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Title: Japan
- From the Japanese Government History
- Edited With Supplementary Chapters
Author: Various, - To be updated
Language: English
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*** Start of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Japan
- From the Japanese Government History
- Edited With Supplementary Chapters" ***
The History _of_ Nations
JAPAN
[Illustration: Emblem]
GHENT
EDITION
[Illustration: THE JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN COMMANDERS OF
THE LATE WAR IN THE PENINSULA OF
LIAO-TUNG, MANCHURIA]
GENERAL NODZU
_Opposed to General Bilderding at the
Battle of Mukden_
GENERAL BARON KUROKI
_Commander-in-Chief of the First
Japanese Army_
GENERAL KUROPATKIN
_Commander-in-Chief of the Russian
Army in the Far East_
GENERAL LIGNIEVITCH
_Successor to General Kuropatkin_
GENERAL NOGI
_Japanese Commander before Port
Arthur_
GENERAL OKU
_Opposed to General Kaulbars at the
Battle of Mukden_
MARSHAL OYAMA
_Commander of the Japanese Field
Forces. Victor at Liao-yang,
Sha-ho and Mukden_
_From drawings made by H. W. Koekkoek from photographs_
THE HISTORY OF NATIONS
HENRY CABOT LODGE, Ph. D., LL. D. EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
JAPAN
From the Japanese Government History
Edited With Supplementary Chapters
by
K. ASAKAWA
Instructor in Japanese Civilization
Yale University
Volume VII
[Illustration: Emblem]
Illustrated
P · F · COLLIER & SON
PUBLISHERS NEW YORK
Copyright, 1907, by
JOHN D. MORRIS & COMPANY
Copyright, 1910, by
THE H. W. SNOW & SON COMPANY
Copyright, 1913, by
P. F. COLLIER & SON
Designed, Printed, and Bound at
The Collier Press, New York
THE HISTORY OF NATIONS
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
HENRY CABOT LODGE, Ph.D., LL.D.
Associate Editors and Authors
ARCHIBALD HENRY SAYCE, LL.D.,
_Professor of Assyriology, Oxford University_
CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTON, M.D., Ph.D.,
_Associate Professor of Oriental History and Archaeology,
Johns Hopkins University_
C.W.C. OMAN, LL.D.,
_Professor of History, Oxford University_
THEODOR MOMMSEN,
_Late Professor of Ancient History, University of Berlin_
ARTHUR C. HOWLAND, Ph.D.,
_Department of History, University of Pennsylvania_
CHARLES MERIVALE, LL.D.,
_Late Dean of Ely, formerly Lecturer in History, Cambridge University_
J. HIGGINSON CABOT, Ph.D.,
_Department of History, Wellesley College_
SIR WILLIAM W. HUNTER, F.R.S.,
_Late Director-General of Statistics in India_
GEORGE M. DUTCHER, Ph.D.,
_Professor of History, Wesleyan University_
SIR ROBERT K. DOUGLAS,
_Professor of Chinese, King's College, London_
JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS, Ph.D., LL.D.,
_Professor of Political Economy and Politics, Cornell University_
KANICHI ASAKAWA, Ph.D.,
_Instructor in the History of Japanese Civilization, Yale University_
WILFRED HAROLD MUNRO, L.H.D.
_Professor of European History, Brown University_
G. MERCER ADAM,
_Historian and Editor_
FRED MORROW FLING, Ph.D.,
_Professor of European History, University of Nebraska_
FRANÇOIS AUGUSTE MARIE MIGNET,
_Late Member of the French Academy_
JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON, Ph.D.,
_Department of History, University of Chicago_
SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, LL.D.,
_Professor of Modern History, King's College, London_
P.W. JOYCE, LL.D.,
_Commissioner for the Publication of the Ancient Laws of Ireland_
JUSTIN McCARTHY, LL.D.,
_Author and Historian_
AUGUSTUS HUNT SHEARER, Ph.D.,
_Instructor in History, Trinity College, Hartford_
W. HAROLD CLAFLIN, B.A.,
_Department of History, Harvard University_
CHARLES DANDLIKER, LL.D.,
_President of Zurich University_
ELBERT JAY BENTON, Ph.D.,
_Department of History, Western Reserve University_
SIR EDWARD S. CREASY,
_Late Professor of History, University College, London_
ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE, Ph.D.,
_Assistant Professor of History, Harvard University_
WILLIAM RICHARD MORFILL, M.A.,
_Professor of Russian and other Slavonic Languages, Oxford University_
CHARLES EDMUND FRYER, Ph.D.,
_Department of History, McGill University_
E.C. OTTE,
_Specialist on Scandinavian History_
EDWARD S. CORWIN, Ph.D.,
_Instructor in History, Princeton University_
PAUL LOUIS LEGER,
_Professor of Slav Languages, Collège de France_
WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH, Ph.D.,
_Assistant Professor of European History, University of Pennsylvania_
BAYARD TAYLOR,
_Former United States Minister to Germany_
SIDNEY B. FAY, Ph.D.,
_Professor of History, Dartmouth College_
J. SCOTT KELTIE, LL.D.,
_President Royal Geographical Society_
ALBERT GALLOWAY KELLER, Ph.D.,
_Assistant Professor of the Science of Society, Yale University_
EDWARD JAMES PAYNE, M.A.,
_Fellow of University College, Oxford_
PHILIP PATTERSON WELLS, Ph.D.,
_Lecturer in History and Librarian of the Law School, Yale University_
FREDERICK ALBION OBER,
_Historian, Author and Traveler_
JAMES WILFORD GARNER, Ph.D.,
_Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois_
JOHN BACH McMASTER, Litt.D., LL.D.,
_Professor of History, University of Pennsylvania_
JAMES LAMONT PERKINS, Managing Editor
* * * * *
The editors and publishers desire to express their appreciation for
valuable advice and suggestions received from the following: Hon. Andrew
D. White, LL.D., Alfred Thayer Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., Hon. Charles
Emory Smith, LL.D., Professor Edward Gaylord Bourne, Ph.D., Charles F.
Thwing, LL.D., Dr. Emil Reich, William Elliot Griffis, LL.D.,
Professor John Martin Vincent, Ph.D., LL.D., Melvil Dewey, LL.D.,
Alston Ellis, LL.D., Professor Charles H. McCarthy, Ph.D., Professor
Herman V. Ames, Ph.D., Professor Walter L. Fleming, Ph.D., Professor
David Y. Thomas, Ph.D., Mr. Otto Reich and Mr. Francis J. Reynolds.
NOTE
The editors of "The History of Nations" concluded their work with the
chronicling of events to October, 1905, and all additions thereafter,
bringing the histories to date, have been supplied by the publishers.
PREFACE
The present revised edition of the "History of the Empire of Japan"
(compiled, in 1893, for the Imperial Japanese Commission of the World's
Columbian Exposition at Chicago, by Messrs. K. Takatsu, S. Mikami, M.
Isoda, and others, and published in Tōkyō by order of the Department of
Education) is not intended to supersede the original edition, the high
qualities of which are, on the contrary, recommended to all students of
Japanese history. That work admirably represents what might be termed
the orthodox view of the national history, and is free alike from the
unscientific method of the more conservative historian, and from the
superficial speculations of the more radical, but not more scientific,
student. Were the present editor to write an original work on Japanese
history, however, he would, it is unnecessary to say, change the entire
manner of presentation in order to make it accord with his own
conception of the subject-matter. In this revision, he has not changed
the general order of the original work, but has merely corrected a few
data which are obviously out of date, omitted those minor facts which
may well be dispensed with, and made the general narrative somewhat
smoother than it was.
The fourth part is, however, the editor's own work. The primary aim in
this division of the volume has been to supply a popular and accurate
account of certain phases of the national progress that has taken place
since the "History of the Empire" was prepared a dozen years ago. The
substance of chapter XVIII has appeared among the new chapters supplied
by the editor to the new edition of Brinkley's (edit.) "Japan," (J. B.
Millet Co., Boston, 1905), and has been inserted here with the
permission of those publishers.
K. Asakawa
YALE UNIVERSITY
INTRODUCTION
The Empire of Japan consists to-day of a group of islands marshaled in
the northwest corner of the Pacific Ocean, off the eastern coast of the
Asiatic continent. These islands--including Formosa and the Pescadores
ceded by China in 1895, and the southern half of Sakhalin, acquired from
Russia in 1905--lie between the parallels of 50° 56' and 21° 48' north
latitude, and the longitude of their extreme eastern and western points
are 156° 32' and 119° 20', respectively, east of Greenwich. The empire
thus covers 29° 8' of latitude and 37° 12' of longitude. On the east it
faces the Pacific; on the southwest it looks across the waters of the
China Sea to the mainland of China; on the northwest the Sea of Japan
and Gulf of Tartary separate it from Korea and Siberia. The fiftieth
parallel divides the Japanese half of Sakhalin from the northern or
Russian half, and the Kurile Strait intercepts the Chishima or Kurile
group of islands on the north from the Russian peninsula of Kamchatka.
The whole group includes five and one-half large islands and nearly six
hundred islets. The large island lying in the center constitutes the
mainland; the island directly to the north is Hokkaidō (Yezo or Ezo),
and that to the south, Kiushū; on the southwest of the mainland and east
of Kiushū is Shikoku; and stretching in a northwesterly direction from
Hokkaidō are the Chishima or Kuriles, while the chain of the Riukiū
(Loochoo) Archipelago leads to Formosa. Floating, as it were, in the Sea
of Japan are the islets of Sado, Oki, and Tsushima, the last lying only
about fifty miles from the southern coast of Korea. Scattered in the
Pacific Ocean, at a distance of nearly 500 miles from the southwest
coast of the mainland, lies the Ogasawara group (Bonins). To these must
now be added the recently ceded southern half of the Island of Sakhalin.
Owing to the insular nature of the country, the area of the empire,
exclusive of the half of Sakhalin, which is perhaps as much as 12,000
square miles, little exceeds 161,000 square miles, or slightly larger
than the area of the British Isles. More than half of this superficies
is comprised in the main island. The coastline of the fourteen larger
islands and archipelagoes, again excepting Sakhalin, stretches to a
length of 13,500 miles. Little indented, the coast along the Sea of
Japan offers few bays or promontories; but the Pacific and the China Sea
coasts are broken into innumerable capes and inlets, and abound in good
harbors.
The country is mountainous, and has little flat land. Two systems of
mountain chains extend north to south and east to west, each having
numerous branches. The highlands of the empire are the two provinces of
Shinano and Kai, situated in the center of the main island. At the
boundary of Kai and Suruga stands Fujisan, or Mount Fuji, capped with
perpetual snows, its summit rising to 12,300 feet above the sea level.
Its position as the loftiest peak in the country has been lost by the
acquisition of Formosa, which contains Mount Morrison, now called Mount
Niitaka, the altitude of which is not less than 14,200 feet. The
mountains of the main island are for the most part volcanic, the active
volcanoes numbering 170, and the ranges that comprise them stretch
across the extent of the country. Mines and mineral springs consequently
abound. Frequency of earthquakes also results from the abundance of
volcanoes. Minor shocks average from thirty or forty to several hundreds
annually, and of severe shocks history shows that there have been some
two or three in each century, entailing sometimes a frightful
destruction of life and property.
From the general configuration of the country it follows that great
rivers with long courses are few, but numerous streams of lesser
magnitude traverse all parts of the empire, affording excellent
facilities for drainage and irrigation. Many of the larger of these are
even navigable. The Ishikari River in Hokkaidō, with a length of 407
miles, is the longest in the empire, followed by the Shinano, in the
main island, about 240 miles long. Nor is the land richer in extensive
plains than in great streams. Valleys lying deep in the bosoms of the
hills, plateaus along the margins of the great rivers, gentle slopes at
the foot of mountain ranges, or stretches by the seashore, are the only
comparatively level places to be seen. The Ishikari Moor, bordering the
Ishikari River in Hokkaidō, is perhaps the most extensive. Its soil is
rich, and it abounds in timber and verdure. Other well-known plains in
the north lie along the course of the Tokachi River and by the seashore
at Kushiro and Nemuro. Passing to the main island, we find, in the
northeasterly section, the Ōshū plateau, traversed by the Kitakami and
Abukuma Rivers, and extending over the provinces of Rikuchū, Rikuzen,
Iwashiro, and Iwaki. There, too, the soil is rich, and fruitful lands
cover a wide area. In the central section the valley of the Tone River
forms the Hasshū plain of the Kwantō, spreading into the four provinces
of Musashi, Kōzuke, Hitachi, and Shimōsa. Thickly populated and highly
fertile, this plain is the most extensive in the main island. Next in
order of magnitude comes the valley of the Kiso River, forming a part of
the provinces of Mino and Owari, and making one great cultivated field.
The Echigo plain, along the lower waters of the Shinano River, is the
most extensive of all the littoral plains of Japan. For the rest, very
wide plains exist in Kinai, along the banks of the Yodo and Yamato
Rivers; while in Shikoku, the most extensive flat-lands are found along
the course of the Yoshino River, and in Kiushū the lands by the banks of
the Chikugo down to the Ariyake seabeach give to the provinces of
Chikugo and Hizen a broad area of irrigated fields.
The main island of Japan, being situated in the temperate zone, enjoys,
for the most part, a medium degree of temperature. But the climate of
the empire is much varied, owing to the elongated shape of the country,
which extends over nearly thirty degrees of latitude, to the great
differences of altitude that characterize the surface of the land, and
also to the action of a warm and a cold current that flow past its
shores. Thus, in the northern part of Hokkaidō and in the Chishima
Islands the snow never disappears, the sea freezes in winter, and sleet
and fogs prevail. On the other hand, in the southern district, as well
as in the Riukiū and Ogasawara groups, the heat is very great, and
neither snow nor ice is seen in winter. In the central parts, again, the
temperature varies according to the elevation of the land, and the
configuration of the mountains and seas. As for Formosa, it is partly
situated within the tropical zone, and the two extremes of the entire
island are recorded to be 96° and 41° Fahrenheit.
The warm ocean current, known as the Kuro-shiwo or Black Stream, from
the deep somber color it displays in cloudy weather, rises from the
distant Equator, and possesses an average temperature of 81° Fahrenheit
in summer. Immediately after leaving the Equator it travels along the
eastern coast of China, and thence passing northward, approaches the
coast of Kiushū, where it bifurcates. The branch stream enters the Sea
of Japan, and flows to the north; the principal stream passes by the
southern coast of Shikoku and the main island, until it reaches the
north of Cape Inubō in Shimōsa, where it again bifurcates, a branch
turning northward, and the current itself traveling in a northeastern
direction until it leaves the main island. In consequence, perhaps, of
the heat received from this warm current, all the provinces of Kiushū,
Shikoku, Sanyō-dō and Tōkai-dō seldom see snow. There is also a cold
stream called the Oya-jiwo, of which the average summer temperature is
as low as 37°. Its source is in the Sea of Okhotsk, whence it passes
through the Kurile Islands, and flowing by Hokkaidō and the east coast
of the northern section of the main island, reaches the neighborhood of
Cape Inubō, where it disappears. Situated in a high degree of latitude,
Hokkaidō and the northern part of the main island, being further exposed
to the influence of this cold stream, have a severe climate. The snow
lies there in masses for many days and the winter is long.
The rainfall is heavy in summer and light in winter. It is greatest
along the coasts washed by the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan, and
least in the central portions of the country along the two coasts of the
Inland Sea, as well as in the northern end of the main island. Hokkaidō
has an average fall.
Rich soil, a genial climate, and a sufficient rainfall produce luxuriant
vegetation. Cultivated fields and gardens succeed each other for wide
areas. The extraordinary position of the islands stretching from north
to south also adds greatly to the variety of vegetation. Thus in Kiushū
and Shikoku are to be seen thick, verdant forests abounding in giant
trees. Sugar-canes, tobacco, and cotton, find a soil congenial to their
growth. The cocoa, the banyan tree, the banana and their congeners
flourish in the Riukiū and Ogasawara Islands. In short, the general
aspect is tropical. Passing thence to the central districts, great
varieties of plant life are found. The pine (_pinus densiflora_ and
_pinus massoniana_), oak (_quercus dentata_), hi-no-ki (_thuya
obtusca_), sugi (_cryptomeria japonica_), camphor and bamboo grow in the
woods; while the mulberry, tea plant, lacquer tree, millet, the five
cereals, vegetables, and various kinds of fruits are seen in the fields
and gardens. Finally, even in the cold and little cultivated Hokkaidō,
its fruitful soil and luxuriant vegetation invite agriculture.
The forms of animal life are also much varied. Among domestic animals
are the ox, the horse, the pig, the dog, and the cat; while the more
important wild animals are the hog, the deer, the hare, the fox, the
badger, and the monkey. Ferocious beasts and noxious reptiles are
limited to the bear of the northern districts and the habu (a kind of
snake) of Riukiū. In the waters that lave the Hokkaidō coasts sea-otters
and fur-seals abound; whales frequent the seas in the north and those
adjacent to Shikoku and Kiushū; and along all the coasts fish and
crustaceans are found in such abundance that they more than suffice for
the ordinary food of the inhabitants. Of birds there is great abundance,
some possessing beautiful plumage, others melodious notes, and others
being suitable for food. To the last mentioned class belong barn-door
fowls and ducks. Among insects, the silk-worm is largely reared
throughout the main island, the climate and soil being peculiarly suited
for the purpose.
Although the country has no mountains of exceptional altitude or rivers
of extraordinary length, the conditions of climate and soil are such
that not one of the mountains is without woods nor one of the rivers
without limpid water. So well distributed, too, are the highlands and
streams, that places of beauty are everywhere to be found in the
interior, and owing to the configuration of the coasts as well as to the
number of islets, gems of scenic loveliness abound by the seaside in all
the provinces. Moreover, in addition to wealth of natural charms,
numerous shrines and temples of note exist in the choice districts of
the main island, so that architectural, glyptic, pictorial, and
horticultural beauties supplement the attractions of the scenery. The
main island is richest in places of note, and Kinai and its neighborhood
are the most favored parts of the main island in this respect. From 794
A. D., when the Emperor Kwammu made Kyōto his capital, until the Emperor
Mutsuhito moved to Tōkyō, a period of over eleven centuries, Kyōto
remained the imperial seat of government. Hence it offers numbers of
historical relics, and is further happy in the possession of scenic
beauties attractive at all seasons of the year. Separated from Kyōto by
a range of hills is the largest lake in the empire, Lake Biwa, noted for
the Ōmi-hakkei which have ever been the theme of poets and the
inspiration of painters. At a distance of nearly twenty-five miles from
Kyōto is Nara, the imperial residence during a large part of the eighth
century. Nara abounds in things historical, the most noteworthy being
the shrine of Kasuga and the Temple of Hōriuji, places nobly planned
and naturally lovely. Tōdaiji, a large temple erected by the Emperor
Shōmu, is more than a thousand years old, and contains the celebrated
Great Image of Buddha. The cherries of Mount Yoshino and the plums of
Tsukigase, displays of bloom that have no peers elsewhere in the
country, are in the same province as Nara. Farther west the face of the
Inland Sea between Shikoku and Sanyō-dō is strewn with hundreds of
little islands whose shining white sands and green pine-trees combine to
make a beautiful picture. Among spots renowned for exquisite seascapes
may be mentioned Waka-no-ura in Kii, the Sumiyoshi beach in Settsu,
Suma-no-ura, the Maiko beach, and Akashi-no-ura in Harima, and
Itsukushima in Aki. The last-named place is a small island close to the
seashore, composed almost entirely of fantastically shaped cliffs and
strange rocks. On it stands a gracefully modeled shrine said to have
been built by Taira-no-Ki-yomori of the twelfth century, the hall and
veranda of which seem to float on the surface of the water. The singular
combination of water effect and architecture and the loveliness of the
whole view suggests an enchanted abode of fairies.
In Kiushū, Yabakei is renowned for its landscape, and the Usajingū
shrine for its architecture. Still more celebrated is Ama-no-Hashidate
in San-indō. Here a sandy promontory completely covered with pine-trees
stretches far into the sea, offering a scene of beauty and making with
Matsushima and Itsukushima the three most celebrated views in Japan.
Among places of note in the neighborhood of Tōkyō is Kamakura on the
southeast coast, which was the seat of the feudal government of Japan
for more than a century and a half till 1333, and still offers many
spots of historical interest. To the north of the capital the most
celebrated places are Nikkō and Matsushima. At Nikkō is the mausoleum of
Tokugawa Ieyasu. The beauties of its architectural decoration, the
fineness of its carvings, and the loveliness of its scenery have
inspired a popular saying that without seeing Nikkō a man is not
qualified to speak of the beautiful (_Nikkō wo minai uchi wa kekkō wo
iuna_). Matsushima, one of the three landscapes of Japan, is on the
seashore of Rikuzen. Here scattered over the face of the bay are
hundreds of tiny islets, every one of which is clothed in a luxury of
pine-trees. Viewed from the top of the hills, the scene is like a
creation of fancy rendered on the canvas of a skillful painter.
Japan proper is divided into nine principal regions according to its
configuration: they are Kinai, Tōkai-dō, Tōsan-dō, Hokuriku-dō,
Nankai-dō, Sanin-dō, Sanyō-dō, and Hokkai-dō. These, again, are
subdivided into eighty-five provinces (_koku_ or _kumi_). The province,
however, has little importance in the administrative divisions of the
country. The unit of the latter is either the urban (_chō_) or rural
(_son_) district, which, together with the larger divisions, city
(_shi_) and county (_gun_), constitutes a self-governing entity. Over
and above these divisions are one board of Hokkaidō (_dō-chō_), three of
Tōkyō, Kyōto, and Ōsaka, and forty-three prefectures or _ken_. At
present, there are, outside of Formosa, 638 gun, 58 shi, 1054 chō and
13,468 son.
The city of Tōkyō was formerly, under the name Edo, the seat of the
feudal government for nearly two and three-quarters centuries. To-day it
is the capital of the empire. It occupies a central position and is the
largest city in the country. Its fifteen wards have a total population
of nearly a million and a half. Kyōto, the old capital, is divided into
two wards and has a population of over 353,000. Ōsaka, the third of the
cities, was the seat of the Taikō's administration. Possessing
exceptional facilities for communication by sea and by river, it has
been a trading center from olden times. It is divided into four wards,
and has a population of 825,000. These three cities constitute the three
_fu_. Next in order of importance come Nagoya, between Tōkyō and Kyōto,
with a population of 245,000; Kanazawa, in the north of the main island,
with a population of 85,000; Sendai, in the northeast, with a population
of 84,000; Hiroshima, in the southwest, with a population of 123,000;
Kumamoto, in Kiushū, with a population of 62,000. Among the open ports,
Yokohama, with a population of 195,000, and Kōbe, with a population of
216,000, are the two most important, Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Niigata
following at a considerable interval.
The total population of Japan proper is nearly forty-seven millions, and
that of Formosa about three millions. The distribution per square mile,
exclusive of Formosa, varied in 1898 from 495 in the western part of the
main island to 23.7 in Hokkaidō, with the average at about 300. To-day
it is approximately 324. The recent national activity of these people
will be briefly described in the last division of this volume, and the
career of their ancestors in the earlier parts.
Before we proceed, however, a few words may be said regarding the
general nature of the historical account of Japan. In ancient times
Japan possessed neither literary script nor a regular system of calendar
and chronology. All events had to be transmitted from generation to
generation by oral tradition. The use of writing was imported from
China, probably one or two hundred years before Christ, but the general
use of letters for the purpose of recording events dates from the fifth
century A. D., while the compilation of the national annals began two
centuries later still. But such historical records as were then compiled
suffered almost total destruction a short time afterward by fire, and
the oral records of remote antiquity must have already been greatly
disfigured by omissions, errors, and confusion of facts. Regretting
this, and perceiving that unless steps were then taken to correct the
annals, subsequent generations would be without any trustworthy record
of remote events, the Emperor Temmu ordered an eminent scholar,
Hieda-no-Are, to prepare a brief chronicle of sovereigns and important
events. Unfortunately the death of the emperor, which occurred in 689,
interrupted this work. Some twenty years later the Empress Gemmyō
instructed Ō-no-Yasumaro to continue the compilation of Hieda-no-Are's
annals. The work thus completed in 712 is the "_Kojiki_" as we now
possess it. It must be regarded as the most trustworthy record extant of
the events of ancient times. Eight years after the appearance of the
"_Kojiki_," or in 720, the "_Nihongi_" was compiled. We find, on
comparing these works, that although, on the whole, they agree, certain
discrepancies exist between them. In these two works, however, is found
the chief material for the reconstruction of the history of ancient
Japan. If curious supernatural incidents figure in their pages, it
should be remembered that literature being then in its infancy and a
long interval having elapsed since the time of many of the events
recorded, the annalists were untrained in the selection of matters
worthy of a place in authentic history, while, at the same time, in the
oral traditions on which they relied, errors had doubtless been
included, and, ordinary events drifting out of sight, extraordinary
incidents and supernatural stories had alone survived.
As regards the ancient chronology of Japan it is recorded that almanacs
first came into use in Japan in 604 A. D., although it appears that the
Chinese calendar had been imported about the middle of the preceding
century. The compilation of annals, as already stated, had preceded the
latter event by a considerable interval. We may therefore conjecture
that some method of reckoning months and years had been practiced from
an early era, but no certain knowledge of this matter is available.
In Japan from ancient time chronology was not based on an era.
Originally the method pursued was to reckon years after the accession of
each emperor to the throne. In 645 A. D., however, was introduced the
Chinese fashion of using year periods designated usually in two
felicitous Chinese characters and changed as frequently as was desired.
The change of the name of a year period thus occurred at the beginning
of each new reign, and also on the recurrence of a cyclical year of
ill-omened designation, as well as on occasions of exceptional good or
bad fortune, so that there are extreme instances of five or six changes
of designation within the reign of one single emperor. It results, of
course, that a troublesome effort is required to commit to memory the
sequence and dates of the various year periods. The Chinese, in the
reign of the Ming sovereign Taitsu, decided that there should be no
change in the designation of a year period throughout the reign of a
sovereign. A similar ruling was made in 1868 on the accession of the
present Emperor of Japan, from which time also the era of Jimmu began to
be used as a chronological basis. This latter era is officially fixed at
660 B. C.[1]
As to the later sources of Japanese history, following the already
mentioned "_Kojiki_" and "_Nihongi_," they are abundant, increasing as
we move further from earlier ages. Much of this vast historical
literature has been published and edited (though thus far little
translated into European languages), but more has neither been
extensively circulated nor even seen light. The Japanese Government,
which has been searching for hidden material all over the land, is now
publishing, through the Imperial University of Tokyo, historical
documents, mostly unpublished hitherto, in two large series[2] of two
and three hundred volumes, respectively, to be completed in about
fifteen years.
The history of Japan does not lend itself to the customary division of
the ancient, mediæval, and modern ages. On the basis of the important
changes that have taken place in the administration and politics of
Japan, her history will, in the following pages, be divided into three
parts of unequal lengths. Part one covers the long space of time between
the founding of the empire and the beginning of the feudal régime toward
the end of the twelfth century. During this period, the power of the
government rested, theoretically, in spite of great fluctuations which
took place, in the hands of the sovereign. This was followed by nearly
seven centuries of military autocracy, which constitutes the second
part. The third part begins in 1868, since which year administrative
power has reverted to the emperor, a constitutional régime with
representative institutions has been established, and the general
aspects of the life of the nation have undergone a profound change.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] It should always be remembered that the historic account of Japan
before the fifth century A. D., must be allowed a large latitude in
regard to its events and their dates.
[2] Called the "_Dai-Nihon Komon-sho_" and the "_Dai-Nihon Shi-ryō_."
CONTENTS
PART I
FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE EMPIRE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF FEUDAL RÉGIME. 660 B. C.-1186 A. D.
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE MYTHICAL AGE 3
II. THE BEGINNING OF THE EMPIRE. 660 B. C.-192 A. D. 6
III. RELATIONS WITH KOREA AND CHINA. 192-645 A. D. 12
IV. THE TAIKWA REFORM. 645-708 A. D. 22
V. THE NARA EPOCH. 710-794 A. D. 31
VI. THE HEI-AN EPOCH. 794-1186 A. D. 38
PART II
THE FEUDAL AGES. 1186-1868
VII. THE KAMAKURA GOVERNMENT. 1186-1339 65
VIII. THE TEMPORARY RESTORATION OF IMPERIAL POWER. 1339-1393 83
IX. THE MUROMACHI PERIOD. 1393-1573 92
X. INTERNAL PEACE AND EXTERNAL WAR. 1573-1603 109
XI. THE FOUNDATION OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1603-1651 122
XII. THE DECLINE OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1651-1837 140
XIII. THE FALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1837-1868 155
PART III
THE NEW JAPAN. 1868-1893
XIV. INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 1868-1893 173
XV. FOREIGN RELATIONS. 1868-1893 188
PART IV
APPENDIX. 1893-
XVI. THE CONSTITUTION IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE. 1893-1906 199
XVII. PARTIES AND POLITICS. 1893-1906 213
XVIII. ECONOMIC PROGRESS. 1893-1906 242
XIX. THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894-1895 252
XX. JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA. 1893-1904 275
XXI. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH. 1904-. 303
BIBLIOGRAPHY 331
INDEX 337
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
GENERALS OF THE LATE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (Photogravure)
_Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
AINOS WORSHIPING 28
ABDUCTION OF GOSHIRAKAWA (_in color_) 60
THE INVASION BY THE MONGOL TARTARS 76
THE PROCESSION OF FEUDAL LORDS 124
A PICNIC ON THE ASUKA HILL IN THE FLOWERY SEASON 156
TEXT MAPS
PAGE
JAPAN BEFORE THE FIFTH CENTURY 10
JAPAN 61
NORTHERN JAPAN 85
SOUTHERN JAPAN 99
KOREA 117
CENTRAL JAPAN 124
JAPANESE PORTS OPENED TO FOREIGN TRADE. 1858 159
DOWNFALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1867-1868 168
THE INSURRECTION IN THE ISLAND OF KIUSHŪ. 1877 181
ISLAND POSSESSIONS OF JAPAN 193
FIRST ENGAGEMENTS OF CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894 261
CAMPAIGNS IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA 268
WEI-HAI-WEI, FORMOSA, AND PESCADORES 270
FOREIGN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA AND MANCHURIA 278
JAPANESE ADVANCE TO LIAO-YANG 309
BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 315
PART I
FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE EMPIRE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEUDAL RÉGIME.
660 B. C.-1186 A. D.
HISTORY OF JAPAN
Chapter I
THE MYTHICAL AGE
The period prior to the reign of the Emperor Jimmu is known as the Age
of the Deities. From this era strange and incredible legends have been
transmitted, some of which follow.
Tradition says that in remote times the deities Izanagi and Izanami were
commanded by the God of Heaven to form a country out of the islets
floating in space. They forthwith descended to the island Onokoro, and
there, becoming husband and wife, created the Eight Great Islands of
Japan. Thereafter were created deities to rule the sea, the mountains,
the winds, fire, herbs, and trees. Subsequently the divine pair gave
birth to the goddess Amaterasu-Ōmikami and the gods Tsukiyomi and
Susanoö. These newly-born divine beings proving themselves greatly
superior to other deities, found high favor with Izanagi. He
commissioned Amaterasu to govern Takama-no-hara, or the Heavenly Region;
Tsukiyomi to govern Yo-no-osukuni, or the Land of Night; and Susanoö to
govern Unabara, or the Seas. But this last deity proving unfaithful to
his father's commands, Izanagi, in anger, expelled him from his kingdom,
whereupon he ascended to the Heavenly Region to convey to his sister the
news of his misfortune. The fierce and enraged demeanor of the dethroned
deity led his sister to imagine that he had come with aggressive
intentions, and she hesitated to receive him. But Susanoö vehemently
declared the integrity of his purpose and succeeded in partially
reassuring the goddess. Nevertheless, his behavior was so disorderly
that Amaterasu, becoming fearful, secluded herself in a cave, with the
result that total darkness overshadowed her realm and troubles of
various sorts ensued. The other deities thereupon met in conclave and
took measures to pacify the goddess, so that she finally emerged from
her retreat and light once more shone upon the Heavenly Region and
Nakatsu-kuni (Midland). The deities then inflicted upon Susanoö the
punishment of exile. Driven from heaven, he proceeded to Izumo, and
there destroyed an eight-headed dragon, obtaining from its body a
precious sword, which he later presented to his sister Amaterasu.
Subsequently, he married the daughter of an earthly deity and settled at
Suga in Izumo. At a later date, leaving one of his sons, Ōkuni-nushi, to
govern the land, he himself proceeded to Korea. Ōkuni-nushi had many
brothers, who were all engaged in a struggle for the sovereign power.
The victory remained with Ōkuni-nushi, but his realm continuing to be
more or less disturbed, Sukunahikona, a son of the Deity of Heaven, came
over the sea to Izumo and aided in restoring peace. Thenceforth
Ōkuni-nushi and his sons administered the realm in tranquillity.
Meanwhile, in the Heavenly Region, Amaterasu, concluding that
Midzuho-no-kuni in Toyo-ashihara, which is perhaps Japan proper now,
ought to be governed by her son, Amano-oshihohomimi, commanded him to
descend and assume authority in the land. Inasmuch, however, as he
represented his proposed realm to be in a very disordered state,
Amaterasu, by order of the Deity of Heaven, held a council of deities,
by whom a mandate to restore peace was given to Amano-hohi. He failed to
accomplish his purpose, and another deity was afterward sent on the same
errand. The latter was, however, likewise conquered by Ōkuni-nushi and
did not return to heaven. Once more a council of deities was convened in
the Heavenly Region, and Nanakime was dispatched to reconnoiter the
land. He, however, was killed by Ama-no-wakahiko. Finally,
Takemikazuchi, being intrusted with the duty, proceeded to Izumo and
informed Ōkuni-nushi of the command given by the Deity of Heaven that
the son of Amaterasu should assume sovereignty over the country then
ruled by Ōkuni-nushi. The command was at last obeyed. Ōkuni-nushi ceded
his kingdom to the son of the goddess, and, with his sons, left the
region. Takemikazuchi having carried this intelligence to Amaterasu,
she, conforming always with the commands of the Deity of Heaven,
summoned her son, Amano-oshihomimi, and informed him that, peace having
been restored in the land below, he must proceed to govern it. He,
however, prayed that his son, Ninigi, might be sent in his stead, and
the goddess consenting, gave to Ninigi a mandate to rule over Japan and
to maintain its prosperity so long as heaven and earth should endure.
She further gave him the Yasaka Jewel, the Yasaka Mirror, and the
Kusanagi Sword, saying: "This mirror is my spirit; regard it as
myself." Thenceforth the Jewel, Mirror, and Sword, venerated as the
three precious relics of the goddess, were transmitted as insignia from
emperor to emperor through all generations.
The terrestrial deity, Sarudahiko, receiving news of the approach of
Ninigi and his divine retinue, came out to greet him. Under his guidance
Ninigi passed to Takachiho Mountain in Hyūga, Kiushū, and took up his
abode at Kasasa Promontory in Ada (now Kaseda port in Satsuma). Ninigi
took to wife the daughter of a terrestrial deity, and by her had two
sons, Hosuseri and Hikohohodemi. These deities fell out and fought, with
the result that the younger subdued the elder by the aid of the deity of
the sea, whose daughter he had married. The victor's son, Ugayafukiaezu,
also married a daughter of the marine deity and had four sons, Itsuse,
Inahi, Mikenu, and Iwarehiko, of whom the fourth and youngest afterward
became the Emperor Jimmu. Inahi went to the dominion of his mother over
the waves, and Mikenu to the far-distant Tokoyo, or the Region of
Eternal Night.[1]
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Abridged genealogy of the "Deities."
Izanagi (male) Izanami (female)
| |
+------------------------------------------------------+
| | |
+-----------+ | +-------------
| | |
Amaterasu Tsukiyomi Susanoö
| |
+-----------------------------+ |
| | |
Amano-oshihomimi Amano-hohi Ōkuni-nushi
|
Hikoho-no-ninigi
|
+-------------------------+
| |
Hikohohodemi Hosuseri
|
Ugayafukiaezu
|
+--------------------------------+
| | | |
Itsuse Inahi Mikenu The Emperor JIMMU.
Chapter II
THE BEGINNING OF THE EMPIRE
660 B. C.-192 A. D.
According to tradition, Itsuse and Iwarehiko took counsel together one
day in their residence in Hyūga, as to the place most suitable for the
seat of administration, and resolved to proceed eastward. At the straits
between Kiushū and Shikoku they were received by a terrestrial deity,
and under his guidance reached Usa in the present Buzen, where the
inhabitants built a palace for them and treated them hospitably. Passing
next to Chikuzen, they subsequently crossed the sea to Aki on the main
island, and thence journeyed to Kibi, ten years being devoted to these
travels. From Kibi they passed over by Naniwa to Tadetsu in the present
Izumi province. The objective point of the expedition was Yamato, where
then ruled a powerful chieftain named Nagasunehiko who, under the
authority of Nigihayahi, a scion of a god of Heaven, whom he had
received, had extended his sway over the surrounding region. This
chieftain, learning of the approach of the deities and their following,
marshaled his forces to oppose them. In the battle that ensued Itsuse
was wounded by an arrow.
The invading army therefore turned their course over the sea to Kii,
where Itsuse died of his wound. His brother, Iwarehiko, then advanced to
the east coast of Kii, and, having there killed a local chieftain,
pushed on to Yoshino under the guidance of Prince Michiomi (ancestor of
the Ōtomo family) and Prince Ōkume (ancestor of the Kume family). The
inhabitants, cave-dwellers, learning that a scion of the god of Heaven
had arrived, went out to meet him and made submission. Prosecuting his
campaign, Iwarehiko struck down several rebel chiefs, and once more
planned an expedition against Nagasunehiko. The latter, however, sent
him a message, saying: "Prince Nigihayahi, son of the Deity of Heaven,
came hither in a strong boat, and married my sister, Kashiya, by whom he
has a son, Prince Umashimate. I have made obeisance to Prince
Nigihayahi as sovereign of the land. There cannot possibly be two
legitimate representatives of the Heavenly Deity. You must have come to
deprive us wrongfully of the realm under pretext of celestial origin."
To this Iwarehiko replied: "There is more than one son of the Deity of
Heaven. If your sovereign be in truth the offspring of the Celestial
Deity, he must possess some proofs. Let me see them." Nagasunehiko
thereupon produced arrows and an arrow-case which Prince Nigihayahi had
brought with him. Iwarehiko, having examined them, declared them to be
genuine, and showed his own arrows and arrow-case to Nagasunehiko. But
the latter, though fully sensible that Iwarehiko was of celestial
origin, maintained an obstinate mien and would not change his view.
Prince Nigihayahi, now clearly perceiving his unreasonable disposition,
put him to death, and passed over with all his men to serve in the
invading army. Well pleased by this act, Iwarehiko treated the prince
kindly and rewarded his loyal conduct. Orders were then issued to the
captains to exterminate all the insurgents in the land, and the Yamato
district having been brought into complete subjection, the conqueror
established his capital at Kashiwabara in Yamato, and ordained the
deities of the various officials of his court, the imperial power being
thus extended and the administration placed on a fixed basis. This was
the opening year of Japanese history. Later annalists fixed the year at
660 B. C., and styled the victorious prince the Emperor Jimmu, the first
sovereign of the Empire of Japan.
After his death his younger son, Prince Takishimimi, sought to usurp the
sovereignty. The eldest son, Prince Kamyaimimi, suspecting the plot,
revealed it to his younger brother, Kannuna-gawamimi, who shot the
usurper. Thereupon the elder prince waived the throne in favor of his
valiant brother, who thus became the second emperor, Suisei. After him
followed the Emperors Annei, Itoku, Kōshō, Kōan, Kōrei, Kōgen, and
Kaikwa, whose reigns are said to have lasted 450 years and are
singularly bare of recorded events.
In these primitive ages the life of the people was naturally simple. The
population must have been small, and the communication between different
parts of the small empire extremely difficult. Boats were propelled by
oars, for sails were unknown. The invaders must have attained to a
higher stage of culture than the vanquished natives. The dwellings of
the aristocracy, for example, were rudely constructed wooden houses,
the simple model of which still survives in the Shintō shrines of the
present day, while the autochthons mostly dwelt in pits dug underground.
On the whole, however, both classes had partially advanced to an
agricultural mode of life, and depended for subsistence largely on
fishing and hunting. Bows and arrows or snares were the chief implements
used in hunting, and hooks, cormorants, and weirs served for purposes of
fishing. Methods of preparing food had already been elaborated, and the
art of brewing _saké_ was known. Marked progress had also taken place in
matters of dress. From skins of animals or textile fabrics woven from
hemp and dyed red and green with juices of herbs, were made hats, robes,
and pantaloons. Ornaments for the neck, arms, and legs consisted of
beads of crystal, agate, glass, serpentine and polished gems, shaped
into cylinders or crescents and strung together. The arts of mining and
smelting ores, as well as of casting metal, were known, for, besides
arrow-heads and other weapons of stone, spears and swords of copper or
iron, together with plows and hatchets of hard metals, were in evidence.
[Illustration: JAPANESE FISHING WITH TRAINED CORMORANTS
_Painting by A Richter_]
It is interesting to know that at marriage the bridegroom, contrary to
the modern custom, went to the house of the bride. A man also was
permitted to have several wives, but a woman was never allowed to have
more than one husband. Divination was always employed to solve doubtful
questions. Music and dancing were already known, the _koto_ and the
flute being employed as musical instruments. Emotions of grief or joy,
love or disappointment, were expressed in song, the most ancient song
now extant being attributed to the deity Susanoö. The Emperor Jimmu also
frequently commemorated brave deeds of war in song, thus encouraging and
reviving the spirit of his warriors.
A profound awe and respect toward the national deities, as well as a
superstitious fear of innumerable spirits, seems to have prevailed
everywhere in all classes of society. If the people submitted readily to
the sway of the Emperor Jimmu, it was largely because they regarded him
as a scion of the gods. The emperor, on his side, firmly convinced that
good and evil were controlled by divine will, never neglected to perform
sacrificial rites. Out of the custom of extreme reverence toward the
deities grew abhorrence for impurity in any form, so that separate huts
came to be built for the bodies of the dead or for women at times of
parturition, and if any man came in contact with an unclean object, he
bathed in a river to purify himself.
Naturally, little distinction existed between religion and government,
between shrine and palace. At the completion of his work of conquest,
Jimmu erected a building at Kashiwabara, in which he deposited the
three insignia, and in which he himself resided and personally governed
the empire. Each one of his eight successors followed his example. The
tenth emperor, Sujin, however, fearing that the insignia might be
polluted, made duplicates of the Mirror and the Sword, and reverently
deposited the originals in a shrine at Kasanui in Yamato, where one of
the imperial princesses was intrusted with the duty of guarding them and
performing due religious rites. Thus, shrine and palace were at last
separated. Subsequently, these sacred objects were removed to Ise, and
placed in the shrine now existing there. The Sword, however, was
afterward carried to Atsuta in Owari, where it now lies in the Atsuta
Shrine.
During the reigns of Sujin and his successor, Suinin, the agriculture
and communication of the country are recorded to have been greatly
encouraged, troubles near the court exterminated, and also the area of
the empire largely extended. The extension of the imperial domain,
however, brought it in sharp conflict with the still unsubdued tribes of
the north and the south. From the reign of Keikō, Suinin's successor, we
hear of the story of the conflict. The Kumaso of Tsukushi, Kiushū, rose
in arms. How seriously this was regarded is seen from the fact that the
emperor in person conducted a campaign for several years in Kiushū. No
sooner was peace restored than the southern tribes again rebelled. This
time the brave Prince Yamato-dake, who was sent to Tsukushi to subdue
the insurgents, had to resort to strategy instead of war. Having
disguised himself as a girl, he obtained entry into the house of the
Kumaso chief, where he killed the chief and his warriors while they were
lying drunk. He also overthrew many other rebellious princes and
returned to Yamato in triumph.
In the meantime the emperor, after his return from Kiushū, had heard
from a special commissioner whom he had sent that in the northeast of
the empire there was a strange region named Hidakami, where the people
of both sexes wore their hair tied up, tattooed their bodies, and
performed deeds of valor. They were known as the Emishi, and their land,
being extensive and fertile, the commissioner represented, ought to be
added to the imperial domain. These Emishi rose in rebellion shortly
after the return of Prince Yamato-dake from the conquest of the Kumaso.
Thereupon the prince boldly offered to undertake the conquest of the new
insurgents. After subduing local uprisings on his way, he proceeded by
sea to the region of the northern rebellion. As his boats drew near the
shore he displayed a large mirror at the prow of his vessel, and when
the rebel chieftains and their followers sighted the ships, they were
terrified by such evidences of pomp and power, and throwing away their
bows and arrows, made submission. The prince accepted their homage, and
enlisting their aid, conquered other rebels who still resisted the
progress of the imperial forces. It seems probable that on that occasion
Prince Yamato-dake advanced as far as the present province of Iwaki. On
his return journey, which was again beset with local difficulties, he
was seized with a severe illness, which soon proved fatal. The emperor
bitterly lamented the death of his beloved son, and the story of the
gallant prince is still dear to the heart of every child of Japan.
[Illustration: JAPAN AS KNOWN TO THE EMPERORS BEFORE THE FIFTH CENTURY]
The local administration of the empire so materially extended during
three successive reigns was now reorganized by the Emperor Shōmu, son of
Keikō. The nature of Shōmu's reform is, however, little known. When the
Emperor Jimmu established the office of local governor, there were only
nine provinces, but the number was increased by more than ten during the
reigns of Kaika, Sujin, and Keikō, and became sixty-three in the time of
the Emperor Shōmu. The imperial sway then extended northward as far as
Shinobu (the present Mutsu), Sado and Noto; eastward to Tsukuba (now
Hidachi); westward to Amakusa, and southward to Kii. Throughout the
whole of this district, governors were appointed to administer local
affairs. Subsequently the process of division continued until, in the
reign of the Emperor Suikō, the total number of provinces reached 144,
at which figure it remained until 645 A. D., the date of the so-called
Taikwa Reformation. These local divisions, though here spoken of as
provinces, had in fact different appellations--as _kuni_, a province, or
_agata_, a district--and were not of uniform area. The term _kuni_ was
employed to designate an area bounded by mountains or rivers, whereas
the _agata_ had no such geographical limits. In general the former was
the more extensive, but in consequence of the natural features of the
country the _agata_ was sometimes the larger. The entire subject of the
local government of ancient Japan is, however, one of the most obscure
subjects in history.
The reigns of the first thirteen emperors, from Jimmu to Shōmu, may be
considered the era of the founding of the Japanese Empire. The main work
of the sovereigns of this period consisted in the organization,
extension, and consolidation of their domain. Foreign relations had
hardly begun, and external influence was as yet slightly felt. The
following table gives the names of the thirteen emperors, with the
officially fixed dates of their reigns:
1. Emperor Jimmu.
660-585 B. C.
|
2. Emperor Suisei.
581-549 B. C.
|
3. Emperor Annei.
548-510 B. C.
|
4. Emperor Itoku.
510-475 B. C.
|
5. Emperor Kōshō.
475-392 B. C.
|
6. Emperor Kōan.
392-290 B. C.
|
7. Emperor Kōrei.
290-214 B. C.
|
8. Emperor Kōgen.
214-157 B. C.
|
9. Emperor Kaikwa.
157-97 B. C.
|
10. Emperor Sujin.
97-29 B. C.
|
11. Emperor Suinin.
29 B. C.-71 A. D.
|
12. Emperor Keikō.
71-131 A. D.
|
13. Emperor Shōmu.
131-192 A. D.
Chapter III
RELATIONS WITH KOREA AND CHINA
192-645 A. D.
Japan's foreign relations naturally began with the neighboring peninsula
of Korea, which then contained several petty kingdoms at variance with
one another. Political relations of Japan with some of these small
states must have begun very early, but the traditional accounts
concerning them are meager and untrustworthy. It is probable that some
of the Korean chiefs were at different times tributary to Japan. The
relations with Korea, however, appear to have become serious only when
it was suspected that the restless tribes of Kiushū had been encouraged
by Shiragi, the most warlike kingdom in the peninsula, in their repeated
acts of rebellion against the emperor of Japan. In this light may be
read the following famous legend of the Japanese expedition to Korea,
which is said to have taken place about 200 A. D., under the leadership
of the valiant Empress Jingō and her minister, Takenouchi.
Tradition says that, as the Kumaso of Tsukushi, Kiushū, again rose in
arms, the Emperor Chūai proceeded thither in person, and, through his
minister, prayed for the guidance of the gods. Thereupon the latter
inspired the empress, who had joined the imperial expedition, to declare
that if Shiragi was first conquered, the Kumaso would submit without
further resistance. The emperor, however, hesitated to take this divine
counsel, and the deities punished his disobedience by death. Awed by
this startling event, the empress gave directions that her consort's
death should be kept secret, and having intrusted to his generals the
duty of guarding the temporary palace at Tsukushi, she sent Takenouchi
to convey the emperor's remains to Nagato by sea, while she herself
remained to mourn the death of her husband in his prime. Sacrifices were
again offered to heaven, and prayers again addressed to the deities, to
which the reply was the same as before. After subduing several rebel
tribes, the empress came to a river, where she sought by fishing to
obtain an omen as to whether the conquest of Korea should be attempted.
The indications being in the affirmative, she finally resolved to lead
an expedition in person across the sea. Sacrificial rites were again
performed to all the deities, and the empress, returning to Kashihi Bay,
ordered the people to build ships, and sent sailors westward to
reconnoiter the land which she contemplated invading. By and by, a lucky
day having been chosen, the Japanese fleet set out from Wanizu in
Tsushima, and, aided by a favorable wind, soon reached the coast of
Shiragi. Hasankin, the king of Shiragi, was so much alarmed by the
appearance of the invading force that, without offering any resistance,
he came to sue for peace, and made a solemn pledge that he would
henceforth serve the ruler of Japan as a groom and send her annual
tributes. Shiragi, he declared, would abide by his oath, "till the river
Yalu flowed backward and sands rose to sky and became stars." The
kingdoms of Koma and Kudara followed the example of Shiragi, so that the
three principal divisions of southern Korea became tributary to Japan.
It should be noted, however, that from this time on neither was Korea
always obedient nor did the Kumaso cease to be rebellious. In the
meantime, however, an important event in an entirely different direction
resulted from Japan's intimate relations with Korea. It was the
introduction through Korea of the Chinese art of writing. Many Koreans
accompanied the commissioners who brought the annual tribute to Japan,
and the literature and art of the west were gradually introduced. Annals
attribute the beginning of Chinese learning in Japan to the reign of the
Emperor Ojin, son of the Empress Jingō, when in 218 A. D. a celebrated
Korean scholar, Achiki, visited Japan and was appointed by the emperor
tutor to his son, Wakairatsuko. At the suggestion of Achiki, another
learned man named Wani was sent for, who is said to have brought with
him blacksmiths, weavers, and brewers, as well as ten copies of the
"_Lun-yu_" (the Confucian Analects) and a copy of the "_Chien-tze-wen_"
(the book of one thousand characters). Achiki and Wani were naturalized
in Japan and received official positions, and their descendants
continued to hold professorships at court. About 110 years after the
introduction of Chinese literature, the Emperor Richū appointed
historiographers in all the local districts to chronicle the chief
events of the locality. This was, so far as we know, the first organized
attempt to compile regular records. Subsequently, as the administrative
machinery grew more complex, the necessity of writing became more
imperative, and to a service of this kind none were more fitted than the
descendants of the naturalized Korean scholars, who kept up their
intellectual heritage and occupied important posts at the court. Fresh
scholars also arrived from Korea in increasing numbers. Thus, in the
reign of the Emperor Keitai, there came from Kudara two doctors in the
Five Classics, and a little later doctors in medicine and astronomy and
other _savants_ settled in the country and opened classes to instruct
the Japanese in their special branches of study. The introduction of
Buddhism from Korea, which soon occurred, and the circumstances of which
will presently be narrated, gave an added impetus to the learning. Some
of the gifted men of the court, particularly the wise Prince Shōtoku,
began to distinguish themselves as accomplished scholars in Chinese
classics and Buddhist canons. As yet, however, the native language and
the Chinese grammar, which are so radically different from each other,
did not begin their long history of struggle to reconcile themselves to
one another. The vernacular could hardly lend itself to expression in
Chinese characters, and histories and inscriptions were written only in
the pure Chinese style.
The coming of Buddhism was an incident which accelerated the progress of
a profound change in the history and civilization of Japan, already
started by her close relations with the continent of Asia. Buddhism was
first introduced early in the sixth century by a Chinese scholar,
Sumatah, who, however, made little progress in propagating the alien
faith among the people of Yamato. Afterward, during the reign of the
Emperor Kimmei, in the year 552 A. D., the king of Kudara, in Korea,
sent the emperor of Japan an envoy bearing an image of Buddha and a copy
of the Sutras, together with a message that the creed of Buddha excelled
all religious beliefs, and that boundless happiness in this world, as
well as in the next, was insured to its disciples, among whom were
already all the nations from India to Korea. The emperor was greatly
impressed and summoned his ministers to a deliberation over the proper
attitude to be assumed by Japan regarding this new problem of the
western civilization. Soga-no-Iname, minister president, counseled the
acceptance of the foreign faith, saying that Japan should not alone
stand aloof when all nations in the west had embraced Buddha's doctrine.
Against this view Mononobe-no-Okoshi and Nakatomi Kamako, ministers of
state, argued that from the most ancient times the Japanese had
worshiped the celestial and terrestrial gods, and that if reverence were
paid now to any alien deity, the wrath of the tutelary gods of the land
might be provoked. The emperor approved the latter view, but gave the
image of Buddha to Iname with permission to worship it by way of trial.
Iname was greatly pleased with the behest, and lost no time in
converting his residence into a temple, where he placed the image. Soon
afterward a pestilence visited the country, sweeping away numbers of
people. The opponents of Buddhism thereupon having represented to the
sovereign that this was obviously a punishment inflicted by Heaven, the
temple was burned down and the image thrown into the canal in Naniwa.
The emperor, however, did not altogether abandon his predilection for
the worship of Buddha, and Iname sent secretly to Korea for another
image. Thus, in the reign of the Emperor Bidatsu, images of Buddha,
copies of the Sutras, priests, and manufacturers of Buddhist
paraphernalia came from the kingdoms of Kudara and Bidatsu. Subsequently
(584 A. D.), Soga-no-Umako, who had succeeded his father, Iname, as
minister president, built temples and pagodas dedicated to Buddha.
Another pestilence came to revive the anti-Buddhist movement, under the
influence of which an imperial edict was issued prohibiting the worship
of Buddha; all the temples and pagodas were demolished or burned, and
the images of Buddha were thrown into the canal. The people's sufferings
were, however, not relieved. A plague of boils ensued, and inasmuch as
the pain caused by the sores resembled that of burning or beating, old
and young alike concluded that they were the victims of a punishment of
burning inflicted by Buddha. From this it may be inferred that Buddhism
had already established a hold upon the popular imagination. Shortly
afterward Soga-no-Umako, having applied for permission, was allowed to
worship Buddha with his own family.
When the Emperor Yōmei ascended the throne in 586, he suffered so much
from bodily infirmity that he felt tempted to worship Buddha. By this
time the influence of Buddhists had grown so strong that they, on the
pretext that their opponents were disloyal to the wishes of the throne,
took this occasion to destroy the two most powerful anti-Buddhists.
Then, by the combined energy of Prince Shōtoku and the minister
president, Soga-no-Mako, the propagation of Buddhism made great
strides, until the Empress Suiko openly encouraged its acceptance among
the people of all classes. In 607, in order to obtain copies of the
Sutras, there was sent for the first time in history an imperial envoy
directly to China, where the Sui dynasty had just unified the long
disrupted empire. This was the commencement of intercourse with China.
The preamble of the dispatch sent on that occasion from the empress of
Japan to the sovereign of China was couched in the following words: "The
Sovereign of the Empire of the Rising Sun to the Sovereign of the Empire
of the Setting Sun sends greetings." Doubtless the name "_Nippon_" (Land
of the Rising Sun) had its origin in this incident. By and by, as the
number of priests and nuns increased, disorders occurred among them, and
for purposes of superintendence the offices of _Sōjō_ (archbishop) and
_Sōzu_ (bishop) were established. From the introduction of Buddhism in
the reign of the Emperor Kimmei to the time of which we are now
speaking, seventy-five years elapsed. During the first thirty-two years
of that period, Buddhism failed to obtain a footing in Japan, but from
584 it gradually extended throughout the empire, until in 627 there were
in Japan 46 temples, 816 priests, and 569 nuns.
Let us now observe some features of the life of the nation and the
profound influence wrought upon it by the introduction of the
continental civilization and of Buddhism. It is not too much to say
that, at least around the seat of the central government, the arts and
sciences of China and the creed of Buddha greatly changed the simplicity
of Japanese life and imparted to it a character of refinement and pomp
hitherto unknown. Chinese literature not only taught Japan the art of
writing and composition, but also brought with it an advanced ethical
sense of fidelity, piety, benevolence, and justice. The Emperor Ōjin's
son, who was the first Japanese student of Chinese literature, had
acquired such an accurate knowledge of the rules of composition and
calligraphy that when a memorial was presented to the throne by Korean
ambassadors, he detected the presence of disrespectful ideograms and
rebuked the envoys. His attainments won for him the favor of his father,
who nominated him heir in preference to his elder brother; nevertheless,
on the death of the emperor, this prince resigned his claim in behalf of
his brother. For such self-denial his scholarship had prepared him. So,
too, the erudite Emperor Nintoku dwelt for the space of three years in
a dilapidated palace, in order that his people might have relief from
taxation during a famine, and know the sense of love and duty his
learning had taught him. The prosperity of the nation, he said, was his
own prosperity, their poverty his poverty.
The doctrine of Confucius inculcated reverence toward Heaven, respect
for ancestors, loyalty to the sovereign, love of the people, and
discharge of the duties of filial piety. On the other hand, Buddhism
proved an ennobling influence upon the mind of the nation. Hitherto the
people naïvely attributed every happy or unhappy event, every fortunate
or unfortunate incident, to the will of the gods, whom they appeased by
offerings and sacrifices that evil might be averted. The gods looked and
acted like men. Highest among them stood the celestial and terrestrial
gods; lowest were certain wild animals and venomous snakes, which also
were propitiated by worship. Gods were near men, and some of the latter
were conceived as scions of the former. This primitive notion of a deity
was not materially affected by the introduction of the Confucian
philosophy, the tenets of which offered no contradiction to the ancient
idea. Buddhism, on the contrary, told of a past and of a future;
announced the doctrine that virtue would be rewarded and vice punished
in a future state; and taught that the Buddha was the supreme being and
that whosoever had faith in him should receive unlimited blessings at
his hands. No longer were the deities the only objects of fear and
reverence, for now a being of supreme wisdom and power loomed upon the
mental horizon of the people. Even the sovereign himself was seen
worshiping Buddha, whose servant he was pleased to regard himself.
Prejudices at court against the Hindu doctrine were dispelled by the
growing light shed by the deeper knowledge of Buddhism, while the golden
images of Buddha and the imposing structures enshrining them, as well as
the gorgeous paraphernalia of the temples and the solemnity of the rites
performed therein, allured the common folk into the faith. At the same
time, the people's reverence for the ancient gods of the nation remained
unshaken, so that Shintōism, Confucianism, and Buddhism existed side by
side, supplying the defects of one another and answering different moral
needs of the race.
Along with learning and religion, various arts of civilized life were
profusely supplied from Korea to vivify the general progress of the
nation. Among the most important was the production and manufacture of
silk, which was largely studied by the people and encouraged by the
Emperor Yūryaku. Many Chinese artisans of the fallen dynasties migrated
through Korea to Japan, where they were naturalized and transmitted
their knowledge of the western arts and sciences. In architecture, also,
with the coming of Buddhism a need arose for lofty and large edifices,
the erection of which must have greatly changed the appearance of the
capital. The art of pottery made a great advance, as did the
blacksmith's craft of forging swords and other articles of iron. Nor
were medicine and the calendar neglected, while the new art of carving
and decorating as well as drawing the image of Buddha, gave a powerful
impetus to painting and sculpture. The collective influence of all these
and other new changes upon the life of the people, nearer the center of
the government at least, must have been very great. With the development
of the art of weaving, apparel was improved by the addition of silk
garments; as agriculture progressed, rice and other cereals furnished
agreeable aliment; the influence of Buddhism gradually produced a
distaste for animal food. The introduction of the science of
architecture soon effected a marked change in the dimensions and
decoration of dwelling-houses. Transmission of intelligence was
facilitated by the imported art of writing, the moral, intellectual, and
political thinking of the ruling classes began to take a more or less
definite shape from the coming of the Chinese classics, while Buddhism
spread over the nation a charm which was at once captivating and
ennobling. A new era of history had begun.
We shall now turn our attention to the remarkable political evolution
which followed and was in fact to a large extent occasioned by the
introduction of Buddhism. In the earliest days of the empire,
administrative posts were transmitted by heredity from generation to
generation. It thus resulted that family names were derived from
official titles, as, for example, the official title for persons
performing religious rites was Nakatomi or Imbe, which titles became
family names of holders of that office. Similarly Ōtomo and Mononobe
were family names of officials having control of troops or direction of
military affairs. Among commoners, also, there were many who performed
certain kinds of work for the government, the art of which they
bequeathed to their children by heredity. Each occupation of this
description was organized into a guild, and each guild was under the
control of a headman who belonged to some influential family. Not only
were public offices and private guilds similarly organized by the
principle of heredity, but also there was no rigid line drawn between
the public property and the personal possession of a nobleman. The
higher one's position among the aristocracy, the more exalted was his
office and the more plenteous his treasury. Under these circumstances,
it is not strange that the administration of the state gradually fell
under the control of the heads of a few powerful clans. Originally,
during the reign of the first emperor, the Nakatomi and Imbe families
discharged religious functions, and the Ōtomo, Kume, and Mononobe
families performed military duties. The influence of these families was
then about equal. But subsequent events resulted in the decline of the
Kume, while the Ōtomo were in the main intrusted with the control of
Korean affairs. Domestic administration remained chiefly in the hands of
the Mononobe and the new family of Soga, descendants of Takenouchi, the
tactful minister of the Empress Jingō. The Mononobe stood at the head of
all the noble families bearing the honorary title of Muraji, and the
Soga, of those likewise designated as Omi. It was inevitable that the
mutual jealousy of the two leading houses should bring them to a clash
of interests, while the introduction of Buddhism had the effect of
greatly accentuating their hostility. It will be remembered that the
Mononobe family adhered steadily to conservative principles and opposed
the spread of Buddhism, which the Soga, on the contrary, zealously
upheld. So long, however, as both families bowed implicitly to the
imperial commands, their dispute did not attain serious proportions. But
when, in the reign of Yōmei, not only was the empress dowager a daughter
of the Soga family, but also the emperor himself inclined to the worship
of Buddha, the final struggle between the two families could no longer
be deferred.
On the death of the emperor, Mononobe Moriya sought to secure the
succession for a brother of the deceased sovereign, as against another
prince, son of the empress dowager. His plot was discovered, and he was
defeated and killed. The Mononobe being thus overthrown, the supremacy
rested with Umako, the head of the Soga, and the throne was occupied by
his own prince. But the prince could not long bear the arbitrary conduct
of Umako, who then caused him to be assassinated. The empress dowager, a
daughter of the Soga, despite the presence of direct successors in the
male line, ascended the throne under the title of the Empress Suiko.
This was the first instance of the scepter being held by a female. On
the death of Umako, his son, Emishi, succeeded him, and wielded even
larger influence than his father. Emishi crushed an opposition offered
by his own uncle, and placed in succession to the empress a prince of
his choice, and under the latter's rule as Emperor Shōmei, Emishi
behaved as he pleased. After Shōmei's death, his consort ascended the
throne under the name of Kōkyoku. Emishi's son, Iruka, who now
discharged the administrative functions, exercised even greater power
than his father. He also designed to obtain the throne for Prince
Furuhito, a relative of his family. But an obstacle existed in the
person of Prince Yamashiro, whose goodness and discretion had won
popular respect. Steps were taken to have this prince assassinated, and
otherwise Iruka showed himself so arbitrary and unscrupulous that there
appeared to be danger of his compassing the destruction of the lineal
successors to the throne and usurping the sovereignty himself. Thereupon
Nakatomi Kamatari, a loyal subject, conferred with Prince Nakano-ōye,
son of the Emperor Shōmei, as to the expediency of making away with
Iruka. This plot culminated in the killing of Iruka in the throne room
on a day when Korean ambassadors were received at the court. Iruka's
father, Emishi, was also killed, and with them the glory of the Soga
vanished.
Thus ended the interesting period of history in which active relations,
first with Korea, and then with China, began to produce in Japan a
direct, profound effect upon her society and politics. Agents of the
advanced civilization were liberally introduced, and, in the midst of
this process, a grave crisis which was about to overcome the central
institutions of the state system was averted only by an anomalous act of
a few patriots. It was these latter who inaugurated in the next period
the grand work of reconstructing the entire system of government and
administration after the pattern of Chinese institutions. The
continental civilization in all its refinement was then even more
eagerly studied around the capital than before, while the country at
large, under the unforeseen effects of these artificial reforms, passed
gradually into a still later period of her history. Before taking up the
story of the reform period, we as usual subjoin a table of the
sovereigns of the period which has been under review in this chapter.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF SOVEREIGNS.
14. Emperor Chūai, 192-270 A. D. (including the 69 years of the
regency of Empress Jingō-kōgō).
|
15. Emperor Ojin, 270-313.
|
16. Emperor Nintoku, 313-400.
|
17. Emperor Richū,--18. Emperor Hanshō,--19. Emperor Inkyō,
400-405. 405-411. 411-453.
| |
| +----------------+
| |
Prince Ichinobe Oshiiwa. 20. Emperor Ankō,--21. Emperor Yūryaku,
| 453-456. 456-480.
| |
| 22. Emperor Seinei.
23. Emperor Kensō,--24. Emperor Ninken, 488-499. 480-485.
485-488. |
25. Emperor Buretsu, 499-507.
(Emperor Ojin.)
|
(Emperor Nintoku.)--Prince Wakamikenofutamata.
|
Prince Ōhito.
|
Prince Hikouishi.
|
26. Emperor Keitai, 507-534.
|
+---------------+
|
27. Emperor Ankan,--28. Emperor Senkwa,--29. Emperor Kimmei, 540-572.
534-536. 536-540. |
+----------------------------------------+
|
30. Emperor Bidatsu,--31. Emperor Yōmei,--32. Emperor Susun,--33. Empress
572-586. 586-588. 588-591. Suiko,
| 591-629.
|
Prince Oshisakahiko-nushibito.
|
+----------+
|
34. Emperor Shōmei, 629-642.--Prince Chinu.
|
35. Empress Kōkyoku, 642-645.
Chapter IV
THE TAIKWA REFORM. 645-708 A. D.
It was in the year 645 A. D. that a small league of supporters of the
imperial institutions, under the leadership of two true statesmen,
Prince Naka-no-ōye and Nakatomi-no-Kamatari, overthrew the disloyal
family of Soga. For the first time in Japanese history, the Chinese
system of year-periods was adopted, and the name Taikwa ("Great Change")
was applied to the period which began with this year. No more
appropriate name could be invented, for the reforms henceforth
introduced, known in history as the Taikwa reformation, were of such a
sweeping character as to transform within a few years all the
fundamental institutions of the central and local administration. The
model of the changes was found in the system of politics and society of
China, which had lately come under the sway of the dynasty of T'ang, the
centralized government and refined civilization of which had excited
emulation in the minds of the Japanese reformers. The memorable year 645
A. D. thus marks the beginning of the exhaustive reformation which was
completed only after fifty-six years, extending over the reigns of six
sovereigns, for it was not till 701 that the celebrated Taihō code of
laws brought the work of state reorganization to a close.
It would hardly be necessary for us to study the reforms in detail,
which brought profound changes upon nearly all the features of national
life. The central institution of the new state may be said to be the
land system. Formerly, noble families abused the influence of their
position and extended their territorial estates so greatly that the
commoner was in a state of perpetual eviction. Between the rich and the
poor had grown a widening gap. Now the reformers, after their Chinese
model, boldly confiscated to the state all the landed estates of private
individuals, which they then allotted equally among all the people above
the age of six at the rate of two _tan_ for a male and one and one-third
_tan_ for a female (a _chō_, or 10 _tan_, at the time being
approximately equal to two acres), subject to a redistribution at every
sixth year. Naturally neither the periodical redistribution nor the
system of equal allotment itself could be long maintained, but the
notion that the ownership of land was ultimately vested in the state was
not abandoned until the present reign, when the people of all classes
were at last allowed to own land.
The economic and financial unit of the nation being thus defined, it was
also provided that a national census should be returned at a fixed
period. New taxes were of three kinds, the principal one, called _so_,
being levied upon land. The method of its assessment was to fix the
annual produce of two _tan_ of rice land at 100 sheaves, 8 of which--4
large and 4 small--were taken as tax, or, roughly, five per cent. of the
gross produce. Of the other two kinds of taxes one was called _yō_ and
the other _chō_. The former may be regarded as a species of _corvée_.
After a man attained the age of twenty-one he was required to perform
ten days' public work annually, which service, however, he was at
liberty to commute for one piece of cloth (_nuno_). The _chō_ was levied
on silk, fish, cloth, and generally speaking on objects produced or
obtained in considerable quantities. The proceeds of the rice-tax were
applied to defray the expenses of local administration, while the outlay
of the central government was met by the proceeds of the two other
taxes, _yō_ and _chō_.
As regards local administration, the old names of local divisions,
_kuni_ (provinces) and _kōri_ (districts), were retained, while towns,
_sato_, were organized generally by grouping together fifty houses under
a town-head. Along the principal roads relays of post horses were
maintained for public service, and every person traveling in the
interior was required by law to carry a hand-bell and a document similar
to a passport. At important places guard-houses were established, with
duly appointed lookouts and garrisons for preserving order. Government
business was transacted in the provinces under the control of officials
collectively called _kokushi_, and in the districts under that of
_gunshi_. The former set of officers were appointed by the central
government from among the nobler families, while the latter seem to have
been largely supplied by the descendants of old local magnates. In those
days the empire comprised 58 _kuni_, over 500 _kōri_, and about 13,000
_sato_, but subsequent changes resulted in 66 _kuni_ and more than 700
_kōri_, which numbers continued till the beginning of the present reign.
Finally, as to the central government, its ultimate control was vested
in the hands of three principal officials, namely, the ministers of the
left, of the right, and of the interior; but this organization
subsequently underwent considerable modification. The eight departments
of administration were Department of Records (_Nakatsukasa_), Department
of Ceremonies (_Shikibu_), Department of Administration (_Jibu_),
Department of Home Affairs (_Mimbu_), Department of Military Affairs
(_Hyōbu_), Department of Justice (_Kyōbu_), Department of Finance
(_Ōkura_), and Department of the Imperial Household (_Kunai_). Each was
comprised of three bureaus, between which the functions of the
department were distributed. Over and above the eight departments stood
the two highest offices, grand council (_Daijō-kwan_) and religious
rites (_Jingi-kwan_).
The administrative organization having been thus determined, steps were
taken to make suitable selection of _personnel_ for the various official
posts, and in connection with this a body of rules was compiled, fixing
the ranks of officials of all kinds. The system of selection by merit
was in this manner substituted for that of hereditary succession. But
the change did not find complete expression in practice, for noble
families, though nominally deprived of exclusive official privileges,
still benefited by the conservatism of custom. Various ranks of
officials were minutely graded, and rigidly marked by means of the
colors of garments and head-gear or by patents, but these insignia
underwent subsequent changes in minor details.
Such, in brief, were the principal features of the Taikwa reforms. The
government, however, did not confine itself to the realm of enactment,
for instructions of an admonitory character were issued with a view to
improving the manners and customs of the agricultural classes. Diligence
in the pursuit of their occupations, economy, integrity, exclusion of
mercenary motives from contracts of marriage, simplicity of funeral
rites, persistence in habits of industry even during periods of
mourning--such were the virtues recommended to farmers by official
proclamation. At the same time, in order to establish contact between
the ruling classes and the ruled, boxes were set up at various places
wherein the people were invited to deposit any statement of grievances
from which they suffered, and it was provided that a man who desired to
bring a complaint speedily to the notice of the authorities should ring
a bell hung in a public building.
On the decease of the Emperor Kōtoku, after a reign of ten years, the
previous empress, Kōkyoku, reassumed the scepter under the name of
Saimei. This was the first instance of a sovereign occupying the throne
twice. Prince Naka-no-ōye, who throughout both reigns had remained
heir-apparent, succeeded the Empress Saimei under the name of Tenchi.
This sovereign, who before ascending the throne had greatly
distinguished himself, is not noted for any conspicuous deeds while in
possession of the scepter. Throughout his reign the country enjoyed
profound internal tranquillity. Its foreign affairs, however, assumed a
complexion worthy of special notice.
Since the conquest of southern Korea, which tradition attributes to the
Empress Jingō, its kingdoms not only rendered tributes of valuable
articles, but also conferred no small benefit on their suzerain by
contributing to the latter's material and moral civilization.
Nevertheless, the interval that separated the two countries made
communication difficult, and although Japan established a branch
government in Korea at a place called Mimana, the Koreans, relying upon
the distance of the latter from headquarters, frequently acted in a
rebellious manner. During an interval of 460 years after the legendary
invasion of the Empress Jingō, no less than thirty instances are
recorded when the Koreans either failed to send tribute, insulted
Japanese envoys, or broke into open revolt. On every occasion Japan sent
embassies to demand explanation and redress, or reasserted her supremacy
by force of arms. Shiragi, which in those days stood at the head of the
districts into which Korea was divided, rose in 562 against Mimana and
succeeded in expelling the Japanese officials and obtaining possession
of the place. This disaster weighed greatly on the mind of the Emperor
Kimmei, whose last behest uttered on his deathbed was that Mimana should
be recovered. A great army was accordingly sent against Shiragi, but
success did not attend the Japanese arms. Not only was it found
impossible to reduce Shiragi, but even the maintenance of the local
government at Mimana proved a task beyond the military strength of the
time. Thenceforth the recovery of Mimana became an object upon which
Japan's attention was ever concentrated. When in 618 China fell under
the powerful sway of the T'ang dynasty, the people of Shiragi, relying
on Chinese assistance, conceived the project of bringing under their
rule the neighboring district of Kudara. Reduced to extremities, Kudara
in 660 sent envoys to seek succor from Japan. After considerable
discussion, the Japanese Government resolved to undertake an expedition
against Shiragi on a large scale. Great preparations were set on foot.
The sovereign himself proceeded to Tsukushi and oversaw the dispatch
thence of a fleet of a hundred war vessels under the command of
Azumi-no-Hirafu, whose instructions were to attack Shiragi and rescue
Kudara. But the latter was found to be in a helpless condition. Invaded
simultaneously by the forces of China and Shiragi, it was also torn by
internal dissensions, and could not coöperate in any effective manner
with the Japanese navy, which consequently withdrew, leaving Kudara to
its inevitable fate. The final fall of Kudara occurred in 670, and a few
years later the third Korean district of Koma was also defeated by
China. Shiragi subsequently sent occasional tribute to Japan, but was
never afterward included in the Japanese dominions. The Emperor Tenchi,
reviewing the history of his country's relations with Korea, seems to
have arrived at the definite conclusion that the wisest policy was on
the side of abandoning all idea of recovering Kudara, and devoting
Japan's energies solely to organizing measures of defense against
foreign attack. He accordingly adopted every possible means of promoting
military efficiency. It should be remembered that Japan had not only
lavished money and blood for Korea, but also had outlived the days when
the civilizing influence of the continent had to come by way of the
peninsula and had already been in communication with the source of
enlightenment, China. It was during the reign of the same Emperor Tenchi
that China sent an envoy to the court of Japan, and the latter country
dispatched an embassy in return, so that the two empires were brought
into more friendly relations than before.
[Illustration: THE WORSHIP OF THE BEAR AMONG THE AUTOCHTHONS (AINOS)
OF EZO]
The curious "Hairy Ainos" of northern Japan hold the bear in
extreme sanctity. They catch the bear when young and bring him
up on human milk, a nurse being deputed to him. Then he is
transferred to a cage and, when he is old enough to be slain, on
the day of sacrifice the whole village turns out armed with bows
and arrows, the cage is opened and each one strives to send home
the fatal shaft. The chief prays the bear to pardon the violence
done him, requests benefits from the now deified carcass, and
presents offerings. They then behead and skin the bear, and
begin an orgie which lasts several days.
If, however, the extent of the Japanese dominions suffered reduction in
the west, it in the meantime received an increment in the north by the
subjection of some recalcitrant tribes. It will be recalled that the
uprising of these people, called Emishi, or _Ebisu_, had been suppressed
by Prince Yamato-dake, but further north in the island of Ezo, the
present Hokkaidō;, the imperial sway received only partial
acknowledgment. There the Emishi not only were restless, but also
generally had the sympathy and support of their kinsmen across the
waters, just as in earlier times, the Kumaso, the autochthons of
Kiushū, habitually espoused the cause of Korea in any conflict between
the latter and Japan. The government always found itself compelled to
undertake a dual campaign in times of trouble with the island on the
north or with the peninsula on the west. Because of these difficulties
forts were built, about 650, at Nutari and Iwafune in Echigo, and
garrisoned by the people of that province and of Shinano, for the
purpose of holding the aborigines of Ezo in control. The unsettled
condition of these outlying districts may be further inferred from an
enactment contemporaneous with the great Taikwa reforms. For whereas a
general interdict was then issued against unauthorized possession of
arms and armor by private persons, dwellers in the remote parts of the
east were exempted from this prohibition on the ground of their
liability to attack.
During the years 658-660, in the Empress Saimei's reign, Abe-no-Hirafu,
a distinguished governor of the Koshi provinces (Echigo and Uzen),
conducted successful campaigns against the autochthons of Ezo, breaking
their power and destroying their vessels of war, and finally invaded
Manchuria at the head of a force composed of subjugated Emishi, and cut
off the source from which insurgents had usually derived succor. The
result of this campaign was that the Emishi were, for the most part,
brought into subjection, and functionaries called _Gunryō_; were posted
at Shiribeshi in the northern island. Frequent insurrections, however,
followed, and finally it was found necessary to build the castles of
Taga and Akita, where strong forces of soldiers were maintained to
preserve order.
A few expeditions on a large scale were also organized against them
under the command of generalissimos (_shōgun_) upon whom the duty of
guarding the northern and eastern marches devolved, but it was not until
796, during the reign of the Emperor Kwammu, that these autochthons were
effectually brought into subjection. The campaign against them at that
time was directed by a renowned captain, Sakanoue-no-Tamuramaro, who, at
the head of a great army, penetrated to the limits of the rebellious
districts, slaughtering all who refused to surrender. This general's
exploits were second only to those of his predecessor Abe-no-Hirafu. Not
only was the sway of the imperial court thus extended to the east and
north, but in the south also various islands--Tokuara, Tane, Yaku,
Amami, Toku, and others--lying off the coasts of Satsuma and Ōsumi, were
added to the Japanese dominions.
Let us now see what important incidents took place during this time
around the person of the sovereign. In the third year of the Emperor
Tenchi's reign, 670, the celebrated statesman of the Taikwa reformation,
Nakatomi-no-Kamatari died. He had been raised to the position of lord
keeper of the privy seal, and had received the family name of Fujiwara,
in recognition of his meritorious services. Kamatari was a man of
thorough loyalty and integrity. His zeal in the emperor's service was
unflagging, and he showed great ability in framing useful laws and
regulations, so that, after his decease, people spoke of him as a model
of fidelity. Two years later the emperor himself, formally the leader of
the reforms since 645, died, leaving behind him a reputation for good
government which was held in so grateful a remembrance that when more
than a century later the Emperor Kwammu promulgated a law dispensing
with the observance of religious ceremonies on the anniversaries of the
deaths of sovereigns deceased at remote periods, public sentiment caused
the Emperor Tenchi to be excepted from the general rule. Yet he had
scarcely been laid to rest when a serious disturbance took place with
reference to his successor. In accordance with the rule of primogeniture
followed in Japan, the scepter was bequeathed to the eldest prince of
the blood with almost unvarying regularity during the thirteen
generations from Jimmu to Seimu; and throughout the thirty-two
generations from Jimmu to Sujun no woman held the scepter, for although
Jingō held regency for sixty-nine years, she was never invested with the
dignity of the title of sovereign.
The accession of the Empress Suiko was due to exceptional circumstances,
and did not mark a recognized departure from the old rule. Subsequently,
however, not a few instances occurred of the scepter falling into the
hands of an uncle or niece of a deceased emperor, and on these occasions
more or less disquiet accompanied the event. But no disturbance
connected with such a cause attained anything like the dimensions of the
trouble that followed Tenchi's death.[1] On the occasion of the
emperor's visit to Tsukushi to make arrangements for the invasion of
Korea, he entrusted the administration of affairs during his absence to
his younger brother, Prince Ōama, and caused the heir apparent, Prince
Ōtomo, to accompany him to Tsukushi. Ōtomo, though young in years, had
already given evidence of great capacity and was exceptionally learned.
The sovereign entertained a strong affection for him, and after
returning from Tsukushi raised him to the position of prime minister. On
the other hand, the relations between the emperor and his brother,
Prince Ōama, were for some unknown reason inharmonious. When the
emperor, perceiving the dangerous character of his malady, would fain
have entrusted the administration of affairs after his death to Ōama,
the latter pretending ill health declined the responsibility. The prince
imperial was consequently proclaimed successor to the throne, and Ōama
took the priestly order and retired to Mount Yoshino, partly for the
purpose of praying for the soul of the deceased emperor, but partly also
to dispel the suspicion with which the public regarded his acts. None
the less, it was the common talk of the time that Ōama's retirement to
Yoshino was as "the letting loose of a tiger on a moor." Twice did the
ministers of state take the oath of allegiance to Prince Ōtomo, but
rivalry and evil feeling continued to grow between the partisans of the
new sovereign and those of Prince Ōama. In the end a state of open
hostilities resulted. Prince Ōama, rapidly withdrawing to the eastern
provinces, obtained possession of all the strategical positions, and was
followed by large numbers of adherents. The emperor dispatched an army
against the insurgents, and engagements took place in Mino, Ōmi, and
Yamato, but on every occasion the imperial forces were routed, and the
eastern army gradually pushed on to Ōtsu in Shiga. A final and desperate
stand was made by the emperor's troops in the Seta district, but the
battle ended in their total defeat, and the sovereign himself, escaping
from the field, perished by his own hand at the age of twenty-five,
after a reign of only eight months. This emperor is known in history as
Kōbun. Prince Ōama succeeded to the throne under the name of Temmu. He
had obtained the scepter under questionable circumstances, but as a
ruler he showed high qualities, carrying on the administration with zeal
and ability. He dispatched inspectors to all districts throughout the
realm in order to acquire full knowledge of local affairs, and raised
the military establishment to a state of high efficiency. On his death a
princess, daughter of Tenchi and sister of Kōbun, succeeded to the
throne as the Empress Jitō. In the third year of her reign the heir
apparent, Prince Kusakabe, died. The empress convoked a council of all
the high dignitaries of state to determine a successor to the prince,
but they could not come to any agreement until Prince Kadono advanced
the principle that when neither son nor grandson was available to
succeed to the throne, the scepter should pass to the brothers and
sisters of the sovereign in due order, since by no other means could
disputes be avoided. The outcome was that Karu, son of the late Prince
Kusakabe, was proclaimed heir apparent. He subsequently ascended the
throne as the Emperor Mommu, well known in history for his ability and
the codification under his direction of the laws of the Taihō period.[2]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The following is a brief genealogical table of the sovereigns
of this period of disputed successions:
30. Emperor Bitatsu.--(Prince Oshisakahikohito).
|
+---------------------------------+
|--34. Emperor Jōmyō.--38. Emperor Tenchi.--(41. Empress Jitō, consort of
| | the 40th emperor, Temmu).
| | |
| | +----------------------------------+
| | |
| | +--(43. Empress Gemmyō, mother of the 42d
| | | emperor Mommu).
| | +--39. Emperor Kōbun.
| | +--(Prince Shiki).--49. Emperor Kōnin.
| |
| 40. Emperor Temmu.--(Prince Kusakabe).
| |
| (Prince Toneri).--47. Emperor Junnin.
+--(Prince Chinu.)--35. Empress Kōkyoku.--37. Empress Saimei.
|
36. Emperor Kōtoku.
[2] Chronological table of sovereigns.
36. Emperor Kōtoku, 645-655.
37. Empress Saimei, 655-668.
38. Emperor Tenchi, 668-672.
39. Emperor Kōbun, 672-673.
40. Emperor Temmu, 673-690.
41. Empress Jitō, 690-697.
42. Emperor Mommu, 697-708.
Chapter V
THE NARA EPOCH. 710-794 A. D.
In 708 A. D. the Empress Gemmyō ascended the throne and two years later
the seat of government, which had hitherto moved from place to place,
was fixed at Nara in the province of Yamato. The imperial palace, as
well as the left and right halves of the city, were built with much
state, the place being thenceforth known in Chinese style as _Heijō_
("castle of tranquillity"). The interval of seventy-five years from that
date, comprising the reigns of seven successive sovereigns, is called in
history the "Nara epoch," an epoch worthy of special reference for its
great prosperity and refinement. Under the sway of the emperors Tenchi
and Temmu the power of the throne had already increased considerably,
and it was further enhanced by the ability of Mommu and his immediate
successors, no little assistance being derived from the royal princes
who occupied the highest posts in the administration with conspicuous
talent. Side by side with the growth of the power of the crown, the
influence of the Fujiwara family, descendants of Kamatair, also steadily
advanced, until, as will be seen later, they came to overshadow the real
authority of the sovereign. This, however, had not yet become noticeable
during the earlier years of the Nara epoch, when the emperor was in
theory and in practice at the apex of the grand centralized system of
government inaugurated by the Taikwa reformation.
Among the events of this period, none is more worthy of note than the
marked spread of Buddhism. This result may be attributed, first, to the
loyal faith of the imperial court, and, secondly, to the exertions of
priests of high talent who labored in the cause of their creed with
remarkable zeal and tact. Ever since the days of the Emperor Kimmei,
when Buddhism was brought to Japan, its progress had been sure and
strong, despite all opposition, until there came a time when the Emperor
Temmu went so far as to order that every private house should have an
altar for the worship of the Buddha. Subsequent sovereigns caused the
canons to be copied and images to be made for all the provinces of the
realm; and the Emperor Shōmu supplemented those measures by an edict
requiring that provincial temples (_kokubunji_) should everywhere be
built for priests and nuns. The ruling classes contributed liberally to
the support of these places of worship, it being generally believed that
by such means individual prosperity and national tranquillity could be
secured. A huge image of Buddha, fifty-three feet high, was cast of
copper and gold, which survives to this day in the temple where it was
originally placed, the Tōtai-ji, at Nara.
It is on record that Shōmu himself adopted the tonsure and took a
Buddhist appellation. The mother of that sovereign, Miyako, and his
consort, Kōmyō,--both daughters of Fujiwara Fubito--were most zealous
devotees of Buddhism, and with their coöperation the sovereign
established in the capital an asylum for the support of the destitute
and a charity hospital, where the poor received medical treatment and
drugs gratis. Measures were also taken to rescue foundlings, and in
general to relieve poverty and distress. Tradition tells us that the
empress cared for the sick to the number of nine hundred and
ninety-nine. The thousandth patient was a miserable old man who asked
her to suck pus from the ulcerated sores of his skin. As she cheerfully
acceded to his wish, he was transfigured into a Buddha, and ascended
into the air, blessing the imperial devotee whose faith he had come to
test. Among the great subjects we also find instances such as those of
Kamartari and Fuhito, of whom the former, though a minister of the
court, built a temple and made his eldest son take orders, and the
latter erected the temple of Kōfuku-ji and endowed it as the place of
worship of the Fujiwara family. Among the priests of high rank, one
whose name has been transmitted to posterity was Gyōgi.
He became famous in the reign of the Empress Genshō,[1] and having won
the confidence and respect of the next sovereign, Shōmu, he attained the
rank of _Daisōjō_ (archbishop) and was subsequently worshiped as a saint
under the title of "Bosatsu." It was by this prelate that the doctrine
of successive incarnations of the Buddha was first enunciated, a
doctrine whose skillful application greatly served the cause of
Buddhism. For though the creed obtained such influence and success in
the times now under consideration, its universal acceptance by the
people encountered a strong obstacle in their traditional belief that
the Shintō deities, not Buddha, had founded the state, bequeathed its
scepter to their posterity, and prescribed a creed with which the very
existence of the nation was bound up. This difficulty, however, the
Buddhist priests adroitly met by the aid of the doctrine that Gyōgi
taught. The goddess Amaterasu had been only an incarnation of
Birushanabutsu, and all the deities of the land were but the Buddha
himself in various human forms. By this skillful reasoning they
dispelled the inherited prejudices of the people and gave a great
impulse to the spread of their creed. Gyōgi, Dōshō, Ryōben, and others
acquired notable influence with the masses, and, aided by their pupils,
preached in such manner as to popularize Buddhism throughout the land.
About this era, also, many priests came to Japan from China. It would
appear, nevertheless, that side by side with the spread of Buddhist
conviction the doctrine of fate and fortune was taught and the necessity
of vows and penances inculcated, to the delusion and demoralization of
ignorant folks. In every direction priestly sway made itself felt, even
the imperial court being largely under the influence of Gembō, Dōkyō,
and their following.
A notable factor in the development of material prosperity at that epoch
was the extraordinary ability of the priests. Many of them made voyages
to China to study the arts and sciences of that empire, and on their
return traveled up and down the land, opening regions hitherto left
barren, building temples, repairing and extending roads, bridging
rivers, establishing ferries, digging ponds, canals, and wells, and
encouraging navigation, thus contributing as much to the material
civilization of the country as to the moral improvement of the people.
It may be truly said that the spread of Buddhism was synchronous with
the rise of art and science. Carpenters, from the practice acquired in
building temples, learned how to construct large edifices; sculptors and
metallurgists became skillful by casting and graving idols of gold and
bronze; painting, decorative weaving, the ornamentation of utensils, and
the illumination of missals, owe their expert pursuit to the patronage
of Buddhism; the first real impetus given to the potter's art is
associated with the name of a priest; in short, almost every branch of
industrial and artistic development owes something to the influence of
the creed. In a storehouse forming part of the Tōtai-ji, and in the
temple of Hōriū, both at Nara, there are preserved a number of household
utensils, objects of apparel, musical instruments, and so forth, handed
down from the Nara epoch, every one of which bears witness to a refined
and artistic civilization, not surpassed by succeeding generations.
Among glyptic artists there have been handed down from these days the
names of men famous for their skill in sculpturing images, two of whom
were called "Kasuga" after the place where they lived, and were held in
the highest honor. It is true that architecture, sculpture, dyeing, and
weaving, introduced originally from China and Korea, had long been
practiced with considerable success, but during the Nara epoch these
arts were in the hands of men celebrated then and subsequently for their
proficiency. The same may be said also of the arts of the lacquerer and
the sword-smith, which at that time were carried far beyond ancient
standards of achievement. It is further worthy of note that the methods
of manufacturing glass and soap were known in the eighth century. Nara
and its temples, remaining outside the range of battles and the reach of
conflagrations, have escaped the destructions that periodically overtook
other imperial capitals, so that those who visit the place to-day can
see objects of fine and useful arts more than a thousand years old.
Simultaneously with the progress thus made in art and industry, learning
received a great impetus. The Emperor Tenchi was the first to appoint
officials charged with educational functions. A university was
established in Kyōto, as well as public schools in the various
localities throughout the provinces. The subjects chiefly taught in the
university were history, the Chinese Classics, law, and mathematics.
These were called the _shidō_, or four paths of learning. In the
succeeding reign, education continued to receive powerful encouragement,
but the principal object in view being the training of government
officials, instruction for the masses still remained in an
unsatisfactory state. Learning in that age virtually signified a
knowledge of the Chinese Classics. Hence, in the Nara epoch, scholars
versed in that kind of erudition were very numerous, conspicuous among
them being Awada-no-Mahito, Ō-no-Yasumaro, Kibi-no-Makibi and others.
Intercourse with China being then tolerably close, there were frequent
instances of priests and students proceeding thither by order of the
government, the former to investigate religious subjects, and the
latter to study Chinese literature. Even in China some of these men
obtained a high reputation for learning. The names of Kibi-no-Makibi and
Abe-no-Nakamaro are best remembered. The former, on his return to Japan,
was appointed a minister of state, but the latter never saw his native
country again. Encountering a violent gale on his homeward voyage, he
was driven back to China, where he received an important official
position and remained until his death, constantly hoping to return to
Japan but always unable to realize his hope.
Japan in those days possessed many scholars who could write Chinese
fluently. The composition of Chinese poetry was commenced in the reign
of Kōbun, the first book of verses ever published in Japan--the
"_Kwaifūso_"--making its appearance at that time. It is on record that,
at an earlier epoch--during the reign of the Empress Suiko--Prince
Shōtoku, Soga-no-Umako, and others, jointly compiled some historical
works, which were, however, almost totally destroyed at the time of the
overthrow of the Soga family. Subsequently, the Emperor Temmu instructed
Prince Kawashima and others to write a history, and further directed
Hieda-no-Are to dictate for transcription the annals of the successive
reigns. Again, in 712 A. D., Ō-no-Yasumaro, by command of the Empress
Gemmyō, compiled a history of the empire from the earliest days to the
reign of Suiko. This work was called the "_Kojiki_." A year later the
various provinces received imperial instructions to prepare geographical
accounts, each of itself, and these were collated into the "_Fūdoki_" a
few of which still remain. During the next reign, the Empress Genshō
continued this literary effort by causing Prince Toneri and others to
compile the "_Nihongi_," comprising a historical narrative from the
beginning of the empire to the reign of Jitō. In these works, the
"_Kojiki_" and the "_Nihongi_," the most ancient traditions of the
country are to be found. Shortly afterward five other chronicles, known
with the "_Nihongi_" as the "Six National Histories," were successively
undertaken, the compilation of which continued down to the reign of the
Emperor Daigo.
To the Japanese poetry of the Nara epoch, however, must be assigned the
first place among the literary efforts of the time. While Kōgen was on
the throne, Tachibana Moroye collected all the poems then extant, and
these, being afterward supplemented by Ōtomo-no-Yakamochi, constitute
the "_Manyōshu_," a work containing stanzas full of _verve_ and
imagination, simple yet by no means deficient in taste. The longer
compositions are especially admirable, and have ever since served as
models for writers of Japanese verse. Later generations considered the
work as a means of studying the ancient language of the country prior to
the Nara epoch, and from it they also derived a knowledge of the customs
and sentiments of early times. Consequently the "_Manyōshu_," together
with the "_Kojiki_" and the "_Nihongi_," came to be regarded as most
precious sources of historical information.
The lavish patronage bestowed upon Buddhism and the artificial wealth
and refinement of the capital were not without an enervating effect upon
the court. From the latter part of the eighth century favoritism and
partisanship began to cause serious troubles around the person of the
sovereign, whose conduct was in a measure responsible for them. The
story of the rise and fall of various favorites and their cliques is too
tedious to be retold, but the case of the priest Dōkyō deserves a brief
notice. Holding the post of palace prelate and enjoying undue favor from
the empress dowager, Dōkyō's power assumed such proportions that the
prime minister, Emi Oshikazu, took up arms against him. The latter's
forces were, however, completely routed, his adherents exterminated, and
he himself killed. With his fall, the emperor, who had ascended the
throne by the influence of Oshikazu, was exiled by the dowager, who
resumed the scepter in 764. This was the first instance of an emperor
being exiled. Many princes of the blood were also either banished with
him or killed, with the result that the princely adherents of the
imperial house were materially reduced in number. Thereafter Dōkyō
received the posts of prime minister and second prelate of the realm
(_Zenshi_), ultimately attaining the position of first prelate (_Hō-ō_).
His food, raiment, and bodyguards were similar to those of the emperor,
and so great was his influence that the entire administration rested in
his hands. His partisans went so far as to say openly that were the
prime minister made emperor, the realm would enjoy peace. Profound,
however, as was the nation's belief in Buddhism at that epoch, there
were just men who could not tamely endure such evil doings. Conspicuous
among them was the brave Wake-no-Kiyomaro, who brought back from the
shrine of the Shintō deity, Usa-Hachiman, an oracle, saying: "The
distinction of sovereign and subject is fundamental. Never may a subject
become emperor. The emperor must always be of the imperial line. Let
the unrighteous subject who would cut off the imperial succession be at
once removed." Dōkyō was much incensed by this procedure and caused
Kiyomaro to be banished. But the oracle produced its effect on the
empress, who at last repented of the things that had been done, and all
idea of raising Dōkyō to the throne was abandoned. The next year she
died and was succeeded by a grandson of Tenchi, the Emperor Kōnin. At
this point the descendants of the Emperor Temmu ceased to hold the
succession, and those of the Emperor Tenchi assumed it. Dōkyō was
banished, and Kiyomaro was recalled to court. Posterity regards his
memory with almost religious respect.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Chronological table of the sovereigns of the Nara Epoch.
43. Empress Gemmyō, 708-715.
44. Empress Genshō, 715-724.
45. Emperor Shōmu, 724-749.
46. Empress Kōken, 749-759.
47. Emperor Junnin, 759-765.
48. Emperor Shōtoku, 765-770.
49. Emperor Kōnin, 770-782.
Chapter VI
THE HEI-AN EPOCH. 794-1186 A. D.
The Nara epoch had come to an end when in 794 the Emperor Kwammu
transferred the capital to Kyōto. The new seat of government being then
known as _Hei-an Kyō_, or Citadel of Tranquillity, the interval that
separated its choice as capital from the establishment of feudal
administration at Kamakura in 1186--an interval of nearly four
centuries--is known in history as the Hei-an epoch. A few words may be
said about the significance of the change of the seat of government from
Nara to Kyōto. From ancient times it had been the custom for the emperor
and the heir apparent to live apart, from which fact it resulted that
when a sovereign died and his son succeeded to the throne, the latter
usually transferred the capital to the site of his own palace. It
sometimes happened also that the residence of the imperial court was
altered as often as two or three times during the same reign. Rarely,
however, did the court move out of the contiguous provinces known as the
_Go-kinai_, the great majority of the seats of government being in the
province of Yamato. So long as the government was comparatively simple,
the transfer of its seat from place to place involved no serious effort.
As, however, the business of administration became more complicated, and
intercourse with China grew more intimate, the character of the palace
assumed magnificence proportionate to the imperial ceremonies and
national receptions that had to be held there. Hence the capital
established at Nara by the Empress Gemmyō was on a scale of
unprecedented magnitude and splendor. There seven sovereigns reigned in
succession without any thought of moving elsewhere. But when the Emperor
Kwammu assumed the reins of government, he found that Nara was not a
convenient place for administrative purposes. He at first moved to
Nagaoka in Yamashiro, but a brief residence there convinced him that his
choice had not been well guided.
At last, in 794, a new capital was built, after the model of Nara, with
some modifications introduced from the metropolis of the T'ang dynasty
in China, at Uda in the same province. This was called Kyōto, which
means capital. It measured from north to south 17,530 feet and from east
to west 15,080 feet, the whole being surrounded by moats and palisades,
and the imperial palace being situated in the center of the northern
portion. From the southern palace gate (_Shujaku-mon_) to the
southernmost city gate (_Rajo-mon_) a long street, 280 feet wide (called
_Shujaku-ōji_, or the main Shujaku thoroughfare), extended in one
straight line, separating the city into two parts, of which the eastern
was designated _Sakyō_, or the left capital, and the western, _Ukyō_, or
the right capital. The whole city, from east to west, was divided into
nine districts (_jo_), and between the first and second districts lay
the imperial palace.
An elaborate system of subdivision was adopted. The unit, or _ko_
(house), was a space measuring 100 feet by 50. Eight of these units made
a row (_gyō_); four rows, a street (_chō_); four streets, a _ho_; four
_ho_, a _bō_, and four _bō_, a _jo_. The entire capital contained 1216
_cho_ and 38,912 houses. The streets lay parallel and at right angles
like the lines on a checkerboard. The imperial citadel measured 3840
feet from east to west, and 4600 feet from north to south. On each side
were three gates, and in the middle stood the emperor's palace,
surrounded by the buildings of the various administrative departments.
This citadel was environed by double walls, and contained altogether
seventeen large and five small edifices, every one of them picturesque
and handsome.
Great and fine as was this metropolis, it suffered such ravages during
the disturbances of succeeding centuries that the Kyōto of to-day, the
"Sakyō," or Western Capital, is but a shadow of the left section of
ancient times. Not even the imperial palace escaped these ravages. Again
and again impaired or destroyed by conflagrations, it gradually assumed
smaller and smaller dimensions until only a trace remained of the
splendid edifice that had once stood in the center of the citadel. But
the regularity of the streets could not be obliterated. That at least
survives to tell the story of the plan on which the city was
constructed. Indeed, Kyōto continued to be the seat of sovereigns for a
long period, covering 1074 years, and until the capital was removed in
1869 to Tōkyō.
In the Hei-an epoch[1] were accentuated the virtues and vices of the
Nara epoch. Buddhism now advanced to an even greater extent than it did
then, the luxury and pomp of the court were never excelled before or
since, and the control of the administrative machinery by the Fujiwara
family became completed. The growth of the Buddhist church was in no
small measure due to two remarkable priests, Saichō and Kūkai, both of
whom studied in China the profoundest doctrines of Buddhism and gained
for themselves a great reputation. Saichō founded the sect called
Tendai, and built the celebrated temple Enryaku-ji, at Hiyei-zan, to
guarantee the imperial palace against maleficent influences from the
northeast. Kūkai founded the Shingon sect, and built the not less famous
temple of Kongobu-ji, at Kōya-san. Other new sects were also founded by
other priests. The earlier teaching of the identity of Buddha and the
Shintō deities was further extended by Saichō and Kūkai, who taught that
the Buddha was the one and only divine being, and that all the gods were
manifestations of him. On that basis they established a new doctrine the
tenets of which mingled Shintōism and Buddhism inextricably. It was
owing to the spread of this doctrine that it became a not uncommon
occurrence to find Buddhist relics in a Shintō shrine, or a Shintō image
in a Buddhist temple, and the names of Shintō deities were confused with
Buddhist titles. Buddhist priests wandered everywhere throughout the
land preaching their doctrine and founding temples on choice sites, on
high mountains or in deep dells.
To this propagandism music lent its aid, for the melody of the Buddhist
chants touched the heart of the people. Devotees constantly grew in
number. Many of the highest personages in the land spent great sums upon
the building of temples; the consort of the Emperor Saga, for example,
constructed Danrin-ji, and the Prime Minister Michinaga erected Hōjō-ji.
Even in case of sickness, litanies and religious rites took the place of
medicine before the science of the latter had been developed, and
against all calamities of nature prayer was regarded as a talisman. It
is easy to conceive that, under such circumstances, Buddhism came to
exercise greater sway than even the ordinances of the sovereign himself.
It should not be imagined, however, that Shintō was completely
forgotten. Overshadowed by Buddhism as it was, it did not yet lose its
sway. Thus we find the Emperor Saga dedicating a fane at the Kamo
shrine, and the Emperor Seiwa establishing a place for the worship of
Iwashimizu Hachiman at Otoko-yama. Imperial visits to these two shrines
were not infrequent. Above all at the celebrated Shingu shrine in Ise,
the Shintō rites were kept free from all admixture of extraneous creeds.
From the days of Kwammu downward, the sovereigns in succession
encouraged learning. The university in Kyōto and the public schools in
the provinces were in a flourishing condition, and many private schools
sprang into existence. The patronage of great nobles was munificently
exercised in the cause of education. Further, great numbers of students
were engaged in compiling not only the history of the empire, but also
many other works of a general character, so that learning occupied a
high place in popular esteem. But unfortunately the scholarship of the
age drifted into superficialities of style to the neglect of practical
uses. Writers of verses applied themselves to imitating Chinese poets,
and writers of prose thought only of constructing their phrases in such
a manner that combinations of four ideograms should in regular
alternation be followed by combinations of six--a form of composition
known as the _Shirokuheirei_ (four-and-six order). But despite this
slavish adherence to valueless forms, a notable literary achievement has
to be placed to the credit of the era; namely, the elaboration of the
syllabaries, the _hira-kana_ and the _kata-kana_. The first syllabary
ever used in Japan had been the _manyō-gana_, in which the Chinese
ideograms were used phonetically with little attention to their original
meaning. But to write a Chinese ideogram for each syllable of a Japanese
word involved much labor, since in many cases a single ideogram was
composed of numerous strokes and dots. The difficulty was gradually
lessened during the Nara epoch by the simplification of Chinese
characters to such an extent that only a rudimentary skeleton of each
ideogram was symbolically used to represent its sound. The syllables
thus obtained were arranged in a table of fifty sounds, constituting the
_kata-kana_. Thenceforth, instead of the pain of committing to memory
thousands of ideograms, and employing them with no little toil, it
became possible to record the most complex thoughts by the aid of fifty
simple symbols. Nevertheless, since the nation had come to regard
Chinese literature as the classics of learning, scholars were still
compelled to use Chinese ideograms and to follow Chinese rules of
composition, so that the cursive forms of the Chinese characters became
the recognized script of educated men. These cursive characters
possessed one advantage: they were capable of considerable abbreviation
within certain limits. Naturally, the facility they offered in that
respect was more and more utilized, until at length their forms were
modified to comparative simplicity. When the great prelate Kūkai
composed, for mnemonic purposes, the rhyming syllabary which comprised
all the necessary sounds without repetition, the forms of the simplified
characters may be considered to have finally crystallized into the
syllabary known as the _hira-kana_.
The invention of these two systems of _kana_ syllabaries gave a powerful
impetus to the growth of prose writing. Many varieties of composition,
fictions, diaries, travels, and fugitive sketches, were added to the
literature of the time. But as men who aspired to the title of scholar
continued to write in Chinese ideograms, the domain of Japanese prose
was occupied, almost exclusively, by women. It is recorded of the
Emperor Ichijō (987-1012 A. D.) that he boasted that, although his own
abilities did not entitle him to wear the crown, his reign was not less
rich in talented subjects than had been the reigns of even Daigo and
Murakami, historically regarded as the best sovereigns of the whole
imperial line. The boast was not unwarranted, for in that era flourished
great writers of both sexes, the charm and grace of whose diction have
been vainly imitated by later generations. Of these, Mura-saki-shikibu
especially attracts attention, on account of her celebrated work, the
"_Genji-monogatari_," a romance in fifty-four volumes. Sei-Shōnagon's
name is remembered for her "_Makura-no-sōshi_," as peerless a production
in literary sketches as was the "_Genji-monogatari_" in fiction.
Even more energy was expended on the production of verses than on prose
writing. In the last part of the ninth century after almost a century of
the sway of Chinese poetry, the tide flowed once more in the direction
of Japanese verses, and they soon engrossed the minds of the noble
classes. Beginning with the "_Kokinshū_," poems compiled by imperial
order by Ki-no-Tsurayuki, himself a celebrated poet, no less than seven
poetical compilations were made by order of the sovereigns during the
rest of the Hei-an epoch, to which were still later added others to the
number of twenty-one. The art of versification made a wonderful
progress, but the rustic vigor and grandeur of the poems of the
"_Manyō-shū_" gave place to tricks of phraseology and flowers of speech
in the later poetry. Nor were poems with many stanzas approved any
longer, for it became the pride of the later poets to embody clever wit
and hidden charm in the space of thirty-one syllables. Thus poetry was
stunted, and literary terms and the speech of everyday life
unnecessarily separated each from the other.
As was so clearly reflected in poetry, the rude and unpolished but
frugal and industrious habits of the Nara age disappeared as the Hei-an
epoch grew older. Instead of vigor and simple strength, luxury and
effeminate gaud became the fashion. Society grew more and more enervated
and self-indulgent. The metropolis was the center of magnificence and
the focus of pleasure. Reference has already been made to the
spaciousness and grandeur of the imperial palace. The princes and great
nobles were scarcely less superbly housed, every aristocratic dwelling
consisting of a number of artistically arranged buildings. There had
also grown up among nobles and men of affluence the habit of choosing in
the suburbs some spot noted for scenic charms, and there building for
themselves retreats on which all the artistic and decorative resources
of the time were lavished. As for the imperial palace, however, from the
time when it was destroyed by a conflagration (960 A. D.), it suffered a
steady diminution in size and splendor, whereas the mansions of the
ministers of the crown grew constantly larger and more magnificent,
their inmates wearing gorgeous garments of rich brocades and elaborately
embroidered silks. Officials, courtiers, and their families emulated one
another in the richness of their apparel. When they went abroad, they
rode in carriages resplendent with gold and silver. By and by, the
active discharge of official and administrative functions began to be
despised by the higher classes, military training and the rude exercises
of arms falling into especial disfavor. Thus it fell out that the nobles
of the court, having abundant leisure, were enabled to devote their time
to literary culture, the elaboration of etiquette, and the pursuit of
luxurious pleasures. In the imperial court, at pleasant times in the
fair seasons, on fine spring mornings or under the soft moonlight of
autumn, gatherings were held at which the guests vied with one another
in making music and composing poetry. There were also specially
appointed festive occasions: as, for example, entertainments in April
(third month of the old calendar) when wine-cups were floated down
stream; or in February (first month of the old calendar) when young
pines growing on the hills or in the fields were pulled up by the roots;
or in the fall, to view the changing tints of the maples; the most
aristocratic of all these festivities being one in which three
picturesquely-decorated boats were launched upon some river or lake and
filled exclusively with persons who excelled in some one of the "three
accomplishments," namely, Chinese poetry, Japanese poetry, or music. In
the reign of the Emperor Uda five fête days were established: New Year's
Day, the third of the third month, the fifth of the fifth month, the
seventh of the seventh month, and the ninth of the ninth month; to which
were also added the festival of the "late moonlight" (13th of the ninth
month), and the festival of "the last chysanthemums."
Of games played in-doors checkers (_go_) and a kind of dice
(_sugo-roku_) were much in vogue; while the favorite outdoor sports were
foot-ball, polo, and hawking, together with horse-racing and equestrian
archery. At wine-feasts, various kinds of songs, some classical, some
popular, were chanted with dancing, and Chinese and Japanese stanzas
were composed and sung. From the end of the eleventh century personal
adornment was carried so far that even men began to imitate women in the
matter of painting their eye-brows and blackening their teeth, much as
though they sought to disguise themselves in the likeness of the puppets
set up at the festival of the third month. Not inaptly did the wits of
the time dub these mummers "lunar courtiers," or "elegants from
cloud-land." On such occasions of festival and sport, men and women of
noble rank mixed freely, and laxity of morals ensued. The ceremony of
marriage had been duly established, but wives still continued to live in
their own houses, where they received the visits of their husbands. In
short, the gratification of the senses was the first object of the time,
and if men thought of anything more serious, it was only the building
and endowment of a temple where prayers might be said and litanies sung
for the prosperity of themselves and their children in this world and
their happiness in a future state.
All these circumstances should be viewed only in conjunction with the
progress of the political power of the Fujiwara family. The great deeds
of Kamatari and the scarcely less distinguished services of his son
Fuhito established the renown of the family, and in the marriage of the
Emperor Shōmu with a daughter of Fuhito we have the first instance of a
procedure which afterward became common, namely the elevation of a
subject to the position of imperial consort. A daughter of another
Fujiwara, Fuyutsugu, became the consort of the Emperor Nimmyō, and bore
him a son who afterward ascended the throne as Montoku. Thus Fuyutsugu
became the reigning sovereign's grandfather on the mother's side, and
the Fujiwara family occupied a position of transcendent power. This
emperor married the daughter of Yoshifusa, his mother's elder brother,
and had by her a son, who when only eight months old, was declared heir
apparent, and ascended the throne in his ninth year under the name of
Seiwa, so that in two succeeding generations one of the sovereign's
grandfathers was a Fujiwara. Nor had there been another instance of the
scepter coming into the hands of such a young ruler. From Yoshifusa,
also, began the custom of appointing a Fujiwara to the post of _dajō
daijin_ (chief minister of state), a post which not only was the highest
and most respected under the sovereign, but also as a rule had been
reserved for an imperial prince of unusual virtue and ability. Failing
such a candidate, it had even been left vacant. Furthermore, owing to
the extreme youth of the Emperor Seiwa, his grandfather Yoshifusa was
appointed regent. The title of regent (_sesshō_) dates from that time.
The imperial authority now passed virtually into the hands of the
Fujiwara family. Seiwa abdicated after a reign of twenty-one years, and
was succeeded by Yōzei, then in his tenth year only, Mototsune, adopted
son of Yoshifusa, holding the offices of chief minister of state and
regent. As the emperor grew older, he became addicted to pleasure and
gave evidence of vicious tendencies.
Mototsune, having taken counsel of all the ministers, deposed the
sovereign and placed Kōkō on the throne in his stead. This was the first
instance of an emperor being dethroned by a subject, but evil as such an
act was in itself, its motive in the case of Mototsune being untainted
by selfish ambition, he has not incurred censure either from the men of
his time or from historians. The Emperor Kōkō, being fifty-six years of
age when he ascended the throne, Mototsune resigned the regency, but the
sovereign was pleased to make a special rule that all affairs of state
should be conveyed to himself through the ex-regent. The latter's office
was consequently called _kwampaku_ (signifying one who receives reports
prior to their transmission to the sovereign), and it became thenceforth
customary to confer this post on a statesman who had resigned the
regency. In effect, the _sesshō_, or regent, was supposed to manage the
administration during the minority of an emperor, while the _kwampaku_
discharged the same functions after the sovereign had attained his
majority. The difference became nominal when the descendants of
Yoshifusa and Mototsune made these two posts permanent and hereditary in
their line. It seemed, indeed, as though all the highest offices of
state had become the exclusive perquisite of that omnipotent family, no
others being eligible except princes of the blood. No less marked were
the marital relations between the imperial house and the Fujiwara, for
only a daughter of the latter could become the sovereign's consort, so
that every sovereign had a Fujiwara for his mother.
The power of the puissant family met a temporary check under the Emperor
Uda (893-898), who selected Sugawara-no-Michizane as minister. Michizane
was a descendant of Nomi-no-Sukune, and did not belong to the Fujiwara
family. Reputed for high literary, calligraphic, and artistic skill, he
also possessed a profound knowledge of politics. It was his fortune to
manage all administrative affairs jointly with the young and keen
Tokihira, son of Fujiwara Mototsune. The Emperor Uda, who took the
tonsure soon afterward, left instructions to his successor Daigo, then a
boy of thirteen, to consult Michizane in all important affairs of the
state. Tokihira filled the office of minister of the left (the highest
administrative post after that of chief minister of state then vacant),
and Michizane was minister of the right. With the exception of Michizane
and Kibi-no-Makibi, no man of the middle class had ever held such an
important office. The ex-emperor would have had Michizane raised still
higher, and urged the reigning sovereign in that sense. But this design
precipitated Tokihira's resolve to contrive the downfall of a man whose
great reputation with the nation and marked favor at court dimmed the
prestige of the Fujiwara family. Michizane was also an object of keen
jealousy to Minamoto-no-Hikaru, a son of the Emperor Nimmyō, who held
the office of _dainagon_ (vice-minister), as well as to
Fujiwara-no-Sadakuni, who like Hikaru, was incomparably superior to
Michizane in lineage, but inferior to him in official position. These
men conspired against Michizane, and conveyed to the sovereign a false
charge that the minister of the right was plotting to depose him and
place his younger brother, Michizane's son-in-law, Prince Tokiyo, on the
throne. Daigo believed the accusation, and reduced Michizane to the head
of the Kiushū local government, a position which it had become customary
to fill with disgraced officials of the imperial court. The order
amounted in effect to a sentence of exile. The ex-emperor did everything
in his power to save Michizane, but in vain. Hikaru succeeded to the
office of minister of the right. In all this affair the members of the
Fujiwara family left nothing undone to sweep away every obstacle to
their own supremacy. Treating as opponents all that did not take active
part with them, they contrived to have them involved in the disgrace of
Michizane. The exiled minister died after two years of banishment. His
popularity had been so great that the nation was filled with grief for
his unmerited sufferings, and when, after his decease, the partisans of
Tokihira died one after another, and a series of calamities occurred in
the capital, people did not hesitate to regard these evils as
retribution inflicted by Heaven for the injustice that had been wrought.
Subsequently Michizane received the posthumous honor of the first class
of the first rank and the post of chief minister of state, and posterity
built a shrine in Kitano to his memory, where he is worshiped to this
day as the tutelary saint of learning, under the canonized name of
Kitano-no-Tenjin.
After the exile of Michizane, the power of the Fujiwara family grew
steadily. During a period of about a century and a half after that
event, the administration was virtually in their hands.
Fujiwara-no-Tadahira occupied the post of chief minister of state, while
his sons, Saneyori and Morosuke, held the offices of minister of the
left and minister of the right respectively, the three highest posts in
the administration being thus filled simultaneously by a father and his
two sons. Among the descendants of these three nobles, those of the
last-named, Morosuke, attained the greatest prosperity. It has been
already noted that the Fujiwara ministers always contrived to have the
sovereign choose his consort from among their daughters. Nay more, when
a son was born of such a union, they had him brought up in their own
house, and when he ascended the throne, the Fujiwara minister who was
his grandfather became either regent or _kwampaku_, was recognized as
the head of the Fujiwara family, and received a large grant of state
land. Under these circumstances the choice of an imperial consort or the
nomination of an heir apparent being synonymous with the acquisition of
complete control over administrative and financial affairs, the branches
of the Fujiwara family often intrigued and fought among themselves to
secure the great prize. Michinaga, youngest son of Kaneiye, was a man of
remarkable strength of purpose and tact. He held the office of
_kwampaku_ during the reigns of three emperors, Ichijō, Sanjō, and
Goichijō; his three daughters became the consorts of three successive
sovereigns; he was grandfather of a reigning emperor and an heir
apparent at the same time, and his power and affluence far surpassed
those of the imperial house itself. To this great noble every official
paid court, except Fujiwara-no-Sanesuke, who maintained his independence
and was consequently relied on by the emperor. It is on record that
Michinaga once composed a stanza the purport of which was that all the
world seemed to have been created for his uses, and that every desire he
felt was satisfied as completely as the full moon is perfectly rounded.
In truth the power of the Fujiwara family culminated in his days. A
contemporary writer described the conditions of the time in a work for
which he found no title more appropriate than "the Story of Grandeur"
("_Eigwa Monogatari_"). With Michinaga the power of the Fujiwara may be
said to have reached its zenith, for although his sons Yorimichi and
Norimichi became _kwampaku_ in succession and retained immense
influence, the gradual decline of the family really began from that
time.
Why the overwhelming power of the Fujiwara should have waned may only be
understood as we observe the conditions of local administration. Within
Kyōto reigned luxury and pomp, but without it, unrest and
discontentment. The principal cause of this sharp contrast between the
capital and country was the inevitable and utter failure of the system
of equal land allotment upon which the great Taikwa reformation had been
constructed. Uncultivated lands, however, were suffered to remain in the
possession of local officials and farmers who reclaimed them. Originally
the term of service for the governor of a province (_kuni_) was fixed at
four years, but in the reign of the Empress Kōken it was extended to
six. Reappointment was generally an object of keen desire to these
officials. They employed every possible means to compass it, since to
remain in administrative control of a province for a long period
signified opportunities of appropriating extensive lands and ultimately
acquiring large territorial possessions. In the case of the headman of a
district (_kōri_), the office was originally held for life, but even
that limit soon fell into neglect, and the post was handed down from
father to son through many generations. To check the abuses arising out
of such a state of affairs, itinerant inspectors were appointed in the
reign of the Empress Gensho, who were chosen from among the ablest of
the provincial governors. In a report addressed by one of them to the
throne in 762, it is declared that "No such thing as justice is now
executed by any provincial governor in the realm." From this time on,
provincial governors not only continued to tread the old wonted paths,
but their selfish arbitrariness became more unbridled in proportion as
the prestige of the administration in the capital grew feebler and the
official organization more lax.
Nor was the illegal practice of land-appropriation confined to rural
districts, for even in the metropolis men began to obtain territorial
possessions. As the living in Kyōto grew more and more luxurious, and it
became difficult for the princes and higher officials to maintain their
dignity by means of their regular salaries and allowances, which were
paid in kind but seldom in land, they set themselves to reclaim
extensive tracts of waste lands. Such lands were called _shōyen_, a term
originally limited to lands granted to princes and ministers of state
for the purpose of defraying expenditures incurred in connection with
their positions, but now extended so as to apply also to land reclaimed
and appropriated by these nobles. Even as early as the reigns of Kwammu
and Saga the area of such estates was very great. The system of
periodical redistribution had in the meantime fallen into desuetude.
People were often forced to sell their lands or were evicted for their
debts. It was in vain to prohibit by edict after edict the
monopolization of land by the wealthy classes. Cunning people even
evaded the public obligations devolving on landowners by nominally
transferring their lands to powerful nobles or to temples, and
themselves taking the position of stewards or superintendents. In that
capacity they were called either "intendants" or "retainers," the
ostensible holders of the land being known as "landlords." By degrees
all the fertile districts and all the newly reclaimed lands were in that
manner absorbed into the estates of the great nobles or of the temples,
and since they were thus exempted from the control of the provincial
governors as well as from the necessity of paying taxes, not only the
power of the local authorities, but also the revenues of the central
government gradually suffered diminution.
During the reign of the Emperor Kwammu the plan was inaugurated of
reducing to the rank of subjects and giving family names to such of the
imperial princes as were of inferior descent on the mother's side.
Kwammu's son, Saga, who had so many children that the revenue of the
imperial household did not suffice to maintain them, followed the
precedent established by his father, giving the name Minamoto to
several of his sons. Thenceforth the device passed into a custom, and
imperial princes were frequently appointed to official positions in the
central or local government under the family names of Minamoto or Taira.
Those who obtained the posts of provincial governors acquired large
influence in the districts administered by them, their descendants
becoming military chiefs with great followings of relatives and
retainers. The Minamoto clan comprised no less than fourteen families,
among them the descendants of the Emperor Seiwa being the most numerous
and important. It was from this clan that the great Yoritomo, the first
feudal ruler of Japan, subsequently sprang. The Taira, on the other
hand, consisted of four families, principally descendants of the Emperor
Kwammu. To them belonged the notorious tyrant Kiyomori, of whose career
we shall soon be told.
The significance of the rise of the two clans, Minamoto and Taira, lies
in the fact that they succeeded in gradually controlling the military
forces of the nation, on the one hand, and, on the other, holding a
great share of the landed estates of the country. The process of
land-appropriation was similar to the one already described. The manner
in which the force of arms passed from the state into the hands of the
private clans must now be explained. Under the elaborate system of the
Taikō laws, garrisons of fixed strength were stationed in all the
provinces, and in the metropolis were guards of five kinds. Men for
service in the garrisons and guards were levied by conscription from
among the people, those upon whom the lot fell being required to join
the nearest garrison, while a part were sent to Kiushū to defend the
western coast, and another part, to the guardposts in Kyōto. Equestrian
archery, the use of the sword, and the manipulation of long spears, were
the arts taught to the soldiers, and for the defense of the coasts
catapults also were used. The entire military organization was imposing
and complete, but its real value was questionable, from the beginning.
The metropolitan troops grew more and more effeminate as years of peace
succeeded each other. Nor were the provincial forces of more service. As
time went by, bandits and marauders pillaged the provinces in the
interior, while the coasts of Nankaidō and Chūgoku were infested by
pirates. It was under these circumstances that, early in the ninth
century, a new bureau called the _kebüshi-chō_ with extensive police and
administrative powers, was created in Kyōto, which soon began to
dominate over other offices and whose branches were later established
in every province for local purposes. A century later it was found
necessary to appoint inspector-generals, _ōryōshi_, for the eastern
provinces, which were particularly restless. In the hands of these new
officials, then,--the central and local _kebüshi_ and the eastern
_ōryōshi_,--rested the real powers which neither rank nor title could
resist. The new, vigorous clans of Minamoto and Taira eagerly sought
after these offices, and succeeded more and more completely, as time
went on, not only in controlling them, but also in acquiring a military
influence far larger than they at first represented.
As local unrest grew, people who had armed themselves either for defense
or for aggrandisement now came with their arms and land under the wings
of the powerful clans, and became their "men." The leaders of the latter
received them, fed them, and made with them a personal contract of
mutual loyalty and protection. Either with the chivalrous relations
between master and follower or with the compact and efficient
organization of their society, the outside world had nothing else to
compare. The feudal formation thus created was bound to transfigure the
organization of the nation. The leaders who possessed large numbers of
men and wide tracts of land were called _daimyō_ ("great name"), and
their followers, _iyenoko_ ("servitors") or _rōdō_ ("retainers"). The
general name for the man of the sword was _samurai_, or "one who
serves." As the military class increased in numbers, it became expedient
to distinguish one house from another, and many appellations were
consequently formed by suffixing to the name of a clan the name of the
place where the person resided or of the hereditary office which he
held. In this way originated many of the house names now used in Japan.
At the same time, almost all the provinces were parceled out among the
military class, especially the eastern provinces, which were the
headquarters of the Minamoto. It is true that appointment of provincial
governors continued to be made, but their functions were purely nominal,
the so-called "governors" often idly remaining in the capital. The
control of local administration now rested with the real holders of the
land.
A few events illustrative of the conditions we have described may here
be cited. In 939 a family of the Taira clan raised arms in the eastern
provinces against the imperial authority. Taira-no-Takamochi, a
great-grandson of the Emperor Kwammu, had been appointed vice-governor
of the province of Kazusa. There his family gradually grew in numbers
and influence, some of them becoming provincial governors. Among
Takamochi's grandsons was a daring but fierce soldier, Masakado. Though
of imperial descent, he obeyed the custom of the time, namely, that
every _samurai_ must obtain a livelihood by entering the service of the
Fujiwara. Masakado became a vassal of Fujiwara-no-Tadahira, through
whose influence he hoped to obtain the office of _kebüshi_. But his
aspiration was not satisfied, and being incensed by failure, he returned
to the province of Shimōsa, gathered a number of disaffected warriors to
his standard, and made organized attacks upon the governors of the
neighboring provinces. He established his headquarters at Ishii, in the
district of Sashima, nominated certain of his followers to be officers
of his court, after the model of the governmental system of Kyōto, and
on the strength of being descended from a sovereign, proclaimed himself
emperor. In the whole course of Japanese history this is the only
instance of a rebellion directed against the throne. Simultaneously with
this disturbance in the eastern provinces, Fujiwara-no-Sumitomo, who
held the third post in the government of Iyo province in the island of
Shikoku, also rebelled. These two rebellions shook the whole empire. Yet
the imperial court remained for a long time ignorant of the dangers that
were impending. When finally the news reached Kyōto, it caused much
consternation. A general was quickly dispatched against the rebels in
the east, but before his arrival Masakado's cousin, Taira-no-Sadamori,
and Fujiwara-no-Hidesato, the ōryōshi of Shimotsuke, defeated and killed
Masakado. In the west, Sumitomo was able for a brief period to retain
the ascendency, but he too was ultimately defeated and taken prisoner by
Ono-no-Yoshifuru and Minamoto-no-Tsunemoto, who had been sent against
him. Tsunemoto was a grandson of the Emperor Seiwa and founder of the
renowned clan of Minamoto. The precedent thus established, namely, that
of one military clan applying itself to quell the rebellion of another,
was followed in after years, with the inevitable result that the
military clans became the chief factors in the state.
Ninety years later, Taira-no-Tadatsune, vice-governor of the province of
Kazusa, forcibly took possession of the provinces of Kazusa and Shimōsa,
but was defeated by Minamoto-no-Yorinobu, a grandson of Tsunemoto. Soon
afterward local chiefs raised an insurrection in the remote northern
province of Mutsu, and maintained their authority for nine years. This
was followed soon after by a three-year revolt of the Kiyowara family,
which threw the provinces of Mutsu and Dewa into a state of tumult.
These troubles were quelled, respectively, by Yoriyoshi, the son, and
Yoshiiye, the grandson, of Yorinobu. Thus the influence of the Minamoto
clan became paramount among the military men of the eastern provinces.
All this while, courtiers and officials of Kyōto despised administrative
duties, whether civil or military, so that in the event of a disturbance
or of a feud among themselves, they were driven to rely upon the
military classes, thus involuntarily but surely strengthening the
influence of the men whom they professed to contemn. Although the
Fujiwara remained in Kyōto and filled all the important posts in the
general government, their sway was only apparent. The reins of state
affairs were in reality held by the military classes dispersed
throughout the provinces. There were also certain singular circumstances
at court which not only hastened this revolution, but also brought the
military forces from the provinces into a clash in the streets of Kyōto.
These circumstances, which we shall briefly describe below, were in the
main owing to two causes, namely, the undue wealth and power of the
Buddhist priests, and the struggle for power among different political
factions in the palace. The former was largely due to the devotion of
the imperial house, particularly the Emperor Shirakawa (1073-1087), who
greatly depleted the treasury by erecting thousands of temples and
images, and ordering the performance of rites and the giving of alms
with unprecedented profusion. The priests, who had already grown rich
and powerful, began to be engaged in quarrels among themselves and with
the outside world, for which purpose the greater monasteries maintained
considerable military forces.
These sacerdotal soldiers were called _sōhei_. The principle of
maintaining them was adopted at many temples, but nowhere did they
exhibit such truculence as in the case of Enryaku-ji near Kyōto. When
the lord high abbot of a temple was appointed, it was the custom that
the priests of the temple, if they objected to the appointment, or if,
subsequently, they had cause of complaint against his ministration,
should appeal to the imperial court for his removal. On such occasions,
it became customary for the complainants to wear armor and carry bow
and spear when they submitted their grievance. They did not shrink even
from attacking the residence of the prime minister. During the reign of
Shirakawa, the military priests developed such lawless independence that
on more than one occasion they entered Kyōto in turbulent force,
dragging with them sacred cars, the sight of which restrained the hand
of the martial defenders of the court. Not only against the government,
but also among themselves, the temples openly used arms and caused
bloodshed. It was said that there were found among these fighting
priests men originally belonging to the military class, who, failing to
obtain promotion in the regular routine of feudal administration,
adopted the cowl as a means of working out their ambitious designs. This
state of things aggrieved the Emperor Shirakawa, but he appears to have
been unable to check it. On one occasion, lamenting the arbitrary
conduct of the Buddhists, he said: "There are but three things in my
dominions that do not obey me: the waters of the Kamo River, the dice of
the 'sugoroku' game, and the priests of Buddha." Finally, the sovereign
was driven to invite the Minamoto clan to defend him against the
rebellious proceedings of the priests, and from that time dates an era
of feuds between the followers of religion and those of the sword.
It was the same Emperor Shirakawa who instituted the peculiar system of
the Camera administration (_Insei_), which powerfully tended to break
down the last remains of the Taikwa reformation. After a reign of
fourteen years he resigned in 1087, only to retain the administrative
power in his hands, with his special court and special ministers. The
reigning emperor and his government had few functions to discharge, as
the entire control of the state affairs rested in the Camera of the
ex-emperor. Shirakawa sat in the Camera till 1130, and was succeeded for
twenty-eight years by the ex-Emperor Toba. All this while Buddhist
soldiers behaved with the greatest lawlessness, constantly disturbing
the peace of the capital, and the military class simultaneously became
turbulent and vicious.
Among these scenes of tumult and violence, the court itself was torn by
disputes and its corruption became a subject of public scandal. Toba had
many female favorites, of whom Bifukumonin enjoyed the largest share of
his affections. Being on bad terms with his eldest son, the reigning
sovereign, Toba took advantage of the birth of a son by Bifukumonin to
bring about the abdication of the emperor and cause his favorite's child
to succeed to the throne at the age of two years. This was the Emperor
Konoye. His uncle, Fujiwara-no-Tadamichi, was appointed regent. The
ex-Emperor Sutoku, being still young, was much incensed at having been
obliged to abdicate, and when Konoye died after a reign of fourteen
years, Sutoku desired ardently that his son, Prince Shigehito, should
succeed to the throne. The Regent Tadamichi had a brother named
Yorinaga, and their father's partial treatment of him had produced a
feud between the brothers.
Yorinaga, active, learned, and able, then held the post of second
minister of state, and strongly supported the design of the ex-Emperor
Sutoku. Bifukumonin and Tadamichi, on their side, acting in concert with
Toba, opposed the accession of Prince Shigehito, and alleged in
objection that the untimely death of the late Emperor Konoye had
resulted from sorcery practiced by Sutoku. The candidate to whom they
gave their support was Goshirakawa, brother of Konoye, who was counted a
youth of inferior capacity. Sutoku's anger against these proceedings was
intense. Being informed just then of the death of Toba, he proceeded to
the latter's palace, but the guards refused to admit him, pretending
that the deceased had desired his exclusion. This insult incensed Sutoku
beyond endurance. Repairing to the residence of Yorinaga, he took
council with him, and finally, retiring to the Shirakawa palace,
declared open war against his opponents, being bravely succored by
Minamoto-no-Tameyoshi, Taira-no-Tadamasa, and their followers.
Bifukumonin and Tadamichi placed the young Emperor Goshirakawa in the
Higashi Sanjō palace. They counted among their chief allies Yoshitomo,
the eldest son of Tameyoshi, Minamoto-no-Yorimasa, and Kiyomori, the
nephew of Tadamasa. One sanguinary engagement sufficed to break the
power of Sutoku. He became a priest, and was ultimately exiled to the
island of Sanuki. Yorinaga died of an accidentally inflicted
arrow-wound, and Tameyoshi and Tadamasa, together with many other men of
note, were slain. The name of the era being thereafter changed to Hōgen,
this affair was spoken of by posterity as the Hōgen Insurrection. The
battle that ended the long struggle lasted for only one day, but its
character and circumstances can never be forgotten. It was veritably an
internecine fight; Sutoku against his brother Goshirakawa; Tadamichi
against his brother Yorinaga; Tameyoshi against his son Yoshitomo;
Tadamasa against his nephew Kiyomori. Men spoke in after years of this
unnatural contest as the battle that destroyed human relations and
ignored all the principles of morality.
The Hōgen disturbance had not long been settled when fresh troubles
arose. Among the councilors of state at that era, Fujiwara-no-Michinori,
who had stood high in the estimation of the Emperor Goshirakawa, was a
conspicuously able politician. Even after the accession of the Emperor
Nijō, Michinori continued to enjoy the imperial confidence. But he had
many enemies. In connection with some private affair he had given deep
umbrage to Fujiwara-no-Nobuyori, an official holding the office of
_chūnagon kebüshi_ (councilor of state and chief police official), who
had been a favorite of the Emperor Goshirakawa after the latter's
abdication. Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo also was disaffected. Believing that
his services in the Hōgen disturbance had been more meritorious than
those of Taira-no-Kiyomori, he nevertheless saw the latter rewarded with
much greater liberality; and having offered his own daughter in marriage
to a son of Michinori, the proposal had been abruptly declined,
Michinori choosing Kiyomori's daughter in preference. Nobuyori and
Yoshitomo ultimately raised the standard of revolt, in the first year of
the Heiji era (1159 A. D.), and having secured the coöperation of the
ex-Emperor Goshirakawa by intimidation, forced their way into the palace
and obtained possession of the person of the reigning sovereign.
Nobuyori then procured for himself the posts of chief minister of state
and generalissimo, promoted Yoshitomo, and caused Michinori to be put to
death. The revolution was short-lived. Nobuyori had not administered the
affairs of state for ten days before the emperor made his escape to the
mansion of Taira-no-Kiyomori and the ex-emperor fled to the temple
Ninnaji. Thereupon Kiyomori with his son Shigemori attacked the
insurgents and utterly routed them. Nobuyori was captured and slain.
Yoshitomo succeeded in effecting his escape to Owari, but was finally
put to death by the Taira adherents. All the other leaders of the
rebellion and those who had prominently participated in it, were exiled.
This affair is known as the Heiji Insurrection. The power of the
Minamoto clan had been greatly broken in the Hōgen disturbance, when
Tameyoshi and his followers fell, and the loss of Yoshitomo and his
adherents in the Heiji trouble brought the great clan almost to
complete ruin. Among the few of its scions who survived was Yoritomo,
son of Yoshimoto. He was exiled to the eastern provinces, thence to
emerge at a later date and win one of the greatest names in Japanese
history.
After the quelling of the Heiji disturbance, the Taira family attained
preëminent prosperity and power. The fortunes of this great house had
been materially advanced by Tadanori, a brave and able captain, who
enjoyed the favor of the ex-Emperor Toba. His son Kiyomori, also a man
of daring and decision, raised the family's prestige still higher by his
services at the Hōgen crisis, and carried it to its zenith by the
conspicuous ability of his action in the Heiji disturbance. On the other
hand, the rival family of Minamoto having been reduced to insignificance
by the death of its chief, Yoshitomo, and by the events that immediately
ensued, the whole military power of the empire came into the hands of
the Taira. Kiyomori was promoted to the position of _gondainagon_
(vice-councilor of state), an event that attracted much attention. The
Taira family, though of imperial lineage, had been looked down upon by
the high court nobles on account of its military career, and it was
considered a notable occurrence that Kiyomori should have been nominated
to a post of such consequence. This was, in truth, the first instance of
a military noble's participation in the administration of state affairs,
and it may be regarded as the dawn of an era when they were to fall
entirely under military control.
A sister of Kiyomori's wife bore a son to the ex-Emperor Goshirakawa.
Kiyomori's favor at court was so great that he succeeded in getting this
child named heir apparent, and he ultimately ascended the throne in 1169
as the Emperor Takakura. Throughout his reign the ex-Emperor Goshirakawa
was the actual ruler. Meanwhile, Kiyomori had steadily risen in imperial
favor, until in 1167 he became chief minister of state. Shortly
afterward, however, he resigned that post, and taking the tonsure,
became a priest under the name of Jōkai. None the less he remained at
his previous place of residence, Rokuhara, in Kyōto attending to the
management of state affairs as before. From that time dates the custom
subsequently followed by the military class of making Rokuhara the seat
of administration.
When the influence of Kiyomori reached its zenith, he conceived the
design of securing permanent official supremacy for himself and his
heirs by contriving that the consort of the sovereign should be taken
from his family, as had been the habit in the case of the Fujiwara. In
pursuance of that project, he induced the emperor to marry his daughter.
Shigemori, his son, held the important offices of lord keeper of the
privy seal and generalissimo of the left, while almost the whole of his
kinsmen and followers occupied prominent positions in the central and
local government. The number of provinces over which the sway of the
clan extended was more than thirty, and it came to be a saying of the
time that a person not belonging to the Taira family was no one. The
members of the Fujiwara clan could not compete with those of the Taira.
Even the regent, Motofusa, and the chief minister of state, Motomichi,
saw themselves reduced to comparative insignificance. Naturally such
conspicuous ascendency caused offense in many quarters, and the Court
Councilor Fujiwara-no-Narichika, a favorite official of the ex-Emperor
Goshirakawa, in combination with several others, elaborated a plot to
overthrow the Taira sway. But the scheme was detected, and its authors
and promoters were all put to death by order of Kiyomori. Having been
informed that the ex-emperor had countenanced the plot, Kiyomori
conceived for him a strong hatred, which was greatly accentuated when,
on the death of the Taira chief's son Shigemori, the ex-emperor, after
consultation with Motofusa, caused the estates of the deceased nobleman
to be confiscated. Too haughty to brook such a slight Kiyomori set out
from his mansion at Fukuhara, and entering Kyōto, caused the ex-emperor
to be seized and confined in the Toba palace, and thirty-nine of his
majesty's high officials to be dismissed at the same time.
Toward the reigning sovereign the demeanor of the Taira was so arrogant
and his methods so arbitrary, that the emperor finally abdicated in
favor of the crown prince, who reigned under the name of Antoku. This
sovereign was the son of the retiring emperor and his mother was
Kiyomori's daughter, so that the Taira then stood toward the imperial
house in the same relation as that formerly occupied by the Fujiwara,
with the tremendous difference, however, that the former also possessed
the whole military power of the time, which gave them unprecedented
influence and supremacy. Nevertheless, even among the members of a
family so puissant, there were to be found some feeble nobles who had no
skill in military exercises nor could boast any accomplishment except
the art of composing stanzas, playing on musical instruments, or
practicing some effeminate pastime.
Among the members of the Minamoto family at the time of which we write
was one Yorimasa, who, incensed by the arbitrary proceedings of the
Taira officials, persuaded Prince Mochihito, son of the ex-Emperor
Goshirakawa and brother-in-law of the Emperor Takakura, to form an
alliance with the priests of Onjō-ji and Kōfuku-ji, their object being
to expel Kiyomori from court and to rescue the ex-emperor from his
confinement in the Toba palace. In 1180, the prince dispatched Yukiiye,
younger brother of the late Yoshitomo, to the remnants of the Minamoto
in the eastern provinces, carrying an edict which summoned them to rise
and overthrow the Taira family. Fortunately for the latter, the plot was
discovered and at once suppressed. But the seed sown by this abortive
rebellion proved beyond Kiyomori's control, for, in the same year, 1180,
the exile, Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, who was destined to become the founder
of the feudal government of Japan, raised a force of troops in the small
island of Izu in obedience to the mandate of Prince Mochihito. Many
partisans flocked to his standard from Kwantō, the former seat of
Minamoto influence. Almost simultaneously, another Minamoto chief,
Yoshinaka, also took the field in the prince's cause, his headquarters
being at Kiso, in Shinano, where he collected a large body of soldiers.
Kiyomori lost no time in dispatching a powerful army against the rebels,
but his forces suffered defeat and were driven back. Henceforth, many
puissant warriors of the Hokuriku region threw in their lot with the
Minamoto, and the force at the latter's disposal assumed formidable
dimensions. Even the great temples in the vicinity of the capital opened
communications with the insurgents, which so exasperated Kiyomori that
he reduced the temples to ashes and confiscated all their lands. These
extreme measures served to check temporarily the active exercise of
priestly power, but did not affect the prestige of the Minamoto, whose
strength continued to grow rapidly. Kiyomori finally saw himself
compelled to relax the ex-emperor's confinement, and even to allow him
to resume an active part in the administration of state affairs. But in
the year 1182 the great Taira chief was stricken by a fatal malady, and
expired after a brief illness. He was succeeded by his son Munemori, who
did not spare to direct all the strength of the clan against the
Minamoto. But fortune shone on the latter's arms in several encounters,
until, in 1183, Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka inflicted a signal defeat on the
Taira forces in a pitched battle, and dividing his own army into two
bodies, pushed, via the Tosan and Hokuriku routes, as far as the temple
Enryaku-ji in the immediate vicinity of Kyōto, where he was secretly
visited at night by the ex-Emperor Goshirakawa. The Emperor Antoku now
fled westward, carrying with him the three insignia, and escorted by
Munemori and the Taira forces. The imperial train reached Dazaifu, in
Kiushū, where the Taira wielded great influence. Munemori was joined by
all the principal warriors of the locality, and being further reinforced
by many others from the island of Shikoku, found himself once more at
the head of a powerful army. In Kyōto, however, another emperor was
enthroned, whose coronation was conducted, for the first time in
Japanese history, without the transfer of the insignia. There were thus
two sovereigns simultaneously ruling, one at Kyōto and the other in
Kiushū.
[Illustration: _THE ABDUCTION OF GOSHIRAKAWA, EMPEROR OF JAPAN,
BY FUJIWARA-NO-NOBUYORI IN THE YEAR 1159 A. D._]
_The illustrations or rather pictures made for the book "Heiji
Monogatari," i. e., "Stories from the Year Heiji," are partially
lost. The picture shown here is an illustration belonging to the
chapter Sandjoden-Yakiuti (the destruction of the castle of
Sandjoden by fire.) [At midnight of the ninth day of the twelfth
month of the year Heiji (1159 A. D.) Fujiwara-no-Nobuyori
surprised and attacked the castle Sandjoden (where the former
Emperor Goshirakawa resided) with 500 cavalrymen under the
General Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo. The Emperor in his fright
attempted to escape, but Nobuyori, Yoshitomo, Mitsuyasu,
Mitsumoto, and Suesane forced him to return in his carriage to
the imperial palace.] Concerning the Monk Keion, who painted
this picture, we possess very meager information, but it is
hardly likely that he was born later than twenty years after the
"Heiji rebellion."
Copied from the 14th number of the monthly "Kokkura" (Flora of
the Land), published by order of the Society Kokkura-sha in
Tokyo by Yamamoto and translated by Dr. Kitasato.
As Dr. Kitasato adds, the disturbances of the year Heiji
developed from the following causes: The Emperor Goshirakawa,
who had reigned since 1156, abdicated the throne in favor of his
little son Nijo (1159-1166), but as regent retained the
government in his own hands, living until the year 1192. At this
time two families of the highest nobility, Shinsei and Nobuyori,
were in political opposition. Nobuyori, jealous because
Goshirakawa showed preferences to Shinsei, attacked the
ex-emperor in his castle of Sandjoden, brought him as prisoner
into the imperial palace, and murdered his opponent Shinsei.
This rising is known as the "Heiji rebellion." The author of the
"Heiji Monogatari" is supposed to be Hamura-Tokinaga, who lived
in the thirteenth century A. D._
[Illustration: JAPAN]
The forces of the Taira and the Minamoto fought many battles in the
Kiushū and Chūgoku districts, the gains and losses being tolerably even
on both sides. But by degrees the military magnates along the Sanyō,
Nankai, and Saikai lines joined the Taira army, and its strength became
so irresistible that it marched back toward Kyōto, escorting Antoku.
Thus the Taira saw themselves once more established at Fukuhara, to
which Kiyomori had for a brief period removed the capital from Kyōto.
They organized their lines of defense, making Fukuhara their base, and
Ikuta and Ichinotani their eastern and western outposts, respectively.
Meanwhile Yoshinaka, the Minamoto leader, had become so insolent as to
be imprecated and dreaded by friend and vassal alike. He also quarreled
with Yoritomo, who had hitherto confined his military operations to the
eastern provinces, but who now sent his two brothers, Noriyori and
Yoshitsune, to attack Yoshinaka. The latter was defeated at Seta in Ise,
and killed in the midst of a rice-field by a stray arrow. The victors
then marched on in triumph to Ichinotani to attack the Taira. The first
conflict was successful for the Minamoto. The Taira lost many a stout
soldier. Munemori and the remnant of his troops retreated to Yashima, in
Sanuki, continuing as before to carry with them the child emperor,
Antoku. Yoshitsune's forces pursued the retreating army to Sanuki, where
a fierce fight ended in the second defeat of the Taira. The latter
receded still further to the bay of Dannoura in Nagato. There the
decisive battle was fought, and for the third time the Taira were
utterly routed. Nearly all their warriors were killed.
When the issue of the battle had ceased to be doubtful, the
empress-dowager plunged into the sea with the infant emperor in her arms
and bearing the sword and seal. Antoku was drowned but the Minamoto
soldiers rescued his mother. The seal was afterward recovered from the
sea, but the sword, which was itself a copy, was irrevocably lost.
Thenceforth the sword called _Hirugoza-no-tsurugi_ was employed for
ceremonial and official purposes. The Taira chief Munemori and his son
were captured and subsequently executed. Thus, after some twenty years
of power and prosperity, the great Taira clan was broken and destroyed.
Often in subsequent centuries men talked of the meteor-like rise of the
Taira, of the extraordinary heights of autocracy and affluence to which
the illustrious family attained, and of the terrible and tragic scenes
that marked its rapid and final fall. "The vain house of the Taira did
not endure" (_ogoru Heike wa hisashikarazu_), is a familiar Japanese
adage suggestive at once of the moral import of the tragedy and of the
swift and extreme vicissitudes of fortune which characterized those
lawless ages.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Table showing lineage and chronology of sovereigns.
(49. Emperor Kōnin, 770-782.)
|
50. Emperor Kwammu, 782-806.
|
+--------------------+-------------------------+
| | |
51. Emperor Heizei, 52. Emperor Saga, 53. Emperor Junna,
806-810. 810-824. 824-834.
|
54. Emperor Nimmyō, 834-851.
|
+------------+----------------+
| |
55. Emperor Montoku, 851-856. 58. Emperor Kōkō, 885-893.
| |
56. Emperor Seiwa, 856-877. 59. Emperor Uda, 893-898.
| |
57. Emperor Yōzei, 877-885. 60. Emperor Daigo, 898-931.
|
+--------------------------------+--+
| |
6l. Emperor Suzaku, 931-947. 62. Emperor Murakami, 947-968.
|
+-----------------------------------+
| |
63. Emperor Reizei, 968-970. 64. Emperor Enyū, 970-985.
| |
+--+----------------+ |
| | |
65. Emperor Kwazan, 67. Emperor Sanjō, 66. Emperor Ichijo,
985-987. 1012-1017. 987-1012.
|
+------------------------------------+
| |
68. Emperor Goichijo, 1017-1037. 69. Emperor Gosuzaku, 1037-1046.
|
+------------------------------------+
| |
70. Emperor Goreizei, 1046-1069. 71. Emperor Gosanjo, 1069-1073.
|
+----------------+
|
72. Emperor Shirakawa, 1073-1087.
|
73. Emperor Horikawa, 1087-1109.
|
74. Emperor Toba, 1109-1124.
|
+------------------------+-----------------------+
| | |
75. Emperor Sutoku, 77. Emperor Goshirakawa, 76. Emperor Konoye,
1124-1142. 1156-1159. 1142-1156.
|
+----------------+----------------+
| |
78. Emperor Nijō, 1159-1166. 80. Emperor Takakura, 1169-1180.
| |
| +----------------+------+
| | |
79. Emperor Rokujō, 81. Emperor Antoku, [82. Emperor Gotoba,
1166-1169. 1180-1186. 1186-1199.]
PART II
THE FEUDAL AGES. 1186-1868
Chapter VII
THE KAMAKURA GOVERNMENT. 1186-1339
The Taira had fallen, and Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, one of the greatest
statesmen Japan has produced, had established his headquarters at
Kamakura, near the present Tōkyō. The influence of his clan had for
generations been implanted in the eastern provinces, where the robust
militarism stood in great contrast with the effeminate atmosphere of
Kyōto.
The rule of Kamakura, so far as the feudal forces of the east were
concerned, was now almost complete, but Yoritomo aspired to the supreme
military power of the whole empire. Here in this connection must be
related the tragic story of his half-brother Yoshitsune, perhaps the
most gallant and most beloved hero in the memory of the children of
Japan. He was a mere babe when after the Heiji insurrection, he was
captured with his mother by the Taira soldiers. He would have been
killed by order of Kiyomori, had it not been for the intercession of the
latter's mother and for the beauty of the young mother of Yoshitsune.
For the sake of the lives of her sons, the latter became the concubine
of Kiyomori, whom she did not love. The pathetic story still excites
feeling in the heart of Japanese womanhood. Yoshitsune was assigned to a
priestly career, but he proved unruly and fond of the arts of the
_samurai_. Tradition ascribes to the child many a superhuman act of
valor and military skill. At length he ran away to the northern province
of Mutsu, where he was kindly received by the great local chieftain
Fujiwara-no-Hidehira. Yoshitsune grew to be a man of commanding genius,
and his personal charm attracted to him many loyal _samurai_, the
romantic careers of several of whom are still remembered. When Yoritomo
rose in 1180 at the mandate of the late Prince Mochihito, Yoshitsune's
opportunity came. After the former had routed the first large detachment
of the Taira forces, a young man with a large head but of small stature
was announced to him, and Yoritomo at once recognized his long
forgotten brother Yoshitsune, whose coming, he said, was to him more
reassuring than the addition of a million warriors.
Henceforth Yoritomo's brilliant victories were largely owing to the
generalship of his brother. But no sooner had the latter destroyed the
remnants of the Minamoto's enemy than his own safety was endangered by
his very success, for Yoritomo grew jealous of his great renown and
popularity. As Yoshitsune escorted the captive chief of the Taira clan,
Munemori, to Kamakura, he not only received no recognition for his
achievements, but also was refused admission to the presence of his
brother. There were not lacking men around the latter to contrive the
downfall of the great general. Shortly afterward Yoritomo sent to Kyōto
a man of proved valor and strength, Tosabō Shōshun, with orders to
destroy Yoshitsune, but Tosabō himself fell under Yoshitsune's sword in
the attempt. Thereafter Yukiiye, Yoshitsune's uncle, induced the
ex-emperor to authorize them to put down Yoritomo. But Yoritomo
addressed himself to the ex-emperor with such persuasion that an
imperial mandate was issued to all the provincial authorities ordering
them to arrest Yoshitsune and Yukiiye. Yoritomo thereupon dispatched
Hōjō Tokimasa to Kyōto to quell the partisans and restore order in the
capital. Yukiiye was subsequently killed in the province of Izumi, but
Yoshitsune escaped to his friend Fujiwara-no-Hidehira in Mutsu. The
latter, however, died soon afterward, and was succeeded by his son
Yasuhira, who received from Yoritomo orders to kill the fugitive. So
great and far-reaching was the authority of the Minamoto chief at that
time that Yasuhira had no choice but to comply with the mandate. He
caused Yoshitsune to be put to death, and sent his head to Kamakura.
Tradition has, however, been reluctant to admit so ignominious an end to
the hero, who, it says, effected his escape to the island of Ezo
(Hokkaido) and thence to the continent, where he became a great prince
over nomadic tribes. Nor did Yasuhira's treachery bring fortune upon
himself, for Yoritomo, already desirous to bring Mutsu under his direct
rule, pretended to believe that Yasuhira had been unduly slow in
destroying his rebellious brother, and, in 1189, led in person a large
army, which succeeded in a brief time in killing Yasuhira and subduing
the great provinces of Mutsu and Dewa.
In the next year, Yoritomo repaired to Kyōto and had his first audience
of the emperor and the ex-emperor.[1] The latter treated him with great
consideration, and after the lapse of a year conferred upon him the
title of _sei-i-tai-shōgun_, or generalissimo, which has since been the
customary title of the feudal overlord of Japan.
Let us here describe the feudal government organized by Yoritomo at
Kamakura--the first attempt of like kind in the history of Japan--and
observe how different it was from the elaborate system of the
centralized government which was first organized in 645 and later
transferred to Kyōto. One of the first steps taken by the Minamoto chief
to consolidate his power was to establish the relation of lord and
vassal between himself and the great local magnates of the eastern
provinces who had espoused his cause, and to secure their allegiance by
confirming them in the possession of their estates. For the better
organization of his military forces he created an office called
_samurai-dokoro_, a species of headquarter staff department, which was
presided over by Wada Yoshimori in the capacity of _bettō_. Thus all the
military men throughout the east were brought completely under his sway.
Later he created a department of public archives (_kumonjo_), and made
Ōye Hiromoto its minister, and Nakahara Chikayoshi its vice-minister,
both of whom were originally civilians at Kyōto. It was owing to
Yoritomo's sagacity that they had been induced to enter the service of
the military government at Kamakura. By this department the
administration of civil affairs was chiefly conducted, as was the
administration of military affairs by the staff department
(_samurai-dokoro_). A department of justice (_monchū-jo_) was also
organized with Miyoshi Yasunobu, another civilian, at its head, its
functions being the hearing of all civil suits, and the management of
matters relating to civil law.
Thenceforward down to the days of the Ashikaga, the descendants of the
three statesmen from Kyōto continued to direct the administration of
affairs at Kamakura. By 1184, the organization of Yoritomo's central
government (_bakufu_) was complete, but the local administration had
still to be elaborated. Advantage was taken of the general disorder that
still existed throughout the land, owing to the disturbance caused by
the remnants of the Taira party and by the followers of Yukiiye and
Yoshitsune. On the advice of Ōye Hiromoto, Yoritomo made such strong
representations to the ex-emperor that the latter sanctioned the
appointment of high constables (_shugo_) in the various provinces and
superintendents (_jitō_) of the great estates, the whole being under the
control of the shōgun himself. By the energy of these officials numbers
of the insurgents were arrested in different localities, and order was
everywhere restored. Furthermore, an edict was issued requiring that all
cultivators of land throughout the empire should without distinction
contribute to the military exchequer a tax at the rate of five _shō_
(.256 bushels) of grain per _tan_ (one-fourth of an acre). Thenceforth
the power of the former provincial governors and headmen gradually
declined, and the authority of the newly appointed high constables and
superintendents increased proportionally. The shōgun, of course, took
care that the occupants of the new offices should be chosen from among
his own relatives and partisans, so that his sway was eventually
consolidated everywhere, and the control of the empire virtually passed
into his hands.
Yoritomo died in 1200 at the age of fifty-three, his eldest son,
Yoriiye, succeeding to the title of generalissimo. But Yoriiye being
only eighteen years of age, and having given no evidence of ability, his
mother, Masako, commissioned her own father Hōjō Tokimasa, together with
twelve councilors, to assume the direction of the government at
Kamakura. From this time began the dark age of Kamakura, in which
unbridled ambition ignored all restraints of propriety. When the young
Yoriiye fell ill in 1203, his mother, acting in concert with Tokimasa,
planned to relieve him of his office of generalissimo, and to appoint
his son Ichihata to be lord and governor general of the twenty-eight
eastern provinces forming Kwantō, and his young brother
Chihata--afterward called Sanetomo--to be lord of the thirty-eight
western provinces forming Kwansei. This plot so incensed Yoriiye that
the latter, with his wife's father, Hiki Yoshikazu, planned means to
exterminate the Hōjō family. Tokimasa frustrated the design by having
Yoshikazu assassinated, and then attacking and slaying all his blood
relations together with Ichihata. Yoriiye he afterward shut up in a
temple, and ultimately caused him to be put to death. Sanetomo,
Yoriiye's younger brother, succeeded him, but exercised no
administrative authority, the Hōjō holding everything in their own
grasp. The shōgun consequently devoted himself to literature rather than
to military exercises. Moreover, foreseeing that fortune would not long
continue to smile upon the Minamoto family, he thought to obtain a high
position in the central government, and add luster to the family's
renown while there was yet time. Hence he was promoted to the post of
chief councilor of state (_dainagon_), in conjunction with that of
commander in chief of the guards of the left, his official rank being
raised to the first of the second class. Shortly afterward he became
lord keeper of the privy seal and then minister of the right. But in
1219, on the occasion of worshiping at a shrine in Kamakura, he was
stabbed to death by Kugyō, a son of Yoriiye. This event terminated the
descendants of the Minamoto family in the direct line. A brief interval
of thirty-five years, or three generations,[2] from the time when
Yoritomo had risen to the head of the government, sufficed to complete
the supremacy of the great clan, the first shōgun of which had so
systematically pruned off the useful members of its own branch.
The Minamoto were followed by the Hōjō as feudal rulers. The Hōjō family
was of Taira origin, its founder being Taira-no-Sadamori. The name Hōjō
was derived from the fact that the family's headquarters were at Hōjō in
Izu. During the period of Yoritomo's exile in Izu, he experienced
generous and hospitable treatment at the hands of Hōjō Tokimasa, whose
daughter he married. All during Yoritomo's campaigns and subsequent
administration at Kamakura, Tokimasa, though of the Taira family, proved
a loyal and indispensable counselor. Under Yoriije, being the
grandfather on the mother's side, he naturally enjoyed the widest
popularity and wielded the greatest power of all the military nobles of
the time. As has been seen, the Hōjō did not even hesitate to
assassinate the shōgun in order to further their personal interests.
Tokimasa allowed himself to be controlled by the counsels of his wife.
At her slanderous instance he brought about the overthrow of a great
territorial noble, Hatakeyama, and by her advice he conceived the
project of elevating to the shōgunate his younger daughter's husband,
Hiraga Tomomasa. The third shōgun, Sanetomo, then a mere youth, was an
inmate of Tokimasa's house at the time of this plot. His mother, Masako,
learning what was on foot, caused him to be removed to the house of her
brother Yoshitoki, with the assistance of the military vassals of the
Minamoto, and succeeded not only in having Tokimasa and his intriguing
wife sent back to Hōjō, but also in compassing the death of Tomomasa in
Kyōto. These events transferred the territorial and military ascendancy
among the Kamakura nobility to the Wada family, whom therefore
Yoshitoki, the Hōjō chief in Kamakura, formed the design of destroying.
In pursuance of that scheme, he prompted Kugyō to assassinate Sanetomo,
the last of the Minamoto family. Then Fujiwara-no-Yoritsune, a relative
of Yoritomo, was summoned from Kyōto to assume the nominal office of
shōgun, Masako, the widow of Yoritomo, exercising the controlling power
and Yoshitoki holding the office of regent (_shikken_, an office
virtually corresponding with the _sesshō_ of the central government); in
which capacity he administered all the affairs of the _bakufu_ in the
name of the young shōgun. Yoshitoki was thus a _shōgun_ with the name of
a _shikken_.
It was about this time that the civil government of Kyōto rose under the
leadership of the ex-Emperor Gotoba in an attempt to overthrow the
feudal administration. Ever since the time of Yoritomo, Gotoba had
cherished the hope of recovering the control of administrative affairs,
and with that object had stationed military men of his own choosing in
the west, in addition to those already stationed in the north,
conferring on their leaders swords forged by his own hands, and
otherwise sparing no pains to organize a strong military following. So
long, however, as Yoritomo lived, Gotoba's designs could not be
realized. But when Sanetomo, the third shōgun of Yoritomo's line, fell
under the sword of Kugyō, the ex-emperor thought that he descried an
opportunity to attain his purpose. But Hōjō Yoshitoki set up a Fujiwara
as a nominal shōgun, and himself exercised the administrative authority
in a markedly arrogant and arbitrary manner. Gotoba then selected a
vassal of Kamakura, without consulting the Hōjō, as warden of the
western marches, and allowed him to reside in Kyōto. Yoshitoki forthwith
confiscated all the lands belonging to the warden. Thereupon an imperial
mandate was issued, directing that the estates should be restored, to
which Yoshitoki paid no attention. A further instance of contumacy
occurred in connection with an estate which the ex-emperor had conferred
on one of his favorite mistresses.
Stung by these insults, Gotoba finally resolved to overthrow the
Kamakura government. In this design he was strongly supported by another
ex-emperor, Juntoku, who had just abdicated in favor of his son, Chūkyō.
The third of the three ex-emperors of the time, Tsuchimikado, opposed
the project of the other two, urging that its execution was still
premature. Gotoba could count upon the support of seventeen hundred
warriors, so in 1221 an imperial mandate circulated through all the
provinces of the empire ordering the destruction of the Hōjō family. It
was specially addressed to the powerful lord, Miura Yoshimura. But,
instead of obeying, he conveyed secret information of the fact to
Yoshitoki, who in turn informed Masako, the widow of Yoritomo. She
thereupon summoned all the military leaders of the surrounding
provinces, and having reminded them of the possessions and ranks
bestowed by the Minamoto chief on the _samurai_ of Kwantō, said that an
occasion had now arisen to repay her deceased husband's favors. The
result was that none of these captains espoused the sovereign's cause in
the struggle that ensued. Meanwhile, Yoshitoki took counsel of his
generals as to a plan of campaign, and finally adopted the proposal of
Ōye Hiromoto that the bulk of the forces at the disposal of the Hōjō
should march against Kyōto, under the command of Hōjō Yasutoki and Hōjō
Tokifusa, by the three trunk routes, the Tōkaidō, the Tōsandō, and the
Hokurikudō. On receipt of this intelligence in Kyōto, the imperial
troops were divided into two bodies under Hideyasu and Taneyoshi, and
moved northward to meet the invaders in the Owari and Mino provinces.
But the defending forces suffered defeat, and were driven back, so that
Yasutoki and Tokifusa were able to enter Kyōto at the head of a large
army. They forced the reigning sovereign to abdicate in favor of
Gohorikawa, and they banished the three ex-emperors, Gotoba to the
province of Oki, Juntoku to Sado Island, and Tsuchimikado to Tosa.
Gotoba's son was also sent into exile. A number of court nobles who had
assisted and promoted the attack upon the Kamakura government were put
to death. Three thousand estates belonging to these nobles and to the
_samurai_ who had espoused the imperial cause were confiscated and
divided among the Hōjō followers. Yoshitoki then stationed Yasutoki and
Tokifusa at Rokuhara to preserve peace in Kyōto. Even in the days of
Yoritomo, affairs of state had been administered in consultation with
the court nobles and the Fujiwara ministers, but the Hōjō recognized no
such obligation. So the imperial uprising not only proved a failure, but
also served to increase immensely the power of the feudal government.
The Hōjō were aware that, great as was their influence, it had been
acquired by questionable means, and that their position could be
maintained only by their good government. For this reason, the Hōjō
administration before the days of its decline has come down to posterity
as a model of feudal rule. Yasutoki, who succeeded Yoshitoki as regent,
devoted himself zealously to political affairs, treated the agricultural
classes with much consideration, and sought earnestly to win the love of
the people. He treated his relatives with uniform kindness, and those
under his sway with condescension, never abandoning himself to
passionate impulses nor ever employing his power wantonly. He framed a
law of fifty-one articles setting forth the principles of administration
and supplying regulations to guide the discharge of official functions.
Ruling wisely and living uprightly, he died lamented by people of all
classes. He was succeeded by his grandson, Tsunetoki, and the latter by
his younger brother, Tokiyori. This last, like his grandfather,
practiced economy in his administration and showed much consideration
for the farming classes.
No one of the Hōjō family,[3] however, did more service to the nation
than the son of Tokiyori, Tokimune, who saved the country from the
Mongol conquest. This deserves our special note.
In Mongolia, on the northeast of China, there appeared a conqueror of
world-wide fame, Temujin, the great Genghis Khan. Against his armies the
Tatar kings were unable to hold their ground, and ultimately the wave of
Mongol conquest flowed into the dominions of the Sung sovereign in the
south of China. Temujin's grandson, Kublai, possessed himself of a great
part of Korea, and having concerted measures for overthrowing the Sung
dynasty and bringing all China under Mongol rule, he conceived the
project of subjugating Japan also. His first step toward consummating
that design was to send envoys via Korea, who were instructed to
remonstrate with the Japanese sovereign for his indifferent attitude
toward the Mongol autocrat. But the Koreans dissuaded these envoys from
prosecuting their voyage. Two years later, in 1268, Kublai dispatched
another embassy to Dazaifu in Kiushū, with letters to the governor of
Dazaifu as well as to the Emperor of Japan, the ostensible object of the
communications being to establish amicable relations between the two
countries. From Dazaifu intelligence of the coming of the embassy and
the nature of its documents was forwarded to Kamakura, thence to be sent
in turn to the court in Kyōto. Considerable anxiety was caused by the
news, both in official and in civilian circles. The emperor laid before
the shrine of Daijingū an autographic supplication for the heavenly
protection of the empire, and caused prayers of a similar purport to be
said at all the shrines and temples throughout the realm. Careful
measures were also taken to guard the coasts, more particularly the
points of strategical importance in Hizen and Chikuzen.
A draft reply to Kublai's dispatch was prepared at the court in Kyōto,
and shown to Hōjō Tokimune, who, however, gave it as his opinion that
inasmuch as the communication from China lacked the forms of prescribed
courtesy, Japan's dignity precluded the sending of any answer. Orders
were therefore conveyed to Dazaifu for the immediate expulsion of the
Chinese envoys. In March of the following year Korean officials again
arrived in the island of Tsushima escorting Mongolian envoys, who asked
for a reply to the dispatch sent by their sovereign the preceding year.
These envoys became involved in quarrels with the people of Tsushima,
and finally took their departure, carrying away two of the latter as
prisoners. Five months later, Kublai caused these two men to be restored
to Japan, and made the act an occasion for addressing another dispatch
to the Japanese emperor. Again Japan refrained from making reply. After
an interval of two years, the khan sent in 1271 another ambassador, with
a train of a hundred followers, who landed at Imatsu in Chikuzen. The
ambassador's instructions were to present the dispatch of which he was
bearer either to the imperial court or to the shōgun in Kamakura. He did
not, however, intrust the original document to the Dazaifu officials,
but gave them a copy only. This was at once forwarded to Kamakura, being
from thence communicated to the court in Kyōto. On receiving it, the
_kwanryō_ took counsel of the other ministers of the crown and came to
the decision that no reply should be given.
By this time the people of Japan had acquired full knowledge of the
immense power wielded by Kublai Khan and of the vast conquests achieved
by him in succession to his grandfather Genghis. Hence there was no
little anxiety as to the outcome of these futile embassies. The emperor
ordered prayers to be offered up as before at the shrines and temples
throughout the empire. Kublai had now brought almost the whole of China
into subjection and established his dynasty of Yuan. He continued to
send embassy after embassy to Japan, and Japan on her side continued,
with equal persistence, to make no reply to messages which she construed
as national insults. Enraged by this indifference, the khan finally sent
against Japan a fleet of a hundred and fifty war vessels under the
command of Liu Fok-hêng, at the same time ordering Korea to reinforce
this expedition. The invaders arrived at Tsushima toward the end of
1274, where they killed the governor. Thence they passed to the island
of Iki and killed its acting high constable, and thereafter directed
their forces against Imatsu in Chikuzen. The military nobles of
Kiushū--Shōni, Ōtomo, Matsuura, Kikuchi and others--collected troops and
made a stand at Hakozaki. The Yuan invaders, armed with guns, caused
great havoc among the Japanese army, but the Chinese leader, Liu,
received a wound that compelled him to retire, and a heavy gale arising
destroyed numbers of the foreign war-vessels. The Korean general's ship
was wrecked and he himself drowned. Finally, the remnant of the invading
force escaped under cover of darkness. Once again after a few months
the Yuan sovereign sent another envoy, but he was sent up to Kamakura
and there put to death by Hōjō Tokimune.
Hōjō Sanemasa was now appointed to command at Dazaifu, and instructions
were issued for the vigilant guarding of all the coast line in the
south. Further, the imperial guards were temporarily withdrawn from
Kyōto, and drafted into a large army recruited from the east of the
empire and stationed at Dazaifu as well as at other important positions
along the coast. Sanemasa was given the command of this army, and other
members of the Hōjō family were dispatched to direct the military
preparations in Harima and Nagato. Further, the territorial nobles of
Kiushū received orders to construct fortifications along the coast, and
this work, being vigorously carried on, was completed in 1279. That year
the Chinese emperor again sent envoys, seeking to establish friendship
and intercourse. They landed at Hakata, but were put to death by order
of the shōgun's government. The Regent Tokimune, foreseeing the
consequences of these complications, dispatched large bodies of troops
from Kamakura to Kiushū, to repel the renewed attack inevitably pending
from the west. By this time the feudal society of Japan seems to have
been roused to its height of patriotism. It not only was determined to
resist the invasion of the world-conqueror, but even plans were made to
invade the continent and fight with the Khan on his own ground. The
latter, on his part, had now completed his conquest of China, and,
having attained the zenith of his power, resolved to gratify his
long-cherished desire, supplemented as it was by indignation at the
repeated slaughter of his ambassadors in Japan.
Accordingly in the middle of 1281, he assembled a force of 100,000
soldiers, whom, together with a contingent of 10,000 Koreans, he sent
against Japan under the command of Hwan Bunko. The invading army touched
at the island of Iki, and after a cruel massacre of its inhabitants,
resumed their voyage toward Dazaifu. Thither the Japanese troops flocked
from Kiushū, Chūgoku, and Shikoku to defend their country. Aided by the
fortresses that had been erected along the coast, they fought stoutly.
The Chinese, however, enjoyed the great advantage of possessing heavy
ordnance, with which they bombarded the forts and slaughtered such
multitudes of the Japanese soldiers that the latter were unable to meet
them in open contest. Organized tactics as much characterized the
invaders as personal valor and individual combat did the defending
warriors. Nevertheless, the latter continued to resist so obstinately,
that, although the contest waged for sixty days, the enemy could not
effect a landing. Meanwhile, a rumor reached Kyōto that the Yuan
invaders, having borne down all resistance in Kiushū, had pushed on to
Nagato, and were on the point of advancing against Kyōto itself, thence
to carry their arms into the Tōkai and Hokuriku districts.
The Emperor Gouda, deeply disquieted by these tidings, proceeded in
person to the shrine of Iwashimizu Hachimangū, god of war, to pray for
the safety of the country, and moreover dispatched an autographic
supplication to the shrine of Daijingū in Ise, vowing that he would
offer himself as a sacrifice to preserve the honor of his empire. But in
Kiushū the contest continued fiercely when, on the last day of the
seventh lunar month, a northwesterly storm swept down on the Chinese
fleet and wrecked a number of the ships with immense loss of life. Those
that survived the tempest, several thousands in number, took refuge in
the island of Takashima off the coast of Hizen, and there, under the
command of Chang Pak--Hwan having fled away in a vessel of exceptional
strength--set themselves to cut timber and build new ships to carry them
back to China. But Shōni Kagesuke, at the head of a body of the Kiushū
troops, followed and attacked the fugitives, killing several hundreds
and taking over a thousand prisoners, so that, in the end, only three
out of the hundred thousand Yuan invaders succeeded in escaping alive to
China. After this success the Kamakura government redoubled its efforts
to place the defenses of the country on a strong footing. It was not
till 1299 that the Chinese sovereign sent two Buddhist priests to Japan
with a peaceful message. The country had been in a state of continuous
defense, since the arrival of the first Mongol embassy thirty-one years
previously. Never before had the Japanese nation encountered a more
colossal struggle with a great conquering foe, nor had she since, till
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. It is noteworthy that in
the former crisis it was the feudal forces which saved the land from
foreign conquest.
If by this great service the Hōjō placed all Japan under obligation to
them, it was also after this crisis that their power began to decline.
Great sums of money had been devoted during the thirty years to
maintaining constant religious services at the shrines and temples
throughout the empire. The expense incurred on that account is said to
have been greater even than the outlay in connection with military
affairs, which in itself must have been immense. Moreover, after the
invaders had been defeated and the danger averted, the rewards granted
to Buddhist priests and Shintō officials far exceeded in monetary value
the recompense given to the troops and their leaders. On the other hand,
the wardens and territorial nobles, on whom the duty of defending the
country had fallen, found the drain on their resources so heavy that
they began to murmur. Thus the popularity of the shōgunate at Kamakura
commenced to wane.
[Illustration: THE INVASION BY THE MONGOL TARTARS]
Tokimune was succeeded by his son Sadatoki, and then followed Morotoki
and Takatoki. During their regency the authority of the Hōjō rapidly
declined. Takatoki, being a man of indolent disposition, entrusted the
control of affairs wholly to one Nagasaki Takasuke, who was betrayed by
avarice into such abuses of power that men's hearts were altogether
estranged from the government. The fall of the Hōjō finally ensued in
1326, a century and a quarter after the first of those powerful rulers
had risen from the position of a rear-vassal to the most puissant office
in the land.
The circumstances of the downfall of the Kamakura government will be
related in the next chapter. In the meantime, we shall observe the
condition of society during the hundred and forty years of the rule of
the Minamoto and the Hōjō. In regard to the customs of the upper
classes, it is interesting to note that the elegance of the Kyōto nobles
and the severe simplicity of the Kamakura soldiers, now the one, then
the other, according to the varying circumstances, set the fashion of
the day. When the warrior element was in the ascendant, its manners and
customs were more or less taken as a model in Kyōto, while, on the other
hand, Kyōto sometimes impressed its own fashions upon the military. An
instance of the latter case is furnished by the story of the Taira
family, whose fighting men gradually fell under the charm of the court
life, and succumbed with comparative ease to the misfortunes that
afterward overtook them. Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, however, fixed his
headquarters at Kamakura and did not visit Kyōto except for very brief
intervals. His habits of life were frugal and simple; he encouraged the
_samurai_ to adopt a severe military regimen, and he set his face
resolutely against costly ostentation and enervating excesses.
But by the time of Sanetomo prolonged peace had produced its usual
effects: the austerity of military customs underwent relaxation even at
Kamakura, and refinement and luxury began to come into vogue. So, too,
in Kyōto, when the city passed under military rule after the Shōkiu
troubles and when the power of the civil nobles declined
correspondingly, the customs of the soldier class prevailed over those
of the courtiers. Speaking generally, however, it may be said that
Kamakura was the nursery of military customs and Kyōto the center of
courtly effeminacy. The warriors' ethics at Kamakura prescribed
frugality and simplicity, inculcated love of soldierly pursuits and
encouraged feelings of gratitude and loyalty in the relations between
lord and vassal. To such a pitch were these latter sentiments carried
that a vassal would choose rather to be estranged from his parents or
find himself opposed to his own brothers and sisters, than to show want
of fealty to his lord. Everything must be sacrificed in the cause of
one's lord, death and life alike being shared with him. The rules of
etiquette were strictly obeyed, and the provisions of the code of honor
carefully observed. Even when a _samurai_ went into battle, he did not
set himself to slaughter indiscriminately, but having first recounted
the achievements of his ancestors, crossed swords with his foe in a
leisurely and dignified manner. Were he guilty of any fault, it was
expected of him to die by his own hand before the disgrace of lawful
punishment could overtake him. The obligations of honor were absolutely
binding on him in all conjunctures.
After the Hōgen and Heiji insurrections, even Kyōto itself, the seat of
refinement and splendor, became like a deserted battlefield, and when
Minamoto-no-Yoritomo made Kamakura the headquarters of his military
government, the science of war absorbed men's attention so completely
that little or no heed was paid to literary pursuits. The Kyōto
University and the provincial schools decayed, and the knowledge of
Chinese classics became the monopoly of Buddhist priests, some of whom,
particularly of the Zen sect, had spent years of diligent study in
China. Anyone desirous of obtaining education had no recourse but to
place himself under the tuition of these priests. It was in this way
that the term _tera-koya_ (temple annex) came to be generally employed
all through the feudal ages to designate a private school. But despite
the people's neglect of Chinese studies, Chinese words and expressions
were largely in vogue among the higher classes, and Buddhist terms also
passed appreciably into the language of the time owing to the prosperous
and influential position occupied by that religion.
The written language being thus enriched by a multitude of phrases and
expressions which had received the indorsement of scholars, the
vocabulary and literature of the era exhibit marked evidences of change.
Not only the manner of expression, but also the taste of the people, had
undergone a decisive change since the close of the Hei-an epoch, and
this difference naturally manifested itself in the kind of literature
affected. Men no longer took pleasure in books treating of the lives and
adventures of beautiful women or the mental feats of renowned scholars.
Such studies seemed incongruous amid the clash of arms and under the
shadow of the sword and spear. Striking vicissitudes in martial careers,
the intrepid deaths or life-long separations of warriors, the rise and
fall of principalities--these were the themes of which the Kamakura
_samurai_ loved to read. Of the prose compositions expressive of this
sentiment, the most noted were the "_Hōgen_" and the "_Heiji
Monogatari_," stories, respectively of the insurrections of those eras;
and the "_Heike Monogatari_," the pathetic epic of the fate of the great
Taira clan, and the "_Gempei Seisuiki_," the stirring tale of the rise
and fall of the families of Taira and Minamoto. Other famous productions
of the period were the "_Hōjō-ki_," and the "_Shiki Monogatari_." In
these works one finds a skillful blending of graceful Japanese phrases,
strong Chinese expressions, and lofty Buddhist terms. At times the style
has all the ring of martial onset; at times, it is plaintive and moving;
now it abounds in graces of diction, and then its transitions from
passion to deliberation, from swift terseness to smooth tranquillity,
are full of force and sentiment. Between the emotional effect of such
writings and the gently flowing phraseology and uneventful paragraphs of
works like the "_Genji Monogatari_" of the preceding period, there is a
wide interval. Running through the pages of the "_Hōjō-ki_" the reader
also detects a current of discontent and disgust for the transient world
and its vanity that reflects the growing tendency of educated minds at
that epoch. So deeply had the Buddhistic pessimism entered the heart of
the people.
On the other hand, poetry in the Japanese style flourished uniformly in
Kyōto, unaffected by the vicissitudes of the times or the decline of the
imperial power. Collections of verses were made from time to time and
published by imperial direction, among which the "_Shin-Kokinshū_"
contains stanzas constructed with so great skill that it remained a
model for the poets of all subsequent generations. In Kamakura, also,
the Shōgun Sanetomo was an accomplished writer of Japanese poetry. The
grace and polish of his songs in the old-time style, as well as the
_verve_ and spirit of their sentiments, reflecting truly the mood of his
era, find no parallel in the poetry subsequent to the Nara epoch.
Indeed, owing to the great popularity of Japanese poetry in those days,
people began for the first time to study it under teachers. Thus there
came into vogue men who made a business of giving instruction in the art
of poetry, the profession being transmitted from generation to
generation in the same family. The result was that canons of style and
tricks of composition peculiar to special schools of teachers became
more or less binding upon students of those schools, inevitable injury
being done to originality and vigor. To these circumstances may be
attributed a gradual decline of real poetic ability.
Hardly less instructive is the change that overtook the nation's
greatest religion, Buddhism. It will be remembered that during the
Hei-an epoch, two Buddhist sects, the Tendai, founded by Saichō, and the
Shingon, by Kūkai, were incomparably the most influential, all others
being more or less in a state of decline. But toward the close of the
epoch, some priests, as already related, began to take more interest in
military affairs than in religious functions. Yoritomo, when he came
into power, interdicted the use of arms by priests, and encouraged them
to devote their attention entirely to literature. The prestige of the
Tendai and the Shingon suffered from these events, and as their
doctrines, being far too recondite and lofty to be comprehended by the
uninitiated, had never satisfied the bulk of the people, there began to
appear, during the Kamakura epoch, priests who taught a form of the
faith radically different from the others but eminently suited to the
spiritual tone of the new age. This was the Zen sect, introduced in its
various branches from China. It at once attracted men of simple and
robust habits by its remarkably vigorous and effective method of
enlightenment and the great practical value of the latter for the men of
the world in those days of continual fluctuations of fortune. Hōjō
Tokiyori and Tokimune, as well as many a great warrior, besides some
emperors, became ardent patrons of the sect, which consequently attained
prominent popularity among the military men at Kamakura, and developed
widespread influence. Its temples, Kenchō-ji and Engaku-ji, at Kamakura,
stood on an equal footing with the Kennin-ji and Tōfuku-ji of Kyōto.
While the Zen tenet so powerfully appealed to the military class, there
was another set of new sects, entirely original to Japan, which by their
brief formulæ and impressive ceremonies attracted large numbers of the
common people. Of these sects, three, namely, the Jōdo, founded by Genkū
(or Hōnen); Ikkō or Shin, founded by Shinran (or Hanyen), and Ji,
founded by Ippen, all used the same litany, while the fourth sect,
Hokke, or Nichiren, founded by Nichiren, used another. The founders all
met opposition from the exponents of the older sects, but spread their
teachings in the face of serious difficulties, until they won the hearts
of simple-minded folks whose minds had been in a state of constant
uncertainty under the violent changes of the time, and who were now
delighted to find, at last, doctrines which taught that an unmixed faith
in the saving power of a Buddha or a canon symbolized in a single word
of formula would bring them to a blissful calm in this present world.
Not less attractive were the beautiful harmony of the litanies and the
impressiveness of the paraphernalia of the temple of every new sect. It
appeared as if the spiritual needs of the age were at last answered, and
the new tenets spread themselves among the people like a fire in a
parched meadow.
In the domain of arts, the most remarkable industrial achievement of the
era was the progress made in tempering sword-blades. Gotoba, after he
had abdicated the scepter and become ex-emperor, freely indulged his
keen love for sword-blades. He engaged sword-smiths, whom he kept
perpetually tempering steel, and did not hesitate even to forge blades
with his own hands. Naturally this and the extensive demand for swords
at the time gave a great impulse to the industry. Much progress was also
made in the art of forging armor, helmets, bridle-bits, and the like.
Other arts were not, however, greatly encouraged by the military
administrators of Kamakura, who set their faces against luxury and
inculcated frugal fashions. Yet not a little progress was made in
ceramics, lacquer, and the carving of Buddhist images and other temple
furniture.
It is interesting to note that under the simple rule of the Kamakura
government the commerce and trade of this period made a tolerable
progress, in spite of frequent interruptions of the peace. At Kamakura,
where merchants from various parts of the empire assembled and made it
the commercial center of the country, there existed seven kinds of
markets in which articles were sold at small stores specially designed
and constructed. The custom of peddling merchandise also existed. For
business transacted at a distance, bills of exchange had already come
into vogue. While Sanetomo administered the shōgunate, an official limit
was fixed for the number of merchants conducting business in Kamakura.
This was the origin of hereditary privileges of trade. The prices for
the various staples of commerce were determined, according to the custom
of previous times. Thus in 1193 an imperial notification ordered that
rice should be sold at one thousand cash (one _kwammon_), or the tenth
of a _ryō_, that is to say nominally ten _sen_ according to present
denominations, but of course representing a much larger sum at that
time. Again, in 1253, firewood, charcoal, and other necessaries having
risen in price, Hōjō Tokiyori proclaimed the rate at which each must be
sold. Gold was at that time constantly mined in Mutsu, but did not serve
for coinage purposes, the common media of exchange being Chinese copper
and the iron cash of the Sung dynasty and similar Japanese coins of
earlier days. Grass-cloth was also sometimes used as a medium of
exchange, and prices were quoted in terms of it. Trade with China, under
the Sung dynasty, and with Korea--or Koma, as it was then called--was
carried on largely at Hakata in Chikuzen and Bonotsu in Satsuma, both in
Kiushū. Import duties upon foreign goods were levied at the various
ports of entry. The principal imports from China were raw silk, indigo,
Chinese ink, porcelain vessels, mats, and so forth, while the staple
exports from Japan were rice, other cereals, and timber. In 1254 Hōjō
Tokiyori limited the number of ships engaged in the China trade to five,
and ordered all except the licensed vessels to be destroyed. But the
trade continued as brisk as ever. Subsequently, however, during the
interval that separated the decline of the Sung dynasty from the
establishment of the Yuan, intercourse between Japan and the neighboring
empire underwent some diminution, and was suspended altogether for a
time after the Mongol invasion of Japan.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Table showing lineage and chronology of sovereigns.
[80. Emperor Takakura, 1169-1180.]
|
+-------------------+--------------------+
| | |
[81. Emperor Antoku, Gotakakura. 82. Emperor Gotoba,
1180-1186.] | 1186-1199.
| |
+-------------------+ +-------------------+
| | |
86. Emperor Gohorikawa, 84. Emperor Juntoku, 83. Emperor
1222-1233. 1211-1222. Tsuchimikado,
| | 1199-1211.
| | |
87. Emperor Shijō, 85. Emperor Chūkyō, 88. Emperor Gosaga,
1233-1243. 1222. 1243-1247.
|
+--------------------------------------+---+
| |
90. Emperor Kameyama, 89. Emperor Gofukakusa,
1266-1276. 1247-1266.
| |
91. Emperor Gouda, 1276-1288. |
| |
+-----+-----------------+ |
| | |
96. Emperor Godaigo, 94. Emperor Gonijō, 92. Emperor Fushimi,
1319-1339. 1301-1308. 1288-1299.
|
+---------------------------------------+
| |
95. Emperor Hanazono, 1308-1319. 93. Emperor Gofushimi, 1299-1301.
[2] Minamoto Yoritomo, 1184-1199; Minamoto Yoriiye, 1199-1203;
Minamoto Sanetomo, 1203-1219.
[3] The following is the list of the Hōjō regents (_shikken_).
Hōjō Tokimasa, father-in-law of Yoritomo, who died in 1215, did not
assume the title of regent.
Hōjō Yoshitoki, 1205-1224.
Hōjō Yasutoki, 1225-1242.
Hōjō Tsunetoki, 1243-1246.
Hōjō Tokiyori, 1246-1256.
Hōjō Tokimune, 1256-1284.
Hōjō Sadatoki, 1284-1300.
Hōjō Morotoki, 1300-1311.
Hōjō Takatoki, 1312-1326.
Chapter VIII
THE TEMPORARY RESTORATION OF IMPERIAL POWER. 1339-1393
The fall of the Hōjō resulted in a rehabilitation of the imperial power,
which, however, as quickly relapsed under a new feudal rule. The story
of this momentary success of the sovereign house must be prefaced by an
account of its domestic affairs, which had caused its renewed uprising
against the usurping regent at Kamakura. It will be remembered that, in
1221, the Hōjō exiled three ex-emperors and their partisans, who had
raised their arms against the all-powerful feudal government. The
influence of the Hōjō became so strong in Kyōto after this event that,
when the Emperor Shijō died without heir, in 1242, the Regent Yasutoki
succeeded, in spite of opposition, in raising his nominee on the throne
as the Emperor Gosaga. This naturally further enhanced the power of the
Hōjō. Gosaga abdicated in 1246, and was succeeded by his two sons, one
after the other. Of these, the younger and abler, Emperor Kameyama, was
the favorite of his retired father, and would have bequeathed the throne
exclusively to his own descendants, had it not been for the intervention
of the ex-emperor, who advocated the cause of the elder prince, the
Emperor Gofukakusa. It was finally decided, during the regency of Hōjō
Sadatoki, that the descendants of the two emperors--called, from the
names of their respective residences, the Daikaku-ji and the Jimyō-in
lines--should reign alternately, each for ten years. The Daikaku-ji line
came first to the throne in the person of Gonijō (1301-1308), followed
by Hanazono of the other line. The latter had to abdicate, in 1319, in
favor of Godaigo of the first line. It was this last emperor who
successfully, though for a brief period, restored the power of the
imperial house, for, being like all other princes of his line, penurious
and discontented, he was particularly offended at the conduct of the
Kamakura regency, which not only kept him in straitened circumstances,
but also alternated his house with the other and richer house favorable
to the Hōjō. Godaigo perceived that, if he would insure his sovereignty,
he must do away at the same time with the Hōjō rule and the system of
alternate succession.
Such an attempt promised greater success in 1325 than in 1221, as the
power of the Hōjō had now greatly declined, particularly under the
regency of the dissolute Takatoki. Bribery was rife, partiality presided
at the tribunals of justice, and dissatisfaction with the Hōjō rule
prevailed among the _samurai_. A premature plot of Godaigo[1] to
overthrow Kamakura was, however, discovered, and he barely saved his
throne by falsely professing innocence and goodwill. The time soon came
when a prince of the Jimyō-in line should replace Godaigo, who on the
contrary sought to name his own son heir apparent. This project was
peremptorily opposed by Takatoki, who also provoked the emperor in other
matters, until the latter again sought to find means to undo the Hōjō.
The immense military following of Kamakura, however, rendered hopeless
all schemes of open defiance. Under the circumstances the emperor
conceived the idea of having recourse to priestly aid. He placed his
son, Prince Morinaga, in the post of lord abbot of Enryaku-ji, and
himself proceeded to Hieizan and Nara, where he succeeded in winning the
priests and elaborating with them a scheme for the overthrow of the
Hōjō. But this plan also was divulged. In August, 1331, the regent sent
three thousand men to Kyōto with orders to arrest the emperor. Godaigo
had escaped during the night, and taken refuge on Mount Kasagi, where he
mustered his partisans from the neighboring provinces and posted them
for the protection of his temporary residence. The siege did not last
long, for Takatoki raised a Jimyō-in prince to the throne, captured
Godaigo, and exiled the latter and his two sons to distant islands.
[Illustration: NORTHERN JAPAN]
The imperial cause seemed completely lost, but about this time a warrior
destined to become a celebrated hero with the loyal sons of Japan,
Kusunoki Masashige, raised the standard of revolt in Kawachi and
declared in favor of the exiled emperor. He constructed a castle at
Akasaka, and when it was destroyed, retired to Mount Kongō and there
held his ground, subsequently developing sufficient strength to restore
the fortifications at Akasaka. Meanwhile Prince Morinaga raised troops
and fought against the Hōjō at Yoshino in Yamato, and afterward at Kōya
in Kii. The time had now come for the Hōjō to put forth their strength.
In February, 1333, a large army was sent from Kamakura against Kyōto,
but great numbers of fighting men flocked to the imperial standard in
Sanyō and Nankai, and in the following month the exiled emperor escaped
from the Island of Oki and proceeded to Hōki, being supported by Nawa
Nagatoshi, who raised troops in the San-in districts. The provinces of
Hizen and Higo were also on the emperor's side, as was the powerful Yūki
family of Mutsu. The Hōjō's army which had been dispatched against Kyōto
suffered defeat in several engagements. Takatoki now sent Ashikaga
Takauji to assume charge of the campaign in Kyōto and its neighborhood.
This was a fatal choice. For not only was Takauji closely related to the
Minamoto clan whom the Hōjō had overthrown, but he also viewed with
strong disfavor the oppressive arbitrariness of the latter. No sooner
had he reached Kyōto than he declared for the imperial cause, and, in
concert with other loyalists, attacked and destroyed Rokuhara, the
headquarters of the Hōjō administration in Kyōto. This event occurred in
May, 1333. The imperial forces then reoccupied Kyōto. About this time
Nitta Yoshisada, a renowned member of the Minamoto, laid siege to the
fortress which Kusunoki Masashige had constructed on Mount Kongō,
combining the forces of the Hōjō for the purpose. But Prince Morinaga
opened relations with him, and in obedience to the prince's secret
instructions he pretended illness, retired to his own province of
Kōzuke, and after consultation with his relatives and partisans, raised
the standard of revolt against Kamakura. Events now marched rapidly. All
the blood relatives of the Minamoto family in Echigo and Shinano came
together, and marching against Kamakura in great numbers, demolished or
burned all the offices and public buildings there. The Regent Takatoki,
together with all the members of his family, committed suicide, and the
rule of the Hōjō came to an end.
A month later the exiled emperor reëntered Kyōto in state and resumed
the reins of government. The eastern provinces, some of which were still
loyal to the memory of the Hōjō, were also greatly reduced. No sooner
was, however, the imperial prestige assured, than difficulties arose
which might long have been expected. The restoration had been effected
by warriors of feudal tenure, whose merits had to be rewarded, and whose
ambitions were hardly compatible with a centralized civil administration
such as would naturally follow the return of the imperial government. At
this juncture the emperor's conduct was not calculated to perpetuate his
success. The estates of the late Hōjō which he had confiscated were
rather indiscriminately parceled among his personal favorites, so that
when the case of the warriors who had rendered real service to his cause
had to be considered, there was little left with which to reward their
merits. Also, private soldiers and landlords of the provinces flocked to
Kyōto to obtain confirmed possession of their holdings or additional
grants for the service they claimed to have done to the sovereign. Under
these circumstances it was inevitable that discontent and disappointment
should be keenly felt in many quarters, and men's minds should once more
turn from an artificial reign of peace to a period of unrest and
plunder. Nor was a leader of exceptional ability lacking to take
advantage of this state of affairs.
Of the two great soldiers of noble descent, Nitta Yoshisada was
comparatively little known, owing to the fact that his ancestor, being
on bad terms with Yoritomo, had lived in retirement at Nitta in Kōzuke.
The other, Ashikaga Takauji, who was, like Yoshisada, of the historic
clan of Minamoto, was well known otherwise for the marriage relations of
his ancestors with the Hōjō. By nature winning and brilliant, he enjoyed
both influence and popularity. The emperor himself was highly pleased by
Takauji's achievements, for which he conferred on him rewards such as no
one else received, and authorized him, among other things, to use for
the first part of his name one of the ideograms in the name of the
sovereign himself, which was likewise pronounced "Taka." Nothing,
however, arouses the indignation of the nation of the present day more
than the story of the way in which Takauji attracted the emperor and
warriors to his side for selfish interests, and wrought the ruin of one
after another of all the truly upright and loyal persons of the day. The
first victim of Takauji's growing ambition was Prince Morinaga, who had
already doubted the sincerity of his motives. Takauji so prevailed upon
the emperor as to cause the prince to be arrested and confined in
Kamakura, where he was later assassinated. When the remaining partisans
of the Hōjō assembled in Shinano and marched against Kamakura, and
Tadayoshi, Takauji's brother, finding himself unable to defend it,
retreated to Mikawa, Takauji at once affected a union with Tadayoshi,
destroyed the Hōjō partisans, reoccupied Kamakura, and bestowed rewards
lavishly on the captains and warriors who had aided him. Now he threw
away the mask. Established on the vantage ground of Kamakura, he called
himself shōgun, and under pretense of subduing Nitta Yoshisada, sent
orders throughout the provinces directing that troops should be raised.
The emperor, whose eyes were at last opened, appointed Prince Takanaga
to the chief command of a large army against Takauji, with Nitta
Yoshisada as chief of staff, and at the same time instructed Kitabatake
of Mutsu to attack Takauji's rear. So began the dramatic campaign, the
incidents of which still appeal to the hearts of the Japanese people.
In November, 1335, Yoshisada encountered the forces of Takauji in Suruga
and Mikawa, and defeated them in successive engagements; but Takauji,
and Tadayoshi subsequently, established themselves at strong positions
in the Hakone district, and Yoshisada's army attempting to dislodge
them, suffered a signal defeat and was driven westward. This event
determined the various provincial magnates whose position had been
undefined to declare for Takauji, and the Ashikaga chief found himself
strong enough, in the following year, to pursue Yoshisada and push on to
Kyōto itself, where in the face of a stout resistance he gained the
victory. The emperor retreated to the temple Enryaku-ji. Meanwhile,
Kitabatake Akiiye, with an army under the command of Prince Yoshinaga,
followed Takauji to Kyōto, and having effected a junction with the
forces of Nitta Yoshisada and Kusunoki Masashige, succeeded in defeating
the Ashikaga chief. Shortly afterward Takauji sustained another severe
defeat in Hyōgo, and was compelled to retreat precipitately westward,
the imperialists once more occupying Kyōto.
Under these reverses, Takauji revealed the remarkable resourcefulness of
his nature. The restoration of imperial authority by Godaigo had
resulted in completely thrusting the princes of the Jimyō-in line into
the background. Takauji descried an opportunity in this circumstance.
Addressing himself to the dethroned Emperor Kōgon, he obtained a mandate
to raise an army. With remarkable energy he got together troops from all
parts of the empire and once more renewed the contest, defeating
Kikuchi, Aso, Akitsuki, and other supporters of the Daikaku-ji princes
at Tadaranohama. Stationing a trusted general in Kiushū, with
instructions to bring the provinces in that quarter under control, he
himself advanced eastward by land and by sea at the head of large forces
raised in the west. Yoshisada and Masahige made a desperate stand in
Hyōgo against the Ashikaga army, but were defeated. It was then that the
pathetic end of Masashige occurred at Minatogawa. He had always been a
steadfast and unassuming servant of the emperor, ever since he rose from
his retired residence at Kawachi to champion the imperial cause against
the Hōjō. How with a handful of soldiers he had defended his castle upon
Mount Kongō, and how his example had inspired other warriors in the land
to take a stand with the emperor, is a story that the Japanese school
children love to tell. To him more than to any other one person had been
due the restoration of imperial rule. But his wise counsels were no
longer followed when selfish ambition began to divide the sovereign's
supporters. Yet Masashige did not complain. Seeing in the last campaign
that his end had come, he dissuaded his son Masatsura from following him
in the battle and exhorted him to grow up to gather the remnants of his
followers and to die for the emperor's cause. He himself gallantly fell
in battle. After his death the imperial cause, which had already begun
to wane, could never again master the situation.
Takauji, who had occupied Kyōto, enthroned there a Jimyō-in prince as
the Emperor Kōmyō, and established his shōgunate at Muromachi in the
capital. The Emperor Godaigo shortly after repaired to Yoshino, about
fifty miles south of Kyōto. For fifty-seven years subsequent to this
event (1336-1393) two emperors reigned simultaneously, one at Kyōto and
the other at Yoshino. The former was of the Jimyō-in line and the latter
of the Daikaku-in line, now known respectively as the Northern and
Southern dynasties (_hoku-chō_ and _nan-chō_).[2] It was a period of
perpetual conflict between the supporters of the two imperial houses.
Among the partisans of the Southern dynasty the most puissant and
popular were Nitta Yoshisada and Kitabatake Akiiye, of whom the former
had his headquarters in Echizen, where he guarded the heir-apparent of
the South, while the latter, under the auspices of Prince Yoshinaga,
held Mutsu under control. Soon, however, the armies of Ashikaga overran
Echizen, and Yoshisada fell in battle. This was followed by the death of
the Southern emperor, Godaigo (1339), who on his deathbed summoned all
the imperial princes to his side, and laid upon them his earnest
injunctions never to rest until the imperial power had been restored. He
was succeeded by Prince Yoshinaga, who ascended the throne as
Gomurakami.
A series of reverses now overtook the imperialists. One after another
their armies were defeated in the provinces, until Kitabatake Chikafusa
alone remained unconquered in Hitachi. But he, too, was soon overpowered
by the shōgun's forces. He effected his escape to Yoshino, and the
emperor issued a summons to the warriors of Chiugoku and Nankai to
reinforce the imperial army in Kiushū. The southern island was thus once
more brought under the imperial sway, and this success encouraged
Chikafusa at Yoshino, who now made one supreme effort. Assembling a
force in Kyōto and its neighborhood, he attempted to reoccupy the city,
and the suddenness of his effort seemed to him a temporary advantage.
But Takauji dispatched large forces to attack the temporary palace at
Yoshino, the defenders of which saw themselves utterly outnumbered.
Kusunoki Masatsura, son of the great Masashige, had hitherto guarded the
palace with stubborn bravery. But now he and his captains bade a final
farewell to the sovereign, and, marching out to encounter the foe,
fought their last battle at Shijōnawate, and fell fighting. After this
victory, the shōgun's army burned the temporary palace at Yoshino, and
the emperor escaped to Anau in Yamato.
Despite all these successes, the shōgun's forces were unable to crush
the defense of the dynasty of the South, as his own armies were often
rent by the disloyalty and mutual jealousy of his immediate followers.
Even his brother Tadayoshi, to whose stout support Takauji's success was
largely due, and his son Yoshiakira, were alienated from him. His
generals and warriors had been attracted to him only from ambition and
selfishness, and now they readily threw off their fealty. Many a
soldier vacillated between the two sovereigns, serving the one who
suited his own interested motives the better.
Takauji died in Kyōto in 1357, and was succeeded by his son, Yoshiakira.
The latter was followed in 1368 by Yoshimitsu. In the meantime, the
prestige of the Southern dynasty had further been impaired, until
finally, in 1393, the Southern sovereign Gokameyama, handed over the
insignia to his Northern rival, Gokomatsu, and the two dynasties being
thus united, Gokomatsu ascended the throne as the hundredth emperor of
Japan.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Reference to the following table will make the genealogical
issues clear:
88. Emperor Gosaga, 1243-1247.
|
JIMYŌ-IN LINE. | DAIKAKU-JI LINE.
+---------------------+
| |
89. Emperor Gofukakusa, 1247-1266. 90. Emperor Kameyama, 1266-1276.
| |
92. Emperor Fushimi, 1288-1299. 91. Emperor Gouda, 1276-1288.
| |
+-----------------+ +--------------------+
| | | |
93. Emperor 95. Emperor 94. Emperor 96. Emperor
Gofushimi, Hanazono, Gonijō, Godaigo,
1299-1301. 1308-1319. 1301-1308. 1319-1339.
[2] Table showing genealogy and chronology of the Northern and
Southern dynasties.
DYNASTY OF THE SOUTH.
96. Emperor Godaigo, [1319-] 1336-1339.
|
97. Emperor Gomurakami, 1339-1368.
|
+----------------------------------+
| |
98. Emperor Chōkei, 1368-1370. 99. Emperor Gokameyama, 1370-1393.
DYNASTY OF THE NORTH.
(I. Kōgon, 1332-1336.) II. Kōmyō, 1336-1349.
|
+----------------------------+
| |
III. Sūkō, 1349-1352. IV. Gokōgon, 1352-1372.
|
V. Goenyū, 1372-1383.
|
VI. Gokomatsu, 1383-1393 [-1413].
In the year 1393 A. D. the two dynasties became united in the person of
a single sovereign, Gokomatsu.
Chapter IX
THE MUROMACHI PERIOD. 1393-1573
The reason that the Ashikaga shōguns established themselves at Muromachi
in Kyōto, the civil capital, was that the seat of the Southern dynasty
being near and the tide of battle sweeping again and again as far as
Kyōto, the exigencies of the struggle made it necessary that the
imperial city should also be the headquarters of the feudal government.
Takauji had to intrust the administration of the eastern provinces to
his son Motouji, as the regent (_kwanryō_) at Kamakura, and also to
another general the control of the southern island of Kiushū. At first
the supporters of the Southern sovereign kept busy the regent of
Kamakura and the warden of Kiushū, who remained loyal to the Muromachi
shōgun so long as this trouble lasted. It might have been foreseen,
however, that in time of peace the vantage ground occupied by these
magnates would be turned against the interests of the overlord. Nor did
the central government at Muromachi promise a greater security to the
will of the Ashikaga, for its functions were performed by men who,
unlike several of Yoritomo's counselors, were at the same time the
greatest landlords of the country. They might readily defy an effete
shōgun and lapse into a bitter quarrel among themselves. Special
circumstances were not wanting to hasten the coming of the logical
consequences of the careless organization of the Ashikaga feudalism.
It so happened that the third shōgun, Yoshimitsu, under whom the rule of
the Ashikaga seemed to have risen to its height, was also arbitrary and
vainglorious. He ceded the shōgunate, in 1393, to his son Yoshimochi,
and received for himself the appointment of chief minister of state
(_daijō daijin_), an unprecedented procedure for a feudal overlord since
Yoritomo. After a brief interval, however, he resigned that post also,
and having adopted the tonsure, nominally retired from official life.
Always prone to luxury, he now more freely than ever gave the reins to
his fancy for pomp and splendor. Whenever he moved abroad, he was
accompanied by an escort large enough for an ex-emperor, and such was
the magnificence of his mansion at Muromachi and so great the profusion
of blossoming trees among which it stood, that men gave to it the name
of the Palace of Flowers. After his retirement from official life he
established his residence at Kitayama, where he erected a three-storied
house with timbers and stones of the finest quality, contributed by the
territorial magnates of the land. Its columns, doors, alcoves, ceilings,
and floors were decorated with gold dust. Nothing could exceed the
elegance and splendor of this edifice. The people called it
"Kinkaku-ji," or the golden temple, and it stands to this day one of the
most interesting relics of ancient Kyōto. On the completion of this
gorgeous mansion, Yoshimitsu--or Tenzan Dogi as he was then called--took
up his residence there, and thither all the magnates of state had to
repair in order to obtain his sanction for administrative measures.
Banquets were often given there on a sumptuous scale, the illustrious
host amusing himself and his guests with displays of music and
dancing--_Budō_, _Sarugaku_, and _Shirabyōshi_. The example thus set by
the ex-shōgun was readily imitated by the military men of the time, and
to support all this luxury, it became necessary to increase the burden
of taxation. Yoshimitsu had strong faith in Buddhist doctrines, and
devoted large sums to the building of temples. The doctrines of the Zen
sect found special favor with him, and its priests were the recipients
of much munificence at his hands. He levied contributions on all the
provinces for the purpose of erecting for the sect in Kyōto a temple of
unparalleled magnificence called Shōkoku-ji.
Amid the exercise of all this pomp and while the power of the shōgunate
was thus supreme from end to end of the country, the seeds of future
misfortune were sown. Not long after the death of Yoshimitsu the country
began to fall into disorder. The generals and military partisans of the
Southern dynasty supposed that a return to the system of alternate
succession between the two lines of Jimyō-in and Daikaku-ji had formed
part of the arrangement under which peace was restored, in 1393, and
Gokomatsu raised to the throne. Hence, after the demise of that
sovereign, they looked to see a prince of the Southern line assume the
scepter. But the shōgun's government crowned Shōkō, of the Northern
line. Discontented with this act, Kitabatake Mitsumasa of Ise declared
war against the shōgun, and a number of military men in or about Kyōto
and in Mutsu raised the standard of revolt. Serious disturbance was
averted on that occasion by the shōgun's promising that a prince of the
Southern line should be the next sovereign. The partisans of the latter
dynasty imagined, therefore, that at the death of Shōkō, Prince Ogura, a
son of Gokameyama, would come to the throne, whereas the Ashikaga
family, disregarding the engagement entered into by its chief, again
secured the succession to a prince of the Northern dynasty.[1] This
breach of faith led to a renewed demonstration by Kitabatake, who, in
collusion with the military men at Kamakura, unsheathed the sword in
behalf of the son of Prince Ogura. There rose also another revolt in
Yamato. The supporters of the Southern line, however, never effected any
material success. But before their energy withered away, combats and
tumults of the most inveterate character devastated the land. The
Ashikaga shōguns found themselves perpetually confronted by disturbance
and disaffection. One, probably the principal, cause of the frequent
insurrections, was that the Ashikaga made immense grants of land to
their supporters without, at the same time, elaborating some efficient
system for the control of the territorial magnates thus created. Many
nobles developed such puissance under these circumstances, and acquired
command of such vast local resources, that they gave themselves no
concern whatsoever about any government, whether that of Kyōto or that
of Muromachi, and sided with whatever party they found most convenient.
Personal ambition and individual aggrandizement were too often the
ruling motives of the time. No bonds proved strong enough to secure
men's union amid these scenes of tumult. Even brothers, as in the time
of Takauji and Yoshinori, did not hesitate to belong to opposite camps,
nor were other family ties considered more sacred. In the days of
Yoshimitsu, a great territorial magnate, Yamana Ujikiyo, whose estates
extended over ten provinces so that men spoke of him as _Rokubuichi-shi_
(lord of a sixth of Japan), took up arms against the Ashikaga. So, too,
Ōuchi Yoshihiro rebelled because his success in subjugating Kiushū had
given him confidence in his own powers. The regent at Kamakura, also, to
whom was entrusted the government of the eastern provinces, became so
puissant that his influence almost equaled that of the shōgun, who
regarded the growth of his relative's power with no little uneasiness.
So independent was the attitude of this Kamakura official and so openly
did he affect autonomic state, that we find him adopting the precedent
of the Muromachi ruler and nominating two of the Uyesugi
family--Yamanouchi and Inugake--to the office of _kwanryō_ or regents.
Immense estates were also held by the branch house of Ogigayatsu
Mitsukane, grandson of the first Kamakura _kwanryō_. Motouji (son of
Ashikaga Takauji), carried away apparently by his wealth and strength,
supported the insurrection of Ōuchi Yoshihiro, mentioned above, but had
no difficulty in making peace with the Muromachi shōgun on the defeat
and downfall of Yoshihiro. Thus feud succeeded feud, and campaign,
campaign, arising out of the universal creed that a prize scarcely
inferior to the scepter itself lay within reach of any noble whose
territorial influence and military puissance enabled him to grasp it.
On the death of the fourth Ashikaga shōgun, Yoshimochi, in 1428, there
was no heir in the direct line to succeed him, his son Yoshikazu having
died in childhood. His younger brother, Prince Giyen, but later named
Yoshinori, was supported to the shōgunate by the _kwanryō_. This
chagrined the Kamakura administrator, Ashikaga Mochiuji, who had aspired
to the office, and who now entered into an open warfare with the
_Kwanryō_ Uyesugi Norizane and the new shōgun. Mochiuji was defeated,
and the Uyesugi family intrusted with the sole administrative control in
the eastern provinces.
Yoshinori, although a man of rare administrative ability and military
achievement, was vain and profligate, and treated his generals and
_samurai_ with contempt. An object of his constant dislike was Akamatsu
Mitsusuke, whom he ridiculed because of his short stature and upon whom
he put many slights. This Mitsusuke was the grandson of Akamatsu
Norimura, who, in consideration of conspicuous services rendered to the
Ashikaga in the days of Takauji, had received, and bequeathed to his
children, broad estates. The shōgun's dislike for Mitsusuke was exceeded
only by his affection for a relative of the latter, Sadamura. He would
fain have deprived Mitsusuke of his domains in order to bestow them on
Sadamura. Mitsusuke was indignant at the notion of such confiscation in
the absence of any misdeed to justify it. In June, 1441, he invited the
shōgun to his mansion, where a splendid banquet was spread and a new
kind of dancing was displayed. While the entertainment was in progress,
Mitsusuke killed and decapitated Yoshinori, set fire to the house, and
carrying with him the head of the shōgun, fled to Harima. Thereafter
Yoshikazu, eldest son of Yoshinori, was proclaimed shōgun by the
_kwanryō_. Hosokawa Mochiyuki and Yamana Mochitoyo, having received the
emperor's mandate, marched against Mitsusuke, destroyed his castle of
Shirahata and killed him. Yoshikazu commissioned Mochitoyo to govern the
three provinces over which Mitsusuke had ruled, and the Akamatsu family
was exterminated.
Yoshikazu died in childhood and was succeeded in the shōgunate in 1449
by his younger brother Yoshimasa, who thus became the eighth Ashikaga
shōgun, the _Kwanryō_ Hatakeyama Mochikuni being intrusted with the
administration of affairs and showing great zeal in the service of the
shōgunate. As Yoshimasa grew older he gave himself up to sensual
excesses, and paid no attention to business of state, leaving everything
in the hands of favorite officers. Thus by degrees disaffection began to
appear among the generals and _samurai_. Moreover, the two _kwanryō_
Hatakeyama and Shiba, ceased to work harmoniously and engaged in
competition for the possession of power. Taking advantage of this state
of affairs, the partisans of the Southern dynasty once more raised their
heads and Kyōto again witnessed scenes of disorder, while Mochiuji's
party renewed their opposition in the Kwantō and the rebellion of the
Shōni family still continued in the west. Yoshimasa, nevertheless,
continued his life of extravagance, devoting great sums to the
gratification of his pleasures and to the building of a magnificent
mansion. Careless of the dilapidated condition of the capital, Kyōto, he
caused the celebrated pavilion Ginkaku-ji to be constructed at
Higashiyama, covering the doors, walls, and ceilings with dust of silver
in order to rival the golden pavilion (Kinkaku-ji) built by Yoshimitsu
at Kitayama. In this new building he brought together rare paintings and
costly objects of virtu, Chinese and Japanese, and there also, in
chambers specially planned for the purpose, he inaugurated the tea
ceremonial (_cha-no-yu_), afterward so fashionable in Japan, devoting
his days to the practice of effeminate dilettanteism.
Official duties received no attention, and by degrees his financial
circumstances became so straitened that, finding it impossible to
procure money for the indulgence of his whims, he began to lay heavy
imposts on the people of the provinces and on the merchants of Kyōto
especially, who were taxed five or six times in the course of the year.
Under these circumstances, great discontent prevailed and riots
occurred, the poor breaking into the houses of the wealthy, and
destroying all certificates of debt that were found there, by which
means the shōgun himself was simultaneously relieved of his monetary
obligations. To this device, endorsed in effect, as it was, by the
authorities, the people mockingly gave the name of _tokusei_, or the
government of virtue, and Yoshimasa found it altogether to his taste,
since it extricated him from many of his financial embarrassments. The
shōgun did not even shrink from sending envoys to China with
instructions to prefer requests for money to the Chinese government, and
the latter were not unwilling thus to purchase immunity from the raids
to which their ports were exposed at the hands of Kiushū pirates. Under
Yoshimasa's administration the power and prestige of the shōgunate
declined sensibly; the affairs of state fell into confusion; the most
cruel mandates were frequently issued; customs opposed to the dictates
of humanity and the principles of morality prevailed; the _kwanryō_,
following the shōgun's example, subserved the duties of their office to
selfish ends, and finally this hopeless misgovernment culminated in the
celebrated war of the Onin era, marking the darkest age of Japan's
history.
The proximate causes of the Onin conflict are to be sought in personal
ambition. Yoshimasa, weary of official duties, determined to intrust to
his younger brother, Gijin, the task of administering affairs. Gijin had
entered the priesthood. He was not averse, however, to falling in with
Yoshimasa's plan on condition that in the event of a child being born to
the latter, it should be devoted to a life of religion. This compact
having been made, Gijin abandoned the priesthood, and taking the name of
Yoshimi, assumed the direction of the affairs of the shōgunate, Hosokawa
Kazumoto acting as controller of his household. By and by, however,
Yoshimasa's wife bore a son, Yoshihisa, and being ambitious that her
child should succeed to the shōgunate, instead of retiring to the
cloister, she took into her confidence Yamana Sōzen, a nobleman
possessing domains as ample and power as extensive as Hosokawa Kazumoto
himself, the idea of the confederates being to contrive the abdication
of Yoshimi. A parallel conjuncture occurred in the family of Hatakeyama
Mochikuni, the _kwanryō_. Having no son, he nominated his nephew
Masanaga to succeed him, but on the subsequent birth of his son
Yoshinari, he resolved to deprive Masanaga of the distinction. Further,
the vassals of the other _kwanryō_, Shiba, became split up into two
parties, one espousing the cause of Yoshikado, the other that of
Yoshitoki. Yoshikado and Yoshinari allied themselves with Yamana Sōzen,
and Masanaga and Yoshitoshi were supported by Hosokawa Kazumoto.
The enmity between these rival factions gradually deepened, until in the
first year of the Onin era, 1467, Sōzen attempted to remove Hatakeyama
Masanaga from the office of _kwanryō_, and to replace him by Yoshinari,
at the same time expelling the partisans of Kazumoto from the Hatakeyama
house. A collision ensued in Kyōto between the parties of Masanaga and
Yoshinari, and the shōgun gave orders that they should settle their
dispute by a combat, the guards attached to them alone taking part in
the duel. Sōzen, however, contrived secretly to render aid to Yoshinari,
so that Masanaga suffered defeat. This result caused much chagrin to
Hosokawa Kazumoto, who considered that his honor was tarnished by his
failure to assist Masanaga. He, therefore, privately assembled all his
troops and partisans, to the number of about a hundred thousand, and
posting them to the east of Muromachi, guarded the residence of
Yoshimasa. Sōzen, on his side, mustered a force of some ninety thousand,
and encamped on the west of Muromachi. Then commenced a long series of
fights in which victory nearly always rested with Kazumoto's side.
Kazumoto had the countenance of the retired shōgun, Yoshimasa, and also
procured the recognition of the emperor and ex-emperor, while Sōzen,
taking advantage of the strained relations between Yoshimasa and his
successor Yoshimi, invited the latter to join him, and also obtained the
support of the former partisans of the Southern dynasty by declaring in
favor of the grandson of Prince Ogura.
Combats occurred almost daily, and were accompanied by numerous
conflagrations. The citizens of Kyōto fled from the city, and the
streets were left desolate. In 1470 Sōzen and Kazumoto both died, but
their parties continued to fight as fiercely as ever. Not until 1477,
when Yoshimi had escaped to Mino, did the generals abandon the campaign
and retire to their castles.
[ILLUSTRATION: SOUTHERN JAPAN]
Kyōto had then been a battlefield for over eleven years, and during the
course of the fierce fighting, the imperial palace, the mansions of the
nobles, the residences and warehouses of the people, and many of the
largest temples, had been burned to the ground, books and documents
transmitted from ancient times and invaluable heirlooms and works of art
being destroyed at the same time. In truth, the once splendid city was
reduced, after this war, to a state of desolation and ruin. The military
and civilian classes alike were plunged in poverty. The laws were
discarded; the administration of justice was in disorder. The
territorial magnates in the provinces discontinued the payment of taxes,
closed their districts against communication from without, and governed
according to their own will. The mandates of the sovereign commanded no
respect. After the palace was leveled with the ground its inner
buildings were later reconstructed, but, inasmuch as the territorial
magnates ceased to pay taxes to the central government, the court nobles
found themselves without revenues and the administrative officials were
without salaries, so that some of them had no resource but to wander
about the country and depend on the farmers for means of sustenance.
Under such circumstances the usual court ceremonials were, of course,
dispensed with. Such was the impecuniosity in Kyōto that the Emperor
Gotsuchimikado was unable to hold the wonted ceremony on the occasion of
his accession, and at the time of his death, his funeral rites could not
be performed owing to lack of funds for the funeral. It was not until
the utmost exertions had been employed that the sum of a thousand _hiki_
(2500 _yen_) was collected and the burial rites were performed. On the
succession of Gokashiwabara, also, the coronation ceremony had to be
abandoned for similar reasons, nor could it be performed until
twenty-two years had elapsed, when the lord abbot of Hongwan-ji
contributed a sum of ten thousand pieces of gold for the purpose. While
Gonara was on the throne, even the daily necessaries of life could not
be procured in the imperial court without difficulty, neither could the
palace buildings be repaired, though they had fallen into a state of
much dilapidation. The court, at that era, experienced the extremity of
poverty. It is on record that Sanjōnishi Sanetaka, one of the courtiers,
persuaded Ōuchi Yoshitaka to provide funds for carrying out the
coronation ceremony, which must otherwise have been left in abeyance;
and that the Emperor Ōgimachi, under similar circumstances, had recourse
to the pecuniary assistance of Mōri Motonari.[2]
Not less did the shōgun himself suffer in this period of great
decentralization and lawlessness. He was a tool in the hands of the
_kwanryō_, and the house of the latter was divided against itself. The
stories of usurpations and murders, which continually disfigured the
annals of this period, are too tedious to be related. Finally, in 1565,
the Shōgun Yoshiteru was assassinated by a rear vassal, and his brother,
Yoshiaki, fled for life. It was in this connection that the great
warrior-statesman, Oda Nobunaga, came to the front, for through his aid
Yoshiaki regained his ground and rose to the shōgunate. Unfortunately
the young shōgun was unable to brook the overshadowing power of
Nobunaga, and took means to compass his ruin. The contest which followed
proved too unequal. In 1573, Yoshiaki forsook his office and fled to
Kawachi, thus ending the two hundred and fifty-eight years of the
Ashikaga rule,[3] as well as a century and a half of lawlessness.
Having briefly sketched the political history of the Muromachi period,
we shall now turn our attention to the remarkable history of the foreign
relations of this era. After the repulse of Kublai Khan's invasion in
the thirteenth century, the sovereign and people of China conceived
sufficient respect for the prowess of the Japanese to refrain from any
renewed onset. But the priests of the two empires continued to
communicate with one another. When the long and bitter struggle between
the rival dynasties greatly impoverished the country, some of the larger
provincial nobles sought to replenish their exchequers by engaging in
trade with China and Korea. The custom of officially recognized trading
with China also came into vogue from that time, restrictions being
imposed on the number of ships engaged and the amount of capital
involved. Perhaps more noteworthy than the trade are the exploits of the
Japanese pirates, for about this time the Japanese living on the
southwestern coasts began to make raids upon the seaside towns of China
and Korea, taking advantage of the internal dissensions then prevailing
in those countries. These raiders were aided by Chinese insurgents, and
entered the districts of Shantung, Fuhkien, and Sikkong, burning towns
and putting the inhabitants to the sword. They were in China called
_wakō_, whose very name struck terror among the inhabitants of the
coast. From 1369 the dynasty of Ming, which had just overthrown Yuan,
sent envoys to Japan urging that steps be taken to prevent the raids of
Japanese pirates into Chinese territory, but no satisfactory steps were
taken. A more serious complication was barely averted when, in 1384, an
envoy sent to China by the Southern dynasty of Japan entered into a plot
in collusion with one of the Chinese ministers, Hu Weiyung, to
assassinate the father of the Chinese emperor. The plot was discovered,
and the incensed sovereign would have sent an expedition against Japan
had he not recalled the ill success attending the Chinese arms in
previous conflicts with the Japanese. He contented himself with the
issue of an edict forbidding all further intercourse with the Japanese.
Stringent measures were at the same time taken for the defense of the
coast.
Korea also had suffered severely from the attacks of Japanese pirates,
who engaged in open conflict with the Korean troops, killing their
generals, destroying their barracks, and plundering houses, ships, and
grain-stores. In these encounters the army of Korea showed lack of
courage, frequently retreating before the Japanese raiders without
striking a blow. The earnest requests of the Korean king, in 1367 and
1375, that measures should be taken to repress the pirates, were only
met by the increased audacity of the Japanese raiders. In 1392 Li
Sei-kei, a Korean general who had been commissioned to beat back the
Japanese, raised the standard of revolt and usurped the sovereignty,
changing the name of the country from Kōrai to Chōsen. He dispatched an
envoy to Japan, seeking to establish amicable relations, and the Shōgun
Yoshimitsu ordered Ōuchi, governor of Kiushū, to treat the delegate with
all courtesy. Thereafter Japan often asked for books of various kinds
and Buddhist manuscripts, and the Koreans showed the utmost goodwill in
acceding to these requisitions. Nevertheless the littoral population of
Japan did not desist from raiding the Korean coasts.
After the union of the Northern and Southern dynasties, the ex-Shōgun
Yoshimitsu frequently sent envoys to China, and on several occasions
caused the pirates to be arrested and handed over to the Chinese. Much
pleased at this action, the Chinese emperor sent to Japan, in 1404, a
hundred tickets (_kango_) of the nature of passports, and from that
time, once in every ten years, gifts were forwarded from China to a
fixed number of ships with a fixed personnel, the articles sent
consisting of head-gear, garments, brocade, gold, antiquities, and old
pictures. Even an imperial commission of investiture was also sent, for
China habitually regarded other nations as tributary to herself.
Yoshimitsu seems to have condoned the nominal humiliation so long as he
was certain of the gifts of the sovereign of the Middle State, but when
at his death the Ming sovereign dispatched an envoy to confer on the
deceased shōgun the posthumous title of _Kyōken-ō_ (the King Kyōken) and
to offer various gifts, the new Shōgun Yoshimochi politely, but
emphatically, declined to receive these marks of favor. This incident
terminated the official intercourse between Japan and China. Trade
relations, however, still continued.
A striking incident occurred in 1419, when a flotilla of thirteen
hundred ships of war from Mongolia, Korea, and Namban (the countries
south of China) appeared off Tsushima. The Kiushū barons, headed by the
Sō and the Shibukawa families, who held the office of governors of
Kiushū, beat off the invaders and slaughtered an immense number of them.
Thenceforth Korea held Japan in awe and made no attempts against her. In
1440 the Korean government established amicable relations with the Sō
family, sent presents of valuable books and opened commercial
intercourse. The same year another Chinese envoy arrived with dispatches
demanding in a peremptory tone the establishment of amity between the
two empires, but the Shōgun Yoshimochi declined to entertain the
proposal. In the time of the Shōgun Yoshinori, however, official
intercourse with China was reopened, the emperor sending to Japan two
hundred tickets in the nature of passports which were placed by the
shōgunate in the charge of the Ōuchi family. The Sō family was then
appointed to control the trade with Korea, that with China being
intrusted to Ōuchi. Under the Shōgun Yoshimasa intercourse with China
received considerable development, and parcels of books as well as
quantities of copper coin were frequently forwarded to Japan at her
request. The Ming sovereigns always complied with Japan's wishes in
these matters, but considerable irregularities occurred in the trade
between the two nations, owing to selfish disregard of the regulations
issued for its control. Moreover, Japanese from Kiushū and other places
crossed over to China, carrying with them not only legitimate articles
of trade, but also implements of war. They pretended that the latter
were gifts from the Japanese government to China, but they did not
hesitate to use them for purposes of intimidation when they found an
opportunity to plunder the Chinese.
Still later, in the closing years of the Ashikaga shōgunate, outlaws
from Kiushū entered China and Korea in constantly increasing numbers for
purposes of plunder, the provinces on the Chinese littoral sustaining
great injury at the hands of these marauders. On the flags of the
Japanese piratical ships were inscribed the ideograms _Hachiman-gu_
(Hachiman, the God of War). The Chinese consequently termed these
vessels _Papan-sen_, "Papan" being the Chinese pronunciation of
"Hachiman," and regarded them with the greatest apprehension. With them,
too, Chinese pirates were associated, and the people of China suffered
so much from their raids that the emperor deputed two of his principal
generals to attack and destroy the raiders, but the task could not be
successfully accomplished. From Korea, too, came a request to the Sō
family that they would restrain the Japanese from further incursions
into the peninsula, but the head of the family paid no heed, and the
result was that the Koreans treated with great cruelty a number of the
inhabitants of Tsushima who happened to be sojourning in the peninsula.
This procedure so enraged the people of Tsushima that, in 1510, they
attacked Fusan in force, and having destroyed its fortifications,
returned unmolested to Tsushima. After this, the pillage of the Korean
coast towns by Japanese pirates continued without intermission. It will
be seen in the next chapter that this long history of piracy in Korea
culminated in an organized invasion into the peninsula of large Japanese
forces under the leadership of their best generals.
The closing days of the Ashikaga shōgunate are also noted for the
opening of Japan's relations with the Europeans. Merchantmen of Portugal
arrived for the first time, in 1542, at the Island of Tanegashima, off
the coast of Ōsumi. They subsequently visited Kagoshima, and thence
proceeded to Bungo, where their captains concluded with the nobleman
Ōtomo Sōrin a convention opening commercial intercourse. Thenceforth
Portuguese vessels frequently visited Kiushū for purposes of trade, the
people competing with each other to purchase the rare and valuable
articles offered by the strangers. It was then that firearms were for
the first time introduced into Japan, and the military class, fully
appreciating the advantages of such a weapon, set themselves eagerly to
learn the method of handling and manufacturing it. With trade and
weapons came also religious teaching. In 1548 Francis Xavier, a Jesuit
missionary, with two disciples, arrived at Nagasaki, and by permission
of the Shimazu family, began to preach Christianity throughout the
provinces of Kiushū. This was the first time since the introduction of
Buddhism that the tenets of a foreign religion were laid before the
Japanese people. The alien creed soon began to spread in the island, as
also in the neighborhood of Kyōto, and afterward in Kwantō, Mutsu, and
Dewa. The largest number of converts were found in Kiushū, where the
people built chapels for the purpose of Christian worship. The great
noble Ōtomo Sōrin was an earnest believer, while Ōuchi Yoshitaka, as
well as the Shōgun Yoshiteru, were also converted. So successful was
Christian propagandism in those early days, that in 1581 the Ōmura and
Arima families of Hizen sent envoys to Rome with letters and articles of
Japanese production for presentation to the Pope. Thus in religion, as
in piracy and trade, this period was characterized by a certain
unconscious freedom, which stands in great contrast with the policy of
restriction and exclusion which was adopted by the Japanese rulers of
later ages.
In the domain of learning and literature, the Muromachi period has left
little to posterity. The continual and widespread warfare and
devastation naturally turned men's attention away from intellectual
refinement. Sporadic efforts were made by some lords to encourage
learning, but the latter had almost completely passed into the monopoly
of the Buddhist priests, some of whom continued in active communication
with the source of enlightenment, China. In short, literature must be
said to have suffered great neglect as compared with the attention
bestowed on it in earlier ages. But the contrary is true of the fine
arts. During the period of the Southern and Northern dynasties many
Japanese priests traveled to China for the purpose of studying the books
and paintings of the Sung and Yuan dynasties. Moreover, from the time of
Yoshimitsu, and especially in the days of Yoshimasa, a general tendency
prevailed to refined pleasure and artistic display of all kinds, so that
objects of virtu and paintings by the old masters were enthusiastically
admired and sought after. Under such circumstances art industry
naturally made great progress in Kyōto. Imperial patronage was extended
to painters, an office being established at court, under the name of
_edokoro_, where affairs relating to pictorial art were controlled.
During the reign of Gotsuchimikado the great painter Tosa Mitsunobu,
founder of the Tosa school, flourished. His style was elaborate, his use
of colors skillful and striking, and his brushwork showed great
delicacy and boldness combined. Previous to his time, Chinese paintings
of the Sung masters, distinguished for refined simplicity of conception
and execution, had stood very high in Japanese estimation, their vogue
being increased by the widespread popularity of the Zen sect of
Buddhism, which had been brought from China to Japan during the era of
the Sung sovereigns. People's taste had been educated to prefer simple
water-color sketches to the more showy and labored productions of the
Yamato school. During the Oyei era (1394-1427 A. D.), three celebrated
painters, Mincho, Josetsu, and Shubun, flourished. Mincho's second art
name was Chodensu. His skill in painting figure subjects, Buddhas,
Rishi, Arhats, and so forth, was most remarkable. His pictures were
generally of large size and the few that remain are immensely prized.
Josetsu took for his models the masters of the Sung and Yuan dynasties,
and developed great skill in depicting figure subjects, landscapes,
birds, and flowers. Shubun was a pupil of Josetsu. His favorite subjects
were those of his master, and he excelled in lightly tinted
water-colors. Among his pupils were the renowned artists Oguri Sotan,
Soga Dasoku, Sesshū, the priest Shokei, and others. Sotan painted
landscapes of the most charming and faithful character, and was also
great in figure subjects, birds, and flowers. Dasoku was conspicuous
for the boldness and strength of his touch. Shokei, who is often called
Keishoki, was famous for his pictures of sacred figures and landscapes,
and Sesshū excelled even his master in the directness of his methods,
the sentiment of his pictures, and the delicacy of his execution. During
the Kansei era (1460-1465), he crossed to China in order to study the
landscapes and foliage of that country. The journey added to his fame,
for in the neighboring empire he found no peer, and the emperor of China
as well as the people paid him great honor. Sesshū has had few equals in
the art of depicting landscapes, figures, floral subjects, dragons, and
tigers. Students of his style were Sesson, Soyen, and Tokan (called also
Shugetsu), all artists of note. A contemporary of Sesshū, Kano
Oyenosuke, was taken under the special patronage of the Shōgun
Yoshinori, and his son, Kano Masanobu, who had studied under Oguri
Sotan, was employed in the decoration of the Golden Pavilion, where, by
order of the ex-Shōgun Yoshimasa, he painted the eight Siao-siong views.
His eldest son, Kohōgen Motonobu, was the initiator of a new style based
on the Yamato school of Nobuzane and the methods of the Sung and Yuan
dynasties. His colors were applied with the greatest feeling and
delicacy, and the facility and force of his brush were evidenced by
noble paintings of landscapes, figure subjects, and foliage. He was the
ancestor of the Kano family, and his son, Shoyei, and grandson, Eitoku,
worked on his lines with conspicuous success.
Sculpture and the ceramic industry made progress not less remarkable
than that of painting during the Muromachi epoch. Muneyasu of the
Myochin family stood at the head of workers in metal. He made for the
Shōgun Yoshimitsu a helmet of extraordinary beauty. Another helmet
equally remarkable for the grace and fineness of its workmanship was
forged for Takeda Shingen by Nobuiye, also a Myochin. The era was also
rich in swordsmiths of note. Of these Gotō Sukenori was the most famous.
A short sword made by him for Yoshimasa was considered a marvel of
skilled forging. Glyptic work in various metals found masters of the
highest craft in the representatives of the Gotō family. They took their
decorative designs from pictures painted by the artists of the Kano
school, and reproduced these charming conceptions on sword fittings with
extraordinary fidelity, using the chisel as though it were a painter's
brush. Aoki Kanaiye and Myochin Nobuiye were specially celebrated as
makers of sword-guards, a part of the warrior's equipment on which much
manufacturing care was lavished.
The vogue attained by the _cha-no-yu_ (tea ceremonial) cult under the
Ashikaga shōguns and owing to the efforts of Sen-no-Rikiu, a celebrated
dilettante of Hideyoshi's time, had a marked influence in encouraging
the development of ceramics, and several experts of the craft made their
appearance. During the reign of Gokashiwabara, a potter named Shozui
traveled to China to study the processes of his art, and on his return
established a kiln in Hizen, where the first Japanese translucent
porcelain was produced. Shozui adapted his methods to the canons of the
_cha-no-yu_ cult, making simplicity and purity of style his chief
objects.
The lacquerer's art also made great progress in this era. Its experts
found munificent patronage owing to the luxurious and costly tastes
which prevailed at the time in obedience to the example set by the
Ashikaga rulers. Objects of extraordinary richness and delicacy were
produced, especially in the line of gold lacquer, where the Japanese
workers developed unique skill. Their _chefs-d'oeuvre_ were not more
valued in Japan than in China, where they were known as "_Yatpun
T'sat-ki_." Two other famous varieties of lacquer work had their origin
in this era, namely, _tsuishu_, or red lacquer, chiseled in high relief,
and _tsuikoku_, or lacquer laid on in alternate layers of red and black
and carved deeply, the edges of the design being sloped so as to show
the gradation of layers. Despite the continued warfare and unceasing
disturbance of the Muromachi epoch, the shōguns and the great nobles and
generals affected a most luxurious and refined manner of life, and it
consequently resulted that the blackest era of Japanese history, so far
as concerned the preservation of public peace and order and the security
of life and property, was nevertheless a time of marked artistic
development.
FOOTNOTES:
[1]
100. Emperor Gokomatsu, 1383-1413.
|
101. Emperor Shōkō, 1413-1429.
|
102. Emperor Gohanazono, 1429-1465.
|
103. Emperor Gotsuchimikado, 1465-1501.
[2] The following is the list of the emperors of this period:
103. Emperor Gotsuchimikado, 1465-1501.
104. Emperor Gokashiwabara, 1501-1527.
105. Emperor Gonara, 1527-1558.
106. Emperor Ogimachi, 1558-1587.
107. Emperor Goyōzei, 1587-1612.
[3] The shōguns of the Ashikaga family and the years of their
rule were as follows:
1. Ashikaga Takauji, 1335-1358. 8. Ashikaga Yoshimasa, 1449-1473.
2. Ashikaga Yoshiakira, 1358-1367. 9. Ashikaga Yoshihisa, 1473-1489.
3. Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 1367-1394. 10. Ashikaga Yoshimura, 1489-1493
4. Ashikaga Yoshimochi, 1394-1423 and 1508-1521.
and 1425-1428. 11. Ashikaga Yoshizumi, 1493-1508.
5. Ashikaga Yoshikazu, 1423-1425. 12. Ashikaga Yoshiharu, 1521-1545.
6. Ashikaga Yoshinori, 1428-1441. 13. Ashikaga Yoshiteru, 1545-1565.
7. Ashikaga Yoshikatsu, 1441-1449. 14. Ashikaga Yoshinaga, 1565-1568.
15. Ashikaga Yoshiaki, 1568-1573.
Chapter X
INTERNAL PEACE AND EXTERNAL WAR. 1573-1603
At the end of the last chapter we left feudal Japan wasted by internal
anarchy. It is one of the most remarkable phenomena in history that
within two decades after the fall of the Ashikaga the national life not
only was restored to its normal peace, but also attained to such
fullness of vigor as to embark in a warfare of unprecedented magnitude
for foreign conquest. The period of thirty years between the fall of the
last shōgun of Muromachi and the foundation of the Edo rule, 1573-1603,
stands unparalleled in the annals of the Japanese nation for its wealth
of stories of valor and heroism. The spirit of the time was such as
brought to the surface only men of uncommon ability. The era was of
itself rich in inspiring events, but the latter were in no small measure
due to the brilliant achievements of three heroes--Oda Nobunaga
(1573-1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1583-1598), and Tokugawa Iyeyasu
(1600-1616)--who rose one after another to rule over feudal Japan.
Deferring the story of the work of the last statesman, we shall now turn
to the career of Oda and Toyotomi, who respectively unified the long
dismembered nation, and organized the great Korean expedition.
The tendency of the Ashikaga times was to encourage individual ambition.
Military chieftains devoted themselves to organizing armies and
equipping soldiers in the most efficient manner, in order to overcome
rivals and establish their own independence. But none of them ever
succeeded in introducing order into the provinces they overran or
organizing their administration on a permanent basis. Probably the
origin of this defect is to be sought, not in the administrative
incompetence of these chieftains, but rather in the absence of any
supreme head to issue general orders. The power of the imperial court,
indeed, had greatly declined, but the nation nevertheless regarded the
sovereign with the utmost respect, and whatever the prowess of military
nobles or however great the number of their following, it was
impossible for them to undertake any decisive campaign against Kyōto,
because, in traversing the interval that separated their bases of
operations from the capital, they would have found themselves environed
by enemies ready to protect the court against violence, as well as by
rivals whom the prospect of any one noble's supremacy would have moved
to union against him. Nothing remained, therefore, but to establish
local autonomy. Beyond that none of the great nobles succeeded in
attaining until the Oda family appeared in Owari, and owing to their
sagacity and valor, as well as to the strategical advantages of their
position, accomplished more than any of their predecessors.
This remarkable family was descended from the family of Taira.
Nobunaga's father, Nobuhide, from his early youth, was an ardent
imperialist. He made large pecuniary sacrifices to effect the repairs of
the emperor's palace and the reconstruction of one of the principal
shrines in Ise. His son Nobunaga, a man of daring, harbored ambitious
designs, and following his father's example, treated the sovereign with
the utmost deference, and constantly revolved plans for the general
pacification of the country and the restoration of order. In his youth
he showed a disposition to profligacy, but when his chief vassal
committed suicide to emphasize a protest against these dissolute
courses, Nobunaga completely reformed his conduct. An opportunity soon
occurred to test his military genius. Among the rival lords of that
time, Imagawa Yoshimoto, chief of the provinces of Suruga, Tōtōmi, and
Mikawa, showed a conspicuous disposition to attack and raid the
neighboring territories. In 1560 he invaded Owari at the head of a great
army, overbearing all resistance and destroying several strongholds.
Pushing on to Okehazama, he rested there, and organized an immense
banquet to celebrate his successes. During the progress of these
festivities, Oda Nobunaga, in command of a comparatively small force,
surprised the Imagawa camp, inflicted a crushing defeat on the invaders,
and killed Yoshimoto, a disaster from which the Imagawa family never
recovered. Soon afterward Nobunaga annexed the province of Mino, the
lord of which had alienated his followers by his unworthy manner of
life. Nobunaga further strengthened his position toward the east by
entering into marital relations with the families of Takeda and
Matsudaira. He now watched closely for a favorable opportunity to direct
his arms against the military magnates in Kyōto. It will be remembered
how one Matsunaga assassinated the Shōgun Yoshiteru, and how the
latter's brother, Yoshiaki, in 1568, succeeded to the shōgunate with the
loyal support of Nobunaga. Nobunaga had in the meantime annexed Ōmi and
all the Kinai provinces. Nominally a vassal, his influence was greater
than that of the shōgun. Nobunaga built a castle at Nijō, summoning the
people of the Kinai and other districts to contribute to its completion
either in money or labor. This place he assigned as residence to the
shōgun, intrusting the duty of guarding him to Kinoshita Hideyoshi,
afterward Toyotomi. Nobunaga also repaired the imperial palace, and
restored it to its ancient and long-forgotten splendor. One of the
methods employed by Nobunaga to obtain funds for the preservation of the
imperial buildings was to lend rice to the people, the interest accruing
on the loans being devoted to the maintenance of the palace. Nobunaga
reversed the policy of the Ashikaga, not only in thus manifesting his
loyalty to the imperial house, but also in dealing harshly with the
Buddhist priests of Mount Hiye, whose great influence had been feared by
temporal rulers ever since the ninth century. In his war with the lord
of Echizen, he found these sacerdotal warriors on the side of his enemy.
As soon as Echizen was reduced, Nobunaga, disregarding the remonstrance
of his vassals, destroyed several of the temples, putting the priests to
death as well as the women and children who lived with them,
confiscating their lands, and bestowing them on his vassal Akechi
Mitsuhide. Thus fell the contumacious and powerful priests who, relying
on the authority of their religion, had treated even imperial mandates
with contempt. Nothing remained of them but a few of their temples and
the doctrines they had taught. Kosa, however, the lord abbot of
Hongwan-ji, fled from one place to another and gathered a body of strong
supporters wherever he went, and it was not till eleven years later that
the priestly opposition was completely reduced. Meanwhile, the Shōgun
Yoshiaki grew jealous of the immense power which Nobunaga was acquiring,
and in spite of the latter's repeated effort to convince him of his
loyalty, at length in 1573 raised an army to destroy Nobunaga. The
campaign, however, ended in the defeat of the shōgun. He escaped to the
province of Kawachi, and the supremacy of the Ashikaga family came to an
end. In 1576 Nobunaga built a castle of unprecedented strength at
Adsuchi in Ōmi. The keep was a hundred feet in height. It stood within
seven stone walls of circumvallation, with moats constructed of large
masses of granite.
Having thus fixed his headquarters in Adsuchi, Oda Nobunaga set about
subduing those eastern provinces which still remained independent, and
also all of the western provinces, where his influence was almost
unknown. No sooner, however, had the former been reduced under his sway
and the plans of campaign against the latter matured, than Nobunaga met
an untimely death in 1582 at the hand of his vassal, Akechi Mitsuhide.
With great strategic skill, Nobunaga had combined the faculty of
discovering able men and winning their loyalty. Seldom had so large a
number of great men been found under the control of a single ruler as
under Nobunaga. Death prevented him from carrying out his design of
subjugating Kiushū, as he had conquered the other districts of the
empire. Toward the imperial court he had shown unvarying reverence. He
had devoted considerable sums to renovating the shrines. He also had
adopted effective measures for the repair of roads and bridges, and
facilitated travel by abolishing military barriers. But his character
was austere, and his administrative measures were strict and
uncompromising. It was by the exercise of these traits that he provoked
the anger of Mitsuhide, and thus unfortunately met an untimely end
without achieving the great ambition of his life.
Akechi Mitsuhide, the assassin, proceeded to Adsuchi, and having there
possessed himself of a large supply of money and other valuables,
returned to Kyōto. Hashiba Hideyoshi, who led the western campaign
against the great Mōri family, quickly accepted the surrender of the
latter, who were ignorant of Nobunaga's death, and hastened back to turn
his arms against the rebel general. Mitsuhide sustained a crushing
defeat at Yamazaki in Settsu. Fleeing toward Ōmi, he was assassinated
_en route_ by a farmer, only thirteen days after he had raised the
standard of revolt. The celerity with which Hideyoshi avenged the death
of Nobunaga had a decisive effect upon the course of events that
followed. Other great vassals of the late Nobunaga also hurried from
their provinces to accomplish the same end, only to find that Hideyoshi
had forestalled them all. A consultation was now held between Hideyoshi
and these generals regarding Nobunaga's successor, his two sons,
Nobukatsu and Nobutaka, being keen rivals for the honor. Hideyoshi,
apprehending that their mutual enmity might prove disastrous if either
were nominated, would not listen to the advice of his colleagues, but
insisted that Sambōshi, son of Nobutada, the heir of Nobunaga, who
perished with his father, should be appointed. Sambōshi was then a child
only three years of age, so the power of the Oda family devolved upon
Hideyoshi. The other generals, however, refused to endorse this
arrangement. Nobutaka especially was hostile to the influence of
Hideyoshi. Acting in collusion with Shibata Katsuiye and Takikawa
Kazumasu, he attempted to destroy Hideyoshi. But again Hideyoshi's
victory was quick and decisive, for not only did the conspirators fall
one after another in battle, but their fiefs were annexed by Hideyoshi,
whose prestige was thus greatly increased. The emperor now conferred on
him the title of _sangi_ (councilor of state). He established his
headquarters in Ōsaka, judging the place convenient for purposes of
transportation and administration alike. Instructions were issued to the
various territorial nobles to furnish timber and stones, with which
Hideyoshi caused to be constructed in Ōsaka a magnificent castle.
Meanwhile, Nobukatsu, the remaining son of Nobunaga, had conceived
hostility toward Hideyoshi, and in conjunction with Tokugawa Iyeyasu,
raised an army and occupied a strong position at Komaki in Owari.
Hideyoshi, finding himself unable to overcome these adversaries,
concluded peace with them. He also subdued the independent provinces of
the north and Shikoku. In Kiushū, where the powerful family of Shimadsu
had held sway over the whole island, Hideyoshi reduced their fief to
three provinces of Hiuga, Satsuma, and Ōsumi, and confiscated the other
six. The Hōjō family of Odawara and Date Masamune of the extreme north
held out the longest against Hideyoshi, but they also finally yielded to
the overwhelming military genius. Further, he recognized as lord of the
Island of Ezo, Matsumaye Nobuhiro, whose grandfather had crossed thither
and subdued the aborigines. For the first time the wars and tumults that
had convulsed Japan since the Ojin era were at last brought to an end,
and the whole country came under the administrative sway of one strong
ruler.
The story of the rise of Hideyoshi from the humblest to the most
elevated position in the feudal world of Japan is highly characteristic
of the man and his times. The son of a foot-soldier in Owari,
Hideyoshi's original name was Tōkichi. From early childhood he acquired
among his playmates a reputation for cleverness. Subsequently,
attracted by the great renown of Nobunaga, he took service under him,
who, pleased with the sagacity displayed by the youth, raised him after
a time to the command of a division of soldiers. Tōkichi grew in favor
with the Oda chief, who conferred on him the name of Hashiba, deriving
it from the names of his two ablest generals, Niwa and Shibata. When
Nobunaga was assassinated, Hideyoshi showed remarkable promptness and
ability in destroying the traitorous vassal, a deed that won for him
high popularity among the partisans of the deceased chief. Thenceforth
his career was a series of brilliantly conceived and boldly executed
conquests. Professing always to protect the Oda family, he took
advantage of the discussions between Nobutaka and Nobukatsu to overthrow
Katsuiye and Kazumasu, and showed at once his magnanimity and his
prowess in the easy terms of peace which he granted to the Shimadsu
family while pushing his operations against the Hōjō to their complete
overthrow. Thus, despite his humble origin, he succeeded ultimately in
grasping the administrative reins of the whole empire. His ambition
prompted him to desire the post of _sei-i-tai-shōgun_, but custom had
required from time immemorial that the occupant of that high office
should be a member of the Minamoto clan. This difficulty Hideyoshi
sought to overcome by getting himself adopted as the son of the Shōgun
Yoshiaki, but the latter could not be persuaded to consent. Ultimately,
he induced the emperor to appoint him _kwanryō_ or regent, a position
really ranking higher than that of shōgun. On that occasion the
sovereign conferred on him the family name of Toyotomi. Hideyoshi also
spared no pains to restore the prestige of the throne, supplying all the
expenses required for the imperial household and exacting from the
nobles an oath that they would reverence the sovereign and make no
encroachment on the imperial domains.
Hideyoshi's administrative organization was remarkable. He created five
_bugyō_; namely, a mayor of the city of Kyōto, a manager of taxation, a
judicial administrator, a supervisor of the public works, and a supreme
judge of civil suits. He also selected Tokugawa Iyeyasu, Uyesugi
Kagekatsu, Mōri Terumoto, Ukita Hideiye, and Mayeda Toshiiye to form a
council of state, called the _gotairō_, five elders, for the purpose of
deliberating upon all weighty national affairs. The question of the land
also received careful attention at his hands. Perceiving that, owing to
faulty administration of the regulations, many irregularities had
arisen, and estates were in many cases wrongly registered, he
dispatched inspectors to all the provinces and caused accurate surveys
and returns to be made, severe punishment being meted out to any
officials convicted of receiving bribes in the execution of this office.
The result was that large tracts of land hitherto improperly exempted
from taxation were brought within the fiscal system. A radical change
was also introduced in the manner of registering lands: hitherto they
had been classed according to the monetary income obtained from them;
thenceforth they were estimated according to their produce in kind, and
the taxes were calculated on the basis of this new valuation. Speaking
roughly, about two-thirds of the produce went to the state, the
remainder to the cultivators of the land. Further, in view of the
defective condition of the currency, Hideyoshi caused gold coins of two
dimensions--_ōban_ and _koban_--to be struck, as well as ingots of
silver, and coins of silver and copper known as the _tenshō tsūhō-sen_.
In Hideyoshi's time Christianity had already obtained considerable vogue
throughout the country. Oda Nobunaga had sanctioned the preaching of the
foreign creed, and had built for it a place of worship, called
Namban-ji, in Kyōto. But when Hideyoshi, in the course of his campaign
against Shimadsu, reached Hakata, the Christian priests showed such an
arrogant demeanor that Hideyoshi, enraged by their conduct, ordered that
they should leave Japan by a certain day, and prohibited the people from
embracing Christianity. He even went to the length of causing Namban-ji
to be destroyed. Some of the converts, however, managed to conceal
themselves and carry on their worship in secret. When the Tokugawa
shōguns came into possession of the administrative power, the edicts
against the foreign faith were strictly enforced, and steps were taken
to restore to Buddhism those who had embraced Christianity. These
measures were unsuccessful, however, and culminated in the Shimabara
disturbances in 1637, which will be subsequently described.
We shall now relate the story of Hideyoshi's Korean expedition. It will
be remembered how, during the period of the lax administration of the
Ashikaga, the laws were ill respected, disorders were constant, and the
littoral population took advantage of the situation to engage in
piratical raids against China. These proceedings led to a cessation of
intercourse between Japan and China, and Korea also, having been
conquered by China, ceased to maintain friendly relations with Japan. At
the same time, on Japan's part, much cause of complaint existed against
Korea. The Koreans had always assisted the Yuan dynasty of Mongols in
their attacks upon Japan, and had shown themselves her bitter enemies.
But owing to the unceasing prevalence of internal disturbances in Japan,
it was not possible to avenge the hostile acts of China and Korea. So
soon, however, as domestic broils were brought to an end and the control
of the administration rendered effective throughout the empire,
Hideyoshi formed the project of leading an expedition against the Ming
sovereigns. He had entertained this idea for some time, and had made it
known to Oda Nobunaga when preparations were in progress for the
campaign against the Mōri family. In 1587, after his successful
expedition against the Shimadsu in Kiushū, Hideyoshi sent a dispatch to
Sō Yoshitomo, warden of Tsushima Island, directing him to take steps for
inviting the king of Korea to come to Japan in order to have audience of
the Japanese emperor. This invitation was to be accompanied by an
intimation that unless the king obeyed the summons, the Japanese forces
would at once be directed against Korea. Following up this measure, he
determined--in 1590, by which time the country's domestic troubles had
been entirely settled--to insist on presents being sent to Japan by both
China and Korea, on pain of being invaded unless they consented to take
that step. He dispatched an envoy to Korea with instructions to make
known his purpose, and to require that the Koreans should act as
intermediaries to procure China's consent. In the event of the Koreans'
refusing, they were threatened with the punishment of being compelled to
march in the van of the Japanese army to the invasion of China. The
Koreans, however, declined to accept such a proposition. Hideyoshi
thereupon gave up the office of _kwanpaku_ to his adopted son, Hidetsugu,
and assuming the title of _taikō_, he decided to lead an expedition
against Korea. The emperor having given his approval of the step, orders
were issued to all the provinces to furnish troops and military
supplies, as well as to build a great fleet of war-vessels. In 1592
Hideyoshi appointed Ukita Hideiye commander-in-chief of the army, with
Masuda Nagamori, Ishida Mitsunari, and Otani Yoshitaka for his staff.
The whole force, numbering, it is said, 130,000 men, was divided into
eight corps, and with the van were Konishi Yukinaga and Katō Kiyomasa.
The sailors of the fleet aggregated 9000, and were under the command of
Kuki Yoshitaka.
[Illustration: Korea]
In March, Hideyoshi left Kyōto, and proceeding westward worshiped at the
sepulchers of the Emperor Chūai and the Empress Jingō, passing thence to
Nagoya in Hizen, where the forces from all the provinces were being
mustered. In April the expedition sailed from the coast of Japan. The
number of ships was so great that they seemed to cover the sea and
struck the Koreans with consternation. Konishi Yukinaga and his division
were the first to reach Korea. They effected a landing at Fusan, and
took prisoner the Korean general who attempted to defend the port.
From this point Yukinaga marched confidently on Tokunegi, overbearing
all resistance and putting the enemy's officers to the sword. Shortly
afterward Kiyomasa and his corps also reached Fusan, and heading for
Kegushagushu, attacked and took it. Korea's opposition was soon crushed,
and the whole country submitted to the vast force of invaders.
Meanwhile, the king, Lien, who had not failed to convey to China
intimation of the pending danger, sent to the court of the Ming
sovereigns earnest appeals for succor; and his troops having been
everywhere defeated by the Japanese, he finally fled from the capital
with his son, and took refuge in Hegushagu, having left one of his
generals to defend Kanko. The Japanese troops, everywhere victorious,
pushed on to the capital, which was taken by Konishi Yukinaga, the other
generals subsequently assembling there. Yukinaga now made preparations
to invade Hei-ando, and Kiyomasa took Hamukyando as the scene of his
next campaign. Meanwhile, Hideyoshi, forseeing that a Chinese army would
be sent to aid the Koreans, dispatched reinforcements to the invading
troops, and conveyed to the commanders messages of encouragement and
exhortation. He was persuaded that the Japanese army would defeat the
Chinese, and he believed that in the space of two years the conquest of
China might be effected, in which event he purposed transferring the
capital of Japan to China. He even went so far as to determine the
routine to be followed in the removal of the Japanese court to China.
Kiyomasa now marched northward to Hamukyando, where he took a town
called Eikyo. Learning there that two Korean princes were at Kaineifu,
he attacked it and took them both prisoners. Continuing his advance, he
crossed the northern frontier and entered Orankai, where he destroyed
the castle, taking and putting to death a number of Koreans. The
impetuosity of his movements and the unvarying success of his arms
filled the Koreans with dismay. They gave him the name of "_Kishokwan_"
(_i. e._, the demon general), and fled at the mere news of his approach.
Yukinaga, in the meanwhile, having conquered Hei-an, the king of Korea
retired from Hegushagu and would have entered Hamukyan, but finding that
Kiyomasa had already overrun that district, he turned westward to Gishu
(Wiju). Yukinaga marched against Kuimeigen and took Hegushagu, the
Japanese troops being everywhere victorious. Things did not fare equally
well with the navy, however. The ships sustained several defeats, and
their intention of proceeding from Terura-do to Kanai-do to effect a
junction with the army was frustrated by the Korean commander Li
Shunshin, who fought with the utmost tenacity and stoutness.
The emperor of China, having received intelligence of what was going
forward in the peninsula, had dispatched from Ap-lok-kong a general
named Tso Shingfon at the head of a considerable force, to succor the
Koreans. Yukinaga encountered this army and completely routed it, the
Chinese general barely escaping with his life, the news of which event
inspired much alarm in China. Kiyomasa, whose operations had also been
attended with uniform success, now directed his forces southward, and
Lien, the king of Korea, in his extremity, once more applied to China
for aid. The Chinese sovereign thereupon commissioned a minister, Chom
Wei-king, to consult with his colleagues as to the advisability of
concluding peace with Japan. But among the Chinese captains there was
one Li Chiu, who, having much confidence in his own prowess, insisted
that no terms should be offered, and that the war should be prosecuted
to the end. Another army was accordingly dispatched to Korea under his
command, and marching with rapidity, he soon reached Hegushagu at the
head of a great force. There he encountered the Japanese under Yukinaga
and defeated them. Yukinaga retired to the Korean capital, whither also
the other Japanese generals concentrated their troops, the corps under
the command of Kobayagawa Takakage alone remaining to guard Kaijo,
despite the urgent advice of the other three generals that he too should
concentrate his forces at the capital. Li, following up his victory,
pushed on toward the capital at the head of a large army. Takakage and
others encountered the Chinese army at Hekitei-kan, and the divisions of
Tachibana Muneshige and Mōri Hidekane fought with such bravery that Li's
force was almost exterminated, Li himself barely escaping. Takakage
hotly pursued the retreating Chinese, great numbers of whom either fell
under the swords of the Japanese or were drowned in attempting to cross
rivers. This blow threw the Chinese into a state of disorganization. Li
retired into Hegushagu, and remained inactive.
Meanwhile, the victorious career of the Japanese had been checked in
Chiushu, in attacking which place they were repulsed. Moreover, plague
broke out in the camp and provisions were exhausted. Under these
circumstances the Japanese were not unwilling to listen to proposals of
peace made by a Chinese envoy, Chom Wei-king. Hideyoshi dictated seven
articles as the basis of a treaty; first, that in order to secure amity
between the two empires, a Chinese imperial princess should become the
consort of a Japanese imperial prince: second, that permits for
commercial intercourse should be sent to Japan; third, that the
ministers of the two countries should exchange a friendly convention;
fourth, that Korea should be divided into halves, one to belong to
Japan, and the other, including the four provinces and the capital, then
in Japanese hands, to be restored to Korea; fifth, that Korea should
place in Japan's hands, as pledges of good faith, her prince royal and
certain ministers of the crown; sixth, that Japan should restore to
Korea the two Korean princes whom she had taken prisoners; and seventh,
that influential Korean subjects should give written promises of
submission to Japan. The Chinese envoy objected to the two conditions
relating to the marriage of a Chinese princess with a Japanese prince,
and to the partition of Korea. Hideyoshi, however, urged him to return
to China and report the situation to his sovereign. Meanwhile, he
ordered the Japanese generals to send back the two Korean prisoners, and
to renew the attack on Chiushu, pending the conclusion of peace. But,
after some further parleying, the Chinese envoy finally refused to
comply with Hideyoshi's suggestion, and no answer to Japan's conditions
was received from the Chinese emperor. Hideyoshi, now concluding that
peace was impossible, began to make preparations for himself leading an
army to attack China. At this juncture the envoy who had been sent to
Japan, as well as other Chinese statesmen, suggested to their emperor
that what Hideyoshi really wanted was an imperial commission appointing
him king of Japan. The Chinese emperor accordingly dispatched another
envoy to Japan carrying a gold seal and a headpiece specially
manufactured for the purpose. In 1596, Hideyoshi gave audience to this
envoy in the castle at Fushimi, and ordered him to read the documents
with which he had come entrusted. The envoy complied, but when he came
to the clause where it was stated that the Chinese government appointed
Hideyoshi to be king of Japan, the _taikō_ became greatly enraged.
Seizing the document he threw it and the headpiece on the floor, and
declared that his intention was to become king of China, and that the
Chinese government should learn how little it had to do with the
sovereignty of Japan. He dismissed the Chinese and Korean envoys, and
issued orders for a campaign against China. In February of the following
year, the Japanese generals assembled at Nagoya in Hizen, Kiyomasa and
Yukinaga being the first to set out for Korea. The Chinese government,
learning that the negotiations had been unsuccessful, sent another army
to the peninsula under the command of Ying Kai and Tik Ho.
Meanwhile, the Korean general Li Shunshin had gained several victories
over the Japanese forces, and joined by this new army, his strength
became very great. Thereupon Kiyomasa fortified his position at Urosan,
and there sustained a stubborn siege, the Chinese General Tik Ho's
repeated efforts to reduce the place proving abortive. By degrees the
provisions within Kiyomasa's lines became exhausted. His men were
obliged to eat horse-flesh, and being exposed to the bitter cold of
mid-winter many lost their hands from frost-bite. Hearing of the evil
plight of their comrades, Toyotomi Hideaki and Mōri Hidemoto marched to
the relief of Kiyomasa, and the besieging army retired without
resistance. Kuroda Nagamasa fell on them as they retreated, and being
joined by Kiyomasa, the two generals attacked the Chinese with great
vehemence and completely routed them. Shimadsu Yoshihiro also defeated a
Chinese army at Shinsai and Shisen. At this juncture, however, the
_taikō_ died. On the point of death he issued instructions for the
recall of the Japanese army from Korea. This event occurred in 1598, and
the news caused great rejoicing in China. The Chinese forces in Korea
hung upon the flanks of the Japanese troops as they withdrew, but were
so disheartened by the crushing reverses they had just experienced that
they did not dare to make any serious attack. The Japanese ships also
defeated the Chinese squadron, and were thus enabled to return to Japan
unmolested. In the following year, the services of Tokugawa Iyeyasu and
other Japanese generals were duly considered by the imperial court in
Kyōto, and received adequate recognition. A few years later, in 1607,
Korea sent an envoy to Japan carrying gifts and suing for peace. The
Shōgun Tokugawa Hidetada received these overtures favorably and amicable
relations were established between the two countries.
During the closing years of Hideyoshi's life, his adopted son Hidetsugu,
in whose favor he had resigned the office of _kwanpaku_ so greatly
abused his power that Hideyoshi became indignant and ordered him into
retirement in the monastery of Kōya-san, where, shortly afterward, he
received instructions to commit suicide. Hideyoshi bequeathed his rank
and titles to his son Hideyori, who was a mere child at the time of his
illustrious father's decease. A few hours before his death the great
captain and administrator summoned all his generals to his side, and
made them swear to protect his youthful successor, appointing Mayeda
Toshiiye to the post of guardian. The generals, however, entertained
toward each other sentiments of such jealousy and hostility that the old
disorders would have been renewed but for the transcendent ability and
prowess of Tokugawa Iyeyasu.
Chapter XI
THE FOUNDATION OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1603-1651
We have now to speak of the fifth line of shōguns, the Tokugawa at Edo,
who held administrative sway for 255 years from 1603 to the time of the
imperial restoration in 1868, a period which is not far removed from the
present; and during which the feudal organization of Japan attained its
most perfect development.
The original name of the Tokugawa family was Matsudaira. They were of
the same blood as Nitta and Ashikaga and of the clan of Minamoto. From
the time of the Southern and Northern dynasties their forefathers,
generation after generation, espoused the cause opposed to the Ashikaga,
and consequently during the Muromachi shōgunate they were relegated to a
position of insignificance. Subsequently, they acquired large
territorial possessions and had their seat in Mikawa during eight
generations. But being surrounded by powerful enemies, they experienced
no little difficulty in maintaining themselves. When Iyeyasu was a mere
child, he was confined in various places as a surety for his family's
conduct. These experiences probably helped to sharpen his naturally
great abilities. At the age of seventeen he succeeded to the headship of
the family, and as he grew to manhood he gave proofs of magnanimity and
coolness, no less than of strategical skill. Gradually and astutely he
encroached upon the neighboring provinces, taking clever advantage of
the disordered state of the country, until finally he obtained
possession of all the provinces that had belonged to the Takeda and the
Imagawa and found himself the strongest chieftain in Tōkai-dō, lord of
the five provinces of Mikawa, Tōtōmi, Suruga, Kai, and Shinano. In 1590,
when Hideyoshi had overthrown the Hōjō at Odawara, all the eight
provinces of Kwantō--Sagami, Musashi, Izu, Kazusa, Shimōsa, Kōzuke,
Shimotsuke, and Hitachi--hitherto held by the Hōjō, were given to
Iyeyasu, the _taikō_ receiving in their stead the five provinces
previously possessed by Iyeyasu in Tōkai-dō; an exchange doubtless
suggested to the _taikō_ by the comparative propinquity of the latter
five provinces to Kyōto, and the advisability of relegating to a distant
part of the empire a chieftain of such commanding gifts as Iyeyasu
exhibited. Having come into possession of the eight provinces, Iyeyasu
made his headquarters at Edo (now Tōkyō). A castle had been built here
more than a century before by Ota Dōkan, a vassal of the Uyesugi, but it
was of insignificant dimensions, and the town which it overlooked was
touched on three sides by the Musashino plain, its southeastern front
being washed by the sea. The streets, where one and a half million
citizens now congregate, were then overgrown with reeds. So soon,
however, as Iyeyasu moved thither, he inaugurated extensive
improvements, leveling hills, filling marshes, digging great moats, and
building colossal parapets, until a site was fully prepared for a great
capital.
Iyeyasu, though of indomitable courage in war, was a man of gentle
methods. His keen perception showed him every aspect of an affair, and
his patience in unraveling difficulties never failed. So long as the
reins of administration remained in his hands, quiet obedience was
everywhere accorded to his sway. No one opposed him. As for Hideyoshi,
he soon appreciated the Tokugawa chief and treated him with all the
consideration due to his great gifts. Iyeyasu had large ambition. Coming
into possession of the Kwantō provinces, he sat down quietly to foster
his strength and bide his time, Hideyoshi, meanwhile, wasting his
resources in fruitless attacks upon Korea and thus impairing the
prosperity which his transcendent abilities had obtained for him.
Finally, before his foreign wars had reached any issue, he died,
bequeathing his power to his son, Hideyori, then a lad of only seven
years. The usual results of a minor's administration ensued. The
government fell into disorder. Once more the old rivalry sprang up among
the feudal chiefs, each struggling for supremacy. Above them all towered
Tokugawa Iyeyasu, for his influence was superior even to that of the
Toyotomi family.
[Illustration: CENTRAL JAPAN]
Gradually the various dissentient elements disposed themselves into two
great parties. The one, including Katō Kiyomasa, Fukushima Masanori,
Kuroda Nagamasa, Asano Yukinaga, and other notables, was under the
leadership of Iyeyasu, and the other, to which belonged Mōri Terumoto,
Uyesugi Kagekatsu, Ukita Hideiye, and forty-three other feudal chiefs,
hostile to the Tokugawa, was under the real leadership of Ishida
Mitsunari, a favorite of the late Hideyoshi, and under the nominal
leadership of the _taikō's_ son, Hideyori. The latter party had their
headquarters in the Ōsaka castle, and the struggle for mastery was
finally concluded in a great battle, fought on September 15, 1600.
Iyeyasu was the assailant. Marching westward at the head of an army of
80,000, he encountered Mitsunari's forces, numbering 130,000, on the
Sekigahara plain in Mino, the Ōsaka confederates having moved thus far
to the combat. Swords were crossed at eight in the morning, and the
battle waged with the utmost fierceness for six hours, the Ōsaka army
being ultimately defeated with a loss of 30,000. Mitsunari and Yukinaga
were among the slain, and tradition says that the whole plain was red
with gore. So decisive was this victory that other nobles who had
espoused the cause of Hideyori and were fighting for it in their own
districts now laid down their arms and hastened to come to terms with
the victor. Iyeyasu now set himself to consolidate his power.
Confiscating, wholly or in part, the estates of the chiefs who had
opposed him, he made ample grants to his own supporters. The
administrative power of the empire came wholly into his hands, and every
part of the country accepted his control. Three years later he was
nominated _sei-i-tai-shōgun_, and thenceforth, through many generations,
his family ruled in Edo.
[Illustration: THE PROCESSION OF FEUDAL LORDS]
But although the administrative supremacy had been acquired by the
Tokugawa, the _taikō's_ son and successor, Toyotomi Hideyori, still
resided at Ōsaka. Possessing a princely income of 650,000 _koku_ of
rice, ruler of three provinces, Settsu, Kawachi, and Izumi, old enough
now to direct his own affairs, and enjoying the prestige of his renowned
father, he wielded a degree of influence which even Iyeyasu could not
afford to despise. Among Hideyori's adherents there were some who hoped
to see him restored to the position his father had occupied, and these,
plotting secretly to effect their purpose, found supporters among the
feudal chieftains, who, though they had made act of submission to the
Tokugawa, still remembered the benefits they had received from the late
Hideyoshi and were fain to succor his son. Thus Ōsaka remained a
constant menace to the Tokugawa, who, on their side, watched keenly for
some act on the part of the Toyotomi that might furnish a pretext for
their overthrow, whereas the adherents of the Toyotomi, bitterly jealous
of the Tokugawa supremacy and resenting every evidence of it, naturally
committed acts of tactlessness and contumacy.
Just at this time the Toyotomi family caused to be rebuilt a great image
of Buddha which stood in the temple of Hōkōji, in Kyōto. The work was
completed in 1614. A bell was cast to commemorate the event, and in its
superscription there appeared a phrase praying for the tranquillity of
the state. Two of the four characters forming this phrase happened to be
the ideograms spelling the name of Iyeyasu. The latter pretended to be
much offended at this. He declared that the obvious intention of the
affair was to invoke the curse of heaven on his head, and being strongly
supported in this view by the nobles who espoused his cause, he directed
that an inquiry of the strictest nature should be at once instituted in
Ōsaka. The Toyotomi family refusing to submit tamely to this indignity,
determined to appeal to the sword, and there flocked to Ōsaka from the
provinces some 60,000 _rōnin_ (unenrolled military men), who formed
themselves into a garrison for the defense of the castle. But the power
of Iyeyasu was too great for such a movement to develop large
proportions. Intelligence of the designs of the Toyotomi, so far from
enlisting the sympathy of the feudal chieftains, led them rather to
renew their professions of loyalty to Iyeyasu, and the latter, who had
anticipated this, ordered them to march to the conquest of Ōsaka. After
the castle had undergone a long siege, peace was temporarily restored,
only to be broken again in the following year, when rivalry led the
Ōsaka folks to once more declare war. On this occasion the number of
Toyotomi partisans who assembled at Ōsaka was twice as great as it had
been in the preceding year. They were all brave men, resolved to fight
to the death. But among such a variously composed host it was difficult
to secure unanimity of opinion or concert in action. Moreover, the moats
of the castle having been filled on the conclusion of peace the year
before, it had lost its old impregnability and become useless as a
defensive stronghold. Hence, the vast army marshaled under the Tokugawa
banners had little difficulty in taking it by assault.[1] Hideyori and
his mother, Yodogimi, threw themselves into the flames of the burning
castle, and Ōno Harunaga, together with the principal of those who had
counseled war, killed themselves out of respect to their lord. The
Toyotomi family was thus finally overthrown, and the power of the
Tokugawa completely established. Thenceforth the country entered upon a
long era of peace.
In the following year, 1616, Iyeyasu fell ill and died at the age of
seventy-five. He was interred at Kunōzan in Suruga, but his remains were
subsequently transferred to Nikkō in Shimotsuke, where, amid natural
scenery of the greatest beauty, a mausoleum of unexampled
magnificence was erected in his honor.
Hidetada, the second Tokugawa shōgun, devoted his energies to enforcing
and observing the laws and precepts of his father. Under him the
influence and prestige of the Tokugawa family increased greatly.
Further, the third shōgun, Iyemitsu, was a man of high courage and
magnanimous generosity. In his hands the organization of the government
was brought to a state of perfection. This system we shall now describe,
as it shows the feudalism of Japan at the height of its development.
During many centuries it had been customary for the military classes to
own estates and to govern the people residing on them according to
feudal methods. In the closing days of the Ashikaga many military
families of old standing were ruined, and, on the other hand, not a few
soldiers who followed the fortunes of Oda and Toyotomi became the
founders of new and opulent families. When the Tokugawa came into power
they divided the nobles into two classes. The _fudai_ class comprised
the barons who had espoused the Tokugawa cause from the time of the
latter's residence in Mikawa and Tōtōmi. The second were called
_tozama_, that is to say, those who did not give in their adherence
until after the decisive battle of Sekigahara of 1600. This distinction
was intended to define the intimacy existing between the Tokugawa and
the other military chiefs. For the rest, the estates of the nobles were
fixed according to their exploits at the battle of Sekigahara. In
consideration of the vital importance of preserving uninterrupted
communication with the capital, the estates of the barons were so
distributed that none of the _tozama_ class held sway along the line of
communications. Further, although the _fudai_ barons were chiefly of the
smaller order, they occupied the most important provinces, and were so
distributed that they could easily combine if necessary; whereas the
_tozama_ magnates, though ruling great territories, were separated from
each other by the _fudai_ barons, and were moreover remotely situated
from important centers of action. For example, Mayeda, the most puissant
among the _tozama_ nobles, had his territories extended over the three
provinces of Kaga, Noto, and Echizen, and his annual revenues aggregated
over a million _koku_ of rice, while his prestige and popularity were
very high. Hence, a number of _fudai_ barons were located in Echigo, to
act for the Tokugawa in case of emergency, and in Echizen also one of
the nobles most closely related to the Tokugawa was placed to block the
route of the Mayeda to Kyōto. A similar policy was adopted throughout
the empire, so that everywhere, at a given instant, the Tokugawa
partisans would find themselves in a majority. Places of vantage were
also occupied by the shōgun's adherents. Such was the case with
Nagasaki, the most important port of foreign trade; the Island of Sado,
where valuable gold and silver mines were worked; the shrine of
Daijin-gū at Yamada in Ise, the headquarters of Shintō worship, and so
forth. At other places the management of local affairs was entrusted to
nominees of the shōgunate, _gundai_ and _daikwan_, all of which
arrangements operated to prevent any effective union among the _tozama_
nobles.
In the opening years of the Tokugawa administration an uncompromising
policy was pursued. Even such a puissant _tozama_ noble as Fukushima
Masanori, and such a loyal feudatory as Honda Masazumi, who had assisted
in the first organization of the shōgunate, had their estates
confiscated by way of punishment for violations of the law, while
several other important nobles were deprived of their territories on the
ground of incompetence to govern them. The principle of succession was
enforced with especial strictness among the _samurai_. If a man died
without direct male issue his family was declared extinct, and were he a
noble, his estate reverted to the shōgunate. Subsequently the severity
of this system was modified and adoption began to be permitted, to the
great satisfaction of the feudal chiefs and the military class in
general. But in the early days the reins of administration were held so
unflinchingly that even consanguinity with the shōgun did not save from
condign punishment a nobleman who failed in respect for the law.
Degradations and removals from one province to another were frequent
forms of punishment for slight breaches of law.
The autonomy of each individual fief was complete within itself. The
feudal barons, whether large or small and whether their relations with
the shōgunate were close or remote enjoyed the privilege of governing
the districts under their control in whatever manner they pleased,
entirely independent of the administration in Edo. This applied to
financial, military, judicial, educational, industrial, and all other
matters, the central government reserving to itself only the right of
declaring war or concluding peace, of coining money and of repairing or
constructing roads. But while, on the one hand, this principle of
non-interference was strictly observed, any dangerous independence that
it might have developed was effectually obviated by another device,
namely, that of requiring the sojourn in Edo of every feudal baron at
fixed intervals and for a fixed period. This was one of the most
remarkable measures conceived by the Tokugawa. The policy itself had
been formulated in the time of Iyeyasu, but it did not come into
operation until 1635, under the third shōgun, Iyemitsu. Each feudal
chief was compelled to spend a part of every second year in Edo, the
dates of setting out from his province and of leaving Edo on his return
journey being fixed by the shōgunate. Nothing could have been simpler
than this device; nothing more efficacious in establishing and
preserving the Tokugawa sway. Probably no factor in the Tokugawa system
contributed more materially to the unprecedented duration of domestic
peace throughout two centuries and a half. It was not until 1862, a few
years before the fall of Edo, that this astute policy was allowed to
fall into abeyance. Further, during the first part of the Tokugawa
shōgunate the feudal barons were obliged to leave their sons in Edo as
pledges of their own good behavior. This custom was discontinued,
however, in the days of the fourth shōgun, though the rule that the
barons with their wives and children must reside for a given time in the
capital every second year was enforced up to within five years of the
restoration. One consequence of the rule was that the feudal lords built
mansions for themselves in Edo, some owning three, some as many as six,
of such city residences, their inmates varying from hundreds to
thousands. The effect thus produced upon the prosperity of the capital
may easily be conceived. It was also the custom under the Tokugawa
régime to prevent undue accumulation of wealth in the hands of
individuals by ordering conspicuously rich folks to carry out some great
public work at their own expense. In fact, no means were neglected to
prevent the feudal barons from developing inconvenient strength.
In addition to these rules, exact and rigidly enforced laws--called
_buke hatto_, or military statutes--were enacted for observance by
feudal chiefs and _samurai_ in general. The first body of such laws,
comprising thirteen articles, was promulgated in 1615. Subsequently, the
laws were repromulgated on the accession of each shōgun, sometimes with
modifications or additions. The principal provisions of these statutes
were: that attendance in Edo must be as punctual as possible; that no
new castles must be built; that repairs of old ones must not be
undertaken without special permission; that leagues must not be formed;
that marriages must not be contracted without due permission; that
garments must be worn and methods of conveyance employed such as suited
the rank of the wearer or traveler, and so forth; these vetoes being
supplemented by provisions for encouraging the pursuit of military and
literary professions, the practice of frugality and other virtues.
The position of the feudal lords was further lowered and that of the
shōgun made more secure when, with a consummate tact, Iyemitsu, the
third Tokugawa, annulled the formal distinction between the _tozama_ and
_fudai_ barons, and reduced the former to the level of the latter. On
his accession he summoned to the palace in Edo all the _tozama_ barons,
and addressed them as follows: "Our ancestor, having been originally of
the same rank with yourselves and enabled to pacify the country through
your assistance, was prompted by a sentiment of deference to refrain
from classing you with the _fudai_ barons. But I differ from my ancestor
in that I was born to the position which he acquired, and am under no
obligation to preserve any distinction. It is therefore my intention to
place you on the same footing as the _fudai_. Should this be displeasing
to any of you, an interval of three years will now be given you, during
which time you should consider the matter maturely in your own dominions
and come to a final decision." Then, adding that the creed of the
_samurai_ was to guard with weapons of war the things acquired by such
means, he presented to each of the barons a sword. This injunction, at
once so frank and so irresistible, evoked no dissent. The barons
acquiesced respectfully, but the greater _tozama_ never forgot the
position they once held, and their loyalty was often more formal than
sincere, until after 1860, when some of them turned open enemies of the
Tokugawa.
The Tokugawa's policy toward the imperial house and the civil nobility
at Kyōto was not less clever and effective than the control of the
_daimio_. Theoretically, the shōgun derived his powers primarily from
the emperor, and ruled his vassals under the authority delegated to him
by the sovereign. The Tokugawa showed deference to this theory by making
every effort to enhance the social position and enrich the temporal
domains of the emperor. But it was at the same time important for the
shōgun that the exercise of his executive power should not be
inconveniently hampered by interference on the part of the court. Hence,
in the same year that saw the promulgation of the military statutes,
1615, Iyeyasu compiled a law of seventeen articles destined chiefly for
observance by the court nobles, and entitled "_Kinchū Jomoku_," or
palace regulations. In this law we find provisions recapitulating orders
issued by the emperor in the Kwampei era, to the effect that men should
study the ancient poetry of Japan, that the prime minister, the minister
of the left, and the minister of the right should rank above the princes
of the blood; that the ranks held by _samurai_ should be considered
entirely distinct from those held by court nobles, and so forth. Men
said that this law was designed to augment the prestige of the imperial
house, but in reality it set limits to the exercise of the sovereign's
authority. The principal official of the shōgun's government, the
_shoshidai_, was stationed in Kyōto and intrusted with the duty of
supervising the imperial guards. Moreover, strict regulations were
enacted to control the journeys of the feudal nobles to and from Kyōto.
In a word, the policy of the shōgunate was to preserve the fullest
semblance of reverence for the sovereign, simultaneously with the
fullest administrative independence. The imperial court was organized in
Kyōto with all pomp and circumstance; it had its ministers, vice
ministers, and subordinate officials; it had its five principal, as well
as more than a hundred ordinary, court nobles; but as for the
sovereign's actual power, it did not extend beyond the direction of
matters relating to rank and etiquette, the classification of
shrine-keepers, priests, and priestesses, and professionals of various
kinds--functions of no material importance whatever. Alone the
_kwanryō_, the _densō_, and the _gisō_ exercised a certain measure of
authority in the shōgun's government. The control of affairs relating to
lands, to the army, to finance, and to everything included in the domain
of practical politics rested absolutely in the hands of the shōgun.
This state of affairs greatly mortified the Emperor Gominoö,[2] a
sovereign of much talent, who reigned during 1612-1630. He would fain
have effected some change in the system, but found himself helpless to
accomplish anything against the all-powerful Tokugawa. An additional
check to such designs was given by the marriage of Kazuko, daughter of
the second shōgun, Hidetada, to the emperor, the offspring of the union,
a daughter, subsequently coming to the throne as the Empress Myōshō.
This close relationship with the imperial family naturally increased the
prestige of the Tokugawa. Subsequently Gokōmyō, Gosai-in, and Reigen,
sons of the Emperor Gominoö, successively ascended the throne and
Gokōmyō cherished the design of achieving his father's ambition. But he
died without accomplishing anything and the times remained unfavorable
to the imperial aspirations until 1868.
With regard to the organization of the shōgun's government in Edo, the
cabinet, called _yōbeya_, held its sessions in the castle, and was
composed of the _tairō_, _rōjiu_, and _wakadoshiyori_. The _tairō_
corresponded with the prime minister (_daijō daijin_) of Kyōto; it was
an office sometimes actually filled, sometimes left without occupant.
The _rōjiu_ were five; their functions were the general direction of
administrative affairs, of the feudal barons and of the city of Kyōto.
The _wakadoshiyori_, also five in number, assisted in the administration
and supervised the _samurai_ directly connected with the shōgunate. The
posts in the cabinet were given invariably to _fudai_ nobles, the
_tozama_ barons being entirely excluded. Next in importance were the
offices of the three governors (_bugyō_), the senior and junior
supervisors (_metsuke_) and so forth. One of the three governors was
called the _jisha bugyō_, and was charged with the management of
temples, shrines, and Shintō and Buddhist priests. Another, the _machi
bugyō_, had control of municipal and mercantile matters in Edo; and the
third, the _kanjō bugyō_, had to do with all the lands in the direct
possession of the shōgunate. These three governors had judicial
functions also, being required to hear and determine all suits connected
with matters falling within their respective provinces. In addition to
duties of general supervision, the _metsuke_ were charged with the
superintendence of special classes, the _ōmetsuke_ being intrusted with
the function of keeping watch on the feudal barons and on officials
below the rank of _rōjiu_, in conjunction with the _rōjiu_; while the
_shōmetsuke_, similarly coöperating with the _wakadoshiyori_, had to
superintend the _samurai_ who were direct vassals of the shōgun, as well
as the _samurai_ in general. Attached to the above-mentioned principal
officials there was a duly-ordered staff of subordinates, the whole
constituting the organization of the general government. Posts inferior
to those of the three governors were generally filled by _hatamoto_
(bannerets). Turning to local officers, we find the _shoshidai_, or
governor, in Kyōto, entrusted with the supervision of the imperial
guards, and the _Ōsaka-jōdai,_ or lord warden of Ōsaka castle. These two
officials had general charge of affairs in the western provinces, in
addition to the duties of their special offices. They also were selected
from among the _fudai_ barons, and their post was usually a stepping
stone to the important position of _rōjiu_. Further, in Nijō of Kyōto
there was a _zaiban shihai_, or controller of the guards; in Ōsaka, a
_jōban shihai_, or controller of the castle guards, and in Shimpu, Kofu,
and so forth, there were _jōban shihai_, or _kinban shihai_, performing
functions similar to those of the Kyōto and Ōsaka _shihai_. Governors,
who were regarded as officials of great importance, _gundai_ (headmen)
of lands under the direct control of the shōgun, _daikwan_ and other
principal officers, were selected by the shōgun from among the _fudai_
barons and bannerets. In the city of Edo there were _machidoshiyori_,
or wardmasters, _nanushi_, or mayors, and so forth, while in provincial
towns there were five _nanushi_ who managed municipal affairs.
Turning to the foreign relations of Japan during this period, we find
that, after the invasion of Hideyoshi's army, which, like the Hundred
Years' War in France, devastated Korea from one end to the other, the
people of the peninsula regarded the Japanese with such aversion that
the relations between the two countries were virtually severed. It was
with great difficulty that Iyeyasu at last succeeded in convincing the
Koreans that the Japan of the Tokugawa differed essentially from the
Japan under Hideyoshi, and that the former's intentions were entirely
pacific. Finally the Koreans, having obtained tacit consent of China,
sent to Japan a letter from their king together with some presents, and
thenceforth, on each occasion of a change of shōgun, Korean envoys came
to offer their country's congratulations, the Tokugawa, on their side,
treating these delegates with all courtesy and consideration. In the
days of the Ashikaga family, it had been customary for the shōgun to
assume the title of king of Japan in his communications with other
sovereigns. The Tokugawa discontinued this, on the ground that it was an
infraction of the imperial dignity, and adopted instead the title
_taikun_, or great prince. The Sō family of Tsushima acted from
generation to generation as intermediaries between Japan and Korea. They
had a monopoly of the trade with the latter country, whither they
dispatched twenty vessels annually, the total value of the trade being
limited, however, to 18,000 _ryō_. But though Korea thus accepted
Japan's amicable overtures, China would not do so. Nevertheless, the
inhabitants of her southeastern parts came to Nagasaki in great numbers
for purposes of commerce, and many Japanese ships crossed to the
neighboring empire with the same object. These ships, called
_shuin-bune_, because of the vermilion-seal permits of the shōgun, were
owned by wealthy merchants residing in or near Kyōto, Sakai, and
Nagasaki.
The Portuguese, who were the first Europeans to establish commercial
intercourse with Japan, held a monopoly of the trade for some time, so
that the Dutch settlers in the Indies were excluded from competing with
them. Finally, however, in 1596, the Dutch managed to make their way to
Hirado in the province of Hizen, in order to arrange the preliminaries
of a commerce destined to continue for a long time. Among the persons
who arrived in the Dutch ships were a Dutchman named Jan Joost and an
Englishman, William Adams, the latter coming in the capacity of pilot.
These two foreigners had an interview with Iyeyasu, who, much pleased
with them, conceived the idea of trading with Western countries. Houses
and lands were given to the two strangers, and they resided in Edo, the
streets now known as Yayosugashi and Anjinchō being the places where
they are said to have lived. The Dutch, eager to monopolize the trade
with Japan, made another visit to Japan in a vessel of war, with a view
to expelling the Portuguese merchants. They brought with them an
autograph letter and presents from the King of Holland for the shōgun,
and solicited permission to carry on commerce, to which Iyeyasu readily
acceded. In 1612 the first Dutch merchantman arrived in Japanese waters
and was soon afterward followed by a British ship, the coming of the
latter being due to information furnished by William Adams to his
country with reference to the state of affairs in Japan. Iyeyasu placed
no obstacles in the way of British trade, but the relations between the
Dutch and the English at Hirado were so inharmonious that at one time
they were on the point of resorting to open hostilities. The Dutch
finally prevailed upon the shōgun to impose as many restrictions as
possible on the trade of the English, and the result was that although
the friction between the British and the Dutch was ostensibly removed,
the former, finding themselves unable to carry on business profitably,
finally took their departure. About this time great numbers of merchants
came to Japan from Annam, Siam, Luzon, and other places of the south, as
well as from the southern districts of China and from India, while on
the Japanese side wealthy traders of Kiushū traveled abroad to a great
extent for business purposes, and Iyeyasu himself went so far as to
dispatch people across the Pacific to New Spain in America in order to
open commercial relations. The Japanese at that era possessed very
strongly constructed vessels, measuring as much as 120 feet by 54, fully
rigged with three masts, having dark-red lacquered hulls and capable of
carrying a great number of passengers. In these ships were exported
copper, bronze utensils, lacquered articles, umbrellas, fans, screens,
sulphur, camphor, dyed textile fabrics, wheat flour, and so forth, and
on their return voyage they brought to Japan silk cocoons, silk fabrics,
woolen stuffs, sugar, drugs, incense, vermilion, quicksilver, glass,
coral, whalebone and so forth. This list of exports and imports
furnishes some clue to the industries and customs of the Japanese of
that era. Foreign trade flourished greatly, and a spirit of enterprise
prevailed throughout the country. Date Masamune, feudal chief of Sendai,
sent an envoy to Rome who came back eventually to Japan, having devoted
seven years to studying the state of affairs in Rome, where he was
received in audience by the Pope. Early in the seventeenth century one
Yamada Nagamasa (or Nizayemon), a native of Suruga, crossed to Siam, and
organizing a force with the Japanese settlers in that country--who had
already become sufficiently numerous to people a village, hence called
_Nippon-machi_--rendered material assistance to the king of the country,
twice quelling a rebellion that prevailed at the time. This same Yamada,
fighting always for Siam, led his troops against an invading army of
Spaniards and defeated them, an exploit regarded with the greatest
admiration at that era when the prestige of the Spanish arms was at its
height. The king rewarded Yamada by adopting him into the royal family
and giving him his own daughter in marriage, so that the Japanese
adventurer's name became widely renowned. Another example of the
adventurous spirit of the age was afforded by Hamada Yahei, who led a
considerable force to Formosa, to avenge the plunder of a Japanese ship
by the natives, and having overrun the island, brought back the son of
the chief as a hostage to Nagasaki.
Unfortunately, however, unexpected religious squabbles fatally
interrupted the course of the country's foreign trade. The Dutch
settlers made a discovery, real or pretended, that the Portuguese and
Spanish missionaries, leaguing themselves with the native Christians,
were plotting to overthrow the Japanese government. Many proofs of the
truth of this accusation were submitted to the shōgun by the Dutch, and
color was lent to the charge by evidence that the missionaries
themselves or their converts behaved with much intolerance and
arrogance. The Edo government was moved by these accusations and by the
doings of the missionaries to take active steps against them. Several of
the principal were put to death and the rest were expelled. Shortly
afterward an order was issued against the voyages of the _shuin-bune_
and it was further declared unlawful to construct ships of more than a
certain size, while, at the same time, the method of construction was so
modified that distant voyages became impossible. Travel to foreign
countries was also strictly interdicted, and as a necessary consequence
the arts of ship-building and navigation sensibly declined. It was at
this epoch, too, that the Christian rebellion of Shimabara occurred,
culminating in the battle of Amakusa in 1637-1638, which had a decisive
influence upon the foreign policy of the Tokugawa.
At the time of the first introduction of Christianity into Japan, it
spread very rapidly throughout the empire, receiving no check until the
arrogance and intolerance of the missionaries provoked the anger of
Hideyoshi and induced him to issue an edict forbidding the propagandism
of the foreign faith. This law, however, was not rigorously enforced,
and moreover official attention was shortly afterward diverted to the
war with Korea. When Iyeyasu came to power, as has been shown, he
expelled the foreign missionaries from Japan and deputed Buddhist
priests to reconvert the Japanese who had embraced the Christian creed,
the efforts of these priests being reinforced by an edict that all who
refused to abjure Christianity should be either exiled or put to death.
But it appeared that many of the Japanese Christians had adopted the new
faith with sincerity and devotion which neither teaching nor threats
could alter. In the provinces of Bungo and Hizen, in Kiushū, where even
the feudal barons themselves had become converts to the Western creed, a
great majority of the population was Christian, and from them issued the
forces of propagandism which made themselves felt elsewhere. Shimabara,
in Hizen, was especially regarded as the headquarters of the foreign
faith, and the shōgun accordingly nominated as feudal chief of that
place Matsukura Shigemasa, a bitter foe to Christianity. The latter
issued proclamations against the profession of the faith, and inflicted
most cruel punishments on its votaries. The people suffered in silence,
for Shigemasa's military following was so great that resistance was
hopeless.
On Shigemasa's death, his incapable and tyrannous son Shigetsugu
succeeded him, and popular discontent began to take a concrete form.
Gradually the plan of a combination for open resistance found advocates.
Among the generals on the defeated side in the battle of Sekigahara of
1600 had been one Konishi Yukinaga, an ardent believer in Christianity.
After the battle his principal retainers retired to the Island of
Amakusa off the coast of Hizen, among whom the most influential
constantly sought means to be revenged on the Tokugawa and to promote
the spread of Christianity. They found a youth named Masuda Shirō who to
remarkable graces of person added a mind of great craftiness, and they
presented him to the people in 1637, alleging that he was the heavenly
messenger of whom Francis Xavier had spoken twenty-five years previously
when leaving Japan, and who was destined to establish the supremacy of
the Christian faith. They also spread rumors that the shōgun had died in
Edo, and the people, much encouraged by these things, assembled in great
numbers and openly offered thanksgivings to heaven. The officials in
Shimabara endeavored to disperse this meeting and to arrest the leaders,
but in a contest which ensued the Christians were victorious. Now the
insurrection spread far and wide throughout Shimabara, Amakusa, and the
neighboring districts, until the insurgents under the command of Masuda
Shirō numbered over thirty thousand. At first the Edo government
regarded the rebels as a mere mob of peasants, and dispatched a petty
baron, Itakura Shigemasa, to restore order. But the latter's inability
to cope with the trouble having afforded a gauge of its true dimensions,
the commission was given to Matsudaira Nobutsuna, a powerful chief. The
insurgents fought with desperate resolution and inflicted numerous
defeats on the government's troops, Shigemasa himself falling in battle.
But the end came at last. In 1638, the stronghold of the rebels was
taken, and its defenders were either burned in the flames kindled by
their own hand or put to the sword.
This experience taught the government that the spread of Christianity
was attended by the gravest dangers to public tranquillity. Strict laws
were therefore enacted for its suppression. Foreigners who came to Japan
for the purpose of propagating the faith were refused admission, and
those who declined to depart despite the edicts were put to death.
Thenceforth Buddhism was adopted as the national religion, receiving the
allegiance of all classes, high and low. It is interesting to note that
the revival of Buddhist influence was not only simultaneous with the
downfall of Catholicism, but also due largely to an institution which
was now for the first time placed on a religious basis. The system of
taking a census at regular intervals, which was introduced by the Taikwa
reformers, had never been successfully practiced for a long period of
time, until the Tokugawa government made the extermination of
Catholicism an occasion for the restoration of the system. It was
ordered in 1716 that the census should be taken in each fief and the
results duly reported every six years. Births, deaths, and marriages
were registered in books kept by Buddhist priests, so that no Christian
should remain in society under the protection of law. The operation was
called, from its religious character, _shūmon-aratame_, or examination
of faith. This of course contributed materially to the influence of the
Buddhist church, for which the Tokugawa period was an era of marked
prosperity, the number of temples throughout the empire aggregating four
hundred thousand. Nevertheless, the government was careful to avoid a
return to the excesses of former days. The building of new temples was
forbidden, the lands assigned for the support of those already in
existence were rigidly defined, and the people were encouraged to study
Chinese literature, so that the corruption which disfigured the Buddhist
priesthood in earlier ages was, in great part, corrected.
Even more important than the revival of Buddhist influence was the
bearing of the Catholic extermination upon the almost total exclusion of
foreign trade from the shores of Japan. The entry of all foreign ships,
except those of China and Holland, into Japanese ports was peremptorily
forbidden. Neither the Chinese nor the Dutch entertained any idea of
religious propagandism, their sole purpose being commercial. The Dutch,
indeed, having shown a disposition to assist Japan in every way, enjoyed
great credit with the Edo government, as will be more fully set forth in
the next chapter. At first no restrictions were imposed on the
commercial transactions of the Chinese and the Dutch, but subsequently a
limit was set to the amount of trade and to the number of ships engaged,
and the prices at which imported articles must be offered for sale were
also determined officially. These restrictions were suggested by the
fact that the trade involved a heavy drain of the precious metals.
Indeed, the quantity of gold and silver exported from Japan during the
interval between the inauguration of foreign commerce and the imposition
of the above restriction was so large that Japan's resources were
seriously impaired. It was found necessary to strictly interdict the
shipping away of the precious metals, but there is strong reason to
doubt whether the interdict effected much, for foreigners, disregarding
the laws of Japan, contrived to carry on clandestine commerce in waters
beyond the purview of the government's officials.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Chronological and genealogical table of the Tokugawa
shōguns.
1. Iyeyasu, 1603.
|
+---------------------------+----------------------+
| | |
2. Hidetada, 1605. Yorinobu (founder of Yorifusa (founder of
| the Kishū house). the Mito house).
+-----------+ | |
| | |
3. Iyemitsu, 1624. Mitsusada. Nariakira (eighth in
| | descent from Yorifusa).
+------------+--------------+ +-------------+ |
| | | | |
4. Iyetsuna, Tsunashige. 5. Tsunayoshi, 8. Yoshimune, 15. Yoshinobu,
1651. | 1680. 1716. 1866.
| |
| +-----------+--------------+
| | |
6. Iyenobu, 1709. 9. Iyeshige, 1745. Munetada (founder of
| | the Hitotsubashi
| | family).
7. Iyesugu, 1713. 10. Iyeharu, 1761. |
Harunari.
|
+------------------------+
|
11. Iyenari, 1787.
|
+-------------------+-------------------+
| |
12. Iyeyoshi, 1837. Nariyoshi (head of the
| Kisuhū house).
| |
13. Iyesada, 1854. 14. Iyemochi, 1857.
[2] Table showing chronology and lineage of emperors.
107. Emperor Goyōzei, 1587-1612.
|
108. Emperor Gominoö, 1612-1630.
|
+------------------+------+----------+-------------+
| | | |
109. Empress 110. Emperor 111. Emperor 112. Emperor
Myōshō, Gokōmyō, Gosai-in, Reigen,
1630-1644. 1644-1655. 1655-1663. 1663-1687.
|
+--------------------------------+--------+
| |
113. Emperor Higashiyama, 1687-1710. Tadahito (ancestor of Prince
| Kan-in).
| |
114. Emperor Nakamikado, 1710-1736. Massahito.
| |
115. Emperor Sakuramachi, 1736-1747. 119. Emperor Kōkaku, 1780-1817.
| |
+-------+---------+ 120. Emperor Ninkō, 1817-1847.
| | |
116. Emperor 117. Emperor 121. Emperor Kōmei, 1847-1867.
Momozono, Gosakuramachi, |
1747-1763. 1763-1771. 122. The present Emperor
| (Mutsuhito).
118. Emperor Gomomozono, 1771-1780.
Chapter XII
THE DECLINE OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT
1651-1837
The period of the third shōgun, Iyemitsu (1624-1651), perhaps marks the
height of the vigor and efficiency of the Tokugawa feudalism. He was
assisted by able councilors, and his strong administration was emulated
by many great local barons in their respective fiefs, so that a profound
peace reigned over the country broken only by the Christian insurrection
at Shimabara. From the latter half of the seventeenth century, however,
signs of the decline of the Edo power began to manifest themselves. At
the accession of the fourth shōgun, Iyetsuna (1651-1680), Yuino Shōsetsu
and Marubashi Chūya, two military captains not attached to any feudal
baron, collected a great number of _rōnin_ ("wave men," _samurai_
attached to no lord) in Suruga and in Edo, their project being to raise
the standard of revolt simultaneously in the west and in the east. Their
attempt was unsuccessful, but its failure did not deter two other
_rōnin_ from plotting a similar insurrection in Edo the following year.
They, too, were discovered and punished before their plans matured.
Thereafter, for a time, owing doubtless to the fact that the feudal
barons were too frequently deprived of their estates, their vassals
found themselves homeless and resourceless, and the peace of the country
was broken here and there by bands of _rōnin_. These troubles, however,
were speedily dealt with. Nor was the Edo castle itself free from
trouble, for toward the close of Iyetsuna's shōgunate, the _tairō_,
Sakai Tadakiyo, acquired so much influence that the authority of the
shōgun himself was somewhat impaired.
The next shōgun, Tsunayoshi (1680-1709), however, returned to the
vigorous policy of the first three of his predecessors. He dismissed
Tadakiyo, and appointed Hotta Masatoshi, a statesman of great acumen, in
his stead as _tairō_. The shōgun and his ministers alike devoted
themselves unwearyingly to promoting the welfare of the country. This
era is worthy of close attention. We find, among other things, that
Tsunayoshi greatly encouraged the study of literature. Tokugawa
Iyeyasu, though essentially a soldier and statesman, fully appreciated
the importance of literature, which he conceived as an indispensable
factor in encouraging the pursuit of virtue and promoting the peace of
society. Even while his hands were busy with campaigns and battles, he
invited great savants and listened to their lectures on the Chinese
classics. He also caused his officers to collect and reprint valuable
books that would otherwise have been lost to the nation. His three
successors followed his example in this respect, but it was the fifth
shōgun, Tsunayoshi, who above all contributed to the spread of literary
pursuits. Devoted from his youth to the study of the Chinese classics,
he made a habit, after his succession, of delivering lectures to the
feudal barons and vassals, and Shintō and Buddhist priests, and it may
well be supposed that this action gave a great impetus to literary
pursuits.
Prior to this time, it had been customary for the military men to
neglect the study of reading and writing. Such occupations were
abandoned to the priests, and it resulted that, even after the
conclusion of the wars, men having a predilection for literature
generally drifted into the ranks of the priests. Such persons, however,
were not required to adopt the tonsure or to give up their position as
_samurai_. The learned family of Hayashi were a case in point. The
succeeding shōguns paid them high respect, and a school founded by them,
at first in the character of a private establishment, but afterward
taken under government protection, grew into an institution of much
importance under the name of the _Shōhei-kō_. The example of Edo was
widely followed in various provinces of Japan, and numerous institutions
of learning sprang up in all the fiefs, from which the most
distinguished pupils were selected and sent to the central school,
_Shōhei-kō_, for purposes of further study. So far was the study of
Chinese literature carried by the Japanese of the time that some of
their publications in that line elicited admiration of the Chinese
themselves. The Edo epoch may thus be described as the golden era of
Chinese literature in Japan, although unfortunately this record is
somewhat marred by the acrimonious disputes that sprang up among the
different schools of philosophy, each considering itself orthodox and
denouncing the teachings of others as spurious. The study of the Chinese
classics also called forth the revival of Japanese history and _belles
lettres_. Fiction, dramatic pieces called _kikyoku_, and the popular,
pithy verses known as _haikai_, flourished greatly, particularly during
the Genroku era (1688-1703). Education among the masses also at last
made its appearance, for in almost every temple there existed a private
school, called _tera-koya_, in which the children of farmers, merchants,
and artisans were taught rudimentary lessons in reading, writing, and
arithmetic.
A few words may be said regarding the literary productions of this
period. Mitsukuni, lord of Mito and grandson of Iyeyasu, himself a
distinguished scholar and munificent patron of literature, established
in his Edo mansion a historiographical bureau, where, under his
direction, a number of savants undertook the compilation of the history
of Japan from the days of the Emperor Jimmu. This work, "_Dai Nihon
shi_" (History of Great Japan), in 243 books, written in the Chinese
style of composition stands at the head of Japanese histories of this
era, the second in order being the "_Honchōtsugan_" (Mirror of Our
Dynasty), in 300 books, compiled under the direction of Hayashi by order
of the shōgun's government. In the same category may be placed the
"_Fusōshuyōshu_," 30 volumes of Mitsukuni, and the "_Reigiruiten_," 510
volumes, of the same author. Of other greater works, the "_Kansei Choshu
Shokafu_," in 1053 books, the "_Chōya Kyubuniko_," in 1083 books, and
the "_Tokugawa Jikki_," in 516 books, may be mentioned. There was also a
large work on botany called "_Shobutsuruisan_," in 1054 volumes. Hanawa
Hokiichi, a renowned scholar, though blind, made a business of
collecting old rare works, as the "_Gunsho Ruijū_" (1821 volumes). Arai
Hakuseki was the author of over three hundred books on classics,
history, and law. The novels of Kyokutei Bakin aggregated more than two
hundred. And in addition there were numerous works by less prolific
students. On the whole, in the variety and height of literary
development the Tokugawa period is unrivaled in the history of Japan.
The monopoly of learning of the Buddhist priest was completely broken,
and the intellectual power of the nation, long held in abeyance under
the stress of continual warfare, now asserted itself with tremendous
vigor.
At the same time proofs became more abundant that the prime of the real
greatness of the Tokugawa had been passed. The same fifth shōgun who so
vigorously encouraged learning, and under whom the glorious era of
Genroku occurred, unduly promoted Yanagizawa Yoshiyasu, a man of humble
origin, and treated him with unbecoming favor. Peace had then lasted for
eighty years, and both the government and the people had begun to fall
into luxurious and extravagant ways, so that, for the first time in the
history of the Tokugawa, the government found itself straitened for
funds. The total revenue of the empire derived from land then amounted
to 30,000,000 _koku_, of which 23,000,000 _koku_ belonged to the feudal
barons, and 3,000,000 _koku_ to the bannerets, shrines, and temples, the
remaining 4,000,000 representing the income of the government. Of this
last named sum, 1,400,000 _koku_ were absorbed by the shōgun's
household, a paltry sum of 150,000 being considered sufficient for the
maintenance of the sovereign, the payment of the civil nobles'
allowances, and the other expenses of the court in Kyōto. The method of
taxation varied according to provinces, but the general rule was that
the government, or the feudal lord, took forty per cent., and the
cultivator sixty per cent., of the gross produce. In the early years of
the shōgunate large reserves of money were accumulated by Iyeyasu,
Hidetada, and Iyemitsu, but Tsunayoshi expended the whole, and found
himself reduced to considerable straits. Yoshiyasu prevailed upon him to
adopt a scheme proposed by one Hagiwara Shigehide, namely, the issue of
a debased currency. The coins issued in the early years of the Tokugawa,
namely, the _Keichō-kingin_ (gold and silver of the Keichō era), were
very pure, but in the recoinage of Tsunayoshi, gold was alloyed with
silver and copper, and copper with lead and tin, so that the cost of the
coins was below their face value. Many hundreds of thousands of _ryō_
were obtained by this device, and thereby the embarrassed finances of
the shōgun seemed to have resumed their normal state. But the evils
incidental to currency debasement did not fail to ensue. Prices
appreciated suddenly and counterfeiting took place on a large scale.
Subsequently, however, the government corrected these abuses by
restoring the currency to its pristine purity, and substituting
administrative economy for false finance. The bad example once set by
the shōgun, however, was followed by the feudal barons long after he had
mended his ways, for they, also, finding themselves in an impecunious
state, began to issue fiat paper money, _hansatsu_, for circulation
within their own fiefs. It is a point well worthy of the attention of
students of history, that from the time of their accession to power
until the day of their downfall, the Tokugawa shōguns never resorted to
the device of issuing fiduciary notes.
Neither the sixth nor the seventh shōgun held his office long enough to
accomplish much. In 1716 the shōgunate passed to Yoshimune of the Kii
branch of the Tokugawa family. He was gifted with rare administrative
talent, and during the thirty years of his rule sought to reform the
government so as to place it again on a sound and strong basis. At this
period the impecuniosity of Edo, which had been going from bad to worse
under succeeding shōguns, and which resulted chiefly from extravagant
and useless expenditure in the Tokugawa household, began to be a subject
of serious embarrassment. Yoshimune had no sooner assumed administrative
control than he set himself to restore financial order by closing or
destroying several of the splendid mansions kept for the shōgun's
amusement, and dismissing their female and male inmates, while he
himself sought to set an example to his people by wearing rough garments
and faring in the simplest manner. Finally, he issued an edict urging
the necessity of economy in all affairs both public and private, and as
the nation had practical evidence of this spirit in the conduct of its
rulers, not alone the ministers of state, but also the feudal barons
adopting and following the admonition of the shōgun by the exercise of
strict frugality, economy became one of the most marked features of the
era. Yoshimune not only sought to foster this spirit of frugality, but
also endeavored to promote industrial and agricultural enterprise. He
encouraged the cultivation of Korean ginseng as well as Batavian and
sweet potatoes; he inaugurated the planting of Japanese sugar cane, and
at the same time dispatched officials to various parts of the empire to
promote the growth of other products. Naturally there appeared many
persons in the different clans who devoted themselves to industry and
agriculture. Enumerating the principal developments of the time, we find
that sericulture was greatly extended and its methods were improved
throughout the eastern provinces; that indigo was cultivated in Awa, and
oranges were grown in Kiushū; that the raising of tobacco and the
operation of drying bonito were considerably encouraged in Satsuma; that
salt was manufactured in Shikoku and Chiukoku, and the hardware,
lacquer, goldsmith's and furrier's trades were greatly developed.
Regulations were enacted for the protection and encouragement of
farmers, providing, among others, that, in the event of a farmer being
prevented from carrying on the necessary operations of agriculture, his
nearest neighbors must assist him. Indiscriminate transactions in real
estate were prohibited. The sale and purchase of land were forbidden;
measures were framed to prevent the undue growth of large estates, as
well as to protect the humble classes and obviate their dispersal
through poverty. Further, the shōgun encouraged the development of
water-ways for the transport of goods and for the irrigation of lands.
The result of all this beneficent administration was such a marked
increase of the production of rice that the people called Yoshimune the
_kome_ (rice) shōgun. His policy, so far as concerned the promotion of
industry and agriculture, was adopted and pursued by several of his
successors.
From the middle ages of Japanese history taxes on land constituted the
chief item of state revenue. It will be remembered that during the
Tokugawa period four-tenths of the produce of the land went to the
government and six-tenths to the farmer. There were two methods of
collecting the tax. One was called _kemmi-dori_. According to this
system, the quality of the rice raised from each particular place had to
be determined annually and the rate of tax fixed accordingly. As the
procedure was tedious, Yoshimune gave preference to the other method,
_jōmen-dori_, the principle of which was to fix the rate of tax
according to the average rice-harvest of the preceding five or ten
years, and thenceforth, during the interval of years to which this rate
applied, the farmers were required to pay the tax thus determined
whatever might be the nature of the crops, exceptions being made,
however, in the event of drought, tempest, or floods.
The industrious hand of Yoshimune extended also to the domain of law.
Throughout the government of Iyeyasu and his first successors no code of
criminal law was specially enacted, the administrative maxim of the time
being that moral doctrines should guide all officials, and that the
judges should consult the dictates of their own conscience in dealing
with criminals. But as popular knowledge increased, it became obviously
necessary that uniformity of punishments should be secured by fixed and
universally applicable laws. Yoshimune caused the various old laws to be
collated and embodied into a fifteen-volume code, called "_Hatto-sho_."
Another volume of law, the "_Kujikata-sho_," popularly called "_Gojō-sho
hyak-ka-jō_," was prepared after consultation with various jurists and
officials. These enactments constituted the complete criminal code of
the Tokugawa. From its provisions were expunged all punishments such as
had been practiced in times of war; examination by torture was
restricted to cases the circumstances of which obviously dictated its
application, and on the whole the object aimed at was to lighten the
scale of punishment as far as possible. These criminal laws were not,
however, made public. The people to whom they applied knew little of
their precise provisions, only the officers charged with the duty of
administering them having cognizance of their purport. The object of
this system was to inculcate respect for the laws themselves rather than
fear of the consequences of violating them.
Among the judicial officers of the time was one Ōoka Tadasuke, whose
acumen in judging offenses was so remarkable that the people credited
him with almost supernatural ability. Many of his judgments were such as
to be thought worthy of perpetual record. As to the punishments commonly
inflicted, we find manacling, scourging, and exile, the most severe
being transportation to a distant island and death. The degree of
punishment in the same class varied with the nature of the crime. There
were also other punishments, as branding, public exposure, confiscation
of property, and the like. In the case of _samurai_, it was assumed
that, being sufficiently conversant with the code of etiquette and the
principles of morality, minor penalties were not required for their
control. Hence the methods resorted to with them were confinement to
their own residences, shutting them off from general intercourse,
dismissal from office, or compulsory suicide. _Samurai_ who had been
guilty of an offense were first degraded from their class and then
suitably punished. With regard to priests, also, special penalties were
applied; as, for example, exposure to public view, expulsion from the
temple at which they officiated, or absolute suspension from religious
duties. In all the fiefs care was taken to preserve a close relation
between local penalties and those inflicted by the central government,
but differences in the degree of severity exercised made themselves
apparent in the sentences of different judges, and further, since the
judiciary was not independent of the executive, miscarriages of justice
were not infrequent.
Another feature of the feudal society of the time which Yoshimune deeply
regretted was the general neglect by the _samurai_ of their military
practices under a long reign of peace. For this grave fault the shōgun
strongly rebuked his vassals, encouraging them to practice equestrian
archery, fencing, spear-exercise, swimming, gymnastics (_jiūjitsu_), and
other martial arts, and reviving the long-discarded pastime of pursuing
game with hawks on the Kogane plain. Originally fond of such pursuits,
he applied himself to them with added ardor in order to popularize them
among the _samurai_. Fencing with the sword was the most practiced and
most esteemed of all military exercises. Every member of the feudal
class, from the shōgun downward, received regular instruction in this
art, and regarded his two swords with the utmost love and veneration,
the skill and spirit shown by him in their use being justly a source of
pride to Japan. Spears and firearms were also widely employed, and the
practice of _jiūjitsu_--a species of gymnastics based on the laws of
balance and reaction and directed to purposes of self-defense--received
general attention. Men conspicuous for skill in fencing and other
martial exercises built schools and became teachers of their respective
specialties. Thus theoretically the military training was very perfect,
but as there had been no occasion for the practical exercise of the art
of war during many years, the _samurai_ became gradually unfit for
service in the field, and would doubtless have lapsed into an even worse
condition but for the strenuous efforts made by Yoshimune on his
accession to power. Subsequently, toward the end of the eighteenth
century, Matsudaira Sadanobu, a minister of state, spared no pains to
encourage the pursuit of martial exercises, but the continued absence of
any practical need of such attainments told steadily upon the _samurai_,
and toward the close of the shōgunate not only had the nation become
comparatively enervated, but also its military systems were
old-fashioned and inefficient from foreign points of view. The
government then found it necessary to remodel the organization, creating
such offices as _rikugun bugyō_ (minister of war) and _kaigun bugyō_
(minister of the navy), adopting the European system, adding cavalry,
artillery, and engineers, to the army, and establishing iron foundries
and docks for the use of the navy. At the same time, the restrictions
imposed upon shipbuilding were removed, and official encouragement was
given to the construction of sea-going vessels and to the art of
navigation. Thus the foundations of the present army and navy were laid.
In this connection, a brief description may be made of the regular
military service of the lord and vassal under the Tokugawa. In the Edo
castle, all the officials from the _rōjiu_ downward served in time of
peace in civil capacities, but, in war, held military command, the
shōgun himself sometimes taking the field. As to the feudal barons in
the country, those whose income did not exceed ten thousand _koku_ of
rice were required to furnish ten horsemen and two hundred and
thirty-five foot-soldiers, with full equipment of bows, guns, spears,
banners, and so forth; while those who enjoyed a larger revenue were
under obligation to furnish more ample contingents in proportion to
their income. The shōgun himself had a large bodyguard, consisting of
30,000 men or upward, as well as a powerful standing force, called
_ōbangumi_, which was prepared to take the field first in the event of
an emergency. The _samurai_ of these troops discharged civil duties in
times of peace. Throughout the various clans a military system closely
resembling that of the shōgunate prevailed.
To Yoshimune's initiative belongs, also, the establishment of a
fire-brigade in Edo. In earlier times, during the period of the fourth
shōgun, Iyetsuna, in January, 1657, a conflagration broke out in Edo,
reducing nearly one-half of the city to ashes, and entailing the loss of
many lives. After this catastrophe, Matsudaira Nobutsuna, who then held
the office of _rōjiu_, effected great improvements in the division of
the city, repaired and widened the streets, removed the great Buddhist
temples to the suburbs, created large spaces to which the citizens could
fly for refuge in the event of fire, and built embankments to prevent
the overflow of the rivers, thus greatly augmenting the prosperity of
the capital. Prior to this three aqueducts had been constructed in the
Kanda, Tamagawa, and Senkawa districts, by which means immense
facilities were conferred in the matter of water supply. After the fire
of 1657, however, the crime of incendiarism became common, and owing to
the high winds so often prevailing in Edo, fires thus kindled proved
very destructive, as many as ten thousand houses being sometimes ruined
at one time. Perpetual exposure to such a destructive agency naturally
exercised an injurious effect upon the methods of house construction.
The citizens contented themselves with flimsy dwellings, in many cases
thatched, not tiled, and the decoration of the nobles' mansions began to
be materially reduced. On the other hand, the prosperity of the city
increased so greatly that its area extended over twenty-five square
miles and its population aggregated two millions. Conflagrations,
however, continued as frequent as ever. Yoshimune, therefore, encouraged
the people to build houses of stone or other fireproof materials, and in
streets of prime importance, like those in the Kanda and Nihonbashi
districts, the shōgun did not hesitate to have the houses pulled down
in order to widen the thoroughfares. At the same time, Ōoka Tadasuke,
municipal governor, established the fire-brigade system. All these
improvements had some effect in reducing the number of fires, but to the
end of the Tokugawa dynasty their ravages continued to be the curse of
the capital.
Yoshimune, who in addition to military, financial, and administrative
aptitudes had a strong scientific bias, devoted much of his spare time
to astronomy, and caused instruments to be constructed for the purpose
of taking observations. He also ordered surveys to be undertaken for the
purpose of making a map. The encouragement of medicine and the building
of hospitals were also within the range of his reforms, and even the
promulgation of a law of copyright was not neglected, while we find him
turning to such a matter as the planting of cherry, willow, and peach
trees at Asukayama, along the banks of the Sumida River, in Kanda, in
Koganei, in Nakano, and other parts of the capital, with the result that
the citizens are to-day in possession of beautiful pleasure resorts both
in the suburbs and in the business districts of Tōkyō.
Under the influence of these wise and comprehensive reforms, it is not
strange that throughout the period of the rule of Yoshimune (1716-1745)
and his son Iyeshige (1745-1761) the country enjoyed comparative peace
and order. But the gradual decline of the Tokugawa power which had
previously set in could not be checked even by Yoshimune. Under the
tenth shōgun, Iyeharu (1761-1787), the influence of his unworthy
favorites, the Tanuma family, introduced evils of bribery and
sycophancy, while the country at large was visited by droughts and
inundations, such discontent being engendered among the poorer classes
that mobs assembled and attacked the residences of wealthy merchants.
Fortunately the next shōgun, Iyenari (1787-1837), and his great
councilor, Matsudaira Sadanobu, reverted to the strict policy of
Yoshimune and the illustrious founders of the Tokugawa shōgunate. Many
an able official was appointed for service in the Edo castle, and
several barons in the country vied with the central administration in
wisdom and efficiency of government. Iyenari's shōgunate also coincided
with the reign of the noble Emperor Kōkaku (1780-1817). Iyenari was
promoted to the second grade of the first rank and to the post of chief
minister of state, thus enjoying the distinction of reaching the highest
position ever attained by a shōgun of the Tokugawa line while in office.
His long rule of fifty years may be said to have effectually stemmed
the tide of the decline of the Edo government which otherwise would have
swept over everything long before it did in the next period.
We shall conclude this chapter by describing various phases of the
society and the life of the people of this period, beginning with the
upper classes. Nothing was deemed of greater importance, politically and
socially, than to preserve distinctions of birth. Throughout the Edo
period the lines of demarcation were clearly and sharply maintained
between the _samurai_, farmers, artisans, and merchants, the four
classes ranking in the order here given. Kyōto was the place of
residence of the imperial princes, among whom Fushimi, Arisugawa,
Katsura, and Kan-in were most closely connected with the imperial house.
The civil nobles aggregated over 130 families, including the five called
_Sekka_ from which the prime ministers were appointed and empresses
chosen, and the seven _Seika_ from which the ministers of the right and
left were selected. The real administration of all the civil and
military affairs of the state rested, however, under the authority of
the sovereign, on the shōgun, who controlled the feudal barons numbering
over 360. At the outset large tracts of territory were given to the
direct descendants of Iyeyasu, on whose support the shōgun chiefly
relied, but subsequently special treatment was extended to the feudal
barons of Owari, Kii, and Mito, who under the name _Sanke_--Three
Families--were authorized to act in the capacity of advisers to the
shōgun with reference to the principal political affairs of the realm,
and they were invested with the right to succeed to the shōgunate in the
event of a failure in the direct line of male descent. Besides these,
the two shōguns Yoshimune and Iyeshige founded three new families at the
head of which they placed their own sons, namely, the houses of Tayasu,
Hitotsubashi, and Shimizu, collectively known as the _Sankyō_--Three
Barons--enjoying the same special privileges and distinctions as the
_Sanke_. Many other feudal chiefs were also the recipients of
exceptional, though smaller, favor at the hands of the shōgun.
As to the various barons in the land, their classification into the
_tozama_ and _fudai_ classes has already been explained. If classified
according to the extent of their holdings, they fall into the three
divisions of _kokushi_, _jōshi_, and _ryōshi_. Lands of varying extent
were granted in perpetuity, such estates being classed into four kinds,
namely, those yielding 10,000 _koku_ annually and upward; those of
50,000 _koku_ and upward; those of 100,000 _koku_ and upward, and those
of 300,000 _koku_ and upward. According to these property qualifications
the relative ranks of the feudal nobles were determined, as well as
their ceremonial robes, their treatment at the Edo castle, and the
places assigned to them there. It was prescribed that, whenever the
feudal barons repaired to Edo or visited the shōgun's palace, they had
to be attended by a fixed retinue of retainers, the number varying with
their rank. On these occasions bows, muskets, spears, and halberds were
borne by the retinue, several of whom were mounted on horseback. The
baggage was carried in handsome cases, called _hasami-bako_, and the
utensils used _en route_ were also enclosed in ornamented coverings, so
that the whole procession formed an imposing and picturesque spectacle,
which was frequently met with on the main roads converging in Edo. As
for the _samurai_ at large, they derived their means of support from
lands granted them for life or in perpetuity by the shōgun's government
or the feudal nobles. Their duties were to master all branches of
military exercises and to devote themselves faithfully to the service of
their lords, and literature was also studied with assiduity. Speaking
broadly, they were divided into two classes. Those belonging to the
higher class, called _bajō-kaku_, or knightly rank, took the field on
horseback and held comparatively high social positions. The second
class, _keihai_, or light men, went on foot, and were subdivided into
various grades, as _kachi_, _kobito_, _ashigaru_. The _samurai_ who
directly served the shōgun's government were called _jikisan_, and
occupied the most respected position among their class, the highest
among them being _hatamoto_ (bannerets) and the lowest _kenin_.
In order to maintain the demarcation between classes and to preserve
social order, strict attention was paid by the government to etiquette
and conventional observances, and the study of literature by men of
position was encouraged. Nevertheless, instances of rude and disorderly
conduct on the part of the people were not infrequent. During the early
years of the Tokugawa period, the memory of the nation being still
freshly imbued with incidents of battle and bloodshed, both the
government and the people regarded the military spirit with the utmost
reverence and considered its development essential to the well-being of
the state. _Samurai_ of the lowest rank wore two swords whenever they
walked abroad, and, one and all, these men of war were disciples of a
cult which placed honor and justice at the head of a soldier's
characteristics and relegated selfishness to the lowest place. It was a
common practice with the _samurai_ of the time to take their own lives
for the purpose of expiating some event which they considered injurious
to the prestige of their feudal lord.
A remarkable example of the vendetta occurred in 1702, when forty-seven
_rōnin_ killed the enemy of their late lord. The affair had its origin
in an act of violence perpetrated by Asano Naganori, feudal chief of
Akō, who, being insulted by a rear-vassal Yoshinaka, drew his sword
within the precincts of the palace and wounded the offender, for which
breach of etiquette he was condemned to take his own life, and his
family estate was confiscated, an exceptionally severe sentence, due to
the fact that the government of the shōgun was just then exercising
every effort to check the rough-and-ready habits of time. Asano's
vassals, forty-seven in number, under the leadership of Ōishi
Kuranosuke, after a long period of patient watching and much hardship,
succeeded in forcing their way into Yoshinaka's residence in Edo and
decapitating him. Then they surrendered themselves to the authorities
and were sentenced to die by suicide. But their achievement excited the
nation's strong admiration, who bestowed upon them the name of _gishi_,
loyal retainers. Their act was later dramatized into one of the greatest
of Japanese plays called "_Chūshigura_," and through all succeeding
generations theatrical representations of their loyal conduct never
failed to attract deeply sympathetic audiences. Similar deeds were
already on record. Early in the Kamakura period, the Soga brothers,
Sukenari and Tokimune, killed their father's foe, Kudo Suketsune; and
under the Tokugawa rule, Araki Matayemon, the renowned swordsman,
together with Watanabe Kazuma, put to death Kawai, the hereditary enemy
of his family, at Ueno in Iga. These and other achievements, some
filial, some loyal, fired the imagination of the nation. It became a
popular creed that orphans, faithful vassals, and even widows should
devote their lives to vindicating the memory or avenging the death of
parents, chiefs, or husbands, and this conviction was constantly
translated into action during the early years of the Tokugawa rule. It
was undoubtedly a custom in some respects worthy only of a military
feudalism, but its effect in fostering a spirit of chivalry was beyond
question.
Even the inferior classes and the merchants of that day, living in or
near Kyōto, attached more importance to the dictates of integrity and
honor than to questions of pecuniary interest. An evidence of the spirit
that governed monetary transactions is furnished in the form of
promissory notes in vogue at the time, which contained such clauses as:
"In the event of my failure to repay the money, I shall have no
objection to being publicly ridiculed," or, "Should I fail to discharge
my obligation at the fixed time, I should be considered as no man." In
fact, displays of courage and resolution and heroic contempt of
difficulties were so highly prized that, from the latter part of the
seventeenth century such a habit of thought naturally degenerated in the
case of the unrefined or illiterate into mere truculence and roughness.
A peculiar class of men called _odokodate_, civilians attired half like
the _samurai_ and exercising deeds of chivalry, no less of mere
roughness, was a product of this period. They roamed about the streets
in bands, between whom bitter quarrels frequently occurred. The
proceedings of these affiliations exercised so injurious an effect on
the customs and morals of the people that they were strictly interdicted
by the fifth shōgun, and their leaders were put to death. The same ruler
forbade the wearing of swords by merchants and farmers, and by these
means succeeded in correcting the rough habits of the lower orders, but
it is questionable whether the evils removed were not replaced by others
still greater.
As years went by and the empire continued to enjoy profound
tranquillity, ostentation, luxury, and effeminate habits began to
prevail. Against these evil practices not a few of the statesmen and
nobles of the time earnestly counseled the people. Dissipation and vain
display reached their height in the time of Iyenari. With this
irresistible growth of superficial and licentious habits and the
corruption and the demoralization of the feudal classes, which arose
from the reign of an unbroken peace and prosperity, and which culminated
in the days of Iyenari, the definite decline of the Tokugawa shōgunate
may be said to have begun.
Turning to the common people, we find that the great majority of them
consisted of farmers, artisans, and merchants. Agriculture being
regarded as the staple national industry, farmers ranked above both
artisans and merchants, the low place assigned to the mercantile class
being due to the consideration that they worked in their own interests
only. Neither farmers, artisans, nor merchants were permitted to use
family names, so they called themselves simply "farmer this," or
"tradesman that," but it was possible to acquire the privilege of using
a family name on account of some meritorious public service, and many
farmers were so privileged. Lower still than any of the classes hitherto
mentioned were the _eta_ and _hinin_, who were not deemed worthy to be
included in any of the above categories.
Chapter XIII
THE FALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1837-1868
In 1837 the first armed rebellion against the Tokugawa government since
the battle of Amakusa, which took place just two hundred years before,
occurred in Ōsaka under the leadership of Ōshio Heihachirō. Erudite and
energetic, he had found himself unable to use his ability owing to his
mean birth, and took advantage of the popular discontent caused by a
famine to raise the standard of revolt. He with his followers attacked
the castle of Ōsaka, but failed, and in consequence died by his own
hand. The government was yet far too powerful to be shaken by such a
small uprising, but the revolt of Ōshio has gained its place in history
as a sign of the growing decay and unpopularity of the Edo
administration. A far more decisive event, however, was soon to follow.
On July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry, envoy of the United States
of America, entered the Bay of Uraga with a squadron consisting of two
frigates, the _Susquehanna_ and the _Mississippi_, and two
sloops-of-war, the _Plymouth_ and the _Saratoga_, and sought to open
commercial relations with Japan. His visit exercised a powerful
influence, entirely unknown to himself, on the domestic affairs of the
country. Ever since the early part of the seventeenth century
anti-foreign feeling had been so intense that only the Chinese and the
Dutch had been allowed to carry on trade at Nagasaki, and other European
nations, owing to various circumstances, gave themselves little, if any,
concern about Japan. But from the beginning of the eighteenth century
the spirit of aggrandizement made itself felt in the Occident, and
Western states began to vie with one another in attempts to extend their
territories and commerce. Eastward of Japan across the Pacific lay the
United States of America, which had shaken off the yoke of Great
Britain, and the latter, deprived of this flourishing colony, sought
compensation in India and farther eastward, while France also, as well
as Russia, turned covetous eyes to the Orient. Nine years before the
arrival of the American squadron in Uraga Bay, or in 1844, the Dutch
addressed a letter to the Tokugawa government advising that Japan be
opened to all foreign nations, and subsequently they often repeated this
counsel, at the same time explaining the conditions of the various
states of Europe. Among the Japanese, many who had studied the Dutch
language and acquired some knowledge of Western affairs were in favor of
a liberal foreign policy, but among the bulk of the nation the
prejudices engendered by the violent and lawless conduct of the early
Christian propagandists remained as strong as ever. Moreover, fresh
reasons for resentment had been furnished by various encroachments of
the Russians between the Kwansei (1789-1800) and Bunka (1804-1817) eras,
and by disorderly conduct of English sailors in Nagasaki. Indeed, the
Tokugawa government had once gone so far as to order that any foreign
ship approaching the coast of Japan should be fired on, and any Japanese
whose studies of Dutch led them to advocate the opening of the country
were deprived of their official positions or otherwise punished.
In the last years of the eighteenth century the councilors of Edo
strongly advocated complete national seclusion, and at the time when the
American squadron visited Japan, Tokugawa Nariakira, commonly called
Rekkō, the feudal chief of Mito, a noble of statesman-like qualities,
ardently urged the policy of holding aloof from all foreign intercourse.
In 1846 two American men-of-war had come to Uraga and sought to open
trade relations, but their proposals were not entertained, and they had
to leave the country without accomplishing anything. Commodore Perry's
visit occurred seven years later; he came with credentials from
President Fillmore, as well as specimens of the products of the United
States, and made formal application that commerce be opened between his
country and Japan. The government replied that the matter being of the
gravest importance, no immediate reply could be given, but that an
answer would be ready the following year, whereupon Perry sailed away,
declaring that he would return the next year without fail. Thereafter
the Tokugawa government invited a council of the feudal barons,
including the lord of Mito, the matter being at the same time reported
to the emperor. During the general confusion incidental to this event,
the Shōgun Iyeyoshi died suddenly, his demise taking place in the very
month of Perry's coming. He was succeeded by his son Iyesada. The year
passed without any definite step being taken, and in February, 1854,
Perry once more made his appearance at Uraga and urgently asked for a
reply to the proposals he had submitted the preceding year. All the
feudal barons, including the Mito chief, united in advocating a policy
of seclusion, but the _rōjiu_, Abe Masahiro, and other chief officials
of the Edo castle were astute enough to see that such a policy would be
impracticable. They therefore insisted on concluding a treaty of amity
and commerce, without paying due attention to its terms. Repeated
conferences were held with the American envoy, and finally a treaty was
signed on March 31, providing that all American citizens driven to Japan
by stress of weather should be kindly treated; that American ships of
war should be supplied in Japanese ports with fuel, coal, provisions,
and other necessaries; and that the two ports of Shimoda and Hakodate
should be opened to American vessels. Subsequently ambassadors came from
Russia, France, and England, and conventions were concluded with them in
terms virtually the same as those of the American treaty. The government
pretended that they had concluded the treaties merely in order to gain
time for warlike preparations, but in truth they had been taken by
surprise. Moreover, natural calamities of a most disastrous character
visited the nation, to increase the financial embarrassment of Edo. In
the year of Commodore Perry's second coming violent earthquakes took
place in western Japan, only to be followed in the next year by a
severer shock, which overthrew immense numbers of the dwellings of the
upper and lower classes as well as of the feudal barons, and caused in
Edo a terrific fire in which 100,000 persons are said to have lost their
lives.
[Illustration: A PICNIC ON THE ASUKA HILL IN THE FLOWERY SEASON]
In 1856, Townsend Harris, consul-general, came duly accredited by the
government of the United States, and proposed that relations of
friendship should be established between the two countries, at the same
time asking on his own part for an audience with the shōgun. The _Rōjiu_
Hotta Masaatsu (Bitchu-no-kami), who had taken charge of foreign affairs
in place of Abe Masahiro, allowed Harris, after considerable hesitation,
to repair to the Edo castle. It was, however, decided not to give a
favorable answer to the American proposal without the sanction of the
emperor. Hitherto, despite the great importance of foreign affairs, the
Tokugawa administration had been allowed to take any steps it pleased
with reference to them without consulting the sovereign. But despite the
large measure of power enjoyed by the Edo government, it was no longer
able to effectually control the feudal barons. Hence it resolved to
consult the imperial wishes, and also to secure the advice of the feudal
chiefs. Such a vacillating and dependent method of procedure was
entirely opposed to the policy pursued by the Tokugawa ever since the
days of Iyeyasu. Now they exposed themselves to the criticism and
interference of both the court and the people, so that in this question
of foreign intercourse is to be sought the proximate cause of the
downfall of the Tokugawa.
At that time the throne was occupied by Kōmei, father of the present
emperor, who was in favor of keeping the country closed against the
ingress of foreigners. He therefore withheld his sanction when the
shōgun's representative came to Kyōto to seek it. At the same time, the
American envoy continually pressed the government to sign a treaty, and,
to make the matter worse, another trouble simultaneously presented
itself, namely, that, the shōgun having no son, friction arose about the
succession. Several of the most influential feudal barons desired that
Yoshinobu, son of Nariakira of Mito, who represented the Hitotsubashi
branch of the Tokugawa, should become heir in consideration of his high
abilities; but many of the principal officers and the court ladies were
opposed to the policy of Nariakira. The shōgun himself was not desirous
of making Yoshinobu his successor, but the steadily increasing influence
of the anti-foreign party in Kyōto, the recognized head of which was
Nariakira, gave new force to the claims of the latter. Meanwhile, as the
need of coming to some terms with the United States became more urgent,
the shōgun appointed to the post of _tairō_ the courageous Ii Naosuke
(Kamon-no-Kami). Ii was not a man to be guided by others whose opinions
he did not share. Under his counsel, it was now agreed that the five
ports of Nagasaki, Hakodate, Hyōgo, Kanagawa, and Niigata should be
opened to foreign trade, a convention in that sense being concluded
without reference to the emperor. This took place in June of 1858, and a
little later treaties of similar import were signed with Russia,
England, the Netherlands, and France, a report being sent to Kyōto,
after the event, to the effect that these measures had been unavoidable.
In the matter of the succession, Ii overrode the advice of the feudal
barons, and Iyemochi, then little more than a child, son of the lord of
Kii, became the fourteenth shōgun. The Tokugawa government thus disposed
finally of the question of foreign intercourse, but the domestic
affairs of the country grew more complicated than ever.
[Illustration: JAPANESE PORTS OPENED TO FOREIGN TRADE 1858]
The officials of Edo who were opposed to foreign intercourse claimed
that the country had been subjected to the shame of concluding a
commercial treaty under duress. The spread of this idea aroused
indignation against the Tokugawa government, and many of the barons,
especially Nariakira of Mito, addressed memorials to Kyōto, complaining
that the opening of the country to foreign trade and intercourse was
contrary to the best interests of the nation. Under these circumstances,
the relations between the courts in Kyōto and Edo were of the least
intimate character. Presently it began to be alleged against the
shōgun's councilors, even by men of Owari, Mito, and Echizen, who stood
in a position of close relationship and intimacy with the Tokugawa, that
by concluding treaties with five foreign countries without reference to
the emperor, the sovereign had been directly insulted. Loyalty to the
throne and the expulsion of aliens became rallying cries of the
exclusive party, and conflicts occurred in various places between the
people who would close the country and those who advocated its opening.
Loyalty to the throne was no new thought to the nation, but it now
acquired a new significance under new circumstances. The Tokugawa
shōguns had, like all other great military families that acquired
administrative control in Japan, asserted their authority largely at the
expense of that of the emperor, and the fact had begun to cause keen
regret to many among the _samurai_. Already, when Iyeshige was shōgun a
_rōnin_ named Takeuchi Shikibu, lamenting the decline of the imperial
power, urged the officials of Kyōto to devote themselves to military and
literary pursuits, so as to be able some day to overthrow the shōgunate.
He was exiled by the Tokugawa, who also arrested and put to death
several others of the same party.
With the growth of a taste for pure Japanese literature reverence for
the sovereign was intensified and propagated. Its influence was most
potent in Mito, the lord of which edited the "_Dai Nihon Shi_" (History
of Great Japan), which as scripture of loyalty was widely read. Another
work which exercised a similar influence was the "_Nihon-gaishi_" by Rai
Sanyō. Various motives so largely contributed to the growth of loyal
sentiment that ultimately a secret imperial rescript was issued to the
Mito vassals, instructing them to unite with the _tozama_ barons and
assist the shōgun to expel foreigners from the country. The _Tairō_ Ii,
vehemently attacked for exceeding the powers that properly belonged to
him, now took another resolute and decisive step. He dismissed all the
senior officials who opposed his policy, and retained in office only
those in harmony with him. He further announced that any person placing
obstacles in the way of measures adopted by the government should be
severely dealt with, and in pursuance of this declaration he placed in
confinement or dismissed from office civil nobles of highest
distinction, and inflicted penalties on six feudal barons of the
greatest magnitude. An equally drastic course was adopted in the case of
the leading Edo officials, and more than fifty prominent retainers of
noblemen, as well as _rōnin_, scholars, priests, and even women, were
seized and sent into exile. These decisive proceedings procured for the
period the name of the "Ansei Jail," but the _tairō_ had at least the
satisfaction of knowing that he had shown his courage and competence to
deal summarily with his opponents. Great excitement prevailed, however,
among all classes of the people, above all, the Mito _samurai_. On the
snowy morning of the 3d of the third month, 1860, as the _Tairō_ Ii was
_en route_ for the palace of the shōgun, he was attacked and killed by
eighteen Mito _rōnin_ under the leadership of Sano Takenosuke, and a
year later the _Rōjiu_ Andō Nobumasa, was attacked near the Sakashita
gate of the castle. In order to restore harmony between the courts of
Kyōto and Edo, the latter now arranged a marriage between the Shōgun
Iyemochi and the emperor's sister, but though the sovereign sanctioned
this union, it brought no peace for the country. Not only did the
anti-Tokugawa agitation continue in noble and official circles, but also
_rōnin_, partly in obedience to the exclusion policy, but chiefly
seeking to increase the embarrassments of Edo, attacked foreigners and
burned their houses, the shōgun's administration showing itself
powerless to check these outrages. By degrees the _samurai_, who had
separated themselves from their fiefs in order to carry on the
agitation, assembled in Kyōto, where were already gathered great numbers
of influential persons interested in the burning question of the day,
and where the emperor himself lent the sanction of his indorsement to
the doings of the malcontents. To the two most powerful among all the
barons, Shimazu Narishige, lord of Satsuma, and Mōri Yoshichika, lord of
Chōshū, secret commissions were specially given by the emperor. Before
anything decisive could be accomplished, however, Narishige died and was
succeeded by his younger brother, Hisamitsu, who, together with the
Chōshū chief, remained in Kyōto at the head of a large force of
_samurai_, with the avowed intention of restoring tranquillity to the
country. There they were joined by Yamanouchi Toyonobu, lord of Tosa,
and this triumvirate of puissant barons, Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa,
began to be spoken of throughout the length and breadth of the land as
the certain saviors of the situation.
The imperial court, in accordance with the advice of these three
powerful councilors, now dispatched an envoy to Edo conveying a command
that the shōgun should repair to Kyōto, that order should be established
in the affairs of the administration, and that foreigners should be
expelled from Japan. Prior to the receipt of this rescript the Tokugawa
government had released the persons then in confinement, had dismissed
all officials of proved incompetence, and had effected various reforms
in the state organization. After the arrival of the imperial rescript
these measures were supplemented by other changes, and punishments were
meted out to Andō and other officials who had been removed from office.
At the same period a most significant step was taken by the shōgun's
government: the system that required the presence of the feudal barons
in Edo was abolished--a step indicative of the marked decadence of the
Tokugawa power. For the first time in two centuries and a half the power
of the imperial court overshadowed that of the castle in Edo. An event
now occurred that tended to precipitate the impending crisis. As the
Satsuma chief, Shimazu Hisamitsu, was escorting the imperial envoy on
his return journey from Edo to Kyōto, a party of four English
equestrians met the procession near the village of Namamugi in Musashi,
and attempted to break through its ranks. This violation of Japanese
official etiquette, an act unpardonable in the eyes of the _samurai_,
was violently resented. Two of the foreigners were severely wounded, one
of them shortly afterward falling from his horse and dying by the
roadside. Incensed by this affair, the British government demanded that
the men who had perpetrated the deed and the personage under whose
direction it had been carried out should be arrested, and that an
indemnity of a hundred thousand dollars should be paid as blood-money, a
demand that greatly embarrassed the shōgun's ministers, who knew that,
even if they had possessed the power to comply in full, the attempt must
lead to the gravest domestic troubles.
In 1863 the Shōgun Iyemochi repaired to Kyōto. This was the first visit
paid to the imperial capital by a Tokugawa shōgun since the days of
Iyemitsu, two hundred years previously, and the event naturally produced
a strong impression upon the nation. At that time the numerous and
constantly increasing body of _samurai_ whose motto was "_sonnō jōi_"
(revere the sovereign and expel the foreigner) were exerting all their
energies, going hither and thither to popularize their views, and not
hesitating even to use the sword against those who opposed them. When
the shōgun arrived in Kyōto they brought strong pressure to bear on him
with the object of inducing him to adopt their policy, and after long
discussion he finally agreed to do so. Notice of this important decision
was given to the feudal barons on May 15 in the same year (1863). The
shōgun then returned without loss of time to Edo, apprehending that his
presence in Kyōto might lead to fresh complications and being further
advised that affairs in Edo needed his presence.
The Edo government now found itself in a dilemma. At once unwilling and
unable to give effect to its anti-foreign policy, it had nevertheless
received and accepted the imperial order to that effect. The ministers,
therefore, adopted the only course opened to them, namely, conveyed to
the foreign representatives an intimation that it would be necessary to
close the ports and put an end to foreign commerce, and, at the same
time, dispatched ambassadors directly to the Occident to explain the
state of affairs in Japan. These measures, however, proved of course
abortive. The anti-foreign sentiment was still further inflamed a few
months later by openly hostile acts committed by the feudal baron of
Chōshū, who fired upon foreign vessels attempting to pass the Strait of
Shimonoseki. Nevertheless, even in Kyōto there were some influential men
who boldly espoused the Tokugawa cause and placed themselves in
opposition to the party working for the overthrow of the Edo government.
A serious obstacle to the success of that party still existed in the
fact that no effective union had yet been brought about between the
powerful fiefs of Satsuma and Chōshū. The former advocated
reconciliation between the courts of Kyōto and Edo, and urged that both
should coöperate for the expulsion of foreigners; whereas the Chōshū
folks were in favor of more precipitate measures, involving the downfall
of the Tokugawa. In Kyōto the partisans of the extreme view urged the
emperor to honor the Chōshū chief by visiting him in his own fief,
subsequently worshiping at the sepulcher of Jimmu Tennō, and then, after
a visit to the shrine of Ise, to openly declare war against the shōgun.
But the programme encountered strong opposition in Kyōto at the hands of
a few other barons who regarded with deep regret and apprehension the
strong course to which the imperial court seemed in danger of being
committed. These nobles, forming a union with certain princes, zealously
opposed the court view; and finally succeeded so far as to procure the
expulsion from Kyōto of the Chōshū lord, who, on his return to his fief,
was accompanied by Sanjō Sanetomi, afterward destined to play a
prominent part in the events of the restoration, and six other court
nobles. The policy of the court was now directed to the reëstablishment
of friendly relations with Edo, and the dissatisfaction engendered by
this attitude led to _émeutes_ by _rōnin_ at Yamato, Tajima, and other
places, but they were speedily reduced to order. In the following year,
1864, the Shōgun Iyemochi again proceeded to Kyōto, where his reception
by the emperor was much more gracious than it had been on the previous
occasion, various commissions being given to him, with the result that
harmony was for the time restored between the two courts. Prior to this
a British squadron had proceeded to Kagoshima to exact an indemnity on
account of the Namamugi affair, and a sharp engagement had taken place
between the ships and the Satsuma forts. The Edo government, however,
paid the indemnity demanded by the foreign representatives. The affair
was thus brought to an amicable issue, and foreign intercourse continued
as before, though the policy of the shōgun's government toward it
remained apparently as undecided as ever.
In Mito "Rekkō" Nariakira had died, and the _samurai_ of the fief were
divided into two parties, one following the late lord's policy and the
other dissenting from it, which carried their enmity to such an extent
that great numbers of persons fell victims to the sword. Finally in
April, 1864, some of the ultra-conservative men of Mito renounced their
service to their lord, and assembled in arms at Mount Tsukuba, where
they were joined by a number of other malcontents, and became the center
of a widespread disorder. It was quickly subdued by the Tokugawa forces,
but while the Tsukuba insurgents were still in the field the Edo
government found itself involved in an open quarrel with a vastly more
formidable rival, the fief of Chōshū. The lord of Chōshū had been
forbidden to enter Kyōto in consequence of his obdurate hostility to the
policy of the Tokugawa, and the issue of such a mandate naturally caused
great umbrage to his lieges. In June, 1864, they presented a memorial to
the throne, setting forth their loyalty and praying that the ban of
exclusion from the capital might be removed from their feudal chief and
his son, as well as from Sanjō and the six other court nobles who had
fled with him to Chōshū for refuge. By degrees _rōnin_ from Chōshū
assembled in the environs of the imperial city, and after some
collisions they entered Kyōto. But they were totally defeated by the
troops of Aidzu and Satsuma, who guarded the city. This act of contumacy
provoked an imperial edict depriving the elder and younger lords of
Chōshū of their rank and commissioning the Shōgun Iyemochi to chastise
Chōshū. An expedition was organized in obedience to this edict, a very
powerful army being raised in western Japan. Just at this time a
squadron composed of British, American, French, and Dutch vessels of war
entered the Straits of Shimonoseki to exact reparation from the men of
Chōshū who had, as has already been related, fired upon foreign vessels
passing through the strait. Attempts to avert hostilities by negotiation
having proved abortive, the Chōshū forts were bombarded and dismantled
by the foreign vessels, and a peace was afterward concluded, the Chōshū
folks pledging themselves to give free passage to foreign ships, and to
pay an indemnity of three million dollars. This large sum, though
subsequently paid by the Tokugawa government, was denounced as excessive
by foreign jurists as well as Japanese statesmen, and the portion that
fell to the share of the United States of America was returned to Japan
more than twenty years afterward.
Pending the settlement of this Shimonoseki affair the Tokugawa military
operations against Chōshū were delayed, and as the latter put to death
three of the leaders of the disturbance in Kyōto, and made ample
apologies for their offense, the force destined for the invasion of
their fief was disbanded. There were, however, two parties in Chōshū;
the one in favor of submitting to the shōgun so as to avert misfortunes
otherwise apparently threatening the fief, and the other advocating
determined resistance to the Tokugawa. At the head of the latter party
was Takasugi Shinsaku, and he, having established relations with Sanjō
and the other court nobles then refugees in Chōshū, succeeded in
completely overcoming the pacific faction and obtaining ascendency in
the fief. The Edo government now found itself openly defied by Chōshū,
and a strong agitation arose in favor of inflicting summary punishment
by sending another large expedition. Against this counsel dissenting
voices were not unheard, but finally an expeditionary force was
organized and moved southward, the shōgun himself accompanying it. A
marked incident of this occasion was the refusal of the great Satsuma
baron to send a quota of troops for service with the shōgun. His fief
and Chōshū, whose mutual rivalry had at times amounted to bitter enmity,
had concluded at last that in their union lay the only hope of
accomplishing the purpose of unifying and consolidating the empire.
Foremost among the far-seeing statesmen was Saigō Takamori of Satsuma,
who never wavered in his conviction that no lasting amity could be
established between the courts of Kyōto and Edo, and that the only
solution of the national difficulties lay in the overthrow of the
Tokugawa. To this view his fellow-clansmen subscribed, and relations
were opened with Chōshū which finally led to the hearty coöperation of
the two fiefs. _En route_ for Chōshū the shōgun stopped at Ōsaka, where
he was approached by the representatives of Great Britain, the
Netherlands, and the United States, who insisted that Hyōgo should be
opened for trade according to the provisions of the Edo treaties, and
that the treaties should be ratified by the emperor. The shōgun, after
reference to the sovereign, declined to entertain this demand, and the
foreign representatives thereupon threatened to prefer it in person to
the throne. The emperor, much incensed at the course events were taking,
severely punished the chief officials of the shōgun who were directly
responsible for the treaties, and this having been done without
reference to the shōgun himself, placed the latter in such an
embarrassing position that he laid his resignation at the foot of the
throne and asked that Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu, of Mito, be appointed in
his stead. He accompanied this document with a memorial praying for the
imperial sanction to the treaties with foreign powers. The emperor
declined to accept the shōgun's resignation, but gave his sanction to
the treaties, the immediate opening of Hyōgo to foreign trade being,
however, refused. Subsequent to these events the expedition against
Chōshū was again put in motion, but the Chōshū men inflicted a crushing
defeat upon it, inasmuch as this was the first occasion of a shōgun's
taking the field in person since two hundred and fifty years before, the
consequences were disastrous to the prestige of the Tokugawa, many of
the feudal barons openly renouncing allegiance to them. While the
campaign was still in progress the Shōgun Iyemochi died in the castle of
Ōsaka, August, 1866, and was succeeded by Yoshinobu in December of the
same year. The Emperor Kōmei also died shortly after. Owing to this sad
event the expedition against Chōshū was finally abandoned. Thereafter
the shōgun found himself confronted by such difficulties both at home
and abroad that further tenure of office became impossible, and finally,
acting on the advice of the lord of Tosa, resigned the office as the
feudal overlord of Japan, and restored the administrative power into the
hands of the sovereign. This memorable event occurred on October 14,
1867.
Feudalism, which had for nearly seven centuries controlled the
administration of the empire, seemed now to have come to an end, but
institutions so deeply rooted in the life of the nation and so long
upheld by persons whose vital interests were interwoven therewith were
not to die away without a struggle. It was mortifying to the supporters
of the shōgun, who had so recently renounced his office from
disinterested motives, to see his policy reversed, his old enemies
raised to the highest posts of the new government, and he and his late
councilors completely excluded from official life. The Chōshū baron and
his son received the imperial pardon and reëntered Kyōto, while they as
well as Sanjō Sanetomi were restored to their former ranks; the soldiers
of Satsuma, Chōshū, Aki, Owari, and Echizen displaced the men of Aidzu
and Kuwana as guards of Kyōto; and radical changes were made in official
posts and emoluments, the offices of _sōsai_, _gijō_, and _sanyo_ being
newly established under the presidency of Prince Arisugawa. The first
_gijō_ were Princes Yoshiaki and Akira, together with Sanjō Sanetomi,
Iwakura Tomomi, and the barons of Satsuma, Echizen, and Tosa. The
_sanyo_ were Ōhara Shigenori, Saigō Takamori, and Ōkubo Toshimichi. More
than twenty court nobles were removed from office and the administrative
power was assumed in effect by a government under the direct control of
the sovereign.
[Illustration: DOWNFALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT 1867-1868]
On December 10 it was announced to the late shōgun, by order of the
emperor through the medium of the barons of Owari and Echizen, that his
administrative functions had been transferred to the emperor, and he was
at the same time privately instructed to resign his post of lord keeper
of the privy seal and to surrender the provinces hitherto forming his
fief. The news of these instructions produced great excitement among the
_fudai_ barons, and the shōgun, apprehending that they might resort to
violence on his behalf, petitioned the sovereign to allow him
temporarily to retain the post of lord keeper of the seal as well as to
hold the provinces of his fief, though he repeated his expression of
resolve to divest himself of all administrative authority. This course
did not, however, entirely allay the umbrage of the _fudai_ barons,
especially the lords of Aidzu and Kuwana. The shōgun himself, suspecting
that the order stripping him of his dignities and possessions had been
issued at the instigation of the chiefs of Satsuma and Chōshū, withdrew
from the Nijō palace and shut himself up in the castle of Ōsaka. There,
however, he was urgently counseled by the barons of Owari and Echizen to
abandon all resistance to the throne and to present himself peacefully
at the imperial court, and in obedience to this advice he was about to
enter Kyōto guarded by a powerful escort, when intelligence reached him
from Edo to the effect that a number of Satsuma _rōnin_, having
assembled at the Satsuma mansion in the city, had fired on a barrack
occupied by Tokugawa troops, and that the latter had consequently
attacked the mansion and driven out its occupants, who had taken refuge
in a warship anchored in Shinagawa Bay. Incensed by this news, the
shōgun, on January 3 in the first year of the Meiji era, 1868, issued
orders to the various clans to combine for the purpose of chastising
Satsuma. He commenced the campaign by mustering the troops of Aidzu and
Kuwana in Kyōto and marching to attack the forces of Satsuma and Chōshū.
But in the engagements that ensued at Fushimi and Toba the shōgun's army
was completely defeated, and Prince Yoshiaki was formally ordered by the
imperial court to lead a punitory expedition against Tokugawa, now an
open rebel. The latter retired to Edo by sea, accompanied by the forces
of Aidzu and Kuwana, when they and twenty-seven other feudal chiefs
were deprived by the emperor of all their ranks and offices, the duty of
breaking their power by force of arms being intrusted to the barons of
Aki, Chōshū, and Tosa. Also, special officers were dispatched to the
various provinces to restore peace, and their presence impressed the
feudal barons so strongly that no resistance was offered, and the
provinces to the west of Kyōto and Ōsaka surrendered without hesitation
to the imperial government. On February 9 Prince Arisugawa received the
commission of commander in chief, with instructions to bring the east
under control, and under his orders the imperial forces moved upon
Tōkai, Tōsan, and Hokuriku. The prince entered Sumpu on March 5 and made
preparations for the assault of Edo. Before the attack took place,
however, the shōgun retired to a temple in Edo, and dispatched Ōkubo
Tadahiro, Katsu Awa Yoshikuni, and others to open negotiations with
Saigō Takamori, general of the imperial forces then about to move on the
eastern capital. Both armies, the imperial and the feudal, were animated
with an uncontrollable desire to fight to the last, and the imminent
clash was barely averted by the word of honor exchanged between two
individuals, General Saigō of the emperor's army and Katsu, a vassal of
the shōgun. They had met each other only once, years before, but,
although circumstances had placed them in hostile camps, had entertained
so unbounded an admiration and confidence in each other's noble
character that now only a few words sufficed for them to pledge, on
their honor as _samurai_, to effect the surrender of the Tokugawa with
their dignity unimpaired, and to save Edo from an unnecessary
destruction of the lives and properties of its two million inhabitants.
On March 4 the van of the imperial army entered Edo and occupied the
castle, the Shōgun Yoshinobu being granted his life and confined in
Mito. On the 15th the prince entered Edo, and in May a grant of lands
yielding annually 700,000 _koku_ of rice in Suruga, Tōtōmi, and Mutsu
was made to the Tokugawa family for its maintenance.
When the imperial forces took possession of Edo castle, Enomoto Takeaki,
a naval officer of the Tokugawa government, fled to the northern Island
of Ezo, taking with him eight war vessels, and Ōtori Keisuke retired to
Kazusa and Shimōsa. Further, a number of the Tokugawa vassals, calling
themselves the _shōgitai_ (loyal band), took refuge in Uyeno, northeast
of Edo, and placing Prince Kozenbō, the lord abbot of Kwanyei-ji, at
their head, refused to surrender to the imperial government. They were
attacked by his majesty's forces and defeated after a sharp engagement,
while Ōtori and his comrades, routed at Utsunomiya and Nikkō, fled to
Aidzu, the feudal lord of which place had already returned thither, and
in conjunction with the barons of Mutsu and Dewa had made preparations
to uphold the Tokugawa cause by force of arms. But the imperial troops,
advancing from Tōsan, Tōkai, and Hokuriku, brought into subjection the
two clans of Sendai and Yonezawa, and entering Aidzu, took the Wakamatsu
castle on September 22, thus completely breaking the resistance of the
rebels and restoring tranquillity throughout the northern regions. In
December Matsudaira Katamori, the Aidzu lord, was sentenced to perpetual
confinement, and the fiefs of Sendai, Shōnai, and Morioka, which had
made act of submission after the fall of Wakamatsu, were confiscated,
and their lords confined. As for the Yonezawa fief, its territory was
reduced and its lord ordered to surrender the management of affairs to
his heir, while the fiefs of Mutsu and Dewa were divided into five and
two provinces, respectively. Meanwhile, Enomoto and his followers,
alleging the intention of reclaiming lands in Ezo, had occupied the
fortress at Hakodate and obtained possession of a great part of the
island. But they also finally in May, 1868, surrendered to the imperial
forces. In August the name Ezo was changed to Hokkaidō, and it was
divided into eleven provinces. The entire land of Japan thus passed
under the sway of the imperial government. Although some of the feudal
institutions still persisted, the Edo rule had in 1868 at last come to
an end--682 years since Minamoto Yoritomo organized the feudal
government of the empire.
PART III
THE NEW JAPAN. 1868-1893
Chapter XIV
INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 1868-1893
The organization of the new government had been started and pushed with
vigor even before the final deposition of the Tokugawa power took place.
In January, 1868, the _daijōkwan_, council of the state, was created,
which was soon divided into seven sections, namely, religion, home
affairs, foreign affairs, army and navy, treasury, justice, and law. The
ablest men of the various fiefs were selected to fill the posts of
councilors and legislative officials, and by degrees the government was
so organized as to put an end to the old system of hereditary office,
_samurai_ of comparatively low rank being nominated for high positions
according to their merits. On March 4 of that year the emperor proceeded
to the Shishinden palace, where, in the presence of the court nobles and
feudal barons, he solemnly pronounced the famous oath in five articles,
which has become the foundation of the constitutional government of new
Japan, that henceforth administrative affairs should be decided by
general deliberation; that both the government and the people should
labor for the good of the nation; that encouragement should be given to
industrial pursuits; that the evil customs hitherto prevailing should be
corrected; and that the country should be strengthened by adopting the
systems of defense employed in foreign lands. Shortly afterward the
administrative organization was recast, with the rule that no official
should be appointed at the same time to legislative, executive, and
judicial posts. The term of office was also fixed at four years, and the
system of appointment by merit received further development. Officials,
however, who showed themselves able and obtained popularity were allowed
to remain in office after the expiration of their first term of service.
On August 27 the coronation rites were duly performed at the Shishinden
palace. In accordance with the custom of changing the year-name on the
accession of an emperor, the era was called Meiji (enlightened
government). The emperor removed the capital to Tōkyō, formerly Edo, and
took up his residence in the castle there.
As regards local administration, the first division of the country after
the abolition of the shōgunate was into 28 _fu_, 273 _han_, and 21
_ken_, the _fu_ and _ken_ being governed by officials appointed by the
sovereign. The _han_, however, being still under the government of their
former feudal chiefs, no uniformity of administration was possible.
Moreover, of the total revenue of the state, namely, eleven million
_koku_ of rice, only 1-4/5 millions belonged to the _fu_ and _ken_,
which were under the direct control of the central government, the
remainder constituting the income of the _han_. The resources of the
imperial treasury proved quite inadequate to meet the heavy calls made
upon them, in spite of the fact that some of the barons contributed
liberally. Kido Takakoto, a distinguished _samurai_ of Chōshū, then
holding the post of councilor of state, appreciating the fundamental
necessity of the time, made such powerful representations to his liege
lord that the latter agreed to surrender his feudal domains and their
revenues to the sovereign. Kido subsequently took council on the same
subject with Ōkubo Toshimichi, a not less distinguished retainer of
Satsuma, and by the latter's advice the Satsuma lord was induced to
follow the course taken by Mōri of Chōshū. The barons of Hizen and Tosa
followed the example, and on January 20, 1868, these four great nobles
addressed to the throne a memorial over their joint signatures,
declaring their desire to restore their territories to the sovereign,
and their conviction that all the lands in the empire should come under
the direct control of the central government. Thereafter the various
other barons signified their wish to follow the same course, and in the
sequel of a consultation held with all the feudal chiefs, whom the
emperor summoned to Tōkyō for the purpose, an imperial edict was issued,
directing that all the fiefs should be restored to the sovereign,
appointing the feudal lords to the post of governor, and remodeling the
administrative organization of the _han_ so as to bring it into
conformity with that of the _fu_ and _ken_. One-tenth of the revenue
accruing from the fief lands was apportioned as the salary of the
governors. The distinctive terms of "court noble" (_kuge_) and "feudal
lord" (_shōkō_) were abolished, and all the nobles were included in the
general appellation of _kwazoku_. Relatives of the _kwazoku_ and
_samurai_ were all classed as _shizoku_, their pensions being at the
same time duly fixed.
Although the organization of the local government had been placed on a
fairly complete footing and uniformity of method had begun to be
discernible, both the military classes and the commoners in the various
fiefs were still disposed to pay more respect to their former lords than
to the new officials appointed by the central authorities. Under these
circumstances it was suggested by a governor, who had himself been a
great feudal baron, that the military monopoly of the _samurai_ should
be abolished and their pensions commuted, and that the army should be
recruited alike from the _shizoku_ and commoners. The versatile Kido
again recommended that the _han_ (fiefs) should be replaced by _ken_
(prefectures), so as to thoroughly centralize the administrative power.
It is remarkable that the view was at once seconded by many barons, who
memorialized the throne begging the latter to reorganize all their fiefs
into prefectures. The policy was finally adopted in 1871, when the 263
_han_ were completely abolished and replaced by 372 new _ken_, and ample
rewards at the same time given to the few baron-governors who had taken
the lead in urging this change. Thus the central government came into
full control of the lands and people that had been under the sway of
feudal chiefs ever since the Kamakura epoch. Subsequently, various
changes of boundaries were made, until in 1890 there were 43 prefectures
(_ken_) and 3 cities (_fu_), besides one board of administration (_cho_)
of Hokkaidō.
The abolition of the _han_ had its grave financial problem, for it now
became necessary for the central government to assume the responsibility
of the fiduciary notes previously issued by the various feudal lords. To
meet this liability the government issued, in lieu of the fiduciary
notes, bonds redeemable within fifty years, and for the purpose of
satisfying the claims of the _shizoku_ an envoy was sent to England to
raise a sum of ten million _yen_. This, Japan's first foreign debt, was
contracted in 1872. In the following year the system of commuting
annuities was fixed, those whose incomes ranged from 100 _koku_ downward
being allowed, on application, to commute at six years' purchase, half
of the commutation money being paid in cash and the remainder in public
bonds. The system was subsequently extended to larger incomes, and in
August, 1876, the method of commutation was made compulsory, applicable
to the income of all the _shizoku_, bonds being handed to them in the
following year. These bonds, carrying interest at different rates, were
to be liquidated annually by lot, their total redemption to be effected
in thirty years. At the same time, the _shizoku_, who from ancient times
had devoted themselves to military and literary pursuits, despising
industry and trade, now found themselves detached from their feudal
lords on whom they had relied, and deprived of their lands and pensions.
Receiving sums of money in commutation of their hereditary incomes, many
of them, without training or experience, turned at once to commerce and
agriculture, and in numerous instances those who had become merchants
fell victims to their own want of knowledge and to the craft of others,
losing everything they possessed and incurring the contempt of the
mercantile classes whom they had so long counted their inferiors.
The overthrow of the feudal tenure naturally affected the military
organization of the nation. Hitherto soldiers to form the imperial guard
had been raised in Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa, and the remaining force
had consisted of five garrison corps (_chindai_), quartered at different
places and recruited from cities and prefectures in the proportion of
five men per 10,000 _koku_ of rice crop.
In 1872 the military department (_hyōbushō_) was replaced by two
separate departments of war and the navy, and an imperial ordinance
provided that soldiers should be recruited from all parts of the empire
and all classes of the people, the monopoly of military service held by
the _samurai_ being thus abolished and the method existing a thousand
years previously restored. At the same time it was clearly indicated
that the command in chief of all the forces devolved on the sovereign.
All persons of twenty years or upward were liable for conscription, and
the army was divided into troops with the colors (_jōbi-hei_), the
reserve (_kōbi-hei_), and the militia (_kokumin-gun_). Subsequently all
of the castles in the fiefs were dismantled with the exception of
fifty-five, which were handed over to the war department, and the number
of the garrison corps was increased to six, their headquarters being
Tōkyō, Sendai, Nagoya, Ōsaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto. Various new
regulations relating to military matters were afterward issued from time
to time, or revisions of the old effected, a colonial militia for
Hokkaidō being among the new measures. Meanwhile, the naval department
established naval stations, built dockyards and ships of war, and opened
colleges, so that the organizations of the two branches of the military
service were placed on a satisfactory footing.
All these changes were radical in nature, and it was inevitable that the
conservative instincts educated among the people through centuries of
feudal training should often burst forth in opposition to the drastic
social revolution. Men conspicuous as advocates of innovation were
sometimes attacked and assassinated, and armed resistance was
occasionally planned. Sakuma Shōzan, Councilor Yokoi Heishirō, and
Senior Vice Minister of the Army Ōmura Masujiro all fell under the
swords of assassins in consequence of their ardent liberalism; while, on
the other hand, Kumoi Tatsuo of Yonezawa plotted with the old _samurai_
of Aidzu and Shizuoka to restore the feudal system by force. But this as
well as some minor attempts of a similar character in other parts of the
empire were quickly dealt with, the nation as a whole being emphatically
favorable to the new order of things. It was not so easy, however, to
pacify some of the larger insurrections which occurred in the southern
part of Japan. In January, 1874, Etō Shimpei, a member of the cabinet,
being opposed by the majority of his colleagues with respect to the
policy to be pursued toward Korea, retired from the government and
gathered about him in Saga, in Hizen, a number of discontented people
who were desirous of restoring feudalism and attacking Korea. They
plundered a sum of 200,000 _yen_ from the Ono Company, and made a
successful raid upon the prefectural offices of Kumamoto. The garrison
corps of the latter place received orders to subdue the rebels--Ōkubo
Toshimichi, minister of home affairs, being dispatched by the sovereign
to direct the operations. The insurgents suffered several defeats, and
were finally imprisoned in Saga castle, but they managed to effect their
escape thence under cover of darkness, and to cross the sea to
Kagoshima, where they landed, with the intention of striking a second
blow by the aid of Saigō Takamori, whose rebellion will presently
receive our attention. Failing in their purpose, however, they were
unable to offer any further resistance. Etō and the other ringleaders
were executed in April, and when Prince Yoshiaki arrived, who had been
dispatched from Tōkyō at the head of a considerable naval and military
force to crush the rebellion, he found that order had been restored. Two
years later there were simultaneous uprisings in Kumamoto and in Hagi
of Nagato, which were quickly subdued by the imperial forces.
No rebellion, however, proved more serious and more difficult to repress
than the revolt of Saigō in Satsuma. The genesis of this insurrection
must be traced to complex circumstances under which the leading
statesmen of the new government had been split into two factions, one of
which had its central figure in Saigō. The occasion for the rupture was
the dispute which arose among the ministers of the crown in regard to
the policy to be pursued by Japan toward Korea. Throughout the Tokugawa
period it had been customary for Korea, on each occasion of a coronation
in that country, to send an ambassador to confirm the friendly relations
between the two states. When the restoration took place in Japan her
government dispatched an envoy to Korea to convey intelligence of the
fact and to renew expressions of amity, but the Koreans refused to
recognize the envoy or accept his message, owing ostensibly to the fact
that the new term "Great Empire of Japan" was employed in the imperial
letter. At a later date the Japanese sent home certain Koreans who had
been shipwrecked on the coast of Japan, and took the opportunity of
renewing expressions of friendship by the mouths of the officials who
escorted the castaways. Korea received the shipwrecked sailors, but
declined to receive the officials accompanying them. The youthful
government contained men, particularly the Councilors Saigō Takamori,
Soyeshima Taneomi, Itagaki Taisuke, Gotō Shōjirō, and Etō Shimpei, who
deeply resented the conduct of Korea, and counseled the opening of the
peninsular kingdom by force of arms. Other chief officials of the
government, headed by Ōkubo Toshimichi, opposed this view, and being
supported by the minister of the left, Iwakura, who had just returned
from his travels through Europe and America, the peace party carried the
day. The advocates of recourse to arms resigned, and a new cabinet was
organized, under Iwakura and Ōkubo, which was the first cabinet change
in Japan since the restoration. The immediate effects of this change
were important. The revolt of Etō has already been related, and the case
of Itagaki and Gotō will soon be heard of. The name of Saigō has been
mentioned as one of the two heroes whose mutual trust had resulted in
averting the great battle imminent in Edo. A man of overmastering
sincerity, his position in the Tōkyō government, in which he was
commander in chief of the army, had been unique. When he resigned and
retired to Kagoshima in Satsuma, and established a private military
school, nearly all the ambitious young men of the province flocked to
the school. Many came from other prefectures also, for Saigō's
reputation as the chief agent in bringing about the restoration was
immense, and his simple, great personality commanded universal love and
respect. These students, little intent on studies, where animated by a
desire to raise Saigō to the leadership of a colossal opposition to the
new cabinet, whose policy and conduct they honestly abhorred. When the
Hagi and Kumamoto insurrections broke out in 1876 these truculent
students maintained correspondence with the rebels, but refrained from
openly imitating their example. By and by, some officials of the
imperial government who visited the province were seized by the students
and tortured into a false confession that they had come with a secret
commission to assassinate Saigō. The war department, apprehending
dangerous contingencies, now ordered that the powder stored in Kagoshima
should be transferred to Ōsaka, but the powder was seized _en route_ by
the students, who also managed to possess themselves of the arsenal and
implements of war belonging to the naval department in Kagoshima. Saigō
earnestly endeavored at first to restore order and discipline among
these turbulent disciples, but he finally yielded to the persuasion of
his chief followers, who represented that on him devolved the patriotic
duty of clearing away disloyal and crafty subjects from the foot of the
throne, and who showed him, at the same time, the false confession
extorted by torture from government officials. Saigō thereupon
circulated a letter throughout the adjacent provinces explaining the
necessity of resorting to arms. News of these events reached the emperor
in Kyōto, whither he had temporarily gone. He made that city his
headquarters, and gave to Prince Arisugawa a commission to quell the
rebellion, Yamagata Aritomo, minister of war, and Kawamura Sumiyoshi,
vice minister of the navy, being appointed chiefs of staff. The brigades
dispatched to the scene of disturbance were commanded by Major Generals
Nozu, Miyoshi, and Miura, and Saigō and his fellow-conspirators were
stripped of all their ranks and honors.
The insurgents assembled in Kagoshima now numbered some 15,000 picked
_samurai_ of desperate courage and great skill in the use of their
weapons. At the head of this force Saigō set out for Kumamoto on
February 15, 1876, and on the 22d of that month he sat down with his
whole army before Kumamoto castle, an error of strategy which ultimately
enabled the government to confine the insurrection to the Island of
Kiushū. Major General Tani Tateki, who held command of the garrison,
made a stubborn resistance, though many of the _samurai_ among his
troops went over to the rebels. The imperial army arriving in the
province of Higo, endeavored to reach Kumamoto from the northwest via
Takase. Severe fighting look place, but the forces of the government
pushed steadily on. At point after point the rebels made obstinate
stands, especially in the strong position of Tawara-saka, where a great
number of lives were lost by both sides, and the whole district was
devastated. The government troops, though victorious, found themselves
seriously weakened, and the insurgents fought with undiminished
desperation. Shortly before this, Yanagiwara Sakimitsu, a senator, was
sent by the emperor to Kagoshima to warn Shimazu Hisamitsu, the former
feudal chief of Satsuma, and his son, Tadayoshi, against connecting
themselves with the insurgents. He was accompanied on this mission by
Lieutenant General Kuroda Kiyotaka, an influential member of the Satsuma
fief, and the two labored so successfully that the dockyard and arsenal,
which had been dismantled by the rebels, were restored to a defensible
condition. It now became possible to advance upon the rear of the
rebels, and General Kuroda, being appointed chief of the staff, landed a
body of troops at Yatsushiro in order to attack Saigō from the south.
The insurgents were now assaulted from two directions, but they fought
so well that the imperial army could not yet effect the relief of
Kumamoto castle, which, having been besieged for over fifty days, was
being reduced to straits for want of provisions. The commander of the
garrison now managed to send an officer through the besieging army with
intelligence of his perilous condition, and on receipt of the message
General Kuroda set all his troops in rapid motion, and forced his way to
Kumamoto on April 14, the insurgents breaking up into two bodies, one of
which retreated into the province of Bungo and the other into the
Hitoyoshi valley in Higo, where the country offered excellent facilities
for resistance. Upon the retreat of the rebels from Kumamoto, Vice
Minister Kawamura Sumiyoshi was sent to Kagoshima, at the head of 8000
men, to attack the rebellion at its root, whereupon Saigō, who was with
the Hitoyoshi branch of the rebels, learning that Kagoshima had fallen
into the hands of the government's troops, issued orders for a retreat
in the directions of Satsuma and Osumi. The Hitoyoshi insurgents then
effected their escape with much adroitness into Hiuga province,
following three different routes, and the imperial army occupied the
Hitoyoshi position on June 1. The Bungo body of insurgents, meanwhile,
being hard pressed by the government forces, retired to a strong
position at Nobeoka, in Hiuga, and opened communications with the other
body, which had fortified itself at Miyazaki in the same province.
Several battles and skirmishes ensued, and it was not till the end of
July that Miyazaki was reduced, Nobeoka falling on August 14. The rebels
now retreated northward to Enotake, where they were closely besieged by
the imperial army, but on the 18th of the same month they succeeded,
with extraordinary celerity and address, in effecting a retreat right
through the besieging lines, and pushing rapidly on to Kagoshima, which
place they suddenly attacked and took. The imperial forces were now
concentrated about Kagoshima, and after a sanguinary engagement, lasting
ten days, the rebels were driven to Shiroyama, where their last fight
was fought on September 24. Saigō Takamori committed suicide, and
Toshiaki and the other rebel chiefs fell on the field of battle, the
rebellion being thus finally crushed. A provisional court was organized
in Kiushū under the presidency of Kōno Tokama, a secretary of the
senate, for the trial of those taken in the fighting, seventeen of whom
were sentenced to death. In this sanguinary struggle the whole of the
army and navy had been engaged, the old imperial bodyguard reorganized,
a band of swordsmen volunteers enrolled, and a company of policemen,
also for sword service, sent to the scene of the fighting. The Japanese
sword was used by both armies with great skill and deadly effect. The
total number of men engaged on the government side was 60,000, and the
entire outlay involved was 416 million _yen_. At one time, indeed, the
affair had threatened to assume almost uncontrollable dimensions, for in
the early days of the rebels' valiant fighting ominous signs of
disaffection made themselves apparent in the prefectures of Yamaguchi,
Kōchi, Fukuoka, and elsewhere. Much as the trouble cost, however, in
blood and treasure, its national uses were very great. By it the army
and navy gained invaluable experience, and all the institutions of the
central government were subjected to the test of severe practice, while
the people learned, once for all, that armed efforts to disturb the new
order of things were utterly hopeless, and that adverse opinion must be
limited to the channels of speech and pen. The treasury, however, found
itself seriously embarrassed. It had been obliged to borrow fifteen
million _yen_ from the Fifteenth National Bank, and also, most
reluctantly, to issue fiduciary notes aggregating 270,000,000 _yen_ in
addition to those already issued for the purpose of redeeming the fiat
paper of the _daijōkwan_, the _mimbushō_, and the former feudal barons.
[Illustration: THE INSURRECTION IN THE ISLAND OF KIUSHŪ 1877]
While the rupture of the cabinet had occasioned the immense rebellion of
Kagoshima and the tragic end of the great Saigō, his former colleagues,
Itagaki and Gotō, also did not accept the political defeat of their
faction without a struggle. Their struggle, however, produced widely
different results from those of Saigō's uprising. Itagaki and Gotō
addressed to the government a memorial urging the expediency of at once
establishing a national assembly in Japan. But the government rejected
the memorial on the ground that the time was not ripe for so radical a
measure. Nevertheless, the embryo of a deliberative assembly was in
truth formed about this time, for the local governors were all summoned
to Tōkyō, and invited to discuss together questions relating to roads,
rivers, bridges, the relief of the destitute, public meetings, and other
matters connected with their jurisdictions. Moreover, in 1875 a senate
_(genrō-in)_ was organized for legislative purposes, its members being
appointed from among men conspicuous for merit and capacity. In 1876 and
1877, owing to rebellious disturbances fomented by the seceding
councilors of state, the local governors were not summoned to Tōkyō for
consultation, but in 1878 they assembled in the capital and discussed
questions relating to local reorganization, to city and prefectural
assemblies--the bases of a future parliament--and to local taxes.
Subsequent to this meeting rules relating to the organization of towns,
villages, districts, and divisions were promulgated, as well as rules
relating to the collection of taxes, while in 1879 the system of local
assemblies was established in each city and prefecture. The members of
these assemblies were elected by the people from among themselves, and
were invested with extensive deliberative functions in relation to local
administration. In the following years the governors were again summoned
to Tōkyō for the purpose of deliberating about relief funds and revising
the rules discussed at their previous meeting, these rules being
supplemented by others relating to the organization of divisions, towns,
and villages. Meanwhile, the advocates of popular rights increased in
number and influence day by day. A newspaper press had arisen which made
this subject a favorite topic of discussion, and political associations
were formed agitating the establishment of a diet or petitioning the
government in that sense. In view of this growing excitement and to
avert contingencies incidental to it, regulations were issued for the
better control of newspapers and political meetings. In 1880 a political
party, the _Jiyū-tō_ (Liberals), destined subsequently to play a
prominent part in national affairs, was organized, under the leadership
of Itagaki Taisuke, while within the government Ōkuma Shigenobu, a
councilor of state, advocated the opening of a national assembly without
delay. The ministers of the crown, however, adhered to their former
decision that the time was not ripe. Not discouraged by this refusal,
the advocates of a parliamentary system continued their agitation, and
spared no pains to injure the credit of the cabinet with the nation. The
sovereign, therefore, judging it expedient to announce publicly the
intentions entertained by him, issued with the advice of his ministers,
in October, 1881, a rescript declaring that in the 23d year of Meiji
(1890) a constitutional government should be established. Ōkuma
Shigenobu, together with Kōno Hironaka and others, now resigned their
official positions and organized a political party, the _Kaishin-tō_
(Progressives), which, though occupying a common platform with the
_Jiyū-tō_ in respect of a national assembly, worked in general
opposition to the latter. At a much later date a third party, hostile to
both of the above, was formed, namely, the _Kokumin Kyōkai_, or National
Unionists.
Immediately after the issue of the rescript fixing the date for opening
the diet, the government set about drafting the constitution, the utmost
care and research being brought to bear on this important work. In the
spring of 1882 Itō Hirobumi was dispatched on a special mission to
Europe for the purpose of investigating the constitutional law of the
various states and its practical applications, and on his return a
legislative bureau, charged with the functions of drafting the
constitution, revising the laws, and remodeling the official
organization, was established. In 1884 titles of nobility--prince,
marquis, count, viscount, and baron--were created, patents being granted
to over five hundred of the former territorial and court nobles, as well
as to officials distinguished for services rendered to the state. In
February of the following year great changes were effected in the
administrative organization. The offices of _daijō daijin_, _sadaijin_,
_udaijin_, _sangi_, and ministers of departments were abolished, and in
their stead were created ministers of state for home affairs, foreign
affairs, finance, war, the navy, education, justice, agriculture and
commerce, and communications, these ministers constituting a cabinet
under the leadership of the minister president and the presidency of the
emperor himself. Outside the cabinet were the minister of the imperial
household, the lord keeper of the privy seal, and a number of court
councilors, while in each department there was a vice minister, as well
as a director and vice directors of each of its bureaus, together with
councilors and secretaries. These changes were much more radical than
anything previously effected during the Meiji era, all other reforms
having been mere modifications of the old system prescribed in the
Taihō Code of 701 A. D. At the same time regulations providing for the
appointment of civil officials by competitive examination were
promulgated, and various new laws and ordinances were issued. One of the
most important effects of this great reform was that it put an end
completely to the pernicious system of selecting officials from personal
considerations without regard to competence. No changes of a radical
character have since that time been effected in the administration.
Count Itō Hirobumi, the chief author of these reforms, became the first
minister president of state. In 1888 a privy council was established,
its members being selected from among old and distinguished officials,
and its function being to advise the sovereign with respect to any
matter submitted by his majesty for its deliberation. Count Itō became
its president, resigning his post of minister president of state to
Count Kuroda Kiyotaka. In the same year a large body of laws for the
reorganization of cities, towns, and villages was promulgated, to go
into effect from the year 1891, and these laws were followed in 1890 by
similar statutes for the organization of prefectures and districts, the
general purport of all this legislation being local autonomy.
The 11th of February in the 22d year of Meiji (1889) saw the
promulgation of the imperial Constitution. On this memorable occasion
the emperor delivered from the throne the following speech: "Whereas We
make it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our
country, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the
supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the
present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects
and their descendants. The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other
Imperial Ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our
subjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis which is to
last forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of
Our country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial
Ancestors, and the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of
their country, and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects
are the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial
Ancestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our
views, and will sympathize with all Our endeavors, and that,
harmoniously coöperating together, they will share with Us Our hope of
making manifest the glory of Our country, both at home and abroad, and
of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our
Imperial Ancestors."
The promulgation of the Constitution took place in the throne room of
the Tōkyō palace, the princes of the blood, ministers of state, peers,
governors of cities and prefectures, presidents of city and prefecture
assemblies, the foreign representatives, and all officials of and above
_chokunin_ rank being present. The Constitution consisted of seventy-six
articles contained in seven chapters. It provided for the perpetuity of
the imperial succession; defined the imperial prerogatives and the
privileges granted to the people; declared the latter's obligation to
pay taxes and serve as soldiers, but guaranteed them against being
arrested, imprisoned, tried, or punished except by the process of law;
decreed the inviolability of person and property; granted freedom of
residence and conscience, and declared that no man's house could be
officially entered without a legal warrant. The law of the houses,
promulgated simultaneously, created a bicameral diet--a house of peers
and a house of representatives--to be convened every year, and in this
diet was vested legislative power without recourse to which no law could
be enacted or altered, and financial authority without the exercise of
which the annual budget could not become existent. The law of election,
which also formed one of the appended statutes of the Constitution,
provided for all affairs relating to the franchise and its exercise; the
law of finance regulated fiscal matters; and the imperial house law
determined affairs connected with the succession, the household, the
princes of the blood, and the like. The day of the promulgation of the
Constitution was observed as a grand national fête, amnesty was
proclaimed in the case of all political offenders, and largess was
freely distributed to the aged and indigent. It was certainly a subject
for national rejoicing and congratulation that this advanced stage of
governmental progress was reached in Japan without any of the scenes of
bloodshed and violence which had disfigured such changes in many other
countries.
The establishment of a constitutional form of government having long
been an object of ardent desire of the people, all classes, official and
private alike, had been preparing themselves for the welcome event. In
addition to the Liberal and Progressive parties mentioned, Count Gōto
Shōjirō had formed a third, the _Daidō Danketsu_ (Great Affiliation),
which, however, after a brief existence, split up into two or three
insignificant bodies. When the first general election for the new
national diet took place in July, 1890, there were several rival parties
and much political ardor, but everything passed off in an orderly and
quiet manner. In view of the assembly of the diet the old senate
(_genrō-in_) was abolished, most of its members being nominated members
of the upper house. By imperial edict the two houses were convoked in
Tōkyō on November 25 of the same year, and his majesty the emperor
opened the diet in person on November 29. The house of representatives
consisted of 300 members elected by the people in the various
localities; the house of peers, of the princes of the blood, the princes
and marquises, all of whom sat in their own right, a certain number of
counts, viscounts, and barons elected by their respective orders,
highest taxpayers elected by the prefectures, one for each, and a
proportion of members nominated by the sovereign in consideration of
meritorious services or proficiency in learning. So with 1890 began the
new régime of Japan.
Chapter XV
FOREIGN RELATIONS. 1868-1893
Under the Tokugawa rule a treaty was concluded between Japan and Russia
recognizing Karafuto (Sakhalin) as a joint possession of the two
empires. Later the Edo government sent an envoy to St. Petersburg with a
proposal that the 50th parallel of north latitude should be the boundary
between the two countries. No final decision was arrived at, however, on
that occasion, and it was resolved that each country should send an
ambassador to Karafuto the following year to survey the island and
determine the boundary. But domestic embarrassments so beset the
shōgun's government that the promised envoy was not sent from Japan. In
1866 there was talk of dispatching an ambassador for the purpose, but
nothing was done, while Russia was gradually pushing southward, until
she finally encroached upon the region indisputably recognized as
Japanese territory. The government of the shōgun was powerless at the
time to offer any opposition, and shortly afterward it had to surrender
the administration to the emperor. His majesty's ministers now proposed,
through the intermediary of the United States, that the parallel of 50°
north latitude should be taken as the boundary, but the Russian
government rejected the proposal. Subsequently, Admiral Enomoto was sent
as Japanese representative to St. Petersburg, and after much discussion
it was decided, by a convention concluded in 1875, that the whole of
Sakhalin should become Russian property, Japan receiving in exchange the
Chishima Islands (the Kuriles).
When in 1858 the first treaties were concluded by the shōgun's
government with five foreign powers, the Japanese plenipotentiaries,
being entirely ignorant of foreign affairs, intrusted the drafting of
the articles to the American minister, and merely indorsed the
provisions proposed by him. A clause was added, however, providing for
revision after the lapse of fourteen years, and when it was found that
the treaties contained much which was injurious to Japan's dignity and
embarrassing to her independence, a strong desire to effect revision
began to be generally felt. Moreover, as a result of the firing upon
foreign ships by the forts at Shimonoseki, England and France, in
addition to exacting an indemnity out of all proportion to the injury
suffered by the ships, took advantage of Japan's internal dissensions to
impose upon her greatly lowered tariff rates. At subsequent dates
treaties were concluded, necessarily on the same lines, with Portugal,
Prussia, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Spain,
Austria-Hungary, and Hawaii, and ministers plenipotentiary were
accredited to most of these countries. The knowledge thus gradually
acquired of Western states and of the international usages prevailing
among them, served to increase Japan's impatience against the unequal
conventional conditions to which she was herself compelled to submit.
The government, not less swayed by this sentiment, did everything in its
power to remove obstacles which foreigners alleged to be fatal to equal
international treatment of Japan. The penal laws were radically altered,
and codes consistent with the principles of Western jurisprudence were
promulgated. Meanwhile, the term of fourteen years fixed by the treaties
had elapsed, and the time for revision having arrived it was resolved to
dispatch an embassy to Europe and America for the purpose of making
known Japan's real condition and acquiring knowledge of foreign affairs.
In October, 1871, Iwakura Tomomi, minister of the right, was sent upon
this mission, together with a number of other prominent officials. In
the United States of America he met with a cordial reception, the
president promising to consider favorably the question of revision, and
Congress showing a disposition to return America's share of the
indemnity unjustly exacted from Japan in connection with the Shimonoseki
affair. (The indemnity was actually returned twelve years later.) In
European countries, also, the ambassador was courteously received, but
failed to obtain any serious attention for the subject of treaty
revision. The embassy returned to Japan in 1873. During the next years
domestic affairs engrossed the attention of the government to the
virtual exclusion of everything else, and it was not until after the
termination of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 that the government found
itself in a position to approach foreign powers with the object of
recovering tariff autonomy and reserving the coastwise trade. The effort
again proved abortive. In 1879, however, an agreement was concluded
with the United States of America, the latter agreeing to a revised
treaty by which Japan's tariff and judicial autonomy was to be restored
and her coastwise trade reserved, with the proviso, however, that the
revised treaty should not go into force until a similar instrument had
been concluded with the other powers. In 1880 Inouye Kaoru, minister for
foreign affairs, opened negotiations with the plenipotentiaries of the
European powers in Tōkyō, but the proposed revision having been
improperly disclosed to the public, the negotiations were suspended.
Renewed shortly afterward, they were brought within apparent reach of
conclusion in 1887, after long and weary discussions. But in the
meanwhile public opinion in Japan had been growing more and more
impatient of the treatment meted out to the empire by foreign states,
and more and more sensible of the rights appertaining to an independent
country. On the other hand, the rivalry of foreign powers, the diversity
of their interests and the difficulty of dealing with them all together,
had involved the introduction of many irksome and humiliating conditions
into the draft of the revised treaty, and when it was published in 1887
it provoked opposition that caused its abandonment, Count Inouye
retiring from office. He was succeeded by Count Ōkuma Shigenobu, who
reopened the negotiations, but was enabled, owing to Japan's improved
position _vis à vis_ the outer world, to insist on conducting them
independently with each power, thus avoiding the insuperable difficulty
of simultaneously placating seventeen states all influenced by more or
less divergent interests. A revised treaty, on lines more favorable to
Japan than the former draft had been, was now concluded and signed by
America and Germany. But no sooner were its provisions published than
the nation again became excited, especially on account of an article
providing that foreigners, as well as natives, should be appointed to
the Japanese judiciary. The cabinet decided to again suspend the
negotiations, and a fanatic threw a bomb at Count Ōkuma which wounded
him severely, necessitating the amputation of his right leg. Some time
afterward he retired from office, together with the minister president,
Count Kuroda, and in 1889 Count Yamagata became minister president,
Viscount Aoki taking the portfolio of foreign affairs. The latter,
together with Count Gotō, minister of communications, and Count Saigō
Tsugumichi, minister of home affairs, were appointed joint
plenipotentiaries for the purposes of treaty revision. But in 1891
Count Yamagata and Viscount Aoki retired, the latter being succeeded by
Viscount Enomoto, who, in 1892, gave place to Mutsu Munemitsu. It was
under the foreign ministry of the latter that, in 1894, Great Britain
took the lead of all other powers to conclude a revised treaty with
Japan, which went into effect on July 17, 1899, and which removed the
consular jurisdiction from the open ports of Japan, in return for the
throwing open of the whole empire to the travel and traffic of all
foreigners. Coasting trade was also recognized as properly belonging to
the domain where Japan had the sovereign right of making regulations.
Tariff autonomy was largely recovered, and new import duties were drawn
up, export duties being entirely abolished. Japan thus became, at
length, not only a sovereign state free to look after its own internal
and external affairs, but also a member of the family of nations whose
legal status was considered on the basis of parity.
Meanwhile, the intercourse with foreign nations had grown more and more
intimate. Many princes, nobles, and celebrities came from the West to
visit Japan, and many Japanese statesmen and students traveled or
sojourned in Europe and America. No vestige seemed to remain of the old
sentiment of national seclusion. It may be interesting to say a word
here about some of the distinguished foreigners who visited Japan during
the Meiji era. Shortly after the restoration, the duke of Edinburgh,
second son of the queen of England, came, and was followed, in 1872, by
Prince Alexis of Russia, who was received by the emperor and was present
at naval and military reviews. In February, 1879, the future William II.
of Germany came to Tōkyō. In July of the same year General Grant,
ex-president of the United States, arrived, and was hospitably
entertained, the citizens of Tōkyō showing their appreciation of
America's sympathetic attitude toward Japan by entertaining him at an
evening party, as well as at a garden-party in Uyeno Park, at which the
emperor was present and various kinds of Japanese sports were shown. At
later dates Japan was visited by the nephew of King Humbert of Italy,
the czarevitch, afterward Nicholas II. of Russia, King Kalakaua of
Hawaii, a Grecian prince, and other distinguished personages.
Japan's relations with Asiatic countries were not always as cordial as
those with European and American states. In the year 1866, owing to the
misconduct of Chinese settlers, it became necessary to enact special
regulations for their control and to restrict the limits of their
residence at the open ports. When the war between the emperor and the
shōgun broke out all the foreign powers declared and maintained
neutrality except the Chinese, who secretly sold arms to the Tokugawa.
Hence their access to non-treaty ports was strictly prohibited. They
also contrived to kidnap and sell the children of indigent Japanese, and
instructions were consequently issued to local governments to guard
strictly against this outrage. In July, 1871, however, a treaty of
friendship and amity was concluded between the two empires.
In the winter of 1872 some inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands were cast
away on the eastern coast of Formosa and murdered by the natives, and in
the following year some shipwrecked sailors from the province of Bitchū
experienced the same fate. Soyeshma Taneomi was sent by the government
as plenipotentiary to Peking to complain of these outrages against
Japanese subjects, but the Chinese government made no satisfactory reply
and declined to acknowledge its responsibility for the acts of the
natives of Formosa. The Japanese government was thus compelled to take
into its own hands the task of exacting reparation. In April, 1874,
Lieutenant General Saigō Tsugumichi was appointed to the command of a
punitory expedition to Formosa. No serious opposition was encountered
except at the hands of one tribe, which, however, was overcome after
some fighting. On the eve of sending this expedition, Yanagiwara
Sakimitsu was dispatched by the Japanese government as ambassador to
China, but as he found the Chinese much incensed about Japan's action
and very anxious that her troops should at once leave Formosa, Ōkubo
Toshimichi, a leading member of the cabinet, was dispatched as
plenipotentiary to Peking. Meeting only with procrastination and
inconsistency on the part of the Chinese, he broke off the negotiations
and announced his intention of returning to Japan. But at this stage the
British minister in Peking mediated between the two empires, and the
Chinese finally agreed to pay 100,000 taels to the families of the
murdered Japanese subjects and 400,000 taels indemnity to Japan for the
cost of the expedition, undertaking at the same time to prevent the
recurrence of similar outrages in Formosa.
[Illustration: ISLAND POSSESSIONS OF JAPAN]
After the Formosan trouble another complication arose between Japan and
China with regard to the Islands of Loochoo. These had long been a
dependency of Japan. In the middle of the twelfth century the Minamoto
leader, Tametomo, driven to the province of Izu, made his way thence to
Loochoo, and, having quelled a civil war raging in the islands, placed
his son Shunten on the throne. Afterward, the Ashikaga shōgun,
Yoshinori, gave the islands to the Shimazu family as an adjunct of the
Satsuma fief, but from the time of Hideyoshi's Korean expedition,
Loochoo having neglected to discharge its duties as a dependency, the
Satsuma chief sent a force to the islands in 1609, took the king
prisoner and conveyed him to Edo, whence he was soon after restored to
his country. Shimazu then sent officials to superintend the affairs of
Loochoo, and from that time forth the revenue of the islands was
included in the yearly income of the Shimazu family. In 1873 Sho Tai,
king of Loochoo, came to Japan and was formally invested with the title
of feudal chief of Loochoo, a residence in Tōkyō being assigned to him
at the same time. Shortly afterward the name of the year period and the
Loochooan calendar were changed for those in use in Japan, and the laws
of the empire were declared operative in Loochoo. Finally, in April,
1879, the feudal title of the ex-king of Loochoo was abolished and the
islands were turned into the prefecture of Okinawa. The Chinese
government thereupon advanced a claim that Loochoo had once been a
tributary of the Middle Kingdom, and that it therefore belonged not less
to China than to Japan. The weight of evidence was on Japan's side,
however, and by the arbitration of General Grant, ex-president of the
United States of America, who happened to be on a visit to the East at
the time, the question was settled in Japan's favor.
Turning now to Korean affairs, it has already been related that an envoy
was sent from Japan at the time of the restoration, but that Korea
refused to receive him. It was on this occasion that Saigō Bakamari
proposed that he himself would proceed thither in the capacity of
ambassador, and that if Korea persisted in her unfriendly attitude, an
armed force should be sent against her. But, as has been related, this
proposal did not meet with the approval of the cabinet. In 1875 Japan
sent another envoy, but again Korea declined to open amicable relations.
An event then occurred which nearly involved the two countries in war. A
Japanese man-of-war, _en route_ for China, whither she was carrying a
Japanese plenipotentiary, called at Chemulpo, in August, 1875, to obtain
fuel and water, but her boats were fired on by the Koreans and two of
her men were wounded. Incensed at this outrage, the crew of the vessel
attacked and burned the Korean fortress. When the matter was reported in
Tōkyō, the government sent Lieutenant General Kuroda, a member of the
cabinet, and Inouye Kaoru to Korea, in the capacity of ambassador and
vice ambassador, respectively. This mission met with success, Korea sent
a letter of apology to Japan and declared her desire to contract
friendly relations. Lieutenant General Kuroda accordingly concluded a
treaty of commerce and amity, in which Korea's independence was
recognized by Japan, and in May, 1876, Korea sent an envoy to Japan,
opened the ports of Gensan and Chemulpo, and agreed that each country
should be represented at the court of the other. Thenceforth the Korean
government began to adopt some of the appliances of Western
civilization. She improved her administrative organization, established
a military training school where Japanese instructors were employed, and
sent youths to Japan to be educated. These innovations, however, proved
very distasteful to many conservatives in Korea, especially to
Taiwon-kun, father of the king, who had always been on bad terms with
the Bin family, to which the queen belonged, and which was at the time
favorable to reform. Affairs were precipitated by discontent among the
soldiery with reference to the removal of a minister, and being incited
by the Taiwon-kun, the troops attacked the palace in July, 1882, and
killed many of the Bin family, as well as several Japanese military
officers. The same night the Japanese legation was attacked by a mob,
and the minister, Hanabusa Yoshimoto, had to force his way through the
city, escorting the women and children of the legation, and push on
through the darkness to Chemulpo, where he escaped by boat, and being
picked up by an English man-of-war, the _Flying Fish_, returned to
Nagasaki on board her. He was speedily sent back by his government in a
vessel-of-war, and entering Seul, demanded an explanation from Korea.
China, meanwhile, had dispatched a squadron to the scene, seized the
Taiwon-kun, and carried him prisoner to Tientsin. Hanabusa subsequently
concluded with Korea a convention providing for the punishment of the
malefactors, the payment of an indemnity of 50,000 yen to the sufferers
and their families, and of 500,000 yen to the Japanese empire, the
guarding of the Japanese legation by Korean troops, and the dispatch of
an ambassador to apologize for the outrage. (Japan afterward returned to
Korea 400,000 yen of this indemnity.) China and Japan both stationed
bodies of men in the Korean capital, and Korea divided her forces into
two bodies, one of which was trained according to Japanese tactics, the
other according to Chinese. There were then two parties in the
peninsular kingdom, the Independents and the Conservatives, between whom
a state of strained relations constantly existed. In December, 1884,
they resorted to open hostilities, and the king, finding himself in
danger, sent an autograph letter to the Japanese legation, asking for
help. The Japanese _chargé d'affaires_ thereupon proceeded to the palace
with a small body of men. There he was attacked by a combined force of
Chinese and Koreans. During the fighting the king's mother was seized by
the Chinese soldiers, and the king having declared his intention of
placing himself in the hands of the Chinese in order to be with her, the
Japanese retired to their legation, which was afterward assaulted by a
Korean mob and set on fire. The _chargé d'affaires_ made his way to
Chemulpo and once more Japan was obliged to demand reparation from
Korea. This time the task of effecting an arrangement was intrusted to
Count Inouye Kaoru, who, proceeding to Korea as ambassador, escorted by
two men-of-war, concluded a treaty providing that Korea should send an
envoy to Japan to tender apologies; that the Koreans who had injured
Japanese persons and property should be duly punished; and that an
indemnity of 110,000 yen, together with 20,000 yen for the rebuilding of
the legation, should be paid. In March of the same year Count Itō
Hirobumi, a member of the cabinet, accompanied by Lieutenant General
Saigō, proceeded to China, and concluded Viceroy Li at Tientsin a
convention providing that China and Japan should withdraw their troops
from Korea; that neither power should thereafter send a force thither
without giving previous notice to the other, and that the Chinese
soldiers who had taken part in the attack on the Japanese in Seul should
be punished. Thus friendly relations were reëstablished between Japan
and China.
PART IV
CONSTITUTIONAL JAPAN. 1893--
Chapter XVI
THE CONSTITUTION IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
1893-1906
The "History of the Empire of Japan" was compiled in 1893, and it is
needless to say that since that time the empire has experienced a
remarkable development in all aspects of its national activity. The war
with China occurred in 1894-1895, the North China campaign in 1900, and
the great conflict with Russia in 1904-1905. Through these important
events the Japanese nation has undergone an immense change in the last
dozen years, in the position it occupies in the comity of nations, as
well as in its attitude toward the rest of the world. The industrial and
financial life of the people has also made a change hardly anticipated
in 1893. Their normal national budget, aside from extraordinary war
expenditures, has grown 260 per cent. as large as it then was, and their
foreign trade in commodities alone has increased nearly fourfold. The
state of internal politics also has taken an evolution correspondingly
significant. With this last subject we shall begin our brief survey of
Japan's national life during the thirteen years between 1893 and 1906.
Before entering into the narrative of the political life of recent
Japan, it would be well to acquire a fuller view of the formal, or
constitutional, side of that life. The reader will remember that the
organization of the two political parties, the _Jiyū-tō_ (1880) and the
_Kaishin-tō_ (1881), or, as generally translated, the Liberals and the
Progressives, preceded the promulgation of the Constitution, which
occurred in 1889. The latter was not granted by the government until the
agitation of the parties for its speedy promulgation had run to a
considerable height. From this fact, however, it does not follow, as has
been asserted by some writers, that the Constitution was wrested by the
enlightened nation from the hands of its reluctant ruler. Such a view is
apt to be easily formed by the superficial observer, but hardly accords
with the facts that stand recorded in history. The agitation of the
parties may, to some extent, have caused the Constitution to appear at
the particular time it did, but it is evident that the enlightenment had
dawned earlier among the authorities than among the parties, for it was
in 1867 that the famous Five-Article Oath was pronounced by the emperor,
the first two articles of which read as follows: "Assemblies and
councils shall be widely established, and all national affairs shall be
decided by public discussion; the government and the people shall be of
one mind and vigorously prosecute the policy of the nation." If these
words may be proven not to imply exactly the future establishment of a
regular system of national representation, no student will deny that
their author sincerely entertained the desire of consulting by some
effective means the intelligent section of the nation at every important
step to be taken in the government of the country. Only a detailed
knowledge of the modern constitutional form of government seems to have
been lacking for the above desire to take a definite shape. Such
knowledge was, however, soon acquired, as we are told by Itō himself,
when the Japanese embassy, of which he was a member, visited the
principal constitutional countries of Europe and America, and saw with
their observant eyes and were convinced that the comparative progress of
these nations and the relative backwardness of their own were in a large
measure due to the presence in the former and absence in the latter of a
regular constitutional machinery of government. The imperial oath
preceded by at least ten years, and the journey of the embassy by seven
years, the inauguration of party life in Japan. Nor should it be
forgotten that, during the long centuries of its existence, the imperial
house of Japan had seldom proved to be despotic, and, when its real
authority was restored in 1867 from the hands of the feudal overlord,
the movement had been started, not by a powerful imperial army, which
did not exist, but by the combined strength of men rising from all ranks
of the nation at large. While it is true that without the awakening of
the nation the Constitution would never have seen light, it was more
truly granted by the emperor and his advisers than wrested from them.
This fact, that the Constitution was granted by the emperor, may be said
to be the keynote of that remarkable document. It was hardly the result
of a compromise between the emperor and the nation. Still less did it
delegate to the former a part of the sovereignty of the latter. The
emperor, in the Japanese Constitution, assumes full sovereignty, and
graciously associates with him representatives of the nation in the
government of the country. The people are, therefore, not givers, but
receivers, of certain rights, the concession of which, however, does not
diminish the sovereignty vested in the emperor. This fundamental notion
clearly characterizes from beginning to end this document of 1889,
which, as we shall see later on, otherwise contains ambiguous and
expansive passages at a few critical points. "The emperor is the head of
the empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and
exercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution."
(Article IV.) Whence does he derive his power? He is "sacred and
inviolable" (Article III.), as he is--says Itō, the framer and
commentator of the Constitution--Heaven-descended, divine, and sacred,
and, though he indeed has to pay due respect to the law, the law has no
power to hold him accountable to it. "The rights of sovereignty of the
state," says the emperor himself in the Preamble of the Constitution,
"We have inherited from Our Ancestors," who, according to tradition,
charged their descendants to reign over and govern the country for
eternity. Upon this peculiar Japanese theory of the divine right of the
emperor is based the noted Article I. of the Constitution, which merely
states in words the principle which has been upheld in history and is
universally and enthusiastically supported by the people, that "the
empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of emperors
unbroken for ages eternal." From his sovereign powers it follows that
the emperor sanctions laws and orders them to be promulgated and
executed (VI.), convokes, opens, closes, and prorogues the imperial
diet, and dissolves the house of representatives (VII.), issues imperial
ordinances in the place of laws, in case of emergency, even about
financial matters, and also administrative ordinances, which shall not
alter the existing laws (VIII., XXXI., and IX.), appoints and dismisses
civil and military officers (X.), has the supreme command of the army
and navy, and determines the organization of their peace standing (XI.,
XII.), declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties (XIII.),
confers titles of nobility, rank, orders, and other marks of honor
(XV.), and orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and
rehabilitation (XVI.), and no amendment of the provisions of the
Constitution shall be attempted by the diet except by imperial order
(LXXIII.).
It should be remembered that the enumeration of these extensive
prerogatives by no means indicates a limitation to the rights of the
emperor. Whatever rights he does not name he as sovereign may, in
theory, exercise. Yet he is assisted by other institutions, the privy
council, the cabinet, and the diet, to which he has made important
concessions. While the emperor controls the appointment, dismissal, and
payment of officers (X.), determines the organization of the peace
standing of the army and navy (XII.), and declares war and makes peace
(XIII.), how could he exercise these powers if the consent of the diet,
which is required for the expenditure and revenue of the state (LXIV.),
were withheld? The diet controls not only the purse, but also
legislation, for while it is stated that the emperor exercises the
legislative power with the consent of the diet (V.), the residuum of
that power vested in him independently of the diet is reduced almost to
_nil_ when it is said, in Article XXXI., that every law requires the
consent of the imperial diet. He may, indeed, if the diet is not
fitting, issue imperial ordinances for emergency, but they lose their
legal force as soon as the diet disapproves them at its next session
(VII.). As against the article that the emperor convokes, opens, closes,
and prorogues the diet, and dissolves the lower house (VII.), stands the
provision that the diet shall be convoked annually for three months
(XLI. and XLII.). Nor is the emperor's executive power unlimited, for
all laws, imperial ordinances and imperial rescripts, that relate to the
affairs of the state, require the countersignature of a minister of
state (LV.). The share of the emperor is least in the business of the
judiciary, the entire judicature being exercised by the courts of law,
the procedure and organization of which are determined by law (LVII.).
To these and other principles of the Constitution the emperor pledges
himself and his descendants, in the wielding of their sovereign rights,
always to conform (Preamble). In law, the full sovereignty is vested in
the emperor alone, and yet, also in law, the sovereignty is as divided
as in the subtle doctrine of the Trinity by his voluntary association
with the other great institutions of the state.
Behind these peculiar principles of the Japanese sovereignty should be
discerned the intense loyalty of the nation to the reigning house, which
during the last few decades has again and again startled the foreign
observers who had not comprehended it. It is not possible for us here to
discuss how this sentiment has developed, and how the emperor has
proved to be the strongest and the only permanent political institution
in the past history of Japan. To-day the precise position which he
occupies in the organism of the Japanese nation may perhaps be defined
as that of the gracious central figure of the social life and the
inspiring personification of the profound unity and absorbing ambition
of the people. It is not difficult to fancy that, but for the presence
in their midst of this commanding institution of the emperor, the
national career of the people would end itself abruptly under the
pressure of the excessive competitions abroad and untrained, blundering
struggles at home.
The new constitutional régime, which began in 1890, has not been without
a few interesting incidents illustrative of the political functions of
the emperor as an actual organ of the state. One of these incidents
follows: In March, 1901, the house of peers had unexpectedly and for the
first time rejected a bill, already passed by the other house, for
increasing the rates of certain taxes in order to meet necessary
expenditures of the state. All efforts of persuasion and mediation
miscarried, and the house of peers could not, in law, be dissolved. The
deadlock was finally removed by the appearance of an imperial word
intimating that the urgent circumstances of the nation made it desirable
for the measures of the proposed bill to receive the concurrence of the
peers, who now immediately and unanimously passed the bill. Thereupon
the opposition in the lower house seized the opportunity to bring
forward a resolution censuring the cabinet for having thus necessitated
the pronouncement of the imperial word. The speeches of the supporters
of the resolution seemed to imply that the cabinet should be held
responsible for creating a situation in which the emperor was obliged to
resort to a perhaps transconstitutional act on a matter so plainly
political, and thus compromise even in the slightest degree his serene
dignity, which should stand unsullied and express itself through the
normal constitutional channels. The late astute Hoshi, then the house
leader of the Liberals, who were supporting the cabinet, quickly seized
upon the carefully guarded implications of the opposition, and
triumphantly pointed out that the real issue contained in the resolution
was the question whether the imperial word was proper or not. He
proceeded to say that the Constitution was the manifestation of a part
of the full imperial sovereignty, the exercise of which should therefore
not be obstructed by the Constitution, and that the imperial word had
issued from the emperor through his special sovereign rights, and was
proper and legal. No exposure of the opponents' logic could be more
ruthless, nor a bolder enunciation of the emperor's "special sovereign
rights" could be imagined, than the trenchant argument of Hoshi. It
would seem that in this debate both parties conceded that the imperial
act was transconstitutional. Seen in this light, the statement made in
this connection by Premier Itō to the president of the upper house is
highly significant. Although the recent imperial word, said he, should
not be regarded as an imperial rescript, as it bore no countersignatures
of the ministers of state, it had been issued after a personal
conference between the emperor and the premier. The latter was, Marquis
Itō went on to declare, responsible for the act of the emperor, for,
constitutionally, the premier is held responsible for all the political
conduct of the sovereign. Coming from the very framer and commentator of
the Constitution, these words may be construed as establishing an
important precedent. The emperor is happily relieved of the
responsibility for his political conduct, but may he, under
extraordinary necessity, resort to a transconstitutional measure at
will, or, in other words, may the premier request the emperor to employ
such a measure by the simple assumption by the former of the
responsibility therefor? The marquis appears to answer the question in
the affirmative. The future political development of this point will be
a matter of great interest.
The fundamental conception of the Constitution being such as we have
described, it would appear as if the political life of Japan must in a
large measure depend upon the personal views and inclinations of the
emperor, to say nothing of those of his ministers. Such a conception,
however, ignores two considerations of utmost importance, namely, that
under the new régime are being created regular channels through which
the life of the state will more and more habitually run, and that the
tradition, whose force has accumulated through the long history of Japan
since her foundation as a state, is the spirit of conciliation on the
part of the subject and the habit of assuming political impersonality on
the part of the supreme ruler. Individual idiosyncrasies of the
sovereign will probably prove to be the least important factor of the
future political life of the Japanese nation.
Now, passing on to the imperial diet, it is observed that the
theoretical view of its legislative capacity is that with its consent
the emperor exercises his legislative power (V.), or, in the words of
the commentator, that the diet "takes part in legislation, but has no
share in the sovereign power; it has power to deliberate upon laws, but
none to determine them." This theoretical definition, however, should
not be taken as a practical limitation imposed upon the legislative
power of the diet, for, it will be remembered, every law of the state
must have its consent (XXXIII.), and it may disapprove imperial
ordinances issued while it was not in session (VIII.). Over and above
its legislative faculty, also, the diet enjoys four important rights:
the right to receive petitions directly from the people, the right to
put questions to the government and demand explanations, the right to
address the throne over the heads of the cabinet ministers, and, the
most effective of all, the right to control the management of the
finances. It is needless to say that the practical issue of conflict
must always lie, not between the diet and the emperor, but between the
diet and the government.
The diet consists of two houses, namely, of the peers and of the
representatives. The importance of the bicameral system is strongly
insisted upon by the commentator of the Constitution. The house of peers
is composed of the members of the imperial family and princes and
marquises, who sit of their own right; counts, viscounts, and barons,
who have been elected by their respective peers; persons who have been
specially nominated by the emperor on account of the meritorious
services they have rendered to the state or on account of their
erudition; and, finally, wealthy persons who have been elected, one
member for each city or prefecture, by the people of their own class.
All hold their seats for life, except the elected members, whose term is
seven years.
It would seem that this upper house was created to serve as a powerful
shield of the government. It contains men of wisdom and weight, and is
comparatively free from party affiliations. While no financial bill can
originate there, the house is above the fear of dissolution, and its
actions may be characterized by a greater continuity of policy than
those of the other house. "If the house of peers fulfills its
functions," writes Marquis Itō in his "Commentaries," "it will serve in
a remarkable degree to preserve an equilibrium between political powers,
to restrain the undue influence of political parties, to check the evil
tendencies of irresponsible discussions, to secure the stability of the
Constitution, to be an instrument for maintaining harmony between the
governing and the governed, and to permanently sustain the prosperity of
the country and the happiness of the people." It was an irony of fate
that a dozen years after these words were written their author, at that
time the premier, should find in this very organ the most stubborn
opposition to his measures that any constitutional cabinet of Japan has
ever experienced. The anomaly of the situation consisted in the fact
that these measures had already been passed through the lower house, so
that the traditionally pro-government peers were now found opposed to
the combined front of the cabinet and the representatives. Nothing of
the sort could have been imagined by the marquis when he first framed
the great document which brought the house of peers into existence. How
the deadlock thus caused was removed by a resort to another anomaly has
already been described. As to the reasons for the unexpectedly
determined opposition of the peers, they will be told in the next
chapter.
The house of representatives is made up of persons elected for the term
of four years from the electoral districts in accordance with the law of
election, which was originally promulgated simultaneously with the
Constitution in 1889 and was revised in 1900. The revised law provided
that the electoral district should be coextensive with the
administrative division, city, or prefecture, and defined the number of
members to be elected from each district. Under the earlier arrangement
the city or prefecture had been divided into smaller districts, each of
which returned one, sometimes two, members. The new larger districts
were calculated to do away with some of the evils of sectionalism which
had previously been unavoidable. The revised law also separated a
certain number of cities from rural districts, to which some of the
former had hitherto been connected to form single districts, the change
signifying the intention of the law to give the urban population a freer
voice in the house than was possible under the old system. The aggregate
number of the representatives was also materially increased from 300 to
369, the cities claiming 61 members, instead of less than twenty, as
heretofore. Another important feature of the law was the voting by
ballot and the provision that each elector should vote for only one
candidate, irrespective of the number of members returnable from the
same district. The obvious intention was to protect the rights of the
elector from the abuses of the political party, whose orderly and
organized action was also indirectly encouraged by this measure, and to
give a chance to the minorities to be represented. Again, while the
property qualifications of the voter and the candidate had been measured
by the payment of direct taxes of not less than ten yen by the former
and fifteen yen by the latter, the amount was now reduced to ten yen for
the elector and altogether removed from the eligible person. The numbers
of the electors in the country accordingly rose from some 460,000 to
about 800,000. It is curious to note that the original bill of the
revised election law introduced by the government was considerably more
liberal than the amended and finally passed articles of the lower house.
Thus it would appear that the representatives of the people showed
themselves reluctant to accept the premium offered by the government
whose conservatism they had been wont to attack, but the real situation
will be understood only when we come to study in the next section the
political maneuvers of the period. We may simply note here in passing
that 800,000 electors among the population of more than 46,000,000
cannot be considered adequate, even when allowance is made for the still
comparatively untrained political condition of the people. Although an
agitation for an enlarged electorate has not yet assumed a definite
form, there can be little doubt that progress will be made in this
respect in a not distant future.
The house elects its president and vice president, and submits to the
imperial decision the names of the three candidates for each position
who have received the highest votes for it, of whom the sovereign
invariably selects the first. The members then divide themselves into
committees, each with an elected chairman, which transact the more
important part of the business of the house before it reaches the
general session. The seats are decided by lot and without regard to the
division of parties. Disorderly scenes on the floor are said to be as
rare as specimens of grand oratory. Thrilling incidents are not,
however, wanting, particularly when an important interpellation of the
government or an address to the throne is under discussion, or on any
occasion when the concerted move of a large party is directed by its
leaders against the government, or against another party. The sentiment
of the house rises to its height when, as in October, 1894, and on March
25, 1904, the partisan spirit is for the moment sunk, opposition to the
government is laid aside, and the members, unanimously and
enthusiastically, voice the urgent wishes of the entire nation, the
latter itself being eminently capable at critical times of standing like
one man. The gallery is on such occasions thronged by interested
spectators, and the debate and its report arrest the attention of the
whole country.
Most of the officers of state, including cabinet members, are eligible
for seats in the lower house, but the ministers seldom appear as
candidates, and, in one solitary case, when one of them was elected
representative, he nearly always absented himself from the house. The
cabinet members may, however, voluntarily or on request make their
appearance to present the views of the administration on questions under
deliberation, and on such occasions they occupy seats assigned for
government officials. The presence, in this manner, of the various
ministers, as well as premier, is usually a sign of an important, or
perhaps exciting, session.
It is unnecessary to say that the representatives are not in theory
regarded as delegates from their constituencies, and the local interests
have not been found particularly engrossing. As to the practical
position which the house occupies in the national life of the
people--that is, as to the questions: What are the preponderant
interests represented therein, and in what way; what have been the
watchwords of the opposition, and how are the party lines drawn; how
much has the existence of the house helped or hindered the progress of
the nation during the past decade; what have been the effects of the
continual struggle between the house and the government on the tactics
and discipline of each, and which has shown the higher ability and
greater continuity of purpose; and what have been the mutual effects of
the action of the house and the more important domestic and foreign
problems of the empire--these queries may be only imperfectly answered
after the actual political history since the promulgation of the
Constitution is thoroughly mastered. The more direct and practical
question concerns the relation between the house or the diet in general
and the cabinet. Is the latter responsible to the former for its
political conduct?
Perhaps nothing in the fundamental law of Japan can be of greater
interest and importance than the question just stated, all the more so
because the text of the Constitution and Marquis Itō's "Commentaries" on
it, as well as his public utterances, seem, when closely examined,
significantly to leave much room for future development. Nor are the
eight changes of the cabinet which have taken place since the birth of
the diet all of a character to decide this momentous question. "The
respective ministers of state," says Article LV. of the Constitution,
"shall give their advice to the emperor, and be responsible for it."
What the last clause signifies is by no means made perfectly clear by
the commentator, who says: "He alone can dismiss a minister, who has
appointed him.... The appointment and dismissal of them [_i. e._, the
ministers] having been included by the Constitution in the sovereign
power of the emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence that the power
of deciding as to the responsibility of ministers is withheld from the
diet. But the diet may put questions to the ministers and demand open
answers from them before the public, and it may also present addresses
to the sovereign setting forth its opinions. Moreover, although the
emperor reserves to himself in the Constitution the right of appointing
his ministers at his pleasure, in making an appointment, the
susceptibilities of the public mind must also be taken into
consideration. This may be regarded as an indirect method of controlling
the responsibility of ministers. Thus, in the Constitution the following
conclusions have been arrived at:
"First, that the ministers of state are charged with the duty of giving
advice to the emperor, which is their proper function, and that they are
not held responsible on his behalf; second, that ministers are directly
responsible to the emperor and indirectly to the people; third, that it
is the sovereign and not the people that can decide as to the
responsibility of ministers, because the sovereign possesses the rights
of sovereignty of the state; fourth, that the responsibility of
ministers is a political one and has no relation to criminal or civil
responsibility, nor can it conflict therewith, neither can the one
affect the other. Save that all criminal or civil cases must be brought
before the ordinary courts of law, and that suits arising out of
administrative matters must be brought before a court of administrative
litigation, the cases of political responsibility are left to be dealt
with by the sovereign as disciplinary measures." The marquis further
emphatically repudiates the theory of joint responsibility of the
cabinet as a state of things that can never be approved of according to
the Japanese Constitution. The argument here again is that the ministers
are individually appointed by the sovereign, to whom they are
individually responsible for the business of their respective
departments, and that for the same reason the minister president, or
premier, cannot have control over the post of each minister, nor shall
the latter be dependent upon the former. The reader will readily see
that the whole line of Itō's argument is consistent with the fundamental
theory of the Japanese body politic, that is, the full sovereignty of
the emperor. No one can, however, fail to perceive between the lines
here quoted a great latitude for the future growth of another theory
whose gradual expansion might, imperceptibly, perhaps, but none the less
steadily, reduce the political responsibility of the minister to the
throne to the position of a mere legal fiction. As has already been
intimated, the past changes of the cabinet have not always been directly
occasioned by the opposition of the diet, nor has the majority of the
opposition in the lower house newly elected after its dissolution always
forced the ministers from their chairs. As will be seen in the next
chapter, the second Yamagata cabinet (1898-1900) resigned despite its
commanding a majority in the diet, and was succeeded by the fourth Itō
cabinet (1900-1901), which also retired for reasons quite independent of
the conditions of the legislative chambers, where it had the following
of an absolute majority of the representatives. On the other hand,
nearly all of the eight changes of the cabinet have been caused by
difficulties more or less financial in nature, and these are, it will be
remembered, under the effective control of the lower house, so that the
"indirect" responsibility of the cabinet to the diet already bids fair
to become more logical and perhaps less indirect. Moreover, the
sovereign has never appointed individual ministers of state at his
pleasure, but at the resignation of a cabinet he invariably summons the
statesman whose succession to the premiership is the most logical,
though not always desired by the latter himself, and leaves to him the
task of forming a new cabinet. It would not be too much to suppose that
if in the future a cabinet was compelled to resign under the powerful
and reasonable opposition of a great popular party in the lower house,
the leader of the party would receive the imperial mandate to form a new
cabinet. We feel almost safe in predicting that with the growth of an
adequate party system, which in Japan is still in its formative stage,
the ministerial responsibility to the diet will have become an
established usage.
It is interesting to note that Marquis Itō himself remarked, in his
address, in February, 1899, to the delegates from the cities, that the
English cabinet and party system must be more or less adopted in Japan
if a harmonious coöperation were to be secured between the cabinet and
the diet, and that the practice of government by party would in no way
impair the authority of the throne. The same statesman had an occasion
two years later to declare in the lower house, when an already mentioned
resolution censuring the cabinet for having caused an imperial word to
be pronounced was under discussion, that the passage of a resolution
would not shake his position as premier, which he owed to the confidence
of his majesty. "If the aim of the resolution is my resignation,"
exclaimed he, "why do you not propose an address to the throne, instead
of a resolution?" These statements made by the same framer of the
Constitution at two different occasions may not be interpreted as
necessarily contradictory to one another, for, if in 1901, an address
had been made to the throne, and if the throne had seemed still to
uphold the premier in spite of the diet, it is not impossible to imagine
that Itō would have quietly resigned. Weighing his statements side by
side, might it not be surmised that in the mind of the veteran statesman
the responsibility of the cabinet to the people must be commensurate
with the political training of the latter, especially in the form of a
well-organized and trained party system? At any rate, it would seem
inevitable that the actual state of things under the present régime
should move in that direction. As to the state of party politics in
Japan, to whose development the marquis himself has made a notable
contribution, we shall discuss it at length in the following chapter.
Finally, a reference should be made to the privy council, whose members,
twenty-five more or less in number, are appointed by the emperor, in
order to deliberate upon important matters of state. The ministers are
_ex officio_ privy councilors, but the cabinet is an administrative
body, while the privy council is a deliberative one. To the latter is
assigned the "task of planning far-sighted schemes of statecraft and of
effectuating new enactments, by leisurely meditation and calm
reflection, by thorough investigation into ancient and modern history,
and by consulting scientific principles" according to Itō's
"Commentaries." The councilors, therefore, must be men above party and
of wide experience and knowledge, and so conservative and impartial as
to be "the palladium of the Constitution and the law." Its opinions are
not given publicity, but when they are embodied in an imperial
ordinance, the latter states the fact in its preamble. The emperor in
theory may accept or reject at will the recommendations of the council,
but in practice has in no case overridden them, nor even shown his
personal preferences.
Those who are at all familiar with the political conditions of Japan
cannot fail to see through this institution of the privy council a group
of men who have in a large measure molded the destiny of new Japan. They
are collectively termed _Genrō_, or Elder Statesmen, and include those
who were prominent about the time of the revolution of 1868, and also
those who have since rendered eminent services to the state. At one time
they numbered among them the great Katsu, the most heroic and dramatic
figure of the revolution and the most sage-like statesman of modern
Japan. Marquis Itō now stands head and shoulders above the rest of the
veteran statesmen, and beside him are found Field Marshal Yamagata,
Count Matsukata, and others of equal note. It is highly significant that
the Constitution has created an institution by means of which those very
men whose wisdom and energy have tended to make Japan what she is were
attracted together around the person of the emperor. The ship of the
state is piloted by their far-sighted loyalty and patriotism, and the
influence these statesmen exercise over the fundamental policy of the
empire cannot easily be overestimated. The latest example of this
influence was the advice of the council to the throne to instruct the
peace envoys at Portsmouth to make large concessions in order
successfully to conclude a treaty with Russia. These concessions, which
made the restoration of peace possible, were radically opposed to the
wishes of the majority of the people, but were boldly counseled by the
Elder Statesmen regardless of personal consequences upon themselves.
Neither the diet nor the political parties could, however, effectively
assail the position of the council as such, for it was no executive
institution, but a purely deliberative organ closely in touch with the
throne. When the treaty was signed by the envoys, the council approved
it and the emperor ratified it, despite a great popular demonstration
for its rejection.
Chapter XVII
PARTIES AND POLITICS. 1893-1906[1]
Having examined the salient features of the machinery of the new régime,
we are now prepared to follow the history of the men and parties that
have operated the machinery, and of the issues which have in turn guided
the action of these political agents. Law and constitution are products
of history and legislation, but men and parties, as also issues at
stake, are the handiwork of mightier powers which can hardly be reduced
into syllogisms or molded by mere force of traditions and precedents. Of
all the political factors of a nation, the progress of the party and the
individuality of the man seem the least subject to human artifice and
control, while the problems, which must largely decide the course of
action of the different political forces at work, appear continually to
baffle one's imagination and forecast. It must then be a matter of great
interest to observe the conduct of the most prominent politicians in the
field and their eventful relations to the changing parties, and the
history of the issues, domestic and foreign, which have sometimes
astounded the actors on the scene by their unexpected emergence and
sometimes wearied them by their persistent and unwelcome reappearance.
What follows is a mere sketch of a period of the most bewildering
political vicissitudes that have ever visited a nation in a decade.
The period between 1890 and 1904 might be divided into three epochs.
Down to 1894, when the war with China broke out, the relation between
the government and the parties in the lower house was in the main one of
simple difference of political theories. With the war the nation
entered, externally, into the arena of world-politics, while, in the
diet, there dawned an era of varied coalitions among the parties and
also between them and the government. Desire for power seemed to begin
to affect the minds of the politicians whose aspirations had heretofore
been comparatively more idealistic. A grand party was finally created
by the combined influence of Marquis Itō, on the one hand, who
apparently aimed at organizing a model constitutional party, and, on the
other, of an enormous number of men the motives of some of whom were
anything but a copy of those of their leader. When the whips of this new
party, which controlled a majority in the diet, began to manifest
unwillingness to accept the discipline and to override the wishes of its
founder and leader, Marquis Itō, the politics of new Japan entered its
third stage, in which the controlling factors are found to be even more
personal and partisan and a matter of interests and feeling, than in the
second period. As soon as the nation entered upon the war with Russia,
however, the political atmosphere at once changed: the party lines and
the traditional differences between the diet and the government were
temporarily obliterated, and the nation--the cabinet, the two houses,
and the people--seemed to think and feel as one mind. The conclusion of
the treaty of peace with Russia, the terms of which displeased many
Japanese, has suddenly terminated this union and alienated the cabinet
and the privy council from some people, while the dividing lines between
the various parties are being again drawn on changed issues. When this
critical stage passes away, the political life of constitutional Japan
must inevitably enter its fourth epoch, but what its nature will be
remains to be seen. At this moment the future progress of the party life
of the Japanese nation appears to be as difficult to forecast as it was
in 1890, when the first diet was convened.
The first period, then, opens with the existence of two popular parties,
the Liberals and Progressives, led, respectively, by Count Itagaki and
Count Ōkuma. The members of the parties who sat in the first lower house
represented an overwhelmingly preponderant interest of the landowning
class of the country, so that a revision of land values and consequently
a reduction of the land tax were among their rallying cries. At the same
time they aimed at overthrowing the existing cabinet, which they
considered under the exclusive control of men of certain provinces of
the south, principally Satsuma and Nagato (Chōshū), which had once been
instrumental in upsetting the feudal régime and restoring the imperial
government. It is remarkable that the party men almost identified the
future downfall of sectionalism, as they deemed the foundation of the
administration to be, with the cause of the establishment of a
responsible cabinet, or a cabinet responsible to the throne as well as
to the diet. Needless to say that, from the party standpoint, a
responsible cabinet was _ipso facto_ a party cabinet. It will be
recalled that the Constitution, which had recently been promulgated and
according to whose provisions the diet had been called into being,
defined, so far as the explicit verbal meaning was concerned, that the
government was answerable for its political conduct to the emperor. The
theory of the full sovereignty of the throne was loyally and
enthusiastically supported by the entire nation, but the parties did not
fail to see the apparent possibility of reconciling it with a practical
control of the cabinet by the diet. It is little wonder that they
straightway crystallized their principle into the phrase, "a responsible
cabinet," which they at once conceived as merely the positive side of
another of their mottoes, "the downfall of sectionalism." The government
and the Elder Statesmen, it is not improbable, possessed a clearer
vision of the foibles of the young parties, and consequently a more
conservative but truer foresight of the future progress of the political
training of the nation. The question between the parties and the
government appears, in the last analysis, to have been largely a
question of time, the former harassing the latter for not giving them at
once what they probably knew it would cheerfully surrender when the
proper time came. Yet, by the law of reaction, the parties rashly
attacked the government, and the latter not infrequently resorted to
measures of self-defense which appeared to the partisan opponents
unwarranted and even arbitrary. Bitter feelings were not seldom aroused,
and the sentiment of the people at large was at times so highly wrought
that it was by no means uncommon to see neighbors in a village range
themselves according to their sympathy with either the government or the
party side in their heated controversies by the fireside. Election
scenes often presented exciting incidents. It should be noted that the
majority of the rural population sided with the anti-government
candidates, but that the two parties, the Liberals and Progressives,
seldom failed to struggle against each other in the election. Things
went on mainly in this condition until Count (now Marquis) Itō became
premier of the famous Itō cabinet, which lasted for an unusual period of
four years, during which, moreover, the victorious war with China took
place.
At first the count found the opposition of the lower house to his
so-called sectional government so powerful that he even contemplated the
advisability of creating a new political party of his own. Early in
1894 the diet was dissolved; the March election returned a majority of
the opposition and was followed by a second dissolution. Under such
circumstances it was no wonder that the late Chinese statesman, Li Hung
Chang, is alleged to have fancied at the time that Japan's hands were
too closely tied by the strife between the diet and the government to
resort to a decisive measure against China over Korea, which was then
the bone of contention between the two empires. But the war did come,
for the successful conduct of which the nation sank their party
considerations and supported with one mind the government and the army.
An account of this important warfare will be found in its proper place,
and it suffices here to point out its interesting effect on the
parliamentary politics of Japan. The new position in the comity of
nations which the world accorded her after the war naturally brought
with it new problems of unexpected importance. One of them was an
enormous increase of state expenditures caused by an increased armament
and by the plans for the development of the resources of the country.
Hereafter financial questions became the central issue to decide the
fate of the succeeding houses and cabinets, and their practical and
urgent character made it impossible for the cabinet to carry out its
proposed measures without the coöperation of the one or the other of the
parties in the house. Naturally an era of political coalitions dawned.
It may also be surmised that the parties, at least some of their
leaders, had been tired of a long fruitless struggle with the
government. However that may be, no one will deny that henceforth the
desire for power began to be manifested by the parties which, whatever
their faults, had in the main fought for a few abstract principles which
had originally brought them together. On the other hand, it is only just
to point out the important fact that the so loudly denounced
sectionalism had in reality become a phantom, particularly after the
inception of the constitutional régime in 1890 and the Chinese war in
1894-1895, both of which had a tremendous influence in arousing the
interest of the nation at large in its own affairs. The southern
provinces could still furnish men of experience and wisdom, but it was
less because the so-called sectionalism was still rampant than because
these men, who possessed the prestige of service and age, could not well
be replaced by the less experienced men of other localities. The Elder
Statesmen could no longer control the political situation of the
country, nor could they reasonably be charged with being animated with
any degree of provincialism. It would be no political apostasy for
either party to support a non-partisan cabinet whose policy appealed to
its cherished principles. Thus various circumstances seem to have
conspired to produce an epoch of political coalitions.
The ninth diet opened early in December, 1895, to which the Itō cabinet
proposed the first so-called _post-bellum_ measures to be carried out
within the ensuing ten years. Briefly stated, the additional
requirements on account of "ordinary" expenditures of states were to be
met by an increased taxation aggregating the sum of more than
thirty-three and one-half million _yen_; the expansion of the armament
and the establishment of an iron foundry were to be paid out of the
Chinese indemnity and other "extraordinary" items of revenue, which
altogether amounted to over 365 millions; and the improvement and
extension of railroads, telephone, and the like were calculated to be
covered by the issuance of public bonds. It is essential in our
discussion to keep in our minds the three sources of increased revenue.
As to the first, that is, the increased taxation, we must note as a
matter of great importance that many of the most interesting features of
the political history from this time on have been determined by whether
it was the landowners or the urban population who were called upon to
bear the bulk of the added imposition. In the present case the burden
fell on the latter class of people, and this fact was fortunate for the
reception of the bill in the house, which consisted almost wholly of
representatives of the landowning interest. The passage of the measure
was, however, entirely owing to the alliance between the government and
the Liberal Party. Unfortunately, some of the financial schemes of the
Itō cabinet were soon found to be falling short of the expectations of
their authors, and a large deficit of the revenue for the next fiscal
year, amounting to nearly ninety-three millions of _yen_, brought about
the downfall of the cabinet, which had otherwise proved the most
brilliant and powerful that had yet guided the affairs of the state
under the new régime.
The succeeding cabinet was headed by the great financier, Count
Matsukata, and was for a time supported by the Progressives, whose
leader, Count Ōkuma, occupied the portfolio of foreign affairs. The
tenth diet (1896-1897) ran its course smoothly, as there appeared no
important financial measure to stir up the partisan blood in the lower
house, but the next diet, which met in December, 1897, witnessed an
altogether different scene. In spite of the painful manipulations of the
items of the budget, and of the fact that the issues of the recently
raised taxes had reached the exchequer, a large deficit of over fourteen
million _yen_ stared the Matsukata cabinet in the face, and, moreover,
promised to rise considerably higher the next year. Count Matsukata now
resolved to increase the revenue by twenty-five millions by raising the
rates of certain taxes, one of which, the land tax, was probably among
the fairest sources of an increased income, but was destined to arouse a
stormy opposition of the representatives. No sooner was the count's
design known than the Progressives, with their versatile leader,
deserted the cabinet. This was the first time that the lower house, one
of whose old cries had been to revise land values and reduce the land
tax, was called upon to discuss a financial measure to which the
interest of the constituencies of their overwhelming majority was
diametrically opposed. We might perhaps consider the eleventh diet, for
this reason, as marking a new stage in which the question of class
interests, so promising of ominous consequences, began to manifest
itself. The determined opposition of the house against the cabinet was
quickly followed by the dissolution of the former and the fall of the
latter.
The year 1898 witnessed the most surprising political changes that have
taken place in any single year since the beginning of the constitutional
régime of Japan. In January Marquis Itō again held the reins of the
cabinet. The Liberals would not support him, nor would Count Ōkuma leave
his lieutenants behind in order to join the cabinet. The government thus
declaring itself clear of entangling alliances, the parties hastened to
their constituencies to prepare for the general election of March. The
nation had never seen such peculiar political conditions as then
prevailed all over the country. The new "transcendental" cabinet had
committed itself to no definite policy. There were practically no issues
on which the parties could address themselves to the people, who had not
been without some misgivings as to the conduct of their former
representatives in the lower house, and who could no longer be blinded
by the specter of the so-called sectionalism. The election resulted in
giving an absolute majority to neither the party members nor the
supporters of the government. After the election, however, political
issues quickly crystallized themselves as soon as it was known that the
cabinet would propose an increase of taxes, mainly the land tax, by
more than thirty-five millions of _yen_. The Liberals and the
Progressives, hitherto so jealous of each other, joined hands to reject
the proposition, for which act the house earned another dissolution, on
June 10. With an amazing celerity the two parties voluntarily
amalgamated themselves into the colossal "Constitutional Party," with
the realization of a party cabinet as its motto.
It will easily be seen that this precipitous move had been caused by the
common landed interest which the two former parties represented in the
house, and which had risen to its height of intensity at the repeated
appearance of the land tax bill, and by the plain fact that power and
spoil would fall into their hands the more readily by their combined
warfare with the authorities. In order to meet this united front of the
opposition, Marquis Itō again had a mind to organize a party of his own,
but was strenuously opposed in this desire by the other Elder Statesmen,
particularly Count Yamagata, who, together with the majority of the
peers, were stanch supporters of the literal interpretation of the
Constitution in respect to its theory of ministerial responsibility.
Nothing could have been more significant and characteristic of Marquis
Itō than his action at this critical juncture of the history of the
Constitution and of his own career. The organization of the
Constitutional Party had been publicly announced on June 22, and on the
24th the premier tendered his resignation, together with an earnest
recommendation to the throne that the leaders of the new party be
summoned to form a cabinet. This stroke was natural when we consider
that the quick vision of the marquis must have seen the impossibility of
building between the two fires of the party and the Elders. He, however,
could not have foreseen all the momentous consequences of this adroit
_coup_. The lightning speed of his act stunned friend and foe alike. The
party found itself utterly unprepared to grasp the opportunity so
suddenly thrust upon it. On the other hand, in the inverse proportion
that his conduct gratified the party, it was galling to his numerous
friends in the house of peers, in the privy council, and in the
government and the court, many of whom owed their training and
advancement to the veteran statesman, but who must now have felt as if
they had been deserted by him at the critical moment. The deep-seated
resentment against the marquis which was created among the peers, who
had always regarded him as the living exponent of the theory of the
non-partisan cabinet hereafter must be particularly borne in mind. Would
it not appear plain that they would oppose him if he should again become
premier with the aid of a party, and would it not be equally clear that
if another cabinet should be formed from among themselves, the party
politicians would present an obstinate opposition to it? It will be seen
later that all these things have since actually taken place. If we may
regard the first introduction of the land tax question into the house in
1897 as the beginning of the controlling influence of a class-interest,
the abrupt resignation of Marquis Itō in 1898 may be said to mark the
dawn of an era in which human feelings not altogether expressible in
words began to play an important rōle in parliamentary politics. When
feelings and interests, independent of principles and issues, come to
influence the course of events, the conflicts of their agents must
inevitably become at times bitter. As to the marquis himself, however,
June 24, 1898, was perhaps another of the turning points of his life,
through which he successfully extricated himself from a groove and made
a leap forward.
The most melodramatic spectacles of the year were yet to come. The new
Janus-like Constitutional Party, whose political composition was as
incongruous as its two masters, the idealistic Count Itagaki of the
Liberals and the nimble-witted Count Ōkuma of the Progressives, suddenly
found itself face to face with an opportunity which had for years been
its cherished goal, but which it was at this moment hardly prepared to
accept with alacrity. A mongrel cabinet was at last organized, with
Ōkuma as premier and foreign minister, Itagaki as home minister, two
more former Progressives and three Liberals receiving other portfolios,
and, finally, Marquis Saigō and Viscount Katsura as ministers of army
and navy. It should be noted that the marquis was one of the Elder
Statesmen, under whose wings the viscount also had shaped his political
career. The party thus failed to form a cabinet of purely its own
complexion, which fact must have been especially disheartening in
showing that the powerful military institutions of the empire could not
be controlled by the inexperienced politicians emerging from the lower
house of the diet. Such a matter, however, weighed little by the side of
the grave internal difficulties that beset the new party from its start.
The traditional sympathies of its two component parts proved too
different from one another, and the individual sense of honor and also
interest too little subservient to the common cause, for the members of
the new government to hold together for half a year. Moreover, the
executive authorities of the party at large instituted a shameless
movement of systematic office-hunting, in which the old Liberals and
Progressives vied against each other and among themselves. The same
disorganized condition characterized the general election of August when
a concerted action of the party could hardly be found anywhere in the
country. What finally precipitated the downfall of the cabinet was a
speech of Ozaki, the Progressive minister of education, which roundly
denounced the materialistic tendencies of the age, and declared that if
Japan should become a republic her people probably would not hesitate to
elect a Vanderbilt or an Astor for president. The former Liberals
adroitly chimed in with those chauvinists who pretended to have
discovered in the speech a sinister, disloyal motive, on the part of the
speaker, against the reigning family. When Ozaki's resignation was thus
forced, the premier, without listening to the overtures of the Liberals,
appointed another Progressive to the vacant post. At the end of October
the dissolution of the party began openly amid considerable bickerings,
and the cabinet, which had already been deserted by the non-partisan
ministers of army and of navy, and could no longer maintain itself,
tendered its resignation. Thus the first attempt at a party cabinet in
Japan came to an ignominious failure under extremely untoward
circumstances. The old parties parted more widely than before, and the
unfortunate ministry passed out of existence before it could face the
unfriendly house of peers and tackle the enormous national deficit
amounting to thirty-seven millions of _yen_.
Field Marshal Count Yamagata, who received an imperial summons, formed a
cabinet, on the eve of a new diet, in November, 1898, which consisted
entirely of Elder Statesmen and their sympathizers. The duty of carrying
out the _post-bellum_ measures had devolved upon the new cabinet. The
support of the peers could be safely relied upon, but in the lower
chamber nothing could be effected without the aid of some party. Perhaps
nothing could show more clearly the possibility of the ultimate
ministerial responsibility to the diet than the conduct of the field
marshal at this juncture. He and some of his colleagues, as well as the
majority of the peers, had been known as the most persistent believers
in the non-partisan government and in the responsibility of the cabinet
to the crown, and yet they could see absolutely no hope of performing
their official duties but by allying themselves with the party which
once supported Marquis Itō's _post-bellum_ measures. That party was the
Liberal, which now monopolized the name Constitutionalist. It demanded
certain portfolios, not from the spirit of office-hunting, but, as it
was explained, for the sake of establishing the principle that no
cabinet can be "transcendental," or absolutely non-partisan. According,
however, to an agreement arrived at between the cabinet and the
Constitutionalists, the latter satisfied themselves with a manifesto
made by Count Yamagata at a social gathering, to the effect that he
believed the coöperation of a party or parties commanding a majority in
the diet was essential for the discharge of the business of the state.
It was significant enough to hear these words from the mouth of the
premier from whom they could otherwise have been least expected, and yet
it is not too much to say that no cabinet, not excluding partisan
cabinets, has succeeded in making a greater use of a party than his. The
success was in no small measure due to Tōru Hoshi, formerly Japanese
minister at Washington, and at the time under discussion the house
leader of the Constitutionalists, who, with his wonderful talent for
political tactics, acted for the government as the trustworthy foreman
of his party. By his skillful maneuvers, an increase of the land tax,
which had, as we saw, failed after causing within half a year the
dissolution of two successive houses of representatives, was now,
despite the preponderant sympathy in the house with the landowning class
of the country, agreed to by a majority of 161 to 134. But for its
passage, the deficit of the next fiscal year would have reached beyond
forty-six millions of _yen_.
Let us pause a moment to examine the nature of the Japanese land tax,
without an understanding of which neither the past nor the future of the
parliamentary politics will be comprehended with sufficient clearness.
The reader will recall how before the fall of feudalism most of the
arable land in the country was held in fief, and how the tenants paid to
their lords onerous rents, ranging between thirty and seventy per cent.
of the product of the soil. When the imperial government assumed the
control of the state in 1868, it found itself confronted with the
colossal task of reorganizing the machinery of the state in nearly all
of its parts, and introducing new, urgent measures, some of which were
on a large scale, and all of which demanded a considerable outlay of
funds. To do this they were supplied with a miserably small income,
which hardly covered one-tenth of the necessary expenditures. It was
essential above all to institute a sound system of taxation, whose
basis, in those days of an insignificant foreign trade, could not but
consist in a reorganized land tax. Nothing could, however, be done in
that direction, so long as the local _daimios_ still held their fiefs,
to which the authority of the new government could not penetrate. It was
only when the fiefs were, in the manner already described in a previous
chapter, surrendered to the state that anything toward the establishment
of a secure system of taxation could be attempted. Pending the assessing
of the values of the arable land, which naturally required time, the
government resorted to the issuance of inconvertible notes and other
measures of purely temporary and irregular nature. The land tax itself
was, however, conceived and finally established in the most remarkable
manner, its principle being, in the first place, a complete
nationalization of land, and, then, the transferring of the ownership to
the individual holders who were actually tilling it. The duty of the new
owner to pay a tax to the state for his landed property was evidently
conceived by the government as a natural consequence of the ownership so
bountifully and so completely conferred upon him on their initiative.
With the land tax securely installed, the main structure of the new
system of national taxation had been finished, for the issue of this new
tax at its first complete return amounted to more than two-thirds of the
entire revenue of the state. It now remains to be told how the value of
each piece of land was assessed and its tax determined. The assessment
of value consisted, first, in taking the average of the harvest for five
years, then converting it into money at the basis of the average price
of rice ruling in the same period, and, finally, estimating the amount
of the capital which would be necessary to yield an interest equal to
the price just calculated. The estimated capitalization was considered
the value of the land in question. The assessment of land throughout the
country was completed in 1881. As to the tax itself, its rate was fixed
at three per cent. of the official value, and later reduced to two and a
half per cent. It would be difficult to overestimate the benefit that
accrued to the farmer under the new law. He passed at once from the
position of a tenant to that of an absolute owner, his former lord being
at the same time recompensed by the state with public bonds for the
fiefs he had surrendered. Thus the emancipation of the cultivator from
the feudal bondage of land, which still has a considerable hold upon
some of the former feudal communities in Europe, was in Japan definite
and final. Nor did the new owner find himself under such restrictions as
had existed under the feudal régime, either in the alienation of his
estate or in its utilization to the best advantage by raising upon it
whatever crop he liked. In return, his due to the state was only a sum,
no longer arbitrary or in kind, but fixed and in money, which, as has
been pointed out by some writers, was no more than one and one-fourth
per cent. of the market value of the land, or equal to a rent assessed
on the basis of an eighty-year purchase, which is less than a quarter of
the ordinary tenant's rent.[2] Add to this the important consideration
that between the time when the land tax law went into effect and the
year 1898 the price of rice rose nearly threefold, so that the real
burden of the tax lessened correspondingly by two-thirds. The market
value of land, also, had increased, even as early as 1888, on the
average of five or sixfold. If it be said that the farmer's quota in the
expenditures of the local government had in the meantime considerably
increased, there still remains the fact that the increase was hardly
commensurate with the growth of cultivated area and general land value
and the rise in both quantity and price of the crops.
To say, however, that the land tax was lenient is not equivalent to
saying that it was the most reasonable source for an increased
imposition. That it was so, in the opinion of the fair-minded people,
remains now to be shown. It should be remembered, in the first place,
that although in 1881 the income of the land tax amounted to more than
four-sevenths of the total revenue of the government, it had not since
increased, but rather fallen from over forty-two millions of _yen_ to
less than forty, while, on the other hand, the expenditures of the state
had risen from seventy-one and one-half millions in 1881 to eighty-five
and three-tenths in 1895, and then, so rapidly after the advent of the
_post-bellum_ measures that in 1899 they stood at 254 millions, or more
than three and one-half times as large as they were less than two
decades before. Such items of taxes as had been created or increased to
meet a part of these enormously swollen expenditures had nearly all
fallen on the urban population. The public bonds which were issued from
time to time and could not be much multiplied by fresh issues were also
absorbed mainly by the merchants and manufacturers, and the burden of
the indirect taxes, which in 1899 brought in the considerable sum of
sixteen millions, was borne by the consumers of foreign goods, who for
the most part lived in the cities. This increased assessment of the
urban population can be appreciated in contrast with the greatly
lightened land tax of the landowners, who gained much and lost little by
the rapid development of the economic resources of the country. Their
interests were further strengthened by the new régime, under which the
lower house of the imperial diet championed their cause with such a
decisive majority of its members that no dissolution could change the
situation. Some of the peers may have represented urban interests, but
their voice in financial measures was as small as the control over them
by the representatives was secure.
By the magnitude of these difficulties should be measured the signal
success of the Yamagata cabinet in obtaining the passage in the lower
house of the land tax bill, on December 20, 1898, by the majority of 161
to 134. It was, however, bought with a heavy cost both to the cabinet
and to its allies, the Constitutionalists. The former had been compelled
to relinquish its "transcendentalism," and the latter risked the
displeasure of their constituencies. Nor was the bill passed without a
hard struggle and serious amendments. The original proposition of the
government contemplated a permanent increase of the tax rate to four per
cent., but the bill as it was adopted fixed it at 3.3 per cent. (the
rate of the house land in the cities being, however, 5 per cent.), and
limited its validity to the short period of five years, so that the
estimated increase in the income of the tax, after its going into
plenary force, was only over eight million _yen_, or less than half the
originally intended increase. Even this reduced measure was not agreed
to until the government yielded to the demands to revise the land
valuation in the country in such a way as to cut the total assessed
value by 3,200,000 _yen_, and, what is more, to transfer the charge of
the prison expenditures, amounting to four millions, from the local to
the central exchequer. The net gain by the increased tax measure would
hardly rise above four million _yen_ annually, and this slight gain
would be temporary, while the losses entailed on the government from the
reassessment and prison expenditure would be permanent. After the
expiration of the five years the government would be left worse off than
at the beginning of the term.
In spite of these drawbacks, the credit of raising the income of the
land, income, and _saké_ taxes by forty-six millions of _yen_, and thus
enabling the _post-bellum_ measures to be carried out to any real
extent, belongs justly to the Yamagata cabinet. If we add to this
remarkable success the establishment of the gold standard in 1898 and
the passage of the new election law in 1900, and also remember that the
cabinet possessed a strong unity, it becomes difficult to understand why
it resigned in September, 1900, at the prime of its success. The reason
was probably the characteristic modesty and prudence of the field
marshal, who saw that he had attained to a success large enough to
satisfy any premier, while the prolongation of his office might involve
him in embarrassing relations with the new party just formed by Marquis
Itō, with which the retiring premier had little sympathy.
The attitude of Marquis Itō toward the Yamagata cabinet during the
latter's tenure of office was one of a cordial adviser to a modest
inquirer. When the late Ōkuma cabinet fell, the marquis was summoned by
the emperor to hasten back from China, where he had been traveling, but
before he touched the shores of the main island of Japan the
organization of the Yamagata cabinet had practically been completed. Itō
may have been somewhat chagrined, but it goes to the credit of himself
and of the field marshal that they maintained all through the twenty-two
months of the latter's administration the utmost mutual respect and
good-will that ever could exist between two men of temperaments so
widely different from each other. But the time came when Itō at last
found favorable opportunities to organize a large model party, which the
former Liberals (lately styled Constitutionalists) joined in a body. He
had seen too well in his tours round the country to what abuses the
existing party system had everywhere led, and how far the nation stood,
mainly owing to the flagrant defects of the present parties, from an
ideal constitutional government, the legal foundation for which he had
himself designed. Gradually and with increasing force he seems to have
convinced himself that there should exist a party powerful enough to
counteract the present evils, sufficiently organized and disciplined to
possess a distinct unity of conduct, and actuated solely by the best and
most logical motives of national progress. The patriotic intention of
the marquis himself in these ideas cannot for a moment be doubted: it
must have seemed plain to him that his assumption of leadership in a
party must mean a radical severance of himself from his past career and
friends, and even the silent resentment of the latter, while his
disciplinary measures would, even with his imposing prestige and
influence, become less binding on the party as the latter grew in size.
As soon, however, as his desires of organizing a new party were made
known, on August 25, men of all classes and motives flocked under his
standard in irresistible numbers. The public inauguration of the party,
under the name Constitutional Political Association (_Rikken Seiyū
Kwai_), took place on September 15, and eleven days later was followed
by the sudden resignation of the Yamagata cabinet. Upon Itō now
logically devolved the duty of taking the reins of the state in hand,
but it was only after a considerable hesitation and some unexpected
difficulties that the fourth Itō cabinet was finally organized on
October 19. Who can deny that this was a genuine party cabinet, in an
even fuller sense than the late Ōkuma cabinet, and that Marquis Itō was
after all deeply convinced of the futility of a "transcendental"
cabinet, which owes everything to the crown and nothing to the diet?
The new cabinet, with its illustrious leader, its absolute majority in
the lower house, and its immense following in the country, seems to have
been attended from its beginning by no inconsiderable difficulties, some
of which, indeed, proved more serious than could have been expected.
Foremost among them stood the financial ghost, which would never down,
but which now, with the dispatch of troops to North China, made an
unusually ominous appearance before the inchoate government. The
increased tax measures, mainly in sugar and _saké_ taxes and customs
duties, intended to raise twenty-one million _yen_, readily passed
through the house of representatives, where the landed interest still
outweighed the urban, but met a different treatment from the peers. That
these would be cool toward the cabinet may have been expected, but no
man had imagined that they would present so stubborn an opposition and
such adroit tactics as they did. Their stand was as determined, when it
was taken, as it had previously been unsuspected. Between February 25
and March 12, 1901, were employed in vain the persuasion of the premier,
reconciliation by four Elders, and two successive suspensions of the
diet. Never before in the history of the Japanese Constitution had the
house of peers so seriously opposed the government, nor had its action
ever caused a suspension of the imperial diet. The anomaly of the
situation becomes more evident when one recalls that the upper chamber
was now wielding its weapons against its creator, who had called it
into being as a conservative force to check the radicalism of the other
chamber. Above the fear of a dissolution, as they were, the peers caused
a complete deadlock. How it was removed by an imperial word, and how
unprecedented the procedure was, has been described in connection with
our account of the Constitution. The survival of the Itō cabinet through
this crisis, and the conduct of the premier in allowing his trouble to
be remedied by an aid from the throne, were not unattended by the
increased ill-will of the peers and even by some significant whispers
among the rank and file of his own party.
The cabinet did not, however, live much longer, as it resigned on May 2
from an entirely unforeseen cause, the like of which it is highly
improbable would recur. Within a week after the prorogation of the
imperial diet, which had passed the increased tax measures, Viscount
Watanabe, minister of finance, stunned the premier by declaring that the
only possible way of forestalling the impending financial dangers of the
government would be to postpone the public works contemplated for the
fiscal year of 1901, mainly consisting of the creation or the extension
of the iron foundry, railroads, telegraphs, and Formosan enterprises.
His argument was not without a plausible ground, as it was plain that
the issuing of the public bonds to the amount of more than sixty
millions of _yen_, part of which had been planned to meet the
expenditures of the public works, could not have been effected without
drawing upon the too scarce productive capital of the nation. But the
abrupt proposition of the viscount caused a veritable panic in the
cabinet, and in the business world, and was agreed to by his colleagues
after a considerable discussion. No sooner, however, did the finance
minister carry his point than he gave everyone a fresh surprise by
recommending an entire suspension of public works for the ensuing fiscal
year of 1902. The breach thus created in the cabinet was complete, and
the enigmatical Watanabe would not listen to the plaint of the premier.
When all the other ministers tendered their resignation it was seen that
the viscount alone was holding to his post, although he also soon joined
the rest. It does not seem perfectly clear why the obstinacy of a
minister was deemed a sufficient cause for the downfall of a cabinet
which commanded an absolute majority in the lower house, and which had
survived the deadlock and anomaly of two months before.
However that may be, the party cabinet, for such it was in practice,
did not recede from the government service without receiving deep scars
on the prestige of the party itself. The internal inharmony of the
cabinet so unfortunately caused by the inexplicable conduct of Viscount
Watanabe seriously reflected upon the credit of the leaders then in
office. For the cabinet and the party at large, however, perhaps no
event was of a more serious import than the immense power, followed by
the assassination, of Tōru Hoshi. A man of blameless character in his
home life and an indefatigable student of the world's new thought,
Hoshi, with undaunted courage and consummate talent for party
leadership, not unattended by unscrupulous conduct in money matters, had
become within a short time a peerless whip of the old Liberals. He was
probably the greatest instrument in their secession from the hasty union
with the Progressives. During the Yamagata administration the success of
the cabinet was mainly due to his efficient maneuvers in the lower
house, where he was at once the contractor and the foreman of his party.
When the Liberals joined in a body Marquis Itō's new party, no man could
have been at once more dangerous and more indispensable to its president
than Hoshi. The latter's word was as reliable and his success as assured
as his rule in the party was despotic and his means detested. In the
proportion that the new association was proclaimed by its founder and
expected by the nation to be a model party, the peers and other neutral
people deprecated Hoshi for his corrupt deeds and the marquis for
allowing them to pass under his eye. The politician, on his part, was
too proud to condescend to explain that he retained not a farthing for
himself, and that abuses were showered on him some of which should
belong to others. The respectable society looked askance at him, but in
the political world no one could resist the action of this intrepid and
clever politician. During the first months of the Itō cabinet Hoshi was
at once minister of state for transportation and a member of the
municipal council of Tōkyō, but it was not long before he incurred the
ire of the peers and others and resigned his former post. It was mainly
as a councilor of Tōkyō, however, that his influence was feared to
contaminate the municipal government in all its branches. Finally, on
June 21, 1901, he fell victim at the age of forty-one to the dagger of
an assassin. The latter, Sōtarō Iba by name, formerly a fencing master
and now a man of respectable social standing, and of the same age as
Hoshi, had been actuated by the simple fear of the widespread
corruption wrought by this engrossing enemy of the public, on whose
removal he staked his life. He was later sentenced to life imprisonment.
With the passing of Hoshi, the Constitutional Political Association and
its president lost their most powerful and most detested figure. Marquis
Itō was no longer subject to the calumny which had fallen upon him for
his close association with the deceased politician, nor could he again
count upon the coöperation of one whose talent and tactics had been the
badge of his discipline as leader, and whose concentration of censure
upon himself had relieved the marquis from the share which would
otherwise have been apportioned him. The political atmosphere was as
purified, as was the forecast of its immediate future rendered
uncertain, by the resignation of the Itō cabinet and the assassination
of Tōru Hoshi.
In the meantime the imperial mandate to organize a new cabinet lingered
between Marquis Saionji, Count Inouye, and Viscount Katsura, until
Katsura succeeded, a month after the fall of the last cabinet, in
forming its successor. It consisted of younger men of that school of
statesmen whose sympathy was with the Elders and peers, who, like their
typical field marshal, Yamagata, were known to be skeptical of the
wisdom of the party government. Hardly a more singular spectacle can be
imagined than the one afforded by this new cabinet, which was at once as
little respected from outside as internally it was united and tactful,
and which was as securely supported by the peers as its relation to the
representatives was precarious. The latter, particularly Marquis Itō's
followers, could not have loved the successor who seemed to have stolen
into the post vacated by their leader, whose untimely downfall from the
cabinet had embittered them. Nor could the feeling be suppressed that,
emerging from the house of peers, the new cabinet now had the use of the
very twenty-one millions of increased taxes to which its members were so
recently and so stubbornly opposed.
Again it was through the financial question that the struggle opened
between the government and the diet. The accounts of the fiscal year
1901 showed a deficit of 44 millions, and the proposed war loan of 50
millions to be floated in the United States failing at the eleventh
hour, the difficulty was tided over by ingenious manipulations. In the
budget for the next year, however, it was proposed to transfer from the
"extraordinary" to the "ordinary" class of accounts the works to be
defrayed by public bonds, representing 18 millions, as well as the net
income to the government from the Chinese indemnity, amounting to 38
millions. The Associationists opposed this budget on rather unimportant
grounds, but, at Itō's advice, consented to its passage with the pledge
of the cabinet to reorganize the official system of the government with
a view to eliminating spurious posts and retrenching administrative
expenditures. The marquis had, however, started, on September 18, on his
tour round the world, leaving an advice to his party that a friendly
neutrality should characterize its attitude toward the cabinet. He
attended the bicentennial celebration of Yale University, where he was
honored with the degree of Doctor of Laws. Thence he sailed to Europe,
receiving warm greetings from the governments of the countries through
which he passed. Shortly before he returned home on February 25, 1902,
however, an event took place which for the time being arrested the
attention of the whole world--the Anglo-Japanese alliance, agreed on
January 30 and published February 11.
The full contents and import of the agreement of this alliance will be
discussed later in connection with the diplomatic history of Japan. In
short, it declared unequivocally that the two governments were for peace
and order and against territorial aggressions in China and Korea; and
that, if one of them should be compelled to go to war with a third power
in order to protect its now vested interests in those countries against
the threatening conduct of the enemy, the other party would be neutral
and make efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities
against its ally; but that if any other power or powers should join in
war against the ally, then the other party should come to its
assistance, and conduct the war in common. It may well be imagined with
what enthusiasm the news was received by both friends and foes of the
cabinet in the two houses of the diet, as it was there for the first
time made known to the world on February 11, when even the peers broke
their usual decorum and applauded. Nothing could have strengthened the
position of the Katsura cabinet more than this successful culmination of
a series of negotiations carried on in absolute secrecy with a great
power whose policy of "splendid isolation" had seemed to be traditional.
It would be only fair to say, however, that but for the international
fame which Japan had won for herself in the Chinese war of 1894-1895 and
latterly in the North China campaign of 1900, coupled with the tact and
influence of Viscount Aoki and Mr. Katō, former Japanese ministers at
London, even the increased common interests of the two powers in the
East and the combined effort of Baron Komura, the foreign minister, and
Viscount Hayashi and Sir Claude MacDonald, the respective
representatives of the two governments at London and Tōkyō, would not
perhaps have been sufficient to bring about the consummation of the
great diplomatic enterprise. It was even suspected in some quarters that
Germany also may have been instrumental in promoting the new alliance,
as her well-known policy of setting England and Russia against each
other for her own benefit would be best served in the Far East by
wedding England to the inveterate object of Russia's jealousy. A more
interesting question for us here regards the position in this affair of
Marquis Itō, who had recently held conferences with the Russian foreign
minister, Count Lamsdorf, at St. Petersburg, and had just been honored
by Edward VII. of England with a Grand Cross of Bath. Whether the former
fact indicated his preference for a Russian _entente_, or whether the
latter was a conclusive evidence of an eminent service he had rendered
toward the successful conclusion of the British agreement, has been a
matter of much speculation. There exists authoritative evidence to show
as conclusively that his negotiations with Lamsdorf had been carried out
with the full knowledge of the Katsura cabinet, as to prove that, on the
other hand, the latter's _pourparlers_ with the British government were
also continually intimated to the marquis during his tour. Probably his
negotiations at St. Petersburg were less successful, while the cabinet's
agreement with Great Britain was more readily concluded than he had
expected. Immediately after his return to Japan the tactful statesman
somewhat checked political gossip by intimating his agreement with the
cabinet in its British policy.
The formation of the alliance must have had some bearing on the success
of the Japanese government in floating the fifty million _yen_
($25,000,000) public bonds at London in the autumn of 1902, which had
been rejected a year before from the financial market of New York. The
income of this foreign loan was not devoted to new public works, but
employed to refill the deficiencies of the old accounts.
Aside from these successes, the path of the Katsura cabinet was thorny.
It could count upon no partisan support in the lower house, nor could
its personnel and prestige command high respect. Its main strength lay
in its remarkable unity, silence, tact, and apparent fairness. The last
quality was manifested anew in its impartial attitude during the general
election for the seventeenth diet. The previous diet was the first in
its history that had served its full term of four years without
dissolution, and the present election saw the first operation of the new
election law. Of the 376 elected representatives, the Constitutional
Political Association returned the absolute majority of 192, while the
Progressives numbered about 80. The house contained entirely new members
to the number of 227, but aside from this one fact, no particular
faction had made any appreciable gain or loss, so that the _status quo_
of all the parties was in fact maintained. Once convened, however, the
conduct of the house demonstrated how precarious therein was the
condition of the cabinet. The opposition of the house would probably not
have been so precipitate had not the interest dear to eight-tenths of
the representatives been directly assailed by the government's
proposition to retain the increased rate of the land tax, which, as will
be remembered, had been intended to return in 1904 from 3.3 to 2.5 per
cent.
Inasmuch as this proposition had arisen from the second _post-bellum_
measure of naval extension, it becomes necessary to say a few words
concerning the status of the Japanese navy. The first programme as
planned by the second Itō cabinet in 1895, and agreed to by the diet,
contemplated an increase of Japan's naval force, in ten years, from 33
war vessels and 26 torpedo boats, aggregating the 63,000 tons'
displacement of the fleet before the China war, to 67 vessels, besides
11 torpedo-boat destroyers and 115 torpedo boats, with a total
displacement of 258,000 tons, at the end of 1905. Of this tonnage at the
end of 1902 there was 252,180 tons, representing 72 vessels of all
kinds. Formidable as these figures would seem, it had long been plain to
the statesmen of the empire that deductions must be made for vessels
built more than twenty years before and for others whose terms of
usefulness must shortly expire one after another. Even if the present
force were maintained, each of the six great naval powers of the
world,--Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States, Germany, and
Italy,--would have completely outrun Japan by the end of 1908; while the
Japanese, after deducting vessels older than twenty years, would hardly
possess more than 145,000 tons. Japan's naval ambition was animated, not
so much by an inordinate elation as a civilized power as by the
necessity of maintaining her position in East Asia and guaranteeing her
own independence. When these matters are considered, the new programme
of naval expansion, as at last set forth by the Katsura cabinet, rather
surprises one with its modesty. It, in short, contemplated the
construction, in the course of eleven years, of three battleships each
of 15,000 tons' displacement, three armored cruisers each of 10,000
tons, and two second-class cruisers each of 5000 tons, totaling 85,000
tons' displacement, besides fifteen torpedo-boat destroyers and fifty
torpedo boats. No one could have seriously opposed this programme had it
not been for its financial side. The source of the estimated annual
outlay of 11.5 million _yen_ which the proposed plan entailed upon the
government could, according to its opinion, be found nowhere but in the
retention of the increased rate of the land tax, augmented by other
slight items of revenue. To the seventy or eighty per cent., however, of
the members of the lower house, who had pledged their word to their
constituencies to restore by all means the old rate of the tax, it was
no argument to say that the landowners had been inequitably lightly
taxed by the side of the urban population, nor to prove the
impossibility of raising the necessary expenditure by any other safe
means than the retention of the increased rate. Into their hands no
sharper weapon against the government could have fallen than the one
which the helpless cabinet gratuitously furnished them under the
pressure of an apparent necessity. Upon this juncture, what was the
attitude of Marquis Itō and his party, which controlled an absolute
majority in the lower house?
To answer this question is again to describe another turning point in
the remarkable career of this statesman. It was made known early in the
season, and no partisan view could well refute, that the marquis was in
sympathy with the cabinet so far as its naval programme was concerned,
which he was reported to have deemed even too moderate. As regarded the
land tax question, however, which he had once in the past years
considered it wise to increase even to four per cent., he now, either
from conviction or from policy, assumed an attitude of unusual
deliberation. Nothing could have been more disastrous to the cabinet,
and more decisive for the termination of his career as a party leader,
than his studied reticence about this important problem. The "whips" of
his party deliberately overrode him, and ordered its long expectant
local branches, soon after the general election, to forward to the
headquarters resolutions against both the naval extension and the
retention of the increased land tax. Resolutions accordingly poured in
thick and fast. At the same time, the marquis was flooded with personal
appeals to him to come out squarely against the unpopular government. It
is plain that the action of his subordinates was calculated to
intimidate him more than the cabinet. His authority as the president of
the Constitutional Political Association had been ignored, and he
yielded, perhaps in order to save others' and his own dignity. Shortly
before the opening of the diet, on November 26, the marquis, after a
deliberation lasting four weeks, conveyed to Premier Katsura his
opinion, reiterating that the naval expansion was necessary, that the
burden of the increased land tax was not particularly onerous, but that
he did not think it politic at present to prolong the term of the
increase, and, finally, that the naval expenditure might be met by
postponing or suspending some of the less urgent public works. After
further conferences, the premier, on December 3, personally assured the
marquis of his sense of gratitude for his counsel, but firmly announced
that, inasmuch as the budget had been sanctioned by his majesty, and as
it would be unwise for the cabinet to resign on the eve of the meeting
of the diet, it remained for him to make an effort to carry through his
proposed plan. After this friendly ultimatum was pronounced the outcome
of the measure could hardly be doubted, for the presence of the common
enemy speedily brought about a temporary alliance of the Associationists
and the Progressives. The irresistible coalition found its first
opportunity to assail the cabinet when the latter made an imprudent but
sincere move to connect three things--the budget, the navy bill, and the
land tax measure--declaring the absolute necessity of upholding them
together and the impossibility of an alternative course of action. The
allied parties in the lower house found herein a justification for
modifying Marquis Itō's suggestion to carefully study the budget with a
view to discovering adequate means to balance the naval expenditure
without resorting to the increased land tax. The committee on finance
straightway negatived the land tax bill, and in the afternoon of the
same day, December 16, when it came before the house, the chair read an
imperial mandate suspending the diet for five days. This was followed by
another suspension, and during this interval Prince Konoye, president of
the peers, and Baron Kodama, military governor of Formosa, sought in
vain to effect a compromise between the truculent lower house and the
cabinet. The latter, however, having expressed willingness to make
reasonable concessions, two representatives of each of the opposition
parties met the premier and the ministers of finance and navy, on
December 25, to discuss the compromise measure proposed by the latter.
This compromise reduced the tax rate to three per cent. and agreed to
make up the balance by postponing some public works and retrenching
general administrative expenses. When this new plan was submitted to the
parties at large, the latter roundly rejected it, Count Ōkuma, the
Progressive leader, going so far as to intimate that his party was
fundamentally opposed to the cabinet, which it considered
unconstitutional. Under these circumstances it was no longer possible
for the government to coöperate with the house, which was accordingly
dissolved on December 28.
When the year 1903 dawned upon Japan it found her political conditions
extremely unstable. The alliance of the Associationists and Progressives
seemed unnatural, and the discipline of Marquis Itō over the former
appeared no longer tenable. The coalition had been based on no positive
political principle, nor could the bulk of the Association be
successfully controlled by one, however personally respected, whose
double capacity as trusted Elder Statesman and an opposition leader was
ever liable to lead him into positions highly repugnant to those who
preferred an open and relentless warfare with the cabinet. The two
parties had already parted hands when the eighteenth diet was convened
for an extra session in May. As to the impossible situation of Marquis
Itō, to which reference has just been made, it was not long before it
was demonstrated anew and with a decisive effect. The occasion was again
in connection with the naval extension measure, the urgent character of
which was freshly brought home to the thoughtful people by the partial
failure of Russia to effect the second evacuation of Manchuria and her
simultaneous pressure upon the Peking court and the Korean frontier. The
cabinet presented to the house some supplementary estimates to the
budget for the fiscal year of 1903, together with eight bills, two of
which related to the navy and the new three per cent. land tax. The
manifest hostility of the house again called forth on May 21 a
suspension of the diet. On the 23d, at a general meeting of the
Association, Marquis Itō made an earnest appeal to his party to accept
the compromise measure which he, as an Elder Statesman, and under the
entreaties of his non-partisan friends, had agreed with the cabinet to
support. Under the terms of this agreement the government was understood
to reintroduce the land tax bill for show, but to consent finally to
raise the required annual naval expenditure of eleven and a half
millions by a yearly flotation of public bonds for six millions,
retrenchment in administrative expenses to the extent of one million,
and deflection from the outlay for railroads and other works to the sum
of four and a half millions. The appeal of the marquis was not accepted
by his party without a powerful opposition and a great sacrifice, which
we shall presently see. The painful compromise measure was further
mangled when the house cut the supplementary budget estimates by five
millions, covering the cost of a few important undertakings, and, in
return for the passage of the naval programme, exacted from the
government pledges to effect a drastic reorganization of finance and
administration, and to place the railroad accounts under the
"extraordinary" class of national expenditures. The climax was reached
when the defeat of an address to the throne proposed by the Progressive
members, censuring the cabinet, was quickly followed by the passage of a
resolution of similar censure which was proposed by the Associationists
themselves. It is unnecessary to say that the last act was no less a
blow to Marquis Itō than to the Katsura cabinet. The latter had,
moreover, to endure the displeasure of its best friends, the peers, who
passed a petition to the government to desist from the highly unwise
policy of resorting to a national loan, and a minority of whom even had
contemplated proposing an address to the throne deprecating the same
policy.
The eighteenth diet, which was prorogued on June 5, left the politics of
Japan in an even more confused state than before its opening. The
humiliation of the cabinet was only matched by the internal injuries
which the parties had suffered for their conduct. The former, whose
diplomatic duties in Korea and Manchuria were threatening to rise to a
hitherto unknown degree of difficulty, had been forced by the merciless
diet not only to retreat from the stand it originally took in regard to
the most important problem of the nation, but also to bear the burden of
the imposed responsibility of reorganizing the financial and
administrative machinery on an almost impossible basis. The Progressives
could scarcely conceal the inharmony of their leaders in regard to the
immediate policy the party should pursue. Far more demoralized was the
Association, which had been born under too favorable auspices, and
possessed too absorbing a desire for power, to maintain its mental
poise when it found itself as an opposition party. It had then appeared
to lack the tried perseverance of the Progressives, while its irritation
had been greatly intensified by the double position of Marquis Itō, who
would on the one hand come to an agreement with the cabinet in his
independent capacity as an Elder Statesman, and on the other maintain
his disciplinarian leadership of the opposition party. Nor can it be
concealed that the marquis, dignified statesman and brilliant counselor
as he is, hardly possesses attributes which appeal to the hearts of the
people and inspire the enthusiastic loyalty of his followers. It seemed
evident that the majority of the party from the beginning respected his
prestige and influence, which was considered as a political asset, more
than either his constitutional ideals or his personality. Since they saw
that the shortest road to power would lie in the direction of
unequivocally upholding the proprietary interest of the country, nothing
could have seemed more galling to some of them than a compromise which
would deprive their parliamentary warfare of these essential tactics.
Around this sentiment as a center there seem to have clustered various
other motives for disloyalty. Some Associationists resented the
autocratic rule of the president, and advocated a more republican form
of party organization, and others denounced the marquis for sacrificing
the dignity of the party for his position as an Elder. Desertion of
several members, including the late lamented president of the lower
house, Kataoka, and the present mayor of Tōkyō, Ozaki, was followed by
the dissolution of a few local branches. The culmination, however, was
the resignation of the president himself, which occurred on July 13. The
marquis had at length yielded to the arguments of his fellow-Elders,
which had long been becoming more and more solicitous, that his proper
mission was rather that of a trusted councilor to the throne than one of
party leadership. The Manchurian question was assuming a more serious
character than before, and the resumption by the marquis of the
presidency of the privy council appeared to the Elders, and perhaps also
to the emperor, as the most natural course of events. The appointment
was finally made on July 13, after Itō had given the matter his
characteristically careful consideration. His severance from the party
naturally followed, as no privy councilor might entertain partisan
connections. In the leadership of the Association he was succeeded, at
his own suggestion, by Marquis Saionji, his friend and also one of the
most promising statesmen of the day. Thus after a wandering of nearly
three years the prodigal son, with perhaps a valuable experience but
scarcely an added prestige, returned to the fold of the council and the
court. In accepting the post of the chief councilor, he said to the
emperor that it was his desire of seeing the perfect operation of the
Constitution, which he had had the honor of framing, that had induced
him to descend to a political party and lead it; but that, as he was
now, even before his work with the party had barely begun, graciously
called by his majesty to resume the chair of the council, he convinced
himself that it would be as much a contribution toward the realization
of the constitutional régime to "stand near the throne and reverently
answer imperial questions regarding important affairs of the state," as
to "move among the people as a party leader." No student of the Japanese
politics of to-day can fail to observe the large place Marquis Itō
occupies therein as the pilot of the state, and also his full
consciousness of the fact. His apparent failure as a partisan seems to
have brought him back to his normal position. It will soon be seen that
he returned thither in an opportune season. Her foreign affairs were
just drifting Japan toward an ocean of unknown difficulties.
In the meanwhile, Premier Katsura had tendered his resignation on the
just plea that an adequate conduct of the government was incompatible
with the slender means in which the diet had left the exchequer. Neither
this argument nor the somewhat reduced physical condition of the
viscount would, however, induce the throne to relinquish its confidence
in him. Thereupon the premier reminded the emperor, and it was agreed to
by his majesty, that his retention of the portfolio could mean nothing
else than a drastic retrenchment of the administrative and financial
expenditures of the state. This colossal task the cabinet set about with
characteristically quiet determination.
The arduous and cheerless life of the cabinet was somewhat brightened
when it received into its community, in July, General Baron Kodama,
military governor of Formosa, and latterly the able chief of Field
Marshal Oyama's staff, and, in September, three other able young men.
Nothing, however, could have been more gratifying to the cabinet than
the fact that, while its hold upon the lower house of the diet was next
to nothing, its apparent patriotism and sincerity, as well as its fair
degree of ability, had begun to be appreciated by the throne, the
Elders, and the peers, and perhaps somewhat by the people at large. The
confidence with which its general purpose was regarded by the nation was
best demonstrated in 1903-1904, during its protracted and otherwise
exasperating negotiations with Russia regarding Manchuria and Korea. It
was remarkable that, in spite of the increasing irritation which one
report after another of the Russian aggression in these territories
caused in the national mind, the Katsura cabinet appeared so little
inclined to stray from its policy of a firm but fair treatment of the
question, as did the people to force its hands to a rash action. If this
remarkable phenomenon was, in part, due to the deeper and more mature
feeling which was now inspiring the nation than had been experienced
before, it none the less redounded to the honest purpose of the cabinet.
Nor were its care and precision in all lines of its policy less
remarkable than its general sincerity.
The crisis in Korea and Manchuria was, in the meanwhile, advancing with
tragic certainty, until the apparently insignificant cabinet was called
upon to lead the nation through the greatest trial of its life. The war
with Russia, as we shall see in a later chapter, broke out in February,
1904, followed by nineteen months of the vast campaign and the brilliant
victories of the Japanese army and navy. The existence of the war, of
course, again united the entire nation, and completely changed the
conditions of Japan's domestic politics, which might otherwise have made
a prolonged life unendurable to the cabinet. Its financial measures were
supported by the diet, not without amendments, but on the whole with
practical unanimity. The 156 million _yen_ of the extraordinary war
expenditures disbursed under an imperial ordinance of December 28, 1903,
were willingly sanctioned by the twentieth session of the diet in March,
1904. It also passed the new tobacco manufacture monopoly law
elaborately drafted by the government, and approved the extraordinary
war expenditures for the fiscal year 1904-1905, amounting to 420 million
_yen_. This last act not only involved the raising of the public and
temporary loans and exchequer bonds to the amount of 131 millions, but
also an increase in tax rates and the imposition of new consumption
taxes on woolen textiles and kerosene oil. The next session of the diet
also met the requisitions of the government by further increasing the
tax rates and creating newer taxes, and approving 571 millions of new
national loans and 63 millions to be transferred from funds under the
so-called special accounts, making the total war expenditures of the
second period 780 million _yen_. The grand total of the war cost
approved by the diet in the two sessions thus aggregated 1356 millions.
This amount became inadequate, as the army in the field, especially
after the battle of Mukden, in February-March, 1905, was increased to an
unprecedented magnitude. A new foreign loan for 30 million pounds
floated, in July, in London, New York, and Berlin, brought the figure up
to 1656 million _yen_. Fortunately, the rice crop for 1904 was unusually
good; an early control of the sea held open the highways of Japan's
Eastern trade; the reduction of local impositions and expenditures
counterbalanced the rise in national taxes; and the savings and general
financial endurance of the people at large proved unexpectedly great.
The unforeseen successes of Japan's arms also contributed to the
temporary prestige of the cabinet.
The spell was broken the moment peace was restored. The broad
concessions made through the peace envoys at Portsmouth for the
conclusion of the Russo-Japanese treaty of September 5 brought upon the
cabinet (and the privy council) the greatest popular resentment ever
experienced by any constitutional government of Japan. Various motives
and circumstances combined to make the sentiment for a time almost
unanimous among the nation. The conclusion, on August 12, of the
agreement of a renewed and much extended alliance with Great Britain,
which was published on September 27, somewhat relieved the strained
situation, and the Constitutional Political Association, under the
leadership of Marquis Saionji, showed an inclination for a moderate
policy toward the treaty and the government. The relative position of
the different parties was again rendered uncertain, so that their
conduct in the coming session of the diet could hardly be forecast. As
to the cabinet, it must either succumb to an attack from the majority in
the lower house, or survive it only to be confronted by colossal
financial difficulties.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The editor has been greatly helped in preparing this chapter by I.
Tokutomi's admirable pamphlet on the recent political life of Japan.
[2] Brinkley's "Oriental Series," vol. V. p. 16-17.
Chapter XVIII
ECONOMIC PROGRESS. 1893-1906
One of the most remarkable features of the economic evolution of Japan
since 1868 has been the slow increase of her rural population as
compared with the urban--a fact which at once indicates that the
agriculture of Japan can offer little to compare with the phenomenal
growth of her manufactures and commerce. Nor will a closer examination
establish an optimistic view regarding the future status of the Japanese
farmer. Although a sedimentary soil admirably suited for the culture of
cereals abounds in the country, and often yields in warmer regions two,
three, or even four different crops during the year, and although Japan
is blessed with a copious rainfall, it must be remembered that the
arable area is extremely limited, and can hardly be extended
commensurately with the fast growth of the population. Of the 94.5
million acres of land of Japan exclusive of Formosa, only 12.4 million
acres, or thirteen per cent., are under cultivation, while, as is well
known, there exists little or no pasture land in Japan. Even if all
sorts of land under fifteen degrees of the angle of inclination were
arbitrarily considered as reclaimable, they could not add to the arable
area more than 10.5 million acres. The actual reclamation outside of the
colony of Hokkaidō amounts annually to only twenty thousand acres more
or less. It seems evident that the future increase of the agricultural
resources of the country may be effected less by extensive breaking of
the soil than by intensive improvement. This is well illustrated by the
rice culture, the area of which has scarcely been increased during the
last twenty years but the actual product of which has in the meantime
risen nearly eighty per cent. The production of other cereals, beans,
and potatoes has grown even more appreciably, while the area of the
cotton, indigo, and sugar culture has, for commercial reasons,
remarkably declined. No illustration, however, of the limited
agricultural resources of the country is more impressive than the ratio
which her arable area bears to her population. The _per capita_
distribution would fall below half an acre. Under these circumstances it
is natural that the cultivated lots are diminutive, more than half of
the rice fields of the country being each less than one-eighth of an
acre. The farmer is obliged to exercise the utmost care in utilizing
every scrap of his land and every grain of its yield. A great majority
of the tenants, moreover, lack a sufficient fund, after the high rents
and interest are paid, even to buy manure, much less to make any
improvement on the land. The implements are as meager and primitive--the
outfit for the cultivation of an acre of field costing probably less
than eight and a half dollars in gold--as their wages are low, seldom
rising above thirty-five cents per day for the male and twenty cents for
the female. The government is making efforts to develop the agriculture
of the country by all possible means of education and encouragement, not
the least important of which has been the creation of the central and
local Hypothec Banks and the Credit Guilds. How much, however, these
methods will really reach the needy villagers is yet to be seen. On the
other hand, Japan cannot help realizing that her agriculture, while it
still constitutes the staple industry of the nation, has already ceased
either to supply her with all the necessary raw products for the
manufactures or to support the new population, which is growing annually
at the rate of more than half a million. Probably this serious problem
lies behind many an event of recent years that characterizes the
activities at home and abroad of the Japanese people.
The difference between the condition of agriculture and that of
manufactures and trade not only is clear, but also becomes increasingly
decisive as time advances. Until we realize this significant difference
we fail to grasp the most fundamental cause, excepting perhaps her
growing ambition as a nation, that impels Japan onward with an
irresistible force into a controlling position in the Far East. In
proceeding to explain the situation, manufactures and trade will be
considered together, as their influence is in a large measure mutual.
It must be noted, in the first place, that when the country was thrown
open to the world's trade, her industrial conditions were altogether
inadequate to meet the marvelously rapid increase of the consumption of
new goods. The original five per cent. import duty, which peculiar
circumstances made almost equal to no duty, accelerated the impetuous
advance of imports over exports. Thus the first decade and more of the
new régime found the nation in a state of almost complete economic
dependence upon foreign countries. Old industries were largely
paralyzed, while capital and labor were not forthcoming for the new. It
was at this juncture that the government began to extend a helping hand,
by subsidies and by example, to the more important economic enterprises,
and not until then could the people begin to take an active interest in
railroads, industries, and export trade. The fact that the low import
tariff had been forced by the powers upon the Japanese government, whose
right of tariff autonomy they had thus ignored, was galling to the
nation in its ardent desire to regain its economic independence, and
tended powerfully to confirm its determination to effect a revision of
the treaties. These were revised in 1894, and the new treaties which
emancipated Japan from the consular jurisdiction of the foreign
residents and gave her a partial tariff autonomy came into force in
1899. It is unnecessary to examine the process of this revision, but it
suffices here to repeat that while consumption had advanced marvelously
under a virtual free trade, production began to grow only after the
government was compelled to aid it. From this point on trade and
industry have helped each other's progress by mutual reaction. The
tremendous expansion of economic resources thus rapidly opened in the
two great fields, manufactures and commerce, was clearly measured by the
enormous increase of population, which numbered less than thirty
millions in 1830, thirty-four millions in 1875, forty-two and a quarter
in 1895, and more than forty-seven to-day. At the same time, foreign
trade itself has grown from 40 million _yen_ in 1871 to 690 million
_yen_ in 1904, the _per capita_ share of the people in the growth rising
more than twelvefold. During the first half of 1905 the total foreign
trade in merchandise amounted to over 429 million _yen_, as compared
with 320 millions during the corresponding period in 1904. In other
words, Japan is changing from an agricultural to an increasingly
industrial and commercial nation, and her commerce is expanding mainly
abroad, as her domestic market has well-nigh reached its "saturation
point." This fact is strikingly illustrated by the rapid growth of the
exportation of manufactured goods, as well as the importation of raw
material, as compared with the relatively slow increase in the
importation of foreign manufactures. The exports of manufactured goods
in 1890 amounted to 10 million _yen_ of the total export trade of 55.7
millions, while ten years later the corresponding rate changed to 74.7
out of 193.8 millions. If raw silk, straw-plaits, and the like were
classed under agricultural, instead of manufactured, goods, the rate of
increase between 1890 and 1900 of different kinds of exports would run
as follows:
1890 1900
Per Cent. Per Cent.
Manufactured 18.0 38.0
Agricultural 51.6 37.8
Fishing 6.6 3.5
Mining 20.0 14.2
Miscellaneous 3.8 6.5
If the enumerated goods were transferred from the agricultural to the
manufactured list, the rate would be thus:
1898 1899 1900
Per Cent. Per Cent. Per Cent.
Manufactured 70.9 69.4 66.0
Agricultural 11.9 11.9 10.5
Others 17.2 18.7 23.5
While the rate of the manufactured exports seems to have fallen between
1898 and 1900, their absolute figures show that some new items appeared
in the list during the interval and that the total volume enormously
advanced. On the other hand, the imports, which increased together with
the purchasing power of the people, show more rapid growth in raw goods
and machinery than in manufactured articles. These changes have been
pointed out here in order to indicate the general nature of the economic
transition of the Japanese people. They will be found to possess a far
greater significance than we have seen when we come to examine further
the character of the trade tendencies of Japan.
Let us for a moment consider the qualifications of the Japanese as a
manufacturing nation, for upon them must ultimately depend their
economic as well as general national success. It would be impossible to
conceal from our view certain serious disadvantages which confront
industrial Japan, particularly in her want of the new form of labor and
experience and lack of certain raw materials and of capital. Regarding
labor, the old manual dexterity and individual apprenticeship have
hardly had time to be sufficiently converted into an organized and
specialized mechanical training, so that the foreign visitors report
continually the apparent inefficiency and ill discipline of the Japanese
mill-hand. On the other hand, Japan cannot forever count on the
cheapness of her labor, whose cost is still low, the average daily wage
of twenty-six principal classes of laborers being not more than
one-quarter of an American dollar, but it has risen more than twice
within the last fifteen years, and will continue to rise along with the
cost of living. The shortage of capital is natural when it is remembered
that Japan is just passing from an agricultural to a manufacturing
stage, but none the less constitutes the most serious drawback to her
industrial growth. Ingenuity and enterprise are not wanting, but owing
to the scarcity of capital Japan's exploitation of resources, both at
home and in Korea and China, is handicapped to an extent which is
exasperating. Latterly, however, particularly after the war, foreign
capitalists have been seeking investment in Japan, and they may be
expected to aid Japanese enterprise on the mainland. The lack of proper
business experience of the Japanese manufacturers is natural from their
comparatively recent appearance. They have been accused of
over-eagerness to rid themselves of foreign advisers and middlemen, who
could have supplied them with a better understanding and control of the
outside market than they themselves could command. The native maker,
however, will learn deeper by blundering more. A graver charge has
continually been made of the slack commercial veracity of the Japanese,
which is admitted by themselves to be real, but which has for certain
reasons been unduly magnified, while it is naturally being remedied by
experience. Another grave disadvantage of the Japanese manufacturer
consists in his want of such important raw materials as cotton, wool,
and iron. The growth of cotton in Japan is insignificant, while its
importation from India, China, and the United States amounts to more
than seventy million _yen_ annually. Wool has to be entirely supplied
from abroad, as pastures for sheep do not exist in Japan, while the
total annual output of iron is less than eighty thousand short tons.
Reflection will show, as experience has proven, that the enumerated
disadvantages are neither permanent nor irremediable. Labor and
practical wisdom will gain by time, and capital and raw material will
come in with greater ease and in larger quantities. Over against these
diminishing disadvantages Japan possesses an unrivaled geographical
position between the great Pacific on the one hand and the teeming
millions of the East Asiatic population on the other, the commercial
importance of both of which must grow wonderfully with the development
of canals and railroads in various parts of the world and the opening of
new markets in the yet slightly explored East. This superb
Phoenicia-like situation of Japan toward the outside world is supported
internally by a richly endowed soil and an eager and ambitious race. The
soil possesses an abundant water supply and extensive coal beds, the
latter already yielding well-nigh ten million tons, and produces tea and
silk the peculiar quality of which is hardly matched by the product of
another land. The ambition and docility of the people would seem to be
well exemplified by the phenomenal growth of silk and cotton textile
industries, which have risen twenty-fold in value during the last two
decades, and by the creation of certain new, prosperous industries,
particularly in matting, lucifer matches, straw braids, and cotton
yarns. The exportation of the six principal branches of manufactures
above enumerated amounted in 1888 to less than 31 million _yen_, and
nearly 195 millions in 1904. It should be remembered that none of these
articles have won their position without encountering embarrassing
difficulties at home and a sharp competition abroad, and that with a
relaxation of effort they would at once sink into insignificance.
Considering the foreign trade of Japan apart from her manufactures, it
is seen that its growth during the last eleven years has been rapid and
on the whole regular. During this space of time the exports in 1904
reached 319¼ million _yen_, which means a gain of 256 per cent. over
1893, and the imports 371-¼ millions, or a gain of 320 per cent., while
the total volume of trade amounted to 690-3/5 millions, that is, nearly
three times as much as it was a decade ago. The figures for 1905 will
possibly exceed the 850-million mark. This remarkable growth of trade
has advanced hand in hand with an even more striking development of
Japan's shipping industry. At the end of 1891 she owned 607 steam
vessels with a total tonnage of 95,588, while in 1903 her vessels
numbered 1088 and their capacity totaled 657,269 tons, so that Japan
stood in 1902 in the ninth place in tonnage in the world's merchant
marine, and the speed and general improvement of her ships were behind
only those of the four greatest shipping nations on the globe. The gross
income from freight and passengers in 1902 amounted to 12-3/5 million
_yen_. Japanese steamboats now ply regularly between her shores and the
ports in Siberia, Australia, India, Europe, and on the Pacific coast of
America, and, in Korea and China, they play an active part in the
coasting and inland navigation.
We conclude this section by briefly pointing out what appear to be the
most significant tendencies of Japan's trade and of her national growth
in general. The growth of imports, which have risen from 23-1/5 million
_yen_ in 1874 to 37-3/5 millions in 1904, is mainly due to causes which
may be classified as follows: First, the progress of industries,
resulting in an increasing demand, on the one hand, for machinery, and,
on the other, for raw materials, particularly cotton and iron; second, a
great advance in the standard of living among the people at large, which
caused a remarkable growth of the general consumption of imported
articles, including textiles, woolens, petroleum, and numerous other
items; third, the rapid increase of population, coupled with the
transition of the new nation from an agricultural to a manufacturing
state of industry, which, besides aiding the growth of general
consumption, necessitated a marked development of the importation of
foodstuffs, such as rice, beans, flour, and sugar. These three classes
of causes have all stimulated import trade to grow with rapidity, and
are apt to continue to do so in the future, but, as the figures plainly
show, in varying degrees from one another. And it is in this difference
that one of the striking indications of Japan's call in the East is to
be discovered. The increase of the imports due to the growth of the
general consumption of foreign goods has not been nearly so fast as
other classes of imports, as Japan is able to supply her people more and
more with the fruits of her own manufacture, which itself is progressing
rapidly. While the future increase of this class of imports must be
steady, it at the same time may not be rapid save in a few exceptional
articles. Nor may the importation of machinery, excepting the most
advanced, such as locomotives, be expected to grow more rapidly, the
reason for this supposition being again the increasing activity of
Japan's manufacturing life. The other two classes of imports, however,
that is, raw material for manufacture and foodstuff for the growing
population, have shown a wonderful advance, and may be said to command
the most assured promise for the future. A glance at the following table
will make an elaborate demonstration of our statement superfluous:
IMPORTATION OF RAW MATERIAL AND FOODSTUFF
(Unit of million _yen_)
1882 1892 1902 1903 1904
Cotton 0.46 12.32 79.78 69.52 73.42
Pig iron 0.09 0.24 0.98 1.25 2.24
Wool .... 0.30 3.40 4.81 9.97
Sugar 3.84 9.53 14.36 20.96 23.04
Rice 0.21[1] 1.86[1] 13.56[1] 51.96 59.70
Flour .... 0.27 3.28 10.32 9.62
Beans .... .... 4.95 6.37 8.12
Oil cakes 0.03 0.82 10.12 10.73 4.66
This remarkable showing of figures becomes highly significant when we
consider further that most of the articles the importation of which
increases the fastest come mainly from the East Asiatic countries. India
furnishes the bulk of cotton, China supplies some iron, sugar, and rice,
as well as some cotton, while North China and Manchuria send their beans
and oil cakes, and Korea is beginning to be a great supply region of
several cereals. Most flour and some iron, however, come from the United
States, which, as we shall see presently, occupies a unique relation to
Japan's trade. We have thus arrived at an important conclusion that
Japan is obliged to depend in an increasing degree for her most
important articles of importation on East Asia, to which she is
intimately connected both geographically and historically.
An analysis of the export figures of Japan leads us to a similar
conclusion from another direction. It has already been shown that, as
contrary to the tendency of her import trade, Japan's exportation
consists yearly more of manufactured articles and less of raw goods than
before. Here again a deeper significance is disclosed by an examination
of the destination of the exports. The time, if ever, seems very remote
when Japan will invade Europe and America with her manufactures and
compete with the fruits of their superior machinery and mechanical
experience. Her exportation to Western countries already has a clear
indication of settling down to two main classes of articles; such
unfinished goods as raw silk, copper, sulphur, and others, which might
rather be finished abroad than in Japan; and certain goods peculiar to
the soil of Japan, as, for instance, tea, _habutai_, and other light
silk fabrics, porcelain, matting, camphor, and the like. The exportation
of these articles must increase in varying degrees, according to the
state of the several determining factors that rule the domestic and
foreign markets, but its future on the whole may be said to be much
more limited and inelastic than that of Japan's exports to the East
Asiatic countries. Her close economic relation to them has become all
the more manifest since she began to be a manufacturing nation, while
they remained agricultural; she buys from them raw products and
foodstuff, and supplies them with her manufactured articles. The demand
for these last-named articles, also, by a fortunate combination of
circumstances, is at present what the still inferior skill of the
Japanese manufacturer can supply. The taste of the Eastern buyer is
still low and his wants still comparatively few, while their advance
will largely coincide with Japan's improvement in industries. Her
neighbors in Korea, Siberia, Manchuria, North and South China, India and
Further India, and the Philippines absorb her coal, matches, marine
products, cotton yarns and coarse cotton fabrics, and other similar
goods, to the amount of 134.5 million _yen_ (in 1901) while eleven years
before they consumed 23 millions and in 1882 only 6 millions. From these
data, the conclusion seems tenable that her geographical and economical
conditions render it natural for Japan to interpret the new Occidental
civilization for the old Orient, and create new wants in the latter for
the fruits of the former, herself reaping an important share of the
profits that accrue from the world-wide exchange. This share consists in
an even closer economic connection of East Asia, particularly Korea and
China, with Japan as her grand supply region of raw goods and market for
made articles. In comparison with this, Japan's trade with countries of
Western civilization may become more and more a mere complement to her
Eastern trade.
The solitary and striking exception to this general statement is found
in the Japanese trade with the United States, which is still to-day, as
she was twenty years ago, the largest single buyer of Japanese goods,
notably tea, raw silk, matting, porcelain, and camphor. In the import
trade, while the United States is second to Great Britain, the former
advanced in twenty years between 1882 to 1902 from 3 to 48.6 million
_yen_, and the latter only from 14 to 50.3 millions. The peculiar
features of Japan's trade with the American nation which are not found
in her European commerce may be said to lie in the fact that the latter
buys a considerable amount of the crude or unfinished Japanese
manufacture, and sells increasing quantities of raw cotton and flour and
other foodstuffs, thus participating in a large measure in the
peculiarities of the Japanese trade with the East. The United States
also furnishes Japan more cheaply certain products of modern industries
which the latter formerly bought from Europe.
We conclude our survey of Japan's foreign trade by appending a table
showing its distribution by the continents, which will speak for itself
without our comment:
(Unit of million _yen_.)
Europe, America, Asia, Australia,
and Others.
1881 Exports, 12.5 11.0 0.6 0.9
Imports, 21.0 1.8 7.6 0.5
1891 Exports, 23.9 31.1 20.9 1.8
Imports, 30.3 6.8 23.7 1.9
1901 Exports, 59.9 75.6 111.4 5.2
Imports, 96.7 42.9 109.0 7.0
1903 Exports, 70.3 85.7 126.7 6.7
Imports, 96.1 46.7 169.1 5.0
1904 Exports, 72.3 104.6 134.5 7.7
Imports, 120.5 58.9 182.5 9.3
FOOTNOTE:
[1] The average for the past ten years inclusive.
Chapter XIX
THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894-1895
Seldom does history offer a more dramatic unfolding of international
relations than the evolution of the East Asiatic question, of which the
China-Japan War of 1894-1895, the Boxer campaign of 1900, and the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are but successive stages of a
continuous and broadening process. The scene of this development now
covers those countries which are among the most resourceful in the world
and which comprise one-third of the human race. The future is unknown.
The origin of the drama, however, may at least in part be traced to the
adoption of a new career by Japan. Having been singularly well trained
by her long history in the past, and impelled by the dictates of her
vital interests, Japan had resolutely entered upon the new career, and
had step by step committed herself to an open and progressive policy
from which there could be no return, and which had to be carried forward
against all obstacles, if she would exist and grow as a nation. This
change of Japan's course of life was a cause of her wars with China and
Russia; by it the history of the Far East radically changed its
character and opened its new volume. At first, the determined attitude
of new Japan immediately caused a breach which continued to widen until
the war of 1894-1895 came as a logical result--for it at once appeared
that Japan had torn herself away from the ancient East Asiatic
civilization, of which China was the mentor and Korea the greatest
pupil, but of which Japan had never been so slavish a disciple as not to
develop her original traits. As soon as Japan proved receptive of
Western arts and sciences, there was resentment on the part of China and
Korea, which felt as if Japan had deserted the historic community of the
East and turned a renegade and servile imitator of the inferior
civilization of the barbarian. To an equal extent Japan desired, even
unconsciously, to demonstrate that her new career not only was not
misguided, but also was the only possible way to preserve herself and
save the East. Conflict with China became acute when Japan desired to
open to the world the tightly sealed kingdom of Korea, over which China
claimed suzerainty. Japan's attempt to open Korea, then, should be taken
as the starting point of our account of the war of 1894-1895.
To complete our general survey, it may again be emphasized that the same
problem which caused the breach of 1894 also produced the conflict of
1904. The interests at stake had, indeed, grown wider and deeper during
the ten intervening years, and Russia was a far more powerful and
aggressive power than China, but the fact still remained that, from
Japan's standpoint, her vital interests were at issue in 1904 as they
were in 1894, and, from that of the world, the conflict raged now as it
did then between an open and an exclusive policy.
As has been said above, Japan's attempt to open Korea as an independent
and sovereign nation was the occasion for the outbreak of the Chinese
war of 1894. Why did Japan desire to open Korea? Was it because Japan
would apply to Korea the treatment she herself had received from the
United States and other powers? Or was it an expression of the vigor of
a newly regenerated nation? Probably the motives were not so simple, for
it should be remembered that from the prehistoric ages the career of
Japan and of Korea had been so vitally entwined that their close
relationship of one kind or another was as inevitable as their
geographical proximity itself. Moreover, beyond the peninsula stood two
other powers, China and Russia, whose friendship Japan could not always
count upon. In providing against any possible danger from these powers,
the entire question seemed to hinge upon Korea, for with the fall of the
latter the very existence of Japan would be threatened. It seemed
essential for Japan, in order to protect her own life, either to annex
Korea before it fell prey to another power or to insure its effective
independence by opening its resources and reforming its rotten
administration. Japan chose the latter alternative. But this brought her
to a conflict with the Koreans themselves, for they were too thoroughly
imbued with Chinese civilization and too deeply corroded by official
corruption not to resent Japan's eagerness to modernize and revivify
Korea. Korea thus presented the singular spectacle of resisting the
suggestion of a friendly nation to insure her independence and power.
Japan was confronted with the colossal task of overcoming the Korean
misapprehension and breaking down the Chinese suzerainty over the
peninsula.
This double conflict began almost as soon as the imperial authority was
restored in Japan. In 1868 Japan sent a message to Korea with a view to
opening friendly relations with her. Korea, however, being ill informed
of the nature of the political change which had just taken place in
Japan, and acting under the false representation by China of Japan's
aggressive pretensions, resolutely declined to entertain these
overtures. Other similar attempts also miscarried, and, in 1872, a
Korean magistrate set a placard upon the gate of the residence of a
Japanese officer at Fusan, in which Japan was stigmatized as the
laughing stock of the world for her slavish imitation of barbarous
customs. The taunt ended in saying that Japan had been so insolent as to
impose the shameless policy upon Korea also, but the latter had too high
a sense of propriety to be so deluded. It is noteworthy that the
objections here raised were characteristically double, that Japan was
under the shadow of other powers and was losing her nationality, and
that she dared to force Korea to follow her unwise example. The former
was sufficiently repugnant, the latter made it unendurable. When in 1873
Japan demanded China's explanation for the repeated insults made by
Korea upon Japan in the latter's attempts to negotiate with her, the
Chinese government declared that it was not answerable for Korea's
conduct, for she was not its dependency. This aroused an outcry in Japan
that she should independently force Korea open, but a greater insult
from Korea was still to come. As a Japanese war vessel on its way to
Niu-chwang stopped at the Kang-hwa Island, not far from Chemulpo, in
August, 1875, it was fired upon by the inhabitants and two marines were
killed. The Japanese-Korean treaty, which was concluded as a result of
this incident, deserves a special note, not only because it was the
first modern treaty made by Korea with a foreign power, but also because
it for the first time showed clearly Japan's fundamental policy
regarding Korea, upon which policy has depended and will for a long time
depend many a serious event in the history of the Extreme Orient. By
this treaty Korea was declared independent, the two parties binding
themselves to treat each other on the basis of equality, and three
Korean ports were shortly to be opened to foreign trade. This
epoch-making treaty was concluded on February 26, 1876, at which date
Korea was at last conventionally independent and partially open to the
outside world.
We need not tarry to repeat the story already told of the strong
internal opposition that the moderate Korean policy of the government
had aroused in Japan, and of its far-reaching consequences in her
domestic politics. What mainly interests us here is the question as to
what effect did the treaty produce upon Korea herself, whose sovereignty
it recognized in unmistakable terms. This conventional independence of
Korea had hardly altered the state of her political mind. Korea, it
should always be remembered, had since prehistoric ages been trained in
that school of experience in which she found herself eking out her bare
existence between stronger surrounding nations, which she was wont
either to propitiate or to set one against another for her precarious
safety. The Koreans had thus by habit and by conviction grown up an
opportunist nation. They gratified Japan by complying with her wish to
declare them independent, while, at the same time, they courted China's
favor by maintaining their vague dependency upon that empire. As
indefinitely did China support her contention that Korea at once was and
was not dependent upon her.
The time soon came, however, when China was obliged to define her
position toward Korea, for the more apparent Japan's policy of upholding
Korean independence became to China, the more urgent was it for the
latter to reassert her suzerainty over the peninsula. The ambiguous
phraseology with which China had masked herself was suddenly cast aside
when an acute crisis came. In 1882 Tai-wen-kun, the father of the Korean
king, assumed the administrative power at Seul, and set about executing
with great rigor his anti-foreign policy. The old patriot believed, like
many a Japanese before the restoration, that exclusion and independence
were synonymous. On April 23 the Japanese legation was attacked by
Korean troops, its twenty-seven members barely escaping to Japan by way
of Chemulpo on an English vessel. With unusual rapidity the Peking
government sent forces to Korea, who captured Tai-wen-kun and carried
him off to China, demonstrating in this way the latter's assumed right
of forcible intervention in Korea. China thus asserted by deed her
suzerainty over Korea, and herein is already forecast an ultimate
conflict between her and Japan, although neither power may have expected
it as yet. Japan, on her part, contented herself by securing the
punishment of the guilty, payment of 50,000 _yen_ for the killed and
wounded, and also an indemnity amounting to half a million _yen_,
four-fifths of which were remitted the next year. She was, besides,
allowed to station troops at Seul for protecting her residents against
future emergencies.
This Korean trouble of 1882 was followed two years later by a greater
crisis, and again the occasion was a political disturbance at Seul. In
1884, when China was at war with France over Annam, the progressive
party in Korea, which had been inspired by the example of Japan, took
advantage of the situation and overthrew by violent force the
pro-Chinese, conservative government. Suddenly the defeated party,
together with 2000 Chinese troops, invaded the palace, murdered several
members of the new cabinet, and attacked and burned the Japanese
legation. The minister, Takezoye, fled for his life, while many of his
compatriots residing at Seul were outraged or killed. The king, who had
summoned Japanese soldiers to guard the court, now threw himself on the
protection of the Chinese. In Japan the cause of the trouble was
attributed to the mild Korean policy of the government. In 1885,
accordingly, an agreement was made with Korea whereby the latter again
promised to punish the guilty and indemnify the outrage. Korea was
settled, and China had now to be dealt with. To allay the censure
directed at himself by the nation, Itō proceeded in person to China,
where he concluded with the Chinese commissioner, Li Hung Chang, the
famous Tientsin Convention of April 18, 1885, which had so much to do
with the later breach with China in 1894. It was agreed by this
convention that Japan and China should withdraw troops from Korea, that
they should not furnish Korea with military instructors, and that if it
should become necessary at any future time for either party to send
soldiers to Korea, it should notify the other of its intention. It was
further stated, in a supplement, that there existed no definite evidence
that Chinese troops had killed Japanese residents at Seul, and
punishment would be inflicted on the guilty only when sufficient proof
was forthcoming. As a matter of fact, no investigation followed and no
punishment was meted out. On the contrary, the Chinese resident at Seul,
Yuan Shih-kai--now the powerful pro-Japanese viceroy of Chihli, but then
an astute promoter of China's ascendency over Korea--who was considered
to have been largely responsible for the conduct of the Chinese forces,
not only was not recalled, but was reinstated as Chinese minister at
Seul. The greatest displeasure of the Japanese nation, however, was felt
over the clause in the convention abrogating Japan's right, gained in
1882, of stationing troops in Seul to protect her citizens and their
interests. Itō was consequently denounced at home now more loudly than
before. China, on her part, equally resented the conclusion of the
convention, for she was thereby obliged to treat Japan on an equal
footing with herself in Korea. Both countries suffered equally, for
while Japan forfeited the rights she had previously acquired, China's
claim of suzerainty was seriously impaired. Things remained in this
strained condition until nine years later, in 1894, when an unforeseen
event forced them to a breaking point. It was the Tonghak rebellion,
which brought military forces of Japan and China face to face in Korea.
The Tonghak (or "Learning of the East") party was a secret organization,
whose doctrines were embodied in a collection of tenets based upon
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Both the practical aims and the real
strength of the party were then little known. Its conduct in 1894,
however, led to an international crisis of which it could not have had
the slightest expectation. In May the society rose in insurrection
against the universal corruption and oppression of the Korean officials,
who were then under the powerful control of the family of the queen, the
Min. The Min, whose safety was thus threatened, despite an opposition in
the court against the proceeding, appealed, on their initiative, to the
assistance of China through the minister at Seul, who had really
suggested the move. Here was a long-awaited opportunity for China to
recover her lost ground in Korea and once more assert her suzerain
rights over the peninsula. The Peking government at once dispatched
forces toward Korea, at the same time notifying Japan, in accordance
with the Tientsin Convention, that China had been requested by Korea to
send troops to suppress the Tonghak rebellion, and that she had
consented to "protect the tributary state." On the same day, June 7,
Japan replied in two messages, one acknowledging the receipt of China's
notice, but declining to admit that Korea was tributary to her, and the
other announcing that Japan also would send soldiers to Korea. To this
China retorted, saying that as Japan had not been requested by Korea to
dispatch forces, the object of her expedition must be to protect
Japanese subjects in the peninsula, which circumstances made it
unnecessary for Japan to send too large forces or to allow them to go
too far into the interior. Japan's answer was that the sending of the
troops was in accordance with the Korean-Japanese convention of 1882,
and that she had the right to determine the number and disposition of
her own forces. The first detachment of the Japanese soldiers escorting
Minister Ōtori reached Seul on June 10, and the Chinese troops landed at
Asan the next day. If the order had been reversed, China might have
regained, temporarily at least, her control over the Korean kingdom, and
Japan's ardent wish to reform and strengthen Korea as an independent
state might have remained unfulfilled. From her vantage ground, however,
Japan made a move which in fact created the critical point of the
affair, for, on June 17, her foreign minister, Mutsu, proposed to China
to suppress the Tonghak insurrection by joint forces, and then reform
the Korean internal government also by joint action, so as to insure
stability and peace in the kingdom. It now rested with China to avoid
all danger by joining hands with Japan in eradicating evils in the
Korean administration, but she would hardly impede a reform upon Korea
which she would not tolerate at home. On the contrary, the more corrupt
and feeble Korea was, the more dependent upon China she would be. It is
little wonder, therefore, that the Peking government replied that a
joint suppression of the insurrection was unnecessary, as the latter had
already subsided, while a joint reform would be incompatible with the
sovereign right of Korea over her own affairs, and that what remained
for China and Japan to do was to withdraw their forces from the
peninsula.
This reply by the Chinese government may be said to have decided the
situation, for henceforth Japan felt obliged to take an independent
course of action in Korea. Thus she wrote to China, on June 22, that
Korea was constantly troubled by party strifes and disorders and was
unable to fulfill obligations as an independent state; that this state
of things seriously affected the interests of Japan, for she was near
and had important economic relations with Korea; that to discard the
matter would be not only against Japan's friendly attitude toward Korea,
but also against her own self-preservation; and that, therefore, a
reform could not be stopped, and evacuation would not be made "without
some understanding which would guarantee the future peace, order, and
good government of Korea."
The coöperation with China having miscarried, Japan proceeded to act
alone in Korea in the interest of the reform and good administration of
the latter. The Japanese minister at Seul, Ōtori, opened the arduous
execution of his policy by putting a direct question to the Korean
government, on June 28, whether or not it considered the kingdom as
independent. This pointed query seemed to have deeply disturbed the
politicians at Seul, for they at once found themselves divided between
three opinions: namely, first, that Korea was of course an independent
nation, and Japan was the first power to declare the fact before the
world; second, that she was an historic dependency of China; and, third,
that the displeasure of both Japan and China might be averted by not
giving a definite answer, but by merely referring them to the treaties.
Nothing reveals more clearly the fundamental weakness of the political
consciousness of the Korean people than their conduct at this critical
stage of their existence. A message was sent to Li Hung Chang in China
asking his instruction as to what answer should be given the Japanese
minister. The telegraph line toward Wiju was interrupted, and Li's
reply--recommending again the ambiguous definition that Korea was at
once dependent and independent--had not been received before Korea had
at length to reply after three days' deliberation that she was
independent.
This first question had been asked by Japan in order to clear the ground
for all subsequent steps in her diplomacy in the peninsula. Korea had
technically renounced the suzerainty of China, and Ōtori now suggested,
on July 3, a thorough reform in the official organization and the
financial, judicial, and military institutions. The king and the
government not only concurred with the Japanese minister, but also
issued edicts calling for a reform. Suddenly a change came, on the 18th,
when the Seul government declared that the presence of the Japanese
troops would hinder the execution of the necessary reform. It was of
course plain that, as soon as these troops left, all hopes of reform
would be lost. The change had apparently been caused by the arrival of
Li Hung Chang's telegram that an overwhelmingly large army was coming
from China to crush the Japanese forces in Seul. Ōtori at once repaired
to the Korean foreign office, where he expressed his surprise at the
sudden breach of faith on the part of Korea, and urged her answers
within three days to the following two demands: an order for the
evacuation of the Chinese troops from Asan, whose presence had become
unnecessary since the Tonghak insurrection died away; and a declaration
that the existing treaty between Korea and China which contained clauses
intimating the former's dependence upon the latter was henceforth null
and void. The three-day limit expired without eliciting any answer from
the government. By this time--July 22--the city of Seul was in a state
of intense excitement. Ōtori resolved to see the king in person, and,
early in the morning of the 23d, started toward the palace in a
palanquin under the escort of his guard. Korean soldiers fired at him,
the Japanese troops responded, and within fifteen minutes the Korean
guards were dispersed and the city gates were taken, followed in the
afternoon by a complete control of the entire capital by Japanese
forces. This was the first bloodshed, and unfortunately it was Korean
blood that was shed. It is necessary, however, to note that the Korean
resistance was a result of the extremely unstable politics at Seul which
had enabled the pro-Chinese, corruptionist family of the Min temporarily
to control the situation. With their fall Korea naturally turned about
and allied herself with Japan against China. The old patriot
Tai-wen-kun, father of the king, who again assumed the grand
councilorship, with his unabated rigor ordered punishment of the Min,
commenced a radical official reorganization, nullified the Chinese
treaty, and, what was more, requested the Japanese troops to drive away
Chinese soldiers from Asan. This last request at once placed the forces
of the two empires in certain hostilities with one another. It was
carried out on July 29, but before that, on the 25th, the first act of
war took place unexpectedly on sea.
Before relating this sea fight it is important to observe that China
evidently expected a war with Japan as early as July 16. It appears that
she was determined, though at first reluctantly, to resist by force of
arms Japan's efforts to realize the independence and reform of Korea,
for in no other light can be interpreted her dispatch by land and by sea
of large forces destined for Korea. China was resolved to make good her
suzerainty over the Korean peninsula by staking a conflict with Japan,
which she had hoped to overwhelm by superior numbers. It was generally
believed in Japan at the time that the Chinese statesmen had been led to
this miscalculation of Japan's capacity by the continuous feud which had
seemed to characterize the relation between the government and the
national diet. Li Hung Chang and others were thought to have imagined
that Japan's hands were too closely tied by this internal discord to
embark upon an undertaking which would require an intense concentration
of national resources. They could not have foreseen that all the
superficial differences would be, as they were, sunk before the national
cause, and that a profound patriotism would unconsciously and without
premeditation compel the entire nation--the government, parties, and
all--to stand like one man.
[Illustration: FIRST ENGAGEMENTS OF CHINO-JAPANESE WAR 1894]
Between July 21 and 23 ten transports conveying Chinese troops left Taku
for Korea. Three Japanese cruisers, the _Yoshino_, _Naniwa_, and
_Akitsushima_, which had since the 23d been cruising in the Korean
waters, met at 7 A. M., the 25th, near the Phung-do Island, not far from
Asan, the Chinese cruiser _Tsi-yuen_ and gunboat _Kwang-yi_. These
vessels had steamed out of Asan in order to meet another Chinese
gunboat, the _Tsao-kiang_, which was convoying a transport toward Asan.
The two Chinese vessels did not return the salute of the Japanese ships,
and when the latter turned to the southwest they were fired upon by the
former. After a brisk exchange of fire for over an hour the _Tsi-yuen_
effected an escape, and the _Kwang-yi_ was stranded south of Caroline
Bay, where its powder-magazine exploded. In the meantime the
_Tsao-kiang_ and a transport, the _Kow-shing_, flying a British flag and
conveying 1100 Chinese troops and stores, appeared on the scene. The
_Tsao-kiang_ was captured. The _Kow-shing_ was ordered to follow the
Japanese cruiser _Naniwa_ to the main squadron, but the Chinese soldiers
on board desired to return to Taku, and threatened to kill the English
captain, Galsworthy, who advised them to surrender and himself wished to
leave the vessel on a boat which the Japanese would send to him. After
the attempt of the _Naniwa_ to save the English mates had failed, it
hoisted a red flag at 1 P. M., or nearly four hours after it had stopped
the _Kow-shing_. Thereupon, the captain and the crew jumped overboard,
and the Chinese soldiers fired at them, killing all but the captain and
two others, who were rescued by the _Naniwa's_ boats. The _Kow-shing_
was then sunk. Only a few of those on board her, including a German,
Major von Hanneken, escaped by swimming ashore.
On the very day when the naval victory near Phung-do was won mixed
Japanese brigades numbering about 4000 men, under command of Major
General Ōshima, started from Seul on their march toward Asan, in order
to carry out the commission of the Korean government to drive away the
Chinese forces stationed there. The large reinforcements which they had
expected from China not having arrived, the Chinese troops, 3500 in
number, met the enemy at the strategic point Song-hwan, east of Asan.
During a sharp engagement lasting from 3 till 7.30 A. M., July 29, the
Chinese gradually lost their ground, until they fled toward Ping-yang,
leaving behind 500 killed and wounded. The Japanese losses amounted to
88 killed and wounded. Asan itself had been completely evacuated by the
Chinese. The victorious army returned to Seul early in the morning of
August 5, where a warm reception by the Korean authorities and Japanese
residents awaited its triumphant arrival.
These hostile acts were followed by the formal declarations of war of
the emperors of China and Japan. The Japanese proclamation may be
translated as follows:
"We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on a throne
occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make
proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects, as follows:
"We hereby declare war against China. We command each and all of our
competent authorities, in obedience to our wish, to carry on hostilities
by sea and land against China, and to make effort to attain the
national aim. We command them, each according to his power, to use all
the means at their disposal, consistently with the Law of Nations.
"During the more than twenty years of our reign, our constant aim has
been to seek the progress of civilization by a peaceful government; and
being sensible of the evils of being involved in complications with
foreign states, we have instructed our ministers always to labor for the
promotion of friendly relations with the treaty powers. The relations
with those powers have fortunately yearly increased in good-will and
friendship. We never expected such a persistent want of amity and of
good faith as has been manifested by China in her conduct toward us in
connection with the Korean affair.
"Korea is an independent state which was first introduced into the
family of nations by the advice of Japan. China has, however, habitually
called Korea her dependency, and openly and secretly interfered with her
domestic affairs. At the time of the recent insurrection in Korea, China
dispatched troops thither, alleging that her purpose was to rescue the
dependent state from its difficulties. We, in virtue of the treaty
concluded with Korea in 1882, caused a military force to be sent to that
country, in order to be able to meet possible emergencies. Wishing to
free Korea for all time from disturbance and to insure her security for
the future, and thereby to maintain the general peace of the East, Japan
invited China's coöperation for the accomplishment of that object.
China, however, advanced several pretexts and declined Japan's
proposals. Thereupon, Japan advised Korea to reform her administration,
so that order and tranquility might be firmly established at home and
the rights and duties of an independent state might be maintained
abroad. Korea has already consented thereto, but China has
surreptitiously and persistently impeded the purpose. She has, moreover,
put forward various pretenses and caused delays, while at the same time
she was making warlike preparations on land and sea. When those
preparations were completed, China sent large forces to Korea, with a
view to the forcible attainment of her ambitions, and conducted herself
so arbitrarily as to open fire upon our ships in Korean waters. It is
beyond a doubt that China's plain object is to make it uncertain where
the responsibility of preserving peace and order in Korea resides; to
obscure the independent international position of Korea which Japan
first recognized, as well as the treaties declaring that position; and
thereby to injure the rights and interests of our empire and to deprive
the tranquillity of the East of its permanent guarantee. Carefully
judging her designs from her action, it must be concluded that China has
from the beginning been bent upon sacrificing peace to the attainment of
her sinister object. In this situation, ardent as our wish is to promote
at home and abroad the glory of our empire by strictly peaceful methods,
we are obliged openly to declare war [against China]. We rely upon the
loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects, and hope permanently to
restore peace and to complete the glory of our empire."
The Chinese emperor's proclamation was an interesting document, giving
an inaccurate statement of facts and revealing some of the main features
of China's warlike plans in the coming campaign. A translation of this
edict reads as follows:
"Korea has been under China's suzerainty for more than two hundred
years, and has rendered us annual tributes, as is well known at home and
abroad. For over a decade Korea has been troubled by repeated
insurrections. We, in sympathy with our small tributary, have often sent
troops to her aid, and suppressed the rebels, and also placed a resident
at Seul to render protection as needed. In the fourth moon of this year
[May, 1894] another rebellion took place in Korea, for the suppression
of which her king made to us an urgent appeal to send troops. We then
ordered Li Hung Chang to dispatch troops to Korea. As soon as they
reached Asan the rebels scattered. But the _Wojên_ [a familiar and
contemptuous name for the Japanese], without cause, sent their soldiers
suddenly into Seul, and reinforced them with more than ten thousand men.
Japan then forced Korea to change her system of administration, and
unreasonably made various demands. According to our method of ruling the
tributary state [Korea], the latter's internal affairs are left to its
self-government. Japan's treaty with Korea was as one country with
another; there is no law for sending large armies to intimidate her and
compel her to change her administrative system. The public opinion of
the various powers considers the conduct of the Japanese as
unjustifiable and unreasonable. We exhorted them to withdraw their
troops, but they paid no heed and offered no explanation. On the
contrary, Japan has continually dispatched more soldiers, until the
Korean peasants and Chinese merchants were every day more alarmed than
before. We therefore sent more troops to protect them. Greatly to our
surprise, a number of the _Wojên_ ships suddenly appeared and taking
advantage of our unpreparedness opened fire upon our transports off
Asan, thus causing us to suffer from their treacherous conduct, which
could not be foretold by us. Japan has observed neither treaties nor
international law, but is running rampant with her false and treacherous
actions, commencing hostilities herself, and laying herself open to
condemnation by the various powers at large. We therefore make it known
to the world that throughout the whole complications we have observed
the utmost benevolence and righteousness, while the _Wojên_ have broken
pledges and opened hostilities, which passes our patience to bear with.
Hence we command Li Hung Chang to give strict orders to our various
armies to hasten with all speed to exterminate the foe; to send
successive forces of valiant men in order to save the Koreans from the
dust of bondage. We also command the Tartar-generals, viceroys, and
governors of the maritime provinces, as well as the commanders in chief
of the various armies, to prepare for war and to make every effort to
fire on the _Wojên_ ships if they come into our ports, and utterly
destroy them. We exhort our generals to refrain from the least laxity in
obeying our commands in order to avoid severe punishment at our hands.
Let all know this edict as if addressed to them individually. Respect
this!"
The second battle on land took place at Ping-yang, on September 15, or
fifty days after the encounter at Song-hwan, between 13,000 to 15,000
Chinese and 16,000 Japanese. The former had arrived at Ping-yang on
August 4, and had made extensive preparations to defend themselves at
this almost impregnable stronghold. The offending force marched against
the walled city from several directions, and, finally converging there
on September 15, gallantly attacked it, practically under no cover, from
the north and from the southeast. The defense was powerful, but was
finally outmaneuvered by the unexpected attack of the Japanese from the
rear. At 4.30 P. M. the Chinese hoisted the white flag, and, taking
advantage of a heavy rain and a dark night, they left the city at 8
o'clock, moving toward the coast and Wiju. The Chinese losses were
estimated at 2000 killed and about twice as many wounded, while the
Japanese side numbered 102 killed, 433 wounded, and 33 missing. The
whole Japanese army entered the city of Ping-yang early on the 16th.
On the day of this decisive battle the military headquarters of Japan
moved forward from Tōkyō to Hiroshima, the emperor himself transferring
his seat thither, and, in his rude temporary quarters, attending to his
duties as the commander in chief of the imperial forces. It is needless
to say that the moral effect of this move upon the Japanese soldiers in
the field of action was thrilling.
The battle of Ping-yang had cleared Chinese troops out of Korea. Two
days after a naval engagement occurred near the mouth of the Yalu, which
opened for the Japanese the sea-route along the northeastern coast of
the Yellow Sea. Early in the morning of the 17th the Japanese squadron,
consisting of the battleship _Fusō_ (3709 tons' displacement), eight
cruisers (between 4278 and 2439 tons), a coast defense gunboat, and the
merchant-cruiser _Saikyō_, having on board Rear Admiral Kabayama,
discovered columns of smoke from twelve Chinese war vessels emerging one
after another upon the horizon. These vessels, which had landed troops
and stores at Ta-tung-kau on the preceding day, consisted of the two
armored battleships _Ting-yuen_ and _Chen-yuen_ (7430 tons each), the
battleships _Lai-yuen_ and _King-yuen_, the coast defender _Ping-yuen_,
six cruisers, and a torpedo-boat destroyer. The Chinese fleet excelled
in tonnage and the size of the guns, while the Japanese had the
advantage of the comparatively greater speed of their vessels and a
larger number of small rapid-firing guns. Fire was opened by the Chinese
at 12.45 at a range of 6000 meters, the Japanese replying only at 3000
meters, and lasted till near sunset. The Chinese flagship _Ting-yuen_
had her flag-pole shattered at an early stage of the battle, and
consequently the fleet, stoutly as it fought, could no longer maintain a
concerted movement. The cruiser _Chao-yung_ caught fire and sunk, the
cruisers _Yang-wei_ and _Chih-yuen_ and the battleship _King-yuen_ were
sunk, and the cruiser _Kwang-chia_ was stranded near Ta-lien-wan; the
battleship _Lai-yuen_ also caught fire and barely escaped to Port
Arthur, while one of the two greatest battleships, _Ting-yuen_, was
severely damaged. Although the other vessels escaped with less serious
injuries, the Chinese commanders reported to Li Hung Chang that not a
single ship was left in a seaworthy condition. The Japanese fleet lost
no vessel, although damages were suffered by several, all of which were,
however, soon repaired.
Again to return to the operations on land. After the battle of Ping-yang
the First Army Corps was definitely organized of the Fifth Provincial
Division from the district of Hiroshima, under Lieutenant General
Viscount Nodzu, and of the Third Provincial Division from the district
of Nagoya, under Lieutenant General Katsura (now Viscount Katsura,
premier). The Fifth Division consisted of the Ninth and Tenth Brigades
under, respectively, Major Generals Y. Ōshima, and Tatsumi; the Third
Division was divided into the Fifth and Sixth Brigades, under Major
Generals Ōseka and H. Ōshima. The command of the entire corps rested
with Marshal Count Yamagata (later replaced, on account of his illness,
by Viscount Nodzu, whose position as commander of the Fifth Division was
filled by Lieutenant General Oku).
The First Army Corps advanced toward the northern frontier of Korea. The
Chinese forces offered no determined resistance this side of the Yalu,
for they had decided, as did the Russians ten years after, to abandon
the indefensible Wiju but to defend Chiulien-cheng on the Chinese side
of the river. For about ten miles to the right and left of this
position, or from An-tung along the stream up to Hu-shan, over a hundred
redoubts and trenches had been built, behind which forts had been
constructed on eminences. General Sung-ching, commanding about 23,000
troops, stationed a powerful detachment upon Hu-shan, an important
outpost across the Ai River, which flows into the Yalu. During the night
of October 24, however, the Japanese army succeeded, undiscovered by the
enemy, in throwing a pontoon bridge across the Yalu in front of Hu-shan.
A severe storming of the outpost, replied to by an able firing, began at
5 P. M., on the 25th, continuing until it was deserted by the Chinese at
10.30. This strategic point having been captured, the main quarters at
Chiulien-cheng were vacated without further resistance during the night.
An-tung was also easily occupied by the Japanese, while Feng-hwang-cheng
was set on fire and deserted by the retreating forces. Thus the Japanese
crossed the Korean boundary and gained an entry into the Chinese
territory with the comparatively small loss of 4 killed and 140 wounded.
They organized a provisional civil administration at An-tung to govern
the Chinese population in the seized territory. Mr. Komura (now Baron
Komura, minister of foreign affairs) was appointed the temporary
director of the administration, to be later succeeded by Lieutenant
Colonel Fukushima.
After the capture of Chiulien-cheng, the First Army Corps divided itself
into two bodies, one under the command of Lieutenant General Katsura
following the Chinese troops that had fled toward Ta-ku-shan on the
coast, and the other pointing toward Mukden. Katsura's army took
Ta-tung-kau and Ta-ku-shan in succession, the latter on November 5, and
then turned northward and defeated the Chinese at Siu-yen on the 17th.
Tomu-cheng was captured on December 12, and Hai-cheng on the next day,
while Kang-wa-seh, where 10,000 Chinese had entrenched themselves, was
carried on the 18th. Meanwhile, the second division of the First Army
Corps had swept the enemy from Sai-ma-tsi and other points, and marched
toward Mukden in the depth of a severe Manchurian winter.
[Illustration: CAMPAIGNS IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA CHINO-JAPANESE WAR]
By this time a part of the Second Army Corps, commanded by Marshal Count
Ōyama and consisting of the First Provincial Division from the district
of Tōkyō, under Lieutenant General Baron Yamaji, and of the Twelfth
Brigade of the Sixth Provincial Brigade of the Kumamoto district, had
already captured the great Port Arthur. Having landed at a point near
Pi-tse-wo, about ninety miles northeast of Port Arthur, on October 24,
the First Division had taken Kin-chow on November 6 and Ta-lien-wan on
the following day. The entire section then, soon after midnight of
October 21, as soon as the moon rose, opened an assault from the rear
upon Port Arthur, which was defended by a magnificent physical position
and strengthened by the powerful forts and guns that had made the port
celebrated as an impregnable stronghold. After severe onsets under
terrific fires, all the important landward defenses, including the
Itsu-shan (Chair Hill) forts, had been carried by the Japanese by noon.
Among the shore forts, those on Hwang-chin-shan (Golden Hill) resisted
most stoutly, and did not fall till 5 P. M. During the night the Chinese
deserted all the other forts, leaving behind 57 large-caliber and 163
small-caliber guns. When the Japanese troops entered the city they were
treacherously fired upon from the houses, where many Chinese soldiers
had hidden themselves and put on civilian dress, so as to be able to
shoot the enemy unawares. The Japanese, on their part, retorted by an
indiscriminate search of the houses and killing of many adult males who
offered resistance, so that the number of the Chinese slain amounted to
almost 4000. The Japanese lost 29 killed and 233 wounded. At the same
time, the harbor not being defended by Chinese war vessels, the Japanese
men-of-war removed mines and entered Port Arthur on the night of October
24.
The Chinese made two successive attempts, on the 21st and 22d, to
recover Kin-chow, but were repulsed. A part of the Second Army Corps
then joined Lieutenant General Katsura's division of the First Army
Corps at Kai-ping, on December 10, and carried that town by charging it
over the slippery ice of the Kai-ping River.
The remainder of the Second Army Corps, consisting of the Second
Provincial Division from the Sendai district under command of Lieutenant
General Sakuma and of the Sixth Provincial Division from the district of
Kumamoto (excepting the Twelfth Brigade, which had already gone to the
Liao-tung peninsula) under Lieutenant General Kuroki, landed, without
resistance, at Yung-cheng in the Shan-tung province, between January 20
and 24, 1895. The object of this expedition was to effect a concerted
attack with the navy upon Wei-hai-Wei, where the Northern Fleet of the
Chinese navy had been concentrated. Leaving Yung-cheng on the 26th, the
Japanese army marched along two routes, expecting to converge at
Wei-hai-Wei early in February. The two divisions met vigorous resistance
from the Chinese on the way, particularly at Mo-tien-ling on the
northern route, opposite the strongly fortified Liu-kung Island, where
the enemy poured fire upon the assailants from the 68 guns planted on
twelve land forts and from the war vessels anchored only 2000 meters
away from the forts. Major General Ödera fell in this battle, and the
forts were carried only after nine hours of ceaseless fusillade. The
town of Wei-hai-Wei was deserted by the Chinese, and was occupied by the
invaders on February 2. This completed the work of the army, for the
task of reducing the forts on Jih and Liu-kung Islands, as well as of
dealing with the Chinese fleet, had been assigned to the navy.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING WEI-HAI-WEI, FORMOSA AND PESCADORES]
The Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-Wei consisted of 15 war vessels including
the iron-clad battleships _Ting-yuen_ and _Chen-yuen_, besides 13
torpedo boats, as against 25 men-of-war and 16 torpedo-boats on the
Japanese side. The Japanese forces not only possessing a numerical
advantage on the sea, but also having captured the land forts from which
the army could coöperate with the fleet, a Chinese defeat appeared a
foregone conclusion. Under these circumstances, Admiral S. Itō,
commanding the Japanese fleet, sent to Admiral Ting Ju-chang, his
personal friend, who held supreme command of the enemy's squadron, a
touching letter in which former expressed his regret that the old
acquaintances had been obliged to meet each other in hostility, appealed
to the latter's enlightened patriotism by pointing out the retrogressive
policy which Ting had been called upon to defend and which could only
end in disaster, and then counseled him to prevent a certain defeat and
unnecessary loss of life by capitulating. Itō further advised Ting to
become Japan's honored guest till the end of the war, and then return to
his native land in order to aid China in setting her policy on a sound
basis. When Ting read this message he was visibly moved, and said to his
attendants: "Kill me," meaning probably that he wished to die alone and
let all others surrender. Then he again remarked: "I am thankful for the
admiral's friendship, but I cannot forsake my duties to the state. The
only thing now remaining for me to do is to die." The Japanese fleet,
which made Yung-cheng Bay its headquarters, began to attack the forts of
Jih and Liu-kung Islands on January 30, 1895, continuing with frequent
interruptions till February 7, when a steady general attack began.
During this time, the daring night attacks made by Japanese torpedo
boats had succeeded in sinking the _Ting-yuen_ and three other vessels,
and the thirteen torpedo boats of the Chinese fleet which tried to
escape toward Chifu had had six destroyed and all the others captured by
the Japanese. The _Ching-yuen_ was sunk on the 9th; soon afterward Jih
Island fell and the eastern forts of Liu-kung Island were silenced. On
the morning of the 12th Ching, commander of the _Kwang-ping_, approached
the Japanese flagship _Matsushima_ in a small gunboat flying a white
flag, and delivered a letter from Admiral Ting, containing a formal
surrender of all the war vessels in the harbor and the forts and stores
of Liu-kung Island. Ting requested that the Chinese and foreign
officers, troops, and civilians on land and sea around Wei-hai-Wei be
allowed to depart unmolested, and proposed that the commander of the
British China squadron should guarantee the faithful performance of the
conditions of surrender on the part of the Chinese. On receipt of this
letter Admiral Itō held a council of his officers, in which many of the
latter advised, as was later seconded by the army officers, that the men
should not be allowed to leave, but be taken prisoners. The admiral,
however, had so high an estimate of Ting's personality and service to
his country and so deep a sympathy with his difficult position that he
insisted that Ting's request should be cheerfully granted. In his reply,
therefore, Itō again advised Ting, for the sake of his own safety and of
the future good of China, to become Japan's guest, agreed to release all
the men on parole, and declined to accept the proposed guarantee by the
British commander as unnecessary, for Itō rested confidence in Ting's
honor as a soldier. The admiral also sent a present to Ting and
Commander Liu of the _Ting-yuen_. The next morning Ching again visited
the _Matsushima_, this time with the Chinese flag at half-mast, and
brought a reply from Ting, who, Ching sorrowfully announced, had
declined to accept Itō's present, and, with Liu and Commander Chang of
the Liu-kung Island, had committed suicide. All the arrangements
regarding the capitulation were then made with the utmost honor to the
deceased admiral, and his body was taken ashore in one of the captured
Chinese cruisers. The soldiers in the army and navy who were released on
parole aggregated 5124 men. The Japanese flag was hoisted on the
surrendered battleship _Chen-yuen_, cruisers _Ping-yuen_, _Tsi-yuen_,
and _Kwang-ping_, and six gunboats. With this pathetic fall of
Wei-hai-Wei the Japanese navy completely annihilated the Northern
Chinese Fleet, and gained an absolute control of the Gulf of Pechili.
Admiral Itō returned to Hiroshima on March 3.
With the expulsion of the Chinese from Korea and the capture of Port
Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei, Japan had accomplished the major part of the
work which she had proposed to herself. The remainder of the story of
the war may be briefly told. Hai-cheng was taken by the Third Division
(of the First Army Corps) on December 13, and the Chinese made in
January and February three unsuccessful attempts to retake this
important walled city. The First Division (of the Second Army Corps)
advanced from Kin-chow on February 10 toward Ying-kow, or the treaty
port of "Niu-chwang," while the First Army Corps in two bodies pressed
northward and then westward with the town of Niu-chwang as its objective
point, whence it intended to join the First Division at Ying-kau.
Niu-chwang was seized on March 4 after a sanguinary fight on the streets
in which more than 1880 Chinese lost their lives. Two days later, the
First Division captured Ying-kau without the coöperation of the First
Army Corps and with no effective resistance from the enemy. The two
armies then joined in the cannonading of Tien-chwang-tai on the other
side of the Liao River, which was razed to the ground in order to
prevent the Chinese from returning to it.
Toward the end of March a column of Japanese troops seized the Pescadore
Islands near Formosa.
The Chinese government, which had already twice sent abortive peace
envoys with insufficient powers, now ordered Viceroy Li Hung Chang to
sail to Japan and sue for peace. He arrived at Shimonoseki on March 19,
where he was met by the Japanese peace commissioners, Premier Count
(soon to be Marquis) Itō and Foreign Minister Viscount (soon to be
Count) Mutsu. Li was later joined by his son-in-law, Li Ching Fang, as
plenipotentiary. Li Hung Chang proposed an armistice, but the conditions
demanded by Japan appeared to him too onerous to accept. On the 24th, as
he was returning from a conference to his lodging, a fanatic, R. Koyama,
who had led himself to believe that Li was the disturber of the peace of
the East, shot at him with a revolver and wounded him on the left
cheek--an incident which plunged the entire nation into profound regret.
The emperor now almost unconditionally granted an armistice for three
weeks. Li soon recovered from his wound, and resumed negotiations on
April 10. The Japanese terms for peace had on his request been shown to
him April 1, and these with various amendments became the basis of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17 and ratified on May 8. By this
treaty the absolute independence of Korea was at last assured; China
agreed to cede to Japan the Liao-tung peninsula, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, and to pay 200 million taels as indemnity; and Kang-chow,
Su-chow, Sha-shi, and Chung-king were opened to foreign trade, and the
foreigners were granted the right of engaging in manufacturing
enterprises in China. The war, which had lasted for more than seven
months and cost Japan nearly 200 million _yen_ and the loss of 1005
killed and 4922 wounded (besides 16,866 deaths from disease), now came
to an end. Japan had placed on the field 120,000 men in two armies and
five columns, and carried out the campaign in all its complexity with
remarkable success.
A few words may be said regarding the effects of the war upon China and
Japan. The former's reverses were in a large measure a blessing in
disguise, for they revealed, as nothing else would, the radical faults
of her policy and administrative system, and convinced many of her
patriots of the need for a reform. It was largely due to this fact that
the two nations emerged from the war with no ill-will against each
other. On the contrary, the more thoughtful among the Chinese seemed to
be attracted to Japan by her success in the same proportion that they
became alive to the causes of the failure of their own government. In
such a vast and conservative country as China a reform must come slowly,
but it is safe to say that some of its seeds were sown as a result of
the war of 1894-1895. As for Japan herself, her position suddenly rose
in the eyes of the nations of the world. Even those foreigners who had
heard little of her great progress in arts and sciences and still
greater hopes of further growth were now forced to admit the foresight,
endurance, courage, and power of organization manifested by the Japanese
during the campaign. The more one knew the practical side of so large an
undertaking the more he realized the magnitude of Japan's success. This
appreciation of the world naturally stimulated the Japanese to a larger
ambition for future progress. The stimulus after the war, however, came
as well from the victory, as from the bitter experience which closely
followed it--the forcible intervention of three European powers against
Japan, which at once changed the whole aspect of the Eastern question.
Chapter XX
JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA
1893-1904
When the peace negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese
plenipotentiaries were in progress at Shimonoseki, Russia and France had
been preparing themselves to intervene, and Germany had for diplomatic
reasons consented to aid the Russian overtures, while Great Britain,
which had once before made a fruitless effort to bring about a concerted
mediation by the powers, declared that she had no objections to Japan's
claims. The plan of intervention having been matured, the Russian,
French, and German representatives at Tōkyō called at the foreign office
on April 23, 1895, and on their separate cordial reception, presented
notes from their governments in which the latter counseled Japan to
return to China the Liao-tung peninsula of South Manchuria, for its
retention by Japan would, in their opinion, not only endanger the
position of the Chinese capital, but also render the independence of
Korea illusory, and permanently threaten the general peace of the Far
East. While the notes were couched in polite terms, the Eastern
squadrons of the three powers manifested such an activity as to
demonstrate the determination of the intervening states to enforce their
demand, if necessary, by a concerted appeal to arms. At this grave
crisis the Japanese authorities agreed among themselves that after the
exhausting war of the last eight months it would be impossible for Japan
to fight single-handed with the three European powers. May 10, 1895,
found the Japanese nation eagerly perusing the imperial decree which
reiterated the unalterable devotion of the emperor to the cause of
peace, for the sake of which the three friendly powers had advised, and
his own sense of magnanimity also counseled, the retrocession to China
of the entire peninsula of Liao-tung. The feeling excited among all
ranks of the people by this memorable incident was intense. It seemed
plain to everyone that the conduct of the powers in thus depriving Japan
of what appeared to be a just fruit of her costly war could not have
been animated by a genuine respect for the integrity of the Chinese
empire. None wished the independence of Korea and the progress of China
more deeply than did the Japanese, while, on the other hand, Russia, the
central figure in the intervention, probably had a design upon Port
Arthur and the whole of Manchuria. The fall of this vast territory into
Russia's hands would eventually threaten the independence of Korea, and,
consequently, the safety of Japan herself. The Japanese nation naturally
awoke to the conviction that, in order to secure the peace of the East
and the repose of Japan, the latter must strengthen and enrich herself,
so that the humiliation of 1895 should never recur. The conviction was
based, it should be clearly noted, not so much upon a desire for revenge
as upon the determination to safeguard the common vital interests of
Japan and the general Far East by means of progress and civilization.
From 1895, therefore, began the most rapid advance in all directions of
Japan's material power that has ever taken place in any period of the
same length in her past history.
In China, however, the clever diplomacy of Russia entered a new epoch
after the intervention of 1895. The first definitely known understanding
between the two powers concerned a Chinese loan of four hundred million
francs, $80,000,000, guaranteed by Russia and raised mainly at Paris in
July, 1895, which was intended for the payment of one-half of the
indemnity due to Japan. Then, the Russo-Chinese Bank was organized by a
syndicate of capitalists of Paris and St. Petersburg, with its
headquarters in the latter city, where the intimate friend of the tsar,
Prince Ukhtomsky, was made its president. An important agreement was
entered upon on September 8, 1896, between this bank and the Chinese
minister at St. Petersburg, which has since proved to be the basis of
many another striking document. By this agreement and also by the
Russian statutes based upon it, it was provided that the Russo-Chinese
Bank should undertake to organize the Eastern Chinese Railway Company,
which should construct a branch line of the great Siberian Railway
through the Hei-lung and Kirin provinces of Manchuria and connect it
with the South Ussuri branch railway. Only Russian and Chinese subjects
could be its shareholders. The Chinese government was to take over the
road after eighty years without payment, or with a due payment after
thirty-six years. It was also agreed that both imports and exports
between China and Russia carried by the new railway should pay only
two-thirds of the regular tariff rates of China.
No sooner was the first sod of the railway cut on its eastern extremity
than events occurred which led to a further extension by the Russians of
the railroad toward the most strategic points in the Liao-tung peninsula
which they leased--points which had so recently been retroceded by
Japan, on Russia's advice, for the peace and independence of China and
Korea. It belongs to the history of China to recount how, at the murder
by a mob of two German Catholic missionaries in Shan-tung, the
government of the kaiser succeeded in March, 1898, in wresting from
China a ninety-nine-year lease of the Bay of Kiao-chow and its
hinterland, together with railway and mining concessions between the
shore and Tsi-nan-fu. This was a signal for the advent of a remarkable
series of territorial demarcations to be made by the rival powers of
Europe which had been no less eager than Germany to seize the first
opportunity to carve out their respective "spheres" of influence or
interest on the soil of the feeble Chinese empire. The act of Germany
disturbed the balance of power in the Far East which could not be
restored until the aggressive passions of all competing powers should
have been satiated. Great Britain obtained in February a pledge never to
alienate to any other power any portion of the extensive provinces
adjoining the Yang-tse River. This was followed by the lease to Russia
for twenty-five years, subject to renewal, of Port Arthur and
Ta-lien-wan. The Russo-Chinese agreement signed on March 27 declared
that the lease constituted no prejudice against the Chinese sovereignty
over the territory, but was designed for the protection of the Russian
navy in the waters of North China. It must be remembered that Russia
with her immense dominion of Siberia had up to this time possessed no
adequate naval station on its shores which was not bound by ice during
the winter months. Now at length she secured the almost ice-free Port
Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, of which the former and a portion of the latter
were agreed to be used exclusively for naval purposes, while the
remaining portion of Ta-lien-wan was to be opened to the merchant
vessels of all nations. The agreement further provided that a branch
line might be built by Russia from the Manchurian railway to Ta-lien-wan
and, as was later stipulated, to Port Arthur, and, if necessary, also a
line from the open port of Niu-chwang to the Yalu River on the Korean
border. A special agreement was further concluded on May 7 to supplement
the one of March 27, which has been described. The Russian lease on the
tip of the Liao-tung peninsula induced Great Britain, on July 1, to
obtain under similar terms on the opposite promontory of Shan-tung the
lease of the Bay of Wei-hai-wei. This port had still been under the
occupation of Japanese troops, pending the final payment of the Chinese
indemnity, but was now cheerfully evacuated by them to be replaced by
the forces of the power with which the relations of Japan had already
begun to be especially amicable. In South China the rivalry between
France and Great Britain was manifested afresh by the proposed opening
of the West River and concessions in Yunnan obtained by the latter, and
the sphere created on the Kwang-chow Bay by the former. Japan also
secured the pledge of non-alienation of the province of Fuh-kien, which
lies opposite her new territory of Formosa.
[Illustration: FOREIGN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA AND MANCHURIA]
It is necessary in order to comprehend the situation with any degree of
clearness, sharply to distinguish the nature of the Russian concessions
in Liao-tung from those of all the other "spheres" in North and South
China. It was alone in the former instance that new naval posts of great
moment were directly connected by a railroad with the military centers
of an enormous and contiguous dominion which represented an expansion
through centuries. The creation of naval posts on the strategic points
of the peninsula would be sufficient, as was avowed by Russia herself
three years before, to threaten Peking, render the independence of Korea
illusory, and continually imperil the peace of the Far East, and its
dangers must further be measured by the immense pressure which might be
exercised with the military resources of all the Russias that lay behind
Liao-tung and were now connected thereto by rail.
The situation was made worse by an Anglo-Russian railway agreement of
April 28, 1899. The origin of this document belongs to the history of
China. It suffices here to point out that it provided that Great Britain
should not seek any railway concession north of the Great Wall, and
Russia should observe the same principle in the Yang-tse basin. The
peculiarity of this agreement consists in the fact that one of its
signatories was not, as usual, the Chinese government, but that two
European powers thereby pledged themselves not to infringe upon each
other's sphere of railroad concession in China. Diplomatic exigencies
might (as they have since done beyond the wall) induce one of the
parties to interpret the railroad sphere in the light of a political
sphere.
The peculiarly favorable position of the United States rendered it both
possible and desirable for her to maintain in China the principles of
the territorial integrity of the empire and of the equal opportunity
therein for the economic enterprise of all nations--the latter principle
often called that of the "open door." Between the end of 1899 and the
beginning of 1900 Secretary Hay induced the great powers, though with
nominal success, to declare anew that they would observe the avowed
policy of the "open door" in their respective spheres in China. He had,
however, hardly received the replies of the powers when the reports of
an anti-foreign campaign of an unusually serious character began to
arrive from China. The story of the so-called Boxer uprising, with its
thrilling episodes, will be told in the volume on China, and here it is
enough for us to observe its two features, namely, Japan's share in the
suppression of the trouble, and the bearing of the latter upon the
Manchurian question.
By the middle of June, 1900, the representatives of twelve powers, as
well as many other foreigners and native Christians, had already found
themselves besieged in Peking and gallantly defending themselves against
the frequent attacks of the Boxers and imperial troops; Admiral Seymour
and his twelve hundred marines had already found it impossible to force
their way to the relief of the besieged foreigners. At this juncture
the government of Great Britain perceived that no other power could with
greater dispatch and success come to the rescue of the legations than
Japan. The latter, however, had resolved to act only in concert with
other powers, or, if alone, only at their united and explicit request.
She therefore contented herself with transporting 3000 soldiers for Taku
to move strictly in unison with the forces of the other allies. The
negotiation carried on by Lord Salisbury with the continental
governments in relation to the advisability of requesting Japan
immediately to mobilize 25,000 or 30,000 troops from her shores had
resulted, early in July, in evoking from Germany a dissent from the
proposition so long as the allies could act in harmony, and from Russia
a reply that she deemed it unwise to intrust a single power with the
restoration of order in China, but that she would welcome 20,000 or
30,000 additional troops from any one of the powers which would move in
perfect accord with the others. Impatient of the dilatory and indefinite
replies, the British government went so far as to guarantee on its own
responsibility the cost of mobilizing the desired number of troops from
Japan. This was on July 6, and on the same day Japan at last resolved to
dispatch, with no condition whatsoever from the other powers, troops
aggregating 22,000. By this time the Japanese Chancellor Sugiyama and
the German Minister von Ketteler had been murdered in Peking, the Taku
forts had been taken by the allies, and the prospect had been that both
the British and the German forces would soon aggregate 10,000 men.
Tientsin fell before the allies on July 14, three days before the
arrival of the fresh troops from Japan. After three weeks at Tientsin
during which nothing could be done, 15,780 allied forces, of which 8000
were the Japanese, began to march toward Peking on August 4. All along
the way there were sanguinary encounters with the Boxers and Chinese
troops, so that the allies probably lost 800 men before they reached
Peking on August 14. The Japanese soldiers, after a terrible battle
lasting for nearly fifteen hours till 9.50 P. M., bombarded the eastern
walls at two of the gates and rushed into the Forbidden City, while
previously a column dispatched by them had led the rest of the allied
forces toward the British legation through the gate which the Russians
had exploded about 5 P. M. With what wild burst of joy and enthusiasm
the foreigners, who had been defending themselves under unspeakable
difficulties within the walls of the British legation, received the
triumphant entry of the allied soldiers may better be imagined than
told. The siege had at length been raised, the imperial court had fled
toward Si-ngan, and the capital of China fell into the hands of the
powers.
It is unnecessary to remind the reader that all during this memorable
campaign the Japanese soldiers won universal praise for their dash and
discipline. With no less admiration were their commissariat system and
method of transportation regarded by their comrades. Repeatedly was it
seen by impartial observers that even in orderliness among themselves
and just and moderate treatment of the non-combatants, the troops of the
non-Christian Japan were behind those of no Christian country then
represented in North China. They excelled also in the power of
organization and control in their dealings with the people of Peking,
who had come under the provisional government of the conquering powers.
All these merits were externally visible, but only the Japanese soldier
himself will know what burning love of his country's name, which he
carried deep in his bosom, animated him with courage and patience and
bridled his animal passion. He marched shoulder to shoulder with the
troops of the powers, three of which had five years before treated his
country with indignity and forced her to forsake the price of the blood
of her sons only to appropriate it for themselves. He could now show
them that he had not been forever reduced by them into an insignificant
position, but, on the contrary, had advanced beyond his former degree of
military efficiency, and could vie with any one of them either in the
art of war or in the moral qualities that constitute the modern soldier.
His experience was invaluable both in training his mind and body and in
demonstrating anew that, after all, his racial identity was hardly a bar
against his full participation in the arts of civilization. As precious
for his country may be regarded the fact that her position in the East
rose, through the North China campaign, considerably higher in the
esteem of the powers than even after the Chinese war of 1894-1895.
Otherwise the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 probably would not have
been so soon formed. Nor could Japan have since proceeded with her
national activities with such a calm confidence.
How far Japan had outrun in the march of national progress her
neighboring empire of China, whose disciple she once was, was strikingly
illustrated by the telegraphic messages that the emperors of the two
nations exchanged both before and after the capture of Peking. Nor can a
stronger refutation of the oft-repeated theory that one day Japan will
revive the moribund China and form with her a pan-"yellow" alliance
powerful enough to exclude the Caucasian influence from the Orient, be
found than in the comparison of the Chinese epistles and the Japanese
replies in which both emperors faithfully expressed the attitude of
their respective nations. On July 3, or half a month after the fall of
the Taku forts, his majesty the emperor of China telegraphed a personal
message to the Japanese emperor in which he laid great stress upon the
idea that in the present rivalry between the East and the West, the
former was supported by only two nations, the Chinese and the Japanese.
Could it be China alone that the Occidental powers covet with their
tiger's eye? "If China should fall," said his majesty, "perhaps your
country would be unable to stand alone." On the strength of this
argument, the Son of Heaven made an earnest appeal to his
fellow-sovereign to sink minor differences and rescue the Orient from
the impending crisis. To this remarkable communication responded the
emperor of Japan, saying that he considered it incumbent upon China
immediately to suppress the internal disorder and save the foreign
envoys, whose persons were inviolable, and that after the restoration of
normal order by China's own efforts Japan would, during the negotiations
of the powers, safeguard the interests of the great empire. The author
of the original message may have thought Japan a renegade of the Orient,
but the reply of the latter's sovereign implied her irrevocable policy
of acting upon the dictates of the most advanced standards of mankind--a
policy which is infinitely removed from the defensive position of one
form of civilization or one section of the earth's surface as over
against another. Nearly three months later, on September 24, the Chinese
emperor again communicated from Ta-yuan to the Japanese sovereign his
sense of gratitude for the work of the latter's soldiers, and solicited
his persuasion of the other powers to expedite the conclusion of peace.
In reply, Japan's ruler suggested that peace would follow if the court
should at once return to Peking, calm the minds of the people, and
manifest to the powers its sincere regrets for the recent outrages, and
also if the reactionary ministers were removed from office and a new
government was organized of men whose ability was universally
recognized.
It was after a number of conferences that, on November 9, the peace
commissioners at Peking came to the final conclusion regarding the terms
of peace, which were reduced into an identical note two months later.
This protracted period of negotiation was mainly due to the difficulty
of maintaining a strict harmony between the several powers on all points
under discussion. We cannot tarry over the details of the discussion,
for they properly belong to the history of China. Nor need we point out
the exact contributions that Japan made toward the peace settlement,
which were in the main of a moderating character. Of the indemnity,
amounting to 450 million Hai-kuan taels ($333,900,000), Japan shared
about 7.73 per cent. Previous to the conclusion of peace an incident
occurred at Amoy which has caused misunderstanding in certain quarters.
On August 24 a mob burned a Japanese Buddhist building in the city, upon
which some Japanese bluejackets were landed to protect the consulate and
the resident subjects of Japan. More marines were later landed, and
still more were reported to be coming via Formosa. A widespread rumor
ensued that Japan was bent on the occupation of Amoy, and the
consternation among the citizens ran so high that the local _taotai_,
together with a large number of _literati_ and wealthy merchants, made a
personal appeal to the Japanese consul to evacuate, themselves pleading
to indemnify the burned building and the landing of the marines. In the
meantime a British and a German war vessel had arrived, and the Japanese
reinforcements bound for Amoy had been recalled from Formosa. The people
who had unnecessarily dreaded the presence of the Japanese forces now
began to manifest contempt of the Japanese residents in Amoy, whose
position was imagined to have suddenly fallen at the coming of the
foreign marines. A general evacuation soon followed the restoration of
order, leaving the status of the Japanese in the city much the same as
before the incident. Although it can hardly be concealed that some of
the Japanese residing in Fuh-kien and Formosa were at the time animated
by a certain degree of chauvinism, the intentions of the government at
Tōkyō could not have been but entirely pacific.
Perhaps in no other instance have the powers more repeatedly and
unequivocally given expression to their avowed devotion to the doctrine
of the territorial integrity and the open door in China than during and
after the Boxer insurrection. Not the least clear declarations came from
Russia, whose conduct, however, could at least as well be explained by
another principle which she has persistently denied. Facts would lead
one to suppose that she at first regarded the trouble in North China as
slight enough to die of its own inanity or be readily suppressed by the
assistance of herself alone. Count Muraviev, the Russian foreign
minister, even prophesied that order would be restored within two weeks.
The serious nature of the uprising, however, soon made it evident that
it hardly was an occasion for any single power thus to ingratiate itself
with the helpless Chinese government. Russia hence joined the concert of
the powers in the march toward Peking, but at least some of her press
and authors continued to regard her joint action with the allies as
rather incidental, for, according to their opinion, the trouble had been
caused by the offensive acts of the other powers in China in which
Russia had had no share. Subsequent events show, however, that, if she
attached a relatively small importance to the conditions in North China,
Russia at the same time grasped the Manchurian situation with great
celerity and vigor. It is impossible to judge from our present state of
knowledge whether the aggressive attitude of Russia in Manchuria
preceded or followed the appearance of threatening signs of danger
against her interests in that territory. Most of the actual troubles,
however, seem to have occurred after Russia had suddenly assumed, from
June 26 on, a belligerent movement in Manchuria on a vast scale which
was to cost her in the end no less than sixty-two million rubles.[1] In
a few days adjoining regions in Siberia were declared as in a state of
war, and troops from Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagovestchensk, and the
Trans-Baikalia, as well as from European Russia, began to press into
Manchuria. It is as unnecessary as impossible to mark at each point of
the widespread warfare that followed whether the initiative was taken by
the Chinese or by the Russians. It is evident that some strategic points
in Manchuria had already been infested by the Boxers and their
sympathizers, who set about from what time is not known, obstructing and
damaging railroad construction, attacking the churches, and persecuting
the converts in the southern region, and, on July 16, bombarding the
Russian city of Blagovestchensk across the Amur, the navigation of which
was consequently stopped, and a week later murdering some eighty
Russians in An-tung near the Korean border. Other outrages followed as
the Russian aggression excited more resentment among the Chinese. The
forces of the tsar occupied the open port of Niu-chwang, where on
August 5 they organized a provisional government. The Russian possession
of Niu-chwang was followed, before the allies entered into Peking, by
that of Hun-chun, Argun, Harbin, Aigun, San-sin, and other centers
scattered over the surface of Manchuria, while in July the dismissal by
the Chinese government of the Chinese manager of the Manchurian railroad
which had hitherto been partly under the nominal control of China, left
the Russians in full and sole possession.
Thus far Russia had no more subdued all Manchuria than the allies had
restored order in North China, and the tsar's government surprised the
other powers, on August 25, only ten days after the rescue of the
legations in Peking, by declaring Russia's intention to withdraw her
minister and troops from Peking. It was thought by observers, and freely
admitted by some Russian writers, that this unexpected move by Russia
was by no means out of the line of her traditional policy of conferring
favor upon the neighbor whose house should as long as possible be left
in a state of confusion and disorder. The proposition was deemed none
the less as acceptable in principle as impracticable in detail at that
early date. In regard to Manchuria, the same Russian circular of August
25 declared that evacuation would occur as soon as peace was permanently
restored and measures were taken to protect the railways, and other
powers threw no obstacle in the way. It was soon seen, however, that the
armed pacification of Manchuria could not so abruptly stop. On the
contrary, the occupation of many strategic points, including Ninguta,
Tsitsihar, Mukden, Kin-chow, and An-tung, was yet to come, until early
in December the entire three eastern provinces had completely fallen
into the hands of the Russians.
It was doubtless with a grave apprehension of this Manchurian situation
that Great Britain had induced Germany to sign, on October 16, 1900, the
ill-fated Anglo-German agreement. It sought to effect a difficult
combination of three principles not easily reconcilable with one
another: the integrity of the remaining territory of China, an open
door, and equal advantage to men of all nations in the trading ports and
marts, and the protection of the interest already acquired in China by
the signatories. The strength of the combination was further reduced by
the manner in which the first and the third principles were upheld in
the agreement, which declared that neither power would make use of the
present complication to acquire any territorial advantages, but that if
another power should act contrary to this view, then the signatories
might consult together as to the measures of protecting their own
interests. At their invitation to accept the principles of the
agreement, Russia, as well as France, cleverly replied that they saw
therein nothing other than the same old principles which they had
repeatedly advocated, while the United States expressed assent to the
first two of the principles, but deemed the third as not concerning her.
Japan entered the agreement as a signatory. Judged from the very purpose
for which the document had been framed by Great Britain, the agreement
may be said to have ended in a failure, for what was the use of
reiterating the first principle if Manchuria was not considered a part
of the Chinese territory, whose integrity was thereby respected? Yet
Count von Bülow, imperial chancellor of Germany, said in the Reichstag
on March 15, 1901, as he again did toward the end of 1903, that the
Anglo-German agreement had no reference to Manchuria. "I can imagine
nothing," he was reported to have said, "which we regard with more
indifference" than Manchuria. "The Yang-tse agreement" was the name
given to the document by the Germans, who were pleased to interpret it
as applying with particular force, not to Manchuria, but to the British
sphere in the basin of the great river which had always been an eyesore
to Germany. With one of the contracting parties at variance with the
very aim of the agreement, it was useless for the marquis of Lansdowne
to declare, on August 6, 1901, that it "most unquestionably extended to
Manchuria, which was part of the Chinese empire." It is to be doubted
that the convention had exerted the slightest influence in staying the
hand of Russia in the three eastern provinces.
Toward the close of 1900 appeared in the London _Times_ a dispatch from
its Peking correspondent, Dr. George E. Morrison, containing the
contents of a secret treaty alleged to have been concluded in November
between Tsang-chi, the Tartar-general at Mukden, and Admiral Alexiev,
which stipulated that Tsang should pacify Manchuria and then report the
detail of his administration of the territory to a Russian resident to
be stationed at Mukden. This convention was not ratified either by the
tsar or by the Son of Heaven. This was merely a prelude to a more
serious development. Early in 1901, when the peace commissioners at
Peking were discussing the matter of the punishment to be demanded of
China for the local officials who had been privy to the Boxer outrages,
Russia showed signs of isolating herself from the concert of the powers
and taking side with the Chinese sentiment. This characteristic action
of the Russians was accompanied by the rumor of negotiations for a
secret convention carried on at St. Petersburg between the government of
the tsar and the Chinese minister. Of this supposed convention several
versions were afloat, some of which would have one believe that in its
scope were comprised, not only Manchuria, but also Ili, the New
Territory, Mongolia, and the provinces of Kan-su, Shen-si, and Shan-si,
as Russian spheres of one sort or another. Either in its truer form or
after some concession on the Russian part, the secret treaty, as it was
more definitely known, was said to have contained the following eight
points, which are worthy of enumeration as showing at least some of the
original intentions Russia had regarding Manchuria: 1, that Russia
should continue the military occupation of Manchuria pending the
restoration of order and the settlement of the question of war
indemnity; 2, that China should consult Russia as to where and how many
Chinese troops might be stationed in Manchuria; 3, that China should at
any time dismiss at Russia's request those Manchurian generals and other
officials whose conduct was deemed prejudicial to mutual amity; 4, that
the number of the Chinese police should also be determined by consulting
Russia, and the use of artillery should be forbidden; 5, that there
should be organized a special official system for the neutral territory
already marked; 6, that no railway or mining concession in Manchuria
should be granted to citizens of any other nation without consulting
Russia; 7, that the railroad indemnity should, through an agreement made
with the railway company, be wholly or in part paid by the profit of the
roads; and 8, that Russia should be allowed to construct a branch line
from the Manchurian railway to the Great Wall. The result of these
demands, were they real and had China granted them, would have been a
complete Russian protectorate over Manchuria, for although it was made
to imply that the military occupation of Manchuria should cease with the
restoration of peace, such concessions were demanded as would tend to
perpetuate the Russian control of the territory. Japan first saw the
gravity of the situation, and communicated about the matter with the
United States and Great Britain. The last power consulted other powers.
The powers thus assumed a united front in warning China of the unwisdom
of concluding with a single power before she had reached a common
agreement with all the allies. The protest, however, bore no appreciable
effect upon Russia, which persisted in avowing that the intended
agreement was unlike the one reported in the press, but was merely a
provisional step toward the evacuation of Manchuria. Before the end of
March, Japan and Great Britain directly communicated with Russia, which
adroitly retorted to the latter that it was not customary with the
tsar's government to show to a third power a treaty to be concluded with
an independent nation. To Japan's request to submit the agreement to the
discussion of the allied powers' commissioners at Peking, with whom all
matters concerning the late complication should rest, Russia replied
that the intended treaty contained injury to none and might well be made
public after conclusion. This reply was dated March 26. On April 5 Japan
forwarded to Russia her second message, supported by a firm
determination. Russia now suddenly withdrew her demands, declaring at
the same time that, owing to the obstruction placed in the way of
effecting the first move preliminary to the eventual evacuation of
Manchuria, she was obliged to maintain for the present the military
occupation of its provinces.
It was again rumored in June that another secret Manchurian convention
was afoot, which, if real, however, must have miscarried. No more
successful was the patriotic effort of the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and
the late Viceroy Liu Kan-yi to create among the peace commissioners a
sentiment for the opening to foreign trade of the whole of Manchuria.
Toward the last of August Paul Lessar was appointed the Russian minister
at Peking. The peace protocol agreed upon between China and the allied
powers was finally signed on September 7, 1901, the imperial court was
expected shortly to return to Peking, and the Chinese government began
to look anxiously for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the realm.
Seizing this opportunity, Russia proposed a new Manchurian treaty whose
comparatively mild terms made it appear acceptable at this moment to the
Chinese commissioners, especially to the pro-Russian, Li Hung Chang.
According to the reported tenor of this treaty, the Manchurian
evacuation was to be completed within two or three years, the Chinese
troops at Mukden were to be trained by Russian officers, and their
numbers to be determined by consulting Russia's wishes, and, as in the
treaty withdrawn in April, Chinese artillery was forbidden. Considering
the feeble attitude of the Chinese commissioners, it would have been
extremely difficult for Japan and Great Britain effectively to protest
against the acceptance of the Russian demands had not the Viceroys Liu
and Chang strongly reminded the emperor and the empress dowager of the
direct peril to the dynasty which might result from virtually forsaking
its ancestral home, Manchuria, to a foreign power whose ambition knew no
bounds. In accordance with the wishes of the court, the dying Li Hung
Chang, on his sick-bed, saw Lessar and appealed to the Russian
friendship for China to modify the terms of the proposed agreement. Li
soon passed away, on November 7, leaving the gravest problem of China in
a state of extreme uncertainty. Prince Ching presented a
counter-proposition, which among other things requested the evacuation
of Manchuria within one year. Russia's reply to this note arrived in
Peking the last of January, 1902, and was found to contain a demand for
an exclusive mining concession to Russia of all Manchuria, which is
noted for its untold stores of minerals. Against this the United States,
Great Britain, and Japan entered a firm protest. Secretary Hay, in his
note of February 3, reminded the Russian and Chinese governments of the
repeated assurances made by the tsar's foreign minister of his devotion
to the principle of the open door in all parts of China, and said: "An
agreement whereby China gives any corporation or company the exclusive
right or privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any
other way industrially developing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the
gravest concern by the government of the United States. It constitutes a
monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of the treaties
concluded between China and foreign powers, and thereby seriously
affects the rights of American citizens." As usual, Russia, in her
reply, so strongly reinforced her former pledges of the principle of the
open door that the government at Washington found it impossible to
dispute them without questioning Russia's integrity, which Hay was not
disposed to do. By this time, however, an important event had taken
place in the diplomatic world which was popularly regarded as a virtual
protest against what was considered the Eastern policy of
Russia--namely, the conclusion of the agreement of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance signed at London on January 30, 1902.
The fair and open principles of this agreement may best be seen from its
text, which was as follows:
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by
a desire to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the
extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining
the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of
China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal
opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry
of all nations, hereby agree as follows:
ARTICLE I.
"The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the
independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be
entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either
country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of
which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while
Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in
China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as
commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting
Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them
to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to
safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive
action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China
or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the
High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and
property of its subjects.
ARTICLE II.
"If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their
respective interests as above described, should become involved
in war with another power, the other High Contracting Party will
maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent
other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.
ARTICLE III.
"If, in the above event, any other power or powers should join
in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting
Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in
common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it.
ARTICLE IV.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will,
without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements
with another power to the prejudice of the interests above
described.
ARTICLE V.
"Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the
above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two governments
will communicate with one another fully and frankly.
ARTICLE VI.
"The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after
the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years
from that date.
"In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have
notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five
years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding
until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of
the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if,
when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is
actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, _ipso facto_,
continue until peace is concluded."
To the Anglo-Japanese agreement Russia and her ally France retorted in
the following declaration of March 16:
"The allied Russo-French Governments are wholly pleased to discern that
the Anglo-Japanese convention supports the essential principles which,
according to the reiterated statement of France and Russia, constituted
and still constitute the foundation of their policy. Both governments
believe that the support of these principles is also a guarantee of the
interests of the Far East. They are compelled, however, not to lose from
view the possibly inimical action of other powers, or a repetition of
disorders in China, possibly impairing China's integrity and free
development, to the detriment of their reciprocal interests. They
therefore reserve to themselves the right to take measures to defend
these interests."
In this connection may be related the diplomatic comedy enacted at
Shanghai in October, in which the newly formed Anglo-Japanese alliance
played a part. According to the just wishes of the Chinese authorities,
Great Britain proposed on July 31 to Japan, Germany, and France to
withdraw the troops the four powers had been stationing at Shanghai,
where peace had been restored. Japan and France cheerfully assented, on
the condition, however, that all the parties should agree. Germany
showed an inexplicable dilatoriness in giving a definite answer,
proposing that the four powers should first come to an agreement as to
the date of a joint evacuation. Great Britain fixed November 1, to which
France agreed. Japan, however, delayed, as she descried a secret
movement being made by one of the parties. Finally, Japan heard on
October 6, and Great Britain on the 8th, that Germany had secured from
the Chinese government a pledge that it would give no additional rights
to any power in the Yang-tse basin, the British influence over which had
always embarrassed the German policy in China. The stroke dealt by
Germany could have been aimed at no other power but Great Britain. The
former notified the latter that her intention was to prevent any power
from taking the present opportunity to come to a secret agreement of an
exclusive nature with China--a possibility altogether incompatible with
the terms of the alliance so recently framed. At the same time, the
Chinese government pretended that it had made no special pledge to
Germany. Great Britain, now fully advised by Japan of the nature of the
case, declared that it would be unnecessary and undesirable to bind only
a few powers to guarantee the integrity of a portion of the Chinese
empire, and that to such an agreement, if any, she would not consider
herself in any way bound. She also expressed to Prince Ching her
resentment of his duplicity. In the meantime, the Viceroy Chang
Chih-tung, from whom the German consul had sought a similar pledge to
one that had been given by the prince, flatly refused the demand.
Germany ended the affair with a clever but unconvincing explanation to
Great Britain. Seeing that the sky was clear, Japan evacuated Shanghai,
alone and boldly, on November 22. The other powers soon followed.
It will be recalled that the Anglo-Japanese agreement was announced in
the midst of the negotiations between Lessar and the Chinese government
concerning Manchuria. During the diplomatic flurry attending the
momentous declarations made first by Japan and Great Britain and then by
Russia and France, the Manchurian negotiation seemed to have been
temporarily forgotten, until the world was taken by surprise to hear of
the conclusion, on April 8, 1902, of a new Russo-Chinese convention
regarding the three eastern provinces, which went into force
simultaneously with the signing of the agreement at three o'clock in the
afternoon of that memorable day. Not the least surprising feature of it
was the remarkable mildness of its terms. Russia promised, upon the
condition that China should protect the Russian railways, Russian
subjects, and their enterprises in Manchuria, to evacuate the territory
and restore it to Chinese sovereignty. The evacuation was to take place
at three different periods within the ensuing eighteen months, as
follows: from regions west of the Liao River, by October 8, 1902; from
the rest of the province of Sheng-king and the province of Kirin, by
April 8, 1903; and, finally, from the Amur (Hei-lung) province, by
October 8, 1903. Pending the evacuation, the number of Chinese troops
and the sites of their stations in Manchuria should be determined by
consultation between the Chinese and Russian officers, but after the
evacuation those troops might be freely distributed at the direction of
the Chinese officers. Then, however, the Russian Government should be
notified of every change made in this respect. Suppressing other points
in the convention which do not concern us directly, it is seen that it
says nothing about Chinese territories outside of Manchuria, and, within
the latter, contains no new mining or railway demands, while it appears
to promise an eventually complete restoration of Manchuria to China. The
moderate tone of the present instrument as compared with the former
abortive conventions, and coming so soon after the renewed declaration
of the Russo-French alliance of its devotion to the principle of the
territorial integrity of China, seemed to confirm the sincerity of
Russia's avowed intention in the East.
The first period of the Manchurian occupation, according to this
convention, was to close on October 8, 1902. Before that date the
Russian forces had completely withdrawn from that part of the Sheng-king
province lying to the west of the Liao River. Russia had fulfilled her
pledge. It was alleged, however, by several eyewitnesses that the
so-called evacuation largely meant the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Chinese quarters into the numerous and extensive Russian barracks and
blockhouses along the Manchurian railway. The most important section of
Manchuria, namely, the rest of the Sheng-king and the whole of the Kirin
province, was, according to the convention, to be evacuated on April 8,
1903. That day came and passed, without seeing, except in a few places,
even the nominal evacuation. In the midst of a suspense full of
apprehension the Russians lodged at the Chinese foreign office, as a
price for the yet unfulfilled evacuations, new demands in seven
articles, which astounded the diplomatic world. The demands were in
substance as follows: 1, the non-alienation of any part of Manchuria to
any other power; 2, the right to construct a Russian telegraph line
between Niu-chwang and Peking; 3, the promise that under no pretext any
other foreigner should be employed in North China; 4, the sole
management of the customs tariff at Niu-chwang by the Russo-Chinese
Bank, and the Russian supervision of the quarantine service at the same
port; 5, the opening of no new port or mart in Manchuria to foreign
trade; 6, the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the Mongolian
administration; and, 7, the pledge to be made by China that all the
privileges that the Russians enjoyed before the late _émeute_ should not
hereby be affected. The Japanese minister, Uchida, entered on April 21 a
vigorous protest at the foreign office at Peking, and was followed by
the British and American ministers. The United States, which had already
been negotiating with China for the opening of two new ports in
Manchuria, where she possessed the greatest interest of any nation in
the import trade, made a query on April 24 direct to St. Petersburg as
to the authenticity of the reported demand. She was assured both by the
Russian foreign minister and Minister Cassini, as was Great Britain by
the Russian representative at London, that the published reports of the
proposed convention were absolutely incorrect. It appeared as if the
Russian disclaimer were final and a signal diplomatic success had been
accomplished by Secretary Hay. But to say that the reported articles
were incorrect was not the same as to say that they were entirely
unfounded, or even that every one of them was incorrect. The government
of the tsar seems to have left sufficient room in its statements for the
inference not only that there was proceeding a _pourparler_ with the
Chinese foreign office, but also that some of the rumored articles were
not to be denied. However that may be, it is noteworthy that the
knowledge of the Russian demand aroused among the leading classes of the
Chinese people a patriotic ebullition not known even during the Japanese
war and the Boxer insurrection. Petitions from all of the eighteen
provinces reminded the Peking government in the strongest terms that the
loss of Manchuria would lead to a widespread uprising in the empire, a
repetition of the anti-foreign crusade of 1900, a probable wholesale
partition of the Middle Kingdom by the rebels and the powers, and an
eventual downfall of the ruling dynasty. In this remarkable upheaval,
merchants and students, including those staying in Japan, took no less
active part than the officials and literates, who, as the ruling class,
are usually the most alive to the interests of the government and the
civilization of China. Under these circumstances it is not strange that
before May 10 the foreign office at Peking replied to the Russian
government that the former could assuredly not concede to a demand that
ignored previous agreements, the stipulations of which China had never
violated.
This reply of China to Russia hardly had a greater effect to settle the
dispute than did the pacific disclaimer given about ten days before by
Russia to the United States, but on the contrary, was followed by a
month the uncertain and trying nature of which to Prince Ching and his
foreign office has seldom since been equaled during the whole period of
the negotiations. While Pokotilov, the influential Peking agent of the
Russo-Chinese Bank, was reported to be freely dispensing gifts and
favors to win over certain members of the office and of the inner court,
the Russian _chargé_, Plançon, demanded an immediate reply to three of
the once proposed seven articles, which pertained to the non-alienation
of the Manchurian territory, the opening of no new ports, and the
maintenance of the _status quo_ in Mongolia. Prince Ching, as well as
the empress dowager, seemed to waver, or at least to bide time. The
attempt of some patriots to install in the foreign office the most
respected Viceroy Chang Chih-tung fell through, and the attitude of the
Japanese government was deemed not sufficiently reassuring to encourage
China once more to assume a decisive tone. In the meantime the Russian
minister, Lessar, returned on May 29 to Peking after an absence, and
severely reprimanded the foreign office for frequently allowing
diplomatic secrecy to be violated. In his conference with Prince Ching,
on June 10, he renewed the demand in each of the seven articles, every
one of which the prince however, was obliged to refuse, as before. At
Lessar's intimation that an indiscriminate refusal would result in
serious disadvantages to China, and his suggestion that some substitute
for the old demand might be devised for mutual benefit, the prince had
only to request the minister of the tsar to present his own substitute,
as the former naturally had none. A new demand was accordingly
presented, which embodied the first, fourth, and sixth articles of the
former convention, the fourth being now stated in two articles. Prince
Ching begged for five days' delay, and temporarily secluded himself from
the world, his negotiation with Lessar being in the meanwhile carried on
by secret correspondence. The protests from the Japanese, American, and
British ministers, as well as the renewed demand of the two former to
open new ports in Manchuria, did not avail.
Irritating to Japan as was the Manchurian situation, she was confronted
in Korea by a still more serious state of things. The diplomatic history
of the latter country since the conclusion of the war of 1894-1895 may
now be briefly recounted. The years between 1895 and 1898 witnessed
violent fluctuations of influence between the Russians and the Japanese
in Korea. The Japanese had been too eager for reform, and, at least on
the occasion of the murder of the queen on October 8, 1895, had allowed
themselves to be too much influenced by their less responsible element
to withstand the obstruction and diplomacy of the Russians. It was not
until the departure of Waeber, the astute Russian minister, and until
the activity of the Russians in China had become all-engrossing, that
the latter's influence was again eclipsed by that of the Japanese.
During this period of struggle Russia and Japan concluded three
agreements defining their position in Korea, namely, the Komura-Waeber
memorandum signed at Seul on May 4, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanov protocol
signed at St. Petersburg on June 9, 1896, and the Nishi-Rosen protocol
concluded at Tokyo on April 25, 1898. Some of the more permanent of the
terms of these agreements deserve notice, as they gave to Japan a
conventional ground for her negotiations with Russia in 1903-1904, just
prior to the war. The two governments "recognized definitively the
sovereignty and the entire independence of Korea, and mutually engaged
themselves to abstain from all direct interference in the internal
affairs of that country." No military teacher or financial adviser
should be furnished to Korea by either power without consulting the
other. In view of the large development of the Japanese commercial and
industrial enterprises in Korea, the Russian government agreed not to
impede the development of the commercial and industrial relations
between Japan and Korea. In case further definitions of principles
should become necessary or other points for discussion should arise, the
representatives of the two powers should be instructed to negotiate
amicably. The arrangement made in these agreements was from its nature
temporary, and would have created fresh complications even if its terms
had been strictly observed.
As soon as her hands were freer in Manchuria, Russia, represented at
Seul by the ambitious Pavlov, and also by the semiofficial diplomats,
Baron Gunzburg and Miss Sonntag, employed such means as befitted the
peculiar situation of Korea in their persistent effort to overthrow
Japanese and promote Russian influence in the peninsula. For this
purpose they made to the Korean court propositions of almost every
conceivable nature, including demands for concessions at Masampo,
Chinhai Bay, and Kojedo Island, in the south, for the right to build
telegraph and railway lines in the north, and for the employment of
Russian financial advisers and military instructors. It was not till
April, 1903, however, that, simultaneously with her pressure upon
Peking, Russia began to work the timber concession which she was said to
have secured in 1896, when the Korean king had taken refuge in the
Russian legation at Seul. Early in May, ostensibly to defend the forest
land, forty-seven Russian soldiers arrived at Yongam-po on the Yalu,
where, despite protests from the Korean government, an extensive tract
of land was seized and fortification was begun. Presently, one hundred,
and then two hundred more Russian troops arrived, while on the
Manchurian side of the frontier fresh troops entered An-tung and
Feng-hwang-Cheng, so that the pressure of the Russian forces was heavily
felt upon the Korean border.
At length the Japanese government came to the decision that it should
deal directly with the government of the tsar in order to establish once
and for all the integrity of China in Manchuria, as well as the
independence and reform of Korea, to define the respective rights and
interests in those countries of Japan and Russia, and radically and
fundamentally to free the general peace of the Far East from the factors
that had continually and profoundly threatened it. The decision in its
main points had been reached by the press and the entire nation long
before the cabinet ministers and privy councilors met before the throne,
on June 23, and built thereon a definite policy to be pursued in the
coming negotiations with Russia. These negotiations were attended by
tortuous delays on the part of Russia, but the Japanese nation,
realizing that never in their long history had they been confronted with
a graver national problem, met it with a remarkable perseverance. The
government, also, conducted itself with dignity and consideration, for
none knew better than it that the immediate peace of the East was
dependent upon the success of the pending negotiations. The different
motives of Russia and Japan for these negotiations and the different
spirit in which each carried them on may be well seen in the following
official statements made by the respective governments soon after the
diplomatic relations between them had been severed. The Russian
communication, issued on February 9, 1904, by the foreign office at St.
Petersburg, said:
"Last year [1903] the Tōkyō cabinet, under the pretext of establishing
the balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of
the Pacific, submitted to the imperial government [of Russia] a proposal
for a revision of the existing treaties with Korea. Russia consented,
and Viceroy Alexiev was charged to draw up a project for a new
understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian minister at
Tōkyō, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese
government. Although the exchange of views with the Tōkyō cabinet on
this subject was of a friendly character, the Japanese social circles
and the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a
warlike ferment among the Japanese and to drive the government into an
armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof the Tōkyō
cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the
negotiations, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make
the country ready for war.
"All these circumstances could not, of course, disturb Russia's
equanimity, but they induced her also to take military and naval
measures. Nevertheless, to preserve peace in the Far East, Russia, so
far as her incontestable rights and interests permitted, gave the
necessary attention to the demands of the Tōkyō cabinet, and declared
herself ready to recognize Japan's privileged commercial and economic
position in the Korean peninsula, with the concession of the right to
protect it by military force in the event of disturbances in that
country. At the same time, while rigorously observing the fundamental
principle of her policy regarding Korea, whose independence and
integrity were guaranteed by previous understandings with Japan and by
treaties with other powers, Russia insisted on three points:
"(1.) On a mutual and unconditional guarantee of this principle.
"(2.) On an undertaking to use no part of Korea for strategic purposes,
as the authorization of such action on the part of any foreign power was
directly opposed to the principle of the independence of Korea.
"(3.) On the preservation of the full freedom of navigation of the
Straits of Korea.
"The project elaborated in this sense did not satisfy the Japanese
Government, which in its last proposals not only declined to accept the
conditions which appeared as the guarantee of the independence of Korea,
but also began at the same time to insist on provisions to be
incorporated in a project regarding the question of Manchuria. Such
demands on the part of Japan, naturally, were inadmissible, the question
of Russia's position in Manchuria concerning in the first place China,
but also all the powers having commercial interests in China. The
imperial government, therefore, saw absolutely no reason to include in a
special treaty with Japan regarding Korean affairs any provisions
concerning territory occupied by Russian troops.
"The imperial government, however, did not refuse, so long as the
occupation of Manchuria lasts, to recognize both the sovereignty of the
Emperor of China in Manchuria and also the rights acquired there by
other powers through treaties with China. A declaration to this effect
had already been made to the foreign cabinets. In view of this the
imperial government, after charging its representatives at Tōkyō to
present its reply to the latest proposal of Japan, was justified in
expecting the Tōkyō cabinet to take into account the considerations set
forth above and that it would appreciate the wish manifested by Russia
to come to a peaceful understanding with Japan. Instead of this the
Japanese Government, not even awaiting this reply, decided to break off
negotiations and to suspend diplomatic relations. The imperial
government, while laying on Japan the full responsibility for any
consequences of such a course of action, will await the development of
events, and the moment it becomes necessary will take the most decisive
measures for the protection of its rights and interests in the Far
East."
The official statement given by the Japanese foreign office on the night
of February 8 reads as follows:
"It being indispensable to the welfare and safety of Japan to maintain
the independence and territorial integrity of Korea, and to safeguard
her paramount interests therein, the Japanese Government finds it
impossible to view with indifference any action endangering the position
of Korea, whereas Russia, notwithstanding her solemn treaty with China
and her repeated assurances to the powers, not only continues her
occupation of Manchuria, but has taken aggressive measures in Korean
territory. Should Manchuria be annexed to Russia, the independence of
Korea would naturally be impossible. The Japanese Government,
therefore, being desirous of securing permanent peace for eastern Asia,
by means of direct negotiations with Russia, with the view of arriving
at a friendly adjustment of their mutual interests in both Manchuria and
Korea, where their interests meet, communicated toward the end of July
last such desire to the Russian Government, and invited its adherence.
To this the Russian Government expressed a willing assent. Accordingly,
on August 12, the Japanese Government proposed to Russia, through its
representative at St. Petersburg, the basis of an agreement which was
substantially as follows:
"(1.) A mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.
"(2.) A mutual engagement to maintain the principles of an equal
opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations with the
natives of those countries.
"(3.) A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in
Korea, and that Russia has special interests in railway enterprises in
Manchuria, and a mutual recognition of the respective rights of Japan
and Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of the
above-mentioned interests, so far as the principle of article 1 is not
infringed.
"(4.) The recognition by Russia of the exclusive rights of Japan to give
advice and assistance to Korea in the interests of reform and good
government.
"(5.) The engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual
extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria, so as to
connect with the Eastern Chinese [_i. e._, Manchurian] and the
Shan-hai-kwan--Niu-chwang lines.
"It was the intention of the Japanese Government originally that a
conference should take place between its representatives at St.
Petersburg and the Russian authorities, so as to facilitate progress as
much as possible in reaching a solution of the situation, but the
Russian Government absolutely refused to do so, on the plea that the
Tsar planned a trip abroad; and for other reasons it was unavoidably
decided to conduct the negotiations at Tōkyō. It was not until October 3
that the Russian Government presented counter-proposals. She therein
declined to engage in respect to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of China, and stipulate the maintenance of the principle of
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in
China, and requested that Japan declare Manchuria and its littoral as
being entirely outside of her sphere of interest. She further put
several restrictions upon Japan's freedom of action in Korea; for
instance, while recognizing Japan's right to dispatch troops, when
necessary, for the protection of her interests in Korea, Russia refused
to allow her to use any portion of Korean territory for strategical
purposes; in fact, Russia went so far as to propose to establish a
neutral zone in Korean territory north of the thirty-ninth parallel.
"The Japanese Government failed utterly to see why Russia, who professed
no intention of absorbing Manchuria, should be disinclined to insert in
the convention a clause in complete harmony with her own repeatedly
declared principle respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of China. Furthermore, this refusal on the part of the Russian
Government impressed the Japanese Government all the more with the
necessity for the insertion of that clause.
"Japan has important commercial interests in Manchuria, and entertains
no small hopes of their future development; and politically she has even
greater interests there by reason of Manchuria's relations to Korea, so
she could not possibly recognize Manchuria as being entirely outside her
sphere of interest. These reasons decided Japan absolutely to reject the
Russian proposal.
"Accordingly, the Japanese Government explained the foregoing views to
the Russian Government, and at the same time it introduced other
necessary amendments in the Russian counter-proposals. They further
proposed, with regard to the neutral zone, that if one was to be created
it should be established on both sides of the boundary line between
Manchuria and Korea, with an equal width, say, of fifty kilometers.
"After repeated discussions at Tōkyō, the Japanese Government finally
presented to the Russian Government its definitive amendment on October
30. The Japanese Government then frequently urged the Russian Government
to give it an early reply, but this was again delayed, and only
delivered on December 11. In that reply Russia suppressed the clauses
relating to Manchuria so as to make the proposed convention apply
entirely to Korea, and maintained its original demand in regard to the
non-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, as well as
a neutral zone; but the exclusion of Manchuria from the proposed
convention being contrary to the original object of the negotiations,
which were to remove causes of conflict between the two countries by a
friendly arrangement of their interests, both in Manchuria and Korea,
the Japanese Government asked the Russian Government to reconsider the
question, and again proposed the removal of the restriction regarding
the use of Korean territory, and the entire suppression of the neutral
zone, on the ground that if Russia was opposed to the establishment of
one in Manchuria it should not establish one in Korea.
"The last reply of Russia was received at Tōkyō on January 6. In this
reply it is true Russia proposed to agree to insert the following clause
in the proposed agreement:
"'The recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as outside her
sphere of interest, while Russia, within the limits of that province,
would not impede Japan or any other power in the employment of rights or
privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China exclusive
of the establishment of a settlement.'
"But this was proposed to be agreed upon only upon conditions
maintaining the clauses regarding a neutral zone in Korean territory and
the non-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, the
conditions whereof were impossible for Japan to accept, as had already
been fully explained to Russia. It should further be observed that no
mention was made at all of the territorial integrity of China in
Manchuria, and it must be self-evident to everybody that the engagement
now proposed by Russia would be of no practical value so long as it was
unaccompanied by a definite stipulation regarding the territorial
integrity of China in Manchuria, since treaty rights are only coexisting
with sovereignty. Eventually, the absorption of Manchuria by Russia
would annul at once those rights and privileges acquired by the powers
in Manchuria by virtue of treaties with China."
Both the negotiations and the general diplomatic relations between Japan
and Russia were severed by the former power on February 5. With this,
diplomacy passed into war.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] A ruble is equivalent to 51.5 cents.
Chapter XXI
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 1904--
The first hostile acts of the Russo-Japanese War were, as in the Chinese
war ten years before, committed before the war was formally declared by
the ruler of either belligerent nation, and were of even more decisive
nature in 1904 than in 1894. No sooner were the diplomatic relations
severed than a Russian force crossed the Korean border and entered the
peninsular empire. The Japanese were even more active. Knowing that the
Russian fleet, though its main squadron of seven battleships and several
cruisers was near Port Arthur, was divided also between Vladivostok,
Chemulpo, and Shanghai, Admiral Tōgō led his entire fleet of six
battleships and ten armored and protected cruisers from Sasebo directly
toward Port Arthur early on February 7, or within thirty hours after the
diplomatic rupture. Having captured a Russian merchantman off Fusan, the
fleet rendezvoused at Mokpo. A squadron of cruisers under command of
Rear Admiral Uryū was dispatched to Chemulpo to act as convoy of the
transports carrying thousands of Japanese soldiers to be landed at the
Korean port, while the remainder of the fleet proceeded toward Port
Arthur. At Chemulpo there were a French, a British, an American, and an
Italian war vessel, besides the Russian cruiser _Korietz_ and gunboat
_Variag_, as well as the Japanese cruiser _Chiyoda_. The last steamed
out of the harbor unnoticed during the night of February 7, and joined
Uryū's squadron, which came in sight of Chemulpo in the afternoon of the
8th. The _Korietz_, probably in an attempt to get to Port Arthur,
ventured out, and, meeting Japanese torpedo boats, fired at them and
then returned into the harbor. She was soon followed by three Japanese
cruisers and several transports, which, within a striking distance of
the Russian vessels, anchored in the harbor until the Japanese troops
from the transports were all landed on the morning of the 9th. A message
was then sent to the _Korietz_ by Uryū, saying that if the Russian
ships did not clear the port before noon his squadron would be obliged
to use forcible measures. The commanders of the neutral vessels in the
harbor might have agreed to protest against the committing of a hostile
act in a port which they regarded as neutral, had not the Russians, as
they did, cheerfully accepted the Japanese challenge and steamed out. In
the exchange of fire which ensued the _Variag_ was seriously injured,
and, protected by the gallant _Korietz_, returned into the harbor. There
fire was set to the magazine of the _Variag_, causing a terrific
explosion and immediate sinking of the vessel. The _Korietz_ was also
burned by the Russians and sank, while the transport _Sungari_ was
scuttled. The Japanese squadron sustained no loss and no injury. By this
engagement the mastery of Korea by the military forces of Japan was
practically assured.
The main section of the Japanese fleet continued its voyage toward Port
Arthur, after Uryū's squadron was sent to Chemulpo. The morning of the
8th found the sea calm and the temperature unusually mild. Late in the
afternoon the fleet headed for Chifu, while torpedo flotillas were sent
to Port Arthur and Dalny. The Russian fleet, which was still outside the
harbor of Port Arthur, was surprised, toward midnight, by a sudden
torpedo attack of the Japanese, who had stolen to the distance of 600
meters. The fire returned by the Russians had little effect, while they
sustained serious injuries on the battleships _Retvizan_ and
_Cesarevich_ and the cruiser _Pallada_. The main squadron of the
Japanese, which was not informed of the success of their torpedo craft
until 10 A. M., and was not even positive that the Russian vessels had
not left for Chemulpo, started early on the 9th toward Port Arthur for a
general attack. At noon Vice Admiral Tōgō signaled to the fleet from the
flagship _Mikasa_: "The decision of victory or defeat depends on this
battle; everyone will do his utmost." The battle lasted nearly an hour
in the middle of the day, in which the Russian fire again proved
comparatively ineffective, while the Japanese shells hit the already
damaged _Retvizan_ and injured the battleship _Poltava_ and the cruisers
_Diana_, _Askold,_ and _Novik_, all below the water-line. This was the
beginning of the complete mastery of the Yellow Sea which Japan was soon
to gain.
On the following day, the 10th, the emperors of both powers issued
proclamations declaring the existence of warfare between them. The
Russian manifesto read as follows: "We proclaim to all our faithful
subjects that, in our solicitude for the preservation of that peace so
dear to our heart, we have put forth every effort to assure tranquillity
in the Far East. To these pacific ends we declared our assent to the
revision, proposed by the Japanese Government, of the agreements
existing between the two empires concerning Korean affairs. The
negotiations initiated on this subject were, however, not brought to a
conclusion, and Japan, not even awaiting the arrival of our last reply
and the proposals of our government, informed us of the rupture of the
negotiations and of diplomatic relations with Russia.
"Without previously notifying us that the rupture of such relations
implied the beginning of warlike action, the Japanese Government ordered
its torpedo boats to make a sudden attack on our squadron in the outer
roadstead of the fortress of Port Arthur. After receiving the report of
our viceroy on the subject, we at once commanded Japan's challenge to be
replied to by arms.
"While proclaiming this our resolve, we, in unshakable confidence in the
help of the Almighty, and firmly trusting in the unanimous readiness of
all our faithful subjects to defend the Fatherland together with
ourselves, invoke God's blessing on our glorious forces of the army and
navy."
The rescript of the Japanese emperor was a formal declaration of war,
which may be read in connection with the similar document issued in 1894
at the beginning of the Chinese war. The rescript ran as follows: "We,
by the grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne
occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make
proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:
"We hereby declare war against Russia. We command our army and navy to
carry on hostilities against her with all their strength, and we also
command all our officials to make effort, in pursuance of their duties
and in accordance with their powers, to attain the national aim, with
all the means within the limits of the law of nations.
"We deem it essential to international relations, and make it our
constant aim, to promote the pacific progress of our empire in
civilization, to strengthen our friendly ties with other states, and
thereby to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring
peace in the East, and assure the future security of our empire without
injury to the rights and interests of other powers. Our officials also
perform their duties in obedience to our will, so that our relations
with all powers grow steadily in cordiality.
"It is thus entirely against our wishes that we have unhappily come to
open hostilities against Russia.
"The integrity of Korea has long been a matter of the gravest concern to
our empire, not only because of the traditional relations between the
two countries, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential
to the safety of our empire. Nevertheless, Russia, despite her explicit
treaty pledges to China and her repeated assurance to other powers, is
still in occupation of Manchuria, and has consolidated and strengthened
her hold upon it, and is bent upon its final absorption. Since the
possession of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain
the integrity of Korea, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment
of all hope for peace in the Far East, we expected, in these
circumstances, to settle the question by negotiations and secure thereby
a permanent peace. With this object in view, our officials by our order
made proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were held during the
last half year. Russia, however, never met such proposals in a spirit of
conciliation, but by her prolonged delays put off the settlement of the
pending question, and, by ostensibly advocating peace on the one hand,
and on the other secretly extending her naval and military preparations,
sought to bring about our acquiescence. It is not possible in the least
to admit that Russia had from the first a sincere desire for peace. She
has rejected the proposals of our empire; the safety of Korea is in
danger; the interests of our empire are menaced. At this crisis, the
guarantees for the future which the empire has sought to secure by
peaceful negotiations can now only be sought by an appeal to arms.
"It is our earnest wishes that, by the loyalty and valor of our faithful
subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of our
empire preserved."
Night attacks by the Japanese destroyers were repeated several times
during the first two months of the war, and succeeded in inflicting some
damages on the Russian destroyers and gunboats. The Japanese also made
three attempts, on the nights of February 23-24, March 21-22, and May
2-3, to force a few old stone-laden steamers up to the mouth of the
harbor, in order to sink them there and thus block the entrance. The
glare of the Russian searchlights and the fierce fire from the shore
batteries and war vessels made it impossible for these heroic attempts
to be completely successful, and the channel remained partially open to
large vessels at high tide.
The indirect attacks and the laying of machine mines by the Japanese
were, however, much more successful. The former proved so damaging to
the Russian warships in the harbor that the lately arrived Vice Admiral
Makarov, whose spirited discipline had already begun to inspire the
squadron with courage and confidence, often steamed out with a few
vessels, and returned fire with fire. Mines were laid by the Japanese at
points where the brave Makarov always moved about. On the morning of
April 13 his squadron of seven vessels, including the flagship
_Peteropavlovsk_, was tempted by Japanese blockaders to a distance of
fifteen miles from the harbor, where it was suddenly encountered by
another Japanese detachment. Turning about and pursued by the enemy, the
Russian vessels retreated toward the harbor, when the _Peteropavlovsk_
struck a mine, at 10.32 A. M., and, after a terrific explosion, turned
turtle and immediately sank. Makarov and 600 men, with the artist
Vereshchagin, went down with the vessel, but the Grand Duke Cyril was
rescued. The Japanese fleet also lost, on May 15, the cruiser _Yoshino_
by collision, and the battleship _Hatsuse_ by twice striking Russian
mines. Other Japanese vessels sunk during the entire period of the war
by contact with the enemy's mines were: the battleship _Yashima_, the
cruisers _Takasago_, _Saiyen,_ and _Miyako,_ and two destroyers and
three gunboats.
After the disaster of April 13 the Russian vessels seldom ventured out
of the harbor in a large force. Realizing, however, that the Baltic
fleet might be unable to reach the eastern waters before the gradual
fall of the land forts at Port Arthur would expose the vessels to the
Japanese fire from the shore, the Russian squadron made two desperate
attempts, on June 23 and August 10, to force its way through the
blockading line and effect a junction with the Vladivostok squadron. On
the former occasion the Vladivostok vessels had just started on one of
their raiding expeditions, and torpedoed and sank three Japanese
transports, carrying 1400 soldiers. The entire Port Arthur squadron, led
by the gallant cruiser _Novik_, made a sortie in the morning at high
tide, and, toward the evening, was met by the Japanese fleet. Returning
toward the harbor, and finding that the tide was now too low at the
entrance for their larger vessels, the Russians anchored them bow out
and stern to the shore, and, under the protection of the shore
batteries, stood at bay over night. Admiral Tōgō gave an order for night
attack to his torpedo boats and destroyers, which, he reported later to
his government, "dashed ahead like a swift wind." Balancing themselves
amid the columns of waterspouts raised by the falling shells from the
enemy, the little boats made charge after charge against the narrow
front of the Russian vessels. It was seen the next morning that the
battleship _Pereviet_ had disappeared and two other vessels were towed
into the harbor.
The sortie of August 10 proved even more desperate and far more
disastrous to the Russians. Rear Admiral Witthoeft led out six
battleships and three protected cruisers southward in a hazy, but calm,
sea, and at noon was nearly thirty miles off the harbor. A little after
one o'clock began the first serious battle of the war, in which modern
armored vessels met on nearly equal terms. The battle was renewed a few
hours later, and on each occasion the Russians suffered from the heavy
shells from the 8-inch guns of the Japanese, aided by the latter's
superior gunnery and highly explosive powder. At 6.40 the flagship
_Cesarevich_ lost its steering gear, and the commanding Admiral
Witthoeft was also killed. Then the Russian vessels began utterly to
lose unity of command and action, and, under the withering fire of the
Japanese from three different directions, were completely routed and
scattered. The flagship and two cruisers reached Tsing-tau in battered
condition. One of the latter, the _Novik_, was later found off Sakhalin
and there sunk by Admiral Kamimura's squadron, and the other, the
_Askold_, and a gunboat reached Shanghai. The _Ryeshitelni_ arrived at
Chifu. The rest of the squadron hastened back toward Port Arthur, where
they were subjected to a night attack of the Japanese torpedo craft. Of
the vessels which finally retired into the harbor, not one was
uninjured, while the fire from the advancing land forces of the Japanese
was soon to make the position of these ships insufferable. The Japanese
fleet sustained no heavy injury on any of the vessels, and lost only 170
in killed and wounded. Of the Russian vessels which found shelter in
neutral ports, the _Cesarevich_ at Tsing-tau was promptly disarmed at
the request of the German governor of Kiao-chow, but those at Shanghai
neither were disarmed nor left the port for more than two weeks. The
_Diana_ reached Saigon, French Indo-China, and was there dismantled
without much delay. The _Ryeshitelni_ at Chifu, which was said to have
sent telegraphic messages to Vladivostok and St. Petersburg, and was
imperfectly disarmed, was finally forcibly captured by two Japanese
cruisers, which action caused wide criticism.
Four days after the battle of the Yellow Sea, the Vladivostok squadron,
consisting of the splendid cruisers _Rurik_, _Rossia_, and
_Gromvoi_--for the other cruiser, _Bogatyr_, had run on the rocks near
the harbor--which had more than once eluded Admiral Kamimura, were
finally discovered by him north of the Tsushima Island. After a lively
engagement the _Rurik_ was sunk, and the other two Russian cruisers
narrowly escaped to Vladivostok.
[Illustration: JAPANESE ADVANCE TO LIAO-YANG]
During these six months between February and August, the Japanese army
on land in three different corps had been steadily advancing toward
Liao-yang. The first corps, under Lieutenant General Kuroki, which
landed at Korean ports, had encountered no serious opposition on its
march through the peninsula, until it reached the Yalu River on the
frontier. There took place on the last days of April and May 1 the first
important land battle between the contending armies. The Russian forces
under Zassulitch were overpowered by the superior artillery of the
enemy, and, after a desperate fight and disastrous retreat, fell back to
Feng-hwang-cheng, which again was abandoned on May 6. Then, taking
Sai-ma-tsi on June 7 after several attempts, Kuroki came to the
difficult pass of Mo-tien-ling, which he captured on July 4 after a hard
fight, and which the Russians made a costly, but unsuccessful, effort to
retake on July 17. Chiao-tow fell on July 19, and Yu-shu-lin-tsu and
Yang-tsu-ling on August 1. From the end of August, Kuroki coöperated
with the two other army corps which had simultaneously been closing upon
Liao-yang. Of these, the second corps, under Lieutenant General Oku,
landing on May 5 at Pi-tsu-wo on the northeastern coast of the Liao-tung
peninsula, immediately took Pu-lan-tien, and, after a sixteen-hour
battle of the most desperate character, had driven the enemy toward Port
Arthur from Kin-chow and Nanshan Hills on May 26. These actions
completely cut the forces at Port Arthur from the rest of the Russian
army in Manchuria. General Kuropatkin, commanding the army, however, now
possessed nearly 100,000 men south of Liao-yang, and, yielding to the
impossible request from St. Petersburg that he should make a supreme
effort to relieve Port Arthur, dispatched General Stakelberg with
perhaps 44,000 men on this difficult mission. He was attacked on June 13
at Telissu by General Oku's army of a nearly equal size, and, after a
savage battle of artillery fire and bayonet charges, was forced back
with heavy losses. Stakelberg's retreating army offered gallant
resistance to the Japanese at Hiung-yo-cheng on June 21, at Kai-ping
from July 6 to 9, at Taping-ling and Tashi-chiao from July 24 to 29, and
at Tomu-cheng between July 31 and August 1. At the later stage of these
engagements Oku's forces coöperated with divisions of the third army
corps, under General Nodzu, which had landed at Ta-ku-shan on May 19,
and had captured Siu-yen on June 8 and Feng-shui (Wafangao) Pass on June
27. The fall of Anshan-chan on August 27 to the second corps practically
opened the great battle of Liao-yang, the military center of southern
Manchuria, to which General Kuropatkin had retired.
The battle of Liao-yang while not the greatest, was in some respects the
most desperate, engagement of the war. The Japanese forces, under the
supreme command of Field Marshal Ōyama (who had arrived at Dalny on July
20), probably numbered 240,000 men, with 800 guns, and the Russian,
under General Kuropatkin, perhaps 200,000 men, with 572 guns. The
defenses around and in the city were most elaborate and extensive. The
Japanese attack was begun a little before its plans had completely
matured, and, for nearly a week, a complex series of fierce and
determined fightings raged in front of the walled city. On August 31 a
part of Kuroki's army crossed the Taitsu River and began its flanking
movement, and, against the determined effort of Kuropatkin to annihilate
this section of the Japanese, Kuroki succeeded after three days of
action in sending his entire forces across the stream. On September 4
Kuropatkin set the city on fire, and, by a masterly retreat, extricated
the remainder of his army from a threatened closure by Kuroki's
divisions, the entire Russian forces reaching Mukden September 20. He
had lost nearly 25,000 men, and Ōyama half of that number.
Heavy rains now intervened. Kuropatkin at Mukden proclaimed that his
forces were now for the first time strong enough to begin a forward
movement against the enemy. With nine army corps he advanced southward
on October 5, easily taking the railway station by the Sha River and
also the defenses of Bentsiaputse to the east. The cavalry outposts also
scored a few minor victories. Ōyama also now decided to take the
offensive, and marched forward with a wide front extending over fifty
miles from east to northwest to the Hun River. Both sides tried flanking
movements, none of which proved decisively successful. In the heavy
fighting which lasted till the 17th, in which the Russian and Japanese
losses probably amounted, respectively, to 69,000 and 13,300, Kuropatkin
was definitely forced back, and his original purpose to turn the tide of
the war failed. This is known as the battle of the Sha River.
In the meantime, ever since General Nogi landed early in June and at
once began desperate attacks on the outer forts, Port Arthur had been a
scene of prodigious acts of heroism by both the besiegers and the
besieged. Points were taken and retaken, and hundreds lost their lives
at each explosion of mines or terrific cannonading from the surrounding
forts. In the midst of this series of engagements, however, officers and
men of the hostile armies frequently met together to arrange for the
recovery of the dead bodies, always fraternizing in kindly spirit. The
besieging army steadily closed in, and, in the outer line of forts
having been reduced, the 203-Meter Hill of the western inner forts was
at length captured, on November 29-30. From this point Japanese shells
could sweep over the harbor. This was followed by the fall of the
eastern forts of Sung-shu and Ki-kwan, on December 19, which were blown
up by mines laid by the besiegers in tunnels dug directly under the feet
of the enemy. When ten days later the Erlung fort was taken, the
position of the gallant General Stoessel's defending army was no longer
tenable. He capitulated on January 1, 1905, with his remaining army of
nearly 25,000 men, and surrendered fifty forts and 546 guns to the
Japanese army. The war vessels in the harbor had, however, been blown up
and sunk by the Russians before the surrender of the forts. Officers,
including Stoessel, who wished to return were allowed to depart on
parole with their side-arms. In their informal meeting, on January 4,
Generals Nogi and Stoessel lauded the high qualities of each other's
army, the latter visibly moved by the news that Nogi had lost his two
sons in the war. Stoessel, with his wife and a few officers, left
Nagasaki on January 17 on their homeward voyage.
The Japanese veterans at Port Arthur, probably 50,000 or 60,000 in
number, were now ready to march northward to join Ōyama's army. Before
their arrival at the front, however, a severe battle took place in the
heart of winter, from January 25 to 31, at Hokau-tai, on the Hun River,
between General Grippenberg's second Russian army and Ōyama's forces.
The result was not a decisive gain to either side, but the Russians lost
twice as many men as the Japanese, nearly 15,000 of their numbers being
killed and wounded. It was after this battle that Grippenberg openly
declared his disagreement with his chief Kuropatkin, and resigned his
command and was succeeded by General Kaulbars.
With the addition of Nogi's army to the left of Oku's, and of General
Kawamura's to the right of Kuroki's, Ōyama now commanded five corps in
sixteen divisions, numbering at least 400,000 men and occupying a front
of nearly a hundred miles. This colossal army tried conclusions with the
at least 350,000 men under Kuropatkin at Mukden in what was probably the
greatest battle or series of battles in the history of the world. The
engagements began on February 20 and continued till March 16, resulting
in a decisive defeat of the Russians. Until March 7 Kuropatkin's left
was harassed by Kuroki, and his right was defending itself desperately
against the flanking movement of Nogi, while his center, under Linevitch
and Kaulbars, together with Rennenkampf's Cossacks, took a determined
stand against the onslaught of Nodzu and Oku. The retreat was ordered on
the night of this day, for a further delay would cause Kuropatkin's
divisions to be surrounded and annihilated. The Japanese closely pursued
the fleeing enemy, and gave him no time to rally before crossing the Hun
River. The blinding dust storm and the biting cold of March 9 did not
greatly detract from the rigor of the pursuit. Mukden was entered by
Ōyama early on March 10, and the strong defense and the great colliery
at Fushun to the east were taken the next day. The Russians now retired
to Tie-ling, forty miles to the north, in a complete rout, Linevitch's
army alone making an orderly retreat. Tie-ling was also taken on the
16th, the Russians receding further north. Their losses probably
aggregated 150,000 men, or more than forty per cent. of the entire army,
while the Japanese lost about one-third as many in killed and wounded.
The tsar at once convoked a war council, and resolved to dispatch to the
East another Russian army of 450,000 men. The day after the fall of
Tie-ling, he telegraphed Kuropatkin and, without a word of praise,
transferred the latter's command over the Manchurian army to Linevitch.
Kuropatkin retired to Harbin, and then returned to serve under the new
commander-in-chief.
The Baltic fleet of Russia, the departure of which for the East had been
announced several times, at last started from Kronstadt in the middle of
October, 1904, under Vice Admiral Rozhestvenski. Having been aroused to
a state of nervous apprehension by the unfounded rumor that Japanese
torpedo boats were in European waters, some officers of the Russian
fleet fancied that they descried two of these small war vessels among
the British fishing boats at Dogger Bank in the North Sea, on the night
of October 21, and fired upon them, sinking a trawler, killing two
fishermen, and injuring several others. The fleet then proceeded south
at full speed. It had also attacked, at different times, a Swedish, a
Norwegian, a Danish, and a German ship. When the news of the Dogger Bank
incident reached Hull on the 24th, all England was aflame, and the more
radical people counseled war with Russia. Owing to the calmness of the
British government, however, and also to the assistance of France, the
matter was referred to the investigation of an international court of
naval experts. The latter published the opinion of its majority, on
February 25, 1905, that the firing was unjustifiable and unduly
prolonged, but that it did not impair the military valor and the
humanitarian sentiment of the Russian admiral and his staff.
Soon after the North Sea incident the Baltic fleet was divided into two
sections, one under Admiral Voelkersam going by way of the Suez Canal
and the other under Rozhestvenski himself rounding the Cape of Good
Hope. The two squadrons reunited in January in the Indian Ocean, and
drilled their raw crews near the French Island of Madagascar. A third
section, under Admiral Nebokatov, left Libau on February 15, and joined
the main squadron before it entered the Chinese waters. The stay of the
fleet near Saigon and Kamranh Bay, French Indo-China, raised delicate
questions as to the rights of the hostile vessel in a neutral harbor,
but a friction was averted by the tardy, but definite, action taken by
the tsar and the French government in ordering away the Russian fleet
from the French territorial waters. Near the end of May the entire fleet
was headed toward its final destination.
Admiral Tōgō had visited Tōkyō after the fall of Port Arthur, and by his
natural modesty and force of character inspired the nation with an
unbounded confidence in his success in the coming contest with the
Baltic fleet. He avoided popular ovation, saying he had yet much to do,
and came and went like a plain farmer. Leaving Tōkyō on February 6,
1905, the very day when, a year before, he led his fleet from Sasebo
toward Port Arthur, he made every preparation to meet Rozhestvenski's
ships. A few days before the latter's arrival Tōgō was convinced that in
their attempt to reach Vladivostok they would make a dash through the
Korean Straits, instead of going by way of the Tsugaru or La Perouse
Straits, and kept his entire fleet at and near Masampo. At five o'clock
in the morning of May 27 Tōgō's scouts reported by wireless telegraphy
that Russian vessels were sighted near Quelpart Island. Thrilled by the
news, all the divisions immediately turned to their assigned missions.
The sea was overcast by a heavy fog and the waves were high from a sharp
southwest wind. Two of the Japanese cruiser squadrons advanced toward
the enemy, and, between 10 and 11 A. M., led him gradually toward the
Japan side of the straits, and then at 1.30 P. M. joined the main
squadron. The enemy's vessels were now visible in two main columns, the
battleships to the starboard and the cruisers and coast-defenders to the
port, and headed by the _Jemchug_ and the _Izumrud_, and followed by a
long line of smaller vessels, the entire formation extending over
several miles. The vessels were painted black, with the funnels whitish
yellow and the rims black, so that they were conspicuous on the sea,
while the Japanese ships were light green and gray, and not so easily
discernible as the Russian. Just before two o'clock Tōgō signaled to the
entire fleet: "The destiny of the empire depends on this one battle; let
everyone do his utmost." The battleship squadron under Tōgō's direct
command and the cruisers under Kamimura pressed the enemy eastward, and,
from a distance of 6000 meters, concentrated their terrific fire upon
the foremost Russian vessels, while other Japanese squadrons attacked
the enemy from the rear. The main issue was decided within an hour. The
_Oslabia_, the _Alexander III._, and the flagship _Kniaz Suvarov_,
caught fire and went out of action, as well as several smaller vessels
in the rear. The columns of smoke wafted by the wind over the sea
concealed the hostile fleets from each other's view, and the firing was
suspended by the main squadrons at 2.45. Admiral Voelkersam had been
killed, and Rozhestvenski himself wounded and transferred to a destroyer
in an unconscious state, the command being assumed by Nebogatov. From
three o'clock the Russian vessels made a desperate effort to flee
northward, but were so fiercely fired upon that they turned south. Now
the battle raged in several sections till sunset. The _Oslabia_, the
_Alexander III._, the _Borodino_, and the _Kniaz Suvarov_, all
battleships, and two special service boats, were sunk. At sundown the
Japanese torpedo craft, whose work had thus far been secondary, took the
field, and succeeded in throwing the enemy into a hopeless confusion,
sinking the battleship _Navarin_ and incapacitating the battleship
_Sissoi Veliki_ and the armored cruisers _Admiral Nakhimov_ and
_Monomakh_. The last three vessels sank the next day.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR]
The fog lifted on May 28, and the main squadrons under Tōgō and Kamimura
were near Ulung Island about 5.30 A. M., when a Russian fleet,
consisting of two battleships, two coast-defenders, and two cruisers,
were discovered heading northeast. The different squadrons completely
surrounded the enemy near Liancourt Islands about 10.30, and Admiral
Nebogatov soon surrendered, although the cruiser _Izumrud_ alone
escaped. In the afternoon two Japanese destroyers found and pursued two
Russian destroyers, one of which, _Biedovy_, carrying the wounded
Rozhestvenski, surrendered, and the other escaped. The cruisers
_Svetlana_ and _Dmitri Donskoi_, the coast-defender _Oushakov_, and a
destroyer, were either sunk or driven aground, making the total Russian
loss during the two days six battleships, one coast-defender, five
cruisers, five destroyers, one converted cruiser, and four special
service vessels. Out of the 18,000 Russian sailors, nearly 12,000 must
have gone down with the sinking vessels. The Japanese lost only three
torpedo boats and 116 killed and 538 wounded, but captured two
battleships, two coast-defenders, and a destroyer. Of the Russian
vessels which escaped, the cruiser _Almaz_ and two destroyers reached
Vladivostok, but a destroyer and two special service boats which got to
Shanghai, and the cruisers _Aurora_, _Oleg_, and _Jemchug_, that went to
Manila, were dismantled. Admiral Tōgō reported, in his characteristic
manner, that the "miracle" of his victory was "entirely owing to the
illustrious virtues of the emperor, and was beyond all human
possibility," and that he could not but believe that "the comparatively
small losses were due to the protection of the spirits of the imperial
forefathers."
As soon as the decisive battle of the Sea of Japan was fought, Theodore
Roosevelt, President of the United States, who had once before failed,
in February, to induce Russia to agree to come treat for peace with
Japan, renewed his effort to bring the belligerent powers together to a
discussion of peace terms exclusively between themselves. In this effort
he was supported by the French government and the German emperor. After
preliminary consultations with Takahira and Count Cassini, the Japanese
and Russian representatives at Washington, Roosevelt addressed the
following note to the governments of St. Petersburg and Tōkyō: "The
President feels that the time has come when in the interest of all
mankind he must endeavor to see if it is not possible to bring to an end
the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged. With both Russia
and Japan the United States has inherited ties of friendship and
good-will. It hopes for the prosperity and welfare of each, and it feels
that the progress of the world is set back by the war between those two
great nations.
"The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese Governments,
not only for their own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized
world, to open direct negotiations for peace with each other. The
President suggests that those peace negotiations be conducted directly
and exclusively between the belligerents, in other words, that there may
be a meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates
without any intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for
those representatives of the two powers to agree to terms of peace. The
President earnestly asks that the Russian Government do now agree to
such a meeting, and is asking the Japanese Government likewise to agree.
"While the President does not feel that any intermediary should be
called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is
entirely willing to do what he properly can, if the two powers concerned
feel that his services will be of aid, in arranging the preliminaries as
to the time and place of meeting. But if even these preliminaries can be
arranged directly between the two powers, or in any other way, the
President will be glad, as his sole purpose is to bring about a meeting
which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace."
The Japanese government responded, saying that Japan would open
negotiations directly and exclusively with Russia regarding terms of
peace. The Russian reply, at first given orally and then made with some
reservation, was finally couched in substantially the same language as
the Japanese. Japan appointed as her peace envoys Baron Komura, minister
for foreign affairs, and Kogorō Takahira, minister at Washington.
Russia's choice of her chief envoy first fell on Nelidov, ambassador at
Paris, then on Muraviev, ambassador at Rome, but later was changed to
Count Serge Witte, president of the committee of ministers. The new
Russian ambassador at Washington, Baron Rosen, was appointed the second
envoy of Russia. As for the place of the conference, neither Paris,
suggested by Russia, nor Chifu, suggested by Japan, being acceptable to
the other party, respectively, the two governments finally agreed upon
Washington. Because of the excessive summer heat of the American
capital, however, it was decided that actual negotiations should be held
at the navy yard near the quiet historic town of Portsmouth, New
Hampshire. The envoys were announced to arrive by August 1.
In the meantime, before the end of July, the Russian Island of Sakhalin,
the southern half of which had till 1875 been claimed by Japan, was
occupied by the Japanese forces, which also seized a few points on the
coast of southeastern Siberia.
The envoys of the belligerent powers having arrived, they were
introduced to one another by President Roosevelt on the _Mayflower_ on
August 5, and then proceeded to Portsmouth, arriving there on the 8th.
They sojourned at the Hotel Wentworth on the small Island of New Castle
near Portsmouth, whither flocked many curious summer visitors and more
than a hundred newspaper correspondents from various parts of the world.
The first informal meeting of the envoys was held at the naval stores
building at the navy yard, but the actual business of the peace
negotiations began on the following day. On that day Baron Komura
presented, in writing, the entire list of twelve terms of peace, which
are believed to have covered the following points: 1, Japan's
preponderant interest in Korea, and the principle of the open door
therein; 2, evacuation of Manchuria by the Japanese and Russian armies;
3, restoration of Chinese administration in Manchuria; 4, China's
territorial integrity and the open door in Manchuria; 5, cession to
Japan of the Island of Sakhalin; 6, surrender to Japan of the lease of
the Kwan-tung district, containing Port Arthur, Dalny, and adjacent
islands; 7, transfer to Japan of the railway between Port Arthur (and
Dalny) and Harbin; 8, retention by Russia of the main Manchurian railway
from Mandchourie to Grotekovo; 9, reimbursement by Russia of Japan's
cost of war; 10, surrender by Russia of her war vessels interned in
neutral ports; 11, limitation of Russia's naval power in the Pacific;
and 12, the rights of the Japanese subjects to fish in the waters of the
Siberian littoral. To these terms Witte gave a written reply on the
12th, stating his assent to some points, willingness to discuss some
others, and absolute dissent from the rest. Then the envoys discussed
the terms one after another, and, within six days, found themselves in
agreement, in substance or in principle, on the first, second, third,
fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and twelfth terms. As regarded the other
four points, particularly the cession of Sakhalin and the payment of the
war expenditures, the Russian envoy considered them as incompatible with
the honor and dignity of the tsar's empire.
The conference now seemed to be ending in failure, when on August 18
occurred the visit of Baron Kaneko to President Roosevelt at Oyster Bay,
followed on the next day by the invitation extended to Baron Rosen to
come on from New Castle. Kaneko again called on Roosevelt on the 21st,
while Meyer, American ambassador at St. Petersburg, had a long interview
with the tsar two days after. The president was urging the two
governments, through these various channels, to arrive at some
compromise of their differences for the sake of peace. When Meyer had an
audience of the tsar, the Japanese government had already accepted
Roosevelt's suggestion for compromise by intimating its willingness to
drop the demands for the surrender of the interned vessels and for the
limitation of Russia's naval power, and to allow Russia to repurchase
the northern half of Sakhalin, which was in Japan's military occupation,
for 1,200,000 _yen_. The tsar, however, unequivocally declined to agree
to this compromise, for he considered the proposed repurchase as an
indemnity in disguise, to which he was opposed in principle. Despite
Ambassador Meyer's repeated appeal, Nicholas II. remained firm,
although--whether by his instruction or on Witte's own initiative is not
known--the southern half of Sakhalin was offered to Japan. In the
meantime, President Roosevelt appealed to Japan, until the deliberations
of the privy councilors at Tōkyō resulted in the emperor's instructions
to his envoys at Portsmouth to waive their demand for money and to
accept the southern half of Sakhalin. This final concession, which at
length made peace possible, was announced by Baron Komura at the morning
session of August 29, and came as a complete surprise to Witte and to
the whole world. The articles of the treaty were then drafted, and
signed by the envoys on September 5.
The concessions of the privy councilors greatly disappointed the
Japanese people, who had been somewhat flushed by their unexpected
victories over the mighty foe. The popular dissatisfaction, intensified
by local conditions, broke out in an open riot on the streets of Tōkyō
on September 5-7. In Russia, also, the treaty was not received with
unmixed joy even by the peace-loving peasants, for although peace was
welcome, the war and consequently the results of its failure, which were
embodied in the terms of the treaty, were considered by them as
unnecessary and ignominious. The sovereigns of both powers, however,
ratified the treaty on October 14. The following is the English version
of this memorable document:
"The Emperor of Japan on one part and the Emperor of All the Russias on
the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace
to their countries, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and have
for this purpose named their plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his
Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutarō Jusami, Grand Cordon
of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his minister of foreign
affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogorō, Imperial Order of the
Sacred Treasure, his minister to the United States, and, for his Majesty
the Emperor of All the Russias his Excellency Serge Witte, his secretary
of state and president of the committee of ministers of the empire of
Russia, and his excellency Baron Roman Rosen, master of the imperial
court of Russia, his Majesty's ambassador to the United States, who,
after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good
and due form, have concluded the following articles:
"Article One--There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their
majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias and
between their respective States and subjects.
"Article Two--The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan
possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical
interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for
guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan
may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian
subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the
subjects and citizens of other foreign powers, that is to say, they
shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the
most favored nation. It is also agreed, in order to avoid causes of
misunderstanding, that the two high contracting parties will abstain on
the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may
menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.
"Article Three--Japan and Russia mutually engage:
"First--To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the
territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung peninsula, and in
conformity with the provisions of the additional Article One annexed to
this treaty, and,
"Second--To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive
administration of China all the portions of Manchuria now in occupation
or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the
exception of the territory above mentioned.
"The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in
Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential, or exclusive
concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent
with the principle of equal opportunity.
"Article Four--Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any
general measures common to all countries which China may take for the
development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.
"Article Five--The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to
the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of
China, the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien, and the adjacent territory and
territorial waters, and all rights, privileges, and concessions
connected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and
assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and
properties in the territory affected by the afore mentioned lease. The
two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the
Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation. The Imperial
Government of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights
of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be
perfectly respected.
"Article Six--The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and
assign to the Imperial Government of Japan without compensation and with
the consent of the Chinese Government the railway between Chang-chun-fu
and Kuan-chang-tsu and Port Arthur and all the branches, together with
all the rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto in that
region, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or
worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties
mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China
mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.
"Article Seven--Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective
railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes
and in nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this
restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by
the lease of the Liao-tung peninsula.
"Article Eight--The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia, with the
view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as
possible, conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their
connecting railway services in Manchuria.
"Article Nine--The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial
Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern
portion of the Island of Sakhalin, and all the islands adjacent thereto,
and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of
north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded
territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the additional Article Eleven, annexed
to this treaty. Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in
their respective possessions on the Island of Sakhalin, or the adjacent
islands, any fortifications or other similar military works. They also
respectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede
the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of
Tartary.
"Article Ten--It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the
territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property, and retire to
their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they
will be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their
industries and rights of property, on condition of submitting to the
Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to
withdraw the right of residence in, or to deport from such territory any
inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She
engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall
be fully respected.
"Article Eleven--Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to
Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian
possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering Seas. It is agreed that
the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to
Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.
"Article Twelve--The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and
Russia having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of
Japan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial
relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and
navigation, the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the
present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the
most favored nation, in which are included import and export duties,
customs formalities, transit, and tonnage dues, and the admission and
treatment of agents, subjects, and vessels of one country in the
territories of the other.
"Article Thirteen--So soon as possible after the present treaty comes in
force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial
Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special
commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands
of one government shall be delivered to and received by the commissioner
of the other government or by his duly authorized representative in such
convenient numbers and such convenient ports of the delivering state as
such delivering state shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the
receiving state. The governments of Japan and Russia shall present each
other so soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is
completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively
incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoners from the
date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery.
Russia engages to repay to Japan so soon as possible after the exchange
of statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount
so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by
Russia.
"Article Fourteen--The present treaty shall be ratified by their
Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias. Such
ratification shall be with as little delay as possible and in any case
no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty,
to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia
respectively through the French minister at Tōkyō and the ambassador of
the United States at St. Petersburg and from the date of the later of
such announcements this treaty shall in all its parts come into full
force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at
Washington so soon as possible.
"Article Fifteen--The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in
both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute
conformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation, the
French text shall prevail.
"In conformity with the provisions of Articles Three and Nine of the
treaty of peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned
plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:
"Sub-Article to Article Three--The Imperial Governments of Japan and
Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military
forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately
after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of
eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be
completely withdrawn from Manchuria except from the leased territory of
the Liao-tung peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the
front positions shall first be withdrawn.
"The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to
maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria.
The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer, and
within that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian
armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be
employed as small as possible while having in view the actual
requirements.
"The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall
agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above
principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to
carry out the evacuation so soon as possible and in any case no later
than the period of eighteen months.
"Sub-Article to Article Nine--So soon as possible after the present
treaty comes into force, a commission of delimitation composed of an
equal number of members is to be appointed respectively by the two high
contracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner
the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the
Island of Sakhalin. The commission shall be bound so far as
topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of
north latitude as the boundary line, and, in case any deflections from
that line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will be
made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the
duty of said commission to prepare a list and a description of the
adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission
shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded
territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval
of the high contracting parties.
"The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with
the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.
"Portsmouth, the Fifth Day of the Ninth Month of the Thirty-eight year
of Meiji, corresponding to the Twenty-third of August, 1905. (September
5, 1905.)
"In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and
affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.
"Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this Fifth day of the Ninth Month of
the Thirty-eighth Year of the Meiji, corresponding to the Twenty-third
day of August, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Five."
No less important than the Russo-Japanese treaty is the renewed
agreement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance concluded between Lord
Lansdowne, the British foreign minister, and Baron Hayashi, the Japanese
minister at London, on August 12 at London, and published on September
27 simultaneously at London and Tōkyō. Its text reads as follows:
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing
the agreement concluded between them January 30, 1902, by fresh
stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for
their object:
"A--The consolidation and the maintenance of general peace in the
regions of Eastern Asia and India.
"B--The preservation of the common interests of all the powers in China
by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the
principles of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all
nations in China.
"C--The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting
parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of
their special interests in the said regions.
"Article 1--It is agreed that whenever in the opinion either of Great
Britain or Japan any of the rights and interests referred to in the
preamble to this agreement are in jeopardy, the two governments will
communicate with each other fully and frankly and will consider in
common the measures which should be taken to safeguard these menaced
rights or interests.
"Art. 2--Should either of the high contracting parties be involved in
war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests, the other
party will at once come to the assistance of its ally and both parties
will conduct a war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with any
power or powers involved in such war.
"Art. 3--Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic
interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes Japan's right to take such
measures for the guidance, control, and protection of Korea as she may
deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests,
providing the measures so taken are not contrary to the principle of
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.
"Art. 4--Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns
the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take
such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find
necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.
"Art. 5--The high contracting parties agree that neither will, without
consulting the other, enter into a separate arrangement with another
power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble.
"Art. 6--As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great
Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality, unless some other
power or powers join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great
Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, will conduct war in
common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.
"Art. 7--The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded
by either power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the
present agreement and the means by which such assistance shall be made
available will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the
contracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another
fully and freely on all questions of mutual interest.
"Art. 8--The present agreement shall be subject to the provisions of
Art. 6 and come into effect immediately after the date of signature and
remain in force for ten years from that date in case neither of the
parties shall have been notified twelve months before the expiration of
said ten years of an intention of terminating it. It shall remain
binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of
the parties shall have denounced it, but if, when the date for the
expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war the alliance
shall be _ipso facto_ and continue until peace shall be concluded."
The armistice was arranged between the Russian and Japanese armies on
September 13. During the nineteen months of war between February, 1904,
and September, 1905, Russia probably sent between eight and nine hundred
thousand soldiers to the East, and Japan not less than six hundred
thousand. Never before in the world's history had such large armies been
sent to the seat of war in so brief a period. The Russian losses
probably amounted to more than 350,000, including the killed, the
wounded, the sick, and the captured, and Japan lost, in deaths alone,
72,490. Of the latter, 15,300 died of sickness, while the rest either
fell in battle or subsequently died from wounds--an unusually low
death-rate from the latter cause. Russia lost the major part of her
Pacific and Baltic fleets, while the Japanese navy was increased in size
by the surrender of the enemy's vessels and by the raising of several of
the sunken ships. The war greatly intensified the otherwise strong
national sentiment of the Japanese people and enhanced their position
among the powers of the world, while the moderate terms of peace and the
catholicity of national character have served as an efficient check
against an undue expansion. On the other hand, the unexpected exposure
of the weakness of Russia's bureaucracy has sensibly reduced the
hitherto overestimated value of her political power. In Europe, as well
as in Asia, her position in international affairs has already begun to
show signs of this change. At the same time, the Russian people have
renewed their conviction of the need of a true national administration,
and the weakened autocracy is compelled to consider popular demands for
reform. Not the least important result of the war is the fact that it
has insured the humane principles of China's territorial integrity in
Manchuria, and of equal opportunity for the trade and industry of all
nations in that region and Korea. The Treaty of Portsmouth recognized
these principles and the Anglo-Japanese agreement has insured them by a
powerful coalition.
[1] On November 6, 1905, the Order of the Garter was conferred on the
emperor by King Edward VII. of England, and the British legation in
Japan was raised to an embassy. The emperor visited the shrine of Ise in
November and there reported the successful conclusion of the war to the
spirits of his ancestors. The end of the year was marked by a treaty
with China which made Japan's position in Korea the same as Russia's had
been before the war.
In October, 1906, the school board of San Francisco in the United States
issued an order excluding the Japanese children from the public schools
of that city and requiring them to attend a separate school for
Orientals. This action was taken as an affront by the Japanese
government and a protest was sent by the latter to the United States
government on October 15. President Roosevelt took prompt action on the
matter, sending Victor H. Metcalf, the Secretary of the Interior, to
investigate and report. President Roosevelt also announced that Japan's
treaty rights would be enforced at every hazard. Conferences were held
between the State officials of California and the President, resulting
in the President issuing an order on March 14, 1907, that all Japanese
and Koreans without passports would be excluded from the United States
and the San Francisco Board of Education deciding to admit Japanese
pupils up to the age of sixteen to the schools. Sensational newspapers
both in Japan and in the United States at this period were filled with
rumors of war between the two countries and at times during the year
1907 they would insist that war was imminent.
In the meantime the Japanese government under the leadership of Viscount
Hayashi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, took measures to enforce certain
laws on her own statute books concerning the use of foreign coolies in
Japan and to limit Japanese emigration to the United States. The visit
of William Howard Taft, the American Secretary of War, to Japan on his
way to the Philippines and the friendliness of his reception by the
Japanese and his own words of assurance did much toward allaying
whatever feeling of actual hostility still remained among the Japanese
people and the visit of the American fleet of sixteen battleships in the
next year ended all talk of a war. In 1907 similar friction occurred
between Great Britain and Japan because certain Japanese merchants and
laborers in Vancouver, Canada, were attacked and driven from their
houses. This matter was adjusted peacefully by Viscount Hayashi and Sir
Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador. As a proof that Japan intends
to keep her promises to regulate immigration to the United States may be
cited some immigration figures for 1908: during that year there were
admitted to the entire United States only 185 more Japanese of all
classes than departed from it, and a great many more Japanese laborers
left the United States than entered it.
In the fall of 1909 a Commercial Commission, sent by the merchants of
Japan, visited the United States, studying American business and
industrial methods and purchasing a large variety of manufactured
articles which had never found a market in the Orient and buying the
newest machinery used in lumber, mining, and milling industries, and
also devices for food preservation, and learned many of the labor-saving
methods used in banking and commercial offices.
A Franco-Japanese Agreement was signed on June 10, 1907, providing that
the most-favored-nation treatment should be accorded the officials and
subjects of Japan in French Indo-China for everything concerning their
persons and the protection of their property, and that the same
treatment should be granted the subjects of French Indo-China in the
Empire of Japan and that these provisions should hold until the
expiration of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between
France and Japan, August 4, 1896. In regard to the continent of Asia,
the two countries agreed to "respect the independence and integrity of
China as well as the principles of equality of treatment in that country
for the commerce and subjects of all nations, and having a special
interest in seeing that order and a pacific state of affairs guaranteed,
particularly in the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the
territories where they have rights of sovereignty, protection, and
occupation, bind themselves mutually to support one another in order to
assure the peace and security of those regions, with a view to the
maintenance of the respective positions and territorial rights of the
two contracting parties on the Asiatic continent."
During 1907 several Russo-Japanese conventions were signed. The first,
concluded on July 28, was a treaty of commerce and navigation in
accordance with article 12 of the Treaty of Portsmouth; in the second,
concluded two days later, each agreed to respect the territorial
integrity of the other, the agreements then in force between the
contracting parties and China, and the independence and integrity of
China, and to uphold the _status quo_ with all the peaceable means at
their disposal; a third convention related to the fisheries of the Sea
of Japan, the Okhotsk Sea, and the Behring Sea; the fourth provided for
the joining of the Russian railways in Manchuria at Kwang-cheng-tsze. In
August the legations at Tokio and St. Petersburg were raised to the
status of embassies by their respective governments.
On February 5, 1908, Chinese custom officers seized the Japanese steamer
Tatsu Maru in Portuguese waters off Macao, where it had landed to
discharge arms shipped from a Japanese port to a Chinese merchant at
Macao. The Japanese resented the seizure and complained to the Chinese
authorities demanding an apology and an indemnity. At first the latter
defended their action, but on the receipt of an ultimatum from the
Japanese on March 5, China apologized and gave assurance that the
indemnity would be paid and the responsible persons punished. Japan in
return agreed to prevent the trade in arms and ammunition between
Japanese and Chinese citizens. Thus a friendly feeling was restored
between the two countries but public opinion had been greatly inflamed
in China and a boycott of Japanese goods had begun. During the year many
Japanese vessels left Chinese ports without the goods for which they had
come. It is estimated that the Japanese lost some $8,000,000 by this
boycott.
China also felt embittered against Japan in this same year because of
the latter's course in Manchuria, where she had retained the public
buildings at Mukden and the Manchurian gold mines, taken possession of
the Manchurian post-offices and telegraph lines, occupied a portion of
the province of Kirin, claiming it as Korean territory, although it had
long been held as part of China, and forbade the building of a railway
to the west of the Liau River, from Hsenmintun to Fakumen, saying that
it would compete with the Japanese system. These difficulties were
adjusted soon. Japan agreed to the building of the railroad on condition
that at no point should it come within a minimum distance from the
Japanese line. On October 12 and November 7, agreements were signed at
Tokio concerning the telegraph lines. China agreed to place special
telegraph wires between the treaty ports, Kwant-cheng-tsze, Tie-ling,
Mukden, Liau-yang, Niu-chwang, Antung, and the railroad territory at the
exclusive disposal of Japan for a period of fifteen years, the service
on the wires to be worked by Japanese clerks in the employ of the
Japanese government from the Chinese telegraph buildings, but only to be
used for the exchange of telegrams from or to places under the direct
control of the Japanese telegraph system. Japan undertook to pass over
to China all Japanese telegraph lines in Manchuria outside her railway
territory, to construct no telegraph or telephone lines in Manchuria
outside the same territory, and to construct no telegraph or telephone
lines or erect wireless stations outside her leased territory. She also
agreed to pay China a small annual royalty on all messages sent over the
Japanese Manchurian telegraph lines. On September 4, 1909, an agreement
was signed at Peking regarding the improvement of the Antung-Mukden
Railroad and which gave to Japan the advantages in Manchurian trade.
General elections to the House of Representatives were held on May 15,
1908, resulting in a sweeping victory for the Seiyu-kai. For the first
time since the formation of the diet, one party had elected a majority
of all the members. On July 12, Marquis Katsura was given the imperial
command to form a ministry. As this nobleman was connected with the
weakest of the political parties, the Daids Club, his appointment as
premier was a great disappointment to the Seiyu-kai, who had hoped to
have one of their own leaders hold that office.
In July, 1909, twenty-three members of the Imperial Diet were convicted
for complicity in a graft scandal. Five directors of the Great Japan
Sugar Company were at the same time convicted of bribing the nation's
representatives and all twenty-eight received very severe sentences.
In the meantime Japan's influence in Korea had increased to such an
extent that by the end of 1907, Korea was for all practical purposes an
integral part of the Japanese Empire. Soon after the outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Korea signed an agreement, by which Japan
undertook to insure the safety of the imperial household and guaranteed
the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire, in
return for which Korea agreed to accept the advice of Japan as to
improvements in administration. Six months later Korea, in another
agreement with Japan, pledged herself to regulate her finances in
accordance with the advice of the Japanese financial adviser and a
foreign diplomatic adviser, named by Japan, and also to consult the
government of Japan before making treaties or conventions with other
powers or granting them concessions. Following the Treaty of Portsmouth,
another agreement was entered into by Japan and Korea on November 17,
1905, which provided that Japan should control and direct the external
relations in the affairs of Korea through the Department of Foreign
Affairs at Tokio; and that Japan should be represented at the court of
the Emperor of Korea by a Resident-General, residing at Seoul, and
should have the right to station representatives at the several open
ports and at such other places in Korea as it might deem necessary. In
accordance with this agreement, Mr. Durham White Stevens, an American,
experienced in diplomatic service, was chosen by Japan to be Diplomatic
Adviser at Seoul to the Foreign Office. In spite of these agreements the
Korean Emperor sent to The Hague Peace Conference in 1907, a delegation
consisting of Prince Yi-Ui-Tjyong, Yi-Tjun, a Korean judge, and
Yi-Sang-Sul, former vice-premier of Korea; these men claimed that Japan
had committed acts contrary to the agreement of 1884, and had forced the
Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign the agreement giving Japan
the control of Korea's foreign affairs. The conference could do nothing
for the delegation as it was understood that the deliberations of the
peace commissioners should not be concerned with relations between
nations that had been settled by treaty. As a result of his sending this
delegation the Emperor of Korea was forced to abdicate on July 19, 1907,
in favor of his son, the Crown Prince. The ministry of Korea opposed
this abdication and the Abolitionists broke out into riots; therefore
Japan forced the signing of another treaty on July 25. This (1) placed
the administration of all Korean affairs in the hands of the Japanese
Resident-General; (2) provided that the enactment of all laws and
ordinances and the transaction of important state affairs must receive
the approval of the Resident-General; (3) decided that a definite line
of demarcation is to be drawn between administrative and judicial
affairs; (4) stated that Japanese subjects recommended by the
Resident-General are eligible to office under the Korean government; (5)
provided that foreigners may be employed only with the consent of the
Resident-General; (6) agreed that the clause of the agreement of August
22, 1904, providing for the employment of a financial adviser be
annulled.
Following this agreement and in order to enforce it, the Korean native
army was disbanded on August 1, 1907. The new emperor, Yi-Chök, at the
instance of Prince Ito, the Resident-General, ordered the punishment of
The Hague envoys and of men of his father's court suspected of fostering
resistance. Japanese forces in Korea were increased and the new
crown-prince was sent to Japan to be educated. During 1908 the Japanese
colonization of Korea continued; new regiments were sent to Korea, the
number of Japanese officials were increased, radical reforms were
undertaken in the judiciary, and the imperial assets were transferred
to the national treasury.
All this was not done without opposition on the part of the Koreans:
parties of rebels gathered over the country and there was a continual
guerilla warfare; plots were formed against Japanese officials, an
attempt being made to derail Prince Ito's train in the latter part of
April, 1908; and the native press became so virulent in its denunciation
of the Japanese government that the latter promulgated and enforced a
law forbidding the sale of any paper containing matter subversive of the
public peace under penalty of fine or imprisonment.
On October 26, 1909, Prince Ito was shot and killed at Harbin,
Manchuria, by a Korean, who confessed to the police that he had
journeyed to Harbin for the express purpose of assassinating the Prince
"to avenge my country," blaming Prince Ito for his countrymen's loss of
political liberty.
The terrible storms which prevailed all over the world during the latter
part of 1909 were especially severe off the coast of Japan, and two
Japanese steamers foundered off Korea and Japan, on November 30, the
loss of life being very heavy.
Manchuria is a center of disturbance in all eastern questions, and Japan
registered her protest on January 8, 1910, against the plan proposed by
the United States Secretary of State, Knox, for neutralizing the
railroads of Manchuria, the Japanese statesmen being utterly opposed to
such a measure.
The history of Japan within recent years has been a record of marvelous
expansion in home industries and in foreign trade. Retrenchments in
expenditures for army and navy, a general betterment of labor conditions
and construction of inland waterways have also materially aided the
progress of the nation.
A high protective tariff was enacted in 1910, but provision was made for
the reduction of duties in specific cases with foreign countries which
had made concessions to Japan. Thus Great Britain's cotton, linen, and
steel imports were admitted at reduced rates in return for free entry of
Japanese goods into Great Britain.
In August, 1910, Japan annexed Korea and made great progress in the
pacification and settlement of the country.
An agreement was signed with Russia to maintain with her the _status
quo_ in Manchuria.
In July, 1911, the alliance between Japan and Great Britain was renewed
for a period of ten years.
The great Emperor Mutsuhito died in July, 1912. His reign was the most
glorious in the history of Japan: it saw the creation of modern Japan.
General Nogi, the conqueror of Port Arthur and Mukden, committed suicide
on the day of the Emperor's funeral.
The anti-Japanese feeling in the Pacific Coast States of the United
States culminated in May, 1913, in the Legislature of California passing
land laws that barred aliens who were not eligible for citizenship from
acquiring real estate. Japan made decided protest, claiming that these
measures were aimed directly at her, and that they were contrary to her
treaty rights with the United States.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] The publishers have supplied the following paragraphs.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following list of books does not represent the sources and
literature used in revising the text and preparing the supplementary
part of the present volume, but is intended solely for the convenience
of the reader who would naturally confine his attention to works written
in English.
There is hardly a work on general Japanese bibliography which can be
compared with that great Chinese bibliography, the "_Bibliotheca
Sinica_," by Henri Cordier. Fr. von Wenckstern's "Bibliography of the
Japanese Empire," London, 1895, gives, with few comments, works written
only in European languages, and covers the period between 1859 and 1893.
It also contains a facsimile-reprint of Léon Pagès's "_Bibliographie
japonaise depuis le XV^e siècle jusqu'a 1859_." As to articles written
on Japan in the English and American periodicals, "Poole's Index" may be
consulted with profit.
Of works of general information on Japan, the first eight volumes
("Japan: Its History, Art and Literature") of Captain Frank Brinkley's
"Oriental Series," in twelve volumes, London and Boston, 1902-1903,
perhaps deserve the first mention. The work is eminently free from both
the superficiality of the tourist and the well-meaning but not harmless
prejudices of many a missionary. The author's thorough acquaintance with
men and things of Japan, where he has lived for more than thirty years
and is editor of perhaps the best informed and most fair-minded English
journal, the _Japan Mail_, has enabled him to give an intimate view of
the history and the national life of the Japanese. The facile style of
the author also adds greatly to the value of his work for popular
reading. This work grew out of the author's edition of "Japan,"
containing essays on various topics originally written by great native
authorities but much revised and rendered into English by Brinkley. A
new edition of this latter work ("Japan," Boston, 1905), has been
published by J. B. Millet & Co., bringing the account down to the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Captain Brinkley also has an
admirable article on Japan in the twenty-ninth volume of the
"Encyclopædia Britannica." For the student's ready reference, J. J.
Rein's "Japan: Travels and Researches Undertaken at the Cost of the
Prussian Government," English translation, New York, 1884, and his
"Industries of Japan, Together with an Account of Its Agriculture,
Forestry and Commerce," English translation, New York, 1889, are very
useful. B.H. Chamberlain's "Things Japanese," originally published in
Tokyo in 1890 but now in its fourth edition (New York, 1902), is a
dictionary of all subjects of interest, and contains bibliographical
references for many of the subjects treated. The work, however, is in
need of further revision. The same author has compiled with W. B. Mason
a "Hand-book for Travelers in Japan," which is now in its seventh
edition (London, 1903). W. E. Griffis's "Mikado's Empire" at first
appeared in New York in 1876, but, owing to the absence of better works
of this nature, has been so popular that it is in its tenth edition (New
York, 1903). It was once unrivaled in its comprehensiveness, but has
never been considered a work upon which the student could rely for
objective truths regarding Japan. E. W. Clement's little book, "A
Hand-book of Modern Japan," Chicago, 1903, and Henry Dyer's "Dai
Nippon, A Study in National Evolution," London and New York, 1904, are
both useful when used critically. Alfred Stead has edited "Japan by the
Japanese: A Survey by the Highest Authorities," London and New York,
1904.
In the field of general history several older works have been superseded
by newer ones, all of which, however, leave vastly much to be desired.
David Murray's "Japan," New York, 1894 (in the "Story of the Nations"
series), is more narrative than analytical or interpretative. Max von
Brandt has a brief survey in the second volume of the "History of the
World: A Survey of Man's Record," edited by H. F. Helmolt, English
translation, London and New York, 1904. Among works on different periods
of history, the present editor's "Early Institutional Life of Japan,"
Tokyo and New York, 1903, covers the period between 500 and 900 A. D.,
and James Murdoch and Isoh Yamagata's "History of Japan during the
Century of Early Foreign Intercourse (1542-1651)," Tokyo, 1904, takes up
the important period of Japan's earliest European relations under the
feudal régime. For the beginning of the foreign relations in the
nineteenth century, F. O. Adams's "History of Japan to 1871," in two
volumes, London, 1874-1875, Richard Hildreth's "Japan as It Was and Is,"
Boston, 1855, and the lives of "M. C. Perry" and "Townsend Harris" by
W. E. Griffis, Boston, 1897 and 1895, may be recommended. I. Nitobe's
"Intercourse between the United States and Japan," extra volume 8 of the
"Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science,"
Baltimore, 1891, is useful. Coming down to a later period of history,
the accounts of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 by "Vladimir" (the
"China-Japan War," New York, 1896) and F. W. Eastlake and Y. Yamada (the
"Heroic Japan," Tokyo, 1896) may be mentioned. Brinkley's large work, of
course, covers history, as well as arts, literature, customs and
manners, and religion. For a still more recent period, one may consult
the present editor's "Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues,"
London and Boston, 1904. As to the progress of the Russo-Japanese War,
we have yet to look for its authentic history.
Among authors on Old Japan, or, that side of the national life in which
the old civilization has not been greatly affected by the inroad of
European influences, no writer has shown a greater aptitude to grasp its
spirit or has presented it in more charming English than the late
prolific author, Lafcadio Hearn, in his "Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan,"
Boston, 1894, "Out of the East," Boston, 1895, "Kokoro: Hints and Echoes
of Japanese Inner Life," Boston, 1896, "Gleanings in Buddha-fields,"
Boston, 1897, "Exotics and Retrospectives," Boston, 1898, "In Ghostly
Japan," Boston, 1899, "Shadowings," Boston, 1900, "A Japanese
Miscellany," Boston, 1901, "Kwaidan," Boston, 1904, "Romance of the
Milky Way," Boston, 1905, "Japan: An Interpretation," New York, 1904,
and others. Miss Alice M. Bacon's "A Japanese Interior," Boston and New
York, 1893, "Japanese Girls and Women," new edition, Boston, 1902, and
"In the Land of the Gods," Boston, 1905, as well as G. W. Knox's
"Japanese Life in Town and Country" ("Our Asiatic Neighbor" series), New
York, 1904, are recommended. For other sides than are so well described
by these works, the reader must again turn to Captain Brinkley's great
work, and also to articles in the _Transactions of the Asiatic Society
of Japan_ published at Tokyo since 1872.
There are a few works interpretative of the moral side of the evolution
of the Japanese nation, among which again chapters in Brinkley, as well
as I. Nitobe's "Bushido," Philadelphia, 1900, and New York, 1905, and K.
Okakura's "Soul of the East," London and New York, 1904, may be
mentioned. These able authors will admit, however, that the subject
requires so extensive and rigorous a training and so naturally refined
and delicate an intellect, and it is so impossible to pass a final or
even a definite judgment on the matter, that it seems hazardous to rely
upon the opinion of any one writer. S. L. Gulick's "Evolution of the
Japanese, Social and Psychic," New York, 1903, is a misnomer, as no work
of such claim can afford to be more seriously defective in showing the
development of a historic nation. The author's notion of social
evolution, which forms the basis of this work, does not seem to have
been tested by the modern student, and the entire work unfortunately
breathes a certain type of mind and training to the exclusion of others.
In studying such a subject as is aimed at in this work, no student can
be too well trained and too thorough, and no statement can be too
undogmatic.
Of books written on the politics of New Japan, Count (now Marquis)
Hirobumi Ito's "Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of
Japan," English translation, Tokyo, 1889, is the authoritative work and
is indispensable. Chapters in Brinkley, Stead and Clement are
interesting. The last writer has also an article on the local
self-government in the _Political Science Quarterly_ for June, 1892, and
another on the constitutional government in the _Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science_ for March, 1903. T. Ienaga's
"Constitutional Development of Japan" ("Johns Hopkins Studies," 9th
Series, No. 9), Baltimore, 1891, takes up the earlier years of the new
régime, while K. Kawakami's "Political Ideas of Modern Japan,"
University of Iowa, 1903, brings the account of the theoretical side of
the development down to about 1902. An article by H. N. Lay on the
political parties of Japan in the _Transactions of the Asiatic Society
of Japan_, volume 30, No. 3, is valuable.
In regard to the economic and financial conditions of Japan, the United
States _Consular Reports_ and the British _Diplomatic and Consular
Reports_ are very useful. The Japanese Government publishes the
_Economic and Financial Annals of Japan_. Among other official
publications by the same government, the "Report on the Adoption of the
Gold Standard," 1899, the "Post-Bellum Finance," 1900, and "Japan in the
Beginning of the Twentieth Century," 1903, are important. Y.
Kinos[h]ita's "Past and Present of Japanese Commerce" ("Columbia
University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law"), New York,
1902, is an interpretative account of Japan's foreign trade. J. Morris
has written a volume on "Japan and Its Trade" ("Harper's International
Commerce Series"), London and New York, 1902.
Passing to the matter of literature, W. G. Aston has a "History of
Japanese Literature," New York, 1901, while, for practical studies of
the language, one may turn to W. Imbrie's "English-Japanese Etymology,"
Toyko, and B. H. Chamberlain's "Hand-book of Colloquial Japanese,"
Tokyo, 1888, "A Simplified Grammar of the Japanese Language," Toyko,
1886, and the "Moji-no-Shirube; a Practical Introduction to the Study of
the Japanese Writing," London, New York, and Shanghai, 1899.
We conclude by again recommending Captain Brinkley's "Oriental Series"
to general readers, who may also profitably consult some articles in the
_Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan_ and of the _Japan Society
at London_.
INDEX
INDEX
A
Abe Masahiro: urges signing of treaty with America, 157
Abe-no-Hirafu: his campaigns in the north, 27
Abe-no-Nakamaro: scholarship of, 35
Achiki: introduces Chinese learning into Japan, 13
Adams, William: settles in Japan, 135
Aigun: occupied by Russia, 285
Akamatsu Mitsusuke: rebellion of, 95
Akechi Mitsuhide: rewarded with lands of Buddhist priests, 111;
kills Oda Nobunaga, 112
Akira, Prince: made _gijo_, 167
Akita: built, 27
Alexiev, Admiral: concludes treaty with Tsang-chi, 286
Alexis, Prince: visits Japan, 191
Amakusa: battle of (1638), 137
Amoy Affair, The, 283
Andō Nobumasa: assassination of, 161
Anglo-German Agreement: signed, 285
Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), 231, 289
Anglo-Russian Railway Agreement (1899), 279
Anshan-chan: captured by Japanese, 310
Antoku, emperor of Japan: reign of, 59;
death of, 62
An-tung: occupied by the Japanese, 267
Aoki Kanaiye: skill of, 107
Aoki, Viscount: becomes minister of foreign affairs, 190
Arai Hakuseki: sketch of, 142
Araki Matayemon: slays Kawai, 152
Argun: occupied by Russia, 285
Arisugawa, Prince: made commander-in-chief of army, 169;
commissioned to quell rebellion of Saigō, 179
Asana Naganori: story of, 152
Asano Yukinaga: at battle of Sekigahara, 123
Ashikaga Motouji: regent at Kamakura, 92;
joins rebellion of Ōuchi Yoshihiro, 95;
revolt of, 95
Ashikaga Takauji: his campaign in Kyōto, 86;
sketch of, 87;
death of, 91
Ashikaga Yoshiaki: shōgunate of, 101;
opposes growing influence of Oda Nobunaga, 111
Ashikaga Yoshiakira: shōgunate of, 91
Ashikaga Yoshihisa: birth of, 97
Ashikaga Yoshikazu: shōgunate of, 96
Ashikaga Yoshimasa: shōgunate of, 96
Ashikaga Yoshimi: assumes the duties of a regent, 97
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu: shōgunate of, 91, 92;
his relations with China, 102
Ashikaga Yoshimochi: shōgunate of, 92;
severs official intercourse between Japan and China, 103
Ashikaga Yoshinori: shōgunate of, 95;
reopens official intercourse with China, 103
Ashikaga Yoshiteru: assassinated, 100
Austria-Hungary: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Awada-no-Mahito: scholarship of, 34
Azumi-no-Hirafu: his campaign in Korea, 26
B
Belgium: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Bentsiaputse: captured by the Russians, 311
Bitchu-no-Kami: see Hotta Masaatsu
Blagovestchensk: bombarded, 284
Bosatsu: see Gyōgi
Boxer Uprising, The, 279
Buddha, The Great Image of: built, 32
Buddhism: introduced into Japan, 14
C
Chang Chih-tung: attempts to have Manchuria opened to foreign trade, 288
Chang Pak: in command of Chinese army, 76
Chemulpo: destroyed by Japanese, 194;
battle of, 303
Chiao-tow: captured by the Japanese, 310
China: early relations with Japan, 16;
conquests in Korea, 26;
concludes treaty with Japan (1871), 192;
relations with Russia, 276
Ching, Prince: his negotiations concerning Manchuria, 289, 295
Chino-Japanese War, 252
Chiulien-cheng: captured by the Japanese, 267
Chom Wei-king: attempts to negotiate peace with Japan, 119
Christianity: introduced into Japan, 105;
sketch of its progress in Japan, 137
Chūai, emperor of Japan: his campaign against the Kumaso, 12
Chūkyō, emperor of Japan: accession of, 71
Constitutional Party: organized, 219
Constitutional Political Association: organized, 227
Constitution, The: promulgated, 185;
in theory and practice, 199
Cyril, grand duke of Russia: at siege of Port Arthur, 307
D
Dannoura: battle of, 62
Danrin-ji: built, 41
Dazaifu: battle of (1281), 75
Denmark: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Deities, Age of the, 3
Dogger Bank Incident, 313
Dōkyō: influence of, 36
Dutch: begin trade with Japan, 134
E
Edo: rise of, 123;
taken by imperial forces, 169;
see also Tōkyō
Eikyo: captured by the Japanese, 118
Emi Oshikazu: rebellion of, 36
Emishi: rebellion of, 10;
brought into subjection, 27
England: begins trade with Japan, 135;
concludes treaty with China, 277
Enomoto Takeaki: rebellion of, 169;
sent to St. Petersburg, 188
Enotake: siege of, 181
Enryaku-ji: built, 41
Etō Shimpei: rebellion of, 177
F
Feng-hwang-cheng: captured by Japanese, 309
Feng-shui (Wafangao) Pass: captured by the Japanese, 310
Formosa: invaded by Japanese, 192;
ceded to Japan, 273
Francis Xavier, St.: preaches in Japan, 104
Fujiwara-no-Fuhito: aids the spread of Buddhism, 32;
services of, to the empire, 45
Fujiwara-no-Hidehira: kindness of, to Minamoto-no-Yoshitsune, 65;
death of, 66
Fujiwara-no-Hidesato: defeats Tairo-no-Masakado, 53
Fujiwara-no-Kamatari: services of, 45
Fujiwara-no-Michinaga: influence of, 48
Fujiwara-no-Michinori: influence of, 57
Fujiwara-no-Morosuke: minister of the right, 48
Fujiwara-no-Mototsune: ministry of, 46
Fujiwara-no-Narichika: plots against the Taira sway, 59
Fujiwara-no-Nobuyori: rebellion of, 57
Fujiwara-no-Sadakuni: conspires against Sugawara-no-Michizane, 47
Fujiwara-no-Sanesuke: opposes influence of Fujiwara-no-Michinaga, 49
Fujiwara-no-Saneyori: minister of the left, 48
Fujiwara-no-Sumitomo: rebellion of, 53
Fujiwara-no-Tadahira: chief minister of state, 48
Fujiwara-no-Tadamichi: regent for Emperor Konoye, 56
Fujiwara-no-Tokihira: conspires against Sugawara-no-Michizane, 47
Fujiwara-no-Yasuhira: kills Minamoto-Yoshitsune, 66
Fujiwara-no-Yoshifusa: influence of, 46
Fujiwara-no-Yoritsune: made shōgun, 70
Fukushima, Lieutenant Colonel: appointed director of Korean
administration, 267
Fukushima Masanori: at battle of Sekigahara, 123;
his estates confiscated, 128
Fusan: attacked by Japanese (1510), 104;
captured by the Japanese (1592), 117
Fushimi: battle of, 168
G
Gemmyō, empress of Japan: reign of, 31
Genghis Khan (Temujin): plans subjugation of Japan, 73
Germany: treaty with China (1898), 277
Godaigo, emperor of Japan: reign of, 83
Gohorikawa, emperor of Japan: accession of, 72
Gokashiwabara, emperor of Japan: reign of, 100
Gokameyama, emperor of Japan: abdication of, 91
Gokomatsu, emperor of Japan: accession of, 91
Gokōmyō, emperor of Japan: reign of, 132
Gold Standard: established (1898), 226
Gominoö, emperor of Japan: grieves over power of the nobles, 132
Gomurakami, emperor of Japan: reign of, 90
Gonara, emperor of Japan: reign of, 100
Gonijō, emperor of Japan: accession of, 83
Gosaga, emperor of Japan: reign of, 83
Gosai-in, emperor of Japan: reign of, 132
Goshirakawa, emperor of Japan: accession of, 56
Gotoba, emperor of Japan: plots against feudal administration, 70
Gotō Shōjirō, Count: counsels war with Korea, 178;
reforms of, 182;
attempts to negotiate treaties with European powers, 190
Gotō Sukenori: sketch of, 107
Gotsuchimikado, emperor of Japan: reign of, 100
Gouda, emperor of Japan: at war with the Mongols, 76
Grant, Ulysses S.: visits Japan, 191
Grippenberg, General: at battle of Ho-kau-tai, 312
Gunzburg, Baron: represents Russia at Seul, 296
Gyōgi (Bosatsu): teachings of, 32
H
Hagiwara Shigehide: proposes the issue of a debased currency, 143
Hai-cheng: captured by the Japanese, 268, 272
Hakozaki: battle of, 74
Hanabusa Yoshimoto: minister to Korea, 195
Hamada Yahei: conquers Formosa, 136
Hanazono, emperor of Japan: accession of, 83
Harbin: occupied by Russia, 285
Harris, Townsend: sent as consul-general to Japan, 157
Hasankin, king of Shiragi: submits to the Japanese, 13
Hashiba Hideyoshi: see Toyotomi Hideyoshi
Hatakeyama Masanaga: plots against, 98
Hatakeyama Yoshinari: claims regency, 98
Hawaii: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Hay, John: his negotiations with the Great Powers, 279;
his note to Russian and Chinese governments concerning Manchuria, 289
Hayashi, Viscount: negotiates treaty with England, 232
Hegushagu: battle of, 119
Hei-an Epoch: 38
Heiji Insurrection, 57
Hekitei-kan: battle of, 119
Hieda no-Are: compiles annals of the reigns of Japanese sovereigns, 35
Hiki Yoshikazu: plots against the Hōjō family, 69
Hiraga Tomomasa: plots to obtain the shōgunate, 70
Hōgen Insurrection, 56
Hōjō Family: rise of, 69
Hōjō Morotoki: regency of, 77
Hōjō Sadatoki: regency of, 77
Hōjō Sanemasa: commands Japanese army, 75
Hōjō Takatoki: regency of, 77, 84
Hōjō Tokifusa: his campaign against the imperial forces, 71
Hōjō Tokimasa: restores order in Nyōto, 66;
assumes government of Kamakura, 68
Hōjō Tokimune: saves Japan from Mogul conquest, 73;
puts Chinese envoy to death, 75
Hōjō Tokiyori: rule of, 72
Hōjō Tsunetoki: rule of, 72
Hōjō Yasutoki: his campaign against the imperial forces, 71;
rule of, 72;
raises Gosaga to the throne, 83
Hōjō Yoshitoki: power of, 71
Hōjō-ji: built, 41
Hokau-tai: battle of, 312
Honda Masazumi: his estates confiscated, 128
Hosokawa Kazumoto: rebellion of, 98
Hosokawa Mochiyuki: crushes revolt of Akamatsu Mitsusuke, 96
Hotta Masaatsu (Bitchu-no-Kami): attempts to negotiate treaty with
the United States, 157
Hotto Masatoshi: made _tairō_, 140
Hu Weiyung: plots assassination of Chinese emperor, 102
Huing-yo-cheng: battle of, 310
Hun-chun: occupied by Russia, 285
Hu-shan: captured by the Japanese, 267
Hwan Bunko: his campaign in Japan, 75
I, J
Ichijō, emperor of Japan: reign of, 43
Ichinotani: battle of, 62
Ii Naosuke (Kamon-no-Kami): made _tairō_, 158;
assassination of, 161
Imagawa Yoshimoto: invades Owari, 110
Inouye Kaoru, Count: attempts to negotiate treaties with European
countries, 190;
vice ambassador to Korea, 194;
ambassador to Korea, 196
Ishida Mitsunari: his campaign against Korea, 116
Itagaki Taisuke: counsels war with Korea, 178;
reforms of, 182;
leads Liberal Party, 214;
made home minister, 220
Itakura Shigemasa: attempts to crush rebellion of Shimabara, 138
Italy: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Itō Hirobumi, Marquis: examines constitutional laws of European
countries, 184;
made minister of state, 185;
negotiates convention with China, 196;
forms a constitutional party, 214;
first premiership of, 215;
second premiership of, 218;
fourth premiership of, 227;
makes tour of the world, 231
Itō, Admiral: at battle of Wei-hai-Wei, 270
Iwafune: built, 27
Iwakura Tomomi: made _gijō_, 167;
visits United States and Europe, 189
Japan, History of: the mythical age, 3;
the beginning of the empire, 6;
relations with Korea and China, 12;
the Taikwa Reform, 22;
the Nara Epoch, 31;
the Hei-an Epoch, 38;
the Kamakura government, 65;
the temporary restoration of imperial power, 83;
the Muromachi period, 92;
internal peace and external war, 109;
the foundation of the Edo government, 122;
the decline of the Edo government, 140;
the fall of the Edo government, 155;
internal affairs, 173;
foreign relations, 188;
the Constitution in theory and practice, 199;
parties and politics, 213;
economic progress, 243;
the Chino-Japanese War, 252;
Japan and Russia in Korea and Manchuria, 275;
the Russo-Japanese War and its aftermath, 303
Japan, Sea of: battle of, 316
Jimmu, emperor of Japan: founds dynasty, 7
Jingō, empress of Japan: her expedition against Korea, 12
Jito, empress of Japan: reign of, 30
Joost, Jan: settles in Japan, 135
Josetsu: sketch of, 106
Juntoku, emperor of Japan: plots against the Hōjō family, 71
K
Kabayama, Rear Admiral: at battle of Yalu, 266
Kagoshima: battle of (1863), 164;
captured by Saigō's forces (1876), 182
Kaineifu: captured by the Japanese, 118
Kai-ping: battle of, 310
Kalakaua, king of Hawaii: visits Japan, 191
Kameyama, emperor of Japan: reign of, 83
Kamon-no-Kami: see Ii Naosuke
Kang-wa-seh: captured by the Japanese, 268
Kannuna-gawamimi: see Suisei
Kano Masanobu: sketch of, 106
Kano Oyenosuke: sketch of, 106
Kato Kiyomasa: his campaign against Korea, 116;
at battle of Sekigahara, 123
Katsura, Viscount: made minister of the navy, 220;
made premier, 230;
his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267
Kaulbars, Alexander, Baron: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 312
Kawamura Sumiyoshi: attempts to crush rebellion of Saigō, 179, 180
Kegushagushu: captured by the Japanese, 117
Keikō, emperor of Japan: reign of, 9
Keishoki: see Shokei
Ketteler, Baron von: murder of, 280
Kibi-no-Makibi: scholarship of, 34
Kido Takakoto: persuades the lord of Chōshū to surrender his
feudal domains to the crown, 174
Kin-chow: captured by the Japanese, 268
Kinoshita Hideyoshi: see Toyotomi Hideyoshi
Ki-no-Tsurayuki: compiles the "_Kokin-shu_," 43
Kitabatake Akiiye: his campaign against Ashikaga Takauji, 88
Kitabatake Chikafusa: his campaign against the Hōjō, 90
Kitabatake Mitsumasa: declares war against Ashikaga Yoshimochi, 93
Kitano-no-Tenjin: see Sugawara-no-Michizane
Kōbun, emperor of Japan: reign of, 29
Kodama, Baron: becomes member of cabinet, 239
Kohōgen Motonobu: sketch of, 106
Kōkaku, emperor of Japan: reign of, 149
Kōkō, emperor of Japan: reign of, 46
Kōkyoku (Saimei), empress of Japan: first reign of, 20;
second reign of, 25
Kōmei, emperor of Japan: reign of, 158;
death of, 166
Komura, Baron: appointed director of Korean administration, 267;
appointed peace commissioner, 317
Komura-Waeber Memorandum (1896), 296
Kōmyō, empress of Japan: her devotion to Buddhism, 32
Kōmyō, emperor of the North: accession of, 89
Kongobu-ji: built, 41
Kōnin, emperor of Japan: accession of, 37
Konishi Yukinaga: his campaign against Korea, 116
Kōno Hironaka: attempted reforms of, 184
Kōno Tokama: forms a provisional court in Kiushū, 182
Konoye, emperor of Japan: reign of, 56
Korea: early relations with Japan, 12;
conquests of China in, 26;
relations with Japan under the Edo government, 134;
refuses to acknowledge the new government in Japan, 178;
adopts some Western civilization, 194;
the Chino-Japanese War, 252;
Russia and Japan in, 275
Kōya: battle of, 85
Kozenbō, Prince: rebellion of, 169
Kublai Khan: his conquests in Korea, 73
Kudo Suketsune: death of, 152
Kūkai: teachings of, 41
Kuki Yoshitaka: commands fleet for invasion of Korea, 116
Kumaso: rebellions of (ca. 50 B. C.), 9;
(ca. 200 A. D.), 12
Kumamota Castle: siege of, 180
Kumoi Tatsuo: plots against the new government, 177
Kuroda Kiyotaka, Count: his campaign against Saigō, 180;
made minister of state, 185;
ambassador to Korea, 194
Kuroda Nagamasa: at battle of Sekigahara, 123
Kuroki, Itci: his campaigns in the Russo-Japanese War, 309
Kuropatkin, Alexei Nikolayevitch: his services in the Russo-Japanese
War, 310
Kusunoki Masashige: revolt of, 85;
his campaigns against the Hōjō, 86
Kusunoki Masatsura: death of, 91
Kwammu, emperor of Japan: transfers the capital to Kyōto, 38
Kyokutei Bakim: sketch of, 142
Kyōto: made capital of Japan, 38;
ruined, 99
L
Land Tax Bill (1898), 225
Lessar, Paul: appointed minister to Peking, 288
Li Ching Fang: negotiates treaty of peace with Japan, 273
Li Chiu: his campaign against the Japanese, 119
Li Hung Chang: negotiates convention with Japan, 196;
negotiates treaty of peace with Japan, 273;
death of, 289
Li Sei-kei: revolt of, 102
Li Shunshin: his campaigns against the Japanese, 118, 120
Liao-yang: battle of, 310
Lien, king of Korea: at war with Japan, 117
Linevitch, General: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 313
Liu Fok-hêng: commands fleet for invading Japan, 74
Liu Kan-yi: attempts to have Manchuria opened to foreign trade, 288
Loochoo, Islands of: sketch of the history of, 192
M
MacDonald, Sir Claude: negotiates treaty with Japan, 232
Makarov, Vice Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 307
Manchuria: Russia and Japan in, 275
Marubashi Chūya: attempts to revolt, 140
Masuda Nagamori: his campaign against Korea, 116
Masuda Shirō: leads rebellion, 137
Matsudaira Katamori: rebellion of, 170
Matsudaira Nobutsuna: crushes rebellion of Shimabara, 138;
makes improvements in Edo, 148
Matsudaira Sadanobu: encourages martial exercises, 147;
policy of, 149
Matsukata, Count: made premier, 217
Matsukura Shigemasa: made feudal chief of Shimabara, 137
Matsumaye Nobuhiro: recognized as lord of Ezo, 113
Mayeda Toshiiye: member of council of state, 114;
appointed guardian for Toyotomi Hideyori, 121
Meiji Era, 174
Meyer, George von Lengerke: aids peace negotiations between Russia
and Japan, 319
Mikawa: battle of (1335), 88
Minamoto, Clan of: rise of, 51
Minamoto-no-Hikaru: conspires against Sugawara-no-Michizane, 47
Minamoto-no-Kugyō: kills Minamoto-no-Sanetomo, 69
Minamoto-no-Noriyori: at battle of Seta, 62
Minamoto-no-Sanetomo: made shōgun, 69
Minamoto-no-Tameyoshi: supports plans of Emperor Sutoku, 56
Minamoto-no-Tsunemoto: defeats Minamoto-no-Sumitomo, 53
Minamoto-no-Yoriiye: made generalissimo, 68
Minamoto-no-Yorimasa: supports accession of Emperor Goshirakawa, 56;
plots against the Taira sway, 60
Minamoto-no-Yorinobu: crushes rebellion of Taira-no-Tadatsune, 53
Minamoto-no-Yoritomo: leads rebellion, 60;
quarrels with Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka, 62;
influence of, 65
Minamoto-no-Yoriyoshi: crushes insurrection in Mutsu, 54
Minamoto-no-Yoshiiye: crushes revolt of the Kiyowara family, 54
Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka: leads rebellion, 60;
defeats Taira forces, 61;
defeated by revolted followers, 62
Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo: supports accession of Emperor Goshirakawa, 56;
rebellion of, 57
Minamoto-no-Yoshitsune: at battle of Seta, 62;
story of, 65
Minamoto-no-Yukiiye: attempts to overthrow the Taira family, 60
Mincho Chodensu: sketch of, 106
Miura, Major General: his campaign against Saigō, 179
Miura Yoshimura: duplicity of, 71
Miyako, empress-dowager of Japan: her devotion to Buddhism, 32
Miyoshi, Major General: his campaign against Saigō, 179
Miyoshi Yasunobu: made minister of justice, 68
Mommu, emperor of Japan: accession of, 30
Mononobe Moriya: feud with Soga-no-Umako, 19
Mononobe-no-Okoshi: opposes the acceptance of Buddhism, 15
Montoku, emperor of Japan: birth of, 45
Mōri Motonari: provides coronation expenses for Emperor Ōgimachi, 100
Mōri Terumoto: member of council of state, 144;
at battle of Sekigahara, 123
Mōri Yoshichika, lord of Chōshū: attempts to restore tranquillity
to Japan, 161;
expelled from Kyōto, 163
Morinaga, Prince: made abbot of Enryaku-ji, 84;
his campaigns against the Hōjō, 85;
fate of, 87
Mo-tien-ling: battles of (1894), 269;
(1904), 310
Mount Kasagi: siege of (1331), 84
Mount Kongo: siege of (1333), 86
Mount Tsukuba Insurrection, 164
Mukden: battle of, 312
Mura-saki-shikibu: scholarship of, 43
Mutsu Munemitsu: negotiates treaty with Great Britain, 191
Myochin Muneyasu: sketch of, 107
Myochin Nobuiye: skill of, 107
Myōshō, empress of Japan: reign of, 132
N
Nagasaki Takasuke: power of, 77
Naka-no-ōye, Prince: see Tenchi, emperor of Japan
Nakahara Chikayoshi: made vice-minister of the public archives, 68
Nakatomi-no-Kamako: opposes the acceptance of Buddhism, 15
Nakatomi-no-Kamatari: plots against Soga-no-Iruka, 20;
death of, 28
Nara Epoch, The, 31
Navy Increase Question, 233
Nawa Nagatoshi: aids Emperor Godaigo, 85
Nebokatov, Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 314
Nicholas II, emperor of Russia: visits Japan, 191
Nikkō: battle of, 170
Nimmyō, emperor of Japan: marriage of, 45
Nishi-Rosen Protocol (1898), 296
Nitta Yoshisada: besieges Mount Kongo (1333), 86;
sketch of, 87;
his campaign against Ashikaga Takauji, 88;
death of, 90
Niu-chwang: captured by the Japanese, 272;
occupied by Russia, 285
Nodzu Michitsura, Viscount: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267
Nogi: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 311
Nozu: his campaign against Saigō, 179
Nutari: built, 27
O
Ōama, Prince: see Temmu, emperor of Japan
Oda Nobunaga: aids Ashikaga Yoshiaki to regain the shōgunate, 101;
career of, 110
Oda Nobukatsu: rebels against Hashiba Hideyoshi, 113
Oda Nubutaka: plots against Hashiba Hideyoshi, 113
Oda Sambōshi: succeeds Oda Nobunaga, 113
Ōgimachi, emperor of Japan: coronation of, 100
Ōhara Shigenori: made _sanyo_, 167
Ōishi Kuranosuke: revenges death of Asana Naganori, 152
Ōjin, emperor of Japan: promotes Chinese learning, 13
Ōjin War, 97
Okehazama: battle of, 110
Oku, Hokyo: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267;
his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 310
Ōkubo Toshimichi: made _sanyo_, 167;
persuades the lord of Satsuma to surrender his feudal domains
to the crown, 174;
crushes rebellion of Eto Shimpei, 177;
opposes war with Korea, 178;
sent as plenipotentiary to Peking, 192
Ōkuma Shigenobu, Count: reforms of, 183;
attempts to negotiate treaties with European powers, 190;
leads Progressive Party, 214;
made minister of foreign affairs, 217;
made premier, 220;
opposes navy expansion, 236
Ōmura Masujiro: assassination of, 177
Ō-no-Yasumaro: scholarship of, 34
Ono-no-Yoshifuru: defeats Minamoto-no-Sumitomo, 53
Ōoka Tadasuke: sketch of, 146;
establishes the fire-brigade system, 149
Ōsaka: siege of, 126
Ōseka: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267
Ōshima: his campaigns against Chinese, 262, 267
Ōshio Heihachirō: leads rebellion, 155
Otani Yoshitaka: his campaign against Korea, 116
Ōtomo, Prince: see Kōbun, emperor of Japan
Ōtomo-no-Yakamochi: aids in the compilation of the "_Manyoshu_," 35
Ōtori, Japanese minister: his career in Korea, 259
Ōtori Keisuke: rebellion of, 169
Ōuchi Yoshihiro: rebellion of, 94
Ōuchi Yoshitaka: provides coronation expenses for Emperor Gonara, 100
Ōyama, Count: his campaign in Chino-Japanese War, 268;
his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 310
Ōye Hiromoto: made minister of the public archives, 68;
plans campaign against the imperial forces, 71
Ozaki: causes downfall of Ōkuma's cabinet, 221
P, Q
Pavlov, General: represents Russia at Seul, 296
Peking: siege of (1900), 280
Perry, Matthew Calbraith: visits Japan, 155;
concludes treaty with Japan, 157
Phung-do Island: battle of, 261
Ping-yang: battle of, 265
Plançon: minister to China, 295
Pokotilov: his attempts to win Chinese officials, 295
Port Arthur: siege of (1894), 268; leased to Russia, 277;
battle of (1904), 304;
siege of (1904), 306
Portsmouth Treaty, The (1905), 318
Portugal: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Portuguese: visit Japan, 104
Prussia: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Pu-lan-tien: captured by the Japanese, 310
R
Rai Sanyō: influence of his writings, 160
Reigen, emperor of Japan: reign of, 132
Religion and Mythology: the mythical age, 3;
introduction of Buddhism, 14;
Christianity introduced into Japan, 105
Richū, emperor of Japan: appoints historiographers throughout Japan, 13
_Rikken Seiyū Kwai_: see Constitutional Political Association
Rokuhara: destroyed (1333), 86
Roosevelt, Theodore: attempts to induce Russia to treat for peace
with Japan, 316
Rosen, Baron: appointed peace commissioner, 318
Rozhestvenski, Vice Admiral: commands Baltic fleet, 313
Russia: in Korea and Manchuria, 275
Russo-Japanese War, 303
Russo-Chinese Bank: established, 276
S
Saichō: teachings of, 41
Saigō Takamori, lord of Satsuma: joins lord of Chōshū against
the shōgun, 165;
made _sanyo_, 167;
negotiates treaty for surrender of Tokugawa Yoshinobu, 169;
rebellion of, 178
Saigō Tsugumichi, Marquis: attempts to negotiate treaties with
European powers, 190;
his campaign in Formosa, 192;
accompanies Count Itō to China, 196;
made minister of the army, 220
Sai-ma-tsi: captured by the Japanese (1894), 268;
(1904), 310
Saimei: see Kōkyoku
Saionji, Marquis: made president of the Constitutional Political
Association, 238
Sakai Tadakiyo: influence of, 140
Sakanoue-no-Tamuramaro: his campaign against the Emishi, 27
Sakhalin: occupied by Japan, 318;
treaty regulations concerning, 319
Sakuma Shōzan: assassination of, 177
Sanjō Sanetomi: accompanies Mōri Yoshichika to his fief, 163;
restored to his former rank, 167
Sano Takenosuke: leads plots for assassination of Ii Naosuke, 161
Sanuki: battle of, 62
San-sin: occupied by Russia, 285
Sea of Japan: battle of, 316
Sei-Shōnagon: scholarship of, 43
Sekigahara: battle of, 124
Sesshū: sketch of, 106
Seta: battle of, 62
Seul: uprising of 1884, 256;
captured by the Japanese, 260
Seiwa, emperor of Japan: reign of, 46
Seymour, Sir Edward Hobart: attempts to relieve foreigners in Peking, 279
Sha River: battle of, 311
Shanghai: evacuation of, by allied forces, 292
Shijōnawate: battle of, 91
Shimabara: rebellion of, 137
Shimazu Hisamitsu: attempts to restore tranquillity to Japan, 161;
causes a breach between Japan and England, 162
Shimazu Narishigi, lord of Satsuma: attempts to restore tranquillity
to Japan, 161
Shimonoseki Affair, The, 163, 165
Shingon: founded, 41
Shinsai: battle of, 121
Shiragi: revolt of, 25
Shirakawa, emperor of Japan: gives influence to Buddhist priests, 54
Shiroyama: battle of, 182
Shisen: battle of, 121
Sho Tai, king of Loochoo: his relations with Japanese government, 193
Shōhei-kō: growth of, 141
Shokei (Keishoki): sketch of, 106
Shōkō, emperor of Japan: accession of, 93
Shōkoku-ji: built, 93
Shōmei, emperor of Japan: accession of, 20
Shōmu, emperor of Japan: reign of, 10;
aids the spread of Buddhism, 32;
marriage of, 45
Shōni Kagesuke: his campaign against the Chinese, 76
Shōtoku, Prince: distinguishes himself as a scholar, 14
Shozui: aids the development of ceramics, 107
Shuban: sketch of, 106
Silk: production and manufacture of, introduced into Japan, 18
Siu-yen: battle of (1894), 268;
captured by Japanese (1904), 310
Sō Yoshitomo: invites king of Korea to visit Japan, 116
Soga Dasoku: sketch of, 106
Soga Sukenari: kills father's foe, 152
Soga Tokimune: kills father's foe, 152
Soga-no-Emishi: influence of, 20
Soga-no-Iname: counsels the acceptance of Buddhism, 14
Soga-no-Iruka: influence of, 20
Soga-no-Mako: works for the acceptance of Buddhism in Japan, 15
Soga-no-Umako: builds temples and pagodas for Buddha, 16;
feud with Monobe Moriya, 19
Song-hwan: battle of, 262
Sonntag, Miss: represents Russia at Seul, 296
Sotan: sketch of, 106
Sōtarō Iba: assassinates Tōru Hoshi, 229
Soyeshima Taneomi: counsels war with Korea, 178
Spain: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Stakelberg, General: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 310
Stoessel, General: surrenders Port Arthur, 312
Sugawara-no-Michizane: influence of, 47;
disgraced, 47;
honored, 48
Sugiyama, Chancellor: murder of, 280
Suiko, empress of Japan: accession of, 20
Suinin, emperor of Japan: condition of the empire under, 9
Suisei (Kannuna-gawamimi), emperor of Japan: accession of, 7
Sujin, emperor of Japan: separates shrine and palace, 9;
condition of the empire under, 9
Sumatah: introduces Buddhism into Japan, 14
Sung-ching: his campaigns against the Japanese, 267
Suruga: battle of (1335), 88
Sutoku, emperor of Japan: deposed, 56;
leads rebellion, 56
Sweden: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
Switzerland: concludes treaty with Japan, 189
T
Tachilana Moroye: collects Japanese poems, 35
Tadaranohama: battle of, 88
Taga: built, 27
Taikwa Reform, 22
Taira, Clan of: rise of, 51
Taira-no-Kiyomori: supports accession of Emperor Goshirakawa, 56;
crushes rebellion of Nobuyori and Yoshitomo, 57;
influence of, 58
Taira-no-Masakado: revolt of, 53
Taira-no-Munemori: influence of, 60;
death of, 62
Taira-no-Sadamori: defeats Taira-no-Masakado, 53
Taira-no-Shigemori: crushes rebellion of Nobuyori and Yoshitomo, 57
Taira-no-Tadamasa: supports plans of Emperor Sutoku, 56
Taira-no-Tadatsune: rebellion of, 53
Taira-no-Takamochi: vice-governor of Kazusa, 52
Taiwon-kun: anti-foreign policy of, 195, 255
Takahira, Kogorō: appointed peace commissioner, 317
Takakura, emperor of Japan: reign of, 58
Takanaga, Prince: his campaign against Ashikaga Takauji, 87
Takasugi Shinsaku: leader of anti-Tokugawa party, 165
Takeuchi Shikibu: plots against the Tokugawa, 160
Takezoye: minister to Korea, 256
Takishimimi, Prince: attempts to usurp the throne, 7
Ta-ku-shan: taken by the Japanese, 268
Ta-lien-wan: captured by the Japanese, 268;
leased to Russia, 277
Tani-Tateki: attempts to defend Kumamoto castle, 180
Taping-ling: battle of, 310
Tashi-chiao: battle of, 310
Tatsumi: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267
Ta-tung-kau: taken by the Japanese, 268
Tawara-saka: battle of, 180
Telissu: battle of, 310
Tenchi, emperor of Japan: plots against Soga-no-Iruka, 20;
reign of, 25
Tendai: founded, 41
Temmu, emperor of Japan: rebellion of, 29;
reign of, 30;
aids the spread of Buddhism, 31
Tie-ling: captured by Japanese, 313
Tien-chwang-tai: destroyed by the Japanese, 272
Tientsin: captured by the allied forces, 280
Tientsin Convention (1885), 256
Tik Ho: his campaign against the Japanese, 120
Ting Ju-chang, Admiral: at battle of Wei-hai-Wei, 270
Toba, emperor of Japan: intrigues of, 55;
death of, 56
Toba: battle of, 168
Togo, Heihachiro: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 303
Tokugawa Hidetada: concludes peace with Korea, 121;
shōgunate of, 127
Tokugawa Iyeharu: shōgunate of, 149
Tokugawa Iyemitsu: character of, 127
Tokugawa Iyemochi: accession to the shōgunate, 158;
marriage of, 161;
visits Kyōto, 162
Tokugawa Iyenari: shōgunate of, 149
Tokugawa Iyesada: shōgunate of, 156
Tokugawa Iyeshige: shōgunate of, 149
Tokugawa Iyetsuna: shōgunate of, 140
Tokugawa Iyeyasu: rebels against Hashiba Hideyoshi, 113;
member of council of state, 114;
sketch of, 122;
death of, 127;
encourages literature, 141
Tokugawa Nariakira: urges policy of national seclusion, 156
Tokugawa Tsunayoshi: shōgunate of, 140
Tokugawa Yoshimune: shōgunate of, 144
Tokugawa Yoshinobu: his claims to the shōgunate, 158;
shōgunate of, 166
Tokunegi: captured by the Japanese, 117
Tōkyō, formerly Edo: made capital, 174
Tomu-cheng: captured by the Japanese (1894), 268;
battle of (1904), 310
Tonghak Rebellion, 257
Tōru Hoshi: influence of, 222;
sketch of his career, 229
Tosa Mitsunobu: sketch of, 105
Tosabō Shōshun: sent to destroy Minamoto-no-Yoshitsune, 66
Toyotomi Hidetsugu: regency of, 121
Toyotomi Hideyori: accession of, to his father's position, 121;
regency of, 123;
influence of, 125
Toyotomi Hideyoshi: guards the shōgun, 111;
crushes rebellion of Akechi Mitsuhide, 112;
sketch of, 113;
invades Korea, 116
Tsang-chi: concludes treaty with Admiral Alexiev, 286
Tso Shingfon: sent to aid the Koreans, 118
Tsushima: battle of (1419), 103
U, V
Uchida: protests against Russian demands (1903), 294
Uda, emperor of Japan: reign of, 47
Ukita Hideiye: member of council of state, 114;
his campaign against Korea, 116;
at battle of Sekigahara, 123
United States: concludes treaty with Japan (1879), 190
Urosan: siege of, 120
Uryū, Rear Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 303
Utsunomiya: battle of, 170
Uyesugi Kagekatsu: member of council of state, 114;
at battle of Sekigahara, 123
Uyesugi Norizane: crushes revolt of Ashikaga Mochiuji, 95
Vereshchagin, Alexander V.: death of, 307
Voelkersam, Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 314
W
Wafangao Pass: see Feng-shui Pass
Wake-no-Kiyomaro: opposes influence of Dōkyō, 36
Wani: introduces Chinese learning into Japan, 13
Watanabe, Viscount: causes downfall of fourth Itō cabinet, 228
Watanabe Kazuma: slays Kawai, 152
Wei-hai-Wei: captured by the Japanese, 270;
naval battle of, 270;
leased to Great Britain, 278
William II, emperor of Germany: visits Japan, 191
Witte, Count Serge: appointed peace commissioner, 317
Witthoeft, Rear Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 308
X, Y, Z
Xavier, St. Francis: see Francis Xavier, St.
Yalu: battle of (1894), 266
Yalu River: battle of (1904), 309
Yamada Nagamasa: career of, 136
Yamagata Aritomo, Count: attempts to crush rebellion of Saigō, 179;
becomes minister president, 190;
made premier, 221;
his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267
Yamagata-Lobanov Protocol (1896), 296
Yamaji, Baron: his campaign in Chino-Japanese War, 268
Yamana Mochitoyo: crushes revolt of Akamatsu Mitsusuke, 96
Yamana Sōzen: rebellion of, 97
Yamano Ujikiyo: rebellion of, 94
Yamanouchi Toyonobu, lord of Tosa: attempts to restore tranquillity
to Japan, 161
Yamato-dake, Prince: his campaign against the Kumaso, 9;
his campaign against the Emishi, 10;
death of, 10
Yamazaki: battle of, 112
Yanagiwara Sakimitsu: warns the Shimazu against joining rebellions, 180
Yanagiwara Sakimitsu: sent as ambassador to China, 192
Yanagizawa Yoshiyasu: rise of, 142
Yang-tse Agreement, The: see Anglo-German Agreement
Yang-tsu-ling: captured by the Japanese, 310
Yellow Sea: battle of, 309
Ying Kai: commands army against Japan, 120
Ying-kau: captured by the Japanese, 272
Yokoi Heishirō: assassination of, 177
Yoshiaki, Prince: made _gijō_, 167;
sent to crush rebellion of Eto Shimpei, 177
Yoshino: battle of, 85
Yōzei, emperor of Japan: reign of, 46
Yuan Shih-kai: minister to Korea, 256
Yuino Shōsetsu: attempts to revolt, 140
Yu-shu-lin-tsu: captured by the Japanese, 310
Zassulitch: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 309
Zen Sect: teachings of, 80
Transcriber's Notes
Vowels "o" and "u" with a macron diacritic have been replaced with the
vowels "ō" and "ū", respectively. (In the UTF-8 and HTML files, the
correct characters are used.)
The family trees may not display correctly on small screens.
Page xiii: "Ogasawara" was "Ogaswara".
Page 6: "straits between" was "straits beween".
Page 9: "Kashiwabara" was "Kashiwa-brara".
Page 15: "Soga-no-Umako" was "Soga-no-Mako".
Pages 17, 133, 141: "Shintō[ism]" was "Shinto[ism]".
Caption of illustration facing page 28: "AMONG THE AUTOCHTHONS (AINOS)"
was "AMONG THE AUTOCHTONS (AINOS)".
Page 39: "Sakyō" was "Sakyo".
Page 47: "a son of the Emperor Nimmyō", was "Nimmyo".
Page 59: "its authors and promotors" was "it authors and promotors".
Page 66: "million warriors" was "million warrors".
Page 67: "sei-i-tai-shōgun" was "seii-taishogun".
Page 74: "thereafter directed" was "therafter".
Page 79: "Heike Monogatari" was "Heike Monogaturi".
Page 85: "1333" was "1133".
Page 113: "original name" was "orginal name".
Page 126: footnote, "shōgun" was "shogun".
Page 127: "a mausoleum of unexampled magnificence" was "a mausoleum of
of unexampled magnificence".
Page 148: "bodyguard" was "body-guard".
Page 149: "Tōkyō" was "Tōkyo".
Page 162: "unpardonable in the eyes of the _samurai_" was "sumurai".
Page 162: "increasing body of samurai" was "sumurai".
Page 190: "no sooner were its provisions" was "it".
Page 222: "future of the parliamentary politics" was "parlimentary".
Page 231: "celebration of Yale University", was "Universisity".
Page 256: "that there existed no definite" was "exised".
Page 261: "steamed out of Asan in order" was "is order".
Page 328b: "Tie-ling" was "Tieling".
Page 328b: "Chinese telegraph buildings" was "Chine telegraph
buildings".
Page 332: "superseded by newer ones" was "onces".
Page 337: "Anshan-chan" was "Anshan chan".
Page 339: "Hawaii: concludes treaty" was "treay".
Page 340: "Jingō" was "Jingo".
Page 341: "Kannuna-gawamimi: see Suisei" was "Kannuna-gau-amimi".
Page 341, 345: "Kōkyoku" was "Kokyoku".
Page 343: "Mōri Yoshichika, lord of Chōshū" was "Mori Yosichika".
Page 343: "made abbot of Enryaku-ji" was "Emyaku-ji".
Page 343: "Nimmyō, emperor of Japan, marriage of" was "Nimmyo".
Page 344: "Ōtomo-no-Yakamochi" was "Otomo-no-Yakamochi".
Page 344: "Rikken Seiyū Kwai: see Constitutional" was "Rikkeū Seiyū
Kwai: see Constitutional".
Pages 337, 341, 343, 345, 347: "Saigō" changed to "Saigo".
Page 345: "Sanjō Sanetomi: accompanies Mōri Yoshichika" was "Sanjo
Sanetomi: accompanies Mori Yoshichika".
Page 347: "Wake-no-Kiyomaro" was "Wake-no-Kyomaro".
*** End of this LibraryBlog Digital Book "Japan
- From the Japanese Government History
- Edited With Supplementary Chapters" ***
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