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Title: History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2
Author: Napoleon III, Emperor of the French
Language: English
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HISTORY
OF
JULIUS CÆSAR.
[Illustration: colophon]
VOL. II.
THE WARS IN GAUL.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1866.
PUBLISHER’S NOTE.
It is, perhaps, not without interest, in publishing the second volume of
the History of Julius Cæsar, written by the Emperor Napoleon III., to
call to memory the names of Sovereigns and Princes who have employed
themselves upon the same subject.
_The King of France, Charles VIII._, showed an especial admiration for
the _Commentaries_ of Cæsar, and the celebrated monk, Robert Gaguin,
presented to him, in 1480, the translation he had made in French of the
eight books of the War in Gaul. We are informed of this in the edition
of the _translation_ by the learned monk, printed in 1500. This edition,
in large 4to, is from the press of Antoine Verard. (See J. Ch. Brunet,
_Manuel du Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres_, fourth edition, tom. I.,
p. 518, and the _Biographie Universelle_, article _Charles VIII._)
_Charles V._, who professed a great admiration for Cæsar, left a copy of
the _Commentaries_ filled with marginal notes, written with his own
hand. It was at his instigation that the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferdinand
Gonzaga, sent a scientific mission into France to study Cæsar’s
campaigns on the localities. The forty plans which were made by the
members of this commission, and among which that of Alise is found, were
published in 1575, in the edition of James Strada.
_The Sultan Soliman II._, contemporary of Charles V., whom he had taken
for his model, sent through all Europe to procure as many copies of
Cæsar’s _Commentaries_ as could be found, which he ordered to be
collated, and caused a translation to be made into the Turkish language
for his own daily reading.
_The King of France, Henri IV._, translated the two first books of
Cæsar’s _Commentaries_. The manuscript of this translation was deposited
in the Bibliothèque du Roi, and M. des Noyers took it thence to deliver
it to Louis XIII., who, in his turn, translated the two last books of
the _Commentaries_. These two translations were joined together, and
printed at the Louvre in 1630.
_Louis XIV._ translated the first book of the _Commentaries_. His
translation was printed at Paris in 1651, in folio, with figures. This
work has not been reprinted; it is now very rare. The reader may consult
on this subject the _Méthode d’étudier l’Histoire_ of the Abbé
Lenglet-Dufresnoy, tom. II., p. 481; and J. Ch. Brunet, _Manuel du
Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres_, fourth edition, tom. I., p. 519.
_The great Condé_, who had studied with care the campaigns of Cæsar,
encouraged the translation of the _Commentaries_ undertaken by Nicolas
Perrot d’Ablancourt; it was the translation most esteemed and the most
in vogue during the last century.
_Christina, Queen of Sweden_, had composed _Reflections on the Life and
Actions of Cæsar_, as we are informed by J. Arckenholz in his work
entitled _Mémoires concernant Christine, Reine de Suède_, Amsterdam,
1751-1760, tom. IV., No. 6, p. 4.
_Louis Philippe Joseph d’Orléans_, surnamed _Egalité_, was a great
reader of the _Commentaries_. He caused a map of Cæsar’s campaigns in
Gaul to be made.
Lastly, _the Emperor Napoleon I._, at St. Helena, dictated a _Précis des
Guerres de César_ to Comte Marchand, who published it in Paris in 1836,
in 8vo.
CONTENTS.
BOOK III.
THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES.”
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.
PAGE
I. ENTERPRISING CHARACTER OF THE GAULS. 1
II. WARS OF THE ROMANS BEYOND THE ALPS. 3
III. CONTINUAL PRE-OCCUPATION OF THE ROMANS IN REGARD TO THE
GAULS. 7
IV. PLAN FOLLOWED IN THE RELATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL. 13
CHAPTER II.
STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR.
I. GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION. (_See Plate 1._) 15
II. POLITICAL DIVISIONS. (_See Plate 2._) 22
III. MANNERS. 32
IV. INSTITUTIONS. 41
CHAPTER III.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. PROJECTS OF INVASION BY THE HELVETII. (_See Plate 3._) 49
II. CÆSAR’S ARRIVAL AT GENEVA. 52
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE RETRENCHMENT OF THE RHONE. (_See
Plate 8._) 52
IV. THE HELVETII BEGIN THEIR MARCH TOWARDS THE SAÔNE. CÆSAR
UNITES HIS TROOPS. (_See Plates 2 and 4._) 59
V. DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII ON THE SAÔNE. (_See Plates 2 and 4._) 64
VI. DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII NEAR BIBRACTE. (_See Plates 4 and 5._) 72
VII. PURSUIT OF THE HELVETII 76
VIII. OBSERVATIONS 79
CHAPTER IV.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. SEAT OF THE SUEVI AND OTHER GERMAN TRIBES. (_See Plate 2._) 80
II. THE GAULS SOLICIT CÆSAR TO COME TO THEIR SUCCOUR. 83
III. MARCH OF CÆSAR UPON BESANÇON. (_See Plate 4._) 86
IV. PANIC IN THE ROMAN ARMY. 88
V. MARCH TOWARDS THE VALLEY OF THE RHINE. (_See Plate 4._) 91
VI. INTERVIEW BETWEEN CÆSAR AND ARIOVISTUS. (_See Plate 6._) 94
VII. MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES. (_See Plates 2 and 6._) 97
VIII. BATTLE AGAINST THE GERMANS. (_See Plate 4._) 99
IX. OBSERVATIONS. 103
CHAPTER V.
WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ
(Year of Rome 697.)
(BOOK II. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. LEAGUE OF THE BELGÆ. CÆSAR ADVANCES FROM BESANÇON TO
THE AISNE. (_See Plate 4._) 106
II. CÆSAR’S CAMP AT BERRY-AU-BAC. (_See Plates 2, 7, 8, and 9._) 109
III. BATTLE ON THE AISNE. 113
IV. RETREAT OF THE BELGÆ. 115
V. CAPTURE OF NOVIODUNUM AND BRATUSPANTIUM. (_See Plate 7._) 116
VI. MARCH AGAINST THE NERVII. (_See Plates 7 and 10._) 118
VII. BATTLE ON THE SAMBRE. (_See Plate 10._) 121
VIII. SIEGE OF THE OPPIDUM OF THE ADUATUCI. (_See Plate 11._) 128
IX. SUBJUGATION OF THE ARMORICA BY P. CRASSUS. 131
X. EXPEDITION OF GALBA INTO THE VALAIS. 132
CHAPTER VI.
(Year of Rome 698.)
(BOOK III. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
WAR OF THE VENETII--VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI--SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE--MARCH
AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.
I. INSURRECTION OF THE MARITIME PEOPLES. (_See Plate 12._) 135
II. WAR AGAINST THE VENETI. (_See Plate 12._) 137
III. NAVAL COMBAT AGAINST THE VENETI. (_See Plate 12._) 141
IV. VICTORY OF SABINUS OVER THE UNELLI. (_See Plate 13._) 144
V. CONQUEST OF AQUITAINE BY P. CRASSUS. 146
VI. MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII. 150
VII. OBSERVATIONS. 151
CHAPTER VII.
(Year of Rome 699.)
(BOOK IV. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI--FIRST PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN--CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND
THE MENAPII.
I. CÆSAR’S MARCH AGAINST THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI.
(_See Plate 14._) 153
II. ROUT OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI. 158
III. FIRST PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. (_See Plates 14 and 15._) 160
IV. DESCRIPTION OF BRITAIN IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR. 165
V. FIRST EXPEDITION TO BRITAIN. (_See Plates 16 and 17._) 172
VI. CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND MENAPII. 184
VII. ORDER FOR REBUILDING THE FLEET. DEPARTURE FOR ILLYRIA. 185
VIII. POINTS OF EMBARKING AND LANDING. DATE OF THE ARRIVAL
IN BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 186
IX. RÉSUMÉ OF THE DATES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 699. 202
CHAPTER VIII.
(Year of Rome 700.)
(BOOK V. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI--SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN.
I. INSPECTION OF THE FLEET. MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI. 204
II. DEPARTURE FOR THE ISLE OF BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 206
III. MARCH INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. (_See Plate 16._) 208
IV. DESTRUCTION OF A PART OF THE FLEET. 210
V. CÆSAR RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE. 211
VI. MARCH TOWARDS THE THAMES. (_See Plate 16._) 214
VII. SUBMISSION OF A PART OF BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 216
VIII. RE-EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY. 217
IX. OBSERVATIONS. (_See Plate 16._) 219
X. PRESUMED DATES OF THE SECOND CAMPAIGN IN BRITAIN. 223
XI. DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEGIONS IN THEIR WINTER QUARTERS.
(_See Plates 14 and 18._) 225
XII. DEFEAT OF SABINUS AT ADUATUCA. 228
XIII. ATTACK ON CICERO’S CAMP. 234
XIV. CÆSAR MARCHES TO THE SUCCOUR OF CICERO. (_See Plates 14
and 27, Fig. 8._) 236
XV. CÆSAR PLACES HIS TROOPS IN WINTER QUARTERS. LABIENUS
DEFEATS INDUTIOMARUS. 246
XVI. OBSERVATIONS. 250
CHAPTER IX.
(Year of Rome 701.)
(BOOK VI. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI--SECOND PASSAGE OF
THE RHINE--WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE EBURONES.
I. CÆSAR AUGMENTS HIS ARMY. 253
II. WAR AGAINST THE NERVII. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GAUL. 254
III. SUBMISSION OF THE MENAPII. 256
IV. SUCCESS OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE TREVIRI. 257
V. SECOND PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. 260
VI. WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX. (_See Plates 2 and 14._) 262
VII. THE SICAMBRI ATTACK ADUATUCA. (_See Plate 18._) 265
CHAPTER X.
(Year of Rome 702.)
(BOOK VII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
REVOLT OF GAUL--CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM--SIEGES
OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA--CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS
AGAINST THE PARISII--SIEGE OF ALESIA.
I. REVOLT OF GAUL. 272
II. CÆSAR BEGINS THE CAMPAIGN. (_See Plate 19._) 275
III. TAKING OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM. (_See
Plate 19._) 278
IV. SIEGE OF AVARICUM. (_See Plate 20._) 287
V. ARRIVAL OF CÆSAR AT DECETIA, AND MARCH TOWARDS AUVERGNE.
(_See Plates 19 and 21._) 299
VI. BLOCKADE OF GERGOVIA. (_See Plates 21 and 22._) 303
VII. OBSERVATIONS. 319
VIII. CÆSAR LEAVES GERGOVIA IN ORDER TO JOIN LABIENUS. 320
IX. EXPEDITION OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE PARISII. (_See Plate 23._) 323
X. THE GAULS ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE. 329
XI. JUNCTION OF CÆSAR AND LABIENUS. BATTLE OF THE VINGEANNE.
(_See Plates 19 and 24._) 331
XII. BLOCKADE OF ALESIA. (_See Plates 25, 26, 27, and 28._) 338
XIII. DETAILS OF THE EXCAVATIONS AT MONT AUXOIS. (_See Plates
25, 27, and 28._) 358
CHAPTER XI.
(Year of Rome 703.)
(BOOK VIII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BITURIGES AND CARNUTES. 367
II. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI. (_See Plates 29 and 30._) 369
III. BATTLE ON THE AISNE. 377
IV. DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY OF THE EBURONES. 379
V. EXPEDITION AGAINST DUMNACUS. 381
VI. CAPTURE OF UXELLODUNUM. (_See Plates 31 and 32._) 383
VII. EXCAVATIONS MADE AT PUY D’ISSOLU. (_See Plates 31 and 32._) 390
VIII. COMPLETE SUBMISSION OF GAUL. 395
BOOK IV.
RECAPITULATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL, AND RELATION
OF EVENTS AT ROME FROM 696 TO 705.
CHAPTER I.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 696.
I. DIFFICULTIES OF CÆSAR’S TASK. 399
II. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII. 402
III. CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS. 405
IV. SEQUEL OF THE CONSULSHIP OF L. CALPURNIUS PISO AND AULUS
GALBINIUS. 408
V. INTRIGUES OF CLODIUS. 409
VI. POMPEY CONSULTS CÆSAR ON THE RETURN OF CICERO. 410
VII. POMPEY BELIEVES HIMSELF THREATENED BY A SLAVE OF CLODIUS. 411
CHAPTER II.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 697.
I. WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ. 413
II. RETURN OF CICERO. 416
III. POMPEY IS CHARGED WITH THE SUPPLYING OF FOOD. 419
IV. FESTIVALS TO COMMEMORATE CÆSAR’S VICTORIES. 420
V. RIOTS AT ROME. 421
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS IN ROME DURING THE YEAR 698.
I. PRESENCE IN ROME OF PTOLEMY AULETES. 424
II. CLODIUS NAMED ÆDILE. TRIAL OF MILO. 426
III. RETURN OF CATO. 429
IV. STATE OF ANARCHY IN ROME. 430
V. THE INTERVIEW AT LUCCA. 433
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVIEW AT LUCCA. CONDUCT OF
CICERO. 438
VII. INTRIGUES OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS TO OBTAIN THE CONSULSHIP. 443
VIII. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PEOPLES ON THE SHORES OF THE OCEAN. 445
CHAPTER IV.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 699.
I. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI. 449
II. FIRST DESCENT IN ENGLAND. 451
III. CÆSAR’S HABITS WHEN IN CAMPAIGN. 452
IV. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS. 453
V. MOTION OF TREBONIUS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCES. 456
VI. POMPEY’S SUMPTUARY LAW. 461
VII. DEPARTURE OF CRASSUS FOR SYRIA. 462
VIII. CATO PROPOSES TO DELIVER CÆSAR TO THE GERMANS. 464
CHAPTER V.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 700.
I. SECOND DESCENT IN ENGLAND. 467
II. DISPLACEMENT OF THE ARMY. DISASTER OF SABINUS. 468
III. L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS AND APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER,
CONSULS. 470
IV. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PTOLEMY IN EGYPT. 472
V. CORRUPTION OF THE ELECTIONS. 474
VI. DEATH OF CÆSAR’S DAUGHTER. 476
VII. CÆSAR’S BUILDINGS AT ROME. 477
VIII. HIS RELATIONS WITH CICERO. 478
CHAPTER VI.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 701.
I. EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH OF GAUL. SECOND PASSAGE OF
THE RHINE. 484
II. PURSUIT OF AMBIORIX. 485
III. C. DOMITIUS CALVINUS AND M. VALERIUS MESSALA, CONSULS. 486
IV. EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST THE PARTHIANS, AND HIS
DEATH. 488
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF CRASSUS. 499
CHAPTER VII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 702.
I. MURDER OF CLODIUS. 501
II. THE REPUBLIC IS DECLARED IN DANGER. 505
III. POMPEY SOLE CONSUL. 506
IV. TRIAL OF MILO. 508
V. POMPEY TAKES AS HIS ASSOCIATE CÆCILIUS METELLUS PIUS
SCIPIO. 514
VI. INSURRECTION OF GAUL, AND CAMPAIGN OF 702. 516
CHAPTER VIII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 703.
I. NEW TROUBLES IN GAUL, AND THE CAMPAIGN ON THE AISNE. 528
II. CÆSAR’S POLICY IN GAUL AND AT ROME. 530
III. SULPICIUS RUFUS AND M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, CONSULS. 536
IV. SPIRIT WHICH ANIMATES CÆSAR’S ADVERSARIES. 538
V. THE QUESTION OF RIGHT BETWEEN THE SENATE AND CÆSAR. 542
VI. INTRIGUES TO DEPRIVE CÆSAR OF HIS COMMAND. 548
CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.
I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS, CONSULS. 554
II. CÆSAR REPAIRS TO THE CISALPINE. 559
III. POMPEY RECEIVES OVATIONS, AND ASKS CÆSAR TO RETURN HIS
TWO LEGIONS. 564
IV. THE SENATE VOTES IMPARTIALLY. 569
V. VIOLENT MEASURES ADOPTED AGAINST CÆSAR. 570
VI. STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION. 572
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.
I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS, CONSULS. 579
II. LENTULUS CARRIES THE SENATE AGAINST CÆSAR. 581
III. CÆSAR HARANGUES HIS TROOPS. 588
IV. CÆSAR IS DRIVEN TO CIVIL WAR. 590
V. CÆSAR CROSSES THE RUBICON. 592
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX A.
CONCORDANCE OF DATES OF THE ANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE
JULIAN STYLE, FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709. 595
APPENDIX B.
CONCORDANCE OF ROMAN AND MODERN HOURS, FOR THE YEAR OF
ROME 699 (55 B. C.) AND FOR THE LATITUDE OF PARIS. 638
APPENDIX C.
LIST OF ANCIENT COINS FOUND IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.
PAGE
NOTE ON THE ANCIENT COINS COLLECTED IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE. 640
COINS STRUCK IN THE MINT AT ROME. 642
COINS STRUCK IN SOUTHERN ITALY. 644
COINS STRUCK OUT OF ITALY. 644
GAULISH COINS (FROM CAMP D, ON THE BANKS OF THE OSE). 645
APPENDIX D.
NOTICE ON CÆSAR’S LIEUTENANTS.
1. T. ATTIUS LABIENUS. 648
2. PUBLIUS LUCINIUS CRASSUS. 648
3. L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA. 649
4. QUINTUS TITURIUS SABINUS. 649
5. Q. PEDIUS. 649
6. SERVIUS SULPICIUS GALBA. 649
7. DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS. 650
8. PUBLIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS. 651
9. LUCIUS MUNATIUS PLANCUS. 652
10. MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS. 652
11. CAIUS FABIUS. 653
12. L. ROSCIUS. 653
13. TITUS SEXTIUS. 653
14. Q. TULLIUS CICERO. 654
15. CAIUS TREBONIUS. 655
16. MINUCIUS BASILUS. 656
17. C. ANTISTIUS REGINUS. 656
18. M. SILANUS. 656
19. C. CANINIUS REBILUS. 656
20. M. SEMPRONIUS RUTILUS. 657
21. MARCUS ANTONIUS (MARK ANTONY). 657
22. PUBLIUS VATINIUS. 657
28. Q. FUFIUS CALENUS. 658
24. L. CÆSAR. 658
LIST OF PLATES TO VOLUME II.
PAGE
1. GENERAL MAP OF GAUL 15
2. GENERAL MAP OF THE PEOPLES OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR 23
3. COURSE OF THE RHONE, FROM GENEVA TO THE PAS DE L’ECLUSE 54
4. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 696 60
5. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE HELVETII 78
6. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF ARIOVISTUS 97
7. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 697 107
8. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE 110
9. CAMP OF CÆSAR ON THE AISNE 111
10. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE 121
11. PLAN OF THE OPPIDUM OF THE ADUATUCI 129
12. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VENETI 137
13. EXPEDITION OF SABINUS TO THE UNELLI 145
14. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 699 153
15. BRIDGE OF PILES BUILT ON THE RHINE 162
16. MAP OF BRITAIN FOR THE TWO EXPEDITIONS 175
17. PLAN OF DOVER 176
18. PLAN OF ADUATUCA 231
19. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 702 277
20. PLAN OF AVARICUM 288
21. PLAN OF GERGOVIA 304
22. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT GERGOVIA 307
23. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS AT LUTETIA 325
24. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE VINGEANNE 334
25. PLAN OF ALESIA 340
26. VIEWS OF MONT AUXOIS 343
27. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT ALESIA 345
28. _Idem_ 346
29. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI 370
30. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT MONT SAINT-PIERRE 372
31. PLAN OF UXELLODUNUM 384
32. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT UXELLODUNUM 390
JULIUS CÆSAR.
BOOK III.
THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES.”
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.
[Sidenote: Enterprising Character of the Gauls.]
I. There are peoples whose existence in the past only reveals itself by
certain brilliant apparitions, unequivocal proofs of an energy which had
been previously unknown. During the interval their history is involved
in obscurity, and they resemble those long-silent volcanoes, which we
should take to be extinct but for the eruptions which, at periods far
apart, occur and expose to view the fire which smoulders in their bosom.
Such had been the Gauls.
The accounts of their ancient expeditions bear witness to an
organisation already powerful, and to an ardent spirit of enterprise.
Not to speak of migrations which date back perhaps nine or ten centuries
before our era, we see, at the moment when Rome was beginning to aim at
greatness, the Celts spreading themselves beyond their frontiers. In the
time of Tarquin the Elder (Years of Rome, 138 to 176), two expeditions
started from Celtic Gaul: one proceeded across the Rhine and Southern
Germany, to descend upon Illyria and Pannonia (now _Western Hungary_);
the other, scaling the Alps, established itself in Italy, in the country
lying between those mountains and the Po.[1] The invaders soon
transferred themselves to the right bank of that river, and nearly the
whole of the territory comprised between the Alps and the Apennines took
the name of _Cisalpine Gaul_. More than two centuries afterwards, the
descendants of those Gauls marched upon Rome, and burnt it all but the
Capitol.[2] Still a century later (475), we see new bands issuing from
Gaul, reaching Thrace by the valley of the Danube,[3] ravaging Northern
Greece, and bringing back to Toulouse the gold plundered from the Temple
of Delphi.[4] Others, arriving at Byzantium,[5] pass into Asia,
establish their dominion over the whole region on this side Mount
Taurus, since called _Gallo-Græcia_, or _Galatia_, and maintain in it a
sort of military feudalism until the time of the war of Antiochus.[6]
These facts, obscure as they may be in history, prove the spirit of
adventure and the warlike genius of the Gaulish race, which thus, in
fact, inspired a general terror. During nearly two centuries, from 364
to 531, Rome struggled against the Cisalpine Gauls, and more than once
the defeat of her armies placed her existence in danger. It was, as it
were, foot by foot that the Romans effected the conquest of Northern
Italy, strengthening it as they proceeded by the establishment of
colonies.
Let us here give a recapitulation of the principal wars against the
Gauls, Cisalpine and Transalpine, ich have already been spoken of in the
first volume of the present work. In 531 the Romans took the offensive,
crossed the Po, and subjugated a great part of the Cisalpine. But hardly
had the north of Italy been placed under the supremacy of the Republic,
when Hannibal’s invasion (536) caused anew an insurrection of the
inhabitants of those countries, who helped to increase the numbers of
his army; and even when that great captain was obliged to quit Italy,
they continued to defend their independence during thirty-four years.
The struggle, renewed in 554, ended only in 588, for we will not take
into account the partial insurrections which followed. During this time,
Rome had not only to combat the Cisalpines, assisted by the Gauls from
beyond the Alps, but also to make war upon the men of their race in Asia
(565) and in Illyria. In this last-mentioned province the colony of
Aquileia was founded (571), and several wild tribes of Liguria, who held
the defiles of the Alps, were subjugated (588).
[Sidenote: Wars of the Romans beyond the Alps.]
II. In 600, the Romans, called to the assistance of the Greek town of
Marseilles, which was attacked by the Oxybii and the Deciates, Ligurian
tribes of the Maritime Alps,[7] for the first time carried their arms
to the other side of the Alps. They followed the course of the Corniche,
and crossed the Var; but it took, according to Strabo, a struggle of
eighty years before they obtained from the Ligures an extent of twelve
stadia (2·22 kils.), a narrow passage on the coast of the sea, to enable
them to pass through Gaul into Spain.[8] Nevertheless, the legions
pushed their encroachments between the Rhone and the Alps. The conquered
territory was given to the people of Marseilles, who soon, attacked
again by the peoples of the Maritime Alps, implored a second time the
support of Rome. In 629, the Consul M. Fulvius Flaccus was sent against
the Salluvii; and, three years afterwards,[9] the proconsul C. Sextius
Calvinus drove them back far from the sea-coast, and founded the town of
Aix (_Aquæ Sextiæ_).[10]
The Romans, by protecting the people of Marseilles, had extended their
dominion on the coast; by contracting other alliances, they penetrated
into the interior. The Ædui were at war with the Allobroges and the
Arverni. The proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus united with the former,
and defeated the Allobroges, in 633, at Vindalium, on the Sorgue
(_Sulgas_), not far from the Rhone. Subsequently, Q. Fabius Maximus,
grandson of Paulus Æmilius, gained, at the confluence of the Isère and
the Rhone, a decisive victory over the Allobroges, and over Bituitus,
king of the Arverni. By this success Q. Fabius gained the surname of
_Allobrogicus_.[11] The Arverni pretended to be descendants of the
Trojans, and boasted a common origin with the Romans;[12] they remained
independent, but their dominion, which extended from the banks of the
Rhine to the neighbourhood of Narbonne and Marseilles, was limited to
their ancient territory. The Ruteni, who had been their allies against
Fabius, obtained similarly the condition of not being subjected to the
Roman power, and were exempted from all tribute.[13]
In 636, the Consul Q. Marcius Rex founded the colony of Narbo Marcius,
which gave its name to the Roman province called _Narbonensis_.[14]
The movement which had long thrust the peoples of the north towards the
south had slackened during several centuries, but in the seventh century
of the foundation of Rome it seems to have re-commenced with greater
intensity than ever. The Cimbri and the Teutones,[15] after ravaging
Noricum and Illyria, and defeating the army of Papirius Carbo sent to
protect Italy (641), had marched across Rhætia, and penetrated by the
valley of the Rhine to the country of the Helvetii. They drew with them
a part of that people, spread into Gaul, and for several years carried
there terror and desolation. The Belgæ alone offered a vigorous
resistance. Rome, to protect her province, sent against them, or against
the tribes of the Helvetii, their allies, five generals, who were
successively vanquished: the Consul M. Junius Silanus, in 645; M.
Aurelius Scaurus, in 646; L. Cassius Longinus, in 647;[16] lastly, in
the year 649, the proconsul Q. Servilius Cæpio[17] and Cn. Manlius
Maximus. The two last each lost his army.[18] The very existence of Rome
was threatened.
Marius, by the victories gained at Aix over the Teutones (652), and at
the Campi Raudii, not far from the Adige, over the Cimbri (653),
destroyed the barbarians and saved Italy.
The ancients often confounded the Gauls with the Cimbri and Teutones;
sprung from a common origin, these peoples formed, as it were, the
rear-guard of the great army of invasion which, at an unknown epoch, had
brought the Celts into Gaul from the shores of the Black Sea.
Sallust[19] ascribes to the Gauls the defeats of Q. Cæpio and Cn.
Manlius, and Cicero[20] designates under the same name the barbarians
who were destroyed by Marius. The fact is that all the peoples of the
north were always ready to unite in the same effort when it was proposed
to throw themselves upon the south of Europe.
From 653 to 684, the Romans, occupied with intestine wars, dreamt not of
increasing their power beyond the Alps; and, when internal peace was
restored, their generals, such as Sylla, Metellus Creticus, Lucullus,
and Pompey, preferred the easy and lucrative conquests of the East. The
vanquished peoples were abandoned by the Senate to the exactions of
governors, which explains the readiness with which the deputies of the
Allobroges entered, in 691, into Catiline’s conspiracy; fear led them to
denounce the plot, but they experienced no gratitude for their
revelations.[21]
The Allobroges rose, seized the town of Vienne,[22] which was devoted to
the Romans, and surprised, in 693, Manlius Lentinus, lieutenant of C.
Pomptinus, governor of the Narbonnese. Nevertheless, some time after,
the latter finally defeated and subdued them. “Until the time of Cæsar,”
says Cicero, “our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls,
thinking more of putting a stop to their aggressions than of carrying
the war among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their towns and
homes, but confined himself to opposing a barrier to these torrents of
peoples which were inundating Italy. C. Pomptinus, who suppressed the
war raised by the Allobroges, rested after his victory. Cæsar alone
resolved to subject Gaul to our dominion.”[23]
[Sidenote: Continual Pre-occupation of the Romans in regard to the
Gauls.]
III. It results from this summary of facts that the constant thought of
the Romans was, during several centuries, to resist the Celtic peoples
established on either side of the Alps. Ancient authors proclaim aloud
the fear which held Rome constantly on the watch. “The Romans,” says
Sallust, “had then, as in our days, the opinion that all other peoples
must yield to their courage; but that with the Gauls it was no longer
for glory, but for safety, that they had to fight.”[24] On his part,
Cicero expresses himself thus: “From the beginning of our Republic, all
our wise men have looked upon Gaul as _the most redoubtable enemy of
Rome_. But the strength and multitude of those peoples had prevented us
until now from combating them all.”[25]
In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii
prevailed at Rome. All political pre-occupation ceased at once, and
resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such
circumstances.[26] In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the
Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy _en
masse_ ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military
service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a
special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was
forbidden to touch except in that eventuality.[27] Accordingly, when, in
705, Cæsar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes
that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless.[28]
War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the
consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a
desperate struggle, and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This
explains, at the same time, both Cæsar’s ardour and the enthusiasm
excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional
sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the
fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the
greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the
fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia,
and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a
check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the
power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on
the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally
as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation.
If Cæsar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say
what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the
North rushing eagerly upon Italy?
And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul.
Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian
Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the
revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of
thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen,[29] and even twenty,[30] for
Cæsar’s victories, and, in honour of them, the people offered sacrifices
during sixty days.[31]
When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of
this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he
is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar
motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Cæsar the
sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power
by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted
view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly
estimating the causes which have produced them.
The sequel of this history will prove that all the responsibility of the
civil war belongs not to Cæsar, but to Pompey. And although the former
had his eyes incessantly fixed on his enemies at Rome, none the less for
that he pursued his conquests, without making them subordinate to his
personal interests. If he had sought only his own elevation in his
military successes, he would have followed an entirely opposite course.
We should not have seen him sustain during eight years a desperate
struggle, and incur the risks of enterprises such as those of Great
Britain and Germany. After his first campaigns, he need only have
returned to Rome to profit by the advantages he had acquired; for, as
Cicero says,[32] “he had already done enough for his glory, if he had
not done enough for the Republic;” and the same orator adds: “Why would
Cæsar himself remain in his province, if it were not to deliver to the
Roman people complete a work which was already nearly finished? Is he
retained by the agreeableness of the country, by the beauty of the
towns, by the politeness and amenity of the individuals and peoples, by
the lust of victory, by the desire of extending the limits of our
empire? Is there anything more uncultivated than those countries, ruder
than those towns, more ferocious than those peoples, and more admirable
than the multiplicity of Cæsar’s victories? Can he find limits farther
off than the ocean? Would his return to his country offend either the
people who sent him or the Senate which has loaded him with honours?
Would his absence increase the desire we have to see him? Would it not
rather contribute, through lapse of time, to make people forget him, and
to cause the laurels to fade which he had gathered in the midst of the
greatest perils? If, then, there any who love not Cæsar, it is not their
policy to obtain his recall from his province, because that would be to
recall him to glory, to triumph, to the congratulations and supreme
honours of the Senate, to the favour of the equestrian order, to the
affection of the people.”[33]
Thus, after the end of 698, he might have led his army back into Italy,
claimed triumph, and obtained power, without having to seize upon it, as
Sylla, Marius, Cinna, and even Crassus and Pompey, had done.
If Cæsar had accepted the government of Gaul with the sole aim of having
an army devoted to his designs, it must be admitted that so experienced
a general would have taken, to commence a civil war, the simplest of the
measures suggested by prudence: instead of separating himself from his
army, he would have kept it with him, or, at least, brought it near to
Italy, and distributed it in such a manner that he could re-assemble it
quickly; he would have preserved, from the immense booty taken in Gaul,
sums sufficient to supply the expenses of the war. Cæsar, on the
contrary, as we shall see in the sequel, sends first to Pompey, without
hesitation, two legions which are required from him under the pretext of
the expedition against the Parthians. He undertakes to disband his
troops if Pompey will do the same, and he arrives at Ravenna at the head
of a single legion, leaving the others beyond the Alps, distributed from
the Sambre as far as the Saône.[34] He keeps within the limit of his
government without making any preparation which indicates hostile
intentions,[35] wishing, as Hirtius says, to settle the quarrel by
justice rather than by arms.[36] In fact, he has collected so little
money in the military chest, that his soldiers club together to procure
him the sums necessary for his enterprise, and that all voluntarily
renounce their pay.[37] Cæsar offers Pompey an unconditional
reconciliation, and it is only when he sees his advances rejected, and
his adversaries meditating his ruin, that he boldly faces the forces of
the Senate, and passes the Rubicon. It was not, then, the supreme power
which Cæsar went into Gaul to seek, but the pure and elevated glory
which arises from a national war, made in the traditional interest of
the country.
[Sidenote: Plan followed in the Relation of the War in Gaul.]
IV. In reproducing in the following chapters the relation of the war in
Gaul, we have borne in mind the words of Cicero. “Cæsar,” he says, “has
written memoirs worthy of great praise. Deprived of all oratorical art,
his style, like a handsome body stripped of clothing, presents itself
naked, upright, and graceful. In his desire to furnish materials to
future historians, he has, perhaps, done a thing agreeable to the little
minds who will be tempted to load these natural graces with frivolous
ornaments; but he has for ever deprived men of sense of the desire of
writing, for nothing is more agreeable in history than a correct and
luminous brevity.”[38] Hirtius, on his part, expresses himself in the
following terms: “These memoirs enjoy an approval so general, that Cæsar
has much more taken from others than given to them the power of writing
the history of the events which they recount. We have still more reasons
than all others for admiring it, for others know only how correct and
accurate this book is; we know the facility and rapidity with which it
was composed.”[39]
If we would act upon the advice of these writers, we must digress as
little as possible from the “Commentaries,” but without restricting
ourselves to a literal translation. We have, then, adopted the narrative
of Cæsar, though sometimes changing the order of the matter: we have
abridged passages where there was a prodigality of details, and
developed those which required elucidation. In order to indicate in a
more precise manner the localities which witnessed so many battles, we
have employed the modern names, especially in cases where ancient
geography did not furnish corresponding names.
The investigation of the battle-fields and siege operations has led to
the discovery of visible and certain traces of the Roman entrenchments.
The reader, by comparing the plans of the excavations with the text,
will be convinced of the rigorous accuracy of Cæsar in describing the
countries he passed over, and the works he caused to be executed.
CHAPTER II.
STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR.
(See Plate I.)
[Sidenote: Geographical Description.]
I. Transalpine Gaul had for its boundaries the ocean, the Pyrenees, the
Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine. This portion of Europe, so well
marked out by nature, comprised what is now France, nearly the whole of
Switzerland, the Rhine Provinces, Belgium, and the south of Holland. It
had the form of an irregular pentagon, and the country of the Carnutes
(the _Orléanais_) was considered to be its centre.[40]
An uninterrupted chain of heights divided Gaul, as it divides modern
France, from north to south, into two parts. This line commences at the
Monts Corbières, at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, is continued by
the Southern Cévennes and by the mountains of the Vivarais, Lyonnais,
and Beaujolais (called the Northern Cévennes), and declines continually
with the mountains of the Charolais and the Côte-d’Or, until it reaches
the plateau of Langres; after quitting this plateau, it leaves to the
east the Monts Faucilles, which unite it to the Vosges, and, inclining
towards the north-west, it follows, across the mountains of the Meuse,
the western crests of the Argonne and the Ardennes, and terminates, in
decreasing undulations, towards Cape Griz-Nez, in the Pas-de-Calais.
This long and tortuous ridge, more or less interrupted, which may be
called the backbone of the country, is the great line of the watershed.
It separates two slopes. On the eastern slope flow the Rhine and the
Rhone, in opposite directions, the first towards the Northern Sea, the
second towards the Mediterranean; on the western slope rise the Seine,
the Loire, and the Garonne, which go to throw themselves into the ocean.
These rivers flow at the bottom of vast basins, the bounds of which, as
is well known, are indicated by the lines of elevations connecting the
sources of all the tributaries of the principal stream.
The basin of the Rhine is separated from that of the Rhone by the Monts
Faucilles, the southern extremity of the Vosges, called _Le trouée de
Belfort_, the Jura, the Jorat (the heights which surround the Lake of
Geneva on the north), and the lofty chain of the Helvetic Alps. In its
upper part, it embraces nearly all Switzerland, of which the Rhine forms
the northern boundary, in its course, from east to west, from the Lake
of Constance to Bâle. Near this town the river turns abruptly towards
the north. The basin widens, limited to the east by the mountains which
separate it from the Danube and the Weser; to the west, by the northern
part of the great line of watershed (the mountains of the Meuse, the
Argonne, and the western Ardennes). It is intersected, from Mayence to
Bonn, by chains nearly parallel to the course of the river, which
separate its tributaries. From Bonn to the point where the Rhine divides
into two arms, the basin opens still more; it is flat, and has no
longer a definite boundary. The southern arm bore already, in the time
of Cæsar, the name of _Waal_ (Vahalis), and united with the Meuse[41]
below Nimeguen. To the west of the basin of the Rhine, the Scheldt forms
a secondary basin.
The basin of the Rhone, in which is comprised that of the Saône, is
sharply bounded on the north by the southern extremity of the Vosges and
the Monts Faucilles; on the west, by the plateau of Langres, the
Côte-d’Or, and the Cévennes; on the east, by the Jura, the Jorat, and
the Alps. The Rhone crosses the Valais and the Lake of Geneva, follows
an irregular course as far as Lyons, and runs thence from north to south
to the Mediterranean. Among the most important of its secondary basins,
we may reckon those of the Aude, the Hérault, and the Var.
The three great basins of the western slope are comprised between the
line of watershed of Gaul and the ocean. They are separated from each
other by two chains branching from this line, and running from the
south-east to the north-west. The basin of the Seine, which includes
that of the Somme, is separated from the basin of the Loire by a line of
heights which branches from the Côte-d’Or under the name of the
mountains of the Morvan, and is continued by the very low hills of Le
Perche to the extremity of Normandy. A series of heights, extending from
north to south, from the hills of Le Perche to Nantes, enclose the basin
of the Loire to the west, and leave outside the secondary basins of
Brittany.
The basin of the Loire is separated from that of the Garonne by a long
chain starting from Mont Lozère, comprising the mountains of Auvergne,
those of the Limousin, the hills of Poitou, and the plateau of Gatine,
and ending in flat country towards the coasts of La Vendée.
The basin of the Garonne, situated to the south of that of the Loire,
extends to the Pyrenees. It comprises the secondary basins of the Adour
and the Charente.
The vast country we have thus described is protected on the north, west,
and south by two seas, and by the Pyrenees. On the east, where it is
exposed to invasions, Nature, not satisfied with the defences she had
given it in the Rhine and the Alps, has further retrenched it behind
three groups of interior mountains--first, the Vosges; second, the Jura;
third, the mountains of Forez, the mountains of Auvergne, and the
Cévennes.
The Vosges run parallel to the Rhine, and are like a rampart in the rear
of that river.
The Jura, separated from the Vosges by _the Gap (trouée) of Belfort_,
rises like a barrier in the interval left between the Rhine and the
Rhone, preventing, as far as Lyons, the waters of this latter river from
uniting with those of the Saône.
The Cévennes and the mountains of Auvergne and Forez form, in the
southern centre of Gaul, a sort of citadel, of which the Rhone might be
considered as the advanced fosse. The ridges of this group of mountains
start from a common centre, take opposite directions, and form the
valleys whence flow, to the north, the Allier and the Loire; to the
west, the Dordogne, the Lot, the Aveyron, and the Tarn; to the south,
the Ardèche, the Gard, and the Hérault.
The valleys, watered by navigable rivers, presented--thanks to the
fruitfulness of their soil and to their easy access--natural ways of
communication, favourable both to commerce and to war. To the north, the
valley of the Meuse; to the east, the valley of the Rhine, conducting to
that of the Saône, and thence to that of the Rhone, were the grand
routes which armies followed to invade the south. Strabo, therefore,
remarks justly that Sequania (_Franche-Comté_) has always been the road
of the Germanic invasions from Gaul into Italy.[42] From east to west
the principal chain of the watershed might easily be crossed in its less
elevated parts, such as the plateau of Langres and the mountains of
Charolais, which have since furnished a passage to the Central Canal.
Lastly, to penetrate from Italy into Gaul, the great lines of invasion
were the valley of the Rhone and the valley of the Garonne, by which the
mountainous mass of the Cévennes, Auvergne, and Forez is turned.
Gaul presented the same contrast of climates which we observe between
the north and south of France. While the Roman province enjoyed a mild
temperature and an extreme fertility,[43] the central and northern part
was covered with vast forests, which rendered the climate colder than it
is at present;[44] yet the centre produced in abundance wheat, rye,
millet, and barley.[45] The greatest of all these forests was that of
the Ardennes. It extended, beginning from the Rhine, over a space of two
hundred miles, on one side to the frontier of the Remi, crossing the
country of the Treviri; and, on another side, to the Scheldt, across the
country of the Nervii.[46] The “Commentaries” speak also of forests
existing among the Carnutes,[47] in the neighbourhood of the Saône,[48]
among the Menapii[49] and the Morini,[50] and among the Eburones.[51] In
the north the breeding of cattle was the principal occupation,[52] and
the pastures of Belgic Gaul produced a race of excellent horses.[53] In
the centre and in the south the richness of the soil was augmented by
productive mines of gold, silver, copper, iron, and lead.[54]
The country was, without any doubt, intersected by carriage roads, since
the Gauls possessed a great number of all sorts of wagons,[55] since
there still remain traces of Celtic roads, and since Cæsar makes known
the existence of bridges on the Aisne,[56] the Rhone,[57] the Loire,[58]
the Allier,[59] and the Seine.[60]
It is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of the population; yet
we may presume, from the contingents furnished by the different states,
that it amounted to more than seven millions of souls.[61]
[Sidenote: Political Divisions.]
II. Gaul, according to Cæsar, was divided into three great regions,
distinct by language, manners, and laws: to the north, Belgic Gaul,
between the Seine, the Marne, and the Rhine; in the centre, Celtic Gaul,
between the Garonne and the Seine, extending from the ocean to the Alps,
and comprising Helvetia; to the south, Aquitaine, between the Garonne
and the Pyrenees.[62] (_See Plate 2._) We must, nevertheless, comprise
in Gaul the Roman province, or the Narbonnese, which began at Geneva, on
the left bank of the Rhone, and extended in the south as far as
Toulouse. It answered, as nearly as possible, to the limits of the
countries known in modern times as Savoy, Dauphiné, Provence, Lower
Languedoc, and Roussillon. The populations who inhabited it were of
different origins: there were found there Aquitanians, Belgæ, Ligures,
Celts, who had all long undergone the influence of Greek civilisation,
and especially establishments founded by the Phocæans on the coasts of
the Mediterranean.[63]
These three great regions were subdivided into many states, called
_civitates_--an expression which, in the “Commentaries,” is synonymous
with _nations_[64]--that is, each of these states had its organisation
and its own government. Among the peoples mentioned by Cæsar, we may
reckon twenty-seven in Belgic Gaul, forty-three in Celtic, and twelve in
Aquitaine: in all, eighty-two in Gaul proper, and seven in the
Narbonnese. Other authors, admitting, no doubt, smaller subdivisions,
carry this number to three or four hundred;[65] but it appears that
under Tiberius there were only sixty-four states in Gaul.[66] Perhaps,
in this number, they reckoned only the sovereign, and not the dependent,
states.
1. _Belgic Gaul._ The Belgæ were considered more warlike than the other
Gauls,[67] because, strangers to the civilisation of the Roman province
and hostile to commerce, they had not experienced the effeminating
influence of luxury. Proud of having escaped the Gaulish enervation,
they claimed with arrogance an origin which united them with the Germans
their neighbours, with whom, nevertheless, they were continually at
war.[68] They boasted of having defended their territory against the
Cimbri and the Teutones, at the time of the invasion of Gaul. The memory
of the lofty deeds of their ancestors inspired them with a great
confidence in themselves, and excited their warlike spirit.[69]
The most powerful nations among the Belgæ were the Bellovaci,[70] who
could arm a hundred thousand men, and whose territory extended to the
sea,[71] the Nervii, the Remi, and the Treviri.
2. _Celtic Gaul._[72] The central part of Gaul, designated by the Greek
writers under the name of _Celtica_, and the inhabitants of which
constituted in the eyes of the Romans the Gauls properly so named
(_Galli_), was the most extensive and most populous. Among the most
important nations of Celtic Gaul were reckoned the Arverni, the Ædui,
the Sequani, and the Helvetii. Tacitus informs us that the Helvetii had
once occupied a part of Germany.[73]
These three first peoples often disputed the supremacy of Gaul. As to
the Helvetii, proud of their independence, they acknowledged no
authority superior to their own. In the centre and south of Celtic Gaul
dwelt peoples who had also a certain importance. On the west and
north-west were various maritime populations designated under the
generic name of _Armoricans_, an epithet which had, in the Celtic
tongue, the meaning of maritime. Small Alpine tribes inhabited the
valleys of the upper course of the Rhone, at the eastern extremity of
Lake Lémon, a country which now forms the Valais.
3. _Aquitaine._[74] Aquitaine commenced on the left bank of the
Garonne: it was inhabited by several small tribes, and contained none of
those agglomerations which were found among the Celts and the Belgæ. The
Aquitanians, who had originally occupied a vast territory to the north
of the Pyrenees, having been pushed backward by the Celts, had but a
rather limited portion of it in the time of Cæsar.
The three regions which composed Gaul were not only, as already stated,
divided into a great number of states, but each state (_civitas_) was
farther subdivided into _pagi_,[75] representing, perhaps, the same
thing as the tribe among the Arabs. The proof of the distinct character
of these agglomerations is found in the fact that in the army each of
them had its separate place, under the command of its own chieftains.
The smallest subdivision was called _vicus_.[76] Such, at least, are the
denominations employed in the “Commentaries,” but which were certainly
not those of the Celtic language. In each state there existed principal
towns, called indifferently by Cæsar _urbs_ or _oppidum_;[77] yet this
last name was given by preference to considerable towns, difficult of
access and carefully fortified, placed on heights or surrounded by
marshes.[78] It was to these _oppida_ that, in case of attack, the Gauls
transported their grain, their provisions, and their riches.[79] Their
habitations, established often in the forests or on the bank of a river,
were constructed of wood, and tolerably spacious.[80]
[Sidenote: Manners.]
III. The Gauls were tall in stature, their skin was white, their eyes
blue, their hair fair or chestnut, which they dyed, in order to make the
colour more brilliant.[81] They let their beard grow; the nobles alone
shaved, and preserved long moustaches.[82] Trousers or breeches, very
wide among the Belgæ, but narrower among the southern Gauls, and a
shirt with sleeves, descending to the middle of the thighs, composed
their principal dress.[83] They were clothed with a mantle or
_saie_,[84] magnificently embroidered with gold or silver among the
rich,[85] and held about the neck by means of a metal brooch. The lowest
classes of the people used instead an animal’s skin. The Aquitanians
covered themselves, probably according to the Iberic custom, with cloth
of coarse wool unshorn.[86]
The Gauls wore collars, earrings, bracelets, and rings for the arms, of
gold or copper, according to their rank; necklaces of amber, and rings,
which they placed on the third finger.[87]
They were naturally agriculturists, and we may suppose that the
institution of private property existed among them, because, on the one
hand, all the citizens paid the tax, except the Druids,[88] and, on the
other, the latter were judges of questions of boundaries.[89] They were
not unacquainted with certain manufactures. In some countries they
fabricated serges, which were in great repute, and cloths or felts;[90]
in others they worked the mines with skill, and employed themselves in
the fabrication of metals. The Bituriges worked in iron, and were
acquainted with the art of tinning.[91] The artificers of Alesia plated
copper with leaf-silver, to ornament horses’ bits and trappings.[92]
The Gauls fed especially on the flesh of swine, and their ordinary
drinks were milk, ale, and mead.[93] They were reproached with being
inclined to drunkenness.[94]
They were frank and open in temper, and hospitable toward strangers,[95]
but vain and quarrelsome;[96] fickle in their sentiments, and fond of
novelties, they took sudden resolutions, regretting one day what they
had rejected with disdain the day before;[97] inclined to war and eager
for adventures, they showed themselves hot in the attack, but quickly
discouraged in defeat.[98] Their language was very concise and
figurative;[99] in writing, they employed Greek letters.
The men were not exempt from a shameful vice, which we might have
believed less common in this county than among the peoples of the
East.[100] The women united an extraordinary beauty with remarkable
courage and great physical force.[101]
The Gauls, according to the tradition preserved by the Druids, boasted
of being descended from the god of the earth, or from Pluto (_Dis_),
according to the expression of Cæsar.[102] It was for this reason that
they took night for their starting-point in all their divisions of time.
Among their other customs, they had one which was singular: they
considered it as a thing unbecoming to appear in public with their
children, until the latter had reached the age for carrying arms.[103]
When he married, the man took from his fortune a part equal to the dowry
of the wife. This sum, placed as a common fund, was allowed to
accumulate with interest, and the whole reverted to the survivor. The
husband had the right of life and death over his wife and children.[104]
When the decease of a man of wealth excited any suspicion, his wives, as
well as his slaves, were put to the torture, and burnt if they were
found guilty.
The extravagance of their funerals presented a contrast to the
simplicity of their life. All that the defunct had cherished during his
life, was thrown into the flames after his death; and even, before the
Roman conquest, they joined with it his favourite slaves and
clients.[105]
In the time of Cæsar, the greater part of the peoples of Gaul were armed
with long iron swords, two-edged (σπἁθη), sheathed in
scabbards similarly of iron, suspended to the side by chains. These
swords were generally made to strike with the edge rather than to
stab.[106] The Gauls had also spears, the iron of which, very long and
very broad, presented sometimes an undulated form (_materis_,
σαὑνιον).[107] They also made use of light javelins without
_amentum_,[108] of the bow, and of the sling. Their helmets were of
metal, more or less precious, ornamented with the horns of animals, and
with a crest representing some figures of birds or savage beasts, the
whole surmounted by a high and bushy tuft of feathers.[109] They carried
a great buckler, a breastplate of iron or bronze, or a coat of mail--the
latter a Gaulish invention.[110] The Leuci and the Remi were celebrated
for throwing the javelin.[111] The Lingones had party-coloured
breastplates.[112] The Gaulish cavalry was superior to the
infantry;[113] it was composed of the nobles, followed by their
clients;[114] yet the Aquitanians, celebrated for their agility, enjoyed
a certain reputation as good infantry.[115] In general, the Gauls were
very ready at imitating the tactics of their enemies.[116] The habit of
working mines gave them a remarkable dexterity in all underground
operations, applicable to the attack and defence of fortified
posts.[117] Their armies dragged after them a multitude of wagons and
baggage, even in the less important expeditions.[118]
Although they had reached, especially in the south of Gaul, a tolerably
advanced degree of civilisation, they preserved very barbarous customs:
they killed their prisoners. “When their army is ranged in battle,” says
Diodorus, “some of them are often seen advancing from the ranks to
challenge the bravest of their enemies to single combat. If their
challenge is accepted, they chaunt a war-song, in which they boast of
the great deeds of their forefathers, exalting their own valour and
insulting their adversary. After the victory, they cut off their enemy’s
head, hang it to their horse’s neck, and carry it off with songs of
triumph. They keep these hideous trophies in their house, and the
highest nobles preserve them with great care, bathed with oil of cedar,
in coffers, which they show with pride to their guests.”[119]
When a great danger threatened the country, the chiefs convoked an armed
council, to which the men were bound to repair, at the place and day
indicated, to deliberate. The law required that the man who arrived last
should be massacred without pity before the eyes of the assembly. As a
means of intercommunication, men were placed at certain intervals
through the country, and these, repeating the cry from one to another,
transmitted rapidly news of importance to great distances. They often,
also, stopped travellers on the roads, and compelled them to answer
their questions.[120]
The Gauls were very superstitious.[121] Persuaded that in the eyes of
the gods the life of a man can only be redeemed by that of his fellow,
they made a vow, in diseases and dangers, to immolate human beings by
the ministry of the Druids. These sacrifices had even a public
character.[122] They sometimes constructed human figures of osier of
colossal magnitude, which they filled with living men; to these they set
fire, and the victims perished in the flames. These victims were
generally taken from among the criminals, as being more agreeable to
the gods; but if there were no criminals to be had, the innocent
themselves were sacrificed.
Cæsar, who, according to the custom of his countrymen, gave to the
divinities of foreign peoples the names of those of Rome, tells us that
the Gauls honoured Mercury above all others. They raised statues to him,
regarded him as the inventor of the arts, the guide of travellers, and
the protector of commerce.[123] They also offered worship to divinities
which the “Commentaries” assimilate to Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and
Minerva, without informing us of their Celtic names. From Lucan,[124] we
learn the names of three Gaulish divinities, Teutates (in whom, no
doubt, we must recognise the Mercury of the “Commentaries”), Hesus or
Esus, and Taranis. Cæsar makes the remark that the Gauls had pretty much
the same ideas with regard to their gods as other nations. Apollo cured
the sick, Minerva taught the elements of the arts, Jupiter was the
master of heaven, Mars the arbiter of war. Often, before fighting, they
made a vow to consecrate to this god the spoils of the enemy, and, after
the victory, they put to death all their prisoners. The rest of the
booty was piled up in the consecrated places, and nobody would be so
impious as to take anything away from it. The Gauls rendered also, as we
learn from inscriptions and passages in different authors, worship to
rivers, fountains, trees, and forests: they adored the Rhine as a god,
and made a goddess of the Ardenne.[125]
[Sidenote: Institutions]
IV. There were in Gaul, says Cæsar, only two classes who enjoyed public
consideration and honours,[126] the Druids and the knights. As to the
people, deprived of all rights, oppressed with debts, crushed with
taxes, exposed to the violences of the great, their condition was little
better than that of slaves. The Druids, ministers of religion, presided
over the sacrifices, and preserved the deposit of religious doctrines.
The youth, greedy of instruction, pressed around them. The dispensers of
rewards and punishments, they were the judges of almost all disputes,
public or private. To private individuals, or even to magistrates, who
rebelled against their decisions, they interdicted the sacrifices, a
sort of excommunication which sequestrated from society those who were
struck by it, placed them in the rank of criminals, removed them from
all honours, and deprived them even of the protection of the law. The
Druids had a single head, and the power of this head was absolute. At
his death, the next in dignity succeeded him; if there were several with
equal titles, these priests had recourse to election, and sometimes even
to a decision by force of arms. They assembled every year in the country
of the Carnutes, in a consecrated place, there to judge disputes. Their
doctrine, it was said, came from the isle of Britain, where, in the time
of Cæsar, they still went to draw it as at its source.[127]
The Druids were exempt from military service and from taxes.[128] These
privileges drew many disciples, whose novitiate, which lasted sometimes
twenty years, consisted in learning by heart a great number of verses
containing their religious precepts. It was forbidden to transcribe
them. This custom had the double object of preventing the divulgation of
their doctrine and of exercising the memory. Their principal dogma was
the immortality of the soul and its transmigration into other bodies. A
belief which banished the fear of death appeared to them fitted to
excite courage. They explained also the movement of the planets, the
greatness of the universe, the laws of nature, and the omnipotence of
the immortal gods. “We may conceive,” says the eminent author of the
_Histoire des Gaulois_, “what despotism must have been exercised over a
superstitious nation by this caste of men, depositaries of all
knowledge, authors and interpreters of all law, divine or human,
remunerators, judges, and executioners.”[129]
The knights, when required by the necessities of war, and that happened
almost yearly, were all bound to take up arms. Each, according to his
birth and fortune, was accompanied by a greater or less number of
attendants or clients. Those who were called _ambacti_[130] performed in
war the part of esquires.[131] In Aquitaine, these followers were named
_soldures_; they shared the good as well as the evil fortune of the
chief to whom they were attached, and, when he died, not one of them
would survive him. Their number was considerable: we shall see a king of
the Sotiates possess no less than six hundred of them.[132]
The states were governed either by an assembly, which the Romans called
a senate, or by a supreme magistrate, annual or for life, bearing the
title of king,[133] prince,[134] or _vergobret_.[135]
The different tribes formed alliances among themselves, either permanent
or occasional; the permanent alliances were founded, some on a community
of territorial interests,[136] others on affinities of races,[137] or on
treaties,[138] or, lastly, on the right of patronage.[139] The
occasional alliances were the results of the necessity of union against
a common danger.[140]
In Gaul, not only each state and each tribe (_pagus_), but even each
family, was divided into two parties (_factiones_); at the head of these
parties were chiefs, taken from among the most considerable and
influential of the knights. Cæsar calls them _principes_.[141] All those
who accepted their supremacy became their clients; and, although the
_principes_ did not exercise a regular magistracy, their authority was
very extensive. This organisation had existed from a remote antiquity;
its object was to offer to each man of the people a protection against
the great, since each was thus placed under the patronage of a chief,
whose duty it was to take his cause in hand, and who would have lost all
credit if he had allowed one of his clients to be oppressed.[142] We see
in the “Commentaries” that this class of the _principes_ enjoyed very
great influence. On their decisions depended all important
resolutions;[143] and their meeting formed the assembly of the whole of
Gaul (_concilium totius Galliæ_).[144] In it everything was decided by
majority of votes.[145]
Affairs of the state were allowed to be treated only in these
assemblies. It appertained to the magistrates alone to publish or
conceal events, according as they judged expedient; and it was a sacred
duty for any one who learnt, either from without or from public rumour,
any news which concerned the _civitas_, to give information of it to the
magistrate, without revealing it to any other person. This measure had
for its object to prevent rash or ignorant men from being led into error
by false reports, and from rushing, under this first impression, into
extravagant resolutions.
In the same manner as each state was divided into two rival factions, so
was the whole of Gaul (with the exception of Belgic Gaul and Helvetia)
divided into two great parties,[146] which exercised over the others a
sort of sovereignty (_principatus_);[147] and when, in extraordinary
circumstances, the whole of Gaul acknowledged the pre-eminence of one
particular state, the chief of the privileged state took the name of
_princeps totius Galliæ_, as had been the case with the Arvernan
Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix.[148]
This supremacy, nevertheless, was not permanent; it passed from one
nation to another, and was the object of continual ambitions and
sanguinary conflicts. The Druids, it is true, had succeeded in
establishing a religious centre, but there existed no political centre.
In spite of certain federative ties, each state had been more engaged in
the consideration of its own individuality than in that of the country
in general. This egoistic carelessness of their collective interests,
this jealous rivality among the different tribes, paralysed the efforts
of a few eminent men who were desirous of founding a nationality, and
the Gauls soon furnished the enemy with an easy means of dividing and
combating them. The Emperor Napoleon I. was thus right in saying: “The
principal cause of the weakness of Gaul was the spirit of isolation and
locality which characterised the population; at this epoch the Gauls had
no national spirit or even provincial spirit; they were governed by a
spirit of town. It is the same spirit which has since forged chains for
Italy. Nothing is more opposed to national spirit, to general ideas of
liberty, than the particular spirit of family or of town. From this
parcelling it resulted that the Gauls had no army of the line kept up
and exercised; and therefore no art and no military science. Every
nation which should lose sight of the importance of an army of the line
perpetually on foot, and which should trust to levies or national
armies, would experience the fate of the Gauls, without even having the
glory of opposing the same resistance, which was the effect of the
barbarism of the time and of the ground, covered with forests, marshes,
and bogs, and without roads, which rendered it difficult to conquer and
easy to defend.”[149] Before Cæsar came into Gaul, the Ædui and the
Arverni were at the head of the two contending parties, each labouring
to carry the day against his rival. Soon these latter united with the
Sequani, who, jealous of the superiority of the Ædui, the allies of the
Roman people, invoked the support of Ariovistus and the Germans. By dint
of sacrifices and promises, they had succeeded in bringing them into
their territory. With this aid the Sequani had gained the victory in
several combats.[150] The Ædui had lost their nobility, a part of their
territory, nearly all their clients, and, after giving up as hostages
their children and their chiefs, they had bound themselves by oath never
to attack the Sequani, who had at length obtained the supremacy of all
Gaul. It was under these circumstances that Divitiacus had gone to Rome
to implore the succour of the Republic, but he had failed;[151] the
Senate was too much engaged with intestine quarrels to assume an
energetic attitude towards the Germans. The arrival of Cæsar was
destined to change the face of things, and restore to the allies of Rome
their old preponderance.[152]
CHAPTER III.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
[Sidenote: Projects of Invasion by the Helvetii.]
I. Cæsar, as we have seen, had received from the Senate and people a
command which comprised the two Gauls (Transalpine and Cisalpine) and
Illyria.[153] Yet the agitation which continued to reign in the Republic
was retaining him at the gates of Rome, when suddenly, towards the
spring of 696, news came that the Helvetii, returning to their old
design, were preparing to invade the Roman province. This intelligence
caused a great sensation.
The Helvetii, proud of their former exploits, confident in their
strength, and incommoded by excess of population, felt humiliated at
living in a country the limits of which had been made narrow by nature,
and for some years they meditated quitting it to repair into the south
of Gaul.
As early as 693, an ambitious chieftain, Orgetorix, found no difficulty
in inspiring them with the desire to seek elsewhere a more fertile
territory and a milder climate. They resolved to go and establish
themselves in the country of the Santones (the _Saintonge_), situated on
the shores of the ocean, to the north of the Gironde. Two years were to
be employed in preparations, and, by a solemn engagement, the departure
was fixed for the third year. But Orgetorix, sent to the neighbouring
peoples to contract alliances, conspired with two influential
personages--one of the country of the Sequani, the other of that of the
Ædui. He induced them to undertake to seize the supreme power, promised
them the assistance of the Helvetii, and persuaded them that those three
powerful nations, leagued together, would easily subjugate the whole of
Gaul. This conspiracy failed, through the death of Orgetorix, accused in
his own country of a design to usurp the sovereignty. The Helvetii
persisted, nevertheless, in their project of emigration. They collected
the greatest possible number of wagons and beasts of burden; and, in
order to destroy all idea of returning, they burnt their twelve towns,
their four hundred hamlets, and all the wheat they could not carry with
them. Each furnished himself with meal[154] for three months; and after
persuading their neighbours, the Rauraci,[155] the Tulingi, and the
Latobriges,[156] to imitate their example and follow them, and having
drawn to them those of the Boii who had moved from Noricum to the
neighbourhood of the Rhine, they fixed the rendezvous on the banks of
the Rhone for the 5th of the Calends of April (the 24th of March, the
day of the equinox).[157]
There were only two roads by which they could leave Helvetia; one
crossed the country of the Sequani, the entrance to which was defended
by a narrow and difficult defile, situated between the Rhone and the
Jura (the _Pas-de-l’Ecluse_), and where the wagons could with difficulty
pass one at a time. As this defile was commanded by a very lofty
mountain, a handful of men was sufficient to prevent the access. The
other road, less contracted and more easy, crossed the Roman province,
after having passed the Rhone, which separated the Allobroges from the
Helvetii, from Lake Léman to the Jura. Within this distance the river
was fordable in several places.[158] At Geneva, the extreme limit of the
territory of the Allobroges towards Helvetia, a bridge established a
communication between the two countries. The Helvetii decided on taking
the most convenient road; they reckoned, moreover, on the co-operation
of this neighbouring people, who, but recently subjugated, could have
but doubtful sympathies for the Romans.[159]
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Arrival at Geneva.]
II. Cæsar, learning that the Helvetii intended to pass through the Roman
province, left Rome hastily in the month of March, hurried by forced
marches into Transalpine Gaul, and, according to Plutarch, reached
Geneva in eight days.[160] As he had in the province only a single
legion, he ordered a levy of as many men as possible, and then destroyed
the bridge of Geneva. Informed of his arrival, the Helvetii, who were
probably not yet all assembled, sent their men of noblest rank to demand
a passage through the country of the Allobroges, promising to commit no
injury there; they had, they said, no other road to quit their country.
Cæsar was inclined to refuse their demand at once, but he called to mind
the defeat and death of the Consul L. Cassius; and wishing to obtain
time to collect the troops of which he had ordered the levy, he gave
them hopes of a favourable reply, and adjourned it to the Ides of April
(8th of April). By this delay he gained a fortnight; it was employed in
fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, between Lake Léman and the
Jura.[161] If we estimate at 5,000 men the legion which was in the
province, and at 5,000 or 6,000 the number of soldiers of the new
levies, we see that Cæsar had at his disposal, to defend the banks of
the Rhone, about 10,000 or 11,000 infantry.[162]
[Sidenote: Description of the Retrenchment of the Rhone.]
III. The distance from Lake Léman to the Jura, following the
sinuosities of the river, is 29½ kilomètres, or 19,000 Roman paces
(_millia passuum decem novem_).[163] It is on the space comprised
between these two points that a retrenchment was raised which is called
in the “Commentaries” _murus fossaque_. This could not be a continuous
work, as the ground to be defended is intersected by rivers and ravines,
and the banks of the Rhone are almost everywhere so precipitous that it
would have been useless to fortify them. Cæsar, pressed for time, can
only have made retrenchments on the weakest points of the line where the
passage of the river was easy; indeed, this is what Dio Cassius tells
us.[164] The labours of the Romans were only supplementary, on certain
points, to the formidable natural obstacles which the Rhone presents in
the greater part of its course. The only places where an attempt could
be made to pass it, because the heights there sink towards the banks of
the river into practicable declivities, are situated opposite the modern
villages of Russin, Cartigny, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. In these
places they cut the upper part of the slope into a perpendicular, and
afterwards hollowed a trench, the scarp of which thus gained an
elevation of sixteen feet. These works, by uniting the escarpments of
the Rhone, formed, from Geneva to the Jura, a continuous line, which
presented an impassable barrier. Behind and along this line, at certain
distances, posts and closed redoubts rendered it impregnable. (_See
Plate 3._)[165]
This retrenchment, which required only from two to three days’ labour,
was completed when the deputies returned, at the time appointed, to hear
Cæsar’s reply. He flatly refused the passage, declaring that he would
oppose it with all his means.
Meanwhile the Helvetii, and the people who took part in their
enterprise, had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone. When they
learnt that they must renounce the hope of quitting their country
without opposition, they resolved to open themselves a passage by
force. Several times--sometimes by day, and sometimes by night--they
crossed the Rhone, some by fording, others with the aid of boats joined
together, or of a great number of rafts of timber, and attempted to
carry the heights, but, arrested by the strength of the retrenchment
(_operis munitione_), and by the efforts and missiles of the soldiers
who hastened to the threatened points (_concursu et telis_), they
abandoned the attack.[166]
[Sidenote: The Helvetii begin their March towards the Saône. Cæsar
unites his Troops.]
IV. The only road which now remained was that which lay across the
country of the Sequani (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse); but this narrow defile
could not be passed without the consent of its inhabitants. The Helvetii
charged the Æduan Dumnorix, the son-in-law of Orgetorix, to solicit it
for them. High in credit among the Sequani, Dumnorix obtained it; and
the two peoples entered into an engagement, one to leave the passage
free, the other to commit no disorder; and, as pledges of their
convention, they exchanged hostages.[167]
When Cæsar learned that the Helvetii were preparing to pass through the
lands of the Sequani and the Ædui on their way to the Santones, he
resolved to oppose them, unwilling to suffer the establishment of
warlike and hostile men in a fertile and open country, neighbouring upon
that of the Tolosates, which made part of the Roman province.[168]
But, as he had not at hand sufficient forces, he resolved on uniting all
the troops he could dispose of in his vast command. He entrusts,
therefore, the care of the retrenchments on the Rhone to his lieutenant
T. Labienus, hastens into Italy by forced marches, raises there in great
haste two legions (the 11th and 12th), brings from Aquileia, a town of
Illyria,[169] the three legions which were there in winter quarters (the
7th, 8th, and 9th), and, at the head of his army, takes across the Alps
(_see Plate 4_) the shortest road to Transalpine Gaul.[170] The
Centrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges (see _page_ 24, _note_),
posted on the heights,[171] attempt to bar his road; but he overthrows
them in several engagements, and from Ocelum (_Usseau_),[172] the
extreme point of the Cisalpine, reaches in seven days the territory of
the Vocontii, making thus about twenty-five kilomètres a day. He next
penetrates into the country of the Allobroges, then into that of the
Segusiavi, who bordered on the Roman province beyond the Rhone.[173]
These operations took two months;[174] the same time had been employed
by the Helvetii in negotiating the conditions of their passage through
the country of the Sequani, moving from the Rhone to the Saône, and
beginning to pass the latter river. They had passed the Pas-de-l’Ecluse,
followed the right bank of the Rhone as far as Culoz, then turned to the
east through Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and Saint-Rambert, and, thence
crossing the plains of Ambérieux, the river Ain, and the vast plateau of
the Dombes, they had arrived at the Saône, the left bank of which they
occupied from Trévoux to Villefranche. (_See Plate 4._) The slowness of
their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of
368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from
8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass
one abreast, would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it.[175]
Cæsar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the
time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saône; and we may
therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into Italy, he
hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that
river.
He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône,
on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally
manœuvre on the two banks of the Saône, take the Helvetii in flank as
they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it,
from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was
probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which
had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his
legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Ædui and men raised in the
Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii
were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Ædui, and those
which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These
peoples implored the succour of Cæsar. He was quite disposed to listen
to their prayers.[176]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Helvetii on the Saône.]
V. The Saône, which crossed the countries of the Ædui and the
Sequani,[177] flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme
sluggishness. Cæsar says that people could not distinguish the direction
of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges,
crossed the river, between Trévoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats
joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his
scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of
the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp
towards midnight (_de tertia vigilia_) (_see note 1 on page 69_) with
three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the
left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans,
towards six o’clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen
kilomètres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of
passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape
dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This
disaster fell upon the Tigurini (_the inhabitants of the Cantons of
Vaud, Friburg, and a part of the Canton of Berne_), one of the four
tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which,
in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L.
Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke.[178]
After this combat, Cæsar, in order to pursue the other part of the
enemy’s army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge
across the Saône, and transported his troops to the right bank. The
barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions would
necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment
established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saône, at the spot
where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted
the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which
remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Cæsar. The
Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which
he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty
days’ labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had
commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and
threatening, Divico reminded Cæsar of the humiliation inflicted formerly
on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of
old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his
conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should
give him hostages. “The Helvetii,” replied Divico, “have learned from
their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought
to know that.” This proud reply closed the interview.
Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding
battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the
possibility of following the course of the Saône to proceed towards the
south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones,
by directing their march towards the sources of the Dheune and the
Bourbince. (_See Plate 4._) This broken country, moreover, permitted
them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the
mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no
doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun,
vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the
Saône as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing
over the Col d’Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to
Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they
would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at
Decize.[179]
Cæsar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him all his cavalry to
watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with
the enemy’s cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some
loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii
became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman
army. But Cæsar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with
following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at
most (about eight kilomètres), opposing the devastations they committed
on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion to inflict a defeat
upon them.
The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days
passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the
provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness;
wheat arrived no longer by the Saône, for Cæsar had been obliged to move
from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Ædui
delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised.
The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day
for distribution approached, Cæsar convoked the Æduan chiefs, who were
numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them,
Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name
of _vergobret_; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as
opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had
heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the
country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Æduan
contingent, had, in the last combat, by retreating with his men, led to
the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Cæsar sent for Divitiacus,
a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable
conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment.
Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the
pardon of Dumnorix. Cæsar granted it to him, and contented himself with
placing him under surveillance. It was, indeed, good policy not to
alienate the Æduan people by any excessive severity against a man of
power among them.
The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had
turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near
Issy-l’Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme,
at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed
of this circumstance, Cæsar judged that the moment had arrived for
attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the
heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and
ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain
by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he
himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same
road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to
attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for
guides the men who had just explored the roads. Cæsar, on his part,
began his march at two o’clock in the morning (_de quarta
vigilia_),[180] preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his scouts was
P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently
under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.
At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Cæsar was no more
than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected
neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius
arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus
was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had
recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At
this news, Cæsar, fearing that he was not in sufficient force against
their whole army, with only four legions, chose a strong position on a
neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus,
whose orders were not to engage in battle till he saw the troops of
Cæsar near the enemy’s camp, remained immovable, watching for him. It
was broad daylight when Cæsar learnt that his troops had made themselves
masters of the mountain, and that the Helvetii had left their camp. They
escaped him thus, through the false report of Considius, who had been
blinded by a groundless terror.
Admitting that the Helvetii had passed near Issy-l’Evêque, Mount
Tauffrin, which rises at a distance of four kilomètres to the west of
that village, answers to the conditions of the text. There is nothing to
contradict the notion that Labienus and Cæsar may have, one occupied the
summit, the other approached the enemy’s camp within 1,500 paces,
without being perceived; and the neighbouring ground presents heights
which permitted the Roman army to form in order of battle.[181]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte.]
VI. That day the Helvetii continued their advance to Remilly, on the
Alène. Since the passage of the Saône, they had marched about a
fortnight, making an average of not more than eleven or twelve
kilomètres a day.[182] According to our reckoning, it must have been the
end of the month of June. Cæsar followed the Helvetii at the usual
distance, and established his camp at three miles’ distance from theirs,
on the Cressonne, near Ternant.
Next day, as the Roman army had provisions left for no more than two
days,[183] and as, moreover, Bibracte (_Mont Beuvray_),[184] the
greatest and richest town of the Ædui, was not more than eighteen miles
(twenty-seven kilomètres) distant, Cæsar, to provision his army, turned
from the road which the Helvetii were following, and took that to
Bibracte. (_See Plate 4._) The enemy was informed of this circumstance
by some deserters from the troop of L. Emilius, decurion[185] of the
auxiliary cavalry. Believing that the Romans were going from them
through fear, and hoping to cut them off from their provisions, they
turned back, and began to harass the rear-guard.
Cæsar immediately led his troops to a neighbouring hill--that which
rises between the two villages called the Grand-Marié and the
Petit-Marié (_see Plate 5_)--and sent his cavalry to impede the enemies
in their march, which gave him the time to form in order of battle. He
ranged, half way up the slope of the hill, his four legions of veterans,
in three lines, and the two legions raised in the Cisalpine on the
plateau above, along with the auxiliaries, so that his infantry covered
the whole height. The heavy baggage, and the bundles (_sarcinæ_)[186]
with which the soldiers were loaded, were collected on one point, which
was defended by the troops of the reserve. While Cæsar was making these
dispositions, the Helvetii, who came followed by all their wagons,
collected them in one place; they then, in close order, drove back the
cavalry, formed in phalanxes, and, making their way up the slope of the
hill occupied by the Roman infantry, advanced against the first
line.[187]
Cæsar, to make the danger equal, and to deprive all of the possibility
of flight, sends away the horses of all the chiefs, and even his
own,[188] harangues his troops, and gives the signal for combat. The
Romans, from their elevated position, hurl the _pilum_,[189] break the
enemy’s phalanxes, and rush upon them sword in hand. The engagement
becomes general. The Helvetii soon become embarrassed in their
movements: their bucklers, pierced and nailed together by the same
_pilum_, the head of which, bending back, can no longer be withdrawn,
deprive them of the use of their left arm; most of them, after having
long agitated their arms in vain, throw down their bucklers, and fight
without them. At last, covered with wounds, they give way, and retire to
the mountain of the castle of La Garde, at a distance of about 1,000
paces; but while they are pursued, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the
number of about 15,000, formed the last of the hostile columns, and
composed the rear-guard, rush upon the Romans, and without halting
attack their right flank.[190] The Helvetii, who had taken refuge on the
height, perceive this movement, return to the charge, and renew the
combat. Cæsar, to meet these two attacks, effects a change of front
(_conversa signa bipartito intulerunt_) in his third line, and opposes
it to the new assailants, while the first two lines resist the Helvetii
who had already been repulsed.[191]
This double combat was long and furious. Unable to resist the
impetuosity of their adversaries, the Helvetii were obliged to retire,
as they had done before, to the mountain of the castle of La Garde; the
Boii and Tulingi towards the baggage and wagons. Such was the
intrepidity of these Gauls during the whole action, which lasted from
one o’clock in the afternoon till evening, that not one turned his back.
Far into the night there was still fighting about the baggage. The
barbarians, having made a rampart of their wagons, some threw from
above their missiles on the Romans; others, placed between the wheels,
wounded them with long pikes (_mataræ ac tragulæ_). The women and
children, too, shared desperately in the combat.[192] At the end of an
obstinate struggle, the camp and baggage were taken. The daughter and
one of the sons of Orgetorix were made prisoners.
This battle reduced the Gaulish emigration to 130,000 individuals. They
began their retreat that same evening, and, after marching without
interruption day and night, they reached on the fourth day the territory
of the Lingones, towards Tonnerre (_see Plate 4_): they had, no doubt,
passed by Moulins-en-Gilbert, Lormes, and Avallon. The Lingones were
forbidden to furnish the fugitives with provisions or succour, under
pain of being treated like them. At the end of three days, the Roman
army, having taken care of their wounded and buried the dead, marched in
pursuit of the enemy.[193]
[Sidenote: Pursuit of the Helvetii.]
VII. The Helvetii, reduced to extremity, sent to Cæsar to treat for
their submission. The deputies met him on his march, threw themselves at
his feet, and demanded peace in the most suppliant terms. He ordered
them to say to their fellow-countrymen that they must halt on the spot
they then occupied, and await his arrival; and they obeyed. As soon as
Cæsar overtook them, he required them to deliver hostages, their arms,
and the fugitive slaves. While they were preparing to execute his
orders, night coming on, about 6,000 men of a tribe named Verbigeni
(_Soleure, Argovie, Lucerne, and part of the Canton of Berne_) fled,
either through fear that, having once delivered up their arms, they
should be massacred, or in the hope of escaping unperceived in the midst
of so great a multitude. They directed their steps towards the Rhine and
the frontiers of Germany.
On receiving news of the flight of the Verbigeni, Cæsar ordered the
peoples whose territories they would cross to stop them and bring them
back, under pain of being considered as accomplices. The fugitives were
delivered up and treated as enemies; that is, put to the sword, or sold
as slaves. As to the others, Cæsar accepted their submission: he
compelled the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to the
localities they had abandoned, and to restore the towns and hamlets they
had burnt; and since, after having lost all their crops, they had no
more provisions of their own, the Allobroges were ordered to furnish
them with wheat.[194] These measures had for their object not to leave
Helvetia without inhabitants, as the fertility of its soil might draw
thither the Germans of the other side the Rhine, who would thus become
borderers upon the Roman province. He permitted the Boii, celebrated for
their brilliant valour, to establish themselves in the country of the
Ædui, who had asked permission to receive them. They gave them lands
between the Allier and the Loire, and soon admitted them to a share in
all their rights and privileges.
In the camp of the Helvetii were found tablets on which was written, in
Greek letters, the number of all those who had quitted their country: on
one side, the number of men capable of bearing arms; and on the other,
that of the children, old men, and women. The whole amounted to 263,000
Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobriges, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000
Boii--together, 368,000 persons, of whom 92,000 were men in a condition
to fight. According to the census ordered by Cæsar, the number of those
who returned home was 110,000.[195] The emigration was thus reduced to
less than one-third.
The locality occupied by the Helvetii when they made their submission is
unknown; yet all circumstances seem to concur in placing the theatre of
this event in the western part of the country of the Lingones. This
hypothesis appears the more reasonable, as Cæsar’s march, in the
following campaign, can only be explained by supposing him to start from
this region. We admit, then, that Cæsar received the submission of the
Helvetii on the Armançon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we
suppose him to have been encamped during the events upon the recital of
which we are now going to enter.
[Sidenote: Observations.]
VIII. The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle
of Bibracte were about equal, for Cæsar had six legions--the 10th, which
he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and
9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and
12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have
been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only
begun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and
volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume (page 456). The
number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised
in the Roman province and among the Ædui, and probably 20,000
auxiliaries,[196] we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not
including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the
baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not
count more than 69,000 combatants, since, out of 92,000, they had lost
one-fourth near the Saône.
In this battle, it must be remarked, Cæsar did not employ the two
legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the
retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the
youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout,
doubtless because the mountainous nature of the locality made it
impossible for it to act.
CHAPTER IV.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
[Sidenote: Seat of the Suevi and other German Tribes.]
I. On the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of
nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Cæsar, and thank him for
having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered
their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit
to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert matters
previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly.
Cæsar gave his consent.
After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in
tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of
their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine,
from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied
the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most
warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of
which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men
for agriculture, taking each other’s place alternately: the labourers
fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the
property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong
his residence on the same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly
lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and
drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these
failed, they were fed upon grass.[197] Masters of themselves from
infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons,
bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of
their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of
prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign
horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses,
though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through
exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle,
often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought
on foot: their horses were taught to remain without moving.[198] The
belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them
the contempt for life.[199] They boasted of being surrounded by immense
solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of
their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported,
indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded,
for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they
bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the
German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed
them in relation with foreign merchants, and because, neighbours to the
Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners.[200]
Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from
west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis
forests. (_See Plate 2._) The first, beginning from the Black Forest and
the Odenwald, covered all the country situated between the Upper Danube
and the Maine, and comprised the mountains which, further towards the
east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is,
the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians.
It had a breadth which Cæsar represents by nine long days’ march.[201]
The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of
Thuringia; it embraced all the mountains to the north of Bohemia, and
that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula
from that of the Danube.
The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries
situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and
the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of
Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of
Wurtemberg.[202] To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (_partly in
Bohemia and partly in the north-west of Austria_);[203] to the north,
the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the
west, the Marcomanni (_the upper and middle course of the Maine_) and
the Sedusii (_between the Maine and the Neckar_); to the south, the
Harudes (_on the north of the Lake of Constance_), the Tulingi, and the
Latobriges (_the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden_).
On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (_the territory of Bâle
and part of the Brisgau_); the Triboces (_part of Alsace and of the
Grand Duchy of Baden_): on the right bank were the Nemetes (_opposite
Spire_); the Vangiones (_opposite Worms_); the Ubii, from the Odenwald
to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were
the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe.
Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north,
towards the mouth of the Rhine. (_See Plate 2._)
[Sidenote: The Gauls solicit Cæsar to come to their assistance.]
II. The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Cæsar made
the following complaints against Ariovistus:--“The German king,” they
said, “had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different
peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the Sequani, he
had gained, with their co-operation, several victories over the Ædui, in
consequence of which the latter were subjected to the most humiliating
conditions. Shortly afterwards his yoke grew heavy on the Sequani
themselves, to such a degree that, though conquerors with him, they are
now more wretched than the vanquished Ædui. Ariovistus has seized a
third of their territory;[204] another third is on the point of being
given up, by his orders, to 24,000 Harudes, who have joined him some
months ago. There are 120,000 Germans in Gaul. The contingents of the
Suevi have already arrived on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years the
invasion of Gaul by the Germans will be general. Cæsar alone can prevent
it, by his prestige and that of the Roman name, by the force of his
arms, and by the fame of his recent victory.”
Gaul thus came voluntarily, in the persons of her chiefs, to throw
herself into the arms of Cæsar, take him for the arbiter of her destiny,
and implore him to be her saviour. He spoke encouragingly, and promised
them his support. Several considerations engaged him to act upon these
complaints. He could not suffer the Ædui, allies of Rome, to be brought
under subjection by the barbarians. He saw a substantial danger for the
Republic in the numerous immigrations of fierce peoples who, once
masters of Gaul, would not fail, in imitation of the Cimbri and
Teutones, to invade the Roman province, and thence fall upon Italy.
Resolved to prevent these dangers, he proposed an interview with
Ariovistus, who was probably occupied, since the defeat of the
Helvetii, in collecting an army among the Triboci (towards
Strasburg),[205] as well to oppose the further designs of the Romans, as
to defend the part of the country of the Sequani which he had seized.
Ariovistus, it will be remembered, had been declared, under Cæsar’s
consulate, ally and friend of the Roman people; and this favour would
encourage the expectation that the head of the Germans would be willing
to treat; but he refused with disdain the proposed interview. Then Cæsar
sent messengers to him to reproach him with his ingratitude. “If
Ariovistus cares to preserve his friendship, let him make reparation for
all the injury he has inflicted upon the allies of Rome, and let him
bring no more barbarians across the Rhine; if, on the contrary, he
rejects these conditions, so many acts of violence will be punished in
virtue of the decree rendered by the Senate, under the consulate of M.
Messala and M. Piso, which authorises the governor of Gaul to do that
which he judges for the advantage of the Republic, and enjoins him to
defend the Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people.”
By this language, Cæsar wished to show that he did not violate the law,
enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors
to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely
appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor
of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required
exceptional laws.[206] The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud:--
“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits
no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has
himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence
diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui;
the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little
service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved
Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the
valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter
under a roof.”[207]
[Sidenote: March of Cæsar upon Besançon.]
III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened
Cæsar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the
devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the
Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing
to cross the Rhine.[208] Cæsar, wishing to prevent the junction of
these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the
collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced
marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of
July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the
neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar
followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges
are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey,
and Dancevoir, led to Langres.[209] (_See Plate 4._) After three long
days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that
Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most
considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three
days’ march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of
urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with
everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march
towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day
and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of
it, and placed a garrison there.[210]
The following description, given in the “Commentaries,” is still
applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature,
that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a
circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred
feet,[211] which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high
mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the
river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and
connects it with the _oppidum_.”[212]
During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had
advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he
was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of
taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from
his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to
pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of
Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous
cavalry.
[Sidenote: Panic in the Roman Army.]
IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of
August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took
possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men
of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect.
Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in
war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the
hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help
receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who
wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the
innumerable solicitations of influential people.[213] This panic had
begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one
made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the
difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of
provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the
illegality of the enterprise.[214]
Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he
admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the
assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek
information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He
reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the
Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated
the German race in the revolt of the slaves;[215] that the Helvetii had
often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten
the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the
difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent
in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to
pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the
Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is
already ripe in the fields (_jamque esse in agris frumenta matura_). As
to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them
themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns
(_signa laturi_).[216] Words like these would not shake him; the soldier
despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own
fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As
to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii
affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without
delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient
to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty.
If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the
10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had
always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the
greatest confidence in it.
This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of
discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at
the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise
and of those whose services he affected to disdain,--this proud
assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the
minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for
fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for
the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they
were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their
tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and
fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the
war, as that appertained only to the general.[217]
[Sidenote: March towards the Valley of the Rhine.]
V. This agitation having been calmed, Cæsar sought information
concerning the roads from Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired
him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from
Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army
had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is
composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of
the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and
the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered
with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Cæsar’s war in Gaul, more
difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold
elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened
undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains
of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier
communications. (_See Plate 4._)
Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on
which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting
his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and
difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than
fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres),[218] which is represented by a
semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from
Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul
as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and
Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then
he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine
by Belfort and Cernay.
On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he
learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of
not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).
Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have
travelled over 140 kilomètres in seven days, and would have arrived on
the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from
Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilomètres.) At this moment,
Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilomètres from the Romans, to
the north, near Colmar.
Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he
consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and
that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him.” Cæsar did
not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more
reasonable sentiments.
The interview was fixed for the fifth day following.[219] In the
interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus,
who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that
Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides,
they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter,
unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not
daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted
on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular
saying of one of the soldiers: “Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to
make us prætorians, and he makes us knights.”[220]
[Sidenote: Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus.]
VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed
by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly
equal distance from either camp.[221] This was the place of meeting of
the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from
the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The
latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and
that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen.
When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the
Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that
constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the
abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated
his first conditions.
Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He
had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which
he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had
subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has
sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of
benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if
he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety;
the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans
belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the
Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is
only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard
him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the
gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages
in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price,
he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free
possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may
undertake.”
Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one
of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not
consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman
people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the
Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor
imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked,
the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if
it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free,
since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her
own laws.”
During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the
cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing
stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the
conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the
attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in
order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that
he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an
interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal
attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon
known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.
Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the
conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar’s lieutenants.
Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had
again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus
his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the
barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius
Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke
the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and
M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of
hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he
ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were
spies.[222]
[Sidenote: Movements of the two Armies.]
VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp and took another
position at the foot of the Vosges (_sub monte_), at a distance of 6,000
paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the
Lauch. (_See Plate 6._) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its
confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the
Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three
kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut
off Cæsar’s communication with Sequania and the Æduan country, but he
left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the
Lingones.[223] (_See the Map of Gaul, 2._) The two armies thus encamped
at a short distance from each other. During the five following days,
Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle
at the head of his camp (_pro castris suas copias produxit_), but was
not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to
cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000
horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom
each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to
circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter
advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up
with the horses, running and holding by the mane.[224]
Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his
camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them,
chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that
occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three
lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third
on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is
perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of
Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops
and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works.
Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled
the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a
part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal
camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.
Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and
backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his
tactics (_instituto suo_) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he
drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and
placed them in order of battle (_paulum a majoribus castris progressus,
aciem instruxit_). In spite of this advanced position (_ne tum
quidem_), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army
re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops
immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till
evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing
that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general
battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons
charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not
be conquerors if they fought before the new moon.[225]
[Sidenote: Battle against the Germans.]
VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Cæsar
placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the
smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the
Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by
displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for
the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by
the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then
Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he
led them up to the enemy’s camp (_usque ad castra hostium accessit_).
This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of
avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain,[226]
drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals--Harudes,
Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to
deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on
the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which
they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the
warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery
to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the
German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly
covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch.[227]
Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them
witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion
either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor.[228] He led the attack in
person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed
weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his
side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great
that the Romans, not having time to use the _pilum_, throw it away, and
fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their
custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of
three or four hundred men,[229] and cover their bare heads with their
bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they
still remain standing.[230] Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that
many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and
striking the enemies from above.[231] The short and sharp-pointed swords
of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the
Germans.[232] Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their
victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness
with which they kept their ranks.[233] Ariovistus’s left did not resist
long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming
in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of
the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and
better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third
line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat.
Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout
then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they
reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle.[234] They
descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus
retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (_See Plate 4._)
Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to
pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in
boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a
boat[235] he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and
Appian,[236] 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit.
Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a
Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and
the other taken prisoner. Cæsar says that, as he himself pursued the
enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by
victory when he recovered, first Procillus, loaded with a triple chain,
and who had thrice seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be
burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we
have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.
The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the
Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt
near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable
number of the fugitives.
Cæsar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed
his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the
season required--at the beginning of September--and left them under the
command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in
Cisalpine Gaul.[237]
[Sidenote: Observations.]
IX. There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign:--
1. The resolution taken by Cæsar to gain possession of Besançon, and
thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches
to that military position as a point of support and of supply.
2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into
cavalry.
3. The judicious use which Cæsar makes of his light troops (_alarii_),
by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a
greater number of legions.
4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves
as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P.
Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.
The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the
following manner:--
Rendezvous of the Helvetii on the
banks of the Rhone (the day of the
equinox) March 24.
Cæsar refuses them a passage through
the province April 8.
Arrival at the confluence of the Rhone
and the Saône of the legions from
Italy and Illyria June 7.
Defeat of the Tigurini on the Saône June 10.
Passage of the Saône by Cæsar June 12.
About fifteen days’ march (_De Bello
Gallico_, I. 15) From June 13 to June 27.
Manœuvre of Labienus to surprise the
Helvetii June 28.
Battle of Bibracte June 29.
Cæsar remains three days interring the
dead; marches on the fourth; employs
six days in his march from
the field of battle to the country of
the Lingones, and there overtakes
the Helvetii in their retreat,
From June 30 to July 8.
Negotiations with Ariovistus (a month),
From July 8 to August 8.
Departure of Cæsar (from Tonnerre,
to meet Ariovistus) August 10.
Arrival of Cæsar at Besançon August 16.
Abode of Cæsar at Besançon,
From August 16 to August 22.
Departure from Besançon (“the harvest
is ripe,” _De Bello Gallico_, I. 40) August 22.
March of seven days from Besançon
to the Rhine From August 22 to August 28.
Interview (five days afterwards) September 2.
Manœuvres (about eight days),
From September 3 to September 10.
Battle of the Thur (fought before the
new moon, which took place on the
18th of September) September 10.
CHAPTER V.
WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ.
(Year of Rome 697.)
(BOOK II. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
[Sidenote: League of the Belgæ. Cæsar advances from Besançon to the
Aisne.]
I. The brilliant successes gained by Cæsar over the Helvetii and the
Germans had delivered the Republic from an immense danger, but at the
same time they had roused the distrust and jealousy of most of the
nations of Gaul. These conceived fears for their independence, which
were further increased by the presence of the Roman army in Sequania.
The irritation was very great among the Belgæ. They feared that their
turn to be attacked would come when Celtic Gaul was once reduced to
peace. Besides, they were excited by influential men who understood
that, under Roman domination, they would have less chance of obtaining
possession of the supreme power. The different tribes of Belgic Gaul
entered into a formidable league, and reciprocally exchanged hostages.
Cæsar learnt these events in the Cisalpine province, through public
rumour and the letters of Labienus. Alarmed at the news, he raised two
legions in Italy, the 13th and 14th, and, in the beginning of
spring,[238] sent them into Gaul, under the command of the lieutenant
Q. Pedius.[239] It is probable that these troops, to reach Sequania
promptly, crossed the Great St. Bernard, for Strabo relates that one of
the three routes which led from Italy into Gaul passed by Mount
Pœrinus (_Great St. Bernard_), after having traversed the country of
the Salassi (_Valley of Aosta_), and that this latter people offered at
first to assist Cæsar’s troops in their passage by levelling the roads
and throwing bridges across the torrents; but that, suddenly changing
their tone, they had rolled masses of rock down upon them and pillaged
their baggage. It was no doubt in the sequel of this defection that,
towards the end of the year 697, Cæsar, as we shall see farther on, sent
Galba into the Valais, to take vengeance on the mountaineers for their
perfidious conduct and to open a safe communication with Italy.[240]
As soon as forage was abundant, he rejoined his legions in person,
probably at Besançon, since, as we have seen, they had been placed in
winter quarters in Sequania. He charged the Senones and the other Celts
who bordered upon Belgic Gaul to watch what was doing there and inform
him of it. Their reports were unanimous: troops were being raised, and
an army was assembling. Cæsar then decided upon immediately entering
into campaign.
His army consisted of eight legions: they bore the numbers 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, and 14. As their effective force, in consequence of marches
and previous combats, cannot have been complete, we may admit a mean of
5,000 men to the legion, which would make 40,000 men of infantry. Adding
to these one-third of auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers, and
Numidians, the total of infantry would have been 53,000 men. There was,
in addition to these, 5,000 cavalry and a body of Æduan troops under the
command of Divitiacus. Thus the army of Cæsar amounted to at least
60,000 soldiers, without reckoning the servants for the machines,
drivers, and valets, who, according to the instance cited by Orosius,
amounted to a very considerable number.[241]
After securing provisions, Cæsar started from Besançon, probably in the
second fortnight in May, passed the Saône at Seveux (_see Plate 4_),
crossed the country of the Lingones in the direction of Langres, at
Bar-sur-Aube, and entered, towards Vitry-le-François, on the territory
of the Remi, having marched in about a fortnight 230 kilomètres, the
distance from Besançon to Vitry-le-François.[242]
The Remi were the first Belgic people he encountered in his road (_qui
proximi Galliæ ex Belgis sunt_). Astonished at his sudden appearance,
they sent two deputies, Iccius and Adecumborius, the first personages of
their country, to make their submission, and offer provisions and every
kind of succour. They informed Cæsar that all the Belgæ were in arms,
and that the Germans on that side of the Rhine had joined the coalition;
for themselves, they had refused to take any part in it, but the
excitement was so great that they had not been able to dissuade from
their warlike projects the Suessiones themselves, who were united with
them by community of origin, laws, and interests. “The Belgæ,” they
added, “proud of having been formerly the only people of Gaul who
preserved their territory from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri,
had the loftiest idea of their own valour. In their general assembly,
each people had engaged to furnish the following contingents:--The
Bellovaci, the most warlike, could send into the field 100,000 men; they
have promised 60,000 picked troops, and claim the supreme direction of
the war. The Suessiones, their neighbours, masters of a vast and fertile
territory, in which are reckoned twelve towns, furnish 50,000 men; they
have for their king Galba, who has been invested, by the consent of the
allies, with the chief command. The Nervii, the most distant of all, and
the most barbarous among these peoples, furnish the same number; the
Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii,
7000; the Caletes, 10,000; the Veliocasses and the Veromandui, 10,000;
the Aduatuci, 19,000; lastly, the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæresi, and
Pæmani, comprised under the general name of Germans, are to send 40,000;
in all, about 296,000 men.”[243]
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Camp at Berry-au-Bac.]
II. Cæsar could judge, from this information, the formidable character
of the league which he had now to combat. His first care was to try to
divide the hostile forces, and, with this view, he induced Divitiacus,
in spite of the friendly relations which had long united the Ædui with
the Bellovaci, to invade and ravage the territory of the latter with the
Æduan troops. He then required the senate of the Remi to repair to his
presence, and the children of the _principes_ to be brought to him as
hostages; and then, on information that Galba was marching to meet him,
he resolved to move to the other side of the Aisne, which crossed the
extremity of the territory of the Remi (_quod est in extremis Remorum
finibus_),[244] and encamp there in a strong position, to await the
enemy’s attack. The road he had hitherto followed led straight to the
Aisne, and crossed it by a bridge at the spot where now stands the
village of Berry-au-Bac. (_See Plate 7._) He marched in great haste
towards this bridge, led his army across it, and fixed his camp on the
right side of the road, on the hill situated between the Aisne and the
Miette, a small stream with marshy banks, which makes a bend in that
river between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert. (_See Plate 8._) This hill,
called Mauchamp, is of small elevation (about 25 mètres) above the
valley of the Aisne, and in its length, from east to west, it presents
sufficient space for the Roman army to deploy. Laterally, it sinks to
the level of the surrounding ground by slight undulations, and the side
which looks upon the Miette descends by a gentle slope towards the banks
of the stream. This position offered several advantages: the Aisne
defended one side of the camp; the rear of the army was protected, and
the transports of provisions could arrive in safety through the
countries of the Remi and other friendly peoples. Cæsar ordered a work
to be constructed on the right bank of the Aisne, at the extremity of
the bridge, where he established a post (_see Plates 8 and 9_),[245] and
he left on the other side of the river the lieutenant Q. Titurius
Sabinus with six cohorts. The camp was surrounded by a retrenchment
twelve feet high, and by a fosse eighteen feet wide.[246]
Meanwhile the Belgæ, after having concentrated their forces in the
country of the Suessiones, to the north of the Aisne, had invaded the
territory of the Remi. On their road, and at eight miles from the Roman
camp (_see Plate 7_), was a town of the Remi called Bibrax
(_Vieux-Laon_).[247] The Belgæ attacked it vigorously, and it was
defended with difficulty all day. These peoples, like the Celts,
attacked fortresses by surrounding them with a crowd of combatants,
throwing from every side a great quantity of stones, to drive the
defenders away from the walls; then, forming the tortoise, they advanced
against the gates and sapped the walls. When night had put a stop to the
attack, Iccius, who commanded in the town, sent information to Cæsar
that he could hold out no longer, unless he received prompt succour.
Towards midnight the latter sent him Numidians, Cretan archers, and
Balearic slingers, who had the messengers of Iccius for their guides.
This re-enforcement raised the courage of the besieged, and deprived the
enemy of the hope of taking the town; and after remaining some time
round Bibrax, laying waste the land and burning the hamlets and houses,
they marched towards Cæsar, and halted at less than two miles from his
camp. Their fires, kindled on the right bank of the Miette, indicated a
front of more than 8,000 paces (twelve kilomètres).
The great numbers of the enemy, and their high renown for bravery, led
the proconsul to resolve to postpone the battle. If his legions had in
his eyes an incontestible superiority, he wished, nevertheless, to
ascertain what he could expect from his cavalry, which was composed of
Gauls. For this purpose, and to try, at the same time, the courage of
the Belgæ, he engaged them every day in cavalry combats in the undulated
plain to the north of the camp. Once certain that his troops did not
yield in valour to those of the enemy, he resolved to draw them into a
general action. In front of the entrenchments was an extensive tract of
ground, advantageous for ranging an army in order of battle. This
commanding position was covered in front and on the left by the marshes
of the Miette. The right only remained unsupported, and the Belgæ might
have taken the Romans in flank in the space between the camp and the
stream, or turned them by passing between the camp and the Aisne. To
meet this danger, Cæsar made, on each of the two slopes of the hill, a
fosse, perpendicular to the line of battle, about 400 paces (600 mètres)
in length, the first reaching from the camp to the Miette, the second
joining it to the Aisne. At the extremity of these fosses he established
redoubts, in which were placed military machines.[248]
[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne.]
III. Having made these dispositions, and having left in the camp his two
newly-raised legions to serve as a reserve in case of need, Cæsar placed
the six others in array of battle, the right resting on the
retrenchments. The enemy also drew out his troops and deployed them in
face of the Romans. The two armies remained in observation, each waiting
till the other passed the marsh of the Miette, as the favourable moment
for attack. Meanwhile, as they remained thus stationary, the cavalry
were fighting on both sides. After a successful charge, Cæsar,
perceiving that the enemies persisted in not entering the marshes,
withdrew his legions. The Belgæ immediately left their position to move
towards the Aisne, below the point where the Miette entered it. Their
object was to cross the river between Gernicourt and Pontavert, where
there were fords, with part of their troops, to carry, if they could,
the redoubt commanded by the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus, and to cut
the bridge, or, at least, to intercept the convoys of provisions, and
ravage the country of the Remi, to the south of the Aisne, whence the
Romans drew their supplies.
The barbarians were already approaching the river, when Sabinus
perceived them from the heights of Berry-au-Bac;[249] he immediately
gave information to Cæsar, who, with all his cavalry, the light-armed
Numidians, the slingers, and the archers, passed the bridge, and,
descending the left bank, marched to meet the enemies towards the place
threatened. When he arrived there, some of them had already passed the
Aisne. An obstinate struggle takes place. Surprised in their passage,
the Belgæ, after having experienced considerable loss, advance
intrepidly over the corpses to cross the river, but are repulsed by a
shower of missiles; those who had reached the left bank are surrounded
by the cavalry and massacred.[250]
[Sidenote: Retreat of the Belgæ.]
IV. The Belgæ having failed in taking the _oppidum_ of Bibrax, in
drawing the Romans upon disadvantageous ground, in crossing the river,
and suffering, also, from want of provisions, decided on returning home,
to be ready to assemble again to succour the country which might be
first invaded by the Roman army. The principal cause of this decision
was the news of the threatened invasion of the country of the Bellovaci
by Divitiacus and the Ædui: the Bellovaci refused to lose a single
instant in hurrying to the defence of their hearths. Towards ten o’clock
in the evening, the Belgæ withdrew in such disorder that their departure
resembled a flight. Cæsar was informed immediately by his spies, but,
fearing that this retreat might conceal a snare, he retained his
legions, and even his cavalry, in the camp. At break of day, better
informed by his scouts, he sent all his cavalry, under the orders of the
lieutenants Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta,[251] and ordered
Labienus, with three legions, to follow them. These troops fell upon the
fugitives, and slew as many as the length of the day would permit. At
sunset they gave up the pursuit, and, in obedience to the orders they
had received, returned to the camp.[252]
The coalition of the Belgæ, so renowned for their valour, was thus
dissolved. Nevertheless, it was of importance to the Roman general, in
order to secure the pacification of the country, to go and reduce to
subjection in their homes the peoples who had dared to enter into league
against him. The nearest were the Suessiones, whose territory bordered
upon that of the Remi.
[Sidenote: Capture of Noviodunum and Bratuspantium.]
V. The day after the flight of the enemy, before they had recovered from
their fright, Cæsar broke up his camp, crossed the Aisne, descended its
left bank, invaded the country of the Suessiones, arrived after a long
day’s march (45 kilomètres) before Noviodunum (_Soissons_) (_see Plate
7_), and, informed that this town had a weak garrison, he attempted the
same day to carry it by assault; he failed, through the breadth of the
fosses and the height of the walls. He then retrenched his camp, ordered
covered galleries to be advanced (_vineas agere_),[253] and all things
necessary for a siege to be collected. Nevertheless, the crowd of
fugitive Suessiones threw themselves into the town during the following
night. The galleries having been pushed rapidly towards the walls, the
foundations of a terrace[254] to pass the fosse (_aggere jacto_) were
established, and towers were constructed. The Gauls, astonished at the
greatness and novelty of these works, so promptly executed, offered to
surrender. They obtained safety of life at the prayer of the Remi.
Cæsar received as hostages the principal chiefs of the country, and even
the two sons of King Galba, exacted the surrender of all their arms, and
accepted the submission of the Suessiones. He then conducted his army
into the country of the Bellovaci, who had shut themselves up, with all
they possessed, in the _oppidum_ of Bratuspantium (_Breteuil_).[255] The
army was only at about five miles’ distance from it, when all the aged
men, issuing from the town, came, with extended hands, to implore the
generosity of the Roman general; when he had arrived under the walls of
the place, and while he was establishing his camp, he saw the women and
children also demanding peace as suppliants from the top of the walls.
Divitiacus, in the name of the Ædui, interceded in their favour. After
the retreat of the Belgæ and the disbanding of his troops, he had
returned to the presence of Cæsar. The latter, who had, at the prayer
of the Remi, just shown himself clement towards the Suessiones,
displayed, at the solicitation of the Ædui, the same indulgence towards
the Bellovaci. Thus obeying the same political idea of increasing among
the Belgæ the influence of the peoples allied to Rome, he pardoned them;
but, as their nation was the most powerful in Belgic Gaul, he required
from them all their arms and 600 hostages. The Bellovaci declared that
the promoters of the war, seeing the misfortune they had drawn upon
their country, had fled into the isle of Britain.
It is curious to remark the relations which existed at this epoch
between part of Gaul and England. We know, in fact, from the
“Commentaries,” that a certain Divitiacus, an Æduan chieftain, the most
powerful in all Gaul, had formerly extended his power into the isle of
Britain, and we have just seen that the chiefs in the last struggle
against the Romans had found a refuge in the British isles.
Cæsar next marched from Bratuspantium against the Ambiani, who
surrendered without resistance.[256]
[Sidenote: March against the Nervii.]
VI. The Roman army was now to encounter more formidable adversaries. The
Nervii occupied a vast territory, one extremity of which touched upon
that of the Ambiani. This wild and intrepid people bitterly reproached
the other Belgæ for having submitted to foreigners and abjured the
virtues of their fathers. They had resolved not to send deputies, nor to
accept peace on any condition. Foreseeing the approaching invasion of
the Roman army, the Nervii had drawn into alliance with them two
neighbouring peoples, the Atrebates and the Veromandui, whom they had
persuaded to risk with them the fortune of war: the Aduatuci, also, were
already on the way to join the coalition. The women, and all those whose
age rendered them unfit for fighting, had been placed in safety, in a
spot defended by a marsh, and inaccessible to an army, no doubt at
Mons.[257]
After the submission of the Ambiani, Cæsar left Amiens to proceed to the
country of the Nervii; and after three days’ march on their territory,
he arrived probably at Bavay (_Bagacum_), which is considered to have
been their principal town. There he learnt by prisoners that he was no
more than ten miles (fifteen kilomètres) distant from the Sambre, and
that the enemy awaited him posted on the opposite bank of the
river.[258] He thus found himself on the left bank, and the Nervii were
assembled on the right bank.[259] (_See Plate 7._)
In accordance with the informations he had received, Cæsar sent out a
reconnoitring party of scouts and centurions, charged with the selection
of a spot favourable for the establishment of a camp. A certain number
of the Belgæ, who had recently submitted, and other Gauls, followed him,
and accompanied him in his march. Some of them, as was known
subsequently by the prisoners, having observed during the preceding days
the usual order of march of the army, deserted during the night to the
Nervii, and informed them that behind each of the legions there was a
long column of baggage; that the legion which arrived first at the camp
being separated by a great space from the others, it would be easy to
attack the soldiers, still charged with their bundles (_sarcinæ_); that
this legion once routed and its baggage captured, the others would not
dare to offer any resistance. This plan of attack was the more readily
embraced by the Belgæ, as the nature of the locality favoured its
execution. The Nervii, in fact, always weak in cavalry (their whole
force was composed of infantry), were accustomed, in order to impede
more easily the cavalry of their neighbours, to notch and bend
horizontally young trees, the numerous branches of which, interlaced and
mingled with brambles and brushwood, formed thick hedges, a veritable
wall which nothing could pass through, impenetrable even to the
eye.[260] As this kind of obstacle was very embarrassing to the march of
the Roman army, the Nervii resolved to hide themselves in the woods
which then covered the heights of Haumont, to watch there the moment
when it would debouch on the opposite heights of the Sambre, to wait
till they perceived the file of baggage, and then immediately to rush
upon the troops which preceded.[261] (_See Plate 10._)
[Sidenote: Battle on the Sambre.]
VII. The centurions sent to reconnoitre had selected for the
establishment of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. These descend in a
uniform slope to the very banks of the river. Those of Boussières, to
which they join, end, on the contrary, at the Sambre, in sufficiently
bold escarpments, the elevation of which varies from five to fifteen
mètres, and which, inaccessible near Boussières, may be climbed a little
lower, opposite the wood of Quesnoy. The Sambre, in all this extent, was
no more than about three feet deep. On the right bank, the heights of
Haumont, opposite those of Neuf-Mesnil, descend on all sides in gentle
and regular slopes to the level of the river. In the lower part, they
were bare for a breadth of about 200 Roman paces (300 mètres), reckoning
from the Sambre; and then the woods began, which covered the upper
parts. It was in these woods, impenetrable to the sight, that the Belgæ
remained concealed. They were there drawn up in order of battle: on the
right, the Atrebates; in the centre, the Veromandui; on the left, the
Nervii; these latter facing the escarpments of the Sambre. On the open
part, along the river, they had placed some posts of cavalry. (_See
Plate 10._)
Cæsar, ignorant of the exact position where the Belgæ were encamped,
directed his march towards the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. His cavalry
preceded him, but the order of march was different from that which had
been communicated to the Nervii by the deserters; as he approached the
enemy, he had, according to his custom, united six legions, and placed
the baggage in the tail of the column, under the guard of the two
legions recently raised, who closed the march.
The cavalry, slingers, and archers passed the Sambre and engaged the
cavalry of the enemy, who at one moment took refuge in the woods, and at
another resumed the offensive, nor were ever pursued beyond the open
ground. Meanwhile, the six legions debouched. Arrived on the place
chosen for the camp, they began to retrench, and shared the labour among
them. Some proceeded to dig the fosses, while others spread themselves
over the country in search of timber and turf. They had hardly begun
their work, when the Belgæ, perceiving the first portion of the baggage
(which was the moment fixed for the attack), suddenly issue from the
forest with all their forces, in the order of battle they had adopted,
rush upon the cavalry and put it to rout, and run towards the Sambre
with such incredible rapidity that they seem to be everywhere at
once--at the edge of the wood, in the river, and in the midst of the
Roman troops; then, with the same celerity, climbing the hill, they rush
towards the camp, where the soldiers are at work at the retrenchments.
The Roman army is taken off its guard.
Cæsar had to provide against everything at the same time. It was
necessary to raise the purple standard as the signal for hastening to
arms,[262] to sound the trumpets to recall the soldiers employed in the
works, to bring in those who were at a distance, form the lines,
harangue the troops, give the word of order.[263] In this critical
situation, the experience of the soldiers, acquired in so many combats,
and the presence of the lieutenants with each legion, helped to supply
the place of the general, and to enable each to take, by his own
impulse, the dispositions he thought best. The impetuosity of the enemy
is such that the soldiers have time neither to put on the ensigns,[264]
nor to take the covering from their bucklers, nor even to put on their
helmets. Each, abandoning his labours, runs to range himself in the
utmost haste under the first standard which presents itself.
The army, constrained by necessity, was drawn up on the slope of the
hill, much more in obedience to the nature of the ground and the
exigencies of the moment than according to military rules. The legions,
separated from one another by thick hedges, which intercepted their
view, could not lend each other mutual succour; they formed an irregular
and interrupted line: the 9th and 10th legions were placed on the left
of the camp, the 8th and 11th in the centre, the 7th and 12th on the
right. In this general confusion, in which it became as difficult to
carry succour to the points threatened as to obey one single command,
everything was ruled by accident.
Cæsar, after taking the measures most urgent, rushes towards the troops
which chance presents first to him, takes them as he finds them in his
way, harangues them, and, when he comes to the 10th legion, he recalls
to its memory, in a few words, its ancient valour. As the enemy was
already within reach of the missiles, he orders the attack; then,
proceeding towards another point to encourage his troops, he finds them
already engaged.
The soldiers of the 9th and 10th legions throw the _pilum_, and fall,
sword in hand, upon the Atrebates, who, fatigued by their rapid advance,
out of breath, and pierced with wounds, are soon driven back from the
hill they have just climbed. These two legions, led no doubt by
Labienus, drive them into the Sambre, slay a great number, cross the
river at their heels, and pursue them up the slopes of the right bank.
The enemy, then thinking to take advantage of the commanding position,
form again, and renew the combat; but the Romans repulse them anew, and,
continuing their victorious march, take possession of the Gaulish camp.
In the centre, the 8th and 11th legions, attacked by the Veromandui, had
driven them back upon the banks of the Sambre, to the foot of the
heights, where the combat still continued.
While on the left and in the centre victory declared for the Romans, on
the right wing, the 7th and 12th legions were in danger of being
overwhelmed under the efforts of the whole army of the Nervii, composed
of 60,000 men. These intrepid warriors, led by their chief, Boduognatus,
had dashed across the Sambre in face of the escarpments of the left
bank; they had boldly climbed these, and thrown themselves, in close
rank, upon the two legions of the right wing. These legions were placed
in a position the more critical, as the victorious movements of the left
and centre, by stripping almost entirely of troops that part of the
field of battle, had left them without support. The Nervii take
advantage of these circumstances: some move towards the summit of the
heights to seize the camp, others outflank the two legions on the right
wing (_aperto latere_).
As chance would have it, at this same moment, the cavalry and
light-armed foot, who had been repulsed at the first attack, regained
pell-mell the camp; finding themselves unexpectedly in face of the
enemy, they are confounded, and take to flight again in another
direction. The valets of the army, who, from the Decuman gate and the
summit of the hill, had seen the Romans cross the river victoriously,
and had issued forth in hope of plunder, look back; perceiving the
Nervii in the camp, they fly precipitately. The tumult is further
increased by the cries of the baggage-drivers, who rush about in terror.
Among the auxiliaries in the Roman army, there was a body of Treviran
cavalry, who enjoyed among the Gauls a reputation for valour. When they
saw the camp invaded, the legions pressed and almost surrounded, the
valets, the cavalry, the slingers, the Numidians, separated, dispersed,
and flying on all sides, they believed that all was lost, took the road
for their own country, and proclaimed everywhere in their march that the
Roman army was destroyed.
Cæsar had repaired from the left wing to the other points of the line.
When he arrived at the right wing, he had found the 7th and 12th legions
hotly engaged, the ensigns of the cohorts of the 12th legion collected
on the same point, the soldiers pressed together and mutually
embarrassing each other, all the centurions of the 4th cohort and the
standard-bearer killed; the standard lost; in the other cohorts most of
the centurions were either killed or wounded, and among the latter was
the primipilus Sextius Baculus, a man of rare bravery, who was destined
soon afterwards to save the legion of Galba in the Valais. The soldiers
who still resisted were exhausted, and those of the last ranks were
quitting the ranks to avoid the missiles; new troops of enemies
continually climbed the hill, some advancing to the front against the
Romans, the others turning them on the two wings. In this extreme
danger, Cæsar judges that he can hope for succour only from himself:
having arrived without buckler, he seizes that of a legionary of the
last ranks and rushes to the first line; there, calling the centurions
by their names and exciting the soldiers, he draws the 12th legion
forward, and causes more interval to be made between the files of the
companies in order to facilitate the handling of their swords. His
example and encouraging words restore hope to the combatants and revive
their courage. Each man, under the eyes of their general, shows new
energy, and this heroic devotedness begins to cool the impetuosity of
the enemy. Not far thence, the 7th legion was pressed by a multitude of
assailants. Cæsar orders the tribunes gradually to bring the two legions
back to back, so that each presented its front to the enemy in opposite
directions. Fearing no longer to be taken in the rear, they resist with
firmness, and fight with new ardour. While Cæsar is thus occupied, the
two legions of the rear-guard, which formed the escort of the baggage
(the 13th and 14th), informed of what was taking place, arrive in haste,
and appear in view of the enemy at the top of the hill. On his part, T.
Labienus, who, at the head of the 9th and 10th legions, had made himself
master of the enemy’s camp on the heights of Haumont, discovers what is
passing in the Roman camp. He judges, by the flight of the cavalry and
servants, the greatness of the danger with which Cæsar is threatened,
and sends the 10th legion to his succour, which, re-passing the Sambre,
and climbing the slopes of Neuf-Mesnil, runs in haste to fall upon the
rear of the Nervii.
On the arrival of these re-enforcements, the whole aspect of things
changes: the wounded raise themselves, and support themselves on their
bucklers in order to take part in the action; the valets, seeing the
terror of the enemy, throw themselves unarmed upon men who are armed;
and the cavalry,[265] to efface the disgrace of their flight, seek to
outdo the legionaries in the combat. Meanwhile the Nervii fight with the
courage of despair. When those of the first ranks fall, the nearest take
their places, and mount upon their bodies; they are slain in their turn;
the dead form heaps; the survivors throw, from the top of this mountain
of corpses, their missiles upon the Romans, and send them back their own
_pila_. “How can we, then, be astonished,” says Cæsar, “that such men
dared to cross a broad river, climb its precipitous banks, and overcome
the difficulties of the ground, since nothing appeared too much for
their courage?” They met death to the last man, and 60,000 corpses
covered the field of battle so desperately fought, in which the fortune
of Cæsar had narrowly escaped wreck.
After this struggle, in which, according to the “Commentaries,” the race
and name of the Nervii were nearly annihilated, the old men, women, and
children, who had sought refuge in the middle of the marshes, finding no
hopes of safety, surrendered.[266] In dwelling on the misfortune of
their country, they said that, of 600 senators, there remained only
three; and that, of 60,000 combatants, hardly 500 had survived. Cæsar,
to show his clemency towards the unfortunate who implored it, treated
these remains of the Nervii with kindness; he left them their lands and
towns, and enjoined the neighbouring peoples not only not to molest
them, but even to protect them from all outrage and violence.[267]
[Sidenote: Siege of the _Oppidum_ of the Aduatuci.]
VIII. This victory was gained, no doubt, towards the end of July. Cæsar
detached the 7th legion, under the orders of young P. Crassus, to reduce
the maritime peoples of the shores of the ocean: the Veneti, the Unelli,
the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Essuvii, the Aulerci, and the Redones.
He proceeded in person, with the seven other legions, following the
course of the Sambre, to meet the Aduatuci, who, as we have seen above,
were marching to join the Nervii. They were the descendants of those
Cimbri and Teutones who, in their descent upon the Roman province and
Italy in the year 652, had left on this side the Rhine 6,000 men in
charge of as much of the baggage as was too heavy to be carried with
them. After the defeat of their companions by Marius, and many
vicissitudes, these Germans had established themselves towards the
confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, and had there formed a state.
As soon as the Aduatuci were informed of the disaster of the Nervii,
they returned to their own country, abandoned their towns and forts, and
retired, with all they possessed, into one _oppidum_, remarkably
fortified by nature. Surrounded in every direction by precipitous rocks
of great elevation, it was accessible only on one side by a gentle
slope, at most 100 feet wide, defended by a fosse and double wall of
great height, on which they placed enormous masses of rock and pointed
beams. The mountain on which the citadel of Namur is situated[268]
answers sufficiently to this description. (_See Plate 11._)
On the arrival of the army, they made at first frequent sorties, and
engaged in battles on a small scale. Later, when the place was
surrounded by a countervallation of twelve feet high in a circuit of
15,000 feet,[269] with numerous redoubts, they kept close in their
_oppidum_. The Romans pushed forward their covered galleries, raised a
terrace under shelter of these galleries, and constructed a tower of
timber, intended to be pushed against the wall. At the sight of these
preparations, the Aduatuci, who, like most of the Gauls, despised the
Romans on account of their small stature, addressed the besiegers
ironically from their walls, not understanding how a great machine,
placed at a great distance, could be put in motion by men so diminutive.
But when they saw this tower move and approach the walls, struck with a
sight so strange and so new to them, they sent to implore peace,
demanding, as the only condition, that they should be left in possession
of their arms. Cæsar refused this condition, but declared that, if they
surrendered before the ram had struck their wall, they should be placed,
like the Nervii, under the protection of the Roman people, and preserved
from all violence. The besieged thereupon threw such a quantity of arms
into the fosses that they filled them almost to the height of the wall
and the terrace; yet, as was afterwards discovered, they had retained
about one-third. They threw open their gates, and that day remained
quiet.
The Romans had occupied the town; towards evening, Cæsar ordered them to
leave it, fearing the violences which the soldiers might commit on the
inhabitants during the night. But these, believing that after the
surrender of the place the posts of the countervallation would be
guarded with less care, resume the arms they had concealed, furnish
themselves with bucklers of bark of trees, or wicker, covered hastily
with skins, and, at midnight, attack the part of the works which seems
most easy of access. Fires, prepared by Cæsar, soon announce the attack.
The soldiers rush to the spot from the nearest redoubts; and, though the
enemies fight with the obstinacy of despair, the missiles thrown from
the entrenchments and the towers disperse them, and they are driven back
into the town with a loss of 4,000 men. Next day the gates were broken
in without resistance, and, the town once taken, the inhabitants were
sold publicly to the number of 53,000.[270]
[Sidenote: Subjugation of Armorica by P. Crassus]
IX. Towards the time of the conclusion of this siege (the first days of
September), Cæsar received letters from P. Crassus. This lieutenant
announced that the maritime peoples on the coasts of the ocean, from the
Loire to the Seine, had submitted. On the arrival of this news at Rome,
the Senate decreed fifteen days of thanksgivings.[271]
These successful exploits, and Gaul entirely pacified, gave to the
barbarian peoples so high an opinion of the Roman power, that the
nations beyond the Rhine, particularly the Ubii, sent deputies to Cæsar,
offering hostages and obedience to his orders. Anxious to proceed to
Italy and Illyria, he commanded the deputies to return to him at the
commencement of the following spring, and placed his legions, with the
exception of the 12th, in winter quarters, in the countries of the
Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, neighbouring upon the localities
where Crassus had been making war.[272] They were probably _échelonnés_
in the valley of the Loire, between Orleans and Angers.
[Sidenote: Expedition of Galba into the Valais.]
X. Before he departed for Italy, Cæsar sent Servius Galba, with a part
of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates,
the Veragri, and the Seduni (_peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper
Valais_), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges,
Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to
open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that
is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were
continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some
successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained
hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his
legions in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (_Martigny_). This
town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by
high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (_the Drance_).
Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the
other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.
Several day had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt
suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the
town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were
appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation
was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he
had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions
in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was
decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to
abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the
camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary
dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the
retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (_gæsa_). Having
to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they
are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the point
that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the
wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the
Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of
missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audacity, were filling up
the fosse and tearing down the palisades; already the Romans were
reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus,
the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and
C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope
which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command
of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the
missiles, and take breath; then, when the signal is given, rushing on
all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and
make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain.[273]
In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety in so difficult
a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th
legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered.[273]
CHAPTER VI.
(Year of Rome 698.)
(BOOK III. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
WAR OF THE VENETI--VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI--SUBMISSION OF
AQUITAINE--MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.
[Sidenote: Insurrection of the Maritime Peoples.]
I. While Cæsar was visiting Illyria and the different towns of the
Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The
cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th
legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he
sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from
the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli,[274]
M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitæ, and Quintus Velanius, with T.
Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the
whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served
to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate
skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean.
The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in
exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus. Their
example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitæ seized, with
the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an
engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same
fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to
recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he
must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be
restored.
Cæsar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them
from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the
Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and
sailors and pilots to be procured. These measures having been promptly
executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At
the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that
they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a
character which is inviolable, made preparations proportionate to the
danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to
work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great:
they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast;
they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown
latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which
would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.
Their determination once taken, they fortified their _oppida_, and
transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the
country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered
together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed by the
river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. (_See Plate 12._) They allied
themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the
Loire to that of the Scheldt,[275] and demanded succour from the isle of
Britain.[276]
In spite of the difficulties of this war, Cæsar undertook it without
hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the
right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so
many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an
encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Cæsar, as well as the
Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter,
possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of
the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive
him of the means; and, on the other, Cæsar could not attempt the
dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed
the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean.[277]
[Sidenote: War against the Veneti.]
II. Be this as it may, in order to prevent new risings, Cæsar divided
his army so as to occupy the country militarily. The lieutenant T.
Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri,
with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to
maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by
the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgæ. P. Crassus
was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of
cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that
province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q.
Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli,
the Curiosolitæ, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus,[278] who had
arrived from the Mediterranean with the galleys,[279] received the
command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed
from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted.
His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the
country of the Veneti. As to Cæsar, he proceeded thither with the rest
of the land army.
The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the
north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion
and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and
eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against
the Veneti.[280]
We may admit that Cæsar started from the neighbourhood of Nantes, and
directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine.
Having arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by
the time which must pass before the arrival of his fleet to obtain
possession of the principal _oppida_ where the inhabitants took refuge.
Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated
at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they
could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was
inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double
obstacle to a siege.
The Romans attacked them in the following manner: they constructed on
the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for
terraces (_aggere ac molibus_), and forming approaches towards the
place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between
these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide;
but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the _oppidum_,
this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally
dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful
in the attack.[281]
With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of
the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded
in taking several of these _oppida_. But all their labours were thrown
away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they
evacuated the _oppidum_, embarked with all their goods on board their
numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring _oppida_, the
situations of which offered the same advantages for a new resistance.
The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner.
Cæsar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was
indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and
fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might
be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of
Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas. (_See Plate
12._)
The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been
able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen,
they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides,
and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the
sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.
The enemy’s ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to
enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the
Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of
oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very
lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams
(_transtra_), made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with
iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains
instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails, either
because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen,
or because they regarded the ordinary sails as insufficient to support,
with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The
Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the
oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the
nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their
construction they resisted the ships’ beaks, and by their elevation they
were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the
grappling-irons (_copulæ_).[282]
[Sidenote: Naval Combat against the Veneti.]
III. The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the east or north-east, was
at length enabled to set sail.[283] It quitted the Loire, and directed
its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. (_See
Plate 12._) As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the
port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped,
which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet
reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the
shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place
under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on
the shore.
It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean.
Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of
the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence
of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops,
which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly,
the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs
were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss,[284] when, to
remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy
with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in
492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks
(_falces_) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses
(_non absimili forma muralium falcium_).[285] The _falx_ was an iron
with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which,
suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that
of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon
as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes
which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all
their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the
disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded
it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was
completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of
courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated
one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The
Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved
their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This
unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility
of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a
very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the
night.
The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till
sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime
peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all
their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without
the means of defending any longer their _oppida_, they surrendered
themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in
future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be
put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.
Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this
great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the
vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives
to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it
was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the
Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the
mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its
revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii
slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the
insurrection.[286]
[Sidenote: Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli.]
IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius
Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this
nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined,
a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A
multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of
Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops.
Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his
three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for
his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He
established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which
separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now
find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier.[287] (_See Plate
13._) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north,
the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000
paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a
position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the
heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his
troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up
in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own
soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the
latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in
face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a
lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle,
without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But,
not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he
determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and
cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a
deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following
night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of
Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the
favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them
escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for
arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with
branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the
retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble
and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But
Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order
to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while
they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality,
the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the
Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the
cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately
submitted.
Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the
victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against
the Veneti.[288]
[Sidenote: Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus.]
V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with
twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which,
according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul.[289] He
believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country
where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had
lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced
a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries,
and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he
led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and
strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during
its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but,
suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (_in
convalle_), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the
battle re-commenced with fury.
Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour
to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show
what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general
and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans.
Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the _oppidum_ of
the Sotiates (the town of _Sos_), attempted to carry it by assault; but
the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to
covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to
sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they
went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the
Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all
their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they
made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the
Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation,
Adiatunnus,[290] supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty
men of the class called _soldures_, attempted a sally from another side
of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and,
after a severe struggle, drove him back into the _oppidum_;
nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.
When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the
countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far
from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an _oppidum_ fortified
by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour
and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon
Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs
enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in
their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had
too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out
detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he
saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was
danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the
same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.
At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two
lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited
the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections
of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the
weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the
victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions
they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack
with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained
shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer
battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of
fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with
loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to
their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others
drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the
rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for
action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones
and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the
enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry
brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate,
the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more
easy.[291] He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the
ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take
the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in
the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to
be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the
principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the
clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus,
redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose
courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight.
The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians
or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp
very late in the night.
At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of
Aquitaine[292] submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him
hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the
advanced period of the season, refused to make their submission.[293]
[Sidenote: March against the Morini and the Menapii.]
VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the
end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who
alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had
not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in
caverns[294] or under the tent.[295] Taught by the example of their
neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into
the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their
country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to
fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without
experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest
which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the
enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he
formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This
work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible
celerity. Cæsar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini
and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of
the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they
were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer
permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to
retire.[296] He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew
his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the
Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently
vanquished.[297]
[Sidenote: Observations.]
VII. The war of 698, directed almost exclusively against the peoples on
the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Cæsar already, at that time,
entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain,
for he not only destroys the only important fleet that could be brought
against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or
by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the
mouth of the Scheldt.
It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the
barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what
facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest
to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of
Cæsar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we
must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the
world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among
these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations,
named _præfecti fabrorum_. They rendered him the most signal services.
Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus,[298] who prepared the material
of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra,[299] who, in spite of the
bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his
genius during the wars in Gaul.
CHAPTER VII.
(Year of Rome 699.)
(BOOK IV OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI--FIRST PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN--CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND THE
MENAPII.
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s March against the Usipetes and the Tencteri.]
I. The Usipetes and the Tencteri, German peoples driven out of their
place by the Suevi, had wandered during three years in different
countries of Germany, when, during the winter of 698 to 699, they
resolved to pass the Rhine. They invaded the territory of the Menapii
(established on the two banks), surprised them, massacred them, crossed
the river not far from its mouth (towards Cleves[300] and Xanten) (_see
Plate 14_), and, after taking possession of the whole country, lived
the rest of the winter on the provisions they found there.
Cæsar saw the necessity of being on his guard against the impression
which this invasion would produce on the minds of the Gauls. It was to
be feared they would be tempted to revolt, with the assistance of the
Germans who had just crossed the Rhine.
To meet this danger, Cæsar crossed the mountains earlier than usual
(_maturius quam consuerat_), and joined the army in the countries of the
Aulerci and the Lexovii, between the Loire and the Seine, where it had
wintered. His apprehensions were but too well founded. Several peoples
of Gaul had invited the Germans to leave the banks of the Rhine and
penetrate farther into the interior. Eager to respond to this appeal,
the latter soon spread themselves far over the country, and already some
of them had arrived at the countries of the Eburones and the Condrusi,
the latter clients of the Treviri. On receiving news of this, Cæsar
called together the Gaulish chiefs who had invited the Germans, feigned
ignorance of their conduct, addressed kind words to them, obtained
cavalry from them, and, after securing his provisions, began his march
against this new irruption of barbarians. He foresaw a formidable war,
for the number of the Tencteri and Usipetes amounted to no less than
430,000 individuals--men, women, and children. If we admit that among
these peoples the proportion of the number of men capable of bearing
arms was the same as in the emigration of the Helvetii, that is,
one-fourth of the total population, we see that the Romans had to
combat more than 100,000 enemies.[301]
Without knowing exactly the road taken by Cæsar, we may suppose that he
promptly concentrated his army on the lower Seine to carry it towards
the north, at Amiens, where he had convoked the Gaulish chiefs who had
sought the support of the Germans. He followed, from Amiens, the road
which passes by Cambrai, Bavay, Charleroy, Tongres, and Maestricht,
where he crossed the Meuse. (_See Plate 14._) He was only a few days’
march from the Germans, when deputies came to propose, in rather haughty
language, an arrangement:--“Driven from their country, they have not
taken the initiative in the war; but they will not seek to avoid it.
The Germans have learnt from their ancestors, whoever may be the
aggressor, to have recourse to arms, and never to prayers. They may be
useful allies to the Romans, if lands are given to them, or if they are
allowed to retain those they have conquered. Moreover, with the
exception of the Suevi, to whom the gods themselves are not equal, they
know no people capable of resisting them.” Cæsar imposed upon them, as a
first condition, to quit Gaul; observing, “Those who have not been able
to defend their own lands, have no right to claim the lands of others;”
and he offered them a settlement among the Ubii, who were imploring his
support against the Suevi. The deputies promised to bring an answer to
this proposal in three days; meanwhile, they begged him to suspend his
march. Cæsar considered that this demand was only a subterfuge to gain
time to recall the cavalry, which had been sent a few days before to
collect plunder and provisions among the Ambivariti,[302] beyond the
Meuse. He rejected their proposal, and continued his advance.
At the appointed time, Cæsar, having passed the locality where Venloo
now stands, was no longer more than twelve miles from the enemy; and the
deputies returned as they had promised. They met the army in march, and
earnestly entreated it should go no farther. When they found they could
not prevail, they begged at least that the cavalry, which formed the
vanguard, should not engage in action, and that they should be allowed a
delay of three days, in order to send deputies to the Ubii; if the
latter bound themselves by oath to receive them, they would accept
Cæsar’s conditions. The latter was not the dupe of this new stratagem,
yet he promised them to advance that day no more than four miles, for
the purpose of finding water. He invited them, further, to send a more
numerous deputation next day. His cavalry received the order not to
provoke a combat, but to confine itself in case of being attacked, to
remaining firm, and await the arrival of the legions.
When they learnt that Cæsar was approaching the Meuse and the Rhine, the
Usipetes and Tencteri had concentrated their forces towards the
confluence of those two rivers, in the most remote part of the country
of the Menapii, and had established themselves on the river Niers, in
the plains of Goch. Cæsar, on his side, after leaving Venloo, had borne
to the right to march to the encounter of the enemy. Since, to the north
of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other
water-course but the Niers, he was evidently obliged to advance to that
river to find water: he was four miles from it when he met, at Straelen,
the German deputation.
The vanguard, consisting of 5,000 cavalry, marched without distrust,
reckoning on the truce which had been concluded. Suddenly, 800 horsemen
(all at the disposal of the Germans, since the greater part of their
cavalry had passed the Meuse) appeared bearing down upon Cæsar’s cavalry
from the greatest distance at which they could be seen. In an instant
the ranks of the latter are thrown into disorder. They have succeeded in
forming again, when the German horsemen, according to their custom,
spring to the ground, stab the horses in the bellies, and overthrow
their riders, who fly in terror till they come in sight of the legions.
Seventy-four of the cavalry perished, among whom was the Aquitanian
Piso, a man of high birth and great courage, whose grandfather had
wielded the sovereign power in his country, and had obtained from the
Senate the title of “Friend.” His brother, in the attempt to save him,
shared his fate.
This attack was a flagrant violation of the truce, and Cæsar resolved to
enter into no further negotiation with so faithless an enemy. Struck
with the impression produced by this single combat on the fickle minds
of the Gauls, he was unwilling to leave them time for reflection, but
decided on delaying battle no longer; besides, it would have been folly
to give the Germans leisure to wait the return of their cavalry. Next
morning their chiefs came to the camp in great numbers, to offer their
justification for the previous day’s attack in defiance of the
convention, but their real object was to obtain by deception a
prolongation of the truce. Cæsar, satisfied at seeing them deliver
themselves into his power of their own accord, judged right to make use
of reprisals, and ordered them to be arrested. The Roman army, then
encamped on the Niers, was only eight miles distant from the
Germans.[303]
[Sidenote: Rout of the Usipetes and the Tencteri.]
II. Cæsar drew all the troops out of his camp, formed the infantry in
three lines,[304] and placed the cavalry, still intimidated by the late
combat, in the rear guard. After marching rapidly over the short
distance which separated him from the Germans, he came upon them totally
unexpected. Struck with terror at the sudden appearance of the army, and
disconcerted by the absence of their chiefs, they had the time neither
to deliberate nor to take their arms, and hesitated for a moment between
flight and resistance.[305] While their cries and disorder announce
their terror, the Romans, provoked by their perfidious conduct on the
previous day, rush upon the camp. As many of the Germans as are quick
enough to gain their arms attempt to defend themselves, and combat among
the baggage and wagons. But the women and children fly on every side.
Cæsar sends the cavalry to pursue them. As soon as the barbarians, who
still resisted, hear behind them the cries of the fugitives, and see the
massacre of their companions, they throw down their arms, abandon their
ensigns, and rush headlong out of the camp. They only cease their flight
when they reach the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, where some
are massacred and others are swallowed up in the river.[306] This
victory, which did not cost the Romans a single man, delivered them
from a formidable war. Cæsar restored their liberty to the chiefs he had
retained; but they, fearing the vengeance of the Gauls, whose lands they
had ravaged, preferred remaining with him.[307]
[Sidenote: First Passage of the Rhine.]
III. After so brilliant a success, Cæsar, to secure the results,
considered it a measure of importance to cross the Rhine, and so seek
the Germans in their homes. For this purpose, he must choose the point
of passage where the right bank was inhabited by a friendly people, the
Ubii. The study of this and the following campaigns leads us to believe
that this was Bonn.[308] From the field of battle, then, he proceeded
up the valley of the Rhine; he followed a direction indicated by the
following localities: Gueldres, Crefeld, Neuss, Cologne, and Bonn. (_See
Plate 14._) Above all, it was Cæsar’s intention to put a stop to the
rage of the Germans for invading Gaul, to inspire them with fears for
their own safety, and to prove to them that the Roman army dared and
could cross a great river. He had, moreover, a plausible motive for
penetrating into Germany--the refusal of the Sicambri to deliver up to
him the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had taken refuge among
them after the battle. The Sicambri had replied to his demand, that the
empire of the Roman people ended with the Rhine, and that beyond it
Cæsar had no further claims. At the same time, the Ubii, who alone of
the peoples beyond the Rhine had sought his alliance, claimed his
protection against the Suevi, who were threatening them more seriously
than ever. It would be a sufficient guarantee for their safety, they
said, to show himself on the right bank of the Rhine, so great was the
renown of the Roman army among even the most remote of the German
nations, since the defeat of Ariovistus and the recent victory; and they
offered him boats for passing the river. Cæsar declined this offer. It
did not appear to him worthy of the dignity of himself or of the Roman
people to have recourse to barbarians, and he judged it unsafe to
transport the army in boats. Therefore, in spite of the obstacles
presented by a wide, deep, and rapid river, he decided on throwing a
bridge across it.
It was the first time that a regular army attempted to cross the Rhine.
The bridge was constructed in the following manner. (_See Plate 15._)
Two trees (probably in their rough state), a foot and a half in
thickness, cut to a point at one of their extremities, and of a length
proportionate to the depth of the river, were bound together with
cross-beams at intervals of two feet from each other; let down into the
water, and stuck into the ground by means of machines placed in boats
coupled together, they were driven in by blows of a rammer, not
vertically, like ordinary piles, but obliquely, giving them an
inclination in the direction of the current. Opposite them, and at a
distance of forty feet below, another couple of piles were placed,
arranged in the same manner, but inclined in a contrary direction, in
order to resist the violence of the river. In the interval left between
the two piles of each couple, a great beam was lodged, called the
_head-piece_, of two feet square; these two couples (_hæc utraque_) were
bound together on each side, beginning from the upper extremity, by two
wooden ties (_fibulæ_), so that they could neither draw from nor towards
each other, and presented, according to the “Commentaries,” a whole of a
solidity so great, that the force of the water, so far from injuring it,
bound all its parts tighter together.[309] This system formed one row of
piles of the bridge; and as many of them were established as were
required by the breadth of the river. The Rhine at Bonn being about 430
mètres wide, the bridge must have been composed of fifty-six arches,
supposing each of these to have been twenty-six Roman feet in length
(7·70 mètres). Consequently, there were fifty-four rows of piles. The
floor was formed of planks reaching from one head-piece to the other, on
which were placed transversely smaller planks, which were covered with
hurdles. Besides this, they drove in obliquely, below each row of piles,
a pile which, placed in form of a buttress (_quæ pro ariete subjectæ_),
and bound in with it, increased the resistance to the current. Other
piles were similarly driven in at a little distance above the rows of
piles, so as to form stockades, intended to stop trunks of trees and
boats which the barbarians might have thrown down in order to break the
bridge.
These works were completed in ten days, including the time employed for
the transport of the materials. Cæsar crossed the river with his army,
left a strong guard at each extremity of the bridge, and marched towards
the territory of the Sicambri, proceeding, no doubt, up the valley of
the Sieg and the Agger, (_See Plate 14._) During his march, deputies
from different peoples came to solicit his alliance. He gave them a
friendly reception, and exacted hostages. As to the Sicambri, at the
beginning of the erection of the bridge, they had fled to the deserts
and forests, terrified by the reports of the Usipetes and Tencteri, who
had taken refuge among them.
Cæsar remained only eighteen days beyond the Rhine. During this time he
ravaged the territory of the Sicambri, returned to that of the Ubii, and
promised them succour if they were attacked by the Suevi. The latter
having withdrawn to the centre of their country, he renounced the
prospect of combating them, and considered that he had thus accomplished
his design.
It is evident, from what precedes, that Cæsar’s aim was not to make the
conquest of Germany, but to strike a great blow which should disgust the
barbarians with their frequent excursions across the Rhine. No doubt he
hoped to meet with the Suevi, and give them battle; but learning that
they had assembled at a great distance from the Rhine, he thought it
more prudent not to venture into an unknown country covered with
forests, but returned into Gaul, and caused the bridge to be broken.
It was not enough for Cæsar to have intimidated the Germans; he formed a
still bolder project, that of crossing the sea, to go and demand a
reckoning of the Britons for the succour which, in almost all his wars,
and particularly in that of the Veneti, they had sent to the Gauls.[310]
[Sidenote: Description of Britain in the time of Cæsar.]
IV. The Romans had but imperfect information relating to Britain, which
they owed to certain Greek writers, such as Pytheas of Marseilles, who
had visited the Northern Sea in the fourth century before our era, and
Timæus of Tauromenium. The Gauls who visited Britain for the sake of
traffic, knew hardly more than the southern and south-eastern coasts.
Nevertheless, a short time before the arrival of the Romans, one of the
populations of Belgic Gaul, the Suessiones, then governed by Divitiacus,
had extended their domination into this island.[311]
It was only after having landed in Britain that Cæsar was able to form a
tolerably exact idea of its form and extent. “Britain,” he says, “has
the form of a triangle, the base of which, about 500 miles in extent,
faces Gaul. The side which faces Spain, that is, the west, presents a
length of about 700 miles. In this direction the island is separated
from Hibernia (_Ireland_) by an arm of the sea, the breadth of which is
apparently the same as the arm of the sea which separates Britain from
Gaul;” and he adds that “the surface of Hibernia represents about one
half the surface of Britain. The third part of the triangle formed by
this latter island is eastward turned to the north, and 800 miles long;
it faces no land; only one of the angles of this side looks towards
Germany.”[312] These imperfect estimates, which were to give place in
the following century to others less inaccurate,[313] led the great
captain to ascribe to the whole of Britain twenty times 100,000 paces in
circuit. He further gathered some information still more vague on the
small islands in the vicinity of Britain. “One of them,” he writes, “is
called Mona (_the Isle of Man_), and is situated in the middle of the
strait which separates Britain from Hibernia.” The Hebrides, the
Shetland islands (_Acmodæ_ of the ancients), and the Orcades, which were
only known to the Romans at the commencement of our era,[314] were
confounded, in the minds of Cæsar and his contemporaries, with the
archipelago of the Feroe isles and Scandinavia. Caledonia (_Scotland_)
appeared only in an obscure distance.
Cæsar represents the climate of Britain as less cold and more temperate
than that of Gaul. With the exception of the beech (_fagus_) and the fir
(_abies_), the same timbers were found in the forests of this island as
on the neighbouring continent.[315] They grew wheat there, and bred
numerous herds of cattle.[316] “The soil, if it is not favourable to
the culture of the olive, the vine, and other products of warm
climates,” writes Tacitus,[317] “produces in their place grain and
fruits in abundance. Although they grow quickly, they are slow in
ripening.”
Britain contained a numerous population. The interior was inhabited by
peoples who believed themselves to be _autochthones_, and the southern
and eastern coasts by a race who had emigrated from Belgic Gaul, and
crossed the Channel and the Northern Sea, attracted by the prospect of
plunder. After having made war on the natives, they had established
themselves in the island, and became agriculturalists.[318] Cæsar adds
that nearly all these tribes which had come from the continent had
preserved the names of the _civitates_ from whence they had issued. And,
in fact, among the peoples of Britain named by geographers in the ages
subsequent to the conquest of Gaul, we meet, on the banks of the Thames
and the Severn, with the names of Belgæ and Atrebates.
The most powerful of the populations of Belgic origin were found in
Cantium (_Kent_), which was placed, by its commercial relations, in more
habitual intercourse with Gaul.[319] The “Commentaries” mention only a
small number of British nations. These are the Trinobantes (the people
of _Essex_ and _Middlesex_), who proved the most faithful to the
Romans,[320] and whose principal _oppidum_ was probably already, in the
time of Cæsar, Londinium (_London_), mentioned by Tacitus;[321] the
Cenimagni[322] (_Suffolk_, to the north of the Trinobantes); the
Segontiaci (the greater part of _Hampshire_ and _Berkshire_, southern
counties); the Bibroci (inhabiting a region then thickly wooded, over
which extended the celebrated forest of Anderida);[323] their territory
comprised a small part of _Hampshire_ and _Berkshire_, and embraced the
counties of _Surrey_ and _Sussex_ and the most western part of _Kent_;
the Ancalites (a more uncertain position, in the north of _Berkshire_
and the western part of _Middlesex_); the Cassii (_Hertfordshire_ and
_Bedfordshire_, central counties). Each of these little nations was
governed by a chieftain or king.[324]
The Belgæ of Britain possessed the same manners as the Gauls, but their
social condition was less advanced. Strabo[325] gives this proof, that,
having milk in abundance, the Britons did not know how to make cheese,
an art, on the contrary, carried to great perfection in certain parts of
Gaul. The national character of the two populations, British and
Gaulish, presented a great analogy:--“The same boldness in seeking
danger, the same eagerness to fly from it when it is before them,”
writes Tacitus; “although the courage of the Britons has more of pride
in it.”[326] This resemblance of the two races showed itself also in
their exterior forms. Yet, according to Strabo, the stature of the
Britons was taller than that of the Gauls, and their hair was less red.
Their dwellings were but wretched huts made of stubble and wood;[327]
they stored up their wheat in subterranean repositories; their _oppida_
were situated in the middle of forests, defended by a rampart and a
fosse, and served for places of refuge in case of attack.[328]
The tribes of the interior of the island lived in a state of greater
barbarism than those of the maritime districts. Clothed in the skins of
animals, they fed upon milk and flesh.[329] Strabo even represents them
as cannibals; and assures us that the custom existed among them of
eating the bodies of their dead relatives.[330] The men wore their hair
very long, and a moustache; they rubbed their skin with woad, which gave
them a blue colour, and rendered their aspect as combatants singularly
hideous.[331] The women also coloured themselves in the same manner for
certain religious ceremonies, in which they appeared naked.[332] Such
was the barbarism of the Britons of the interior, that the women were
sometimes common to ten or twelve men, a promiscuousness which was
especially customary amongst the nearest relatives. As to the children
who were born of these incestuous unions, they were considered to belong
to the first who had received into his house the mother while still a
girl.[333] The Britons of the Cape Belerium (_Cornwall_) were very
hospitable, and the trade they carried on with foreign merchants had
softened their manners.[334]
The abundance of metals in Britain, especially of tin, or _plumbum
album_, which the Phœnicians went to seek there from a very remote
antiquity,[335] furnished the inhabitants with numerous means of
exchange. At all events, they were not acquainted with money, and only
made use of pieces of copper, gold, or iron, the value of which was
determined by weighing. They did not know how to make bronze, but
received it from abroad.[336]
The religion of the Britons, on which Cæsar gives us no information,
must have differed little from that of the Gauls, since Druidism passed
for having been imported from Britain into Gaul.[337] Tacitus, in fact,
tells us that the same worship and the same superstitions were found in
Britain as among the Gauls.[338] Strabo speaks, on the authority of
Artemidorus, of an island neighbouring to Britain, where they
celebrated, in honour of two divinities, assimilated by the latter to
Ceres and Proserpine, rites which resembled those of the mysteries of
Samothrace.[339] Under the influence of certain superstitious ideas, the
Britons abstained from the flesh of several animals, such as the hare,
the hen, and the goose, which, nevertheless, they domesticated as
ornamental objects.[340]
The Britons, though living in an island, appear to have possessed no
shipping in the time of Cæsar. They were foreign ships which came to
the neighbourhood of Cape Belerium to fetch the tin, which the
inhabitants worked with as much skill as profit.[341] About a century
after Cæsar, the boats of the Britons were still only frames of
wicker-work covered with leather.[342] The inhabitants of Britain were
less ignorant in the art of war than in that of navigation. Protected by
small bucklers,[343] and armed with long swords, which they handled with
skill, but which became useless in close combat, they never combated in
masses: they advanced in small detachments, which supported each other
reciprocally.[344] Their principal force was in their infantry;[345] yet
they employed a great number of war-chariots armed with scythes.[346]
They began by driving about rapidly on all sides, and hurling darts,
seeking thus to spread disorder in the enemy’s ranks by the mere terror
caused by the impetuosity of the horses and the noise of the wheels;
then they returned into the intervals of their cavalry, leaped to the
ground, and fought on foot mixed with the horsemen. During this time the
drivers withdrew themselves with the chariots so as to be ready in case
of need to receive the combatants.[347] The Britons thus united the
movableness of cavalry with the steadiness of infantry; daily exercise
had made them so dexterous that they maintained their horses at full
speed on steep slopes, drew them in or turned them at will, ran upon the
shaft, held under the yoke, and thence threw themselves rapidly into
their chariots.[348] In war they used their dogs as auxiliaries, which
the Gauls procured from Britain for the same purpose. These dogs were
excellent for the chase.[349]
In short, the Britons were less civilised than the Gauls. If we except
the art of working certain metals, their manufactures were limited to
the fabrication of the coarsest and most indispensable objects; and it
was from Gaul they obtained collars, vessels of amber and glass, and
ornaments of ivory for the bridles of their horses.[350]
It was known also that pearls were in the Scottish sea, and people
easily believed that it concealed immense treasures.
These details relating to Britain were not collected until after the
Roman expeditions, for that country was previously the subject of the
most mysterious tales; and when Cæsar resolved on its conquest, this
bold enterprise excited people’s minds to the highest degree by the
ever-powerful charm of the unknown. As to him, in crossing the Channel,
he obeyed the same thought which had carried him across the Rhine: he
wished to give the barbarians a high notion of Roman greatness, and
prevent them from lending support to the insurrections in Gaul.
[Sidenote: First Expedition to Britain.]
V. Although the summer approached its end, the difficulties of a
descent upon Britain did not stop him. Even supposing, indeed, that the
season should not permit him to obtain any decisive result by the
expedition, he looked upon it as an advantage to gain a footing in that
island, and to make himself acquainted with the locality, and with the
ports and points for disembarking. None of the persons whom he examined
could or would give him any information, either on the extent of the
country, or on the number and manners of its inhabitants, or on their
manner of making war, or on the ports capable of receiving a large
fleet.
Desirous of obtaining some light on these different points before
attempting the expedition, Cæsar sent C. Volusenus, in a galley, with
orders to explore everything, and return as quickly as possible with the
result of his observations. He proceeded in person with his army into
the country of the Morini, from whence the passage into Britain was
shortest. There was on that coast a port favourably situated for fitting
out an expedition against this island, the _Portius Itius_, or, as we
shall endeavour to prove farther on, the port of Boulogne. The ships of
all the neighbouring regions, and the fleet constructed in the previous
year for the war against the Veneti, were collected there.
The news of his project having been carried into Britain by the
merchants, the deputies of several nations in the island came with
offers of submission. Cæsar received them with kindness; and on their
return he sent with them Commius, whom he had previously made king of
the Atrebates. This man, whose courage, prudence, and devotion he
appreciated, enjoyed great credit among the Britons. He directed him to
visit the greatest possible number of tribes, to keep them in good
feelings, and to announce his speedy arrival.
While Cæsar remained among the Morini, waiting the completion of the
preparations for his expedition, he received a deputation which came in
the name of a great part of the inhabitants to justify their past
conduct. He accepted their explanations readily, unwilling to leave
enemies behind him. Moreover, the season was too far advanced to allow
of combating the Morini, and their entire subjection was not a matter of
sufficient importance to divert him from his enterprise against Britain:
he was satisfied with exacting numerous hostages. Meanwhile Volusenus
returned, at the end of five days, to report the result of his mission:
as he had not ventured to land, he had only performed it imperfectly.
The forces destined for the expedition consisted of two legions, the 7th
and the 10th, commanded probably by Galba and Labienus, and of a
detachment of cavalry, which made about 12,000 legionaries and 450
horses.
Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta received the command of
the troops left on the continent to occupy the territory of the Menapii
and that of the country of the Morini which had not submitted. The
lieutenant P. Sulpicius Rufus was charged with the guard of the port
with a sufficient force.
They had succeeded in collecting eighty transport ships, judged capable
of containing the two legions of the expedition, with all their baggage,
and a certain number of galleys, which were distributed among the
quæstor, the lieutenants, and the prefects. Eighteen other vessels,
destined for the cavalry, were detained by contrary winds in a little
port (that of _Ambleteuse_) situated eight miles to the north of
Boulogne.[351] (_See Plate 16._)
Having made these dispositions, Cæsar, taking advantage of a favourable
wind, started in the night between the 24th and 25th of August (we shall
endeavour to justify this date farther on), towards midnight, after
giving orders to the cavalry to proceed to the port above
(_Ambleteuse_); he reached the coast of Britain at the fourth hour of
the day (ten o’clock in the forenoon), opposite the cliffs of Dover. The
cavalry, which had embarked but slowly, had not been able to join him.
From his ship Cæsar perceived the cliffs covered with armed men. At this
spot the sea was so close to these cliffs that a dart thrown from the
heights could reach the beach.[352] The place appeared to him in no
respect convenient for landing. This description agrees with that which
Q. Cicero gave to his brother, of “coasts surmounted by immense
rocks.”[353] (_See Plate 17._) Cæsar cast anchor, and waited in vain
until the fifth hour (half-past three) (see the Concordance of Hours,
_Appendix B_), for the arrival of the vessels which were delayed. In the
interval, he called together his lieutenants and the tribunes of the
soldiers, communicated to them his plans as well as the information
brought by Volusenus, and urged upon them the instantaneous execution of
his orders on a simple sign, as maritime war required, in which the
manœuvres must be as rapid as they are varied. It is probable that
Cæsar had till then kept secret the point of landing.
When he had dismissed them, towards half-past three o’clock, the wind
and tide having become favourable at the same time, he gave the signal
for raising their anchors, and, after proceeding about seven miles to
the east, as far as the extremity of the cliffs, and having, according
to Dio Cassius, doubled a lofty promontory,[354] the point of the South
Foreland (_see Plate 16_), he stopped before the open and level shore
which extends from the castle of Walmer to Deal.
From the heights of Dover it was easy for the Britons to trace the
movement of the fleet; guessing that it was making for the point where
the cliffs ended, they hastened thither, preceded by their cavalry and
their chariots, which they used constantly in their battles. They
arrived in time to oppose the landing, which had to be risked under the
most difficult circumstances. The ships, on account of their magnitude,
could only cast anchor in the deep water; the soldiers, on an unknown
coast, with their hands embarrassed, their bodies loaded with the weight
of their arms, were obliged to throw themselves into the waves, find a
footing, and combat. The enemy, on the contrary, with the free use of
their limbs, acquainted with the ground, and posted on the edge of the
water, or a little way in advance in the sea, threw their missiles with
confidence, and pushed forward their docile and well-disciplined horses
into the midst of the waves. Thus the Romans, disconcerted by this
concurrence of unforeseen circumstances, and strangers to this kind of
combat, did not carry to it their usual ardour and zeal.
In this situation, Cæsar detached from the line of transport ships the
galleys--lighter ships, and of a form which was new to the
barbarians--and directed them by force of rowing upon the enemy’s
uncovered flank (that is, on his right side), in order to drive him from
his position by means of slings, arrows, and darts thrown from the
machines. This manœuvre was of great assistance; for the Britons,
struck with the look of the galleys, the movement of the oars, and the
novel effect of the machines, halted and drew back a little. Still the
Romans hesitated, on account of the depth of the water, to leap out of
the ships, when the standard-bearer of the 10th legion, invoking the
gods with a loud voice, and exhorting his comrades to defend the eagle,
leaps into the sea and induces them to follow.[355] This example is
imitated by the legionaries embarked in the nearest ships, and the
combat begins. It was obstinate. The Romans being unable to keep their
ranks, or gain a solid footing, or rally round their ensigns, the
confusion was extreme; all those who leapt out of the ships to gain the
land singly, were surrounded by the barbarian cavalry, to whom the
shallows were known, and, when they were collected in mass, the enemy,
taking them on the uncovered flank, overwhelmed them with missiles. On
seeing this, Cæsar caused the galleys’ boats and the small vessels which
served to light the fleet to be filled with soldiers, and sent them
wherever the danger required. Soon the Romans, having succeeded in
establishing themselves on firm ground, formed their ranks, rushed upon
the enemy, and put him to flight; but a long pursuit was impossible for
want of cavalry, which, through contrary winds in the passage, had not
been able to reach Britain. In this alone fortune failed Cæsar.
In this combat, in which, no doubt, many acts of courage remained
unknown, a legionary, whose name, Cæsius Scæva, has been preserved by
Valerius Maximus, distinguished himself in a very remarkable manner.
Having thrown himself into a boat with four men, he had reached a
rock,[356] whence, with his comrades, he threw missiles against the
enemy; but the ebb rendered the space between the rock and the land
fordable. The barbarians then rushed to them in a crowd. His companions
took refuge in their boat; he, firm to his post, made an heroic defence,
and killed several of his enemies; at last, having his thigh
transpierced with an arrow, his face bruised by the blow of a stone, his
helmet broken to pieces, his buckler covered with holes, he trusted
himself to the mercy of the waves, and swam back towards his companions.
When he saw his general, instead of boasting of his conduct, he sought
his pardon for returning without his buckler. It was, in fact, a
disgrace among the ancients to lose that defensive arm; but Cæsar loaded
him with praise, and rewarded him with the grade of a centurion.
The landing having been effected, the Romans established their camp near
the sea, and, as everything leads us to believe, on the height of
Walmer. The galleys were hauled on the strand, and the transport ships
left at anchor not far from the shore.
The enemies, who had rallied after their defeat, decided on peace. They
joined with their deputies; sent, to solicit it, some of the Morini,
with whom they lived on friendly terms,[357] and Commius, the King of
the Atrebates, who had been previously sent on a mission to Britain. The
barbarians had seized his person the moment he landed, and loaded him
with fetters. After the combat, they set him at liberty, and came to ask
pardon for this offence, throwing the fault upon the multitude. Cæsar
reproached them with having received him as an enemy, after they had, of
their own motion, sent deputies to him on the continent to treat of
peace. Nevertheless, he pardoned them, but required hostages; part of
these were delivered to him immediately, and the rest promised within a
few days. Meanwhile they returned to their homes, and from all sides the
chiefs came to implore the protection of the conqueror.
Peace seemed to be established. The army had been four days in Britain,
and the eighteen ships which carried the cavalry, quitting the upper
port with a light breeze, approached the coast, and were already in view
of the camp, when suddenly a violent tempest arose which drove them out
of their course. Some were carried back to the point whence they had
started, whilst others were driven towards the south of the island,
where they cast anchor; but, beaten by the waves, they were obliged, in
the midst of a stormy night, to put to sea and regain the continent.
This night, between the 30th and 31st of August, coincided with full
moon; the Romans were ignorant of the fact that this was the period of
the highest tides on the ocean. The water soon submerged the galleys
which had been drawn upon the dry beach, and the transport ships which
had remained at anchor, yielding to the tempest, were broken on the
coast or disabled. The consternation became general; the Romans were in
want of everything at once, both of the means of transport, of materials
for repairing their ships, and even of provisions; for Cæsar, not
intending to winter in Britain, had carried thither no supplies.
At the moment of this disaster, the chiefs of the Britains had again
assembled to carry out the conditions imposed upon them; but, informed
of the critical position of the Romans, and judging the small number of
the invaders by the diminutive proportions of their camp, which was the
more contracted as the legions had embarked without baggage[358] they
determined on again resorting to arms. The opportunity seemed favourable
for intercepting provisions, and prolonging the struggle till winter, in
the firm conviction that, if they annihilated the Romans and cut them
off from all retreat, nobody would dare in future to carry the war into
Britain.
A new league is forming. The barbarian chiefs depart one after another
from the Roman camp, and secretly recall the men they had sent away.
Cæsar as yet was ignorant of their design; but their delay in delivering
the rest of the hostages, and the disaster which had befallen his fleet,
soon led him to anticipate what would happen. He therefore took his
measures to meet all eventualities. Every day the two legions repaired
in turn to the country to reap; the fleet was repaired with the timber
and copper of the ships which had suffered most, and the materials of
which they were in want were brought over from the continent. Thanks to
the extreme zeal of the soldiers, all the ships were set afloat again,
with the exception of twelve, which reduced the fleet to sixty-eight
vessels instead of eighty, its number when it left Gaul.
During the execution of these works, Britons came backwards and forwards
to the camp freely, and nothing predicted the approach of hostilities;
but one day, when the seventh legion, according to custom, had proceeded
to no great distance from the camp to cut wheat, the soldiers on guard
before the gates suddenly came to announce that a thick cloud of dust
arose in the direction taken by the legion. Cæsar, suspecting some
attack from the barbarians, assembles the cohorts on guard, orders two
others to replace them, and the rest of the troops to arm and follow him
without delay, and hurries forward in the direction indicated. What had
happened was this. The Britons, foreseeing that the Romans would repair
to the only spot which remained to reap (_pars una erat reliqua_), had
concealed themselves the previous night in the forests. After waiting
till the soldiers of the 7th legion had laid aside their arms and begun
to cut the grain, they had fallen upon them unexpectedly, and, while the
legionaries in disorder were forming, they had surrounded them with
their cavalry and chariots.
This strange manner of combating had thrown the soldiers of the 7th
legion into disorder. Closely surrounded, and resisting with difficulty
under a shower of missiles, they would perhaps have succumbed, when
Cæsar appeared at the head of his cohorts; his presence restored
confidence to his own men and checked the enemy. Nevertheless, he did
not judge it prudent to risk a battle, and, after remaining a certain
length of time in position, he withdrew his troops. The 7th legion had
experienced considerable loss.[359] Continual rains, during some days,
rendered all operations impossible; but eventually the barbarians,
believing that the moment had arrived to recover their liberty,
assembled from all parts, and marched against the camp.
Deprived of cavalry, Cæsar foresaw well that it would go the same with
this combat as with the preceding, and that the enemy, when repulsed,
would escape easily by flight; nevertheless, as he had at his disposal
thirty horses brought into Britain by Commius, he believed that he could
use them with advantage;[360] he drew up his legions in battle at the
head of the camp, and ordered them to march forward. The enemy did not
sustain the shock long, and dispersed; the legionaries pursued them as
quickly and as far as their arms permitted; they returned to the camp,
after having made a great slaughter, and ravaged everything within a
vast circuit.
The same day, the barbarians sent deputies to ask for peace. Cæsar
doubled the number of hostages he had required before, and ordered them
to be brought to him on the continent. In all Britain, two states only
obeyed this order.
As the equinox approached, he was unwilling to expose vessels ill
repaired to a navigation in winter. He took advantage of favourable
weather, set sail a little after midnight, and regained Gaul with all
his ships without the least loss. Two transport vessels only were unable
to enter the port of Boulogne with the fleet, and were carried a little
lower towards the south. They had on board about 300 soldiers, who, once
landed, marched to rejoin the army. In their way, the Morini, seduced by
the prospect of plunder, attacked them by surprise, and soon, increasing
to the number of 6,000, succeeded in surrounding them. The Romans formed
in a circle; in vain their assailants offered them their lives if they
would surrender. They defended themselves valiantly during more than
four hours, until the arrival of all the cavalry, which Cæsar sent to
their succour. Seized with terror, the Morini threw down their arms, and
were nearly all massacred.[361]
[Sidenote: Chastisement of the Morini and Menapii.]
VI. On the day after the return of the army to the continent, Labienus
received orders to reduce, with the two legions brought back from
Britain, the revolted Morini, whom the marshes, dried up by the summer
heats, no longer sheltered from attack, as they had done the year
before. On another side, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Cotta rejoined
Cæsar, after laying waste and burning the territory of the Menapii, who
had taken refuge in the depths of their forests. The army was
established in winter quarters among the Belgæ. The Senate, when it
received the news of these successes, decreed twenty days of
thanksgiving.[362]
[Sidenote: Order for Rebuilding the Fleet. Departure for Illyria.]
VII. Before he left for Italy, Cæsar ordered his lieutenants to repair
the old ships, and to construct during the winter a greater number, of
which he fixed the form and dimensions. That it might be easier to load
them and draw them on land, he recommended them to be made a little
lower than those which were in use in Italy; this disposition presented
no inconvenience, for he had remarked that the waves of the channel rose
to a less elevation than those of the Mediterranean, which he attributed
wrongly to the frequency of the motions of the tide and ebb. He desired
also to have greater breadth in the vessels on account of the baggage
and beasts of burden he had to transport, and ordered them to be
arranged so as to be able to employ oars, the use of which was
facilitated by the small elevation of the side-planks. According to Dio
Cassius, these ships held the mean between the light vessels of the
Romans and the transport ships of the Gauls.[363] He procured from Spain
all the rigging necessary for the equipment of these vessels.
Having given these instructions, Cæsar went into Italy to hold the
assembly of Citerior Gaul, and afterwards started for Illyria, on the
news that the Pirustes (_peoples of the Carnic Alps_) were laying the
frontier waste. Immediately on his arrival, by prompt and energetic
measures, he put a stop to these disorders, and re-established
tranquillity.[364]
[Sidenote: Points of Embarking and Landing. Date of the Arrival in
Britain.]
VIII. We have indicated, in the preceding pages, Boulogne as the port at
which Cæsar embarked, and Deal as the point where he landed in Britain.
Before explaining our reasons, it will not be useless to state that in
this first expedition, as well as in the second, the account of which
will follow, the places of embarking and landing were the same. In the
first place, the terms used in the “Commentaries” lead us to suppose it;
next, as we will endeavour to prove, he could only start from Boulogne;
and lastly, according to the relation of Dio Cassius, he landed on both
occasions at the same spot.[365] It is, then, convenient to treat here
the question for both expeditions, and to anticipate in regard to
certain facts.
Writers of great repute have placed the Portus Itius, some at Wissant,
others at Calais, Etaples, or Mardyke; but the Emperor Napoleon I, in
his _Précis des Guerres de César_, has not hesitated in preferring
Boulogne. It will be easy for us to prove in effect that the port of
Boulogne is the _Portus Itius_, which alone answers the necessities of
the text, and at the same time satisfies the requirements of a
considerable expedition.[366]
To proceed logically, let us suppose the absence of all kind of data.
The only means to approach the truth would then be to adopt, as the
place where Cæsar embarked, the port mentioned most anciently by
historians; for, in all probability, the point of the coast rendered
famous by the first expeditions to Britain would have been chosen in
preference for subsequent voyages. Now, as early as the reign of
Augustus, Agrippa caused a road to be constructed, which went from Lyons
to the ocean, across the country of the Bellovaci and the Ambiani,[367]
and was to end at Gesoriacum (_Boulogne_), since the Itinerary of
Antoninus traces it thus.[368] It was at Boulogne that Caligula caused a
pharos to be raised,[369] and that Claudius embarked for Britain.[370]
It was thence that Lupicinus, under the Emperor Julian,[371] and
Theodosius, under the Emperor Valentinian,[372] Constantius
Chlorus,[373] and lastly, in 893, the Danes,[374] set sail. This port,
then, was known and frequented a short time after Cæsar, and continued
to be used during the following centuries, while Wissant and Calais are
only mentioned by historians three or four centuries later. Lastly, at
Boulogne, Roman antiquities are found in abundance; none exist at Calais
or Wissant. Cæsar’s camp, of which certain authors speak as situated
near Wissant, is only a small modern redoubt, incapable of containing
more than 200 men.
To this first presumption in favour of Boulogne we may add another: the
ancient authors speak only of a single port on the coast of Gaul nearest
to Britain; therefore, they very probably give different names to the
same place, among which names figures that of _Gesoriacum_. Florus[375]
calls the place where Cæsar embarked the port of the Morini. Strabo[376]
says that this port was called _Itius_; Pomponius Mela, who lived less
than a century after Cæsar, cites _Gesoriacum_ as the port of the Morini
best known;[377] Pliny expresses himself in analogous terms.[378]
Let us now show that the port of Boulogne agrees with the conditions
specified in the “Commentaries.”
1. Cæsar, in his first expedition, repaired _to the country of the
Morini, whence the passage from Gaul to Britain is shortest_. Now,
Boulogne is actually situated on the territory of that people which,
occupying the western part of the department of the Pas-de-Calais, was
the nearest to England.
2. In his second expedition, Cæsar _embarked at the port Itius, which he
had found to offer the most convenient passage for proceeding to
Britain, distant from the continent about thirty Roman miles_. Now, even
at the present day, it is from Boulogne that the passage is easiest to
arrive in England, because the favourable winds are more frequent than
at Wissant and Calais. As to _the distance of about thirty miles_
(forty-four kilometres), Cæsar gives it evidently as representing the
distance from Britain to the _Portus Itius_: it is exactly the distance
from Boulogne to Dover, whereas Wissant and Calais are farther from
Dover, the one twenty, the other twenty-three Roman miles.
3. _To the north, at eight miles’ distance from the Portus Itius,
existed another port, where the cavalry embarked_. Boulogne is the only
port on this coast at eight miles from which, towards the north, we meet
with another, that of Ambleteuse. The distance of eight miles is exact,
not as a bird flies, but following the course of the hills. To the north
of Wissant, on the contrary, there is only Sangatte or Calais. Now
Sangatte is six Roman miles from Wissant, and Calais eleven.
4. _The eighteen ships of the upper port were prevented by contrary
winds from rallying the fleet at the principal port_. We understand
easily that these ships, detained at Ambleteuse by winds from the
south-west or west-south-west, which prevail frequently in the Channel,
were unable to rally the fleet at Boulogne. As to the two ships of
burthen, which, at the return of the first expedition, could not make
land in the same port as the fleet, but were dragged by the current more
to the south, nothing is said in the “Commentaries” which would show
that they entered a port; it is probable, indeed, that they were driven
upon the shore. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that they may have
landed in the little fishers’ ports of Hardelot and Camiers. (_See
Plate_ 15.)
We see from what precedes that the port of Boulogne agrees with the text
of the “Commentaries.” But the peremptory reason why, in our opinion,
the port where Cæsar embarked is certainly that of Boulogne, is, that it
would have been impossible to prepare elsewhere an expedition against
England, Boulogne being the only place which united the conditions
indispensable for collecting the fleet and embarking the troops. In
fact, it required a port capable of containing either eighty transport
ships and galleys, as in the first expedition, or 800 ships, as in the
second; and extensive enough to allow the ships to approach the banks
and embark the troops in a single tide. Now these conditions could only
be fulfilled where a river sufficiently deep, flowing into the sea,
formed a natural port; and, on the part of the coasts nearest to
England, we find only at Boulogne a river, the Liane, which presents all
these advantages. Moreover, it must not be forgotten, all the coast has
been buried in sand. It appears that it is not more than a century and
a half that the natural basin of Boulogne has been partly filled; and,
according to tradition and geological observations, the coast advanced
more than two kilomètres, forming two jetties, between which the high
tide filled the valley of the Liane to a distance of four kilomètres
inland.
None of the ports situated to the north of Boulogne could serve as the
basis of Cæsar’s expedition, for none could receive so great a number of
vessels, and we cannot suppose that Cæsar would have left them on the
open coast, during more than a month, exposed to the tempests of the
ocean, which were so fatal to him on the coasts of Britain.
Boulogne was the only point of the coast where Cæsar could place in
safety his depôts, his supplies, and his spare stores. The heights which
command the port offered advantageous positions for establishing his
camps,[379] and the little river Liane allowed him to bring with ease
the timber and provisions he required. At Calais he would have found
nothing but flats and marshes, at Wissant nothing but sands, as
indicated by etymology of the word (_white sand_).
It is worthy of remark, that the reasons which determined Cæsar to start
from Boulogne were the same which decided the choice of Napoleon I. in
1804. In spite of the difference in the times and in the armies, the
nautical and practical conditions had undergone no change. “The Emperor
chose Boulogne,” says M. Thiers, “because that port had long been
pointed out as the best point of departure of an expedition directed
against England; he chose Boulogne, because its port is formed by the
little river Liane, which allowed him, with some labour, to place in
safety from 1,200 to 1,300 vessels.”
We may point out, as another similarity, that certain flat boats,
constructed by order of the Emperor, had nearly the same dimensions as
those employed by Cæsar. “There required,” says the historian of the
‘Consulate and the Empire,’ “boats which would not need more, when they
were laden, than seven or eight feet of water to float, and which would
go with oars, so as to pass, either in calm or fog, and strand without
breaking on the flat English shores. The great gun-boats carried four
pieces of large bore, and were rigged like brigs, that is, with two
masts, manœuvred by twenty-four sailors, and capable of carrying a
company of a hundred men, with its staff, and its arms and munitions....
These boats offered a vexatious inconvenience, that of falling to the
leeward, that is, yielding to the currents. This was the result of their
clumsy build, which presented more hold to the water than their masts to
the wind.”[380]
Cæsar’s ships experienced the same inconvenience, and, drawn away by the
currents in his second expedition, they went to the leeward rather far
in the north.
We have seen that Cæsar’s transport boats were flat-bottomed, that they
could go either with sails or oars; carry if necessary 150 men, and be
loaded and drawn on dry ground with promptness (_ad celeritatem
onerandi subductionesque_). They had thus a great analogy with the
flat-bottomed boats of 1804. But there is more, for the Emperor Napoleon
had found it expedient to imitate the Roman galleys. “He had seen the
necessity,” says M. Thiers, “of constructing boats still lighter and
more movable than the preceding, drawing only two or three feet of
water, and calculated for landing anywhere. They were large boats,
narrow, sixty feet long, having a movable deck which could be laid or
withdrawn at will, and were distinguished from the others by the name of
pinnaces. These large boats were provided with sixty oars, carried at
need a light sail, and moved with extreme swiftness. When sixty
soldiers, practised in handling the oar as well as the sailors, set them
in motion, they glided over the sea like the light boats dropped from
the sides of our great vessels, and surprised the eye by the rapidity of
their course.”
The point of landing has been equally the subject of a host of contrary
suppositions. St. Leonards, near Hastings, Richborough (_Rutupiœ_),
near Sandwich, Lymne, near Hythe, and Deal, have all been proposed.
The first of these localities, we think, must be rejected, for it
answers none of the conditions of the relation given in the
“Commentaries,” which inform us that, in the second expedition, the
fleet sailed with a gentle wind from the south-west. Now, this is the
least favourable of all winds for taking the direction of Hastings, when
starting from the coasts of the department of the Pas-de-Calais. In this
same passage, Cæsar, after having been drawn away from his course during
four hours of the night, perceived, at daybreak, that he had left
Britain to his left. This fact cannot possibly be explained if he had
intended to land at St. Leonards. As to Richborough, this locality is
much too far to the north. Why should Cæsar have gone so far as
Sandwich, since he could have landed at Walmer and Deal? Lymne, or
rather Romney Marsh, will suit no better. This shore is altogether unfit
for a landing-place, and none of the details furnished by the
“Commentaries” can be made to suit it.[381]
There remains Deal; but before describing this place, we must examine
if, on his first passage, when Cæsar sailed, after remaining five days
opposite the cliffs of Dover, the current of which he took advantage
carried him towards the north or towards the south. (_See Page_ 177.)
Two celebrated English astronomers, Halley and Mr. Airy, have studied
this question; but they agree neither on the place where Cæsar embarked,
nor on that where he landed. We may, nevertheless, arrive at a solution
of this problem by seeking the day on which Cæsar landed. The year of
the expedition is known by the consulate of Pompey and Crassus--it was
the year 699. The month in which the departure took place is known by
the following data, derived from the “Commentaries;” the fine season was
near its end, _exuigua parte œstatis reliqua_ (IV. 20); the wheat had
been reaped everywhere, except in one single spot, _omni ex reliquis
partibus demesso frumento, una pars erat reliqua_ (IV. 32); the equinox
was near at hand, _propinqua die œquinoctii_ (IV. 36). These data
point sufficiently clearly to the month of August. Lastly, we have,
relative to the day of landing, the following indications:--After four
days past since his arrival in Britain.... there arose suddenly so
violent a tempest.... That same night it was full moon, which is the
period of the highest tides of the ocean, _Post diem quartam, quam est
in Britanniam ventum_([382]).... _tanta tempestas subita coorta est....
Eadem nocte accidit, ut esset luna plena, qui dies maritimos æstus
maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit_.
According to this, we consider that the tempest took place after four
days, counted from the day of landing; that the full moon fell on the
following night; and lastly, that this period coincided not with the
highest _tide_, but with the highest _tides_ of the ocean. Thus we
believe that it would be sufficient for ascertaining the exact day of
landing, to take the sixth day which preceded the full moon of the month
of August, 699; now this phenomenon, according to astronomical tables,
happened on the 31st, towards three o’clock in the morning. On the eve,
that is, on the 30th, the tempest had occurred; four full days had
passed since the landing; this takes us back to the 25th. Cæsar then
landed on the 25th of August. Mr. Airy, it is true, has interpreted the
text altogether differently from our explanation: he believes that the
expression _post diem quartum_ may be taken in Latin for the third day;
on another hand, he doubts if Cæsar had in his army almanacks by which
he could know the exact day of the full moon; lastly, as the highest
tide takes place a day and a half after the full moon, he affirms that
Cæsar, placing these two phenomena at the same moment, must have been
mistaken, either in the day of the full moon, or in that of the highest
tide; and he concludes from this that the landing may have taken place
on the second, third, or fourth day before the full moon.
Our reasoning has another basis. Let us first state that at that time
the science of astronomy permitted people to know certain epochs of the
moon, since, more than a hundred years before, during the war against
Perseus, a tribune of the army of Paulus Æmilius announced on the
previous day to his soldiers an eclipse of the moon, in order to
counteract the effect of their superstitious fears.[383] Let us remark
also, that Cæsar, who subsequently reformed the calendar, was well
informed in the astronomical knowledge of his time, already carried to a
very high point of advance by Hipparchus, and that he took especial
interest in it, since he discovered, by means of water-clocks, that the
nights were shorter in Britain than in Italy.
Everything, then, authorises us in the belief that Cæsar, when he
embarked for an unknown country, where he might have to make night
marches, must have taken precautions for knowing the course of the moon,
and furnished himself with calendars. But we have put the question
independently of these considerations, by seeking among the days which
preceded the full moon of the end of August, 699, which was the one in
which the shifting of the currents of which Cæsar speaks could have been
produced at the hour indicated in the “Commentaries.”
Supposing, then, the fleet of Cæsar at anchor at a distance of half a
mile opposite Dover, as it experienced the effect of the shifting of the
currents towards half-past three o’clock in the afternoon, the question
becomes reduced to that of determining the day of the end of the month
of August when this phenomenon took place at the above hour. We know
that in the Channel the sea produces, in rising and falling, two
alternate currents, one directed from the west to the east, called
_flux_ (_flot_), or current of the rising tide; the other directed from
the east to the west, named _reflux_ (_jusant_), or current of the
falling tide. In the sea opposite Dover, at a distance of half a mile
from the coast, the flux begins usually to be sensible two hours before
high tide at Dover, and the reflux four hours after.
So that, if we find a day before the full moon of the 31st of August,
699, on which it was high tide at Dover, either at half-past five in the
afternoon or at midday, that will be the day of landing; and further, we
shall know whether the current carried Cæsar towards the east or towards
the west. Now, we may admit, according to astronomical data, that the
tides of the days which preceded the full moon of the 31st of August,
699, were sensibly the same as those of the days which preceded the full
moon of the 4th of September, 1857; and, as it was the sixth day before
the full moon of the 4th of September, 1857, that it was high tide at
Dover towards half-past five in the afternoon (_see the Annuaire des
Marées des Côtes de France for the year_ 1857),[384] we are led to
conclude that the same phenomenon was produced also at Dover on the
sixth day before the 31st of August, 699; and that it was on the 25th of
August that Cæsar arrived in Britain, his fleet being carried forward by
the current of the rising tide.
This last conclusion, by obliging us to seek the point of landing to the
north of Dover, constitutes the strongest theoretic presumption in
favour of Deal. Let us now examine if Deal satisfies the requirements of
the Latin text.
The cliffs which border the coasts of England towards the southern part
of the county of Kent form, from Folkestone to the castle of Walmer, a
vast quarter of a circle, convex towards the sea, abrupt on nearly all
points; they present several bays or creeks, as at Folkestone, at Dover,
at St. Margaret’s, and at Oldstairs, and, diminishing by degrees in
elevation, terminate at the castle of Walmer. From this point,
proceeding towards the north, the coast is flat, and favourable for
landing on an extent of several leagues.
The country situated to the west of Walmer and Deal is itself flat as
far as the view can reach, or presents only gentle undulations of
ground. We may add that it produces, in great quantities, wheat of
excellent quality, and that the nature of the soil leads us to believe
that it was the same at a remote period. These different conditions
rendered the shore of Walmer and Deal the best place of landing for the
Roman army.
Its situation, moreover, agrees fully with the narrative of the
“Commentaries.” In the first expedition, the Roman fleet, starting from
the cliffs of Dover and doubling the point of the South Foreland, may
have made the passage of seven miles in an hour; it would thus have
come to anchor opposite the present village of Walmer. The Britons,
starting from Dover, might have made a march of eight kilomètres quickly
enough to oppose the landing of the Romans. (_See Plate_ 16.)
The combat which followed was certainly fought on the part of the shore
which extends from Walmer Castle to Deal. At present the whole extent of
this coast is covered with buildings, so that it is impossible to say
what was its exact form nineteen centuries ago; but, from a view of the
locality, we can understand without difficulty the different
circumstances of the combat described in Book IV. of the “Commentaries.”
Four days completed after the arrival of Cæsar in Britain, a tempest
dispersed the eighteen ships which, after quitting Ambleteuse, had
arrived just within sight of the Roman camp. All the sailors of the
Channel who have been consulted believe it possible that the same
hurricane, according to the text, might have driven one part of the
ships towards the South Foreland and the other part towards the coast of
Boulogne and Ambleteuse. The conformation of the ground itself indicates
the site of the Roman camp on the height where the village of Walmer
rises. It was situated there at a distance of 1,000 or 1,200 mètres from
the beach, in a position which commanded the surrounding country. And it
is thus easy to understand, from the aspect of the locality, the details
relative to the episode of the 7th legion, surprised while it was
mowing.[385] It might be objected that at Deal the Roman camp was not
near to a water-course, but they could dig wells, which is the only
method by which the numerous population of Deal at the present day
obtain water.
From all that has just been said, the following facts appear to us to be
established in regard to the first expedition. Cæsar, after causing all
his flotilla to go out of the port the day before, started in the night
between the 24th and 25th of August, towards midnight, from the coast of
Boulogne, and arrived opposite Dover towards six o’clock in the morning.
He remained at anchor until half-past three in the afternoon, and then,
having wind and tide in his favour, he moved a distance of seven miles
and arrived near Deal, probably between Deal and Walmer Castle, at
half-past four. As in the month of August twilight lasts till after
half-past seven, and its effect may be prolonged by the moon, which at
that hour was in the middle of the heaven, Cæsar had still four hours
left for landing, driving back the Britons, and establishing himself on
the British soil. As the sea began to ebb towards half-past five, this
explains the anecdote of Cæsius Scæva told by Valerius Maximus; for,
towards seven o’clock, the rocks called the _Malms_ might be left
uncovered by the ebb of the tide.
After four entire days, reckoned from the moment of landing, that is, on
the 30th of August, the tempest arose, and full moon occurred in the
following night.
This first expedition, which Cæsar had undertaken too late in the
season, and with too few troops, could not lead to great results. He
himself declares that he only sought to make an appearance in Britain.
In fact, he did not remove from the coast, and he left the island
towards the 17th of September, having remained there only twenty-three
days.[386]
[Sidenote: _Résumé_ of the Dates of the Campaign of 699.]
IX. We recapitulate as follows the probable dates of the campaign of
699:--
Cæsar crosses the mountains
_earlier than usual_. April 10.
His arrival at the army between the
Loire and the Seine. April 22.
Abode with the army, and informations.
From April 22 to May 10.
March to between the Meuse and the
Rhine From May 11 to May 28.
Victory over the Usipetes and Tencteri June 4.
Arrival at Bonn for the passage of the
Rhine June 11.
Construction of the bridge of piles (10
days) From June 12 to June 21.
The campaign beyond the Rhine (18
days) From June 22 to July 9.
March from Bonn to Boulogne,
From July 11 to July 28.
Preparations for the expedition to Britain
From July 28 to August 24.
Departure. Night between Aug. 24 and Aug. 25.
Landing. August 25.
The tempest. August 30.
Duration of the abode in Britain (18
days). From August 25 to Sept. 12.
Return to Gaul. Sept. 12.
Autumnal equinox. Sept. 26.
CHAPTER VIII
(Year of Rome 700.)
(BOOK V. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI--SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN.
[Sidenote: Inspection of the Fleet. March against the Treviri.]
I. Cæsar, after having appeased the troubles of Illyria, and passed some
time in Italy, rejoined the army in the country of the Belgæ, at the
beginning of June in the year 700. Immediately on his arrival, he
visited all his quarters, and the naval arsenal established, according
to Strabo, at the mouth of the Seine.[387] He found his fleet ready for
sea. In spite of the scarcity of necessary materials, the soldiers had
laboured in building it with the greatest zeal. He rewarded them with
commendations, complimented those who had directed the works, and
appointed for the general rendezvous the Portus Itius (_Boulogne_).
The concentration of the fleet required a considerable length of time,
of which Cæsar took advantage to prevent the effects of the agitation
which had shown itself among the Treviri. These populations, rebelling
against his orders, and suspected of having called the Germans from
beyond the Rhine, did not send their representatives to the assemblies.
Cæsar marched against them with four legions, without baggage, and 800
cavalry, and left troops in sufficient number to protect the fleet.
The Treviri possessed, in addition to a considerable infantry, a more
numerous cavalry than any other people in Gaul. They were divided into
two factions, whose chiefs, Indutiomarus and his son-in-law Cingetorix,
disputed the chief power. The latter was no sooner informed of the
approach of the legions, than he repaired to Cæsar, and assured him that
he would not fail in his duties towards the Roman people. Indutiomarus,
on the contrary, raised troops, and caused to be placed in safety, in
the immense forest of the Ardennes, which extended across the country of
the Treviri from the Rhine to the territory of the Remi, all those whose
age rendered them incapable of carrying arms. But when he saw several
chiefs (_principes_), drawn by their alliance with Cingetorix or
intimidated by the approach of the Romans, treat with Cæsar, fearing to
be abandoned by all, he made his submission. Although Cæsar put no faith
in his sincerity, yet, as he did not want to pass the fine season among
the Treviri, and as he was desirous of hastening to Boulogne, where all
was ready for the expedition into Britain, he was satisfied with
exacting 200 hostages, among whom were the son and all the kindred of
Indutiomarus, and, after having assembled the principal chiefs, he
conferred the authority on Cingetorix. This preference accorded to a
rival turned Indutiomarus into an irreconcileable enemy.[388]
[Sidenote: Departure for the Isle of Britain.]
II. Hoping that he had pacified the country by these measures, Cæsar
proceeded with his four legions to the Portus Itius. His fleet,
perfectly equipped, was ready to sail. Including the vessels of the
preceding years, it was composed of six hundred transport ships and
twenty-eight galleys. It wanted only forty ships built in the country of
the Meldæ,[389] which a tempest had driven back to their point of
departure; adding to it a certain number of light barques which many
chiefs had caused to be built for their own personal usage, the total
amounted to 800 sail.[390] The Roman army concentrated at Boulogne
consisted of eight legions and 4,000 cavalry raised in the whole of Gaul
and in Spain;[391] but the expeditionary body was composed only of five
legions and 2,000 cavalry. Labienus received orders to remain on the
coast of the Channel with three legions, and one-half of the cavalry, to
guard the ports, provide for the supply of the troops, keep watch upon
Gaul, and act according to circumstances. Cæsar had convoked the
principal citizens, of each people (_principes ex omnibus civitatibus_),
and left upon the continent but the small number of those of whose
fidelity he was assured, taking with him the others as pledges of
tranquillity during his absence. Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan
cavalry in the expedition, was of all the chiefs the one it was most
important to carry with him. Restless, ambitious, and distinguished by
his courage and credit, this man had tried every means in vain to obtain
permission to remain in his country. Irritated by the refusal, he became
a conspirator, and said openly that Cæsar only dragged the nobles into
Britain to sacrifice them. These plots were known and watched with care.
It was the end of June. The wind from the north-west, which on this
coast blows habitually at this period of the year, retarded the
departure of the fleet twenty-five days; at length a favourable wind
rose, and the army received orders to embark. In the middle of the
bustle and confusion of starting, Dumnorix left the camp secretly with
the Æduan cavalry, and took the road for his own country. When this was
known, the embarkment was suspended, and a great part of the cavalry
went in pursuit of the fugitive, with orders to bring him back dead or
alive. Dumnorix, soon overtaken, resists, and is surrounded and slain.
The Æduan cavalry all returned to the camp.
On the 20th of July, we believe, the fleet raised anchor at sunset, with
a light breeze from the south-west. This wind having ceased towards
midnight, the fleet was carried rather far out of its route by the
current of the rising tide. At daybreak, Cæsar perceived that he had
left Britain to his left. (_See Plate_ 16.) But then came on the
shifting of the current, of which he took advantage, and, aided by the
reflux (_jusant_), laboured with all oars to gain the part of the isle
found, in the preceding year, to offer an easy landing. Under these
circumstances, the soldiers, with a persevering energy, succeeded, by
means of their oars, in giving to the transport ships, in spite of their
heaviness, the speed of galleys. The army landed, towards noon, on
several points at once,[392] without any appearance of the enemy.
Prisoners reported subsequently that the barbarians, terrified at the
view of so great a number of ships, had withdrawn to the heights.[393]
[Sidenote: March into the interior of the Country.]
III. Having effected the landing, Cæsar established his camp in a good
position, near the sea.[394] The fleet, left at anchor near the shore,
on a level beach without shoals, under the command of Atrius, inspired
him with no uneasiness.[395] As soon as he knew where the enemy was
posted, he began his march at the third watch (midnight), leaving ten
cohorts[396] and 300 cavalry to guard the fleet. After having proceeded
during the night about twelve miles, the Romans at daybreak came in
sight of the barbarians, posted on the heights of Kingston, beyond a
stream of water now called the Little Stour.[397] These caused their
cavalry and chariots to advance as far as the bank of the stream,
seeking, from their commanding position, to dispute the passage; but,
repulsed by the cavalry, they withdrew into a forest where there was a
place singularly fortified by nature and art, a refuge constructed in
former times in their intestine wars.[398] Numerous _abatis_ of felled
trees closed all the avenues. The Romans pushed the enemy up to the
border of the wood, and made an attempt to carry the position. The
Britons issued forth in small groups to defend the approaches of their
_oppidum_; but the soldiers of the 7th legion, having formed the
tortoise and pushed a terrace up to the inclosure, obtained possession
of the retrenchment, and drove them out of the wood without sensible
loss. Cæsar prevented the pursuit; he was unacquainted with the country,
and wished to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp.[399]
[Sidenote: Destruction of a part of the Fleet.]
IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies,
and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had
advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the
fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q.
Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent
tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither
anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of
pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels
against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called
in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the
enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He
verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty
ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long
labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others
from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the
greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his
fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it
must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them
in the camp by a new retrenchment.[400] The soldiers employed ten entire
days in this work, without interruption, even during the night.[401]
[Sidenote: Cæsar resumes the offensive.]
V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial
defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and
returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the
pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The
general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose
states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river
which was about eighty miles distant from the coast.[402] This chief had
heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of
the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord,
agreed in giving him the command.
The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the
cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into
the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were
labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly
issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle
becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of
two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight
interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their
chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of
fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the
interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival
of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in
this action.
The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been
differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at
first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their
chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a
free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus
have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to
protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.
This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of
the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind
of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in
line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far
from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the
cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the
legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot
in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they
were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence.[403]
The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the
heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated,
harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the
middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry,
under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed
from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they
approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The
infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the
cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive
them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came
themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally
nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great
carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no
more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing
the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length.[404]
[Sidenote: March towards the Thames.]
VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to
terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their
strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus,
passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (_See Plate 16._)
Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one
place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up
on the opposite bank.[405] It was defended by a palisade of sharp
pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the
river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by
prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a
certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy’s position
and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and
crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and,
although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their
ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the
bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of
an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the “Commentaries” do not
mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe.[406]
[Sidenote: Submission of a part of Britain.]
VII. This check deprived Cassivellaunus of all hope of resistance; he
sent away the greatest part of his troops, and only kept with him about
4,000 men, mounted in chariots. (Supposing six _essedarii_ to the
chariot, this would still amount to the considerable number of 660
carriages.) Sometimes confining himself to watching the march of the
army, at others hiding in places of difficult access, or making a void
before the march of the Roman columns; often, also, profiting by his
knowledge of the localities, he fell unexpectedly with his chariots on
the cavalry when it ventured far plundering and sacking, which obliged
the latter to keep near the legions. Thus the damage inflicted on the
enemy could not extend beyond the march of the infantry.
Meanwhile the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful peoples of Britain,
sent deputies to offer their submission and demand Mandubratius for
their king. This young man, flying from the anger of Cassivellaunus, who
had put his father to death, had come to the continent to implore the
protection of Cæsar, and had accompanied him into Britain. The Roman
general listened favourably to the demand of the Trinobantes, and
exacted from them forty hostages and wheat for the army.
The protection obtained by the Trinobantes engaged the Cenimagni, the
Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi (_see p. 168_), to
follow their example. The deputies of these different peoples informed
Cæsar that the _oppidum_ of Cassivellaunus (_St. Albans_) stood at a
short distance, defended by marshes and woods, and containing a great
number of men and cattle.[407] Although this formidable position had
been further fortified by the hands of men, Cæsar led his legions
thither, and attacked it on two points without hesitation. After a
feeble resistance, the barbarians, in their attempt to escape, were
slain or captured in great numbers.
Nevertheless, Cæsar was operating too far from his point of departure
not to tempt Cassivellaunus to deprive him of the possibility of
returning to the continent, by seizing upon his fleet. In effect,
Cassivellaunus had ordered the four kings of the different parts of
Cantium (_Kent_), Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segovax, to
collect all their troops, and attack unexpectedly the camp in which the
Roman ships were inclosed. They hastened thither; but the cohorts did
not leave them time to attack; they made a sortie, killed a great number
of barbarians, captured one of their principal chiefs, Lugotorix, and
re-entered their camp without loss. On the news of this defeat,
Cassivellaunus, discouraged by so many reverses and the defection of
several peoples, employed Commius to offer his submission.[408]
[Sidenote: Re-embarkment of the Army.]
VIII. Summer approached its end (they were in the last days of August).
Cæsar, aware that there no longer remained sufficient time to be
employed with advantage, prepared for his departure; he wished,
moreover, to pass the winter on the continent, fearing sudden revolts on
the part of the Gauls. He therefore caused hostages to be delivered to
him, fixed the tribute to be paid annually by Britain to the Roman
people, and expressly prohibited Cassivellaunus from all acts of
hostility against Mandubratius and the Trinobantes.
After receiving the hostages, Cæsar hastened to return in person to the
coast, and ordered his army to follow him afterwards; he found the ships
repaired, and caused them to be put afloat. His great number of
prisoners, and the loss of several of his ships, obliged him to pass the
army across the channel in two convoys. It is remarkable that, of so
many ships employed several times in the passage this year or the year
before, not one of those which carried the troops was lost; but, on the
contrary, the greater part of the ships which returned empty, after
having landed the soldiers of the first transport, and those built by
Labienus, to the number of sixty, did not reach their destination; they
were nearly all thrown back upon the coast of the continent. Cæsar, who
had resolved to leave Britain only with the last convoy, waited for them
some time in vain. The approach of the equinox led him to fear that the
period favourable for navigation would pass by, and he decided on
overloading his ships with soldiers, sailed in a moment of calm at the
beginning of the second watch (nine o’clock), and, after a favourable
passage, landed at daybreak.[409]
This second expedition, though more successful than the first, did not
bring as its result the complete submission of the isle of Britain.
According to Cæsar, the Romans did not even obtain any booty; yet Strabo
speaks of a considerable booty,[410] and another author confirms this
fact by relating that Cæsar formed out of the spoils of the enemy a
cuirass ornamented with pearls, which he consecrated to Venus.[411]
[Sidenote: Observations.]
IX. Several indications enable us again to fix precisely the period of
the second expedition to Britain. We know, from a letter from Quintus to
his brother Cicero, that Cæsar was at the end of May at Lodi (we admit
the 22nd of May).[412] He might therefore have arrived towards the 2nd
of June on the shores of the ocean, where he inspected his fleet. During
the interval before it assembled at the Portus Itius, he proceeded to
the country of the Treviri, where he did not remain long; for, towards
the middle of the summer (_ne æstatem in Treviris consumere cogeretur_),
he started for Boulogne, where he arrived at the end of June. The winds
from the north-west retained him there twenty-five days, that is, till
towards the end of July. On another hand, Cicero wrote to Atticus on the
26th of July: “I see, from my brother’s letters, that he must already be
in Britain.”[413] In reply to another letter of Quintus, dated on the
4th of the Ides of August (the 8th of August), he rejoices at having
received on the day of the Ides of September (9th of September), the
news of his arrival in that island.[414] These data fix the departure of
the expedition to the end of July, for the letters took from twenty to
thirty days to pass from Britain to Rome.[415] When the army moved from
the coasts, the news was naturally much longer on the way; and in the
month of October, Cicero wrote to his brother, “Here are fifty days
passed without the arrival of letter or sign of life from you, or Cæsar,
or even from where you are.”[416] Having ascertained the month of July
for that of his departure, we have next to find the day on which that
departure took place.
Cæsar sailed at sunset, that is, towards eight o’clock (_solis occasu
naves solvit, leni Africo provectus_). The wind having ceased at
midnight, he was drawn by the currents towards the north; and when day
broke, at four o’clock in the morning, he saw on his left the cliffs of
the South Foreland; but then, the current changing with the tide, by
force of rowing he made land towards midday, as in the preceding summer,
near Deal.
To determine the day on which Cæsar landed, it is necessary, in the
first place, to know to what part the Roman fleet was carried during the
night. It is evident, first, that it was borne towards the north-east by
the current of the rising tide or flux, for otherwise we could not
understand how Cæsar, at sunrise, could have perceived Britain on his
left. We may add that it wandered from its way till it came to the
latitude of the Northern Sea, which is situated to the east of Deal, and
at about ten maritime miles from the coast. (_See Plate 14._) In fact,
according to the text, the fleet took advantage of the current contrary
to that which had carried it away, and consequently of the reflux or
current of the ebbing tide, to reach the coast. Now, we are obliged by
this fact to conclude that it had been carried northward at least to the
latitude of Deal; for, if it had only arrived to the south of that
latitude, the reflux would necessarily have thrown it back into the
Straits. Lastly, to cause the fleet by force of rowing and aided by the
reflux to require eight hours to effect the last part of its passage to
Deal, it must, according to the best information obtained from sailors,
have been, at sunrise, ten miles from the coast.
This being granted, it is evidently sufficient, for determining the day
of landing, to resolve this question: on what day of the month of July
in the year 700 the current of the descending tide began to be perceived
_at sunrise, that is, towards four o’clock in the morning_, in the part
of the sea at ten miles to the east of Deal? or otherwise, if we
consider that the reflux begins there about four hours and a half after
the hour of high tide at Dover,[417] what day of the month of July in
the year 700 it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven o’clock
at night?
By following a train of reasoning similar to that which we applied to
determine the day of Cæsar’s first landing in Britain, and remarking
that the tides of the days preceding the full moon of the month of July,
700, which fell on the 21st, correspond to those of the days which
preceded the full moon of the 26th of July, 1858, we find that it was
either fifteen days or one day before the 21st of July of the year 700,
that is, the 6th or the 20th of July, that it was high tide at Dover
towards half-past eleven at night. Cæsar, therefore, landed on the 7th
or on the 21st of July. We adopt the second date, because, according to
Cicero’s letter cited above, he received, before the 26th of July, at
Rome news of his brother, which must have been of the 6th of the same
month, as the couriers were twenty days on the road. In this letter
Quintus announced his approaching departure for Britain.
This date, according to which the Roman army would have landed on the
eve of the day of the full moon, is the more probable, as Cæsar,
immediately on his arrival in Britain, made a night march, which would
have been impossible in complete darkness. The passage of the sea had
taken fifteen hours. In the return, it only took nine hours, since
Cæsar started at nine o’clock in the evening (_secunda inita cum
solvisset vigilia_), and arrived at Boulogne at daybreak (_prima luce_),
which, in the middle of September, is at six o’clock in the
morning.[418]
The date of his return is nearly fixed by a letter of Cicero, who
expresses himself thus: “On the 11th of the Calends of November (17th of
October), I received letters from my brother Quintus, and from Cæsar;
the expedition was finished, and the hostages delivered. They had made
no booty. They had only imposed contributions. The letters, written from
the shores of Britain, are dated on the 6th of the Calends of October
(21st of September), at the moment of embarking the army, which they are
bringing back.”[419] This information accords with the date of the
equinox, which fell on the 26th of September, and which, according to
the “Commentaries,” was close at hand (_quod equinoctium suberat_).
Cæsar had, then, remained in Britain about sixty days.
[Sidenote: Presumed Dates of the Second Campaign in Britain.]
X. Departure of Cæsar from Lodi[420] May 22.
Arrival at the army, in the
country of the Belgæ (in
12 days) June 2.
Inspection of the fleet and of the winter
quarters; junction of the four legions
in the country of the Remi, on the
Meuse, towards Sedan. From June 2 to June 7.
Passage from Sedan to the country of
the Treviri (80 kilometres, 3 days),
From June 8 to June 10.
Occurrences among the Treviri,
From June 10 to June 15.
Passage from Treviri to Boulogne (330
kil., 12 days) From June 15 to June 26.
Delay of 25 days at Boulogne,
From June 26 to July 20.
Embarkment July 20.
Landing July 21.
Combat July 22.
Cæsar returns to his fleet July 23.
Ten days of reparations, From July 24 to August 2.
New march against the Britons August 3.
Combat August 4.
March towards the Thames (from the
Little Stour to Sunbury, 140 kilomètres)
From August 5 to August 11.
March from the Thames to the _oppidum_
of Cassivellaunus, From August 12 to August 15.
Time employed in negotiations and receiving
hostages (8 days),
From August 16 to August 23.
Return of Cæsar (in person) towards
the sea-coast. The 28th of August,
on his arrival at the fleet, he writes
to Cicero.--(_Epist. ad Quintum_, III.
1.) August 28.
March of his army to the coast,
From August 24 to Sept. 10.
Embarkation of the last convoy Sept. 21.
[Sidenote: Distribution of the Legions in their Winter Quarters.]
XI. Cæsar had no sooner arrived on the continent than he caused his
ships to be brought on ground, and then held at Samarobriva, (_Amiens_)
the assembly of Gaul. The defective harvest, caused by the dryness of
the season, obliged him to distribute his winter quarters differently
from the preceding years, by spreading them over a greater extent.[421]
The number of his legions was eight and a half, because, independent of
the eight legions brought together at Boulogne before the departure for
Britain, he had no doubt formed five cohorts of soldiers and sailors
employed on his fleet. The troops were distributed in the following
manner: he sent one legion into the country of the Morini (_to Saint
Pol_), under the orders of C. Fabius; another to the Nervii (_at
Charleroy_), with Quintus Cicero;[422] a third to the Essuvii (_at Sées,
in Normandy_), under the command of L. Roscius; a fourth, under T.
Labienus, to the country of the Remi, near the frontier of the Treviri
(_at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe_).[423] He placed three in Belgium,[424]
one at Samarobriva itself (_Amiens_), under the orders of Trebonius; the
second in the country of the Bellovaci, under M. Crassus, his questor,
at twenty-five miles from Amiens (_Montdidier_); the third under L.
Munatius Plancus, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne (_at
Champlieu_). The legion last raised[425] among the Transpadans repaired
with five cohorts, under the orders of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius
Cotta, to the Eburones, whose country, situated in great part between
the Meuse and the Rhine, was governed by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. It
occupied a fortress named Aduatuca (_Tongres_).[426] This distribution
of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with
provisions. Moreover, these different winter quarters, with the
exception of that of M. Roscius, who occupied the most peaceable part of
Gaul, were all included within a circle of a hundred miles radius (148
kil.). It was Cæsar’s intention not to leave them until he knew that the
legions were firmly established and their quarters fortified. (_See
Plate 14_, the sites of the winter quarters.)
There was among the Carnutes (_country of Chartres_) a man of high
birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In
consideration of his valour and of his important military services,
Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his
forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had
participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for
fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent
it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his
legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the
Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of
Tasgetius.[427]
[Sidenote: Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuca.]
XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the
lieutenants and the questor, the news that the legions had arrived and
retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them
about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation
of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the
limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even
furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran
Indutiomaras, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers
occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with
considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the
_vallum_. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies
retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm.
Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their
custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate
on their common interests, C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend
of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several
missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had
not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that
he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a
common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his
statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so
as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans
had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus had no
other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero
or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix
promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported
to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the
more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so
small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman
power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it
became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the
tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they
should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was
strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not
pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under
circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their
counsel from the enemy.
Sabinus replied with force that it would be too late to decide when the
number of the assailants would be increased by the arrival of the
Germans, and when the neighbouring quarters would have experienced some
disaster. “The movement requires a prompt decision. Cæsar has, no doubt,
started for Italy: otherwise, would the Carnutes have dared to slay
Tasgetius, and the Eburones to attack the camp with so much boldness? We
must consider the counsel itself, and not him who gives it: the Rhine is
at a short distance; the Germans are irritated by the death of
Ariovistus, and by their preceding defeats; Gaul is in flames; she
supports with impatience the Roman yoke, and the loss of her ancient
military glory. Would Ambiorix have engaged without powerful motives in
such an enterprise? It is safest, therefore, to follow his counsel, and
to gain as quickly as possible the nearest quarters.”
Cotta and the centurions of the first class earnestly maintained the
contrary opinion. “Let it then be as you will!” said Sabinus; and then,
raising his voice to be heard by the soldiers, he shouted: “Death does
not terrify me; but behold, Cotta, those who will require of thee a
reckoning for the misfortunes which thou art preparing for them. After
to-morrow, if you would agree to it, they could have rejoined the
nearest legion, and, united with it, incur together the chances of war;
they will know that thou hast preferred leaving them, far from their
companions, exposed to perish by the sword or by famine.”
When the council was ended, the lieutenants are surrounded and implored
not to compromise the safety of the army by their misunderstanding; let
them go or remain, provided they are agreed, everything will be easy.
The debate is prolonged into the middle of the night; at last, Cotta,
moved, yields to the opinion of Sabinus, and agrees to repair to Cicero,
encamped in the country of the Nervii; the departure is fixed for
daybreak. The rest of the night is passed in the midst of preparations;
the soldier chooses what articles of his winter equipment he will carry
with him. And, as if the danger were not sufficiently great, he seems as
if he wished to increase it by fatigue and watching. At daybreak, the
troops, in full security, begin their march in a long column,
encumbered with a numerous baggage.
At the distance of three kilomètres (_a millibus passuum circiter
duobus_) from the town of Tongres is the vale of Lowaige, closed in
between two hills, and forming a great defile of about 2,500 mètres in
length (_magnam convallem_). It is traversed by a stream, the Geer. The
hills, now denuded, were, only a century ago, covered with wood;[428] it
was there that the Eburones lay in wait for the Roman army.
Informed of the intended retreat by the noise and tumult, they had
divided themselves into two bodies, on the right and left of the vale,
and placed themselves in ambush in the middle of the woods. When they
saw the greater part of the Roman troops engaged in the defile, they
attacked them in rear and in front, profiting by all the advantages of
the locality.
Then Sabinus, like a man who had shown no foresight, becomes troubled,
hurries hither and thither, hesitates in all his measures--as happens to
him who, taken by surprise, is obliged to act decisively in the middle
of danger. Cotta, on the contrary, who had calculated the fatal chances
of the departure which he had opposed, neglects nothing for the general
safety. He encourages the troops, combats in the ranks--a general and a
soldier at the same time. As the length of the column prevented the
lieutenants from seeing all and ordering all themselves, they caused the
soldiers to pass on from mouth to mouth the order to abandon the baggage
and form the circle. This resolution, though justified by the
circumstances, had, nevertheless, a disastrous effect; it diminished the
confidence of the Romans, and increased the ardour of the Eburones, who
ascribed so desperate a resolution to fear and discouragement. There
resulted from it, too, an inevitable inconvenience: the soldiers quitted
their ensigns in crowds to run to the baggage, and take their more
valuable effects; and on all parts there was nothing but shouts and
confusion.
The barbarians acted with intelligence. Their chiefs, fearing that they
would disperse to pillage the baggage of the Romans, sent orders on all
points that every one must keep his rank, declaring that the thing
important was first to assure themselves of the victory, and that
afterwards the booty would fall into their hands.
The Eburones were rough adversaries; but by their number and their
courage, the Romans might have maintained the struggle. Although
abandoned by their chief and by fortune, they relied upon themselves for
everything, and every time that a cohort fell upon the enemies, it made
a great carnage of them. Ambiorix perceived this: he shouted loudly his
commands that his men should throw their missiles from a distance, and
not approach near; that they should retire whenever the Romans rushed
forward, and only attack them in their retreat, when they returned to
their ensigns--a manœuvre easy to the Eburones, practised in such
exercises, and nimble on account of the lightness of their equipment.
The order was faithfully executed. When a cohort quitted the circle to
charge the enemies, they fled with speed; but the cohort, in its
advance, left its right flank (not protected, like the left flank, by
the bucklers) exposed to the missiles; when it resumed its former
position, it was surrounded on all sides both by those who had
retreated, and by those who had remained on its flanks.
If, instead of sending forward their cohorts in succession, the Romans
stood firm in their circle, they lost the advantage of attacking, and
their close ranks made them more exposed to the multitude of missiles.
Meanwhile, the number of the wounded increased every moment. It was two
o’clock; the combat had lasted from sunrise, and yet the Roman soldiers
had not ceased to show themselves worthy of themselves. At this moment
the struggle becomes more desperate. T. Balventius, a brave and
respected man, who, in the previous year, had commanded as primipilus,
has his two thighs transpierced by a javelin; Q. Lucanius, an officer of
the same grade, is killed fighting valiantly to rescue his son, who is
surrounded by enemies. Cotta himself, while he runs from rank to rank to
encourage the soldiers, is wounded in the face by a missile from a
sling.
At this sight, Sabinus, discouraged, sees no other help but to treat
with Ambiorix. Perceiving him at a distance in the act of urging on his
troops, he sends to him his interpreter Cn. Pompeius, to pray him to
spare him and his men. Ambiorix replies that he is quite willing to
enter into negotiations with Sabinus, whose person he undertakes under
the obligation of his oath to cause to be respected; that further, he
hopes to obtain from the Eburones safety of life for the Roman soldiers.
Sabinus communicates this reply to Cotta, who is already wounded, and
proposes that they should go together to confer with Ambiorix; this step
may secure the safety of themselves and the army. Cotta refuses
obstinately, and declares that he will never treat with an enemy in
arms.
Sabinus enjoins to the tribunes of the soldiers who stand round him, and
to the centurions of the first class, to follow him. Arriving near
Ambiorix, he is summoned to lay down his sword: he obeys, and orders his
men to imitate his example. While they discuss the conditions in an
interview which the chief of the Eburones prolongs intentionally,
Sabinus is gradually surrounded and massacred. Then the barbarians,
raising, according to their custom, wild cries, rush upon the Romans and
break their ranks. Cotta and the greatest part of his soldiers perish
with their arms in their hands; the others seek refuge in the camp of
Aduatuca, from whence they had started. The ensign-bearer, L.
Petrosidius, pressed by a crowd of enemies, throws the eagle into the
retrenchments, and dies defending himself bravely at the foot of the
rampart. The unfortunate soldiers strive to sustain the combat till
night, and that very night they kill one another in despair. A few,
however, escaping from the field of battle, cross the forests, and gain
by chance the quarters of T. Labienus, to whom they give information of
this disaster.[429]
[Sidenote: Attack on Cicero’s Camp.]
XIII. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately repairs with his
cavalry into the country of the Aduatuci, a people adjoining to his
states, and marches without interruption all the night and the following
day: the infantry has orders to follow him. He announces his successes
to the Aduatuci, and urges them to take up arms. Next day he proceeds to
the Nervii, presses them to seize this occasion to avenge their injuries
and deliver themselves for ever from the yoke of the Romans; he informs
them of the death of two lieutenants, and of the destruction of a great
part of the Roman army; he adds that the legion in winter quarters among
them, under the command of Cicero, will be easily surprised and
annihilated; he offers his alliance to the Nervii, and easily persuades
them.
These immediately give information to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the
Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, tribes under their dependence:
they collect all the troops they can, and proceed unexpectedly to the
winter quarters of Cicero, before he had learnt the disaster and death
of Sabinus. There, as it had happened recently at Aduatuca, some
soldiers, occupied in cutting wood in the forest, are surprised by the
cavalry. Soon a considerable number of Eburones, Aduatuci, and Nervii,
with their allies and clients, proceed to attack the camp. The Romans
rush to arms, and mount the _vallum_; but that day they make head with
difficulty against an enemy who has placed all his hope in the
promptness of an unforeseen attack, and was convinced that after this
victory nothing further could resist him.[430]
[Sidenote: Cæsar marches to the succour of Cicero.]
XIV. Cæsar was still at Amiens, ignorant of the events which had just
taken place. Cicero immediately wrote to him, and promised great
recompenses to those who should succeed in delivering his letters to
him; but all the roads were watched, and nobody could reach him. During
the night twenty towers were raised, with an incredible celerity, by
means of the wood which had been already brought for fortifying the
camp,[431] and the works were completed. Next day, the enemies, whose
forces had increased, returned to the attack and began to fill the
fosse. The resistance was as energetic as the day before, and continued
during the following days; among these heroic soldiers constancy and
energy seemed to increase with the peril. Each night they prepare
everything necessary for the defence on the morrow. They make a great
number of stakes hardened by fire, and _pila_ employed in sieges; they
establish with planks the floors of the towers, and by means of hurdles
make parapets and battlements. They work without intermission: neither
wounded nor sick take repose. Cicero himself, though a man of feeble
health, is day and night at work, in spite of the entreaties of his
soldiers, who implore him to spare himself.
Meanwhile, the chiefs and _principes_ of the Nervii proposed an
interview to Cicero. They repeated to him what Ambiorix had said to
Sabinus: “All Gaul is in arms; the Germans have passed the Rhine; the
quarters of Cæsar and his lieutenants are attacked.” They added:
“Sabinus and his cohorts have perished; the presence of Ambiorix is a
proof of their veracity; Cicero would deceive himself if he reckoned on
the succour of the other legions. As to them, they have no hostile
intention, provided the Romans will discontinue occupying their country.
The legion has full liberty to retire without fear whither it likes.”
Cicero replied “that it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept
conditions from an enemy in arms; but that, if they consented to lay
them down, he would serve them as a mediator with Cæsar, who would
decide.”
Deceived in their expectation of intimidating Cicero, the Nervii
surrounded the camp with a rampart nine feet high, and a fosse fifteen
wide. They had observed the Roman works in the preceding campaigns, and
learnt from some prisoners to imitate them. But, as they did not possess
the necessary instruments of iron, they were obliged to cut the turf
with their swords, to take the earth with their hands, and to carry it
in their cloaks. We may judge of their great number by the fact that in
less than three hours they completed a retrenchment of 15,000 feet in
circuit.[432] On the following days, they raised towers to the height of
the _vallum_, prepared hooks (_falces_), and covered galleries
(_testudines_), which they had similarly been taught by the
prisoners.[433]
On the seventh day of the siege, a great wind having arisen, the enemies
threw into the camp fiery darts, and launched from their slings balls of
burning clay (_ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes_).[434] The barracks,
roofed with straw, in the Gaulish manner, soon took fire, and the wind
spread the flames in an instant through the whole camp. Then, raising
great shouts, as though they had already gained the victory, they pushed
forward their towers and covered galleries, and attempted, by means of
ladders, to scale the _vallum_; but such were the courage and steadiness
of the Roman soldiers, that, though surrounded with flames, overwhelmed
with a shower of darts, and knowing well that the fire was devouring
their baggage and their property, not one of them quitted his post, or
even dreamt of turning his head, so much did that desperate struggle
absorb their minds. This was their most trying day. Meanwhile, many of
the enemies were killed and wounded, because, crowding to the foot of
the rampart, the last ranks stopped the retreat of the first. The fire
having been appeased, the barbarians pushed up a tower against the
_vallum_.[435] The centurions of the third cohort, who happened to be
there, drew their men back, and, in bravado, invited, by their gesture
and voice, the enemies to enter. Nobody ventured. Then they drove them
away by a shower of stones, and the tower was burnt. There were in that
legion two centurions, T. Pulio and L. Vorenus, who emulated each other
in bravery by rushing into the midst of the assailants. Thrown down in
turn, and surrounded by enemies, they mutually rescued each other
several times, and returned into the camp without wounds. Defensive arms
then permitted individual courage to perform actual prodigies.
Still the siege continued, and the number of the defenders diminished
daily; provisions began to fall short, as well as the necessaries for
tending the wounded.[436] The frequent messengers sent by Cicero to
Cæsar were intercepted, and some of them cruelly put to death within
view of the camp. At last, Vertico, a Nervian chieftain who had embraced
the cause of the Romans, prevailed upon one of his slaves to take charge
of a letter to Cæsar. His quality of a Gaul enabled him to pass
unperceived, and to give intelligence to the general of Cicero’s danger.
Cæsar received this information at Amiens towards the eleventh hour of
the day (four o’clock in the afternoon). He had only at hand three
legions--that of Trebonius, at Amiens; that of M. Crassus, whose
quarters were at Montdidier, in the country of the Bellovaci, at a
distance of twenty-five miles; and lastly, that which, under C. Fabius,
was wintering in the country of the Morini, at Saint-Pol.[437] (_See
Plate 14._) He despatched a courier to Crassus, charged with delivering
to him his order to start with his legion in the middle of the night,
and join him in all haste at Amiens, to relieve there the legion of
Trebonius. Another courier was sent to the lieutenant C. Fabius, to
direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which
Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected. He wrote
similarly to Labienus, to march with his legion towards the country of
the Nervii, if he could without peril. As to the legion of Roscius and
that of Plancus, which were too far distant, they remained in their
quarters.
Crassus had no sooner received his orders than he began his march; and
next day, towards the third hour (ten o’clock), his couriers announced
his approach. Cæsar left him at Amiens, with one legion, to guard the
baggage of the army, the hostages, the archives, and the winter
provisions. He immediately started in person, without waiting for the
rest of the army, with the legion of Trebonius, and four hundred cavalry
from the neighbouring quarters. He followed, no doubt, the direction
from Amiens to Cambrai, and made that day twenty miles (thirty
kilomètres). He was subsequently joined on his road, probably towards
Bourcies, between Bapaume and Cambrai, by Fabius, who had not lost a
moment in executing his orders. Meanwhile arrived the reply of Labienus.
He informed Cæsar of the events which had taken place among the
Eburones, and of their effect among the Treviri. These latter had just
risen. All their troops had advanced towards him, and surrounded him at
a distance of three miles. In this position, fearing that he should not
be able to resist enemies proud of a recent victory, who would take his
departure for a flight, he thought that there would be danger in
quitting his winter quarters.
Cæsar approved of the resolution taken by Labienus, although it reduced
to two the three legions on which he counted; and, although their
effective force did not amount to more than 7,000 men, as the safety of
the army depended on the celerity of his movements, he proceeded by
forced marches to the country of the Nervii; there he learnt from
prisoners the perilous situation of Cicero. He immediately engaged, by
the promise of great recompenses, a Gaulish horseman to carry a letter
to him: it was written in Greek,[438] in order that the enemy, if he
intercepted it, might not know its meaning. Further, in case the Gaul
could not penetrate to Cicero, he had directed him to attach the letter
to the _amentum_ (see page 37, note 2) of his javelin, and throw it over
the retrenchments. Cæsar wrote that he was approaching in great haste
with his legions, and he exhorted Cicero to persevere in his energetic
defence. According to Polyænus, the despatch contained these words:
θαῥῥεἱν βοἡθειαν προσδἑχου (“Courage! expect succour”).[439]
As soon as he arrived near the camp, the Gaul, not daring to penetrate
to it, did as Cæsar had directed him. By chance his javelin remained two
days stuck in a tower. It was only on the third that it was seen and
carried to Cicero. The letter, read in the presence of the assembled
soldiers, excited transports of joy. Soon afterwards they perceived in
the distance the smoke of burning habitations, which announced the
approach of the army of succour. At that moment, after a five days’
march, it had arrived within twenty kilomètres of Charleroi, near
Binche, where it encamped. The Gauls, when they were informed of it by
their scouts, raised the siege, and then, to the number of about 60,000,
marched to meet the legions.
Cicero, thus liberated, sent another Gaul to announce to Cæsar that the
enemy were turning all their forces against him. At this news, received
towards the middle of the night, Cæsar informed his soldiers, and
strengthened them in their desire of vengeance. At daybreak next day he
raised his camp. After advancing four miles, he perceived a crowd of
enemies on the other side of a great valley traversed by the stream of
the Haine.[440] Cæsar did not consider it prudent to descend into the
valley to engage in combat against so great a number of troops.
Moreover, Cicero once rescued, there was no need for hurrying his march;
he therefore halted, and chose a good position for retrenching--mount
Sainte-Aldegonde. Although his camp, containing hardly 7,000 men,
without baggage, was necessarily of limited extent, he diminished it as
much as possible by giving less width to the streets, in order to
deceive the enemy as to his real strength. At the same time he sent out
scouts to ascertain the best place for crossing the valley.
That day passed in skirmishes of cavalry on the banks of the stream, but
each kept his positions: the Gauls, because they were waiting for
re-enforcements; Cæsar, because he counted on his simulated fear to draw
the enemies out of their position, and compel them to fight on his side
of the Haine, before his camp. If he could not succeed, he obtained time
to reconnoitre the roads sufficiently to pass the river and valley with
less danger. On the morrow, at daybreak, the enemy’s cavalry came up to
the retrenchments, and attacked that of the Romans. Cæsar ordered his
men to give way, and return into the camp; at the same time he caused
the height of the ramparts to be increased, the gates to be stopped up
with mere lumps of turf, and directed his soldiers to execute his
directions with tumultuous haste and all the signs of fear.
The Gauls, drawn on by this feint, passed the stream, and formed in
order of battle in a disadvantageous place. Seeing that the Romans had
even abandoned the _vallum_, they approached nearer to it, threw their
missiles over it from all sides, and caused their heralds to proclaim
round the retrenchments that, until the third hour (ten o’clock), every
Gaul or Roman who should desert to them should have his life saved. At
last, having no hope of forcing the gates, which they supposed to be
solidly fortified, they carried their boldness so far as to begin to
fill up the fosse, and to pull down the palisades with their hands. But
Cæsar held his troops in readiness to profit by the excessive confidence
of the Gauls: at a signal given, they rush through all the gates at
once; the enemy does not resist, but takes to flight, abandoning their
arms, and leaves the ground covered with his dead.
Cæsar did not pursue far, on account of the woods and marshes; he would
not have been able, indeed, to inflict further loss; he marched with his
troops, without having suffered any loss, towards the camp of Cicero,
where he arrived the same day.[441] The towers, the covered galleries,
and the retrenchments of the barbarians, excited his astonishment.
Having assembled the soldiers of Cicero’s legion, nine-tenths of whom
were wounded, he could judge how much danger they had run and how much
courage they had displayed. He loaded with praise the general and
soldiers, addressing individually the centurions and the tribunes who
had distinguished themselves. The prisoners gave him more ample details
on the deaths of Sabinus and Cotta, whose disaster had produced a deep
impression in the army. The next day he reminds the troops convoked for
that purpose of the past event, consoles and encourages them, throws the
fault of this check on the imprudence of the lieutenant, and exhorts
them to resignation the more, because, thanks to the valour of the
soldiers and the protection of the gods, the expiation had been prompt,
and left no further reason for the enemies to rejoice, or for the Romans
to be afflicted.[442]
We see, from what precedes, how small a number of troops, disseminated
over a vast territory, surmounted, by discipline and courage, a
formidable insurrection. Quintus Cicero, by following the principle
invoked by Cotta, _not to enter into negotiations with an enemy in
arms_, saved both his army and his honour. As to Cæsar, he gave proof,
in this circumstance, of an energy and strength of mind which Quintus
Cicero did not fail to point out to his brother when he wrote to
him.[443] If we believe Suetonius and Polyænus, Cæsar felt so great a
grief for the check experienced by Sabinus, that, in sign of mourning,
he let his beard and hair grow until he had avenged his
lieutenants,[444] which only happened in the year following, by the
destruction of the Eburones and the Nervii.
[Sidenote: Cæsar places his Troops in Winter Quarters. Labienus defeats
Indutiomarus.]
XV. Meanwhile the news of Cæsar’s victory reached Labienus, across the
country of the Remi, with incredible speed: his winter quarters were at
a distance of about sixty miles from Cicero’s camp, where Cæsar had only
arrived after the ninth hour of the day (three o’clock in the
afternoon), and yet before midnight shouts of joy were raised at the
gates of the camp, the acclamations of the Remi who came to congratulate
Labienus. The noise spread in the army of the Treviri, and Indutiomarus,
who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus next day, withdrew
during the night, and took all his troops with him.
These events having been accomplished, Cæsar distributed the seven
legions he had left in the following manner: he sent Fabius with his
legion to his winter quarters among the Morini, and established himself
in the neighbourhood of Amiens with three legions, which he separated in
three quarters: they were the legion of Crassus, which had remained
stationary, that of Cicero, and that of Trebonius. There are still seen,
along the Somme, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, three camps at a short
distance from each other, which appear to have been those of that
period.[445] Labienus, Plancus, and Roscius continued to occupy the same
positions. The gravity of the circumstances determined Cæsar to remain
all the winter with the army. In fact, on the news of the disaster of
Sabinus, nearly all the people of Gaul showed a disposition to take
arms, sent deputations and messages to each other, communicated their
projects, and deliberated upon the point from which the signal for war
should be given. They held nocturnal assemblies in bye-places, and
during the whole winter not a day passed in which there was not some
meeting or some movement of the Gauls to cause uneasiness to Cæsar. Thus
he learnt from L. Roscius, lieutenant placed at the head of the 13th
legion, that considerable troops of Armorica had assembled to attack
him; they were not more than eight miles from his winter quarters, when
the news of Cæsar’s victory had compelled them to retreat precipitately
and in disorder.
The Roman general called to his presence the _principes_ of each state,
terrified some by letting them know that he was informed of their plots,
exhorted the others to perform their duty, and by these means maintained
the tranquillity of a great part of Gaul. Meanwhile a vexatious event
took place in the country of the Senones, a powerful and influential
nation among the Gauls. They had resolved, in an assembly, to put to
death Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for king. Cavarinus had fled;
upon which they pronounced his deposition, banished him, and pursued him
to the limits of their territory. They had sought to justify themselves
to Cæsar, who ordered them to send him all their senators. They refused.
This boldness on the part of the Senones, by showing to the barbarians
some individuals capable of resisting the Romans, produced so great a
change in their minds, that, with the exception of the Ædui and the
Remi, there was not a people which did not fall under suspicion of
revolt, each desiring to free itself from foreign domination.
During the whole winter, the Treviri and Indutiomarus never ceased
urging the people on the other side of the Rhine to take up arms,
assuring them that the greater part of the Roman army had been
destroyed. But not one of the German nations could be persuaded to pass
the Rhine. The remembrance of the double defeat of Ariovistus and the
Tencteri made them cautious of trying their fortune again. Deceived in
his expectations, Indutiomarus did not discontinue collecting troops,
exercising them, buying horses from the neighbouring countries, and
drawing to him from all parts of Gaul outlaws and condemned criminals.
His ascendency was soon so great, that from all parts people eagerly
sought his friendship and protection.
When he saw some rallying to him spontaneously, others, such as the
Senones and the Carnutes, engaging in his cause through a consciousness
of their fault; the Nervii and the Aduatuci preparing for war, and a
crowd of volunteers disposed to join him as soon as he should have
quitted his country, Indutiomarus, according to the custom of the Gauls
at the beginning of a campaign, called together an assembly in arms. He
pronounced Cingetorix, his son-in-law, who remained faithful to Cæsar,
an enemy of his country; and announced that, in reply to the appeal of
the Senones and Carnutes, he would go to them through the country of the
Remi, whose lands he would ravage; but, above all, he would attack the
camp of Labienus.
The latter, established on the Ourthe, master of a position naturally
formidable, which he had further fortified, was in fear of no attack,
but dreamt, on the contrary, of seizing the first opportunity of
combating with advantage. Informed by Cingetorix of the designs of
Indutiomarus, he demanded cavalry of the neighbouring states, pretended
fear, and, letting the enemy’s cavalry approach with impunity, remained
shut up in his camp.
While, deceived by these appearances, Indutiomarus became daily more
presumptuous, Labienus introduced secretly into his camp during the
night the auxiliary cavalry, and, by keeping a close watch, prevented
the Treviri from being informed of it. The enemy, ignorant of the
arrival of this re-enforcement, advanced nearer and nearer to the
retrenchments, and redoubled his provocations. They were unnoticed, and
towards evening he withdrew in disorder. Suddenly Labienus causes his
cavalry, seconded by his cohorts, to issue by the two gates. Foreseeing
the rout of the enemy, he urges his troops to follow Indutiomarus alone,
and promises great rewards to those who shall bring his head. Fortune
seconded his designs; Indutiomarus was overtaken just at the ford of the
river (the Ourthe), and put to death, and his head was brought into the
camp. The cavalry, in their return, slew all the enemies they found in
their way. The Eburones and the Nervii dispersed. The result of these
events was to give to Gaul a little more tranquillity.[446]
[Sidenote: Observations.]
XVI. The Emperor Napoleon, in his _Précis des Guerres de César_,
explains in the following manner the advantage the Romans drew from
their camps:--
“The Romans owe the constancy of their successes to the method, from
which they never departed, of encamping every night in a fortified camp,
and of never giving battle without having behind them a retrenched camp,
to serve them as a place of retreat, and to contain their magazines,
their baggage, and their wounded. The nature of arms in those ages was
such that, in these camps, they were not only in safety from the attacks
of an equal army, but even an army which was stronger; they were the
masters to fight or to wait a favourable opportunity. Marius is assailed
by a cloud of Cimbri or Teutones; he shuts himself up in his camp,
remains there until the favourable day or occasion comes, then he issues
with victory before him. Cæsar arrives near the camp of Cicero; the
Gauls abandon the latter, and march to meet the former; they are four
times more numerous. Cæsar takes a position in a few hours, retrenches
his camp, and in it he bears patiently the insults and provocations of
an enemy whom he is not yet willing to combat; but a favourable
opportunity is not long in presenting itself. He then issues through all
his gates; the Gauls are vanquished.
“Why, then, has a rule so wise, so fertile in great results, been
abandoned by modern generals? Because offensive arms have changed its
character; arms for the hand were the principal arms of the ancients; it
was with his short sword that the legionary conquered the world; it was
with the Macedonian pike that Alexander conquered Asia. The principal
arms of modern armies are projectiles; the musket is superior to
anything ever invented by man; no defensive arm is a protection against
it.
“As the principal arm of the ancients was the sword or the pike, their
habitual formation was in deep order. The legion and the phalanx, in
whatever situation they were attacked, either in front, or in right
flank, or in left flank, faced everywhere without disadvantage; they
could encamp on surfaces of small extent, in order to have less labour
in fortifying the line of circuit, and in order to hold their ground
with the smallest detachment possible. The principal arm of the moderns
is the projectile; their habitual order has naturally been narrow order,
the only one which permits them to bring all their projectiles to bear.
“A consular army enclosed in its camp, attacked by a modern army of
equal force, would be driven out of it without assault, and without
being able to use their swords; it would not be necessary to fill up the
fosses or to scale the ramparts: surrounded on all sides by the
attacking army, pierced through, enveloped, and raked by the fire, the
camp would be the common drain of all the shots, of all the balls, of
all the bullets: fire, devastation, and death would open the gates and
throw down the retrenchments. A modern army, placed in a Roman camp,
would at first, no doubt, make use of all its artillery; but, though
equal to the artillery of the besieger, it would be taken in _rouage_
and quickly reduced to silence; a part only of the infantry could use
their muskets, but it would fire upon a line less extended, and would be
far from producing an effect equal to the injury it would receive. The
fire from the centre to the circumference is null; that from the
circumference to the centre is irresistible. All these considerations
have decided modern generals in renouncing the system of retrenched
camps, to adopt instead natural positions well chosen.
“A Roman camp was placed independently of localities: all these were
good for armies whose strength consisted in arms used with the hand; it
required neither experienced eye nor military genius to encamp well;
whereas the choice of positions, the manner of occupying them and
placing the different arms, by taking advantage of the circumstances of
the ground, is an art which forms part of the genius of the modern
captain.
“If it were said now-a-days to a general, You shall have, like Cicero,
under your orders, 5,000 men, sixteen pieces of cannon, 5,000 pioneers’
tools, 5,000 sacks of earth; you shall be within reach of a forest, on
ordinary ground; in fifteen days you shall be attacked by an army of
60,000 men, having 120 pieces of cannon; you shall not be succoured till
eighty or ninety-six hours after having been attacked. What are the
works, what are the plans, what are the profiles, which art prescribes?
Has the art of the engineer secrets which can solve this problem?”[447]
CHAPTER IX.
(Year of Rome 701.)
(BOOK VI. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI--SECOND PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE TREVIRI.
[Sidenote: Cæsar augments his Army.]
I. The state of Gaul gave Cæsar cause to anticipate serious agitations,
and he felt convinced of the necessity of new levies. He employed on
this mission his lieutenants M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T.
Sextius; at the same time he asked Pompey, who had remained before Rome
with the _imperium_, in order to watch over the public interests, to
recall to their colours and send him the soldiers of Cisalpine Gaul
enlisted under the consulate of the latter in 699. Cæsar attached, with
a view to the present and to the future, great importance to giving the
Gauls a high idea of the resources of Italy, and to proving to them that
it was easy for the Republic, after a check, not only to repair its
losses, but also to bring into the field troops more numerous than ever.
Pompey, through friendship and consideration for the public good,
granted his demand. Thanks to the activity of his lieutenants, before
the end of winter three new legions (or thirty cohorts) were raised and
joined to the army: the 1st, the 14th, which had just taken the number
of the legion annihilated at Aduatuca, and the 15th. In this manner, the
fifteen cohorts lost under Sabinus were replaced by double their number,
and it was seen, by this rapid display of forces, what was the power of
the military organization and resources of the Roman people. It was the
first time that Cæsar commanded ten legions.
[Sidenote: War against the Nervii, General Assembly of Gaul.]
II. After the death of Indutiomarus, the Treviri took for their chiefs
some members of his family. These in vain urged the nearest peoples of
the right bank of the Rhine to make common cause with them; but they
succeeded with some of the more distant tribes, particularly the Suevi,
and persuaded Ambiorix to enter into their league. From all parts, from
the Rhine to the Scheldt, were announced preparations for war. The
Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menapii, all the Germans on this side of the
Rhine, were in arms. The Senones persisted in their disobedience, and
acted in concert with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states;
everything urged upon Cæsar the counsel to open the campaign earlier
than usual. Accordingly, without waiting for the end of winter, he
concentrates the four legions nearest to Amiens, his head-quarters
(those of Fabius, Crassus, Cicero, and Trebonius), invades unexpectedly
the territory of the Nervii, gives them time neither to assemble nor to
fly, but carries off the men and cattle, abandons the booty to the
soldiers, and forces this people to submission.
This expedition so rapidly terminated, the legions returned to their
winter quarters. At the beginning of spring, Cæsar convoked, according
to his custom, the general assembly of Gaul, which met, no doubt, at
Amiens. The different peoples sent thither their representatives, with
the exception of the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri. He regarded
this absence as a sign of revolt, and in order to pursue his designs
without neglecting the general affairs, he resolved to transfer the
assembly nearer to the insurrection, to Lutetia. This town belonged to
the Parisii, who bordered on the Senones, and although formerly these
peoples had formed but one, the Parisii do not appear to have entered
into the conspiracy. Cæsar, having announced this decision from the
summit of his prætorium (_pro suggestu pronuntiata_), started the same
day at the head of his legions, and advanced by forced marches towards
the country of the Senones.
At the news of his approach, Acco, the principal author of the revolt,
ordered the population to retire into the _oppida_; but, taken by
surprise by the arrival of the Romans, the Senones employed the Ædui,
once their patrons, to intercede in their favour. Cæsar pardoned them
without difficulty, preferring to employ the fine season in war than in
the search of those who were culpable. A hundred hostages exacted from
the Senones were entrusted to the Ædui. The Carnutes imitated the
example of the Senones, and, by the intermediation of the Remi, whose
clients they were, obtained their pardon. Cæsar pronounced the close of
the assembly of Gaul, and ordered the different states to furnish their
contingents of cavalry.[448]
[Sidenote: Submission of the Menapii.]
III. Having pacified this part of the country, Cæsar turned all his
thoughts towards the war with the Treviri and with Ambiorix, the chief
of the Eburones. He was, above all, impatient to take a striking
vengeance for the humiliation inflicted on his arms at Aduatuca. Knowing
well that Ambiorix would not hazard a battle, he sought to penetrate his
designs. Two things were to be feared: the first, that Ambiorix, when
his territory was invaded, would take refuge among the Menapii, whose
country, adjoining that of the Eburones, was defended by woods and vast
marshes, and who, alone among the Gauls, had never made an act of
submission; the second, that he might join the Germans beyond the Rhine,
with whom, as was known, he had entered into friendly relations through
the intermediation of the Treviri. Cæsar conceived the plan of first
preventing these two eventualities, in order to isolate Ambiorix.
Wishing, above all, to reduce to submission the Menapii and Treviri, and
carry the war at the same time into the countries of these two peoples,
he undertook in person the expedition against the Menapii, and entrusted
that against the Treviri to Labienus, his best lieutenant, who had
operated against them on several occasions. Labienus, after his victory
over Indutiomarus, had continued in his winter quarters with his legions
at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe.[449] Cæsar sent him all the baggage of
the army and two legions. He marched in person towards the country of
the Menapii, at the head of five legions without baggage. He took with
him Cavarinus and the Senonese cavalry, fearing lest the resentment of
this king against his people, or the hatred which he had drawn upon
himself, might raise some disorders, and, following the general
direction of Sens, Soissons, Bavay, and Brussels, he reached the
frontier of the Menapii. The latter, trusting in the nature of the
ground, had assembled no forces, but took refuge in the woods and
marshes. Cæsar divided his troops with the lieutenant C. Fabius and the
questor M. Crassus, formed them into three columns, and, causing bridges
to be hastily constructed, to cross the marshy water-courses, penetrated
at three points into their territory, which he ravaged. The Menapii,
reduced to extremity, demanded peace: it was granted to them on the
express condition that they should refuse all shelter to Ambiorix or to
his lieutenants. Cæsar left Commius among them with part of the cavalry
to hold them under surveillance, and marched thence towards the country
of the Treviri.[450]
[Sidenote: Success of Labienus against the Treviri.]
IV. On his part, Labienus had obtained brilliant successes; the Treviri
had marched with considerable forces against his winter quarters. They
were no more than two days’ march from him, when they learnt that he
had been joined by two other legions. Resolving then to wait the succour
of the Germans, they halted at a distance of fifteen miles from the camp
of Labienus. The latter, informed of the cause of their inaction, and
hoping that their imprudence would present an opportunity for giving
battle, left five cohorts to guard the greatest part of the baggage,
and, with the twenty-five others and a numerous cavalry, established his
camp within a mile of the enemy.
The two armies were separated by the river Ourthe, the passage of which
was rendered difficult by the steepness of the banks. Labienus had no
intention of crossing it, but he feared that the enemy might imitate his
prudence until the arrival of the Germans, who were expected
immediately. To draw them to him, he spread a rumour that he should
withdraw on the morrow at break of day, in order to avoid having to
combat the united forces of the Treviri and the Germans. He assembled
during the night the tribunes and centurions of the first class,
informed them of his design, and, contrary to Roman discipline, broke up
his camp with every appearance of disorder and a precipitate retreat.
The proximity of the camps allowed the enemy to obtain information of
this movement by his scouts before daybreak.
The rear-guard of Labienus had no sooner begun its march, than the
barbarians urge each other not to let a prey so long coveted escape
them. They imagine that the Romans are struck with terror, and, thinking
it disgraceful to wait any longer the succour of the Germans, they cross
the river and advance unhesitatingly upon unfavourable ground.
Labienus, seeing the success of his stratagem, continued slowly his
apparent retreat, in order to draw all the Gauls over the river. He had
sent forward, to an eminence, the baggage, guarded by a detachment of
cavalry. Suddenly he orders the ensigns to be turned towards the enemy,
forms his troops in order of battle, the cavalry on the wings, and
exhorts them to display the same valour as if Cæsar were present. Then
an immense cry rises in the ranks, and the _pila_ are thrown from all
sides. The Gauls, surprised at seeing an enemy they believed they were
pursuing turn against them, did not sustain even the first shock, but
fled precipitately into the neighbouring forests. Pressed by the
cavalry, they were slain or captured in great numbers.
Labienus employed those wise tactics to which the Romans owed their
greatest successes. Invincible in their fortified camps, they could, as
the Emperor Napoleon I. has so well remarked, either combat or wait for
the opportune moment. The Gauls, on the contrary, warlike peoples,
carried away by a fiery courage, not understanding the patience and
wiliness of their adversaries, fell always into the snare which was laid
for them. It was enough to feign terror, and inspire them with contempt
for the enemy’s forces, to make them engage instantly in disorderly
attacks, which the Romans, by sudden sorties, easily defeated. This was
the system followed by Sabinus when attacked by the Unelli, by Cæsar on
his way to the relief of Cicero, and by Labienus himself in the previous
year.
A few days afterwards the country submitted; for, on the news of the
defeat of the Treviri, the Germans returned home, followed by the
relatives of Indutiomarus, the author of the revolt. Cingetorix,
constant in his fidelity to the Romans, was replaced at the head of the
nation. The double object proposed by Cæsar was thus attained; for, on
one hand, since the submission of the Menapii, Ambiorix could no longer
dream of finding a refuge among them; and, on the other, the victory of
Labienus, followed by the retreat of the Germans, placed it out of his
power to league with these latter. Nevertheless, to assure this double
result, punish the Germans for their readiness to succour the Treviri,
and cut off Ambiorix from all retreat, Cæsar, after having effected his
junction with Labienus, resolved to pass the Rhine a second time.[451]
[Sidenote: Second Passage of the Rhine.]
V. He had passed from the country of the Menapii into that of the
Treviri, and had arrived near the locality where now stands the town of
Bonn. He there caused a bridge to be built a little above the spot where
his army had crossed two years before. In consequence of the experience
gained by the processes employed on the former occasion, and of the
extreme zeal of the soldiers, the work was finished in a few days.
Having left for the protection of the bridge a strong detachment on the
bank belonging to the Treviri, for fear of some movement on their part,
Cæsar crossed the river with the legions and the cavalry. The Ubii, who
had long before made their submission, assured him that they had
neither sent assistance to the Treviri or violated their oath; that the
Suevi alone had furnished auxiliaries; and that thus he ought not to
confound them with the latter in his anger against the Germans. He
accepted their excuses, and obtained information on the roads and passes
which led to the country of the Suevi.
A few days afterwards, he learnt that the latter were concentrating on a
single point their troops and the contingents of the tribes under their
dependence. He provided for the supply of provisions, chose a favourable
position for his camp, and enjoined the Ubii to transport their cattle
and goods into their _oppida_, hoping to compel the barbarians by famine
to fight at disadvantage. The Ubii were similarly charged to watch the
enemy by means of numerous scouts. A few days later, they informed Cæsar
that the Suevi, at the approach of the Romans, had retired, with all
their troops and those of their allies, to the extremity of their
territory. There lay the forest Bacenis,[452] which advanced very far
into the country, and which, placed like a natural barrier between the
Suevi and the Cherusci, separated these two peoples and defended them
against their mutual excursions. It was at the entrance to this forest,
probably towards the mountains of Thuringia, that the Suevi had resolved
to await the Romans.
In this expedition, as in the one preceding, Cæsar feared to engage
himself too far in the middle of an uncultivated country, where
provisions might have failed him. He therefore repassed the Rhine. But
to keep the barbarians in fear of his return, and to prevent their
re-enforcements from reaching the Gauls, he did not destroy the whole
bridge, but only cut off 200 feet on the side of the Ubian bank; at the
extremity of the truncated part he built a tower of four stories, and
left on the left bank twelve cohorts in a retrenched post. Young C.
Volcatius Tullus had the command of it. Cæsar’s two expeditions to the
right bank of the Rhine led to no battle, and yet the moral effect was
so great, that after this period the Germans no longer supported the
insurrections in Gaul, and even became the auxiliaries of the
Romans.[453]
[Sidenote: War against Ambiorix.]
VI. On the approach of harvest, Cæsar marched against Ambiorix, with his
ten legions, except the guard left at the bridge of the Rhine. He
started from Bonn, and advanced towards the country of the Eburones, by
way of Zulpich and Eupen (_see Plate 14_), across the forest of the
Ardennes, which extended, it will be remembered, from the banks of the
Rhine to the country of the Nervii. In the hope of surprising the enemy,
he sent forward M. Minucius Basilus, with all the cavalry, recommending
to him not to light fires, which would reveal his approach, and
informing him that he should follow him closely.
Basilus, faithful to his orders, fell by surprise on a great number of
Eburones, proceeded straight towards the locality to which Ambiorix was
said to have retired with a few cavalry, succeeded in penetrating to the
abode of this chieftain, and seized upon all his effects; but the
latter, protected by some of his followers, escaped on horseback
through the woods; his partisans dispersed. It was thus that fortune,
which plays so important a part in war, favoured at the same time the
enterprise against Ambiorix and his escape. The Eburon chief sent secret
messages in all directions, recommending the inhabitants to provide for
their own safety. Some concealed themselves in the forest of the
Ardennes, others in the midst of the marshes. Those who were nearest to
the ocean sought refuge in the islands which are formed at high tide;
others expatriated themselves, and settled in distant countries.
Catuvolcus, king of one-half of the country of the Eburones, crushed
with age and misfortunes, took poison, that he might not fall alive into
the power of the Romans.
During this time, Cæsar was approaching the country of the Segni and
Condrusi,[454] who came to implore him not to confound in the same cause
all the Germans beyond the Rhine, and protested their neutrality. The
fact having been satisfactorily proved, Cæsar assured them that, if they
would deliver up to him the Eburones who had sought refuge among them,
their territory should be respected. Having arrived at Visé, on the
Meuse, where a ford exists from time immemorial, he divided his troops
into three bodies, and sent the baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca
(_Tongres_): it was the place which had witnessed the recent disaster of
Sabinus. He gave preference to this position, because the retrenchments
of the preceding year, still standing, would spare the troops much
labour. He left, as a guard for the baggage, the 14th legion, and placed
it, with 200 cavalry, under the command of Quintus Cicero.
Of the nine legions remaining with Cæsar, three were sent with T.
Labienus to the north towards the ocean, into the part of the country of
the Eburones which touched on that of the Menapii; three to the south
with C. Trebonius, to ravage the districts neighbouring on the Aduatuci
(towards the south-west, between the Meuse and the Demer); lastly,
Cæsar, at the head of the three others, advanced towards the Scheldt,
the waters of which, at this period, mingled with those of the
Meuse.[455] (_See Plate 14._) It was his intention to gain the extremity
of the Ardennes (between Brussels and Antwerp), whither it was said that
Ambiorix had retired with a few horsemen. He announced, on his
departure, that he should return to Aduatuca on the seventh day, the
period for the distribution of provisions to the legion which was left
at that place in charge of the baggage. Labienus and Trebonius were, if
they found it possible, to return at the same period, in order to
concert again on the measures to be taken after they had made themselves
acquainted with the designs of the enemy.
The Eburones had neither regular force, nor garrison, nor _oppidum_.
They formed a scattered multitude, always in ambush, attacking the
soldiers when isolated, and obliging the Romans to carry on a harassing
war, without any decisive result; for the nature of the country, covered
with thick forests, and intersected by marshes, protected the
barbarians, who could only be reached by small detachments. In the midst
of these difficulties, Cæsar preferred doing less injury to the enemy,
and sparing the lives of his own soldiers, by having recourse to the
Gauls. He accordingly sent messages to invite the neighbouring peoples
to come and ravage the territory of the Eburones, and assist him in
exterminating a race guilty of having slaughtered his soldiers. At his
call, numerous hordes rushed from all sides, and the entire territory of
the Eburones was soon given up to pillage.[456]
[Sidenote: The Sicambri attack Aduatuca.]
VII. Meanwhile, the seventh day, the period fixed for Cæsar’s return,
approached. Chance, so common in war, brought about a remarkable
incident. The enemy, scattered, and struck with terror, could no longer
inspire the least fear. But rumour having spread beyond the Rhine, among
the Germans, that all peoples were invited to ravage the country of the
Eburones, the Sicambri, neighbours to the river, who had, as we have
seen, received the Usipetes and Tencteri after their defeat, collect
2,000 cavalry; they pass the Rhine on rafts and boats, thirty miles
below where Cæsar had built his bridge and left a guard (forty-five
kilomètres below Bonn.)[457] They invade the territory of the Eburones,
pick up a crowd of fugitives, and seize upon a great number of cattle.
The attraction of booty draws them on farther and farther; bred in the
midst of war and plundering, nothing stops them--neither marshes nor
woods. On their arrival at some distance from the Meuse, they learn from
prisoners the absence of Cæsar and the distance of the army, and that in
three hours they can reach Aduatuca, where the riches of the Romans are
deposited. They are made to believe that this fortress is defended by a
garrison too weak to line the walls or venture to issue from the
retrenchments. Trusting in this information, the Germans hide their
booty, and, guided by a prisoner, march against Aduatuca, crossing the
Meuse at Maestricht.
Hitherto, Cicero had scrupulously executed Cæsar’s order, and retained
the troops in the camp without even permitting a single valet to quit
it; but on the seventh day, reckoning no longer on the return of the
general at the term fixed, he yielded to the complaints of the soldiers,
who blamed his obstinacy in keeping them shut up as though they were
besieged. He believed, moreover, that the nine legions, and the numerous
cavalry which scoured the country, permitted him to venture without
danger to a distance of three miles from his camp, especially after the
dispersion of the enemy’s forces; he therefore sent five cohorts to cut
wheat in the nearest fields, situated to the north of Aduatuca, and
separated from the camp only by a hill. With them went, under the same
ensign, 300 men of different legions left sick, but then restored, and
a multitude of valets, taking with them a great number of beasts of
burden, which were in the camp.
Suddenly the German cavalry arrive; their march had been concealed by
the woods. Without halting, they rush toward the Decuman gate, and
attempt to enter the camp. (_See Plate 18._) The attack is so sudden,
that the merchants established under the _vallum_ have not time to
enter. The soldiers, taken by surprise, are in confusion; the cohort on
guard struggles to prevent the enemy from entering the gate. The
Sicambri spread themselves round the camp, to discover another passage;
but, fortunately, the nature of the locality and the retrenchments
render access impossible everywhere but at the gates. They attempt to
force an entry there, and are prevented with difficulty. The alarm and
disorder are at their height. The soldiers are uncertain where to direct
their steps, or where to assemble; some pretend that the camp is taken,
others that the army and Cæsar have perished. A feeling of superstitious
anxiety recalls to their minds the disaster of Sabinus and Cotta, slain
at the same place. At the sight of such a general consternation, the
barbarians are confirmed in their opinion that the Romans are too few to
resist; they strive to force an entrance, and urge one another not to
let so rich a prey escape.
Among the sick left in the camp was the primipilus P. Sextius Baculus,
who had signalised himself in the preceding combats. For five days he
had taken no food. Uneasy for the safety of all, as well as his own, he
leaves his tent without arms, sees before him the enemy and the danger,
snatches a sword from the first man he meets, and takes his post at a
gate. The centurions of the cohort on guard follow him, and all together
sustain the attack for a few instants. Baculus, grievously wounded,
faints. He is passed from hand to hand, and only saved with difficulty.
This incident gives the others time to recover their courage. They
remain on the rampart, and present at least some appearance of defence.
At this moment the soldiers who had gone out to reap were on their way
back to the camp; they are struck with the cries they hear; the cavalry
press forward, perceive the imminence of the danger, and see, with
terror, that it is no longer possible to obtain refuge behind the
retrenchments. The newly-levied soldiers, inexperienced in war,
interrogate the tribune and centurions with their looks, and wait their
orders. There is no one so brave as not to be agitated by so unexpected
an event. The Sicambri, perceiving the ensigns at a distance, believe at
first that the legions were returning, and cease from the attack; but
soon, filled with contempt for such a handful of men, they rush upon
them on all sides.
The valets take refuge on a neighbouring hill, that on which now stands
the village of Berg. Driven from this post, they rush back into the
midst of the ensigns and manipuli, and increase the fear of the already
intimidated men. Among the soldiers, some propose to form in wedge, in
order to open themselves a way to the camp they see so near them: the
loss of a small number will be the safety of all. Others advise to
remain firm on the heights, and run the same chance together. This
latter opinion is not that of the old soldiers, united under the same
ensign. Led by C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, they fight their way
through the enemy, and re-enter the camp without the loss of a single
man. Under protection of this bold movement, the valets and cavalry
succeed in following them. As to the young soldiers who had posted
themselves on the heights, they were not able, in their inexperience,
either to maintain their resolution to defend themselves in their
position, or to imitate the successful energy of the veterans; they
engaged on disadvantageous ground in an attempt to regain the camp, and
their destruction would have been certain but for the devotedness of the
centurions. Some had been promoted from the lowest ranks of the army to
this grade, in reward for their courage; and for a moment they
intimidated the enemy, by sacrificing their lives in order to justify
their renown. This heroic act, contrary to all expectation, enabled
three cohorts to re-enter the camp; the two others perished.
During these combats, the defenders of the camp had recovered from their
first alarm. When they saw them stationed on the rampart, the Germans
despaired of being able to force the retrenchments; they withdrew, and
repassed the Rhine with their booty. The terror they had spread was such
that, even after their retreat, when, the following night, C. Volusenus
arrived at Aduatuca with the cavalry which preceded the legions, the
return of Cæsar and the safety of the army seemed hardly credible. Men’s
minds were affected to such a degree that they supposed the cavalry
alone had escaped from the disaster; for, they said, the Germans would
never have attacked the camp if the legions had not been defeated. The
arrival of Cæsar alone dissipated all their fears.
Accustomed to the various chances of war, and to events which must be
supported without complaining, he uttered no reproach;[458] he merely
reminded them that they should not have run the least risk by letting
the troops go out of the camp; that, moreover, if they might blame
fortune for the sudden attack of the enemy, they might, on the other
hand, congratulate themselves on having driven them back from the gates
of the camp. He was astonished, nevertheless, that the Germans, having
crossed the Rhine for the purpose of ravaging the territory of the
Eburones, should have acted so as to render the most signal service to
Ambiorix, by coming to attack the Romans.
Cæsar, to complete the ruin of the Eburones, marched again, collected a
great number of pillagers from the neighbouring states, and sent them in
different directions in pursuit of the enemy, to plunder and burn
everything. Their villages and habitations became, without exception, a
prey to the flames. The cavalry scoured the country in all directions,
in the hope of overtaking Ambiorix; the prospect of seizing him, and
gaining thereby the gratitude of the general, made them support infinite
fatigues, almost beyond human endurance. At every moment they believed
they were on the point of seizing the fugitive, and continually the
thick forests or deep retreats hid him from their pursuit. At last,
under protection of night, he reached other regions, escorted by four
horsemen, the only friends left to whom he dared trust his life.
Ambiorix escaped, but the massacre of the legion of Sabinus was cruelly
avenged by the devastation of the country of the Eburones!
After this expedition, Cæsar led back to Durocortorum (_Rheims_), the
chief town of the Remi, the army diminished by the two cohorts lost at
Aduatuca. He there convoked the assembly of Gaul, and caused judgment to
be passed on the conspiracy of the Senones and Carnutes. Acco, the chief
of the revolt, was condemned to death, and executed according to the old
Roman custom. Some others, fearing the same fate, took flight. They were
forbidden fire and water (that is, they were condemned to exile). Cæsar
sent two legions to winter quarters on the frontier of the Treviri, two
among the Lingones, and the six others among the Senones, at Agedincum
(_Sens_). After providing for the provisionment of the army, he
proceeded into Italy.[459]
CHAPTER X.
(Year of Rome 702.)
(BOOK VII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
REVOLT OF GAUL--CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND
NOVIODUNUM--SIEGES OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA--CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS
AGAINST THE PARISII--SIEGE OF ALESIA.
[Sidenote: Revolt of Gaul.]
I. The Roman arms had in six years subjugated, one after another, the
principal states of Gaul. Belgium, Aquitaine, and the countries on the
sea-coast, had been the theatre of the most desperate struggles. The
inhabitants of the isle of Britain, like the Germans, had become prudent
by the defeats they had suffered. Cæsar had just taken a signal
vengeance upon the revolted Eburones, and thought that he might without
danger leave his army and proceed into Italy, to hold the assemblies.
During his abode in this part of his command, the murder of P. Clodius
took place (the 13th of the Calends of February, 30th of December, 701),
which caused a great agitation, and gave rise to the Senatus-consultus,
which ordered all the youths of Italy to take the military oath; Cæsar
took advantage of it to make levies also in the Province. The rumours of
what was taking place at Rome soon passed the Alps, to revive the
resentments and hopes of the Gauls; they believed that the domestic
troubles would detain Cæsar in Italy, and would give rise to a
favourable opportunity for a new insurrection.
The principal chiefs meet in secluded spots; mutually excite each other
by the recital of their grievances, and by the remembrance of the death
of Acco; promise great rewards to those who, at the peril of their
lives, will commence the war; but decide that, before all, the return of
Cæsar to his army must be rendered impossible, a project the execution
of which was so much the easier, since the legions would not dare to
leave their winter quarters in the absence of their general, and since
the general himself could not join them without a sufficient escort.
The Carnutes are the first to offer to take arms: as the necessity of
acting secretly did not allow them to exchange hostages, they exact as
security an oath of alliance. This oath is taken by all the ensigns in a
meeting in which the moment for the rising is fixed.
On the day appointed, the Carnutes, led by two resolute men, Cotuatus
and Conetodunus, rush to Genabum (_Gien_), plunder and slaughter the
Roman merchants, amongst others the knight C. Fusius Cita, charged by
Cæsar with the victualling department. These news reached every state in
Gaul with an extreme celerity, according to the custom of the Gauls of
communicating remarkable events by cries transmitted from neighbour to
neighbour across the country.[460] Thus what had happened at Genabum at
sunrise, was known by the Arverni before the end of the first watch
(towards eight o’clock at night), at a distance of 160 miles.
Vercingetorix, a young Arvernan who possessed great influence in his
country,[461] and whose father, Celtillus, for a time chief of all Gaul,
had been put to death by his countrymen for having aspired to the
royalty, calls his clients together, and excites their zeal. Expelled
from Gergovia by those who were unwilling to tempt fortune with him, he
raises the country, and, with the help of a numerous band, retakes the
town, and causes himself to be proclaimed king. Soon he seduces the
Senones, the Parisii, the Pictones, the Cadurci, the Turones, the
Aulerci, the Lemovices of Armorica, the Andes, and the other peoples who
dwell on the shores of the ocean. The commandment is given to him by
unanimous consent. He exacts hostages from those peoples, orders a
prompt levy of soldiers, fixes the number of men and arms which each
country is to furnish in a given time, and occupies himself especially
with the raising of the cavalry. Active, daring, severe, and inflexible
even to cruelty, he subjects to the most atrocious tortures those who
hesitate, and by these means of terror soon forms an army.
He sent a part of it to the Ruteni, under the command of Cadurcus
Lucterius, a man full of daring; and to draw the Bituriges into the
insurrection, he invaded their territory. By acting thus, he threatened
the Province, and protected his rear whilst he moved towards the north,
where the Roman occupation was concentrated. On his approach, the
Bituriges solicited the help of the Ædui, their allies. The last, by the
advice of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who had remained with the army, sent them
a body of cavalry and infantry to support them against Vercingetorix;
but, when they reached the Loire, which separated the territory of the
two peoples, these auxiliary troops halted for some days, and then
returned, without having dared to cross the river, pretending that they
had been betrayed by the Bituriges. Immediately after their departure,
the latter joined the Arverni.[462]
[Sidenote: Cæsar begins the Campaign.]
II. Cæsar heard of these events in Italy, and, reassured on the troubles
in Rome, which had been appeased by the firmness of Pompey, he took his
departure from Transalpine Gaul. When he arrived on the other side of
the Alps (perhaps on the banks of the Rhone), he was struck with the
difficulties which lay in the way of his joining the army. If he sent
for the legions into the Roman province, they would be compelled, on
their way, to fight without him; if, on the other hand, he would go to
them, he was obliged to pass through populations to whom,
notwithstanding their apparent tranquillity, it would have been
imprudent to trust his person.
While Cæsar found so great difficulties before him, Lucterius,[463] who
had been sent by Vercingetorix to the Ruteni, brings them over to the
alliance with the Arverni, advances towards the Nitiobriges and the
Gabali, from whom he receives hostages, and, at the head of a numerous
army, threatens the Province in the direction of Narbonne. These events
made Cæsar resolve to proceed to that town. His arrival put an end to
people’s fears. He placed garrisons among the peoples who bordered on
the territory of the enemy, the Ruteni of the left bank of the Tarn
(_Ruteni provinciales_), the Volcæ Arecomici, the Tolosates, and near
Narbonne. At the same time, he ordered a part of the troops of the
province, and the re-enforcements which he had brought from Italy, to
unite on the territory of the Helvi, which bordered upon that of the
Arverni.[464] Intimidated by these dispositions, Lucterius did not
venture to engage himself in the midst of these garrisons, and retired.
This first danger averted, it was important for Cæsar to prevent
Vercingetorix from raising other peoples, who might perhaps be inclined
to follow the example of the Bituriges. By invading the country of the
Arverni, Cæsar might hope to draw the Gaulish chief into his own
country, and thus remove him from those where the legions were
wintering. He proceeded, therefore, to the country of the Helvi, where
he joined the troops who had just concentrated there. The mountains of
the Cévennes, which separated this people from the Arverni, were covered
with six feet of snow; the soldiers opened a passage by dint of labour.
Advancing by Aps and Saint-Cirgues, between the sources of the Loire and
the Allier (_see Plate 19_), Cæsar debouched on Le Puy and Brioude. The
Arverni, at this season, the most rigorous of the year, believed
themselves defended by the Cévennes, as by an insurmountable wall: he
fell upon them unexpectedly, and, in order to spread still greater
terror, he caused the cavalry to scour the country far around.
Quickly informed of this march, Vercingetorix, at the prayer of the
Arverni, who implored his succour, abandoned the country of the
Bituriges. Cæsar had foreseen this; so he only remains two days amongst
the Arverni, and, quitting them under the pretext of increasing his
forces, he leaves the command to young Brutus, whom he enjoins to throw
out his reconnoitring parties to as great a distance as possible, and
promises to return at the end of three days. Having by this diversion
drawn Vercingetorix southward, he proceeds in great haste to Vienne,
arrives there unexpectedly, takes the newly-raised cavalry which he had
sent thither, marches night and day, crosses the country of the Ædui,
and directs his march towards the Lingones, where two legions were in
winter quarters. By this extreme rapidity he seeks to prevent any evil
design on the part of the Ædui. Scarcely has he arrived amongst the
Lingones, when he sends orders to the other legions, two of which were
on the frontiers of the Treviri, and the six others in the country of
the Senones, to concentrate the whole army at Agedincum (_Sens_) before
his march is known to the Arverni. As soon as Vercingetorix was informed
of this movement, he returned with his army to the country of the
Bituriges, and thence started to lay siege to Gorgobina
(_Saint-Parize-le-Châtel_), an _oppidum_ of the Boii, who had settled,
after the defeat of the Helvetii, near the confluence of the Allier and
the Loire.[465]
[Sidenote: Taking of Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum.]
III. Although Cæsar had succeeded in uniting his troops, and in placing
himself at their head, he found it still difficult to fix upon a
determined plan. If he opened the campaign too early, the army might run
short of provisions through the difficulty of transport. If, on the
other hand, during the rest of the winter,[466] his army, remaining
inactive, allowed Vercingetorix to take Gorgobina, a place tributary to
the Ædui, the example might discourage his allies and lead to the
defection of the whole of Gaul. Rather than undergo such an affront, he
resolved to brave all obstacles. He engaged the Ædui, therefore, to
furnish provisions, announced his speedy arrival to the Boii,
recommended them to remain faithful, and to offer an energetic
resistance; and then, leaving at Agedincum two legions and the baggage
of the whole army, he marched with the eight others towards the
territory of the Boii. On the second day[467] he arrived at
Vellaunodunum (_Triguères_), a town of the Senones, and prepared to lay
siege to it, in order to protect his rear and secure his supply of
provisions. (_See Plate 19._) The countervallation was finished in two
days. On the third, the town offered to surrender: the capitulation was
only accepted on condition of delivering up the arms, the beasts of
burden, and 600 hostages. Cæsar left C. Trebonius, his lieutenant, to
see the convention executed, and marched in haste towards Genabum
(_Gien_), a town of the Carnutes.[468] He arrived there in two days,
and sufficiently early to surprise the inhabitants, who, thinking that
the siege of Vellaunodunum would last longer, had not yet assembled
sufficient troops for the defence of the place. The Roman army took its
position before the _oppidum_; but the approach of night made it
necessary to postpone the attack until the following morning. However,
as Genabum had a bridge on the Loire adjoining to the town, Cæsar kept
two legions under arms to watch it, in the fear that the besieged might
escape during the night. And, in fact, towards midnight they silently
issued from Genabum and began to pass the river. Cæsar, informed by his
scouts, set fire to the gates, introduced the legions he had kept in
reserve, and took possession of the place. The fugitives, who were
closely crowded together at the issues of the town, and at the entrance
of the bridge, which were too narrow to allow them to pass, fell nearly
all into the hands of the Romans. Genabum was plundered and burnt, and
the spoil abandoned to the soldiers. Then the army passed the Loire,
arrived on the territory of the Bituriges, and continued its march.
The town of Noviodunum (_Sancerre_), belonging to this latter people,
lay in Cæsar’s route; he undertook to lay siege to it. The inhabitants
were already hastening to make their submission, and a part of the
hostages had been delivered, when they saw in the distance the cavalry
of Vercingetorix, who, warned of the approach of the Romans, had raised
the siege of Gorgobina, and marched to meet them. At this sight, the
besieged, mustering courage again, seize their arms, shut their gates,
and man the wall. The Roman cavalry was immediately sent to meet the
enemy; staggered at the first shock, it was on the point of giving way;
but soon, supported by about 400 German cavalry, in Cæsar’s pay since
the commencement of the campaign, they entirely routed the Gauls. This
defeat having again spread terror in the town, the inhabitants delivered
up the instigators of the revolt, and surrendered. Cæsar marched thence,
through the fertile territory of the Biturges, towards Avaricum
(_Bourges_), the largest and strongest _oppidum_ of that people. The
taking of this town, he considered, would render him master of the whole
country.[469]
[Sidenote: Siege of Avaricum.]
IV. Vercingetorix, after having experienced so many reverses
successively at Vellaunodunum, at Genabum, and at Noviodunum, convokes a
council, in which he explains the necessity of adopting a new system of
warfare. Above all, according to him, they must take advantage of the
season, and of the numerous Gaulish cavalry, to cut off the Romans from
provisions and forage, sacrifice private interest to the common welfare,
set fire to the habitations, burgs, and _oppida_ which they could not
defend, so as to spread desolation from the territory of the Boii as far
as the enemy could extend his incursions. If that be an extreme
sacrifice, it is nothing in comparison with death and slavery.
This advice having been unanimously approved, the Bituriges, in one
single day, set fire to more than twenty towns; the neighbouring
countries follow their example. The hope of a speedy victory made them
support this painful sight with resignation. They deliberated whether
Avaricum should not undergo the same fate; the Bituriges implored them
to spare one of the most beautiful towns in Gaul, the ornament and
bulwark of their country; “the defence of it will be easy,” they added,
“on account of its almost inaccessible position.” Vercingetorix, at
first of a contrary opinion, ended by giving way to this general feeling
of compassion, entrusted the place to men capable of defending it, and,
following Cæsar by short marches, pitched his camp in a spot defended by
woods and marshes, sixteen miles from Avaricum[470] (two kilomètres to
the north of _Dun-le-Roy_, at the confluence of the Auron and the
Taisseau).
Avaricum was situated, as Bourges is at present, at the extremity of a
piece of ground surrounded, to the north and west, by several marshy
streams: the Yèvre, the Yévrette, and the Auron. (_See Plate 20._) The
Gaulish town, adorned with public places, and enclosing 40,000 souls,
exceeded, no doubt, in extent the Gallo-Roman circuit. The aspect of the
locality is certainly no longer the same: the marshes have been dried,
and the courses of water reduced within regular limits; the ruins
accumulated so many centuries ago have raised the level of the ground on
many points. To the south of Bourges, at a distance of 700 mètres, the
ground forms a neck, which, in the time of Cæsar’s wars, was narrower
than at present; it inclined more towards the place, and presented, at
80 mètres from the walls, a sudden depression, resembling a vast fosse.
(_See the section along C D._) The slopes, then, abrupt towards the
Yévrette and the Auron, defined more clearly the only and very narrow
avenue (_unum et perangustum aditum_) which gave access to the
town.[471]
Cæsar established his camp behind this tongue of land, to the south, and
at 700 mètres from Avaricum, between the Auron and the Yévrette. As the
nature of the locality prevented all countervallation, he took his
dispositions for a regular siege. The place was only open to attack
towards that part of the enclosure which faced the avenue, on a width of
from 300 to 400 Roman feet (about 100 mètres). In this place the summit
of the walls commanded by about 80 feet (twenty-four mètres) the ground
situated in advance.[472] Cæsar commanded a terrace to be commenced,
covered galleries to be pushed towards the _oppidum_, and two towers to
be constructed.
During the execution of these works, trusty messengers informed
Vercingetorix every moment of what was going on in Avaricum, and carried
back his orders. The besiegers were watched when they went to forage,
and, notwithstanding their precaution to choose every day different
hours and roads, they could not move any distance from the camp without
being attacked.
The Romans incessantly demanded provisions from the Ædui and the Boii;
but the first showed little haste to send them, and the latter, poor and
weak, had exhausted their resources; moreover, their country had just
been laid waste by fire. Although, during several days, the troops,
deprived of corn, lived only on cattle which had been brought from afar,
yet they uttered no complaint unworthy of the Roman name and of their
preceding victories. When, visiting the works, Cæsar addressed by turn
each of the legions, and offered to the soldiers to raise the siege if
they felt their privations too rigorous, they unanimously called upon
him to persevere: “they had learned,” they said, “after so many years
that they served under his command, never to suffer anything that was
humiliating, and to leave nothing unfinished.” They renewed this protest
to the centurions and to the tribunes.
The towers already approached the walls, when prisoners informed Cæsar
that Vercingetorix, from want of forage, had quitted his camp, leaving
in it the mass of his army, and had advanced nearer to Avaricum with his
cavalry and light infantry, with the intention of laying an ambush on
the spot where he expected that the Romans would go to forage the
following day.[473] Upon this information, Cæsar, seeking to take
advantage of the absence of Vercingetorix, started silently in the
middle of the night, and came in the morning near the camp of the
enemies. As soon as they were acquainted with his march, they hid their
baggage and wagons in the forests, and drew up their troops on an open
height. Cæsar immediately ordered his soldiers to lay down their bundles
in one spot, and to keep their arms ready for combat.
The hill occupied by the Gauls rose with an easy slope above a marsh
which, surrounding it on nearly all sides, rendered it difficult of
access, although it was only fifty feet broad. They had broken the
bridges, and, full of confidence in their position, drawn up according
to tribes, and guarding all the fords and passages, they were ready to
fall upon the Romans, if the latter attempted to overcome this obstacle.
With the two armies thus in presence and so near to each other, one
would have believed them, by their attitude, animated with the same
courage, and offering the combat under equal conditions; but, when we
consider the defensive strength of the position of the Gauls, we are
soon convinced that the firmness of the latter was only one of
ostentation. The Romans, indignant at being thus braved, demanded the
order to fight; but Cæsar represented to them that the victory would
cost the lives of too many brave men, and that the more they were bent
upon daring everything for his glory, the more blamable would it be in
him to sacrifice them. These words calmed their impatience, and the same
day he led them back to the siege operations.
Vercingetorix, on his return to his army, was accused of treason, for
having placed his camp nearer to that of the Romans, taken away with him
all the cavalry, left his infantry without a head, and facilitated, by
his departure, the sudden and so well-calculated arrival of the enemy.
“All these incidents,” they said, “could not be the effect of chance;
evidently Vercingetorix preferred owing the empire of Gaul to Cæsar than
to his fellow-citizens.” As the improvised chief of a popular movement,
Vercingetorix had to expect one of those fickle demonstrations of the
multitude, who are rendered fanatical by successes, and unjust by
reverses. But, strong in his patriotism and in his conduct, he justified
easily to his followers the dispositions he had taken. “The scarcity of
forage only has decided him, at their entreaties, to change the position
of his camp; he has chosen a new position, which is impregnable; he has
employed the cavalry, which is useless in a marshy place, to advantage.
He has transferred the command to nobody, for fear that a new chief, to
please bands without discipline, incapable of supporting the fatigues of
war, might let himself be persuaded to give battle. Whether it were
chance or treason which had brought the Romans before them, they ought
to thank Fortune for it, since they had retired with disgrace. He has no
desire to obtain the supreme authority from Cæsar at the price of a
guilty defection: victory will soon give it him. It is now no longer
doubtful. As to himself, he is ready to lay down an authority which
would be only a vain honour, and not a means of delivery;” and, to prove
the sincerity of his hopes, he brought forward slaves who had been made
prisoners, whom he represents as legionaries, and who, at his
instigation, declare that in three days the Romans will be obliged by
want of provisions to raise the siege. His discourse is received by the
acclamations of the army, and all signify their applause by the clang of
their arms, according to the Gaulish manner. It is agreed to send 10,000
men to Avaricum, taken among the different contingents, so that the
Bituriges alone should not have the glory of saving a town upon which
depended in a great measure the fate of the war.
The Gauls, endowed with the genius of imitation, struggled by all means
possible against the wonderful perseverance of the Roman soldiers. They
turned away the rams with pointed heads (_falces_)[474] by means of
nooses, and, when they had once caught hold of them, they dragged them
up by means of machines.[475] Accustomed to work in the iron mines, and
to the construction of subterranean galleries, they skilfully
countermined the terrace, and also provided their walls with towers of
several stories, covered with leather. Day and night they made sallies,
and set fire to the works of the besiegers. As the daily increase of the
terrace heightened the level of the towers, the besieged raised theirs
to the same height by means of scaffoldings; they stopped the progress
of the subterranean galleries, prevented them from being advanced to the
walls by trying to break them open with pointed stakes hardened in the
fire (_apertos cuniculos prœusta ac prœacuta materia ...
morabantur_),[476] and by throwing molten pitch and blocks of stone.
The Gauls constructed their walls in this manner: beams were placed
horizontally on the ground, in a direction perpendicular to the line of
the enclosure,[477] at intervals of two feet from each other; they were
bound together on the side of the town; by cross-beams, usually of forty
feet in length, firmly fixed in the ground, and the whole covered with a
great quantity of earth, except on the exterior side, where the
intervals were furnished with large blocks of rock, and formed a facing.
After this first layer had been well fixed and rendered compact, they
raised upon it a second, absolutely similar, taking care that the beams
were not exactly above each other, but corresponded with the intervals
filled in with stones, in which they were, as it were, enchased. The
work was thus continued until the wall had attained the required height.
These successive layers, in which the beams and stones alternated
regularly, offered, by their very variety, an agreeable appearance to
the eye. This construction had great advantages for the defence of
places: the stone preserved it from fire, and the wood from the ram;
held together by the cross-beams, the beams could be neither torn down
nor driven in. (_See Plate 20._)
Notwithstanding the obstinacy of the defence, and the cold and continual
rains, the Roman soldiers surmounted all obstacles, and raised in
twenty-five days a terrace 330 feet wide by 80 feet high. It already
nearly touched the town wall, when, towards the third watch (midnight),
clouds of smoke were seen issuing from it. It was the moment when Cæsar,
according to his custom, was inspecting the works, and encouraging the
soldiers at their labour; the Gauls had set the terrace on fire from the
gallery of a mine. At the same instant cries arose from the whole extent
of the rampart, and the besieged, rushing out by two gates, made a sally
on the two sides where the towers were; from the top of the walls some
threw dry wood and torches on the terrace, others pitch and various
inflammable materials; nobody knew whither to run nor where to give
help. As two legions, however, generally passed the night under arms in
front of the camp, whilst the others relieved each other alternately for
the work, they were soon able to face the enemy; meanwhile some drew
back the towers, and others cut the terrace to intercept the fire; the
whole army, in fact, hurried to put out the latter.
When day broke, they were still fighting on every point; the besieged
had the more hope of conquering, as the penthouses which protected the
approaches to the towers were burnt (_deustos pluteos turrium_),[478]
and as then the Romans, compelled to march without cover, could with
difficulty arrive at the burning works. Persuaded that the salvation of
Gaul depended on this critical moment, they replaced incessantly the
troops which were weary. Then happened a fact worthy of notice: before
the gate of the _oppidum_ there was a Gaul who threw balls of grease and
pitch into the fire opposite a Roman tower; a dart shot from a
_scorpion_[479] struck him in the right side and killed him. The next
man immediately takes his place, and perishes in the same manner; a
third succeeds him, then a fourth, and the post is only abandoned after
the extinction of the fire and the retreat of the assailants.
After so many fruitless efforts, the Gauls resolved next day to obey the
order of Vercingetorix, and evacuate the place. His camp not being far
off, they hoped, by favour of the night, to escape without great loss,
reckoning on a continuous marsh to protect their flight. But the women,
in despair, struggle to retain them, and, seeing that their
supplications had no effect, to such an extent does fear extinguish
pity, they give warning to the Romans by their cries, and thus compel
the Gauls to renounce their intended flight.
The day following Cæsar caused a tower to be advanced, and the works to
be prosecuted with vigour; an abundant rain, and the negligence of the
enemy in guarding the wall, engaged him to attempt an assault. He
thereupon ordered the work to be slackened without entirely stopping it,
in order not to awaken suspicions, assembled his legions under arms,
sheltered behind the covered galleries (_vineas_), and informed them
that they were going to reap the fruit of so many fatigues. He promised
rewards to those who should be first to scale the wall of the town, and
gave the signal. The Romans at once rushed forward from every side, and
reached the top of the ramparts.
The enemies, terrified by this unexpected attack, and thrown down from
the tops of the walls and towers, sought refuge in the public places,
and formed in wedges, so as to offer a resistance on all sides; but when
they saw that the Romans, instead of descending into the town, went
round it on the ramparts, they were afraid of being shut in, and threw
down their arms and fled towards the other extremity of the _oppidum_
(where are at present the faubourgs Taillegrain and Saint-Privé). (_See
Plate 20._) Most of them were killed near the gates, the narrow passage
of which they blocked up; the others by the cavalry outside the town. No
one among the Roman soldiers thought of plunder. Irritated by the
remembrance of the massacre of Genabum, and by the fatigues of the
siege, they spared neither old men, women, nor children. Of about 40,000
combatants, scarcely 800 fugitives were able to join Vercingetorix. He,
fearing that their presence, if they came in a body, might excite a
mutiny, had, in the middle of the night, sent trusty men and the
principal chiefs a long way out, to distribute them in fractions among
the camps belonging to the different tribes.
The next day Vercingetorix sought, in a general assembly, to revive the
courage of his countrymen, by ascribing the success of the Romans to
their superiority in the art of sieges, which was unknown to the Gauls.
He told them that this reverse ought not to dishearten them; that his
advice, they well knew, had never been to defend Avaricum; that a signal
revenge would soon console them; that, through his care, the countries
separated from the common cause would enter into his alliance, animate
Gaul with the one thought, and cement a union capable of resisting the
whole world. Then this fearless defender of the national independence
shows his genius in taking advantage even of a misfortune to subject his
ill-disciplined troops to the rough labours of war, and succeeds in
convincing them of the necessity of retrenching their camp in the manner
of the Romans, so as to protect it from surprise.
The constancy of Vercingetorix, after so great a reverse, and the
foresight which he had shown in recommending, from the beginning of the
war, to burn, and afterwards to abandon Avaricum, increased his
influence. So the Gauls, for the first time, fortified their camp, and
their courage was so much confirmed, that they were ready to undergo all
trials.
Vercingetorix, true to his engagements, exerted himself to the utmost to
gain over to his cause the other states of Gaul, and to seduce the
chiefs by presents and promises; and, for this purpose, he sent to them
zealous and intelligent agents. He caused the men who had fled from
Avaricum to be clothed and armed anew, and, in order to repair his
losses, he required from the divers states a contingent at a stated
period, and archers, who were very numerous in Gaul. At the same time
Teutomatus, son of Ollovico, King of the Nitiobriges, whose father had
received from the Senate the title of friend, came to join him with a
numerous corps of cavalry, raised in his own country and in Aquitaine.
Cæsar remained some time in Avaricum, where he found great store of
provisions, and where the army recovered from its fatigues.[480]
[Sidenote: Arrival of Cæsar at Decetia, and March towards Auvergne.]
V. The winter was drawing to a close, and the season was propitious for
the continuation of military operations. As Cæsar prepared to march
against the enemy, either in order to draw him from the woods and
marshes, or to shut him up in them, the _principes_ of the Ædui came to
request him to put an end to dissensions among them which threatened to
degenerate into civil war. “The situation was most critical. In fact,
according to ancient customs, the supreme authority was only granted to
a single magistrate, named for a year. At that moment, however, there
were two, each claiming to have been legally elected. The first was
Convictolitavis, a young man of illustrious birth; the second, Cotus,
sprung from a very ancient family, powerful also by his personal
influence, his alliances, and whose brother, Valetiacus, had the year
before filled the same office. The country was in arms, the Senate
divided like the people, each of the pretenders at the head of his
clients. The authority of Cæsar alone could prevent civil war.”
The Roman general considered it essential to prevent troubles from
arising in an important state, closely attached to the Republic, and
where the weakest party would not fail to call in the aid of
Vercingetorix. Consequently, notwithstanding the inconvenience of
suspending the military operations and moving from the enemy, he
resolved to repair to the Ædui, whose first magistrate, according to the
laws, could not leave the territory. Having thus aimed at proving to
them the respect which he entertained for their institutions, he arrived
at Decetia (_Decize, in the Nivernais_), where he called before him the
Senate and the two pretenders.[481] Nearly the whole nation came
thither. Cæsar, having acquired the conviction that the nomination of
Cotus was the result of an intrigue of the minority, obliged him to
resign, and maintained Convictolitavis, who had been chosen by the
priests, according to the legal forms and customs of the country.
After this decision, he engaged the Ædui to forget their quarrels, and
to devote themselves entirely to the war; Gaul once subjected, he would
recompense them for their sacrifices. He exacted from them all their
cavalry and 10,000 infantry, intending to distribute them in such a
manner as to ensure the regularity of the victualling department. He
next divided his army into two bodies. Labienus, detached with two
legions and part of the cavalry, had instructions to take at Sens the
two other legions which Cæsar had left there, and to repair, at the head
of those four legions, to the country of the Parisii, who had been drawn
by Vercingetorix into the revolt.
On his part, Cæsar resolved, with the six other legions and the rest of
the cavalry, to invade the country of the Arverni themselves, the focus
of the insurrection. He started from Decetia, and directed his march
upon Gergovia, the principal _oppidum_ of that people.
After the capture of Avaricum, Vercingetorix, suspecting Cæsar’s
ulterior designs, had moved towards the Allier, which the Romans were
obliged to pass in order to reach Gergovia; and, on the news of their
march, he had caused all the bridges to be destroyed.
Cæsar, having arrived on the banks of the Allier, towards Moulins (_see
Plate 19_), followed its downward course, on the right bank.
Vercingetorix, on his part, marched along the opposite bank. The two
armies were within sight of each other, the camps nearly opposite, and
the Gaulish scouts, who watched the left bank, prevented the Romans from
establishing a bridge. The position of the latter was difficult, for the
Allier, which is fordable in the autumn only, might delay their passage
a long time.[482] In order to surmount this obstacle, Cæsar had recourse
to a stratagem: he fixed his camp in a place covered with wood, opposite
the remains of one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be
destroyed (probably at Varennes). There he remained hidden the following
day with two legions, and made the rest of the troops, as well as the
baggage, proceed in the usual order. But, that they might present to the
enemy the appearance of six legions, he had divided into six corps the
forty cohorts or four legions which he sent forward.[483] They received
the order to march as long as possible, in order to attract
Vercingetorix, and, at the time Cæsar presumed that they had arrived at
their camp, he caused the bridge to be rebuilt on the old piles, the
lower part of which remained untouched. The work being soon completed,
the legions which remained with him passed the river, and, after having
chosen a favourable position, he recalled the mass of his army, which
rejoined him during the night.[484] When Vercingetorix was informed of
this manœuvre, fearing lest he should be compelled to fight against
his will, he took the start and marched in great haste to occupy the
_oppidum_ of the Arverni.
From the place he occupied, which we believe to have been Varennes,[485]
Cæsar reached Gergovia in five days; on the very day of his arrival,
after a slight skirmish of cavalry, he reconnoitred the position of the
town. As it was built on a very high mountain of difficult access, he
considered it impossible to take it by assault; he therefore resolved to
blockade it, and not to begin investing it until he had assured his
provisions. (_See Plate 21._)
[Sidenote: Blockade of Gergovia.]
VI. The _oppidum_ of the Arverni was situated at a distance of six
kilomètres to the south of Clermont-Ferrand, on the mountain which has
preserved the name of Gergovia. Its summit, elevated about 740 mètres
above the level of the sea, and 380 above the plain, forms a plateau of
1,500 mètres in length by more than 500 mètres in breadth. The northern
and eastern slopes present such abrupt declivities that they defy the
escalade. The southern slope presents a very different character: it may
be compared to an immense staircase, the steps of which would be vast
terraces with very little inclination, and a breadth which in some
places extends to as much as 150 mètres.
On the western side, the mountain of Gergovia is attached by a narrow
defile of 120 mètres in width, called the _Goules_ (_see Plate 21, C_),
to the heights of Risolles, an irregular mass, the plateau of which is
at a mean depth of about 30 mètres beneath that of Gergovia. To the west
are the detached mountains of Montrognon and Le Puy-Giroux. This latter
is separated from that of Risolles by a rather deep gorge, in which the
village of Opme is built. Opposite the southern slope of Gergovia, at
the very foot of the mountain, rises a very steep hill, called the Roche
Blanche. Its culminating point is at about 108 mètres below the plateau.
Two brooks, the Auzon and the Artières,[486] tributaries of the Allier,
flow, one to the south, the other to the north of Gergovia. Lastly, a
low tract of ground, situated to the east, indicates the site of the
ancient marsh of Sarlièves, which has been dry since the seventeenth
century.
Cæsar established his camp near the Auzon, on the undulations of the
ground which extend to the north-west of the village of Orcet, and as
far as the ancient marsh of Sarlièves. These undulations form a natural
_glacis_ towards the plain, above which they rise about thirty mètres;
on the side of the stream of the Auzon they terminate in almost
imperceptible slopes. The camp occupied a part of the table-land and of
the northern slope.[487] (_See Plate 21._)
Vercingetorix had arranged the contingents of each country separately,
at small intervals, on the southern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia
and the mountain mass of Risolles which look towards the Auzun; they
covered all the heights attached to the principal mountain, and
presented, in the space which the eye could embrace, a formidable
aspect.[488] His principal camps were situated between the outer wall of
the _oppidum_ and a wall of large stones, six feet high, which ran along
the bend of the hill.
Every day, at sunrise, the chiefs who composed the council of
Vercingetorix repaired to him in order to make their reports or to
receive his orders. Every day, also, he tried in slight engagements[489]
the courage of his cavalry mixed with archers. The Gauls occupied, as an
advanced post, but by a weak garrison, La Roche-Blanche, which, scarped
on three sides, presented an extremely strong position; Cæsar judged
that, by taking possession of this hill, he would deprive the Gauls
almost entirely of forage and water, for they could no longer descend to
the Auzon, the only considerable stream in the neighbourhood. He started
from the camp in the silence of the night, drove away this post before
it could be succoured from the town, took the position, and placed two
legions upon it. The Roche-Blanche became his smaller camp;[490] it was
joined to the larger one by a double ditch of twelve feet, which
allowed the troops to communicate in safety, even singly, without fear
of being surprised by the enemy. (_See Plate 22._)
During this time, the Æduan Convictolitavis, who, as we have seen, owed
the supreme magistracy to Cæsar, seduced by the money of the Arverni,
resolved to abandon the party of the Romans, and entered into
communication with several young men, at whose head was Litavicus and
his brothers, descended from an illustrious family. He shares with them
the price of his treason; exhorts them to remember that, born free, they
are made to command in their country; proves to them that the
lukewarmness of the Ædui alone delayed the general insurrection; and
that they ought to value above everything the independence of their
country. Seduced by such discourses and by the bait of gold, those young
men occupy themselves only with the means of executing their project;
yet, mistrusting the inclination of the people to be drawn into war,
they decide that Litavicus shall take the command of the 10,000 men who
were to join the Roman army, and induce them to revolt on the road,
whilst his brothers go before them to Cæsar.
Litavicus began his march. At thirty miles from Gergovia (probably at
Serbannes), he halts his troops, assembles them, and, spreading the
report that Cæsar has caused the Æduan nobility and knights who were in
his pay to be massacred, among others Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he
easily persuades them to go and join the Arverni at Gergovia, instead of
proceeding to the Roman camp. But, before taking this determination, he
gives up to plunder the convoy of provisions which marched under his
guard, causes the Romans who conducted it to be put to death with
tortures, and then sends messengers to raise the whole country of the
Ædui, by means of the same imposture. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whose
death he had falsely announced, were with Cæsar, who, by special favour,
had raised Viridomarus from a very low to a high dignity. The former,
informed of the design of Litavicus, came in the middle of the night to
acquaint the proconsul with it, imploring him not to allow the folly of
a few young men to detach his country from the Roman alliance. It would
be too late when so many thousands of men had embraced the contrary
party.
Cæsar, more affected by this news as he had always favoured the Ædui,
takes immediately four legions, without baggage, and all the cavalry; he
waits not even to contract the compass of the two camps, for everything
depends upon celerity. His lieutenant, C. Fabius, is left to guard them,
with two legions. He orders the brothers of Litavicus to be placed under
arrest, and learns that they have just passed over to the enemy. His
soldiers, encouraged to support the fatigues of the march, follow him
with ardour, and at about twenty-five miles from Gergovia (near Randan,
on the road which Litavicus had to follow to join Vercingetorix) they
meet the Ædui. The cavalry, sent in advance, have orders to stop them
without using their arms. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who had been
reported as dead, step forth from the ranks, speak to their
fellow-citizens, and are recognised. As soon as the deception practised
by Litavicus is discovered, the Ædui throw down their arms, ask for
pardon, and obtain it. Litavicus flies to Gergovia, with his clients,
who, in Gaul, never abandoned their patrons, not even in their worst
fortunes.
Cæsar sent to the Ædui to represent to them how generously he had acted
towards men whom the laws of war authorised him to put to death; and,
after having given his army three hours’ rest during the night, he
returned to his quarters before Gergovia. Half-way, horsemen came to
inform him of the perilous position of Fabius. The camps had been
attacked by troops which were unceasingly renewed. The Romans were
exhausted by unceasing labour, for the great extent of the enclosure
obliged them to remain continually on the _vallum_. The arrows and
missiles of all sorts thrown by the barbarians had wounded a great
number; but, on the other hand, the machines had been of great help in
supporting the defence. After the retreat of the enemies, Fabius,
expecting to be again attacked next day, had hastened to block up the
gates of the great camp, with the exception of two, and to add a
palisade to the _vallum_. On receiving this information, Cæsar hurried
his march, and, seconded by the ardour of his soldiers, arrived at the
camp before sunrise (having thus performed fifty miles, or seventy-four
kilomètres, in twenty-four hours).[491]
While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Ædui, also
deceived by the news which Litavicus had spread, fall upon the Roman
citizens, plunder their goods, kill some, and drag others to prison. It
is Convictolitavis, also, who prompts these violences. The military
tribune M. Aristius, who was on his way to join his legion, as well as
the foreign merchants who resided in the country, are compelled to leave
Cabillonum (_Châlon-sur-Sâone_). An escort is promised to protect them;
but they have hardly started when they are attacked and stripped. They
defend themselves, and their resistance, which lasts during twenty-four
hours, calls a greater multitude to arms. However, as soon as the Ædui
hear of the new submission of their troops, they exert themselves to the
utmost to obtain their pardon; they have recourse to Aristius, throw the
blame of the outbreak upon a few, order the plundered goods to be
collected, and confiscate those of Litavicus and his brothers. They send
deputies to Cæsar to excuse themselves. Their object, in acting thus,
was to obtain the free disposal of their troops, for the consciousness
of their treason and the fear of punishment made them, at the same time,
conspire in secret with the neighbouring states.
Although informed of these secret plots, Cæsar received their deputies
with kindness, declaring that he did not hold the nation responsible for
the fault of some individuals, and that his feelings towards the Ædui
were not changed. Nevertheless, as he foresaw a general insurrection of
Gaul, which would surround him on all sides, he entertained serious
thoughts of abandoning Gergovia, and again effecting the concentration
of his whole army; but it was of importance that his retreat, caused by
the sole fear of a general defection, should not appear to be a flight.
In the midst of these cares, the besieged offered him a favourable
chance, of which he sought to take advantage. As he was visiting the
little camp to inspect the works, he perceived that a hill (no doubt the
hill marked _A_, which forms part of the mountain mass of Rissoles, _see
Plate 21_), which was almost hidden from sight by the masses of enemies
on the previous days, was clear of troops. Astonished at this change, he
inquired the cause of the deserters, who came every day in crowds to
surrender to him. All agreed in saying, as his scouts had already
reported to him, that the mountain ridge to which this hill belonged
(the top of the heights of Risolles) was almost flat, was connected with
the town, and gave access to it by a narrow and wooded defile. (_See
Plates 21 and 22._) This point caused particular anxiety to the enemy;
for if the Romans, already masters of La Roche-Blanche, gained
possession of the mountain mass of Risolles, the Gauls would be almost
entirely invested, and could neither escape nor go to forage. This was
the reason why Vercingetorix had decided upon fortifying these heights,
and had called thither all his troops.[492]
In accordance with this information, Cæsar sends in this direction,
towards the middle of the night, several detachments of cavalry, with
orders to scour with great noise the country in every direction at the
foot of the heights of Risolles. At break of day, he sends out of the
great camp many horses and mules without pack-saddles, and causes the
muleteers to mount them, who put on helmets, so as to assume the
appearance of mounted troopers. He enjoins them to wind round the hills,
and a few cavalry who are joined with them have orders to spread wide
over the country, so as to increase the illusion. Finally, they are all,
by a long circuit, to move towards the spots which have just been
mentioned. These movements were perceived from the town, which
overlooked the camp, but at too great a distance to distinguish objects
accurately. Cæsar sends towards the same mountain mass one legion, who,
after having marched for a short distance, halt in a hollow, and pretend
to hide in the woods (towards Chanonat), so as to feign a surprise. The
suspicions of the Gauls increase; they take all their forces to the spot
threatened. Cæsar, seeing the enemy’s camp deserted, orders the military
ensigns (plumes, shields, &c.) to be covered, the standards to be
lowered, and the troops to pass in small detachments from the great to
the little camp, behind the epaulment of the double fosse of
communication, so that they cannot be perceived from the _oppidum_.[493]
He communicates his intentions to the lieutenants placed at the heads of
the legions, recommends them to take care to prevent the soldiers from
allowing themselves to be carried away by the ardour of the combat or
the hope of plunder, and draws their attention to the difficulties of
the ground. “Celerity alone,” he says, “can enable us to overcome them;
in fact, it is to be an attack by surprise, and not a fight.” Having
communicated these directions, he gives the signal, and, at the same
time, sends the Ædui out of the great camp, with orders to climb the
eastern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia, to effect a diversion to the
right. (_See Plate 21._)
The distance from the wall of the _oppidum_ to the foot of the mountain,
where the ground is almost flat, was 1,200 paces (1,780 mètres) in the
most direct line; but the way was longer, on account of the circuits it
was necessary to make to break the steepness.[494] Towards the middle of
the southern slope, in the direction of its length, the Gauls, taking
advantage of the character of the ground, had, as we have said, built a
wall of large stones, six feet high, a serious obstacle in case of
attack. The lower part of the slopes had remained free; but the upper
part, up to the wall of the _oppidum_, was occupied with camps placed
very near together. When the signal is given, the Romans reach rapidly
the wall, scale it, and take three camps with such promptitude, that
Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, surprised in his tent where he was
taking his repose in the middle of the day, fled half naked; his horse
was wounded, and he escaped with difficulty from the hands of the
assailants.
Cæsar, satisfied with this success, ordered the retreat to be sounded,
and made the tenth legion, which accompanied him, halt (from an
examination of the ground, the spot where Cæsar stood is the knoll which
rises to the west of the village of Merdogne). (_See Plate 21_, first
position of the tenth legion.) But the soldiers of the other legions,
separated from him by a rather wide ravine, did not hear the trumpet.
Although the tribunes and the lieutenants did all they could to restrain
them, excited by the hope of an easy victory, and by the recollection of
their past successes, they thought nothing was insurmountable to their
courage, and persisted in the pursuit of the enemy up to the walls and
gates of the _oppidum_.
Then an immense cry arises in the town. The inhabitants of the most
remote quarters believe that it is invaded, and rush out of the walls.
The matrons throw from the top of the walls their precious objects to
the Romans, and, with breasts bare and hands extended in supplication,
implore them not to massacre the women and children, as at Avaricum.
Several even, letting themselves down from the walls, surrender to the
soldiers. L. Fabius, centurion of the 8th legion, excited by the rewards
given at Avaricum, had sworn to be the first to mount to the assault; he
is lifted up by three soldiers of his company, reaches the top of the
wall, and, in his turn, helps them to mount one after the other.
Meanwhile the Gauls, who, as we have seen, had proceeded to the west of
Gergovia to raise retrenchments, hear the cries from the town; repeated
messages announce the capture of the _oppidum_. They immediately hurry
towards it, sending their cavalry before them. As they arrive, each man
takes his stand under the wall and joins the combatants, and their
number increases every moment; while the same women who just before
implored the pity of the besiegers, now excite against them the
defenders of Gergovia, displaying their dishevelled hair and showing
their children. The place as well as the numbers rendered the struggle
unequal; the Romans, fatigued with their run and the length of the
combat, resisted with difficulty troops which were still fresh.
This critical state of things inspired Cæsar with alarm; he ordered T.
Sextius, who had been left to guard the little camp, to bring out the
cohorts quickly, and take a position at the foot of the mountain of
Gergovia, on the right of the Gauls, so as to support the Romans if they
were repulsed, and check the enemy’s pursuit. He himself, drawing the
10th legion a little back[495] from the place where he had posted it,
awaited the issue of the engagement. (_See Plate 21_, second position of
the 10th legion.)
When the struggle was most obstinate, suddenly the Ædui, who had been
sent to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack from another
side, appeared on the right flank of the Romans. The resemblance of
their arms to those of the Gauls caused a great alarm; and although they
had their right shoulders bare (_dextris humeris exsertis_), the
ordinary mark of the allied troops, it was taken for a stratagem of the
enemy. At the same moment, the centurion L. Fabius, and those who had
followed him, are surrounded and thrown down from the top of the wall.
M. Petronius, centurion of the same legion, overwhelmed by numbers in
his attempt to burst the gates, sacrifices himself for the safety of his
soldiers, and meets his death in order to give them time to join their
ensigns. Pressed on all sides, the Romans are driven back from the
heights, after having lost forty-six centurions; nevertheless, the 10th
legion, placed in reserve on more level ground (_see Plate 21_, third
position), arrests the enemies, who are too eager in their pursuit. It
is supported by the cohorts of the 13th, who had just taken position on
a commanding post (_Le Puy-de-Marmant_), under the command of the
lieutenant T. Sextius. As soon as the Romans had reached the plain, they
rallied, and formed front against the enemy. But Vercingetorix, once
arrived at the foot of the mountain, ventured no further, but led back
his troops within the retrenchments. This day cost Cæsar nearly 700
men.[496]
Next day, Cæsar assembled his troops, and reprimanded them for their
rashness and for their thirst for plunder. He reproached them with
having “wished to judge for themselves of the object to be attained, and
of the means of attack, and not listening either to the signal of
retreat or to the exhortations of the tribunes and lieutenants. He
pointed out to them all the importance of the difficulties caused by the
inequalities of the ground; and reminded them of his conduct at
Avaricum, where, in presence of an enemy without chief and without
cavalry, he had renounced a certain victory rather than expose himself
to loss, though slight, in a disadvantageous position. Much as he
admired their bravery, which had been checked neither by the
retrenchments, nor by the steepness of the ground, nor by the walls, he
blamed no less their disobedience and their presumption in believing
themselves capable of judging of the chances of success and calculating
the issue of the undertaking better than their general. He demanded of
the soldiers submission and discipline, no less than firmness and
bravery; and, to revive their courage, he added that their want of
success was to be attributed to the difficulties of the ground much more
than to the valour of the enemy.”[497]
[Sidenote: Observations.]
VII. In the foregoing account, which is taken almost literally from the
“Commentaries,” Cæsar skilfully disguises a defeat. It is evident that
he hoped to take Gergovia by a sudden assault, before the Gauls, drawn
by a false attack to the west of the town, had time to come back to its
defence. Deceived in his expectation, he ordered the retreat to be
sounded, but too late to be executed in good order. Cæsar does not
appear to be sincere when he declares that he had attained his object
the moment his soldiers reached the foot of the wall. This could not
have been the case, for what use could it be to him to take camps almost
without troops in them, if the consequence was not to be the surrender
of the town itself? The defeat appears to have been complete, and,
according to some, Cæsar was for a moment a prisoner in the hands of the
Gauls; according to others, he had only lost his sword. Servius, indeed,
relates the following rather incomprehensible anecdote: when Cæsar was
taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out _Cæsar_,
which signifies in Gaulish _let him go_, and thus he escaped.[498]
Plutarch gives another version: “The Arverni,” he says, “still show a
sword hung up in one of their temples, which they pretend to be a spoil
taken from Cæsar. He saw it there himself subsequently, and only laughed
at it. His friends engaged him to take it away, but he refused,
pretending that it had become a sacred object.”[499] This tradition
proves that he was sufficiently great to bear the recollection of a
defeat, in which he was very different from Cicero, whom we have seen
stealthily taking away from the Capitol the brass plate on which was
engraved the law of his banishment.
[Sidenote: Cæsar leaves Gergovia in order to join Labienus.]
VIII. Cæsar, after the check he had suffered before Gergovia, persisted
all the more in his intentions of departure; but, not to have the
appearance of flight, he drew out his legions, and placed them in order
of battle on an advantageous ground. Vercingetorix did not allow himself
to be drawn into the plain; the cavalry only fought, and the combat was
favourable to the Romans, who afterwards returned to their camp. The
next day the same manœvre was repeated with the same success.
Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as
well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and
took his way towards the country of the Ædui.
His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived
on the third day (that is, his second day’s march, reckoning from the
assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the
bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in
order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.
There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their
presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience,
and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the
cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their
perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would
hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished
to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself
to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their
country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had
drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and
then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (_Nevers_). This
town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable
position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public
treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and,
lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt
of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of
Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as
of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of
Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre
the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share
amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the
hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away,
and destroy the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the
neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry
everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of
provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the
Narbonnese--a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire,
swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.
Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier
towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering
under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more
than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on
all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated
with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges,
irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute
the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or
retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter
course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the
passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt
the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted
to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order
to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before
the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that
river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at
Bourbon-Lancy.[500] The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity
made them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above
water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry
was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army
passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his
first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and
with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched
towards the land of the Senones.[501]
[Sidenote: Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii.]
IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus
had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an
island in the Seine, the _oppidum_ of the Parisii. After leaving his
baggage at Agedincum (_Sens_)[502] under the guard of the troops
recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left
bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important
streams and considerable towns.[503] At the news of his approach, the
enemy assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The
command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this
honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in
the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh
sloped towards the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of
the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops
along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (_See
Plate 23._)
When Labienus arrived on the opposite bank, he ordered covered galleries
to be pushed forward, and sought, by means of hurdles and earth, to
establish a road across the marsh; but, meeting with too many
difficulties, he formed the project of surprising the passage of the
Seine at Melodunum (_Melun_), and, when once on the right bank, of
advancing towards Lutetia by stealing a march upon the enemy. He
therefore left his camp in silence, at the third watch (midnight), and,
retracing his steps, arrived at Melun, an _oppidum_ of the Senones,
situated, like Lutetia, on an island in the Seine. He seized about fifty
boats, joined them together, filled them with soldiers, and entered into
the place without striking a blow. Terrified at this sudden attack, the
inhabitants, a great part of whom had answered to the appeal of
Camulogenus, offered no resistance. A few days before, they had cut the
bridge which united the island with the right bank; Labienus restored
it, led his troops over it, and proceeded towards Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. He took a position near the place where
Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois now stands. Camulogenus, informed by those who
had fled from Melun, quits his position on the Essonne, returns to
Lutetia, gives orders to burn it and to cut the bridges, and establishes
his camp on the left bank of the Seine, in front of the _oppidum_, that
is, on the present site of the Hotel de Cluny.
It was already rumoured that Cæsar had raised the siege of Gergovia; the
news of the defection of the Ædui, and of the progress of the
insurrection, had begun already to spread. The Gauls repeated
incessantly that Cæsar, arrested in his march by the Loire, had been
compelled, by want of provisions, to retire towards the Roman province.
The Bellovaci, whose fidelity was doubtful, had no sooner heard of the
revolt of the Ædui, than they collected troops and prepared openly for
war.
At the news of so many unfavourable events, Labienus felt all the
difficulties of his situation. Placed on the right bank of the Seine, he
was threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, who had only to cross the
Oise to fall upon him; on the other by Camulogenus, at the head of a
well-trained army, ready to give battle; lastly, a large river, which he
had crossed at Melun, separated him from Sens, where he had his dépôts
and baggage. To escape from this perilous position, he thought it
advisable to change his plans: he renounced all offensive movements, and
resolved to return to his point of departure by an act of daring.
Fearing that, if he went by the road on which he had advanced, he should
not be able to cross the Seine at Melun, because his boats would not
have re-mounted the river without difficulty, he decided on surprising
the passage of the Seine below Paris, and returning to Sens by the left
bank, marching over the body of the Gaulish army. Towards evening he
convoked a council, and urged on his officers the punctual execution of
his orders. He entrusted the boats he had brought from Melun to the
Roman knights, with orders to descend the river at the end of the first
watch (ten o’clock), to advance in silence for the space of four miles
(six kilomètres), which would bring them as far down as the village of
Point-du-Joir, and to wait for him. The five cohorts which had least
experience were left in charge of the camp, and the five others of the
same legion received orders to re-ascend on the right bank of the river
in the middle of the night, with all their baggage, and attract by their
tumult the attention of the enemy. Boats were sent in the same
direction, which were rowed with great noise. He himself, a little
after, left in silence with the three remaining legions, and, proceeding
down the river, repaired to the spot where the first boats waited for
him.
When he arrived there, a violent storm enabled him to carry by surprise
the Gaulish posts placed along the whole bank. The legions and cavalry
had soon passed the Seine with the assistance of the knights. Day began
to appear, when the enemy learnt, almost at the same instant, first,
that an unusual agitation prevailed in the Roman camp, that a
considerable column of troops was ascending the river, and that in the
same direction a great noise of oars was heard; lastly, that lower down
the stream the troops were crossing the Seine in boats. This news made
the Gauls believe that the legions intended to cross it on three points,
and that, perplexed by the defection of the Ædui, they had decided on
forcing the road by the left bank.[504] Camulogenus divided also his
forces into three corps: he left one opposite the Roman camp; sent the
second, less numerous, in the direction of Melodunum,[505] with
instructions to regulate its march according to the progress of the
enemy’s boats which re-ascended the Seine; and, at the head of the
third, went to meet Labienus.
At sunrise the Roman troops had crossed the river, and the enemy’s army
appeared drawn up in order of battle. Labienus exhorts his soldiers to
recall to mind their ancient valour, and so many glorious exploits, and,
as they marched to the combat, to consider themselves under the eye of
Cæsar, who had led them so often to victory: he then gives the signal.
At the first shock the 7th legion, placed on the right wing, routs the
enemy; but on the left wing, although the 12th legion had transpierced
the first ranks with their _pila_, the Gauls defend themselves
obstinately, and not one dreams of flight. Camulogenus, in the midst of
them, excites their ardour. The victory was still doubtful, when the
tribunes of the 7th legion, informed of the critical position of the
left wing, lead their soldiers to the back of the enemies, and take them
in the rear. The barbarians are surrounded, yet not one yields a step;
all die fighting, and Camulogenus perishes with the rest. The Gaulish
troops left opposite the camp of Labienus had hurried forward at the
first news of the combat, and had taken possession of a hill (probably
that of Vaugirard); but they did not sustain the attack of the
victorious Romans, and were hurried along in the general rout; all who
would not find refuge in the woods and on the heights were cut to pieces
by the cavalry.
After this battle Labienus returned to Agedincum; thence he marched with
all his troops, and went to join Cæsar.[506]
[Sidenote: The Gauls assume the offensive.]
X. The desertion of the Ædui gave the war a greater development.
Deputies are sent in all directions: credit, authority, money,
everything is put in activity to excite the other states to revolt.
Masters of the hostages whom Cæsar had entrusted to them, the Ædui
threaten to put to death those who belong to the nations which hesitate.
In a general assembly of Gaul, convoked at Bibracte, at which the Remi,
the Lingones, and the Treviri only were absent, the supreme command is
conferred on Vercingetorix, in spite of the opposition of the Ædui, who
claim it, and who, seeing themselves rejected, begin to regret the
favours they had received from Cæsar. But they had pronounced for the
war, and no longer dare to separate themselves from the common cause.
Eporedorix and Viridomarus, young men of great promise, obey
Vercingetorix unwillingly. The latter begins by exacting from the other
states hostages to be delivered on a fixed day; orders that the cavalry,
amounting to 15,000 men, shall be gathered round his person; declares he
has infantry enough at Bibracte, for his intention is not to offer a
pitched battle to the Romans, but, with a numerous cavalry, to intercept
their convoys of grain and forage. He exhorts the Gauls to set fire
with a common accord to their habitations and crops, which are only
small sacrifices in comparison to their liberty. These measures having
been decided, he demands from the Ædui and the Segusiavi, who bordered
upon the Roman province, 10,000 foot soldiers, sends them 800 horse, and
gives the command of these troops to the brother of Eporedorix, with
orders to carry the war into the country of the Allobroges. On another
side, he orders the Gabali and the neighbouring cantons of the Arverni
to march against the Helvii, and sends the Ruteni and the Cadurci to lay
waste the country of the Volcæ Arecomici. At the same time, he labours
secretly to gain the Allobroges, in the hope that the remembrance of
their ancient struggles against the Romans is not yet effaced. He
promises money to their chiefs, and to their country the sovereignty
over the whole Narbonnese.
To meet these dangers, twenty-two cohorts, raised in the province, and
commanded by the lieutenant Lucius Cæsar,[507] had to face the enemy on
every side. The Helvii, faithful to the Romans, by their own impulse,
attacked their neighbours in the open field; but repulsed with loss, and
having to deplore the death of their chiefs, among others that of C.
Valerius Donnotaurus, they ventured no more outside their walls. As to
the Allobroges, they defended their territory with energy, by placing a
great number of posts along the Rhone. The superiority of the enemy in
cavalry, the interruption of the communications, the impossibility of
drawing succour from Italy or the province, decided Cæsar on demanding
from the German peoples on the other side of the Rhine, subdued the year
before, cavalry and light infantry accustomed to fight intermingled. On
their arrival, finding that the cavalry were not sufficiently well
mounted, he distributed amongst them the horses of the tribunes, and
even those of the Roman knights and the volunteers (_evocati_).[508]
[Sidenote: Junction of Cæsar and Labienus. Battle of the Vingeanne.]
XI. The line of march followed by Cæsar after he had crossed the Loire
has been the subject of numerous controversies. Yet the “Commentaries”
appear to us to furnish sufficient data to determine it with precision.
On leaving Gergovia, Cæsar’s object was, as he tells us himself, to
effect a junction with Labienus; with this view, he marched towards the
land of the Senones, after having crossed the Loire at Bourbon-Lancy. On
his part, Labienus, after returning to Sens, having advanced to meet
Cæsar, their junction must necessarily have taken place on a point of
the line from Bourbon-Lancy to Sens; this point, in our opinion, is
Joigny. (_See Plate 19._) Encamped not far from the confluence of the
Armançon and the Yonne, Cæsar could easily receive the contingent which
he expected from Germany.
The Roman army was composed of eleven legions: the 1st, lent by Pompey,
and the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th.[509]
The effective force of each of them varied from 4,000 to 5,000 men;
for, if we see (lib. V. 49) that on the return from Britain two legions
reckoned together only 7,000 men, their effective force was soon
increased by considerable re-enforcements which came to the army of Gaul
in 702;[510] the legion lent by Pompey was of 6,000 men;[511] and the
13th, at the breaking out of the civil war, had in its ranks 5,000
soldiers.[512] Cæsar had then at his disposal, during the campaigns
which ended with the taking of Alesia, 50,000 legionaries, and perhaps
20,000 Numidian or Cretan archers, and 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry, a
thousand of whom were Germans, making a total of about 75,000 men,
without counting the valets, who were always very numerous.
When the junction of the troops had been effected, Cæsar sought above
all to approach the Roman province, in order to carry succour to it with
more ease; he could not think of taking the most direct road, which
would have led him into the country of the Ædui, one of the centres of
the insurrection; he was, therefore, obliged to pass through the
territory of the Lingones, who had remained faithful to him, and to
proceed into Sequania, where Besançon offered an important place of
arms. (_See Plate 19._) He started from Joigny, following the road which
he had taken when he marched to meet Ariovistus (696),[513] and the
winter before, when he moved from Vienne to Sens. After reaching the
Aube at Dancevoir, he proceeded towards the little river Vingeanne,
crossing, as the “Commentaries” say, the extreme part of the territory
of the Lingones (_per extremos Lingonum fines_).[514] His intention was,
no doubt, to cross the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler.
Whilst the Romans abandoned that part of Gaul which had revolted, in
order to approach nearer to the province, Vercingetorix had assembled
his army, amounting to more than 80,000 men, at Bibracte; it had come in
great part from the country of the Arverni, and counted in its ranks the
cavalry furnished by all the states. Having been informed of Cæsar’s
march, he started at the head of his troops, to bar the road through
Sequania. Passing, as we believe, by Arnay-le-Duc, Sombernon, Dijon, and
Thil-Châtel, he arrived at the heights of Occey, Sacquenay, and
Montormentier, where he formed three camps, at a distance of 10,000
paces (fifteen kilomètres) from the Roman army. (_See Plate 24._) In
this position Vercingetorix intercepted the three roads which Cæsar
could have taken towards the Saône, either at Gray, or at Pontailler, or
at Chalon.[515] Resolved on risking a battle, he convoked the chiefs of
the cavalry. “The moment of victory,” he told them, “has arrived; the
Romans fly into their province, and abandon Gaul. If this retreat
delivers us for the present, it ensures neither peace nor rest for the
future; they will return with greater forces, and the war will be
endless. We must attack them, therefore, in the disorder of their march;
for if the legions stop to defend their long convoy, they will not be
able to continue their road; or if, which is more probable, they abandon
their baggage in order to secure their own safety, they will lose what
is indispensable to them, and, at the same time, their prestige. As to
their cavalry, they will surely not dare to move away from the column;
that of the Gauls must show so much the more ardour, as the infantry,
ranged before the camp, will be there to intimidate the enemy.” Then,
the cavalry exclaimed, “Let every one swear, by a solemn oath, never to
return to the home of his forefathers, his wife, or his children, if he
has not ridden twice through the ranks of the enemy!” This proposition
was received with enthusiasm, and all took the oath.
The day on which Vercingetorix arrived on the heights of Sacquenay,[516]
Cæsar, as we have seen, encamped on the Vingeanne, near Longeau.
Ignorant of the presence of the Gauls, he started next day, in marching
column, the legions at a great distance from each other, separated by
their baggage. When his vanguard arrived near Dommarien, it could
perceive the hostile army. Vercingetorix was watching the moment they
(the Romans) debouched, to attack. He had divided his cavalry in three
bodies, and his infantry had descended from the heights of Sacquenay in
order to take a position along the Vingeanne and the Badin. (_See Plate
24._) As soon as the vanguard of the enemy appears, Vercingetorix bars
its way with one of the bodies of cavalry, while the two others show
themselves in order of battle on the two wings of the Romans. Taken
unexpectedly, Cæsar divides his cavalry also into three bodies, and
opposes them to the enemy. The combat engages on all sides; the column
of the Roman army halts; the legions are brought into line, and the
baggage placed in the intervals. This order, in which the legions were,
no doubt, in column of three deep, was easy to execute, and presented
the advantages of a square. Wherever the cavalry gives way or is too
hotly pressed, Cæsar sends to its support the cohorts, which he draws
from the main body to range them in order of battle.[517] By this
manœuvre he renders the attacks less vigorous, and increases the
confidence of the Romans, who are assured of support. Finally, the
German auxiliaries, having gained, to the right of the Roman army, the
summit of a height (the hill of Montsaugeon), drive the enemies from it,
and pursue the fugitives as far as the river, where Vercingetorix stood
with his infantry. At the sight of this rout, the rest of the Gaulish
cavalry fear to be surrounded, and take to flight. From this time the
battle became a mere carnage. Three Ædui of distinction are taken and
brought to Cæsar: Cotus, chief of the cavalry, who, at the last
election, had contended with Convictolitavis for the sovereign
magistracy; Cavarillus, who, since the defection of Litavicus, commanded
the infantry; and Eporedorix, whom the Ædui had for chief in their war
against the Sequani, before the arrival of Cæsar in Gaul.[518]
[Sidenote: Blockade of Alesia.]
XII. Vercingetorix, after the defeat of his cavalry, decided on a
retreat; taking his infantry with him, without returning to his camp, he
marched immediately towards Alesia, the _oppidum_ of the Mandubii. The
baggage, withdrawn from the camp, followed him without delay.[519] Cæsar
ordered his baggage to be carried to a neighbouring hill, under the
guard of two legions, pursued the enemies as long as daylight permitted,
killed about 3,000 men of their rear-guard, and established his camp,
two days afterwards, before Alesia.[520] After having reconnoitred the
position of the town, and taking advantage of the disorder of the enemy,
who had placed his principal confidence in his cavalry, which was thrown
into consternation by its defeat, he resolved to invest Alesia, and
exhorted his soldiers to support the labours and fatigues of a siege
with constancy.
Alise-Sainte-Reine, in the department of the Côte-d’Or, is, undoubtedly,
the Alesia of the “Commentaries.” The examination of the strategic
reasons which determined the march of Cæsar, the correct interpretation
of the text, and, lastly, the excavations lately made, all combine to
prove it.[521]
Ancient Alesia occupied the summit of the mountain now called Mont
Auxois; on the western slope is built the village of Alise-Sainte-Reine.
(_See Plates 25 and 26_.) It is an entirely isolated mountain, which
rises 150 to 160 mètres above the surrounding valleys (_erat oppidum
Alesia in colle summo, admodum edito loco ..._). Two rivers bathe the
foot of the mountain on two opposite sides: they are the Ose and the
Oserain (_cujus collis radices duo duabus ex partibus flumina
subluebant_). To the west of Mont Auxois the plain of Laumes extends,
the greatest dimension of which, between the village of Laumes and that
of Pouillenay, is 3,000 paces or 4,400 mètres (_ante oppidum planities
circiter millia passuum III in longitudinem patebat_). On all other
sides, at a distance varying from 1,100 to 1,600 mètres, rises a belt of
hills, the plateaux of which are at the same height (_reliquis ex
omnibus partibus colles, mediocri interjecto spatio, pari altitudinis
fastigio oppidum cingebant_).
The summit of Mont Auxois has the form of an ellipse, 2,100 mètres in
length, and 800 mètres broad in its greatest diameter. Including the
first spurs which surround the principal mass, it is found to contain a
superficies of 1,400,000 square mètres, 973,100 mètres of which for the
upper plateau and 400,000 mètres for the terraces and spurs. (_See Plate
25_.) The town appears to have crowned the whole of the plateau, which
was protected by scarped rocks against all attack.[522]
This _oppidum_ could, apparently, only be reduced by a complete
investment. The Gaulish troops covered, at the foot of the wall, all the
slopes of the eastern part of the mountain; they were there protected by
a fosse and by a wall of unhewn stones six feet high. Cæsar established
his camps in favourable positions, the infantry on the heights, the
cavalry near the watercourses. These camps, and twenty-three redoubts or
blockhouses,[523] formed a line of investment of 11,000 paces (sixteen
kilomètres).[524] The redoubts were occupied in the day by small posts,
to prevent any surprise; by night, strong detachments bivouacked in
them.
The works were hardly begun, when a cavalry engagement took place in the
plain of Laumes. The combat was very hot on both sides. The Romans were
giving way, when Cæsar sent the Germans to their assistance, and ranged
the legions in order of battle in front of the camps, so that the
enemy’s infantry, kept in awe, should not come to the assistance of the
cavalry. That of the Romans recovered confidence on seeing that they
were supported by the legions. The Gauls, obliged to fly, became
embarrassed by their own numbers, and rushed to the openings left in the
wall of unhewn stones, which were too narrow for the occasion. Pursued
with fury by the Germans up to the fortifications, some were slain, and
others, abandoning their horses, attempted to cross the fosse and climb
over the wall. Cæsar then ordered the legions, who were drawn up before
his retrenchments, to advance a little. This movement carried disorder
into the Gaulish camp. The troops within feared a serious attack, and
the cry to arms rose on all sides. Some, struck with terror, threw
themselves into the _oppidum_; Vercingetorix was obliged to order the
gates to be closed, for fear the camp should be abandoned. The Germans
retired, after having killed a great number of the cavalry, and taken a
great number of horses.
Vercingetorix resolved to send away all his cavalry by night, before the
Romans had completed the investment. He urges the cavalry, on their
departure, to return each to his country, and recruit the men able to
carry arms; he reminds them of his services, and implores them to think
of his safety, and not to deliver him as a prey to the enemies, him who
has done so much for the general liberty: their indifference would
entail with his loss that of 80,000 picked men. On an exact calculation,
he has only provisions for one month; by husbanding them carefully, he
may hold out some time longer. After these recommendations, he causes
his cavalry to leave in silence, at the second watch (nine o’clock). It
is probable that they escaped by ascending the valleys of the Ose and
the Oserain. Then he orders, on pain of death, all the corn to be
brought to him. He divides among the soldiers individually the numerous
cattle which had been collected by the Mandubii; but as to the grain,
he reserves the power of distributing it gradually and in small
quantities. All the troops encamped outside withdraw into the _oppidum_.
By these dispositions he prepares to wait for the succour of Gaul, and
to sustain the war.
As soon as Cæsar was informed of these measures by the prisoners and
deserters, he resolved to form lines of countervallation and
circumvallation, and adopted the following system of fortifications: he
ordered first of all to be dug, in the plain of Laumes, a fosse twenty
feet wide, with vertical walls, that is, as wide at the bottom as at the
level of the ground (_see Plates 25 and 28_), so as to prevent lines so
extensive, and so difficult to guard with soldiers along their whole
extent, from being attacked suddenly by night, and also to protect the
workmen from the darts of the enemy during the day. Four hundred feet
behind this fosse, he formed the countervallation. He then made two
fosses of fifteen feet wide, of equal depth,[525] and filled the
interior fosse--that is, the one nearest to the town--with water derived
from the river Oserain. Behind these fosses he raised a rampart and a
palisade (_aggerem ac vallum_), having together a height of twelve feet.
Against this was placed a fence of hurdles with battlements (_loricam
pinnasque_); strong forked branches were placed horizontally at the
junction of the hurdle-fence and the rampart, so as to render them more
difficult to scale. (_See Plate 27._) Lastly, he established towers on
all this part of the countervallation, with a distance of eighty feet
between them.
It was necessary at the same time to work at widely extended
fortifications, and to fetch in wood and provisions, so that these
distant and toilsome expeditions diminished incessantly the effective
force of the combatants; and the Gauls, too, often attempted to harass
the workmen, and even made vigorous sallies, through several gates at a
time. Cæsar judged it necessary to increase the strength of the works,
so that they might be defended with a smaller number of men. He ordered
trees or large branches to be taken, the extremities of which were
sharpened and cut to a point;[526] they were placed in a fosse five feet
deep; and, that they might not be torn up, they were tied together at
the lower part; the other part, furnished with branches, rose above
ground. There were five rows of these, contiguous and interlaced;
whoever ventured amongst them would be wounded by their sharp points;
they were called _cippi_. In front of these sorts of _abatis_ were dug
wolves’ pits (_scrobes_), trunconic fosses, of three feet deep, disposed
in the form of a quincunx. In the centre of each hole was planted a
round stake, of the thickness of a man’s thigh, hardened in the fire,
and pointed at the top; it only rose about four inches above ground. In
order to render these stakes firmer, they were surrounded at the base
with earth well stamped down; the rest of the excavation was covered
with thorns and brushwood, so as to conceal the trap. There were eight
rows of holes, three feet distant from each other: they were called
_lilies_ (_lilia_), on account of their resemblance to the flower of
that name. Lastly, in front of these defences were fixed, level with
the ground, stakes of a foot long, to which were fixed irons in the
shape of hooks. These kind of caltrops, to which they gave the name of
_stimuli_,[527] were placed everywhere, and very near each other.
When this work was finished, Cæsar ordered retrenchments to be dug,
almost similar, but on the opposite side, in order to resist attacks
from the exterior. This line of circumvallation, of fourteen miles in
circuit (twenty-one kilomètres), had been formed on the most favourable
ground, in conforming to the nature of the locality. If the Gaulish
cavalry brought back an army of succour, he sought by these means to
prevent it, however numerous it might be, from surrounding the posts
established along the circumvallation. In order to avoid the danger
which the soldiers would have run in quitting the camps, he ordered that
every man should provide himself with provisions and forage for thirty
days. Notwithstanding this precaution, the Roman army suffered from
want.[528]
Whilst Cæsar adopted these measures, the Gauls, having convoked an
assembly of their principal chiefs, probably at Bibracte, decided not to
collect all their men able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix wished, but to
demand from each people a certain contingent, for they dreaded the
difficulty of providing for so large and so confused a multitude, and of
maintaining order and discipline. The different states were required to
send contingents, the total of which was to amount to 283,000 men; but,
in reality, it did not exceed 240,000. The cavalry amounted to
8,000.[529]
The Bellovaci refused their contingent, declaring that they intended to
make war on their own account, at their own will, without submitting to
anybody’s orders. Nevertheless, at the instance of Commius, their host,
they sent 2,000 men.
This same Commius, we have seen, had in previous years rendered signal
service to Cæsar in Britain. In return for which, his land, that of the
Atrebates, freed from all tribute, had recovered its privileges, and
obtained the supremacy over the Morini. But such was then the eagerness
of the Gauls to re-conquer their liberty and their ancient glory, that
all feelings of gratitude and friendship had vanished from their memory,
and all devoted themselves body and soul to the war.
The numbering and the review of the troops took place on the territory
of the Ædui. The chiefs were named; the general command was given to the
Atrebatan Commius; to the Æduans Viridomarus and Eporedorix, and to the
Arvernan Vercasivellaunus, cousin of Vercingetorix. With them were
joined delegates from each country, who formed a council of direction
for the war. They began their march towards Alesia, full of ardour and
confidence: each was convinced that the Romans would retreat at the mere
sight of such imposing forces, especially when they found themselves
threatened at the same time by the sallies of the besieged, and by an
exterior army powerful in infantry and in cavalry.
Meanwhile, the day on which the besieged expected succour was past, and
their provisions were exhausted; ignorant, moreover, of what was taking
place among the Ædui, they assembled to deliberate on a final
resolution. The opinions were divided: some proposed to surrender,
others to make a sally, without waiting till their vigour would be
exhausted. But Critognatus, an Arvernan distinguished by his birth and
credit, in a discourse of singular and frightful atrocity, proposed to
follow the example of their ancestors, who, in the time of the war of
the Cimbri, being shut up in their fortresses, and a prey to want, ate
the men who were unable to bear arms, rather than surrender. When the
opinions were gathered, it was decided that that of Critognatus should
only be adopted at the last extremity, and that for the present they
would confine themselves to sending out of the place all useless mouths.
The Mandubii, who had received the Gaulish army within their walls,
were compelled to leave with their wives and children. They approached
the Roman lines, begged to be taken for slaves and supplied with bread.
Cæsar placed guards along the _vallum_, with orders not to admit them.
At length Commius and the other chiefs, followed by their troops, appear
before Alesia; they halt upon a neighbouring hill, scarcely 1,000 paces
from the circumvallation (the hill of Mussy-la-Fosse). The following day
they draw their cavalry out of their camp; it covered the whole plain of
Laumes. Their infantry establishes itself at a short distance on the
heights. The plateau of Alesia commanded the plain. At the sight of the
army of succour, the besieged meet together, congratulate each other,
yield to excess of joy, and then they rush out of the town, fill the
first fosse with fascines and earth, and all prepare for a general and
decisive sally.
Cæsar, obliged to face the enemy on two sides at once, disposed his army
on the two opposite lines of the retrenchments, and assigned to each his
post; he then ordered the cavalry to leave its camps, and to give
battle. From all the camps placed on the top of the surrounding hills,
the view extended over the plain, and the soldiers, in suspense, waited
for the issue of the event. The Gauls had mixed with their cavalry a
small number of archers and light-armed soldiers, to support them if
they gave way, and arrest the attack of the cavalry of the enemy. A good
number of the latter, wounded by these foot-soldiers, whom they had not
perceived until then, were obliged to retire from the battle. Then the
Gauls, confident in their numerical superiority, and in the valour of
their cavalry, believed themselves sure of victory; and from all sides,
from the besieged, as well as from the army of succour, there arose an
immense cry to encourage the combatants. The engagement was in view of
them all; no trait of courage or of cowardice remained unknown; on both
sides, all were excited by the desire of glory and the fear of
dishonour. From noon till sunset the victory remained uncertain, when
the Germans in Cæsar’s pay, formed in close squadrons, charged the
enemy, and put them to the rout; in their flight they abandoned the
archers, who were surrounded; then, from all parts of the plain, the
cavalry pursued the Gauls up to their camp without giving them time to
rally. The besieged, who had sallied out of Alesia, returned in
consternation, and almost despairing of safety.
After a day employed in making a great number of hurdles, ladders, and
hooks, the Gauls of the army of succour left their camp in silence
towards the middle of the night, and approached the works in the plain.
Then, suddenly uttering loud cries, in order to warn the besieged, they
throw their fascines, to fill up the fosse, attack the defenders of the
_vallum_ with a shower of sling-balls, arrows, and stones, and prepare
everything for an assault. At the same time, Vercingetorix, hearing the
cries from without, gives the signal with the trumpet, and leads his
troops out of the place. The Romans take in the retrenchments the places
assigned to them beforehand, and they spread disorder among the Gauls by
throwing leaden balls, stones of a pound weight, and employing the
stakes placed in the works beforehand; the machines rain down upon the
enemy a shower of darts. As they fought in the dark (the shields being
useless), there were in both armies many wounded. The lieutenants M.
Antony and C. Trebonius, to whom was entrusted the defence of the
threatened points, supported the troops that were too hardly pressed by
means of reserves drawn from the neighbouring redoubts. So long as the
Gauls kept far from the circumvallation, the multitude of their missiles
gave them the advantage; but when they approached, some became suddenly
entangled in the _stimuli_; others fell bruised into the _scrobes_;
others again were transpierced by the heavy _pila_ used in sieges, which
were thrown from the tops of the _vallum_ and the towers. They had many
disabled, and nowhere succeeded in forcing the Roman lines. When day
began to break, the army of succour retired, fearing to be taken in
their uncovered flank (the right side) by a sally from the camps
established on the mountain of Flavigny. On their side, the besieged,
after losing much valuable time in transporting the material for the
attack, and in making efforts to fill up the first fosse (the one which
was twenty feet wide), learnt the retreat of the army of succour before
they had reached the real retrenchment. This attempt having failed, like
the other, they returned into the town.
Thus twice repulsed with great loss, the Gauls of the army of succour
deliberated on what was to be done. They interrogate the inhabitants of
the country, who inform them of the position and the sort of defences
of the Roman camps placed on the heights.
To the north of Alesia there was a hill (Mont Réa) which had not been
enclosed in the lines, because it would have given them too great an
extent; the camp necessary on that side had, for this reason, to be
established on a slope, and in a disadvantageous position (_see Plate
25, camp D_); the lieutenants C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius
Rebilus occupied it with two legions. The enemy’s chiefs resolved to
attack this camp with one part of their troops, whilst the other should
assail the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes. Having decided on
this plan, they send their scouts to reconnoitre the localities,
secretly arrange among themselves the plan and the means of execution,
and decide that the attack shall take place at noon. They choose 60,000
men amongst the nations most renowned for their valour.
Vercasivellaunus, one of the four chiefs, is placed at their head. They
sally at the first watch, towards nightfall, proceed by the heights of
Grignon and by Fain towards Mont Réa, arrive there at break of day,
conceal themselves in the depressions of the ground to the north of that
hill, and repose from the fatigues of the night. At the hour appointed,
Vercasivellaunus descends the slopes and rushes upon the camp of Reginus
and Rebilus; at the same moment, the cavalry of the army of succour
approaches the retrenchments in the plain, and the other troops,
sallying from their camps, move forwards.
When, from the top of the citadel of Alesia, Vercingetorix saw these
movements, he left the town, carrying with him the poles, the small
covered galleries (_musculos_), the iron hooks (_falces_),[530] and
everything which had been prepared for a sally, and proceeded towards
the plain. An obstinate struggle follows;, everywhere the greatest
efforts are made, and wherever the defence appears weakest, the Gauls
rush to the attack. Scattered over extensive lines, the Romans defend
only with difficulty several points at the same time, and are obliged to
face two attacks from opposite sides. Fighting, as it were, back to
back, everybody is agitated by the cries he hears, and by the thought
that his safety depends upon those that are behind him; “it lies in
human nature,” says Cæsar, “to be struck more deeply with the danger one
cannot see.”[531]
On the northern slopes of the mountain of Flavigny (at the point marked
_J C_, _Plate 25_), Cæsar had chosen the most convenient spot for
observing each incident of the action, and for sending assistance to the
places which were most threatened. Both sides were convinced that the
moment of the decisive struggle had arrived. If the Gauls do not force
the lines, they have no further hope of safety; if the Romans obtain the
advantage, they have reached the end of their labours. It is especially
at the retrenchments on the slopes of Mont Réa that the Romans run the
greatest danger, for the commanding position of the enemy gives them an
immense disadvantage (_iniquum loci ad declivitatem fastigium, magnum
habet momentum_). One part of the assailants throw darts; another
advances, forming the tortoise; fresh troops incessantly relieve the
soldiers who are weary. All strive desperately to fill the fosses, to
render useless the accessory defences by covering them with earth, and
to scale the rampart. Already the Romans begin to feel the want of arms
and strength. Cæsar, informed of this state of things, sends Labienus to
their succour with six cohorts, and orders him, if the troops cannot
maintain themselves behind the retrenchments, to withdraw them and make
a sally, but only at the last extremity. Labienus, encamped on the
mountain of Bussy, descends from the heights to proceed to the place of
combat. Cæsar, passing between the two lines, repairs to the plain,
where he encourages the soldiers to persevere, for this day, this hour
will decide whether they are to gather the fruit of their former
victories.
Meanwhile the besieged, having abandoned the hope of forcing the
formidable retrenchments of the plain, direct their attack against the
works situated at the foot of the precipitous heights of the mountain of
Flavigny, and transport thither all their materials of attack; with a
shower of arrows they drive away the Roman soldiers who fight from the
top of the towers; they fill the fosses with earth and fascines, clear a
passage for themselves, and, by means of iron hooks, tear down the
wattling of the parapet and the palisade. Young Brutus is first sent
thither with several cohorts, and after him the lieutenant C. Fabius
with seven more; at last, as the action becomes still hotter, Cæsar
himself hurries to them with new reserves.
After the fortune of the fight has been restored, and the enemies driven
back, he proceeds towards the place where he had sent Labienus, draws
four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, orders a part of the cavalry to
follow him, and the other part to go round by the exterior lines, to
take the enemy in the rear by issuing from the camp of Grésigny. On his
side, Labienus, seeing that neither the fosses nor the ramparts can
arrest the efforts of the Gauls, rallies thirty-nine cohorts which have
arrived from the neighbouring redoubts, and which chance offers to him,
and informs Cæsar that, according to what had been agreed, he is going
to make a sally.[532] Cæsar hastens his march in order to share in the
combat. As soon as, from the heights on which they stood, the
legionaries recognise their general by the colour of the garment which
he was in the habit of wearing in battle (the purple-coloured
_paludamentum_),[533] and see him followed by cohorts and detachments of
cavalry, they sally from the retrenchments and begin the attack. Shouts
arise on both sides, and are repeated from the _vallum_ to the other
works. When Cæsar arrives, he sees the lines abandoned, and the battle
raging in the plain of Grésigny, on the banks of the Ose. The Roman
soldiers throw away the _pilum_, and draw their swords. At the same
time, the cavalry of the camp of Grésigny appears in the rear of the
enemy; other cohorts approach. The Gauls are put to the rout, and in
their flight encounter the cavalry, who make great slaughter among them.
Sedulius, chief and prince of the Lemovices, is slain; the Arvernan
Vercasivellaunus is taken prisoner. Seventy-four ensigns are brought to
Cæsar. Of all this army, so numerous as it was, few combatants return to
their camp safe and sound.
Witnesses, from the top of their walls, of this sanguinary defeat, the
besieged despaired of their safety, and called in the troops who were
attacking the countervallation.[534] As the result of these reverses,
the Gauls of the army of succour fly from their camp; and if the Romans,
compelled to defend so many points at one time, and to assist each other
mutually, had not been worn out by the labours of a whole day, the
entire mass of the enemies might have been annihilated. Towards the
middle of the night the cavalry sent in pursuit came up with their
rear-guard; a great part of them were taken prisoners or killed; the
others dispersed, to return to their countries.
Next day, Vercingetorix convokes a council. He declares that he has not
undertaken this war out of personal interest, but for the cause of the
liberty of all. “Since they must yield to fate, he places himself at the
discretion of his fellow-citizens, and offers them, in order to appease
the Romans, to be delivered up, dead or alive.” A deputation is at once
sent to Cæsar, who requires that the arms and the chiefs be delivered to
him. He places himself in front of his camp, inside the retrenchments;
the chiefs are brought, the arms are laid down, and Vercingetorix
surrenders to the conqueror. This valiant defender of Gaul arrives on
horseback, clad in his finest arms, makes the circuit of Cæsar’s
tribunal, dismounts, and laying down his sword and his military ensigns,
exclaims: “Thou hast vanquished a brave man, thou, the bravest of
all!”[535] The prisoners were distributed by head to each soldier, by
way of booty, except the 20,000 who belonged to the Ædui and Arverni,
and whom Cæsar restored in the hope of bringing back those people to his
cause.
Dio Cassius relates the surrender of the Gaulish chief as follows:
“After this defeat, Vercingetorix, who had neither been taken nor
wounded, might have fled; but, hoping that the friendship which had
formerly bound him to Cæsar would procure his pardon, he repaired to the
proconsul, without having sent a herald to ask for peace, and appeared
suddenly in his presence, at the moment he was sitting on his tribunal.
His appearance inspired some fear, for he was of tall stature, and had a
very imposing aspect under arms. There was a deep silence: the Gaulish
chief fell at Cæsar’s knees, and implored him by pressing his hands,
without uttering a word. This scene excited the pity of the by-standers,
by the remembrance of Vercingetorix’s former fortune compared to his
present misfortune. Cæsar, on the contrary, upbraided him with the
recollections on which he had hoped for his safety. He compared his
recent struggle with the friendship of which he reminded him, and by
that means pointed out more vividly the odiousness of his conduct. And
thus, far from being touched with his misfortune at that moment, he
threw him at once in fetters, and afterwards ordered him to be put to
death, after having exhibited him in his triumph.” By acting thus, Cæsar
believed that he was obeying state policy and the cruel customs of the
time. It is to be regretted for his glory that he did not use, towards
Vercingetorix, the illustrious Gaulish chief, the same clemency which,
during the Civil War, he showed towards the vanquished who were his
fellow-citizens.
When these events were accomplished, Cæsar proceeded towards the Ædui,
and received their submission. There he met the envoys of the Arverni,
who promised to pay deference to his orders: he required from them a
great number of hostages. Afterwards, he placed his legions in winter
quarters. T. Labienus, with two legions and some cavalry, among the
Sequani (Sempronius Rutilius was given him as a colleague); C. Fabius
and L. Minucius Basilius, with two legions, among the Remi, in order to
protect them against the Bellovaci, their neighbours; C. Antistius
Reginus amongst the Ambluareti; T. Sextius among the Bituriges; C.
Caninius Rebilus among the Ruteni, each with one legion. Q. Tullius
Cicero and P. Sulpicius were established at Cabillonum (_Chalon_) and
Matisco (_Mâcon_), in the land of the Ædui, on the Saône, to ensure the
supply of provisions. Cæsar resolved to pass the winter at
Bibracte.[536] He announced those events at Rome, where twenty days of
public thanksgivings were decreed.
[Sidenote: Details of the Excavations at Mont Auxois.]
XIII. The excavations earned on round Mont Auxois, from 1862 to 1863,
have brought to light, in nearly all points, the fosses of the Roman
retrenchments. The following is the result:--
CAMPS.--Cæsar debouched upon Alesia by the mountain of Bussy (_see Plate
25_), and distributed his army round Mont Auxois: the legions encamped
on the heights, and the cavalry was established on the lower grounds,
near the streams.
There were four camps of infantry, two of them, _A_ and _B_, on the
mountain of Flavigny. Their form depends on that of the ground: they
were shaped in such a manner that the retrenchments should, as far as
possible, command the ground situated before them. On the side where it
could have been attacked, that is, to the south, the camp _A_ presented
formidable defences, to judge from the triple line of fosses which
surround this part. (_See Plates 25 and 28._) We must, perhaps, suppose
that it was occupied by Cæsar in person. The camp _B_ is more extensive.
The vestiges of its _remblai_ are still visible at the present day, in
the greatest part of its circuit, in consequence of this land having
never been touched by the plough. It is the only known example of
visible traces of a camp made by Cæsar. None of the camps of the
mountain of Flavigny having been attacked, the excavations have only
brought to light in the fosses a small number of objects. The entrances
to the camps are at the places marked by arrows on _Plate 25_. A third
camp of infantry was situated on the mountain of Bussy, at _C_.
The fourth infantry camp was established on the lower slopes of Mont
Réa, at _D_. It is the one occupied by the two legions of Reginus and
Rebilus, and which Vercasivellaunus attacked with 60,000 men. Indeed, it
will be observed that the spur situated to the north of Mont Auxois,
between the Rabutin and the Brenne, is much farther from Alesia than the
other mountains which surround it, and Mont Réa, which is the nearest
part of it, is still more than 2,000 mètres distant from it. Hence it
follows that Cæsar could not have included Mont Réa in his lines without
giving them an excessive development. Consequently, he was obliged to
establish one of his camps on the southern slope of that hill. This
camp was on the point of being forced, and an obstinate battle was
fought there. The excavations have led to the discovery in the fosses of
a multitude of interesting objects, and, among them, more than 600 Roman
and Gaulish coins. (See the list in _Appendix C_.)[537] The extremity of
the upper fosse, represented by dots on _Plates 25_ and _28_, has not
been discovered, because earthfalls have taken place on that part of
Mont Réa, which would have obliged the excavators to dig too deep to
arrive at the bottom of the fosse. The strength of the retrenchments of
the infantry camps was very variable, as may be seen by inspecting the
various profiles of the fosses. (_See Plate 28._) For each camp, they
have larger dimensions on the side which is not defended by the
escarpments, as may easily be conceived.
There were four cavalry camps, _G H I K_, placed near the different
streams: three in the plain of Laumes, and one in the valley of the
Rabutin. The fosses of these camps took greatly varied shapes. (_See
Plate 28._) In general, their dimensions were decidedly less than those
of the fosses of the infantry camps. Camp _G_, however, had rather deep
fosses; no doubt because it was farthest from the lines. The fosse which
enclosed camp _I_ towards the side of the Brenne has disappeared by the
inundations of the river.
REDOUBTS, OR CASTELLA.--Of the twenty-three redoubts or blockhouses
(_castella_), five only have been discovered; they were the most
considerable; they are represented on _Plate 25_, by the numbers 10, 11,
15, 18, 22. The others, built of wood, and forming blockhouses, would
not have left any trace; they are marked by circles on the most
convenient places.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINE OF INVESTMENT.--We
know, from the “Commentaries,” that camp _D_, on the slopes of Mont Réa,
contained two legions. By comparing its superficies with that of the
other camps, we may admit that these were occupied in the following
manner: in camp _A_, one legion; in camp _B_, two legions; in camp _C_,
three legions; total, eight legions. The three remaining legions would
have been distributed in the twenty-three redoubts. As we have said, the
number of 11,000 paces can evidently only apply to the line of
investment formed by the eight camps and the twenty-three redoubts
established round Alesia immediately after the arrival of the army, and
not, as has been believed, to the countervallation properly so called,
which was only constructed subsequently (VII. 72). This number is
rigorously exact, for the circuit of ground surrounded by the camps
measures a little more than sixteen kilomètres, which represents 11,000
Roman paces.
THE FOSSE OF TWENTY FEET.--This fosse has been discovered in its whole
extent: it barred the plain of Laumes, following a direction
perpendicular to the course of the Ose and the Oserain, and did not go
round Mont Auxois. _Plate 28_ represents two of its most remarkable
sections. It was not exactly twenty feet in width, as stated in the
“Commentaries;” neither was it everywhere 400 paces distant from the
countervallation. This measurement is only exact towards the extremities
of the fosse, near the two rivers.
COUNTERVALLATION.--Vercingetorix, having retired to the plateau of
Alesia, could only have escaped by the plain of Laumes, and, at the
worst, by the valley of the Rabutin; for the spurs situated to the
south, the east, and the north of Mont Auxois are surmounted by a belt
of perpendicular rocks, which form insurmountable barriers, and the
valleys of the Oserain and the Ose, which divide them, constitute
veritable defiles. It became important, therefore, to bar the plain of
Laumes with impregnable works. Hence Cæsar accumulated there the means
of defence; but he simplified them everywhere else, as the excavations
have shown.
These are the works, peculiar to the plain of Laumes, which Cæsar
describes in chapters 72 and 73. The traces of the two fosses exist
over the whole extent of the plain, from one river to the other. They
had not the same form: the one nearest to Mont Auxois is
square-bottomed; the other is triangular. (_See Plates 27 and 28._) The
width of the first is fifteen feet, as stated in the text; that of the
triangular fosse is fifteen feet at certain points, but more frequently
a little less. The two fosses have the same depth; but it does not reach
fifteen feet, as the translators have wrongly understood it. To dig a
fosse of fifteen feet deep is so considerable a work, on account of the
two stages of workmen which it requires, that it has, perhaps, never
been executed for a temporary fortification. Moreover, the result of the
excavations leaves no doubt on this subject: the two fosses of the
countervallation have both only a depth of from eight to nine feet.
The fosse which is nearest Mont Auxois was filled with water. The Romans
had naturally introduced the water into that of the two fosses which,
owing to its square bottom, could contain the most considerable volume.
A careful level made in the plain of Laumes has proved that this water
was derived from the Oserain. During the excavations, the gravel has
been found which the water of this river had carried with it, at the
time of the investment of Alesia, almost to the middle of the length of
the fosse.
To the left of the Oserain, the countervallation cut the first slopes of
the hill of Flavigny for a length of 800 mètres; thence it continued,
having but one fosse, the various sections of which are indicated on
_Plate 28_. It ran at first along the left bank of the river, at a mean
distance of fifty mètres, as far as the mill of Chantrier, then cut the
western extremity of Mont Penneville, between the Oserain and the Ose,
followed the right bank of the latter river, along the slopes of the
mountain of Bussy, and, after having crossed the small plain of
Grésigny, joined the camp established at the foot of Mont Réa. Nearly
everywhere the Romans had the advantage of a commanding position to
defend the countervallation. The excavations have proved that in the
plain of Grésigny the fosse of the countervallation had been filled with
water from the Rabutin. They have led to the discovery in the ancient
bed of this stream (_see Plate 25_), at the very point where the fosse
joined it, of a wall of unhewn stones, which barred the waters so as to
conduct them into this fosse.[538]
CIRCUMVALLATION.--Over the extent of the plain of Laumes, and on the
slopes of the mountain of Flavigny, the circumvallation was parallel to
the countervallation, at a mean distance of 200 mètres. It had only one
single fosse, which in the plain was square-bottomed, so as to allow
more soil to be dug out; everywhere else its form was triangular. (_See
Plate_ 28.) The circumvallation of the mountain of Flavigny ceased
towards the escarpments, where the defences became useless; then, again,
it continued on the plateau, where it formed the connection between the
camps. After this, it descended towards the Oserain, cut the point of
Mont Penneville, re-ascended the slopes of the mountain of Bussy, where
it similarly united the camps, descended into the plain of Grésigny,
which it crossed in a direction parallel to the countervallation, and
ended at camp _D_. On the heights it was made to follow the undulations
of the ground, so that its defenders should occupy as much as possible a
commanding position with respect to that of the assailants. Moreover,
the works of the circumvallation were not everywhere the same. Thus,
near the escarpments and ravines which cut this line, the Romans had
made no fosse with epaulment, but only accessory defences, such as
_abatis_ and wolf-pits, which even alternated on divers points.
Above the _castellum_ 21, between Grésigny and Mont Réa, the excavations
have brought to light a fosse of great dimensions, the bottom of which
was full of bones of animals of divers kinds. Its position, near a small
ravine in which runs a brook, may lead us to suppose that here was the
_abattoir_ of the Roman army. In considering this fosse, and those which
have been discovered on the top and on the slopes of Mont Réa, as
forming part of the circumvallation, there will be found for the
development of this line about twenty kilomètres, which represents with
sufficient accuracy the fourteen miles of the text of the
“Commentaries.”[539]
WOLF-PITS.--In the plain of Laumes, at the top of the circumvallation,
and close to the exterior bank of the fosse, there have been counted
more than fifty wolf-pits, in five rows. Others have been cleared out on
the heights--nine between the camp _A_ and the escarpments, twenty-seven
on the mountain of Bussy, near the _castellum_ 15; they are dug in the
rock, and in such a perfect state of preservation that they appear as
though they had been made but yesterday. At the bottom of some of these
last, fifteen arrow-heads were picked up. All these wolf-pits are three
feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and a little less than one
foot at the bottom.
GAULISH CAMP.--During the first days of the investment, the besieged
encamped on the slopes of Mont Auxois, towards the eastern part of the
hill. They were protected by a fosse and a wall of unhewn stones six
feet high. We have traced the site of this camp at _P Q R S_ on _Plate
25_. The excavations have brought to light, in the direction of _Q R_ on
the slopes which shelve towards the Oserain, traces of fosses and
remains of walls. On the plateau of Mont Auxois it might be interesting
to attempt to discover the ancient Gaulish wall. It has been uncovered
in pieces here and there over the whole space of the declivities; hence
it may be concluded that the town occupied the whole of the plateau.
A remarkable specimen of this wall is visible at a point of Mont Auxois,
near the spot where recently the statue of Vercingetorix has been
erected.
As to the camps of the army of succour, it is probable that the Gauls
did not form any retrenchments on the hills where they established
themselves.
CHAPTER XI.
(Year of Rome 703.)
(BOOK VIII.[540] OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
[Sidenote: Expedition against the Bituriges and Carnutes.]
I. The capture of Alesia and that of Vercingetorix, in spite of the
united efforts of all Gaul, naturally gave Cæsar hopes of a general
submission; and he therefore believed that he could leave his army,
during the winter, to rest quietly in its quarters from the hard labours
which had lasted, without interruption, during the whole of the past
summer. But the spirit of insurrection was not extinct among the Gauls;
and convinced by experience that, whatever might be their number, they
could not, in a body, cope with troops inured to war, they resolved, by
partial insurrections, raised on all points at once, to divide the
attention and the forces of the Romans, as their only chance of
resisting them with advantage.
Cæsar was unwilling to leave them time to realise this new plan, but
gave the command of his winter quarters to his quæstor Mark Antony,
quitted Bibracte on the day before the Calends of January (the 25th of
December), with an escort of cavalry, joined the 13th legion, which was
in winter quarters among the Bituriges, not far from the frontier of the
Ædui, and called to him the 11th legion, which was the nearest at hand.
Having left two cohorts of each legion to guard the baggage, he
proceeded towards the fertile country of the Bituriges, a vast
territory, where the presence of a single legion was insufficient to put
a stop to the preparations for insurrection.
His sudden arrival in the midst of men without distrust, who were spread
over the open country, produced the result which he expected. They were
surprised before they could enter into their _oppida_, for Cæsar had
strictly forbidden everything which might have raised their suspicion,
especially the application of fire, which usually betrays the sudden
presence of an enemy. Several thousands of captives were made; those who
succeeded in escaping sought in vain a refuge among the neighbouring
nations. Cæsar, by forced marches, came up with them everywhere, and
obliged each tribe to think of its own safety before that of others.
This activity held the populations in their fidelity, and, through fear,
engaged the wavering to submit to the conditions of peace. Thus the
Bituriges, seeing that Cæsar offered them an easy way to recover his
protection, and that the neighbouring states had suffered no other
chastisement than that of having to deliver hostages, did not hesitate
in submitting.
The soldiers of the 11th and 13th legions had, during the winter,
supported with rare constancy the fatigues of very difficult marches, in
intolerable cold. To reward them, he promised to give, by way of
prize-money, 200 sestertii to each soldier, and 2,000 to each centurion.
He then sent them into their winter quarters, and returned to Bibracte,
after an absence of forty days. Whilst he was there dispensing justice,
the Bituriges came to implore his support against the attacks of the
Carnutes. Although it was only eighteen days since he returned, he
marched again, at the head of two legions, the 6th and the 14th, which
had been placed on the Saône to ensure the supply of provisions.
On his approach, the Carnutes, taught by the fate of others, abandoned
their miserable huts, which they had erected on the site of their burgs
and _oppida_ destroyed in the last campaign, and fled in every
direction. Cæsar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the rigour of the
season, established his camp at Genabum (_Gien_), and lodged his
soldiers partly in the huts which had remained undestroyed, partly in
tents, under penthouses covered with straw. The cavalry and auxiliary
infantry were sent in pursuit of the Carnutes, who, hunted down
everywhere, and without shelter, took refuge in the neighbouring
countries.[541]
[Sidenote: Campaign against the Bellovaci.]
II. After having dispersed some rebellious meetings and stifled the
germs of an insurrection, Cæsar believed that the summer would pass
without any serious war. He left, therefore, at Genabum, the two legions
he had with him, and gave the command of them to C. Trebonius.
Nevertheless, he learnt, by several intimations from the Remi, that the
Bellovaci and neighbouring peoples, with Correus and Commius at their
head, were collecting troops to make an inroad on the territory of the
Suessiones, who had been placed, since the campaign of 697, under the
dependence of the Remi.
He then considered that it regarded his interest, as well as his
dignity, to protect allies who had deserved so well of the Republic. He
again drew the 11th legion from its winter quarters, sent written orders
to C. Fabius, who was encamped in the country of the Remi, to bring into
that of the Suessiones the two legions under his command, and demanded
one of his legions from Labienus, who was at Besançon. Thus, without
taking any rest himself, he shared the fatigues among the legions by
turns, as far as the position of the winter quarters and the necessities
of the war permitted.
When this army was assembled, he marched against the Bellovaci,
established his camp on their territory, and sent cavalry in every
direction, in order to make some prisoners, and learn from them the
designs of the enemy. The cavalry reported that the emigration was
general, and that the few inhabitants who were to be seen were not
remaining behind in order to apply themselves to agriculture, but to act
as spies upon the Romans. Cæsar, by interrogating the prisoners, learnt
that all the Bellovaci able to fight had assembled on one spot, and that
they had been joined by the Ambiani, the Aulerci,[542] the Caletes, the
Veliocasses, and the Atrebates. Their camp was in a forest, on a height
surrounded by marshes (Mont Saint-Marc, in the forest of Compiègne)
(_see Plate 29_); their baggage had been transported to more distant
woods. The command was divided among several chiefs, but the greater
part obeyed Correus, on account of his well-known hatred to the Romans.
Commius had, a few days before, gone to seek succour from the numerous
Germans who lived in great numbers in the neighbouring countries
(probably those on the banks of the Meuse). The Bellovaci resolved with
one accord to give Cæsar battle, if, as report said, he was advancing
with only three legions, for they would not run the risk of having
afterwards to encounter his entire army. If, on the contrary, the Romans
were advancing with more considerable forces, they proposed to keep
their positions, and confine themselves to intercepting, by means of
ambuscades, the provisions and forage, which were very scarce at that
season.
This plan, confirmed by many reports, seemed to Cæsar full of prudence,
and altogether contrary to the usual rashness of the barbarians. He
took, therefore, every possible care to dissimulate the number of his
troops; he had with him the 7th, 8th, and 9th legions, composed of old
soldiers of tried valour, and the 11th, which, formed of picked young
men who had gone through eight campaigns, deserved his confidence,
although it could not be compared with the others with regard to bravery
and experience in war. In order to deceive the enemies by showing them
only three legions, the only number they were willing to fight, he
placed the 7th, 8th, and 9th in one line; whilst the baggage, which was
not very considerable, was placed behind, under the protection of the
11th legion, which closed the march. In this order, which formed almost
a square, he came unawares in sight of the Bellovaci. At the unexpected
view of the legions, which advanced in order of battle and with a firm
step, they lost their courage; and instead of attacking, as they had
engaged to do, they confined themselves to drawing themselves up before
their camp, without leaving the height. A valley, deeper than it was
wide (_magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente_), separated the
two armies. On account of this obstacle and the numerical superiority of
the barbarians, Cæsar, though he had wished for battle, abandoned the
idea of attacking them, and placed his camp opposite that of the Gauls,
in a strong position (the camp of Saint Pierre-en-Chatre [_in Castris_],
in the forest of Compiègne).[543] (_See Plates 29 and 30._) He caused it
to be surrounded with a parapet twelve feet high, surmounted with
accessory works, proportioned to the importance of the retrenchment
(_loriculamque pro ratione ejus altitudinis_),[544] and preceded by a
double fosse, fifteen feet wide, with a square bottom;[545] towers of
three stories were constructed from distance to distance, and united
together by covered bridges, the exterior part of which was protected by
hurdle-work. In this manner, the camp was protected not only by a double
fosse, but also by a double row of defenders, some of whom, placed on
the bridges, could, from this elevated and sheltered position, throw
their missiles farther and with a better aim; while the others, placed
on the _vallum_, nearer to the enemy, were protected by the bridges from
the missiles which showered down upon them. The entrances were defended
by means of higher towers, and were closed with gates.
These formidable retrenchments had a double aim: to increase the
confidence of the barbarians, by making them believe that they were
feared; and, next, to allow the number of the garrison to be reduced
with safety, when they had to go far for provisions. For some days there
were no serious engagements, but slight skirmishes in the marshy plain
which extended between the two camps. The capture, however, of a few
foragers did not fail to swell the presumption of the barbarians, which
was still more increased by the arrival of Commius, although he had
brought only 500 German cavalry.
The enemies remained for several days shut up in their impregnable
position. Cæsar judged that an assault would cost too many lives; an
investment alone seemed to him opportune, but it would require a greater
number of troops. He wrote thereupon to Trebonius to send him as soon as
possible the 13th legion, which, under the command of T. Sextius, was in
winter quarters among the Bituriges; to join it with the 6th and the
14th, which the first of these lieutenants commanded at Genabum, and to
come himself with these three legions by forced marches. During this
time he employed the numerous cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the
other allies, to protect the foragers and to prevent surprises. But this
daily service, as is often the case, ended by being negligently
performed; and one day the Remi, pursuing the Bellovaci with too much
ardour, fell into an ambuscade. In withdrawing, they were surrounded by
foot-soldiers, in the midst of whom Vertiscus, their chief, met with his
death. True to his Gaulish manner, he would not allow his age to
dispense him from commanding and mounting on horseback, although he was
hardly able to keep his seat. His death and this feeble advantage raised
the self-confidence of the barbarians still more, but it rendered the
Romans more circumspect. Nevertheless, in one of the skirmishes which
were continually taking place within sight of the two camps, about the
fordable places of the marsh, the German infantry, which Cæsar had sent
for from beyond the Rhine, in order to mix them with the cavalry, joined
in a body, boldly crossed the marsh, and, meeting with little
resistance, continued the pursuit with such impetuosity that fear seized
not only the enemies who fought, but even those who were in reserve.
Instead of availing themselves of the advantages of the ground, all fled
cowardly; they did not stop till they were within their camp, and some
even were not ashamed to fly beyond it. This defeat caused a general
discouragement, for the Gauls were as easily damped by the least reverse
as they became arrogant on the smallest success.
Day after day was passing in this manner, when Cæsar was informed of the
arrival of C. Trebonius and his troops, which raised the number of his
legions to seven. The chiefs of the Bellovaci then feared an investment
like that of Alesia, and resolved to quit their position. They sent away
by night the old men, the infirm, the unarmed men, and the part of the
baggage which they had kept with them. Scarcely was this confused
multitude in motion, embarrassed with its own mass and its numerous
chariots, when daylight surprised it, and the troops had to be drawn up
in line before the camp, to give the column time to move away. Cæsar saw
no advantage either in giving battle to those who were in position, or,
on account of the steepness of the hill, in pursuing those who were
making their retreat; he resolved, nevertheless, to make two legions
advance in order to disturb the enemy in his retreat. Having observed
that the mountain on which the Gauls were established was connected with
another height (Mont Collet), from which it was only separated by a
narrow valley, he ordered bridges to be thrown on the marsh; the legions
crossed over them, and soon attained the summit of the height, which was
defended on both sides by abrupt declivities. There he collected his
troops, and advanced in order of battle up to the extremity of the
plateau, whence the engines, placed in battery, could reach the masses
of the enemy with their missiles.
The barbarians, rendered confident by the advantage of their position,
were ready to accept battle, if the Romans dared to attack the mountain;
besides, they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if
divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led
Cæsar to resolve on leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing a
camp on this spot, and retrenching it. When the works were completed,
the legions were placed before the retrenchments, and the cavalry
distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had
recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed
from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the
Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the
same time their order of battle, placed them in front of the camp, and,
towards the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to
them. Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish
troops, who fled in haste.
Although the fire prevented Cæsar from seeing the retreat of the enemy,
he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry
in pursuit; but he marched only slowly, for fear of some stratagem, as
the barbarians might have formed the design of drawing the Romans to a
disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride
through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass
over a distance of ten miles, and halt in a place strongly fortified by
nature, Mont Ganelon, where they pitched their camp. In this position,
they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent
ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to
forage.[546]
[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne.]
III. After several encounters of this kind, Cæsar learnt by a prisoner
that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with 6,000 picked infantry and
1,000 horsemen, were preparing an ambuscade in the places where the
abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans. In
consequence of this information, he sent forward the cavalry, which was
always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some
light-armed auxiliaries; and he himself, with a greater number of
legions, followed them as near as possible.
The enemy had posted themselves in a plain (that of Choisy-au-Bac) of
about 1,000 paces wide in every direction, and surrounded on one side by
forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to pass (the
Aisne). The cavalry were acquainted with the designs of the Gauls;
feeling themselves supported, they advanced resolutely, in squadrons,
towards this plain, which was surrounded with ambushes on all sides.
Correus, seeing them arrive in this manner, believed the opportunity
favourable for the execution of his plan, and began by attacking the
first squadrons with a few men. The Romans sustained the shock, without
concentrating themselves in a mass on the same point, “which,” says
Hirtius, “happens usually in cavalry engagements, and leads always to a
dangerous confusion.” There, on the contrary, the squadrons remained
separated, fought in detached bodies, and, when one of them advanced,
its flanks were protected by the others. Correus then ordered the rest
of his cavalry to issue from the woods. An obstinate combat began on all
sides, without any decisive result, until the enemy’s infantry,
debouching from the forest in close ranks, forced the Roman cavalry to
fall back. The lightly-armed soldiers, who preceded the legions, placed
themselves between the squadrons, and restored the fortune of the
combat. After a certain time, the troops, animated by the approach of
the legions and the arrival of Cæsar, and ambitious of obtaining alone
the honour of the victory, redoubled their efforts, and gained the
advantage. The enemies, on the other hand, were discouraged and took to
flight; but they were stopped by the very obstacles which they intended
to throw in the way of the Romans. A small number, nevertheless, escaped
through the forest and crossed the river. Correus, who remained unshaken
under this catastrophe, obstinately refused to surrender, and fell
pierced with wounds.
After this success, Cæsar hoped that, if he continued his march, the
enemy, in dismay, would abandon his camp, which was only eight miles
from the field of battle. He therefore crossed the Aisne, though not
without great difficulties.
The Bellovaci and their allies, informed by the fugitives of the death
of Correus, of the loss of their cavalry and the flower of their
infantry, fearing every moment to see the Romans appear, convoked, by
sound of trumpets, a general assembly, and decided by acclamation to
send deputies and hostages to the proconsul. The barbarians implored
forgiveness, alleging that this last defeat had ruined their power, and
that the death of Correus, the instigator of the war, delivered them
from oppression, for during his life it was not the Senate who
governed, but an ignorant multitude. To their prayers, Cæsar replied,
“that last year the Bellovaci had revolted in concert with the other
Gaulish peoples, but that they alone had persisted in the revolt. It was
very convenient to throw their faults upon those who were dead; but how
could it be believed that, with nothing but the help of a weak populace,
a man should have had sufficient influence to raise and sustain a war,
contrary to the will of the chiefs, the decision of the Senate, and the
desire of honest people? However, the evil which they had drawn upon
themselves was for him a sufficient reparation.”
The following night the Bellovaci and their allies submitted, with the
exception of Commius, who fled to the country whence he had recently
drawn succours. He had not dared to trust the Romans for the following
reason: the year before, in the absence of Cæsar, T. Labienus, informed
that Commius was conspiring and preparing an insurrection, thought that,
without accusing him of bad faith, says Hirtius, he could repress his
treason. Under pretext of an interview, he sent C. Volusenus Quadratus
with some centurions to kill him; but, when they were in the presence of
the Gaulish chief, the centurion who was to strike him missed his blow,
and only wounded him; swords were drawn on both sides, and Commius had
time to escape.[547]
[Sidenote: Devastation of the Country of the Eburones.]
IV. The most warlike tribes had been vanquished, and none of them dreamt
of further revolt. Nevertheless, many inhabitants of the
newly-conquered countries abandoned the towns and the fields in order to
withdraw themselves from the Roman dominion. Cæsar, in order to put a
stop to this emigration, distributed his army into different countries.
He ordered the quæstor Mark Antony to come to him, with the 12th legion,
and sent the lieutenant Fabius with twenty-five cohorts into an opposite
part of Gaul (to the country situated between the Creuse and the
Vienne), where it was said that several peoples were in arms, and where
the lieutenant Caninius Rebilus, who commanded with two legions,
appeared not to be sufficiently strong;[548] lastly, he ordered T.
Labienus to join him in person, and to send the 15th legion,[549] which
he had under his command, into Cisalpine Gaul, to protect the colonies
of Roman citizens there against the sudden inroads of the barbarians,
who, the summer before, had attacked the Tergestini (the inhabitants of
Trieste).
As for Cæsar, he proceeded with four legions to the territory of the
Eburones, to lay it waste; as he could not secure Ambiorix, who was
still wandering at large, he thought it advisable to destroy everything
by fire and sword, persuaded that this chief would never dare to return
to a country on which he had brought such a terrible calamity: the
legions and the auxiliaries were charged with this execution. Then, he
sent Labienus with two legions to the country of the Treviri, who,
always at war with the Germans, were only kept in obedience by the
presence of a Roman army.[550]
[Sidenote: Expedition against Dumnacus.]
V. During this time, Caninius Rebilus, who had first been appointed to
go into the country of the Ruteni, but who had been detained by partial
insurrections in the region situated between the Creuse and the Vienne,
learnt that numerous hostile bands were assembling in the country of the
Pictones; he was informed of this by letters from Duratius, their king,
who, amid the defection of a part of his people, had remained invariably
faithful to the Romans. He started immediately for Lemonum (_Poitiers_).
On the road, he learnt from prisoners that Duratius was shut up there,
and besieged by several thousand men under the orders of Dumnacus, chief
of the Andes. Rebilus, at the head of two weak legions, did not dare to
measure his strength with the enemy; he contented himself with
establishing his camp in a strong position. At the news of his approach,
Dumnacus raised the siege, and marched to meet the legions. But, after
several days’ fruitless attempts to force their camp, he returned to
attack Lemonum.
Meanwhile, the lieutenant Caius Fabius, occupied in pacifying several
peoples, learnt from Caninius Rebilus what was going on in the country
of the Pictones; he marched without delay to the assistance of
Duratius. The news of the march of Fabius deprived Dumnacus of all hope
of opposing at the same time the troops shut up in Lemonum and the army
of succour. He abandoned the siege again in great haste, not thinking
himself safe until he had placed the Loire between him and the Romans;
but he could only pass that river where there was a bridge (at Saumur).
Before he had joined Rebilus, before he had even obtained a sight of the
enemy, Fabius, who came from the north, and had lost no time, doubted
not, from what he heard from the people of the country, that Dumnacus,
in his fear, had taken the road which led to that bridge. He therefore
marched thither with his legions, preceded, at a short distance, by his
cavalry. The latter surprised the column of Dumnacus on its march,
dispersed it, and returned to the camp laden with booty.
During the night of the following day, Fabius again sends his cavalry
forward, with orders to delay the march of the enemy, so as to give time
for the arrival of the infantry. The two cavalries are soon engaged; but
the enemy, thinking that he had to contend only with the same troops as
the day before, draws up his infantry in line, so as to support the
squadrons, when, suddenly, the legions appear in order of battle. At
this sight, the barbarians are struck with terror, the long train of
baggage is thrown into confusion, and they disperse. More than 12,000
men were killed, and all the baggage fell into the hands of the Romans.
Only 5,000 fugitives escaped from this rout; they were received by the
Senonan Drappes, the same who, in the first revolt of the Gauls, had
collected a crowd of vagabonds, slaves, exiles, and robbers, to
intercept the convoys of the Romans. They took the direction of the
Narbonnese with the Cadurcan Lucterius, who, as has been seen in the
preceding chapter (p. 275), had before attempted a similar invasion.
Rebilus pursued them with two legions, in order to avoid the shame of
seeing the province suffering any injury from such a contemptible
rabble.
As for Fabius, he led the twenty-five cohorts against the Carnutes and
the other peoples, whose forces had already been reduced by the defeat
they had just experienced with Dumnacus. The Carnutes, though often
beaten, had never been completely subdued; they gave hostages; the
Armorican peoples followed their example. Dumnacus, driven out of his
own territory, went to seek a refuge in the remotest part of Gaul.[551]
[Sidenote: Capture of Uxellodunum.]
VI. Drappes and Lucterius, when they learnt that they were pursued by
Rebilus and his two legions, gave up the design of penetrating into the
province; they halted in the country of the Cadurci, and threw
themselves into the _oppidum_ of Uxellodunum (_Puy-d’Issolu_, near
Vayrac), an exceedingly strong place, formerly under the dependence of
Lucterius, who soon excited the inhabitants into revolt.
Rebilus appeared immediately before the town, which, surrounded on all
sides by steep rocks, was, even without being defended, difficult of
access to armed men. Knowing that there was in the _oppidum_ so great a
quantity of baggage that the besieged could not send them secretly away
without being overtaken by the cavalry, and even by the infantry, he
divided his cohorts into three bodies, and established three camps on
the highest points. (_See Plate 31._) Next, he ordered a
countervallation to be made. On seeing these preparations, the besieged
remembered the ill fortune of Alesia, and feared a similar fate.
Lucterius, who had witnessed the horrors of famine during the investment
of that town, took especial care for the provisions, and, with the
consent of all, having 2,000 men in Uxellodunum, he left by night, with
Drappes and the rest of the troops, to procure them.
After a few days they collected, by good-will or by force, a great
quantity of provisions. During this time the garrison of the _oppidum_
attacked the redoubts of Rebilus several times, which obliged him to
interrupt the work of the countervallation, which, indeed, he would not
have had sufficient forces to defend.
Drappes and Lucterius established themselves at a distance of ten miles
from the _oppidum_, with the intention of introducing the provisions
gradually. They shared the duties between them. Drappes remained with
part of the troops to protect the camp. Lucterius, during the
night-time, endeavoured to introduce beasts of burden into the town, by
a narrow and woody path. The noise of their march gave warning to the
sentries. Rebilus, informed of what was going on, ordered the cohorts to
sally from the neighbouring redoubts, and at daybreak fell upon the
convoy, the escort of which was slaughtered. Lucterius, having escaped
with a small number of his followers, was unable to rejoin Drappes.
Rebilus soon learnt from prisoners that the rest of the troops which had
left the _oppidum_ were with Drappes at a distance of twelve miles, and
that, by a fortunate chance, not one fugitive had taken that direction
to carry him news of the last combat. The Roman general sent in advance
all the cavalry and the light German infantry; he followed them with one
legion without baggage, leaving the other as a guard to the three camps.
When he came near the enemy, he learnt by his scouts that the
barbarians, according to their custom, neglecting the heights, had
placed their camp on the banks of a river (probably the Dordogne); that
the Germans and the cavalry had surprised them, and that they were
already fighting. Rebilus then advanced rapidly at the head of the
legion, drawn up in order of battle, and took possession of the heights.
As soon as the ensigns appeared, the cavalry redoubled their ardour, the
cohorts rush forward from all sides, the Gauls were taken or killed, the
booty was immense, and Drappes fell into the hands of the Romans.
Rebilus, after this successful exploit, which cost him but a few
wounded, returned under the walls of Uxellodunum. Fearing no longer any
attack from without, he set resolutely to work to continue his
circumvallation. The day after, C. Fabius arrived, followed by his
troops, and shared with him the labours of the siege.
While the south of Gaul was the scene of serious troubles, Cæsar left
the quæstor Mark Antony, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the
Bellovaci. To deprive the Belgæ of all idea of revolt, he had proceeded
to the neighbouring countries with two legions, had exacted hostages,
and restored confidence by his conciliating speeches. When he arrived
among the Carnutes, who, the year before, had been the first to revolt,
he saw that the remembrance of their conduct kept them in great alarm,
and he resolved to put an end to it by causing his vengeance to fall
only upon Gutruatus, the instigator of the war. This man was brought and
delivered up; and although Cæsar was naturally inclined to indulgence,
he could not resist the tumultuous entreaties of his soldiers, who made
that chief responsible for all the dangers they had run, and for all the
misery they had suffered. Gutruatus died under the stripes, and was
afterwards beheaded.
It was in the land of the Carnutes that Cæsar received news, by the
letters of Rebilus, of the events which had taken place at Uxellodunum,
and of the resistance of the besieged. Although a handful of men shut up
in a fortress was not very formidable, he judged it necessary to punish
their obstinacy, for fear that the Gauls should acquire the conviction
that it was not strength, but constancy, which had failed them in
resisting the Romans; and lest this example might encourage the other
states, which possessed fortresses advantageously situated, to recover
their independence.
Moreover, it was known everywhere amongst the Gauls that Cæsar had only
one summer more to hold his command, and that after that they would
have nothing more to fear. He left, therefore, the lieutenant Quintus
Calenus[552] at the head of his two legions, with orders to follow him
by ordinary marches, and with his cavalry he hastened by long marches
towards Uxellodunum.
Cæsar, arriving unexpectedly before that town, found it completely
invested on all accessible points. He judged that it could not be taken
by assault (_neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla conditione
posse_), and, as it was abundantly provided with provisions, he
conceived the project of depriving the inhabitants of water. The
mountain was surrounded nearly on every side by very low ground; but on
one side there existed a valley through which a river (the Tourmente)
ran. As it flowed at the foot of two precipitous mountains, the
disposition of the localities did not admit of turning it aside and
conducting it into lower channels. It was difficult for the besieged to
come down to it, and the Romans rendered the approaches to it still more
dangerous. They placed posts of archers and slingers, and brought
engines which commanded all the slopes which gave access to the river.
The besieged had thenceforth no other means of procuring water but by
fetching it from an abundant spring which arose at the foot of the wall,
300 feet from the channel of the Tourmente. (_See Plate 31._) Cæsar
resolved to drain this spring, and for this purpose he did not hesitate
to attempt a laborious undertaking: opposite the point where it rose, he
ordered covered galleries to be pushed forwards against the mountain,
and, under protection of these, a terrace to be raised, labours which
were carried on in the middle of continual fights and incessant
fatigues. Although the besieged, from their elevated position, fought
without danger, and wounded many Romans, yet the latter did not yield to
discouragement, but continued their task. At the same time they made a
subterranean gallery, which, running from the covered galleries, was
intended to lead up to the spring. This work, carried on free from all
danger, was executed without being perceived by the enemy; the terrace
attained a height of sixty feet, and was surmounted by a tower of ten
stories, which, without equalling the elevation of the wall, a result it
was impossible to obtain, still commanded the fountain. (_See Plate
32._) Its approaches, battered by engines from the top of this tower,
became inaccessible; in consequence of this, many men and animals in the
place died of thirst. The besieged, terrified at this mortality, filled
barrels with pitch, grease, and shavings, and rolled them in flames upon
the Roman works, making at the same time a sally, so as to prevent them
from extinguishing the fire; soon it spread to the covered galleries and
the terrace, which stopped the progress of the inflammable materials.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground and the increasing danger,
the Romans still persevered in their struggle. The battle took place on
a height, within sight of the army; loud cries were raised on both
sides; each individual sought to rival his fellows in zeal, and the more
he was exposed to view, the more courageously he faced the missiles and
the fire.
Cæsar, as he was sustaining great loss, determined to feign an assault,
in order to create a diversion: he ordered some cohorts to climb the
hill on all sides, uttering loud cries. This movement terrified the
besieged, who, fearing to be attacked on other points, called back to
the defence of the wall those who were setting fire to the works. Then
the Romans were able to extinguish the fire. Nevertheless, the siege
span out in length; the Gauls, although exhausted by thirst and reduced
to a small number, did not cease to defend themselves vigorously. At
length, the subterranean gallery having reached the veins of the spring,
they were taken and turned aside. The besieged, seeing the fountain all
at once dried up, believed, in their despair, that it was an
intervention of the gods, submitted to necessity, and surrendered.
Cæsar considered that the pacification of Gaul would never be completed
if the same resistance was encountered in many other towns. He thought
it indispensable to spread terror by a severe example, so much the more
as “the well-known mildness of his temper,” says Hirtius, “would not
allow this necessary rigour to be ascribed to cruelty.” He ordered all
those who had carried arms to have their hands cut off, and sent them
away, as living witnesses of the chastisement reserved for rebels.
Drappes, who had been taken prisoner, starved himself to death;
Lucterius, who had been arrested by the Arvernan Epasnactus, a friend of
the Romans, was delivered up to Cæsar.[553]
[Sidenote: Excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu.]
VII. The excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu in 1865 leave no further doubt
as to the site of Uxellodunum. (_See Plates 31 and 32._)
The Puy d’Issolu is a lofty mountain, situated not far from the right
bank of the Dordogne, between Vayrac and Martel; it is isolated on all
sides except towards the north, where it is joined by a defile of 400
mètres wide (the Col de Roujon) to heights named the Pech-Demont. Its
plateau, crowned by a circle of perpendicular rocks, commands, almost in
every direction, the low ground which surrounds it. This is what the
author of the VIIIth book _De Bello Gallico_ expresses by these words:
_Infima vallis totum pæne montem cingebat in quo positum erat præruptum
undique oppidum Uxellodunum_. This plateau, with a surface of eighty
hectares in extent, presents strongly-marked undulations: its general
incline lies from the north to the south, in the direction of the length
of the mountain mass; its highest point is 317 mètres above the level of
the sea, and it rises 200 mètres above the valleys which surround it.
The whole eastern slope of the mountain, that which looks towards Vayrac
and the Dordogne, is surmounted with rocks, which have a height of as
much as forty mètres; consequently, no operation took place on this side
during the time of the siege. The western slope alone was the theatre of
the different combats. Its declivities are not inaccessible, especially
between the village of Loulié and the hamlet of Leguillat, but they are
sufficiently abrupt to make the Latin author say: _Quo, defendente
nullo, tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile_. At the very foot of
this declivity, and at 200 mètres beneath the culminating point of the
plateau, the Tourmente flows, a little river ten mètres broad, embanked
between this declivity and that of the opposite heights: _Flumen infimam
vallem dividebat_, &c. Such a disposition of the localities, as well as
the slight descent of the Tourmente (one mètre in 1,000), rendered it
impossible to turn off that river. (_Hoc flumem averti loci natura
prohibebat_, &c.)
There is no spring on the plateau of Puy-d’Issolu; but several issue
from the sides of the mountain, one of which, that of Loulié, is
sufficiently abundant to provide for the necessities of a numerous
population. This was the spring which the Romans succeeded in turning
off. At the time of the siege, it issued from the side of the mountain
at _S_ (_see Plate 31_), at twenty-five mètres from the wall of the
_oppidum_, and at a distance of about 300 mètres from the Tourmente.
These 300 mètres make about 200 Roman paces. We see, therefore, that in
the Latin text the word _pedum_ must be replaced by _passuum_. We also
see that the word _circuitus_ (VIII. 4) must be taken in the sense of
the _course_ of the river.
The “Commentaries” say (VIII. 33) that Rebilus established three camps
in very elevated positions. Their sites are indicated by the nature of
the localities: the first, _A_, was on the heights of Montbuisson; the
second, _B_, on those of the Château de Termes; the third, _C_, opposite
the defile of Roujon, on the Pech-Demont. It appears from the
excavations that the Romans had not retrenched the two first, which is
easily explained, for the heights to the west of the Puy-d’Issolu are
impregnable. Moreover, the Romans at Uxellodunum were not in the same
situation as at Alesia. There they had before them 80,000 men, and in
their rear a very numerous army of succour; here, on the contrary, it
was only a question of reducing a few thousand men. The camp _C_
required to be protected, because it was possible for troops to descend
from the tableau of the Puy-d’Issolu towards the defile of Roujon,
which, being situated fifty mètres lower down, gives an easy access to
the heights of Pech-Demont. The excavations have, in fact, brought to
light a double line of parallel fosses, which barred the defile behind,
and formed at the same time a countervallation.
The Gauls could only quit the town by this defile, and by the western
slope of the mountain. It became, consequently, interesting to ascertain
if the Romans made a countervallation along the Tourmente, on the slopes
of the heights of the castle of Termes and of Montbuisson.
Unfortunately, the railway from Perigueux to Capdenac, which passes over
the very site where the countervallation might have been made, has
destroyed all traces of the Roman works: the excavations made above this
line have produced no result.
The most interesting discovery was that of the subterranean
gallery.[554] Until the moment when the excavations were commenced, a
part of the rain-water absorbed by the plateau of the Puy-d’Issolu
issued near the village of Loulié by two springs, _A_ and _A’_. (_See
Plate 32._) The spring _A’_ flows from a ravine, and corresponds to the
_thalweg_ of the slope; as to the source _A_, it is easily seen by the
appearance of the ground that it has been turned from its natural
course. The excavations, in fact, have proved that it is produced by the
waters which run in the Roman gallery. This gallery has been opened over
an extent of forty mètres. It was dug in a solid mass of tufa nearly ten
mètres thick, which had been formed in the centuries anterior to Cæsar.
Its form is that of a semicircular vault, supported by two perpendicular
sides; its average dimensions are 1·80m. in height, by a width of 1·50
mètres. The mud carried along by the waters, and accumulated since the
time of the siege of Uxellodunum, had almost filled the gallery, leaving
only at the top of the _intrados_ an empty space in the form of a
segment of a circle, with 0·50m. chord by 0·15m. for the absciss of its
curve. Through this empty space the water ran at the time of the
excavations.
Before reaching the tufa, the first subterranean works of the Romans had
been made in the pure soil, which had to be propped: fragments of
blindage have been found, some of them fixed in silicious mud, corroded
or reduced to the state of ligneous paste, others petrified by their
long contact with the waters charged with calcareous sediments. A
considerable number of these petrified blocks, and remains of wood,
collected in the interior of the gallery, are deposited in the museum of
Saint-Germain.
The gallery does not lead directly to the spring which existed in the
time of the Gauls. The Roman miners, after having made their way
straightforward for a length of six mètres, came upon a thick bed of
blue marl of the lias: they turned to their left to avoid digging
through it, and advanced four mètres farther, following the marl, which
they left to the right. When they reached the end of the marls, a
horizontal layer of hard rock, one mètre thick, obliged them to bring
the gallery back to its former direction, and to raise it, in order to
avoid this new obstacle without going out of the tufas, which, formed by
the waters, would necessarily lead towards the spring. (_See Plate 32._)
From this second turning, the gallery continued close to the line of
separation of the marls and the tufas. It rose rapidly, until it reached
the limit of the deposits of tufa. At this point blindage had again been
necessary. It was there chiefly that the blocks of petrification
presented a peculiar character: some lay thrown down in the gallery,
pierced by sockets with a rectangular section, which show the dimensions
and the way in which it had been worked; others, with a rounded base,
are veritable uprights, still standing on the rock.
Independently of the excavations made to find the Roman fosses and the
subterranean gallery, others have been made on the slope of Loulié, in
the soil which is near the spring. They have brought to light numerous
fragments of Gaulish pottery and of amphoræ, and, which is a further
confirmation of the identity of the Puy d’Issolu with Uxellodunum,
remains of arms similar in all respects to those found in the fosses of
Alesia.[555] Under the earthfalls which during nineteen centuries have
taken place on the slope of Loulié, all the traces of the fire described
in the “Commentaries” have been also found. The site of the terrace and
the covered galleries which were fired were also traced on the ground.
_Plate 32_ represents the slope which was the scene of the struggle: the
terrace, the tower, and the covered galleries are represented on it, as
well as the subterranean gallery, according to a very exact survey made
on the spot.
[Sidenote: Complete Submission of Gaul.]
VIII. Whilst these events were taking place on the banks of the
Dordogne, Labienus, in a cavalry engagement, had gained a decisive
advantage over a part of the Treviri and Germans, had taken prisoner
their chief, and thus subjected that people, who were always ready to
support any insurrection against the Romans. The Æduan Surus fell also
into his hands: he was a chief distinguished for his courage and his
birth, and the only one of that nation who had not yet laid down his
arms.
From that moment Cæsar considered Gaul to be completely pacified; he
resolved, however, to go himself to Aquitaine, which he had not yet
visited, and which Publius Crassus had partly conquered. Arriving there
at the head of two legions, he obtained the complete submission of that
country without difficulty: all the tribes sent him hostages. He
proceeded next to Narbonne with a detachment of cavalry, and charged
his lieutenants to put the army into winter quarters. Four legions,
under the orders of Mark Antony, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and
Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium; two among the Ædui, and two among
the Turones, on the frontier of the Carnutes, to hold in check all the
countries bordering on the ocean. These two last legions took up their
winter quarters on the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the
Arverni, so that no part of Gaul should be without troops. Cæsar
remained but a short time in the province, presiding hastily over the
assemblies, determining cases of public contestation, and rewarding
those who had served him well. He had had occasion, more than any one,
to know their sentiments individually, because, during the general
revolt of Gaul, the fidelity and succour of the province had aided him
in triumphing over it. When these affairs were settled, he returned to
his legions in Belgium, and took up his winter quarters at Nemetocenna
(_Arras_).
There he was informed of the last attempts of Commius, who, continuing a
partisan war at the head of a small number of cavalry, intercepted the
Roman convoys. Mark Antony had charged C. Volusenus Quadratus, prefect
of the cavalry, to pursue him; he had accepted the task eagerly, in the
hope of succeeding this time better than the first; but Commius, taking
advantage of the rash ardour with which his enemy had rushed upon him,
had wounded him seriously, and escaped; he was discouraged, however, and
had promised Mark Antony to retire to any spot which should be
appointed him, on condition that he should never be compelled to appear
before a Roman.[556] This condition having been accepted, he had given
hostages.[557]
Gaul was henceforth subjugated; death or slavery had carried off its
principal citizens. Of all the chiefs who had fought for its
independence, only two survived, Commius and Ambiorix. Banished far from
their country, they died unknown.
BOOK IV.
RECAPITULATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL, AND RELATION OF EVENTS AT ROME FROM
696 TO 705.
CHAPTER I.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 696.
[Sidenote: Difficulties of Cæsar’s Task.]
I. In the preceding book we have given, from the “Commentaries,” the
relation of the war in Gaul, and endeavoured to elucidate doubtful
questions, and to discover the localities which were the scenes of so
many combats. It will now be not uninteresting to recapitulate the
principal events of the eight campaigns of the Roman proconsul,
separated from all their technical details. We will at the same time
examine what was passing, during this period, on the banks of the Tiber,
and the events which led to the Civil War.
Writers who dislike glory take pleasure in undervaluing it. They seem to
wish thus to invalidate the judgment of past ages: we seek in preference
to confirm it, by explaining why the renown of certain men has filled
the world. To bring to light the heroic examples of the past, to show
that glory is the legitimate reward of great actions, is to pay homage
to the public opinion of all times. Man struggling with difficulties
which seem insurmountable, and conquering them by his genius, offers a
spectacle always worthy of our admiration; and this admiration will be
the more justified, according to the greater disproportion between the
end and the means.
Cæsar is going to quit Rome, to go far from the debates of the Forum,
the agitation of the comitia, and the intrigues of a corrupt town, in
order to take the command of his troops. Let us, then, for a moment lay
aside the statesman, and consider only the warrior, the great captain.
The Roman proconsul is not one of those barbarian chieftains who, at the
head of innumerable hordes, throw themselves upon a foreign country to
ravage it with fire and sword. His mission is not to destroy, but to
extend to a distance the influence of the Republic, by protecting the
peoples of Gaul, either against their own dissensions, or against the
encroachments of their dangerous neighbours. The dangers from which
Italy had been saved by the victories of Marius are not forgotten. Men’s
memory still recalls the savage bravery, and, still more, the multitude
of those barbarians who, before the battle of Aix, had employed six
entire days in defiling in front of the camp of Marius;[558] they still
fear a renewal of these inundations of peoples, and Cæsar’s first duty
is to avert similar perils. Already the Helvetii and their allies, to
the number of 368,000, are on the road towards the Rhine; 120,000
Germans have established themselves in Gaul; 24,000 Harudes, their
countrymen, have just followed the same example; others are marching
after them, and more than 100,000 Suevi are preparing to cross the
Rhine.
The Narbonnese forms the proconsul’s basis of operation, but it is
partly composed of populations recently subjugated, whose fidelity is as
yet doubtful. Rome has in Gaul allied peoples, but they have lost their
preponderance. The different states, divided among themselves by
intestine rivalries, offer an easy prey to the enemy; but let the Roman
army come to occupy their territory in a permanent manner, and thus
wound their feelings of independence, and all the warlike youth will
unite, eager to begin a struggle full of perils for the invaders. Cæsar
is obliged, therefore, to act with extreme prudence, to favour the
ambition of some, repress the encroachments of others, and spare the
susceptibility of all, taking care not to wound their religion, their
laws, or their manners; he is obliged at the same time to draw a part of
his forces from the country he occupies, and obtain thence men,
subsidies, and provisions. The greatest difficulty experienced by the
commander of an army operating in a country the good-will of which he
seeks to conciliate, is to enable his troops to live without exhausting
it, and to assure the welfare of his soldiers without exciting the
discontent of the inhabitants. “To seek to call,” says the Emperor
Napoleon I. in his _Mémoires_, “a nation to liberty and independence; to
desire that a public spirit should form in the midst of it, and that it
should furnish troops; and at the same time to take from it its
principal resources, are two contradictory ideas, and to conciliate them
is the province of talent.”[559]
Thus, to fight between two and three hundred thousand Helvetii and
Germans, to hold in dominion eight millions of Gauls, and to maintain
the Roman province--such is the task which Cæsar has undertaken, and, to
carry it out, he has as yet only at hand a single legion. What means
will he have to overcome all these obstacles? His genius and the
ascendency of civilisation over barbarism.
[Sidenote: Campaign against the Helvetii.]
II. Cæsar starts from Rome towards the middle of March, 696, and arrives
in eight days at Geneva. Immediately the Helvetii, who had appointed
their rendezvous on the banks of the Rhine towards the 24th of March,
the day of the equinox, ask his permission to cross Savoy, with the
intention of going to establish themselves in Saintonge. He adjourns his
answer to the 8th of April, and employs the fifteen days thus gained in
fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, from Geneva to the
Pas-de-l’Ecluse, in raising troops in the Roman province, and in
renewing the old bonds of friendship with the Burgundians,[560] who will
soon furnish him with men, horses, and provisions.
By rendering the passage of the Rhone impossible, and by binding to his
cause the peoples who occupied the whole course of the Saône, from
Pontailler to near Trévoux, he had cut off from the Helvetii the road to
the south, and thrown difficulties in their way towards the west. Still,
these persisted none the less in their design; they made an arrangement
with the people of Franche-Comté, to whom the passage of the
Pas-de-l’Ecluse belonged, to debouch by that defile into the plains of
Ambérieux and on the plateau of the Dombes. They could thus arrive at
the Saône, pass it peaceably or by force, proceed into the valley of the
Loire by crossing the mountains of Charolais, and penetrate thence into
Saintonge.
As soon as Cæsar was aware of this project, he immediately decided on
his course of action: he foresaw that a long time would elapse before
the Helvetii effected a passage across the unquiet countries of so many
hosts; he reckons that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men,
women, and children, carrying three months’ provisions in wagons, would
be slow to move; he repairs to the Cisalpine, raises two legions there,
sends to Aquileia for the three who were in winter quarters there, and,
crossing the Alps again, arrives, two months afterwards, at the
confluence of the Rhone and the Saône, on the heights of Sathonay. He
learns that the Helvetii have been employed during twenty days in
crossing the Saône between Trévoux and Villefranche, but that a part of
them still remain on the left bank; seizes the opportunity, attacks the
latter, defeats them, and thus diminishes the number of his adversaries
by one-fourth; then, crossing the Saône, he follows during fifteen days
the mass of the Helvetian emigration, which was advancing towards the
sources of the Bourbince. As he finds himself in want of provisions, he
turns off from his road, and marches towards Bibracte (_Mont Beuvray_),
the citadel and principal town of the Burgundians. This march to the
right leads the Helvetii to believe that he is afraid of encountering
them; they then march back, and attack him unexpectedly; a great battle
is fought, and, with his four old legions only, Cæsar gains the victory.
The immigration, already considerably diminished by the battle of the
Saône, no longer counts more than 130,000 individuals, who make their
retreat towards the country of Langres. The Roman general does not
pursue them; he remains three days burying the dead and attending to the
wounded. But his influence is already so great, that, to deprive the
wreck of the vanquished army of provisions, he has only to give orders
to the peoples whose territory they cross. Deprived of all resources,
the fugitives discontinue their march, and make their submission. He
hastens to overtake them towards Tonnerre. When he arrives in the midst
of them, he adopts a generous policy, and gains, by his generous
behaviour, those whom he had subjugated by his arms.
There was in the Helvetic conglomeration a people renowned for their
valor, the Boii; Cæsar permits the Burgundians to receive them into the
number of their fellow-citizens, and give them lands at the confluence
of the Allier and the Loire. As to the other barbarians, with the
exception of 6,000 who had attempted to withdraw from the capitulation
by flight, he obliges them to return to their country, dismisses them
without ransom, instead of selling them as slaves, and thus drawing from
them a considerable profit, according to the general usage of that
period.[561] By preventing the Germans from establishing themselves in
the countries abandoned by the immigration, he made a calculation of
interest secondary to a high political sentiment, and foresaw that
Helvetia, by its geographical position, was destined to be a bulwark
against invasion from the north, and that, then as now, it was important
for the power seated on the Rhone and the Alps to have on its eastern
frontiers a friendly and independent people.[562]
[Sidenote: Campaign against Ariovistus.]
III. The victory gained near Bibracte has, at one blow, restored the
prestige of the Roman arms. Cæsar has become the arbitrator of the
destinies of a part of Gaul: all the peoples comprised between the
Marne, the Rhone, and the mountains of Auvergne, obey him.[563] The
Helvetii have returned into their country; the Burgundians have
re-conquered their ancient preponderance. The assembly of Celtic Gaul,
held with his permission at Bibracte, invokes his protection against
Ariovistus, and, to the far north, the people of Trèves hasten to
denounce to him a threatened invasion of Germans. It had always been a
part of the policy of the Republic to extend its influence by going to
the succour of oppressed peoples. Cæsar could not fail to regulate his
conduct upon this principle. Not only did it concern him to deliver the
Gauls from a foreign yoke, but he sought to deprive the Germans of the
possibility of settling on the banks of the Saône, and thus threatening
the Roman province, and perhaps Italy itself.
Before having recourse to arms, Cæsar, who, during his consulship, had
caused Ariovistus to be declared the ally and friend of the Roman
republic, undertook to try upon him the means of persuasion. He sent to
demand an interview, and received only a haughty reply. Soon, informed
that, three days before, the German king has crossed his frontiers at
the head of a numerous army, and that, on another side, the hundred
cantons of the Suevi are threatening to cross the Rhine towards Mayence,
he starts from Tonnerre in haste to go forward to meet him. When he
arrives near Arc-en-Barrois, he learns that Ariovistus is marching with
all his troops upon Besançon. He then turns to the right, anticipates
him, and takes possession of that important place. No doubt, at the news
of the march of the Roman army, Ariovistus slackened his own, and halted
in the neighbourhood of Colmar.
After remaining a few days at Besançon, Cæsar takes the way to the
Rhine, avoids the mountainous spurs of the Jura, proceeds by
Pennesières, Arcey, and Belfort, and debouches towards Cernay in the
fertile plains of Alsace. The two armies are only twenty-four miles
apart. Cæsar and Ariovistus have an interview; its only result is to
increase their mutual resentment. The latter conceives the project of
cutting the line of operation of the Romans, and, passing near the site
of the modern Mulhouse, he proceeds, by a circuitous movement, to
establish himself on the stream of the little Doller, to the south of
the Roman army, which, encamped on the Thur, supports its rear on the
last spurs of the Vosges, near Cernay. In this position, Ariovistus
intercepts Cæsar’s communications with Franche-Comté and Burgundy. The
latter, to restore them, distributes his troops into two camps, and
causes a second camp to be made, less considerable than the first, on
his right, near the little Doller. During several days, he seeks in vain
to draw Ariovistus to a battle; then, learning that the matrons have
advised the Germans not to tempt fortune before the new moon, he unites
his legions, places all the auxiliaries on his right, marches resolutely
to assault the camp of the Germans, forces them to accept battle, and
defeats them after an obstinate resistance. In their flight, they take
the same road by which they had advanced, and, pursued for a distance of
fifty miles, they re-pass the Rhine towards Rhinau. As to the Suevi, who
had assembled near Mayence, when they are informed of the disaster of
their allies, they hasten to regain their country.
Thus, in his first campaign, Cæsar, by two great battles, had delivered
Gaul from the invasion of the Helvetii and the Germans; all the Gauls
looked upon him as a liberator. But services rendered are very soon
forgotten when people owe their liberty and independence to a foreign
army.
Cæsar places his troops in winter quarters in Franche-Comté, leaves the
command to Labienus, and starts for Cisalpine Gaul, where he is obliged,
as proconsul, to preside over the provincial assemblies. Nearer Rome
during the winter, he could follow more easily the political events of
the metropolis.
[Sidenote: Sequel of the Consulship of L. Calpurnius Piso and Aulus
Galbinus.]
IV. While the armies were augmenting the power of the Republic without,
at Rome the intestine struggles continued with new fury. It could hardly
be otherwise among the elements of discord and anarchy which were at
work, and which, since the departure of Cæsar, were no longer held under
control by a lofty intelligence and a firm will. Moral force, so
necessary to every government, no longer existed anywhere, or rather, it
did not exist where the institutions willed it to be, in the Senate;
and, according to the remark of a celebrated German historian, this
assembly which ruled the world, was incapable of ruling the town.[564]
For a long time the prestige of one man in visible power was master over
that of the Senate; Pompey, by his military renown, and by his alliance
with Cæsar and Crassus, continued dominant, although he had not then any
legal power. Cæsar had reckoned upon him to continue his work, and curb
the bad passions which were in agitation in the highest regions as well
as in the lowest depths of society: but Pompey had neither the mind nor
energy necessary to master at the same time the arrogance of the nobles
and the turbulence of certain partisans of the demagogy; he was soon
exposed to the censure of both parties.[565] Moreover entirely under the
influence of the charms of his young wife, he appeared indifferent to
what was passing around him.[566]
The relation of the events at Rome during the eight years of Cæsar’s
abode in Gaul will only offer us an uninterrupted series of vengeances,
murders, and acts of violence of every description. How, indeed, could
order be maintained in so vast a city without a permanent military
force; when each man of importance took with him, for his escort, his
clients or slaves in arms, and thus, within it, everybody had an army
except the Republic? From this moment, as we shall see, the quarrels
which are about to spring up among the parties will result always in
riots; the slaves and gladiators will be enrolled as the ordinary
actors.
[Sidenote: Intrigues of Clodius.]
V. Clodius, whose imprudent support of those who were subsequently
called the triumvirs had increased his influence, continued, after
Cæsar’s departure, to court a vain popularity, and to excite the
passions which had been imperfectly allayed. Not satisfied with having,
at the beginning of his tribuneship, re-established those religious,
commercial, and political associations, which, composed chiefly of the
dregs of the people, were a permanent danger to society; with having
made distributions of wheat, restrained the censors in their right of
exclusion, forbidden the auspices to be taken or the sky observed on the
day fixed for the meeting of the comitia,[567] and with having provoked
the exile of Cicero, he turned his restless activity against
Pompey,[568] whom he soon deeply offended, by causing to be taken away
and set at liberty a son of Tigranes, King of Armenia, made prisoner in
the war against Mithridates, and retained as a pledge for the
tranquillity of Asia.[569] At the same time he began judicial
proceedings against some of Pompey’s friends, and replied to the
expostulations which were addressed to him, “That he was glad to learn
how far the great man’s credit went.”[570] The latter then conceived the
idea of recalling Cicero, to oppose him to Clodius, just as, a few
months before, he had raised Clodius against Cicero. We see the game of
political see-saw is not new.
[Sidenote: Pompey consults Cæsar on the Return of Cicero.]
VI. Under these circumstances, the opinion of Cæsar was of great weight.
Pompey wrote to consult him,[571] and P. Sextius, one of those nominated
as the new tribunes, repaired to Gaul to ascertain his mind.[572] It
appears certain that it was favourable,[573] for, so early as the
Calends of June, 696, hardly two months after the decree against
Cicero, a tribune of the people, L. Ninnius, demanded his recall in the
Senate. This proposal was on the point of being carried, when another
tribune of the people, Ælius Ligus, _interceded_.[574] The Senate, in
its irritation, declared that it would take into consideration no
political or administrative affair until it had voted on Cicero’s
return.[575] We thus judge how much the assembly took to heart the
success of this measure, and how much, in supporting it, Pompey
flattered the sentiments of the majority.
[Sidenote: Pompey believes himself threatened by a Slave of Clodius.]
VII. A singular occurrence determined his reconciliation with the
Senate: on the 3rd of the Ides of Sextilis (the 5th of August), a slave
of Clodius let a dagger fall in Pompey’s way, as he was entering the
curia; arrested by the lictors, and questioned by the consul A.
Gabinius, the slave declared that his master had ordered him to
assassinate the great citizen.[576] This attempt, whether serious or
not, produced a sufficient impression on Pompey to prevent him, for a
long time, from going to the Forum, or showing himself in public.[577]
The demands in favour of Cicero were renewed; and on the 4th of the
Calends of November (the 20th of October) eight tribunes of the people,
most of them men devoted to Pompey, proposed formally in the Senate the
recall of the exile. One of these was T. Annius Milo, a violent, bold
man, without scruples, and resembling Clodius in all things, but his
open adversary. Clodius and his brother, the prætor Appius, again
succeeded in defeating this motion.[578] At last, with the extreme of
audacity, the turbulent tribune, when near the close of his functions,
dared to attack Cæsar himself, and tried to obtain the revocation of the
Julian laws; but this attempt was powerless in face of the splendour of
the victories gained over the Helvetii and the Germans.
CHAPTER II.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 697.
[Sidenote: War against the Belgæ.]
I. Cæsar’s victories had awakened among the Gauls feelings of
admiration, but also of distrust; they could not see without fear that
it had required only six legions to scatter two invasions, each counting
100,000 combatants. There are successes which, by their very brilliancy,
alarm even those who profit by them. Nearly all Gaul looks on with
jealousy at events which prove the superiority of permanent armies over
populations without military organization. A small number of experienced
and disciplined soldiers, under the guidance of a great captain, make
all the peoples tremble from the Rhine to the ocean, and even the
islanders of Great Britain feel themselves unsafe against the attacks of
the Roman power; the Belgæ especially, proud of having formerly alone
repulsed the invasion of the Cimbri and the Teutones, feel their warlike
instincts revive. Provocations which have come from the other side of
the Straits increase their distrust; these picture to them the abode of
the Roman army in Franche-Comté as a threat against the independence of
the whole of Gaul. The greatest part of the peoples comprised between
the Rhine, the Scheldt, the Ocean, and the Seine, agitate, combine, and
assemble an army of 300,000 men.
Informed in Italy of these preparations, Cæsar raises two new legions,
rejoins his army in Franche-Comté, and decides immediately on invading
the country of the Belgæ. The first who present themselves on his road
are the people of Champagne. Surprised by his sudden arrival, they
submit, and even offer him subsidies and auxiliaries. Cæsar is able to
add to his eight legions and his light troops the contingents from
Rheims, and join them with those of Burgundy and Trèves. In spite of
this augmentation of his forces, the enemy he has to combat is four
times more numerous. To defeat them, he sends the Burgundians to make a
diversion and ravage the territory of Beauvais, then he crosses the
Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and selects, behind the Miette, a marshy stream,
a defensive position which he renders inexpugnable.
The Belgæ, whose army occupies, on the right bank of the Miette, an
extent of twelve kilomètres, are powerless to force the position of the
Romans, and fail in all their attempts to cross the Aisne at Pontavert.
Soon, discouraged by the want of provisions, disputes among themselves,
and the news that the Burgundians have just invaded the territory of
Beauvais, they separate, because each, believing his own country
threatened, thinks only of going to its defence. The Belgian league is
thus dissolved almost without combat. Cæsar then hastens to chastise
each people one after the other; he seizes in their turn Soissons and
Breteuil, the principal citadels of the Soissonais and Beauvaisis, and
arrives at Amiens.
But the coalitions of the peoples of the north succeed each other like
the waves of the sea; after the Helvetii, the Germans; after the
Germans, the people of the Beauvaisis; after them, the inhabitants of
Hainault. These have assembled on the Sambre, and wait to be re-enforced
by the peoples of German origin established in the neighbourhood of
Namur. Cæsar then marches towards the Sambre by its left bank. When he
arrives near the enemy concealed in the woods of the right bank, on the
heights of Haumont, he unites six legions, places the two others in
reserve with the baggage of the army, and, reaching the heights of
Neuf-Mesnil, begins to fortify his camp; but hardly have the soldiers
commenced their work, when the Belgæ debouch from all the issues of the
forest, cross the shallow waters of the Sambre, scale the abrupt slopes,
and fall upon the Romans, who, taken by surprise and unable to form
their line of battle, range themselves without order under the first
ensigns which offer themselves. The confusion is extreme; Cæsar is
obliged, sword in hand, to throw himself into the thick of the fight.
Nevertheless, the fortune of the battle is gradually restored; the
centre and left wing have repulsed their assailants; the latter arrives
to succour the right wing in its peril; the two legions of the
rear-guard hasten to the field of battle; then victory decides for the
Romans, and the peoples of Hainault are nearly annihilated. In this
engagement the experience and valour of the old veteran soldiers save
the Roman army from the impetuosity of the Belgæ. After this exploit,
Cæsar marches towards Namur, in which the inhabitants of the whole
country have shut themselves up on the news of the defeat of their
allies, and he makes himself master of that place.
While he was completing the conquest of Belgic Gaul, one of his
lieutenants, the young Publius Crassus, detached, after the battle of
the Sambre, into Normandy and Brittany, reduced to submission the
peoples of those provinces, so that at that time the greatest part of
Gaul acknowledged the authority of the Republic: the effect of Cæsar’s
victories was such that the Ubii, a German people from beyond the Rhine,
established between the Maine and the Sieg, sent their congratulations
to the conqueror with the offer of their services.
Before leaving for the Cisalpine, Cæsar sent a legion into the Valais,
to chastise the inhabitants of those Alpine valleys, who, at the
beginning of the year, had attacked in their march the two new legions
on their way from Italy; it was his aim also to open easy communications
with the Cisalpine by the Simplon and Saint-Bernard. But his lieutenant
Galba, after a sanguinary battle, was obliged to retreat and take up his
winter quarters in Savoy. Thus Cæsar’s designs could not be realised. It
was reserved for another great man, nineteen centuries afterwards, to
level that formidable barrier of the Alps.
[Sidenote: Return of Cicero.]
II. Let us now resume the account of events in Rome subsequent to the
Calends of January, 697 (20th of December, 696). The consuls who entered
upon their office were P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther and Q. Cecilius
Metellus Nepos; the first, a friend of Cicero; the second, favourable
to Clodius from hatred to the celebrated orator who had offended
him.[579]
Lentulus brought forward the question of the recall of the exile.[580]
L. Aurelius Cotta, a man of esteem and of consular dignity, declared
that the banishment of Cicero, pronounced in the sequel of extreme acts
of violence, carried in itself the cause of its nullity; and that,
therefore, there was no need of a law to revoke an act that was contrary
to the laws.[581] Pompey combated the opinion of Cotta, and sustained
that it was necessary that Cicero should owe his recall, not only to the
authority of the Senate, but also to a vote of the people. Nothing
further was proposed but to present a _plebiscitum_ to the comitia.
Nobody opposed it, when Sextus Atilius, tribune of the people, demanded
the adjournment,[582] and, by those dilatory manœuvres so familiar to
the Romans, obliged the Senate to defer the presentation of the law to
the 22nd of the same month. When the day arrived, the two parties
prepared to support their opinion by force. Q. Fabricius, tribune of the
people, favourable to Cicero, sought in the morning to gain possession
of the rostra. Clodius was no longer tribune, but he continued to guide
the populace. To the professional agitators in his pay he had joined a
troop of gladiators, brought to Rome, by his brother Appius, for the
funeral of one of his kinsmen.[583] The troop of Fabricius was easily
put to the rout; a tribune, M. Cistius, had hardly presented himself,
when he was driven away. Pompey had his toga covered with blood, and
Quintus Cicero, whom he had brought with him to the Forum to speak to
the people in favour of his brother, was obliged to hide himself; the
gladiators rushed upon another tribune, P. Sextius, and left him for
dead. “The struggle was so violent,” Cicero says, “that the corpses
obstructed the Tiber and filled the sewers, and the Forum was inundated
with blood to such a degree that it was found necessary to wash it with
sponges. A tribune was killed, and the house of another was threatened
with fire.”[584] The amazement was so great, that the question of the
recall of the exile was again adjourned. It was thus by the sword that
everything was decided in Rome in its disorder and abasement.
In fact, to obtain the recall of Cicero, the Senate saw itself obliged
to oppose riot to riot, and to make use of P. Sextius, who had recovered
from his wounds, as well as of Milo, who had organised, with military
discipline, an armed band in condition to make head against the
rioters.[585] At the same time, it hoped to intimidate the urban mob by
bringing into Rome, from all parts of Italy,[586] the citizens upon whom
it relied. In fine, the very men who had, two years before, engaged
Bibulus to embarrass all Cæsar’s measures by observing the sky,[587] now
prohibited, under pain of being considered as an enemy of the
Republic,[588] those religious artifices which suspended all
deliberations. The result was that the law of recall was passed.
Cicero re-entered Rome on the eve of the Nones of September (the 15th of
August, 697), in the midst of the warmest demonstrations of joy. The
Senate had thus at last triumphed over the factious opposition of
Clodius; but it was not without great efforts, nor without frequently
having had recourse on its own side to violence and arbitrary acts.
[Sidenote: Pompey is charged with the Supplying of Food.]
III. From the first moment of his return, Cicero gave all his care to
augmenting the influence of Pompey and reconciling him with the Senate.
The famine under which Italy suffered that year furnished him with the
occasion. The populace rose suddenly, hurried first to a theatre, where
games were celebrating, and afterwards to the Capitol, uttering threats
of death and fire against the Senate, to which they attributed the
public distress.[589] Before this, in July, at the time of the
Apollinarian games,[590] a riot had occurred from the same motive.
Cicero, by his persuasive eloquence, calmed the irritated mob, and
proposed to entrust to Pompey the care of provisioning, and to confer
upon him for five years proconsular powers in Italy and out of
Italy.[591] The senators, in their terror, adopted this measure
immediately. It was, as at the time of the war of the pirates, to give
to one man an excessive power _over all the earth_, according to the
words of the decree. Fifteen lieutenants were associated with him, of
whom Cicero was one.[592] But the creation of this new office did not
put an end to the discontent of the multitude. Clodius tried to persuade
the people that the famine was fictitious, and that the Senate had
created it, in order to have a pretext for making Pompey master over
everything.[593] He overlooked no occasion for stirring up troubles.
Although the Senate had given Cicero an indemnity of more than two
millions of sestertii,[594] and decided that his house should be rebuilt
in the same place, Clodius, who sought to prevent the rebuilding of it,
came several times to blows with Milo, in struggles which resembled
regular battles, their adherents carrying bucklers and swords. Every day
witnessed a riot in the streets. Milo swore he would kill Clodius, and
Cicero confessed at a later period that the victim and the arm which was
to strike were pointed out beforehand.[595]
[Sidenote: Festivals to commemorate Cæsar’s Victories.]
IV. It was towards the end of the year 697 that the news of Cæsar’s
prodigious successes against the Belgæ reached Rome; they excited there
the warmest enthusiasm. As soon as the Senate was informed of them, it
voted fifteen days of thanksgiving to celebrate them.[596] This number
of days had never before been accorded to anybody. Marius had obtained
five, and Pompey, when he had vanquished Mithridates, only ten. The
decree of the Senate was expressed in more flattering terms than had
ever been used for any general. Cicero himself took part in obtaining
this high testimony of public gratitude.[597]
[Sidenote: Riots at Rome.]
V. In spite of these demonstrations, there continued to exist among a
certain class a secret hatred against the conqueror of Gaul: in the
month of December, 697, Rutilius Lupus, named tribune for the following
year, proposed to revoke Cæsar’s laws, and to suspend the distribution
of the lands in Campania;[598] he expatiated in accusations against that
general and Pompey. The senators were silent; Cn. Marcellinus, the
consul nominate, declared that in the absence of Pompey nothing could be
decided. On another hand, Racilius, tribune of the people, rose to renew
the old accusations against Clodius.[599] In order to baffle the designs
of the latter, who aspired to the office of ædile, and who, once named,
would have been inviolable, the consuls nominate proposed that the
election of the judges should take place before that of the ædiles. Cato
and Cassius opposed this. Cicero eagerly seized the opportunity of
fulminating against Clodius; but the latter, who was prepared, defended
himself at length, and during this time his adherents excited, by
attacking Milo’s men, such an uproar on the steps of the Temple of
Castor, where the Senate held its sitting, that the Forum became a new
field of battle. The senators fled, and all projects of laws were
abandoned.[600]
In the presence of these sanguinary collisions, the elections of ædiles
and quæstors could not take place; moreover, Milo and Sextius, from
feelings of personal vengeance, prevented the Consul Q. Metellus from
convoking the comitia. As soon as the consul named a day of assembly,
the two tribunes declared immediately that _they were observing the
sky_; and, for fear that this cause of adjournment might not be
sufficient, Milo established himself in the Campus Martius with his
followers in arms. Metellus tried to hold the comitia by surprise,[601]
and proceeded by night to the Campus Martius through bye streets; but he
was well watched. Before he arrived at the place, he was met and
recognised by Milo, who signified to him, in virtue of his tribunitial
power, the _obnunciation_, that is, the declaration of a religious
obstacle to the holding of the popular assemblies.[602] Thus ended the
year 697.
During these inglorious struggles, in which both parties dishonoured
themselves by acts of violence, Cæsar had, in two campaigns, saved Italy
from the invasion of the barbarians, and vanquished the most warlike
peoples of Gaul. Thus, at Rome, venality and anarchy prevailed; with the
army, devotedness and glory. Then, as at certain epochs of our own
revolution, we may say that the national honour had taken refuge under
the flag.
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS IN ROME DURING THE YEAR 698.
[Sidenote: Presence in Rome of Ptolemy Auletes.]
I. The Consuls of the year preceding had just been succeeded by Cn.
Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus; the latter
allied by family to Cæsar, whose niece, Atia, he had married.[603] It
was in vain that the chief magistrates succeeded each other annually,
the change of persons led to no change in the state of the Republic.
There happened about this time a circumstance which showed to what a low
degree of contempt law and morality had fallen. Ptolemy Auletes, King of
Egypt, father of the famous Cleopatra, hated by his subjects, had fled
from Alexandria, and arrived in Rome, towards the end of 697, in spite
of the advice of M. Cato, whom he had met at Rhodes. He came to solicit
the protection of the Republic against the Egyptians, who, in his
absence, had given the crown to his daughter Berenice. He had obtained
the title, then the object of so much emulation, of friend and ally of
the Roman people, by purchasing the suffrages of a great number of
considerable personages, which had obliged him to exact heavy taxes from
his subjects. He was at first well received, for it was known that he
had brought with him his treasure, ready for distribution among his new
protectors. Pompey gave him a lodging in his house,[604] and declared
publicly in his favour. But the Egyptians, when they were informed of
his departure, sent an embassy, composed of more than a hundred persons,
to defend their cause; most of them were assassinated on their way by
Ptolemy’s agents; and the rest, terrified or corrupted by force of
bribery, never carried out their mission.[605] This affair made so much
noise, that Favonius, called the _ape_ of Cato, because he imitated his
austerity, denounced the conduct of Ptolemy in the Senate, and added
that he knew one of the Egyptian deputies, named Dio, who was ready to
confirm his assertions. Dio did not dare to appear, and, a short time
after, was assassinated. In spite of this crime, Pompey persisted in his
friendship for Ptolemy, and no one dared to prosecute the guest of so
powerful a man.[606]
Several plans were proposed for replacing the King of Egypt on the
throne, and this enterprise, which promised glory and profit, excited
everybody’s ambition. Those who, probably, were opposed to it, proposed
to consult the Sibylline books, which gave the answer: “If the King of
Egypt come to ask you for succour, do not refuse him your friendship,
but grant him no army.” Caius Cato, tribune of the people, kinsman of M.
Porcius Cato, and yet his adversary, lost no time in divulging this
reply, although it was not permitted, without a decree of the Senate, to
publish the Sibylline oracles.[607] The Senate decreed that the King of
Egypt should be restored to his throne by the Roman magistrates, but
without an armed intervention.[608] But this mission was a cause of
great dispute: some proposed to charge Lentulus Spinther with it, others
preferred Pompey, with the obligation to employ only two lictors; the
jealousy of the candidates caused it soon to be renounced. Ptolemy,
abandoning all hope, quitted Rome and retired to Ephesus.[609] He was
restored subsequently by Gabinius.
[Sidenote: Clodius named Ædile. Trial of Milo.]
II. The election for the ædileship had taken place on the 11th of the
Calends of February of the year 698 (28th of December, 697), and, thanks
to the money he had distributed, Clodius had been named ædile.[610] He
had hardly been invested with this office, which protected him from the
prosecutions of Milo, when he turned round and attacked his accuser,
charging him with an armed conspiracy, precisely the same crime with
which Milo reproached him. It was not Milo he had in view, but his
powerful protectors. Moreover, alleging unfavourable auspicia, or
employing for that purpose some tribunes of the people, he absolutely
opposed the presentation by the consuls of all public affairs of any
importance, not excepting the curiate law, which decreed their commands
to the proconsuls and proprætors.[611]
The trial with which he was threatened by Clodius gave little uneasiness
to Milo, who had lost none of his habitual audacity. In fact, at a time
when a political personage could not be in safety unless escorted by a
band of armed men, it was difficult to condemn Milo for having
gladiators in his pay, especially when his enemies had set the example
of having recourse to similar auxiliaries.
The judicial struggle was at hand, and preparations were made as for a
combat. The accused had for his defenders Cicero and Pompey; the greater
part of the Senate was favourable to him, and, as a precaution against
riots, his friends brought their clients from all parts of Italy, and
even from Cisalpine Gaul.[612] Clodius and Caius Cato, on their side,
had assembled all their forces. They calculated, moreover, that the
populace, rendered still more turbulent by the dearth, would give a very
ill reception to Pompey, who found no remedy for the public misery; and
to Cicero, who, as superstitious people said, had drawn upon the town
the anger of the gods, by choosing to rebuild his house on a piece of
ground consecrated to the goddess _Libertas_.[613] It appears that many
enemies of Pompey secretly encouraged and aided Clodius. Crassus himself
was suspected of giving money to him, as well as to Caius Cato.
On the 8th of the Ides of February, (the 12th January, 698), Milo
appeared before his judges.[614] When Pompey presented himself to speak
in his defence, the mob, excited by Clodius, received him with hooting
and insults. The town mob knew all Pompey’s vanities, and wounded them
with subtle cruelty. He, meanwhile, though every moment interrupted,
kept his temper, and strove to speak. Clodius replied to him; but his
adversaries also had a mob organised and paid to abuse him, and to sing
infamous verses on the subject of his amours with his own sister.[615]
In this strange and ignoble dispute Milo was forgotten; it had become
nothing more than a sort of duel between Clodius and Pompey. Clodius, in
the midst of his satellites, cried out at the utmost extent of his
voice, “Who is the man who makes us die of hunger?” And all the
populace, with the unity of a tragic chorus, cried “Pompey!”--“Who wants
to go into Egypt?” cried Clodius again. A thousand voices replied,
“Pompey!”--“Who ought to be sent there?” “Crassus!”[616] Clodius added,
“Who is the autocrat whom nothing satisfies? Who is the man who seeks a
man? Who scratches his head with a single finger?” “Pompey! Pompey!” the
crowd continued repeating. After all these mutual provocations, the two
parties, tired of shouting, came to blows. Cicero prudently made his
escape,[617] and the victory once again remained with the nobles, who
were probably supported by a greater number of gladiators.[618] The
judgment of Milo, adjourned to another day, gave rise again to similar
scenes; but he was acquitted.
[Sidenote: Return of Cato.]
III. In the midst of these intestine quarrels, M. Cato returned from
Cyprus to Rome. He brought with him the treasure of Ptolemy, the brother
of Ptolemy Auletes, amounting to 7,000 talents (about 40,000,000
francs), a considerable quantity of personal goods, and a great number
of slaves. Ptolemy had poisoned himself on the report of Cato’s arrival,
leaving him no other trouble than that of collecting his treasures, for
the Cypriots, then slaves, in the hope of becoming the allies and
friends of Rome, received him with open arms. Proud of his expedition,
which he had carried out with the most perfect integrity, he was very
anxious that it should be approved.[619]
The return of Cato could bring no remedy to the deeply troubled state of
the Republic.[620] His virtue was not one of those which attract, but of
those which repulse. Blaming everybody, because, perhaps, everybody was
to blame, he remained the only one of his party.
From the moment of his arrival, he found himself at the same time in
opposition with Cicero, who attacked the legality of his mission; and
with Clodius, who, having entrusted it to him in his quality of tribune,
counted on appropriating all the glory of it to himself. In these new
intrigues of Clodius, Cæsar, it is said, supported him, and furnished
him with subjects of accusation against Cato.[621]
[Sidenote: State of Anarchy in Rome.]
IV. A concise view of the events at Rome at this time shows to what a
degree the moral level had been abased. It was no longer those memorable
struggles between the patricians and the plebeians, where the greatness
of the object aimed at ennobled the means. It was no longer a question
of defending secular rights, or of acquiring new rights, but of vulgar
ambitions and personal interests to be satisfied.
Nothing indicates more the decay of society than when law becomes an
engine of war for the use of the different parties, instead of remaining
the sincere expression of the general needs. Each man who arrived at
power rendered himself guilty on the morrow of that which he had
condemned on the eve, and made the institutions of his country the
slaves of his momentary passion. At one time it was the Consul Metellus
who, in 697, retarded the nomination of the quæstors, in order to
prevent that of the judges, with the view of shielding Clodius, his
kinsman, from a judiciary accusation;[622] at another time it was Milo
and Sextius who, by way of reprisals against the same consul, opposed
all imaginable obstacles to the convocation of the comitia;[623] lastly,
it was the Senate itself which (in 698) sought to retard the election of
the judges, in order to deprive Clodius of the chance of being named
ædile. The ancient custom of taking the auspices was no longer, in the
eyes of anybody, more than a political manœuvre. Not one of the great
personages whom the momentary favour of the people and the Senate raise
to distinction preserve any true sentiment of rectitude. Cicero, who
sees the whole Republic in himself, and who attacks as monstrous all
which is done against him and without him, declares all the acts of the
tribuneship of Clodius illegal; the rigid Cato, on the contrary,
defends, through personal interest, these same acts, because Cicero’s
pretension wounds his pride, and invalidates the mission he has received
from Clodius.[624] Caius Cato violates the law by making public the
Sibylline oracle. On all sides people have recourse to illegal means,
which vary according to their several tempers; some, like Milo, Sextius,
and Clodius, openly place themselves at the head of armed bands; others
act with timidity and dissimulation, like Cicero, who, one day, after a
previous unsuccessful attempt, carries away by stealth from the Capitol
the plate of brass which bore inscribed the law which had proscribed
him. A singular error of men, who believe that they efface history by
destroying a few visible signs of the past!
This relaxation of the social bonds caused inevitably the dispersion of
all the forces, the union of which would have been so useful to the
public good. It was no sooner agreed, in a moment of danger, to give to
one man the authority necessary to restore order and tranquillity, than,
at the same moment, everybody united to attack and degrade him, as if
each were afraid of his own work. Cicero has hardly returned from exile,
when the friends who have recalled him become jealous of his influence;
they see with pleasure a certain degree of coldness arise between Pompey
and him, and secretly support the intrigues of Clodius.[625] Pompey,
amid the famine and the public agitation, is hardly invested with new
powers, before the Senate on one side, and the popular faction on the
other, plot together to ruin his credit: by clever intrigues, they
awaken the old hatred between him and Crassus.
Pompey believed, or pretended to believe, that there was a conspiracy
against his life. He would no longer attend the Senate, unless the
session were held close to his residence, he seemed to think it so
dangerous to pass through the town.[626] “Clodius,” he said, “seeks to
assassinate me. Crassus pays him, and Cato encourages him. All the
talkers, Curio, Bibulus, all my enemies excite him against me. The
populace, who love the tattle of the tribune, have almost abandoned me;
the nobility is hostile to me; the Senate is unjust towards me; the
youth is entirely perverted.” He added that he would take his
precautions, and that he would surround himself with people from the
country.[627]
Nobody was safe from the most odious imputations. Caius Cato accused the
Consul P. Lentulus of having assisted Ptolemy with the means of
quitting Rome clandestinely.[628] M. Cato was exasperated against
everybody. Lastly, an implacable party never ceased manifesting, by its
motions, without result, it is true, its rancour and animosity against
the proconsul of Gaul. Towards the spring of 698, L. Domitius
Ahenobarbus, the brother-in-law of Cato, whose sister Porcia he had
espoused, and who had enriched himself with the spoils of the victims of
Sylla, proposed to deprive him of his command.[629] Others renewed the
proposal to put an end to the distribution of the lands of the Campania,
and revived the opposition to the Julian laws.[630] But Cicero, at the
request of Pompey, obtained the adjournment of this question to the
month of May.[631] He was, indeed, himself perplexed on this question,
and confessed that he had no very clear views upon it.[632]
[Sidenote: The Interview at Lucca.]
V. In the midst of the general confusion, many citizens turned their
eyes towards Cæsar. Appius Claudius had already paid him a visit.[633]
Crassus left Rome suddenly to join him at Ravenna, at the beginning of
the spring of 698, before the campaign against the Veneti, and explain
to him the state of affairs, for, as Cicero says in a letter of a
subsequent date, there was no occurrence so small in Rome that Cæsar was
not informed of it.[634]
Some time afterwards, Pompey, who was to embark at Pisa, to proceed to
Sardinia, in order to hasten the supply of wheat, arrived at Lucca,
where he had an interview with Cæsar and Crassus. A crowd of people
assembled similarly in that town; some were drawn thither by the
prestige of Cæsar’s glory, others by his well-known generosity, all by
the vague instinct which, in moments of crisis, points to the place
where strength exists, and gives a presentiment of the side from which
safety is to come. The Roman people sent him a deputation of
senators.[635] All the most illustrious and powerful personages in Rome,
such as Pompey, Crassus, Appius, governor of Sardinia, Nepos, proconsul
of Spain,[636] came to show their warm admiration for him and invoke his
support;[637] even women repaired to Lucca, and the concourse was so
great that as many as 200 senators were seen there at a time; 120
lictors, the obligatory escort of the first magistrates,[638] besieged
the door of the proconsul. “Already,” Appius writes, “he disposed of
everything by his ascendance, by his riches, and by the affectionate
eagerness with which he conferred obligations upon everybody.”[639]
What took place in this interview? No one knows; but we may conjecture
from the events which were the immediate consequences of it. It is
evident, in the first place, that Crassus and Pompey, who had recently
quarrelled, were reconciled by Cæsar, who, no doubt, placed before their
eyes the arguments most calculated to reconcile them: “The public
interest required it; they alone could put an end to the state of
anarchy which afflicted the capital; in a country which was a prey to
vulgar ambitions, it required, to control them, ambitions which were
greater, but, at the same time, purer and more honourable; they must
easily have seen that it was not in the power of a man like Cicero, with
his tergiversations, his cowardice, and his vanity, or Cato, with his
stoicism, belonging to another age, or Domitius Ahenobarbus, with his
implacable hatred and his selfish passions, to restore order, or put an
end to the divisions of opinion. In order to obtain these results, it
was necessary that Crassus and Pompey should labour resolutely to obtain
the consulship.[640] As to himself, he only asked to remain at the head
of his army, and complete the conquest he had undertaken. Gaul was
vanquished, but not subjugated. Some years were still necessary to
establish there the Roman domination. This fickle and warlike people,
always ready for revolt, was secretly incited and openly supported by
two neighbouring nations, the Britons and the Germans. In the last war
against the Belgæ, the promoters of the rising, according to the
confession of the Bellovaci, had clearly shown, by taking refuge in
Britain after their defeat, whence came the provocation. Even at this
very moment, the insurrection which was in preparation among the tribes
of the Veneti, on the shores of the ocean, was instigated by these same
islanders. As to the Germans, the defeat of Ariovistus had not
discouraged them; and several contingents of that nation were lately
found with the troops of Hainault. He intends to chastise these two
peoples, and to carry his arms beyond the Rhine as well as beyond the
sea; let them, then, leave him to finish his enterprise. Already the
Alps are levelled; the barbarians, who, hardly forty-four years ago,
were ravaging Italy, are driven back into their deserts and forests. A
few years more, and fear or hope, punishments or recompenses, arms or
laws, will have bound for ever Gaul to the empire.”[641]
Language like this could not fail to be understood by Pompey and by
Crassus. People are easily persuaded when the public interest offers
itself through the prism of self-love and personal interest. Beyond the
consulship, Crassus and Pompey saw at once the government of provinces
and the command of armies. As to Cæsar, the logical realisation of his
desires was the prolongation of his powers. Only one difficulty lay in
the way of the execution of this plan. The period of the elections was
near at hand, and neither Pompey nor Crassus had taken steps to offer
themselves as candidates for the consulship within the time fixed by the
law; but it had been so usual for many years to delay the comitia, under
frivolous pretexts, that the same thing might easily be done on the
present occasion with a more legitimate object.
Cæsar promised to support their election with all his power, by his
recommendations, and by sending his soldiers on leave to vote in the
comitia. In fact, his soldiers, either recruited from the veterans whom
he had carried from Rome, or among Roman citizens established in great
numbers in Cisalpine Gaul, had the right to give their vote in Rome, and
enjoy the legitimate influence which is the reward of a life of dangers
and self-denial. Cicero assures us of this in these words: “Do you
consider, in seeking the consulship, as a weak support the will of the
soldiers, so powerful by their number and by the influence which they
exercise in their families? Moreover, what authority must the vote of
our warriors have over the whole Roman people in the question of
nominating a consul! For, in the consular comitia, it is the generals
they choose, and not the rhetoricians. It is a very powerful
recommendation to be able to say, I was wounded, he has restored me to
life; he shared the booty with me. It was under him that we captured the
enemy’s camp, that we gave battle; he never required from the soldier
more labour than he took upon himself; his success is as great as his
courage. Can you imagine what a favourable influence such discourses
have upon people’s minds?”[642] Thus Cæsar conformed to the established
practice, in allowing his soldiers to exercise their rights of citizens.
[Sidenote: Consequences of the interview at Lucca. Conduct of Cicero.]
VI. The result of the interview at Lucca had been to unite in a common
feeling the most important men in the Republic. Some historians have
seen in it a mysterious conspiracy, and they have not hesitated to
qualify it with the name of _triumvirate_, a denomination as
inapplicable to this agreement as to that which took place in 694. An
interview in the midst of so many illustrious citizens, who have
assembled from all sides to salute a victorious general, had hardly the
appearance of a mystery, and the mutual understanding of some men of
influence in the same political thought was not a conspiracy. Some
authors have, nevertheless, pretended that the Senate, informed of this
plot devised in Cisalpine Gaul, had expressed its indignation; but there
is nothing to support this allegation; if it had been the case, would
they, a few months after the interview at Lucca, have granted Cæsar
everything he desired, and rejected everything that was displeasing to
him? We see, indeed, that at the annual distribution of the governments
of provinces, the senators hostile to Cæsar proposed that he should be
deprived of his command, or, at least, of the part of his command
decreed by the Senate.[643] Yet, not only was this proposal rejected,
but the Senate gave him ten lieutenants and subsidies to pay the legions
he had raised on his own authority, in addition to the four legions
originally placed at his disposal by the Senate. In fact, the triumphs
of Cæsar had excited people’s minds. Public opinion, that irresistible
force in all times, had declared loudly for him, and his popularity
reflected upon Pompey and Crassus.[644] The Senate had then silenced
its animosity, and even Cæsar showed himself full of deference for that
assembly.[645]
It must be said, in praise of humanity, that true glory possesses the
privilege of rallying all generous hearts; only men who are madly in
love with themselves, or hardened by party fanaticism, can resist this
general attraction towards those who constitute the greatness of their
country. At this period, with the exception of a few spiteful and
intractable individuals, the greater part of the senators felt the
general impulse, as we learn from the orations of Cicero.[646]
But if, on one side, the members of this pretended triumvirate are
represented as closely leagued together against the Republic, on the
other, Dio Cassius asserts that, at this time, Pompey and Crassus were
conspiring against Cæsar. This opinion has no better foundation. We see,
on the contrary, by a letter of Cicero, how warmly Pompey at that time
advocated the party of his father-in-law. Pompey, when he was leaving
Lucca, met with Quintus Cicero, and, addressing him with warmth, he bade
him remind his brother of his past engagements: “Cicero ought not to
forget that what Pompey had done for his recall was also the work of
Cæsar, whose acts he had promised not to attack; if he would not serve
him, at least let him abstain from all hostility.”[647] These reproaches
did not remain without effect. Cicero, very apt to turn to the side of
fortune, wrote to Atticus: “There is an end to everything; and since
those who are without power will have me no longer, I will seek friends
among those who have the power.”[648]
He had already acted with the senators in voting thanks for Cæsar’s
victories, since which he had employed all his efforts in seconding
every proposal in favour of the conqueror of Gaul. As the part Cicero
acted on this occasion has had a particular importance, it will not be
uninteresting to quote his words: “Could I be the enemy of a man whose
couriers and letters, in concert with his renown, make our ears listen
every day to the names of so many peoples, of so many nations, of so
many countries which he has added to our empire? I am inflamed with
enthusiasm, senators, and you are the less inclined to doubt it, since
you are animated by the same sentiments.[649] He has combated, with the
greatest success, the most warlike and powerful nations of the Germans
and Helvetii; he has overthrown, subdued, and driven back the others,
and has accustomed them to obey the Roman people. Countries, which no
history, no relation, no public report had hitherto brought to our
knowledge, have been overrun by our general, our troops, our arms. We
had formerly but one way into Gaul; the other parts were occupied by
peoples who were either enemies of this empire, or little to be
trusted, or unknown, or at least ferocious, barbarous, and warlike;
there was no one who was not desirous of seeing them vanquished and
subdued.[650] A report has been recently presented to us on the pay of
the troops. I was not satisfied with giving my opinion, but I laboured
to secure its adoption; I replied at great length to those who held a
contrary opinion; I assisted in drawing up the decree; then, again, I
granted more to the person than to I know not what necessity. I thought
that, even without such a succour of money, with the mere produce of the
booty, Cæsar might have maintained his army and terminated the war; but
I did not consider that we ought, by a narrow parsimony, to diminish the
lustre and glory of his triumph.
“Moreover, there has been a question of giving Cæsar ten lieutenants:
some absolutely opposed the grant, others required precedents; these
would have put off the consideration to another day; those granted it,
without employing flattering terms. Under these circumstances, from the
manner in which I spoke, everybody understood that, while I sought to
serve the interests of the Republic, I did still more to honour Cæsar.”
In another speech, the same orator exclaims: “The Senate has decreed
Cæsar public prayers in the most honourable form, and for a number of
days hitherto without example. In spite of the exhausted state of the
treasury, it has provided for the pay of his victorious army; it has
decided that ten lieutenants shall be given to the general, and that,
by derogation of the law Sempronia, a successor should not be sent him.
It was I who moved these measures, and who spoke in support of them;
and, rather than listen to my old disagreement with Cæsar, I lent myself
to what is demanded, under present circumstances, by the interest of the
Republic and the need of peace.”[651]
But if in public Cicero expressed himself with so much clearness, in his
private intercourse he was still tender of the opinion of his former
friends. It is, indeed, the only manner in which we can explain a
contradiction too glaring even in a temper so inconstant. In fact, at
the moment when he was boasting openly of the services he had assisted
in rendering to Cæsar, he wrote to his friend P. Lentulus, proconsul in
Cilicia: “They have just granted Cæsar subsidies and ten lieutenants,
and they have paid no regard to the law Sempronia, which required that a
successor should be given to him. But it is too sorrowful a subject, and
I will not dwell upon it.”[652]
[Sidenote: Intrigues of Pompey and Crassus to obtain the Consulship.]
VII. From what precedes, it is evident that unpopularity did not fall
upon Cæsar, but upon the means employed by Crassus and Pompey for the
purpose of obtaining the consulship.
They made use of Caius Cato, kinsman of the Stoic, and of other men
equally undeserving of esteem, to cause delay in the time of holding the
comitia, and thus lead to the creation of an interrex,[653] which would
facilitate their election, since the consuls, who were the ordinary
presidents of the assembly of the people, were opposed to them.
The relations of the events of this period present great confusion. Dio
Cassius informs us that, in the sequel of violent disputes in the curia,
between Pompey, who had recently returned from Sardinia, and the Consul
Marcellinus, the Senate, in sign of its displeasure, decreed that it
would go into mourning, as for a public calamity, and immediately
carried the decree into effect. Caius Cato opposed his veto. Then the
Consul Cn. Marcellinus, at the head of the Senate, proceeded to the
Forum, and harangued the people to ask it for the comitia, without
success probably, since the senators returned immediately to the place
of their session. Clodius, who, since the conference of Lucca, had
become more intimate with Pompey, appeared suddenly among the crowd,
interrupted the consul, and bantered him on this display of untimely
mourning. In the public place Clodius would easily carry the approval of
the multitude; but when he attempted to return to the Senate, he
encountered the most resolute opposition. The senators rushed to meet
him and prevent him from entering; many of the knights assailed him with
insults; they would have treated him still worse, had not the populace
rushed to his aid and delivered him, threatening to commit to the flames
the entire assembly.[654]
On another hand, Pompey, with more authority and less violence,
protested against the last senatus-consultus. Lentulus Marcellinus,
addressing him in full Senate, demanded if it were true, as reported,
that he aimed at the consulship. “As yet I know not what I shall do,”
replied Pompey, roughly. Then, perceiving the bad impression caused by
these disdainful words, he added immediately, “For the good citizens,
there is no use in my being consul; against the factious, perhaps I am
necessary.”[655] To a similar question, Crassus replied, modestly, “that
he was ready to do whatever would be useful to the Republic.” Then
Lentulus bursting into reproaches against Pompey’s ambition, the latter
interrupted him insolently. “Remember,” he said, “that thou art indebted
to me for everything. Thou wast dumb, I made thee a talker; thou wast a
greedy beggar, I turned thee into a glutton, who vomits to eat again.”
This language will give an idea of the violence of political passions at
that period. The senators, and Marcellinus himself, seeing that they
could not contend against the influence of these two men, withdrew.
During the rest of the year they took no part in public affairs; they
confined themselves to wearing mourning, and absenting themselves from
the festivals of the people.
[Sidenote: Campaign against the Peoples on the Shores of the Ocean.]
VII. While Pompey and Crassus, in accord with the convention of Lucca,
employed all the means in their power to arrive at the consulship, Cæsar
had his regards still fixed on a conquest which every year seemed
achieved, yet every year it had to be commenced again. If the Gauls,
divided into so many different peoples, were incapable of uniting for
their common defence, they did not allow themselves to be discouraged by
a single misfortune. Hardly were they crushed on one point, when the
standard of insurrection was raised somewhere else.
In 698, the agitation showed itself first along the shores of the ocean,
from the Loire to the Seine. The peoples of the Morbihan, masters of a
considerable fleet, and possessing the exterior trade, placed themselves
at the head of the movement. They entered into alliance with all the
peoples who dwelt on the coasts between the Loire and the Scheldt, and
sent for assistance from England, with which country they were in
constant relation. Under these circumstances, Cæsar foresaw that it was
on the sea that he must curb the spirit of these maritime peoples. He
gave orders for the building of ships on the Loire, demanded others from
the peoples of the Charente and the Gironde, and sent from Italy Decimus
Brutus with galleys and sailors. As soon as the season permitted, he
repaired in person to the neighbourhood of Nantes, not far from Angers,
where Publius Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion. From
the moment of his arrival his attention extended over the vast territory
where he was to establish the domination of Rome. With this aim, he
distributed his troops as follows: Labienus is sent with the cavalry to
the east, in the direction of Trèves, to hold the Germans in check; on
his way, he will confirm the fidelity of the people of Champagne and
their neighbours; P. Crassus is sent towards Aquitaine, to subdue that
country; Sabinus towards Normandy, to combat the insurgents of the
Cotentin; Cæsar reserves for himself the operations in the Morbihan.
After besieging, not without great difficulties, several small
fortresses which, placed at the extremity of promontories, were
surrounded with water at high tide, he resolved to wait for his fleet,
and took a position on the coast, at Saint-Gildas, to the south of
Vannes. Decimus Brutus led his vessels out of the Loire, encountered the
enemy in sight of the Roman army, and, by a concurrence of fortunate
circumstances, destroyed the Gaulish fleet; the flower of Brittany
perished in the combat. The Morbihan and the neighbouring states
submitted, and, nevertheless, the conqueror put to death all the
principal citizens.
Cæsar’s conduct towards the inhabitants of this province has been justly
blamed by the Emperor Napoleon I. “These people,” he says, “had not
revolted; they had furnished hostages, and had promised to live
peaceably; but they were in possession of all their liberty and all
their rights. They had given Cæsar cause to make war upon them, no
doubt, but not to violate international law in regard to them, and to
commit so atrocious an abuse of victory. This conduct was not just, and
it was still less politic. Such means never answer their object, they
exasperate and revolt nations. The punishment of particular chiefs is
all that justice and policy permit.”[656]
While Brittany was vanquished on the sea, Sabinus gained a decisive
victory over the peoples of Normandy, near Avranches; and, at the same
time, Publius Crassus reduced Aquitaine. Although this young lieutenant
of Cæsar had only a single legion, a corps of cavalry, and some
auxiliaries, he gained possession of the strong fortress of Sos, and
inflicted a sanguinary defeat on the peoples situated between the
Garonne and the Adour. His glory was the greater, as the Aquitanians had
called to their assistance the Spanish chiefs, the wreck of that famous
army which Sertorius had so long formed on the model of the Roman
tactics.
Although the season was far advanced, Cæsar still resolved to subjugate
the peoples of Brabant and the Boulonnais, and marched against them. The
Gauls retired into their forests; he was then obliged to clear a road in
the woods by cutting down the trees, which, placed to the right and
left, formed on each side a rampart against the enemy. The bad state of
the weather obliged him to retire before he had completed his task.
In this campaign of 698, most of the countries which extend from the
mouth of the Adour to that of the Scheldt had felt the weight of the
Roman arms. The sea was free; Cæsar was at liberty to attempt a descent
upon England.
CHAPTER IV.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 699.
[Sidenote: Campaign against the Usipetes and the Tencteri.]
I. The successes of the preceding campaign, and the existence of a Roman
fleet in the waters of the Morbihan, must have given Cæsar the hope that
nothing henceforth would prevent an expedition against Great Britain;
yet new events came to delay his projects.
In the winter between 698 and 699, the Usipetes and the Tencteri,
peoples of German origin, to escape the oppression of the Suevi, passed
the Rhine not far from its mouth, towards Xanten and Clèves. They
numbered 400,000, of all ages and both sexes; they sought new lands to
settle in, and, in the spring of 699, the head of the emigration had
already reached the country where now stand Aix-la-Chapelle and Liége.
Cæsar, alarmed at this event, starts for the army sooner than usual,
proceeds to Amiens, there assembles his troops, and finds the Gaulish
chiefs profoundly shaken in their fidelity by the approach of these new
barbarians, whose co-operation they hope to obtain. He confirms their
feeling of duty, obtains a contingent of cavalry, marches to encounter
the Usipetes and the Tencteri, and arrives on the Meuse, which he
crosses at Maëstricht. These latter, on hearing of the approach of the
Roman army, had concentrated in Southern Gueldres. Established on the
river Niers, in the plains of Goch, they send a deputation to Cæsar, who
had arrived near Venloo, to ask him not to attack them, but to allow
them to keep the lands they had conquered. The Roman general refuses,
and continues his march. After new conferences, the object of which, on
the part of the Germans, was to give their cavalry, sent beyond the
Meuse, time to return, a truce of one day is accepted. Cæsar declares,
nevertheless, that he will advance to Niers. Suddenly, however, his
vanguard is treacherously attacked in its march and routed by the German
cavalry; he then believes himself freed from his engagements; and when
next day the deputies come to excuse this perfidious aggression, he has
them arrested, falls unexpectedly on the camp of the Germans, and
pursues them without remission to the confluence of the Rhine and the
Meuse (towards the place occupied now by Fort Saint-André), where these
unfortunate people nearly all perish.
In the sequel of this exploit, which brought him little glory, and in
which doubt has been thrown on his good faith, Cæsar resolved to cross
the Rhine, on the pretence of claiming from the Sicambri the cavalry of
the Usipetes and the Tencteri, who had taken refuge among them, but, in
reality, to intimidate the Germans, and make them abandon the practice
of seconding the insurrections in Gaul. He therefore proceeded up the
valley of the Rhine, and arrived at Bonn, opposite the territory of the
Ubii, a people which had already solicited his alliance and support
against the Suevi. He caused to be built in ten days a bridge of piles,
which he crossed with his troops, but he did not penetrate far into
Germany: unable to come up with either the Sicambri or the Suevi, who
had withdrawn into the interior of their country, he re-crossed to the
left bank, and caused the bridge to be broken.
[Sidenote: First Descent in England.]
II. Though the summer was already advanced, Cæsar determined to take
advantage of the time which still remained to pass into England and
visit that island, concerning which people had but confused notions, and
which was only known to the Romans by the intervention of the islanders
in all the wars in Gaul. He therefore started from Bonn, travelled
towards Boulogne, marking out, as we might say, the road which
subsequently Augustus ordered to be constructed between those two towns,
and collected in that port the ships of the neighbouring coasts and the
fleet which, the year before, had vanquished that of the Morbihan. After
sending one of his officers to assure himself of the point of landing,
he started from Boulogne, in the night of the 24th to the 25th of
August, with two legions, reconnoitred in his turn the coast of Dover,
and landed at Deal. The shore was covered with armed men, who offered a
vigorous opposition to the landing of the Roman army, which, having
repulsed them, established itself on land near the sea. The Britons,
astonished at such boldness, came from all sides to implore peace and
make their submission. But the elements conspired against the invaders,
and a dreadful tempest destroyed the transport ships and galleys. At the
news of this disaster, the Britons raised their heads again; on their
side the Roman soldiers, far from desponding, hastened to repair their
ships with so much zeal that, out of eighty, sixty-eight were made fit
for sea again. Not far from Cæsar’s camp, the Britons one day drew a
legion into an ambuscade; this led to a general battle, in which the
Romans were victorious. Then Cæsar, hurried by the approach of the
equinox, treated with the chiefs of some tribes, received hostages, and
crossed again to the continent on the 12th of September, having remained
eighteen days only in England. On the day after his arrival at Boulogne,
the two legions he brought with him were dispatched against the people
of the territory of Boulogne, who had taken refuge, since the preceding
year, in the marshes of their country; other troops were sent to
chastise the inhabitants of Brabant. After these expeditions, Cæsar
placed his legions in winter quarters among the Belgæ, and then departed
to visit the opposite part of his vast command, namely, Illyria, where
also he had to protect the Roman frontiers against the incursion of the
barbarians.
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Habits when in Campaign.]
We are astonished, in reading the “Commentaries”, at the ease with which
Cæsar repaired every year from Gaul into Italy, or into Illyria. There
must have been relays established on the principal lines along which he
had to travel, not only for his own use, but also for the couriers who
carried dispatches. We have seen that, in 696, Cæsar passed in eight
days from the banks of the Tiber to Geneva. According to Suetonius, he
travelled 100 miles a day, or 150 kilometres in twenty-four hours,
which makes a little more than six kilometres an hour. The couriers took
twenty-eight or thirty days to go from England to Rome. Plutarch informs
us that, in order to lose no time, Cæsar travelled by night, sleeping in
a chariot or litter.[657] By day he had with him a secretary, who wrote
under his dictation, and he was followed by a soldier who carried his
sword. In his military marches he went sometimes on horseback, but most
frequently he preceded the soldiers on foot, and, with head uncovered,
he gave no care either to sun or rain.[658]
In the midst of the most perilous enterprises, he found time to
correspond with men of influence, and even to read poems which Cicero
sent him, to whom he sent back his opinions and criticisms;[659] his
mind was incessantly occupied with the events which were passing in
Rome.
[Sidenote: Consulship of Pompey and Crassus.]
IV. At the beginning of the year 699, the consuls were not yet
nominated. In such circumstances, the Senate appointed _interreges_,
who, invested with the consular powers, succeeded each other in office
every five days. It was by favour of this interregnum that the comitia
were held. The result was foreseen. Besides their immense _clientelle_,
Pompey and Crassus were assured of the support of Cæsar, who, as we
have said, had taken care to send on leave a great number of his
legionaries to vote.[660] They arrived in charge of Publius Crassus, son
of the triumvir, whose exploits in Aquitaine had given him celebrity.
The only candidate of the previous year, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus,
excited by Cato, his brother-in-law, persisted in his candidature to the
last moment. Starting before daybreak to the comitia, with M.Cato and
many of his clients, he and his followers were exposed to violent
attacks. The slave who walked before him with a lantern in his hand was
killed, and Cato wounded. Domitius was seized with terror, and sought
shelter in his house. The interrex who presided over the comitia
proclaimed, without opposition, Crassus and Pompey consuls.
The arrangements concluded at Lucca had thus succeeded, and the ambition
of the three eminent personages who absorbed public attention was
satisfied; but the aim of this ambition varied according to their
several tempers. Crassus only desired the command of an army, in order
to increase his reputation and his immense riches. Pompey, without deep
convictions, placed his vanity in being the first man of the Republic.
Cæsar, the head of the popular party, aspired to power, in order, above
all other considerations, to ensure the triumph of his cause. The way
which would offer itself to his mind was not to excite civil war, but to
obtain his own nomination several times to the consulship; the great
citizens who had preceded him had followed no other way, and the there
is a natural tendency to take for our example that which has been
successful in the past. The glory acquired in Gaul assured Cæsar
beforehand of the public favour, which was to carry him again to the
first magistracy. Nevertheless, to dispel the obstacles continually
raised by a powerful party, it was necessary to remove hostile
competitors from important offices; to gain the support of distinguished
men, such as Cicero; and, as everything was venal, to buy, with the
produce of the booty he made by war, the consciences which were for
sale. This course, seconded by Pompey and Crassus, promised success.
Pompey, always under the influence of his wife’s charms, appeared to
rest satisfied with the part which was assigned to him. Had he been free
from all engagement, and obeyed his own instincts, he would have
embraced the cause of the Senate rather than that which he was
sustaining; for men of a nature so vain as his, prefer the flattering
adherence of the aristocracy in the middle of which they live, to the
expression of the approbation of the people, which rarely reaches their
ears. Dragged on by the force of circumstances, he was obliged to
wrestle against those who stood in his way; and the more the opposition
showed itself ardent, the more he gave way to the violence of his
temper. Legality, moreover, was observed by nobody, as the following
incident proves. Cato aspired to the prætorship. On the day of the
comitia, the first century, to which the epithet of _prœrogativæ_ was
given, and the suffrage of which exercised a great influence over the
others, voted for him. Pompey, not doubting the same result from the
other centuries, declared suddenly that he heard a clap of
thunder,[661] and dismissed the assembly. Some days afterwards, by
purchasing votes and employing all the means of intimidation at their
disposal, the new consuls caused P. Vatinius, the author of the motion
which, in 695, procured for Cæsar the government of the Cisalpine
province, to be elected prætor, in the place of M. Cato.[662] Most of
the other magistrates were similarly chosen among their creatures, and
there were only two tribunes of the people, C. Ateius Capito and P.
Aquilius Gallus, to represent the opposition. All these elections were
conducted with a certain degree of order, troubled only once in the
comitia for the ædileship. A battle took place in the Campus Martius, in
which there were killed and wounded. Pompey rushed into the middle of
the riot to appease it, and had his toga covered with blood. His slaves
took it to his house to bring another. At the view of this blood, Julia,
who was in an advanced state of pregnancy, believed that her husband had
been slain, and suffered a miscarriage. This accident injured her
health, but was not, as has been stated, the cause of her death, which
occurred only in the year following.[663]
[Sidenote: Motion of Trebonius on the Government of the Provinces.]
V. There was no further resistance to the two consuls. The factions
appeared to be vanquished. Cicero himself and Clodius became reconciled,
and, through the mediation of Pompey and Crassus, promised reciprocal
concessions.[664] The moment had arrived for presenting the law which
was to give provinces and armies to the two first magistrates of the
Republic: the latter wished the motion to come from a tribune of the
people, and they had entrusted it to C. Trebonius, who was subsequently
one of Cæsar’s lieutenants. The Senate had not proceeded to the
distribution of provinces before the consular elections, as the law
required. Trebonius, following the example given a few years before, in
the case of the government of Gaul, addressed the people, and took the
initiative of the two motions, one relating to Pompey and Crassus, the
other to Cæsar.
The provinces destined for the two consuls, on quitting office, were not
named separately for each, but Pompey and Crassus were to arrange the
partition between them: Dio Cassius even pretends that they drew lots.
This assertion appears to be incorrect. An insurrection of the Vaccæi
and the reduction of the revolt of Clunia[665] served as a pretext to
ask that Spain should be given to Pompey with four legions; Crassus was
to have Syria and the neighbouring states, with a considerable army. The
name of Parthians was not pronounced, but everybody knew why Crassus
coveted Syria.[666] Although advanced in age (he was sixty years old),
he dreamt of making the conquest of the countries which extend from the
Euphrates to the Indus.[667] As to Cæsar, he was to be continued in his
province. The duration of these governments was for five years; they
conferred the power of raising Roman or allied troops, and of making
war or peace.
The propositions of Trebonius were warmly combated by M. Cato, by
Favonius, and by two other tribunes of the people, Ateius and Aquilius
Gallus. “But Favonius,” says Plutarch, “was listened to by nobody; some
were retained by their respect for Pompey and Crassus, the greater
number sought to please Cæsar, and remained quiet, placing all their
hopes in him.”[668] The enemies of the consuls in the Senate were
intimidated, and kept silence. Cicero, to avoid the discussion, had
retired to the country.
In the assembly of the people, M. Cato spoke against the project of law
of Trebonius, or rather he employed the two hours allowed him in
declamations on the conduct of the depositaries of power. When the two
hours were expired, Trebonius, who presided over the assembly, enjoined
him to quit the tribune. Cato refused to obey; one of the tribune’s
lictors dragged him from it; he slipped from him, and a moment after
re-appeared on the rostra, trying to speak again. Trebonius ordered him
to be taken to prison, and, to obtain possession of his person, it
required a regular contest; but, in the midst of this tumult, Cato had
gained what he wanted, namely, to make them lose a day.[669]
A second assembly had better success. Considerable sums had been
distributed among the tribes, and armed bands were in readiness to
interfere in case of need. The opposition, on their side, had omitted
no preparation for disputing the victory. The tribune P. Aquilius,
fearing that they might prevent him from approaching the public place,
conceived the idea of hiding himself the previous evening in the Curia
Hostilia, which opened upon the Forum. Trebonius, informed of this,
caused the doors to be locked, and kept him in all the night and the
next day.[670] M. Cato, Favonius, and Ateius succeeded with great
difficulty in reaching the Forum; but, unable to force a way through the
crowd up to the rostra, they mounted on the shoulders of some of their
clients, and began to shout that _Jupiter was thundering_, and that
there could be no deliberation. But it was all in vain; always repulsed,
but always protesting, they gave up the contest when Trebonius had
proclaimed that the law was accepted by the people.[671] One of its
provisions decreed that Pompey should remain at Rome after his
consulship, and that he should govern his province of Spain through his
lieutenants. The vote was published in the midst of the most stormy
tumult. Ateius was wounded in the fray, which cost the lives of several
citizens; this was a thing then too frequent to produce any great
sensation.
Such was the memorable struggle now commenced at Rome between the
consuls and the opposition. If we judge only from certain acts of
violence related by the historians, we are at first tempted to accuse
Crassus and Pompey of having had recourse to a strange abuse of force;
but a more attentive examination proves that they were, so to say,
constrained to it by the turbulent intrigues of a factious minority. In
fact, these same historians, who describe complacently the means of
culpable compulsion employed by the candidates for the consulship, allow
contrary assertions to escape them here and there in the sequel, which
help to deface the disagreeable impression made by their narrative.
Thus, according to Cicero, public opinion blamed the hostility which was
exercised against Pompey and Crassus.[672] Plutarch, after presenting
under the most unfavourable colours the manœuvres of the consuls for
the distribution of the governments of the provinces, adds: “This
partition pleased all parties. The people desired that Pompey might not
be sent away from Rome.”[673]
Cæsar might hope that the consulship of Pompey and Crassus would restore
order and the supremacy of the laws: it did nothing of the sort. After
having themselves so often violated legality and corrupted the
elections, they sought to remedy the evil, which they had contributed to
aggravate, by proposing severe measures against corruption; this tardy
homage rendered to public morality was destined to remain without
effect, like all the remedies which had hitherto been employed.
[Sidenote: Pompey’s Sumptuary Law.]
VI. They sought to repress extravagance by a sumptuary law, but a speech
of Hortensius was sufficient to cause its rejection. The orator, after a
brilliant picture of the greatness of the Republic, and of the progress
of civilisation, of which Rome was the centre, proceeded to laud the
consuls for their magnificence, and for the noble use they made of their
immense riches.[674] And, in fact, at that very moment Pompey was
building the theatre which bore his name, and was giving public games,
in which it seemed his wish to surpass the acts of sumptuous
extravagance of the most prodigal courtiers of the Roman people.[675] In
these games, which lasted several days, 500 lions and eighteen elephants
were slain. This spectacle inspired the mob with admiration; but it was
remarked that, usually insensible to the death of the gladiators who
expired under their eyes, they were affected by the cries of pain of the
elephants. Cicero, who was present at these festivals, places, in the
relation he addresses to one of his friends, the men and the animals on
the same footing, and displays no more regret for the one than for the
other, the spirit of humanity was still so little developed![676]
The splendour of these games had dazzled Rome and Italy, and restored to
Pompey a great part of his prestige; but the levies of troops, which he
was obliged to order soon afterwards, caused great discontent. Several
tribunes vainly opposed their veto; they were obliged to renounce a
struggle which had Pompey, and especially Crassus, to sustain it.
[Sidenote: Departure of Crassus for Syria.]
VII. Without waiting for the end of his consulship, Crassus determined
on quitting Rome; he left in the last days of October.[677] As we have
said, it was not the government of Syria which excited his ardour; his
aim was to carry the war into the country of the Parthians, in order to
acquire new glory, and obtain possession of the treasures of those rich
countries.
The idea of this expedition was not new. The Parthians had long awakened
the jealousy of Rome. They had extended their frontiers from the
Caucasus to the Euphrates,[678] and considerably increased their
importance; their chief assumed, like Agamemnon, the title of _king of
kings_. It is true that the part of Mesopotamia taken from the Parthians
by Tigranes had been restored to them by Lucullus, and Pompey had
renewed the treaty which made the Euphrates the frontier of the empire
of the Arsacides. But this treaty had not always been respected, for it
was not one of the habits of the Republic to suffer a too powerful
neighbour. Nevertheless, different circumstances might, at this moment,
lead the Senate to make war upon the Parthians. While A. Gabinius
exercised the command in Syria, Mithridates, dethroned, on account of
his cruelty, by his younger brother Orodes, had invoked the support of
the proconsul; and the latter was on the point of giving it, when Pompey
sent him orders to repair first into Egypt to replace Ptolemy on his
throne. Mithridates, besieged in Babylon, had surrendered to his
brother, who had caused him to be put to death.[679] On another hand,
the Parthians were always at war with the kings of Armenia, allies of
the Romans. The Senate, had it the wish, was not, therefore, in want of
pretexts for declaring war. It had to avenge the death of a friendly
pretender, and to sustain a threatened ally. To what point could the law
of nations be invoked? That is doubtful; but, for several centuries, the
Republic had been in the habit of consulting its own interests much more
than justice, and the war against the Parthians was quite as legitimate
as the wars against Perseus, Antiochus, or Carthage.
Nevertheless, this enterprise encountered a warm opposition at Rome; the
party hostile to the consuls feared the glory which it might reflect
upon Crassus, and many prudent minds dreaded the perils of so distant an
expedition; but Cæsar, who had inherited that passion of the ancient
Romans who dreamt for their town the empire of the world, encouraged
Crassus in his projects, and, in the winter of 700, he sent Publius to
his father, with 1,000 picked Gaulish cavalry.
Inauspicious auguries marked the departure of the proconsul. The two
tribunes of the people, C. Ateius Capito and P. Aquilius Gallus,
adherents of the party of the nobles, opposed it. They had succeeded in
imparting their sentiments to many of their fellow-citizens. Crassus,
intimidated, took with him Pompey, whose ascendency over the people was
so powerful that his presence was sufficient to put a stop to all
hostile manifestation. Ateius Capito was not discouraged; he gave orders
to an usher to place Crassus under arrest at the moment when he was
leaving Rome. The other tribune prevented this act of violence. Then,
seeing that all his efforts had failed, he had recourse to an extreme
measure: he sent for a chafing-dish, and threw perfumes into it, while
he pronounced against Crassus the most terrible curses. These
imprecations were of a nature to strike the superstitious minds of the
Romans. People did not fail to call them to memory afterwards, when news
came of the Syrian disasters.
[Sidenote: Cato proposes to deliver Cæsar to the Germans.]
VIII. About the same time, the news arrived at Rome of the defeat of the
Usipetes and Tencteri, of the passage of the Rhine, and of the descent
in Britain; they excited a warm enthusiasm, and the Senate decreed
twenty days of thanksgiving.[680] The last expedition especially made a
great impression on people’s minds; it was like the discovery of a new
world; the national pride was flattered at learning that the legions had
penetrated into an unknown country, from which immense advantages for
the Republic were promised.[681] Yet all were not dazzled by the
military successes; some pretended that Cæsar had crossed, not the
ocean, but a mere pool,[682] and Cato, persevering in his hatred,
proposed to deliver him to the Germans. He accused him of having
attacked them at the moment when they were sending deputies, and, by
this violation of the law of nations, drawn upon Rome the anger of
Heaven; “they must,” he said, “turn it upon the head of the perfidious
general:” an impotent diatribe, which did not prevail against the public
feeling![683] Yet, as soon as Cæsar was informed of it, too sensitive,
perhaps, to the insult, he wrote to the Senate a letter full of
invectives and accusations against Cato. The latter at first repelled
them calmly; then, taking advantage of the circumstance, he began to
paint, in the darkest colours, Cæsar’s pretended designs. “It was,” he
said, “neither the Germans nor the Gauls they had to fear, but this
ambitious man, whose designs were apparent to everybody.” These words
produced a strong impression on an auditory already prejudiced
unfavourably. Nevertheless, the fear of the public opinion prevented any
decision; for, according to Plutarch, “Cato made no impression outside
the Senate; the people desired that Cæsar should be raised to the
highest power, and the Senate, though it was of the same opinion as
Cato, dared not to act, through fear of the people.”[684]
CHAPTER V.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 700
[Sidenote: Second Descent in England.]
I. The expedition to England, in 699, may be said to have been only a
reconnoitring visit, showing the necessity of more numerous forces and
more considerable preparations to subjugate the warlike people of Great
Britain. Accordingly, before starting for Italy, Cæsar gave orders to
build on the coast, and especially at the mouth of the Seine, a great
number of ships fitted for the transport of troops. In the month of June
he left Italy, visited his stocks where the vessels were building,
appointed Boulogne as the general rendezvous of his fleet, and, while it
was assembling, marched rapidly, with four legions, towards the country
of the Treviri, where the inhabitants, who had rebelled against his
orders, were divided into two parties, having at their head, one
Indutiomarus, and the other Cingetorix. He gave the power to the latter,
who was favourable to the Romans. After having thus calmed the agitation
of that country, Cæsar repaired at once to Boulogne, where he found 800
ships ready to put to sea; he embarked with five legions and 2,000
cavalry, and, without any resistance, landed, as in the year before,
near Deal. A first successful combat, not far from Kingston, engaged him
to continue his advance, when he received information that a tempest
had just destroyed part of his fleet; he then returned to the coast,
took the measures necessary for repairing this new disaster, caused all
his ships to be drawn on land, and surrounded them with a retrenchment
adjoining to the camp. He next marched towards the Thames. On his way he
encountered the Britons, who, vanquished in two successive combats, had
nevertheless more than once scattered trouble and disorder through the
ranks of the legions, thanks to their chariots; these engines of war,
mixed with the cavalry, spread terror and disconcerted the Roman
tactics. Cæsar forced the passage of the Thames at Sunbury, went to
attack the citadel of Cassivellaunus near St. Albans, and obtained
possession of it. Several tribes, situated to the south of that river,
made their submission. Then, dreading the approach of the equinox, and
especially the troubles which might break out in Gaul during his
absence, he returned to the continent.
[Sidenote: Displacement of the Army. Disaster of Sabinus.]
II. Immediately on his return, he placed his legions in winter quarters:
Sabinus and Cotta at Tongres; Cicero at Charleroi; Labienus at
Lavacherie, on the Ourthe; Fabius at Saint-Pol; Trebonius at Amiens;
Crassus at Montdidier; Plancus at Champlieu; and, lastly, Roscius in the
country of Séez. This displacement of the army, rendered necessary by
the difficulty of provisioning it, separated by great distances the
quarters from each other, though all, except that of Roscius, were
comprised in a radius of 100 miles.
As in the preceding years, Cæsar believed he might repair into Italy;
but Gaul still chafed under the yoke of the foreigner, and, while the
people of Orleans massacred Tasgetius, who had been given them for their
king three years before, events of a more serious character were in
preparation in the countries situate between the Rhine and the Meuse.
The people of Liége, led by Ambiorix and Cativolcus, revolt and attack,
at Tongres, the camp occupied by Sabinus and Cotta with fifteen cohorts.
Unable to take it by assault, they have recourse to stratagem: they
spread abroad the report of the departure of Cæsar, and of the revolt of
the whole of Gaul; they offer the two lieutenants to let them go,
without obstacle, to rejoin the nearest winter quarters. Sabinus
assembles a council of war, in which Cotta, an old experienced soldier,
refused all arrangement with the enemy; but, as often happens in such
meetings, the majority rallies to the least energetic opinion; the
fifteen cohorts, trusting in the promise of the Gauls, abandon their
impregnable position, and begin their march. On arriving at the defile
of Lowaige, they are attacked and massacred by the barbarians, who had
placed themselves in an ambuscade in the woods. Ambiorix, emboldened by
this success, raises all the peoples on his way, and hastens, at
Charleroi, to attack the camp of Cicero. The legion, though taken
unexpectedly, defends itself bravely, but the Gauls have learnt from
deserters the art of besieging fortresses in the Roman manner; they
raise towers, construct covered galleries, and surround the camp with a
countervallation. Meanwhile Cicero has found the means of informing
Cæsar of his critical position. The latter was at Amiens; the morrow of
the day on which he receives this news, he starts with two legions, and
sends a Gaul to announce his approach. The assailants, informed on their
part of Cæsar’s march, abandon the siege, and go to meet him. The two
armies encounter near the little stream of the Haine, at fourteen
kilomètres from Charleroi. Shut up in his retrenchments on Mont
Sainte-Aldegonde, Cæsar counterfeits fear, in order to provoke the Gauls
to attack him; and when they rush upon the ramparts to storm them, he
sallies out through all the gates, puts the enemies to the rout, and
strews the ground with their dead. The same day he rejoins Cicero,
congratulates the soldiers on their courage, and his lieutenant for
having been faithful to the Roman principle of never entering into
negotiation with an enemy in arms. For the moment this victory defeated
at one blow the aggressive attempts of the populations on the banks of
the Rhine against Labienus, and those of the maritime peoples on the
coasts of the Straits against Roscius; but soon new disturbances arose:
the inhabitants of the state of Sens expelled Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had
given them for king; and, a little later, Labienus was forced to combat
the inhabitants of the country of Trèves, whom he defeated in an
engagement in which Indutiomarus was slain. With the exception of the
peoples of Burgundy and Champagne, all Gaul was in fermentation, which
obliged Cæsar to pass the winter in it.
[Sidenote: L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher,
Consuls.]
III. During this time, the struggle of parties continued at Rome, and
Pompey, charged with the supplying of provisions, having under his
orders lieutenants and legions, posted himself at the gates of the town;
his presence in Italy, a pledge of order and tranquillity, was accepted
by all good citizens.[685] His influence was, as Cæsar thought, to
paralyse that of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had obtained the
consulship. In fact, when on the preceding occasion Crassus and Pompey
placed themselves on the ranks as candidates for the consulship, the
opposite party, hopeless of defeating both, had sought the admission of
at least one of their candidates. They tried again the manœuvre they
had employed in 695, by which they succeeded in the nomination of
Bibulus as the colleague of Cæsar. The attempt had failed; but, at the
moment when the question of the election of consuls for the year 700 was
agitated, the aristocratic party, having no longer to contend against
persons of such eminence as Crassus and Pompey, obtained without
difficulty the election of Ahenobarbus. This latter represented alone,
in that high magistracy, the passions hostile to the triumvirs, since
his colleague Appius Claudius Pulcher was still, at that epoch,
favourable to Cæsar.
The authority of the consuls, whoever they might be, was powerless for
remedying the demoralisation of the upper classes, which was revealed by
numerous symptoms at Rome as well as in the provinces. Cicero himself,
as the following event proves, treated legality with contempt when it
interfered with his affections or political opinions.
[Sidenote: Re-establishment of Ptolemy in Egypt.]
IV. The Sibylline oracle, it will be remembered, had forbidden recourse
to arms for the purpose of restoring Ptolemy, King of Egypt, to his
states. In spite of this prohibition, Cicero, as early as the year 698,
had engaged P. Lentulus, proconsul in Cilicia and in Cyprus, to
re-establish him by force, and, to encourage this enterprise, he had
suggested to him the prospect of impunity in success, without, however,
concealing from him that, in case of reverse, the legal question, as
well, as the religious question, would assume a threatening form.[686]
Lentulus had thought it prudent to abstain; but Gabinius, proconsul in
Syria in the following year, had not shown the same degree of scruple.
Bribed by the king, some said, but, as others said, having received
orders from Pompey, he had left his son in Syria with a few troops, and
had marched with his legions towards Egypt.
After having, on his way, plundered Judæa, and sent prisoner to Rome its
king Aristobulus, he crossed the desert, and arrived before Pelusium. A
certain Archelaus, who was looked upon as a good general, and had served
under Mithridates, was detained in Syria. Gabinius, informed that Queen
Berenice wished to place him at the head of her army, and that she
offered a large sum of money for his ransom, immediately set him at
liberty, showing thereby as much avidity for riches as contempt for the
Egyptians. He defeated them in several battles, slew Archelaus, and
entered Alexandria, where he re-established Ptolemy on the throne, and
the latter, it is said, gave him 10,000 talents.[687] In this
expedition, Mark Antony, who was soon to be Cæsar’s quæstor, commanded
the cavalry; he distinguished himself by his intrepidity and by his
military talent.[688] This was the commencement of his fortune.
Gabinius, if we believe Dio Cassius, took good care not to send an
account of his conduct, but it was not long in becoming known, and he
was compelled to return to Rome, where serious accusations awaited him.
Unfortunately for him, when the period of his trial came on, Pompey, his
protector, was no longer consul.
Gabinius had to undergo in succession two accusations: he was acquitted
of the first, on the double head of sacrilege and high treason, because
he paid heavy bribes to his judges.[689] As to the second accusation,
relating to acts of extortion, he experienced more difficulties. Pompey,
who had been obliged to absent himself, in order to provide for the
provisioning with which he was charged, hastened to the gates of Rome,
which his office of proconsul did not allow him to enter, convoked an
assembly of the people outside the Pomœrium, employed all his
authority, and even read letters from Cæsar, in favour of the accused.
Still more, he begged Cicero to undertake his defence, and Cicero
accepted the task, forgetting the invectives with which he had
overwhelmed Gabinius before the Senate. All these efforts failed: it was
necessary to yield to the rage of the public opinion, skilfully excited
by the enemies of Gabinius; and the latter, condemned, went into exile,
where he remained until Cæsar’s dictatorship.[690]
[Sidenote: Corruption of the Elections.]
V. We are astonished to see personages such as Pompey and Cæsar
protecting men who seem to have borne such bad character as Gabinius;
but, to judge with impartiality the men of that period, we must not
forget, in the first place, that there were very few without blemish,
and, further, that the political parties never hesitated in throwing
upon their adversaries the most odious calumnies. Gabinius, belonging to
the popular faction, and the partisan of Pompey, had incurred the hatred
of the aristocracy and of the farmers of the revenues. The nobles never
pardoned him for being the author of the law which had entrusted to
Pompey the command of the expedition against the pirates, and for having
shown, during his proconsulship in Syria, want of deference in regard to
the Senate. So that assembly refused, in 698, to order thanksgivings for
his victories.[691] The farmers of the revenues bore ill-will towards
him on account of his decrees against usury,[692] and his solicitude for
the interests of his province.[693] This proconsul, who is represented
as an adventurer pillaging those under his administration, appears to
have governed Judæa with justice, and to have restored with skill, on
his return from Egypt, the order which had been disturbed during his
absence. His military capacity cannot be called in doubt. In speaking of
him, the historian Josephus closes with these words his account of the
battle against the Nabathæi: “This great captain, after so many
exploits, returned to Rome, and Crassus succeeded him in the government
of Syria.”[694] Nevertheless, it is very probable that Gabinius was not
more scrupulous than the other proconsuls in matter of probity; for, if
corruption then displayed itself with impudence in the provinces, it was
perhaps still more shameless in Rome. The following is a striking
example. Two candidates for the consulship, Domitius Calvinus and
Memmius Gemellus, united their clients and resources of all kinds to
obtain the first magistracy. In their desire to procure the support of
Ahenobarbus and Claudius Pulcher, the consuls in office, they engaged by
writing to secure for them, on their quitting office, the provinces they
desired, and that by a double fraud: they promised first to bring three
augurs to affirm the existence of a supposititious curiate law, and then
to find two consulars who would declare that they had assisted at the
regulation relative to the distribution of the provinces; in case of
non-performance, there was stipulated, for the profit of the consuls,
400,000 sestertii.[695] This shameless traffic and others of the same
kind, in which were compromised Æmilius Scaurus and Valerius Messala,
had caused the interest of money to be doubled.[696] The bargain would
probably have been carried out, if, in consequence of a quarrel between
the two consuls, Memmius had not denounced the convention in full
Senate, and produced the contract. The scandal was enormous, but it
remained unpunished as regarded the consuls.
Memmius, formerly Cæsar’s enemy, had recently joined his party;
nevertheless, the latter, incensed at his impudence, blamed his conduct,
and abandoned him; Memmius was exiled.[697] As to Domitius, he was, it
is true, accused of solicitation, and the Senate intended absolutely to
close the consulship against him by deciding that the consular comitia
should not be held until after judgment had been given on his trial.
All these facts bear witness to the decay of society, for the moral
degradation of the individuals must infallibly bring with it the
abasement of the institutions.
[Sidenote: Death of Cæsar’s Daughter.]
VI. Towards the month of August of the year 700, Cæsar lost his mother
Aurelia, and, a few days afterwards, his daughter Julia. The latter,
whose health had been declining since the troubles of the preceding
year, had become pregnant; she died in giving birth to a son, which did
not survive. Cæsar was painfully affected by this misfortune,[698] of
which he received the news during his expedition to Britain.[699] Pompey
was desirous of burying his wife in his estate of Alba; but the populace
opposed it, carried the body to the Campus Martius, and insisted on its
being buried there. By that rare privilege reserved to illustrious men,
the people sought, according to Plutarch, to honour rather the daughter
of Cæsar than the wife of Pompey.[700] This death broke one of the ties
which united the two most important men of the Republic. To create new
ties, Cæsar proposed his niece Octavia in marriage to Pompey, whose
daughter he offered to espouse, although she was already married to
Faustus Sylla.[701]
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Buildings at Rome.]
VII. At the same period, the proconsul of Gaul was, with the produce of
his booty, rebuilding at Rome a magnificent edifice, the old basilica of
the Forum, which was extended as far as to the Temple of Liberty. “It
will be the most beautiful thing in the world,” says Cicero; “there will
be in the Campus Martius seven electoral enclosures and galleries of
marble which will be surrounded with great porticoes of a thousand
paces. Near it will be a public villa.” Paulus was charged with the
execution of the works; Cicero and Oppius considered that 60,000,000
sestertii was a small sum for such an undertaking.[702] According to
Pliny, the mere purchase of the site in the Forum cost Cæsar the sum of
100,000,000 sestertii.[703] This building, interrupted by events, was
only finished after the African war.[704]
[Sidenote: His Relations with Cicero.]
VIII. While Cæsar was gaining, by these works destined for the public,
the general admiration, he neglected none of those attentions which were
of a nature to ensure him the alliance of men of importance. Cicero, as
we have seen, was already reconciled with him, and Cæsar had done all in
his power to gain his attachment still further. He flattered his
self-love, listened to all his recommendations,[705] treating with great
friendship Quintus Cicero, whom he had made one of his lieutenants; he
went so far as to place at the disposal of the great orator his credit
and fortune,[706] and accordingly Cicero was in continual
correspondence with him. He composed, as we have seen, poems in his
honour, and he wrote to Quintus “that he placed above everything the
friendship of such a man, whose affection he prized as much as that of
his brother and children.”[707] Elsewhere he said: “The memorable and
truly divine behaviour of Cæsar towards me and towards my brother has
imposed upon me the duty of seconding him in all his designs.”[708] And
he had kept his word. It was at Cæsar’s request that Cicero had
consented to resume his old friendly relations with Crassus,[709] and to
defend Gabinius and Rabirius. This last, compromised in the affairs of
Egypt, was accused of having received great sums of money from King
Ptolemy; but Cicero proved that he was poor, and reduced to live upon
Cæsar’s generosity, and, in the course of the trial, he expressed
himself as follows:--
“Will you, judges, know the truth? If the generosity of C. Cæsar,
extreme towards everybody, had not, in regard to Rabirius, passed all
belief, we should have ceased long ago to see him in the Forum. Cæsar
singly performs towards Postumus the duty of his numerous friends; and
the services which these rendered to his prosperity, Cæsar lavishes them
upon his adversity. Postumus is no longer more than the shadow of a
Roman knight; if he preserves this title, it is by the protection, by
the devotedness of a single friend. This phantom of his old rank, which
Cæsar alone has preserved for him and assists him in sustaining, is the
only wealth that we can now take from him. And this is a reason why we
ought the more to maintain him in it in his distress. It cannot be the
effect of a mean merit, to inspire, absent and in misfortune, so much
interest in such a man, who, in so lofty a fortune, does not disdain to
cast down his looks on the affairs of others. In that pre-occupation
with the great things which he is doing or has done, we should not be
astonished if we saw him forget his friends, and, if he forgot them, he
would easily obtain forgiveness.
“I have recognised in Cæsar very eminent and wonderful qualities; but
his other virtues are, as on a vast theatre, exposed to the gaze of
nations. To choose with skill the place for a camp, to marshal an army,
to take fortresses, break through enemies’ lines, face the rigour of
winter and those frosts which we support with difficulty in the bosom of
our towns and houses, to pursue the enemy in that same season when the
wild beasts hide in the depth of their retreats, and where everywhere
the law of nations gives a truce to combats: these are great things; who
denies it? but they have for their motive the most magnificent of
recompenses, the hope of living for ever in men’s memory. Such efforts
cause us no surprise in the man who aspires to immortality.
“But this is the glory which I admire in Cæsar, a glory which is neither
celebrated by the verses of poets nor by the monuments of history, but
which is weighed in the balance of the sage: a Roman knight, his old
friend, attached, devoted, affectioned to his person, had been ruined,
not by his excesses, not by shameful extravagance and the losses
brought on by indulgence of the passions, but by a speculation which had
for its object to augment his patrimony: Cæsar has arrested him in his
descent; he has not suffered him to fall, he has held out his hand to
him, has sustained him with his wealth, with his credit, and he still
sustains him at the present time; he holds back his friend on the edge
of the precipice, and the calm of his mind is no more disturbed by the
brightness of his own name, than his eyes are dazzled by the blaze of
his glory. May the actions of which I have spoken be as great in our
esteem as they are in reality! Let people think what they will of my
opinion in this respect; but when I see, in the bosom of such a power
and of such a prodigious fortune, this generosity towards others, this
unforgetfulness of friendship, I prefer them to all the other virtues.
And you, judges, far from this character of goodness, so new and so rare
among considerable and illustrious men, being disdained or repulsed by
you, you should wrap it up in your favour, and seek to encourage it; you
should do this the more, since this moment seems to have been chosen for
attacking Cæsar’s consideration, although, in this respect, we could do
nothing but he supports it with constancy or repairs it without
difficulty. But if he hears that one of his best friends has been struck
in his honour, it will be with the deepest pain, and to him an
irreparable misfortune.”[710]
In another circumstance, Cicero explained as follows the reason of his
attachment for the conqueror of Gaul: “Should I refuse my praises to
Cæsar, when I know that the people, and, after its example, the Senate,
from which my heart has never been severed, have shown their esteem for
him by loud and multiplied testimonies? Then, without doubt, it must be
confessed that the general interest has no influence on my sentiments,
and that individuals alone are the objects of my hatred or of my
friendship! What then? Should I see my vessel float with full sails
towards a port which, without being the same which I preferred formerly,
is neither less sure nor less tranquil, and, at the risk of my life,
wrestle against the tempest rather than trust myself to the skill of the
pilot who promises to save me? No, there is no inconstancy in following
the movements which storms impress on the vessel of the state. For me, I
have learned, I have recognized, I have read a truth, and the writers of
our nation, as well as those of other peoples, have consecrated it in
their works by the example of the wisest and most illustrious of men; it
is, that we ought not to persist irrevocably in our opinions, but that
we ought to accept the sentiments which are required by the situation of
the state, the diversity of conjunctures, and the interests of
peace.”[711]
In his _Oration against Piso_, he exclaims: “It would be impossible for
me, in contemplation of the great things which Cæsar has done, and which
he is doing every day, not to be his friend. Since he has the command of
your armies, it is no longer the rampart of the Alps which I seek to
oppose to the invasion of the Gauls; it is no longer by means of the
barrier of the Rhine, with all its gurges, that I seek to arrest the
fierce Germanic nations. Cæsar has done so much that, if the mountains
should be levelled, and the rivers dried, our Italy, deprived of her
natural fortifications, would find, in the result of his victories and
exploits, a safe defence.”[712]
The warm expansion of such sentiments must have touched Cæsar, and
inspired him with confidence; therefore he earnestly engaged Cicero not
to quit Rome.[713]
The influence of Cæsar continued to increase, as the letters and
orations of Cicero sufficiently testify. If it was required to raise
citizens such as C. Messius, M. Orfius, M. Curtius, C. Trebatius,[714]
to elevated positions, or to excite the interest of the judges in favour
of an accused, as in the trials of Balbus, Rabirius, and Gabinius, it
was always the same support which was invoked.[715]
CHAPTER VI.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 701.
[Sidenote: Expedition to the North of Gaul. Second Passage of the
Rhine.]
I. The disturbed state of Gaul and the loss of fifteen cohorts at
Tongres obliged Cæsar to augment his army; he raised two legions in the
Cisalpine, and asked for a third from Pompey. Again at the head of ten
legions, Cæsar, with his usual activity, hastened to repress the
incipient insurrections. From the Scheldt to the Rhine, from the Seine
to the Loire, most of the peoples were in arms. Those of Trèves had
called the Suevi to their assistance.
Without waiting for the end of winter, Cæsar brought together four
legions at Amiens, and, falling unexpectedly upon the peoples of
Hainault, forced from them a speedy submission. Then he convoked in this
latter town the general assembly of Gaul; but the peoples of Sens,
Orleans, and Trèves did not repair to it. He then transferred the
assembly to Paris, and afterwards marched upon Sens, where his
appearance sufficed to pacify not only that country, but also that of
Orleans. Having thus appeased in a short time the troubles of the north
and centre of Gaul, he directed all his attention towards the countries
situated between the Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix continued to
excite revolt. He was impatient to avenge upon him the defeat of
Sabinus; but, to make more sure of overtaking him, he resolved first to
make two expeditions, one into Brabant, the other into the country of
Trèves, and in this manner to cut off that chieftain from all retreat,
either on the side of the north, or on the side of the east, where the
Germans were.
He advanced in person towards Brabant, which he soon reduced to
obedience. During this time, Labienus gained, on the banks of the
Ourthe, a great victory over the inhabitants of the country of Trèves.
At the news of this defeat, the Germans, who had already crossed the
Rhine, returned home. Cæsar rejoined Labienus on the territory of
Trèves, and, determined to chastise the Suevi, he a second time crossed
the Rhine, near Bonn, a little above the place where he had built a
bridge two years before. After compelling the Suevi to take refuge in
the interior of their territory, he returned to Gaul, caused a part of
the bridge to be cut, and left a strong garrison on the left bank.
[Sidenote: Pursuit of Ambiorix.]
II. Having thus rendered all retreat impossible to Ambiorix, he advanced
with his army towards the country of Liége by way of Zulpich and Eupen,
across the forest of the Ardennes. Having arrived on the Meuse, he
divided his troops into three corps, and sent all his baggage with the
14th legion, under the command of Cicero, into the fortress of Tongres,
the scene of the disaster of Sabinus. Of these three corps, the first
was sent towards the north, near the southern frontiers of Brabant; the
second towards the west, between the Meuse and the Demer; and the third
marched towards the Scheldt, under the command of Cæsar, whose intention
was to gain the extremity of the forest of the Ardennes between Brussels
and Antwerp, where Ambiorix was said to have taken refuge. When he
quitted Tongres, he announced that he should return in seven days. But,
unwilling to risk his troops on difficult ground, against men who,
scattered, carried on a war of partisans, he sent messengers to invite
the neighbouring peoples to go and ravage the country of Liége, and, at
his call, all hurried to take part in the pillage. Among them 2,000
Sicambrian cavalry, attracted from beyond the Rhine, conceived the idea
of falling upon Cicero’s camp in order to carry off the riches it
contained. They arrived at the moment when a part of the garrison had
gone to forage. It was with great difficulty, and with the loss of two
cohorts, that the Romans repulsed this attack. The devastation of the
country of Liége was completed, but Ambiorix escaped.
The defeat of Sabinus at Tongres thus cruelly avenged, Cæsar returned to
Rheims, convoked there the assembly of Gaul, and caused judgment to be
passed on the conspiracy of the peoples of Sens and Orleans. Acco, the
head of the revolt, was condemned to death and executed, and Cæsar,
after placing his legions in winter quarters in the countries watered by
the Moselle, the Marne, and the Yonne, repaired to Italy.
[Sidenote: C. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala, Consuls.]
III. At Rome, the legal working of the institutions was incessantly
clogged by the ambitions of individuals. The year 700 had closed
without the holding of the consular comitia. Sometimes the tribunes of
the people, the only magistrates whose elections took place on a fixed
day, opposed the holding of the comitia; sometimes the _interreges_
themselves failed to obtain favourable auspices, or, in moments of
trouble, dared not assemble the people.[716] The boldness of the
agitators of all parties explains this anarchy.
Weary of intrigues and disorder, the public opinion looked for the end
of it only from a new power, which wrests from Cicero this painful
confession: “The Republic is without force; Pompey alone is
powerful.”[717] Already people even spoke of the dictatorship.[718]
Several men, according to Plutarch, ventured to say openly “that the
power of a single person was the only remedy for the evils of the
Republic, and that this remedy must be sought from the mildest
physician, which clearly indicated Pompey.”[719] Accordingly, the
tribune Lucceius brought forward the formal motion to elect Pompey
dictator. Cato rose energetically against this ill-timed motion. Several
of Pompey’s friends considered it prudent to justify him by affirming
that he never asked or desired the dictatorship. Cato’s reproaches had
none the less produced their effect; and, to put an end to suspicions,
Pompey permitted the consular comitia to be held.[720] In fact, he had
never the courage equal to his ambition, and “although he affected in
his speeches,” says Plutarch, “to refuse absolute power, all his
actions showed a desire to arrive at it.”[721]
The comitia opened in the month of Sextilis of the year 701; the consuls
named were Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala. The first had
been placed under accusation, as we have seen above; but the
pre-occupations of the moment had caused his trial to drag out in
length; and it is unknown whether he was acquitted, or whether all
judicial action had been paralysed on account of the absence of
magistrates during the first months of the year 701. Moreover, Calvinus
was protected by Pompey, and his colleague, Messala, was favoured by
Cæsar, at the recommendation of Cicero.
[Sidenote: Expedition of Crassus against the Parthians, and his Death.]
IV. Crassus had left for Syria about eighteen months before, full of
ambitious hopes, and flattering himself with the prospect of immense
conquests. He intended not only to subjugate the Parthians, but even to
renew the campaigns of Alexander, penetrate into Bactriana, and reach
India; unfortunately, he was not equal to such a task. Forgetting the
first rules of a general-in-chief, which consist in never despising his
enemies, and in placing on his side all the chances of success, he had
no care for the army he was going to combat, had made no inquiries
either as to the roads, or as to the countries he had to cross, and
neglected the alliances and succours which the peoples who were
neighbours and enemies to the Parthians might have offered him.
He had started from Brundusium in spite of the bad season, had landed at
Dyrrachium, not without the loss of several vessels; thence, following
the direct military road which led from the coasts of the Adriatic to
the Bosphorus,[722] he had proceeded by land into Galatia, and had
entered into Mesopotamia, after crossing the Euphrates.[723]
The Parthians, taken by surprise, offered no resistance, and the rich
and flourishing Greek colonies on the Euphrates and Tigris, who detested
the Parthian yoke, received Crassus as a liberator. The town of
Nicephorium (_Rakkah_), situated near Ichnæ, on the Balissus, opened its
gates to him; Zenodotium alone stood a siege. Instead of taking
advantage of the concurrence of circumstances, and advancing promptly
upon the Tigris, carrying the considerable town of Seleucia,
Ctesiphon,[724] the ordinary residence of the King of the Parthians, and
even Babylon, he confined himself to plundering the province. Having
left 7,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry in garrison in a few fortresses,
he returned to Syria to take his winter quarters. There, without
occupying himself with the next campaign, he only thought of committing
exactions and of pillaging the temples of Hierapolis and Jerusalem.
At the commencement of 701, Crassus took the field again with seven
legions, nearly 4,000 cavalry, and the same number of light-armed
infantry,[725] and re-entered Mesopotamia. He had for lieutenants his
son Publius, celebrated for his courage, his elevated sentiments, and
his conduct in Gaul; the brave Octavius, who afterwards perished rather
than abandon his general; Vargunteius, Censorinus, and Petronius: for
quæstor, C. Cassius Longinus, esteemed for his valour and prudence, and
who was, ten years afterwards, one of the murderers of Cæsar. An Arab
had become his auxiliary; it was the chief of the Osroenes, Bedouins of
the desert, who had formerly served Pompey in his campaign against
Mithridates; he was named Abgaros, or Abgar,[726] and had been bribed by
the King of the Parthians to betray Crassus.
Artabazus, King of Armenia, visited the proconsul at the head of 6,000
cavalry, promising him 10,000 more, and 30,000 foot, if he consented to
attack the Parthians through Armenia, where the mountainous character of
the country rendered their numerous and formidable cavalry useless.
Crassus rejected this proposal, alleging the necessity of proceeding
into Mesopotamia to the garrisons he had left there in the preceding
year. These, in fact, were already blockaded by the Parthians, and
soldiers who had escaped brought information of the immense preparations
Orodes was making to resist him. A second time, then, he crossed the
Euphrates, not far from Biradjik, the place of the passage of Alexander
the Great.[727] There he had his choice of two roads to reach Seleucia:
either to descend the left bank of the Euphrates to the point where it
approaches the Tigris,[728] or to cross the desert. The first, proposed
by Cassius, although the longest, procured him the immense advantage of
having his right wing constantly supported by the Euphrates, on which
boats could have carried his provisions. The second offered, it is true,
a shorter passage; but in following it, the army was exposed to want of
water and provisions, and to more laborious marches. The perfidious
counsels of Abgar led him to prefer the latter. “There was not,” said
the Arab, “a moment to lose, to prevent the Parthians from carrying away
their treasures, and placing them in safety among the Hyrcanians and
Scythians.” Crassus possessed some of the qualities which make a good
general; he had given proofs of it in the war of the allies, as well as
in that against Spartacus, but his faculties were paralysed by his
covetousness. Glory ought to be the only thought of the soldier.
During this time, Orodes, King of the Parthians, had divided his forces
into two armies: one, of which he took the command in person, went to
ravage Armenia, in order to prevent Artabazus from joining the Romans;
the other was entrusted to the vizier Surena, a man of merit, to whom
Orodes owed his crown. Without undervaluing his intelligence, we are
unwilling to believe, with some writers, that Surena invented new
military tactics to oppose those of the Romans, and that that was the
reason why, renouncing the employment of infantry, he made use only of
cavalry. If he placed all his confidence in that arm, it was because the
Parthians, in conformity with the nature of their country, generally
fought only on horseback, and among them, as Dio Cassius says, infantry
was of no value.[729] Surena’s talent consisted in the employment of the
craft so familiar to the Asiatics, in order to surround Crassus with
snares and traitors, and to draw him into the plains, where the
advantage was all on the side of cavalry.
The army of the Parthians was thus composed solely of cavalry, some
barbed with iron, as well as their horses,[730] and armed with long and
heavy lances; others furnished with powerful bows and arrows, which,
while they carried much farther than those of the Romans, perforated
defensive armour.
After quitting the town of Carrhæ, the Roman army advanced towards the
south, across the desert. The sand and heat made the march painful,
while the enemy remained always invisible. At length, when they arrived
on the banks, of a small river, the Balissus (_Belick_), which flows
into the Euphrates, they perceived a few Parthian horsemen. Abgar, sent
against them with a vanguard to reconnoitre, did not return. The traitor
had betrayed Crassus to Surena. The proconsul, impatient and uneasy,
then crosses the Balissus with his whole army, and, without allowing it
to repose, pushes forward his cavalry, and obliges the infantry to
follow it.
A few soldiers soon arrive to inform Crassus that they are all who have
been able to escape from an ambuscade into which his vanguard has
fallen, and that the whole Parthian army is on its march to encounter
him. At this intelligence, he, who believed that the enemy would not
dare to wait him, becomes confused, and hastily forms his troops in
array of battle on a long front, for fear of being surrounded. The
cavalry is on the wings; the Osroenes form a last line. The Parthians
first throw forward their light cavalry, which makes whirls in the
plain, raising clouds of dust, and causing the air to ring with their
savage cries and the noise of their drums,[731] and then retire as if in
flight.[732] Crassus sends forward against them his light infantry; but,
surrounded and overwhelmed with the more powerful missiles of the
Parthians, it is obliged to take refuge behind the legions.
On a sudden, the Osroenes whom Abgar had not carried with him attack the
Romans in the rear,[733] and at the same time appear, glittering in the
sun, the long lines of the cuirassed horsemen. Crassus then forms his
army in a square. Each face is composed of twelve cohorts, and the rest
is in reserve. The cavalry and light infantry, divided into two corps,
flank two opposite sides of the square.[734] Publius and Cassius
command, one the right, the other the left. Crassus takes his place in
the centre.[735] The heavy cavalry, lance in rest, charge the great
Roman square, and attempt to break it; but the thick and close ranks of
the legions oppose an invincible resistance. The Parthians fall back a
certain distance and call up their numerous archers, then, all together,
they return in line, and throw upon the deep masses of the Romans a
shower of missiles of which none fail of their aim. The legionaries, if
they remain in their position, have the disadvantage of their _pila_ and
slings, which carry but a short distance, and, if they advance to use
their swords, they lose that cohesion which forms their strength.
Without moving, and defending themselves with difficulty, they see their
numbers diminish without being discouraged; they hope that the enemy
will soon have exhausted his munitions. But the ranks of the Parthians
succeed each other; as quickly as the first have used all their arrows,
they go to fetch others near a long line of camels which carry their
provisions. The combat has lasted several hours; and the Parthians
continue to extend their circle, and threaten to surround entirely the
great Roman square.
In this critical position, Crassus can only have recourse to his
cavalry. The side hardest pressed by the enemy is that commanded by
Publius; his father orders him to make a desperate effort to disengage
the army.
This noble and intrepid young man immediately takes 1,300 cavalry, among
whom were the 1,000 Gauls sent by Cæsar, 500 archers, and eight cohorts
of infantry. Two young men of his own age follow him--Censorinus and
Megabacchus; the first a senator and talented orator, the second equally
distinguished. As soon as they are in motion, the Parthians, according
to their custom, fly, shooting their arrows at the same time, in the
manner of the Scythians. Publius takes this flight for a rout, and
allows himself to be drawn too far away. When he has long advanced far
out of sight of the body of the army, the fugitives halt, wheel round,
are joined by numerous reserves, and surround the Roman troop. These
defend themselves heroically, but the Gauls, unprovided with defensive
armour, resist with difficulty the cavalry barbed with iron. Meanwhile
the son of Crassus has been rejoined by his foot, who combat valiantly;
he orders them to advance, but they show him their hands nailed to their
bucklers, and their feet fixed to the ground, by the arrows. Publius
then makes a last appeal to his brave Gaulish cavalry, who, in their
devotedness to him, meet death far from their country, in the service of
a foreign cause. They dash with impetuosity against the wall of iron
which rises before them, they overthrow some of the cavalry under the
weight of their own armour, snatch their lances from others, or leap to
the ground to stab their horses in the belly; but valour must yield to
numbers. Publius, wounded, tries to retreat, and draws up the wreck of
his troops on ground the slope of which is disadvantageous to him. He
attempts in vain to make a retrenchment with bucklers; his cavalry being
placed in form of an amphitheatre, the last ranks are as much exposed as
the first to the arrows of the Parthians. Two Greeks offer to save him
by leading him to Ichnæ, a town not far off; the young hero replies that
he will not abandon his soldiers; he remains to die with them. Of 6,000
men, 500 only are made prisoners, the others are killed fighting.
Publius and his two friends, Censorinus and Megabacchus, slay each
other.
During this time, Crassus, relieved by his son’s offensive movement, had
taken position on a height, and waited in expectation of his victorious
return. But soon messengers come to inform him that, without prompt
succour, his son is lost. He hesitates a moment between the hope of
saving him and the fear of endangering the rest of his army. At last he
decides on marching. Hardly has he put the troops in motion, when he
sees the Parthians approaching to meet him, uttering shouts of victory,
and carrying the head of his son on the end of a pike. In this
circumstance, Crassus recovers an instant that energy familiar to the
Roman character, and, passing along the ranks, “Soldiers,” he exclaims,
“this loss concerns me alone. As long as you live, all the fortune and
all the glory of Rome endure and remain invincible. Be not discouraged
by my misfortune, and let your compassion for me be changed into rage
against your enemies.” These last accents of a presumptuous chief
produced little effect upon an army already disheartened. It fought
with resignation, no longer feeling that ardour which gives the hope of
victory. Taken in flank by the numerous archers, attacked in front by
the heavy cuirassed cavalry, the Romans struggled till evening,
remaining always on the defensive, and seeing the circle in which they
were enclosed incessantly contracting around them. Fortunately, the
Parthians, incapable of holding a position during the night, never
encamped on the field of battle; they withdrew.
This combat, fought at fifteen or twenty leagues to the south of Carrhæ,
was disastrous. Nevertheless, all was not lost, if the general-in-chief
preserved his energy and presence of mind; but, disheartened and plunged
in deep grief, he stood immovable, aside from the rest, incapable of
giving any order. Octavius and Cassius called together the tribunes and
centurions, and decided on retreat; yet it was necessary to abandon
4,000 wounded, who could not be carried away, and even conceal their
departure from them, lest their cries might awaken the attention of the
enemy. The retreat is executed at first in complete silence; suddenly
the miserable victims perceive that they are made a sacrifice, their
groans give warning to the Persians, and excite a frightful tumult among
the Romans: some return to load the wounded on the baggage horses,
others form in battle to repulse the enemy: 300 of the cavalry escape,
reach Carrhæ, and cross the Euphrates over the bridge which Crassus had
built. Meanwhile the Parthians, occupied in massacring the 4,000 wounded
and the stragglers, pursue only faintly the remains of the Roman army,
which, protected by a sally of the garrison of Carrhæ, succeed in
shutting themselves up within its walls.
Either through discouragement, or through want of provisions, the Romans
made no stay in this town, but abandoned it, to seek refuge in Armenia.
Crassus, followed by a small number of troops, trusting again in a
native who was deceiving him, saw his flight retarded by the circuitous
way he was made to take uselessly. At daybreak the Parthians appeared.
Octavius had reached, with 5,000 men, one of the spurs of the mountains
of Armenia, and would have been able to place himself in safety in the
fortress of Sinnaka, at a distance of only a day’s march; he prefers
descending into the plain to the succour of his general, whom he brings
back with him to the heights. If they continue the combat till evening,
all will not be lost; but Surena has again recourse to stratagem: he
sends seductive offers, and proposes an interview. Crassus refuses it;
he is resolved on fighting. Unfortunately, the soldiers, who hitherto
had obeyed imprudent orders, this time refuse to obey the only order
which could save them. Crassus is forced to agree to the interview. At
the moment he is on his way to it, an accidental quarrel, or rather one
raised by the treachery of the Parthians, arises between the escorts of
the two nations. Octavius thrusts his sword through the body of a
Parthian esquire; a battle follows, and all the Roman escort is
massacred. Crassus is slain, and his head carried to Orodes. Of 40,000
legionaries, one quarter alone survived. The cavalry of C. Cassius,
which had separated from the army on their departure from Carrhæ, and a
few other fugitives, succeeded in reaching Syria, in covering Antioch,
and even subsequently in expelling successfully the Parthians from the
Roman province.
[Sidenote: Consequences of the Death of Crassus.]
V. The death of Crassus had two serious consequences: the first was to
raise still higher the merit of the conqueror of Gaul, by showing what
became of the most numerous and best-disciplined armies under the
command of a presumptuous and unskilful chief; the second, to take away
from the scene a man whose influence was a check upon the ambition of
two individuals destined to become rivals. With Crassus, Pompey would
not have been the instrument of a party; without Pompey, the Senate
would not have dared to declare against Cæsar.
The balance thus broken, Pompey sought a new point of support. His
alliance with Cæsar had alone given him the concurrence of the popular
party. Now that this alliance was weakened, he would naturally seek to
be reconciled to the aristocracy, flatter its passions, and serve its
rancours. In the first moments, he provoked disorder rather than
repressed it.
Three competitors disputed the consulship for 702, T. Annius Milo, P.
Plautius Hypsæus, and Q. Cæcilius Metellus Scipio.[736] They rivalled
each other in intrigue and corruption.[737] Pompey, especially since he
had been reconciled to P. Clodius, treated Milo as an enemy, and,
according to his habitual tactics, pretended to believe that he
harboured designs against his life. Although he retarded the comitia,
he favoured P. Hypsæus and Q. Scipio, who solicited the consulship, and
Clodius, who, the same year, was a candidate for the prætorship. Milo
had a great number of partisans; his largesses to the people and his
spectacles seemed likely to ensure his election; and Pompey, in the way
of whose views he stood, did all he could to prevent the Senate from
naming an interrex to hold the comitia. He desired this important office
for himself; but, obliged to give way before the resistance of Cato, he
confined himself to preventing any election, and the year ended again
without the nomination of consuls.
CHAPTER VII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 702.
[Sidenote: Murder of Clodius.]
I. Rome seemed to be given up only to the petty contentions of
individuals; but, behind the men who stood in view, grave interests and
violent passions were in agitation. The disease which undermines society
unknown to it, reveals itself when facts, of no great importance in
themselves, occur suddenly to produce an unforeseen crisis, to unveil
dangers which were unperceived, and to show to all men that society on
the brink of an abyss of which nobody had suspected the depth. Thus, by
mere accidents of his life, Clodius seems to have been destined to cause
the explosion of the elements of disorder which the Republic concealed
in its bosom. He is caught in the house of Cæsar’s wife during a
religious sacrifice, and this violation of the mysteries of the _Bona
Dea_ leads to a fatal division in the first bodies of the state. His
impeachment irritates the popular party; his acquittal exposes to the
world the venality of the judges, and separates the order of the knights
from that of the Senate. The animosity with which he is pursued makes
him a chief of a formidable party, which sends Cicero into exile, makes
Pompey tremble, and accelerates the elevation of Cæsar. His death is
destined to awaken all the popular passions, and inspire the opposite
faction with so many fears, that it will forget its rancours and
jealousies to throw itself into the arms of Pompey, and all the people
will be in arms from one end of Italy to the other.
On the 13th of the Calends of February, 702 (13th of December, 701),
Milo started from Rome to proceed to Lanuvium, his native town, of which
he was the dictator.[738] Towards the ninth hour, he met on the Appian
Way, a little beyond Bovillæ, Clodius, who, on his part, was returning
on horseback from Aricia to Rome, accompanied by three friends and
thirty slaves, all armed with swords. Milo was in a chariot with his
wife Fausta, daughter of Sylla, and M. Fufius, his familiar. In his
train marched an escort ten times more numerous than that of Clodius,
and in which were several celebrated gladiators. The two troops passed
near a small temple of the _Bona Dea_,[739] without exchanging a single
word, but casting on each other furious looks. They had hardly passed,
when two of Milo’s gladiators, who lagged behind, picked a quarrel with
the slaves of Clodius. At the noise of this dispute, the latter turned
his bridle, and advanced uttering threats. One of the gladiators, named
Birria, struck him with his sword, and wounded him grievously in the
shoulder;[740] he was carried into a neighbouring tavern.[741]
Milo, learning that Clodius was wounded, feared the consequences of this
aggression, and believed that he would incur less danger by dispatching
his enemy. He therefore sent his men to burst open the tavern; Clodius,
dragged from the bed on which he had been placed, is pierced with blows,
and thrown into the high road. His slaves are slain or put to flight.
The corpse remained stretched on the Appian Way, until a senator, Sext.
Tedius, who was passing, caused him to be taken up, placed in a litter,
and carried to Rome, where he arrived at night, and was laid on a bed in
the _atrium_ of his house. But already the news of the fatal meeting was
spread through the whole town, and the crowd hastened towards the
residence of Clodius, where his wife, Fulvia, pointing to the wounds
with which he was covered, urged the people to vengeance. The concourse
was so great that several men of mark, and among others C. Vibienus, a
senator, were stifled in the crowd. The corpse was carried to the Forum,
and exposed on the rostra; two tribunes of the people, T. Munatius
Plancus and Q. Pompeius Rufus, harangued the multitude, and demanded
justice.
Afterwards, at the instigation of a scribe named Sext. Clodius, the body
was carried to the curia, in order to insult the Senate; a funereal pile
was made of the benches, tables, and registers. The fire communicated to
the Curia Hostilia, and thence gained the Basilica Porcia, and the two
buildings were reduced to ashes. Then the multitude, becoming more and
more furious, snatched the fasces which surrounded the funereal
bed,[742] and proceeded to the front of the houses of Hypsæus and Q.
Metellus Scipio, as if to offer them the consulship. Lastly, they
presented themselves before the abode of Pompey; some demanded with loud
shouts that he should be consul or dictator, others shouted the same
wishes for Cæsar.[743]
Nevertheless, nine days after, when the smoke was still rising from the
ruins, the populace, on the occasion of a funereal banquet in the Forum,
sought to burn the house of Milo and that of the interrex, M. Lepidus.
They were driven away by a shower of arrows.[744] Milo, in the first
moment, had dreamt only of hiding himself; but on hearing the
indignation and terror caused by the burning of the curia, he resumed
his courage. Persuaded, moreover, that, to repress these excesses, the
Senate would proceed to severities against the opposite party,[745] he
returned into Rome by night, carried his boldness so far as to announce
that he still solicited the consulship, and began actually to buy the
votes. Cœlius, a tribune of the people, spoke in his favour in the
Forum. Milo himself mounted the tribune, and accused Clodius of having
laid an ambush for him. He was interrupted by a considerable number of
armed men, who rushed into the public place. Milo and Cœlius wrapped
themselves in the mantles of slaves, and took flight. A great slaughter
of their adherents was made. But soon the rioters, profiting by this
pretext for disorder, murdered all they met, whether citizens or
strangers, especially such as attracted their attention by their rich
garments and gold rings; armed slaves were the chief instruments of
these disorders. No crime was spared; under pretence of seeking Milo’s
friends, a great number of houses were pillaged, and during several days
all sorts of outrages were committed.[746]
[Sidenote: The Republic is declared in Danger.]
II. Meanwhile the Senate declared the Republic in danger, and charged
the interrex, the tribunes of the people, and the proconsul Cn. Pompey,
having the _imperium_ near the town, to watch over the public safety,
and make levies in all Italy. The care of rebuilding the Curia Hostilia
was entrusted to the son of Sylla: it was decided that it should bear
the name of the old dictator, the memory of whom the Senate sought to
place in honour.[747]
As soon as Pompey had assembled a military force sufficiently imposing,
the two nephews of Clodius, both named Appius, demanded the arrest of
the slaves of Milo, and of those of Fausta, his wife. But the first care
of Milo, his enemy once dead, had been to enfranchise his slaves, as a
reward for having defended him, and, once enfranchised, they could no
longer depose against their patron.
About a month after the death of Clodius, Q. Metellus Scipio brought the
affair before the Senate, and accused Milo of falsehood in the
explanations he had given. He arrayed skilfully all the circumstances
which pointed to him as the aggressor: on one side, his escort much more
numerous--the three wounds of Clodius--the eleven slaves of the latter
slain; on the other, certain criminal facts connected with the event--a
taverner slaughtered--two messengers massacred--a slave chopped to
pieces for refusing to give up a son of Clodius; lastly, the sum of
1,000 ases offered by the accused to whoever would undertake his
defence. Then Milo sought to appease Pompey, by offering to desist from
his candidature for the consulship. Pompey replied that the right of
deciding belonged to the Roman people alone. Milo remained under the
accusation not only of murder, but of electoral solicitation, and of an
outrage on the Republic. He could not be judged before the previous
nomination of the urban prætor, and before the convocation of the
comitia.
[Sidenote: Pompey sole Consul.]
III. This time the fear of disorder silenced opposition, and all eyes
turned towards Pompey; but what title to give him? That of dictator
caused alarm. M. Bibulus, though previously hostile, moved the proposal
to elect him sole consul; it offered the only means of averting the
dictature, and preventing Cæsar from becoming his colleague.[748] M.
Cato supported this motion, which passed unanimously.[749] It was added
that, if Pompey believed a second consul necessary, he should name
himself, but not within two months.[750] On the 5th of the Calends of
March (27th of February)--it was during an intercalary month--Pompey,
though absent, was declared consul by the interrex Serv. Sulpicius, and
immediately re-entered Rome. “This extraordinary measure, which had
never before been adopted for anybody, appeared wise; nevertheless, as
Pompey sought less than Cæsar the favour of the people, the Senate
flattered itself with the hope of detaching him completely from it, and
securing him in its own interests. And so it happened. Proud of this new
and altogether unusual honour, Pompey no longer proposed any measure
with a view of pleasing the multitude, and did scrupulously all that
could be agreeable to the Senate.”[751]
Three days after his installation, he obtained two
senatus-consultus--one, to repress outrages with violence, especially
the murder committed on the Appian Way, the burning of the curia, and
the attack on the house of the interrex, M. Lepidus; the other, to
prevent electoral solicitation by a more rapid proceeding and a more
severe penalty. In all criminal actions, a delay of three days was fixed
for the interrogation of witnesses, and one day for the contradictory
debates. The accuser had two hours to speak, the accused three to defend
himself.[752]
M. Cœlius, tribune of the people, protested against these laws,
alleging that they violated the tutelary forms of justice, and that they
were only imagined for the ruin of Milo. Pompey replied in a tone of
menace: “Let them not oblige me to defend the Republic by arms!” He,
moreover, adopted all measures for his personal safety, and went with a
military guard, as though he feared some outrage on the part of Milo.
[Sidenote: Trial of Milo.]
IV. Pompey required farther, that a quæstor should be chosen among the
consulars to preside over the hearing of the cause. The comitia were
held, and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was elected. It was conceded to Milo
that the accusation of murder should be tried first, and that that of
solicitation should be adjourned.
The accusers were the elder of the Appii (the nephew of Clodius), M.
Antonius, and P. Valerius Nepos. Cicero, assisted by M. Claudius
Marcellus, was to defend the accused. Every effort had been made to
intimidate Cicero. Pompeius Rufus, C. Sallustius,[753] and T. Munatius
Plancus had sought to excite the people against him, and to make Pompey
look upon him with suspicion. Although he remained firm against the
threats of his adversaries, his courage was shaken.
The trial began on the eve of the Nones of April, and on the first day
the pleadings were interrupted by a violent agitation. Next day, the
interrogation of the witnesses was carried on under the protection of an
imposing military force. Most of the evidence was overpowering for the
accused, and proved that Clodius had been massacred in cold blood. When
Fulvia, the widow of Clodius, appeared, the emotion increased twofold;
her tears, and the spectacle of her grief, affected the assembly. When
the session was closed, the tribune of the people, T. Munatius Plancus,
harangued the mob, engaged the citizens to come next day in great number
to the public place, in order to oppose the acquittal of Milo, and he
recommended them to show unmistakably _their opinion and grief to the
judges when it came to the voting_.
On the 6th of the Ides of April the shops were closed; guards were
placed on the issues of the Forum by order of Pompey, who, with a
considerable reserve, stationed himself at the treasury. After the
drawing for the judges, the eldest of the Appii, M. Antonius, and P.
Valerius Nepos sustained the accusation. Cicero alone replied. He had
been advised to represent the murder of Clodius as a service rendered to
the Republic; but he rejected this plea, although Cato had dared to
declare in full Senate that Milo had performed the act of a good
citizen.[754] He preferred resting his argument on the right of
legitimate defence. He had hardly commenced, when the cries and
interruptions of the partisans of Clodius caused him an emotion which
was visible in his speech; the soldiers were obliged to make use of
their arms.[755] The cries of the wounded, and the sight of the blood,
deprived Cicero of his presence of mind; he trembled, and often broke
off. His pleading was far from being worthy of his talent. Milo was
condemned, and went into exile to Marseilles. In the sequel, Cicero
composed at his leisure the magnificent oration which we know, and sent
it to his unfortunate client, who replied; “If thou hadst spoken
formerly as thou hast now written, I should not be eating mullets at
Marseilles.”[756]
During the wars of Greece and Africa, Milo, who had not forgotten his
part of conspirator, returned into Italy, invited by Cœlius. They
both attempted to organise seditious movements; but they failed, and
paid for their rash enterprise with their lives.[757]
Pompey, having reached the summit of power, believed, like most men who
are vain of themselves, that all was saved because they had placed him
at the head of affairs; but, instead of attending to these, his first
care was to marry again. He espoused, in spite of his advanced age,
Cornelia, daughter of Scipio, the young widow of Publius Crassus, who
had just perished among the Parthians. “It was considered,” says
Plutarch, “that a woman so young, remarkable both for her mental
qualities and for external graces, would have been more properly married
to his son. The more honest citizens reproached him with having, on this
occasion, sacrificed the interests of the Republic, which, in the
extremity to which it was reduced, had chosen him for its physician, and
trusted to him alone for its cure. Instead of responding to this
confidence, he was seen crowned with flowers, offering sacrifices and
celebrating nuptial rites, while he ought to have regarded as a public
calamity this consulship, which he would not have obtained, according
to the laws, alone and without a colleague, if Rome had been more
happy.”[758]
Pompey had, nevertheless, rendered great services by putting down the
riots and protecting the exercise of justice. He had delivered Rome from
the bands of Clodius and Milo, had given a more regular organisation to
the tribunals,[759] and caused their judgments to be respected by armed
force. Still, if we except these acts, commanded by circumstances, he
had used his power with hesitation, as a man who is struggling between
his conscience and his interests. Having become, perhaps unknowingly,
the instrument of the aristocratic party, the ties which had attached
him to Cæsar had often checked him in the way in which they sought to
push him. As the defender of order, he had promulgated laws to restore
it; but, as the man of a party, he had been incessantly led to violate
them, to satisfy the urgencies of his faction. He caused a
senatus-consultus to be adopted, authorising prosecutions against those
who had exercised public employments since his first consulship. The
retrospective effect of this law, which embraced a period of twenty
years; and consequently the consulship of Cæsar, excited the indignation
of the partisans of the latter; they exclaimed that Pompey would do much
better to occupy himself with the present than to call the hateful
investigation of the factions to the past conduct of the first
magistrates of the Republic; but Pompey replied that, since the law
permitted the control of his own acts, he saw no reason why those of
Cæsar should be freed from it; and that, moreover, the relaxation of
morals during so many years rendered the measure necessary.[760]
Complaint was made of the power left to orators of pronouncing the
eulogy of the accused, whose defence they offered, because the prestige
attached to the word of men of consideration procured too easily the
acquittal of the guilty. A senatus-consultus prohibited the custom. Yet
in contempt of these orders, which he had brought forward, Pompey was
not ashamed to pronounce the eulogy of T. Munatius Plancus, accused,
with Q. Pompeius Rufus, of the fire which burnt the Curia Hostilia.[761]
Cato, who was one of the members of the tribunal, exclaimed, stopping
his ears: “I do not believe this eulogiser, who speaks against his own
laws.” The accused were condemned nevertheless.
With the aim of repressing electoral corruption and bringing to justice
those guilty of it, it was enacted that every one condemned for bribery
who should succeed in convicting another of the same crime should obtain
thereby the remission of his punishment. Memmius, condemned for an act
of this description, wishing to take advantage of the benefit of the
legal impunity, denounced Scipio. Then Pompey appeared clothed in
mourning before the tribunal, at the side of his father-in-law. At the
view of this image of sorrow and of the moral pressure which resulted
from it, Memmius desisted, deploring the misfortune of the Republic. As
to the judges, they pushed flattery to the point of conducting Scipio
back to his dwelling.[762]
To put a stop in the elections to the intrigues arising from the
shameless covetousness of the candidates, it was decreed that the
consuls and prætors should not be allowed to take the government of a
province until five years after their consulship or prætorship.[763]
This discouraged the ambitious, who threw themselves into extravagant
expenses in order to arrive through one of these magistracies at the
government of the provinces. And nevertheless Pompey, although consul,
not only preserved the proconsulship of Spain, but he caused his
government to be prolonged for five years, kept a part of his army in
Italy, and received a thousand talents for the maintenance of his
troops. In the interest of his partisans, he did not hesitate to violate
his own laws, which has made Tacitus say of him, _Suarum legum auctor
idem ac subversor_.[764]
The preceding law did not deprive Cæsar of the possibility of arriving
at the consulship, but the Senate put in force again the law which
prohibited any one who was absent from offering himself as a candidate,
forgetting that it had just elected Pompey sole consul, although absent
from the town of Rome. The friends of the proconsul of Gaul protested
with energy. “Cæsar,” they said, “had merited well of his country; a
second consulship would only be the just recompense of his immense
labours; or, at all events, if they felt reluctance in conferring this
great dignity upon him, they ought at least not to give him a
successor, or deprive him of the benefit he had acquired.” Pompey, who
had no desire of breaking with Cæsar, had recourse to Cicero[765] to add
to the law already engraved on a tablet of brass, which was then the
form of promulgation, that the prohibition did not apply to those who
had obtained the authorisation to offer themselves as candidates in
spite of their absence. All the tribunes, who had at first protested,
accepted this qualification, at the motion of Cœlius.[766]
Nevertheless, Cæsar’s friends went to him in great numbers to
demonstrate that Pompey’s laws had been all brought forward against his
interest, and that it was essential that he should be on his guard
against him. Cæsar, proud in the justice of his claims, and strong in
the services he had rendered, distrusted neither his son-in-law nor
destiny, encouraged them, and praised greatly the conduct of
Pompey.[767]
[Sidenote: Pompey takes as his Associate Cæcillus Metellus Pius Scipio.]
V. About the first of August, Pompey chose his father-in-law Scipio as
his associate in the consulship, for the last five months. This
partition of power, purely nominal, and which was subsequently imitated
by the emperors, appeared to satisfy men who thought only of forms. The
senators boasted of having restored order without injuring the
institutions of the Republic.[768]
Scipio sought to signalise his short administration by abolishing the
law of Clodius, which permitted the censors to expel from the Senate
only men who had already undergone a condemnation. He restored things to
the old footing, by rendering the power of the censors almost unlimited.
This change was not received with favour, as Scipio had expected. The
old consulars, among whom the censors were usually chosen, found the
responsibility of such functions dangerous in a time of trouble and
anarchy. Instead of being sought as an honour, the censorship was
avoided as a perilous post.[769]
It was every day more evident, in the eyes of all men of judgment, that
the institutions of the Republic were becoming more and more powerless
to guarantee order within, and perhaps even peace without. The Senate
could no longer meet, the comitia be held, or the judges render
judgment, without the protection of a military force; it was necessary,
therefore, to place themselves at the discretion of a general, and to
abdicate all authority into his hands. Thus, while the popular instinct,
which is rarely deceived, saw the safety of the Republic in the power of
a single individual, the aristocratic party, on the contrary, saw danger
only in this general tendency towards one man. For this reason Cato
inscribed himself among the candidates for the consulship for the year
703, denouncing Pompey and Cæsar as equally dangerous, and declaring
that he only aspired to the first magistracy to counteract their
ambitious designs. This competition, opposed to the spirit of the time
and to the powerful instincts which were in play, had no chance of
success: the candidature of Cato was defeated without difficulty.
[Sidenote: Insurrection of Gaul, and Campaign of 702.]
VI. Not only had the murder of Clodius deeply agitated Italy, but the
reverberation made itself felt beyond the Alps, and the troubles in Rome
had revived in Gaul the desire to shake off the yoke of the Romans. The
intestine dissensions, by spreading a belief in the debilitation of the
state, awakened incessantly the hopes of its exterior enemies, and,
which is sad to confess, these exterior enemies always find accomplices
among traitors who are ready to betray their country.[770]
The campaign of 702 is, without dispute, the most interesting in the
double point of view--political and military. To the historian, it
presents the affecting scene of tribes, hitherto divided, uniting in one
national thought, and arming for the purpose of re-conquering their
independence. To the philosopher it presents, as a result consoling for
the progress of humanity, the triumph of civilisation against the best
combined and most heroic efforts of barbarism. Lastly, in the eyes of
the soldier, it is a magnificent example of what may be done by energy
and experience in war by a small number contending against masses who
are wanting in organisation and discipline.
The events which had occurred in Rome led the Gauls to think that Cæsar
would be detained in Italy, upon which a formidable insurrection is
organised among them. All the different peoples act in concert, and form
a coalition. The provinces in the military occupation of the legions, or
held in fear by their proximity, alone remain foreign to the general
agitation. The country of Orleans first gives the signal; the Roman
citizens are slaughtered at Gien; Berry and Auvergne join the league;
and soon, from the Seine to the Gironde, from the Cévennes to the ocean,
the whole country is in arms. As a chief never fails to reveal himself
when a great national movement breaks out, Vercingetorix appears, places
himself at the head of a war of independence, and, for the first time,
proclaims this truth, the stamp of grandeur and patriotism: “_If Gaul
has the sense to be united, and become one nation, it may defy the
universe._” All respond to his call.
The peoples, but lately divided by rivalries, customs, and tradition,
forget their reciprocal grievances, and unite under him. Foreign
oppression creates nationalities much more than community of ideas and
interests. Had Vercingetorix formerly, like so many others, bent his
brow under the Roman domination? Dio Cassius is the only historian who
says so. Be this as it may, he shows himself, as early as the year 702,
the firm and intrepid adversary of the invaders. His plan is as bold as
it is well combined: to create in the heart of Gaul a great centre of
insurrection, protected by the mountains of the Cévennes and of
Auvergne; from this natural fortress to throw his lieutenants upon the
Narbonnese, whence Cæsar would be no longer able to draw either succours
or provisions; to prevent even the Roman general from returning to his
army; to attack separately the legions while deprived of their chief,
urge into insurrection the centre of Gaul, and destroy the _oppidum_ of
the Boii, that small people, the remains of the defeat of the Helvetii,
placed by Cæsar at the confluence of the Allier and the Loire as an
advance sentinel.
Informed of these events, Cæsar quits Italy in haste, followed by a
small number of troops raised in the Cisalpine. On his descent from the
Alps, he finds himself almost alone in presence of wavering allies, and
of the greatest part of Gaul in revolt, while his legions are dispersed
at a distance on the Moselle, the Marne, and the Yonne. So many perils
excite his ardour instead of abating it, and his resolution is soon
taken.
He is going to draw his enemies, by successful and multiplied
diversions, to the points where he intends to strike decisive blows; and
by sending his infantry into the Vivarais, his cavalry to Vienne, and
proceeding in person to Narbonne, he divides the attention of his
adversaries, in order to conceal his designs.
His presence in the Roman province is equivalent to an army. He
encourages the men who have remained faithful, intimidates the others;
doubles, with the local resources, all the garrisons of the towns of the
Province as far as Toulouse; and, after having thus raised in the south
a barrier against all invasion, he returns, and arrives at the foot of
the Cévennes, in the Vivarais, where he finds the troops which had been
sent forward. He then crosses the mountains covered with snow,
penetrates into Auvergne, and obliges Vercingetorix to abandon Berry, in
order to hasten to defend his own country, which is threatened.
Satisfied with this result, he starts unexpectedly, and, almost alone,
hastens to Vienne. He takes the escort of cavalry which had preceded
him, reaches the country of Langres, and proceeds thence to Sens, where
he brings together his ten legions.
Thus, in little time, he has placed the Roman Province in security from
any attack, forced Vercingetorix to fly to the defence of Auvergne, and
rejoined and concentrated his army.
Although the rigour of the season adds to the difficulty of the marches
and supplies of provisions (it was in the month of March), he decides
upon immediately taking the field. Vercingetorix has just laid siege to
Gorgobina, the _oppidium_ of the Boii. These 20,000 Germans, so recently
vanquished, preserve the sincere gratitude of a primitive people towards
him who has given them lands, instead of selling them for slaves: they
remain faithful to the Romans, and face the anger of Vercingetorix and
the attacks of revolted Gaul. Cæsar, unwilling that a people who set the
example of fidelity should become the victims of their devotedness,
marches to their succour. He might go directly to Gorgobina, and cross
the Loire at Nevers; but in that case, Vercingetorix, informed of his
approach, would have had time to come and dispute the passage. To
attempt this by force was a dangerous operation. He leaves at Sens two
legions and his baggage, starts at the head of the eight others, and
hastens, by the shortest way, to cross the Loire at Gien. He proceeds up
the left bank of the river; while Vercingetorix, instead of waiting for
him, raises the siege of Gorgobina. He proceeds to meet Cæsar, who beats
him at Sancerre in a cavalry encounter, and then marches upon Bourges,
without further care for an enemy incapable of arresting him in the open
field. The capture of that important town must make him master of the
whole country. The Gaulish general confines himself to following by
short marches, and burning all the country around, in order to starve
the Roman army.
The siege of Bourges is one of the most regular and interesting of the
war in Gaul. Cæsar opens the trenches, that is, he makes covered
galleries which permit him to approach the place, to fill the fosse, and
to construct a terrace, a veritable breaching battery, surmounted on
each side by a tower. When, with the assistance of his military engines,
he has thinned the ranks of the defenders, he assembles his legions
under protection of the parallels composed of covered galleries, and by
means of the terrace, which equals the elevation of the wall, he gives
the assault and carries the place.
After the capture of Bourges, he proceeds to Nevers, where he
establishes his magazines; then to Decize, to appease the disputes which
had arisen, among the Burgundians, from the competition of two claimants
to the supreme power. He next divides his army; sends Labienus, with two
legions, against the Parisii and their allies; orders him to take the
two legions left at Sens; and in person, with the six others, directs
his march towards Auvergne, the principal focus of the insurrection. By
means of a stratagem, he crosses the Allier at Varennes without striking
a blow, and obliges Vercingetorix to retire into Gergovia with all his
forces.
Placed on almost inaccessible heights, these vast Gaulish _oppida_,
which enclosed the greater part of the population of a province, could
only be reduced by famine. Cæsar was well aware of this, and resolved on
confining himself to the blockade of Gergovia; but one day he judges the
occasion favourable, and he risks an assault. Repulsed with loss, he
thinks only of retreat, when already the insurrection surrounds him on
all sides. The Burgundians themselves, who owe everything to Cæsar, have
followed the general impulse: by their defection, the communications of
the Roman army are intercepted and its rear threatened. Nevers is burnt,
and the bridges on the Loire are destroyed; the Gauls, in their
presumptuous hope, already see Cæsar humiliated, and obliged to pass
with his soldiers under new Furcæ Caudinæ; but old veteran troops,
commanded by a great captain, do not recoil after a first reverse; and
these six legions, shut up in their camp, isolated in the middle of a
country in insurrection, separated from all succour by rivers and
mountains, yet immovable and unshaken in face of a victorious enemy who
dares not pursue his victory, resemble those rocks beaten by the waves
of the ocean, which defy the tempests, and the approach to which is so
perilous that no one dare brave them.
In this extremity Cæsar has not lost hope. Far from him the thought of
re-crossing the Cévennes, and returning into the Narbonnese. This
retreat would bear too great a resemblance to a flight. Moreover, he has
fears for the four legions entrusted to Labienus, of whom he has
received no news since they went to combat the Parisii; he is anxious to
rejoin them at all risks. He therefore marches in the direction of Sens,
crosses the Loire by a ford, near Bourbon-Lancy, and, on his arrival
near Joigny, he rallies Labienus, who, after having defeated the army of
Camulogenus under the walls of Paris, had returned to Sens and hastened
to meet him.
What joy Cæsar must have experienced, when he found his lieutenant, then
faithful still, on the banks of the Yonne! for this junction doubled his
forces, and restored the chances of the struggle in his favour. While he
was re-modelling his army, calling to him a re-enforcement of German
cavalry, and preparing to approach nearer to the Roman province,
Vercingetorix had not lost a moment in stirring up the whole of Gaul
against the Romans. The inhabitants of Savoy, as well as those of the
Vivarais, are drawn into revolt; all is agitation from the coasts of the
ocean to the Rhone. He communicates to all hearts the sacred fire which
inflames him, and from Mont Beuvray, as its centre, its action radiates
to the extremities of Gaul.
But it is granted neither to the most eminent of men to create in one
day an army, nor to popular insurrection, however general, to form
suddenly a nation. The foreigner has not yet quitted the territory of
their country before the chiefs become jealous of each other, and
rivalries break out between the different states. The Burgundians obey
unwillingly the people of Auvergne; the people of the territory of
Beauvais refuse their contingent, alleging that they will only make war
at their own time and in their own manner. The inhabitants of Savoy,
instead of responding to the appeal made to their old independence,
oppose a vigorous resistance to the attacks of the Gauls, and the
Vivarais shows no less devotedness to the Roman cause.
As to the Gaulish army, its strength consisted chiefly in cavalry; the
footmen, in spite of the efforts of Vercingetorix, composed only an
undisciplined mass; for military organisation is always a reflection of
the state of society, and where there is no people there is no infantry.
In Gaul, as Cæsar tells us, two classes alone were dominant, the priests
and the nobles.[771] It is not surprising if, then as in the Middle
Ages, the nobility on horseback formed the true sinew of the armies.
Accordingly, the Gauls never incurred the risk of resisting the Romans
in the open field, or rather everything was confined to a combat of
cavalry, and, when their cavalry was defeated, the army retired without
the infantry being engaged at all. This is what happened before
Sancerre: the defeat of his cavalry had forced Vercingetorix to make his
retreat; he had allowed Cæsar to continue his route undisturbed towards
Bourges, and take that town, without ever daring to attack him either
during his march or during the siege.
It will be the same at the battle of the Vingeanne. Cæsar directed his
march from Joigny towards Franche-Comté, across the country of Langres.
His aim was to reach Besançon, an important fortress, from whence he
could at the same time resume the offensive and protect the Roman
Province; but when he arrived at the eastern extremity of the territory
of Langres, in the valley of the Vingeanne, at about sixty-five
kilomètres from Alesia, his army, in march, is brought to a halt by that
of Vercingetorix, whose numerous cavalry have sworn to pass three times
through the Roman lines; this cavalry is repulsed by that of the Germans
in Cæsar’s pay, and Vercingetorix hastens to take refuge in Alesia,
without the least resistance offered by his infantry.
It is the belief of the Gauls that their country can only be defended in
the fortresses, and the example of Gergovia animates them with a
generous hope; but Cæsar will attempt no more imprudent assaults. 80,000
infantry shut themselves up in the walls of Alesia, and the cavalry is
sent into the whole of Gaul to call to arms, and to conduct to the
succour of the invested town the contingents of all the states. About
forty or fifty days after the blockade of the place, 250,000 men, of
whom 8,000 are cavalry, appear on the low hills which bound the plain of
Laumes on the west. The besieged leap with joy. How will the Romans be
able to sustain the double attack from within and from without? Cæsar
has obviated all perils by the art of fortification, which he has
carried to perfection. A line of countervallation against the fortress,
and a line of circumvallation against the army of succour, are rendered
almost impregnable by means of works adapted to the ground, and in which
science has accumulated all the obstacles in use in the warfare of
sieges. These two concentric lines are closely approached to each other,
in order to facilitate the defence. The troops are not scattered over
the great extent of the retrenchments, but distributed into twenty-three
redoubts and eight camps, from which they can move, according to
circumstances, on the points threatened. The redoubts are advanced
posts. The camps of infantry, placed on the heights, form so many
reserves. The cavalry camps are stationed on the banks of the streams.
In the plain especially, where the attacks may be most dangerous, to the
fosses, ramparts, and ordinary towers are added _abatis_, wolf-pits,
things like caltrops, means still employed in modern fortification.
Thanks to so many works, but thanks also to the imperfection of the
projectiles of that time, we see a besieging army, equal in number to
the army besieged, three times less in force than the army of succour,
resist three simultaneous attacks, and finish by vanquishing so many
enemies assembled against it. It is a thing to be remarked that Cæsar,
in the decisive day of the struggle, shut up in his lines, has become,
in a manner, the besieged, and, like all besieged who are victorious, it
is by a sally that he triumphs. The Gauls have nearly forced his
retrenchments on one point; but Labienus, by Cæsar’s order, debouches
from the lines, attacks the enemy with the sword, and puts him to
flight: the cavalry completes the victory.
This siege, so memorable in a military point of view, is still more so
in the historic point of view. Beside the hill, so barren at the present
day, of Mont Auxois, were decided the destinies of the world. In these
fertile plains, on these hills, now silent, nearly 400,000 men
encountered each other; one side led by the spirit of conquest, the
other by the spirit of independence; but none of them were conscious of
the work which destiny was employing them to accomplish. The cause of
all civilisation was at stake.
The defeat of Cæsar would have stopped for a long period the advance of
Roman domination, of that domination which, across rivers of blood, it
is true, conducted the peoples to a better future. The Gauls,
intoxicated with their success, would have called to their aid all those
nomadic peoples who followed the course of the sun to create themselves
a country, and all together would have thrown themselves upon Italy;
that focus of intelligence, destined to enlighten the peoples, would
then have been destroyed, before it had been able to develop its
expansive force. Rome, on her side, would have lost the only chief
capable of arresting her decline, of re-constituting the Republic, and
of bequeathing to her at his death three centuries of existence.
Thus, while we honour duly the memory of Vercingetorix, we are not
allowed to deplore his defeat. Let us admire the ardent and sincere love
of this Gaulish chieftain for the independence of his country; but let
us not forget that it is to the triumph of the Roman armies that we owe
our civilisation; institutions, manners, language, all come to us from
the conquest. Thus are we much more the children of the conquerors than
of the conquered; for, during long years, the former have been our
masters for everything which raises the soul and embellishes life; and,
when at last the invasion of the barbarians came to overthrow the old
Roman edifice, it could not destroy its foundations. Those wild hordes
only ravaged the territory, without having the power to annihilate the
principles of law, justice, and liberty, which, deeply rooted, survived
by their own vitality, like those crops which, bent down for a moment
beneath the tread of the soldiers, soon rise again spontaneously, and
recover a new life. On the ground thus prepared by Roman civilisation,
the Christian idea was able easily to plant itself, and to regenerate
the world.
The victory gained at Alesia was, then, one of those decisive events
which decide the destinies of peoples.
It is towards the end of the third consulship of Pompey that the lictors
must have arrived in Rome, carrying, according to the custom, with their
fasces crowned with laurels, the letters announcing the surrender of
Alesia. The degenerate aristocracy, who placed their rancours above the
interests of their country, would, no doubt, have preferred receiving
the news of the loss of the Roman armies, to seeing Cæsar become greater
than ever by new successes; but public opinion compelled the Senate to
celebrate the victory gained at Mont Auxois: it ordered sacrifices
during twenty days; still more, the people, to testify their joy,
trebled the number.[772]
CHAPTER VIII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 703.
[Sidenote: New Troubles in Gaul, and the Campaign on the Aisne.]
I. The capture of Alesia and the defeat of the army of succour, composed
of all the contingents of Gaul, must have encouraged the hope that the
war was ended; but the popular waves, like those of the ocean, once
agitated, require time to calm them. In 703, disturbances broke out on
several points at the same time. Cæsar, who was wintering at Bibracte,
was obliged to proceed with two legions into Berry, and, some time
afterwards, into the country of Orleans, to restore order there; next he
marched against the people of Beauvais, whose resistance threatened to
be the more formidable, as they had taken but a slight part at the siege
of Alesia. After having assembled four legions, he established his camp
on Mont Saint-Pierre, in the forest of Compiègne, opposite the Gauls,
who were posted on Mont Saint-Marc. At the end of a few weeks, unable to
draw them to quit their post, and not considering his forces sufficient
to surround on all sides the mountain which they occupied, he sent for
three other legions, and then threatened to invest their camp, as had
happened at Alesia. The Gauls left their position, and retired upon Mont
Ganelon, from whence they sent troops to lay in ambush in the forest, in
order to fall upon the Romans when they went to forage. The result was
a combat in the plain of Choisy-au-Bac, in which the Gauls were
defeated, and which led to the submission of the whole country. After
this expedition, Cæsar turned his attention to the country situated
between the Rhine and the Meuse, the populations of which, in spite of
the hard lesson of 701, were again raising the standard of revolt under
Ambiorix. The whole country was committed to fire and sword; but the
invaders could not lay hold of the person of that implacable enemy of
the Roman name.
The remains of the old Gaulish bands had united on the left bank of the
Loire, the constant refuge of the last defenders of their country, and
were still displaying an energy sufficient to give uneasiness to the
conquerors. They joined Dumnacus, the chief of the Angevins, who was
besieging, in Poitiers, Duratius, a Gaulish chief faithful to the
Romans. Cæsar’s lieutenants, Caninius Rebilus and C. Fabius, obliged
Dumnacus to raise the siege, and defeated his army.
During this time, Drappes of Sens and Lucterius of Cahors, who had
escaped from the last battle, attempted to invade the Roman province;
but, pursued by Rebilus, they threw themselves into the fortress of
Uxellodunum (_le Puy d’Issolu_), where the last focus of the
insurrection was destined to be extinguished. After a battle outside the
fortress, in which the Romans were victorious, Drappes fell into their
power; Rebilus and Fabius continued the siege. But the courage of the
besieged rendered useless the efforts of the besiegers. At this
conjuncture Cæsar arrived there. Seeing that the place, being
obstinately defended and abundantly provisioned, could not be reduced
either by force or by famine, he conceived the idea of depriving the
besieged of water. For this purpose, a subterranean gallery was carried
to the veins of the spring which, alone, supplied their wants. It became
instantly dry. The Gauls, taking this circumstance for a prodigy,
believed they saw in it a manifestation of the will of the gods, and
surrendered. Cæsar inflicted on the heroic defenders of Uxellodunum an
atrocious punishment: he caused their hands to be cut off; an
unpardonable act of cruelty, even although it might have appeared
necessary.
These events accomplished, he visited Aquitaine for the first time, with
two legions, and saw his authority accepted everywhere. He subsequently
proceeded to Narbonne, and from thence to Arras, where he established
his head-quarters for the winter. Labienus, on his side, had obtained
the complete submission of the country of Trèves.
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Policy in Gaul and at Rome.]
II. After eight years of sanguinary struggles, Gaul was subdued, and
thenceforward, far from meeting enemies in it, Cæsar was destined to
find only auxiliaries.
His policy had contributed as much as his arms to this result. Instead
of seeking to reduce Gaul into a Roman province, the great captain had
applied himself to founding the supremacy of the Republic on powerful
alliances, making the conquered countries subject to the states of which
he was sure, and leaving to each people its chiefs and its institutions,
and to Gaul entire its general assemblies.
It may have been remarked with what consideration Cæsar, in all his
wars, deals with the countries which offer him their co-operation, and
with what generous ability he treats them. Thus, in his first campaign,
he raises the Burgundians from the state of inferiority in which they
were held by the people of Franche-Comté, and re-establishes them in
possession of their hostages and of their rights of patronage over the
states which were their clients;[773] yielding to their prayer, in the
second campaign, he pardons the people of Beauvais;[774] in the sixth,
the inhabitants of Sens.[775] In 702, the auxiliary troops furnished by
the Burgundians revolt; yet he takes no vengeance upon them; the same
year these people massacre the Roman merchants: they expect terrible
reprisals, and send to implore pardon; Cæsar replies to their deputies
that he is far from wishing to throw on the whole country the fault of a
few; lastly, when, under the influence of the national feeling, their
contingents have taken part in the general insurrection, and are
defeated before Alise, instead of reducing them to captivity, Cæsar
gives them their liberty. He behaves in the same manner towards the
people of Rheims, whose influence he augments by granting their
petitions in favour, at one time of the people of Soissons,[776] at
another of the inhabitants of Orléanais.[777] He restores similarly to
the inhabitants of Auvergne their contingent vanquished at Alise; to the
people of Artois, he remits all tribute, restores their laws, and
places the territory of the Boulonnaise in subjection to them.[778] In
each of his campaigns he follows an equally generous policy towards his
allies.
The chiefs whom Cæsar places over the governments of the different
states are not chosen arbitrarily; he takes them from the ancient
families who have reigned over the country; often even he does no more
than confirm the result of a free election. He maintains Ambiorix at the
head of the people of Liége, restores to him his son and nephew,
prisoners of the people of Namur, and frees him from the tribute which
he paid to that people.[779] He gives to the people of Orleans for their
chief Tasgetius, and to the inhabitants of Sens, Cavarinus, both issued
from families which had possessed the sovereignty.[780] He appoints, as
King of Artois, Commius,[781] who, nevertheless, as well as Ambiorix,
subsequently revolted against him. In presence of the principal
personages of the country of the Treviri, he decides between rival
ambitions, and pronounces for Cingetorix,[782] whom he calls to the
power. Again, he recognises Convictolitavis as chief of the
Burgundians.[783] We can pardon Cæsar some acts of cruel vengeance, when
we consider how far his age was still a stranger to the sentiments of
humanity, and how far a victorious general must have been provoked to
see those whose oath of fidelity he had received, and whom he had loaded
with honours, incessantly revolting against his authority.
Almost every year he convokes the assembly of Gaul,[784] either at
Lutetia, or at Rheims, or at Bibracte, and he only imposes on the people
the rights of the conqueror after having called them to discuss in his
presence their several interests; he presides over them more as a
protector than as a conqueror. Finally, when the last remains of the
insurrection have been annihilated at Uxellodunum (_Puy d’Issolu_), he
proceeds to pass the winter in Belgium; there he strives to render
obedience more easy to the vanquished, brings into the exercise of power
more of leniency and justice, and introduces among these races, still
savages, the benefits of civilisation. Such was the efficacy of these
measures that, when, finally abandoning Gaul, he was obliged to withdraw
his legions from it, the country, formerly so agitated, remained calm
and tranquil; the transformation was complete, and, instead of enemies,
he left on the other side of the Alps a people always ready to furnish
him with numerous soldiers for his new wars.[785]
When we see a man of eminence devote himself, during nine years, with so
much perseverance and skill, to the greatness of his country, we ask how
so many animosities and rancours could rise against him in Rome. But
this angry feeling is explained by the regret and vexation, very
excusable indeed, which the privileged castes feel when a system which
has, during several centuries, been the cause of their power and of the
glory of the country, has just given way under the irresistible action
of new ideas; this hatred fell upon Cæsar as the most dangerous promoter
of these ideas. It is true that people accused his ambition; in reality,
it was his convictions openly pronounced which had long provoked
hostility.
Cæsar began his political career with a trial which is always
honourable, persecution supported for a good cause. The popular party
then rested for support on the memory of Marius; Cæsar did not hesitate
in reviving it with glory. Hence the prestige which surrounded him, in
his youth, and which ceased not to grow with him. The constancy of his
principles gained him all the honours and all the dignities which were
conferred upon him; named successively military tribune, quæstor, grand
pontiff, guardian of the Appian Way, ædile, urban prætor, proprætor in
Spain, and lastly consul, he might consider these different testimonies
of public favour as so many victories gained under the same flag against
the same enemies. This was the motive of the violent passions of the
aristocracy: it made a single man responsible for the decay of an order
of things which was falling into the abyss of corruption and anarchy.
When, during his ædileship, Cæsar causes the trophies of Marius,
glorious symbols of the war against the Cimbri and Teutones, to be
replaced in the Capitol, the opposite party already cries out that he
intends to overthrow the Republic; when he returns from Spain, after
having led his victorious legions as far as Portugal, his passage
across the Transpadane colonies inspires the Senate with so many fears,
that two legions, destined for Asia, are retained in Italy; when he
believes that he has a claim to a triumph and the consulate at the same
time--a double favour accorded to many others--he is obliged to renounce
the triumph. As consul he encounters, during the whole period of his
magistracy, the most active and the most spiteful opposition. Hardly
have his functions expired, when an accusation is sought to be brought
against him, which he only escapes by the privilege attached to the
_imperium_. In his interview, not far from the Rhine, with Ariovistus,
he learns that the nobles of Rome have promised their friendship to the
German king, if, by his death, he delivers them from their enemy. His
victories, which transport the people with enthusiasm, excite jealousy
and detraction among the Roman aristocracy. They seek to undervalue his
expeditions beyond the sea, as well as beyond the Rhine. In 701 the news
reached Rome of the defeat of the German tribes who again threatened
Gaul with invasion. Cato, under the pretence that Cæsar had not observed
the truce, proposed that they should deliver up to the barbarians the
glorious chief of the legions of the Republic.
During the last campaign against the people of the Beauvaisin, his
adversaries rejoice in the false rumours which were spread abroad
concerning his military operations; they relate in whispers, without
concealing their satisfaction, that he is surrounded by the Gauls, that
he has lost his cavalry, and that the 7th legion has been nearly
annihilated.[786] In the Senate, Clodius, Rutilius Lupus, Cicero,
Ahenobarbus, and the two Marcelli, move in their turns, either to revoke
the acts of his consulship, or to supersede him as governor of Gaul, or,
lastly, to reduce his command. Political parties never disarm, not even
before the national glory.
[Sidenote: Sulpicius Rufus and M. Claudius Marcellus, Consuls.]
III. The two factions which divided the Republic had each, in 703, their
adherent in the consulship. Servius Sulpicius Rufus, a lawyer of
reputation, passed for a man attached to Cæsar; M. Claudius Marcellus
was his declared enemy. The latter, a distinguished orator, who imitated
Cicero, announced, on his entrance into office, the design of giving a
successor to Cæsar before the legal period of his command had expired;
but this design, counteracted by his colleague, and by the earnest
opposition of the tribunes, was from time to time adjourned. “Why,” it
was said, “depose a magistrate who has not committed a fault?”[787] The
attention of the Senate was, moreover, called in another direction by
grave events.
It will be remembered that C. Cassius Longinus, the quæstor of Crassus,
had rallied the wreck of the Roman army; he had even succeeded in
repulsing vigorously an invasion of the Parthians into the province of
Syria. He was reproached, meanwhile, with great rapacity in his
administration; it was pretended that, for the purpose of justifying
his acts of rapine, he had drawn in bands of Arabs, and afterwards
driven them out, boasting that he had beaten the Parthians.[788] Syria
was an important province, which could not be left in the hands of a
simple quæstor; M. Calpurnius Bibulus, Cæsar’s old colleague in the
consulship, was sent thither to exercise the command.[789] At the same
time Cicero, in obedience to the new law on the consular provinces,
started, to his great regret, for Cilicia. As he passed through
Tarentum, he paid a visit to Pompey, who, after his consulship, had
absented himself from Rome, in order to avoid acting decisively. Cicero,
with his ordinary want of discernment, went away enchanted with his
interview; declared in his letters that Pompey was an excellent citizen,
whose foresight, courage, and wisdom were equal to all events, and that
he believed him sincerely allied to the cause of the Senate.[790]
If we reflect on the danger which then threatened the provinces of the
East, we have reason to be surprised at these two appointments. Neither
Bibulus nor Cicero had given any proof of military talents; the latter
even very frankly avowed it.[791] The Parthians were threatening, and,
while Pompey had sent into Spain four old legions, remaining himself in
Italy with two others, the Eastern frontiers were only guarded by weak
armies,[792] and commanded by two generals who had never seen war.
[Sidenote: Spirit which animates Cæsar’s Adversaries.]
IV. Marcellus, after he had failed in his project of taking Cæsar away
from his army, proposed a measure which displays the true character of
the passions which agitated the Republic. Pompey’s father had founded in
the Cisalpine the colony of _Novum Comum_, and had given it the right of
_Latium_, which conferred on the magistrates of the town, after a year’s
office, the privileges of Roman citizens.[793] Cæsar had sent thither
5,000 colonists, of whom 500 were Greeks,[794] and during his first
consulship he had conferred upon them the right of Roman citizens. Now
Marcellus strove to cause this right to be withdrawn from them; but not
having succeeded in this attempt, and unwilling at any price to
acknowledge Cæsar’s law,[795] he condemned to the rod, it is not known
for what offence, an inhabitant of _Novum Comum_. The latter protested,
invoking the privileges conferred on his city, but in vain; Marcellus
had him flogged, telling him: “Go, show thy shoulders to Cæsar; it is
thus I treat the citizens he makes.”[796] This contempt for the new
rights proved clearly the haughty disdain of the aristocratic party,
blaming one of the things which had contributed most to the greatness of
the Republic, the successive extension of the Roman city to the
provinces, and to the vanquished themselves. Confounding, in his blind
reprobation, both the principle of a liberal policy and him who had
applied it, he saw not that the persecution exercised towards the
Transpadan citizen contributed further to increase Cæsar’s greatness,
and to legitimise his popularity.
Yet these are the doctrines and acts of those men who are represented as
the worthy supports of the Republic! And Marcellus was not the only man
who, by denying to the Transpadans the rights they had acquired, showed
the perversity of egotistic sentiments; the other principal personages
of the aristocratic faction hardly recommended themselves by more
moderation and disinterestedness. “Appius Claudius Pulcher,” says
Cicero, “had treated with fire and sword the province entrusted to his
care; and had bled and drained it in every way;”[797] Faustus, Sylla,
Lentulus, Scipio, Libo, and so many others, sought to elevate themselves
by civil war, and to recover their fortune by pillage;[798] Brutus,
whose conduct was that of a usurer, employed the troops of his country
to oppress the allied peoples. Having lent money to the inhabitants of
Salamina, he reckoned on extorting the repayment of the capital and the
interest at the usurious rate of four per cent. a month, or forty-eight
per cent. a year. To recover his debt, a certain Scaptius, to whom he
had made over his claim, had obtained from Appius a troop of cavalry,
with which, according to Cicero, “he held the Senate of Salamina
besieged so long that five senators died of hunger.” Cicero, when he
became governor of Cilicia, sought to repair this injustice. Brutus,
irritated, wrote him letters full of arrogance, of which Cicero
complained to Atticus with vivacity: “If Brutus pretends that I ought to
pay Scaptius at the rate of four per cent. a month, in spite of my
regulations and edicts which fixed the interest at one per cent., and
when the least reasonable usurers are satisfied with that rate; if he
takes it ill that I have refused him a place of prefect for a tradesman;
... if he reproaches me with having withdrawn the cavalry, I regret much
to have displeased him, but I regret much more to find him so different
from what I had believed!”[799] There was a law of Gabinius, intended to
prevent such abuses; it prohibited the towns from borrowing money at
Rome to pay their taxes. But Brutus had obtained a senatus-consultus to
free him from this constraint,[800] and he employed even the means of
coercion to obtain even two or three times the value of that he had
given. Such was the probity of a man who has been vaunted for his
virtue. It is thus that the aristocratic party understood liberty; the
hatred to Cæsar arose especially from the circumstance that he took to
heart the cause of the oppressed, and that, during his first consulship,
as Appian says, he had done nothing in favour of the nobles.[801]
The prestige of his victories had bridled the opposition; when the end
of his command drew near, all the hostilities were awakened; they waited
the time when, returning to every-day life, he would be no longer
protected by the prerogatives attached to the _imperium_. “Marcus Cato,”
says Suetonius, “swore that he would denounce Cæsar to the magistrates
as soon as he had disbanded his army; and it was a matter of common talk
that, if Cæsar returned as a private individual, he would be obliged,
like Milo, to defend himself before judges, surrounded with armed men.
Asinius Pollio makes this account very probable; he relates that, at the
battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar, casting his eyes on his adversaries
vanquished or fugitives, exclaimed: ‘They have willed it! After having
accomplished so many great things, I, Caius Cæsar, was condemned, if I
had not demanded succour of my army.’”[802] Hence Cœlius, writing to
Cæsar, put the question in its true light when he said, “Cæsar is
persuaded that his only hope lies in keeping his army;”[803] and, on
another side, as Dio Cassius informs us, Pompey did not dare to submit
the difference to the people, knowing well that, if the people were
taken for judge, Cæsar would gain the day.[804]
[Sidenote: The Question of Right between the Senate and Cæsar.]
V. It is here the place to examine at what period the power of Cæsar
expired, and what was the pretext of the conflict which rose between him
and the Senate.
Learned historians have long had this subject under consideration; they
have devoted themselves to the most profound researches, and to the most
ingenious suppositions, still without arriving at a completely
satisfactory result,[805] which ought not to surprise us, inasmuch as
Cicero himself found the question obscure.[806]
In virtue of a law of C. Sempronius Gracchus, named _lex Sempronia_, it
had been decided that the Senate should designate, before the election
of the consuls, the provinces they were to administer after quitting
office. When Cæsar and Bibulus were elected, instead of provinces, the
inspection of the public ways was given to them; but Cæsar, unwilling to
suffer this affront, obtained, by a _plebiscitum_, on the motion of
Vatinius, the government of Cisalpine Gaul for five years; the Senate
added to it Transalpine Gaul, which then formed a separate province
independent of the other.[807] In 699, the law Trebonia prolonged, for
five more years, Cæsar’s command in Gaul. This command was therefore to
last ten years; and, since Cæsar only entered upon his proconsular
functions at the beginning of the year 696, it seems natural to infer
that these ten years should reach to the 1st of January, 706. We,
nevertheless, see that, at the end of 704, the Senate regarded Cæsar’s
power as at an end. We then ask, on what ground that assembly supported
the pretence that the ten years devolved to the proconsul were completed
at that date. We consider the following to be the explanation:--
It was in the month of March that, according to custom, the retiring
consuls took possession of the government of provinces.[808] It is,
consequently, very probable that the law of Vatinius, published, as we
have seen, in 695, was voted towards the latter days of the month of
February in that same year, and that the proconsulship given to Cæsar
was to begin from the day of the promulgation of that law. Nothing would
have prevented him, indeed, from shortening the time of his magistracy,
and seizing, before the termination of his curule functions, the
military command or _imperium_, as Crassus did in 699, who started for
Syria without waiting for the end of his consulship. Supposing, then,
which is not impossible, that the whole year of Cæsar’s consulship was
included in his proconsulship,[809] the five first years of his command
would date from 695, and end on the 1st of January, 700. The oration on
the Consular Provinces proves that it was so understood. The time when
it was pronounced (July or August, 698) was that of the assignment of
the provinces destined for the consuls who were to quit office eighteen
months after--that is, in 700--and when the question of superseding
Cæsar was agitated. The first _quinquennium_ of his command terminated,
therefore, in December, 699, and, consequently, the second in December,
704. Such was the system of the Senate, naturally much inclined to
shorten the duration of the proconsulship of Gaul.[810] Accordingly,
Hirtius informs us that, in 703, the Gauls knew that Cæsar had but one
summer, that of 704, to pass in Gaul.[811] Dio Cassius says similarly
that Cæsar’s power was to end with the year 704.[812] According to
Appian, the Consul Claudius Marcellus proposed, at the beginning of 704,
to name a successor to Cæsar, whose powers were on the eve of
expiring.[813] On the other hand, Cicero relates in one of his letters
that Pompey seemed to be of the same opinion as the Senate, to require
the return of the proconsul on the Ides of the November of 704. At the
end of that same year, the great orator expresses, in the following
terms, his own opinion on the subject of the claim raised by Cæsar to
dispensation from coming to Rome to solicit the consulship: “What, then?
must we have regard for a man who will keep his army after the day fixed
by the law?”[814] Some time afterwards, apostrophising Cæsar in a
letter to Atticus,[815] he exclaims: “You have kept, during ten years, a
province of which you have procured the continuance, not by the
sovereign will of the Senate, but by your intrigues and your acts of
violence. You have overpassed the term fixed, by your ambition, and not
by the law.... You retain your army longer than the people has ordained
and than it is the people’s will.” On another hand, a passage of
Suetonius says, in a very formal manner, that Cæsar intended to offer
himself as candidate in 705, to exercise the consulship in 706, when he
would have completed the time of his proconsulship.[816] Lastly the
Senate so evidently regards the beginning of the year 705 as the
obligatory termination of Cæsar’s command, that, in the month of
January, it declares him the enemy of the Republic, because he is still
at the head of his soldiers, and decrees extreme measures against
him.[817]
But the dispute between the Senate and Cæsar did not turn upon the term
of his command. Cæsar offered himself to the consular comitia of the
year 705. A law, submitted to the people by the ten tribunes, and
supported by Pompey and Cicero, had permitted him to solicit this
charge, although absent.[818] This law would have been without object
unless it had implied the authorisation for Cæsar to keep his army
until the time of the consular elections. Certain authors even think
that this right must have been formally reserved in the law. The
“Epitome” of Titus Livius says, in fact, that, according to the law, he
was to keep his command until the time of his second consulship.[819] On
the other hand, Cicero writes to Atticus that the best argument for
refusing Cæsar, in his absence, the power of soliciting the second
consulship, is that, by granting it to him, they acknowledge in him, by
the same act, the right of keeping his province and his army.[820] This
advantage Cæsar calls _beneficium populi_;[821] and when he complained
that they were depriving him of six months of his command, he reckoned
the time which had to pass between the 1st of January, 705, and the
month of July, the period of the consular comitia.[822]
Nevertheless, Cæsar had a great interest in keeping his army until he
was elected to the first magistracy of the Republic, for he would then
keep the _imperium_ as long as Pompey, whose powers, prolonged in 702,
would end on the 1st of January, 707.[823] It was evident that he was
unwilling to disarm before his rival; now if, according to the
combination established by law, he remained consul till the 1st of
January, 707, his command ended at the same time as that of Pompey, and
after that he had nothing more to fear from the plots of his enemies.
In fact, everything was now merging into an open struggle between Cæsar
and Pompey. In vain will the former seek all means of conciliation, in
vain will the latter strive to escape from the exactions of his party;
the force of circumstances will infallibly push them one against the
other. And just as we see, in the liquid traversed by an electric
current, all the elements it contains moving towards the two opposite
poles, so in Roman society in a state of dissolution, air the passions,
all the interests, the memories of the past, the hopes of the future,
are going to separate violently and divide themselves between the two
men who personify the antagonism of two opposite causes.
[Sidenote: Intrigues to deprive Cæsar of his Command.]
VI. Let us return to the relation of events. Pompey, all-powerful,
though a simple proconsul, had, as we have said before, retired to
Tarentum; he seemed to wish to remain foreign to the intrigues which
were at work in Rome; it appears even that he had the intention of going
into Spain to govern his province.[824] At the outset of revolutions,
the majority of the people, and even that of the assemblies, incline
always towards moderation; but soon, overruled by an excitable and
enterprising minority, they are drawn by it into extreme courses. It is
what happened at this time. Marcellus and his party strove first to
carry Pompey, and, when he had once taken his decision, they carried the
Senate. At the moment when, in the month of June, Pompey prepared to
return to the troops stationed at Ariminum, he was called back to Rome;
and when, on the 11th of the Calends of August, the senators assembled
in the temple of Apollo to regulate the pay of the troops, he was asked
why he had lent a legion to Cæsar. Obliged to give an explanation, he
promised to recall it, but not immediately, as he was unwilling to have
the appearance of yielding to threats. He was then pressed to give his
opinion on the recall of Cæsar; upon which, by one of those evasive
phrases which were habitual with him, and which revealed his hesitation,
he replied that “everybody ought equally to obey the Senate.”[825]
Nothing was enacted in regard to the consular powers.
The question of the government of Gaul was to be resumed on the Ides of
August; then again, in the month of September; but the Senate never
found itself in sufficient numbers to deliberate, so much did it fear to
come to a decision. They did not determine on entering upon the question
frankly until they were convinced of Pompey’s consent to the recall of
Cæsar.[826] beforehand the consuls nominated for the following year,
and imposed upon them a rule of conduct: their hostility to Cæsar had
determined their election. On the 11th of the Calends of October, M.
Marcellus, who made himself the organ of the passions of the moment,
exacted such numerous and unusual guarantees, that we may judge to what
point his party had at heart to carry the day. Thus, the consuls
recently elected were required to enter into the engagement to put the
question on the orders of the day for the Calends of March; until it was
settled, the Senate was bound to assemble to deliberate upon it every
day, even on those which were called _comitiales_, when any meeting of
that body was forbidden, and, to this effect, the senators who should
fill the offices of judges were to be sent for into the curia. The
Senate was also to declare beforehand that those who had the power of
interceding should abstain from exercising it, and that, if they
interceded or demanded an adjournment, they should be considered as
enemies of the Republic; a report of their conduct should be made, at
the same time, to the Senate and to the people.[827] This motion was
adopted and inscribed in the minutes as a _decision_ or an _opinion_ of
the Senate (_senatus auctoritas_). Four tribunes of the people
interceded: C. Cœlius, L. Vinucius, P. Cornelius, and C. Vibius
Pansa.
It was not enough to prepare attacks against Cæsar’s command; the
discontent of the army was also to be feared; and, in order to avert or
weaken its effect, M. Marcellus caused to be further inscribed in the
minutes of the Senate the following decision: “The Senate will take
into consideration the situation of those soldiers of the army of Gaul
whose time of service is expired, or who shall produce sufficient
reasons for being restored to civil life.” C. Cœlius and C. Vibius
Pansa renewed their opposition.[828]
Some senators, more impatient, demanded that they should not wait for
the time fixed by M. Marcellus to decree upon this subject. Pompey
interfered again as moderator, and said that they could not, without
injustice, take a decision on the subject of Cæsar’s province before the
Calends of March, 704, an epoch at which he should find no further
inconvenience in it. “What will be done,” asked one of the senators, “if
the decision of the Senate be opposed?”--“It matters little,” replied
Pompey, “whether Cæsar refuses to obey this decision, or suborns people
to intercede.”--“But,” said another, “if he seeks to be consul, and keep
his army?”--Pompey only replied with great coolness, “If my son would
beat me with a staff?...” He always, as we see, affected obscurity in
his replies. The natural conclusion from this language was to raise the
suspicion of secret negotiations with Cæsar, and it was believed that
the latter would accept one of these two conditions, either to keep his
province without soliciting the consulship, or to quit his army and
return to Rome when, though absent, he should be elected consul.
The Senate declared also that, for the province of Cilicia and the eight
other prætorian provinces, the governors should be chosen by lot among
the prætors who had not yet had a government. Cœlius and Pansa made
opposition to this decree, which left to that assembly the power of
giving the provinces at its will.[829] These different measures revealed
sufficiently the thoughts of the Senate, and the prudent politicians saw
with uneasiness that it was seeking to precipitate events.
Discord in the interior generally paralyses all national policy on the
exterior. Absorbed by the intrigues at home, the aristocratic party was
sacrificing the great interests of the Republic. Cicero wrote in vain
that his forces were insufficient to resist the Parthians, an invasion
by whom appeared imminent: the consuls refused to occupy the Senate with
his claims, because they were unwilling either to go themselves to
undertake so distant a campaign, or to permit others to go in their
place.[830] They were much more anxious to humble Cæsar than to avenge
Crassus; and yet the public opinion, moved by the dangers with which
Syria was threatened, called for an extraordinary command in the East,
either for Pompey or for Cæsar.[831] Fortunately, the Parthians did not
attack; Bibulus and Cicero had only to combat bands of plunderers. The
latter, on the 3rd of the Ides of October, defeated a party of Cilician
mountaineers near Mount Amanus. He carried their camp, besieged their
fortress of Pindenissus, which he took, and his soldiers saluted him as
_imperator_.[832] From that time he took this title in the subscription
of his letters.[833]
CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.
[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Æmilius Paulus, Consuls.]
I. The year 703 had been employed in intrigues with the object of
overthrowing Cæsar, and the aristocratic party believed that, for the
success of this sort of plot, it could reckon upon the support of the
chief magistrates who were entering upon office in January, 704. Of the
two consuls, C. Claudius Marcellus, nephew of the preceding consul of
the same name, and L. Æmilius Paulus, the first was kinsman, but at the
same time enemy, of Cæsar; the second had not yet shown his party,
though report gave him the same opinions as his colleague. It was
expected that, in concert with C. Scribonius Curio, whose advancement to
the tribuneship was due to Pompey,[834] he would distribute the lands of
Campania which had not yet been given out, the consequence of which
would be that Cæsar, on his return, could no longer dispose of this
property in favour of his veterans.[835] This hope was vain; for already
Paulus and Curio had joined the party of the proconsul of Gaul. Well
informed of the intrigues of his enemies, Cæsar had long taken care to
have always at Rome a consul or tribunes devoted to his interest; in 703
he could reckon on the Consul Sulpicius and the tribunes Pansa and
Cœlius; in 704, Paulus and Curio were devoted to him. If,
subsequently, in 705, the two consuls were opposed to him, he had, at
least on his side, that year, the tribunes Mark Antony and Q. Cassius.
Curio is called by Velleius Paterculus the wittiest of rogues;[836] but
as long as this tribune remained faithful to the cause of the Senate,
Cicero honoured him with his esteem, and paid the greatest compliments
to his character and his high qualities.[837] Curio had acquired
authority by his eloquence, and by the numbers of his clients. His
father had been the declared enemy of Cæsar, against whom he had written
a book,[838] and uttered many jokes, cutting or coarse, which were
repeated in Rome.[839] Inheriting these feelings, Curio had long pursued
the conqueror of Gaul with his sarcasms; but nobody forgot insults so
easily as Cæsar, and, as he appreciated the political importance of this
dangerous adversary, he spared nothing to gain him to his interests.
From his earliest youth, Curio had been bound by close intimacy to Mark
Antony. Both ruined by debts, they had led together the most dissolute
lives; their friendship had never changed.[840] The relationship of Mark
Antony with the Julia family,[841] his connection with Gabinius, and,
above all, his military conduct in Egypt, had gained for him the respect
of Cæsar to whom he withdrew when Gabinius was put on his trial.[842]
Cæsar employed him first as lieutenant, and afterwards, in 701, chose
him as quæstor. His kindness for Mark Antony probably contributed to
soften Curio’s temper; his liberality did the rest. He had given him, if
we can believe Appian, more than 1,500 talents.[843] It is true that, at
the same time, he bought equally dear the Consul L. Æmilius Paulus,
without requiring more than his neutrality.[844] We can hardly
understand how Cæsar, while he was paying his army, could support such
sacrifices, and meet, at the same time, so many other expenses. To
increase by his largesses the number of his partisans in Rome;[845] to
cause to be built in the Narbonnese theatres and monuments; near Aricia,
in Italy, a magnificent villa;[846] to send rich presents to distant
towns--such were his burthens. How, to meet them, could he draw money
enough from a province exhausted by eight years’ war? The immensity of
his resources is explained by the circumstance that, independently of
the tributes paid by the vanquished, which amounted, for Gaul, to
40,000,000 sestertii a year (more than 7,500,000 francs) [£300,000], the
sale of prisoners to Roman traders produced enormous sums. Cicero
informs us that he gained 12,000,000 sestertii from the captives sold
after the unimportant siege of Pindenissus. If we suppose that their
number amounted to 12,000, this sum would represent 1,000 sestertii a
head. Now, in spite of Cæsar’s generosity in often restoring the
captives to the conquered peoples, or in making gifts of them to his
soldiers, as was the case after the siege of Alesia, we may admit that
500,000 Gauls, Germans, or Britons were sold as slaves during the eight
years of the war in Gaul, which must have produced a sum of about
500,000,000 sestertii, or about 95,000,000 francs [£3,800,000]. It was
thus Roman money, given by the slave-dealers, which formed the greatest
part of the booty, in the same manner as in modern times, when, in
distant expeditions, the European nations take possession of the foreign
custom-houses to pay the costs of the war, it is still European money
which forms the advance for the costs.
The reconciliation of Curio with Cæsar was at first kept secret; but,
whether in order to contrive a pretext for changing his party, the new
tribune had moved laws which had no chance of being adopted, or because
he felt offended at the rejection of his propositions, towards the
beginning of the year 704 he declared for Cæsar, or, which was the same
thing, as Cœlius said, he ranged himself on the side of the people.
Whatever might be the motive of his conduct, the following are the
circumstances in the sequel of which his attitude became modified. He
had proposed the intercalation of a month in the current year, in order,
probably, to retard the period for the decision of the question which
agitated the Senate and the town.[847] His character of pontiff
rendered his motion perfectly legal: in spite of its incontestable
utility,[848] it was ill received. He expected this, but he appeared to
take the matter to heart, and to look upon the Senate’s refusal as an
offence. From that moment he began a systematic opposition.[849] Towards
the same time he presented two laws, one concerning the alimentation of
the people, with which he proposed to charge the ædiles;[850] the other,
on the repair of the roads, of which he asked for the direction during
five years.[851] He seems to have intended to make the travellers pay
according to the number and nature of their means of transport; or, in a
word, to establish a tax upon the rich, and thus increase his
popularity.[852] These last two projects were as ill received as the
first, and this double check completed his reconciliation with those
against whom he had hitherto contended.
The nomination of the censors, which took place at this period, brought
new complications. One, L. Calpurnius Piso, Cæsar’s father-in-law,
accepted the office only with regret, and showed an extreme indulgence;
the other, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been consul in 700, a fiery
partisan of the nobles, thought he served their cause by displaying
excessive severity. He expelled from the Senate all the freedmen, and
several of the most illustrious nobles, among others the historian
Sallust, a man of mind and talent, who immediately repaired to the
Cisalpine, where Cæsar received him with eagerness.[853]
Appius had no moderation in his harshness. Cicero says of him that, to
efface a mere stain, he cut open veins and entrails.[854] Instead of
remedying the evil, he only envenomed it; he threw into the ranks of the
opposite party all whom he excluded, without giving greater
consideration to those whom he kept. There are times when severity is a
bad adviser, and is not calculated to restore to a government the moral
force it has lost.
[Sidenote: Cæsar repairs to the Cisalpine.]
II. Cæsar passed the whole of the winter, 704, at Nemetocenna (_Arras_).
“At the beginning of the following year, he started in haste for Italy,
in order,” says Hirtius, “to recommend to the municipal towns and
colonies his quæstor, Mark Antony, who solicited the priesthood.
Supporting him with his credit, he not only sought to serve a faithful
friend whom he had himself persuaded to seek that office, but to strive
against a faction which wished to defeat him, in order to shake Cæsar’s
power at the moment when his government was on the eve of expiring. On
his way, before he reached Italy, he received intelligence of the
election of Antony to the office of augur; he considered it none the
less his duty to visit the municipal towns and colonies, to thank them
for their favourable feeling towards Antony. He sought also to secure
their support next year (705), for his enemies insolently boasted that
they had, on one hand, named to the consulship L. Lentulus and C.
Marcellus, who would strip Cæsar of his offices and dignities; and, on
the other, that they had deprived Servius Galba of the consulship, in
spite of his credit and the number of his votes, for the sole reason
that he was Cæsar’s friend and lieutenant.
“Cæsar was received by the municipal towns and colonies with incredible
marks of respect and affection; it was the first time he appeared among
them since the general insurrection of Gaul. They omitted nothing that
could be imagined in adorning the gates, roads, and places on his
passage; women and children all rushed in crowds to the public places
and into the temples; everywhere they immolated victims and spread
tables. The rich displayed their magnificence, the poor rivalled each
other in zeal.” Cæsar tasted beforehand the pleasures of a triumph
earnestly desired.[855]
After having thus visited Citerior Gaul, he quickly rejoined the army at
Nemetocenna. In the prospect of his approaching departure, he wished to
strike the minds of the Germans and Gauls by a grand agglomeration of
forces, and show himself once more to his assembled troops. The legions,
who had withdrawn to their quarters, were sent into the country of the
Treviri; Cæsar went there also, and passed the army in review. This
solemnity was necessarily grand. He saw before him his old cohorts, with
whom he had fought so many battles, and of which the youngest soldiers
reckoned eight campaigns. No doubt he reminded them that, general or
consul, he owed everything to the people and to the army, and that the
glory they had acquired formed between them indissoluble ties. Until the
end of the summer he remained in the north of Gaul, “only moving the
troops as much as was necessary to preserve the soldiers’ health. T.
Labienus received afterwards the command of Citerior Gaul, in the aim of
securing more votes for Cæsar’s approaching candidateship for the office
of consul. Although the latter was not ignorant of the manœvres of
his enemies to detach Labienus from him, and of their intrigues to cause
the Senate to deprive him of a part of his army, he could not be
prevailed upon either to doubt Labienus, or to attempt anything against
the authority of the Senate. He knew that, if the votes were free, the
conscript fathers would do him justice.”[856] In fact, whenever the
Senate was not under the dominion of a factious minority, the majority
pronounced in favour of Cæsar.
It had been decided, in the preceding month of October, that the
question of the consular provinces should be brought under consideration
on the 1st of March, 704, the period at which Pompey had declared that
he would throw no obstacle in the way of the discussion. It was opened
then, as appears from a letter of Cicero, and the Senate showed an
inclination to recall Cæsar for the Ides of November, 704. Nevertheless,
there was no decisive result. People were afraid yet to engage in a
struggle for life: Curio, singly, made the Senate tremble by his
opposition.[857]
When, in the bosom of that assembly, C. Marcellus was declaiming against
Cæsar, Curio began to speak, praised the consul’s prudence, approved
much of the proposal that the conqueror of Gaul should be summoned to
disband his army; but he insinuated that it would not be less desirable
to see Pompey disband his. “Those great generals,” said he, “were
objects of suspicion to him, and there would be no tranquillity for the
Republic until both of them should become private men.”[858] This speech
pleased the people, who, moreover, began to lose much of their esteem
for Pompey since the time that, by his law on bribery, a great number of
citizens were condemned to exile. On all sides they praised Curio; they
admired his courage in braving two such powerful men, and on several
occasions an immense crowd escorted him to his house, throwing flowers
over him “like an athlete,” says Appian, “who had just sustained a
severe and dangerous combat.”[859]
The clever manœuvres of Cicero had such success that, when Marcellus
proposed to concert with the tribunes of the people on the means of
opposing the candidature of Cæsar, the majority of the Senate gave their
opinion to the contrary. On this subject, M. Cœlius wrote to Cæsar:
“The opinions have changed so much that now they are ready to reckon as
a candidate for the consulship a man who will give up neither his army
nor his province.”[860] Pompey gave no sign of life, and let the Senate
have its way.
He always seemed to disdain what he desired most. Thus, at this time, he
affected an entire carelessness, and retrenched himself in his legality,
taking care to avoid all appearance of personal hostility towards Cæsar.
At the same time, either in order to avoid being pressed too soon, or to
appear indifferent to the question which agitated the Republic, he left
his gardens near Rome to visit Campania. Thence he sent a letter to the
Senate, in which, while he praised Cæsar and himself, he reminded them
that he never had solicited a third consulship, nor yet the command of
the armies; that he had received it in spite of himself, in order to
save the Republic, and that he was ready to renounce it without waiting
the term fixed by the law.[861] This letter, studied and artful, was
intended to bring out the contrast between his disinterested conduct and
that of Cæsar, who refused to surrender his government; but Curio
baffled this manœuvre. “If Pompey were sincere,” he said, “he ought
not to promise to give his resignation, but to give it at once; so long
as he should not have retired into private life, the command could not
be taken from Cæsar. Besides, the interest of the State required the
presence of two rivals constantly opposed to each other; and, in his
eyes, it was Pompey who openly aspired to absolute power.”[862] This
accusation was not without ground; for during the last nineteen
years--that is to say, since 684, the time of his first
consulship--Pompey had nearly always been in possession of the
_imperium_, either as consul, or as general in the wars against the
pirates and against Mithridates, or, finally, as charged with the
victualling of Italy. “To take Cæsar’s army from him,” says Plutarch,
“and to leave his army to Pompey, was, by accusing the one of aspiring
to the tyranny, to give the other the means of obtaining it.”[863]
[Sidenote: Pompey receives Ovations, and asks Cæsar to return his Two
Legions.]
III. About this time Pompey fell dangerously ill, and on his recovery
the Neapolitans and the peoples of all Italy showed such joy, that
“every town, great or small,” says Plutarch, “celebrated festivals for
several days. When he returned to Rome, there was no place spacious
enough to contain the crowd which came to meet him; the roads, the
villages, and the ports were full of people offering sacrifices and
making banquets, in order to show their joy at his recovery. A great
number of citizens, crowned with leaves, went to receive him with
torches, and threw flowers on him as they accompanied him; the
procession which followed him in his progress offered the most
agreeable and most magnificent spectacle.”[864] Although these ovations
had given Pompey an exaggerated opinion of his influence, on his return
to Rome he observed in public the same reserve, though in secret he
supported the measures calculated to diminish Cæsar’s power. Thus,
taking for pretext the demands for re-enforcements renewed incessantly
by Bibulus and Cicero, proconsuls of Syria and Cilicia, who sought to
place their provinces in safety against an invasion of the Parthians, he
represented that the levies ordered by the Senate were insufficient, and
that it was necessary to send experienced troops to the East. It was
thereupon decided that Pompey and Cæsar, who were at the head of
considerable armies, should each of them detach one legion for the
defence of the threatened provinces. A senatus-consultus at once
summoned Cæsar to send his legion, and ordered him, besides, to return
the legion which Pompey had lent him shortly after the conference of
Lucca. Perhaps they hoped for resistance on his part, for this last
legion had been raised, like all those of his army, in Cisalpine Gaul;
but he obeyed without hesitation, so that he alone had to furnish the
re-enforcements required for the East. Before parting with his soldiers,
who had so long fought under his orders, he caused 250 drachmas (225
francs) to be distributed to each legionary.[865]
Appius Claudius, nephew of the censor of the same name, who had left
Rome with the mission of bringing those troops from the Cisalpine into
Italy, reported on his return that the soldiers of Cæsar, weary of their
long campaigns, sighed for repose, and that it would be impossible to
draw them into a civil war; he pretended even that the legions in winter
quarters in Transalpine Gaul would no sooner have passed the Alps than
they would rally to Pompey’s flag.[866] Events in the sequel proved the
falsity of this information, for not only, as will appear hereafter, did
the troops which had remained under Cæsar’s command continue faithful to
him, but those which had been withdrawn from him preserved the
remembrance of their ancient general. In fact, Pompey himself had not
the least confidence in the two legions he had received, and his letter
to Domitius, proconsul at the commencement of the civil war, explains
his inaction by the danger of bringing them into the presence of the
army of Cæsar, so much he fears to see them pass over to the opposite
camp.[867] At Rome, nevertheless, they believed in the reports which
flattered the pretensions of Pompey, although they were contradicted by
other more certain information, which showed Italy, the Cisalpine
provinces, and Gaul itself, equally devoted to Cæsar. Pompey, deaf to
these last warnings, affected the greatest contempt for the forces of
which his adversary could dispose. According to him, Cæsar was ruining
himself, and had no other chance of safety but in a prompt and complete
submission. When he was asked with what troops he would resist the
conqueror of Gaul, in case he were to march upon Rome, he replied, with
an air of confidence, that he had only to strike the soil of Italy with
his foot to make legions start up out of it.[868]
It was natural that his vanity should make him interpret favourably all
that was passing under his eyes. At Rome, the greatest personages were
devoted to him. Italy had shuddered at the news of his illness, and
celebrated his recovery as if it had been a triumph. The army of Gaul,
it was said, was ready to answer to his call.
With less blindness, Pompey might have discerned the true reason of the
enthusiasm of which he had been the object. He would have understood
that this enthusiasm was much less addressed to his person than to the
depositary of an authority which alone then seemed capable of saving the
Republic: he would have understood that, the day another general should
appear under the same conditions of fame and power as himself, the
people, with its admirable discernment, would at once side with him who
should best identify himself with their interests.
To understand the public opinion correctly, he ought not, though this
might have been a difficult thing to the chief of the aristocratic
cause, to have confined himself solely to the judgment of the official
world, but he should have interrogated the sentiments of those whose
position brought them nearest to the people. Instead of believing the
reports of Appius Claudius, and reckoning on the discontent of certain
of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who, like Labienus, already showed hostile
tendencies, Pompey ought to have meditated upon that exclamation of a
centurion, who, placed at the door of the Senate, when that assembly
rejected the just reclamations of the conqueror of Gaul, exclaimed,
putting his hand to his sword, “This will give him what he asks.”[869]
The fact is that, in civil commotions, each class of society divines, as
by instinct, the cause which responds to its aspirations, and feels
itself attracted to it by a secret affinity. Men born in the superior
classes, or brought to their level by honours and riches, are always
drawn towards the aristocracy, whilst men kept by fortune in the
inferior ranks remain the firm supports of the popular cause. Thus, at
the return from the isle of Elba, most of the generals of the Emperor
Napoleon, loaded with wealth like the lieutenants of Cæsar,[870] marched
openly against him; but in the army all up to the rank of colonel said,
after the example of the Roman centurion, pointing to their weapons,
“This will place him on the throne again!”
[Sidenote: The Senate votes impartially.]
IV. An attentive examination of the correspondence between M. Cœlius
and Cicero, as well as the relations of the various authors, leads to
the conviction that at that period it required great efforts on the part
of the turbulent fraction of the aristocratic party to drag the Senate
into hostility towards Cæsar. The censor Appius, reviewing the list of
that body, _noted_ Curio, that is, wished to strike him from the list;
but at the instances of his colleague and of the Consul Paulus, he
confined himself to expressing a formal reproof, and his regret that he
could not do justice. On hearing him, Curio tore his toga, and protested
with the utmost passion against a disloyal attack. The Consul Marcellus,
who suspected the good understanding between Curio and Cæsar, and who
reckoned on the feelings of the Senate, which were very unfavourable to
both, brought the conduct of the tribune under discussion. While he
protested against this illegal proceeding, Curio accepted the debate,
and declared that, strong in his conscience, and certain of having
always acted in the interests of the Republic, he placed with confidence
his honour and his life in the hands of the Senate. This scene could
have no other result but an honourable vote for Curio;[871] but this
incident was soon left, and the discussion passed to the political
situation. Marcellus proposed at first this question: _Ought Cæsar to be
superseded in his province?_ He urged the Senate to a vote. The senators
having formed themselves into two groups in the curia, an immense
majority declared for the affirmative. The same majority pronounced for
the negative on a second question of Marcellus: _Ought Pompey to be
superseded?_ But Curio, resuming the arguments which he had used so many
times on the danger of favouring Pompey at the expense of Cæsar,
demanded a vote upon a third question: _Ought Pompey and Cæsar both to
disarm?_ To the surprise of the consul, this unexpected motion passed by
a majority of 370 against 22. Then Marcellus dismissed the Senate,
saying with bitterness, “You carry the day! you will have Cæsar for
master.”[872] He did not imagine that he foretold the future so well.
Thus the almost unanimity of the assembly had, by its vote, justified
Curio, who, in this instance, was only the representative of Cæsar; and
if Pompey and his party had submitted to this decision, there would no
longer have been a pretext for the struggle which honest men feared:
Cæsar and Pompey would have resumed their place in ordinary life, each
with his partisans and his renown, but without army, and consequently
without the means of disturbing the Republic.
[Sidenote: Violent Measures adopted against Cæsar.]
V. This was not what these restless men wanted, who masked their petty
passions under the great words of public safety and liberty. In order to
destroy the effect of this vote of the Senate, the rumour was spread in
Rome that Cæsar had entered Italy; Marcellus demanded that troops should
be raised, and that the two legions destined for the war in the East
should be brought from Capua, where they were in garrison. Curio
protested against the falsehood of this news, and interceded, in his
quality of tribune, to oppose all extraordinary arming. Then Marcellus
exclaimed, “Since I can do nothing here with the consent of all, I alone
take charge of the public welfare on my own responsibility!” He then
hurried to the suburb where Pompey had his quarters, and, presenting him
with a sword, addressed him in these words: “I summon you to take the
command of the troops which are at Capua, to raise others, and to take
the measures necessary for the safety of the Republic.” Pompey accepted
this mission, but with reserves: he said that he would obey the orders
of the consuls, “if, at least, there was nothing better to do.” This
prudent reflection, at a moment so critical, pictures the character of
the man.[873] M. Marcellus understood all the irregularity of his
conduct, and brought with him the consuls nominated for the following
year (705); even before they entered upon office,[874] which was to take
place in a few days, they had the right to render edicts which indicated
the principles upon which they intended to act during the time of their
magistracy. They were L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius
Marcellus, the last a kinsman of the preceding consul of the same name,
both enemies to Cæsar. They entered into an engagement with Pompey to
support with all their efforts the measure which their predecessor had
taken at his own risk and peril. We see, they are the consuls and Pompey
who revolt against the decisions of the Senate.
Curio could not oppose these measures regularly, the tribunes not having
the right of exercising their powers outside Rome; but he attacked
before the people what had just been done, and recommended them not to
obey the levy of troops which had been ordered by Pompey, in contempt of
the law.[875]
[Sidenote: State of Public Opinion.]
VI. The following letter from M. Cœlius to Cicero shows what was the
judgment of impartial Romans upon the public situation in September,
704:--
“The nearer we approach the inevitable struggle, the more we are struck
with the greatness of the danger. This is the ground on which the two
men of power of the day are going to encounter each other. Cn. Pompey is
decided not to suffer Cæsar to be consul until he has resigned his army
and his provinces, and Cæsar is convinced that there is no safety for
him unless he keep his army; he consents, nevertheless, if the condition
of giving up the commandment be reciprocal. Thus those effusions of
tenderness and this so dreaded alliance will end, not in hidden
animosity, but in open war. As far as I am concerned, I do not know
which side to take in this conjuncture, and I doubt not but this
perplexity is common to us. In one of the parties, I have obligations of
gratitude and friendship; in the other, it is the cause, not the men, I
hate. My principles, which no doubt you share, are these: in domestic
dissensions, so long as things pass between unarmed citizens, to prefer
the most honest party; but when war breaks out, and two camps are in
presence, to side with the strongest, and seek reason where there is
safety. Now, what do I see here? On one side, Pompey, with the Senate
and the magistracy; on the other, Cæsar, with all who have anything to
fear or to covet. No comparison possible, as far as the armies are
concerned. May it please the gods to give us time to weigh the
respective forces, and to make our choice.”[876] Cœlius was not long
in making his; he embraced the party of Cæsar.[877]
This appreciation of a contemporary was certainly shared by a great
number of persons, who, without well-defined convictions, were ready to
side with the strongest. Cicero, who was returning to Italy,[878] had
the same tendency, yet he felt an extreme embarrassment. Not only was he
on friendly terms with the two adversaries, but Cæsar had lent him a
considerable sum, and this debt weighed upon him like a remorse.[879]
After having ardently desired to leave his command for fear of the war
against the Parthians, he fell into the midst of preparations for a
civil war which presented a much greater danger. Hence, when on his
arrival in Greece he believed, on false reports, that Cæsar had sent
four legions into Piacenza, his first thought was to shut himself up in
the citadel of Athens.[880] When at last he had returned to Italy, he
congratulated himself on being in a condition to obtain the honours of a
triumph, because then the obligation of remaining outside Rome dispensed
him from declaring for either of the two rivals.
He wished above all for the triumph, and in his letters he pressed the
influential personages to prevail upon the Senate to consent to it; but
Cato considered, like many others, that the exploits of the proconsul in
Cilicia did not deserve so much honour, and he refused to give him his
support, whilst, at the same time, he greatly praised his character.
Cæsar, less rigid on principles, forgetting nothing which could flatter
the self-love of important men, had written to Cicero to promise him his
assistance, and blame Cato’s severity.[881]
Meanwhile, the celebrated orator did not deceive himself as to the
resources of the two parties. When he talked with Pompey, the assurance
of that warrior tranquillised him; but when abandoned to his own
meditations, he saw well that all the chances were on the side of Cæsar.
“To-day,” he wrote, “Cæsar is at the head of eleven legions (he forgot
the two legions given to Pompey), without counting the cavalry, of which
he can have as many as he likes; he has in his favour the Transpadan
towns, the populace of Rome, the entire order of the knights, nearly all
the tribunes, all the disorderly youth, the ascendant of his glorious
name, and his extreme boldness. This is the man they have to
combat.[882] This party only wants a good cause; the rest they have in
abundance. Consequently, there is nothing which they must not do rather
than come to war; the result of which is always uncertain, and how much
the more is it not to be feared for us!”[883]
As for his own party, he defined it in the following manner: “What do
you mean by these men of the good side? I know none that I could name. I
know some, if we mean to speak of the whole class of honest men; for
individually, in the true sense of the word, they are rare; but in civil
strife you must seek the cause of honourable men where it is. Is it the
Senate which is that good party; the Senate, which leaves provinces
without governors? Curio would never have resisted if they had made up
their minds to oppose him; but the Senate has done nothing of the kind,
and they have not been able to give Cæsar a successor. Is it the knights
who have never shown a very firm patriotism, and who now are entirely
devoted to Cæsar? Are they the merchants or the country people who only
ask to live in repose? Shall we believe that they fear much to see one
single man in power, they who are content with any government, so long
as they are quiet?”[884]
The more the situation became serious, the more wise men inclined
towards the party of peace. Pompey had again absented himself from Rome
for a few days; he showed great irritation at the arrogance of the
tribune Mark Antony, who, in a speech before the people, had attacked
him with violence. He seemed also much hurt at the want of regard of
Hirtius, that friend of Cæsar, who had come to Rome without paying him a
visit.[885] The absence of Pompey in such critical moments had been
generally blamed,[886] but he soon returned; his resolution was taken.
“I have seen Pompey,” wrote Cicero to his friend, on the 6th of the
Calends of December. “We went together to Formiæ, and we conversed alone
from two o’clock till evening. You ask me if there is any hope of
agreement. As far as I have been able to judge from what he told me in
a lengthy conversation full of details, there is even no desire for it.
He pretends that, if Cæsar obtains the consulship, even after having
dismissed his army, there will be a revolution in the state. He is,
moreover, convinced that, when Cæsar knows that they take measures
against him, he will abandon the consulship for this year, and that he
will prefer keeping his army and his province; he added that his anger
would not frighten him, and that Rome and he would know how to defend
themselves. What shall I say? Although the great phrase, _Mars has equal
chances for everybody_, recurred often to my mind, I felt reassured, in
hearing a valiant man, so able and so powerful, reasoning like a
politician upon the dangers of a false peace. We read together the
speech of Antony, of the 10th of the Calends of January, which is, from
beginning to end, an accusation against Pompey, whom he takes up from
his infantile toga. He reproaches him with condemnations by thousands;
he threatens us with war. Upon which Pompey said to me, ‘What will Cæsar
not do, once master of the Republic, if his quæstor, a man without
wealth, without support, dare to speak in this manner?’ In short, far
from desiring such a peace, he appeared to me to fear it, perhaps
because then he would be obliged to go to Spain. What annoys me most is,
that I shall be obliged to reimburse Cæsar, and to apply to that use all
the money which I intended for my triumph, for it would be disgraceful
to remain the debtor of a political adversary.”[887] By this declaration
Cicero proves in the most positive manner that Pompey desired war, and
rejected all reconciliation; he repeats it elsewhere with still more
precision.
Pompey, led by the inevitable march of events to oppose Cæsar’s just
demands, which he had favoured at first, was reduced to desire civil
war.
He and his party had not arrived at this extremity without in most cases
overruling the will of the Senate, without wounding the public feeling,
and without overstepping the bonds of legality. In the beginning of 703,
when Marcellus had proposed to recall Cæsar before the legal period, the
Senate, assembled in great number, had passed to the order of the
day,[888] and during the rest of the year they had shown a determination
not to undertake anything against the proconsul of Gaul. They had
rejected a second time the motion of Marcellus, renewed on the 1st of
March, 704, and afterwards the Senate had shown dispositions favourable
to Cæsar. However, the law which permitted him to keep his command until
the consular comitia of 705 is soon treated with contempt; after many
hesitations the Senate decides that Cæsar and Pompey shall disband their
armies at the same time, but the decree is not executed; passions become
inflamed, the most arbitrary measures are proposed, the tribunes
intercede: their veto is considered as not existing. Then, without
obtaining a senatus-consultus, without appealing to the people, the
consuls charge Pompey to raise troops, and to watch over the welfare of
the Republic. It is the aristocratic party which places itself above the
law, and places right on the side of Cæsar.
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.
[Sidenote: C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, Consuls.]
I. In the course of the summer, it will be remembered, Cæsar had
returned to Arras, to the middle of his army, which was encamped in the
north of Gaul. He was informed of the plots going on at Rome; he knew
that his enemies would agree to no arrangement, but he still hoped that
the Senate would maintain the equal balance between him and his rival,
for that assembly had already shown its pacific tendencies, and did not
even seem inclined to interfere in the quarrel.[889] In the winter
between 704 and 705 he returned to Cisalpine Gaul; presided there,
according to his custom, over the provincial assemblies, and stopped at
Ravenna, the last town in his command.[890] He had only the 13th legion
at his disposal, which was 5,000 men strong, with 300 cavalry;[891]
nearly his whole army, to the number of eight legions, had remained in
winter quarters in Belgium and Burgundy.[892]
It was at Ravenna that Curio, the year of whose tribuneship expired in
December, 704,[893] hastened to him. Cæsar received him with open arms,
thanked him for his devotedness, and conferred with him upon the
measures to be taken. Curio proposed that he should call the other
legions which he had beyond the Alps, and march upon Rome; but Cæsar did
not approve of this counsel, still persuaded that things would yet come
to an understanding. He engaged his friends[894] at Rome to propose a
plan of accommodation which had been approved, it was said, by Cicero,
and which Plutarch expressly ascribes to him: Cæsar was to have given up
Transalpine Gaul, and kept Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions,
until he had obtained the consulship. It was even said that he would be
satisfied with Illyria alone and one legion.[895] “He made the greatest
efforts,” says Velleius Paterculus,[896] “to maintain peace: the friends
of Pompey refused all conciliatory proposals.” “The appearance of
justice,” says Plutarch, “was on the side of Cæsar.” When the
negotiation had failed, he charged Curio to carry to the Senate a letter
full of impudence, according to Pompey; full of threats, according to
Cicero;[897] well adapted, on the contrary, according to Plutarch, to
draw the multitude to Cæsar’s side.[898]
Curio, after travelling 1,300 stadia (210 kilomètres) in three days,
re-appeared in that assembly on the very day of the installation of the
new consuls, the Calends of January, 705. He did not deliver to them,
according to custom, the letter of which he was the bearer, for fear
that they should not communicate it; and, indeed, at first they opposed
the reading of it; but two tribunes of the people devoted to Cæsar, Mark
Antony, formerly his quæstor, and Q. Cassius, insisted with so much
energy, that the new consuls were unable to refuse.[899]
Cæsar, after reminding them of what he had done for the Republic,
justified himself against the imputations spread against him by his
enemies. While he protested his respect for the Senate, he declared that
he was ready to resign his proconsular functions, and to disband his
army, or deliver it to his successor, provided Pompey did the same. It
could not be required of him to deliver himself up unarmed to his
enemies while they remained armed, and alone to set the example of
submission. He spoke not on this occasion of his pretensions to the
consulship; the great question, to know whether he and Pompey should
keep their armies, overruled all the others. The conclusion of the
letter displayed a strong feeling of resentment. Cæsar declared in it
that, if justice were not rendered to him, he should know how, by
revenging himself, to revenge his country also. This last expression,
which strongly resembled a threat, excited the loudest reclamations in
the Senate. “It is war he declares,” they exclaimed, and the irritation
rose to the greatest height.[900] No deliberation could be obtained on
any of his propositions.
[Sidenote: Lentulus carries the Senate against Cæsar.]
II. The Consul L. Lentulus, in a violent oration, engaged the Senate to
show more courage and firmness: he promised to support it, and defend
the Republic: “If, on the contrary, the assembly, in this critical
moment, was wanting in energy--if, as in the past, it meant to spare
Cæsar and to conciliate his good graces, there would be an end of its
authority: as far as he was concerned, he should hasten to withdraw from
it, and should in future consult only himself. After all, he also might
gain the friendship and favour of Cæsar.” Scipio spoke in the same
spirit: “Pompey,” said he, “will not fail the Republic, if he is
followed by the Senate; but if they hesitate, if they act with weakness,
the Senate will henceforth invoke his aid in vain.” This language of
Scipio seemed to be the expression of the thoughts of Pompey, who was at
the gates of the town with his army. More moderate opinions were also
offered. M. Marcellus demanded that, before coming to any decision, the
Senate should assemble troops from the different parts of Italy in order
to ensure the independence of their deliberations; M. Calidius proposed
that Pompey should retire to his province, in order to avoid all motive
for a war; for Cæsar might justly fear to see used against him the two
legions taken away from his command, and retained under the walls of
Rome. M. Rufus gave his opinion nearly in the same terms. Lentulus
immediately burst out into violent reproaches against the latter
speakers; he upbraided them with their defection, and refused to put the
proposal of Calidius to a vote. Marcellus, terrified, withdrew his
motion. Then there happened one of those strange and sudden changes, so
common in revolutionary assemblies: the violent apostrophes of
Lentulus, the threats uttered by the partisans of Pompey, the terror
inspired by the presence of an army under the walls of Rome, exerted an
irresistible pressure upon the minds of the senators, who, in spite of
themselves, adopted the motion of Scipio, and decreed that “if Cæsar did
not disband his army on the day prescribed, he should be declared an
enemy of the Republic.”[901]
Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, oppose this
decree.[902] A report is immediately made of their opposition, invoking
the decision taken by the Senate the year before; grave measures are
proposed: the more violent they are, the more the enemies of Cæsar
applaud. In the evening, after the sitting, Pompey convokes the senators
in his gardens: he distributes praise and blame amongst them, encourages
some, intimidates others. At the same time, he recalls from all parts a
great number of his veterans, promising them rewards and promotion. He
addressed himself even to the soldiers of the two legions who had formed
part of Cæsar’s army.[903]
The town is in a state of extreme agitation. The tribune Curio claims
the right of the comitia which had been set aside. The friends of the
consuls, the adherents of Pompey, all who nourished old rancours against
Cæsar, hurry towards the Senate, which is again assembled. Their
clamours and threats deprive that assembly of all liberty of decision.
The most varied proposals follow each other. The censor L. Piso and the
prætor Roscius offer to go to Cæsar, to inform him of what is going on;
they only ask a delay of six days. Others desire that deputies be
charged to go to make him acquainted with the will of the Senate.
All these motions are rejected. Cato, Lentulus, and Scipio redouble in
violence. Cato is animated by old enmities and the mortification of his
recent check in the consular elections. Lentulus, overwhelmed with
debts, hopes for honours and riches; he boasts among his party that he
will become a second Sylla, and be master of the empire.[904] Scipio
flatters himself with an ambition equally chimerical. Lastly, Pompey,
who will have no equal, desires war, the only way to get over the folly
of his conduct,[905] and this prop of the Republic assumes the title,
like Agamemnon, of king of kings.[906]
The consuls propose to the Senate to assume public mourning, in order to
strike the imagination of the people, and to show them that the country
is in danger. Mark Antony and his colleague Cassius intercede; but no
attention is paid to their opposition. The Senate assembles in mourning
attire, decided beforehand on rigorous measures. The tribunes, on the
other hand, announce that they intend to make use of their right of
veto. In the midst of this general excitement, their obstinacy is no
longer considered as a right of their office, but as a proof of their
complicity; and, first of all, measures are brought under deliberation
to be taken against their opposition. Mark Antony is the most
audacious; the Consul Lentulus interrupts him with anger, and orders him
to leave the curia, “where,” he says, “his sacred character will not
preserve him any longer from the punishment merited by his spirit of
hostility towards the Republic.” Mark Antony thereupon, rising
impetuously, takes the gods to witness that the privileges of the
tribune’s power are violated in his person. “We are insulted,” exclaims
he; “we are treated like murderers. You want proscriptions, massacres,
conflagrations. May all those evils which you have drawn down fall upon
your own heads!” Then, pronouncing the forms of execration, which had
always the power of impressing superstitious minds, he leaves the curia,
followed by Q. Cassius, Curio, and M. Cœlius.[907] It was time: the
curia was on the point of being surrounded by a detachment of troops,
which were already approaching.[908] All four left Rome in the night
between the 6th and 7th of January, in the disguise of slaves, in an
ordinary chariot, and reached Cæsar’s quarters.[909]
The following days the Senate meets outside the town. Pompey repeats
there what he had employed Scipio to say. He applauds the courage and
firmness of the assembly; he enumerates his forces, boasts of having ten
legions--six in Spain, and four in Italy.[910] According to his
conviction, the army is not devoted to Cæsar, and will not follow him in
his rash undertakings. Besides, would he dare, with one single legion,
to face the forces of the Senate? Before he will have had time to summon
his troops, which are on the other side of the Alps, Pompey will have
assembled a formidable army.[911] Then the Senate declares the country
in danger (it was the 18th of the Ides of January), an extreme measure
reserved for great public calamities; and the care to watch that the
Republic receive no harm is confided to the consuls, the proconsuls, the
prætors, and the tribunes of the people. Immediately, all his party,
whose violence has driven Pompey and the Senate into civil war, fell
upon the dignities, the honours, the governments of provinces, as so
many objects of prey. Italy is divided into great commands,[912] which
the principal chiefs divide amongst themselves. Cicero, always prudent,
chooses Campania as being more distant from the scene of war. Scribonius
Libo is sent to Etruria,[913] P. Lentulus Spinther to the coast of
Picenum,[914] P. Attius Varus to Auximum and Cingulum,[915] and Q.
Minucius Thermus to Umbria.[916] By a false interpretation of the law
which allows proconsuls to be chosen among the magistrates who have
resigned their functions within five years, the consular and prætorian
provinces are shared arbitrarily: Syria is given to Metellus Scipio,
Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cisalpine Gaul to Considius
Nonianus, Sicily to Cato, Sardinia to M. Aurelius Cotta, Africa to L.
Ælius Tuberno, and Cilicia to P. Sextius.[917] The obligation of a
curiate law to legitimate their power is regarded as useless. Their
names are not drawn by lot; they do not wait, according to the
established practice, till the people has ratified their election, and
till they have put on the dress of war, after having pronounced the
usual vows. The consuls, contrary to custom, leave the town; men, till
then strangers to all high office, cause lictors to go before them in
Rome and in the Capitol. It is proposed to declare King Juba friend and
ally of the Roman people. What matters whether he be devoted or not to
the Roman domination, provided he become a useful auxiliary for the
civil war? A levy of 130,000 men in Italy is decreed. All the resources
of the public treasure are placed at the disposal of Pompey; the money
preserved in the temples is taken; and if that be not sufficient, the
property of private persons themselves shall be employed for the pay of
the troops. In the midst of this sudden commotion, rights divine and
human are equally trampled under foot.[918] And yet a few days had
scarcely passed “when the Senate,” says Appian, “regretted not having
accepted the conditions of Cæsar, the justice of which they felt at a
moment when fear brought them back from the excitement of party spirit
to the counsels of wisdom.”[919]
[Sidenote: Cæsar harangues his Troops.]
III. Whilst at Rome all was confusion, and Pompey, nominal chief of his
party, underwent its various exigencies and impulses, Cæsar, master of
himself and free in his resolutions, waited quietly at Ravenna until the
thoughtless impetuosity of his enemies should break itself against his
firmness and the justice of his cause. The tribunes of the people, Mark
Antony and Q. Cassius, accompanied by Curio and M. Cœlius, hasten to
him.[920] At the news of the events in Rome, he sends couriers to the
other side of the Alps, in order to unite his army; but, without waiting
for it, he assembles the 13th legion, the only one which had crossed the
Alps; he reminds his soldiers in a few words of the ancient insults and
the recent injustices of which he is the victim.
“The people had authorised him, although absent, to solicit a new
consulship, and, as soon as he thought that he ought to avail himself of
this favour, it was opposed. He has been asked, for the interest of his
country, to deprive himself of two legions, and, after he has made the
sacrifice, it is against him they are employed. The decrees of the
Senate and the people, legally rendered, have been disregarded, and
other decrees have been sanctioned; notwithstanding the opposition of
the tribunes. The right of intercession, which Sylla himself had
respected, has been set at naught, and it is under the garb of slaves
that the representatives of the Roman people come to seek a refuge in
his camp. All his proposals of conciliation have been rejected. What has
been refused to him has been granted to Pompey, who, prompted by envious
malignity, has broken the ties of an old friendship. Lastly, what
pretext is there for declaring the country in danger, and calling the
Roman people to arms? Are they in presence of a popular revolt, or a
violence of the tribunes, as in the time of the Gracchi, or an invasion
of the barbarians, as in the time of Marius? Besides, no law has been
promulgated, no motion has been submitted for the sanction of the
people; _all which has been done without the sanction of the people is
unlawful_.[921] Let the soldiers, then, defend the general under whom,
for nine years, they have served the Republic with so much success,
gained so many battles, subdued the whole of Gaul, overcome the Germans
and the Britons; for his enemies are theirs, and his elevation, as well
as his glory, is their work.”
Unanimous acclamations respond to this speech of Cæsar. The soldiers of
the 13th legion declare that they are ready to make the greatest
sacrifices; they will revenge their general and the tribunes of the
people for all these outrages; as a proof of his devotion, each
centurion offers to entertain a horseman at his expense; each soldier,
to serve gratuitously, the richer ones providing for the poorer ones;
and during the whole civil war, Suetonius affirms, not one of them
failed in this engagement.[922] Such was the devotedness of the army;
Labienus alone, whom Cæsar loved especially, whom he had loaded with
favours, deserted the cause of the conqueror of Gaul, and passed over to
Pompey.[923] Cicero and his party thought that this deserter would bring
a great addition to their strength. But Labienus,[924] though an able
general under Cæsar, was only an indifferent one in the opposite camp.
Desertions have never made any man great.
[Sidenote: Cæsar is driven to Civil War.]
IV. The moment for action had arrived. Cæsar was reduced to the
alternative of maintaining himself at the head of his army, in spite of
the Senate, or surrendering himself to his enemies, who would have
reserved for him the fate of the accomplices of Catiline, who had been
condemned to death, if he were not, like the Gracchi, Saturninus, and so
many others, killed in a popular tumult. Here the question naturally
offers itself: Ought not Cæsar, who had so often faced death on the
battle-fields, have gone to Rome to face it under another form, and to
have renounced his command, rather than engage in a struggle which must
throw the Republic into all the horrors of a civil war? Yes, if by his
abnegation he could save Rome from anarchy, corruption, and tyranny. No,
if this abnegation would endanger what he had most at heart, the
regeneration of the Republic. Cæsar, like men of his temper, cared
little for life, and still less for power for the sake of power; but,
as chief of the popular party, he felt a great cause rise behind him; it
urged him forward, and obliged him to conquer in despite of legality,
the imprecations of his adversaries, and the uncertain judgment of
posterity. Roman society, in a state of dissolution, asked for a master;
oppressed Italy, for a representative of its rights; the world, bowed
under the yoke, for a saviour. Ought he, by deserting his mission,
disappoint so many legitimate hopes, so many noble aspirations? What!
Cæsar, who owed all his dignities to the people, and confining himself
within his right, should he have retired before Pompey, who, having
become the docile tool of a factious minority of the Senate, was
trampling right and justice under foot; before Pompey, who, according to
the admission of Cicero himself, would have been, after victory, a cruel
and vindictive despot, and would have allowed the world to be plundered
for the benefit of a few families, incapable, moreover, of arresting the
decay of the Republic, and founding an order of things sufficiently firm
to retard the invasion of barbarians for many centuries! He would have
retreated before a party which reckoned it a crime to repair the evils
caused by the violence of Sylla, and the severity of Pompey, by
recalling the exiles;[925] to give rights to the peoples of Italy; to
distribute lands among the poor and the veterans; and, by an equitable
administration, to ensure the prosperity of the provinces! It would have
been madness. The question had not the mean proportions of a quarrel
between two generals who contended for power: it was the decisive
conflict between two hostile causes, between the privileged classes and
the people; it was the continuation of the formidable struggle between
Marius and Sylla![926]
There are imperious circumstances which condemn public men either to
abnegation or to perseverance. To cling to power when one is no longer
able to do good, and when, as a representative of the past, one has, as
it were, no partisans but among those who live upon abuses, is a
deplorable obstinacy; to abandon it when one is the representative of a
new era, and the hope of a better future, is a cowardly act and a crime.
[Sidenote: Cæsar crosses the Rubicon.]
V. Cæsar has taken his resolution. He began the conquest of Gaul with
four legions; he is going to commence that of the world with one only.
He must first of all, by a surprise, take possession of Ariminum
(_Rimini_), the first important fortress of Italy on the side of
Cisalpine Gaul. For this purpose, he sends before him a detachment
composed of trusty soldiers and centurions, commanded by Q. Hortensius;
he places a part of his cavalry in _échelon_ on the road.[927] When
evening arrives, pretending an indisposition, he leaves his officers,
who were at table, enters a chariot with a few friends, and joins his
vanguard. When he arrives at the Rubicon, a stream which formed the
limit of his government, and which the laws forbad him to cross, he
halts for a moment as though struck with terror; he communicates his
apprehensions to Asinius Pollio and those who surround him. A comet has
appeared in the sky;[928] he foresees the misfortunes which are on the
point of befalling Italy, and recollects the dream which the night
before had oppressed his mind: he had dreamt that he violated his
mother. Was not his country, in fact, his mother; and, notwithstanding
the justness of his cause and the greatness of his designs, was not his
enterprise an outrage upon her? But the augurs, those flattering
interpreters of the future, affirm that this dream promises him the
empire of the world; this woman whom he has seen extended on the ground
is no other than the earth, the common mother of all mortals.[929] Then
suddenly an apparition, it is said, strikes the eyes of Cæsar: it is a
man of tall stature, blowing martial airs on a trumpet, and calling him
to the other bank. All hesitation ceases; he hurries onward and crosses
the Rubicon, exclaiming, “The die is cast! Let us go where I am called
by the prodigies of the gods and the iniquity of my enemies.”[930] Soon
he arrived at Ariminum, of which he takes possession without striking a
blow. The civil war has commenced!
“The true author of war,” says Montesquieu, “is not he who declares it,
but he who renders it necessary.” It is not granted to man,
notwithstanding his genius and power, to raise at will the popular
waves; yet, when, elected by the public voice, he appears in the midst
of the storm which endangers the vessel of the state, then he alone can
direct its course and bring it to the harbour. Cæsar was not, therefore,
the instigator of this profound perturbation of Roman society: he had
become the indispensable pilot. Had it been otherwise, when he
disappeared all would have returned to order; on the contrary, his death
gave up the whole universe to all the horrors of war. Europe, Asia,
Africa, were the theatre of sanguinary struggles between the past and
the future, and the Roman world did not find peace until the heir of his
name had made his cause triumph. But it was no longer possible for
Augustus to renew the work of Cæsar; fourteen years of civil war had
exhausted the strength of the nation and used up the characters; the men
imbued with the great principles of the past were dead; the survivors
had alternately served all parties; to succeed, Augustus himself had
made peace with the murderers of his adoptive father; the convictions
were extinct, and the world, longing for rest, no longer contained the
elements which would have permitted Cæsar, as was his intention, to
re-establish the Republic in its ancient splendour and its ancient
forms, but on new principles.
NAPOLEON.
_The Tuileries, March 20, 1866._
APPENDIX A.
CONCORDANCE OF DATES OF THE ANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE JULIAN
STYLE, FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709.
_Bases on which the Tables of Concordance are Founded._
Before the Julian reform, the Roman year comprised 355 days, divided
into twelve months, namely: Januarius, 29 days; Februarius, 28; Martius,
31; Aprilis, 29; Maius, 31; Junius, 29; Quintilis, 31; Sextilis, 29;
September, 29; October, 31; November, 29; December, 29.
Every other year, an intercalation of 22 or 23 days alternately was to
be added after the 23rd day of February.
The mean year being thus too long by one day, 24 days were to be
subtracted in the last eight years of a period of 24 years. We shall not
here have to take this correction into consideration.
The intercalation appears to have been regularly followed from A.U.C.
691 (that of Cicero’s consulship) until 702, when it was of 23 days. In
the middle of the troubles, the intercalation was omitted in the years
704, 706, and 708.
Towards the end of the year 708, Cæsar remedied the disorder by placing
extraordinarily between November and December 67 days, and by
introducing a new mode of intercalation.
The year 708 is the last of the _confusion_.
The year 709 is the first of the Julian style.
_Historical Data which the Concordance must Satisfy._
Cicero relates that at the beginning of his consulship the planet
Jupiter lighted the whole sky. (_De Divin._, I. 11.) Cicero entered on
office on the Calends of January in the year of Rome 691; that is, on
the 14th of December, 64 B.C. Jupiter had reached opposition eleven days
before, on the 3rd of December.[931]
In the year 691, on the 5th of the Ides of November, Cicero, in his
_Second Oration against Catiline_, 10, asks how the effeminate
companions of Catiline will support the frosts of the Appenine,
especially in these nights _already_ long (_his præsertim jam
noctibus_).[932] We are, in fact, on the 15th of October, 63 B.C. Later,
in his _Oration for Sextius_, speaking of the defeat of Catiline at the
beginning of January, 692 (the middle of December, 63 B.C.), Cicero
asserts that the result is due to Sextius, without whose activity the
winter would have been allowed to intervene (_datus illo in bello esset
hiemi locus_).
In the year 696 of Rome (58 B.C.), the Helvetii appoint their rendezvous
at Geneva for a day fixed: “is dies erat a.d.v. Kal-Aprilis.” (Cæsar,
_De Bello Gallico_, I. 6.) This date corresponds with the Julian 24th of
March, the day on which the spring equinox fell. The Helvetii had taken
this natural period; Cæsar has referred it to the Roman calendar.[933]
In the year 700 of Rome (54 B.C.), Cæsar, after his second campaign in
Britain, re-embarks his troops “quod æquinoctium suberat.” (_De Bello
Gallico_, V. 23.) He informs Cicero of it on the 6th of the Calends of
October, the Julian 21st of September. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV.
17.) The equinox fell on the 26th of September.[934]
In the year 702, on the 13th of the Calends of February (that is, on the
30th of December, 53 B.C.), Clodius is slain by Milo. (Cicero, _Orat.
pro Milone_, 10.) Pompey is created consul for the third time on the 5th
of the Calends of March, _in the intercalary month_. (Asconius.)
In the year 703, Cicero writes to Atticus (V. 13): “I have arrived at
Ephesus on the 11th of the Calends of Sextilis (12th of July, 51 B.C.),
560 days after the battle of Bovillæ;” an exact computation, if we count
the day of the murder of Clodius, and reckon 23 days for the
intercalation of 702.[935]
In the year 704 the intercalation is omitted. Cæsar’s partisans demanded
it in vain. (Dio Cassius, XL. 61, 62.)
In 705, Cicero, who hesitates in joining Pompey, writes to Atticus:
“a.d. xvii Kal. Junii: Nunc quidem æquinoctium nos moratur, quod valde
perturbatum erat.” It was the 16th of April; the equinox was passed 21
days before, and the atmospheric disturbances might still last. Or was
it anything else than an excuse on the part of Cicero?
Cæsar embarks at Brundusium on the eve of the Nones of January, 706.
(_De Bello Civili_, III. 6.) It is the 28th of November, 49 B.C. “Gravis
autumnus in Apulio circumque Brundusium ... omnem exercitum valetudine
tentaverat.” (_De Bello Civili_, III. 2, 6.)--“Bibulus gravissima hieme
in navibus excubabat.” (_De Bello Civili_, III. 8.)--“Jamque hiems
appropinquabat.” (_De Bello Civili_, III. 9.)
After his arrival at Rome towards the end of the year 707, Cæsar started
again for the African war. It was only on his return towards the middle
of the year 708, that he could devote himself to the re-organisation of
the Republic and the reform of the calendar. According to Dio Cassius
(XLIII. 26), “as the days of the year did not concord well together,
Cæsar introduced the present manner of reckoning, by intercalating 67
days necessary to restore the concordance. Some authors have pretended
that he intercalated more; but this is the truth.”[936]
What concordance was it that required to be established thus? The 67
days _necessary_ were exactly what required to be added that, in the
secular year of Rome 700, the Julian month of March should coincide with
the ancient Roman month of March. The month of March of the year 700 of
Rome is the true starting-point of the Julian style.
--+--------------------------------------------------------
D |
a |
y | JULIAN YEAR 64 BEFORE CHRIST.
s |
|--------------------------------------------------------
o | | | |
f | | | |
| | | |
t | | | |
h | SEPTEMBER. | OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.
e | | | |
| | | |
J | | | |
u | | | |
l | YEAR OF ROME.
i | | | |
a | | | |
n | | | |
| | | |
M | | | |
o | | | |
n | | | |
t | 690 | 690 | 690 | 690-691
h | | | |
s | | | |
. | | | |
--+------------+--------------+-------------+-------------
1|XVI Kal.Oct.|XVII Kal. Nov.|XV Kal. Dec. |XIV Kal. Jan.
2|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
3|XIV |XV |XIII |XII
4|XIII |XIV |XII |XI
5|XII |XIII |XI |X
| | | |
6|XI |XII |X |IX
7|X |XI |IX |VIII
8|IX |X |VIII |VII
9|VIII |IX |VII |VI
10|VII |VIII |VI |V
| | | |
11|VI |VII |V |IV
12|V |VI |IV |III
13|IV |V |III |Pridie
14|III |IV |Pridie |-------------
| | |-------------| KAL. JAN.
15|Pridie |III | KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
|------------| | |
16| KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| |--------------| |
17|VI Nonas | KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
18|V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
19|IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
20|III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
| | | |
21|Pridie |Nonæ |VII |VI
22|Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
23|VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
24|VII |VI |IV |III
25|VI |V |III |Pridie
| | | |
26|V |IV |Pridie |Idus
27|IV |III | Idus |XVII Kal.Feb.
28|III |Pridie |XVII Kal.Jan.|XVI
29|Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
30| Idus |XVII Kal. Dec.|XV |XIV
| | | |
31| |XVI | |XIII
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
D|
a|
y|
s| JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.
|
o|
f|
|
t|----------------------------------------------------------------------
h| | | | | |
e| | | | | |
| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
J| | | | | |
u| | | | | |
l| | | | | |
i| | | | | |
a| | | | | |
n| YEAR OF ROME.
| | | | | |
M| | | | | |
o| | | | | |
n| | | | | |
t| | | | | |
h| | | | | |
s| 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691
.| | | | | |
--+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------
1|XII K. Feb.|IX K. Mar. |XII K.Apr. |X Kal. Maii|XI Kal. Ju.|IX K.Quin.
2|XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
3|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
4|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
5|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
| | | | | |
6|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
7|VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
8|V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |-----------
9|IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL QUIN.
| | | |-----------| |
10|III |VI Nonas |III |KAL.MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |-----------|
11|Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | |V
|-----------| |-----------| |KAL. JUN. |
12|KAL. FEB. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
13|IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
14|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
15|Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
| | | | | |
16| Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
17|VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VTII Idus |VII |VII
18|VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI
19|VI |V |VI |VI |V |V
20|V |IV |V |V |IV |IV
| | | | | |
21|IV |III |IV |IV |III |III
22|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
23|Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus
24| Idus |XVII K.AP. | Idus | Idus |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Sex.
25|XVI K. Mr. |XVI |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Jun.|XVI [Quin. |XVI
| | | [Maii | | |
26|XV |XV |XVI |XVI |XV |XV
27|XIV |XIV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV
28|XIII |XIII |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII
29|XII | |XIII |XIII |XII |XII
30|XI | |XII |XII |XI |XI
| | | | | |
31|X | |XI | |X |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
D|
a|
y|
s| JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.
|
o|
f|
|
t|-----------------------------------------------------------------------
h| | | | | |
e| | | | | |
| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
J| | | | | |
u| | | | | |
l| | | | | |
i| | | | | |
a| | | | | |
n| YEAR OF ROME.
| | | | | |
M| | | | | |
o| | | | | |
n| | | | | |
t| | | | | |
h| | | | | |
s| 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691
.| | | | | |
--+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------
1|XII K. Feb.|IX K. Mar. |XII K.Apr. |X Kal. Maii|XI Kal. Ju.|IX K.Quin.
2|XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
3|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
4|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
5|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
| | | | | |
6|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
7|VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
8|V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |-----------
9|IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL QUIN.
| | | |-----------| |
10|III |VI Nonas |III |KAL.MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |-----------|
11|Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | |V
|-----------| |-----------| |KAL. JUN. |
12|KAL. FEB. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
13|IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
14|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
15|Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
| | | | | |
16| Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
17|VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VTII Idus |VII |VII
18|VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI
19|VI |V |VI |VI |V |V
20|V |IV |V |V |IV |IV
| | | | | |
21|IV |III |IV |IV |III |III
22|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
23|Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus
24| Idus |XVII K.AP. | Idus | Idus |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Sex.
25|XVI K. Mr. |XVI |XVII Kal. |XVII K.Jun.|XVI [Quin. |XVI
| | | [Maii | | |
26|XV |XV |XVI |XVI |XV |XV
27|XIV |XIV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV
28|XIII |XIII |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII
29|XII | |XIII |XIII |XII |XII
30|XI | |XII |XII |XI |XI
| | | | | |
31|X | |XI | |X |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 63 BEFORE CHRIST.
|--------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER.| DECEMBER.
Days | | | | | |
of the| YEAR OF ROME
Julian| | | | | |
months.| 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691 | 691-692
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1|X Kal.Sex.|VIII K.Sep.|VI Kal.Oct.|VII K. Nov.|V Kal.Dec.|IV Kal.Jan.
2|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
3|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
4|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
5|VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
6|V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
7|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
8|III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
9|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
10|KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
11|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
12|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
13|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
14| Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
15|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
16|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
17|VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.
18|V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jn.|XVI
19|IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
20|III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dc. |XV |XIV
21|Pridie |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K.Nv. |XVI |XIV |XIII
22| Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
23|XVIIK.Sep.|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI
24|XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X
25|XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX
26|XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII
27|XIII |XI |XI |X |VIII |VII
28|XII |X |X |IX |VII |VI
29|XI |IX |IX |VIII |VI |V
30|X |VIII |VIII |VII |V |IV
31|IX |VII | |VI | |III
-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 62 BEFORE CHRIST.
|--------------------------------------------------------------------
| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
Days | | | | | |
of the | YEAR OF ROME.
Julian | | | | | |
months.| 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692
-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------
1 |Pr. K. Feb.|VI Id. int.|VII Id.Mar.| V Id. Apr.|VI Id.Maii.|IV Id.Jun.
2 |KAL. FEB. |V |VI |IV |V |III
3 |IV Nonas |IV |V |III |IV |Pridie
4 |III |III |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
5 |Pridie |Pridie |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Qu.
6 | Nonæ | Idus |Pridie |XVII K. M. | Idus |XVI
7 |VIII Idus |XV K. Mar. | Idus |XVI |XVII K. Ju.|XV
8 |VII |XIV |XVII K.Ap. |XV |XVI |XIV
9 |VI |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
10 |V |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
11 |IV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
12 |III |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
13 |Pridie |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
14 | Idus |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
15 |XI Kal.int.|VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
16 |X |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
17 |IX |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
18 |VIII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
19 |VII |III |VI |IV |V |III
20 |VI |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
21 |V |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.
22 |IV |VI Nonas |III |KAL MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
23 |III |V |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
24 |Pridie |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
25 |KAL. INT. |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
26 |IV Nonas |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
27 |III | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
28 |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
29 | Nonæ | |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
30 |VIII Idus | |VII |VII |VI |VI
31 |VII | |VI | |V |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
D|
a|
y|
s| JULIAN YEAR 62 BEFORE CHRIST.
|
o|
f|-----------------------------------------------------------------------
| | | | | |
t| | | | | |
h| | | | | |
e| | | | | |
| JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.
J| | | | | |
u| | | | | |
l| | | | | |
i| | | | | |
a| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
n| | | | | |
| | | | | |
M| | | | | |
o| | | | | |
n| | | | | |
t| | | | | |
h| | | | | |
s| 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692 | 692-693
.| | | | | |
--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|V Id. Quin.|III Id.Sex.|Idus Sept. |Pr.Id. Oct.|XVII K.Dec.|XVI K. Jan.
2|IV |Pridie |XVII K.Oct.| Idus |XVI |XV
3|III | Idus |XVI |XVII K. Nv.|XV |XIV
4|Pridie |XVII K.Sep.|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
5| Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
| | | | | |
6|XVII K.Sex.|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
7|XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
8|XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
9|XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
10|XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
| | | | | |
11|XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
12|XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
13|X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
14|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
15|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie.
| | | | | |-----------
16|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
17|VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |-----------| | |
18|V |III | KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |-----------| |
19|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |
20|III | KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
| | | | | |
21|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III |Nonæ |VIII Idus
|-----------| | | | |
22|KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
23|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
24|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
25|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
| | | | | |
26|Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
27|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
28|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
29|VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K. Fb.
30|V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan.|XVI
| | | | | |
31|IV |Pridie | | Idus | |XV
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
D|
a|
y|
s| JULIAN YEAR 61 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
o|
f|-----------------------------------------------------------------------
| | | | | |
t| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
h| | | | | |
e| | | | | |
| | | | | |
J| | | | | |
u| | | | | |
l| | | | | |
i| | | | | |
a| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
n| | | | | |
| | | | | |
M| | | | | |
o| | | | | |
n| | | | | |
t| | | | | |
h| | | | | |
s| 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693
.| | | | | |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1|XIV K.Feb. |XI K.Mar. |XIII K.Ap. |XI K.Maii |XII K.Jun. |X Kal.Qu.
2|XIII |X |XII |X |XI |IX
3|XII |IX |XI |IX |X |VIII
4|XI |VIII |X |VIII |IX |VII
5|X |VII |IX |VII |VIII |VI
| | | | | |
6|IX |VI |VIII |VI |VII |V
7|VIII |V |VII |V |VI |IV
8|VII |IV |VI |IV |V |III
9|VI |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
10|V |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III |---------
| | | | | |KAL.QUIN.
| |-----------| |-----------| |
11|IV |KAL. MAR. |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |-----------|
12|III |VI Nonas |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
| | |-----------| | |
13|Pridie |V |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
|-----------| | | | |
14|KAL.FEB. |IV |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
15|IV Nonas |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
| | | | | |
16|III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
17|Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
18| Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
19|VIII Idus |VII |VII |VII |VI |VI
20|VII |VI |VI |VI |V |V
| | | | | |
21|VI |V |V |V |IV |IV
22|V |IV |IV |Iv |III |III
23|IV |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
24|III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie |Idus |Idus
25|Pridie | Idus | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Qu. |XVII K.Sex.
| | | | | |
26| Idus |XVII K.Ap. |XVII K.M. |XVII K.Jn. |XVI |XVI
27|XVIK.Mr. |XVI |XVI |XVI |XV |XV
28|XV |XV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV
29|XIV |XIV |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII
30|XIII | |XIII |XIII |XII |XII
| | | | | |
31|XII | |XII | |XI |
-----+----------------------------------------------------------------
D t M| JULIAN YEAR 61 BEFORE CHRIST.
a h o|
y e n| JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
s t| | | | | |
J h| | | | | |
o u s| YEAR OF ROME.
f l | | | | | |
i | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693 | 693-694
a | | | | | |
n | | | | | |
-----+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------
1 |XI K.Sex |IX K.Sep. |VII K.Oct.|VIII K.Nv.|VI K.Dec. |V Kal. Jan
2 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
3 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
4 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
5 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | | |
6 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
7 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
8 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
9 |III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
10 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
| | | | | |
11 |KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
12 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
13 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
14 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
15 | Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
| | | | | |
16 |VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
17 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
18 |VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.
19 |V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan|XVI
20 |IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
| | | | | |
21 |III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec|XV |XIV
22 |Pridie |XVII K.Oct|XVII K.Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII
23 | Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
24 |XVII K.Sep|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI
25 |XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X
| | | | | |
26 |XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX
27 |XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII
28 |XIII |XI |XI |X |VIII |VII
29 |XII |X |X |IX |VII |VI
30 |XI |IX |IX |VIII |VI |V
| | | | | |
31 |X |XIII | |VII | |IV
-----+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
-----+-----------------------------------------------------------------------
D t M| JULIAN YEAR 60 BEFORE CHRIST.
a h o|-----------------------------------------------------------------------
y e n| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
s t| | | | | |
J h|
o u s| YEAR OF ROME.
f l .|
i | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694
a | | | | | |
n | | | | | |
-----+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+-----------+----------
1 |III K. Feb. |VII Id. int.|Nonæ Mart. |VIII d. Ap.|VIII Id. Ma.|VI Id. Jun.
2 |Pridie |VI |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
|------------| | | | |
3 |KAL. FEB. |V |VII |V |VI |IV
4 |IV Nonas |IV |VI |IV |V |III
5 |III |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
| | | | | |
6 |Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
7 | Nonæ | Idus |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K. Qu.
8 |VIII Idus |XVI K. Mar. |Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI
9 |VII |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K. Ju. |XV
10 |VI |XIV |XVII K. Ap.|XV |XVI |XIV
| | | | | |
11 |V |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
12 |IV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
13 |III |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
14 |Pridie |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
15 | Idus |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
| | | | | |
16 |XI Kal. int.|VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
17 |X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
18 |IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
19 |VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
20 |VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
| | | | | |
21 |VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
22 |V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |------------| | | |----------
23 |IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.
| | | |-----------| |
24 |III |VI Nonas |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |------------|
25 |Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
| | | | | |
|------------| |-----------| | |
26 |KAL. INT. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
27 |IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
28 |III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
29 |Pridie | |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
30 | Nonæ | | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
| | | | | |
31 |VIII Idus | |VIII Idus | |VII |
-----+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+------------+----------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 60 BEFORE CHRIST.
|------------------------------------------------------------------------
Days | JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER. | OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| YEAR OF ROME.
Months| | | | | |
| 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694 | 694--695
------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1|VII Id. Qu.|V Id. Sext.|III Id. Sep.|IV Id. Oct. |Pr. Id. Nov.|Idus Dec.
2|VI |IV |Pridie |III |Idus |XVII K. Jn.
3|V |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Dc. |XVI
4|IV |Pridie |XVII K. Oct | Idus |XVI |XV
5|III | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Nv. |XV |XIV
6|Pridie |XVII K.Sep.|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
7| Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
8|XVII K.Sex.|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
9|XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
10|XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
11|XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
12|XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
13|XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
14|XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
15|X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
16|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
17|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |-----------
18|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | |------------|
19|VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |------------| | |
20|V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |------------| |
21|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |
22|III |KAL SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
23|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|-----------| | | | |
24|KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
25|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
26|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
27|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
28| Nonae |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
29|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
30|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
31|VI |IV | |III | |XVII K.Fb.
------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 59 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695
------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|XVI K. Feb.|XIII K. Mr.|XVI K. Ap. |XIV K. Maii|XV K. Jun. |XIII K. Qn.
2|XV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
3|XIV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
4|XIII |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
5|XII |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
| | | | | |
6|XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
7|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
8|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
9|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
10|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
| | | | | |
11|VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
12|V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |-----------
13|IV | KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III | KAL QUIN.
| | | |-----------| |
14|III |VI Nonas |III | KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |-----------|
15|Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | KAL.JUN. |V
|-----------| |-----------| | |
16| KAL. FEB. |IV | KAL APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
17|IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
18|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
19|Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |Nonæ
20| Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
| | | | | |
21|VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
22|VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI
23|VI |V |VI |VI |V |V
24|V |IV |V |V |IV |IV
25|IV |III |IV |IV |III |III
| | | | | |
26|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
27|Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus
28| Idus |XVII K. Ap.| Idus | Idus |XVII K. Qu.|XVII K.SEX.
29|XVI K. Mr. | |XVII K.M. |XVII K. Ju.|XVI |XVI
30|XV | |XVI |XVI |XV |XV
| | | | | |
31|XIV | |XV | |XIV |
------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX A.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 59 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------------------------------------------------------------------
Days | JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| YEAR OF ROME.
Months| | | | | |
| 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695--696
------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|XIV K. Sex.|XII K. Sep.|X Kal. Oct.|XI K. Nov. |IX K. Dec. |VIIl K.Jan.
2|XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
3|XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
4|XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
5|X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
| | | | | |
6|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
7|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |-----------
8|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie | KAL. JAN.
| | | | |-----------|
9|VI |IV |Pridie |III | KAL.DEC. |IV Nonas
10|V |III | KAL OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |-----------| |
11|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas | KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |
12|III | KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
13|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|-----------| | | | |
14| KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
15|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
| | | | | |
16|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
17|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
18| Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
19|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
20|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
| | | | | |
21|VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K. Fb.
22|V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan.|XVI
23|IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
24|III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec.|XV |XIV
25|Pridie |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K. Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII
| | | | | |
26| Idas |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
27|XVII K.Sep.|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI
28|XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X
29|XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX
30|XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII
| | | | | |
31|XIII |XI | |X | |VII
------+----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 58 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 696 | 696 | 696 | 696 | 696 | 696
| | | | | |
------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|VI K. Feb. |Pr.Non.int.|III Non.Mr.| Nonæ Ap. |Pr.Non.Ma. |VIII Id Ju.
2|V | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus |Nonæ |VII
3|IV |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI
4|III |VII |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
5|Pridie |VI |VII |V |VI |IV
|-----------| | | | |
6|KAL. FEB. |V |VI |IV |V |III
7|IV Nonas |IV |V |III |IV |Pridie
8|III |III |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
9|Pridie |Pridie |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Qu.
10| Nonæ | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI
| | | | | |
11|VIII Idus |XV K. Man | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju. |XV
12|VII |XIV |XVII K.Ap. |XV |XVI |XIV
13|VI |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
14|V |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
15|IV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
| | | | | |
16|III |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
17|Pridie |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
18| Idus |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
19|XI Kal.int.|VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
20|X |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
| | | | | |
21|IX |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
22|VIII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
23|VII |III |VI |IV |V |III
24|VI |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |-----------
25|V |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.
| | | |-----------| |
26|IV |VI Nonas |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |-----------|
27|III |V |Pridie |VI Nonas | KAL. JUN. |V
| | |-----------| | |
28|Pridie |IV | KAL.APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
|-----------| | | | |
29| KAL. INT. | |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
30|IV Nonas | |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
| | | | | |
31|III | |Pridie | | Nonæ |
------+-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 58 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 696 | 696 | 696 | 696 | 696 | 696-697
| | | | | |
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |Nonæ Qu. |VII Id.Sex|V Id.Sept.|VI Id.Oct.|IV Id.Nov.|III Id.Dec.
2 |VIII Idus |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
3 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie | Idus
4 |VI |IV |Pridie |III | Idus |XVII K.Jn.
5 |V |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Dc.|XVI
| | | | | |
6 |IV |Pridie |XVII K.Oct| Idus |XVI |XV
7 |III | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Nv.|XV |XIV
8 |Pridie |XVII K.Sep|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
9 | Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
10 |XVII K.Sex|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
| | | | | |
11 |XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
12 |XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
13 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |XIII
14 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
15 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
| | | | | |
16 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
17 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
18 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
19 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
20 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | | |
21 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
22 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
23 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
24 |III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
25 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
| | | | | |
26 |KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
27 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
28 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
29 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
30 | Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
| | | | | |
31 |VIII Idus |VI | |V | |Pridie
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 57 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY.| MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 697 | 697 | 697 | 697 | 697 | 697
|
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |Idus Jan. |XV K.Mar. |XVII K.Ap.|XV K.Maii |XVI K.Jun.|XIV K.Qu.
2 |XVII K.Fb.|XIV |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
3 |XVI |XIII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
4 |XV |XII |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
5 |XIV |XI |XIII |XI |XII |X
| | | | | |
6 |XIII |X |XII |X |XI |IX
7 |XII |IX |XI |IX |X |VIII
8 |XI |VIII |X |VIII |IX |VII
9 |X |VII |IX |VII |VIII |VI
10 |IX |VI |VIII |VI |VII |V
| | | | | |
11 |VIII |V |VII |V |VI |IV
12 |VII |IV |VI |IV |V |III
13 |VI |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
| | | | | |----------
14 |V |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.
| |----------| |----------| |
15 |IV |KAL. MAR. |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |__________|
16 |III |VI Nonas |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
| | |----------| | |
17 |Pridie |V |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
|__________| | | | |
18 |KAL. FEB. |IV |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
19 |IV Nonas |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
20 |III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
| | | | | |
21 |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
22 | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
23 |VIII Idus |VII |VII |VII |VI |VI
24 |VII |VI |VI |VI |V |V
25 |VI |V |V |V |IV |IV
| | | | | |
26 |V |IV |IV |IV |III |III
27 |IV |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
28 |III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus
29 |Pridie | Idus | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Qu.|XVII K.Sex.
30 | Idus | |XVII K.M. |XVII K.Jn.|XVI |XVI
| | | | | |
31 |XVI K.Mr. | |XVI | |XV |
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 57 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 697 | 697 | 697 | 697 | 697 | 697-698
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |XV K.Sex. |XIII K.Sep|XI Kal.Oct|XII K.Nov.|X Kal.Dec.|IX Kal.Jan.
2 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |XIII
3 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
4 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
5 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
| | | | | |
6 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
7 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
8 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |---------
9 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | |----------|
10 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |__________| | |
11 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |----------| |
12 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |__________| | | |
13 |III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
14 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |III Idus
|__________| | | | |
15 |KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
| | | | | |
16 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
17 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
18 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
19 | Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
20 |VIII |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |
21 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
22 |VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K. Fb.
23 |V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan|XVI
24 |IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
25 |III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec|XV |XIV
| | | | | |
26 |Pridie |XVII K.Oct|XVII K.Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII
27 | Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
28 |XVII K.Sep|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI
29 |XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X
30 |XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX
| | | | | |
31 |XIV |XII | |XI | |XIII
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 56 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. |FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 698 | 698 | 698 | 698 | 698 | 698
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |VII K.Feb.|IIINon.int|V Non.Mr. |III Non.Ap|IV Non.Ma.|Pr.Non.Ju.
2 |VI |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III | Nonæ
3 |V | Nonæ |III | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus
4 |IV |VIII Idus |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII
5 |III |VII | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI
| | | | | |
6 |Pridie |VI |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
|__________| | | | |
7 |KAL. FEB. |V |VII |V |VI |IV
8 |IV Nonas |IV |VI |IV |V |III
9 |III |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
10 |Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III |Idus
| | | | | |
11 | Nonæ | Idus |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Qu.
12 |VIII Idus |XVI K.Mar.|Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI
13 |VII |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju.|XV
14 |VI |XIV |XVII K.Ap.|XV |XVI |XIV
15 |V |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
| | | | | |
16 |IV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
17 |III |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
18 |Pridie |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
19 | Idus |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
20 |XI Kal.int.|VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
| | | | | |
21 |X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
22 |IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
23 |VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
24 |VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
25 |VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
| | | | | |
26 |V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |__________| | | |_________
27 |IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL.QUIN.
| | | |__________| |
28 |III |VI Nonas |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |__________|
29 |Pridie | |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
|__________| |__________| | |
30 |KAL. INT. | |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
| | | | | |
31 |IV Nonas | |IV Nonas | |III |
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 56 BEFORE CHRIST.
|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 698 | 698 | 698 | 698 | 698 | 698-699
------|------------+------------+------------+-------------+-----------+----------
1 |III Non. Qu.|Nonæ Sext. |VII Id. Sep.|VIII Id. Oct.|VI Id. Nov.|V Idus Dec.
2 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V |IV
3 | Nonæ |VII |V |VI |IV |III
4 |VIII Idus |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
5 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie | Idus
| | | | | |
6 |VI |IV |Pridie |III | Idus |XVII K. Jn.
7 |V |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K. De.|XVI
8 |IV |Pridie |XVII K. Oct.| Idus |XVI |XV
9 |III | Idus |XVI |XVII K. Nv. |XV |XIV
10 |Pridie |XVII K. Sep.|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
| | | | | |
11 | Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
12 |XVII K. Sex.|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
13 |XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
14 |XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
15 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
| | | | | |
16 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
17 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
18 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
19 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
20 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
| | | | | |
21 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |---------
22 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | |-----------|
23 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |------------| | |
24 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |-------------| |
25 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| | | | | |
| |------------| | | |
26 |III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
27 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|------------| | | | |
28 |KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
29 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
30 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
| | | | | |
31 |Pridie |VIII Idus | |VII | |IV
------+------------+------------+------------+-------------+-----------+----------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 55 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. |FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 699 | 699 | 699 | 699 | 699 | 699
| | | | | |
------|-----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |III Id.Jan | Idus Feb|III Id.Mar| Idus Apr|Pr.Id.Ma. |XVII K.Qu.
2 |Pridie |XVI K. Mr.|Pridie |XVII K.Mr.| Idus |XVI
3 | Idus |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju.|XV
4 |XVII K.Fb. |XIV |XVII K.Ap.|XV |XVI |XIV
5 |XVI |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
| | | | | |
6 |XV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
7 |XIV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
8 |XIII |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
9 |XII |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
10 |XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
| | | | | |
11 |X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
12 |IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
13 |VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
14 |VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
15 |VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
| | | | | |
16 |V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |__________| | | |_________
17 |IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL.QUIN.
| | | |__________| |
18 |III |VI Nonas |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |__________|
19 |Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
|___________| |__________| | |
20 |KAL. FEB. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
| | | | | |
21 |IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
22 |III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
23 |Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
24 | Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
25 |VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
| | | | | |
26 |VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI
27 |VI |V |VI |VI |V |V
28 |V |IV |V |V |IV |IV
29 |IV | |IV |IV |III |III
30 |III | |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
| | | | | |
31 |Pridie | |Pridie | | Idus |
------+-----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 55 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 699 | 699 | 699 | 699 | 699 | 699-700
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 | Idus Qu.|XVI K.Sep.|XIV K.Oct.|XV K.Nov. |XIII K.Dec|XII K. Jan.
2 |XVII K.Sex|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
3 |XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
4 |XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
5 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
| | | | | |
6 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
7 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
8 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
9 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
10 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
| | | | | |
11 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |--------
12 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | |__________|
13 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |__________| | |
14 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |__________| |
15 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |__________| | | |
16 |III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
17 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|__________| | | | |
18 |KAL. SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
19 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
20 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VII Idus |VI |V
| | | | | |
21 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
22 | Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
23 |VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
24 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
25 |VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.
| | | | | |
26 |V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan|XVI
27 |IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
28 |III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec|XV |XIV
29 |Pridie |XVII K.Oct|XVII K.Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII
30 | Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
| | | | | |
31 |XVII K.Sep|XV | |XIV | |XI
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+---------
-------+------------+-------------+-----------+-----------+----------+---------
| JULIAN YEAR 62 BEFORE CHRIST.
|------------+-------------+-----------+-----------+----------+---------
| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
Days | | | | | |
of the | YEAR OF ROME.
Julian | | | | | |
months.| 700 | 700 | 700 | 700 | 700 | 700
-------+------------+-------------+-----------+-----------+----------+---------
1 |X Kal. Feb. |Pr. Kal. int.| KAL. MAR. | KAL. APR. |VI Non.Ma.|IV Non. Ju.
| |-------------| | | |
2 |IX | KAL. INT. |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |V |III
3 |VIII |IV Nonas |V |III |IV |Pridie
4 |VII |III |IV |Pridie |III | Nonæ
5 |VI |Pridie |III | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus
| | | | | |
6 |V | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII
7 |IV |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI
8 |III |VII |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
9 |Pridie |VI |VII |V |VI |IV
|------------| | | | |
10 | KAL. FEB. |V |VI |IV |V |III
| | | | | |
11 |IV Nonas |IV |V |III |IV |Pridie
12 |III |III |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
13 |Pridie |Pridie |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K. Qu.
14 | Nonæ | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI
15 |VIII Idus |XV K. Mar. | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju.|XV
| | | | | |
16 |VII |XIV |XVII K. Ap.|XV |XVI |XIV
17 |VI |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
18 |V |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
19 |IV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
20 |III |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
| | | | | |
21 |Pridie |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
22 | Idus |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
23 |XI Kal. int.|VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
24 |X |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
25 |IX |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
| | | | | |
26 |VIII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
27 |VII |III |VI |IV |V |III
28 |VI |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| | | | | |-------
29 |V | |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.
| | | |-----------| |
30 |IV | |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |----------|
31 |III | |Pridie | |KAL. JUN. |
-------+------------+-------------+-----------+-----------+----------+---------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 54 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 700 | 700 | 700 | 700 | 700 | 700-701
------|----------+-----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------
1 |V Non. Qu.|III Non.Sex|Nonæ Sept.|Pr.Non.Oct|VIII Id.No|VII Id.Dec.
2 |IV |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII |VI
3 |III | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI |V
4 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V |IV
5 | Nonæ |VII |V |VI |IV |III
| | | | | |
6 |VIII Idus |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
7 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie | Idus
8 |VI |IV |Pridie |III | Idus |XVII K.Jn.
9 |V |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Dc.|XVI
10 |IV |Pridie |XVII K.Oct| Idus |XVI |XV
| | | | | |
11 |III | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Nv.|XV |XIV
12 |Pridie |XVII K.Sep.|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
13 | Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
14 |XVIIK.Sex.|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
15 |XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
| | | | | |
16 |XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
17 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
18 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
19 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
20 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
| | | | | |
21 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
22 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
23 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |__________
24 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL.JAN.
| | | | |__________|
25 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL.DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |__________| | |
26 |V |III |KAL.OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |__________| |
27 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL.NOV. |III |Pridie
| |___________| | | |
28 |III |KAL.SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
29 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|__________| | | | |
30 |KAL.SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
| | | | | |
31 |IV Nonas |Pridie | | Nonæ | |VI
------|----------+-----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 53 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY.| MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 701 | 701 | 701 | 701 | 701 | 701
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------+----------
1 |V Idus Jan|III Id.Feb|IV Id.Mar.|Pr.Id.Apr.|III Id.Maii| Idus Jun.
2 |IV |Pridie |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K. Qu.
3 |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI
4 |Pridie |XVI K.Mr. | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju. |XV
5 | Idus |XV |XVII K.Ap.|XV |XVI |XIV
| | | | | |
6 |XVII K.Fb.|XIV |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
7 |XVI |XIII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
8 |XV |XII |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
9 |XIV |XI |XIII |XI |XII |X
10 |XIII |X |XII |X |XI |IX
| | | | | |
11 |XII |IX |XI |IX |X |VIII
12 |XI |VIII |X |VIII |IX |VII
13 |X |VII |IX |VII |VIII |VI
14 |IX |VI |VIII |VI |VII |V
15 |VIII |V |VII |V |VI |IV
| | | | | |
16 |VII |IV |VI |IV |V |III
17 |VI |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
| | | | | |__________
18 |V |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.
| |__________| |__________| |
19 |IV |KAL. MAR. |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |___________|
20 |III |VI Nonas |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
| | |__________| | |
21 |Pridie |V |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
|__________| | | | |
22 |KAL. FEB. |IV |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
23 |IV Nonas |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
24 |III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
25 |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
| | | | | |
26 | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
27 |VIII Idus |VII |VII |VII |VI |VI
28 |VII |VI |VI |VI |V |V
29 |VI |V |V |V |IV |IV
30 |V | |IV |IV |III |III
| | | | | |
31 |IV | |III | |Pridie |
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------+----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 53 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JULY. | AUGUST. |SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. |NOVEMBER. |DECEMBER.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 701 | 701 | 701 | 701 | 701 | 701-702
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------
1 |Pr.Id.Quin|XVII K.Sep|XV K. Oct.|XVI K.Nov.|XIV K.Dec.|XIII K.Jan.
2 | Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
3 |XVII K.Sex|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
4 |XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
5 |XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
| | | | | |
6 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
7 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
8 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
9 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
10 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
| | | | | |
11 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
12 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |___________
13 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL.JAN.
| | | | |__________|
14 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL.DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |__________| | |
15 |V |III |KAL.OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |__________| |
16 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |__________| | | |
17 |III |KAL.SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
18 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonaæ |VIII Idus
|__________| | | | |
19 |KAL.SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
20 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonaæ |VII |VI
| | | | | |
21 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
22 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
23 | Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
24 |VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
25 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
| | | | | |
26 |VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.
27 |V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan|XVI
28 |IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
29 |III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec|XV |XIV
30 |Pridie |XVII K.Oct|XVII K.Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII
| | | | | |
31 | Idus |XVI | |XV | |XII
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 52 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 702 | 702 | 702 | 702 | 702 | 702
------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|XI K. Feb. |IIIKal.int.|III K. Mar.|III K. Apr.|Pr. K. Maii|Pr. K. Jun.
| | | | |-----------|-----------
2|X |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | KAL.MAII | KAL.JUN.
| |-----------|-----------|-----------| |
3|IX | KAL. INT. | KAL. MAR. | KAL. APR. |VI Nonas |IV Nonas
4|VII |IV Nonas |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |V |III
5|VII |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
| | | | | |
6|VI |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III | Nonæ
7|V | Nonæ |III | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus
8|IV |VIII Idus |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII
9|III |VII | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI
10|Pridie |VI |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
|___________| | | | |
11|KAL. FEB. |V |VII |V |VI |IV
12|IV Nonas |IV |VI |IV |V |III
13|III |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
14|Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
15| Nonæ | Idus |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Qu.
| | | | | |
16|VIII Idus |XVI K. Mar.|Pridie |XVII K.M. | Idus |XVI
17|VII |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju. |XV
18|VI |XIV |XVII K.Ap. |XV |XVI |XIV
19|V |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
20|IV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
| | | | | |
21|III |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
22|Pridie |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
23| Idus |X |XII |X |XI |IX
24|XI Kal int.|VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
25|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
| | | | | |
26|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
27|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
28|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
29|VI | |VI |IV |V |III
30|V | |V |III |IV |Pridie
| | | | | |
31|IV | |IV | |III |
------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 52 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 702 | 702 | 702 | 702 | 702 | 702-703
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------
1 |KAL. QUIN.|KAL. SEX. |III Non.Sep|IV Non.Oct|Pr.Non.Nv.| Nonæ Dec.
2 |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |Pridie |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
3 |V |III | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
4 |IV |Pridie |VII Idus | Nonæ |VII |VI
5 |III | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI |V
| | | | | |
6 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V |IV
7 | Nonæ |VII |V |VI |IV |III
8 |VIII Idus |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
9 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie | Idus
10 |VI |IV |Pridie |III | Idus |XVII K.Jn.
| | | | | |
11 |V |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.De.|XVI
12 |IV |Pridie |XVII K.Oct| Idus |XVI |XV
13 |III | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Nv.|XV |XIV
14 |Pridie |XVII K.Sep|XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
15 | Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
| | | | | |
16 |XVII K.Sex|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
17 |XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
18 |XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
19 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
20 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
| | | | | |
21 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
22 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
23 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
24 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
25 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |_________
26 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | |__________|
27 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |__________| | |
28 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |__________| |
29 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |__________| | | |
30 |III |KAL. SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
| | | | | |
31 |Pridie |IV Nonas | |III | |VIII Idus
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 51 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. |FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 703 | 703 | 703 | 703 | 703 | 703
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |VII Id.Jan|V Id. Feb.|VII Id.Mar|V Idus Apr|VI Id.Maii|IV Id.Jun.
2 |VI |IV |VI |IV |V |III
3 |V |III |V |III |IV |Pridie
4 |IV |Pridie |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
5 |III | Idus |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Qu.
| | | | | |
6 |Pridie |XVI K.Mr. |Pridie |XVII K.Mr.| Idus |XVI
7 | Idus |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Ju.|XV
8 |XVII K.Fb.|XIV |XVII K.Ap.|XV |XVI |XIV
9 |XVI |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
10 |XV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
| | | | | |
11 |XIV |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
12 |XIII |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
13 |XII |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
14 |XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
15 |X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
| | | | | |
16 |IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
17 |VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
18 |VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
19 |VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
20 |V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |__________| | | |__________
21 |IV |KAL. MAR. |IV |Pridie |III |KAL. QUIN.
| | | |__________| |
22 |III |VI Nonas |III |KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |__________|
23 |Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
|__________| |__________| | |
24 |KAL. FEB. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
25 |IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
| | | | | |
26 |III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
27 |Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
28 | Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
29 |VIII Idus | |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
30 |VII | |VII |VII |VI |VI
| | | | | |
31 |VI | |VI | |V |
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 51 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 703 | 703 | 703 | 703 | 703 | 703--704
------|-----------+------------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------
1 |V Id. Quin.|III Id. Sex.|Idus Sept. |Pr.Id.Oct.|XVII K.DEC.|XVI K. Jan.
2 |IV |Pridie |XVII K.Oct.|Idus |XVI |XV
3 |III |Idus |XVI |XVII K.Nv.|XV |XIV
4 |Pridie |XVII K.Sep. |XV |XVI |XIV |XIII
5 |Idus |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII |XII
| | | | | |
6 |XVII K.Sex.|XV |XIII |XIV |XII |XI
7 |XVI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI |X
8 |XV |XIII |XI |XII |X |IX
9 |XIV |XII |X |XI |IX |VIII
10 |XIII |XI |IX |X |VIII |VII
| | | | | |
11 |XII |X |VIII |IX |VII |VI
12 |XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
13 |X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
14 |IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
15 |VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |________
16 |VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL.JAN.
| | | | |___________|
17 |VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL.DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |___________| | |
18 |V |III |KAL. OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |__________| |
19 |IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie
| |____________| | | |
20 |III |KAL.SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie |Nonæ
| | | | | |
21 |Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III |Nonæ |VIII Idus
|___________| | | | |
22 |KAL.SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
23 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie |Nonæ |VII |VI
24 |III |Nonæ |Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
25 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
| | | | | |
26 |Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
27 |VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
28 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie |Idus
29 |VI |IV |IV |III |Idus |XVII K.Fb.
30 |V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan.|XVI
| | | | | |
31 |IV |Pridie | |Idus | |XV
------|-----------+------------+-----------+----------+-----------+----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 50 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704
| | | | | |
------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|XIV K. Feb.|XI K. Mar.|XIV K. Apr.|XII K. Maii|XIII K. Ju.|XI K. Quin.
2|XIII |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
3|XII |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
4|XI |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
5|X |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
| | | | | |
6|IX |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
7|VIII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
8|VII |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
9|VI |III |VI |IV |V |III
10|V |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |-----------
11|IV | KAL. MAR |IV |Pridie |III |KAL.QUIN.
| | | |-----------| |
12|III |VI Nonas |III | KAL. MAII |Pridie |VI Nonas
| | | | |-----------|
13|Pridie |V |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL.JUN. |V
|-----------| |-----------| | |
14|KAl. FEB. |IV |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
15|IV Nonas |III |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
| | | | | |
16|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
17|Pridie | Nonæ |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |Nonæ
18| Nonæ |VIII Idus | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
19|VIII Idus |VII |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
20|VII |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI
| | | | | |
21|VI |V |VI |VI |V |V
22|V |IV |V |V |IV |IV
23|IV |III |IV |IV |III |III
24|III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
25|Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus
| | | | | |
26| Idus |XVII K.Ap. | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Qu. |XVII K.Sex.
27|XVI K. Mr. |XVI |XVII K.Mr. |XVII K. Ju.|XVI |XVI
28|XV |XV |XVI |XVI |XV |XV
29|XIV | |XV |XV |XIV |XIV
30|XIII | |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII
| | | | | |
31|XII | |XIII |XII | |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 50 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704 | 704--705
------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|XII K.Sext.|X Kal.Sept.|VIII K.Oct.|IX K. Nov. |VII K. Dec.|VI K. Jan.
2|XI |IX |VII |VIII |VI |V
3|X |VIII |VI |VII |V |IV
4|IX |VII |V |VI |IV |III
5|VIII |VI |IV |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |-----------
6|VII |V |III |IV |Pridie |KAL. JAN.
| | | | |-----------|
7|VI |IV |Pridie |III |KAL.DEC. |IV Nonas
| | |-----------| | |
8|V |III |KAL OCT. |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |-----------| |
9|IV |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL NOV. |III |Pridie
| |-----------| | | |
10|III |KAL SEP. |V |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
| | | | | |
11|Pridie |IV Nonas |IV |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|-----------| | | | |
12|KAL SEX. |III |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
13|IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
14|III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
15|Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
| | | | | |
16| Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
17|VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
18|VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
19|VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.
20|V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan.|XVI
| | | | | |
21|IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
22|III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec.|XV |XIV
23|Pridie |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K.Nv. |XVI |XIV |XIII
24| Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
25|XVII K.Sep.|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI
| | | | | |
26|XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X
27|XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX
28|XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII
29|XIII |XI |XI |X |VIII |VII
30|XII |X |X |IX |VII |VI
| | | | | |
31|XI |IX | |VIII | |V
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 49 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY.| MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 705 | 705 | 705 | 705 | 705 | 705
------|----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |IV K. Feb.|KAL. MAR. |III Kal.Ap|KAL. MAII |Pr.Kal.Jun|VI N.Quin.
| | | | |__________|
2 |III |VI Nonas |Pridie |VI Nonas |KAL. JUN. |V
| | |__________| | |
3 |Pridie |V |KAL. APR. |V |IV Nonas |IV
|__________| | | | |
4 |KAL. FEB. |IV |IV Nonas |IV |III |III
5 |IV Nonas |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
| | | | | |
6 |III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ
7 |Pridie | Nonæ | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
8 | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |VII
9 |VIII Idus |VII |VII |VII |VI |VI
10 |VII |VI |VI |VI |V |V
| | | | | |
11 |VI |V |V |V |IV |IV
12 |V |IV |IV |IV |III |III
13 |IV |III |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
14 |III |Pridie |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus
15 |Pridie | Idus | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Qu.|XVII K.Sex.
| | | | | |
16 | Idus |XVII K.Ap.|XVII K.M. |XVII K.Ju.|XVI |XVI
17 |XVI K.Mr. |XVI |XVI |XVI |XV |XV
18 |XV |XV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV
19 |XIV |XIV |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII
20 |XIII |XIII |XIII |XIII |XII |XII
| | | | | |
21 |XII |XII |XII |XII |XI |XI
22 |XI |XI |XI |XI |X |X
23 |X |X |X |X |IX |IX
24 |IX |IX |IX |IX |VIII |VIII
25 |VIII |VIII |VIII |VIII |VII |VII
| | | | | |
26 |VII |VII |VII |VII |VI |VI
27 |VI |VI |VI |VI |V |V
28 |V |V |V |V |IV |IV
29 |IV |IV |IV |IV |III |III
30 |III | |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
| | | | |__________|
31 |Pridie | |Pridie | |KAL. QUIN.|
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 49 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JULY. | AUGUST. |SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. |NOVEMBER. |DECEMBER.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 705 | 705 | 705 | 705 | 705-706 | 706
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+-----------
1 |KAL. SEX. |III N.Sep.|III N.Oct.|Pr. N.Nov.|VIII Id.Dec|VII Id.Jan.
2 |IV Nonas |Pridie |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
3 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
4 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
5 | Nonæ |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
| | | | | |
6 |VIII Idus |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
7 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
8 |VI |IV |IV |III | Idus |XVII K.Fb.
9 |V |III |III |Pridie |XVII K.Jan|XVI
10 |IV |Pridie |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XV
| | | | | |
11 |III | Idus | Idus |XVII K.Dec|XV |XIV
12 |Pridie |XVII K.Oct|XVII K.Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII
13 | Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
14 |XVII K.Sep|XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI
15 |XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X
| | | | | |
16 |XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX
17 |XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII
18 |XIII |XI |XI |X |VIII |VII
19 |XII |X |X |IX |VII |VI
20 |XI |IX |IX |VIII |VI |V
| | | | | |
21 |X |VIII |VIII |VII |V |IV
22 |IX |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
23 |VIII |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |________
24 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie |KAL. FEB.
| | | | |__________|
25 |VI |IV |IV |III |KAL. JAN. |IV Nonas
| | | | | |
26 |V |III |III |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |__________| |
27 |IV |Pridie |Pridie |KAL. DEC. |III |Pridie
| |__________|__________| | |
28 |III |KAL. OCT. |KAL. NOV. |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
29 |Pridie |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|__________| | | | |
30 |KAL. SEP. |V |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
| | | | | |
31 |IV Nonas |IV | | Nonæ | |VI
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 48 BEFORE CHRIST.
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. |FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 706 | 706 | 706 | 706 | 706 | 706
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
1 |V Idus Feb|IV Id.Mar.|V Idus Apr|V Id. Maii|IV Id.Jun.|IV Id.Quin.
2 |IV |III |IV |IV |III |III
3 |III |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
4 |Pridie | Idus |Pridie |Pridie | Idus | Idus
5 | Idus |XVII K.Ap.| Idus | Idus |XVII K.Qu.|XVII K.Sex.
| | | | | |
6 |XVI K.Mr. |XVI |XVII K.Mr.|XVII K.Ju.|XVI |XVI
7 |XV |XV |XVI |XVI |XV |XV
8 |XIV |XIV |XV |XV |XIV |XIV
9 |XIII |XIII |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIII
10 |XII |XII |XIII |XIII |XII |XII
| | | | | |
11 |XI |XI |XII |XII |XI |XI
12 |X |X |XI |XI |X |X
13 |IX |IX |X |X |IX |IX
14 |VIII |VIII |IX |IX |VIII |VIII
15 |VII |VII |VIII |VIII |VII |VII
| | | | | |
16 |VI |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI
17 |V |V |VI |VI |V |V
18 |IV |IV |V |V |IV |IV
19 |III |III |IV |IV |III |III
20 |Pridie |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
|__________|__________| | |__________|_________
21 |KAL. MAR. |KAL. APR. |Pridie |Pridie |KAL. QUIN.|KAL. SEX.
| | |__________|__________| |
22 |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |KAL. MAII |KAL. JUN. |VI Nonas |IV Nonas
23 |V |III |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |V |III
24 |IV |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
25 |III | Nonæ |IV |Pridie |III | Nonæ
| | | | | |
26 |Pridie |VIII Idus |III | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus
27 | Nonæ |VII |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII
28 |VIII Idus |VI | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI
29 |VII | |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
30 |VI | |VII |V |VI |IV
| | | | | |
31 |V | |VI | |V |
------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+----------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 48 BEFORE CHRIST.
|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JULY | AUGUST |SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 706 | 706 | 706 | 706 | 706-707 | 707
------+------------+-----------+----------+-----------+-----------+----------
1 |III Id. Sex.| Idus Sept.| Idus Oct.|XVII K.Dec.|XV K. Jan. |XIV K. Feb.
2 |Pridie |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K.Nv.|XVI |XIV |XIII
3 | Idus |XVI |XVI |XV |XIII |XII
4 |XVII K.Sep. |XV |XV |XIV |XII |XI
5 |XVI |XIV |XIV |XIII |XI |X
| | | | | |
6 |XV |XIII |XIII |XII |X |IX
7 |XIV |XII |XII |XI |IX |VIII
8 |XIII |XI |XI |X |VIII |VII
9 |XII |X |X |IX |VII |VI
10 |XI |IX |IX |VIII |VI |V
| | | | | |
11 |X |VIII |VIII |VII |V |IV
12 |IX |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
13 |VIII |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |________
14 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie |KAL. FEB.
| | | | |___________|
15 |VI |IV |IV |III |KAL. JAN. |IV Nonas
| | | | | |
16 |V |III |III |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |___________| |
17 |IV |Pridie |Pridie |KAL. DEC. |III |Pridie
| |___________|__________| | |
18 |III |KAL. OCT. |KAL. NOV. |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
19 |Pridie |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|____________| | | | |
20 |KAL. SEP. |V |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
| | | | | |
21 |IV Nonas |IV |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
22 |III |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
23 |Pridie |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
24 | Nonæ | Nonæ |VII |VI |IV |III
25 |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VI |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |
26 |VII |VII |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
27 |VI |VI |IV |III | Idus |XVI K.Mr.
28 |V |V |III |Pridie |XVII K.Fb. |XV
29 |IV |IV |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XIV
30 |III |III | Idus |XVII K.Jan.|XV |XIII
| | | | | |
31 |Pridie |Pridie | |XVI | |XII
------+------------+-----------+----------+-----------+-----------+----------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 47 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 707 | 707 | 707 | 707 | 707 | 707
------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|XI K. Mar. |XI Kal Ap. |XII K. Ma. |XII K. Jun.|XI K. Quin.|XI Kal.Sex.
2|X |X |XI |XI |X |X
3|IX |IX |X |X |IX |IX
4|VIII |VIII |IX |IX |VIII |VIII
5|VII |VII |VIII |VIII |VII |VII
| | | | | |
6|VI |VI |VII |VII |VI |VI
7|V |V |VI |VI |V |V
8|IV |IV |V |V |IV |IV
9|III |III |IV |IV |III |III
10|Pridie |Pridie |III |III |Pridie |Pridie
|-----------|-----------| | |-----------|-----------
11|KAL. MAR. |KAL. APR. |Pridie |Pridie |KAL. QUIN |KAL. SEX.
| | |-----------|-----------| |
12|VI Nonas |IV Nonas |KAL. MAII. |KAL. JUN. |VI Nonas |IV Nonas
13|V |III |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |V |III
14|IV |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
15|III | Nonæ |IV |Pridie |III | Nonæ
| | | | | |
16|Pridie |VIII Idus |III | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus
17| Nonæ |VII |Pridie |VIII Idas | Nonæs |VII
18|VIII Idus |VI | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI
19|VII |V |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
20|VI |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
| | | | | |
21|V |III |VI |IV |V |III
22|IV |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
23|III | Idus |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
24|Pridie |XVII K.M. |III | Idus |Pridie |XVIIK.Sep.
25| Idus |XVI |Pridie |XVII K.Qu. | Idus |XVI
| | | | | |
26|XVII K.Ap. |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Sex.|XV
27|XVI |XIV |XVII K.Ju. |XV |XVI |XIV
28|XV |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
29|XIV | |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
30|XIII | |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
| | | | | |
31|XII | |XIII | |XII |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
JULIAN YEAR 47 BEFORE CHRIST.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Days of the Julian Months |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER.| DECEMBER.
| | | | | |
| YEAR OF ROME.
| | | | | |
| 707 | 707 | 707 | 707 | 707-708 | 708
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 |X Kal. Sep.|VIII K.Oct|VII K. NV. |VII K.Dec.|V Kal. Jan.|IV Kal. Feb.
2 |IX |VII |VII |VI |IV |III
3 |VIII |VI |VI |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |------------
4 |VII |V |V |IV |Pridie |KAL. FEB.
| | | | |-----------|
5 |VI |IV |IV |III |KAL. JAN. |IV Nonas
| | | | | |
6 |V |III |III |Pridie |IV Nonas |III
| | | |----------| |
7 |IV |Pridie |Pridie |KAL DEC. |III |Pridie
| |----------|-----------| | |
8 |III |KAL. OCT. |KAL. NOV. |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ
9 |Pridie |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus
|-----------| | | | |
10 |KAL. SEP. |V |III |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII
| | | | | |
11 |IV Nonas |IV |Pridie | Nonæ |VII |VI
12 |III |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI |V
13 |Pridie |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII |V |IV
14 | Nonæ | Nonæ |VII |VI |IV |III
15 |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VI |V |III |Pridie
| | | | | |
16 |VII |VII |V |IV |Pridie | Idus
17 |VI |VI |IV |III | Idus |XVI K. Mar.
18 |V |V |III |Pridie |XVII K. Fb.|XV
19 |IV |IV |Pridie | Idus |XVI |XIV
20 |III |III | Idus |XVII K.Jn.|XV |XIII
| | | | | |
21 |Pridie |Pridie |XVII K. Dc.|XVI |XIV |XII
22 | Idus | Idus |XVI |XV |XIII |XI
23 |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K.Nv.|XV |XIV |XII |X
24 |XVI |XVI |XIV |XIII |XI |IX
25 |XV |XV |XIII |XII |X |VIII
| | | | | |
26 |XIV |XIV |XII |XI |IX |VII
27 |XIII |XIII |XI |X |VIII |VI
28 |XII |XII |X |IX |VII |V
29 |XI |XI |IX |VIII |VI |IV
30 |X |X |VIII |VII |V |III
| | | | | |
31 |IX |IX | |VI | |Pridie
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
D|
a|
y|
s| JULIAN YEAR 46 BEFORE CHRIST.
|
o|
f|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
| | | | | |
t| | | | | |
h| | | | | |
e| | | | | |
| JANUARY. | FEBRUARY. | MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
J| | | | | |
u| | | | | |
l| | | | | |
i| | | | | |
a| YEAR OF ROME.
n| | | | | |
| | | | | |
M| | | | | |
o| | | | | |
n| | | | | |
t| | | | | |
h| | | | | |
s| 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708
.| | | | | |
--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------
1|KAL. MAR. |KAL. APR. |Pr. K. Maii|Pr. K.Junii|KAL. QUIN. |KAL. SEX.
2|VI Nonas |IV Nonas |KAL.MAII |KAL.JUN. |VI Nonas |IV Nonas
3|V |III |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |V |III
4|IV |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
5|III | Nonæ |IV |Pridie |III | Nonæ
| | | | | |
6|Pridie |VIII Idus |III | Nonæ |Pridie |VIII Idus
7| Nonæ |VII |Pridie |VIII Idus | Nonæ |VII
8|VIII Idus |VI | Nonæ |VII |VIII Idus |VI
9|VII |V |VIII Idus |VI |VII |V
10|VI |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
| | | | | |
11|V |III |VI |IV |V |III
12|IV |Pridie |V |III |IV |Pridie
13|III | Idus |IV |Pridie |III | Idus
14|Pridie |XVII K.Mr. |III | Idus |Pridie |XVII K.Sep.
15| Idus |XVI |Pridie |XVII K.Qu. | Idus |XVI
| | | | | |
16|XVII K.Ap. |XV | Idus |XVI |XVII K.Sex.|XV
17|XVI |XIV |XVII K. Ju.|XV |XVI |XIV
18|XV |XIII |XVI |XIV |XV |XIII
19|XIV |XII |XV |XIII |XIV |XII
20|XIII |XI |XIV |XII |XIII |XI
| | | | | |
21|XII |X |XIII |XI |XII |X
22|XI |IX |XII |X |XI |IX
23|X |VIII |XI |IX |X |VIII
24|IX |VII |X |VIII |IX |VII
25|VIII |VI |IX |VII |VIII |VI
| | | | | |
26|VII |V |VIII |VI |VII |V
27|VI |IV |VII |V |VI |IV
28|V |III |VI |IV |V |III
29|IV | |V |III |IV |Pridie
30|III | |IV |Pridie |III |-----------
| | | | | |KAL. SEP.
31|Pridie | |III | |Pridie |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 46 BEFORE CHRIST.
|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------
Days | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708 | 708
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 |IV Non.Sep.|IV Non.Oct|Pr. Non.Nv.|Non.int.pr.|VII Id.int.|III Kal.Dec.
2 |III |III | Nonæ |VIII Idus |VI [post. |Pridie
| | | | | |------------
3 |Pridie |Pridie |VIII Idus |VII |V |KAL. DEC.
4 | Nonæ | Nonæ |VII |VI |IV |IV Nonas
5 |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |VI |V |III |III
| | | | | |
6 |VII |VII |V |IV |Pridie |Pridie
7 |VI |VI |IV |III | Idus | Nonæ
8 |V |V |III |Pridie |XXXI Kal. |VIII Idus
9 |IV |IV |Pridie | Idus |XXV [Dec. |VII
10 |III |III | Idus |XVII K.int.|XXIV |VI
| | | | [post.| |
11 |Pridie |Pridie |XVII K.int.|XVI |XXIII |V
12 | Idus | Idus |XVI [pr. |XV |XXII |IV
13 |XVII K.Oct.|XVII K.Nv.|XV |XIV |XXI |III
14 |XVI |XVI |XIV |XIII |XX |Pridie
15 |XV |XV |XIII |XII |XIX | Idus
| | | | | |
16 |XIV |XIV |XII |XI |XVIII |XVII K. Jn.
17 |XIII |XIII |XI |X |XVII |XVI
18 |XII |XII |X |IX |XVI |XV
19 |XI |XI |IX |VIII |XV |XIV
20 |X |X |VIII |VII |XIV |XIII
| | | | | |
21 |IX |IX |VII |VI |XIII |XII
22 |VIII |VIII |VI |V |XII |XI
23 |VII |VII |V |IV |XI |X
24 |VI |VI |IV |III |X |IX
25 |V |V |III |Pridie |IX |VIII
| | | | | |
| | | |-----------| |
26 |IV |IV |Pridie |K.INT.POST.|VIII |VII
| | |-----------| | |
27 |III |III |K. INT. PR.|IV Nonas |VII |VI
28 |Pridie |Pridie |IV Nonas |III |VI |V
|-----------|----------| | | |
29 |KAL. OCT. |KAL. NOV. |III |Pridie |V |IV
30 |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |Pridie | Nonæ |IV |III
| | | | | |
31 |V |III | |VIII Idus | |Pridie
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULIAN YEAR 45 BEFORE CHRIST.
| (BISSEXTILE.)
|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------
Days | JANUARY. | FEBRUARY.| MARCH. | APRIL. | MAY. | JUNE.
of the| | | | | |
Julian| | | YEAR OF ROME. | |
Months| | | | | |
| 709 | 709 | 709 | 709 | 709 | 709
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 |KAL. JAN. |KAL. FEB. |KAL. MAR. |KAL. APR. |KAL. MAII |KAL. JUN.
2 |IV Nonas |IV Nonas |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |VI Nonas |IV Nonas
3 |III |III |V |III |V |III
4 |Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |IV |Pridie
5 | Nonæ | Nonæ |III | Nonæ |III | Nonæ
| | | | | |
6 |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |Pridie |VIII Idus |Pridie |VIII Idus
7 |VII |VII | Nonæ |VII | Nonæ |VII
8 |VI |VI |VIII Idus |VI |VIII Idus |VII
9 |V |V |VII |V |VII |V
10 |IV |IV |VI |IV |VI |IV
| | | | | |
11 |III |III |V |III |V |III
12 |Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |IV |Pridie
13 | Idus | Idus |III | Idus |III | Idus
14 |XIX K. Feb.|XVI K. Mr.|Pridie |XVIII K. M.|Pridie |XVIII K. Q.
15 |XVIII |XV | Idus |XVII | Idus |XVII
| | | | | |
16 |XVII |XIV |XVII K. Ap.|XVI |XVII K. Ju.|XVI
17 |XVI |XIII |XVI |XV |XVI |XV
18 |XV |XII |XV |XIV |XV |XIV
19 |XIV |XI |XIV |XIII |XIV |XIII
20 |XIII |X |XIII |XII |XIII |XII
| | | | | |
21 |XII |IX |XII |XI |XII |XI
22 |XI |VIII |XI |X |XI |X
23 |X |VII |X |IX |X |IX
24 |IX |Bissext. |IX |VIII |IX |VIII
25 |VIII |VI |VIII |VII |VIII |VII
| | | | | |
26 |VII |V |VII |VI |VII |VI
27 |VI |IV |VI |V |VI |V
28 |V |III |V |IV |V |IV
29 |IV |Pridie |IV |III |IV |III
30 |III | |III |Pridie |III |Pridie
| | | | | |
31 |Pridie | |Pridie | |Pridie |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JULIAN YEAR 45 BEFORE CHRIST.
(BISSEXTILE.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Days of the Julian Months.|
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------
| JULY. | AUGUST. | SEPTEMBER.| OCTOBER. | NOVEMBER. | DECEMBER.
| | | | | |
| YEAR OF ROME.
| | | | | |
| 709 | 709 | 709 | 709 | 709 | 709
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 |KAL. QUIN. |KAL. SEX. |KAL. SEP. |KAL. OCT. |KAL. NOV. |KAL. DEC.
2 |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |IV Nonas |VI Nonas |IV Nonas |IV Nonas
3 |V |III |III |V |III |III
4 |IV |Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |Pridie
5 |III | Nonæ | Nonæ |III | Nonæ | Nonæ
| | | | | |
6 |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus |Pridie |VIII Idus |VIII Idus
7 | Nonæ |VII |VII | Nonæ |VII |VII
8 |VIII Idus |VI |VI |VIII Idus |VI |VI
9 |VII |V |V |VII |V |V
10 |VI |IV |IV |VI |IV |IV
| | | | | |
11 |V |III |III |V |III |III
12 |IV |Pridie |Pridie |IV |Pridie |Pridie
13 |III | Idus | Idus |III | Idus | Idus
14 |Pridie |XIX K.Sep.|XVIII Kal. |Pridie |XVIII K.Dc.|XIX K. Jan.
15 | Idus |XVIII |XVII [Oct.| Idus |XVII |XVIII
| | | | | |
16 |XVII K.Sex.|XVII |XVI |XVII K. Nv.|XVI |XVII
17 |XVI |XVI |XV |XVI |XV |XVI
18 |XV |XV |XIV |XV |XIV |XV
19 |XIV |XIV |XIII |XIV |XIII |XIV
20 |XIII |XIII |XII |XIII |XII |XIII
| | | | | |
21 |XII |XII |XI |XII |XI |XII
22 |XI |XI |X |XI |X |XI
23 |X |X |IX |X |IX |X
24 |IX |IX |VIII |IX |VIII |IX
25 |VIII |VIII |VII |VIII |VII |VIII
| | | | | |
26 |VII |VII |VI |VII |VI |VII
27 |VI |VI |V |VI |V |VI
28 |V |V |IV |V |IV |V
29 |IV |IV |III |IV |III |IV
30 |III |III |Pridie |III |Pridie |III
| | | | | |
31 |Pridie |Pridie | |Pridie | |Pridie
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX B.
CONCORDANCE OF ROMAN AND MODERN HOURS,
FOR THE YEAR OF ROME 699 (55 B.C.) AND FOR THE LATITUDE OF PARIS.
Spring Equinox March 23, 5 o’clock, p.m.
Summer Solstice June 25, 5 o’clock, p.m.
Autumnal Equinox September 26, 3 o’clock, a.m.
Winter Solstice December 23, 7 o’clock, p.m.
The dates are referred to the Julian style.
The Roman hours are reckoned from sunset and sunrise.
The modern hours are given in true solar time.
The Roman hours are given at the head of the columns, in Roman numerals.
The modern hours are in ordinary numerals. Two examples will explain the
use of the Table.
_Division of the Night on the 16th of August._--To obtain it, we seek
the date in the indicating column on the left, entitled NIGHTS. We
conclude from the line opposite: at 7h. 11m., sunset, beginning of the
first hour and of the first watch; at 9h. 36m., end of the first watch
and beginning of the second; at 12h. 0m. it is midnight, the second
watch ends, the third begins; at 2h. 24m., end of the third watch,
beginning of the fourth; at 4h. 49m. the sun rises, and the fourth watch
ends.
_Division of the Day on the 16th of August._--We seek the date in the
indicating column to the right, entitled DAYS. We conclude from the line
opposite: at 4h, 49m., sunrise, beginning of the first hour; the third
hour ends at 8h. 25m.; the sixth, hour at noon; the ninth at 3h. 35m.;
at 7h. 11m, the sun sets.
At the summer solstice, each watch embraces two of our hours; in the
winter solstice, it embraces four.
--------------------------------------------------------
| 1ST WATCH | 2ND WATCH |
|-------------------|-----------------|
NIGHTS | I II III IV V VI |
-----------------|/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \|
|H M H M H M H M H M H M H|
June 25 |8 1 8 41 9 20 10 0 10 40 11 20 12|
July 5|June 15|7 58 8 39 9 19 9 59 10 40 11 20 12|
July 16|June 4|7 51 8 33 9 14 9 56 10 37 11 19 12|
July 26|May 25|7 41 8 41 9 7 9 51 10 34 11 17 12|
| | |
Aug. 5|May 15|7 28 8 13 8 59 9 44 10 29 11 15 12|
Aug. 16|May 4|7 11 8 0 8 48 9 36 10 24 11 12 12|
Aug. 26|April 24|6 55 7 46 8 37 9 27 10 18 11 9 12|
| | |
Sept. 5|April 13|6 37 7 31 8 25 9 19 10 13 11 6 12|
Sept. 16|April 2|6 18 7 15 8 12 9 9 10 6 11 3 12|
Sept. 26|Mar. 23|6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 10 0 11 0 12|
| | |
Oct. 6|Mar. 12|5 42 6 45 7 48 8 51 9 54 10 57 12|
Oct. 16|Mar. 2|5 23 6 29 7 35 8 41 9 47 10 54 12|
Oct. 25|Feb. 21|5 6 6 15 7 24 8 33 9 42 10 51 12|
| | |
Nov. 4|Feb. 11|4 49 6 1 7 13 8 25 9 36 10 48 12|
Nov. 14|Feb. 1|4 33 5 48 7 2 8 17 9 31 10 46 12|
Nov. 24|Jan. 22|4 19 5 36 6 58 8 10 9 27 10 43 12|
| | |
Dec. 3|Jan. 12|4 9 5 28 6 46 8 5 9 23 10 42 12|
Dec. 13|Jan. 2|4 2 5 22 6 41 8 1 9 21 10 40 12|
December 23 |3 59 5 20 6 40 8 0 9 20 10 40 12|
-----------------|\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /|
NIGHTS | I II III IV V VI |
-------------------------------------------------------+
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| 3RD WATCH | 4TH WATCH | |
|-----------------|---------------------| |
| VII VIII IX X XI XII | DAYS |
|/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \|-----------------|
| M H M H M H M H M H M H M | |
| 0 0 40 1 20 2 0 2 40 3 19 3 59 | December 23 |
| 0 0 40 1 20 2 1 2 41 3 21 4 2 |Jan. 1|Dec. 14|
| 0 0 41 1 23 2 4 2 46 3 27 4 9 |Jan. 11|Dec. 4|
| 0 0 43 1 26 2 9 2 53 3 36 4 19 |Jan. 21|Nov. 25|
| | |
| 0 0 45 1 31 2 16 3 1 3 47 4 32 |Jan. 31|Nov. 15|
| 0 0 48 1 36 2 24 3 12 4 0 4 49 |Feb. 10|Nov. 5|
| 0 0 51 1 42 2 33 3 23 4 14 5 5 |Feb. 20|Oct. 26|
| | |
| 0 0 54 1 47 2 41 3 35 4 29 5 23 |Mar. 2|Oct. 16|
| 0 0 57 1 54 2 51 3 48 4 45 5 42 |Mar. 13|Oct. 6|
| 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 |Mar. 23|Sept. 26|
| | |
| 0 1 3 2 6 3 9 4 12 5 15 6 18 |April 2|Sept. 15|
| 0 1 6 2 13 3 19 4 25 5 31 6 37 |April 13|Sept. 5|
| 0 1 9 2 18 3 27 4 36 5 45 6 54 |April 23|Aug. 26|
| | |
| 0 1 12 2 24 3 35 4 47 5 59 7 11 |May 3|Aug. 16|
| 0 1 14 2 29 3 43 4 58 6 12 7 27 |May 14|Aug. 6|
| 0 1 17 2 33 3 50 5 7 6 24 7 41 |May 24|July 27|
| | |
| 0 1 18 2 37 3 55 5 14 6 32 7 51 |June 3|July 17|
| 0 1 20 2 39 3 59 5 19 6 38 7 58 |June 14|July 6|
| 0 1 20 2 40 4 0 5 20 6 40 8 1 | June 25 |
|\ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ /|-----------------|
| VII VIII IX X XI XII | DAYS |
|----------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX C.
NOTE ON THE ANCIENT COINS COLLECTED IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.
The result of the excavations made round Alise-Sainte-Reine would be
sufficient to establish the identity of that locality with the _Alesia_
of Cæsar; but the abundance of proofs can do no injury to the argument,
and there is one the value of which cannot be disputed: we mean that
furnished by the ancient coins found in the fosses of Camp D. (_See
Plate_ 23.) Lost in a combat, and falling into a fosse full of water,
they thus escaped discovery in the immediate search made usually on a
battle-field.
To establish the date of an event which has occasioned the burial of
certain coins, we must first show that these coins have been struck at a
period anterior to that event. Thus the coins lost at Alesia must
naturally belong to a period anterior to the siege of that town.
The coins collected are in number 619; they may be divided into two
distinct groups: some bear the impression of the Roman Mint, others are
of the Gaulish Mint.
This being understood, let us examine separately the age of the two
groups. M. le Comte de Salis and M. de Saulcy have kindly undertaken the
classification.
All the Roman coins, without exception, have been struck by order and
under the direction of the monetary magistrates, appointed by the
government of the Republic: they belong to the republican period, and
appertain to the class of coins called _consular_. Thanks to the labours
of men like Morell, Borghesi, Cavedoni, Cohen, Mommsen, and, above all,
the Comte de Salis, the age of the coins of this class is now pretty
clearly determined. On the date of their emission, in general, it would
be, so to say, impossible to commit an error of several years. The
series of denarii and quinarii offers us the names of eighty-two
magistrates, and the club, the symbol of an eighty-third; four of these
denarii present neither name nor symbol; it is the same case with an as
in copper, of the type of Janus with the prow of a ship, which has
probably borne no other legend but the word ROMA. The most recent of
these coins belong to the year 700 of Rome, or 54 B.C. The year in which
the siege of Alesia took place was 702. This fact alone would serve, if
needed, to demonstrate that Alise and Alesia are the same place.
The examination of the coins of Gaulish fabrication is equally
important. They belong to twenty-four _civitates_, or different tribes.
Military contingents, assembled from all parts of the Gaulish territory,
have therefore taken part in the war in which these coins were lost and
scattered in the soil. But the decisive fact is, that in this number we
find 103 which are incontestably of Arvernan origin; one of them bears,
distinctly inscribed, the name of Vercingetorix. Of 487 Gaulish coins,
103 belong to the Arverni.
We may add that, among the latter, 61 bear the name of Epasnactus, who
became, after the capitulation of Alesia, a faithful ally of the Romans,
and the chief of Arvernia. (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 44.) Now the coins
of Epasnactus have been long well known; they may be subdivided into two
classes: some, anterior to the submission of that personage, present
pure Gaulish types; others, of later date, offer only Romanised types,
if we may use the expression. In the fosses of Camp D have been found
only coins of Epasnactus of the primitive type. The battle in which
these coins were lost by the Arverni before Alise was, therefore,
anterior to the year 51 B.C., the year of the submission of Epasnactus.
LIST OF ANCIENT COINS
FOUND IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.
COINS STRUCK IN THE MINT AT ROME.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N o | | |
u f | | |
m | | |
b e | Names or Symbols | |
e a | of the | Probable | Numbers of
r c | Magistrates inscribed | Dates | the Plates
h | on the Coins | A.U.C. | in Cohen’s Work
-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 | Anonymous. | 485-537 |Pl. XLIII. _Uncertain_ 1.
| | | (The word ROMA is
| | | not in incuse letters.)
1 | Anonymous. | 558-579 |Pl. XLIII. _Uncertain_ 2.
| | | (The word ROMA is in
| | | a rectangle.)
1 | M. ATILI. SARAN. | 580-588 |Pl. VII Atilia 2.
1 | NAT. | 589-595 | Pl. XXXI Pinaria 2.
1 | L. CVP. | 602-605 |Pl. XVI Cupiennia.
1 | M. IVNI. | 602-605 |Pl. XXIII Junia 2.
1 | C. RENI. | 606-609 |Pl. XXXVI Renia.
1 | P. PAETVS. | 606-609 |Pl. I Ælia 1.
1 | CN. LVCR. TRIO. | 624-627 |Pl. XXV Lucretia 1.
1 | M. MARC. | 640-643 |Pl. XXVI Marcia 3.
1 | M. PORC. LAECA. | 644-647 |Pl. XXXIV Porcia 2.
1 | Q. METE. | 648-651 |Pl. VIII Cæcilia 3.
1 | M. VARG. | 652 |Pl. XL Vargunteia.
1 | T. CLOVLI. (a quinarius) | 653 |Pl. XII Cloulia 2.
1 | Q. PILIPVS. | 658 |Pl. XXVI Marcia 4.
1 | L. LIC. CN. DOM. L. PORCI. | 662 |Pl. XXXIV Porcia 1.
| LICI. | |
1 | M. HERENNI. | 663 |Pl. XIX Herennia.
2 | L. IVLI. L.F. CAESAR. | 664 |Pl. XX Julia 4.
1 | C. COIL. CALD. | 664 |Pl. XIII Cœlia 2.
1 | CALD. | 664 |Pl. XIII Cœlia 3.
1 | Q. THERM. M.F. | 664 |Pl. XXVIII Minucia 5.
1 | L. THORIVS BALBVS | 664 |Pl. XXXIX Thoria.
1 | P. SERVILI M.F. RVLLI. | 665 |Pl. XXXVIII Servilia 6.
1 | C. ALLI. BALA | 665 |Pl. I Aelia 3.
1 | L. PISO FRVGI (a quinarius) | 666 |Pl. IX Calpurnia 5.
2 | L. PISO FRVGI. | 666 |Pl. IX Calpurnia 10.
1 | Q. TITI. | 667 |Pl. XXXIX Titia 1.
4 | Q. TITI. | 667 |Pl. XXXIX Titia 2.
4 | C. VIBIVS C.F. PANSA. | 667 |Pl. XLI Vibia 4.
1 | L. TITVRI. SABIN. | 667 |Pl. XXXIX Tituria 4.
2 | L. TITVRI. SABIN. | 667 |Pl. XXXIX Titnria 5.
1 | C. CENSO. | 668 |Pl. XXVI Marcia 7.
8 | CN. LENTVL. | 668 |Pl. XIV Cornelia 7.
1 | L. RVBRI. DOSSEN. | 668 |Pl. XXXVI Rubria 1.
3 | L.C. MEMIES L.F. GAL. | 668 |Pl. XXVII Memmia 3.
1 | MN. FONTEI. C.F. | 669 |Pl. XVIII Fonteia 4.
-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N o | | |
u f | | |
m | | |
b e |
e a | | Probable |
r c | Names or Symbols of the | Dates | Numbers of the Plates in
h |Magistrates inscribed on the Coins | A.U.C. | Cohen’s Work
-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 |CAR. OGVL. VER. | 670 |Pl. XI Carvilia 3.
2 |C. LIMETA. P. CREPVSI. | 671 |Pl. XXVI Marcia 10.
I. CENSORIN.
1 |L. CENSOR. | 671 |Pl. XXVI Marcia 9.
2 |P. CREPVSI. | 671 |Pl. XVI Crepusia.
4 |C. MAMIL. LIMETAN. | 671 |Pl. XXV Mamilia.
1 |C. ANNI. T.F.T.N.L. | 672 |Pl. II Annia 2.
| FABI. L.F. | |
1 |C. NAE. BALB. | 672 |Pl. XXIX Nævia.
1 |L. PAPI. | 673 |Pl. XXX Papia 1.
2 |TI. CLAVD. TI. F. AP. N. | 673 |Pl. XII Claudia 3.
1 |C. MARI. C.F. CAPIT. | 674 |Pl. XXVI Maria 3.
1 |L. PROCILI. F. | 675 |Pl. XXXV Procilia 1.
2 |L. PROCILI. F. | 675 |Pl. XXXV Procilia 2.
1 |P. SATRIENVS | 676 |Pl. XXXVI Satriena.
1 |L. RVTILI. FLAC. | 676 |Pl. XXXVI Rutilia.
1 |L. LVCRETI. TRIO | 677 |Pl. XXV Lucretia 2.
1 |MN. AQVIL. MN. F. MN. N. | 682 |Pl. VI Aquillia 2.
6 |PAVLLVS LEPIDVS | 683 |Pl. I Æmilia 9.
2 |PAVLLVS LEPIDVS LIBO | 683 |Pl. I Æmilia 10.
2 |LIBO | 683 |Pl. XXXVI Scribonia 2.
2 |C. HOSIDI. C.F. GETA | 683 |Pl. XIX Hosidia 1.
1 |C. HOSIDI. C.F. GETA | 683 |Pl. XIX Hosidia 2.
1 |P. GALB. | 683 |Pl. XXXVIII Sulpicia 2.
2 |L. ROSCI FABATI | 684 |Pl. XXXVI Roscia.
1 |M. PLAETORI. CEST. | 686 |Pl. XXXII Plætoria 3.
1 |M. PLAETORIVS M.F. | 686 |Pl. XXXII Plætoria 9.
| CESTIANVS | |
1 |C. PISO L.F. FRVGI. | 690 |Pl. IX Calpurnia 15.
1 |C. PISO L.F. FRVGI. | 690 |Pl. IX Calpurnia 16.
1 |Q. CASSIVS | 695 |Pl. XI Cassia 6.
5 |M. SCAVR. P. HYPSAE. | 696 |Pl. I Æmilia 1.
2 |Q. POMPEI. RVF. | 697 |Pl. XV Cornelia 20. (This
| | | coin ought to be classed
| | | with the Pompeia.)
1 |PHILIPPVS | 698 |Pl. XXVI Marcia 8.
1 |P. CRASSVS M.F. (incuse) | 699 |Pl. XXIV Licinia 2.
1 |FAVSTVS (in a monogram) | 700 |Pl. XV Cornelia 23.
1 |A. PLAVTIVS | 700 |Pl. XXXIII Plautia 6.
-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The coins of the social war (664-665), of the time of Marias and Sylla
(666-674), and of the last two years of the war of Spartacus (682-683),
are extremely common, and mostly of very rude work.
COINS STRUCK IN SOUTHERN ITALY.
------+--------------------------+----------+----------------------------
Number| Names or Symbols of the | Probable |
of | Magistrates inscribed | Dates | Numbers of the Plates in
each | on the Coins | A.U.C. | Cohen’s Work
------+--------------------------+----------+----------------------------
1 |A club. | 485-537 | This coin is not found in
| | | Cohen.
1 |Anonymous. | 538-557 | Pl. XLIII uncertain 2. (The
| | | name on the exergue is
| | | written ROMA.)
1 |Anonymous. | 558-579 | Pl. XLIII uncertain 2. (The
| | | name on the exergue is
| | | written ROMA.)
3 |Q. FABI. LABEO | 653 | Pl. XVII Fabia 2.
1 |M. TVLLI. | 653 | Pl. XXXIX Tullia.
1 |M. SERGI. | 655 | Pl. XXXVII Sergia.
3 |L. FLAMINI. CILO | 656 | Pl. XVIII Flaminia 1.
1 |M. CIPI M.F. (incuse) | 658 | Pl. XII Cipia.
1 |P. NERVA | 659 | Pl. XXXVIII Silia.
1 |L. PHILIPPVS. | 660 | Pl. XXVI Marcia 5.
2 |M. FOVRI L.F. PHILI | 662 | Pl. XIX Furia 3.
1 |MN. AEMILIO LEP. | 663 | Pl. I Æmilia 3.
1 |CN. BLASIO CN. F. | 663 | Pl. XIV Cornelia 4.
1 |L. CAESI. | 663 | Pl. VIII Cæsia.
1 |Q. LVTATI | 664 | Pl. XXV Lutatia 2.
8 |L. MEMMI. | 664 | Pl. XXVII Memmia 1.
1 |L. VALERI FLACCI | 664 | Pl. XL Valeria 3.
1 |M. CATO | 664 | Pl. XXXV Porcia 6.
1 |A. ALBINVS S.F. | 665 | Pl. XXXV Postumia 2.
------+--------------------------+----------+----------------------------
This series ends with the social war in 665.
COINS STRUCK OUT OF ITALY.
------+--------------------------+----------+--------------------------
Number| Names or Symbols of the | Probable |
of | Magistrates inscribed | Dates | Numbers of the Plates in
each | on the Coins | A.U.C. | Cohen’s Work
------+--------------------------+----------+--------------------------
2 | CN. LEN. Q. | 678-682 | Pl. XIV Cornelia 10.
2 | LENT. CVR. X FL. | 678-682 | Pl. XIV Cornelia 11.
------+--------------------------+----------+--------------------------
These coins were struck in Spain during the war of Sertorius. No
provincial coins were struck during the interval between the two civil
wars from 682 to 704.
GAULISH COINS (FROM CAMP D, ON THE BANKS OF THE OSE).
ARVERNI.
ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS Number of each.
Electrum. Staters with the types of Vercingetorix 3
Electrum. Stater with an effigy adorned with a singular head-dress 1
Silver. Thick and ancient denarii of various types 13
Silver. A thick and ancient denarius, with a bird under the horse 1
Silver. A thick and ancient denarius, of the type, of the staters
of Vercingetorix 1
COINS WITH NAMES OF CHIEFS.
VERCINGETORIXS. This coin appears to be of copper, and yet
may be only a stater of very debased electrum 1
Æ. CVNVANOS 5
Æ. CALIIDV 7
Æ. A. behind the effigy 2
[AR]. PICTILOS 8
[AR]. EPAD. Epasnactus, before his submission 3
Æ IIPAD·℞-CICIIDV·BRI. Epasnactus 59
NOTE.--Three of these latter coins are stuck together.
AULERCI-EBUROVICES.
Æ. CAMBIL. (Camulogenus?) 5
BITURIGES.
ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS.
Electrum. Staters with a peacock placed above the horse 2
[AR]. Head. ℞. horse and boar 1
[AR]. Head dressed with long locks of hair 1
[AR]. The same type. A branch above the horse 1
[AR]. The same type. A sword and pentagram 1
COINS WITH LEGENDS.
Electrum. ABVDOS. A stater 1
Æ. The same legend 9
Æ. The same type. OSNAII 1
Æ. The same type. ISVNIS 1
Electrum. SOLIMA. A stater 1
[AR]. The same legend 6
[AR]. DIASVLOS 7
Æ. The same type. YNO 4
[AR]. The same type. ƎIOV 1
Æ. Under the horse. ƆƐN 1
Æ. Under the horse. CAM (Cambolectres?) 1
BUCIOS.
Æ. An unknown coin, at present unique 1
CADURCI.
Æ. Anepigraphic. Types of the coins of Lucterius 1
CARNUTES.
ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS.
Brass 7
Æ. Head. ℞. An eagle and serpent 4
Æ. Head. ℞. Eagle and young eagle 1
COINS WITH LEGENDS.
Æ. VANDIILIOS. 19
Æ. CALIAGIIS. 12
Æ. TASGIITIOS. Tasgetius 1
ÆDUI.
ANEPIGRAPHIC COINS.
[AR]. Old denarii. 27
COINS WITH LEGENDS.
[AR]. ΚΑΔ--ΕΔΟV. (Celts-Ædui). 2
[AR]. ANORBO-DVBNOREX. (Dumnorix). 14
[AR]. DVBNOREX-DVBNO-COV. (Dumnorix). 4
[AR]. DVBNOREX-DVBNO-COV. (Dumnorix.) The
chief holds in his hand a man’s head cut off. 1
[AR]. LITA. Litavicus. 12
HELVII?
[AR]. EPOMIID. A lion. ℞. Two heads embracing. 4
LEMOVICES.
[AR]. A human head above the horse. 5
LEUCI.
Brass, with the boar. 1
LEAGUE AGAINST THE GERMANS.
[AR]. Quinarii with the horseman. 2
MANDUBII (OR LINGONES)?
Brass. 32
MASSALIETES.
[AR]. Oboli with the wheel. 2
PETROCORII.
[AR]. With the boar lying down 4
PICTONES.
Electrum. A stater with the hand. 1
Æ. Anepigraphic. 1
COINS WITH NAMES OF CHIEFS.
[AR]. VIIROTAL. A warrior standing. 10
[AR]. VIIROTAL. A lion. 1
REMI.
Æ. With three heads joined together. 2
SANTONES.
Electrum. A stater. Under the horse SA. 1
SENONES.
Brass, anepigraphic. Animals facing each other. 1
Æ. YLLYCCI 6
SEQUANI.
Brass, anepigraphic. 12
[AR]. SEQVANOIOTVOS. 16
[AR]. TOGIRIX. 72
[AR]. Q·DOCI SAM·F. 18
SUESSIONES.
Æ. Divitiacus. ΔEIOVICIA-COS. 1
TREVIRI.
[AR]. Anepigraphic 1
TRICASSES (OR LINGONES)?
Brass 2
VELIOCASSES.
Æ. A figure kneeling 1
VOLCÆ-ARECOMICI.
[AR]. 1
VOLCÆ-TECTOSAGES.
[AR]. 3
VOLCÆ-TECTOSAGES.
EMIGRANTS FROM GERMANY.
[AR]. 1
UNCERTAIN FROM THE SOUTH.
Æ. A horse drinking in a vase 3
UNDETERMINABLE.
[AR]. 1
Æ. and brass 14
APPENDIX D.
NOTICE ON CÆSAR’S LIEUTENANTS.
In his campaign against Ariovistus, Cæsar had six legions; he put at the
head of each either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor. (_De Bello
Gallico_, I. 52.) His principal officers, then, were at that period six
in number, namely, T. Labienus, bearing the title of _legatus pro
prœtore_ (I. 21), Publius Crassus, L. Arunculeius Cotta, Q. Titurius
Sabinus, Q. Pedius, and C. Salpicius Galba.
1. T. ATTIUS LABIENUS.
T. Attius Labienus had been tribune of the people in 691, and had, in
this quality, been the accuser of C. Rabirius. He served Cæsar with zeal
during eight years in Gaul. Although he had been loaded with his
favours, and had, thanks to him, amassed a great fortune (Cicero,
_Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 7.--Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 15), he
deserted his cause as soon as the civil war broke out, and in 706 became
Pompey’s lieutenant in Greece. After the battle of Pharsalia, he went,
with Afranius, to rejoin Cato at Corcyra, and passed afterwards into
Africa. When Scipio was vanquished, Labienus repaired to Spain, to Cn.
Pompey. He was slain at the battle of Munda. Cæsar caused a public
funeral to be given to the man who had repaid his benefits by so much
ingratitude. (Florus, IV. 2.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 105.--Dio
Cassius, XLIII. 30, 38.)
2. PUBLIUS LICINIUS CRASSUS.
Publius Licinius Crassus Dives, youngest son of the celebrated triumvir,
started with Cæsar for the war in Gaul, made the conquest of Aquitaine,
and was employed to conduct to Rome the soldiers who were to vote in
favour of Pompey and Crassus. He quitted Cæsar’s army in 698, or at the
beginning of 699. Taken by his father into Syria, he perished, in 701,
in the war against the Parthians, still very young; for Cicero, attached
to him by an intimate friendship (_Epist. Familiar._, V. 8), speaks of
him as _adolescens_ in a letter to Quintus (II. 9), written in May, 699.
He was, nevertheless, already augur, and the great orator succeeded him
in that dignity. (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XV. 4.--Plutarch,
_Cicero_, 47.)
3. L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA.
The biography of Arunculeius Cotta, before his arrival in Gaul, is not
known. His name leads us to suppose that he was descended from a family
of clients or freedmen of the _gens Aurelia_, in which the name of
_Cotta_ was hereditary. The mother of Cæsar was an Aurelia.
4. QUINTUS TITURIUS SABINUS.
The antecedents of Quintus Titurius Sabinus are no more known than those
of Arunculeius Cotta, whose melancholy fate he shared. His name shows
that he descended from the family of Sabine origin of the Titurii, which
had given different magistrates to the Republic. The name of Titurius is
found on several consular medals; it is also found in some inscriptions
posterior to the time of Cæsar.
5. Q. PEDIUS.
Q. Pedius was the son of a sister of Cæsar. (Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 83.)
Elected ædile in the year 700 (Cicero, _Orat. pro. Plancio_, 7), he must
have quitted the army of Gaul at the latest in 699. When the civil war
broke out, he remained one of the firmest adherents of his uncle, whose
interests he sustained, in 705, at Capua. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
IX. 14.) He was prætor when he was besieged in Cosa, by Milo, a partisan
of Pompey. He was sent into Spain with Q. Fabius. (Cæsar, _De Bello
Civili_, III. 22; _De Bello Hispan._, 2.--Dio Cassius, XLIII. 31.) Made
by Cæsar’s will the heir of one-eighth of his wealth, he gave up what
was left to him to Octavius. (Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 83.--Appian, _Civil
Wars_, III. 94.) It was at the motion of Q. Pedius, then consul, that
the law was passed which has received its name from him, and which was
directed against the murderers of the Dictator. (Velleius Paterculus,
II. 65.--Suetonius, _Nero_, 3.) Q. Pedius remained faithful to Octavius,
yet he proposed the retractation of the declaration of war launched
against Antony and Lepidus. He was admitted to the secret of the
triumvirate, which was on the point of being concluded, and died
suddenly before the end of the year 711. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 52--Appian,
_Civil Wars_, IV. 6.)
6. SERVIUS SULPICIUS GALBA.
Servius Sulpicius Galba, whom the Emperor Galba reckoned among his
ancestors, was of the illustrious family of the Sulpicii; he descended
from Sulpicius Galba, consul in 610, who had left the reputation of a
great orator. S. Sulpicius Galba, Cæsar’s lieutenant in Gaul, had
already served in the war in that country under C. Pomptinus, in 693
(Dio Cassius, XXXVII. 48), which explains the choice made of him by the
future Dictator. He must have quitted Cæsar’s army at latest in 699, for
he was, at his recommendation, elected prætor in 700. (Dio Cassins,
XXXIX. 65.) He solicited the consulship in vain in 705. Pressed by the
creditors of Pompey, for whom he had made himself surety, he was
relieved from his difficulties by Cæsar, who paid his debts. (Valerius
Maximus, V. 2, §11.) Finding himself finally deceived in his hope of
arriving at the consulship, S. Galba joined the conspiracy against his
old chief. (Suetonius, _Galba_, 3.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 113.) He
served in the war against Antony, under the Consul Hirtius. We have a
letter from him to Cicero, written from the camp of Modena. (Cicero,
_Epist. Familiar_., X. 30.) Prosecuted, in virtue of the law Pedia, as a
murderer of Cæsar, (Suetonius, _Galba_, 3), he was condemned, and died
probably in exile.
The Senate granted Cæsar, in 608, ten lieutenants: Labienus, Arunculeius
Cotta, Titurias Sabinus, already in Gaul, Decimus Brutus, P. Sulpicius
Rufus, Munatius Plancus, M. Crassus, C. Fabius, L. Roscius, and T.
Sextius. As to Sulpicius Galba, P. Crassus, and Q. Pedius, they had
returned to Italy.
7. DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS.
Decimus Junius Brutus, belonging to the family of the _Junii_, was son
of Decimus Junius Brutus, elected consul in the year 677, and of
Sempronia, who performed so celebrated a part in Catiline’s conspiracy.
He was adopted by A. Postumius Albinus, consul in 655, and took, for
this reason, the surname of Albinus, by which we find him sometimes
designated. When Cæsar took him into Gaul, he was still very young; the
“Commentaries” apply to him the epithet _adolescens_. He must have
returned to Rome in January, 704, since a letter of Cicero mentions his
presence there at that period. (_Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 7.) The year
following he commanded Cæsar’s fleet before Marseilles. (Cæsar, _De
Bello Civili_, I. 36.--Dio Cassius, XLI. 19.) He gained, although with
unequal forces, a naval victory over L. Domitius. (Cæsar, _De Bello
Civili_, II. 5.) Having received from Cæsar, in 706, the government of
Transalpine Gaul, he repressed, in 708, an insurrection of the
Bellovaci. (Titos Livius, _Epitome_, CXIV.) An object of the special
favours of his old general, who felt for him a warm affection, D.
Brutus, along with Antony and Octavius, was associated in the triumph
which Cæsar celebrated in 709, on his return from Spain, and mounted
with them on the car. (Plutarch, _Antony_, 13.) By his will of the Ides
of September, the Dictator named him one of the guardians of Octavius,
and made him one of his second heirs (Dio Cassius, XLIV. 35.--Appian,
_Civil Wars_, II, 143.--Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 83); he caused to be given
him, for the year 712, the government of Cisalpine Gaul. In spite of
this friendship, of which Cæsar had given him so many proofs, and which
the latter believed to be paid by a requital, Brutus, who had remained
faithful to his benefactor in the civil war, lent his ear to the
proposals of the conspirators, and yielded to the seductions of M.
Brutus, his kinsman. He not only went to the Senate to assist in
striking the victim, but he accepted the mission of going to persuade
the Dictator, who was hesitating, to repair to the curia. (Dio Cassius,
XLIV. 14, 18.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 115.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 70.)
Exposed to public hatred (Cicero, _Philippic._, X. 7), and intimidated
by the threats of Antony, he left Rome to go and take possession of the
province which Cæsar had caused to be assigned to him. (Cicero, _Epist.
ad Atticum_, XIV. 13.)
He appears, however, to have acted but feebly in favour of the party he
had embraced. Antony, having obtained from the people, in exchange for
Macedonia, the province commanded by Brutus (Appian, _Civil Wars_, III.
30), the latter refused to abandon his government, and, supported by
Cicero, he obtained from the Senate an edict maintaining him in it
(Cicero, _Philippic._, III. 4.--Appian, _Civil War_, III. 45), which led
to an armed contest between the two competitors. Pursued by his rival,
Brutus threw himself into Modena, and there sustained a long siege
(Appian, _Civil Wars_, III. 49.--Titus Livius, _Epitome_, CXVII), which
had for its final result the celebrated battle in which Antony was
defeated. D. Brutus, overlooked among new actors in this sanguinary
drama, remained in it almost a mere spectator. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 40.)
He then ranged himself on the side of Octavius, yet without the
existence of any very close or very sincere intimacy between these two
men. He continued to exercise an important command during the war, but
fortune was not long in turning against him. Pressed by Antony, who had
united with Lepidus, and threatened personally by the prosecutions which
Octavius, armed with the law Pedia, was directing against the murderers
of Cæsar (Titus Livius, _Epitome_, CXX.--Dio Cassius, XLVI. 53), he
found himself deserted by his troops, and, after a vain attempt to cross
into Macedonia, he directed his steps with a small escort towards
Aquileia; but a Gaulish chief, named Camillus, betrayed towards him the
rites of hospitality, kept him prisoner, and sent information of what he
had done to Antony. The old lieutenant of Cæsar immediately sent Furius
with a party of cavalry, who slew Brutus, and carried away his head.
(Appian, _Civil Wars_, III. 97, 98.--Velleius Paterculus, III. 63, 64.)
Brutus was one of the correspondents of Cicero, who gives him praise,
especially for his constancy in friendship, of which he was certainly
little worthy.
8. PUBLIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS.
Publius Sulpicius Rufus, who belonged to the same family as S. Sulpicius
Galba, served, in 705, the cause of Cæsar in Spain (Cæsar, _De Bello
Civili_, I. 74); he commanded in the following year, with the title of
prætor, the fleet which was cruising at Vibo, on the coast of Bruttium
(Cæsar, _De Bella Civili_, III. 101); subsequently he obtained the
government of Illyria, a country where he had served in the ranks of the
Cæsarians, and consequently succeeded Q. Cornificius (Cæsar, _De Bello
Afric._, 10; _De Bello Alexandrin._, 42). A letter of Cicero, addressed
to him (_Epist. Familiar._, XIII. 77), shows that he was still in that
province in 709. We know nothing certain relating to his actions. It has
been supposed with probability that he is the same with a P. Sulpicius,
censor under the triumvirate, and mentioned in a Latin inscription
_(Tabula Collatina_), to which Drumann refers (tom. i., p. 528).
9. LUCIUS MUNATIUS PLANCUS.
Lucius Munatius Plancus, whose name is found in several inscriptions and
on a rather great number of medals (see especially Orelli,
_Inscriptions_, N. 591), belonged to an illustrious plebeian family.
Intimate at first with Cato, he subsequently gained the entire affection
of Cæsar (Plutarch, _Cato of Utica_, 42.--Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, X.
24), and remained faithful to him to the last. After having served in
Gaul, he became, in 705, one of his most active lieutenants in Spain
(Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 40), and afterwards in Africa. (Cæsar, _De
Bello Afr._, 4.) Cæsar caused to be given to him, for the year 710, the
government of Transalpine Gaul, without the Narbonnese and Belgic Gaul
(Appian, _Civil Wars_, III. 46--Cicero, _Philipp._, III. 15), and named
him, with P. Brutus, for the consulship in 712 (Velleius Paterculus, II.
63.--Dio Cassius, XLVI. 53); he was then in great favour with the
Dictator: Cicero made his approaches through him to obtain Cæsar’s
favour. (_Epist. Familiar._, X. 3; XIII. 29.)
After the murder of Cæsar, Plancus, who no doubt, like Antony, feared
the vengeance of the party of the conspirators, proposed an amnesty, in
concert with him and Cicero (Plutarch, _Brutus_, 22), and hastened to go
into the province which had been assigned to him. In Gaul he founded the
colonies of Lugdunum and Raurica (Orelli, _Inscriptiones_, No. 590.--Dio
Cassius, XLVI. 50); subsequently, gained by Antony, he abandoned to his
vengeance, during the proscription, Plotius, his own brother. (Appian,
_Civil Wars_, IV. 12.--Valerias Maximus, VI. 8, § 5.) In 712, Plancus
took, with Lepidus, on the 1st of January, the consulship which Cæsar
had destined for him. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 53; LXVII. 16.) In the war of
Perusia, he commanded the troops of Antony, who sent him, in 714, into
Asia. In 719 he still governed Syria for that triumvir, and he has been
accused of the death of Sextus Pompey. (Appian, _Civil Wars_, V. 144.)
He proceeded to Egypt with Antony, to the court of Cleopatra. (Velleius
Paterculus, II. 83.) Foreseeing the ruin of Antony, of whom he has been
reproached with being the base flatterer, he did not wait for the defeat
of Actium to embrace the party of Octavius: he returned to Rome, and
attacked his former friend bitterly in the Senate. (Velleius Paterculus,
II. 83.) Dio Cassius (L. 3) accuses him of having revealed Antony’s
will. From this time devoted to Octavius, he proposed, in 727, to confer
upon him the title of Augustus. (Suetonius, _Octavius_, 7.--Velleius
Paterculus, II. 91.) In 732, he held the office of censor. (Dio Cassias,
LIV. 2.) The inscriptions and medals show that he was also invested with
other dignities. The date of his death is unknown. Horace addressed to
him one of his odes. (Book I., Ode 7.)
10. MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS.
Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives was the elder brother of young Crassus,
whose place he had taken as Cæsar’s lieutenant in Gaul. Little is known
of his life. Cicero, less intimate with him than with his younger
brother, has mentioned him but slightly. (_Epist. Familiar._, 8.) He
ranged himself on Cæsar’s side at the time of the civil war, and became,
in 705, governor of Citerior Gaul. (Appian, _Civil Wars_, II.
41.--Justin, XLII. 4.) The time of his death is unknown.
11. CAIUS FABIUS.
It is not known what Caius Fabius had been before the campaign of Gaul.
When the civil war broke out, he remained faithful to Cæsar, who sent
him orders to proceed from Narbonnese Gaul to Spain. With his usual
rapidity, he moved by forced marches to Herda (_Herida_), near which
town Afranius was encamped. He distinguished himself in the whole of
this campaign, in which the army of Cæsar, which had joined him, was for
a moment in danger.
No further mention is made of C. Fabius. His name does not occur either
in the campaigns of Greece, Alexandria, or Africa, or in that of the
second Spanish war, or elsewhere.
12. L. ROSCIUS.
L. Roscius, who only played a secondary part in the war of Gaul, appears
to be the same as a personage to whom Cicero gives the name of _L.
Fabatus_, and who fell in the battle of Modena in 711. (_Epist.
Familiar._, X. 33.) He was prætor in 705, and Pompey, who knew the
friendship which Cæsar had for Roscius, deputed him to him at Ariminum
with proposals of peace. (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 8, 10.--Dio
Cassius, XLI 5.) It is believed that it is his name which, followed by
the surname Fabatus, figures on the Roman denarii which bear the image
of Juno Lanuvina. It is also believed to occur in a Latin inscription.
13. TITUS SEXTIUS.
Titus Sextius, whose history before his arrival in Gaul is not known,
became, in 710, governor of Numidia. (Dio Cassius, XLVIII. 21.)
According to Appian (_Civil Wars_, IV. 53), he took the side of
Octavius; according to Dio Cassius (XLVIII. 21), that of Antony. He made
war against Q. Cornificius, who sought to keep the ancient province of
Africa, which the Senate had given him. Sextius aspired to the same
government, and prepared to exercise it for Octavius, to whom Africa had
been assigned in the partition of the triumvirs. (Appian, _Civil Wars_,
IV. 53.) The defeat and death of Cornificius allowed him to realise his
projects, and he remained in possession of his province until 713.
Appian and Dio Cassius have told differently the events which forced
Sextius, after the battle of Philippi, to abandon Numidia, where
Octavius had sent a new governor. Nothing else is known of his
biography.
In the year 700 two new lieutenants make their appearance, Q. Tullius
Cicero and C. Trebonius, who came to replace Arunculeius Cotta and
Titurius Sabinus, slain by the Gauls at Tongres.
14. Q. TULLIUS CICERO.
Quintus Tullius Cicero, younger brother of the great orator, was born in
652, and went with him to Athens, in order to perfect himself in
literature, which he cultivated with success. The correspondence of the
two brothers which has been preserved is a proof of this, and we know,
from other sources, that Quintus had composed divers works which are
lost. Quintas had married, before the year 686, Pomponia, sister of
Atticus (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, I. 5, 6), with whom he lived on
bad terms, and from whom he finally separated. He was ædile in 688, the
year of his brother’s prætorship; and in 691, when his brother was
consul, he lent him in the affair of Catiline his intelligent support,
and shared the same dangers. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, I. 1;
_Catilinaria Quarta_, 2, 3.) However, he did not share in his opinion in
the judgment of the conspirators, when he voted, with Cæsar, against the
punishment of death. (Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 14.) He became prætor in 692,
defeated in Bruttium the bands of the Catilinarian Marcellus (Orosius,
VI. 6), and presided over the tribunal which judged Archias. (_Scholiast
of Bobbio on the Oration for Archias_, p. 354, edit. Orelli.) In March
of the year 693, he proceeded to the province of Asia, of which he had
obtained the government (Cicero, _Pro Flacco_, 14); he administered that
province with as much equity as talent, seconded by able lieutenants.
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, I. 1.) They had, however, to reproach him
with frequent fits of anger, which drew upon him the remonstrances of
his brother. At the end of April, 696, Quintus left Asia in order to
proceed direct to Rome, without taking time to visit at Thessalonica M.
Cicero, who was still under the weight of his condemnation to exile. The
fact was, he feared an accusation of extortion, which his enemies, and
those of his brother, endeavoured to prepare against him. (Cicero,
_Epist. ad Atticum_, III. 9; _Epist. ad Quintum_, I. 3; _Oratio pro Domo
sua_, 36.) He employed himself actively in favour of his brother, and
narrowly escaped being killed in the riot raised by Clodius, on the 8th
of the Calends of February, 697, on the occasion of the proposition of
the tribune Fabricius. (Cicero, _Oratio pro Sextio_, 35.--Plutarch,
_Cicero_, 44.) When this same Clodius opposed the rebuilding of the
house of M. Cicero, Quintus saw his own, which was next to that of his
brother, burnt by the partisans of that turbulent demagogue. (Cicero,
_Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 3.) Towards the end of the same year, Quintus
was one of the fifteen lieutenants given to Pompey in order to direct
the supplying of victuals, and in that quality he proceeded to Sardinia.
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 2.) He started for Gaul in the
beginning of 700, and it appears from a passage in the _Oratio pro
Milone_ that he was still there in 702. He left Cæsar’s army in 703, and
joined, in the quality of legate, his brother, who had been made
proconsul of Cilicia, and to whom he lent the indispensable support of
his experience and ability in matters of war. (Cicero, _Epist.
Familiar_., XV. 4; _Epist. ad Atticum_, V, 20.) During the civil war,
Quintus took the side of Pompey, but he imitated his brother’s
circumspection, and, after the battle of Pharsalia, he made every effort
to clear himself in the eyes of Cæsar, to whom he sent as his deputy in
Asia his own son, and thus obtained his pardon. After the death of
Cæsar, Quintus pronounced energetically, like M. Cicero, against Antony,
an opposition which turned out equally fatal to him, for, like his
brother, he was comprised in the proscription. Having vainly attempted
with him to reach Macedonia, he returned to Rome accompanied by his son,
and both were delivered up by slaves to the executioner. (Appian, _Civil
Wars_, IV. 20.--Plutarch, _Cicero_, 62.)
15. CAIUS TREBONIUS.
Caius Trebonius was the son of a Roman knight, of whom Cicero speaks in
his _Philippica_ (XIII. 10). Being quæstor in 694, he opposed the law
Herennia, which authorised the adoption of Clodius by a plebeian; as
tribune of the people in 699, he proposed the celebrated laws which gave
to Pompey and Crassus important provinces, and continued for five years
Cæsar’s command in Gaul. Having been called by Cæsar the year after in
quality of legate, he remained in Gaul until the commencement of the
civil war. He was afterwards sent to Spain against Afranius, and next
charged with the siege of Marseilles by land. (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_,
I. 36.--Dio Cassius, XLI. 19;) In 706, he became præter urbanus (Dio
Cassius, XLII. 20); a year later he succeeded Cassius Longinus in the
government of one of the two Spains. (Cæsar, _De Bello Alexandrino_, 64;
_De Bello Hispano_, 7.--Dio Cassius, XLIII. 29.) Compelled to leave the
Peninsula, after some checks, he returned to Rome, where Cæsar caused
him to be named consul in October, 709, and with the province of Asia,
on quitting office. (Dio Cassius, XLIII. 46.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, III.
2.) All these acts of kindness, however, could not secure to the
dictator the devotedness of his lieutenant: even before Trebonius had
taken possession of his proconsulate of Asia, he entered into the
conspiracy formed against the life of Cæsar. But, detained by Antony
outside the curia, he could not strike him with his own hand. (Appian,
_Civil Wars_, II. 117.--Dio Cassius, XLIV. 19.--Cicero, _Philippica_,
II. 14; XIII. 10.) After the death of Cæsar, Trebonius started quietly
for his government of Asia, and was in May, 710, at Athens. (Cicero,
_Epist. Familiar_., XII. 16.) During his proconsulship he supported the
party of Brutus and Cassius. In February, 711, Dolabella, who had come
to replace him, drew him into a snare at Smyrna; slew him, and threw his
head at the foot of a statue of Cæsar, thus revenging his friend who had
been so shamefully betrayed. (Cicero, _Philippica_, XIII. 10.--Appian,
_Civil Wars_, III. 26.--Velleius Paterculus, II. 69.--Dio Cassius,
XLVII. 29.) Cicero, whose correspondent Trebonius had been, stigmatises
this murder, in which Antony saw the just punishment of a villain and a
parricide. It is certain that Trebonius had entered the conspiracy
without remorse, since afterwards he wrote to Cicero: “If you compose
anything on the murder of Cæsar, do not attribute a small part of it to
me.” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XII. 16.)
During the years 701 to 705 new lieutenants joined Cæsar in Gaul: they
were Minucius Basilus, Antistius Reginus, M. Silanus, Caninius Rebilus,
Sempronius Rutilus, Marcus Antonius, P. Vatinius, Q. Calenus, and Lucius
Cæsar.
16. MINUCIUS BASILUS.
L. Minucius Basilus had taken his name and surname from a rich Roman who
had adopted him. Previously his name was L. Satrius. Cicero names him
thus in one of his treatises (_De Officiis_, III. 18), although
elsewhere (_Epist. ad Atticum_, XI. 5) he designates him by his name and
surname. He became prætor in 709. (Dio Cassius, XLIII. 47.) Irritated at
not having obtained, on leaving office, the province which he coveted,
and at having only received money from Cæsar, he entered into the
conspiracy formed against the Dictator. (Appian, _Civil Wars_, II;
113.--Dio Cassius, XLIII. 47.) A few months after, he was assassinated
by his slaves, who thus took revenge for his having subjected several of
them to the punishment of castration. (Appian, _Civil Wars_, III. 98.)
17. C. ANTISTIUS REGINUS.
Nothing is known of the antecedents or the end of this lieutenant of
Cæsar. To judge by his name, he must have belonged to the family of the
_Antistii_, which produced divers magistrates of the Republic, and
several members of which have perpetuated their memory in inscriptions.
18. M. SILANUS.
Marcus Junius Silanus, son of Servilia, was brother, by the mother’s
side, to M. Brutus. After the murder of Cæsar, he accompanied his
brother-in-law Lepidus in his campaign in the north of Italy, and was
sent by him, in 711, to Modena, without precise instructions (Dio
Cassius, XLVI. 38); to the great regret of Lepidus, he took the side of
Antony. (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, X. 30, 34.) After Antony’s defeat,
Silanus, who had lost the confidence of Lepidus, proceeded to Sicily, to
Sext. Pompey, and did not return to Rome until the peace of Misenum had
been concluded with the latter, in 715. (Velleius Paterculas, II. 77.)
Nothing more is known of his life, except that Augustus, in 729, took
him as his colleague in the consulship. (Dio Cassius, LIII. 25.).
19. C. CANINIUS REBILUS.
Caius Caninius Rebilus, great-grandson, in all probability, of the
person of that name who was prætor in 583, does not appear in history
until the war with Gaul. Cæsar sent him, in 705, to Scribonius Libo, to
treat of peace with Pompey. (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 26.) Rebilus
next accompanied Curio into Africa, and escaped only with a small number
from the defeat inflicted upon them by King Juba. (_De Bello Civili_,
II. 24.) In 708 he was still making war in the same province, and took
Thapsus after the defeat of Scipio. (Cæsar, _De Bello Africano_, 86,
93.) In 709 he commanded in Spain the garrison of Hispalis. (Cæsar, _De
Bello Hispano_, 35.) At the end of the same year, Cæsar caused him to be
named consul, in the place of Q. Fabius, who had died suddenly: it was
on the eve of the Calends of January that this event had taken place.
Rebilus consequently was only consul for a few hours, and the short
period of his office has excited the jokes of Cicero. (_Epist.
Familiar._, VII. 30.--Dio Cassius, XLIII. 46.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 63.)
No other details are known of the life of this lieutenant of Cæsar.
20. M. SEMPRONIUS RUTILUS.
History is silent on what became of this lieutenant after the war of
Gaul.
21. MARCUS ANTONIUS (MARK ANTONY).
The biography of Mark Antony is too well known, and is too much mixed up
with the events which followed the war in Gaul, to render it necessary
to give a sketch of it here. It is well known that Mark Antony, born in
671, was the son of a Mark Antony who had served in Crete, and grandson
of the celebrated orator of the same name. His mother was a Julia, and
belonged, consequently, to the family of Cæsar. After having encouraged
and supported Cæsar in his projects on Rome, he became his _magister
equitum_, when the dictature had been conferred upon him. At Pharsalia,
he commanded the left wing of Cæsar’s army. After the murder of the
great man, he was the rival of Octavius, and subsequently, with Lepidus,
his colleague in the triumvirate. When disunion arose between the future
Augustus and the ancient lieutenant of his uncle, the battle of Actium
completed the ruin of Antony, who, having taken refuge in Egypt, slew
himself in despair, on the information which Cleopatra, with whom he was
violently in love, gave him of her intended suicide.
22. PUBLIUS VATINIUS.
The part played by Publius Vatinius, before he became lieutenant in
Gaul, has been told in the course of this work. At the conclusion of his
tribuneship, he was employed in the army of Cæsar; but he had already,
after his quæstorship, served in Spain in the same quality of
lieutenant, under the proconsul C. Cosconius. Threatened by the laws
Licinia and Junia, Vatinius returned to Rome, and succeeded, thanks to
the support of Clodius, in avoiding the trial with which he was
threatened. He failed in his candidature for the ædileship, figured as
one of the witnesses in the trial of Sextius, in which he showed great
animosity against the accused, and against Cicero who defended him.
Important events marked his prætorship in 699. As lieutenant of Cæsar in
the civil war (_De Bello Civili_, III. 19), after the battle of
Pharsalia, he defended Brundusium against Lælius. (_De Bello Civili_,
III. 100.) In 706 and 707 he continued to serve in the ranks of the
partisans of the Dictator, who, in the end of that year, caused the
consulship to be conferred upon him for a few days. (Dio Cassius, XLII.
55.--Macrobius, _Saturnalia_, II. 3.) In 709 he was sent by Cæsar into
Illyria, with the title of proconsul (Appian, _Illyric War_, 13), from
which province he sent obliging letters to Cicero. (_Epist. Familiar._,
V. 9, 10.) After the murder of the Dictator, when the Dalmatians had
revolted and had defeated a considerable corps of his army, Vatinius,
who mistrusted the fidelity of his soldiers, retired to Epidamnus, and
delivered his province and his legions to M. Brutus, (Titus Livius,
_Epitome_, CXVIII.--Velleius Paterculus, II. 69.--Appian, _Illyric War_,
13.) Nevertheless, he obtained, at the end of that year (711), a triumph
for his victories. It is not known what became of him afterwards.
23. Q. FUFIUS CALENUS.
Q. Fufius Calenus, of one of the most illustrious families of Rome, the
_gens Fufia_, was tribune of the people in 693, and served at that time
actively the interests of Clodius, when the latter was accused of having
violated the mysteries of the _Bona Dea_. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
I. 14.) As prætor during the consulship of Cæsar and Bibulus, he gave
his name to a judiciary law, and served with zeal, during his
magistracy, the projects of him whose lieutenant he became in Gaul. He
also supported Clodius in the affair of Milo. When the civil war broke
out, Fufius Calenus joined Cæsar at Brundusium; he followed him
afterwards into Spain, in the character of lieutenant. (_Epist. ad
Atticum_, IX. 5.--Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 87.) Sent afterwards into
Epirus, he took, before the battle of Pharsalia, the principal towns of
Greece. In 707, he became consul with Vatinius (Dio Casius, XLII. 55);
sided, after the death of Cæsar, with Antony, whom he defended against
the attacks of Cicero (_Philippica_, VIII. 4.--Dio Cassius, XLVI. 1-28),
and was his lieutenant during the struggles which followed. He commanded
an army in Transalpine Gaul in 713, when he was carried off by a sudden
death, at the moment when he was on the point of encountering the troops
of Octavius. (Appian, _Civil Wars_, V. 3, 51.--Dio Cassius, XLVIII. 20.)
24. L. CÆSAR
L. Julius Cæsar, who appears as lieutenant of the great Cæsar only at
the end of the war of Gaul, belonged to the same family as himself; he
was a son of L. Julius Cæsar, consul in the time of the war against the
Marsi, who was assassinated by Fimbria, and brother of Julia, mother of
Mark Antony. He stood for the ædileship without success (Cicero, _Orat.
pro Plancio_, 21), was more fortunate in his petition for the
consulship, and exercised that high magistracy in 690. (Cicero, _Orat.
pro Murena_, 34; _Epist. ad Atticum_, I. 1, 2.--Dio Cassius, XXXVII. 6.)
He was, with Cæsar, the year after, one of the judges (_duumvir
perduellionis_) in the trial of C. Rabirius. (Dio Cassius, XXXVII. 27.)
When the Senate was deliberating on the conspiracy of Catiline, the
relationship which united him with P.Lentulus did not prevent him from
voting for his condemnation to death. After the war of Gaul, he returned
to Rome, and, in the year 707, Mark Antony invested him with the
functions of prefect of the town; he was then very aged. (Dio Cassius,
XLII. 30.) After Cæsar had been assassinated, L. Cæsar withdrew from the
party of Antony, although the latter was his nephew, for which he has
been praised by Cicero. (_Epist. Familiar._, XII. 2.) But his opposition
softened down afterwards, and he rejected the proposal to declare war
against the ancient lieutenant of Cæsar, made by the great orator.
(Cicero, _Philippica_, VIII. 1; _Epist. Familiar._, X. 28.) This was the
effect of the influence exercised upon him by his sister Julia, to whom
he owed his safety in the proscription which followed the conclusion of
the triumvirate. (Appian, _Civil Wars_, IV. 12.--Plutarch, _Cicero_, 61;
_Antony_, 20.--Floras, IV. 6.--Velleias Paterculus, II. 67.) Nothing is
known concerning his after life.
END OF VOL. II.
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FOOTNOTES:
[1] Justin, XXIV. 4.--Titus Livius, V. 48.
[2] Polybius, II. 17-19.--Titus Livius, V. 35.
[3] Pausanias, X. 19-23.--Diodorus Siculus, _Eclog._, XXII. 13.
[4] Strabo, IV. p. 156, edit. Dübner and Müller.--Justin, XXXII. 3.
[5] Polybius, IV. 46.
[6] Justin, XXV. 2.--Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 16.--Pausanias, VII. 6, § 5.
[7] Polybius, XXXIII. 7, 8.--Titus Livius, _Epitome_, XLVII.
[8] Strabo, IV., p. 169.
[9] Titus Livius, _Epitome_, LX.
[10] Titus Livius, _Epitome_, LXI.
[11] Strabo, IV., pp. 154, 159.--Titus Livius, _Epitome_, LXI.--Florus,
III. 2.--Velleius Paterculus, II. 10.
[12] Lucan, I. 424.
[13] Cæsar, _De Bello Gallico_, I. 45.--Strabo, IV., p. 158.
[14] Titus Livius, _Epitome_, LXII.--Eutropius, IV. 10.--Velleius
Paterculus, I. 15.
[15] Strabo, VII., p. 243.
[16] This victory was gained by the Tigurini, a people of Helvetia, on
the territory of the Allobroges. According to the _Epitome_ of Titus
Livius (LXV.), the battle took place in the district of the Nitiobriges,
a people inhabiting the banks of the Garonne, which is not very
probable.
[17] After pillaging the temple of Toulouse.
[18] Titus Livius, _Epitome_, LXVII.--Tacitus, _Germania_, 37.
[19] _Jugurtha_, 114.
[20] _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 13.
[21] _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 13.
[22] The fugitives from Vienne founded the town which subsequently took
the name of _Lugdunum_, in a place called _Condate_, which is synonymous
with confluence. (Dio Cassius, XLVI. 50.)
[23] _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 13.
[24] _Jugurtha_, 114.
[25] Cicero, _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 13.
[26] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, I. 19.
[27] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 41.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 41.
[28] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 41.
[29] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 41.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 41.
[30] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 41.
[31] Cicero, _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 11.--Dio Cassius, XL.
50.
[32] Cicero, _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 14.
[33] Cicero, _Orat. de Provinciis Cousularibus_, 12.
[34] It is stated in the “Commentaries” that Cæsar placed in winter
quarters four legions among the Belgæ, and the same number among the
Ædui. (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 54.)--“Cæsar had with him but 5,000 men
and 300 horse. He had left the rest of his army beyond the Alps.”
(Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 36, and Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 34.)
[35] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 35.
[36] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 55.
[37] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 68.
[38] In Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 56.--Cicero, _Brutus_, 75.
[39] Preface of Hirtius to Book VIII. of the “Commentaries.”
[40] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 13.
[41] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 10.
[42] Strabo, IV. 3, p. 160
[43] The Narbonnese reminded the Romans of the climate and productions
of Italy. (Strabo, IV. 1, p. 147.)
[44] Pomponius Mela, who compiled in the first century, from old authors
an abridgement of Geography, says that Gaul was rich in wheat and
pastures, and covered with immense forests: “Terra est frumenti præcipue
ac pabuli forax, et amœna lucis immanibus.” (_De Situ Orbis_, III.
2.)--(_De Bello Gallico_, I, 16.)--The winter was very early in the
north of Gaul. (_De Bello Gallico_, IV. 20.) Hence the proverbial
expression at Rome of _heims Gallica_. (Petronius, _Satir._ 19.--Strabo,
IV., 147-161.)--See the “Memoire on the Forests of Gaul” read before the
Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, by M. Alfred Maury.
[45] Strabo, IV., p. 147.--Diodorus Siculus, V. 26.
[46] Cæsar, after having said (V. 3) that the forests of the Ardennes
extended from the Rhine to the frontier of the Remi, _ad initium
Remorum_, adds (VI. 29) that it extended also towards the Nervii, _ad
Nervios_. Nevertheless, according to chapter 33 of book VI., we believe
that this forest extended, across the country of the Nervii, to the
Scheldt. How otherwise could Cæsar have assigned to the forests of the
Ardennes a length of 500 miles, if it ended at the eastern frontier of
the Nervii? This number is, in any case, exaggerated, for from the Rhine
(at Coblentz) to the Scheldt, towards Ghent and Antwerp, it is but 300
kilomètres, or 200 miles.
[47] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 5.
[48] “Citra flumen Ararim ... reliqui sese fugæ mandarunt atque in
proximas silvas abdiderunt.” (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 12.)
[49] “Menapii propinqui Eburonum finibus, perpetuis paludibus silvisque
muniti.” (_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 5.)
[50] “(Morini et Menapii) ... silvas ac paludes habebant, eo se suaque
contulerunt.” (_De Bello Gallico_, III. 28.)
[51] “(Sugambri) primos Eburonum fines adeunt ... non silvæ morantur.”
(_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 35.)
[52] Strabo, p. 163, edit. Didot.
[53] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 2.
[54] Strabo, pp. 121, 155, 170, edit. Didot.
[55] “Carpenta Gallorum.” (Florus, I. 13)--“Plurima Gallica (verba)
valuerunt, ut reda ac petorritum.” (Quintilian, _De Institutione
Oratoria_, lib. I., cap. v. 57.)--“Petorritum enim est non ex Græcia
dimidiatum, sed totum transalpibus, nam est vox Gallica. Id scriptum est
in libro M. Varronis quarto decimo _Rerum Divinarum_; quo in loco Varro,
quum de petorrito dixisset, esse id verbum Gallicum dixit.” (Aulus
Gellius, XV. 30.)--“Petoritum et Gallicum vehiculum est, et nomen ejus
dictum esse existimant a numero quatuor rotarum. Alii Osce, quod hi
quoque _petora_ quatuor vocent. Alii Græce, sed αἱλικὡς dictum.”
(Festus, voc. _Petoritum_, p. 206, edit. Müller.)--“Belgica esseda,
Gallicana vehicula. Nam Belga civitas est Galliæ in qua hujusmodi
vehiculi repertus est usus.” (Servius, _Commentaries on the Georgics_ of
Virgil, lib. III. v. 204.--Cæsar, _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 33, and
_passim_.
[56] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 5.
[57] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 7.
[58] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 11.
[59] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 34, 53.
[60] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 58.
[61] The reckoning of these contingents is the most positive element for
estimating the state of the population. We find in the “Commentaries”
three valuable statements: 1st, the numerical state of the Helvetian
immigration in 696 (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 29.); 2nd, that of the Belgic
troops, in the campaign of 697 (_De Bello Gallico_, II. 4.); 3rd, the
census of the Gaulish army which, in 702, attempted to raise the siege
of Alesia (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 75.) Of 368,000 men, composing the
agglomeration of the Helvetii and their allies, 92,000 were able to bear
arms; that is, about a quarter of the population. In the campaign of
697, the Belgic coalition counted 296,000 combatants, and, in 702, at
the time of the blockade of Alesia, the effective force of a great part
of Gaul amounted to 281,000 men. But, in order not to count twice the
different contingents of the same states, we suppress from the
enumeration of the year 702 the contingents of the countries already
mentioned in the census of 697, which reduces the effective force to
201,000 men. Yet this number cannot represent the total of men fit for
war; it comprises only the troops which could easily be sent out of the
territory, and which were more numerous accordingly as the people to
which they belonged were nearer to the theatre of military operations.
Thus Cæsar informs us that the Bellovaci, who could bring into the field
100,000 men, only furnished 60,000 picked men in 697, and 10,000 in 702.
The contingent of the Atrebates, which had been 15,000 men in 697, was
reduced to 4,000 in 702; that of the Nervii, of 50,000 in the former
year, sank to 5,000; and that of the Morini similarly from 25,000 to
5,000. From these circumstances we may be allowed to infer that the
Gauls armed three-fifths of their male population when the enemy was
near their territory, and only one-fifth, or even one-sixth, when he was
more distant.
If, then, we would form an idea of the total number of men able to carry
arms in Gaul, we must augment the contingents really furnished,
sometimes by two-fifths, sometimes in a higher proportion, according to
the distances which separated them from the seat of war. By this
calculation, the levies of 697 represent 513,600 men capable of carrying
arms, and those of 702, at least 573,600; we add together these two
numbers, because, as stated above, each army comprises different
populations, which gives 1,087,200 men, to whom we must add 92,000
Helvetii; moreover, it is indispensable to take into account the
contributive capability of the populations which are not mentioned in
the “Commentaries” among the belligerents at the two epochs indicated
above, such as the Pictones, the Carnutes, the Andes, the Remi, the
Treviri, the Lingones, the Leuci, the Unelli, the Redones, the
Ambivareti, and the peoples of Armorica and Aquitaine. By an approximate
estimate of their population according to the extent of their territory,
we shall obtain the number of 625,000 men. Adding together these four
numbers, to obtain the total number of men capable of bearing arms, we
shall get 513,600 + 573,600 + 92,000 + 625,000 = 1,804,200 men.
Quadrupling this number to get, according to the proportion applied to
the Helvetii, the total of the population, we shall have 7,216,800
inhabitants for Gaul, the Roman province not included. In fact, Diodorus
Siculus, who wrote in the first century of our era, says (lib. V., c.
25) that the population of the different nations of Gaul varies from
200,000 to 50,000 men, which would make a mean of 125,000 men. If we
take the word ἁνδρες in the sense of inhabitants, and if we admit with
Tacitus that there were in Gaul sixty-four different nations, we should
have the number of 8,000,000 inhabitants, very near the preceding.
[62] Pliny expresses himself thus: “The country comprised under the name
of _Gallia Comata_ is divided into three peoples, generally separated by
rivers. From the Scheldt to the Seine is Belgic Gaul; from the Seine to
the Garonne, Celtic, called also _Lyonnese_; from thence to the Pyrenees
is Aquitaine.” (_Hist. Nat._, IV. xxxi. 105.)
[63] PEOPLES COMPOSING THE ROMAN PROVINCE:
_The Albici_ (the south of the department of the Lower Alps, and the
north of the Var). (_De Bello Civil._, I. 34; II. 2.)
_The Allobroges_, probably of Celtic origin, inhabited the north-west of
Savoy, and the greater part of the department of the Isère.
_The Helvii_, inhabitants of the ancient Vivarais (the southern part of
the department of the Ardèche), separated from the Arverni by the
Cévennes. (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 8.)
_The Ruteni_ of the province (_Ruteni Provinciales_), a fraction of the
Celtic nation of the Ruteni, incorporated into the Roman province, and
whose territory extended over a part of the department of the Tarn.
_The Sallyes_, or _Salluvii_ (the Bouches-du-Rhône, and western part of
the Var). (_De Bello Civil._, I. 35, edit. Nipperdey.)
_The Vocontii_ (department of the Drôme and Upper Alps, southern part of
the Isère, and the northern part of the Ardèche).
_The Volcæ_ occupied all Lower Languedoc, from the Garonne to the Rhone.
They had emigrated from the north of Gaul. They were subdivided into the
Volcæ Tectosages, who had Tolosa (_Toulouse_) for their principal town;
and the Volcæ Arecomici.
_The Deciates_ (western part of the department of the }
Maritime Alps). }
}
_The Oxybii_ (eastern part of the department of the } Not mentioned by
Var). } Cæsar.
}
_The Sordones_, of the same race as the Aquitainians, }
inhabiting the Eastern Pyrenees and the Aude. }
_The Caturiges._ } Independent peoples on the upper channels of the Durance
_The Centrones._ } and the Isère, and in the mountains of the
_The Graioceli._ } Tarentaise.
[64] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 10.
[65] Four hundred, according to Appian (_Civil War_, II. 150); three
hundred and five, according to Flavius Josephus (_Wars of the Jews_, II.
xxviii. 5); three hundred, according to Plutarch (_Cæsar_, 15); about a
hundred and forty, according to Pliny (_Hist. Nat._, III. 5; IV. 31-33).
[66] “Nevertheless, it was said at Rome that it was not only the Treviri
and the Ædui who revolted, but the sixty-four states of Gaul.” (Tacitus,
_Annal._, III. 44.)--The revolt in question was that of Sacrovir, under
Tiberius.
[67] Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit. Didot.
[68] Although of Germanic origin, like the Nervii, and glorying in it
(Tacitus, _Germania_, 28), the Treviri were often at war with the
Germans. (Cæsar, _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 68.)
[69] PEOPLES OF BELGIC GAUL:
_The Aduatuci_, who occupied a part of the province of Namur.
_The Ambiani_, a people of the department of the Somme. Their chief town
was Samarobriva (_Amiens_).
_The Ambivareti_, established on the left bank of the Meuse, to the
south of the marsh of Peel.
_The Atrebates_, the people of the ancient Artois, and a part of French
Flanders. Their principal _oppidum_ was Nemetocenna (_Arras_).
_The Bellovaci_, occupying the greater part of the department of the
Oise (the ancient Beauvaisis), and who extended, probably, to the sea.
(Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, IV. 17.)
_The Caletes_, whose territory answered to the ancient Pays de Caux (the
western and central part of the department of the Seine-Inférieure).
_The Leuci_, who occupied the southern part of the department of the
Meuse, the greater part of that of the Meurthe, and the department of
the Vosges.
_The Mediomatrices_. They extended from the upper course of the Meuse to
the Rhine (department of the Moselle, and part of the departments of the
Meuse, the Meurthe, the Upper Rhine, and the Lower Rhine).
_The Menapii_, who occupied the territory comprised between the Rhine
and the mouths of the Scheldt.
_The Morini_, who inhabited the western part of the department of the
Pas-de-Calais, and extended to near the mouths of the Scheldt.
_The Nervii_, established between the Sambre and the Scheldt (French and
Belgic Hainaut, provinces of Southern Brabant, of Antwerp, and part of
Eastern Flanders). The writers posterior to Cæsar mention Bagacum
(_Bavay_) as their principal town.
_The Ceutrones_, }
_The Geiduni_, } Clients (or dependents) of the Nervi, whose territories
_The Grudii_, } appear to have been situated on the left of
_The Pleumoxii_, } the Meuse, from Mézières to near Hasselt.
_The Levaci_, }
_The Remi_, whose territory embraced the greater part of the departments
of the Marne and the Ardennes, a fraction of the departments of the
Aisne and the Meuse, and of the province of Luxemburg. Their principal
town was Durocortorum (_Rheims_).
_The Suessiones_, the people of the ancient Soissonais, whose territory
comprised the greater part of the department of the Aisne. Principal
_oppidum_, Noviodunum (_Soissons_).
_The Treviri_, separated from Germany by the Rhine, and occupying the
whole lower basin of the Moselle (Rhenish Luxemburg, Prussia, and
Bavaria). The Treviri had for clients--
_The Condrusi_, established to the south of the Meuse, in the
ancient Condroz, and who reached almost to Aix-la-Chapelle.
_The Eburones_, occupying part of the provinces of Liége and
Limburg, and reaching to the Rhine through the ancient duchy of
Juliers.
_The Ceresi_, }
_The Pæmani_, } whose territories extended on the east of the Meuse,
_The Segni_, } to the north of the Remi and the Treviri.
_The Triboces_, established on both banks of the Rhine, occupied the
central part of the Grand Duchy of Baden and the north of the department
of the Lower Rhine, perhaps already invaded, on the left bank. Their
presence on the left bank of the Rhine appears from Cæsar’s account.
(_De Bello Gallico_, IV. 10.)
_The Veliocasses_, whose territory embraced the ancient Vexin, and who
occupied part of the departments of the Seine-Inférieure and the Eure.
_The Veromandui_, occupying the ancient Vermandois, the northern part of
the Aisne, and the eastern part of the Somme.
[70] “Qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque præstabant.” (_De Bello
Gallico_, II. 4, and VIII. 6.)
[71] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, IV. xxxi, 17.
[72] PEOPLES OF CELTIC GAUL:
_The Arverni_ extended over a vast region, comprising the present
departments of the Puy-de-Dôme and Cantal, and part of those of the
Allier and the Upper Loire. Gergovia was their principal town. The
Arverni had for clients--
_The Cadurei Eleutheri_, whose territory answered to the ancient Quercy
(department of the Lot). [This epithet of Eleutheri, which is found in
Cæsar (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 75) leads us to believe that in
southern Quercy there existed Cadurci placed under the dominion of
Rome.]
_The Gabali_, who occupied the ancient Gévaudan (the department of the
Lozère).
_The Vellavi_, whose territory answered to the ancient Velay (department
of the Upper Loire).
_The Aulerci_ formed an extensive nation, which was subdivided into
three great tribes, established over the country from the lower course
of the Seine to the Mayenné.
1. _The Aulerci Cenomanni_, a fraction of whom was, as early as the
sixth century of Rome, established in Cisalpine Gaul, between the
Oglio and the Adige, and who occupied in Gaul the greater part of
the territory now forming the department of the Sarthe;
2. _The Aulerci Diablintes_, the northern and central parts of the
department of the Mayenne.
3. _The Aulerci Eburovices_, the central and southern part of the
department of the Eure.
_The Bituriges_, a nation which had more than twenty towns. Avaricum
(_Bourges_) was the principal. Their territory embraced the ancient
Berry (departments of the Cher, the Indre, and part of the Allier).
_The Carnutes_ occupied the greatest part of the present departments of
Eure-et-Loir, Loir-et-Cher, and Loiret. Genabum (_Gien_) was one of
their most important towns.
_The Ædui_ occupied the modern departments of Saône-et-Loire and the
Nièvre, and a part of the Côte-d’Or and the Allier. Their principal
_oppidum_ was Bibracte (_Mont-Beuvray_), the place of which was
subsequently taken by Augustodunum (_Autun_). Cabillonum
(_Chalon-sur-Saône_), Matisco (_Mâcon_), and Noviodunum, afterwards
called Nivernum (_Nevers_), were also reckoned among their most
important places. The _Ædui_ had for clients--
_The Ambarri_, a small tribe situated between the Saône, the Rhone, and
the Ain (department of the Ain).
_The Ambluaretes_, a people occupying a district around Ambierle
(arrondissement of Roanne, department of the Loire). (?)
_The Aulerci Brannovices_, a tribe which dwelt between the Saône and the
Loire, occupied the ancient country of Brionnais.
_The Blannovii_, who occupied a territory round Blanot (Saône-et-Loire).
(?)
_The Boii_, a fraction of a great nomadic nation of this name, of Celtic
origin, authorised by Cæsar to establish themselves on the territory of
the Ædui, between the Loire and the Allier.
_The Segusiavi_, who occupied the ancient Forez (departments of the
Rhône and the Loire), and extended to the left bank of the Saône.
_The Essuvii_, established in the department of the Orne.
_The Helvetii_, who were subdivided into four tribes or _pagi_; their
territory occupied the part of Switzerland which extends from the north
shore of the Léman to the Lake of Constance.
_The Lemovices_, whose territory answered to the Limousin (departments
of the Upper Vienne and the greater part of the Corrèze and the Creuse).
_The Lingones_, whose territory embraced the greatest part of the
department of the Haute-Marne and a fraction of the departments of the
Aube, the Yonne, and the Côte-d’Or.
_The Mandubii_, established between the Ædui and the Lingones
(department of the Côte-d’Or), occupied the ancient country of Auxois.
Alesia (_Alise_) was their principal _oppidum_.
_The Meldœ_ occupied the north of the department of the Seine-et-Marne
and a small part of the department of the Oise.
_The Nitiobriges_ occupied the greatest part of the department of the
Lot-et-Garonne and a fraction of the Tarn-et-Garonne.
_The Parisii_, whose territory embraced the department of the Seine and
a great part of the department of the Seine-et-Oise. Their principal
town was Lutetia (_Paris_).
_The Petrocorii_, established in the ancient Périgord (department of the
Dordogne).
_The Rauraci_, whose origin is perhaps German, established on both banks
of the Rhine, towards the elbow which the river forms at Bâle.
_The Ruteni_ occupied the ancient province of Rouergne (department of
the Aveyron).
_The Senones_, established between the Loire and the Marne. Their
principal town was Agedincum (_Sens_). Their territory comprised a part
of the departments of the Yonne, the Marne, the Loiret, Seine-et-Marne,
and the Aube.
_The Sequani_, whose territory embraced the ancient Franche-Comté (Jura,
Doubs, Haute-Saône, and part of the Haut-Rhin). Principal town, Vesontio
(_Besançon_).
_The Turones_, who occupied Touraine (department of Indre-et-Loire).
The peoples whom Cæsar calls _maritime_, or _Armorican_, were--
_The Ambibari_, established at the point where the departments of
La Manche and Ille-et-Vilaine join.
_The Ambiliates_, whose territory comprised the part of the
department of Maine-et-Loire situated to the south of the Loire.
_The Andes_, occupying Anjon (department of Maine-et-Loire and a
fraction of the department of the Sarthe).
_The Curiosolitæ_, occupying the greatest part of the department of
the Côtes-du-Nord.
_The Lemovices Armorici_, fixed to the south of the Loire, in the
southern part of the department of the Loire-Inférieure and the
west of that of Maine-et-Loire.
_The Lexovii_, occupying the department of Calvados, and a fraction
of that of the Eure.
_The Namnetes_, who occupied, in the department of the
Loire-Inférieure, the right bank of the Loire.
_The Osismii_, whose territory answered to the department of
Finistère.
_The Pictones_, occupying Poitou (departments of La Vendée, the
Deux-Sèvres, and the Vienne).
_The Redones_, whose territory embraced the greatest part of the
department of Ille-et-Vilaine.
_The Santones_, occupying Saintonge, Aunis, and Angoumois
(department of the Charente and the Charente-Inférieure, and a part
of the department of the Gironde).
_The Unelli_, the people of the ancient Contentin (department of La
Manche).
_The Veneti_, whose territory included the department of Morbihan.
To these maritime peoples we must add--
_The Caletes_, }
_The Essuvii_, } mentioned above.
_The Morinu_, }
We may also join to the Celtic populations--
_The Nuntuates_, }
_The Seduni_, } Alpine tribes, established on the upper course of the
_The Veragri_, } Rhone, in the Valais and the Chablais.
[73] Tacitus. _Germania_, 28.
[74] PEOPLES OF AQUITAINE:
_The Ausci_, who occupied the central part of the department of the
Gers, the most powerful of the nations of Aquitaine, according to
Pomponius Mela (III. 2).
_The Bigerriones_ occupied Bigorre (department of the Hautes-Pyrénées).
_The Cocosates_, established on the coasts of the Gulf of Gascony, in
the Landes (the southern part of the department of the Gironde and the
northern of the department of the Landes).
_The Elusates_ occupied the north-west part of the department of the
Gers and part of that of the Lot-et-Garonne.
_The Gates_, at the confluence of the Gers and the Garonne.
_The Garumni_, in the south of the department of the Haute-Garonne.
_The Ptianes_, probably towards Pau and Orthez.
_The Sibuzates_ appear to have occupied the ancient country of Soule
(Basses-Pyrénées).
_The Sotiates_ occupied the south-west part of the department of
Lot-et-Garonne and a part of the departments of the Landes and the Gers.
_The Tarbelli_ occupied all the territory bordering upon the head of the
Gulf of Gascony (departments of the Landes and the Basses-Pyrénées).
_The Tarusates_, established on the Adour, in the ancient Tursan (the
south-east part of the department of the Landes). PEOPLES OF AQUITAINE
(_continued_).
_The Vasates_ or _Vocates_, established in the country of Bazas (the
south-east part of the department of the Gironde).
_The Bituriges Vivisci_, the most northern of the peoples }
of Aquitane (department of the Gironde). }
}
_The Convenes_ (a confederacy of small tribes established } Not mentioned by
in the valleys of the Hautes-Pyrénées and the } Cæsar.
southern part of the department of the Haute-Garonne). }
[75] “Pagus, pars civitatis.” (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 12.)
[76] Cæsar mentions in different pasages the existence of _vici_ among
the Helvetii (I. 5), the Allobroges _trans Rhodanum_ (I. 11), the Remi
(II. 7), the Morini (III. 29), the Menapii (IV. 4), the Eburones (VI.
43), the Boii (VII. 14), the Carnutes (VIII. 5), and the Veragri (III.
1).
[77] _De Bello Gallico_ VII. 15, 25, 68.
[78] The “Commentaries” name twenty-one _oppida_: Alesia, Avaricum,
Bibracte, Bibrax, Bratuspantium, Cabillonum, Genabum, Genava, Gergovia,
Gorgobina, Lutetia, Lemonum, Melodunum, Noviodunum Æduorum, Noviodunum
Biturigum, Noviodunum Suessionum, Uxellodunum, Vellaunodunum, Vesontio,
the _oppidum_ Aduatucorum, and the _oppidum_ Sotiatum.
[79] “Oppidum dictum quod ibi homines opes suas conferunt.” (Paulus
Diaconus, p. 184, edit. Müller.)
[80] The Gauls lived in houses, or rather in huts, constructed of wood
and with hurdles, tolerably spacious and of a circular form, covered
with a high roof. (Strabo, IV. 163, edit. Didot.)--The Gauls, to avoid
the heat, almost always built their habitations in the neighbourhood of
woods and rivers. (Cæsar, _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 30.)
[81] See a very curious passage in Solinus, chap. 25, on the practice of
tattooing among the Gauls.
[82] Diodorus Siculus (V. 28) says that the Gauls were of tall stature,
had white flesh, and were lymphatic in constitution. Some shaved; the
majority had beards of moderate size.--According to Titus Livius, the
Gauls possessed a tall stature (_procera corpora_), flowing hair of an
auburn colour (_promissæ et rutilatæ comæ_), a white complexion
(_candida corpora_). (Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 17, 21, and Ammianus
Marcellinus, XV. 22.) The latter adds that the Gauls had generally a
threatening and terrible tone of voice, which is also stated by Diodorus
Siculus (V. 31).--The skeletons found in the excavations at
Saint-Etienne-au-Temple are 1·80m. to 1·90m. in length.
[83] Strabo, p. 163, edit. Didot.
[84] Isidorus Hispalensis, _Origines_, I. 19, 24.
[85] Diodorus Siculus, V. 30.
[86] Diodorus Siculus, V. 33.
[87] Pliny, XXXIII. 24.--Gold was very abundant in Gaul; silver was much
less common. The rich wore bracelets, rings on the leg, and collars, of
the purest gold and tolerably massive; they had even breastplates of
gold. (Diodorus Siculus, V. 27.)--A great number of these rings and
circles of gold, of very good workmanship, have been found in the
Gaulish burying-places. The Museum of Saint-Germain contains bracelets
and earrings of chased gold, found, in 1863, in a tumulus situated near
Châtillon-sur-Seine.
[88] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 14.
[89] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 13.
[90] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, VIII. xlviii. lxxiii., p. 127, edit. Sillig.
[91] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 22.--Pliny, XXXIV. xvii., p. 162, edit.
Sillig.
[92] “Deinde et argentum incoquere simili modo cœpere, equorum maxime
ornamentis, jumentorumque ac jugorum, in Alesia oppido.” (Pliny, XXXIV.
xvii., p. 162.--Florus, III. 2.)
[93] Milk and the flesh of wild or domestic animals, especially swine’s
flesh fresh or salted, formed the principal food of the Gauls. (Strabo,
IV., p. 163.)--Beer and mead were the principal drink of the Gauls.
(Posidonius quoted by Athenæus, IV., p. 151, _Fragmenta Historicum
Græc._, III. 260.)--This statement is made also by Diodorus Siculus (V.
26), who informs us that this beer was made with barley.
[94] Cicero already remarked the propensity of the Gauls to drunkenness
(_Orat. pro Fonteio_), and Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 12) also addresses
the same reproach to them, which is again stated in Diodorus Siculus (V.
26).
[95] “The Gauls, in their great hospitality, invited the stranger to
their meal as soon as he presented himself, and it was only after
drinking and eating with them that they inquired his name and country.”
(Diodorus Siculus, V. 28.)
[96] Strabo (IV., p. 162) says that the Gauls were of a frank character
and good-hearted (literally, without malice).--Ammianus Marcellinus (XV.
12), who wrote at the end of the fifth century, represents the Gauls as
excessively vain.--Strabo (IV., p. 165) assures us that they were much
inclined to disputes and quarrels.
[97] Cæsar often speaks of the fickleness of temper of this people,
which, during a long period, gave great trouble to the Roman people.
“Omnes fere Gallos novis rebus studere, et ad bellum mobiliter
celeriterque excitari.” (_De Bello Gallico_, III 10.)--Lampridius, in
his _Life of Alexander Severus_, 59, expresses himself thus: “But the
Gauls, those tempers hard to deal with, and who regret all they have
ceased to possess, often furnished grave cares to the
emperors.”--“Gallorum subita et repentina consilia.” (_De Bello
Gallico_, III. 8.)
[98] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 19.
[99] Diodorus Siculus (V. 31) says that the language of the Gauls was
very concise and figurative, and that the Gauls made use of hyperbole in
blaming and praising.
[100] Diodorus Siculus, V. 32.--Strabo, IV., p. 165.--Athenæus, XIII.,
p. 603.
[101] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 47 and 48.--Among the Gauls, the women
were equal to the men, not only in size, but also in courage. (Diodorus
Siculus, V. 32.)--The Gaulish women were tall and strong.--Ammianus
Marcellinus (XV. 12) writes: “Several foreigners together could not
wrestle against a single Gaul, if they quarrelled with him, especially
if he called for help to his wife, who even exceeds her husband in her
strength and in her haggard eyes. She would become especially formidable
if, swelling her throat and gnashing her teeth, she agitated her arms,
robust and white as snow, ready to act with feet or fists; to give blows
as vigorous as if they came from a catapult.”
[102] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 18: “Ab Dite patre prognatos.”
[103] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 18.
[104] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 19.
[105] The Gauls, like most of the barbarian peoples, looked upon the
other life as resembling the present. And with this sentiment, at the
funeral, they threw into the funereal pile, letters addressed to the
dead, which they imagined he read. (Diodorus Siculus, V. 28.)
[106] Titus Livius tells us (XXXVIII. 17) that the Gauls had long swords
(_prælongi gladii_) and great bucklers (_vasta scuta_). In another
passage (XXII. 46) he remarks that the swords of the Gauls were long and
without point (_prælongi ac sine mucronibus_).--Their bucklers were
long, narrow, and flat (_scuta longa, cœterum ad amplitudinem corporum
parum lata et ea ipsa plana_). (Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 21.)--“Et Biturix
longisque leves Suessones in armis.” (Lucan, _Pharsalia_, I.
422.)--Didorus Siculus (V. 30) says that the Gauls had iron coats of
mail. He adds: “Instead of glaive (ξἱφος), they have long swords
(σπἁθη), which they carry suspended to their right side by chains of
iron or bronze. Some bind their tunics with gilt or silvered girdles.
They have spears (λὁγχη or λογχἱς) having an iron blade a cubit long,
and sometimes more. The breadth is almost two palms, for the blade of
these _saunions_ (the Gaulish dart) is not less than that of our glaive,
and it is a little longer. Of these blades, some are forged straight,
others present undulated curves, so that they not only cut in striking,
but in addition they tear the wound when they are drawn out.”
[107] Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit. Didot.--Pseudo-Cicero (_Ad Herennium_,
IV. 32) writes _materis_.
[108] The _amentum_ was a small strap of leather which served to throw
the javelin and doubled its distance of carriage, as recent trials have
proved. In the _De Bello Gallico_, V. 48, there is mention of a Gaul
throwing the javelin with the _amentum_; but this Gaul was in the Roman
service, which explains his having more perfect arms. Strabo says that
the Gauls used javelins like the Roman _velites_, but that they threw
them with the hand, and not by means of a strap. (Strabo, edit. Didot,
II. 65.)
[109] Diodorus Siculus, V. 30.
[110] Diodorus Siculus, V. 30.--Varro, _De Lingua Latina_, V. 116.--The
Museum of Zurich possesses a Gaulish breastplate formed of long plates
of iron. The Louvre and the Museum of Saint-Germain possess Gaulish
breastplates in bronze.
[111] “Optimus excusso Lucus Remusque lacerto.” (Lucan, _Pharsalia_, I.
424.)
[112] “Pugnaces pictis cohibebant Lingonas armis.” (Lucan, _Pharsalia_,
I. 398.)
[113] Strabo, IV., p. 163, edit. Didot.
[114] Pausanias (_Phocid._, XIX. 10, 11), speaking of the ancient Gauls,
who had penetrated to Delphi, says that “each horseman had with him two
esquires, who were also mounted on horses; when the cavalry was engaged
in combat, these esquires were poised behind the main body of the army,
either to replace the horsemen who were killed, or to give their horse
to their companion if he lost his own, or to take his place in case he
were wounded, while the other esquire carried him out of the battle.”
[115] _De Bello Civili_, I. 39.
[116] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 20 and VII. 22.
[117] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 21 and VII. 22.
[118] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 14.
[119] Diodorus Siculus, V. 29.--See the bas-reliefs from Entremonts in
the Museum of Aix, representing Gaulish horsemen, whose horses have
human heads suspended to the poitrel.
[120] Cæsar, _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 5; VII. 3.
[121] Titus Livius (V. 46) represents the Gauls as very religious.
[122] The existence of human sacrifices among the Gauls is attested by a
great number of authors. (Cicero, _Orat. pro Fonteio_, xiv.
31.--Dionysius of Halicarnassus, I. 38.--Lucan, _Pharsalia_, I. 444;
III. 399, _et seq._--Solinus, 21.--Plutarch, _De Superstitione_, p.
171.--Strabo, IV., p. 164, edit. Didot.)
[123] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 17.
[124] _Pharsalia_, I., lines 445, 446.
[125] “So, in spite of their love of money, the Gauls never touched the
piles of gold deposited in the temples and sacred woods, so great was
their horror of sacrilege.” (Diodorus Siculus, V. 27.)
[126] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 13, _et seq._
[127] “The Gauls have poets who celebrate in rhythmic words, on a sort
of lyre, the high deeds of heroes, or who turn to derision disgraceful
actions.” (Diodorus Siculus, V. 31.) And he adds: “They have
philosophers and theologians, who are held in great honour, and are
named _Druids_ (according to certain texts, _Saronides_). They have
diviners, whose predictions are held in great respect. These consult the
future by the aid of auguries and the entrails of the victims; and, in
solemn circumstances, they have recourse to strange and incredible
rites. They immolate a man by striking him with a sword above the
diaphragm, and they draw presages from the manner in which he falls, in
which he struggles, or in which the blood flows. They authority of the
Druids and bards is not less powerful in peace than in war. Friends and
enemies consult them, and submit to their decision; it has often been
sufficient to arrest two armies on the point of engaging.”--Strabo (VI.,
p. 164, edit. Didot) relates nearly the same facts. He makes a
distinction also between the bards, the priests, and the Druids.
[128] Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. 9) speaks as follows of the ancient
Druids: “The men of that country (Gaul), having become gradually
polished, caused the useful studies to flourish which the bards, the
_euhages_ (prophets), and the Druids had begun to cultivate. The bards
sang, in heroic verse, to the sound of their lyres, the lofty deeds of
men; the _euhages_ tried, by meditation, to explain the order and
marvels of nature. In the midst of these were distinguished the Druids,
who united in a society, occupied themselves with profound and sublime
questions, raised themselves above human affairs, and sustained the
immortality of the soul.” These details, which Ammianus Marcellinus
borrows from the Greek historian Timagenes, a contemporary of Cæsar, and
from other authors, show that the sacerdotal caste comprised three
classes--1, the bards; 2, the prophets; 3, the Druids, properly so
called.
[129] Amédée Thierry, II. 1.
[130] See Paulus Diaconus, p. 4, edit. Müller.
[131] Diodorus Siculus, V. 29.
[132] _De Bello Gallico_; III. 22.
[133] Cæsar mentions the names of ten kings: 1. Catamantalœdes, among
the Sequani (I. 3); 2. Divitiacus and Galba, among the Suessiones (II.
4, 13): 3. Commius, among the Atrebates (IV. 21, 27, 35; V. 22; VI. 6;
VII. 75, 76, 79; VIII. 6, 7, 10, 21, 23, 47, 48); 4. Catuvolcus, among
the Eburones (V. 24, 26; VI. 31); 5. Tasgetius, among the Carnutes (V.
25, 29); 6. Cavarinus, among the Treviri (V. 54; VI. 5); 7. Ambiorix,
among the Eburones (V. 24, 26, 27, 29, 38, 41; VI. 5, 6, 19, 29, 30, 31,
32, 42, 47; VIII. 24, 25); 8. Moritasgus, among the Senones (V. 54); 9.
Teutomatus, among the Nitiobriges (VII. 31, 46).
[134] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 88; VIII. 12.
[135] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 16.
[136] Thus the _Civitates Armoricæ_ (V. 53; VII. 75; VIII. 81); Belgium
(V. 12, 24, 25; VIII. 46, 49, 54; the Aulerci Cenomanni and the Aulerci
Eburovices (II. 34; III. 17; VII. 4, 75; VIII. 7). See the interesting
memoir by Mr. Valentino Smith.
[137] Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Æduorum (I. 11); Suessiones
fratres consanguineosque Remorum, qui eodem jure et iisdem legibus
utuntur (II. 3); Suessiones qui Remis erant adtributi (VIII. 6).
[138] _In fide_; thus the Ædui with the Bellovaci (II. 14); with the
Senones (VI. 4); with the Bituriges (VII. 5).
[139] Eburonum et Condrusorum, qui sunt Trevirorum clientes (IV. 6);
Carnutes ... usi deprecatoribus Remis, quorum erant in clientela (VI.
4); imperant Æduis atque eorum clientibus Segusiavis, Ambluaretis,
Aulercis Brannovicibus, Brannoviis (VII. 75)
[140] The known federations of this kind are--1, that of the Belgæ
against the Romans, in the year 57 before Jesus Christ (_De Bello
Gallico_, II. 4); 2, that of the Veneti with the neighbouring tribes, in
the year 56 (_De Bello Gallico_, III. 9); 3, that of the Treviri, the
Nervii, The Aduatuci, and the Menapii, in the year 53 (_De Bello
Gallico_, VI. 2); 4, that of the peoples who invested Camulogenus with
the supreme power, in 52 (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 57); 5, the great
federation which placed all the forces of Gaul under the command of
Vercingetorix (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 63).
[141] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 11.
[142] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 11.
[143] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 3, 54; VI. 11; VII. 75; VIII. 22.
[144] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 30.
[145] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 63.
[146] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 11.
[147] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 12.
[148] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 4.
[149] _Précis des Guerres de César_, by the Emperor Napoleon I., p. 53,
Paris, 1836.
[150] The hostility which prevailed between the Sequani and the Ædui was
further augmented, according to Strabo, by the following cause: “These
two tribes, separated by the Arar (the _Saône_), both claimed the right
of tolls.” (Strabo, p. 160, edit. Didot.)
[151] “Divitiacus, introduced to the Senate, explained the subject of
his mission. He was offered a seat, but refused that honour, and
pronounced his discourse leaning on his buckler.” (Eumenius, _Panegyric
of Constantine_, cap. 3.)
[152] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 12.
[153] The limits of Illyria, in the time of Cæsar, are hardly known; yet
it appears that this province comprised the modern Istria and part of
Carniola. Aquileia was its capital, situated at the head of the gulf of
the Adriatic Sea, not far from the Isonzo. In fact, Strabo (I., p. 178)
says that Aquileia was situated without the frontiers of the Veneti, in
whose territory this town was included under Augustus. On another side,
Titus Livius (XXXIX. 55) informs us that the colony of Aquileia had been
founded in Istria; and Herodotus (I. 196), as well as Appian, reckons
the Istrians among the peoples of Illyria.
[154] “Molita cibaria.” (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 5.)
[155] Inhabitants of the country of Bâle. The Rauraci inhabited the
diocese of Bâle, which was called _Augusta Rauracorum_.
[156] Inhabitants of the south of the Grand Duchy of Baden. The town of
Stulingen, near Schaffhausen, is believed to derive its name from the
Tulingi.
[157] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 3, 4, and 5.--Scholars have taken great
pains to determine the concordance between the ante-Julian calendar and
the Julian calendar; unfortunately, the results at which they have
arrived are very imperfect. We have asked M. Le Verrier to solve this
difficult problem, and we owe to his courtesy the tables placed at the
end of this volume. (_Appendix A._)
[158] The bed of the Rhone has changed at several points since the time
of Cæsar; at present, according to the report of those who live on its
banks, there are no fords except between Russin, on the right bank, and
the mill of Vert, on the left bank. (_See Plate 3._)
[159] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 6.
[160] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 18.
[161] This part of the Jura on the left bank of the Rhone is called the
_Mont du Vuache_.
[162] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 8.
[163] M. Queypo, in his learned work on the weights and measures of the
ancients, assigns to the Roman foot, subdivided into twelve inches, a
length of 0·29630m. The Roman pace was five feet, so that the mile was
equivalent to a length of 1481·50m.
[164] Dio Cassius says that “Cæsar fortified with retrenchments and
walls the most important points.” (XXXVIII. 31.)
[165] The retrenchments which Cæsar calls _murus fossaque_ could not be
a wall, in the usual acceptation of the word: first, because a wall
would have been but a weak obstacle; further, because the materials were
not found on the spot; and lastly, because if so great a quantity of
stones had been collected on the bank of the Rhone, we should still find
traces of them. I have therefore sought another explanation, and thought
that _murus_ might be understood of a natural escarpment rendered
steeper by a slight work. Penetrated with this idea, I sought Baron
Stoffel, the commandant of artillery, to inspect the localities, and the
result of his researches has fully confirmed my suppositions. The
following is a summary of his report:--
Considered in its _ensemble_, from Geneva to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, the
Rhone presents the appearance of an immense fosse from 100 to 120 mètres
broad, with abrupt and very elevated scarp and counter-scarp. The parts
where it does not present this character are few, and of relatively
small extent. They are the only ones where operations for passing the
river could be attempted--the only ones, consequently, which Cæsar would
have need to fortify on the left bank.
1. From Geneva to the confluence of the Arve and the Rhone, an extent of
1½ kilomètres. Breadth of the river, 90 to 100 mètres.--The left bank is
flat in the whole of this extent. The right bank has escarpments almost
vertical, the height of which varies from 15 to 35 mètres. (_See Plate
3_, mean profile between Geneva and the Arve.) No attempt at passage
could have taken place, neither at Geneva, nor between the town and the
Arve.
2. From the Arve to the plateau of Aire-la-Ville, extent 12½
kilomètres.--After leaving the confluence of the Arve, the heights of
the right bank of the Rhone increase in elevation; the escarpments
become formidable.--The left bank is bordered with similar escarpments,
and the river runs thus between high and abrupt banks, everywhere
impassable. It preserves this character to a kilomètre above the ravine
of Avril, near Peney. The profiles _a a_ and _b b_ give an idea of the
escarpments of the banks from the Avre to the ravine of Avril. (_See
Plate 3_.)--The heights which, on the right bank of the Rhone, extend
from Vernier to Peney, sink gradually from one of these villages towards
the other, and they form to the east of the ravine of Avril a plateau,
the mean elevation of which above the bed of the river is only 20
mètres. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the plateau of
Aire-la-Ville. Length 1,700 mètres; breadth, 700 mètres; mean elevation
above the bed of the Rhone, 20 to 25 mètres. The heights of the Peney
are well disposed for the establishment of an army, and the plateau of
Aire-la-Ville would permit an army, the Rhone once passed, to deploy
easily. But, in spite of these advantages, it is certain that the
Helvetii attempted no operation on this side, for the Rhone flows at the
foot of a slope of the height of from 14 to 16 mètres and an inclination
of at least 45 degrees.
3. From the plateau of Aire-la-Ville to the point of Epeisses, extent 6
kilomètres.--Down the river from the escarpments of Peney, the heights
of the right bank (heights of Russin) form with those of the left bank
an immense amphitheatre, nearly circular, the arena of which would be
the ground represented green on Plate 3 (diameter, 1½ kilomètres). From
the heights of Russin we can descend into the plain to the water of the
river. The Rhone, in this part, has never been deep or rapid. The left
bank is little elevated, entirely flat opposite the mill of Vert, and
the slope of the heights which command it is far from impracticable.
Thus, it was here possible for the Helvetii to effect the passage of the
river, and climb the heights of the left bank, if they had not been
fortified or guarded. This operation presented least difficulty in the
part _t t o_. And we can hardly doubt that the Romans fortified it to
add to the natural obstacles, which were insufficient in this extent.
(_See the profile c c._)
An attentive examination of the locality, the discovery of certain
irregularities of ground, which we may be allowed to consider as
vestiges, lead us to explain in the following manner the expression
_murum fossamque perducit_.
Cæsar took advantage of the mean heights at the foot of which the Rhone
flows, to cause to be made, on the slope towards the river, and
beginning with the crest, a longitudinal trench, of such a depth that
the main wall had an elevation of 16 feet. The earth arising from the
excavation was thrown down the side of the slope, and the crest was
furnished with palisades. (_See the profile of the retrenchment._) It
was, properly speaking, a fosse, the scarp of which was higher than the
counter-scarp.
The hills on the left bank, which rise opposite Russin, are accessible,
especially in an extent of 900 mètres, reckoning from the point where
the ravine which descends to Aire-la-Ville opens upon the river. They
form there, among other peculiarities of the ground, a terrace 8 mètres
in breadth, rising from 13 to 14 mètres above the plain, and descending
to this by a tolerably uniform _talus_ of 45 degrees.
The Romans would be able to prevent the access by means of the trench
just described. They, no doubt, continued it to the point _o_, where the
terrace ceases, and the heights become impracticable. It would then have
been from 800 to 900 mètres long.
If we continue to descend the Rhone, we meet, on the left bank, first
with the perpendicular escarpments of Cartigny, which are 70 or 80
mètres in height, and then abrupt beaches to near Avully. Below
Cartigny, the Rhone surrounds a little plain, very slightly inclined
towards the river, and presenting a projection of land (_v r_) from 5 to
6 mètres high, with a _talus_ of less than 45 degrees. The bank being of
small elevation, the Helvetii might have landed there. To prevent this,
the Romans opened, in the _talus_ which fronted the Rhone, a trench
similar to the preceding; it was 250 mètres long.
The heights of Avully and Epeisses leave between them and the river a
tolerably vast space, composed of two distinct parts. The first is
formed of gentle slopes from Avully to a projection of land, _q p_; the
other part is a plain comprised between this projection of land and the
left bank of the river. On the right bank a torrent-like river, the
London, debouches into flat ground named La Plaine. The Helvetii might
have made their preparations for passing the Rhone there, and directed
their efforts towards the western point of La Plaine, in face of the low
and flat land comprised between the left bank and the escarpment _q p_.
In this part the left bank is only from 1½ to 2 mètres high. Moreover,
the slopes of Avully are not difficult to climb, and therefore the
Romans must have sought to bar the passage in this direction. (_See the
broken profile d e f._) The escarpment _q p_, from its position and
height, is easy to fortify. Its length is 700 mètres; its mean elevation
above the plain, 18. It presents to the river a _talus_ of less than 45
degrees. The Romans made in this _talus_, along the crest, a trench,
forming wall and fosse. Its length was 700 mètres.
4. From the point of Epeisses to the escarpments of Etournel, extent 6
kilomètres.--From Epeisses to Chancy the Rhone flows in a straight line,
and presents the appearance of a vast fosse, 100 mètres wide, the walls
of which have an inclination of more than 45 degrees. (_See the profile
g g_.)
At 200 mètres above Chancy, at _k_, the character of the banks changes
suddenly. The heights on the right sink towards the river in tolerably
gentle slopes, through an extent of 2,300 mètres, reckoning from _k_ to
the escarpments of Etournel. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the
plateau of Chancy. It presents to the Rhone, from _k_ to _z_, in a
length of 1,400 mètres, an irregular crest, distant from 50 to 60 mètres
from the river, and commanding it by about 20 mètres. The side towards
the Rhone, from _k_ to _z_, presents slopes which are very practicable.
(_See the profile h h._)
The position of Chancy was certainly the theatre of the most serious
attempts on the part of the Helvetii. Encamped on the heights of the
right bank, they could easily descend to the Rhone, and there make their
preparations for passing, on an extent of 1,500 mètres. The river once
crossed, they had only before them, from _k_ to _z_, slopes which were
practicable to debouch on the plateau of Chancy.
The Romans had then to bar the gap _k z_ by joining the impassable
escarpments which terminate in _k_ with those which commence at _z_, and
which are also inaccessible. To effect this, they opened from one of
these points to the other, in the upper part of the slope at the foot of
which the Rhone flows, a longitudinal trench _k z_, similar to that
already spoken of. It was 1,400 mètres in length.
5. From the escarpments of Etournel to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, an extent of
6 kilomètres.--At the escarpments of Etournel, the Rhone removes from
the heights on the right, and only returns to them towards the hamlet of
the Isles, 2 kilomètres farther down. These heights form a vast
semi-elliptical amphitheatre, embracing a plain slightly inclined
towards the river. It is marked by a green tint on Plate 3. People can
descend from all sides and approach the Rhone, the bank of which is
flat. Opposite, the left bank presents insurmountable obstacles until
below Cologny, at _s_. But below this point, from _s_ to _y_, the bank
is flat, and the heights situated behind are accessible on an extent of
2 kilomètres.
The Helvetii, established on the heights of Pougny and Colonges, could
descend to the Rhone, and cross it between Etournel and the hamlet of
Les Isles. The Romans had thus to unite the escarpments which terminate
at Cologny with the impracticable slopes of the mountain of Le Vuache.
Here again we shall see that they took advantage of the peculiarities of
the ground.
At the village of Cologny, the heights form a triangular plateau, _s u
x_, of which the point _s_ advances like a promontory towards the Rhone,
which it commands perpendicularly by at least 20 mètres. A projection of
land, _s u_, bounds it in front, and separates it from a plain which
extends to the river. The escarpment produced by this projection of land
presents to the Rhone a slope of about 45 degrees. It rises over the
plain about 14 mètres towards its extremity _s_, but diminishes
gradually in height, until it is only 2 to 3 mètres in height near the
point _u_. (_See the profile n n._) The Romans hollowed, on the slope of
the escarpment from _s_ to _u_, a length of 800 mètres, a trench forming
wall and fosse. The plateau of Cologny, situated in the rear, offered a
favorable position for the defence of this retrenchment. (_See the
profile p p._) They prolonged their works towards the west as far as
_y_; beyond that, the heights presented sufficient natural obstacles. We
may thus estimate that, from Cologny to the mountain of Le Vuache, the
Romans executed from 1,600 to 1,700 mètres of retrenchments.
To sum up: the works executed on five principal points, between Geneva
and the Jura, represent a total length of about 5,000 mètres, that is,
less than the sixth part of the development of the course of the Rhone.
Admitting that Cæsar had at his disposal 10,000 men, we may suppose that
he distributed them in the following manner:--3,000 men on the heights
of Avully, his head-quarters; 2,500 at Geneva; 1,000 on the plateau of
Aire-la-Ville; 2,000 at Chancy; and 1,500 on the plateau of Cologny.
These 10,000 men might be concentrated: in two hours, on the heights
between Aire-la-Ville and Cartigny; in three hours, on the heights of
Avully; in three hours and a half, on the plateau of Chancy; in three
hours and a half, these troops, with the exception of those encamped at
Geneva, might be brought together between Cologny and the fort of
L’Ecluse. It would require five hours to carry the detachment from
Geneva thither.
The detachments mentioned above, with the exception of that of Geneva,
were established in what Cæsar calls the _castella_. These were
constructed on the heights, in the proximity of the retrenchments which
had to be defended--namely, at Aire-la-Ville, Avully, Chancy, and
Cologny. They consisted probably of earthen redoubts, capable of
containing a certain number of troops. They are represented by squares
in Plate 3.
Cæsar could reconnoitre every instant the march and designs of the
Helvetii, the heights of the left bank of the Rhone presenting a great
number of positions where it was easy to place advantageously posts of
observation. Commandant Stoffel has pointed out six, which are marked on
Plate 3. As it will be observed, the Helvetii, in crossing the Rhone,
could not be disturbed by darts thrown from the top of the
retrenchments, for these darts would not carry to the left bank of the
river. Now there exists at present, between this bank and the foot of
the heights in which these trenches were cut, flat ground of more or
less extent. Admitting, then, that the Rhone flowed nineteen centuries
ago in the same bed as at the present day, we may ask if the Romans did
not construct, in these low parts near the bank, ordinary retrenchments,
composed of a fosse and rampart. The excavations undertaken by the
Commandant Stoffel have revealed everywhere, in these plains, the
existence of ground formed by alluvium, which would lead us to believe
that the Rhone once covered them. However, even if at that epoch these
little plains had been already uncovered, either wholly or in part, we
can hardly suppose that Cæsar would have raised works there, since the
heights situated in the rear permitted him, with less labour, to create
a more redoubtable defence--that of the trenches opened along the
crests. As we see, the obstacle presented to the assailants began only
with these trenches, at the top of the slopes.
As to the vestiges which still appear to exist, they may be described as
follows. The slopes which the Romans fortified at Chancy, from _k_ to
_z_, and at Cologny, from _s_ to _y_, present, in the upper parts, in
some places, undulations of ground, the form of which denotes the work
of man. On the slope of Chancy, for instance, the ground presents a
projection, _i i_ (_see the profile h h_), very distinctly marked, and
having the remarkable peculiarity that it is about 11 feet high and 8 to
9 feet broad. Now, is it not evident that, if one of the fosses which
have been described should get filled up, either naturally, by the
action of time, or by the processes of agriculture, it would take
absolutely the form _i i_, with the dimensions just indicated? It would
not, therefore, be rash to consider these peculiarities of the ground,
such as _i i_, as traces of the Roman trenches.
We must further mention the projection of land _v r_, situated below
Cartigny. Its form is so regular, and so sharply defined, from the crest
to the foot of the _talus_, that it is difficult not to see in it the
vestiges of a work made by men’s hands.
It is easy to estimate approximately the time which it would have taken
Cæsar’s troops to construct the 5,000 mètres of trenches which extended,
at separate intervals, from Geneva to the Jura.
Let us consider, to fix our ideas, a ground A D V, inclined at 45
degrees, in which is to be made the trench A B C D. The great wall A B C
had 16 Roman feet in elevation: we will suppose that A B was inclined at
5 on 1, and that the small wall D C was 6 feet high.
The amount of rubbish removed would be as follows:--Section A B C D = 64
square feet, or, reducing it into square mètres, A B C D = 5 square
mètres 60 centimètres.
The mètre in length of the earth thrown out would give thus 5·60 cubic
mètres.
If we consider the facility of labour in the trench, since the earth has
only to be thrown down the slope, we shall see that two men can dig
three mètres in length of this trench in two days. Therefore, admitting
that the 10,000 men at Cæsar’s disposal had only been employed a quarter
of the time, from two to three days would have been sufficient for the
execution of the complete work.
[166] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 8.
[167] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 9.--The country of the Sequani comprised
the Jura, and reached to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse. (_See Plate 2_, Map of
Gaul.)
[168] It has been considered to have been an error of Cæsar to place the
Santones in the proximity of the Tolosates: modern researchers have
proved that the two peoples were not more than thirty or forty leagues
from each other.
[169] Several authors have stated wrongly that Cæsar went into Illyria;
he informs us himself (_De Bello Gallico_, III. 7) that he went thither
for the first time in the winter of 698.
[170] We believe, with General de Gœler, from the itinerary marked on
the Peutingerian table, that the troops of Cæsar passed by Altinum
(_Altino_), Mantua, Cremona, Laus Pompei (_Lodi Vecchio_), Pavia, and
Turin; but, after quitting this last place, we consider that they
followed the route of Fenestrella and Ocelum. Thence they directed their
march across the Cottian Alps, by Cesena and Brigantium (_Briançon_);
then, following the road indicated by the Theodosian table, which
appears to have passed along the banks of the Romanche, they proceeded
to Cularo (_Grenoble_), on the frontier of the Vocontii, by Stabatio
(_Chahotte_ or _Le Monestier_, Hautes-Alpes), Durotineum
(_Villards-d’Arenne_), Melloseeum (_Misoen_ or _Bourg-d’Oysans_, Isère),
and Catorissium (_Bourg-d’Oysans_ or _Chaource_, Isère).
[171] “Locis superioribus occupatis.” (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 10.)
[172] There is difference of opinion as to the site of Ocelum. The
following remark has been communicated to me by M.E. Celesia, who is
preparing a work on ancient Italy: _Ocelum_ only meant, in the ancient
Celtic or Iberian language, _principal passage_. We know that, in the
Pyrenees, these passages were called _ports_. There existed places of
the name of _Ocelum_, in the Alps, in Gaul, and as far as Spain.
(Ptolemy, II. 6.)--The itineraries found in the baths of Vicarello
indicate, between Turin and Susa, an _Ocelum_, which appears to us to
have been that of which Cæsar speaks; there was a place similarly named
in Maurienne, on the left bank of the Arc, at an equal distance from the
source of that river and the town of Saint-Jean; it is now _Usseglio_.
There was another in the valley of the Lanzo, on the left bank of the
Gara, from which appears to be derived the name of Garaceli or
Graioceli; it was called _Ocelum Lanciensium_. The Ocelum of Cæsar,
according to M. Celesia, who adopts the opinion of D’Anville, was called
_Ocelum ad Clusonem fluvium_; it was situated in the valley of the
Pragelatto, on the road leading from Pignerol to the defile of
Fenestrella. This place has continued to preserve its primitive name of
_Ocelum_, _Occelum_, _Oxelum_, _Uxelum_ (_Charta Adeladis_, an. 1064),
whence by corruption its modern name of _Usseau_. According to this
hypothesis, Cæsar would have passed from the valley of Chiusone into
that of Pragelatto, and thence, by Mount Genèvre, to Briançon, in order
to arrive among the Vocontii.--Polyænus (_Stratag._, VIII. xxiii. 2)
relates that Cæsar took advantage of a mist to escape the mountaineers.
[173] “Segusiavi sunt trans Rhodanum primi.” (_De Bello Gallico_, I.
10.) It is to be supposed that there existed a bridge on the Rhone, near
Lyons.
[174] Cæsar had deferred his reply till the Ides of April (April the
8th). If it were then decided to bring the legions from Aquileia, the
time necessary to bring them would have been as follows:
6 days employed by the couriers to proceed from Geneva to Aquileia.
This time does not appear to us too short, since Cæsar had employed
8 days to go from Rome to Geneva, and that the distance from Geneva
to Aquileia is only 1,000 kilomètres, while it is 1,200 from Geneva
to Rome;
8 days to assemble the legions--in 581, it required only eleven
days to enroll four legions (Titus Livius, XLIII. 45);
28 days from Aquileia to Ocelum (_Usseau_) (681 kilom.)reckoning 24
kilomètres for a day’s march;
6 days’ halts;
7 days from Ocelum to Grenoble (174 kilom.) (_De Bello Gallico_, I.
10);
5 days from Grenoble to Lyons (126 kilom.)
--
60
According to this reckoning, Cæsar required 60 days, reckoning from the
moment when he decided on this course, to transport his legions from
Aquileia to Lyons; that is to say, if he sent, as is probable, couriers
on the 8th of April, the day he refused the passage to the Helvetii, the
head of his column arrived at Lyons towards the 7th of June.
[175] To estimate the volume and weight represented by the provisions
for three months for _three hundred and sixty-eight thousand_ persons of
both sexes and of all ages, let us allow that the ration of food was
small, and consisted, we may say, only in a reserve of meal, _trium
mensium molita cibaria_, at an average of ¾ of a pound (¾ of a pound of
meal gives about a pound of bread); at this rate, the Helvetii must have
carried with them 24,840,000 pounds, or 12,420,000 kilogrammes of meal.
Let us allow also that they had great four-wheeled carriages, capable
each of carrying 2,000 kilogrammes, and drawn by four horses. The 100
kilogrammes of unrefined meal makes 2 cubic hectolitres; therefore,
2,000 kilogrammes of meal make 4 cubic mètres, so that this would lead
us to suppose no more than 4 cubic mètres as the average load for the
four-wheeled carriages. On our good roads in France, levelled and paved,
three horses are sufficient to draw, at a walking pace, during ten
hours, a four-wheeled carriage carrying 4,000 kilogrammes. It is more
than 1,300 kilogrammes per collar.
We suppose that the horses of the emigrants drew only 500 kilogrammes in
excess of the dead weight, which would give about 6,000 carriages and
24,000 draught animals to transport the three months’ provisions.
But these emigrants were not only provided with food, for they had also
certainly baggage. It appears to us no exaggeration to suppose that each
individual carried, besides his food, fifteen kilogrammes of baggage on
an average. We are thus left to add to the 6,000 provision carriages
about 2,500 other carriages for the baggage, which would make a total of
8,500 carriages drawn by 34,000 draught animals. We use the word animals
instead of horses, as at least a part of the teams would, no doubt, be
composed of oxen, the number of which would diminish daily, for the
emigrants would be led to use the flesh of these animals for their own
food.
Such a column of 8,500 carriages, supposing them to march in file, one
carriage at a time, on a single road, could not occupy less than
_thirty-two_ leagues in length, if we reckon fifteen mètres to each
carriage. This remark explains the enormous difficulties the emigration
would encounter, and the slowness of its movements: we need, then, no
longer be astonished at the twenty days which it took three quarters of
the column to pass the Saône.
We have not comprised the provisions of grain for the animals
themselves: yet it is difficult to believe that the Helvetii, so
provident for their own wants, had neglected to provide for those of
their beasts, and that they had reckoned exclusively for their food on
the forage they might find on the road.
[176] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 11.
[177] It is an error to translate _Arar, quod per fines Æduorum et
Sequanorum in Rhodamam influit_, by the words, “the Saône, which forms
the common boundary line of the Ædui and the Sequani.” Cæsar always
understands by _fines_, territory, and not boundary line. He expresses
himself very differently when he speaks of a river separating
territories. (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 6, 83; VII. 5.) The expression _per
fines_ thus confirms the supposition that the territories of these two
peoples extended on both sides of the Saône. (_See Plate 2._)
[178] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 12.--The excavations, carried on in 1862
between Trévoux and Riottier, on the plateaux of La Bruyère and
Saint-Bernard, leave no doubt of the place of this defeat. They revealed
the existence of numerous sepulchres, as well Gallo-Roman as Celtic. The
tumuli furnished vases of coarse clay, and many fragments of arms in
silex, ornaments in bronze, iron arrow-heads, fragments of sockets.
These sepultures are some by incineration, others by inhumation. In the
first, the cremation had nowhere been complete, which proves that they
had been burnt hastily, and excludes all notion of an ordinary cemetery.
Two common fosses were divided each into two compartments, one of which
contained cinders, the other human skeletons, thrown in pell-mell,
skeletons of men, women, and children. Lastly, numerous country ovens
line, as it were, the road followed by the Helvetii. These ovens, very
common at the foot of the abrupt hills of Trévoux, Saint-Didier, Frans,
Jassans, and Mizérieux, are found again on the left bank of the Ain and
as far as the neighbourhood of Ambronay.
[179] Cæsar declares, on two different occasions, the fixed design of
the Helvetii to establish themselves in the country of the Santones (I.
9 and 11), and Titus Livius confirms this fact in these words: “Cæsar
Helvetios, gentem vagam, domuit, quæ, sedem quærens, in provinciam
Cæsaris Narbonem iter facere volebat.” (_Epitome_, CIII.) Had they, for
the execution of this project, the choice between several roads (the
word “road” being taken here in the general sense)? Some authors, not
considering the topography of France, have believed that, to go to the
Santones, the Helvetii should have marched by the shortest line, from
east to west, and passed the Loire towards Roanne. But they would have
had first to pass, in places almost impassable, the mountains which
separate the Saône from the Loire, and, had they arrived there, they
would have found their road barred by another chain of mountains, that
of Le Forez, which separates the Loire from the Allier.
The only means of going from the Lower Saône into Saintonge consists in
travelling at first to the north-west towards the sources of the
Bourbince, where is found the greatest depression of the chain of
mountains which separates the Saône from the Loire, and marching
subsequently to the west, to descend towards the latter river. This is
so true, that at an epoch very near to our own, before the construction
of the railways, the public conveyances, to go from Lyons to La
Rochelle, did not pass by Roanne, but took the direction to the
north-west, to Autun, and thence to Nevers, in the valley of the Loire.
We understand, in exploring this mountainous country, why Cæsar was
obliged to confine himself to pursuing the Helvetii, without being ever
able to attack them. We cannot find a single point where he could have
gained upon them by rapidity of movement, or where he could execute any
manœuvre whatever.
[180] The Romans used little precision in the division of time.
Forcellini (_Lex._, voce _Hora_) refers to Pliny and Censorinus. He
remarks that the day--that is, the time between the rising and setting
of the sun--was divided into twelve parts, _at all seasons of the year_,
and the night the same, from which it would result that in summer the
hours of the day were longer than in winter, and _vice versa_ for the
nights.--Galenus (_De San. Tuend._, VI. 7) observed that at Rome the
longest days were equal to fifteen equinoctial hours. Now, these fifteen
hours only reckoning for twelve, it happened that towards the solstice
each hour was more than a quarter longer than towards the equinox. This
remark was not new, for it is found in Plautus. One of his personages
says to a drunkard: “Thou wilt drink four good harvests of Massic wine
in an hour!” “Add,” replied the drunkard, “in an hour of winter.”
(Plautus, _Pseudolus_, v. I, 302, edit. Ritschl.)--Vegetius says that
the soldier ought to make twenty miles in five hours, and notes that he
speaks of hours in summer, which at Rome, according to the foregoing
calculation, would be equivalent to six hours and a quarter towards the
equinox. (Vegetius, _Mil._, I. 9.)
Pliny (_Hist. Nat._, VII. 60) remarks that, “at the time when the Twelve
Tables were compiled, the only divisions of time known were the rising
and setting of the sun; and that, according to the statement of Varro,
the first public solar dial was erected near the rostra, on a column, by
M. Valerius Messala, who brought it from Catania in 491, thirty years
after the one ascribed to Papirius; and that it was in 595 that Scipio
Nasica, the colleague of M. Popilius Lænas, divided the hours of night
and day, by means of a clepsydra or water-clock, which he consecrated
under a covered building.”
Censorinus (_De Die Natali_, xxiii., a book dated in the year 991 of
Rome, or 338 A.D.) repeats, with some additions, the details given by
Pliny. “There is,” he says, “the _natural_ day and the _civil_ day. The
first is the time which passes between the rising and setting of the
sun; on the contrary, the night begins with the setting and ends with
the rising of the sun. The _civil_ day comprises a revolution of the
heaven--that is, a true day and a true night; so that when one says that
a person has lived thirty days, we must understand that he has lived the
same number of nights.
“We know that the day and the night are each divided into twelve hours.
The Romans were three hundred years before they were acquainted with
hours. The word _hour_ is not found in the Twelve Tables. They said in
those times, ‘before or after mid-day.’ Others divided the day, as well
as the night, into four parts--a practice which is preserved in the
armies, where they divide the night into four watches.” Upon these and
other data, M. Le Verrier has had the goodness to draw up a table, which
will be found at the end of the volume, and which indicates the increase
or decrease of the hours with the seasons, and the relationship of the
Roman _watches_ with our modern hours. (_See Appendix B._)
[181] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 22.
[182] They reckon from Villefranche to Remilly about 170 kilomètres.
[183] Each soldier received twenty-five pounds of wheat every fortnight.
[184] It is generally admitted that Bibracte stood on the site of Autun,
on account of the inscription discovered at Autun in the seventeenth
century, and now preserved in the cabinet of antiquities at the
Bibliothèque Impériale. Another opinion, which identifies Bibracte with
Mont Beuvray (a mountain presenting a great surface, situated thirteen
kilomètres to the west of Autun), had nevertheless already found, long
ago, some supporters. It will be remarked first that the Gauls chose for
the site of their towns, when they could, places difficult of access: in
broken countries, these were steep mountains (as Gergovia, Alesia,
Uxellodunum, &c.); in flat countries, they were grounds surrounded by
marshes (such as Avaricum). The Ædui, according to this, would not have
built their principal town on the site of Autun, situated at the foot of
the mountains. It was believed that a plateau so elevated as that of
Mont Beuvray (its highest point is 810 mètres above the sea) could not
have been occupied by a great town. Yet the existence of eight or ten
roads, which lead to this plateau, deserted for so many centuries, and
some of which are in a state of preservation truly astonishing, ought to
have led to a contrary opinion. Let us add that recent excavations leave
no further room for doubt. They have brought to light, over an extent of
120 hectares, foundations of Gaulish towers, some round, others square;
of mosaics, of foundations of Gallo-Roman walls, gates, hewn stones,
heaps of roof tiles, a prodigious quantity of broken amphoræ, a
semicircular theatre, &c.... Everything, in fact, leads us to place
Bibracte on Mont Beuvray: the striking resemblance of the two names, the
designation of Φροὑριον, which Strabo gives to Bibracte, and even the
vague and persistent tradition which, prevailing among the inhabitants
of the district, points to Mont Beuvray as a centre of superstitious
regard.
[185] The cavalry was divided into _turmæ_, and the _turma_ into three
decuries of ten men each.
[186] The word _sarcinæ_, the original sense of which is baggage or
burthens, was employed sometimes to signify the bundles carried by the
soldiers (_De Bello Gallico_, II. 17), sometimes for the heavy baggage
(_De Bello Civili_, I, 81). Here we must take _sarcinæ_ as comprising
both. This is proved by the circumstance that the six legions of the
Roman army were on the hill. Now, if Cæsar had sent the heavy baggage
forward, towards Bibracte, as General de Gœler believes, he would have
sent with it, as an escort, the two legions of the new levy, as he did,
the year following, in the campaign against the Nervii. (_De Bello
Gallico_, II. 19.)
[187] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 24.--In the phalanx, the men of the first
rank covered themselves with their bucklers, overlapping one another
before them, while those of the other ranks held them horizontally over
their heads, arranged like the tiles of a roof.
[188] According to Plutarch (_Cæsar_, 20), he said, “I will mount on
horseback when the enemy shall have taken flight.”
[189] The _pilum_ was a sort of javelin thrown by the hand: its total
length was from 1·70 to 2 mètres; its head was a slender flexible blade
from 0·60 to 1 mètre long, weighing from 300 to 600 grammes, terminating
in a part slightly swelling, which sometimes formed a barbed point.
The shaft, sometimes round, sometimes square, had a diameter of from 25
to 32 millimètres. It was fixed to the head by ferules, or by pegs, or
by means of a socket.
Such are the characteristics presented by the fragments of _pila_ found
at Alise. They answer in general to the descriptions we find in Polybius
(VI. 28), in Dionysius (V. 46), and in Plutarch (_Marius_). _Pila_ made
on the model of those found at Alise, and weighing with their shaft from
700 grammes to 1·200 kilog., have been thrown to a distance of 30 and 40
mètres: we may therefore fix at about 25 mètres the average distance to
which the _pilum_ carried.
[190] _Latere aperto_, the right side, since the buckler was carried on
the left arm. We read, indeed, in Titus Livius: “Et cum in latus
dextrum, quod parebat, Numidæ jacularentur, translatis in dextrum
scutis,” &c. (XXII. 50.)
[191] Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 33) says on this subject that “the Helvetii
were not all on the field of battle, on account of their great number,
and of the haste with which the first had made the attack. Suddenly
those who had remained in the rear came to attack the Romans, when they
were already occupied in pursuing the enemy. Cæsar ordered his cavalry
to continue the pursuit; with his legions, he turned against the new
assailants.”
[192] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 20.
[193] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 26.--Till now the field of battle where
Cæsar defeated the Helvetii has not been identified. The site which we
have adopted, between Luzy and Chides, satisfies all the requirements of
the text of the “Commentaries.” Different authors have proposed several
other localities; but the first cause of error in their reckonings
consists in identifying Bibracte with Autun, which we cannot admit; and
further, not one of these localities fulfils the necessary topographical
conditions. In our opinion, we must not seek the place of engagement to
the east of Bibracte, for the Helvetii, to go from the Lower Saône to
the Santones, must have passed to the west, and not to the east, of that
town. Cussy-la-Colonne, where the field of battle is most generally
placed, does not, therefore, suit at all; and, moreover,
Cussy-la-Colonne is too near to the territory of the Lingones to require
four days for the Helvetii to arrive there after the battle.
[194] “He drove back this people into their country as a shepherd drives
back his flock into the fold.” (Florus, II. x. 3.)
[195] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 29.
[196] Cæsar pursued the Helvetii, taking for auxiliaries about 20,000
Gaulish mountaineers. (Appian, _De Rebus Gallicis_, IV. 15, edit.
Schweigh.)
[197] Appian, _De Bello Celt._, IV. i. 3.
[198] Tacitius (_Germania_, iv. 32.) speaks of this custom of the German
horsemen of fighting on foot. Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) ascribes this
practice to the Bastarni (the Moldavians.)
[199] Appian, _De Bello Celt._, IV. i. 3.
[200] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 1, 2, 3.--General de Gœler, in our
opinion, extends the territory of the Ubii much too far to the south.
[201] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 25.--This statement agrees well enough
with the length of the Black Forest and the Odenwald, which is sixty
leagues.
[202] It is difficult to fix with precision the localities inhabited at
this period by the German peoples, for they were nearly all nomadic, and
were continually pressing one upon another. Cæsar, in his fourth book
_De Bello Gallico_ (cap. I), asserts that the Suevi never occupied the
same territory more than one year.
[203] Strabo (VII., p. 244) relates, after Posidonius, that the Boii had
inhabited first the Hercynian forest; elsewhere he says (V. 177) that
the Boii established themselves among the Taurisci, a people dwelling
near Noricum. The same author (VII. 243) places the solitudes inhabited
by the Boii to the east of Vindelicia (_Southern Bavaria and Western
Austria_). Lastly, he says (IV. 471) that the Rhætii and the Vindelicii
are the neighbours of the Helvetii and the Boii. The Nemetes and the
Vangiones subsequently passed over to the left bank of the Rhine,
towards Worms and Spire, and the Ubii towards Cologne.
[204] Which formed the present Upper Alsace.
[205] We look upon it as certain, from the tenth chapter of Book IV. of
the “Commentaries,” that the Triboci occupied also the left bank of the
Rhine. We therefore naturally place among this German people the spot
where the army of Ariovistus was assembled. Moreover, to understand the
campaign about to be related, we must not seek this place, in the valley
of the Rhine, higher than Strasburg.
[206] In the speech which Dio Cassius puts in the mouth of Cæsar before
entering on the campaign against Ariovistus, he dilates upon the right
which the governor of the Roman province has to act according to
circumstances, and to take only his own advice. This speech is naturally
amplified and arranged by Dio Cassius, but the principal arguments must
be true. (Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 41.--_De Bello Gallico_, I. 33, 34, 35.)
[207] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 36.
[208] Since this information was given to Cæsar by the Treviri, it is
certain that the Suevi assembled on the Rhine, opposite or not far from
the country of the Treviri, and, in all probability, towards Mayence,
where the valley of the Maine presents a magnificent and easy opening
upon the Rhine.
[209] Between Tanlay and Gland, the Roman way is still called the _Route
de César_. (_See the map of the Etat-Major._)
[210] To explain this rapid movement upon Besançon, we must suppose that
Cæsar, at the moment when he received news of the march of Ariovistus,
believed him to be as near Besançon as he was himself. In fact, Cæsar
might fear that during the time the news had taken to reach him, the
German king, who had already advanced three days’ journey out of his
territory, might have arrived in the neighbourhood of Mulhausen or
Cernay. Now Cæsar was at Arc-en-Barrois, 130 kilomètres from Besançon,
and the distance from this latter town to Cernay is 125 kilomètres.
[211] The “Commentaries” give here the erroneous number DC: the breadth
of the isthmus which the Doubs forms at Besançon cannot have undergone
any sensible variation; it is at present 480 mètres, or 1,620 Roman
feet. The copyists have, no doubt, omitted an M before DC.
[212] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 38.
[213] “ ... qui ex urbe, amicitiæ causa, Cæsarem secuti, non magnum in
re militari usum habebant.” (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 39.)--We see in the
subsequent wars Appius repairing to Cæsar to obtain appointments of
military tribunes, and Cicero recommending for the same grade several
persons, among others, M. Curtius, Orfius, and Trebatius. “I have asked
him for a tribuneship for M. Curtius.” (_Epist. ad Quint._, II. 15;
_Epist. Famil._, VII. 5, a letter to Cæsar.) Trebatius, though a bad
soldier, was treated with kindness, and at once appointed a military
tribune. “I wonder that you despise the advantages of the tribuneship,
especially since they have allowed you to dispense with the fatigues of
the military service.” (Cicero, _Epist. Famil._, VII. 8.)--“Resign
yourself to the military service, and remain.” (Cicero, _Epist. Famil._,
VII. 11.)--Trebatius appeared little satisfied, complained of the
severity of the service, and, when Cæsar passed into Britain, he
prudently remained on the Continent.
[214] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 36.
[215] This shows that then, in Italy, a great number of slaves were
Germans.
[216] This Latin phrase indicated the putting the troops in march.
[217] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 41.
[218] There has been much discussion on the meaning of the words
_millium amplius quinquaginta circuitu_. Some pretend that the number of
fifty miles means the whole distance, and that thus Cæsar would have
taken seven days to travel fifty miles, which would make about seven
kilomètres a day: this supposition is inadmissible. Others pretend, on
the contrary, that we must add fifty miles to the direct distance. This
last interpretation is refuted by a passage in the “Commentaries” (_De
Bello Civili_, I. 64). We read there, _Ac tantum fuit in militibus
studii, ut, millium vi. ad iter addito circuito_, &c. This shows that
when Cæsar means to speak of a turn of road, to be added to the total
length of the route, he is careful to indicate it. We consider it more
simple, therefore, to admit that the fifty miles are only a part of the
distance performed during the seven days’ march; that is, that after
making a circular _détour_ of fifty miles, which required three or four
days, Cæsar had still to march some time before he met the enemy,
following the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine. The study of the
ground completely justifies this view, for it was sufficient for Cæsar
to make a circuit of fifty miles (or seventy-five kilomètres) to turn
the mass of mountains which extends from Besançon to Montbéliard.
[219] It is probable that, during the negotiations, Ariovistus had
approached nearer to the Roman camp, in order to facilitate
intercommunication; for, if he had remained at a distance of thirty-six
kilomètres from Cæsar, we should be obliged to admit that the German
army, which subsequently advanced towards the Roman camp, in a single
day, to within nine kilomètres, had made a march of twenty-five
kilomètres at least, which is not probable when we consider that it
dragged after it wagons and women and children.
[220] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 42.
[221] _Planities erat magna, et in ea tumulus terrenus satis
grandis_.... (_De Bello Gallico_, I. 43)--This phrase would be
sufficient itself to prove that the encounter of the two armies took
place in the plains of Upper Alsace. We may ask how, in spite of a text
so explicit, different writers should have placed the field of battle in
the mountains of the Jura, where there is nowhere to be found a plain of
any extent. It is only at Mulhausen, to the north of the Doller, that
the vast plain of the valley of the Rhine opens.
Cæsar employs three times the word _tumulus_ to designate the eminence
on which his interview with Ariovistus took place, and he never calls it
_collis_. Is it not evident from this that we must consider this
_tumulus_ as a rounded knoll, insulated in the plain? Now it is to be
considered that the plain which extends to the north of the Doller,
between the Vosges and the Rhine, contains a rather large number of
small rounded eminences, to which the word _collis_ would not apply, and
which the word _knoll_ or _tumulus_ perfectly describes. The most
remarkable of these are situated, one near Feldkirch, the other between
Wittenheim and Ensisheim. We may suppose that the interview took place
on one of these knolls, marked 231 on Plate 6.
General de Gœler has adopted as the place of the interview an eminence
which rises on the left bank of the Little Doller, to the north of the
village of Aspach-le-Bas. Cæsar would have called this eminence
_collis_, for it is rather extensive, and, by its elongated form, but
not rounded, does not at all represent to the eye what is commonly
called a _knoll_ or _tumulus_; moreover, contrary to the text, this
elevation is not, properly speaking, in the plain. It is only separated
from the hills situated to the south by a brook, and the plain begins
only from its northern slope.
[222] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 47.
[223] It is not unworthy of remark that Cæsar’s communications with the
Leuci and the Lingones remained open. We have seen that, in his address
to the troops at Besançon, he reckoned on obtaining from these peoples a
part of his supplies.
[224] Tacitus (_Germania_, VI. 32) and Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) speak of
this method of fighting employed by the Germans.
[225] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 50.--The predictions of these priestesses,
who pretended to know the future by the noise of waters and by the
vortexes made by the streams in rivers, forbade their giving battle
before the new moon. (Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 21.)
[226] “Having skirmished opposite their retrenchments and the hills on
which they were encamped, he exasperated and excited them to such a
degree of rage, that they descended and fought desperately.” (Plutarch,
_Cæsar_, 21.)
[227] General de Gœler adopts this same field of battle, but he differs
from us in placing the Romans with their back to the Rhine. It would be
impossible to understand in this case how, after their defeat, the
Germans would have been able to fly towards that river, Cæsar cutting
off their retreat; or how Ariovistus, reckoning upon the arrival of the
Suevi, should have put Cæsar between him and the re-inforcements he
expected.
[228] As the legions were six in number, the above phrase proves that in
this campaign Cæsar had one quæstor and five lieutenants. (_See Appendix
D._)
[229] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.--We have adopted the version of Dio
Cassius, as we cannot admit with Orosius that an army of more than
100,000 men could have formed only a single phalanx.
[230] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.
[231] Orosius expresses himself thus: “United in one phalanx, and their
heads protected by their bucklers, they attempted, thus covered, to
break the Roman lines; but some Romans, not less agile than bold, rushed
upon this sort of tortoise, grappled with the German soldiers body to
body, tore from them their shields, with which they were covered as with
scales, and stabbed them through the shoulders.” (Orosius, VI. 7.)
[232] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.
[233] Appian, _De Bello Celt._, IV. 1, 3.
[234] The manuscripts followed by the early editors of the
“Commentaries” gave some the number of 50 miles, others that of 5 miles.
We believe that Cæsar wrote 50 miles. This is proved by the very words
he employs, _neque prius fugere destiterunt_ ... which could not be
applied to a flight of merely a few miles. Moreover, the testimony of
old writers confirms the number of 50 miles: Paulus Orosius relates that
the carnage extended over a space of 40 miles; Plutarch, over 300 or 400
stadia, that is, 35 or 50 miles, according to the editions; and J.
Celsus (Petrarch) (_De Vita J. Cæsaris_, I., p. 40, edit. Lemaire) says,
_usque ad ripam Rheni fuga perpetua fuit_, a phrase in which the word
_perpetua_ is significative.
Modern writers, supposing erroneously that Cæsar had indicated the
distance, that is, the shortest line from the field of battle to the
Rhine, have discussed lengthily the number to be adopted. They have
overlooked the fact that the Latin text states, not exactly the distance
from the field of battle to the Rhine, but the length of the line of
retreat from the battle-field to the river. This line may have been
oblique towards the Rhine, for it is probable that the retreat of the
Germans lay down the valley of the Ill, which they had previously
ascended. We must therefore seek towards Rhinau the point where they
attempted to re-pass the river.
[235] According to Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 50), Ariovistus, followed by
his cavalry, succeeded in escaping. Having reached the right bank, he
collected the fugitives; but he died shortly afterwards (_De Bello
Gallico_, V. 29), perhaps of his wounds.
[236] Appian. _De Bello Celt._, IV. 1, 3.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 21.
[237] _De Bello Gallico_, I. 53.--The war against Ariovistus became the
subject of a poem by P. Terentius Varro Atacinus (_De Bello Sequanico_).
(Priscian, X., p. 877, P.)
[238] “Inita æstate.” (_De Bello Gallico_, II. 2.)--_Æstas_ according to
Forcellini, signifies the period comprised between the two equinoxes of
spring and autumn.
[239] See his biography, _Appendix D_.
[240] Strabo, IV. 171, V. 174.
[241] “In the year 642, the consul C. Manlius and the proconsul Q. Cæpio
were defeated by the Cimbri and the Teutones, and there perished 80,000
Romans and allies and 40,000 valets (_colones et lixæ_). Of all the
army, ten men only escaped.” (Orosius, V. 16.) These data are no doubt
exaggerated, for Titus Livius (XXXVI. 38) pretends that Orosius took his
information from Valerius of Antium, who habitually magnified his
numbers.
[242] This route, the most direct from Besançon to the territory of the
Remi, is still marked by the numerous vestiges of the Roman road which
joined Vesontio with Durocortorum (_Besançon_ with _Rheims_).
[243] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 4.
[244] The word _fines_ in Cæsar, always signifies territory. We must
therefore understand by _extremi fines_ the part of the territory
farthest removed from the centre, and not the extreme frontier, as
certain translators have thought. The Aisne crossed the northern part of
the country of the Remi, and did not form its boundary. (_See Plate 2._)
[245] The retrenchments of this tête-du-pont, especially the side
parallel to the Aisne, are still visible at Berry-au-Bac. The gardens of
several of the inhabitants are made upon the rampart itself, and the
fosse appears at the outside of the village in the form of a cistern.
The excavations have displayed distinctly the profile of the fosse.
[246] The excavations undertaken in 1862, by bringing to light the
fosses of the camp, showed that they were 18 feet wide, with a depth of
9 or 10. (_See Plates 8 and 9._) If, then, we admit that the platform of
earth of the parapet was 10 feet wide, it would have measured 8 feet in
height, which, with the palisade of 4 feet, would give the crest of the
parapet a command of 22 feet above the bottom of the fosse.
[247] The following localities have been suggested for Bibrax: _Bièvre_,
_Bruyères_, _Neufchâtel_, _Beaurieux_, and the mountain called
_Vieux-Laon_. Now that the camp of Cæsar has been discovered on the hill
of Mauchamp, there is only room to hesitate between Beaurieux and
Vieux-Laon, as they are the only localities among those just mentioned
which, as the text requires, are eight miles distant from the Roman
camp. But Beaurieux will not suit, for the reason that even if the Aisne
had passed, at the time of the Gallic war, at the foot of the heights on
which the town is situated, we cannot understand how the re-enforcements
sent by Cæsar could have crossed the river and penetrated into the
place, which the Belgian army must certainly have invested on all sides.
This fact is, on the contrary, easily understood when we apply it to the
mountain of Vieux-Laon, which presents towards the south impregnable
escarpments. The Belgæ would have surrounded it on all parts except on
the south, and it was no doubt by that side that, during the night,
Cæsar’s re-enforcements would enter the town.
[248] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 7.--(_Plate 9_ gives the plan of the camp,
which has been found entire, and that of the redoubts with the fosses,
as they have been exposed to view by the excavations; but we have found
it impossible to explain the outline of the redoubts.)
[249] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 12.--Sabinus evidently commanded on both
sides the river.
[250] _De Bello Gallico_ II. 12.--Sabinus evidently commanded on both
sides the river.
[251] See the biographies of Cæsar’s lieutenants, _Appendix D_.
[252] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 11.
[253] The _vineæ_ were small huts constructed of light timber work
covered with hurdles and hides of animals. (Vegetius, Lib. IV. c. 16.)
See the figures on Trajan column.
In a regular siege the _vineæ_ were constructed out of reach of the
missiles, and they were then pushed in file one behind the other up to
the wall of the place attacked, a process which was termed _agere
vineas_; they thus formed long covered galleries which, sometimes placed
at right angles to the wall and sometimes parallel, performed the same
part as the branches and parallels in modern sieges.
[254] The terrace (_agger_) was an embankment, made of any materials,
for the purpose of establishing either platforms to command the ramparts
of a besieged town, or viaducts to conduct the towers and machines
against the walls, when the approaches to the place presented slopes
which were too difficult to climb. These terraces were used also
sometimes to fill up the fosse. The _agger_ was most commonly made of
trunks of trees, crossed and heaped up like the timber in a funeral
pile.--(Thucydides, _Siege of Platæa_.--Lucan, _Pharsalia_.--Vitruvius,
book XI., _Trajan Column_.)
[255] Antiquaries hesitate between Beauvais, Montdidier, or Breteuil. We
adopt Breteuil as the most probable, according to the dissertation on
Bratuspantium, by M. l’Abbé Devic, cure of Mouchy-le-Châtel. In fact,
the distance from Breteuil to Amiens is just twenty-five miles, as
indicated in the “Commentaries.” We must add, however, that M. l’Abbé
Devic does not place Bratuspantium at Breteuil itself, but close to that
town, in the space now comprised between the communes of Vaudeuil,
Caply, Beauvoir, and their dependencies.--Paris, 1843, and Arras, 1865.
[256] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 15.
[257] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 14, 15, 16. Mons is, in fact, seated on a
hill completely surrounded by low meadows, traversed by the sinuous
courses of the Haine and the Trouille.
[258] According to scholars, the frontier between the Nervii and the
Ambiani lay towards Fins and Bapaume. Supposing the three days’ march of
the Roman army to be reckoned from this point, it would have arrived, in
three days, of twenty-five kilomètres each, at Bavay.
[259] If Cæsar had arrived on the right bank of the Sambre, as several
authors have pretended, he would already have found that river at
Landrecies, and would have had no need to learn, on the third day of
this march, that he was only fifteen kilomètres from it.
[260] It is worthy of remark, that still at the present day the fields
in the neighbourhood of the Sambre are surrounded with hedges very
similar to those here described. Strabo (II., p. 161) also mentions
these hedges.
[261] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 17.
[262] “The signal for battle is a purple mantle, which is displayed
before the general’s tent.” (Plutarch, _Fabius Maximus_, 24.)
[263] _Signum dare_, “to give the word of order.” In fact, we read in
Suetonius: “Primo etiam imperii die signum excubanti tribuno dedit:
_Optimam matrem_.” (_Nero_, 9; _Caligula_, 56.--Tacitus, _Histor._, III.
22.)
[264] The soldiers wore either the skins of wild beasts, or plumes or
other ornaments, to mark their grades. “Excussit cristas galeis.”
(Lucan, _Pharsalia_, line 158.)
[265] Except the Treviran cavalry, who had withdrawn.
[266] According to Titus Livius (_Epitome_, CIV.), 1,000 armed men
succeeded in escaping.
[267] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 28.
[268] According to the researches which have been carried on by the
Commandant Locquessye in the country supposed to have been formerly
occupied by the Aduatuci, two localities only, Mount Falhize and the
part of the mountain of Namur on which the citadel is built, appear to
agree with the site of the _oppidum_ of the Aduatuci. But Mount Falhize
is not surrounded with rocks on all sides, as the Latin text requires.
The countervallation would have had a development of more than 15,000
feet, and it would have twice crossed the Meuse, which is difficult to
admit. We therefore adopt, as the site of the _oppidum_ of the Aduatuci,
the citadel of Namur.
Another locality, Sautour, near Philippeville, would answer completely
to Cæsar’s description, but the compass of Sautour, which includes only
three hectares, is too small to have contained 60,000 individuals. The
site of the citadel of Namur is already in our eyes very small.
[269] We translate _quindecim millium_ by 15,000 feet; the word _pedum_,
employed in the preceding sentence, being understood in the text. When
Cæsar intends to speak of _paces_, he almost always uses the word
_passus_.
[270] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 33.
[271] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 35.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 20.--Cicero,
_Epist. Famil._, I. 9, 17, 18.
[272] This passage has generally been wrongly interpreted. The text has,
_Quæ civitates propinquæ his locis erant ubi bellum gesserat_. (_De
Bello Gallico_, II. 35.) We must add the name of Crassus, overlooked by
the copyists; for if Anjou and Touraine are near Brittany and Normandy,
where Crassus had been fighting, they are very far from the Sambre and
the Meuse, where Cæsar had carried the war.
[273] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 6
[274] Some manuscripts read _Esuvios_, but we adopt _Unellos_, because
the geographical position of the country of the Unelli agrees better
with the relation of the campaign.
[275] They leagued with the Osismii (_the people of the department of
Finistère_), the Lexovii (_department of Calvados_), the Namnetes
(_Loire-Inférieure_), the Ambiliates (_on the left bank of the Loire, to
the south of Angers_), the Morini (_the Boulonnais and bishopric of
Saint-Omer_), the Diablintes (_Western Maine_), and the Menapii
(_between the Rhine and the mouths of the Scheldt_). (_De Bello
Gallico_, III. 9.)
[276] Orosius (VI. 8) confirms this fact as stated in the Commentaries.
[277] “The Veneti fought at sea against Cæsar; they had made their
dispositions to prevent his passage, into the isle of Britain, because
they were in possession of the commerce of that country.” (Strabo, IV.
iv., p. 162, edit. Didot.)
[278] We must not confound him with M. Junius Brutus, the assassin of
Cæsar. Decimus Junius Brutus was the adopted son of A. Postumius
Albinus. (See Drumann, IV. 9, and _Appendix D_.)
[279] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 40.
[280] We suppose, in this enumeration, that the legion of Galba,
cantoned the preceding winter among the Allobroges, had rejoined the
army.
[281] I borrow this interpretation of the Roman works from the very
instructive book of General de Gœler.
[282] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 13.--Strabo, IV., p. 162.
[283] The fleet of the Veneti, superior to that of the Romans in number,
in the magnitude of their vessels, and in their rigging and sails, must
have issued from the river Auray by the Morbihan entrance to the gulf,
and met Brutus to fight him, instead of waiting for him at the head of
the bay, where retreat would be impossible. This follows from Cæsar’s
account: _ex portu profectæ, nostris adversæ constiterunt_. According to
the memoir by M. le Comte de Grandpré, a post-captain, inserted in the
_Recueil de la Société des Antiquaires de France_, tom. II., 1820, the
wind must have been east or north-east, for it was towards the end of
the summer. It appears that these winds usually prevail at that period,
and that, when they have blown during the morning, there is a dead calm
towards the middle of the day: it is just what happened in this combat;
the calm came, probably, towards midday. It was necessary, indeed, that
the wind should be between the north and the east, to allow, on one hand
the Roman fleet to leave the Loire and sail towards the Point
Saint-Jacques, and, on the other, to permit the fleet of the Veneti to
quit the river Auray. These latter, in this position, could, in case of
defeat, take refuge in the Bay of Quiberon, or fly to the open sea,
where the Romans would not have dared to follow them.
With winds blowing from below, it matters not from what point, the
Romans could not have gone in search of their enemies, or the latter
come to meet them. Supposing that, in one tide, the Roman fleet had
arrived at the mouth of the Loire towards five o’clock in the morning;
it might have been towards ten o’clock, the moment when the battle
commenced, between Haedik and Sarzeau. Supposing similarly that, as
early as five o’clock in the morning, the movement of the Roman fleet
had been announced to the Veneti, they could, in five hours, have issued
from the river Auray, defiled by the entrance of the Morbihan, rallied
and advanced in order of battle to meet the Romans in the part of the
sea above described.
As to the place where Cæsar encamped, it is very probable, as we have
said, that it was on the heights of Saint-Gildas; for from thence he
could see the dispositions of the enemy, and perceive far off the
approach of his fleet. In case of check, the Roman galleys found, under
his protection, a place of refuge in the Vilaine. Thus, he had his rear
secured; rested upon the towns of the coast which he had taken; could
recall to him, if necessary, Titurius Sabinus; and lastly, could cross
the Vilaine, to place that river between him and his enemies. Placed, on
the contrary, on the other side of the Bay of Quiberon, he would have
been too much enclosed in an enemy’s country, and would have had none of
the advantages offered by the position of Saint-Gildas.
[284] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 41.
[285] We see, in fact, in Vegetius, that the word _falces_ was applied
to the head of a battering ram, armed with a point, and with a hook to
detach the stones from the walls. “Quæ (trabes) aut adunco præfigitur
ferro, et falx vocatur ab eo quod incurva est, ut de muro extrahat
lapides.” (Vegetius, IV. 14.)
[286] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 17.
[287] This position is at the distance of seven kilomètres to the east
of Avranches. The vestiges still visible of Chastellier are probably
those of a camp made at a later period than this Gallic war, but we
think that Sabinus had established his camp on the same site.
[288] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 19.
[289] Cæsar, after having said, in the first book of his “Commentaries”,
that Aquitaine was one of the three parts of Gaul, states here that it
formed the third part by its extent and population, which is not
correct.
[290] Nicholas of Damascus (in _Athenæus, Deipn._, VI. 249) writes in
this manner the name of King _Adiatomus_, and adds that the _soldurii_
were clothed in royal vestments.
[291] This combat is remarkable as being the only one in the whole war
in Gaul in which the Romans attack a fortified Gaulish camp.
[292] Of this number were the Tarbelli, The Bigerriones, The Ptiani, the
Vasates, the Tarusates, the Elusates, the Gaites, the Ausci, the
Garumni, the Sibusates, and the Cocosates.
[293] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 27.
[294] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, III. x. 6.
[295] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 44.
[296] Cæsar never entirely subjugated the north-west of Gaul. (See
Sallust, cited by Ammianus Marcellinus, XV., 15.) Still, under the reign
of Augustus, in 724 and 726, there were triumphs over the Morini.
[297] _De Bello Gallico_, III. 29.
[298] “In praetura, in consulatu præfectum fabrum detulit.” (Cicero,
_Orat. pro Balbo_, 28.)
[299] Mamurra, a Roman knight, born at Formiæ. (Pliny, _Hist. Nat._,
XXXVI. 7.)
[300] From Xanten to Nimeguen, for a length of fifty kilomètres, extends
a line of heights which form a barrier along the left bank of the Rhine.
All appearances would lead us to believe that the river flowed, in
Cæsar’s time, close at the foot of these heights; but now it has removed
from them, and at Emmerich, for instance, is at a distance of eight
kilomètres. This chain, the eastern slope of which is scarped, presents
only two passes; one by a large opening at Xanten itself, to the north
of the mountain called the Furstenberg; the other by a gorge of easy
access, opening at Qualburg, near Cleves. These two passes were so well
defined as the entries to Gaul in these regions, that, after the
conquest, the Romans closed them by fortifying the Furstenberg (_Castra
vetera_), and founding, on the two islands formed by the Rhine opposite
these entries, _Colonia Trajana_, now Xanten, and _Quadriburgium_, now
_Qualburg_. The existence of these isles facilitated at that time the
passage of the Rhine, and, in all probability, it was opposite these two
localities just named that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the river
to penetrate into Gaul.
[301] The account of this campaign is very obscure in the
“Commentaries.” Florus and Dio Cassius add to the obscurities: the
first, by placing the scene of the defeat of the Usipetes and Tencteri
towards the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine; the second, by
writing that Cæsar came up with the Germans in the country of the
Treviri. Several authors have given to the account of these two
historians more credit than to that of Cæsar himself, and they give of
this campaign an explanation quite different from ours. General de
Gœler, among others, supposes that the whole emigration of the Germans
had advanced as far as the country of the Condrusi, where Cæsar came up
with them, and that he had driven them from west to east, into the angle
formed by the Moselle and the Rhine. From researches which were kindly
undertaken by M. de Cohausen, major in the Prussian army, and which have
given the same result as those of MM. Stoffel and De Locqueyssie, we
consider this explanation of the campaign as inadmissible. It would be
enough, to justify this assertion, to consider that the country situated
between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the south of Aix-la-Chapelle, is too
much broken and too barren to have allowed the German emigration,
composed of 430,000 individuals, men, women, and children, with wagons,
to move and subsist in it. Moreover, it contains no trace of ancient
roads; and if Cæsar had taken this direction, he must necessarily have
crossed the forest of the Ardennes, a circumstance of which he would not
have failed to inform us. Besides, is it not more probable that, on the
news of the approach of Cæsar, instead of directing their march towards
the Ubii, who were not favourable to them, the Germans, at first spread
over a vast territory, would have concentrated themselves towards the
most distant part of the fertile country on which they had seized--that
of the Menapii?
[302] The Ambivariti were established on the left bank of the Meuse, to
the west of Ruremonde, and to the south of the marshes of Peel.
[303] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 13.
[304] “Acie triplici instituta.” Some authors have translated these
words by “the army was formed in three columns;” but Cæsar, operating in
a country which was totally uncovered and flat, and aiming at surprising
a great mass of enemies, must have marched in order of battle, which did
not prevent each cohort from being in column.
[305] Attacked unexpectedly in the afternoon, while they were sleeping.
(Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 48.)
[306] The study of the deserted beds of the Rhine leads us to believe
that the confluence of the Waal and the Meuse, which is at present near
Gorkum, was then much more to the east, towards Fort Saint-André. In
that case, Cæsar made no mistake in reckoning eighty miles from the
junction of the Waal and the Meuse to the mouth of the latter river.
[307] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 14, 15.
[308] The following reasons have led us to adopt Bonn as the point where
Cæsar crossed the Rhine:--
We learn from the “Commentaries” that in 699 he debouched in the country
of the Ubii, and that two years later it was a little above (_paulum
supra_) the first bridge that he established another, which joined the
territory of the Treviri with that of the Ubii. Now everything leads to
the belief that, in the first passage as in the second, the bridge was
thrown across between the frontiers of the same peoples; for we cannot
admit, with some authors, that the words _paulum supra_ apply to a
distance of several leagues. As to those who suppose that the passage
was effected at Andernach, because, changing with Florus the Meuse
(_Mosa_) into Moselle, they placed the scene of the defeat of the
Germans at the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine, we have given
the reasons for rejecting this opinion. We have endeavoured to prove, in
fact, that the battle against the Usipetes and the Tencteri had for its
theatre the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine; and since, in
crossing this latter river, Cæsar passed from the country of the Treviri
into that of the Ubii, we must perceive that after his victory he must
necessarily have proceeded up the valley of the Rhine to go from the
territory of the Menapii to the Treviri, as far up as the territory of
the Ubii, established on the right bank.
This being admitted, it remains to fix, within the limits assigned to
these two last peoples, the most probable point of passage. Hitherto,
Cologne has been adopted; but, to answer to the data of the
“Commentaries,” Cologne appears to us to be much too far to the north.
In fact, in the campaign of 701, Cæsar, having started from the banks of
the Rhine, traversed the forest of the Ardennes from east to west,
passed near the Segni and the Condrusi, since they implored him to spare
their territory, and directed his march upon Tongres. If he had started
from Cologne, he would not have crossed the countries in question.
Moreover, in this same year, 2,000 Sicambrian cavalry crossed the Rhine
thirty miles below the bridge of the Roman army. Now, if this bridge had
been constructed at Cologne, the point of passage of the Sicambri,
thirty miles below, would have been at a very great distance from
Tongres, where, nevertheless, they seem to have arrived very quickly.
On the contrary, everything is explained if we adopt Bonn as the point
of passage. To go from Bonn to Tongres, Cæsar proceeded, as the text has
it, across the forest of the Ardennes; he passed through the country of
the Segni and Condrusi, or very near them; and the Sicambri, crossing
the Rhine thirty miles below Bonn, took the shortest line from the Rhine
to Tongres. Moreover, we cannot place Cæsar’s point of passage either
lower or higher than Bonn. Lower, that is, towards the north, the
different incidents related in the “Commentaries” are without possible
application to the theatre of the events; higher, towards the south, the
Rhine flows upon a rocky bed, where the piles could not have been driven
in, and presents, between the mountains which border it, no favourable
point of passage. We may add that Cæsar would have been much too far
removed from the country of the Sicambri, the chastisement of whom was
the avowed motive of his expedition.
Another fact deserves to be taken into consideration: that, less than
fifty years after Cæsar’s campaigns, Drusus, in order to proceed against
the Sicambri--that is, against the same people whom Cæsar intended to
combat--crossed the Rhine at Bonn. (Florus, IV. 12.)
[309] The following passage has given room for different
interpretations:--
“Hæc utraque insuper bipedalibus trabibus immissis, quantum eorum
tignorum junctura distabat, binis utrimque fibulis ab extrema parte
distinebantur; quibus disclusis atque in contrariam partem revinctis,
tanta erat operis firmitudo atque ea rerum natura, ut, quo major vis
aquæ se incitavisset, hoc arctius illigata tenerentur.” (_De Bello
Gallico_, IV. 17.)
It has not been hitherto observed that the words _hæc utraque_ relate to
the two couples of one row of piles, and not to the two piles of the
same couple. Moreover, the words _quibus disclusis_, &c., relate to
these same two couples, and not, as has been supposed, to _fibulis_.
[310] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 20.
[311] _De Bello Gallico_, II. 4.
[312] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 13.
[313] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, IV. 30, § 16.
[314] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, IV. 30, § 16.--Tacitus, _Agricola_, 10.
[315] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 12.
[316] Strabo, IV., p. 199.
[317] _Agricola_, 12.
[318] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 12.
[319] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 13 and 14.
[320] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 20.
[321] _Annales_, XIV. 33.
[322] Although the greater number of manuscripts read _Cenimagni_, some
authors have made two names of it, the _Iceni_ and the _Cangi_.
[323] The _Anderida Silva_, 120 miles in length by 30 in breadth,
extended over the counties of Sussex and Kent, in what is now called the
_Weald_. (See Camden, _Britannia_, edit. Gibson, I., col. 151, 195, 258,
edit. of 1753.)
[324] Diodorus Siculus, V. 21.--Tacitus, _Agricola_, 12.
[325] IV., p. 200.
[326] _Agricola_, 11.
[327] Diodorus Siculus, V. 21.
[328] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 21.
[329] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 14.
[330] Strabo, IV., p. 200.
[331] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 14.
[332] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, XXII. 1.
[333] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 14.
[334] Diodorus Siculus, V. 22.
[335] Diodorus Siculus, V. 22.--Strabo, IV., p. 200.
[336] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 12.
[337] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 13.
[338] _Agricola_, 11.
[339] Strabo, IV., p. 199.
[340] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 12.
[341] Diodorus Siculus, V. 22.
[342] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, IV. 30, § 16.
[343] Tacitus, _Agricola_, 36.
[344] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 16.
[345] Tacitus, _Agricola_, 12.
[346] Frontinus, _Stratagm._, II. 3, 18.--Diodorus Siculus, V.
21.--Strabo, IV., p. 200.
[347] The account on page 213 confirms this interpretation, which is
conformable to that of General Gœler.
[348] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 32 and 33.
[349] Strabo, IV., p. 200.
[350] Strabo, IV., p. 201.
[351] From what will be seen further on, each transport ship, on its
return, contained 150 men. Eighty ships could thus transport 12,000 men,
but since, reduced to sixty-eight, they were enough to carry back the
whole army to the continent, they can only have carried 10,200 men,
which was probably the effective force of the two legions. The eighteen
ships appropriated to the cavalry might transport 450 horses, at the
rate of twenty-five horses each ship.
[352] The port of Dover extended formerly from the site of the present
town, between the cliffs which border the valley of the Dour or of
Charlton. (_See Plate 17._) Indeed, from the facts furnished by ancient
authors, and a geological examination of the ground, it appears certain
that once the sea penetrated into the land, and formed a creek which
occupied nearly the whole of the valley of Charlton. The words of Cæsar
are just justified: “Cujus loci hæc erat natura, atque ita montibus
angustis mare continebatur, uti ex locis superioribus in littus telum
adjici posset.” (IV. 23.)
The proofs of the above assertion result from several facts related in
different notices on the town of Dover. It is there said that in 1784
Sir Thomas Hyde Page caused a shaft to be sunk at a hundred yards from
the shore, to ascertain the depth of the basin at a remote period; it
proved that the ancient bed of the sea had been formerly thirty English
feet below the present level of the high tide. In 1826, in sinking a
well at a place called _Dolphin Lane_, they found, at a depth of
twenty-one feet, a bed of mud resembling that of the present port, mixed
with the bones of animals and fragments of leaves and roots. Similar
detritus have been discovered in several parts of the valley. An ancient
chronicler, named Darell, relates that “Wilbred, King of Kent, built in
700 the church of St. Martin, the ruins of which are still visible near
the market-place, on the spot where formerly ships cast anchor.”
The town built under the Emperors Adrian and Septimus Severus occupied a
part of the port, which had already been covered with sand; yet the sea
still entered a considerable distance inland. (_See Plate 17._)
It would appear to have been about the year 950 that the old port was
entirely blocked up with the maritime and fluvial alluvium which have
been increasing till our day, and which at different periods have
rendered it necessary to construct the dykes and quays which have given
the port its present form.
[353] “Constat enim aditus insulæ esse munitos mirificis molibus.”
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 16.)
[354] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 51.
[355] The Emperor Julian (p. 70, edit. Lasius) makes Cæsar say that he
had been the first to leap down from the ship.
[356] It is in the text, _in scopulum vicinum insulæ_, which must be
translated by “a rock near the isle of Britain,” and not, as certain
authors have interpreted it, “a rock isolated from the continent.”
(Valerius Maximus, III. ii. 23.)--In fact, these rocks, called _Malms_,
are distinctly seen at low water opposite the arsenal and marine
barracks at Deal.
[357] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 51.
[358] Cæsar himself had only carried three servants with him, as Cotta
relates. (Athenæus, _Deipnosophist._, VI. 105.)
[359] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 53.
[360] At the battle of Arcola, in 1796, twenty-five horsemen had a great
influence on the issue of the day. (_Mémoires de Montholon, dictées de
Sainte-Hélène,_ II. 9.)
[361] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 36 and 37.
[362] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 38.
[363] Dio Cassius, XL. 1.--See Strabo, IV., p. 162, edit. Didot.
[364] _De Bello Gallico_, V. I.
[365] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 56. XL. 1.
[366] This opinion has been already supported by learned archæologists.
I will cite especially M. Mariette; Mr. Thomas Lewin, who has written a
very interesting account of Cæsar’s invasions of England; and lastly, M.
l’Abbé Haigneré, archivist of Boulogne, who has collected the best
documents on this question.
[367] Strabo, IV. 6, p. 173.
[368] According to the Itinerary of Antoninus, the road started from
Bagacum (_Bavay_), and passed by Pons-Scaldis (_Escaut-Pont_), Turnacum
(_Tournay_), Viroviacum (_Werwick_), Castellum (_Montcassel, Cassel_),
Tarvenna (_Thérouanne_), and thence to Gesoriacum (_Boulogne_).
According to Mariette, medals found on the road demonstrate that it had
been made in the time of Agrippa; moreover, according to the same
Itinerary of Antoninus, a Roman road started from Bavay, and, by
Tongres, ended at the Rhine at Bonn. (See _Jahrbücher des Vereins von
Alterthums Freunden_, Heft 37, Bonn, 1864. Now, admitting that there had
been already under Augustus a road which united Boulogne with Bonn, we
understand the expression of Florus, who explains that Drusus amended
this road by constructing bridges on the numerous water-courses which it
crossed, _Bonnam et Gesoriacum pontibus junxit_. (Florus, IV. 12.)
[369] Suetonius, _Caligula_, 46.--The remains of the pharos of Caligula
were still visible a century ago.
[370] Suetonius, _Claudius_, 17.
[371] Ammianus Marcellinus, XX. 1.
[372] Ammianus Marcellinus, XX. 7, 8.
[373] Eumenius, _Panegyric of Constantinus Cæsar_, 14.
[374] Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, cited by Mr. Lewin.
[375] “Qui tertia vigilia Morino solvisset a portu.” (Florus, III. 10.)
[376] Strabo, IV. 5, p. 166.
[377] “Ultimos Gallicarum gentium Morinos, nec portu quam Gesoriacum
vocant quicquam notius habet.” (Pomponius Mela, III. 2.)--“Μορινὡν
Γησοριακον ἑπἱνειον.” (Ptolemy, II. ix. 3.)
[378] “Hæc [Britannia] abest a Gesoriaco Morinorum gentis litore proximo
trajectu quinquaginta M.” (Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, IV. 30.)
[379] The camp of Labienus, during the second expedition, was, no doubt,
established on the site now occupied by the high town. From thence it
commanded the surrounding country, the sea, and the lower course of the
Liane.
[380] _Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire_, tom. IV., I. 17.
[381] What is now called _Romney Marsh_ is the northern part of a vast
plain, bounded on the east and south by the sea, and on the west and
north by the line of heights at the foot of which the military canal has
been cut. It is difficult to determine what was the aspect of Romney
Marsh in the time of Cæsar. Nevertheless, the small elevation of the
plain above the level of the sea, as well as the nature of the soil,
lead us to conclude that the sea covered it formerly up to the foot of
the heights of Lymne, except at least in the part called
_Dymchurch-Wall_. This is a long tongue of land, on which are now raised
three forts and nine batteries, and which, considering its height above
the rest of the plain, has certainly never been covered by the sea.
These facts appear to be confirmed by an ancient chart in the Cottonian
collection in the British Museum.
Mr. Lewin appears to have represented as accurately as possible the
appearance of Romney Marsh in the time of Cæsar, in the plate which
accompanies his work. The part not covered by the sea extended, no
doubt, as he represents it, from the bay of Romney to near Hythe, where
it terminated in a bank of pebbles of considerable extent. But it
appears to us that it would have been difficult for the Roman army to
land on a bank of pebbles at the very foot of the rather steep heights
of Lymne. Mr. Lewin places the Roman army, in the first expedition, at
the foot of the heights, on the bank of pebbles itself, surrounded on
almost all sides by the sea. In the second expedition, he supposes it to
have been on the heights, at the village of Lymne; and, to explain how
Cæsar joined his fleet to the camp by retrenchments common to both, he
admits that this fleet was drawn on land as far as the slope of the
heights, and shut up in a square space of 300 mètres each side, because
we find there the ruins of an ancient castle called _Stutfall Castle_.
All this is hardly admissible.
[382] Word for word, this expression signifies that the ships set sail
four days after the arrival of the Romans in England. The Latin language
often employed the ordinal number instead of the cardinal number. Thus,
the historian Eutropius says, “Carthage was destroyed 700 years after it
was founded, _Carthago septingentesimo anno quam condita erat deleta
est_.” Are we, in the phrase, _post diem quartum_, to reckon the day of
the arrival?--Virgil says, speaking of the seventeenth day, _septima
post decimam_.--Cicero uses the expression _post sexennium_ in the sense
of _six years_. It is evident that Virgil counts seven days after the
tenth. If the tenth was comprised in this number, the expression
_septima post decimam_ would signify simply the _sixteenth day_. On his
part, Cicero understands clearly the six years as a lapse of time which
was to pass, starting from the moment in which he speaks. Thus, the
_post diem quartum_ of Cæsar must be understood in the sense of four
days accomplished, without reckoning the day of landing.
[383] Titus Livius, XLIV. 37.
[384] We must now go back to the fourteenth day before the full moon,
that is, to the 17th of August, 699, to find a day on which high tide
took place at Dover towards midday.
[385] Mr. Lewin has stated that the country between Deal and Sandwich
produces no wheat. This assertion is tolerably true for the tongue of
marshy land which separates those two localities; but what does it
signify, since wheat grows in great quantities in all the part of the
county of Kent situated to the west of the coast which extends from the
South Foreland to Deal and Sandwich?
[386] It is almost impossible to fix with certainty the day when Cæsar
quitted Britain; we know only that it was a short time before the
equinox (_propinqua die æquinoxii_), which, according to the
calculations of M. Le Verrier, fell on the 26th of September, and that
the fleet started a little after midnight. If we admit a passage of nine
hours, with a favorable wind (_ipse idoneam tempestatem nactus_), as on
the return of the second expedition, Cæsar would have arrived at
Boulogne towards nine o’clock in the morning. As the fleet could not
enter the port until the tide was in, it is sufficient, to know
approximatively the date of Cæsar’s return, to seek what day in the
month of September, 699, there was high tide at that hour at Bolougne.
Now, in this port, the tide is always at its height towards nine o’clock
in the morning two or three days before full moon and before new moon;
therefore, since the full moon of the month of September, 699, took
place on the 14th, it must have been about the 11th or 12th of September
that Cæsar returned to Gaul. As to the two ships which were driven
farther down, Mr. Lewin (_Invasion of Britain by J. Cæsar_) explains
this accident in a very judicious manner. He states that we read in the
tide-tables of the English Admiralty the following recommendation: “In
approaching Boulogne when the tide is flowing in, great attention must
be paid, because the current, which, on the English side, drags a ship
towards the east, on the Boulogne side drags them, on the contrary,
towards the Somme.” Nothing, then, is more natural than that the two
Roman transport ships should be driven ashore to the south of Boulogne.
[387] “It was there (the mouth of the Seine) that Cæsar established his
naval arsenal, when he passed over to that island (Britain.)” (Strabo,
II. 160.)
[388] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 3, 4.
[389] The Meldæ dwelt on the Marne, in the country around Meaux; and as
we have seen, according to Strabo, that Cæsar had established his naval
arsenal at the mouth of the Seine, there is nothing extraordinary in the
circumstance that some of the ships were built near Meaux. But it is not
reasonable to suppose, with some writers, that the Meldæ dwelt at the
mouth of the Scheldt, and believe that Cæsar had left important
shipyards in an enemy’s country, and out of reach of protection.
[390] The five legions which Cæsar led into Britain made, at about 5,000
men each, 25,000 men. There were, in addition to these, 2,000 cavalry.
If we suppose, as in the first expedition, twenty-five horses per ship,
it would require eighty to contain the cavalry. In the preceding year,
eighty transport ships had been sufficient for two legions, without
baggage--200 ought to have been enough for five legions; but as the
“Commentaries” give us to understand that those vessels were narrower,
and that the troops had their baggage, it may be believed that they
required double the number of ships, that is, 400, for the transport of
the five legions, which would make about sixty-two men in a ship. There
would remain 160 transport ships for the Gaulish and Roman chiefs, the
valets, and the provisions. The twenty-eight galleys were, no doubt, the
true ships of war, destined to protect the fleet and the landing.
[391] According to a passage in the “Commentaries” (Book V. 26), there
was in the Roman army a body of Spanish cavalry.
[392] Dio Casstas, XL. 1.
[393] De Bella Galtico, V. 8.
[394] This appears to us to be evident, since we shall see subsequently
Cæsar inclosed his fleet within the retrenchments contiguous to his
camp.
[395] As in the first expedition the disaster which happened to his
fleet must have proved to Cæsar the danger to which the vessels were
exposed on the coast, the above reflection indicates that, in his second
expedition, he chose a better anchorage, at a few kilomètres farther to
the north.
[396] Ten cohorts formed a legion; but Cæsar does not employ this last
expression, because, no doubt, he drew from each of his legions two
cohorts, which he left for the guard of the camp. In this manner he
preserved the tactical number of five legions, which was more
advantageous, and caused each legion to participate in the honour of
combating.
[397] If from the sea-shore, near Deal, where we suppose that the Romans
established their camp, we describe, with a radius of twelve miles, an
arc of a circle, we cut towards the west, the villages of Kingston and
Barham, and more to the north, the village of Littlebourne, a stream
called the Little Stour, which rises near Lyminge, flows from south to
north across a rather irregular country, and falls into the Great Stour.
This stream is incontestably the _flumen_ of the “Commentaries.” There
is the less room for error, as we find no other stream in the part of
the county of Kent comprised between the coast of Deal and the Great
Stour, and as this latter runs too far from Deal to answer to the text.
Although the Little Stour is not, between Barham and Kingston, more than
from three to four mètres broad, we need not be astonished at the
denomination of _flumen_ given to it by Cæsar, for he employs the same
expression to designate simple rivulets, such as the Ose and the
Oserain. (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 69, _Alesia_.)
But did Cæsar reach the Little Stour towards Barham and Kingston or
towards Littlebourne? The doubt is allowable. We believe, nevertheless,
that the country of Barham and Kingston agrees best with the idea we
form from reading the “Commentaries.” The heights on the left bank of
the Little Stour are not so broken as to prevent chariots and cavalry
from manœuvring on them, and the Britons might have occupied, as the
text requires, a commanding position, _locus superior_, on the banks
which end at the river in gentle slopes.
This stream, considering its little depth, does not form any real
obstacle. Now it appears, in fact, to result from the recital of the
“Commentaries,” that the engagement as it was not of a serious
character, and that Cæsar’s cavalry passed it without difficulty. This
last fact forms an objection to the Great Stour, which several authors,
and among others General de Gœler, take for the _flumen_ of the text; it
is sufficiently broad and sufficiently steep-banked towards Sturry,
where they place the scene of the action, to render the passage
difficult for cavalry. Moreover, Sturry is fifteen, and not twelve miles
from the coast of Deal.
[398] It is evident that this place must not be sought at more than a
few kilomètres from the Little Stour; for it must be remembered that the
Romans had landed the day before, that they had made a night march of
twelve miles, and that they have just given battle. Unfortunately, the
country situated to the west of Kingston is so much broken and wooded,
that it is impossible to choose one site rather than another to make a
British _oppidum_. Perhaps it might be placed towards Bursted or Upper
Hardres.
[399] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 9.
[400] It has appeared to us interesting to explain how Cæsar could join
the fleet to his camp.
The Roman camp must have been on flat ground, to allow of the
possibility of drawing up the ships of the fleet. Supposing that the
mean size of each ship was twenty-five mètres long by six mètres broad,
and that the 800 ships composing the fleet had been placed at two mètres
from each other, on five lines separated by a distance of three mètres,
the fleet would have covered a rectangle of 1,280 mètres by 140, joined
with the camp by other trenches. It is, of course, understood that the
lightest boats would form the line farthest from the sea.
[401] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 11.
[402] This is the expression of Cæsar, but it is certain that this
number does not indicate the shortest distance from the Thames to the
Straits. Cæsar, no doubt, meant to tell us the length of the route he
took from the sea to the Thames.
[403] On the chariots of the Britons consult Strabo (IV., p. 166), and
Dio Cassius (LXXVI. 12). Cæsar spoke of many thousand cavalry and
war-chariots, in the third book of a Memoir addressed to Cicero, but
which is lost. (Junius Philargyrus, _Comm. on the Georgics of Virgil_,
III., p. 204.)
[404] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 17.
[405] There remains not the slightest vestige in the county of Kent
which might help us in tracing the march of the Roman army. The camp of
Holwood, near Keston, which the English maps call _Cæsar’s Camp_, does
not belong to the period of which we are treating. On St. George’s Hill,
near Walton-on-the-Thames, no camp ever existed.
Unfortunately, it is no more possible to ascertain the exact place where
Cæsar crossed the Thames by a ford. We are convinced of this by the
researches of all kinds made by the officers Stoffel and Hamelin. The
boatmen of the Thames all assured them that between Shepperton and
London there are now reckoned eight or nine places fordable; the most
favourable is that at Sunbury. At Kingston, where General de Gœler
places the passage, nothing leads us to suppose that a ford ever
existed. The same thing must be said of Coway Stakes. At Halliford, in
spite of the termination of the word, the inhabitants have no tradition
of an ancient ford. The only thing which appears to us evident is, that
the Roman army did not pass below Teddington. We know that this village,
the name of which comes from _Tide-end-town_, marks the last point of
the Thames where the tide is felt. We cannot believe that Cæsar would
expose himself to be surprised during his passage by an increase of the
volume of water.
[406] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 18.--Polyænus expresses himself thus:
“Cæsar, when he was in the isle of Britain, sought to pass a great
river. Cassivellaunus, King of the Britons, opposed the passage with a
numerous cavalry and many chariots. Cæsar had a very great elephant, an
animal which the Britons had never seen; he armed it with iron flakes,
and placed on its back a great tower filled with archers and slingers,
all men of skill, and caused it to advance into the river. The Britons
were struck with astonishment at the view of such an enormous animal,
which was unknown to them. And is it necessary to say that their horses
were frightened at it, since we know that, even among the Greeks, the
presence of an elephant causes the horses to flee? Much more were those
of the barbarians unable to support the view of an elephant armed and
loaded with a tower from which flew stones and arrows. Britons, horses,
and chariots, all equally took flight; and the Romans, by means of the
terror caused by a single animal, passed the river without danger.”
(_Strateg._, VIII. 23, § 5.)
[407] After having crossed the Thames, Cæsar invaded the territory of
Cassivellaunus, and directed his march to the _oppidum_ of that chief.
Certain commentators place this _oppidum_ to the west of Wendover (_see
Plate 15_), others at St. Albans, the ancient _Verulamium_. All we can
possibly say is, that the brief indications of the “Commentaries” seem
to agree best with the latter locality.
[408] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 22.
[409] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 23.
[410] Strabo, p. 167.
[411] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, IX., 116.--Solinus, LIII. 28.
[412] “I have received, on the 4th of the nones of June (the 1st of
June, according to the concordance here adopted, _see Appendix A_), your
letter dated from Placentia; that of the following day, dated from Lodi,
arrived on the very day of the nones (4th of June).” It was accompanied
with a letter from Cæsar, expressing his satisfaction at the arrival of
Quintus. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 15.
[413] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 15. This letter was closed on the
5th of the calends of August, answering to the 26th of July.
[414] “I have received, on the day of the ides of September (the 9th of
September), your fourth letter, dated from Britain on the 4th of the
ides of August (8th of August).” (_Epist. ad Quintum_, III. 1.
[415] “The 11th of the calends of October (16th of September) your
courier arrived; he has taken twenty days on the road; my uneasiness was
mortal.” (_Epist. ad Quintum_, III. 1.)--“Cæsar has written to me from
Britain a letter, dated on the calends of September (28th of August),
which I received on the 4th of the calends of October. It appears that
affairs are not going on ill with him. Cæsar adds, to prevent me from
being surprised at not hearing from you, that you were not with him when
he came to the coast (23rd of September).”
[416] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, III. 3.
[417] At ten miles to the east of Deal it is high tide half an hour
later than at Dover, and the reflux begins there four hours after the
hour of high tide.
[418] Those who refuse to admit Boulogne and Deal for the points of
Cæsar’s embarking and landing, pretend that so long a time was not
necessary to effect so short a passage. But a fleet requires a longer
time to navigate the more numerous it is; resembling in that an army,
which marches much more slowly than a single man.
[419] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 17.
[420] To find the time required, we must suppose that, by some delay or
by the absence of regular couriers, Cæsar’s letter to Cicero had been
thirteen days on the road between Lodi and Rome.
[421] Much uncertainty exists in regard to the distribution of the
legions; yet the location of two of the winter quarters appears to us
certain, Samarobriva (_Amiens_) and Aduatuca (_Tongres_). If now, from a
point situate near to the Sambre, from Bavay as the centre, we describe
a circle, we shall see that Cæsar’s winter quarters, except those of
Normandy, were all comprised in a radius of 100 miles, or 148
kilomètres. The researches which Major Cohausen kindly made for me, and
those of MM. Stoffel and Locqueyssie, have enabled me to determine
approximately the winter quarters.
[422] The brother of the orator.
[423] The Commandant of Artillery, De Locqueyssie, has found on the
Ourthe, near the village of Lavacherie (_Duchy of Luxemburg_), the
remains of a Roman camp with triangular fosses, and in a position which
appears to agree with the date of the “Commentaries.”
[424] Under the name of _Belgium_, we must only comprise a part of the
peoples of Belgic Gaul, such as the Atrebates, the Ambiani, and the
Bellovaci. (_De Bello Gallico_, V. 24, 25, 46; VIII. 46.)
[425] _Unam legionem, quam proxime trans Padum
conscripserat._--According to the use of the good Latin writers,
_proxime_ does not mean _recently_, but _in the last place_. Through an
incorrect interpretation of this phrase, General de Gœler has supposed
that Cæsar had, at this time, brought from Italy the 15th legion; this
legion, as we shall see, was only raised at a later period.
[426] More than fourteen different localities have been proposed for
identification with Aduatuca. If some writers have advanced good
arguments for placing Aduatuca on the right bank of the Meuse, others
have believed that they have offered equally good ones for seeking it on
the left bank of that river; but the greater part of them have admitted
this or that site for the most futile reasons. Nobody has dreamt of
resolving the question by the simplest of all means--which consists in
seeking if, among the different sites proposed, there is one which, by
the form of the ground, agrees with the requirements of the narrative
given in the “Commentaries.” Now, Tongres is in this position, and it
alone, and so completely satisfies them that we cannot think of placing
Aduatuca elsewhere. In fact, Tongres is situated in the country occupied
formerly by the Eburones, and, as Cæsar expresses it, _in modiis finibus
Eburonum_, which signifies entirely in the country of the Eburones, and
not in the centre of the country. It is moreover enclosed in a circle of
a hundred miles radius, comprising all the winter quarters of the Roman
army except those of Roscius. This locality fulfils all the conditions
required for the establishment of a camp; it is near a river, on a
height which commands the neighborhood, and the country produces wheat
and forage. At two miles towards the west is a long defile, _magna
convallis_, the vale of Lowaige, where the relation of the massacre of
the cohorts of Sabinus is perfectly explained. At three miles from
Tongres we find a plain, separated from the town by a single hill; on
the same side as this hill rises a rounded eminence--that of Berg, to
which the name of tumulus may be fairly applied. Lastly, the Geer, the
banks of which were formerly marshy, defended through a large extent the
height of Tongres. (_See Plate 18._)
[427] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 25.
[428] See the notice by M. M. F. Driesen on the position of Aduatuca, in
the _Bulletins de l’Académie Royale de Belgique_, 2nd series, tom. XV.
No. 3.
[429] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 37.
[430] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 39.
[431] The towers of the Romans were constructed of timber of small size,
bound together by cross pieces. (_See Plate 27, fig. 8._) They still
raise scaffolding at Rome in the same manner at the present day.
[432] Although the text has _passuum_, we have not hesitated in
substituting _pedum_, for it is very improbable that Gauls could have
made, in three hours’ time, a countervallation of more than 22
kilomètres.
[433] The siege machine called _testudo_, “a tortoise,” was ordinarily a
gallery mounted upon wheels, made of wood strongly squared, and covered
with a solid blindage. It was pushed against the wall of the place
besieged. It protected the workmen employed either in filling the fosse,
or in mining the wall, or in working the ram. The siege operations of
the Gauls lead us to presume that the camp of Cicero was in a fort
surrounded by a wall. (_See_, on the word _falces_, note (1) on p. 143.)
[434] In the coal-basin, in the centre of which Charleroy is situated,
the coal layers crop out of the surface of the soil on different points.
Still, at the present day, they knead the clay with small coal. But,
what is most curious, people have found at Breteuil (Oise), as in the
ruins of Carthage, a quantity of ovoid balls made of pottery.
[435] It will be seen that we use indifferently the terms _vallum_ and
_rampart_.
[436] Dio Cassius, XL. 8.
[437] It has appeared to us that the movement of concentration of Cæsar
and Fabius did not allow the winter quarters of the latter to be placed
at Therouanne or at Montreuil-sur-Mer, as most authors have supposed.
These localities are too far distant from the route from Amiens to
Charleroy to have enabled Fabius to join Cæsar on the territory of the
Atrebates, as the text of the Commentaries requires. For this reason, we
place Fabius at Saint-Pol.
[438] The “Commentaries” say, _Græcis conscriptam litteris_; but
Polyænus and Dio Cassius affirm that the letter was written in Greek.
[439] Polyænus, _Strateg._, VIII. xxiii. 6.
[440] We admit that Cicero encamped at Charleroi: all circumstances
concur in justifying this opinion. Charleroi is situated on the Sambre,
near the Roman road from Amiens to Tongres (_Aduatuca_), and, as the
Latin text requires, at fifty miles from this latter town. On the high
part of Charleroi, where the camp was, no doubt, established, we command
the valley of the Sambre, and we can see, in the distance towards the
west, the country through which Cæsar arrived. Moreover, the valley of
the Haine and mount Sainte-Aldegonde, above the village of Carnières,
agree perfectly with the details of the combat in which the Gauls were
defeated.
[441] From Amiens to Charleroi it is 170 kilomètres. Cæsar must have
arrived on the territory of the Nervii, towards Cambrai, _the morning of
the third day_, counting from his departure from Amiens, after marching
ninety kilomètres. He immediately sends the Gaulish horseman to Cicero.
This horseman has to perform eighty kilomètres. He can only take eight
to nine hours, and arrive at the camp in the afternoon of the third day.
He throws his javelin, which remains where it was fixed _the third_ and
_the fourth day_. The _fifth_ day it was discovered, and the smoke of
the fires is then seen. Cæsar, then, arrived on the fifth day (reckoning
thirty kilomètres for a day’s march) at Binche, twenty kilomètres from
Charleroi. That town is on a sufficiently elevated knoll to allow the
smoke to be seen. The siege lasted about fifteen days.
[442] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 53.
[443] “I have read with a lively joy what you tell me of the courage and
strength of mind of Cæsar in this cruel trial.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad
Quintum_, III. viii. 166.)
[444] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 67.--Polyænus, _Strateg._, VIII. xxiii.
[445] One is on the site of the citadel of Amiens; the second is near
Tirancourt; the third is the camp of l’Etoile. (_See the Dissertation
sur les Camps Romains de la Somme_, by the Comte L. d’Allonville.)
[446] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 58.
[447] _Précis des Guerres de César_, by Napoleon, Chapter V. 5.
[448] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 4.
[449] The “Commentaries,” after having informed us (V. 24) that Labienus
established himself in the country of the Remi, on the confines of that
of the Treviri, give us afterwards to understand that he encamped among
the Treviri, where he had passed the winter, “Labienum cum una legione,
quæ in eorum finibus hiemaverat.” (VI. 7.) We believe, with certain
authors, that the country in which he encamped was either on the
boundary of the two countries, or ground of which the Remi and the
Treviri disputed the possession. Is it not evident, moreover, that after
the catastrophe of Aduatuca and the insurrection of the people seduced
by Ambiorix, everything dictated to Labienus the necessity of engaging
himself no further in a hostile country, by separating himself from the
other legions?
[450] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 6.
[451] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 8.
[452] See page 82.
[453] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 29.
[454] We must suppose from this that, during his march, Cæsar crossed
the territory of the Segni and Condrusi, or that at least he passed not
far from it. This consideration has induced us to extend this territory
farther towards the north than is generally done. (_See Plates 1 bis and
13._)
[455] Cæsar might very well say that the Scheldt mingles his waters with
those of the Meuse. Several ancient authors share in this opinion. This
took place by the eastern arm of the Scheldt, formerly more developed
than in modern times, which spread itself in the space which, according
to Tacitus, formed the _immense mouth of the Meuse_ (_immensum Mosæ
os_).
[456] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 34.
[457] Forty-five kilomètres reckoned down from Bonn bring us to the
confluence of the Wipper and the Rhine.
[458] Cæsar complained of the conduct of Quintus, when he wrote to
Cicero the orator: “He did not keep within the camp, as would have been
the duty of a prudent and scrupulous general.” (Charisius, p. 101.)
[459] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 42.
[460] An ancient manuscript belonging to Upper Auvergne, the manuscript
of Drugeac, informs us that this custom continued long in use, and that
it still existed in the Middle Ages. Rough towers were built for this
purpose on the heights, 400 or 500 mètres apart; watchmen were placed in
them, who transmitted the news from one to another by sonorous
monosyllables. A certain number of these towers still exist in the
Cantal. If the wind prevented this mode of transmission, they had
recourse to fire.
It is evident that criers had been posted beforehand from Genabum to
Gergovia, since it was agreed that the Carnutes should give the signal
of war. It is exactly 160 miles (about 240 kilomètres), through the
valleys of the Loire and the Allier, from Gien to Gergovia, the
principal _oppidum_ of the Arverni.
[461] “Hic corpore, armis, spirituque terribilis, nomine etiam quasi ad
terrorem composito.” (Florus, II. x. 21.)--Vercingetorix was born at
Gergovia. (Strabo, IV., p. 158.)
[462] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 5.
[463] Coins of Lucterius have been found, as well as of many of the
Gaulish chiefs mentioned in the “Commentaries.” The first has been
described by MM.[“Messieurs” methinks] Mionet and Chaudruc de Crazannes.
(_Revue Numismatique_, t. V., pl. 16, p. 333.)
[464] Their capital was Alba, now Aps (_Ardèche_). During recent
researches, remains of an ancient road have been discovered, which
passed by the places here indicated, and led from the land of the Helvi
to the Vellavi and Arverni.
[465] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 9.
[466] Since Cæsar did not start until after the murder of Clodius, which
took place on the 13th of the Calends of February (December 30th, 701),
and had raised troops in Italy, passed through the Roman province,
penetrated over the Cévennes into Auvergne, and had thence returned to
Vienne, it is probable that he did not arrive at Sens before the
commencement of March.
[467] The Latin term has _Altero die, quum ad oppidum Senonum
Vellaunodunum venisset_, &c. All authors, without exception, considering
wrongly the expression of _altero die_ as identical with those of
_postro die_, _proximo die_, _insequenti die_, _pridie ejus diei_, have
translated it by _the following day_. We consider that _altero die_,
when used with regard to an event, signifies the second day which
follows that of the said event.
Thus Cicero gives it this sense in his _Philippica Prima_, § 13, where
he reminds us of the conduct of Antony after the death of Cæsar. Antony
had begun by treating with the conspirators who had taken refuge in the
Capitol, and, at a sitting of the Senate, which he called together _ad
hoc_, on the day of the Liberalia, that is to say, the 16th of the
Calends of April, an amnesty was pronounced in favour of the murderers
of Cæsar. Cicero, speaking of this session of the Senate, says,
_Proximo, altero, tertio, denique reliquis consecutis diebus_, &c. Is it
not evident that here _altero die_ signifies the second day which
followed the session of the Senate, or two days after that session?
Here are other examples which show that the word _alter_ must be taken
in the sense of _secundus_. Virgil says (_Eclogue_ VIII., line 39),
_Alter ab undecimo tum jam me ceperat annus_, which must be translated,
_I was thirteen years old_. Servius, who composed a commentary on Virgil
at a time when the traditions were still preserved, makes the following
comment on this verse: _Id est tertius decimus. Alter enim de duobus
dicimus ut unus ab undecimo sit duodecimus, alter tertius decimus, et
vult significare jam se vicinum fuisse pubertati, quod de duodecimo anno
procedere non potest_. (Virgil, edit. Burmann, tom. I., p. 130.)
Forcellini peremptorily establishes that _vicesimo altero_ signifies the
_twenty-second_; _legio altera vicesima_ means the _twenty-second
legion_.
The “Commentaries” inform us (_De Bello Civili_, III. 9) that Octavius,
when besieging Salona, had established five camps round the town, and
that the besieged took those five camps one after the other. The text is
thus expressed: _Ipsi in_ PROXIMA _Octavii castra irruperunt. Mis
expugnatis, eodem impetu_, ALTERA _sunt adorti; inde_ TERTIA _et_
QUARTA, _et deinceps_ RELIQUA. (See also _De Bello Civili_, III. 83.)
In the “Commentaries” we find sixty-three times the expression _postero
die_, thirty-six times _proximo die_, ten times _insequenti die_, eleven
times _postridie ejus diei_, or _pridie ejus diei_. The expression
_altero die_ is used only twice in the eight books _De Bello Gallico_,
viz., lib. VII. cc. 11 and 68, and three times in _De Bello Civili_,
lib. III. cc. 19, 26, and 30. Is that coincidence alone not sufficient
to make us suppose that _altero die_ ought not to be confounded with the
preceding expressions; and does it not appear certain that, if Cæsar had
arrived at Vellaunodunum the morning after his departure from Agedincum,
he would have written, _Postero die_ (or _proximo die_) _quum ad oppidum
Senonum Vellaunodunum venisset_, &c.?
We believe, therefore, that we are authorized in concluding that Cæsar
arrived at Vellaunodunum the second day after the army moved.
Farther on, on page 339, will be found a new confirmation of the sense
which we give to _altero die_. It results from the appreciation of the
distance which separates Alesia from the battle-field where Cæsar
defeated the cavalry of Vercingetorix. (See the opinions of the
commentators on _altero die_ in the sixth volume of Cicero, edit.
Lemaire, Classiques Latins, _Excursus ad Philippicam primam_.)
[468] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 11.--Contrary to the generally received
opinion, we adopt _Gien_ and not _Orleans_ for the ancient Genabum,
_Triguères_ for Vellaunodonum, _Sancerre_ for Noviodunum, and, lastly,
_Saint-Parize-le-Châtel_ for the Gorgobina of the Boii.
As Cæsar’s object, on quitting Sens, was to march as quickly as possible
to the _oppidum_ of the Boii, in order to raise the siege, since he
starts without baggage, so as to be less impeded in his march, we will
first examine the probable position of this latter town, before
discussing the question relating to the intermediate points.
_Gorgobina Boiorum_. After the defeat of the Helvetii, Cæsar allowed the
Ædui to receive the Boii upon their territory, and it is probable that
they were established on the western frontier, as in an advanced post
against the Arverni and the Bituriges. Several data confirm this
opinion. Tacitus (_Histor._, II. 61) relates that: _Mariccus quidam, e
plebe Boiorum,.... concitis octo millibus hominum, proximos Æduorum
pagos trahebat_. The possessions of the Boii were, therefore, contiguous
to the Æduan territory. Pliny the Elder (_Hist. Nat._, IV. 18) places
the Boii in the number of the nations who inhabited the centre of the
Lyonnaise. _Intus autem Ædui fœderati, Carnuti fœderati, Boii,
Senones_.... The place here occupied by the word _Boii_ shows us again
that this people was not far from the Ædui, the Senones, and the
Carnutes. Lastly, the text of the “Commentaries” represents
Vercingetorix as obliged to traverse the country of the Bituriges to
repair to Gorgobina. The most plausible opinion is that which places the
Boii between the Loire and the Allier, towards the confluence of these
two rivers. This was already an old tradition, adopted in the fifteenth
century by Raimondus Marlianus, one of the first editors of Cæsar. This
space of ground, covered in its eastern part with woods and marshes, was
admirably suited by its extent to the limited population of the Boii,
who did not number more than 20,000 souls. Neither
Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, marked on the map of Gaul as Gorgobina, nor La
Guerche, proposed by General de Gœler, answer completely, by their
topographical position, to the site of a Gaulish _oppidum_. In fact,
Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier is far from being advantageously situated; this
village stands at the foot of the hills which border the right bank of
the Allier. La-Guerche-sur-Aubois fulfils no better the conditions of
defence which must be required in the principal town of the Boii: it is
situated almost in a plain, on the edge of a marshy valley of the
Aubois. It presents a few remains of fortifications of the Middle Ages,
but not a trace of more remote antiquity has been discovered in it. To
seek Gorgobina farther down, and on the left bank of the Loire, is
impossible, since, according to Cæsar, the Boii had been established on
the territory of the Ædui, and the Loire formed the boundary between the
Ædui and the Bituriges. If we are reduced to conjectures, we must at
least admit as incontestable what is advanced by Cæsar.
The village of Saint-Parize-le-Châtel suits better. It is about eight
kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier, nearly in the middle
of the space comprised between the Loire and the Allier; it occupies the
centre of ancient agglomeration of inhabitants, which Guy Coquille, at
the end of the sixteenth century, designates under the name of the
_bourg de Gentily_, and which the _chronicles_ called, down to the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, _Pagus Gentilicus_, or _bourg des
gentils_. The history of this people has this remarkable peculiarity,
that, whilst all the neighbouring nations on the other side of the
Allier and the Loire had, as early as the fourth century, accepted the
Christian religion, they alone continued in idolatry until the sixth
century. Does this fact apply to a tribe settled in a foreign country,
as the Boii were, who would retain their customs and religion for a
longer time unchanged? An ancient tradition states that, in the environs
of Saint-Parize, there was, at a very remote period, a considerable
town, which was destroyed by a fire. A few scattered foundations,
discovered in the woods of Bord, to the south-west of Saint Parize, seem
to indicate the site of the _oppidum_ of the Boii. The name of the
castle, of the domain, and of the place called _Les Bruyères de Buy_,
remind us of that of the Boii.
There was probably a Roman station at Saincaise-Meauce (thirteen
kilomètres to the north of Saint-Pierre-le-Moutier), on the right bank
of the Allier. In 1861, there were discovered there numerous objects of
the Gallo-Roman period, and two busts in white marble, life-size,
representing Roman emperors. At Chantenay, eight kilomètres south from
Saint-Pierre, a few Roman foundations have been found, and a
considerable number of Gaulish coins, one of which, amongst others,
bears the name of the Æduan Litavicus.
_Genabum_. The position of Gorgobina once established at the confluence
of the Loire and the Allier, we must admit _Gien_ as the ancient
Genabum, and not _Orleans_, for the following reasons:--
1st. We cannot believe that Cæsar, leaving Sens in spite of the rigour
of the season, and in haste to raise the siege of Gorgobina, should,
without any reason, have taken a circuitous road of seventy-five
kilomètres, which would represent three or four days march, in order to
pass by Orleans. In fact, the distance from Sens to the confluence of
the Allier and the Loire, is, by Orleans, 270 kilomètres, whilst it is
only 180 kilomètres by the way of Gien.
2nd. From Sens to Gien the road was short and easy; on the contrary,
from Sens to Orleans it was necessary to pass the great marsh of Sceaux
and the forest of Orleans, probably impracticable. Now, the road
indicated on the Peutingerian Table, as leading from Orleans to Sens,
must have had a decided curve towards the south, and passed close by
Gien, after having passed through Aquæ-Segeste (_Craon_ and
_Chenevière_), for the distance between Sens and Orleans is marked at
fifty-nine Gaulish leagues, or 134 kilomètres. The Roman road, which
leads directly from Sens to Orleans, by way of Sceaux, and which the
itineraries do not mention, has only a length of 110 kilomètres: it is
certainly less ancient than the former, and can never have been a
Gaulish road.
3rd. The “Commentaries” inform us that the news of the insurrection of
Genabum arrived in a short time among the Averni (of whom Gergovia, near
Clermont, was the principal centre), at a distance of 160 miles (237
kilomètres) from Genabum. Now, the distance from Gien to Gergovia, by
the valleys of the Loire and the Allier, is 240 kilomètres, which agrees
with the text, whilst from Orleans to the same spot it is 300
kilomètres.
4th. After having crossed the Loire at Genabum, Cæsar was in the
territory of the Bituriges. This is true if he passed by Gien, and false
if he passed by Orleans, since, opposite Orleans, the left bank belonged
to the territory of the Carnutes. It is true that it has been pretended
that Gien belonged to the ancient diocese of Auxerre, and that,
consequently, it was in the territory of the Senones, and not in that of
the Carnutes. The limits of the ancient dioceses cannot be considered as
indicating in an absolute manner the frontiers of the peoples of Gaul;
and we cannot admit that the territory of the Senones formed an acute
angle upon the territory of the Carnutes, the summit of which would be
occupied by Gien. Moreover, whatever change it may have experienced in
feudal times, in regard to its diocesan attribution, Gien has never
formed a part of the Orléanais, in its civil and political relations. In
561, Gien was included in the kingdom of Orleans and Burgundy.
We believe, therefore, that Genabum was, not old Gien, which,
notwithstanding its epithet, may be posterior to Cæsar, but the present
Gien. This little town, by its position on the banks of the Loire,
besides containing a hill very appropriate for the site of an ancient
_oppidum_, possesses sufficiently interesting ruins, and agrees much
better than Old Gien with the _oppidum_ of the Carnutes. Without
attaching too great faith to traditions and etymologies, we must,
nevertheless, mention a gate at Gien, which, from time immemorial, has
been called Cæsar’s Gate (_la Porte de César_); a street called _à la
Genabye_, which leads, not towards Orleans, but towards the high part of
town; a piece of ground, situated to the north of Gien, at the angle
formed by the road to Montargis and the Roman road, at a distance of
about one kilomètre, which still preserves the name of the Field of the
Camp (_La Pièce du Camp_). Perhaps this is the spot where Cæsar placed
his camp, opposite the most accessible part of the town.
The principal reason why Orleans has been taken for Genabum is that the
Itinerary of Antoninus indicates that town under the name of _Cenabum_
or _Cenabo_, and that this name is also found in some lately discovered
inscriptions. It may be supposed that the inhabitants of Gien, after
having escaped from the destruction of their town, descended the river,
and, on the spot where Orleans now stands, formed a new establishment,
to which they gave the name of the first city; in the same manner the
inhabitants of Bibracte removed to Autun, and those of Gergovia to
Clermont.
Independently of the above considerations, Orleans, by its position on a
declivity uniformly inclined toward the Loire, does not at all answer to
the conditions of a Gaulish _oppidum_. If we admit Orleans to be
Genabum, it becomes very difficult to assign a convenient site for the
_oppida_ of Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
_Vellaunodunum._ The situation of the territory of the Boii being
admitted, as well as that of Genabum, we have to find, on the road which
Cæsar pursued from Sens to Gorgobina, the intermediate points of
Vellaunodunum and Noviodunum.
On the direct line from Sens to Gien, at the distance of 40 kilomètres
from Sens, we meet with the little town of Triguères. The hill which
overlooks it from the north agrees with the position of the ancient
_oppidum_; the remains of walls, fosses, and parapets have been found on
it. Farther, there were discovered in 1856, at 500 mètres to the
north-west of Triguères, the ruins of a large semi-elliptical theatre,
capable of containing from 5,000 to 6,000 spectators. In another
direction, the ruins of a Druidical monument have been pointed out; in
fact, everything leads to the belief that there existed at Triguères, in
the Gallo-Roman period, an important centre, which had been preceded by
a Gaulish establishment anterior to the conquest. A road paved with
stones, considered by some as a Gaulish or Celtic way, but accepted by
all archæologists as a Roman road, goes direct from Sens to Triguères,
by Courtenay, and passes along the eastern side of the _oppidum_.
Another ancient way leads similarly from Triguères to Gien. We feel no
hesitation, after what precedes, in placing Vellaunodunum at Triguères.
It will be objected that the distance from Sens to this little town (40
kilomètres) is too small to have taken the Roman army, without baggage,
three days’ march; but Cæsar does not say that he employed three days in
proceeding from _Agedincum_ to _Vellaunodunum_: he informs us merely
that, leaving all his baggage at Agedincum, he journeyed towards the
country of the Boii, and that on the second day he arrived at
Vellaunodunum. Nothing, therefore, obliges us to suppose that, before it
marched, the Roman army was concentrated or encamped at Agedincum
itself. Persons unacquainted with military art are apt to suppose that
an army lives and marches always concentrated on one point.
Cæsar, although he was effecting the concentration of his troops before
entering into campaign, did not keep them massed at the gates of Sens,
but he probably distributed them in _échelon_ in the neighbourhood of
the town, along the Yonne. When afterwards he decided on marching to the
succour of the Boii, we must suppose that the first day was employed in
concentrating the whole army at Sens itself, in leaving the baggage
there, perhaps also in crossing the Yonne, a long operation for more
than 60,000 men. The first day having passed, the army continued its
march next day, and arrived at Triguères the day following, having
performed two days’ march of 20 kilomètres each. We see, then, that the
distance between Sens and Triguères does not prevent us from identifying
this latter locality with Vellaunodunum. Triguères is distant 44
kilomètres from Gien, the distance which separated Vellaunodunum from
Genabum, and which might have been marched in two days.
_Noviodunum._ To find the site of Noviodunum, we must seek a position
which agrees best with the “Commentaries” in the triangle formed by the
three known points, Gien, Le Bec-d’Allier, and Bourges. Since, according
to the text, Vercingetorix did not raise the siege of the town of the
Boii until he had heard of Cæsar’s arrival on the left bank of the
Loire, and since the two hostile armies, marching towards each other,
met at Noviodunum, it follows that this last-named town must be about
half-way between the spot where the Loire was passed and the town of the
Boii; on another hand, since Cæsar took several days to reach Bourges
from Noviodunum, there must have been a rather considerable distance
between those two last-named towns. Moreover, in order that the
inhabitants of Noviodunum should have seen in the distance, from the top
of their walls, the cavalry of Vercingetorix, the town must necessarily
have been situated on an eminence. Lastly, the cavalry combat, fought at
a small distance from the town, proves that the ground was sufficiently
flat to permit that engagement.
It is, therefore, because certain points hitherto indicated do not
answer to the conditions required by the text, that we have not
admitted, as representing Noviodunum, the towns of Nouan-le-Fuselier,
Pierrefitte-sur-Saudre, Nohant-en-Goût, Neuvy-en-Sullias, or
Neuvy-sur-Barangeon. In fact, some of these are too far from
Bec-d’Allier, while others are too near Bourges, and most of them are
situated in a plain.
Sancerre, on the contrary, answers all the conditions of the text. It is
situated on a hill which rises 115 mètres above the valley watered by
the Loire. Encircled on all sides by deep ravines, it can only be
approached from one point, situated to the east, where the ancient Roman
road of Bourges terminated, which is still at the present day called the
Big Road (_le Gros Chemin_). The Abbé Lebœuf, as early as 1727, had
designated this town as the ancient Noviodunum. It is near Saint-Satur,
at the very foot of the mountain of Sancerre, that a Gallo-Roman town
existed, of which, within the last few years, numerous foundations have
been found. It is probable that this Gallo-Roman town had succeeded to a
great centre of Gaulish population, for the Bituriges must necessarily
have occupied in their territory a point so admirably fortified by
nature, and which commanded the course of the Loire, the line of
boundary between them and the Ædui. The present town seems to have kept
within the very limits of the ancient _oppidum_; it has the form of an
ellipse of from 700 to 800 mètres in length on a breadth of about 500
mètres, capable of containing a population of from 4,000 to 5,000
inhabitants. At Sancerre there was also, at the extremity of one of the
streets, towards the north, a gate called the Gate of Cæsar (_Porte de
César_), which was demolished in the beginning of the nineteenth
century. By adopting Sancerre, all the movements of the commencement of
the campaign of 702 are easily explained. This town is forty-six
kilomètres from Gien, forty-eight kilomètres from Le Bec-d’Allier,
distances nearly equal, so that Vercingetorix and Cæsar, starting almost
at the same time from two opposite points, may have met under its walls.
Its elevated position allowed the eye to range far towards the south
along the valley of the Loire, through which the inhabitants would have
seen the approach of the cavalry of Vercingetorix. Cæsar may have
occupied with his army the heights of Verdigny or Saint-Satur, to the
north of Sancerre. A cavalry engagement may have taken place in the
valley of Saint-Satur, or on the plain between Ménétréol and
Saint-Thibaud. The captain of staff Rouby has examined with the greatest
care the places just mentioned.
Cæsar, after the surrender of Noviodunum, marches towards Bourges.
Vercingetorix follows him by short marches (_minoribus itineribus_). The
Roman general, having Bourges before him, and a hostile army on his
left, marches slowly and with precaution. Perhaps he took three or four
days to perform the forty-five kilomètres which separate Sancerre from
Bourges. At last, after having reconnoitred the site of Avaricum, he
must have traversed the marshes of the Yèvre, at a distance of three or
four kilomètres from that town, so as to take up a position to the
south-east of the _oppidum_, in that part which was not surrounded by
the river and the marshes, and which only offered a narrow passage. As
to Vercingetorix, he follows, or rather hovers on, the Roman army,
taking up his position on its left, and still keeping up his
communication with Avaricum, hesitating whether he shall deliver it to
the flames.
[469] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 13.
[470] Archælogists have pretended they find traces still existing of the
camp of Vercingetorix in the neighbourhood of Bourges, not considering
that Cæsar declares that the Gaulish chief did not, for the first time,
think of retrenching his camp in the Roman fashion till after the siege
of this town. We believe that Vercingetorix, although he came from the
east, encamped to the south of Bourges. It was, indeed, natural that he
should place himself between the Roman army and the land of the Arverni,
whence, probably, it drew its provisions. Besides, if he had placed his
camp to the east of Bourges, he would have intercepted the provisions
which Cæsar expected from the land of the Ædui, which the text does not
say.
[471] The ravine which descends to the Auron is still recognised at the
present day, between the Portes Saint-Michel and Saint-Paul, by the
sudden incline of the ground. Old plans of Bourges designate it by the
name of the _Vallée Saint-Paul_. The opposite ravine, which runs towards
the Porte Bourbonnoux, has disappeared under the successive fillings up
composing the soil of the garden of the archbishop’s palace. The ridge
of land forming the avenue cannot have been in Cæsar’s time more than
100 mètres broad. It has lost its primitive physiognomy, especially by
the formation of the Place Sérancourt, in 1700, on a site the level of
which did not then exceed that of the field of the present fair. The
depression of the ground which existed before the wall is more visible;
it has been filled-up during the different sieges of Bourges.
[472] This is evident, since the Romans, in order to be able to give the
assault, were obliged to construct a terrace eighty feet high. General
de Gœler believed this measurement exaggerated. Nevertheless, as this
terrace was constructed in a ravine, it was necessary that it should
compensate a difference of level of eighty mètres, of which thirty,
perhaps, represent the height of the wall.
[473] Vercingetorix, encamped first towards Dun-le-Roi, had approached
nearer Bourges. He had established his new camp to the east of that of
Cæsar, perhaps at La Chenevière, at the confluence of the Yèvre and the
brook of Villabon, fourteen kilomètres from Bourges.
[474] See the quotation from Vegetius, p. 143, note (1).
[475] We read in Vitruvius, on occasion of the siege of Marseilles:
“When the tortoise approached to batter the wall, they let down a cord
furnished with a slip-knot, in which they caught the ram, and raised its
head so high, by means of a wheel, that they prevented its striking the
wall.” (Vitruvius, X. 16.)
[476] Titus Livius expresses himself thus in speaking of the beseiged in
Ambracia, who dug a mine to meet that of the enemies: “Aperiunt viam
rectam in cuniculum.” (XXXVII. 7.)
[477] Several authors have thought that these beams, instead of being
placed perpendicularly to the direction of the wall, were placed
parallel to that direction. This interpretation appears to us
inadmissable. The beams so placed would have no solidity, and would
easily have been torn down. We see on the Trajan Column walls
constructed as we describe; moreover, the Latin expression _trabes
directæ_ can leave no doubt, for the word _directus_ means always
_perpendicular to a direction_. (See _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 17,
_directa materia injecta_, and the dissertation in the _Philologus_,
Jahrganges 19, Heft. 3.)
[478] The name of _pluteus_ was given generally to all kinds of covering
with hurdles or with skins. (Festus, in voce _Pluteus_.--Vitruvius, X.
20.)--Vegetius (IV. 15) applies the name of _pluteus_ to a kind of
penthouse, of wicker-work or skins, mounted on three wheels, and
protecting the men placed behind it, so that they might shoot at the
defenders.
[479] They gave this name to a small engine resembling the balistæ,
which threw darts. These scorpions composed, as it were, the
field-artillery of the ancients.
[480] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 32.
[481] It is very probably that Cæsar proceeded first to Noviodunum
(_Nevers_), since he informs us that he had established in that town a
great magazine and provisions of every kind.
[482] At present the Allier is fordable almost everywhere in summer; but
in the course of nineteen centuries the bed of the river must have been
considerably raised.
[483] The commentators are not agreed on this passage. I have adopted
the version which seemed to me the best, and which MM. Köchly and Rustow
have followed in their German translation, Stuttgart, 1862.
[484] Dio Cassius, XL. 35.
[485] Cæsar, on leaving Decize, followed, no doubt the Gaulish road
which led to the Allier, and the existence of which may be assumed from
the later construction of the Roman road which goes from Decize to
Bourbon-l’Archambault (_Aquæ Borvonis_), and which crossed the Allier a
little below Moulins. Thence he followed the course of the river for
some days, constantly in face of the enemy. In order to pass it by the
help of a stratagem, he took advantage of the remains of a bridge; and,
as this bridge indicates that there must have been a road, it becomes a
question to find among the ancient roads which crossed the Allier that
which Cæsar followed. Now we only know two Roman roads leading to the
Allier below Moulins, one at Varennes, the other at Vichy. We adopt
Varennes. That locality is seventy-seven kilomètres from Gergovia,
reckoning them along the Allier, and Cæsar took five days to perform
them; but, as the four legions sent forward to deceive the enemy
returned during the night, in order to rejoin him, they must have
suffered great fatigues; hence it is to be presumed that the next day
the first march was very short. The fifth also was not long, for,
according to the “Commentaries,” Cæsar had time on the day of his
arrival to fortify his camp, to reconnoitre the place, and to engage in
a cavalry combat. Besides, the country, interspersed with woods and
marshes, was unknown to him; and we believe that we do not depart from
the truth if we admit that the first and the last march were of no more
than ten kilomètres, and the three others of nineteen, which gives a
total of seventy-seven kilomètres, the distance from Varennes to
Gergovia. When Cæsar left Gergovia, he crossed the Allier again, but at
a point nearer to Gergovia, being in haste to place the river between
him and the enemy. Indeed, on the second day after his check, he fought
a successful cavalry engagement, broke up his camp, and the following
day (_tertio die_) crossed the Allier again, according to our opinion,
at Vichy, which is only fifty-five kilomètres from Gergovia.
[486] The Artières receives, on the north of Gergovia, the little brook
of Clémensat, marked on _Plate 21_.
[487] It is by seeking the essential conditions required for the placing
of troops that Commandant Baron Stoffel succeeded in finding the camps.
Cæsar had to place from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of
water, at a convenient distance from Gergovia, and in such a manner as
to preserve his line of operation upon Nevers, where his magazines were.
These necessities indicated that the principal camp would be near the
Auzon, and to the east. Moreover, it must be sufficiently near the
_oppidum_, that from the top of the mountain of Gergovia could be seen
what was going on in it; and yet sufficiently distant that the objects
could not be clearly distinguished. The camp must be in the plain; Dio
Cassius (XL. 36) formally says, “Cæsar remained in the plain, not having
been able to take (for placing his camp) a place strong by its
elevation;” and then the “Commentaries” inform us that the Romans only
occupied one single hill, namely, the one they took by surprise (La
Roche-Blanche). Lastly, it was indispensable that there should be in
front of the camp a space sufficiently large to admit of cavalry
engagements.
[488] Vercingetorix, placed in the centre of a kind of semicircle, might
easily be considered by Cæsar as surrounded by his numerous troops
(_collocaverat copias circum se_).
[489] The combats of cavalry took place in the plain which extends from
the small eminence called _Le Puy-de-Marmant_ to the marsh of Sarlièves.
[490] The hill is certainly the Roche-Blanche, for it is situated
opposite the _oppidum_ (_e regione oppidi_); it begins at the very foot
of the slopes of the mountain of Gergovia (_sub ipsis radicibus
montis_), is singularly fortified by nature, and, as it were, cut out
from all sides (_egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcisus_). So
long as the Gauls occupied it, they could go to the Auzon by the ravine
of Merdogne, to obtain water and forage; but as soon as it was in the
power of the Romans, the Gauls were compelled to draw their water from
the springs on the mountain of Gergovia, and from the little brook of
Artières.
The excavations made in 1862 brought the two camps to light. The fosses
of the little camp are clearly defined in the calcareous soil. They form
an irregular outline, represented on _Plate 22_. The Roche-Blanche,
which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as
perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by
successive landslips, the last of which took place within memory of the
inhabitants. The communication between the great and little camps was
composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous
fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth
of the two together is only twelve feet. If we wonder that the Romans
should have dug two little ditches, each six feet broad and four feet
deep, instead of making one eight feet wide by six feet deep, which
would have given the same amount of soil to take out, it may be answered
that the two little ditches were much more quickly made than one large
ditch.
[491]
HOURS.
Cæsar starts at four o’clock in the morning, and arrives at Randan
at one o’clock in the afternoon 9
Employs in negotiation from one o’clock to seven o’clock 6
Repose from seven o’clock to ten o’clock in the evening 3
Hurried return from Randan to Gergovia, from ten o’clock to
four o’clock in the morning 6
--
Duration of Cæsar’s absence 24
[492] _Plate 22_ shows the places which Cæsar’s eye could embrace from
the summit of the Roche-Blanche. He could see neither the plateau, nor
the country situated on the norther slopes of the mountains of Gergovia
and Rissoles. It was for this reason that he had to learn from the
deserters the form of the ground which lay on the other side. He thus
learnt that the ridge of this latter mountain (_dorsum ejus jugi_) was
not very uneven, and gave access to the western part of the town (_ad
alteram partem oppidi_) by a narrow wooded passage (the defile of the
Goules, which separates Rissoles from Gergovia). (_See Plate 21 in C._)
This defile leads to the gate _P_ of the _oppidum_. The foundations, of
masonry, and the approaches to this gate, were uncovered in the month of
July, 1861. The wide road which led from this gate to the defile _C_ is
distinctly seen. The alarm of Vercingetorix may be imagined; he feared
lest the Romans might shut up from the Gauls this issue from the
_oppidum_. These latter would have been almost blockaded (_pœne
circumvallati_), without any way out, and in the impossibility of
producing forage from the valley of the Artières, since the northern
part of the town was difficult to access. Consequently, the words _si
alterum collem amisissent_ can only apply to the mountain mass of
Rissoles, and not, as several authors have pretended, to Montrognon or
to Puy-Giroux; for the possession of those two peaks, detached and
rather far from the mountain mass of Gergovia, offered no interest
either for the attack or for the defence.
The spot which it was important for the Gauls to fortify was the part _D
E_ of the heights of Rissoles which are opposite the village of Opme,
because troops could only scale the mass by the western slope. How can
any one suppose that, fearing for the defile of the Goules, the Gauls
would have abandoned their camp before the place to go and entrench
themselves on Montrognon, three kilomètres from Gergovia? How admit that
Cæsar, to threaten the defile, would have sent troops to make the
circuit of the mountain of Gergovia by the north? How could the legion,
which supported this movement, without advancing far, and which
concealed itself in the woods, have assisted in the stratagem, if the
false attack had been made to the east and to the north of Gergovia, at
two leagues from the camp? In passing by the south, that is, by the
defile of Opme, the legion was always in communication with the camps,
on which it could fall back, and the broken and wooded ground prevented
the Gauls from knowing accurately the importance of the attack. Besides,
two facts which result from the “Commentaries” prove that the Gauls were
not very far from the _oppidum_. Cæsar sees the southern front
abandoned, and he establishes his legions at a distance of 1,200 paces
from the place. The soldiers scale the heights at a rapid pace; but
scarcely have they reached the principal enclosure, when the Gauls, who
hear the cries of the women and of the small number of defenders left in
the place (_primo exaudito clamore_), have time to hurry to them, and
drive back the Romans. Consequently, the Gauls were at a distance where
the cries could be heard; and this distance may be measured by the time
which the attacking columns must have taken to climb the space of 1,200
paces, since they arrived almost simultaneously. We believe, therefore,
that they were at a distance of less than two kilomètres from the gate
_O_ of the town, engaged in fortifying the plateau of the heights of
Risolles.
[493] According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 9), the soldiers marched with
their heads bent down, in order not to be seen.
[494] It is, in fact, 1780 mètres from the foot of the mountain, where
Cæsar must have assembled his troops, between the Roche-Blanche and the
Puy-de-Marmant, to the gate _O_ of the _oppidum_. This is the line which
passes by the ravine in which the village of Merdogne is situated; to
the left and to the right the ground is too rugged for the troops to
climb it.
[495] General Gœler believes, with apparent reason, that we ought to
read _regressus_ instead of _progressus_. The 10th legion, which acted
as reserve, must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was
uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the
front.
[496] The part of the southern slope of Gergovia which was the scene of
the last battle is clearly indicated by the ground itself. This battle
took place on the whole space which extends in front of the gate _O_ of
the _oppidum_, the principal object of the attack. The ravine which,
according to the “Commentaries,” prevented the legions from hearing the
signal to retreat, is that which descends to the west of the Merdogne.
Hence it may be concluded that, at this moment, Cæsar and the 10th
legion were to the right of this ravine. Lastly, we understand on the
spot the movement of the Ædui. To the east of Merdogne there is a spur,
_H_, attached to the mountain of Gergovia, forty mètres below the
table-land, and presenting several successive terraces. So long as the
Ædui, who came from the east, had not arrived on the crest of this spur,
they could not be perceived by the Romans, who were fighting towards
Merdogne; but it may be imagined that, when they appeared all at once on
this crest, and at a distance of 600 mètres from the right flank of the
legions, the sight of them must have singularly surprised the troops,
who were expecting no re-enforcement from that side.
General de Gœler, without having seen the locality, has indicated nearly
the site of the Roman camp; but he does not place it sufficiently to the
west. He makes the Gaulish troops encamp on the four slopes of the
mountain of Gergovia. It is, no doubt, the expression _circum se_ (VII.
36) which led him into this error. It is, indeed, impossible to admit
that the Gauls could have encamped on the abrupt slopes of the northern
declivity. General de Gœler is also mistaken in directing the false
attack upon Montrognon. Lastly, he places the scene of the battle too
much towards the west.
[497] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 52.
[498] “In the war of the Gauls, Caius Julius Cæsar was surprised by an
enemy, who carried him off, armed as he was, on his horse, when another
Gaul, who recognized Cæsar, called out, intending to insult him, “Cæcos,
Cæsar!” which in the Gaulish language signifies, _let him go, set him
loose_; and so he escaped. Cæsar says so himself, in his _Ephemerides_,
in the passage where he speaks of his good fortune.” (Servius Maurus
Honoratus, a grammarian of the fifth century, in his commentary on the
11th book of the _Æneid_, line 743, II. p. 48, edit. Albert Lion.)
The manuscripts of Servius do not all present the same reading. The
following are some of the principal variations: _Cecos, Cæsar_; _Cæcos
ac Cæsar_; and _Cæsar, Cesar_.
[499] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 29.
[500] There has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy.
[501] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 56.
[502] A sling-ball of lead has been found at Sens, on which are stamped
in relief the words “T. Labienus.” This ball forms part of the
collection of the Museum of Saint-Germain.
[503] MM. de Saulcy and J. Quicherat have already demonstrated in a
conclusive manner that Labienus must have followed the left bank of the
Yonne, after leaving Sens, and that he crossed over to the right bank of
the Seine at Melun. In fact, Labienus, on the right bank, found himself,
as Cæsar says, threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, on the other by
the army of Camulogenus (VII. 59). On the opposite bank, on the
contrary, Labienus would not have been placed between the two, since he
would have had Camulogenus in front, and, at a greater distance, the
Bellovaci coming from the north.
“A very large river kept the legions separated from their reserve and
their baggage.” This very great river cannot be the Marne, which Cæsar
does not even mention in the whole course of this campaign: it was
evidently the Seine, which Labienus has crossed once only, at Melodunum
(_Melun_); by crossing over to the right bank, he was separated from his
base of operations, which was at Sens. On the contrary hypothesis, no
river would have separated Labienus from his line of retreat; unless we
admit, with Dulaure and several others, the identity of Agedincum with
Provius, which is no longer possible.
The Captain of the Staff Rouby has made investigations on the spot,
which prove that from Sens the most ancient ways leading to Paris passed
on the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine. Moreover, the
discoveries of M. Carré have made us acquainted with the exact direction
followed by the Roman road after quitting Sens towards Paris; it was
entirely on the left bank of the Yonne. If Cæsar’s lieutenant had
followed the right bank of the Yonne, he would, the day after his
departure, have been arrested by the course of the Seine, and would have
fallen in with the Gaulish town of Condate, built in the very angle of
the two streams, in the midst of perhaps impassable marshes. If only a
few thousand Gauls had occupied the heights which played so important a
part in the campaign of 1814, Labienus, compelled to seek for a place to
cross higher up the stream, would have been diverted considerably from
his aim.
It has been supposed wrongly that the Bièvre was the marsh where
Labienus, in his march on the left bank of the Seine, had been arrested
by the Gaulish army. Leaving out of consideration the fact that the
Bièvre, which flows through a calcareous soil, can at no epoch have
formed a marsh capable of arresting an army, how can we suppose that
Labienus, if he had arrived at this stream, that is, close to Lutetia,
would have retraced his steps as far back as Melun, to march from thence
towards the _oppidum_ of the Parisii by the right bank of the Seine,
which would have obliged him to make a journey of twenty-four leagues?
The manœuvre of Labienus can only be explained by his desire to turn the
strong position of Camulogenus, and arrive at Paris before him. The text
of the “Commentaries” says clearly that Labienus, stopped by the marsh
which shelves towards the Seine, stole away by night, surprised the
passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutetia, where he
arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manœuvre,
the marsh in question must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The
Essonne alone fulfils that condition. The ground on the banks of this
little river offers, even at present, by its nature, a very serious
obstacle to an army. It is cut up by innumerable peat mosses; and it was
behind this line of Essonne that, in 1814, the Emperor Napoleon I.
established his army, whilst the enemy occupied Paris.
[504] We have not translated these words, _fugam parare_, because this
passage has always appeared unintelligible to us. How, indeed, could the
Gauls, seeing that the Romans were ready to pass the Seine by force,
believe that this was a flight?
[505] Some manuscripts have Metiosedum, a version which, in our opinion,
is utterly incorrect.
[506] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 62.
[507] See _Appendix D_.
[508] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 65.--_Evocati_ was the name given to the
old soldiers who, after having served, returned voluntarily to the ranks
of the army.
[509] Let us here recapitulate the numbers of the legions employed
during the war in Gaul. Cæsar’s army, as we have seen, was composed in
696 of six legions, the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th. In 697, two
new legions were raised in Italy, the 13th and 14th. Probably, in the
winter between 699 and 700, Cæsar brought several cohorts composed of
soldiers and sailors who were to serve in the fleet; for, on his return
from the second expedition into England, notwithstanding the losses he
had sustained, he was at the head of eight legions and five cohorts (V.
24). He lost at Aduatuca one legion and a half, that is, the 14th
legion, besides five cohorts; but in 701 three new legions replaced the
cohorts lost, and even doubled their number. These legions were the 1st,
lent by Pompey (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 54, and Lucan, _Pharsalia_,
VII., 1. 218); the 14th, which took the number of the legion destroyed
at Aduatuca (_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 32; VIII. 4); and the 15th; this
last legion was afterwards, with the 1st, given to Pompey for the war of
the Parthians; it figured in the Civil War, and took, in Pompey’s army,
the number 3. (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, III. 88.)
The 6th legion, judging from its number, must have been one of the
oldest, for Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 47) informs us that the legions were
designated according to their order of inscription on the rolls of the
army; but, as it only appears for the first time in 702, it is probable
that it had remained in garrison among the Allobroges or in Italy. A
proof that this legion assisted in the siege of Alesia is found in the
fact that, after the surrender of the place, it was sent to winter
quarters on the Saône, where Cæsar found it a few months afterwards (_De
Bello Gallico_, VIII. 4). The distribution of the troops in their winter
quarters after the taking of Alesia confirms the number of legions given
above. The re-distribution after the siege of Uxellodunum gives also the
same result, for in book VII. c. 46 the “Commentaries” give the
positions of ten legions, without reckoning the 15th, which, according
to book VIII. c. 24, had been sent to Cisalpine Gaul. These facts are
repeated again, book VIII. c. 54.
[510] It is evident that an army could not remain in the wars for eight
years without receiving frequent re-enforcements in order to keep it up
to its effective number. Thus, when, after the murder of Clodius, all
the youth of Italy had been called to arms, Cæsar made new levies, which
were used probably to swell the ranks of his legions, for no new numbers
appear (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 1).--In the same manner, when he
arrived, in 702, in the south of Gaul, and crossed the Cévennes, he
placed himself at the head of the troops which had been recruited in the
Roman province and of the re-enforcements which he had brought from
Italy (_partem copiarum ex provincia supplementumque quod ex Italia
adduxerat in Helvois, qui fines Arvernorum contingunt, convenire
jubet_). (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 7.)--Labienus, on the other hand,
during his expedition to Paris, left his recruits in dépôt at Sens
(_Labienus eo supplemento quod nuper ex Italia venerat relicto_). (_De
Bello Gallico_, VII. 57.)
[511] Plutarch, _Cato_, 53.
[512] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 36.
[513] See above, page 87.
[514] See above, page 108, note (2).
[515] We learn from the text that he formed three camps. This
disposition was necessitated by circumstances and the character of the
locality. The heights of Sacquenay form, in fact, three promontories,
_V_, _V_, _V_ (_see Plate 24_), advancing towards the north; the road to
Dijon passes over the one to the left, the road to Pontallier over the
one in the middle. By establishing three camps on these three
promontories, Vercingetorix occupied each of these roads with one-third
of his army, whilst he backed his right wing against the Vingeanne.
The Gaulish army had there a position of great natural strength, for, to
attack it, the enemy would have to climb high hills which were easy to
defend; it was, moreover, protected by two watercourses: one, the
Vingeanne, which covered its right; the other, the Badin, a small
tributary of the Vingeanne, which protected its front. In the space
comprised between these two watercourses and the road from Dijon to
Langres, a ground extends, measuring five kilomètres in every direction,
slightly broken in some parts, but almost flat everywhere else,
particularly between the Vingeanne and the hillock of Montsaugeon. Near
the road, and to the west, arise hills which command it, as well as the
whole country as far as Badin and the Vingeanne.
[516] The field of battle of the Vingeanne, which H.M. Defay, of
Langres, first pointed out, answers perfectly to all the requirements of
the Latin narrative, and, moreover, material proofs exist which are
undeniable evidences of the struggle. We allude to the tumuli which are
found, some at Prauthoy, others on the banks of the Vingeanne, at
Dardenay, and Cusey, and those which, at Pressant, Rivières-les-Fosses,
Chamberceau, and Vesvres, mark, as it were, the line of retreat of the
Gaulish army, to a distance of twelve kilomètres.
Two of these tumuli are situated near each other, between Prauthoy and
Montsaugeon (_see Plate 24_, where the tumuli are marked). There is one
near Dardenay, three to the west of Cusey, one at Rivières-les-Fosses,
another at Chamberceau. We will not mention those which have been
destroyed by agriculture, but which are still remembered by the
inhabitants.
Researches lately made in these tumuli have brought to light skeletons,
many of which had bronze bracelets round the arms and legs, calcined
bones of men and horses, thirty-six bracelets, several iron circles
which were worn around the neck, iron rings, fibulæ, fragments of metal
plates, pieces of Celtic pottery, an iron sword, &c.
It is a fact worthy of remark, that the objects found in the tumuli at
Rivières-les-Fosses and Chamberceau bear so close a resemblance to those
of the tumuli on the banks of the Vingeanne, that we might think they
had come from the hand of the same workman. Hence there can be no doubt
that all these tumuli refer to one and the same incident of war.
(Several of these objects are deposited in the Museum of Saint-Germain.)
We must add that the agricultural labourers of Montsaugeon, Isomes, and
Cusey have found during many years, when they make trenches for
drainage, horse-shoes buried a foot or two deep under the soil. In 1860,
at the dredging of the Vingeanne, hundreds of horse-shoes, the
inhabitants say, of excellent metal, were extracted from the gravel of
the river, at a depth of two or three feet. They are generally small,
and bear a groove all round, in which the heads of the nails were
lodged. A great number of these horse-shoes have preserved their nails,
which are flat, have a head in the form of a T, and still have their
rivet--that is, the point which is folded back over the hoof--which
proves that they are not shoes that have been lost, but shoes of dead
horses, the foot of which has rotted away in the soil or in the gravel.
Thirty-two of these horse-shoes have been collected. One of them is
stamped in the middle of the curve with a mark, sometimes found on
Celtic objects, and which has a certain analogy with the stamp on a
plate of copper found in one of the tumuli of Montsaugeon.
When we consider that the action between the Roman and Gaulish armies
was merely a cavalry battle, in which were engaged from 20,000 to 25,000
horses, the facts just stated cannot but appear interesting, although
they may possibly belong to a battle of a later date.
[517] We have adopted the reading, _aciemque constitui jubebat_, which
alone gives a reasonable interpretation.
[518] He was not the same as the one mentioned in pp. 307, 321, 320.
(_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 67.)
[519] The three Gaulish camps having been established on the heights of
Sacquenay, four or five kilomètres behind the position occupied by the
infantry during the battle, and the line of retreat towards Alesia lying
to the left, in the direction of Pressant and Vesvres, if Vercingetorix
had returned to ascend the hills with his 80,000 men, to remove the
baggage, that operation would have taken two or three hours, during
which Cæsar might have cut off his retreat, or have inflicted a still
more serious defeat upon him. But, by immediately hastening his march on
Pressant, in order to follow from thence the road which, by
Rivières-les-Fosses and Vesvres, joined the great road from Langres to
Alise, near Aujeur, he got in advance of the Roman army, which, in the
disorder in which it was at that moment, was not able to pursue him at
once. And this is what he did.
The text says, also, that Vercingetorix gave orders that the baggage
should be taken out of the camps in all haste, to follow him. If the
baggage of an army of 100,000 men had accompanied Vercingetorix, on the
road followed by the infantry, we cannot understand how the Roman army,
which pursued the Gauls as long as daylight lasted, should not have
captured it all. But investigations made in the country situated between
the field of battle and the Alise, behind the heights of Sacquenay, have
brought to light vestiges of a Roman road which, starting from
Thil-Châtel, thirteen kilomètres behind Sacquenay, proceeded, by
Avelanges, towards the hamlet of Palus, where it branched from the road
from Langres to Alise. We may suppose, therefore, that Vercingetorix
caused his baggage to follow in his rear as far as Thil-Châtel, where it
took the road to Palus.
The Roman road from Langres to Alise, which, without any doubt, marks
the direction followed by the two armies, has been traced almost in its
whole extent by Commandant Stoffel. Even at the present day, on the
territories of Fraignot, Salives, Echalot, and Poiseul-la-Grange, the
inhabitants call it the _Road of the Romans_, or _Cæsar’s way_.
[520] We read (_De Bello Gallico_, VII. 68) the words, _Altero die ad
Alesiam castra fecit_. We have before sought to prove that the words
_altero die_ must be translated by the _second day after_, and not by
the _next day_. [See page 279, note (1).] It took Cæsar, therefore, two
days’ march to move from the field of battle to Alesia.
A study of the country fully confirms the interpretation we give to the
expression _altero die_. In fact, to the north and east of
Alise-Sainte-Reine (_Alesia_), to less than two days’ march, the ground
is so cut up and broken that no cavalry battle would be possible upon
it. It retains this character as far as fifty-five or sixty kilomètres
from Alise, to the east of the road from Pranthoy to Dijon, where it
becomes more easy and open. The battle-field of the Vingeanne, which we
consider as the true one, is at a distance of sixty-five kilomètres from
Alise. Supposing that, on the day of the victory, the Roman army had
pursued the Gauls over a space of fifteen kilomètres, it would have had
to traverse in the two following days, before arriving at Alesia, a
distance of fifty kilomètres, that is to say, twenty-five kilomètres a
day.
[521] We call the reader’s attention particularly to the numerous Roman
and Gaulish coins found in one of the fosses of the camp _D_, the list
of which will be found in _Appendix C_, at the end of this volume.
[522] Near the western summit of the mountain two abundant springs
arise; there is another on the eastern side. With these springs, as at
Gergovia, it was easy to form large watering-places for cattle. Besides,
manifest traces of a great number of wells are visible on the
table-land, so that it is evident the besieged can never have wanted
water, besides which, they could always descend to the two rivers.
[523] We believe that these _castella_ were palisaded redoubts having a
recess attached, similar to the wooden blockhouses represented on the
Trajan Column; often even these recesses alone composed the _castellum_.
[524] It was not, as will be remarked, the countervallation which was
11,000 feet in extent, but the line of investment.
[525] _Eadem altitudine_. See paragraph XIII., Details on the
Excavations of Alesia, page 364.
[526] _Dolabratis_, diminished to a point, and not _delibratis_, peeled.
[527] In the excavations at Alesia, five _stimuli_ have been found, the
form of which is represented in _Plate 27_. The new names which Cæsar’s
soldiers gave to these accessory defenses prove that they were used for
the first time.
[528] This appears from a passage in _De Bello Civili_, III. 47.
[529]
The Ædui and their clients, the Segusiavi, the Ambluareti, the MEN.
Aulerci-Brannovices, and the Blannovii 35,000
The Arverni, with the people in their dependence, as the
Cadurci-Eleutheri, the Gabali, the Vellavi 35,000
The Senones, the Sequani, the Bituriges, the Santones, the Ruteni,
the Carnutes (each 12,000) 72,000
The Bellovaci 10,000
The Lemovices 10,000
The Pictones, the Turones, the Parisii, the Helvii (each 8,000) 32,000
The Suessiones, the Ambiani, the Mediomatrice, the Petrocorii,
the Nervii, the Morini, the Nitiobriges (each 5,000) 35,000
The Aulerci-Cenomanni 5,000
The Atrebates 4,000
The Veliocasses, the Lexovii, the Aulerci-Eburovices (each 3,000) 9,000
The Rauraci and the Boii (each 3,000) 6,000
Lastly, the peoples who dwelt on the shores of the ocean, and
whom the Gauls called Armoricans, amongst whom were the
Curiosolites, the Redones, the Ambibari, the Caletes, the
Osismii, the Lemovices-Armoricani, the Veneti, and the Unelli,
had to furnish together 30,000
-------
Total 283,000
[530]: See note on page 143.
[531] This passage proves clearly that the army of succour attacked also
the circumvallation of the plain. In fact, how can we admit that, of
240,000 men, only 60,000 should have been employed? It follows, from the
accounts given in the “Commentaries,” that among this multitude of
different peoples, the chiefs chose the most courageous men to form the
corps of 60,000 which operated the movement of turning the hills; and
that the others, unaccustomed to war, and less formidable, employed in
the assault of the retrenchments in the plain, were easily repulsed.
[532] According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 11), Cæsar, during the night,
detached 3,000 legionaries and all his cavalry to take the enemy in the
rear.
[533] “Cæsar (at Alexandria) was greatly perplexed, being burdened with
his _purple_ vestments, which prevented him from swimming.” (Xiphilinus,
_Julius Cæsar_, p. 26.)--“Crassus, instead of appearing before his
troops in a purple-coloured _paludamentum_, as is the custom of the
Roman generals....” (Plutarch, _Crassus_, 28.)
[534] “The inhabitants of Alesia despaired of their safety when they saw
the Roman soldiers bringing from all sides into their camp an immense
quantity of shields ornamented with gold and silver, cuirasses stained
with blood, plate, and Gaulish flags.” (Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 30.)
[535] Florus, III. x. 26.--According to Plutarch (_Cæsar_, 30),
Vercingetorix, after having laid down his arms, seated himself in
silence at the foot of Cæsar’s tribunal.
[536] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 90.--By comparing the data of the VIIth
book with those of the VIIIth, we obtain the following results:
LEGIONS.
In Franche-Comté, Labienus with the 7th and 15th 2
In the country of the Remi, Fabius and Basilius with the 8th
and 9th 2
Between the Loire and the Allier, Reginus with the 11th 1
In Berrry, Sextius with the 13th 1
In Rouergue, Rebilus with the 1st 1
At Mâcon, Tullius Cicero with the 6th 1
At Chalon, Sulpicius with the 14th 1
At Bibracte, Mark Antony with the 10th and 12th 2
--
Total 11
[537] There have been found, on a length of 200 mètres, in the bottom of
the upper fosse, ten Gaulish coins, twenty arrow-heads, fragments of
shields, four balls of stone of different diameters, two millstones of
granite, skulls and bones, earthenware, and fragments of amphoras in
such quantity, that it would lead us to suppose that the Romans threw
upon the assailants everything that came to hand. In the lower fosse,
near which the struggle was hotter after the sally of Labienus, the
result has surpassed all hopes. This fosse has been opened for a space
of 500 mètres in length from _X_ to _X_ (_see Plate 25_): it contained,
besides 600 coins (_see Appendix C_), fragments of pottery, and numerous
bones, the following objects: ten Gaulish swords and nine scabbards of
iron, thirty-nine pieces which belonged to arms of the description of
the Roman _pilum_, thirty heads of javelins, which, on account of their
lightness, are supposed to have been the points of the _hasta amentata_;
seventeen more heavy heads may also have served for javelins thrown by
the _amentum_, or simply by the hand, or even for lances; sixty-two
blades, of various form, which present such finished workmanship that
they may be ranged among the spears.
Among objects of defensive armour there have been found one iron helmet
and seven cheek-pieces, the forms of which are analogous to those which
we see represented on Roman sculptures; umbos of Roman and Gaulish
shields; an iron belt of a legionary; and numerous collars, rings and
fibulæ.
[538] In the fosses of the plain of Laumes have been found a fine sword,
several nails, and some bones; on the left bank of the Oserain, two
coins, three arrow-heads, and other fragments of arms; in the fosse
which descends towards the Ose, on the northern slopes of Mont
Penneville, a prodigious quantity of bones of animals. A spot planted
with vines, close by, on the southern slope of Mont Penneville, is still
at the present day called, on the register of lands, _Cæsar’s Kitchen_
(_la Cuisine de César_).
[539] In the fosses of the circumvallation in the plain of Laumes have
been found stone balls, some fragments of arms, pottery, and a
magnificent silver vase, of good Greek art. This last was found at _z_
(_see Plate 25_), near the imperial road from Paris to Dijon, at the
very bottom of the fosse, at a depth of 1·40m. Bronze arms, consisting
of ten spears, two axes, and two swords, have been found previously at
_y_ near the Oserain.
[540] This book, as is known, was written by Hirtius.
[541] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 5.
[542] Viz., the Aulerci-Eburovices.
[543] It has been objected that Mont Saint-Pierre was not sufficiently
large to contain seven legions; but, since Cæsar for a long while had
only four legions with him, the camp was made for that number.
Afterwards, instead of remaining on the defensive, he determined, as at
Alesia, to invest the Gaulish camp, and it was then only that he sent
for three more legions. The appearance of the different camps which have
been found is, on the contrary, very rational, and in conformity with
the number of troops mentioned in the “Commentaries.” Thus, the camp of
Berry-au-Bac, which contained eight legions, had forty-one hectares of
superfices; that of Gergovia, for six legions, had thirty-three
hectares; and that of Mont Saint-Pierre, for four legions, twenty-four
hectares.
[544] “Non solum vallo et sudibus, sed etiam turriculis instruunt....
quod opus loriculam vocant.” (Vegetius, IV. 28.)
[545] It may be seen, by the profiles of the fosses which have been
brought to light, that they could not have had vertical sides; the
expression used by Hirtius leads us to believe that, by _lateribus
directis_, he meant fosses not triangular, but with a square bottom.
[546] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 17.
[547] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 23.
[548] Rebilus had at first only one legion; we believe, with Rustow,
that the 10th, which was quartered at Bibracte, had come to join him. It
is said (VII. 90) that Rebilus had been sent to the Ruteni; but it
appears, from a passage of Orosius (VI. 11), “that he was stopped on his
way by a multitude of enemies, and ran the greatest dangers.” He
remained, therefore, in the country of the Pictones, where Fabius came
to his succour.
[549] Some manuscripts read erroneously the 13th legion.
[550] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 25.
[551] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 31.
[552] See his biography in _Appendix D_.
[553] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 44.
[554] It is due to the persevering research of M. J. B. Cessac, assisted
subsquently by the departmental commission of the Lot.
[555] List of the objects found at Puy-d’Issolu: one blade of a
_dolabrum_, thirty-six arrow-heads, six heads of darts for throwing by
catapults, fragments of bracelets, bear’s tooth (an amulet), necklace
beads, rings, a blade of a knife, and nails.
[556] According to Frontinus (_Stratag._, II. 11), Commius sought an
asylum in Great Britain.
[557] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 48.
[558] Plutarch, _Marius_, 19.
[559] _Mémoires de Napoléon I._, Revolt of Pavia, VII. 4.
[560] For the clearer intelligence of the recapitulation, we have
adopted the modern names of the different people of Gaul, although these
names are far from answering to their ancient boundaries.
[561] Cicero, when proconsul in Cilicia, obtained the sum of twelve
millions of sesterii (2,280,000 francs) from the sale of prisoners made
at the siege of Pindenissus. (Cicero, _Epistolæ ad Atticum_, V. 20.)
[562] Julian (_Cæsares_, p. 72, edit. Lasius) makes Cæsar say that he
had treated the Helvetii _like a philanthropist_, and rebuilt their
burnt towns.
[563] It was probably at this time that the chiefs of Auvergne, and
perhaps Vercingetorix himself, as Dio Cassius tells us, came to render
homage to the Roman proconsul. (See above, p. 80.)
[564] Mommsen, _Römische Geschichte_, III., p. 291. Berlin, 1861.
[565] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51, 52.
[566] “He soon allowed himself to be enervated by his love for his young
wife. Entirely occupied in pleasing her, he passed whole days with her
in his country house or in his gardens, and ceased to think of public
affairs. Thus even Clodius, then tribune of the people, regarding him no
longer with anything but contempt, dared to embark in the rashest
enterprises.” (Plutarch, _Pompey_, 50.)
[567] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 13.
[568] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51, 52.
[569] Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 30.
[570] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 48 and 50.
[571] “Pompey is going at last to labour on my recall: he only waited
for a letter from Cæsar to cause the proposal to be made by one of his
partisans.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, III. 18.)--“If Cæsar has
abandoned me, if he has joined my enemies, he has been unfaithful to his
friendship, and has done me an injury; I ought to have been his enemy, I
deny it not; but if Cæsar has interested himself in my restoration, if
it be true that you thought it important for me that Cæsar should not be
opposed,” &c.... (_Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 18.)
[572] “It was then that P. Sextius, the tribune nominate, repaired to
Cæsar to interest him in my recall. I say only that if Cæsar were well
intentioned towards me, and I believe he was, these proceedings added
nothing to his good intentions. He (Sextius) thought that, if they
wished to restore concord among the citizens and decide on my recall,
they must secure the consent of Cæsar.” (Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 33)
[573] “Pompey took my brother as witness that all he had done for me he
had done by the will of Cæsar.” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.)
[574] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 31, _et seq._
[575] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 31.
[576] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51.--Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 32; _De Responsu
Haruspic._, 23: _Pro Milone_, 7.--Asconius, _Comment. in Orat. pro
Milone_, p. 47, edit. Orelli.
[577] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 51.--Cicero, _Pro Milone_, 7.--Asconius,
_Comment. in Orat. pro Milone_, p. 47, edit. Orelli.
[578] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, III. 23.--Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 6.
[579] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 33.
[580] Cicero, _Orat. pro Domo sua_, 27; _Pro Sextio_, 34.
[581] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 34; _De Legibus_, III. 19.
[582] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 34.
[583] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 35.--Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 7.--Plutarch,
_Pompey_, 51.
[584] Cicero, _Pro Sextio_, 35; _Orat. prima post Reditum_, 5, 6.
[585] Cicero, _De Officiis_, II. 17; _Orat. pro Sextio_, 39.--Dio
Cassius XXXIX. 8.
[586] Cicero, _Orat. secunda post Reditum ad Senatum_, 10; _Orat. pro
Domo sua_, 28; _Orat. in Pisonem_, 15.
[587] We thus see that the power of observing the sky continued to exist
in spite of the law Clodia.
[588] Cicero, in the passages cited.
[589] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV, 1.
[590] Asconius, _Comment in Orat. Ciceronis pro Milone_, p. 48, edit.
Orelli.
[591] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 9.--Plutarch, _Pompey_, 52.
[592] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 1.--Cicero’s proposal was further
amplified by C. Messius, tribune of the people, who demanded for Pompey
a fleet, an army, and the authority to dispose of the finances.
[593] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 52.--Cicero, _Orat. pro Domo sua_, 10.
[594] _Epist. ad Attic._, IV. 2.
[595] “I will add that, in the opinion of the public, Clodius is
regarded as a victim reserved for Milo.” (Cicero, _De Respons. Harusp._,
3.)--This oration on the reply of the Aruspices is of May, June, or
July, 698. See, also, what he says in his letter to Atticus, of
November, 697. (_Epist. ad Attic._ IV. 3.)
[596] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 23.--_De Bello Gallico_, II. 35.
[597] “But why, especially on that occasion, should any one be
astonished at my conduct or blame it, when I myself have already several
times supported propositions which were more honourable for Cæsar than
necessary for the state? I voted in his favour fifteen days of prayers;
it was enough for the Republic to have decreed to Cæsar the same number
of days which Marius had obtained. The gods would have been satisfied, I
think, with the same thanksgivings which had been rendered to them in
the most important wars. So great a number of days had therefore for its
only object to honour Cæsar personally. Ten days of thanksgivings were
accorded, for the first time, to Pompey, when the war of Mithridates had
been terminated by the death of that prince. I was consul, and, on my
report, the number of days usually decreed to the consulars was doubled,
after you had heard Pompey’s letter, and been convinced that all the
wards were terminated on land and sea. You adopted the proposal I made
to you of ordaining ten days of prayers. At present I have admired the
virtue and greatness of soul of Cn. Pompey, who, loaded with
distinctions such as no other before him had received the like, gave to
another more honours than he had obtained himself. Thus, then, those
prayers which I voted in favour of Cæsar were accorded to the immortal
gods, to the customs of our ancestors, and to the needs of the state;
but the flattering terms of the decree, this new distinction, and the
extraordinary number of days, it is to the person itself of Cæsar that
they were addressed, and they were a homage rendered to his glory.”
(Cicero, _Orat. pro Provinc. Consular._, 10, 11.) (August, A.U.C. 698.)
[598] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quint._, II. 1.
[599] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quint._, II. 1.
[600] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quint._, II. 1.
[601] Cicero, _Epist. ad Attic._, IV. 3.
[602] Cicero, _Epist. ad Attic._, IV. 2 and 3; _Epist. ad Quint._, II.
1.
[603] Atia had wedded in first marriage Octavius, by whom she had a son,
who was afterwards Augustus.
[604] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 14.
[605] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 12, 13.--Plutarch, _Pompey_, 52.
[606] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 14.--“I do not spare upon him even reproaches,
to prevent him (Pompey) from meddling in this infamy.” Cicero, _Epist.
Famil._, I. 1.
[607] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 15.
[608] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 2.
[609] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 16.
[610] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 2.--Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 18.
[611] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 18, 19.
[612] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 3.
[613] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 20.
[614] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 3.
[615] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 3.
[616] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 3.--We look upon this word as
giving the explanation of the quarrel then existing between the two
triumvirs. Egypt was so rich a prey, that it was calculated to cause
division between them.
[617] “Clodius is cast down from the tribune, and I steal away, for fear
of accident.” (Cicero, _Ep. ad Quint._, II. 3.)
[618] Cicero, _Ep. ad Quint._, II. 3.
[619] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 22.
[620] Plutarch, _Cato_, 45, tells us that Cato returned under the
consulship of Marcius Philippus.
[621] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 23.
[622] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 7.
[623] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 1.
[624] Plutarch, _Cato_, 40; _Cicero_, 45.
[625] “There has reached me a mass of private talk of people here, whom
you may guess, who have always been, and always are, in the same ranks
with me. They openly rejoice at knowing that I am, at the same time,
already on terms of coolness with Pompey, and on the point of
quarrelling with Cæsar; but what was most cruel was to see their
attitude towards my enemy (Clodius), to see them embrace him, flatter
him, coax him, and cover him with caresses.” (Cicero, _Epist.
Familiar._, I. 9.)
[626] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 3.
[627] These words are reported by Cicero (_Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 3),
to whom they were addressed by Pompey. Dio Cassius, contrary to all
probability, pretends that Pompey, from this moment, was irritated
against Cæsar, and sought to deprive him of his province. There is no
proof of such an allegation. The interview at Lucca, which took place
this same year, offers a formal contradiction to it.
[628] See Nonius Marcellus (edit. Gerlach and Roth, p. 261), who quotes
a passage from Book XXII. of the _Annals_ of Fenestella, who wrote under
Augustus or Tiberius.
[629] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 24.
[630] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 5.
[631] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar_., I. 9.
[632] “The question of the lands of Campania, which ought to have been
settled on the day of the Ides and the day following, is not yet
decided. I have much difficulty in making up my mind on this question.”
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 8.) (April, 698.)
[633] “Appius is not yet returned from his visit to Cæsar.” (Cicero,
_Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 6.) (April, 698.)
[634] “Knowing well that small news as well as great news have reached
Cæsar.” (_Epist. ad Quintum_, III. i. 3.)
[635] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 25.
[636] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 24.
[637] “Appius, he says, has visited Cæsar, in order to wrest from him
some nominations of tribunes.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 15.)
[638] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 17.--The consuls and proconsuls had
twelve lictors, the prætors six, the dictators twenty-four, and the
master of the cavalry a number which varied. The curule ædiles, the
quæstors, and the tribunes of the people, not having the _imperium_, had
no lictors. As, at the time of the conference of Lucca, there was no
dictator or master of cavalry, the number of 120 fasces can only apply
to the collective escort of proconsuls and prætors. It is not probable
that the two consuls then in office at Rome should have gone to Lucca.
On the other hand, the proconsuls were prohibited from quitting their
provinces as long as they were in the exercise of their commands. (see
Titus Livius, XLI. 7; XLIII. 1.) But as the conferences of Lucca took
place just at the epoch when the proconsuls and proprætors were starting
for their provinces (we know from Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, III. 9,
that this departure took place in the months of April and May), it is
probable that the newly-named proconsuls and proprætors repaired to
Lucca before they went to take possession of their commands. Thus the
number of 120 fasces would represent the collective number of the
lictors of proprætors or proconsuls who could pass through Lucca before
embarking either at Pisa, or Adria, or at Ravenna.
On this hypothesis, we should have the following numbers:--
Proprætor of Sicily 6 fasces.
“ of Sardinia 6 “
Proconsul of Citerior Spain 12 “
“ of Ulterior Spain 12 “
“ of Africa 12 “
“ of Asia 12 “
“ of Macedonia 12 “
“ of Bithynia 12 “
“ of Crete 12 “
“ of Syria 12 “
“ of Cilicia 12 “
---
120
Plutarch (_Pompey_, 53) says in so many words that there were seen every
day at his door 120 fasces of proconsuls and prætors.
[639] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 17.
[640] See Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 24.--The proof that this plan originated
with Cæsar is found in the fact that Pompey and Crassus had not
previously taken any steps to ensure their election.
[641] We have put into the mouth of Cæsar the following words of Cicero:
“In giving the Alps as a boundary to Italy, Nature had not done it
without a special intention of the gods. If the entrance had been open
to the ferocity and the multitude of the Gauls, this town would never
have been the seat and centre of a great empire. These lofty mountains
may now level themselves; there is now nothing, from the Alps to the
ocean, which Italy has to fear. One or two campaigns more, and fear or
hope, punishments or recompenses, arms or the laws, will reduce all Gaul
into subjection to us, and attach her to us by everlasting ties.”
(Cicero, _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 14.
[642] Cicero, _Orat. pro Muræna_, 18.
[643] _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 15.
[644] “Evidently all opposition to these great men, especially since the
brilliant successes of Cæsar, was contrary to the general feeling, and
unanimously rejected.” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.)
[645] “Cæsar, strengthened by his successes, and by the recompenses,
honours, and testimonials with which the Senate had loaded him, had just
lent to this illustrious order his glory and his influence.” (Cicero,
_Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.)
[646] “Why should I wait to be reconciled with Cæsar? Has this
reconcilement not been effected already by the Senate? the Senate, the
supreme council of the Republic, my rule and my guide in all my
opinions. I walk in your steps, senators, I obey your counsels, I yield
to your authority.... So long as the political measures of Cæsar have
not had your approbation, you did not see me allied with him. When his
exploits had changed your feelings and dispositions, you have seen me
not only agree in your decisions, but loudly applaud them.” (Cicero,
_Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 10.)
[647] _Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.
[648] _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 5.
[649] Cicero, _Orat. de Prov. Consularibus_, 9. (August, A.U.C. 698.)
[650] Cicero, _Orat. de Prov. Consularibus_, 13. (August, A.U.C. 698.)
[651] Cicero, _Orat. pro Balbo_, 27.
[652] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, I. 7.
[653] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 27.
[654] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 29.
[655] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 30.--Plutarch, _Pompey_, 53; _Crassus_, 18.
[656] _Précis des Guerres de César_, III. 5.
[657] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 18.
[658] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 57.
[659] “What does Cæsar think of my poem, I pray? He has written to me
that he had read the first book, and that he had seen nothing, even in
Greek, which ever pleased him more. The rest, up to a certain passage,
is less finished: that is his expression. Tell me what it is that
displeases him, the matter or the form, and fear not to speak candidly”.
(Cicero, _Ep. ad Quint._, II. 16.)
[660] Plutarch, _Crassus_, 16.--Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 31.
[661] Plutarch, _Cato_, 48; _Pompey_, 54.
[662] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.
[663] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 55.
[664] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 9.
[665] The country of the Vaccæi comprised part of old Castile, of the
kingdom of Leon, and of the Basque provinces. Clunia, a town of the
Celtiberii, was situated near Coruña del Conde.
[666] Plutarch, _Crassus_, 19.
[667] Plutarch, _Crassus_, 19.
[668] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 24.
[669] Plutarch, _Cato_, 49.--Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 34.
[670] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 35.
[671] Plutarch, _Cato_, 49.--Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 33, 35.--Dio Cassius
pretends erroneously that the _imperium_ in the province of Gaul was
only continued to Cæsar by a sort of favour, and but for three years,
when his partisans murmured at seeing that Crassus and Pompey thought
only for themselves. He does not mention the conference of Lucca, which
is attested by Suetonius, Plutarch, and Appian. He forgets that
Trebonius, Cæsar’s creature, was one of his most devoted lieutenants in
the Civil War. We think that the testimony of the other historians is to
be preferred.
[672] “In my opinion, that which it would have been best for his
adversaries to do, would have been to cease a struggle which they are
not strong enough to sustain.... At the present day the only ambition
one can have is to be quiet, and those who governed would be disposed to
allow it us, if they found certain people less rigid against their
domination.” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, I. 8, letter to Lentulus.)
[673] Plutarch, _Crassus_, 19.
[674] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 37.
[675] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 38.
[676] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VII. 1.
[677] According to the letter from Cicero to Atticus (IV. 13), Crassus
had left Rome a little before the 17th of the Calends of December, 699,
which answers, according to the concordance established by M. Le
Verrier, to the 28th of October, 699.
[678] Justin, XLI. 6.
[679] Justin, XLII. 4.
[680] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 38.
[681] “Cæsar was very proud of his expedition into Britain, and
everybody at Rome cried it up with enthusiasm. People congratulated each
other on becoming acquainted with a country of the existence of which
they were previously ignorant, and of having penetrated into countries
of which they had never heard before; everybody took his hopes for
reality, and all that people flattered themselves with obtaining some
day caused as great an outburst of joy as if they had already possessed
it.” (Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 53.)--“After having landed in Britain, Cæsar
believed he had discovered a new world. He wrote (it is unknown to whom)
that Britain was not an island, but a country surrounding the ocean.”
(Eumenius, _Panegyrici_, IV. 2.)
[682] Lucan, _Pharsalia_, II., line 571.
[683] “Without paying any attention to the opinion of Cato, the people
during fifteen days performed sacrifices to celebrate this victory, and
exhibited the greatest marks of joy.” (Plutarch, _Nicias_ and _Crassus_,
4.)
[684] Plutarch, _Cato of Utica_, 58.
[685] See page 456.
[686] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, I. 7.
[687] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 56, 57, 58.--_Schol. Bob. Pro Plancio_, 271.
[688] Plutarch, _Antony_, 2.
[689] Dio Cassius speaks of it as follows: “The influence of powerful
men and of riches was so great, even against the decrees of the people
and of the Senate, that Pompey wrote to Gabinius, governor of Syria, to
charge him with the restoring of Ptolemy in Egypt, and that he, who had
already taken the field, performed this task, in spite of the public
will, and in contempt of the oracles of the Sibyl. Pompey only sought to
do what would be agreeable to Ptolemy; but Gabinius had yielded to
corruption. Afterwards, when brought under accusation for this fact, he
was not condemned, thanks to Pompey and to his gold. There reigned then
in Rome such a degree of moral disorder, that the magistrates and
judges, who had received from Gabinius but a small part of the sums
which had served to corrupt him, set their duties at nought in order to
enrich themselves, and taught others to do evil, by showing them that
they could easily escape punishment with money. It was this which caused
Gabinius to be acquitted; in the sequel, brought to trial for having
carried off from his province more than 100,000,000 drachmas, he was
condemned.” (Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 55.)
[690] Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 43.
[691] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quint._, II. 8.
[692] See the _Index Legum_ of Baiter, 181.
[693] Josephus, XIV. 48.
[694] Josephus, XIV. 11.
[695] Cicero, _Ep. ad Atticum_, IV. 18.
[696] Cicero, _Ep. ad Quintum_, IV. 15.
[697] _Schol. Bob. Pro Sextio_, 297.--Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV.
16; _Epist. Familiar._, XIII. 19.
[698] “Cæsar has written to me from Britain a letter dated on the
Calends of September (28th of August), which I received on the 4th of
the Calends of October (23rd of September). His mourning had prevented
my replying and congratulating him.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, III.
1.)
[699] “In Cæsar’s affliction, I dare not write to him, but I write to
Balbus.” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VII. 9.)--“How kind and affecting
is Cæsar’s letter! There is in what he writes a charm which increases my
sympathy for the misfortune which afflicts him.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad
Quintum_, III. 1.)
[700] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 4.
[701] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 27.
[702] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 17.--Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 36.
[703] Pliny, _Hist. Nat._, XXXVI. 15.
[704] Appian, _De Bel. Civil._, II. 102.
[705] “Have you any other _protégé_ to send me? I take charge of him.”
(Letter of Cæsar cited by Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VII. 5.)--“I say
not a word, I take not a step in Cæsar’s interest, but he immediately
testifies in high terms that he attaches to it a value which assures me
of his affection.” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VII. 5.)
[706] “I dispose, as though they were my own, of his credit, which is
preponderant, and of his resources, which, you know, are immense.”
(_Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.)--A few years later, when Cicero foresaw the
civil war, he wrote to Atticus: “There is, however, an affair of which I
shall not cease speaking as long as I write to you at Rome: it is
Cæsar’s credit. Free me, before leaving, I implore you.” (Cicero,
_Epist. ad Atticum_, V. 6.)
[707] _Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 15; III. 1.
[708] _Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.
[709] “I have undertaken his defense (that of Crassus) in the Senate, as
high recommendations and my own engagement made it imperative for me.”
(_Epist. Familiar._, I. 9.)
[710] Cicero, _Pro Rabirio Postumo_, 15, 16.
[711] Cicero, _Pro Cn. Plancio_, 39. (A.U.C. 700.)
[712] Cicero, _Orat. in L. Calpurnium Pisonem_, 33. (A.U.C. 700.)
[713] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, III. 1.
[714] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, IV. 15; _Epist. Familiar._, VII. 5;
_Epist. ad Quintum_, II. 15.
[715] “Pompey is all for Gutta, and he is confident of obtaining from
Cæsar an active intervention.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, III. 8.)
[716] Dio Cassius, XL. 45.
[717] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, III. 4.
[718] Cicero, _Epist. ad Quintum_, III. 8.
[719] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 31.
[720] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 57.
[721] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 31.
[722] “Ut via illa nostra, quæ per Macedoniam est usque ad Hellespontum
militaris.” (Cicero, _Orat. de Provinciis Consularibus_, 2.--Strabo,
VII. vii. 268.)
[723] Plutarch, _Crassus_, 17.
[724] On the left bank of the Tigris, opposite Seleucia.
[725] Plutarch, _Crassus_, 24.
[726] The ancient authors name him Augar, Abgaros, or Ariamnes.
[727] Zeugma, according to Dio Cassius. This town is on the right bank
of the Euphrates, opposite Biradjik.
[728] According to Drumann, the course of the river could not always be
followed, as Plutarch says, because there existed a canal which joined
the Euphrates with the Tigris. (Pliny, VI. 30.--Ammianus Marcellinus,
XXIV. 2.)
[729] “There are among them few infantry. These are only chosen among
the weakest men. From the tenderest age the Parthians are accustomed to
handle the bow and the horse. Their country, which forms almost entirely
one plain, is very favourable for breeding horses, and for courses of
cavalry.” (Dio Cassius, XL. 15.)--“Equis omni tempore vectantur; illis
bella, illis convivia, illis publica ac privata officia obeunt.”
(Justin, XLI. 8.)
[730] “Munimentum ipsis equisque loricæ plumatæ sunt, quæ utrumque toto
corpore tegunt.” (Justin, XLI. 2.)
[731] “Signum in prælio non tuba, sed tympano datur.” (Justin, XLI. 2.)
[732] “Fidentemque fuga Parthum versisque sagittis.” (Virgil, _Georg._,
III., line 31.
[733] “The Osroenes, placed behind the Romans, who had their backs
turned to them, struck them where their unprotected limbs were exposed,
and rendered more easy their destruction by the Parthians.” (Dio
Cassius, XL. 22.)
[734] The army was composed of seven legions, but some troops had been
left at Carrhæ. The square was composed of forty-eight cohorts, or
nearly five legions; the rest was probably in reserve in the square. The
4,000 cavalry and 4,000 light infantry were probably divided half to the
right and half to the left of the great square, the sides of which must
have been about 1,000 mètres long.
[735] Plutarch, _Crassus_, 28.
[736] Q. Cæcilius Metellus Scipio was the son of P. Cornelius Scipio
Nasica, and of Licinia, daughter of Crassus. He had been adopted by Q.
Cæcilius Metellus Pius.
[737] Plutarch, _Cato_, 55.
[738] All that follows is taken almost entirely from Asconius, the most
ancient commentator on Cicero, and is derived, it is believed, from the
_Acta Diurna_. (See the _Argument of the Oration of Cicero for Milo_,
edit. Orelli, p. 31.)
[739] Nine years after the sacrilege committed on the day of the
festival of the Bona Dea, Clodius was slain by Milo before the gate of
the temple of the Bona Dea, near Bovillæ. (Cicero, _Orat. pro Milone_,
31.)
[740] _Romphæa_. (Asconius, _Argument of the Orat. of Cicero pro
Milone_, p. 32, edit. Orelli.)
[741] Cicero, _Orat. pro Milone_ 10.--Dio Cassius, XL. 48.--Appian,
_Civil Wars_, II. 21.--(Asconius, _Argument of the Oration of Cicero pro
Milone_, p. 31, _et seq._)
[742] _Lectus libitinæ._ (Asconius, p. 34.)--The sense of this word is
given by Acro, a scholiast on Horace (see _Scholia Horatiana_, edit.
Pauly, tom. I., p. 360). It corresponds with our word _corbillard_, a
hearse. We know the custom of the Romans of carrying at interments the
images of the ancestors of the dead with the ensigns of their dignities.
The fasces must have been numerous in the Clodian family.
[743] Dio Cassius, XL. 50.
[744] Dio Cassius, XL. 49.
[745] Dio Cassius, XL. 49.
[746] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 22.
[747] Dio Cassius, XL. 50.
[748] “The Senate and Bibulus, who was first to state his opinion,
forestalled the thoughtless resolutions of the multitude by conferring
the consulship on Pompey, in order that he might not be proclaimed
dictator; and in conferring it upon him alone, in order that he might
not have Cæsar for his colleague.” (Dio Cassius, XL. 2.)
[749] Plutarch, _Cato_, 47.
[750] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 57.
[751] Dio Cassius, XL. 50.
[752] Dio Cassius, XL. 52.--Cicero, _Brutus_, 94; _Epist. ad Atticum_,
XIII 49.--Tacitus, _Dialog. de Oratoribus_, 38.
[753] This was the historian. He had been the paramour of Milo’s wife.
Surprised by him in the very act, he had been cruelly beaten, and
compelled to pay, without pity.
[754] Velleius Paterculus, II. 47.
[755] All this account is taken from the argument by Asconius Servius,
serving as an introduction to his Commentary on the _Oration for Milo_.
(See the edit. of Orelli, pp. 41, 42.--Dio Cassius, XL. 53.)
[756] Dio Cassius, XL. 54.
[757] Velleius Paterculus, II. 68.
[758] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 58.
[759] Dio Cassius, XL. 53.
[760] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 24.
[761] Dio Cassius, XL. 52.
[762] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 59.
[763] Dio Cassius, XL. 56; comp. 30.
[764] Tacitus, _Annales_, III. 28.
[765] “Shall I pronounce against Cæsar? But what then becomes of that
faith sworn, when, for this same privilege which he demands, I myself,
at his prayer at Ravenna, went to solicit Cœlius, the tribune of the
people? What do I say, at this prayer! _at the prayer of Pompey
himself_, then invested with his third consulship, of eternal memory.”
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 1.
[766] “It is he, Pompey, who has absolutely willed that the ten tribunes
should propose the decree which permitted Cæsar to ask for the
consulship without coming to Rome.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VIII.
3.--Dio Cassius, XL. 56.--Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 28.)
[767] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 25.
[768] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 55.--Valerius Maximus, IX. 5.--Appian, _Civil
Wars_, II. 23, 24.
[769] Dio Cassius, XL. 57.
[770] “ ...He (Vercingetorix) reckoned on persuading all Gaul to take
arms while they were preparing at Rome a revolt against Cæsar. If the
chief of the Gauls had deferred his enterprise until Cæsar had the civil
war to contend with, he would have struck all Italy with no less terror
than was caused in former days by the Cimbri and the Teutones.”
(Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 28.)
[771] “In all Gaul there are only two classes of men who count and are
considered (the Druids and the knights), for the people have hardly any
other rank than that of slaves.” (_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 13.)
[772] Dio Cassius, XL. 50.
[773] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 12.
[774] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 15.
[775] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 4.
[776] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 12.
[777] _De Bello Gallico_, VI. 4.
[778] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 76.
[779] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 27.
[780] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 25, 54.
[781] _De Bello Gallico_, IV. 21.
[782] _De Bello Gallico_, V. 4.
[783] _De Bello Gallico_, VII. 33.
[784] “In the beginning of spring he convoked, according to custom, the
assembly of Gaul.” (_De Bello Gallico_, VI. 3.)
[785] Cicero appears to fear for his wife and daughter in thinking that
Cæsar’s army was filled with barbarians. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
VII. 13, A.U.C. 705.) He wrote to Atticus that, according to Matius, the
Gauls offered Cæsar 10,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, which they would
entertain at their own expense for ten years. (Cicero, _Epist. ad
Atticum_, IX, xii. 2.)
[786] “All this,” Cœlius writes to Cicero, “is not said in public, but
in secret, in the little circle which you know well, _sed inter paucos
quos tu nosti palam secreto narrantur_.” (Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist.
Familiar._, VIII. 1.)
[787] Dio Cassius, XL. 59.
[788] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 10.
[789] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, V. 18.
[790] Cicero to Cœlius, _Epist. Familiar._, II. 8.
[791] “I station myself for some days near Issus, on the very site of
the camp of Alexander, who was a rather better general than you and I.”
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, V. 20.)--“How ill this mission agrees with
my habits, and how just is the saying, Every one to his trade!” (Cicero,
_Epist. ad Atticum_, V. x. 18.)
[792] Cicero had two legions, but very incomplete.
[793] Asconius, _In Pisonem_, 3.--Apian, _Civil Wars_, II. 26.
[794] Strabo, V. 177.
[795] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 28.
[796] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 26.
[797] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VI. 1.
[798] In speaking of Pompey’s party, Cicero exclaims: “Men who all, with
the exception of a very small number, breathed nothing but pillage, and
discourses such as made one tremble, the more as victory might convert
them into reality: not a person of rank who was not crippled with debts:
there was absolutely nothing beautiful except the cause which they
served.” (Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VII. 8.)--“They all agree, and
Crassipes with them, that yonder there are nothing but imprecations, but
threats of hatred to the rich, of war against the municipia (admire
their prudence!), but proscriptions in mass; they are nothing but
Syllas; and you must see the tone of Lucceius, and all that train of
Greeks, and that Theophanes! Yet this is the hope of the Republic! A
Scipio, a Faustus, a Libo, with their troops of creditors at their
heels, of what enormities are not such people capable? What excesses
against their fellow-citizens will such conquerors refuse?” (Cicero,
_Epist. ad Atticum_, IX. 11.)
[799] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VI. 1.
[800] “The Salaminians sought to borrow money at Rome to pay their
taxes, but, as the law Gabinia prohibited it, the friends of Brutus, who
offered to lend it them at four per cent. a month, demanded a
senatus-consultus for their safety, which Brutus obtained for them.”
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, V. 21.)
[801] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 25.
[802] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 30.
[803] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 14.
[804] Dio Cassius, XLI. 6.
[805] In our opinion, Professor A.W. Zumpt (_Studia Romana_, Berlin,
1859) is the only one who has cleared up this question; and we shall
borrow of him the greatest part of his arguments. As to M. Th. Mommsen,
in a special dissertation, entitled _The Question of Right between Cæsar
and the Senate_, he proves that we must distinguish in the proconsulship
between the _provincia_ and the _imperium_. According to him, the
_provincia_ being given at the same time with the consulship, it could
be taken possession of, according to the law Sempronia, only on the
Calends of the month of January of the following year; the _imperium_,
or military command, was added to it two months later, on the Calends of
March. The _provincia_ was given by a senatus-consultus, and counted
from January to January; the _imperium_ was given by a curiate law, and
went from March to March: the _imperium_ followed the rules of the
military service; a year commenced was reputed finished, as for the
campaigns of the soldiers, and thus the two first months of 705 might
count for a complete year. The learned professor concludes that, if the
Senate had the right to deprive Cæsar of his _imperium_, it could not
take from him the command of the province before the end of the year
705, and that then Cæsar would find himself in the same position as all
the proconsuls who, during the interval between the 1st of January, the
commencement of their proconsulship, and the 1st of March, the time when
they received the _imperium_, had the _potestas_, and not the military
command. This system, we see, rests upon hypotheses which it is
difficult to admit.
[806] “Erat autem obscuritas quædam.” (Cicero, _Pro Marcello_, 10.)
[807] The question became complicated through the difference of origin
of the powers given for each of the two Gauls. The Senate had the power
of taking away from Cæsar’s command Ulterior Gaul, which was given to
him by a senatus-consultus, but it could not deprive him of Citerior
Gaul, given by a plebiscitum, and yet it was the contrary opinion that
Cicero sustained in 698. In fact, he exclaimed then, in his _Oration on
the Consular Provinces_: “He separates the part of the province on which
there can be no opposition (because it has been given by a
senatus-consultus), and does not touch that which can be easily
attacked; and, at the same time that he dares not take away that which
has been given by the people, he is in haste to take away all, senator
as he is, that which has been given by the Senate.” (Cicero, _Orat. de
Provinc. Consular._, 15.--Velleius Paterculus, II. 44.--Suetonius,
_Cæsar_, 20.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 13.--Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 8.)
[808] The 1st of March was the commencement of the ancient Roman year,
the period at which the generals entered into campaign.
[809] P. Servilius, who was consul in 675, took possession of his
province a short time after he entered upon his duties as consul; he
returned in 679. Cicero (_Orat. III. in Verrem_, 90) says that he held
the command during five years. This number can only be explained by
admitting that the years 675 and 679 were reckoned as complete. L. Piso,
who was consul in 696, quitted Rome at the end of his consulship, and
returned thither in the summer of 699. Now, he was considered as having
exercised the command during three years. (Cicero, _In Pisonem_, 35,
40.) They must, therefore, have counted as one year of the proconsulship
the few months of 695. (See Mommsen, _The Question of Right between
Cæsar and the Senate_, p. 28.)
[810] At all times the assemblies have been seen striving to shorten the
duration of the powers given by the people to a man whose sympathies
were not with them. Here is an example. The Constitution of 1848 decided
that the President of the French Republic should be named for four
years. The Prince Louis Napoleon was elected on the 10th of December,
1848, and proclaimed on the 20th of the same month. His powers ought to
have ended on the 20th of December, 1852. Now, the Constituent Assembly,
which foresaw the election of Prince Louis Napoleon, fixed the
termination of the presidency to the second Sunday of the Month of May,
1852, thus robbing him of seven months.
[811] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 39.
[812] Dio Cassius, XL. 59.
[813] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 4.
[814] “Quid ergo? exercitum retinentis, quum legis dies transierit,
rationem haberi placet? Mihi vero ne absentis quidem.” (_Epist. ad
Atticum_, VII. 7.)
[815] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 9.
[816] “Absenti sibi, _quandocumque imperii tempus expleri cœpisset_.”
(Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 26.--Cicero, _Epist. Famil._, XIII. 11.)
[817] Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 5.
[818] “I have contended that regard should be had to Cæsar for his
absence. It was not to favour him; it is for the honour of a decision of
the people, promoted by the consul himself.” (Cicero, _Epist.
Familiar._, VI. 6.)
[819] Titus Livius, _Epitome_, CVIII.
[820] “Sed quum id datum est, illud una datum est.” (_Epist. ad
Atticum_, VII. 7.)
[821] “Doluisse se, quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam
ab inimicus extorqueretur, erepto semestri imperio in urbem
retraheretur.” (Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 9.)
[822] See, on the period of the comitia, Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
III. 13; _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 4.
[823] Although all the facts prove that the term of the power was to
cease in 707, Plutarch (_Pompey_, 55) reckons four years of
prolongation, and Dio Cassius (XL. 44, 46) five, which shows the
difference in the estimation of dates. (Zumpt, _Studia Romana_, 85.)
[824] “I believe certainly in Pompey’s intention of starting for Spain,
and it is what I by no means approve. I have easily demonstrated to
Theophanes that the best policy was not to go away. I am more uneasy for
the Republic since I see by your letters that our friend Pompey is going
to Spain.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, V. 11.)
[825] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 4.
[826] “But at last, after several successive adjournments, and the
certainty well acquired that Pompey consented to consider the recall of
Cæsar on the Calends of March, the senatus-consultus was passed, which I
send you.” (Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 8.)
[827] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 8.
[828] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 8.
[829] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 8, §§ 3, 4.
[830] “But the consuls, who fear being obliged, by a decree of the
Senate, to leave for the war, and who feel at the same time how
disgraceful it will be to them if this commission fall on any other but
them, will absolutely not allow the Senate to assemble; they carry it so
far as to make people suspect them of want of zeal for the Republic:
there is no knowing if it be negligence, or cowardice, or the fear of
which I have just spoken; but what is concealed under this appearance of
reserve is, that they will not have that province.” (Cœlius to Cicero,
_Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 10.)
[831] “With the succour of Dejotarus, the enemies may be held at bay
till the arrival of Pompey, who sends me word that they intend him for
this war.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VI. 1.)--“At this news of the
passage of the Euphrates, every one offers to give his advice: this man
would have them send Pompey; the other Cæsar and his army.” (Cœlius to
Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 10.)
[832] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, V. 20
[833] He kept this title until the moment the civil war broke out.
[834] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 4.
[835] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 10.
[836] “Ingeniosissime nequam.”
[837] Cicero to Curio, _Epist. Familiar._, II. 7.
[838] Cicero, _Brutus_, lx. 218.
[839] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 49.
[840] Plutarch, Antony, 2.--Cicero, _Philippica_, II. xix. 48.
[841] See his biography in _Appendix D_.
[842] Cicero, _Philippica_, II. xx. 49.
[843] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 26.--Yet Cicero, who never spared his
adversaries, makes no mention of this act of corruption; and Velleius
Paterculus (II. 48) expresses himself as follows: “Did Curio, as has
been said, sell himself? It is a question we cannot venture to decide.”
[844] “Æmilius Paulus built, they say, with this money the famous
basilica which bears his name.” (Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 26.)
[845] “It was said of him that there was no man so low but he thought
him worth the trouble of gaining.” (Cicero, _Ad Div._, VIII. 22.)
[846] A villa near Aricia. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VI. 1.)
[847] “Curio, in his ill humour at not having obtained the
intercalation, has thrown himself, with unequalled levity, into the
party of the people, and began to speak on Cæsar’s side.” (Cœlius to
Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 6.)
[848] See _Appendix A_.
[849] Dio Cassius, XL. 62.
[850] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 6.
[851] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VI. 1; _Ad Div._, VIII. vi.
5.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 27.
[852] The following letter explains the nature of this tax: “This man of
importance (P. Vedius) met me with two chariots, a chaise, a litter, and
so great a number of valets, that, _if Curio’s law passes_, Vedius will
surely be taxed at 100,000 sestertii. He had, moreover, a cynocephalus
in one of his chariots, and wild asses in his equipage. I never saw a
man so ridiculous.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VI. i. 22.)
[853] Dio Cassius, XL. 63.
[854] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 14.
[855] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 50, 51, 52.
[856] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 52.
[857] “Pompey appears to agree with the Senate in requiring absolutely
the return of Cæsar on the Ides of Novembre. Curio is decided to do
everything rather than suffer this: the rest he cares little about. Our
party--you know them well--do not dare to undertake a deadly combat.
This is how things stand now. Pompey, who, without attacking Cæsar, will
accord nothing to him but what is just, accuses Curio of being an agent
of discord. At the bottom, he will not allow that Cæsar be designated
consul before he has given up his army and his province, and his great
fear is that that may happen. He is by no means spared by Curio, who
throws continually his second consulate in his teeth. I will tell you
what will come to pass: if they do not use discretion with Curio, Cæsar
will gain a defender in him. With the fear which they show of the
opposition of a tribune, they will do so much that Cæsar will remain
indefinitely master in Gaul.” Cicero, _Epist. ad Familiar._ VIII. 11.)
[858] Dio Cassius, XL. 41.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 27.
[859] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 27.
[860] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 13.
[861] “It is his custom to speak in one way and to think in another; but
he has not head enough to prevent people from seeing through him.”
(Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. ad Familiar._, VIII. 1.)
[862] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 28.
[863] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 34.
[864] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 61.
[865] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 29.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 32.
[866] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 29.--This officer (Appius) affected to
undervalue the exploits which had been accomplished in that country
(Gaul), and to spread rumours injurious to Cæsar. “Pompey,” said he,
“must have known very little his strength and reputation, otherwise
would he, in order to measure himself with Cæsar, seek other troops than
those which were at his disposal? He would conquer him with the very
legions of his enemy, as soon as he appeared, so much did the soldiers
hate Cæsar, and desire to see Pompey again.” (Plutarch, _Pompey_, 61.)
[867] “I should like to come nearer to you; but, I regret to say, I dare
not trust myself to the two legions.... The two legions must not be
exposed in the presence of Cæsar without the cohorts from Picenum.”
(_Letter from Pompey to Domitius, Proconsul._--Cicero, _Epist. ad
Atticum_, VIII. 12.)--“All my resources are reduced to two legions,
which Pompey has retained in an odious manner, and of which he is no
more sure than of foreigners.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 13.)
[868] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 61.
[869] Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 33.
[870] “Do you approve that Labienus and Mamurra should have amassed
immense riches?” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 7.)
[871] Dio Cassius, XL. 63, 64.
[872] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 30.--Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VIII.
4.
[873] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 31.--Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VI. 9;
VII. 1.
[874] Dio Cassius, XL. 64.
[875] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 31.
[876] Cœlius to Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 14.
[877] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 3.
[878] Cicero landed at Brundusium on the 7th of the Calends of December,
704. (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 2.)
[879] “I receive flattering letters from Cæsar; Balbus writes me as many
in his name. I am firmly determined not to flinch a finger’s length from
the road of honour; but you know how much I am under obligation to
Cæsar. Do you think that I have not to fear that they will reproach me
my debt, if I vote even quietly in his favour, and, if I speak strongly,
that they will ask it loudly from me? What am I to do? Pay it, you will
say. Well! I will borrow from Cœlius. But think of it, I beg of you, for
I expect, if I happen to speak firmly in the Senate, your good friend
from Tartessus will at once tell me: You, pay what you owe!” (Year 704,
9th December. Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 3.)
[880] “What will become of us? I have a good mind to shut myself up in
the citadel of Athens, whence I write you this note.” (Year 704. _Epist.
ad Atticum_, VI. 9.)--“Consequently, leaving to the fools the initiative
of speech, I think that I shall do well to endeavour to obtain this
triumph, were it only to have a reason not to be in Rome; but they are
sure to find a means to come to wrest my opinion from me. You will laugh
at me. How I wish I had remained in my province!” (Cicero, _Epist. ad
Atticum_, VII. 1.)
[881] “He has borne witness, which I did not ask him, to my integrity,
my equity, and my kindness, and he has refused me what I expected from
him. You should see how Cæsar, in the letter in which he congratulates
me and promises me everything, knows how to make the most of this
abominable ingratitude of Cato! But this same Cato has caused twenty
days to be granted to Bibulus. You must excuse me being spiteful; but
this is a thing which I cannot bear, and which I will never forgive
him.” (Year 704, November. Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 2.)
[882] Year 704, December. Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 7.--The
words _entire order of the knights_ are not in the text, but they result
from what Cæsar says in the same letter.
[883] Year 704, December. Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 3.
[884] Year 704, December. Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 7.
[885] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 4.
[886] “The situation of the Republic inspires me every day with more
uneasiness. Honest people do not agree so well as is thought. How many
Roman knights, how many senators, have I not heard inveighing against
Pompey, particularly on account of this unfortunate journey! What we
want is peace. All victory will be fatal, and cause a tyrant to rise up.
Yes, I am one of those who think that it is better to grant all he
(Cæsar) asks than to appeal to arms. It is now too late to resist him,
when for the last ten years we have done nothing else but to give him
strength against us.” (Year 704, December. Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
VII. 5.)
[887] Year 704, December. Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 8.
[888] “Senatus frequens in alia transiit.” (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII.
43.)
[889] “Neque senatu interveniente.” (_De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 4.)
[890] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 30.
[891] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 22.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 41; _Pompey_,
85.
[892] _De Bello Gallico_, VIII. 54.
[893] It ended before the consular year.
[894] Drumann is of opinion that the “Commentaries” are in error in
mentioning Fabius.
[895] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 59.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 32.
[896] Velleius Paterculus, II. 49.
[897] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 9.
[898] Plutarch, _Pompey_, 63.
[899] Plutarch (_Pompey_, 59) pretends even that they read it before the
people.
[900] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 32.
[901] Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 1.
[902] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, VIII. 8.
[903] Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 3.
[904] The Sibylline books had predicted the empire of Rome to three
Cornelii: L. Cornelius Cinna had been consul; Sylla, dictator; Cornelius
Lentulus was in hopes of being the third.
[905] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XVI. 12.
[906] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 34.
[907] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XVI. 2.--_Philippica_, II. 21, 22.
[908] Plutarch, _Antony_, 7.--Dio Cassius, XLI. 2, 3.
[909] Plutarch, _Antony_, 7.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 33.
[910] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XVI. 12.
[911] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 34.
[912] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XVI. 11.
[913] Florus, IV. 11.
[914] Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 15.--Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
VII. 23.
[915] Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 7.--Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII.
13.
[916] Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 12.--Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
VII. 3.--Lucan, _Pharsalia_, II., line 463.
[917] Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 6, 30.--Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._,
V. 20; XVI. 12; _Epist. ad Atticum_, X. 16.--Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 34.
[918] Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XV. 11.--Appian, _Civil Wars_, II.
34.--Cæsar, _De Bello Civili_, I. 7.
[919] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 36.
[920] The “Commentaries,” it is true, say that the tribunes of the
people rejoined Cæsar at Rimini: but it was more probably at Ravenna, as
reported by Appian (II. 33), or in his camp between Ravenna and Rimini.
[921] The words of the proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon on landing
in the gulf of Juan in 1815.
[922] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 68.
[923] Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 12.
[924] “Cæsar has received a terrible blow: T. Labienus, who had so much
influence in his army, has refused to become his accomplice: he has left
him and has joined us. This example will have numerous imitators.”
(Cicero, _Epist. Familiar._, XVI. 12.)--“Labienus considers Cæsar as
utterly unable to maintain the struggle.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
VII. 16.)
[925] “Is that honourable ... (in Cæsar) to think of nothing but
abolition of debts, calling back exiles, and so many other outrages?”
(Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_, VII. 11.)
[926] “A power after the manner of Sylla, that is what Pompey desires,
and what all those wish who surround him.” (Cicero, _Epist. ad Atticum_,
VIII. 11.)
[927] Appian, _Civil Wars_, II. 35.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 35.
[928] Lucan, _Pharsalia_, I., line 526.
[929] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 7.--Plutarch, _Cæsar_, 37.
[930] Suetonius, _Cæsar_, 32.
[931] De la Nauze refers this opposition to the 17th of April following
(_Académie des Inscriptions_, tom. XXVI. 244). His calculation is
incorrect.
[932] De la Nauze, influenced by his wrong calculation of the opposition
of Jupiter, insists that these events took place at the approach of
spring. He overlooks the particle _jam_. Ideler suppresses it from the
German text.
[933] According to the system of Ideler, the Helvetii only started on
the Julian 16th of April. On that reckoning, we cannot find room for the
numerous events which occurred before the wheat was ripe. (Cæsar, _De
Bello Gallico_, I. 16.)
[934] The system of Ideler (see Korb, in Orelli, _Onomasticum
Tullianum_, tom. I., p. 170), according to whom the 6th of the Calends
of October fell on the Julian 30th of August, is manifestly in the
wrong. Cæsar, who, in the preceding year, saw no objection to pass into
Britain at the end of August, would not have troubled himself about the
equinox when it was still 27 days’ distant.
[935] General de Gœler has sought to raise a new system founded on the
assumption that the Roman year had only 354 days. According to him, this
reduction would have been necessary to find the 560 days of which Cicero
speaks. The author commits more than one error; among others, he
ascribes, by inattention, 29 days instead of the 27, to the month of
February in the year 703. (De Gœler, p. 91.)
[936] Suetonius had written: “Cæsar placed, for this time, two more
months between November and December, so that the year had fifteen
months, including the one to be intercalated, which, following the
usage, had fallen in this same year.” Censorinus, adopting this view,
finds that Cæsar intercalated 90 days in the year 708. But Suetonius has
bequeathed us other errors. Dio Cassius, consul for the second time in
the year 229 after Christ, had drawn from authentic sources; it is
better to hold to his system, which restores the astronomical
concordance for the equinox in the year 700, whereas, with the system of
Censorinus, it has been sought in vain what Cæsar’s intention could have
been.
* * * * *
Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber:
inflict=> to inflict {pg 68}
consequene=> consequence {pg 84}
Helveti=> Helvetii {pg 278}
Cevennes=> Cévennes {pg 278 fn. 466}
Dumnacas=> Dumnacus {pg 382}
Dio Cassius, XXXXIX. 22.=> Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 22. {pg 429 fn. 619}
preraired=> repaired {pg 435 fn. 638}
All interview=> An interview {pg 439}
Choisy-a-Bac=> Choisy-au-Bac {pg 529}
we suppose that ther number=> we suppose that their number {pg 556}
with the will=> will the will {pg 584}
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2" ***
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