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Title: Warren Commission (5 of 26): Hearings Vol. V (of 15)
Author: Kennedy, The President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Language: English
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www.history-matters.com.



    INVESTIGATION OF

    THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

    HEARINGS
    Before the President's Commission
    on the Assassination
    of President Kennedy

PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 11130, an Executive order creating a
Commission to ascertain, evaluate, and report upon the facts relating
to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the
subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination and
S.J. RES. 137, 88TH CONGRESS, a concurrent resolution conferring upon
the Commission the power to administer oaths and affirmations, examine
witnesses, receive evidence, and issue subpenas

_Volume_ V


UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON: 1964

For sale in complete sets by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office Washington, D.C., 20402



    PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
    ON THE
    ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY


    CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, _Chairman_

    SENATOR RICHARD B. RUSSELL
    SENATOR JOHN SHERMAN COOPER
    REPRESENTATIVE HALE BOGGS
    REPRESENTATIVE GERALD R. FORD
    MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
    MR. JOHN J. McCLOY


    J. LEE RANKIN, _General Counsel_


    _Assistant Counsel_

    FRANCIS W. H. ADAMS
    JOSEPH A. BALL
    DAVID W. BELIN
    WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, Jr.
    MELVIN ARON EISENBERG
    BURT W. GRIFFIN
    LEON D. HUBERT, Jr.
    ALBERT E. JENNER, Jr.
    WESLEY J. LIEBELER
    NORMAN REDLICH
    W. DAVID SLAWSON
    ARLEN SPECTER
    SAMUEL A. STERN
    HOWARD P. WILLENS[A]

[A] Mr. Willens also acted as liaison between the Commission and the
Department of Justice.


    _Staff Members_

    PHILLIP BARSON
    EDWARD A. CONROY
    JOHN HART ELY
    ALFRED GOLDBERG
    MURRAY J. LAULICHT
    ARTHUR MARMOR
    RICHARD M. MOSK
    JOHN J. O'BRIEN
    STUART POLLAK
    ALFREDDA SCOBEY
    CHARLES N. SHAFFER, Jr.


Biographical information on the Commissioners and the staff can be found
in the Commission's _Report_.



Preface


The testimony of the following witnesses is contained in volume V:
Alan H. Belmont, assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Jack Revill and V. J. Brian of the Dallas police, who
testified concerning conversations Revill had with James Patrick Hosty,
Jr., a special agent of the FBI; Robert A. Frazier, a firearms expert
with the FBI; Drs. Alfred Olivier, Arthur Dziemian, and Frederick W.
Light, Jr., wound ballistics experts with the U.S. Army laboratories
at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; John A. McCone, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; Richard M. Helms, Deputy Director for Plans of the
Central Intelligence Agency; Thomas J. Kelley, Leo J. Gauthier, and
Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, who testified concerning efforts to reconstruct
the facts of the assassination; Mrs. John F. Kennedy; Jack Ruby;
Henry Wade, district attorney of Dallas; Sgt. Patrick T. Dean, of the
Dallas police, who testified concerning a conversation with Ruby;
Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas; Richard Edward Snyder, John
A. McVickar, Abram Chayes, Bernice Waterman, and Frances G. Knight, of
the U.S. Department of State; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Mrs. Lee
Harvey Oswald; Harris Coulter, an interpreter with the Department of
State; Robert Alan Surrey, a Dallas citizen who testified regarding his
relationship with General Walker; James J. Rowley, Chief of the U.S.
Secret Service; Robert Carswell, special assistant to the Secretary
of the Treasury; Bernard William Weissman, who testified concerning
an advertisement signed by him which appeared in the Dallas Morning
News on November 22, 1963; Robert G. Klause, a Dallas citizen who
testified regarding a "Wanted For Treason" handbill; Mark Lane, a New
York attorney; President Lyndon B. Johnson and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson;
Llewellyn E. Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and
Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon.



Contents


                                                         Page
    Preface                                                 v

    Testimony of--
      Alan H. Belmont.                                      1
      Jack Revill                                          33
      V. J. Brian                                          47
      Robert A. Frazier                               58, 165
      Alfred Olivier                                       74
      Arthur J. Dziemian                                   90
      Frederick W. Light, Jr                               94
      J. Edgar Hoover                                      97
      John A. McCone and Richard M. Helms                 120
      Thomas J. Kelley                               129, 175
      Leo J. Gauthier                                     135
      Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt                           138, 176
      Mrs. John F. Kennedy                                178
      Jack Ruby                                           181
      Henry Wade                                          213
      Patrick T. Dean                                     254
      Waggoner Carr                                       258
      Richard Edward Snyder                               260
      John A. McVickar                               299, 318
      Abram Chayes                                   307, 327
      Bernice Waterman                                    346
      Hon. Dean Rusk                                      363
      Frances G. Knight                                   371
      Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald (resumed)               387, 410
      Harris Coulter                                      408
      Robert Alan Surrey                                  420
      James J. Rowley                                     449
      Robert Carswell                                     486
      Bernard William Weissman, accompanied by
          Thomas A. Flannery, Esq                         487
      Robert G. Klause                                    535
      Mark Lane (resumed)                                 546
      President Lyndon B. Johnson                         561
      Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson                              564
      Llewellyn E. Thompson                               567
      C. Douglas Dillon                                   573


COMMISSION EXHIBITS INTRODUCED

    Exhibit No.:    Page
       825            16
       833            10
       834            14
       835            15
       836            32
       837            32
       838            47
       839            58
       840            66
       841            69
       842            72
       843            73
       844            88
       845            88
       846            88
       847            88
       848            88
       849            88
       850            88
       851            88
       852            88
       853            88
       854            88
       855            88
       856            88
       857            88
       858            88
       859            88
       860            88
       861            89
       862            89
       863           111
       864           115
       865           115
       866           120
       867           120
       868           123
       869           123
       870           121
       871           130
       872           131
       873           131
       874           131
       875           134
       876           135
       877           135
       878           136
       879           136
       880           136
       881           136
       882           137
       883           137
       884           138
       885           171
       886           171
       887           171
       888           171
       889           171
       890           171
       891           171
       892           171
       893           171
       894           171
       895           171
       896           171
       897           171
       898           171
       899           171
       900           171
       901           171
       902           171
       903           171
       904           178
       905           178
       906           178
       907           178
       908           299
       909           299
       910           299
       911           325
       912           299
       913           299
       914           299
       915           299
       916           299
       917           299
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       930           299
       931           299
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       934           299
       935           299
       936           299
       937           299
       938           299
       939           299
       940           299
       941           325
       942           325
       943           326
       944           326
       945           326
       946           299
       947           299
       948           346
       949           346
       950           346
       951           336
       952           335
       953           346
       954           345
       955           343
       956           345
       957           362
       958           326
       959           326
       960           340
       961           362
       962           362
       963           362
       964           362
       965           362
       966           362
       967           362
       968           362
       969           362
       970           362
       971           362
       973           362
       974           362
       975           362
       976           362
       977           362
       978           362
       979           362
       980           362
       981           362
       982           362
       983           362
       984           371
       985           371
       986           371
       987           404
       988           404
       989           371
       990           403
       991           403
       992           404
       993           410
       994           413
       995           421
       996           448
       997           448
       998           448
       999           448
      1000           448
      1002           448
      1003           448
      1004           448
      1005           448
      1006           448
      1007           448
      1008           448
      1009           448
      1010           448
      1011           448
      1012           448
      1013           448
      1014           448
      1015           448
      1016           448
      1017           448
      1018           454
      1019           461
      1020           462
      1021           463
      1022           463
      1023           465
      1024           469
      1025           469
      1026           471
      1027           471
      1028           476
      1029           483
      1030           483
      1031           532
      1032           532
      1033           532
      1033-A         532
      1034           532
      1035           532
      1036           532
      1036-A         532
      1037           532
      1037-A         532
      1037-B         532
      1038           532
      1038-A         532
      1039           532
      1040           532
      1041           532
      1042           532
      1043           532
      1044           532
      1045           532
      1046           532
      1047           532
      1048           532
      1049           532
      1050           532
      1051           532
      1052           532
      1053-A         576
      1053-B         577
      1053-C         582
      1053-D         583
      1053-E         585



Hearings Before the President's Commission

on the

Assassination of President Kennedy



_Wednesday, May 6, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF ALAN H. BELMONT

The President's Commission met at 9:25 a.m. on May 6, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald
R. Ford, John J. McCloy, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; David W. Belin,
assistant counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Samuel A. Stern,
assistant counsel; and Charles Murray, observer.


The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, the Commission will come to order.

Mr. Belin, you had something you wanted the record to show in
connection with our testimony yesterday.

Mr. BELIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you present it to the Commission now, please.

Mr. BELIN. Yes, sir. We have a report from an FBI document that states
that Roy Truly when interviewed on November 22, advised that "it is
possible Oswald did see him with a rifle in his hands within the past
few days," that is as of November 22, "as a Mr. Warren Caster, employed
by Southwestern Publishing Co., which company has an office in the same
building, had come to his office with two rifles, one was a .22 caliber
rifle which Caster said he had purchased for his son, and the other
a larger more high-powered rifle which Caster said he had purchased
with which to go deer hunting if he got a chance," and Truly said that
he examined the high-powered rifle and raised it to his shoulder and
sighted over it and then returned it to Caster and Caster left with
both rifles.

Then Truly went on to state that he does not own a rifle and has had
no other rifle in his hands or in his possession for a long period of
time. Now because of the problem that did arise, I believe the staff
will promptly go down to Dallas to take the deposition of both Mr.
Truly and Mr. Caster to fully get this in deposition form and find out
where these rifles were as of November 22.

The CHAIRMAN. And their caliber, and so forth.

Mr. BELIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; I think that is desirable. You ought to do that.

Mr. Belmont, the purpose of today's hearing is to take your testimony
concerning the general procedures of the FBI and explain their
relationship to the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Would you please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear
the testimony you are about to give before this Commission will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BELMONT. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please.

Mr. STERN, will you conduct the examination, please?

Mr. STERN. Thank you, sir. Would you state your full name for the
record, please?

Mr. BELMONT. Alan H. Belmont.

Mr. STERN. And your address, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. BELMONT. 2711 North Yucatan Street, Arlington, Va.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, what was your education at the college level?

Mr. BELMONT. Graduate of Stanford University in California, with an
A.B. degree, majoring in accounting.

Mr. STERN. What year?

Mr. BELMONT. 1931.

Mr. STERN. What was your employment briefly before joining the Federal
Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. BELMONT. I joined the Bureau, the FBI, in 1936, and in the interim
I worked for public accountants and as a public accountant myself in
California.

Mr. STERN. Would you describe, please, for the Commission briefly your
experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1936?

Mr. BELMONT. I entered the FBI November 30, 1936, and after the period
of training, was assigned to Birmingham, Ala., as my first office.
I transferred to Chicago in about August 1937, and remained there
until the summer of 1938 when I was transferred to Washington, D.C.,
headquarters.

In January of 1941 I was transferred to New York as supervisor of
applicant and criminal investigative matters, remained there until
the fall of 1942, when I was made assistant agent in charge of our
Chicago office. In January of 1943 I was made agent in charge of our
Cincinnati office and remained there until the summer of 1944 when I
was transferred to New York as assistant agent in charge of criminal
matters in New York.

Subsequently, I was placed in charge of all security work in New York
for a number of years and was transferred to Washington in charge of
the domestic intelligence division in February 1950. I headed that
division until about June of 1961 when I was made assistant to the
director in charge of all investigative work of the FBI and that is my
present position.

Mr. STERN. Could you describe the organization of the FBI with two
purposes in mind: First, to fix your position in the organization.
Second, to provide a framework for describing the investigation of the
case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. BELMONT. The headquarters of the FBI is, of course, or the FBI is
headed by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as Director. Directly under him is Mr.
Clyde Tolson, Associate Director. There are 10 divisions broken down in
particular types of administration.

Mr. DULLES. May I say if any of this is classified, highly classified,
you had better let us know because then we could go off the record.

Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing classified here.

Mr. DULLES. Right. I know that you would have that in mind.

Mr. BELMONT. Thank you.

Basically, the division of the 10 divisions at headquarters is
between administrative and investigative. The 10th division is the
inspection division and reports directly to Mr. Hoover. I am in charge
of the investigative divisions which are comprised of the general
investigative divisions handling general criminal work, the special
investigative division handling special inquiries of applicant nature,
and our aggressive approach to organized crime.

The laboratory division handles all examinations of a scientific
nature, and the domestic intelligence division handles all types of
security work. I am in charge of those four divisions, and thus am in
charge and responsible for our investigative work.

Our field offices, numbering 55, are geographically located in
accordance with the amount of work in a particular area. Each division
in the field is headed by a special agent in charge, assisted by an
assistant special agent in charge. They are responsible for the proper
conduct of the work within their divisions. They are answerable to Mr.
Hoover. They are also supervised, of course, in the particular area of
the work concerned by the division at headquarters.

Depending on----

Mr. DULLES. May I ask is that 55 in the United States?

Mr. BELMONT. United States and its possessions.

Mr. DULLES. And Puerto Rico?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. It doesn't include your legal----

Mr. BELMONT. Legal attachés abroad?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. No; they are under the direct supervision of our
headquarters.

Depending on the size of the division in the field, we will have a
supervisory staff in order to properly supervise the work of the agents
in the field.

Mr. STERN. Can you describe the establishment of a typical case,
indicating the meaning of the terms office of origin and auxiliary
office?

Mr. BELMONT. A case is opened by the FBI upon the receipt of
information indicating a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI.
We restrict our investigations to those matters which are within our
jurisdiction.

The office of origin is the office where the major part of the work
is to be done. Thus it should be the controlling office of the
investigation.

Normally, if an individual is under investigation, it will be the
office where he resides. There will be in many cases investigation to
be conducted by other offices. Those offices that have investigations
in that case are considered auxiliary offices, and will cover the
investigation sent to it, sent to them, by the office of origin or
by another auxiliary office if a lead develops within that area that
requires attention elsewhere.

I may say that the office of origin can be changed and is changed if
during the investigation it becomes apparent that the focus of the
investigation has shifted to another area.

It is logical, therefore, that that office which bears the brunt of the
investigation should be in possession of all the material pertinent
to the investigation and should be charged with the supervision and
running of the investigation and the direction of it.

In the event the office of origin is changed at any given time, the
previous office of origin will forward to the new office of origin all
material pertaining to the case so that it will have a complete file
and the necessary knowledge to run the case.

Mr. STERN. Can you tell us a bit more about how information is
maintained and how it flows through the system from headquarters to
office of origin, to the auxiliary office or in the other directions
that are possible?

Mr. BELMONT. Since the information is maintained in a standard and
uniform filing system in both our field offices and our headquarters
so that there is complete uniformity in the handling of information,
our main filing system is at headquarters. Consequently, we need here
all pertinent information in any case. Consequently, the reports and
information developed during a case are sent to our headquarters for
filing.

It is pertinent to observe that we conduct close to 2 million name
checks a year for other agencies and departments of the Federal
Government. Consequently, we must have here all pertinent information
so that a name check will reflect the information in possession of the
Bureau.

When a report is prepared in our field office--an investigation, and
there are leads or investigation to be performed in another office,
copies of this report are designated for that office, together with
the lead or the investigation to be covered. Upon receipt of that the
office gathers the background information from the report and proceeds
with the investigation.

Mr. STERN. This is the auxiliary office?

Mr. BELMONT. The auxiliary office.

If there is a matter of urgency rather than wait for an investigative
report, the information will be transmitted by more rapid means, such
as teletype. All of our offices have teletypes; radio, our offices have
a radio system; telephone.

Mr. DULLES. Is that teletype from the office to Washington only, or is
there some interoffice teletypes?

Mr. BELMONT. Each office is connected with each other office by
teletype.

Mr. DULLES. It is; all over the country?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; permitting rapid communication.

Mr. DULLES. That is, New Orleans and Dallas would have teletype between
these two offices?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of radio communication, Mr. Belmont, did you
say?

Mr. BELMONT. We have an emergency radio communication so that both for
normal use, in the matter of expense, to reduce expenses, and for an
emergency, our offices can communicate with headquarters and with each
other.

The CHAIRMAN. On your own transmission system?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; that is correct. We feel that in any type of an
emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities----

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the
recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with
the mainland was our radio system.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that so?

Mr. BELMONT. And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska.

We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication
in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a
matter of urgency and requires special handling.

So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we
determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter
was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of
communication.

By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling,
the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of
perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we
require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL.

Mr. STERN. I think we might turn now to a description of your role
in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the
assassination.

Mr. BELMONT. As the individual in charge of all investigative
operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility,
the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau.

Mr. STERN. Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall
in the investigation of his case before November 22--personally?

Mr. BELMONT. No; this case was not of the importance or urgency that it
was considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal
direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the
FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters.
Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal
attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis.

Mr. STERN. Have you been personally involved in the investigation since
the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. I have indeed.

Mr. McCLOY. Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the
Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year?

Mr. BELMONT. I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our
system to investigate any individual where there is information or
evidence that indicates a necessity for investigation within our
jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are
investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other
areas of the world.

Mr. McCLOY. They also would not come per se to your attention, your
personal attention?

Mr. BELMONT. Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some
urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my
attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover.

I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of
many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all
matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure.
That is inherent in our system of close supervision.

Mr. McCLOY. What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of
defection just out of its own character of such significance that it
becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when
you learn of it.

Mr. BELMONT. Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to
which those particular cases would be called to my attention.

As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these.
Immediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I
do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication
of possible damage to the country through the leak of information,
classified or in some other instance where there is a question of
policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only
say in general I do see many such cases.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a
preassassination investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a
defector, they had interviews with him, and then they marked the case
closed.

At one stage it was reopened and then it was closed again because, as I
gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would
lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of
violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense.

I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character
or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in
the field office, in the office that had charge, the man who was in
charge of the office that was dealing with that case locally, is that
right?

Mr. BELMONT. That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment
would be passed on by our headquarters staff.

Mr. McCLOY. Passed on by Washington?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence
division.

Mr. McCLOY. In this case then the decision to close that case, I am
talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or
tacitly approved by the Washington staff.

Mr. BELMONT. Not tacitly approved. Approved.

Mr. McCLOY. Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just
accept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing."

Mr. BELMONT. When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is
reviewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the
action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation.
That is a decision of substance.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report
comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your
examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify
the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved?

Mr. BELMONT. No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that
would be an unnecessary move.

Mr. McCLOY. I can understand that.

Mr. BELMONT. It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service,
through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and
it is reviewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to
the handling of the closing of the case or any other matter pertaining
to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with
instructions to the field.

Mr. McCLOY. All right.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question further on that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Mr. DULLES. As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday,
with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that
after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in
New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets,
and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started.

Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I
missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new
case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to
reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the
case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you
could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful.

Mr. BELMONT. The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed
the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion
that the purpose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine
whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had
been served. He closed the case, as he felt there was no further action
to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed.

In March 1963 Agent Hosty received information in Dallas to the effect
that Oswald had been in communication with The Worker, the east coast
Communist newspaper. He therefore reinstituted the case, and sent out a
lead to check Oswald's employment. He also received information, as I
recall it, that Oswald had been in communication with the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee, so there were two incidents that aroused his interest.

In June 1963 our New Orleans office likewise received information that
Oswald had communicated with The Worker or was on a subscription list
for The Worker. So that the case was revived in Dallas by Hosty.

Mr. DULLES. That was even before what we call the New Orleans incident?

Mr. BELMONT. Correct.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. And he learned that Oswald had left Dallas, the residence
was then picked up in New Orleans, and the case was revived. So that
actually there was a joint revival of the case.

Then on August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested by the New Orleans police
in connection with a disturbance of the peace in passing out these
pamphlets, which further aroused our interest. So that the reopening
of the case after the closing was due to these incidents that I have
mentioned.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you. So that at the time of the assassination, this
was an open and not a closed case as regards the Dallas office.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. At the time that Oswald was found to be
living in New Orleans, and this was definitely established that he
was actually residing there, the Dallas office in accordance with the
procedure that I mentioned, transferred the case to New Orleans as
office of origin.

Subsequently, the case was again transferred back to Dallas when it was
determined that Oswald was again residing in the Dallas area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Stern.

Mr. STERN. We were getting, Mr. Belmont, to the question of whether
you had been personally involved in the investigation since the
assassination.

Mr. BELMONT. I said I have indeed.

Mr. STERN. Yes. As a part of that you have reviewed in detail the
investigation made prior to the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. Have you participated in or supervised the preparation of
reports and other correspondence to the Commission in response to
questions from the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. I show you a letter with attached memorandum which has been
marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 833. Can you identify
this document, Mr. Belmont?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for
identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter transmitted on April 6, 1964, to Mr.
Rankin by the FBI with enclosure answering a number of questions which
the Commission posed to the FBI.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this letter?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. And you have reviewed it and are familiar with it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. We have covered in your answers to Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCloy
a good deal of the material in here.

I would like briefly to touch upon several of the questions, the more
important questions, regarding the nature of the FBI's interest in
Lee Harvey Oswald at various times, and I would like you to refer to
each question that I indicate but not read your answer. Paraphrase
it. I think we have had a good deal of the specific detail but what
I am interested in is a description from your examination of the
investigation as it was carried on, of the nature of the FBI interest
in Oswald.

I would like to turn to the first question in which we asked----

The CHAIRMAN. You mean by that that you could get, we could get, a
better idea from paraphrasing the answer than we could get from the
exact answer itself?

Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have
the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might----

The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I
would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to
paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem
to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see
what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to
ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has
not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase
answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be
confusing the record, and serve no purpose.

Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you
would like to add or amplify in these questions?

Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in
view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very
happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the
fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the
fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on
the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had
applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see
was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint
record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.

We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice
in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back
into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble
we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the
case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country
we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet
intelligence in some manner.

That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have
happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue
whenever we can.

Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a
stop in the files that you just referred to?

Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what
we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that
should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the
appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division,
would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he
was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.

Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his
mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in
April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had
told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in
Switzerland.

So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see
whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed
that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he
did not show up at the college.

Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the
answer to the first question.

Mr. DULLES. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first
question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833--the
Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the
first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then
later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file
concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from
other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his
file."

The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does
show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State
Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that
might have known about it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other
agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the
State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or
his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we
were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.

Mr. DULLES. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans
abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come
back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established
SOP?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we
pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or
otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have
any information and establish an interest there so that if they have
not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our
request.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. STERN. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the
second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview
Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable
to interview him upon his arrival in New York?

Mr. BELMONT. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when
an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the
press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and
Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless
there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in
residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and
to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we
will interview him immediately upon arrival.

Mr. STERN. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6,
was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon
after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything
unusual about that?

Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain
interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963--1962, I believe it was, was it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; 1962.

Mr. BELMONT. And was not satisfied that he had received all the
information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at
that time.

Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an
appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within
the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not
satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility
to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.

Mr. STERN. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of
Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the
returned defector, or unusual?

Mr. BELMONT. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is
an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background
of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.

Mr. STERN. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if
he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?

Mr. BELMONT. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of
our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited
by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us
if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether
he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this
man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the
American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent
that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new
concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that
Russia was not for him.

When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed
his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his
stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is
customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will
report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because
frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't
say yes.

Mr. STERN. Turning to----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your
report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no
evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United
States?

Mr. BELMONT. No evidence whatsoever.

Mr. STERN. Question 8, Mr. Belmont, on page 5, sets out the information
from a report by Agent Hosty regarding alleged Fair Play for Cuba
Committee activity by Oswald while he was still residing in Dallas.
Have you found that an investigation was conducted to determine whether
that was accurate and do you think it should have been investigated?

Mr. BELMONT. As to whether he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee in Dallas? We did check. We have rather excellent coverage
of such activities. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that
he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas. And,
as a matter of fact, I can go a step further and say that following
his dissemination of pamphlets and his activities in New Orleans, our
inquiry of our sources who are competent to tell us what is going on in
the organizations such as Fair Play for Cuba Committee, advised that
he was not known to them in New Orleans. So that his activities in New
Orleans were of his own making, and not as a part of the organized
activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. McCLOY. On that point, Mr. Belmont, where did he get his material,
the printed material that he was distributing? Must he not have gotten
that from some headquarters?

Mr. BELMONT. It is my recollection that he had that printed up himself.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. McCLOY. All of it, so far as you know, was self-induced, so to
speak?

Mr. BELMONT. Correct.

Mr. STERN. Does your answer imply, Mr. Belmont, that there were Fair
Play for Cuba activities in Dallas and New Orleans that you knew about?

Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not have information of Fair Play for Cuba
activities in Dallas nor any organized activity in New Orleans. So that
this letter that you refer to, which was undated, was, as in so many
things that Oswald wrote, not based on fact.

Mr. STERN. On page 7 in the answer to question 12, you refer to the
inconsistencies and contradictions between the information Oswald gave
to Agent Quigley when he interviewed him in the New Orleans jail and
the facts as they were known to the FBI before that, and say that "in
the event the investigation of Oswald warranted a further interview,
these discrepancies would have been discussed with him."

Can you explain why the fact of these inconsistencies and
contradictions and perhaps outright lies to Agent Quigley was not
itself reason for a further interview?

Mr. BELMONT. Let me turn this just a little bit and say why should we
re-interview him?

Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether his
activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the
country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving statement to
Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files as a part of
the case, and if we determined that the course of the investigation
required us to clarify or face him down with this information, we would
do it at the appropriate time.

In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling
us something that wasn't true, and unless this required further
investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course, in accord
with the whole context of the investigation.

Mr. STERN. Do you know whether the fact of these contradictions was
called to the attention of the Dallas office at the time of Oswald's
return to Dallas?

Mr. BELMONT. The entire file, of course, or the pertinent serials were
sent to Dallas at the time that the case was transferred back to Dallas
so they would have that information.

Mr. STERN. I gather what you are saying is they would note the
contradictions from the reports?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. In the answer to question 14 on page 8, again in connection
with these inconsistencies, the letter reads "These inconsistencies
were considered in subsequent investigation."

Can you expand on that and tell us how they were considered?

Mr. BELMONT. That is right along the line of my previous explanation
to you, namely, that they were recorded in the file. In the event it
was desired to talk to him further at a future date, they would be
considered as to whether we desired to have him further explain.

Mr. STERN. On page 12, in response to question 22, which asked for
an explanation of the reason for the investigation to ascertain his
whereabouts, the letter reads, "In view of Oswald's background and
activities the FBI had a continuing interest in him."

What was the nature of that continuing interest at that time?

Mr. BELMONT. On August 21, 1963, because of his activities in
distributing these pamphlets, and his arrest in New Orleans,
headquarters here in Washington sent a letter to the New Orleans and
Dallas offices instructing them to pursue the investigation. In other
words, in evaluating this information we felt it desirable that we
further explore his activities to determine whether they were inimical
to the internal security of the country. So that we had this continuing
interest based on our evaluation, and so instructed our field offices.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, I believe the answers to the other questions
give us a complete enough record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. STERN. May this exhibit which has been marked 833 for
identification be admitted?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in evidence under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 833
for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. McCLOY. Is there anything else, Mr. Belmont, that you may want to
add? You have already been asked this question as you went through all
these questions and answers, but is there anything else you would like
to add in view of your answers this morning in further elaboration of
the answers that have been given?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; unless the Commission has further questions at
this point, I believe that the questions are answered properly and
sufficiently.

Mr. McCLOY. You think that if you are interviewing a defector which is
something that provokes your interest, and I guess the mere fact of
defection and return to the United States would do so, and if you found
that defector was lying to you, you think that without something in
addition to that there would be no further necessity of examining him.
Is that a fair question? Let me put it another way.

Mr. BELMONT. I have just a little difficulty following you.

Mr. McCLOY. Here is my point. Here was a defector who comes within the
category of interesting cases naturally.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. And you question him and you find he is lying to you. At
that stage, as I understand your testimony, you say without something
more you don't necessarily go any further, is that right?

Mr. BELMONT. No; that is not correct. We had talked to this man twice
in detail concerning the question of possible recruitment by Soviet
intelligence. We had checked his activities. He was settling down. He
had a wife and a child. He had, according to what he had told us, in
our interview with him, he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. The
State Department evaluation of him in Moscow was that he had learned
his lesson and, as a matter of fact, he had made some statement to the
effect that he now recognized the value of the American way of life,
along those lines.

So that we had pretty well settled that issue. At the time that we
interviewed him in the jail in New Orleans, we had again been following
his activities because of his communications, his contacts with The
Worker and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and our interest there was
to determine whether he was a dangerous subversive. The interview in
the jail was very apparently a self-serving interview in an attempt
to explain his activities in the New Orleans area, and if I recall
correctly, he took the position that the policy as directed against
Cuba was not correct, and that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was
merely addressing itself to the complaints of Cuba, and was not in
effect a subversive organization.

If, Mr. McCloy, during those first two interviews where we were
pursuing this matter of him being a defector and his recruitment, he
had lied to us, and the agent was not satisfied we would have pursued
it to the bitter end. Or if during any other time information came to
our attention which indicated a necessity to pursue that further we
would have pursued it to the bitter end.

Mr. McCLOY. You speak of this as a self-serving interview. Do you think
that he sought the interview with you, with Mr. Quigley eventually,
because he had known of the prior contacts that he had had with the
FBI, and he simply wanted to keep out of trouble?

Mr. BELMONT. I don't know why he asked to see an agent. I simply do not
know why.

Mr. McCLOY. I think that is all.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter marked for identification
Commission Exhibit No. 834. Can you identify that for the Commission,
please?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for
identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated May 4, 1964, addressed to the
Commission which sets forth in summary the contents of the headquarters
file on Oswald prior to the assassination.

Mr. STERN. Do you have that file with you?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. Would you explain generally to the Commission what materials
there are in that file that for security reasons you would prefer not
to disclose?

Mr. BELMONT. The file contains the identity of some of our informants
in subversive movements. It contains information as to some of the
investigative techniques whereby we were able to receive some of the
information which has been made available to the Commission.

Mr. STERN. I think that is enough, Mr. Belmont, on that.

Mr. McCLOY. You didn't have anything further to add to that, did you?

Mr. BELMONT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think as to those things if it is agreeable to the
other members of the Commission, we will not pursue any questioning
that will call for an answer that would divulge those matters that you
have just spoken of.

Mr. BELMONT. I would like to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that--I think
that is very kind of you--I would like to make it clear that Mr. Hoover
has expressed a desire to be of the utmost help to the Commission,
and to make any information available that will be helpful to the
Commission. I think your observation is very much worthwhile.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, have you reviewed the actual file and this
letter of May 4 which summarizes each document in the file?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, is this an accurate summary of each
piece of information in the file?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. The file is available to the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. If they want to look at any item in it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The file does not include that security matter that you
mentioned, or does it?

Mr. BELMONT. This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau with all
information in it.

The CHAIRMAN. With all information in it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; this is the actual file.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Belmont, are you willing to leave the file a reasonable
time in case any of the Commissioners desire to examine it personally?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. We will return it.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we do want it on those conditions. If we want
to get anything from it don't you think, Mr. Rankin, that we ought
to make it known here while the witness is here. I personally don't
care to have this information that involves our security unless it is
necessary, and I don't want to have documents in my possession where it
could be assumed that I had gotten that information and used it, so I
would rather, I would rather myself confine our questions to this file
to the testimony of Mr. Belmont. Then if we want it, if we want any of
those things, it then becomes a matter to discuss here in the open, and
not just in privacy.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I felt it made a better record if the file is
available only to the Commissioners in case they do want to examine it,
and then it will be taken back and the staff will not examine it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he has stated that the file will be made
available to us whenever we want it.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If we do want it to read it that is one thing. For
myself, I think we can get what we want from examining the witness,
and then if there is any portion of it that comes into play why we can
determine the question here, but I really would prefer not to have a
secret file, I mean a file that contains matters of that kind in our
possession.

Mr. RANKIN. There is one factor that I wanted to get before the
Commission and in the record, and that is that you had all the
information that the FBI had in regard to this matter, and I thought
that was important to your proceedings, so that we would not retain
such a file, and we had an accurate summary but that it is available
so that the Commission can be satisfied that nothing was withheld from
it in regard to this particular question. That was the purpose of the
inquiry.

Mr. DULLES. I assume, Mr. Belmont, if later other testimony arises that
would make us desire to refer to this file we could consult it in your
offices or you would make it available to us?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I would personally rather have it done on that
basis. What do you think, Mr. McCloy?

Mr. McCLOY. I was just glancing at the file, and it seems to have the
regular, the usual type of reports that we have seen. But there is a
good bit of elaboration in those, in that file of the summary which
is here. This summary I don't think can purport to be a complete
description of the documents that are in here, as I glance through them
here.

I just happened to see a good bit of detail in here which doesn't have
anything to do with the security problem we talked about, but I would
think that probably it would be wise for some member of the Commission
or members of the Commission as a whole, to run through that file in
order to be sure that we have seen the material elements of the file
that we would not perhaps, might not, be able to get from this letter
of May 4.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there are so many of these questions in here that
are obviously matters that we would have no more concern with than just
to know about them.

Start from the very beginning, a news clipping from the Corpus Christi
Times, dated October 2, 1959. Now if that excites any interest on the
part of any member, why we could say, "Well, could you show us that?"
Then the next is the United Press release, dated October 31 at Moscow,
and a great many of these.

Now, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for us to look over all of these
various things, items that are in the file, and then if there are any
that happen to excite our interest, we can ask Mr. Belmont about it.
If it is a matter that involves security, we could then discuss it and
make our determination as to whether we wanted to see it. I would think
that when we are dealing with things that are as sensitive as the FBI
has to deal with in that respect, that that would be adequate; that is
my opinion of it.

But if the rest of the Commission feel that they want to see it
notwithstanding the security measure, I would, of course, have no
objection.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, what I was trying to deal with was a
claim by someone that the Commission never saw all there was in the
hands of the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, and we recognize that some
of these items should not be considered important by anyone, as we look
at the matter, but we wanted you to be able to satisfy the public and
the country that whatever there was that the FBI had, the Commission
had it, and we didn't think that in light of the security problems
the whole file should be a part of the files of the Commission. And
we tried to present here a summary, even of items that did not seem
important, but we did want the record in such condition that the
Commission could say in its report, "We have seen everything that they
have." I think it is important to the case.

Mr. McCLOY. I notice, Mr. Belmont, in running through this file, a note
here that symbols are used in instances where the identities of the
sources must be concealed.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. If that is so----

Mr. BELMONT. In some instances.

Mr. McCLOY. Only in some instances. There are other cases where that is
not the case.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McCLOY. There is a great deal of narrative in here about Oswald and
his relations with the Embassy. Maybe it is elsewhere in the record.

Mr. BELMONT. I would presume that you have received that from the other
agencies. Those are copies of communications that the other agencies
sent to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, why couldn't we go over this list and see what
items we would be interested in and then we can determine, can we not,
whether we want----

Mr. McCLOY. I am not so sure, you can look through this yourself, I am
not so sure if from reading just that short summary you get the full
impact of all the narrative that is in the various reports. There is a
good bit here. For example, one page I have here about this business of
beating his wife and the drinking. There is a good bit of detail.

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. McCloy, you have that record.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the record, I have read the records myself.

Mr. McCLOY. Maybe we have that one.

Mr. BELMONT. Any investigative report you have.

Mr. McCLOY. Is there any investigative report in here that we have not
got?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. We are trying to develop, Mr. Chief Justice and
Commissioners, that you have everything that the FBI had, this is their
total file in regard to this matter of Lee Harvey Oswald so that there
is nothing withheld from you as far as the FBI is concerned. That is
part of what we are trying to develop this morning, in addition to the
items themselves.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder if the staff, Mr. Rankin, could not go over this
and check over those items we have from other sources and what the FBI
has already furnished us so what we deal with with respect to this file
are only items that are not in the Commission's records, already. That
would cut this down by half, I would imagine or more.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; we could do that for you.

Mr. DULLES. Then we could have this available possibly at a later date
just to check over the other items against your files to see if there
is any information there that we really need.

The CHAIRMAN. You could come back, couldn't you, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. BELMONT. I am at your disposal.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be better. I think, Mr. Rankin, your
purpose is entirely laudable here, but I think we do have to use some
discretion in the matter, and you say that you want it so we can say we
have seen everything. Well, the same people who would demand that we
see everything of this kind would also demand that they be entitled to
see it, and if it is security matters we can't let them see it. It has
to go back to the FBI without their scrutiny.

So unless, I would say, unless there is something that we think
here is vital to this situation, that it isn't necessary for us to
see the whole file, particularly in view of the fact that we have
practically--we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports
that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go
over it and over it again.

Mr. McCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here
from the Embassy?

Mr. BELMONT. You are looking at----

Mr. McCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We
don't have these in our files, for example.

Mr. BELMONT. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area
of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior
to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that
started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see.

Mr. McCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should
examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading
it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record,
and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that
is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't
believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing
a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking
of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your
investigative processes as you are. But I don't think that when it is
on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that
was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it,
without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have
somebody go through it.

Mr. DULLES. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we
checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about
half of that file probably.

Mr. McCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about
half of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see.
All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.

Mr. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the
file then until we can give you the information.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. STERN. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at
this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There are no security matters in this?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834
for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6
with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as
Commission Exhibit No. 835?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for
identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the
Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director
J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. STERN. What is the subject?

Mr. BELMONT. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an
informant of the FBI.

Mr. DULLES. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew
some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews.
I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an
informant in this sense?

Mr. BELMONT. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed
to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either
for or without payment.

Mr. STERN. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen
to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information
in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or
seeks out information at the direction and instance of the FBI relative
to subversive or criminal matters. In other words, I want to make it
clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants.

Mr. STERN. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an
informant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and
the other agents have told us about?

Mr. BELMONT. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant;
in no way.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the
information contained here?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And you are familiar with it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; I am.

Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely
state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information
covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?

Mr. BELMONT. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct
statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.

Mr. STERN. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other
than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation
from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his
handling of the Oswald case?

Mr. BELMONT. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and
decided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and
is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the
FBI is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. And a year before the assassination.

Mr. BELMONT. Frankly, I don't recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.

Mr. STERN. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that
the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an
agent of the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.

Mr. STERN. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to
testimony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you
subsequently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the
Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us
that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than
actual testimony before the Commission.

Mr. STERN. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that
Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald
as an informant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the
Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. The Commission's letter so advised us.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835
for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964,
a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was
identified yesterday, parts of it were identified yesterday and it
therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify
this letter for us?

Mr. BELMONT. In order to be sure--I beg your pardon. This is a letter
dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is
attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee
Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents
who contacted Oswald.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?

Mr. BELMONT. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men
themselves. I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an
enclosure and sent over with this letter.

Mr. STERN. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony
before the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. To your knowledge, are they accurate?

Mr. BELMONT. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.

Mr. STERN. Are they complete?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. STERN. In connection with the material they cover?

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. STERN. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I
suggest we admit this document.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825
for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from
Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission,
with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been
marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the
Commission?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for
identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission
from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our
manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to
Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service.

Mr. STERN. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?

Mr. BELMONT. I did.

Mr. STERN. Have you reviewed it recently?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it is.

Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect
to the matters covered?

Mr. BELMONT. Well----

Mr. DULLES. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry
directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this
is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two
questions there to consider.

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret
Service and the material that is attached covers both the instructions
to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions.

Mr. DULLES. Subsequent to the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. STERN. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your
agents to employ before the assassination in determining what
information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats
against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and
the Vice President?

Mr. BELMONT. These are contained in detail in the attachments which
represent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to
all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government,
and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual
agent in the field. These instructions require that any information
indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety
of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the
most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the
Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Washington must be
advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been
furnished to Secret Service.

Mr. STERN. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested
in, that is before the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Specifically the kind?

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat
against the President and Vice President and members of the family.

Mr. STERN. Have you broadened----

Mr. BELMONT. I may say, sir----

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will
find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information
over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice
religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without
request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type
of information but rather considered it our responsibility and duty to
furnish this information.

Mr. STERN. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion
with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of
information they were interested in?

Mr. BELMONT. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no
doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't
present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were
constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you
might say, as to what should be furnished.

Mr. STERN. That is, established by the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of----

Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.

Mr. STERN. This liaison function.

Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that
we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President
goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy
relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.

Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your
instructions to special agents in this respect?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional
instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other
dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the
President.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr.
Belmont?

Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment--working from the back, I
think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of
Instructions Section 83."

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it.

Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously
furnished to Secret Service involving threats.

The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before.

Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but
essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the
Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a
certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without
referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the
instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the
present date?

Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to
do it with the staff, or can I help you here?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would
be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in
studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the
attachments.

Mr. BELMONT. Very good.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir,
the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security
of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion
in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives,
ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (_a_) possessing emotional
instability or irrational behavior, (_b_) who have made threats of
bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local
government or officials of a foreign government, (_c_) who express
or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who
have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct
indicates tendencies toward violence, and (_d_) whose prior acts or
statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized
government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and
a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information
that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November
22, 1963.

Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about,
through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the
Secret Service?

Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to
provide any additional information in the light of what happened that
might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting
the President.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly
changing in section (_d_) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or
statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and
hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe,
where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the
hatred of organized government has.

Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that.

Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to
rewrite it.

Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr
Belmont, should that "and" before (_d_) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean
these----

Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled
together if that is your thought.

Mr. STERN. That is right.

Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or".

Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people,
subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these
four tests.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in
volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By
volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that
more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under
these criteria.

The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time?

Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.

Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963?

Mr. BELMONT. Correct.

Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or
difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem
or difficulty under the expanded criteria?

Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance
security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws
and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the
increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual
and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is
a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase
security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In
some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much
difficulty. Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous
are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the
country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries
there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are
detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of
security--I am not boring you with this, am I?

The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.

Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its
tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the
country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our
work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law
that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy.
It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly,
and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire
security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is
handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the
terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the
country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security
as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these
controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward
the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.

We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all
Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that
if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group
of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by
power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which
inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or
later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this
action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and
carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately
on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis,
any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible
threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take
such action as was required against these individuals who had by
their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation
based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position
to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set
in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since
the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of
dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question
that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt
that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence,
we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of
pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the
hearing room.)

We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these
broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have
not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed
beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe
in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless
such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.

For example, we know that in one city when the President recently
visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in
the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with
you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys,
have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that
this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats
against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we
give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something
with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the
police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this
picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed
of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of
what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat,
and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a
danger.

That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional
information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I
may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach
of the FBI to the security field. We go as far in our investigations
as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people.
We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be
thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out
this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics
of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue
a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our
responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of
our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I
have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative
field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and
I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care
with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.

Mr. McCLOY. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret
Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have
been used to having.

Mr. BELMONT. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.

Mr. McCLOY. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that
the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it
something that you feel----

Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required
to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President
visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of
Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.

Mr. McCLOY. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their
procedures to cope with this, won't they?

Mr. BELMONT. I do not know.

Mr. McCLOY. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All
investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of
subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (_a_) possessing
emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a
good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this
Commission--I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that
I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you
are going to send everybody over there, but the names that--all those
under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that
classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason
behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport
to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the
names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you
indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who
knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.

You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be
as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our
best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people
and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.

Mr. McCLOY. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are
not saying that all those people that you characterize here under
this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service
every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all
investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right
in that?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say,
"If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly
furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the
information.

Mr. McCLOY. So without any further ado all the people in your list who
are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service
when there is an occasion, when the President travels?

Mr. BELMONT. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during
our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or
category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret
Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has
that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been
referred to them.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally
made. This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on
the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had
placed on their shoulders.

Mr. BELMONT. I think you are correct.

Mr. McCLOY. The reason I am asking these questions is because by
implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this
situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to
see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.

Mr. DULLES. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit
indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the
procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change
has been made, how it has been extended?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. If you----

Mr. DULLES. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of
Instructions.

Mr. BELMONT. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets
forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.

Mr. DULLES. That is paragraph 1?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. What are the various categories given now at the top of
page 2 of this exhibit which have been added?

Mr. BELMONT. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that
should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the
individual is and the background information that was furnished to
Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.

Representative FORD. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have
gone to the Secret Service automatically?

Mr. BELMONT. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all
defectors automatically.

Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set
forth is a question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all
defectors.

Representative FORD. Defectors are for the time being at least a
special category other than what is set forth here unless for some
other reason they would fall into one of these categories.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. All Communists, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise
for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the
importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and
which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative
cases?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we can put it into the record.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set
forth in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section
83; is that correct?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. McCLOY. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's
Exhibit No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?

Mr. STERN. That is right number of the exhibit.

Mr. McCLOY. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.

Mr. DULLES. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be
included that we add the dates and the page numbers.

Mr. STERN. I think the witness can do this immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy
it and incorporate it later in the record.

(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)

"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the
President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the
identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists
(_a_) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (_b_)
who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees
of Federal, State, or local government or officials of a foreign
government, (_c_) who express or have expressed strong or violent
anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb
making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and
(_d_) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and
hatred against organized government."

Mr. DULLES. Do I understand you, Mr. Belmont, to say, as drafted
you would not consider that defectors automatically fell under this
paragraph 2, but it is your practice to notify the Secret Service about
defectors?

Mr. BELMONT. We do notify Secret Service of any defectors coming to our
attention.

Mr. DULLES. And by defectors, I guess we mean here maybe a redefector,
meaning those who have gone to Russia and have come back or maybe those
who have gone and not come back.

Mr. BELMONT. If they haven't come back----

Mr. DULLES. They are not a danger.

Mr. BELMONT. They are not within our cognizance and we don't notify
Secret Service.

Mr. DULLES. These would be defectors who have gone to the Soviet Union
and who then come back to the United States and tried to defect while
they were over there.

Mr. McCLOY. Not necessarily, not exclusively the Soviet Union, of
course.

Mr. DULLES. Communist countries, I would say.

Representative FORD. Just to get an order of magnitude, how many are
there? Is this a sizable number?

Mr. BELMONT. I don't have a figure, Mr. Ford. You have had defectors in
Korea from the military. You have had defectors----

Mr. McCLOY. Germany.

Mr. BELMONT. Berlin. When these are military personnel they are within
the cognizance of the military, so that it is very difficult for me to
give you a figure.

When we become interested is when they return to this country and
warrant action by us from an internal security standpoint.

As in the Oswald case, we started our action based on newspaper
publicity that he had attempted to or indicated his intention to,
renounce his citizenship in Moscow. But I do not have a figure because
many of these people are members of the armed services and I would
hesitate to give you an estimate.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, do these terms "subversives, ultrarightists,
racists, and Fascists" have a particular meaning of art in FBI
parlance? Can you tell us how you use these terms in this regulation or
what these mean to you and to your agents.

Mr. BELMONT. I will have to refer you to the dictionary, I think, Mr.
Stern. A subversive is an individual who is active in the Communist
Party or front groups associated with it or one of the other groups
that we term subversive, such as the Socialist Workers Party.

The ultrarightists----

Mr. DULLES. Socialist Workers Party is a Trotskyite Party, is it not?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

The ultrarightists, I believe here we attempt to spell out those people
who are so far to the right that they do not consider themselves
subject to the law and the proper procedures, and take things into
their own hands.

The racists, I think, are--that speaks for itself, individuals who will
go beyond the bounds of propriety in seeking their goals, and who adopt
violence.

The Fascists----

Mr. McCLOY. I was wondering how you were going to define that one.

Mr. BELMONT. Is to give you the opposite end of the spectrum of
subversives.

Mr. DULLES. Do we have anarchists in this country at the present time?
There used to be an old anarchist society in the old days.

Mr. BELMONT. That used to be, but it is dissolved. There is no
organization. I venture to say we have individual anarchists at this
time.

Mr. DULLES. No organized anarchist organization.

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, in view of the quite important considerations
you mentioned before, the danger of interfering with individual
liberty, would it be possible within your organization to have the
agents recommend to headquarters here and have someone at a higher
level examine the recommendation before it is made to the Secret
Service? This is, as I understand it, a continuing program and not one
that comes into effect only when the President schedules a trip. This
would operate without respect to scheduled trips by the President.
Would that be possible? Would it fit your operation? Do you think it
might help any?

Mr. BELMONT. Well, what is your thought behind that, Mr. Stern? In
other words, so that names of persons won't indiscriminately be sent on
a local level?

Mr. STERN. Precisely. These categories are, after all, fairly gross.
They use large terms which can mean different things to different
people. The considerations you mention, I think, are quite real and
important. Would it help any to do something of the sort?

Mr. BELMONT. I think we will find that our agents are using good
judgment in this matter. The danger involved in referring these matters
to headquarters for a decision as to dissemination is the delay in
time and, you will note, we stress the time element that when such
information comes into the possession of our agents, immediate steps
must be taken to transmit this information to Secret Service by the
most expeditious means possible.

This might be of assistance to you. This information which we send to
Secret Service in the field is placed in a control file, a separate
file in the field, and is subject, under instructions, to inspection
by our inspectors as they visit our field offices to insure that this
requirement is being carried out properly; and they will examine the
type of material that is being sent over.

Each field office is thoroughly inspected about once a year, and that
is one of the requirements that they go through this to make sure this
instruction is being properly carried out.

Mr. McCLOY. I have no further questions. I have some general questions
I would like to get to at the end, but I have to leave early this
afternoon.

Mr. RANKIN. I have one question I wanted to interject, Mr. Chairman,
and that is as to statements, Mr. Belmont, about subversives, including
persons who are members of Communist front groups. You mean to say that
that includes any person who is a member of a Communist front group
because, as you know, many leading citizens have been members of such
groups.

Mr. BELMONT. Now, Mr. Rankin, I wouldn't carry it by any means that
far. It would be dependent upon the front group, the extent of activity
in it, and the activities of the individual. By no means would we
classify someone as a subversive who was connected with a front group
by name or----

Mr. DULLES. By front groups you mean those on the Attorney General's
list; you are taking that as a criterion of a front group?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; not necessarily that, sir. There are other groups
that we consider front groups.

Mr. DULLES. I see.

Mr. BELMONT. I am glad you raised that because each case would have to
be considered on its own individual merits as to what is the extent of
the activity and the purpose and intent of the activity.

Mr. RANKIN. You recognize in the work in this field that there are many
Americans who are interested in certain causes and purposes and front
groups in connection with them who are loyal Americans, don't you?

Mr. BELMONT. I have no doubt of that whatsoever.

Mr. RANKIN. I just wanted to get that in the record.

Mr. BELMONT. I also know many loyal Americans, unfortunately, who
don't look behind some of these groups to determine their intents
and purposes, and allow their names to be used where they would not
otherwise do so if they took the time and trouble to check into what
the organization was.

Mr. RANKIN. So you don't lump them all under the term "subversive,"
that is what I was trying to get at.

Mr. BELMONT. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose some join before an organization is
infiltrated, too.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir; that is right.

Mr. McCLOY. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some
selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and
they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet
this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would
get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and
our agents are capable of applying the judgment.

Representative FORD. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service
to this greater flow of information that they have received?

Mr. BELMONT. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction,
to my knowledge.

Representative FORD. Have they objected to the greater burden?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you
are going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret
Service are excellent. We work closely together.

As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of
Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the
protection of the President, which is primarily a function of Secret
Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions
made agents available at the request of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure
runs to something like 139 agents--yes, 139 agents that we have made
available.

We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat
of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at
the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch
with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for
Secret Service and for the FBI; to see that the problems are handled
immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a
number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our
agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad,
particularly where we have a representative in the countries being
visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in
those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus
in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary
security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose.

In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our
offices to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel
of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive
that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is
accompanying the President when he makes this trip.

This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the
invitation and request of Secret Service.

Representative FORD. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the
assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their
help in these instances?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was
offered to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit
a city and Secret Service does not have sufficient personnel in that
particular city to cover what they consider is necessary, they need
specialized help from us, they will make the request to us and we will
authorize our local agent in charge to make those men, the designated
number, available to the Secret Service representative, who then uses
their services while the President is there.

Representative FORD. I gather that prior to the assassination such
requests, specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the
Bureau.

Mr. BELMONT. No. There were never any such requests before.

Mr. STERN. At the level at which the requests have been made so far,
have they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of
something like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have,
and our agents are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the
country, ranging from matters of immediate urgency to matters which
can be handled in due time, and whenever our agents are putting in an
average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, the loan of 139 men
will be felt.

Representative FORD. 169.

Mr. BELMONT. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139.

Mr. STERN. 139 on 16 separate occasions.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not
complaining.

We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase
its personnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is
properly their problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure
and we are not complaining.

Mr. DULLES. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr.
Belmont was here, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going
back to the assassination day, a clear definition of the respective
functions of the FBI and the Secret Service prior to and immediately
after the assassination. There seemed to have been at one time a little
confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this kind it always
happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to----

Mr. BELMONT. At the time of the assassination?

Mr. DULLES. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were
just before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the
functions of the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting
the President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is
a basic responsibility.

Mr. DULLES. And you have no auxiliary function to that----

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a
primary responsibility and function of Secret Service.

Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish
to Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that
we have done religiously.

After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation
of the assassination which changed the picture as far as this
particular case was concerned.

Mr. DULLES. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the
assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And there was a period there, there was a period though,
after the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of
office--did this order come to you during that period or after he had
taken the oath of office?

Mr. BELMONT. It was very rapid, probably within a day.

Mr. DULLES. I see. It wasn't immediately after.

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. DULLES. It wasn't this period I am speaking of.

Mr. BELMONT. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no
jurisdiction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder
and was within the province of the local police who immediately took
hold of it and started the investigation.

Mr. DULLES. I realize that.

Mr. BELMONT. And started the investigation and it was theirs.

Mr. DULLES. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by
courtesy of the local authorities.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and
immediately went into action because of what had happened, and there
was no time for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be
of the utmost assistance, and we sent men to the police department to
assist in the interview and do anything else we could. This wasn't a
time, of course, to sit back and say, "This isn't our job."

Mr. DULLES. I understand.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any
legislation in recent years that might have been introduced in the
Congress to make an attack upon the President a Federal offense?

Mr. BELMONT. I do know that there is legislation presently pending.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Since the assassination.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know
it had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were
there any recent legislation to that effect?

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done
research on it, and I just don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of
Representatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right
to take certain action when a chief of state from a foreign country was
within the United States; a broadening of their authority when they had
a suspicion or they had some reason to believe that an attack was being
made on a foreign dignitary.

At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question
you just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific
legislative matters pending before any committee on this particular
point.

Mr. BELMONT. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection
is that it was called to our attention--I cannot pinpoint it for
you--but I think there is pending legislation now in this matter.

Mr. McCLOY. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to
the fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the
wastebasket.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true.

Mr. McCLOY. In respect of other incidents.

The CHAIRMAN. When the emotion died down.

Mr. McCLOY. When the emotion died down, that is true.

I have some further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?

Mr. STERN. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday.
Mr. Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if
possible, when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on
October 29, November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that
he thought it had been done after the assassination. Have you caused a
check to be made on that?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not
have a specific record of when that information was recorded.

Mr. STERN. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some
contemporaneous communication?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I
recall correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of
Mrs. Paine and had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.

Mr. STERN. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64
and 67, just so the record is straight.

Mr. BELMONT. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the
headquarters dated October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview
that he had had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.

On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his
contact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his
interviews were incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4,
but the actual insert for the report was not prepared until some time
later. To the best of Hosty's recollection it was after the 22d and
prior to December 2, but he was already on record by these AIRTELS.

Mr. STERN. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloy.

Mr. McCLOY. I have one or two questions.

Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald
was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever
that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an
agent or an informant of the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr.
McCloy, and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never
was, an agent or an informant of the FBI.

Mr. McCLOY. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason
to make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent
of any other country.

Mr. McCLOY. Or any other agency of the United States?

Mr. BELMONT. Or any other agency of the United States.

Mr. McCLOY. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr.
Hosty said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in
connection with it are still of constant concern to the FBI.

Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at
the present time require or justify further investigation other than
routine checkups that have not already been undertaken?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; frankly, I don't. I will say that from the
requests we have received from the Commission, you have explored
this most thoroughly. We do not have any unexplored areas in this
investigation that should be explored. There are some pending requests
that you have made, and we are running them out as rapidly as we can.

Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after
all, you have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have
had a long exposure to investigation in this case.

As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any
credible evidence thus far which would support a conclusion or an
opinion that the death of the President was the result of a conspiracy
or anything other than the act of a single individual?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no
conclusion that this was other than an act of Oswald.

Mr. McCLOY. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that
he was the President's assassin?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever--you
or the agency--have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker,
case?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I
am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the
incident, we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered----

Mr. McCLOY. Bullets.

Mr. BELMONT. And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that
we did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to
the assassination itself.

Mr. McCLOY. Until recently.

Mr. BELMONT. No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.

Mr. McCLOY. In your investigation of the President's assassination, did
you have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's
background or Ruby's relationship to Oswald?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.

Mr. McCLOY. Have we got all your reports on that?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to
Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?

Mr. BELMONT. The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in
summation, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is
anything that would stand up to indicate that there was any association
between Ruby and Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out
extensively and carefully, but there is nothing, no information, that
would stand up to show there was an association between them.

Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this is in the record, but do you--by reason of your
very close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this
question--do you, from your knowledge of the investigation find--was
there any evidence in regard to Ruby's propensity for violence before
this shooting took place in the police headquarters in Dallas?

Mr. BELMONT. Did we have any information of that character and of that
nature?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes; I am not talking before it happened, but as a result
of your investigation did you turn up any other indications of any
violence on the part of Ruby?

Mr. BELMONT. I hesitate to attempt to evaluate the information that we
gathered from hundreds and hundreds of people that we talked to during
the investigation of Ruby after the assassination. I just don't feel
that I am in a position to render a judgment as to his character or his
impulsiveness, the degree of impulsiveness, whether he was capable----

Mr. McCLOY. Whether he was prone to violent action.

Mr. BELMONT. I just don't feel really competent. I have no doubt that
a conclusion can be drawn from reports; of course, that was one of the
basic issues at the trial.

Representative FORD. Was there any evidence that the FBI found to the
effect that Ruby was a Communist?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

Representative FORD. None whatsoever?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Was there any evidence found by the FBI to the
effect that Ruby was connected with in any way whatsoever so-called
rightist groups?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall anything of that nature.

Mr. McCLOY. No association that you know of as a result of the
investigation of Ruby with any foreign government or agency of a
foreign government?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; you understand, you are asking me questions, and
I am replying on the basis of my best recollection, but I am giving you
an answer from my knowledge of the case.

Mr. McCLOY. That is what we were seeking, no more than that, because
your impressions would be valuable.

Mr. BELMONT. The reason I say that there may be someone we interviewed
who made a statement about Ruby and it was run out, and it was found to
be false. Congressman Ford, you asked me if he was a Communist. I would
say we have no evidence of that.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you feel that in view of the evidence that Oswald was
a defector, that he engaged in this Fair Play for Cuba business, that
he lied in his communications with the FBI, that Mr. Hosty should have
been alerted by locating Oswald in the School Book Depository early
in November, that he should have been alerted to informing the Secret
Service of that?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not. You must take this matter in its proper
context. I pointed out to you previously that this man came back from
Russia; he indicated that he had learned his lesson, was disenchanted
with Russia, and had a renewed concept--I am paraphrasing, a renewed
concept--of the American free society.

We talked to him twice. He likewise indicated he was disenchanted with
Russia. We satisfied ourselves that we had met our requirement, namely
to find out whether he had been recruited by Soviet intelligence. The
case was closed.

We again exhibited interest on the basis of these contacts with
The Worker, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which are relatively
inconsequential.

His activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, we
knew, were not of real consequence as he was not connected with any
organized activity there.

The interview with him in jail is not significant from the standpoint
of whether he had a propensity for violence.

Mr. McCLOY. That is the Quigley interview you are talking about?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it was a self-serving interview.

The visits with the Soviet Embassy were evidently for the purpose of
securing a visa, and he had told us during one of the interviews that
he would probably take his wife back to Soviet Russia some time in the
future. He had come back to Dallas. Hosty had established that he had
a job, he was working, and had told Mrs. Paine that when he got the
money he was going to take an apartment when the baby was old enough,
he was going to take an apartment, and the family would live together.

He gave evidence of settling down. Nowhere during the course of this
investigation or the information that came to us from other agencies
was there any indication of a potential for violence on his part.

Consequently, there was no basis for Hosty to go to Secret Service and
advise them of Oswald's presence. Hosty was alert, as was the Dallas
office, to furnish information to Secret Service on the occasion of the
President's visit.

It is my recollection that Hosty actually participated in delivering
some material to Secret Service himself, and helped prepare a
memorandum on another matter that was sent over there. So that most
certainly the office was alert. The agent in charge had alerted his
agents, even on the morning of the visit, as he had previously done a
week or 10 days before the visit.

So that, in answer to your question, I cannot even through the process
of going back and seeking to apply this against what happened,
justifiably say that Hosty should have given this information under the
existing conditions and with the history of this matter, that he was in
a position to give it to the Secret Service. Now, most certainly----

Mr. McCLOY. We wish he had.

Mr. BELMONT. Of course.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, I have a call from the floor of the
House. I wonder if I could ask Mr. Belmont a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Representative FORD. In response to a question by Mr. McCloy, you
categorically said that Federal Bureau of Investigation under no
circumstances had employed Oswald as an informant, as an agent or in
any other way whatsoever.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. You would be in a position to know specifically
that information?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. You also said, as I recall, that you had found no
credible information or evidence thus far that Oswald was connected in
any way whatsoever with another country as an agent. Is that about what
you said or do you wish to reaffirm it in another way?

Mr. BELMONT. I will affirm what you said.

Representative FORD. There is a difference, however, between your
knowledge as to whether the FBI had hired Oswald, you can be very
categorical about that.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Representative FORD. You can only----

Mr. BELMONT. Say based on the evidence that we have or which developed
or all information that we received, there was no indication that
Oswald was in any way connected or within the service of a foreign
government.

Representative FORD. But there is a difference in the way you can
answer those two questions.

Mr. BELMONT. There is a difference, yes; there is a difference
because in the one case we know, in the other case we rely on all the
information and evidence available.

Representative FORD. But as far as a foreign government is concerned,
you only know what you have been able to find out?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.

Representative FORD. There is always the possibility in the second
case, involving a foreign government, that something might come up at
some other time.

Mr. BELMONT. There is always the possibility. We have no indication of
it. There is always the possibility; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. But you cannot be as categorical about the future
in the second case as you were in the first case.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; you are right.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Mr. DULLES. Do you have some more?

Mr. McCLOY. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the
hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES. I have two or three questions.

As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors
that have been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the
assassination.

I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published
in England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed
Kennedy," by Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and
Warburg. I have not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have
read a good deal of the background material on which it is based.

I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we
will make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly,
whether you would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in
the Bureau familiar with the case or yourself, and possibly give us
your views with regard to certain of the allegations here within your
particular competence.

Mr. BELMONT. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a
compilation of the articles that he wrote in the French press.

Mr. DULLES. Express; yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we
received them.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. BELMONT. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they
are filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions,
misinformation, and certainly what I would term false journalism. In
other words, he has stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many
things which the Commission's investigation has disproved completely.

We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general
comment on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it
would probably result in a critique of 500 pages.

Mr. DULLES. We do not want that. I don't think we need that.

Mr. BELMONT. Where actually many of these allegations have already been
resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and
give you a----

Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have,
Mr. Chairman. Do you agree?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there
that contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our
attention.

Mr. BELMONT. Most certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book.
That is your idea, is it?

Mr. DULLES. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations
there, any evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to
have it.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything
about Buchanan's background?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. DULLES. I wish you would check.

Mr. BELMONT. We can send you a letter.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the record.

Mr. McCLOY. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School
and Yale.

Mr. DULLES. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a
Communist at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington
Star, I am advised, and I believe, according to the information I have,
that he was terminated by the Star some years ago.

Mr. BELMONT. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement
which we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in
off the street.

Mr. DULLES. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.

I believe, Mr. Belmont, that you probably have furnished us already
with information with regard to any contacts that Oswald might have
had, individuals whom he knew, persons who might have been accused of
being accomplices of his, but if there is anybody there or any persons
in your file whom Oswald knew who have not been communicated to us, we
would certainly like to have them to be sure we have looked into that
field exhaustively, anybody who, according to your records, Oswald knew.

Mr. BELMONT. I am sure we have explored that fully, and we have
reported it to the Commission fully.

Mr. DULLES. All right; good.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. In view of your deep study of the case, have you reached
any views of your own or are there any views of the Bureau, as to
Oswald's motivation in the act that he committed?

Mr. BELMONT. Again I don't feel competent to give you an answer. There
is an indication from the exploration of his background that he wanted
to be somebody. He wanted to be known as someone. Whether this caused
him to do this terrible thing I don't know. I think if it were possible
to peer into Oswald's mind, that would really be the only way you could
get your question answered.

Mr. DULLES. Have you and the Bureau made any comparative study of the
various assassination attempts and assassinations of other Presidents
and people in high authority in this Government to see whether any
pattern at all runs through these various attempts other than attempts
where there is clearly a plot, as in the case of the attack on
President Truman, and probably also in the case of President Lincoln? I
am thinking chiefly of the assassination of President McKinley and the
attempted assassination of President-elect Roosevelt in 1933.

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have not made a study of that nature. I would
imagine that Secret Service has made a study.

Mr. DULLES. They have made a study. I didn't know whether you had made
one also.

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have not.

Mr. DULLES. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Belmont, I have here in my hand a sheet that appeared
on the newsstands over the weekend. It is supposed to be the National
Enquirer. I believe it is out of New York, and it contains a page and
a third about the assassination of the President and certain actions
of the FBI, and so forth, and for the record I should like to read a
portion of it and merely ask you if, in your opinion----

Mr. BELMONT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And with your knowledge there is any truth to any part of
it. You, of course, are acquainted with that paper.

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I am not. In fact, someone told me it was, it
came from, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and I was shocked that something
like that would be in that paper. I found it was not the Philadelphia
Inquirer.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think, in view of the relationship you have had in this
whole matter, I would like to have your testimony in the record on it.

Mr. BELMONT. Very good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no date on this paper, and I am told it appeared
in three different days in three different formats with different
headlines, but the same item. It is said to be by John Henshaw,
Enquirer Washington Bureau Chief.

"Washington--The hottest story making the rounds here is that the U.S.
Justice Department prevented the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack
Ruby BEFORE the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Oswald and
the man who killed him, Ruby, were suspected of being partners in crime
7 months before the President's death.

"The incredible details of the story are so explosive that officials
won't even answer 'no comment' when queried about it. But the story
being discussed by top-level Government officials reveals:

"1. That the Justice Department deliberately kept Oswald and Ruby out
of jail before the assassination.

"2. That Dallas cops suspected Oswald of being the gunman and Ruby
the paymaster in a plot to murder former Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker--7
months before the President was assassinated.

"3. That the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was using Ruby to recruit
commandoes for raids against Castro's Cuba. To prevent this explosive
information from being disclosed, the CIA asked the Justice Department
to step in and stop the Dallas police from arresting Jack Ruby, as well
as Oswald.

"A top-secret document--a letter signed by a high official of the
Justice Department--was sent in April 1963 from the Dallas Police
Department to Dallas Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry requesting the
Dallas police NOT to arrest Oswald and Ruby in connection with the
attempted slaying of General Walker.

"After a sniper shot at, but missed, General Walker in Dallas, April
10, 1963, Dallas police suspected that Oswald was the sniper and Ruby
the payoff man.

"The cops were set to arrest the pair. But they never got the
chance because of the heavy pressure brought to bear by the Justice
Department. And so Oswald and Ruby were allowed to remain free. And 7
months later, on last November 22 in Dallas, Oswald was able to kill
the President of the United States.

"The top-secret document--a copy of it is reportedly in the hands of
the Presidential Commission investigating the assassination--bares a
web of intrigue that involves the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
along with the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

"It is so politically explosive that the Presidential Commission,
headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, has even withheld it
from one of its own members, Senator Richard Russell (D., Ga.).

"It is feared that Senator Russell, who leads the South in the fight
against the civil rights bill, might use the document as a weapon
against the Justice Department and its chief, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, a leader in the fight for civil rights.

"The document--requesting the cops not to arrest Ruby and
Oswald--contradicts the FBI report on the assassination and the
subsequent murder of Oswald."

My question is, do you have any information that would lead you to
believe that any of those allegations are true?

Mr. BELMONT. My answer, sir, is that that is utter fantastic nonsense,
and I have no information to indicate that any of the allegations are
true.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better mark this and introduce it in
evidence. There is much more to the article, but it is explanatory of
this, but I thought that was sufficiently a direct allegation that we
ought to note it in the testimony. So will you give that a number, Mr.
Stern.

Mr. STERN. It will be numbered 837.

The CHAIRMAN. 837. It is introduced in evidence as No. 837.

Mr. STERN. May we also have admitted, Mr. Chief Justice, Exhibit No.
836, the letter of March 31, 1964, which Mr. Belmont has identified.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.

(The documents referred to were marked for identification as Commission
Exhibits Nos. 836 and 837 and were received in evidence.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, gentlemen?

Mr. McCLOY. May I suggest that we get a copy of the paper which does
have the date on it. I forget what date it was.

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Rankin, I understand you have sent it over to us, so
we will be glad to answer your letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Belmont, we appreciate your cooperation, and we
thank you for your courtesy.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



_Wednesday, May 13, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF LT. JACK REVILL

The President's Commission met at 10 a.m. on May 13, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald
R. Ford; and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; Norman Redlich,
assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; and Charles
Murray, observer.


The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Revill, the purpose of today's hearing is to
hear your testimony and that of Detective V. J. Brian with particular
regard to alleged conversation with Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr.,
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, claimed to have occurred on
November 22, 1963, in the afternoon, and also concerning the facts
surrounding the discussion of Commission Exhibits 710 and 711.

What are those--those are the affidavits?

Mr. RANKIN. That is his affidavit and Detective Brian's.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are the affidavits that you made in that regard.

Would you please rise and raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before
this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth so help you God?

Lieutenant REVILL. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. RANKIN. Lieutenant Revill, will you state your name and place of
residence for the record, please?

Mr. REVILL. My name is Jack Revill. I reside at 5617 Madowics, Dallas,
Tex.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an official connection with the police
department of Dallas?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. RANKIN. What is that?

Mr. REVILL. I am presently a lieutenant of police of the Dallas Police
Department.

Mr. RANKIN. How long have you occupied that position?

Mr. REVILL. I was promoted to lieutenant June 26, 1958.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any particular area of responsibility?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I am presently in charge of the criminal
intelligence section.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you been in charge of that section since November 22
of 1963?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. RANKIN. What are the functions of your work in that job?

Mr. REVILL. My unit--our primary responsibility is to investigate
crimes of an organized nature, subversive activities, racial matters,
labor racketeering, and to do anything that the chief might desire. We
work for the chief of police. I report to a captain who is in charge of
the special service bureau.

Mr. RANKIN. Who is that?

Mr. REVILL. Capt. Pat Gannaway.

Mr. RANKIN. How long have you reported to him?

Mr. REVILL. In my present capacity?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. Since I have been assigned to the criminal intelligence
section.

Mr. RANKIN. So that was for all times since and on November 22, 1963?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this is true.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know James P. Hosty, Jr.?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. RANKIN. How long have you known him?

Mr. REVILL. I have known Jim, Mr. Hosty, since 1959, when I took over
the intelligence section.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you see him on November 22?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. RANKIN. Where.

Mr. REVILL. In the basement of the city hall.

Mr. RANKIN. Just before you saw Special Agent Hosty, where had you been?

Mr. REVILL. I had been at the Texas School Book Depository.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you do there?

Mr. REVILL. We conducted a systematic search of the building, evacuated
the people working in the building, and took names, addresses, and
phone numbers of all of these people before they were permitted to
leave.

Mr. RANKIN. Was anyone working with you there?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Who?

Mr. REVILL. Numerous people.

Mr. RANKIN. I see. Was Detective Brian with you there?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. I had taken Detective Brian with me from the
Trade Mart, Dallas Trade Mart, upon hearing of the shots being fired at
Mr. Kennedy. I took Detective Brian and two other officers assigned to
my unit, Detective R. W. Westphal and Detective Tarver, O. J. Tarver.

Mr. RANKIN. How did you come back to the police department?

Mr. REVILL. By automobile.

Mr. RANKIN. By car?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Was anyone with you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir, I had Detectives Brian, Tarver, and Westphal.

Mr. RANKIN. They were all in the car with you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And which way did you enter the building?

Mr. REVILL. The Main Street ramp into the basement of the city hall.

Mr. RANKIN. About what time of the day?

Mr. REVILL. It must have been about 2:45, 2:50.

Mr. RANKIN. All of these officers were with you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Where did you see Special Agent Hosty?

Mr. REVILL. If I might explain that, I followed Mr. Hosty into the
basement of the city hall. He drove into the basement, parked his car,
I did the same, and Mr. Hosty departed from his car, ran over to where
I was standing, Detective Brian and I.

The other two officers, Westphal and Tarver, as well as I recall, had
remained in the rear talking to some other officers. I don't know who
they were. At that time everything was mass confusion, and we were all
upset.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you explain to the Commission where you parked the car
with reference to the point where you saw Agent Hosty?

Mr. REVILL. I got out of my car, and we have two attendants assigned to
the basement, two Negro attendants, and one of these individuals parked
my vehicle for me, I don't know where he parked it. But as I got out of
the car, Mr. Hosty ran toward me----

Mr. RANKIN. Now, about the parking, excuse me.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that a part of the basement area of the police
department?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. RANKIN. All right; proceed.

Mr. REVILL. And Mr. Hosty ran over to me and he says, "Jack"--now as I
recall these words--"a Communist killed President Kennedy."

I said, "What?"

He said, "Lee Oswald killed President Kennedy."

I said, "Who is Lee Oswald?"

He said, "He is in our Communist file. We knew he was here in Dallas."
At that time Hosty and I started walking off, and Brian, as well as
I recall, sort of stayed back, and as we got onto the elevator or
just prior to getting on the elevator Mr. Hosty related that they had
information that this man was capable of this, and at this I blew up at
him, and I said, "Jim"----

Mr. RANKIN. What did he say in regard to his being capable?

Mr. REVILL. This was it. They had--"We had information that this man
was capable"----

Mr. RANKIN. Of what?

Mr. REVILL. Of committing this assassination. This is what I understood
him to say.

Mr. RANKIN. Are those his exact words?

Mr. REVILL. As well as I recall. Give him the benefit of the doubt; I
might have misunderstood him. But I don't believe I did, because the
part about him being in Dallas, and the fact that he was a suspected
Communist, I understand by the rules of the Attorney General they
cannot tell us this, but the information about him being capable,
I felt that we had taken a part in the security measures for Mr.
Kennedy, and if such, if such information was available to another law
enforcement agency, I felt they should have made it known to all of us,
and I asked Hosty where he was going at that time. By this time we were
on the elevator and he said he was going up to homicide and robbery to
tell Captain Fritz the same thing. I said, "Do you know Captain Fritz?"
and he said he had never met him. I said, "All right, I will take you
up and introduce you to Captain Fritz." So Detective Brian and I and
Hosty went to the third floor of the city hall and went to Captain
Fritz' office, the homicide and robbery bureau. We didn't see Captain
Fritz, he may or may not have been there. His office door was closed.

Mr. DULLES. What time of the day, could you give me the approximate
time?

Mr. REVILL. Between 2:30 and 3 o'clock, and I have the reason for
saying this because of the typing of this report here. Our secretary
got off at 4 o'clock.

Mr. DULLES. And Chief Curry had not yet returned, had he?

Mr. REVILL. I don't know where he was.

Mr. DULLES. You didn't know about that?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about this to Captain Fritz?

Mr. REVILL. I did not talk to Captain Fritz, as I said, I didn't see
him. I introduced Mr. Hosty to Lieutenant Ted Wells, who is one of
the lieutenants assigned to the homicide and robbery bureau and also
present at that time was another special agent, Mr. Bookhout, and
Hosty, there was confusion within this office, so Brian and I, after
introducing Mr. Hosty to Wells, left and went back to the special
service bureau office.

Mr. RANKIN. And you didn't say anything to the inspector about it?

Mr. REVILL. The inspector?

Mr. RANKIN. Lieutenant Wells.

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't tell him this important information?

Mr. REVILL. Hosty was going up to tell him the same thing.

Mr. RANKIN. Did he tell you that?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he told me that.

Mr. RANKIN. And Hosty told you then that he was going up to tell him
that they knew he was capable of being the assassin?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; being at that time I was out of touch with
everything, being in the building, I had put no connection between the
shooting of Tippit and the President.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you know that Oswald had been arrested?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; at that time I did not.

Mr. RANKIN. You just knew about the someone by the name of Lee, didn't
you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; Lee. And this was told to me by a colored
employee of the School Book Depository. Myself and Lieutenant Frank
Dyson took charge of the search of the building and we must have had
75 or 80 men in the building assisting in this search. I talked to a
Negro----

Mr. DULLES. Were you in charge of that?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I was in charge of that phase of the search.
I talked to a Negro by the name of Givens, and we had handled this
person in the past for marijuana violations and I recognized him and in
talking to him I asked him if he had been on the sixth floor, and as
well as I recall, and Detective Brian was present at this same time he
said, yes, that he had observed Mr. Lee, over by this window. Well,
I asked him who Mr. Lee was, he said, "It is a white boy." He didn't
know his full name. So, I turned this Givens individual over to one
of our Negro detectives and told him to take him to Captain Fritz for
interrogation, and while going to the city hall, or the police station
I passed this detective and Givens, and they came into the homicide
and robbery bureau shortly after Hosty and I did, so I am sure Captain
Fritz did talk to Mr. Givens.

Mr. RANKIN. When did you learn that Oswald had been arrested?

Mr. REVILL. I really don't know, sir. Because time, we were all shocked
that this thing had happened in our city and I personally felt that
maybe a sense of responsibility, maybe we could have done more to
prevent this thing. I just don't know when I heard that he had been
arrested.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you know it by the time you went to Lieutenant Wells'
office?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. He may have been in the office at that
time.

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't know that Oswald was already in the police
department?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. I had been in this building since word
came of the shots being fired until about 2:30, 2:35, and at that time
I decided that my unit could possibly do more at our office where we
kept all of our files, cataloging these people, the suspects that were
running through my mind at that time. So, I was, I put out a call for
all of the intelligence unit personnel to meet me at the office and I
got no reply to this because they were all up in the special service
bureau. We had been assigned to the Trade Mart, and two or three of my
officers had taken into custody four or five of these picket carriers,
and we did this more for protection than anything else because after
the word came of the assassination, well, I am afraid they would have
been mobbed, and they were all up in the special service bureau booking
these prisoners at the time, and I decided we would stop by the special
service bureau office, to report back to my captain and see if there
was something we could do there. And as I pulled into the basement this
conversation took place with Mr. Hosty.

Mr. RANKIN. And the particular words about Oswald being capable of
being an assassin those were told you by Agent Hosty in the elevator?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; either just outside the elevator and as we got on.
He never mentioned this again because I guess I lost my temper at him
for withholding this type of information.

Mr. RANKIN. I see. Did you do anything about losing your temper, did
you say anything?

Mr. REVILL. No; Jim Hosty and I are friends, and this has hurt me that
I have involved Hosty into this thing, because he is a good agent, he
is one of the agents there that we can work with; that has been most
cooperative in the past, and I worked with him just like he is one of
us.

Mr. RANKIN. You went to the third floor on the elevator?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Who else went with you?

Mr. REVILL. Detective Brian and Hosty, the elevator was--had several
people on it. I don't recall who they were.

Mr. RANKIN. Was Detective Brian on that elevator?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was.

Mr. RANKIN. At that same time?

Mr. REVILL. He went to the third floor with me.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are sure Agent Hosty was on the elevator with you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are sure you were on the elevator?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, will you tell us exactly what you said to Hosty and
also what he said to you?

Mr. REVILL. After hearing about the information that they were
purported to have had----

Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us all the information that Hosty told you?

Mr. REVILL. As well as I recall; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, did you say anything to him about it?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. What?

Mr. REVILL. I asked him why he had not told us this, and the best, my
recollection is that he said he couldn't. Now, what he meant by that I
don't know. Because in the past our relations had been such that this
type of information, it surprised me they had not, if they had such
information he had not brought it or hadn't made it available to us.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are certain you went up there on the elevator
together?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; took him to the third floor and introduced him to
Lieutenant Wells.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you sure you didn't go up the stairs together.

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; we went to the third floor on the elevator.

Mr. RANKIN. You are positive?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; because we caught the elevator in the basement,
and there would have been no reason to walk up the stairs.

Mr. RANKIN. If Agent Hosty said you went up the stairs rapidly
together, that would be untrue?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this would be untrue.

Mr. DULLES. Did you go in that same driveway that the car went in that
was to take Oswald out?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. That driveway; and you took that elevator right to the left
as you went in there?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; we go straight into the doors into the elevator
that goes up to the third floor.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. Third and fourth floor.

Representative FORD. May I ask a question to reconstruct this a bit?
Both Detective Brian and yourself came in one car?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And you had two other officers with you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. More or less the same time Mr. Hosty came in?

Mr. REVILL. We followed Mr. Hosty into the basement.

Mr. DULLES. Each in a car?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was in a car and we were in mine.

Representative FORD. Your first contact with Mr. Hosty was in the
basement there?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. What did he say there?

Mr. REVILL. He come running up to me, and he said, "Jack, a Communist
killed President Kennedy." I said, "What? What are you talking about?"
He said, "Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy," and at that I
said "Who is Lee Harvey Oswald?" And then he told me about him having
him in their security files, and then that, "We had information that he
was capable of this." By "we" I assumed he meant the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.

Representative FORD. Then Brian, Hosty, and yourself walked to the
elevator?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And the three of you took the elevator up to the
third floor?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. It is about 10 feet as I remember it.

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; it is more than that.

Mr. DULLES. It is a different elevator. It is not the one that take
prisoners down?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; it is the swinging doors, you go through the
swinging doors.

Mr. DULLES. It is another elevator?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. At what point in the sequence did you blow up, as
you say?

Mr. REVILL. When he told me about the capability. By blowing up----

Representative FORD. Was that standing in the basement near the car or
was it over toward the elevator?

Mr. REVILL. We were walking over toward the elevator during this
conversation and as far as blowing up, this is semantics. I wanted to
know why they had not given us this information.

Representative FORD. What is his reaction to that?

Mr. REVILL. "We couldn't." I do not know what he meant by that.

Representative FORD. When you use words like "We couldn't" that "Oswald
was a Communist" this is what I am trying to find out. You mean these
are the precise words he said or are these your interpretations of what
he said?

Mr. REVILL. The time involved it could be my interpretation, to give
him the benefit of the doubt, because as I said Hosty is a friend of
mine, and the last thing I wanted to do was to cause this man any
trouble, because of our relations in the past.

Representative FORD. Have you ever had any doubt in the interval
between that time and now that what your recollection is is accurate or
inaccurate, fair or unfair?

Mr. REVILL. As far as I am concerned I have; this report is honest,
and it was made within an hour after he made the thing. And since this
assassination I have gone over in my mind could I have misunderstood
him. I sometimes wish or hoped that I have. But this is in essence what
he said to me. It might not be exactly the "we's" the "I's" but in
essence it is what Mr. Hosty said.

Representative FORD. At one point as I recall your testimony, you
said Hosty said that Oswald was a Communist. A few minutes after that
testimony I think you said that Hosty suspected he was a Communist.
Now, did you say that deliberately or did you just----

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; if I said that I was wrong.

Representative FORD. Was that just confusion?

Mr. REVILL. As I mentioned earlier he come hurrying up to me and he
said, "Jack, a Communist killed the President." I said, "What?" He
said, "Lee Harvey Oswald, a Communist killed the President," and then
he went into the fact that they had known he was there, and then at
the conclusion of our, not the conclusion because we continued to
discuss this thing going up on the elevator, he made the statement that
they had information that he was capable of this. He might have said
probably or possibly capable of it, I don't recall, because in Dallas
that day, the town died, and I know I was sick that this thing happened
in my city, and I felt that maybe we could have done something else to
prevent it.

Mr. DULLES. You stress the word "capable", that sticks in your mind,
does it?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. He didn't say might have done it?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; capable.

Mr. DULLES. Normally would information of this kind have passed to you
directly from the FBI or through the Secret Service in the event--of
course, there hadn't been other Presidential visits, I guess, so there
was no precedent but I was wondering in the case of a Presidential
visit would it normally have come to you directly from the Secret
Service rather than directly from the FBI?

Mr. REVILL. Well, in the past Mr. Kennedy had visited Mr. Rayburn
there and this information had never been made known to us and usually
the information we got from the FBI and you have got to realize the
relations are good, was on a personal basis, working with Mr. Hosty and
the other agent assigned to their security section and men assigned to
their criminal section, it was a share and share alike thing because
I have 11 men, and we just augmented their force really with the
information we gathered.

Mr. DULLES. Had you had a meeting with the FBI, a general meeting, to
go over security problems prior to this time, prior to the President's
visit?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I personally had taken part in no meetings.

Mr. DULLES. With the FBI?

Mr. REVILL. With the FBI.

Mr. DULLES. Or Secret Service?

Mr. REVILL. Or Secret Service.

Mr. DULLES. Why was this?

Mr. REVILL. This I do not know. This was handled at a higher level.
It is my understanding meetings were held and my captain who is my
immediate supervisor was involved in these meetings but----

Mr. DULLES. You were not present at these meetings?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. DULLES. But the meetings you think were held?

Mr. REVILL. This is my understanding; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Lieutenant Revill, have you seen the original of that
Exhibit 709?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that the report that you referred to when you were
answering questions?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I brought a copy.

Mr. RANKIN. And Congressman Ford?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; there was just one copy made of this and this is
the copy I retained. The original went to Chief Curry. And on this,
Chief Curry called me and he would like me to swear that this was a
true and correct statement, and this I did.

Mr. RANKIN. By that you are referring to the statement sworn to and
subscribed before me this 7th day of April 1964?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, will you tell us how you happened to make this report,
Exhibit 709?

Mr. REVILL. Why I made the report?

Mr. RANKIN. How did it happen that you made it?

Mr. REVILL. After Mr. Hosty had related these circumstances to me, and
after taking him to the third floor, I reported this incident to my
captain, Captain Gannaway.

Mr. RANKIN. When was this?

Mr. REVILL. Within minutes after I left Mr. Hosty at the homicide and
robbery bureau.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say to him?

Mr. REVILL. I told him what had happened, what had transpired.

Mr. RANKIN. Just describe what you said to him.

Mr. REVILL. About meeting Mr. Hosty in the basement?

Mr. RANKIN. Just tell us what you said.

Mr. REVILL. About Mr. Hosty, following Mr. Hosty in the basement, that
he came up to me, and stated that a Communist had killed the President,
and that a Lee Harvey Oswald, they had him in their security files, and
that they knew he was in Dallas, and that he was capable, that they had
information he was capable of this. To this----

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about what you have said?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I don't recall. I might have.

Mr. RANKIN. You don't recall that at all?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I don't.

Mr. RANKIN. Did your captain ask you whether you said anything about
that?

Mr. REVILL. I don't recall him asking me that; no, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did he say anything to you about it?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he did. He told me to put this on paper.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all he said?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; and to which I told him that I hated to do that
because of Mr. Hosty, that he might have been stating a personal
opinion. He said, "You put it on paper and give it to me and I will
take it to Chief Curry," and this I did.

Within 30 minutes to an hour after the thing happened.

Mr. RANKIN. Neither one of you said anything about this being strange
that Agent Hosty would say anything like this?

Mr. REVILL. I do not recall, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't say anything like that?

Mr. REVILL. I don't recall making such a statement.

Mr. RANKIN. And he didn't say anything like that to you that you
recalled?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Did you write this out in longhand?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; and then I dictated it to one of the stenos in
the office. And she was to, this is what I mentioned earlier the time
element, she was to, she got off at 4 o'clock and this was before she
went home for the day.

Mr. DULLES. This is on November 22 you are talking about?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Did you sign it on November 22 or at a later date?

Mr. REVILL. The same time.

Mr. DULLES. But you swore to it on the 7th day of April 1964?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You swore that was your signature?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; at the time I was hoping it would never come up.

Mr. RANKIN. Why?

Mr. REVILL. Because of the relations that we had with the Bureau.

Mr. RANKIN. You thought this was a bad thing for the Bureau?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. RANKIN. For them to admit to you that they knew----

Mr. REVILL. Not the admitting but to withhold it.

Mr. RANKIN. To withhold the information?

Mr. REVILL. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. They thought this man was capable of being an assassin?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And yet you say that Agent Hosty just blurted that out?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us all that you remember about it?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; all that I remember.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you make this----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question that comes right along with that?
Did he say anything to you about his having been in Russia and
redefected?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Mr. DULLES. That did not come up in this conversation?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ask him how he knew he was a Communist?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. DULLES. Why not?

Mr. REVILL. I don't know.

Representative FORD. In the statement that you gave on November 22
which you have signed, you say?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. "The subject was arrested for the murder of J.
D. Tippit and is a prime suspect in the assassination of President
Kennedy."

Mr. REVILL. This I found out after reporting to my office, I didn't
know what time this happened.

Representative FORD. In other words, you learned this subsequent to
going with Hosty?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And then coming back to your own office?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; some of the officers assigned to the Special
Service Bureau on--were involved in the arrest, Detectives Carroll and
I talked to Agent Bob Barrett, I ran into him in the hall and he had
told me about the arrest of Oswald. I think he was present at the time.

Representative FORD. That is how you learned about this?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. At what time of day did you make this actual statement and
sign it approximately?

Mr. REVILL. Approximately 3:30, 3:35.

Mr. DULLES. 3:35 on the 22d of November?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. This is the actual statement that you then signed and then
you swore to it, and the notary's signature was put on on the 22d of
April?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; the notary's was on April 7, I believe.

Mr. DULLES. 7th day of April, I mean, 7th day of April.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; but this is the report that I signed on the 22d.

Mr. DULLES. This is the actual report that you signed on the 22d?

Mr. REVILL. On the 22d. This is a copy, I believe.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; this is a copy I have in my hand.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. The original of this was made on November 22?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And signed on November 22d?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. DULLES. And later sworn to on April 7?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this is correct.

Mr. DULLES. April 7, 1964.

Mr. RANKIN. Is all the information on 709 given by you?

Mr. REVILL. Is this 709?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. All of the information, what do you mean by this, sir?

Mr. RANKIN. All of the language and everything on that exhibit, did you
give that to some stenographer to write?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I wrote it out. My stenographer, she is a clerk
typist, and--I roughed it out and then she typed it for me.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, the words "subject" Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Was that given by you on the slip of paper you wrote out?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I wrote it out in longhand.

Mr. RANKIN. And the words 605 Elsbeth Street, was that given by you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this is the address we were given or I was given
by some of the officers involved in the arrest.

Mr. RANKIN. Who gave that to you?

Mr. REVILL. I believe Detective Carroll, Carroll or Detective Taylor,
they were both there.

Mr. RANKIN. And was that at the time you made this out that you were
given that information?

Mr. REVILL. Shortly before I made this out.

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't even know where he lived then?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. I had never heard of him.

Mr. RANKIN. You know that is wrong, don't you?

Mr. REVILL. The 605?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. I don't know.

Mr. RANKIN. Is it wrong?

Mr. REVILL. Yes; it is.

Mr. DULLES. As of the time.

Mr. REVILL. That is what they gave me.

Mr. RANKIN. You found that out?

Mr. DULLES. This is an address he once lived at.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know that?

Mr. DULLES. This is correct. I want to find out what he knows about it.

Mr. REVILL. Is this a--is this an incorrect address on Mr. Oswald where
he was living at the time?

Mr. RANKIN. If you check it up I think you will find--it is an
incorrect address at the time. I think you will also find that 602
Elsbeth Street is where he lived at one time.

Mr. REVILL. Now, where they got this address----

Mr. RANKIN. You never checked that?

Mr. REVILL. I personally have not checked it but I am sure it has been
checked.

Mr. RANKIN. I see.

Mr. REVILL. But this is the address I was given.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, you say here that you were told that the subject was a
member of the Communist Party. Is that right?

Mr. REVILL. This might be my interpretation of Mr. Hosty saying a
Communist killed the President and we had him in our security files.

Mr. RANKIN. You are an expert in this field, aren't you? You are
working in the subversive field?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; but as far as an expert, I wouldn't say I am an
expert.

Mr. RANKIN. You know the difference between membership and a person
being a Communist, don't you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And you know it is a very real difference?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; there is a difference.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know which Mr. Hosty told you?

Mr. REVILL. He did not say that he was a member. This was my
connotation of what he said that a Communist, that "We had him in our
security files."

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question? Where did you get this address that
you put on of 605 Elsbeth Street, do you recall?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; from Detective E. B. Carroll or Detective Taylor.

Mr. DULLES. Are they subordinates?

Mr. REVILL. No; they are detectives assigned to the special service
bureau. One of them works the narcotics squad and one of them is
assigned to the vice unit.

Mr. DULLES. You never ascertained where they got it?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; this might be the address that they got from
Oswald, I do not know. I never even thought about it until you brought
up the point that this is not the address.

Mr. DULLES. Can you find out where they got this address?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I can.

Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful. I would like to know that. I
would like to know where they got this address also.

Mr. REVILL. It would have been the same day because this was made
within an hour----

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't put down on this statement anything about what
you said, did you?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RANKIN. Why didn't you?

Mr. REVILL. All I was doing was reporting what Mr. Hosty said to me.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that the way you make all your reports just one side?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You never say what you said?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not put our opinions or our interpretation in
the report.

Mr. RANKIN. You don't even say what you asked?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You just put the answer down?

Mr. REVILL. Put what was given to me; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And that is the way all the police department reports are
made?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I don't know whether this is the way they are all
made. This is the way we do it in our unit.

Mr. RANKIN. After you made this report, do you know what happened to it?

Mr. REVILL. I gave it to the captain, my captain, Captain Gannaway.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether it was given to the Commission when the
police reports were furnished to the Commission?

Mr. REVILL. This I do not know, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will tell you that it was not given to the Commission. Do
you know any reason why it was withheld?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know any reason why it should have been withheld
until Chief Curry came here?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with that being withheld?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I gave it to my superior, and what he did with it,
I do not know.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever have any discussions about withholding it?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You did want to protect Agent Hosty, you say?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And you hoped the information would not get out?

Mr. REVILL. By hoping----

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't say exactly that, Mr. Rankin. He said he hoped
he wouldn't have to use it against Hosty as I understood him to say.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; my opinion, and this was my personal opinion that
it would not serve any purpose. In your scope of the investigation,
yes, I can see where it would, but I hated to get involved in a
controversy with the FBI, because of our past relations.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you recently have a conversation with Lieutenant
Hopkins of Fort Worth?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Where was that?

Mr. REVILL. Lieutenant Hopkins and I went to Sacramento, Calif., to a
law enforcement intelligence unit conference and shared a room.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you discuss this matter with him?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it broke in the papers while we were there.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say to him about it?

Mr. REVILL. About the report? About this report?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. I told him about the conversation with Mr. Hosty and
about according to the news release, the news stories, this thing
was released, and the newspaper reporters and television people in
Sacramento made it impossible for me to remain at the conference so I
returned to Dallas. I was there for 1 day and returned the next, the
next evening.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about the report being inaccurate?

Mr. REVILL. Inaccurate?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Representative FORD. What was the date of this conference in Sacramento?

Mr. REVILL. April 22, 23, and 24, I believe. It was on a Thursday,
Friday, and Saturday. It could have been the 23d, 24th, and 25th but I
returned on Friday evening.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you examine the newspaper report of your report,
Exhibit 709?

Mr. REVILL. Did I examine it? Yes, sir; I read several newspaper
reports of it.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you give the reports to the newspapers?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with giving it to the
newspapers?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; this would have been the last thing I would have
done.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know who did?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not.

Representative FORD. What prompted you to discuss this information with
the other officer from Fort Worth?

Mr. REVILL. I started getting long-distance telephone calls on the
evening, it must have been the 23d, it was Thursday night, I got two
long-distance phone calls, and Lieutenant Hopkins and I were sharing a
double room and, of course----

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant who?

Mr. REVILL. Lieutenant Hopkins of the Fort Worth Police Department. H.
F. Hopkins.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. And I discussed it with him.

Representative FORD. Who was calling you long distance, what relevance
does that have to it?

Mr. REVILL. To my discussing it with him?

Representative FORD. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. The long-distance phone calls were about this report, the
Associated Press and the United Press.

Representative FORD. I see. They had heard about it, they called you
long distance and you discussed it with Hopkins who was in the room
with you?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all that I have, Mr. Chief Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further, or you?

Mr. DULLES. Tippit was not under your jurisdiction, was he?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; he was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, I am not familiar with the newspaper report
that you are speaking of. What, in substance, did it say?

Mr. REVILL. There were several articles written. The Dallas papers
carried articles on it and the Sacramento, Calif., paper carried an
article on it. In essence it had to do with this conversation that
Hosty and I had and about this report and somewhere, someplace some
newspaper reporter must have seen a copy of this because he knew how
many paragraphs they had in it and he quoted, I believe, the last
paragraph of the report verbatim, and this is what concerned me, that a
report such as this would fall into their hands.

Now, who the reporter is, there were several reporters that were
curious about the thing, and I don't even recall which newspaper
carried the verbatim paragraph about Agent Hosty's conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is what caused you and Lieutenant Hopkins to
have a discussion?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he bring the matter up to you or did you bring it up
to him?

Mr. REVILL. I might have brought it up to him because I was concerned
that this thing had been released.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your conversation concerning that?

Mr. REVILL. That I had received these calls, the first one must have
been around 2 o'clock in the morning, California time, from the
Associated Press. It was a lady writer, and she asked about this and
I told her that any statement would have to be made by Chief Curry,
and she trapped me really. She made a false statement that Hosty was
supposed to have said something else and I said no, that is not so. He
did not make a statement, and then there was my comment. From that it
looked like I had written them out a press release.

The CHAIRMAN. Looks like what?

Mr. REVILL. It appears as if I had written out a press release from the
comment in the newspapers but that was the only statement I made that
Hosty had not made such statement, it was a fabrication, he knew he was
capable, but he did not make such a statement. Hosty did not make such
a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you discussed that with Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall just what Mr. Hopkins asked you and what
you told him about this report?

Mr. REVILL. Well, when I received the first call, I was in the coffee
shop, it was 2 o'clock in the morning, we had been out with two of
the Sacramento County Sheriff's officers and I got the call and after
getting the call I went to the room and Hopkins had been awakened by
this phone call, and I told him about the call, and then from there on,
I had numerous long-distance calls, and I answered the one with the
UPI, and then I decided I would not talk to people. Because I couldn't
see where it would help anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he ask you if the substance of this report was true,
I am speaking now of Exhibit 709, the one we have been talking about.

Mr. REVILL. Mr. Hopkins had never seen this report. I just told him
what had transpired between Hosty and I and told him that a report had
been made, and this is what they were calling on.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you at any time in talking to him repudiate anything
that was in this report?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir. The only thing I repudiated was the fact that this
reporter had said that Hosty had made a statement and I said no, this
is not true, about them not believing that he would do it, and I think
I told Hopkins that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Anything more?

Mr. DULLES. I have nothing more.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, thank you very much, sir, for your help here.

Mr. REVILL. Thank you, sir. I am just sorry it happened.

The CHAIRMAN. You have told us what the truth of the situation is, you
could do no more and no less.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, just a question or two, we forgot to ask, Mr.
Rankin, would you ask them, please?

Mr. RANKIN. You said you made some handwritten notes about this 709
exhibit.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. When you gave them to the typist--do you know what happened
to those notes?

Mr. REVILL. They were destroyed, I am sure.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know what her name is who typed 709?

Mr. REVILL. Mary Jane Robertson.

Mr. RANKIN. Is she still with the police department?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. What position is she in now?

Mr. REVILL. She is a clerk-typist in the special service bureau.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know where the original of 709 is?

Mr. REVILL. With Chief Curry, I assume. Well, let's see. You have a
copy; I would assume he has got it.

Mr. DULLES. Wasn't a copy made at the time?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I have it.

Mr. DULLES. The actual copy, you have?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it is in my little briefcase.

Mr. RANKIN. So that original would be available to us?

Mr. DULLES. You have it here now?

Mr. REVILL. I have a copy.

Mr. DULLES. A carbon copy?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He showed us a copy of his testimony.

Representative FORD. Do you know how many copies were made?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; one and one; an original and one.

Representative FORD. And you kept one copy and one went to Captain
Gannaway?

Mr. REVILL. No; both copies went to Captain Gannaway who is my
immediate superior and he later gave me back the carbon and the
original went to Chief Curry.

Representative FORD. And you have had the one copy in your possession
since how long?

Mr. REVILL. Probably a week or two after this thing happened, and I
have had it in the Lee Harvey Oswald file.

Representative FORD. You have had this copy in your files in the police
department?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Since about December 1 or thereabouts?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; thereabouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you number those items in the file?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the order in which they come in?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. Now, this particular report was put in the Lee
Harvey Oswald file, and he was given an intelligence number, A & T, if
I may get this copy I will explain to you----

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; would you do so, please?

Mr. REVILL. Excuse me just a moment. You see, he was given A & T 2965,
page 34, as it appears in his file. This is indexed with a card with
this file number and page number.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, would the next item in that file be numbered
35?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it would.

The CHAIRMAN. And the one directly preceding it would be 33?

Mr. REVILL. Thirty-three; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I see, and you have the rest of your file which would
indicate that?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I don't have it with me.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but you have it in your records.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that could be produced if we wanted it?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it is the complete file we have now on Lee Harvey
Oswald.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. May we have----

Mr. DULLES. Could I just see that?

Mr. RANKIN. Could we make a copy of that?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I put another piece in there because it is on
onion skin.

Mr. RANKIN. We could make a photostatic copy quickly and return this to
you.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to number this in the next
order of exhibits and offer it in evidence, if I may, this copy, the
photostatic copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Just as a security matter, would you kindly look in the
file and see if by any chance your original longhand notes could have
been put in the file, at this place in the file?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I can, but I am sure they were not, because this
was not made at my office. You see, we are removed physically from the
police department, the intelligence unit, and this was made at the
special service bureau office.

Mr. DULLES. I see, not in your own office.

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; we are an integral part of the special service
bureau office but our files are maintained elsewhere, and this was made
at the special service bureau office.

Representative FORD. When you sat down to write out this statement,
just describe where you did it and how you did it, what kind of paper
you used and so forth.

Mr. REVILL. Well, we use the white pads like this, and I wrote it out
on the pad, and in the special service bureau office and it was made in
Lieutenant Dyson's office, he was out, and I used his desk, and then I
took it to Mrs. Robertson, and she typed it.

Representative FORD. Did you consult with Detective Brian?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Representative FORD. During the time you were preparing it?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Or subsequent to its preparation?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. At the time I couldn't have told you
who was with me or who overheard this thing because there was so much
confusion in the elevator and going to the elevator.

Representative FORD. But Brian was with you on the elevator?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was with me in the automobile and on the
elevator.

Representative FORD. Was he up in Gannaway's office with you, too?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he works for me.

Representative FORD. He was with you at the time you went to Gannaway's
office?

Mr. REVILL. The special service bureau office; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. But he didn't see this at anytime?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I say he didn't, I don't know whether he ever saw
it or not. He might have seen it when I was working on it and I gave
both of the copies to the captain.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, did that entire Oswald file that you have
just told us about come to the Commission, do you know?

Mr. REVILL. I don't know. Now what we did, we made up several large
books, and it is my understanding that a copy of one of these was given
to the Attorney General Waggoner and he was in turn to furnish it to
this Commission, this I was told by Captain Gannaway.

Mr. RANKIN. When was that?

Mr. REVILL. This was a month or two ago.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; but not when you first gave the files.

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; because this happened on the same day.

The CHAIRMAN. Should that file have included this?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; it didn't. There were only two pieces made of it,
one copy and the original made of this.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. What I am getting at, when the department sent
their reports to us, did they send copies of this file that Exhibit 709
is in?

Mr. REVILL. The Lee Harvey Oswald file?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. REVILL. I don't believe they did, because much of this is, pertains
to newspaper articles, and information that we picked up such as leads
where Ruby and Oswald were seen together, we ran all these things down,
and then we would make a report of the lead, or the findings, and a
copy of it would go in their files.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. REVILL. But this one here, was not placed in that book?

Mr. DULLES. In the original of Commission Exhibit No. 709 that you have
just given us prior to the notary public's inscription, subscription to
it, there is red ink underlining of Lee Harvey Oswald and James Hosty.
When was that put on this copy?

Mr. REVILL. I don't know, sir. Captain Gannaway must have done that
because he had the thing and then later gave it to me. Now, the reason
for it being underlined, I don't know. On the original--yes; I do.

Mr. DULLES. Would that be for filing purposes?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I do. Normally we retain the original copy of
every report for our file copy, but I did not have the file copy or the
original report so our clerk in indexing this underscored the name and
the address and she made cards for the index files.

Mr. DULLES. That was a card, also, under the file of James Hosty?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. His name is also underlined in red?

Mr. REVILL. His name indexed; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. In your original copy of Exhibit 709?

Mr. REVILL. No, sir; not the original copy, because the original----

Mr. DULLES. The carbon copy, excuse me, the carbon copy of 709.

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And I assume that Commission's Exhibit No. 709 which is a
photostat is a photostat of the original rather than of the carbon copy?

Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; and I don't know who made the photostat, I did
not. I assume Chief Curry had it made.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Reporter, we are giving the number 838 to the carbon
copy of Exhibit 709 that Lieutenant Revill has just produced.

The CHAIRMAN. You propose to take a photostat of this and return this
report to the lieutenant?

Mr. RANKIN. If we may, Mr. Chief Justice, this is the only copy that I
have.

The CHAIRMAN. You should have it back.

Mr. REVILL. That is fine.

The CHAIRMAN. We will take a photostat and return this to you then.

Mr. REVILL. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in that manner.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 838 for
identification, and received in evidence.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. Thank you, again, lieutenant.

Mr. REVILL. I will attempt to find out on that address, and I shall let
Mr. Sorrels know, with Secret Service.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; that will be fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.


TESTIMONY OF V. J. BRIAN

The CHAIRMAN. Come right in, sir. Detective Brian, the purpose of
today's hearing is to hear the testimony of Lieutenant Revill and
yourself with particular regard to an alleged conversation with Special
Agent James P. Hosty, Jr. of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
claimed to have occurred on November 22, 1963, in the afternoon and
also concerning the facts surrounding the discussion of Commission
Exhibits Nos. 709 and 711. 709 is the affidavit of Lieutenant Revill,
and 711 is the affidavit that you made concerning that matter.

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this
Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Please be seated.

Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. BRIAN. My name is Brian.

Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live?

Mr. BRIAN. In Dallas, Tex.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have some connection with the police department in
Dallas?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I am a detective in the criminal intelligence
section.

Mr. RANKIN. How long have you occupied that position?

Mr. BRIAN. Since June of 1955.

Mr. RANKIN. What is your function as a detective for the criminal
intelligence section?

Mr. BRIAN. To gain, obtain information and keep records and files, and
usually when an important Government official comes to town we guard
them or help assist guard them, and furnish information for other
agencies outside of the Dallas Police Department and have liaison, and
general criminal investigation work.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with the Lee Harvey Oswald case?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. When was the first time that you had anything to do with
that matter?

Mr. BRIAN. Well, we started interrogating people and talking to people
immediately after the assassination.

Mr. RANKIN. About what time of the day?

Mr. BRIAN. In the middle of the afternoon, probably----

Mr. RANKIN. November 22, 1963?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir. The first thing that we done, I was, I personally
that day was, assigned at the Dallas Trade Mart where the President was
to speak, I was on the side of the speaker stand when he was to come
in, and they came in and got us and told us that he had been shot, and
the President of the United States had been shot, and that a man in the
Book Depository down there and told us to go down there and see if we
could get him out, and four of us detectives down there got in a car
and we went to the Book Depository and we arrived there a short time, I
don't know what time it was, a short time after the shooting occurred.

Mr. RANKIN. Who were the four you are describing now?

Mr. BRIAN. Lieutenant Revill, myself, a detective, O. J. Tarver, and a
detective, Roy W. Westphal.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you do there?

Mr. BRIAN. We searched the Book Depository for a couple of hours. We
spent about 2 hours, I would guess, approximately 2 hours down there
searching the Depository.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you find anything at that time?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir. I was there on the floor when the man found shells
over in a corner when--where the assassin was hidden at. But other than
that, I wasn't present when anything was found.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you just describe that event when you saw those shells?

Mr. BRIAN. Well, a police sergeant, Jerry Hill, hollered, I was on the
opposite side of the sixth floor, hollered that he had, this is where
he shot from, and shells were laying there, and I walked from where I
was at over to the other corner of the building and looked, and that
is about the extent of my investigation there because they called the
crime laboratory and everybody else to get down there and they got an
officer to guard the place and not let nobody get around and we went on
searching the building.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you see, how many shells did you see?

Mr. BRIAN. I am going to guess.

Mr. RANKIN. We don't want you to guess. If you can tell us your
recollection, that is all.

Mr. BRIAN. Well, the first time I went over there, I believe I saw two,
but I am not sure, but I went back again later and there were three
shells there.

Mr. RANKIN. Now after that, did you leave the Depository Building?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; after we spent considerable time, we went from the
top floor down to the bottom floor, back up, going through it, and we
finally wound up on the second floor taking all the acoustic tile out
of the ceiling looking up to see if anybody was hidden up there, and I
believe that was the last thing we did in the building. By that time,
there were a number of people in the building.

Mr. RANKIN. You were making a complete search of each floor, were you?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I was with, I mean there were a number of officers
there. I didn't do it by myself, there were a number of us there and we
were searching it.

Mr. RANKIN. Then you left the building?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you leave with some other officers?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; Lieutenant Revill, myself, and Tarver and Westphal
all went back to the car and left to go to city hall.

Mr. RANKIN. Then you got back to the city hall. What did you do?

Mr. BRIAN. We drove into the basement and parked.

Mr. RANKIN. What time of the day was that, can you tell us?

Mr. BRIAN. Probably around 2 o'clock or somewhere in that. I don't
really know to be truthful because I didn't pay any attention to the
time but it was around 2 o'clock, I would guess.

Mr. RANKIN. And the four of you were together at that time?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. What happened at that point?

Mr. BRIAN. We got out of the car, and as we got out of the car----

Mr. DULLES. Was the car already inside the building or in the driveway
there?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Let me explain. City hall basement, as some of you all know----

Mr. DULLES. I was just there so I want to know.

Mr. BRIAN. We came around the ramp and we parked in the basement. We
were parked in the basement, and we got out, and started around, there
is a railing there, we started around the railing and at that time Jim
Hosty was coming across the basement, at a fast trot, or moving fairly
fast----

Mr. RANKIN. Special Agent Hosty of the Bureau?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

And he came across there and I know him, and I had known him for a good
while to speak to him.

Mr. RANKIN. Where were you with reference to Lieutenant Revill at that
point?

Mr. BRIAN. I think I was on his, probably his right-hand side.

Mr. RANKIN. Close to him?

Mr. BRIAN. Fairly close; yes, sir.

And so we walked over to meet, kind of cornered, you cross paths and we
walked up there to meet Jim, and he said, he came up there and he said,
that Lee Oswald, a Communist, killed the President, and then Revill
said, "What?" He said, Lee Oswald, a Communist, killed the President.

He was in--nervous--in a hurry, and was just talking.

And then he said, he said that he knew that he was a Communist and he
knew he worked in the Book Depository, and then Lieutenant Revill said
something else to him, I am not--I don't know what he said, and they
walked off in front of me going in around and in through the door over
to the elevator to go up, and then we accompanied Agent Hosty up to
Captain Fritz' office which is on the----

Mr. DULLES. Was the elevator there at the basement floor when you took
it or did you have to wait?

Mr. BRIAN. We had to wait just a very short time on it. It wasn't
standing open waiting; no, sir.

We had to wait on it just a very short time, I believe, and we went up
to the third floor, and Hosty and Lieutenant Revill went in there and
talked. I went to the door and just stepped inside and waited and then
we went back downstairs to our office which is on two, right underneath
Captain Fritz' office.

Mr. DULLES. You accompanied them to the third floor and then you came
down?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. In the elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. That I am not sure.

Mr. DULLES. Or did you get out and come down the stairs?

Mr. BRIAN. I am not sure.

Mr. DULLES. But you weren't with Lieutenant Revill any further?

Mr. BRIAN. When we came back down to our office, we came back down, I
am not sure whether we rode the elevator or not. It is a short trip
down and I am--I would be afraid to say whether we walked, rode, or
how we got down, but we went into Captain Gannaway's office and Revill
told, Lieutenant Revill told the Captain what Hosty had said, so he
said, "Write a report."

Mr. RANKIN. What did he say at that time? What did he tell the Captain
that Agent Hosty had said?

Mr. BRIAN. He told him, short and very quick, that they knew that
Oswald was a Communist and that he was in the Book Depository, and he
said, "Write a report and get it back to me right now."

And he went right back and wrote a report.

I forgot about the whole incident, I didn't think it would be important
and I didn't--well, in fact, I didn't have time to because when I got
back there they had a list of names they were going to start checking
out and they handed me six of them and says, "Start going and checking
here and here and here and checking these people."

So I never did dwell on it again.

Mr. RANKIN. In this conversation down in the basement, have you told us
all that Agent Hosty said that you recall?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And have you told us all that Lieutenant Revill said that
you recall?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us all that Lieutenant Revill told to Captain
Gannaway that you recall?

Mr. BRIAN. Well, let's see. I believe that I have, yes, sir.
When--Captain Gannaway's office, as you go in the door and turn right
and his office is in there and if I recall correctly I didn't go all
the way in his office, he did and I stood in the door, and I really
didn't make a mental note of what happened and things were moving at a
rather fast pace, and I believe that I did; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You have made an affidavit about this, have you not?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I made a report to Chief Curry.

Mr. RANKIN. And you swore to that?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Is Exhibit 711 a photostatic copy of your report that you
made that you have just described?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you swear to that report on the date that it bears?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. April 20, 1964?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You read the Exhibit 711 right now, didn't you?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Is it correct?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Are there any additions or corrections that you wish to
make to it?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to ask if you fixed the date on which he
dictated that or wrote it, whichever he did.

Mr. RANKIN. I haven't, but I will.

Will you tell us on what date you wrote or dictated Exhibit 711?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; the day before, I believe it was the day before,
Chief Curry came up here. It was either a day or 2 days before April
20th is what it says on there. That is the date that I made the report,
the day or 2 days before Chief Curry came up here.

Will you tell us on what date you wrote or dictated Exhibit 711?

Mr. BRIAN. I didn't think--well, Captain Gannaway told Lieutenant
Revill to write a report about the thing the date it happened, and he
did, or I assumed he did, and I guess that he did. I haven't----

Mr. RANKIN. Have you ever seen that report?

Mr. BRIAN. I have seen it, but I haven't read it. That is unusual but I
haven't. I didn't think the incident was really important, that is the
reason why I didn't dwell on it, and I am sure it is now or I wouldn't
be up here.

But they, a few days before Chief Curry was to come up here they said
they wanted a report, you know, to what I had heard in the basement
and this and that and the other, and I said, "Well, I better write one
then."

I just assumed it was all taken care of, and so I wrote one on the
20th, I wrote that report on the 20th and swore to it and turned it in
and he brought it up here.

Mr. DULLES. You made no contemporaneous memoranda, that is on November
22 you made no notes or memoranda of this?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Mr. DULLES. So the report of April 20 you dictated on or about April 20
is based on your memory?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Exhibit 711, your report, was that written out in longhand
or dictated to a girl?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; I typed it myself on the typewriter. We don't have
a stenographer in our office to dictate to.

Mr. RANKIN. You did type the part about the notary and so forth on the
bottom?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know who did that?

Mr. BRIAN. I believe Bill Biggio.

Mr. RANKIN. Who is he?

Mr. BRIAN. He is a detective who works the desk there, who is a notary
who notarized it.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, before you made Exhibit 711 did anyone give you
Lieutenant Revill's report to examine?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Compare your report with?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And you have never read that?

Mr. BRIAN. I don't recall reading it; no, sir. I sure don't. I probably
looked at it but as far as sitting down and reading it, I have never
read the report, I don't believe.

Mr. RANKIN. So if there is any differences between your report and his
you are not familiar with them?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Representative FORD. Subsequent to November 22 and prior to April 20,
when you prepared this Exhibit 711, did you ever talk to Lieutenant
Revill about the incident?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I sure did. He couldn't remember who was with him
down in the basement, and it rocked on there and had rocked on there,
and somewhere it came out that somebody said he was lying about it and
he was telling us, he said, "I am telling you the truth". "You don't
have to tell me, I know you are; I was standing there with you."

And he said, "You were the one who was with me?"

And I said, "Yes, I was with you."

And I assumed he knew that I was with him. That is when he talked to
Chief Curry and Chief Curry come back and said he needed the report
from me, too.

Representative FORD. When did this conversation take place?

Mr. BRIAN. The date I don't have any idea. Probably 2 or 3 weeks, I
will tell you----

Mr. DULLES. 2 or 3 weeks what? After November 22?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; before the date I wrote the report, because I
messed around there for another couple of weeks and then I walked in
the office one day and he said, "Chief Curry wants it today," and I
said, "All right, I will write it," and I sat down and wrote it, and
I believe the next day or the day after that he brought it, came up
here, and all this come out in the paper about making a statement and
me backing the statement up in Dallas, I don't know whether it came up
here or not.

Representative FORD. Who prompted this conversation that you have been
describing?

Mr. BRIAN. In our office that day?

Representative FORD. Yes.

Mr. BRIAN. I am trying to think what brought it on. Somebody, there was
a statement in the paper or something that said that--anyway, somewhere
down the line it came out, it said it wasn't right what Lieutenant
Revill had said.

And I said, "I know it is right, I was standing there," and that was
about the extent of that.

And then he said, "Well, I will need"--he talked to Chief Curry, I
guess, and they decided they needed a report from me on it, and then
I finally wrote the report and he brought it up here. I guess it was
just in the course of a conversation more than anything. I don't think
anybody prompted it, really.

Representative FORD. In this Commission 711 you actually typed it out
yourself?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Are you a fairly accomplished typist?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir. I can type fairly well. I am not a touch typist. I
can't copy, but I can type fairly well typing something I don't have
to copy off of a sheet of paper. In other words, I have to look at the
keys to type it.

Representative FORD. Did you have to rewrite this a second time on the
typewriter?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir. I made several strikeovers and some other stuff,
and typed it, I had to type it over again.

Representative FORD. In other words, you typed it out once, and then
retyped it yourself?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I typed it twice. The first time everything wasn't
right in there and the spelling and the strikeovers and stuff, and not
being an accomplished typist I still don't like to throw things out,
you know, that don't look too bad so I typed it over again.

Representative FORD. But after you typed it over the first time did you
show it to somebody else?

Mr. BRIAN. I believe Lieutenant Revill looked at it and called a bunch
of mistakes to my attention.

Representative FORD. What kind of mistakes?

Mr. BRIAN. Well, I don't know. There were some strikeovers and some, a
couple of misspelled words, I believe, and I don't have a copy of the
one that I copied from so I couldn't say, but I did have to type the
report over.

Representative FORD. But these mistakes that were pointed out by
Lieutenant Revill, were they mistakes of substance or just mistakes
involving spelling and the like?

Mr. BRIAN. Well, what do you mean by substance now?

Representative FORD. Well, I mean as to the precise things that you
said as to what transpired?

Mr. BRIAN. I don't believe there were. I am trying to recall what I had
to add that took place there, and----

Representative FORD. It is important whether or not any statements of
facts were altered or whether the changes were simply typographical
errors or otherwise.

Mr. BRIAN. I will tell you one thing that I recall he called to my
attention was 2:05 p.m., I believe, and I told him, I said I can't put
that in there because I don't know what time it was, and I don't. I
don't have any idea of what time it was, and he said, "Well, all right,
leave that out," but I think the substance was probably the same in
both reports. In fact, I am sure the substance was probably the same,
because it was, the grammar was changed in some places, some spelling
was changed, and some strikeovers were changed, and I think probably
the second report was copied, that one was copied partially from the
first one and then I made some changes.

Representative FORD. While you were in the process of discussing this
with Lieutenant Revill he didn't show you his report, Exhibit 709?

Mr. BRIAN. I don't know whether he did or not. I don't believe that he
did. I don't believe he did.

Representative FORD. Had you seen it before?

Mr. BRIAN. I have seen the report.

Representative FORD. Did you see it before you typed this up?

Mr. BRIAN. I don't recall seeing it. I may have, but I don't recall it.

Now, he has got something in there that I don't have in mine, I know
about him saying that Hosty knew that Oswald, I believe, was capable of
assassinating the President, but I didn't hear Hosty say that.

Representative FORD. When did you learn that that statement was in
Revill's statement?

Mr. BRIAN. Just to be truthful, I don't know.

Mr. RANKIN. Did Lieutenant Revill ask you to include in your statement
that Hosty had said that Oswald was known to be capable of being an
assassin?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; he asked me if I heard him say it and I told him
no, but I don't believe he asked me to include that in the report.

Mr. DULLES. You told him, no.

Mr. RANKIN. When was that?

Mr. BRIAN. Probably the day--now, this all happened in the course of a
week's time and the conversations are hard to put on a day or time, I
mean when you don't think--I didn't think all this was real important,
and so I didn't try to backlog it to where--it was probably the day,
probably about April 20, along in there.

Mr. RANKIN. Before or after you wrote your report?

Mr. BRIAN. In between the first report and the second report I imagine.

Mr. RANKIN. I am not quite clear about how you happened to make this
report in that I understood you to say that there were some newspaper
accounts about it, and the lieutenant said, well, he had said what was
true and something like that. Can you tell us what happened?

Mr. BRIAN. Well, now, to go back. We were in the office talking and I
don't know how long this was because it may have been 2 days, 3 days,
2 weeks or 3 weeks, before I wrote that report, we were sitting in the
office, and I don't recall whether it was a newspaper account or what
it was, but anywhere somewhere down the line he got--somebody said that
it wasn't the truth and he was lying or something and he was sitting
out there talking and he said, he said he wasn't lying about it and I
told him, I said "I know you are not lying because I stood there and
heard you."

And he said, "Oh, you are the one who was with me?" And I said, "Yes."

But I assumed that his report, up until that time I had not seen his
report, and I have seen it since then and I haven't read it from one
end to the other until the other day, and he said, "Well, I am glad
to know you are the one who was there then," and evidently he had
forgotten I was there, too.

So, he said, "Well, make me a report on what you heard," and I said,
"All right, I will," and he talked to Chief Curry and evidently before
he told me that it was a matter of days or time differential in there
and I said, "All right," and I just did not get around to it until
finally one day I came in the office and he said, "I've got to have
that report today," and I said, "All right," and I sat down and wrote
it and I had to write it over again, that happened on the day the
report is dated.

Mr. RANKIN. All of that happened, though, before any news accounts of
it, didn't it?

Mr. BRIAN. Well, I don't remember when they started putting it in the
newspapers. There had been something about it to make him, somewhere to
make him say, he was trying to convince me he was telling the truth and
I said, "Well, I know you are."

I don't know what brought it on, I don't know whether it was a
newspaper report or something, but anyway there was some--maybe
Chief Curry was on him about it, I don't know. But he said that he
was telling the truth and I told him I knew he was telling the truth
because I had heard it.

Mr. RANKIN. You said you were there with him?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. How close were you to him when he was talking to Hosty?

Mr. BRIAN. Right next to him when we were talking with him. We talked
around there and how you meet, you know, you walk up together and meet
and went on with him.

Mr. DULLES. You were walking toward the elevator at that time, weren't
you?

Mr. BRIAN. Let me draw you a little picture of how that is down there.

Mr. DULLES. I have been in the basement so I know something about it.

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir. But the ramp goes up here, this is why it would be
easier to draw a picture and it would be easier than I can explain. He
came down the ramp.

Mr. DULLES. In the car?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And you parked in the basement?

Mr. BRIAN. And we parked the car, and Hosty had parked over here. You
know the ramp is wide here and the other side goes up here, he had
parked over in here and he was coming across this way and we coming
across this way and we met.

Mr. DULLES. Where is the elevator which takes prisoners up where Oswald
was shot?

Mr. BRIAN. Right through here, right in here somewhere is where Ruby
shot Oswald and this is a ramp from the Main Street side and this is
the ramp to the Commerce side. And this is the elevator.

Mr. DULLES. Where is the elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. The elevator is right there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the prisoners' elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the freight elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; that is the elevator going up----

The CHAIRMAN. Which one did you take?

Mr. BRIAN. We took the elevator inside the city hall basement.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. DULLES. Is there only one elevator there?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; there are two side by side. Back on this side of
the basement there are two elevators over here and one freight elevator
right back on in here. But this is to the city hall this direction and
this is the ramp coming in from Main Street and the ramp going up to
Commerce Street. We drove in this ramp one way going in this way and
one way going out.

Mr. DULLES. Where are the stairs?

Mr. BRIAN. In the basement?

Mr. DULLES. You don't know?

Mr. BRIAN. There are no stairs in the basement. I mean out here where
the cars are parked. Right here is the ramp, there is a walkway going
up but it is not a stairway and then it levels off and you go by
through here, and the jail is right here, do you recall the jail being
here, on the right by the doors as you go in.

Mr. DULLES. I only saw the jail on top side.

Mr. BRIAN. Well, the jail office is right there at the head of this
ramp, the jail office where they book the prisoners through.

Mr. DULLES. I didn't go in there.

Mr. BRIAN. That is the door they brought Lee Oswald out of when he was
shot, going into the jail office right there.

Mr. RANKIN. There are no stairs from the basement to the third floor?

Mr. BRIAN. There are stairs inside of the basement but there are none
out here, inside of the basement of city hall but none out here in the
parking area.

Mr. RANKIN. Where are the stairs from the place where the elevators are
that you took. Are there any stairs?

Mr. BRIAN. I didn't take any stairs.

Mr. RANKIN. No. You say you took elevators.

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Were there stairs near the elevators?

Mr. BRIAN. Back right over--let me get a pencil and draw the whole
thing for you. That is about the way it is situated right there.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Brian, we will call that Exhibit 839. Will you just
briefly tell the Commission what you have done in making that exhibit
now?

Mr. BRIAN. All right, sir. I am not an artist. But we came down the
ramp on Main Street, came around here to the parking area. Mr. Hosty
was parked over here. There is a bunch of poles out there and I won't
try to draw them in here.

Mr. RANKIN. Mark that "A" where Mr. Hosty was parked as you just
indicated.

Mr. BRIAN. All right. And he was coming this way and we were coming
this way. We met him about in the middle of this ramp out here, and
talked, and----

Mr. RANKIN. You were right alongside of Lieutenant Revill?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; and they walked on off and I came back behind
through here to these elevators and off here we caught the elevators
and went on up.

Mr. RANKIN. How close were you when you came behind them?

Mr. BRIAN. Just--I didn't keep a constant pace with them, but as far
as--I don't recall exactly----

Mr. RANKIN. You were close to them, were you?

Mr. BRIAN. Here is the stairway in the basement, there is one narrow
stairway going up to the first floor, and you pass it and you go by the
phone booth and a jail office and you pass the stairway, it is right
over here in the basement of city hall.

Mr. RANKIN. And you were close to them as you went across there to take
the elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. I was behind them and they were going away from me and I was
fairly close, yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. About how far?

Mr. BRIAN. Probably 6 or 7 feet or 8 feet behind. When we got to the
elevator and we all stopped there together and caught the elevator.

Mr. DULLES. Where did the conversation take place, in front of the
elevators there?

Mr. BRIAN. That I heard?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. BRIAN. Right out here, because Mr. Hosty started blurting it out
just as soon as he started across here.

Mr. DULLES. And you walked from this point here?

Mr. BRIAN. Over to here, to the elevators.

Mr. DULLES. Mark that point "B."

Mr. RANKIN. Where you met?

Mr. DULLES. Where you met Hosty.

Mr. BRIAN. OK.

Mr. DULLES. And you walked along, make a mark there, if you would,
along there to the elevators where you walked.

Mr. BRIAN. That is not exactly that way, this is offset, you have to
come over here to go up, it is not drawn exactly right, we walked
across here to the elevators straight through.

Mr. DULLES. How far is that, a hundred feet--no, less than that.

Mr. BRIAN. It is much less than a hundred feet.

Mr. DULLES. Fifty feet, something like that.

Mr. BRIAN. Probably 60, 70 feet.

Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRIAN. Something like that.

Mr. DULLES. Where is this, where does that stairway go?

Mr. BRIAN. Up to the first floor. Back in the hallway.

Mr. DULLES. And you are quite clear you didn't go up that stairway?

Mr. BRIAN. We didn't go up a stairway, no; not that stairway here.

Mr. DULLES. Or any other stairway?

Mr. BRIAN. Going up?

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; we didn't go up the stairway going up.

The CHAIRMAN. When you got up to the first floor by that stairway, are
there other stairs leading up to the floors above that connect with
this?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; you have to go around. This is just a narrow
stairway going from the basement, it is probably, well, just a regular
narrow staircase that goes up, straight up. After you get to the first
floor the stairways widen out probably as wide as that window and go up
half a floor and meet another landing and then go up to the third floor
that way. They widen out.

Representative FORD. Was anybody with Mr. Hosty?

Mr. BRIAN. Not when we met him there; no, sir.

Representative FORD. When you got on the elevator, who was on the
elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. It was full.

Mr. DULLES. Were there a lot of pressmen down there, no television----

Mr. BRIAN. I don't recall seeing any but there may have been some. I
don't recall seeing any but there may have been.

The CHAIRMAN. You say the elevator was full?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. About how many people would it carry approximately?

Mr. BRIAN. Probably 10 or 12.

Representative FORD. Did Revill and Hosty and yourself get on the
elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Anybody else get on at that point that you recall?

Mr. BRIAN. As I recall there was a little interchange of people, some
got off and some got on, I believe. I believe there was a little
interchange of people.

Mr. DULLES. At the bottom, that is the bottom story for the elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; in the basement.

Representative FORD. As you got on the elevator and as you rode up, did
you hear Hosty and Revill converse at all?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Representative FORD. There was no further conversation on this problem?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Representative FORD. When you got off the elevator where did you go?

Mr. BRIAN. Right on around. You get off the elevator and you come
straight out----

Mr. DULLES. What floor--three?

Mr. BRIAN. Three. Went around to the left to Captain Fritz' office and
turned right in Captain Fritz' office and I stopped right there at the
door and he took him over and introduced him, talked to, I believe,
Lieutenant Wells.

Mr. DULLES. Captain Fritz wasn't there at that time?

Mr. BRIAN. I don't recall seeing him in there. But Captain Fritz has
got him a little office in the side and you have got to walk up in
front and see if he is in there because he stays in there all the time.

Representative FORD. What did Revill and you do?

Mr. BRIAN. Went back down to our office.

Representative FORD. Gannaway's--is that Gannaway's office?

Mr. BRIAN. Gannaway's; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. As you drove----

Mr. DULLES. What floor is that on?

Mr. BRIAN. Captain Gannaway's is on the second floor.

Representative FORD. As you drove from the Texas School Depository
Building after making a check of the facilities who was in the car?

Mr. BRIAN. Our car?

Representative FORD. Yes.

Mr. BRIAN. Let me see, Lieutenant Revill, myself, Westphal, Tarver,
and we gave a man a lift, and I don't remember whether he was a CID, I
don't know the man, I don't remember whether he was a CIC agent or a
CID or OSI, he was some type of, as I recall, Army intelligence man.

Mr. DULLES. Army, Air Force, or something?

Mr. BRIAN. He was connected with the service and we let him out a
couple of blocks, if I recall, up about Field Street, somewhere along
in there. Lieutenant Revill knew him, who he was, and he rode up there
with us.

Representative FORD. Who drove the car?

Mr. BRIAN. Lieutenant Revill. It was his car.

Representative FORD. Did you sit in the front or back seat?

Mr. BRIAN. Sat in the back seat on the left-hand side.

Representative FORD. Who sat in the front seat.

Mr. BRIAN. I don't recall.

Mr. DULLES. You were right behind Lieutenant Revill?

Mr. BRIAN. I believe I was right behind Lieutenant Revill. Yes, sir;
that is, I believe I sat in the back seat.

Representative FORD. When you got into the building and got out of the
car, what happened to the other occupants of the car?

Mr. BRIAN. I don't know. They went on about, probably went up to
Captain Gannaway, but I don't recall seeing them after we started
talking to Hosty and went on, somewhere in the shuffle they didn't stay
with us and went on.

Representative FORD. They didn't accompany you up the elevator?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; and I don't know where they went.

Mr. DULLES. That is they weren't among the possibly 10 men of the
police who were in the elevator, as far as you remember, I mean?

Mr. BRIAN. As far as I remember; no.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Brian, I call your attention to Exhibit 857A and the
fact that is a newspaper account and ask you to examine and state
whether or not you recall having seen that before. I want to correct
the record, that is Commission 857A which is attached to Exhibit 831.

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I read this in the Dallas paper, I believe.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with giving that to the paper?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you talk to any newspaper people about it?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; haven't talked to any since it happened.

Mr. RANKIN. All you know about it is that you just saw it in the paper?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Then----

Mr. BRIAN. I know the next--it was supposed to come out on Friday
because on Saturday they started calling my house and I left.

Mr. RANKIN. You never answered any of the calls?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; I never talked to any reporters about it.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all I have, Mr. Chief Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman, do you have anything?

Representative FORD. I don't believe so, Mr. Chief Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles?

Mr. DULLES. Give me just 1 minute, Mr. Chief Justice. In the second
paragraph of your letter, Commission Exhibit 711, you say "Upon
entering the basement of city hall," he, Agent Hosty, that you
explained, who had already parked his car, he also parked his car in
the basement of the city hall building?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; over here where you told me to put "A" he was or
in that area over there and was out of his car walking towards us.

Mr. DULLES. And you go on to say "and was walking very fast toward the
entrance of the city hall from the parking area."

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; that is this entrance over here.

Mr. DULLES. What is that marked? Is there a mark on that?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir. You didn't tell me to mark "A" and "B" where we met.

Mr. DULLES. You might mark that "C," I think we have "A" and "B."

Mr. BRIAN. O.K., "C" would be the entrance by the jail office.

Mr. DULLES. That is right.

"At this time Hosty made the statement that Lee Oswald had killed the
President, and that Oswald was a Communist."

Now, at this time, that is walking toward point "C" you have just
marked on exhibit----

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; we stopped here for a pause just for a short time,
it would be hard to say how long but it wasn't because--it wasn't long
because it don't take long to make a statement.

Representative FORD. That is point "B."

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Near point "B" is where this conversation took place.

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And you did not hear the content of any further
conversations?

Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; other than that he said he knew he was a Communist
and knew he was working in the Book Depository.

Mr. DULLES. Did further conversations take place between Lieutenant
Revill and Agent Hosty after that?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; they walked on talking.

Mr. DULLES. But you did not hear what they said at that time?

Mr. BRIAN. I was behind them and Lieutenant Revill got in a hurry when
that happened and they got on and I was behind them, and it is pretty
hard to hear what people are saying in front of you when they have got
their back turned to you and you are behind them.

Mr. DULLES. You have indicated that in paragraph 3 of Exhibit 7. You
say, "While we were in the basement Hosty also said several things to
Lieutenant Revill that I could not hear," because of the excitement and
commotion, that is what you had reference to?

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; they were conversing as they walked on and I
couldn't hear them and I didn't hear what they said, I was behind them.
I didn't pay a whole lot of attention to the whole thing because like
I say I didn't think it would matter any. It was just--and things were
happening pretty fast, and along about that time.

Mr. DULLES. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer the diagram, Exhibit
839, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, all right; it may be admitted under that number.
Thank you very much.

(At this point Representative Ford left the hearing room.)

(Commission Exhibit No. 839 was marked for identification and received
in evidence.)

Mr. DULLES. That is the original before the notary public put his
endorsement on it.

Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; that went forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Specter is going to examine these
people about the velocity and so forth and I want to speak on--speak to
him just a minute about the matter we talked about.

The CHAIRMAN. We will take a break now.

(Recess.)


TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. FRAZIER

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Specter, you may proceed.

You have been sworn and you are still under oath, as you understand?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you state your name again for the record, please?

Mr. FRAZIER. Robert A. Frazier.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, you have appeared heretofore to testify
about certain tests which you have conducted, but at this phase of the
record, will you state briefly your occupation and your specialty,
please?

Mr. FRAZIER. I am a special agent assigned to the FBI laboratory,
the firearms identification unit in Washington, D.C., where I make
examinations of bullets, cartridges, gunpowder tests, bullet holes,
examinations of clothing, and other similar types of examinations.

Mr. SPECTER. In the course of your duties have you had an occasion
to examine the clothing which was purportedly worn by President John
Kennedy on November 22, 1963?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And do you have that clothing with you at the present
time, sir?

Mr. FRAZIER. I have certain parts of it. I have the coat, shirt, tie,
and the bandages and support belt which he allegedly was wearing that
day.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you refer at this time to the coat, if you please,
which, may the record show, has heretofore been marked as Commission
Exhibit 393.

And by referring to that coat will you describe what, if anything, you
observed on the rear side of the coat?

Mr. FRAZIER. There was located on the rear of the coat 5-3/8 inches
below the top of the collar, a hole, further located as 1-3/4 inches to
the right of the midline or the seam down the center of the coat; all
of these being as you look at the back of the coat.

Mr. SPECTER. What characteristics did you note, if any, on the nature
of that hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. I noticed that the hole penetrated both the outer and
lining areas of the coat, that it was roughly circular in shape. When
I first examined it it was approximately one-fourth of an inch in
diameter, and the cloth fibers around the margins of the hole were
pushed inward at the time I first examined it in the laboratory.

Mr. SPECTER. Did any tests conducted on the coat disclose any metallic
substance on that area of that hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir. I had a spectrographer run an analysis of a
portion of the hole which accounts for its being slightly enlarged at
the present time. He took a sample of cloth and made an analysis of it.
I don't know actually whether I am expected to give the results of his
analysis or not.

Mr. SPECTER. Yes; would you please, or let me ask you first of all,
were those tests run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the
regular course of its testing procedures?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; they were.

Mr. SPECTER. And have those results been made available to you through
the regular recordkeeping procedures of the FBI?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you then please tell us what those tests disclose?

Mr. FRAZIER. Traces of copper were found around the margins of the hole
in the back of the coat, and as a control, a very small section under
the collar was taken, and no copper being found there, it was concluded
that the copper was foreign to the coat itself.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you now described all of the characteristics of
that hole, which you consider to be important for the Commission's
consideration?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Assuming that those clothes, that jacket, specifically,
at this juncture, was worn by President Kennedy, and was in the same
condition when that hole was made as it is now, and at the time when
you made your examination, do you have a professional opinion as to
what caused that hole in the back of the jacket?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; I would say that it was an entrance hole for a
bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the reason for that conclusion, please?

Mr. FRAZIER. It has all the physical appearance characteristics which
are considered when examining holes, such as its shape, its size, and
in particular the fact that the fibers around the margins of the hole
were all pushed inward where the cloth was torn by the object which
passed through, and the fibers were unraveled as they were pushed
inward, which is characteristic of a entrance-type bullet hole.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the presence of the metallic substance relevant in your
conclusion that it was a bullet hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. Not necessarily. It is a factor which corroborates that
opinion but even without it, it would still have been my opinion that
it was a bullet entrance hole.

Mr. SPECTER. Can you tell the size of the bullet from the hole in the
jacket?

Mr. FRAZIER. The hole in the jacket is approximately a quarter of an
inch in diameter.

Mr. SPECTER. Would that hole be consistent with a hole which would be
caused by a 6.5 millimeter bullet?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; the actual bullet which makes a hole cannot be
determined because the cloth in one instance may stretch more than
it does in another instance causing either a larger or smaller hole
even for the same caliber, but it is consistent for a bullet of 6.5
millimeters in diameter to make a hole of approximately this size.

Mr. SPECTER. Were there any holes indicative of being bullet holes
found on the front part of the President's jacket?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have further occasion to examine the President's
shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. I did.

Mr. SPECTER. May the record show that the shirt has heretofore been
identified as Commission Exhibit 394?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may be.

Mr. SPECTER. What, if anything, did you observe then on the back side
of the shirt, Mr. Frazier?

Mr. FRAZIER. I found on the back of the shirt a hole, 5-3/4 inches
below the top of the collar, and as you look at the back of the shirt
1-1/8 inch to the right of the midline of the shirt, which is this hole
I am indicating.

Mr. SPECTER. May the record show the witness is examining the shirt, as
he has the coat, to indicate the hole to the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. The record may show that.

Mr. FRAZIER. In connection with this hole, I made the same examination
as I did on the coat, Exhibit 393. I found the same situation to
prevail, that is the hole was approximately circular in shape, about
one-fourth inch in diameter, and again the physical shape of it is
characteristic of a bullet hole, that is the edges are frayed, and
there are slight radial tears in the cloth, which is characteristic
of a bullet having passed through the cloth, and further, the fibers
around the margin of the hole were--had been pressed inward, and
assuming that, when I first examined the shirt it was in the same
condition as it was at the time the hole was made, it is my opinion
that this hole, in addition, was caused by a bullet entering the shirt
from the back at that point.

Mr. SPECTER. Is that hole consistent with having been caused by a 6.5
millimeter bullet?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; it is.

Mr. SPECTER. With respect to the front side of the shirt, what, if any,
hole did you find there?

Mr. FRAZIER. Only one hole.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask one question there?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; certainly.

Mr. DULLES. Is the hole in the shirt and the hole in the coat you have
just described in a position that indicates that the same instrument,
whatever it was, or the same bullet, made the two?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; they are. They are both--the coat hole is 5-3/8
inches below the top of the collar. The shirt hole is 5-3/4 inches,
which could be accounted for by a portion of the collar sticking up
above the coat about a half inch.

Mr. DULLES. I see.

Mr. FRAZIER. And they are both located approximately the same distance
to the right of the midline of both garments.

Now, on the front of the shirt, I found what amounts to one hole.
Actually, it is a hole through both the button line of the shirt and
the buttonhole line which overlap down the front of the shirt when it
is buttoned.

Mr. SPECTER. Proceed.

Mr. FRAZIER. This hole is located immediately below the button being
centered seven-eighths of an inch below the button on the shirt, and
similarly seven-eighths of an inch below the buttonhole on the opposite
side.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of the collar button itself, aren't you?

Mr. FRAZIER. The collar button.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. In each instance for these holes, the one through the
button line and the one through the buttonhole line, the hole amounts
to a ragged slit approximately one-half inch in height. It is oriented
vertically, and the fibers of the cloth are protruding outward,
that is, have been pushed from the inside out. I could not actually
determine from the characteristics of the hole whether or not it
was caused by a bullet. However, I can say that it was caused by a
projectile of some type which exited from the shirt at that point and
that is again assuming that when I first examined the shirt it was--it
had not been altered from the condition it was in at the time the hole
was made.

Mr. SPECTER. What characteristics differ between the hole in the rear
of the shirt and the holes in the front of the shirt which lead you to
conclude that the hole in the rear of the shirt was caused by a bullet
but which are absent as to the holes in the front of the shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. The hole in the front of the shirt does not have the round
characteristic shape caused by a round bullet entering cloth. It is an
irregular slit. It could have been caused by a round bullet, however,
since the cloth could have torn in a long slitlike way as the bullet
passed through it. But that is not specifically characteristic of a
bullethole to the extent that you could say it was to the exclusion of
being a piece of bone or some other type of projectile.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you now described all of the characteristics of the
front of the shirt holes which you consider to be important?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there. If the bullet, after
entering, hit something that made it tumble or change, would that
account for this change in the appearance of the exit through the shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. I think not. In my opinion it would not have been
necessary, if I may put it that way, for the bullet to have turned
sideways or partially sideways in order to make an elongated hole.

Mr. DULLES. I see.

Mr. FRAZIER. I think the effect in the front of the shirt is due more
to the strength of the material being more in the horizontal rather
than the vertical direction which caused the cloth to tear vertically
rather than due to a change in the shape or size of the bullet or
projectile.

Mr. DULLES. Or possibly the velocity of the bullet at that place, would
that have anything to do with it?

Mr. FRAZIER. I think the hole would not have been affected unless it
was a very large change in velocity.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Frazier, I notice that the front of the shirt
immediately around the hole you have just been describing and in fact
on much of the front of the shirt is bloodsoaked. Would that, with the
other evidences you have seen there indicate to you as an expert that
this was the exit of the bullet that had entered in the back of the
coat as you have described it?

Mr. FRAZIER. The presence of the blood would have in my opinion no
value for determining which was entrance or exit, because I have seen
entrance wounds which bleed extensively and exit wounds which bleed not
at all and vice versa. It depends entirely on the type of bullet which
strikes, whether or not it mutilates itself in the body, and probably
more importantly it depends on the position of the person who is shot
after the shooting occurs as to where the blood will be located on the
garments.

The CHAIRMAN. May I put it this way, probably a little better. Do the
evidences that you see on this shirt indicate to you that this hole in
the front of the shirt that you have just described was made by the
bullet which entered in the rear.

Mr. FRAZIER. I can say that this hole in the collar area could have
been made by this bullet but I cannot say that the bullet which entered
the back actually came out here or at some other place because I am not
aware of the autopsy information as to the path of the bullet through
the body.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. FRAZIER. But if the path of the bullet was such that it came
through the body at the right angle, then one bullet could have caused
both holes.

The CHAIRMAN. Could have caused both holes.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is sufficient.

Mr. DULLES. Is it correct that the blood on the shirt might well have
been occasioned by the second wound rather than exclusively by the
first wound?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; it could have come from any other wound on the body
as well as this one.

Mr. SPECTER. When you refer to any other wound, Mr. Frazier, are
you referring to the head wound which is widely known to have been
inflicted on the President at the time of the assassination?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have occasion to examine the President's tie or
the tie purportedly worn by the President on November 22, 1963?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. May the record show at this juncture that that tie has
heretofore been marked as Commission Exhibit 395?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may show that.

Mr. SPECTER. What did you note, if anything, with respect to the tie,
Mr. Frazier?

Mr. FRAZIER. When the tie was examined by me in the laboratory I noted
that the neck portion had been cut from one side of the knot. However,
the knot remained in apparently its original condition. The only damage
to the tie other than the fact that it had been cut, was a crease or
nick in the left side of the tie when you consider the tie as being
worn on a body. As you view the front of the tie it would be on the
right side. This nick would be located in a corresponding area to the
area in the shirt collar just below the button.

Mr. SPECTER. As you now indicate on your own tie, you are indicating on
the portion of the tie to your right?

Mr. FRAZIER. If it was on my tie it would be on the left side of the
tie.

Mr. SPECTER. Your left side.

Mr. FRAZIER. The left side of my tie. There is a nick on the left side
of the tie if you consider it as left and right according to the person
wearing the tie.

Mr. SPECTER. Does the nick in the tie provide any indication of the
direction of the missile?

Mr. FRAZIER. The nick is elongated horizontally, indicating a possible
horizontal direction but it does not indicate that the projectile which
caused it was exiting or entering at that point. The fibers were not
disturbed in a characteristic manner which would permit any conclusion
in that connection.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the nick consistent with an exiting path?

Mr. FRAZIER. Oh, yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Is there any indication from the nature of the nick as to
the nature of the projectile itself?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the nick consistent with a 6.5 millimeter bullet having
caused the nick?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes. Any projectile could have caused the nick. In this
connection there was no metallic residue found on the tie, and for that
matter there was no metallic residue found on the shirt at the holes in
the front. However, there was in the back.

Mr. SPECTER. Did any of the other----

Mr. DULLES. Excuse me, on the back of the coat?

Mr. FRAZIER. The shirt.

Mr. DULLES. Back of the coat and on the shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Did any of the other items of President Kennedy's clothing
which you have heretofore referred to contain any indications at all of
any bullet holes or any other type of holes?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, did you have occasion to examine the clothing
which has heretofore been identified in prior Commission proceedings
as that worn by Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you what purports to be the Governor's coat,
and may the record show that has been heretofore marked as Commission
Exhibit No. 683?

(At this point the Chairman left the hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES [presiding]. The record may so show.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you had opportunity heretofore to examine that coat?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. What did your examination reveal with respect to the back
side of the coat?

Mr. FRAZIER. There was found on the coat by me when I first examined
it, near the right sleeve 1-1/8 inches from the seam where the sleeve
attaches to the coat, and 7-1/4 inches to the right of the midline
when you view the back of the coat, a hole which is elongated in a
horizontal direction to the length of approximately five-eights of an
inch, and which had an approximate one-quarter inch height.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you able to determine from your examination of the
Governor's clothing whether or not they had been cleaned and pressed
prior to the time you saw them?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; they had.

Mr. SPECTER. Is that different from or the same as the condition of the
President's clothing which you have just described this morning?

Mr. FRAZIER. It is different in that the President's clothing had not
been cleaned. It had only been dried. The blood was dried. However, the
Governor's garments had been cleaned and pressed.

Mr. SPECTER. Had the President's clothing been pressed then?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you proceed to describe any other characteristics----

Mr. DULLES. Had been dried artificially or let nature take its course?

Mr. FRAZIER. It appeared to be air dried.

Mr. DULLES. Air dried, artificially?

Mr. FRAZIER. I couldn't say whether any outside heat had been applied
but it did not appear that any heat had been applied to the blood.

Mr. SPECTER. Proceed.

Mr. FRAZIER. On the hole on the back of the coat although it had the
general appearance and could have been a bullet hole, possibly because
of the cleaning and pressing of the garment. I cannot state that it
actually is a bullet hole nor the direction of the path of the bullet,
if it were a bullet hole.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the nature of the opening consistent with being a
bullet hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. SPECTER. And is it consistent with a bullet hole caused by a
missile traveling from the back to the front of the wearer of the
garment?

Mr. FRAZIER. I could not determine that.

Mr. SPECTER. You couldn't determine that it was, but could it have been?

Mr. FRAZIER. It could have been, yes; either way.

Mr. SPECTER. All right. Will you now turn to the front side of the coat
and state what, if any, damage you observed on the body of the garment?

Mr. FRAZIER. When considered from the wearer's standpoint, on the right
chest area of the coat there is a hole through the lining and the outer
layer of the coat which is located 6-1/2 inches from the right side
seam line and also 6-1/2 inches from the armpit which places this hole
approximately 5 inches to the right of the front right edge of the coat.

This hole was approximately circular in shape, three-eights of an inch
in diameter, and again possibly because of the cleaning and pressing
of the garment, I could not determine whether it actually was a bullet
hole or whether or not it entered or exited if it were a bullet hole.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the hole consistent with being an exit bullet hole?
That is to say, could it have been caused by an exiting bullet?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you find any damage on the right sleeve of the jacket?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; on more or less the top portion of the right
sleeve very near the end of the sleeve there is a very rough hole which
penetrates both the outside layer, the lining and the inside layer of
the sleeve.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you able to observe sufficient characteristics to
formulate any conclusion as to the cause of that tear?

Mr. FRAZIER. This also did not indicate direction from the condition of
the fibers, possibly due to the cleaning and pressing of the garment.

However, it could have been a bullet which struck the garment at an
angle to the surface which caused a slight elongation. The hole was
approximately five-eights of an inch in length, and three-eights of
an inch in width. The elongation could also have been the result of a
mutilated bullet having struck the garment or it could have been caused
by a fold in the garment at the time the object or bullet struck.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have occasion to examine the shirt, which was
purportedly worn by Governor Connally, and which has heretofore been
identified by the Governor in Commission proceedings, as that worn by
him on November 22, 1963?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. May the record show at this point that Mr. Frazier is
examining the shirt heretofore identified on the back side with a
photograph marked Commission Exhibit 685 and on the front side with a
photograph marked Commission Exhibit 686.

Now, referring to that shirt, Mr. Frazier, what, if anything, did you
observe on the rear side by way of an imperfection, hole or defect?

Mr. FRAZIER. I found a hole which is very ragged. An L-shaped tear
actually is what it amounted to in the back of the shirt near the right
sleeve, 2 inches from the seam line where the sleeve attaches to the
shirt, and 7-1/2 inches to the right of the midline of the shirt, the
right side being as you look at the back of the shirt.

This tear amounted to a five-eights of an inch long horizontal and
approximately one-half inch long vertical break in the cloth, with a
very small tear located immediately to its right, as you look at the
back of the shirt, which was approximately three-sixteenths of an inch
in length.

This hole corresponds in position to the hole in the back of the coat,
Governor Connally's coat, identified as Commission No. 683.

Mr. SPECTER. Were there sufficient characteristics observable to
formulate a conclusion as to the cause and direction of that hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; there were no characteristics on which you could
base a conclusion as to what caused it, whether or not it was a bullet
and if it had been, what the direction of the projectile was.

Mr. SPECTER. Could it have been caused by a 6.5-mm. bullet coming from
the rear of the wearer toward his front?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Referring now to the front side of the Governor's shirt,
what, if anything, did you observe with respect to a tear or a hole
thereon, as to the body of the shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER, I found in the right chest area of the shirt, considering
the shirt when it is being worn, a very irregular tear more or less
in the form of an "H," of the letter "H." This tear was approximately
1-1/2 inches in height, with the crossbar tear being approximately 1
inch in width, which caused a very irregularly shaped and enlarged
hole in the front of the shirt. The hole is located 5 inches from the
right-side seam, and 9 inches below the top of the right sleeve. The
9-inch figure is from the top of the right shoulder where the sleeve
adjoins the yoke of the shirt.

Mr. SPECTER. Had that garment been cleaned and pressed, Mr. Frazier,
prior to the time you examined it?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Were there sufficient characteristics then remaining on
the hole on the front side to enable you to formulate an opinion as to
the cause of the hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Could it have been caused by a 6.5 millimeter bullet
exiting from the chest of the Governor?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, it could.

Mr. SPECTER. Now what, if anything----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask there, would the size and character of this
hole indicate the condition of the bullet, I mean as to whether it was
tumbling or whether it was a mutilated bullet or anything of that kind?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; it would not.

Mr. DULLES. Even a bullet in full flight, full velocity could have made
this kind of a hole in the shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. It could have, particularly if the shirt had been wrinkled
at the time it passed through, and particularly because the material in
this shirt tore rather severely at the time the object passed through,
indicating a very weak structure of the cotton fiber, so that it would
tear out of all proportion to a stronger fabric.

And for that reason, the shape of the hole could be affected by the
condition of the material as well as any folds in the material or, as
you say, by a mutilated bullet or a passage of a bullet through the
cloth at an angle to the surface or the passing of a bullet partially
sideways through the cloth.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Will you proceed?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, what, if any, defect or hole did you observe
on the right sleeve of the Governor's shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. I found in the cuff of the shirt which is a French cuff,
through both the outer and inner layers of the cuff, a hole which is
ragged in contour, irregularly shaped, and which had more or less
star-shaped tears extending outward from the hole into the material,
located 1-1/2 inches up from the end of the sleeve, and 5-1/2 inches
from the outside cuff link hole, through both, as I said, through both
layers of the cuff, and the hole was in such a condition, possibly
due to the washing of the material, that I could not determine what
actually caused it or if it had been caused by a bullet, the direction
of the path of the bullet with reference to entrance and exit.

Mr. SPECTER. Could those holes have been caused by a bullet passing
through the Governor's wrist from the dorsal or upper portion to the
volar or palmar side?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; they could.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have occasion to examine the trousers which have
been heretofore identified in Commission hearings as those worn by
Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, I did.

Mr. SPECTER. May the record show that Mr. Frazier has taken and is
observing the trousers which have been identified in the record,
through a picture of the front side, bearing Commission Exhibit No. 687
and a picture of the rear side bearing Commission Exhibit No. 688.

Now, referring to those trousers, what if anything did you observe in
the nature of a defect or hole, Mr. Frazier?

Mr. FRAZIER. In the area which would be the left-knee area of the
person wearing the trousers, there was a hole which is roughly circular
in shape, and approximately one-quarter of an inch in diameter with
some possible expansion of the hole due to slight tearing of the cloth
at the outer margins of the hole.

Mr. SPECTER. Had the trousers been cleaned and pressed prior to your
examination?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Were there sufficient characteristics available for you to
formulate any conclusion as to the cause of that hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; I can say that it had the general appearance of a
bullet hole but I could not determine the direction of the bullet if,
in fact, it had been caused by a bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. What are the characteristics which led you to believe that
it had the characteristics of a bullet hole?

Mr. FRAZIER. It has the roughly circular shape with slight tearing away
from the edges of the material.

Mr. SPECTER. Is there any other hole on the trousers which could be a
hole of exit?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, did you have occasion to examine an
automobile which was the vehicle used customarily by the President of
the United States in parades?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. When did that examination occur?

Mr. FRAZIER. In the early morning hours of November 23, 1963, at the
Secret Service garage here in Washington, D.C.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph previously identified for the
record as Commission Exhibit No. 344 and ask you if that depicts the
car which you examined?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. SPECTER. I hand you a subsequent exhibit of the Commission, No.
346, showing the interior view of the automobile and ask you if that
depicts the automobile which you examined?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; however, it wasn't in this condition. It wasn't
as clean as it is in Exhibit 346.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the condition with respect to cleanliness?

Mr. FRAZIER. There were blood and particles of flesh scattered all over
the hood, the windshield, in the front seat and all over the rear floor
rugs, the jump seats, and over the rear seat, and down both sides of
the side rails or tops of the doors of the car.

Mr. SPECTER. Is that condition depicted by Commission Exhibits 352 and
353 to the extent that they show the interior of the automobile?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the purpose of the examination which you made of
the car at that time and place?

Mr. FRAZIER. I examined the car to determine whether or not there were
any bullet fragments present in it, embedded in the upholstery of the
back of the front seat, or whether there were any impact areas which
indicated that bullets or bullet fragments struck the inside of the car.

Mr. SPECTER. With respect to the fragments first, what did your
examination disclose?

Mr. FRAZIER. We found three small lead particles lying on the rug in
the rear seat area. These particles were located underneath or in the
area which would be underneath the left jump seat.

Mr. SPECTER. Have those particles been identified during the course of
your prior testimony?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; they have not?

Mr. SPECTER. Will you produce them at this time then, please? May we
assign to this group of particles Commission Exhibit No. 840?

Mr. DULLES. These have not been discussed before, have they?

Mr. SPECTER. They have not.

Mr. DULLES. It shall be admitted as Commission Exhibit No. 840.

(Commission Exhibit No. 840 was marked for identification and received
in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. I move formally for their admission, then, into evidence
at this time.

Mr. DULLES. They shall be admitted.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you describe the three pieces of metal which are
contained within this vial, please?

Mr. FRAZIER. The three pieces of metal are lead. They were weighed
immediately upon recovery and were found to weigh nine-tenths of
a grain, seven-tenths of a grain, and seven-tenths of a grain,
respectively. Since that time small portions have been removed for
spectrographic analysis and comparison with other bullets and bullet
fragments.

Mr. SPECTER. Has that comparison been made with a whole bullet
heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit 399 which in other
proceedings has been identified as the bullet from the Connally
stretcher?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; the comparison was made by comparing Exhibit
399 with a bullet fragment found in the front seat of the Presidential
limousine and then comparing that fragment with these fragments from
the rear seat of the automobile.

Mr. SPECTER. For identification purposes, has that fragment from the
front seat been heretofore identified during your prior testimony?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; it has. It bears Commission No. 567.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, what did the comparative examination then disclose as
among Commission Exhibits 399, 567, and 840?

Mr. FRAZIER. That examination was performed by a spectrographer, John
F. Gallagher, and I do not have the results of his examinations here,
although I did ascertain that it was determined that the lead fragments
were similar in composition.

Mr. SPECTER. So that they could have come from, so that the fragments
designated 840 could have come from the same bullet as fragment
designated 567?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Were the tests sufficient to indicate conclusively whether
fragments 840 did come from the fragment designated as 567?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you personally find any other fragments in the
President's car during the course of your examination?

Mr. FRAZIER. No; I did not.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, where, according to information provided to you then,
was the fragment designated Commission Exhibit 567 found?

Mr. FRAZIER. That was found by the Secret Service upon their
examination of the limousine here in Washington when it first arrived
from Dallas, and Commission No. 567 was delivered by Deputy Chief
Paul Paterni and by a White House detail chief, Floyd M. Boring, to a
liaison agent of the FBI, Orrin Bartlett, who delivered them to me in
the laboratory at 11:50 p.m., on November 22, 1963.

Mr. SPECTER. Does that constitute the total chain of possession then
from the finder with the Secret Service into your hands, as reflected
on the records of the FBI?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there another fragment, was there any other fragment
found in the front seat of the car?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes. Alongside the right side of the front seat,
Commission Exhibit No. 569, which is the base portion of the jacket of
a bullet, was found, and handled in identical manner to the Exhibit 567.

Mr. DULLES. And the front seat is the seat which would be the driver's
seat?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. And the Secret Service man on his right, I believe?

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Kellerman.

Mr. DULLES. That was the seat from which this came?

Mr. FRAZIER. Commission Exhibit 567 was found on the seat right beside
the driver, and Exhibit 569 was found on the floor beside the right
side of the front seat.

Mr. SPECTER. The right side of the front seat, Mr. Dulles, as the
prior testimony shows was occupied by Roy Kellerman and the driver was
William Greer.

Mr. DULLES. Right. Thank you.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you state what the chain of possession was from
the time of discovery of Exhibit 569 until the time it came into your
possession, based on the records of the FBI, please, if you have those
records available?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir. It was delivered by Secret Service Deputy Chief
Paul Paterni, and SAC of the White House detail Floyd M. Boring of the
Secret Service again, to Special Agent Orrin Bartlett of the FBI who
delivered it to me at 11:50 p.m. on November 22, 1963.

Mr. SPECTER. Are the records which you have just referred to relating
to the chain of possession of Exhibits 567 and 569 maintained by you in
the normal course of your duties as an examiner of those items?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, is it possible for the fragments identified
in Commission Exhibit 840 to have come from the whole bullet heretofore
identified as Commission Exhibit 399?

Mr. FRAZIER. I would say that based on weight it would be highly
improbable that that much weight could have come from the base of that
bullet since its present weight is--its weight when I first received it
was 158.6 grains.

Mr. SPECTER. Referring now to 399.

Mr. FRAZIER. Exhibit 399, and its original normal weight would be 160
to 161 grains, and those three metal fragments had a total of 2.1
grains as I recall--2.3 grains. So it is possible but not likely since
there is only a very small part of the core of the bullet 399 missing.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you now described all of the bullet fragments which
you found in the President's automobile?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Was it your job to analyze all of the bullets or bullet
fragments which were found in the President's car?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; it was, except for the spectrographic analysis of the
composition.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you now described all of the bullet fragments which
were brought to you by anyone else and identified as having been found
in the President's car?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; not this morning but at previous times during my
testimony I have; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. But then there is on the record now all of the
identification of the metallic or bullet fragments found in connection
with your examination of the President's car or which were examined by
you after having been found by someone else?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir. There is one other, it is not a metal particle
but it is a residue of metal on the inside of the windshield.

Mr. SPECTER. Aside from that residue of the windshield which I am going
to come to now, have we placed on the record a description of all of
the bullets or bullet fragments?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Now----

Mr. DULLES. Just one moment. You mean bullet fragments related to the
car or bullet fragments found anywhere?

Mr. SPECTER. Related to the President's automobile.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; you have.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have occasion then to examine the windshield of
the Presidential limousine?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. What did that examination disclose?

Mr. FRAZIER. On the inside surface of the windshield there was a
deposit of lead. This deposit was located when you look at the inside
surface of the windshield, 13-1/2 inches down from the top, 23 inches
from the left-hand side or driver's side of the windshield, and was
immediately in front of a small pattern of star-shaped cracks which
appeared in the outer layer of the laminated windshield.

Mr. DULLES. What do you mean by the "outer layer of the laminated
windshield"?

Mr. FRAZIER. The windshield is composed of two layers with a very thin
layer of plastic in between which bonds them together in the form of
safety glass. The inside layer of the glass was not broken, but the
outside layer immediately on the outside of the lead residue had a very
small pattern of cracks and there was a very minute particle of glass
missing from the outside surface.

Mr. DULLES. And the outside surface was the surface away from where the
occupants were sitting?

Mr. FRAZIER. That is correct; yes.

Mr. DULLES. And the inside surface was the surface nearest the
occupants?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. What do those characteristics indicate as to which side of
the windshield was struck?

Mr. FRAZIER. It indicates that it could only have been struck on the
inside surface. It could not have been struck on the outside surface
because of the manner in which the glass broke and further because of
the lead residue on the inside surface. The cracks appear in the outer
layer of the glass because the glass is bent outward at the time of
impact which stretches the outer layer of the glass to the point where
these small radial or wagon spoke-wagon wheel spoke-type cracks appear
on the outer surface.

Mr. DULLES. So the pressure must have come from the inside and not from
the outside against the glass?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. DULLES. As far as the car is concerned from the back to the front?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Not from outside against the glass--from the front against
the glass.

Mr. FRAZIER. That is right.

Mr. SPECTER. Was a comparison made of the lead residues on the inside
of the windshield with any of the bullet fragments recovered about
which you have heretofore testified?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes. They were compared with the bullet fragment found on
the front seat, which in turn was compared with Commission 399. The
lead was found to be similar in composition. However, that examination
in detail was made by a spectrographer, Special Agent John F. Gallagher.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that examination made in the regular course of
examining procedures by the FBI?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. And was that information made available to you through the
normal conference procedures among FBI examiners?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir. He submitted his report to me and I prepared the
formal report of the entire examination.

Mr. SPECTER. Are his report and your formal report a part of the
permanent record of the FBI then?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. I now show you Commission Exhibit No. 350 which has
heretofore been identified as a picture of the windshield of the
Presidential limousine and I ask you if that is the crack about which
you have just testified?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; it is. This Exhibit 350 is a photograph which I took
on the 23d of November, showing a view from the front toward the rear
of the Presidential limousine and showing the crack in the glass and
the lead residue on the inside surface.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you produce at this time the lead residue obtained
by you from that inside surface, please? May it please the Commission,
I would like to mark this as Commission Exhibit 841 and move for its
admission into evidence at this time.

Mr. DULLES. It shall be admitted into evidence.

(Commission Exhibit No. 841 was marked for identification and received
in evidence.)

Mr. DULLES. May I just ask a question of you, Mr. Specter, and possibly
of the witness.

I assume that the windshield we are now discussing is the windshield
that was exhibited to the Commission several weeks ago and which
members of the Commission examined?

Mr. SPECTER. It was, Mr. Dulles, and we can establish that, of record,
through another Commission Exhibit which is 351, which was the number
given to the windshield and we have a reproduction here through the
photograph.

Mr. DULLES. You don't have the windshield here today, though?

Mr. SPECTER. No, we do not.

Mr. DULLES. It would be the same windshield that the Commission saw.

Mr. SPECTER. We can establish it through the witness, too.

Mr. Frazier, for that purpose can you identify what is depicted in a
photograph heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit 351?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; this is a photograph of the very small pattern
of cracks in the windshield which was on the Presidential limousine
at the time I examined it, and which I also later examined in the FBI
laboratory.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, have you now described all of your findings
on the windshield of the Presidential limousine?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; that is concerning the glass itself and not the
molding around the windshield.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you then move to the molding around the windshield
and state what, if anything, you found there?

Mr. FRAZIER. On the strip of chrome which goes across the top of the
windshield and again on the passenger side of the windshield or the
inside surface, I found a dent in the chrome which had been caused by
some projectile which struck the chrome on the inside surface.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there one dent or more than one dent or what?

Mr. FRAZIER. One dent.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you identify what is depicted by a photograph
heretofore marked as Commission Exhibit 349?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; this is a photograph which I took of this dent
at that time, showing the damaged chrome, just to the right of the
rearview mirror support at the top of the windshield.

Mr. SPECTER. Did your examination of the President's limousine disclose
any other holes or markings which could have conceivably been caused by
a bullet striking the automobile or any part of the automobile?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder if I could go back just a moment to the
indentation in the chrome around the windshield at the top of the
windshield, but on the inside, could that have been caused by a
fragment of a bullet?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, it very easily could have. It would not have been
caused, for instance, by a bullet which was traveling at its full
velocity from a rifle, but merely from a fragment traveling at fairly
high velocity which struck the inside surface of the chrome.

Mr. DULLES. Could that have been caused by any of the fragments that
you have identified as having been found on the front seat or near the
front seat of the car?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I believe it could have by either, in fact, of the
two fragments of rifle bullets found in the front seat.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, assume certain facts to be true for
purposes of expressing an opinion on a hypothetical situation, to
wit: that President Kennedy was struck by a 6.5 millimeter bullet
which passed through his body entering on the rear portion of his
neck 14 centimeters to the left of his right acromion process and 14
centimeters below his mastoid process, with a striking velocity of
approximately 1,904 feet per second, and exited after passing through
a fascia channel in his body, through the lower anterior third of his
neck with an exit velocity of approximately 1,772 to 1,779 feet per
second; and that bullet had then traveled from the point where it
exited from his neck and struck the front windshield in some manner.
What effect would that have had on the front windshield and the
subsequent flight of the missile?

Mr. FRAZIER. It would have shattered the front windshield. It would
have caused a very large, relatively large hole, approximately
three-eighths to an inch in diameter with radiating cracks extending
outward into the glass for several inches, even to the side of the
glass.

Mr. DULLES. It would have penetrated the windshield?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Would the missile then have proceeded in a forward
direction?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; it would.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have an opinion as to how far it would have gone?

Mr. FRAZIER. Until it struck some other object in the area of
approximately a mile.

Mr. SPECTER. Now assume the same sequence with respect to exit velocity
from the point of the President's neck at the same rate of 1,772
to 1,798 feet per second, and assume still further that the bullet
had, the whole bullet had, struck the metal framing which you have
heretofore described and identified. What effect would that have had on
the metal framing?

Mr. FRAZIER. It would have torn a hole in the chrome, penetrated the
framing both inside and outside of the car. I can only assume, since
I haven't tested the metal of that particular car, I would assume
that the bullet would completely penetrate both the chrome, the metal
supporting the chrome, on the inside, and the body metal on the outside
which supports the windshield of the car.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, assume the same set of factors as to the exit
velocity from the President's neck. What effect would that bullet have
had on any other portion of the automobile which it might have struck
in the continuation of its flight?

Mr. FRAZIER. In my opinion it would have penetrated any other metal
surface and, of course, any upholstery surface depending on the
nature of the material as to how deep it would penetrate or how many
successive layers it may have penetrated.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any evidence in any portion of the car that the
automobile was struck by a bullet which exited from the President's
neck under the circumstances which I have just asked you to assume?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; there was not.

Mr. SPECTER. And had there been any such evidence would your
examination of the automobile have uncovered such an indication or such
evidence?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; I feel that it would have.

Mr. SPECTER. Was your examination a thorough examination of all aspects
of the interior of the automobile?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; for our purpose. However, we did not tear out
all of the rugs on the floor, for instance. We examined the rugs
carefully for holes, for bullet furroughs, for fragments. We examined
the nap of the rug, in the actual nap of the rug, for fragments and
bullet holes. We pulled the rug back as far as we could turn it back
and even tore the glue or adhesive material loose around the cracks
at the edges of the rug so we could observe the cracks to see whether
they had been enlarged, and we examined all of the upholstery covering,
on the back of the front seat, on the doors, and in the rear seat
compartment, the jump seats, the actual rear seat, the back of the rear
seat, and we examined the front seat in a similar manner, and we found
no bullet holes or other bullet impact areas, other than the one on the
inside of the windshield and the dent inside the windshield chrome.

Mr. SPECTER. Had any of those portions of the automobile been struck by
the bullet exiting from the President's neck, which I have described
hypothetically for you, would you have found some evidence of striking?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. When was this examination made?

Mr. FRAZIER. Between 2 and 4:30 a.m. on November 23, 1963.

Mr. DULLES. That was about 10 hours, 12 hours after the assassination?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; 14 to 16 hours.

Mr. DULLES. Fourteen to sixteen hours.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask, do you know in whose custody the automobile was
prior to your examination from the time it was shipped on the airplane?

Mr. FRAZIER. When I arrived there were two Secret Service men present
but I do not recall their names. They were introduced to me, and they
were there during the entire examination but I don't recall their
actual names. The car was under guard in the Secret Service garage in
Washington, D.C.

Other than that I do not know.

Mr. DULLES. Was this a joint examination by you and by the Secret
Service or was the examination made by the FBI?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; by the FBI at the request of the Secret Service
who had already examined the interior of the car for personal effects
and other items.

Mr. DULLES. Did they certify to you or advise you that the car had been
under their custody during this 14-to 16-hour period?

Mr. FRAZIER. I don't recall whether they actually stated that. What
they stated was that the car had immediately been flown to Washington
and placed in this garage and kept under surveillance the entire time.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. SPECTER. Was a fragment of metal brought to you which was
identified as coming from the wrist of Governor Connally?

Mr. FRAZIER. It was identified to me as having come from the arm of
Governor Connally.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you produce that fragment at this time, please?

Mr. FRAZIER. This one does not have a Commission number as yet.

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission, I would like to have this
fragment marked as Commission Exhibit 842.

(Commission Exhibit No. 842 was marked for identification and received
in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Now, referring to a fragment heretofore marked as Q9 for
FBI record purposes, and now marked as Commission Exhibit No. 842, will
you describe that fragment for us, please?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; this is a small fragment of metal which weighed
one-half a grain when I first examined it in the laboratory. It is a
piece of lead, and could have been a part of a bullet or a core of a
bullet.

However, it lacks any physical characteristics which would permit
stating whether or not it actually originated from a bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. Are its physical characteristics consistent with having
come from Commission Exhibit 399?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; it could have.

Mr. SPECTER. Are they consistent with that fragment identified as
Commission Exhibit No. 842, as having come from fragment identified as
Commission Exhibit 567?

Mr. FRAZIER. Which is 567?

Mr. SPECTER. 567 is the one which was found on the front seat.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; it could have.

Mr. SPECTER. Were the characteristics of the fragment identified as
Commission Exhibit 842 consistent with having come from the fragment
heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit 569?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you set forth from the records of the FBI, if
you have those before you, the chain of possession of the fragment
identified as Commission Exhibit 842, please?

Mr. FRAZIER. Commission Exhibit 842, that is the one from Governor
Connally's arm, was delivered to me in the FBI laboratory on November
23, 1963, by Special Agent Vincent E. Drain of the Dallas Office of the
FBI, who stated he had secured this item from Capt. Will Fritz of the
Dallas Police Department.

I do not know where Captain Fritz obtained it.

Mr. SPECTER. Referring back for just a moment to the coat identified as
that worn by Governor Connally, Mr. Frazier, was there any observable
angle of elevation or declination from the back side of the Governor's
coat to the front side of the Governor's coat?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; there was, approximately a 35-degree downward
angle.

Mr. SPECTER. Measuring from----

Mr. FRAZIER. That is----

Mr. SPECTER. Back to front or front to back?

Mr. FRAZIER. From back towards the front.

Mr. SPECTER. How about the same question as to the Governor's shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. I would say it was approximately the same angle or
slightly less. I think we measured approximately 30 degrees.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that from the front to back or from the back to front
of the Governor's shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. That would be from the back towards the front. Downward
from back towards the front.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Dulles, those questions complete the ones which we
have to ask, sir.

Mr. Frazier, one additional question: Do you have any knowledge through
any source whatsoever of any bullets or bullet fragments found anywhere
in the vicinity of the assassination other than those which you have
already testified to, which were in the car, or the whole bullet from
the Connally stretcher or the fragments from Governor Connally's wrist?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; I have never heard of any nor have any been
submitted to me.

Mr. SPECTER. During the regular processing of the FBI examination in
this case, would all such bullets or bullet fragments be brought to
you for examination in accordance with your assignment to this matter
generally?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; they would.

Mr. SPECTER. Were any metallic fragments brought to you which were
purported to have been found in the head of President Kennedy?

Mr. DULLES. Or body?

Mr. SPECTER. Or body of President Kennedy?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; they were.

On November 23, 1963, at 1:35 a.m., the two metal fragments in this
container were delivered to me in the FBI laboratory by Special Agent
James W. Sibert, and Special Agent Francis O'Neill of the Baltimore
office of the FBI who stated they had obtained these in the autopsy
room at the Naval Hospital near Washington, D.C., where they were
present when they were removed from the head of President Kennedy.

Mr. SPECTER. Is there any specification as to the portion of the
President's head from which they were removed?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; they told me that there had been numerous
particles in the head but only these two had been removed, the others
being very small.

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission I would like to have those
marked and admitted into evidence as Commission Exhibit No. 843.

Mr. DULLES. It shall be so marked and admitted under those numbers.

(Commission Exhibit No. 843 was marked for identification and received
in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. In the event we have not already had 842 admitted into
evidence, I move, Mr. Dulles, for the admission into evidence of 842
which was the fragment from Governor Connally's arm.

Mr. DULLES. That shall be admitted.

Mr. SPECTER. Moving back to 843 will you describe those fragments
indicating their weight and general composition?

Mr. FRAZIER. These fragments consisted of two pieces of lead, one
weighed 1.65 grains. The other weighed .15 grain. They were examined
spectrographically so their present weight would be somewhat less since
a very small amount would be needed for spectrographic analysis.

Mr. SPECTER. Was a comparison made between or among these two fragments
with the other metal from the bullets heretofore identified as
Commission Exhibits 399, 567, 569, 840, and 842?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; they were.

Mr. SPECTER. What did that examination disclose?

Mr. FRAZIER. Possibly my numbers do not agree with those you have.
These two particles from the President's head were compared with the
lead of Exhibit 842.

Mr. SPECTER. Which is the fragment from the arm of Governor Connally?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; they were compared with the lead scraping from
the inside of the windshield.

Mr. SPECTER. Which is Exhibit 841.

Mr. FRAZIER. And with the three lead fragments found on the rear
floorboard carpet of the limousine.

Mr. SPECTER. Which is Exhibit 840.

Mr. FRAZIER. And they were found to be similar in metallic composition.

Mr. SPECTER. Can you state with any more certainty----

Mr. FRAZIER. Excuse me, one thing. These, as a group, were compared
with the bullet fragment, Commission Exhibit 567, which was found on
the front seat of the automobile, which also was found to be similar in
metallic composition.

Mr. SPECTER. Is it possible to state with any more certainty whether or
not any of those fragments came from the same bullet?

Mr. FRAZIER. Not definitely, no; only that they are of similar lead
composition.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you now described fully all of the relevant
characteristics of the fragments identified as Commission Exhibit 843?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other bullets or bullet fragment or metallic
substances of any sort connected with this case in any way which you
have examined which you have not already testified to here today or on
your prior appearance?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; that is all of them.

Mr. DULLES. Is there anything further?

Mr. SPECTER. No.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much, Mr. Frazier.

The Commission will reconvene at 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



Afternoon Session

TESTIMONY OF DR. ALFRED G. OLIVIER


The President's Commission reconvened at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will come to order.

Mr. Specter, has the doctor been sworn yet?

Mr. SPECTER. No, sir; he has not.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, would you raise your right hand and be sworn,
please? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give in
the matter before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated.

Mr. SPECTER. State your full name for the record.

Dr. OLIVIER. Dr. Alfred G. Olivier.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your occupation or profession?

Dr. OLIVIER. A supervisory research veterinarian and I work for the
Department of the Army at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe the nature of your duties at that
arsenal, please?

Dr. OLIVIER. Investigating the wound ballistics of various bullets and
other military missiles.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe the general nature of the tests which
are carried on at Edgewood Arsenal?

Dr. OLIVIER. For example, with a bullet we run tissue studies getting
the retardation of the bullet through the tissues, the penetration,
various characteristics of it. We use as good tissue simulant 20
percent gelatin. This has a drag coefficient of muscle tissue and makes
an excellent homogenous medium to study the action of the bullet.
We also use animal parts and parts of cadavers where necessary to
determine the characteristics of these things.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you set forth your educational background briefly,
please?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did 2 years of preveterinary work at the University
of New Hampshire and 4 years of veterinary school at the University of
Pennsylvania, and I hold a degree doctor of veterinary medicine at the
University of Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. In what year did you complete your educational work?

Dr. OLIVIER. 1953.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you outline your experience in the field subsequent
to 1953?

Dr. OLIVIER. In this field?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.

Dr. OLIVIER. I came to Edgewood Arsenal, then the Army Chemical Center,
in 1957, and originally to work, take charge of the animal colonies but
immediately I got interested in the research and started working in
the field of wound ballistics and have been in it ever since, and am
presently Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you been in charge of a series of tests performed
to determine certain wound ballistics on circumstances analogous to
the underlying facts on wounds inflicted upon President Kennedy and
Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And in the course of those tests what weapon was used?

Dr. OLIVIER. It was identified as Commission Exhibit 139. It was a 6.5
mm. Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.

Mr. SPECTER. Did the designation, Commission Exhibit No. 139, appear on
the body of that rifle?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; it did.

Mr. SPECTER. What type of bullets were used in the tests which you
performed?

Dr. OLIVIER. We used the Western ammunition, Western being a division
of Olin Industries, Winchester Western, it was lot 6,000 to 6.5 mm.
round. Has a muzzle velocity of approximately 2,160 feet per second.

Mr. SPECTER. And were those bullets obtained by you upon information
provided to you by the Commission's staff as to the identity of the
bullets which were believed to have been used during the assassination?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I first got the identity from the people at Aberdeen
Proving Grounds and then I further checked with the Commission to see
if that was right before ordering this type of ammunition.

Mr. SPECTER. And where were those bullets obtained from?

Dr. OLIVIER. I obtained 100 rounds from Remington at Bridgeport.
Conn., and Dr. Dziemian obtained another 160 rounds, I believe, from
Winchester in New Haven.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you perform certain tests to determine the wound
ballistics and include in that the penetration power of the
Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, which you referred to, firing the Western
Cartridge Co. bullet by comparison with other types of bullets?

Dr. OLIVIER. We didn't fire any of the others at the same time. These
had been fired previously. We have all these records for comparison.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle then fired for comparison
purposes with the other bullets where you already had your experience?

Dr. OLIVIER. No; it was fired for the purposes for which--to try to
shed some light on say the factors leading to the assassination and
all, not for comparison with the other bullets.

Mr. SPECTER. I now show you a photograph which is marked as Commission
Exhibit No. 844, may it please the Commission, and ask you if this
photograph was prepared by you in conjunction with the study on the
Mannlicher-Carcano and the Western Cartridge Co. bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; it was.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you explain to the Commission what that photograph
depicts?

Dr. OLIVIER. Actually, the bullet passed through two gelatin blocks.
This was done as part of an energy study to see the amount of energy
imparted to the block of gelatin taking a high-speed motion picture.
These blocks show a record of the permanent cavity left in the gelatin.
This is not necessarily the total penetration. This bullet when it
comes out of the second block still has quite a bit of penetrating
power. Quite a few of these bullets would go into a dirt bank and imbed
themselves so deeply that they couldn't be recovered.

Mr. SPECTER. I now show you Commission Exhibit No. 845 which is a
photograph, and ask you to state for the record what that photograph
represents?

Dr. OLIVIER. This has been adopted as standard military ammunition of
the U.S. Army. It is known as the NATO round. It is M-80 ball fired
in the M-14 rifle. It has a different--it is a full jacketed military
bullet but has a different point, what they call a no jag point, a
sharp point. It has tumbling characteristics. When it goes in a certain
block it tumbles and does the same in the body. It is more efficient in
producing wounds than the bullet under study.

Mr. SPECTER. How do the impact, penetration, and other characteristics
of the bullet depicted in 845 compare with the Western Cartridge Co.
bullet fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano in 844?

Dr. OLIVIER. It has better wounding potential due to the quicker
tumbling but it would not have as good penetrating ability, when it
starts tumbling and releasing all that energy doing all that damage it
comes to a stop in a shorter distance.

Mr. SPECTER. Would the Western bullet be characterized as having the
qualities of a more stable bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; it would. You mean in the target?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. The stability in the air would be the same for any
missile, would it not?

Dr. OLIVIER. To be a good bullet they should be stable in air in order
to hit what you are aiming at, yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Then would the characteristics of stability in the air be
the same for either of the two bullets you have heretofore referred to?

Dr. OLIVIER. Essentially so.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you photograph marked as Commission Exhibit No.
846 and ask you to state what that depicts?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is a 257 Winchester Roberts soft nose hunting bullet.
This one pictured fired from right to left instead of left to right
and the bullet didn't even go out of the block. It deforms almost
immediately on entering the block and releases its energy rather
rapidly. This type of ammunition is illegal for military use. We are
just studying the wounding characteristics of various bullets, but this
is not a military bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. How does it compare with the Western bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. It would be better for wounding, better for hunting
purposes. But as I said, it isn't acceptable as a military bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. How does it compare with respect to penetration power?

Dr. OLIVIER. Much less than the Mannlicher-Carcano.

Mr. SPECTER. In the normal course of the work that you perform for
the U.S. Army at Edgewood Arsenal, do you have occasion to simulate
substances for testing purposes on determining the path of a bullet
through the human body?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; we do use animal tissues or gelatin as simulants for
tissues of the human body.

Mr. SPECTER. Has the autopsy report on President John F. Kennedy been
made available to you for your review?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; it has.

Mr. SPECTER. And subsequent to your review of that report, did you
make an effort to simulate the body tissue through which the bullet is
reported to have passed through the President in accordance with the
report of the autopsy surgeon; entering on the rear of his neck, 14 cm.
below the mastoid process and 14 cm. to the left of the right acromion
process, passing through a fascia channel, striking the trachea and
exiting through the lower anterior of the neck?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. What substance did you prepare to simulate that portion of
the President's body?

Dr. OLIVIER. We determined the distance on various people by locating
this anatomical region and using people of various sizes we found that
regardless of general body build, the distance penetrated was around
13-1/2 to 14-1/2 cm.

As a consequence, I used gelatin blocks 20 percent gelatin cut at
13-1/2 cm. lengths and also used horsemeat and goatmeat placed in a
box so that--this was a little harder to get the exact length but that
varied between 13-1/2 and 14-1/2 cm. of muscle tissue.

Mr. SPECTER. Did that simulate, then, the portion of the President's
body through which the bullet is reported to have passed, as closely as
you could for your testing purposes?

Dr. OLIVIER. As closely as we could for these test purposes; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph marked as Commission Exhibit
No. 847 and ask you to testify as to what that depicts?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is a box containing--I couldn't say looking at
it whether it is the horsemeat or the goatmeat but one of the two.
The distance traveled through that meat would be 13-1/2 to 14-1/2
centimeters. It is also covered with clothing and clipped goatskin
on the entrance and exit sides, and behind that are the screens for
measuring the exit velocity. We had already determined the striking
velocity by firing I believe it was--I have it right here if you
want----

Mr. SPECTER. Before you proceed to that, describe the type of screens
which are shown in the picture which were used to measure exit
velocity, if you please?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes. These screens are known as the break-type screen.
They are silver imprinted on paper and when the bullet passes through
it breaks the current. When it passes through the first screen it
breaks the current activating a chronograph, counting chronograph. When
it passes through the second screen it stops. This is over a known
distance, and so the time that it took to pass between the first and
the second will give you the average velocity halfway between the two
screens.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 848
and ask you to describe what that shows?

Dr. OLIVIER. This was a similar setup used for firing through gelatin.
It had clothing and skin over the entrance side only. If it had been
placed on the other side it would have just flown off.

Mr. SPECTER. And that is similar to that depicted in 846?

Dr. OLIVIER. Essentially; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Except that it is----

Dr. OLIVIER. Gelatin instead of the tissues.

Mr. SPECTER. Now at what range was the firing performed on the gelatin,
goatmeat and horsemeat?

Dr. OLIVIER. This firing was done at a 60-yard range.

Mr. SPECTER. And what gun was used?

Dr. OLIVIER. The 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano that was marked Commission
Exhibit 139.

Mr. SPECTER. And what bullets were used?

Dr. OLIVIER. The Western ammunition lot 6,000, 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano.

Mr. SPECTER. And was there any substance placed over the gelatin,
horsemeat and goatmeat?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; over the gelatin we had clothing; had a suit, shirt
and undershirt, and underneath that a clipped goatskin. The same thing
was over the meat, and on the other side of the meat was also clipped
goatskin.

Mr. SPECTER. Would there be any significant difference to the test by
leaving out the undershirt if the President had not worn an undershirt?

Dr. OLIVIER. No.

Mr. SPECTER. So that the circumstance was simulated with the actual
type clothing and a protective skin over the substance just as
realistically as you could make it?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. What measurement was obtained as to the entrance velocity
of the bullet at the distance of 60 yards which you described?

Dr. OLIVIER. The striking velocity at an average of three shots was
1,904 feet per second.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was the average exit velocity on each of the
substances used?

Dr. OLIVIER. For the gelatin the average exit velocity was 1,779 feet
per second. The horsemeat, the average exit velocity was 1,798 feet
per second. And the goatmeat the average exit velocity was 1,772 feet
per second.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 849
and ask you what that picture represents?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is one of the gelatin blocks used in that test. It
shows the type of track left by the bullet passing through it. That
bullet is very stable. Passing through the body and muscle, it would
make a similar type wound. Of course, you couldn't observe it that
nicely.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe that as being a straight line?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a picture marked Commission Exhibit No. 850
and ask you what that represents?

Dr. OLIVIER. These are pieces of clipped goatskin, clipped very
shortly. There is still some hair on it. These were placed, these
particular ones were placed over the tissues. This would be placed over
the entrance side of the animal.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say "this," you are referring to a piece of
goatskin which is marked "enter"?

Dr. OLIVIER. Marked "enter." The one marked "exit" was placed on the far
side of the tissues and the bullet passed through that after it came
out of the tissues.

Mr. SPECTER. For the record, will you describe the characteristics,
which are shown on the goatskin at the point of entry, please?

Dr. OLIVIER. At the point of entry the wound holes through the skin
are for all purposes round. On the exit side they are more elongated,
two of them in particular are a little more elongated. The bullet had
started to become slightly unstable coming out.

Mr. SPECTER. And how about the third or lower bullet on the skin
designated exit?

Dr. OLIVIER. That hole appears as more stable than the other two. In
all three cases the bullet is still pretty stable. The gelatin blocks,
there were gelatin blocks placed behind these things too, and for all
practical purposes, the tracks through them still indicated a stable
bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other conclusions which you would care to
add to those which you have already indicated, resulting from the tests
you have heretofore described?

Dr. OLIVIER. Well, it means that the bullet that passed through the
President's neck had lost very little of its wounding potential and
was capable of doing a great deal of damage in penetrating. I might
mention one thing showing how great its penetrating ability was. That
say on one of the gelatin shots, it went through a total, counting the
gelatin block, it went through plus the backing up blocks of gelatin,
it went through a total of 72-1/2 centimeters of gelatin, was still
traveling and buried itself in a mound of earth so it has terrific
penetrating ability. This means that had the bullet that passed through
the President's neck hit in the car or anywhere you would have seen
evidence, a good deal of evidence.

Mr. SPECTER. Dr. Olivier, in the regular course of your work for the
U.S. Army, do you have occasion to perform tests on animal materials
where the characteristics of those animals materials are sufficiently
similar to human bodies to make a determination of the effect of the
bullet wounds in human bodies?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I do.

Mr. SPECTER. And did you have occasion to make a test on goat material
in connection with the experiments which you ran?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Are you familiar with the wounds inflicted on Governor
Connally on November 22, 1963?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; from reading the surgeon's report and also from
talking to Dr. Gregory and Dr. Shaw.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have access to the medical reports of Parkland
Hospital concerning the wounds of Governor Connally in all respects?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And did you have occasion to discuss those wounds in
great detail with Dr. Shaw and Dr. Gregory when they were present in
Washington, D.C. on April 21, 1964, preparatory to their testifying
before this Commission?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the nature of the wound on Governor Connally's
back?

Dr. OLIVIER. The surgeon's report described it as about 3 centimeters
long, its longest dimension, and it is hard for me to remember reading
it or discussing it with him but I did both. Apparently it was a jagged
wound. He said a wound like this consists of two things, usually a
defect in the epidermis and a central hole which is small, and he could
put his finger in it so it was a fairly large wound.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the path of the bullet in a general way, based on
the information provided to you concerning Governor Connally's wound in
the back?

Dr. OLIVIER. Apparently it passed along the rib. I don't recall which
rib it was but passed the fifth rib, passed along this rib causing a
fracture that I believe removed about 10 centimeters of the rib through
fragments through the pleura, lacerating the lung. I asked Dr. Shaw
directly whether he thought the bullet had gone through the pleural
cavity and he said he didn't believe that it had, that the damage was
done by the rib fragments. Then the bullet exited as described somewhat
below the right nipple.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you perform a test on goat substance to endeavor to
measure the reduction in velocity of a missile similar to the one which
passed through Governor Connally?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. Why was goat substance selected for that purpose in the
testing procedure?

Dr. OLIVIER. We usually use this in our work so we are familiar with
it. I am not saying it is the only substance that could be used, but we
were not using any unknown procedures or any procedures that we hadn't
used already.

Mr. SPECTER. Does it closely simulate the nature of a wound in the
human body?

Dr. OLIVIER. In this particular instance it did.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the wound inflicted on the goat, then, subjected to
X-ray analysis for the purpose of determining the precise nature of the
wound and for comparison purposes with that wound----

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; it was.

Mr. SPECTER. Inflicted on Connally?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; it was.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you an X-ray marked Commission Exhibit 851 and
ask you to state what that shows?

Dr. OLIVIER. It shows a fractured rib. From this you wouldn't be able
to--well, if you were a better radiologist than I was, you might be
able to tell which one, but it was the eighth left rib. It shows a
comminuted fracture extending some distance along the rib.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you Commission Exhibit No. 852, which is a
photograph, and ask you to testify as to what that depicts, please?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is a photograph taken from the same X-ray again
showing the comminuted fracture of the eighth left rib.

Mr. SPECTER. And is that a photograph then of the X-ray designated
Commission Exhibit 851?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; it is.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have an opportunity to observe personally the
X-rays showing the wound on Governor Connally's rib?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. And how do those X-rays compare with the wound inflicted
as depicted in Exhibits 851 and 852?

Dr. OLIVIER. They are very similar.

Mr. SPECTER. When the wounds were inflicted, as depicted in 851 and
852, what weapon was used?

Dr. OLIVIER. This was again the 6.5 millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano
rifle.

Mr. SPECTER. And what bullets were used?

Dr. OLIVIER. The 6.5 millimeter Western ammunition lot 6,000.

Mr. SPECTER. And what distance was utilized?

Dr. OLIVIER. On the goat the distance was 70 yards.

Mr. SPECTER. And was there any covering over the goat?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes. There was a suit, shirt, and undershirt.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the entrance velocity of the bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. Striking velocity for an average of 11 shots was 1,929
feet per second.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was the exit velocity?

Dr. OLIVIER. The exit velocity was 1,664 feet per second.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a box containing a bullet, which has been
marked as Commission Exhibit No. 853, and ask you if you have ever seen
that bullet before?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And under what circumstances have you previously seen that
bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. This was the bullet that was fired through the goat. It
went through the velocity screens into some cotton waste, dropped out
of the bottom of that and was lying on the floor. It was picked up
immediately afterwards still warm, so we knew it was the bullet that
had fired that particular shot.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that fired through the goat depicted in the
photographs and X-ray, 851 and 852?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; that was the goat.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe for the record, verbally please, the
characteristics of that bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. The bullet has been quite flattened. The lead core is
extruding somewhat from the rear. We weighed the bullet. It weighs
158.8 grains.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you Commission Exhibit 399, which has been
heretofore in Commission proceedings identified as the bullet found
on the stretcher of Governor Connally, and ask if you have had an
opportunity to compare 399 with 853?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And what did you find on that comparison?

Dr. OLIVIER. The bullet recovered on the stretcher has not been
flattened as much, but there is a suggestion of flattening there from
a somewhat similar occurrence. Also, the lead core has extruded from
the rear in the same fashion, and it appears that some of it has even
broken from the rear.

Mr. SPECTER. Is there some flattening on both of those bullets in
approximately the same areas toward the rear of the missiles?

Dr. OLIVIER. In the bullet, our particular bullet is flattened the
whole length, but you say towards the rear?

Mr. SPECTER. You say our bullet; you mean 853?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, 853 is flattened. No. 399 is flattened more towards
the rear.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other conclusions which you have to add to
the tests performed on the goat?

Dr. OLIVIER. Well, again in this test it demonstrates that the bullet
that was stable when it struck in this fashion again lost very little
velocity in going through that much goat tissue.

Incidentally, the amount of goat tissue it traversed was probably
somewhat less than the Governor, but in any case it indicates the
bullet would have had a lot of remaining velocity and could have done a
lot of damage.

Another thing that hasn't been brought up is the velocity screen
immediately behind the goat, the imprint of the bullet left on it was
almost the length of the bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. What does that indicate?

Dr. OLIVIER. This indicates that the bullet was now no longer traveling
straight but either traveling sideways or tumbling end over end at the
time it hit the screen.

Mr. SPECTER. And that was after the point of exit from the goat?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other conclusions which you found from the
studies on the goat?

Dr. OLIVIER. No, I believe that is all I can think of right at this
moment.

Mr. SPECTER. In the regular course of your work for the U.S. Army,
do you have occasion to perform tests on parts of human cadavers to
determine the effects of bullets on human beings?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, I do.

Mr. SPECTER. And was a series of tests performed under your supervision
on the portions of human cadavers simulated to the wound inflicted on
the wrist of Governor Connally?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you familiar with the nature of the wound on Governor
Connally's wrist prior to performing those tests?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, I was.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the source of your information on those wounds?

Dr. OLIVIER. I had read the surgeon's report, also talked with Dr.
Gregory, the surgeon who had done the surgery, and had looked at the
X-rays.

Mr. SPECTER. Had you had an opportunity to discuss the wounds with Dr.
Gregory and view the X-rays taken at Parkland Hospital, here in the
Commission headquarters?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. On April 21, 1964?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you an X-ray marked as Commission Exhibit 854,
and ask you what that depicts?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is a comminuted fracture of the distal end of the
radius of a human arm.

Mr. SPECTER. And in what manner was that wound caused?

Dr. OLIVIER. It was caused by a bullet from the Commission Exhibit 139.
This was again the 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano Western ammunition
lot 6,000.

Mr. SPECTER. Fired at what distance?

Dr. OLIVIER. Fired at a distance of 70 yards.

Mr. SPECTER. And was there anything protecting the wrist at the time of
impact?

Dr. OLIVIER. Not protection but there was again clothing, this time
suit material or suit lining, at least suit material and shirt. I am
not sure about the lining. I can tell you. I have it right here. Suit
material, suit lining material, and shirt material.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph marked as Commission Exhibit
855 and ask you what that represents?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is a photograph taken from the X-ray, Commission
Exhibit 854.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you describe for the record the details of the
injuries shown on 854 and 855, please?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is a comminuted fracture of the distal end of the
radius. It was struck directly by the bullet. It passed through, not
directly through but through at an oblique angle so that it entered
more proximal on the dorsal side of the wrist and distal on the volar
aspect.

Mr. SPECTER. How does the entry and exit compare with the wound on
Governor Connally which you observed on the X-rays?

Dr. OLIVIER. In this particular instance to the best of my memory from
looking at the X-rays, it is very close. It is about one of the best
ones that we obtained.

Mr. SPECTER. Is there any definable difference at all?

Dr. OLIVIER. I couldn't determine any.

Mr. SPECTER. It is close, you say?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes. If I had both X-rays in front of me if there was a
difference I could determine it, but from memory I would say it was for
all purposes identical.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a bullet in a case marked Commission
Exhibit 856 and ask if you have ever seen that before?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes. This is the bullet that caused the damage shown in
Commission Exhibits Nos. 854 and 855.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe that bullet for the record, please?

Dr. OLIVIER. The nose of the bullet is quite flattened from striking
the radius.

Mr. SPECTER. How does it compare, for example, with Commission Exhibit
399?

Dr. OLIVIER. It is not like it at all. I mean, Commission Exhibit 399
is not flattened on the end. This one is very severely flattened on the
end.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the velocity of the missile at the time it struck
the wrist depicted in 854 and 855?

Dr. OLIVIER. The average striking velocity was 1,858 feet per second.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have the precise striking velocity of that one?

Dr. OLIVIER. No; I don't. We could not put velocity screen in front of
the individual shots because it would have interfered with the gunner's
view. So we took five shots and got an average striking velocity.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say five shots with an average striking velocity,
those were at the delineated distance without striking anything on
those particular shots?

Dr. OLIVIER. Right, and after establishing that velocity, then we went
on to shoot the various arms.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was the exit velocity?

Dr. OLIVIER. On this particular one?

Mr. SPECTER. If you have it?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes. Well, I don't know if I have that or not. We didn't
get them in all because some of these things deflect. No, I have no
exit velocity on this particular one.

Mr. SPECTER. What exit velocity did you get on the average?

Dr. OLIVIER. Average exit velocity was 1,776 feet per second. This was
for an average of seven. We did 10. We obtained velocity on seven.

Mr. SPECTER. Would the average reduction be approximately the same,
in your professional opinion, as to the bullet exiting from the wrist
depicted in 854 and 855?

Dr. OLIVIER. Somewhat. Let me give you the extremes of our velocities.
The highest one was 1,866 and the lowest was 1,664, so there was a
202-feet-per-second difference in the thing. Some of the cases bone was
missed, in other cases glancing blows. But I would say it is a close
approximation to what the exit velocity was on that particular one.

Mr. SPECTER. And what would the close approximation be, the average?

Dr. OLIVIER. The average.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you compare the damage, which was done to Governor
Connally's wrist, as contrasted with the damage to the wrist depicted
in 854 and 855?

Dr. OLIVIER. The damage in the wrist that you see in the X-ray on 854
and 855, the damage is greater than was done to the Governor's wrist.
There is more severe comminution here.

Mr. SPECTER. How much more severe is the comminution?

Dr. OLIVIER. Considerably more. If I remember correctly in the
X-rays of the Governor's wrist, I think there were only two or three
fragments, if that many. Here we have many, many small fragments.

Mr. SPECTER. In your opinion, based on the tests which you have
performed, was the damage inflicted on Governor Connally's wrist caused
by a pristine bullet, a bullet fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle
6.5 missile which did not hit anything before it struck the Governor's
wrist?

Dr. OLIVIER. I don't believe so. I don't believe his wrist was struck
by a pristine bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the reason for your conclusion on that?

Dr. OLIVIER. In this case I go by the size of the entrance wound and
exit wound on the Governor's wrist. The entrance wound was on the
dorsal surface, it was described by the surgeon as being much larger
than the exit wound. He said he almost overlooked that on the volar
aspect of the wrist.

In every instance we had a larger exit wound than an entrance wound
firing with a pristine bullet apparently at the same angle at which it
entered and exited the Governor's wrist.

Also, and I don't believe they were mixed up on which was entrance and
exit. For one thing the clothing, you know, the surgeon found pieces
of clothing and the other thing the human anatomy is such that I don't
believe it would enter through the volar aspect and out the top.

So I am pretty sure that the Governor's wrist was not hit by a pristine
or a stable bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. What is there, in and of the nature of the smaller wound
of exit and larger wound of entrance in the Governor's wrist as
contrasted with a smaller wound of entrance and larger wound of exit in
854 and 855, which leads you to conclude that the Governor's wrist was
not struck by a pristine bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. Do you want to repeat that question again?

Mr. SPECTER. What is there about the wound of entry or exit which led
you to think that the Governor's wrist wasn't struck by a pristine
bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. Well, he would have had a larger exit wound than entrance
wound, which he did not.

Mr. SPECTER. And if the velocity of the missile is decreased, how does
that effect the nature of the wounds of entry and exit?

Dr. OLIVIER. If the velocity is decreased, if the bullet is still
stable, he still should have a larger exit wound than an entrance.

Now, on the other hand, to get a larger entrance wound and a smaller
exit wound, this indicates the bullet probably hit with very much of a
yaw. I mean, as this hole appeared in the velocity screen the bullet
either tumbling or striking sideways, this would have made a larger
entrance wound, lose considerable of its velocity in fracturing the
bone, and coming out at a very low velocity, made a smaller hole.

Mr. SPECTER. So the crucial factor would be the analysis that the
bullet was characterized with yaw at the time it struck?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Causing a larger wound of entry and a smaller wound of
exit?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Now is there anything in the----

Dr. OLIVIER. Also at a reduced velocity because if it struck at
considerable yaw at a high velocity as it could do if it hit something
and deflected, it would have, it could make a larger wound of exit but
it would have been even a more severe wound than we had here. It would
have been very severe, could even amputate the wrist hitting at high
velocity sideways. We have to say this bullet was characterized by an
extreme amount of yaw and reduced velocity. How much reduced, I don't
know, but considerably reduced.

Mr. SPECTER. Does the greater damage, inflicted on the wrist in 854 and
855 than that which was inflicted on Governor Connally's wrist, have
any value as indicating whether Governor Connally's wrist was struck by
a pristine bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. No; because holding the velocity the same or similar the
damage would be greater with a tumbling bullet than a pristine.

I think it reflects both instability and reduced velocity. You have
to show the two. I mean, the size of the entrance and exit are very
important. This shows that the thing was used when it struck. The
fact that there was no more damage than was done by a tumbling bullet
indicates the bullet at a reduced velocity. You have to put these two
things together.

Mr. SPECTER. Had Governor Connally's wrist been struck with a pristine
bullet without yaw, would more damage have been inflicted----

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Than was inflicted on the Governor's wrist?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. So then the lesser damage on the Governor's wrist in and
of itself indicates in your opinion----

Dr. OLIVIER. That it wasn't struck by a pristine bullet; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other conclusions which flow from the
experiments which you conducted on the wrist?

Dr. OLIVIER. We concluded that it wasn't struck by a pristine bullet.
Also drew the conclusion that it was struck by an unstable bullet, a
bullet at a much reduced velocity. The question that it brings up
in my mind is if the same bullet that struck the wrist had passed
through the Governor's chest, if the bullet that struck the Governor's
chest had not hit anything else would it have been reduced low enough
to do this, and I wonder, based on our work--it brings to mind the
possibility the same bullet that struck the President striking the
Governor would account for this more readily. I don't know, I don't
think you can ever say this, but it is a very good possibility, I think
more possible, more probable than not.

The CHAIRMAN. What is more probable than not, Doctor?

Dr. OLIVIER. In my mind at least, and I don't know the angles at which
the things went or anything, it seems to me more probable that the
bullet that hit the Governor's chest had already been slowed down
somewhat, in order to lose enough velocity to strike his wrist and do
no more damage than it did. I don't know how you would ever determine
it exactly. I think the best approach is to find out the angles of
flight, whether it is possible. But I have a feeling that it might have
been.

The CHAIRMAN. It might have been?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The one that went through his chest went through his hand
also.

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; and also through the President.

The CHAIRMAN. The first shot?

Dr. OLIVIER. Well, I don't know whether the first or second. The first
one could have missed. It could have been the second that hit both.

The CHAIRMAN. The one that went through his back and came out his
trachea?

Dr. OLIVIER. It could have hit the Governor in the chest and went
through because it had so little velocity after coming out of the wrist
that it barely penetrated the thigh.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask one more question? Would you think, that the
same bullet could have done all three of those things?

Dr. OLIVIER. That same bullet was capable.

The CHAIRMAN. Gone through the President's back as it did, gone through
Governor Connally's chest as it did, and then through his hand as it
did?

Dr. OLIVIER. It was certainly capable of doing all that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was capable?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The one shot?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Doctor Olivier, based on the descriptions of the wound on
the Governor's back, what in your opinion was the characteristic of the
bullet at the time it struck the Governor's back with respect to the
course of its flight?

Dr. OLIVIER. Let's say from the size of the wound as described by the
surgeon, it could have been tipped somewhat when it struck because that
is a fairly large wound. Another thing that could have done it is the
angle at which it hit. On the goat some of the wounds were larger than
others. On the goat material some of the wounds were larger than others
because of the angle at which it hit this material. The same thing
could happen on the Governor's back.

Mr. SPECTER. And how was that wound described with respect to its size?

Dr. OLIVIER. The Governor's wound?

Mr. SPECTER. On the Governor's back?

Dr. OLIVIER. About 3 centimeters at its largest dimension.

Mr. SPECTER. And would you have any view as to which factor was more
probable, as to whether it was a tangential strike on the Governor's
back, or whether there was yaw in the bullet at the time it struck the
Governor's back?

Dr. OLIVIER. I couldn't as far as being tangential. I couldn't answer
that, not knowing the position of the Governor. But it could have been
caused by a bullet yawing. I mean it would have made a larger wound, as
that was.

Mr. SPECTER. Is there any other cause which could account for that type
of a large wound on the Governor's back other than with the bullet
yawing?

Dr. OLIVIER. With this particular bullet those would be the two
probable causes of this wound of this size.

Mr. SPECTER. And those two probable causes are what?

Dr. OLIVIER. One, the bullet hitting not perpendicular to the surface
of the Governor, in other words, hitting tangential at a slight angle
on his back so that it came in cutting the skin. Another, the bullet
hitting that wasn't perpendicular to the surface as it hit. The bullet
did go along, the surgeon described the path as tangential but he is
speaking of along the rib. It isn't clear it was, as it struck, whether
it was a tangential shot or actually perpendicular to the Governor's
back.

Mr. SPECTER. Permit me to add one additional factor which Dr. Shaw
testified to during the course of the proceeding after he measured the
angle of decline through the Governor; and Dr. Shaw testified that
there was a 25° to 27° angle of declination measuring from front to
back on the Governor, taking into account the position of the wound on
the Governor's back and the position of the wound on the Governor's
chest below the right nipple.

Now with that factor, added to those which you already know, would
that enable you to form a conclusion as to whether the nature of the
wound on the Governor's back was caused by yaw of the bullet or by a
tangential strike?

Dr. OLIVIER. I don't think I would want to say. If I could have seen
the Governor's wound, this would have been a help.

Mr. SPECTER. Would the damage done to the Governor's wrist indicate
that a bullet which was fired approximately 160 to 250 feet away with
the muzzle velocity of approximately 2,000 feet per second, would it
indicate that the bullet was slowed up only by the passage through the
Governor's body, in the way which you know, or would it indicate that
there was some other factor which slowed up the bullet in addition?

Dr. OLIVIER. It would indicate there was some other factor that had
slowed up the bullet in addition.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your reason for that conclusion, sir?

Dr. OLIVIER. The amount of damage alone; striking that end it would have
caused more severe comminution as we found. You know--if it hadn't been
slowed up in some other fashion. At that range it still had a striking
velocity of 1,858 or in the vicinity of 1,800 feet per second, which is
capable of doing more damage than was done to the Governor's wrist.

Mr. SPECTER. Had the same bullet which passed through the President, in
the way heretofore described for the record, then struck the Governor
as well, what effect would there have been in reducing its velocity as
a result of that course?

Dr. OLIVIER. You say the bullet first struck the President. In coming
out of the President's body it would have had a tendency to be slightly
unstable. In striking the Governor it would have lost more velocity in
his chest than if it had been a pristine bullet striking the Governor's
chest, so it would have exited from the Governor's chest I would say
at a considerably reduced velocity, probably with a good amount of yaw
or tumbling, and this would account for the type of wound that the
Governor did have in his wrist.

Mr. SPECTER. The approximate reduction in velocity on passage through
the goat was what, Doctor?

Dr. OLIVIER. The average velocity loss in the seven cases we did was 82
feet per second.

Mr. SPECTER. If the bullet had passed through the President prior to
the time it passed through the Governor, would you expect a larger loss
than 82 feet per second resulting from the passage through the body of
the Governor?

Dr. OLIVIER. I am not sure if I heard you correctly. This is if it hit
the Governor without hitting the President or hitting the President
first?

Mr. SPECTER. Let me rephrase it for you, Dr. Olivier.

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; please.

Mr. SPECTER. You testified that the bullet lost 82 feet per second when
it passed through the goat.

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Now what would your expectations be as to the reduction in
velocity on a bullet which passed through the Governor, assuming that
it struck nothing first?

Dr. OLIVIER. It would be greater; the distance through the Governor's
chest would have been greater.

Mr. SPECTER. Would that be an appreciable or approximately the same?

Dr. OLIVIER. Can I bring in any other figures? Dr. Dziemian has
computed approximately what he thought it would have lost.

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, of course, if you have any other figure which would
be helpful.

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I believe you misunderstood Mr. Specter. I think you
gave the figure for the loss of velocity through the Governor's wrist
instead of through his chest.

Dr. OLIVIER. I am sorry. We were on the wrist; okay.

Mr. SPECTER. Let me start again then. In an effort to draw some
conclusion about the reduction in velocity through the Governor's
chest, I am now going back and asking you what was the reduction in
velocity of the bullet which passed through the goat?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did misunderstand you. I am sorry. The loss in
velocity passing through the goat was 265 feet per second.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, would that be the approximate loss in velocity of a
pristine bullet passing through the Governor?

Dr. OLIVIER. The loss would be somewhat greater.

Mr. SPECTER. How much greater in your opinion?

Dr. OLIVIER. Do you have that figure, Dr. Dziemian?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I would say a pristine bullet of the Governor was about
half again thicker. It would be about half again as great velocity,
somewhere around 400.

Mr. SPECTER. Had the bullet passed through only the Governor, losing
velocity of 400 feet per second, would you have expected that the
damage inflicted on the Governor's wrist would have been about the same
as that inflicted on Governor Connally or greater?

Dr. OLIVIER. My feeling is it would have been greater.

Mr. SPECTER. Had the bullet passed through the President and then
struck Governor Connally, would it have lost velocity of 400 feet per
second in passing through Governor Connally or more?

Dr. OLIVIER. It would have lost more.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the reason for that?

Dr. OLIVIER. The bullet after passing through, say a dense medium, then
through air and then through another dense medium tends to be more
unstable, based on our past work. It appears to be that it would have
tumbled more readily and lost energy more rapidly. How much velocity it
would have lost, I couldn't say, but it would have lost more.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any indications from the internal wounds on
Governor Connally as to whether or not the bullet which entered his
body was an unstable bullet?

Dr. OLIVIER. The only thing that might give you an indication would be
the skin wound of entrance, the type of rib fracture and all that I
think could be accounted for by either type, because in our experiment
we simulated, although not to as great a degree, the damage wasn't as
severe, but I think it would be hard to say that.

One thing comes to my mind right now that might indicate it. There was
a greater flattening of the bullet in our experiments than there was
going through the Governor, which might indicate that it struck the rib
which did the flattening at a lower velocity. This is only a thought.

Mr. SPECTER. It struck the rib of the Governor?

Dr. OLIVIER. It struck the rib of the Governor at a lower velocity
because that bullet was less flattened than the bullet through the goat
material.

Mr. SPECTER. Based on the nature of the wound inflicted on the
Governor's wrist, and on the tests which you have conducted then, do
you have an opinion as to which is more probable on whether the bullet
passed through only the Governor's chest before striking his wrist, or
passed through the President first and then the Governor's chest before
striking the Governor's wrist?

Dr. OLIVIER. Will you say that again to make sure I have it?

Mr. SPECTER. [To the reporter.] Could you repeat that question, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Dr. OLIVIER. You couldn't say exactly at all. My feeling is that it
would be more probable that it passed through the President first. At
least I think it is important to establish line of flight to try to
determine it.

Mr. SPECTER. Aside from the lines of flight, based on the factors which
were known to you from the medical point of view and from the tests
which you conducted, what would be the reason for the feeling which you
just expressed?

Dr. OLIVIER. Because I believe you would need that, I mean to account
for the damage to the wrist. I don't think you would have gotten a low
enough velocity upon reaching the wrist unless you had gone through the
President's body first.

Mr. SPECTER. The President's body as well as the Governor's body?

Dr. OLIVIER. As well as the Governor's.

Mr. SPECTER. Does the nature of the wound which was inflicted on
Governor Connally's thigh shed any light on this subject?

Dr. OLIVIER. This, to my mind, at least, merely indicates the bullet
at this time was about spent. In talking with doctor, I believe it was
Gregory, I don't think he did the operation on the thigh but at least
he saw the wound, and he said it was about the size of an eraser on a
lead pencil. This could be accounted for--and there was also this small
fragment of bullet in this thigh wound--this, to me, indicates that
this was a spent bullet that had gone through the wrist as the Governor
was sitting there, went through the wrist into his thigh, just partly
imbedded and then fell out and I believe this was the bullet that was
found on the stretcher.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you have any opinion as to the velocity of that
bullet at the time it struck the Governor's thigh?

Dr. OLIVIER. No. We didn't do any work to simulate this, but it would
have been at a very low velocity just to have gone in that far and drop
out again.

Mr. SPECTER. Dr. Olivier, in the regular course of your work for the
U.S. Army, do you have occasion to perform tests on reconstructed human
skulls to determine the effects of bullets on skulls?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I do.

Mr. SPECTER. And did you have occasion to conduct such a test in
connection with the series which you are now describing?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. And would you outline briefly the procedures for
simulating the human skull?

Dr. OLIVIER. Human skulls, we take these human skulls and they are
imbedded and filled with 20 percent gelatin. As I mentioned before, 20
percent gelatin is a pretty good simulant for body tissues.

They are in the moisture content. When I say 20 percent, it is 20
percent weight of the dry gelatin, 80 percent moisture.

The skull, the cranial cavity, is filled with this and the surface is
coated with a gelatin and then it is trimmed down to approximate the
thickness of the tissues overlying the skull, the soft tissues of the
head.

Mr. SPECTER. And at what distance were these tests performed?

Dr. OLIVIER. These tests were performed at a distance of 90 yards.

Mr. SPECTER. And what gun was used?

Dr. OLIVIER. It was a 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano that was marked Commission
Exhibit 139.

Mr. SPECTER. What bullets were used?

Dr. OLIVIER. It was the 6.5 millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano Western
ammunition lot 6,000.

Mr. SPECTER. What did that examination or test, rather, disclose?

Dr. OLIVIER. It disclosed that the type of head wounds that the
President received could be done by this type of bullet. This surprised
me very much, because this type of a stable bullet I didn't think
would cause a massive head wound, I thought it would go through making
a small entrance and exit, but the bones of the skull are enough to
deform the end of this bullet causing it to expend a lot of energy and
blowing out the side of the skull or blowing out fragments of the skull.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a case containing bullet fragments marked
Commission Exhibit 857 and ask if you have ever seen those fragments
before.

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And under what circumstances have you viewed those before,
please?

Dr. OLIVIER. There were, the two larger fragments were recovered
outside of the skull in the cotton waste we were using to catch the
fragments without deforming them. There are some smaller fragments in
here that were obtained from the gelatin within the cranial cavity
after the experiment. We melted the gelatin out and recovered the
smallest fragments from within the cranial cavity.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, I show you two fragments designated as Commission
Exhibits 567 and 579 heretofore identified as having been found on the
front seat of the President's car on November 22, 1963, and ask you if
you have had an opportunity to examine those before.

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And have you had an opportunity to compare those to the
two fragments identified as Commission Exhibit 857?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And what did that comparison show?

Dr. OLIVIER. They are quite similar. These two fragments on, what is
the number?

Mr. SPECTER. 857.

Dr. OLIVIER. On 857 there isn't as much of the front part in this one,
but in other respects they are very similar.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 858
and ask you what that depicts.

Mr. DULLES. Could I see that other exhibit?

Dr. OLIVIER. These are the same fragments as marked 857.

Mr. SPECTER. That is a photograph of the fragments marked 857?

Dr. OLIVIER. 857.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph marked Commission Exhibit 859
and ask you what that depicts?

Dr. OLIVIER. These are the smaller fragments that have been labeled,
also, Exhibit 857. This picture or some of the fragments labeled 857,
these are the smaller fragments contained in the same box.

Mr. SPECTER. Are all of the fragments on 859 contained within 857?

Dr. OLIVIER. They are supposed to be, photographed and placed in the
box. If they dropped out they are supposed to be all there.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Back on the record.

Mr. SPECTER. At what point on the skull did the bullet, which
fragmented into Commission Exhibit 857, strike?

Dr. OLIVIER. I would have to see the picture. I mean I can't remember
exactly what point. I can tell you the point we were aiming at and
approximately where it hit.

Mr. SPECTER. Permit me to make available a photograph to you, then, for
purposes of refreshing your recollection, and in testifying as to the
point which was struck, for that purpose.

Dr. OLIVIER. We did 10 skulls so I can't remember offhand where
everyone struck.

Mr. SPECTER. For that purpose I hand you Commission Exhibit 860 and ask
you if that is designated in any way to identify it.

Mr. DULLES. This is the test we are talking about now, is it?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir; where the bullet fragmented into pieces in 857.

Mr. DULLES. Are you introducing that into evidence?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Have you already introduced it in the record?

Mr. SPECTER. May I at this point move for the admission into evidence
of Commission Exhibits 844 through 860, and they have been identified
in sequence as being the photographs, X-rays, and other tangible
exhibits used in connection with these tests.

Mr. DULLES. They shall be admitted.

(The documents heretofore marked for identification as Commission
Exhibits Nos. 844 through 860 were received in evidence.)

Dr. OLIVIER. This photograph is the skull that was shot with the
bullet, the fragments which are marked 857.

Mr. SPECTER. At what point on the skull did the bullet strike?

Dr. OLIVIER. From this I couldn't tell you exactly the point. We were
aiming, as described in the autopsy report if I remember correctly the
point 2 centimeters to the right of the external occipital protuberance
and slightly above it. We placed a mark on the skull at that point,
according to the autopsy the bullet emerged through the superorbital
process, so we drew a line to give us the line of flight, put unclipped
goat hair over the back to simulate the scalp and put a mark on the
area which we wished to shoot.

Now, every shot didn't strike exactly where we wanted, but they all
struck in the back of the skull in the vicinity of our aiming point,
some maybe slightly above the external occipital protuberance. In some
cases very close to our aiming spot.

This particular skull blew out the right side in a manner very similar
to the wounds of the President, and if I remember correctly, it was
very close to the point at which we aimed.

In other words, a couple centimeters to the right.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have any record which would be more specific on the
point of entrance?

Dr. OLIVIER. Our notebook has all----

Mr. SPECTER. Will you refer to your notes, then?

Dr. OLIVIER. The notebook is in the safe in there in the briefcase.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you get the notebook and refer to it so we can be as
specific as possible on this point.

Dr. OLIVIER. I have the location of that wound.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you give us then the precise location of the wound
caused by bullet identified as 857?

Dr. OLIVIER. The entrance wound is 2.9 centimeters to the right and
almost horizontal to the occipital protuberance. This is almost exactly
where we were aiming. We were aiming 2 centimeters to the right.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph marked as Commission Exhibit
861, move its admission into evidence, and ask you to state what that
depicts.

Dr. OLIVIER. This is the skull in question, the same one from which the
fragments marked Exhibit 857 were recovered.

Mr. SPECTER. And what does that show as to damage done to the skull?

Dr. OLIVIER. It blew the whole side of the cranial cavity away.

Mr. SPECTER. How does that compare, then, with the damage inflicted on
President Kennedy?

Dr. OLIVIER. Very similar. I think they stated the length of the
defect, the missing skull was 13 centimeters if I remember correctly.
This in this case it is greater, but you don't have the limiting scalp
holding the pieces in so you would expect it to fly a little more but
it is essentially a similar type wound.

Mr. SPECTER. Does the human scalp work to hold in the human skull in
such circumstances to a greater extent than the simulated matters used?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes; we take this into account.

Mr. SPECTER. I hand you Commission Exhibit 862, move its admission into
evidence, and ask you what that depicts?

Dr. OLIVIER. This is the same skull. This is just looking at it
from the front. You are looking at the exit. You can't see it here
because the bone has been blown away, but the bullet exited somewhere
around--we reconstructed the skull. In other words, it exited very
close to the superorbital ridge, possibly below it.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you formulate any other conclusions or opinions based
on the tests on firing at the skull?

Dr. OLIVIER. Well, let's see. We found that this bullet could do
exactly--could make the type of wound that the President received.

Also, that the recovered fragments were very similar to the ones
recovered on the front seat and on the floor of the car.

This, to me, indicates that those fragments did come from the bullet
that wounded the President in the head.

Mr. SPECTER. And how do the two major fragments in 857 compare, then,
with the fragments heretofore identified as 567 and 569?

Dr. OLIVIER. They are quite similar.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have an opinion as to whether the wound on the
Governor's wrist could have been caused by a fragment of a bullet
coming off of the President's head?

Dr. OLIVIER. I don't believe so. Frankly, I don't know, but I don't
believe so, because it expended so much energy in blowing the head
apart and took a lot of energy that I doubt if they could have
fractured the radius. The radius is a very strong, hard bone and I
don't believe they could have done that much damage. I believe they
could have caused a superficial laceration on someone or a mark on the
windshield, but I don't believe they could have done that damage to the
wrist.

Mr. DULLES. And it couldn't have then gone through the wrist into the
thigh?

Dr. OLIVIER. I don't believe so.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you had an opportunity to examine a fragment
identified as Commission Exhibit 842 which is the fragment taken from
Governor Connally's wrist?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, I have.

Mr. SPECTER. Could that fragment have come from the bullet designated
as Commission Exhibit 399?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, I believe it would have, I will add further I believe
it could have because the core of the bullet extrudes through the back
and would allow part of it to break off very readily.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have an opinion as to whether, in fact, bullet
399 did cause the wound on the Governor's wrist, assuming if you will
that it was the missile found on the Governor's stretcher at Parkland
Hospital?

Dr. OLIVIER. I believe that it was. That is my feeling.

Mr. SPECTER. To be certain that the record is complete on the skull
tests, would you again state the distance at which those tests were
performed?

Dr. OLIVIER. Yes, the skulls--it was fired at the skulls at a range of
90 yards.

Mr. SPECTER. With what gun?

Dr. OLIVIER. The 6.5 mm. Carcano which was marked Commission Exhibit
139 and using Western ammunition lot 6,000, again the 6.5 mm.
Mannlicher-Carcano.

Mr. SPECTER. Going to the results of the test on the cadavers, what was
the average exit velocity?

Dr. OLIVIER. The average exit velocity on the wrist was 1,776 feet per
second.

Mr. SPECTER. Had Governor Connally's wrist been struck with a pristine
bullet and the bullet exited at that speed, what damage would have been
inflicted had it then struck the area of the thigh which was struck on
the Governor according to the Parkland Hospital records which you have
said you have examined?

Dr. OLIVIER. It would have made a very severe wound.

Mr. SPECTER. Would it have been more severe than the one which was
inflicted?

Dr. OLIVIER. Much more so.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have anything to add, Dr. Olivier, which you think
would be helpful to the Commission in any way?

Dr. OLIVIER. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. DULLES. I have no further questions.

Mr. SPECTER. That completes my questions, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much. We appreciate very much your coming.

(Discussion off the record.)


TESTIMONY OF DR. ARTHUR J. DZIEMIAN

Mr. SPECTER. Dr. Dziemian.

Mr. DULLES. Doctor, will you raise your right hand, please? Do you
solemnly swear the testimony you give in this proceeding is the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Dr. Dziemian, as you know, the purpose of the proceeding
is to question you concerning the experiments which were performed at
Edgewood Arsenal which may shed light on the assassination of President
Kennedy. With that brief statement of purpose, will you state your full
name for the record, please?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Arthur J. Dziemian.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your profession or occupation, sir?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I am a physiologist at the U.S. Army Chemical Research
and Development Laboratories, and am chief of the Biophysics Division.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you outline your educational background briefly,
please?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes; A.B. and Ph. D. from Princeton, Ph. D. in 1939. I
was national research fellow at the University of Pennsylvania in the
physiology department of the medical school and fellow in anatomy at
Johns Hopkins University Medical School.

Mr. SPECTER. In a general way, what have your professional activities
been since 1939?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Since 1939?

Well, these fellowships that I had. Then I went to Edgewood Arsenal,
was there for a few months and then went into the Army, was in the Army
for 3 years, in the sanitary corps, officer in the sanitary corps, and
then I returned to Edgewood Arsenal in 1947 and in 1947 I went into
wound ballistics work and have been in it since 1947.

Mr. SPECTER. And how long have you been chief of the Biophysics
Division?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Since November of 1959.

Mr. DULLES. Where is this Biophysics Division?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. U.S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories,
Edgewood Arsenal, Md.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe in a general way the tests which are
performed at the Edgewood Arsenal, please?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes; well, our mission, the division's mission is to
study the antipersonnel effects of munitions, including kinetic energy
munitions, incendiary, and some chemical munitions.

Mr. SPECTER. Is it the regular function of your unit then to test the
effects of bullet wounds on various parts of the human body?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes; it is.

Mr. SPECTER. And does Dr. Olivier function under your direction in his
capacity as chief of the Wounds Ballistics Branch?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes; his branch is one of the branches of the Biophysics
Division.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you been present today to hear the full testimony of
Dr. Olivier?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. Were the tests which he described, performed under your
general supervision and direction as his superior?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes; they were.

Mr. SPECTER. As to the underlying facts which those tests disclosed,
do you have any details to add as to results which you think would be
helpful or significant for the Commission to know?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Well, I think that Dr. Olivier described them pretty well
on the whole, got all the details in.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you agree with the recitation of the detailed findings,
then, as described by Dr. Olivier?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I do, yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Then moving to the general topic of reconstructing the
events in terms of what professional opinion you may have as to what
actually occurred at Dallas, permit me to ask you some questions in
terms of the known medical facts, and in the light of the results of
this series of tests which you have performed. First of all, have you
had access to the autopsy report on President Kennedy?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes, I have.

Mr. SPECTER. And have you had access to the same general information
described by Dr. Olivier on the wounds inflicted on Governor Connally?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes, I have. I did not speak to the surgeons. I was not
here at that time. My information on Dr. Connally's wounds----

Mr. DULLES. Governor Connally.

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Governor Connally, are from the reports and from
discussions with Dr. Light or Dr. Olivier.

Mr. SPECTER. So that all of the information available to Dr. Light and
Dr. Olivier obtained through consultations with Governor Connally's
doctors, Dr. Shaw and Dr. Gregory, have been passed on to you? In
addition, you have had access to the records of Parkland Hospital on
Governor Connally's treatment there?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. That is right.

Mr. SPECTER. And have you had an opportunity to observe certain films
known as the Zapruder films showing the assassination?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. No; I did not see those.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you had, then, brought to your attention the
approximate distances involved from the situation here, to wit;
that the shots were fired from a 6th floor window at a distance of
approximately 160 to 250 feet at a moving vehicle, striking the
Governor and the President at angles estimated from 25 to 45 degrees,
the angle of impact on President Kennedy being given by the autopsy
surgeon as a 45-degree angle of declination, and the angle on Governor
Connally being described as 25 to 27 degrees?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Yes, I did----

Mr. DULLES. You are speaking now of the first two wounds, aren't you?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. You are not speaking now of the brain wound at all, are you?

Mr. SPECTER. Correct, Mr. Dulles. The wound that I am referring to
on the President is the wound which entered the back of his neck and
exited from the front part of his neck in accordance with the prior
testimony of the doctors in the case.

Now, based on the tests which have been performed, and the other
factors which I will ask you to assume, since you weren't present; for
purposes of expressing an opinion, what is your opinion as to whether
all of the wounds on Governor Connally were inflicted by one bullet?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. My opinion is that it is most probably so, that one
bullet produced all the wounds on Governor Connally.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is your opinion as to whether the wound through
President Kennedy's neck and all of the wounds on Governor Connally
were produced by one bullet?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I think the probability is very good that it is, that all
the wounds were caused by one bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say all the wounds, are you excluding from that
the head wound on President Kennedy?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I am excluding the head wound, yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the reasoning behind your conclusion that one
bullet caused the neck wound on President Kennedy and all of the other
wounds on Governor Connally?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I am saying that the probability is high that that was so.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the reason for your assessment of that high
probability?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. The same reasons that Dr. Olivier gave, based on the
same information, that especially the wound to the wrist. That higher
velocity strike on the wrist would be caused by the bullet slowing down
by going through all this tissue would cause more damage to the wrist
and also more damage to the thigh.

Mr. SPECTER. Had the bullet only gone through Governor Connally's chest
then, what is your opinion as to whether or not there would have been
greater damage to the Governor's wrist?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I think there would have been greater damage to the
Governor's wrist, and also to the thigh from the information, from the
experiments obtained by Dr. Olivier's group.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question here? Does that take into account
any evidence as to the angle of fire and the relative positions of the
two men, or excluding that?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Excluding that. I do not know enough details about that
to make an opinion on that. This is just on the basis of the velocities
of the bullets.

Mr. SPECTER. Would the nature of the wounds on the Governor's wrist
and thigh, then, be explained by the hypothesis that the bullet passed
through the President first, then went through the Governor's chest
before striking the wrist and in turn the thigh?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I think that could be a good explanation.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your opinion as to whether or not a fragment of
a bullet striking the President's head could have caused the wound to
Governor Connally's wrist?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I think it is unlikely.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your opinion as to whether or not Governor
Connally's wrist wound could have been caused by a pristine bullet?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. That is unlikely, too. Our results with pristine bullets
were very different from the wound that the Governor had.

Mr. SPECTER. Based on the description provided to you of the nature of
the wound in the Governor's back, what is your opinion as to whether,
or not, that was a pristine bullet or had yaw in it, just on the basis
of the nature of the wound on the Governor's back?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. It could very well have yaw in it because of the rather
large wound that was produced in the Governor's back. The wound from a
nonyawing bullet could be considerably smaller.

Mr. SPECTER. For the record, would you define in lay terms what yaw
means?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. It is the procession of the bullet. The bullet is
wobbling on its axis, so that as it wobbles, it presents different
presented areas to the target or to the air, and this changes the drag
coefficient of the bullet. It will slow down the bullet more both in
the air and in tissues, in the yawing.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the course of a bullet, then, which is a pristine
bullet or the nature of the bullet immediately after coming out of the
muzzle of a rifle before it strikes anything?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. A pristine bullet is normally stable. It does not
wobble in the air. It presents the same presented area along most of
its trajectory until it slows down, so that the drag coefficient in
air or in the tissue of this type of bullet is less than the drag
coefficient----

Mr. SPECTER. What do you mean by drag coefficient?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. It is a measurement of the resistance of the target
material or the air to the bullet. The greater the drag coefficient,
the more the resistance to the bullet, the more the bullet slows down
within a given time.

Mr. SPECTER. So would a bullet with yaw cause a greater or lesser hole
on the surface which it strikes than a bullet without yaw?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. It would normally cause a greater hole. It usually would
have more presented area, that is more the surface of the bullet would
hit the skin.

Mr. SPECTER. And would a bullet with yaw decrease in velocity to a
greater, lesser, or the same extent as a bullet without yaw?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. It would decrease in velocity to a greater extent.

Mr. SPECTER. Whether it passed through air or----

Dr. DZIEMIAN. Or through tissue, and the important thing in tissue is
that it transfers more energy to the target than would a nonyawing
bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. Dr. Dziemian, Governor Connally testified that he
experienced the sensation of a striking blow on his back which he
described as being similar to a hard punch received from a doubled-up
fist. Do you have an opinion as to whether that sensation would
necessarily occur immediately upon impact of a wound such as that
received by Governor Connally, or could there be a delayed reaction in
sensing that feeling?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I don't have too much of an opinion on that. All I can
say is that some people are struck by bullets and do not even know they
are hit. This happens in wartime. But I don't know about that.

Mr. SPECTER. So that it is possible in some situations there is some
delay in reaction?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I couldn't say.

Mr. SPECTER. Is it a highly individual matter as to the reaction of an
individual on that subject?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I don't know.

Mr. DULLES. But take a wound like the wrist wound of Governor Connally.
He couldn't get that without knowing it, could he?

Dr. DZIEMIAN. I think he said that he didn't know he had a wrist wound
until much later.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SPECTER. I have no further questions of Dr. Dziemian, Commissioner
Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much.


TESTIMONY OF DR. FREDERICK W. LIGHT, JR.

Mr. DULLES. Doctor, would you give your full name?

Dr. LIGHT. Frederick W. Light, Jr.

Mr. DULLES. Would you raise your right hand? Do you swear that the
testimony that you will give before this Commission is the truth, the
whole truth, so help you God?

Dr. LIGHT. I do.

Mr. SPECTER. Dr. Light, the purpose of asking you to appear today is
to question you concerning the results of tests taken at the Edgewood
Arsenal. With that brief statement of purpose, I will ask you to state
your full name for the record, please.

Dr. LIGHT. Frederick W. Light, Jr.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your business or profession, sir?

Dr. LIGHT. I am a physician specializing in pathology.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your educational background?

Dr. LIGHT. I have an A.B. from Lafayette in 1926, M.D. from Johns
Hopkins Medical School in 1930, and Ph. D. from Hopkins in 1948.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you outline your experience since 1933 in a very
general way, please?

Dr. LIGHT. Well, in 1933 I was still at the Reading Hospital, resident
in pathology. Between then and 1940 I was pathologist in Clarksburg, W.
Va., and later in Springfield, Ill. In 1940 I returned to Johns Hopkins
University to study mathematics for awhile.

Mr. DULLES. To study mathematics?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes. And then in 1952, or 1951, excuse me, I began working
at Edgewood Arsenal where I am at the present time.

Mr. SPECTER. What have your duties consisted of while working at
Edgewood Arsenal?

Dr. LIGHT. Primarily the study of pathology of wounding.

Mr. SPECTER. What is your formal title there now, Dr. Light?

Dr. LIGHT. I am chief of the Wound Assessment Branch and assistant
chief of the Biophysics Division.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is your relationship to Dr. Olivier and Dr.
Dziemian?

Dr. LIGHT. Dr. Dziemian is the chief of the division. Dr. Olivier
is chief of one of the branches, and I am chief of one of the other
branches.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you been present here today to hear the full
testimony of Dr. Olivier?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And were the tests which he described conducted under your
joint supervision with Dr. Olivier?

Dr. LIGHT. Only a very general way. I wouldn't want to say I supervised
him at all. We discussed what he was going to do.

Mr. SPECTER. Would it be more accurate to state that you coordinated
with him in the tests which were under his general supervision?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes; that might be stretching it a bit even.

Mr. SPECTER. How would you characterize your participation?

Dr. LIGHT. Largely--originally Dr. Dziemian, as I recall, was ill, and
by the time we began to do these specific tests that you mention,
Dr. Dziemian was back on the job again. So he took over whatever
supervision was needed.

Mr. SPECTER. Were the tests which Dr. Olivier described made at the
request of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes; they were.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have anything to add by way of any detail to the
findings reported by Dr. Olivier in his testimony here earlier today?

Dr. LIGHT. No; I think he covered it very thoroughly.

Mr. SPECTER. And as to the conclusions and opinions which he expressed,
do you agree or disagree, to some extent, on his conclusions?

Dr. LIGHT. I agree in general at least. I am not quite so certain about
some of the things, but generally I certainly agree with what he said.

Mr. DULLES. What are the things on which you are not quite so certain?

Dr. LIGHT. For example, I am not quite as sure in my mind as I believe
he is that the bullet that struck the Governor was almost certainly one
which had hit something else first. I believe it could have produced
that wound even though it hadn't hit the President or any other person
or object first.

Mr. DULLES. That is the wound, then, in the thigh?

Dr. LIGHT. No; in the chest.

Mr. DULLES. I was thinking that the wound in the thigh--let me start
again. As I understand the previous testimony, Dr. Olivier would have
expected the wound in the thigh to be more serious if it had not hit
some object.

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Prior to entering Governor Connally's body, but you feel
that the wound in the thigh might be consistent?

Dr. LIGHT. The wound in the thigh is the terminal end, is the far end
of the whole track. I don't believe that in passing through the tissue
which was simulated by what Dr. Olivier described first, 13 or 14
centimeters of gelatin, I don't believe that the change in velocity
introduced by the passage through that much tissue can be relied upon
to make such a definite difference in the effect.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you believe that if the Governor had been struck by a
pristine bullet which had gone through his chest, that it would have
caused no more damage than which appeared on the Governor's chest?

Dr. LIGHT. I think that is possible; yes. I might say I think perhaps
the best, the most likely thing is what everyone else has said so far,
that the bullet did go through the President's neck and then through
the chest and then through the wrist and then into the thigh.

Mr. SPECTER. You think that is the most likely possibility?

Dr. LIGHT. I think that is probably the most likely, but I base
that not entirely on the anatomical findings but as much on the
circumstances.

Mr. SPECTER. What are the circumstances which lead you to that
conclusion?

Dr. LIGHT. The relative positions in the automobile of the President
and the Governor.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other circumstances which contribute to that
conclusion, other than the anatomical findings?

Dr. LIGHT. And the appearance of the bullet that was found and the
place it was found, presumably, the bullet was the one which wounded
the Governor.

Mr. SPECTER. The whole bullet?

Dr. LIGHT. The whole bullet.

Mr. SPECTER. Identified as Commission Exhibit No. 399?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And what about that whole bullet leads you to believe that
the one bullet caused the President's neck wound and all of the wounds
on Governor Connally?

Dr. LIGHT. Nothing about that bullet. Mainly the position in which they
are seated in the automobile.

Mr. SPECTER. So in addition to the----

Dr. LIGHT. And the fact that the bullet that passed through the
President's body lost very little velocity since it passed through
soft tissue, so that it would strike the Governor, if it did, with a
velocity only, what was it, 100 feet per second, very little lower than
it would have if it hadn't struck anything else first. I am not sure,
I didn't see, of course, none of us saw the wounds in the Governor in
the fresh state or any other time, and I am not too convinced from
the measurements and the descriptions that were given in the surgical
reports and so on that the actual holes through the skin were unusually
large.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you had access to the autopsy records?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And have you had access to the reports of Parkland
Hospital on the Governor's operations there?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. All three of them?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And have you had an opportunity to view the films of the
assassination commonly known as the Zapruder films?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And the slides?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And have you had an opportunity to talk to Dr. Shaw and
Dr. Gregory who performed the thoracic and wrist operations on Governor
Connally?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And you heard Governor Connally's version yourself?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes; but not in----

Mr. SPECTER. Not in the Commission?

Dr. LIGHT. Not in the Commission session.

Mr. SPECTER. But at the time when the films were viewed by the Governor?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. At the VFW building on the first floor?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Focusing on a few of the specific considerations, do you
believe that there would have been the same amount of damage done to
the Governor's wrist had the pristine bullet only passed through the
Governor's body without striking the President first?

Dr. LIGHT. I think that is possible; yes. It won't happen the same way
twice in any case, so you have got a fairly wide range of things that
can happen if a person is shot in more or less this way.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you think it is as likely that the damage would have
been inflicted on the Governor's wrist as it was, with the bullet
passing only through the Governor's chest as opposed to passing through
the President's neck and the Governor's chest?

Dr. LIGHT. I think the difference in likelihood is negligible on that
basis alone.

Mr. SPECTER. So the damage on the Governor's wrist would be equally
consistent----

Dr. LIGHT. Equally consistent; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. With (_A_) passing only through the Governor's chest, or
(_B_) passing through the President's neck and the Governor's chest?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, as to the damage on the thigh, would the nature of
that wound again be equally consistent with either going through (_A_)
the President's neck, the Governor's chest, the Governor's wrist, and
then into the thigh, or (_B_) only through the Governor's chest, the
Governor's wrist and into the thigh?

Dr. LIGHT. I'd say equally consistent; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And based on the descriptions which have been provided to
you about the nature of the wound on the Governor's back, do you have
an opinion as to whether the bullet was yawing or not at the time it
struck the Governor's back?

Mr. LIGHT. No; I don't. That is really one of the points----

Mr. SPECTER. It would be either way?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes; I don't feel too certain that it was yawing. The
measurements were not particularly precise as far as I could tell.
You wouldn't expect them to be in an operating room. So I think it is
difficult to be sure there that the missile wasn't presenting nose on.
It undoubtedly struck not at normal instance, that is to say it was a
certain obliquity, just in the nature of the way the shoulder is built.

Mr. SPECTER. Then do you think based on only the anatomical findings
and the results of the tests which Dr. Olivier has performed that the
scales are in equipoise as to whether the bullet passed through the
President first and then through the Governor or passed only through
the Governor?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes; I would say I don't feel justified in drawing a
conclusion one way or the other on that basis alone.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have any preference of any sort?

Dr. LIGHT. Yes; I do, for other reasons.

Mr. SPECTER. But only for the other reasons?

Dr. LIGHT. As I mentioned, their positions in the automobile, the
fact that if it wasn't the way--if one bullet didn't produce all
of the wounds in both of the individuals, then that bullet ought
to be somewhere, and hasn't been found. But those are not based on
Dr. Olivier's tests nor are they based on the autopsy report or the
surgeon's findings in my mind.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. On the record.

Mr. SPECTER. Dr. Light, do you have an opinion as to whether or not the
wound inflicted on Governor Connally's wrist could have been caused by
a fragment which struck the President's head?

Dr. LIGHT. It is barely conceivable but I do not believe that that is
the case.

Mr. SPECTER. You say barely?

Dr. LIGHT. Barely conceivable. I mean a fragment probably had enough
velocity, it couldn't have produced that wound, in my mind, but it
can't be ruled out with complete certainty.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have anything to add which you think would be
helpful to the Commission in any way?

Dr. LIGHT. I don't believe I do.

Mr. SPECTER. Those are all the questions I have, Commissioner Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much indeed. I express our appreciation.
I didn't realize these tests were being carried out. I am very glad
they have been. It is a very useful thing to do and very helpful to
the Commission. Thank you very much. I want to thank all three of you
doctors for having so fully cooperated in this matter, and I think that
these tests that you have run have made a real contribution to the
Commission's work.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



_Thursday, May 14, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, JOHN A. McCONE, AND RICHARD M. HELMS

The President's Commission met at 9:15 a.m., on May 14, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman
Cooper, Representative Hale Boggs, Representative Gerald R. Ford, and
Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; Norman Redlich,
assistant counsel; Charles Murray and Walter Craig, observers; and
Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas.


TESTIMONY OF J. EDGAR HOOVER

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be in order.

Director Hoover, will you please raise your right hand to be sworn,
please. You solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before
the Commission will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOOVER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin will carry on the examination, Mr. Director.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, do you want to tell him briefly what our
purpose is?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; it is our practice to make a brief statement
before the testimony of each witness, and I will do it now.

Mr. Hoover will be asked to testify in regard to whether Lee H. Oswald
was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on
behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any capacity at any
time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence of any conspiracy,
either domestic or foreign, involved in the assassination of President
Kennedy.

What he has to say about an article in the National Enquirer,
Commission Exhibit No. 837, and concerning the failure to include
the name and information concerning special agent Hosty in the
initial report of the Oswald address book and any suggestions and
recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in
provisions for the protection of the President of the United States.
Now, Mr. Rankin, you may proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, will you state for the record your name and
position?

Mr. HOOVER. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the Department of Justice.

Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live, Mr. Hoover?

Mr. HOOVER. I live at 4936 30th Place, Northwest, Washington, D.C.

Mr. RANKIN. And you have been Director of the Bureau for some 40 years
according to the newspapers?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; since 1924.

Mr. RANKIN. You have furnished us a considerable amount of information,
Mr. Hoover, about whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent or
acting for the Bureau in any capacity as informer or otherwise at any
time. Are those statements correct?

Mr. HOOVER. They are correct. I can most emphatically say that at no
time was he ever an employee of the Bureau in any capacity, either as
an agent or as a special employee, or as an informant.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your particular attention to Exhibit 835, and
suggest that you will find that that is your letter, together with
your affidavit about this subject matter, and other matters that you
furnished to us concerning this particular subject.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you wish to add anything?

Mr. HOOVER. No; there is nothing that I desire to add to what appears
in this letter and my affidavit which accompanied it to the Commission.

Mr. RANKIN. You have provided many things to us in assisting the
Commission in connection with this investigation and I assume, at
least in a general way, you are familiar with the investigation of the
assassination of President Kennedy, is that correct?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to
Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and
asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination
because as you are aware, there is no Federal jurisdiction for such
an investigation. It is not a Federal crime to kill or attack the
President or the Vice President or any of the continuity of officers
who would succeed to the Presidency.

However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make
special investigations, and in this instance he asked that this
investigation be made. I immediately assigned a special force headed
by the special agent in charge at Dallas, Tex., to initiate the
investigation, and to get all details and facts concerning it, which we
obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted to the Attorney
General for transmission to the President.

Mr. RANKIN. From your study of this entire matter of the assassination
and work in connection with it, do you know of any credible evidence
that has ever come to your attention that there was a conspiracy either
foreign or domestic involved in the assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. I know of no substantial evidence of any type that would
support any contention of that character. I have read all of the
requests that have come to the Bureau from this Commission, and I have
read and signed all the replies that have come to the Commission.

In addition, I have read many of the reports that our agents have made
and I have been unable to find any scintilla of evidence showing any
foreign conspiracy or any domestic conspiracy that culminated in the
assassination of President Kennedy.

Representative FORD. May I ask this, Mr. Hoover. As I understand your
testimony, it is based on the evidence that has been accumulated thus
far?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct, sir.

Representative FORD. Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation continuing
its investigation of all possible ramifications of this assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. We are receiving and we, I expect, will
continue to receive for days or weeks to come, letters from individuals
that normally would probably be in the category of what we would
call crank letters in which various weird allegations are made or in
which people have reported psychic vibrations. We are still running
out letters of that character and in turn making a report to this
Commission upon it, notwithstanding the fact that on the face of it the
allegation is without any foundation. Individuals who could not have
known any of the facts have made some very strange statements. There
have been publications and books written, the contents of which have
been absurd and without a scintilla of foundation of fact. I feel, from
my experience in the Bureau, where we are in constant receipt over the
years of these so-called crank letters, that such allegations will be
going on possibly for some years to come.

I, personally, feel that any finding of the Commission will not be
accepted by everybody, because there are bound to be some extremists
who have very pronounced views, without any foundation for them, who
will disagree violently with whatever findings the Commission makes.
But I think it is essential that the FBI investigate the allegations
that are received in the future so it can't be said that we had ignored
them or that the case is closed and forgotten.

Representative FORD. Could you give us some idea of how many agents are
currently working to one degree or another on any aspects of this case?

Mr. HOOVER. I would estimate, Congressman Ford, that there are at the
present time at least 50 or 60 men giving their entire time to various
aspects of the investigation, because while Dallas is the office of
origin, investigation is required in auxiliary offices such as Los
Angeles or San Francisco, and even in some foreign countries like
Mexico. We have representatives in Mexico City.

At the outset of the investigation, following the assassination, it was
the desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau
just as quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible, and I would
say we had about 150 men at that time working on the report in the
field, and at Washington, DC.

Now, all the reports that come in from the field are, of course,
reviewed at Washington by the supervisor in charge of the case, and
then in turn by the assistant director of the division, and then in
turn by Mr. Belmont, who is the assistant to the Director.

Reports in which there is a controversial issue or where statements
have been made of the existence of some particular thing that we have
never heard of before, I myself, go over these to see that we haven't
missed anything or haven't had any gap in the investigation so it can
be tied down.

Recently the National Enquirer had a fantastic article in it as to the
existence of a letter that had been written or a request that had been
made by the Department of Justice to Chief Curry of the Dallas Police
Department, to withhold arresting Rubinstein, or Ruby, and Oswald after
the Oswald attempt on General Walker's life.

First, I had the agent in charge at Dallas interview Chief Curry and
I have sent to the Commission a letter as to what Chief Curry had to
say. He branded it as an entire lie--that he had never received any
request of that kind. I had our files searched to be certain we had
not written any such letter as that and found we had not. I requested
the Department of Justice to advise me whether they had written any
such letter and Mr. Katzenbach advises there is no reference in the
Department files to the alleged letter from any Department of Justice
official to Chief Curry nor any reference that an FBI official was
asked to request the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald or Ruby.
A letter is being sent to the Commission today setting forth this
information.

Representative FORD. The point that I think ought to be made is that
despite the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the FBI
and by other agencies, and despite the tremendous effort that has
been made, I believe, by the Commission to help and assist and to
consolidate all of the evidence that we possibly could, that there is
always the possibility at some future date that some evidence might
come to the surface.

Mr. HOOVER. That is, of course, possible; yes.

Representative FORD. I want just to be sure that no leads, no evidence
regardless of its credibility will be ignored, that it will be pursued
by the Bureau or any other agency to make certain that it is good, bad
or of no value.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned,
the case will be continued in an open classification for all time.
That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from
any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able
to either prove or disprove the allegation. We found in the course of
our investigations that individuals have made statements. Yet, when we
investigate they will frankly admit that the statement is an entire
falsehood, or that they don't know why they wrote the letter or why
they made the statement. But, nevertheless, we have the record and
generally in those instances we try to get a signed statement from that
individual so it can be made a part of the record.

Representative FORD. Under your authority from the President, the
authority which gave you the FBI, the responsibility to conduct this
investigation it is not an authority with a terminal point. It is an
authority that goes on indefinitely?

Mr. HOOVER. Very definitely so. The President wanted a full and
thorough investigation made of this matter, and we have tried to do
so. As I have stated, I think we will continue to receive allegations.
I think this will be a matter of controversy for years to come,
just like the Lincoln assassination. There will be questions raised
by individuals, either for publicity purposes or otherwise, that
will raise some new angle or new aspect of it. I think we must, and
certainly we intend in the FBI to continue to run down any such
allegations or reports of that kind.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Boggs.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Hoover, I don't want any cover--to cover any
ground which has been covered but I just have one or two questions.
First, let me say that you and the Bureau have been very cooperative
with this Commission.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

Representative BOGGS. And tremendously helpful. I have been concerned
about some of these wild press reports and concerned about what impact
it may have ultimately on the history of this thing. For instance there
is a man named Buchanan who has written a series of articles.

Mr. DULLES. A book now. A book is out; yes.

Representative BOGGS. A book now. I understand they have been widely
circulated in the European press, and this man came here and was, as
I got it from some other sources, he took in some people here, some
American journalists, and I am told that this man has a Communist
background, and in addition to that is a most unreliable person. He has
made these allegations that the Dallas police force was involved in the
assassination and so on.

Would you have any suggestions on how this Commission should deal with
this sort of thing?

Mr. HOOVER. We have received a request from the Commission to review
that book and to make a report upon any portions of it that can be
contradicted or substantiated by actual facts or documents. I know
Buchanan's background. He worked on the Washington Star and he was
dismissed from the Washington Star because he was a member of the
Communist Party. He spent much of his time in recent years in France
writing for French newspapers. I have followed the articles that
he has written about this matter and they are what I would call
"journalistic garbage." There is not a scintilla of truth to most of
the things he has written in these articles and in his book which I
have had a chance to scan but haven't actually reviewed yet. It is
being reviewed by my research section. Some of the allegations are
utterly fantastic. I often wonder where some of these individuals get
such ideas and why they make such statements without foundation.

Now, he makes many wild charges there, and to read it, a person not
knowing him, or his views, or his background, would be inclined to
wonder. I think you are going to have that problem, as I say, for years
to come. I don't know how you can handle individuals like him other
than to have the record clear upon the facts of the case, and either
substantiate or disprove his statements. I don't think too much time
should be given to these individuals who have such unsavory backgrounds
as Buchanan has and who makes statements that have been proved to be
untrue. But, at the same time I think when a book like that comes out
or an article of that type comes out that deals with the assassination
of the late President, I think it should be gone into from an
investigative point of view. We should then submit to this Commission,
even after it has concluded its hearings, for record purposes, what we
have found in each particular instance.

Representative BOGGS. Now, on the other side of the fence----

Mr. DULLES. May I add one other thing just to interrupt. I wish you
would add to your list a book called "The Red Roses of Dallas" by a man
named Gun. He is a more reliable correspondent.

Mr. HOOVER. He is a Philadelphia correspondent.

Mr. DULLES. He has been living in this country since 1946. I have met
him over here. Let's see, he was at Dallas at the time. He was then
reporting, I think, for the Italian newspaper Epoca.

Mr. HOOVER. That is not the same one.

Mr. DULLES. He might have been lying. This book is full of lies. But I
think it is a book that ought to be added, too, and I will see that a
copy is sent to the Bureau.

Mr. HOOVER. I would appreciate that.

Representative BOGGS. On the other side of the spectrum some professor
out at the University of Illinois wrote a piece in which he alleged
the President was a Communist agent, President Kennedy, and Buchanan's
allegations are that the extreme right assassinated the President and
this fellow's allegations are that the Communists assassinated the
President. Would you care to comment? Have you read that piece?

Mr. HOOVER. I have read that piece. My comment on it is this in
general: I think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the
freedom of this country as the extreme left. There are groups,
organizations, and individuals on the extreme right who make these
very violent statements, allegations that General Eisenhower was a
Communist, disparaging references to the Chief Justice and at the other
end of the spectrum you have these leftists who make wild statements
charging almost anybody with being a Fascist or belonging to some
of these so-called extreme right societies. Now, I have felt, and I
have said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much a danger,
at either end of the spectrum. They don't deal with facts. Anybody
who will allege that General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has
something wrong with him.

A lot of people read such allegations because I get some of the
weirdest letters wanting to know whether we have inquired to find out
whether that is true. I have known General Eisenhower quite well myself
and I have found him to be a sound, level-headed man.

In New York City there is a woman by the name of Kraus who must be
mentally deranged as she stands on a Broadway corner there handing out
leaflets in which she charges me with being in the conspiracy with the
Communists to overthrow this Government and so forth.

Well now, if any person has fought communism, I certainly have fought
it. We have tried to fight it and expose it in democratic ways I think
that is the thing we have to very definitely keep in mind in this whole
problem in the security of the President and the successor to office.
Just how far you are going to go for his protection and his security. I
don't think you can get absolute security without almost establishing a
police state, and we don't want that. You can't put security in a black
groove or a white groove. It is in a gray groove, and certain chances
have to be taken. You are dealing with a human being when you are
dealing with the President of the United States. President Johnson is a
very down to earth human being, and it makes the security problem all
the more difficult, but you can't bar him from the people.

There are certain things that can be done, and I submitted a memorandum
to the Secret Service, and to the White House on certain security
steps that might be taken and tightened up. But you are dealing with
the general public and that is what has given me great concern in the
recent expansion, of the criteria for dissemination that we adopted
after the assassination.

Prior to that time we reported to the Secret Service all information
that dealt with individuals who were potential killers or by whom
acts of violence might be anticipated. The Secret Service would take
that information and would do with it as they saw fit. I gave great
consideration to it because I am not very happy with the criteria
expansion, but I felt we had to include subversives of various
character, and extremists. We have, in turn, furnished their names to
the Secret Service. I think 5,000 names up to the present time already
have been submitted and there are at least three or four thousand more
that will be submitted within the next few months.

Then you come to the problem of what you are going to do when the
Secret Service gets those names. They have to call upon the local
authorities. Just recently, in the city of Chicago, when the President
was there, the local authorities were asked to give assistance as they
usually do to the Secret Service and they went to the homes of some of
these people, and it resulted really almost in a house arrest.

Now, I don't think there is any place in this country for that
kind of thing, but these people who belonged to extreme subversive
organizations or organizations that advocated the overthrow of
government by force and violence were told that they couldn't leave
their house or if they did they would be accompanied by a police
officer. That gives me great concern because in New York City alone,
you run into maybe three or four thousand such individuals who would be
members of subversive organizations, and then you get into the twilight
zone of subversive fronts.

Now, there again, merely because a man belongs to a subversive front
organization, in my estimation doesn't mean that he is blacklisted and
is a menace to the country for life. If he belongs to 20 of them, it
certainly shows either one of two things, he is either very gullible
and dumb or he is a menace. That has been my attitude in regard to
Government service where you find a Government employee who belonged to
one or two, maybe in his early days. I don't believe this necessarily
makes him a security risk. Rather, this would be dependent on the
degree of his activity in the front group and his purpose and intent in
associating himself with it. But where he has belonged to 15, 18, 20 of
them, I don't think he has enough good judgment to be in the Government.

Some ministers get drawn into organizations, some of which are under
the domination of the Communist Party. Now, those ministers don't know
that. They are just as loyal and patriotic as you and I are, but they
happen to belong. Now, that is where the question of human judgment
has to be used. We try to use it in selecting these names. But I was
startled when I learned of the incident in Chicago because there you
come pretty close to a house arrest and we don't want that. We don't
want a gestapo. We have to, I think, maintain an even balance.

I think it was very well expressed--

Mr. DULLES. May I ask you, Mr. Hoover, was this house arrest based on
names you had furnished the Secret Service and they furnished the local
authorities?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative BOGGS. That brings me back to the question I think I
heard Congressman Ford ask you as I came into the room, because I
think this is the crux of our investigation.

I read the FBI report very carefully and the whole implication of the
report is that, number one, Oswald shot the President; number two,
that he was not connected with any conspiracy of any kind, nature or
description.

Mr. HOOVER. Correct.

Representative BOGGS. Do you still subscribe to that?

Mr. HOOVER. I subscribe to it even more strongly today than I did at
the time that the report was written. You see, the original idea was
that there would be an investigation by the FBI and a report would be
prepared in such form that it could be released to the public.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Then a few days later, after further consideration,
the President decided to form a commission, which I think was very
wise, because I feel that the report of any agency of Government
investigating what might be some shortcomings on the part of other
agencies of Government ought to be reviewed by an impartial group such
as this Commission. And the more I have read these reports, the more I
am convinced that Oswald was the man who fired the gun; and he fired
three times, killed the President, and wounded Governor Connally.

And I also am further convinced that there is absolutely no association
between Oswald or Ruby. There was no such evidence ever established.

Mr. DULLES. Or Oswald and anybody else? Would you go that far?

Mr. HOOVER. Anybody else who might be----

Mr. DULLES. In connection with the assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I would certainly go that far. There was suspicion at
first this might be a Castro act.

Representative BOGGS. Right.

Mr. HOOVER. We had information that had been obtained in Mexico City
by another intelligence agency indicating there was a man who had seen
a certain amount of money passed to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate. I
think it was $6,000 that was passed. We went into that very thoroughly.
The man later retracted his statement and stated it was not true. He
was asked whether he would take a lie detector test, and he did. The
lie detector test showed that he was telling a lie.

As to the lie detector, I do want to make this comment on it. I have
always held to the opinion that it is not a perfect piece of machinery.
It is an interpretation made by human beings of what the machine, the
polygraph, shows. I would never want to convict or to send to the
penitentiary any person solely on the evidence of the lie detector. It
is a contribution in an investigation, a more or less psychological
contribution.

But I have seen individuals who have failed the lie detector test and
who were just as innocent as they could be. That particular lead in
Mexico City was completely disproved; there was no foundation for it.

We found no associations between Oswald and Ruby. There has been a
story printed that Ruby and Oswald worked together and were close
friends.

There was no evidence, there was never any indication that we could
find that Oswald had ever been in Ruby's nightclub or had had any
association with him.

Ruby comes from Chicago, he was on the fringe of what you might call
the elements of the underworld there. He came to Dallas, opened up
the nightclub and it was a place where, certainly not the better
class of people went, but it wasn't any so-called "joint," to use the
vernacular. It was just another nightclub. So far as we have been able
to establish there was no relationship or contact between Oswald and
Ruby or anyone else allegedly involved in this assassination.

Representative BOGGS. The FBI interviewed practically everybody who
ever associated with Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. It did.

Representative BOGGS. You didn't find any indication of why anyone
should even suspect that Oswald would do this, did you?

Mr. HOOVER. We found no indication at all that Oswald was a man
addicted to violence. The first indication of an act of violence came
after he, Oswald, had been killed, and Mrs. Oswald told us about the
attempt on General Walker's life by Oswald. No one had known a thing
about that.

I think in the Enquirer article there is reference to the fact that the
Dallas Police knew or suspected Oswald of possibly being a party to the
shooting into the house of General Walker. Chief Curry specifically
denies that. There was no connection of that kind and there was no
evidence that Oswald had any streak of violence.

We went back into his Marine Corps record. He was a "loner." He didn't
have many friends. He kept to himself, and when he went abroad, he
defected to Russia. The first evidence we had of him in our file was
a statement to the press in Moscow. And then later, about 22 months
later, he returned to the Embassy there and according to the report of
the Embassy we have and which the Commission has been furnished, the
Embassy gave him a clean bill. He had seen the error of his ways and
disliked the Soviet atmosphere, et cetera, and they, therefore, cleared
him, paid his way and paid his wife's way to come back to this country.

At no time, other than the so-called street disturbance in New Orleans,
was there any indication that he might be a fighter. Well, in that
particular instance he was handing out leaflets that he printed for
the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and some of the anti-Castro forces,
we have several thousand of them in New Orleans alone, happened to see
him and they moved in on him and immediately the police moved in and
arrested him. I believe they fined him $10 for disorderly conduct.
There was no evidence in the place where he was employed in Dallas of
acts of violence or temper or anything of that kind on his part.

Representative BOGGS. You have spent your life studying criminology and
violence and subversion. Would you care to speculate on what may have
motivated the man? I know it would be just speculation.

Mr. HOOVER. My speculation, Mr. Boggs, is that this man was no doubt a
dedicated Communist. He prefers to call himself a Marxist, but there
you get into the field of semantics. He was a Communist, he sympathized
thoroughly with the Communist cause.

I don't believe now, as I look back on it, that he ever changed his
views when he asked to come back to this country. I personally feel
that when he went to the American Embassy in Moscow originally to
renounce his citizenship he should have been able right then and there
to sign the renouncement. He never could have gotten back here. I think
that should apply to almost all defectors who want to defect and become
a part of a system of government that is entirely foreign to ours. If
they have that desire, they have that right, but if they indicate a
desire for it, let them renounce their citizenship at once.

That was not done. He stayed in Moscow awhile and he went to Minsk
where he worked. There was no indication of any difficulty, personally
on his part there, but I haven't the slightest doubt that he was a
dedicated Communist.

There has been some question raised which cannot be resolved, because
Oswald is dead, as to whether he was trying to kill the President or
trying to kill the Governor. He had had some correspondence with the
Governor as to the form of his discharge from the Marine Corps. It was
not a dishonorable discharge, but a discharge less than honorable after
he defected.

Governor Connally had left the Navy Department, and was back in Texas
as Governor. Oswald may have had his anger or his animosity against
the Governor, but no one can say definitely--that is mere speculation,
no one can tell that, because the gun and the sighting of the gun was
directed at the car.

Now, first, it was thought that the President had been shot through the
throat that is what the doctors at the Parkland Hospital felt when he
was brought in.

If that had been true, the shot would have had to come from the
overpass. But as soon as the body arrived in Washington, the doctors
at Bethesda Hospital performed the autopsy and it was then determined
definitely from their point of view that he had been shot from the
rear, and that portions of the skull had been practically shot off.
There was no question but that the gun and the telescopic lens could
pinpoint the President perfectly. The car was moving slowly. It wasn't
going at a high rate of speed, so that he had perfect opportunity to do
it.

Now, some people have raised the question: Why didn't he shoot the
President as the car came toward the storehouse where he was working?

The reason for that is, I think, the fact there were some trees between
his window on the sixth floor and the cars as they turned and went
through the park. So he waited until the car got out from under the
trees, and the limbs, and then he had a perfectly clear view of the
occupants of the car, and I think he took aim, either on the President
or Connally, and I personally believe it was the President in view of
the twisted mentality the man had.

But he had given no indication of that--we had interviewed him, I
think, three times. Of course, our interviews were predicated to find
out whether he had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service,
because they frequently do that.

Representative BOGGS. And had he been?

Mr. HOOVER. He had not been, so he said, and we have no proof that
he was. He had been over there long enough but they never gave him
citizenship in Russia at all. I think they probably looked upon him
more as a kind of a queer sort of individual and they didn't trust him
too strongly.

But just the day before yesterday information came to me indicating
that there is an espionage training school outside of Minsk--I don't
know whether it is true--and that he was trained at that school to
come back to this country to become what they call a "sleeper," that
is a man who will remain dormant for 3 or 4 years and in case of
international hostilities rise up and be used.

I don't know of any espionage school at Minsk or near Minsk, and I
don't know how you could find out if there ever was one because the
Russians won't tell you if you asked them.

They do have espionage and sabotage schools in Russia and they do have
an assassination squad that is used by them but there is no indication
he had any association with anything of that kind.

Representative BOGGS. Now we have some people, including this man's
mother, talk about Oswald having been an agent of the Government of the
United States. I think his mother mentioned the CIA; she has made these
statements publicly for money, apparently.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; she has.

Representative BOGGS. Just for the purpose of the record, I think it
would be well if you would comment on that, Mr. Director.

Mr. HOOVER. Of course, we have interviewed his mother and his wife, and
all his relatives, and everybody that he is known to have associated
with. His mother I would put in a category of being emotionally
unstable. She has been around the country making speeches, and the
first indication of her emotional instability was the retaining of a
lawyer that anyone would not have retained if they really were serious
in trying to get down to the facts. But she has been in New York City;
she has been in Chicago; I think other parts of the country, always
speaking for money.

Now, that kind of an individual is the type we have seen over the
years, who will say almost anything to draw a crowd. Just to be able to
say something sensational. Many times we have gone out to such people
and asked them specifically, "Now, what is your basis for this?" And
they will say, "Well, I just had a feeling that that was true, so I
said it."

She has never made that statement to us, but we have many other
instances where that kind of statement is made. They don't have the
legal evidence that you must have if you are going to take any positive
action. I would put very little credence in anything that his mother
said.

I think his wife was a far more reliable person in statements that she
made, so far as we were able to ascertain, than his mother. I think the
mother had in mind, naturally, the fact she wanted to clear her son's
name, which was a natural instinct, but more importantly she was going
to see how much money she could make, and I believe she has made a
substantial sum.

Representative BOGGS. And the allegations she has made about this man
being an agent either of the CIA or the FBI are false?

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can certainly speak for the FBI that it is false,
and I have discussed the matter, naturally, with Mr. McCone, the
Director of CIA, and he, of course, will no doubt appear himself,
but there is no indication at all that he was employed by them. We
frequently get that kind of a story from individuals who, when they get
into some kind of difficulty, will claim they were working for the CIA
or they were working for the FBI.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Now, no one can work for the FBI without the approval being
given at Washington and a record kept of it, even of the confidential
informants. That is very tightly controlled. We have no so-called lump
sum that we can use to hire people. So there has to be a voucher and
specific details of payment. And I know at no time was he an informant
or agent or a special employee or working in any capacity for the FBI.

As to the interviews we had with him in which he gave us some
information, some of it was not the truth, but this was not
particularly significant. The interviews we had with him I would not
term as talking with an informant. He was interviewed while under
arrest by the New Orleans police, and then after he had committed this
act of assassination we interviewed him in police headquarters in
Dallas. But they were the only contacts we had, I think four contacts
altogether, and he received no money of any kind, no promise of any
kind, and there was no indication that he was rendering assistance
to the U.S. Government. We looked upon him as a criminal after the
assassination, of course, and prior to that time we looked upon him
as an individual who we suspected might become an agent of the Soviet
government. There was no proof of that, and we checked him carefully.

We knew of his contact with the Soviet Embassy here at Washington, his
contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and his
contact with the Worker publication in New York. And none of those
contacts gave any indication of any tendency to commit violence.

There are many people who read the Daily Worker, or what is now the
Worker, and you certainly can't brand them as hazards to the security
of the country or as potential assassins. It is in that area that I
am particularly concerned that we don't become hysterical and go too
far in restricting the citizens of our country from exercising their
civil and constitutional rights. The mere fact a person disagrees with
you in a matter on communism doesn't mean he should be arrested. Many
Communists make very violent speeches, and we know them, but I don't
feel that the time has come that they should be arrested. If they have
violated the laws of the United States, we will, then, proceed with
prosecution, and the cases can then go through the courts. Such cases
last for years before they get to the Supreme Court, and even then such
cases often start over on some legal angle. But, all in all, I think
that the enforcement of security and the enforcement of laws dealing
with subversion ought to be handled in the American manner.

I am criticized by the extreme right for that. They put me in the
category, I guess, along with General Eisenhower. But the extreme
left criticizes me, saying I believe that any person who has on a
red necktie may be addicted to communism, and, therefore, is a great
danger. That is why I say the extremists at both ends are bad, and I
have repeated that several times publicly.

Representative BOGGS. No doubt about the problem being a difficult one.
I remember some years back when these fanatics started shooting up the
House of Representatives.

Mr. HOOVER. I recall that.

Representative BOGGS. I happened to be there on the occasion and there
were many suggestions that we build a bulletproof glass enclosure
around the Members of Congress and so on. Of course, all of us
rejected those ideas because it would be totally incompatible with our
democratic institutions and this, obviously, becomes a problem in the
security of the President; that is what you are telling us, isn't it?

Mr. HOOVER. That is the great problem. We have participated in the
protection of the President since the assassination. The Secret
Service indicates how many agents it needs when the President is
traveling somewhere or going somewhere in Washington, and then I assign
that number of agents to the Secret Service. They are not under my
direction. They are under the direction of the Secret Service because
under law they are charged with the protection of the President. We
have never done that before, but I felt that it was something we must
do if the Secret Service desired it. Sometimes, such as at the funeral
of the late President Kennedy, the procession walked up Connecticut
Avenue, which created a very, very grave security problem because they
were walking with these tall building on either side. As I recall,
we had the responsibility for the Cathedral, and we had 43 agents in
the Cathedral during the services. I was more concerned about these
tall buildings, because all the small buildings have been torn down
along Connecticut Avenue, and there were about six or seven blocks to
walk. Not only the high officials of this Government, including the
President, but the Queen of Greece, General de Gaulle, Emperor Haile
Selassie, and many Prime Ministers were present. They were a perfect
target for someone in some window.

Now, you can't empty these buildings. It is impossible to do that,
because you can't go to the Mayflower Hotel and say all front rooms
must be vacated. Other office buildings are there, even taller than
the Mayflower, and you can't make them keep everybody out of the front
offices because then you get into a police state.

The Secret Service does try to check to find out who have these various
offices. We also check so if there is anything in our files on those
individuals the Secret Service is at once advised. When the President
goes to a banquet or a social occasion, all of the employees in the
hotel, the cooks, waiters, and busboys, and so forth, are all checked
by Secret Service to be certain there is no one with a background
that would indicate a hazard to the President. But that is as far as
I think you can go. You can't put in a whole new staff of waiters and
you can't make people move out. People going to a Presidential function
are generally invited by card or by list, and that is very carefully
checked at the entrance by the Secret Service.

We suggested a few more things that possibly could be done, and some of
which I have doubts about. You speak about this matter of glass around
the galleries in the House. One of the suggestions that we made was
that there be bulletproof glass in front of the President's lectern. In
my own mind, I question whether that is wise. Knowing this President as
this President is, he wants to get close to the audience; he wants to
reach over and shake hands with people. That concerns me because you
never know when an emotionally unstable person may be in that crowd.
As you noted, he has frequently brought groups into the White House
gardens and walked around with people he didn't know. I know the Secret
Service people are concerned about it. I am concerned about it.

President Truman last week expressed his concern that the President was
taking unnecessary chances.

But the governmental agency having the responsibility for guarding him,
the Secret Service, has a natural hesitancy to say, "You can't do this."

Representative BOGGS. Of course, for the record, President Kennedy had
the same difficulty.

Mr. HOOVER. That is right. It was best expressed at Parkland Hospital.
One of President Kennedy's staff made the statement that the whole
fault in this matter was that, in the choice between politics and
security, politics was chosen. That is exactly what happened. It was an
open car. I am thoroughly opposed to the President riding in an open
car.

They did not have any armored car in the Secret Service at that time. I
have now sent one of our armored cars over for the President, but it is
a closed limousine. But on occasion, such as at Gettysburg and Atlanta
the other day, the President got out of the armored car which had been
flown there for his use, and commandeered the car of the Secret Service
which is wide open, so he could wave and see the people. Now, that is
a great hazard. I think he should always be in an armored car that is
closed, that can't have the top put down. But as you recall, President
Kennedy had the bubble top off of the car that he was in. It was not
armored and the bubble top was made of plastic so a bullet could have
gone through it very easily.

Representative FORD. Mr. Hoover, you have categorically testified that
the FBI never at any time had Oswald as an agent, as an informant, or
in any other way.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. I couldn't make it more emphatic.

Representative FORD. And Mr. Belmont testified to the same last week
when he was before us.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Both you and he would be fully familiar with all
of the records of the FBI in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. We would, and we would not only be fully familiar with it
because while Mr. Belmont is in charge of the Investigative Branch of
the Bureau--we have two assistants to the Director, one in charge of
administrative work and the other in charge of investigative work--we
have also checked the administrative records where vouchers or payments
would have been made and there is no indication that any money was
ever paid to Oswald. We have obtained, and they are on file with the
Commission, the affidavits of the agents, who at various times were
in contact with Oswald, to the effect that he was not an informant;
that they had never paid him anything; that he was being questioned as
to possible recruitment by the Soviet intelligence; so there was no
evidence at any time indicating employment by the FBI.

Representative FORD. And you were not under any limitation or
restriction from any other authority in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. Absolutely not. I have the entire control of whether a
man shall be an informant or shall not be an informant. That comes
under my chain of command from the local office which has the matter
at hand. They can't just put on an informant without our approval. The
recommendation on security informants comes to the Bureau; it goes
through the Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division,
and, in significant cases, goes to Mr. Belmont, and then to my desk for
my specific approval. So I, or my seat-of-government staff, have to
approve every one of those who are used as informants in all classes
of cases, not only in intelligence cases but in white-slave cases,
automobile thefts, and all of these cases.

Representative FORD. There is no limitation on what you can tell us
about this situation?

Mr. HOOVER. None whatsoever.

Representative FORD. No limitation; no restrictions?

Mr. HOOVER. No restriction. So far as the record of vouchers in
the Bureau are concerned, they are open to the inspection of this
Commission at any time going back as far as you may want to go.

Senator COOPER. May I ask just one question there? I think you have
answered it, but in your examination of this aspect as to whether or
not Oswald was an informer or employee or held any relationship to
the FBI, you, yourself, have looked into all of the means you have of
determining that fact when you make the statement to us?

Mr. HOOVER. I have personally looked into that for two reasons: Because
the President asked me personally to take charge of this investigation
and to direct it, and I knew that the report ultimately would be made
to him. For that reason I became familiar with every step and every
action that was taken. Then when the allegation was made by someone--I
think it was the mother of Oswald first, if I recall correctly--that
he was employed by some Government agency, the CIA, or FBI, and maybe
both, I insisted upon a check being made and any record showing any
indication of that being brought to me. When they could find none, I
then asked for affidavits from the field force that had dealt with
Oswald as to whether they had hired him or paid him anything or given
him anything, and the affidavits are on file here that they had not.

Senator COOPER. I think you have said there is no sum available to the
FBI which would enable these men, these agents, to employ him out of
any funds that are made available to them.

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, no; it must be done by voucher, and those vouchers are
examined by the General Accounting Office every year or so. We have
no lump sum in the field offices for employment of informants as such
which is not supported by vouchers.

Senator COOPER. I have just about two questions, I may have to go in a
few minutes to the Senate. I would like to direct your attention to
that period of time when Oswald was a defector, beginning when he left
the United States and when he returned.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. During that period, did the FBI have any jurisdiction
over intelligence regarding him, or any capacity to know?

Mr. HOOVER. While he was in Russia?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. No; we did not. We were interested in knowing what he might
say in Russia that appeared in the press. That was our first intimation
that this man had defected, when we read it in a newspaper article. We
were, of course, interested in knowing when he would return or if he
would return. We had no jurisdiction as to what he was doing in Russia
after he had gone there.

Senator COOPER. As I understand it, you had no capacity at that time to
follow his activities?

Mr. HOOVER. That is true. We have no agents in Russia. Foreign
intelligence is handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, and our
responsibility is domestic. We work very closely together.

Senator COOPER. Have you had the jurisdiction since the assassination
or the occasion to examine persons connected with the State Department
concerning the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. HOOVER. Well----

Senator COOPER. Would that be a matter for some other agency?

Mr. HOOVER. That could be a matter for CIA or for us after Oswald had
returned here.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. Then he becomes a civilian in the country here. Now,
there is what we call a delimitation agreement among the Government
intelligence agencies. For instance, the military branches of the
Government have their own intelligence services and they handle all
military deviations in regard to espionage or things of that kind. If
they want our assistance and ask for it we, of course, will always
cooperate. In regard to CIA, there are many cases which CIA and the
FBI work jointly on, of individuals that may have been recruited over
in Europe by the CIA, not by us, because we don't have authority to do
that abroad, but when that man comes to this country, the best ends of
intelligence are served by having the two agencies work very closely
together, conduct joint interviews, and exchange information very,
very freely. That has been going on ever since I can recall CIA being
existence.

Mr. DULLES. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation
existed during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has
continued now with great cooperation on both sides.

Mr. HOOVER. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence
agency of many of these foreign countries will cover the whole world
and the country itself. Whereas in this country you have separate
agencies covering espionage activities. CIA covers the foreign
activity, and the FBI the domestic activities, and they must be
interlocking. An espionage agent of the Soviet Government can arrive
in New York today by plane from Paris and he can be in Mexico City
tomorrow. Then, CIA would pick him up there. We would not pick him up
there. We would watch him while in this country, but as soon as he
takes that plane and leaves the United States CIA moves in on him. If
he comes back to the United States, we move in on him. Therefore, we
have a very close liaison.

As a matter of fact, what we have done in government agencies is
to have a liaison agent in our Bureau assigned to contact CIA, the
Pentagon, State Department, and various other agencies to cut out
the red tape of writing letters back and forth. In order to orally
relay information which has come to his attention, our representative
can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if there is need, for
instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that is
docking at New York, it is all accomplished within a matter of 45
minutes or an hour.

If you went through this letter-writing process and the paper war that
goes on so often in the Government it might take a week or 10 days.

The FBI does have 10 legal attaches attached to 10 embassies abroad.
Their purpose is not operational. They don't investigate in those
countries any matters that have to be investigated. That, if it is to
be done, is handled by CIA. Our purpose in being there is to maintain
liaison with our opposite number such as the Surete Nationale in
France and with the national police in the Philippines, to exchange
information that is vital to our internal security, and also vital to
the internal security of the other country.

Senator COOPER. May I ask one other question?

Is there any, considering the number of defectors in the United States
to Communist countries, which cannot be large, I would assume----

Mr. HOOVER. I think there are about 36.

Senator COOPER. Which would indicate, I would think either a lack of
reliability on their part and stability or beyond that a dedicated
purpose to become Communists, then upon their return, wouldn't it seem
to you they should be given some special attention?

Mr. HOOVER. We have now----

Senator COOPER. To determine whether they are a risk to become Soviet
or Communist espionage agents or in fact become dangerous?

Mr. HOOVER. We have taken steps to plug that gap.

Prior to the assassination of the President, a defector, before he came
back was always cleared for return by a representative of the State
Department or the military abroad. When he came back we immediately
interviewed him if he was a civilian. It had to be done promptly to
determine whether he could be a potential intelligence agent.

Now, in December of last year, following the assassination, we expanded
the criteria of what should be furnished to the Secret Service, and all
defectors automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret
Service.

There are 36 defectors that we know of in this country who have been
under investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views
sincerely. Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general
precaution, as a result of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all
go to the Secret Service.

Mr. DULLES. That includes military defectors, does it not?

Mr. HOOVER. Military defectors and defectors from any private agency,
after they return to the U.S. and become civilians. Some have defected
to China, to the satellite nations and to Russia.

Senator COOPER. Just one other question, because I have to go.

In the course of this investigation, as you know so well, there
have been a number identified who were very close, at least to Mrs.
Oswald, and a few, I can't say that were close to Oswald yet they had
association with him, such as the man who drove him back and forth,
Mrs. Paine, with whom Mrs. Oswald lived, and others, has there been
any credible, I won't say credible because if you had you would have
presented it to us in your report, has there been any claims by persons
that these people are in any way related to the Communist Party?

Mr. HOOVER. We have had no credible evidence that they have been
related to the Communist Party in this country.

Now, as to Mrs. Oswald, the wife of Oswald, there is no way of knowing
whether she belonged to the Russian Communist Party in Russia. She
is a rather intelligent woman, and notwithstanding that you have to
talk with her through an interpreter, we have had no indication of her
association with Communists in this country, nor have any of her close
friends or relatives.

As to his mother, we found no indication she is associated or closely
associated with the Communists. She is the only one of the group that
we have come in contact with that I would say is somewhat emotionally
unstable. Our agents have interviewed her. She sometimes gets very
angry and she won't answer questions. As to the rest of the group who
had been friends of his, or worked with him in the Texas School Book
Depository, none of them have indicated any Communist associations of
any kind.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I hand you Exhibit 863 and ask you to examine
that and state whether or not that is the letter that you referred
to in which you answered questions of the Commission concerning the
National Enquirer magazine or newspaper?

Mr. HOOVER. This letter of May 8 addressed to the Commission is
the letter that dealt with our interview with Chief Curry and was
predicated upon the article which appeared in the National Enquirer of
May 17, 1964.

Mr. RANKIN. I ask you if you would care to add anything to that letter
except what you have already testified to?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to that. Chief Curry was very
specific, I am told by my agent in charge at Dallas, that this article
is an absolute lie; that none of these things set forth in the article
occurred; that he received no phone call or any request of any kind
oral or by phone or in writing from the Department of Justice or from
the FBI. As I stated earlier, the report from the Department of Justice
indicated that they made no request.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 863, being the
letter just referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 863 for
identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, is Exhibit 837 the article that you referred to
in the National Enquirer?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; that is the one.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your attention to Exhibit 836 and ask you if that
is the letter that you referred to which describes the criteria in the
handling of the security of the President that you have described in
your testimony.

Mr. HOOVER. This is the letter. It sets forth the criteria which were
adopted, originally about 1942 and later incorporated in the manual
of instructions in 1954. It also includes the amended instructions to
our field offices, prepared in December of 1963, which extended the
criteria.

Mr. RANKIN. Does that Exhibit correctly set forth the information you
had in regard to those matters?

Mr. HOOVER. It does.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you care to add anything to it?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to it at all.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, in light of what happened. Mr. Hoover, I think the
Commission would desire to have your comments or whatever you care
to tell them, concerning the reasons why you did not furnish the
information you had concerning Lee Harvey Oswald to the Secret Service
prior to the time of the President's assassination.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I have gone into that very thoroughly because that
was obviously one of the questions that I had in my mind when the
tragedy occurred in Dallas.

In going back over the record, and I have read each one of the reports
dealing with that and the reports of Mr. Hosty who had dealt with
the Oswald situation largely in Dallas, we had the matter that I
have previously referred to, the report of the State Department that
indicated this man was a thoroughly safe risk, he had changed his
views, he was a loyal man now and had seen the light of day, so to
speak.

How intensive or how extensive that interview in Moscow was, I don't
know. But, nevertheless, it was in a State Department document that was
furnished to us.

Now, we interviewed Oswald a few days after he arrived. We did not
interview him on arrival at the port of entry because that is always
undesirable by reason of the fact it is heavily covered by press, and
any relatives generally are there, so we prefer to do it after the man
has settled down for two or three days and become composed. We do it
in the privacy of our office or wherever he may be, or in his own home
or apartment. We interviewed him twice in regard to that angle that we
were looking for. We had no indication at this time of anything other
than his so-called Marxist leanings, Marxist beliefs.

We wanted to know whether he had been recruited by the Soviet
government as an intelligence agent, which is a frequent and constant
practice. There is not a year goes by but that individuals and groups
of individuals, sometimes on these cultural exchanges, go through
Russia and recruits are enlisted by the Russian intelligence, usually
through blackmail. The individual is threatened that if he doesn't come
back to this country and work for them they will expose the fact that
he is a homosexual or a degenerate or has been indiscrete.

Pictures are usually taken of individuals who become implicated in that
sort of thing, so the individual is really desperate. Such blackmail
has occurred year after year for some time.

In Oswald's case we had no suspicion that any pressure like that had
been brought to bear on him because he had gone voluntarily and had
obviously wanted to live in Russia and had married a Russian woman.

After those interviews had been completed, the next incident was the
difficulty he had at New Orleans. We were concerned there as to whether
he was functioning officially for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
which was financed and supported by Castro and Castro's government, and
if he was, where he obtained money and with whom he had dealt.

He apparently had the leaflets printed himself on plain ordinary paper.
There was no reason for us, then, to have any suspicion that he had any
element of danger in him.

However, we did not ignore or forget the fact that he was still in the
country. We kept track of him when he went from New Orleans to Dallas,
and that was one of the reasons why Hosty went to the home of Mrs.
Paine. She told us where Oswald was working, at the Texas book house.
Hosty gave her his telephone number and his name so that if there was
any information or any contact she wanted to make she could phone him
at the Dallas office.

Mrs. Oswald, the wife, took down the license number of Hosty's car
which was incorrect only in one digit. The name, the telephone number,
and the automobile license were later found in Oswald's memorandum book.

However, that in itself was not significant because many times we will
go to see a person and tell him now, "If you think of anything you want
to tell us or you have any information you want to give us, here are my
name and address, telephone number, and call me," and that is what was
done with Mrs. Paine because Hosty wasn't there at the time. He was at
work.

Incidentally, those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative
attention were first set out in an investigative report of our Dallas
Office dated December 23, 1963. This report was not prepared for this
Commission but rather for investigative purposes of the FBI and,
therefore, the information concerning Hosty's name, telephone number
and license number was not included in the report as the circumstances
under which Hosty's name, et cetera, appeared in Oswald's notebook were
fully known to the FBI.

After our investigative report of December 23, 1963, was furnished to
the Commission, we noted that Agent Hosty's name did not appear in the
report. In order that there would be a complete reporting of all items
in Oswald's notebook, this information was incorporated in another
investigative report of our Dallas Office, dated February 11, 1964.
Both of the above-mentioned reports were furnished to the Commission
prior to any inquiry concerning this matter by the President's
Commission.

There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any
indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to
the President or to the Vice President. Up to that time, as has been
indicated.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, may I interrupt, you said Hosty was not there
at the time, he was at work--did you mean Mr. Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. That was my mistake. I meant Mr. Oswald. Hosty talked with
Mrs. Paine and Mrs. Oswald. Mrs. Paine speaks Russian and she could
interpret for her.

Oswald was at the Texas Book Co., and then, as I say, Hosty left his
telephone number and name, and Mrs. Oswald for some reason took down
the license number. I don't know whether she was convinced this was an
agent of the FBI, or why she did it.

But, anyway, that was in the book that was later found, and which
contained many other things that Oswald had entered in the book.

Now, as I say, up to that time, there had been no information that
would have warranted our reporting him as a potential danger or hazard
to the security or the safety of the President or the Vice President,
so his name was not furnished at the time to Secret Service.

Under the new criteria which we have now put into force and effect,
it would have been furnished because we now include all defectors. As
to the original criteria, which we felt were sound and sufficient and
which we felt no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent
could take exception to, we limited the furnishing of names to S.S.
to persons potentially dangerous to the physical well being of the
President. We included emotionally unstable people who had threatened
the President or Vice President.

At my office during the course of a week there are sometimes three or
four callers who have to be taken to a Hospital because of their mental
condition. They claim they are being persecuted by radio beams and they
want to see me or the President to have those beams stopped. Now you
never know what tangent they are going to take. If such a person is
living in some part of the country where the President may be going his
name would be furnished to the Secret Service.

One car last year, I think, crashed through the gates of the White
House; the person driving wanted to see the President. The guard
wouldn't let him in and so the car crashed through and got within 20
feet of the first door. The guards, by that time, had their revolvers
out and took him into custody.

Last year a gentleman drove all the way from Arizona to see me. He
drove up the marble steps of the Department of Justice, and by that
time the guards had come out and took him into custody. I think he was
incarcerated in Arizona.

People of this type are among those we would have furnished to the
Secret Service. They have the potential to harm somebody.

We get names from members of Congress, of people who come to the
Capitol and try to threaten them or harass them. They let us know about
it, and we make the investigation or advise the police. If we can get
the family to have the person put into an institution, we try to do so.
If they don't, we may take steps to have him incarcerated through other
legal means.

Mr. DULLES. How many names, Mr. Director, in general, could the Secret
Service process? Aren't their facilities limited as to dealing with
vast numbers of names because of their limited personnel?

Mr. HOOVER. I think they are extremely limited. The Secret Service is a
very small organization and that is why we are fortifying them, so to
speak, or supplementing them by assigning agents of our Bureau which
is, of course, quite a burden on us. Our agents are assigned about 24
to 25 cases per agent and cover such involved matters as bankruptcy and
antitrust cases.

Now, the Secret Service has a very small group and I would estimate
that the names we have sent over number some 5,000. I would guess there
are about another 4,000 that will go over in the next month to them.
Frankly, I don't see how they can go out and recheck those names. We
keep the records up to date; if additional information comes in on
these names we furnish it to the Secret Service. They will have to call
upon the local authorities, unless the Secret Service force is enlarged
considerably so that they can handle it entirely on their own. I think
the Secret Service is entirely too small a force today to handle the
duties that they are handling. The great crowds that are at the White
House all the time, around the gates, that go to church where the
President goes, all of those things, of course, have to be checked over
by them. They always check in advance and just recently, a few Sundays
ago, they found some individuals in the basement of St. Mark's church
in Washington, where he was going to attend on Sunday morning. His
arrival was held up until they could ascertain who they were. They were
deaf mutes whose identity had not been cleared with the Secret Service.

Now, the Presidential party was delayed about 5 or 10 minutes in
reaching the church by reason of the radio call to the White House to
hold it up.

We are giving to Secret Service more and more names. The total, in
addition to the names they already had, will reach 10,000. I don't see
how they are going to be able to handle the situation as they would
want to handle it. They have to depend upon local police organizations.
Many local police departments are capable and efficient; some are
not. Many have good judgment and some have not. Wherever you have a
police department of 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 men you are bound to find
a few who will just barge in and do something which better judgment
would dictate should not be done, as in the incident which occurred in
the Midwest where they placed people practically under house arrest.
I think it was very bad judgment and should not have been done but
the Secret Service, of course, turned the names over to the local
authorities, and the local authorities do what they think is right.

Now, I guess their attitude with all justice to them is. "Well, we
will resolve the risk in our favor. If we keep these people under
surveillance and keep them in the house until the President gets out
of town nothing can happen from them." That is what you would call
totalitarian security. I don't think you can have that kind of security
in this country without having a great wave of criticism against it.
There is a great tendency for people to expect the intelligence forces
and the law enforcement agencies to be able to go out and arrest
people and bring them in and hold them endlessly and talk to them. We
can't arrest a person, without probable cause, or unless he commits a
crime in our presence. We have to arraign him promptly and if not done
promptly, the confession that he may have made generally cannot be used
against him.

Just as a collateral matter we faced that problem in California in the
case of the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr. One of the kidnappers we
arrested near San Diego confessed but we didn't arraign him because
the other kidnappers would have left California and it would have been
difficult to find them. However, the next day after arraignment he made
changes in the confession and signed it so the court held that it was
admissible.

The Secret Service, of course, is faced with the same problem. They
just can't arrest people because they may not like their looks. They
have to have facts justifying detention but the public conception is
that you have a full right to go out and do these things. We have
stressed in the FBI that there must be full compliance with the laws of
this country and with the decisions of the Supreme Court. That is the
law of the country. Now, whether a person likes it or not and there are
some groups that are very violent against the decisions of the court
while others are very much in favor of them, it is not for the FBI to
take sides. We have a job to do and we do it under the rulings of the
courts and we have been able to do it effectively.

I know when the ruling came down on the prompt arraignment, there
was great shouting and some strong editorials claiming that it was
going to wreck law enforcement. It hasn't wrecked us. It has made it
more difficult but I think we have to face up to the fact that law
enforcement in a free country must abide by the laws of that country
irrespective of how difficult it is. Some persons talk about putting
handcuffs on the law enforcement officers and taking them off the
criminals. That is a nice catch phrase to use in a speech or article
but operating within the law has not interfered with our work.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I ask you about Exhibit 825 which is first a
letter and then encloses certain affidavits of your agents.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. You are familiar with that?

Mr. HOOVER. I am familiar with that. I read all of that and signed it.

Mr. RANKIN. You know those are the affidavits in regard to whether Lee
Harvey Oswald was an agent or connected in anyway with the Bureau that
you have just testified to?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; and the affidavits of all agents, who had
any contact with him.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your attention to Exhibits 864 and 865, and ask you
if you have seen those before or, you have seen the original of 864 and
865 is a photostatic copy of your letter to us in answer to 864, is
that correct?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; yes. I recall very distinctly.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall those letters involved an inquiry as to any
connections of Lee Harvey Oswald with Communists or any criminal groups
or others that might be conspiratorial?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; and my letter of April 30 states the facts
as they are in our files.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, we offer in evidence Exhibits 864 and 865.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit Nos. 864 and 865 were marked for identification and
received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, do you have any suggestions that you would
like to tell the Commission about of your ideas that might improve
the security of the President, and you might comment upon information
the Commission has received. You have a special appropriation that is
related to that area.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I, at the request of----

The CHAIRMAN. Director, before you get into that question, and may
I ask something that I would like to hear you discuss in this same
connection?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have told us that you had no jurisdiction down there
in Dallas over this crime.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Because there is no Federal crime committed. And I assume
that that caused you some embarrassment and some confusion in doing
your work?

Mr. HOOVER. It most certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. Because of the likelihood of your being in conflict with
other authorities. Do you believe there should be a Federal law?

Mr. HOOVER. I am very strongly in favor of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Against an attempt to assassinate the President?

Mr. HOOVER. I am very strongly in favor of legislation being enacted
and enacted promptly that will make a Federal crime of attempts upon
the life of the President and the Vice President, and possibly the next
two persons in succession, the Speaker and the President pro tempore
of the Senate. In the Oswald case, we could not take custody of him.
If we had had jurisdiction we would have taken custody of him and I
do not believe he would have been killed by Rubenstein. The failure
to have jurisdiction was extremely embarrassing. I think the killing
of Oswald has created a great fog of speculation that will go on for
years, because of the things that Oswald might have been able to tell
which would have been of assistance in pinning down various phases of
this matter. This must be done now by collecting evidence from third
parties, and not from Oswald himself.

Now, as to the publicity that took place in Dallas, I was very
much concerned with that. We have in the FBI a crime laboratory
that furnishes free service to all law enforcement agencies of the
country. Any law enforcement agency can send to our laboratory here
in Washington any evidence--blood, dirt, dust, guns, anything of
that kind--and our laboratory examines it and then reports back to
the contributing police department. This was being done in the early
stages of the Oswald case, and almost as soon as the report would
reach the Dallas Police Department, the chief of police or one of the
representatives of the department would go on TV or radio and relate
findings of the FBI, giving information such as the identification of
the gun and other items of physical evidence.

Now, that concerned me for several reasons. In the first place, I don't
think cases should be tried in the newspapers. I think a short and
simple statement can be made when a person is arrested, but the details
of the evidence should be retained until you go into court to try the
case. Secondly, it creates a great deal of speculation on the part of
the press. There was very aggressive press coverage at Dallas. I was
so concerned that I asked my agent in charge at Dallas, Mr. Shanklin,
to personally go to Chief Curry and tell him that I insisted that he
not go on the air any more until this case was resolved. Until all
the evidence had been examined, I did not want any statements made
concerning the progress of the investigation. Because of the fact the
President had asked me to take charge of the case I insisted that he
and all members of his department refrain from public statements.

There was an officer in his department who was constantly on the
radio or giving out interviews. The chief concurred in my request and
thereafter refrained from further comment but of course by that time
the identification of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where
it had come from, where it had been bought and the information we had
run down in Chicago and had furnished to the Dallas Police Department.

If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information
would have been given out. Because of the publicity you had to face the
charge that the prejudice of the community would require a change of
venue. With the publicity, I don't know where you could have changed
the venue to, since newspapers all over the State covered it. I think
a Houston reporter was the first one who wrote that Oswald was an
informant of the FBI. We went to the newspaper reporter. He refused to
tell us his source. He said he had also heard it from other persons.
We asked him the names of these persons and we interviewed them but
none of them would provide the source. In other words, I was trying
to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always the
result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the
press wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in
the Bureau of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest.
Then a release is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what
the written complaint says, the fact. The complaint was filed with the
Commissioner, and that ends it. We don't try to run it out for a week
or 10 days. It is up to the U.S. attorney thereafter and the court to
try the case.

I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the
evidence was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn't know
that Oswald was going to be killed, and there was a possibility that
he might be confronted with some of this evidence. If it had been kept
secret and used in the interrogation of him, just confronting him
with what was found, such as his picture with the gun might have been
helpful.

A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full
confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he
will be on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always
advised of his rights and that he can have an attorney. We always
make a point of this. We generally have a reputable physician of
the community present in our office while the prisoner is there, to
administer to him and be able to testify that he has not been subjected
to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes in and he is
examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him before the
commissioner in a case like Oswald's would probably have been done
within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an
hour.

That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say
I am in favor of having the procedures of law enforcement officers as
tightly bound down as we can, with due respect for the interests of
society.

Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule
against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments
used the third degree. I think very few of them use it now because if
they use it they violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate
them for having brutally handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made
unfairly against police officers that they have used third degree
methods and we are able to prove they haven't in our investigations.
That is particularly true where civil rights matters are involved. We
have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is going on.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions
that you may have concerning the protection of the President, and
the information that the Commission has that you have a special
appropriation in that connection for the Bureau?

Mr. HOOVER. We do not have a special appropriation for the
protection of the President. The Secret Service, of course, has that
responsibility. On December 2, I prepared this memorandum for the
President, and for the chief of the Secret Service at the request of
the President, outlining suggestions that I felt should be considered
to tighten up on the security of the President. If the Commission
desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to
the Commission.

Representative BOGGS. Why don't you ask the Director just to summarize
it.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you summarize it?

Mr. DULLES. Can we have a copy of it?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.

Representative FORD. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. I have no objection to
it.

Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as
possible of the President's travel plans and proposed itinerary. The
reason for that is there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they
are going somewhere and the Secret Service does not have the chance
always to cover the area and check the neighborhood and check the hotel
or place where it may be.

Representative BOGGS. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.

Mr. HOOVER. I know from experience.

Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible.
Again, it has been the practice in the past to announce the President
is going along a certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather
along that route. And, therefore, I thought that was something that
should not be given out and the President should be taken along some
routes which are not announced. At the present time, he goes to cities
and he wants to see people and the crowd wants to see him. In Dallas,
the route was publicized at least 24 hours before so everybody knew
where he would be driving.

Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such
cars readily available in locations frequently visited. The President,
as I observed earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one
now which I supplied to Secret Service and they will have one made no
doubt in due time for the President's use. But if it had been armored,
I believe President Kennedy would be alive today.

Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity
such as visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.

Regarding public appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of
persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to
the amount of metal required in a firearm or grenade.

Second, use a bulletproof shield in front of the entire rostrum in
public appearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on
inauguration day, the presidential reviewing stand in front of the
White House on the same day and on the rear of trains.

Third, keep to a minimum the President's movements within crowds,
remain on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling
with the audience. Again, there is great difficulty in that field.

Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football
games, remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time
ceremonies.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored
car that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have
some protection to protect his head?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Because if the armored car had been open----

Mr. HOOVER. He must never ride in an open car; that has been my
recommendation.

Mr. DULLES. The back never comes down?

Mr. HOOVER. The back never comes down, and it is bulletproof. The top,
sides, and underpart are all of bulletproof construction. So that
except by opening a window and waving through the window the occupant
is safe. A person can shoot through the window if the glass window is
lowered.

Fifth, limit public appearances by use of television whenever possible.

Sixth, avoid walking in public except when absolutely necessary.

Now, on legislation. First, I recommended that the President and the
Vice President be added to the list of Federal officers set out in
section 1114, title 18 of the U.S. Code which deals with assaults which
are punishable under Federal law.

Mr. RANKIN. You would add to that I understood from your prior remarks,
the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore?

Mr. HOOVER. In view of the situation which prevails at the present time
the Speaker and President pro tempore, in other words, the line of
succession under the Constitution but not below that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOOVER. Second, furnish the Secret Service authority to request
assistance and cooperation from other U.S. agencies including the
military, particularly in connection with foreign travel.

Now, my reason for that is that sometimes requests for assistance have
to clear through red-tape channels here at Washington through some
high official of Government. If an emergency arises abroad, or even in
this country, it may be of such character that you do not have time to
telephone back to Washington or to telephone back to the Pentagon. Aid
ought to be immediately available by calling on the local authorities
and the nearest military authority.

Third, improve control of the sale of firearms requiring as a
minimum registration of every firearm sold together with adequate
identification of the purchaser. The problem of firearms control is
under extensive debate, in both the House and Senate at the present
time.

The gun that Oswald used was bought by mail order from a mail-order
house in Chicago, no license for it, no permit for it, no checkup on
it. The only way we were able to trace it was to find out where in this
country that Italian-made gun was sold. We found the company in Chicago
and later the mail-order slip that had been sent by Oswald to Chicago
to get the gun. Now, there are arguments, of course----

Mr. DULLES. In a false name.

Mr. HOOVER. In a false name.

There is argument, of course, that by passing firearms legislation you
are going to take the privilege of hunting away from the sportsmen of
the country. I don't share that view with any great degree of sympathy
because you have to get a license to drive an automobile and you have
to get a license to have a dog, and I see no reason why a man shouldn't
be willing, if he is a law-abiding citizen, to have a license to get a
firearm whether it be a rifle or revolver or other firearm.

It is not going to curtail his exercise of shooting for sport because
the police make a check of his background. If he is a man who is
entitled to a gun, a law-abiding citizen, a permit will be granted.

Of course, today firearms control is practically negligible, and I
think some steps should be taken along that line.

Fourth, a ban on picketing within the vicinity of the White House as is
now done at the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Some of these pickets
are well-meaning and law-abiding individuals, some are for peace and
some are more or less dedicated Communists.

Representative BOGGS. It is illegal to picket a Federal court now, Mr.
Director, I happen to be the author of that law.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I am glad you had that law passed. Of course, they
picket public buildings, they march around the Department of Justice
Building, now and then, but the principal places they prefer to go are
the Supreme Court Building, the Capitol and its grounds and the White
House.

I think such picketing at the White House, of large or small groups,
should be forbidden. I think at the White House they tried to get
the pickets to walk across the street along Lafayette Park. That at
least takes them away from being close to the gates at the White
House. I think there ought to be some control. Picketing, of course,
is legitimate if it is orderly. Many times it doesn't continue to be
orderly, and sometimes pickets, as in this city, have thrown themselves
on the pavement and the police have to come and pick them up or drag
them away. Then, of course, the charge is made of brutality right away.

Delegations of colored groups have visited me and asked why I don't
arrest a police officer for hitting some Negro whom he is arresting in
a sit-in strike, lay-in strike or demonstration in some southern cities.

We have no authority to make an arrest of that kind. Under the
authority the Bureau has we have to submit those complaints to the
Department of Justice and if they authorize us to make an arrest we
will do it.

Those in general are the recommendations I made and I will furnish the
committee with a copy of this memorandum.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I would like to ask you in regard to your
recommendations, do you think you have adequately taken into account
that the President is not only the Chief Executive but also necessarily
a politician under our system?

Mr. HOOVER. I have taken that into account, and I would like to say
this off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RANKIN. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions, gentlemen?

Representative BOGGS. I would just like to thank the Director again for
all the help he has given us.

Mr. HOOVER. I am happy to.

The CHAIRMAN. I would, too, on behalf of the Commission, Mr. Director,
I would not only like to thank you for your testimony but for your
cooperation that your people have given us throughout this entire
investigation.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I also want to add one other thing, having in mind the
testimony you gave that this is still an open investigation, that
should anything come to your attention that you believe this Commission
has either overlooked or should look into you feel free to ask us to do
it.

Mr. HOOVER. I would most certainly do that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do it.

Mr. HOOVER. I want to give all the cooperation I can to this most
difficult task you have.

Representative FORD. One question. The other day when we had the State,
Justice, Judiciary Appropriation bill before the full Committee on
Appropriations----

Mr. HOOVER. Yes.

Representative FORD. And I am not a member of that subcommittee, I
noticed a provision in the bill, as I recall, to the effect funds
for or something of that content, of FBI responsibilities for the
protection of the President.

Mr. HOOVER. There is a provision for funds that we can use for the
apprehension of a man who has been declared a fugitive from justice,
that is where a man has committed a crime, a warrant is out for him and
he has fled or where he has escaped from a penitentiary. I don't recall
offhand any specific appropriation for the protection of the President.
I will look at the appropriation bill. I may be wrong there but I am
quite certain that is so.

Representative FORD. It was my recollection as I was looking at the
bill in committee there was a phrase to this effect in the language of
the bill. I think it might be helpful for the record to get whatever
the history is of that if it is still a matter of the bill or the law.

Mr. HOOVER. I remember that at the time Mr. Curtis was Vice President,
he was Senator and then Vice President, at that time he insisted that
he wanted FBI agents with him and nobody else. When Mr. Nixon took
office as Vice President he was protected by the Secret Service and
with Mr. Johnson, it was the same thing.

Secret Service asked us to let them have additional manpower, as a
matter of assistance, and we have done so.

Representative FORD. I think it would be helpful if you would have a
memorandum prepared.

Mr. HOOVER. I will be glad to.

Representative FORD. Showing the history of this provision from its
inception and whether or not it is in the bill or the proposed law for
fiscal 1965.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. And the justification you have indicated.

Mr. HOOVER. That was not taken up, I know, in the testimony before the
Appropriations Committee. I gave the testimony before the committee in
January, and the testimony wasn't released until 2 weeks ago when the
bill was reported out. It was not discussed in the hearings.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, in order to complete the record, may I ask
to have the number 866 assigned to the memo that Mr. Hoover is going
to send about protection of the President, and have it admitted to this
record under that number.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may be.

Representative FORD. Also a number for this letter Mr. Hoover is going
to submit.

Mr. RANKIN. May I assign 867?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Commission Exhibit Nos. 866 and 867 were marked for identification and
received in evidence.)


TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. McCONE AND RICHARD M. HELMS

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be in order.

Director McCone, it is customary for the Chairman to make a short
statement to the witness as to the testimony that is expected to be
given. I will read it at this time.

Mr. McCone will be asked to testify on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was
ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on
behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency in any capacity at any time,
and whether he knows of any credible evidence or of any conspiracy
either domestic or foreign involved in the assassination of President
Kennedy, also with regard to any suggestions and recommendations he
may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the
protection of the President of the United States.

Would you please rise and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony
you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McCONE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please? Mr. Rankin will conduct the
examination.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, will you state your name?

Mr. McCONE. My name is John Alex McCone.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an official position with the U.S. Government?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, sir; I am Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you been Director for some time?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; a little over 2-1/2 years.

Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live, Mr. McCone?

Mr. McCONE. I live at 3025 Whitehaven Street in Washington.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you familiar with the records and how they are kept by
the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether a man is acting as an
informer, agent, employee, or in any other capacity for that Agency?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; I am generally familiar with the procedures and the
records that are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Quite
naturally, I am not familiar with all of the records because they are
very extensive.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you determined whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald, the
suspect in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy,
had any connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, informer or
indirectly as an employee, or any other capacity?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no
such connection, and I would like to read for the record----

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us briefly the extent of your inquiry?

Mr. McCONE. In a form of affidavit, I have gone into the matter in
considerable detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate
people within the Agency, examined all records in our files relating to
Lee Harvey Oswald. We had knowledge of him, of course, because of his
having gone to the Soviet Union, as he did, putting him in a situation
where his name would appear in our name file. However, my examination
has resulted in the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent,
employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency
never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or
solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with
him directly or in any other manner. The Agency never furnished him
with any funds or money or compensated him directly or indirectly in
any fashion, and Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected
directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency. When
I use the term "Agency," I mean the Central Intelligence Agency, of
course.

Representative FORD. Does that include whether or not he was in the
United States, in the Soviet Union, or anyplace?

Mr. McCONE. Anyplace; the United States, Soviet Union, or anyplace.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, is that the affidavit you are going to supply
the Commission in connection with our request for it?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; this is the substance of the affidavit which I will
supply to you.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to mark that Exhibit 870 and have
it introduced in evidence as soon as we receive it from Mr. McCone as a
part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 870 was marked for identification and received
in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell us about your procedures in regard to having
an agent or informer or any person acting in that type of capacity?
Does that have to pass through your hands or come to your attention in
the Agency?

Mr. McCONE. No; it does not have to come through my personal hands.

Mr. RANKIN. Without disclosing something that might be a security
matter, could you tell us how that is handled in a general way in the
Agency?

Mr. McCONE. Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that division of
the Agency's activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that
be permissible?

Mr. RANKIN. Could we have him sworn then?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you
solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this
Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?

Mr. HELMS. I do.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, you heard the inquiry just directed to Mr.
McCone. Could you answer the question directly?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; we have a specific procedure which we follow in all
cases where the Agency is in contact, for the purposes of acquiring
intelligence or whatever the case may be, with an individual. We not
only have a record of the individual's name, but we also usually get
information of a biographical nature. We then check this individual's
name against our record. At that point we make a determination as to
whether we desire to use this man or not to use him. It varies from
case to case as to how many officers may be involved in approving a
specific recruitment. May I go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, did you have anything to do on behalf of your
Agency with determining whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was acting in
any of the capacities I have described in my questions to Mr. McCone?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I did.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us what you did in that regard?

Mr. HELMS. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched
to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President
Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency
with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personnel
files and all our records.

Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch
with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the
times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact
having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be
negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency,
either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that
there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Do you recall or do you
know at what time the name of Lee Harvey Oswald was carded, first came
to your attention so it became a matter of record, in the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I would want to consult the record to be absolutely
accurate, but it is my impression that the first time that his name
showed up on any Agency records was when he went to the Soviet Union.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, in connection with your work you have supplied
information to the Commission and we have requested many things from
your Agency. Can you tell the Commission as to whether or not you have
supplied us all the information the Agency has, at least in substance,
in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. We have; all.

Representative FORD. Has a member of the Commission staff had full
access to your files on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. He has, sir.

Representative FORD. They have had the opportunity to personally look
at the entire file?

Mr. HELMS. We invited them to come out to our building in Langley and
actually put the file on the table so that they could examine it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was personally out there, too, and was offered the same
opportunity. I did not avail myself of it because of the time element,
but I was offered the same opportunity.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, can you explain, according to the limitations of
security, the reasons why we examined materials but did not always take
them, in a general way?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I can.

In our communications between individuals working overseas and in
Washington, we for security reasons have a method of hiding the
identities of individuals in telegrams and dispatches by the use of
pseudonyms and cryptonyms. For this reason, we never allow the original
documents to leave our premises. However, on the occasion when the
representatives of the Commission staff looked at these files, we sat
there and identified these pseudonyms and cryptonyms and related them
to the proper names of the individuals concerned, so that they would
know exactly what the correspondence said.

Mr. RANKIN. By that you mean the representatives of the Commission were
able to satisfy themselves that they had all of the information for the
benefit of the Commission without disclosing matters that would be a
threat to security; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. It is my understanding that they were satisfied.

Representative FORD. Mr. McCone, do you have full authority from higher
authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information
in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCONE. That is right. It is my understanding that it is the desire
of higher authority that this Commission shall have access to all
information of every nature in our files or in the minds of employees
of Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative FORD. On the basis of that authority, you or the Agency
have made a full disclosure?

Mr. McCONE. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, I have handed you Exhibits 868 and 869 directed
to you acting for the Agency, the first one being from the Commission
to you and the second one, 869, being your answer in regard to your
full and complete disclosure in regard to your records; isn't that
correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct. May I say, Mr. Rankin, that any
information, though, subsequent to this correspondence which we may
obtain we will certainly continue to forward to the Commission.

Mr. RANKIN. Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask leave to have those two
exhibits, 868 and 869, received in evidence at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under those numbers.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 868 and 869 were marked for identification
and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, if I may return to you, I will now ask you if
you have any credible information that you know of or evidence causing
you to believe that there is any or was any conspiracy either domestic
or foreign in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. McCONE. No; I have no information, Mr. Rankin, that would lead me
to believe or conclude that a conspiracy existed.

Representative FORD. Did the CIA make an investigation of this aspect
of the assassination?

Mr. McCONE. We made an investigation of all developments after the
assassination which came to our attention which might possibly have
indicated a conspiracy, and we determined after these investigations,
which were made promptly and immediately, that we had no evidence to
support such an assumption.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any
contact with Oswald during the period of his life in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCONE. No; not to my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who
would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according
to any record we have.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any
personal contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United
States?

Mr. McCONE. No.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, your Agency made a particular investigation in
connection with any allegations about a conspiracy involving the Soviet
Union or people connected with Cuba, did you not?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, we did. We made a thorough, a very thorough,
investigation of information that came to us concerning an alleged
trip that Oswald made to Mexico City during which time he made contact
with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to gain transit
privileges from Mexico City to the Soviet Union via Havana. We
investigated that thoroughly.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you also include in your statement that you found no
evidence of conspiracy in all of that investigation?

Mr. McCONE. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. And also the investigation you made of the period that Lee
Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCONE. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Does your answer, Mr.
McCone, include a negation of any belief that Oswald was working for or
on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time when you were in contact with
him or knew about his activities?

Mr. McCONE. As I have already stated, we were never in contact with
Oswald. We have no evidence that he was working for or on behalf of the
Soviet Union at any time. According to his diary, Oswald did receive a
subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross which we assume had the approval of
the authorities. Such a payment does not indicate to us that he even
worked for the Soviet intelligence services. Furthermore, we have no
other evidence that he ever worked for Soviet intelligence.

Representative FORD. Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any
investigation into this area?

Mr. McCONE. No, because, at the present time, we have no information in
our files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to
our satisfaction. Naturally, any new information that might come into
our hands would be investigated promptly.

Mr. HELMS. I simply wanted to add that we obviously are interested in
anything we can pick up applying to this case, and anything we get will
be immediately sent to the Commission, so that we haven't stopped our
inquiries or the picking up of any information we can from people who
might have it. This is on a continuing basis.

Representative FORD. In other words, the case isn't closed.

Mr. HELMS. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.

Mr. RANKIN. Would that be true, Mr. Helms, even after the Commission
completed its report, you would keep the matter open if there was
anything new that developed in the future that could be properly
presented to the authorities?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I would assume the case will never be closed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, do you have any ideas about improving the
security provisions for the President that you would like to relate to
the Commission?

Mr. McCONE. Well, this is, in my opinion, a very important question
which I am sure this Commission will--has and will--devote a
considerable amount of thought to, and undoubtedly have some
recommendations as part of its report.

Mr. RANKIN. Your Agency does have an important function in some aspects.

Mr. McCONE. We have a very important function in connection with the
foreign travels of the President, and I would like to inform the
Commission as to how we discharge that responsibility by quickly
reviewing the chronology of the Central Intelligence Agency's support
of President Kennedy's visit to Mexico City from the 29th of June to
the 2d of July 1962.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you please do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Director, is that a security matter?

Mr. McCONE. No. I think I can handle this for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. McCONE. If I have to make a remark or two off the record I will ask
that privilege.

That visit, as I said, started on the 29th of June. On the 28th of
April, in anticipation of the visit, instructions were transmitted to
Mexico for the Ambassador to coordinate planning and informational
guidance for the advance party of the Secret Service.

We asked that the Secret Service be given information on local groups
and persons who would cause disturbances, embarrassments or physical
harm, an estimate of the determination and ability of the Mexican
government to prevent incidents, and preparation for special briefings
to the Embassy officials and the Secret Service, and such additional
support and communications personnel that might be required.

These instructions were given two months before the trip.

On the 15th of May, we received confirmed information that the
President would visit Mexico on the specific dates. On the 1st of June
the Secret Service was supplied by the Agency with the detailed survey
of Mexican security forces that would be called upon to protect the
President.

Friendly and allied governments were informed of the visit and their
cooperation and pertinent informational support was solicited. From
this date through the 2d of July daily information reports were
furnished to the State Department, the Secret Service, the FBI and the
military services.

That is from the 1st of June to the 2d of July, a period of 31,
32 days. On the 8th of June the Secret Service advance party was
briefed in detail by a group of officers of the Agency on the Mexican
government's plans for the protection of the President, including
current information on the size, strength and capabilities of potential
troublemakers.

Hazardous locations and times in the planned itinerary were identified,
political and economic issues that might be invoked by hostile elements
for demonstrations were specified.

On the 11th of June, the Secret Service advance party left for Mexico
supported by additional security personnel to assist in coordinating an
informational report and the followup activity required.

Especially prepared national intelligence estimates on the current
security conditions in Mexico was approved by the United States
Intelligence Board on the 13th of June.

On the 15th of June arrangements were completed to reenforce
communications facilities. On the 24th of June a conference at the
State Department was held at the request of the President for reviewing
security measures, and this meeting I attended personally, and reported
to the State Department on the essence of all that had gone before.

Emergency contingency plans were discussed and a consensus was reached
that the President should make the visit as scheduled.

On the 27th of June, a final updated special national intelligence
estimate was prepared, and this indicated no basic changes in the
security assessment that Mexican government was prepared to cope with
foreseeable security contingencies.

On the 28th of June, a final briefing report was prepared for the
Director's use which indicated the security precautions of the Mexican
government had effectively forestalled major organized incidents, and
our informed estimate was that the President would receive a great
welcome.

The report was presented to the President personally by the Director at
noon in a final meeting prior to departure on this trip.

From the 29th of June to the 2d of July in Washington headquarters,
headquarters components remained on a 24-hour alert for close support
of the embassy and the Secret Service.

So, not only was the Central Intelligence Agency and its various
components involved in this for a period of 2 months in close
collaboration with the Secret Service, but by bringing in the United
States Intelligence Board we brought in all of the intelligence assets
of the United States Government in connection with this particular
trip. I thought this procedure which is followed regularly on all trips
that the President makes out of the country would be of interest to the
Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the normal format of your procedures?

Mr. McCONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When the President goes abroad?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I selected this one. The same was true of his trip to
Caracas or Paris or elsewhere.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, in your investigation of the Oswald matter
did you use the same approach or a comparable approach to a liaison
with the other intelligence agencies of government to try to discover
anything that might involve your jurisdiction.

Mr. McCONE. Yes. We were in very close touch with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and with the Secret Service on a 24-hour basis at all
points, both domestic and foreign, where information had been received
which might have a bearing on this problem.

Mr. RANKIN. Assassination?

Mr. McCONE. Assassination.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an opinion, Mr. McCone, as to whether or not
the liaison between the intelligence agencies of the United States
Government might be improved if they had better mechanical, computer or
other facilities of that type, and also some other ideas or methods of
dealing with each other?

Mr. McCONE. There is a great deal of improvement of information that
might be of importance in a matter of this kind through the use of
computers and mechanical means of handling files, and you, Mr. Chief
Justice, saw some of our installations and that was only a beginning of
what really can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I did.

Mr. McCONE. I would certainly urge that all departments of government
that are involved in this area adopt the most modern methods of
automatic data processing with respect to the personnel files and other
files relating to individuals. This would be helpful.

But I emphasize that a computer will not replace the man, and
therefore, we must have at all levels a complete exchange of
information and cooperation between agencies where they share this
responsibility, and in going through this chronology, it points out the
type of exchange and cooperation that the Central Intelligence Agency
tries to afford both the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in matters where we have a common responsibility.

I would like to emphasize the very great importance of this exchange,
which is not always easily accomplished because it is cumbersome.

Sometimes it becomes involved in distracting people from other duties,
and so on and so forth.

I have given a good deal of thought to the matter of some incentives to
bring out informers, thinking about the old informer statutes in which
some of them are still on the books, in which people were rewarded for
informing when others conducted themselves in a damaging way.

Mr. DULLES. Smuggling cases?

Mr. McCONE. Smuggling cases. But I believe that something could be
done. I call to the attention of this Commission one of the laws
relating to atomic energy, namely the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15
July 1955 wherein a substantial reward is offered for the apprehension
of persons responsible for the clandestine introduction or manufacture
in the United States of such nuclear material or atomic weapons. It
is suggested that the Commission may wish to recommend that original
but similar legislation be enacted which would induce individuals to
furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a
substantial reward and preferential treatment. Substantial reward could
represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel
of secret associations and state security organs abroad who are
charged with assassination and sabotage. We have information that such
personnel and police state apparatuses have expressed and, in certain
cases, acted upon their repugnance for such work and for the political
system which requires such duties to be performed.

Mr RANKIN. Is it your belief, Mr. McCone, that the methods for exchange
of information between intelligence agencies of the Government could be
materially improved.

Mr. McCONE. I think the exchange between the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Secret Service
is quite adequate. I am not informed as to whether the exchanges
between the Secret Service and the FBI are equally adequate. I have not
gone into that. I would have no means to know. Certainly it is most
important that it be done.

Mr. DULLES. Looking back now that you have the full record, do you feel
that you received from the State Department adequate information at the
time that they were aware of Oswald's defection and later activities
in the Soviet Union, did you get at the time full information from the
State Department on those particular subjects?

Mr. McCONE. Well, I am not sure that we got full information, Mr.
Dulles. The fact is we had very little information in our files.

Mr. HELMS. It was probably minimal.

Representative FORD. Why did that happen?

Mr. HELMS. I am not sure, Mr. Ford. I can only assume that the State
Department had a limited amount. Interestingly enough, it is far enough
back now so that it's very hard to find people who were in the Moscow
Embassy at the time familiar with the case, so in trying to run this
down one comes to a lot of dead ends and I, therefore, would not like
to hazard any guess.

Representative FORD. Whose responsibility is it; is it CIA's
responsibility to obtain the information or State Department's
responsibility to supply it to Central Intelligence and to others.

Mr. McCONE. With respect to a U.S. citizen who goes abroad, it is the
responsibility of the State Department through its various echelons,
consular service and embassies and so forth.

For a foreigner coming into the United States, who might be of
suspicious character, coming here for espionage, subversion,
assassination and other acts of violence, we would, and we do exchange
this information immediately with the FBI.

Representative FORD. But in this particular case, Oswald in the Soviet
Union, whose responsibility was it to transmit the information,
whatever it was, to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCONE. Well, it would be the State Department's responsibility
to do that. Whether there really exists an order or orders that
information on an American citizen returning from a foreign country be
transmitted to CIA, I don't believe there are such regulations which
exist.

Mr. HELMS. I don't believe they do, either.

Mr. McCONE. I am not sure they should.

Representative FORD. It wouldn't be your recommendation that you, the
head of Central Intelligence Agency, should have that information?

Mr. DULLES. In a case of an American defecting to a Communist country,
shouldn't you have it?

Mr. McCONE. Certainly certain types of information. What we ought to
be careful of here, would be to rather clearly define the type of
information which should be transmitted, because after all, there are
hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans going back and forth
every year, and those records are the records of the Immigration
Service, the Passport Division.

Mr. DULLES. I was thinking of a person who having defected might, of
course, have become an agent and then reinserted into the United States
and if you were informed of the first steps to that you might help to
prevent the second step.

Mr. McCONE. Well, certainly information on defectors or possible
recruitments should be, and I have no question is being, transmitted.

Representative FORD. What I was getting at was whether the procedures
were adequate or inadequate, whether the administration was proper
or improper in this particular case, and if some files you have that
started when he attempted to defect are inadequate why we ought to
know, and we ought to know whether the basic regulations were right or
wrong, whether the administration was proper or improper, that is what
I am trying to find out.

I would like your comment on it.

Mr. McCONE. Well, I think the basic regulations should be examined
very carefully to be sure that they are copper-riveted down and
absolutely tight. What I am saying, however, is because of the vast
number of Americans who go abroad and stay in foreign countries for
indefinite periods of time, it would be an impossible task to transmit
all information available in the State Department and Immigration
Service as files to the Central Intelligence Agency. It would not be a
productive exercise. What must be transmitted and is being transmitted,
while I cannot recite the exact regulations is information that is,
becomes, known to the various embassies of suspicious Americans that
might have been recruited and defected, and then returned so that they
would be agents in place.

Representative FORD. In this case, Oswald attempted to defect, he did
not, he subsequently sought the right to return to the United States,
he had contact with the Embassy. Was the Central Intelligence Agency
informed of these steps, step by step, by the Department of State?

Mr. McCONE. You might answer that.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Ford, in order to answer this question precisely I
would have to have the file in front of me. I have not looked at it
in some time so I don't have it all that clearly in mind. But it is
my impression that we were not informed step by step. When I say that
there is no requirement that I am aware of that the State Department
should inform us and when I said a moment ago that we had minimal
information from them, this was not in any sense a critical comment but
a statement of fact.

But an American going to the American Embassy would be handled by
the Embassy officials, either consular or otherwise. This would be a
matter well within the purview of the State Department to keep all
the way through, because we do not have responsibility in the Central
Intelligence Agency for the conduct or behavior or anything else of
American citizens when they are abroad unless there is some special
consideration applying to an individual, or someone in higher authority
requests assistance from us. So that the State Department, I think,
quite properly would regard this matter as well within their purview
to handle themselves within the Embassy or from the Embassy back to
the Department of State without involving the Agency in it while these
events were occurring.

Representative FORD. I think it could be argued, however, that the
uniqueness of this individual case was such that the Department of
State might well have contacted the Central Intelligence Agency to
keep them abreast of the developments as they transpired. This is
not--and when I say this, I mean the Oswald case--is not an ordinary
run-of-the-mill-type of case. It is far from it. Even back in the time,
well, from the time he went, and particularly as time progressed, and
he made application to return, there is nothing ordinary about the
whole situation.

Mr. McCONE. That is quite correct; there is no question about that.

Representative FORD. And I am only suggesting that if the regulations
were not adequate at the time and are not now, maybe something ought to
be done about it.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, when you said that supplying all of the
information about U.S. citizens who went abroad and came back to
the country would not be a profitable exercise, did that comment
include the thought that such an intrusion upon all citizens would be
questionable?

Mr. McCONE. Such an intrusion?

Mr. RANKIN. Upon their right to travel.

Mr. McCONE. Well, I think this would have a bearing on it. I did
not have that particular matter in mind when I made that statement,
however. I was just thinking of the----

Mr. RANKIN. Burden?

Mr. McCONE. Of the burden of vast numbers involved.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you you have any thought in regard to whether it would
be an intrusion upon their rights?

Mr. McCONE. Well, that would be a matter of how it was handled.
Certainly, if it was handled in a way that the counterpart of providing
the information was to impose restrictions on them, then it would be an
intrusion on their rights.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Senator COOPER. May I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

Senator COOPER. I missed the first part of Mr. McCone's testimony; I
went to answer a quorum call. Perhaps the question has been asked.

It has been brought into evidence that a number of people in the
Embassy talked to Oswald when he first defected, and the various
communications with the Embassy and, of course, when he left to come
back to the United States. Have we been able to ascertain the names of
officials in the Embassy or employees with whom Oswald talked on these
various occasions?

Mr. McCONE. I am not familiar with them; no.

Mr. HELMS. Neither am I, sir.

Mr. McCONE. I presume that the Department's inquiries have covered it.

Senator COOPER. Is it possible to ascertain the names of those
employees?

Mr. RANKIN. Senator Cooper, I can answer that. We have inquired of
the State Department for that information, and are in the process of
obtaining it all.

Senator COOPER. Taking into consideration your answers to the previous
question, would it have been possible in your judgment to have secured
more comprehensive information about the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. McCONE. It would not have been possible for the Central
Intelligence Agency to have secured such information because we do not
have the resources to gain such information.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything more? Congressman Ford?

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency investigate
any aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; we did.

Representative FORD. Can you give us any information on that?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; we were aware that Oswald did make a trip to Mexico
City and it was our judgment that he was there in the interest of
insuring transit privileges and that he made contact with the Cuban
Embassy while he was there.

We do not know the precise results of his effort, but we assumed,
because he returned to the United States, he was unsuccessful. We have
examined to every extent we can, and using all resources available to
us every aspect of his activity and we could not verify that he was
there for any other purpose or that his trip to Mexico was in any way
related to his later action in assassinating President Kennedy.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency make any
investigation of any alleged connection between Oswald and the Castro
government?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; we investigated that in considerable detail, because
information came to us through a third party that he had carried on
a rather odd discussion with Cuban officials in the Cuban Embassy in
Mexico City. The allegation was that he had received under rather odd
circumstances a substantial amount of money in the Cuban Embassy, and
the statement was made by one who claimed to have seen this transaction
take place. After a very thorough and detailed examination of the
informer, it finally turned out by the informer's own admission that
the information was entirely erroneous, and was made for the purpose
of advancing the informer's own standing with the Central Intelligence
Agency and the U.S. Government and it was subsequently retracted by the
informer in its entirety.

Representative FORD. Was there any other evidence or alleged
evidence----

Mr. McCONE. Parenthetically, I might add a word for the record that
the date that the informer gave as to the date in time of this
alleged transaction was impossible because through other, from other,
information we determined that Oswald was in the United States at that
particular time.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency ever make an
investigation or did it ever check on Mr. Ruby's trip to Cuba or any
connections he might have had with the Castro government?

Mr. McCONE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. HELMS. We had no information.

Mr. McCONE. We had no information.

Representative FORD. Central Intelligence Agency has no information of
any connections of Ruby to the Castro government?

Mr. McCONE. That is right.

Representative FORD. Did you ever make a check of that?

Mr. HELMS. We checked our records to see if we had information and
found we did not.

Representative FORD. What would that indicate, the fact that you
checked your records?

Mr. HELMS. That would indicate that if we had received information
from our own resources, that the Cubans were involved with Mr. Ruby in
something which would be regarded as subversive, we would then have
it in our files. But we received no such information, and I don't,
by saying this, mean that he did not. I simply say we don't have any
record of this.

Representative FORD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Director, thank you very much, sir, for coming and being
with us and we appreciate the help your department has given to us.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



_Thursday, June 4, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY, LEO J. GAUTHIER, LYNDAL L. SHANEYFELT,
AND ROBERT A. FRAZIER

The President's Commission met at 2:10 p.m., on June 4, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren. Chairman; Senator John Sherman
Cooper, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J.
McCloy, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich,
assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; Waggoner Carr,
attorney general of Texas; and Charles Murray, observer.


TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY

(Members present at this point: The Chairman, Representative Ford, Mr.
Dulles, and Mr. McCloy.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, we have witnesses today who are Thomas
J. Kelley of the Secret Service; Leo J. Gauthier, Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt,
and Robert A. Frazier of the FBI. They are going to testify concerning
certain onsite tests made in Dallas at the scene of the assassination,
and of preliminary studies which were made prior to the onsite tests at
Dallas.

May we have them sworn in as a group?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Will you rise and raise your right hands, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before
this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KELLEY. I do.

Mr. GAUTHIER. I do.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I do.

Mr. FRAZIER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated, gentlemen. Mr. Kelley, will you take
the witness chair, please? Mr. Specter will conduct the examination.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. KELLEY. Thomas J. Kelley.

Mr. SPECTER. By whom are you employed?

Mr. KELLEY. I am employed by the U.S. Secret Service.

Mr. SPECTER. In what capacity?

Mr. KELLEY. I am an inspector.

Mr. SPECTER. In a general way, of what do your duties consist, Mr.
Kelley?

Mr. KELLEY. As an inspector, I am part of the chief's headquarters
staff. I conduct office inspections of our field and protective
installations, and report on their actions to the chief.

Mr. SPECTER. How long have you been with the Secret Service?

Mr. KELLEY. Twenty-two years.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you participate in the planning of the onsite tests at
Dallas, Tex.?

Mr. KELLEY. I did.

Mr. SPECTER. And did you participate in the making of those tests?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. On what date was the onsite testing made?

Mr. KELLEY. It was a week ago Sunday.

Mr. SPECTER. That would be May 24, 1964?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. What car was used for testing purposes?

Mr. KELLEY. The car that was used was a 1956 specially built Cadillac,
open, a convertible, seven-passenger Cadillac. It has a termination
of 679-X, the Secret Service calls it. It is a car that is used as a
followup car to the President's car when he is in a motorcade.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that car actually in the motorcade on November 22,
1963, in Dallas?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; it was.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any special reason why the car in which the
President rode on November 22 was not used?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; the car in which the President rode has been modified
by a body builder in Cincinnati, the Hess & Eisenhardt Co. of
Cincinnati.

Mr. SPECTER. And do you have a diagram showing the dimensions of the
Secret Service followup car which was used during the onsite tests?

Mr. KELLEY. I have. It was felt that the best simulation of the test
could be presented by having a car that was similar to the car in which
the President was riding, which was also an open Lincoln convertible.

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission, I would like to mark the
diagram of the followup car as Commission Exhibit No. 871 and move its
admission into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 871 for
identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have diagrams showing the dimensions of the
Presidential car?

Mr. KELLEY. I have.

Mr. SPECTER. I would like to have that marked as Commission Exhibit No.
872 and move for its admission into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 872 for
identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Without specifying all of the details, Inspector Kelley,
are the followup car and the Presidential car generally similar in
dimensions?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; they are. There are very few, of course,
seven-passenger convertible cars in existence, and these are
specially--these cars are specially built for us by the Lincoln--the
Ford Motor Co. and the followup car by the General Motors Co.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe what seating arrangements are present
in each of those cars in between the permanent front seat and the
permanent rear seat?

Mr. KELLEY. There are two jump seats that can be opened up for riders
in each of the cars. In the Presidential followup car, these jump seats
are usually occupied by Secret Service agents.

In the President's car, they are occupied by the President's guests.

On the day of the assassination, of course, the jump seats were
occupied by Mrs. Connally and Governor Connally.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Kelley, have you brought with you two photographs
depicting the interior of the President's car?

Mr. KELLEY. I have. These are photographs of the interior of the
President's car which is known to us as 100-X.

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission, I would like to mark one of
these photographs as Commission Exhibit No. 873, and move its admission
into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 873 for
identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. I would like to mark the second photograph as Commission
Exhibit No. 874 and move, also, its admission into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 874 for
identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe briefly what Exhibit No. 873 depicts,
please?

Mr. KELLEY. Exhibit No. 873 is a photograph of the interior of the
rear section of the 100-X, the President's car, showing the seating
arrangement in the car and the jump seats are in an open position.

Mr. McCLOY. As of what time were these photographs taken?

Mr. KELLEY. I am sorry, Commissioner. I don't know just when those
photographs were taken. They were taken some time in the last 2 years.

Mr. SPECTER. As to Exhibits Nos. 873 and 874, do they accurately depict
the condition of the President's car as of November 22, 1963?

Mr. KELLEY. They do, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe briefly what Exhibit No. 874 shows?

Mr. KELLEY. Exhibit No. 874 is another photograph of the car taken from
the rear, and it shows the relative positions of the jump seats in an
open position as they relate to the back seat of the car.

Mr. SPECTER. So that the record may be clear, which Commission number
has been given to the diagram of the President's car?

Mr. KELLEY. The President's car is Exhibit No. 872.

Mr. SPECTER. And the followup car diagram is what?

Mr. KELLEY. Exhibit No. 871.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you know whether these photographs were taken before or
after the assassination?

Mr. KELLEY. Before the assassination.

Mr. DULLES. Did the car that you used for this test--did that car have
the seat lifting capacity that I understand the President's car had?

Mr. KELLEY. No; it did not, sir. I might say that there is in the
Commission's records photographs of the President's car after the
assassination, showing the condition of it after the assassination, at
the garage.

Mr. SPECTER. On the President's car itself, what is the distance on the
right edge of the right jump seat, that is to say from the right edge
of the right jump seat to the door on the right side?

Mr. KELLEY. There is 6 inches of clearance between the jump seat and
the door.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the relative position of the jump seat to the
rear seat on the Presidential automobile?

Mr. KELLEY. There is 8-1/2 inches between the back of the jump seat and
the front of the back seat of the President's car, the rear seat.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the relative height of the jump seat and the
rear seat?

Mr. KELLEY. The jump seat is 3 inches lower than the back seat in its
bottom position. That is, the back seat of the President's car had a
mechanism which would raise it 10-1/2 inches. But at the time of the
assassination, the seat was in its lowest position.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the differential between the jump seats and
the rear seat on the Secret Service followup car?

Mr. KELLEY. The jump seat of the Secret Service car is a little closer
to the right door.

However, the seating arrangement is not exactly the same in these cars,
in that there is a portion of a padding that comes around on the rear
seat.

But relatively, when two persons are seated in this car, one in the
rear seat and one in the jump seat, they are in the same alinement as
they were in the President's car.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question in response to your statement
that the back seat was in its lowest position at the time of the
assassination? How do you know that?

Mr. KELLEY. That is a result of questioning of the people who took the
car, the driver who took the car from the hospital to the plane. This
was one of the drivers of the Presidential car. There was nobody who
touched the car until it got back to the White House garage. It was in
his custody all the time. And he did not move it.

When it was in the White House garage, it was at its lowest point.

Mr. DULLES. And there would be no opportunity to lower it from the time
the President was shot?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir. The President, of course, operates that thing
himself. But when it was examined, at the time it was examined, and it
was in the custody of this man all the time, it had not been touched.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the height of President Kennedy?

Mr. KELLEY. He was 72-1/2 inches.

Mr. SPECTER. And were you present when a man was placed in the same
position in the Secret Service followup car as that in which President
Kennedy sat in the Presidential car when the tests were simulated on
May 24th of this year?

Mr. KELLEY. I was.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you know the name of that individual?

Mr. KELLEY. He was an FBI agent by the name of James W. Anderton.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was the height of Mr. Anderton?

Mr. KELLEY. He was 72-1/2 inches.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you know the height of Governor Connally?

Mr. KELLEY. Governor Connally was 6 foot 4.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that the height of the Governor himself or the
Governor's stand-in?

Mr. KELLEY. It was my understanding that Governor Connally was--6 foot
2, I guess. The Governor's stand-in, Mr. Doyle Williams, was 6 foot 4.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you present when those two individuals were seated in
the Secret Service followup car?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. And what adjustment was made, if any, so that the relative
positions of those two men were the same as the positioning of
President Kennedy and Governor Connally on November 22, 1963?

Mr. KELLEY. The officials at Hess Eisenhardt, who have the original
plans of the President's car, conducted a test to ascertain how high
from the ground a person 72-1/2 inches would be seated in this car
before its modification. And it was ascertained that the person would
be 52.78 inches from the ground--that is, taking into consideration the
flexion of the tires, the flexion of the cushions that were on the car
at the time.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say 52.78 inches, which individual would that be?

Mr. KELLEY. That would be the President.

Mr. SPECTER. And what part of his body?

Mr. KELLEY. The top of the head would be 52.78 inches from the ground.

When Mr. Anderton was placed in the followup car, it was found that the
top of his head was 62 inches from the ground. There was an adjustment
made so that there would be--the stand-in for Governor Connally would
be in relatively the same position, taking into consideration the
3-inch difference in the jump seat and the 2-inch difference in his
height.

Mr. SPECTER. Considering the 3-inch difference in the jump seat--and
I believe it would be an inch and a half difference in height between
President Kennedy and Governor Connally--how much higher, then,
approximately, was President Kennedy sitting than the Governor on
November 22?

Mr. KELLEY. I am not----

Mr. SPECTER. Would the President have been about an inch and half
higher than the Governor on the day of the assassination?

Mr. KELLEY. The day of the assassination, yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And were----

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't the height of these men depend upon the length
of their torso?

Mr. KELLEY. Well,----

The CHAIRMAN. You have some people who are shortwaisted, some people
who are longwaisted. I don't know which either of these men were who
were of the same height. But I know there is a lot of difference in
men. We sometimes see the--a man who looks large sitting down, when he
stands up he is small, because he has a long torso, and vice versa.

Mr. KELLEY. Of course the relative positions are apparent from the
films that were taken at the time of the assassination. It would be, of
course, that judgment--and it would have to be a judgment. But I think
the films indicate there was just about that much difference in their
height when both were seated.

Mr. SPECTER. Inspector Kelley, I hand you a photograph marked as
Commission Exhibit No. 697, which has heretofore been admitted into
evidence, and identified by Governor Connally as depicting the
President and the Governor as they rode in the motorcade on the day of
the assassination, and I ask you if the stand-ins for the President and
the Governor were seated in approximately the same relative positions
on the reconstruction on May 24.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; in my judgment that is very close.

Mr. SPECTER. What marking, if any, was placed on the back of President
Kennedy--the stand-in for President Kennedy?

Mr. KELLEY. There was a chalk mark placed on his coat, in this area
here.

Mr. SPECTER. And what did that chalk mark represent?

Mr. KELLEY. That represented the entry point of the shot which wounded
the President.

Mr. SPECTER. And how was the location for that mark fixed or determined?

Mr. KELLEY. That was fixed from the photographs of a medical drawing
that was made by the physicians and the people at Parkland and an
examination of the coat which the President was wearing at the time.

Mr. SPECTER. As to the drawing, was that not the drawing made by the
autopsy surgeons from Bethesda Naval Hospital?

Mr. KELLEY. Bethesda Naval.

Mr. McCLOY. Not Parkland, as I understand it?

Mr. SPECTER. No, sir; not Parkland, because as the record will show,
the President was not turned over at Parkland.

Mr. KELLEY. I was shown a drawing of--that was prepared by some medical
technicians indicating the point of entry.

Mr. SPECTER. Permit me to show you Commission Exhibit No. 386, which
has heretofore been marked and introduced into evidence, and I ask you
if that is the drawing that you were shown as the basis for the marking
of the wound on the back of the President's neck.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And the record will show, may it please the Commission,
that this was made by the autopsy surgeons at Bethesda.

And was there any marking placed on the back of Governor Connally?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; there was a marking placed on the back of his coat
in the area where the medical testimony had indicated the bullet had
entered Governor Connally.

Mr. SPECTER. And what coat was worn by the stand-in for Governor
Connally?

Mr. KELLEY. It was the coat that Governor Connally was wearing at the
time he was injured.

Mr. SPECTER. And was the chalk circle placed around the hole which
appeared on the back of that coat garment?

Mr. KELLEY. It was.

Mr. SPECTER. Were certain tests made by the Secret Service shortly
after the day of the assassination?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And were those tests reduced to photographs which were
compiled in an album?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; in Commission Document No. 88, we took some
photographs of the scene of the assassination on December 5, 1963, from
the window of the Texas Book Depository, and from the street.

Mr. SPECTER. The number which you refer to bears Commission No. 88,
which is an index number which was given for internal Commission
document filing, but it has not been marked as a Commission exhibit.

I would now like to mark it Commission Exhibit No. 875 and move for its
admission into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 875 for
identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Does a photograph in that group show the condition of the
foliage of the trees in the vicinity where the assassination occurred?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And is there----

Mr. DULLES. One question. This photograph was taken, though, several
weeks later, wasn't it?

Mr. KELLEY. On December 5.

Mr. DULLES. That was 2 weeks later.

Mr. KELLEY. Two weeks later; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. So the foliage would presumably be somewhat less in that
picture, would it not, than it was on November 22?

Mr. KELLEY. No; actually, the foliage hadn't changed very much even in
the latest tests we are making.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an evergreen?

Mr. KELLEY. It was an oak tree, Mr. Chief Justice, I have been told the
foliage doesn't change much during the year. They call it pine oak.
Some people call it a life oak. But the people down there I talked to
said it was called a pine oak.

Mr. SPECTER. And did you observe the foliage on the tree on May 24?

Mr. KELLEY. I did, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. And would you state the relative condition of that
foliage, as contrasted with the photographs you have before you taken
on December 5?

Mr. KELLEY. It was very similar, practically the same.

Mr. SPECTER. And the description which you have just given applies to
a large oak tree which intervened between a point on the sixth floor
of the Texas School Book Depository Building and any automobile which
would have been driven down the center lane of Elm Street in a westerly
direction?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, the purpose of having Inspector Kelley
testify was just to set the scene. That completes our questioning of
him.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Thank you, Inspector Kelley.

Mr. SPECTER. The next witness will be Inspector Gauthier.


TESTIMONY OF LEO J. GAUTHIER

Mr. SPECTER. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Leo J. Gauthier.

Mr. SPECTER. And by whom are you employed, sir?

Mr. GAUTHIER. The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is your rank with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Inspector. I am in charge of the Bureau's exhibit
section, where we prepare investigative aids, consisting of diagrams,
charts, maps, three-dimensional exhibits, in connection with the
presentation of cases in court.

Mr. SPECTER. How long have you been employed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Twenty-nine years.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have occasion to reconstruct certain models to
scale in connection with the investigation on the assassination of
President Kennedy?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. And what model reproduction, if any, did you make of the
scene of the assassination itself?

Mr. GAUTHIER. The data, concerning the scene of the assassination,
was developed by the Bureau's Exhibits Section, including myself, at
the site on December 2, 3, and 4, of 1963. From this data we built
a three-dimensional exhibit, one-quarter of an inch to the foot. It
contained the pertinent details of the site, including street lights,
catch basin, concrete structures in the area, including buildings,
grades, scale models of the cars that comprised the motorcade,
consisting of the police lead car, the Presidential car, the followup
car, the Lincoln open car that the Vice President was riding in, and
the followup car behind the Vice-Presidential car.

Mr. SPECTER. On the model of the scene itself, Mr. Gauthier, did you
reproduce a portion of the scene which is depicted in Commission
Exhibit No. 876?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. Handing you that Commission Exhibit No. 876, I will ask
you to describe what it represents in toto.

Mr. GAUTHIER. This is an aerial view of the site known as Dealey Plaza,
in Dallas, Tex.

It indicates the large buildings that surround this area. They are
numbered 1 through 11. It indicates the main streets--Commerce, Main,
and Elm Streets, and the roadways through the plaza, including the
triple underpass.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a document which has been marked as
Commission Exhibit No. 877 and ask you if that document was obtained by
you in connection with the survey for the model which you prepared.

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes; this is a description of Dealey Plaza stating the
historical background and the physical description.

Mr. SPECTER. I move at this time for the admission into evidence of
Commission Exhibits Nos. 876 and 877.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked Commission Exhibits Nos. 876 and
877 for identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Inspector, I now hand you two photographs marked as
Commission Exhibits Nos. 878 and 879 and ask you to state what those
depict.

(The documents referred to were marked Commission Exhibits Nos. 878 and
879 for identification.)

Mr. GAUTHIER. Commission Exhibit No. 878 is a view of the scale model
looking toward the northeast with the Texas School Book Depository
Building in the background, together with the Daltex Building, and a
portion of the Dallas County Courthouse. It includes the pergola to the
left, and the pericycle structure on the right with the reflecting pool
in the immediate background.

It also shows the roadway through the plaza, which is an extension of
Elm Street, upon which appears miniature scale models of the vehicles
in the motorcade.

Mr. DULLES. What motorcade is this?

Mr. GAUTHIER. We are depicting the Presidential motorcade at the time
of the assassination, the motorcade that passed that area.

Mr. DULLES. And this was done on what day?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Our data to build this were compiled on December 2, 3,
and 4. It took about 5 weeks to prepare this exhibit in Washington.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you now describe what is shown on the photograph?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Commission Exhibit No. 879 is a view of the scale model
looking toward the southwest, in the direction of the Triple Underpass,
from a position on the sixth floor in the southeast corner window.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you two additional photographs marked as
Commission Exhibits Nos. 880 and 881, and ask you to state what they
represent.

(The documents referred to were marked Commission Exhibits Nos. 880 and
881 for identification.)

Mr. GAUTHIER. Commission Exhibit No. 880 is a scale dimension view of
the sixth floor looking toward the southeast corner of the Texas School
Book Depository Building.

Mr. SPECTER. And in the corner of that photograph is the area depicted
which has been described as the possible site of the rifleman?

Mr. GAUTHIER. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you now describe what Exhibit No. 881 shows?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Commission Exhibit No. 881 is a three-dimensional view of
leading down from Main Street and Commerce Street. Positioned on the
ramps are scale models of an armored van and two police squad cars.
There are also miniature mockups of individuals--representing position
of people in this area of the basement garage.

Mr. SPECTER. And what event is depicted in that model, if any?

Mr. GAUTHIER. This represents the arrangement, physical arrangement, in
the basement at the time Lee Harvey Oswald walked out from the elevator
through the jail office onto the basement ramp.

Mr. SPECTER. And where have these models been maintained since the time
they were prepared by the FBI?

Mr. GAUTHIER. The models were delivered to the Commission's building
and installed in the exhibits room on the first floor, on January 20,
1964.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, I now move for the admission into
evidence of the photographs 878, 879, 880, and 881.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted.

(The documents heretofore marked for identification as Commission
Exhibits Nos. 878, 879, 880, and 881, were received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Did you participate in the onsite tests made in Dallas?

Mr. GAUTHIER. I did.

Mr. SPECTER. Was a survey made of the scene used to record some of the
results of that onsite testing?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And by whom was the survey made?

Mr. GAUTHIER. The survey was made on May 24, 1964, by Robert H. West,
county surveyor, a licensed State land surveyor, located at 160 County
Courthouse, Dallas, Tex.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you brought the tracing of that survey with you today?

Mr. GAUTHIER. I have; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And have you brought a cardboard reproduction of that?

Mr. GAUTHIER. A copy made from the tracing; yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you produce the cardboard copy made from the tracing
for the inspection of the Commission at this time, please?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you produce the tracing at this time, please?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes; the tracing is wrapped, and sealed in this container.

Mr. SPECTER. Without breaking the seal, I will ask you if the cardboard
which has been set up here--may the record show it is a large
cardboard. I will ask you for the dimensions in just a minute.

Does the printing on the cardboard represent an exact duplication of
the tracing which you have in your hand?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission, we will mark the tracing
Commission Exhibit No. 882, and not take it out, since the cardboard
represents it, and place Commission Exhibit No. 883 on the cardboard
drawing itself, and I would like to move for the admission into
evidence of both Exhibits Nos. 882 and 883.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted.

(The documents referred to were marked Commission Exhibits Nos. 882 and
883 for identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. Will you now describe what Exhibit No. 883 is, Inspector
Gauthier, indicating, first of all, the approximate size of the
cardboard?

Mr. GAUTHIER. This is a copy of the tracing measuring 40 inches in
width, 72 inches in length. It is made to a scale of 1 inch equals 10
feet.

From the data compiled on that day by the surveyor, this tracing was
prepared.

The area is bounded on the north by the Texas School Book Depository
Building, and on further here by railroad property.

Mr. SPECTER. Indicating a general westerly direction from the School
Book Depository Building?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes; I am pointing towards the west.

On the east it is bounded by Houston Street.

On the south by Main, which is a roadway going through Dealey Plaza.

And on the west by the triple underpass.

Located on this plat map are street lights accurately located, a
catch basin, certain trees, location of trees, the delineation of the
concrete pergola, which you see here on the photograph, the outer
boundaries of the pericycle, and the reflecting pool--locating exactly
the window in the Texas School Book Depository Building, in the
southeast corner, and also a tabulation of the measurements and angles
that the surveyor has compiled from certain positions identified for
him on the street by an observation from this window, an observation
from the position of Mr. Zapruder----

Mr. SPECTER. When you say this window, which window did you mean?

Mr. GAUTHIER. The window on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book
Depository Building, the one in the southeast corner, the farthest
window.

Mr. SPECTER. And when you identify the Zapruder position, what did you
mean by that?

Mr. GAUTHIER. This is a concrete abutment of the pergola, located in
the area upon which Zapruder was standing at the time the movies were
made.

(At this point, Senator Cooper entered the hearing room.)

(At this point, Representative Ford withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other positions noted on the diagram that
you have been describing showing where other movies were made?

Mr. GAUTHIER. Yes.

(At this point, Chief Justice Warren withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. GAUTHIER. We also locate the position of Mr. Nix, who also made
movies of the motorcade at certain points on the roadway.

Mr. SPECTER. On what street was Mr. Nix standing?

Mr. GAUTHIER. I am pointing now to the south side of Main Street,
approximately in front of the concrete pylon of the south pericycle
structure. That is a short distance from the intersection of Main and
Houston.

Mr. SPECTER. A short distance west of the intersection?

Mr. GAUTHIER. West.

Mr. SPECTER. And what other position is shown of the situs of a movie
photographer?

Mr. GAUTHIER. We have another position here by Mrs. Mary Muchmore, who
made movies of the motorcade movement along the Elm Street roadway on
November 22, 1963.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a schedule which I have marked as
Commission Exhibit No. 884 and ask you what figures are contained
thereon.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 884 for
identification.)

Mr. GAUTHIER. This is a copy of a tabulation which appears on the
plat map. It contains certain positions marked as frame numbers. It
indicates elevations and a column dealing with angle of sight from the
frame positions to the window and to a horizontal line.

It also contains angels of sight the degree of sight and distances from
these positions to a point on the top of the bridge, handrail height.

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission, that concludes the
description of the general setting.

I would like to move now at this time for the admission into evidence
of Exhibit No. 884, which completes all of the exhibits used heretofore.

Mr. McCLOY. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission
Exhibit No. 884, was received in evidence.)

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission, that completes the testimony
of Inspector Gauthier.

I would like to call Mr. Shaneyfelt.

Mr. McCLOY. Mr Shaneyfelt?


TESTIMONY OF LYNDAL L. SHANEYFELT

Mr. SPECTER. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt.

Mr. SPECTER. By whom are you employed?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I am employed as a special agent of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.

Mr. SPECTER. And how long have you been so employed?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Fourteen years.

Mr. SPECTER. What are your duties, in a general way?

Mr SHANEYFELT. I am assigned to the FBI Laboratory, as a document
examiner, and photographic expert.

Mr. SPECTER. During the course of those duties, have you had occasion
to make an analysis of certain movies which purport to have been taken
of the assassination?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. What movies have you examined?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I have examined a roll of 8-mm. motion pictures made by
Mr. Abraham Zapruder of Dallas, Tex., that he took on November 22, of
the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. SPECTER. Can you outline in a general way how the movies taken by
Mr. Zapruder came into your possession?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; Mr. Zapruder, on realizing what he had in his
photographs, took them immediately to a local Dallas processing plant,
had them processed, and had three copies made. He turned two copies of
those movies over to representatives of the Secret Service.

The original and other copy he sold to Life magazine.

The FBI was given one of the copies by the Secret Service. The Secret
Service loaned a copy to us long enough for us to make a copy for our
use, which we did, and this copy is the one that I have been examining.

Mr. SPECTER. At any time in the course of the examination of the
Zapruder film, was the original of that movie obtained?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; it was. On February 25, Mr. Herbert Orth, who
is the assistant chief of the Life magazine photographic laboratory,
provided the original of the Zapruder film for review by the Commission
representatives and representatives of the FBI and Secret Service here
in the Commission building.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was the reason for his making that original
available?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Life magazine was reluctant to release the original
because of the value. So he brought it down personally and projected
it for us and allowed us to run through it several times, studying the
original.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that because the copies were not distinct on certain
important particulars?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. The original had considerably more
detail and more there to study than any of the copies, since in the
photographic process each time you copy you lose some detail.

Mr. SPECTER. And subsequently, were slides made from the original of
the Zapruder film?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes. Since it was not practical to stop the projector
when using the original of the Zapruder film, because of the
possibility of damage to the film, Mr. Orth volunteered to prepare
35-mm. color slides directly from the original movie of all of the
pertinent frames of the assassination which were determined to be
frames 171 through 434.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you outline what you mean by frames, please?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes. In motion picture films, the actual motion
picture film consists of consecutive pictures that are made in rapid
succession, each one being a separate exposure. And as the camera runs,
it films these, and they are projected fast enough on the screen when
you do not have the sensation of them being individual pictures, but
you have the sensation of seeing the movement--even though they are
individual little pictures on the film. So each one of those little
pictures on the film is called a frame.

Mr. SPECTER. And how did you number the frames?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I numbered the frames on the Zapruder film beginning
with No. 1 at the assassination portion of his film.

He did have on his film some photographs of a personal nature that we
disregarded, and started at the first frame of his motion picture that
was made there on Elm Street of the assassination.

Mr. SPECTER. And what was happening at the time of frame 1?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. At the time of frame 1, the police motorcycle lead
portion of the parade is in view, and that goes for several frames.
Then he stopped his camera, feeling that it might be some time before
the Presidential car came into view. Then when the Presidential car
rounded the corner and came into view, he started his camera again, and
kept it running throughout the route down Elm Street until the car went
out of sight on his right.

Mr. SPECTER. What other movies have been examined by you in the course
of this analysis?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. An amateur 8-mm. motion picture film made by a Mr.
Orville Nix of Dallas, Tex., has been examined. Mr. Nix was standing on
the corner of Houston and Main Streets, photographing the motorcade as
it came down Main Street and turned right into Houston Street.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you explain briefly how you ascertained the location
of Mr. Nix when he took those movies?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes. At the time Mr. Nix took his movies of the
motorcade coming down Main Street, he was standing on the corner, and
photographed them turning the corner and going down Houston Street.

Mr. SPECTER. You are now indicating the southwest corner of Houston and
Main?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; southwest corner. After he heard the shots, he
hurried down along the curb of Main Street, but did not remember
exactly where he was standing. On the basis of his motion pictures, we
were able to analyze the pictures using his camera, and on the 23d of
May of this year, during the survey, preparatory to the reenactment,
we reestablished this point by viewing pictures taken from his motion
picture camera, at varying angles across here, in order to reestablish
the point where he was standing, based on the relationship of this
street light to other items in the background of the photograph.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say this point, you mean the point of the Nix
position?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And when you say this street light, you are referring to a
street lamp on the opposite side of Main Street?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you outline in a general way how you obtained the
copy of the Nix film?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

The Nix film was obtained as a result of a notice that the FBI gave to
processing plants in the Dallas area, that the FBI would be interested
in obtaining or knowing about any film they processed, that had
anything on it, relating to the assassination.

And, as a result of this, we learned of the Nix film and arranged to
obtain a copy of it.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you analyze any other film in connection with this
inquiry?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes. I analyzed a film that was 8-mm. motion picture
film taken by Mrs. Mary Muchmore of Dallas, Tex.

Mr. SPECTER. How did you obtain a copy of that film?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Our first knowledge of this came as a result of a
review of the book "Four Days" which covers the assassination period,
in which representatives of the FBI noted a colored picture taken from
a motion picture film that did not match either the Nix film or the
Zapruder film.

Once we established that, then we investigated and learned that it was
made by Mrs. Mary Muchmore, and was at that time in the possession of
United Press International in New York, and made arrangements for them
to furnish us with a copy of the Muchmore film. That is the copy that I
used for examination.

Mr. SPECTER. Where was Mrs. Muchmore standing at the time she took
those movies?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Mrs. Muchmore was standing along Houston Street,
close to the corner of Main, on the west side of Houston Street, and
photographed the motorcade as it came down Main, turned into Houston,
and proceeded down Houston. She says that when she heard the shots, she
panicked, and did not take any further pictures. But a review of her
film shows pictures of the assassination route, the motorcade going
down Elm Street, beginning just before the shot that hit the President
in the head, and continuing a short period after that.

Since she did not remember taking the pictures, we then, in the same
manner we established Mr. Nix's position, by checking the photograph in
relation to objects in the background, established her position along
this structure that is marked on the map and found that she had come
from the curb over to this point----

Mr. SPECTER. Indicating a position on Exhibit No. 883 marked "Muchmore
Position."

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

And this we established as her position when she photographed a portion
of the assassination--motorcade.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you elaborate just a bit more on how you ascertained
that position from fixed points in the background of the movie?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; we took a frame of the motion picture that is
close to the beginning and a picture that is close to the end, and made
a still photograph of those. We then establish a position and try to
line up the relationship of objects close to where we are standing with
objects in the background, so that they are in relation to each other
as they are in the picture.

Then we take the other picture from farther along the motion picture
film, and do the same thing, and where those two lines intersect is
where she had to be standing.

Mr. SPECTER. You draw two straight lines through two objects that you
line up on each of those pictures, and the intersection point of those
two lines is the calculated position of the camera.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And was that same system used to ascertain the position of
Mr. Nix?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And how did you ascertain the position of Mr. Zapruder?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Mr. Zapruder's position was known, as he was on the top
of the abutment along Elm Street--he stated that he was standing on the
abutment. And there is relatively no room to move around there, other
than to stand there. It is about 2 feet wide by 3 to 4 feet deep.

(At this point, Representative Ford entered the hearing room.)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. And aside from that, we checked that position against
his photographs and determined that that was in fact correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the position of Mr. Zapruder confirmed through the use
of any other film?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; in Mr. Nix's motion picture films you can see Mr.
Zapruder standing on the abutment.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a question there?

After you had made those calculations to establish the position of
Mrs. Muchmore and Mr. Nix and Mr. Zapruder, did you then identify
those positions to the three and ask them whether or not it
corresponded--your findings corresponded with their recollection as to
where they were standing?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We did not do that; no. Mr. Nix, I might say, did state
that he went down along this side--the south side of Main Street, along
the curb, and it generally conforms to where he stated he went, but he
could not place the exact position. We did, by this study.

Senator COOPER. Mr. Zapruder's position was established by another
photograph?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. Do I understand you correctly that Mrs. Muchmore didn't
realize she had taken the later pictures that appear?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. According to her statement, she said after hearing the
shots, she panicked, and didn't take any more pictures.

Mr. DULLES. You think she did?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On the film there are pictures.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the position of Mrs. Muchmore and Mr. Nix ascertained
through a geometric calculation, lining up various points as you have
just described?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Well, it is actually a geometric calculation, although
no strings were drawn or no lines were drawn. It is a matter of
standing in a position out there with Mr. Nix's camera, and viewing the
two different photographs we had selected, until we arrived at a point
that matched.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there reasonable mathematical certainty in that
alinement, within the limits of your observations of their pictures?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Did Mr. Zapruder himself point out his location on the
abutment as depicted on Exhibit No. 883?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, how many occasions were you a participant in an
analysis of these various films which you have just described?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Seven.

Mr. SPECTER. And when was the first time that you were a participant in
such an analysis?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On January 27, 1964.

Mr. SPECTER. And who else has been with you at the time you analyzed
those films--just stating in in a general way without identifying each
person present on each of the occasions?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On most occasions, Mr. Gauthier of the FBI was present,
I was present, Mr. Malley of the FBI was present. Inspector Kelley from
Secret Service, and Mr. John Howlett from Secret Service.

Representatives of the Commission were always present--normally Mr.
Redlich, Mr. Specter, or Mr. Eisenberg were present.

On several occasions Mr. Ball and Mr. Belin were present. Mr. Rankin
was present on some occasions.

I believe Mr. McCloy was present on one occasion.

Various representatives of the Commission were present.

Mr. SPECTER. And how long did those analysis sessions ordinarily last?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. They would normally last most of the day, about all
day.

Mr. SPECTER. And what would be done during the course of those
analytical sessions?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. In each case we would take the film and run it through
regular speed, slow motion, we would stop it on individual frames and
study it frame by frame, trying to see in the photographs anything that
would give any indication of a shot hitting its mark, a reaction of the
President, a reaction of Mr. Connally or Mrs. Connally, reaction of the
Secret Service agents, reaction of people in the crowd, relating it to
all the facts that we felt were important.

When we obtained the slides from Life magazine, we went through those
very thoroughly, because they gave so much more detail and were so
much clearer and analyzed again all these things about the reaction
of the President and Mr. Connally, trying to ascertain where he was
reacting--whether either one was reacting to being hit.

Of course the only shot that is readily apparent in any of the films,
and it appears in the Zapruder, the Nix, and the Muchmore films, is the
shot that hit the President in the head.

Mr. SPECTER. Why do you say that is readily apparent?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Because on the film there is practically an explosion
of his head and this is obviously the shot that hit the President in
the head. It is very apparent from the photograph.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, were any others present at any time, such as
witnesses who appeared before the Commission, during the analysis
sessions on these films and slides?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

On April 14, representatives of the Commission, FBI, and doctors--Dr.
Hume of the Navy, who is at Bethesda, Commander Boswell from the U.S.
Navy Medical School at Bethesda, Colonel Finck, Chief of the Wound
Ballistics Pathology of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

Mr. SPECTER. Are those the autopsy surgeons?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; that is my understanding. Dr. Olivier, from
Edgewood Arsenal, Dr. Light, from Edgewood Arsenal, were present also
with Dr. Humes and the others, on April 14.

Mr. SPECTER. Did any individuals who were present at the motorcade
itself ever have an opportunity to view the films and slides?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; on April 21, films were again viewed by
representatives of the Commission and the FBI, and at that time Drs.
Gregory and Shaw, from Parkland Hospital in Dallas, were available,
Drs. Light and Olivier, and a Dr. Dolce, and Governor and Mrs. Connally
were present.

And at all of the viewings, they were again reviewed frame by frame,
studied by the doctors to tie it in with their findings, studied by the
Parkland doctors, and studied by the Connallys, to try to tie in where
the shots occurred along the film.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you an album which has been marked as
Commission Exhibit No. 885.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 885 for
identification.)

Mr. SPECTER. I ask you to state what that album depicts.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is an album that I prepared of black and white
photographs made of the majority of the frames in the Zapruder film----

Mr. SPECTER. Starting with what frame number?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Starting with frame 171, going through frame 334.

Mr. SPECTER. And why did you start with frame 171?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is the frame that the slides start from. This was
an arbitrary frame number that was decided on as being far enough back
to include the area that we wanted to study.

Mr. SPECTER. Is that a frame where President Kennedy comes into full
view after the motorcade turns left off of Houston onto Elm Street?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes, yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And how was the ending point of that frame sequence, being
No. 334, fixed?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It was fixed as several frames past the shot that hit
the President in the head. Frame 313 is the frame showing the shot to
the President's head, and it ends at 334.

Mr. SPECTER. Are there any other photographs in that album in addition
to the Zapruder frames?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there are. There are six photographs selected
at random from the Nix film, including frame 24, which is a frame
depicting the shot to the head of the President, and there are three
photographs picked at random from the Muchmore film, including frame
42, which is the frame depicting the head shot. These are the pictures
that were used in establishing the location of the Nix and Muchmore
cameras on location in Dallas. Frame 10, which is the first one of the
Nix series, is the one showing Mr. Zapruder standing on the projection.

Mr. SPECTER. And where was the viewing of the films and slides
undertaken?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. They have been viewed here at the Commission--all those
in addition to the ones I have made personally in the FBI Laboratory.

Mr. SPECTER. And was that down on the first floor of the VFW Building
here?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And was there any model available adjacent to the area
where the films were shown, for use in re-creating or reconstructing
the assassination events?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; the model was available and used.

Mr. SPECTER. Is that the model which has been described earlier this
afternoon by Inspector Gauthier?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you present on May 24 in Dallas, Tex.?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And what, if anything, was done at the site of the
assassination on that date?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On May 24, 1964, representatives of the Commission,
Secret Service, and FBI reenacted the assassination, relocated specific
locations of the car on the street based on the motion pictures, and in
general staged a reenactment.

Mr. SPECTER. Who was present at that time representing the Commission?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The Commission was represented by Mr. Rankin, Mr.
Specter, and Mr. Redlich.

Mr. SPECTER. And who was present at that time from the FBI?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I was present, Inspector Gauthier was present,
Inspector J. R. Malley was present, Special Agent R. A. Frazier was
present, with some aids, assistants.

Mr. SPECTER. Other aids from the FBI were also present?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; in addition, there were several agents from the
Dallas office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who assisted.

Mr. SPECTER. And were there representatives of the Secret Service
participating in that onsite testing?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there were. Inspector Kelley was present, Agent
John Howlett was present, the driver of the car, or the Secret Service
agent whose name I do not recall----

Mr. SPECTER. George Hickey?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And at what time did the onsite test start?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. They started at 6 o'clock Sunday morning.

Mr. SPECTER. Why was that time selected?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The time was selected because of the traffic in the
area. The Dallas Police Department recommended that that would be the
most logical time to do it, causing the least problem with traffic.

Mr. SPECTER. At what time did the onsite tests conclude?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. They concluded about 1 o'clock, 12:45 to 1 o'clock.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any subsequent testing done in Dallas on that
day?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there was.

Mr. SPECTER. And where was that testing undertaken?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. There was some testing done in a railway express agency
garage nearby the assassination site.

Mr. SPECTER. At what time did that start?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That started at 3 p.m., and lasted until 5:30 p.m.

Mr. SPECTER. Where were the various individuals positioned who
participated in these onsite tests at the outset, at, say, 6 a.m., on
the 24th of May?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. At the very beginning, at 6 a.m., Mr. Rankin and
Mr. Specter were in the sixth floor window of the Texas School Book
Depository Building, which is the southeast corner of the building,
sixth floor window, which was referred to as our control point, and
where we had the master radio control for the other units.

Mr. Redlich was on the street with the car. At the car on the street
were the occupants of the car, the Secret Service driver, Mr. Hickey,
an agent from the FBI, who handled radio contact with control, Agents
Anderton and Williams in the President's and Connally's seats, Mr.
Gauthier and his aids, a surveyor, and I, were all on the ground in the
vicinity of the car.

Agent Frazier was in the window of the Book Building at the control
point with the rifle that was found at the window following the
assassination.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, was that rifle found at the window or in another
location on the sixth floor?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. In another location on the sixth floor.

Mr. SPECTER. And that is the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle which was
heretofore identified as Commission Exhibit No. 139?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And where were you positioned on most of the occasions at
the time of the onsite tests?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. For the first portion of them, I was at the car in the
street, and at the position of Mr. Zapruder, the position from which he
took his pictures.

Mr. SPECTER. What communications were available, if any, among the
participants at the various locations heretofore described?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We had radio contact between all points.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the starting position of the car at the most
easterly position on Elm Street, immediately after turning off Houston
Street?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The first position we established that morning was
frame 161.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there not a position established prior in sequence to
frame 161, specifically that designated as position A?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That was actually established later. But the first one
to be actually located was 161. And we went back later and positioned
point A.

Mr. SPECTER. Well, let's start with the position which is the most
easterly point on Elm Street, which I believe would be position A,
would it not?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you a photographic exhibit depicting that position?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; in each of the positions that we established,
we used, insofar as possible, the Zapruder pictures to establish the
position, or we established it from the window, and made photographs
from the position Mr. Zapruder was standing in.

Mr. SPECTER. This chart has been marked as Commission Exhibit No. 886.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 886 for
identification.)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This shows the photograph that was made from the point
where Zapruder was standing looking toward the car, and is a point that
we have designated as position A because it is in a position that did
not appear on the Zapruder film.

The Zapruder film does not start until the car gets farther down Elm
Street.

Mr. SPECTER. What is that exhibit number?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Exhibit No. 886.

Mr. SPECTER. And why was that location selected for the position of the
car?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This location was selected as the first point at which
a person in the sixth floor window of the Book Building at our control
point could have gotten a shot at the President after the car had
rounded the corner from Houston to Elm.

Mr. SPECTER. And what position is station C?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Station C is on a line drawn along the west curb line
of Houston Street in a direct line, and station C is at a point along
that line that is in line with where the car would have turned coming
around that corner. It is on a line which is an extension of the west
curb line of Houston Street.

Mr. DULLES. Where is position A on that chart?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Position A is here.

Mr. McCLOY. That is before you get to the tree?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; he isn't under the tree yet.

Mr. SPECTER. And what occupant, if any, in the car is position A
sighted on for measuring purposes?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. All of the photographs made through the rifle sight
that are shown on the exhibit in the lower left-hand corner were
sighted on the spot that was simulating the spot where the President
was wounded in the neck. The chalk mark is on the back of the coat.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say that position A is the first position at
which President Kennedy was in view of the marksman from the southeast
window on the sixth floor of the School Book Depository Building, you
mean by that the first position where the marksman saw the rear of the
President's stand-in?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. So that would be the first position where the marksman
could focus in on the circled point where the point of entry on the
President was marked?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Could the marksman then have taken a shot at the President
at any prior position and have struck him with the point of entry on
that spot, on the base of the President's neck?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I don't quite understand the question.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any prior position, that is a position before
position A, where the marksman from the sixth floor could have fired
the weapon and have struck the President at the known point of entry at
the base of the back of his neck?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; because as the car moves back, you lose sight of
the chalk mark on the back of his coat.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the distance between that point on the
President and station C?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is 44 feet from station C--91.6 feet to the rifle
in the window from the actual chalk mark on the coat. All measurements
were made to the chalk mark on the coat.

Mr. SPECTER. On the coat of the President?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. The President's stand-in?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Right. The angle to the rifle in the window was 40°10´.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the other data?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The distance to the overpass was 447 feet, and
the angle to the overpass was minus O°27´; that is, 27´ below the
horizontal.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a question there? How did you establish the
location of the rifle in making those calculations?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The location of the rifle was established on the basis
of other testimony and information furnished to us by the Commission,
photographs taken by the Dallas Police Department immediately after the
assassination, and the known opening of the window.

It was an estimation of where the rifle most likely was based on the
knowledge that the Commission has through testimony.

Mr. SPECTER. Senator Cooper, Mr. Frazier is present and has been sworn,
and he is going to identify that. He could do it at this time, to
pinpoint that issue.

Senator COOPER. I think we can just make a note of that, and go ahead
with this witness.

Mr. SPECTER. Fine. We will proceed then with this witness and Mr.
Frazier will testify in due course.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I might say that this position was determined by Mr.
Frazier in the window. We moved the car around until he told us from
the window, viewing through the rifle, the point where he wanted the
car to stop. And he was the one in the window that told us where the
point A was. Once we established that, we then photographed it.

Mr. DULLES. Could he see the mark on the back of the coat from the
window?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; through the rifle scope, he could see the mark.

Mr. SPECTER. Does the picture designated "photograph through rifle
scope" depict the actual view of the rifleman through the actual
Mannlicher-Carcano weapon?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. At point A.

Senator COOPER. When Mr. Frazier testifies, then, will he correlate
this photograph with a frame from photographs taken of the actual
motorcade at the time of the assassination?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; we cannot correlate this with a frame from the
motion picture because Mr. Zapruder didn't start taking pictures until
the car had passed this point.

So we, therefore, on this frame and for the next two or three points,
have no picture from Mr. Zapruder, since he wasn't taking pictures at
that time.

Mr. DULLES. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Back on the record.

Do I understand that you are not suggesting that a shot was necessarily
fired at this point A, but this was the first point where this
particular vision of the President's back could have been obtained?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. It is only an arbitrary point showing
the first possible shot that could have entered the President's coat at
this chalk mark.

Representative FORD. What criteria did you use for determining that you
could see the chalk mark? Was the criteria a part or the whole of the
chalk mark?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The actual manner in which it was set up--let me see if
this answers your question. As we moved the car around, Mr. Frazier was
in the window looking through the actual scope of the rifle, and could
see very clearly the President or the man taking the President's place,
as the car moved around.

And the instant that he could first see that chalk mark is the point
where he radioed to us to stop the car, and is the first point at which
a shot could be fired that would go in where the chalk mark is located.

Mr. DULLES. And that is point A?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is point A. Does that answer your question?

Representative FORD. I think it does. Is that picture in the lower
left-hand corner of Exhibit No. 886 an actual photograph taken through
the sight of the weapon that was allegedly used in the assassination?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Representative FORD. And the chalk mark we see there is through that
sight?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. And that is exactly what an individual
looking through the sight would see.

Mr. SPECTER. Then at point A, could the rifleman see the entire back
of the President's stand-in as well as the specific chalk mark, as
depicted on the exhibit?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. He could see only a portion of the back.

Mr. SPECTER. And the portion, which he could not see, is that which is
below the seat level?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. You didn't say the President's stand-in, did you?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes; stand-in.

Mr. Shaneyfelt, for purposes of illustration would you produce the
photograph at this time showing the mounting of the motion picture
camera on the weapon found on the sixth floor?

I now hand you a photograph which is being marked as Commission Exhibit
No. 887 and ask you to state for the record who that is a picture of,
and what else is in the photograph.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 887 for
identification.)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Commission Exhibit No. 887 is a picture of me that was
taken on May 24, 1964. My location was at the sixth floor window of the
Texas School Book Depository that we have designated as our control
point. I have the rifle that is the assassination rifle mounted on a
tripod, and on the rifle is mounted an Arriflex 16-mm. motion picture
camera, that is alined to take photographs through the telescopic sight.

This Arriflex motion picture camera is commonly known as a reflex
camera in that as you view through the viewfinder a prism allows
you to view directly through the lens system as you are taking your
photographs so that as I took the photographs looking into the
viewfinder I was also looking through the scope and seeing the actual
image that was being recorded on the film.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the view recorded on the film as shown on Exhibit No.
886 the actual view which would have been seen had you been looking
through the telescopic sight of the Mannlicher-Carcano itself?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. How did you determine the level and angle at which to hold
the rifle?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I placed the rifle in the approximate position based
on prior knowledge of where the boxes were stacked and the elevation
of the window and other information that was furnished to me by
representatives of the Commission.

Mr. DULLES. You used the same boxes, did you, that the assassin had
used?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; I did not.

Mr. SPECTER. Were those boxes used by Mr. Frazier.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. They were used by Mr. Frazier and used in making the
measurements. I had to use a tripod because of the weight of the camera
and placed the elevation of the rifle at an approximate height in a
position as though the boxes were there.

Mr. SPECTER. Was Mr. Frazier present at the time you positioned the
rifle on the tripod?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; he was.

Mr. SPECTER. Did he assist in describing for you or did you have
an opportunity to observe the way he held a rifle to ascertain the
approximate position of the rifle at that time?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. May it please the Commission, we will, with Mr.
Frazier, indicate, the reasons he held the rifle in the way he did
to approximate the way we believe it was held at the time of the
assassination.

What is the next position which has been depicted on one of your
exhibits, please.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The next position that we established during the
reenactment is frame 161 of the Zapruder motion picture film.

Mr. SPECTER. Permit me to mark that if you would as Commission Exhibit
No. 888.

(Commission Exhibit No. 888 was marked for identification.)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This position which has been designated by us as frame
161 and as Commission Exhibit No. 888, was established as the last
position that the car could be in where the rifleman in the window
could get a clear shot of the President in the car before the car went
under the covering of the tree.

Mr. SPECTER. How was that position located, from the ground or from the
sixth floor?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This was positioned by Mr. Frazier in the sixth floor
window. In addition we knew from the Zapruder photographs the relative
position of the car in the street as related to the curb and the
guidelines or the lane lines.

Following those lane lines we then moved the car down to a point where
Mr. Frazier radioed to us that it was the last point at which he could
get a clear shot and we stopped the car there.

Mr. SPECTER. How did you then select the appropriate frame from the
Zapruder film?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. After Mr. Frazier had stationed the car at this
point, I then went to the position of Mr. Zapruder. Based on his
motion pictures, a comparison of the photograph that we made with the
photograph from the film, I was able to state that because of the
relative position of the car in the street and in relation to other
objects in the background, it corresponded to frame 161 of the motion
picture.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have on Exhibit No. 888 a reproduction of frame 161?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; the upper left-hand corner is a reproduction of
the frame 161 of the Zapruder motion picture. The picture on the upper
right is a photograph that I made with a speed graphic camera from
Zapruder's position of the car reestablished in that location. The
photograph in the lower left-hand corner, is a photograph of the view
through the rifle scope that Mr. Frazier saw at the time he positioned
the car there. This is the view that you would obtain from looking
through the rifle scope from the sixth floor window.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the automobile in exactly the same position at the
time of the taking of the "photograph through rifle scope" and the
"photograph from reenactment"?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; approximately the same. We went through all
stations with Mr. Frazier in the window and I took photographs from Mr.
Zapruder's position, and once establishing a frame position, we marked
it clearly in the street. After we had taken all of the photographs
from Zapruder's position, we then took the car back, and went to the
sixth floor window and mounted the motion picture camera on the rifle.
These photographs were made by rolling the car in the same position
based on the marks we had in the street so it was as accurate as could
be done in the same position.

Mr. DULLES. There is no one sitting in that right-hand corner of the
rear seat, is there in that picture?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; the person taking President Kennedy's place is
sitting in the back seat.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; I see it. It is rather hard to see through the trees.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; we moved it up to a point where the chalk mark was
just about to disappear on the street.

Mr. DULLES. I don't think I see the chalk mark maybe someone else can.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It may be covered by the crosshair of the rifle scope.

Representative FORD. In that picture photographed through the rifle
scope on Exhibit No. 888 a man standing in for Governor Connally is
also in the car, is he not?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. He is mostly hidden by the tree.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; I see.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any difference between the position of President
Kennedy's stand-in and the position of President Kennedy on the day of
the assassination by virtue of any difference in the automobiles in
which each rode?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; because of the difference in the automobiles there
was a variation of 10 inches, a vertical distance of 10 inches that
had to be considered. The stand-in for President Kennedy was sitting
10 inches higher and the stand-in for Governor Connally was sitting 10
inches higher than the President and Governor Connally were sitting and
we took this into account in our calculations.

Mr. SPECTER. Was any allowance then made in the photographing of the
first point or rather last point at which the spot was visible on the
back of the coat of President Kennedy's stand-in before passing under
the oak tree?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there was. After establishing this position,
represented by frame 161, where the chalk mark was about to disappear
under the tree, we established a point 10 inches below that as the
actual point where President Kennedy would have had a chalk mark on his
back or where the wound would have been if the car was 10 inches lower.
And we rolled the car then sufficiently forward to reestablish the
position that the chalk mark would be in at its last clear shot before
going under the tree, based on this 10 inches, and this gave us frame
166 of the Zapruder film.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission Exhibit number has been affixed to that?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is Commission Exhibit No. 889.

(Commission Exhibit No. 889 was marked for identification.)

Mr. DULLES. Is that 10 inches difference due to the difference in the
two cars?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. That is the President's--the car the President was in and
the car you had to use for this particular test?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. On Exhibit No. 889, is the car in the same position on
the "photograph through rifle scope" as it is on "photograph from
reenactment"?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct, the same position.

Mr. SPECTER. And what is the comparison between the photograph
from Zapruder film on that Exhibit No. 889 and the photograph from
reenactment?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The car is in the same position relative to the
surrounding area in both the reenactment photograph and the Zapruder
photograph.

Incidentally, the position that was used throughout all of the
positioning of the car was the President's. His placement in the
photograph, and this will be clearer in some of the later photographs,
if the President's head was directly under a stop sign or a street sign
or whatever, in the background, this was then the way we positioned the
car with the person standing in for the President directly below or
slightly to the side or directly below the stop sign and so on; so all
of the calculations were based upon the position of the President.

Mr. SPECTER. Before leaving frame 161, finally, would you recite the
distances which appear from the various points on that exhibit?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

At the position that has been designated as frame 161, and appears
on Commission Exhibit No. 888, the distance from the wound mark on a
stand-in for President Kennedy to station C was 94.7 feet.

The distance to the rifle in the window was 137.4 feet, the angle to
the window was 26°58' based on the horizontal line, the distance to the
overpass was 392.4 feet, and the angle to the overpass was minus 0°7´.

Mr. SPECTER. Are all angles calculated thereon based on the horizontal?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any street angle taken into consideration in the
calculations here?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there is a 3° street grade that has to be deducted
from the angle to the window to determine the actual angle from the
street to the window as opposed to the horizon.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you now----

Mr. DULLES. Frame 161 is 3° on 161?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Three degrees all along Elm Street.

Mr. DULLES. All along. That applies to all of these different pictures,
is that correct?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you now read the same statistical data from frame
166 on Exhibit No. 889, please?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

From the chalk mark on the back of the stand-in for President Kennedy,
to station C is 95.6 feet, the distance to rifle in window, 138.2 feet,
the angle to rifle in window based on the horizontal, is minus 26°52´.

Distance to overpass is 391.5 feet. The angle to the overpass is 0°7´.

Mr. SPECTER. Did the back of President Kennedy ever come into view at
any time while he was passing through the foliage of the oak tree?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. What frame number was ascertained with respect to that
position?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This was determined to be frame 185. There is a slight
opening in the tree, where the car passed under the tree, where a shot
could have been fired that would have passed through this opening in
the tree. This again was positioned on the basis of Mr. Frazier in the
window looking through the rifle scope and telling us on the street
where to stop the car at the point where he could get a shot through
the trees.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission Exhibit number has been assigned to frame
185?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is Commission Exhibit No. 890, frame 185.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the "photograph through rifle scope" taken with the
position of the car at the same place as "photograph from reenactment"?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And is the "photograph from reenactment" in the same
position, as close as you could make it to the "photograph from
Zapruder's film"?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you read the statistical data from frame 185?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; from the point of the chalk on the back of the
stand-in for the President at position 185 to station C is 114.8 feet,
the distance to rifle on window is 154.9 feet.

The angle to rifle in window based on horizontal is 24°14´, distance
to overpass is 372.5 feet. The angle to the overpass is 0°3´ above
horizontal.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there any adjustment made for the difference in
the height of the automobiles on the location where the back of the
President's stand-in was visible through the tree?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there was an adjustment made for the 10 inch
differential in the heights because of the different cars, and this was
established as frame 186.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission Exhibit number is affixed to frame 186?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Commission Exhibit No. 891.

Mr. SPECTER. On Exhibit No. 891 is the car in the same position in
"photograph through rifle scope" and "photograph from reenactment"?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Are the cars on those two pictures in the same positions
on all of the frames which you are going to show this afternoon?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. In the "photograph from Zapruder film", does that
"photograph from Zapruder film" show the Presidential automobile to be
in the same position or as close to the same position as you could make
it as is the replica car in the "photograph from reenactment"?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you read the statistical data from frame 186, please?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

At frame 186 position the distance from the chalk mark on the back of
the stand-in for the President was 116.3 feet from the station C. It
was 156.3 feet to the rifle in the window.

The angle to the rifle in the window was 24°3' based on the horizontal.
Distance to the overpass was 371.7 feet. The angle to the overpass is
0°3´.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that position ascertained where the chalk spot on the
back of President Kennedy's coat was first visible from the sixth floor
window through the telescopic sight?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. This is after passing the tree.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. After passing out from under the oak tree.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. What frame did that turn out to be?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That was frame 207.

Mr. SPECTER. Do you have an exhibit depicting the same photographic
sequence on frame 207?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; I do.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission Exhibit number has been affixed to that
frame?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Commission Exhibit No. 892.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the car in the same position on "photograph through
rifle scope" and "photograph from reenactment" on that exhibit?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the car in the same position, as closely as you could
make it, on the "photograph from reenactment" and "photograph from
Zapruder film"?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you now read the statistical data from that exhibit?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes. Distance from the chalk mark on the back of the
stand-in for the President to the station C is 136.6 feet.

Distance to rifle in the window is 174.9 feet. The angle to the rifle
in the window based on the horizontal is 21°50'. The distance to the
overpass is 350.9 feet, and the angle to the overpass is 0°12'.

This is on frame 207, Commission Exhibit No. 892.

Mr. SPECTER. Was an adjustment made on that position for the heights of
the automobiles?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the adjusted frame for the first view that the
marksman had of the President's stand-in coming out from under the tree?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is frame 210 and has been marked as Commission
Exhibit No. 893 and represents the 10-inch adjustment for the
difference in the height of the car as compared with frame 207.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the layout of frame 210 exactly the same as that for
frames 207 and 185 that you have already testified about?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. In viewing the films on the frames preceding 210, what was
President Kennedy doing?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. He is waving to the crowd, and in some frames it is
obvious that he is smiling, you can actually see a happy expression on
his face and his hand----

Mr. DULLES. Which way is he turning, to the left or to the right?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. He is looking toward the crowd to his right during most
of that area, he is looking slightly to his right. His arm is up on
the side of the car and his hand is in a wave, in approximately this
position and he appears to be smiling.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the latest frame count where, to your eye, it
appears that he is showing no reaction to any possible shot?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Approximately--I would like to explain a little bit,
that at frames in the vicinity of 200 to 210 he is obviously still
waving, and there is no marked change.

In the area from approximately 200 to 205 he is still, his hand is
still in a waving position, he is still turned slightly toward the
crowd, and there has been no change in his position that would signify
anything occurring unusual. I see nothing in the frames to arouse my
suspicion about his movements, up through in the areas from 200 on and
as he disappears behind the signboard, there is no change.

Now, 205 is the last frame, 205 and 206 are the last frames where we
see any of his, where we see the cuff of his coat showing above the
signboard indicating his hand is still up generally in a wave.

From there on the frames are too blurry as his head disappears you
can't really see any expression on his face. You can't see any change.
It is all consistent as he moves in behind the signboard.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say "signboard" what do you mean by that, Mr.
Shaneyfelt?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I refer to the sign that is between the photographer,
Mr. Zapruder, and the Presidential car.

Representative FORD. Not any sign post between the rifleman and the
President?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; this is a sign between the cameraman and the
President. So that we are unable to see his reaction, if any.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the frame at which Governor Connally first emerges
from behind the sign you just described?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is frame 222.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you prepared a model demonstration on frame 222?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission Exhibit number has just been affixed on
that frame?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Frame 222 has been given Commission Exhibit No. 894.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the location of the automobile fixed from the window
or from the street on frame 222?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On frame 222, the position of the automobile was fixed
from the street, based on the photograph from the Zapruder film.

Mr. SPECTER. Are the various photographs on that frame and the various
distances the same in terms of general layout as the prior exhibit you
testified to?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the first frame at which President Kennedy is
visible coming out from behind that sign?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is frame 225.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission Exhibit has been affixed to frame 225?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Frame 225 has been assigned Commission Exhibit No. 895.

Mr. SPECTER. What, if anything, is detectable from a view of the
Zapruder film frame 225 as to the positions or reaction of President
Kennedy?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Frame 225 there appears to be a reaction on the part of
the President. This is----

Mr. SPECTER. Describe specifically what movement he is making in that
picture or what his position is?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. At frame 225 his hand is down, his right hand that was
waving is down, and has been brought down as though it were reaching
for his lapel or his throat. The other hand, his left hand is on his
lapel but rather high, as though it were coming up, and he is beginning
to go into a hunched position.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say beginning to go into a hunched position is
that apparent to you from viewing the motion picture and slides from
the frames which succeed frame 225?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is primarily apparent from the motion picture
because of the two or three or four frames that show as he emerges
from the sign; that is, in the motion picture, you see the President
reaching for his coat lapels and going into a hunched position, leaning
forward and lowering his head.

Mr. McCLOY. That doesn't exist in frame 225 yet, does it?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It is just beginning in frame 225. That is frame 225 is
the first view we have of the President.

Mr. McCLOY. Out past the sign.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. As he comes out from behind the sign that obstructs the
cameraman from the President.

Mr. DULLES. But there is no obstruction from the sixth floor window?

Mr. SHANEYFELT, No; no obstruction at this point. There is no
obstruction from the sixth floor window from the time they leave the
tree until they disappear down toward the triple overpass.

Mr. SPECTER. Do the photographs on frame 225 depict the same
circumstances as those depicted on the prior exhibits?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And do the measurements on frame 225 cover the same
subjects as those covered on prior exhibits?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the angle from the rifle to the spot on the
President's back on frame 210, please?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On frame 210, the angle from the rifle to the window,
based on the horizon is 21°34´.

Mr. SPECTER. That is from the rifle to what, Mr. Shaneyfelt.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. From the rifle to the chalk mark on the back of the
stand-in for the President.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the same angle at frame 225?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It is 20°11´.

Mr. SPECTER. Those angles are computed to the horizontal?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the range of distance from the position of the car
in frame 210 to the position of the car in frame 225?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is 14.9 feet between frame 210 and frame 225.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the position of President Kennedy at frame 210
with respect to position C.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. President Kennedy is 138.9 feet from station C at frame
210.

Mr. SPECTER. Station C.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; station C to President Kennedy on frame 210 is
138.9 feet.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the distance between station C and President
Kennedy at frame 225?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is 153.8 feet.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the car further positioned at frame 231?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; it was.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission exhibit number are we affixing to that?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is Commission Exhibit No. 896.

Mr. SPECTER. Are the photographs and measurements on 896 the same
layout as those affixed to prior exhibits?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the automobile stopped at frame 235 and similar
photographs and measurements taken?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission exhibit number is affixed to frame 235.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Exhibit No. 897.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the automobile again stopped at frame 240 with
measurements and photographs taken similar to those in prior exhibits?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; it was. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission exhibit number is affixed to that frame?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Exhibit No. 898.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the automobile again stopped at frame 249 with similar
photographs and measurements taken?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And what Commission exhibit number is given to those
calculations and photographs on frame 249?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Commission Exhibit 899.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, as to frame 249, that is how many frames beyond the
first point at which the spot on President Kennedy's back was visible
after he passed out from under the oak tree?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is 249?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It is 42 frames.

Mr. SPECTER. And does a 42-frame count have any significance with
respect to the firing time on the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; we have established that the Zapruder motion
picture camera operates at an average speed of 18.3 frames per second.
And we have been advised that the minimum time for firing the rifle in
successive shots is approximately two and a quarter seconds. So this
gives us then a figure of two and a quarter seconds of frames; at 18.3,
this gives us this figure of 41 to 42 frames.

Representative FORD. Would you repeat that again, please?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The camera operates at a speed of 18.3 frames per
second. So that in two and a quarter seconds it would run through about
42--41 to 42 frames.

Representative FORD. Then the firing of the rifle, repeat that again?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. As to the firing of the rifle--we have been advised
that the minimum time for getting off two successive well-aimed shots
on the rifle is approximately two and a quarter seconds. That is the
basis for using this 41 to 42 frames to establish two points in the
film where two successive quick shots could have been fired.

Representative FORD. That is with one shot and then the firing.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Work the bolt and fire another one.

Mr. SPECTER. At frame 249 was Governor Connally in a position where
he could have taken a shot with the bullet entering at the point
immediately to the left under his right armpit with the bullet then
going through and exiting at a point immediately under his right nipple?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; Governor Connally has begun to turn in his seat
around in this manner, in such a way, turn to his right so that his
body is in a position that a shot fired from the sixth floor window
could not have passed through the path that it reportedly took through
his body, if the bullet followed a straight, undeflected path.

Mr. DULLES. I don't quite get that. You mean because of his having
turned this way, the shot that was then--had then been fired and
apparently had hit the President could not have gone through him at
that point?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct under the stated conditions. Even a
shot, independent of the shot that hit the President, could not have
gone through in that manner, coming from the sixth floor window,
because the window was almost directly behind the automobile at that
time and the Governor was in a position where the bullet couldn't have
gone through his body in the manner that it reportedly did.

It would have come in through his shoulder and out through the other
shoulder, in the way that he was lined up with the window.

Mr. SPECTER. So you say it could have gone through him, but it could
not have passed through him with the angle of entry as disclosed in the
Parkland Hospital records and described by Dr. Shaw?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct, if it followed a straight path.

Mr. SPECTER. And exiting immediately under his right nipple, again as
described in the hospital records at Parkland and by Dr. Shaw.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Have those points of entry and exit been made available to
you in your analysis of this situation?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; they have.

Mr. SPECTER. Could you elaborate just a little further on the
observations and reasoning which you have undertaken to come to the
conclusion which you have just expressed?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We are speaking of frame 249, are we?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir, frame 249.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Could I see that exhibit? The photograph in the lower
left corner of Commission Exhibit No. 899 is the photograph taken
through the scope of the rifle on the sixth floor window when the car
was stationed in this frame number position. It is noted from this
photograph that the rifle is not quite directly behind the car but very
nearly directly behind the car.

Governor Connally's body is turned. We have duplicated the position in
the Zapruder photographs of Governor Connally and the President in the
reenactment photograph, as nearly as possible, duplicated the same body
position, and from the sixth floor window then you can see from the
photograph that the Governor's body is turned to the Governor's right
in such a fashion that an undeflected shot would not go through in the
path as described by the Parkland doctors.

Mr. McCLOY. I don't quite follow that yet. The President has been shot
at frame 249, according to your theory.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. Might he not also have been shot at some earlier frames
in--the indications are the reactions are shown considerably ahead of
that frame.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. McCLOY. So, for example, at frame 237 and at frame 237 Governor
Connolly hasn't turned to the right.

Mr. DULLES. But a shot has been fired at this time.

Mr. McCLOY. But a shot has been fired at that time.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. So at that point he could have been hit; Governor Connally
could have been hit.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; Governor Connally could have been hit by frame 238.

Mr. McCLOY. But your point is when he gets farther along, he couldn't
have been hit, let's say at frame 249 in the same spot where he was hit.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. He made the turn later than those frames you have been
discussing at the time apparently of the first shot at the President.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes; the first shot, but according to these frames, the
first shot hit the President considerably before this.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. And at a time again when Governor Connally's back was
square to the window.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Well, not exactly square. I believe he was turned
slightly to the right as he went behind the sign.

Mr. McCLOY. Take frame 231.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. There the President has got his hands up as you put it to
his throat.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. And here is Connally facing to the front.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. So at that point a bullet coming through the President's
throat could have hit Connally in the spot where it did hit Connally.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I am going to defer that question to Mr. Frazier who is
in the window with the rifle scope and made a more thorough study of
the possible path of the bullet. But he is straight in the car in frame
231.

Mr. McCLOY. But your testimony is in frame 248--frame 249 Connally
couldn't have been hit from this window in the position where he was
sitting.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct, on the basis stated.

Mr. DULLES. But, you would have then the problem you would think if
Connally had been hit at the same time, would have reacted in the same
way, and not reacted much later as these pictures show.

Mr. McCLOY. That is right.

Mr. DULLES. Because the wounds would have been inflicted.

Mr. McCLOY. That is what puzzles me.

Mr. DULLES. That is what puzzles me.

Senator COOPER. Would you identify the frame in which Governor Connally
started turning to the right?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I might say that as--in the motion picture--as the car
comes out from behind the signboard, the Governor is turned slightly to
his right in this manner. This would be in the first frame, in frame
222, he is turned just slightly to his right, and from there on he
turns almost square, straight on with the car momentarily, and there is
a jerking motion there at one point in the film about there, at which
time he starts to turn this way and continues to turn.

Mr. DULLES. Jerky motion in Connally in the film.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. There is--it may be merely where he stopped turning and
started turning this way. It is hard to analyze.

Mr. DULLES. What I wanted to get at--whether it was Connally who made
the jerky motion or there was something in the film that was jerky. You
can't tell.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. You can't tell that.

Mr. McCLOY. Certainly the film is jerky at that point. I mean there is
a big blur.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. He does turn.

Mr. McCLOY. Just before and after that.

Representative FORD. But isn't it apparent in those pictures that after
a slight hesitation Governor Connally's body turns more violently than
the President's body?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Representative FORD. The President's only reaction is a motion to his
throat or to his neck with his hands.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Representative FORD. Whereas Governor Connally actually turns his body
rather sharply?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; he turns as they go behind the signboard, he turns
this way and he is turning a little bit this way and as he comes out of
the signboard he is facing slightly to the right, comes around straight
on and then he turns to his left straight on, and then he turns to his
right, continues to turn around and falls over in Mrs. Connally's lap.

But in the motion picture it is a continuous movement as he goes around
and falls.

Senator COOPER. Will you again answer my question which I asked and
hasn't been answered and I say with all respect, in what frame did
Governor Connally begin to turn to the right after he had placed his
position straightforward as you have testified.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I am sorry. That starts approximately at frames 233 to
234.

Senator COOPER. In what frame does the photograph show or in what frame
is it shown that President Kennedy had moved his hands to his throat?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That shows on frame--it is clearer on frame 226, 225 is
the frame where you first see him, and frame 226.

Mr. DULLES. How many frames between those two?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. From 26 to 33, eight. That would be a fraction of a
second in time.

That is less than half second.

Representative FORD. It can be contended that based on these
photographs of films that the first shot apparently was fired in frames
220 to 224, in that area.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; I think you have to go back even to 210 because of
reaction times; we don't know reaction times. But I would say between
210 and 225 because at 225 we have the President reacting.

So, in that 15 frames there it is behind the signboard, we can't see
what is happening.

Mr. DULLES. What frame first shows him with his hands at his throat?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. 225, 226.

Mr. McCLOY. 225, it is not too clear. It is much more pronounced in the
next frame is where he puts his both hands to his throat, such as that.

Mr. DULLES. And Mrs. Kennedy has apparently turned around and looking
at him.

Mr. McCLOY. One hand may be coming down from waving in 225.

Mr. DULLES. That is his left hand there--no; it is his right hand, your
right. His right hand.

Representative FORD. Then based on the mathematics of how quickly
a second shot could be fired, the second shot would be fired in
approximately what frame?

If you assume it, the first shot is from 210 to 224.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It would be 252 to 266, down in there.

Representative FORD. That would be the elapsed time of what?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Two and a quarter seconds.

Representative FORD. Two and a quarter seconds.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is the very quickest.

Mr. SPECTER. On fixing the range from frames 210 to 225, where the
President was first struck, did you take frame 210 because that was the
first point after the President had passed out from under the oak tree?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; that is the first point from this, and although we
are able to see in the films that there is no apparent reaction from
the President from 203 to 210, and as he disappears from behind the
signboard, we cannot estimate the reaction time.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say reaction time you mean?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Of the President?

Mr. SPECTER. Reaction time from 205----

Representative FORD. To 210?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Representative FORD. But there at frame 210, that is the first point at
which the marksman had a clear shot after the President passed out from
under the tree.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Representative FORM. Then you select frame 225 as the outside limit of
the shot which struck the President because that is where you first
observe a reaction by the President when he comes out from behind the
sign.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. DULLES. What frames are blanked out because of the sign?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The President, the last we get any scene of him at all,
and this is just the very top of his head is 210.

Mr. DULLES. 210 to what is blanked out?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. 225.

Mr. DULLES. To 225 is blanked out?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes, that is 15 frames.

Mr. McCLOY. 224 he just begins to appear.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. I don't think if you assume the President was hit at 225
and I don't think that is clear at all. I think it begins to get clear
about 227 that he had been hit, that the reaction really develops. But
I think that 225 it may very well be that he has not been hit because
his hand isn't at his throat, he may be just moving from the position
of waving.

Mr. DULLES. But that is about a tenth of a second.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes; it is a very short time entirely, but I don't think
the frame unequivocally shows the reaction to the bullet at 225. I
think it does unequivocally show it at 226 and 227.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Perhaps an additional question on the clarity of the slide
itself as a point of reaction would be in order for Mr. Shaneyfelt, and
then, may I say parenthetically, we want to have the Commission see
these slides this afternoon.

We have prepared them to show to you so that you can observe for
yourself what we are bringing to you through the witness to give you a
frame of reference and an orientation.

Mr. Shaneyfelt, then what was your impression by frame 225, as you
viewed it most recently this morning, with respect to a possible
reaction on that frame made from the original Zapruder film?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It is my feeling that at frames 225, 226 and 227 you
are having a reaction. You have a split second there, and at 225 the
reaction is barely discernible, more discernible on the film and the
slides than the reproduction you have here but it has to be considered
in the light of the motion picture you see as he starts this reaction,
and the reaction is by frame--in either the slides or pictures--is
clearly apparent in 226, and barely apparent in 225.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, was frame 249 selected as a situs for calculations
on the possible construction that President Kennedy was struck in the
back at the first point unadjusted at which he emerged from the tree,
to wit: frame 207, with an additional calculation of 42 frames giving
the approximately two and a quarter seconds for the firing of a second
shot to determine through this one means whether there was time for the
rifleman to have operated the bolt, assuming he made a shot at 207, and
to have made another shot at the earliest possible time at 249.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That was the basis for the selection of frame 249, yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, going back just a moment, was frame 231 selected as
a basis for analysis as the first frame after 225 because Governor
Connally expressed the opinion when he viewed the frames that he
thought he was hit by or at frame 231.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And was frame 235 selected as a basis of analysis because
that was one point at which a number of the viewers, including staff
and agents of the FBI and Secret Service thought that might be the last
frame at which Governor Connally had turned enough to the right to
still take a shot and have the bullet pass through his body from the
sixth floor window at the angle described in the medical reports and by
his doctors.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct on the basis of an undeflected path.
That is the frame that the doctors selected as the frame beyond which
he could not have received this shot and have it travel in the path
that it reportedly traveled.

Mr. SPECTER. Was frame 240 selected for analysis as being the
absolutely last time, based on the observations of those whom you have
described as seeing the films, that the Governor could have conceivably
taken a shot from the sixth floor window and have it pass through the
body of the Governor in the way described in the medical reports and by
the Governor's doctors?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the analysis, made on the ability of the Governor to
take the shot at each of the positions, based on the position he had
at that particular frame in accordance with the amount of turn to the
right which he had made at that particular time?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Was there a still photograph known as AP photograph,
which was taken at the time of the assassination or a view seconds
thereafter, studied by you and others in connection with the analysis
that you have been describing?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there was.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the simulated automobile placed in the same position
that the Presidential automobile was in when the photograph was made by
the AP photographer, as closely as it could be positioned at the time
of the reenactment?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission exhibit number is attached to the
photographs of that AP shot and the reenactment picture?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is Commission Exhibit No. 900.

Mr. SPECTER. Would you describe what photographs appear then on
Commission Exhibit No. 900?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On Commission Exhibit No. 900, the top photograph is a
photograph purportedly made by an AP photographer shortly after one of
the shots. It depicts the side of the Governor's head, the left side of
the Governor's head, his ear is visible, he has turned considerably. It
depicts the President's hand touching his lapels, and a portion of the
President's face.

Secret Service agents on the followup car are seen also. The Texas
School Book Building in the background.

The reenactment photograph was made after positioning the car by
looking at the photograph, based on the position of the car as related
to the lane line in the street, as related to the position of the
building, the column of the building and so on to reestablish the
location.

We also reestablish in reenactment the position of the agent taking
Governor Connally's position in the car used in the reenactment and
the position of President Kennedy to closely approximate the actual
photograph made by the AP, Associated Press. This was then studied, the
car in this position was then studied, from the Zapruder position, and
was determined to be frame 255.

Mr. SPECTER. Was an exhibit prepared then on frame 255?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission exhibit number is affixed to frame 255?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Exhibit No. 901.

Mr. SPECTER. Does that have the same layout of photographs and
measurements as on frames 225, 222 and those which preceded them.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; it has. It has the Zapruder photographs, the
matching reenactment photograph, and the photograph through the rifle
scope along with the measurements and the angles.

Mr. SPECTER. On the AP photograph shown on Commission Exhibit No. 900,
what reaction, if any, do you observe by the Secret Service agents on
the followup car?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The Secret Service agents on the right-hand side of
the followup car are looking back and to their right. The one to the
front on the left-hand side of the car is looking generally toward the
President.

The one in back of him on the left fender is looking slightly to his
right.

Representative FORD. What is the distance on frame 255 between the
President and the rifle?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The distance to the rifle in the window is 218 feet.
This is frame 255, which is well past the signboard, well past 249
which is the last frame we considered.

Mr. McCLOY. Well past the first evidence of reaction?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. On the part of the President to a shot.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Well past, and past the point in the film where
Governor Connally states he has been hit.

Mr. SPECTER. Was that simulated car placed in any other position to
duplicate still a subsequent frame?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; the frame No. 313, which is the frame that records
the shot to the President's head, was recorded as frame 313 and was
reestablished during reenactment.

Mr. SPECTER. What Commission number has been affixed to frame 313?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Commission Exhibit No. 902.

Mr. SPECTER. Is this exhibit organized in a somewhat different fashion
from the prior frame exhibits?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you start with the photograph in the upper left-hand
corner and describe for the Commissioners, please, each photograph or
picture which appears thereon and what it represents?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; I might state first that all of the other
photographs were reestablished on the basis of the Zapruder film using
reference points in the background of the pictures.

As is apparent here from the photograph of the Zapruder frame 313 there
are no reference points. There is just a grassy plot. So there is no
reference point on which we can reestablish the position of the car in
the roadway.

For this reason it was necessary to use the Nix film of the head shot
and the Muchmore film of the head shot to establish this position in
the road.

The right-hand photograph represents frame 24 from the Nix film, and is
the frame that depicts the shot to the head. We used Mr. Nix's camera
and a print of this picture and stood in the previously determined
position of Mr. Nix when he took his photographs, and had them roll the
car down to a position so that the President's head was directly under
the point where Mr. Zapruder is standing on the projection.

Mr. SPECTER. You are describing the photograph on which side----

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On the---

Mr. SPECTER. Of the viewer.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. On the upper left-hand side.

Mr. McCLOY. I think you said right.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The upper left-hand photograph is the photograph from
the--taken from the frame 24 of the Nix film.

The photograph on the right, upper right, is the photograph taken at
the reenactment from the position where Mr. Nix was standing. We then
proceeded over to the point that we had established as the position
of Mrs. Muchmore, and using frame 42, which is a frame in her film
depicting the shot to the head, and using the steps and their relation
to the President and the objects in the background in relation to the
President as shown in this lower left-hand photograph, which is the
Muchmore frame 42, we reestablished, we checked the position we had
placed the car in, based on the Nix photographs, and found that it
conformed and checked out as being in a closely accurate position.

This is the basis used for establishing the position of the car. After
we had established that, through the Nix and Muchmore films, we then
checked it against the Zapruder photograph, which is the second from
the top on the left of Commission Exhibit No. 902, frame 313, which
shows the explosion from the top of the President's head. Just to the
right of that second picture down from the right, is the photograph
made at the reenactment from Zapruder's position.

We know from studying the films that just two or three frames before
frame 313 we can see a little bit of yellow along the curb, and this
checks out because along this area of the photograph from the Zapruder
position of the reenactment is a yellow strip.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say this area you are referring to the yellow
area which appears on the left-hand curb immediately to the rear of the
simulated car?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct, and this, therefore, checks out this
as being a fairly accurate position for the car in frame 313.

This photograph then, the third down on the left, is a photograph
through the telescope of the rifle of the car positioned in frame 313.

Mr. McCLOY. Would you read off those dimensions from that?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The dimensions from the surveyor on frame 313 of the
distance from the wound mark on the President's stand-in to station C
is 230.8 feet.

Distance to the rifle in the window is 265.3 feet. The angle to rifle
in window is 15°21´ and this is based on the horizontal.

Distance to the overpass is 260.6 feet, the angle to the overpass is
1°28´.

Mr. SPECTER. What would the angle be considering the adjustment on the
angle of the street?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It would be less 3° or 12°21´, approximately.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say approximately is that because the adjustment
is somewhat greater than 3°?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. How much is it exactly, if you know?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It is 3.9. It is almost 4.

Mr. SPECTER. Three degrees nine minutes?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Three degrees nine minutes, I am sorry.

Mr. DULLES. Would you have to make a similar adjustment to the overpass?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; because the angle to the overpass is based on the
horizontal. The overpass, you would have to add the 3°9´.

Mr. DULLES. From the overpass, is this an angle up or angle down?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is an angle down.

Mr. DULLES. So it is an angle down in both cases?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. When you say that you are reducing the angle of 15°21´ by
3°9´ to an angle of 12°12´, is that as the shot passes through the body
of the President?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. It is at that point.

Mr. SPECTER. How was the speed of the camera ascertained, Mr.
Shaneyfelt?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We obtained from Mr. Zapruder, Mr. Nix, Mrs. Muchmore;
their cameras for examination, and in the FBI laboratory exposed film
in all three cameras, aiming, focusing the camera on a clock with
a large sweep-second hand. We then ran the camera at the speed and
conditions as described by the people who used the cameras. We ran
through several tests of film, and then after the film was developed it
was studied under magnification, and frames were counted for a period
of 2 to 3 seconds or for the full running time, and averages were taken.

Mr. Zapruder has stated that his camera was fully wound. Most of the
others have stated their cameras were fully wound, so we were able to
more or less eliminate the very slow time that occurs when the cameras
are approximately run down, and all of these things were taken into
consideration and were averaged.

The Zapruder camera was found to run at an average speed of 18.3 frames
per second.

The Nix and Muchmore cameras were both found around 18.5 frames per
second.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you able to ascertain the speed of the Presidential
limousine at the time of the assassination?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; because we were able to determine the speed of the
camera, and thereby accurately determine the length of time it takes
for a specific number of frames to run through the camera at this 18.3
frames per second, and having located these frame positions in the
street, we took the farthest distance point we had in the Zapruder film
which was frame 161 through frame 313.

This was found to run elapsed time from the film standpoint which runs
at 18.3 frames a second, runs for a total of 8.3 seconds.

This distance is 136.1 feet, and this can be calculated then to 11.2
miles per hour.

Mr. SPECTER. Is that a constant average speed or does that speed
reflect any variations in the movement of the car?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is the overall average from 161 to 313. It does
not mean that it was traveling constantly at 11.2, because it was more
than likely going faster in some areas and slightly slower in some
areas. It is only an average speed over the entire run.

Mr. DULLES. Over the entire run between what points?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Between frame 161 and 313.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; but where, could you place that on that chart, for
example?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. And describe the points?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is frame 161 which is the frame where they have
just gone under the tree, to frame 313 which is the shot to the head.
So that it is that distance there which is 136.1 feet.

Mr. SPECTER. In referring to those points, will you specify what
exhibit number you are referring to there?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is----

Mr. DULLES. I wonder if we could mark those points on that exhibit?

Mr. SPECTER. Of course, Mr. Dulles.

That is Commission Exhibit No. 883, is it not, Mr. Shaneyfelt?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you take the first point Mr. Dulles has referred
to and mark it as point X. I think we already have some letter
designations in the early part of the alphabet.

Mr. McCLOY. Where is that point? What significance is that point? The
first point?

Mr. SPECTER. This frame 161----

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the first frame we have on the Zapruder film.

Mr. DULLES. It is only to get the speed and distance here.

Mr. McCLOY. It has no relation to any shots.

Mr. DULLES. No relation to shots. Speed and distance.

Mr. SPECTER. It is the first frame we have where the marksman has his
last clear shot of the back of the President's neck before it passes
under the tree without adjustment. Is that correct, Mr. Shaneyfelt?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. What letter designations did you want?

Mr. SPECTER. Mark 161, frame 161, with the letter designation X, if you
will, please.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. And 313?

Mr. SPECTER. With the letter designation Y.

Mr. McCLOY. The record ought to show the two points are the point which
you merely calculated the speed at which the car is going, isn't that
right?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Between those two points the car went at an average speed
of 11.2 miles an hour?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. Between point X and Y on Exhibit No.
883 the speed of the car was determined to be an average speed of 11.2
miles per hour.

Mr. DULLES. How long did the car take to go that distance, do you know,
translated into time?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. 8.3 seconds.

Mr. DULLES. 8.3 seconds.

Mr. SPECTER. What motion pictures, if any, were taken during the
reenactment?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. During the reenactment the black-and-white photographs
were made from Zapruder's position with a Speedgraphic camera and we
also took motion pictures with Mr. Zapruder's camera from Zapruder's
position with the car in the fixed locations as they were established
with the car just stationary in those locations.

After establishing all those points and making these film records
of it, we then had the car proceed along that Elm Street route at
approximately 11 miles per hour, and filmed it with Mr. Zapruder's
camera loaded with color film from Mr. Zapruder's position and
simultaneously photographed it with Mr. Nix's camera from Mr. Nix's
position, and Mrs. Muchmore's camera from Mrs. Muchmore's position, and
this was done twice.

(Off the record.)

Mr. SPECTER. The last question was about what movies and stills you
took?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We haven't discussed them all yet.

Mr. SPECTER. Were any other movies taken or photographs taken in
addition to those which you heretofore described?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; after positioning the car in the street at the
specific locations and making the movies with the Zapruder, Nix, and
Muchmore cameras with the car running at 11 miles an hour on the route,
I then went to the sixth-floor window and mounted the camera on the
rifle, and photographs were made with black and white film motion
pictures of the car in the fixed positions from frame 161 through frame
positions 313. The car was stopped at each position. The individuals
and the car were positioned by Mr. Gauthier on the street using the
Zapruder pictures to reposition the individuals in the car, and motion
pictures were made of the car sitting in those various positions.
After this the car was driven at 11 miles an hour along the route and
photographs were made through the rifle scope with a 16-mm. motion
picture camera following the car as a target, as the car drove down the
assassination route.

Following this, there were three runs made on black and white film.
Then color film was loaded in the camera and it was again photographed
on color film, 16 mm. with the car traveling at 11 miles an hour and
the scope of the rifle following the car as the target.

This completed all the photographs that were made at the assassination
site.

Mr. SPECTER. Was a subsequent photograph taken in the garage which you
previously identified as the railway express garage?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. Will you repeat, even though you have heretofore mentioned
them, the angles between the spot on the back of President Kennedy's
neck which was marked with a white chalk mark and the muzzle of the
rifle when the car was positioned at frame 210?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The angle, based on the horizontal at frame 210, to the
rifle in the window was 21°34´.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the comparable angle at frame 225?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. 20°11´.

Mr. SPECTER. So what would be the average angle then between those two
points?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The average angle, allowing for the 3°9´ street
grade results in an average angle between frame 210 and frame 225 of
17°43´30´´.

Mr. SPECTER. And that is the average angle from the muzzle to President
Kennedy as he sat in the car or President Kennedy's stand-in as he sat
in the car?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. To the wound entrance.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the average angle of 17°43´30´´ measured from the
muzzle to the President's body as the President would be seated in the
car?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is out on the street in those frame positions,
yes. It is measured to the point of the wound on the back of the
President.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you a photograph which has been marked as
Commission Exhibit No. 903 and ask you if you know who the photographer
was?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; I took this photograph.

Mr. SPECTER. When was that photograph taken?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. It was taken Sunday afternoon, May 24, 1964.

Mr. SPECTER. Is there a white string which is apparent in the
background of that photograph?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. What is the angle of declination of that string?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That string was placed along the wall by the surveyor
at an angle of 17°43´30´´.

Mr. SPECTER. Did the surveyor make that placement in your presence?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. He did.

Mr. SPECTER. Were the stand-ins for President Kennedy and Governor
Connally positioned in the same relative positions as those occupied by
President Kennedy and Governor Connally depicted in the Zapruder films?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; these positions were approximately the position of
the President and Governor Connally in the Zapruder films in the area
around frame 225 as they go behind the signboard and as they emerge
from the signboard.

Mr. SPECTER. Was the rod which is held in that photograph positioned
at an angle as closely parallel to the white string as it could be
positioned?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. And through what positions did that rod pass?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The rod passed through a position on the back of
the stand-in for the President at a point approximating that of the
entrance wound, exited along about the knot of the tie or the button of
the coat or button of the shirt, and the end of the rod was inserted
in the entrance hole on the back of Governor Connally's coat which was
being worn by the stand-in for Governor Connally.

Mr. SPECTER. And was Governor Connally's stand-in seated in the
position where the point of exit would have been below the right nipple
at the approximate point described by Governor Connally's doctors?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a couple of questions?

Am I correct in assuming that you have made these determinations about
the degree of the angle of the trajectory of the bullet at the time the
President was struck, locating the position of the President in the car
on the one hand, and the location of the rifle at the time the shots
were fired?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The location of the wound, you mean the angle of the
wound?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The angle----

Senator COOPER. You had to establish the position of the President at
the time the bullet struck him and the position of the rifle to make a
determination about the degree of the angle of the direction?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. The positions in the car, their
positions in the car, were based on the Zapruder film.

Senator COOPER. And you were able to determine what you think very
accurately the position of the President in the car by the films that
you have examined?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Senator COOPER. Then the factor then, which is not determinate,
exactly, then is the location of the rifle, is that correct?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. Upon what did you determine the location of the
rifle--upon what factors?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The rifle was positioned in the sixth floor window of
the Book Building where the cartridges were found, and was determined
from information furnished by representatives of the Commission.

Senator COOPER. Did you have information about the location of certain
boxes that were seen--were found--at the window after the shooting
occurred?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct. Yes; we had photographs of the boxes
and we were advised, of the approximate position in the window and how
far down the window was, the fact that some observers noted the rifle
sticking out the window.

Senator COOPER. I want to ask you--you did have information from the
testimony of witnesses who said they saw the rifle protruding from the
window?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We had this information furnished to us by the
Commission.

Senator COOPER. And those facts, those locations were made known to
you, and upon that evidence did you locate the rifle, in making these
calculations?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That was the basis for the location of the rifle in all
of our calculations.

Senator COOPER. Just one other question. Assuming that there might have
been some variation in the location of the rifle, length of the window,
the breadth of the window, or that the rifle you used was held higher
than the rifle might have been, would it have made--how much variation
would it have made, in your judgement, in these calculations you made?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I don't believe that any movement of the rifle in
that specific window would alter our calculations to any appreciable
degree if you stay within that window, because our reenactment and our
repositioning of the bodies in the car based on the photographs is
subject to some variation, too, so we have variations throughout.

And the variations from the position of the rifle at that particular
window, I feel would be negligible.

Senator COOPER. At every point where you made it, hypothetically, at
least, made the determination that at a particular point the President
was struck by a bullet, at that point the car and the President could
be seen from the window?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. That is all I want to ask.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Even under the tree you still could see the car and the
President through the tree.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Shaneyfelt, did the surveyors calculate the angle and
distance from each position where the simulated car was stopped from
the President to the triple underpass?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct.

Mr. SPECTER. And are those figures reproduced in terms of distance to
overpass, and angle to overpass on every one of the exhibits which also
depict distance to window, referring to the sixth floor window, and
angle to rifle in window?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; they do. They are on all the exhibits.

Mr. SPECTER. Now; is there any point on the overpass where the angle
to the President's car or the angle to the President's stand-in seated
in the simulated car, would permit a shot to be fired and to create
the wound in the President's neck, which has an angle of decline of
approximately 17°, based on the information furnished to you by the
medical evidence, which we have asked you to assume, where that wound
could be inflicted on the President's neck without regard to the point
of entry?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; none of the angles from the overpass are anywhere
near 17°. They range from frame 161 at a minus 7´, from horizontal, to
frame 313 which is 1°28´. None of them are even close to 17°.

Senator COOPER. From the exhibit that has been introduced, showing
the position of the car and the President at the time of the first
shot--what was the distance from that point to the overpass?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The approximate location of the first shot----

Senator COOPER. Frame what?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Well, the exact frame has not been established, but
it would be in the range from frames 207 to 225. At frame 207, the
distance to the handrail on a line of sight vision to the wound on the
President is 350.9 feet.

At frame 225 the line of sight distance from the handrail of the
overpass to the wound on the President is 334 feet.

Senator COOPER. What is the distance at those points to the window in
the Texas School Book Depository?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Frame 207 line of sight distance from the wound to the
window is 174.9 feet. This distance to the overpass from there is 350.9.

On frame 225, line of sight to the window is 190.8 feet as opposed to
the distance to the handrail on the overpass of 334.0 feet.

Senator COOPER. Did you yourself stand at the handrail of the overpass?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Did I?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; I did not.

Mr. SPECTER. What do you mean, Mr. Shaneyfelt, by line of sight?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Straight line distance.

Representative FORD. Is that what is calculated by the surveyor?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. That is correct; by Mr. West.

Mr. SPECTER. Were there members of the testing teams that did go to the
handrail at the triple underpass to make observations?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; there were.

Mr. SPECTER. Who were they?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. I am not real sure.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, those conclude my questions for Mr.
Shaneyfelt. If it please the Commission, I would like to call Mr.
Frazier at this time.

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you very much, Mr. Shaneyfelt.


TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. FRAZIER RESUMED

Mr. SPECTER. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. FRAZIER. Robert A. Frazier.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, you have appeared before to testify, but will
you at this juncture again give us the outline of your occupation and
experience?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I am a special agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation assigned to the FBI Laboratory, Washington, D.C.

I work in the firearms identification unit in the laboratory,
making examinations of firearms, bullets, the effects of bullets,
trajectories, firing tests, powder pattern tests, and various other
types of examinations.

(At this point Senator Cooper left the hearing room.)

Mr. SPECTER. Have you appeared heretofore before the Commission to
testify about examinations which you have conducted of the clothing
worn by President Kennedy, the clothing worn by Governor Connally,
the examination of the Presidential limousine and certain ballistics
information?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you participate in the onsite tests at Dallas on May
24, 1964?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. What was your position during most of the time of those
onsite tests?

Mr. FRAZIER. I was stationed at the window on the sixth floor of the
Texas School Book Depository Building at the southeast corner of the
building.

Mr. SPECTER. How far was that window open at the time the tests were
being conducted?

Mr. FRAZIER. I estimated it as approximately one-third. It was somewhat
less than halfway open.

Mr. SPECTER. Is that the distance depicted on Commission Exhibit No.
492, which has heretofore been introduced in evidence?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Is the distance open on that window about the same as that
which you had it open at the time these tests were run?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I would say that this is very close. The window was
placed according to information already furnished to the Commission as
to how much it had been opened at that time.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you handle the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle during the
course of the onsite tests?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. The rifle previously identified as Commission Exhibit No.
139?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. At what position--what was the basis for your positioning
of that rifle during those tests?

Mr. FRAZIER. To position the rifle, we selected boxes of the same
size and contour as boxes shown in a photograph or rather in two
photographs, reportedly taken by the police department at Dallas
shortly after the assassination.

We placed these boxes in their relative position in front of the window
spacing them from left to right, according to the photographs which
were furnished to us, and also placing them up against the window,
with one of them resting on the window ledge as it was shown in the
photographs.

Mr. SPECTER. In addition to the placement of the boxes, were there any
other guides which you had for reconstructing the position of the rifle
to the way which you believed it to have been held on November 22, 1963?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; there was one physical obstruction in the
building which could not be moved consisting of two vertical pipes
located just at the left side of the sixth floor window. These
prevented me or anyone who was shooting from that window from moving
any further to the left.

The position of the rifle, of course, had to be such that it could be
sighted out through the window, using the telescopic sight high enough
above the window ledge so that the muzzle of the weapon would clear
the window ledge, and low enough in position so that the bottom of
the window, which was only partially raised, would not interfere with
a view through the telescopic sight, which is approximately 2 inches
higher than the actual bore of the weapon.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you position the rifle further, based on information
provided to you concerning the testimony of certain eyewitnesses at the
assassination scene concerning what they observed?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; we attempted to put the muzzle of the weapon
sufficiently far out the window so it would have been visible from
below.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, referring to Commission Exhibit No. 886, did
you view through the sight that depicted in "photograph through rifle
scope" on the positioning of the Presidential limousine or the car to
simulate the limousine at position A?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; this would be the first position that an
individual in that sixth floor window could sight at the car due to the
interference of the window ledge of the building and the fact that the
angle downward is limited by the partially lowered window.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you Commission Exhibit No. 888 and ask you if
you had the view depicted on the "photograph through the rifle scope"
shown on that exhibit?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; this Exhibit No. 888 is frame 161, and is
the position at which I had the car stopped just before the spot,
indicating the entrance wound on the back of the President's stand-in,
passed into the foliage of the tree.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you Exhibits Nos. 889, 890, and 891, and ask
you if you had the view on each of those depicted in the "photograph
through rifle scope"?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; Commission No. 889 represented by frame 166 is
the adjusted position to account for the fact that the Presidential
stand-in on May 24 was actually 10 inches higher in the air above the
street than the President would have been in the Presidential limousine.

Mr. DULLES. Would you explain to us simply how you made those
adjustments?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. I mean how did you get him down 10 inches as a practical
matter.

Mr. FRAZIER. They had marked on the back of the President's coat the
location of the wound, according to the distance from the top of his
head down to the hole in his back as shown in the autopsy figures. They
then held a ruler, a tape measure up against that, both the back of
the Presidential stand-in-and the back of the Governor's stand-in, and
looking through the scope you could estimate the 10-inch distance down
on the automobile.

You could not actually see it on the President's back. But could
locate that 10-inch distance as a point which we marked with tape on
the automobile itself, both for the Presidential and the Governor's
stand-in.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. FRAZIER. Continuing with Commission Exhibit No. 890, represented by
frame----

Mr. McCLOY. Hold that around so I can see it.

Mr. FRAZIER. Represented by frame 185, this is the first or rather the
only position through the foliage of the tree at which a person from
the sixth floor could get a clear shot at the back of the President,
and I had the car stopped at this position and then we determined that
this was frame 185 from the Zapruder films.

Mr. DULLES. There are no heavy limbs in there of any kind, are there----

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir.

Mr. DULLES. That would obstruct a bullet?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir. The tree--it is a live oak tree which retains its
leaves all year around and the limbs at that point are relatively small.

Mr. DULLES. All right.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you compare the appearance of the foliage on the
pictures taken by the Secret Service, about which Inspector Kelley
earlier testified, with the appearance of the foliage on May 24?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I did.

Mr. SPECTER. What was that comparison?

Mr. FRAZIER. They are so nearly identical that you could not really
pick out any difference between the foliage and the photograph taken
previously in November.

In Commission Exhibit No. 891, which is marked frame 186, this is the
adjusted position to which the car was moved to accommodate the 10-inch
distance at which the actual wound in the President would have been
located had the car been the actual Presidential limousine rather than
the stand-in car.

Mr. SPECTER. Were you standing, seated, or kneeling at the time when
these photographs were taken and the sighting of the rifle was made by
you.

Mr. FRAZIER. I was actually sitting on a carton with my left elbow
resting on the boxes stacked in front of the window.

Mr. SPECTER. Did that position represent to you the most likely
position which the rifleman assumed on November 22, 1963, based upon
the positioning of the various boxes?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. And the eyewitness accounts as to how far the rifle
protruded?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, in all of the frames that you have described up to
now, did you position the automobile on the street or give instructions
over the radio as to where the automobile ought to be stopped for those
various sightings?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you Commission Exhibits Nos. 892 and 893, and
ask you if you observed the views depicted in the "photograph through
rifle scope" on each of those exhibits?

Mr. FRAZIER. On Commission Exhibit No. 892, also marked frame No. 207,
the car was moved forward under the tree to the point where the spot
on the Presidential stand-in's back just became visible beyond the
foliage of the tree. I had the car stopped at that point so that this
photograph could be made there.

On Commission Exhibit No. 893, also marked frame 210, we have the
photograph made at the adjusted position to accommodate the 10-inch
difference in height between the stand-in and the actual position of
the wound above the street and on the President's body.

Mr. SPECTER. What was the alinement of President Kennedy's stand-in
with Governor Connally's stand-in at frames 207 and 210?

Mr. FRAZIER. They both are in direct alinement with the telescopic
sight at the window. The Governor is immediately behind the President
in the field of view. Was that your question?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. Alinement of people?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Could Governor Connally have taken a shot in the range of
frames 207 to 210 which would have traversed his body with the entry
and exit points being approximately what they were shown to be through
the medical records?

Preliminarily, let me ask you if, for the record, you had seen or had
made available to you the contents of the medical records showing the
point of entry on the back of the Governor and the point of exit on the
front side of his chest?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; I don't recall having seen the medical testimony.
However, information has been furnished to me by Commission members as
to the relative positions on the back and the front of the Governor.

Mr. SPECTER. Have you in addition had an opportunity to examine
personally the clothing worn by the Governor consisting of his jacket
and shirt?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I have.

Mr. SPECTER. Based on the Governor's position then in frames 207 and
210, was he lined up so that a bullet fired from the sixth floor would
have passed through his body in about the way that the entry and exit
holes were described to you?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I would say that this could have happened at these
two frames.

However, this would assume that the path of the bullet through the
Governor's body was the same as the path of the bullet before it
struck, that is, there was no appreciable deflection in the body
itself. Since I have no actual technical evidence available to me that
there was no deflection, I can only say that it is a possibility under
the circumstances as set up in these photographs.

Mr. SPECTER. You would state that as a possibility based upon the
observations you made and the facts provided to you?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. All right.

I now hand you Commission Exhibits Nos. 894 and 895 and ask you if you
saw the photograph as depicted on the "photograph through rifle sight"
on those exhibits?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Commission Exhibit No. 894 is marked frame 222, and the photograph
through the scope is the same field which I saw looking through the
telescope on May 24, 1964.

This is similarly true of Commission Exhibit No. 895--895 being frame
No. 225.

Mr. SPECTER. I now show you Exhibits Nos. 896 and 897 and ask you if
the picture shown on "photograph through rifle scope" is that which you
observed at the times those pictures were taken.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir. This Exhibit No. 896 is also marked frame No.
231, and represents the relative positions of the President's and
Governor's stand-in on May 24.

Commission Exhibit No. 897, which is marked frame 235, also represents
the positions of the Presidential and Governor's stand-in as I saw it
from the sixth floor on that date.

Mr. SPECTER. I now hand you Exhibits Nos. 899, 898, and 901 and ask
if you saw the pictures or if your view was the same as "photograph
through rifle scope" depicted on those exhibits?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; they are. In each case Commission Exhibit No. 898,
which is marked frame 240, Commission Exhibit No. 899, which is also
marked frame 249, and Commission Exhibit No. 901, which is also marked
frame 255.

In the "photographs through the scope" the individuals representing the
President and the Governor are as they were positioned on May 24.

Mr. SPECTER. Now, assuming certain factors, Mr. Frazier, to wit: That
the President and Governor Connally were seated in an open automobile
in the approximate positions taken by the President's stand-in and
the Governor's stand-in during the onsite tests, that a bullet passed
through President Kennedy entering at a velocity of 1,900 feet per
second striking 14 centimeters below the right mastoid process and 14
centimeters to the left of the right acromion process which is the tip
of the right shoulder, that the bullet passed through a fascia channel,
hitting no bones, and proceeded in a straight line, exiting through the
lower one-third of his neck, passing out of his shirt at the position
which you observed personally from your inspection of the President's
shirt, nicking the knot on the President's tie in the way you observed
from your examination of that tie; do you have an opinion as to whether
it is probable, based on the fact which I have asked you to assume,
that a bullet could have gone through the President and missed the
interior of the limousine and all of its occupants between frames 207
and 225?

Mr. FRAZIER. I can give you my opinion based on this reconstruction, as
I understand your question.

All of these things refer to the reconstruction and assuming
particularly that the path of the projectile to the President was also
the same path, the same angle as it went through his body and then on,
and in that connection, yes.

In my opinion the bullet had to strike in the car, either the car
itself or an occupant of the car.

Mr. SPECTER. And is that a probable opinion of yours based on what you
saw during the tests and the facts I have asked you to assume?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; it is, and in fact, I think it is rather--it is
obvious when you look at the photographs themselves that the crosshair
of the telescopic sight actually would give you the point of impact of
the bullet if the weapon is sighted in and if there is no change in the
line of sight the bullet had to strike the cars shown in each of these
photographs which is frame 225 on this end of this series, and frame
207 on the other end of the series.

It shows that there would be no chance for the bullet to miss the car
at all if it had no deviation in its--if it had no deflection in its
path.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you have an opportunity to examine the car shortly
after the assassination?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; I did, on the early morning of November 23, 1963.

Mr. SPECTER. The record will show you have testified about it
heretofore, but will you again state at this juncture whether or not
you found any indication within the car that the interior of the car
was struck by a missile proceeding at a high velocity such as 1,775
feet per second?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; we found none.

We examined in particular the passenger's section, the rear seat area
of the back of the automobile clear up to the back of the rear seat,
the rear seat itself, the floorboards and the back of the front seat,
the backs primarily of the jump seats, and other areas in the front of
the car, the windshield and the chrome and the front hoods and fenders
and sides of the automobile and we found no evidence of a bullet impact
having those characteristics you mentioned.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you also examine the windshield of the car, interior
and exterior?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. And the chrome of the car on the interior and the exterior?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Did you also examine the front portion of the Presidential
limousine?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; we did. That portion, the dashboard below the
windshield and the dashboard in the area immediately under that were
particularly examined, because the rest of it would have been shielded
from a shot due to the height of the dashboard and the height of the
back of the front seat.

Mr. SPECTER. Did any of that area examined disclose any impact of such
a missile?

Mr. FRAZIER. No, sir; not of a high velocity. Only the lead area
smeared on the inside of the windshield from a relatively light object
which struck the inside, and did not even break the inside surface of
the glass, and then there was a possible bullet impact area at the top
of the chrome to the right of the rearview mirror. This was made by a
projectile not having the weight or velocity of a whole bullet moving
at, in the range of a thousand to 1,500 feet per second or more.

Mr. SPECTER. Based on the position of Governor Connally as depicted in
the Zapruder slides at frames 222 and 225, could he have taken a shot,
assuming the firing point to have been the sixth floor of the Texas
School Book Depository Building, which entered and exited from his body
in accordance with the known medical evidence?

Mr. FRAZIER. I have not made a very thorough study of the Zapruder
film which I understand you mentioned in this particular question with
reference to the Zapruder film itself.

Mr. SPECTER. We will take it with reference to the reconstructed
positions of Governor Connally in frames 222 and 225, which you have
testified you did observe at the time the measurements and photographs
were taken.

Mr. FRAZIER. I would say, yes, under the conditions that I mentioned
previously, that the reconstruction would represent the Governor as it
was in November, then he could have been struck anywhere in that frame
area of from 207 to 225.

Mr. SPECTER. How about the same question in frames 231, 235, 240 and
thereafter?

Mr. FRAZIER. There is only one position beyond frame 225 at which the
Governor could have been struck according to the information furnished
to me and from my examination of his clothing that he was struck near
the right sleeve seam and that the bullet came out through the inside
pocket of his jacket.

At frame 231 the Governor is, as I saw it from the window on that date,
turned to the front to such an extent that he could not have been hit
at that particular frame.

Mr. SPECTER. Why not, Mr. Frazier?

Mr. FRAZIER. The angle through his body, as I measured it on the coat
is approximately 20° from the right toward the left. On May 24 in our
reconstruction I found that the Governor had turned farther to the
front from a position slightly facing the right than he was in at frame
225. He had turned back to the front so that a shot which struck him in
this shoulder in the back----

Mr. SPECTER. Indicating the right shoulder?

Mr. FRAZIER. Indicating the right shoulder near the seam would have
come out much further to his right than the actual exit hole described
to me as being just under the right nipple.

Mr. SPECTER. How would the bullet have passed through his body based on
his position as shown in frame 235?

Mr. FRAZIER. In frame 235, which is Commission Exhibit No. 897, the
Governor in our reconstruction, according to the Zapruder film was also
facing too far, too much towards the front. The angle of the bullet
through his body, assuming no deflection, would not have corresponded
to the angle through his clothing or according to the information
furnished from the medical examiners.

Mr. SPECTER. How about the Governor's position in frame 240?

Mr. FRAZIER. In frame 240 the Governor again could not have been shot,
assuming no deflection of the bullet prior to its striking his body,
from the window on the sixth floor because he is turned in this case
too far to the right.

Now, this obviously indicates that the Governor in between frame 235
and frame 240 has turned from facing completely forward in the car
around to the right to the point that a bullet entering his back on the
right shoulder area would have exited in my opinion somewhere from his
left chest area rather than from his right chest area.

Mr. SPECTER. How about the Governor's position at frame 249?

Mr. FRAZIER. In frame 249 a similar situation exists in that the
Governor, as represented by his stand-in in our reconstruction, has
turned too far to the right, even further than frame 240, so that in
frame 249 represented by Commission Exhibit No. 899, he again could not
have been hit by a bullet which came from the window on the sixth floor
and struck him in an undeflected fashion and passed through his body
undeflected.

Mr. SPECTER. How about frame 255?

Mr. FRAZIER. On frame 255 which is in Commission Exhibit No. 901 the
Governor is turned again too far to the right, and the same situation
would hold true as to what we saw in frame 249.

The bullet would have exited too far on his left side, provided there
was no deflection between the window and the point of exit from the
Governor's body.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Frazier, based on the angles, distances, and speeds of
the car and bullet in this situation, what lead would a marksman have
to give to strike the moving target, allowing for all of those factors?

Mr. FRAZIER. The lead would be approximately the same for all of these
positions represented by your frame or rather your Commission Exhibit
No. 888, which is frame 161, all the way up to frame 313 which I don't
have, the Commission's Exhibit is No. 902 on frame 313, a lead of 6
inches above the point of impact would be sufficient to account for
the movement of the car during the flight of the bullet.

The fact that the same lead would be necessary at each place is because
at the closer frame numbers, the lower frame numbers, 161, 166, 185,
and so forth, there is a relatively steep downward angle beginning at
40°, whereas the last shot, the downward angle is approximately 17° or
20°, in that neighborhood.

Just one thing more, it would require less apparent elevation of the
crosshair over the point of impact at the distant target to allow for a
further movement of the car of approximately 2 feet at the point where
the head shot occurred.

So the lead would be constant between 5.9 inches above the point of
impact to 6.3 inches above the point of impact.

Mr. DULLES. Have you asked the witness--I was studying these frame
pictures--at about what frame he thinks the body of Governor Connally
would have been in a position to receive a bullet that would go through
the body with this trajectory?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes; I believe I did.

Mr. DULLES. I wasn't quite clear.

Mr. FRAZIER. I testified that it would have been in position from
anywhere from frames 207 to 225.

However, I cannot limit it to 207 because at that point the car goes
back under the foliage and you can't actually see clearly enough.

Mr. DULLES. Between frames 207 and 225?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; approximately frame 207 to approximately frame
225.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. SPECTER. Looking at Exhibit No. 902, frame 313, on the view shown
on the "photograph through rifle scope," is that the way you saw it at
the time of the reconstruction, when the car was in that position as
shown in that exhibit?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; it is.

Mr. SPECTER. At this time I move for the admission into evidence of
Commission Exhibits Nos. 885 through 903 which constitute all of the
photographs referred to by Mr. Shaneyfelt and Mr. Frazier during their
testimony.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 855 through 903 were marked for
identification, and received in evidence.)

Mr. McCLOY. They may be admitted.

Mr. SPECTER. That completes the questioning.

Mr. McCLOY. As I get it, Mr. Frazier, what you are saying is there
is only a certain point at which the bullet could pass through the
President, could have hit Mr. Connally, and that is at a point when he
is not sitting full face forward and at a point when he is not too far
turned around.

Mr. FRAZIER. That is exactly right.

Mr. McCLOY. Somewhere when he is turning to the right.

Mr. FRAZIER. He was placed approximately 20° to the right.

Mr. McCLOY. To the right.

Mr. FRAZIER. That is 20° according to my examination of his clothing
but I don't know the exact figures of the angle through his body.

Mr. SPECTER. I have one additional question.

Mr. Frazier, assuming the factors which I have asked you to accept as
true for the purposes of expressing an opinion before, as to the flight
of the bullet and the straight line penetration through the President's
body, considering the point of entry and exit, do you have an opinion
as to what probably happened during the interval between frames 207
and 225 as to whether the bullet which passed through the neck of the
President entered the Governor's back.

Mr. FRAZIER. There are a lot of probables in that. First, we have to
assume there is absolutely no deflection in the bullet from the time it
left the barrel until the time it exited from the Governor's body. That
assumes that it has gone through the President's body and through the
Governor's body.

I feel that physically this would have been possible because of the
positions of the Presidential stand-in and the Governor's stand-in, it
would be entirely possible for this to have occurred.

However, I myself don't have any technical evidence which would permit
me to say one way or the other, in other words, which would support it
as far as my rendering an opinion as an expert. I would certainly say
it was possible but I don't say that it probably occurred because I
don't have the evidence on which to base a statement like that.

Mr. SPECTER. What evidence is it that you would be missing to assess
the probabilities?

Mr. FRAZIER. We are dealing with hypothetical situations here of
placing people in cars from photographs which are not absolutely
accurate. They are two dimensional. They don't give you the third
dimension. They are as accurate as you can accurately place the people
but it isn't absolute.

Secondly, we are dealing with the fact that we don't know whether, I
don't know technically, whether there was any deviation in the bullet
which struck the President in the back, and exited from his front. If
there were a few degrees deviation then it may affect my opinion as to
whether or not it would have struck the Governor.

We are dealing with an assumed fact that the Governor was in front of
the President in such a position that he could have taken. So when you
say would it probably have occurred, then you are asking me for an
opinion, to base my opinion on a whole series of hypothetical facts
which I can't substantiate.

Mr. McCLOY. Let me put it to you in another way--from your best
judgment about what you know about this thing, what was the sequence of
the shots, and who was hit, and when in relation to----

Mr. FRAZIER. I will say this--I have looked at the film and have seen
evidence of one shot occurring which struck the President in the head.
That was at frame 313.

Mr. SPECTER. Frame 313? Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. Commission Exhibit No. 902. I have seen evidence in the
film of the President with both arms up clutching at his throat, and
having examined his clothing and having seen the hole in his shirt and
his back, I might assume that he is clutching his throat because a
bullet exited from his throat. I don't have the technical knowledge to
substantiate that. There was no metal on this hole in front, and there
is no way for me to say from my own examination that it actually was a
bullet hole. Nowhere else in this film have I seen any indication of a
bullet striking.

Mr. SPECTER. The President?

Mr. FRAZIER. Either the President or the Governor. Because I do not
know the reaction time which would exist from the time a bullet struck
until someone made a move. It may be a half second, it may be a full
second. It may be a tenth of a second. It depends upon the intensity of
the pain, and actually what happened.

And therefore, in looking at the film you can't say a bullet struck
right here because he started to move his hands here. It may have been
a full second, a half second behind that spot. I would say that two
bullets at least struck in the automobile. I cannot say that three
bullets did not strike in the automobile from my examination, but it
appears and due to the reconstruction at Dallas, it appears that if the
one bullet did strike the President, then it landed in the automobile,
and if it landed in the automobile, and we found no evidence of it
having hit the car itself, then I say it is possible that it struck the
Governor.

Now, as to the sequence of the shots, that one obviously was before the
head shot. If there was a third shot fired, I could not tell you from
anything I know whether it was the first, the second, or the third.

Mr. McCLOY. It is possible, according to your analysis of it, that the
first shot could have gone through the back of the President and exited
through the front of his neck, and the second shot could have hit
Connally, and the third shot could have hit the President.

Mr. DULLES. Where would the first shot have gone under that thesis?

Mr. McCLOY. I just say I don't know where it could have gone.

Mr. FRAZIER. From what I know from my examination that is true, because
I have seen bullets strike small twigs, small objects, and ricochet for
no apparent reason except they hit and all the pressure is on one side
and it turns the bullet and it goes off at an angle.

If there was no deviation from the time the bullet left the rifle
barrel until the time it exited from the Governor's body, then the
physical setup exists for it to have gone through the President, and
through the Governor.

Mr. SPECTER. You mean from the time it exited through the Governor's
body?

Mr. FRAZIER. That is right. Otherwise, you have nothing to base a
conclusion upon. If you have deviation anywhere along the line then
you both affect the position at which the Governor could have been
shot--for instance--if the bullet entered the Governor's back and
immediately took a 20° leftward angle, then the Governor could have
been shot when he was facing straightforward in the automobile.

Now, I can't tell that, and therefore I can only say that my opinion
must be based on your assumption that there was not a deviation of the
bullet through the President's body and no deviation of the bullet
through the Governor's body, no deflection. On that basis then you can
say that it is possible for both of them to have been hit with one
bullet.

Representative FORD. Does that opinion rule out the possibility or cast
doubt on the possibility of a third shot?

Mr. FRAZIER. It does not rule out the possibility of a third shot.
No, sir; because I can only base my opinion on what I saw and my own
experience, and that is that a bullet could have struck the President,
if it had deflection in the President's body it could have, and he
happened to be in a certain position in the car which would affect the
angle, the bullet may have exited from the automobile.

Representative FORD. As I understood your assumptions there was no
deviation and no deflection, and I thought I phrased my question based
on your opinion under those facts, it might rule out a third shot.

Mr. DULLES. Do you mean rule out a third shot entirely or just rule out
a third shot hitting in the car?

Representative FORD. Rule out a third shot in one instance or establish
the possibility of a third shot that missed everything.

Mr. FRAZIER. As I understand your question I am now assuming these
various factors to exist, that there was no deviation, no change in the
path of the bullet.

Representative FORD. The bullet went through the President and through
the Governor.

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes; then under that premise and the reconstruction
showing the position of the car with reference to the path of the
bullet, then it is entirely possible that these two individuals were
hit with one bullet and that there was not another bullet that struck
in the car other than the one that struck the President in the back of
the head and exited from his head.

Representative FORD. Under these assumptions there is a possibility
there was not a third shot or there was a third shot that missed
everything.

Mr. FRAZIER. That missed everything; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Is there any way of correlating the time of the shot with
the position of the car so as to know whether possibly the first shot
was fired before the car was out from the tree and it might have hit a
branch of the tree and be deflected so it didn't hit the car? If he had
fired too soon. I guess it is impossible.

Mr. FRAZIER. It is possible, I don't have any evidence to support it
one way or the other.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. FRAZIER. As to whether or not a limb of the tree may have deflected
one shot. However, I think it should be remembered that the frame
207 is just as he exits under the tree; from there to frame 225 to
where the President shows a reaction is only a matter of 1 second.
He is under the tree in frames 166 until frame 207, which is about 2
seconds. So somewhere in that 3-second interval there may have been
a shot--which deflected from a limb or for some other reason and was
never discovered.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, may I return to questions that I was
asking Mr. Frazier?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Representative FORD. Again making those same assumptions we made a
moment ago, is there any evidence that a third shot hit the car or any
occupant of the car?

Mr. FRAZIER. Assuming all those assumptions we had before; no. I would
say that, and again I have not the technical evidence to back this up
one way or the other but you make these assumptions and I would say
under those conditions only two shots hit the occupants of the car
because the one through the President had to cause Connally's wound
otherwise it would have struck somewhere else in the car and it did not
strike somewhere else.

Therefore, it had to go through Governor Connally.

And the second shot had to strike the President in the head.

Mr. McCLOY. How about these shots you spoke of, one of the fragments,
at least, hitting the glass, the windshield and one possibly hitting
the chrome. Was there anything, could it have been any fragmentation
of the first shot which didn't hit, the first shot that hit the
President, let's say, but didn't hit Connally, might that again make
the possibility of three shots, one of them hitting the President and
fragmenting as you indicated, and a second one hitting Connally, and
the third one hitting the President for the lethal shot.

Mr. FRAZIER. Under that circumstance the bullet exiting from the
President would have had to strike something else in the car to break
it up.

Mr. McCLOY. Break it up inasmuch as it was broken up?

Mr. FRAZIER. Yes, sir; there was no evidence that the bullet which
exited from the President was in any but complete condition, that is
there was only one hole through the shirt, there was only one hole
through his coat or shirt actually and the testimony of the medical
examiners was that it made a relatively straight path through the body.

Mr. SPECTER. That completes my questions of Mr. Frazier.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask just one more question?

Mr. SPECTER. Yes, sir; Mr. Dulles.

Mr. DULLES. There has been a certain amount of testimony indicating
there was a longer pause between the report of the first shot or what
is believed to be the report, explosion of the first shot and the
second and third shots, that is not absolutely unanimous but I would
say it is something like 5 to 1 or something of that kind, what would
you say, 2 to 1, 3 to 1?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. Is it possible that the assassin attempted to fire when the
car was behind the tree or going into the tree, that that shot went
astray, and that that accounts for, if there was a longer delay between
one and two, that would account for it, and then the lethal shots were
fired or the wound, the one shot that was fired that hit the two and
then the lethal shot was fired immediately after. It is speculation.

Mr. McCLOY. I think that must be speculation because there certainly
is conflicting evidence as to the intervals between the first and the
second shot and the second and the third shot.

Mr. DULLES. I think if you will read the testimony you will find it at
least 2 to 1 except for the people in the car.

Mr. McCLOY. Maybe, but what weight do you give these, I don't know. I
think that is quite possible that a bullet was deflected by that tree,
but there is no evidence whatever of the bullet landing anywhere in the
street or among the crowd.

And yet there seems to be no doubt at all that three shots were fired.

Mr. DULLES. That seems to be the evidence.

Mr. McCLOY. At least three shots were fired, and probably three shots
were fired because of the three shells that were found.

Mr. DULLES. Three shells?

Mr. McCLOY. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. We probably won't settle that today.

Mr. FRAZIER. I don't know how to answer that question except possibly
to go back to the frame numbers of the Zapruder film and you will find
they are about equally spaced from frame 161 just before the tree to
frame, say, 220, which is just a few frames after the tree, that is
59 or approximately 60 frames, from that point. But from frame 222 to
the last shot of frame 313 is 78 and 13, 91 frames, so there is more
time between the second and third than the first and second, assuming
that the second one actually occurred and that it occurred at about the
middle of that interval.

Mr. McCLOY. In the middle of that frame, yes. I think that is pretty
persuasive.

Mr. DULLES. I didn't quite follow that.

Mr. McCLOY. There seemed to be more frames between, going backwards,
between the third shot, that is between the time that----

Mr. DULLES. The first shot went astray, you don't know whether it was
fired. You have no way of getting at that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you very much, Mr. Frazier.

Mr. SPECTER. I want to call Inspector Kelley for observations from the
underpass.

May the record show that Inspector Thomas Kelley has returned to the
witness chair.


TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY RESUMED

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPECTER. Before we conclude the testimony, Inspector Kelley, I
want to ask you if on May 24 you had occasion to go over to the triple
underpass and observe the simulated car and occupants drive down Elm
Street from Houston Street?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; I accompanied Mr. Redlich and Mr. Specter from the
Commission on the point on the overpass.

Mr. SPECTER. From the Commission or from where to the overpass--pardon
me. I understand your sequence there.

What did you observe as to the position of the President's stand-in
concerning whether he could have been struck by a bullet which was
fired from the top of the triple underpass?

Mr. KELLEY. I observed as the car came down Elm Street that the
President's stand-in was in our view all the time as he was coming
down the street from the right-hand side of the car. As the more you
moved over to the left of the underpass, the longer the stand-in was in
direct view of anybody standing on the overpass.

Mr. SPECTER. And was the stand-in obstructed by the windshield at
anytime as the car drove down Elm Street?

Mr. KELLEY. No; he was not. However, never at any time was he in a
position to take a wound in the throat which from the drawings that
have been given me, that I have been shown by the Commission, would
he take a wound in the throat which would have exited higher than the
throat or in the shoulder.

From the evidence that has been shown previously, the wound in the
throat was lower on the President's body than the wound in the
shoulder, and----

Mr. SPECTER. By the wound in the shoulder do you mean the wound in the
back of the President's neck, the base of his neck?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. SPECTER. So, could a shot have been fired from the top of the
triple underpass which would have passed through the President's neck,
disregarding the medical evidence on point of entry, which traveled in
an upward direction from the front of his neck upward to the back of
his neck?

Mr. KELLEY. In my judgment, no.

Representative FORD. If a person were standing where you have indicated
you were on that triple overpass, on November 22, he would have been in
full view of anybody in the immediate vicinity.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; and there were people on the overpass. There was a
policeman on the overpass, there were a number of railroad workmen on
the overpass at that time.

Representative FORD. There would have been no place where such a person
could have hidden himself and not been detected?

Mr. KELLEY. Not on the overpass.

Mr. DULLES. What were the railway workmen doing on the overpass, were
they helping to guard the overpass or just spectators?

Mr. KELLEY. No; they were working. There are a great many tracks
indicated here.

Mr. DULLES. Yes; I was up there and I remember it very well.

Mr. KELLEY. They were doing some repairs on the tracks.

Mr. DULLES. I see.

Mr. McCLOY. I had the impression there was more than one policeman also
guarding up there, at least two, but maybe I am wrong. At least there
is some testimony.

Mr. DULLES. Do you recall, Mr. Specter, what the testimony is on
that--the number of policemen on the overpass?

Mr. SPECTER. I believe there were two officers on the overpass, who
said that no shots came from that direction.

Mr. McCLOY. No shots came from that direction. Is that all you wanted?

Mr. SPECTER. That completes the testimony of Mr. Kelley and all of the
individuals this afternoon.

Mr. McCLOY. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley.

(Whereupon, at 6:40 p.m., the President's Commission recessed to view
the films.)


TESTIMONY OF LYNDAL L. SHANEYFELT RESUMED

(Present were Mr. McCloy, Mr. Dulles, and Representative Ford)

Mr. SPECTER. May the record now show that the Commission has now
reassembled on the first floor of the VFW Building where a motion
picture projector and slide projector and screen have been set up for
viewing of the films.

Mr. Shaneyfelt, what are you going to show us first of all?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The first film will be of the color motion picture made
through the rifle scope as the car drove down the assassination route
at approximately 11 miles an hour. It will give the view the rifleman
had as he aimed the rifle from the sixth floor window of the Book
Building.

(Film)

Mr. DULLES. Is that going 11 miles per hour?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This film will be the black and white photographs of
the car in the fixed still positions in each of the frame numbers
described in previous testimony.

In addition the final portion of the film is a run through of the car
at 11 miles an hour on three separate runs filmed as the rifleman would
have seen the car looking through the rifle.

On the first run of the car going down the assassination route I have
stained frames in the vicinity of frame 222 which is after the first
clear shot after the tree, I have stained the frame at the location of
shot 313, which is the second pink flash you will see.

I found, in examining the film, that this is a shorter span of time
than in the actual film. It is a span on the reenactment of about three
and a half seconds between 222 and 313.

The second frame stained is 313 but since it is running at a faster
speed I have also stained a spot that represents 5 seconds which is
what the time lapse was between frame 222 and frame 313 in the actual
assassination films.

That will be after the car driving scene.

(Film)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is the last clear shot and this is an adjusted
last clear shot before going under the tree. This is the shot
approximately 185. This is frame 186 which is the adjusted shots which
would account for a 10-inch variance.

Shot of frame 207, and the adjusted frame which was 210. This is frame
222 and you can see the tree is still in the background.

This is 225 now. 231. At this point Governor Connally states he has
been hit by now. This is 235. 240--249--255--and the shot to the head
which is 313.

Mr. SPECTER. What is this? Describe this, Mr. Shaneyfelt.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is the run at 11 miles an hour containing the pink
stain. This is another run at 11 miles an hour. It will give you some
idea of the difficulty of tracking a car with a heavy camera mounted
on the rifle.

Mr. McCLOY. You have to sight that with a camera?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Sighting through a camera.

(Film)

Mr. REDLICH. Just as a final thing, Mr. McCloy, would you like to see
the Zapruder film?

Mr. McCLOY. I think we will take the original Zapruder again, I don't
know whether we have anything that is more significant in the black and
whites, I am talking about the particular movies of the frames, we have
not seen those.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. I think we have seen all we need to see with regard to
that. What have you got left?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. The original Zapruder film.

Mr. McCLOY. We will see that.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We have the duplication of the Zapruder film
reenactment. The first portion of the reel is the still shots and the
last portion is the run through at 11 miles an hour.

Mr. SPECTER. I think you would find that worth while to see.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Then we have Nix and Muchmore of the same run.

Mr. McCLOY. Let's do those, too.

Representative FORD. First is the original Zapruder.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Original Zapruder. This is not the original. This is
the first copy.

(Film)

Mr. SPECTER. Will you state for the record what film we just saw?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This film we just viewed is a copy made directly from
the original Zapruder film of the actual assassination.

Mr. SPECTER. Could you now show us the film which was taken at the
reconstruction from the Zapruder position?

(Film)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. These films we made in Dallas have been developed and
left intact and have not been edited in any way so there are a lot of
blank spaces where we run the leader off and turn the film. This is
position 161. This side-to-side jiggle is a camera malfunction.

Mr. McCLOY. This is 16 mm.?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No; 8 mm.

Representative FORD. Is this from his camera?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes; taken with his camera. Frame 222, frame 225. This
is frame 231.

Representative FORD. He has a delayed reaction compared to what the
President did.

Mr. SPECTER. What frame is this, Mr. Shaneyfelt?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. 313, the head shot.

Mr. McCLOY. The head shot.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is the position which is not duplicated on the
Zapruder film. This is running the film out to reload it.

During that run at 11 miles an hour we made no effort to duplicate the
body position because it would have been most difficult to know just
when to turn. The only other films we have are the ones we shot with
the Nix and Muchmore cameras of this same run from their positions.

Mr. McCLOY. Did Nix, Muchmore get a second shot of the head shot?

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Mrs. Muchmore got the head shot and Mr. Nix got the
head shot.

Mr. McCLOY. They both got it.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. We have both those films.

Mr. McCLOY. We might take a look at it while we are here. I don't think
I have ever seen those. Those are 88 mm., too.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. Yes.

(Film.)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This film is the film that was taken by Mr. Orville
Nix of the assassination. This is along Houston street going toward
Elm. There was the head shot. We will roll it back and run it at slow
motion. The head shot shows just a very faint pink.

Mr. McCLOY. Very soon after this sequence begins. Just as the President
is directly under the white abutment in the background. I will try to
give you a clue about when it is going to happen, there.

The next film is the film that was exposed in Mr. Nix's camera standing
in the position determined to be his camera position at the reenactment
in Dallas, with the car traveling at approximately 11 miles an hour
along Elm street.

These films were compared with each other and found to be consistent
in the size of the car in the area of the picture and verified the
position as being that of Mr. Nix.

(Film)

Mr. SPECTER. Have you now shown us, Mr. Shaneyfelt, all of the movies
that we saw, we took in Dallas?

Mr. McCLOY. Mrs. Muchmore.

Mr. SPECTER. Mrs. Muchmore.

(Film)

Mr. SHANEYFELT. This is the motorcade coming down Main and turning into
Houston street.

Mr. McCLOY. She didn't know she took that.

Mr. SHANEYFELT. No.

Mr. SPECTER. Have we now seen all the films from Dallas? That concludes
the films.

Mr. McCloy, for the record, I would like to have the films marked with
Commission Exhibit No. 904 identifying the Zapruder copy. That is the
copy of the original Zapruder film.

May I say here, parenthetically, that we do not intend to reproduce
all of this in the published record of the Commission since we have
extracted the key numbers on Exhibit 885 on the album which shows the
frames of the Zapruder film after the President's automobile turns left
off of Houston onto Elm, but for the permanent archives these films
should be made a part of the permanent record.

I would like to have a copy of the original Nix film marked as
Commission Exhibit No. 905. I would like to have the copy of the
original Muchmore film marked as Commission Exhibit No. 906. I would
like to have all of the movies which we took at Dallas marked in a
group as Commission Exhibit No. 907.

Mr. McCLOY. That is all the movies that were taken on May 24 in Dallas
by the test team, so to speak.

Mr. SPECTER. Right, Commissioner McCloy. They are marked as Commission
Exhibit No. 907, and I would like to move formally for the admission
into evidence of Commission Exhibits Nos. 904 through 907 at this time.

Mr. McCLOY. They may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibits Nos. 904, 905, 906, and 907 were marked for
identification, and received in evidence.)

(Whereupon, at 7:20 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



_Friday, June 5, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF MRS. JOHN F. KENNEDY

The President's Commission met, at 4:20 p.m., on Friday, June 5, 1964,
at 3017 N Street NW., Washington, D.C.

Present was Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; and Robert F.
Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be in order.


Mrs. Kennedy, the Commission would just like to have you say in
your own words, in your own way, what happened at the time of
the assassination of the President. Mr. Rankin will ask you a few
questions, just from the time you left the airport until the time you
started for the hospital. And we want it to be brief. We want it to
be in your own words and want you to say anything that you feel is
appropriate to that occasion.

Would you be sworn, please, Mrs. Kennedy?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give before the Commission
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?

Mrs. KENNEDY. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be seated.

Mr. RANKIN. State your name for the record.

Mrs. KENNEDY. Jacqueline Kennedy.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are the widow of the former President Kennedy?

Mrs. KENNEDY. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. You live here in Washington?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you go back to the time that you came to Love Field on
November 22 and describe what happened there after you landed in the
plane?

Mrs. KENNEDY. We got off the plane. The then Vice President and
Mrs. Johnson were there. They gave us flowers. And then the car was
waiting, but there was a big crowd there, all yelling, with banners and
everything. And we went to shake hands with them. It was a very hot
day. And you went all along a long line. I tried to stay close to my
husband and lots of times you get pushed away, you know, people leaning
over and pulling your hand. They were very friendly.

And, finally, I don't know how we got back to the car. I think
Congressman Thomas somehow was helping me. There was lots of confusion.

Mr. RANKIN. Then you did get into the car. And you sat on the left side
of the car, did you, and your husband on your right?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. And was Mrs. Connally----

Mrs. KENNEDY. In front of me.

Mr. RANKIN. And Governor Connally to your right in the jump seat?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. And Mrs. Connally was in the jump seat?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. And then did you start off on the parade route?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. And were there many people along the route that you waved
to?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes. It was rather scattered going in.

Once there was a crowd of people with a sign saying something like
"President Kennedy, please get out and shake our hands, our neighbors
said you wouldn't."

Mr. RANKIN. Did you?

Mrs. KENNEDY. And he stopped and got out. That was, you know, like a
little suburb and there were not many crowds. But then the crowds got
bigger as you went in.

Mr. RANKIN. As you got into the main street of Dallas were there very
large crowds on all the streets?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. And you waved to them and proceeded down the street with
the motorcade?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes. And in the motorcade, you know, I usually would be
waving mostly to the left side and he was waving mostly to the right,
which is one reason you are not looking at each other very much. And it
was terribly hot. Just blinding all of us.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, do you remember as you turned off of the main street
onto Houston Street?

Mrs. KENNEDY. I don't know the name of the street.

Mr. RANKIN. That is that one block before you get to the Depository
Building.

Mrs. KENNEDY. Well, I remember whenever it was, Mrs. Connally said, "We
will soon be there." We could see a tunnel in front of us. Everything
was really slow then. And I remember thinking it would be so cool under
that tunnel.

Mr. RANKIN. And then do you remember as you turned off of Houston onto
Elm right by the Depository Building?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Well, I don't know the names of the streets, but I
suppose right by the Depository is what you are talking about?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; that is the street that sort of curves as you go down
under the underpass.

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes; well, that is when she said to President Kennedy,
"You certainly can't say that the people of Dallas haven't given you a
nice welcome."

Mr. RANKIN. What did he say?

Mrs. KENNEDY. I think he said--I don't know if I remember it or I have
read it, "No, you certainly can't," or something. And you know then the
car was very slow and there weren't very many people around.

And then--do you want me to tell you what happened?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; if you would, please.

Mrs. KENNEDY. You know, there is always noise in a motorcade and there
are always motorcycles besides us, a lot of them backfiring. So I was
looking to the left. I guess there was a noise, but it didn't seem like
any different noise really because there is so much noise, motorcycles
and things. But then suddenly Governor Connally was yelling, "Oh, no,
no, no."

Mr. RANKIN. Did he turn toward you?

Mrs. KENNEDY. No; I was looking this way, to the left, and I heard
these terrible noises. You know. And my husband never made any sound.
So I turned to the right. And all I remember is seeing my husband, he
had this sort of quizzical look on his face, and his hand was up, it
must have been his left hand. And just as I turned and looked at him, I
could see a piece of his skull and I remember it was flesh colored. I
remember thinking he just looked as if he had a slight headache. And I
just remember seeing that. No blood or anything.

And then he sort of did this [indicating], put his hand to his forehead
and fell in my lap.

And then I just remember falling on him and saying, "Oh, no, no, no," I
mean, "Oh, my God, they have shot my husband." And "I love you, Jack,"
I remember I was shouting. And just being down in the car with his head
in my lap. And it just seemed an eternity.

You know, then, there were pictures later on of me climbing out the
back. But I don't remember that at all.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you remember Mr. Hill coming to try to help on the car?

Mrs. KENNEDY. I don't remember anything. I was just down like that.

And finally I remember a voice behind me, or something, and then I
remember the people in the front seat, or somebody, finally knew
something was wrong, and a voice yelling, which must have been Mr.
Hill, "Get to the hospital," or maybe it was Mr. Kellerman, in the
front seat. But someone yelling. I was just down and holding him.
[Reference to wounds deleted.]

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any recollection of whether there were one or
more shots?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Well, there must have been two because the one that made
me turn around was Governor Connally yelling. And it used to confuse
me because first I remembered there were three and I used to think my
husband didn't make any sound when he was shot. And Governor Connally
screamed. And then I read the other day that it was the same shot
that hit them both. But I used to think if I only had been looking to
the right I would have seen the first shot hit him, then I could have
pulled him down, and then the second shot would not have hit him. But I
heard Governor Connally yelling and that made me turn around, and as I
turned to the right my husband was doing this [indicating with hand at
neck]. He was receiving a bullet. And those are the only two I remember.

And I read there was a third shot. But I don't know.

Just those two.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any recollection generally of the speed that
you were going, not any precise amount.

Mrs. KENNEDY. We were really slowing turning the corner. And there were
very few people.

Mr. RANKIN. And did you stop at any time after the shots, or proceed
about the same way?

Mrs. KENNEDY. I don't know, because--I don't think we stopped. But
there was such confusion. And I was down in the car and everyone was
yelling to get to the hospital and you could hear them on the radio,
and then suddenly I remember a sensation of enormous speed, which must
have been when we took off.

Mr. RANKIN. And then from there you proceeded as rapidly as possible to
the hospital, is that right?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall anyone saying anything else during the time
of the shooting?

Mrs. KENNEDY. So; there weren't any words. There was just Governor
Connally's. And then I suppose Mrs. Connally was sort of crying and
covering her husband. But I don't remember any words.

And there was a big windshield between--you know--I think. Isn't there?

Mr. RANKIN. Between the seats.

Mrs. KENNEDY. So you know, those poor men in the front, you couldn't
hear them.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you think of anything more?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I think not. I think that is the story and that is
what we came for.

We thank you very much, Mrs. Kennedy.

Mr. RANKIN. I would just like to ask if you recall Special Agent
Kellerman saying anything to you as you came down the street after you
turned that corner that you referred to.

Mrs. KENNEDY. You mean before the shots?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mrs. KENNEDY. Well, I don't, because--you know, it is very hard for
them to talk. But I do not remember, just as I don't recall climbing
out on the back of the car.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes. You have told us what you remember about the entire
period as far as you can recall, have you?

Mrs. KENNEDY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mrs. Kennedy. (Whereupon, at 4:30
p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



_Sunday, June 7, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF MR. JACK RUBY

The President's Commission met at 11:45 a.m., on June 7, 1964, in the
interrogation room of the Dallas County Jail, Main and Houston Streets,
Dallas, Tex.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; and Representative
Gerald R. Ford, member.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Joseph A. Ball,
assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; Leon Jaworski and
Robert G. Storey, special counsel to the attorney general of Texas; Jim
Bowie, assistant district attorney; Joe H. Tonahill, attorney for Jack
Ruby; Elmer W. Moore, special agent, U.S. Secret Service; and J. E.
Decker, sheriff of Dallas County.


Mr. RUBY. Without a lie detector test on my testimony, my verbal
statements to you, how do you know if I am tell the truth?

Mr. TONAHILL. Don't worry about that, Jack.

Mr. RUBY. Just a minute, gentlemen.

Chief Justice WARREN. You wanted to ask something, did you, Mr. Ruby?

Mr. RUBY. I would like to be able to get a lie detector test or truth
serum of what motivated me to do what I did at that particular time,
and it seems as you get further into something, even though you know
what you did, it operates against you somehow, brainwashes you, that
you are weak in what you want to tell the truth about and what you want
to say which is the truth.

Now Mr. Warren, I don't know if you got any confidence in the lie
detector test and the truth serum, and so on.

Chief Justice WARREN. I can't tell you just how much confidence I have
in it, because it depends so much on who is taking it, and so forth.

But I will say this to you, that if you and your counsel want any kind
of test, I will arrange it for you. I would be glad to do that, if you
want it.

I wouldn't suggest a lie detector test to testify the truth, We will
treat you just the same as we do any other witness, but if you want
such a test, I will arrange for it.

Mr. RUBY. I do want it. Will you agree to that, Joe?

Mr. TONAHILL. I sure do, Jack.

Chief Justice WARREN. Any kind of a test you want to verify what you
say, we will be glad to do.

Mr. RUBY. I want it even if you put me into a sort of drowsiness so you
can question me as to anything pertaining to my involvement in this
particular act.

Mr. TONAHILL. Jack, you have wanted to do that from the very beginning,
haven't you?

Mr. RUBY. Yes; and the reason why I am asking for that is--are you
limited for time?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; we have all the time you want.

Mr. RUBY. As it started to trial--I don't know if you realize
my reasoning, how I happened to be involved--I was carried away
tremendously emotionally, and all the time I tried to ask Mr. Belli, I
wanted to get up and say the truth regarding the steps that led me to
do what I have got involved in, but since I have a spotty background
in the night club business, I should have been the last person to ever
want to do something that I had been involved in.

In other words, I was carried away tremendously.

You want to ask me questions?

Chief Justice WARREN. You tell us what you want, and then we will ask
you some questions.

Mr. RANKIN. I think he ought to be sworn.

Mr. RUBY. Am I boring you?

Chief Justice WARREN. Go ahead. All right, Mr. Ruby, tell us your story.

Mr. RUBY. That particular morning--where is Mr. Moore--I had to go down
to the News Building, getting back to this--I don't want to interrupt.

Chief Justice WARREN. What morning do you mean?

Mr. RUBY. Friday morning, the starting of the tragedy.

Mr. Belli evidently did not go into my case thoroughly,
circumstantially. If he had gone into it, he wouldn't have tried to
vindicate me on an insanity plea to relieve me of all responsibility,
because circumstantially everything looks so bad for me.

It can happen--it happens to many people who happen to be at the wrong
place at the right time.

Had Mr. Belli spent more time with me, he would have realized not
to try to get me out completely free; at the time we are talking,
technically, how attorneys operate.

Chief Justice WARREN. I understand.

Mr. RUBY. Different things came up, flashed back into my mind, that
it dirtied my background, that Mr. Belli and I tell the truth what I
went to say that I wanted to get on the stand and tell the truth what
happened that morning, he said, "Jack, when they get you on the stand,
you are actually speaking of a premeditated crime that you involved
yourself in."

But I didn't care, because I wanted to tell the truth.

He said, "When the prosecution gets you on the stand, they will cut you
to ribbons."

So naturally, I had to retract, and he fought his way to try to
vindicate me out of this particular crime.

You follow that?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; I do indeed.

Mr. RUBY. I want you to question me and requestion me on anything you
want, plus the fact I do want the tests when they are available.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. On Friday, the morning parade--this goes back to Thursday
night, because it has something to do with it.

We were having dinner at the Egyptian Restaurant----

Chief Justice WARREN. Right now, Mr. Ruby, before we get started taking
your testimony, would you mind being sworn?

(Chief Justice Warren and Jack Ruby stand and both raise their right
hand.)

Chief Justice WARREN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are
about to give before the Commission will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. RUBY. I do.

Chief Justice WARREN. Now will you please state whether the things you
have just told us are true under your oath?

Mr. RUBY. I do so state they are the truth.

Chief Justice WARREN. Now you complete whatever story you want to tell.

Mr. RUBY. All right. Thursday night I was having dinner at the Egyptian
Restaurant on Mockingbird Lane, and a fellow comes over to the table. I
was sitting with a guy by the name of Ralph Paul. He tried to invite me
to the club a couple of doors down and I refused, because he had taken
a band away from me that had been engaged for 7 years, and I felt it
was a lost cause, that the club would be failing because of that, and I
sort of excused myself and I refused to go over to the club.

We finished our dinner, and I went down to the club that I operated,
the Carousel, and this particular master of ceremonies happened to be
there at the time, and we discussed a few things.

And there is a columnist by the name of Tony Zoppi--and prior to that,
I wrote out a full page copy of this build--I have the copies--as an
emcee, and I brought a picture and brochure, and Tony said, "I will
write a story."

This was done 2 days prior to this Thursday night.

So then I went down, so we discussed it and were very much disgusted
with Tony because he only gave us a build of one or two lines.

Well, I retired that night after closing the club. Then I knew I wanted
to go back to the Morning News Building to get the brochure I left,
and also this complete page of longhand writing describing the various
talents of this Bill DeMar.

I picked up the brochure that Friday morning, and I also had business
at the News Building on Friday because that is the start of the
weekend, which is very lucrative, the weekend.

I have ways of making my ads of where they have a way of selling the
product I am producing or putting on on the show.

So I went down there Friday morning to Tony Zoppi's office, and they
said he went to New Orleans for a couple of days.

I picked up the brochure. I believe I got downtown there at 10:30 or 11
o'clock that morning. And I took the brochure and then went into the
main room where we compose our ads. That is the sales room where we
placed our ads.

And I remained there for a while. I started to write the copy of my ad.

Now I go back to the same fellow that wanted me to come over to the
club when we were having our dinner on Mockingbird at the Egyptian
Lounge.

I came to the desk and I wanted to apologize and explain why I didn't
accept his invitation last night. I wanted to explain, and that took
about 20 or 25 minutes. All this is pertaining to everything prior to
the terrible tragedy that happened.

I started to explain to him why I didn't want to go there, because this
fellow mentioned--Tony, I think--I can't think of his last name--of me
having his band so many years, and I felt at the moment I didn't want
to go over to the club because I didn't care to meet this fellow.

And he started to apologize, "Jack, I am sorry, I did work for the
fellow and we have been advertising him for that club, and I am
putting out a night club book."

I remained with him for 20 or 25 minutes talking there. I don't know
whether my ad was completed or not. It was an ad on the Vegas and the
Carousel.

My ads were completed, I believe, and after finishing my conversation
with him, he left.

Suddenly the man that completes my ads for me, that helps me with it on
occasion--but I usually make it up myself--but the person that takes
the money for the ads--this is the reason it is so hard for me to meet
a deadline when I get downtown to the News Building. And as a rule, I
have to pay cash for my ads.

When you are in debt, it is necessary, and they will not put it in
unless you pay cash.

And consequently, the weekend, I had been to town on that particular
day. All this adds up later on, as I will state why I didn't go to the
parade.

In the first place, I don't want to go where there is big crowds. I
can't explain it to you. If I was interested, I would have seen it on
television, our beloved President and all the parade that transpired.

But all that adds up why it is important for me to be in the News
Building.

I owe the Government quite a bit of money, and it is doing business out
of your pocket, supposedly, in the slang expression.

Well, John Newnam comes in, and evidently he took it for granted I
finished my ad, and I don't recall if he paid for his ad, and suddenly
there is some milling around. I think it was 12, or 15 minutes after
12, I don't recall what, but John Newnam said someone had been shot.

And I am sorry, I got carried away. It is the first time I got carried
away, because I had been under pressure.

And someone else came running over and he said a Secret Service man was
shot, or something to that effect.

And I am here in the middle with John Newnam, because Newnam isn't
paying any attention to anyone else, and there is a lot of going back
and forth.

So someone must have made a statement that Governor Connally was shot.
I don't recall what was said. And I was in a state of hysteria, I mean.

You say, "Oh my God, it can't happen." You carry on crazy sayings.

There was a little television set in one office not far away from
where I had been sitting at the desk. I ran over there and noticed a
little boy and a little sister say, "I was standing right there when it
happened." I mean, different things you hear on the television.

Then the phone started ringing off the desk and I heard John Newnam say
people were complaining about the ad, why they accepted this ad.

(A tray of water and glasses was brought in.)

Thank you.

Has every witness been this hesitant in trying to explain their story?

Chief Justice WARREN. You are doing very well. I can understand why you
have to reflect upon a story of that length.

Mr. RUBY. The phones were ringing off the desk calling various ads, and
they were having a turmoil in that News Building because of a person by
the name of Bernard Weissman placing that particular ad, a full page
ad. I am sure you are familiar with the ad.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; I am.

Mr. RUBY. Criticizing a lot of things about our beloved President. Then
John Newnam and I and another gentleman walked over to another part of
the room, and I heard John Newnam say, "I told him not to take that
ad." Something to that effect.

Then he said, "Well, you have seen him pay part cash and come back and
pay the balance."

Now everything is very vague to me as to when this transpired; after
they heard the President had been shot, or prior to that.

You know it's been a long time, and I am under a very bad mental strain
here.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. From the time that we were told that the President was shot,
35 minutes later they said he had passed away. In the meantime, I
became very emotional. I called my sister at home. She was carried
away terribly bad. And John Newnam happened to be there, and I know it
is a funny reaction you have, you want other people to feel that you
feel emotionally disturbed the same way as other people, so I let John
listen to the phone that my sister was crying hysterically.

And I said to John, I said, "John, I will have to leave Dallas." I
don't know why I said that, but it is a funny reaction that you feel;
the city is terribly let down by the tragedy that happened. And I said,
"John, I am not opening up tonight."

And I don't know what else transpired there. I know people were just
heartbroken.

I left the room. I may have left out a few things. Mr. Moore remembers
probably more, but you come back and question me and maybe I can answer
those questions.

I left the building and I went down and I got my car, and I couldn't
stop crying, because naturally when I pulled up to a stoplight and
other people would be adjacent to me, I wouldn't want them to see me
crying, because it looked kind of artificial.

And I went to the club and I came up, and I may have made a couple of
calls from there. I could have called my colored boy, Andy, down at the
club. I could have--I don't know who else I would have called, but I
could have, because it is so long now since my mind is very much warped
now.

You think that literally?

I went up to the club, and I told Andy, I said, "Call everyone and tell
them we are not opening."

We have a little girl in Fort Worth I wanted to make sure he called her.

And a fellow by the name of Bell called and wanted to know if we were
open.

And Kathy Kay called, and I said, "Definitely not."

And I called Ralph Paul, that owns the Bull Pen. He said, "Jack,
being as everyone else is open"--because he knows I was pressed for
money--and I said, "No, Ralph, I can't open."

He said, "Okay, if that is why, that is the way it's got to be."

So in the meantime, I had gone with Alice Nichols for some time, and
I called her on the phone but she wasn't there, but I left the number
on the pay phone for her to return the call, because I didn't want to
keep the business phone tied up. And I hadn't spoken to her in maybe 9
months or a year. I don't know what I said to her, not many words, but
just what happened.

I still remained around the club there. I am sure I was crying pretty
bad. I think I made a long-distance call to California. This fellow had
just visited me, and I had known him in the days back in Chicago when
we were very young, in the real tough part of Chicago. His name is Al
Gruber.

He was a bad kid in those days, but he is quite reformed. He is married
and has a family, and I am sure he makes a very legitimate livelihood
at this time.

He happened to come through a couple of nights prior to that to try
to interest me, or 4 or 5 days prior to that, to interest me in a new
kind--you follow the story as I tell it?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. It is important, very important. It is on a new kind of
machine that washes cars. You pay with tokens. It is a new thing. I
don't know if it faded out or not. He tried to interest my brother,
Sammy, because Sammy sold his washateria.

And my sister was in the hospital when he first came. I am going back
a little bit. Sammy didn't go to the hospital, and we needed to tell
Sammy about this particular thing, and that is the reason Al Gruber
came into the picture, because he came to try to interest my brother,
Sammy, in this new washateria deal to wash cars.

He left and went to California, but before he went to California I
promised him my dachshund dog.

When this thing happened, I called him. He said, "Yes, we are just
watching on television." And I couldn't carry on more conversation. I
said, "Al, I have to hang up."

Then I must have called my sister, Eileen, in Chicago.

Then a fellow came over to deliver some merchandise I had ordered over
the phone, or Andy ordered. And we said, "What is the use of purchasing
any merchandise of any kind, we are not interested in business." And I
don't recall what I said, but I told him whatever money he received, to
keep the change. I am not a philanthropist, but nothing bothered me at
the time. I wasn't interested in anything.

Then I kept calling my sister, Eva, because she wanted me to come be
with her.

Eva and I have a very complex personality. Very rarely can I be with
her, but on this particular occasion, since she was carrying on so, I
felt that I wanted to be with someone that meant something to me. I
wanted to be with her.

And I kept calling her back, "I will be there." And so on. But I never
did get there until a couple of hours later.

I finally left the club. I am sure you gentlemen can brief in all the
things that happened before. A kid by the name of Larry up there, I
think I told him to send the dog they crated, to find out about the
price--very implusive about everything.

Then I left the club. And I had been dieting, but I felt I wanted some
food. I can't explain it. It would be like getting intoxicated at that
particular time. It is amusing, but it is true.

I went over to the Ritz Delicatessen a block and a half away. Must have
bought out the store, for about $10 worth of delicacies and so on. Went
out to my sister's and stayed at her apartment.

Oh, I called from the apartment--my sister knew more of my calls than I
did. I remember I think I called--I can't think of who I called.

Anyway, I am sure I made some calls of what had happened there.
Somebody will have to piece me together from the time I got to my
sister's apartment where I had partaken of the food.

Oh yes, I called Andy. This Andy Armstrong called me and said, "Don
Safran wants you to call him."

This is rare for this gentleman, because he is a columnist for the
Dallas Times Herald, because he never could get out any copy for my
club. And he said, "Don Safran wants me to call him."

I called him, and he said, "Jack, are you going to be closed tonight?"

I said, "Yes."

He said, "Well, the Cabana and the Adolphus, the Century Room, are
going to be closed."

I said, "Don, I am not asking you about any clubs that are going to be
closed. I know I am going to be closed."

And he said, "Jack, that is what I want to know."

And I said, "You don't have to prompt me about who else is going to be
closed."

I put the receiver down and talked to my sister, and I said, "Eva, what
shall we do?"

And she said, "Jack, let's close for the 3 days." She said, "We don't
have anything anyway, but we owe it to"--(chokes up).

So I called Don Safran back immediately and I said, "Don, we decided to
close for Friday, Saturday, and Sunday."

And he said, "Okay."

Then I called the Morning News and I wanted to definitely make sure
to change a copy of my ad to "Closed Friday, Saturday, and Sunday,"
something to that effect.

And it was a little late in the afternoon, but he said, "we will try to
get the copy in."

Then I called Don back again but couldn't get him, and I spoke to one
of his assistants, and I said, I forget what I told him. Anyway, that
is one of the calls I had that had transpired.

I lie down and take a nap. I wake about 7 or 7:30. In the meantime, I
think I called--the reason this comes back to me, I know I was going to
go to the synagogue.

I called Coleman Jacobson and asked him what time services are tonight,
and he said he didn't know.

And I said, "Are there going to be any special services?"

And he said he didn't know of any.

And I called the Congregation Shearith Israel and asked the girl, and
she said, "Regular services at 8 o'clock."

And I said, "Aren't there going to be earlier services like 5:30 or 6?

And about 7:30 I went to my apartment. I don't know if I went downtown
to the club. I know I went to my apartment--either to the club or to
the apartment.

And I changed, showered and shaved, and I think I drove--and as I drove
down, there is a certain Thornton Freeway, and I saw the clubs were
still open going full blast, a couple of clubs there.

Anyway, I went out to the synagogue and I went through the line and
I spoke to Rabbi Silverman, and I thanked him for going to visit my
sister at the hospital. She was in a week prior and had just gotten
out. I don't remember the date.

Then he had a confirmation--this is the night prior to the
confirmation. They serve little delicacies. So in spite of the fact
of the mood I was in, I strolled into the place, and I think I had a
little glass of punch. Nothing intoxicating, just a little punch they
serve there. I didn't speak to anyone. One girl, Leona, said "Hello,
Jack," and I wasn't in a conversational mood whatsoever.

I left the club--I left the synagogue and I drove by the Bali-Hai
Restaurant. I noticed they were open. I took recognition of that.

I drove by another club called the Gay Nineties, and they were closed.

And I made it my business to drive down Preston Road. In my mind
suddenly it mulled over me that the police department was working
overtime. And this is the craziest thing that ever happened in a
person's life. I have always been very close to the police department,
I don't know why.

I felt I have always abided by the law--a few little infractions, but
not serious--and I felt we have one of the greatest police forces in
the world here, and I have always been close to them, and I visited in
the office.

And over the radio I heard they were working overtime.

I stopped at the delicatessen called Phil's on Oak Lawn Avenue, and
suddenly I decided--I told the clerk there I wanted him to make me some
real good sandwiches, about 10 or 12, and he had already started on the
sandwiches and I got on the phone.

I called an officer by the name of Sims and I said, "Sims, I hear you
guys are working," and so on. I said, "I want to bring some sandwiches."

And he said, "Jack, we wound up our work already. We wound up what we
were doing. We are finished what we were doing. I will tell the boys
about your thoughtfulness, and I will thank them for you."

In the meantime, there is a fellow in town that has been very good to
me named Gordon McLendon. Do you know him, Mr. Warren?

Chief Justice WARREN. I think I do not.

Mr. RUBY. He had been giving me a lot of free plugs. And all the while
listening to the radio, I heard about a certain diskjockey, Joe Long,
that is down at the station, giving firsthand information--I want to
describe him--of Oswald.

Very rarely do I use the name Oswald. I don't know why. I don't know
how to explain it--of the person that committed the act. [Pause to
compose self.]

So before going down to the police station, I try to call KLIF but
can't get their number.

I wanted to bring the sandwiches to KLIF so they would have the
sandwiches, since they already started to make them up.

And I remember Russ Knight, a diskjockey--these names aren't familiar
to you, but I have to mention them in order to refresh my memory.

His name was Moore, or something, and I tried to get information on the
telephone, but they couldn't give me the phone number of his home.

I probably thought I could get the phone number, but after 6 p.m., you
cannot get into the premises unless you have a "hot" number that is
right to the diskjockey room.

So I couldn't get a hold of that.

But in the meantime, I called Gordon McLendon's home, because I know
he lives near the synagogue out there, and I got a little girl on the
phone, and I knew they had children, and I asked for the number for
KLIF.

I said, "Anyone home?"

She said, "No."

I said, "Is your daddy or mommy home?" I forget what transpired. I
said, "I would like to get the number of the station so I can get in
the building at this time."

She said she would go and see, and gave me a Riverside exchange.

Mind you, this is 6 or 7 months back, gentlemen.

And I asked her name. Her name was Christine, I think. I said, "I
wanted to bring some sandwiches."

She said, "My mother already brought sandwiches."

And I said, "I wanted to go there too." And that was the end of this
little girl's conversation with myself.

I called that number, as I am repeating myself. There was no such
number. It was an obsolete number.

I go down to the--I drive by--I leave the delicatessen--the clerk
helped me with the sandwiches out to my car, and I thanked him. I told
him, "These were going to KLIF, and I want you to make them real good."

He helped me with the sandwiches in the car. I got in the car and drove
down toward town. I imagine it is about 4 or 5 miles to the downtown
section from this delicatessen.

But prior to going into the station, I drove up McKinney Avenue to look
over a couple of clubs to see if they were activating. I knew the club
across from the Phil's Delicatessen and I knew the B. & B. Restaurant
was open. That is a restaurant and I know the necessity for food, but I
can't understand some of the clubs remaining open. It struck me funny
at such a tragic time as that happening.

I drove down to Commerce and Harwood and parked my car with my
dog--incidentally, I always have my dog with me--on the lot there,
left the sandwiches in the car, went into the building of the police
station, took the elevator up to the second floor, and there was a
police officer there.

This is the first time I ever entered the building, gentlemen. The
first time of that Friday. This time it must have been about--I
mean the time, the time of my entering the building, I guess, was
approximately 11:15 p.m.

The officer was there, and I said, "Where is Joe Long?"

I said, "Can I go and look for him?"

Evidently I took a little domineering part about me, and I was able
to be admitted. I asked different reporters and various personalities
there, "Are you Joe Long?," and I couldn't locate him.

I even had a police officer try to page him and he couldn't locate him.

I recognized a couple of police officers, Cal Jones and a few others,
and I said "hello" to them.

And I am still looking for Joe Long, but I am carried away with the
excitement of history.

And one fellow then--I am in the hallway there--there is a narrow
hallway, and I don't recall if Captain Fritz or Chief Curry brings the
prisoner out, and I am standing about 2 or 3 feet away from him, and
there is some reporters that didn't know the various police officers,
and I don't know whether they asked me or I volunteered to tell them,
because I knew they were looking to find out who that was, and I said,
"That was Chief Curry" or "That is Captain Fritz," or whoever it was.

I don't recall Henry Wade coming out in the hallway. He probably did. I
don't recall what happened.

(To Joe Tonahill) Is that for me, Joe?

Then suddenly someone asked, either the Chief or Captain Fritz, "Isn't
there a larger room we can go into?"

They said, "Well, let's go down to the assembly room downstairs."

I don't know what transpired in between from the time that I had the
officer page Joe Long up to the time I was standing about 3 feet
away from Oswald. All the things--I don't recall if I am telling you
everything that happened from that time, from the time I entered the
building to the time I went down to the assembly room.

I went down to the assembly room down in the basement. I felt perfectly
free walking in there. No one asked me or anything. I got up on a
little table there where I knew I wasn't blocking anyone's view,
because there was an abutment sticking out, and I had my back to the
abutment, and I was standing there.

Then they brought the prisoner out and various questions were being
shouted.

I noticed there was a chief county judge--Davidson, I can't think of
his name, one of these precinct court judges, and they brought the
prisoner out.

I don't recall if Chief Fritz, Captain Fritz was there, or Chief Curry.
I know Henry Wade was there. And they started shouting questions and he
said, "Is he the one?" And the question about the gun.

And they questioned Henry Wade, "what organization did he belong to,"
or something. And if I recall, I think Henry Wade answered, "Free Cuba."

And I corrected Henry Wade, because listening to the radio or KLIF,
it stood out in my mind that it was "Fair Play Cuba." There was a
difference.

So he said, "Oh yes, Fair Play Cuba," and he corrected that.

I don't know how long we remained there. There was a lot of questions
thrown back and forth, and this District Attorney Henry Wade was
answering them to the best he could.

From the way he stated, he let the reporters know that this was the
guilty one that committed the crime.

He specifically stated that in that room, that he was the one.

It didn't have any effect in my mind, because whether the person had
come out, whether he come out openly and publicly stated didn't have
any bearing in my mind, because I wasn't interested in anything. All I
knew, they had the prisoner. But the reporters like to know where they
stand, "is he the one?"

We left out in the hallway, and I saw Henry Wade standing there, and
I went over to him and said, "Henry. I want you to know I was the one
that corrected you." I think it is a childish thing, but I met Henry
Wade sometime back, and I knew he would recognize me.

By the way, it was "Fair Play Cuba," or something to that effect.

In the meantime, as I leave Henry Wade, two gentlemen pass by and I
said, "Are you Joe Long?" He said, "No, why do you want Joe Long?"

And I said, "I got to get into KLIF. I have got some sandwiches."

And he said, "What about us?"

And I said, "Some other time."

And it so happened I found out Jerry Cunkle and Sam Pease, I found out
they were the names, so I did get the number, because these fellows
work for a rival radio station, and he gave me the number of KLIF.

And in the testimony of John Rutledge, if I recall now--this is the
only time I had ever seen this person. When I went out the railing
where the phone was at, people felt free to walk in.

In other words, I felt that I was deputized as a reporter momentarily,
you might say.

So I called one of the boys at KLIF and I said to them, "I have
sandwiches for you. I want to get over there." I said, "By the way, I
see Henry Wade talking on the phone to someone. Do you want me to get
him over here?"

And he said, "Yes, do that."

That is when everyone was beckoning Henry Wade, and I called him over
and he talked on the phone to this boy.

And after he finished; I didn't even tell him what station it was.
I said, "Here is somebody that wants to talk to you." And I felt he
wouldn't turn it down.

And this fellow was very much elated that I brought him over there.

And I said, "Now, will you let me in?"

He said, "I will only leave the door open for 5 minutes." That was
after the conversation was finished with Henry Wade.

I got ready to leave the building and I got up to the next floor and
there was another diskjockey at KLIF, Russ Knight. He said, "Jack,
where is everything happening?" And he had a tape recorder.

And I said, "Come on downstairs", and led him downstairs. And there was
Henry Wade sitting there. And I said, "Henry, this is Russ Knight." And
I left him there with Henry Wade, and I went to my car and drove over
to KLIF, which is a block away from there.

And it was a little chilly that night, as I recall, but by bringing
Russ Knight over to Henry Wade, I delayed too long to get to KLIF, and
I had to wait 15 minutes until Russ Knight came from finishing his
interview with Henry Wade.

I had the sandwiches with me and some soda pop and various things, and
Russ Knight opened the door and we went upstairs.

(Mr. Arlen Specter, a staff counsel, entered the room.)

Chief Justice WARREN. This is another man on my staff, Mr. Specter.
Would you mind if he came in?

(Chief Justice Warren introduced the men around the room.)

Mr. RUBY. Is there any way to get me to Washington?

Chief Justice WARREN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. RUBY. Is there any way of you getting me to Washington?

Chief Justice WARREN. I don't know of any. I will be glad to talk to
your counsel about what the situation is, Mr. Ruby, when we get an
opportunity to talk.

Mr. RUBY. I don't think I will get a fair representation with my
counsel, Joe Tonahill. I don't think so. I would like to request that I
go to Washington and you take all the tests that I have to take. It is
very important.

Mr. TONAHILL. Jack, will you tell him why you don't think you will get
a fair representation?

Mr. RUBY. Because I have been over this for the longest time to get the
lie detector test. Somebody has been holding it back from me.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Ruby, I might say to you that the lateness of
this thing is not due to your counsel. He wrote me, I think, close to
2 months ago and told me that you would be glad to testify and take, I
believe he said, any test. I am not sure of that, but he said you would
be glad to testify before the Commission.

And I thanked him for the letter. But we have been so busy that this is
the first time we have had an opportunity to do it.

But there has been no delay, as far as I know, on the part of Mr.
Tonahill in bringing about this meeting. It was our own delay due to
the pressures we had on us at the time.

Mr. RUBY. What State are you from, Congressman?

Representative FORD. Michigan. Grand Rapids, Mich.

Chief Justice WARREN. I will be glad to talk that over, if we can. You
might go right ahead, if you wish, with the rest of your statement.

Mr. RUBY. All right. I remained at KLIF from that moment on, from the
time I got into the building, with Russ Knight. We talked about various
things. I brought out the thought of this ad that Bernard Weissman had
placed in the newspaper, and I also told Russ the one I admired by
Gordon McLendon.

He came out with an editorial about the incident with Adlai Stevenson
and all those things. He is one person that will immediately go to bat
if anything is wrong. He will clarify it.

And I told Russ Knight there were some other things that were occurring
at the time. So I remained there until about 2 a.m., and we all partook
of the sandwiches and had a feast there.

And they spliced the various comments they got back and forth of Henry
Wade, of Russ Knight's copy--of Russ Knight's items of Henry Wade.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Ruby, this is the young man, Mr. Specter. He
is a member of our staff, and he comes from Philadelphia.

(Ruby shakes hands with Mr. Specter.)

Mr. RUBY. I am at a disadvantage, gentlemen, telling my story.

Chief Justice WARREN. You were right at the point where you had it
about 2 o'clock in the morning, and you had had your feast, as you
mentioned, and had talked to these men, and so forth. That was the last
that you had told us.

Mr. RUBY. Well, lots of things occurred up to that. They talked pro and
con about the tragedy.

At 2 a.m., I left the building. I drove--I was going to go toward the
Times Herald Building, because as a result--I very rarely go there for
my weekend ad, because once I get the ad into the Morning News, which
is the earlier issue, all I have to do is call the newspaper and they
transpire the same ad that I had into the newspaper--into the Morning
News.

And I promised one of the boys working in the Times Herald Building
there--I was in the act, in the business of a twist-board deal I was
promoting as a sales item by advertisement and mail order, and I had
been evading him, or didn't have time to go out there because it was
very late when I left the club, and I didn't want to stop, but because
this was an early morning, I thought this would be the right time to go
over there, plus the fact of changing my ad I had in the Morning News
to the closing of 3 days, that I would go over there and maybe add a
little more effectiveness to it in the way I wanted the ad placed.

As I was driving toward the Times Herald with the intention of doing
these things, I heard someone honk a horn very loudly, and I stopped.
There was a police officer sitting in a car. He was sitting with this
young lady that works in my club, Kathy Kay, and they were very much
carried away.

And I was carried away; and he had a few beers, and it is so bad, about
those places open, and I was a great guy to close; and I remained with
them--did I tell you this part of it?

Mr. MOORE. I don't recall this part; no.

Mr. RUBY. I didn't tell you this part because at the time I thought a
lot of Harry Carlson as a police officer, and either it slipped my mind
in telling this, or it was more or less a reason for leaving it out,
because I felt I didn't want to involve them in anything, because it
was supposed to be a secret that he was going with this young lady. He
had marital problems.

I don't know if that is why I didn't tell you that. Anyway, I did leave
it out. His name is Harry Carlson. Her name is Kathy Kay.

And they talked and they carried on, and they thought I was the
greatest guy in the world, and he stated they should cut this guy inch
by inch into ribbons, and so on.

And she said, "Well, if he was in England, they would drag him through
the streets and would have hung him." I forget what she said.

I left them after a long delay. They kept me from leaving. They were
constantly talking and were in a pretty dramatic mood. They were crying
and carrying on.

I went to the building of the Times Herald. I went to the Times
Herald--may I read that, Joe? May I please?

(Joe Tonahill hands paper to Jack Ruby.)

Mr. TONAHILL. Sam ever get your glasses?

Mr. RUBY. Not yet. [Reading.] "This is the girl that"--what?--"that
started Jack off." What is this other word?

Mr. TONAHILL. Culminated?

Mr. RUBY. That is untrue. That is what I wanted to read. (Throwing pad
on table.)

Gentlemen, unless you get me to Washington, you can't get a fair shake
out of me.

If you understand my way of talking, you have got to bring me to
Washington to get the tests.

Do I sound dramatic? Off the beam?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; you are speaking very, very rationally,
and I am really surprised that you can remember as much as you have
remembered up to the present time.

You have given it to us in detail.

Mr. RUBY. Unless you can get me to Washington, and I am not a crackpot,
I have all my senses--I don't want to evade any crime I am guilty of.
But Mr. Moore, have I spoken this way when we have talked?

Mr. MOORE. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. Unless you get me to Washington immediately, I am afraid
after what Mr. Tonahill has written there, which is unfair to me
regarding my testimony here--you all want to hear what he wrote?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; you might read it. If you need glasses
again, try mine this time (handing glasses to Mr. Ruby).

Mr. RUBY (putting on glasses). "This is the girl"----

Mr. TONAHILL. "Thing," isn't it?

Mr. RUBY. "This is the thing that started Jack in the shooting."

Mr. TONAHILL. Kathy Kay was talking about Oswald.

Mr. RUBY. You are lying, Joe Tonahill. You are lying.

Mr. TONAHILL. No; I am not.

Mr. RUBY. You are lying, because you know what motivated me. You want
to make it that it was a premeditation.

Mr. TONAHILL. No.

Mr. RUBY. Yes; you do.

Mr. TONAHILL. I don't think there was any premeditation, but you go
ahead and tell it your way. That is what we want you to do. That is
what the Chief Justice wants.

Mr. RUBY. Not when you specify this.

You are Senator Rankin?

Mr. RANKIN. No; I am the general counsel for our Commission, Mr. Ruby.

Mr. TONAHILL. You go on and keep telling it down to Caroline and the
truth.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Ruby, may I suggest this, that if we are to
have any tests, either a lie detector or, as you suggest, maybe a truth
serum--I don't know anything about truth serum, but if we are to have
it, we have to have something to check against, and we would like to
have the rest of your story as you started to tell us, because you are
now getting down to the crucial part of it, and it wouldn't be fair to
you to have this much of it and then not have the rest.

Mr. RUBY. Because the reason why, Joe knows from the time that I told
Attorney Belli, and the story I wanted to tell on the stand, and Mr.
Tonahill knows this isn't the time. The thought never entered my mind.
He knows it.

Mr. TONAHILL. I didn't say the thought entered your mind. I didn't say
that.

Mr. RUBY. You are inferring that.

Mr. TONAHILL. Unconsciously, maybe, is what I meant to say.

Mr. RUBY. Why go back to Friday, Joe?

Mr. TONAHILL. You are going to come right down----

Mr. RUBY. Why go back to Friday? That set me off.

Then it is a greater premeditation than you know is true.

Mr. TONAHILL. I don't say it is premeditation. I never have. I don't
think it is.

Mr. RUBY. Because it never entered my mind when they talked about, the
officer, cutting him into bits. You would like to have built it up for
my defense, but that is not it. I am here to tell the truth.

Mr. TONAHILL. The psychiatrist said that to me.

Mr. RUBY. You want to put that into my thoughts, but it never happened.
I took it with a grain of salt what he said at that particular time.

Well, it is too bad, Chief Warren, that you didn't get me to your
headquarters 6 months ago.

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, Mr. Ruby, I will tell you why we didn't.
Because you were then about to be tried and I didn't want to do
anything that would prejudice you in your trial. And for that reason, I
wouldn't even consider asking you to testify until your trial was over.
That is the only reason that we didn't talk to you sooner.

And I wish we had gotten here a little sooner after your trial was
over, but I know you had other things on your mind, and we had other
work, and it got to this late date.

But I assure you, there is no desire on our part to let this matter go
to any late date for any ulterior purpose. I assure you of that.

And as I told you at the beginning, if you want a test of some kind
made, I will undertake to see that it is done.

Mr. RUBY. You have power to do it, even though the district attorney
objects to me getting the tests?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; I do.

Mr. RUBY. How soon can it be done?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, I am not familiar with those things, but we
will try to do it expeditiously, you may be sure, because we are trying
to wind up the work of this Commission. And I assure you we won't delay
it.

Mr. RUBY. Are you staying overnight here, Chief Warren?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; I have to be back, because we have an early
session of the Court tomorrow morning.

Mr. RUBY. Is there any way of getting a polygraph here?

Mr. DECKER. May I make a suggestion?

Jack, listen, you and I have had a lot of dealings. Do you want my
officers removed from the room while you talk to this Commission?

Mr. RUBY. That wouldn't prove any truth.

Mr. DECKER. These people came several thousand miles to interview you.
You have wanted to tell me your story and I have refused to let you
tell me. Now be a man with a bunch of men that have come a long way to
give you an opportunity to.

You asked me for permission to tell your story, and I told you "No."

This is a supreme investigating committee at this particular time. Now
give them your story and be a man, if you want them to deal with you
and deal fairly with you.

Mr. RUBY. It is unfair to me unless I get all the facilities to back up
what I say.

Mr. DECKER. You tell him your story. Nobody is denying it. You tell
this man. He has come a thousand or more miles to listen to you. Now be
a man about it.

Mr. MOORE. What I suggest--Jack, at one time I was a polygraph
operator, and you would not be able to go through the entire story the
way you have here.

So, seriously, you should tell the story and the things you want
checked, you can be asked directly. Because you can only answer yes or
no on the polygraph examination. So I think in view of what you want,
you should tell your story first, and then the points that you want
verified, you can be questioned on.

As the sheriff mentioned, the Commission has come a long way to have
the opportunity to listen to your story, and I am sure that they know
you are telling the truth, in any case.

Mr. RUBY. I wish the President were right here now. It is a terrible
ordeal, I tell you that.

Chief Justice WARREN. I am sure it is an ordeal for you, and we want to
make it just as easy as we can. That is the reason that we have let you
tell your story in your own way without being interrupted.

If you will just proceed with the rest of your statement, I think it
would make it a lot easier for us to verify it in the way that you want
it to be done.

Mr. RUBY. I don't know how to answer you.

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, you have told us most of what happened up
to the time of the incident, and you are almost within, you are just
within a few hours of it now.

Mr. RUBY. There is a Saturday.

Chief Justice WARREN. Beg your pardon?

Mr. RUBY. There is a Saturday night. There is a Friday night. This is
still only Friday night, Chief.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; that is true.

Mr. RUBY. Well, I will go into a certain point, and if I stop, you will
have to understand if I stop to get my bearings together.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. I am in the Times Herald Building. I go upstairs, naturally.

Chief Justice WARREN. This is about what time?

Mr. RUBY. This, I imagine, is--I left the KLIF at 2 a.m., and I spent
an hour with the officer and his girl friend, so it must have been
about 3:15 approximately. No; it wasn't. When you are not concerned
with time, it could have been 4 o'clock.

Chief Justice WARREN. It doesn't make any difference.

Mr. RUBY. Forty-five minutes difference.

I am up there in the composing room talking to a guy by the name of
Pat Gadash. He was so elated that I brought him this twist board, and
I had it sealed in a polyethylene bag, but he wanted to see how it is
demonstrated, how it was worked.

It is a board that is on a pivot, a ball bearing, and it has a tendency
to give you certain exercises in twisting your body. So not that I
wanted to get in with the hilarity of frolicking, but he asked me to
show him, and the other men gathered around.

When you get into the movement of a ball bearing disk, your body is
free to move. I know you look like you are having a gay time, because
naturally if your body is so free of moving, it is going to look that
way.

I am stating this in that even with my emotional feeling for our
beloved President, even to demonstrate the twist board, I did it
because someone asked me to.

You follow me, gentlemen, as I describe it?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; I do.

Mr. RUBY. Then we placed the ad in, and if I recall, I requested from
Pat to put a black border around to show that the ad was in mourning,
or something, because we were, everything was in mourning.

Bill, will you do that for me that you asked a minute ago? You said you
wanted to leave the room.

Mr. DECKER. I will have everyone leave the room, including myself, if
you want to talk about it. You name it, and out we will go.

Mr. RUBY. All right.

Mr. DECKER. You want all of us outside?

Mr. RUBY. Yes.

Mr. DECKER. I will leave Tonahill and Moore. I am not going to have Joe
leave.

Mr. RUBY. If you are not going to have Joe leave----

Mr. DECKER. Moore, his body is responsible to you. His body is
responsible to you.

Mr. RUBY. Bill, I am not accomplishing anything if they are here, and
Joe Tonahill is here. You asked me anybody I wanted out.

Mr. DECKER. Jack, this is your attorney. That is your lawyer.

Mr. RUBY. He is not my lawyer.

(Sheriff Decker and law enforcement officers left room.)

Gentleman, if you want to hear any further testimony, you will have to
get me to Washington soon, because it has something to do with you,
Chief Warren.

Do I sound sober enough to tell you this?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; go right ahead.

Mr. RUBY. I want to tell the truth, and I can't tell it here. I can't
tell it here. Does that make sense to you?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, let's not talk about sense. But I really
can't see why you can't tell this Commission.

Mr. RUBY. What is your name?

Mr. BALL. Joe Ball.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Joe Ball. He is an attorney from Los Angeles
who has been working for me.

Mr. RUBY. Do you know Belli too?

Mr. BALL. I know of him.

Mr. RUBY. Ball was working with him. He knows Belli. You know Melvin
Belli?

Mr. BALL. I am not acquainted with him.

Chief Justice WARREN. No association of any kind.

Mr. BALL. We practice in different cities.

Chief Justice WARREN. Five hundred miles away. Mr. Ball practices
in Long Beach, and Mr. Belli practices in San Francisco. There is
positively no connection between anybody in this room, as far as I
know, with Mr. Belli. I can assure you of that.

Mr. RUBY. Where do you stand, Moore?

Mr. MOORE. Well, I am assigned to the Commission, Jack.

Mr. RUBY. The President assigned you?

Mr. MOORE. No; my chief did. And I am not involved in the
investigation. I am more of a security officer.

Mr. RUBY. Boys, I am in a tough spot, I tell you that.

Mr. MOORE. You recall when I talked to you, there were certain things
I asked you not to tell me at the time, for certain reasons, that
you were probably going to trial at that time, and I respected your
position on that and asked you not to tell me certain things.

Mr. RUBY. But this isn't the place for me to tell what I want to tell.

Mr. MOORE. The Commission is looking into the entire matter, and you
are part of it, should be.

Mr. RUBY. Chief Warren, your life is in danger in this city, do you
know that?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; I don't know that. If that is the thing that
you don't want to talk about, you can tell me, if you wish, when this
is all over, just between you and me.

Mr. RUBY. No; I would like to talk to you in private.

Chief Justice WARREN. You may do that when you finish your story. You
may tell me that phase of it.

Mr. RUBY. I bet you haven't had a witness like me in your whole
investigation, is that correct?

Chief Justice WARREN. There are many witnesses whose memory has not
been as good as yours. I tell you that, honestly.

Mr. RUBY. My reluctance to talk--you haven't had any witness in telling
the story, in finding so many problems?

Chief Justice WARREN. You have a greater problem than any witness we
have had.

Mr. RUBY. I have a lot of reasons for having those problems.

Chief Justice WARREN. I know that, and we want to respect your rights,
whatever they may be. And I only want to hear what you are willing to
tell us, because I realize that you still have a great problem before
you, and I am not trying to press you.

I came here because I thought you wanted to tell us the story, and I
think the story should be told for the public, and it will eventually
be made public. If you want to do that, you are entitled to do that,
and if you want to have it verified as the thing can be verified by a
polygraph test, you may have that, too.

I will undertake to do that for you, but at all events we must first
have the story that we are going to check it against.

Mr. RUBY. When are you going back to Washington?

Chief Justice WARREN. I am going back very shortly after we finish this
hearing--I am going to have some lunch.

Mr. RUBY. Can I make a statement?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. If you request me to go back to Washington with you right
now, that couldn't be done, could it?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; it could not be done. It could not be done.
There are a good many things involved in that, Mr. Ruby.

Mr. RUBY. What are they?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, the public attention that it would attract,
and the people who would be around. We have no place there for you to
be safe when we take you out, and we are not law enforcement officers,
and it isn't our responsibility to go into anything of that kind.

And certainly it couldn't be done on a moment's notice this way.

Mr. RUBY. Well, from what I read in the paper, they made certain
precautions for you coming here, but you got here.

Chief Justice WARREN. There are no precautions taken at all.

Mr. RUBY. There were some remarks in the paper about some crackpots.

Chief Justice WARREN. I don't believe everything I read in the paper.

Mr. MOORE. In that respect, the Chief Justice is in public life. People
in public life are well aware they don't please everyone, and they get
these threats.

Incidentally, if it is the part about George Senator talking about the
Earl Warren Society, the Chief Justice is aware of that phase, and
I am sure he would like to hear anything that you have to say if it
affects the security.

Chief Justice WARREN. Before you finish the rest of your statement, may
I ask you this question, and this is one of the questions we came here
to ask you.

Did you know Lee Harvey Oswald prior to this shooting?

Mr. RUBY. That is why I want to take the lie detector test. Just saying
no isn't sufficient.

Chief Justice WARREN. I will afford you that opportunity.

Mr. RUBY. All right.

Chief Justice WARREN. I will afford you that opportunity. You can't do
both of them at one time.

Mr. RUBY. Gentlemen, my life is in danger here. Not with my guilty plea
of execution.

Do I sound sober enough to you as I say this?

Chief Justice WARREN. You do. You sound entirely sober.

Mr. RUBY. From the moment I started my testimony, have I sounded as
though, with the exception of becoming emotional, have I sounded as
though I made sense, what I was speaking about?

Chief Justice WARREN. You have indeed. I understood everything you have
said. If I haven't, it is my fault.

Mr. RUBY. Then I follow this up. I may not live tomorrow to give any
further testimony. The reason why I add this to this, since you assure
me that I have been speaking sense by then, I might be speaking sense
by following what I have said, and the only thing I want to get out
to the public, and I can't say it here, is with authenticity, with
sincerity of the truth of everything and why my act was committed, but
it can't be said here.

It can be said, it's got to be said amongst people of the highest
authority that would give me the benefit of doubt. And following that,
immediately give me the lie detector test after I do make the statement.

Chairman Warren, if you felt that your life was in danger at the
moment, how would you feel? Wouldn't you be reluctant to go on
speaking, even though you request me to do so?

Chief Justice WARREN. I think I might have some reluctance if I was in
your position, yes; I think I would. I think I would figure it out very
carefully as to whether it would endanger me or not.

If you think that anything that I am doing or anything that I am asking
you is endangering you in any way, shape, or form, I want you to feel
absolutely free to say that the interview is over.

Mr. RUBY. What happens then? I didn't accomplish anything.

Chief Justice WARREN. No; nothing has been accomplished.

Mr. RUBY. Well, then you won't follow up with anything further?

Chief Justice WARREN. There wouldn't be anything to follow up if you
hadn't completed your statement.

Mr. RUBY. You said you have the power to do what you want to do, is
that correct?

Chief Justice WARREN. Exactly.

Mr. RUBY. Without any limitations?

Chief Justice WARREN. Within the purview of the Executive order which
established the Commission. We have the right to take testimony of
anyone we want in this whole situation, and we have the right, if we so
choose to do it, to verify that statement in any way that we wish to do
it.

Mr. RUBY. But you don't have a right to take a prisoner back with you
when you want to?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; we have the power to subpena witnesses to
Washington if we want to do it, but we have taken the testimony of
200 or 300 people, I would imagine, here in Dallas without going to
Washington.

Mr. RUBY. Yes; but those people aren't Jack Ruby.

Chief Justice WARREN. No; they weren't.

Mr. RUBY. They weren't.

Chief Justice WARREN. Now I want you to feel that we are not here to
take any advantage of you, because I know that you are in a delicate
position, and unless you had indicated not only through your lawyers
but also through your sister, who wrote a letter addressed either
to me or to Mr. Rankin saying that you wanted to testify before the
Commission, unless she had told us that, I wouldn't have bothered you.

Because I know you do have this case that is not yet finished, and I
wouldn't jeopardize your position by trying to insist that you testify.

So I want you to feel that you are free to refrain from testifying any
time you wish.

But I will also be frank with you and say that I don't think it would
be to your advantage to tell us as much as you have and then to stop
and not tell us the rest. I can't see what advantage that would give
you.

Mr. RUBY. The thing is this, that with your power that you have, Chief
Justice Warren, and all these gentlemen, too much time has gone by for
me to give you any benefit of what I may say now.

Chief Justice WARREN. No; that isn't a fact, because until we make our
findings for the Commission, and until we make our report on the case,
it is not too late.

And there are other witnesses we have who are yet to be examined. So
from our standpoint, it is timely. We are not handicapped at all by the
lateness of your examination.

Mr. RUBY. Well, it is too tragic to talk about.

Mr. RANKIN. Isn't it true that we waited until very late in our
proceedings to talk to Mrs. Kennedy?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; I might say to you that we didn't take Mrs.
Kennedy's statement until day before yesterday. Mr. Rankin and I took
her testimony then.

So we are not treating you different from any other witness.

Mr. RUBY. I tell you, gentlemen, my whole family is in jeopardy. My
sisters, as to their lives.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes?

Mr. RUBY. Naturally, I am a foregone conclusion. My sisters Eva,
Eileen, and Mary, I lost my sisters.

My brothers Sam, Earl, Hyman, and myself naturally--my in-laws, Harold
Kaminsky, Marge Ruby, the wife of Earl, and Phyllis, the wife of Sam
Ruby, they are in jeopardy of loss of their lives. Yet they have, just
because they are blood related to myself--does that sound serious
enough to you, Chief Justice Warren?

Chief Justice WARREN. Nothing could be more serious, if that is the
fact. But your sister, I don't know whether it was your sister Eva or
your other sister----

Mr. RUBY. Eileen wrote you a letter.

Chief Justice WARREN. Wrote the letter to me and told us that you would
like to testify, and that is one of the reasons that we came down here.

Mr. RUBY. But unfortunately, when did you get the letter, Chief Justice
Warren?

Chief Justice WARREN. It was a long time ago, I admit. I think it was,
let's see, roughly between 2 and 3 months ago.

Mr. RUBY. Yes.

Chief Justice WARREN. I think it was; yes.

Mr. RUBY. At that time when you first got the letter and I was begging
Joe Tonahill and the other lawyers to know the truth about me, certain
things that are happening now wouldn't be happening at this particular
time.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes?

Mr. RUBY. Because then they would have known the truth about Jack Ruby
and his emotional breakdown.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes?

Mr. RUBY. Of why that Sunday morning--that thought never entered my
mind prior to that Sunday morning when I took it upon myself to try to
be a martyr or some screwball, you might say.

But I felt very emotional and very carried away for Mrs. Kennedy, that
with all the strife she had gone through--I had been following it
pretty well--that someone owed it to our beloved President that she
shouldn't be expected to come back to face trial of this heinous crime.

And I have never had the chance to tell that, to back it up, to prove
it.

Consequently, right at this moment I am being victimized as a part of a
plot in the world's worst tragedy and crime at this moment.

Months back had I been given a chance--I take that back. Sometime back
a police officer of the Dallas Police Department wanted to know how
I got into the building. And I don't know whether I requested a lie
detector test or not, but my attorney wasn't available.

When you are a defendant in the case, you say "speak to your attorney,"
you know. But that was a different time. It was after the trial,
whenever it happened.

At this moment, Lee Harvey Oswald isn't guilty of committing the crime
of assassinating President Kennedy. Jack Ruby is.

How can I fight that, Chief Justice Warren?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well now, I want to say, Mr. Ruby, that as far as
this Commission is concerned, there is no implication of that in what
we are doing.

Mr. RUBY. All right, there is a certain organization here----

Chief Justice WARREN. That I can assure you.

Mr. RUBY. There is an organization here, Chief Justice Warren, if it
takes my life at this moment to say it, and Bill Decker said be a man
and say it, there is a John Birch Society right now in activity, and
Edwin Walker is one of the top men of this organization--take it for
what it is worth, Chief Justice Warren.

Unfortunately for me, for me giving the people the opportunity to get
in power, because of the act I committed, has put a lot of people in
jeopardy with their lives.

Don't register with you, does it?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; I don't understand that.

Mr. RUBY. Would you rather I just delete what I said and just pretend
that nothing is going on?

Chief Justice WARREN. I would not indeed. I am only interested in what
you want to tell this Commission. That is all I am interested in.

Mr. RUBY. Well, I said my life, I won't be living long now. I know
that. My family's lives will be gone. When I left my apartment that
morning----

Chief Justice WARREN. What morning?

Mr. RUBY. Sunday morning.

Chief Justice WARREN. Sunday morning.

Mr. RUBY. Let's go back. Saturday I watched Rabbi Seligman. Any of you
watch it that Saturday morning?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; I didn't happen to hear it.

Mr. RUBY. He went ahead and eulogized that here is a man that fought in
every battle, went to every country, and had to come back to his own
country to be shot in the back [starts crying].

I must be a great actor, I tell you that.

Chief Justice WARREN. No.

Mr. RUBY. That created a tremendous emotional feeling for me, the way
he said that. Prior to all the other times, I was carried away.

Then that Saturday night, I didn't do anything but visit a little club
over here and had a Coca-Cola, because I was sort of depressed. A
fellow that owns the Pago Club, Bob Norton, and he knew something was
wrong with me in the certain mood I was in.

And I went home and that weekend, the Sunday morning, and saw a letter
to Caroline, two columns about a 16-inch area. Someone had written a
letter to Caroline. The most heartbreaking letter. I don't remember the
contents. Do you remember that?

Mr. MOORE. I think I saw it.

Mr. RUBY. Yes; and alongside that letter on the same sheet of paper was
a small comment in the newspaper that, I don't know how it was stated,
that Mrs. Kennedy may have to come back for the trial of Lee Harvey
Oswald.

That caused me to go like I did; that caused me to go like I did.

I don't know, Chief Justice, but I got so carried away. And I remember
prior to that thought, there has never been another thought in my mind;
I was never malicious toward this person. No one else requested me to
do anything.

I never spoke to anyone about attempting to do anything. No subversive
organization gave me any idea. No underworld person made any effort to
contact me. It all happened that Sunday morning.

The last thing I read was that Mrs. Kennedy may have to come back to
Dallas for trial for Lee Harvey Oswald, and I don't know what bug got
ahold of me. I don't know what it is, but I am going to tell the truth
word for word.

I am taking a pill called Preludin. It is a harmless pill, and it is
very easy to get in the drugstore. It isn't a highly prescribed pill. I
use it for dieting.

I don't partake of that much food. I think that was a stimulus to give
me an emotional feeling that suddenly I felt, which was so stupid, that
I wanted to show my love for our faith, being of the Jewish faith, and
I never used the term and I don't want to go into that--suddenly the
feeling, the emotional feeling came within me that someone owed this
debt to our beloved President to save her the ordeal of coming back. I
don't know why that came through my mind.

And I drove past Main Street, past the County Building, and there was a
crowd already gathered there. And I guess I thought I knew he was going
to be moved at 10 o'clock, I don't know. I listened to the radio; and I
passed a crowd and it looked--I am repeating myself--and I took it for
granted he had already been moved.

And I parked my car in the lot across from the Western Union. Prior
to that, I got a call from a little girl--she wanted some money--that
worked for me, and I said, "Can't you wait till payday?" And she said,
"Jack, you are going to be closed."

So my purpose was to go to the Western Union--my double purpose--but
the thought of doing, committing the act wasn't until I left my
apartment.

Sending the wire was when I had the phone call--or the money order.

I drove down Main Street--there was a little incident I left out, that
I started to go down a driveway, but I wanted to go by the wreaths, and
I saw them and started to cry again.

Then I drove, parked the car across from the Western Union, went into
the Western Union, sent the money order, whatever it was, walked the
distance from the Western Union to the ramp--I didn't sneak in. I
didn't linger in there.

I didn't crouch or hide behind anyone, unless the television camera can
make it seem that way.

There was an officer talking--I don't know what rank he had--talking to
a Sam Pease in a car parked up on the curb.

I walked down those few steps, and there was the person that--I
wouldn't say I saw red--it was a feeling I had for our beloved
President and Mrs. Kennedy, that he was insignificant to what my
purpose was.

And when I walked down the ramp--I would say there was an 8-foot
clearance--not that I wanted to be a hero, or I didn't realize that
even if the officer would have observed me, the klieg lights, but I
can't take that.

I did not mingle with the crowd. There was no one near me when I walked
down that ramp, because if you will time the time I sent the money
order, I think it was 10:17 Sunday morning.

I think the actual act was committed--I take that back--was it 11
o'clock? You should know this.

Mr. MOORE. 11:21.

Mr. RUBY. No; when Oswald was shot.

Mr. MOORE. I understood it to be 11:22.

Mr. RUBY. The clock stopped and said 11:21. I was watching on that
thing; yes. Then it must have been 11:17, closer to 18. That is the
timing when I left the Western Union to the time of the bottom of the
ramp.

You wouldn't have time enough to have any conspiracy, to be
self-saving, to mingle with the crowd, as it was told about me.

I realize it is a terrible thing I have done, and it was a stupid
thing, but I just was carried away emotionally. Do you follow that?

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; I do indeed, every word.

Mr. RUBY. I had the gun in my right hip pocket, and impulsively, if
that is the correct word here, I saw him, and that is all I can say.
And I didn't care what happened to me.

I think I used the words, "You killed my President, you rat." The next
thing, I was down on the floor.

I said, "I am Jack Ruby. You all know me."

I never used anything malicious, nothing like s.o.b. I never said that
I wanted to get three more off, as they stated.

The only words, and I was highly emotional; to Ray Hall--he
interrogated more than any other person down there--all I believe I
said to him was, "I didn't want Mrs. Kennedy to come back to trial."

And I forget what else. And I used a little expression like being of
the Jewish faith, I wanted to show that we love our President, even
though we are not of the same faith.

And I have a friend of mine--do you mind if it is a slipshod story?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; you tell us in your own way.

Mr. RUBY. A fellow whom I sort of idolized is of the Catholic faith,
and a gambler. Naturally in my business you meet people of various
backgrounds.

And the thought came, we were very close, and I always thought a lot of
him, and I knew that Kennedy, being Catholic, I knew how heartbroken
he was, and even his picture--of this Mr. McWillie--flashed across me,
because I have a great fondness for him.

All that blended into the thing that, like a screwball, the way it
turned out, that I thought that I would sacrifice myself for the few
moments of saving Mrs. Kennedy the discomfiture of coming back to trial.

Now all these things of my background, I should have been the last
person in the world to want to be a martyr. It happens, doesn't it,
Chief Warren?

I mean, for instance, I have been in the night club business, a
burlesque house. It was a means of a livelihood. I knew persons of
notorious backgrounds years ago in Chicago. I was with the union
back in Chicago, and I left the union when I found out the notorious
organization had moved in there. It was in 1940.

Then recently, I had to make so many numerous calls that I am sure you
know of. Am I right? Because of trying to survive in my business.

My unfair competition had been running certain shows that we were
restricted to run by regulation of the union, but they violated all the
rules of the union, and I didn't violate it, and consequently I was
becoming insolvent because of it.

All those calls were made with only, in relation to seeing if they can
help out, with the American Guild of Variety Artists. Does that confirm
a lot of things you have heard?

Every person I have called, and sometimes you may not even know a
person intimately, you sort of tell them, well, you are stranded down
here and you want some help--if they know of any official of the
American Guild of Variety Artists to help me. Because my competitors
were putting me out of business.

I even flew to New York to see Joe Glazer, and he called Bobby Faye. He
was the national president. That didn't help. He called Barney Ross and
Joey Adams. All these phone calls were related not in anyway involved
with the underworld, because I have been away from Chicago 17 years
down in Dallas.

As a matter of fact, I even called a Mr.--hold it before I say
it--headed the American Federation of Labor--I can't think--in the
State of Texas--Miller.

Chief Justice WARREN. I don't know.

Mr. RUBY. Is there a Deutsch I. Maylor? I called a Mr. Maylor here in
Texas to see if he could help me out.

I want to set you gentlemen straight on all the telephone calls I
had. This was a long time prior to what has happened. And the only
association I had with those calls, the only questions that I inquired
about, was if they could help me with the American Guild of Variety
Artists, to see that they abolished it, because it was unfair to
professional talent, abolish them from putting on their shows in
Dallas. That is the only reason I made those calls. Where do we go from
there?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, I will go back to the original question
that I asked you. Did you ever know Oswald?

Mr. RUBY. No; let me add--you are refreshing my mind about a few
things.

Can I ask one thing? Did you all talk to Mr. McWillie? I am sure you
have.

VOICE. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. He always wanted me to come down to Havana, Cuba; invited me
down there, and I didn't want to leave my business because I had to
watch over it.

He was a key man over the Tropicana down there. That was during our
good times. Was in harmony with our enemy of our present time.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes?

Mr. RUBY. I refused. I couldn't make it. Finally he sent me tickets to
come down, airplane tickets.

I made the trip down there via New Orleans, and so I stayed at the
Volk's Apartments, and I was with him constantly.

And I was bored with the gambling, because I don't gamble, and there is
nothing exciting unless you can speak their language, which is Spanish,
I believe.

And that was the only environment. That was in August of 1959.

Any thought of ever being close to Havana, Cuba, I called him
frequently because he was down there, and he was the last person to
leave, if I recall, when they had to leave, when he left the casino.

As a matter of fact, on the plane, if I recall, I had an article he
sent me, and I wanted to get it published because I idolized McWillie.
He is a pretty nice boy, and I happened to be idolizing him.

When the plane left Havana and landed in the United States, some
schoolteacher remarked that the United States is not treating Castro
right. When they landed in the United States, this Mr. Louis McWillie
slugged this guy for making that comment.

So I want you to know, as far as him having any subversive thoughts,
and I wanted Tony to put it in the paper here. That is how much I
thought of Mr. McWillie. And that is my only association.

The only other association with him was, there was a gentleman here
that sells guns. He has a hardware store on Singleton Avenue.

Have I told this to you gentlemen? It is Ray's Hardware. His name is
Ray Brantley.

This was--I don't recall when he called me, but he was a little worried
of the new regime coming in, and evidently he wanted some protection.

He called me or sent me a letter that I should call Ray Brantley. He
wanted some four little Cobra guns--big shipment.

So me, I should say myself rather, feeling no harm, I didn't realize,
because he wasn't sending them to me, and I thought there was no crime,
the man wanted protection, he is earning a livelihood.

I called Ray Brantley and I said, "Ray, McWillie called me." I don't
remember if he sent me a letter or he called. He said he wants four
little Cobras, or something like that.

He said "I know Mac. I have been doing business with him for a long
time." Meaning with reference to when he was living in Texas. He did a
lot of hunting and things like that.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes?

Mr. RUBY. That was the only relationship I had of any mention, outside
of phone calls, to Mr. McWillie, or any person from Havana, Cuba.

Chief Justice WARREN. When was that?

Mr. RUBY. Now the guns--am I correct? Did you ever go to check on it?
On Ray Brantley?

Mr. MOORE. No.

Mr. RUBY. He denies I ever called. Evidently he feels, maybe he feels
it would be illegal to send guns out of the country. I don't know if
you gentlemen know the law. I don't know the law.

Chief Justice WARREN. I don't know.

Mr. RUBY. I kept--did I tell you this, Joe, about this?

Mr. TONAHILL. Yes; you did.

Mr. RUBY. That I wanted someone to go to Ray Brantley?

Mr. TONAHILL. Yes.

Mr. RUBY. When Phil Burleson came back with a letter signed, an
affidavit that Ray Brantley said he never did receive a call from me,
and the only gun he sent to McWillie was to the Vegas, but it came back
that they didn't pick it up because it was a c.o.d. order.

This definitely would do me more harm, because if I tell my story that
I called Ray Brantley, and he denies that he ever got a call from me,
definitely that makes it look like I am hiding something.

Haven't I felt that right along, Joe?

Mr. TONAHILL. You sure have, Jack.

Mr. RUBY. Now, the reason I am telling you these things, I never knew
Lee Harvey Oswald. The first time I ever have seen him was the time in
the assembly room when they brought him out, when he had some sort of a
shiner on his eye.

Chief Justice WARREN. When was that little incident about the Cobras?
About what year? That is all I am interested in.

Mr. RUBY. Could have been prior to the early part of 1959.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; all right.

Mr. RUBY. That is the only call I made. And as a matter of fact, I
didn't even follow up to inquire of this Mr. Brantley, whether he
received it or what the recourse was. That is why I tell you, Chief
Justice Warren--who is this new gentleman, may I ask?

Mr. RANKIN. This is Mr. Storey from your community, a lawyer who is
working with the attorney general, and Mr. Jaworski, in connection with
watching the work of the Commission so that they will be satisfied
as to the quality of the work done insofar as the State of Texas is
concerned.

(Pause for reporter to change paper, and Ruby asked about one of the
gentlemen, to which Chief Justice Warren replied as follows):

Chief Justice WARREN (referring to Mr. Specter). He has been working
with us on the Commission since very close to the beginning now.

Mr. RANKIN. How long did you spend in Cuba on this trip?

Mr. RUBY. Eight days. A lot of your tourists were there. As a matter of
fact, a lot of group tourists were going down, students of schools.

I mean, he had a way of purchasing tickets from Havana that I think he
purchased them at a lesser price. He bought them from the travel agent
in the Capri Hotel.

He bought them--did you meet McWillie?

Mr. MOORE. I didn't.

Mr. RANKIN. He was checked by the Commission in connection with this
work.

Chief Justice WARREN. There was some story in one of the papers that
you had been interested in shipping jeeps down to Cuba. Was there
anything to that at all?

Mr. RUBY. No; but this was the earlier part, when the first time Castro
had ever invaded Cuba. There was even a Government article that they
would need jeeps. I don't recall what it was, but I never had the
facilities or the capabilities of knowing where to get jeeps.

But probably in conversation with other persons--you see, it is a new
land, and they have to have a lot of things. As a matter of fact, the
U.S. Government was wanting persons to help them at that particular
time when they threw out the dictator, Batista.

And one particular time there was a gentleman that smuggled guns to
Castro. I think I told you that, Mr. Moore; I don't remember.

Mr. MOORE. I don't recall that.

Mr. RUBY. I think his name was Longley out of Bay--something--Texas, on
the Bayshore. And somehow he was, I read the article about him, that he
was given a jail term for smuggling guns to Castro. This is the early
part of their revolution.

Chief Justice WARREN. Before the Batista government fell?

Mr. RUBY. Yes; I think he had a boat, and he lived somewhere in Bay
something, Bayshore, in the center part of Texas. Do you know him, Mr.
Storey? Do you know this man?

Mr. STOREY. No; I don't know him.

Mr. RUBY. How can I prove my authenticity of what I have stated here
today?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, you have testified under oath, and I don't
even know that there is anything to disprove what you have said.

Mr. RUBY. No; because I will say this. You don't know if there
is anything to disprove, but at this moment, there is a certain
organization in this area that has been indoctrinated, that I am the
one that was in the plot to assassinate our President.

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell us what that is?

Mr. RUBY. The John Birch Society.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us what basis you have for that, Mr. Ruby?

Mr. RUBY. Just a feeling of it. Mr. Warren, you don't recall when
I--Friday night after leaving the Times Herald, I went to my apartment
and very impatiently awakened George Senator. As a matter of fact, used
the words, as I state, "You will have to get up, George. I want you to
go with me."

And he had been in bed for a couple of hours, which was about, I
imagine, about 4:30 or a quarter to 5 in the morning.

And I called the club and I asked this kid Larry if he knew how to pack
a Polaroid, and he said "Yes."

And I said, "Get up." And we went down and picked up Larry. And in the
meantime, I don't recall if I stopped at the post office to find out
his box number of this Bernard Weissman. I think the box number was
1792, or something to that; and then there was, it came to my mind when
I left the Times Herald--I am skipping back--why I had awakened George.

I recall seeing a sign on a certain billboard "Impeach Earl Warren."
You have heard something about that?

Chief Justice WARREN. I read something in the paper, yes; that is all.

Mr. RUBY. And it came from New Bedford, or Massachusetts; I don't
recall what the town was.

And there was a similar number to that, but I thought at the time it
would be the same number of 1792, but it was 1757.

That is the reason I went down there to take the Polaroid picture of
it, because of that remaining in the city at the time.

What happened to the picture, I don't know. I asked Jim Bowie or
Alexander to tell you.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you know Weissman before that?

Mr. RUBY. Never knew him. When I said Jim Bowie, no one says a word.

Mr. BOWIE. We never have seen them.

Mr. RUBY. They were in my person.

Mr. BOWIE. But no evidence came?

Mr. RUBY. No; it did not, never. As a matter of fact, I went to the
post office to check on box 1792. I even inquired with the man in
charge of where you purchase the boxes, and I said to him, "Who bought
this box?"

And he said, "I can't give you the information. All I know is, it is a
legitimate business box purchase."

And I checked the various contents of mail there.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you know Officer Tippit?

Mr. RUBY. I knew there was three Tippits on the force. The only one
I knew used to work for the special services, and I am certain this
wasn't the Tippit, this wasn't the man.

Mr. RANKIN. The man that was murdered. There was a story that you were
seen sitting in your Carousel Club with Mr. Weissman, Officer Tippit,
and another who has been called a rich oil man, at one time shortly
before the assassination. Can you tell us anything about that?

Mr. RUBY. Who was the rich oil man?

Mr. RANKIN. Can you remember? We haven't been told. We are just trying
to find out anything that you know about him.

Mr. RUBY. I am the one that made such a big issue of Bernard Weissman's
ad. Maybe you do things to cover up, if you are capable of doing it.

As a matter of fact, Saturday afternoon we went over to the Turf Bar
lounge, and it was a whole hullabaloo, and I showed the pictures
"Impeach Earl Warren" to Bellocchio, and he saw the pictures and got
very emotional.

And Bellocchio said, "Why did the newspaper take this ad of Weissman?"

And Bellocchio said, "I have got to leave Dallas."

And suddenly after making that statement, I realized it is his
incapability, and suddenly you do things impulsively, and suddenly you
realize if you love the city, you stay here and you make the best of
it. And there were witnesses.

I said, "The city was good enough for you all before this. Now you feel
that way about it." And that was Bellocchio.

As far as Tippit, it is not Tippitts, it is not Tippitts it is Tippit.

Mr. RANKIN. This Weissman and the rich oil man, did you ever have a
conversation with them?

Mr. RUBY. There was only a few. Bill Rudman from the YMCA, and I
haven't seen him in years.

And there is a Bill Howard, but he is not a rich oil man. He owns the
Stork Club now. He used to dabble in oil.

Chief Justice WARREN. This story was given by a lawyer by the name of
Mark Lane, who is representing Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, the mother of
Lee Harvey Oswald, and it was in the paper, so we subpenaed him, and
he testified that someone had given him information to the effect that
a week or two before President Kennedy was assassinated, that in your
Carousel Club you and Weissman and Tippit, Officer Tippit, the one who
was killed, and a rich oil man had an interview or conversation for an
hour or two.

And we asked him who it was that told him, and he said that it was
confidential and he couldn't tell at the moment, but that he would find
out for us if whether he could be released or not from his confidential
relationship.

He has never done it, and we have written him several letters asking
him to disclose the name of that person, and he has never complied.

Mr. RUBY. Isn't that foolish? If a man is patriotic enough in the first
place, who am I to be concerned if he wasn't an informer.

I am incarcerated, nothing to be worried about anyone hurting me.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Ruby, I am not questioning your story at all.
I wanted you to know the background of this thing, and to know that it
was with us only hearsay. But I did feel that our record should show
that we would ask you the question and that you would answer it, and
you have answered it.

Mr. RUBY. How many days prior to the assassination was that?

Chief Justice WARREN. My recollection is that it was a week or two. Is
that correct?

Mr. RUBY. Did anyone have any knowledge that their beloved President
was going to visit here prior to that time, or what is the definite
time that they knew he was coming to Dallas?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, I don't know just what those dates are.

Mr. RUBY. I see.

Chief Justice WARREN. I just don't know. Well, we wanted to ask you
that question, because this man had so testified, and we have been
trying ever since to get him to give the source of his information, but
he will not do it, so we will leave that matter as it is.

Mr. RUBY. No; I am as innocent regarding any conspiracy as any of
you gentlemen in the room, and I don't want anything to be run over
lightly. I want you to dig into it with any biting, any question that
might embarrass me, or anything that might bring up my background,
which isn't so terribly spotted--I have never been a criminal--I have
never been in jail--I know when you live in the city of Chicago and
you are in the livelihood of selling tickets to sporting events, your
lucrative patrons are some of these people, but you don't mean anything
to those people. You may know them as you get acquainted with them at
the sporting events or the ball park.

Chief Justice WARREN. The prizefights?

Mr. RUBY. The prizefights. If that was your means of livelihood,
yet you don't have no other affiliation with them, so when I say I
know them, or what I have read from stories of personalities that
are notorious, that is the extent of my involvement in any criminal
activity.

I have never been a bookmaker. I have never stolen for a living. I am
not a gangster. I have never used a goon squad for union activities.

All I was was a representative to sound out applications for the
American Federation of Labor, and if the employees would sign it, we
would accept them as members.

I never knew what a goon looked like in Chicago, with the exception
when I went to the service.

I never belonged to any subversive organization. I don't know any
subversive people that are against my beloved country.

Mr. RANKIN. You have never been connected with the Communist Party?

Mr. RUBY. Never have. All I have ever done in my life--I had a very
rough start in life, but anything I have done, I at least try to do it
in good taste, whatever I have been active in.

Mr. RANKIN. There was a story that you had a gun with you during the
showup that you described in the large room there.

Mr. RUBY. I will be honest with you. I lied about it. It isn't so. I
didn't have a gun. But in order to make my defense more accurate, to
save your life, that is the reason that statement was made.

Mr. RANKIN. It would be quite helpful to the Commission if you
could--in the first place, I want to get the trip to Cuba. Was that in
1959?

Mr. RUBY. Yes; because I had to buy a $2 ticket, a pass to get through
Florida.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have any other trip to Cuba?

Mr. RUBY. Never; that is the only one that I made.

I stayed at the Volk's Apartments with Mr. McWillie, lived in his
apartment. Ate directly in a place called Wolf's, downstairs. Wouldn't
know how to speak their language. I wouldn't know how to communicate
with them.

I probably had two dates from meeting some young ladies I got to
dancing with, because my dinners were served in the Tropicana.

One thing I forgot to tell you--you are bringing my mind back to a few
things--the owners, the greatest that have been expelled from Cuba, are
the Fox brothers. They own the Tropicana.

Mr. RANKIN. Who are the Fox brothers?

Mr. RUBY. Martin Fox and I can't think of the other name.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know where they are located now?

Mr. RUBY. They are in Miami, Fla. They know everything about McWillie,
I heard; and know the officials.

I met McWillie because he came to the club, and he came to the club to
look over the show. And you get to talk to people and meet a lot of
different types of people.

The Fox brothers came to Dallas--I don't know which one it was--to
collect a debt that some man owed the Cotton Gin Co. here.

Do you know their name, Mr. Bowie?

Mr. BOWIE. Murray, or something.

Mr. RUBY. He gave some bad checks on a gambling debt, and they came to
visit me. The lawyer, I think, is Mark Lane. That is the attorney that
was killed in New York?

Chief Justice WARREN. That is the fellow who represents, or did
represent Mrs. Marguerite Oswald. I think I read in the paper where he
no longer represents her.

Mr. RANKIN. He is still alive though.

Chief Justice WARREN. Oh, yes.

Mr. RUBY. There was one Lane that was killed in a taxicab. I thought he
was an attorney in Dallas.

Chief Justice WARREN. That was a Dave Lane.

Mr. RUBY. There is a very prominent attorney in Dallas, McCord. McCord
represents the Fox brothers here. They called me because the Fox
brothers wanted to see me, and I came down to the hotel.

And Mrs. McWillie--Mr. McWillie was married to her at that time--and if
I recall, I didn't show them off to the airport at that time.

This is when they were still living in Havana, the Fox brothers. We had
dinner at--how do you pronounce that restaurant at Love Field? Luau?
That serves this Chinese food.

Dave McCord, I was in his presence, and I was invited out to dinner,
and there was an attorney by the name of Leon. Is he associated with
McCord?

And there was a McClain.

Chief Justice WARREN. Alfred was killed in a taxi in New York.

Mr. RUBY. He was at this dinner meeting I had with McCord. I don't know
if Mrs. McWillie was along. And one of the Fox brothers, because they
had just been awarded the case that this person owns, this Gin Co.,
that was compelled to pay off.

Mr. RANKIN. I think, Mr. Ruby, it would be quite helpful to the
Commission if you could tell, as you recall it, just what you said to
Mr. Sorrels and the others after the shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald. Can
you recall that?

Mr. RUBY. The only one I recall Mr. Sorrels in, there were some
incorrect statements made at this time.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us what you said?

Congressman FORD. First, tell us when this took place.

Mr. RANKIN. How soon after the shooting occurred?

Mr. RUBY. Well, Ray Hall was the first one that interrogated me. Wanted
to know my whole background.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us how soon it was? Within a few minutes after
the shooting?

Mr. RUBY. No; I waited in a little room there somewhere upstairs in--I
don't know what floor it was. I don't recall.

Mr. RANKIN. Where did this occur, on the third floor?

Mr. RUBY. One of those floors. I don't know whether it was the third or
second. If you are up on an elevator----

Mr. RANKIN. Can you give us any idea of the time after the shooting?

Mr. RUBY. I spent an hour with Mr. Hall, Ray Hall. And I was very much,
I was very much broken up emotionally, and I constantly repeated that
I didn't want Mrs. Kennedy to come back to trial, and those were my
words, constantly repeated to Mr. Hall.

And I heard there was a statement made--now I am skipping--and then I
gave Mr. Hall my complete background about things he wanted to know,
my earlier background going back from the years, and I guess there
was nothing else to say to Hall because as long as I stated why I did
it--it is not like planning a crime and you are confessing something. I
already confessed, and all it took is one sentence why I did it.

Now what else could I have said that you think I could have said?
Refresh my memory a little bit.

Mr. RANKIN. There was a conversation with Mr. Sorrels in which you told
him about the matter. Do you remember that?

Mr. RUBY. The only thing I ever recall I said to Mr. Ray Hall and
Sorrels was, I said, "Being of Jewish faith, I wanted to show my love
for my President and his lovely wife."

After I said whatever I said, then a statement came out that someone
introduced Mr. Sorrels to me and I said, "What are you, a newsman?" Or
something to that effect. Which is really--what I am trying to say is,
the way it sounded is like I was looking for publicity and inquiring if
you are a newsman, I wanted to see you.

But I am certain--I don't recall definitely, but I know in my right
mind, because I know my motive for doing it, and certainly to gain
publicity to take a chance of being mortally wounded, as I said before,
and who else could have timed it so perfectly by seconds.

If it were timed that way, then someone in the police department is
guilty of giving the information as to when Lee Harvey Oswald was
coming down.

I never made a statement. I never inquired from the television man what
time is Lee Harvey Oswald coming down. Because really, a man in his
right mind would never ask that question. I never made the statement
"I wanted to get three more off. Someone had to do it. You wouldn't do
it." I never made those statements.

I never called the man by any obscene name, because as I stated
earlier, there was no malice in me. He was insignificant, to my
feelings for my love for Mrs. Kennedy and our beloved President. He was
nothing comparable to them, so I can't explain it.

I never used any words--as a matter of fact, there were questions at
the hearing with Roy Pryor and a few others--I may have used one word
"a little weasel" or something, but I didn't use it. I don't remember,
because Roy said it. If he said I did, I may have said it.

I never made the statement to anyone that I intended to get him. I
never used the obscene words that were stated.

Anything I said was with emotional feeling of I didn't want Mrs.
Kennedy to come back to trial.

Representative FORD. It has been alleged that you went out to Parkland
Hospital.

Mr. RUBY. No; I didn't go there. They tried to ask me. My sisters asked
me. Some people told my sister that you were there. I am of sound mind.
I never went there. Everything that transpired during the tragedy, I
was at the Morning News Building.

Congressman FORD. You didn't go out there subsequent to the
assassination?

Mr. RUBY. No; in other words, like somebody is trying to make me
something of a martyr in that case. No; I never did.

Does this conflict with my story and yours in great length?

Mr. MOORE. Substantially the same, Jack, as well as I remember.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about people of your religion have
guts, or something like that?

Mr. RUBY. I said it. I never said it up there. I said, I could have
said, "Weren't you afraid of getting your head blown off?" I said,
"Well, to be truthful, I have a little nerve." I could have said that.

Now I could have said to the doctor that was sent to me, Bromberg,
because there is a certain familiarity you have, because it is like you
have an attorney representing you, it is there. I mean, it is there.

But I did say this. McWillie made a statement about me, something to
the effect that "he is considered a pretty rough guy," this McWillie.
He said, "One thing about Jack Ruby, he runs this club and no one runs
over him."

And you have a different type of entertainment here than any other part
of the country, our type of entertainment.

But I don't recall that. I could have said the sentimental feeling that
I may have used.

Representative FORD. When you flew to Cuba, where did you go from
Dallas en route? What was the step-by-step process by which you arrived
at Havana?

Mr. RUBY. I think I told Mr. Moore I stopped in New Orleans. Sometime
I stopped in New Orleans, and I don't remember if I stopped in Florida
or New Orleans, but I know I did stop in New Orleans, because I bought
some Carioca rum coming back.

I know I was to Miami on a stopover. It could have been on the way
back. I only went to Cuba once, so naturally, when I bought the
Carioca rum, there was a couple of fellows that sell tickets for Delta
Airlines, and they know me like I know you, and I am sure you gentlemen
have spoken to them, and they were to tell me where to go in Havana,
and have a ball, and I told them why I was going there, and who I was
going to look up, and everything else.

Representative FORD. They were Delta Airlines employees in New Orleans
or Dallas?

Mr. RUBY. No; in New Orleans. Evidently I went out to the Delta
Airlines at Love Field and caught the plane. I may have taken the
flight--here is what could have happened. I could have made a double
stop from Havana on the way back in taking in Miami, and then taking
another plane to New Orleans, I am not certain.

But I only made one trip to Havana. Yet I know I was in Miami, Fla. and
I was in New Orleans.

And the next time I went to New Orleans, when I tried to look up some
showgirl by the name of Jada, I stopped in to see the same fellows at
Delta Airlines.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall going up the elevator after the shooting of
Oswald?

Mr. RUBY. That is so small to remember, I guess it is automatic, you
know.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have this gun a long while that you did the
shooting with?

Mr. RUBY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't carry it all the time?

Mr. RUBY. I did. I had it in a little bag with money constantly. I
carry my money.

Chief Justice WARREN. Congressman, do you have anything further?

Mr. RUBY. You can get more out of me. Let's not break up too soon.

Representative FORD. When you got to Havana, who met you in Havana?

Mr. RUBY. McWillie. Now here is what happened. One of the Fox brothers
came to visit me in Dallas with his wife. They came to the Vegas Club
with Mrs. McWillie, and we had taken some pictures. 8 x 10's.

Evidently the Foxes were in exile at that time, because when I went to
visit McWillie, when he sent me the plane tickets, they looked through
my luggage and they saw a photograph of Mr. Fox and his wife. They
didn't interrogate, but they went through everything and held me up for
hours.

Representative FORD. Castro employees?

Mr. RUBY. Yes; because evidently, in my ignorance, I didn't realize I
was bringing a picture that they knew was a bitter enemy. At that time
they knew that the Fox brothers weren't going to jail, or something was
going to happen.

Whether it was they were in exile at that time. I don't know.

But they came to my club, the Vegas Club, and we had taken pictures.

Mr. McWillie was waiting for me, and he saw me go through the customs
line for a couple of hours, and he said, "Jack, they never did this to
anyone before." Evidently, they had me pretty well lined up as to where
I come in the picture of Mr. Rivera Fox. I can't think of his name.

Representative FORD. You spent 8 days there in Havana?

Mr. RUBY. Yes; approximately.

Representative FORD. And you stayed at the apartment of Mr.----

Mr. RUBY. Volk's Apartments. I never used the phone. I wouldn't know
how to use the phone. Probably to call back to Dallas. And the only
time, Mr. McWillie had to be at the club early, so I remained a little
later in town--not often--because I saved money when I rode with him,
because they charge you quite a bit. But I didn't want to get there too
early, because to get there at 7 o'clock wasn't very lively.

Because I would always be with him for the complete evening.

We leave the place and stop somewhere to get coffee, a little
dugout--I saw Ava Gardner down there at the time when I was there. She
was visiting there.

Representative FORD. What prompted you to leave at the end of 8 days?

Mr. RUBY. I was bored because gambling isn't my profession, and when
you have a business to run, and there weren't many tourists I could get
acquainted with there.

I went to the Capri rooftop to go swimming, and went to the Nacional to
go swimming once.

Representative FORD. Did you ever go to Mexico? Have you ever been to
Mexico?

Mr. RUBY. The only time, 30 or 40 years ago, 1934.

Representative FORD. This trip to Cuba was the only time you left the
country other than military service?

Mr. RUBY. Actually I didn't leave in the military. I was stationed
three and a half years here in the States. Let's see, never out of the
United States except at one time to Havana, Cuba.

Chief Justice WARREN. Now you said there were some other things. Would
you mind telling us anything you have on your mind?

Mr. RUBY. No; because as I said earlier, you seem to have gotten the
juicy part of the story up to now in the various spasmodic way of my
telling it.

How valuable am I to you to give you all this information?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, how valuable is rather an indefinite term,
but I think it is very helpful to our Commission report. I think the
report would have been deficient if it had not been for this interview
we have had with you.

So we are interested in anything that you would like to tell us, in
your own language.

Mr. RUBY. The only thing is this. If I cannot get these tests you give,
it is pretty haphazard to tell you the things I should tell you.

Mr. Moore, you seem to have known more about my interrogation than
anybody else, right?

Mr. MOORE. I think you have told us about everything you told me.

Mr. RANKIN. It isn't entirely clear how you feel that your family
and you yourself are threatened by your telling what you have to the
Commission.

How do you come to the conclusion that they might be killed? Will you
tell us a little bit more about that, if you can?

Mr. RUBY. Well, assuming that, as I stated before, some persons are
accusing me falsely of being part of the plot--naturally, in all the
time from over 6 months ago, my family has been so interested in
helping me.

Mr. RANKIN. By that, you mean a party to the plot of Oswald?

Mr. RUBY. That I was party to a plot to silence Oswald.

All right now, when your family believes you and knows your mannerisms
and your thoughts, and knows your sincerity, they have lived with you
all your life and know your emotional feelings and your patriotism--on
the surface, they see me only as the guilty assailant of Oswald, and by
helping me like they have, going all out.

My brother who has a successful business, I know he is going to be
killed. And I haven't seen him in years. And suddenly he feels that he
wants to help me, because he believes that I couldn't be any further
involved than the actual----

When I told him I did it because of Mrs. Kennedy, that is all he had
to hear, because I would never involve my family or involve him in a
conspiracy.

Everyone haven't let me down. Because they read the newspapers away
from Dallas that stated certain facts about me, but they are untrue,
because they wouldn't come out and put those things in the newspapers
that they should be putting in; and people outside of Dallas read
the Dallas newspapers and are all in sympathy with me, as far as the
country itself.

That they felt, well, Jack did it. They probably felt they would do the
same thing.

That sympathy isn't going to help me, because the people that have the
power here, they have a different verdict. They already have me as the
accused assassin of our beloved President.

Now if I sound screwy telling you this, then I must be screwy.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Ruby, I think you are entitled to a statement
to this effect, because you have been frank with us and have told us
your story.

I think I can say to you that there has been no witness before this
Commission out of the hundreds we have questioned who has claimed to
have any personal knowledge that you were a party to any conspiracy to
kill our President.

Mr. RUBY. Yes; but you don't know this area here.

Chief Justice WARREN. No; I don't vouch for anything except that I
think I am correct in that, am I not?

Mr. RANKIN. That is correct.

Chief Justice WARREN. I just wanted to tell you before our own
Commission, and I might say to you also that we have explored the
situation.

Mr. RUBY. I know, but I want to say this to you. If certain people have
the means and want to gain something by propagandizing something to
their own use, they will make ways to present certain things that I do
look guilty.

Chief Justice WARREN. Well. I will make this additional statement to
you, that if any witness should testify before the Commission that you
were, to their knowledge, a party to any conspiracy to assassinate the
President, I assure you that we will give you the opportunity to deny
it and to take any tests that you may desire to so disprove it.

I don't anticipate that there will be any such testimony, but should
there be, we will give you that opportunity.

Does that seem fair?

Mr. RUBY. No; that isn't going to save my family.

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, we can't do everything at once.

Mr. RUBY. I am in a tough spot, and I don't know what the solution can
be to save me.

And I know our wonderful President, Lyndon Johnson, as soon as he was
the President of his country, he appointed you as head of this group.
But through certain falsehoods that have been said about me to other
people, the John Birch Society, I am as good as guilty as the accused
assassin of President Kennedy.

How can you remedy that, Mr. Warren? Do any of you men have any ways of
remedying that?

Mr. Bill Decker said be a man and speak up. I am making a statement now
that I may not live the next hour when I walk out of this room.

Now it is the most fantastic story you have ever heard in a lifetime.
I did something out of the goodness of my heart. Unfortunately, Chief
Earl Warren, had you been around 5 or 6 months ago, and I know your
hands were tied, you couldn't do it, and immediately the President
would have gotten ahold of my true story, or whatever would have been
said about me, a certain organization wouldn't have so completely
formed now, so powerfully, to use me because I am of the Jewish
extraction, Jewish faith, to commit the most dastardly crime that has
ever been committed.

Can you understand now in visualizing, what happened, what powers, what
momentum has been carried on to create this feeling of mass feeling
against my people, against certain people that were against them prior
to their power?

That goes over your head, doesn't it?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, I don't quite get the full significance of
it, Mr. Ruby. I know what you feel about the John Birch Society.

Mr. RUBY. Very powerful.

Chief Justice WARREN. I think it is powerful, yes I do. Of course, I
don't have all the information that you feel you have on that subject.

Mr. RUBY. Unfortunately, you don't have, because it is too late. And
I wish that our beloved President, Lyndon Johnson, would have delved
deeper into the situation, hear me, not to accept just circumstantial
facts about my guilt or innocence, and would have questioned to find
out the truth about me before he relinquished certain powers to these
certain people.

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, I am afraid I don't know what power you
believe he relinquished to them. I think that it is difficult to
understand what you have to say.

Mr. RUBY. I want to say this to you. The Jewish people are being
exterminated at this moment. Consequently, a whole new form of
government is going to take over our country, and I know I won't live
to see you another time.

Do I sound sort of screwy in telling you these things?

Chief Justice WARREN. No; I think that is what you believe, or you
wouldn't tell it under your oath.

Mr. RUBY. But it is a very serious situation. I guess it is too late to
stop it, isn't it?

All right, I want to ask you this. All you men have been chosen by the
President for this committee, is that correct?

Chief Justice WARREN. Representative Ford and I are the only members of
the Commission that are here.

Mr. Rankin of the Commission is employed as our chief counsel.

Mr. Rankin employed Mr. Specter and Mr. Ball as members of the staff.

You know who the other gentlemen here are.

You know that Mr. Moore is a member of the Secret Service, and he has
been a liaison officer with our staff since the Commission was formed.

Representative FORD. Are there any questions that ought to be asked to
help clarify the situation that you described?

Mr. RUBY. There is only one thing. If you don't take me back to
Washington tonight to give me a chance to prove to the President that I
am not guilty, then you will see the most tragic thing that will ever
happen.

And if you don't have the power to take me back, I won't be around to
be able to prove my innocence or guilt.

Now up to this moment, I have been talking with you for how long?

Chief Justice WARREN. I would say for the better part of 3 hours.

Mr. RUBY. All right, wouldn't it be ridiculous for me to speak sensibly
all this time and give you this climactic talk that I have?

Maybe something can be saved, something can be done.

What have you got to answer to that, Chief Justice Warren?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, I don't know what can be done. Mr. Ruby,
because I don't know what you anticipate we will encounter.

Representative FORD. Is there anything more you can tell us if you went
back to Washington?

Mr. RUBY. Yes; are you sincere in wanting to take me back?

Representative FORD. We are most interested in all the information you
have.

Mr. RUBY. All I know is maybe something can be saved. Because right
now, I want to tell you this, I am used as a scapegoat, and there is no
greater weapon that you can use to create some falsehood about some of
the Jewish faith, especially at the terrible heinous crime such as the
killing of President Kennedy.

Now maybe something can be saved. It may not be too late, whatever
happens, if our President, Lyndon Johnson, knew the truth from me.

But if I am eliminated, there won't be any way of knowing.

Right now, when I leave your presence now. I am the only one that can
bring out the truth to our President, who believes in righteousness and
justice.

But he has been told, I am certain, that I was part of a plot to
assassinate the President.

I know your hands are tied; you are helpless.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Ruby. I think I can say this to you, that if
he has been told any such thing, there is no indication of any kind
that he believes it.

Mr. RUBY. I am sorry. Chief Justice Warren. I thought I would be very
effective in telling you what I have said here. But in all fairness to
everyone, maybe all I want to do is beg that if they found out I was
telling the truth, maybe they can succeed in what their motives are,
but maybe my people won't be tortured and mutilated.

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, you may be sure that the President and his
whole Commission will do anything that is necessary to see that your
people are not tortured.

Mr. RUBY. No.

Chief Justice WARREN. You may be sure of that.

Mr. RUBY. No; the only way you can do it is if he knows the truth, that
I am telling the truth, and why I was down in that basement Sunday
morning, and maybe some sense of decency will come out and they can
still fulfill their plan, as I stated before, without my people going
through torture and mutilation.

Chief Justice WARREN. The President will know everything that you have
said, everything that you have said.

Mr. RUBY. But I won't be around, Chief Justice. I won't be around to
verify these things you are going to tell the President.

Mr. TONAHILL. Who do you think is going to eliminate you, Jack?

Mr. RUBY. I have been used for a purpose, and there will be a certain
tragic occurrence happening if you don't take my testimony and somehow
vindicate me so my people don't suffer because of what I have done.

Chief Justice WARREN. But we have taken your testimony. We have it
here. It will be in permanent form for the President of the United
States and for the Congress of the United States, and for the courts of
the United States, and for the people of the entire world.

It is there. It will be recorded for all to see. That is the purpose of
our coming here today. We feel that you are entitled to have your story
told.

Mr. RUBY. You have lost me though. You have lost me, Chief Justice
Warren.

Chief Justice WARREN. Lost you in what sense?

Mr. RUBY. I won't be around for you to come and question me again.

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, it is very hard for me to believe that. I
am sure that everybody would want to protect you to the very limit.

Mr. RUBY. All I want is a lie detector test, and you refuse to give it
to me.

Because as it stands now--and the truth serum, and any
other--Pentothal--how do you pronounce it, whatever it is. And they
will not give it to me, because I want to tell the truth.

And then I want to leave this world. But I don't want my people to be
blamed for something that is untrue, that they claim has happened.

Chief Justice WARREN. Mr. Ruby, I promise you that you will be able to
take such a test.

Mr. RUBY. When?

Chief Justice WARREN. You will have to let me see when we can figure
that out. But I assure you, it won't be delayed, because our desire
is to terminate the work of the Commission and make our report to the
public just as soon as possible, so there won't be any misunderstanding
caused by all of these rumors or stories that have been put out that
are not consistent with the evidence in the case.

But it will not be unnecessarily delayed, and we will do it on behalf
of the Commission, I promise you.

Mr. RUBY. All I want, and I beg you--when are you going to see the
President?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, I have no date with the President. I don't
know just when. But as soon as I do see him, I will be glad to tell him
what you have said.

Mr. RUBY. All I want is to take a polygraph to tell the truth. That is
all I want to do.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; that, I promise you you can do.

Mr. RUBY. Because my people are going to suffer about things that will
be said about me.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes; well, I promise.

Mr. RUBY. Hold on another minute.

Chief Justice WARREN. All right.

Mr. RUBY. How do you know if the facts I stated about everything I
said, statements with reference to, are the truth or not?

Chief Justice WARREN. Well, if you want a test made to test those
principal questions, we will work them out so they can be tested.

As I understand it, you can't use the polygraph to say now this is the
story.

Mr. RUBY. I know that.

Chief Justice WARREN. To say you have the story of Jack Ruby. You can't
do that.

Mr. RUBY. I know that. You can clarify by questioning me when I
conceived the idea and what my answer would naturally be that Sunday
morning.

Chief Justice WARREN. Maybe I can help the situation this way. Suppose
you list for us, if you can, the questions that you would like to have
asked of you on the polygraph to establish the truth of your testimony.

What things do you consider vital in it, and what would you like to
have verified?

Mr. RUBY. Yes; but you are telling me to do these things--these things
are going to be promised, but you see they aren't going to let me do
these things.

Because when you leave here, I am finished. My family is finished.

Representative FORD. Isn't it true, Mr. Chief Justice, that the same
maximum protection and security Mr. Ruby has been given in the past
will be continued?

Mr. RUBY. But now that I have divulged certain information because I
want to be honest, all I want to take is a polygraph test and tell the
truth about things and combat the lies that have been told about me.

Now maybe certain people don't want to know the truth that may come out
of me. Is that plausible?

Representative FORD. In other words, the Chief Justice has agreed, and
I on the Commission wholeheartedly concur, that you will be given a
polygraph test as expeditiously as possible.

And I am sure you can rely on what has been stated here by the Chairman.

Mr. RUBY. How are we going to communicate and so on?

Chief Justice WARREN. We will communicate directly with you.

Mr. RUBY. You have a lost cause, Earl Warren. You don't stand a chance.
They feel about you like they do about me, Chief Justice Warren.

I shouldn't hurt your feelings in telling you that.

Chief Justice WARREN. That won't hurt my feelings, because I have had
some evidence of the feeling that some people have concerning me.

Mr. RUBY. But you are the only one that can save me. I think you can.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes?

Mr. RUBY. But by delaying minutes, you lose the chance. And all I want
to do is tell the truth, and that is all.

There was no conspiracy. But by you telling them what you are going to
do and how you are going to do it is too late as of this moment.

Chief Justice WARREN. You take my word for it and the word of
Representative Ford, that we will do this thing at the earliest
possible moment, and that it will be done in time. It will be done in
time.

Mr. RUBY. Well, you won't ever see me again, I tell you that. And I
have lost my family.

Chief Justice WARREN. Yes?

Mr. RUBY. No, no; you don't believe me, do you?

Chief Justice WARREN. To be frank with you, I believe that you are not
stating now what is the fact.

I don't say you don't believe it, but I believe that I will be able to
see you again and that we will be able to take this test that you are
speaking of.

Well, I think we have tired Mr. Ruby. We have had him here for close to
4 hours now, and I am sure our reporter must be equally tired, but we
appreciate your patience and your willingness to testify in this manner
for us.

Mr. RUBY. All I want to do is tell the truth, and the only way you can
know it is by the polygraph, as that is the only way you can know it.

Chief Justice WARREN. That we will do for you.

(Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



_Monday, June 8, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF HENRY WADE, PATRICK D. DEAN, AND WAGGONER CARR

The President's Commission met at 9:25 a.m., on June 8, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman
Cooper and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich,
assistant counsel; Dr. Alfred Goldberg, historian; Waggoner Carr,
attorney general of Texas, and Charles Murray, observers.


TESTIMONY OF HENRY WADE

Senator COOPER. Will you raise your hand?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give this
Commission will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?

Mr. WADE. I do.

Senator COOPER. You are informed about the purposes of this
investigation.

Mr. WADE. I know it, generally.

Senator COOPER. Do you desire a lawyer?

Mr. WADE. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. Thank you very much.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Wade, we are going to ask you generally about the time
of Mr. Oswald's, Lee Harvey Oswald's, arrest, what you had to do in
connection with the entire matter, and the press being there at the
jail, and the scene and seeing what happened there, and the various
things in regard to Mr. Dean and other witnesses in connection with the
matter.

Will you state your name?

Mr. WADE. Henry Wade.

Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live?

Mr. WADE. I am district attorney, or criminal district attorney of
Dallas, Tex.; my home is in Dallas.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us briefly your qualifications for your
position and profession?

Mr. WADE. Well, I am a graduate of the University of Texas Law School,
1938, with highest honors. I was county attorney at Rock Wall, Tex.,
another county for 1 year. I resigned on December 4, 1939, and became
a special agent of the FBI. As a special agent of the FBI--I was there
until August of 1943, these were rough months--when I resigned and
became an apprentice seaman in the Navy.

Later I became a lieutenant, junior grade, served in the Pacific 2
years, about 2 years.

Then after the war I got out of the Navy on the 6th of February 1946,
ran for district attorney in Dallas and was not elected at that
time. I hadn't ever lived in Dallas prior to that. You see there was
another county. I was assistant district attorney and then was Federal
prosecutor from January 1, 1947, up until December 1949, when I
resigned and ran for district attorney.

I was elected district attorney in 1950 and have been criminal district
attorney of Dallas County since January 1, 1951.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you handled many of the prosecutions of that county
since that time?

Mr. WADE. Well, my office or I have handled all of them since that
time. I have had quite a bit of experience myself. I have a staff of
41 lawyers and, of course, I don't try all the cases but I have tried
quite a few, I would say 40, 50 anyhow since I have been district
attorney.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any particular policy about which cases you
would try generally?

Mr. WADE. Well, it varies according to who my first assistant has been.
It is varied. If I have a first assistant who likes to try cases, I
usually let him try a lot and I do the administrative. At the present
time I have a very fine administrative assistant, Jim Bowie, whom you
met and I try a few more cases.

I guess I have tried four in the last year probably but two to five a
year are about all the cases I try myself personally.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any policy about capital cases as to whether
you should try them or somebody else?

Mr. WADE. I don't try all of them. I try all the cases that are very
aggravated and receive probably some publicity to some extent, and
I don't try all the capital cases. I think we have had quite a few
death penalties but I don't imagine I have been in over half of them,
probably half of them.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you remember where you were at the time you learned of
the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. WADE. Well, they were having a party for President Kennedy at
Market Hall and I was out at Market Hall waiting for the President to
arrive.

Mr. RANKIN. How did you learn about the assassination?

Mr. WADE. Well, one of the reporters for one of the newspapers told
me there had been a shooting or something, of course, one of those
things we were getting all kinds of rumors spreading through a crowd
of 3,000-5,000 people, and then they got the radio on and the first
report was they had killed two Secret Service agents, that was on the
radio, and then the press all came running in there and then ran out,
no one knew for sure what was going on until finally they announced
that President had been shot and from the rostrum there the chairman of
the----

Mr. DULLES. Who was the chairman of that meeting, do you recall?

Mr. WADE. Eric Johnson. Eric Johnson.

Mr. RANKIN. Was he mayor then?

Mr. WADE. No; he wasn't mayor, he was the president of Texas Industries
and I believe was president of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce. I may
have been wrong on that but he has been president of the chamber
of commerce. He is president of Texas Industries, and this is not
particularly important but he is--that was sort of a bipartisan deal,
in that he is one of the leading Republicans of Dallas and he was
chairman of the meeting.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you do after you heard of the assassination?

Mr. WADE. Well, the first thing, we were set up in a bus to go from
there to Austin to another party that night for President Kennedy, a
group of us, 30 or 40. We got on a bus and went. I went back to the
office and sent my wife home, my wife was with me.

And the first thing that I did was go check the law to see whether it
was a Federal offense or mine. I thought it was a Federal offense when
I first heard about it. We checked the law, and were satisfied that was
no serious Federal offense, or not a capital case, anyhow.

There might be some lesser offense. I talked to the U.S. attorney.

Mr. RANKIN. Who was that?

Mr. WADE. Barefoot Sanders and he was in agreement it was going to be
our case rather than his and he had been doing the same thing.

Mr. RANKIN. Where did you talk to him?

Mr. WADE. On the telephone as I recall, in his office from my office. I
am not even sure I talked with him, somebody from my office talked to
him, because I think you can realize things were a little confused and
that took us, say, until 3:30 or 4.

I let everybody in the office go home, but some of my key personnel who
stayed there. I let the girls or told them they could go home, because
they did close all the offices down there. The next thing I did--do you
want me to tell you?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. I will tell you what I can.

The next thing I did was to go by the sheriff's office who is next door
to me and talked to Decker, who is the sheriff. Bill Decker, and they
were interviewing witnesses who were on the streets at the time, and I
asked him and he said they have got a good prospect.

This must have been 3 o'clock roughly.

Mr. RANKIN. The witnesses that were on the street near the Depository
Building?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; and in the building, I am not sure who they were,
they had two court reporters there taking statements.

Mr. RANKIN. Did they tell you anything about a suspect at that point?

Mr. WADE. The Sheriff told me, he said, "Don't say nothing about it,
but they have got a good suspect," talking about the Dallas Police.

He didn't have him there. John Connally, you know, was shot also--and
he was, he used to be a roommate of mine in the Navy and we were good
friends, and are now--and the first thing I did then was went out to
the hospital to see how he was getting along.

I must have stayed out there until about 5 o'clock, and in case you all
don't know or understand one thing, it has never been my policy to make
any investigations out of my office of murders or anything else for
that matter. We leave that entirely to the police agency.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have a reason for that?

Mr. WADE. That is the way it is set up down there. We have more than we
can do actually in trying the cases. The only time we investigate them
is after they are filed on, indicted, and then we have investigators
who get them ready for trial and then lawyers.

Mr. DULLES. Have you any personnel for that?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I have in my office 11 investigators but that is
just 1 for each court, and they primarily, or at least about all they
do is line up the witnesses for trial and help with jury picking and
things of that kind.

Mr. RANKIN. At this point that you are describing, had you learned of
any arrest?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; Mr. Decker says they have a good suspect. He said
that sometime around 3 o'clock. You see, I didn't have the benefit of
all that was on the air. I didn't even know Oswald had been arrested at
this time. As a matter of fact, I didn't know it at 5 o'clock when I
left the hospital.

When I left the hospital, I went home, watched television a while, had
dinner, and a couple, some friends of ours came over there. They were
going to Austin with us on the bus, and we had dinner and started out
somewhere but I said we had better go by the police station.

At that time they kept announcing they had Oswald or I believe they
named a name.

Mr. RANKIN. Had you learned about the Tippit murder yet?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; of course, it had been on the air that Tippit had
been killed.

I went by the Dallas police, just to let us see what was kind of going
on.

Mr. RANKIN. Was that unusual for you to do that?

Mr. WADE. It was unusual because I hadn't been in the Dallas Police
Department, I won't be there on the average of once a year actually, I
mean on anything. I went by there and I went to Chief Curry's office.

Mr. RANKIN. How did you happen to do that this time?

Mr. WADE. Of course, this is not really, this was not an ordinary case,
this was a little bit different, and I mostly wanted to know how he was
coming along on the investigation is the main reason I went by.

As I went in, and this is roughly 6:30, 7 at night--I said we ate
dinner at home, I believe the couple were out in the car with my wife
were waiting for me to go to dinner with them.

Mr. DULLES. Did you go down to the airfield when President Johnson left?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; no, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You did not.

Mr. WADE. I didn't go anywhere but to my office, then to Parkland
Hospital and then home, and then I was there a while and then I went by
the police station, mostly to see how they were coming along. Papers
were announcing, the radios, I mean, were announcing, television, that
they had a suspect and was even telling them what some of the evidence
was against him.

Mr. RANKIN. About what time was this at the police station?

Mr. WADE. I would say around 7 o'clock. This can vary 30 minutes either
way.

Mr. RANKIN. Who did you see there?

Mr. WADE. Chief Curry.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you talk to him?

Mr. WADE. I talked to him.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say to him and what did he say to you?

Mr. WADE. Well, it is hard to remember. I know the first thing he did
was pull out a memorandum that you all were interested in, signed by
Jack Revill, and showed it to me and I read it, and said, "What do you
think about that?"

And I said----

Mr. DULLES. I wonder if you would identify this for the record?

Mr. WADE. You can get it. Let me tell you the story. I read that thing
there hurriedly and I remember it mentioned that Agent Hosty had talked
to Revill----

Senator COOPER. Who was that?

Mr. WADE. Hosty.

Senator COOPER. Can you identify him as to what he does?

Mr. WADE. He is a special agent of the FBI, but I don't think I would
know him if he walked in here actually.

But that is his business. He showed me that, and I read it. Now, as far
as identifying it, I have seen--I have a copy of it in my files.

You see, when they turned the records over to me and I read it and
looked it over and to the best of my knowledge was the same memorandum
he showed me, although all I did was glance at it and it said generally
they knew something about him and knew he was in town or something like
that.

Senator COOPER. Who said that?

Mr. WADE. This memorandum said that.

Senator COOPER. Who is reported to be quoting the memorandum?

Mr. WADE. Special Agent Hosty. Now, I have since looked at the
memorandum. So far as I know it is the same memorandum, but like I
say I read it there and I don't know whether it is the--I don't know
whether it said word for word to be the same thing but it appears to me
to my best knowledge to be the same memorandum.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know when you first got the memorandum in your files
that you are referring to?

Mr. WADE. It was a month later. You see the police gave me a record of
everything on the Ruby case, I would say some time about Christmas.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 709 and ask you if
that is the memorandum you just referred to?

Mr. WADE. Yes; to the best of my knowledge that is the memorandum he
showed me there at 7 p.m. on the 22d day of November 1963.

Jack Revill incidentally, you all have talked with him, but he is one
of the brightest, to my mind, of the young Dallas police officers.

As a matter of fact, when we got into the Ruby trial, I asked that they
assign Jack Revill to assist us in the investigation and he assisted
with picking of the jury and getting the witnesses all through the Ruby
trial.

Mr. RANKIN. Would your records show when you received a copy of this
document, Commission Exhibit No. 709?

Mr. WADE. Well, I am sure it would. It would be the day--you can trace
it back to when the newspapers said he had turned all the files over to
me and it was around Christmas as I recall, and I believe actually it
was after Christmas, but probably 30 days, but you see they turned over
a file that thick to me, I imagine. It was of all of that, the same
thing they turned over to you, everything the police had on Jack Ruby.

Mr. RANKIN. You put a receipt stamp on anything like that?

Mr. WADE. I don't think it will show a date or anything like that on it
because they just hauled it in there and laid it on my desk. But this
was--it is in our files, and I am rather sure it is the same time. You
all got the same thing.

Mr. RANKIN. We didn't receive anything like that until the time that
Chief Curry came to testify, just for your information.

Mr. WADE. Well, I didn't know that, but now on this, this is the Ruby
matter----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Just to refresh my recollection of your testimony, did you
see this that afternoon around 5 or 6 o'clock?

Mr. WADE. Around 7 o'clock I would say it was on Chief Curry's desk.

Mr. DULLES. Of the 22d?

Mr. WADE. Of the 22d.

Senator COOPER. I don't want to interrupt too much, but looking at
this exhibit, I note it is written, you have seen this Commission,
Commission Exhibit No. 709 signed by Jack Revill?

Mr. WADE. Yes; let me see it; yes.

Senator COOPER. Is your recollection, was the memorandum that was shown
to you by--first, who did show you the memorandum on the 22d?

Mr. WADE. Chief Curry of the Dallas police.

Senator COOPER. Was the memorandum shown to you on the 22d by Chief
Curry in this same form?

Mr. WADE. To the best of my knowledge that was it now.

Now, like I said I read this memorandum, and I read the memorandum, and
asked the chief what he was going to do with it and he said, "I don't
know."

And then the next morning I heard on television Chief Curry, I don't
know whether I heard him or not, he made some kind of statement
concerning this memorandum on television, and then later came back and
said that wasn't to his personal knowledge, and I think that was--he
said that what he said about it he retracted it to some extent but I
guess you all have got records of those television broadcasts or at
least can get them.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you remember whether he said just what was in this
Exhibit No. 709 or something less than that or more or what?

Mr. WADE. I don't remember. You see, things were moving fast, and it is
hard, there are so many things going on. I will go on to my story.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. I will answer anything, of course.

Mr. RANKIN. You can tell us the rest that you said to Chief Curry and
he said to you at that time, first.

Mr. WADE. I asked him how the case was coming along and as a practical
matter he didn't know. You probably have run into this, but there is
really a lack of communication between the chief's office and the
captain of detective's office there in Dallas.

Mr. RANKIN. You found that to be true.

Mr. WADE. For every year I have been in the office down there. And
I assume you have taken their depositions. I don't know what the
relations--the relations are better between Curry and Fritz than
between Hanson and Fritz, who was his predecessor. But Fritz runs a
kind of a one-man operation there where nobody else knows what he is
doing. Even me, for instance, he is reluctant to tell me, either, but
I don't mean that disparagingly. I will say Captain Fritz is about as
good a man at solving a crime as I ever saw, to find out who did it
but he is poorest in the getting evidence that I know, and I am more
interested in getting evidence, and there is where our major conflict
comes in.

I talked to him a minute there and I don't believe I talked to Captain
Fritz. One of my assistants was in Fritz's office. I believe I did walk
down the hall and talk briefly, and they had filed, they had filed on
Oswald for killing Tippit.

Mr. DULLES. Which assistant was that?

Mr. WADE. Bill Alexander. There was another one of--another man there,
Jim Allen, who was my former first assistant who is practicing law
there in Dallas and frankly I was a little surprised of seeing him
there, he is a real capable boy but he was there in homicide with
Captain Fritz. They were good friends.

And I know there is no question about his intentions and everything
was good, but he was just a lawyer there, but he had tried many death
penalty cases with Fritz--of Fritz's cases.

But he was there. Your FBI was there, your Secret Service were there in
the homicide.

Mr. RANKIN. Who from the FBI, do you recall?

Mr. WADE. Well, I saw Vince Drain, a special agent that I knew,
and Jim Bookhout, I believe, and there was Mr. Kelley and Mr.
Sorrels--Inspector Kelley of the Secret Service, Sorrels, Forest
Sorrels.

I might tell you that also, to give you a proper perspective on this
thing, there were probably 300 people then out in that hall.

You could hardly walk down the hall. You just had to fight your way
down through the hall, through the press up there.

Mr. RANKIN. Who were they?

Mr. WADE. The television and newsmen. I say 300, that was all that
could get into that hall and to get into homicide it was a strain to
get the door open hard enough to get into the office.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything to Chief Curry about that?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I probably mentioned it but I assume you
want--whether I meant he ought to clean them out or not. I didn't tell
him he should or shouldn't because I have absolutely no control over
the police. They are a separate entity. They have a municipality, and
they work under a city manager.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything to Chief Curry about what should be
told the press about investigation, how it was progressing or anything
of that kind?

Mr. WADE. Yes; I think that is the brief conversation, that is the last
I talked to Curry that night. I may have talked to--but that is all I
recall. I left thereafter, and went on out to dinner.

Mr. RANKIN. About what time did you leave?

Mr. WADE. 7, 7:30, something like that. I got home, say, 9:30 or 10,
after eating dinner, and I believe I talked to the U.S. attorney or at
least I saw it come on the radio that they are going to file on Oswald
as part of an international conspiracy in murdering the U.S. President,
and I think I talked to Barefoot Sanders. He called me or I called him.

Mr. RANKIN. I wanted to get for the record, Mr. Wade, who would be
trying to file like that.

Mr. WADE. I don't know. All I know it wasn't me. It was told to me at
one time that the justice of the peace said something about it and
another one, one of my assistants, Alexander had said something about
it and I have talked to both of them since and both of them deny so I
don't know who suggested it or anything but it was on the radio and I
think on television.

I know I heard it and I am not sure where.

Mr. RANKIN. Can you tell us whether it was from your office or from a
Federal office that such an idea was developing as far as you know?

Mr. WADE. Well, on that score it doesn't make any sense at all to me
because there is no such crime in Texas, being part of an international
conspiracy, it is just murder with malice in Texas, and if you allege
anything else in an indictment you have to prove it and it is all
surplusage in an indictment to allege anything, whether a man is a John
Bircher or a Communist or anything, if you allege it you have to prove
it.

So, when I heard it I went down to the police station and took the
charge on him, just a case of simple murder.

Mr. DULLES. Is that of Tippit or of the President?

Mr. WADE. No; of the President, and the radio announced Johnston was
down there, and Alexander, and of course other things, and so I saw
immediately that if somebody was going to take a complaint that he
is part of an international conspiracy it had to be a publicity deal
rather--somebody was interested in something other than the law because
there is no such charge in Texas as part of--I don't care what you
belong to, you don't have to allege that in an indictment.

Mr. RANKIN. What do you mean by the radio saying that Johnson was
there? Do you mean President Johnson?

Mr. WADE. No; that is the justice of the peace whose name is Johnston.

Mr. RANKIN. I see.

Mr. WADE. Yes; Justice of the Peace David L. Johnston was the justice
of the peace there.

So, I went down there not knowing--also at that time I had a lengthy
conversation with Captain Fritz and with Jim Alexander who was in the
office, Bill Alexander, Bookhout because another reason I thought maybe
they were going to want to file without the evidence, and then that put
everything on me, you know.

If they didn't have the evidence and they said, "We file on him, we
have got the assassin" I was afraid somebody might take the complaint
and I went down to be sure they had some evidence on him.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us all that you said to the U.S. attorney
when you talked to him at that time?

Mr. WADE. So far as I know. I know that concerned that point, you know.

Mr. RANKIN. Well, did he say anything to you about that point?

Mr. WADE. Well, I think he asked me was that--I don't think Barefoot
was real conversant, I guess is the word with what the law is in a
murder charge.

I told him that it had no place in it and he said he had heard it on
the radio and didn't know whether it would be--thought it might because
some--if it was not necessary, he did not think it ought to be done,
something to that effect so I went down there to be sure they didn't.

I went over the evidence which they--when I saw the evidence, it was
the evidence as told to me by Captain Fritz.

Mr. RANKIN. This conversation you have described you had when Jim
Alexander was there and the others?

Mr. WADE. Yes; I first asked Jim Allen, a man whom I have a lot of
confidence in, do they have a case and he said it looks like a case,
you can try.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that the case about the assassination?

Mr. WADE. Yes; we are talking entirely about the assassination.

On the Tippit thing, I didn't take the charge on that and I think they
had some witnesses who had identified him there at the scene, but I was
more worried about the assassination of them filing on somebody that we
couldn't prove was guilty.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you discuss the evidence that they did have at that
time with Captain Fritz?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us what evidence you recall?

Mr. WADE. I have made no notes but roughly he gave the story about him
bringing the gun to work, saying it was window rods from the neighbor,
someone who had brought him to work. He also said there were three
employees of the company that left him on the sixth floor. He told
about, the part about, the young officer running in there right after
the assassination and Oswald leaving after the manager said that he was
employed there. Told about his arrest and said that there was a scuffle
there, and that he tried to shoot the officer.

I don't know--I think I am giving you all this because I think a little
of it may vary from the facts but all I know is what Fritz told me.

He said the Dallas police had found a palmprint on the underside of the
gun of Oswald. At that time, the FBI was standing by to fly the gun to
the laboratory here in Washington which incidentally, they didn't find,
but I assume the Commission has interviewed Senator--not Senator--Day,
the fingerprint man of the Dallas police but I have learned since that
he probably can't identify the palmprint under there but at that time
they told me they had one on it.

They said they had a palmprint on the wrapping paper, and on the box, I
believe there by the scene. They did at least put Oswald there at the
scene.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you clarify the palmprint that you are referring to on
the rifle?

Was it on the underside of the rifle, was it between the rifle and the
stock or where was it as you recall?

Mr. WADE. Specifically, I couldn't say because--but he said they had a
palmprint or a fingerprint of Oswald on the underside of the rifle and
I don't know whether it was on the trigger guard or where it was but I
knew that was important, I mean, to put the gun in his possession.

I thought we had that all the time when I took the complaint on the
thing.

Let me see what else they had that night. Well, they had a lot of the
things they found in his possession. They had the map, you know, that
marked the route of the parade. They had statements from the bus driver
and the taxicab driver that hauled him somewhere.

I think they varied a little as to where they picked him up but
generally they had some type of statement from them.

That is generally what they gave me now.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all you recall as of that time?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you give any report to the press then about----

Mr. WADE. No; I will tell you what happened then.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WADE. As we walked out of the thing they started yelling, I started
home, and they started yelling they wanted to see Oswald, the press.

And Perry said that he had put him in the showup room downstairs. Of
course, they were yelling all over the world they wanted a picture of
Oswald. And I don't know the mob and everybody ended up in the showup
room. It is three floors below there.

Mr. RANKIN. Still Friday night?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. About what time?

Mr. WADE. I would say around midnight roughly. It would--it could be
either way an hour because I went down there around 11 o'clock, 10:30
or 11, some roughly and I don't know what the time element was but I
would say around midnight.

So, they started interviewing Fritz and Curry, and I started to leave
and Fritz said, "Well, we will get--" either Fritz or Curry said, "We
will show him up down there," he said, "This is Mr. Wade, the district
attorney."

He kind of introduced me to the press. I didn't say anything at that
time but down in the basement they started to put Oswald--I went down
there with them. They started to put Oswald in the lineup down there.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you describe that briefly to the Commission?

Mr. WADE. Well, I don't know whether you have seen--it is a room larger
than this and you have a glass here on this side. Behind that glass
they have a place out here where they walk prisoners in through there
and you can see through this side but you can't see through that side.
I think that is the way it is set up.

Senator COOPER. You mean observers can see?

Mr. WADE. Observers can see, but the defendants or suspects can't see
through or at least can't identify.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you remember who else besides Lee Harvey Oswald was in
the showup?

Mr. WADE. No; I am just telling you about the showup room. Now, they
had had showups on him but I wasn't there at any of those, but this
was, the purpose of this, was to let the press see Oswald, if I
understand it.

And the police were yelling, "Everybody wants to see him, wants a
picture of him." They started in the screened-in portion and a howl
went up that you can't take a picture through that screen. Then they
had a conference with, among some of them, and the next thing I knew
I was just sitting there upon a little, I guess, elevated, you might
say a speaker's stand, although there were 300 people in the room, you
couldn't even actually get out, you know.

Mr. RANKIN. Did they ask you whether they should do this?

Mr. WADE. I don't think I said yea or nay to the thing so far as I
know, because it was--and I actually didn't know what they were doing
until, the next thing I knew they said they were going to have to bring
him in there.

Well, I think I did say, "You'd better get some officers in here or
something for some protection on him."

I thought a little about, and I got a little worried at that stage.

So about 12 officers came in and they were standing around Oswald, and
at this time I looked out in the audience and saw a man out there,
later, who turned out to be Jack Ruby. He was there at that scene.

Mr. RANKIN. How did you happen to pick him out?

Mr. WADE. Well, I don't know. He had--I had seen the fellow somewhere
before, but I didn't know his name, but he had a pad, and the reason I
remember him mostly----

Mr. RANKIN. You mean a scratch pad?

Mr. WADE. He had some kind of scratch pad. The reason I mentioned
him mostly, I will get into him in a minute and tell you everything
about him. He was out there about 1 minute, I would say, and they took
pictures and everything else and Oswald was here and the cameras were
in a ring around him, and as they left----

Mr. RANKIN. Excuse me. Where was Ruby from where you told us where
Oswald was?

Mr. WADE. Well, he was, I would say, about 12 feet. I am giving a
rough----

Mr. RANKIN. When you saw him----

Mr. WADE. We went all through this at the trial, and it varied on where
Ruby was, but when I saw him he was about four rows back in the aisle
seat, standing up in the seat.

Mr. RANKIN. Were there press men around him?

Mr. WADE. All kinds of press men around him, and also press men 10 deep
between him and Oswald.

Now, one of their--you mentioned the gun awhile ago--one of their
defenses in the trial was if he had a gun, he had a gun there, he could
have killed him if he wanted to. It is the first I heard him say that
he didn't have a gun that you mentioned awhile ago. So when I got--when
they got through, they started asking him questions, the press.

Senator COOPER. Wait a minute. How close were the nearest people in the
audience to Oswald?

Mr. WADE. I would say they were that far from him.

Senator COOPER. How far is that?

Mr. WADE. Three feet.

Senator COOPER. You mean some of the reporters and photographers were
within 3 feet of him?

Mr. WADE. They were on the ground, they were on the ground, and they
were standing on top of each other, and on top of tables, and I assume
in that room there were 250 people. It was just a mob scene.

Senator COOPER. I believe I have seen the room. Isn't it correct that
at the end where the showup is held that is an elevated platform?

Mr. WADE. There is a platform up there where the microphone is.

Senator COOPER. Was he standing up on the platform?

Mr. WADE. No, he was not at the platform.

Senator COOPER. Was he on the floor level?

Mr. WADE. He was in the floor level in the middle. If I understand,
that was the first or second time I had ever been in the room.

Senator COOPER. Were there people around him, surrounding him?

Mr. WADE. People were on the floor in front of those desks.

Senator COOPER. But I mean, were they, were people on all sides of him?

Mr. WADE. No; they were all in front of him. They were all in front of
him, and you had a ring of policemen behind him, policemen on all sides
of him. It was just the front where they were, and that is the way I
recall it, but I knew they had a line of policemen behind him, and the
place was full of policemen, because they went up and it turns out
later they got all the police who were on duty that night. They were
plain clothes police, most of them, maybe they had a uniform or two, a
few of them.

So they started----

Senator COOPER. Excuse me one moment.

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Can I make a statement? I will have to go to my office
for a few minutes. I hope to return in about 20 minutes, and I will ask
Mr. Dulles to preside in my place, and I will return.

Mr. WADE. Thank you, sir.

(At this point, Senator Cooper withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES. Proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you proceed?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; so they said, "Have you filed on him?" At that
stage, started yelling has he been filed on, and I said yes, and
filed on for murder with malice, and they asked Judge Johnston, is
there--they asked him something.

Then they started asking me questions everywhere, from all angles.

Mr. RANKIN. Under your practice, what do you mean by file on him? Is
that something different than an arraignment?

Mr. WADE. Well, of course, it is according to the terminology and what
you mean by arraignment. In Texas the only arraignment is when you get
ready to try him. Like we arraigned Ruby just before we started putting
on evidence. That is the only arraignment we have, actually.

Mr. RANKIN. I see. You don't bring him before a magistrate?

Mr. WADE. Well, that is called--you can have an examining trial before
the magistrate to see whether it is a bailable matter. At that time, I
don't believe he had been brought before the magistrate, because I told
David Johnston as we left there, I said, "You ought to go up before the
jail and have him brought before you and advise him of his rights and
his right to counsel and this and that," which, so far as I know, he
did.

But at that meeting you had two attorneys from American Civil Liberties
Union.

Mr. RANKIN. Which meeting?

Mr. WADE. That Friday night meeting, or Friday night showup we had
better call it, midnight on Friday night. I believe it was Greer Ragio
and Professor Webster from SMU. I saw them there in the hall, and Chief
Curry told me that they had been given an opportunity or had talked
with Oswald. I am not sure. I was under the impression that they had
talked with them but, of course, I didn't see them talking with him.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you talk to them about it?

Mr. WADE. Yes; I told them that he is entitled to counsel, that is what
they are interested in on the counsel situation, and anybody, either
them or anybody else could see him that wanted to.

Mr. RANKIN. What did they say then?

Mr. WADE. Mr. Rankin, I will tell you what, there was so much going on
I don't remember exactly. The only thing was I got the impression they
had already talked with them somewhere, but I don't know whether they
told me or the chief told me or what. Like I say, it was a mob scene
there, practically, and they were standing in the door when I--they
were in the meeting there.

Let me get a little further and go back to--I don't know whether I
answered your question and if I don't it is because I can't, because I
don't know--I will tell you what happened the next day.

Mr. RANKIN. Let's finish with the showup now.

Mr. WADE. Yes. They asked a bunch of questions there. I think if
you get a record of my interview that you will find that any of the
evidence----

Mr. DULLES. Which interview is that?

Mr. WADE. With the press, midnight, radio, television, and everything
else. I think if you will get a copy of that you will find they asked
me lots of questions about fingerprints and evidence. I refused to
answer them because I said it was evidence in the case. The only thing
that I told them that you might get the impression was evidence but is
really not evidence, I told them that the man's wife said the man had
a gun or something to that effect. The reason, maybe good or bad, but
that isn't admissible in Texas. You see a wife can't testify. It is not
evidence, but it is evidence but it is inadmissible evidence actually
is what it was. So I think if you find anything in that interview that
deals with the evidence you are going to feel that it dealt only with
that piece of testimony of Marina Oswald, which someone had told me she
said about the gun was missing from the house, which I think later was
corroborated.

Mr. RANKIN. At that time, had you filed on the assassination?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; we had filed upstairs prior to this. He had been
filed on for murder with malice.

Mr. RANKIN. But he hadn't been brought before the justice of the peace
or magistrate yet on that complaint, had he?

Mr. WADE. The justice of the peace was there in the office and took it
in the homicide. Oswald was in homicide, also, but he is in a separate
office.

Like I told you, I never did see Oswald except in that lineup
downstairs. That was the first time I had seen him.

Mr. RANKIN. Was that when you told the justice of the peace that he
ought to have him before him to tell him his rights and so forth?

Mr. WADE. Yes; it was some time during that hour, this went on for
about an hour down there, everything.

Well, during that interview somebody said, and the thing--Oswald
belonged to, was he a Communist, something generally to that effect.

Mr. RANKIN. They asked you that?

Mr. WADE. I was asked that. And I said, well, now, I don't know about
that but they found some literature, I understand, some literature
dealing with Free Cuba Movement. Following this--and so I looked up and
Jack Ruby is in the audience and he said, no, it is the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee. Well, he corrected me, you see, to show you why I got
attracted to his attention, why someone in the audience would speak up
and answer a question.

Mr. DULLES. You hadn't known him before?

Mr. WADE. I had never known him, to my knowledge. He is a man about
town, and I had seen him before, because when I saw him in there, and I
actually thought he was a part of the press corps at the time.

Mr. RANKIN. Were any of your assistants or people working for you there
at that showup?

Mr. WADE. I don't believe there were any of them there now. If there is
any of them, it is Alexander, because he is the only one down there,
but I think he is still up in homicide.

I will go further on that, some of my assistants know him, but he was
in my office 2 days before this with a hot check or something where he
was trying to collect a hot check or pay someone. I think he was trying
to pay someone else's hot check off, I don't know what it was, I didn't
see him. He talked to my check section. I found this out later.

Mr. RANKIN. By "he" you mean----

Mr. WADE. Ruby, Jack Ruby.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. He was in another office of mine, since this all came out,
he was in there with a bunch of the police, we were trying a case on
pornography, some of my assistants were, and my assistant came in his
office during the noon hour after coming from the court, this was 2
or 3 days before the assassination and Ruby was sitting there in his
office with five or six Dallas police officers. In fact, he was sitting
in my assistant's desk and he started to sit down and asked who he was
and the officer said, "Well, that is Jacky Ruby who runs the Carousel
Club," so he had been down there.

I don't know him personally--I mean I didn't know who he was. It was
one of these things I had seen the man, I imagine, but I had no idea
who he was, and I will even go further, after it was over, this didn't
come out in the trial, as they left down there, Ruby ran up to me and
he said, "Hi Henry" he yelled real loud, he yelled. "Hi, Henry," and
put his hand to shake hands with me and I shook hands with him. And
he said, "Don't you know me?" And I am trying to figure out whether I
did or not. And he said, "I am Jack Ruby, I run the Vegas Club." And
I said, "What are you doing in here?" It was in the basement of the
city hall. He said, "I know all these fellows." Just shook his hand and
said, "I know all these fellows." I still didn't know whether he was
talking about the press or police all the time, but he shook his hands
kind of like that and left me and I was trying to get out of the place
which was rather crowded, and if you are familiar with that basement,
and I was trying to get out of that hall. And here I heard someone
call "Henry Wade wanted on the phone," this was about 1 o'clock in the
morning or about 1 o'clock in the morning, and I gradually get around
to the phone there, one of the police phones, and as I get there it is
Jack Ruby, and station KLIF in Dallas on the phone. You see, he had
gone there, this came out in the trial, that he had gone over there
and called KLIF and said Henry Wade is down there, I will get you an
interview with him.

Mr. RANKIN. Who is this?

Mr. WADE. KLIF is the name of the radio station.

You see, I didn't know a thing, and I just picked up the phone and they
said this is so and so at KLIF and started asking questions.

But that came out in the trial.

But to show that he was trying to be kind of the type of person who was
wanting to think he was important, you know.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you give him an interview over the telephone to KLIF?

Mr. WADE. Ruby?

Mr. RANKIN. No.

Mr. WADE. I answered about two questions and hung up, but they had
a man down there who later interviewed me before I got out of the
building. But they just asked me had he been filed and one or two
things.

Mr. DULLES. It was a KLIF reporter that you gave this to, not Ruby?

Mr. WADE. Not Ruby. Ruby was not on the phone, he had just gone out
and called him and handed the phone to me. I thought I got a call from
somebody, and picked it up and it was KLIF on the phone.

Mr. RANKIN. On the pornography charge, was Ruby involved in that?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I don't know why he was down there, actually. But
there were six or seven police officers, special services of the Dallas
police were officers in the thing and I don't know whether he was
just interested in it or what he was down there for but he was down
there, and I didn't know him. He has tried to leave the impression
that he had known me a long time but it is one of those things, I have
been in politics and sometimes there are a lot of faces I know that I
don't know actually who they are, but I didn't know who he was and he
actually introduced himself to me that night.

Well, that is about all I can recall of that night.

I went home then.

Mr. RANKIN. You have told us all you remember about the showup?

Mr. WADE. I told you all, and, of course, all I know about it as far as
my interview with the press. You can get more accurate, actually, by
getting a transcript of it because I don't remember what all was asked,
but I do remember the incident with Ruby and I know I told them that
there would be no evidence given out in the case.

At that time, most of it had already been given out, however, by
someone. I think by the police.

Now, the next morning, I don't know of anything else until the next
morning. I went to the office about 9 o'clock.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any particular transcript that you are speaking
about?

Mr. WADE. No; I don't have anything. The thing about it is this was
taken, this was on television and radio and all the networks. They had
everything there set up and that is the only--that is the first of, I
think, three times I was interviewed, but it was Friday night around
between 12 and 1 o'clock. It was actually Saturday morning between 12
and 1.

Mr. RANKIN. So there were a number of networks, possibly, and a number
of the radio stations and television stations from the whole area?

Mr. WADE. The whole area and it actually wasn't set up for an interview
with me. It was an interview, what I thought, with Fritz and Curry, and
I thought I would stay for it, but when they got into the interviewing,
I don't know what happened to them but they weren't there. They had
left, or I was the one who was answering the questions about things I
didn't know much about, to tell you the truth.

Has that got it cleared? Can I go to the next morning?

I will try to go a little and not forget anything.

The next morning I went to my office, probably, say, 9 o'clock Saturday
morning. Waiting there for me was Robert Oswald, who was the brother of
Lee Harvey Oswald. You probably have met him, but I believe his name is
Robert is his brother.

I talked to him about an hour.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say to him and what did he say to you?

Mr. WADE. Well, we discussed the history of Lee Harvey Oswald and
the--one of the purposes he came to me, he wanted his mother, Oswald's
mother, and wife and him to see Oswald.

Mr. RANKIN. Did he say this to you?

Mr. WADE. Yes; but we had already set it up, somebody, I don't know
whether my office or the police, but he was set up to see him that
morning at 11 o'clock, I believe, or 12 o'clock, some time.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you do anything about it?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; I checked to see if it was arranged. I called
Captain Fritz and told him that he wanted to see him, and he said they
were going to let him see him. I don't know. I don't know the name, but
it was either 11 o'clock or 12 o'clock Saturday morning.

I don't know whether he had requested or not, but that was the first
time I had seen him. I don't know why he came to my office, but I used
it to try to go into Lee Harvey Oswald's background some, and I also
told him that there is a lot involved in this thing from a national
point of view, and I said, "You appear to be a good citizen," which
he did appear to me, "and I think you will render your country a
great service if you will go up and tell Oswald to tell us all about
the thing." That was part of the deal of my working for a statement
from Oswald which didn't pan out, of course. Because I was going to
interview Oswald Sunday afternoon when we got him into the county jail
and I was going to attempt to get a statement from him.

Mr. RANKIN. Did Robert tell you anything about Lee Harvey Oswald's
background at that time?

Mr. WADE. He told me about in Europe, how in Russia, how they had had
very little correspondence with them and he wrote to them renouncing or
telling them he wanted to renounce his American citizenship and didn't
want to have anything else to do with him. He said later that one of
the letters changed some, I mean back, and then he said he was coming
home, coming back and he had married and kind of his general history
of the thing and he came back and I believe stayed with this Robert in
Fort Worth for 2, 3, or 4 months. Now I say this is from memory, like
I don't have--and they had helped him some, and said that Marina, the
thing that impressed her was most your supermarkets, I think, more than
anything else in this country, your A. & P. and the big, I guess you
call them, supermarkets or whatever they are.

And he told me something about him going to New Orleans, but I gathered
that they were not too close. I believe he told me this, that he hadn't
seen him in close to a year prior to this, or a good while.

Now, it seemed to me like it was a year, and he said their families,
they didn't have anything in common much, and he said, of course--I
said "Do you think"--I said, "the evidence is pretty strong against
your brother, what do you think about it?" He said, "Well, he is my
brother, and I hate to think he would do this." He said, "I want to
talk to him and ask him about it."

Now, I never did see him. Roughly, that is about all I remember from
that conversation. We rambled around for quite a bit.

I know I was impressed because he got out and walked out the front
of my office and in front of my office there were 15 or 20 press men
wanting to ask him something, and he wouldn't say a word to them, he
just walked off.

I told him they would be out there, and he said, "I won't have anything
to say."

Mr. DULLES. Was this the morning after the assassination?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; Saturday morning.

Mr. DULLES. About what time?

Mr. WADE. I would say between 9 and 10 is when I talked with him.

And so the main purpose in the office, we believed, the main purpose
of me and the lawyers in the office were briefing the law on whether
to try Oswald for the murder of the President, whether you could prove
the flight and the killing of Officer Tippit, which we became satisfied
that we could, I mean from an evidentiary point of view.

Mr. RANKIN. By "we" who do you mean, in your office?

Mr. WADE. Well, I think I had seven or eight in there, Bowie, and
Alexander, and Dan Ellis, Jim Williamson, but there was a legal point.

My office was open, but that, with reference to this case, there were
other things going on, but in reference to this case, this is what we
spent our time trying to establish whether that would be admissible or
not.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you consult with any Federal officers in regard to how
you should handle the case or what you should say about it at any time?

Mr. WADE. No; I didn't discuss, consult with any of them. I did talk to
some of the FBI boys and I believe there was an inspector.

Mr. RANKIN. Secret Service?

Mr. WADE. No.

Mr. RANKIN. FBI?

Mr. WADE. There was an inspector of the FBI who called me two or three
times. I don't remember.

Mr. RANKIN. Did they tell you how to handle the case in any way?

Mr. WADE. I don't think so. I mean it wasn't really up to them.

Mr. RANKIN. The only time you ever talked to Barefoot Sanders about it
was in regard to this conspiracy, possibility of, that you have already
described?

Mr. WADE. Frankly, that is hard to say. I think we talked off and on
every day or two about developments in it, because, you see, well, I
don't know whether we talked any more but before the killing by Ruby,
but we had nearly a daily conversation about the files in the Oswald
case, what we were going to do with them. You see, they were going to
give them all to me, and at that stage we didn't know whether it was
going to be a President's Commission or a congressional investigation
or what. After the President's Commission was set up, I arranged
through him and Miller here in the Justice Department that rather than
give the files to me, to get the police to turn them over to the FBI
and send them to you all, or photostat them and send them to you all.

Barefoot and I talked frequently, but I don't know of anything
significant of the Oswald angle that we discussed, and we spent the
last 2 months trying to get some of the FBI files to read on the Ruby
trial. I mean we talked a lot but I don't know anything further about
Oswald into it or anything on Ruby of any particular significance.

Mr. RANKIN. Was Barefoot Sanders suggesting how you should handle the
Oswald case except the time you already related?

Mr. WADE. I don't recall him doing, suggesting that.

Mr. RANKIN. Any other Federal officers suggesting anything like that to
you?

Mr. WADE. The only thing I remember is the inspector of the FBI whom I
don't think I ever met. I was there in the police one time during this
shuffle, and I think it was some time Saturday morning, and he said
they should have nothing, no publicity on the thing, no statements.

Now, I don't know whether that was after Ruby shot Oswald or before, I
don't know when it was, but I did talk with him and I know his concern
which was that there was too much publicity.

Mr. RANKIN. And he told you that, did he?

Mr. WADE. At some stage in it. I am thinking it was Sunday night which
I know I talked with him Sunday night, but we are not that far along
with it yet. But I don't know whether I talked to him previously or not.

Mr. RANKIN. That is the only conversation of that type that you recall
with any Federal officer?

Mr. WADE. That is all I recall. I am sure Barefoot and I discussed the
publicity angle on it some, but I don't remember Barefoot suggesting
how we handle it, but neither one of us knew whether it was his offense
or mine, to begin with, for 2 or 3 hours because we had to select it.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know what Barefoot said about publicity when you did
discuss it with him?

Mr. WADE. I don't recall anything.

Mr. RANKIN. All right.

What happened next, as you recall?

Mr. WADE. I was going home. I went by the police station to talk to
Chief Curry.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you discuss the evidence then?

Mr. WADE. Well, at that time--you see, Chief Curry knew very little of
the evidence at that stage. He should have known, but he didn't. But I
discussed the thing with him and I told him there was too much evidence
being put out in the case from his department, that I wish he would
talk to Fritz and have no further statements on it.

Mr. RANKIN. What did he say about that?

Mr. WADE. He said, "That is fine. I think that is so."

Mr. RANKIN. Now, going back just a moment, you spoke out about a map
earlier that you had been told they had as evidence, do you recall, of
the parade route. Did you look at the map at the time?

Mr. WADE. I don't think I ever saw the map.

Mr. RANKIN. You don't know what it contained in regard to the parade
route?

Mr. WADE. I was told by Fritz that it had the parade route and it had
an X where the assassination took place and it had an X out on Stemmons
Freeway and an X at Inwood Road and Lemon, is all I know, a circle or
some mark there.

Mr. RANKIN. But you have never seen the map?

Mr. WADE. So far as I know, I have never seen the map. I don't know
even where it was found, but I think it was found in his home,
probably. But that is my recollection. But I don't even know that. I
told Chief Curry this.

Then I walked out, and Tom Pettit of NBC said, "We are all confused on
the law, where we are really on this thing."

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say?

Mr. WADE. At that time I said, "Well, I will explain the procedure,
Texas procedure in a criminal case," and I had about a 10-minute
interview there as I was leaving the chief's office, dealing entirely
with the procedure, I mean your examining trial and grand jury and jury
trial. I mean as to what takes place. You see, they had all kinds of
statements and other countries represented and they were all curious to
ask legal questions, when bond would be set and when it would be done.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you discuss the evidence at that time?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I refused. You will find that I refused to answer
questions. They all asked questions on it, but I would tell them that
is evidence and that deals with evidence in the matter.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you tell them why you wouldn't answer those questions?

Mr. WADE. I told them we had to try the case, here, and we would have
to try the case and we wouldn't be able to get a jury if they knew all
the evidence in the case.

You will find that in those interviews most, I think. I haven't seen
them. As a matter of fact, didn't see them myself even. But I went home
that day, and----

Mr. DULLES. That day is Saturday?

Mr. WADE. Saturday; yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. About what time? Do you recall?

Mr. WADE. I guess I got home 2:30 probably. I must have eaten on the
way home or somewhere.

Mr. RANKIN. In the afternoon?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; and I know I was amazed as I walked through the
television room there and saw Chief Curry with that gun. You see,
at that time they had not identified the gun as his gun, but he was
telling about the FBI report on it.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you just describe what you saw there at that time?

Mr. WADE. Well, I know he was in a crowd, and it seems to me like
he had the gun, but on second thought I am not even sure whether he
had the gun, but he was tracing the history of how that the gun was
bought under the name, under an assumed name from a mail-order house
in Chicago and mailed there to Dallas, and that the serial number
and everything that had been identified, that the FBI had done that,
something else.

I believe they said they had a post office box here, a blind post
office box that the recipients of that had identified as Oswald as the
guy or something that received it.

In other words, he went directly over the evidence connecting him with
the gun.

Mr. RANKIN. You say there was a crowd there. Who was the crowd around
him?

Mr. WADE. Newsmen. You see, I was at home. I was watching it on
television.

Mr. RANKIN. I see. Did you do anything about that, then? Did you call
him and ask him to quit that?

Mr. WADE. No; I felt like nearly it was a hopeless case. I know now why
it happened. That was the first piece of evidence he got his hands on
before Fritz did.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you explain what you mean by that?

Mr. WADE. Well, this went to the FBI and came to him rather than to
Captain Fritz, and I feel in my own mind that this was something new,
that he really had been receiving none of the original evidence, that
it was coming through Fritz to him and so this went from him to Fritz,
you know, and I think that is the reason he did it.

So I stayed home that afternoon. I was trying to think, it seems like I
went back by the police station some time that night, late at night.

Mr. RANKIN. This way of giving evidence to the press and all of the
news media, is that standard practice in your area?

Mr. WADE. Yes; it is, unfortunately. I don't think it is good. We have
just, even since this happened we have had a similar incident with the
police giving all the evidence out or giving out an oral confession of
a defendant that is not admissible in court. You know, oral admissions
are not generally admissible in Texas. And they gave all the evidence
out in it.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you done anything about it, tried to stop it in any
way?

Mr. WADE. Well, in this actually, in the same story they quoted me as
saying, I mean the news quoted me as saying they shouldn't give the
information out, that is the evidence, we have got to try the case,
we will get a jury, it is improper to do this, or something to that
effect. So far as taking it up with--I have mentioned many times that
they shouldn't give out evidence, in talking to the police officers, I
mean in there in training things, but it is something I have no control
over whatever. It is a separate entity, the city of Dallas is, and I
do a little fussing with the police, but by the same token it is not
a situation where--I think it is one of your major problems that are
going to have to be looked into not only here but it is a sidelight, I
think, to your investigation to some extent, but I think you prejudice
us, the state, more than you do the defense by giving out our testimony.

You may think that giving out will help you to convict him. I think it
works the other way, your jurors that read, the good type of jurors,
get an opinion one way or another from what they read, and you end
up with poor jurors. If they haven't read or heard anything of the
case--well, not generally the same type of juror.

The only thing I make a practice of saying is that I reviewed the
evidence in this case in which the State will ask the death penalty,
which may be going too far, but I tell them we plan to ask the death
penalty or plan to ask life or plan to ask maximum jail sentence or
something of that kind.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say that at any time about the Oswald case?

Mr. WADE. Oh, yes, sir; I have said that about both Oswald and Ruby.

Mr. RANKIN. When did you say it about the Oswald case?

Mr. WADE. I guess it was Friday night probably. I was asked what
penalty we would ask for.

Mr. RANKIN. When the police made these releases about the evidence, did
they ever ask you whether they should make them?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; like I told you. I talked Saturday morning around
between 11 and 12, some time. I told him there was entirely too much
publicity on this thing, that with the pressure going to be on us to
try it and there may not be a place in the United States you can try
it with all the publicity you are getting. Chief Curry said he agreed
with me, but, like I said about 2 hours later, I saw him releasing this
testimony.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you consult any State officials about how you should
handle either the Oswald or the Ruby case?

Mr. WADE. I don't know. It seems like I talked to Waggoner Carr that
night, but I don't remember.

Didn't we talk some time about it?

I don't know whether it was consulting about how to try it or anything.
But I know I talked to Waggoner's office some time within 2 or 3 days,
but I don't know whether it was before the Ruby assault or not. But he
doesn't actually----

Mr. RANKIN. Does the Texas attorney general have any jurisdiction to
tell you how to try such cases?

Mr. WADE. No sir; I think Waggoner will agree with that. They don't
have any jurisdiction to try criminal cases other than antitrust, but
I assume we would ask for their assistance if we wanted it. We don't
generally, and I don't, the law doesn't contemplate that.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Carr didn't try to tell you in any way how to handle
either case?

Mr. WADE. Not that I know of.

Mr. CARR. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. May we proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Wade, will you give us the substance of what Mr. Carr
said to you and what you said to him at that time?

Mr. WADE. All I remember--I don't actually remember or know what night
it was I talked to him but I assume it was that night because he did
mention that the rumor was out that we were getting ready to file a
charge of Oswald being part of an international conspiracy, and I told
him that that was not going to be done.

It was late at night and I believe that is----

Mr. DULLES. It must have been Saturday night, wasn't it?

Mr. WADE. No; that was Friday night.

Mr. DULLES. Friday night.

Mr. WADE. And I told him, and then I got a call, since this happened, I
talked to Jim Bowie, my first assistant who had talked to, somebody had
called him, my phone had been busy and Barefoot Sanders, I talked to
him, and he--they all told that they were concerned about their having
received calls from Washington and somewhere else, and I told them
that there wasn't any such crime in Texas, I didn't know where it came
from, and that is what prompted me to go down and take the complaint,
otherwise I never would have gone down to the police station.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about whether you had evidence to
support such a complaint of a conspiracy?

Mr. WADE. Mr. Rankin, I don't know what evidence we have, we had at
that time and actually don't know yet what all the evidence was.

I never did see, I was told they had a lot of Fair Play for Cuba
propaganda or correspondence on Oswald, and letters from the Communist
Party, and it was probably exaggerated to me.

I was told this. I have never seen any of that personally. Never saw
any of it that night. But whether he was a Communist or whether he
wasn't, had nothing to do with solving the problem at hand, the filing
of the charge.

I also was very, I wasn't sure I was going to take a complaint, and a
justice of the peace will take a complaint lots of times because he
doesn't have to try it. I knew I would have to try this case and that
prompted me to go down and see what kind of evidence they had.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us what you mean by taking a complaint under
your law.

Mr. WADE. Well, a complaint is a blank form that you fill out in the
name, by the authority of the State of Texas, and so forth, which I
don't have here, but it charged, it charges a certain person with
committing a crime, and it is filed in the justice court.

The law permits the district attorney or any of his assistants to swear
the witness to the charge. The only place we sign it is over on the
left, I believe sworn to and subscribed to before me, this is the blank
day of blank, Henry Wade, district attorney.

Over on the right the complainant signs the complaint. We mean when we
say take or accept a complaint is when we swear the witness and we draw
it up ourselves and word it and take it.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that what you did in the Oswald-Ruby case?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; we did that. Now, as a practical matter that is not
really filing the complaints. The complaint is not really legally filed
until a justice of the peace takes it and records it on his docket.

Now, it goes to the justice of the peace court to clear the whole thing
up and his purpose, he has--the law says you shall take him immediately
before a magistrate, which is the justice of the peace.

The courts have held that it is not necessary in Texas, but there
is a statute that says that, and then he--his purpose is to hold an
examining trial to see whether it is a bailable case or not.

Then he sends it to the grand jury and the grand jury hears it and
returns an indictment or a no bill and then it is in a certain court
set with a docket number and then it is ours to try.

Does that answer some of the questions?

(At this point, Senator Cooper returned to the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Which route did you follow in regard to the Oswald case?

Mr. WADE. The same route. I accepted the complaint on him in the
homicide department, and gave it to David Johnston, the justice of the
peace who was there incidentally, or there in the homicide department.

But I didn't actually type it up. I don't know who actually typed it
up, somebody typed it up, but we file about a 100 a year, murders "did
with malice aforethought."

It was a straight murder indictment, murder with malice charge, and
that was the procedure we followed in the Oswald case.

Mr. RANKIN. Why did you not include in that complaint a charge of an
international conspiracy?

Mr. WADE. Well, it is just like I said, it is surplusage to begin with.
You don't need it. If you allege it you have to prove it. The U.S.
attorney and the attorney general had called me and said that if it
wasn't absolutely necessary they thought it shouldn't be done, and---

Mr. RANKIN. By the "attorney general" who do you mean?

Mr. WADE. Mr. Carr. And actually it is never done. I mean, you see
that got clear, apparently you had the press writing that up, radio or
whoever was saying that was--had no idea about what murder was.

Now, to write in there, assume he was, assume we could prove he was,
a Communist, which I wasn't able to prove because all I heard was he
had some literature there on him and had been in Russia, but assume I
knew he was a Communist, can I prove it, I still wouldn't have alleged
it because it is subject actually to be removed from the indictment
because it is surplusage, you know, and all a murder indictment, the
only thing that a murder indictment varies on is the method of what
they used, did kill John Doe by shooting him with a gun or by stabbing
him or by drowning him in water or how, the manner and means is the
only thing that varies in a murder indictment, all other wordage is the
same. Does that clear that up?

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator COOPER. As I understand it, under Texas law there is no crime
which is denominated under the term "international conspiracy."

Mr. WADE. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. I assume that conspiracy is a crime in Texas, isn't it,
conspiracy to commit a crime?

Mr. WADE. Conspiracy is a crime. It is a joining together of a group,
your conspiracy where they enter into an agreement to commit a crime,
and that is usually the one is indicted as a conspirator, the one who
doesn't participate in the crime.

Senator COOPER. My point is, though, that conspiracy is a crime under
Texas law?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir; conspiracy to commit murder is a crime.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Let me ask this question.

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. As I understand it then, one of the reasons that no
warrant of indictment was rendered upon, touching upon an international
conspiracy is that there is just no such crime in Texas as an
international conspiracy?

Mr. WADE. There was no such crime. If it was any such crime it would be
a Federal rather than a State offense. If there is such crime as being
a part of an international conspiracy it would deal with treason rather
than murder, I would think.

But there is no such thing as being a part of any organization that
makes that it is a crime to commit murder. This was a straight murder
charge.

If we would have had four or five co-conspirators who conspired with
him, planned the thing and could prove it we would have. That would
have been a conspiracy to, conspiracy to commit murder.

Senator COOPER. But conspiracy is not essential to the crime, to
describe the person accused as belonging to any organization?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; it is not necessary and it is entirely what they
call surplusage.

Senator COOPER. Now the last question, was there any evidence brought
to you or any evidence of which you had knowledge upon which you could
base an indictment or a warrant for conspiracy to commit murder in this
case?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; you mean parties other than Oswald?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. WADE. No. I might say on that score, to clear that up, I haven't
seen any evidence along that line. I haven't even seen any of the
correspondence that they had, allegedly had with the Communist Party
here in New York or the Fair Play for Cuba, I haven't seen his little
black book where he is supposed to have had the Russian Embassy's
telephone numbers in it which I am sure you all have gone into it.

I never did see the book, none of that.

Of course, I have been told by a lot of people and undoubtedly a lot of
it was exaggerated that he was a Communist, and you have had people say
he was a Communist who might say I was a Communist, you know, if they
didn't agree with me on something, so I have absolutely no evidence
that he was a Communist of my own knowledge, I have heard a lot, of
course.

Mr. DULLES. What you are saying in this last answer relates to the
present time, not only the way your knowledge has----

Mr. WADE. At that time and up to the present.

Mr. DULLES. Rather than the day of assassination.

Mr. WADE. I have no evidence myself now that he was a Communist, or
ever was a Communist, and I never did see what evidence that they had
on him there gathered on him. I never saw any of the physical evidence
in the Oswald case other than one or two statements, and I think I
saw the gun while they were taking it out of there bringing it to
Washington, because I told them at that stage, they didn't want to take
it out, didn't want to let the FBI have it and I told them I thought
they ought to let them bring it on up here that night and get it back
the next night.

There was arguing over that. I am getting off, rambling around, but
their argument over that was they were still trying to identify the gun
through a pawn broker or something like that and the police wanted to
keep it but I said, "Let it go up there and they said they would have
it back the next afternoon."

Mr. RANKIN. Have you ever had any evidence that Oswald was involved
with anyone else in actually shooting the President?

Mr. WADE. Well, I will answer that the same way. I have absolutely no
evidence myself.

Now, of course, I might have some type of opinion or some connection
with reference to the Fair Play for Cuba and these letters that they
told me about. If that was so there may have been some connection or
may not, but I have no evidence myself on it.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any evidence as to whether Jack Ruby was
involved with anyone else in the killing of Oswald?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I have no evidence on that. We have some and I think
you have them all, some 8 or 10 witnesses who have said they had seen
Ruby and Oswald together at various times.

Some of them were, I know one of them during the trial was a lawyer
there in Dallas, which I presume you all got his four-page statement,
said he heard them discussing killing Connally a week before then, came
out to my house and that had been sent to the FBI, and that was during
the trial, and I gave him a lie detector which showed that he didn't
have, this was a fanciful thing.

That, I can't think of his name, some of you all may know it, but he is
a lawyer there in Dallas.

Mr. RANKIN. You found that was not anything you could rely on.

Mr. WADE. I didn't use him as a witness and after giving him the
polygraph I was satisfied that he was imagining it. I think he was
sincere, I don't think he was trying--I don't think he was trying to be
a hero or anything. I think he really thought about it so much I think
he thought that it happened, but the polygraph indicated otherwise.

Mr. DULLES. Did you have any other evidence than the polygraph on this
point that he was not telling the truth or that this was a fiction?

Mr. WADE. No, but I didn't--but I did see a report where the FBI
interviewed the girl that was allegedly with him in Ruby's place in
October, and she didn't corroborate all of it. I think she did say he
was in there but I am not even sure of that. I didn't interview her but
I just read a report on it.

I read where they checked with the Department of Public Safety and
they did not, were not able to--he said he reported all this to the
Department of Public Safety, and I don't think they found any record of
him reporting it. It is very difficult to get him to come in to see me.
He didn't just walk in, this went on for a month, I kept hearing that
there was a certain person knew about it and I kept telling him to come
on and talk to me and he finally came out to my house late one night.

The reason I think he actually must have thought it was so, but--I
wasn't too interested in that theory of the case on this thing because
I had a theory on this Ruby case from the start because I, even before
you are going to get into some of these officers' testimony in a
minute, but when this happened I was going home from church, and my own
mind I said I believe that was Jack Ruby who shot him because from that
Friday night, and from my theory has been from that Friday night, when
he saw him there he made up his mind to kill him if he got a chance and
I have had that--I didn't even know about Dean's testimony which you
are going to hear today, I didn't know about his testimony until the
day before I put him on the stand because I had not been preparing the
evidence, I had been picking a jury for 2 weeks but that was my theory
from the start.

We had a waitress that I think you are all familiar with that was out
at B&B Cafe at 3 a.m. on the 22d who said she served Ruby and Oswald
there.

B&B Cafe on Oak Lane, I know you have got that, I have seen it
somewhere.

I don't think she was ever given a polygraph test. You have about four
homosexuals, I think that is probably the word, that have said they
have seen them together places. There was some indication that Ruby
was either bisexual or homosexual, but at least, I think they testified
to that in the trial, I think by mistake.

Belli asked the man, meant to ask him another word and says, he meant
to say homicidal tendencies and he said homosexual tendencies and his
one witness said yes, sir.

That is in the record which you will get of the trial, I guess.

Mr. RANKIN. I understood you to say when you came home from church,
after the killing of Oswald that you thought it was Ruby before you had
heard that it was Ruby.

Mr. WADE. You see, they announced Dallas businessman kills him.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. I took my family, I was in church with the family. I took
them on home and on the way down there they kept--they didn't say who
it was but this ran through my mind, a businessman.

I said that must be Jack Ruby the way he looked. He looked kind of wild
to me down there Friday night the way he was running everywhere, you
know, and I said to myself that must be him. I didn't tell my wife. You
can't prove that. It is one of those things, that was my theory that
he was likely the one. I couldn't, you know, out of a million people I
couldn't say he was the one but when they announced his name I will say
it didn't surprise me.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, what do you want to do about Mr. Carr?

Senator COOPER. Mr. Wade, can you name to the Commission the names of
the persons who told you or who stated in your presence that they had
seen Lee Oswald and Jack Ruby together?

Mr. WADE. Well----

Senator COOPER. Start out with the first one, his name.

Mr. WADE. If anybody would mention the lawyer's name, I know him--he
has run for the legislature a number of times.

Senator COOPER. A lawyer who lives in Dallas?

Mr. WADE. A lawyer in Dallas, and he has--we have, he made a four-page
affidavit about this thing, and mailed it to J. Edgar Hoover.

Senator COOPER. You can supply his name.

Mr. WADE. We can supply his name and I would supply you with copies of
his affidavit which I think you have.

Don't you have it, isn't that up here?

Senator COOPER. Without going into that in a moment, you can refresh
your recollection and supply to the Commission the name of this lawyer.

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Had he talked to you?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. What did he say? Did he make a written statement to you
or just talk to you?

Mr. WADE. He handed me a written statement. He said, "The day after
this happened I made this," it was a copy of a written statement, he
said, "I sent this to J. Edgar Hoover in Washington." I am talking to
him, we will say, the 10th to the 20th of February, the first time I
talked with him.

He said, "I sent this to the FBI, to J. Edgar Hoover, special delivery
air mail within a day or two after the assassination," and he left that
and as far as I know I have got a copy of that, he left it with me.

He talked to me at length there at my house, just us, and I would say
at 11 o'clock at night, it was on a Sunday night I know, but what
Sunday night I don't know. It was on a Sunday night in February. I read
that statement over. It is a rather startling thing. It didn't ring
true to me. It all deals with a conversation between Oswald and Ruby
about killing John Connally, the Governor of Texas, over, he says, they
can't get syndicated crime in Texas without they kill the Governor.

I know enough about the situation, the Governor has practically nothing
to do with syndicated crime. It has to be on a local, your district
attorney and your police are the ones on the firing line on that, and
they discussed at length killing him, how much they are going to pay
him, "He wants five thousand, I believe or half of it now, and half of
it when it is done."

Don't you have this memorandum?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. There is no use of me trying to give it to you.

Senator COOPER. I was just personally trying to get your recollection
about it.

Mr. WADE. He told me this is what happened, and I said, "I can't put
you on the stand without I am satisfied you are telling the truth
because," I said, "We have got a good case here, and if they prove we
are putting a lying witness on the stand, we might hurt us," and I
said, "The only thing I know to do I won't put you on the stand but to
take a polygraph to see if you are telling the truth or not."

He said, "I would be glad to." And I set it up and I later ran into
him in the lawyers' club there and he handed me another memorandum
which amplified on the other one, which all have been furnished to the
attorney general or if we didn't lose it in the shuffle.

This was during the trial actually, and then when the man called me he
took a lie detector. There was no truth in it.

That he was in the place. He was in the place, in Ruby's Carousel, but
that none of this conversation took place. He said he was in one booth
and Ruby was in another booth.

Senator COOPER. Did anyone else tell you that they had seen Ruby and
Oswald talking together?

Mr. WADE. No one else personally has told me this.

Senator COOPER. You mentioned a girl.

Mr. WADE. No, I never talked to her but we had the Dallas Police take
an affidavit from her and so did the FBI of that which is in all your
files. What her name is, I just know it is a waitress out at the B&B
Cafe. She lived in Mesquite, Tex., and some of my people interviewed
her and she told them the same thing she told the FBI.

The other information was in your FBI reports of where people or
somebody who claimed he had seen them together in a YMCA, if I recall
correctly, and another one in a store.

The report indicated these, all these people were homosexuals as I
believe, or there was an indication of that.

I have an interview, in answering your question, in Lynn's first, but
this is the only one I have talked personally about it. But the rest of
them I got from reading the FBI and police files.

Senator COOPER. Lynn?

Mr. WADE. I believe that is his first name, and he is a lawyer there.

Senator COOPER. He is the lawyer?

Mr. WADE. That is the lawyer I am thinking about, I am trying to think
of his name while I sit here.

Senator COOPER. Have you ever talked to anyone or has anyone ever
talked to you or in your presence about Oswald and named any other
person, other than Ruby, who they claimed were connected with Oswald in
the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. WADE. Senator, I don't believe anyone has talked to me. I have
received, I guess 5,000 letters about this thing from all over the
country, which I have down there. I remember somebody wrote me from
West Virginia and said that in West Virginia that Oswald was in a used
car business and Ruby was across the street from him.

Well, I furnished this information to the investigative agencies but
as far as personally, I don't know of any. I have had a lot of letters
that said they were connected but not based on anything.

Senator COOPER. But leave Ruby out now for a moment, did anyone ever
tell you that Oswald was connected with persons other than Ruby in the
assassination of President Kennedy?

Have you heard the names of any other persons who it is claimed had
something to do with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. WADE. I don't know of any names. Of course, like I said there
was the head of the Fair Play for Cuba, whatever his name was, was
mentioned. Everything I know on that score was from the police. When I
went up there Friday night and again I believe it was Saturday night
or Sunday, they told me that they just talked like he was the biggest
Communist, they had all kinds of evidence that he was a Communist, and
that he was working with other people.

I believe Captain Fritz told me once that he showed at the time that
Oswald bristled most was when they would talk about Castro. Apparently
he was more friendly to Castro than he was for instance to Khrushchev,
I am using those in broad terms.

Senator COOPER. Of course, once Oswald was killed, then your duties
were connected with the prosecution of Ruby.

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. And there wasn't any occasion for you then to search
out----

Mr. WADE. I had this, Senator.

Senator COOPER. Other persons.

Mr. WADE. I had this, Senator, I had this, when he was killed and they
tried to give me the files. I told them no, to give them to the FBI
because we couldn't try him, and I went to work on Ruby and actually
wouldn't know it.

From what I picked up it appeared to me there was no question that he
received his inspiration on this and maybe other help from somewhere.

Senator COOPER. That is what I am driving at here. You know there have
been statements made that other persons could have been connected with
Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Do you have any facts to give the Commission which would bear upon that
question that any person other than Oswald was in any way connected
with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. WADE. I have no facts that I can give you on it. It is one of these
things, and the reason I gave you what my opinion on the thing was, I
have read what the U.S. World News and Report said the Commission is
going to say, and also this deal out in Japan, you know, where they
said that he was not instantaneous, impulsive, I believe, killer of the
President, which sounded silly to me.

I mean he planned the thing. He practiced shooting, and he had his
inspiration from somebody else. Whether he had a--was working with
someone, I don't know. I never did know, it was rumored all over town
that they had an airplane there to carry him out of town. I am sure you
all have checked into that but I never know whether they did or not.

There seemed to have been something misfired in the thing if there was
anybody tried to get it. I don't think there was anybody with him in
the shooting but what you are getting at is if there was anyone back of
him.

I always felt that the minimum was an inspiration from some cause, and
the maximum was actual pay, but like you asked for evidence, I don't
have any.

Senator COOPER. Did you ever hear about any evidence that there was an
airplane stationed any place there?

Mr. WADE. They ran it in the newspapers that an airplane was supposedly
to pick him up but nobody ever found the airplane, so far as I know.
You have had every kind of rumor, this has been a thing that has been,
that the press has been most inaccurate in a lot of things they have
reported, and it is because of the pressure from their offices to get a
Ruby story.

We have reporters down there coming down and said, "My office said to
write something on Ruby today, what are we going to write."

And it has been so very irresponsible.

Like I said, I have no evidence and the only thing where I get my
impression is reading and hearing people talking but I haven't actually
figured it wasn't any of my business on Oswald, that I had a problem,
a big one of trying Ruby and I have concentrated all of my efforts on
that and when we had anybody of this nature we would refer them to the
FBI or some other agency.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

Mr. DULLES. You referred, Mr. Wade, to some testimony or some evidence
that Oswald was at one time in the Carousel when Ruby was there.

Was that solely from this lawyer whose testimony you have mentioned?

Mr. WADE. The only one of my personal knowledge that I talked with
was from the lawyer. He told me he was there with a certain girl, a
stripper, and Ruby and Oswald were in an adjoining booth. There is
lots of other people, I think your master of ceremonies, they had him
on television and said he had seen them there but later on said he
hadn't when they got to interviewing him. But my own personal knowledge
that you are all interested in was that one man who told me that.

Mr. RANKIN. Was there anyone either from the State or Federal
Government that urged you not to state a crime of international
conspiracy if you found one was present?

Mr. WADE. No; not in that light. It is like I mentioned to you what
Mr. Carr and Mr. Sanders both inquired, said they had heard on the
radio about this or talked with someone in Washington about it, and
I told them right off that whether it was so or not doesn't make any
difference. It wouldn't be alleged. I mean if I had known he was a
Communist I wouldn't have alleged it. I mean, suppose I knew he was a
Communist, and signed a statement he was a Communist. That was a time
when the press blew up when they had nothing else to talk about at the
time, actually.

The answer to your question is "No."

Mr. RANKIN. Was any statement made by you as to whether or not there
was any international conspiracy, conspiracy with Oswald about the
assassination?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I don't think there was. I think in one of those
interviews you will find that I said they found some literature or
something from the Fair Play for Cuba at his home, something to that
effect. If I did anything, that was all that was said, in one of those
interviews.

Mr. RANKIN. Did anybody ask you to say anything one way or another
about that?

Mr. WADE. If they did I don't remember it. I am sure they asked that,
but I am talking about, I mean in all these interviews, that was the
thing where they were trying to prove a connection or something, you
know, and I told them I knew nothing about it.

Mr. RANKIN. But no officials asked you to say anything about it
publicly or otherwise?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; not that I recall.

Mr. RANKIN. Did anybody ask you at any time not to say that a foreign
government was involved if you found it was or anything about that?

Mr. WADE. Your FBI man may have. I don't know. I talked to him two or
three times. I wish I could think of his name because I don't think I
ever met him. He was an inspector out of Washington.

Mr. DULLES. He is not our FBI man, he is the FBI. We are an independent
commission.

Mr. WADE. I see. But he had talked with me something, I think his
conversation, as I recall, largely dealt with the giving out of
information. He was concerned about it and so was I, and where we had
the longest conversation was, I will run through Sunday, and get me
up to it real fast because I talked to him Sunday night. We haven't
covered one of my television interviews.

After I went down to the police station and I will take this real fast
if it is all right with you all, they told me that Oswald had been shot
and I was there in the Chief's office when he died, when Oswald died
and the Chief says I have got to go out here and announce it.

So as he went out for a press conference, I went down the back door,
went home and went to bed because I was tired and disappointed actually
because we got even interested in trying Oswald, and I didn't mean to
have anything else further to say.

I woke up about 5 o'clock and a national commentator was giving the
Dallas police hell, me hell, and just about everybody hell, and saying
that I had said that the case, there would be nothing further on the
case, it would be closed, in which I had never even had a television
interview, I don't know where they got it.

Somebody might have said that. I don't know but it wasn't me because I
hadn't talked to anybody.

And then I went out to dinner and got to thinking, I said, well now,
the Dallas police did have a breakdown in security here, and they
are taking a beating and I am taking a beating, but they did have
the right man according to my thinking, so I went down to the police
station and got all the brass in there but Chief Curry and I said this
stuff, people are saying on there you had the wrong man and you all
were the one who killed him or let him out here to have him killed
intentionally, I said somebody ought to go out in television and lay
out the evidence that you had on Oswald, and tell them everything.

It had been most of it laid out but not in chronological order.

Mr. RANKIN. When was this now?

Mr. WADE. This was 8 o'clock roughly on the 24th. Sunday night. I sat
down with Captain Fritz and took a pencil and pad and listed about
seven pieces of evidence from my own knowledge and I was going to write
it down. They got hold of Chief Curry and he said no, that he had told
this inspector of the FBI that there would be nothing further said
about it.

I asked Chief Batchelor and Lumpkin, they were all there, I said you
all are the ones who know something about it, I said if you have at
least got the right man in my opinion the American people ought to know.

This is evidence you can't use actually, because he is dead. You can't
try him. And the upshot of that was the police wouldn't say a word and
refused actually to furnish me any more of the details on this.

I mean what the seven points. I went on out there in from front of
the cameras and ran them through those points. Actually my purpose
in it was, good or bad was, because the Dallas police were taking a
beating because they had solved the crime and had good evidence and
I told them it was good but I did leave out some things and I was
a little inaccurate in one or two things but it was because of the
communications with the police.

I didn't have the map, incidentally. I wanted the map at that time but
forgot all about it, and I ran through just what I knew, which probably
was worse than nothing.

It probably would have been better off without giving anything, because
we didn't give what all we had.

Mr. DULLES. Do you remember the elements of inaccuracy that got into
this statement of yours?

Mr. WADE. I think I told them about the palmprint on the bottom of the
gun, that Lane has made a great issue of and I still think I was right
on it but he has made an issue. I think Oswald snapped the pistol over
there in the jail or at least in the theater where they arrested him.
There was a question of whether the gun had been snapped or not and I
was told it was, you all may have seen the gun; I never have seen the
gun. You had--I might have at that stage said what bullets are supposed
to hit whom. That might have been somewhat inaccurate then but that is
all I can think of.

I don't think there is any basic thing. But my purpose in that, and I
know the minute I got off that television, inspection called me and
said please say nothing further about this case.

Well, you see, at that stage----

Mr. DULLES. Who was it that called you?

Mr. WADE. The inspector at FBI called me in the police station. He
was the one the police had talked to. He was the man from Dallas down
there. It wasn't Shanklin, Shanklin was in charge of the office.

But I told him what my purpose was but apparently someone told him. I
gathered since he had delivered a message, apparently someone had told
him to have me quit talking about it. But my purpose on that was, I
never did think that the people or the television were giving the right
facts on the thing and they were making believe that probably they
didn't have the right one, that the Dallas police had him in there to
kill him, they even had commentators saying practically that, don't you
know.

So, I did that entirely--not anything for me. You may think I wanted to
be on television. I didn't care a thing about being because I don't run
for office in New York and Washington and other places, but I thought
the police needed, because their morale was awfully low and they were
at fault in Ruby killing him.

There was undoubtedly a breakdown on security there in the basement.

Mr. RANKIN. On the seven points were any of them that were new that
hadn't already been told to the public?

Mr. WADE. To tell you the truth, I don't know. I think there were some
of them that hadn't been but I think most of them had. But I couldn't
see at this stage the evidence on this thing, nobody, the situation
where you had an assassination, and a dead person and another case
pending, and it was against my interest actually, to trying Ruby, it
would be a whole lot better trying Ruby if he killed the wrong man
than if he killed the assassin of the President, but I was trying to
establish that this was the assassin of the President.

And I didn't give all the evidence, and I don't know whether there was
anything new or not because I didn't see much of television during all
this time. I don't actually know everything that was given out, and
there was so much in the papers that I didn't have time to read them,
so I didn't know for sure what all the police had given out.

Senator COOPER. Substantially then, you were laying out to the public
the facts which had led you to issue a warrant for Oswald as the killer
of President Kennedy?

Mr. WADE. That was the purpose of that interview.

You also have to--I don't know where you gentlemen were, but you have
to get a picture of what was going on. You had, of course, there in
Dallas, you had threats on people's lives everywhere.

As a matter of fact, it ran over the radio that I had been
assassinated, for 2 hours, on Monday morning. I wasn't listening to the
radio. My wife called me up--called me up and I denied it. [Laughter.]

Mr. WADE. But you had lots of things of that kind. And I thought you
needed some type of, somebody--and your whole thing was wrong with this
whole deal, you had no one in charge of the thing. You had the police,
the FBI, the Secret Service, the Department of Justice, my Department,
Waggoner Carr's department, but no one had any say to offer the rest of
them.

Mr. RANKIN. Tell us how that affected it. You had the jurisdiction of
the crime itself.

Mr. WADE. Of the trial of the case.

Mr. RANKIN. And the police department, what jurisdiction did they have?

Mr. WADE. They had the jurisdiction, the primary responsibility for the
investigation of the assassination, and--they had the primary job of
finding out who did it and getting the evidence. They were assisted,
the Secret Service, of course, had the job of protecting the President.
The FBI, they have criminal, pretty general, investigation, I am not
sure, but they were in on it, they were all there, and assisting. It
was a deal where nobody had any actual control over another person.

Mr. RANKIN. Had the State authorities any jurisdiction or effect on the
operation?

Mr. WADE. You mean the State?

Mr. RANKIN. Of Texas.

Mr. WADE. They actually had none. They had no authority. The Governor
has no authority in a situation like this nor the attorney general
other than in a vague sort of way, as the police, I guess they had
the police powers to some extent of maintaining order but you didn't
need the National Guard or anything. I mean this was more dealing with
a situation of information. I think this situation is true in many
States, in practically all of them.

Mr. RANKIN. Was that confusing, did that make it harder to try to solve
the crime and handle the problems?

Mr. WADE. It did; very much so. Your press was the most confusing
thing. I mean you couldn't get in the police station. I mean I just
barely could get into the police station myself for stomping over the
press and you had a lot of reporters, not like the reporters we usually
deal with down there. I mean we don't have trouble usually with the
local press, people we pretty well know.

We would tell them what is going on, and they will go on, but these
people just followed everybody everywhere they went, and they were
throwing policemen on the corner, if he made a statement about he saw
someone running that way dressed maybe like the killer--they ran all
that on. They were just running everybody. There was no control over
your public media. It made it worse since all television networks were
on the assassination all--24 hours, I mean all day. And there was no
central thing from--there was no central person who had any control
of handling the thing that information was given out. You see they
interviewed some of your patrolmen who were giving out evidence, you
know, some of your foot patrolmen on the corner, they were interviewing
anybody.

Mr. RANKIN. Would it help or hinder the handling of such a crime of the
killing of the President if it was a Federal crime, in your opinion?

Mr. WADE. Well, offhand, I think probably it would, but----

Mr. RANKIN. It would help?

Mr. WADE. I think it would help, but you are going to have the same
situation. I am thinking if you had, if it is a Federal crime, for
instance, it is still murder in Texas. If Captain Fritz and the Dallas
police had arrested this man, the FBI wouldn't have had him. I don't
care if it was a Federal crime. We have bank robberies where there is
joint jurisdiction. The one that gets him, if it is the State police or
the city police gets them, they file with me and if the FBI gets them
they file with the Federal.

Mr. RANKIN. You need more control over the police investigation in
order to carry out your duties, is that----

Mr. WADE. Of course; my idea if you had it to do over, it is easy to
do that, but I think you need someone where all the information is
channeled through one person. If anything is given out and getting an
intelligent person, not just a police officer, you know. Now, your
city manager of Dallas is a newspaper man, Elgin Crull, he would have
been an ideal person and he was there but I don't think he ever said
anything in any way. He was there in the middle of all that thing.

Mr. RANKIN. Is the lawyer that you referred to in answer to Senator
Cooper's questions Carroll Jarnegan?

Mr. WADE. Carroll Jarnegan is his name; yes, sir. Let me mention
another thing for the record here. I don't know whether it is
mentioned. Saturday, most of my day was spent in talking to Dean R. G.
Storey, and the dean of the Harvard Law School, raising, wondering what
the situation was with reference to attorneys for Oswald.

Mr. RANKIN. What Saturday are you talking about?

Mr. WADE. Saturday the 23d, 1963; November 23. I told them that, all
of them, we had calls from various people, and most of them was from
people here in the East calling lawyers there in Dallas rather than me,
and them calling me.

Mr. RANKIN. What were they saying to you about that?

Mr. WADE. Well, they were very upset, one, in looking at American
justice where the man didn't have an attorney, as apparently, and two,
that too much information was being given to the press too, by the
police and by me, some of them had said, and that is what prompted me
probably to talk to Chief Curry about the thing, because I had received
some of those calls.

I told them they ought to appoint the president of the bar association
and the president of the Criminal Bar Association to represent him.

Mr. RANKIN. Who did you tell that to?

Mr. WADE. Told that to Mr. Paul Carrington and also to Mr. Storey, I
believe.

I believe they are the two that discussed it more at length with me.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether anything was done about that?

Mr. WADE. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. What?

Mr. WADE. They got ahold of Louis Nichols who is the president of
the Dallas Bar Association. They got ahold of the president of the
Criminal Bar Association, but they had started a Tippit fund in the
meantime, and practically every lawyer was scared they were going to be
appointed, you know, and they had gone and subscribed to that fund so
they were having much trouble getting a lawyer appointed.

Now, I must go a little further and tell you that under Texas law that
is an improper time to appoint them. The only one who can actually
appoint him is the judge after indictment under the Texas law, no one
else has really authority.

Louis Nichols, I talked to him, the president of the bar, and he was
trying to get some criminal lawyer to go down there with him, and I
said, "Go down there yourself and talk to him because they are raising
just so much cain about it and see what they want and tell him you will
get him a lawyer."

Senator COOPER. You are speaking now about a lawyer for Oswald?

Mr. WADE. Yes; for Oswald.

This was around noon or some time on Saturday, noon, early afternoon.
This went on all day. He called me back and said, "I have talked to
him and told him I would get him a lawyer, that I would represent him
or get him a lawyer." Louis Nichols is a civil lawyer, not actually a
criminal lawyer.

He says, "He doesn't want but one lawyer, John Abt, in New York."

Mr. RANKIN. Who is he?

Mr. WADE. He is an attorney in New York.

Mr. RANKIN. You said he didn't want any attorney?

Mr. WADE. Lee Harvey Oswald told Nichols and Nichols told me this. He
said that. Nichols then said he told him, along with the police they
would try to get ahold of Mr. Abt, which they did. I think, I think
maybe the press found him before the lawyers found him. But he says
something that he didn't have time or something, as I understand it.
This was all reported in the press. He had said the second person he
wanted, Lee Harvey Oswald told Nichols the second person he wanted, was
some lawyer out in Chicago with the American Civil Liberties Union, his
name I don't know what it was, but Nichols would know.

He said, "If I can't get either one of those I will help get a local
lawyer," because that was all done Saturday, with reference to his
obtaining a lawyer.

I wanted to get that because I think you probably knew it and get it in
the record anyhow.

Mr. RANKIN. Now going back to this telephone conversation with Mr. Carr
that you referred to, do you remember anything else that Mr. Carr said
to you at that time?

Mr. WADE. I don't actually even remember, you know, he said that he had
had a call from Washington, I don't actually remember anything about
that. I remember he said that about this charge that this is going.
"This would be a bad situation, if you allege it as part of a Russian,
the Russian conspiracy, and it may affect your international relations,
a lot of things, of the country," and I said it was silly because I
don't know where the rumor started but I will see even if it was so we
could prove it, I wouldn't allege it. Isn't that about it, the way you
recall it, Mr. Carr?

Senator COOPER. We will call him in a minute.

Mr. WADE. O.K.

Mr. RANKIN. Was he during that conversation saying anything to you
about not alleging it if it were true?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; it was a question of, he had heard we were going to
allege it and he asked me about it and I said it is silly. I had heard
something, I think, about it, about the same time.

And to no one, if it was part of it, no one said they necessarily
wanted to hush the thing up, but it was a situation where the minute
they mentioned what their problem was, it sounded silly to me, I said
whether he is a member of the Communist Party or not is not important
in this charge.

Senator COOPER. Was there any official, anyone on your staff or any
persons charged with law enforcement in Dallas, or any U.S. district
attorney in Dallas or anyone connected with his office, to your
knowledge ever suggest that there should be a charge of conspiracy?

Mr. WADE. None to my knowledge.

Now, I will say in some of these conversations, like I said, I don't
know whether it was with Waggoner Carr or Barefoot Sanders, they said,
one said, "Well, David Johnston, the J. P. has said this," and the
other one has said, "Bill Alexander, one of your assistants who was up
at the police department said it."

I asked them both about it and they both denied it.

Senator COOPER. Did anyone ever say to you in the event there was a
charge of conspiracy who would be named other than Oswald?

Mr. WADE. No; there is no other names, there is no other name that
I know of that has ever been mentioned to me as being part of the
conspiracy.

The question we are talking about here, if I understand it, being that
Oswald, as a part of an international conspiracy, did murder John
Fitzgerald Kennedy. And there is no other names of co-conspirators, we
have had lots of leads run down upon it. Somebody at the penitentiary
down there, a colored person, at least the word to us, that he had told
the guard he had hauled Oswald away from there, you all probably got
this, but we interviewed him down there.

He was just talking and wanting to come back to Dallas. But there had
been lots of things of that kind but to my knowledge none of them have
actually been proven out.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Wade, I don't think you have quite finished the--all of
your--hour-by-hour description of what happened up through the killing
of Mr. Oswald.

Mr. WADE. I thought I had hit it. The only thing I can't remember now
is the Saturday night.

It seemed like I was down at the police station Saturday night. Why I
don't know and maybe for a short while and don't recall everything that
happened. That was Saturday, 23d of November, and there is nothing, the
charge had already been taken, and I think probably I was on my way
home and just stopped by to see what was going on.

At that time there wasn't anything going on and I went home.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you do anything more about the press and TV and radio
people crowding into the police station than you have already described?

Mr. WADE. No; you see--I have been in that building probably once every
2 years.

It is the other end of town from my building. I never go up there
and I don't think it is my business what goes on up there. Maybe it
should be, but I have never been considering it. I think I have enough
problems down at my end of the street.

Mr. RANKIN. In any event you didn't do anything.

Mr. WADE. I didn't tell them anything, I could see the confusion they
were getting into but I don't know of anything that I told about, but
what if I did, I had no control over it. It was one of those things I
just figured I was the one who didn't have the say in it.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you do on Sunday, the 25th?

Mr. WADE. Well, went to church.

Mr. RANKIN. The 24th.

Mr. WADE. I went to church, my family and I went to Dr. W. J. Martin's
nondenominational church. It has 27 different denominations, very
bright fellow, if you are in Dallas you ought to go and hear him.

And as I walked out somebody said they shot Oswald. So I took--turned
on the radio and took my wife and kids home, and went down to the
police station.

There were still fragments of the story coming in, and we would still
get every kind of story out of them, and we got down there at I guess
1:30. He died and then like I said, I think all I told the press, they
asked me as I left there, a few of them what we would do on Ruby and I
said we would ask the death penalty on him, and then I left and I went
home and then I followed it that night and giving them what evidence I
had.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with a lawyer by the name of
Tom Howard in connection with that?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; Tom Howard had filed some kind of writ of habeas
corpus, assault to murder, and I never did see him. I saw Bob Stinson,
another lawyer on a corner and he said he and Robey were going to
represent him, which, I don't think they did, but they said they were
and so I went on home, and then when he died, we had a murder case, and
we took it to the grand jury the next morning, I believe, on Monday
morning and indicted him, turned it into Judge Joe Brown's court and I
was there, and as the grand jury walked in he said, "When are you going
to hear Ruby?"

And I said, "I already have got the indictment here," and I said, then
I went right back and asked the judge to transfer it over to Judge
Henry King's court or Frank Wilson's court.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know what happened to that habeas corpus of Tom
Howard's?

Mr. WADE. No.

Mr. RANKIN. You didn't have anything to do with it?

Mr. WADE. I understand from hearsay it disappeared or somewhere down
there but we don't have anything to do with writs. But they don't come
through our office. You see that is directed by the judge. I heard or
at least Decker or somebody told me they never could find the writ but
there was some writ for assault to murder originally issued.

And then, of course, after he died and the murder charge was filed,
well, that would actually be out of date.

Senator COOPER. Was it a writ of habeas corpus to bring Oswald before a
court?

Mr. WADE. No. Jack Ruby.

Senator COOPER. Jack Ruby.

Mr. WADE. It was actually, they have two kinds of writs, one of them is
where they set a bond on it and another one is what they have called a
dry writ which says, "You file on him or bring him before me at such
and such a time."

Which one it was I don't know. As a matter of fact, I thought there
was a bond set on it, but I told the chief, I said, "You can hold him,
we don't want to release him until you know whether the person dies or
not because then he wouldn't be a bailable case," assault to murder is
bailable.

I never saw the writ or anything. I just heard somebody say there is a
writ on him.

(At this point, Chairman Warren entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever help Ruby about any of his troubles of any
kind?

Mr. WADE. Not that I know of.

Mr. RANKIN. Prior to this occasion?

Mr. WADE. No; I think we have had him for a liquor violation or
something, but if we have--like I say, I never knew him. I think that
they have had some charges against him.

As a matter of fact, they had two pistol charges against him but I
don't think they ever reached my office.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know what charges they were about pistols?

Mr. WADE. Carrying a concealed weapon and if I understand the record I
think we checked it out and they dismissed them up in the police force.

There was one liquor case that was dismissed in my office by an
assistant who is no longer there which I have read the reports on and
don't have any recollection of it either way.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you know Eva Grant?

Mr. WADE. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Ruby's sister. Do you know Sam Ruby?

Mr. WADE. I knew none of them, none of the Ruby family, and didn't know
Jack Ruby. I think he claims that he had known me or something or other
but if he had, it is one of those things where you see somebody and I
didn't know his name or anything when I saw him that night or didn't
know who he was. I thought he was a member of the press, actually.

Mr. RANKIN. Did it come to your attention that there was some claim
that Oswald was an agent of one of the intelligence agencies of
Government?

Mr. WADE. I heard that talk down there. It was talk some----

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know who was talking that?

Mr. WADE. I don't know. I have been up here once before, and some of
the press were--I don't remember, some of the press mentioned that
they had two voucher numbers in his book there that indicated he was
working for the FBI or the CIA. I know nothing about them, don't think
anybody in my office does. I think maybe Alexander mentioned it some,
but Alexander is not a great lover of the FBI. They fuss all the time
openly, so I don't know. I know nothing about it myself because I never
have seen the book and I don't know whether they have even got any
numbers in there but they were supposed to have two numbers in there as
a voucher number of $200 from some Government agency but like I say,
supposed to.

I never saw it and heard it, talk, but I am sure you all know more
about it than I do.

Mr. DULLES. By voucher you mean an entry or something of that kind,
what kind of a voucher?

Mr. WADE. I think it was called a voucher number, it was voucher 209,
which doesn't make sense. I believe it was a low number. It doesn't
make sense for a government to have a voucher number that low.

Mr. RANKIN. What book are you referring to?

Mr. WADE. The little black book that Oswald had in his possession at
the time he was arrested.

Mr. RANKIN. That was his memorandum book, in which he had a list of
numbers of various people and addresses and so forth, is that what you
referring to?

Mr. WADE. Yes; and I never have seen the book myself. As a matter of
fact, I am trying to get some photos of it, trying to but I haven't
gotten them yet.

Mr. RANKIN. Now what agency was it rumored he was a member of?

Mr. WADE. It was rumored he worked first for the FBI and then for the
CIA.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that all you have heard?

Mr. WADE. As a matter of fact, I don't think I had ever heard that
until Waggoner Carr called me and told me--I don't think I ever heard
that. I did check into it a little, and they were talking it some, and
they have actually written it up in the newspapers by rumors or a story
or two--rumors of the thing.

Mr. RANKIN. Is that the report by the reporter Hudkins?

Mr. WADE. I believe it is. On the Houston paper, Hudkins. I believe we
got that introduced in the Ruby trial on the change of venue motion.

Mr. RANKIN. Is there anything more that you know about that matter?

Mr. WADE. I know absolutely nothing about it. I might say, I was under
the impression, I think when I talked to you and the Chief Justice
before, that, you see I was in the FBI, and I was under the impression
and I think maybe I told you all that we didn't list our informant
by name. The FBI have been kind enough to send down some of my old
vouchers on paying informants back in, down in South America, and I
see that we did list them by name which I--probably may, if I said
otherwise it was just my recollection on the thing but in that case I
was listing informants from South America that we were paying when I
was there.

Mr. RANKIN. There was one other report by Goulden, reporter of the
Philadelphia Inquirer. Did that ever come to your attention in regard
to this matter?

Mr. WADE. No; but I know him. He used to be a reporter in Dallas, but I
don't know what it was, if you will tell me about it.

Mr. RANKIN. Apparently it was the same thing.

Mr. WADE. Different angle.

Mr. RANKIN. From Hudkins' report that had been picked up.

Mr. WADE. He is more reliable than Hudkins but I know absolutely
nothing about that. Like I say, I have heard rumors and conversation
and I will even put it further, I don't think Alexander knows anything
about it, my assistant, although he doesn't fully admit all that. I
think he would like to talk a little about it but I don't think he
knows anything of his own knowledge.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you inquired of him?

Mr. WADE. I have asked him about it and he gives me nothing in the way
of evidence.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you prepare the complaint in regard to Jack Ruby
yourself?

Mr. WADE. I don't believe I did. I don't believe I had anything to do
with it. If I did, my name will show on it but I don't think I had
anything to do with it.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you give any information to the press about what you
had in regard to that prosecution, and the nature of the evidence?

Mr. WADE. No; not that I know of. Of course, they all saw it on
television, you know. We have got in--to bring you through the whole
story, I said practically nothing about this thing for about 3 weeks or
a month, but we had a lawyer on the other side who came into town and
every time he was met at the airport he would make statements.

Mr. RANKIN. Who was that?

Mr. WADE. Mr. Melvin Belli, and he had his psychiatrist on the
television, all his witnesses, said what he was going to prove and it
got to a situation where I had to do a little talking in self-defense,
and so we did later on have some statements more or less in answer to
his. It was entirely too much trying of that in the newspapers but a
situation where we couldn't let his psychiatrist go on there and prove
he had been insane on the jury without at least our saying we had some
evidence that he was sane.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of the
case for trial?

Mr. WADE. Yes, to some extent. You see I had four assistants to assist
me in the trial.

Mr. RANKIN. Who were they?

Mr. WADE. Jim Bowie, Frank Watt, and Bill Alexander. I read most of the
reports on it. I mean I had most of what I did was read things on it
because my main job in the trial as we started out was for me to pick
the jury, which I did, I think I have some ability along that line, and
do a great deal of the cross examination and the final argument. That
is what I do in the cases I participate in usually.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. Alexander spent the 2 weeks we were picking a jury in viewing
the witnesses. I never talked to any of the witnesses. After the
first half a day of testimony I was very disappointed in the way the
witnesses were being put on the stand; if this is of interest to you.

Mr. RANKIN. Tell us what happened.

Mr WADE. I told him, I said, on this case we are going on this theory,
I want everybody who saw Ruby from the time of the assassination of
President Kennedy down to the time he killed Oswald, I want to prove
where he was every minute of the time that I can and then we will take
it from there and put the films on there and show what happened there
and then afterward. We are going on the theory that he is a glory
seeker and a hero because I was convinced that was the motive of the
killing.

I put on seven witnesses, and about six of them testified against us, I
think, or made poor witnesses saying if they saw him down in the Dallas
News where he was 2 minutes in a stare that never made any sense.

Some of them said they thought there was something wrong with him and
none of them were the type of witnesses that I wanted testifying for
the State.

Mr. RANKIN. Who were they?

Mr. WADE. Well, you can check the first seven witnesses in the case.
You had three from the Dallas News who testified, and so during that
noon hour, I was convinced, whether right or wrong that Alexander had
been more interested in talking to the press.

In my office our biggest problem was keeping the press out of the
office, and so I just would have to bar them from my office, I mean
personal property. He wouldn't do it. He liked to talk to them.

So, I said, "Get all these witnesses in during the noon hour and let me
talk to them."

I put all the witnesses on the next morning. I talked to all the
officers, I talked to Officers Dean, McMillon, Archer, King never had
talked with them about the case before and I talked with them then and
I put all of them on next morning.

Mr. RANKIN. Tell us what starting with--which one did you talk to
first, Archer, Dean, or McMillon.

Mr. WADE. I think I talked to all of them at first in a body. I talked
to----

Mr. RANKIN. I see.

Mr. WADE. I had them all in there and said "Now what do you know about
the case?" because a lot of them I didn't know what they knew.

Mr. RANKIN. What did they say?

Mr. WADE. As a matter of fact, I wasn't familiar with Dean's testimony
until he told me right there a day before he testified. Then he showed
me the memorandum that he had made on the thing. I talked with him
there and I put Archer on the next morning and McMillon on, who stayed
all day. They cross-examined him from 11:30 until 5:30. Then I put King
on, and then Dean, I believe the next morning, and we rested. But they
told me just what they testified to in the trial which I don't know
whether I can give all of it but I can tell you roughly that McMillon
and Archer were partners and heard Ruby say some things, "I hope I
killed the sonofabitch."

Mr. RANKIN. When?

Mr. WADE. Within about a few seconds after the killing and then
upstairs then, "I meant to shoot three times but you all got me before
I did."

Incidentally, you may not know it but their psychiatrist corroborated
that statement.

Mr. RANKIN. Who was that?

Mr. WADE. Dr. Guttmacher on cross-examination. We asked Dr. Guttmacher,
"Well, didn't Ruby tell you that he meant to shoot three times?"

He said, "Yes; and he told me that."

He said, "One time he told me that." He also said at one time he told
him otherwise but he corroborated that portion of it. Then it seemed
like there was something else said. Archer said to him as he got up in
the jail, "I believe he is going to die, Jack." I may be getting these
wrong, but they are roughly--he said something about, "You fellows
couldn't do it," or talking about the police, and, I believe that was
Archer and McMillon.

Maybe you all being lawyers, in Texas this is not admissible unless
it is part of the res gestae. Mr. Belli sent into McMillon all
conversations in the jail that happened 4 hours later.

Under our law if one side goes into a conversation we can bring out
anything in the conversation, the rest of the conversation. That is a
rule of law in Texas, I don't know whether it is that way everywhere
else, and so that was the theory that made Dean's testimony admissible
because had been in the jail--time varies from 20 minutes to an hour,
depending on who you are listening to.

Senator COOPER. I have to go to a quorum call.

(At this point, Senator Cooper left the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Wade, could you tell us a little more clearly what was
involved in regard to this testimony? Did the defense start introducing
testimony concerning these conversations, is that what you are telling
us?

Mr. WADE. The defense cross-examined McMillon--you see McMillon and
Archer stayed with Ruby until 4 o'clock that afternoon when he was
turned over to Captain Fritz or roughly. I am giving a rough hour of 4
o'clock.

Mr. RANKIN. Where did they stay with him?

Mr. WADE. In the jail. They were--I don't say both of them were there
but they were assigned there and another person. The three of them or
two of them were there at all times, along with your jailers, they were
inside the jail.

During this time he went into conversations, for instance he said,
"Didn't I tell you that he left his dog out in the car?" He said, "Yes,
they did," but this is something that happened an hour and a half after
they had been in jail.

Mr. RANKIN. By "he" there you mean Ruby?

Mr. WADE. Ruby.

And they said also, "Didn't he tell you about going to the Western
Union," and he said, "Weren't you there when Sorrels and Dean came up
there, and what was the first thing that Sorrels asked him."

Mr. RANKIN. Did they say when that was?

Mr. WADE. Well, you are going to find your time varies from 20 minutes
to an hour, depending on whether it is a defense theory or our theory,
but----

Mr. RANKIN. After what?

Mr. WADE. After the killing of Oswald.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. I think Dean, I would rather you get the record, and you can
get it accurate, but I think he said it was some time before 20 minutes
to 12 or some time before 12. Well, the killing happened at 11:21, I
think. That seems to be the best time, 11:21.

Mr. RANKIN. Did they describe what the conversation was with Ruby when
Sorrels and Dean were there?

Mr. WADE. They told, if I recall, what Sorrels asked him and he asked
him "What did you do it for, Jack?" or something; they knew that part
of it but they weren't present during that conversation between--they
were in the room but I may say not within hearing distance. They heard
part of what was said but not all of the conversation.

Mr. RANKIN. By "they" who do you mean?

Mr. WADE. I am talking about McMillon and Archer.

Mr. RANKIN. What did they hear?

Mr. WADE. Well, that is all I know that was testified to. Now, whether
they heard anything else I don't know. But that is all I know, the
beginning of the conversation.

They had heard previous to this coming up there the conversation about
Jack, "I think he is going to die," and Jack answered some question, I
believe he said, "You couldn't do it, somebody had to," or something
like that. Jack Ruby, I am referring to.

Mr. RANKIN. Where did that occur?

Mr. WADE. That occurred as they arrived on the floor where the jail is,
the fifth floor, I believe, of the jail.

Mr. RANKIN. Then what else could they testify to?

Mr. WADE. That was about all we used them for, actually, that was
the last that we put on, but they asked them some questions of what
happened. Didn't he tell Captain Fritz something at 4 o'clock that
afternoon, but our testimony from them actually that amounted to
anything quit when they came on to the floor there of the jail. That is
McMillon and Archer.

Shortly thereafter, Dean's testimony came on and only--I am kind of
anticipating your questions on this.

Mr. RANKIN. Where was Dean then?

Mr. WADE. They were in the jail. Dean----

Mr. RANKIN. Who else?

Mr. WADE. Sorrels, Forest Sorrels. I am not testifying as a fact but
this was all told to me, of course, by Dean and Sorrels.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. The following day during the noon hour I found for the first
time that Sorrels was present in the jail. I told the sheriff there I
would like to talk to Sorrels and he came down there and he and Dean
and I talked in my office.

Mr. RANKIN. That is the following day?

Mr. WADE. That is Thursday before we rested the case on Friday.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us the approximate date that you talked to
him?

Mr. WADE. It seems like we started on the 17th, and this was 2 weeks----

Mr. RANKIN. 17th of what month?

Mr. WADE. Of February.

Maybe we started on the 10th, because they ended on the 14th, 17th to
the 14th, I would say this was around the 6th of March roughly, a day
or two either way.

I sat down there to talk to Dean and Sorrels because we was going to
put--and Sorrels showed me a copy of his report made on that incident
which I didn't keep a copy but I am sure you all have a copy of it or
it will be available to you.

I read it over, and essentially from what Dean said, and him were the
same with other than the, I think the only variance was the part which
was strong testimony where Dean said that Ruby said, "The first time I
thought of killing him was Friday night or thought about killing him
was Friday night in the lineup."

Mr. RANKIN. Sorrels didn't have that in his statement, did he?

Mr. WADE. He didn't have that in his statement, and I, to go back a
little bit, I asked Sorrels how he got up in the jail and he said he
didn't know, and he said he didn't actually know Dean there sitting in
my office.

I think he finally decided Dean was the one but he didn't know him. I
think it is pretty obvious that Dean, because they went in an unusual
entrance to the jail from the third floor, from the chief's office, and
he says there are two guards standing on each side of him which none of
the others corroborate, unless they are talking about jail guards in
the building, but there was no police in uniform supposed to be up on
that floor but Sorrels said that he saw two police guards on each side
of him.

But I asked Sorrels, I said, "How can you account for it?" I had
already talked to Dean. I said, "I am getting ready to put him on the
stand."

I said, "How are you going to--what are you going to say if you go on
the stand on this?"

He said, "Well, I called my office in Washington and they wanted me
to find out two things: One, whether there was any connection between
Oswald and Ruby from Ruby, and two, whether Ruby had any confederates
or co-conspirators."

He said, "Those were the two things I went to find out and I dwelled on
those entirely."

He said, "These other officers were there and when I left they were
still questioning," and he said, "I couldn't say whether that happened,
I don't remember hearing it, I just can't say that I heard it," and so
the defense lawyers talked to Sorrels that night about testifying and
didn't use him.

Of course, I thought probably they were going to use him on this one
thing, but there were so many other things in the statement that were
the same as what Dean has testified to about, something about being a
hero, Jew hero, or something in the statement, which Sorrels had that
in his statement.

He had practically everything in the statement, but this is one thing
that he didn't have in there, as I recall.

I couldn't find it and asked him about it and he said he couldn't say
it. He said there were a lot of things in there but he was interested
in knowing only two things.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you examine Dean's statement in regard to this matter?

Mr. WADE. Well, I read it there that day. It is a very short one, you
know. Of course, there is more than one statement.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; did you look at his prior statements at that time?

Mr. WADE. I think I had all of his statements. He was in charge
of security in the basement. All statements, this all came out on
cross-examination, dealt entirely with the matter of security, what was
done to secure the basement.

Mr. RANKIN. Did he say anything in regard to this premeditation in the
prior statement?

Mr. WADE. I don't think he did, and I don't think he actually said
anything about how Ruby got in in that prior statement. I may be wrong,
I don't remember even going into the conversation with Ruby.

Mr. RANKIN. What did Dean tell you at the time that you asked him about
the later statement?

Mr. WADE. He told me that he had been asked to submit a report dealing
with the security of the basement, and that that first report was the
security problem.

Mr. RANKIN. What did he say about that, the security?

Mr. WADE. Well, he said that, he told me, that when he heard the shot
that he thought a policeman had shot him because he didn't think there
was anybody else in the basement. He said he thought a policeman had
shot him, just got mad and the cop shot him for killing Officer Tippit.

I don't know whether that was in the statement or not but he told me
that. I actually read that, that security, we were not too interested
in that because from our point of view, because there is no question
the security wasn't good. Something happened somewhere.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you learn from Dean how Ruby got into the basement?

Mr. WADE. I learned the way he told him he got in.

Mr. RANKIN. How was that?

Mr. WADE. On walking in on Main Street, the ramp down on Main Street.
And I was under the impression he told a lot of other people that. But
if he had been in that basement a long time it would have helped us a
lot to know it. It would have shown more premeditation, but I don't
think he actually had been in long from what I know about the case.

But Ruby told Dean in his statement that he got in by going to the
Western Union and walking there and the cop was helping a car go
out into it. I don't know whether that is Dean, that is somebody's
statement, that he went in that ramp and was there maybe a minute or
two before they brought him out.

Mr. RANKIN. Did Dean tell you why he left out of his prior statements
the statement about premeditation or prior thinking about killing
Oswald?

Mr. WADE. Well, he was cross-examined about that, and told me also
that he wasn't asked about it. That that wasn't part of what his
report concerned. I mean, you have to keep in mind Dean is a uniformed
officer. He is sergeant, had nothing to do with the investigation of
the crime. He just happened to be the one who was sent up there to
show Sorrels how to get in the jail and out, you know. He wasn't an
investigative officer.

Now, McMillon and Archer are detectives, you know, but he is not. He is
a uniformed man.

Mr. RANKIN. What did McMillon tell you about his statement?

Mr. WADE. He just told me what his testimony was. I didn't actually
talk to him over 30 minutes, I don't guess, during the noon hour and
I was talking to all of them. I had the various statements he made,
some of what he said was in the statements and some wasn't, so I don't
remember--but the same story was where he was and what he was supposed
to do and one dealt with security and the other dealt with statement
that he had made. Dean and McMillon and any of them didn't think these
statements were admissible while he was in the jail.

Mr. RANKIN. Did McMillon make a statement about premeditation?

Mr. WADE. He had in his statement that he meant to shoot three times,
which was premeditation, but I don't think he thought about it Friday
night.

Mr. RANKIN. What about Archer, did he have anything in his statement
about Friday night in his prior statements?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I don't think he did. He did have about the
intending to shoot three times.

Mr. RANKIN. When Dean was telling you about this statement about
planning to shoot Oswald on Friday night, was he telling you that Ruby
had told him that?

Mr. WADE. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. He didn't tell that to Sorrels?

Mr. WADE. I think he said he told it to both of them. I think that the
question on that, he said when he saw the snarl on his face he first
thought about killing him. Now the snarl on his face could have been
Friday night or Saturday night.

Mr. DULLES. That is on Oswald's face?

Mr. WADE. On Oswald's face.

And I think that, I am not sure of this, but I think that Sorrels
remembers saying something about the snarl on his face. But I think the
question was whether they were talking before the time of the shooting
of Oswald or whether they was talking about Friday night and it is
Dean's impression that when he saw the snarl on his face is when he
first thought about killing him.

I don't think he ever testified he planned to kill him or anything. I
think he said that is the first time he thought about killing him.

Mr. RANKIN. What I wanted to get clear for the Commission was whether
Ruby was telling this in answer to questions from Dean or in answer to
questions from Sorrels?

Mr. WADE. I think largely Sorrels. I think at the end Dean asked him
one or two questions, mostly about how he got in, I think. I think that
is what Dean was asking him about. But I think actually that this came
out in the conversation while Sorrels was at least taking the lead in
questioning him.

And I think, my recollection is at the end, as Sorrels got through and
walked on over to the elevator, he asked him how he got in the jail or
something on that score rather than on this subject.

Now, Dean is under the impression that all this came out while Sorrels
was there. But I don't think Sorrels, at least, didn't have it in his
notes and I don't think he would say it didn't happen but he didn't
remember it, you know.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you make any further investigation of this addition or
change in the statements of Dean and these other people?

Mr. WADE. I don't think there is any change in the statement. I think
you are asking a kind of a misleading question.

I think that first report dealt entirely with the security in the
basement of the thing.

Mr. RANKIN. You don't think that purported to relate what the
conversation was?

Mr. WADE. Up in the jail, I don't think, you may have it there, and I
may be wrong. I never questioned him any more because like I said from
the time of the killing of Lee Harvey Oswald I thought that Friday
night was the time, in my own mind, that is what I thought, he had
thought about killing him. I don't say he said he would go arm himself,
but in my own mind I had that feeling all along and I thought it was
the first time he had thought about it, that is where I discounted
all the other theories there was a connection between them because I
saw him there and talked to him, and saw his excited demeanor, and so
you asked me did I question him any more, he finally told me, what I
actually thought were the facts and I do now incidentally.

Mr. RANKIN. You have already testified that you thought it was Jack
Ruby before you even knew the name.

Mr. WADE. Well, you may--I may have stressed a little saying thought.
When I was driving down there they said Dallas businessman kills him,
without his name.

But in my own mind I said it must have been that Jack Ruby that was
down there the night before. I mean I was just talking to myself, there
wasn't nobody there. But like I say, one of those things, I might
be more truthful to say it ran through my mind rather than to say I
thought.

Mr. DULLES. You didn't say that to your wife?

Mr. WADE. I didn't say it to a soul. I went down there alone. I took
her home. We don't live four or five blocks and I drove downtown
myself, and it entered my mind and I will say when they announced
it I wasn't too surprised. I mean I had or thought about him as a
possibility.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, did you get any assistance from the FBI, Secret
Service, and other agencies in the handling of these cases?

Mr. WADE. Practically none. I never have seen the Secret Service
file. This Sorrels is the only one I talked with and I saw his report
although I never did get a copy of it. The FBI let us examine, I
believe all their files, I am not sure, but we couldn't take possession
of them and we had to send somebody up there to run through them and
dictate on them, and undoubtedly they helped us some in the trial.

They helped us in this way. If you had a witness on the stand--I was
cross-examining and I would say, well now, you talked to the FBI and he
would say yes, sir, and they really picked up when they knew they had
talked to the FBI and then I would say didn't you tell them this and
they would usually admit it.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether the files of the--of either of
these agencies or both of them were made available to the police in
connection with the two cases?

Mr. WADE. It is a one-way deal usually with the FBI, you know. They
don't usually tell you anything about their files but I say they did
show us their files on this, and whether they showed them to the police
I have no idea.

I will say they turned their files to the U.S. attorney and let me send
somebody up there to look at it, 4,500 pages of it.

But that was about a week before the trial, and during the picking of
the jury when we were still going through them.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you learn anything during your investigation of the
Ruby case about the billfold and the ignition case in the car?

Mr. WADE. Of Ruby's car?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. No.

Mr. RANKIN. That didn't come to your attention?

Mr. WADE. You know they found a lot of stuff in his car and a lot of
stuff on his person. I might say this--there are only two pieces of
evidence found on him I wanted to introduce during the trial and until
this day I never have found either one of them.

I don't know where they are. The police say they gave them to us, and I
know they didn't. One was the receipt from the Western Union which we
never, can't find the original of that or a copy, which I think you all
have a copy of it.

The second one was he had in his possession a "Lifeline Deal on
Heroism," telling about everybody had to take things into their own
hands and be a hero.

We later got a copy of that because the night before the killing he
gave that to the Weird Beard up at KLIF, radio station, and told him
that we had to have some heroes, that was the night before the killing.

We got a copy of what the article was but one of them, two or three
copies were in his possession but I never could find one to introduce.

I never did know for sure whether to introduce it because there was a
lot of good American patriotism in the thing and, of course, there is a
lot of other that is complete hogwash, you know, and you don't know how
a jury is going to read part of it and like it and the other part not,
but the title of it was "Heroism" and he talked to the Weird Beard,
this was in testimony, that somebody had to be a hero.

This was the night before the killing.

This was in before, this was before the jury, and said he gave him an
article, the title of it was "Heroism," that he never did read.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you supplied to the Commission all the information
that you have or has come to your attention with regard to the
assassination of the President?

Mr. WADE. I don't know of anything. As far as I know, I have. I never
did get any information on the assassination of the President. I
requested them to send it up here to begin with.

Mr. RANKIN. And all you have in regard to Jack Ruby, too.

Mr. WADE. Everything I know of.

Like I said I let them take those pictures of the physical evidence
last week, and there are supposed to be some things that I don't know
where it is. It is not in my office, I think the police have lost them
actually or at least they are up there and I don't think anybody is
trying to hide anything but it is just a situation there is so much
that it just got lost in the shuffle.

Mr. RANKIN. So, far as you know it has all been supplied then?

Mr. WADE. As far as I know it has. I don't know--I know of nothing in
my files that you don't have, and if there is you sure are entitled to
have it. I am not sure about this letter you mentioned from the lawyer,
the affidavit but I am pretty sure you all have that but I know I got
that during the trial and stuck it in my desk somewhere and I don't
even know where it is but it will be available.

Mr. RANKIN. In any of these press conferences that you have described
did you ever say anything about the type of rifle that was thought to
be involved in the killing of the President?

Mr. WADE. I think that was one of the inaccuracies that Sunday night on
the thing.

Mr. RANKIN. What did you say about it?

Mr. WADE. I think I said I thought it was a Mauser or I thought--was
one of those things I didn't know what it was. It was an Italian gun, I
think and I really thought I was giving them Italian but Mauser is a
German gun, isn't it?

But I think you have that--it was a situation, I don't contend I
was right on that because it was a situation somebody asked me that
and that is what I thought I was telling them and I never--all my
information came from the police and actually somebody said originally
it was a Mauser but it turned out it was not.

Mr. RANKIN. You learned it was not.

Mr. WADE. Oh, yes; there was no question, I am not contending whatever
I said was so on that because I got it all secondhand from someone else.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you learn that the Mauser-type rifle was similar in the
type of action to the gun that was involved. Did that ever come to your
attention?

Mr. WADE. I think someone told me that but I am not an expert on guns.
I don't believe I ever saw this gun except from a distance. I think
that Saturday night--Friday night, the 22d when they were taking it to
Washington, I saw somebody take it through homicide and give it to the
FBI and from a distance, I never did examine it.

Mr. RANKIN. In your testimony you were not entirely sure as to whether
Chief Curry had the gun during the press conference?

Mr. WADE. No; I am not. I remember seeing some officer wave that gun
around. I was tying it into Chief Curry but it could have been the day
before, because that gun actually should have still been in Washington
on the 23d.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. WADE. I am deducting, I think probably that I saw someone else with
the gun, rather than Chief Curry.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you in any press conference describe anything about
paraffin tests?

Mr. WADE. I told them they gave him paraffin tests. I believe that--I
am not positive what I told them, but what I was told, they found
paraffin on one hand--powder showed positive on one hand. I don't know
which one, but I remember the police told me the paraffin test was
positive on one hand. I don't know which hand.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you indicate what that meant in terms of the effect on
crime or its investigation?

Mr. WADE. Well, of course, it meant that a man had fired a gun if they
find powder on his hands. I assume I have told them that. I think
that was Sunday night when we were laying out the evidence, so far as
I know. I don't think that was prior to his being killed. It was, it
shouldn't have been done, but I think that was Friday night.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all I have, Mr. Chief Justice. Mr. Dulles has a few
questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dulles, do you have some questions you would like to
ask Mr. Wade?

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Ford, believing I was the only one
going to be here during the interrogation--during the entire session
this morning--gave me a few questions and asked me to tell you he was
very sorry he could not be here today, but he will be here tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. A great many of these questions have already been covered.
I will just run over them briefly.

You have testified as to a telephone call that the attorney general
received from Washington, what he told you about that. Did you have
anything further to add to that?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; I believe we have covered that all right. I
was trying to think. In the course of this thing, during all this
investigation, I have talked to Cliff Carter in the White House, or at
least he used to be, but I don't think we talked then on it. I think it
was later, the next day, and then 2 or 3 days later, as I recall, but
I believe right after they got back to Washington, I got a call from
Cliff Carter wondering whether they had the person, or something, but
Cliff was one of President Johnson's aides.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. WADE. And I have talked with him later, I think, on, I don't know,
I don't think it concerned any of these problems, but I am just talking
out loud with you, but we have covered that fully and, I believe, the
attorney general told you that he had talked to somebody in the White
House about it and called me, I think that is where he told me where he
had----

Mr. DULLES. There were no other messages other than these messages that
you mentioned with Cliff Carter, is that right?

Mr. WADE. Yes; I talked to him, but I don't think it concerned this
problem. I think it was on a--as a matter of fact, I think it was after
Ruby had shot Oswald when I talked to him, but it is one of those
things I can't remember. I hope you don't think I am trying not to tell
you, I don't mind telling you anything, but talking to you that I got
a call every 5 minutes, and so I don't know, mostly the press calling,
you know.

Mr. DULLES. Was the conduct of the investigation of the assassination
hindered by any possible overlapping of jurisdiction between Federal,
State, and local authorities? You have dealt with that in a general
way. Do you have anything more to say on that point?

Mr. WADE. Well, I think the investigation of the assassination was
carried on in a rather cooperative manner between all the agencies
concerned. I think this cooperation was more than generally you would
have. It was born out of a feeling that all the agencies were to some
extent on the spot, I think, your FBI, your Secret Service. I think
that bred cooperation rather than antagonism. I don't know of any
antagonism. I think the biggest fault with the investigation was your
press and television.

I don't think there is any question that you people up here deal with
it. But you take a chief of police, a little chief of police, or a
little district attorney down there who is not used to having all,
everybody, calling you all hours of the night and asking you questions,
and then if you sneeze, write a front page story about what you said,
with no way to deny it, you know, and I think the press was the biggest
thing that caused--I don't think they ever ought to have been in the
police department to begin with. I would have liked to have kept them
out of the courtroom. The judge announced that he was going to have
them in the courtroom, but I was instrumental in keeping them out.

Mr. DULLES. When we were in Dallas, it was suggested to us that the
press, radio, and news media kind of took possession of city hall
there, and it was a question of throwing them out by force of arms or
leaving them there. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. WADE. I don't know how they got in. I don't see how they could
run those big cables right through the chief of police's office there
without somebody giving them permission. However, I have no way of
knowing how they got in.

Mr. DULLES. It was suggested to us that the chief of police was out at
the airport and did not get back, and found them in there when he got
back at 3 o'clock.

Mr. WADE. How they got in I have no idea, but the whole mechanics of
the thing--for instance, in the homicide office, the whole office--you
probably have seen it--I don't imagine it is as big as this room. It is
cut up into little offices.

Mr. DULLES. I was in there; yes.

Mr. WADE. If you know, when I went into the office, went into that
office there Friday night, you had to push people back to open the door
to get out. You had police having to move the crowd, and they were just
stacked down that corridor, and it was a situation that should not have
developed.

Of course, you have a situation where the press yell that the American
people have a right to know their President had been assassinated. I
don't say there are not two sides to the situation, but I think when
they get to interfering with the processes of law there is bound to be
a middle ground or some way to work it out. I can't solve it.

Mr. DULLES. So far as you know, have all documents of any evidence,
of any kind whatsoever, collected by State and local authorities in
Texas been turned over to the Federal authorities and the President's
Commission?

Mr. WADE. So far as I know they have. We have either sent it to the
Commission or to Mr. Waggoner Carr, and I assume whatever he gets
he sends to you all. I don't know of any documents; I don't know
whether--you don't have a transcript of the trial, but that will be
testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. How long was the transcript, Mr. Wade?

Mr. WADE. I don't know how many pages. I don't think--we don't have
our copy of it. We ordered a copy, and so--he filed a pauper's oath,
so I don't have any idea how long it will be. It was about 2 weeks of
testimony, an argument, and also 2 weeks of picking the jury. They took
all that down, all questioning of prospective jurors, so all that will
be in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. Will that all be in the record on appeal?

Mr. WADE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they made any extra copies, do you know?

Mr. WADE. I know they are making some extra copies that have been
bought by individuals, I believe Life magazine, some of those magazines
have ordered a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. I see; yes.

Mr. WADE. We are having to pay for ours. We are having to pay for ours,
and, of course, we will handle that, we will use that when briefing our
case on appeal.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what it will cost? You don't know that yet?

Mr. WADE. I think--we think--our copy will be $3,000. I mean I have got
that figure in my mind, because the Commissioners' Court kicked about
us having to pay court reporters who are working for the county, but I
think the court reporters wrote the law, but I have got in mind $3,000,
but that is a copy. The original usually is twice that much, but of
course, a copy is all you would want. But you can write Mr. Jimmy
Muleady. He is the official court reporter of that court.

Mr. DULLES. You have testified with regard to the Hudkins and Goulden
rumors that the FBI or CIA or some other Federal agency might have
employed Oswald. One or the other of those correspondents indicated
that he got his information from some high official that he refused to
identify--he or they--refused to identify. Do you know anything about
that?

Mr. WADE. No; Hudkins, as I recall, wrote in his article--I don't know
who the high official is, but I imagine they are basing it on me or
the police or someone--Hudkins put in his article, you know he wrote
all this stuff, he is a wild writer, and he said, "Henry Wade said he
doubted whether it would be public information" or something.

Well, he came running into me one day there and said, "Now, I have got
all kinds of evidence that he is working for the FBI."

And I said, "Well, fine, I have none myself," and he said, "What would
you think about it?"

I said, "Well, you are getting onto a situation that I don't know
whether it ought to be public information or not." I mean, I asked,
suppose he did, I don't know whether it would be something that ought
to be written or not, well, more or less trying to get him not to write
the article, and I said, "Assuming it is so, I don't see you are doing
any good writing it."

So he quoted from that. That is all the conversation I had with
Hudkins, and you can get that--I haven't seen the Goulden article, and
didn't talk with him. I haven't seen Joe Goulden--I assume it is Joe
Goulden. He left Dallas and went with a Philadelphia paper. So if it is
the situation, if I have seen it I don't remember anything about it, if
he wrote a story.

But the high official, all I can tell you anything on that, I have
absolutely no evidence myself or any personal knowledge that he worked
for the FBI or any Federal agency, and the only thing I have heard are
rumors on the subject, and none of them that has got anything to base
it on that I know of.

Does that cover that?

Mr. DULLES. That covers that.

You referred to the statement attributed to you made prior to Oswald's
killing that the case against him was closed. I understand you say that
was not correct, you did not make that statement.

Mr. WADE. That is right. To the best of my knowledge, I never said
that. I mean that is what burned me up more than anything, more than
any other statement on television when I saw it. I had not been on
television. They have written this in the Dallas papers and some woman
wrote in and said she saw me say it on television. But I would like to
see a picture of it because the case never had actually been opened as
far as--I mean, we weren't investigating the case. I think that night
I told them, of course he is dead, there is no way of trying him. But
the purpose, one other purpose in that interview Sunday night was to
point out that I am sure the agencies will go on investigating it for
the benefit of posterity, and I actually, if not in that interview,
the following day, said I agreed with some Congressmen who said they
thought they ought to have a Federal investigation on a national level
of this thing.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know whether any other Texas officials made any such
statement?

Mr. WADE. I don't know whether anybody did. They quoted the chief of
police. They quoted Fritz on it, and then they started quoting me on
it, which is all saying that. But so far, to the best of my knowledge,
I never told anybody the case was closed, and I really think that Fritz
must have said something about it, and then people think the captain
of detectives and the district attorney and the chief are all about
the same, and it finally drifted over to me because I left the police
station and never had a word to say until that night when I was on
television.

Mr. DULLES. Do you know whether there were any official transcripts
made of the various interrogations of Oswald from the time he was
captured to the time of his killing?

Mr. WADE. If there are any, I have never seen them. I have asked
for them, but you are dealing with a man who not only doesn't make
transcripts, but doesn't even make notes. Captain Fritz is the one who
interrogated him most of the time, and if you--if there is any written
evidence of what he said it must be from the FBI or the Secret Service
or someone who interviewed him. I assume they make a record of what he
said to them.

Mr. DULLES. If any transcript was made we would have had it, would we
not? So far as you know?

Mr. WADE. The only thing I know I never have seen one, and I don't have
one of an interview, and I don't know of any--you should have it, but
you are dealing with Fritz there who interviewed Ruby, and Melvin Belli
went right into the conversation with Ruby, and Belli at 4 o'clock that
afternoon made everything admissible, and we couldn't get a thing,
couldn't put Fritz on the stand because he couldn't remember anything
that was helpful. I mean, he could remember Ruby rambling around the
situation, but I don't know of any transcript like that that I have
that you don't have.

Mr. DULLES. In your talks, going back to your talks, with Mr. Carter at
the White House----

Mr. WADE. Carter; yes.

Mr. DULLES. Carter--did any questions come up in these conversations
about not raising the issue that he was a Communist or that there might
be a conspiracy or something of that kind?

Mr. WADE. No, sir; that conversation, I'm rather sure sometime Friday
afternoon, and he called me and said, "Are they making any progress on
the case?" You see, Cliff Carter and I are close personal friends. I
have known him, and they were all upset, and I said, "I don't know. I
have heard they have got some pretty good evidence." I think that is
the only conversation I had with him.

Somebody told me, Mr. Carr, I believe, or Barefoot Sanders, that
they had had some conversations with some Washington officials, and
I have got an impression it was the State Department, but it might
have been--that they--concerning the international conspiracy angle. I
didn't discuss it because it was silly, I mean the whole thing was a
silly deal.

I mean, if you would prove he was a Communist, suppose he gave a
statement he was a Communist, I wouldn't have put that in a murder
charge because I had to prove it.

Mr. DULLES. That is all I have, Mr. Chief Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Mr. Wade. Thank you very much for
your cooperation.

Mr. WADE. I appreciate what you all are doing and your problems you
have got up here. I know if I were in your place I would hate to listen
to somebody like me talk 5 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)


Afternoon Session

TESTIMONY OF PATRICK T. DEAN

The President's Commission reconvened at 2 p.m.

(Chairman Warren presiding and Mr. Dulles present.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen.

Do you have a statement?

Mr. RANKIN. Sergeant Dean asked if he couldn't appear before the
Commission and testify. We took his deposition in Dallas, and he asked,
when he signed his deposition, whether he couldn't appear personally,
so we are permitting him to do this.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very happy to have you, Sergeant. Will you raise
your right hand and be sworn, please?

You solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the
Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?

Mr. DEAN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated, please.

Mr. Rankin, you may examine the witness.

Mr. RANKIN. Sergeant, will you give us your name, your address, please?

Mr. DEAN. Patrick T. Dean. I live at 2822 Nicholson Drive in Dallas.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you connected with the police department in Dallas?

Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. What is your position?

Mr. DEAN. I am a sergeant on patrol.

Mr. RANKIN. How long have you been an official in the police department?

Mr. DEAN. Eleven and a half years.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us briefly any training or experience you
have had?

Mr. DEAN. Well, I worked as a patrolman for 5 years. Then I was
promoted to sergeant and remained in the patrol division. I have since
been in the patrol division the rest of the time.

Mr. RANKIN. You have given us your deposition, have you not, Sergeant?

Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is that correct and true as far as anything you know?

Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Is there any part of it that you want to change or correct
or modify?

Mr. DEAN. No, sir; I feel the main reason I wanted to appear before
the Commission was about the 20 or 25 minutes that was off the record
that I feel I would like the Commission to have on the record, and this
is between Mr. Griffin and I. He was the original one who started my
deposition.

Mr. RANKIN. Well, do you want to tell that at this time?

First, is there anything about what you said on the record that was not
correct?

Mr. DEAN. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And the truth?

Mr. DEAN. No, sir.

Well, Mr. Griffin had questioned me about 2 hours, or maybe a little
longer. There was no problems at all, no difficulties. And after that
length of time, a little over 2 hours, Mr. Griffin desired to get off
the record, and he advised the court reporter that he would be off the
record and he could go smoke a cigarette or get a Coke, and he would
let him know when he wanted him to get back on the record.

Well, after the court reporter left, Mr. Griffin started talking to me
in a manner of gaining my confidence in that he would help me and that
he felt I would probably need some help in the future.

My not knowing what he was building up to, I asked Mr. Griffin to go
ahead and ask me what he was going to ask me. He continued to advise
me that he wanted me to listen to what he had to say before he asked
me whatever question he was going to ask me. I finally told him that
whatever he wanted to ask me he could just ask me, and if I knew I
would tell him the truth or if I didn't know, I would tell him I didn't
know.

Mr. Griffin took my reports, one dated February 18, the subject of it
was an interview with Jack Ruby, and one dated November 26, which was
my assignment in the basement.

He said there were things in these statements which were not true and,
in fact, he said both these statements, he said there were particular
things in there that were not true, and I asked him what portions did
he consider not true, and then very dogmatically he said that, "Jack
Ruby didn't tell you that he entered the basement via the Main Street
ramp."

And, of course, I was shocked at this. This is what I testified to, in
fact, I was cross-examined on this, and he, Mr. Griffin, further said,
"Jack Ruby did not tell you that he had thought or planned to kill
Oswald two nights prior."

And he said, "Your testimony was false, and these reports to your chief
of police are false."

So this, of course, all this was off the record. I told Mr. Griffin
then this shocked me, and I told him it shocked me; that I couldn't
imagine what he was getting at or why he would accuse me of this, and I
asked him, and Mr. Griffin replied he didn't or he wasn't at liberty to
discuss that particular part of it with me, and that he wasn't trying
to cross-examine me here, but that under cross-examination he could
prove that my testimony was false, and that is when I told Mr. Griffin
that these are the facts and I can't change them. This is what I know
about it.

I quoted Ruby just about verbatim, and since he didn't believe me, and
I was saying they were true, we might as well terminate the interview.

Mr. Griffin then got back on the record, or before he did get back
on the record, he said, "Well now, Sergeant Dean, I respect you as a
witness, I respect you in your profession, but I have offered my help
and assistance, and I again will offer you my assistance, and that I
don't feel you will be subjecting yourself to loss of your job," or
some words to that effect, "If you will go ahead and tell me the truth
about it."

I again told Mr. Griffin that these were the facts and I couldn't
change them, so with that we got back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you ask Mr. Griffin to ever put this part that was off
the record on the record?

Mr. DEAN. No, sir; I didn't.

Mr. RANKIN. Why didn't you at that time?

Mr. DEAN. Well, now the discussion was, I said, "Mr. Griffin, I have
waived my rights for an attorney, of which I don't feel like I need
one." I still don't feel like I need one.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not need one either Sergeant.

Mr. DEAN. True.

The CHAIRMAN. You will get along all right.

Mr. DEAN. Thank you.

I said, "I have come over here with the idea of giving you all the
information that I have." In fact, I had some additional information
that I had gotten the night before, and it was a call that I had
received from some man in Victoria, Canada, who said he had a reel of
movie film that he had taken of the assassination.

I got this man's name, where he called from, had the police department
in Victoria check to crisscross the number, and I gave him the
name--well, all the information as to where the call had originated
from, his name, also this man's attorney, he had given me his name, and
I told him that the reason the man had called, had called especially
for me at the police department, was that he had a reel of movie film
that he had taken the day of the assassination and that these--or the
camera was on the President at the time of the assassination, and he
described to me the position as to where he was, which was across and
in trajectory of the line of fire, and that he felt that in addition to
the assassination that he had gotten the School Book Depository.

I told Mr. Griffin at the time that I had told this man--I can't
remember his name, the FBI has gotten it, and at the time I gave it
to Mr. Griffin, I told this man on the telephone from Victoria that
night that he should send these things, this film, that he said wasn't
developed, to the Warren Commission.

He said, that is when he told me that he had contacted his attorney in
Victoria and that his attorney's name was Batter, and he spelled it
for me, B-a-t-t-e-r, and his attorney had advised him not to send this
information to the Warren Commission but to contact someone in Dallas
and send it to them.

This man told me that he had read something about my testimony and
that he asked me would it be all right for him to send it to me, and
I told him, "Yes," and I said I was supposed to go back to the Warren
Commission and he could send it to me, and I would make it available
for them.

This was just additional information that I told Mr. Griffin that I
was--this is an example--I was there to help them in any way I could.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, the differences in your testimony that Mr. Griffin was
discussing with you off the record, you have gone into that in detail
on the record, haven't you, in your deposition?

Mr. DEAN. Yes; I believe I have, about how Ruby entered the basement or
how he told me how he entered the basement. Also that he had thought
two nights prior when he saw Lee Oswald on a showup stand with a
sarcastic sneer on his face is when he decided if he got the chance he
would kill him. This was the thing that I testified in court about. I
was cross-examined in court.

Mr. RANKIN. And you have explained all that in your deposition, haven't
you?

Mr. DEAN. I believe so; I am not certain.

Mr. RANKIN. And did he ask you about why you didn't have your--this
information about his planning to shoot Oswald the night before, or on
the Friday----

Mr. DEAN. Now, are you asking did Mr. Griffin ask me why I didn't----

Mr. RANKIN. Why you didn't put it in your February--in your statement
before the February 18 one?

Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir; I believe he did, and I explained to him this
wasn't the subject--the subject of that November 26 report was my
assignment. I didn't put any of the conversation as to what Mr. Sorrels
and I talked to Mr. Ruby about. I did put at the closing paragraph, I
think, and I have a copy of it here, that my main concern was how he
got into the basement and how long he had been there because I was in
charge of the security of the basement.

Mr. RANKIN. So you didn't put it in your prior reports?

Mr. DEAN. No, sir; this was later on. Chief Curry--I think probably it
was February 18--and I think I probably wrote it that day, called me
to his office and asked me had I heard all the interview of Ruby and
Sorrels, and I told him that I did, and he asked me could I remember
it pretty well, and I said, "Yes, I believe I can remember most all of
it," and that is when Chief Curry told me that, he said, "Well, you are
going to have to testify to it because Mr. Sorrels can't because he
says he didn't warn Mr. Ruby when he was questioning him.

Well, this was fine with me. I wrote the report. This was February 18.

Mr. RANKIN. Did you tell Mr. Griffin at that time that you thought it
was unimportant or had some other reason for not including it?

Mr. DEAN. I believe that I told him that the investigation, the focal
point, was as to how he got into the basement. There was an officer,
and I knew who the officer was, I assigned him there myself, and I
felt this was more of a part of the investigation in which it was
investigated--Officer R. E. Vaughan was investigated as to whether or
not he let Ruby into the basement or saw him in the basement, and, of
course, he was cleared of this. I know of no--the only information
I passed on about that was when Jack Ruby told me how he entered. I
told my superiors and then they carried it on from there as far as the
investigation.

Mr. RANKIN. And about his planning to shoot him prior to the day
that----

Mr. DEAN. Now, this wasn't--the only time that I put that in the report
was February 18.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; did you explain to Mr. Griffin in your prior testimony
why you didn't put it in?

Mr. DEAN. I believe that I did; I am not sure.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you want to add anything to that, just anything that you
wanted, to the Commission?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall whether you were asked that specific
question or not, Sergeant? May I ask, Mr. Rankin, was he asked that
question, and did he answer it?

Mr. RANKIN. I have to look at the record to be sure.

Mr. Chief Justice, in answer to your question, he was asked about what
was the first time that he had given this information and if this was
the date. He was not asked for any explanation as to why he didn't give
it at any earlier time.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we can't blame him if he didn't answer why.

Mr. RANKIN. No; I just wanted to find out if he wanted to add anything
at this time that would complete the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; all right.

Mr. DEAN. Well, my main concern has been in some way this got out to
the papers. The only thing I told the papers was that I can't give any
statement. I said I have no comment, and I feel that the accusation
started with my denial because I haven't had an opportunity to deny it.
The story came out in the papers and it has been on the radio several
times, and, in fact, several times since the original, some weeks or so
after the paper learned of it of the so-called rift, as they put it.

They had the one side of it that he accused me of lying. He didn't use
the word "lie," he just said, "These are false statements, and when
you testified in court you testified falsely." He didn't use the word
"lying," and a lot of papers have since then used the word "lying."

I feel like the accusation is a lot stronger than my denial because
I haven't denied it. I haven't made any statement at all to press or
radio or any news media. I just told them it will have to come from the
Warren Commission or some other source.

Mr. RANKIN. What I was asking, Sergeant, was whether there is anything
that you would like to tell the Commission or add to your testimony
about why it wasn't in the earlier statement prior to February 18 that
you haven't already told us.

Mr. DEAN. Well, I don't think I would like--if I could, I would like
to know why Mr. Griffin had accused me of perjury. Of course, this is
something for you people to know, but I just--he wouldn't discuss it
with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Sergeant, I want to say to you that, of course,
without knowing what your conversation was with Mr. Griffin, I have
never talked to Mr. Griffin about this. I didn't know that you had
this altercation with him, but I want to say this: That so far as
the jurisdiction of this Commission is concerned and its procedures,
no member of our staff has a right to tell any witness that he is
lying or that he is testifying falsely. That is not his business. It
is the business of this Commission to appraise the testimony of all
the witnesses, and, at the time you are talking about, and up to the
present time, this Commission has never appraised your testimony or
fully appraised the testimony of any other witness, and furthermore, I
want to say to you that no member of our staff has any power to help or
injure any witness.

So, so far as that conversation is concerned, there is nothing that
will be binding upon this Commission.

Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as I say, I don't know what your conversation was
with Griffin, but I am just telling you as to what the limitations of
the members of our staff are.

Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir; thank you. That is about all I had.

Mr. RANKIN. That is all I have, Mr. Chief Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Sergeant, for coming and feeling as you
do, I am glad you had the frankness to come and talk to the Commission,
and offer to testify concerning it.

Mr. DEAN. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Sergeant.

Mr. DEAN. Thank you. It is nice to have met you.

Mr. RANKIN. Waggoner, do you want to take the stand for a minute about
that conversation?

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to ask the General about it?

Have you been sworn?


TESTIMONY OF WAGGONER CARR

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before the
Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?

Mr. CARR. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated, please.

Proceed, Mr. Rankin.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Carr, will you state your name and position for the
record?

Mr. CARR. I am Waggoner Carr, attorney general of the State of Texas.

Mr. RANKIN. And you are a practicing lawyer, are you?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir; before I was elected, I was practicing law in
Lubbock, Tex. Now, of course, being attorney general, this has taken me
out of the private practice. Prior to that I graduated from law school
at the University of Texas, had my pre-law with a BBA degree from Texas
Tech. I have been an assistant district attorney for the 72nd judicial
district in Texas; county attorney of Lubbock County for 2 years;
served in the Texas House of Representatives for 10 years, the last 4
of those years being as Speaker of the House, and was elected attorney
general in 1960.

Mr. RANKIN. You are the same Waggoner Carr who has participated from
time to time in observing these hearings and cooperating with the
Commission regarding its work?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Insofar as the State of Texas is concerned?

Mr. CARR. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. Were you here when Henry Wade was testifying with regard to
a conversation between himself and yourself, this morning?

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Would you relate to us that conversation as you recall it,
both what you said and what he said?

Mr. CARR. As I recall, it was around 8 or 9 o'clock at night on
November 22, 1963, when I received a long-distance telephone call from
Washington from someone in the White House. I can't for the life of me
remember who it was.

A rumor had been heard here that there was going to be an allegation
in the indictment against Oswald connecting the assassination with an
international conspiracy, and the inquiry was made whether I had any
knowledge of it, and I told him I had no knowledge of it.

As a matter of fact, I hadn't been in Dallas since the assassination
and was not there at the time of the assassination.

So the request was made of me to contact Mr. Wade to find out if that
allegation was in the indictment.

I received the definite impression that the concern of the caller was
that because of the emotion or the high tension that existed at that
time that someone might thoughtlessly place in the indictment such an
allegation without having the proof of such a conspiracy. So I did
call Mr. Wade from my home, when I received the call, and he told me
very much what he repeated to you today, as I recall, that he had no
knowledge of anyone desiring to have that or planning to have that
in the indictment; that it would be surplusage, it was not necessary
to allege it, and that it would not be in there, but that he would
doublecheck it to be sure.

And then I called back, and--as I recall I did--and informed the White
House participant in the conversation of what Mr. Wade had said, and
that was all of it.

Mr. RANKIN. Was there anything said to you at any time by anybody from
Washington that if there was any evidence that was credible to support
such an international conspiracy it should not be included in the
indictment or complaint or any action?

Mr. CARR. Oh, no; absolutely not. There was no direct talk or indirect
talk or insinuation that the facts, whatever they might be, should
be suppressed. It was simply that in the tension someone might put
something in an indictment for an advantage here or disadvantage there,
that could not be proved, which would have very serious reaction, which
the local person might not anticipate since he might not have the
entire picture of what the reaction might be.

Mr. RANKIN. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chief Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Attorney General, I don't know whether you will be
testifying on any other subject before the Commission or not, but
in the event that you do not, and both of us are not here in the
Commission again at the same time, I want to say to you for the record
that from the very beginning of our investigation your cooperation has
been complete, it has been enthusiastic, and it has been most helpful
to the Commission.

The Commission and I all appreciate it very much indeed.

Mr. CARR. Well, thank you, sir. I will say this, that it has been a
very pleasant experience for us, and I think set a good example of how
a State government and a Federal Government can cooperate together
where we have common objectives such as this, where we are trying to
determine the facts and nothing else.

Mr. DULLES. May I add my voice to that, Mr. Chief Justice?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; indeed, you may.

Mr. DULLES. I know that has been true as far as I am personally
concerned, and during our trip to Dallas, Mr. Carr was of great help to
us.

Could I ask just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Mr. DULLES. Was there any indication in the call from the White House
as to whether this was a leftist, rightist, or any other type of
conspiracy or, as far as you recall, was just the word "conspiracy"
used?

Mr. CARR. As far as I recall, it was an international conspiracy. This
was the idea, but I don't know whether the word "Communist" was used or
not, Mr. Dulles. It could have been, or maybe I just assumed that if
there was a conspiracy it would only be a Communist conspiracy. I don't
know which it was, but it was a perfectly natural call.

The circumstances that existed at the time, knowing them as I did, and
the tension and the high emotion that was running rampant there, it was
not inconceivable that something like that could have been done, you
understand, without any thought of harming anyone or any thought of
having to prove it, as long as you didn't know that under our Texas law
you have to prove every allegation made in an indictment. If you didn't
know that, it might seem logical that someone might put something like
that into an indictment, factual or not.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you very much.

Mr. CARR. But there was no such thing going on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, I think that will be all then. Thank you
very much.

Mr. CARR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)



_Tuesday, June 9, 1964_

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD EDWARD SNYDER, JOHN A. McVICKAR, AND ABRAM CHAYES

The President's Commission met at 10 a.m., on June 9, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman
Cooper, Representative Gerald Ford, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were William T. Coleman, Jr., assistant counsel; W. David
Slawson, assistant counsel; Charles Murray, observer; and Dean Robert
G. Storey, special counsel to the attorney general of Texas.


TESTIMONY OF RICHARD EDWARD SNYDER

(Members present at this point: Chief Justice Warren, and Mr. Dulles.)

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the Commission will come to order. Mr.
Coleman, would you make a statement as to the purpose of the meeting
this morning?

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, the first witness is Mr. Richard E.
Snyder, who is presently first secretary in the American Embassy in
Tokyo, Japan, and was second secretary and consul, American Embassy,
Moscow, U.S.S.R., in 1959, and remained in that post in Moscow through
at least the middle of 1961.

Mr. Snyder will be asked to testify concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's
actions when he came into the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31,
1959, and stated that he desired to renounce his U.S. citizenship, the
actions which the Embassy took at that time, and the information which
it gave to the State Department.

Mr. Snyder also handled the interview of Oswald when he appeared at the
Embassy in July of 1961, and had his passport returned to him, and will
be asked to testify about the return of the passport.

Mr. Snyder will also be asked to identify for the record the various
Embassy dispatches and State Department instructions which were
exchanged concerning Oswald in 1959, 1960, and to the middle of 1961.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Snyder, it is customary for us to read a statement of
that kind to the witness, so you will be apprised of what we are going
to interview you about.

Will you please rise and raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before
this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SNYDER. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be seated.

Mr. Coleman will conduct the examination.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, will you state your name for the record.

Mr. SNYDER. Richard Edward Snyder.

Mr. COLEMAN. And what is your present address?

Mr. SNYDER. 118 Geary Drive, South Plainfield, N.J.

Mr. COLEMAN. Are you presently employed by the Federal Government?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. SNYDER. As a Foreign Service officer of the Department of State.

Mr. COLEMAN. Where are you presently stationed?

Mr. SNYDER. In Tokyo, American Embassy.

Mr. COLEMAN. Directing your attention to the fall of 1959, were you
employed by the Federal Government at that time?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Where were you stationed?

Mr. SNYDER. At the Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. COLEMAN. What was your title?

Mr. SNYDER. Second secretary and consul, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I take it that you have had called to your attention a
copy of the joint resolution which was adopted by Congress with respect
to the Commission.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. And I also take it that since you have been back in the
country that you have had an opportunity to look at the various State
Department files dealing with Oswald.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Calling your attention to the date of October 31----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question, Mr. Coleman, about that? What
previous posts had you had before going to Moscow?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, my first post in the Foreign Service----

Mr. DULLES. I am interested as an old Foreign Service officer.

Mr. SNYDER. I see. I served for a brief time in HICOG in Frankfurt,
Germany and then for about 2 years in Munich, in the consulate general,
which was my first post in the Foreign Service.

My second post, I spent 1 year in the boondocks of Japan, in Niigata,
on the Sea of Japan, in a one-man cultural center.

Mr. DULLES. As a Foreign Service officer?

Mr. SNYDER. As a Foreign Service officer; yes, sir. I was assigned to
this duty at a time when USIS was still part of the State Department,
and when I reached my post it had already been separated, so I was on
loan to them. And then a year and a half in Tokyo. Then a summer and
an academic year at Harvard, in Russian area studies.

Mr. DULLES. In what school there?

Mr. SNYDER. In Littauer.

Mr. DULLES. Did you learn Russian at that time?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I had had Russian in college before.

Mr. DULLES. So you speak Russian fairly fluently?

Mr. SNYDER. Fairly fluently; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And then Moscow was your next post?

Mr. SNYDER. And then Moscow for 2 years; yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. What 2 years?

Mr. SNYDER. July of 1959 to July of 1961. I arrived there just before
the Vice President.

Mr. COLEMAN. Directing your attention, sir, to October 31, 1959, did
you have occasion to see Lee Harvey Oswald on that day?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Had you ever seen him before?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

(At this point, Representative Ford entered the hearing room.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Had you ever heard about him before?

Mr. SNYDER. No.

Mr. COLEMAN. Could you state for the Commission just what happened when
you saw Mr. Oswald on October 31. 1959, indicating the time of day,
what he said, and what you did?

The CHAIRMAN. Before you answer that question, may I say that this is
Congressman Ford, a member of the Commission.

This is Mr. Snyder of the State Department now stationed in Tokyo, and
who was stationed at the Embassy in Moscow when Oswald attempted to
defect.

Representative FORD. Thank you.

Mr. SNYDER. Well, as for the time of day, I am afraid I draw a blank.
I can make some assumptions as to the time of day, for what they are
worth.

But since I told Oswald--and you will come to this, I think, a little
later on--that the Embassy was closed theoretically at the time, I
presume this was a Wednesday afternoon or perhaps a Saturday afternoon,
but I just don't recall.

Mr. COLEMAN. For the record, I think it was a Saturday, sir.

Mr. SNYDER. Was it a Saturday?

So, at any rate--if it had been a morning, I could not have used this
particular approach with him. So I presume it was an afternoon.

Oswald came into the Embassy without prior announcement. He didn't call
or in any other way communicate with us, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. DULLES. You had no way of knowing he was in Russia?

Mr. SNYDER. I had no previous knowledge of his presence; no, sir.

At any rate, he came in to me cold, so to speak. I was told that an
American wanted to see me, wanted to see the consul. And I am not sure
whether I went out and brought him in or whether he was taken into my
office by someone else. At any rate, this was my first meeting with
Oswald.

I will be glad to give you such recollections as I have as to his
general demeanor and this sort of thing, if you would like.

Mr. COLEMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SNYDER. And I might inject at this point something which I
mentioned to Mr. Slawson before our session began, and that is that
I reviewed the files, our own files, on Oswald, enough to refresh my
memory as to the basic facts and the chronology of events and this sort
of thing, but I have attempted not to go too deeply into details with
the thought that what the Commission is interested in, presumably, is
what I honestly remember at the time and not so much what may have been
planted in my mind by reviews since that time.

As to his general appearance, I do recall that he was neatly and very
presentably dressed. I couldn't say offhand whether he was dressed
in a suit and shirt, though I think probably he was. At any rate, he
presented a nice physical appearance.

I presume that he was well shaven. Otherwise, I would not have had this
feeling about him--that he, in general, was competent looking.

He was extremely sure of himself. He seemed to know what his mission
was. He took charge, in a sense, of the conversation right from the
beginning. He told me in effect that he was there to give up his
American citizenship. I believe he put his passport on my desk, but
I am not sure. I may have asked for it. In general, his attitude was
quite arrogant.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? When you say you presume
you asked for it, you mean you asked to see it--you didn't ask to take
it from him?

Mr. SNYDER. No, I asked to see it. If he didn't put it on the desk,
then I asked for it early in the game--one way or the other.

He told me, among other things, that he had come to the Soviet Union
to live, that he did not intend to go back to the United States, that
this was a well thought out idea on his part. He said, again in effect,
"Don't bother wasting my time asking me questions or trying to talk me
out of my position."

He said, "I am well aware"--either he said, "I am well aware" or "I
have been told exactly the kind of thing you will ask me, and I am not
interested, so let's get down to business"--words to that effect.

Well, he was a very cocksure young man at that time.

I am not sure that he sat at all throughout the interview, but
certainly in the early part of it he did not.

I asked him--I recall asking him to take a seat, and he said, no, he
wanted to stand. He may have relented later on.

At any rate, I did nevertheless probe about and elicited a bit of
information about him which was in my report to the Department of State.

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, was anyone else present at the time you were talking
to Mr. Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I believe Mr. McVickar was in the next room. But there
was no one in the room with us at that time.

Mr. COLEMAN. How long did the interview with Mr. Oswald last,
approximately?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, I would have to pull it out of the air, really. It
would be on the order of magnitude of half an hour. It might have
extended to three-quarters of an hour, something of this sort.

Mr. COLEMAN. Other than the passport, did he give you any other piece
of paper?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, yes; he did. He gave me a written statement saying
something along the line of what I have said he mentioned to me orally.
That is, that he had come to the Soviet Union to live, that he desired
to renounce his citizenship, that he was going to become a citizen of
the Soviet Union, words to that effect.

Mr. DULLES. We have that written statement, do we not?

Mr. COLEMAN. I have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 913 a photostatic
copy of a handwritten letter which is signed by Lee H. Oswald, and
ask you whether that is a copy of the letter that Oswald gave you on
October 31, when he appeared at the Embassy?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 913 for
identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; I would say it is, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. After he gave you the letter and the passport, did he do
anything else?

Mr. SNYDER. No; after his initial statement of purpose and intent, and
after giving me this statement, the interview was then pretty much in
my hands. He was, I would say, a reluctant interviewee from there on.

He had announced initially his desire not to discuss the matter with
me, but simply to get on with the business for which he had come and,
therefore, anything else that was to be said was up to me to get said.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did you at that time go through whatever formalities are
required for a person to renounce his citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I did not.

Mr. COLEMAN. What does an American citizen have to do at the Embassy to
renounce his citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, the law requires, in general, that an American
citizen, to renounce his citizenship, must appear before--I am not
sure whether the law confines it to a consular officer--but at any
rate must appear, in the case of the Foreign Service, appear before
a consular officer, and swear to an affidavit in the proper form,
something of this order. In practical terms, it means that the consul
draws up a statement, the content of which--the exact wording of which
is contained in our regulations, and has the person swear to it in his
presence.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, did Mr. Oswald ask for such an affidavit?

Mr. SNYDER. I don't think he asked for such an affidavit in those
terms. I am not sure that he understood that completely, what the
procedure was. But he did ask to renounce his citizenship.

Mr. COLEMAN. Well, did you provide him with the affidavit?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. COLEMAN. Why didn't you provide him with the affidavit at that time?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, as the consul and, of course, the responsible person
at the time, it didn't seem to me the sensible thing to do--in the
sense that--I can't, I suppose, speak for all consuls, but it is sort
of axiomatic, I think, in the consular service that when a man, a
citizen comes in and asks to renounce his citizenship, you don't whip
out a piece of paper and have him sign it. This is a very serious step,
of course, an irrevocable step, really, and if nothing else you attempt
to provide enough time for--to make sure that the person knows what
he is doing. You explain, for one thing, what the meaning of the act
is; and, secondly, again speaking for myself--I cannot speak for the
Foreign Service in this--provide a little breather, if possible make
the man leave your office and come back to it at a later time, just
to make sure--for what value there is in making sure--that the man's
action is not something completely off the top of his head.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, would it be helpful for the record
to have put in the record at this point whatever the law is in this
regard, and whatever the Department regulations are on this point?

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done; yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would like to say, sir, at 2 o'clock the Legal Adviser
to the State Department is coming in, and he is going to put it in at
that time.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question at this point?

Mr. COLEMAN. If you want it in now, we can indicate the sections which
are applicable.

Representative FORD. I think there ought to be some citation at this
point, because the witness is talking specifically about the process of
the law and the regulations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the law there, Mr. Snyder--is that the law?

Mr. SNYDER. I brought nothing with me, myself.

The CHAIRMAN. I saw a book there that you were looking at, and I
thought that would suffice.

Mr. SNYDER. Shall I read the section of law, sir?

This is the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 349(a)(6).

Section 349(a) states, "From and after the effective date of this Act,
a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by"--then section 6 under
that, subsection, states, "making a formal renunciation of nationality
before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a
foreign state in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
State."

Mr. COLEMAN. Sir, the Secretary of State has promulgated regulations
which are found in 22 Code of Federal Regulations, sections 50.1 and
50.2 and they are also reproduced in 8 Foreign Affairs Manual, section
225.6.

Basically, as I understand it, those regulations provide the form in
which the citizen is to make the renunciation, and it is to be done in
four copies, and then one copy is to be given to the person who makes
the renunciation. Is that your understanding?

Mr. SNYDER. This is my understanding; yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Are those forms available? Are they printed up, or
do you have to draft them? What is the circumstance?

Mr. SNYDER. They are not printed forms, to my knowledge, Mr. Ford--at
least I have never seen a printed form. The only time that I have used
them in my Foreign Service experience I have had them typed up on the
spot.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue, Mr. Coleman.

Mr. DULLES. We ought to have in the record, Mr. Chief Justice, a copy
of that form--either here or later.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understood, someone from the State Department is
coming here to testify on the procedures, and the witness did not bring
anything with him, he says.

Mr. SNYDER. That is right, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, when you were talking to Mr. Oswald on October
31, 1959, did he say anything with respect to applying for Soviet
citizenship?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; this was contained in his written statement, for one
thing, and I believe that he also stated this to me orally.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did he say anything with respect to having any information
since he had been in the Marine Corps that he would be willing to make
available to the Soviet Union?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; he did. He stated again, in effect, that he would make
available to the Soviet authorities or to the Soviet Union what he had
learned concerning his speciality--he was an electronics specialist of
some sort, a radar technician--at any rate, he would make available to
the Soviet Union such knowledge as he had acquired while in the Marine
Corps concerning his specialty.

He volunteered this statement. It was rather peculiar.

Mr. COLEMAN. You say that the interview lasted about a half an hour. I
take it he then left. Did he say he was going to return?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I don't believe he did. He gave no particular
indication of when he would return, if he would return, or this sort of
thing.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you recall just what he said when he left your office?

Mr. SNYDER. No, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you a document----

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Did he take his passport or
did he leave it?

Mr. SNYDER. No; I kept it.

Mr. DULLES. You kept the passport?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I show you a document which has been marked Commission
Exhibit No. 908, and it is a Foreign Service dispatch dated November
2, 1959. This is from Embassy, Moscow, to the Department of State,
Washington. It is signed by Edward L. Freers, but on the first page
there is an indication it was actually drafted by you. Do you recall
drafting the original of that document?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 908 for
identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. That statement was drafted within a day or two after you
had the interview with Mr. Oswald. I take it it reflects what happened
at that time.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Was there any cabled report of this incident?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; I cabled a report on the 31st, Mr. Dulles. Commission
Exhibit No. 908 is a somewhat fuller report, 2 days later.

Mr. COLEMAN. To answer Mr. Dulles' question, I show you a document
which has been marked Commission Exhibit No. 910, which purports to be
a copy of a cable from Moscow to the Secretary of State, and ask you
whether that is the cable which was sent off on October 31, 1959.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 910 for
identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. I also had marked, and I would like to show you,
Commission Exhibit No. 909, which is a copy of a telegram from American
Embassy, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, dated November 27, 1963. This
telegram purports to be an interview which the Ambassador in Tokyo had
with you immediately after the assassination in which you attempted to
recall what happened on October 31, 1959, when Mr. Oswald appeared at
the Embassy.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 909 for
identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I ask you if you can identify that telegram?

Mr. SNYDER. Might I just inject something? I notice in my reports, on
my first interview with Oswald, that I mention the Petrulli case. You
might at this time or later on wish to refer to the Petrulli case.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, this cable is very short and quite
significant. I wonder if it could not be read into the record at this
point, just for the continuity of the record.

Mr. SNYDER. There is a slight problem of classification on these, Mr.
Dulles. I don't know how public the records are.

Mr. DULLES. Maybe you could paraphrase it, then. You mean it is a
question of codes?

Mr. SNYDER. It is a question of code security; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If this is in the record, it will be published.

Mr. COLEMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. COLEMAN. Would you be kind enough to read Commission Exhibit No.
910 into the record?

Mr. SNYDER. In paraphrase?

The CHAIRMAN. Paraphrase, yes; in your own way.

Representative FORD. Of course keeping the intent of what was said
precisely as it was sent.

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

A person appeared at the Embassy today, October 31, identified himself
as Lee Harvey Oswald, and stated that he had come to renounce his
American citizenship. He was the bearer of U.S. passport No. 1733242,
date of issuance September 10, 1959, which showed him to be unmarried
and gave his age as 20, or which showed him to be 20--it gives his date
of birth. Mr. Oswald stated that he had applied for Soviet citizenship
in Moscow. He stated that he had entered the Soviet Union from
Helsinki, Finland, on October 15. He said that he had contemplated this
action for the previous 2 years. The main reason given was that "I am a
Marxist." He has a mother living at 4936 Collinwood Street, Fort Worth,
Tex., which was also his last address.

His attitude was arrogant and aggressive. He stated that he had
recently been discharged from the Marine Corps. He also volunteered
the information that he had offered to the Soviet authorities any
information which he had acquired as an enlisted radar operator in the
Marines.

In view of the Petrulli case, the Embassy proposes to delay completing
the renunciation procedure until the action of the Soviet authorities
on his request for Soviet citizenship is known or the Department
advises.

A dispatch follows.

The press has been informed.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Commissioners like to see the document itself?

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Snyder, could you tell the Commission what the
Petrulli case was?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes. The Petrulli case I remember quite well.

Mr. Petrulli was an American citizen who came into the Embassy some
weeks before, I believe, asking to renounce his American citizenship.
Mr. Petrulli hung around Moscow for quite some time, again a number of
weeks, and perhaps as long as 3 weeks or a month. He had entered the
Soviet Union as a tourist, I believe.

It is not clear what intent he had when he arrived.

But, at any rate, he did apply for Soviet citizenship while in Moscow,
and he did come into the Embassy, and was interviewed by me to renounce
his American citizenship. I did not, in accordance with the thinking
which I outlined to you earlier--I did not accept his renunciation
the first time he came in, but did accept it when he subsequently
appeared, and insisted that is what he wanted to do.

The case had a--I might skip over the minor details, but it had a
rather rapid denouncement, when the Soviet authorities, after having
looked him over for a number of weeks, decided they did not want him
as a citizen or resident of the Soviet Union. And when we subsequently
learned, that is I learned, from my reporting to the Department, and
correspondence with them, that Mr. Petrulli had been discharged from
the Armed Forces some time earlier on, I believe, a 100-percent mental
disability--the Soviet, I think it was the head of the consular section
of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, called me into the Foreign Ministry one
day and said words to the effect that an American citizen Mr. Petrulli,
has overstayed his visa in the Soviet Union, he is living here
illegally, and "We request that you take steps to see that he leaves
the country immediately."

I told the Soviet official that to the best of my knowledge Mr.
Petrulli was not then an American citizen, he having executed a
renunciation of citizenship before me.

The Soviet official said in effect, "As far as we are concerned, he
came here on an American passport, and we ask that you get him out of
here."

Well, again to end what was a long, involved and terribly
time-consuming story at the time, it was determined by the Department
that Mr. Petrulli's renunciation was null and void because he was not
competent, and therefore he was an American citizen, and we shipped him
home.

The Petrulli case, as I say, was very much in my mind when Mr. Oswald
showed up.

Mr. COLEMAN. After you sent the telegram, which is Commission Exhibit
No. 910, to the State Department, I take it that the first word that
you received from the State Department is a telegram which I have
marked as Commission Exhibit No. 916.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 916 for
identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, by paraphrasing, could you read the second paragraph
of that telegram into the record?

Mr. SNYDER. "For your information, in the event that Mr. Oswald insists
on completing a renunciation of his United States citizenship, the
Embassy is precluded by the provisions of section 1999 of the Revised
Statutes from withholding the right to do so without regard to the
status of his application for citizenship which is pending before the
Soviet government and without regard to the Petrulli case."

Mr. COLEMAN. At the same time that you were notifying the State
Department that Oswald had appeared, someone in the Embassy also sent
a telegram to the Navy Department, didn't he, advising that Oswald, a
former Marine, had appeared at the Embassy and stated that he was a
radar operator in the Marine Corps, and that he had offered to furnish
the Soviets the information he possessed on radar.

I have marked as Commission Exhibit No. 917 this telegram and ask you
whether that is the telegram that went forth to the Navy Department.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 917 for
identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. I don't recall that I saw this telegram at the time. But I
would say from the content of it, and the form, that it is clearly a
telegram sent by the naval attaché of the Embassy to his home office.

Mr. COLEMAN. We also have had marked as Commission Exhibit No. 918 the
telegram which the Navy sent in reply to Commission Exhibit No. 917.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 918 for
identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Have you seen that before and can you identify that?

Mr. SNYDER. I do not recall having seen this telegram before; no, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Now, sir; the next contact that you had with Oswald was by
a letter dated November 3, 1959, which has been marked as Commission
Exhibit No. 912, is that correct?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 912 for
identification.)

Mr. SNYDER. Yes--to the best of my knowledge, this was the next thing
that I heard of Oswald--the next thing I heard from Oswald.

Mr. COLEMAN. How did the original of Commission Exhibit No. 912 come
into your possession?

Mr. SNYDER. I believe it came through the mail.

Mr. COLEMAN. And after you received Commission Exhibit No. 912, what
did you do?

Mr. SNYDER. I wrote Mr. Oswald a reply, I believe, the same day.

The CHAIRMAN. Exhibit No. 912 was a request to revoke his application
to renounce citizenship, was it not?

Mr. COLEMAN. No, Mr. Chief Justice; Commission Exhibit No. 912 is a
letter from Mr. Oswald complaining that the Embassy had not permitted
him to renounce.

The CHAIRMAN. I misread it. Yes; that is right. Excuse me.

Mr. COLEMAN. You say you wrote Mr. Oswald a letter the same day?

We have had marked as Commission Exhibit No. 919 a letter from Richard
E. Snyder, to Lee Harvey Oswald, dated November 6, 1959.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 919 for
identification.)

Mr. COLEMAN. I show it to you and ask you is this a copy of the letter
which you wrote to Mr. Oswald?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman----

Mr. DULLES. Could we have some indication of what that letter is, for
the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring back to Exhibit No. 912, where I was acting
apparently under some misapprehension I read the first three lines and
it said "Nov. 3, 1959. I, Lee Harvey Oswald, do hereby request that my
present United States citizenship be revoked." Well, that is consistent
with what was said.

Representative FORD. I think that is a pretty categorical statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it is.

Representative FORD. He subsequently, in Exhibit No. 912, makes a
protest about the fact that he was not accorded that right previously.
But I don't see how we could come to any other conclusion but the first
three lines are a specific request for the right to revoke his American
citizenship.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I had misread that first sentence, and I had
asked if it wasn't a revocation of his original request. I was in error
when I said that. You are correct, absolutely, on your interpretation
of it.

Mr. COLEMAN. As a result of receiving Commission Exhibit No. 912, you
wrote Mr. Oswald a letter which has been--a copy of which has been
marked and identified as Commission Exhibit No. 919, is that correct?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLEMAN. Earlier in your testimony, when asked about what a citizen
has to do to renounce his citizenship, you referred to section 349(a)
(6).

I would like to call your attention to the fact there is also another
provision--section 349(a) (2)--which provides that an American citizen
shall lose his nationality by "taking an oath or making an affirmation
or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a
political subdivision thereof."

Did you consider whether the Oswald letter, marked as Commission
Exhibit No. 912, was such an affirmation or other formal declaration?

Mr. SNYDER. There is a considerable body of law, I believe,
interpreting this provision of law as to what constitutes an
affirmation or other formal declaration. I believe that I was quite
aware at the time that a mere statement did not constitute a formal
declaration within the meaning of the law.

Mr. COLEMAN. Did----

Mr. DULLES. May I ask one question about Exhibit No. 912?

In the second paragraph of this letter, Exhibit No. 912, Oswald says,
"I appered [sic] in person at the consulate office of the United States
Embassy, Moscow, on Oct. 31st, for the purpose of signing the formal
papers to this effect. This legal right I was refused at that time."

Do you know how he learned about his legal rights? Did you tell him his
legal rights in your conversation with him? Or where did he get the
information about his legal rights, if you know about that?

Mr. SNYDER. Well, to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Dulles, I did
discuss with Oswald both the significance of his act and the legal
basis of it, and so forth. And I believe that in the letter which I
wrote to him----

Mr. DULLES. Which was subsequent to Exhibit No. 912, was it not, in
answer to 912?

Mr. SNYDER. In answer to Exhibit No. 912--in the letter which I wrote,
replying to this, I purposely used the word, I think, "again", or words
to that effect, and I put that word in there at the time, indicating
that he had been told this before, and that I was repeating it to him.

Mr. COLEMAN. You are talking about Commission Exhibit No. 919, the
third paragraph, is that correct, where you use the word "again"?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes; that is correct.

In other words, at the time Oswald was there, the reason which I gave
him for not taking his renunciation at the time was not that he was
not legally entitled to have it, but that the office was closed at the
time. In matter of fact, I don't think I had a secretary there to type
out the form and so forth. But this is really quite beside the point.

But the reason which I gave him was not that I had any legal right to
refuse him--that is, it wasn't based on a provision of law, as it was
based on simply the fact that the Embassy was closed at the time.

Mr. COLEMAN. You will recall in Commission Exhibit No. 913, which was
the first letter that Oswald gave you, that the last paragraph states,
"I affirm that my allegiance is to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics," and once again I take it that you didn't think that that
was the type of oath or affirmation which is set forth in section
349(a) (2)?

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. SLAWSON. Mr. Snyder, in reference to the same document, Commission
Exhibit No. 913, do you think that Mr. Oswald, when he appeared before
you and gave this to you, believed in his mind that this was sufficient
to renounce his citizenship?

The CHAIRMAN. How could he tell what was in his mind?

Mr. SNYDER. I really don't know.

Mr. SLAWSON. Do you believe that if you had given Mr. Oswald the
opportunity to carry through with the procedures, that