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Title: Aristotle
Author: Grote, George
Language: English
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ARISTOTLE.

BY GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,

D.C.L. OXFORD, AND LL.D. CAMBRIDGE;
LATE VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON;
PRESIDENT OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON;
AND FOREIGN MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE.


EDITED BY

ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN,


AND


G. CROOM ROBERTSON, M.A.,

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND LOGIC IN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
LONDON.

_SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS._

LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1880.

_The right of Translation is reserved._


PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
LONDON:
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.



NOTICE TO THE SECOND EDITION.


This Edition is an exact reprint of the First Edition, with the
addition of two important Essays on the Ethics and Politics of
Aristotle, which were found among the author's posthumous papers.
They were originally published in 1876, in 'Fragments on Ethical
Subjects, by the late George Grote,' but would have been included in
the First Edition of this Work, had they been discovered in time.
These Essays are the fruit of long and laborious study, and, so far
as they extend, embody the writer's matured views upon the Ethics and
the Politics: the two treatises whose omission from his published
exposition of the Aristotelian philosophy has been most regretted.

The Essay on 'The Ethics of Aristotle' falls naturally into two
divisions; the first treats of Happiness; the second of what,
according to Aristotle, is the chief ingredient of Happiness, namely.
Virtue. On Aristotle's own conception of Happiness, Mr. Grote dwells
very minutely; turning it over on all sides, and looking at it from
every point of view. While fully acknowledging its merits, he gives
also the full measure of its defects. His criticisms on this head are
in the author's best style and are no less important as regards
Ethical discussion than as a commentary on Aristotle.

His handling of Aristotle's doctrine of Virtue is equally subtle and
instructive. Particularly striking are the remarks on the _Voluntary_
and the _Involuntary_, and on [Greek: proai/resis], or _deliberate
preference_.

The treatment of the Virtues in detail is, unhappily, more
fragmentary; but what he does say regarding Justice and Equity has a
permanent interest.

The Essay on 'The Politics of Aristotle' must be studied in
connection with the preceding. Although but a brief sketch, it is
remarkable for the insight which it affords us into the most
consummate political ideal of the ancient world.



PREFACE BY THE EDITORS

TO THE FIRST EDITION.


The Historian of Greece, when closing his great narrative in the year
1856, promised to follow out in a separate work that speculative
movement of the fourth century B.C. which upheld the supremacy of the
Hellenic intellect long after the decline of Hellenic liberty. He had
traced the beginnings of the movement in the famous chapter on
Sokrates, but to do justice to its chief heroes--Plato and

Aristotle--proved to be impossible within the limits of the History.
When, however, the promised work appeared, after nine laborious years,
it was found to compass only Plato and the other immediate companions
of Sokrates, leaving a full half of the appointed task unperformed.
Mr. Grote had already passed his 70th year, but saw in this only a
reason for turning, without a moment's pause, to the arduous labour
still before him. Thenceforth, in spite of failing strength and the
increasing distraction of public business, he held steadily on till
death overtook him in the middle of the course. What he was able to
accomplish, though not what study he had gone through towards the
remainder of his design, these volumes will show. The office of
preparing and superintending their publication was entrusted to the
present editors by Mrs. Grote, in the exercise of her discretion as
sole executrix under his last Will. As now printed, the work has its
form determined by the author himself up to the end of Chapter XI.
The first two chapters, containing a biography of Aristotle and a
general account of his works, are followed by a critical analysis, in
eight chapters, of all the treatises included under the title
'Organon;' and in the remaining chapter of the eleven the handling of
the Physica and Metaphysica (taken together for the reasons given) is
begun. What now stand as Chapters III., IV., &c., were marked,
however, as Chapters VI., VII., &c., by the author; his design
evidently being to interpolate before publication three other
chapters of an introductory cast. Unfortunately no positive
indication remains as to the subject of these; although there is
reason to believe that, for one thing, he intended to prefix to the
detailed consideration of the works a key to Aristotle's perplexing
terminology. Possibly also he designed to enter upon a more
particular discussion of the Canon, after having viewed it externally
in Chapter II.; citations and references bearing on such a discussion
being found among his loose notes.

What might have been the course of the work from the point where it
is broken off, is altogether matter of inference, beyond an
indication of the subject of the chapter next to follow; but the
remarks at the beginning of Chapter III. point to some likely
conclusions. After the metaphysical discussions, which must have been
prolonged through several chapters, there would probably have been
taken in order the treatises De Coelo, De Generatione et Corruptione,
the Meteorologica, and next the various Biological works; though with
what detail in each case it is impossible to guess. Then must have
followed the De Animâ with the minor Psychological treatises summed
up as Parva Naturalia, and next, without doubt, the Ethica and
Politica; last of all, the Rhetorica and Poetica. That Mr. Grote had
carefully mastered all these works is evident from his marginal
annotations in the various copies which he read. With the Ethica and
Politica in particular he had early been familiar, and most there is
reason to regret that he has left nothing worked out upon this field
so specially his own.[1] Fortunately it happens that on the
psychological field next adjoining there is something considerable to
show.

[Footnote 1: It has been already stated that two important Essays on
these subjects have been discovered among Mr. Grote's posthumous
papers since the publication of the First Edition. They are printed
in this Edition after the chapter De Animâ.--Second Edition.]

In the autumn of 1867 Mr. Grote undertook to write a short account of
Aristotle's striking recognition of the physical aspect of mental
phenomena, to be appended to the third edition of the senior editor's
work, 'The Senses and the Intellect;' but, on following out the
indications relative to that point, he was gradually led by his
interest in the subject to elaborate a full abstract of the De Animâ
and the other psychological treatises. Several months were spent on
this task, and at the end he declared that it had greatly deepened
his insight into Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. He also expressed
his satisfaction at having thus completed an exposition of the
Psychology, fitted to stand as his contribution to that part of
Aristotle, in case he should never reach the subject in the regular
course of his general work. The exposition was printed in full at the
time (1868), and drew the attention of students. It is now reprinted,
with the prominence due to its literary finish and intrinsic value,
as a chapter--the last--in the body of the present work. The long
Appendix coming after is composed of elements somewhat heterogeneous;
but the different sections were all written in the period since 1865,
and all, not excepting the last two (treating briefly of Epikurus and
the Stoics), have a bearing upon the author's general design.

The first section--an historical account of ancient theories of
Universals--has already seen the light.[2] It brings together, as
nowhere else, all the chief references to the doctrine of Realism in
Plato, and exhibits the directly antagonistic position taken up by
Aristotle towards his master. This it does so impressively that there
could be no question of excluding it, even although it reproduces in
part some of the matter of Chapter III., on the Categories. Being
composed, in 1867, later than this Chapter, it is on that account
written with all the firmer a grasp. On finishing it as it stands,
Mr. Grote, in a private letter, expressed himself in terms that
deserve to be quoted:--"I never saw before so clearly the extreme
importance of Aristotle's speculations as the guides and stimulants
of mediæval philosophy. If I had time to carry the account further, I
should have been able to show how much the improved views of the
question of Universals depended on the fact that more and more of the
works of Aristotle, and better texts, became known to Albertus
Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and their successors. During the centuries
immediately succeeding Boëthius, nothing of Aristotle except the
Categories and the treatise De Interpretatione was known, and these
in a Latin translation. Most fortunately the Categories was never put
out of sight; and it is there that the doctrine of _Substantia Prima_
stands clearly proclaimed."

[Footnote 2: In the Appendix to the senior editor's 'Manual of Mental
and Moral Science' (1867).]

The second section, or, rather, the part therein treating of
Aristotle's doctrine of First Principles, is also a reprint. It was
composed (in 1867) at the same time as the section on Universals, and
was printed along with that; shorn, however, of the critical
examination of Sir William Hamilton's views on Aristotle, which is
now prefixed to the statement of the Aristotelian doctrine. Hamilton
having (in Note A, appended to his edition of Reid's Works) claimed
Aristotle as a supporter of the Philosophy of Common Sense, basing
upon a long list of passages quoted, these were subjected by Mr.
Grote to a searching criticism, the pointed vigour of which will be
duly appreciated. The statement of his own view of Aristotle's
doctrine, though containing little that may not be found at more
places than one in the body of the present work, is yet reprinted,
because iteration was his favourite art for impressing anything to
which he attached as much importance as he did attach to this
conviction of his, regarding the very heart of Aristotle's thought.

The long abstracts of six books of the Metaphysica and two books of
the De Coelo, next following in the Appendix, are sections of a
character altogether different from the foregoing. Evidently not
intended for publication, they have been included, partly as
furnishing some indication of the labour the author underwent in
seeking to lay hold of his subject, partly because of their inherent
value. From the first motive, they are here reproduced as nearly as
possible in the guise they wore as preliminary drafts, bestrewed with
references. Their value consists in the fact that they give Mr.
Grote's interpretation of the text of treatises at once exceedingly
difficult and important: difficult, as is proved by the great
divergence, among commentators at many points; important, not more
for the deeper aspects of Aristotle's own system, than for the
speculations of the earlier Greek philosophers on which they are the
classical authority. What relation, in the case of each treatise, the
books abstracted (often translated) hold to the other books left
untouched, is specially indicated at the beginning of the third
section and at the end of the fourth. Here let it suffice to mention
that each abstract has a certain completeness in itself, and at the
same time a bond of connection with the other. The abstract of the
Metaphysica closes where Aristotle descends to speak of the concrete
heavenly bodies, and just as much of the De Coelo is given as treats
specially of these. This connection, whether or not it was present to
the author's mind, enhances the value of the abstracts as here
presented.[3]

[Footnote 3: The author carried the abstract of De Coelo a little
farther, and then abruptly broke it off; probably finding himself
borne too far away from the logical treatises with which he was at
the time dealing.]

In the remaining sections of the Appendix, not dealing with
Aristotle, the short account of Epikurus aims at setting in its true
light a much-maligned system of thought. On writing it, in 1867, Mr.
Grote remarked that the last word had not yet been said on Epikurus.
The ethical part of the sketch was printed at the time:[4] the whole
is now given. More fragmentary is the notice of the Stoics, as merely
replacing passages that he considered inadequate in a sketch
submitted to him. Since it formed part of his entire design to add to
the treatment of Aristotle a full exposition both of Stoic and
Epikurean doctrines, considered as the outgrowth of the Cynic and
Kyrenaic theories already handled at the end of the 'Plato,' the two
fragments may not unfitly close the present work.

[Footnote 4: Also in the 'Manual of Mental and Moral Science,' among
'Ethical Systems.']

Taken altogether, the two volumes are undoubtedly a most important
contribution to the history of ancient thought. As regards Aristotle,
the author's design must be gathered chiefly from the first eleven
chapters,--begun as these were in 1865, and proceeded with in their
order, till he was overtaken, in the act of composing the last, by
the insidious malady which, after six months, finally carried him
off. Perhaps the most striking feature in the exposition of the
Organon, is the very full analysis given of the long treatise called
Topica. While the other treatises have all, more or less, been drawn
upon for the ordinary theory of Logic, the Topica, with its mixed
logical and rhetorical bearings, has ceased to be embodied in modern
schemes of discipline or study. Mr. Grote's profound interest in
everything pertaining to Dialectic drew him especially to this work,
as the exhibition in detail of that habit of methodized discussion so
deep rooted in the Hellenic mind. And in the same connection it may
be noted how the natural course of his work brought him, in the last
months of his intellectual activity, to tread again old and familiar
ground. A plea--this time against Aristotle--for the decried
Sophists, and, once more, a picture of that **dialectical mission of
Sokrates which for him had an imperishable charm, were among the very
last efforts of his pen.

. . . . . . .

Besides making up the Second Volume from the end of Chapter XI., the
editors have, throughout the whole work, bestowed much attention on
the notes and references set down by the author with his usual
copious minuteness. It was deemed advisable to subject these
everywhere to a detailed verification; and, though the editors speak
on the matter with a diffidence best understood by those who may have
undergone a similar labour, it is hoped that a result not unworthy of
the author has been attained. In different places additional
references have been supplied, either where there was an obvious
omission on the author's part, or in farther confirmation of his
views given in the text: such references, mostly to the works of
Aristotle himself, it has not been thought necessary to signalize.
Where, as once or twice in the Appendix, a longer note in explanation
seemed called for, this has been printed within square brackets.

From the text some passages, where the iterations seemed excessive,
have been withheld, but only such as it was thought the author would
himself have struck out upon revision: wherever there was evidence
that revision had been made, the iterations, freely employed for
emphasis, have been allowed to stand. On rare occasions,
interpolations and verbal changes have been made with the view of
bringing out more clearly the meaning sought to be conveyed. It is
impossible to be more deeply sensible than the editors are, of the
responsibility they have thus incurred; but they have been guided by
their very respect for the venerable author, and they were fortunate
in the many opportunities they enjoyed of learning from his own lips
the cast of his views on Aristotle.[5]

[Footnote 5: It is but due to the younger editor to state that the
heaviest part of all the work here indicated has been done by
him.--A. B.]

An index has been drawn up with some care; as was needful, if meant
to be of real service to the readers of so elaborate a work.

It only remains to add that in printing the Greek of the notes, &c.,
the text of Waitz has been followed for the Organon (everywhere short
of the beginning); the text of Bonitz, for the Metaphysica; and for
other works of Aristotle, generally the Berlin edition. Regard was
had, as far as the editors' knowledge went, to the author's own
preferences in his reading.



CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
LIFE OF ARISTOTLE                                    1

CHAPTER II.
ARISTOTELIAN CANON                                  27

CHAPTER III.
CATEGORIÆ                                           54

CHAPTER IV.
DE INTERPRETATIONE                                 108

CHAPTER V.
ANALYTICA PRIORA I.                                139

CHAPTER VI.
ANALYTICA PRIORA II.                               171

CHAPTER VII.
ANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.                            207

CHAPTER VIII.
ANALYTICA POSTERIORA II.                           238

CHAPTER IX.
TOPICA (I.-VIII.)                                  262

CHAPTER X.
SOPHISTICI ELENCHI                                 376

CHAPTER XI.
PHYSICA AND METAPHYSICA                            422

CHAPTER XII.
DE ANIMÂ, ETC.                                     446

CHAPTER XIII.
ETHICA                                             494

CHAPTER XIV.
POLITICA                                           539

APPENDIX.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSALS                      551

II. FIRST PRINCIPLES:
  A. Sir William Hamilton on Aristotle's Doctrine  565
  B. Aristotle's Doctrine                          573

III. METAPHYSICA:
  Book [Greek: G].                                 583
  Book [Greek: E].                                 592
  Book [Greek: Z].                                 594
  Book [Greek: Ê].                                 609
  Book [Greek: Th].                                613
  Book [Greek: L].                                 619

IV. DE COELO:
  Book I.                                          630
  Book II.                                         639

V. EPIKURUS                                        654

VI. THE STOICS.--A FRAGMENT                        660



ARISTOTLE.



CHAPTER I.

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.


In my preceding work, 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' I
described a band of philosophers differing much from each other, but
all emanating from Sokrates as common intellectual progenitor; all
manifesting themselves wholly or principally in the composition of
dialogues; and all living in an atmosphere of Hellenic freedom, as
yet untroubled by any over-ruling imperial ascendancy from without.
From that band, among whom Plato is _facilè princeps_, I now proceed
to another, among whom the like pre-eminence belongs to Aristotle.
This second band knew the Sokratic stimulus only as an historical
tradition; they gradually passed, first from the Sokratic or Platonic
dialogue--dramatic, colloquial, cross-examining--to the Aristotelian
dialogue, semi-dramatic, rhetorical, counter-expository; and next to
formal theorizing, ingenious solution and divination of special
problems, historical criticism and abundant collections of detailed
facts: moreover, they were witnesses of the extinction of freedom in
Hellas, and of the rise of the Macedonian kingdom out of comparative
nullity to the highest pinnacle of supremacy and mastership. Under
the successors of Alexander, this extraneous supremacy, intermeddling
and dictatorial, not only overruled the political movements of the
Greeks, but also influenced powerfully the position and working of
their philosophers; and would have become at once equally
intermeddling even earlier, under Alexander himself, had not his
whole time and personal energy been absorbed by insatiable thirst for
eastern conquest, ending with an untimely death.

Aristotle was born at Stageira, an unimportant Hellenic colony in
Thrace, which has obtained a lasting name in history from the fact of
being his birthplace. It was situated in the Strymonic Gulf, a little
north of the isthmus which terminates in the mountainous promontory
of Athos; its founders were Greeks from the island of Andros,
reinforced afterwards by additional immigrants from Chalkis in
Euboea. It was, like other Grecian cities, autonomous--a distinct,
self-governing community; but it afterwards became incorporated in
the confederacy of free cities under the presidency of Olynthus. The
most material feature in its condition, at the period of Aristotle's
birth, was, that it lay near the frontier of Macedonia, and not far
even from Pella, the residence of the Macedonian king Amyntas (father
of Philip). Aristotle was born, not earlier than 392 B.C., nor later
than 385-384 B.C. His father, Nikomachus, was a citizen of Stageira,
distinguished as a physician, author of some medical works, and
boasting of being descended from the heroic _gens_ of the Asklepiads;
his mother, Phaestis, was also of good civic family, descended from
one of the first Chalkidian colonists.[1] Moreover, Nikomachus was
not merely learned in his art, but was accepted as confidential
physician and friend of Amyntas, with whom he passed much of his
time--a circumstance of great moment to the future career of his son.
We are told that among the Asklepiads the habit of physical
observation, and even manual training in dissection, were imparted
traditionally from father to son, from the earliest years, thus
serving as preparation for medical practice when there were no
written treatises to study.[2] The mind of Aristotle may thus have
acquired that appetite for physiological study which so many of his
treatises indicate.

[Footnote 1: Diog. L. v. 10. This was probably among the reasons
which induced Aristotle to prefer Chalkis as his place of temporary
retirement, when he left Athens after the death of Alexander.]

[Footnote 2: Galen, De Anatomicis Administr. ii. 1. T. ii. pp.
280-281, ed. Kühn. [Greek: para\ toi=s goneu=sin e)k pai/dôn
a)skoume/nois, ô(/sper a)naginô/skein kai\ gra/phein, ou(/tôs
a)nate/mnein]--(compare Plato--Protagoras, p. 328 A, p. 311 C).

Diog. L. v. 1. [Greek: O( de\ Niko/machos ê)=n a)po\ Nikoma/chou tou=
Macha/nos tou= A)sklêpiou=, katha/ phêsin E(/rmippos e)n tô=| peri\
A)ristote/lous kai\ sunebi/ô A)mu/nta| tô=| Makedo/nôn basilei=
i)atrou= kai\ phi/lou chrei/a|.]

We here learn that in the heroic genealogy of the Asklepiads, the son
of Machaon himself bore the name of Nikomachus. I do not think that
Will. v. Humboldt and Bernays are warranted in calling Aristotle "ein
Halbgrieche," "kein vollbürtiger Hellene"--(Die Dialoge des
Aristoteles, pp. 2-56-134). An Hellenic family which migrated from
Athens, Chalkis, Corinth, etc., to establish a colony on the coast of
Thrace, or Asia Minor, did not necessarily lose its Hellenism. One
cannot designate Demokritus, Xenokrates, Anaxagoras, Empedokles, &c.,
half Greeks.

Diogenes here especially cites Hermippus (B.C. 220-210), from whom
several of his statements in this and other biographies appear to
have been derived. The work of Hermippus seems to have been entitled
"Lives of the Philosophers" (v. 2), among which lives that of
Aristotle was one.

Hermippus mentioned, among other matters, communications made to
Aristotle by Stroebus (a person engaged in the service of
Kallisthenes as reader) respecting the condemnation and execution of
Kallisthenes in Baktria, by order of Alexander (Plutarch, Alex. c.
54). From what source did Hermippus derive these statements made by
Stroebus to Aristotle?]

Respecting the character of his youth, there existed, even in
antiquity, different accounts. We learn that he lost his father and
mother while yet a youth, and that he came under the guardianship of
Proxenus, a native of Atarneus who had settled at Stageira. According
to one account, adopted apparently by the earliest witnesses
preserved to us,[3] he was at first an extravagant youth, spent much
of his paternal property, and then engaged himself to military
service; of which he soon became weary, and went back to Stageira,
turning to account the surgical building, apparatus, and medicines
left by his father as a medical practitioner. After some time, we
know not how long, he retired from this profession, shut up the
building, and devoted himself to rhetoric and philosophy. He then
went to Athens, and there entered himself in the school of Plato, at
the age of thirty.[4] The philosophical life was thus (if this
account be believed) a second choice, adopted comparatively late in
life.[5] The other account, depending also upon good witnesses,
represents him as having come to Athens and enlisted as pupil of
Plato, at the early age of seventeen or eighteen: it omits all
mention of an antecedent period, occupied by military service and a
tentative of medical profession.[6] In both the two narratives,
Aristotle appears as resident at Athens, and devoting himself to
rhetoric and philosophy, from some period before 360 B.C. down to the
death of Plato in 347 B.C.; though, according to the first of the two
narratives, he begins his philosophical career at a later age, while
his whole life occupied seventy years instead of sixty-two
years.

[Footnote 3: Epikurus and Timæus. [Greek: E)pi/kouros e)n tê=| peri\
e)pitêdeuma/tôn e)pistolê=|] (Eusebius, Præp. Ev. xv. 5)--Diogen. L.
x. 8; Ælian. V. H. v. 9.]

[Footnote 4: An author named Eumêlus (cited by Diogenes, v. 6, [Greek
e)n tê=| pe/mptê| tô=n i(storiô=n], but not otherwise known) stated
that Aristotle came to Plato at the age of thirty, and that he lived
altogether to seventy years of age, instead of sixty-three, as
Hermippus and Apollodorus affirmed. Eumêlus conceived Aristotle as
born in 392 B.C., and coming to Plato in 362 B.C. His chronological
data are in harmony with the statements of Epikurus and Timæus
respecting the early life of Aristotle. The [Greek: Bi/os A)nô/numos]
given by Ménage recognizes two distinct accounts as to the age at
which Aristotle died: one assigning to him 70 years, the other only
63.]

[Footnote 5: See the Fragments of Timæus in Didot, Fragmenta
Historicorum Græcorum, Fr. 70-74; also Aristokles, ap. Eusebium,
Præp. Evang. xv. 2; Diogenes, L. x. 8; Athenæus, viii. p. 354. Timæus
called Aristotle [Greek: _sophistê\n o)psimathê=_ kai\ misêto/n, kai\
to\ poluti/mêton i)atrei=on a)rti/ôs a)pokekeiko/ta]. The speaker in
Athenæus designates him as [Greek: o( pharmakopô/lês]. The terms used
by these writers are illtempered and unbecoming in regard to so great
a man as Aristotle; but this is irrelevant to the question, whether
they do not describe, in perverted colouring, some real features in
his earlier life, or whether there was not, at least, a chronological
basis of possibility for them. That no such features were noticed by
other enemies of Aristotle, such as Eubulides and Kephisodôrus, is a
reason as far as it goes for not believing them to be real, yet not
at all a conclusive reason; nor is the speaker in Athenæus exact when
he says that Epikurus is the _only_ witness, for we find Timæus
making the same statements. The [Greek: i)atrei=on] (see Antiphanes,
apud Polluc. iv. 183--Fragmenta Comic. cxxv., Meineke) of a Greek
physician (more properly we should call the [Greek: i)atro\s] _a
general practitioner and chemist_) was the repository of his
materials and the scene of his important operations; for many of
which instructions are given in the curious Hippokratic treatise
entitled [Greek: Kat' I)êtrei=on], vol. iii. pp. 262-337 of the
edition of M. Littré, who in his preface to the treatise, p. 265,
remarks about Aristotle:--"Il paraît qu'Aristote, qui était de
famille médicale, avoit renoncé à une officine de ce genre, d'une
grande valeur." Stahr speaks of this [Greek: i)atrei=on] as if
Aristotle had set up one _at Athens_ (Aristotelia, p. 38), which the
authorities do not assert; it was probably at Stageira. Ideler (Comm.
**ad Aristot. Meteorol. iv. 3, 16, p. 433) considers this story about
Aristotle's [Greek: i)atrei=on] to have been a fiction arising out of
various expressions in his writings about the preparation of
drugs--[Greek: ta\ pha/rmaka e(/psein], &c. I think this is
far-fetched. And when we find Aristokles rejecting the allegation
about the [Greek: i)atrei=on], by speaking of it as an [Greek:
a)/doxon i)atrei=on], we can admit neither the justice of the epithet
nor the ground of rejection.]

[Footnote 6: This account rested originally (so far as we know) upon
the statement of Hermippus (B.C. 220), and was adopted by Apollodôrus
in his Chronology (B.C. 150), both of them good authorities, yet
neither of them so early as Epikurus and Timæus. Diogenes Laertius
and Dionysius of Halikarnassus alike follow Hermippus. Both the life
of Aristotle ascribed to Ammonius, and the Anonymous Life first
edited by Robbe (Leyden, 1861, p. 2), include the same strange
chronological blunder: they affirm Aristotle to have come to Athens
at the age of seventeen, and to have frequented the society of
_Sokrates_ (who had been dead more than thirty years) for three
years; then to have gone to Plato at the age of twenty. Zeller
imagines, and I think it likely, that Aristotle may have been for a
short time pupil with _Isokrates_, and that the story of his having
been pupil with _Sokrates_ has arisen from confusion of the two
names, which confusion has been seen on several occasions (Zeller,
Gesch. der Philos. der Griechen, ii. 2, p. 15.)]

During the interval, 367-360 B.C., Plato was much absent from Athens,
having paid two separate visits to Dionysius the younger at Syracuse.
The time which he spent there at each visit is not explicitly given;
but as far as we can conjecture from indirect allusions, it cannot
have been less than a year at each, and may possibly have been
longer. If, therefore, Aristotle reached Athens in 367 B.C. (as
Hermippus represents) he cannot have enjoyed continuous instructions
from Plato for the three or four years next ensuing.

However the facts may stand as to Aristotle's early life, there is no
doubt that in or before the year 362 B.C. he became resident at
Athens, and that he remained there, profiting by the society and
lectures of Plato, until the death of the latter in 347 B.C. Shortly
after the loss of his master, he quitted Athens, along with his
fellow-pupil Xenokrates, and went to Atarneus, which was at that time
ruled by the despot Hermeias. That despot was a remarkable man, who
being a eunuch through bodily hurt when a child, and having become
slave of a prior despot named Eubulus, had contrived to succeed him
in the supreme power, and governed the towns of Atarneus and Assos
with firmness and energy. Hermeias had been at Athens, had heard
Plato's lectures, and had contracted friendship with Aristotle; which
friendship became farther cemented by the marriage of Aristotle,
during his residence at Atarneus, with Pythias the niece of
Hermeias.[7] For three years Aristotle and Xenokrates remained at
Assos or Atarneus, whence they were then forced to escape by reason
of the despot's death; for Mentor the Rhodian, general of the
Persians in those regions, decoyed Hermeias out of the town under
pretence of a diplomatic negociation, then perfidiously seized him,
and sent him up as prisoner to the Persian king, by whose order he
was hanged. Mentor at the same time seized the two towns and other
possessions of Hermeias,[8] while Aristotle with his wife retired to
Mitylene. His deep grief for the fate of Hermeias was testified in a
noble hymn or pæan which he composed, and which still remains, as
well as by an epigram inscribed on the statue of Hermeias at Delphi.
We do not hear of his going elsewhere, until, two or three years
afterwards (the exact date is differently reported), he was invited
by Philip into Macedonia, to become preceptor to the young prince
Alexander, then thirteen or fourteen years old. The reputation, which
Aristotle himself had by this time established, doubtless coincided
with the recollection of his father Nikomachus as physician and
friend of Amyntas, in determining Philip to such a choice. Aristotle
performed the duties required from him,[9] enjoying the confidence
and favour both of Philip and Alexander, until the assassination of
the former and the accession of the latter in 336 B.C. His principle
residence during this period was in Macedonia, but he paid occasional
visits to Athens, and allusion is made to certain diplomatic services
which he rendered to the Athenians at the court of Philip; moreover
he must have spent some time at his native city Stageira,[10] which
had been among the many Greek cities captured and ruined by Philip
during the Olynthian war of 349-347 B.C. Having obtained the consent
and authority of Philip, Aristotle repaired to Stageira for the
purpose of directing the re-establishment of the city. Recalling such
of its dispersed inhabitants as could be collected, either out of the
neighbouring villages or from more distant parts, he is said to have
drawn up laws, or framed regulations for the returned citizens, and
new comers. He had reason to complain of various rivals who intrigued
against him, gave him much trouble, and obstructed the complete
renovation of the city; but, notwithstanding, his services were such
that an annual festival was instituted to commemorate them.[11] It is
farther stated, that at some time during this period he had a school
(analogous to the Academy at Athens) in the Nymphæum of the place
called Mieza; where stone seats and shady walks, ennobled by the name
of Aristotle, were still shown even in the days of Plutarch.[12]

[Footnote 7: Strabo, xiii. 610; Diodor. xvi. 52. It appears that
Aristotle incurred censure, even from contemporary rivals, for this
marriage with Pythias. On what ground we cannot exactly make out
(Aristokles ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2), unless it be from her
relationship to Hermeias. She died long before Aristotle, but he
mentions her in his will in terms attesting the constant affection
which had reigned between them until her death. Aristotle thought it
right to reply to the censure in one of his letters to Antipater.
Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2) says that Aristotle did not
marry Pythias until after the death of Hermeias, when she was
compelled to save herself by flight, and was in distress and poverty.
Mr. Blakesley (Life of Aristotle, p. 36) and Oncken (Die Staatslehre
des Aristoteles, p. 158) concur in thinking that the departure of
Aristotle from Athens had nothing to do with the death of Plato, but
was determined by the capture of Olynthus, and by the fear and
dislike of Philip which that event engendered at Athens.

But the fact that Xenokrates left Athens along with Aristotle
disproves this supposition, and proves that the death of Plato was
the real cause.]

[Footnote 8: Diog. Laert. v. 7-8. Diodorus ascribes this proceeding
to Mentor the Rhodian: Strabo, to his brother Memnon. I think
Diodorus is right. A remarkable passage in the Magna Moralia (genuine
or spurious) of Aristotle, seems to me to identify the proceeding
with Mentor (Aristot. Magn. Mor. i. 35, p. 1197, b. 21; as also the
spurious second book of the OEkonomica, p. 1351, a. 33).]

[Footnote 9: It was probably during this period that Aristotle
introduced to Alexander his friend the rhetor Theodektês of Phasêlis.
Alexander took delight in the society of Theodektês, and testified
this feeling, when he conquered Phasêlis, by demonstrations of
affection and respect towards the statue of the rhetor, who had died
during the intervening years--[Greek: a)podidou\s timê\n tê=|
genome/nê| di' A)ristote/lên kai\ philosophi/an o(mili/a| pro\s to\n
a)/ndra] (Plutarch, Alex. c. 17).]

[Footnote 10: It is to this period of Aristotle's life that the
passage extracted from his letters in Demetrius (so-called [Greek:
peri\ E(rmênei/as]) refers. [Greek: ô(s A)ristote/lês phêsi/n--e)gô\
e)k me\n A)thênô=n ei)s Sta/geira ê)=lthon dia\ to\n basile/a to\n
me/gan, e)k de\ Stagei/rôn ei)s A)thê/nas dia\ to\n cheimô=na to\n
me/gan]--s. 29.

We shall hardly consider this double employment of the epithet
[Greek: **me/gan] as an instance of that success in epistolary style,
which Demetrius ascribes to Aristotle (s. 239); but the passage
proves Aristotle's visits both to Stageira and to Athens. The very
cold winters of the Chalkidic peninsula were severely felt by the
Greeks (Plato--Symposion, p. 220), and may well have served as motive
to Aristotle for going from Stageira to Athens.]

[Footnote 11: Ammonius, Vit. Aristot. See the curious statements
given by Dion Chrysostom, out of the epistles of Aristotle; Orat. ii.
p. 100, xlvii. p. 225, Reiske.

Respecting the allusions made in these statements to various persons
who were reluctant to return out of the separate villages into the
restored city, compare what Xenophon says about the [Greek:
dioi/kisis], and subsequent restitution, of Mantineia; Hellenica, v.
2, 1-8, vi. 5, 3-6.]

[Footnote 12: Plutarch, Alexander, c. 7. What Plutarch calls the
_Nymphæum_, is considered by Stahr (Aristotelia, i. p. 93 n.) to be
probably the same as what Pliny denominates the _Museum_ at Stageira
(N. H. xvi. c. 23); but Zeller (p. 23, n.), after Geier, holds that
Mieza lay S.W. of Pella, in Emathia, far from Stageira. Plutarch
seems to imply that Aristotle was established along with Alexander at
Meiza by Philip.

Compare, for these facts of the biography of Aristotle, Stahr,
Aristotelia, Part I., pp. 86-94, 103-106.

I conceive that it was during this residence in Macedonia and at
Pella, that Aristotle erected the cenotaph in honour of Hermeias,
which is so contemptuously derided by the Chian poet Theokritus in
his epigram, Diog. L. v. 11. The epigram is very severe on Aristotle,
for preferring Pella to the Academy as a residence; ascribing such
preference to the exigencies of an ungovernable stomach.]

In 336 B.C. Alexander became king of Macedonia, and his vast projects
for conquest, first of Persia, next of other peoples known and
unknown, left him no leisure for anything but military and imperial
occupations. It was in the ensuing year (335 B.C. when the
preparations for the Persian expedition were being completed, ready
for its execution in the following spring, that Aristotle transferred
his residence to Athens. The Platonic philosophical school in which
he had studied was now conducted by Xenokrates as Scholarch, having
passed at the death of Plato, in 347 B.C., to his nephew Speusippus,
and from the latter to Xenokrates in 339 B.C. Aristotle established
for himself a new and rival school on the eastern side of Athens, in
the gymnasium attached to the temple of Apollo Lykeius, and deriving
from thence the name by which it was commonly known--the Lykeium. In
that school, and in the garden adjoining, he continued to lecture or
teach, during the succeeding twelve years, comprising the life and
the brilliant conquests of Alexander. Much of his instruction is said
to have been given while walking in the garden, from whence the
students and the sect derived the title of Peripatetics. In the
business of his school and the composition of his works all his time
was occupied; and his scholars soon became so numerous that he found
it convenient to desire them to elect from themselves every ten days
a rector to maintain order, as Xenokrates had already done at the
Academy.[13] Aristotle farther maintained correspondence, not merely
with Alexander and Antipater but also with Themison, one of the
princes of Cyprus, as Isokrates had corresponded with Nikokles, and
Plato with Dionysius of Syracuse.[14]

[Footnote 13: Diog. L. v. 4. Brandis notes it as a feature in
Aristotle's character (p. 65), that he abstained from meddling with
public affairs at Athens. But we must remember, that, not being a
citizen of Athens, Aristotle was not competent to meddle personally.
His great and respected philosophical competitor, Xenokrates (a
non-citizen or metic as well as he), was so far from being in a
condition to meddle with public affairs, that he was once even
arrested for not having paid in due season his [Greek: metoi/kion],
or capitation-tax imposed upon metics. He was liberated, according
to one story, by Lykurgus (Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. p. 842);
according to another story (seemingly more probable), by Demetrius
Phalereus (Diog. La. iv. 14). The anonymous life of Aristotle
published by Robbe (Leyden, 1861, p. 3), takes due notice of
Aristotle's position at Athens as a metic.]

[Footnote 14: Aristotle addressed to Themison a composition now lost,
but well known in antiquity, called [Greek: Protreptiko/s]. It was
probably a dialogue; and was intended as an encouragement to the
study of philosophy. See Rose, Aristot. Pseud. pp. 69-72, who gives a
very interesting fragment of it out of Stobæus.

We have the titles of two lost works of Aristotle--[Greek: Peri\
Basilei/as], and [Greek: A)le/xandros, ê)\ u(pe\r a)poi/kôn] (or
[Greek: a)poikiô=n]). Both seem to have been dialogues. In one, or in
both, he gave advice to Alexander respecting the manner of ruling his
newly acquired empire in Asia; and respecting the relations proper to
be established between Hellenes and native Asiatics (see Rose, Arist.
Pseud. pp. 92-96; Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristot. pp. 51-57).]

In June, 323 B.C., occurred the premature and unexpected decease of
the great Macedonian conqueror, aged 32 years and 8 months, by a
violent fever at Babylon. So vast was his power, and so unmeasured
his ambition, that the sudden removal of such a man operated as a
shock to the hopes and fears of almost every one, both in Greece and
Asia. It produced an entire change in the position of Aristotle at
Athens.

To understand what that position really was, we must look at it in
connection with his Macedonian sympathies, and with the
contemporaneous political sentiment at Athens. It was in the middle
of the year 335 B.C., that Alexander put down by force the revolt of
the Thebans, took their city by assault, demolished it altogether
(leaving nothing but the citadel called Kadmeia, occupied by a
Macedonian garrison), and divided its territory between two other
Boeotian towns. Immediately after that terror-striking act, he
demanded from the Athenians (who had sympathized warmly with Thebes,
though without overt acts of assistance) the surrender of their
principal anti-Macedonian politicians. That demand having been
refused, he at first prepared to extort compliance at the point of
the sword, but was persuaded, not without difficulty, to renounce
such intention, and to be content with the voluntary exile of
Ephialtes and Charidemus from Athens. Though the unanimous vote of
the Grecian Synod at Corinth constituted him Imperator, there can be
no doubt that the prevalent sentiment in Greece towards him was that
of fear and dislike; especially among the Athenians, whose dignity
was most deeply mortified, and to whom the restriction of free speech
was the most painful.[15]

[Footnote 15: See History of Greece, chap. xci. pp. 18, 41, 64.]

Now it was just at this moment (in 335 B.C.) that Aristotle came to
Athens and opened his school. We cannot doubt that he was already
known and esteemed as the author of various published writings. But
the prominent mark by which every one now distinguished him, was,
that he had been for several years confidential preceptor of
Alexander, and was still more or less consulted by that prince, as
well as sustained by the friendship of Antipater, viceroy of
Macedonia during the king's absence. Aristotle was regarded as
philo-Macedonian, and to a certain extent, anti-Hellenic--the
sentiment expressed towards him in the unfriendly epigram of the
contemporary Chian poet Theokritus.[16] His new school, originally
opened under the protection and patronage of Alexander and Antipater,
continued to be associated with their names, by that large proportion
of Athenian citizens who held anti-Macedonian sentiments. Alexander
caused the statue of Aristotle to be erected in Athens,[17] and sent
to him continual presents of money, usefully employed by the
philosopher in the prosecution of his physical and zoological
researches,[18] as well as in the purchase of books. Moreover,
Aristotle remained in constant and friendly correspondence with
Antipater, the resident viceroy at Pella,[19] during the absence of
Alexander in Asia. Letters of recommendation from Aristotle to the
Macedonian rulers were often given and found useful: several of them
were preserved and published afterwards. There is even reason to
believe that the son of Antipater--Kassander, afterwards viceroy or
king of Macedonia, was among his pupils.[20]

[Footnote 16: Diog. L. v. 11.

  [Greek: E(rmi/ou eu)nou/chou ê)/d' Eu)bou/lou a(/ma dou/lou
    Sê=ma keno\n keno/phrôn teu=xen A)ristote/lês;
  O(\s dia\ tê\n a)kratê= gastro\s phu/sin ei)/leto nai/ein
    A)nt' A)kadêmei/as Borbo/rou e)n prochoai=s.]

Cf. Plutarch, De Exilio, p. 603.]

[Footnote 17: Stahr, Aristotelia, vol. ii. p. 290.]

[Footnote 18: Athenæus, ix. 398; Pliny, H. N. viii. c. 16. Athenæus
alludes to 800 talents as having been given by Alexander to Aristotle
for this purpose. Pliny tells us that Alexander put thousands of men
at his service for enquiry and investigation. The general fact is all
that we can state with confidence, without pretending to verify
amounts.]

[Footnote 19: Vit. Aristotelis, Leyden, 1861, Robbe, pp. 4-6;
Aristokles ap. Eusebium Præp. Evang. xv. 2. Respecting the Epistles
of Aristotle, and the collection thereof by Artemon, see Rose,
Aristoteles Pseudepigr. pp. 594-598.]

[Footnote 20: We may infer this fact from the insulting reply made by
Alexander, not long before his death, to Kassander, who had just then
joined him for the first time at Babylon, having been sent by
Antipater at the head of a reinforcement. Some recent comers from
Greece complained to Alexander of having been ill-used by Antipater.
Kassander being present at the complaint, endeavoured to justify his
father and to invalidate their testimony, upon which Alexander
silenced him by the remark that he was giving a specimen of
sophistical duplicity learnt from Aristotle. [Greek: Tau=ta e)kei=na
sophi/smata tô=n A)ristote/lous ei)s e(ka/teron tô=n lo/gôn,
oi)môxome/nôn, a)\n kai\ mikro\n a)dikou=ntes tou\s a)nthrô/pous
phanê=te] (Plutarch, Alex. 74).]

I have recounted elsewhere how the character of Alexander became
gradually corrupted by unexampled success and Asiatic influences;[21]
how he thus came to feel less affection and esteem for Aristotle, to
whom he well knew that his newly acquired imperial and semi-divine
pretensions were not likely to be acceptable; how, on occasion of the
cruel sentence passed on Kallisthenes, he threatened even to punish
Aristotle himself, as having recommended Kallisthenes, and as
sympathizing with the same free spirit; lastly, how Alexander became
more or less alienated, not only from the society of Hellenic
citizens, but even from his faithful viceroy, the Macedonian
Antipater. But these changed relations between Aristotle and
Alexander did not come before the notice of the Athenians, nor alter
the point of view in which they regarded the philosopher; the rather,
since the relations of Aristotle with Antipater continued as intimate
as ever.

[Footnote 21: Histor. of Greece, ch. xciv. pp. 291, 301, 341;
Plutarch, Alexand. c. lv.; Dion Chrysostom. Orat. 64, p. 338,
Reiske.]

It will thus appear, that though all the preserved writings of
Aristotle are imbued with a thoroughly independent spirit of
theorizing contemplation and lettered industry, uncorrupted by any
servility or political bias--yet his position during the twelve years
between 335-323 B.C. inevitably presented him to the Athenians as the
macedonizing philosopher, parallel with Phokion as the macedonizing
politician, and in pointed antithesis to Xenokrates at the Academy,
who was attached to the democratical constitution, and refused kingly
presents. Besides that enmity which he was sure to incur, as an acute
and self-thinking philosopher, from theology and the other
anti-philosophical veins in the minds of ordinary men, Aristotle thus
became the object of unfriendly sentiment from many Athenian
patriots,[22] who considered the school of Plato generally as hostile
to popular liberty, and who had before their eyes examples of
individual Platonists, ruling their respective cities with a sceptre
forcibly usurped.[23]

[Footnote 22: The statement of Aristokles (ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev.
xv. 2) is doubtless just--[Greek: phanero\n ou)=n, o(/ti katha/per
polloi=s kai\ a)/llois, ou(/tô kai\ A)ristote/lei sune/bê, dia/ te
ta\s pro\s tou\s basilei=s phili/as kai\ dia\ tê\n e)n toi=s lo/gois
u(perochê/n, u(po\ tô=n to/te sophistô=n phthonei=sthai.] The like is
said by the rhetor Aristeides--Or. xii. p. 144, Dindorf. I have
already observed that the phrase of "Halbgrieche" applied by Bernays
and W. v. Humboldt to Aristotle (Bernays, Die Dialoge des
Aristoteles, p. 2, p. 134) is not accurate literally, unless we
choose to treat all the Hellenic colonies as half-Greek. His ancestry
was on both sides fully Hellenic. But it is true of him, in the same
metaphorical sense in which it is true of Phokion. Aristotle was
semi-Macedonian in his sympathies. He had no attachment to Hellas as
an organized system autonomous, self-acting, with an Hellenic city as
president: which attachment would have been considered, by Perikles,
Archidamus, and Epameinondas, as one among the constituents
indispensable to Hellenic patriotism.]

[Footnote 23: Quintilian--Declamat. 268. "Quis ignorat, ex ipsâ
Socratis (quo velut fonte omnis philosophia manasse creditur) scholâ
evasisse tyrannos et hostes patriæ suæ?" Compare Athenæus, xi.
508-509.]

Such sentiment was probably aggravated by the unparalleled and
offensive Macedonian demonstration at the Olympic festival of 324
B.C. It was on that occasion that Alexander, about one year prior to
his decease, sent down a formal rescript, which was read publicly to
the assembled crowd by a herald with loud voice; ordering every
Grecian city to recall all exiles who had been banished by judicial
sentence, and intimating, that if the rescript were not obeyed
spontaneously, Antipater would be instructed to compel the execution
of it by force. A large number of the exiles whose restitution was
thus ordered, were present on the plain of Olympia, and heard the
order proclaimed, doubtless with undisguised triumph and exultation.
So much the keener must have been the disgust and humiliation among
the other Grecian hearers, who saw the autonomy of each separate city
violently trampled down, without even the pretence of enquiry, by
this high-handed sentence of the Macedonian conqueror. Among the
Athenians especially, the resentment felt was profound; and a vote
was passed appointing deputies to visit Alexander in person, for the
purpose of remonstrating against it. The orator Demosthenes, who
happened to be named Archi-Theôrus of Athens (chief of the solemn
legation sent to represent Athens) at this Olympic festival, incurred
severe reproach from his accuser Deinarchus, for having even been
seen in personal conversation with the Macedonian officer who had
arrived from Asia as bearer of this odious rescript.[24]

[Footnote 24: See the description of this event in History of Greece,
ch. xcv. p. 416.

There is reason for supposing that Hypereides also (as well as
Deinarchus) inveighed against Demosthenes for having publicly sought
the company of Nikanor at this Olympic festival. At least we know
that Hypereides, in his oration against Demosthenes, made express
allusion to Nikanor. See Harpokration _v._ [Greek: Nika/nôr].

The exordium prefixed to the Pseud-Aristotelian Rhetorica ad
Alexandrum, announces that discourse to have been composed pursuant
to the desire of Alexander; and notices especially one message
transmitted by him to Aristotle through Nikanor (p. 1420 a. 6, 1421
a. 26-38, [Greek: katha/per ê(mi=n e)dê/lôse Nika/nôr], &c.).]

Now it happened that this officer, the bearer of the rescript, was
Nikanor of Stageira;[25] son of Proxenus who had been Aristotle's
early guardian, and himself the cherished friend or ward, ultimately
the son-in-law, of the philosopher. We may be certain that Aristotle
would gladly embrace the opportunity of seeing again this attached
friend, returning after a long absence on service in Asia; that he
would be present with him at the Olympic festival, perhaps receive a
visit from him at Athens also. And the unpopularity of Aristotle at
Athens, as identified with Macedonian imperial authority, would thus
be aggravated by his notorious personal alliance with his
fellow-citizen Nikanor, the bearer of that rescript in which such
authority had been most odiously manifested.

[Footnote 25: Diodor. xviii. 8. [Greek: dio/per u(pogu/ôn o)/ntôn
tô=n O)lumpi/ôn e)xe/pempsen] (Alexander) [Greek: ei)s tê\n E(lla/da
Nika/nora to\n Stageiri/tên, dou\s e)pistolê\n peri\ tê=s katho/dou.]

Antipater, when re-distributing the satrapies of the Macedonian
empire, after the death both of Alexander and of Perdikkas, appointed
Nikanor prefect or satrap of Kappadokia (Arrian, [Greek: Ta\ meta\
A)le/xandron], apud Photium, cod. 92, s.37, Didot).

Ammonius, in the life of Aristotle, mentions Nikanor as son of
Proxenus of Atarneus. Sextus Empiricus alludes to Nikanor as
son-in-law of Aristotle (adv. Mathematicos, sect. 258. p. 271, Fabr.).
See Ménage ad Diogen. Laert. v. 12. Robbe's Life of Aristotle also
(Leyden, 1861, p. 2) mentions Nikanor as son of Proxenus.

Nikanor was appointed afterwards (in 318 B.C., five years later than
the death of Aristotle) by Kassander, son of Antipater, to be
commander of the Macedonian garrison which occupied Munychia, as a
controlling force over Athens (Diodor. xviii. 64). It will be seen in
my History of Greece (ch. xcvi. p. 458) that Kassander was at that
moment playing a difficult game, his father Antipater being just
dead; that he could only get possession of Munychia by artifice, and
that it was important for him to entrust the mission to an officer
who already had connections at Athens; that Nikanor, as adopted son
of Aristotle, possessed probably beforehand acquaintance with Phokion
and the other macedonizing leaders at Athens; so that the ready way
in which Phokion now fell into co-operation with him is the more
easily explained.

Nikanor, however, was put to death by Kassander himself, some months
afterwards.]

During the twelve or thirteen years[26] of Aristotle's teaching and
Alexander's reign, Athens was administered by macedonizing citizens,
with Phokion and Demades at their head. Under such circumstances, the
enmity of those who hated the imperial philosopher could not pass
into act; nor was it within the contemplation of any one, that only
one year after that rescript which insulted the great Pan-Hellenic
festival, the illustrious conqueror who issued it would die of fever,
in the vigour of his age and at the height of his power (June, 323
B.C.). But as soon as the news of his decease, coming by surprise
both on friends and enemies, became confirmed, the suppressed
anti-Macedonian sentiment burst forth in powerful tide, not merely at
Athens, but also throughout other parts of Greece. There resulted
that struggle against Antipater, known as the Lamian war:[27] a
gallant struggle, at first promising well, but too soon put down by
superior force, and ending in the occupation of Athens by Antipater
with a Macedonian garrison in September, 322 B.C., as well as in the
extinction of free speech and free citizenship by the suicide of
Demosthenes and the execution of Hypereides.

[Footnote 26: There remain small fragments of an oration of Demades
in defence of his administration, or political activity, for twelve
years--[Greek: u(pe\r tê=s dôdekaeti/as] (Demad. Fragm. 179, 32). The
twelve years of Demades, however, seem to be counted from the battle
of Chæroneia in 338 B.C.; so that they end in B.C. 326. See Clinton,
Fast. Hellen. B.C. 326.]

[Footnote 27: For the account of the Lamian war, see History of
Greece, ch. xcv. pp. 420-440. As to the **anti-Macedonian sentiment
prevalent at Athens, see Diodorus, xviii. 10.]

During the year immediately succeeding the death of Alexander, the
anti-Macedonian sentiment continued so vehemently preponderant at
Athens, that several of the leading citizens, friends of Phokion,
left the city to join Antipater, though Phokion himself remained,
opposing ineffectually the movement. It was during this period that
the enemies of Aristotle found a favourable opportunity for assailing
him. An indictment on the score of impiety was preferred against him
by Eurymedon the Hierophant (chief priest of the Eleusinian Demeter),
aided by Demophilus, son of the historian Ephorus. The Hymn or Pæan
(still existing), which Aristotle had composed in commemoration of
the death, and in praise of the character, of the eunuch
Hermeias,[28] was arraigned as a mark of impiety; besides which
Aristotle had erected at Delphi a statue of Hermeias with an
honorific inscription, and was even alleged to have offered
sacrifices to him as to a god. In the published writings of
Aristotle, too, the accusers found various heretical doctrines,
suitable for sustaining their indictment; as, for example, the
declaration that prayer and sacrifices to the gods were of no
avail.[29] But there can be little doubt that the Hymn, Ode, or Pæan,
in honour of Hermeias, would be more offensive to the feelings of an
ordinary Athenian than any philosophical dogma extracted from the
cautious prose compositions of Aristotle. It is a hymn, of noble
thought and dignified measure, addressed to Virtue ([Greek:
A)retê\]--masculine or military Virtue), in which are extolled the
semi-divine or heroic persons who had fought, endured, and perished
in her service. The name and exploits of Hermeias are here introduced
as the closing parallel and example in a list beginning with Hêraklês,
the Dioskûri, Achilles, and Ajax. Now the poet Kallistratus, in his
memorable Skolion, offers a like compliment to Harmodius and
Aristogeiton; and Pindar, to several free Greeks of noble family, who
paid highly for his epinician Odes now remaining. But all the persons
thus complimented were such as had gained prizes at the sacred
festivals, or had distinguished themselves in other ways which the
public were predisposed to honour; whereas Hermeias was a eunuch, who
began by being a slave, and ended by becoming despot over a free
Grecian community, without any exploit conspicuous to the eye. To
many of the Athenian public it would seem insult, and even impiety,
to couple Hermeias with the greatest personages of Hellenic
mythology, as a successful competitor for heroic honours. We need
only read the invective of Claudian against Eutropius, to appreciate
the incredible bitterness of indignation and contempt, which was
suggested by the spectacle of a eunuch and a slave exercising high
public functions.[30] And the character of a despot was, to the
anti-macedonizing Athenians, hardly less odious than either of the
others combined with it in Hermeias.

[Footnote 28: Diogen. L. v. 5; Athenæus, xv. 696. The name of
Demophilus was mentioned by Favorinus as also subscribed to the
indictment: this Demophilus was probably son of the historian
Ephorus. See Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 582. He took
part afterwards in the indictment against Phokion. As an historian,
he completed the narrative of the Sacred War, which his father
Ephorus had left unfinished (Diodor. xvi. 14). The words of Athenæus,
as far as I can understand them, seem to imply that he composed a
speech for the Hierophant Eurymedon.]

[Footnote 29: See the passages from Origen advers. Celsum, cited in
Stahr's Aristotelia, vol. i. p. 146.

Among the titles of the lost works of Aristotle (No. 14 in the
Catalogue of Diogenes Laertius, No. 9 in that of the Anonymous; see
Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp. 12-18), one is [Greek: Peri\
Eu)chê=s]. From its position in the Catalogue, it seems plainly to
have been a dialogue; and the dialogues were the most popular and
best-known writings of Aristotle. Now we know from the Nikomach.
Ethica (x. 8, 1178, b. 6-32) that Aristotle declared all constructive
effort, and all action with a view to external ends, to be
inconsistent with the Divine Nature, which was blest exclusively in
theorizing and contemplation. If he advocated the same doctrine in
the dialogue [Greek: Peri\ Eu)chê=s], he must have contended that
persons praying could have no additional chance of obtaining the
benefits which they prayed for; and this would have placed him in
conflict with the received opinions.

Respecting the dialogue [Greek: Peri\ Eu)chê=s], see Bernays, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 120-122; and Rose, Arist. Pseudepigr.
pp. 67, 68.]

[Footnote 30: "Omnia cesserunt, eunucho consule, monstra:" this is
among the bitter lines of Claudian, too numerous to cite; but they
well deserve to be read in the original. Compare also, about the
ancient sentiment towards eunuchs, Herodotus, viii. 106; Xenophon,
Cyropæd. viii. 3. 15.

Apellikon thought it worth while to compose a special treatise, for
the purpose of vindicating Aristotle from the aspersions circulated
in regard to his relations with Hermeias. Aristokles speaks of the
vindication as successful (ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 2).]

Taking these particulars into account, we shall see that a charge
thus sustained, when preferred by a venerable priest, during the
prevalence of strong anti-Macedonian feeling, against a notorious
friend of Antipater and Nikanor, was quite sufficient to alarm the
prudence of the accused. Aristotle bowed to the storm (if indeed he
had not already left Athens, along with other philo-Macedonians) and
retired to Chalkis (in Euboea),[31] then under garrison by Antipater.
An accused person at Athens had always the option of leaving the
city, at any time before the day of trial; Sokrates might have
retired, and obtained personal security in the same manner, if he had
chosen to do so. Aristotle must have been served, of course, with due
notice: and according to Athenian custom, the indictment would be
brought into court in his absence, as if he had been present; various
accusers, among them Demochares,[32] the nephew of Demosthenes, would
probably speak in support of it; and Aristotle must been found guilty
in his absence. But there is no ground for believing that he intended
to abandon Athens, and live at Chalkis, permanently; the rather,
inasmuch as he seems to have left not only his school, but his
library, at Athens under the charge of Theophrastus. Aristotle knew
that the Macedonian chiefs would not forego supremacy over Greece
without a struggle; and, being in personal correspondence with
Antipater himself, he would receive direct assurance of this
resolution, if assurance were needed. In a question of military
force, Aristotle probably felt satisfied that Macedonian arms must
prevail; after which the affairs of Athens would be again
administered, at least in the same spirit, as they had been before
Alexander's death, if not with more complete servility. He would then
have returned thither to resume his school, in competition with that
of Plato under Xenokrates at the Academy; for he must have been well
aware that the reputation of Athens, as central hearth of Hellenic
letters and philosophy, could not be transferred to Chalkis or to any
other city.[33]

[Footnote 31: That Chalkis was among the Grecian towns then occupied
by a Macedonian garrison is the statement of Brandis (Entwickelungen
der Griechischen Philosophie, i. p. 391, 1862). Though I find no
direct authority for this statement, I adopt it as probable in the
highest degree.]

[Footnote 32: Aristokles (ap. Eusebium Præp. Ev. xv. 2) takes notice
of the allegations of Demochares against Aristotle: That letters of
Aristotle had been detected or captured ([Greek: a(lô=nai]), giving
information injurious to Athens: That Aristotle had betrayed Stageira
to Philip: That when Philip, after the capture of Olynthus, was
selling into slavery the Olynthian prisoners, Aristotle was present
at the auction ([Greek: e)pi\ tou= laphuropôlei/ou]), and pointed out
to him which among the prisoners were men of the largest property.

We do not know upon what foundation of fact (if upon any) these
allegations were advanced by a contemporary orator. But they are
curious, as illustrating the view taken of Aristotle by his enemies.
They must have been delivered as parts of one of the accusatory
speeches on Aristotle's trial _par contumace_: for this was the
earliest occasion on which Aristotle's enemies had the opportunity of
publicly proclaiming their antipathy against him, and they would
hardly omit to avail themselves of it. The Hierophant, the principal
accuser, would be supported by other speakers following him; just as
Melêtus, the accuser of Sokrates, was supported by Anytus and Lykon.
The [Greek: i(stori/ai] of Demochares were not composed until
seventeen years after this epoch--certainly not earlier than 306
B.C.--sixteen years after the death of Aristotle, when his character
was not prominently before the public. Nevertheless Demochares may
possibly have included these accusatory allegations against the
philosopher in his [Greek: i(stori/ai], as well as in his published
speech. His invectives against Antipater, and the friends of
Antipater, were numerous and bitter:--Polybius. xii. 13, 9; Cicero,
Brutus, 83; compare Democharis Fragmenta, in Didot's Fragm.
Historicorum Græcorum, vol. ii. p. 448. Philôn, who indicted
Sophokles (under the [Greek: graphê\ parano/môn]) for the law which
the latter had proposed in 306 B.C. against the philosophers at
Athens, had been a friend of Aristotle, [Greek: A)ristote/lous
gnô/rimos]. Athenæus, xiii. 610.]

[Footnote 33: We may apply here the same remark that Dionysius makes
about Deinarchus as a speech-maker; when Deinarchus retired to
Chalkis, no one would send to Chalkis for a speech: [Greek: Ou) ga\r
ei)s Chalki/da a)/n tines e)/pleon lo/gôn cha/rin, ê)\ i)di/ôn, ê)\
dêmosi/ôn; ou) ga\r te/leon ê)po/roun ou(/tô lo/gôn.] Dionys. Halic.
Dinar. p. 639.]

This is what would probably have occurred, when the Lamian war was
finished and the Macedonian garrison installed at Athens, in Sept.
322 B.C.--had Aristotle's life lasted longer. But in or about that
very period, a little before the death of Demosthenes, he died at
Chalkis of illness; having for some time been troubled with
indigestion and weakness of stomach.[34] The assertion of Eumêlus and
others that he took poison, appears a mere fiction suggested by the
analogy of Sokrates.[35] One of his latest compositions was a defence
of himself against the charge of impiety, and against the allegations
of his accusers (as reported to him, or published) in support of it.
A sentence of this defence remains,[36] wherein he points out the
inconsistency of his accusers in affirming that he intended to honour
Hermeias as an immortal, while he had notoriously erected a tomb, and
had celebrated funeral ceremonies to him as a mortal. And in a letter
to Antipater, he said (among other things) that Athens was a
desirable residence, but that the prevalence of sycophancy or false
accusation was a sad drawback to its value; moreover that he had
retired to Chalkis, in order that the Athenians might not have the
opportunity of sinning a second time against philosophy, as they had
already done once, in the person of Sokrates.[37] In the same or
another letter to Antipater, he adverted to an honorific tribute
which had been voted to him at Delphi before the death of Alexander,
but the vote for which had been since rescinded. He intimated that
this disappointment was not indifferent to him, yet at the same time
no serious annoyance.[38]

[Footnote 34: Censorinus, De Die Natali--Ménage ad Diogen. Laert. v.
16.]

[Footnote 35: Diogenes L. however (v. 8) gave credit to this story,
as we may see by his Epigram.]

[Footnote 36: Athenæus xv. p. 696, 697. Probably this reply of
Aristotle (though Zeller, p. 33, declares it to be spurious, in my
judgment very gratuitously), may have been suited to the words of the
speech (not preserved to us) which it was intended to answer. But the
reply does not meet what I conceive to have been the real feeling in
the minds of those who originated the charge. The logical
inconsistency which he points out did not appear an inconsistency to
Greeks generally. Aristotle had rendered to the deceased Hermeias the
same honours (though less magnificent in degree) as Alexander to the
deceased Hephæstion, and the Amphipolitans to the deceased Brasidas
(Thucyd. v. 11; Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. v. 7. 1). In both these
cases a tomb was erected to the deceased, implying mortality; and
permanent sacrifices were offered to him, implying immortality: yet
these two proceedings did not appear to involve any logical
contradiction, in the eyes of the worshippers. That which offended
the Athenians, really, in the case of Aristotle, was the
worthlessness of Hermeias, to whom he rendered these prodigious
honours--eunuch, slave, and despot; an assemblage of what they
considered mean attributes. The solemn measure and character of a
Pæan was disgraced by being applied to such a vile person.]

[Footnote 37: Ammonius, Vit. Aristotelis, p. 48, in Buhle's Aristot.
vol. i.; Ménage ad Diog. Laert. v. 5, with the passage from Origen
(adv. Celsum) there cited; Ælian, V. H. iii. 36.

We learn from Diogenes that Theophrastus was indicted for impiety by
Agnonides; but such was the esteem in which Theophrastus was held,
that the indictment utterly failed; and Agnonides was very near
incurring the fine which every accuser had to pay, if he did not
obtain one-fifth of the suffrages of the Dikasts (Diog. L. v. 37).
Now Agnonides comes forward principally as the vehement accuser of
Phokion four years after the death of Aristotle, during the few
months of democratical reaction brought about by the edicts and
interference of Polysperchon (318 B.C.) after the death of Antipater
(History of Greece, ch. xcvi. p. 477). Agnonides must have felt
himself encouraged by what had happened five years before with
Aristotle, to think that he would succeed in a similar charge against
Theophrastus. But Theophrastus was personally esteemed; he was not
intimately allied with Antipater, or directly protected by him;
moreover, he had composed no hymn to a person like Hermeias.
Accordingly, the indictment recoiled upon the accuser himself.]

[Footnote 38: Ælian, V. H. xiv. 1. [Greek: A)ristote/lês, e)pei/ tis
au)tou= a)phei/leto ta\s psêphisthei/sas e)n Delphoi=s tima/s,
e)piste/llôn pro\s A)nti/patron peri\ tou/tôn, phêsi/n--U(pe\r tô=n
e)n Delphoi=s psêphisthe/ntôn moi, kai\ ô(=n a)phê/|rêmai nu=n,
ou(/tôs e)/chô ô(s mê/te moi spho/dra me/lein au)tô=n, mê/te moi
mêde\n me/lein.] The statue of Aristotle at Athens was before the
eyes of Alexander of Aphrodisias about A.D. 200. See Zumpt,
Scholarchen zu Athen, p. 74.]

In regard to the person and habits of Aristotle, we are informed that
he had thin legs and small eyes; that in speech he was somewhat
lisping; that his attire was elegant and even showy; that his table
was well-served--according to his enemies, luxurious above the
measure of philosophy. His pleasing and persuasive manners are
especially attested by Antipater, in a letter, apparently of marked
sympathy and esteem, written shortly after the philosopher's
death.[39] He was deeply attached to his wife Pythias, by whom he had
a daughter who bore the same name. His wife having died after some
years, he then re-married with a woman of Stageira, named Herpyllis,
who bore him a son called Nikomachus. Herpyllis lived with him until
his death; and the constant as well as reciprocal attachment between
them is attested by his last will.[40] At the time of his death, his
daughter Pythias had not yet attained marriageable age; Nikomachus
was probably a child.

[Footnote 39: Plutarch--Alkibiad. et Coriolan. Comp. c. 3; Aristeid.
cum Caton. maj. Comp. c. 2. The accusation of luxury and dainty
feeding was urged against him by his contemporary assailant
Kephisodorus (Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xv. 2); according to some statements,
by Plato also, Ælian, V. H. iii. 19. Contrast the epigram of the
contemporary poet Theokritus of Chios, who censures Aristotle [Greek:
dia\ tê\n a)kratê= gastro\s phu/sin], with the satirical drama of the
poet Lykophron (ap. Athenæum, ii. p. 55), in which he derided the
suppers of philosophers, for their coarse and unattractive food:
compare the verses of Antiphanes, ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 98 F.; and
Diog. L. vii. 27; Timæus ap. Athenæum, viii. 342. The lines of
Antiphanes ap. Athenæ. iv. 1346, seem to apply to Aristotle,
notwithstanding Meineke's remarks, p. 59.]

[Footnote 40: Diog. L. v. 1, 13; Aristokles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv.
2.]

The will or testament of the philosopher is preserved.[41] Its first
words constitute Antipater his general executor in the most
comprehensive terms,[42] words well calculated to ensure that his
directions should be really carried into effect; since not only was
Antipater now the supreme potentate, but Nikanor, the chief
beneficiary under the will, was in his service and dependent on his
orders. Aristotle then proceeds to declare that Nikanor shall become
his son-in-law, by marriage with his daughter Pythias as soon as she
shall attain suitable age; also, his general heir, subject to certain
particular bequests and directions, and the guardian of his infant
son Nikomachus. Nikanor being at that time on service, and perhaps in
Asia, Aristotle directs that four friends (named Aristomenes,
Timarchus, Hipparchus, Diotelês) shall take provisional care of
Herpyllis, his two children, and his effects, until Nikanor can
appear and act: Theophrastus is to be conjoined with these four if he
chooses, and if circumstances permit him.[43] The daughter Pythias,
when she attains suitable age, is to become the wife of Nikanor, who
will take the best care both of her and her son Nikomachus, being in
the joint relation of father and brother to them.[44] If Pythias
shall die, either before the marriage or after it, but without
leaving offspring, Nikanor shall have discretion to make such
arrangements as may be honourable both for himself and for the
testator respecting Nikomachus and the estate generally. In case of
the death of Nikanor himself, either before the marriage or without
offspring, any directions given by him shall be observed; but
Theophrastus shall be entitled, if he chooses, to become the husband
of Pythias, and if Theophrastus does not choose, then the executors
along with Antipater shall determine what they think best both for
her and for Nikomachus.[45] The will then proceeds as follows:--"The
executors (here Antipater is not called in to co-operate) with
Nikanor, in faithful memory of me and of the steady affection of
Herpyllis towards me, shall take good care of her in every way, but
especially if she desires to be married, in giving her away to one
not unworthy of me. They shall assign to her, besides what she has
already received, a talent of silver, and three female slaves chosen
by herself, out of the property, together with the young girl and the
Pyrrhæan slave now attached to her person. If she prefers to reside
at Chalkis, she may occupy the lodging near the garden; if at
Stageira, she may live at my paternal house. Whichever of the two she
may prefer, the executors shall provide it with all such articles of
furniture as they deem sufficient for her comfort and dignity."[46]

[Footnote 41: Diog. L. v. 11. [Greek: E)/stai men eu)=; e)a\n de/ ti
sumbai/nê|, ta/de die/theto A)ristote/lês; e)pi/tropon me\n ei)=nai
pa/ntôn kai\ dia\ panto\s A)nti/patron], &c. The testament of
Aristotle was known to Hermippus (Athenæus, xiii. p. 589) about a
century later than Aristotle, and the most ancient known authority
respecting the facts of his life. Stahr (Aristotelia, vol. i. 159)
and Brandis (Arist. p. 62) suppose that what Diogenes gives is only
an extract from the will; since nothing is said about the library,
and Aristotle would not omit to direct what should be done with a
library which he so much valued. But to this I reply, that there was
no necessity for his making any provision about the library; he had
left it at Athens along with his school, in the care of Theophrastus.
He wished it to remain there, and probably considered it as an
appendage to the school; and it naturally would remain there, if he
said nothing about it in his testament. We must remember (as I have
already intimated) that when Aristotle left Athens, he only
contemplated being absent for a time; and intended to come back and
resume his school, when Macedonian supremacy should be
re-established.]

[Footnote 42: Pausanias (vi. 4, 5) describes a statue of Aristotle
which he saw at Olympia: the fact by which Aristotle was best known
both to him and to the guides, seems to have been the friendship
first of Alexander, next of Antipater.]

[Footnote 43: Diog. L. v. 12. [Greek: e(/ôs d' a)\n Nika/nôr
katala/bê|, e)pimelei=sthai A)ristome/nên, Ti/marchon, I(/pparchon,
Diote/lên, Theo/phraston, e)a\n bou/lêtai kai\ e)nde/chêtai au)tô=|,
tô=n te paidi/ôn kai\ E(rpulli/dos kai\ tô=n kataleleimme/nôn.] The
four persons here named were probably present at Chalkis, so that
Aristotle could count upon them; but at the time when this will was
made, Theophrastus was at Athens, conducting the Aristotelian school;
and in the critical condition of Grecian politics, there was room for
doubt how far he could securely or prudently act in this matter.

The words of Diogenes--[Greek: e(/ôs d' a)\n Nika/nôr
katala/bê|]--are rendered in the improved translation of the edition
by Firmin Didot, "_quoad vero Nicanor adolescat," &c. I cannot think
this a correct understanding, either of the words or of the fact.
Nikanor was not a minor under age, but an officer on active service.
The translation given by Ménage appears to me more true--"_tantisper
dum redux sit Nicanor:_" (ad. D. L. v. 12.)]

[Footnote 44: Diog. L. v. 12. [Greek: ô(s kai\ patê\r ô)\n kai\
a)delpho/s].]

[Footnote 45: Diog. L. v. 13. In following the phraseology of this
testament, we remark that when Aristotle makes allusion to these
inauspicious possibilities--the death of Nikanor or of Pythias, he
annexes to them a deprecatory phrase: [Greek: e)a\n de\ tê=| paidi\
sumbê=|--o(\ mê\ ge/noito ou)de\ e)/stai], &c.]

[Footnote 46: Diog. L. v. 14. [Greek: kai\ e)a\n me\n e)n Chalki/di
bou/lêtai oi)kei=n, to\n xenô=na to\n pro\s tô=| kê/pô|; e)a\n de\
e)n Stagei/rois, tê\n patrô/|an oi)ki/an.] The "lodging near the
garden" may probably have been the residence occupied by Aristotle
himself, during his temporary residence at Chalkis. The mention of
his paternal house, which he still possessed at Stageira, seems to
imply that Philip, when he destroyed that town, respected the house
therein which had belonged to his father's physician.

We find in the will of Theophrastus (Diog. L. v. 52) mention made of
a property ([Greek: chôri/on]) at Stageira belonging to Theophrastus,
which he bequeaths to Kallinus. Probably this is the same property
which had once belonged to Aristotle; for I do not see how else
Theophrastus (who was a native of Eresus in Lesbos) could have become
possessed of property at Stageira.]

Aristotle proceeds to direct that Nikanor shall make comfortable
provision for several persons mentioned by name, male and female,
most of them slaves, but one (Myrmex), seemingly, a free boarder or
pupil, whose property he had undertaken to manage. Two or three of
these slaves are ordered to be liberated, and to receive presents, as
soon as his daughter Pythias shall be married. He strictly enjoins
that not one of the youthful slaves who attended him shall be sold.
They are to be brought up and kept in employment; when of mature age,
they are to be liberated according as they shew themselves
worthy.[47]

[Footnote 47: Diog. L. v. 15. [Greek: mê\ pôlei=n de\ tô=n pai/dôn
mêde/na tô=n e)me\ therapeuo/ntôn, **a)lla\ chrê=sthai au)toi=s;
o(/tan d' e)n ê(liki/a| ge/nôntai, e)leuthe/rous a)phei=nai kat'
a)xi/an.]]

Aristotle had in his lifetime ordered, from a sculptor named
Gryllion, busts of Nikanor and of the mother of Nikanor; he intended
farther to order from the same sculptor a bust of Proxenus, Nikanor's
father. Nikanor is instructed by the will to complete these orders,
and to dedicate the busts properly when brought in. A bust of the
mother of Aristotle is to be dedicated to Demeter at Nemea, or in any
other place which Nikanor may prefer; another bust of Arimnêstus
(brother of Aristotle) is to be dedicated as a memento of the same,
since he has died childless.[48]

[Footnote 48: Diog. L. v. 15.]

During some past danger of Nikanor (we do not know what) Aristotle
had made a vow of four marble animal figures, in case the danger were
averted, to Zeus the Preserver and Athênê the Preserver. Nikanor is
directed to fulfil this vow and to dedicate the figures in
Stageira.[49]

[Footnote 49: Diog. L. v. 16. [Greek: a)nathei=nai de\ kai\ Nika/nora
sôthe/nta, ê(\n eu)chê\n u(pe\r au)tou= êu)xa/mên, zô=|a li/thina
tetrapê/chê Dii+\ Sô/têri kai\ A)thê/na| Sôtei/ra| e)n Stagei/rois.]

Here is a vow, made by Aristotle to the gods under some unknown
previous emergency, which he orders his executor to fulfil. I presume
that the last words of direction given by Sokrates before his death
to Kriton were of the same nature: "We owe a cock to Æsculapius: pay
the debt, and do not fail." (See my preceding work, Plato and the
other Companions of Sokrates, vol. ii. ch. 23, p. 195.)]

Lastly, wherever Aristotle is buried, the bones of his deceased wife
Pythias are to be collected and brought to the same spot, as she had
commanded during her lifetime.[50]

[Footnote 50: Diog. L. v. 16.]

This testament is interesting, as it illustrates the personal
circumstances and sentiments of the philosopher, evincing an
affectionate forethought and solicitude for those who were in
domestic relations with him. As far as we can judge, the
establishment and property which he left must have been an ample
one.[51] How the provisions of the will were executed, or what became
of most persons named in it, we do not know, except that Pythias the
daughter of Aristotle was married three times: first, to Nikanor
(according to the will); secondly, to Proklês, descendant of
Demaratus (the king of Sparta formerly banished to Asia) by whom she
had two sons, Proklês and Demaratus, afterwards pupils in the school
of Theophrastus; thirdly, to a physician named Metrodôrus, by whom
she had a son named Aristotle.[52]

[Footnote 51: The elder Pliny (H. N. xxxv. 12, 46; compare also
Diogen. L. v. 1, 16) mentions that in the sale of Aristotle's effects
by his heirs there were included seventy dishes or pans (_patinas_,
earthenware). Pliny considered this as a mark of luxurious living;
since (according to Fenestella) "tripatinium appellabatur summam
coenarum lautitia."]

[Footnote 52: Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, i. p. 271 F. sect.
258. About the banishment, or rather voluntary exile, of Demaratus to
Asia, in the reign of Darius I. king of Persia, see Herodot. vi. 70.
Some towns and lands were assigned to him in Æolis, where Xenophon
found his descendant Prokles settled, after the conclusion of the
Cyreian expedition (Xen. Anab. vii. 8, 17).

Respecting this younger Aristotle--son of Metrodorus and grandson of
the great philosopher--mention is made in the testament of
Theophrastus, and directions are given for promoting his improvement
in philosophy (Diog. La. v. 53). Nikomachus was brought up chiefly by
Theophrastus, but perished young in battle (Aristokles ap. Euseb.
Præp. Ev. xv. 2).]

There existed in antiquity several works, partly by contemporaries
like the Megaric Eubulides, partly by subsequent Platonists, in which
Aristotle was reproached with ingratitude to Plato,[53] servility to
the Macedonian power, love of costly display and indulgences, &c.
What proportion of truth may lie at the bottom of these charges we do
not know enough to determine confidently; but we know that he had
many enemies, philosophical as well as political;[54] and controversy
on those grounds (then as now) was rarely kept free from personal
slander and invective.

[Footnote 53: Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2; Diog. La. ii. 109.]

[Footnote 54: The remarkable passage of Themistius (Orat. xxiii.
p. 346) attests the number and vehemence of these opponents. [Greek:
Kêphisodô=rous te kai\ Eu)bouli/das kai\ Timai/ous kai\
Dikaia/rchous, kai\ stra/ton o(/lon tô=n e)pitheme/nôn A)ristote/lei
tô=| Stageiri/tê|, po/t' a)\n katale/xaimi eu)petô=s, ô(=n kai\
lo/goi e)xiknou=ntai ei)s to/nde to\n chro/non, diatêrou=ntes tê\n
a)pe/chtheian kai\ philoneiki/an?]]

The accusation of ingratitude or unbecoming behaviour to Plato is no
way proved by any evidence now remaining. It seems to have been
suggested to the Platonists mainly, if not wholly, by the direct
rivalry of Aristotle in setting up a second philosophical school at
Athens, alongside of the Academy; by his independent, self-working,
philosophical speculation; and by the often-repeated opposition which
he made to some capital doctrines of Plato, especially to the
so-called Platonic Ideas.[55] Such opposition was indeed expressed,
as far as we can judge, in terms of respectful courtesy, and
sometimes even of affectionate regret; examples of which we shall
have to notice in going through the Aristotelian writings. Yet some
Platonists seem to have thought that direct attack on the master's
doctrines was undutiful and ungrateful in the pupil, however
unexceptionable the language might be. They also thought, probably,
that the critic misrepresented what he sought to refute. Whether
Aristotle really believed that he had superior claims to be made
Scholarch of the Platonic school at the death of Plato in 347 B.C.,
or at the death of Speusippus in 339 B.C., is a point which we can
neither affirm nor deny. But we can easily understand that the act of
setting up a new philosophical school at Athens, though perfectly
fair and admissible on his part, was a hostile competition sure both
to damage and offend the pre-established school, and likely enough to
be resented with unbecoming asperity. Ingratitude towards the great
common master Plato, with arrogant claims of superiority over
fellow-pupils, were the allegations which this resentment would
suggest, and which many Platonists in the Academy would not scruple
to advance against their macedonizing rival at the Lykeium.

[Footnote 55: This is what lies at the bottom of the charges advanced
by Eubulides, probably derived from the Platonists, [Greek: kai\
Eu)bouli/dês prodê/lôs e)n tô=| kat' au)tou= bibli/ô| pseu/detai,
pha/skôn, teleutô=nti Pla/tôni mê\ paragene/sphai, ta/ te bi/blia
au)tou= diaphthei=rai] (Aristokles ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 2). There
can be no possible basis for this last charge--destroying or
corrupting the books of Plato--except that Aristotle had sharply
criticized them, and was supposed to have mis-stated or unfairly
discredited them.

The frequently recurring protest of Aristotle against the Platonic
doctrine of Ideas may be read now in the Analytica, Topica,
Metaphysica, and Ethica Nikomachea, but was introduced even in the
lost Dialogues. See Plutarch adv. Kolôten, c. 14; and Proklus adv.
Joann. Philoponum ap. Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, not. 22,
p. 151.]

Such allegations moreover would find easy credence from other men of
letters, whose enmity Aristotle had incurred, and to a certain extent
even provoked--Isokrates and his numerous disciples.

This celebrated rhetor was an elderly man at the zenith of his glory
and influence, during those earlier years which Aristotle passed at
Athens before the decease of Plato. The Isokratean school was then
the first in Greece, frequented by the most promising pupils from
cities near and far, perhaps even by Aristotle himself. The political
views and handling, as well as the rhetorical style of which the
master set the example, found many imitators. Illustrious statesmen,
speakers, and writers traced their improvement to this teaching. So
many of the pupils, indeed, acquired celebrity--among them
Theodektês, Theopompus, Ephorus, Naukrates, Philiskus, Kephisodôrus,
and others--that Hermippus[56] thought it worth his while to draw up
a catalogue of them: many must have been persons of opulent family,
highly valuing the benefit received from Isokrates, since each of
them was required to pay to him a fee of 1000 drachmæ.[57] During the
first sojourn of Aristotle in Athens (362-347 B.C.), while he was
still attached to and receiving instruction from Plato, he appears to
have devoted himself more to rhetoric than to philosophy, and even to
have given public lessons or lectures on rhetoric. He thus entered
into rivalry with Isokrates, for whom, as a teacher and author, he
contracted dislike or contempt.

[Footnote 56: Athenæus x. p. 451; Dionys. Hal., De Isæo Judic. pp.
588, 625. [Greek: ou)de\ ga\r o( tou\s I)sokra/tous mathêta\s
a)nagra/phas E(/rmippos, a)kribê\s e)n toi=s a)/llois geno/menos,
u(pe\r tou=de tou= r(ê/toros ou)de\n ei)/rêken, e)/xô duoi=n
tou/toin, o(/ti diê/kouse me\n I)sokra/tous, kathêgê/sato de\
Dêmosthe/nous, sunege/neto de\ toi=s a)ri/stois tô=n philoso/phôn.]
See Hermippi Fragmenta ed. Lozinski, Bonn, 1832, pp. 42-43. Cicero,
De Oratore, ii. 22, 94. "Ecce tibi exortus est Isocrates, magister
istorum omnium, cujus è ludo, tanquam ex equo Trojano, meri principes
exierunt: sed eorum partim in pompâ, partim in acie, illustres esse
voluerunt. Atqui et illi--Theopompi, Ephori, Philiski, Naucratæ,
multique alii--ingeniis differunt," &c. Compare also Cicero, Brutus,
8, 32; and Dionys. Hal., De Isocrate Judicium, p. 536. [Greek:
e)piphane/statos de\ geno/menos tô=n kata\ to\n aou)to\n a)kmasa/ntôn
chro/non, kai\ tou\s krati/stous tô=n e)n A)thê/nê|si/ te kai\ e)n
tê=| a)/llê| E(lla/di ne/ôn paideu/sas; ô(=n oi( me\n e)n toi=s
dikanikoi=s e)ge/nonto a)/ristoi lo/gois, oi( d' e)n tô=|
politeu/esthai kai\ ta\ koina\ pra/ttein diênegkan, kai\ a)/lloi de\
ta\s koina\s tô=n e(llê/nôn te kai\ barba/rôn pra/xeis a)ne/grapsan],
&c.]

[Footnote 57: See Demosthenes, adv. Lakritum, pp. 928, 938. Lakritus
was a citizen of Phasêlis--[Greek: me/ga pra=gma, I)sokra/tous
mathêtê/s]. To have gone through a course of teaching from Isokrates,
was evidently considered as a distinction of some importance.]

The composition of Isokrates was extremely elegant: his structure of
sentences was elaborate even to excess, his arrangement of words
rhythmical, his phrases nicely balanced in antithetical equipoise,
like those of his master Gorgias; the recital of his discourses
proved highly captivating to the ear.[58] Moreover, he had composed a
book of rhetorical precepts known and esteemed by Cicero and
Quintilian. Besides such technical excellence, Isokrates strove to
attain, and to a certain extent actually attained, a higher order of
merit. He familiarized his pupils with thoughts and arguments of
lofty bearing and comprehensive interest; not assisting them to gain
victory either in any real issue tried before the Dikasts, or in any
express motion about to be voted on by the public assembly, but
predisposing their minds to prize above all things the great
Pan-hellenic aggregate--its independence in regard to external force,
and internal harmony among its constituent cities, with a reasonable
recognition of presidential authority, equitably divided between
Athens and Sparta, and exercised with moderation by both. He
inculcated sober habits and deference to legal authority on the part
of the democrats of Athens; he impressed upon princes, like Philip
and Nikokles, the importance of just and mild bearing towards
subjects.[59] Such is the general strain of the discourses which we
now possess from Isokrates; though he appears to have adopted it only
in middle life, having begun at first in the more usual track of the
logographer--composing speeches to be delivered before the Dikastery
by actual plaintiffs or defendants,[60] and acquiring thus both
reputation and profit. His reputation as a teacher was not only
maintained but even increased when he altered his style; and he made
himself peculiarly attractive to foreign pupils who desired to
acquire a command of graceful expressions, without special reference
to the Athenian Assembly and Dikastery. But his new style being
midway between Demosthenes and Plato--between the practical advocate
and politician on one side, and the generalizing or speculative
philosopher on the other--he incurred as a semi-philosopher,
professing to have discovered the _juste milieu_, more or less of
disparagement from both extremes;[61] and Aristotle, while yet a
young man in the Platonic school, raised an ardent controversy
against his works, on the ground both of composition and teaching.
Though the whole controversy is now lost, there is good ground for
believing that Aristotle must have displayed no small acrimony. He
appears to have impugned the Isokratean discourses, partly as
containing improper dogmas, partly as specimens of mere unimpressive
elegance, intended for show, pomp, and immediate admiration from the
hearer--_ad implendas aures_--but destitute both of comprehensive
theory and of applicability to any useful purpose.[62] Kephisodôrus,
an intimate friend and pupil of Isokrates, defended him in an express
reply, attacking both Aristotle the scholar and Plato the master.
This reply was in four books, and Dionysius characterizes it by an
epithet of the highest praise.[63]

[Footnote 58: Dionysius, while admiring Isocrates, complains of him,
and complains still more of his imitators, as somewhat monotonous,
wanting in flexibility and variety (De Compos. Verborum, p. 134). Yet
he pronounces Isokrates and Lysias to be more natural, shewing less
of craft and art than Isæus and Demosthenes (De Isæo Judicium, p.
592). Isokrates [Greek: to\n o)/gkon tê=s poiêtikê=s kataskeuê=s
e)pi\ lo/gous ê)/gage philoso/phous, zêlô/sas tou\s peri\ Forgi/an.]
(Dionys. Hal. ad Pompeium de Platone, p. 764; also De Isæo Judicium,
p. 592; besides the special chapter, p. 534, seq., which he has
devoted to Isokrates.)

Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 44, 173: "Idque princeps Isocrates
instituisse fertur, ut inconditam antiquorum dicendi consuetudinem
delectationis atque aurium causâ, quemadmodum scribit discipulus ejus
Naucrates, numeris adstringeret." Compare Cicero, Orator. 52, 175,
176.

The reference to Naucrates (whose works have not been preserved,
though Dionysius commends his [Greek: Lo/gos E)pita/phios], Ars.
Rhet. p. 259) is interesting, as it shews what was said of Isokrates
by his own disciples. Cicero says of the doctrines in his own
dialogue De Oratore (Epist. ad Famil. i. 9, 23), "Abhorrent a
communibus præceptis, et omnem antiquorum, et _Aristoteleam et
Isocrateam_, rationem oratoriam complectuntur." About the [Greek:
Te/chnê] of Isokrates, see Spengel, [Greek: Sunagôgê\ Technô=n]
(Munich), pp. 155-170.]

[Footnote 59: Dionysius Hal. dwells emphatically on the lofty
morality inculcated in the discourses of Isokrates, and recommends
them as most improving study to all politicians (De Isocrate Judic.
pp. 536, 544, 555, seq.)--more improving than the writers purely
theoretical, among whom he probably numbered Plato and Aristotle.]

[Footnote 60: Dionysius Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, pp. 576, 577,
Reiske: [Greek: de/smas pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn I)sokratei/ôn
periphe/resthai/ phêsin u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês.] It
appears that Aphareus, the adopted son of Isokrates, denied that
Isokrates had ever written any judicial orations; while Kephisodôrus,
the disciple of Isokrates, in his reply to Aristotle's accusations,
admitted that Isokrates had composed a few, but only a few. Dionysius
accepts the allegation of Kephisodôrus and discredits that of
Aristotle: I, for my part, believe the allegation of Aristotle, upon
a matter of fact which he had the means of knowing. Cicero also
affirms (Brutus, xii. 46-48), on the authority of Aristotle, that
Isokrates distinguished himself at first as a composer of speeches
intended to be delivered by actual pleaders in the Dikastery or
Ekklesia; and that he afterwards altered his style. And this is what
Aristotle says (respecting Isokrates) in Rhetoric. i. 9, 1368, a. 20,
[Greek: o(/per I)sokra/tês e)poi/ei dia\ tê\n sunê/theian tou=
dikologei=n], where Bekker has altered the substantive to [Greek:
tê\n a)sunê/theian]; in my judgment, not wisely. I do not perceive
the meaning or pertinence of [Greek: a)sunê/theian] in that
sentence.]

[Footnote 61: See Plato, Euthydemus, p. 305; also 'Plato and the
Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. i. ch. xix. pp. 557-563.

It is exactly this _juste milieu_ which Dionysius Hal. extols as the
most worthy of being followed, as being [Greek: ê( a)lêthinê\
philosophi/a]. De Isocrate Jud. pp. 543, 558.]

[Footnote 62: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141. "Itaque ipse
Aristoteles quum florere Isocratem nobilitate discipulorum videret,
quod ipse suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad
inanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam
formam prope disciplinæ suæ, versumque quendam Philoctetæ paulo secus
dixit. Ille enim 'turpe sibi ait esse tacere, quum barbaros'--hic
autem, 'quum Isocratem'--'pateretur dicere'" See **Quintilian, Inst.
Or. iv. 2, 196; and Cicero, Orator. 19, 62: "Aristoteles Isocratem
ipsum lacessivit." Also, ib. 51, 172: "Omitto Isocratem discipulosque
ejus Ephorum et Naucratem; quanquam orationis faciendæ et ornandæ
auctores locupletissimi summi ipsi oratores esse debebant. Sed quis
omnium doctior, quis acutior, quis in rebus vel inveniendis vel
judicandis acrior Aristotele fuit? _Quis porro Isocrati adversatus
est infensius?_" That Aristotle was the first to assail Isokrates,
and that Kephisodôrus wrote only in reply, is expressly stated by
Numenius, ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 6: [Greek: o( Kêphiso/dôros,
e)peidê\ u(p' A)ristote/lous ballo/menon e(autô=| to\n dida/skalon
I)sokra/tên e(ô/ra], &c. Quintilian also says, Inst. Or. iii. 1, p.
126: "Nam et Isocratis præstantissimi discipuli fuerunt in omni
studiorum genere; eoque jam seniore (octavum enim et nonagesimum
implevit annum) pomeridianis scholis Aristoteles præcipere artem
oratoriam coepit; noto quidem illo (ut traditur) versu ex Philoctetâ
_frequenter usus_: [Greek: Ai)schro\n siôpa=|n me/n, kai\ I)sokra/tên
e)a=|n le/gein]."

Diogenes La. (v. 3) maintains that Aristotle turned the parody not
against _Isokrates_, but against _Xenokrates_: [Greek: Ai)schro\n
siôpa=|n, Xenokra/tên d' e)a=|n le/gein]. But the authority of Cicero
and Quintilian is decidedly preferable. When we recollect that the
parody was employed by a young man, as yet little known, against a
teacher advanced in age, and greatly frequented as well as admired by
pupils, it will appear sufficiently offensive. Moreover, it does not
seem at all pertinent; for the defects of Isokrates, however great
they may have been, were not those of analogy with [Greek:
ba/rbaroi], but the direct reverse. Dionysius must have been forcibly
struck with the bitter _animus_ displayed by Aristotle against
Isokrates, when he makes it a reason for rejecting the explicit
averment of Aristotle as to a matter of fact: [Greek: kai\ ou)/t'
A)ristote/lei pei/thomai _r(upai/nein to\n a)/ndra boulome/nô|_] (De
Isocr. Jud. p. 577).

Mr. Cope, in his Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (p. 39, seq.),
gives a just representation of the probable relations between
Aristotle and Isokrates; though I do not concur in the unfavourable
opinion which he expresses about "the malignant influence exercised
by Isokrates upon education in general" (p. 40). Mr. Cope at the same
time remarks, that "Aristotle in the Rhetorica draws a greater number
of illustrations of excellences of style from Isokrates than from any
other author" (p. 41); and he adds, very truly, that the absence of
any evidence of ill feeling towards Isokrates in Aristotle's later
work, and the existence of such ill feeling as an actual fact at an
earlier period, are perfectly reconcileable in themselves (p. 42).

That the Rhetorica of Aristotle which we now possess is a work of his
later age, certainly published, perhaps composed, during his second
residence at Athens, I hold with Mr. Cope and other antecedent
critics.]

[Footnote 63: Athenæus, ii. 60, iii. 122; Euseb. Pr. E. xiv. 6;
Dionys. H. de Isocrate Judic. p. 577: [Greek: i(kano\n ê(gêsa/menos
ei)=nai tê=s a)lêthei/as bebaiôtê\n to\n A)thênai=on Kêphiso/dôron,
o(\s kai\ sunebi/ôsen I)sokra/tei, kai\ gnêsiô/tatos a)koustê\s
e)ge/neto, kai\ tê\n a)pologi/an tê\n pa/nu thaumastê\n e)n tai=s
pro\s A)ristote/lê a)ntigraphai=s e)poiê/sato], &C. Kephisodôrus, in
this defence, contended that you might pick out, even from the very
best poets and sophists, [Greek: e(\n ê)\ du/o ponêrô=s ei)rême/na].
This implies that Aristotle, in attacking Isokrates, had cited
various extracts which he denounced as exceptionable.]

These polemics of Aristotle were begun during his first residence at
Athens, prior to 347 B.C., the year of Plato's decease, and at the
time when he was still accounted a member of the Platonic school.
They exemplify the rivalry between that school and the Isokratean,
which were then the two competing places of education at Athens: and
we learn that Aristotle, at that time only a half-fledged Platonist,
opened on his own account not a new philosophical school in
competition with Plato, as some state, but a new rhetorical school in
opposition to Isokrates.[63] But the case was different at the latter
epoch, 335 B.C., when Aristotle came to reside at Athens for the
second time. Isokrates was then dead, leaving no successor, so that
his rhetorical school expired with him. Aristotle preferred
philosophy to rhetoric: he was no longer trammelled by the living
presence and authority of Plato. The Platonic school at the Academy
stood at that time alone, under Xenokrates, who, though an earnest
and dignified philosopher, was deficient in grace and in
persuasiveness, and had been criticized for this defect even by Plato
himself. Aristotle possessed those gifts in large measure, as we know
from the testimony of Antipater. By these circumstances, coupled with
his own established reputation and well-grounded self-esteem, he was
encouraged to commence a new philosophical school; a school, in which
philosophy formed the express subject of the morning lecture, while
rhetoric was included as one among the subjects of more varied and
popular instruction given in the afternoon.[64] During the twelve
ensuing years, Aristotle's rivalry was mainly against the Platonists
or Xenokrateans at the Academy; embittered on both sides by
acrimonious feelings, which these expressed by complaining of his
ingratitude and unfairness towards the common master, Plato.

[Footnote 64: That Aristotle had a school at Athens before the death
of Plato we may see by what Strabo (xiii. 610) says about Hermeias:
[Greek: geno/menos d' A)thê/nê|sin ê)kroa/sato kai\ Pla/tônos kai\
A)ristote/lous]. Compare Cicero, Orator. 46; also Michelet, Essai sur
la Métaphys. d'Aristote, p. 227. The statement that Aristotle during
Plato's lifetime tried to set up a rival school against him, is
repeated by all the biographers, who do not however believe it to be
true, though they cite Aristoxenus as its warrant. I conceive that
they have mistaken what Aristoxenus said; and that they have
confounded the school which Aristotle first set up as a rhetor,
against Isokrates, with that which he afterwards set up as a
philosopher, against Xenokrates.]

[Footnote 65: Aulus Gellius, N. A. xx. 5. Quintilian (see note on p.
35) puts the rhetorical "pomeridianæ scholæ" within the lifetime of
Isokrates; but Aristotle did not then lecture on philosophy in the
morning.]

There were thus, at Athens, three distinct parties inspired with
unfriendly sentiment towards Aristotle: first, the Isokrateans;
afterwards, the Platonists; along with both, the anti-Macedonian
politicians. Hence we can account for what Themistius entitles the
"army of assailants" ([Greek: stra/ton o(/lon]) that fastened upon
him, for the unfavourable colouring with which his domestic
circumstances are presented, and for the necessity under which he lay
of Macedonian protection; so that when such protection was nullified,
giving place to a reactionary fervour, his residence at Athens became
both disagreeable and insecure.



CHAPTER II.

ARISTOTELIAN CANON.


In the fourth and fifth chapters of my work on 'Plato and the Other
Companions of Sokrates,' I investigated the question of the Platonic
Canon, and attempted to determine, upon the best grounds open to us,
the question, What are the real works of Plato? I now propose to
discuss the like question respecting Aristotle.

But the premisses for such a discussion are much less simple in
regard to Aristotle than in regard to Plato. As far as the testimony
of antiquity goes, we learn that the Canon of Thrasyllus, dating at
least from the time of the Byzantine Aristophanes, and probably from
an earlier time, was believed by all readers to contain the authentic
works of Plato and none others; an assemblage of dialogues, some
unfinished, but each undivided and unbroken. The only exception to
unanimity in regard to the Platonic Canon, applies to ten dialogues,
which were received by some (we do not know by how many, or by whom)
as Platonic, but which, as Diogenes informs us, were rejected by
agreement of the most known and competent critics. This is as near to
unanimity as can be expected. The doubts, now so multiplied,
respecting the authenticity of various dialogues included in the
Canon of Thrasyllus, have all originated with modern scholars since
the beginning of the present century, or at least since the earlier
compositions of Wyttenbach. It was my task to appreciate the value of
those doubts; and, in declining to be guided by them, I was at least
able to consider myself as adhering to the views of all known ancient
critics.

Very different is the case when we attempt to frame an Aristotelian
Canon, comprising all the works of Aristotle and none others. We find
the problem far more complicated, and the matters of evidence at once
more defective, more uncertain, and more contradictory.

The different works now remaining, and published in the Berlin
edition of Aristotle, are forty-six in number. But, among these,
several were disallowed or suspected even by some ancient critics,
while modern critics have extended the like judgment yet farther. Of
several others again, the component sections (either the _books_, in
our present phraseology, or portions thereof) appear to have existed
once as detached rolls, to have become disjointed or even to have
parted company, and to have been re-arranged or put together into
aggregates, according to the judgment of critics and librarians.
Examples of such doubtful aggregates, or doubtful arrangements, will
appear when we review the separate Aristotelian compositions (the
Metaphysica, Politica, &c.). It is, however, by one or more of these
forty-six titles that Aristotle is known to modern students, and was
known to mediæval students.

But the case was very different with ancient _literati_, such as
Eratosthenes, Polybius, Cicero, Strabo, Plutarch, &c., down to the
time of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Athenæus, Diogenes Laertius, &c.,
towards the close of the second century after the Christian era. It
is certain that these ancients perused many works of Aristotle, or
generally recognized as his, which we do not now possess; and among
those which we do now possess, there are many which it is not certain
that they perused, or even knew.

Diogenes Laertius, after affirming generally that Aristotle had
composed a prodigious number of books ([Greek: pa/mpleista bi/blia]),
proceeds to say, that, in consequence of the excellence of the author
in every variety of composition, he thinks it proper to indicate them
briefly.[1] He then enumerates one hundred and forty-six distinct
titles of works, with the number of books or sections contained in
each work. The subjects are exceedingly heterogeneous, and the form
of composition likewise very different; those which come first in the
list being Dialogues,[2] while those which come last are Epistles,
Hexameters, and Elegies. At the close of the list we read: "All of
them together are 445,270 lines, and this is the number of books
(works) composed by Aristotle."[3] A little farther on, Diogenes
adds, as an evidence of the extraordinary diligence and inventive
force of Aristotle, that the books (works) enumerated in the
preceding list were nearly four hundred in number, and that these
were not contested by any one; but that there were many other
writings, and _dicta_ besides, ascribed to Aristotle--ascribed (we
must understand him to mean) erroneously, or at least so as to leave
much doubt.[4]

[Footnote 1: Diog. La. v. 21. [Greek: Sune/grapse de\ pa/mpleista
bi/blia, a(/per a)ko/louthon ê(gêsa/mên u(pogra/psai, dia\ tê\n peri\
pa/ntas lo/gous ta)ndro\s a)retê/n.]]

[Footnote 2: Bernays has pointed out (in his valuable treatise, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 133) that the first in order, nineteen in
number, among the titles enumerated by Diogenes, designate Dialogues.
The longest of them, those which included more than one book or
section, are enumerated first of all. Some of the dialogues appear to
have coincided, either in title or in subject, with some of the
Platonic:--[Greek: Peri\ Dikaiosu/nês], in four books (comparable
with Plato's Republic); [Greek: Politikou=], in two books; [Greek:
Sophistê\s, Mene/xenos, Sumpo/sion], each in one book; all similar in
title to works of Plato; perhaps also another, [Greek: Peri\
r(êtorikê=s ê)\ Gru/llos], the analogue of Plato's Gorgias.]

[Footnote 3: Diog. La. v. 27. [Greek: gi/gnontai ai( pa=sai muria/des
sti/chôn te/ttares kai\ tettara/konta pro\s toi=s pentakischili/ois
kai\ diakosi/ois e(bdomê/konta. Kai\ tosau=ta me\n au)tô=|
pepragma/teutai bi/blia.]]

[Footnote 4: Diog. La. v. 34. Heitz (Die Verlorenen Schriften des
Aristoteles, p. 17) notices, as a fact invalidating the
trustworthiness of the catalogue given by Diogenes, that Diogenes, in
other places, alludes to Aristotelian compositions which are not
mentioned in his own catalogue. For example, though Diogenes, in the
catalogue, allows only five books to the Ethica, yet he himself
alludes (v. 21) to the seventh book of the Ethica. But this example
can hardly be relied upon, because [Greek: e)n tô=| e(bdo/mô| tô=n
ê)thikô=n] is only a conjecture of H. Stephens or Ménage. The only
case which Heitz really finds to sustain his remark, is the passage
of the Prooemium (i. 8), where Diogenes cites Aristotle [Greek: e)n
tô=| Magikô=|], that work not being named in his catalogue. But there
is another case (not noticed by Heitz) which appears to me still
stronger. Diogenes cites at length the Hymn or Pæan composed by
Aristotle in honour of Hermeias. Now there is no general head of his
catalogue under which this hymn could fall. Here Anonymus (to be
presently mentioned) has a superiority over Diogenes; for he
introduces, towards the close of his catalogue, one general
head--[Greek: e)gkô/mia ê)\ u(/mnous], which is not to be found in
Diogenes.]

We have another distinct enumeration of the titles of Aristotle's
works, prepared by an anonymous biographer cited in the notes of
Ménage to Diogenes Laertius.[5] This anonymous list contains only one
hundred and twenty-seven titles, being nineteen less than the list in
Diogenes. The greater number of titles are the same in both; but
Anonymus has eight titles which are not found in Diogenes, while
Diogenes has twenty-seven titles which are not given by Anonymus.
There are therefore thirty-five titles which rest on the evidence of
one alone out of the two lists. Anonymus does not specify any total
number of lines; nevertheless he gives the total number of _books_
composed by Aristotle as being nearly four hundred--the same as
Diogenes. This total number cannot be elicited out of the items
enumerated by Anonymus; but it may be made to coincide pretty nearly
with the items in Diogenes,[6] provided we understand by _books_,
sections or subdivisions of one and the same title or work.

[Footnote 5: Ménage ad Diog. tom. ii. p. 201. See the very
instructive treatise of Professor Heitz, Die Verlorenen Schriften des
Aristoteles, p. 15 (Leipzig, 1865).]

[Footnote 6: Heitz, Die Verl. Schrift. des Aristot. p. 51. Such
coincidence assumes that we reckon the [Greek: Politei=ai] and the
Epistles each as one book.

I think it unnecessary to transcribe these catalogues of the titles
of works mostly lost. The reader will find them clearly printed in
the learned work of Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, pp.
12-20.]

The two catalogues just mentioned, agreeing as they do in the total
number of books and in the greater part of the items, may probably be
considered not as original and copy, but as inaccurate transcripts
from the same original authority. Yet neither of the two transcribers
tells us what that original authority was. We may, however, be
certain that each of them considered his catalogue to comprehend all
that Aristotle could be affirmed on good authority to have published;
Diogenes plainly signifies thus much, when he gives not only the
total number of books, but the total number of lines. Such being the
case, we expect to find in it, of course, the titles of the forty-six
works composing the Berlin edition of Aristotle now before us. But
this expectation is disappointed. The far greater number of the
Aristotelian works which we now peruse are not specified either in
the list of Diogenes, or in that of Anonymus.[7] Moreover, the lists
also fail to specify the titles of various works which are not now
extant, but which we know from Aristotle himself that he really
composed.[8]

[Footnote 7: Heitz, Verl. Schr. Aristot. p. 18, remarks that "In
diesem Verzeichnisse (that of Diogenes) die bei weitem grösste Zahl
derjenigen Schriften fehlt, welche wir heute noch besitzen, und die
wir als den eigentlichen Kern der aristotelischen Lehre enthaltend zu
betrachten gewohnt sind." Cf. p. 32. Brandis expresses himself
substantially to the same effect (Aristoteles, Berlin, 1853, pp. 77,
78, 96); and Zeller also (Gesch. der Phil. 2nd ed. Aristot.
Schriften, p. 43).]

[Footnote 8: Heitz, Verl. Schr. des Aristoteles, p. 56, seq.]

The last-mentioned fact is in itself sufficiently strange and
difficult to explain, and our difficulty becomes aggravated when we
combine it with another fact hardly less surprising. Both Cicero, and
other writers of the century subsequent to him (Dionysius Hal.,
Quintilian, &c.), make reference to Aristotle, and especially to his
dialogues, of which none have been preserved, though the titles of
several are given in the two catalogues mentioned above. These
writers bestow much encomium on the style of Aristotle; but what is
remarkable is, that they ascribe to it attributes which even his
warmest admirers will hardly find in the Aristotelian works now
remaining. Cicero extols the sweetness, the abundance, the variety,
the rhetorical force which he discovered in Aristotle's writings: he
even goes so far as to employ the phrase "flumen orationis aureum" (a
golden stream of speech), in characterizing the Aristotelian
style.[9] Such predicates may have been correct, indeed were
doubtless correct, in regard to the dialogues, and perhaps other lost
works of Aristotle; but they describe exactly the opposite[10] of
what we find in all the works preserved. With most of these (except
the History of Animals) Cicero manifests no acquaintance; and some of
the best modern critics declare him to have been ignorant of
them.[11] Nor do other ancient authors, Plutarch, Athenæus, Diogenes
Laertius, &c., give evidence of having been acquainted with the
principal works of Aristotle known to us. They make reference only to
works enumerated in the Catalogue of Diogenes Laertius.[12]

[Footnote 9: Cicero, Acad. Prior. ii. 38, 119: "Quum enim tuus iste
Stoicus sapiens syllabatim tibi ista dixerit, veniet flumen orationis
aureum fundens Aristoteles, qui illum desipere dicat." Also Topica,
i. 3. "Quibus (_i.e._ those who were ignorant of Aristotle) eo minus
ignoscendum est, quod non modo rebus iis, quæ ab illo dictæ et
inventæ sunt, adlici debuerunt, sed dicendi quoque incredibili quâdam
quum copiâ, tum suavitate." Also De Oratore, i. 11, 49; Brutus, 31,
121; De Nat. Deor. ii. 37; De Inventione, ii. 2; De Finibus, i. 5,
14; Epistol. ad Atticum, ii. 1, where he speaks of the "Aristotelia
pigmenta," along with the [Greek: murothê/kion] of Isokrates.
Dionysius Hal. recommends the style of Aristotle in equal terms of
admiration: [Greek: paralêpte/on de\ kai\ A)ristote/lê ei)s mi/mêsin
tê=s te peri\ tê\n e(rmênei/an deino/têtos kai\ tê=s saphênei/as,
kai\ tou= ê(de/os kai\ polumathou=s] (De Veter. Script. Censurâ, p.
430, R.; De Verb. Copiâ, p. 187). Quintilian extols the "eloquendi
suavitas" among Aristotle's excellences (Inst. Or. X. i. p. 510).
Demetrius Phalereus (or the author who bears that title), De
Eloquentiâ, s. 128, commends [Greek: ai( A)ristote/lous cha/rites].
David the Armenian, who speaks of him (having reference to the
dialogue) as [Greek: A)phrodi/tês e)nno/mou ge/môn] (the correction
of Bernays, Dial. des Arist. p. 137) [Greek: kai\ chari/tôn
a)na/mestos], probably copies the judgment of predecessors (Scholia
ad Categor. p. 26, b. 36, Brandis).

Bernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 3-5) points out how little
justice has been done by modern critics to the literary merits,
exhibited in the dialogues and other works now lost, of one whom _we_
know only as a "dornichten und wortkargen Systematiker."]

[Footnote 10: This opinion is insisted on by Ravaisson, Essai sur la
Métaphysique d'Aristote, pp. 210, 211.]

[Footnote 11: Valentine Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 23:
"Cicero philosophicis certe ipsius Aristotelis libris nunquam usus
est." Heitz, Die Verlor. Schrift. des Aristot. pp. 31, 158, 187:
"Cicero, dessen Unbekanntschaft mit beinahe sämmtlichen heute
vorhandenen Werken des Aristoteles eine unstreitige Thatsache bildet,
deren Bedeutung man sich umsonst bemüht hat abzuschwächen." Madvig,
Excursus VII. ad Ciceron. De Finibus, p. 855: "Non dubito profiteri,
Ciceronem mihi videri dialogos Aristotelis populariter scriptos, et
Rhetorica (quibus hic Topica adnumero) tum [Greek: politei/as]
legisse; difficiliora vero, quibus omnis interior philosophia
continebatur, aut omnino non attigisse, aut si aliquando attigerit,
non longe progressum esse, ut ipse de subtilioribus Aristotelis
sententiis aliquid habere possit explorati." The language here used
by Madvig is more precise than that of the other two; for Cicero must
be allowed to have known, and even to have had in his library, the
Topica of Aristotle.]

[Footnote 12: See this point enforced by Heitz, pp. 29-31. Athenæus
(xiv. 656) refers to a passage of Philochorus, in which Philochorus
alludes to Aristotle, that is, as critics have hitherto supposed, to
Aristot. Meteorol. iv. 3, 21. Bussemaker (in his Præfat. ad Aristot.
Didot, vol. iv. p. xix.) has shewn that this supposition is
unfounded, and that the passage more probably refers to one of the
Problemata Inedita (iii. 43) which Bussemaker has first published in
Didot's edition of Aristotle.]

Here, then, we find several embarrassing facts in regard to the
Aristotelian Canon. Most of the works now accepted and known as
belonging to Aristotle, are neither included in the full Aristotelian
Catalogue given by Diogenes, nor were they known to Cicero; who,
moreover, ascribes to Aristotle attributes of style not only
different, but opposite, to those which _our_ Aristotle presents.
Besides, more than twenty of the compositions entered in the
Catalogue are dialogues, of which form _our_ Aristotle affords not a
single specimen: while others relate to matters of ancient exploit or
personal history; collected proverbs; accounts of the actual
constitution of many Hellenic cities; lists of the Pythian victors
and of the scenic representations; erotic discourses; legendary
narratives, embodied in a miscellaneous work called 'Peplus'--a title
perhaps borrowed from the _Peplus_ or robe of Athênê at the
Panathenaic festival, embroidered with various figures by Athenian
women; a symposion or banquet-colloquy; and remarks on intoxication.
All these subjects are foreign in character to those which _our_
Aristotle treats.[13]

[Footnote 13: Brandis and Zeller, moreover, remark, that among the
allusions made by Aristotle in the works which we possess to other
works of his own, the majority relate to other works actually extant,
and very few to any of the lost works enumerated in the Catalogue
(Brand. Aristoteles, pp. 97-101; Zeller, Phil. der Griech. ii. 2, p.
79, ed. 2nd). This however is not always the case: we find (_e.g._)
in Aristotle's notice of the Pythagorean tenets (Metaphys. A. p. 986,
a. 12) the remark, [Greek: diô/ristai de\ peri\ tou/tôn e)n e(te/rois
ê(mi=n a)kribe/steron]; where he probably means to indicate his
special treatises, [Greek: Peri\ tô=n Puthagorei/ôn] and [Greek:
Pro\s tou\s Puthagorei/ous], enumerated by Diog. L. v. 25, and
mentioned by Alexander, Porphyry, and Simplikius. See Alexander,
Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 542, b. 5, 560, b. 25, Br.; and the note of
Schwegler on Metaphys. i. 5, p. 47.]

The difficulty of harmonizing _our_ Aristotle with the Aristotle of
the Catalogue is thus considerable. It has been so strongly felt in
recent years, that one of the ablest modern critics altogether
dissevers the two, and pronounces the works enumerated in the
Catalogue not to belong to _our_ Aristotle. I allude to Valentine
Rose, who in his very learned and instructive volume, '_Aristoteles
Pseudepigraphus_,' has collected and illustrated the fragments which
remain of these works. He considers them all pseudo-Aristotelian,
composed by various unknown members of the Peripatetic school, during
the century or two immediately succeeding the death of Aristotle, and
inscribed with the illustrious name of the master, partly through
fraud of the sellers, partly through carelessness of purchasers and
librarians.[14] Emil Heitz, on the other hand, has argued more
recently, that upon the external evidence as it stands, a more
correct conclusion to draw would be (the opposite of that drawn by
Rose, viz.): That the works enumerated in the Catalogue are the true
and genuine; and that those which we possess, or most of them, are
not really composed by Aristotle.[15] Heitz thinks this conclusion
better sustained than that of Rose, though he himself takes a
different view, which I shall presently mention.

[Footnote 14: Valent. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigr. pp. 4-10. The
same opinion is declared also in the earlier work of the same author,
De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate.]

[Footnote 15: Heitz, Die Verlor. Schrift. des **Ar. pp. 29, 30.]

It will be seen from the foregoing observations how much more
difficult it is to settle a genuine Canon for Aristotle than for
Plato. I do not assent to either of the two conclusions just
indicated; but I contend that, if we applied to this question the
same principles of judgment as those which modern Platonic critics
often apply, when they allow or disallow dialogues of Plato, we
should be obliged to embrace one or other of them, or at least
something nearly approaching thereto. If a critic, after attentively
studying the principal compositions now extant of _our_ Aristotle,
thinks himself entitled, on the faith of his acquired
"_Aristotelisches Gefühl_," to declare that no works differing
materially from them (either in subject handled, or in manner of
handling, or in degree of excellence), can have been composed by
Aristotle--he will assuredly be forced to include in such rejection a
large proportion of those indicated in the Catalogue of Diogenes.
Especially he will be forced to reject the Dialogues--the very
compositions by which Aristotle was best known to Cicero and his
contemporaries. For the difference between them and the known
compositions of Aristotle, not merely in form but in style (the style
being known from the epithets applied to them by Cicero), must have
been more marked and decisive than that between the Alkibiades,
Hippias, Theages, Erastæ, Leges, &c.--which most Platonic critics now
set aside as spurious--and the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias,
Philêbus, &c., which they treat as indisputably genuine.[16]

[Footnote 16: Thus (for example) in Bernays, who has displayed great
acuteness and learning in investigating the Aristotelian Canon, and
in collecting what can be known respecting the lost dialogues of
Aristotle, we read the following observations:--"In der That mangelt
es auch nicht an den bestimmtesten Nachrichten über die vormalige
Existenz einer grossen aristotelischen Schriftenreihe, die von der
jetzt erhaltenen _durch die tiefste formale Verschiedenheit_ getrennt
war. Das Verzeichniss aristotelischer Werke führt an seiner Spitze
sieben und zwanzig Bände jetzt verlorener Schriften auf, die alle in
der künstlerischen Gesprächsform abgefasst waren," &c. (Bernays, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 2; compare ibid. p. 30).

If, as Bernays justly contends, we are to admit these various
writings, notwithstanding "the profound difference of form," as
having emanated from the same philosopher Aristotle, how are we to
trust the Platonic critics when they reject about one-third of the
preserved dialogues of Plato, though there is no difference of form
to proceed upon, but only a difference of style, merit, and, to a
certain extent, doctrine?

Zeller (Die Phil. der Griechen, ii. 2, pp. 45, 46, 2nd ed.) remarks
that the dialogues composed by Aristotle are probably to be ascribed
to the earlier part of his literary life, when he was still (or had
recently been) Plato's scholar.]

In discussing the Platonic Canon, I have already declared that I
consider these grounds of rejection to be unsafe and misleading. Such
judgment is farther confirmed, when we observe the consequences to
which they would conduct in regard to the Aristotelian Canon. In
fact, we must learn to admit among genuine works, both of Plato and
Aristotle, great diversity in subject, in style, and in excellence.

I see no ground for distrusting the Catalogue given by Diogenes, as
being in general an enumeration of works really composed by
Aristotle. These works must have been lodged in some great
library--probably the Alexandrine--where they were seen and counted,
and the titles of them enrolled by some one or more among the
_literati_, with a specification of the sum total obtained on adding
together the lines contained in each.[17] I do not deny the
probability, that, in regard to some, the librarians may have been
imposed upon, and that pseudo-Aristotelian works may have been
admitted; but whether such was partially the fact or not, the general
goodness of the Catalogue seems to me unimpeachable. As to the author
of it, the most admissible conjecture seems that of Brandis and
others, recently adopted and advocated by Heitz: that the Catalogue
owes its origin to one of the Alexandrine _literati_; probably to
Hermippus of Smyrna, a lettered man and a pupil of Kallimachus at
Alexandria, between 240-210 B.C.. Diogenes does not indeed tell us
from whom he borrowed the Catalogue; but in his life of Aristotle, he
more than once cites Hermippus, as having treated of Aristotle and
his biography in a work of some extent; and we know from other sources
that Hermippus had devoted much attention to Aristotle as well as to
other philosophers. If Hermippus be the author of this Catalogue, it
must have been drawn up about the same time that the Byzantine
Aristophanes arranged the dialogues of Plato. Probably, indeed,
Kallimachus the chief librarian, had prepared the way for both of them.
We know that he had drawn up comprehensive tables, including, not only
the principal orators and dramatists, with an enumeration of their
discourses and dramas, but also various miscellaneous authors, with the
titles of their works. We know, farther, that he noticed Demokritus and
Eudoxus, and we may feel assured that, in a scheme thus large, he
would not omit Plato or Aristotle, the two great founders of the
first philosophical schools, nor the specification of the works of
each contained in the Alexandrine library.[18] Heitz supposes that
Hermippus was the author of most of the catalogues (not merely of
Aristotle, but also of other philosophers) given by Diogenes;[19] yet
that nevertheless Diogenes himself had no direct acquaintance with
the works of Hermippus, but copied these catalogues at second-hand
from some later author, probably Favorinus. This last supposition is
noway made out.

[Footnote 17: Stahr, who in the first volume of his work Aristotelia
(p. 194), had expressed an opinion that the Catalogue given by
Diogenes is the Catalogue "der eigenen Schritten des Stageiriten, wie
sie sich in seinem Nachlasse befanden," retracts that opinion in the
second volume of the same work (pp. 68-70), and declares the
Catalogue to be an enumeration of the Aristotelian works in the
library of Alexandria. Trendelenburg concurs in this later opinion
(Prooemium ad Commentar. in Aristot. De Animâ, p. 123).]

[Footnote 18: [Greek: E(/rmippos o( Kallima/cheios e)n tô=| prô/tô|
peri\ A)ristote/lous], is cited by Athenæus, xv. 696; also v. 213.

Among the Tables prepared by Kallimachus, one was [Greek: Pantoda/pôn
Suggramma/tôn Pi/nax]; and in it were included the [Greek:
Plakountopoii+ka\ suggra/mmata Ai)gimi/ou, kai\ Ê(gêsi/ppou, kai\
Mêtrobi/ou, e)/ti de\ Phai/tou] (Athenæus, xiv. 644). If Kallimachus
carried down his catalogue of the contents of the library to works so
unimportant as these, we may surely believe that he would not omit to
catalogue such works of Aristotle as were in it. He appears to have
made a list of the works of Demokritus (_i.e._ such as were in the
library) with a glossary. See Brandis (Aristoteles, Berlin, 1853, p.
74); also Suidas _v._ [Greek: Kalli/machos], Diogen. Laert. viii. 86;
Dionys. Hal. De Dinarcho, pp. 630, 652 R.; Athenæus, viii. 336, xv.
669.]

[Footnote 19: Heitz, Die Verl. Schr. des Aristot. pp. 45-48.

Patricius, in his Discuss. Peripatetic. (t. i. pp. 13-18), had
previously considered Hermippus as having prepared a Catalogue of the
works of Aristotle, partly on the authority of the Scholion annexed
to the conclusion of the Metaphysica of Theophrastus. Hermippus
recited the testament of Aristotle (Athenæus, xiii. 589).

Both Valentine Rose and Bernays regard Andronikus as author of the
Catalogue of Aristotle in Diogenes. But I think that very sufficient
reasons to refute this supposition have been shown by Heitz, pp.
49-52. The opinion given by Christ, respecting the Catalogue which we
find in Diogenes Laertius--"illum catalogum non Alexandrinæ
bibliothecæ, sed exemplarium Aristotelis ab Apelliconte Athenas
translatorum fuisse equidem censeo"--is in substance the same as that
of Rose and Bernays. I do not concur in it. (Christ, Studia in
Aristotelis Libros Metaphysicos, Berlin, 1853, p. 105).]

It seems thus probable that the Catalogue given by Diogenes derives
its origin from Hermippus or Kallimachus, enumerating the titles of
such works of Aristotle as were contained in the Alexandrine library.
But the aggregate of works composing _our_ Aristotle is noway in
harmony with that Catalogue. It proceeds from a source independent
and totally different, viz., the edition and classification first
published by the Rhodian Andronikus, in the generation between the
death of Cicero and the Christian era. To explain the existence of
these two distinct and independent sources and channels, we must have
recourse to the remarkable narrative (already noticed in my chapter
on the Platonic Canon), delivered mainly by Strabo and less fully by
Plutarch, respecting the fate of the Aristotelian library after
Aristotle's death.

At the decease of Aristotle, his library and MSS. came to
Theophrastus, who continued chief of the Peripatetic school at Athens
for thirty-five years, until his death in 287 B.C. Both Aristotle and
Theophrastus not only composed many works of their own, but also laid
out much money in purchasing or copying the works of others;[20]
especially we are told that Aristotle, after the death of Speusippus,
expended three talents in purchasing his books. The entire library of
Theophrastus, thus enriched from two sources, was bequeathed by his
testament to a philosophical friend and pupil, Neleus;[21] who left
Athens, and carried away the library with him to his residence at the
town of Skêpsis, in the Asiatic region known as Æolis, near Troad. At
Skêpsis the library remained for the greater part of two centuries,
in possession of the descendants of Neleus, men of no accomplishments
and no taste for philosophy. It was about thirty or forty years after
the death of Theophrastus that the kings of Pergamus began to occupy
themselves in collecting their royal library, which presently reached
a magnitude second only to that of Alexandria. Now Skêpsis was under
their dominion, and it would seem that the kings seized the books
belonging to their subjects for the use of the royal library; for we
are told that the heirs of Neleus were forced to conceal their
literary treasures in a cellar, subject to great injury, partly from
damp, partly from worms. In this ruinous hiding-place the manuscripts
remained for nearly a century and a half--"_blattarum ac tinearum
epulæ_,"--until the Attalid dynasty at Pergamus became extinct. The
last of these kings, Attalus, died in 133 B.C., bequeathing his
kingdom to the Romans. All fear of requisitions for the royal library
being thus at end, the manuscripts were in course of time withdrawn
by their proprietors from concealment, and sold for a large sum to
Apellikon, a native of Teos, a very rich resident at Athens, and
attached to the Peripatetic sect. Probably this wealthy Peripatetic
already possessed a library of his own, with some Aristotelian works;
but the new acquisitions from Skêpsis, though not his whole stock,
formed the most rare and precious ingredients in it. Here, then, the
manuscripts and library both of Aristotle and Theophrastus became,
for the first time since 287 B.C., open to the inspection of the
Athenian Peripatetics of the time (about 100 B.C.), as well as of
other learned men. Among the stock were contained many compositions
which the Scholarchs, successors of **Theophrastus at Athens, had
neither possessed nor known.[22] But the manuscripts were found
imperfect, seriously damaged, and in a state of disorder. Apellikon
did his best to remedy that mischief, by causing new copies to be
taken, correcting what had become worm-eaten, and supplying what was
defective or illegible. He appears to have been an erudite man, and
had published a biography of Aristotle, refuting various calumnies
advanced by other biographers; but being (in the words of Strabo) a
lover of books rather than a philosopher, he performed the work of
correction so unskilfully, that the copies which he published were
found full of errors.[23] In the year 86 B.C., Sylla besieged Athens,
and captured it by storm; not long after which he took to himself as
a perquisite the library of Apellikon, and transported it to
Rome.[24] It was there preserved under custody of a librarian, and
various literary Greeks resident at Rome obtained access to it,
especially Tyrannion, the friend of Cicero and a warm admirer of
Aristotle, who took peculiar pains to gain the favour of the
librarian.[25] It was there also that the Rhodian Andronikus obtained
access to the Aristotelian works.[26] He classified them to a great
degree anew, putting in juxtaposition the treatises most analogous in
subject;[27] moreover, he corrected the text, and published a new
edition of the manuscripts, with a tabulated list. This was all the
more necessary, because some booksellers at Rome, aiming only at sale
and profit, had employed bad writers, and circulated inaccurate
copies, not collated with the originals.[28] These originals,
however, were so damaged, and the restitutions made by Apellikon were
so injudicious, that the more careful critics who now studied them
were often driven to proceed on mere probable evidence.

[Footnote 20: Diog. L. iv. 5; Aulus Gellius, N. A. iii. 17.]

[Footnote 21: From a passage of Lucian (De Parasito, c. xxxv.) we
learn that Aristoxenus spoke of himself as friend and guest of
Neleus: [Greek: kai\ ti/s peri\ tou/tou le/gei? Polloi\ me\n kai\
a)/lloi, A)risto/xenos de\ o( mousiko/s, pollou= lo/gou a)/xios kai\
au)to\s de\ para/sitos Nê/leôs ê)=n.]]

[Footnote 22: Strabo, xiii. 608, 609; Athenæus, v. 214. The narrative
of Strabo has been often misunderstood and impugned, as if he had
asserted that none of the main works of Aristotle had ever been
published until they were thus exhumed by Apellikon. This is the
supposed allegation which Stahr, Zeller, and others have taken so
much pains to refute. But in reality Strabo says no such thing. His
words affirm or imply the direct contrary, viz., that many works of
Aristotle, not merely the exoteric works but others besides, _had_
been published earlier than the purchase made by Apellikon. What
Strabo says is, that few of these works were in possession of the
Peripatetic Scholarchs at Athens before the time of that purchase;
and he explains thus how it was that these Scholarchs, during the
century intervening, had paid little attention to the profound and
abstruse speculations of Aristotle; how it was that they had confined
themselves to dialectic and rhetorical debate on special problems. I
see no ground for calling in question the fact affirmed by
Strabo--the poverty of the Peripatetic school-library at Athens;
though he may perhaps have assigned a greater importance to that fact
than it deserves, as a means of explaining the intellectual working
of the Peripatetic Scholarchs from Lykon to Kritolaus. The
philosophical impulse of that intervening century seems to have
turned chiefly towards ethics and the _Summum Bonum_, with the
conflicting theories of Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and
Epikureans thereupon.]

[Footnote 23: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: ê)=n de\ o( A)pellikô=n
philo/biblos ma=llon ê)\ philo/sophos, dio\ kai\ zêtô=n
e)pano/othôsin tô=n diabrôma/tôn, ei)s a)nti/grapha kaina\ metê/negke
tê\n graphê\n a)naplêrô=n ou)k eu)=, kai\ e)xe/dôken a(marta/dôn
plê/rê ta\ bi/blia.]]

[Footnote 24: Strabo, xiii. 609; Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.]

[Footnote 25: Strabo, xiii. 609. [Greek: Turanni/ôn, o( grammatiko\s
diecheiri/sato philaristote/lês ô)/n, therapeu/sas to\n e)pi\ tê=s
biblothê/kês.] Tyrannion had been the preceptor of Strabo (xii. 548);
and Boêthus, who studied Aristotle along with Strabo, was a disciple
of the Rhodian Andronikus. See Ammonius ad Categorias, f. 8; and
Ravaisson, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, Introduction, p.
10.]

[Footnote 26: Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.]

[Footnote 27: The testimony of Porphyry in respect to Andronikus, and
to the real service performed by Andronikus, is highly valuable.
Porphyry was the devoted disciple and friend, as well as the literary
executor, of Plotinus; whose writings were left in an incorrect and
disorderly condition. Porphyry undertook to put them in order and
publish them; and he tells us that, in fulfilling this promise, he
followed the example of what Andronikus had done for the works of
Aristotle and Theophrastus. [Greek: E)pei\ de\ au)to\s] (Plotinus)
[Greek: tê\n dio/rthôsin kai\ tê\n dia/taxin tô=n bibli/ôn
poiei=sthai ê(mi=n e)pe/trepsen, e)gô\ de\ e)kei/nô| zô=nti
u(pescho/mên kai\ toi=s a)/llois e(tai/rois e)pêggeila/mên poiê=sai
tou=to, prô=ton me\n ta\ bi/blia ou) kata\ chro/nous e)a=sai phu/rdên
e)kdedome/na e)dikai/ôsa, mimêsa/menos d' A)pollo/dôron to\n
A)thênai=on kai\ A)ndro/nikon to\n Peripatêtiko/n, ô(=n o( me\n
E)pi/charmon to\n kômô|diogra/phon ei)s de/ka to/mous phe/rôn
sunê/gagen, o( de\ ta\ A)ristote/lous kai\ Theophra/stou ei)s
pragmatei/as diei=le, ta\s oi)kei/as u(pothe/seis ei)s tau)to\n
sunagagô/n, ou(/tô dê\ kai\ e)gô\ pentê/konta te/ssarau)/nta e)/chôn
ta\ tou= Plôti/nou bi/blia diei=lon me\n ei)s e(\x e)nnea/das, tê=|
teleio/têti tou= e(\x a)rithmou= kai\ tai=s e)nnea/sin a)sme/nôs
e)pituchô/n, e(ka/stê| de\ e)nnea/di ta\ oi)kei=a phe/rôn
sunepho/rêsa, dou\s kai\ ta/xin prô/tên toi=s e)laphrote/rois
problê/masin.] (Porphyry, Vita Plotini, p. 117, Didot.) Porphyry here
distinctly affirms that Andronikus rendered this valuable service not
merely to the works of Aristotle, but also to those of Theophrastus.
This is important, as connecting him with the library conveyed by
Sylla to Rome; which library we know to have contained the
manuscripts of both these philosophers. And in the Scholion appended
to the Metaphysica of Theophrastus (p. 323, Brandis) we are told that
Andronikus and Hermippus had made a catalogue of the works of
Theophrastus, in which the Metaphysics was not included.]

[Footnote 28: Strabo, xiii. 609: [Greek: bibliopô=lai/ tines
grapheu=si phau/lois chrô/menoi kai\ ou)k a)ntiba/llontes], &c.]

This interesting narrative--delivered by Strabo, the junior
contemporary of Andronikus, and probably derived by him either from
Tyrannion his preceptor or from the Sidonian Boêthus[29] and other
philosophical companions jointly, with whom he had prosecuted the
study of Aristotle--appears fully worthy of trust. The proceedings
both of Apellikon and of Sylla prove, what indeed we might have
presumed without proof, that the recovery of these long-lost original
manuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastus excited great sensation in
the philosophical world of Athens and of Rome. With such
newly-acquired materials, a new epoch began for the study of these
authors. The more abstruse philosophical works of Aristotle now came
into the foreground under the auspices of a new Scholarch; whereas
Aristotle had hitherto been chiefly known by his more popular and
readable compositions. Of these last, probably, copies may have been
acquired to a certain extent by the previous Peripatetic Scholarchs
or School at Athens; but the School had been irreparably impoverished,
so far as regarded the deeper speculations of philosophy, by the loss
of those original manuscripts which had been transported from Athens
to Skêpsis. What Aristotelian Scholarchs, prior to Andronikus, chiefly
possessed and studied, of the productions of their illustrious
founder, were chiefly the _exoteric_ or extra-philosophical and
comparatively popular:--such as the dialogues; the legendary and
historical collections; the facts respecting constitutional history
of various Hellenic cities; the variety of miscellaneous problems
respecting Homer and a number of diverse matters; the treatises on
animals and on anatomy, &c.[30] In the Alexandrine library (as we see
by the Catalogue of Diogenes) there existed all these and several
philosophical works also; but that library was not easily available
for the use of the Scholarchs at Athens, who worked upon their own
stock, confining themselves mainly to smooth and elegant discourses
on particular questions, and especially to discussions, with the
Platonists, Stoics, and Epikureans, on the _principia_ of Ethics,
without any attempt either to follow up or to elucidate the more
profound speculations (logical, physical, metaphysical, cosmical) of
Aristotle himself. A material change took place when the library of
Apellikon came to be laid open and studied, not merely by lecturers
in the professorial chair at Athens, but also by critics like
Tyrannion and Andronikus at Rome. These critics found therein the
most profound and difficult philosophical works of Aristotle in the
handwriting of the philosopher himself; some probably, of which
copies may have already existed in the Alexandrine library, but some
also as yet unpublished. The purpose of Andronikus, who is described
as Peripatetic Scholarch, eleventh in succession from Aristotle, was
not simply to make a Catalogue (as Hermippus had made at Alexandria),
but to render a much greater service, which no critic could render
without having access to original MSS., namely, to obtain a correct
text of the books actually before him, to arrange these books in
proper order, and then to publish and explain them,[31] but to take
no account of other Aristotelian works in the Alexandrine library or
elsewhere. The Aristotelian philosophy thus passed into a new phase.
Our editions of Aristotle may be considered as taking their date from
this critical effort of Andronikus, with or without subsequent
modifications by others, as the case may be.

[Footnote 29: Strabo, xvi. 757. Stahr, in his minor work, Aristoteles
unter den Römern, p. 32, considers that this circumstance lessens the
credibility of Strabo. I think the contrary. No one was so likely to
have studied the previous history of the MSS. as the editors of a new
edition.]

[Footnote 30: Strabo, xiii. 609: [Greek: sune/bê de\ toi=s e)k tô=n
peripa/tôn toi=s me\n pa/lai toi=s meta\ Theo/phraston, o(/lôs ou)k
e)/chousi ta\ bi/blia plê\n o)li/gôn kai\ ma/lista tô=n e)xôterikô=n,
mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ the/seis
lêkuthi/zein; toi=s d' u(/steron, a)ph' ou)= ta\ bi/blia tau=ta
proê=lthen, a)/meinon me\n e)kei/nôn philosophei=n kai\
a)ristoteli/zein, a)nagka/zesthai me/ntoi ta\ polla\ ei)ko/ta le/gein
dia\ to\ plê=thos tô=n a(martiô=n.] Also Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi.

The passage of Strabo is so perspicuous and detailed, that it has all
the air of having been derived from the best critics who frequented
the library at Rome, where Strabo was when he wrote ([Greek: kai\
_e)/nthade_ kai\ e)n A)lexandrei/a|], xiii. 609). The Peripatetic
Andronikus, whom he names among the celebrated Rhodians (xiv. 655),
may have been among his informants. His statements about the bad
state of the manuscripts; the unskilful emendations of Apellikon; the
contrast between the vein of Peripatetic study, as it had stood
before the revelation of the manuscripts, and as it came to stand
afterwards; the uncertain evidences upon which careful students, even
with the manuscripts before them, were compelled to proceed; the tone
of depreciation in which he speaks of the carelessness of booksellers
who sought only for profit,--all these points of information appear
to me to indicate that Strabo's informants were acute and diligent
critics, familiar with the library, and anxious both for the real
understanding of these documents, and for philosophy as an end.]

[Footnote 31: Plutarch, Sylla, c. xxvi. Spengel ("Ueber die
Reihenfolge der naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften des Aristoteles,"
München. philol. Abhandl. 1848,) remarks justly that the critical
arrangement of Aristotle's writings, for collective publication,
begins from the library of Apellikon at Rome, not from that of
Alexandria. See p. 146: "Mehr als zweihundert Jahre lang fehlt uns
alle nähere Kunde über die peripatetische Schule. Erst mit der viel
besprochenen Auffindung der Bibliothek des Aristoteles in Athen und
deren Wegführung nach Rom durch Sulla wird ein regeres Studium für
die Schriften des Philosophen bemerkbar--_und zwar jetzt eigentlich
der Schriften, weniger der Lehre und Philosophie im Allgemeinen,
welche früher allein beachtet worden ist_. Wir möchten sagen, von
jetzt an beginne das philologische Studium mit den Werken des
Aristoteles, die kritische und exegetische Behandlung dieser durch
Tyrannion, Andronikus, Adrastus und viele andre nachlfolgende," &c.]

The explanation just given, coinciding on many points with Brandis
and Heitz, affords the most probable elucidation of that obscurity
which arises about the Aristotelian Canon, when we compare _our_
Aristotle with the Catalogue of Diogenes--the partial likeness, but
still greater discrepancy, between the two. It is certain that
neither Cicero[32] nor the great Alexandrine _literati_, anterior to
and contemporary with him, knew Aristotle from most of the works
which we now possess. They knew him chiefly from the dialogues, the
matters of history and legend, some zoological books, and the
problems; the dialogues, and the historical collections respecting
the constitutions of Hellenic cities,[33] being more popular and
better known than any other works. While the Republic of Plato is
familiar to them, they exhibit no knowledge of our Aristotelian
Politica, in which treatise the criticism upon the Platonic Republic
is among the most interesting parts. When we look through the
contents of our editions of Aristotle the style and manner of
handling is indeed pretty much the same throughout, but the subjects
will appear extremely diverse and multifarious; and the
encyclopedical character of the author, as to science and its
applications, will strike us forcibly. The entire and real Aristotle,
however, was not only more encyclopedical as to subjects handled, but
also more variable as to style and manner of handling; passing from
the smooth, sweet, and flowing style--which Cicero extols as
characterizing the Aristotelian dialogues--to the elliptical brevity
and obscurity which we now find so puzzling in the De Animâ and the
Metaphysica.[34]

[Footnote 32: This is certain, from the remarks addressed by Cicero
to Trebatius at the beginning of the Ciceronian Topica, that in his
time Aristotle was little known and little studied at Rome, even by
philosophical students. Trebatius knew nothing of the Topica, until
he saw the work by chance in Cicero's library, and asked information
about the contents. The reply of Cicero illustrates the little notice
taken of Aristotle by Roman readers. "Cum autem ego te, non tam
vitandi laboris mei causâ, quam quia tua id interesse arbitrarer, vel
ut eos per te ipse legeres, vel ut totam rationem a doctissimo quodam
rhetore acciperes, hortatus essem, utrumque ut ex te audiebam, es
expertus. Sed a libris te obscuritas rejecit: rhetor autem ille
magnus, ut opinor, _Aristotelia se ignorare_ respondit. Quod quidem
minime sum admiratus, eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, _qui
ab ipsis philosophis, præter admodum paucos, ignoraretur._" Compare
also Cicero, Academ. Post. i. 3, 10.]

[Footnote 33: Even the philosophical commentators on Aristotle, such
as David the Armenian, seem to have known the lost work of Aristotle
called [Greek: Politei=ai] (the history of the constitutions of 250
Hellenic cities), better than the theoretical work which we possess,
called the Politica; though they doubtless knew both. (See Scholia ad
Categorias, Brandis, p. 16, b. 20; p. 24, a. 25; p. 25, b. 5.)--We
read in Schneider's Preface to the Aristotelian Politica (p. x.):
"Altum et mirabile silentium est apud antiquitatem Græcam et Romanam
de novâ Aristotelis Republicâ, cum omnes ferè scriptores Græci et
Romani, mentione Reipublicæ Platonicæ pleni, vel laudibus vel
vituperiis ejus abundant."--There is no clear reference to the
Aristotelian Politica earlier than Alexander of Aphrodisias. Both
Hildenbrand (Geschichte der Staats- und Rechts-Philosophen, t. i. pp.
358-361), and Oncken (Staatslehre des Aristot. pp. 65-66), think that
the Aristotelian Politica was not published until after the purchase
of the library by Apellikon.]

[Footnote 34: What Strabo asserts about the Peripatetic Scholarchs
succeeding Theophrastus (viz., [Greek: mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n
pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ the/seis lêkuthi/zein]: that they could not
handle philosophy in a businesslike way--with those high generalities
and that subtle analysis which was supposed to belong to
philosophy--but gave smooth and ornate discourses on set problems or
theses) is fully borne out by what we read in Cicero about these same
Peripatetics. The Stoics (immediate successors and rivals) accused
their Peripatetic contemporaries even of being ignorant of Dialectic:
which their founder, Aristotle, in his works that we now possess, had
been the first to raise into something like a science. Cicero says
(De Finibus, iii. 12, 41): "His igitur ita positis (inquit Cato)
sequitur magna contentio: quam tractatam à Peripateticis mollius
(_est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non satis acuta, propter
ignorationem Dialecticæ_), Carneades tuus, egregiâ quâdam
exercitatione in dialecticis summâque eloquentiâ, rem in summum
discrimen adduxit." Also Cicero, in Tuscul. Disput. iv. 5. 9: "Quia
Chrysippus et Stoici, quum de animi perturbationibus disputant,
magnam partem in iis partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt, illa
eorum perexigua oratio est, quâ medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos
esse patiantur. Peripatetici autem _ad placandos animos multa
afferunt, spinas partiendi et definiendi prætermittunt_." This last
sentence is almost an exact equivalent of the words of Strabo:
[Greek: mêde\n e)/chein philosophei=n pragmatikô=s, a)lla\ the/seis
lêkuthi/zein.] Aristotle himself, in the works which we possess,
might pass as father of the Stoics rather than of the Peripatetics;
for he abounds in classification and subdivision (spinas partiendi et
dividendi), and is even derided on this very ground by opponents (see
Atticus ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xv. 4); but he has nothing of the
polished amplification ascribed to the later Peripatetics by Strabo
and Cicero. Compare, about the Peripatetics from Lykon to Kritolaus,
Cicero, De Finibus, v. 5: "Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis
jejunior." Plutarch (Sylla, c. xxvi.) calls these later Peripatetics
[Greek: charie/ntes kai\ philo/logoi], &c.]

I shall assume this variety, both of subject and of handling, as a
feature to be admitted and allowed for in Aristotle, when I come to
discuss the objections of some critics against the authenticity of
certain treatises among the forty-six which now pass under his name.
But in canvassing the Aristotelian Canon I am unable to take the same
ground as I took in my former work, when reviewing the Platonic
Canon. In regard to Plato, I pointed out a strong antecedent
presumption in favour of the Canon of Thrasyllus--a canon derived
originally from the Alexandrine librarians, and sustained by the
unanimous adhesion of antiquity. In regard to Aristotle, there are no
similar grounds of presumption to stand upon. We have good reason for
believing that the works both of Plato and Aristotle--if not all the
works, at least many of them, and those the most generally
interesting--were copied and transmitted early to the Alexandrine
library. Now _our_ Plato represents that which was possessed and
accredited as Platonic by the Byzantine Aristophanes and the other
Alexandrine librarians; but _our_ Aristotle does not, in my judgment,
represent what these librarians possessed and accredited as
Aristotelian. That which they thus accredited stands recorded in the
Catalogue given by Diogenes, probably the work of Hermippus, as I
have already stated; while _our_ Aristotle is traceable to the
collection at Athens, including that of Apellikon, with that which he
bought from the heirs of Neleus, and to the sifting, correction, and
classification, applied thereto by able critics of the first century
B.C. and subsequently; among whom Andronikus is best known. We may
easily believe that the library of Apellikon contained various
compositions of Aristotle, which had never been copied for the
Alexandrine library--perhaps never prepared for publication at all,
so that the task of arranging detached sections or morsels into a
whole, with one separate title, still remained to be performed. This
was most likely to be the case with abstruser speculations, like the
component books of the Metaphysica, which Theophrastus may not have
been forward to tender, and which the library might not be very eager
to acquire, having already near four hundred other volumes by the
same author. These reserved works would therefore remain in the
library of Theophrastus, not copied and circulated (or at least
circulated only to a few private philosophical brethren, such as
Eudêmus), so that they never became fully published until the days of
Apellikon.[35]

[Footnote 35: The two Peripatetic Scholarchs at Athens, Straton and
Lykon, who succeeded (after the death of Theophrastus and the
transfer of his library to Skêpsis) in the conduct of the school,
left at their decease collections of books, of which each disposes by
his will (Diogen. L. v. 62; v. 73). The library of Apellikon, when
sent by Sylla to Rome, contained probably many other Aristotelian
MSS., besides those purchased from Skêpsis.

Michelet, in his Commentary on the Nikomachean Ethica, advances a
theory somewhat analogous but bolder, respecting the relation between
the Catalogue given by Diogenes, and the works contained in _our_
Aristotle. Comm. p. 2. "Id solum addam, hoc Aristotelis opus (the
Nikomachean Ethica), ut reliqua omnia, ex brevioribus
commentationibus consarcinatum fuisse, quæ quidem vivo Aristotele in
lucem prodierint, cum unaquæque disciplina, e quâ excerpta fuerint in
admirabilem illum quem habemus ordinem jam ab ipso Aristotele sive
quodam ejus discipulo redacta, in libris Aristotelis manu scriptis
latitaverit, qui hereditate ad Nelei prolem, ut notum est,
transmissi, in cellâ illâ subterraneâ Scepsiâ absconditi fuerunt,
donec Apellicon Teius et Rhodius Andronicus eos ediderint. Leguntur
autem commentationum illarum de Moribus tituli in elencho librorum
Aristotelis apud Diogenem (v. 22-26): [Greek: peri\ a)retô=n] (Lib.
ii., iii. c. 6-fin. iv. nostrorum Ethicorum); [Greek: peri\
e(kousi/ou] (Lib. iii. c. 1-5); &c. Plerumque enim non integra
volumina, sed singulos libros vel singula volumina diversarum
disciplinarum, Diogenes in elencho suo enumeravit."

In his other work (Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote, pp. 202,
205, 225) Michelet has carried this theory still farther, and has
endeavoured to identify separate fragments of the Aristotelian works
now extant, with various titles in the Catalogue given by Diogenes.
The identification is not convincing.]

But though the edition published by Andronikus would thus contain
many genuine works of Aristotle not previously known or edited, we
cannot be sure that it would not also include some which were
spurious. Reflect what the library of Apellikon, transported to Rome
by Sylla, really was. There was in it the entire library of
Theophrastus; probably, also, that of Neleus, who must have had some
books of his own, besides what he inherited from Theophrastus. It
included all the numerous manuscript works composed by Aristotle and
Theophrastus, and many other manuscript works purchased or acquired
by them, but composed by others--the whole in very bad order and
condition; and, moreover, the books which Apellikon possessed before,
doubtless as many Aristotelian books as he could purchase. To
distinguish, among this heterogeneous mass of manuscripts, which of
them were the manuscripts composed by Aristotle; to separate these
from the writings of Theophrastus, Eudêmus, or other authors, who
composed various works of their own upon the same subjects and with
the same titles as those of Aristotle--required extreme critical
discernment and caution; the rather, since there was no living
companion of Aristotle or Theophrastus to guide or advise, more than
a century and a half having elapsed since the death of Theophrastus,
and two centuries since that of Aristotle. Such were the difficulties
amidst which Apellikon, Tyrannion, and Andronikus had to decide, when
they singled out the manuscripts of Aristotle to be published. I will
not say that they decided wrongly; yet neither can I contend (as I
argued in the case of the Platonic dialogues) that the presumption is
very powerful in favour of that Canon which their decision made
legal. The case is much more open to argument, if any grounds against
the decision can be urged.

Andronikus put in, arranged, and published the treatises of Aristotle
(or those which he regarded as composed by Aristotle) included in the
library conveyed by Sylla to Rome. I have already observed, that
among these treatises there were some, of which copies existed in the
Alexandrine library (as represented by the Catalogue of Diogenes),
but a still greater number which cannot be identified with the titles
remaining of works there preserved. As to the works common to both
libraries, we must remember that Andronikus introduced a
classification of his own, analogous to the Enneads applied by
Porphyry to the works of Plotinus, and to the Tetralogies adopted by
Thrasyllus in regard to the Dialogues of Plato; so that even these
works might not be distributed in the same partitions under each of
the two arrangements. And this is what we actually see when we
compare the Catalogue of Diogenes with _our_ Aristotle. Rhetoric,
Ethics, Physics, Problems, &c., appear in both as titles or subjects,
but distributed into a different number of books or sections in one
and in the other; perhaps, indeed, the compositions are not always
the same.

Before I proceed to deal with the preserved works of Aristotle--those
by which alone he is known to us, and was known to mediæval readers,
I shall say a few words respecting the import of a distinction which
has been much canvassed, conveyed in the word _exoteric_ and its
opposite. This term, used on various occasions by Aristotle himself,
has been also employed by many ancient critics, from Cicero
downwards; while by mediæval and modern critics, it has not merely
been employed, but also analysed and elucidated. According to Cicero
(the earliest writer subsequent to Aristotle in whom we find the
term), it designates one among two classes of works composed by
Aristotle: _exoteric_ works were those composed in a popular style
and intended for a large, indiscriminate circle of readers: being
contrasted with other works of elaborated philosophical reasoning,
which were not prepared for the public taste, but left in the
condition of memorials for the instruction of a more select class of
studious men. Two points are to be observed respecting Cicero's
declaration. First, he applies it to the writings not of Aristotle
exclusively, but also to those of Theophrastus, and even of
succeeding Peripatetics; secondly, he applies it directly to such of
their writings only as related to the discussion of the _Summum
Bonum_.[36] Furthermore, Cicero describes the works which Aristotle
called exoteric, as having _proems_ or introductory prefaces.[37]

[Footnote 36: Cicero, De Finibus, v. 5, 12. "De summo autem bono,
quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum, quod
[Greek: e)xôteriko\n] appellabant, alterum limatius, quod in
commentariis reliquerunt, non semper idem dicere videntur: nec in
summâ tamen ipsâ aut varietas est ulla, apud hos quidem quos
nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio."

The word _limatius_ here cannot allude to high polish and ornament of
style (nitor orationis), but must be equivalent to [Greek:
a)kribe/steron], _doctius_, _subtilius_, &c. (as Buhle and others
have already remarked, Buhle, De Libris Aristot. Exoter. et Acroam.
p. 115; Madvig, ad Cicero de Finib. v. 12; Heitz, p. 134), applied to
profound reasoning, with distinctions of unusual precision, which it
required a careful preparatory training to apprehend. This employment
of the word _limatius_ appears to me singular, but it cannot mean
anything else here. The _commentarii_ are the general heads--plain
unadorned statements of facts or reasoning--which the orator or
historian is to employ his genius in setting forth and decorating, so
that it may be heard or read with pleasure and admiration by a
general audience. Cicero, in that remarkable letter wherein he
entreats Lucceius to narrate his (Cicero's) consulship in an
historical work, undertakes to compose "commentarios rerum omnium" as
materials for the use of Lucceius (Ep. ad Famil. v. 12. 10). His
expression, "in commentariis reliquerunt," shows that he considered
the exoteric books to have been prepared by working up some naked
preliminary materials into an ornate and interesting form.]

[Footnote 37: Cicero, Ep. ad Att. iv. 16.]

In the main, the distinction here drawn by Cicero, understood in a
very general sense, has been accepted by most following critics as
intended by the term _exoteric_: something addressed to a wide,
indiscriminate circle of general readers or hearers, and intelligible
or interesting to them without any special study or training--as
contrasted with that which is reserved for a smaller circle of
students assumed to be specially qualified. But among those who agree
in this general admission, many differences have prevailed. Some have
thought that the term was not used by Aristotle to designate any
writings either of his own or of others, but only in allusion to
informal oral dialogues or debates. Others again, feeling assured
that Aristotle intended by the term to signify some writings of his
own, have searched among the works preserved, as well as among the
titles of the works lost, to discriminate such as the author
considered to be exoteric: though this search has certainly not ended
in unanimity; nor do I think it has been successful. Again, there
have not been wanting critics (among them, Thomas Aquinas and
Sepulveda), who assign to the term a meaning still more vague and
undefined; contending that when Aristotle alludes to "exoteric
discourses," he indicates simply some other treatise of his own,
distinct from that in which the allusion occurs, without meaning to
imply anything respecting its character.[38]

[Footnote 38: Sepulveda, p. 125 (cited by Bernays, Dialoge des
Aristoteles, p. 41): "Externos sermones sive exotericos solet
Aristoteles libros eos appellare, quicunque sunt extra id opus in quo
tunc versatur, ut jure pontificio periti consueverunt: non enim
exoterici sermones seu libri certo aliquo genere continentur, ut est
publicus error."

Zeller lends his high authority to an explanation of _exoteric_ very
similar to the above. (Gesch. der Philos. ii. 2, p. 100, seq.:--"dass
unter exoterischen Reden nicht eine eigene Klasse populär
geschriebener Bücher, sondern nur überhaupt solche Erörterungen
verstanden werden, welche nicht in den Bereich der vorliegenden
Untersuchung gehören.") He discusses the point at some length; but
the very passages which he cites, especially Physica, iv. 10, appear
to me less favourable to his view than to that which I have stated in
the text, according to which the word means _dialectic_ as contrasted
with _didactic_.]

To me it appears that this last explanation is untenable, and that
the term _exoteric_ designates matter of a certain character,
assignable to some extent by positive marks, but still more by
negative; matter, in part, analogous to that defined by Cicero and
other critics. But to conceive clearly or fully what its character
is, we must turn to Aristotle himself, who is of course the final
authority, wherever he can be found to speak in a decisive manner.
His preserved works afford altogether eight passages (two of them
indeed in the Eudemian Ethics, which, for the present at least, I
shall assume to be his work), wherein the phrase "exoteric
discourses" ([Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi]) occurs. Out of these eight
passages, there are seven which present the phrase as designating
some unknown matter, not farther specified, but distinct from the
work in which the phrase occurs: "Enough has been said (or is said,
Aristotle intimates) about this subject, even in the exoteric
discourses." To what it is that he here alludes--whether to other
writings of his own or oral discussions of his own, or writing and
speech of a particular sort by others--we are left to interpret as we
best may, by probable reason or conjecture. But there is one among
the eight passages, in which Aristotle uses the term _exoteric_ as
describing, not what is to be looked for elsewhere, but what he is
himself about to give in the treatise in hand. In the fourth book of
the Physica, he discusses the three high abstractions, Place, Vacuum,
Time. After making an end of the first two, he enters upon the third,
beginning with the following words:--"It follows naturally on what
has been said, that we should treat respecting Time. But first it is
convenient to advert to the difficulties involved in it, by _exoteric
discourse also_--whether Time be included among entities or among
non-entities; then afterwards, what is its nature. Now a man might
suspect, from the following reasons, that Time either absolutely does
not exist, or exists scarcely and dimly," &c. Aristotle then gives a
string of dialectic reasons, lasting through one of the columns of
the Berlin edition, for doubting whether Time really exists. He
afterwards proceeds thus, through two farther columns:--"Let these be
enumerated as the difficulties accompanying the attributes of Time.
What Time is, and what is its nature, is obscure, as well from what
has been handed down to us by others, as from what we ourselves have
just gone through;"[39] and this question also he first discusses
dialectically, and then brings to a solution.

[Footnote 39: Aristot. Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 29. [Greek:
E)cho/menon de\ tô=n ei)rême/nôn e)sti\n e)pelthei=n peri\ chro/nou;
prô=ton de\ kalô=s e)/chei diaporê=sai peri\ au)tou= _kai\ dia\ tô=n
e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn_, po/teron tô=n o)/ntôn e)sti\n ê)\ tô=n mê\
o)/ntôn, ei)=ta ti/s ê( phu/sis au)tou=. O(/ti me\n ou)=n ê)\ o(/lôs
e)/stin, ê)\ mo/lis kai\ a)mudrô=s, e)k tô=nde/ tis a)\n
u(popteu/seien.] Then, after a column of text urging various [Greek:
a)pori/as] as to whether Time is or is not, he goes on, p. 218, a.
31:--[Greek: Peri\ me\n ou)=n tô=n u(parcho/ntôn au)tô=| tosau=t'
e)/stô diêporême/na. Ti/ d' e)sti\n o( chro/nos, kai\ ti/s au)tou= ê(
phu/sis, o(moi/ôs e)/k te tô=n paradedome/nôn a)/dêlo/n e)sti, kai\
peri\ ô(=n tugcha/nomen dielêlutho/tes pro/teron]--thus taking up the
questions, What Time is? What is the nature of Time? Upon this he
goes through another column of [Greek: a)pori/ai], difficulties and
counter-difficulties, until p. 219, a. 1, when he approaches to a
positive determination, as the sequel of various negatives--[Greek:
o(/ti me\n ou)=n ou)/te ki/nêsis ou)/t' a)/neu kinê/seôs o( chro/nos
e)sti/, phanero/n. _lêpte/on_ de/, e)pei\ zêtou=men ti/ e)stin o(
chro/nos, _e)nteu=then a)rchome/nois_, ti/ tê=s kinê/seô/s e)stin.]
He pursues this positive determination throughout two farther columns
(see [Greek: u(pokei/sthô], a. 30), until at length he arrives at his
final definition of Time--[Greek: a)rithmo\s kinê/seôs kata\ to\
pro/teron kai\ u(/steron, kai\ sunechê/s (sunechou=s ga\r)]--which he
declares to be [Greek: phanero/n], p. 220, a. 25.

It is plain that the phrase [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi] here
designates the preliminary dialectic tentative process, before the
final affirmative is directly attempted, as we read in De Gener. et
Corr. i. 3, p. 317, b. 13: [Greek: peri\ me\n ou)=n tou/tôn e)n
a)/llois _te diêpo/rêtai kai\ diô/ristai_ toi=s lo/gois e)pi\
plei=on]--first, [Greek: to\ _diaporei=n_], next, [Greek: to\
_diori/zein_].]

Now what is it that Aristotle here means by "exoteric discourse?" We
may discover by reading the matter comprised between the two
foregoing citations. We find a string of perplexing difficulties
connected with the supposition that Time exists: such as, "That all
Time is either past or future, of which the former no longer exists,
and the latter does not yet exist; that the Now is no part of Time,
for every Whole is composed of its Parts, and Time is not composed of
Nows," &c. I do not go farther here into these subtle suggestions,
because my present purpose is only to illustrate what Aristotle calls
"exoteric discourse," by exhibiting what he himself announces to be a
specimen thereof. It is the process of noticing and tracing out all
the doubts and difficulties ([Greek: a)pori/as]) which beset the
enquiry in hand, along with the different opinions entertained about
it either by the vulgar, or by individual philosophers, and the
various reasons whereby such opinions may be sustained or impugned.
It is in fact the same process as that which, when performed (as it
was habitually and actively in his age) between two disputants, he
calls _dialectic debate_; and which he seeks to encourage as well as
to regulate in his treatise entitled Topica. He contrasts it with
philosophy, or with the strictly didactic and demonstrative
procedure: wherein the teacher lays down principles which he requires
the learner to admit, and then deduces from them, by syllogisms
constructed in regular form, consequences indisputably binding on all
who have admitted the principles. But though Aristotle thus
distinguishes Dialectic from Philosophy, he at the same time declares
it to be valuable as an auxiliary towards the purpose of philosophy,
and as an introductory exercise before the didactic stage begins. The
philosopher ought to show his competence as a dialectician, by
indicating and handling those various difficulties and controversies
bearing on his subject, which have already been made known, either in
writings or in oral debate.[40]

[Footnote 40: See Aristot. Topic. i. p. 100, b. 21, p. 101, a. 25,
34-36, b. 2. [Greek: Pro\s de\ ta\s kata\ philosophi/an e)pistê/mas
(chrê/simos ê( pragmatei/a), o(/ti duna/menoi pro\s a)mpho/tera
diaporê=sai r(a=|on e)n e(ka/stois katopso/metha ta)lêthe/s te kai\
to\ pseu=dos], p. 105, b. 30. [Greek: Pro\s me\n ou)=n philosophi/an
kat' a)lêtheian peri\ **au)tô=n pragmateue/on, _**dialektikô=s de\
pro\s do/xan_.]

Compare also the commencement of book B. in the Metaphysica, p. 995,
a. 28 seq., and, indeed, the whole of book B., which contains a
dialectic discussion of numerous [Greek: a)pori/ai]. Aristotle
himself refers to it afterwards ([Greek: G]. p. 1004, a. 32) in the
words [Greek: u(/per e)n tai=s a)pori/ais e)lechthê].

The Scholia of Alexander on the beginning of the Topica (pp. 251,
252, Brandis) are instructive; also his Scholia on p. 105, b. 30, p.
260, a. 24. [Greek: _dialektikô=s de\ pro\s do/xan_, ô(s e)n tau/tê|
tê=| pragmatei/a|] (_i.e._ the Topica) [Greek: kai\ e)n toi=s
r(êtorikoi=s, kai\ _e)n toi=s e)xôterikoi=s_. kai\ ga\r e)n
e)kei/nois plei=sta kai\ peri\ tô=n** ê)thikô=n kai\ peri\ tô=n
phusikô=n _e)ndo/xôs_ le/getai.]

We see here that Alexander understands by the _exoteric_ the
dialectic handling of opinions on physics and ethics.

In the Eudemian Ethica also (i. 8, p. 1217, b. 16) we find [Greek:
e)pe/skeptai de\ polloi=s peri\ au)tou= tro/pois, kai\ e)n toi=s
e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois kai\ e)n toi=s kata\ philosophi/an], where we
have the same antithesis in other words--Exoteric or Dialectic
_versus_ Philosophical or Didactic. Compare a clear statement in
Simplikius (Schol. ad Physic. p. 364, b. 19). [Greek: Prô=ton me\n
logikô=s e)picheirei=, tou/testi pithanô=s kai\ e)ndo/xôs, kai\ e)/ti
koino/tero/n pôs kai\ dialektikô/teron. Ê( ga\r dialektikê\ ê(
A)ristote/lous koinê/ e)sti me/thodos peri\ panto\s tou=
protethe/ntos e)x e)ndo/xôn sullogizome/nê--to\ ga\r logiko\n ô(s
koino\n ei)/ôthen a)ntidiaste/llein ta| oi)kei/ô| kai\ kata\ phu/sin
tou= pra/gmatos kai\ a)podeiktikô=|.]]

We thus learn, from the example furnished by Aristotle himself, what
he means by "exoteric discourses." The epithet means literally,
_extraneous to_, _lying on the outside of_; in the present case, on
the outside of philosophy, considered in its special didactic and
demonstrative march.[41] Yet what thus lies outside philosophy, is
nevertheless useful as an accompaniment and preparation for
philosophy. We shall find Aristotle insisting upon this in his Topica
and Analytica; and we shall also find him introducing the exoteric
treatment into his most abstruse philosophical treatises (the Physica
is one of the most abstruse) as an accompaniment and auxiliary--a
dialectic survey of opinions, puzzles, and controverted points,
before he begins to lay down and follow out affirmative principles of
his own. He does this not only throughout the Physica (in several
other passages besides that which I have just cited),[42] but also in
the Metaphysica, the treatises De Animâ, De Generatione et
Corruptione, &c.

[Footnote 41: We find the epithet [Greek: e)xôteriko\s] used once by
Aristotle, not in conjunction with [Greek: lo/goi], but with [Greek:
pra/xeis], designating those acts which are performed with a view to
some ulterior and extraneous end ([Greek: tô=n a)pobaino/ntôn
cha/rin], as contrasted with [Greek: pra/xeis
au)totelei=s--oi)kei=ai]): Polit. vii. p. 1325, b. 22-29.
[Greek: scholê=| **ga\r a)\n o( theo\s e)/choi kalô=s kai\ pa=s o(
ko/smos, oi(=s ou)k ei)si\n e)xôterikai\ pra/xeis para\ ta\s
oi)kei/as ta\s au)tô=n.] In the Eudemian Ethics the phrase [Greek:
_toi=s a)llotri/ois lo/gois_ sophi/zontai] is used much in the same
sense as [Greek: _toi=s e)xôterikoi=s_ lo/gois]: _i.e._ opposed to
[Greek: toi=s oi)kei/ois]--to that which belongs specially to the
scientific determination of the problem (Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1218,
b. 18).

The phrase [Greek: dia\ tô=n e)xôterikô=n lo/gôn], in Aristot.
Physic. iv. 10, p. 217, b. 31, and the different phrase [Greek: e)k
tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn lo/gôn le/gesthai], in Phys. vi. 2, p. 233, a. 13,
appear to have the same meaning and reference. Compare Prantl not. ad
Arist. Phys. p. 501.]

[Footnote 42: If we turn to the beginning of book iv. of the Physica,
where Aristotle undertakes to examine [Greek: To/pos], _Place_, we
shall see that he begins by a dialectic handling of [Greek:
a)pori/ai], exactly analogous to that which he himself calls [Greek:
e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], when he proceeds to examine [Greek: Chro/nos],
_Time_: see Physica, iv. pp. 208, a. 32-35, 209, a. 30; 210, a. 12,
b. 31. He does the like also about [Greek: Keno/n], _Vacuum_, p. 213,
a. 20, b. 28, and about [Greek: A)/peiron], _Infinitum_, iii. p. 204,
b. 4 (with the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 364, b. 20, Br.).

Compare the Scholion of Simplikius ad Physica (i. p. 329, b. 1,
Br.)--[Greek: _i)/sôs_ de\] (Simplikius uses this indecisive word
[Greek: i)/sôs]) [Greek: o(/ti ê( e)ph' e(ka/tera a)pori/a tou=
lo/gou e)xôterikê/ tis ê)=n, ô(s Eu)/dêmo/s phêsi, dialektikê\ ma=llon
ou)=sa], with this last Scholion, on p. 364, b. 20, which describes
the same dialectic handling, though without directly calling it
_exoteric_.]

Having thus learnt to understand, from one distinct passage of
Aristotle himself, what he means by "exoteric discourses," we must
interpret by the light of this analogy the other indistinct passages
in which the phrase occurs. We see clearly that in using the phrase,
he does not of necessity intend to refer to any other writings of his
own--nor even to any other writings at all. He may possibly mean
this; but we cannot be sure of it. He means by the phrase, a
dialectic process of turning over and criticizing diverse opinions
and probabilities: whether in his own writings, or in those of
others, or in no writings at all, but simply in those oral debates
which his treatise called Topica presupposes--this is a point which
the phrase itself does not determine. He _may_ mean to allude, in
some cases where he uses the phrase, to his own lost dialogues; but
he may also allude to Platonic and other dialogues, or to colloquies
carried on orally by himself with his pupils, or to oral debates on
intellectual topics between other active-minded men. When Bernays
refers "exoteric discourse" to the lost Aristotelian Dialogues; when
Madvig, Zeller, Torstrick, Forchhammer, and others, refer it to the
contemporary oral dialectic[43]--I think that neither of these
explanations is in itself inadmissible. The context of each
particular passage must decide which of the two is the more probable.
We cannot go farther, in explaining the seven doubtful passages where
Aristotle alludes to the "exoteric discourses," than to understand
the general character and scope of the reasonings which he thus
designates. Extra-philosophical, double-sided, dialectic, is in
general (he holds) insufficient by itself, and valuable only as a
preparation and auxiliary to the didactic process. But there are some
particular points on which such dialectic leaves a result sufficient
and satisfactory, which can be safely accepted as the basis of future
deduction. These points he indicates in the passages above cited;
without informing us more particularly whether the dialectic was
written or spoken, and whether by himself or by others.[44]

[Footnote 43: Ueberweg (Geschichte der Philos. des Alterthums, vol.
i. § 46, p. 127, 2nd ed.) gives a just and accurate view of [Greek:
e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi], as conceived by Aristotle. See also the
dissertation of Buhle, prefixed to his unfinished edition of
Aristotle, De Aristotelis Libris Exotericis et Acroamaticis, pp.
107-152--which discusses this subject copiously, and gives a
collection both of the passages and comments which bear upon it.
It is instructive, though his opinion leans too much towards the
supposition of a double doctrine. Bernays, in his dissertation, Die
Dialoge des Aristoteles, maintains that by _exoteric books_ are
always meant the lost dialogues of Aristotle; and he employs much
reasoning to refute the supposition of Madvig (Excurs. VII. ad
Cicero, de Fin. p. 861), of Torstrick (ad Aristotel. de Animâ, p.
123), and also of Zeller, that by exoteric discourses are not meant
any writings at all, but simply the colloquies and debates of
cultivated men, apart from the philosophical schools. On the other
hand, Forchhammer has espoused this last-mentioned opinion, and has
defended it against the objections of Bernays (Forchhammer,
Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden, p. 16, seq.). The question is
thus fully argued on both sides. To me it seems that each of these
two opinions is partially right, and neither of them exclusively
right. "Exoteric discourse," as I understand it, might be found both
in the Aristotelian dialogues, and in the debates of cultivated men
out of the schools, and also in parts of the Aristotelian akroamatic
works. The argument of Bernays (p. 36, seq.), that the points which
Aristotle alludes to as having been debated and settled in exoteric
discourses, were too abstruse and subtle to have been much handled by
cultivated men out of the schools, or (as he expresses it) in the
_salons_ or coffee-houses (or what corresponded thereto) at
Athens--this argument seems to me untenable. We know well, from the
Topica of Aristotle, that the most abstruse subjects were handled
dialectically, in a manner which he called extra-philosophical; and
that this was a frequent occupation of active-minded men at Athens.
To discuss these matters in the way which he calls [Greek: pro\s
do/xan], was more frequent than to discuss them [Greek: pro\s
a)lê/theian].

Zell remarks (ad Ethica Nikom. i. 13), after referring to the passage
in Aristotle's Physica, iv. 10 (to which I have called attention in a
previous note), "quo loco, à Buhlio neglecto, [Greek: e)xôterikoi\
lo/goi] idem significant quod alibi [Greek: koinai\ do/xai,
ei)ôtho/tes lo/goi], vel [Greek: ta\ lego/mena]: quæ semper,
priusquam suas rationes in disputando proponat, disquirere solet
Aristoteles. Vide supra, ad cap. viii. 1." I find also in Weisse
(Translation of and Comment on the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517) a
fair explanation of what Aristotle really means by _exoteric_; an
explanation, however, which Ritter sets aside, in my judgment
erroneously (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 23).]

[Footnote 44: Thus, for example, the passage in the Ethica Nikom. i.
13, p. 1102, a. 26. [Greek: le/getai de\ peri\ au)tô=n kai\ e)n toi=s
e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois a)rkou/ntôs e)/nia, kai\ chrêste/on au)toi=s],
is explained in the Paraphrase of the Pseudo-Andronikus as referring
to oral colloquy of Aristotle himself with pupils or interlocutors;
and this _may_ possibly be a correct explanation.]

From the time of Cicero downward, a distinction has been drawn
between some books of Aristotle which were exoteric, and others that
were not so; these last being occasionally designated as
_akroamatic_. Some modern critics have farther tried to point out
which, among the preserved works of Aristotle, belonged to each of
these heads. Now there existed, doubtless, in the days of Cicero,
Strabo, Plutarch, and Gellius, books of Aristotle properly called
_exoteric_, _i.e._ consisting almost entirely of exoteric discourse
and debate; though whether Aristotle himself would have spoken of an
exoteric _book_, I have some doubt. Of such a character were his
Dialogues. But all the works designated as akroamatic (or
non-exoteric) must probably have contained a certain admixture of
"exoteric discourse"; as the Physica ([Greek: Phusikê\ A)kro/asis])
and the Metaphysica are seen to contain now. The distinction
indicated by Cicero would thus be really between one class of works,
wherein "exoteric discourse" was exclusive or paramount,--and
another, in which it was partially introduced, subordinate to some
specified didactic purpose.[45] To this last class belong all the
works of Aristotle that we possess at present. Cicero would have
found none of them corresponding to his notion of an exoteric book.

[Footnote 45: To this extent I go along with the opinion expressed by
Weisse in his translation of the Physica of Aristotle, p. 517: "Dass
dieser Gegensatz kein absoluter von zwei durchaus getrennten
Bücherclassen ist, sondern dass ein und dasselbe Werk zugleich
_exoterisch_ und _esoterisch_ sein konnte; und zweitens, dass
_exoterisch_ überhaupt dasjenige heisst, was nicht in den
positiv-dogmatischen Zusammenhang der Lehre des Philosophen
unmittelbar als Glied eintritt." But Weisse goes on afterwards to
give a different opinion (about the meaning of _exoteric_ books),
conformable to what I have cited in a previous note from Sepulveda;
and in that I do not concur. However, he remarks that the manner in
which Aristotle handled the Abstracta, _Place_ and _Infinite_, is
just the same as that which he declares to be _exoteric_ in the case
of _Time_. The distinction drawn by Aulus Gellius (xx. 5) is not
accurate: "[Greek: E)xôterika\] dicebantur, quæ ad rhetoricas
meditationes, facultatem argutiarum, civiliumque rerum notitiam
conducebant. [Greek: A)kroatika\] autem vocabantur, in quibus
philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur; quæque ad naturæ
contemplationes, disceptationesque dialecticas pertinebant." It
appears to me that _disceptationes dialecticæ_ ought to be
transferred to the department [Greek: e)xôterika/], and that
_civilium rerum notitia_ belongs as much to [Greek: a)kroatika\] as
to [Greek: e)xôterika/]. M. Ravaisson has discussed this question
very ably and instructively, Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote,
pp. 224-244. He professes indeed to defend the opinion which I have
cited from Sepulveda, and which I think erroneous; but his reasonings
go really to the support of the opinion given in my text. He remarks,
justly, that the dialogues of Plato (at least all the dialogues of
Search) are specimens of exoteric handling; of which attribute
Forchhammer speaks as if it were peculiar to the Charmides (Aristot.
Exot. Reden. p. 22). Brandis (Aristoteles, p. 105) thinks that when
Aristotle says in the Politica, vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 21: [Greek:
nomi/santas ou)=n i(kanô=s polla\ le/gesthai kai\ tô=n e)n toi=s
e)xôterikoi=s lo/gois peri\ tê=s a)ri/stês zô/ês, kai\ nu=n
chrêste/on au)toi=s], he intends to designate the Ethica. It may be
so; yet the Politica seems a continuation of the Ethica: moreover,
even in the Ethica, we find reference made to previous discussions,
[Greek: e)n toi=s e)xôterikô=s lo/gois] (Eth. N. I. 13).]

To understand fully the extent comprehended by the word _exoteric_,
we must recollect that its direct and immediate meaning is negative--
_extraneous to philosophy_, and suitable to an audience not specially
taught or prepared for philosophy. Now this negative characteristic
belongs not merely to dialectic (as we see it in the example above
cited from the Aristotelian Physica), but also to rhetoric or
rhetorical argument. We know that, in Aristotle's mind, the
rhetorical handling and the dialectical handling, are placed both of
them under the same head, as dealing with opinions rather than with
truth.[46] Both the one and the other are parted off from the
didactic or demonstrative march which leads to philosophical truth;
though dialectic has a distant affinity with that march, and is
indeed available as an auxiliary skirmisher. The term _exoteric_ will
thus comprehend both rhetorical argument and dialectical
argument.[47] Of the latter, we have just seen a specimen extracted
from the Physica; of the former, I know no specimen remaining, but
there probably were many of them in the Aristotelian dialogues now
lost--that which was called 'Eudemus,' and others. With these
dialogues Cicero was probably more familiar than with any other
composition of Aristotle. I think it highly probable that Aristotle
alludes to the dialogues in some of the passages where he refers to
"exoteric discourses." To that extent I agree with Bernays; but I see
no reason to believe (as he does) that the case is the same with all
the passages, or that the epithet is to be understood _always_ as
implying one of these lost Aristotelian dialogues.[48]

[Footnote 46: See the first two chapters of Aristotle's Rhetorica,
especially pp. 1355 a. 24-35, 1358 a. 5, 11, 25, also p. 1404 a. 1.:
[Greek: o(/lôs ou)/sês _pro\s do/xan_ tê=s pragmatei/as tê=s peri\
tê\n r(êtorikê/n], which is exactly what he says also about
Dialectic, in the commencement of the Topica.]

[Footnote 47: Octavianus Ferrarius observes, in his treatise De
Sermonibus Exotericis (Venet. 1575), p. 24: "Quod si Dialecticus et
Rhetor inter se mutant, ut aiunt, ita ut Dialecticus Rhetorem et
Rhetor Dialecticum vicissim induat--de his ipsis veteribus
Dialecticis minime nobis dubitandum est, quin iidem dialectice simul
et rhetorice loqui in utramque partem potuerint. Nec valde mirum
debet hoc videri; libros enim exotericos prope solos habuerunt: qui
cum scripti essent (ut posterius planum faciam) dialectico more,
illorum lectio cum libris peperit philosophos congruentes"--Ferrari
adverts well to the distinction between the philosopher and the
dialectician (_sensu Aristotelico_), handling often the same
subjects, but in a different way: between the [Greek: oi)kei=ai
a)rchai/], upon which didactic method rested, and the [Greek: do/xai]
or diverse opinions, each countenanced by more or less authority,
from which dialectic took its departure (pp. 36, 86, 89).]

[Footnote 48: I agree very much with the manner in which Bernays puts
his case, pp. 79, 80, 92, 93: though there is a contradiction between
p. 80 and p. 92, in respect to the taste and aptitude of the exterior
public for dialectic debate; which is affirmed in the former page,
denied in the latter. But the doctrine asserted in the pages just
indicated amounts only to this--that the dialogues were _included in_
Aristotle's phrase, [Greek: e)xôterikoi\ lo/goi]; which appears to me
true.]

There grew up, in the minds of some commentators, a supposition of
"exoteric doctrine" as denoting what Aristotle promulgated to the
public, contrasted with another secret or mystic doctrine reserved
for a special few, and denoted by the term _esoteric_; though this
term is not found in use before the days of Lucian.[49] I believe the
supposition of a double doctrine to be mistaken in regard to
Aristotle; but it is true as to the Pythagoreans, and is not without
some colour of truth even as to Plato. That Aristotle employed one
manner of explanation and illustration, when discussing with advanced
pupils, and another, more or less different, when addressing an
unprepared audience, we may hold as certain and even unavoidable; but
this does not amount to a double positive doctrine. Properly
speaking, indeed, the term "exoteric" (as I have just explained it
out of Aristotle himself) does not designate, or even imply, any
positive doctrine at all. It denotes a many-sided controversial
debate, in which numerous points are canvassed and few settled; the
express purpose being to bring into full daylight the perplexing
aspects of each. There are indeed a few exceptional cases, in which
"exoteric discourse" will itself have thrown up a tolerably
trustworthy result: these few (as I have above shown) Aristotle
occasionally singles out and appeals to. But as a general rule, there
is no _doctrine_ which can properly be called _exoteric_: the
"exoteric discourse" suggests many new puzzles, but terminates
without any solution at all. The doctrine, whenever any such is
proved, emerges out of the didactic process which follows.

[Footnote 49: Luc. Vit. Auct. 26.]



CHAPTER III.

CATEGORIÆ.


Of the prodigious total of works composed by Aristotle, I have
already mentioned that the larger number have perished. But there
still remain about forty treatises, of authenticity not open to any
reasonable suspicion, which attest the grandeur of his intelligence,
in respect of speculative force, positive as well as negative,
systematizing patience, comprehensive curiosity as to matters of
fact, and diversified applications of detail. In taking account of
these treatises, we perceive some in which the order of sequence is
determined by assignable reasons; as regards others, no similar
grounds of preference appear. The works called 1. De Coelo; 2. De
Generatione et Corruptione; 3. Meteorologica,--are marked out as
intended to be studied in immediate succession, and the various
Zoological treatises after them. The cluster entitled Parva Naturalia
is complementary to the treatise De Animâ. The Physica Auscultatio is
referred to in the Metaphysica, and discusses many questions
identical or analogous, standing in the relation of prior to a
posterior, as the titles indicate; though the title 'Metaphysica' is
not affixed or recognized by Aristotle himself, and the treatise so
called includes much that goes beyond the reach of the Physica. As to
the treatises on Logic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Politics, Poetics,
Mechanics, &c., we are left to fix for ourselves the most convenient
order of study. Of no one among them can we assign the date of
composition or publication. There are indeed in the Rhetorica,
Politics, and Meteorologica, various allusions which must have been
written later than some given events of known date; but these
allusions may have been later additions, and cannot be considered as
conclusively proving, though they certainly raise a presumption, that
the entire work was written subsequently to those events.

The proper order in which the works of Aristotle ought to be studied
(like the order proper for studying the Platonic dialogues),[1] was
matter of debate from the time of his earliest editors and
commentators, in the century immediately preceding the Christian era.
Boêthus the Sidonian (Strabo's contemporary and fellow-student)
recommended that the works on natural philosophy and physiology
should be perused first; contending that these were the easiest, the
most interesting, and, on the whole, the most successful among all
the Aristotelian productions. Some Platonists advised that the
ethical treatises should be put in the front rank, on the ground of
their superior importance for correcting bad habits and character;
others assigned the first place to the mathematics, as exhibiting
superior firmness in the demonstrations. But Andronikus himself, the
earliest known editor of Aristotle's works, arranged them in a
different order, placing the logical treatises at the commencement of
his edition. He considered these treatises, taken collectively, to be
not so much a part of philosophy as an _Organon_ or instrument, the
use of which must be acquired by the reader before he became
competent to grasp or comprehend philosophy; as an exposition of
method rather than of doctrine.[2] From the time of Andronikus
downward, the logical treatises have always stood first among the
written or printed works of Aristotle. They have been known under the
collective title of the 'Organon,' and as such it will be convenient
still to regard them.[3]

[Footnote 1: Scholia, p. 25, b. 37, seq. Br.; p. 321, b. 30; Diogen.
L. iii. 62. The order in which the forty-six Aristotelian treatises
stand printed in the Berlin edition, and in other preceding editions,
corresponds to the tripartite division, set forth by Aristotle
himself, of sciences or cognitions generally: 1. Theoretical; [Greek:
theôrêtikai/] 2. Practical; [Greek: praktikai/]. 3. Constructive or
Technical; [Greek: poiêtikai/].

Patricius, in his Discussiones Peripateticæ, published in 1581 (tom.
i. lib. xiii. p. 173), proclaims himself to be the first author who
will undertake to give an account of Aristotle's philosophy _from
Aristotle himself_ (instead of taking it, as others before him had
done, from the Aristotelian expositors, Andronikus, Alexander,
Porphyry, or Averroes); likewise, to be the first author who will
consult _all_ the works of Aristotle, instead of confining himself,
as his predecessors had done, to a select few of the works. Patricius
then proceeds to enumerate those works upon which alone the
professors "in Italicis scholis" lectured, and to which the attention
of all readers was restricted. 1. The Predicabilia, or Eisagoge of
Porphyry. 2. The Categoriæ. 3. The De Interpretatione. 4. The
Analytica Priora; but only the four first chapters of the first book.
5. The Analytica Posteriora; but only a few chapters of the first
book; nothing of the second. 6. The Physica; books first and second;
then parts of the third and fourth; lastly, the eighth book. 7. The
De Coelo; books first and second. 8. The De Generatione et
Corruptione; books first and second. 9. The De Animâ; all the three
books. 10. The Metaphysica; books Alpha major, Alpha minor, third,
sixth, and eleventh. "Idque, quadriennio integro, quadruplicis
ordinis Philosophi perlegunt auditoribus. De reliquis omnibus tot
libris, mirum silentium." Patricius expressly remarks that neither
the Topica nor the De Sophisticis Elenchis was touched in this full
course of four years. But he does not remark--what to a modern reader
will seem more surprising--that neither the Ethica, nor the Politica,
nor the Rhetorica, is included in the course.]

[Footnote 2: Aristot. Topica, i. p. 104, b. 1, with the Scholia of
Alexander, p. 259, a. 48 Br.; Scholia ad Analyt. Prior. p. 140, a.
47, p. 141, a. 25; also Schol. ad Categor. p. 36, a., p. 40, a., 8.
This conception of the Organon is not explicitly announced by
Aristotle, but seems quite in harmony with his views. The
contemptuous terms in which Prantl speaks of it (Gesch. der Logik, i.
136), as a silly innovation of the Stoics, are unwarranted.

Aristotle (Metaph. E. i. p. 1025, b. 26) classifies the sciences as
[Greek: theôrêtikai/, praktikai/, poiêtikai/]; next he subdivides the
first of the three into [Greek: phusikê/, mathêmatikê/, prô/tê
philosophi/a]. Brentano, after remarking that no place in this
distribution is expressly provided for Logic, explains the omission
as follows: "Diese auffallende Erscheinung erklärt sich daraus, dass
diese [the three above-named theoretical sciences] allein das reelle
Sein betrachten, und nach den drei Graden der Abstraktion in ihrer
Betrachtungsweise verschieden, geschieden werden; während die Logik
das bloss rationelle Sein, das [Greek: o(\n ô(s a)lêthe/s],
behandelt." (Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, p.
39.)--Investigations [Greek: peri\ tê=s a)lêthei/as, o(\n tro/pon
dei= a)pode/chesthai] are considered by Aristotle as belonging to
[Greek: ta\ A)naluktika]; enquiries into method in the first
instance, and into doctrine chiefly with a view to method (Metaphys.
[Greek: G]. p. 1005, b. 2. In Metaphys. ]Greek: G]. 1005, b. 7, he
declares that these enquiries into method, or analysis of the
_principia_ of syllogistic reasoning, belong to the Philosophia Prima
(compare Metaphys. Z. 12, p. 1037, b. 8). Schwegler in his Commentary
(p. 161) remarks that this is one of the few passages in which
Aristotle indicates the relation in which Logic stands to
Metaphysics, or First Philosophy. The question has been started among
his [Greek: A)pori/ai] Metaph. B. 2, p. 999, b. 30.]

[Footnote 3: Respecting the title of Organon which was sometimes
applied to the Analytica Posteriora only, see Waitz ad Organ, ii. p.
294.]

These treatises are six in number:--1. Categoriæ;[4] 2. De
Interpretatione, or De Enunciatione; 3. Analytica Priora; 4.
Analytica Posteriora; 5. Topica; 6. De Sophisticis Elenchis. This
last short treatise--De Sophisticis Elenchis--belongs naturally to
the Topica which precedes it, and of which it ought to be ranked as
the ninth or concluding book. Waitz has printed it as such in his
edition of the Organon; but as it has been generally known with a
separate place and title, I shall not depart from the received
understanding.

[Footnote 4: Some eminent critics, Prantl and Bonitz among them,
consider the treatise Categoriæ not to be the work of Aristotle. The
arguments on which this opinion rests are not convincing to me; and
even if they were, the treatise could not be left out of
consideration, since the _doctrine_ of the Ten Categories is
indisputably Aristotelian. See Zeller, Die Phil. der Griech. ii. 2,
pp. 50, 51, 2nd ed.]

Aristotle himself does not announce these six treatises as forming a
distinct aggregate, nor as belonging to one and the same department,
nor as bearing one comprehensive name. We find indeed in the Topica
references to the Analytica, and in the Analytica references to the
Topica. In both of them, the ten Categories are assumed and
presupposed, though the treatise describing them is not expressly
mentioned: to both also, the contents of the treatise De
Interpretatione or Enunciatione, though it is not named, are
indispensable. The affinity and interdependence of the six is
evident, and justifies the practice of the commentators in treating
them as belonging to one and the same department. To that department
there belonged also several other treatises of Aristotle, not now
preserved, but specified in the catalogue of his lost works; and
these his disciple Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Phanias, had before
them. As all these three disciples composed treatises of their own on
the same or similar topics,[5] amplifying, elucidating, or
controverting the views of their master, the Peripatetics immediately
succeeding them must have possessed a copious logical literature, in
which the six treatises now constituting the Organon appeared as
portions, but not as a special aggregate in themselves.

[Footnote 5: Ammonius ap. Schol. p. 28, a. 41; p. 33, b. 27, Br.]

Of the two treatises which stand first in the Aristotelian
Organon--the Categoriæ and the De Interpretatione--each forms in a
certain sense the complement of the other. The treatise De
Interpretatione handles Propositions (combinations of terms in the
way of Subject and Predicate), with prominent reference to the
specific attribute of a Proposition--the being true or false, the
object of belief or disbelief; the treatise Categoriæ deals with
these same Terms (to use Aristotle's own phrase) pronounced without
or apart from such combination. In his definition of the simple
Term, the Proposition is at the same time assumed to be foreknown
as the correlate or antithesis to it.[6]

[Footnote 6: [Greek: Ta\ a)/neu sumplokê=s lego/mena--tô=n kata\
mêdemi/an sumplokê\n legome/nôna] Categ. p. 1, a. 16, b. 25). See
Schol. ad Aristot. Physica, p. 323, b. 25, Br.; and Bonitz ad
Aristotel. Metaph. (A. p. 987) p. 90.

The Categories of Aristotle appear to formed one of the most
prominent topics of the teaching of Themistius: rebutting the charge,
advanced both against himself, and, in earlier days, against Sokrates
and the Sophists, of rendering his pupils presumptuous and conceited,
he asks, [Greek: ê)kou/sate de\ au)= tinos tô=n e)mô=n e)pitêdei/ôn
u(psêlogoume/nou kai\ brenthuome/nou _e)pi\ toi=s sunônu/mois ê)\
o(mônu/moi=s ê)\ parônu/mois_]; (Orat. xxiii. p. 351.)

Reference is made (in the Scholia on the Categoriæ, p. 43, b. 19) to
a classification of names made by Speusippus, which must have been at
least as early as that of Aristotle; perhaps earlier, since
Speusippus died in 339 B.C. We do not hear enough of this to
understand clearly what it was. Boêthus remarked that Aristotle had
omitted to notice some distinctions drawn by Speusippus on this
matter, Schol. p. 43, a. 29. Compare a remark in Aristot. De Coelo,
i. p. 280, b. 2.]

The first distinction pointed out by Aristotle among simple,
uncombined Terms, or the things denoted thereby, is the Homonymous,
the Synonymous, and the Paronymous. _Homonymous_ are those which are
called by the same name, used in a different sense or with a
different definition or rational explanation. _Synonymous_ are those
called by the same name in the same sense. _Paronymous_ are those
called by two names, of which the one is derived from the other by
varying the inflexion or termination.[7]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 1-15.]

We can hardly doubt that it was Aristotle who first gave this
peculiar distinctive meaning to the two words Homonymous and
Synonymous, rendered in modern phraseology (through the Latin)
_Equivocal_ and _Univocal_. Before his time this important
distinction between different terms had no technical name to
designate it. The service rendered to Logic by introducing such a
technical term, and by calling attention to the lax mode of speaking
which it indicated, was great. In every branch of his writings
Aristotle perpetually reverts to it, applying it to new cases, and
especially to those familiar universal words uttered most freely and
frequently, under the common persuasion that their meaning is not
only thoroughly known but constant and uniform. As a general fact,
students are now well acquainted with this source of error, though
the stream of particular errors flowing from it is still abundant,
ever renewed and diversified. But in the time of Aristotle the source
itself had never yet been pointed out emphatically to notice, nor
signalized by any characteristic term as by a beacon. The natural
bias which lead us to suppose that one term always carries one and
the same meaning, was not counteracted by any systematic warning or
generalized expression. Sokrates and Plato did indeed expose many
particular examples of undefined and equivocal phraseology. No part
of the Platonic writings is more valuable than the dialogues in which
this operation is performed, forcing the respondent to feel how
imperfectly he understands the phrases constantly in use. But it is
rarely Plato's practice to furnish generalized positive warnings or
systematic distinctions. He has no general term corresponding to
homonymous or equivocal; and there are even passages where (under the
name of Prodikus) he derides or disparages a careful distinctive
analysis of different significations of the same name. To recognize a
class of equivocal terms and assign thereto a special class-name, was
an important step in logical procedure; and that step, among so many
others, was made by Aristotle.[8]

[Footnote 8: In the instructive commentary of Dexippus on the
Categoriæ (contained in a supposed dialogue between Dexippus and his
pupil Seleukus, of which all that remains has been recently published
by Spengel, Munich, 1859), that commentator defends Aristotle against
some critics who wondered why he began with these Ante-predicaments
([Greek: o(mô/numa, sunô/numa], &c.), instead of proceeding at once
to the Predicaments or Categories themselves. Dexippus remarks that
without understanding this distinction between _equivoca_ and
_univoca_, the Categories themselves could not be properly
appreciated; for Ens--[Greek: to\ o)\n]--is homonymous in reference
to all the Categories, and not a Summum Genus, comprehending the
Categories as distinct species under it; while each Category is a
Genus in reference to its particulars. Moreover, Dexippus observes
that this distinction of homonyms and synonyms was altogether unknown
and never self-suggested to the ordinary mind ([Greek: o(/sôn ga\r
e)/nnoian ou)k e)/chomen, tou/tôn pro/lêpsin ou)k e)/chomen], p. 20),
and therefore required to be brought out first of all at the
beginning; whereas the Post-predicaments (to which we shall come
later on) were postponed to the end, because they were cases of
familiar terms loosely employed, (See Spengel, Dexipp. pp. 19, 20,
21.)]

Though Aristotle has professed to distinguish between terms
implicated in predication, and terms not so implicated,[9] yet when
he comes to explain the functions of the latter class, he considers
them in reference to their functions as constituent members of
propositions. He immediately begins by distinguishing four sorts of
matters (_Entia_): That which is affirmable of a Subject, but is not
in a Subject; That which is in a Subject, but is not affirmable of a
Subject; That which is both in a Subject, and affirmable of a
Subject; That which is neither in a Subject, nor affirmable of a
Subject.[10]

[Footnote 9: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 16. [Greek: tô=n legome/nôn
ta\ me\n kata\ sumplokê\n le/getai, ta\ d' a)/neu sumplokê=s; ta\
me\n ou)=n kata\ sumplokê\n oi(=on a)/nthrôpos tre/chei, a)/nthrôpos
nika=|; ta\ d' a)/neu sumplokê=s oi)=on a)/nthrôpos, bou=s, tre/chei,
nika=|.]

It will be seen that the meaning and function of the single word can
only explained relatively to the complete proposition, which must be
assumed as foreknown. That which Aristotle discriminates in this
treatise, in the phrases--[Greek: le/gesthai kata\ sumplokê\n] and
[Greek: le/gesthai a)/neu sumplokê=s] is equivalent to what we read
in the De Interpretatione (p. 16, b. 27, p. 17, a. 17) differently
expressed, [Greek: phônê\ sêmantikê\ ô(s kata/phasis] and [Greek:
phônê\ sêmantikê\ ô(s pha/sis].]

[Footnote 10: Aristot. Categor. p. 1, a. 20.]

This fundamental quadruple distinction of _Entia_, which serves as an
introduction to the ten Categories or Predicaments, belongs to words
altogether according to their relative places or functions in the
proposition; the meanings of the words being classified accordingly.
That the learner may understand it, he ought properly to be master of
the first part of the treatise De Interpretatione, wherein the
constituent elements of a proposition are explained: so intimate is
the connection between that treatise and this.

The classification applies to _Entia_ (Things or Matters)
universally, and is thus a first step in Ontology. He here looks at
Ontology in one of its several diverse aspects--as it enters into
predication, and furnishes the material for Subjects and Predicates,
the constituent members of a proposition.

Ontology, or the Science of _Ens quatenus Ens_, occupies an important
place in Aristotle's scientific programme; bearing usually the title
of First Philosophy, sometimes Theology, though never (in his works)
the more modern title of Metaphysica. He describes it as the
universal and comprehensive Science, to which all other sciences are
related as parts or fractions. Ontology deals with _Ens_ in its
widest sense, as an _Unum_ not generic but analogical--distinguishing
the derivative varieties into which it may be distributed, and
setting out the attributes and accompaniments of _Essentia_
universally; while other sciences, such as Geometry, Astronomy, &c.,
confine themselves to distinct branches of that whole;[11] each
having its own separate class of _Entia_ for special and exclusive
study. This is the characteristic distinction of Ontology, as
Aristotle conceives it; he does not set it in antithesis to
Phenomenology, according to the distinction that has become current
among modern metaphysicians.

[Footnote 11: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 21, 25-33,
E. p. 1025, b. 8. [Greek: e)/stin e)pistê/mê tis ê)\ theôrei= to\
o)\n ê(=| o)\n kai\ ta\ tou/tô| u(pa/rchonta kath' au(to/; au(/tê d'
e)sti\n ou)demia=| tô=n a)/llôn e)piskopei= _katho/lou peri\ tou=
o)/ntos ê(=| o(/n, a)lla\ me/ros au)tou= ti a)potemo/menai peri\
tou/tou theôrou=si to\ sumbebêko/s], &c. Compare p. 1005, a. 2-14.]

Now _Ens_ (or _Entia_), in the doctrine of Aristotle, is not a
synonymous or univocal word, but an homonymous or equivocal word; or,
rather, it is something between the two, being equivocal, with a
certain qualification. Though not a _Summum Genus_, _i.e._ not
manifesting throughout all its particulars generic unity, nor
divisible into species by the addition of well-marked essential
_differentiæ_, it is an analogical aggregate, or a _Summum Analogon_,
comprehending under it many subordinates which bear the same name
from being all related in some way or other to a common root or
_fundamentum_, the relationship being both diverse in kind and nearer
or more distant in degree. The word _Ens_ is thus homonymous, yet in
a qualified sense. While it is not univocal, it is at the same time
not absolutely equivocal. It is _multivocal_ (if we may coin such a
word), having many meanings held together by a multifarious and
graduated relationship to one common _fundamentum_.[12] _Ens_ (or
_Entia_), in this widest sense, is the theme of Ontology or First
Philosophy, and is looked at by Aristotle in four different principal
aspects.[13]

[Footnote 12: Simplikius speaks of these Analoga as [Greek: to\
me/son tô=n te sunônu/môn kai\ tô=n o(mônu/môn, to\ a)ph' e(no/s],
&c. Schol. ad Categor. p. 69, b. 29, Brand. See also Metaphys. Z. p.
1030, a. 34.

Dexippus does not recognize, formally and under a distinct title,
this intermediate stage between [Greek: sunô/numa] and [Greek:
o(mô/numa]. He states that Aristotle considered Ens as [Greek:
o(mô/numon], while other philosophers considered it as [Greek:
sunô/numon] (Dexippus, p. 26, book i. sect. 19, ed. Spengel). But he
intimates that the ten general heads called Categories have a certain
continuity and interdependence ([Greek: sune/cheian kai\
a)llêlouchi/an]) each with the others, branching out from [Greek:
ou)si/a] in ramifications more or less straggling (p. 48, book ii.
sects. 1, 2, Spengel). The list (he says, p. 47) does not depend upon
[Greek: diai/resis] (generic division), nor yet is it simple
enumeration ([Greek: a)pari/thmêsis] of incoherent items. In the
Physica, vii. 4, p. 249, a. 23, Aristotle observes: [Greek: ei)si\
de\ tô=n o(mônumiôn ai( me\n polu\ a)pe/chousi ai( de\ e)/chousai/
tina o(moio/têta, ai( d' e)ggu\s ê)\ ge/nei ê)\ a)nalogi/a|, dio\ ou)
dokou=sin o(mônumi/ai ei)=nai ou)=sai.]]

[Footnote 13: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 7, E. p.
1025, a. 34, p. 1026, a. 33, b. 4; upon which last passage see the
note of Bonitz.]

1. [Greek: To\ o)\n kata\ sumbebêko/s]--_Ens per Accidens_--_Ens_
accidental, or rather concomitant, either as rare and exceptional
attribute to a subject, or along with some other accident in the same
common subject.

2. [Greek: To\ o)\n ô(s a)lêthe/s, kai\ to\ mê\ o)\n ô(s
pseu=dos]--_Ens_, in the sense /of Truth, _Non-Ens_, in the sense of
Falsehood. This is the _Ens_ of the Proposition; a true affirmation
or denial falls under _Ens_ in this mode, when the mental conjunction
of terms agrees with reality; a false affirmation or denial, where no
such agreement exists, falls under _Non-Ens_.[14]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. Metaph. E. 4, p. 1027, b. 18,--p. 1028, a. 4.
[Greek: ou) ga\r e)sti to\ pseu=dos kai\ to\ a)lêthe\s e)n toi=s
pra/gmasin--a)ll' e)n dianoi/a|--ou)k e)/xô dêlou=sin ou)=sa/n tina
phu/sin tou= o)/ntos.] Also [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 1: [Greek:
to\ kuriô/tata o)\n a)lêthes kai\ pseu=dos]. In a Scholion, Alexander
remarks: [Greek: to\ de\ ô(s a)lêthô=s o)\n pa/thos e)sti\ kai\
bou/lêma dianoi/as, to\ de\ zêtei=n to\ e(ka/stô| dokou=n ou)
spho/dra a)nagkai=on.]]

3. [Greek: To\ o)\n duna/mei kai\ to\ o)\n e)nergei/a|]--_Ens_,
potential, actual.

4. [Greek: To\ o)\n kata\ ta\ schê/mata tô=n katêgoriô=n]--_Ens_,
according to the ten varieties of the Categories, to be presently
explained.

These four are the principal aspects under which Aristotle looks at
the aggregate comprised by the equivocal or multivocal word _Entia_.
In all the four branches, the varieties comprised are not species
under a common genus, correlating, either as co-ordinate or
subordinate, one to the other; they are _analoga_, all having
relationship with a common term, but having no other necessary
relationship with each other. Aristotle does not mean that these four
modes of distributing this vast aggregate, are the only modes
possible; for he himself sometimes alludes to other modes of
distributions.[15] Nor would he maintain that the four distributions
were completely distinguished from each other, so that the same
subordinate fractions are not comprehended in any two; for on the
contrary, the branches overlap each other and coincide to a great
degree, especially the first and fourth. But he considers the four as
discriminating certain distinct aspects of _Entia_ or _Entitas_, more
important than any other aspects thereof that could be pointed out,
and as affording thus the best basis and commencement for the Science
called Ontology.

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: G]. p. 1003, a. 33, b. 10.
Compare the able treatise of Brentano, "Ueber die Bedeutung des
Seienden nach Aristoteles," pp. 6, 7.]

Of these four heads, however, the first and second are rapidly
dismissed by Aristotle in the Metaphysica,[16] being conceived as
having little reference to real essence, and therefore belonging more
to Logic than to Ontology; _i.e._ to the subjective processes of
naming, predicating, believing, and inferring rather than to the
objective world of Perceivables and Cogitables.[17] It is the third
and fourth that are treated in the Metaphysica; while it is the
fourth only (_Ens_ according to the ten figures of the Categories)
which is set forth and elucidated in this first treatise of the
Organon, where Aristotle appears to blend Logic and Ontology into
one.

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1027, b. 16, p. 1028. a. 6.]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 10, p. 1051, b. 2-15,
with Schwegler's Comment, p. 186. This is the distinction drawn by
Simplikius (Schol. ad Categ. p. 76, b. 47) between the Organon and
the Metaphysica: [Greek: Ai( ga\r a)rchai\ kata\ me\n tê/n
sêmantikê\n au)tô=n le/xin e)n tê=| logikê=| pragmatei/a| dêlou=ntai,
kata\ de\ ta\ sêmaino/mena e)n tê=| Meta\ ta\ Phusika\ oi)kei/ôs.]

[Greek: Ta\ o)/nta] are equivalent to [Greek: ta\ lego/mena], in this
and the other logical treatises of Aristotle. Categ. p. 1, a. 16-20,
b. 25; Analyt. Prior. i. p. 43, a. 25.

This is the logical aspect of Ontology; that is, Entia are considered
as Objects to be named, and to serve as Subjects or Predicates for
propositions: every such term having a fixed denotation, and (with
the exception of proper names) a fixed connotation, known to speakers
and hearers.

[Greek: Ta\ lego/mena] (or Entia considered in this aspect) are
distinguished by Aristotle into two classes: 1. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena
_kata\ sumplokê/n_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos tre/chei, a)/nthropos nika=|.]
2. [Greek: Ta\ lego/mena _a)/neu sumplokê=s_] (or [Greek: kata\
mêdemi/an sumplokê/n]) [Greek: oi(=on a)/nthrôpos, bou=s, tre/chei,
nika=|.]

We are to observe here, that in Logic the Proposition or Enunciation
is the Prius Naturâ, which must be presupposed as known before we can
understand what the separate terms are (Analytic. Prior. i. p. 24, a.
16): just as the right angle must be understood before we can explain
what is an acute or an obtuse angle (to use an illustration of
Aristotle; see Metaphys. Z. p. 1035, b. 7). We must understand the
entire logical act, called Affirming or Denying, before we can
understand the functions of the two factors or correlates with which
that act is performed. Aristotle defines the Term by means of the
Proposition, [Greek: o(/ron de\ kalô= ei) o)\n dialu/etai ê(
pro/tasis] (Anal. Pr. i. 24, b. 16).

[Greek: Ta\ lego/mena], as here used by Aristotle, coincides in
meaning with what the Stoics afterwards called [Greek: Ta\
lekta/]--of two classes: 1. [Greek: _lekta\ au)totelê=_], one branch
of which, [Greek: ta\ a)xiô/mata], are equivalent to the Aristotelian
[Greek: ta\ kata\ sumplokê\n lego/mena]. 2. [Greek: _lekta\
e)llipê=_], equivalent to [Greek: ta\ a)/neu sumplokê=s lego/mena]
(Diogen. Laert. vii. 43, 44, 63, 64; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat. viii.
69, 70, 74): equivalent also, seemingly, to [Greek: ta\ dianoêta\] in
Aristotle: [Greek: o( dianoêto\s A)ristome/nês] (Anal. Pr. I. p. 47,
b. 22).

Hobbes observes (Computation or Logic, part i. 2, 5): "Nor is it at
all necessary that every name should be the name of something. For as
these, _a man_, _a tree_, _a stone_, are the names of the things
themselves, so the images of a man, of a tree, of a stone, which are
represented to men sleeping, have their names also, though they be
not things, but only fictions and phantasms of things. For we can
remember these; and therefore it is no less necessary that they have
names to mark and signify them, than the things themselves. Also this
word _future_ is a name; but no future thing has yet any being.
Moreover, that which neither is, nor has been, nor ever shall or ever
can be, has a name--_impossible_. To conclude, this word _nothing_ is
a name, which yet cannot be name of any thing; for when we subtract
two and three from five, and, so nothing remaining, we would call
that subtraction to mind, this speech _nothing remains_, and in it
the word _nothing_, is not unuseful. And for the same reason we say
truly, _less than nothing_ remains, when we subtract more from less;
for the mind feigns such remains as these for doctrine's sake, and
desires, as often as is necessary, to call the same to memory. But
seeing every name has some relation to that which is named, though
that which we name be not always a thing that has a being in nature,
yet is lawful for doctrine's sake to apply the word _thing_ to
whatsoever we name; as it were all one whether that thing truly
existent, or be only feigned."

The Greek neuter gender ([Greek: to\ lego/menon] or [Greek: to\
lekto/n, ta\ lego/mena] or [Greek: ta\ lekta/]) covers all that
Hobbes here includes under the word _thing_.--Scholia ad Aristot.
Physic. I. i. p. 323, a. 21, Brand.: [Greek: o)noma/zontai me\n kai\
ta\ mê\ o)/nta, o(ri/zontai de\ mo/na ta\ o)/nta.]]

Of this mixed character, partly logical, partly ontological, is the
first distinction set forth in the Categoriæ--the distinction between
matters _predicated of_ a Subject, and matters which are _in_ a
Subject--the Subject itself being assumed as the _fundamentum_
correlative to both of them. The definition given of that which is
_in_ a Subject is ontological: viz., "_In_ a Subject, I call that
which is in anything, not as a part, yet so that it cannot exist
separately from that in which it is."[18] By these two negative
characteristics, without any mark positive, does Aristotle define
what is meant by being _in_ a Subject. Modern logicians, and Hobbes
among them, can find no better definition for an Accident; though
Hobbes remarks truly, that Accident cannot be properly defined, but
must be elucidated by examples.[19]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. Categ. p. 1, a. 24.]

[Footnote 19: Hobbes, Computation or Logic, part i. 3, 3, i. 6, 2,
ii. 8, 2-3.]

The distinction here drawn by Aristotle between being _predicated of_
a Subject, and being in a Subject, coincides with that between
essential and non-essential predication: all the predicates
(including the _differentia_) which belong to the essence, fall under
the first division;[20] all those which do not belong to the essence,
under the latter. The Subjects--what Aristotle calls the First
Essences or Substances, those which are essences or substances in the
fullest and strictest meaning of the word--are concrete individual
things or persons; such as Sokrates, this man, that horse or tree.
These are never employed as predicates at all (except by a distorted
and unnatural structure of the proposition, which Aristotle indicates
as possible, but declines to take into account); they are always
Subjects of different predicates, and are, in the last analysis, the
Subjects of all predicates. But besides these First Essences, there
are also Second Essences--Species and Genus, which stand to the first
Essence in the relation of predicates to a Subject, and to the other
Categories in the relation of Subjects to predicates.[21] These
Second Essences are less of Essences than the First, which alone is
an Essence in the fullest and most appropriate sense. Among the
Second Essences, Species is more of an Essence than Genus, because it
belongs more closely and specially to the First Essence; while Genus
is farther removed from it. Aristotle thus recognizes a graduation of
_more or less_ in Essence; the individual is more Essence, or more
complete as an Essence, than the Species, the Species more than the
Genus. As he recognizes a First Essence, _i.e._ an individual object
(such as Sokrates, this horse, &c.), so he also recognizes an
individual accident (this particular white colour, that particular
grammatical knowledge) which is _in_ a Subject, but is not
_predicated of_ a Subject; this particular white colour exists _in_
some given body, but is not _predicable of_ any body.[22]

[Footnote 20: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, a. 20. It appears that Andronikus
did not draw the line between these two classes of predicates in same
manner as Aristotle: he included many non-essential predicates in
[Greek: ta\ kath' u(pokeime/nou]. See Simplikius, ad Categorias,
Basil. 1551, fol. 13, 21, B. Nor was either Alexander or Porphyry
careful to observe the distinction between the two classes. See
Schol. ad Metaphys. p. 701. b. 23, Br.; Schol. ad De Interpret. p.
106, a. 29, Br. And when Aristotle says, Analyt. Prior. i. p. 24, b.
26, [Greek: to\ de\ e)n o(/lô| ei)nai e(/teron e(te/rô|, kai\ to\
kata\ panto\s katêgorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron, tau)to/n e)stin],
he seems himself to forget the distinction entirely.]

[Footnote 21: Categor. p. 2, a. 15, seq. In Aristotle phraseology it
is not said that Second Essences are contained in First Essences, but
that First Essences are contained in Second Essences, _i.e._ in the
species which Second Essences signify. See the Scholion to p. 3, a.
9, in Waitz, vol. i. p. 32.]

[Footnote 22: Arist. Categ. p. 1, a. 26; b. 7: [Greek: A)nplô=s de\
ta\ a)/toma kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| kat' ou)deno\s u(pokeime/nou
le/getai, e)n u(pokeime/nô| de\ e(/nia ou)de\n kôlu/ei ei)=nai; ê(
ga/r tis grammatikê\ tô=n e)n u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n.] Aristotle here
recognizes an attribute as "individual and as numerically one;" and
various other logicians have followed him. But is it correct to say,
that an attribute, when it cannot be farther divided specifically,
and is thus the lowest in its own predicamental series, is _Unum
Numero_? The attribute may belong to an indefinite number of
different objects; and can we count it as _One_, in the same sense in
which we count each of these objects as _One_? I doubt whether _Unum
Numero_ be applicable to attributes. Aristotle declares that the
[Greek: deute/ra ou)si/a] is not _Unum Numero_ like the [Greek:
prô/tê ou)si/a--ou) ga\r e)n e)sti to\ u(pokei/menon Ô(/sper ê(
prô/tê ou)si/a, a)lla\ kata\ pollô=n o( a)/nthrôpos le/getai kai\ to\
zô=|on (Categ. p. 3, b. 16). Upon the same principle, I think, he
ought to declare that the attribute is not _Unum Numero_; for though
it is not (in his language) _predicable of_ many Subjects, yet it is
_in_ many Subjects. It cannot correctly be called _Unum Numero_,
according to the explanation which he gives of that phrase in two
passages of the Metaphysica, B. p. 999, b. 33; [Greek: D]. p. 1016,
b. 32: [Greek: a)rithmô=| me\n ô(=n ê( u(/lê mi/a], &c.]

Respecting the logical distinction, which Aristotle places in the
commencement of this treatise on the Categories--between predicates
which are _affirmed of_ a Subject, and predicates which are _in_ a
Subject[23]--we may remark that it turns altogether upon the name by
which you describe the predicate. Thus he tells us that the Species
and Genus (man, animal), and the Differentia (rational), may be
_predicated of_ Sokrates, but are not _in_ Sokrates; while knowledge
is _in_ Sokrates, but cannot be _predicated of_ Sokrates; and may be
_predicated of_ grammar, but is not _in_ grammar. But if we look at
this comparison, we shall see that in the last-mentioned example, the
predicate is described by an abstract word (knowledge); while in the
preceding examples it is described by a concrete word (man, animal,
rational).[24] If, in place of these three last words, we substitute
the abstract words corresponding to them--humanity, animality,
rationality--we shall have to say that these are _in_ Sokrates,
though they cannot (in their abstract form) be _predicated of_
Sokrates, but only in the form of their concrete paronyms, which
Aristotle treats as a distinct predication. So if, instead of the
abstract word knowledge, we employ the concrete word knowing or wise,
we can no longer say that this is _in_ Sokrates, and that it may be
_predicated of_ grammar. Abstract alone can be _predicated of_
abstract; concrete alone can be _predicated of_ concrete; if we
describe the relation between Abstract and Concrete, we must say, The
Abstract is _in_ the Concrete--the Concrete contains or embodies the
Abstract. Indeed we find Aristotle referring the same predicate, when
described by the abstract name, to one Category; and when described
by the concrete paronymous adjective, to another and different
Category.[25] The names Concrete and Abstract were not in the
philosophical vocabulary of his day. In this passage of the
Categoriæ, he establishes a distinction between predicates essential
and predicates non-essential; the latter he here declares to be _in_
the Subject, the former not to be in it, but to be _co-efficients of_
its essence. But we shall find that he does not adhere to this
distinction even throughout the present treatise, still less in other
works. It seems to be a point of difference between the Categoriæ on
one side, and the Physica and Metaphysica on the other, that in the
Categoriæ he is more disposed to found supposed real distinctions on
verbal etiquette, and on precise adherence to the syntactical
structure of a proposition.[26]

[Footnote 23: The distinction is expressed by Ammonius (Schol. p. 51,
b. 46) as follows:--[Greek: ai( prô=tai ou)si/ai u(pokeu=ntai pa=sin,
a)ll' ou)ch o(moi/ôs; toi=s me\n ga\r _pro\s u(/parxin_, tou/testi
toi=s sumbebêko/sin, toi=s de\ _pro\s katêgori/an_, tou/testi tai=s
katho/lou ou)si/ais.]]

[Footnote 24: Ueberweg makes a remark similar to this.--System der
Logik, sect. 56, note, p. 110, ed. second.]

[Footnote 25: The difference of opinion as to the proper mode of
describing the Differentia--whether by the concrete word [Greek:
pezo\n], or by the abstract [Greek: pezo/tês]--gives occasion to an
objection against Aristotle's view, and to a reply from Dexippus not
very conclusive (Dexippus, book ii. s. 22, pp. 60, 61, ed. Spengel).]

[Footnote 26: Categor. p. 3, a. 3. In the Physica, iv. p. 210, a.
14-30, Aristotle enumerates nine different senses of the phrase
[Greek: e(/n tini]. His own use of the phrase is not always uniform
or consistent. If we compare the Scholia on the Categoriæ, pp. 44, 45,
53, 58, 59, Br., with the Scholia on the Physica, pp. 372, 373, Br.,
we shall see that the Commentators were somewhat embarrassed by his
fluctuation. The doctrine of the Categoriæ was found especially
difficult in its application to the Differentia.

In Analyt. Post. i. p. 83, a. 30, Aristotle says, [Greek: o(/sa de\
mê\ ou)si/an sêmai/nei, dei= kata/ tinos u(pokeime/nou
katêgorei=sthai], which is at variance with the language of the
Categoriæ, as the Scholiast remarks, p. 228, a. 33. The like may be
said about Metaphys. B. p. 1001, b. 29; [Greek: D]. p. 1017, b. 13.
See the Scholia of Alexander, p. 701, b. 25, Br.

See also De Gener. et Corrupt. p. 319, b. 8; Physic. i. p. 185, a.
31: [Greek: ou)the\n ga\r tô=n a)/llôn chôristo/n e)sti para\ tê\n
ou)si/an; pa/nta ga\r kath' u(pokeime/nou tê=s ou)si/as le/getai],
where Simplikius remarks that the phrase is used [Greek: a)nti\ tou=
e)n u(pokeime/nô|] (Schol. p. 328, b. 43).]

Lastly, Aristotle here makes one important observation respecting
those predicates which he describes as (not _in a Subject_ but)
_affirmed_ or _denied of_ a Subject--_i.e._ the essential predicates.
In these (he says) whatever predicate can be truly affirmed or denied
of the predicate, the same can be truly affirmed or denied of the
Subject.[27] This observation deserves notice, because it is in fact
a brief but distinct announcement of his main theory of the
Syllogism; which theory he afterwards expands in the Analytica
Priora, and traces into its varieties and ramifications.

[Footnote 27: Categor. p. 1, b. 10-15.]

After such preliminaries, Aristotle proceeds[28] to give the
enumeration of his Ten Categories or Predicaments; under one or other
of which, every subject or predicate, considered as capable of
entering into a proposition, must belong: 1. _Essence_ or
_Substance_; such as, man, horse. 2. _How much_ or _Quantity_; such
as, two cubits long, three cubits long. 3. _What manner of_ or
_Quality_; such as, white, erudite. 4. _Ad aliquid_--_To something_
or _Relation_; such as, double, half, greater. 5. _Where_; such as,
in the market-place, in the Lykeium. 6. _When_; such as, yesterday,
last year. 7. _In what posture_; such as, he stands up, he is sitting
down. 8. _To have_; such as, to be shod, to be armed. 9. _Activity_;
such as, he is cutting, he is turning. 10. _Passivity_; such as, he
is being cut, he is being burned.

[Footnote 28: Ibid. p. 1, b. 25, seq.]

_Ens_ in its complete state--concrete, individual, determinate--
includes an embodiment of all these ten Categories; the First _Ens_
being the Subject of which the rest are predicates. Whatever question
be asked respecting any individual Subject, the information given in
the answer must fall, according to Aristotle, under one or more of
these ten general heads; while the full outfit of the individual will
comprise some predicate under each of them. Moreover, each of the ten
is a _Generalissimum_; having more or fewer species contained under
it, but not being itself contained under any larger genus (_Ens_ not
being a genus) So that Aristotle does not attempt to define or
describe any one of the ten; his only way of explaining is by citing
two or three illustrative examples of each. Some of the ten are even
of wider extent than _Summa Genera_; thus, Quality cannot be
considered as a true genus, comprehending generically all the cases
falling under it. It is a _Summum Analogon_, reaching beyond the
comprehension of a genus; an analogous or multivocal name, applied to
many cases vaguely and remotely akin to each other.[29] And again the
same particular predicate may be ranked both under Quality and under
Relation; it need not belong exclusively to either one of them.[30]
Moreover, Good, like _Ens_ or _Unum_, is common to all the
Categories, but is differently represented in each.[31]

[Footnote 29: Aristot. Categor. p. 8, b. 26. [Greek: e)/sti de\ ê(
poio/tês tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn], &c.

See the Scholia, p. 68, b. 69 a., Brandis. Ammonius gives the true
explanation of this phrase, [Greek: tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn] (p.
69, b. 7). Alexander and Simplikius try to make out that it implies
here a [Greek: sunô/nomon].]

[Footnote 30: Aristot. Categor. p. 11, a. 37. Compare the Scholion of
Dexippus, p. 48, a. 28-37.]

[Footnote 31: Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 25; Ethic.
Eudem. i. p. 1217, b. 25.]

Aristotle comments at considerable length upon the four first of the
ten Categories. 1. Essence or Substance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4.
Relation. As to the six last, he says little upon any of them; upon
some, nothing at all.

His decuple partition of _Entia_ or _Enunciata_ is founded entirely
upon a logical principle. He looks at them in their relation to
Propositions; and his ten classes discriminate the relation which
they bear to each other as parts or constituent elements of a
proposition. Aristotle takes his departure, not from any results of
scientific research, but from common speech; and from the dialectic,
frequent in his time, which debated about matters of common life and
talk, about received and current opinions.[32] We may presume him to
have studied and compared a variety of current propositions, so as to
discover what were the different relations in which Subjects and
Predicates did stand or could stand to each other; also the various
questions which might be put respecting any given subject, with the
answers suitable to be returned.[33]

[Footnote 32: Waitz, ad Aristot. Categor. p. 284: "Id Categoriis non
de ipsâ rerum natura et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales
apparent in communi vita homini philosophia non imbuto, unde fit, ut
in Categoriis alia sit [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] et in prima
philosophia: illa enim partes habet, hæc vero non componitor ex
partibus."

Compare Metaphys. Z. p. 1032, b. 2, and the [Greek: a)pori/a] in Z.
p. 1029, a., p. 1037, a. 28.

The different meaning of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ and
in the Metaphysica, is connected with various difficulties and
seeming discrepancies in the Aristotelian theory of cognition, which
I shall advert to in a future chapter. See Zeller, Philos. der
Griech. ii. 2, pp. 234, 262; Heyder, Aristotelische und Hegelsche
Dialektik, p. 141, seq.]

[Footnote 33: Thus he frequently supposes a question put, an answer
given, and the proper mode of answering. Categor. p. 2, b. 8: [Greek:
e)a\n ga\r a)podidô=| tis tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an ti/ e)sti,
gnôrimô/teron kai\ oi)keio/teron a)podô/sei], &c.; also ibid. p. 2,
b. 32; p. 3, a. 4, 20.]

Aristotle ranks as his first and fundamental Category Substance or
Essence--[Greek: Ou)si/a]; the abstract substantive word
corresponding to [Greek: To\ o)/n]; which last is the vast aggregate,
not generically One but only analogically One, destined to be
distributed among the ten Categories as _Summa Genera_. The First
_Ens_ or First Essence--that which is _Ens_ in the fullest sense--is
the _individual_ concrete person or thing in nature; Sokrates,
Bukephalus, this man, that horse, that oak-tree, &c. This First _Ens_
is indispensable as Subject or _Substratum_ for all the other
Categories, and even for predication generally. It is a Subject only;
it never appears as a predicate of anything else. As _Hic Aliquis_ or
_Hoc Aliquid_, it lies at the bottom (either expressed or implied) of
all the work of predication. It is _Ens_ or Essence most of all, _par
excellence_; and is so absolutely indispensable, that if all First
_Entia_ were supposed to be removed, neither Second _Entia_ nor any
of the other Categories could exist.[34]

[Footnote 34: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, a. 11, b. 6. [Greek: Ou)si/a ê(
kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê--mê\ ou)sô=n ou)=n
tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n, a)du/naton tô=n a)/llôn ti ei)=nai.]]

The Species is recognized by Aristotle as a Second _Ens_ or Essence,
in which these First Essences reside; it is less (has less completely
the character) of Essence than the First, to which it serves as
Predicate. The Genus is (strictly speaking) a Third Essence,[35] in
which both the First and the Second Essence are included; it is
farther removed than the Species from the First Essence, and has
therefore still less of the character of Essence. It stands as
predicate both to the First and to the Second Essence. While the
First Essence is more Essence than the Second, and the Second more
than the Third, all the varieties of the First Essence are in this
respect upon an equal footing with each other. This man, this horse,
that tree, &c., are all Essence, equally and alike.[36] The First
Essence admits of much variety, but does not admit graduation, or
degrees of more or less.

[Footnote 35: Aristotle here, in the Categoriæ, ranks Genus and
Species as being, both of them, [Greek: deu/terai ou)si/ai]. Yet
since he admits Genus to be farther removed from [Greek: prô/tê
ou)si/a] than Species is, he ought rather to have called Genus a
Third Essence. In the Metaphysica he recognizes a gradation or
ordination of [Greek: ou)si/a] into First, Second, and Third, founded
upon a totally different principle: the Concrete, which in the
Categoriæ ranks as [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], ranks as [Greek: tri/tê
ou)si/a] in the Metaphysica. See Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. p. 1043. a.
18-28.]

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 20; p. 3, b. 35.

Nothing else except Genera and Species can be called Second Essences,
or said to belong to the Category Essence; for they alone declare
what the First Essence is. If you are asked respecting Sokrates,
_What_ he _is_? and if you answer by stating the Species or the Genus
to which he belongs--that he is a man or an animal--your answer will
be appropriate to the question; and it will be more fully understood
if you state the Species than if you state the Genus. But if you
answer by stating what belongs to any of the other Categories (viz.,
that he is white, that he is running), your answer will be
inappropriate, and foreign to the question; it will not declare
_what_ Sokrates _is_.[37] Accordingly, none of these other Categories
can be called Essences. All of them rank as predicates both of First
and of Second Essence; just as Second Essences rank as predicates of
First Essences.[38]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. p. 2, b. 29-37. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\ ta\s
prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê
deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na ga\r dêloi= tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an
tô=n katêgoroume/nôn. to\n ga/r tina a)/nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis
ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\ ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs
a)podô/sei_, kai\ gnôrimô/teron poiê/sei a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on
a)podidou/s; tô=n de\ a)/llôn o(/, ti a)\n a)podidô=| tis,
_a)llotri/ôs e)/stai a)podedôkô/s_, oi(=on leuko/n ê)\ tre/chei ê)\
o(tiou=n tô=n toiou/tôn a)podidou/s. Ô(/ste ei)ko/tôs tô=n a)/llôn
tau=ta mo/na ou)si/ai le/gontai.]]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. p. 3, a. 2.]

Essence or Substance is not _in_ a Subject; neither First nor Second
Essence. The First Essence is neither _in_ a Subject nor _predicated
of_ a Subject; the Second Essences are not _in_ the First, but are
_predicated of_ the First. Both the Second Essence, and the
definition of the word describing it, may be _predicated of_ the
First; that is, the predication is synonymous or univocal; whereas,
of that which is _in_ a Subject, the name may often be predicated,
but never the definition of the name. What is true of the Second
Essence, is true also of the Differentia; that it is not _in_ a
Subject, but that it may be _predicated_ univocally _of_ a Subject--
not only its name, but also the definition of its name.[39]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. p. 3, a. 7, 21, 34. [Greek: koino\n de\ kata\
pa/sês ou)si/as to\ mê\ e)n u(pokeime/nô| ei)=nai--ou)k i)/dion de\
tê=s tou=to ou)si/as, a)lla\ kai\ ê( diaphora\ tô=n mê\ e)n
u(pokeime/nô| e)sti/n--u(pa/rchei de\ tai=s ou)si/ais kai\ tai\s
diaphorai=s to\ pa/nta sunônu/môs a)p' au)tô=n le/gesthai.]]

All Essence or Substance seems to signify _Hoc Aliquid Unum Numero_.
The First Essence really does so signify, but the Second Essence does
not really so signify: it only seems to do so, because it is
enunciated by a substantive name, like the First.[40] It signifies
really _Tale Aliquid_, answering to the enquiry _Quale Quid_? for it
is said not merely of one thing numerically, but of many things each
numerically one. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn. The
Second Essence does not (like the Accident, such as white) signify
_Tale Aliquid_ simply and absolutely, or that and nothing more. It
signifies _Talem Aliquam Essentiam_; it declares what the Essence is,
or marks off the characteristic feature of various First Essences,
each _Unum Numero_. The Genus marks off a greater number of such than
the Species.[41]

[Footnote 40: Aristot. Categ. p. 3, b. 10-16: [Greek: Pa=sa de\
ou)si/a _dokei=_ to/de ti sêmai/nein. e)pi\ me\n ou)=n tô=n prô/tôn
ou)siô=n a)namphisbê/têton kai\ a)lêthe/s e)stin o(/ti to/de ti
sêmai/nei; a)/tomon ga\r kai\ e(\n a)rithmô=| to\ dêlou/meno/n
e)stin; e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn ou)siô=n _phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs
tô=| schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as to/de ti sêmai/nein_, o(/tan ei)/pê|
a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, _ou) mê\n a)lêthe/s ge_, a)lla\ ma=llon
poio/n ti sêmai/nei.]]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 3, b. 18-24.]

Again, Essences have no contraries.[42] But this is not peculiar to
Essences, for _Quanta_ also have no contraries; there is nothing
contrary to ten, or to that which is two cubits long. Nor is any one
of the varieties of First Essence more or less Essence than any other
variety. An individual man is as much Essence as an individual horse,
neither more nor less. Nor is he at one time more a man than he was
at another time; though he may become more or less white, more or
less handsome.[43]

[Footnote 42: Ibid. b. 24-30.]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. b. 34, seq.]

But that which is most peculiar to Essence, is, that while remaining
_Unum et Idem Numero_, it is capable by change in itself of receiving
alternately contrary Accidents. This is true of no other Category.
For example, this particular colour, being one and the same in
number, will never be now black, and then white; this particular
action, being one and the same in number, will not be at one time
virtuous, at another time vicious. The like is true respecting all
the other Categories. But one and the same man will be now white,
hot, virtuous; at another time, he will be black, cold, vicious. An
objector may say that this is true, not merely of Essence, but also
of Discourse and of Opinion; each of which (he will urge) remains
_Unum Numero_, but is nevertheless recipient of contrary attributes;
for the proposition or assertion, Sokrates is sitting, may now be
true and may presently become false. But this case is different,
because there is no change in the proposition itself, but in the
person or thing to which the proposition refers; while one and the
same man, by new affections in himself, is now healthy, then sick;
now hot, then cold.[44]

[Footnote 44: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10-b. 20.]

Here Aristotle concludes his first Category or Predicament--Essence
or Substance. He proceeds to the other nine, and ranks Quantity first
among them.[45] _Quantum_ is either Continual or Discrete; it
consists either of parts having position in reference to each other,
or of parts not having position in reference to each other. Discrete
_Quanta_ are Number and Speech; Continual _Quanta_ are Line, Surface,
Body, and besides these, Time and Place. The parts of Number have no
position in reference to each other; the parts of Line, Surface,
Body, have position in reference to each other. These are called
_Quanta_, primarily; other things are called _Quanta_ in a secondary
way, [Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s].[46] Thus we say _much white_, when
the surface of white is large; we say, _the action is long_, because
much time and movement have been consumed in it. If we are asked,
_how long the action_ is? we must answer by specifying its length in
time--a year or a month.

[Footnote 45: Ibid. b. 21, seq.]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. p. 5, a. 38, seq.]

To _Quantum_ (as to Essence or Substance) there exists no
contrary.[47] There is nothing contrary to a length of three cubits
or an area of four square feet. Great, little, long, short, are more
properly terms of Relation than terms of Quantity; thus belonging to
another Category. Nor is _Quantum_ ever more or less _Quantum_; it
does not admit of degree. The _Quantum_ a yard is neither more nor
less _Quantum_ than that called a foot. That which is peculiar to
_Quanta_ is to be equal or unequal:[48] the relations of equality and
inequality are not properly affirmed of anything else except of
_Quanta_.

[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 11, seq.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. p. 6, a. 26-35.]

From the Category of Quantity, Aristotle proceeds next to that of
Relation;[49] which he discusses in immediate sequence after
Quantity, and before Quality, probably because in the course of his
exposition about Quantity, he had been obliged to intimate how
closely Quantity was implicated with Relation, and how essential it
was that the distinction between the two should be made clear.

[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 36, seq.]

_Relata_ ([Greek: ta\ pro/s ti]--_ad Aliquid_) are things such, that
what they are, they are said to be _of other things_, or are said to
in some other manner _towards something else_ ([Greek: o(/sa au)ta\
a(/per e)sti\n **e(te/rôn ei)=nai le/getai, ê)\ o(pôstou=n a)/llôs
pro\s e(/teron]). Thus, that which is greater, is said to be greater
_than another_; that which is called double is called also double _of
another_. Habit, disposition, perception, cognition, position, &c.,
are all _Relata_. Habit, is habit _of something_; perception and
cognition, are always _of something_; position, is position _of
something_. The Category of Relation admits contrariety in some
cases, but not always; it also admits, in some cases, graduation, or
the more or less in degree; things are more like or less like to each
other.[50] All _Relata_ are so designated in virtue of their relation
to other _Correlata_; the master is master _of a servant_--the
servant is servant _of a master_. Sometimes the _Correlatum_ is
mentioned not in the genitive case but in some other case; thus
cognition is cognition _of_ the _cognitum_, but _cognitum_ is
_cognitum by_ cognition; perception is perception _of_ the
_perceptum_, but the _perceptum_ is _perceptum by_ perception.[51]
The correlation indeed will not manifestly appear, unless the
Correlate be designated by its appropriate term: thus, if the wing be
declared to be wing _of a bird_, there is no apparent correlation; we
ought to say, the wing is wing _of the winged_, and the winged is
winged _through_ or _by_ the wing; for the wing belongs to the bird,
not _quâ bird_, but _quâ winged_,[52] since there are many things
winged, which are not birds. Sometimes there is no current term
appropriate to the Correlate, so that we are under the necessity of
coining one for the occasion: we must say, to speak with strict
accuracy, [Greek: ê( kephalê/, tou= kephalôtou= kephalê/] not [Greek:
ê( kephalê/, tou= zô=|ou kephalê/]; [Greek: to\ pêda/lion, tou=
pêdaliôtou= pêda/lion], not [Greek: to\ pêda/lion, ploi/ou
pêda/lion].[53]

[Footnote 50: Aristot. Categ. p. 6, b. 20.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 28-37.]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. b. 36; p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: ou) mê\n a)ll'
e)ni/ote ou) do/xei a)ntistre/phein, e)a\n mê\ oi)kei/ôs pro\s o(\
le/getai a)podothê=|, a)lla\ diama/rtê| o( a)podidou/s, oi(=on to\
ptero\n e)a\n a)podothê=| o)/rnithos, ou)k a)ntistre/phei o)/rnis
pterou=; ou) ga\r oi)kei/ôs to\ prô=ton a)pode/dotai ptero\n
o)/rnithos; ou) ga\r ê(=| o)/rnis, tau/tê| to\ ptero\n au)tou=
le/getai, a)ll' ê(=| pterôto/n e)sti; pollô=n ga\r kai\ a)/llôn
ptera/ e)stin, a(\ ou)k ei)si\n o)/rnithes.]]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. p. 7, a. 6-25. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\ kai\
o)nomatopoiei=n I)/sôs a)nagkai=on, e)a\n mê\ kei/menon ê)=| o)/noma
pro\s o(\ oi)kei/ôs a)\n a)podothei/ê], &c.]

The _Relatum_ and its Correlate seem to be _simul naturâ_. If you
suppress either one of the pair, the other vanishes along with it.
Aristotle appears to think, however, that there are many cases in
which this is not true. He says that there can be no _cognoscens_
without a _cognoscibile_, nor any _percipiens_ without a
_percipibile_; but that there may be _cognoscibile_ without any
_cognoscens_, and _percipibile_ without any _percipiens_. He says
that [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] exists [Greek: pro\ tou= ai)/sthêsin
ei)=nai].[54] Whether any Essence or Substance can be a _Relatum_ or
not, he is puzzled to say; he seems to think that the Second Essence
may be, but that the First Essence cannot be so. He concludes,
however, by admitting that the question is one of doubt and
difficulty.[55]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. b. 15; p. 8, a. 12. The Scholion of Simplikius on
this point (p. 65, a. 16, b. 18, Br.) is instructive. He gives his
own opinion, and that of some preceding commentators, adverse to
Aristotle. He says that [Greek: e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: to\
e)pistêto/n, ai)sthêsis] and [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto/n], are not
properly correlates. The actual correlates with the actual, the
potential with the potential. Now, in the above pairs, [Greek: to\
e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n] are potentials, while
[Greek: **e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] are actuals; therefore
it is correct to say that [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] and [Greek: to\
ai)sthêto\n] will not cease to exist if you take away [Greek:
e)pistê/mê] and [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]. But the real and proper
correlate to [Greek: to\ e)pistêto\n] would be [Greek: to\
e)pistêmoniko/n]: the proper correlate to [Greek: to\ ai)sthêto\n]
would be [Greek: to\ ai)sthêtiko\n]. And when we take these two
latter pairs, it is perfectly correct to say, [Greek: sunanairei=
tau=ta a)/llêla].

In the treatise, De Partibus Animalium, i. p. 641, b. 2, where
Aristotle makes [Greek: nou=s] correlate with [Greek: ta\ noêta/], we
must understand [Greek: nou=s] as equivalent to [Greek: to\
noêtiko/n], and as different from [Greek: ê( no/êsis].]

[Footnote 55: Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b. 22.]

Quality is that according to which Subjects are called Such and Such
([Greek: poioi/ tines]). It is, however, not a true genus, but a
vague word, of many distinct, though analogous, meanings including an
assemblage of particulars not bound together by any generic tie.[56]
The more familiar varieties are--1. Habits or endowments ([Greek:
e(/xeis]) of a durable character, such as, wise, just, virtuous; 2.
Conditions more or less transitory, such as, hot, cold, sick,
healthy, &c. ([Greek: diathe/seis]); 3. Natural powers or
incapacities, such as hard, soft, fit for boxing, fit for running,
&c. 4. Capacities of causing sensation, such as sweet of honey, hot
and cold of fire and ice. But a person who occasionally blushes with
shame, or occasionally becomes pale with fear, does not receive the
designation of _such or such_ from this fact; the occasional emotion
is a passion, not a quality.[57]

[Footnote 56: See the first note on p. 66. Aristot. Categ. p. 8, b.
26: [Greek: e)/sti de\ ê( poio/tês tô=n pleonachô=s legome/nôn], &c.
Compare Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, a. 33, and the Scholion of
Alexander, p. 715, a. 5, Br.

The abstract term [Greek: Poio/tês] was a new coinage in Plato's
time; he introduces it with an apology (Theætet. p. 182 A.).]

[Footnote 57: Aristot. Categ. p. 9, b. 20-33.]

A fifth variety of Quality is figure or circumscribing form,
straightness or crookedness. But dense, rare, rough, smooth, are not
properly varieties of Quality; objects are not denominated _such and
such_ from these circumstances. They rather declare position of the
particles of an object in reference to each other, near or distant,
evenly or unevenly arranged.[58]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 10, a. 11-24.]

Quality admits, in some cases but not in all, both contrariety and
graduation. Just is contrary to unjust, black to white; but there is
no contrary to red or pale. If one of two contraries belongs to
Quality, the other of the two will also belong to Quality. In regard
to graduation, we can hardly say that Quality in the abstract is
capable of more and less; but it is indisputable that different
objects have more or less of the same quality. One man is more just,
healthy, wise, than another; though justice or health in itself
cannot be called more or less. One thing cannot be more a triangle,
square, or circle than another; the square is not more a circle than
the oblong.[59]

[Footnote 59: Aristot. Categ. p. 10, b. 12; p. 11, a. 10, 11-24.]

What has just been said is not peculiar to Quality; but one
peculiarity there is requiring to be mentioned. Quality is the
foundation of Similarity and Dissimilarity. Objects are called _like_
or _unlike_ in reference to qualities.[60]

[Footnote 60: Ibid. p. 11, a. 15.]

In speaking about Quality, Aristotle has cited many illustrations
from _Relata_. Habits and dispositions, described by their generic
names, are _Relata_; in their specific varieties they are Qualities.
Thus cognition is always cognition _of something_, and is therefore a
_Relatum_; but _grammatiké_ (grammatical cognition) is not
_grammatiké of any thing_, and is therefore a Quality. It has been
already intimated[61] that the same variety may well belong to two
distinct Categories.

[Footnote 61: Ibid. a. 20-38. [Greek: e)/ti ei) tu/gchanoi to\ au)to\
pro/s ti kai\ poio\n o)/n, ou)de\n a)/topon e)n a)mphote/rois toi=s
ge/nesin au)to\ katarithmei=sthai.]]

After having thus dwelt at some length on each of the first four
Categories, Aristotle passes lightly over the remaining six.
Respecting _Agere_ and _Pati_, he observes that they admit (like
Quality) both of graduation and contrariety. Respecting _Jac[=e]re_
he tells us that the predicates included in it are derived from the
fact of positions, which positions he had before ranked among the
_Relata_. Respecting _Ubi_, _Quando_, and _Habere_, he considers them
all so manifest and intelligible, that he will say nothing about
them; he repeats the illustrations before given--_Habere_, as, to be
shod, or to be armed (to have shoes or arms); _Ubi_, as, in the
Lykeium; _Quando_, as, yesterday, last year.[62]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 8-15. [Greek: dia\ to\ prophanê= ei)=nai,
ou)de\n u(pe\r au)tô=n a)/llo le/getai ê)\ o(/sa e)n a)rchê=|
e)rre/thê], &c.]

. . . . . .


No part of the Aristotelian doctrine has become more incorporated
with logical tradition, or elicited a greater amount of comment and
discussion,[63] than these Ten Categories or Predicaments. I have
endeavoured to give the exposition as near as may be in the words and
with the illustrations of Aristotle; because in many of the comments
new points of view are introduced, sometimes more just than those of
Aristotle, but not present to his mind. Modern logicians join the
Categories side by side with the five Predicables, which are
explained in the Eisagoge of Porphyry, more than five centuries after
Aristotle's death. As expositors of Logic they are right in doing
this; but my purpose is to illustrate rather the views of Aristotle.
The mind of Aristotle was not altogether exempt from that
fascination[64] which particular numbers exercised upon the
Pythagoreans and after them upon Plato. To the number Ten the
Pythagoreans ascribed peculiar virtue and perfection. The fundamental
Contraries, which they laid down as the Principles of the Universe,
were ten in number.[65] After them, also, Plato carried his ideal
numbers as far as the Dekad, but no farther. That Aristotle
considered Ten to be the suitable number for a complete list of
general heads--that he was satisfied with making up the list of ten,
and looked for nothing beyond--may be inferred from the different
manner in which he deals with the different items. At least, such was
his point of view when he composed this treatise. Though he
recognizes all the ten Categories as co-ordinate in so far that
(except _Quale_) each is a distinct Genus, not reducible under either
of the others, yet he devotes all his attention to the first four,
and gives explanations (copious for him) in regard to these. About
the fifth and sixth (_Agere_ and _Pati_)[66] he says a little, though
much less than we should expect, considering their extent and
importance. About the last four, next to nothing appears. There are
even passages in his writings where he seems to drop all mention of
the two last (_Jacere_ and _Habere_), and to recognize no more than
eight Predicaments. In the treatise Categoriæ where his attention is
fastened on Terms and their signification, and on the appropriate way
of combining these terms into propositions, he recites the ten
_seriatim_; but in other treatises, where his remarks bear more upon
the matter and less upon the terms by which it is signified, he
thinks himself warranted in leaving out the two or three whose
applications are most confined to special subjects. If he had thought
fit to carry the total number of Predicaments to twelve or fifteen
instead of ten,[67] he would probably have had little difficulty in
finding some other general heads not less entitled to admission than
_Jacere_ and _Habere_; the rather, as he himself allows, even in
regard to the principal Categories, that particulars comprised under
one of them may also be comprised under another, and that there is no
necessity for supposing each particular to be restricted to one
Category exclusively.

[Footnote 63: About the prodigious number of these comments, see the
Scholion of Dexippus, p. 39, a. 34, Br.; p. 5, ed. Spengel.]

[Footnote 64: See Simpl. in Categ. Schol. p. 78, b. 14, Br.; also the
two first chapters of the Aristotelian treatise De Coelo; compare
also, about the perfection of the [Greek: tri/tê su/stasis], De
Partibus Animalium, ii. p. 646, b. 9; De Generat. Animal. iii. p.
760, a. 34.]

[Footnote 65: Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 986, a. 8. There existed, in the
time of the later Peripatetics, a treatise in the Doric dialect by
Archytas--[Greek: Peri\ tou= Panto/s]--discriminating Ten Categories,
and apparently the same ten Categories as Aristotle. By several
Aristotelian critics this treatise was believed to have been composed
by Archytas the Tarentine, eminent both as a Pythagorean philosopher
and as the leading citizen of Tarentum--the contemporary and friend
of Plato, and, therefore, of course, earlier than Aristotle. Several
critics believed that Aristotle had borrowed his Ten Categories from
this work of Archytas; and we know that the latter preserved the
total number of Ten. See Schol. ad Categor. p. 79, b. 3, Br.

But other critics affirmed, apparently with better reason, that the
Archytas, author of this treatise, was a Peripatetic philosopher
later than Aristotle; and that the doctrine of Archytas on the
Categories was copied from Aristotle in the same manner as the Doric
treatise on the Kosmos, ascribed to the Lokrian Timæus, was copied
from the Timæus of Plato, being translated into a Doric dialect.

See Scholia of Simplikius and Boëthius, p. 33, a. 1, n.; p. 40, a.
43, Brandis. The fact that this treatise was ascribed to the
Tarentine Archytas, indicates how much the number Ten was consecrated
in men's minds as a Pythagorean canon.]

[Footnote 66: Trendelenburg thinks (Geschichte der Kategorienlehre,
p. 131) that Aristotle must have handled the Categories _Agere_, and
_Pati_ more copiously in other treatises; and there are some passages
in his works which render this probable. See De Animâ, ii. p. 416, b.
35; De Generat. Animal. iv. p. 768, b. 15. Moreover, in the list of
Aristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius, one title appears--
[Greek: Peri\ tou= poiei=n kai\ peponthe/nai] (Diog. L. v. 22).]

[Footnote 67: Prantl expresses this view in his Geschichte der Logik
(p. 206), and I think it just.]

These remarks serve partly to meet the difficulties pointed out by
commentators in regard to the Ten Categories. From the century
immediately succeeding Aristotle, down to recent times, the question
has always been asked, why did Aristotle fix upon Ten Categories
rather than any other number? and why upon these Ten rather than
others? And ancient commentators[68] as well as modern have insisted,
that the classification is at once defective and redundant; leaving
out altogether some particulars, while it enumerates others twice
over or more than twice. (This last charge is, however, admitted by
Aristotle himself, who considers it no ground of objection that the
same particular may sometimes be ranked under two distinct heads.)
The replies made to the questions, and the attempts to shew cause for
the selection of these Ten classes, have not been satisfactory;
though it is certain that Aristotle himself treats the classification
as if it were real and exhaustive,[69] obtained by comparing many
propositions and drawing from them an induction. He tries to
determine, in regard to some particular enquiries, under which of the
Ten _Summa Genera_ the subject of the enquiry is to be ranged; he
indicates some predicate of extreme generality (_Unum_, _Bonum_,
&c.), which extend over all or several Categories, as equivocal or
analogous, representing no true _Genera_. But though Aristotle takes
this view of the completeness of his own classification, he never
assigns the grounds of it, and we are left to make them out in the
best way we can.

[Footnote 68: Schol. p. 47, b. 14, seq., 49, a. 10, seq. Br.; also
Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 15, 31 A, 33 E. ed. Basil., 1551.]

[Footnote 69 Scholia ad Analyt. Poster. (I. xxiii. p. 83, a. 21) p.
227, b. 40, Br. [Greek: O(/ti de\ tosau=tai mo/nai ai( katêgori/ai
ai( kata\ tô=n ou)siô=n lego/menai, e)k tê=s e)pagôgê=s lamba/nei.]

Brentano (in his treatise, Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden in
Aristoteles, Sects. 12 and 13, pp. 148-177) attempts to draw out a
scheme of systematic deduction for the Categories. He quotes (pp.
181, 182) a passage from Thomas Aquinas, in which such a scheme is
set forth acutely and plausibly. But if Aristotle had had any such
system present to his mind, he would hardly have left it to be
divined by commentators.

Simplikius observes (Schol. ad Categ. p. 44, a. 30) that the last
nine Categories coincide in the main (excepting such portion of
_Quale_ as belongs to the Essence) with [Greek: to\ o)/n kata\
sumbebêko/s]: which latter, according to Aristotle's repeated
declarations, can never be the matter of any theorizing or scientific
treatment--[Greek: ou)demi/a e)sti\ peri\ au)to\ theôri/a], Metaphys.
E. p. 1026, b. 4; K. p. 1064, b. 17. This view of Aristotle
respecting [Greek: to\ sumbebêko/s], is hardly consistent with a
scheme of intentional deduction for the accidental predicates.]

We cannot safely presume, I think, that he followed out any deductive
principle or system; if he had done so, he would probably have
indicated it. The decuple indication of general heads arose rather
from comparison of propositions and induction therefrom. Under each
of these ten heads, some predicate or other may always be applied to
every concrete individual object, such as a man or animal. Aristotle
proceeded by comparing a variety of propositions, such as were
employed in common discourse or dialectic, and throwing the different
predicates into _genera_, according as they stood in different
logical relation to the Subject. The analysis applied is not
metaphysical but logical; it does not resolve the real individual
into metaphysical [Greek: a)rchai\] or Principles, such as Form and
Matter; it accepts the individual as he stands, with his full complex
array of predicates embodied in a proposition, and analyses that
proposition into its logical constituents.[70] The predicates derive
their existence from being attached to the First Subject, and have a
different manner of existence according as they are differently
related to the First Subject.[71] What is this individual, Sokrates?
He is an _animal_. What is his Species? _Man_. What is the
Differentia, limiting the Genus and constituting the Species?
_Rationality_, _two-footedness_. What is his height and bulk? He is
_six feet_ high, and is of _twelve stone_ weight. What manner of man
is he? He is _flat-nosed_, _virtuous_, _patient_, _brave_. In what
relation does he stand to others? He is a _father_, a _proprietor_, a
_citizen_, a _general_. What is he doing? He is _digging his garden_,
_ploughing his field_. What is being done to him? He is _being rubbed
with oil_, he is _having his hair cut_. Where is he? _In the city_,
_at home_, _in bed_. When do you speak of him? _As he is, at this
moment_, _as he was, yesterday_, _last year_. In what posture is he?
He is _lying down_, _sitting_, _standing up_, _kneeling_, _balancing
on one leg_. What is he wearing? He _has a tunic_, _armour_, _shoes_,
_gloves_.

[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1038, b. 15. [Greek: dichô=s
u(pokei=tai, ê)\ to/de ti o)/n, ô(/sper to\ zô=|on toi=s pa/thesin,
ê)\ ô(s ê( u(/lê tê=| e)ntelechei/a|.] The first mode of [Greek:
u(pokei/menon] is what is in the Categories. For the second, which is
the metaphysical analysis, see Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1029, a. 23:
[Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\
tê=s u(/lês. ô(/ste to\ e)/schaton kath' au(to\ ou)/te ti\ ou)/te
poso\n ou)/te a)/llo ou)the/n e)sti.]

Porphyry and Dexippus tell us (Schol. ad Categ. p. 45, a. 6-30) that
both Aristotle and the Stoics distinguished [Greek: prô=ton
u(pokei/menon] and [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon]. The [Greek:
prô=ton u(pokei/menon] is [Greek: ê( a)/poios u(/lê--to\ duna/mei
sô=ma], which Aristotle insists upon in the Physica and Metaphysica,
the [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon, o(\ koinô=s poio\n ê)\ i)di/ôs
u(phi/statai], coincides with the [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] of the
Categories, already implicated with [Greek: ei)=dos] and stopping
short of metaphysical analysis.

The remarks of Boêthus and Simplikius upon this point deserve
attention. Schol. pp. 50-54, Br.; p. 54, a. 2: [Greek: ou) peri\ tê=s
a)sche/tou u(/lês e)sti\n o( parô\n lo/gos, a)lla\ tê=s ê)/dê
sche/sin e)chou/sês pro\s to\ ei)=dos. to\ de\ su/ntheton dêlo/noti,
o(/per e)sti\ to\ a)/tomon, e)pide/chetai to\ to/de.] They point out
that the terms Form and Matter are not mentioned in the Categories,
nor do they serve to illustrate the Categories, which do not carry
analysis so far back, take their initial start from [Greek: to/de
ti], the [Greek: su/ntheton] of Form and Matter,--[Greek: ou)si/a
kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê].

Simplikius says (p. 50, a. 17):--[Greek: dunato\n de\ tou= mê\
mnêmoneu=sai tou= ei)/dous kai\ tê=s u(/lês ai)/tion le/gein, kai\
to\ tê\n tô=n Katêgoriô=n pragmatei/an _kata\ tê\n pro/cheiron kai\
koinê\n tou= lo/gou chrê=sin_ poiei=sthai; to\ de\ tê=s u(/lês kai\
tou= ei)/dous o)/noma kai\ ta\ u(po\ tou/tôn sêmaino/mena ou)k ê)=n
toi=s polloi=s sunê/thê], &c. Compare p. 47, a. 27. This what
Dexippus says also, that the Categories bear only upon [Greek: tê\n
prô/tên chrei/an tou= lo/gou kath' ê(\n ta\ pra/gmata dêlou=n
a)llêlois e)phie/metha] (p. 13, ed. Spengel; also p. 49).

Waitz, ad Categor. p. 284. "In Categoriis, non de ipsâ rerum naturâ
et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi
vitâ homini philosophiâ non imbuto."

We may add, that Aristotle applies the metaphysical analysis--Form
and Matter--not only to the Category [Greek: ou)si/a] but also to
that of [Greek: poio\n] and [Greek: poso/n] (De Coelo, iv. 312, a.
14.)]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 23. [Greek:
o(sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei].]

Confining ourselves (as I have already observed that Aristotle does
in the Categories) to those perceptible or physical subjects which
every one admits,[72] and keeping clear of metaphysical entities, we
shall see that respecting any one of these subjects the nine
questions here put may all be put and answered; that the two last are
most likely to be put in regard to some living being; and that the
last can seldom be put in regard to any other subject except a person
(including man, woman, or child). Every individual person falls
necessarily under each of the ten Categories; belongs to the Genus
animal, Species man; he is of a certain height and bulk; has certain
qualities; stands in certain relations to other persons or things; is
doing something and suffering something; is in a certain place; must
be described with reference to a certain moment of time; is in a
certain attitude or posture; is clothed or equipped in a certain
manner. Information of some kind may always be given respecting him
under each of these heads; he is always by necessity _quantus_, but
not always of any particular quantity. Until such information is
given, the concrete individual is not known under conditions
thoroughly determined.[73] Moreover each head is separate and
independent, not resolvable into any of the rest, with a reservation,
presently to be noticed, of Relation in its most comprehensive
meaning. When I say of a man, that he is at home, lying down, clothed
with a tunic, &c., I do not predicate of him any quality, action, or
passion. The information which I give belongs to three other heads
distinct from these last, and distinct also from each other. If you
suppress the two last of the ten Categories and leave only the
preceding eight, under which of these eight are you to rank the
predicates, Sokrates is _lying down_, Sokrates is _clothed with a
tunic_, &c.? The necessity for admitting the ninth and tenth
Categories (_Jacere_ and _Habere_) as separate general heads in the
list, is as great as the necessity for admitting most of the
Categories which precede. The ninth and tenth are of narrower
comprehension,[74] and include a smaller number of distinguishable
varieties, than the preceding; but they are not the less separate
heads of information. So, among the chemical elements enumerated by
modern science, some are very rarely found; yet they are not for that
reason the less entitled to a place in the list.

[Footnote 72: Ibid. Z. p. 1028, b. 8, seq.: p. 1042, a. 25. [Greek:
ai( ai)sthêtai\ ou)si/ai--ai( o(mologou/menai ou)si/ai].]

[Footnote 73: Prantl observes, Geschichte der Logik, p. 208:--"Fragen
wir, wie Aristoteles überhaupt dazu gekommen sei, von Kategorien zu
sprechen, und welche Geltung dieselben bei ihm haben, so ist unsere
Antwort hierauf folgende: Aristoteles geht, im Gegensatze gegen
Platon, davon aus, dass die Allgemeinheit in der Concretion des
Seienden sich verwirkliche und in dieser Realität von dem
menschlichen Denken und Sprechen ergriffen werde; der
Verwirklichungsprocess des concret Seienden ist der Uebergang vom
Unbestimmten, jeder Bestimmung aber fähigen, zum allseitig
Bestimmten, welchem demnach die Bestimmtheit überhaupt als eine
selbst concret gewordene einwohnt und ebenso in des Menschen Rede von
ihm ausgesagt wird. Das grundwesentliche Ergebniss der Verwirklichung
ist sonach: die zeitlich-räumlich concret auftretende und hiemit
individuell gewordene Substanzialität, in einer dem Zustande der
Concretion entsprechenden Erscheinungsweise; diese letztere umfasst
das ganze habituelle Dasein und Wirken der concreten Substanz, welche
in der Welt der räumlichen Ausdehnung numerären Vielheit erscheint.
Die ontologische Basis demnach der Kategorien ist der in die
Concretion führende Verwirklichungsprocess der Bestimmtheit
überhaupt."]

[Footnote 74: Plotinus, among his various grounds of exception to the
ten Aristotelian Categories, objects to the ninth and tenth on the
ground of their narrow comprehension (Ennead. vi. 1, 23, 24).

Boêthus expressly vindicated the title of [Greek: e)/chein] to be
recognized as a separate Category, against the Stoic
objectors.--Schol. ad Categ. p. 81, a. 5.]

If we seek not to appreciate the value of the Ten Categories as a
philosophical classification, but to understand what was in the mind
of Aristotle when he framed it, we shall attend, not much to the
greater features, which it presents in common with every other scheme
of classification, as to the minor features which constitute its
peculiarity. In this point of view the two last Categories are more
significant than the first four, and the tenth is the most
significant of all; for every one is astonished when he finds
_Habere_ enrolled as a tenth _Summum Genus_, co-ordinate with
_Quantum_ and _Quale_. Now what is remarkable about the ninth and
tenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals are the only
Subjects respecting whom they are ever predicated, and are at the
same time Subjects respecting whom they are constantly (or at least
frequently) predicated. An individual person is habitually clothed in
some particular way in all or part of his body; he (and perhaps his
horse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover
animals are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal
Subject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various, determined
by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to
know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten
Categories, as _Summa Genera_ for all predications which can be made
about any given Subject, the Subject which he has wholly, or at least
principally, in his mind is an individual Man. We understand, then,
how it is that he declares _Habere_ and _Jacere_ to be so plain as to
need no farther explanation. What is a man's posture? What is his
clothing or equipment? are questions understood by every one.[75] But
when Aristotle treats of _Habere_ elsewhere, he is far from
recognizing it as narrow and plain _per se_. Even in the
Post-Predicamenta (an appendix tacked on to the Categoriæ, either by
himself afterwards, or by some follower) he declares _Habere_ to be a
predicate of vague and equivocal signification; including portions of
_Quale_, _Quantum_, and _Relata_. And he specifies the personal
equipment of an individual as only one among these many varieties of
signification. He takes the same view in the fourth book ([Greek:
D].) of the Metaphysica, which book is a sort of lexicon of
philosophical terms.[76] This enlargement of the meaning of the word
_Habere_ seems to indicate an alteration of Aristotle's point of
view, dropping that special reference to an individual man as
Subject, which was present to him when he drew up the list of Ten
Categories. The like alteration carried him still farther, so as to
omit the ninth and tenth almost entirely, when he discusses the more
extensive topics of philosophy. Some of his followers, on the
contrary, instead of omitting _Habere_ out of the list of Categories,
tried to procure recognition for it in the larger sense which it
bears in the Metaphysica. Archytas ranked it fifth in the series,
immediately after _Relata_.[77]

[Footnote 75: In the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Mr. James
Harris's Philosophical Arrangements, there is a learned and valuable
illustration of these two last Aristotelian Categories. I think,
however, that he gives to the Predicament [Greek: Kei=sthai]
(_Jacere_) a larger and more comprehensive meaning than it bears in
the treatise Categoriæ; and that neither he, nor the commentators
whom he cites (p. 317), take sufficient notice of the marked
distinction drawn in that treatise between [Greek: kei=sthai] and
[Greek: the/sis] (Cat. p. 6, b. 12). Mr. Harris ranks the arrangement
of words in an orderly discourse, and of propositions in a valid
syllogism, as cases coming under the Predicament [Greek Kei=sthai];
which is travelling far beyond the meaning of that word in the
Aristotelian Categories. At the same time he brings out strongly the
fact, that living beings, and especially _men_, are the true and
special subjects of predicates belonging to [Greek: Kei=sthai] and
[Greek: E)/chein]. The more we attend to this, the nearer approach
shall we make to the state of Aristotle's mind when he drew up the
list of Categories; as indeed Harris himself seems to recognize
(chap. ii. p. 29).]

[Footnote 76: Aristot. Categor. p. 15, b. 17; Metaphys. [Greek: D].
p. 1023, a. 8.]

[Footnote 77: See the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 80, b. 7, seq.; p.
92, b. 41, Brand.; where the different views of Archytas, Plotinus,
and Boêthus, are given; also p. 59, b. 43: [Greek: proêgei=tai ga\r
ê( sumphuê\s tô=n pro/s ti sche/sis tô=n e)piktê/tôn sche/seôn, ô(s
kai\ tô\| A)rchu/ta| dokei=.] In the language of Archytas, [Greek:
ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] were the equivalent of the Aristotelian
[Greek: e)/chein].]

The narrow manner in which Aristotle conceives the Predicament
_Habere_ in the treatise Categoriæ, and the enlarged sense given to
that term both in the Post-Predicaments and in the Metaphysica, lead
to a suspicion that the Categoriæ is comparatively early, in point of
date, among his compositions. It seems more likely that he should
begin with the narrower view, and pass from thence to the larger,
rather than _vice versâ_. Probably the predicates specially
applicable to Man would be among his early conceptions, but would by
later thought be tacitly dropped,[78] so as to retain those only
which had a wider philosophical application.

[Footnote 78: Respecting the paragraph (at the close of the
Categoriæ) about [Greek: to\ e)/chein], see the Scholion in Waitz's
ed. of the Organon, p. 38.

The fact that Archytas in his treatise presented the Aristotelian
Category [Greek: e)/chein] under the more general phrase of [Greek:
ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] (see the preceding note), is among the
reasons for believing that treatise to be later than Aristotle.]

I have already remarked that Aristotle, while enrolling all the Ten
Predicaments as independent heads, each the _Generalissimum_ of a
separate descending line of predicates, admitted at the same time
that various predicates did not of necessity belong to one of these
lines exclusively, but might take rank in more than one line. There
are some which he enumerates under all the different heads of
Quality, Relation, Action, Passion. The classification is evidently
recognized as one to which we may apply a remark which he makes
especially in regard to Quality and Relation, under both of which
heads (he says) the same predicates may sometimes be counted.[79] And
the observation is much more extensively true than he was aware; for
he both conceives and defines the Category of Relation or Relativity
(_Ad Aliquid_) in a way much narrower than really belongs to it. If
he had assigned to this Category its full and true comprehension, he
would have found it implicated with all the other nine. None of them
can be isolated from it in predication.

[Footnote 79: Aristot. Categ. p. 11, a. 37.

Simplikius says that what Aristotle admits about [Greek: poio/tês],
is true about all the other Categories also, viz.: that it is not a
strict and proper [Greek: ge/nos]. Each of the ten Categories is
(what Aristotle says about [Greek: to\ o(\n]) [Greek: me/son tô=n te
sunôno/môn kai\ o(mônu/môn.--ou)de\ ga\r e)kei=na kuri/ôs e)sti\
ge/nê, ou)de\ ô(s ge/nê tô=n u(p' au)ta\ katêgorei=tai, _ta/xeôs
ou)/sês pantachou= prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn_.] (Scholia ad Categor. p.
69, b. 30, Br.) This is a remarkable observation, which has been
sufficiently adverted to, I think, by Brentano in his treatise on
Aristotle's Ontology.]

That _Agere_ and _Pati_ (with the illustrations which he himself
gives thereof--_urit_, _uritur_) may be ranked as varieties under the
generic Category of Relation or Relativity, can hardly be overlooked.
The like is seen to be true about _Ubi_ and _Quando_, when we advert
to any one of the predicates belonging to either; such as, _in the
market-place_, _yesterday_.[80] Moreover, not merely the last six of
the ten Categories, but also the second and fourth (_Quantum_ and
_Quale_) are implicated with and subordinated to Relation. If we look
at _Quantum_, we shall find that the example which Aristotle gives of
it is [Greek: tripê=chus], tricubital, or three cubits long; a term
quite as clearly relative as the term [Greek: dipla/sios] or double,
which he afterwards produces as instance of the Category _Ad
Aliquid_.[81] When we are asked the questions, How much is the
height? How large is the field? we cannot give the information
required except by a relative predicate--_it is three feet_--_it is
four acres_; we thereby carry back the mind of the questioner to some
unit of length or superficies already known to him, and we convey our
meaning by comparison with such unit. Again, if we turn from
_Quantum_ to _Quale_, we find the like Relativity implied in all the
predicates whereby answer is made to the question [Greek: Poio\s ti/s
e)sti?] _Qualis est_? What manner of man is he? _He is such as A, B,
C_--persons whom we have previously seen, or heard, or read of.[82]

[Footnote 80: The remarks of Plotinus upon these four last-mentioned
Categories are prolix and vague, but many of them go to shew how much
[Greek: to\ pro/s ti] is involved in all of the four (Ennead. vi. 1,
14-18).]

[Footnote 81: Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 184) admits a
certain degree of interference and confusion between the Categories
of _Quantum_ and _Ad Aliquid_; but in very scanty measure, and much
beneath the reality.]

[Footnote 82: The following passages from Mr. James Mill (Analysis of
the Phenomena of the Human Mind, vol. ii. ch. xiv. sect. ii. pp. 48,
49, 56, 1st ed.) state very clearly the Relativity of the predicates
of Quantity and Quality:--

"It seems necessary that I should say something of the word
_Quantus_, from which the word Quantity is derived. _Quantus_ is the
correlate of _Tantus_. _Tantus_, _Quantus_, are relative terms,
applicable to all the objects to which we apply the terms Great,
Little."--"Of two lines, we call the one _tantus_, the other
_quantus_. The occasions on which we do so, are when the one is as
long as the other."--"When we say that one thing is _tantus_,
_quantus_ another, or one so great, as the other is great; the first
is referred to the last, the _tantus_ to the _quantus_. The first is
distinguished and named by the last. The _Quantus_ is the
standard."--"On what account, then, is it that we give to any thing
the name _Quantus_? As a standard by which to name another thing,
_Tantus_. The thing called _Quantus_ is the previously known thing,
the ascertained amount, by which we can mark and define the other
amount."

"_Talis_, _Qualis_, are applied to objects in the same way, on one
account, as _Tantus_, _Quantus_, on another; and the explanation we
gave of _Tantus_, _Quantus_, may be applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to
the pair of relatives which we have now named. _Tantus_, _Quantus_,
are names applied to objects on account of dimension. _Talis_,
_Qualis_, are names applied to objects on account of all other
sensations. We apply _Tantus_, _Quantus_, to a pair of objects when
they are equal; we apply _Talis_, _Qualis_, to a pair of objects when
they are alike. One of the objects is then the standard. The object
_Qualis_ is that to which the reference is made."

Compare the same work, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 225:--"The word _Such_ is a
relative term, and always connotes so much of the meaning of some
other term. When we call a thing _such_, it is always understood that
it is such _as_ some other thing. Corresponding with our words _such
as_, the Latins had _Talis_, _Qualis_."]

We thus see that all the predicates, not only under the Category
which Aristotle terms _Ad Aliquid_, but also under all the last nine
Categories, are relative. Indeed the work of predication is always
relative. The express purpose, as well as the practical usefulness,
of a significant predicate is, to carry the mind of the hearer either
to a comparison or to a general notion which is the result of past
comparisons. But though each predicate connotes Relation, each
connotes a certain _fundamentum_ besides, which gives to the Relation
its peculiar character. Relations of Quantity are not the same as
relations of Quality; the predicates of the former connote a
_fundamentum_ different from the predicates of the latter, though in
both the meaning conveyed is relative. In fact, every predicate or
concrete general name is relative, or connotes a Relation to
something else, actual or potential, beyond the thing named. The only
name not relative is the Proper name, which connotes no attributes,
and cannot properly be used as a predicate (so Aristotle remarks),
but only as a Subject.[83] Sokrates, Kallias, Bukephalus &c., denotes
the _Hoc Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which, when pronounced alone,
indicates some concrete aggregate (as yet unknown) which may manifest
itself to my senses, but does not, so far as the name is concerned,
involve necessary reference to anything besides; though even these
names, when one and the same name continues to be applied to the same
object, may be held to connote a real or supposed continuity of past
or future existence, and become thus to a certain extent relative.

[Footnote 83: You may make Sokrates a predicate, in the proposition,
[Greek: to\ leuko\n e)kei=no Sôkra/tês e)sti/n], but Aristotle
dismisses this as an irregular or perverse manner of speaking (see
Analytic. Priora, i. p. 43, a. 35; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 83,
a. 2-16).

Alexander calls these propositions [Greek: ai( para\ phu/sin
prota/seis] (see Schol. ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 23).

Mr. James Harris observes (Philosophical Arrangements, ch. x. p. 214;
also 317, 348):--"Hence too we may see why Relation stands next to
Quantity; for in strictness the Predicaments which follow are but
different modes of Relation, marked by some peculiar character over
their own, over and above the relative character, which is common to
them all." To which I would add, that the first two Categories,
Substance and Quantity, are no less relative or correlative than the
eight later Categories; as indeed Harris himself thinks; see the same
work, pp. 90, 473: "Matter and Attribute are essentially distinct,
yet, like _convex_ and _concave_, they are by nature inseparable. We
have already spoken as to the inseparability of attributes; we now
speak as to that of matter. [Greek: Ê(mei=s de\ phame\n me\n ei)=nai/
tina u(/lên tô=n sôma/tôn tô=n ai)sthêtô=n, a)lla\ tau/tên ou)
chôristê\n a)ll' a)ei\ met' e)nantiô/seôs--u(/lên tê\n a)chô/riston
me\n, u(pokeime/nên de\ toi=s e)nanti/ois (Aristot. De Gen. et Corr.
p. 329, a. 24). By contraries, Aristotle means here the several
attributes of matter, hot, cold, &c.; from some one or other of which
matter is always inseparable."]

We must observe that what the proper name denotes is any certain
concrete One and individual,[84] with his attributes essential and
non-essential, whatever they may be, though as yet undeclared, and
with his capacity of receiving other attributes different and even
opposite. This is what Aristotle indicates as the most special
characteristic of Substance or Essence, that while it is _Unum et
Idem Numero_, it is capable of receiving contraries. This
potentiality of contraries, described as characterizing the _Unum et
Idem Numero_,[85] is relative to something about to come; the First
Essence is doubtless logically First, but it is just as much relative
to the Second, as the Second to the First. We know it only by two
negations and one affirmation, all of which are relative to
predications _in futuro_. It is neither in a Subject, nor predicable
of a Subject. It is itself the ultimate Subject of all predications
and all inherencies. Plainly, therefore, we know it only relatively
to these predications and inherencies. Aristotle says truly, that if
you take; away the First Essences, everything else, Second Essences
as well as Accidents, disappears along with them. But he might have
added with equal truth, that if you take away all Second Essences and
all Accidents, the First Essences will disappear equally. The
correlation and interdependence is reciprocal.[86] It may be
suitable, with a view to clear and retainable philosophical
explanation, to state the Subject first and the predicates
afterwards; so that the Subject may thus be considered as logically
_prius_. But in truth the Subject is only a _substratum_ for
predicates,[87] as much as the predicates are _superstrata_ upon the
Subject. The term _substratum_ designates not an absolute or a _per
se_, but a _Correlatum_ to certain _superstrata_, determined or
undetermined: now the _Correlatum_ is one of the pair implicated
directly or indirectly in all Relation; and it is in fact specified
by Aristotle as one variety of the Category _Ad Aliquid_.[88] We see
therefore that the idea of Relativity attaches to the first of the
ten Categories, as well as to the nine others. The inference from
these observations is, that Relation or Relativity, understood in the
large sense which really belongs to it, ought to be considered rather
as an Universal, comprehending and pervading all the Categories, than
as a separate Category in itself, co-ordinate with the other nine. It
is the condition and characteristic of the work of predication
generally; the last analysis of which is into Subject and Predicate,
in reciprocal implication with each other. I remark that this was the
view taken of it by some well-known Peripatetic commentators of
antiquity;[89] by Andronikus, for example, and by Ammonius after him.
Plato, though he makes no attempt to draw up a list of Categories,
has an incidental passage respecting Relativity;[90] conceiving it in
a very extended sense, apparently as belonging more or less to all
predicates. Aristotle, though in the Categoriæ he gives a narrower
explanation of it, founded upon grammatical rather than real
considerations, yet intimates in other places that predicates ranked
under the heads of _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, _Jacere_, &c., may
also be looked at as belonging to the head of _Ad Aliquid_.[91] This
latter, moreover, he himself declares elsewhere to be _Ens_ in the
lowest degree, farther removed from the _Prima Essentia_ than any of
the other Categories; to be more in the nature of an appendage to
some of them, especially to _Quantum_ and _Quale_;[92] and to
presuppose, not only the _Prima Essentia_ (which all the nine later
Categories presuppose), but also one or more of the others,
indicating the particular mode of comparison or Relativity in each
case affirmed. Thus, under one aspect, Relation or Relativity may be
said to stand _prius naturâ_, and to come first in order before all
the Categories, inasmuch as it is implicated with the whole business
of predication (which those Categories are intended to resolve into
its elements), and belongs not less to the mode of conceiving what we
call the Subject, than to the mode of conceiving what we call its
Predicates, each and all. Under another aspect, Relativity may be
said to stand last in order among the Categories--even to come after
the adverbial Categories _Ubi et Quando_; because its _locus standi_
is dim and doubtful, and because every one of the subordinate
predicates belonging to it may be seen to belong to one or other of
the remaining Categories also. Aristotle remarks that the Category
_Ad Aliquid_ has no peculiar and definite mode of generation
corresponding to it, in the manner that Increase and Diminution
belong to _Quantum_, Change to _Quale_, Generation, simple and
absolute, to Essence or Substance.[93] New relations may become
predicable of a thing, without any change in the thing itself, but
simply by changes in other things.[94]

[Footnote 84: Simplikius ap. Schol. p. 52, a. 42: [Greek: pro\s o(/
phasin oi( spoudaio/teroi tô=n e)xêgêtô=n, o(/ti ê( ai)sthêtê\
ou)si/a sumpho/rêsi/s ti/s e)sti poiotê/tôn kai\ u(/lês, kai\ o(mou=
me\n pa/nta sumpage/nta mi/an poiei= tê\n ai)sthêtê\n ousi/an,
chôri\s de\ e(/kaston lambano/menon to\ me\n poio\n to\ de\ poso/n
e)sti lambano/menon, ê)/ ti a)/llo.]]

[Footnote 85: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10: [Greek: Ma/lista de\
I)/dion tou=to tê=s ou)si/as dokei= ei)=nai, to\ tau)to\n kai\ e(\n
a)rithmô=| o)\n tô=n e)nanti/ôn ei)=nai dektiko/n.] See Waitz, note,
p. 290: [Greek: dektiko\n] dicitur [Greek: to\ e)n ô(=| pe/phuken
u(pa/rchein ti].

Dexippus, and after him Simplikius, observe justly, that the
characteristic mark of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] is this very
circumstance of being _unum numero_, which belongs in common to all
[Greek: prô=|tai ou)si/ai], and is indicated by the Proper name:
[Greek: lu/sis de\ touo/tou, o(/ti au)to\ to\ mi/an ei)=nai
a)rithmô=|, koino/s e)sti lo/gos]. (Simpl. in Categor., fol. 22
[Greek: D]].; Dexippus, book ii. sect. 18, p. 57, ed. Spengel.)]

[Footnote 86: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 5. [Greek: mê\ ou)sô=n ou)=n
tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n a)du/naton tô=n a)/llôn ti ei)=nai.]

Mr. John Stuart Mill observes: "As to the self-existence of
Substance, it is very true that a substance may be conceived to exist
without any other substance; but so also may an attribute without any
other attributes. And we can no more imagine a substance without
attributes, than we can imagine attributes without a substance."
(System of Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. p. 61, 6th ed.)]

[Footnote 87: Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, b. 8. [Greek: e)/ti tô=n
pro/s ti ê( u(/lê; a)/llô| ga\r ei)/dei a)/llê u(/lê.]

Plotinus puts this correctly, in his criticisms on the Stoic
Categories; criticisms which on this point equally apply to the
Aristotelian: [Greek: pro/s ti ga\r to\ u(pokei/menon, ou) pro\s to\
e)n au)tô=|, a)lla\ pro\s to\ poiou=n ei)s au)to/, kei/menon. Kai\
to\ u(pokei/menon u(pokei=tai pro\s to\ ou)ch u(pokei/menon; ei)
tou=to, pro\s ta\ to\ e)/xô], &c. Also Dexippus in the Scholia ad
Categor. p. 45, a. 26: [Greek: to\ ga\r u(pokei/menon kata\ pro/s ti
le/gesthai e)do/kei, tini\ ga\r u(pokei/menon.]]

[Footnote 88: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 31, p. 1021,
a. 27, seq.]

[Footnote 89: Schol. p. 60, a. 38, Br.; p. 47, b. 26. Xenokrates and
Andronikus included all things under the two heads [Greek: to\ kath'
au(to\] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]. [Greek: A)ndro/nikos me\n ga\r o(
R(o/dios teleutai/an a)pone/mei toi=s pros ti ta/xin, le/gôn ai)ti/an
toiau/tên. ta\ pro/s ti oi)kei/an u(/lê ou)k e)/chei; _paraphua/di
ga\r e)/oiken oi)kei/an phu/sin mê\ e)chou/sê| a)lla\ periplekome/nê|
toi=s e)/chousin oi)kei/an r(i/zan; ai( de\ e)/nnea katêgori/ai
oi)kei/an u(/lên e)/chousin_; ei)ko/tôs ou)=n teleutai/an ô)/pheilon
e)/chein ta/xin.] Again, Schol. p. 60, a. 24 (Ammonius): [Greek:
kalô=s de/ tines a)peika/zousi ta\ pro/s ti paraphua/sin], &c. Also
p. 59, b. 41; p. 49, a. 47; p. 61, b. 29: [Greek: i)/sôs de\ kai\
o(/ti ta\ pro/s ti e)n toi=s a)/llois ge/nesin u(phe/stêke, dia\
tou=to su\n au)toi=s theôrei=tai, ka)\n mê\ proêgoume/nês e)/tuche
mnê/mês (and the Scholia ad p. 6, a. 36, prefixed to Waitz's edition,
p. 33). Also p. 62, a. 37: [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ ô(s paraphuome/nên
tai=s a)/llais katêgori/ais tê\n tou= pro/s ti e)peisodiô/dê
nomi/zousi, kai/toi proêgoume/nên ou)=san kai\ kata\ diaphora\n
oi)kei/an theôroume/nên.] Boêthus had written an entire book upon
[Greek: ta\ pro/s ti], Schol. p. 61, b. 9.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. 437 C. to 439 B. (compare also
Sophistes, p. 255 C., and Politicus, p. 285). [Greek: Kai\ ta\ plei/ô
dê\ pro\s ta\ e)la/ttô kai\ ta\ dipla/sia pro\s ta\ ê(mi/sea kai\
pa/nta ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ au)= baru/tera pro\s koupho/tera kai\
tha/ttô pro\s bradu/tera, _kai\ e)/ti ge ta\ therma\ pro\s ta\
psuchra\_ kai\ pa/nta ta\ tou/tois o(/moia, a)=r' ou)ch ou(/tôs
e)/chei?] (438 C.)]

[Footnote 91: See Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 26, p. 1021, b.
10. Trendelenburg observes (Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, pp. 118-122,
seq.) how much more the description given of [Greek: pro/s ti] in the
Categoriæ is determined by verbal or grammatical considerations, than
in the Metaphysica and other treatises of Aristotle.]

[Footnote 92: See Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 20: [Greek: to\ de\
kath' au(to\ kai\ ê( ou)si/a pro/teron tê=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti;
paraphua/di ga\r tou=t' e)/oike kai\ sumbebêko/ti tou= o)/ntos,
ô(/ste ou)k a)\n ei)/ê koinê/ tis e)pi\ tou/tôn i)de/a.] (The
expression [Greek: paraphua/di] was copied by Andronikus; see a note
on the preceding page.) Metaphys. N. p. 1088, a. 22-26: [Greek: to\
de\ pro/s ti pa/ntôn ê(/kista phu/sis tis ê)\ ou)si/a tô=n katêgoriôn
e)sti/, kai\ u(ste/ra tou= poiou= kai\ posou=; kai\ _pa/thos ti tou=
posou= to\ pro/s ti_, ô(/sper e)le/chthê, a)ll' ou)ch u(/lê, ei)/ ti
e(/teron kai\ tô=| o(/lôs koinô=| pro/s ti kai\ toi=s me/resin
au)tou= kai\ ei)/desin.] Compare Bonitz in his note on p. 1070, a.
33.

The general doctrine laid down by Aristotle, Metaphys. N. p. 1087, b.
34, seq., about the universality of [Greek: me/tron] as pervading all
the Categories, is analogous to the passage above referred to in the
Politicus of Plato, and implies the Relativity involved more or less
in all predicates.]

[Footnote 93: Aristot. Metaph. N. p. 1088, a. 29: [Greek: sêmei=on
de\ o(/ti ê(/kista ou)si/a tis kai\ o)/n ti _to\ pro\/s ti_ to\
mo/non mê\ ei)=nai ge/nesin au)tou= mêde\ phthora\n mêde\ ki/nêsin,
ô(/sper kata\ to\ poso\n au)/xêsis kai\ phthi/sis, kata\ to\ poio\n
a)lloi/ôsis, kata\ to/pon phora/, kata\ tê\n ou)si/an ê( a(plê=
ge/nesis kai\ phthora/.] Compare K. p. 1068, a. 9: [Greek: a)na/gkê
trei=s ei)=nai kinê/seis, poiou=, posou=, to/pou. kat' ou)si/an d'
ou)/, dia\ to\ mêthe\n ei)=nai ou)si/a| e)nanti/on, ou)de\ tou= pro/s
ti.] Also Physica, v. p. 225, b. 11: [Greek: e)nde/chetai ga\r
thate/rou metaba/llontos a)lêtheu/esthai tha/teron mêde\n
meta/ballon.] See about this passage Bonitz and Schwegler's notes on
Metaphys. p. 1068.]

[Footnote 94: Hobbes observes (First Philosophy, part ii. ch. xi. 6):
"But we must not so think of Relation as if it were an accident
differing from all the other accidents of the relative; but one of
them, namely, that by which the comparison is made. For example, the
likeness of one white to another white, or its unlikeness to black,
is the same accident with its whiteness." This may be true about the
relations Like and Unlike (see Mr. John Stuart Mill, Logic, ch. iii.
p. 80, 6th ed.) But, in Relations generally, the _fundamentum_ may be
logically distinguished from the Relation itself.

Aristotle makes the same remarks upon [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] as
upon [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]:--That it verges upon Non-ens; and that it
has no special mode of being generated or destroyed. [Greek:
phai/netai ga\r to\ sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos; tô=n
me\n ga\r a)/llon tro/pon o)/ntôn e)/sti ge/nesis kai\ phthora/, tô=n
de\ kata\ sumbebêko\s ou)k e)/stin.] (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 21.)]

Those among the Aristotelian commentators who denied the title of _Ad
Aliquid_ to a place among the Categories or _Summa Genera_ of
predicates, might support their views from passages where Aristotle
ranks the Genus as a _Relatum_, though he at the same time declares
that the Species under it are not _Relata_. Thus _scientia_ is
declared by him to be a _Relatum_; because it must be _of
something--alicujus scibilis_; while the _something_ thus implied is
not specified.[95] But (_scientia_) _musica_, _grammatica_, _medica_,
&c., are declared not to be _Relata_; the indeterminate _something_
being there determined, and bound up in one word with the predication
of Relativity. Now the truth is that both are alike _Relata_, though
both also belong to the Category of Quality; a man is called _Talis_
from being _sciens_, as well as from being _grammaticus_. Again, he
gives as illustrative examples of the Category _Ad Aliquid_, the
adjectives double, triple. But he ranks in a different Category (that
of _Quantum_) the adjectives bicubital, tricubital ([Greek:
dipê=chus, tripê=chus]. It is plain that the two last of these
predicates are species under the two first, and that all four
predicates are alike relative, under any real definition that can be
given of Relativity, though all four belong also to the Category of
_Quantum_. Yet Aristotle does not recognize any predicates as
belonging to _Ad Aliquid_, except such as are logically and
grammatically elliptical; that is, such as do not include in
themselves the specification of the Correlate, but require to be
supplemented by an additional word in the genitive or dative case,
specifying the latter. As we have already seen, he lays it down
generally, that all _Relata_ (or _Ad Aliquid_) imply a _Correlatum_;
and he prescribes that when the _Correlatum_ is indicated, care shall
be taken to designate it by a precise and specific term, not of wider
import than the _Relatum_,[96] but specially reciprocating therewith:
thus he regards _ala_ (a wing) as _Ad Aliquid_, but when you specify
its correlate in order to speak with propriety ([Greek: oi)kei/ôs]),
you must describe it as _ala alati_ (not as _ala avis_), in order
that the _Correlatum_ may be strictly co-extensive and reciprocating
with the _Relatum_. Wing, head, hand, &c., are thus _Ad Aliquid_,
though there may be no received word in the language to express their
exact _Correlata_; and though you may find it necessary to coin a new
word expressly for the purpose.[97] In specifying the _Correlatum_ of
servant, you must say, servant _of a master_, not servant of a man or
of a biped; both of which are in this case accompaniments or
accidents of the master, being still accidents, though they may be in
fact constantly conjoined. Unless you say master, the terms will not
reciprocate; take away master, the servant is no longer to be found,
though the man who was called _servant_ is still there; but take away
man or biped, and the servant may still continue.[98] You cannot know
the _Relatum_ determinately or accurately, unless you know the
_Correlatum_ also; without the knowledge of the latter, you can only
know the former in a vague and indefinite manner.[99] Aristotle
raises, also, the question whether any Essence or Substance can be
described as _Ad Aliquid_.[100] He inclines to the negative, though
not decisively pronouncing. He seems to think that Simo and Davus,
when called men, are Essences or Substances; but that when called
master and slave, they are not so; this, however, is surprising, when
he had just before spoken of the connotation of man as accidents
([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]) belonging to the connotation of master. He
speaks of the members of an organized body (wing, head, foot) as
examples of _Ad Aliquid_; while in other treatises, he determines
very clearly that these members presuppose, as a _prius naturâ_, the
complete organism whereof they are parts, and that the name of each
member connotes the performance of, or aptitude to perform, a certain
special function: now, such aptitude cannot exist unless the whole
organism be held together in co-operative agency, so that if this
last condition be wanting, the names, head, eye, foot, can no longer
be applied to the separate members, or at least can only be applied
equivocally or metaphorically.[101] It would seem therefore that the
functioning _something_ is here the Essence, and that all its
material properties are accidents ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]).

[Footnote 95: Categor. p. 6, b. 12, p. 11, a. 24; Topic. iv. p. 124,
b. 16. Compare also Topica, iv. p. 121, a. 1, and the Scholia
thereupon, p. 278, b. 12-16, Br.; in which Scholia Alexander feels
the difficulty of enrolling a generic term as [Greek: pro/s ti],
while the specific terms comprised under it are not [Greek: pro/s
ti]; and removes the difficulty by suggesting that [Greek:
e)pistê/mê] may be at once both [Greek: poio/tês] and [Greek: pro/s
ti]; and that as [Greek: poio/tês] (not as [Greek: pro/s ti]) it may
be the genus including [Greek: mousikê\] and [Greek: geômetri/a],
which are not [Greek: pro/s ti], but [Greek: poio/têtes].]

[Footnote 96: Categor. p. 6, b. 30, p. 7, b. 12.]

[Footnote 97: Categor. p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\
o)nomatopoiei=n I)/sôs a)nagkai=on, e)a\n mê\ kei/menon ê)=| o)/noma
pro\s o(\ _oi)kei/ôs_ a)\n a)podothei/ê.]]

[Footnote 98: Categor. p. 7, a. 31. [Greek: e)/ti d' e)a\n me/n ti
oi)kei/ôs a)podido/menon ê)=| pro\s o(\ le/getai, pa/ntôn
periairoume/nôn tô=n a)/llôn o(/sa _sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti/,
kataleipome/nou de\ mo/nou tou/tou pro\s o(\ a)pedo/thê oi)kei/ôs,
a)ei\ pro\s au)to\ r(êthê/setai, oi(=on o( dou=los e)a\n pro\s
despo/tên le/gêtai, periairoume/nôn tô=n _a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn o(/sa
sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti\ _tô=| despo/tê|_ oi(=on to\ di/podi ei)=nai kai\
to\ e)pistê/mês dektikô=| kai\ _to\ a)nthrô/pô|_, kataleipome/nou de\
mo/nou tou= despo/tên ei)=nai, a)ei\ o( dou=los pro\s au)to\
r(êthêsetai.]

This is not only just and useful in regard to accuracy of
predication, but deserves attention also in another point of view. In
general, it would be said that _man_ and _biped_ belonged to the
Essence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); and the being a master to the Accidents
or Accompaniments ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]). Here the case is reversed;
man and biped are the accidents or accompaniments; master is the
Essence. What is connoted by the term _master_ is here the essential
idea, that which is bound up with the idea connoted by _servant_;
while the connotation of _man_ or _biped_ sinks into the character of
an accessory or accompaniment. The master might possibly not be a
man, but a god; the Delphian Apollo (Euripid. Ion, 132), and the
Corinthian Aphrodité, had each many slaves belonging to them.
Moreover, even if every master were a man, the qualities connoted by
_man_ are here accidental, as not being included in those connoted by
the term master. Compare Metaphysica, [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 32;
Topica, i. p. 102, a. 18.]

[Footnote 99: That Plato was fully sensible to the necessity of
precision and appropriateness in designating the _Correlatum_
belonging to each _Relatum_, may be seen by the ingenious reasoning
in the Platonic Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where [Greek: despo/tês] and
[Greek: dou=los] are also the illustrative examples employed.]

[Footnote 100: Categor. p. 8, a. 35, b. 20.]]

[Footnote 101: See Politica, i. p. 1253, a. 18: [Greek: kai\ pro/tero
dê\ tê=| phu/sei po/lis ê)\ oi)ki/a kai\ e(/kastos ê(mô=n e)sti/n;
to\ ga\r o(/lon pro/teron a)nagkai=on ei)=nai tou= me/rous;
a)nairoume/nou ga\r tou= o(/lou ou)k e)/stai pou=s ou)de\ chei\r, ei)
mê\ o(mônu/môs, ô(/sper ei)/ tis le/gei **tê\n lithi/nên;
diaphtharei=sa ga\r e)/stai toiau/tê. pa/nta de\tô=| e)/rgô|
ô(/ristai kai\ tê=| duna/mei, ô/ste _mêke/ti toiau=ta o)/nta ou)
lekte/on ta\ au)ta ei)=nai_ a)ll' o(mô/numa]; also p. 1254, a. 9:
[Greek: to/ te ga\r mo/rion ou) mo/non a)/llou e)sti\ mo/rion, a)lla\
kai\ a)/llou].

Compare De Animâ, ii. 1, p. 412, b. 20; Meteorologic. iv. p. 390, a.
12.

The doctrine enunciated in these passages is a very important one, in
the Aristotelian philosophy.

Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 182) touches upon this confusion
of the Categories, but faintly and partially.]

In the fourth book of the Metaphysica, Aristotle gives an explanation
of _Ad Aliquid_ different from, and superior to, that which we read
in the Categoriæ; treating it, not as one among many distinct
Categories, but as implicated with all the Categories, and taking a
different character according as it is blended with one or the
other--_Essentia_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, &c.[102] He
there, also, enumerates as one of the varieties of _Relata_, what
seems to go beyond the limit, or at least beyond the direct
denotation, of the Categories; for, having specified, as one variety,
_Relata Numero_, and, as another, _Relata secundum actionem et
passionem ([Greek: to\ thermantiko\n pro\s to\ thermanto/n], &c.), he
proceeds to a third variety, such as the _mensurabile_ with reference
to _mensura_, the _scibile_ with reference to _scientia_, the
_cogitabile_ with reference to _cogitatio_; and in regard to this
third variety, he draws a nice distinction. He says that _mensura_
and _cogitatio_ are _Ad Aliquid_, not because they are themselves
related to _mensurabile_ and _cogitabile_, but because _mensurabile_
and _cogitabile_ are related to them.[103] You cannot say (he thinks)
that mensura is referable to the _mensurabile_, or _cogitatio_ to the
_cogitabile_, because that would be repeating the same word twice
over--_mensura est illius cujus est mensura_--_cogitatio est illius
cujus est cogitatio._ So that he regards _mensura_ and _cogitatio_ as
_Correlata_, rather than as _Relata_; while _mensurabile_ and
_cogitabile_ are the _Relata_ to them. But in point of fact, the
distinction is not important; of the relative pair there may be one
which is more properly called the _Correlatum_; yet both are alike
relative.

[Footnote 102: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 27-32. At the same
time we must remark, that while Aristotle enumerates [Greek: to\
u(pe/rechon] and [Greek: to\ u(perecho/menon] under [Greek: Pro/s
ti], he had just before (a. 25) ranked [Greek: to\ me/ga kai\ to\
mikro/n, to\ mei=zon kai\ to\ e(/latton], under the general head
[Greek: Poso/n]--as [Greek: posou= pa/thê kath' au(ta/].]

[Footnote 103: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1021, a. 26, b. 3; also I. p.
1056, b. 34. Bonitz in his note (p. 262) remarks that the distinction
here drawn by Aristotle is not tenable; and I agree with him that it
is not. But it coincides with what Aristotle asserts in other words
in the Categoriæ; viz., that to be _simul naturâ_ is not true of
_all_ Relata, but only of the greater part of them; that [Greek: to\
ai)sthêto\n] is [Greek: pro/teron tê=s ai)sthê/seôs], and [Greek: to\
e)pistêto\n pro/teron tê=s e)pistê/mês] (Categor. p. 7, b. 23; p. 8,
a. 10). As I have mentioned before (p. 71 n.), Simplikius, in the
Scholia (p. 65, b. 14), points out that Aristotle has not been
careful here to observe his own precept of selecting [Greek:
oi)kei/ôs] the correlative term. He ought to have stated the
potential as correlating with the potential, the actual with the
actual. If he had done this, the [Greek: sunu/parxis tô=n pro/s ti]
would have been seen to be true in all cases. Eudorus noticed a
similar inadvertence of Aristotle in the case of [Greek: pte/ron] and
[Greek: pterôto/n] (Schol. 63, a. 43). See 'Plato and the Other
Companions of Sokrates,' vol. ii. p. 330, note x.

I transcribe a curious passage of Leibnitz, bearing on the same
question:--"On réplique maintenant, que la vérité du mouvement est
indépendante de l'observation: et qu'un vaisseau peut avancer, sans
que celui qui est dedans s'en aperçoive. Je réponds, que le mouvement
est indépendant de l'observation: mais qu'il _n'est point indépendant
de l'observabilité_. Il n'y a point de mouvement, quand il n'y a
point de changement _observable_. Et même quand il n'y a point de
changement observable, il n'y a point de changement du tout. Le
contraire est fondé sur la supposition d'un Espace réel absolu, que
j'ai réfuté demonstrativement par le principe du besoin d'une Raison
suffisante des choses." (Correspondence with Clarke, p. 770.
Erdmann's edition.)]

If we compare together the various passages in which Aristotle cites
and applies the Ten Categories (not merely in the treatise before us,
but also in the Metaphysica, Physica, and elsewhere), we shall see
that he cannot keep them apart steadily and constantly; that the same
predicate is referred to one head in one place, and to another head
in another: what is here spoken of as belonging to _Actio_ or
_Passio_, will be treated in another place as an instance of _Quale_
or _Ad Aliquid_; even the derivative noun [Greek: e(/xis] (_habitus_)
does not belong to the Category [Greek: e)/chein] (_Habere_), but
sometimes to _Quale_, sometimes to _Ad Aliquid_.[104] This is
inevitable; for the predicates thus differently referred have really
several different aspects, and may be classified in one way or
another, according as you take them in this or that aspect. Moreover,
this same difficulty of finding impassable lines of demarcation would
still be felt, even if the Categories, instead of the full list of
Ten, were reduced to the smaller list of the four principal
Categories--Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation; a reduction
which has been recommended by commentators on Aristotle as well as by
acute logicians of modern times. Even these four cannot be kept
clearly apart: the predicates which declare Quantity or Quality must
at the same time declare or imply Relation; while the predicates
which declare Relation must also imply the _fundamentum_ either of
Quantity or of Quality.[105]

[Footnote 104: Aristot. Categor. p. 6, b. 2; p. 8, b. 27.]

[Footnote 105: See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq. The
remarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i.
ch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged
philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well
deserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr.
Mill says:--"It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked
out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to
penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the _rationale_ even of these
common distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the
enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are
omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads."
(Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol.
p. 48, b. 10 Br.: [Greek: a)thetou=ntes tê\n diai/resin ô(s polla\
pariei=san kai\ mê\ perilamba/nousan, ê)\ kai\ pa/lin pleona/zousan.]
And Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be
ranked often under more than one head.) "That could not be a very
comprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude
action, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same
objection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and
Ubi (or position in space); _while the distinction between the latter
and Situs ([Greek: Kei=sthai]) is merely verbal_. The incongruity of
erecting into a _summum genus_ the tenth Category is manifest. On the
other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but
Substances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place
sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy,
fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment,
conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed
by the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and
the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of
such of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly
so placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind,
wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be
counted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among
substances or among attributes." Among the many deficiencies of the
Aristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more
glaring than the imperfect conception of [Greek: Pro/s ti] (the
Relative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category [Greek:
Kei=sthai] (badly translated by commentators _Situs_, from which
Aristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: [Greek:
to\ de\ a)nakei=sthai ê)\ e(sta/nai ê)\ kathê=sthai au)ta\ me\n ou)k
ei)si\ the/seis]) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mill's remark,
that it is only verbally distinguished from [Greek: Pou=], _Ubi_.
[Greek: Kei=sthai] is intended to mean _posture_, _attitude_, &c. It
is a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer.--He
is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, [Greek: pu\x protei/nôn],
&c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In
the market-place, in the palæstra, &c. [Greek: Kei=sthai] (as
Aristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily
distinguished from [Greek: Pro/s ti]: for the abstract and general
word [Greek: _the/sis_] (_position_) is reckoned by Aristotle under
Greek: Pro/s ti], though the _paronyma_ [Greek: a)nakei=sthai,
e(sta/nai, kathê=sthai] are affirmed not to be [Greek: the/seis], but
to come under the separate Category [Greek: _Kei=sthai_]. But [Greek:
Kei=sthai] is clearly distinguishable from [Greek: Pou=] _Ubi_.

Again, to Mr. Mill's question, "In what Category are we to place
sensations or other states of mind--hope, fear, sound, smell, pain,
pleasure, thought, judgment," &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I
apprehend) that they come under the Category either of _Quale_ or of
_Pati_--[Greek: Poio/têtes] or [Greek: Pa/thê]. They are attributes
or modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of
which we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a [Greek: pa/thos],
and we speak of Kallias as [Greek: pa/schôn ti]; if it be a durable
disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations,
it is [Greek: poio/tês], and we describe Kallias as [Greek: poio/s
tis] (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental
and bodily conditions ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ tou/tois kai\ kata\ tê\n
psuchê\n pathêtikai\ poio/têtes kai\ pa/thê le/getai.]--p. 9, b. 33).
The line is dubious and difficult between [Greek: pa/thos] and
[Greek: poio/tês], but one or other of the two will comprehend all
the mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have
admitted that "feelings are to be counted among realities," except as
they are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some
other _Hic Aliquis_--one or many. He would consider feelings as
attributes belonging to these [Greek: Prô=tai Ou)si/ai]; and so in
fact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified
the Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the
Substance to which they belong.

Mr. Mill's classification of Nameable Things is much better and more
complete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into
full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective
points of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of
Relativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either
confuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and
inadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the
Categories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has
a place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He
takes account of _himself_ only as an object--as one among the
[Greek: prô=tai ou)si/ai], or individuals, along with Sokrates and
Kallias.]

The most capital distinction, however, which is to be found among the
Categories is that of Essence or Substance from all the rest. This is
sometimes announced as having a standing _per se_; as not only
logically distinguishable, but really separable from the other nine,
if we preserve the Aristotelian list of ten,[106] or from the other
three, if we prefer the reduced list of four. But such real
separation cannot be maintained. The _Prima Essentia_ (we are told)
is indispensable as a Subject, but cannot appear as Predicate; while
all the rest can and do so appear. Now we see that this definition is
founded upon the function enacted by each of them in predication, and
therefore presupposes the fact of predication, which is in itself a
Relation. The Category of Relation is thus implied, in declaring what
the First Essence is, together with some _predicabilia_ as
correlates, though it is not yet specified what the _predicabilia_
are. But besides this, the distinction drawn by Aristotle, between
First and Second Essence or Substance, abolishes the marked line of
separation between Substance and Quality, making the former shade
down into the latter. The distinction recognizes a more or less in
Substance, which graduation Aristotle expressly points out, stating
that the Species is _more_ Substance or Essence, and that Genus
_less_ so. We see thus that he did not conceive Substance (apart from
attributes) according to the modern view, as that which exists
_without_ the mind (excluding _within_ the mind or _relation_ to the
mind); for in that there can be no graduation. That which is without
the mind, must also be within; and that which is within must also be
without; the subject and the object correlating. This implication of
within and without understood, there is then room for graduation,
according as the one or the other aspect may be more or less
prominent. Aristotle, in point of fact, confines himself to the
mental or logical work of predication, to the conditions thereof, and
to the component terms whereby the mind accomplishes that act. When
he speaks of the First Essence or Substance, without the Second, all
that he can say about it positively is to call it _Unum numero_ and
indivisible:[107] even thus, he is compelled to introduce unity,
measure, and number, all of which belong to the two Categories of
Quantity and Relation; and yet still the First Essence or Substance
remains indeterminate. We only begin to determine it when we call it
by the name of the Second Substance or Essence; which name connotes
certain attributes, the attributes thus connoted being of the essence
of the Species; that is, unless they be present, no individual would
be considered as belonging to the Species, or would be called by the
specific name.[108] When we thus, however, introduce attributes, we
find ourselves not merely in the Category of _Substantia_
(_Secunda_), but also in that of _Qualitas_. The boundary between
_Substantia_ and _Qualitas_ disappears; the latter being partially
contained in the former. The Second Substance or Essence includes
attributes or Qualities belonging to the Essence. In fact, the Second
Substance or Essence, when distinguished from the First, is both here
and elsewhere characterized by Aristotle, as being not Substance at
all, but Quality,[109] though when considered as being in implication
with the First, it takes on the nature of Substance and becomes
substantial or essential Quality. The Differentia belongs thus both
to Substance and to Quality (_quale quid_), making up as complement
that which is designated by the specific name.[110]

[Footnote 106: Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as [Greek:
chôristo/n], the other Categories being not [Greek: chôrista/]
(Metaphys. Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to
distinguish whether he means by the term [Greek: chôrista\]
"_sejuncta re_", or "_sejuncta notione solâ_." See Bonitz ad
Metaphysic. ([Greek: D]. p. 1017), p. 244.]

[Footnote 107: Categor. p. 3, b. 12: [Greek: a)/tomon ga\r kai\ e(\n
a)rithmô=| to\ dêlou/meno/n e)stin.] Compare Metaphysic. N. p. 1087,
b. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.]

[Footnote 108: Hobbes says:--"Now that accident (_i.e._ attribute)
for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which
denominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as
rationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing,
and extension the essence of a body" (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii.
s. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and
philosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book I.
ch. vi. ss. 2-3; ch. vii. s. 5.]

[Footnote 109: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn
ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as
to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=on, ou) mê\n
a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon _poio/n ti sêmai/nei--poia\n ga/r tina
ou)si/an_ sêmai/nei] (b. 20).

Metaphysic. Z. p. 1038, b. 35: [Greek: phanero\n o(/ti ou)the\n tô=n
katho/lou u(parcho/ntôn ou)si/a e)sti/, kai\ o(/ti ou)the\n sêmai/nei
tô=n koinê=| katêgoroume/nôn to/de ti, a)lla\ toio/nde.] Compare
Metaphys. M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a.
9.

That which is called [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ is
called [Greek: tri/tê ou)si/a] in Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. p. 1043, a.
18. In Ethic. Nikom. Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., the _generalissima_ are
called [Greek: prô=ta], and particulars are called [Greek:
e)/schata]. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), "[Greek: ta\
e)/schata] sunt res singulæ, quæ et ipsæ sunt extremæ, ratione mentis
nostræ, ab universis ad singula delabentis." Patricius remarks upon
the different sense of the terms [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a] in the
Categoriæ and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p.
21).]

[Footnote 110: Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 13: [Greek:
schedo\n dê\ kata\ du/o tro/pous le/goit' a)\n to\ poio/n, kai\
tou/tôn e(/na to\n kuriô/taton; prô/tê me\n ga\r poiotê\s ê( tê=s
ou)si/as diaphora/.] Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See
Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.

The remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp.
52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of
Differentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be
Neither and Both--[Greek: ou)de/tera kai\ a)mpho/tera] (Plato,
Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something
intermediate between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: poio/tês], or
between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: sumbebêko/s].]

We see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between
the Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so
impassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as
some thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as
admitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps
down to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete
manifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete
manifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or
understood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity,
Quality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition of
_Substantia_ given by Spinoza--"_quod in se est et per se
concipitur_." It can no more be conceived or described without some
of the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described
without it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two
negative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it
cannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, the **Subject of all
Predicates: it is _Unum numero_ and indivisible.[111] Not one of
these four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we
have in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to
them. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is,
relatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without
the Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by
a Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of
Substance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor
can be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic
notion of Predicate.[112] All three lie together at the bottom of the
analytical process, as the last findings and residuum.

[Footnote 111: Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.]

[Footnote 112: Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by
[Greek: kath' au(to/--kath' au(ta/], in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p.
73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary
to include in [Greek: to\ kath' au(to\] of the Category [Greek:
Ou)si/a], all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation
of that Category understood.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his
translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the
Categories generally, and especially of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], as
simply naming (_i.e._ giving a proper name), and doing nothing more.
I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the terms _anterior_ and
_posterior_ can mean nothing more than _logical_ anteriority and
posteriority.

"Mais comment classer les mots?--C'est à la réalité seule qu'il faut
le demander; à la réalité dont le langage n'est que le réflet, dont
les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des
individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-mêmes, et se
groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des
espèces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant l'individu,
l'être individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu'il est
possible d'en dire en tant qu'être, on aura les classes les plus
générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme
français, les attributions, qu'il est possible de lui appliquer.
Voilà tout le fondement des Catégories.--Ce n'est pas du reste, une
classification des choses à la manière de celles de l'histoire
naturelle, qu'il s'agit de faire en logique: c'est une simple
énumération de tous les points de vue, d'**où l'esprit peut
considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport à l'esprit
lui-même, mais par rapport à leur réalité et à leurs
appellations.--Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix
significations principales des mots.--La Catégorie de la Substance
est à la tête de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la première,
la plus essentielle, marque d'un être, c'est d'être. Cela revient à
dire qu'avant tout, l'être est, l'être existe. Par suite les mots qui
expriment la substance sont antérieurs à tous les autres et sont les
plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots là participeront en
quelque sorte à cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la
nature. Mais de même que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant
par eux seuls forment des espèces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi
une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de même en
substance première et substance seconde.--Les espèces et les genres,
s'ils expriment la substance, ne l'expriment pas dans toute sa
pureté; c'est **déjà de la substance qualifié, comme le dit
Aristote.--Il n'y a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des
espèces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n'existent
pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence
se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi,
tout comme ils expriment l'existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes
de mots formeront les autres Catégories.--Ces modifications, ces
accidents, de l'individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n'en
reconnaît pas davantage.--**Voilà donc les dix Catégories: les dix
seules attributions possibles. _Par la première, on nomme les
individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les
qualifie._ On dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu, et ensuite quel il
est." Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d'Aristote, Preface, pp.
lxxii.-lxxvii.]

Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete
sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the
Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The
noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when
pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception
than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these
make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing
complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the
conception, raised by the substantive named alone ([Greek: a)/neu
sumplokê=s]), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we
added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from
this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it
would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to
come; a mere point of commencement or departure,[113] known only by
the various lines which may be drawn from it; a _substratum_ for
various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known
only as a _substratum_, is known only relatively to a superstructure
to come; the one is _Relatum_, the other _Correlatum_, and the
mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There
may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience,
belonging to the _substratum_, because it remains numerically one and
the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is
nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an
ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is
simultaneity _by nature_ (according to Aristotle's own definition of
the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all
imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is
the cause of the others.[114]

[Footnote 113: Plato would not admit the point as as anything more
than [Greek: a)rchê\n grammê=s] (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a.
21).]

[Footnote 114: Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: [Greek: phu/sei de\
a(/ma, o(/sa a)ntistre/phei kata\ tê\n tou= ei)=nai a)kolou/thêsin,
mêdamô=s de\ ai)/tion tha/teron thate/rô| tou= ei)=nai e)stin, oi(=on
e)pi\ tou= diplasi/ou kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos;] &c.]

When Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were
non-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must
understand what he means by the term _first_. That term bears, in
this treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here
it means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the
extreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence,
in the Categories, is a _Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]),
illustrated by the examples _hic homo_, _hic equus_. Now, as thus
explained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second
Substance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of
This man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the
attributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental
attributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The
First Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as
a mere _substratum_ without Second Substance and without any
Accidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet
indeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what
its Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are.
Being an individual (_Unum numero_), it unites in itself both the
essential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes
peculiar to itself.[115] It is already understood as including
attributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare
([Greek: dêlou=n--a)podido/nai][116]) what these attributes are. The
First or Complete _Ens_ embodies in itself all the Predicaments,
though as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating
adjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of
existence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away
either one of the three, and the First _Ens_ disappears. But in
regard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority,
founded on convenience and facility of understanding. The _Hoc
Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which intimates in general outline a
certain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not
yet know what they are--being as it were a skeleton--comes naturally
as Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and
specifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential
attributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a
specific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential
attributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a
specific name connoting other attributes.[117] The essential
characters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are
domiciliated foreigners.[118]

[Footnote 115: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8.
[Greek: To\ d' a)/pan to/de Kalli/as ê)\ Sôkra/tês e)sti\n ô(/sper ê(
sphai=ra ê( chalkê= ê(di/, o( d' a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ zô=|on ô(/sper
sphai=ra chalkê= o(lôs.--to\ d' a(/pan ê)/dê to\ toio/nde ei)=dos e)n
tai=sde tai=s sarxi\ kai\ o)stoi=s Kalli/as kai\ Sôkra/tês; kai\
e(/teron me\n dia\ tê\n u(/lên, e(/tera ga/r, tau)to\ de\ tô=|
ei)/dei; a)/tomon ga\r to\ ei)=dos.]]

[Footnote 116: Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\
ta\s prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê
deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na _ga\r dêloi=_ tê\n prô/tên
ou)si/an tô=n katêgoroume/nôn.] &c.

[Footnote 117: Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on to\
badi/zon e(/tero/n ti o(\n badi/zon e)sti\ kai\ leuko/n, ê( d'
ou)si/a, kai\ o(/sa to/de ti sêmai/nei, ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o)/nta
o(/per e)sti/n.] Also p. 83, a. 31. [Greek: kai\ mê\ ei)=nai/ ti
leuko/n, o(\ ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o(\n leuko/n e)stin]: also p. 83, b.
22.]

[Footnote 118: Categor. p. 2, b. 31: [Greek: to\n ga/r tina
a)nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\
ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs_ a)podô/sei--tô=n d' a)/llôn o(/ ti
a)\n a)podidô=| tis, _a)llotri/ôs_ e)stai a)podedôkô/s], &c.]

It is thus that Aristotle has dealt with Ontology, in one of the four
distinct aspects thereof, which he distinguishes from each other;
that is, in the distribution of _Entia_ according to their logical
order, and the reciprocal interdependence, in predication. _Ens_ is a
multivocal word, neither strictly univocal nor altogether equivocal.
It denotes (as has been stated above) not a generic aggregate,
divisible into species, but an analogical aggregate, starting from
one common terminus and ramifying into many derivatives, having no
other community except that of relationship to the same
terminus.[119] The different modes of _Ens_ are distinguished by the
degree or variety of such relationship. The _Ens Primum_, _Proprium_,
_Completum_, is (in Aristotle's view) the concrete individual; with a
defined essence or essential constituent attributes ([Greek: ti/ ê(/n
ei)=nai]), and with unessential accessories or accidents also--all
embodied and implicated in the One _Hoc Aliquid_. In the Categoriæ
Aristotle analyses this _Ens Completum_ (not metaphysically, into
Form and Matter, as we shall find him doing elsewhere, but) logically
into Subject and Predicates. In this logical analysis, the Subject
which can never be a Predicate stands first; next, come the near
kinsmen, Genus and Species (expressed by substantive names, as the
First Substance is), which are sometimes Predicates--as applied to
_Substantia Prima_, sometimes Subjects--in regard to the extrinsic
accompaniments or accidents;[120] in the third rank, come the more
remote kinsmen, Predicates pure and simple. These are the logical
factors or constituents into which the _Ens Completum_ may be
analysed, and which together make it up as a logical sum-total. But
no one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independent
_locus standi_, apart from the others. Each is relative to the
others; the Subject to its Predicates, not less than the Predicates
to their Subject. It is a mistake to describe the Subject as having a
real standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as something
afterwards tacked on to it. The Subject _per se_ is nothing but a
general potentiality or receptivity for Predicates to come; a
relative general conception, in which the two, Predicate and Subject,
are jointly implicated as _Relatum_ and _Correlatum_.[121]

[Footnote 119: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 22. [Greek:
kath' au(ta\ de\ ei)=nai le/getai o(/saper sêmai/nei ta\ schê/mata
tê=s katêgori/as; o)sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai
sêmai/nei.]]

[Footnote 120: Categor. p. 3, a. 1: [Greek: ô(s de/ ge ai( prô=tai
ou)si/ai pro\s ta\ a)/lla pa/nta e)/chousin, ou(/tô ta\ ei)/dê kai\
ta\ ge/nê pro\s ta\ loipa\ pa/nta e)/chei; kata\ tou/tôn ga\r pa/nta
ta\ loipa\ katêgorei=tai.]]

[Footnote 121: Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter,
the _metaphysical_ constituents of _Prima Substantia_, _Hoc Aliquid_,
Sokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which
illustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject,
the _logical_ constituents of the same [Greek: su/nolon]. He observes
(not. p. 327, **ad Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1033, b. 19). "Quoniam ex
duabus substantiis, quæ quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit
substantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus,
nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, [Greek:
to/de ti]. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam,
utrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut formæ
definitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero
per se et absolute sit." What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form
is no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the
other--neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In
fact, the explanation given by Aristotle of _Materia_ (Metaph. Z. p.
1028, b. 36) coincides very much with the _Prima Essentia_ of the
Categories, if abstracted from the _Secunda Essentia_. _Materia_ is
called there by Aristotle [Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon, kath' ou(= ta\
a)/lla le/getai. e)kei=no d' au)to\ mêke/ti kat' a)/llo--le/gô d'
u(/lên ê(\ kath' au(tê\n mê/te ti\ mê/te poso\n mê/te a)/llo mêthe\n
le/getai oi(=s ô(/ristai to\ o)/n] (p. 1029, a. 20). [Greek: e)/sti
ga/r ti kath' ou(= katêgorei=tai tou/tôn e(/kaston, ô(=| _to\ ei)=nai
e(/teron_ kai\ tô=n katêgoriô=n e(ka/stê|; ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s
ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\ tê=s u(/lês.]

Aristotle proceeds to say that this Subject--the Subject for all
Predicates, but never itself a Predicate--cannot be the genuine
[Greek: ou)si/a], which must essentially be [Greek: chôristo\n kai\
to\ to/de ti] (p. 1029, a. 28), and which must have a [Greek: ti/
ê)=n ei)=nai] (1029, b. 2). The Subject is in fact not true [Greek:
ou)si/a], but is one of the constituent elements thereof, being
relative to the Predicates as _Correlata_: it is the potentiality for
Predicates generally, as _Materia_ is the potentiality for Forms.]

The logical aspect of Ontology, analysing _Ens_ into a common Subject
with its various classes of Predicates, appears to begin with
Aristotle. He was, as far as we can see, original, in taking as the
point of departure for his theory, the individual man, horse, or
other perceivable object; in laying down this Concrete Particular
with all its outfit of details, as the type of _Ens_ proper, complete
and primary; and in arranging into classes the various secondary
modes of _Ens_, according to their different relations to the primary
type and the mode in which they contributed to make up its
completeness. He thus stood opposed to the Pythagoreans and
Platonists, who took their departure from the Universal, as the type
of full and true Entity;[122] while he also dissented from
Demokritus, who recognized no true _Ens_ except the underlying,
imperceptible, eternal atoms and vacuum. Moreover Aristotle seems to
have been the first to draw up a logical analysis of Entity in its
widest sense, as distinguished from that metaphysical analysis which
we read in his other works; the two not being contradictory, but
distinct and tending to different purposes. Both in the one and in
the other, his principal controversy seems to have been with the
Platonists, who disregarded both individual objects and accidental
attributes; dwelling upon Universals, Genera and Species, as the only
real _Entia_ capable of being known. With the Sophists, Aristotle
contends on a different ground, accusing them of neglecting
altogether the essential attributes, and confining themselves to the
region of accidents, in which no certainty was to be found;[123] in
Plato, he points out the opposite mistake, of confining himself to
the essentials, and ascribing undue importance to the process of
generic and specific subdivision.[124] His own logical analysis takes
account both of the essential and accidental, and puts them in what
he thinks their proper relation. The Accidental ([Greek:
sumbebêko/s]), concomitant, _i.e._ of the essence) is _per se_ not
knowable at all (he contends), nor is ever the object of study
pursued in any science; it is little better than a name, designating
the lowest degree of _Ens_, bordering on _Non-Ens_.[125] It is a term
comprehending all that he includes under his nine last Categories;
yet it is not a term connoting either generic communion, or even so
much as analogical relation.[126] In the treatise now before us, he
does not recognize either that or any other general term as common to
all those nine Categories; each of the nine is here treated as a
_Summum Genus_, having its own mode of relationship, and clinging by
its own separate thread to the Subject. He acknowledges the Accidents
in his classification, not as a class by themselves, but as
subordinated to the Essence, and, as so many threads of distinct,
variable, and irregular accompaniments, attaching themselves to this
constant root, without uniformity or steadiness.[127]

[Footnote 122: Simplikius ad Categ. p. 2, b. 5; Schol. p. 52, a. 1,
Br: [Greek: A)rchu/tas o( Puthagorei=os ou) prosi/etai tê\n nuni\
prokeime/nên tô=n ou)si/ôn diai/resin, a)ll' a)/llên a)nti\ tau/tês
e)kei=nos e)gkri/nei--tô=n me/ntoi Puthagorei/ôn ou)dei\s a)\n
pro/soito tau/tên tê\n diai/resin tô=n prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn
ou)siô=n, o(/ti toi=s katho/lou to\ prô/tôs u(pa/rchein marturou=si,
to\ de\ e)/schaton e)n toi=s meristoi=s a)polei/pousi, kai\ dio/ti
e)n toi=s a(plousta/tois tê\n prô/tên kai\ kuriôta/tên ou)si/an
a)poti/thentai, a)ll' ou)ch ô(s nu=n le/getai e)n toi=s sunthe/tois
kai\ ai)sthêtoi=s, kai\ dio/ti ta\ ge/nê kai\ ta\ ei)/dê o)/nta
nomi/zousin, a)ll' ou)chi\ sugkephalaiou/mena tai=s chôristai=s
e)pinoi/ais.]]

[Footnote 123: Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 15: [Greek: ei)si\ ga\r oi(
tô=n sophistô=n lo/goi peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ô(s ei)pei=n ma/lista
pa/ntôn], &c.; also K. p. 1061, b. 8; Analytic. Poster. i. p. 71, b.
10.]

[Footnote 124: Analytic. Priora, i. p. 46, a. 31.]

[Footnote 125: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1026, b. 13-21. [Greek: ô(/sper
ga\r o)no/mati mo/non to\ sumbebêko/s--phai/netai ga\r to\
sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos.]]

[Footnote 126: Physica, iii. 1, p. 200, b. 34. [Greek: koino\n d'
e)pi\ tou/tôn ou)de/n e)sti labei=n], &c.]

[Footnote 127: See the explanation given of [Greek: to\ o)\n kata\
sumbebêko\s] in Metaphys. E. pp. 1026 b., 1027 a. This is the sense
in which Aristotle most frequently and usually talks of [Greek:
sumbebêko/s], though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant
and inseparable accompaniment or Accident, if it be not included in
the Essence (_i. e._ not connoted by the specific name); thus, to
have the three angles equal to two right angles is a [Greek:
sumbebêko\s] of the triangle, Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 80. The
proper sense in which he understands [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] is as
opposed to [Greek: to\ a)ei\ e)x a)na/gkês], as well as [Greek: to\
ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]. See Metaphys. K. p. 1065, a. 2; Analyt. Poster.
i. p. 74, b. 12, p. 75, a. 18.

It is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable. See
the valuable chapter (ii) in Brentano, Von der Bedeutung des Seienden
nach Aristoteles (pp. 8-21), in which the meaning of [Greek: to\
sumbebêko\s] in Aristotle is clearly set forth.]

In discriminating and arranging the Ten Categories, Trendelenburg
supposes that Aristotle was guided, consciously or unconsciously, by
grammatical considerations, or by a distinction among the parts of
speech. It should be remembered that what are now familiarly known as
the eight parts of speech, had not yet been distinguished or named in
the time of Aristotle, nor did the distinction come into vogue before
the time of the Stoic and Alexandrine grammarians, more than a
century after him. _Essentia_ or _Substantia_, the first Category,
answers (so Trendelenburg thinks[128]) to the Substantive; _Quantum_
and _Quale_ represent the Adjective; _Ad Aliquid_, the comparative
Adjective, of which _Quantum_ and _Quale_ are the positive degree;
_Ubi_ and _Quando_ the Adverb; _Jacere_, _Habere_, _Agere_, _Pati_
the Verb. Of the last four, _Agere_ and _Pati_ correspond to the
active and passive voices of the Verb; _Jacere_ to the neuter or
intransitive Verb; and _Habere_ to the peculiar meaning of the Greek
perfect--the present result of a past action.

[Footnote 128: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 23, 211.]

This general view, which Trendelenburg himself conceives as having
been only guiding and not decisive or peremptory in the mind of
Aristotle,[129] appears to me likely and plausible, though Bonitz and
others have strongly opposed it. We see from Aristotle's own
language, that the grammatical point of view had great effect upon
his mind; that the form (_e.g._) of a substantive implied in his view
a mode of signification belonging to itself, which was to be taken
into account in arranging and explaining the Categories.[130] I
apprehend that Aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his
Categories by analysing various complete sentences, which would of
course include substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. It is
also remarkable that Aristotle should have designated his four last
Categories by the indication of verbs, the two immediately preceding
by adverbs, the second and third by adjectives, and the first by a
substantive. There remains the important Category _Ad Aliquid_, which
has no part of speech corresponding to it specially. Even this
Category, though not represented by any part of speech, is
nevertheless conceived and defined by Aristotle in a very narrow way,
with close reference to the form of expression, and to the
requirement of a noun immediately following, in the genitive or
dative case. And thus, where there is no special part of speech, the
mind of Aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from
grammatical and syntactic forms.

[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 209: "Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den
erfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die
grammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht." P. 216:
"der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt."]

[Footnote 130: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn
ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| _schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as_
to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, ou) mê\n
a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon poio/n ti sêmai/nei.] &c.]

We may illustrate the ten Categories of Aristotle by comparing them
with the four Categories of the Stoics. During the century succeeding
Aristotle's death, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus (principally the
latter), having before them what he had done, proposed a new
arrangement for the complete distribution of Subject and Predicates.
Their distribution was quadruple instead of decuple. Their first
Category was [Greek: ti/], _Aliquid_ or _Quiddam_--[Greek: to\
u(pokei/menon], the _Substratum_ or Subject. Their second was [Greek:
poio/n], _Quale_ or Quality. Their third was [Greek: pô\s e)/chon],
_certo Modo se habens_. Their fourth was, [Greek: pro/s ti pô\s
e)/chon], _Ad Aliquid certo Modo se habens_.[131]

[Footnote 131: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: [Greek: ta\
pô\s e)/chonta tri/ta ti/thesthai]. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p.
48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: [Greek: Oi( Stôi+koi\ ei)s e)la/ttona
suste/llein a)xiou=si to\n tô=n prô/tôn genô=n a)rithmo/n kai/ tina
e)n toi=s a)la/ttosin u(pêllagme/na paralamba/nousi. poiou=ntai ga\r
tê\n tomê\n ei)s te/ssara, ei)s u(pokei/mena, kai\ poia\, kai\ pô\s
e)/chonta, kai\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chonta.]

It would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the
Stoics recognized one grand [Greek: **ge/nos] comprehending all the
above four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi.
1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He
admits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme
[Greek: ge/nos] comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but
treated all the ten as [Greek: prô=ta ge/nê], under an analogous
aggregate. I cannot but think that the **Stoics looked upon their
four [Greek: ge/nê] in the same manner; for I do not see what they
could find more comprehensive to rank generically above [Greek:
ti/].]

We do not possess the advantage (which we have in the case of
Aristotle) of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by
its authors. We know it only through the abridgment of Diogenes
Laertius, together with incidental remarks and criticisms, chiefly
adverse, by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, and some
Aristotelian commentators. As far as we can make out upon this
evidence, it appears that the first Stoic Category corresponded with
the [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a], First Essence or Substance of Aristotle.
It was exclusively Subject, and could never become Predicate; but it
was indispensable as Subject, to the three other Predicates. Its
meaning was concrete and particular; for we are told that all general
notions or conceptions were excluded by the Stoics from this
Category,[132] and were designated as [Greek: Ou)/tina],
Non-Individuals, or Non-Particulars. _Homo_ was counted by them, not
under the Category [Greek: ti/], _Quid_, but under the Category
[Greek: _poio/n_], _Quale_; in its character of predicate determining
the Subject [Greek: ti/s] or [Greek: ti/]. The Stoic Category _Quale_
thus included the Aristotelian Second Essences or Substances, and
also the Aristotelian _differentia_. _Quale_ was a _species_-making
Category ([Greek: ei)dopoio/s]).[133] It declared what was the
Essence of the Subject [Greek: ti/]--the essential qualities or
attributes, but also the derivative manifestations thereof,
coinciding with what is called the _proprium_ in Porphyry's Eisagoge.
It therefore came next in order immediately after [Greek: ti/]: since
the Essence of the Subject must be declared, before you proceed to
declare its Accidents.

[Footnote 132: Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: [Greek:
sumparalêpte/on de\ kai\ tê\n sunê/theian tô=n Stôi+kô=n peri\ tô=n
genikô=n poiô=n, pô=s ai( ptô/seis kat' au)tou\s prophe/rontai, kai\
pô=s _ou)/tina_ ta\ koina\ par' au)toi=s le/getai, kai\ o(/pôs para\
tê\n a)/gnoian tou= mê\ pa=san ou)si/an to/de ti sêmai/nein kai\ to\
_para\ to\n ou)/tina_ so/phisma gi/netai para\ to\ schê=ma tê=s
le/xeôs; oi(=on ei)/ ti/s e)stin e)n A)thê/nais, ou)k e)/stin e)n
Mega/rois; _ o( ga\r a)/nthrôpos ou)/tis e)sti/n, ou) ga/r e)sti/ tis
o( koino/s_, ô(s tina\ de\ au)to\n e)la/bomen e)n tô=| lo/gô|, kai\
para\ tou=to to\ o)/noma tou=to e)/schen o( lo/gos ou)/tis
klêthei/s.]

Compare Schol. p. 45**, a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as
well as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of
departure [Greek: to\ **deu/teron u(pokei/menon], not [Greek: to\
prô=ton u(pokei/menon ( = tê\n a)/poion u(/lên)].]

[Footnote 133: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De
Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67.
Br. [Greek: Poia\] were distributed by the Stoics into three
varieties; and the abstract word [Greek: Poio/tês], in the Stoic
sense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these
three varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that [Geek:
poio/tês] had a narrower extension than [Greek: poio/n]: there were
[Greek: poia\] without any [Greek: poiotê\s] corresponding to them.
To the third Category, [Greek: Pô\s e)/chonta], which was larger and
more varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding;
nor to the fourth Category, [Greek: Pro/s ti]. Hence, we may see one
reason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term [Greek:
poio/têtes] to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the
[Greek: poio/têtes tô=n sôma/tôn] were themselves [Greek: sô/mata] or
[Greek: sômatika/]: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix.
p. 463, seq. ed. Kühn). The Stoics considered these qualities as
[Greek: a)e/ras tina/s], or [Greek: pneu/mata], &c., spiritual or
gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.

It is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the
evidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp.
67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between [Greek:
poia\] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta]. The Stoics considered [Greek:
poio/tês] to be [Greek: du/namis plei/stôn e)poistikê\ sumptôma/tôn,
ô(s ê( phro/nêsis tou= te phroni/môs peripatei=n kai\ tou= phron/môs
diale/gesthai] (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these [Greek: sumptô/mata]
were included under [Greek: poio/n], so that [Greek: o( phroni/môs
peripatô=n, o( pu\x protei/nôn] and [Greek: o( tre/chôn], were
[Greek: poioi/ tines] (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for
the third Category [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta] to comprehend; although,
according to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most
comprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among
themselves and to have written inconsistently.

Neither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even
Prantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik,
pp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.]

The Third Stoic Category ([Greek: pô\s e)/chon]) comprised a portion
of what Aristotle ranked under _Quale_, and all that he ranked under
_Quantum_, _Ubi_, _Quando_, _Agere_, _Pati_, _Jacere_, _Habere_. The
fourth Stoic Category coincided with the Aristotelian _Ad Aliquid_.
The third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute
or non-relative Accidents; the fourth included what were understood
as Relative Accidents.

The order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and
peremptory. They were not co-ordinate species under one and the same
genus, but superordinate and subordinate,[134] the second
presupposing and attaching to the first; the third, presupposing and
attaching to the first, _plus_ the second; the fourth, presupposing
and attaching to the first, _plus_ the second and third. The first
proposition to be made is, in answer to the question _Quale Quid_?
You answer _Tale Aliquid_, declaring the essential attributes. Upon
this, the next question is put, _Quali Modo se habens_? You answer by
a term of the third Category, declaring one or more of the accidental
attributes non-relative, _Tale Aliquid, tali Modo se habens_. Upon
this, the fourth and last question follows, _Quali Modo se habens ad
alia_? Answer is made by the predicate of the fourth Category, _i.e._
a Relative. _Hic Aliquis--homo_ (1), _niger_ (2), _servus_ (3).

[Footnote 134: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429;
Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: [Greek: ka)kei=no a)/topon to\
su/ntheta poiei=n ta\ ge/nê e)k prote/rôn tinô=n kai\ deute/rôn ô(s
to\ pro/s ti e)k poiou= kai\ pro/s ti.] Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,
25-29.

Porphyry appears to include all [Greek: sumbebêko/ta] under [Greek:
poio\n] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chon]: he gives as examples of the
latter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category [Greek:
kei=sthai] (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a.
30).]

In comparing the ten Aristotelian with the four Stoic Categories we
see that the first great difference is in the extent and
comprehension of _Quale_, which Aristotle restricts on one side (by
distinguishing from it _Essentia Secunda_), and enlarges on the other
(by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the
Essence). The second difference is, that the Stoics did not subdivide
their third Category, but included therein all the matter of six
Aristotelian Categories,[135] and much of the matter of the
Aristotelian _Quale_. Both schemes agree on two points:--1. In taking
as the point of departure the concrete, particular, individual,
Substance. 2. In the narrow, restricted, inadequate conception formed
of the Relative--_Ad Aliquid_.

[Footnote 135: Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the
number of disparates ranked under [Greek: to\ pô\s e)/chon], which
has (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is
curious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the
decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.

Simplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between [Greek: to\
pro/s ti] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chon]; and Trendelenburg,
(pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which,
however, appears to be very obscure.]

Plotinus himself recognizes five _Summa_ or _Prima Genera_,[136] (he
does not call them Categories) _Ens_, _Motus_, _Quies_, _Idem_,
_Diversum_; the same as those enumerated in the Platonic Sophistes.
He does not admit _Quantum_, _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, to be _Prima
Genera_; still less the other Aristotelian Categories. Moreover, he
insists emphatically on the distinction between the intelligible and
the sensible world, which distinction he censures Aristotle for
neglecting. His five _Genera_ he applies directly and principally to
the intelligible world. For the sensible world he admits ultimately
five Catgories; _Substantia_ or _Essentia_ (though he conceives this
as fluctuating between Form, Matter, and the Compound of the two),
_Ad Aliquid_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Motus_. But he doubts whether
_Quantum_, _Quale_, and _Motus_, are not comprehended in _Ad
Aliquid_.[137] He considers, moreover, that Sensible Substance is not
Substance, properly speaking, but only an imitation thereof; a
congeries of non-substantial elements, qualities and matter.[138]
Dexippus,[139] in answering the objections of Plotinus, insists much
on the difference between Aristotle's point of view in the Categoriæ,
in the Physica, and in the Metaphysica. In the Categoriæ, Aristotle
dwells mainly on sensible substances (such as the vulgar understand)
and the modes of naming and describing them.

[Footnote 136: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 2, 8, 14, 16.]

[Footnote 137: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 3. 3. [Greek: ê)\ kai\ tau=ta
ei)s ta\ pro/s ti; periektiko\n ga\r ma=llon.] His idea of Relation
is more comprehensive than that of Aristotle, for he declares that
terms, propositions, discourse, &c., are [Greek: pro/s ti; kath' o(\
sêmantika/] (vi. 3. 19).]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. vi. 3. 8-15.]

[Footnote 139: The second and third books of Dexippus's Dialogue
contain his answers to many of the objections urged by Plotinus.
Aristotle, in the Categoriæ (Dexippus says), accommodates himself
both to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary
conception of [Greek: ou)si/a] entertained by youth or
unphilosophical men--[Greek: ou)/te ga\r peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn, ou)/te
peri\ tô=n genô=n tê=s prô/tês ou)si/as nu=n au)tô=| pro/keitai
le/gein; stocha/zetai ga\r tô=n ne/ôn toi=s a(plouste/rois
e)pakolouthei=n duname/nôn] (p. 49). Compare also pp. 50-54, where
Dexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the
Physica and Metaphysica, with the more obvious and unpretending
thoughts worked out by Aristotle in the Categoriæ. Dexippus gives an
interesting piece of advice to his pupil, that he should vary his
mode of discussing these topics, according as his companions are
philosophical or otherwise--[Greek: e)gô\ me\n ou)=n, ô)= kale\
ka)gathe\ Se/leuke, dogmatikô/teron pro\s Plôti=non a)pantô=, su\
de/, e)pei\ bathu/terai/ pôs ei)si\n ai( lu/seis au(=tai, pro\s me\n
tou=s e)k philosophi/as o(rmôme/nous tai=s toiau/tais a)pantê/sesi
chrô=, pro\s de\ tou\s o)li/ga e)pistame/nous tô=n dogma/tôn tai=s
prochei/rois chrô= dialu/sesin, e)kei=no le/gôn, _o(/ti peri\ po/da
poiei=sthai e)/thos ta\s a)kroa/seis A)ristote/lei;_ dio\ kai\ nu=n
ou)de\n e)/xôthen e)peisa/gei tô=n a)nôte/rô keime/nôn
philosophêma/tôn], &c. (pp. 50, 51).]

Galen also recognizes five Categories; but not the same five as
Plotinus. He makes a new list, formed partly out of the Aristotelian
ten, partly out of the Stoic four:--[Greek: Ou)si/a, poso/n, poio/n,
_pro/s ti_, pro/ ti pô\s e)/chon].[140]

[Footnote 140: Schol. ad Categor. p. 49 a. 30.]

. . . . . .

The latter portion of this Aristotelian treatise, on the Categories
or Predicaments, consists of an Appendix, usually known under the
title of 'Post-Predicamenta;'[141] wherein the following terms or
notions are analysed and explained--_Opposita_, _Prius_, _Simul_,
_Motus_, _Habere_.

[Footnote 141: Andronikus and other commentators supposed the
Post-Predicamenta to have been appended to the Categoriæ by some
later hand. Most of the commentators dissented from this view. The
distinctions and explanations seem all Aristotelian.]

Of _Opposita_, Aristotle reckons four modes, analogous to each other,
yet not different species under the same genus:[142]--1.
_Relative-Opposita_--_Relatum_ and _Correlatum_. 2. _Contraria_.
3. _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. 4. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_.

[Footnote 142: Categ. p. 11, b. 16: [Greek: peri\ de\ tô=n
a)ntikeime/nôn, posachô=s ei)/ôthen a)ntikei=sthai r(ête/on.] See
Simpl. in Schol. p. 81, a. 37-b. 24. Whether Aristotle reckoned
[Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] a true genus or not, was debated among the
commentators. The word [Greek: posachô=s] implies that he did not;
and he treats even the term [Greek: e)nanti/a] as a [Greek:
pollachô=s lego/menon], though it is less wide in its application
than [Greek: a)ntikei/mena], which includes _Relata_ (Metaphys. I. p.
1055, a. 17). He even treats [Greek: ste/rêsis] as a [Greek:
pollachô=s lego/menon] (p. 1055, a. 34).

[Greek: Ai( a)ntithe/seis te/ssares], the four distinct varieties of
[Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] are enumerated by Aristotle in various
other places:--Topic. ii. p. 109, b. 17; p. 113, b. 15; Metaphys. I.
p. 1055, a. 38. In Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, a. 20, two other
varieties are added. Bonitz observes (ad Metaph. p. 247) that
Aristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution of
_Opposita_, "tanquam certum et exploratum, pariter ac causarum
numerum," &c.]

These four modes of opposition have passed from the Categoriæ of
Aristotle into all or most of the modern treatises on Logic. The
three last of the four are usefully classed together, and illustrated
by their contrasts with each other. But as to the first of the four,
I cannot think that Aristotle has been happy in the place which he
has assigned to it. To treat _Relativa_ as a variety of _Opposita_,
appears to me an inversion of the true order of classification;
placing the more comprehensive term in subordination to the less
comprehensive. Instead of saying that Relatives are a variety of the
Opposite, we ought rather to say that Opposites are varieties of the
Relative. We have here another proof of what has been remarked a few
pages above; the narrow and inadequate conception which Aristotle
formed of his _Ad Aliquid_ or the Relative; restricting it to cases
in which the describing phrase is grammatically elliptical.[143] The
three classes last-mentioned by Aristotle (1. _Contraria_, 2.
_Habitus_ and _Privatio_, 3. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_) are truly
_Opposita_; in each there is a different mode of opposition, which it
is good to distinguish from the others. But the _Relatum_ and its
_Correlatum_, as such, are not necessarily _Opposite_ at all; they
are compared or conceived in conjunction with each other; while a
name, called relative, which connotes such comparison, &c., is
bestowed upon each. _Opposita_ fall under this general description,
as parts (together with other parts not _Opposita_) of a larger
whole. They ought properly to be called _Opposite-Relativa_: the
phrase _Relative-Opposita_, as applied to Relatives generally, being
discontinued as incorrect.[144]

[Footnote 143: Categ. p. 11, b. 24.

Ammonius and Simplikius inform us that there was much debate among
the commentators about these four alleged varieties of [Greek:
a)ntikei/mena]; also, that even Aristotle himself had composed a
special treatise (not now extant), [Greek: Peri\ tô=n
A)ntikeime/nôn], full of perplexing [Greek: a)pori/ai], which the
Stoics afterwards discussed without solving (Schol. p. 83, a. 15-48).
Herminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all
Relatives [Greek: a)ntikei/mena]; for they admitted that the
antithesis between the Relative and its Correlate was of gentler
character, not conflicting, but reciprocally sustaining. Alexander
ingeniously compared _Relatum_ and its _Correlatum_ to the opposite
rafters of a roof, each supporting the other ([Greek: malakô/tera
kai\ ê(=tton macho/mena e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois, ô(s _ kai\
a)mphiba/lesthai ei) ei)si\n a)ntikei/mena sô/zonta a)/llêla;_ a)lla\
tou=to me\n dei/knusin A)le/xandros o(/ti a)ntikei/mena, o(\s kai\
ta\ labdoeidê= xu/la paradei=gma lamba/nei], &c., Schol. p. 81, b.
32; p. 82, a. 15, b. 20). This is an undue enlargement of the meaning
of _Opposita_, by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct
to the logical. On the contrary, the Stoics are alleged to have
worked out the views of Aristotle about [Greek: e)nanti/a], but to
have restricted the meaning of [Greek: **a)ntikei/mena] to
contradictory opposition, _i. e._ to Affirmative and Negative
Propositions with the same subject and predicate (Schol. p. 83, b.
11; p. 87, a. 29). In Metaphysica, A. 983, a. 31, Aristotle calls the
final cause ([Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka kai\ ta)gatho/n) tê\n
a)ntikeime/nên ai)ti/an] to the cause (among his four), [Greek: to\
**o(/then ê( ki/nêsis]. This is a misleading phrase; the two
are not opposed, but mutually implicated and correlative.]

[Footnote 144: See the just and comprehensive definition of Relative
Names given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Book I.
chap. ii. § 7, p. 46.

After reading that definition, the inconvenience of ranking Relatives
as a species or variety of Opposites, will be seen at once.]

From _Opposita_ Aristotle passes to _Prius_ and _Simul_; with the
different modes of each.[145] _Successive_ and _Synchronous_, are the
two most general classes under which facts or events can be cast.
They include between them all that is meant by Order in Time. They
admit of no definition, and can be explained only by appeal to
immediate consciousness in particular cases. Priority and
Simultaneity, in this direct and primary sense, are among the
clearest and most impressive notions of the human mind. But Aristotle
recognizes four additional meanings of these same words, which he
distinguishes from the primary, in the same way as he distinguishes
(in the ten Categories) the different meanings of _Essentia_, in a
gradually descending scale of analogy. The secondary _Prius_ is that
which does not reciprocate according to the order of existence with
its _Posterius_; where the _Posterius_ presupposes the _Prius_, while
the _Prius_ does not presuppose the _Posterius_: for example, given
two, the existence of one is necessarily implied; but given one, the
existence of two is not implied.[146] The tertiary _Prius_ is that
which comes first in the arrangements of science or discourse: as, in
geometry, point and line are prior as compared with the diagrams and
demonstrations; in writing, letters are prior as compared with
syllables; in speeches, the proem is prior as compared with the
exposition. A fourth mode of _Prius_ (which is the most remote and
far-fetched) is, that the better and more honourable is _prius
naturâ_. Still a fifth mode is, when, of two Relatives which
reciprocate with each other as to existence, one is cause and the
other effect: in such a case, the cause is said to be prior by nature
to the effect.[147] For example, if it be a fact that Caius exists,
the proposition "Caius exists," is a true proposition; and _vice
versâ_, if the proposition "Caius exists" is a true proposition, it
is a fact that Caius exists. But though from either **of these you
can infer the other, the truth of the proposition is the effect, and
not the cause, of the reality of the fact. Hence it is correct to say
that the latter is _prius naturâ_, and the former _posterius naturâ_.

[Footnote 145: Categ. p. 14, a. 26, seq.]

[Footnote 146: Ibid. p. 14, a. 29, seq. This second mode of _Prius_
is entitled by Alexander (see Schol. (ad Metaphys. [Greek: D].) p.
707, b. 7, Brandis) [Greek: pro/teron tê=| phu/sei]. But Aristotle
does not so call it here; he reserves that title for the fourth and
fifth modes.

It appears that debates, [Greek: Peri\ Prote/rou kai\ U(ste/rou] were
frequent in the dialectic schools of Aristotle's day as well as
debates, [Greek: Peri\ Tau)tou= kai\ E(te/rou, Peri\ O(moi/ou kai\
A)nomoi/ou, Peri\ Tau)to/têtos kai\ E)nantio/têtos] (Arist. Metaph.
B. p. 995, b. 20).]

[Footnote 147: Aristot. Categ. p. 14, b. 10.]

This is a sort of article in a Philosophical Dictionary, tracing the
various derivative senses of two very usual correlative phrases; and
there is another article in the fourth book of the Metaphysica, where
the derivations of the same terms are again traced out, though by
roads considerably different.[148] The two terms are relatives;
_Prius_ implies a _Posterius_, as _Simul_ implies another _Simul_;
and it is an useful process to discriminate clearly the various
meanings assigned to each. Aristotle has done this, not indeed
clearly nor consistently with himself, but with an earnest desire to
elucidate what he felt to be confused and perplexing. Yet there are
few terms in his philosophy which are more misleading. Though he sets
out, plainly and repeatedly the primary and literal sense of
Priority, (the temporal or real), as discriminated from the various
secondary and metaphorical senses, nevertheless when he comes to
employ the term _Prius_ in the course of his reasonings, he often
does so without specifying in which sense he intends it to be
understood. And as the literal sense (temporal or real priority) is
the most present and familial to every man's mind, so the term is
often construed in this sense when it properly bears only the
metaphorical sense. The confusion of logical or emotional priority
(priority either in logical order of conception, or in esteem and
respect) with priority in the order of time, involving separability
of existence, is a frequent source of misunderstanding in the
Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics. The order of logical
antecedence and sequence, or the fact of logical coexistence, is of
great importance to be understood, with a view to the proof of truth,
to the disproof of error, or to the systematization of our processes
of thought; but we must keep in mind that what is prior in the
logical order is not for that reason prior in temporal order, orf
separable in real existence, or fit to be appealed to as a real Cause
or Agent.[149]

[Footnote 148: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, b. 11-p. 1019,
a. 12. The article in the Metaphysica is better and fuller than that
in the Categoriæ. In this last, _Order in Place_ receives no special
recognition, while we find such recognition in the Metaphysica, and
we find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or
intellectual _Prius_.]

[Footnote 149: In the language of Porphyry, [Greek: prou+phe/stêke]
(priority in real existence) means nothing more than [Greek:
proe+pinoei=tai] (priority in the order of conception), Eisagoge, cc.
xv., xvi.; Schol. Br. p. 6, a. 7-21.]



CHAPTER IV.

DE INTERPRETATIONE.


In the preceding chapter I enumerated and discussed what Aristotle
calls the Categories. We shall now proceed to the work which stands
second in the aggregate called the Organon--the treatise De
Interpretatione.

We have already seen that the Aristotelian Ontology distinguishes one
group of varieties of _Ens_ (or different meanings of the term _Ens_)
as corresponding to the diversity of the ten Categories; while
recognizing also another variety of _Ens_ as _Truth_, with its
antithesis _Non-Ens_ as _Falsehood_.[1] The former group was dealt
with in the preceding chapter; the latter will form the subject of
the present chapter. In both, indeed, Ontology is looked at as
implicated with Logic; that is, _Ens_ is considered as distributed
under significant names, fit to be coupled in propositions. This is
the common basis both of the Categoriæ and of the treatise De
Interpretatione. The whole classification of the Categories rests on
the assumption of the proposition with its constituent parts, and on
the different relation borne by each of the nine _genera_ of
predicates towards their common Subject. But in the Categoriæ no
account was taken of the distinction between truth and falsehood, in
the application of these predicates to the Subject. If we say of
Sokrates, that he is fair, pug-nosed, brave, wise, &c., we shall
predicate truly; if we say that he is black, high-nosed, cowardly,
stupid, &c., we shall predicate falsely; but in each case our
predicates will belong to the same Category--that of _Quale_. Whether
we describe him as he now is, standing, talking, in the market-place
at Athens; or whether we describe him as he is not, sitting down,
singing, in Egypt--in both speeches, our predicates rank under the
same Categories, _Jacere_, _Agere_, _Ubi_. No account is taken in the
Categoriæ of the distinction between true and false application of
predicates; we are only informed under what number of general heads
all our predicates must be included, whether our propositions be true
or false in each particular case.

[Footnote 1: See above in the preceding chapter, p. 60.]

But this distinction between _true_ and _false_, which remained
unnoticed in the Categoriæ, comes into the foreground in the treatise
De Interpretatione. The Proposition, or enunciative speech,[2] is
distinguished from other varieties of speech (interrogative,
precative, imperative) by its communicating what is true or what is
false. It is defined to be a complex significant speech, composed of
two terms at least, each in itself significant, yet neither of them,
separately taken, communicating truth or falsehood. The terms
constituting the Proposition are declared to be a Noun in the
nominative case, as Subject, and a Verb, as Predicate; this latter
essentially connoting time, in order that the synthesis of the two
may become the enunciation of a fact or quasi-fact, susceptible of
being believed or disbelieved. All this mode of analysing a
proposition, different from the analysis thereof given or implied in
the Categoriæ, is conducted with a view to bring out prominently its
function of imparting true or false information. The treatise called
the Categoriæ is a theory of significant names subjicible and
predicable, fit to serve as elements of propositions, but not yet
looked at as put together into actual propositions; while in the
treatise De Interpretatione they are assumed to be put together, and
a theory is given of Propositions thus completed.

[Footnote 2: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 17, a. 1: [Greek: lo/gos
a)pophantiko/s].]

Words spoken are marks significant of mental impressions associated
with them both by speaker and hearer; words written are symbols of
those thus uttered. Both speech and writing differ in different
nations, having no natural connection with the things signified. But
these last, the affections or modifications of the mind, and the
facts or objects of which they are representations or likenesses, are
the same to all. Words are marks primarily and directly of the first,
secondarily and indirectly of the second.[3] Aristotle thus
recognizes these two aspects--first, the subjective, next the
objective, as belonging, both of them conjointly, to significant
language, yet as logically distinguishable; the former looking to the
proximate _correlatum_, the latter to the ultimate.

[Footnote 3: Ibid. p. 16, a. 3, seq. [Greek: ô(\n me/ntoi tau=ta
sêmei=a prô/tôs, tau)ta\ pa=si pathê/mata tê=s psuchê=s, kai\ ô(=n
tau=ta o(moiô/mata, pra/gmata ê)/dê tau)ta/.]]

For this doctrine, that the mental affections of mankind, and the
things or facts which they represent, are the same everywhere, though
the marks whereby they are signified differ, Aristotle refers us to
his treatise De Animâ, to which he says that it properly belongs.[4]
He thus recognizes the legitimate dependence of Logic on Psychology
or Mental Philosophy.

[Footnote 4: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 16, a. 8: [Greek: peri\ me\n
ou)=n tau/tôn ei)/rêtai e)n toi=s peri\ psuchê=s; a)/llês ga\r
pragmatei/as.] It was upon this reference, mainly, that Andronikus
the Rhodian rested his opinion, that the treatise De Interpretatione
was not the work of Aristotle. Andronikus contended that there was
nothing in the De Animâ to justify the reference. But Ammonius in his
Scholia (p. 97, Brand.) makes a sufficient reply to the objection of
Andronikus. The third book De Animâ (pp. 430, 431) lays down the
doctrine here alluded to. Compare Torstrick's Commentary, p. 210.]

That which is signified by words (either single or in combination) is
some variety of these mental affections or of the facts which they
represent. But the signification of a single Term is distinguished,
in an important point, from the signification of that conjunction of
terms which we call a Proposition. A noun, or a verb, belonging to
the aggregate called a language, is associated with one and the same
phantasm[5] or notion, without any conscious act of conjunction or
disjunction, in the minds of speakers and hearers: when pronounced,
it arrests for a certain time the flow of associated ideas, and
determines the mind to dwell upon that particular group which is
called its meaning.[6] But neither the noun nor the verb, singly
taken, does more than this; neither one of them affirms, or denies,
or communicates any information true or false. For this last purpose,
we must conjoin the two together in a certain way, and make a
Proposition. The signification of the Proposition is thus
specifically distinct from that of either of its two component
elements. It communicates what purports to be matter of fact, which
may be either true or false; in other words, it implies in the
speaker, and raises in the hearer, the state of belief or disbelief,
which does not attach either to the noun or to the verb separately.
Herein the Proposition is discriminated from other significant
arrangements of words (precative, interrogative, which convey no
truth or falsehood), as well as from its own component parts. Each of
these parts, noun and verb, has a significance of its own; but these
are the ultimate elements of speech, for the parts of the noun or of
the verb have no significance at all. The Verb is distinguished from
the Noun by connoting time, and also by always serving as predicate
to some noun as subject.[7]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. p. 16, a. 13: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n o)no/mata
au)ta\ kai\ ta\ r(ê/mata e)/oike tô=| a)/neu diaire/seôs kai\
sunthe/seôs noê/mati, oi(=on to\ a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ leuko/n, o(/tan
mê\ proste/thê| ti; ou)/te ga\r pseu=dos ou)/te a)lêthe/s pô.]]

[Footnote 6: Ibid. p. 16, b. 19: [Greek: au)ta\ me\n kath' e(auta\
lego/mena ta\ r(ê/mata o)no/mata/ e)sti kai\ sêmai/nei ti (_i(/stêsi
ga\r o( le/gôn tê\n dia/noian_, kai\ _o( a)kou/sas ê)re/mêsen_) a)ll'
ei) e)sti\n ê)\ mê/, ou)/pô sêmai/nei], &c.

Compare Analyt. Poster. II. xix. pp. 99, 100, where the same doctrine
occurs: the movement of association is stopped, and the mind is
determined to dwell upon a certain idea; one among an aggregate of
runaways being arrested in flight, another halts also, and so the
rest in succession, until at length the Universal, or the sum total,
is detained, or "stands still" as an object of attention. Also
Aristot. Problem. p. 956, b. 39.]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, b. 2, seq.]

Aristotle intimates his opinion, distinctly and even repeatedly, upon
the main question debated by Plato in the Kratylus. He lays it down
that all significant speech is significant by convention only, and
not by nature or as a natural instrument.[8] He tells us also that,
in this treatise, he does not mean to treat of all significant
speech, but only of that variety which is known as _enunciative_.
This last, as declaring truth or falsehood, is the only part
belonging to Logic as he conceives it; other modes of speech, the
precative, imperative, interrogative, &c., belong more naturally to
Rhetoric or Poetic.[9] Enunciative speech may be either simple or
complex; it may be one enunciation, declaring one predicate (either
in one word or in several words) of one subject; or it may comprise
several such.[10] The conjunction of the predicate with the subject
constitutes the variety of proposition called Affirmation; the
disjunction of the same two is Negation or Denial.[11] But such
conjunction or disjunction, operated by the cogitative act, between
two mental states, takes place under the condition that, wherever
conjunction may be enunciated, there also disjunction may be
enunciated, and _vice versâ_. Whatever may be affirmed, it is
possible also to deny; whatever may be denied, it is possible also to
affirm.[12]

[Footnote 8: Ibid. p. 16, a. 26; p. 17, a. 2.]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. p. 17, a. 6: [Greek: _o( de\ a)pophantiko\s tê=s
nu=n theôri/as_]. See the **Scholion of Ammonius, pp. 95, 96, 108, a.
27. In the last passage, Ammonius refers to a passage in one of the
lost works of Theophrastus, wherein that philosopher distinguished
[Greek: to\n a)pophantiko\n lo/gon] from the other varieties of
[Greek: lo/gos], by the difference of [Greek: sche/sis]: the [Greek:
a)pophantiko\s lo/gos] was [Greek: pro\s ta\ pra/gmata], or
_objective_; the others were [Greek: pro\s tou\s a)kroôme/nous],
_i.e._ varying with the different varieties of hearers, or
_subjective_.]

[Footnote 10: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]

[Footnote 11: Ibid. p. 17, a. 25.]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. p. 17, a. 30: [Greek: a(/pan a)\n e)nde/choito
kai\ o(\ kate/phêse/ tis a)pophê=sai, kai\ o(\ a)pe/phêse/ tis
kataphê=sai.]]

To every affirmative proposition there is thus opposed a
contradictory negative proposition; to every negative a contradictory
affirmative. This pair of contradictory opposites may be called an
_Antiphasis_; always assuming that the predicate and subject of the
two shall be really the same, without equivocation of terms--a
proviso necessary to guard against troublesome puzzles started by
Sophists.[13] And we must also distinguish these propositions
opposite as _Contradictories_, from propositions opposite as
_Contraries_. For this, it has to be observed that there is a
distinction among things ([Greek: pra/gmata]) as universal or
singular, according as they are, in their nature, predicable of a
number or not: _homo_ is an example of the first, and _Kallias_ is an
example of the second. When, now, we affirm a predicate universally,
we must attach the mark of universality to the subject and not to the
predicate; we must say, Every man is white, No man is white. We
cannot attach the mark of universality to the predicate, and say,
Every man is every animal; this would be untrue.[14] An affirmation,
then, is _contradictorily_ opposed to a negation, when one indicates
that the subject is universally taken, and the other, that the
subject is taken not universally, _e.g. Omnis homo est albus_, _Non
omnis homo est albus_; _Nullus homo est albus_, _Est aliquis homo
albus_. The opposition is _contrary_, when the affirmation is
universal, and the negation is also universal, _i.e._, when the
subject is marked as universally taken in each: for example, _Omnis
homo est albus_, _Nullus homo est albus_. Of these contrary
opposites, both cannot be true, but both may be false. Contradictory
opposites, on the other hand, while they cannot both be true, cannot
both be false; one must be false and the other true. This holds also
where the subject is a singular term, as Sokrates.[15] If, however,
an universal term appear as subject in the proposition
_indefinitely_, that is, without any mark of universality whatever,
_e.g._, Est albus homo_, _Non est albus homo_, then the affirmative
and negative are not necessarily either contrary or contradictory,
though they may be so sometimes: there is no opposition, properly
speaking, between them; both may alike be true. This last observation
(says Aristotle) will seem strange, because many persons suppose that
_Non est homo albus_ is equivalent to _Nullus homo est albus_; but
the meaning of the two is not the same, nor does the truth of the
latter follow from that of the former,[16] since _homo_ in the former
may be construed as not universally taken.

[Footnote 13: Ibid. p. 17, a. 33: [Greek: _kai\ e)/stô a)nti/phasis
tou=to_, kata/phasis kai\ a)po/phasis ai( a)ntikei/menai.]

It seems (as Ammonius observes, Schol. p. 112, a. 33) that [Greek:
a)nti/phasis] in this sense was a technical term, introduced by
Aristotle.]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 37-b. 14: [Greek: e)pei\
d' e)sti\ ta\ me\n katho/lou tô=n pragma/tôn, ta\ de\ kath' e(/kaston
(le/gô de\ katho/lou me\n o(\ e)pi\ pleio/nôn pe/phuke
katêgorei=sthai, kath' e(/kaston de\ o(\ mê\, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos me\n
tô=n katho/lou, Kalli/as de\ tô=n kath' e(/kaston);] &c. Ammonius (in
Schol. p. 113, a. 38) says that what is predicated, either of many
subjects or of one, must be [Greek: mi/a phu/sis].

The warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical
treatise of Aristotle, and is repeated in the Analytica Priora, I.
xxvii. p. 43, b. 17. Here we have: [Greek: ou)demi/a kata/phasis
a)lêthê\s e)/stai, e)n ê(=| tou= katêgoroume/nou katho/lou to\
katho/lou katêgorei=tai, oi(=on e)/sti pa=s a)/nthrôpos pa=n zô=|on]
(b. 14).]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. b. 16-29.]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. p. 17, b. 29-37. Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of
Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 4) cites and approves Dr. Whately's
observation, that the recognition of a class of Propositions called
_indefinite_ "is a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by
grammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate the
_doubtful_ gender. The speaker _must mean_ to assert the proposition
either as an universal or as a particular proposition, though he has
failed to declare which."

But Aristotle would not have admitted Dr. Whately's doctrine,
declaring what the speaker "_must mean_." Aristotle fears that his
class, _indefinite_, will appear impertinent, because many speakers
are not conscious of any distinction or transition between the
particular and the general. The looseness of ordinary speech and
thought, which Logic is intended to bring to view and to guard
against, was more present to his mind than to that of Dr. Whately:
moreover, the forms of Greek speech favoured the ambiguity.

Aristotle's observation illustrates the deficiencies of common
speaking, as to clearness and limitation of meaning, at the time when
he began to theorize on propositions.

I think that Whately's assumption--"the speaker _must mean_"--is
analogous to the assumption on which Sir W. Hamilton founds his
proposal for explicit quantification of the predicate, viz., that the
speaker _must_, implicitly or mentally, quantify the predicate; and
that his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification
explicit. Mr. Mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of Sir.
W. Hamilton's is incorrect.]

It thus appears that there is always one negation corresponding to
one and the same affirmation; making up together the _Antiphasis_, or
pair of contradictory opposites, quite distinct from contrary
opposites. By _one_ affirmation we mean, that in which there is one
predicate only, and one subject only, whether taken universally or
not universally:--

 _E.g._ Omnis homo est albus  ...  ... Non omnis homo est albus.
        Est homo albus   ...  ...  ... Non est homo albus.
        Nullus homo est albus ...  ... Aliquis homo est albus.

But this will only hold on the assumption that _album_ signifies one
and the same thing. If there be one name signifying two things not
capable of being generalized into one nature, or not coming under the
same definition, then the affirmation is no longer one.[17] Thus if
any one applies the term _himation_ to signify both horse and man,
then the proposition, _Est himation album_, is not one affirmation,
but two; it is either equivalent to _Est homo albus_ and _Est equus
albus_--or it means nothing at all; for this or that individual man
is not a horse. Accordingly, in this case also, as well as in that
mentioned above, it is not indispensable that one of the two
propositions constituting the _Antiphasis_ should be true and the
other false.[18]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 13, seq.: [Greek: mi/a
de/ e)sti kata/phasis kai\ a)po/phasis ê( e(\n kath' e(no\s
sêmai/nousa, ê)\ katho/lou o)/ntos katho/lou ê)\ mê\ o(moi/ôs, oi(=on
pa=s a)/nthrôpos leuko/s e)stin . . . _ei) to\ leuko\n e(\n
sêmai/nei_. ei) de\ duoi=n e(\n o)/noma kei=tai, e)x ô(=n _mê/ e)stin
e(/n_, ou) mi/a kata/phasis], &c., and the Scholion of Ammonius, p.
116, b. 6, seq.]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 26. The example which
Aristotle here gives is one of a _subject_ designated by an equivocal
name; when he had begun with the _predicate_. It would have been more
pertinent if he had said at first, [Greek: ei) o( a)/nthrôpos e(\n
sêmai/nei].]

With these exceptions Aristotle lays it down, that, in every
_Antiphasis_, one proposition must be true and the other must be
false. But (he goes on to say) this is only true in regard to matters
past or present; it is not true in regard to events particular and
future. To admit it in regard to these latter, would be to affirm
that the sequences of events are all necessary, and none of them
casual or contingent; whereas we know, by our own personal
experience, that many sequences depend upon our deliberation and
volition, and are therefore not necessary. If all future sequences
are necessary, deliberation on our part must be useless. We must
therefore (he continues) recognize one class of sequences which are
not uniform--not predetermined by antecedents; events which _may_
happen, but which also _may not_ happen, for they will not happen.
Thus, my coat _may_ be cut into two halves, but it never _will_ be so
cut; it will wear out without any such bisection occurring.[19]

[Footnote 19: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 18, a. 28-p. 19, b. 4.]

If you affirm the reality of a fact past or present, your affirmation
is of necessity determinately true, or it is determinately false,
_i.e._ the contradictory negation is determinately true. But if you
affirm the reality of a fact to come, then your affirmation is not by
necessity determinately true, nor is the contradictory negation
determinately true. Neither the one nor the other separately is true:
nothing is true except the disjunctive antithesis as a whole,
including both. If you say, To-morrow there will either be a
sea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight, this disjunctive or
indeterminate proposition, taken as a whole, will be true. Yet
neither of its constituent parts will be determinately true; neither
the proposition, To-morrow there will be a sea-fight, nor the
proposition, To-morrow there will not be a sea-fight. But if you
speak with regard to past or present--if you say, Yesterday either
there was a sea-fight or there was not a sea-fight--then not only
will the disjunctive as a whole be true, but also one or other of its
parts will be determinately true.[20]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 18, b. 29. Ammonius (Scholia ad De Interpret.
p. 119, bb. 18, 28, seq.) expresses Aristotle's meaning in terms more
distinct than Aristotle himself: [Greek: mê\ pa/ntôs e)/chein to\
e(/teron mo/rion tê=s a)ntipha/seôs _a)phôrisme/nôs a)lêtheu=on_],
&c. (b. 43).]

This remarkable logical distinction is founded on Aristotle's
ontological or physical doctrines respecting the sequence and
conjunction of events. He held (as we shall see more fully in the
Physica and other treatises) that sequences throughout the Kosmos
were to a certain extent regular, to a certain extent irregular. The
exterior sphere of the Kosmos (the _Aplan=es_) with the countless
number of fixed stars fastened into it, was a type of regularity and
uniformity; eternal and ever moving in the same circular orbit, by
necessity of its own nature, and without any potentiality of doing
otherwise. But the earth and the elemental bodies, organized and
unorganized, below the lunar sphere and in the interior of the
Kosmos, were of inferior perfection and of very different nature.
They were indeed in part governed and pervaded by the movement and
influence of the celestial substance within which they were
comprehended, and from which they borrowed their Form or constituent
essence; but they held this Form implicated with Matter, _i.e._ the
principle of potentiality, change, irregularity, generation, and
destruction, &c. There are thus in these sublunary bodies both
constant tendencies and variable tendencies. The _constant_ Aristotle
calls 'Nature;' which always aspires to Good, or to perpetual
renovation of Forms as perfect as may be, though impeded in this work
by adverse influences, and therefore never producing any thing but
individuals comparatively defective and sure to perish. The
_variable_ he calls 'Spontaneity' and 'Chance,' forming an
independent agency inseparably accompanying Nature--always modifying,
distorting, frustrating, the full purposes of Nature. Moreover, the
different natural agencies often interfere with each other, while the
irregular tendency interferes with them all. So far as Nature acts,
in each of her distinct agencies, the phenomena before us are regular
and predictable; all that is uniform, and all that (without being
quite uniform) recurs usually or frequently, is her work. But,
besides and along with Nature, there is the agency of Chance and
Spontaneity, which is essentially irregular and unpredictable. Under
this agency there are possibilities both for and against; either of
two alternative events may happen.

It is with a view to this doctrine about the variable kosmical
agencies or potentialities that Aristotle lays down the logical
doctrine now before us, distinguishing propositions affirming
particular facts past or present, from propositions affirming
particular facts future. In both cases alike, the disjunctive
antithesis, as a whole, is necessarily true. Either there was a
sea-fight yesterday, or there was not a sea-fight yesterday: Either
there will be a sea-fight to-morrow, or there will not be a sea-fight
to-morrow--both these disjunctives alike are necessarily true. There
is, however, a difference between the one disjunctive couple and the
other, when we take the affirmation separately or the negation
separately. If we say, There will be a sea-fight to-morrow, that
proposition is not necessarily true nor is it necessarily false; to
say that it is either the one or the other (Aristotle argues) would
imply that every thing in nature happened by necessary agency--that
the casual, the potential, the _may be or may not be_, is stopped out
and foreclosed. But this last is really the case, in regard to a past
fact. There was a sea-fight yesterday, is a proposition either
necessarily true or necessarily false. Here the antecedent agencies
have already spent themselves, blended, and become realized in one or
other of the two alternative determinate results. There is no
potentiality any longer open; all the antecedent potentiality has
been foreclosed. The proposition therefore is either necessarily true
or necessarily false; though perhaps we may not know whether it is
the one or the other.

In defending his position regarding this question, Aristotle denies
(what he represents his opponents as maintaining) that all events
happen by necessity. He points to the notorious fact that we
deliberate and take counsel habitually, and that the event is
frequently modified, according as we adopt one mode of conduct or
another; which could not be (he contends), if the event could be
declared beforehand by a proposition necessarily or determinately
true. What Aristotle means by _necessity_, however, is at bottom
nothing else than constant sequence or conjunction, conceived by him
as necessary, because the fixed ends which Nature is aiming at can
only be attained by certain fixed means. To this he opposes
Spontaneity and Chance, disturbing forces essentially inconstant and
irregular; admitting, indeed, of being recorded when they _have_
produced effects in the past, yet defying all power of prediction as
to those effects which they _will_ produce in the future. Hence
arises the radical distinction that he draws in Logic, between the
truth of propositions relating to the past (or present) and to the
future.

But this logical distinction cannot be sustained, because his
metaphysical doctrine (on which it is founded) respecting the
essentially irregular or casual, is not defensible. His opponents
would refuse to grant that there is any agency essentially or in
itself irregular, casual, and unpredictable.[21] The aggregate of
Nature consists of a variety of sequences, each of them constant and
regular, though intermixed, co-operating, and conflicting with each
other, in such manner that the resulting effects are difficult to
refer to their respective causes, and are not to be calculated
beforehand except by the highest scientific efforts; often, not by
any scientific efforts. We must dismiss the hypothesis of Aristotle,
assuming agencies essentially irregular and unpredictable, either as
to the past or as to the future. The past has been brought about by
agencies all regular, however multifarious and conflicting, and the
future will be brought about by the like: there is no such
distinction of principle as that which Aristotle lays down between
propositions respecting the past and propositions respecting the
future.

[Footnote 21: The Stoics were opposed to Aristotle on this point.
They recognized no logical difference in the character of the
Antiphasis, whether applied to past and present, or to future.
Nikostratus defended the thesis of Aristotle against them. See the
Scholia of Simplikius on the Categoriæ, p. 87, b. 30-p. 88, a. 24.
[Greek: ai( ga\r ei)s to\n me/llonta chro/non e)gklino/menai
prota/seis ou)/te a)lêthei=s ei)si\n ou)/te pseudei=s dia\ tê\n tou=
e)ndechome/nou phu/sin.]

The remarks of Hobbes, upon the question here discussed by Aristotle,
well deserve to be transcribed (De Corpore, part II. ch. X. s. 5):--

"But here, perhaps, some man may ask whether those future things,
which are called _contingents_, are necessary. I say, therefore, that
generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called
contingents in respect of other events, upon which they do not
depend; as the rain, which shall be to-morrow, shall be necessary,
that is, from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by
chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though
they exist now. For men commonly call that _casual_ or _contingent_,
whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause; and in the same
manner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a
thing be done or no, they say, it is possible it never was done.

"Wherefore, all propositions concerning future things, contingent or
not contingent--as this, _It will rain to-morrow_, or this,
_To-morrow the sun will rise_--are either necessarily true, or
necessarily false; but we call them contingent, because we do not yet
know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not
upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there
are some, who, though they confess this whole proposition, _To-morrow
it will either rain or not rain_, to be true, yet they will not
acknowledge the parts of it, as _To-morrow it will rain_, or
_To-morrow it will not rain_, to be either of them true by itself;
because they say neither this nor that is true _determinately_. But
what is this _determinately true_, but true _upon our knowledge_, or
evidently true? And therefore they say no more, but that it is not
yet known whether it be true or no; but they say it more obscurely,
and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words with which
they endeavour to hide their own ignorance."

Compare also the fuller elucidation of the subject given by Mr. John
Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Bk. III. ch. xvii. s. 2:--"An
event occurring by chance may be better described as a coincidence
from which we have no ground to infer an uniformity; the occurrence
of an event in certain circumstances, without our having reason on
that account to infer that it will happen again in those
circumstances. This, however, when looked closely into, implies that
the enumeration of the circumstances is not complete. Whatever the
fact was, since it has occurred once, we may be sure that if all the
circumstances were repeated, it would occur again; and not only if
all, but there is some particular portion of those circumstances, on
which the phenomenon is invariably consequent. With most of them,
however, it is not connected in any permanent manner: its conjunction
with those is said to be the effect of chance, to be merely casual.
Facts casually conjoined are separately the effect of causes, and
therefore of laws; but of different causes, and causes not connected
by any law. It is incorrect then to say that any phenomenon is
produced by chance; but we may say that two or more phenomena are
conjoined by chance, that they co-exist or succeed one another only
by chance."]

There is, indeed, one distinction between inferences as to the past
and inferences as to the future, which may have contributed to
suggest, though it will not justify, the position here laid down by
Aristotle. In regard to the disjunctive--To-morrow there will be a
sea-fight, or there will not be a sea-fight--nothing more trustworthy
than inference or anticipation is practicable: the anticipation of a
sagacious man with full knowledge is more likely to prove correct
than that of a stupid man with little knowledge; yet both are alike
anticipations, unverifiable at the present moment. But if we turn to
the other disjunctive--Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or there was
not a sea-fight--we are no longer in the same position. The two
disputants, supposed to declare thus, may have been far off, and may
have no other means of deciding the doubt than inference. But the
inference here is not unverifiable: there exist, or may exist,
witnesses or spectators of the two fleets, who can give direct
attestation of the reality, and can either confirm or refute the
inference, negative or affirmative, made by an absentee. Thus the
proposition, Yesterday there was a sea-fight, or the other, Yesterday
there was not a sea-fight, will be verifiable or determinably true.
There are indeed many inferences as to the past, in regard to which
no direct evidence is attainable. Still this is an accident; for such
direct evidence may always be supposed or imagined as capable of
being brought into court. But, in respect to the future, verification
is out of the question; we are confined to the region of inference,
well or ill-supported. Here, then, we have a material distinction
between the past and the future. It was probably present to the mind
of Aristotle, though he misconceives its real extent of operation,
and makes it subservient to his still more comprehensive
classification of the different contemporaneous agencies (regular and
irregular) which he supposes to pervade the Kosmos.

In the treatise before us, he next proceeds to state what collocation
of the negative particle constitutes the special or legitimate
negation to any given affirmation, or what are the real forms of
proposition, standing in contradictory opposition to certain other
forms, so as to make up one _Antiphasis_.[22] The simplest
proposition must include a noun and a verb, either definite or
indefinite: _non homo_ is a specimen of an indefinite noun--_non
currit_, of an indefinite verb. There must be, in any one
proposition, one subject and one predicate; even the indefinite noun
or verb signifies, in a certain sense, one thing. Each affirmation
comprises a noun, or an indefinite noun, with a verb; the special
corresponding or contradictory negation (making up the _Antiphasis_
along with the former) comprises a noun (or an indefinite noun) with
an indefinite verb. The simplest proposition is--

     _Affirmative_.          _Contradictory Negative_.

      Est homo     ... ... ... ... Non est homo.
      Est non homo ... ... ... ... Non est non homo.

Here are only two pairs of antithetic propositions, or one
quaternion. The above is an indefinite proposition (which may be
either universal or not). When we universalize it, or turn it an
universal proposition, we have--

     _Affirmative_.          _Contradictory Negative_.

      Est omnis homo ... ... ... Non est omnis homo.
      Est omnis non homo ... ... Non est omnis non homo.

[Footnote 22: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 5, seq.]

The above are specimens of the smallest proposition; but when we
regard larger propositions, such as those (called _tertii
adjacentis_) where there are two terms besides _est_, the collocation
of the negative particle becomes more complicated, and requires
fuller illustration. Take, as an example, the affirmative _Est justus
homo_, the true negation of this is, _Non est justus homo_. In these
two propositions, _homo_ is the subject; but we may join the negative
with it, and we may consider _non homo_, not less than _homo_, as a
distinct subject for predication, affirmative or negative. Farther,
we may attach _est_ and _non est_ either to _justus_ or to _non
justus_ as the predicate of the proposition, with either _homo_, or
_non homo_, as subject. We shall thus obtain a double mode of
antithesis, or two distinct quaternions, each containing two pairs of
contradictory propositions. The second pair of the first quaternion
will not be in the same relation as the second pair of the second
quaternion, to the proposition just mentioned, viz.--(A) _Est justus
homo_; with its negative, (B) _Non est justice homo_.[23]

[Footnote 23: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 19. [Greek: o(/tan de\
to\ e)/sti tri/ton proskatêgorê=tai, ê)/dê dichô=s le/gontai ai(
a)ntithe/seis; le/gô de\ oi(=on _e)/sti di/kaios a)/nthrôpos_; to\
_e)/sti_ tri/ton phêmi\ sugkei=sthai o)/noma ê)\ r(ê=ma e)n tê=|
katapha/sei. ô(/ste dia\ tou=to te/ttara e)/stai tau=ta, ô(=n ta\
me\n du/o pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\ a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\ to\
stoichou=n ô(s ai( sterê/seis, ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/. [le/gô de\ o(/ti
to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|],
ô(/ste kai\ ê( a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai. noou=men de\ to\
lego/menon e)k tô=n u(pogegramme/nôn.] In this passage the words
which I have enclosed between brackets are altered by Waitz: I shall
state presently what I think of his alteration. Following upon these
words there ought to be, and it seems from Ammonius (Schol. p. 121,
a. 20) that there once was, a scheme or table arranging the four
propositions in the order and disposition which we read in the
Analytica Priora, I. xlvi. p. 51, b. 37, and which I shall here
follow. But no such table now appears in our text; we have only an
enumeration of the four propositions, in a different order, and then
a reference to the Analytica.]

First, let us assume _homo_ as subject. We have then

                              (QUATERNION I.)

 (A) Est justus homo  ...    ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo.
 (D) Non est non justus homo ... ... ... (C) Est non justus homo.

Examining the relation borne by the last two among these four
propositions (C and D), to the first two (A and B), the simple
affirmative and negative, we see that B is the legitimate negative of
A, and D that of C. We farther see that B is a consequence of C, and
D a consequence of A, but not _vice versâ_: that is, if C is true, B
must certainly be true; but we cannot infer, because B is true, that
C must also be true: while, if A is true, D must also be true; but D
may perhaps be true, though A be not true. In other words, the
relation of D to A and of C to B, is the same as it would be if the
privative term _injustus_ were substituted in place of _non justus_;
_i.e._ if the proposition C (_Est injustus homo_) be true, the other
proposition B (_Non est justus homo_) must certainly be true, but the
inference will not hold conversely; while if the proposition A (_Est
justus homo_) be true, it must also be true to say D (_Non est
injustus homo_), but not _vice versâ_.[24]

[Footnote 24: Referring to the words cited in the preceding note, I
construe [Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/] as Boethius does (II. pp.
384-385), and not in agreement with Ammonius (Schol. p. 122, a. 26,
Br.), who, however, is followed both by Julius Pacius and Waitz (p.
344). I think it impossible that these words, [Greek: ta\ de\ du/o,
ou)/], can mean (as Ammonius thinks) the [Greek: kata/phasis] and
[Greek: a)po/phasis] themselves, since the very point which Aristotle
is affirming is the relation of these words, [Greek: pro\s tê\n
kata/phasin kai\ a)po/phasin], _i.e._ to the affirmative and negative
started from--

 (A) Est justus homo ... ... ... ... (B) Non est justus homo.

As the words [Greek: ta\ me\n du/o] refer to the second contradictory
pair (that is, C and D) in the _first_ Quaternion, so the words
[Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/] designate the second contradictory pair
(G and H) in the _second_ Quaternion. Though G and H are included in
the second Quaternion, they are here designated by the negative
relation ([Greek: ta\ de\ du/o, ou)/]) which they bear to A and B,
the first contradictory pair of the _first_ Quaternion. [Greek:
dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis] (line 20) is explained and
illustrated by line 37--[Greek: au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o
a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s
u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n]. Lastly, Aristotle expressly states
that the second Quaternion will stand independently and by itself (p.
20, a. 1), having noticed it in the beginning only in relation to the
first.]

Such is the result obtained when we take _homo_ as the subject of the
proposition; we get four propositions, of which the two last (C and
D) stand to the two first (B and A) in the same relation as if they
(C and D) were privative propositions. But if, instead of _homo_, we
take _non homo_ as Subject of the proposition (_justus_ or _non
justus_ being predicates as before), we shall then obtain two other
pairs of contradictory propositions; and the second pair of this new
quaternion will not stand in that same relation to these same
propositions B and A. We shall then find that, instead of B and A, we
have a different negative and a different affirmative, as the
appropriate correlates to the third and fourth propositions. The new
quaternion of propositions, with _non homo_ as subject, will stand
thus--

                              (QUATERNION II.)

 (E) Est justus non homo ... ... ... (F) Non est justus non homo.
 (H) Non est non justus non homo ... (G) Est non justus non homo.[25]

Here we see that propositions G and H do not stand to B and A in the
same relations as C and D stand to B and A; but that they stand in
that same relation to two perfectly different propositions, F and E.
That is, if in place of _non **justus_, in propositions G and H, we
substitute the privative term _injustus_ (thus turning G into _Est
injustus non homo_, and turning H into _Non est injustus non homo_),
the relation of G, when thus altered, to F, and the relation of H,
when thus altered, to E, will be the same as it was before. Or, in
other words, if G be true, F will certainly be true, but not _vice
versâ_; and if E be true, H will certainly be true, but not _vice
versâ_.

[Footnote 25: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 36. [Greek: au(=tai me\n
ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (the two pairs--A B and C D--of the first
quaternion), [Greek: a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\ _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_
ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;]

 (E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... ... ... (F)
[Greek: ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]
 (H) [Greek: ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... (G)
[Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: plei/ous de\ tou/tôn ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai
de\ chôri\s e)kei/nôn au)tai\ kath' e(auta\s e)/sontai, ô(s o)no/mati
tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai.] The second [Greek: au(=tai]
alludes to this last quaternion, [Greek: e)kei/nôn] to the first. I
have, as in the former case, transposed propositions three and four
of this second quaternion, in order that the relation of G to F and
of H to E may be more easily discerned.

There are few chapters in Aristotle more obscure and puzzling than
the tenth chapter of the De Interpretatione. It was found so by
Alexander, Herminus, Porphyry, Ammonius, and all the Scholiasts.
Ammonius (Schol. pp. 121, 122, Br.) reports these doubts, and
complains of it as a riddle almost insolvable. The difficulties
remain, even after the long note of Waitz, and the literal
translation of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire.]

The propositions which we have hitherto studied have been indefinite;
that is, they might be universal or not. But if we attach to them the
sign of universality, and construe them as universals, all that we
have said about them would still continue to be true, except that the
propositions which are diametrically (or diagonally) opposed would
not be both true in so many instances. Thus, let us take the first
quaternion of propositions, in which _est_ is attached to _homo_, and
let us construe these propositions as universal. They will stand
thus--

 (A) Omnis est homo justus  ... ... (B) Non omnis est homo justus.
 (D) Non omnis est homo non justus  (C) Omnis est homo non justus.

In these propositions, as in the others before noticed, the same
relation prevails between C and B, and between A and D; if C be true,
B also is true, but not _vice versâ_; if A be true, D also will be
true, but not _vice versâ_. But the propositions diagonally opposed
will not be so often alike true:[26] thus, if A be true (_Omnis est
homo justus_), C cannot be true (_Omnis est homo non justus_);
whereas in the former quaternion of propositions (indefinite, and
therefore capable of being construed as not universal) A and C might
both be alike true.[27]

[Footnote 26: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, b. 35. [Greek: plê\n
ou)ch o(moi/ôs ta\s kata\ dia/metron e)nde/chetai sunalêtheu/ein;
e)nde/chetai de\ pote/.] The "diameter" or "diagonal" is to be
understood with reference to the scheme or square mentioned p. 119,
note, the related propositions standing at the angles, as above.]

[Footnote 27: The Scholion of Ammonius, p. 123, a. 17, Br., explains
this very obscure passage: [Greek: a)ll' e)pi\ me\n tô=n
a)prosdiori/stôn] (indefinite propositions, such as may be construed
either as universal or as particular), [Greek: kata\ tê\n
e)ndechome/nên u(/lên ta/s te katapha/seis] (of the propositions
diagonally opposite), [Greek: sunalêtheu/ein a)llê/lais sumbai/nei
kai\ ta\s a)popha/seis, _a(/te tai=s merikai=s i)sodunamou/sas_.
e)pi\ de\ tô=n prosdiôrisme/nôn] (those propositions where the mark
of universality is tacked to the Subject), [Greek: peri\ ô(=n nuni\
au)tô=| o( lo/gos, tê=s katho/lou katapha/seôs kai\ tê=s e)pi\
me/rous a)popha/seôs, ta\s me\n katapha/seis a)du/naton
sunalêtheu=sai kath' oi(andê/pote u(/lên, ta\s me/ntoi a)popha/seis
sumbai/nei sunalêtheu/ein kata\ mo/nên tê\n e)ndechome/nên;] &c.]

It is thus that Aristotle explains the distinctions of meaning in
propositions, arising out of the altered collocation of the negative
particle; the distinction between (1) _Non est justus_, (2) _Est non
justus_, (3) _Est injustus_. The first of the three is the only true
negative, corresponding to the affirmative _Est Justus_. The second
is not a negative at all, but an affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs], or by transposition, as Theophrastus afterwards called
it). The third is an affirmative, but privative. Both the second and
the third stand related in the same manner to the first; that is, the
truth of the first is a necessary consequence either of the second or
of the third, but neither of these can be certainly inferred from the
first. This is explained still more clearly in the Prior Analytics;
to which Aristotle here makes express reference.[28]

[Footnote 28: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 19, b. 31. [Greek: tau=ta me\n
ou)=n, ô(/sper e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s le/getai, ou(/tô te/taktai.]

Waitz in his note suggests that instead of [Greek: te/taktai] we
ought to read [Greek: teta/chthô]. But if we suppose that the formal
table once existed in the text, in an order of arrangement agreeing
with the Analytica, this conjectural change would be unnecessary.

Waitz has made some changes in the text of this chapter, which appear
to me partly for the better, partly not for the better. Both Bekker
and Bussemaker (Firmin Didot) retain the old text; but this old text
was a puzzle to the ancient commentators, even anterior to Alexander
of Aphrodisias. I will here give first the text of Bekker, next the
changes made by Waitz: my own opinion does not wholly coincide with
either. I shall cite the text from p. 19, b. 19, leaving out the
portion between lines 30 and 36, which does not bear upon the matter
here discussed, while it obscures the legitimate sequence of
Aristotle's reasoning.

(Bekker.)--[Greek: O(/tan de\ to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton proskatêgorê=tai,
ê)/dê dichô=s le/gontai ai( a)ntithe/seis. le/gô de\ oi(=on _e)/sti
di/kaios a)/nthrôpos_; to\ _e)/sti_ tri/ton phêmi\ sugkei=sthai
o)/noma ê)\ r(ê=ma e)n tê=| katapha/sei. ô(/ste dia\ tou=to te/ttara
e)/stai tau=ta, ô(=n ta\ me\n du/o pro\s tê\n kata/phasin kai\
a)po/phasin e(/xei kata\ to\ stoichou=n ô(s ai( sterê/seis, ta\ de\
du/o, ou)/. le/gô d' o(/ti to\ _e)/stin_ ê)\ _tô=| dikai/ô|
proskei/setai_ ê)\ tô=| _ou) dikai/ô|_] (25), [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ ê(
a)po/phasis. te/ttara ou)=n e)/stai.] (Here follow the first pairs of
Antitheses, or the first Quaternion of propositions in the order as
given)--

 (A) [Greek: e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos]   ... ... (B) [Greek: ou)k
e)/sti di/kios a)/nthrôpos.]y
 (C) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos] ... (D) [Greek: ou)k
e)/stin ou) di/kaios a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ _ou)k e)/sti tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]_ (30).--[Greek:
Au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai, a)/llai de\ du/o pro\s to\
ou)k _a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti] (38) [Greek:
_prostethe/n_.] (Here follow the second pairs of Antitheses, or the
second Quaternion of propositions, again in the order from which I
have departed above)--

 (E) [Greek: e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos]  ... ... (F) [Greek:
Ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]
 (G) [Greek: e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos] ... (H) [Greek:
Ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos.]

[Greek: plei/ous de\ tou/tôn ou)k e)/sontai a)ntithe/seis. au(=tai
de\] (the second Quaternion) [Greek: chôri\s e)kei/nôn] (first
Quaternion) [Greek: au)tai\ kath' e(auta\s e)/sontai, ô(s o)no/mati
tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai.]

In this text Waitz makes three alterations:--1. In line 24, instead
of [Greek: ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he
reads, [Greek: ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou)k
a)nthrô/pô|].

2. In line 30 he makes a similar change; instead of [Greek: tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|]--he reads, [Greek:
tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|].

In line 38, instead of [Greek: prostethe/n], he reads [Greek:
prostethe/ntos].

Of these three alterations the first appears to me good, but
insufficient; the second not good, though the passage as it stands in
Bekker requires amendment; and the third, a change for the worse.

The purpose of Aristotle is here two-fold. First, to give the reason
why, when the propositions were _tertii adjacentis_, there were two
Quaternions or four couples of antithetical propositions; whereas in
propositions _secundi adjacentis_, there was only one Quaternion or
two couples of antithetical propositions. Next, to assign the
distinction between the first and the second Quaternion in
propositions _tertii adjacentis_.

Now the first of these two purposes is marked out in line 25, which I
think we ought to read not by substituting the words of Waitz in
place of the words of Bekker, but by retaining the words of Bekker
and inserting the words of Waitz as an addition to them. The passage
after such addition will stand thus--[Greek: le/gô d' o(/ti to\
_e)/stin_ ê)\ tô=| dikai/ô| proskei/setai ê)\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\
ê)\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| ê)\ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|, ô(/ste kai\ ê(
a)po/phasis. te/ttara _ou)=n_ e)/stai.] Here Aristotle declares the
_reason why_ ([Greek: ou)=n]) there come to be four couples of
propositions; that reason is, because [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek:
ou)k e)/sti] may be joined either with [Greek: di/kaios] or [Greek:
ou) di/kaios] and either with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] or with [Greek:
ou)k a)/nthrôpos]. Both these alternatives must be specified in order
to make out a reason why there are two Quaternions or four couples of
antithetical propositions. But the passage, as read by Bekker, gives
only one of these alternatives, while the passage, as read by Waitz,
gives only the other. Accordingly, neither of them separately is
sufficient; but both of them taken together furnish the reason
required, and thus answer Aristotle's purpose.

Aristotle now proceeds to enunciate the first of the two Quaternions,
and then proceeds to line 30, where the reading of Bekker is
irrelevant and unmeaning; but the amendment of Waitz appears to me
still worse, being positively incorrect in statement of fact. Waitz
reads [Greek: to\ ga\r _e)/stin_ e)ntau=tha] (in the first
Quaternion, which has just been enunciated) [Greek: kai\ to\ _ou)k
e)/stin_ tô=| a)nthrô/pô| proskei/setai kai\ _tô=| ou)k
a)nthrô/pô|_]. These last words are incorrect in fact, for [Greek:
ou)k a)/nthrôpos] does not appear in the first Quaternion, but is
reserved for the second. While the reading of Waitz is thus evidently
wrong, that of Bekker asserts nothing to the purpose. It is useless
to tell us merely that [Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin]
attach both to [Greek: di/kaios] and to [Greek: ou) di/kaios] in this
first Quaternion ([Greek: e)ntau=tha]), because that characteristic
is equally true of the second Quaternion (presently to follow), and
therefore constitutes no distinction between the two. To bring out
the meaning intended by Aristotle I think we ought here also to
retain the words of Bekker, and to add after them some, though not
all, of the words of Waitz. The passage would then stand
thus--[Greek: to\ ga\r e)/stin e)ntau=tha kai\ to\ ou)k e)/sti tô=|
dikai/ô| proskei/setai kai\ tô=| ou) dikai/ô|, kai\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|,
_a)ll' ou)_ tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|.] Or perhaps [Greek: _kai\ ou)_
tô=| ou)k a)nthrô/pô|] might suffice in the last clause (being a
smaller change), though [Greek: a)ll' ou)] seem the proper terms to
declare the meaning. In the reading which I propose, the sequence
intended by Aristotle is clear and intelligible. Having first told us
that [Greek: e)/stin] and [Greek: ou)k e)/sti] being joined
alternately with [Greek: di/kaios] and with [Greek: ou) di/kaios] and
also with [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos], make up
two Quaternions, he proceeds to enunciate the distinctive character
belonging to the first Quaternion of the two, viz., that in it
[Greek: e)/sti] and [Greek: ou)k e)/stin] are joined both with
[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios], and also with [Greek:
a)/nthrôpos] _but not with_ [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_], This is
exactly the truth.

Aristotle next proceeds to the second Quaternion, where he points
out, as the characteristic distinction, that [Greek: ou)k
a)/nthrôpos] comes in and [Greek: a)/nthrôpos] disappears, while
[Greek: di/kaios] and [Greek: ou) di/kaios] remain included, as in
the first. This is declared plainly by Aristotle in line 37:--[Greek:
au(=tai me\n ou)=n du/o a)nti/keintai] (referring to the two pairs of
antithetical propositions in the first Quaternion), [Greek: _a)/llai
de\ pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n;
e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k
a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/sti di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos, e)/stin ou)
di/kaios ou)k a)/nthrôpos-ou)k e)/stin ou) di/kaios ou)k
a)/nthrôpos.] When we read these words, [Greek: a)/llai de\ du/o
pro\s to\ ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s u(pokei/meno/n ti prostethe/n], as
applied to the second Quaternion, we see that there must have been
some words preceding which excluded [Greek: _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_] from
the first Quaternion. Waitz contends for the necessity of changing
[Greek: prostethe/n] into [Greek: prostethe/ntos]. I do not concur
with his reasons for the change; the words that follow, p. 20, line
2, [Greek: ô(s o)no/mati tô=| _ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ chrô/menai
(proschrô/menai)], are a reasonable justification of [Greek:
prostethe/n--_ou)k a)/nthrôpos_ ô(s _u(pokei/meno/n ti_ prostethe/n]
being very analogous to [Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos ô(s o)/noma].

This long note, for the purpose of restoring clearness to an obscure
text, will appear amply justified if the reader will turn to the
perplexities and complaints of the ancient Scholiasts, revealed by
Ammonius and Boethius. Even earlier than the time of Alexander
(Schol. p. 122**, b. 47) there was divergence in the MSS. of
Aristotle; several read [Greek: tô=| dikai/ô|] (p. 19, b. 25),
several others read [Greek: tô=| a)nthrô/pô|]. I think that all of
them were right in what they retained, and wrong by omission only
or mainly.]

After this very subtle and obscure distinction between propositions
_secundi adjacentis_, and those _tertii adjacentis_, in respect to
the application of the negative, Aristotle touches on the relation of
_contrariety_ between propositions. The universal affirmation _Omne
est animal justum_ has for its contrary _Nullum est animal justum_.
It is plain that both these propositions will never be true at once.
But the negatives or contradictories of both may well be true at
once: thus, _Non omne animal est justum_ (the contradictory of the
first) and _Est aliquid animal justum_ (the contradictory of the
second) may be and are both alike true. If the affirmative
proposition _Omnis homo est non justus_ be true, the negative _Nullus
est homo justus_ must also be true; if the affirmative _Est aliquis
homo justus_ be true, the negative _Non omnis homo est non justus_
must also be true. In singular propositions, wherever the negative or
denial is true, the indefinite affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs], in the language of Theophrastus) corresponding to it
will also be true; in universal propositions, the same will not
always hold. Thus, if you ask, Is Sokrates wise? and receive for
answer No, you are warranted in affirming, Sokrates is not wise (the
indefinite affirmation). But if you ask, Are all men wise? and the
answer is No, you are not warranted in affirming, All men are not
wise. This last is the contrary of the proposition, All men are wise;
and two contraries may both be false. You are warranted in declaring
only the contradictory negative, Not all men are wise.[29]

[Footnote 29: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 20, a. 16-30.]

Neither the indefinite noun ([Greek: ou)k a)/nthrôpos]) nor the
indefinite verb ([Greek: ou) tre/chei--ou) di/kaios]) is a real and
true negation, though it appears to be such. For every negation ought
to be either true or false; but _non homo_, if nothing be appended to
it, is not more true or false (indeed less so) than _homo_.[30]

[Footnote 30: Ibid. a. 31, seq.]

The transposition of substantive and adjective makes no difference in
the meaning of the phrase; _Est albus homo_ is equivalent to _Est
homo albus_. If it were not equivalent, there would be two negations
corresponding to the same affirmation; but we have shown that there
can be only one negation corresponding to one affirmation, so as to
make up an _Antiphasis_.[31]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. b. 1-12. That [Greek: e)sti\ leuko\s
a)/nthrôpos], and [Greek: e)sti\n a)/nthrôpos leuko/s], mean exactly
the same, neither more nor less--we might have supposed that
Aristotle would have asserted without any proof; that he would have
been content [Greek: a)po\ tô=n pragma/tôn pistou=sthai] (to use the
phrase of Ammonius in a portion of the Scholia, p. 121, a. 27). But
he prefers to deduce it as a corollary from a general doctrine much
less evident than the statement itself; and after all, his deduction
is not conclusive, as Waitz has already remarked (ad Organ. I. p.
351).]

In one and the same proposition, it is indispensable that the subject
be one and the predicate one; if not, the proposition will not be
one, but two or more. Both the subject and the predicate indeed may
consist of several words; but in each case the several words must
coalesce to make one total unity; otherwise the proposition will not
be one. Thus, we may predicate of man--_animal_, _bipes_,
_mansuetum_; but these three coalesce into one, so that the
proposition will be a single one. On the other hand the three terms
_homo_, _albus_, _ambulans_, do not coalesce into one; and therefore,
if we predicate all respecting the same subject, or if we affirm the
same predicate respecting all three, expressing them all by one word,
the proposition will not be one, but several.[32]

[Footnote 32: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 20, b. 13-22.]

Aristotle follows this up by a remark interesting to note, because we
see how much his generalities were intended to bear upon the actual
practice of his day, in regard to dialectical disputation. In
dialectic exercise, the respondent undertook to defend a thesis, so
as to avoid inconsistency between one answer and another, against any
questions which might be put by the opponent. Both the form of the
questions, and the form of the answers, were determined beforehand.
No question was admissible which tended to elicit information or a
positive declaration from the respondent. A proposition was tendered
to him, and he was required to announce whether he affirmed or denied
it. The question might be put in either one of two ways: either by
the affirmative alone, or by putting both the affirmative and the
negative; either in the form, Is Rhetoric estimable? or in the form,
Is Rhetoric estimable or not? To the first form the respondent
answered Yes or No: to the second form, he replied by repeating
either the affirmative or the negative, as he preferred. But it was
not allowable to ask him, _What_ is Rhetoric? so as to put him under
the necessity of enunciating an explanation of his own.[33]

[Footnote 33: See the Scholia of Ammonius, p. 127, Br.]

Under these canons of dialectic debate, each question was required to
be really and truly one, so as to admit of a definite answer in one
word. The questioner was either unfair or unskilful, if he wrapped up
two questions really distinct in the same word, and thus compelled
the respondent either to admit them both, or to deny them both, at
once. Against this inconvenience Aristotle seeks to guard, by
explaining what are the conditions under which one and the same word
does in fact include more than one question. He had before brought to
view the case of an equivocal term, which involves such duplication:
if _himation_ means both horse and man, it will often happen that
questions respecting _himation_ cannot be truly answered either by
Yes or No. He now brings to view a different case in which the like
ambiguity is involved. To constitute one proposition, it is essential
both that the subject should be one, and that the predicate should be
one; either of them indeed may be called by two or three names, but
these names must coalesce into one. Thus, _animal_, _bipes_,
_mansuetum_, coalesce into _homo_, and may be employed either as one
subject or as one predicate; but _homo_, _albus_, _ambulans_, do not
coalesce into one; so that if we say, _Kallias est homo, albus,
ambulans_, the proposition is not one but three.[34] Accordingly, the
respondent cannot make one answer to a question thus complicated. We
thus find Aristotle laying down principles--and probably no one had
ever attempted to do so before him--for the correct management of
that dialectical debate which he analyses so copiously in the Topica.

[Footnote 34: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 20, b. 2. seq.; Ammonius,
Schol. pp. 127-128, a. 21, Br. Compare De Sophist. Elench. p. 169, a.
6-15.]

There are cases (he proceeds to state) in which two predicates may be
truly affirmed, taken separately, respecting a given subject, but in
which they cannot be truly affirmed, taken together.[35] Kallias is a
_currier_, Kallias is _good_--both these propositions may be true;
yet the proposition, Kallias is a _good currier_, may not be true.
The two predicates are both of them accidental co-inhering in the
same individual; but do not fuse themselves into one. So, too, we may
truly say, Homer _is a poet_; but we cannot truly say, Homer
_is_.[36] We see by this last remark,[37] how distinctly Aristotle
assigned a double meaning to _est_: first, _per se_, as meaning
existence; next, relatively, as performing the function of copula in
predication. He tells us, in reply either to Plato or to some other
contemporaries, that though we may truly say, _Non-Ens est
opinabile_, we cannot truly say _Non-Ens est_, because the real
meaning of the first of these propositions is, **_Non-Ens est
opinabile non esse_.[38]

[Footnote 35: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 7, seq.]

[Footnote 36: Ibid. a. 27.]

[Footnote 37: Compare Schol. (ad Anal. Prior. I.) p. 146, a. 19-27;
also Eudemi Fragment. cxiv. p. 167, ed. Spengel.

Eudemus considered [Greek: e)/stin] as one term in the proposition.
Alexander dissented from this, and regarded it as being only a copula
between the terms, [Greek: sunthe/seôs mênutiko\n mo/rion tô=n e)n
tê=| prota/sei o(/rôn.]]

[Footnote 38: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 32; compare Rhetorica,
ii. p. 1402, a. 5. The remark of Aristotle seems to bear upon the
doctrine laid down by Plato in the Sophistes, p. 258--the close of
the long discussion which begins, p. 237, about [Greek: to\ mê\
o)/n], as Ammonius tells us in the Scholia, p. 112, b. 5, p. 129, b.
20, Br. Ammonius also alludes to the Republic; as if Plato had
delivered the same doctrine in both; which is not the fact. See
'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii. pp.
447-458, seq.]

Aristotle now discusses the so-called Modal Propositions--the
Possible and the Necessary. What is the appropriate form of
_Antiphasis_ in the case of such propositions, where _possible to
be_, or _necessary to be_, is joined to the simple _is_. After a
chapter of some length, he declares that the form of _Antiphasis_
suitable for the Simple proposition will not suit for a Modal
proposition; and that in the latter the sign of negation must be
annexed to the modal adjective--_possible_, _not possible_, _&c._ His
reasoning here is not merely involved, but substantially incorrect;
for, in truth, both in one and in the other, the sign of
contradictory negation ought to be annexed to the copula.[39] From
the _Antiphasis_ in Modals Aristotle proceeds to legitimate sequences
admissible in such propositions, how far any one of them can be
inferred from any other.[40] He sets out four tables, each containing
four modal determinations interchangeable with each other.

     1.

1. Possible (physically) to be.
2. Possible (logically) to be.
3. Not impossible to be.
4. Not necessary to be.

     2.

1. Possible (physically) not to be.
2. Possible (logically) not to be.
3. Not impossible not to be.
4. Not necessary not to be.

     3.

1. Not possible (physically) to be.
2. Not possible (logically) to be.
3. Impossible to be.
4. Necessary not to be.

     4.

1. Not possible (physically) not to be.
2. Not possible (logically) not to be.
3. Impossible not to be.
4. Necessary to be.

Aristotle canvasses these tables at some length, and amends them
partly by making the fourth case of the second table change place
with the fourth of the first.[41] He then discusses whether we can
correctly say that the _necessary to be_ is also _possible to be_. If
not, then we might say correctly that the _necessary to be_ is _not
possible to be_; for one side or other of a legitimate _Antiphasis_
may always be truly affirmed. Yet this would be absurd: accordingly
we must admit that the _necessary to be_ is also _possible to be_.
Here, however, we fall seemingly into a different absurdity; for the
_possible to be_ is also _possible not to be_; and how can we allow
that what is _necessary to be_ is at the same time _possible not to
be_? To escape from such absurdities on both sides, we must
distinguish two modes of the Possible: one, in which the affirmative
and negative are alike possible; the other in which the affirmative
alone is possible, because it is always and constantly realized. If a
man is actually walking, we know that it is possible for him to walk;
and even when he is not walking, we say the same, because we believe
that he may walk if he chooses. He is not always walking; and in his
case, as in all other intermittent realities, the affirmative and the
negative are alike possible. But this is not true in the case of
necessary, constant, and sempiternal realities. With them there is no
alternative possibility, but only the possibility of their doing or
continuing to do. The celestial bodies revolve, sempiternally and
necessarily; it is therefore possible for them to revolve; but there
is no alternative possibility; it is not possible for them not to
revolve. Perpetual reality thus includes the unilateral, but not the
bilateral, possibility.[42]

[Footnote 39: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 21, a. 34-p. 22, a. 13. See
the note of Waitz, ad Organ. I. p. 359, who points out the error of
Aristotle, partly indicated by Ammonius in the Scholia.

The rule does not hold in propositions with the sign of universality
attached to the subject; but it is at least the same for Modals and
Non-modals.]

[Footnote 40: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 22, a. 14-b. 28.]

[Footnote 41: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 22, b. 22, [Greek: lei/petai
toi/nun] &c.; Ammonius, Schol. p. 133, b. 5-27-36.

Aristotle also intimates (p. 23, a. 18) that it would be better to
reverse the order of the propositions in the tables, and to place the
Necessary before the Possible. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire has inserted
(in the note to his Translation, p. 197) tables with this reversed
order.]

[Footnote 42: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 22, b. 29-p. 23, a. 15.]

Having thus stated that _possible to be_, in this unilateral and
equivocal sense but in no other, is a legitimate consequence of
_necessary to be_, Aristotle proceeds to lay down a tripartite
distinction which surprises us in this place. "It is plain from what
has been said that that which is by Necessity, is in Act or
Actuality; so that if things sempiternal are prior, Actuality is
prior to Possibility. Some things, like the first (or celestial)
substances, are Actualities without Possibility; others (the
generated and perishable substances) which are prior in nature but
posterior in generation, are Actualities along with Possibility;
while a third class are Possibilities only, and never come into
Actuality" (such as the largest number, or the least magnitude).[43]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. p. 23, a. 21-26.]

Now the sentence just translated (enunciating a doctrine of
Aristotle's First Philosophy rather than of Logic) appears decidedly
to contradict what he had said three lines before, viz., that in one
certain sense, the _necessary to be_ included and implied the
_possible to be_; that is, a possibility or potentiality unilateral
only, not bilateral; for we are here told that the celestial
substance is Actuality without Possibility (or Potentiality), so that
the unilateral sense of this last term is disallowed. On the other
hand, a third sense of the same term is recognized and distinguished;
a sense neither bilateral nor unilateral, but the negation of both.
This third sense is hardly intelligible, giving as it does an
_impossible_ Possible; it seems a self-contradictory description.[44]
At best, it can only be understood as a limit in the mathematical
sense; a terminus towards which potentiality may come constantly
nearer and nearer, but which it can never reach. The first, or
bilateral potentiality, is the only sense at once consistent,
legitimate, and conformable to ordinary speech. Aristotle himself
admits that the second and third are equivocal meanings,[45]
departing from the first as the legitimate meaning; but if equivocal
departure to so great an extent were allowed, the term, put to such
multifarious service, becomes unfit for accurate philosophical
reasoning. And we find this illustrated by the contradiction into
which Aristotle himself falls in the course of a few lines. The
sentence of First Philosophy (which I translated in the last page) is
a correction of the logical statement immediately preceding it, in so
far as it suppresses the _necessary_ Possible, or the unilateral
potentiality. But on the other hand the same sentence introduces a
new confusion by its third variety--the _impossible_ Potential,
departing from all clear and consistent meaning of potentiality, and
coinciding only with the explanation of _Non-Ens_, as given by
Aristotle elsewhere.[46]

[Footnote 44: M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
translation (p. 197) calls it justly--"le possible qui n'est jamais;
et qui par cela même, porte en lui une sorte d'impossibilité." It
contradicts both the two explanations of [Greek: dunato\n] which
Aristotle had given a few lines before. 1. [Greek: dunato\n o(/ti
e)nergei=]. 2. [Greek: dunato\n o(/ti e)nergê/seien a)/n] (p. 23, a.
10).]

[Footnote 45: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 23, a. 5. [Greek: tou=to me\n
tou/tou cha/rin ei)/rêtai, o(/ti ou) pa=sa du/namis tô=n
a)ntikeime/nôn, ou)d' o(/sai le/gontai kata\ to\ au)to\ ei)=dos.
e)/niai de\ duna/meis o(mô/numoi/ ei)sin; to\ ga\r dunato\n ou)ch
a(plô=s le/getai, a)lla\ to\ me\n o(/ti a)lêthe\s ô(s e)nergei/a|
o)/n], &c.

If we read the thirteenth chapter of Analytica Priora I. (p. 32, a.
18-29) we shall see that [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon] is declared to
be [Greek: ou)k a)nagkai=on], and that in the definition of [Greek:
to\ e)ndecho/menon], the words [Greek: ou(= mê\ o)/ntos a)nagkai/ou]
are expressly inserted. When [Greek: to\ a)nagkai=on] is said [Greek:
e)nde/chesthai], this is said only in an _equivocal_ sense of [Greek:
e)nde/chesthai--to\ ga\r a)nagkai=on _o(mônu/môs_ e)nde/chesthai
le/gomen.]

On the meaning of [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon], translated above, in
the table, "possible (logically) to be," and its relation to [Greek:
to\ dunato/n], see Waitz, ad Organ. I. pp. 375-8. Compare Prantl.
Gescht. der Logik, I. pp. 166-8.]

[Footnote 46: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 21, a. 32: [Greek: to\ de\ mê\
o)/n, o(/ti doxasto/n, ou)k a)lêthe\s ei)pei=n o)/n ti; do/xa ga\r
au)tou= ou)k e)/stin o(/ti e)/stin, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k e)/stin. To\ mê\
o)/n] is the true description of that which Aristotle improperly
calls [Greek: du/namis ê(\ ou)de/pote e)ne/rgeia/ e)stin].

The triple enumeration given by Aristotle (1. Actuality without
Potentiality. 2. Actuality with Potentiality. 3. Potentiality without
Actuality) presents a neat symmetry which stands in the place of
philosophical exactness.]

The contrast of Actual and Potential stands so prominently forward in
Aristotle's First Philosophy, and is, when correctly understood, so
valuable an element in First Philosophy generally, that we cannot be
too careful against those misapplications of it into which he himself
sometimes falls. The sense of Potentiality, as including the
alternative of either affirmative or negative--_may be or may not
be_--is quite essential in comprehending the ontological theories of
Aristotle; and when he professes to drop the _may not be_ and leave
only the _may be_, this is not merely an equivocal sense of the word,
but an entire renunciation of its genuine sense. In common parlance,
indeed, we speak elliptically, and say, _It may be_, when we really
mean, _It may or may not be_. But the last or negative half, though
not expressly announced, is always included in the thought and belief
of the speaker and understood by the hearer.[47]

[Footnote 47: See Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Animâ, pp. 303-307.]

Many logicians, and Sir William Hamilton very emphatically, have
considered the Modality of propositions as improper to be included in
the province of Logic, and have treated the proceeding of Aristotle
in thus including it, as one among several cases in which he had
transcended the legitimate boundaries of the science.[48] This
criticism, to which I cannot subscribe, is founded upon one peculiar
view of the proper definition and limits of Logic. Sir W. Hamilton
lays down the limitation peremptorily, and he is warranted in doing
this for himself; but it is a question about which there has been
great diversity of view among expositors, and he has no right to
blame others who enlarge it. My purpose in the present volume is to
explain how the subject presented itself to Aristotle. He was the
first author that ever attempted to present Logic in a scientific
aspect; and it is hardly fair to try him by restrictions emanating
from critics much later. Yet, if he is to be tried upon this point, I
think the latitude in which he indulges preferable to the restricted
doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton.

[Footnote 48: See pp. 143-5 of the article, "Logic," in Sir William
Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy--a very learned and instructive
article, even for those who differ from most of its conclusions.
Compare the opposite view, as advocated by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire,
Logique d'Aristote, Préface, pp. **lxii.-lxviii.]

In the treatise now before us (De Interpretatione) Aristotle
announces his intention to explain the Proposition or Enunciative
Speech, the conjunction of a noun and a verb; as distinguished,
first, from its two constituents (noun and verb) separately taken;
next, from other modes of speech, also combining the two (precative,
interrogative, &c.). All speech (he says), the noun or verb
separately, as well as the proposition conjointly, is, in the first
instance, a sign of certain mental states common to the speaker with
his hearers; and, in the second instance, a sign of certain things or
facts, resembling (or correlating with) these mental states.[49] The
noun, pronounced separately, and the verb, pronounced separately, are
each signs of a certain thought in the speaker's mind, without either
truth or falsehood; the Proposition, or conjunction of the two, goes
farther and declares truth or falsehood. The words pronounced (he
says) follow the thoughts in the mind, expressing an opinion (_i.e._
belief or disbelief) entertained in the mind; the verbal affirmation
or negation gives utterance to a mental affirmation or negation--a
feeling of belief or disbelief--that something _is_, or that
something _is not_.[50] Thus, Aristotle intends to give a theory of
the Proposition, leaving other modes of speech to Rhetoric or
Poetry:[51] the Proposition he considers under two distinct aspects.
In its first or _subjective_ aspect, it declares the state of the
speaker's mind, as to belief or disbelief. In its second or
_objective_ aspect, it declares a truth or falsehood correlating with
such belief or disbelief, for the information of the hearer. Now the
Mode belonging to a proposition of this sort, in virtue of its
_form_, is to be _true_ or _false_. But there are also other
propositions--other varieties of speech enunciative--which differ
from the Simple or Assertory Proposition having the form _is_ or _is
not_, and which have distinct modes belonging to them, besides that
of being true or false. Thus we have the Necessary Proposition,
declaring that a thing _is_ so _by necessity_, that it _must be_ so,
or _cannot but be_ so; again, the Problematical Proposition,
enunciating that a thing _may or may not be so_. These two modes
attach to the _form_ of the proposition, and are quite distinct from
those which attach to its _matter_ as simply affirmed or denied; as
when, instead of saying, John is sick, we say, John is sick _of a
fever_, John is _dangerously_ sick, with a merely material
modification. Such adverbs, modifying the _matter_ affirmed or
denied, are numerous, and may be diversified almost without limit.
But they are not to be placed in the same category with the two just
mentioned, which modify the _form_ of the proposition, and correspond
to a state of mind distinct from simple belief or disbelief,
expressed by a simple affirmation or negation.[52] In the case of
each of the two, Aristotle has laid down rules (correct or incorrect)
for constructing the legitimate _Antiphasis_, and for determining
other propositions equipollent to, or following upon, the
propositions given; rules distinct from those applying to the simple
affirmation. When we say of anything, _It may be or may not be_, we
enunciate here only one proposition, not two; we declare a state of
mind which is neither belief nor disbelief, as in the case of the
Simple Proposition, but something wavering between the two; yet which
is nevertheless frequent, familiar to every one, and useful to be
made known by a special form of proposition adapted to it--the
Problematical. On the other hand, when we say, _It is by
necessity--must be--cannot but be_--we declare our belief, and
something more besides; we declare that the supposition of the
opposite of what we believe, would involve a contradiction--I would
contradict some definition or axiom to which we have already sworn
adherence. This again is a state of mind known, distinguishable, and
the same in all, subjectively; though as to the objective
correlate--what constitutes the Necessary, several different
opinions have been entertained.

[Footnote 49: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 16, a. 3-8: [Greek: e)/sti me\n
ou)=n ta\ e)n tê=| phônê=| tô=n e)n tê=| psuchê=| pathêma/tôn
su/mbola--ô(=n me/ntoi tau=ta sêmei=a _prô/tôs_, tau)ta\ pa=si
pathê/mata tê=s psuchê=s, kai\ ô(=n tau=ta o(moiô/mata, pra/gmata
ê)/dê tau)ta/.] Ibid. a. 13: [Greek: ta\ me\n ou)=n o)no/mata au)ta\
kai\ ta\ r(ê/mata e)/oike tô=| a)/neu sunthe/seôs kai\ diaire/seôs
noê/mati--ou)/te ga\r pseu=dos ou)/t' a)lêthe/s pô.] Ib. p. 17, a. 2:
[Greek: lo/gos a)pophantiko\s, e)n ô(=| to\ a)lêtheu/ein ê)\
pseu/desthai u(pa/rchei]. Compare p. 20, a. 34.]

[Footnote 50: Aristot. De Interpret. p. 23, a. 32: [Greek: ta\ me\n
e)n tê=| phônê=| a)kolouthei= toi=s e)n tê=| dianoi/a|, e)kei= de\
e)nanti/a do/xa ê( tou= e)nanti/ou], &c. Ib. p. 24, b. 1: [Greek:
ô(/ste ei)/per e)pi\ do/xês ou(/tôs e)/chei, ei)si\ de\ ai( e)n tê=|
phônê=| katapha/seis kai\ a)popha/seis su/mbola tô=n e)n tê=|
psuchê=|, dê=lon o(/ti kai\ katapha/sei e)nanti/a me\n a)po/phasis
ê(/ peri\ tou= au)tou= katho/lou], &c. Ib. p. 17, a. 22: [Greek:
e)/sti de\ ê( a(plê= a)po/phansis phônê\ sêmantikê\ peri\ tou=
u(pa/rchein ti ê)\ mê\ u(pa/rchein], &c.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. p. 17, a. 5. [Greek: oi( me\n ou)=n a)/lloi
(lo/goi) a)phei/sthôsan; r(êtorikê=s ga\r ê)\ poiêtikê=s oi)keiote/ra
ê( ske/psis; o( de\ a)pophantiko\s tê=s nu=n theôri/as.]]

[Footnote 52: Ammonius (in the Scholia on De Interpret. p. 130, a.
16, seq., Brand.) ranks all modal propositions under the same
category, and considers the number of them to be, not indeed
infinite, but very great. He gives as examples: "The moon changes
_fast_; Plato loves Dion _vehemently_." Sir W. Hamilton adopts the
same view as Ammonius: "Modes may be conceived without end--all must
be admitted, if any are; the line of distinction attempted to be
drawn is futile." (Discussions on Phil. ut sup. p. 145.) On the other
hand, we learn from Ammonius that most of the Aristotelian
interpreters preceding him reckoned the simple proposition [Greek:
to\ u(pa/rchein] as a modal; and Aristotle himself seems so to
mention it (Analytica Priora, I. ii. p. 25, a. 1); besides that he
enumerates _true_ and _false_, which undoubtedly attach to [Greek:
to\ u(pa/rchein], as examples of modes (De Interpret. c. 12, p. 22,
a. 13). Ammonius himself protests against this doctrine of the former
interpreters.

Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 2) says:--"A
remark of a similar nature may be applied to most of those
distinctions among propositions which are said to have reference to
their _modality_; as difference of tense or time; the sun _did_ rise,
_is_ rising, _will_ rise. . . . The circumstance of time is properly
considered as attaching to the copula, which is the sign of
predication, and not to the predicate. If the same cannot be said of
such modifications as these, Cæsar is _perhaps_ dead; it is
_possible_ that Cæsar is dead; it is only because these fall together
under another head; being properly assertions not of anything
relating to the fact itself, but of the state of our own mind in
regard to it; namely, our absence of disbelief of it. Thus, _Cæsar
may be dead_, means, _I am not sure that Cæsar is alive_."

I do not know whether Mr. Mill means that the function of the copula
is different in these problematical propositions, from what it is in
the categorical propositions: I think there is no difference. But his
remark that the problematical proposition is an assertion of the
state of our minds in regard to the fact, appears to me perfectly
just. Only, we ought to add, that this is equally true about the
categorical proposition. It is equally true about all the three
following propositions:--1. The three angles of a triangle may or may
not be equal to two right angles. 2. The three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles. 3. The three angles of a triangle are
necessarily equal to two right angles. In each of these three
propositions, an assertion of the state of our minds is involved, and
a different state of mind in each. This is the subjective aspect of
the proposition; it belongs to the form rather than to the matter,
and may be considered as a mode. The commentators preceding Ammonius
did so consider it, and said that the categorical proposition had its
mode as well as the others. Ammonius differed from them, treating the
categorical as having no mode--as the standard unit or point of
departure.

The propositions now known as Hypothetical and Disjunctive, which may
also be regarded as in a certain sense Modals, are not expressly
considered by Aristotle. In the Anal. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50 a. 16-38,
he adverts to hypothetical syllogisms, and intimates his intention of
discussing them more at length: but this intention has not been
executed, in the works that we possess.]

In every complete theory of enunciative speech, these modal
propositions deserve to be separately explained, both in their
substantive meaning and in their relation to other propositions.
Their characteristic property as Modals belongs to _form_ rather than
to _matter_; and Aristotle ought not to be considered as
unphilosophical for introducing them into the Organon, even if we
adopt the restricted view of Logic taken by Sir W. Hamilton, that it
takes no cognizance of the matter of propositions, but only of their
form. But though I dissent from Hamilton's criticisms on this point,
I do not concur with the opposing critics who think that Aristotle
has handled the Modal Propositions in a satisfactory manner. On the
contrary, I think that the equivocal sense which he assigns to the
Potential or Possible, and his inconsistency in sometimes admitting,
sometimes denying, a Potential that is always actual, and a Potential
that is never actual--are serious impediments to any consistent
Logic. The Problematical Proposition does not admit of being cut in
half; and if we are to recognize a _necessary_ Possible, or an
_impossible_ Possible, we ought to find different phrases by which to
designate them.

We must observe that the distinction of Problematical and Necessary
Propositions corresponds, in the mind of Aristotle, to that capital
and characteristic doctrine of his Ontology and Physics, already
touched on in this chapter. He thought, as we have seen, that in the
vast circumferential region of the Kosmos, from the outer sidereal
sphere down to the lunar sphere, celestial substance was a necessary
existence and energy, sempiternal and uniform in its rotations and
influence; and that through its beneficent influence, pervading the
concavity between the lunar sphere and the terrestrial centre (which
included the four elements with their compounds) there prevailed a
regularizing tendency called Nature: modified, however, and partly
counteracted by independent and irregular forces called Spontaneity
and Chance, essentially unknowable and unpredictable. The irregular
sequences thus named by Aristotle were the objective correlate of the
Problematical Proposition in Logic. In these sublunary sequences, as
to future time, _may or may not_ was all that could be attained, even
by the highest knowledge; certainty, either of affirmation or
negation, was out of the question. On the other hand, the necessary
and uniform energies of the celestial substance, formed the objective
correlate of the Necessary Proposition in Logic; this substance was
not merely an existence, but an existence necessary and unchangeable.
I shall say more on this when I come to treat of Aristotle as a
kosmical and physical philosopher; at present it is enough to remark
that he considers the Problematical Proposition in Logic to be not
purely subjective, as an expression of the speaker's ignorance, but
something more, namely, to correlate with an objective essentially
unknowable to all.

The last paragraph of the treatise De Interpretatione discusses the
question of Contraries and Contradictories, and makes out that the
greatest breadth of opposition is that between a proposition and its
contradictory (Kallias is just--Kallias is not just), not that
between, a proposition and what is called its contrary (Kallias is
just--Kallias is unjust); therefore, that according to the definition
of contrary, the true contrary of a proposition is its
contradictory.[53] This paragraph is not connected with that which
precedes; moreover, both the reasoning and the conclusion differ from
what we read as well in this treatise as in other portions of
Aristotle. Accordingly, Ammonius in the Scholia, while informing us
that Porphyry had declined to include it in his commentary, intimates
also his own belief that it is not genuine, but the work of another
hand. At best (Ammonius thinks), if we must consider it as the work
of Aristotle, it has been composed by him only as a dialectical
exercise, to debate an unsettled question.[54] I think the latter
hypothesis not improbable. The paragraph has certainly reference to
discussions which we do not know, and it may have been composed when
Aristotle had not fully made up his mind on the distinction between
Contrary and Contradictory. Considering the difficult problems that
he undertook to solve, we may be sure that he must have written down
several trains of thought merely preliminary and tentative. Moreover,
we know that he had composed a distinct treatise 'De Oppositis,'[55]
which is unfortunately lost, but in which he must have included this
very topic--the distinction between Contrary and Contradictory.

[Footnote 53: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 23, a. 27, seq.]

[Footnote 54: Scholia ad Arist. pp. 135-139, Br. [Greek: gumna/sai
mo/non boulêthe/ntos tou\s e)ntugcha/nontas pro\s tê\n e)pi/krisin
tô=n pithanô=s me\n ou) me/ntoi a)lêthô=s legome/nôn lo/gôn] &c. (p.
135, b. 15; also p. 136, a. 42).]

[Footnote 55: Scholia ad Categorias, p. 83, a. 17-19, b. 10, p. 84,
a. 29, p. 86, b. 42, p. 88, a. 30. It seems much referred to by
Simplikius, who tells us that the Stoics adopted most of its
principles (p. 83, a. 21, b. 7).]

Whatever may have been the real origin and purpose of this last
paragraph, I think it unsuitable as a portion of the treatise De
Interpretatione. It nullifies, or at least overclouds, one of the
best parts of that treatise, the clear determination of _Anaphasis_
and its consequences.

If, now, we compare the theory of the Proposition as given by
Aristotle in this treatise, with that which we read in the Sophistes
of Plato, we shall find Plato already conceiving the proposition as
composed indispensably of noun and verb, and as being either
affirmative or negative, for both of which he indicates the technical
terms.[56] He has no technical term for either subject or predicate;
but he conceives the proposition as belonging to its subject:[57] we
may be mistaken in the predicates, but we are not mistaken in the
subject. Aristotle enlarges and improves upon this theory. He not
only has a technical term for affirmation and negation, and for
negative noun and verb, but also for subject and predicate; again,
for the mode of signification belonging to noun and verb, each
separately, as distinguished from the mode of signification belonging
to them conjointly, when brought together in a proposition. He
follows Plato in insisting upon the characteristic feature of the
proposition--aptitude for being true or false; but he gives an ampler
definition of it, and he introduces the novel and important
distribution of propositions according to the quantity of the
subject. Until this last distribution had been made, it was
impossible to appreciate the true value and bearing of each
_Antiphasis_ and the correct language for expressing it, so as to say
neither more nor less. We see, by reading the Sophistes, that Plato
did not conceive the _Antiphasis_ correctly, as distinguished from
Contrariety on the one hand, and from mere Difference on the other.
He saw that the negative of any proposition does not affirm the
contrary of its affirmative; but he knew no other alternative except
to say, that it affirms only something different from the
affirmative. His theory in the Sophistes recognizes nothing but
affirmative propositions, with the predicate of contrariety on one
hand, or of difference on the other;[58] he ignores, or jumps over,
the intermediate station of propositions affirming nothing at all,
but simply denying a pre-understood affirmative. There were other
contemporaries, Antisthenes among them, who declared contradiction to
be an impossibility;[59] an opinion coinciding at bottom with what I
have just cited from Plato himself. We see, in the Theætêtus, the
Euthydêmus, the Sophistes, and elsewhere, how great was the
difficulty felt by philosophers of that age to find a proper _locus
standi_ for false propositions, so as to prove them theoretically
possible, to assign a legitimate function for the negative, and to
escape from the interdict of Parmenides, who eliminated _Non-Ens_ as
unmeaning and incogitable. Even after the death of Aristotle, the
acute disputation of Stilpon suggested many problems, but yielded few
solutions; and Menedêmus went so far as to disallow negative
propositions altogether.[60]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 261-262. [Greek: pha/sin kai\
a)po/phasin].--ib. p. 263 E. In the so-called Platonic 'Definitions,'
we read [Greek: e)n katapha/sei kai\ a)popha/sei] (p. 413 C); but
these are probably after Aristotle's time. In another of these
Definitions (413 D.) we read [Greek: a)po/phasis], where the word
ought to be [Greek: a)po/phansis].]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A-C.]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 257, B: [Greek: Ou)k a)r', e)nanti/on o(/tan
a)po/phasis le/gêtai sêmai/nein, sugchôrêso/metha, tosou=ton de\
mo/non, o(/ti _tô=n a)/llôn ti mênu/ei to\ mê\ kai\ to\ ou)/_
protithe/mena tô=n e)pio/ntôn o)noma/tôn, ma=llon de\ tô=n
pragma/tôn, peri\ a(/tt' a)\n ke/êtai ta\ e)piphtheggo/mena u(/steron
tê=s a)popha/seôs o)no/mata.]

The term [Greek: a)nti/phasis], and its derivative [Greek:
a)ntiphatikô=s], are not recognized in the Platonic Lexicon. Compare
the same dialogue, Sophistes, p. 263; also Euthydêmus, p. 298, A.
Plato does not seem to take account of negative propositions as such.
See 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii.
pp. 446-455.]

[Footnote 59: Aristot. Topica, I. xi. p. 104, b. 20; Metaphys.
[Greek: D]. p. 1024, b. 32; Analytic. Poster. I. xxv. p. 86, b. 34.]

[Footnote 60: Diogon. Laert. ii. 134-135. See the long discussion in
the Platonic Theætêtus (pp. 187-196), in which Sokrates in vain
endeavours to produce some theory whereby [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa] may
be rendered possible. Hobbes, also, in his Computation or Logic (De
Corp. c. iii. § 6), followed by Destutt Tracy, disallows the negative
proposition _per se_, and treats it as a clumsy disguise of the
affirmative [Greek: e)k metathe/seôs], to use the phrase of
Theophrastus. Mr. John Stuart Mill has justly criticized this part of
Hobbes's theory (System of Logic, Book I. ch. iv. § 2).]

Such being the conditions under which philosophers debated in the age
of Aristotle, we can appreciate the full value of a positive theory
of propositions such as that which we read in his treatise De
Interpretatione. It is, so far as we know, the first positive theory
thereof that was ever set out; the first attempt to classify
propositions in such a manner that a legitimate _Antiphasis_ could be
assigned to each; the first declaration that to each affirmative
proposition there belonged one appropriate negative, and to each
negative proposition one appropriate counter-affirmative, and one
only; the earliest effort to construct a theory for this purpose,
such as to hold ground against all the puzzling questions of acute
disputants.[61] The clear determination of the _Antiphasis_ in each
case--the distinction of Contradictory antithesis from Contrary
antithesis between propositions--this was an important logical
doctrine never advanced before Aristotle; and the importance of it
becomes manifest when we read the arguments of Plato and Antisthenes,
the former overleaping and ignoring the contradictory opposition, the
latter maintaining that it was a process theoretically indefensible.
But in order that these two modes of antithesis should be clearly
contrasted, each with its proper characteristic, it was requisite
that the distinction of quantity between different propositions
should also be brought to view, and considered in conjunction with
the distinction of quality. Until this was done, the Maxim of
Contradiction, denied by some, could not be shown in its true force
or with its proper limits. Now, we find it done,[62] for the first
time, in the treatise before us. Here the Contradictory antithesis
(opposition both in quantity and quality) in which one proposition
must be true and the other false, is contrasted with the Contrary
(propositions opposite in quality, but both of them universal).
Aristotle's terminology is not in all respects fully developed; in
regard, especially, to the quantity of propositions it is less
advanced than in his own later treatises; but from the theory of the
De Interpretatione all the distinctions current among later
logicians, take their rise.

[Footnote 61: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 36: [Greek: pro\s ta\s
sophistika\s e)nochlê/seis].]

[Footnote 62: We see, from the argument in the Metaphysica of
Aristotle, that there were persons in his day who denied or refused
to admit the Maxim of Contradiction; and who held that contradictory
propositions might both be true or both false (Aristot. Metaph.
[Greek: G]. p. 1006, a. 1; p. 1009, a. 24). He employs several pages
in confuting them.

See the Antinomies in the Platonic Parmenides (pp. 154-155), some of
which destroy or set aside the Maxim of Contradiction ('Plato and the
Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxv. p. 306).]

The distinction of Contradictory and Contrary is fundamental in
ratiocinative Logic, and lies at the bottom of the syllogistic theory
as delivered in the Analytica Priora. The precision with which
Aristotle designates the Universal proposition with its exact
contradictory antithesis, is remarkable in his day. Some, however, of
his observations respecting the place and functions of the negative
particle ([Greek: ou)]), must be understood with reference to the
variable order of words in a Greek or Latin sentence; for instance,
the distinction between _Kallias non est justus_ and _Kallias est non
justus_ does not suggest itself to one speaking English or
French.[63] Moreover, the Aristotelian theory of the Proposition is
encumbered with various unnecessary subtleties; and the introduction
of the Modals (though they belong, in my opinion, legitimately to a
complete logical theory) renders the doctrine so intricate and
complicated, that a judicious teacher will prefer, in explaining the
subject, to leave them for second or ulterior study, when the simpler
relations between categorical propositions have been made evident and
familiar. The force of this remark will be felt more when we go
through the Analytica Priora. The two principal relations to be
considered in the theory of Propositions--Opposition and
Equipollence--would have come out far more clearly in the treatise De
Interpretatione, if the discussion of the Modals had been reserved
for a separate chapter.

[Footnote 63: The diagram or parallelogram of logical antithesis,
which is said to have begun with Apuleius, and to have been
transmitted through Boethius and the Schoolmen to modern times
(Ueberweg, System der Logik, sect. 72, p. 174) is as follows:--

 A. Omnis homo est justus.   --- E. Nullus homo est justus.
                             |X|
 I. Aliquis homo est justus. --- O. Aliquis homo non est justus.

But the parallelogram set out by Aristotle in the treatise De
Interpretatione, or at least in the Analytica Priora, is different,
and intended for a different purpose. He puts it thus:--

1. Omnis homo est justus . . . .  . 2. Non omnis homo est justus.
4. Non omnis homo est non justus  . 3. Omnis homo est non justus.

Here Proposition (1) is an affirmative, of which (2) is the direct
and appropriate negative: also Proposition (3) is an affirmative
(Aristotle so considers it), of which (4) is the direct and
appropriate negative. The great aim of Aristotle is to mark out
clearly what is the appropriate negative or [Greek: A)po/phasis] to
each [Greek: Kata/phasis (mi/a a)po/phasis mia=s katapha/seôs], p.
17, b. 38), making up together the pair which he calls [Greek:
A)nti/phasis], standing in Contradictory Opposition; and to
distinguish this appropriate negative from another proposition which
comprises the particle of negation, but which is really a new
affirmative.

The true negatives of _homo est justus--Omnis homo est justus_ are,
_Homo non est justus--Non omnis homo est justus_. If you say, _Homo
est non justus--Omnis homo est non justus_, these are not negative
propositions, but new affirmatives ([Greek: e)k metathe/seôs] in the
language of Theophrastus).]



CHAPTER V.

ANALYTICA PRIORA I.


Reviewing the treatise De Interpretatione, we have followed Aristotle
in his first attempt to define what a Proposition is, to point out
its constituent elements, and to specify some of its leading
varieties. The characteristic feature of the Proposition he stated to
be--That it declares, in the first instance, the mental state of the
speaker as to belief or disbelief, and, in its ulterior or final
bearing, a state of facts to which such belief or disbelief
corresponds. It is thus significant of truth or falsehood; and this
is its logical character (belonging to Analytic and Dialectic), as
distinguished from its rhetorical character, with other aspects
besides. Aristotle farther indicated the two principal discriminative
attributes of propositions as logically regarded, passing under the
names of quantity and quality. He took great pains, in regard to the
quality, to explain what was the special negative proposition in true
contradictory antithesis to each affirmative. He stated and enforced
the important separation of contradictory propositions from contrary;
and he even parted off (which the Greek and Latin languages admit,
though the French and English will hardly do so) the true negative
from the indeterminate affirmative. He touched also upon equipollent
propositions, though he did not go far into them. Thus commenced with
Aristotle the systematic study of propositions, classified according
to their meaning and their various interdependences with each other
as to truth and falsehood--their mutual consistency or
incompatibility. Men who had long been talking good Greek fluently
and familiarly, were taught to reflect upon the conjunctions of words
that they habitually employed, and to pay heed to the conditions of
correct speech in reference to its primary purpose of affirmation and
denial, for the interchange of beliefs and disbeliefs, the
communication of truth, and the rectification of falsehood. To many
of Aristotle's contemporaries this first attempt to theorize upon the
forms of locution familiar to every one would probably appear hardly
less strange than the interrogative dialectic of Sokrates, when he
declared himself not to know what was meant by justice, virtue,
piety, temperance, government, &c.; when he astonished his hearers by
asking them to rescue him from this state of ignorance, and to
communicate to him some portion of their supposed plenitude of
knowledge.

Aristotle tells us expressly that the theory of the Syllogism, both
demonstrative and dialectic, on which we are now about to enter, was
his own work altogether and from the beginning; that no one had ever
attempted it before; that he therefore found no basis to work upon,
but was obliged to elaborate his own theory, from the very rudiments,
by long and laborious application. In this point of view, he
contrasts Logic pointedly with Rhetoric, on which there had been a
series of writers and teachers, each profiting by the labours of his
predecessors.[1] There is no reason to contest the claim to
originality here advanced by Aristotle. He was the first who
endeavoured, by careful study and multiplied comparison of
propositions, to elicit general truths respecting their ratiocinative
interdependence, and to found thereupon precepts for regulating the
conduct of demonstration and dialectic.[2]

[Footnote 1: See the remarkable passage at the close of the
Sophistici Elenchi, p. 183, b. 34-p. 184, b. 9: [Greek: tau/tês de\
tê=s pragmatei/as ou) to\ me\n ê)=n to\ de\ ou)k ê)=n
proexeirgasme/non, a)ll' ou)de\n pantelô=s u(pê=rche--kai\ peri\ me\n
tô=n r(êtorikô=n u(pê=rche polla\ kai\ palaia\ ta\ lego/mena, peri\
de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron
a)/llo le/gein, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non
e)ponou=men.]]

[Footnote 2: Sir Wm. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Lect. v. pp. 87-91,
vol. III.:--"The principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle can
both be traced back to Plato, by whom they were enounced and
frequently applied; though it was not till long after, that either of
them obtained a distinctive appellation. To take the principle of
Contradiction first. This law Plato frequently employs, but the most
remarkable passages are found in the Phædo (p. 103), in the Sophista
(p. 252), and in the Republic (iv. 436, vii. 525). This law was
however more distinctively and emphatically enounced by Aristotle. .
. . . Following Aristotle, the Peripatetics established this law as
the highest principle of knowledge. From the Greek Aristotelians it
obtained the name by which it has subsequently been denominated, the
_principle_, or _law_, or _axiom_, of _Contradiction_ ([Greek:
a)xi/ôma tê=s a)ntipha/seôs]). . . . . The law of Excluded Middle
between two contradictories remounts, as I have said, also to Plato;
though the Second Alcibiades, in which it is most clearly expressed
(p. 139; also Sophista, p. 250), must be admitted to be spurious. . .
. . This law, though universally recognized as a principle in the
Greek Peripatetic school, and in the schools of the middle ages, only
received the distinctive appellation by which it is now known at a
comparatively modern date."

The passages of Plato, to which Sir W. Hamilton here refers, will not
be found to bear out his assertion that Plato "enounced and
frequently applied the principles of Contradiction and Excluded
Middle." These two principles are both of them enunciated,
denominated, and distinctly explained by Aristotle, but by no one
before him, as far as our knowledge extends. The conception of the
two maxims, in their generality, depends upon the clear distinction
between Contradictory Opposition and Contrary Opposition; which is
fully brought out by Aristotle, but not adverted to, or at least
never broadly and generally set forth, by Plato. Indeed it is
remarkable that the word [Greek: A)nti/phasis], the technical term
for Contradiction, never occurs in Plato; at least it is not
recognized in the _Lexicon Platonicum_. Aristotle puts it in the
foreground of his logical exposition; for, without it, he could not
have explained what he meant by Contradictory Opposition. See
Categoriæ, pp. 13-14, and elsewhere in the treatise De
Interpretatione and in the Metaphysica. Respecting the idea of the
Negative as put forth by Plato in the Sophistes (not coinciding
either with Contradictory Opposition or with Contrary Opposition),
see 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' vol. II. ch. xxvii.
pp. 449-459. I have remarked in that chapter, and the reader ought to
recollect, that the philosophical views set out by Plato in the
Sophistes differ on many points from what we read in other Platonic
dialogues.]

He begins the Analytica Priora by setting forth his general purpose,
and defining his principal terms and phrases. His manner is one of
geometrical plainness and strictness. It may perhaps have been common
to him with various contemporary geometers, whose works are now lost;
but it presents an entire novelty in Grecian philosophy and
literature. It departed not merely from the manner of the
rhetoricians and the physical philosophers (as far as we know them,
not excluding even Demokritus), but also from Sokrates and the
Sokratic school. For though Sokrates and Plato were perpetually
calling for definitions, and did much to make others feel the want of
such, they neither of them evinced aptitude or readiness to supply
the want. The new manner of Aristotle is adapted to an undertaking
which he himself describes as original, in which he has no
predecessors, and is compelled to dig his own foundations. It is
essentially didactic and expository, and contrasts strikingly with
the mixture of dramatic liveliness and dialectical subtlety which we
find in Plato.

The terminology of Aristotle in the Analytica is to a certain extent
different from that in the treatise De Interpretatione. The
Enunciation ([Greek: A)po/phanis]) appears under the new name of
[Greek: Pro/tasis], _Proposition_ (in the literal sense) or
_Premiss_; while, instead of Noun and Verb, we have the word _Term_
([Greek: O(/ros]), applied alike both to Subject and to Predicate.[3]
We pass now from the region of _declared_ truth, into that of
_inferential_ or _reasoned_ truth. We find the proposition looked at,
not merely as communicating truth in itself, but as generating and
helping to guarantee certain ulterior propositions, which communicate
something additional or different. The primary purpose of the
Analytica is announced to be, to treat of Demonstration and
demonstrative Science; but the secondary purpose, running parallel
with it and serving as illustrative counterpart, is, to treat also of
Dialectic; both of them[4] being applications of the inferential or
ratiocinative process, the theory of which Aristotle intends to
unfold.

[Footnote 3: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 16: [Greek:
o(/ron de\ kalô= ei)s o(\n dialu/etai ê( pro/tasis, oi(=on to/ te
katêgorou/menon kai\ to\ kath' ou(= katêgorei=tai], &c.

[Greek: O(/ros]--_Terminus_--seems to have been a technical word
first employed by Aristotle himself to designate subject and
predicate as the _extremes_ of a proposition, which latter he
conceives as the _interval_ between the _termini_--[Greek:
_dia/stêma_]. (Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 35, a. 12. [Greek:
sterêtikô=n diastêma/tôn], &c. See Alexander, Schol. pp. 145-146.)

In the Topica Aristotle employs [Greek: o(/ros] in a very different
sense--[Greek: lo/gos o( to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai sêmai/nôn] (Topic. I.
v. p. 101, b. 39)--hardly distinguished from [Greek: o(rismo/s]. The
Scholia take little notice of this remarkable variation of meaning,
as between two treatises of the Organon so intimately connected (pp.
256-257, Br.).]

[Footnote 4: Analyt. Prior. I. i. p. 24, a. 25.]

The three treatises--1, Analytica Priora, 2, Analytica Posteriora, 3,
Topica with Sophistici Elenchi--thus belong all to one general
scheme; to the theory of the Syllogism, with its distinct
applications, first, to demonstrative or didactic science, and, next,
to dialectical debate. The scheme is plainly announced at the
commencement of the Analytica Priora; which treatise discusses the
Syllogism generally, while the Analytica Posteriora deals with
Demonstration, and the Topica with Dialectic. The first chapter of
the Analytica Priora and the last chapter of the Sophistici Elenchi
(closing the Topica), form a preface and a conclusion to the whole.
The exposition of the Syllogism, Aristotle distinctly announces,
precedes that of Demonstration (and for the same reason also precedes
that of Dialectic), because it is more general: every demonstration
is a sort of syllogism, but every syllogism is not a
demonstration.[5]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. I. iv. p. 25, b. 30.]

As a foundation for the syllogistic theory, propositions are
classified according to their quantity (more formally than in the
treatise De Interpretatione) into Universal, Particular, and
Indefinite or Indeterminate;[6] Aristotle does not recognize the
Singular Proposition as a distinct variety. In regard to the
Universal Proposition, he introduces a different phraseology
according as it is looked at from the side of the Subject, or from
that of the Predicate. The Subject is, or is not, in the whole
Predicate; the Predicate is affirmed or denied respecting all or
every one of the Subject.[7] The minor term of the Syllogism (in the
first mode of the first figure) is declared to be in the whole middle
term; the major is declared to belong to, or to be predicable of, all
and every the middle term. Aristotle says that the two are the same;
we ought rather to say that each is the concomitant and correlate of
the other, though his phraseology is such as to obscure the
correlation.

[Footnote 6: Ibid. I. i. p. 24, a. 17. The Particular ([Greek: e)n
me/rei]), here for the first time expressly distinguished by
Aristotle, is thus defined:--[Greek: e)n me/rei de\ to\ tini\ ê)\ mê\
tini\ ê)\ mê\ panti\ u(pa/rchein.]]

[Footnote 7: Ibid. b. 26: [Greek: to\ d' e)n o(/lô| ei)nai e(/teron
e(te/rô|, kai\ to\ kata\ panto\s katêgorei=sthai thate/rou tha/teron,
tau)to/n e)sti--tau)to\n], _i.e._ [Greek: _a)ntestramme/nôs_], as
Waitz remarks in note. Julius Pacius says:--"Idem re, sed ratione
differunt ut ascensus et descensus; nam subjectum dicitur esse vel
non esse in toto attributo, quia attributum dicitur de omni vel de
nullo subjecto" (p. 128).]

The definition given of a Syllogism is very clear and
remarkable:--"It is a speech in which, some positions having been
laid down, something different from these positions follows as a
necessary consequence from their being laid down." In a _perfect_
Syllogism nothing additional is required to make the necessity of the
consequence obvious as well as complete. But there are also
_imperfect_ Syllogisms, in which such necessity, though equally
complete, is not so obviously conveyed in the premisses, but requires
some change to be effected in the position of the terms in order to
render it conspicuous.[8]

[Footnote 8: Aristot. Anal. Prior. I. i. p. 24, b. 18-26. The same,
with a little difference of wording, at the commencement of Topica,
p. 100, a. 25. Compare also Analyt. Poster. I. x. p. 76, b. 38:
[Greek: o(/sôn o)/ntôn tô=| e)kei=na ei)=nai gi/netai to\
sumpe/rasma.]]

The term Syllogism has acquired, through the influence of Aristotle,
a meaning so definite and technical, that we do not easily conceive
it in any other meaning. But in Plato and other contemporaries it
bears a much wider sense, being equivalent to reasoning generally, to
the process of comparison, abstraction, generalization.[9] It was
Aristotle who consecrated the word, so as to mean exclusively the
reasoning embodied in propositions of definite form and number.
Having already analysed propositions separately taken, and
discriminated them into various classes according to their
constituent elements, he now proceeds to consider propositions in
combination. Two propositions, if properly framed, will conduct to a
third, different from themselves, but which will be necessarily true
if they are true. Aristotle calls the three together a Syllogism.[10]
He undertakes to shew how it must be framed in order that its
conclusion shall be necessarily true, if the premisses are true. He
furnishes schemes whereby the cast and arrangement of premisses,
proper for attaining truth, may be recognized; together with the
nature of the conclusion, warrantable under each arrangement.

[Footnote 9: See especially Plato, Theætêt. p. 186, B-D., where
[Greek: o( sullogismo\s] and [Greek: ta\ a)nalogi/smata] are
equivalents.]

[Footnote 10: Julius Pacius (ad Analyt. Prior. I. i.) says that it is
a mistake on the part of most logicians to treat the Syllogism as
including three propositions (ut vulgus logicorum putat). He
considers the premisses alone as constituting the Syllogism; the
conclusion is not a part thereof, but something distinct and
superadded. It appears to me that the _vulgus logicorum_ are here in
the right.]

In the Analytica Priora, we find ourselves involved, from and after
the second chapter, in the distinction of Modal propositions, the
necessary and the possible. The rules respecting the simple Assertory
propositions are thus, even from the beginning, given in conjunction
and contrast with those respecting the Modals. This is one among many
causes of the difficulty and obscurity with which the treatise is
beset. Theophrastus and Eudemus seem also to have followed their
master by giving prominence to the Modals:[11] recent expositors
avoid the difficulty, some by omitting them altogether, others by
deferring them until the simple assertory propositions have been
first made clear. I shall follow the example of these last; but it
deserves to be kept in mind, as illustrating Aristotle's point of
view, that he regards the Modals as principal varieties of the
proposition, co-ordinate in logical position with the simple
assertory.

[Footnote 11: Eudemi Fragmenta, cii.-ciii. p. 145, ed. Spengel.]

Before entering on combinations of propositions, Aristotle begins by
shewing what can be done with single propositions, in view to the
investigation or proving of truth. A single proposition may be
_converted_; that is, its subject and predicate may be made to change
places. If a proposition be true, will it be true when thus
converted, or (in other words) will its converse be true? If false,
will its converse be false? If this be not always the case, what are
the conditions and limits under which (assuming the proposition to be
true) the process of conversion leads to assured truth, in each
variety of propositions, affirmative or negative, universal or
particular? As far as we know, Aristotle was the first person that
ever put to himself this question; though the answer to it is
indispensable to any theory of the process of proving or disproving.
He answers it before he enters upon the Syllogism.

The rules which he lays down on the subject have passed into all
logical treatises. They are now familiar; and readers are apt to
fancy that there never was any novelty in them--that every one knows
them without being told. Such fancy would be illusory. These rules
are very far from being self-evident, any more than the maxims of
Contradiction and of the Excluded Middle. Not one of the rules could
have been laid down with its proper limits, until the discrimination
of propositions, both as to quality (affirmative or negative), and as
to quantity (universal or particular), had been put prominently
forward and appreciated in all its bearings. The rule for trustworthy
conversion is different for each variety of propositions. The
Universal Negative may be converted simply; that is, the predicate
may become subject, and the subject may become predicate--the
proposition being true after conversion, if it was true before. But
the Universal Affirmative cannot be thus converted simply. It admits
of conversion only in the manner called by logicians _per accidens_:
if the predicate change places with the subject, we cannot be sure
that the proposition thus changed will be true, unless the new
subject be lowered in quantity from universal to particular; _e.g._
the proposition, All men are animals, has for its legitimate converse
not, _All_ animals are men, but only, _Some_ animals are men. The
Particular Affirmative may be converted simply: if it be true that
Some animals are men, it will also be true that Some men are animals.
But, lastly, if the true proposition to be converted be a Particular
Negative, it cannot be converted at all, so as to make sure that the
converse will be true also.[12]

[Footnote 12: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 25, a. 1-26.]

Here then are four separate rules laid down, one for each variety of
propositions. The rules for the second and third variety are proved
by the rule for the first (the Universal Negative), which is thus the
basis of all. But how does Aristotle prove the rule for the Universal
Negative itself? He proceeds as follows: "If A cannot be predicated
of any one among the B's, neither can B be predicated of any one
among the A's. For if it could be predicated of any one among them
(say C), the proposition that A cannot be predicated of any B would
not be true; since C is one among the B's."[13] Here we have a proof
given which is no proof at all. If I disbelieved or doubted the
proposition to be proved, I should equally disbelieve or doubt the
proposition given to prove it. The proof only becomes valid, when you
add a farther assumption which Aristotle has not distinctly
enunciated, viz.: That if some A (_e.g._ C) is B, then some B must
also be A; which would be contrary to the fundamental supposition.
But this farther assumption cannot be granted here, because it would
imply that we already know the rule respecting the convertibility of
Particular Affirmatives, viz., that they admit of being converted
simply. Now the rule about Particular Affirmatives is afterwards
itself proved by help of the preceding demonstration respecting the
Universal Negative. As the proof stands, therefore, Aristotle
demonstrates each of these by means of the other; which is not
admissible.[14]

[Footnote 13: Ibid. p. 25, a. 15: [Greek: ei) ou)=n mêdeni\ tô=n B
to\ A u(pa/rchei, ou)de\ tô=n A ou)deni\ u(pa/rxei to\ B. ei) ga\r
tini, oi(=on tô=| G, ou)k a)lêthe\s e)/stai to\ mêdeni\ tô=n B to\ A
u(pa/rchein; to\ ga\r G tô=n B ti/ e)stin.]

Julius Pacius (p. 129) proves the Universal Negative to be
convertible _simpliciter_, by a _Reductio ad Absurdum_ cast into a
syllogism in the First figure. But it is surely unphilosophical to
employ the rules of Syllogism as a means of proving the legitimacy of
Conversion, seeing that we are forced to assume conversion in our
process for distinguishing valid from invalid syllogisms. Moreover
the _Reductio ad Absurdum_ assumes the two fundamental Maxims of
Contradiction and Excluded Middle, though these are less obvious, and
stand more in need of proof than the simple conversion of the
Universal Negative, the point that they are brought to establish.]

[Footnote 14: Waitz, in his note (p. 374), endeavours, but I think
without success, to show that Aristotle's proof is not open to the
criticism here advanced. He admits that it is obscurely indicated,
but the amplification of it given by himself still remains exposed to
the same objection.]

Even the friends and companions of Aristotle were not satisfied with
his manner of establishing this fundamental rule as to the conversion
of propositions. Eudêmus is said to have given a different proof; and
Theophrastus assumed as self-evident, without any proof, that the
Universal Negative might always be converted simply.[15] It appears
to me that no other or better evidence of it can be offered, than the
trial upon particular cases, that is to say, Induction.[16] Nothing
is gained by dividing (as Aristotle does) the whole A into parts, one
of which is C; nor can I agree with Theophrastus in thinking that
every learner would assent to it at first hearing, especially at a
time when no universal maxims respecting the logical value of
propositions had ever been proclaimed. Still less would a Megaric
dialectician, if he had never heard the maxim before, be satisfied to
stand upon an alleged _à priori_ necessity without asking for
evidence. Now there is no other evidence except by exemplifying the
formula, No A is B, in separate propositions already known to the
learner as true or false, and by challenging him to produce any one
case, in which, when it is true to say No A is B, it is not equally
true to say, No B is A; the universality of the maxim being liable to
be overthrown by any one contradictory instance.[17] If this proof
does not convince him, no better can be produced. In a short time,
doubtless, he will acquiesce in the general formula at first hearing,
and he may even come to regard it as self-evident. It will recall to
his memory an aggregate of separate cases each individually
forgotten, summing up their united effect under the same aspect, and
thus impressing upon him the general truth as if it were not only
authoritative but self-authorized.

[Footnote 15: See the Scholia of Alexander on this passage, p. 148,
a. 30-45, Brandis; Eudemi Fragm. ci.-cv. pp. 145-149, ed. Spengel.]

[Footnote 16: We find Aristotle declaring in Topica, II. viii. p.
113, b. 15, that in converting a true Universal Affirmative
proposition, the negative of the Subject of the convertend is always
true of the negative of the Predicate of the convertend; _e.g._ If
every man is an animal, every thing which is not an animal is not a
man. This is to be assumed (he says) upon the evidence of
Induction--uncontradicted iteration of particular cases, extended to
all cases universally--[Greek: lamba/nein d' e)x e)pagôgê=s, oi(=on
ei) o( a)/nthrôpos zô=|on, to\ mê\ zô=|on ou)k a)/nthrôpos; o(moi/ôs
de\ kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn. . . . . e)pi\ pa/ntôn ou)=n to\
toiou=ton a)xiôte/on.]

The rule for the simple conversion of the Universal Negative rests
upon the same evidence of Induction, never contradicted.]

[Footnote 17: Dr. Wallis, in one of his acute controversial treatises
against Hobbes, remarks upon this as the process pursued by Euclid in
his demonstrations:--"You tell us next that an Induction, without
enumeration of all the particulars, is not sufficient to infer a
conclusion. Yes, Sir, if after the enumeration of some particulars,
there comes a general clause, _and the like in other cases_ (as here
it doth), this may pass for a proofe till there be a possibility of
giving some instance to the contrary, which here you will never be
able to doe. And if such an Induction may not pass for proofe, there
is never a proposition in Euclid demonstrated. For all along he takes
no other course, or at least grounds his Demonstrations on
Propositions no otherwise demonstrated. As, for instance, he
proposeth it in general (i. c. 1.)--_To make an equilateral triangle
on a line given_. And then he shows you how to do it upon the line A
B, which he there shows you, and leaves you to supply: _And the same,
by the like means, may be done upon any other strait line_; and then
infers his general conclusion. Yet I have not heard any man object
that the Induction was not sufficient, because he did not actually
performe it in all lines possible."--(Wallis, Due Correction to Mr.
Hobbes, Oxon. 1656, sect. v. p. 42.) This is induction by _parity of
reasoning_.

So also Aristot. Analyt. Poster. I. iv. p. 73, b. 32: [Greek: to\
katho/lou de\ u(pa/rchei to/te, o(/tan e)pi\ tou= tucho/ntos kai\
prô/tou deiknu/êtai.]]

Aristotle passes next to Affirmatives, both Universal and Particular.
First, if A can be predicated of all B, then B can be predicated of
_some_ A; for if B cannot be predicated of any A, then (by the rule
for the Universal Negative) neither can A be predicated of any B.
Again, if A can be predicated of some B, in this case also, and for
the same reason, B can be predicated of some A.[18] Here the rule for
the Universal Negative, supposed already established, is applied
legitimately to prove the rules for Affirmatives. But in the first
case, that of the Universal, it fails to prove _some_ in the sense of
_not-all_ or _some-at-most_, which is required; whereas, the rules
for both cases can be proved by Induction, like the formula about the
Universal Negative. When we come to the Particular Negative,
Aristotle lays down the position, that it does not admit of being
necessarily converted in any way. He gives no proof of this, beyond
one single exemplification: If some animal is not a man, you are not
thereby warranted in asserting the converse, that some man is not an
animal.[19] It is plain that such an exemplification is only an
appeal to Induction: you produce one particular example, which is
entering on the track of Induction; and one example alone is
sufficient to establish the negative of an universal proposition.[20]
The converse of a Particular Negative is not in all cases true,
though it may be true in many cases.

[Footnote 18: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 25, a. 17-22.]

[Footnote 19: Ibid. p. 25, a. 22-26.]

[Footnote 20: Though some may fancy that the rule for converting the
Universal Negative is intuitively known, yet every one must see that
the rule for converting the Universal Affirmative is not thus
self-evident, or derived from natural intuition. In fact, I believe
that every learner at first hears it with great surprise. Some are
apt to fancy that the Universal Affirmative (like the Particular
Affirmative) may be converted _simply_. Indeed this error is not
unfrequently committed in actual reasoning; all the more easily,
because there is a class of cases (with subject and predicate
co-extensive) where the converse of the Universal Affirmative _is_
really true. Also, in the case of the Particular Negative, there are
many true propositions in which the simple converse is true. A novice
might incautiously generalize upon those instances, and conclude that
both were convertible simply. Nor could you convince him of his error
except by producing examples in which, when a true proposition of
this kind is converted simply, the resulting converse is notoriously
false. The appeal to various separate cases is the only basis on
which we can rest for testing the correctness or incorrectness of all
these maxims proclaimed as universal.]

From one proposition taken singly, no new proposition can be
inferred; for purposes of inference, two propositions at least are
required.[21] This brings us to the rules of the Syllogism, where two
propositions as premisses conduct us to a third which necessarily
follows from them; and we are introduced to the well-known three
Figures with their various Modes.[22] To form a valid Syllogism,
there must be three terms and no more; the two, which appear as
Subject and Predicate of the conclusion, are called the _minor_ term
(or minor extreme) and the _major_ term (or major extreme)
respectively; while the third or _middle_ term must appear in each of
the premisses, but not in the conclusion. These terms are called
_extremes_ and _middle_, from the position which they occupy in every
perfect Syllogism--that is in what Aristotle ranks as the First among
the three figures. In _his_ way of enunciating the Syllogism, this
middle position formed a conspicuous feature; whereas the modern
arrangement disguises it, though the denomination _middle_ term is
still retained. Aristotle usually employs letters of the alphabet,
which he was the first to select as abbreviations for exposition;[23]
and he has two ways (conforming to what he had said in the first
chapter of the present treatise) of enunciating the modes of the
First figure. In one way, he begins with the major extreme (Predicate
of the conclusion): A may be predicated of all B, B may be predicated
of all C; therefore, A may be predicated of all C (Universal
Affirmative). Again, A cannot be predicated of any B, B can be
predicated of all C; therefore, A cannot be predicated of any C
(Universal Negative). In the other way, he begins with the minor term
(Subject of the conclusion): C is in the whole B, B is in the whole
A; therefore, C is in the whole A (Universal Affirmative). And, C is
in the whole B, B is not in the whole A; therefore, C is not in the
whole A (Universal Negative). We see thus that in Aristotle's way of
enunciating the First figure, the middle term is really placed
between the two extremes,[24] though this is not so in the Second and
Third figures. In the modern way of enunciating these figures, the
middle term is never placed between the two extremes; yet the
denomination _middle_ still remains.

[Footnote 21: Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 34, a. 17; xxiii. p. 40, b.
35; Analyt. Poster. I. iii. p. 73, a. 7.]

[Footnote 22: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 25, b. 26, seq.]

[Footnote 23: M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Logique d'Aristote, vol. ii.
p. 7, n.), referring to the examples of Conversion in chap. ii.,
observes:--"Voici le prémier usage des lettres représentant des
idées; c'est un procédé tout à fait algébrique, c'est à dire, de
généralisation. Déjà, dans l'Herméneia, ch. 13, § 1 et suiv.,
Aristote a fait usage de tableaux pour représenter sa pensée
relativement à la consécution des modales. Il parle encore
spécialement de figures explicatives, liv. 2. des Derniers
Analytiques, ch. 17, § 7. Vingt passages de l'Histoire des Animaux
attestent qu'il joignait des dessins à ses observations et à ses
théories zoologiques. Les illustrations pittoresques datent donc de
fort loin. L'emploi symbolique des lettres a été appliqué aussi par
Aristote à la Physique. Il l'avait emprunté, sans doute, aux procédés
des mathématiciens."

We may remark, however, that when Aristotle proceeds to specify those
combinations of propositions which _do not_ give a valid conclusion,
he is not satisfied with giving letters of the alphabet; he superadds
special illustrative examples (Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 27, a. 7, 12,
34, 38).]

[Footnote 24: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 25, b. 35: [Greek:
kalô= de\ _me/son_, o(\ kai\ au)to\ e)n a)/llô| kai\ a)/llo e)n
tou/tô| e)sti/n, o(\ kai\ tê=| the/sei gi/netai me/son.]]

The Modes of each figure are distinguished by the different character
and relation of the two premisses, according as these are either
affirmative or negative, either universal or particular. Accordingly,
there are four possible varieties of each, and sixteen possible modes
or varieties of combinations between the two. Aristotle goes through
most of the sixteen modes, and shows that in the first Figure there
are only four among them that are legitimate, carrying with them a
necessary conclusion. He shows, farther, that in all the four there
are two conditions observed, and that both these conditions are
indispensable in the First figure:--(1) The major proposition must be
universal, either affirmative or negative; (2) The minor proposition
must be affirmative, either universal or particular or indefinite.
Such must be the character of the premisses, in the first Figure,
wherever the conclusion is valid and necessary; and _vice versâ_, the
conclusion will be valid and necessary, when such is the character of
the premisses.[25]

[Footnote 25: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 26, b. 26, et sup.]

In regard to the four valid modes (_Barbara_, _Celarent_, _Darii_,
_Ferio_, as we read in the scholastic Logic) Aristotle declares at
once in general language that the conclusion follows necessarily;
which he illustrates by setting down in alphabetical letters the
skeleton of a syllogism in _Barbara_. If A is predicated of all B,
and B of all C, A must necessarily be predicated of all C. But he
does not justify it by any real example; he produces no special
syllogism with real terms, and with a conclusion known beforehand to
be true. He seems to think that the general doctrine will be accepted
as evident without any such corroboration. He counts upon the
learner's memory and phantasy for supplying, out of the past
discourse of common life, propositions conforming to the conditions
in which the symbolical letters have been placed, and for not
supplying any contradictory examples. This might suffice for a
treatise; but we may reasonably believe that Aristotle, when teaching
in his school, would superadd illustrative examples; for the doctrine
was then novel, and he is not unmindful of the errors into which
learners often fall spontaneously.[26]

[Footnote 26: Analyt. Poster. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 21.]

When he deals with the remaining or invalid modes of the First
figure, his manner of showing their invalidity is different, and in
itself somewhat curious. "If (he says) the major term is affirmed of
all the middle, while the middle is denied of all the minor, no
necessary consequence follows from such being the fact, nor will
there be any syllogism of the two extremes; for it is equally
possible, either that the major term may be affirmed of all the
minor, or that it may be denied of all the minor; so that no
conclusion, either universal or particular, is necessary in all
cases."[27] Examples of such double possibility are then exhibited:
first, of three terms arranged in two propositions (A and E), in
which, from the terms specially chosen, the major happens to be truly
affirmable of all the minor; so that the third proposition is an
universal Affirmative:--

Major and  }
           } Animal is predicable of every Man;
  Middle.  }

Middle and }
           } Man is not predicable of any Horse;
  Minor    }

Major and  }
           } Animal is predicable of every Horse.
  Minor    }

Next, a second example is set out with new terms, in which the major
happens not to be truly predicable of any of the minor; thus
exhibiting as third proposition an universal Negative:--

Major and  }
           } Animal is predicable of every Man;
  Middle.  }

Middle and }
           } Man is not predicable of any Stone;
  Minor    }

Major and  }
           } Animal is not predicable of any Stone.
  Minor    }

Here we see that the full exposition of a syllogism is indicated with
real terms common and familiar to every one; alphabetical symbols
would not have sufficed, for the learner must himself recognize the
one conclusion as true, the other as false. Hence we are taught that,
after two premisses thus conditioned, if we venture to join together
the major and minor so as to form a pretended conclusion, we may in
some cases obtain a true proposition universally Affirmative, in
other cases a true proposition universally Negative. Therefore
(Aristotle argues) there is no one necessary conclusion, the same in
all cases, derivable from such premisses; in other words, this mode
of syllogism is invalid and proves nothing. He applies the like
reasoning to all the other invalid modes of the first Figure; setting
them aside in the same way, and producing examples wherein double and
opposite conclusions (improperly so called), both true, are obtained
in different cases from the like arrangement of premisses.

[Footnote 27: Analyt. Prior. I. iv. p. 26, a. 2, seq.]

This mode of reasoning plainly depends upon an appeal to prior
experience. The validity or invalidity of each mode of the First
figure is tested by applying it to different particular cases, each
of which is familiar and known to the learner _aliunde_; in one case,
the conjunction of the major and minor terms in the third proposition
makes an universal Affirmative which he knows to be true; in another
case, the like conjunction makes an universal Negative, which he also
knows to be true; so that there is no one _necessary_ (_i.e._ no one
uniform and trustworthy) conclusion derivable from such
premisses.[28] In other words, these modes of the First figure are
not valid or available in form; the negation being sufficiently
proved by one single undisputed example.

[Footnote 28: Though M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (note, p. 19) declares
Aristotle's exposition to be a model of analysis, it appears to me
that the grounds for disallowing this invalid mode of the First
figure (A--E--A, or A--E--E) are not clearly set forth by Aristotle
himself, while they are rendered still darker by some of his best
commentators. Thus Waitz says (p. 381): "Per exempla allata probat
(Aristoteles) quod demonstrare debebat ex ipsâ ratione quam singuli
termini inter se habeant: est enim proprium artis logicæ, ut
terminorum rationem cognoscat, dum res ignoret. Num de Caio
prædicetur animal nescit, scit de Caio prædicari animal, si animal de
homine et homo de Caio prædicetur."

This comment of Waitz appears to me founded in error. Aristotle had
no means of shewing the invalidity of the mode A E in the First
figure, except by an appeal to particular examples. The invalidity of
the invalid modes, and the validity of the valid modes, rest alike
upon this ultimate reference to examples of propositions known to be
true or false, by prior experience of the learner. The valid modes
are those which will stand this trial and verification; the invalid
modes are those which will not stand it. Not till such verification
has been made, is one warranted in generalizing the result, and
enunciating a formula applicable to unknown particulars (rationem
terminorum cognoscere, dum res ignoret). It was impossible for
Aristotle to do what Waitz requires of him. I take the opposite
ground, and regret that he did not set forth the fundamental test of
appeal to example and experience, in a more emphatic and
unmistakeable manner.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (in the note to his translation, p. 14)
does not lend any additional clearness, when he talks of the
"_conclusion_" from the propositions A and E in the First figure.
Julius Pacius says (p. 134): "Si tamen _conclusio_ dici debet, quæ
non colligitur ex propositionibus," &c. Moreover, M. St. Hilaire (p.
19) slurs over the legitimate foundation, the appeal to experience,
much as Aristotle himself does: "Puis prenant des exemples où la
_conclusion est de toute évidence_, Aristote les applique
successivement à chacune de ces combinaisons; celles qui donnent la
_conclusion fournie d'ailleurs par le bon sens_, sont concluantes ou
syllogistiques, les autres sont asyllogistiques."]

We are now introduced to the Second figure, in which each of the two
premisses has the middle term as Predicate.[29] To give a legitimate
conclusion in this figure, one or other of the premisses must be
negative, and the major premiss must be universal; moreover no
affirmative conclusions can ever be obtained in it--none but negative
conclusions, universal or particular. In this Second figure too,
Aristotle recognizes four valid modes; setting aside the other
possible modes as invalid[30] (in the same way as he had done in the
First figure), because the third proposition or conjunction of the
major term with the minor, might in some cases be a true universal
affirmative, in other cases a true universal negative. As to the
third and fourth of the valid modes, he demonstrates them by assuming
the contradictory of the conclusion, together with the major premiss,
and then showing that these two premisses form a new syllogism, which
leads to a conclusion contradicting the minor premiss. This method,
called _Reductio ad Impossibile_, is here employed for the first
time; and employed without being ushered in or defined, as if it were
familiarly known.[31]

[Footnote 29: Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 26, b. 34. As Aristotle
enunciates a proposition by putting the predicate before the subject,
he says that in this Second figure the middle term comes [Greek:
prô=ton tê=| the/sei]. In the Third figure, for the same reason, he
calls it [Greek: e)/schaton tê=| the/sei], vi. p. 28, a. 15.]

[Footnote 30: Analyt. Prior. I. v. p. 27, a. 18. In these invalid
modes, Aristotle says there is no _syllogism_; therefore we cannot
properly speak of a _conclusion_, but only of a third proposition,
conjoining the major with the minor.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. p. 27, a. 15, 26, seq. It is said to involve
[Greek: u(po/thesis], p. 28, a. 7; to be [Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs]
xxiii. p. 41, a. 25; to be [Greek: tou= e)x u(pothe/seôs], as opposed
to [Greek: deiktiko/s], xxiii. p. 40, b. 25.

M. B. St. Hilaire remarks justly, that Aristotle might be expected to
define or explain what it is, on first mentioning it (note, p. 22).]

Lastly, we have the Third figure, wherein the middle term is the
Subject in both premisses. Here one at least of the premisses must be
universal, either affirmative or negative. But no universal
conclusions can be obtained in this figure; all the conclusions are
particular. Aristotle recognizes six legitimate modes; in all of
which the conclusions are particular, four of them being affirmative,
two negative. The other possible modes he sets aside as in the two
preceding figures.[32]

[Footnote 32: Ibid. I. vi. p. 28, a. 10-p. 29, a. 18.]

But Aristotle assigns to the First figure a marked superiority as
compared with the Second and Third. It is the only one that yields
perfect syllogisms; those furnished by the other two are all
imperfect. The cardinal principle of syllogistic proof, as he
conceives it, is--That whatever can be affirmed or denied of a whole,
can be affirmed or denied of any part thereof.[33] The major
proposition affirms or denies something universally respecting a
certain whole; the minor proposition declares a certain part to be
included in that whole. To this principle the four modes of the First
figure manifestly and unmistakably conform, without any
transformation of their premisses. But in the other figures such
conformity does not obviously appear, and must be demonstrated by
reducing their syllogisms to the First figure; either ostensively by
exposition of a particular case, and conversion of the premisses, or
by _Reductio ad Impossibile_. Aristotle, accordingly, claims
authority for the Second and Third figures only so far as they can be
reduced to the First.[34] We must, however, observe that in this
process of reduction no new evidence is taken in; the matter of
evidence remains unchanged, and the form alone is altered, according
to laws of logical conversion which Aristotle has already laid down
and justified. Another ground of the superiority and perfection which
he claims for the First figure, is, that it is the only one in which
every variety of conclusion can be proved; and especially the only
one in which the Universal Affirmative can be proved--the great aim
of scientific research. Whereas, in the Second figure we can prove
only _negative_ conclusions, universal or particular; and in the
Third figure only _particular_ conclusions, affirmative or
negative.[35]

[Footnote 33: Ibid. I. xli. p. 49, b. 37: [Greek: o(/lôs ga\r o(\ mê/
e)stin ô(s o(/lon pro\s me/ros kai\ a)/llo pro\s tou=to ô(s me/ros
pro\s o(/lon, e)x ou)deno\s tô=n toiou/tôn dei/knusin o( deiknu/ôn,
ô(/ste ou)de\ gi/netai sullogismo/s.]

He had before said this about the relation of the three terms in the
Syllogism, I. iv. p. 25, b. 32: [Greek: o(/tan o(/roi trei=s ou(/tôs
e)/chôsi pro\s a)llê/lous ô(/ste to\n e)/schaton e)n o(/lô| ei)=nai
tô=| me/sô| kai\ to\n me/son e)n o(/lô| tô=| prô/tô| ê)\ ei)=nai ê)\
mê\ ei)=nai, a)na/gkê tô=n a)/krôn ei)=nai sullogismo\n te/leion]
(_Dictum de Omni et Nullo_).]

[Footnote 34: Analyt. Prior. I. vii. p. 29, a. 30-b. 25.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. I. iv. p. 26, b. 30, p. 27, a. 1, p. 28, a. 9, p.
29, a. 15. An admissible syllogism in the Second or Third figure is
sometimes called [Greek: dunato\s] as opposed to [Greek: te/leios],
p. 41, b. 33. Compare Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-Theorie des Aristoteles,
p. 245, Leipzig, 1870.]

Such are the main principles of syllogistic inference and rules for
syllogistic reasoning, as laid down by Aristotle. During the mediæval
period, they were allowed to ramify into endless subtle
technicalities, and to absorb the attention of teachers and studious
men, long after the time when other useful branches of science and
literature were pressing for attention. Through such prolonged
monopoly--which Aristotle, among the most encyclopedical of all
writers, never thought of claiming for them--they have become so
discredited, that it is difficult to call back attention to them as
they stood in the Aristotelian age. We have to remind the reader,
again, that though language was then used with great ability for
rhetorical and dialectical purposes, there existed as yet hardly any
systematic or scientific study of it in either of these branches. The
scheme and the terminology of any such science were alike unknown,
and Aristotle was obliged to construct it himself from the
foundation. The rhetorical and dialectical teaching as then given (he
tells us) was mere unscientific routine, prescribing specimens of art
to be committed to memory: respecting syllogism (or the conditions of
legitimate deductive inference) absolutely nothing had been said.[36]
Under these circumstances, his theory of names, notions, and
propositions as employed for purposes of exposition and
ratiocination, is a remarkable example of original inventive power.
He had to work it out by patient and laborious research. No way was
open to him except the diligent comparison and analysis of
propositions. And though all students have now become familiar with
the various classes of terms and propositions, together with their
principal characteristics and relations, yet to frame and designate
such classes for the first time without any precedent to follow, to
determine for each the rules and conditions of logical
convertibility, to put together the constituents of the Syllogism,
with its graduation of Figures and difference of Modes, and with a
selection, justified by reasons given, between the valid and the
invalid modes--all this implies a high order of original
systematizing genius, and must have required the most laborious and
multiplied comparisons between propositions in detail.

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. p. 184, a. 1, b. 2: [Greek:
dio/per tachei=a me\n a)/technos d' ê)=n ê( didaskali/a toi=s
mantha/nousi par' au)tô=n; ou) ga\r te/chnên a)lla\ ta\ a)po\ tê=s
te/chnês dido/ntes paideu/ein u(pela/mbanon . . . . _peri\ de\ tou=
sullogi/zesthai pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo
le/gein, a)ll' ê)\ tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non e)ponou=men_.]]

The preceding abridgment of Aristotle's exposition of the Syllogism
applies only to propositions simply affirmative or simply negative.
But Aristotle himself, as already remarked, complicates the
exposition by putting the Modal propositions (Possible, Necessary)
upon the same line as the above-mentioned Simple propositions. I have
noticed, in dealing with the treatise De Interpretatione, the
confusion that has arisen from thus elevating the Modals into a line
of classification co-ordinate with propositions simply Assertory. In
the Analytica, this confusion is still more sensibly felt, from the
introduction of syllogisms in which one of the premisses is
necessary, while the other is only possible. We may remark, however,
that, in the Analytica, Aristotle is stricter in defining the
Possible than he has been in the De Interpretatione; for he now
disjoins the Possible altogether from the Necessary, making it
equivalent to the Problematical (not merely _may be_, but _may be or
may not be_).[37] In the middle, too, of his diffuse exposition of
the Modals, he inserts one important remark, respecting universal
propositions generally, which belongs quite as much to the preceding
exposition about propositions simply assertory. He observes that
universal propositions have nothing to do with time, present, past,
or future; but are to be understood in a sense absolute and
unqualified.[38]

[Footnote 37: Analyt. Prior. I. viii. p. 29, a. 32; xiii. p. 32, a.
20-36: [Greek: to\ ga\r a)nagkai=on o(mônu/môs e)nde/chesthai
le/gomen]. In xiv. p. 33, b. 22, he excludes this equivocal meaning
of [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon--dei= de\ to\ e)nde/chestha lamba/nein
mê\ e)n toi=s a)nagkai/ois, a)lla\ kata\ to\n ei)rême/non
diorismo/n.] See xiii. p. 32, a. 33, where [Greek: to\ e)nde/chesthai
u(pa/rchein] is asserted to be equivalent to or convertible with
[Greek: to\ e)nde/chesthai mê\ u(pa/rchein]; and xix. p. 38, a. 35:
[Greek: to\ e)x a)na/gkês ou)k ê)=n _e)ndecho/menon_]. Theophrastus
and Eudemus differed from Aristotle about his theory of the Modals in
several points (Scholia ad Analyt. Priora, pp. 161, b. 30; 162, b.
23; 166, a. 12, b. 15, Brand.). Respecting the want of clearness in
Aristotle about [Greek: to\ e)ndecho/menon], see Waitz's note **ad p.
32, b. 16. Moreover, he sometimes uses [Greek: u(pa/rchon] in the
widest sense, including [Greek: e)ndecho/menon] and [Greek:
a)nagkai=on], xxiii. p. 40, b. 24.]

[Footnote 38: Analyt. Prior. I. xv. p. 34, b. 7.]

Having finished with the Modals, Aristotle proceeds to lay it down,
that all demonstration must fall under one or other of the three
figures just described; and therefore that all may be reduced
ultimately to the two first modes of the First figure. You cannot
proceed a step with two terms only and one proposition only. You must
have two propositions including three terms; the middle term
occupying the place assigned to it in one or other of the three
figures.[39] This is obviously true when you demonstrate by direct or
ostensive syllogism; and it is no less true when you proceed by
_Reductio ad Impossibile_. This last is one mode of syllogizing from
an hypothesis or assumption:[40] your conclusion being disputed, you
prove it indirectly, by assuming its contradictory to be true, and
constructing a new syllogism by means of that contradictory together
with a second premiss admitted to be true; the conclusion of this new
syllogism being a proposition obviously false or known beforehand to
be false. Your demonstration must be conducted by a regular
syllogism, as it is when you proceed directly and ostensively. The
difference is, that the conclusion which you obtain is not that which
you wish ultimately to arrive at, but something notoriously false.
But as this false conclusion arises from your assumption or
hypothesis that the contradictory of the conclusion originally
disputed was true, you have indirectly made out your case that this
contradictory must have been false, and therefore that the conclusion
originally disputed was true. All this, however, has been
demonstration by regular syllogism, but starting from an hypothesis
assumed and admitted as one of the premisses.[41]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. xxiii. p. 40, b. 20, p. 41, a. 4-20.]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. p. 40, b. 25: [Greek: e)/ti ê)\ deiktikô=s ê)\
e)x u(pothe/seôs; tou= d' _e)x u(pothe/seôs_ me/ros to\ dia\ tou=
a)duna/tou.]]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 41, b. 23: [Greek: pa/ntes ga\r oi( dia\ tou=
a)duna/tou perai/nontes to\ me\n pseu=dos sullogi/zontai, to\ d' e)x
a)rchê=s _e)x u(pothe/seôs_ deiknu/ousin, o(/tan a)du/nato/n ti
sumbai/nê| tê=s a)ntipha/seôs tethei/sês.]

It deserves to be remarked that Aristotle uses the phrase [Greek:
sullogismo\s _e)x u(pothe/seôs_], not [Greek: sullogismo\s
u(pothetiko/s]. This bears upon the question as to his views upon
what subsequently received the title of _hypothetical syllogisms_;
a subject to which I shall advert in a future note.]

Aristotle here again enforces what he had before urged--that in every
valid syllogism, one premiss at least must be affirmative, and one
premiss at least must be universal. If the conclusion be universal,
both premisses must be so likewise; if it be particular, one of the
premisses may not be universal. But without one universal premiss at
least, there can be no syllogistic proof. If you have a thesis to
support, you cannot assume (or ask to be conceded to you) that very
thesis, without committing _petitio principii,_ (_i.e._ _quæsiti_ or
_probandi_); you must assume (or ask to have conceded to you) some
universal proposition containing it and more besides; under which
universal you may bring the subject of your thesis as a minor, and
thus the premisses necessary for supporting it will be completed.
Aristotle illustrates this by giving a demonstration that the angles
at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal; justifying every step
in the reasoning by an appeal to some universal proposition.[42]

[Footnote 42: Analyt. Prior. I. xxiv. p. 41, b. 6-31. The
demonstration given (b. 13-22) is different from that which we read
in Euclid, and is not easy to follow. It is more clearly explained by
Waitz (p. 434) than either by Julius Pacius or by M. Barth. St.
Hilaire (p. 108).]

Again, every demonstration is effected by two propositions (an _even_
number) and by three terms (an _odd_ number); though the same
proposition may perhaps be demonstrable by more than one pair of
premisses, or through more than one middle term;[43] that is, by two
or more distinct syllogisms. If there be more than three terms and
two propositions, either the syllogism will no longer be one but
several; or there must be particulars introduced for the purpose of
obtaining an universal by induction; or something will be included,
superfluous and not essential to the demonstration, perhaps for the
purpose of concealing from the respondent the real inference
meant.[44] In the case (afterwards called _Sorites_) where the
ultimate conclusion is obtained through several mean terms in
continuous series, the number of terms will always exceed by one the
number of propositions; but the numbers may be odd or even, according
to circumstances. As terms are added, the total of intermediate
conclusions, if drawn out in form, will come to be far greater than
that of the terms or propositions, multiplying as it will do in an
increasing ratio to them.[45]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. I. xxv. p. 41, b. 36, seq.]

[Footnote 44: Ibid. xxv. p. 42, a. 23: [Greek: ma/tên e)/stai
ei)lêmme/na, ei) mê\ e)pagôgê=s ê)\ kru/pseôs ê)/ tinos a)/llou tô=n
toiou/tôn cha/rin.] Ib. a. 38: [Greek: ou(=tos o( lo/gos ê)\ ou)
sullelo/gistai ê)\ plei/ô tô=n a)nagkai/ôn ê)rô/têke pro\s tê\n
the/sin.]]

[Footnote 45: Ibid. p. 42, b. 5-26.]

It will be seen clearly from the foregoing remarks that there is a
great difference between one thesis and another as to facility of
attack or defence in Dialectic. If the thesis be an Universal
Affirmative proposition, it can be demonstrated only in the First
figure, and only by one combination of premisses; while, on the other
hand, it can be impugned either by an universal negative, which can
be demonstrated both in the First and Second figures, or by a
particular negative, which can be demonstrated in all the three
figures. Hence an Universal Affirmative thesis is at once the hardest
to defend and the easiest to oppugn: more so than either a Particular
Affirmative, which can be proved both in the First and Third figures;
or a Universal Negative, which can be proved either in First or
Second.[46] To the opponent, an universal thesis affords an easier
victory than a particular thesis; in fact, speaking generally, his
task is easier than that of the defendant.

[Footnote 46: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvi. p. 42, b. 27, p. 43, a. 15.]

In the Analytica Priora, Aristotle proceeds to tell us that he
contemplates not only theory, but also practice and art. The reader
must be taught, not merely to understand the principles of Syllogism,
but likewise where he can find the matter for constructing syllogisms
readily, and how he can obtain the principles of demonstration
pertinent to each thesis propounded.[47]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 20: [Greek: pô=s d'
eu)porê/somen au)toi\ pro\s to\ tithe/menon a)ei\ sullogismô=n, kai\
dia\ poi/as o(dou= lêpso/metha ta\s peri\ e(/kaston a)rcha/s, nu=n
ê)/dê lekte/on; ou) ga\r mo/non i)/sôs dei= tê\n ge/nesin theôrei=n
tô=n sullogismô=n, a)lla\ kai\ tê\n du/namin e)/chein tou= poiei=n.]
The second section of Book I. here begins.]

A thesis being propounded in appropriate terms, with subject and
predicate, how are you the propounder to seek out arguments for its
defence? In the first place, Aristotle reverts to the distinction
already laid down at the beginning of the Categoriæ.[48] Individual
things or persons are subjects only, never appearing as
predicates--this is the lowest extremity of the logical scale: at
the opposite extremity of the scale, there are the highest
generalities, predicates only, and not subjects of any predication,
though sometimes supposed to be such, as matters of dialectic
discussion.[49] Between the lowest and highest we have intermediate
or graduate generalities, appearing sometimes as subjects, sometimes
as predicates; and it is among these that the materials both of
problems for debate, and of premisses for proof, are usually
found.[50]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 25, seq.]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. p. 43, a. 39: [Greek: plê\n ei) mê\ kata\
do/xan]. Cf. Schol. of Alexander, p. 175, a. 44, Br.: [Greek:
e)ndo/xôs kai\ dialektikô=s, ô(/sper ei)=pen e)n toi=s Topikoi=s],
that even the _principia_ of science may be debated; for example, in
book B. of the Metaphysica. Aristotle does not recognize either
[Greek: to\ o)/n] or [Greek: to\ e(/n] as true genera, but only as
predicates.]

[Footnote 50: Ibid. a. 40-43.]

You must begin by putting down, along with the matter in hand itself,
its definition and its _propria_; after that, its other predicates;
next, those predicates which _cannot_ belong to it; lastly, those
other subjects, of which it may itself be predicated. You must
classify its various predicates distinguishing the essential, the
_propria_, and the accidental; also distinguishing the true and
unquestionable, from the problematical and hypothetical.[51] You must
look out for those predicates which belong to it as subject
universally, and not to certain portions of it only; since universal
propositions are indispensable in syllogistic proof, and indefinite
propositions can only be reckoned as particular. When a subject is
included in some larger genus--as, for example, man in animal--you
must not look for the affirmative or negative predicates which belong
to animal universally (since all these will of course belong to man
also) but for those which distinguish man from other animals; nor
must you, in searching for those lower subjects of which man is the
predicate, fix your attention on the higher genus animal; for animal
will of course be predicable of all those of which man is predicable.
You must collect what pertains to man specially, either as predicate
or subject; nor merely that which pertains to him necessarily and
universally, but also usually and in the majority of cases; for most
of the problems debated belong to this latter class, and the worth of
the conclusion will be co-ordinate with that of the premisses.[52]**
Do not select predicates that are predicable[53] both of the
predicate and subject; for no valid affirmative conclusion can be
obtained from them.

[Footnote 51: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 8: [Greek: kai\
tou/tôn poi=a doxastikô=s kai\ poi=a kat' a)lê/theian.]]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 10-35.]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. b. 36: [Greek: e)/ti ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena ou)k
e)klekte/on; ou) ga\r e)/stai sullogismo\s e)x au)tô=n.] The phrase
[Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena], as denoting predicates applicable both
to the predicate and to the subject, is curious. We should hardly
understand it, if it were not explained a little further on, p. 44,
b. 21. Both the Scholiast and the modern commentators understand
[Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena] in this sense; and I do not venture to
depart from them. At the same time, when I read six lines afterwards
(p. 44, b. 26) the words [Greek: oi(=on ei) ta\ e(po/mena e(kate/rô|
tau)ta/ e)stin]--in which the same meaning as that which the
commentators ascribe to [Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena] is given in its
own special and appropriate terms, and thus the same supposition
unnecessarily repeated--I cannot help suspecting that Aristotle
intends [Greek: ta\ pa=sin e(po/mena] to mean something different; to
mean such wide and universal predicates as [Greek: to\ e(\n] and
[Greek: to\ o)/n] which soar above the Categories and apply to every
thing, but denote no real _genera_.]

Thus, when the thesis to be maintained is an universal affirmative
(_e.g._ A is predicable of all E), you will survey all the subjects
to which A will apply as predicate, and all the predicates applying
to E as subject. If these two lists coincide in any point, a middle
term will be found for the construction of a good syllogism in the
First figure. Let B represent the list of predicates belonging
universally to A; D, the list of predicates which cannot belong to
it; C, the list of subjects to which A pertains universally as
predicate. Likewise, let F represent the list of predicates belonging
universally to E; H, the list of predicates that cannot belong to E;
G, the list of subjects to which E is applicable as predicate. If,
under these suppositions, there is any coincidence between the list C
and the list F, you can construct a syllogism (in _Barbara_, Fig. 1),
demonstrating that A belongs to _all_ E; since the predicate in F
belongs to all E, and A universally to the subject in C. If the list
C coincides in any point with the list G, you can prove that A
belongs to _some_ E, by a syllogism (in _Darapti_, Fig. 3). If, on
the other hand, the list F coincides in any point with the list D,
you can prove that A cannot belong to any E: for the predicate in D
cannot belong to any A, and therefore (by converting simply the
universal negative) A cannot belong as predicate to any D; but D
coincides with F, and F belongs to all E; accordingly, a syllogism
(in _Celarent_, Fig. 1) may be constructed, shewing that A cannot
belong to any E. So also, if B coincides in any point with H, the
same conclusion can be proved; for the predicate in B belongs to all
A, but B coincides with H, which belongs to no E; whence you obtain a
syllogism (in _Camestres_, Fig. 2), shewing that no A belongs to
E.[54] In collecting the predicates and subjects both of A and of E,
the highest and most universal expression of them is to be preferred,
as affording the largest grasp for the purpose of obtaining a
suitable middle term.[55] It will be seen (as has been declared
already) that every syllogism obtained will have three terms and two
propositions; and that it will be in one or other of the three
figures above described.[56]

[Footnote 54: Analyt. Prior. I. xxviii. p. 43, b. 39-p. 44, a. 35.]

[Footnote 55: Ibid. p. 44, a. 39. Alexander and Philoponus (Scholia,
p. 177, a. 19, 39, Brandis) point out an inconsistency between what
Aristotle says here and what he had said in one of the preceding
paragraphs, dissuading the inquirer from attending to the highest
generalities, and recommending him to look only at both subject and
predicate in their special place on the logical scale. Alexander's
way of removing the inconsistency is not successful: I doubt if there
be an inconsistency. I understand Aristotle _here_ to mean only that
the universal expression KZ ([Greek: to\ katho/lou Z]) is to be
preferred to the indefinite or indeterminate (simply Z, [Greek:
a)dio/riston]), also K[Greek: G] ([Greek: to\ katho/lou G]) to simple
[Greek: G (a)dio/riston)]. This appears to me not inconsistent with
the recommendation which Aristotle had given before.]

[Footnote 56: Ibid. p. 44, b. 6-20.]

The way just pointed out is the only way towards obtaining a suitable
middle term. If, for example, you find some predicate applicable both
to A and E, this will not conduct you to a valid syllogism; you will
only obtain a syllogism in the Second figure with two affirmative
premisses, which will not warrant any conclusion. Or if you find some
predicate which cannot belong either to A or to E, this again will
only give you a syllogism in the Second figure with two negative
premisses, which leads to nothing. So also, if you have a term of
which A can be predicated, but which cannot be predicated of E, you
derive from it only a syllogism in the First figure, with its minor
negative; and this, too, is invalid. Lastly, if you have a subject,
of which neither A nor E can be predicated, your syllogism
constructed from these conditions will have both its premisses
negative, and will therefore be worthless.[57]

[Footnote 57: Analyt. Prior. I. xxviii. p. 44, b. 25-37.]

In the survey prescribed, nothing is gained by looking out for
predicates (of A and E) which are different or opposite: we must
collect such as are identical, since our purpose is to obtain from
them a suitable middle term, which must be the same in both
premisses. It is true that if the list B (containing the predicates
universally belonging to A) and the list F (containing the predicates
universally belonging to E) are incompatible or contrary to each
other, you will arrive at a syllogism proving that no A can belong to
E. But this syllogism will proceed, not so much from the fact that B
and F are incompatible, as from the other fact, distinct though
correlative, that B will to a certain extent coincide with H (the
list of predicates which cannot belong to E). The middle term and the
syllogism constituted thereby, is derived from the coincidence
between B and H, not from the opposition between B and F. Those who
derive it from the latter, overlook or disregard the real source, and
adopt a point of view merely incidental and irrelevant.[58]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 44, b. 38-p. 45, a. 22. [Greek: sumbai/nei dê\
toi=s ou(/tôs e)piskopou=si prosepible/pein a)/llên o(do\n tê=s
a)nagkai/as, dia\ to\ lantha/nein tê\n tau)to/têta tô=n B kai\ tô=n
Th.]]

The precept here delivered--That in order to obtain middle terms and
good syllogisms, you must study and collect both the predicates and
the subjects of the two terms of your thesis--Aristotle declares to
be equally applicable to all demonstration, whether direct or by way
of _Reductio ad Impossibile_. In both the process of demonstration is
the same--involving two premisses, three terms, and one of the three
a suitable middle term. The only difference is, that in the direct
demonstration, both premisses are propounded as true, while in the
_Reductio ad Impossibile_, one of the premisses is assumed as true
though known to be false, and the conclusion also.[59] In the other
cases of hypothetical syllogism your attention must be directed, not
to the original _quæsitum_, but to the condition annexed thereto; yet
the search for predicates, subjects, and a middle term, must be
conducted in the same manner.[60] Sometimes, by the help of a
condition extraneous to the premisses, you may demonstrate an
universal from a particular: _e.g._, Suppose C (the list of subjects
to which A belongs as predicate) and G (the list of subjects to which
E belongs as predicate) to be identical; and suppose farther that the
subjects in G are the _only_ ones to which E belongs as predicate
(this seems to be the _extraneous_ or _extra-syllogistic_ condition
assumed, on which Aristotle's argument turns); then, A will be
applicable to all E. Or if D (the list of predicates which cannot
belong to A) and G (the list of subjects to which E belongs as
predicate) are identical; then, assuming the like extraneous
condition, A will not be applicable to any E.[61] In both these
cases, the conclusion is more universal than the premisses; but it is
because we take in an hypothetical assumption, in addition to the
premisses.

[Footnote 59: Ibid. I. xxix. p. 45, a. 25-b. 15.]

[Footnote 60: Ibid. I. xxix. p. 45, b. 15-20. This paragraph is very
obscure. Neither Alexander, nor Waitz, nor St. Hilaire clears it up
**completely. See Schol. pp. 178, b., 179, a. Brandis.

Aristotle concludes by saying that syllogisms from an hypothesis
ought to be reviewed and classified into varieties--[Greek:
e)piske/psasthai de\ dei= kai\ dielei=n posachô=s oi( e)x
u(pothe/seôs] (b. 20). But it is doubtful whether he himself ever
executed this classification. It was done in the Analytica of his
successor Theophrastus (Schol. p. 179, a. 6, 24). Compare the note of
M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p. 140.]


[Footnote 61: Analyt. Prior. I. xxix. p. 45, b. 21-30.]

Aristotle has now shown a method of procedure common to all
investigations and proper for the solution of all problems, wherever
soluble. He has shown, first, all the conditions and varieties of
probative Syllogism, two premisses and three terms, with the place
required for the middle term in each of the three figures; next, the
quarter in which we are to look for all the materials necessary or
suitable for constructing valid syllogisms. Having the two terms of
the thesis given, we must study the predicates and subjects belonging
to both, and must provide a large list of them; out of which list we
must make selection according to the purpose of the moment. Our
selection will be different, according as we wish to prove or to
refute, and according as the conclusion that we wish to prove is an
universal or a particular. The lesson here given will be most useful
in teaching the reasoner to confine his attention to the sort of
materials really promising, so that he may avoid wasting his time
upon such as are irrelevant.[62]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 36-xxx. p. 46, a. 10.]

This method of procedure is alike applicable to demonstration in
Philosophy or in any of the special sciences,[63] and to debate in
Dialectic. In both, the premisses or _principia_ of syllogisms must
be put together in the same manner, in order to make the syllogism
valid. In both, too, the range of topics falling under examination is
large and varied; each topic will have its own separate premisses or
_principia_, which must be searched out and selected in the way above
described. Experience alone can furnish these _principia_, in each
separate branch or department. Astronomical experience--the observed
facts and phenomena of astronomy--have furnished the data for the
scientific and demonstrative treatment of astronomy. The like with
every other branch of science or art.[64] When the facts in each
branch are brought together, it will be the province of the logician
or analytical philosopher to set out the demonstrations in a manner
clear and fit for use. For if nothing in the way of true matter of
fact has been omitted from our observation, we shall be able to
discover and unfold the demonstration, on every point where
demonstration is possible; and, wherever it is not possible, to make
the impossibility manifest.[65]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. p. 46, a. 8**: [Greek: kata\ me\n a)lê/theian e)k
tô=n kat' a)lê/theian _diagegramme/nôn_ u(pa/rchein, ei)s de\ tou\s
dialektikou\s sullogismou\s e)k tô=n kata\ do/xan prota/seôn.]

Julius Pacius (p. 257) remarks upon the word [Greek: diagegramme/nôn]
as indicating that Aristotle, while alluding to special sciences
distinguishable from philosophy on one side, and from dialectic on
the other, had in view geometrical demonstrations.]

[Footnote 64: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 10-20**: [Greek: ai(
d' a)rchai\ tô=n sullogismô=n katho/lou me\n ei)/rêntai--i)/diai de\
kath' e(ka/stên ai( plei=stai. dio\ ta\s me\n a)rcha\s ta\s peri\
e(/kaston e)mpeiri/as e)/sti paradou=nai. le/gô d' oi(=on tê\n
a)strologikê\n me\n e)mpeiri/an tê=s a)strologikê=s e)pistê/mês;
lêphthe/ntôn ga\r i(kanô=s tô=n phainome/nôn ou(/tôs eu(re/thêsan ai(
a)strologikai\ a)podei/xeis. o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ peri\ a)/llên
o(poianou=n e)/chei te/chnên te kai\ e)pistê/mên.]

What Aristotle says here--of astronomical observation and experience
as furnishing the basis for astronomical science--stands in marked
contrast with Plato, who rejects this basis, and puts aside, with a
sort of contempt, astronomical observation (Republic, vii. pp.
530-531); treating acoustics also in a similar way. Compare Aristot.
Metaphys. [Greek: L]. p. 1073, a. 6, seq., with the commentary of
Bonitz, p. 506.]

[Footnote 65: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 22-27**: [Greek:
ô(/ste a)\n lêphthê=| ta\ u(pa/rchonta peri\ e(/kaston, ê(me/teron
ê)/dê ta\s a)podei/xeis e(toi/môs e)mphani/zein. ei) ga\r mêde\n
_kata\ tê\n i(stori/an_ paraleiphthei/ê tô=n a)lêthô=s u(parcho/ntôn
toi=s pra/gmasin, e(/xomen peri\ a(/pantos ou(= me\n e)/stin
a)po/deixis, tau/tên eu(rei=n kai\ a)podeiknu/nai, ou(= de\ mê\
pe/phuken a)po/deixis, tou=to poiei=n phanero/n.]

Respecting the word [Greek: i(stori/a]--investigation and record of
matters of fact--the first sentence of Herodotus may be compared with
Aristotle, Histor. Animal. p. 491, a. 12; also p. 757, b. 35;
Rhetoric. p. 1359, b. 32.]

For the fuller development of these important principles, the reader
is referred to the treatise on Dialectic, entitled Topica, which we
shall come to in a future chapter. There is nothing in all
Aristotle's writings more remarkable than the testimony here
afforded, how completely he considered all the generalities of
demonstrative science and deductive reasoning to rest altogether on
experience and inductive observation.

We are next introduced to a comparison between the syllogistic
method, as above described and systematized, and the process called
logical Division into _genera_ and _species_; a process much relied
upon by other philosophers, and especially by Plato. This logical
Division, according to Aristotle, is a mere fragment of the
syllogistic procedure; nothing better than a feeble syllogism.[66]
Those who employed it were ignorant both of Syllogism and of its
conditions. They tried to demonstrate--what never can be
demonstrated--the essential constitution of the subject.[67] Instead
of selecting a middle term, as the Syllogism requires, more universal
than the subject but less universal (or not more so) than the
predicate, they inverted the proper order, and took for their middle
term the highest universal. What really requires to be demonstrated,
they never demonstrated but assume.[68]

[Footnote 66: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxi. p. 46, a. 33. Alexander, in
Scholia, p. 180, a. 14. The Platonic method of [Greek: diai/resis] is
exemplified in the dialogues called Sophistês and Politicus; compare
also Philêbus, c. v., p. 15.]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. p. 46, a. 34: [Greek: prô=ton d' au)to\ tou=to
e)lelê/thei tou\s chrôme/nous au)tê=| pa/ntas, kai\ pei/thein
e)pechei/roun ô(s o)/ntos dunatou= peri\ ou)si/as a)po/deixin
gi/nesthai kai\ tou= ti/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 68: Ibid. p. 46, b. 1-12.]

Thus, they take the subject man, and propose to prove that man is
mortal. They begin by laying down that man is an animal, and that
every animal is either mortal or immortal. Here, the most universal
term, animal, is selected as middle or as medium of proof; while
after all, the conclusion demonstrated is, not that man is mortal,
but that man is either mortal or immortal. The position that man is
mortal, is assumed but not proved.[69] Moreover, by this method of
logical division, all the steps are affirmative and none negative;
there cannot be any refutation of error. Nor can any proof be given
thus respecting _genus_, or _proprium_, or _accidens_; the _genus_ is
assumed, and the method proceeds from thence to _species_ and
_differentia_. No doubtful matter can be settled, and no unknown
point elucidated by this method; nothing can be done except to
arrange in a certain order what is already ascertained and
unquestionable. To many investigations, accordingly, the method is
altogether inapplicable; while even where it is applicable, it leads
to no useful conclusion.[70]

[Footnote 69: Ibid. p. 46, b. 1-12.]

[Footnote 70: Ibid. b. 26-37. Alexander in Schol. p. 180, b. 1.]

We now come to that which Aristotle indicates as the third section of
this First Book of the Analytica Priora. In the first section he
explained the construction and constituents of Syllogism, the
varieties of figure and mode, and the conditions indispensable to a
valid conclusion. In the second section he tells us where we are to
look for the premisses of syllogisms, and how we may obtain a stock
of materials, apt and ready for use when required. There remains one
more task to complete his plan--that he should teach the manner of
reducing argumentation as it actually occurs (often invalid, and even
when valid, often elliptical and disorderly), to the figures of
syllogism as above set forth, for the purpose of testing its
validity.[71] In performing this third part (Aristotle says) we shall
at the same time confirm and illustrate the two preceding parts; for
truth ought in every way to be consistent with itself.[72]

[Footnote 71: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxii. p. 47, a. 2: [Greek: loipo\n
ga\r e)/ti tou=to tê=s ske/pseôs; ei) ga\r tê/n te ge/nesin tô=n
sullogismô=n theôroi=men kai\ tou= eu(ri/skein e)/choimen du/namin,
e)/ti de\ tou\s gegenême/nous a)nalu/oimen ei)s ta\ proeirême/na
schê/mata, te/los a)\n e)/choi ê( e)x a)rchê=s pro/thesis.]]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. a. 8.]

When a piece of reasoning is before us, we must first try to
disengage the two syllogistic premisses (which are more easily
disengaged than the three terms), and note which of them is universal
or particular. The reasoner, however, may not have set out both of
them clearly: sometimes he will leave out the major, sometimes the
minor, and sometimes, even when enunciating both of them, he will
join with them irrelevant matter. In either of these cases we must
ourselves supply what is wanting and strike out the irrelevant.
Without this aid, reduction to regular syllogism is impracticable;
but it is not always easy to see what the exact deficiency is.
Sometimes indeed the conclusion may follow necessarily from what is
implied in the premisses, while yet the premisses themselves do not
form a correct syllogism; for though every such syllogism carries
with it necessity, there may be necessity without a syllogism. In the
process of reduction, we must first disengage and set down the two
premisses, then the three terms; out of which three, that one which
appears twice will be the middle term. If we do not find one term
twice repeated, we have got no middle and no real syllogism. Whether
the syllogism when obtained will be in the first, second, or third
figure, will depend upon the place of the middle term in the two
premisses. We know by the nature of the conclusion which of the three
figures to look for, since we have already seen what conclusions can
be demonstrated in each.[73]

[Footnote 73: Ibid. a. 10-b. 14.]

Sometimes we may get premisses which look like those of a true
syllogism, but are not so in reality; the major proposition ought to
be an universal, but it may happen to be only indefinite, and the
syllogism will not in all cases be valid; yet the distinction between
the two often passes unnoticed.[74] Another source of fallacy is,
that we may set out the terms incorrectly; by putting (in modern
phrase) the abstract instead of the concrete, or abstract in one
premiss and concrete in the other.[75] To guard against this, we
ought to use the concrete term in preference to the abstract. For
example, let the major proposition be, Health cannot belong to any
disease; and the minor. Disease can belong to any man; _Ergo_, Health
cannot belong to any man. This conclusion seems valid, but is not
really so. We ought to substitute concrete terms to this effect:--It
is impossible that the sick can be well; Any man may be sick; _Ergo_,
It is impossible that any man can be well. To the syllogism, now, as
stated in these concrete terms, we may object, that the major is not
true. A person who is at the present moment sick may at a future time
become well. There is therefore no valid syllogism.[76] When we take
the concrete man, we may say with truth that the two contraries,
health-sickness, knowledge-ignorance, _may_ both alike belong to him;
though not to the same individual at the same time.

[Footnote 74: Ibid. I. xxxiii. p. 47, b. 16-40: [Greek: au(/tê me\n
ou)=n ê( a)pa/tê gi/netai e)n tô=| para\ mikro/n; ôs ga\r ou)de\n
diaphe/ron ei)pei=n _to/de tô=|de u(pa/rchein, ê)\ to/de tô=|de
panti\ u(pa/rchein_, sugchôrou=men.]

M. B. St. Hilaire observes in his note (p. 155): "L'erreur vient
uniquement de ce qu'on confond l'universel et l'indeterminé séparés
par une nuance très faible d'expression, qu'on ne doit pas cependant
negliger." Julius Pacius (p. 264) gives the same explanation at
greater length; but the example chosen by Aristotle ([Greek: o(
A)ristome/nês e)sti\ dianoêto\s A)ristome/nês]) appears open to other
objections besides.]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxiv. p. 48, a. 1-28.]

[Footnote 76: Ibid. a. 2-23. See the Scholion of Alexander, p. 181,
b. 16-27, Brandis.]

Again, we must not suppose that we can always find one distinct and
separate name belonging to each term. Sometimes one or all of the
three terms can only be expressed by an entire phrase or proposition.
In such cases it is very difficult to reduce the reasoning into
regular syllogism. We may even be deceived into fancying that there
are syllogisms without any middle term at all, because there is no
single word to express it. For example, let A represent equal to two
right angles; B, triangle; C, isosceles. Then we have a regular
syllogism, with an explicit and single-worded middle term; A belongs
first to B, and then to C through B as middle term (triangle). But
how do we know that A belongs to B? We know it by demonstration; for
it is a demonstrable truth that every triangle has its three angles
equal to two right angles. Yet there is no other more general truth
about triangles from which it is a deduction; it belongs to the
triangle _per se_, and follows from the fundamental properties of the
figure.[77] There is, however, a middle term in the demonstration,
though it is not single-worded and explicit; it is a declaratory
proposition or a fact. We must not suppose that there can be any
demonstration without a middle term, either single-worded or
many-worded.

[Footnote 77: Ibid. I. xxxv. p. 48, a. 30-39: [Greek: phanero\n o(/ti
to\ me/son ou)ch ou(/tôs a)ei\ lêpte/on ô(s to/de ti, a)ll' e)ni/ote
lo/gon, o(/per sumbai/nei ka)pi\ tou= lechthe/ntos.] A good Scholion
of Philoponus is given, p. 181, b. 28-45, Brand.]

When we are reducing any reasoning to a syllogistic form, and tracing
out the three terms of which it is composed, we must expose or set
out these terms in the nominative case; but when we actually
construct the syllogism or put the terms into propositions, we shall
find that one or other of the oblique cases, genitive, dative, &c.,
is required.[78] Moreover, when we say, 'this belongs to that,' or
'this may be truly predicated of that,' we must recollect that there
are many distinct varieties in the relation of predicate to subject.
Each of the Categories has its own distinct relation to the subject;
predication _secundum quid_ is distinguished from predication
_simpliciter_, simple from combined or compound, &c. This applies to
negatives as well as affirmatives.[79] There will be a material
difference in setting out the terms of the syllogism, according as
the predication is qualified (_secundum quid_) or absolute
(_simpliciter_). If it be qualified, the qualification attaches to
the predicate, not to the subject: when the major proposition is a
qualified predication, we must consider the qualification as
belonging, not to the middle term, but to the major term, and as
destined to re-appear in the conclusion. If the qualification be
attached to the middle term, it cannot appear in the conclusion, and
any conclusion that embraces it will not be proved. Suppose the
conclusion to be proved is. The wholesome is knowledge _quatenus
bonum_ or _quod bonum est_; the three terms of the syllogism must
stand thus:--

 _Major_--_Bonum_ is knowable, _quatenus bonum_ or _quod bonum est_.

 _Minor_--The wholesome is _bonum_.

 _Ergo_--The wholesome is knowable, _quatenus bonum_, &c.

For every syllogism in which the conclusion is qualified, the terms
must be set out accordingly.[80]

[Footnote 78: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxvi. p. 48, a. 40-p. 49, a. 5.
[Greek: a(plô=s le/gomen ga\r tou=to kata\ pa/ntôn, o(/ti tou\s me\n
o(/rous a)/ei thete/on kata\ ta\s klê/seis tô=n o)noma/tôn--ta\s de\
prota/seis lêpte/on kata\ ta\s e(ka/stou ptô/seis.] Several examples
are given of this precept.]

[Footnote 79: Ibid. I. xxxvii. p. 49, a. 6-10. Alexander remarks in
the Scholia (p. 183, a. 2) that the distinction between simple and
compound predication has already been adverted to by Aristotle in De
Interpretatione (see p. 20, b. 35); and that it was largely treated
by Theophrastus in his work, [Greek: Peri\ Katapha/seôs], not
preserved.]

[Footnote 80: Ibid. I. xxxviii. p. 49, a. 11-b. 2. [Greek: phanero\n
ou)=n o(/ti e)n toi=s e)n me/rei sullogismoi=s ou(/tô lêpte/on tou\s
o(/rous.] Alexander explains [Greek: oi( e)n me/rei sullogismoi/]
(Schol. p. 183, b. 32, Br.) to be those in which the predicate has a
qualifying adjunct tacked to it.]

We are permitted, and it is often convenient, to exchange one phrase
or term for another of equivalent signification, and also one word
against any equivalent phrase. By doing this, we often **facilitate
the setting out of the terms. We must carefully note the different
meanings of the same substantive noun, according as the definite
article is or is not prefixed. We must not reckon it the same term,
if it appears in one premiss with the definite article, and in the
other without the definite article.[81] Nor is it the same
proposition to say B is predicable of C (indefinite), and B is
predicable of _all_ C (universal). In setting out the syllogism, it
is not sufficient that the major premiss should be indefinite; the
major premiss must be universal; and the minor premiss also, if the
conclusion is to be universal. If the major premiss be universal,
while the minor premiss is only affirmative indefinite, the
conclusion cannot be universal, but will be no more than indefinite,
that is, counting as particular.[82]

[Footnote 81: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxix.-xl. p. 49, b. 3-13. [Greek:
ou) tau)to\n e)sti to\ ei)=nai tê\n ê(donê\n a)gatho\n kai\ to\
ei)=nai tê\n ê(donê\n to\ a)gatho/n], &c.]

[Footnote 82: Ibid. I. xli. p. 49, b. 14-32. The Scholion of
Alexander (Schol. p. 184, a. 22-40) alludes to the peculiar mode,
called by Theophrastus [Greek: kata\ pro/slêpsin], of stating the
premisses of the syllogism: two terms only, the major and the middle,
being enunciated, while the third or minor was included potentially,
but not enunciated. Theophrastus, however, did not recognize the
distinction of meaning to which Aristotle alludes in this chapter. He
construed as an universal minor, what Aristotle treats as only an
indefinite minor. The liability to mistake the Indefinite for an
Universal is here again adverted to.]

There is no fear of our being misled by setting out a particular case
for the purpose of the general demonstration; for we never make
reference to the specialties of the particular case, but deal with it
as the geometer deals with the diagram that he draws. He calls the
line A B, straight, a foot long, and without breadth, but he does not
draw any conclusion from these assumptions. All that syllogistic
demonstration either requires or employs, is, terms that are related
to each other either as whole to part or as part to whole. Without
this, no demonstration can be made: the exposition of the particular
case is intended as an appeal to the senses, for facilitating the
march of the student, but is not essential to demonstration.[83]

[Footnote 83: Ibid. I. xli. p. 50, a. 1: [Greek: tô=| d'
e)kti/thesthai ou(/tô chrô/metha ô(/sper kai\ tô=| ai)stha/nesthai
to\n mantha/nonta le/gontes; ou) ga\r ou(/tôs ô(s a)/neu tou/tôn
ou)ch oi(=o/n t' a)podeichthê=nai, ô(/sper e)x ô(=n o(
sullogismo/s.]

This chapter is a very remarkable statement of the Nominalistic
doctrine; perceiving or conceiving all the real specialties of a
particular case, but attending to, or reasoning upon, only a portion
of them.

Plato treats it as a mark of the inferior scientific value of
Geometry, as compared with true and pure Dialectic, that the geometer
cannot demonstrate through Ideas and Universals alone, but is
compelled to help himself by visible particular diagrams or
illustrations. (Plato, Repub. vi. pp. 510-511, vii. p. 533, C.)]

Aristotle reminds us once more of what he had before said, that in
the Second and Third figures, not all varieties of conclusion are
possible, but only some varieties; accordingly, when we are reducing
a piece of reasoning to the syllogistic form, the nature of the
conclusion will inform us which of the three figures we must look
for. In the case where the question debated relates to a definition,
and the reasoning which we are trying to reduce turns upon one part
only of that definition, we must take care to look for our three
terms only in regard to that particular part, and not in regard to
the whole definition.[84] All the modes of the Second and Third
figures can be reduced to the First, by conversion of one or other of
the premisses; except the fourth mode (_Baroco_) of the Second, and
the fifth mode (_Bocardo_) of the Third, which can be proved only by
_Reductio ad Absurdum_.[85]

[Footnote 84: Analyt. Prior. I. xlii., xliii. p. 50, a. 5-15. I
follow here the explanation given by Philoponus and Julius Pacius,
which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire adopts. But the illustrative example
given by Aristotle himself (the definition of _water_) does not
convey much instruction.]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. xlv. p. 50, b. 5-p. 51, b. 2.]

No syllogisms from an Hypothesis, however, are reducible to any of
the three figures; for they are not proved by syllogism alone: they
require besides an extra-syllogistic assumption granted or understood
between speaker and hearer. Suppose an hypothetical proposition
given, with antecedent and consequent: you may perhaps prove or
refute by syllogism either the antecedent separately, or the
consequent separately, or both of them separately; but you cannot
directly either prove or refute by syllogism the conjunction of the
two asserted in the hypothetical. The speaker must ascertain
beforehand that this will be granted to him; otherwise he cannot
proceed.[86] The same is true about the procedure by _Reductio ad
Absurdum_, which involves an hypothesis over and above the syllogism.
In employing such _Reductio ad Absurdum_, you prove syllogistically a
certain conclusion from certain premisses; but the conclusion is
manifestly false; therefore, one at least of the premisses from which
it follows must be false also. But if this reasoning is to have
force, the hearer must know _aliunde_ that the conclusion is false;
your syllogism has not shown it to be false, but has shown it to be
hypothetically true; and unless the hearer is prepared to grant the
conclusion to be false, your purpose is not attained. Sometimes he
will grant it without being expressly asked, when the falsity is
glaring: _e.g._ you prove that the diagonal of a square is
incommensurable with the side, because if it were taken as
commensurable, an odd number might be shown to be equal to an even
number. Few disputants will hesitate to grant that this conclusion is
false, and therefore that its contradictory is true; yet this last
(viz. that the contradictory is true) has not been proved
syllogistically; you must assume it by hypothesis, or depend upon the
hearer to grant it.[87]

[Footnote 86: Ibid. xliv. p. 50, a. 16-28.]

[Footnote 87: Analyt. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50, a. 29-38. See above,
xxiii. p. 40, a. 25.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire remarks in the note to his translation of
the Analytica Priora (p. 178): "Ce chapitre suffit à prouver
qu'Aristote a distingué très-nettement les syllogismes par l'absurde,
des syllogismes hypothétiques. Cette dernière dénomination est tout à
fait pour lui ce qu'elle est pour nous." Of these two statements, I
think the _latter_ is more than we can venture to affirm, considering
that the general survey of hypothetical syllogisms, which Aristotle
intended to draw up, either never was really completed, or at least
has perished: the _former_ appears to me incorrect. Aristotle
decidedly reckons the _Reductio ad Impossibile_ among hypothetical
proofs. But he understands by _Reductio ad Impossibile_ something
rather wider than what the moderns understand by it. It now means
only, that you take the contradictory of the conclusion together with
one of the premisses, and by means of these two demonstrate a
conclusion contradictory or contrary to the other premiss. But
Aristotle understood by it this, and something more besides, namely,
whenever, by taking the contradictory of the conclusion, together
with some other incontestable premiss, you demonstrate, by means of
the two, some new conclusion notoriously false. What I here say, is
illustrated by the very example which he gives in this chapter. The
incommensurability of the diagonal (with the side of the square) is
demonstrated by _Reductio ad Impossibile_; because if it be supposed
commensurable, you may demonstrate that an odd number is equal to an
even number; a conclusion which every one will declare to be
inadmissible, but which is not the contradictory of either of the
premisses whereby the true proposition was demonstrated.]

Here Aristotle expressly reserves for separate treatment the general
subject of Syllogisms from Hypothesis.[88]

[Footnote 88: The expressions of Aristotle here are remarkable,
Analyt. Prior. I. xliv. p. 50, a. 39-b. 3: [Greek: polloi\ de\ kai\
e(/teroi perai/nontai e)x u(pothe/seôs, ou(\s e)piske/psasthai dei=
kai\ diasêmê=nai katharô=s. ti/nes me\n ou)=n ai( diaphorai\ tou/tôn,
kai\ posachô=s gi/netai to\ e)x u(pothe/seôs, u(/steron e)rou=men;
nu=n de\ tosou=nton ê(mi=n e)/stô phanero/n, o(/ti ou)k e)/stin
a)nalu/ein ei)s ta\ schê/mata tou\s toiou/tous sullogismou/s. kai\
di' ê(\n ai)ti/an, ei)rê/kamen.]

Syllogisms from Hypothesis were many and various, and Aristotle
intended to treat them in a future treatise; but all that concerns
the present treatise, in his opinion, is, to show that none of them
can be reduced to the three Figures. Among the Syllogisms from
Hypothesis, two varieties recognized by Aristotle (besides [Greek:
oi) dia\ tou= a)duna/tou]) were [Greek: oi( kata\ meta/lêpsin] and
[Greek: oi( kata\ poio/têta]. The same proposition which Aristotle
entitles [Greek: kata\ meta/lêpsin], was afterwards designated by the
Stoics [Greek: kata\ pro/slêpsin] (Alexander ap. Schol. p. 178,
b. 6-24).

It seems that Aristotle never realized this intended future treatise
on Hypothetical Syllogisms; at least Alexander did not know it. The
subject was handled more at large by Theophrastus and Eudêmus after
Aristotle (Schol. p. 184, b. 45. Br.; Boethius, De Syllog.
Hypothetico, pp. 606-607); and was still farther expanded by
Chrysippus and the Stoics.

Compare Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, I. pp. 295, 377, seq. He treats
the Hypothetical Syllogism as having no logical value, and commends
Aristotle for declining to develop or formulate it; while Ritter
(Gesch. Phil. iii. p. 93), and, to a certain extent, Ueberweg (System
der Logik, sect. 121, p. 326), consider this to be a defect in
Aristotle.]

In the last chapter of the first book of the Analytica Priora,
Aristotle returns to the point which we have already considered in
the treatise De Interpretatione, viz. what is really a _negative_
proposition; and how the adverb of negation must be placed in order
to constitute one. We must place this adverb immediately before the
copula and in conjunction with the copula: we must not place it after
the copula and in conjunction with the predicate; for, if we do so,
the proposition resulting will not be negative but affirmative
([Greek: e)k metathe/seôs], by transposition, according to the
technical term introduced afterwards by Theophrastus). Thus of the
four propositions:

  1. Est bonum.          2. Non est bonum.
  4. Non est non bonum.  3. Est non bonum.

No. 1 is affirmative; No. 3 is affirmative ([Greek: e)k
metathe/seôs]); Nos. 2 and 4 are negative. Wherever No. 1 is
predicable, No. 4 will be predicable also; wherever No. 3 is
predicable, No. 2 will be predicable also--but in neither case _vice
versâ_.[89] Mistakes often flow from incorrectly setting out the two
contradictories.

[Footnote 89: Analyt. Prior. I. xlvi. p. 51, b. 5, ad finem. See
above, Chap. IV. p. 118, seq.]



CHAPTER VI.

ANALYTICA PRIORA II.


The Second Book of the Analytica Priora seems conceived with a view
mainly to Dialectic and Sophistic, as the First Book bore more upon
Demonstration.[1] Aristotle begins the Second Book by shortly
recapitulating what he had stated in the First; and then proceeds to
touch upon some other properties of the Syllogism. Universal
syllogisms (those in which the conclusion is universal) he says, have
always more conclusions than one; particular syllogisms sometimes,
but not always, have more conclusions than one. If the conclusion be
universal, it may always be converted--_simply_, when it is negative,
or _per accidens_, when it is affirmative; and its converse thus
obtained will be proved by the same premisses. If the conclusion be
particular, it will be convertible simply when affirmative, and its
converse thus obtained will be proved by the same premisses; but it
will not be convertible at all when negative, so that the conclusion
proved will be only itself singly.[2] Moreover, in the universal
syllogisms of the First figure (_Barbara_, _Celarent_), any of the
particulars comprehended under the minor term may be substituted in
place of the minor term as subject of the conclusion, and the proof
will hold good in regard to them. So, again, all or any of the
particulars comprehended in the middle term may be introduced as
subject of the conclusion in place of the minor term; and the
conclusion will still remain true. In the Second figure, the change
is admissible only in regard to those particulars comprehended under
the subject of the conclusion or minor term, and not (at least upon
the strength of the syllogism) in regard to those comprehended under
the middle term. Finally, wherever the conclusion is particular, the
change is admissible, though not by reason of the syllogism in regard
to particulars comprehended under the middle term; it is not
admissible as regards the minor term, which is itself particular.[3]

[Footnote 1: This is the remark of the ancient Scholiasts. See Schol.
p. 188, a. 44, b. 11.]

[Footnote 2: Analyt. Prior. II. i. p. 53, a. 3-14.]

[Footnote 3: Analyt. Prior. II. i. p. 53, a. 14-35. M. Barthélemy St.
Hilaire, following Pacius, justly remarks (note, p. 203 of his
translation) that the rule as to particulars breaks down in the cases
of _Baroco_, _Disamis_, and _Bocardo_.

On the chapter in general he remarks (note, p. 204):--"Cette théorie
des conclusions diverses, soit patentes soit cachées, d'un même
syllogisme, est surtout utile en dialectique, dans la discussion; où
il faut faire la plus grande attention à ce qu'on accorde à
l'adversaire, soit explicitement, soit implicitement." This
illustrates the observation cited in the preceding note from the
Scholiasts.]

Aristotle has hitherto regarded the Syllogism with a view to its
_formal_ characteristics: he now makes an important observation which
bears upon its _matter_. Formally speaking, **the two premisses are
always assumed to be true; but in any real case of syllogism (form
and matter combined) it is possible that either one or both may be
false. Now, Aristotle remarks that if both the premisses are true
(the syllogism being correct in form), the conclusion must of
necessity be true; but that if either or both the premisses are
false, the conclusion need not necessarily be false likewise. The
premisses being false, the conclusion may nevertheless be true; but
it will not be true because of or by reason of the premisses.[4]

[Footnote 4: Analyt. Prior. II. ii. p. 53, b. 5-10: [Greek: e)x
a)lêthô=n me\n ou)=n ou)k e)/sti pseu=dos sullogi/sasthai, e)k
pseudô=n d' e)/stin a)lêthe/s, plê\n ou) dio/ti a)ll' o(/ti; tou=
ga\r dio/ti ou)k e)/stin e)k pseudô=n sullogismo/s; di' ê(\n d'
ai)ti/an, e)n toi=s e(pome/nois lechthê/setai.]

The true conclusion is not true by reason of these false premisses,
but by reason of certain other premisses which are true, and which
may be produced to demonstrate it. Compare Analyt. Poster. I. ii. p.
71, b. 19.]

First, he would prove that if the premisses be true, the conclusion
must be true also; but the proof that he gives does not seem more
evident than the _probandum_ itself. Assume that if A exists, B must
exist also: it follows from hence (he argues) that if B does not
exist, neither can A exist; which he announces as a _reductio ad
absurdum_, seeing that it contradicts the fundamental supposition of
the existence of A.[5] Here the _probans_ is indeed equally evident
with the _probandum_, but not at all more evident; one who disputes
the latter, will dispute the former also. Nothing is gained in the
way of proof by making either of them dependent on the other. Both of
them are alike self-evident; that is, if a man hesitates to admit
either of them, you have no means of removing his scruples except by
inviting him to try the general maxim upon as many particular cases
as he chooses, and to see whether it does not hold good without a
single exception.

[Footnote 5: Ibid. II. ii. p. 53, b. 11-16.]

In regard to the case here put forward as illustration, Aristotle has
an observation which shows his anxiety to maintain the characteristic
principles of the Syllogism; one of which principles he had declared
to be--That nothing less than three terms and two propositions, could
warrant the inferential step from premisses to conclusion. In the
present case he assumed, If A exists, then B must exist; giving only
one premiss as ground for the inference. This (he adds) does not
contravene what has been laid down before; for A in the case before
us represents two propositions conceived in conjunction.[6] Here he
has given the type of hypothetical reasoning; not recognizing it as a
variety _per se_, nor following it out into its different forms (as
his successors did after him), but resolving it into the categorical
syllogism.[7] He however conveys very clearly the cardinal principle
of all hypothetical inference--That if the antecedent be true, the
consequent must be true also, but not _vice versâ_; if the consequent
be false, the antecedent must be false also, but not _vice versâ_.

[Footnote 6: Analyt. Prior. II. ii. p. 53, b. 16-25. [Greek: to\
ou)=n A ô(/sper e(\n kei=tai, du/o prota/seis sullêphthei=sai.]]

[Footnote 7: Aristotle, it should be remarked, uses the word [Greek:
katêgoriko/s], not in the sense which it subsequently acquired, as
the antithesis of [Greek: u(pothetiko/s] in application to the
proposition and syllogism, but in the sense of affirmative as opposed
to [Greek: sterêtiko/s].]

Having laid down the principle, that the conclusion may be true,
though one or both the premisses are false, Aristotle proceeds, at
great length, to illustrate it in its application to each of the
three syllogistic figures.[8] No portion of the Analytica is traced
out more perspicuously than the exposition of this most important
logical doctrine.

[Footnote 8: Analyt. Prior. II. ii.-iv. p. 53, b. 26-p. 57, b. 17. At
the close (p. 57, a. 36-b. 17), the general doctrine is summed up.]

It is possible (he then continues, again at considerable length) to
invert the syllogism and to demonstrate _in a circle_. That is, you
may take the conclusion as premiss for a new syllogism, together with
one of the old premisses, transposing its terms; and thus you may
demonstrate the other premiss. You may do this successively, first
with the major, to demonstrate the minor; next, with the minor, to
demonstrate the major. Each of the premisses will thus in turn be
made a demonstrated conclusion; and the circle will be complete. But
this can be done perfectly only in _Barbara_, and when, besides, all
the three terms of the syllogism reciprocate with each other, or are
co-extensive in import; so that each of the two premisses admits of
being simply converted. In all other cases, the process of circular
demonstration, where possible at all, is more or less imperfect.[9]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. II. v.-viii. p. 57, b. 18-p. 59, a. 35.]

Having thus shown under what conditions the conclusion can be
employed for the demonstration of the premisses, Aristotle proceeds
to state by what transformation it can be employed for the refutation
of them. This he calls _converting_ the syllogism; a most
inconvenient use of the term _convert_ ([Greek: a)ntistre/phein]),
since he had already assigned to that same term more than one other
meaning, distinct and different, in logical procedure.[10] What it
here means is _reversing_ the conclusion, so as to exchange it either
for its contrary, or for its contradictory; then employing this
reversed proposition as a new premiss, along with one of the previous
premisses, so as to disprove the other of the previous
premisses--_i.e._ to prove its contrary or contradictory. The result
will here be different, according to the manner in which the
conclusion is reversed; according as you exchange it for its contrary
or its contradictory. Suppose that the syllogism demonstrated is: A
belongs to all B, B belongs to all C; _Ergo_, A belongs to all C
(_Barbara_). Now, if we reverse this conclusion by taking its
_contrary_, A belongs to no C, and if we combine this as a new premiss
with the major of the former syllogism, A belongs to all B, we shall
obtain as a conclusion B belongs to no C; which is the _contrary_ of
the minor, in the form _Camestres_. If, on the other hand, we reverse
the conclusion by taking its _contradictory_, A does not belong to all
C, and combine this with the same major, we shall have as conclusion,
B does not belong to all C; which is the _contradictory_ of the minor,
and in the form _Baroco_: though in the one case as in the other the
minor is disproved. The major is _contradictorily_ disproved, whether
it be the contrary or the contradictory of the conclusion that is
taken along with the minor to form the new syllogism; but still the
form varies from _Felapton_ to _Bocardo_. Aristotle shows farther how
the same process applies to the other modes of the First, and to the
modes of the Second and Third figures.[11] The new syllogism,
obtained by this process of reversal, is always in a different figure
from the syllogism reversed. Thus syllogisms in the First figure are
reversed by the Second and Third; those in the second, by the First
and Third; those in the Third, by the First and Second.[12]

[Footnote 10: Schol. (ad Analyt. Prior. p. 59, b. 1), p. 190, b. 20,
Brandis. Compare the notes of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, pp. 55,
242.]

[Footnote 11: Analyt. Prior. II. viii.-x. p. 59, b. 1-p. 61, a. 4.]

[Footnote 12: Ibid. x. p. 61, a. 7-15.]

Of this reversing process, one variety is what is called the
_Reductio ad Absurdum_; in which the conclusion is reversed by taking
its contradictory (never its contrary), and then joining this last
with one of the premisses, in order to prove the contradictory or
contrary of the other premiss.[13] The _Reductio ad Absurdum_ is
distinguished from the other modes of reversal by these
characteristics: (1) That it takes the contradictory, and not the
contrary, of the conclusion; (2) That it is destined to meet the case
where an opponent declines to admit the conclusion; whereas the other
cases of reversion are only intended as confirmatory evidence towards
a person who already admits the conclusion; (3) That it does not
appeal to or require any concession on the part of the opponent; for
if he declines to admit the conclusion, you presume, as a matter of
course, that he must adhere to the contradictory of the conclusion;
and you therefore take this contradictory for granted (without asking
his concurrence) as one of the bases of a new syllogism; (4) That it
presumes as follows:--When, by the contradictory of the conclusion
joined with one of the premisses, you have demonstrated the opposite
of the other premiss, the original conclusion itself is shown to be
beyond all impeachment on the score of form, _i.e._ beyond
impeachment by any one who admits the premisses. You assume to be
true, for the occasion, the very proposition which you mean finally
to prove false; your purpose in the new syllogism is, not to
demonstrate the original conclusion, but to prove it to be true by
demonstrating its contradictory to be false.[14]**

[Footnote 13: Analyt. Prior. II. xi. p. 61, a. 18, seq.]

[Footnote 14: Ibid. p. 62, a. 11: [Greek: phanero\n ou)=n o(/ti ou)
to\ e)nanti/on, a)lla\ to\ a)ntikei/menon, u(pothete/on e)n a(/pasi
toi=s sullogismoi=s. ou(/tô ga\r to\ a)nagkai=on e)/stai kai\ to\
a)xi/ôma e)/ndoxon. ei) ga\r kata\ panto\s ê)\ kata/phasis ê)\
a)po/phasis, deichthe/ntos o(/ti ou)ch ê( a)po/phasis, a)na/gkê tê\n
kata/phasin a)lêtheu/esthai.] See Scholia, p. 190, b. 40, seq.,
Brand.]

By the _Reductio ad Absurdum_ you can in all the three figures
demonstrate all the four varieties of conclusion, universal and
particular, affirmative and negative; with the single exception, that
you cannot by this method demonstrate in the First figure the
Universal Affirmative.[15] With this exception, every true conclusion
admits of being demonstrated by either of the two ways, either
directly and ostensively, or by reduction to the impossible.[16]

[Footnote 15: Ibid. p. 61, a. 35-p. 62, b. 10; xii. p. 62, a. 21.
Alexander, ap. Schol. p. 191, a. 17-36, Brand.]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. xiv. p. 63, b. 12-21.]

In the Second and Third figures, though not in the First, it is
possible to obtain conclusions even from two premisses which are
contradictory or contrary to each other; but the conclusion will, as
a matter of course, be a self-contradictory one. Thus if in the
Second figure you have the two premisses--All Science is good; No
Science is good--you get the conclusion (in _Camestres_), No Science
is Science. In opposed propositions, the same predicate must be
affirmed and denied of the same subject in one of the three different
forms--All and None, All and Not All, Some and None. This shows why
such conclusions cannot be obtained in the First figure; for it is
the characteristic of that figure that the middle term must be
predicate in one premiss, and subject in the other.[17] In dialectic
discussion it will hardly be possible to get contrary or
contradictory premisses conceded by the adversary immediately after
each other, because he will be sure to perceive the contradiction:
you must mask your purpose by asking the two questions not in
immediate succession, but by introducing other questions between the
two, or by other indirect means as suggested in the Topica.[18]

[Footnote 17: Analyt. Prior. II. xv. p. 63, b. 22-p. 64, a. 32.
Aristotle here declares _Subcontraries_ (as they were later
called),--Some men are wise, Some men are not wise,--to be opposed
only in expression or verbally ([Greek: kata\ tê\n le/xin mo/non]).]

[Footnote 18: Ibid. II. xv. p. 64, a. 33-37. See Topica, VIII. i. p.
155, a. 26; Julius Pacius, p. 372, note. In the Topica, Aristotle
suggests modes of concealing the purpose of the questioner and
driving the adversary to contradict himself: [Greek: e)n de\ tô=s
Topikoi=s paradi/dôsi metho/dous tô=n kru/pseôn di' a(\s tou=to
dothê/setai] (Schol. p. 192, a. 18, Br.). Compare also Analyt. Prior.
II. xix. p. 66, a. 33.]

Aristotle now passes to certain general heads of Fallacy, or general
liabilities to Error, with which the syllogizing process is beset.
What the reasoner undertakes is, to demonstrate the conclusion before
him, and to demonstrate it in the natural and appropriate way; that
is, from premisses both more evident in themselves and logically
prior to the conclusion. Whenever he fails thus to demonstrate, there
is error of some kind; but he may err in several ways: (1) He may
produce a defective or informal syllogism; (2) His premisses may be
more unknowable than his conclusion, or equally unknowable; (3) His
premisses, instead of being logically prior to the conclusion, may be
logically posterior to it.[19]

[Footnote 19: Ibid. II. xvi. p. 64, b. 30-35: [Greek: kai\ ga\r ei)
o(/lôs mê\ sullogi/zetai, kai\ ei) di' a)gnôstote/rôn ê)\ o(moi/ôs
a)gnô/stôn, kai\ ei) dia\ tô=n u(ste/rôn to\ pro/teron; ê( ga\r
a)po/deixis e)k pistote/rôn te kai\ prote/rôn e)stin.... ta\ _me\n
di' au(tô=n pe/phuke gnôri/zesthai, ta\ de\ di' a)/llôn_.]]

Distinct from all these three, however, Aristotle singles out and
dwells upon another mode of error, which he calls _Petitio
Principii_. Some truths, the _principia_, are by nature knowable
through or in themselves, others are knowable only through other
things. If you confound this distinction, and ask or assume something
of the latter class as if it belonged to the former, you commit a
_Petitio Principii_. You may commit it either by assuming at once
that which ought to be demonstrated, or by assuming, as if it were a
_principium_, something else among those matters which in natural
propriety would be demonstrated by means of a _principium_. Thus,
there is (let us suppose) a natural propriety that C shall be
demonstrated through A; but you, overlooking this, demonstrate B
through C, and A through B. By thus inverting the legitimate order,
you do what is tantamount to demonstrating A through itself; for your
demonstration will not hold unless you assume A at the beginning, in
order to arrive at C. This is a mistake made not unfrequently, and
especially by some who define parallel lines; for they give a
definition which cannot be understood unless parallel lines be
presupposed.[20]

[Footnote 20: Analyt. Prior. II. xvi. p. 64, b. 33-p. 65, a. 9.
_Petere principium_ is, in the phrase of Aristotle, not [Greek: tê\n
a)rchê\n ai)tei=sthai], but [Greek: to\ e)n a)rchê=| ai)tei=sthai] or
[Greek: to\ e)x a)rchê=s ai)tei=sthai] (xvi. p. 64, b. 28, 34).]

When the problem is such, that it is uncertain whether A can be
predicated either of C or of B, if you then assume that A is
predicable of B, you may perhaps not commit _Petitio Principii_, but
you certainly fail in demonstrating the problem; for no demonstration
will hold where the premiss is equally uncertain with the conclusion.
But if, besides, the case be such, that B is identical with C, that
is, either co-extensive and reciprocally convertible with C, or
related to C as genus or species,--in either of these cases you
commit _Petitio Principii_ by assuming that A may be predicated of
B.[21] For seeing that B reciprocates with C, you might just as well
demonstrate that A is predicable of B, because it is predicable of C;
that is, you might demonstrate the major premiss by means of the
minor and the conclusion, as well as you can demonstrate the
conclusion by means of the major and the minor premiss. If you cannot
so demonstrate the major premiss, this is not because the structure
of the syllogism forbids it, but because the predicate of the major
premiss is more extensive than the subject thereof. If it be
co-extensive and convertible with the subject, we shall have a
circular proof of three propositions in which each may be alternately
premiss and conclusion. The like will be the case, if the _Petitio
Principii_ is in the minor premiss and not in the major. In the First
syllogistic figure it may be in either of the premisses; in the
Second figure it can only be in the minor premiss, and that only in
one mode (_Camestres_) of the figure.[22] The essence of _Petitio
Principii_ consists in this, that you exhibit as true _per se_ that
which is not really true _per se_.[23] You may commit this fault
either in Demonstration, when you assume for true what is not really
true, or in Dialectic, when you assume as probable and conformable to
authoritative opinion what is not really so.[24]**

[Footnote 21: Ibid. p. 65, a. 1-10.]

[Footnote 22: Ibid. p. 65, a. 10: [Greek: ei) ou)=n tis, a)dê/lou
o)/ntos o(/ti to\ A u(pa/rchei tô=| G, o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ o(/ti tô=|
B, ai)toi=to tô=| B u(pa/rchein to\ A, ou(/pô dê=lon ei) to\ e)n
a)rchê=| ai)tei=tai, a)ll' o(/ti ou)k a)podei/knusi, dê=lon; ou) ga\r
a)rchê\ a)podei/xeôs to\ o(moi/ôs a)/dêlon. ei) me/ntoi to\ B pro\s
to\ G ou(/tôs e)/chei ô(/ste tau)to\n ei)=nai, ê)\ dê=lon o(/ti
a)ntistre/phousin, ê)\ u(pa/rchei tha/teron thate/rô|, to\ e)n
a)rchê=| ai)tei=tai. kai\ ga\r a)/n, o(/ti tô=| B to\ A u(pa/rchei,
di' e)kei/nôn deiknu/oi, ei) a)ntistre/phoi. nu=n de\ tou=to kôlu/ei,
a)ll' ou)ch o( tro/pos. ei) de\ tou=to poioi=, to\ ei)rême/non a)\n
poioi= kai\ a)ntistre/phoi ô(s dia\ triô=n.]

This chapter, in which Aristotle declares the nature of Petitio
Principii, is obscure and difficult to follow. It has been explained
at some length, first by Philoponus in the Scholia (p. 192, a. 35, b.
24), afterwards by Julius Pacius (p. 376, whose explanation is
followed by M. B. St. Hilaire, p. 288), and by Waitz, (I. p. 514).
But the translation and comment given by Mr. Poste appear to me the
best: "Assuming the conclusion to be affirmative, let us examine a
syllogism in Barbara:--

      All B is A.
  .   All C is B.
 . .  All C is A.

And let us first suppose that the major premiss is a Petitio
Principii; _i.e._ that the proposition _All B is A_ is identical with
the proposition _All C is A_. This can only be because the terms B
and C are identical. Next, let us suppose that the minor premiss is a
Petitio Principii: _i.e._ that the proposition _All C is B_ is
identical with the proposition _All C is A_. This can only be because
B and A are identical. The identity of the terms is, their
convertibility or their sequence ([Greek: u(pa/rchei, e(/petai]).
This however requires some limitation; for as the major is always
predicated ([Greek: u(pa/rchei, e(/petai]) of the middle, and the
middle of the minor, if this were enough to constitute Petitio
Principii, every syllogism with a problematical premiss would be a
Petitio Principii." (See the Appendix A, pp. 178-183, attached to Mr.
Poste's edition of Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi.)

Compare, about Petitio Principii, Aristot. Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 162,
b. 34, in which passage Aristotle gives to the fallacy called Petitio
Principii a still larger sweep than what he assigns to it in the
Analytica Priora. Mr. Poste's remark is perfectly just, that
according to the above passage in the Analytica, every syllogism with
a problematical (_i.e._ real as opposed to verbal) premiss would be a
Petitio Principii; that is, all real deductive reasoning, in the
syllogistic form, would be a Petitio Principii. To this we may add,
that, from the passage above referred to in the Topica, all inductive
reasoning also (reasoning from parts to whole) would involve Petitio
Principii.

Mr. Poste's explanation of this difficult passage brings into view
the original and valuable exposition made by Mr. John Stuart Mill of
the Functions and Logical Value of the Syllogism.--System of Logic,
Book II. ch. iii. sect 2:--"It must be granted, that in every
syllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there
is a Petitio Principii," &c.

Petitio Principii, if ranked among the Fallacies, can hardly be
extended beyond the first of the five distinct varieties enumerated
in the Topica, VIII. xiii.]

[Footnote 23: Analyt. Prior. II. xvi. p. 65, a. 23-27: [Greek: to\
ga\r e)x a)rchê=s ti/ du/natai, ei)/rêtai ê(mi=n, o(/ti to\ di'
au(tou= deiknu/nai to\ mê\ di' au(tou= dê=lon.--tou=to d' e)/sti, to\
mê\ deiknu/nai.]

The meaning of some lines in this chapter (p. 65, a. 17-18) is to me
very obscure, after all the explanations of commentators.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. p. 65, a. 35; Topic. VIII. xiii. p. 162, b. 31.]

We must be careful to note, that when Aristotle speaks of a
_principium_ as knowable in itself, or true in itself, he does not
mean that it is innate, or that it starts up in the mind ready made
without any gradual building up or preparation. What he means is,
that it is not demonstrable deductively from anything else prior or
more knowable by nature than itself. He declares (as we shall see)
that _principia_ are acquired, and mainly by Induction.

Next to _Petitio Principii_, Aristotle indicates another fallacious
or erroneous procedure in dialectic debate; misconception or
misstatement of the real grounds on which a conclusion rests--_Non
per Hoc_. You may impugn the thesis (set up by the respondent)
directly, by proving syllogistically its contrary or contradictory;
or you may also impugn it indirectly by _Reductio ad Absurdum_;
_i.e._ you prove by syllogism some absurd conclusion, which you
contend to be necessarily true, if the thesis is admitted. Suppose
you impugn it in the first method, or directly, by a syllogism
containing only two premisses and a conclusion: _Non per Hoc_ is
inapplicable here, for if either premiss is disallowed, the
conclusion is unproved; the respondent cannot meet you except by
questioning one or both of the premisses of your impugning
syllogism.[25] But if you proceed by the second method or indirectly,
_Non per Hoc_ may become applicable; for there may then be more than
two premisses, and he may, while granting that the absurd conclusion
is correctly made out, contend that the truth or falsehood of his
thesis is noway implicated in it. He declares (in Aristotle's phrase)
that the absurdity or falsehood just made out does not follow as a
consequence from his thesis, but from other premisses independent
thereof; that it would stand equally proved, even though his thesis
were withdrawn.[26] In establishing the falsehood or absurdity you
must take care that it shall be one implicated with or dependent upon
his thesis. It is this last condition that he (the respondent)
affirms to be wanting.[27]

[Footnote 25: Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 4: [Greek: o(/tan
a)naire/thê| ti deiktikôs dia\ tô=n A, B, G], &c.; xviii. 66, a. 17:
[Greek: ê)\ ga\r e)k tô=n du/o prota/seôn ê)\ e)k pleio/nôn pa=s
e)sti\ sullogismo/s; ei) me\n ou)=n e)k tô=n du/o, tou/tôn a)na/gkê
tê\n me\n e(te/ran ê)\ kai\ a)mphote/ras ei)=nai pseudei=s;] &c.
Whoever would understand this difficult chapter xvii., will do well
to study it with the notes of Julius Pacius (p. 360), and also the
valuable exposition of Mr. Poste, who has extracted and illustrated
it in Appendix B. (p. 190) of the notes to his edition of the
Sophistici Elenchi. The six illustrative diagrams given by Julius
Pacius afford great help, though the two first of them appear to me
incorrectly printed, as to the brackets connecting the different
propositions.]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 38, b. 14, p. 66, a. 2, 7:
[Greek: to\ mê\ _para\ tou=to_ sumbai/nein to\ pseu=dos--tou= mê\
_para\ tê\n the/sin_ ei)=nai to\ pseu=dos--ou) _para\ tê\n the/sin_
sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos--ou)k a)\n ei)/ê _para\ tê\n the/sin_.]

Instead of the preposition [Greek: para/], Aristotle on two occasions
employs [Greek: dia/--ou(/tô ga\r e)/stai _dia\ tê\n
u(po/thesin_]--p. 65, b. 33, p. 66, a. 3.

The preposition [Greek: para/], with acc. case, means _on account
of_, _owing to_, &c. See Matthiæ and Kühner's Grammars, and the
passage of Thucydides i. 141; [Greek: kai\ e(/kastos _ou) para\ tê\n
e(autou= a)me/leian_ oi)etai bla/psein, me/lein de/ tini kai\ a)/llô|
u(pe\r e(autou= ti proi+dei=n], &c., which I transcribe partly on
account of Dr. Arnold's note, who says about [Greek: para\]
here:--"This is exactly expressed in vulgar English, _all along of_
his own neglect, _i. e._ owing to his own neglect."]

[Footnote 27: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 65, b. 33: [Greek: dei= pro\s tou\s
e)x a)rchê=s o(/rous suna/ptein to\ a)du/naton; ou(/tô ga\r e)/stai
dia\ tê\n u(po/thesin.]]

Aristotle tells us that this was a precaution which the defender of a
thesis was obliged often to employ in dialectic debate, in order to
guard against abuse or misapplication of _Reductio ad Absurdum_ on
the part of opponents, who (it appears) sometimes took credit for
success, when they had introduced and demonstrated some absurd
conclusion that had little or no connection with the thesis.[28] But
even when the absurd conclusion is connected with the thesis
continuously, by a series of propositions each having a common term
with the preceding, in either the ascending or the descending scale,
we have here more than three propositions, and the absurd conclusion
may perhaps be proved by the other premisses, without involving the
thesis. In this case the respondent will meet you with _Non per
Hoc_:[29] he will point out that his thesis is not one of the
premisses requisite for demonstrating your conclusion, and is
therefore not overthrown by the absurdity thereof. Perhaps the thesis
may be false, but you have not shown it to be so, since it is not
among the premisses necessary for proving your _absurdum_. An
_absurdum_ may sometimes admit of being demonstrated by several lines
of premisses,[30] each involving distinct falsehood. Every false
conclusion implies falsity in one or more syllogistic or
prosyllogistic premisses that have preceded it, and is _owing to_ or
occasioned by this first falsehood.[31]

[Footnote 28: Analyt. Prior. II. xvii. p. 65, a. 38: [Greek: o(\
polla/kis e)n toi=s lo/gois ei)ô/thamen le/gein], &c. That the
_Reductio ad Absurdum_ was sometimes made to turn upon matters wholly
irrelevant, we may see from the illustration cited by Aristotle, p.
65, b. 17.]

[Footnote 29: In this chapter of the Analytica, Aristotle designates
the present fallacy by the title, _Non per Hoc_, [Greek: ou) para\
tou=to--ou) para\ tê\n the/sin sumbai/nei to\ pseu=dos]. He makes
express reference to the Topica (_i.e._ to the fifth chapter of
Sophist. Elenchi, which he regards as part of the Topica), where the
same fallacy is designated by a different title, _Non Causa pro
Causâ_, [Greek: to\ a)nai/tion ô(s ai)/tion tithe/nai]. We see
plainly that this chapter of the Anal. Priora was composed later than
the fifth chapter of Soph. El.; whether this is true of the two
treatises as wholes is not so certain. I think it probable that the
change of designation for the same fallacy was deliberately adopted.
It is an improvement to dismiss the vague term Cause.]

[Footnote 30: Ibid. II. xvii. p. 66, a. 11: [Greek: e)pei\ tau)to/ ge
pseu=dos sumbai/nein dia\ pleio/nôn u(pothe/seôn ou)de\n i)/sôs
a)/topon, oi(=on ta\s parallê/lous sumpi/ptein], &c.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. II. xviii. p. 66, a. 16-24: [Greek: o( de\
pseudê\s lo/gos gi/netai para\ to\ prô=ton pseu=dos], &c.]

In impugning the thesis and in extracting from your opponent the
proper concessions to enable you to do so, you will take care to put
the interrogations in such form and order as will best disguise the
final conclusion which you aim at establishing. If you intend to
arrive at it through preliminary syllogisms (prosyllogisms), you will
ask assent to the necessary premisses in a confused or inverted
order, and will refrain from enunciating at once the conclusion from
any of them. Suppose that you wish to end by showing that A may be
predicated of F, and suppose that there must be intervening steps
through B, C, D, E. You will not put the questions in this regular
order, but will first ask him to grant that A may be predicated of B;
next, that D may be predicated of E; afterwards, that B may be
predicated of C, &c. You will thus try to obtain all the concessions
requisite for your final conclusion, before he perceives your drift.
If you can carry your point by only one syllogism, and have only one
middle term to get conceded, you will do well to put the middle term
first in your questions. This is the best way to conceal your purpose
from the respondent.[32]

[Footnote 32: Analyt. Prior. II. xix. p. 66, a. 33-b. 3: [Greek:
chrê\ d' o(/per phila/ttesthai paragge/llomen a)pokrinome/nous,
au)tou\s e)picheirou=ntas peira=sthai lantha/nein.--ka)\n di' e(no\s
me/sou gi/nêtai o( sullogismo/s, a)po\ tou= me/sou a)/rchesthai;
ma/lista ga\r a)\n ou(/tô la/nthanoi to\n a)pokrino/menon.] See the
explanation of Pacius, p. 385. Since the middle term does not appear
in the conclusion, the respondent is less likely to be prepared for
the conclusion that you want to establish. To put the middle term
first, in enunciating the Syllogism, is regarded by Aristotle as a
perverted and embarrassing order, yet it is the received practice
among modern logicians.]

It will be his business to see that he is not thus tripped up in the
syllogistic process.[33] If you ask the questions in the order above
indicated, without enunciating your preliminary conclusions, he must
take care not to concede the same term twice, either as predicate, or
as subject, or as both; for you can arrive at no conclusion unless he
grants you a middle term; and no term can be employed as middle,
unless it be repeated twice. Knowing the conditions of a conclusion
in each of the three figures, he will avoid making such concessions
as will empower you to conclude in any one of them.[34] If the thesis
which he defends is affirmative, the _elenchus_ by which you impugn
it must be a negative; so that he will be careful not to concede the
premisses for a negative conclusion. If his thesis be negative, your
purpose will require you to meet him by an affirmative; accordingly
he must avoid granting you any sufficient premisses for an
affirmative conclusion. He may thus make it impossible for you to
prove syllogistically the contrary or contradictory of his thesis;
and it is in proving this that the _elenchus_ or refutation consists.
If he will not grant you any affirmative proposition, nor any
universal proposition, you know, by the rules previously laid down,
that no valid syllogism can be constructed; since nothing can be
inferred either from two premisses both negative, or from two
premisses both particular.[35]

[Footnote 33: Analyt Prior. II. xix. p. 66, a. 25-32: [Greek: pro\s
de\ to\ mê\ katasullogi/zesthai paratêrête/on, o(/tan a)/neu tô=n
sumperasma/tôn e)rôta=| to\n lo/gon], &c.

Waitz (p. 520) explains [Greek: katasullogi/zesthai], "disputationum
et interrogationum laqueis aliquem irretire." This is, I think, more
correct than the distinction which M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire seeks to
draw, "entre le Catasyllogisme et la Réfutation," in the valuable
notes to his translation of the Analytica Priora, p. 303.]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. II. xix. p. 66, a. 25-32.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. xx. p. 66, b. 4-17. The reader will observe how
completely this advice given by Aristotle is shaped for the purpose
of obtaining victory in the argument and how he leaves out of
consideration both the truth of what the opponent asks to be
conceded, and the belief entertained by the defendant. This is
exactly the procedure which he himself makes a ground of contemptuous
reproach against the Sophists.]

We have already seen that error may arise by wrong enunciation or
arrangement of the terms of a syllogism, that is, defects in its
form; but sometimes also, even when the form is correct, error may
arise from wrong belief as to the matters affirmed or denied.[36]
Thus the same predicate may belong, immediately and essentially,
alike to several distinct subjects; but you may believe (what is the
truth) that it belongs to one of them, and you may at the same time
believe (erroneously) that it does not belong to another. Suppose
that A is predicable essentially both of B and C, and that A, B, and
C, are all predicable essentially of D. You may know that A is
predicable of all B, and that B is predicable of all D; but you may
at the same time believe (erroneously) that A is not predicable of
any C, and that C is predicable of all D. Under this state of
knowledge and belief, you may construct two valid syllogisms; the
first (in _Barbara_, with B for its middle term) proving that A
belongs to _all_ D; the second (in _Celarent_, with C for its middle
term) proving that A belongs to _no_ D. The case will be the same,
even if all the terms taken belong to the same ascending or
descending logical series. Here, then, you _know_ one proposition;
yet you _believe_ the proposition contrary to it.[37] How can such a
mental condition be explained? It would, indeed, be an impossibility,
if the middle term of the two syllogisms were the same, and if the
premisses of the one syllogism thus contradicted directly and in
terms, the premisses of the other: should that happen, you cannot
know one side of the alternative and believe the other. But if the
middle term be different, so that the contradiction between the
premisses of the one syllogism and those of the other, is not direct,
there is no impossibility. Thus, you know that A is predicable of all
B, and B of all D; while you believe at the same time that A is
predicable of _no_ C, and C of _all_ D; the middle term being in one
syllogism B, in the other, C.[38] This last form of error is
analogous to what often occurs in respect to our knowledge of
particulars. You know that A belongs to all B, and B to all C; you
know, therefore, that A belongs to all C. Yet you may perhaps be
ignorant of the existence of C. Suppose A to denote equal to two
right angles; B, to be the triangle generally; C, a particular
visible triangle. You know A B the universal proposition; yet you may
at the same time believe that C does not exist; and thus it may
happen that you know, and do not know, the same thing at the same
time. For, in truth, the knowledge, that every triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles, is not (as a mental fact) simple
and absolute, but has two distinct aspects; one as concerns the
universal, the other as concerns the several particulars. Now,
assuming the case above imagined, you possess the knowledge in the
first of these two aspects, but not in the second; so that the
apparent contrariety between knowledge and no knowledge is not
real.[39] And in this sense the doctrine of Plato in the Menon is
partially true--that learning is reminiscence. We can never know
beforehand particular cases _per se_; but in proportion as we extend
our induction to each case **successively, we, as it were, recognize
that, which we knew beforehand as a general truth, to be realized in
each. Thus when we ascertain the given figure before us to be a
triangle, we know immediately that its three angles are equal to two
right angles.[40]

[Footnote 36: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 18: [Greek:
sumbai/nei d' e)ni/ote, katha/per e)n tê=| the/sei tô=n o(/rôn
a)patô/metha, kai\ kata\ tê\n u(po/lêpsin gi/nesthai tê\n a)pa/tên.]

The vague and general way in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek:
u(po/lêpsis], seems to be best rendered by our word _belief_. See
Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Animâ, p. 469; Biese, Philos. des
Aristot. i. p. 211.]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 33: [Greek: ô(/ste o(/ pôs
e)pi/statai, tou=to o(/lôs a)xioi= mê\ u(polamba/nein; o(/per
a)du/naton.]]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 5-8.]

[Footnote 39: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 19: [Greek: ou(/tô
me\n ou)=n ô(s tê=| katho/lou ou)=de to G o(/ti du/o o)rthai/, ô(s
de\ tê=| kath' e(/kaston ou)k oi)=den, ô(/st' ou)ch e(/xei ta\s
e)nanti/as] (sc. [Greek: e)pistê/mos]).]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: ou)damou= ga\r sumbai/nei
proepi/stasthai to\ kath' e(/kaston, a)ll' a(/ma tê=| e)pagôgê=|
lamba/nein tê\n tô=n kata\ me/ros e)pistê/mên _ô(/sper
a)nagnôri/zontas_], &c. Cf. Anal. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9, seq.;
Plato, Menon, pp. 81-82.]

We thus, by help of the universal, acquire a theoretical knowledge of
particulars, but we do not know them by the special observation
properly belonging to each particular case: so that we may err in
respect to them without any positive contrariety between our
cognition and our error; since what we know is the universal, while
what we err in is the particular. We may even know that A is
predicable of all B, and that B is predicable of all C; and yet we
may believe that A is not predicable of C. We may know that every
mule is barren, and that the animal before us is a mule, yet still we
may believe her to be in foal; for perhaps we may never have combined
in our minds the particular case along with the universal
proposition.[41] _A fortiori_, therefore, we may make the like
mistake, if we know the universal only, and do not know the
particular. And this is perfectly possible. For take any one of the
visible particular instances, even one which we have already
inspected, so soon as it is out of sight we do not know it by actual
and present cognition; we only know it, partly from the remembrance
of past special inspection, partly from the universal under which it
falls.[42] We may know in one, or other, or all, of these three
distinct ways: either by the universal; or specially (as remembered):
or by combination of both--actual and present cognition, that is, by
the application of a foreknown generality to a case submitted to our
senses. And as we may know in each of these three ways, so we may
also err or be deceived in each of the same three ways.[43] It is
therefore quite possible that we may know, and that we may err or be
deceived about the same thing, and that, too, without any
contrariety. This is what happens when we know both the two premisses
of the syllogism, but have never reflected on them before, nor
brought them into conjunction in our minds. When we believe that the
mule before us is in foal, we are destitute of the actual knowledge;
yet our erroneous belief is not for that reason contrary to
knowledge; for an erroneous belief, contrary to the universal
proposition, must be represented by a counter-syllogism.[44]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 36: [Greek: ou) ga\r
e)pi/statai o(/ti to\ A tô=| G, _mê\ suntheôrô=n_ to\ kath'
e(ka/teron.]]

[Footnote 42: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 39: [Greek: ou)de\n
ga\r tô=n ai)sthêtô=n e)/xô tê=s ai)sthê/seôs geno/menon i)/smen,
ou)/d' a)\n ê)|sthême/noi tugcha/nômen, ei) mê\ ô(s tô=| katho/lou
kai\ tô=| e)/chein tê\n oi)kei/an e)pistê/mên, a)ll' _ou)ch ô(s tô=|
e)nergei=n_.]

Complete cognition ([Greek: to\ e)nergei=n], according to the view
here set forth) consists of one mental act corresponding to the major
premiss; another corresponding to the minor; and a third including
both the two in conscious juxta-position. The third implies both the
first and the second; but the first and the second do not necessarily
imply the third, nor does either of them imply the other; though a
person cognizant of the first is _in a certain way, and to a certain
extent_, cognizant of _all_ the particulars to which the second
applies. Thus the person who knows Ontology (the most universal of
all sciences, [Greek: tou= o)/ntos ê(=| o)/n]), knows _in a certain
way_ all _scibilia_. Metaphys. A., p. 982, a. 21: [Greek: tou/tôn de\
to\ me\n pa/nta e)pi/stasthai tô=| ma/lista e)/chonti tê\n katho/lou
e)pistê/mên a)nagkai=on u(pa/rchein; ou(/tos ga\r _oi)=de/ pôs_
pa/nta ta\ u(pokei/mena.] Ib. a. 8: [Greek: u(polamba/nomen dê\
prô=ton me\n e)pi/stasthai pa/nta to\n sopho\n ô(s _e)nde/chetai, mê\
kath' e(/kaston e)/chonta e)pistê/mên au)tô=n_.] See the Scholia of
Alexander on these passages, pp. 525, 526, Brandis; also Aristot.
Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86, a. 25; Physica, VII. p. 247, a. 5.
Bonitz observes justly (Comm. **ad Metaphys. p. 41) as to the doctrine
of Aristotle: "Scientia et ars versatur in notionibus universalibus,
solutis ac liberis à conceptu singularum rerum; ideoque, _etsi orta
est à principio et experientiâ_, tradi tamen etiam iis potest qui
careant experientiâ."]

[Footnote 43: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, b. 3: [Greek: to\ ga\r
e)pi/stasthai le/getai trichô=s, ê)\ ô(s tê=| katho/lou, ê)\ ô(s tê=|
oi)kei/a|, ê)\ ô(s tô=| e)nergei=n; ô(/ste kai\ to\ ê)patê=sthai
tosautachô=s.]]

[Footnote 44: Ibid. b. 5: [Greek: ou)de\n ou)=n kôlu/ei kai\
ei)de/nai kai\ ê)patê=sthai peri\ au)to/, plê\n ou)k e)nanti/ôs.
o(/per sumbai/nei kai\ tô=| kath' e(kate/ran ei)do/ti tê\n pro/tasin
kai\ mê\ e)peskemme/nô| pro/teron. u(polamba/nôn ga\r ku/ein tê\n
ê(mi/onon ou)k e)/chei tê\n kata\ to\ e)nergei=n e)pistê/mên, ou)d'
au)= dia\ tê\n u(po/lêpsin e)nanti/an a)pa/tên tê=| e)pistê/mê|;
sullogismo\s ga\r ê( e)nanti/a a)pa/tê tê=| katho/lou.] About
erroneous belief, where a man believes the contrary of a true
conclusion, adopting a counter-syllogism, compare Analyt. Post. I.
xvi. p. 79, b. 23: [Greek: a)/gnoia kata\ dia/thesin].]

It is impossible, however, for a man to believe that one contrary is
predicable of its contrary, or that one contrary is identical with
its contrary, essentially and as an universal proposition; though he
may believe that it is so by accident (_i.e._ in some particular
case, by reason of the peculiarities of that case). In various ways
this last is possible; but this we reserve for fuller
examination.[45]

[Footnote 45: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, b. 23: [Greek: a)ll'
i)/sôs e)kei=no pseu=dos, to\ u(polabei=n tina\ kakô=| ei)=nai to\
a)gathô=| ei)=nai, ei) mê\ kata\ sumbebêko/s; pollachô=s ga\r
e)gchôrei= tou=th' u(polamba/nein. e)piskepte/on de\ tou=to
be/ltion.] This distinction is illustrated by what we read in Plato,
Republic, v. pp. 478-479. The impossibility of believing that one
contrary is identical with its contrary, is maintained by Sokrates in
Plato, Theætetus, p. 190, B-D, as a part of the long discussion
respecting [Greek: pseudê\s do/xa]: either there is no such thing as
[Greek: pseudê\s do/xa], or a man may know, and not know, the same
thing, ibid. p. 196 C. Aristotle has here tried to show in what sense
this last-mentioned case is possible.]

Whenever (Aristotle next goes on to say) the extremes of a syllogism
reciprocate or are co-extensive with each other (_i.e._ when the
conclusion being affirmative is convertible simply), the middle term
must reciprocate or be co-extensive with both.[46] If there be four
terms (A, B, C, D), such that A reciprocates with B, and C with D,
and if either A or C must necessarily be predicable of every subject;
then it follows that either B or D must necessarily also be
predicable of every subject. Again, if either A or B must necessarily
be predicable of every subject, but never both predicable of the same
at once; and if, either C or D must be predicable of every subject,
but never both predicable of the same at once; then, if A and C
reciprocate, B and D will also reciprocate.[47] When A is predicable
of all B and all C, but of no other subject besides, and when B is
predicable of all C, then A and B must reciprocate with each other,
or be co-extensive with each other; that is, B may be predicated of
every subject of which A can be predicated, though B cannot be
predicated of A itself.[48] Again, when A and B are predicable of all
C, and when C reciprocates with B, then A must also be predicable of
all B.[49]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 67, b. 27, seq. In this chapter
Aristotle introduces us to affirmative universal propositions
convertible _simpliciter_; that is, in which the predicate must be
understood to be distributed as well as the subject. Here, then, the
quantity of the predicate is determined in thought. This is (as
Julius Pacius remarks, p. 371) in order to lay down principles for
the resolution of Induction into Syllogism, which is to be explained
in the next chapter. In these peculiar propositions, the reason urged
by Sir W. Hamilton for his favourite precept of verbally indicating
the quantity of the predicate, is well founded as a fact: though _he_
says that in _all_ propositions the quantity of the predicate is
understood in thought, which I hold to be incorrect.

We may remark that this recognition by Aristotle of a class of
universal affirmative propositions in which predicate and subject
reciprocate, contrived in order to force Induction into the
syllogistic framework, is at variance with his general view both of
reciprocating propositions and of Induction. He tells us (Analyt.
Post. I. iii. p. 73, a. 18) that such reciprocating propositions are
very rare, which would not be true if they are taken to represent
every Induction; and he forbids us emphatically to annex the mark of
universality to the predicate; which he has no right to do, if he
calls upon us to reason on the predicate as distributed (Analyt.
Prior. I. xxvii., p. 43, b. 17; De Interpret. p. 17, b. 14).]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 2-15.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. a. 16-21. [Greek: plê\n au)tou= tou= A]. Waitz
explains these words in his note (p. 531): yet I do not clearly make
them out; and Alexander of Aphrodisias declared them to assert what
was erroneous ([Greek: e)spha/lthai le/gei], Schol. p. 194, a. 40,
Brandis).]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 21-25.]

Lastly, suppose two pairs of opposites, A and B, C and D; let A be
more eligible than B, and D more eligible than C. Then, if A C is
more eligible than B D, A will also be more eligible than D. For A is
as much worthy of pursuit as B is worthy of avoidance, they being two
opposites; the like also respecting C and D. If then A and D are
equally worthy of pursuit, B and C are equally worthy of avoidance;
for each is equal to each. Accordingly the two together, A C, will be
equal to the two together, B D. But this would be contrary to the
supposition; since we assumed A to be more eligible than B, and D to
be more eligible than C. It will be seen that on this supposition A
is more worthy of pursuit than D, and that C is less worthy of
avoidance than B; the greater good and the lesser evil being more
eligible than the lesser good and the greater evil. Now apply this to
a particular case of a lover, so far forth as lover. Let A represent
his possession of those qualities which inspire reciprocity of love
towards him in the person beloved; B, the absence of those qualities;
D, the attainment of actual sexual enjoyment; C, the non-attainment
thereof. In this state of circumstances, it is evident that A is more
eligible or worthy of preference than D. The being loved is a greater
object of desire to the lover _qua_ lover than sexual gratification;
it is the real end or purpose to which love aspires; and sexual
gratification is either not at all the purpose, or at best only
subordinate and accessory. The like is the case with our other
appetites and pursuits.[50]

[Footnote 50: Analyt. Prior. II. xxii. p. 68, a. 25-b. 17. Aristotle
may be right in the conclusion which he here emphatically asserts;
but I am surprised that he should consider it to be proved by the
reasoning that precedes.

It is probable that Aristotle here understood the object of [Greek:
e)/rôs] (as it is conceived through most part of the Symposion of
Plato) to be a beautiful youth: (see Plato, Sympos. pp. 218-222; also
Xenophon, Sympos. c. viii., Hiero, c. xi. 11, Memorab. I. ii. 29,
30). Yet this we must say--what the two women said when they informed
Simætha of the faithlessness of Delphis (Theokrit. Id. ii.
149)--[Greek: Kê)=|pe/ moi a)/lla te polla/, kai\ ô(s a)/ra De/lphis
e)/ratai;
Kê)/|te min au)=te gunaiko\s e)/chei po/thos, ei)/te kai\ a)ndro/s,
Ou)k e)/phat' a)treke\s i)/dmen.]]

Such is the relation of the terms of a syllogism in regard to
reciprocation and antithesis. Let it next be understood that the
canons hitherto laid down belong not merely to demonstrative and
dialectic syllogisms, but to rhetorical and other syllogisms also;
all of which must be constructed in one or other of the three
figures. In fact, every case of belief on evidence, whatever be the
method followed, must be tested by these same canons. We believe
everything either through Syllogism or upon Induction.[51]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 13: [Greek: a(/panta ga\r
pisteu/omen ê)\ dia\ sullogismou= ê)\ e)x e)pagôgê=s.]]

Though Aristotle might seem, even here, to have emphatically
contrasted Syllogism with Induction as a ground of belief, he
proceeds forthwith to indicate a peculiar form of Syllogism which may
be constructed out of Induction. Induction, and the Syllogism from or
out of Induction (he says) is a process in which we invert the order
of the terms. Instead of concluding from the major through the middle
to the minor (_i.e._ concluding that the major is predicable of the
minor), we now begin from the minor and conclude from thence through
the middle to the major (_i.e._ we conclude that the major is
predicable of the middle).[52] In Syllogism as hitherto described, we
concluded that A the major was predicable of C the minor, through the
middle B; in the Syllogism from Induction we begin by affirming that
A the major is predicable of C the minor; next, we affirm that B the
middle is also predicable of C the minor. The two premisses, standing
thus, correspond to the Third figure of the Syllogism (as explained
in the preceding pages) and would not therefore by themselves justify
anything more than a _particular_ affirmative conclusion. But we
reinforce them by introducing an extraneous assumption:--That the
minor C is co-extensive with the middle B, and comprises the entire
aggregate of individuals of which B is the universal or class-term.
By reason of this assumption the minor proposition becomes
convertible simply, and we are enabled to infer (according to the
last preceding chapter) an universal affirmative conclusion, that the
major term A is predicable of the middle term B. Thus, let A (the
major term) mean the class-term, long-lived; let B (the middle term)
mean the class-term, bile-less, or the having no bile; let C (the
minor term) mean the individual animals--man, horse, mule, &c.,
coming under the class-term B, bile-less.[53] We are supposed to
know, or to have ascertained, that A may be predicated of all C;
(_i.e._ that all men, horses, mules, &c., are long-lived); we farther
know that B is predicable of all C (_i.e._ that men, horses, mules,
&c., belong to the class bile-less). Here, then, we have two
premisses in the Third syllogistic figure, which in themselves would
warrant us in drawing the particular affirmative conclusion, that A
is predicable of _some_ B, but no more. Accordingly, Aristotle
directs us to supplement these premisses[54] by the extraneous
assumption or postulate, that C the minor comprises all the
individual animals that are bile-less, or all those that correspond
to the class-term B; in other words, the assumption, that B the
middle does not denote any more individuals than those which are
covered by C the minor--that B the middle does not stretch beyond or
overpass C the minor.[55] Having the two premisses, and this
postulate besides, we acquire the right to conclude that A is
predicable of _all_ B. But we could not draw that conclusion from the
premisses alone, or without the postulate which declares B and C to
be co-extensive. The conclusion, then, becomes a particular
exemplification of the general doctrine laid down in the last
chapter, respecting the reciprocation of extremes and the
consequences thereof. We thus see that this very peculiar Syllogism
from Induction is (as indeed Aristotle himself remarks) the opposite
or antithesis of a genuine Syllogism. It has no proper middle term;
the conclusion in which it results is the first or major proposition,
the characteristic feature of which it is to be _immediate_, or not
to be demonstrated through a middle term. Aristotle adds that the
genuine Syllogism, which demonstrates through a middle term, is by
nature prior and more effective as to cognition; but that the
Syllogism from Induction is _to us_ plainer and clearer.[56]

[Footnote 52: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 15: [Greek:
e)pagôgê\ me\n ou)=n e)sti\ kai\ o( e)x e)pagôgê=s sullogismo\s to\
dia\ tou= e(te/rou tha/teron a)/kron tô=| me/sô| sullogi/sasthai;
oi(=on ei) tô=n AG me/son to\ B, dia\ tou= G dei=xai to\ A tô=| B
u(pa/rchon; ou(/tô ga\r poiou/metha ta\s e)pagôga/s.]

Waitz in his note (p. 532) says: "Fit Inductio, cum per minorem
terminum demonstratur _medium prædicari de majore_." This is an
erroneous explanation. It should have been: "demonstratur _majorem
prædicari de medio_." Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. 68, b. 32: [Greek:
kai\ tro/pon tina\ a)ntikei=tai ê( e)pagôgê\ tô=| sullogismô=|; o(
me\n ga\r dia\ tou= me/sou to\ a)/kron tô=| tri/tô| dei/knusin, ê(
de\ dia\ tou= tri/tou to\ a)/kron tô=| me/sô|.]]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 18: [Greek: oi(=on e)/stô
to\ A makro/bion, to\ d' e)ph' ô(=| B, to\ cholê\n mê\ e)/chon, e)ph'
ô(=| de\ G, to\ kath' e(/kaston _makro/bion_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos kai\
i(/ppos kai\ ê(mi/onos. tô=| dê\ G o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A; pa=n ga\r
to\ a)/cholon makro/bion; a)lla\ kai\ to\ B, to\ mê\ e)/chein
cholê/n, panti\ u(pa/rchei tô=| G. ei) ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\ G
tô=| B kai\ mê\ u(pertei/nei to\ me/son, a)na/gkê to\ A tô=| B
u(pa/rchein.]

I have transcribed this Greek text as it stands in the editions of
Buhle, Bekker, Waitz, and F. Didot. Yet, notwithstanding these high
authorities, I venture to contend that it is not wholly correct; that
the word [Greek: _makro/bion_], which I have emphasized, is neither
consistent with the context, nor suitable for the point which
Aristotle is illustrating. Instead of [Greek: _makro/bion_], we ought
in that place to read [Greek: a)/cholon]; and I have given the sense
of the passage in my English text as if it did stand [Greek:
a)/cholon] in that place.

I proceed to justify this change. If we turn back to the edition by
Julius Pacius (1584, p. 377), we find the text given as follows after
the word [Greek: ê(mi/onos] (down to that word the text is the same):
[Greek: tô=| dê\ G o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A; pa=n ga\r to\ G
makro/bion; a)lla\ kai\ to\ B, to\ mê\ e)/chon cholê/n, panti\
u(pa/rchei tô=| G. ei) ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\ G tô=| B, kai\ mê\
u(pertei/nei to\ me/son, a)na/gkê to\ A tô=| B u(pa/rchein.] Earlier
than Pacius, the edition of Erasmus (Basil. 1550) has the same text
in this chapter.

Here it will be seen that in place of the words given in Waitz's
text, [Greek: pa=n ga\r to\ _a)/cholon_ makro/bion], Pacius gives
[Greek: pa=n ga\r _to\ G_ makro/bion]: annexing however to the letter
[Greek: G] an asterisk referring to the margin, where we find the
word [Greek: a)/cholon] inserted in small letters, seemingly as a
various reading not approved by Pacius. And M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire
has accommodated his French translation (p. 328) to the text of
Pacius: "Donc A est à C tout entier, car tout C est longève."
Boethius in his Latin translation (p. 519) recognizes as his original
[Greek: pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion], but he alters the text
in the words immediately preceding:--"Ergo _toti B_ (instead of _toti
C_) inest A, omne enim quod sine cholera est, longævum," &c. (p.
519). The edition of Aldus (Venet. 1495) has the text conformable to
the Latin of Boethius: [Greek: tô=| dê\ B o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A;
pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. Three distinct Latin
translations of the 16th century are adapted to the same text, viz.,
that of Vives and Valentinus (Basil. 1542); that published by the
Junta (Venet. 1552); and that of Cyriacus (Basil. 1563). Lastly, the
two Greek editions of Sylburg (1587) and Casaubon (Lugduni 1590),
have the same text also: [Greek: tô=| dê\ B o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A;
pa=n ga\r [to\ G] to\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. Casaubon prints in
brackets the words [Greek: [to\ G]] before [Greek: to\ a)/cholon].

Now it appears to me that the text of Bekker and Waitz (though Waitz
gives it without any comment or explanation) is erroneous; neither
consisting with itself, nor conforming to the general view enunciated
by Aristotle of the Syllogism from Induction. I have cited two
distinct versions, each different from this text, as given by the
earliest editors; in both the confusion appears to have been felt,
and an attempt made to avoid it, though not successfully.

Aristotle's view of the Syllogism from Induction is very clearly
explained by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in the instructive notes of
his translation, pp. 326-328; also in his Preface, p.
lvii.:--"L'induction n'est au fond qu'un syllogisme dont le mineur et
le moyen sont d'extension égale. Du reste, il n'est qu'une seule
manière dont le moyen et le mineur puissent être d'égale extension;
c'est que le mineur se compose de toutes les parties dont le moyen
représente la totalité. D'une part, tous les individus: de l'autre,
l'espèce totale qu'ils forment. L'intelligence fait aussitôt
équation entre les deux termes égaux."

According to the Aristotelian text, as given both by Pacius and the
others, A, the major term, represents _longævum_ (long-lived, the
class-term or total); B, the middle term, represents _vacans bile_
(bile-less, the class-term or total); C, the minor term, represents
the aggregate individuals of the class _longævum_, man, horse, mule,
&c.

Julius Pacius draws out the Inductive Syllogism, thus:--

  1. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., est longævus.
  2. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., vacat bile.
       Ergo:
  3. Quicquid vacat bile, est longævum.

Convertible into a Syllogism in Barbara:--

  1. Omnis homo, equus, asinus, &c., est longævus.
  2. Quicquid vacat bile, est homo, equus, asinus, &c.
       Ergo:
  3. Quicquid vacat bile, est longævum.

Here the force of the proof (or the possibility, in this exceptional
case, of converting a syllogism in the Third figure into another in
_Barbara_ of the First figure) depends upon the equation or
co-extensiveness (not enunciated in the premisses, but assumed in
addition to the premisses) of the minor term C with the middle term
B. But I contend that this is _not_ the condition peremptorily
required, or sufficient for proof, if we suppose C the minor term to
represent _omne longævum_. We must understand C the minor term to
represent _omne vacans bile_, or _quicquid vacat bile_: and unless we
understand this, the proof fails. In other words, _homo, equus,
asinus, &c._ (the aggregate of individuals), must be co-extensive
with the class-term bile-less or _vacans bile_: but they need not be
co-extensive with the class-term long-lived or _longævum_. In the
final conclusion, the subject _vacans bile_ is distributed; but the
predicate _longævum_ is not distributed; this latter may include,
besides all bile-less animals, any number of other animals, without
impeachment of the syllogistic proof.

Such being the case, I think that there is a mistake in the text as
given by all the editors, from Pacius down to Bekker and Waitz. What
they give, in setting out the terms of the Aristotelian Syllogism
from Induction, is: [Greek: e)/stô to\ A makro/bion, to\ d' e)ph'
ô(=| B, to\ cholên mê\ e)/chon, e)ph' ô(=| de\ G, _to\ kath'
e(/kaston makro/bion_, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos kai\ i(/ppos kai\
ê(mi/onos.] Instead of which the text ought to run, [Greek: e)ph'
ô(=| de\ G, _to\ kath' e(/kaston a)/cholon_, oi(=on a)/nthr. k. i(/p.
k. ê(mi/]. That these last words were the original text, is seen by
the words immediately following: [Greek: tô=| dê\ G o(/lô| u(pa/rchei
to\ A. _pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion_]. For the reason thus
assigned (in the particle [Greek: ga/r]) is irrelevant and unmeaning
if [Greek: G] designates [Greek: to\ kath' e(/kaston _makro/bion_ ],
while it is pertinent and even indispensable if [Greek: G] designates
[Greek: to\ kath' e(/kaston _a)/cholon_]. Pacius (or those whose
guidance he followed in his text) appears to have perceived the
incongruity of the reason conveyed in the words [Greek: pa=n ga\r to\
a)/cholon makro/bion]; for he gives, instead of these words, [Greek:
pa=n ga\r _to\ G_ makro/bion]. In this version the reason is indeed
no longer incongruous, but simply useless and unnecessary; for when
we are told that A designates the class _longævum_, and that [Greek:
G] designates the individual _longæva_, we surely require no reason
from without to satisfy us that A is predicable of all [Greek: G].
The text, as translated by Boethius and others, escapes that
particular incongruity, though in another way, but it introduces a
version inadmissible on other grounds. Instead of [Greek: tô=| _dê\
G_ o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A, pa=n ga\r to\ a)/cholon makro/bion],
Boethius has [Greek: tô=| _dê\ B_ o(/lô| u(pa/rchei to\ A, pa=n ga\r
to\ a)/cholon makro/bion]. This cannot be accepted, because it
enunciates the conclusion of the syllogism as if it were one of the
premisses. We must remember that the conclusion of the Aristotelian
Syllogism from Induction is, that A is predicable of B, one of the
premisses to prove it being that A is predicable of the minor term C.
But obviously we cannot admit as one of the premisses the proposition
that A may be predicated of B, since this proposition would then be
used as premiss to prove itself as conclusion.

If we examine the Aristotelian Inductive Syllogism which is intended
to conduct us to the final _probandum_, we shall see that the terms
of it are incorrectly set out by Bekker and Waitz, when they give the
minor term [Greek: G] as designating [Greek: to\ kath' e(/kaston
makro/bion]. This last is not one of the three terms, nor has it any
place in the syllogism. The three terms are:

1. A--major--the class-term or class [Greek: makro/bion]--_longævum_.
2. B--middle--the class term or class [Greek: a)/cholon]--bile-less.
3. C--minor--the individual bile-less animals, man, horse, &c.

There is no term in the syllogism corresponding to the individual
_longæva_ or long-lived animals; this last (I repeat) has no place in
the reasoning. We are noway concerned with the totality of long-lived
animals; all that the syllogism undertakes to prove is, that in and
among that totality all bile-less animals are included; whether there
are or are not other long-lived animals besides the bile-less, the
syllogism does not pretend to determine. The equation or
co-extensiveness required (as described by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire
in his note) is not between the individual long-lived animals and the
class, bile-less animals (middle term), but between the aggregate of
individual animals known to be bile-less and the class, bile-less
animals. The real minor term, therefore, is (not the individual
_long-lived_ animals, but) the individual _bile-less_ animals. The
two premisses of the Inductive Syllogism will stand thus:--

 Men, Horses, Mules, &c., are long-lived (major).
 Men, Horses, Mules, &c., are bile-less (minor).

And, inasmuch as the subject of the minor proposition is co-extensive
with the predicate (which, if quantified according to Hamilton's
phraseology, would be, _All_ bile-less animals), so that the
proposition admits of being converted simply,--the middle term will
become the subject of the conclusion, All bileless animals are
long-lived.]

[Footnote 54: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 27: [Greek: dei=
de\ noei=n to\ G to\ e)x a(pa/ntôn tô=n kath' e(/kaston sugkei/menon;
ê( ga\r e)pagôgê\ dia\ pa/ntôn.]]

[Footnote 55: Analyt. Prior. II. **xxiii. p. 68, p. 23: [Greek: ei)
ou)=n a)ntistre/phei to\ G tô=| B, kai\ mê\ u(pertei/nei to\ me/son,
a)na/gkê to\ A tô=| B u(pa/rchein.]

Julius Pacius translates this: "Si igitur convertatur [Greek: to\ G]
cum B, nec medium excedat, necesse est [Greek: to\ A tô=| B] inesse."
These Latin words include the same grammatical ambiguity as is found
in the Greek original: _medium_, like [Greek: to\ me/son], may be
either an accusative case governed by _excedat_, or a nominative case
preceding _excedat_. The same may be said of the other Latin
translations, from Boethius downwards.

But M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his French translation, and Sir W.
Hamilton in his English translation (Lectures on Logic, Vol. II. iv.
p. 358, Appendix), steer clear of this ambiguity. The former says:
"Si donc C est réciproque à B, et qu'il ne dépasse pas le moyen, il
est nécessaire alors que A soit à B:" to the same purpose, Hamilton,
_l. c._ These words are quite plain and unequivocal. Yet I do not
think that they convey the meaning of Aristotle. In my judgment,
Aristotle meant to say: "If then C reciprocates with B, and if the
middle term (B) does not stretch beyond (the minor C), it is
necessary that A should be predicable of B." To show that this must
be the meaning, we have only to reflect on what C and B respectively
designate. It is assumed that C designates the sum of individual
bile-less animals; and that B designates the class or class-term
bile-less, that is, the totality thereof. Now the sum of individuals
included in the minor (C) cannot upon any supposition overpass the
totality: but it may very possibly fall short of totality; or (to
state the same thing in other words) the totality may possibly
surpass the sum of individuals under survey, but it cannot possibly
fall short thereof. B is here the limit, and may possibly stretch
beyond C; but cannot stretch beyond B. Hence I contend that the
translations, both by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Sir W. Hamilton,
take the wrong side in the grammatical alternative admissible under
the words [Greek: kai\ mê\ u(pertei/nei to\ me/son]. The only doubt
that could possibly arise in the case was, whether the aggregate of
individuals designated by the minor did, or did not, reach up to the
totality designated by the middle term; or (changing the phrase)
whether the totality designated by the middle term did, or did not,
stretch beyond the aggregate of individuals designated by the minor.
Aristotle terminates this doubt by the words: "And if the middle term
does _not_ stretch beyond (the minor)." Of course the middle term
does not stretch beyond, when the terms reciprocate; but when they do
not reciprocate, the middle term must be the _more_ extensive of the
two; it can _never_ be the _less_ extensive of the two, since the
aggregate of individuals cannot possibly exceed totality, though it
may fall short thereof.

I have given in the text what I think the true meaning of Aristotle,
departing from the translations of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and
Sir** W. Hamilton.]

[Footnote 56: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 30-38: [Greek:
e)/sti d' o( toiou=tos sullogismo\s tê=s prô/tês kai\ a)me/sou
prota/seôs; ô(=n me\n ga/r e)sti me/son, dia\ tou= me/sou o(
sullogismo/s, ô(=n de\ mê/ e)sti, di' e)pagôgê=s.--phu/sei me\n ou)=n
pro/teros kai\ gnôrimô/teros o( dia\ tou= me/sou sullogismo/s, ê(mi=n
d' e)narge/steros o( dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s.]]

From Induction he proceeds to Example. You here take in (besides the
three terms, major, middle, and minor, of the Syllogism) a fourth
term; that is, a new particular case analogous to the minor. Your
purpose here is to show--not, as in the ordinary Syllogism, that the
major term is predicable of the minor, but, as in the Inductive
Syllogism--that the major term is predicable of the middle term; and
you prove this conclusion, not (as in the Inductive Syllogism)
through the minor term, but through the new case or fourth term
analogous to the minor.[57] Let A represent evil or mischievous; B,
war against neighbours, generally; C, war of Athens against Thebes,
an event to come and under deliberation; D, war of Thebes against
Phokis, a past event of which the issue is known to have been
signally mischievous. You assume as known, first, that A is
predicable of D, _i.e._ that the war of Thebes against Phokis has
been disastrous; next, that B is predicable both of C and of D,
_i.e._ that each of the two wars, of Athens against Thebes, and of
Thebes against Phokis, is a war of neighbours against neighbours, or
a conterminous war. Now from the premiss that A is predicable of D,
along with the premiss that B is predicable of D, you infer that A is
predicable of the class B, or of conterminous wars generally; and
hence you draw the farther inference, that A is also predicable of C,
another particular case under the same class B. The inference here
is, in the first instance, from part to whole; and finally, through
that whole, from the one part to another part of the same whole.
_Induction_ includes in its major premiss all the particulars,
declaring all of them to be severally subjects of the major as
predicate; hence it infers as conclusion, that the major is also
predicable of the middle or class-term comprising all these
particulars, but comprising no others. _Example_ includes not all,
but only one or a few particulars; inferring from it or them, first,
to the entire class, next, to some new analogous particular belonging
to the class.[58]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. II. xxiv. p. 68, b. 38: [Greek: paradei=gma d'
e)sti\n o(/tan tô=| me/sô| to\ a)/kron u(pa/rchon deichthê=| dia\
tou= o(moi/ou tô=| tri/tô|.]]

[Footnote 58: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiv. p. 69, a. 1-19**.
Julius Pacius (p. 400) notes the unauthorized character of
this so-called Paradeigmatic Syllogism, contradicting the rules of
the figures laid down by Aristotle, and also the confused manner in
which the scope of it is described: first, to infer from a single
example to the universal; next, to infer from a single example
_through_ the universal to another parallel case. To which we may add
the confused description in p. 69, a. 17, 18, where [Greek: to\
a)/kron] in the first of the two lines signifies the _major_
extreme--in the second of the two the _minor_ extreme. See Waitz's
note, p. 533.

If we turn to ch. xxvii. p. 70, a. 30-34, we shall find Aristotle on
a different occasion disallowing altogether this so-called Syllogism
from Example.]

These chapters respecting Induction and Example are among the most
obscure and perplexing in the Aristotelian Analytica. The attempt to
throw both Induction and Example into the syllogistic form is alike
complicated and unfortunate; moreover, the unsatisfactory reading and
diversities in the text, among commentators and translators, show
that the reasoning of Aristotle has hitherto been imperfectly
apprehended.[59] From some of his phrases, we see that he was aware
of the essential antithesis between Induction and Syllogism; yet the
syllogistic forms appear to have exercised such fascination over his
mind, that he could not be satisfied without trying to find some
abnormal form of Syllogism to represent and give validity to
Induction. In explaining generally what the Syllogism is, and what
Induction is, he informs us that the Syllogism presupposes and rests
upon the process of Induction as its postulate. For there can be no
valid Syllogism without an universal proposition in one (at least) of
the premisses; and he declares, unequivocally, that universal
propositions are obtained only through Induction. How Induction
operates through the particular facts of sense, remembered, compared,
and coalescing into clusters held together by associating similarity,
he has also told us; it is thus that Experience, with its universal
notions and conjunctions, is obtained. But this important process is
radically distinct from that of syllogizing, though it furnishes the
basis upon which all syllogizing is built.

[Footnote 59: Sir W. Hamilton (Lectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 319)
says justly, that Aristotle has been very brief and unexplicit in his
treatment of Induction. Yet the objections that Hamilton makes to
Aristotle are very different from those which I should make. In the
learned and valuable Appendix to his Lectures (vol. iv. pp. 358-369),
he collects various interesting criticisms of logicians respecting
Induction as handled by Aristotle. Ramus (in his Scholæ Dialecticæ,
VIII. xi.) says very truly:--"Quid vero sit Inductio, perobscure ab
Aristotele declaratur; nec ab interpretibus intelligitur, quo modo
_syllogismus_ per medium concludat majus extremum de minore;
_inductio_, majus de medio per minus."

The Inductive Syllogism, as constructed by Aristotle, requires a
reciprocating minor premiss. It may, indeed, be cited (as I have
already remarked) in support of Hamilton's favourite precept of
quantifying the predicate. The predicate of this minor must be
assumed as _quantified in thought_, the subject being taken as
co-extensive therewith. Therefore Hamilton's demand that it shall be
_quantified in speech_ has really in this case that foundation which
he erroneously claims for it in all cases. He complains that Lambert
and some other logicians dispense with the necessity of quantifying
the predicate of the minor by making it disjunctive; and adds the
remarkable statement that "the recent German logicians, Herbart,
Twesten, Drobisch, &c., following Lambert, make the Inductive
Syllogism a byeword" (p. 366). I agree with them in thinking the
attempted transformation of Induction into Syllogism very
unfortunate, though my reasons are probably not the same as theirs.

Trendelenburg agrees with those who said that Aristotle's doctrine
about the Inductive Syllogism required that the minor should be
disjunctively enunciated (Logische Untersuchungen, xiv. p. 175, xvi.
pp. 262, 263; also Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der Aristotelischen
Logik, ss. 34-36, p. 71). Ueberweg takes a similar view (System der
**Logik, sect. 128, p. 367, 3rd ed.). If the Inductive Inference
is to be twisted into Syllogism, it seems more naturally to fall into
an _hypothetical_ syllogism, _e. g._:--

If this, that, and the other magnet attract iron, all magnets attract
iron;
But this, that, and the other magnet do attract iron: _Ergo_,
&c.]

The central idea of the Syllogism, as defined by Aristotle, is that
of a conclusion following from given premisses by _necessary_
sequence;[60] meaning by the term _necessary_ thus much and no
more--that you cannot grant the premisses, and deny the conclusion,
without being inconsistent with yourself, or falling into
contradiction. In all the various combinations of propositions, set
forth by Aristotle as the different figures and modes of Syllogism,
this property of necessary sequence is found. But it is a property
which no Induction can ever possess.[61] When Aristotle professes to
point out a particular mode of Syllogism to which Induction conforms,
he can only do so by falsifying the process of Induction, and by not
accurately distinguishing between what is observed and what is
inferred. In the case which he takes to illustrate the Inductive
Syllogism--the inference from all particular bile-less animals to the
whole class bile-less--he assumes that we have ascertained the
attribute to belong to _all_ the particulars, and that the inductive
inference consists in passing from all of them to the class-term; the
passage from premisses to conclusion being here necessary, and thus
falling under the definition of Syllogism; since, to grant the
premisses, and yet to deny the conclusion, involves a contradiction.
But this doctrine misconceives what the inductive inference really is.
We never can observe _all_ the particulars of a class, which is
indefinite as to number of particulars, and definite only in respect
of the attributes connoted by the class-term. We can only observe
_some_ of the particulars, a greater or smaller proportion. Now it is
in the transition from these _to_ the totality of particulars, that
the real inductive inference consists; not in the transition _from_
the totality to the class-term which denotes that totality and
connotes its determining common attribute. In fact, the distinction
between the totality of particulars and the meaning of the
class-term, is one not commonly attended to; though it is worthy of
note in an analysis of the intellectual process, and is therefore
brought to view by Aristotle. But he employs it incorrectly as an
intermediate step to slur over the radical distinction between
Induction and Syllogism. He subjoins:[62]--"You must conceive the
minor term C (in the Inductive Syllogism) as composed of all the
particulars; for Induction is through all of them." You may say that
Induction is _through_ all the particulars, if you distinguish this
totality from the class-term, and if you treat the class-term as the
ultimate _terminus ad quem_. But the Induction must first travel _to_
all the particulars; being forced to take start from a part only, and
then to jump onward far enough to cover the indefinite unobserved
remainder. This jump is the real Induction; and this can never be
brought under the definition of Syllogism; for in the best and most
certain Induction the sequence is never a necessary one: you may
grant the premisses and deny the conclusion without contradicting
yourself.

[Footnote 60: Alexander intimates that Aristotle enunciated
"necessary sequence" as a part of his definition of Syllogism, for
the express purpose of distinguishing it from Induction, which is a
sequence _not necessary_ (Schol. ad Top. p. 253, a. 19, Br.): [Greek:
to\ d' _e)x a)na/gkês_ proskei/menon e)n tô=| o(/rô|, tê=s
**e)pagôgê=s chôri/zei to\n sullogismo/n; **e)/sti me\n ga\r kai\
e)pagôgê\ lo/gos e)n ô(=| tethe/ntôn tinô=n e(/tero/n ti tô=n
keime/nôn sumbai/nei, a)ll' _ou)k_ e)x a)na/gkês.]]

[Footnote 61: Alexander (in his Scholia on the Metaphysica, E. i. p.
406**, ed. Bonitz) observes truly: [Greek: a)ll' ei) e)k tê=s
ai)sthê/seôs kai\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s pi/stis, ou)k e)/stin a)po/deixis,
pro\s pa=san ga\r e)pagôgê\n du/natai/ tis e)ni/stasthai kai\ mê\
e)a=|n to\ katho/lou sumperai/nein.]]

[Footnote 62: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 27: [Greek: dei=
de\ noei=n to\ G to\ e)x a(pa/ntôn tô=n kath' e(/kaston sugkei/menon;
ê( ga\r e)pagôgê\ dia\ pa/ntôn.] See Professor Bain's 'Inductive
Logic,' chap. i. s. 2, where this process is properly criticised.]

Aristotle states very clearly:--"We believe everything either through
Syllogism, or from Induction."[63] Here, as well as in several other
passages, he notes the two processes as essentially distinct. The
Syllogism requires in its premisses at least one general proposition;
nor does Aristotle conceive the "generalities as the original
data:"[64] he derives them from antecedent Induction. The two
processes are (as he says) opposite in a certain way; that is, they
are complementary halves of the same whole; Induction being the
establishment of those universals which are essential for the
deductive march of the Syllogism; while the two together make up the
entire process of scientific reasoning. But he forgets or
relinquishes this antithesis, when he presents to us the Inductive
process as a given variety of Syllogism. And the objection to such a
doctrine becomes the more manifest, since in constructing his
Inductive Syllogism, he is compelled to admit either that there is no
middle term, or that the middle term is subject of the conclusion, in
violation of the syllogistic canons.[65]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 13: [Greek: a(/panta ga\r
pisteu/omen ê)\ dia\ sullogismou= ê)\ e)x e)pagôgê=s]. Here Induction
includes Example, though in the next stage he puts the two apart.
Compare Anal. Poster. I. i. p. 71, a. 9.]

[Footnote 64: See Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Bk. II. ch.
iii. a. 4, p. 219, 5th ed.]

[Footnote 65: Aldrich (Artis Log. Rudim. ch. iii. 9, 2, p. 175) and
Archbishop Whately (Elem. of Logic, ch. i. p. 209) agree in treating
the argument of Induction as a defective or informal Syllogism: see
also to the same purpose Sir.** W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, vol.
i. p. 322. Aldrich treats it as a Syllogism in _Barbara_, with the
minor suppressed; but Whately rejects this, because the minor
necessary to be supplied is false. He maintains that the premiss
suppressed is the major, not the minor. I dissent from both. It
appears to me that the opinion which Whately pronounces to be a
fallacy is the real truth: "Induction is a distinct kind of argument
from the Syllogism" (p. 208). It is the essential property of the
Syllogism, as defined by Aristotle and by every one after him, that
the truth of the conclusion follows _necessarily_ from the truth of
its premisses: that you cannot admit the premisses and reject the
conclusion without contradicting yourself. Now this is what the best
Induction never attains; and I contend that the presence or absence
of this important characteristic is quite enough to constitute "two
_distinct kinds_ of argument." Whately objects to Aldrich (whom
Hamilton defends) for supplying a suppressed _minor_, because it is
"manifestly false" (p. 209). I object to Whately's supplied _major_,
because it is uncertified, and therefore cannot be used to prove any
conclusion. By clothing arguments from Induction in syllogistic form,
we invest them with a character of necessity which does not really
belong to them. The establishment of general propositions, and the
interpretation of them when established (to use the phraseology of
Mr. Mill), must always be distinct mental processes; and the forms
appropriate to the latter, involving necessary sequence, ought not to
be employed to disguise the want of necessity--the varying and
graduated probability, inherent in the former. Mr. Mill says (Syst.
Log. Bk. III. ch. iii. s. 1, p. 343, 5th ed.:)--"As Whately remarks,
every induction is a syllogism with the major premiss suppressed; or
(as I prefer expressing it) every induction may be thrown into the
form of a syllogism, by supplying a major premiss." Even in this
modified phraseology, I cannot admit the propriety of throwing
Induction into syllogistic forms of argument. By doing this we efface
the special character of Induction, as the jump from particular
cases, more or fewer, to an universal proposition comprising them and
an indefinite number of others besides. To state this in forms which
imply that it is a necessary step, involving nothing more than the
interpretation of a higher universal proposition, appears to me
unphilosophical. Mr. Mill says with truth (in his admirable chapter
explaining the real function of the major premiss in a Syllogism, p.
211), that the individual cases are all the evidence which we
possess; the step from them to universal propositions ought not to be
expressed in forms which suppose universal propositions to be already
attained.

I will here add that, though Aldrich himself (as I stated at the
beginning of this note) treats the argument from Induction as a
defective or informal Syllogism, his anonymous Oxonian editor and
commentator takes a sounder view. He says (pp. 176, 177, 184, ed.
1823. Oxon.):--

"The principles acquired by human powers may be considered as
twofold. Some are _intuitive_, and are commonly called Axioms; the
other class of general principles are those acquired by Induction.
But it may be doubted whether this distinction is correct. It is
highly probable, if not certain, that those primary Axioms generally
esteemed _intuitive_, are in fact acquired by an inductive process;
although that process is less discernible, because it takes place
long before we think of tracing the actings of our own minds. It is
often found necessary to facilitate the understanding of those
Axioms, when they are first proposed to the judgment, by
illustrations drawn from individual cases. But whether it is, as is
generally supposed, the mere _enunciation_ of the principle, or the
_principle itself_, which requires the illustration, may admit of a
doubt. It seems probable, however that, such illustrations are
nothing more than a recurrence to the original method by which the
knowledge of those principles was acquired. Thus, the repeated trial
or observation of the necessary connection between mathematical
coincidence and equality, first authorizes the general position or
Axiom relative to that subject. If this conjecture is founded in
fact, it follows that both _primary_ and _ultimate_ principles have
the same nature and are alike acquired by the exercise of the
inductive faculty." "Those who acquiesce in the preceding
observations will feel a regret to find _Induction_ classed among
defective or informal Syllogisms. It is in fact prior in its order to
Syllogism; nor can syllogistic reasoning he carried on to any extent
without previous Induction" (p. 184).]

We must presume Syllogisms without a middle term, when we read:--"The
Syllogism through a middle term is _by nature_ prior, and of greater
cognitive efficacy; but _to us_ the Syllogism through Induction is
plainer and clearer."[66] Nor, indeed, is the saying, when literally
taken, at all well-founded; for the pretended Syllogisms from
Induction and Example, far from being clear and plain, are more
involved and difficult to follow than _Barbara_ and _Celarent_. Yet
the substance of Aristotle's thought is true and important, when
considered as declaring the antithesis (not between varieties of
Syllogisms, but) between Induction and Example on the one part, and
Syllogism (Deduction) on the other. It is thus that he sets out the
same antithesis elsewhere, both in the Analytica Posteriora and the
Topica.[67] Prior and more cognizable _by nature_ or _absolutely_,
prior and more cognizable _to us_ or _in relation to us_--these two
are not merely distinct, but the one is the correlate and antithesis
of the other.

[Footnote 66: Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 35: [Greek: phu/sei
me\n ou)=n pro/teros kai\ gnôrimô/teros o( dia\ tou= me/sou
sullogismo/s, ê(mi=n d' e)narge/steros o( dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s.]]

[Footnote 67: Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 2, b. 29; Ethic. Nik.
VI. iii**. p. 1139, b. 28: [Greek: ê( me\n dê\ e)pagôgê\ a)rchê/
e)sti kai\ tou= katho/lou=, o( de\ sullogismo\s e)k tô=n katho/lou.
ei)si\n a)/ra a)rchai\ e)x ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ô(=n ou)k e)/sti
sullogismo/s; e)pagôgê\ a)/ra.] Compare Topica, I. xii. p. 105, a.
11; VI. iv. pp. 141, 142**; Physica, I. i. p. 184, a. 16; Metaphysic.
E. iv. p. 1029, b**. 4-12. Compare also Trendelenburg's explanation
of this doctrine, Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der Aristotelischen
Logik, sects. 18, 19, 20, p. 33, seq.]

_To us_ the particulars of sense stand first, and are the earliest
objects of knowledge. _To us_, means to the large variety of
individual minds, which grow up imperceptibly from the simple
capacities of infancy to the mature accomplishments of adult years;
each acquiring its own stock of sensible impressions, remembered,
compared, associated; and each learning a language, which both
embodies in general terms and propositions the received
classification of objects, and communicates the current emotional
beliefs. We all begin by being learners; and we ascend by different
paths to those universal notions and beliefs which constitute the
common fund of the advanced intellect; developed in some minds into
_principia_ of philosophy with their consequences. _By nature_, or
_absolutely_, these _principia_ are considered as prior, and as
forming the point of departure: the advanced position is regarded as
gained, and the march taken is not that of the novice, but that of
the trained adult, who having already learnt much, is doubly equipped
either for learning more or for teaching others; who thus stands on a
summit from whence he surveys nature as a classified and coherent
whole, manifesting herself in details which he can interpret and
sometimes predict. The path of knowledge, seen _relatively to us_, is
one through particulars, by way of example to fresh particulars, or
by way of induction to universals. The path of knowledge, _by nature_
or _absolutely_, is from universals by way of deduction either to new
universals or to new particulars. By the cognitive _nature_ of man,
Aristotle means the full equipment, of and for cognition, which our
mature age exhibits; _notiora naturâ_ are the acquisitions, points of
view, and processes, familiar in greater or less perfection to such
mature individuals and societies. _Notiora nobis_ are the facts and
processes with which all of us begin, and which belong to the
intellect in its highest as well as its lowest stage; though, in the
higher stages, they are employed, directed, and modified, by an
acquired intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of
universal significant terms in which that capital is invested.

Such is the antithesis between _notiora naturâ_ (or _simpliciter_)
and _notiora nobis_ (or _quoad nos_), which Aristotle recognizes as a
capital point in his philosophy, and insists upon in many of his
writings. The antithesis is represented by Example and Induction, in
the point of view--_quoad nos_--last mentioned; by Syllogism or
Deduction, in the other point of view--_naturâ_. Induction (he
says),[68] or the rising from particulars to universals, is plainer,
more persuasive, more within the cognizance of sensible perception,
more within the apprehension of mankind generally, than Syllogism;
but Syllogism is more cogent and of greater efficacy against
controversial opponents. What he affirms here about Induction is
equally true about the inference from Example, that is, the inference
from one or some particulars, to other analogous particulars; the
rudimentary intellectual process, common to all human and to many
animal minds, of which Induction is an improvement and an exaltation.
While Induction will be more impressive, and will carry assent more
easily with an ordinary uncultivated mind, an acute disputant may
always deny the ultimate inference, for the denial involves no
contradiction. But the rightly constructed Syllogism constrains
assent;[69] the disputant cannot grant the premisses and deny the
conclusion without contradicting himself. The constraining force,
however, does not come into accurate and regulated working until the
principles and conditions of deductive reasoning have been set
forth--until the Syllogism has been analysed, and the characteristics
of its validity, as distinguished from its invalidity, have been
marked out. This is what Aristotle teaches in the Analytica and
Topica. It admits of being set out in regular figure and mode--forms
of premisses with the conclusion appropriate to each; and the lesson
must be learnt before we can know how far the force of deductive
reasoning, which begins with the _notiora naturâ_, is legitimately
binding and trustworthy.

[Footnote 68: Aristot. Topica, I. xii. p. 105, a. 13-19: [Greek:
e)pagôgê\ de\ ê( a)po\ tô=n kath' e(/kaston e)pi\ ta\ katho/lou
e)/phodos; oi(=on ei) e)/sti kubernê/tês o( e)pista/menos kra/tistos
kai\ ê(ni/ochos, kai\ o(/lôs e)sti\n o( e)pista/menos peri\ e(/kaston
a)/ristos. e)/sti d' ê( me\n e)pagôgê\ pithanô/teron kai\
saphe/steron kai\ kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin gnôrimô/teron, _kai\ toi=s
polloi=s koino/n_; o( de\ sullogismo\s biastikô/teron kai\ pro\s
tou\s a)ntilogikou\s e)nerge/steron.] Also the same treatise. VI. iv.
p. 141, b. 17.

The inductive interrogations of Sokrates relating to matters of
common life, and the way in which they convinced ordinary hearers,
are strikingly illustrated in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, especially
IV. vi.: [Greek: polu\ ma/lista ô(=n e)gô\ oi)=da, o(/te le/goi,
tou\s a)kou/ontas o(mologou=ntas parei=chen] (15). The same can
hardly be said of the Platonic dialogues.]

[Footnote 69: Bacon, Novum Organ. I. Aphor. 13:--"Syllogismus
assensum constringit, non res."]

Both the two main points of Aristotle's doctrine--the antithesis
between Induction and Deduction, and the dependence of the latter
process upon premisses furnished by the former, so that the two
together form the two halves of complete ratiocination and
authoritative proof--both these two are confused and darkened by his
attempt to present the Inductive inference and the Analogical or
Paradeigmatic inference as two special forms of Syllogistic
deduction.[70] But when we put aside this attempt, and adhere to
Aristotle's main doctrine--of Induction as a process antithetical to
and separate from Deduction, yet as an essential preliminary
thereto,--we see that it forms the basis of that complete and
comprehensive System of Logic, recently elaborated in the work of Mr.
John Stuart Mill. The inference from Example (_i.e._ from some
particulars to other similar particulars) is distinguished by
Aristotle from Induction, and is recognized by him as the primitive
intellectual energy, common to all men, through which Induction is
reached; its results he calls Experience ([Greek: e)mpeiri/a]), and
he describes it as the real guide, more essential than philosophical
generalities, to exactness of performance in detail.[71] Mr. John
Mill has been the first to assign to Experience, thus understood, its
full value and true position in the theory of Ratiocination; and to
show that the Paradeigmatic process exhibits the prime and ultimate
reality of all Inference, the real premisses and the real conclusion
which Inference connects together. Between these two is interposed
the double process of which Induction forms the first half and
Deduction the second; neither the one nor the other being
indispensable to Inference, but both of them being required as
securities for Scientific inference, if we desire to have its
correctness tested and its sufficiency certified; the real evidence,
whereby the conclusion of a Syllogism is proved, being the minor
premiss, together with (not the major premiss itself, but) the
assemblage of particular facts from which by Induction the major
premiss is drawn. Now Aristotle had present to his mind the
conception of Inference as an entire process, enabling us from some
particular truths to discover and prove other particular truths: he
considers it as an unscientific process, of which to a limited extent
other animals besides man are capable, and which, as operative under
the title of Experience in mature practical men, is a safer guide
than Science amidst the doubts and difficulties of action. Upon this
foundation he erects the superstructure of Science; the universal
propositions acquired through Induction, and applied again to
particulars or to lower generalities, through the rules of the
deductive Syllogism. He signalizes, with just emphasis, the
universalizing point of view called Science or Theory; but he regards
it as emerging from particular facts, and as travelling again
downwards towards particular facts. The misfortune is, that he
contents himself with barely recognizing, though he distinctly
proclaims the necessity of, the inductive part of this complex
operation; while he bestows elaborate care upon the analysis of the
deductive part, and of the rules for conducting it. From this
disproportionate treatment, one half of Logic is made to look like
the whole; Science is disjoined from Experience, and is presented as
consisting in Deduction alone; every thing which is not Deduction, is
degraded into unscientific Experience; the major premiss of the
Syllogism being considered as part of the proof of the conclusion,
and the conclusion being necessarily connected therewith, we appear
to have acquired a _locus standi_ and a binding cogency such as
Experience could never supply; lastly, when Aristotle resolves
Induction into a peculiar variety of the Syllogism, he appears
finally to abolish all its separate dignity and jurisdiction. This
one-sided view of Logic has been embraced and perpetuated by the
Aristotelian expositors, who have carefully illustrated, and to a
certain extent even amplified, the part which was already in
comparative excess, while they have added nothing to the part that
was in defect, and have scarcely even preserved Aristotle's
recognition of it as being not merely legitimate but essential. The
vast body of Inductive Science, accumulated during the last three
centuries, has thus, until recently, been allowed to grow up, as if
its proofs and processes had nothing to do with Logic.

[Footnote 70: Heyder (in his learned treatise, Darstellung der
Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, p. 226), after having
considered the unsatisfactory process whereby Aristotle attempts to
resolve Induction into a variety of Syllogism, concludes by a remark
which I think just:--"Aus alle dem erhellt zur Genüge, dass sich
Aristoteles bei dem Versuch die Induction auf eine Schlussform
zurückzuführen, selbst sich nicht recht befriedigt fühlte, und
derselbe wohl nur aus seinem durchgängigen Bestreben zu erklären ist,
alles wissenschaftliche Verfahren in die Form des Schlusses zu
bringen; dass dagegen, seiner eigentlichen Meinung und der strengen
Consequenz seiner Lehre zu Folge, die Induction zum syllogistischen
und beweisenden Verfahren einen in dem Begriff der beiden
Verfahrungsweisen liegenden Gegensatz bildete, was sich ihm dann auch
auf das Verhältniss der Induction zur Begriffsbestimmung ausdehnen
musste."]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Analyt. Prior. II. xxiii. p. 68, b. 12; xxvi.
p. 69, a. 17. Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30, seq**.; xiii. p.
97, b. 7. Topica, VIII. i. p. 155, b. 35; p. 156, b. 10; p. 157, a.
14-23; p. 160, a. 36. Metaphys. A. i. p. 980, b. 25-p. 981, a. 30.
This first chapter of the Metaphysica is one of the most remarkable
passages of Aristotle, respecting the analytical philosophy of mind.]

But though this restricted conception of Logic or the theory of
Reasoning has arisen naturally from Aristotle's treatment, I maintain
that it does not adequately represent his view of that theory. In his
numerous treatises on other subjects, scarcely any allusion is made
to the Syllogism; nor is appeal made to the rules for it laid down in
the Analytica. His conviction that the formalities of Deduction were
only one part of the process of general reasoning, and that the value
of the final conclusion depended not merely upon their being
correctly performed, but also upon the correctness of that initial
part whereby they are supplied with matter for premisses--is
manifested as well by his industry (unrivalled among his
contemporaries) in collecting multifarious facts, as by his specific
declarations respecting Induction. Indeed, a recent most erudite
logician, Sir William Hamilton, who insists upon the construction of
Logic in its strictest sense as purely formal, blames Aristotle[72]
for having transgressed this boundary, and for introducing other
considerations bearing on diversities of matter and of material
evidence. The charge so made, to whatever extent it is well-founded,
does rather partake of the nature of praise; inasmuch as it evinces
Aristotle's larger views of the theory of Inference, and confirms his
own statement that the Deductive process was only the last half of
it, presupposing a prior Induction. It is only this last half that
Aristotle has here analysed, setting forth its formal conditions with
precepts founded thereupon; while he claims to have accomplished the
work by long and patient investigation, having found not the smallest
foundation laid by others, and bespeaks indulgence[73] as for a first
attempt requiring to be brought to completion by others. He made this
first step for himself; and if any one would make a second step, so
as to apply the same analysis to the other half, and to bring out in
like manner the formal conditions and principles of Induction, we may
fairly believe that Aristotle would have welcomed the act, as filling
up what he himself recognized to be a gap in the entire compass of
Reasoning. As to his own achievement, it is certain that he could not
have composed the Analytica and Topica, if he had not had before him
many specimens of the deductive process to study and compare. Neither
could the inductive process have been analysed, until after the
examples of successful advance in inductive science which recent
years have furnished. Upon these examples, mainly, has been based the
profound System of Mr. John Stuart Mill, analysing and discriminating
the formalities of Induction in the same way as those of Deduction
had before been handled by Aristotle; also fusing the two together as
co-operative towards one comprehensive scheme of Logic--the Logic of
Evidence generally, or of Truth as discoverable and proveable. In
this scheme the Syllogistic Theory, or Logic of Consistency between
one proposition and others, is recognized as an essential part, but
is no longer tolerated as an independent whole.[74]

[Footnote 72: See his Discussions on Philosophy, p. 139, seq.;
Lectures on Logic, vol. i. p. 27.]

[Footnote 73: See the remarkable paragraph at the close of the
Sophistici Elenchi, already quoted (supra, p. 140, note).]

[Footnote 74: Mr. John Stuart Mill says (Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 3):
**"Induction is inferring a proposition from premisses _less general_
than itself, and Ratiocination is inferring a proposition from
premisses _equally or more general_." Again in another passage: "We
have found that all Inference, consequently all Proof, and all
discovery of truths not self-evident, consists of inductions, and the
interpretation of inductions; that all our knowledge, not intuitive,
comes to us exclusively from that source. What Induction is,
therefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, cannot but be
deemed the main question of logic--the question which includes all
others. It is however one which professed writers on logic have
almost entirely passed over. The generalities of the subject, indeed,
have not been altogether neglected by metaphysicians; but, for want
of sufficient acquaintance with the processes by which science has
actually succeeded in establishing general truths, their analysis of
the inductive operation, even when unexceptionable as to correctness,
has not been specific enough to be made the foundation of practical
rules, which might be for Induction itself what the rules of the
Syllogism are for interpretation of Induction" (Bk. III. ch. i. s. 1.
p. 313.)--"The business of Inductive Logic is to provide rules and
models (such as the Syllogism and its rules are for ratiocination) to
which if inductive arguments conform, those arguments are conclusive,
and not otherwise. This is what the Four Methods profess to be, and
what I believe they are universally considered to be by experimental
philosophers, who had practised all of them long before any one
sought to reduce the practice to theory" (Bk. III. ch. ix. s. 5, p.
471, 5th ed.)--See also the same point of view more copiously set
forth, in Mr. Mill's later work, 'Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's
Philosophy' (ch. xx. pp. 454-462, 3rd ed.): "It is only as a means to
material truth that the formal (or to speak more clearly, the
conditional) validity of an operation of thought is of any value; and
even that value is only negative: we have not made the smallest
positive advance towards right thinking, by merely keeping ourselves
consistent in what is perhaps systematic error. This by no means
implies that Formal Logic, even in its narrowest sense, is not of
very great, though purely negative value."--"Not only however is it
indispensable that the larger Logic, which embraces all the general
conditions of the ascertainment of truth, should be studied in
addition to the smaller Logic, which only concerns itself with the
conditions of consistency; but the smaller Logic ought to be (at
least, finally) studied as part of the greater--as a portion of the
means to the same end; and its relation to the other parts--to the
other means--should be distinctly displayed."]

After adverting to another variety of ratiocinative procedure, which
he calls _Apagoge_ or Abduction (where the minor is hardly more
evident than the conclusion, and might sometimes conveniently become
a conclusion first to be proved),[75] Aristotle goes on to treat of
Objection generally--the function of the dialectical respondent. The
_Enstasis_ or Objection is a proposition opposed not to a conclusion,
but to the proposition set up by the defendant. When the proposition
set up by him is universal, as it must be if he seeks to establish an
universal conclusion, your objection may be either universal or
particular: you may deny either the whole of his proposition, or only
one portion of the particulars contained under it; the denial of one
single particular, when substantiated, being enough to overthrow his
universal. Accordingly, your objection, being thus variously opposed
to the proposition, will lie in the syllogistic figures which admit
opposite conclusions; that is, either in the First or Third; for the
Second figure admits only negative conclusions not opposed to each
other. If the defendant has set up an Universal Affirmative, you may
deny the whole and establish a contrary negative, in the First
figure; or you may deny a part only, and establish a contradictory
negative, in the Third figure. The like, if he has set up an
Universal Negative: you may impugn it either by an universal contrary
affirmative, in the First figure; or by a particular contradictory
affirmative, in the Third figure.[76]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Prior. II. xxv. p. 69, a. 20-36.]

[Footnote 76: Ibid. II. xxvi. p. 69, a. 37-b. 37.

In objecting to A _universally_, you take a term comprehending the
original subject; in objecting _particularly_, a term comprehended by
it. Of the new term in each case you deny the original predicate, and
have thus, as a major premiss, E. For a minor premiss, you affirm, in
the first case, the new term as predicate of the original subject
(less comprehensive); in the second case, the original subject (more
comprehensive) as predicate of the new term. This gives you, in the
first case, a conclusion in _Celarent_ (Fig. I.), and, in the second,
a conclusion in _Felapton_ (Fig. III.); opposed, the one universally
or contrarily, the other particularly or contradictorily, to the
original proposition.]

The Enthymeme is a syllogism from Probabilities or Signs;[77] the two
being not exactly the same. _Probabilities_ are propositions commonly
accepted, and true in the greater number of cases; such as, Envious
men hate those whom they envy, Persons who are beloved look with
affection on those who love them. We call it a _Sign_, when one fact
is the antecedent or consequent of another, and therefore serves as
mark or evidence thereof. The conjunction may be either constant, or
frequent, or merely occasional: if constant, we obtain for the major
premiss of our syllogism a proposition approaching that which is
universally or necessarily true; if not constant but only frequent or
occasional, the major premiss of our syllogism will at best only be
probable. The constant conjunction will furnish us with a Syllogism
or Enthymeme in the First figure; the significant mark being here a
genuine middle term--subject in the major premiss, and predicate in
the minor. We can then get a conclusion both affirmative and
universally true. In other cases, we cannot obtain premisses for a
syllogism in the First figure, but only for a syllogism in the Second
or Third. In the Third figure, since we get by right no universal
conclusions at all, but only particular conclusions, the conclusion
of the Enthymeme, though it may happen to be true, is open to
refutation. Where by the laws of Syllogism no affirmative conclusion
whatever is possible, as in the Second figure, the conclusion
obtained by Enthymeme is altogether suspicious. In contrast with the
Sign in these figures, that which enters as an effective middle term
into the First figure, should be distinguished under the name of
_Proof_ ([Greek: tekmê/rion].)[78]

[Footnote 77: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 10: [Greek: e)nthu/mêma me\n
ou)=n e)sti\ sullogismo\s e)x ei)ko/tôn ê)\ sêmei/ôn; lamba/netai de\
to\ sêmei=on trichô=s, o(sachô=s kai\ to\ me/son e)n toi=s
schê/masi.]]

[Footnote 78: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 31-b. 6.

Aristotle throws in the remark (a. 24), that, when one premiss only
of the Enthymeme is enunciated, it is a Sign; when the other is
added, it becomes a Syllogism. In the examples given to illustrate
the description of the Enthymeme, that which belongs to the First
figure has its three terms and two propositions specified like a
complete and regular Syllogism; but when we come to the Third and
Second figures, Aristotle gives two alternate ways of stating each:
one way in full, with both premisses enunciated, constituting a
normal, though invalid, Syllogism; the other way, with only one of
the premisses enunciated, the other being suppressed as well-known
and familiar.

Among logicians posterior to Aristotle, the definition given of the
Enthymeme, and supposed to be derived from Aristotle was, that it was
a Syllogism with one of the premisses suppressed--[Greek:
monolê/mmatos]. Sir W. Hamilton has impugned this doctrine, and has
declared the definition to be both absurd in itself, and not
countenanced by Aristotle. (Lectures on Logic, Vol. I. Lect. xx. p.
386, seq.) I think Hamilton is mistaken on this point. (See Mr.
Cope's Introd. to Arist. Rhetoric, p. 103, seq.) Even in the present
chapter Aristotle distinctly alludes to the monolemmatic enunciation
of the Enthymeme as one mode of distinguishing it from a full
Syllogism; and in the Rhetorica he brings out this characteristic
still more forcibly. The distinction is one which belongs to Rhetoric
more than to Logic; the rhetor, in enunciating his premisses, must be
careful not to weary his auditors; he must glance at or omit reasons
that are familiar to them; logical fulness and accuracy would be
inconsistent with his purpose. The writers subsequent to Aristotle,
who think much of the rhetorical and little of the logical point of
view, bring out the distinction yet more forcibly. But the rhetorical
mode of stating premisses is often not so much an omission either of
major or minor, as a confused blending or packing up of both into
one.]

Aristotle concludes his Analytica Priora by applying this doctrine of
Signs to determine the limits within which Physiognomy as a science
is practicable. The basis upon which it rests is this general fact or
postulate: That in all natural affections of the animal, bodily
changes and mental changes accompany each other. The former,
therefore, may become signs or proofs of the latter,[79] if, in each
class of animals, we can discriminate the one specific bodily
phenomenon which attaches to each mental phenomenon. Thus, the lion
is a courageous animal. What is the bodily sign accompanying a
courageous disposition? It is (we assume here) the having extremities
of great size. This belongs to all lions, as a _proprium_; in the
sense that, though it may or does belong also to some individuals of
other races (as men), it does not belong to any other entire race.
Physiognomy as a science will, then, be possible, if we can find
races of animals which have only one characteristic mental attribute,
and if we can discover what is the physical attribute correlating
with it.[80] But the difficulties are greater when the same race has
two characteristic mental attributes (_e.g._ lions are both
courageous and generous), each with its correlative physical
attribute; for how can we tell which belongs to which? We have then
to study individuals of other races possessing one of these
attributes without the other; thus, if we find that courageous men,
who are not generous, agree in having large extremities, we may infer
that this last circumstance is, in the lion, the correlative mark of
his courage and not of his generosity. The physiognomonic inference
will be expressed by a syllogism in the First figure, in which the
major term (A) reciprocates and is convertible with the middle term
(B), while B stretches beyond (or is more extensive than) the minor
(C); this relation of the terms being necessary, if there is to be a
single mark for a particular attribute.[81]

[Footnote 79: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 7-16: [Greek: ei)/
tis di/dôsin a(/ma metaba/llein to\ sô=ma kai\ tê\n psuchê/n, o(/sa
phusika/ e)sti pathê/mata;--sumpa/schein ga\r a)llê/lois
u(pokei=tai.] See the Aristotelian treatise entitled [Greek:
Phusiognômonika/], pp. 808-809, Bekk.]

[Footnote 80: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 22. About the
characteristics of the lion see Aristot. Physiognom. p. 809, b.
14-36: [Greek: ta\ peri\ tê\n psuchê\n dotiko\n kai\ e)leu/theron,
megalo/psuchon kai\ philo/nikon, kai\ prau+\ kai\ di/kaion kai\
philo/storgon pro\s a(\ a)\n o(milê/sê|.]]

[Footnote 81: Ibid. II. xxvii. p. 70, b. 31-36.]

Here the treatise ends; but the reader will remember that, in
describing the canons laid down by Aristotle for the Syllogism with
its three Figures and the Modes contained therein, I confined myself
to the simple Assertory syllogism, postponing for the moment the long
expositions added by him about Modal syllogisms, involving the
Possible and the Necessary. What is proper to be said about this
complicated and useless portion of the Analytica Priora, may well
come in here; for, in truth, the doctrines just laid down about
Probabilities, Signs, and Proofs, bring us back to the Modals under a
different set of phrases. The Possible or Problematical is that, of
the occurrence or reality of which we doubt, neither believing nor
disbelieving it, not being prepared to assert either that it is, or
that it is not; _that which may be or may not be_. It is our manner
of speaking, when we have only signs or probabilities to guide us,
and not certain proofs. The feeling of doubt is, as a psychological
phenomenon, essentially distinct from the feeling of belief which, in
its objective aspect, correlates with certainty or matter of fact; as
well as from the feeling of disbelief, the correlate of which can
only be described negatively. Every man knows these feelings by his
own mental experience. But in describing the feeling of doubt, as to
its matter or in its objective aspect, we must take care to use
phrases which declare plainly both sides of its disjunctive or
alternative character. The Possible is, _That which either may be or
may not be_. As _That which may be_, it stands opposed to the
Impossible; as _That which may not be_, it stands opposed to the
Necessary. It thus carries with it negation both of impossibility and
of necessity; but, in common parlance, the first half of this meaning
stands out prominently, and is mistaken for the whole. Aristotle, as
we saw previously, speaks equivocally on this point, recognizing a
double signification of the term: he sometimes uses it in the sense
opposed only to impossible, maintaining that what is necessary must
also be possible; sometimes in the truer sense, opposed both to
necessity and to impossibility.[82]

[Footnote 82: Aristot. De Interpret. xiii. p. 22. Analyt. Prior. I.
xiii. p. 32, a. 21, 29, 36, xiv. p. 33, b. 22; xix. p. 38, a. 35.]

The Possible or Problematical, however, in this latter complete
sense--_What may or may not be_--exhibits various modifications or
gradations. 1. The chances on either side may be conceived as
perfectly equal, so that there is no probability, and we have no more
reason for expecting one side of the alternative than the other; the
sequence or conjunction is indeterminate. Aristotle construes this
indeterminateness in many cases (not as _subjective_, or as depending
upon our want of complete knowledge and calculating power, but) as
_objective_, insuperable, and inherent in many phenomenal agencies;
characterizing it, under the names of Spontaneity and Chance, as the
essentially unpredictable. 2. The chances on both sides may be
conceived as unequal and the ratio between them as varying
infinitely: the usual and ordinary tendency of phenomena--what
Aristotle calls Nature--prevails in the majority of cases, but not in
all; being liable to occasional counteraction from Chance and other
forces. Thus, between Necessity and perfect constancy at one extreme
(such as the rotation of the sidereal sphere), and Chance at the
other, there may be every shade of gradation; from natural agency
next below the constant, down to the lowest degree of
probability.[83]

[Footnote 83: Analyt. Prior. I. xiii. p. 32, b. 5-19. [Greek: to\ d'
a)o/riston tô=| mêde\n ma=llon ou(/tôs ê)\ e)kei/nôs]. Compare
Metaphys. K. p. 1064, b. 32.]

Now, within the range of these limits lie what Aristotle describes as
Signs and Probabilities; in fact, all the marks which we shall
presently come to as distinguishing the _dialectical_ syllogism from
the _demonstrative_. But here is involved rather the matter of the
Syllogism than its form. The form indeed is so far implicated, that
(as Aristotle justly remarks at the end of the Analytica Priora[84]),
the First figure is the only one that will prove both conjunctions
and disjunctions, as well constant as occasional; the Third figure
proves only occasional conjunctions and occasional disjunctions, not
constant; the Second figure will prove no conjunctions at all, but
only disjunctions, constant as well as occasional. Here a difference
of form is properly pointed out as coupled with and founded on a
difference of matter. But the special rules given by Aristotle, early
in the present treatise, for the conversion of Modal Propositions,
and the distinctions that he draws as to the modal character of the
conclusion according as one or other of the premisses belongs to one
or other of the different modes,--are both prolix and of little
practical value.[85]

[Footnote 84: Analyt. Prior. II. xxvii. p. 70, a. 2-38. Compare what
is said here about [Greek: ei)ko/s, sêmei=on, tekmê/rion], with the
first chapter of the Topica, and the dialectic syllogism as there
described: [Greek: o( e)x e)ndo/xôn sullogizo/menos].]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. I. viii.-xxii. p. 29, b. 29-p. 40, b. 16.]

What he calls the Necessary might indeed, from the point of view now
reached, cease to be recognized as a separate mode at all. The
Certain and the Problematical are real modes of the Proposition;
objective correlates to the subjective phases called Belief and
Doubt. But no proposition can be more than certain: the word
_necessary_, in strictness, implies only a peculiarity of the
evidence on which our belief is grounded. Granting certain given
premisses to be true, a given conclusion must be true also, if we
would avoid inconsistency and contradiction.



CHAPTER VII.

ANALYTICA POSTERIORA I.

In the two books of Analytica Priora, Aristotle has carried us
through the full doctrine of the functions and varieties of the
Syllogism; with an intimation that it might be applied to two
purposes--Demonstration and Dialectic. We are now introduced to these
two distinct applications of the Syllogism: first, in the Analytica
Posteriora, to Demonstration; next, in the Topica, to Dialectic. We
are indeed distinctly told that, as far as the forms and rules of
Syllogism go, these are alike applicable to both;[1] but the
difference of matter and purpose in the two cases is so considerable
as to require a distinct theory and precepts for the one and for the
other.

[Footnote 1: Analyt. Prior. I. xxx. p. 46, a. 4-10; Analyt. Post. I.
ii. p. 71, a. 23.]

The contrast between Dialectic (along with Rhetoric) on the one hand
and Science on the other is one deeply present to the mind of
Aristotle. He seems to have proceeded upon the same fundamental
antithesis as that which appears in the Platonic dialogues; but to
have modified it both in meaning and in terminology, dismissing at
the same time various hypotheses with which Plato had connected it.

The antithesis that both thinkers have in view is Opinion or Common
Sense _versus_ Science or Special Teaching and Learning; those
aptitudes, acquirements, sentiments, antipathies, &c., which a man
imbibes and appropriates insensibly, partly by his own doing and
suffering, partly by living amidst the drill and example of a given
society--as distinguished from those accomplishments which he derives
from a teacher already known to possess them, and in which both the
time of his apprenticeship and the steps of his progress are alike
assignable.

Common Sense is the region of Opinion, in which there is diversity of
authorities and contradiction of arguments without any settled truth;
all affirmations being particular and relative, true at one time and
place, false at another. Science, on the contrary, deals with
imperishable Forms and universal truths, which Plato regards, in
their subjective aspect, as the innate, though buried, furniture of
the soul, inherited from an external pre-existence, and revived in it
out of the misleading data of sense by a process first of the
cross-examining _Elenchus_, next of scientific Demonstration. Plato
depreciates altogether the untaught, unexamined, stock of
acquirements which passes under the name of Common Sense, as a mere
worthless semblance of knowledge without reality; as requiring to be
broken up by the scrutinizing _Elenchus_, in order to impress a
painful but healthy consciousness of ignorance, and to prepare the
mind for that process of teaching whereby alone Science or Cognition
can be imparted.[2] He admits that Opinion may be right as well as
wrong. Yet even when right, it is essentially different from Science,
and is essentially transitory; a safe guide to action while it lasts,
but not to be trusted for stability or permanence.[3] By Plato,
Rhetoric is treated as belonging to the province of Opinion,
Dialectic to that of Science. The rhetor addresses multitudes in
continuous speech, appeals to received common places, and persuades:
the dialectician, conversing only with one or a few, receives and
imparts the stimulus of short question and answer; thus awakening the
dormant capacities of the soul to the reminiscence of those universal
Forms or Ideas which are the only true Knowable.

[Footnote 2: Plato, Sophistes, pp. 228-229; Symposion, pp. 203-204;
Theætetus, pp. 148, 149, 150. Compare also 'Plato and the Other
Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. I. chs. vi.-vii. pp. 245-288; II. ch.
xxvi. p. 376, seq.]

[Footnote 3: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 477-478; Menon, pp. 97-98.]

Like Plato, Aristotle distinguishes the region of Common Sense or
Opinion from that of Science, and regards Universals as the objects
of Science. But his Universals are very different from those of
Plato: they are not self-existent realities, known by the mind from a
long period of pre-existence, and called up by reminiscence out of
the chaos of sensible impressions. To operate such revival is the
great function that Plato assigns to Dialectic. But in the philosophy
of Aristotle Dialectic is something very different. It is placed
alongside of Rhetoric in the region of Opinion. Both the rhetor and
the dialectician deal with all subjects, recognizing no limit; they
attack or defend any or all conclusions, employing the process of
ratiocination which Aristotle has treated under the name of
Syllogism; they take up as premisses any one of the various opinions
in circulation, for which some plausible authority may be cited; they
follow out the consequences of one opinion in its bearing upon
others, favourable or unfavourable, and thus become well furnished
with arguments for and against all. The ultimate foundation here
supposed is some sort of recognized presumption or authoritative
sanction[4]--law, custom, or creed, established among this or that
portion of mankind, some maxim enunciated by an eminent poet, some
doctrine of the Pythagoreans or other philosophers, current proverb,
answer from the Delphian oracle, &c. Any one of these may serve as a
dialectical authority. But these authorities, far from being
harmonious with each other, are recognized as independent,
discordant, and often contradictory. Though not all of equal
value,[5] each is sufficient to warrant the setting up of a thesis
for debate. In Dialectic, one of the disputants undertakes to do
this, and to answer all questions that may be put to him respecting
the thesis, without implicating himself in inconsistencies or
contradiction. The questioner or assailant, on the other hand, shapes
his questions with a view to refute the thesis, by eliciting answers
which may furnish him with premisses for some syllogism in
contradiction thereof. But he is tied down by the laws of debate to
syllogize only from such premisses as the respondent has expressly
granted; and to put questions in such manner that the respondent is
required only to give or withhold assent, according as he thinks
right.

[Footnote 4: Aristot. Topica, I. x. p. 104, a. 8, xi. p. 104, b. 19.
Compare Metaphysica, A. p. 995, a. 1-10.]

[Footnote 5: Analyt. Post. I. xix. p. 81, b. 18: [Greek: kata\ me\n
ou)=n do/xan sullogizome/nois kai\ mo/non dialektikô=s dê=lon o(/ti
tou=to mo/non skepte/on, ei) e)x ô(=n e)nde/chetai e)ndoxota/tôn
gi/netai o( sullogismo/s, ô(/st' ei) kai\ e)/sti ti tê=| a)lêthei/a|
tô=n AB me/son, dokei= de\ mê/, o( dia\ tou/tou sullogizo/menos
sullelo/gistai dialektikô=s, pro\s d' a)lê/theian e)k tô=n
u(parcho/ntôn dei= skopei=n.] Compare Topica, VIII. xii. p. 162, b.
27.]

We shall see more fully how Aristotle deals with Dialectic, when we
come to the Topica: here I put it forward briefly, in order that the
reader may better understand, by contrast, its extreme antithesis,
viz., Demonstrative Science and Necessary Truth as conceived by
Aristotle. First, instead of two debaters, one of whom sets up a
thesis which he professes to understand and undertakes to maintain,
while the other puts questions upon it,--Demonstrative Science
assumes a teacher who knows, and a learner conscious of ignorance but
wishing to know. The teacher lays down premisses which the learner is
bound to receive; or if they are put in the form of questions, the
learner must answer them as the teacher expects, not according to his
own knowledge. Secondly, instead of the unbounded miscellany of
subjects treated in Dialectic, Demonstrative Science is confined to a
few special subjects, in which alone appropriate premisses can be
obtained, and definitions framed. Thirdly, instead of the several
heterogeneous authorities recognized in Dialectic, Demonstrative
Science has _principia_ of its own, serving as points of departure;
some _principia_ common to all its varieties, others special or
confined to one alone. Fourthly, there is no conflict of authorities
in Demonstrative Science; its propositions are essential, universal,
and true _per se_, from the commencement to the conclusion; while
Dialectic takes in accidental premisses as well as essential.
Fifthly, the _principia_ of Demonstrative Science are obtained from
Induction only; originating in particulars which are all that the
ordinary growing mind can at first apprehend (_notiora nobis_), but
culminating in universals which correspond to the perfection of our
cognitive comprehension (_notiora naturâ_.)[6]

[Footnote 6: Aristot. Topica, VI. iv. p. 141, b. 3-14. [Greek: oi(
polloi\ ga\r ta\ toiau=ta prognôri/zousin; ta\ me\n ga\r tê=s
tuchou/sês, ta\ d' a)kribou=s kai\ perittê=s dianoi/as katamathei=n
e)sti/n.] Compare in Analyt. Post. I. xii. pp. 77-78, the contrast
between [Greek: ta\ mathê/mata] and [Greek: oi( dia/logoi].]

Amidst all these diversities, Dialectic and Demonstrative Science
have in common the process of Syllogism, including such assumptions
as the rules of syllogizing postulate. In both, the conclusions are
hypothetically true (_i.e._ granting the premisses to be so). But, in
demonstrative syllogism, the conclusions are true universally,
absolutely, and necessarily; deriving this character from their
premisses, which Aristotle holds up as the cause, reason, or
condition of the conclusion. What he means by Demonstrative Science,
we may best conceive, by taking it as a small [Greek: te/menos] or
specially cultivated enclosure, subdivided into still smaller
separate compartments--the extreme antithesis to the vast common land
of Dialectic. Between the two lies a large region, neither
essentially determinate like the one, nor essentially indeterminate
like the other; an intermediate region in which are comprehended the
subjects of the treatises forming the very miscellaneous Encyclopædia
of Aristotle. These subjects do not admit of being handled with equal
exactness; accordingly, he admonishes us that it is important to know
how much exactness is attainable in each, and not to aspire to
more.[7]

[Footnote 7: Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. I. p. 1094, b. 12-25; p. 1098, a.
26-b. 8; Metaphys. A. p. 995, a. 15; Ethic. Eudem. I. p. 1216, b.
30-p. 1217, a. 17; Politic. VII. p. 1328, a. 19; Meteorolog. I. p. 338,
a. 35. Compare Analyt. Post. I. xiii. p. 78, b. 32 (with Waitz's
note, II. p. 335); and I. xxvii. p. 87, a. 31.

The passages above named in the Nikomachean Ethica are remarkable:
[Greek: le/goito d' a)\n i(kanô=s, ei) kata\ tê\n u(pokeime/nên
u(/lên diasaphêthei/ê; to\ ga\r a)kribe\s ou)ch o(moi/ôs e)n a(/pasi
toi=s lo/gois e)pizêtête/on, ô(/sper ou)d' e)n toi=s
dêmiourgoume/nois. tê\n a)kri/beian mê\ o(moi/ôs e)n a(/pasin
e)pizêtei=n (chrê/), a)ll' e)n e(ka/stois kata\ tê\n u(pokeime/nên
u(/lên, kai\ e)pi\ tosou=ton e)ph' o(/son oi)kei=on tê=| methodô=|.]
Compare Metaphys. E. p. 1025, b. 13: [Greek: a)podeiknu/ousin ê)\
a)nagkai/oteron ê)\ malakô/teron.]

The different degrees of exactness attainable in different
departments of science, and the reasons upon which such difference
depends are well explained in the sixth book of Mr. John Stuart
Mill's System of Logic, vol. II. chap. iii. pp. 422-425, 5th ed.
Aristotle says that there can be no scientific theory or cognition
about [Greek: to\ sumbebêko/s] which he defines to be that which
belongs to a subject neither necessarily, nor constantly, nor
usually, but only on occasion (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 3, 26, 33; K.
p. 1065, a. 1, meaning [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s mê\ kath'
au(to/],--Analyt. Post. I. 6, 75, a. 18; for he uses the term in two
different senses--Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 31). In his view,
there can be no science except about constant conjunctions; and we
find the same doctrine in the following passage of Mr. Mill:--"Any
facts are fitted, in themselves, to be a subject of science, which
follow one another according to constant laws; although those laws
may not have been discovered, nor even be discoverable by our
existing resources. Take, for instance, the most familiar class of
meteorological phenomena, those of rain and sunshine. Scientific
inquiry has not yet succeeded in ascertaining the order of antecedence
and consequence among these phenomena, so as to be able, at least in
our regions of the earth, to predict them with certainty, or even with
any high degree of probability. Yet no one doubts that the phenomena
depend on laws. . . . . Meteorology not only has in itself every
requisite for being, but actually is, a science; though from the
difficulty of observing the facts upon which the phenomena depend (a
difficulty inherent in the peculiar nature of those phenomena), the
science is extremely imperfect; and were it perfect, might probably be
of little avail in practice, since the data requisite for applying its
principles to particular instances would rarely be procurable.

"A case may be conceived of an intermediate character between the
perfection of science, and this its extreme imperfection. It may
happen that the greater causes, those on which the principal part of
the phenomena depends, are within the reach of observation and
measurement; so that, if no other causes intervened, a complete
explanation could be given, not only of the phenomenon in general,
but of all the variations and modifications which it admits of. But
inasmuch as other, perhaps many other, causes, separately
insignificant in their effects, co-operate or conflict in many or in
all cases with those greater causes, the effect, accordingly,
presents more or less of aberration from what would be produced by
the greater causes alone. Now if these minor causes are not so
constantly accessible, or not accessible at all, to accurate
observation, the principal mass of the effect may still, as before,
be accounted for, and even predicted; but there will be variations
and modifications which we shall not be competent to explain
thoroughly, and our predictions will not be fulfilled accurately, but
only approximately.

"It is thus, for example, with the theory of the Tides. . . . . And
this is what is or ought to be meant by those who speak of sciences
which are not exact sciences. Astronomy was once a science, without
being an exact science. It could not become exact until not only the
general course of the planetary motions, but the perturbations also,
were accounted for and referred to their causes. It has become an
exact science because its phenomena have been brought under laws
comprehending the whole of the causes by which the phenomena are
influenced, whether in a great or only in a trifling degree, whether
in all or only in some cases, and assigning to each of those causes
the share of effect that really belongs to it. . . . . The science of
human nature falls far short of the standard of exactness now
realized in Astronomy; but there is no reason that it should not be
as much a science as Tidology is, or as Astronomy was when its
calculations had only mastered the main phenomena, but not the
perturbations."]

In setting out the process of Demonstration, Aristotle begins from
the idea of teaching and learning. In every variety thereof some
_præcognita_ must be assumed, which the learner must know before he
comes to be taught, and upon which the teacher must found his
instruction.[8] This is equally true, whether we proceed (as in
Syllogism) from the more general to the less general, or (as in
Induction) from the particular to the general. He who comes to learn
Geometry must know beforehand the figures called circle and triangle,
and must have a triangular figure drawn to contemplate; he must know
what is a unit or monad, and must have, besides, exposed before him
what is chosen as the unit for the reasoning on which he is about to
enter. These are the _præcognita_ required for Geometry and
Arithmetic. Some _præcognita_ are also required preparatory to any
and all reasoning: _e.g._, the maxim of Identity (fixed meaning of
terms and propositions), and the maxims of Contradiction and of
Excluded Middle (impossibility that a proposition and its
contradictory can either be both true or both false.)[9] The learner
must thus know beforehand certain Definitions and Axioms, as
conditions without which the teacher cannot instruct him in any
demonstrative science.

[Footnote 8: Analyt. Post. I. i. pp. 71-72; Metaphys. A. IX. p. 992,
b. 30.]

[Footnote 9: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I, i. p. 71, a. 11-17. [Greek:
a(/pan ê)\ phê=sai ê)\ a)pophê=sai a)lêthe/s].]

Aristotle, here at the beginning, seeks to clear up a difficulty
which had been raised in the time of Plato as between knowledge and
learning. How is it possible to _learn_ at all? is a question started
in the Menon.[10] You either know a thing already, and, on this
supposition, you do not want to learn it; or you do not know it, and
in this case you cannot learn it, because, even when you have learnt,
you cannot tell whether the matter learnt is what you were in search
of. To this difficulty, the reply made in the Menon is, that you
never _do_ learn any thing really new. What you are said to learn, is
nothing more than reminiscence of what had once been known in an
anterior life, and forgotten at birth into the present life; what is
supposed to be learnt is only the recall of that which you once knew,
but had forgotten. Such is the Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence.
Aristotle will not accept that doctrine as a solution; but he
acknowledges the difficulty, and intimates that others had already
tried to solve it without success. His own solution is that there are
two grades of cognition: (1) the full, complete, absolute; (2) the
partial, incomplete, qualified. What you already know by the first of
these grades, you cannot be said to learn; but you may learn that
which you know only by the second grade, and by such learning you
bring your incomplete cognition up to completeness.

[Footnote 10: Plato, Menon. p. 80.]

Thus, you have learnt, and you know, the universal truth, that every
triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; but you do
not yet know that A B C, D E F, G H I, &c., have their two angles
equal to two right angles; for you have not yet seen any of these
figures, and you do not know that they _are_ triangles. The moment
that you see A B C, or hear what figure it is, you learn at one and
the same time two facts: first, that it is a triangle; next, by
virtue of your previous cognition, that it possesses the
above-mentioned property. You knew this _in a certain way_ or
incompletely before, by having followed the demonstration of the
universal truth, and by thus knowing that _every_ triangle had its
three angles equal to two right angles; but you did not know it
absolutely, being ignorant that A B C was a triangle.[11]

[Footnote 11: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, a. 17-b. 8: [Greek:
e)/sti de\ gnôri/zein ta\ me\n pro/teron gnôri/zonta, tô=n de\ kai\
a)/ma lamba/nonta tê\n gnô=sin, oi(=on o(/sa tugcha/nei o)/nta u(po\
to\ katho/lou, ô(=n e)/chei tê\n gnô=sin. o(/ti me\n ga\r pa=n
tri/gônon e)/chei dusi\n o)rthai=s i)/sas, proê/|dei; o(/ti de\ to/de
to\ e)n tô=| ê(mikukli/ô| tri/gôno/n e)stin, a(/ma e)pago/menos
e)gnô/risen.--pri\n d' e)pachthê=nai ê)\ labei=n sullogismo/n,
tro/pon me/n tina i)/sôs phate/on e)pi/stasthai, tro/pon d' a)/llon
ou)/. o(\ ga\r mê\ ê)/|dei ei) e)/stin a(plô=s, tou=to pô=s ê)/|dei
o(/ti du/o o)rtha\s e)/chei a(plô=s? a)lla\ dê=lon ô(s _ô(di\ me\n
e)pi/statai, o(/ti katho/lou e)pi/statai, a(plô=s d' ou)k
e)pi/statai_.--ou)de\n (oi)=mai) kôlu/ei, o(\ mantha/nei, e)/stin ô(s
e)pi/stasthai, e)/sti d' ô(s a)gnoei=n; a)/topon ga\r ou)k ei)
oi)=de/ pôs o(\ mantha/nei, a)ll' ei) ô(di/, oi(=on ê(=| mantha/nei
kai\ ô(/s.] Compare also Anal. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86, a. 23, and
Metaph. A. ii. p. 982, a. 8; Anal. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 5-b.
10.)

Aristotle reports the solution given by others, but from which he
himself dissented, of the Platonic puzzle. The respondent was asked,
Do you know that every Dyad is even?--Yes. Some Dyad was then
produced, which the respondent did not know to be a Dyad; accordingly
he did not know it to be even. Now the critics alluded to by
Aristotle said that the respondent made a wrong answer; instead of
saying I know every Dyad is even, he ought to have said. Every Dyad
_which I know to be a Dyad_ is even. Aristotle pronounces that this
criticism is incorrect. The respondent knows the conclusion which had
previously been demonstrated to him; and that conclusion was, Every
triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; it was not,
Every thing _which I know_ to be a triangle has its three angles
equal to two right angles. This last proposition had never been
demonstrated, nor even stated: [Greek: ou)demi/a ga\r pro/tasis
lamba/netai toiau/tê, o(/ti _o(\n su\ oi)=das_ a)rithmo/n, _ê)\ o(\
su\ oi)=das_ eu)thu/grammon, a)lla\ _kata\ panto/s_] (b. 3-5).

This discussion, in the commencement of the Analytica Posteriora
(combined with Analyt. Priora, II. xxi.), is interesting, because it
shows that even then the difficulties were felt, about the major
proposition of the Syllogism, which Mr. John Stuart Mill has so ably
cleared up, for the first time, in his System of Logic. See Book II.
ch. iii. of that work, especially as it stands in the sixth edition,
with the note there added, pp. 232-233. You affirm, in the major
proposition of the Syllogism, that every triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles; does not this include the triangle
A, B, C, and is it not therefore a _petitio principii_? Or, if it be
not so, does it not assert more than you know? The Sophists (upon
whom both Plato and Aristotle are always severe, but who were
valuable contributors to the theory of Logic by fastening upon the
weak points) attacked it on this ground, and raised against it the
puzzle described by Aristotle (in this chapter), afterwards known as
the Sophism entitled [Greek: o( e)gkekalumme/nos] (see Themistius
Paraphras. I. i.; also 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,'
Vol. III. ch. xxxviii. p. 489). The critics whom Aristotle here cites
and disapproves, virtually admitted the pertinence of this puzzle by
modifying their assertion, and by cutting it down to "Everything
_which we know to be a triangle_ has its three angles equal to two
right angles." Aristotle finds fault with this modification, which,
however, is one way of abating the excess of absolute and peremptory
pretension contained in the major, and of intimating the want of a
minor to be added for interpreting and supplementing the major; while
Aristotle himself arrives at the same result by admitting that the
knowledge corresponding to the major proposition is not yet absolute,
but incomplete and qualified; and that it is only made absolute when
supplemented by a minor.

The very same point, substantially, is raised in the discussion
between Mr. John Stuart Mill and an opponent, in the note above
referred to. "A writer in the 'British Quarterly Review' endeavours
to show that there is no _petitio principii_ in the Syllogism, by
denying that the proposition All men are mortal, asserts or assumes
that Socrates is mortal. In support of this denial, he argues that we
may, and in fact do, admit the general proposition without having
particularly examined the case of Socrates, and even without knowing
whether the individual so named is a man or something else. But this
of course was never denied. That we can and do draw inferences
concerning cases specifically unknown to us, is the datum from which
all who discuss this subject must set out. The question is, in what
terms the evidence or ground on which we draw these conclusions may
best be designated--whether it is most correct to say that the
unknown case is proved by known cases, or that it is proved by a
general proposition including both sets of cases, the known and the
unknown? I contend for the former mode of expression. I hold it an
abuse of language to say, that the proof that Socrates is mortal, is
that all men are mortal. Turn it in what way we will, this seems to
me asserting that a thing is the proof of itself. Whoever pronounces
the words, All men are mortal, has affirmed that Socrates is mortal,
though he may never have heard of Socrates; for since Socrates,
whether known to be a man or not, really is a man, he is included in
the words, All men, and in every assertion of which they are the
subject. . . . . The reviewer acknowledges that the maxim (Dictum de
Omni et Nullo) as commonly expressed--'Whatever is true of a class is
true of everything included in the class,' is a mere identical
proposition, since the class _is_ nothing but the things included in
it. But he thinks this defect would be cured by wording the maxim
thus: 'Whatever is true of a class is true of everything which can be
shown to be a member of the class:' as if a thing could be shown to
be a member of the class without being one."

The qualified manner in which the maxim is here enunciated by the
reviewer (what _can be shown_ to be a member of the class)
corresponds with the qualification introduced by those critics whom
Aristotle impugns ([Greek: lu/ousi ga\r ou) pha/skontes ei)de/nai
pa=san dua/da a)rti/an ou)=san, a)ll' _ê(\n i)/sasin o(/ti dua/s_]);
and the reply of Mr. Mill would have suited for these critics as well
as for the reviewer. The puzzle started in the Platonic Menon is, at
bottom, founded on the same view as that of Mr. Mill, when he states
that the major proposition of the Syllogism includes beforehand the
conclusion. "The general principle, (says Mr. Mill, p. 205), instead
of being given as evidence of the particular case, cannot itself be
taken for true without exception, until every shadow of doubt which
could affect any case comprised in it is dispelled by evidence
_aliunde_; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove? From a
general principle we cannot infer any particulars but those which the
principle itself assumes as known."

To enunciate this in the language of the Platonic Menon, we learn
nothing by or through the evidence of the Syllogism, except a part of
what we have already professed ourselves to know by asserting the
major premiss.]

Aristotle proceeds to tell us what is meant by knowing a thing
_absolutely_ or completely ([Greek: a(plô=s]). It is when we believe
ourselves to know the cause or reason through which the matter known
exists, so that it cannot but be as it is. That is what
Demonstration, or Scientific Syllogism, teaches us;[12] a Syllogism
derived from premisses true, immediate, prior to, and more knowable
than the conclusion--causes of the conclusion, and specially
appropriate thereto. These premisses must be known beforehand without
being demonstrated (_i.e._ known not through a middle term); and must
be known not merely in the sense of understanding the signification
of the terms, but also in that of being able to affirm the truth of
the proposition. _Prior_ or _more knowable_ is understood here as
prior or more knowable _by nature_ (not _relatively to us_, according
to the antithesis formerly explained); first, most universal,
undemonstrable _principia_ are meant. Some of these are Axioms, which
the learner must "bring with him from home," or know before the
teacher can instruct him in any special science; some are Definitions
of the name and its essential meaning; others, again, are Hypotheses
or affirmations of the existence of the thing defined, which the
learner must accept upon the authority of the teacher.[13] As these
are the _principia_ of Demonstration, so it is necessary that the
learner should know them, not merely as well as the conclusions
demonstrated, but even better; and that among matters contradictory
to the _principia_ there should be none that he knows better or
trusts more.[14]

[Footnote 12: Aristot. Analyt. Post I. ii. p. 71, b. 9-17. Julius
Pacius says in a note, ad c. ii. p. 394: "Propositio demonstrativa
est prima, immediata, et indemonstrabilis. His tribus verbis
significatur una et eadem conditio; nam propositio prima est, quæ,
quod medio caret, demonstrari nequit."

So also Zabarella (In lib. I. Post. Anal. Comm., p. 340, Op. ed.
Venet. 1617): "Duæ illæ dictiones (_primis_ et _immediatis_) unam
tantum significant conditionem ordine secundam, non duas; idem namque
est, principia esse medio carentia, ac esse prima."]

[Footnote 13: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 1-24;
Themistius, Paraphr. I. ii. p. 10, ed. Spengel; Schol. p. 199, b. 44.
Themistius quotes the definition of an Axiom as given by
Theophrastus: [Greek: A)xi/ôma/ e)sti _do/xa_ tis], &c. This shows
the difficulty of adhering precisely to a scientific terminology.
Theophrastus explains an axiom to be a sort of [Greek: do/xa], thus
lapsing into the common loose use of the word. Yet still both he and
Aristotle declare [Greek: do/xa] to be of inferior intellectual worth
as compared with [Greek: e)pistê/mê] (Anal. Post. I. xxiii.), while
at the same time they declare the Axiom to be the very maximum of
scientific truth. Theophrastus gave, as examples of Axioms, the
**maxim of Contradiction, universally applicable, and, "If
equals be taken from equals the remainders will be equal," applicable
to homogeneous quantities. Even Aristotle himself sometimes falls
into the same vague employment of [Greek: do/xa], as including the
Axioms. See Metaphys. B. ii. p. 996, b. 28; [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005,
b. 33.]

[Footnote 14: Aristot. Anal. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 25, b. 4. I
translate these words in conformity with Themistius, pp. 12-13, and
with Mr. Poste's translation, p. 43. Julius Pacius and M. Barthélemy
St. Hilaire render them somewhat differently. They also read [Greek:
a)meta/ptôtos], while Waitz and Firmin Didot read [Greek:
a)meta/peistos], which last seems preferable.]

In Aristotle's time two doctrines had been advanced, in opposition to
the preceding theory: (1) Some denied the necessity of any
indemonstrable _principia_, and affirmed the possibility of,
demonstrating backwards _ad infinitum_; (2) Others agreed in denying
the necessity of any indemonstrable _principia_, but contended that
demonstration in a circle is valid and legitimate--_e.g._ that A may
be demonstrated by means of B, and B by means of A. Against both
these doctrines Aristotle enters his protest. The first of them--the
supposition of an interminable regress--he pronounces to be obviously
absurd: the second he declares tantamount to proving a thing by
itself; the circular demonstration, besides, having been shown to be
impossible, except in the First figure, with propositions in which
the predicate reciprocates or is co-extensive with the subject--a
very small proportion among propositions generally used in
demonstrating.[15]

[Footnote 15: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 5-p. 73, a.
20: [Greek: ô(/st' e)peidê\ _o)li/ga toiau=ta_ e)n tai=s
a)podei/xesin], &c.]

Demonstrative Science is attained only by syllogizing from necessary
premisses, such as cannot possibly be other than they are. The
predicate must be (1) _de omni_, (2) _per se_, (3) _quatenus ipsum_,
so that it is a _Primum Universale_; this third characteristic not
being realized without the preceding two. First, the predicate must
belong, and belong at all times, to everything called by the name of
the subject. Next, it must belong thereunto _per se_, or essentially;
that is, either the predicate must be stated in the definition
declaring the essence of the subject, or the subject must be stated
in the definition declaring the essence of the predicate. The
predicate must not be extra-essential to the subject, nor attached to
it as an adjunct from without, simply concomitant or accidental. The
like distinction holds in regard to events: some are accidentally
concomitant sequences which may or may not be realized (_e.g._, a
flash of lightning occurring when a man is on his journey); in
others, the conjunction is necessary or causal (as when an animal
dies under the sacrificial knife).[16] Both these two characteristics
(_de omni_ and _per se_) are presupposed in the third (_quatenus
ipsum_); but this last implies farther, that the predicate is
attached to the subject in the highest universality consistent with
truth; _i.e._, that it is a First Universal, a primary predicate and
not a derivative predicate. Thus, the predicate of having its three
angles equal to two right angles, is a characteristic not merely _de
omni_ and _per se_, but also a First Universal, applied to a
triangle. It is applied to a triangle, _quatenus_ triangle, as a
primary predicate. If applied to a subject of higher universality
(_e.g._, to every geometrical figure), it would not be always true.
If applied to a subject of lower universality (_e.g._, to a
right-angled triangle or an isosceles triangle), it would be
universally true and would be true _per se_, but it would be a
derivative predicate and not a First Universal; it would not be
applied to the isosceles _quatenus_ isosceles, for there is a still
higher Universal of which it is predicable, being true respecting
any triangle you please. Thus, the properties with which
Demonstration, or full and absolute Science, is conversant, are _de
omni_, _per se_, and _quatenus ipsum_, or _Universalia Prima_;[17]
all of them necessary, such as cannot but be true.]

[Footnote 16: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iv. p. 73, a. 21, b. 16.

[Greek: Ta\ a)/ra lego/mena e)pi\ tô=n a(plô=s e)pistêtô=n kath'
au(ta\ ou(/tôs ô(s e)nupa/rchein toi=s katêgoroume/nois ê)\
e)nupa/rchesthai di' au(ta/ te/ e)sti kai\ e)x a)na/gkês] (b. 16,
seq.). _Line_ must be included in the definition of the opposites
_straight_ or _curve_. Also it is essential to every line that it is
either straight or curve. _Number_ must be included in the definition
of the opposites _odd_ or _even_; and to be either odd or even is
essentially predicable of every number. You cannot understand what is
meant by _straight_ or _curve_ unless you have the notion of a
_line_.

The example given by Aristotle of _causal_ conjunction (the death of
an animal under the sacrificial knife) shows that he had in his mind
the perfection of Inductive Observation, including full application
of the Method of Difference.]

[Footnote 17: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. iv. p. 73, b. 25-p. 74, a. 3.
[Greek: o(\ toi/nun _to\ tucho\n prô=ton_ dei/knutai du/o o)rtha\s
e)/chon ê)\ o(tiou=n a)/llo, tou/tô| prô/tô| u(pa/rchei katho/lou,
kai\ ê( _a)po/deixis kath' au(to\_ tou/tou katho/lou e)sti\, tô=n d'
a)/llôn tro/pon tina\ ou) kath' au(to/; ou)de\ tou= i)soske/lous ou)k
e)/sti katho/lou a)ll' e)pi\ ple/on.]

About the precise signification of [Greek: katho/lou] in Aristotle,
see a valuable note of Bonitz (ad Metaphys. Z. iii.) p. 299; also
Waitz (ad Aristot. De Interpr. c. vii.) I. p. 334. Aristotle gives it
here, b. 26: [Greek: katho/lou de\ le/gô o(\ a)\n kata\ panto/s te
u(pa/rchê| kai\ kath' au(to\ kai\ ê(=| au)to/.] Compare Themistius,
Paraphr. p. 19, Spengel. [Greek: To\ kath' au(to/] is described by
Aristotle confusedly. [Greek: To\ katho/lou], is that which is
predicable of the subject as a whole or _summum genus_: [Greek: to\
kata\ panto/s], that which is predicable of every individual, either
of the _summum genus_ or of any inferior species contained therein.
Cf. Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 24: [Greek: ô(=| ga\r kath'
au(to\ u(pa/rchei ti, tou=to au)to\ au(tô=| ai)/tion]--the subject is
itself the cause or _fundamentum_ of the properties _per se_. See the
explanation and references in Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-theorie des
Aristoteles, ch. v. pp. 160-165.]

Aristotle remarks that there is great liability to error about these
_Universalia Prima_. We sometimes demonstrate a predicate to be true,
universally and _per se_, of a lower species, without being aware
that it might also be demonstrated to be true, universally and _per
se_, of the higher genus to which that species belongs; perhaps,
indeed, that higher genus may not yet have obtained a current name.
That proportions hold by permutation, was demonstrated severally for
numbers, lines, solids, and intervals of time; but this belongs to
each of them, not from any separate property of each, but from what
is common to all: that, however, which is common to all had received
no name, so that it was not known that one demonstration might
comprise all the four.[18] In like manner, a man may know that an
equilateral and an isosceles triangle have their three angles equal
to two right angles, and also that a scalene triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles; yet he may not know (except
sophistically and by accident[19]) that a triangle _in genere_ has
its three angles equal to two right angles, though there be no other
triangles except equilateral, isosceles, and scalene. He does not
know that this may be demonstrated of every triangle _quatenus_
triangle. The only way to obtain a certain recognition of _Primum
Universale_, is, to abstract successively from the several conditions
of a demonstration respecting the concrete and particular, until the
proposition ceases to be true. Thus, you have before you a brazen
isosceles triangle, the three angles whereof are equal to two right
angles. You may eliminate the condition brazen, and the proposition
will still remain true. You may also eliminate the condition
isosceles; still the proposition is true. But you cannot eliminate
the condition triangle, so as to retain only the higher genus,
geometrical figure; for the proposition then ceases to be always
true. Triangle is in this case the _Primum Universale_.[20]

[Footnote 18: Aristot. Analyt. Post I. v. p. 74, a. 4-23. [Greek:
a)lla\ dia\ to\ mê\ ei)=nai ô)nomasme/non ti pa/nta tau=ta e(/n,
a)rithmoi/, mê/kê, chro/nos, sterea/, kai\ ei)/dei diaphe/rein
a)llê/lôn, chôri\s e)lamba/neto.] What these four have in common is
that which he himself expresses by [Greek: Poso/n]--_Quantum_--in the
Categoriæ and elsewhere. (Categor. p. 4, b. 20, seq.; Metaph. [Greek:
D]. p. 1020, a. 7, seq.)]

[Footnote 19: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. v. p. 74, a. 27: [Greek:
ou)/pô oi)=de to\ tri/gônon o(/ti du/o o)rthai=s, ei) mê\ _to\n
sophistiko\n tro/pon_ ou)de\ katho/lou tri/gônon, ou)/d' ei) mêde/n
e)sti para\ tau=ta tri/gônon e(/teron.] The phrase [Greek: to\n
sophistiko\n tro/pon] is equivalent to [Greek: to\n sophistiko\n
**tro/pon to\n kata\ sumbebêko/s], p. 71, b. 10. I see nothing
in it connected with Aristotle's characteristic of a Sophist (special
professional life purpose--[Greek: tou= bi/ou tê=| proaire/sei],
Metaphys. [Greek: G]. p. 1004, b. 24): the phrase means nothing more
than _unscientific_.]

[Footnote 20: Aristot. Analyt Post I. v. p. 74, a. 32-b. 4.]

In every demonstration the _principia_ or premisses must be not only
true, but necessarily true; the conclusion also will then be
necessarily true, by reason of the premisses, and this constitutes
Demonstration. Wherever the premisses are necessarily true, the
conclusion will be necessarily true; but you cannot say, _vice
versâ_, that wherever the conclusion is necessarily true, the
syllogistic premisses from which it follows must always be
necessarily true. They may be true without being necessarily true, or
they may even be false: if, then, the conclusion be necessarily true,
it is not so by reason of these premisses; and the syllogistic proof
is in this case no demonstration. Your syllogism may have true
premisses and may lead to a conclusion which is true by reason of
them; but still you have not demonstrated, since neither premisses
nor conclusion are _necessarily_ true.[21] When an opponent contests
your demonstration, he succeeds if he can disprove the _necessity_ of
your conclusion; if he can show any single case in which it either is
or may be false.[22] It is not enough to proceed upon a premiss which
is either probable or simply true: it may be true, yet not
appropriate to the case: you must take your departure from the first
or highest universal of the genus about which you attempt to
demonstrate.[23] Again, unless you can state the _why_ of your
conclusion; that is to say, unless the middle term, by reason of
which the conclusion is necessarily true, be itself necessarily
true,--you have not demonstrated it, nor do you know it absolutely.
Your middle term not being necessary may vanish, while the conclusion
to which it was supposed to lead abides: in truth no conclusion was
known through that middle.[24] In the complete demonstrative or
scientific syllogism, the major term must be predicable essentially
or _per se_ of the middle, and the middle term must be predicable
essentially or _per se_ of the minor; thus alone can you be sure that
the conclusion also is _per se_ or necessary. The demonstration
cannot take effect through a middle term which is merely a Sign; the
sign, even though it be a constant concomitant, yet being not, or at
least not known to be, _per se_, will not bring out the _why_ of the
conclusion, nor make the conclusion necessary. Of non-essential
concomitants altogether there is no demonstration; wherefore it might
seem to be useless to put questions about such; yet, though the
questions cannot yield necessary premisses for a demonstrative
conclusion, they may yield premisses from which a conclusion will
necessarily follow.[25]

[Footnote 21: Ibid. vi. p. 74, b. 5-18. [Greek: e)x a)lêthô=n me\n
ga\r e)/sti kai\ mê\ a)podeiknu/nta sullogi/sthai, e)x a)nagkai/ôn d'
ou)k e)/stin a)ll' ê)\ a)podeiknu/nta; tou=to ga\r ê)/dê
a)podei/xeô/s e)stin.] Compare Analyt. Prior. I. ii. p. 53, b. 7-25.]

[Footnote 22: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. vi. p. 74, b. 18: [Greek:
sêmei=on d' o(/ti ê( a)po/deixis e)x a)nagkai/ôn, o(/ti kai\ ta\s
e)nsta/seis ou(/tô phe/romen pro\s tou\s oi)ome/nous a)podeiknu/nai,
o(/ti ou)k a)na/gkê], &c.]

[Footnote 23: Ibid. vi. p. 74, b. 21-26: [Greek: dê=lon d' e)k
tou/tôn kai\ o(/ti eu)ê/theis oi( lamba/nein oi)o/menoi kalô=s ta\s
a)rcha/s, e)a\n e)/ndoxos ê)=| ê( pro/tasis kai\ a)lêthê/s, oi(=on
oi( sophistai\ o(/ti to\ e)pi/stasthai to\ e)pistê/mên e)/chein;],
&c.]

[Footnote 24: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. vi. p. 74, b. 26-p. 75, a.
17.]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. vi. p. 75, a. 8-37.

On the point last mentioned, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire observes in
his note, p. 41: "Dans les questions de dialectique, la conclusion
est nécessaire en ce sens, qu'elle suit nécessairement des prémisses;
elle n'est pas du tout nécessaire en ce sens, que la chose qu'elle
exprime soit nécessaire. Ainsi il faut distinguer la nécessité de la
forme et la nécessité de la matière: ou comme disent les
scholastiques, _necessitas illationis et necessitas materiæ_. La
dialectique se contente de la première, mais la demonstration a
essentiellement besoin des deux."]

In every demonstration three things may be distinguished: (1) The
demonstrated conclusion, or Attribute essential to a certain genus;
(2) The Genus, of which the attributes _per se_ are the matter of
demonstration; (3) The Axioms, out of which, or through which, the
demonstration is obtained. These Axioms may be and are common to
several genera: but the demonstration cannot be transferred from one
genus to another; both the extremes as well as the middle term must
belong to the same genus. An arithmetical demonstration cannot be
transferred to magnitudes and their properties, except in so far as
magnitudes are numbers, which is partially true of some among them.
The demonstrations in arithmetic may indeed be transferred to
harmonics, because harmonics is subordinate to arithmetic; and, for
the like reason, demonstrations in geometry may be transferred to
mechanics and optics. But we cannot introduce into geometry any
property of lines, which does not belong to them _quâ_ lines; such,
for example, as that a straight line is the most beautiful of all
lines, or is the contrary of a circular line; for these predicates
belong to it, not _quâ_ line, but _quâ_ member of a different or more
extensive genus.[26] There can be no complete demonstration about
perishable things, or about any individual line, except in regard to
its attributes as member of the genus line. Where the conclusion is
not eternally true, but true at one time and not true at another,
this can only be because one of its premisses is not universal or
essential. Where both premisses are universal and essential, the
conclusion must be eternal or eternally true. As there is no
demonstration, so also there can be no definition, of perishable
attributes.[27]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. vii. p. 75, a. 38-b. 20. Mr. Poste, in his
translation, here cites (p. 50) a good illustrative passage from Dr.
Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Book II. ii.:--"But,
in order that we may make any real advance in the discovery of truth,
our ideas must not only be clear; they must also be _appropriate_.
Each science has for its basis a different class of ideas; and the
steps which constitute the progress of one science can never be made
by employing the ideas of another kind of science. No genuine advance
could ever be obtained in Mechanics by applying to the subject the
ideas of space and time merely; no advance in Chemistry by the use of
mere mechanical conceptions; no discovery in Physiology by referring
facts to mere chemical and mechanical principles." &c.]

[Footnote 27: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. viii. p. 75, b. 21-36.
Compare Metaphys. Z. p. 1040, a. 1: [Greek: dê=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\n
ei)/ê au)tô=n (tô=n phthartô=n) ou)/th' o(rismo\s ou)/t'
a)po/deixis]. Also Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, ch. iv. p.
249.]

For complete demonstration, it is not sufficient that the premisses
be true, immediate, and undemonstrable; they must, furthermore, be
essential and appropriate to the class in hand. Unless they be such,
you cannot be said to know the conclusion _absolutely_; you know it
only by accident. You can only know a conclusion when demonstrated
from its own appropriate premisses; and you know it best when it is
demonstrated from its highest premisses. It is sometimes difficult to
determine whether we really know or not; for we fancy that we know,
when we demonstrate from true and universal _principia_, without
being aware whether they are, or are not, the _principia_ appropriate
to the case.[28] But these _principia_ must always be assumed without
demonstration--the class whose essential constituent properties are
in question, the universal Axioms, and the Definition or meaning of
the attributes to be demonstrated. If these definitions and axioms
are not always formally enunciated, it is because we tacitly presume
them to be already known and admitted by the learner.[29] He may
indeed always refuse to grant them in express words, but they are
such that he cannot help granting them by internal assent in his
mind, to which every syllogism must address itself. When you assume a
premiss without demonstrating it, though it be really demonstrable,
this, if the learner is favourable and willing to grant it, is an
assumption or Hypothesis, valid relatively to him alone, but not
valid absolutely: if he is reluctant or adverse, it is a Postulate,
which you claim whether he is satisfied or not.[30] The Definition by
itself is not an hypothesis; for it neither affirms nor denies the
existence of anything. The pupil must indeed understand the terms of
it; but this alone is not an hypothesis, unless you call the fact
that the pupil comes to learn, an hypothesis.[31] The Hypothesis or
assumption is contained in the premisses, being that by which the
reason of the conclusion comes to be true. Some object that the
geometer makes a false hypothesis or assumption, when he declares a
given line drawn to be straight, or to be a foot long, though it is
neither one nor the other. But this objection has no pertinence,
since the geometer does not derive his conclusions from what is true
of the visible lines drawn before his eyes, but from what is true of
the lines conceived in his own mind, and signified or illustrated by
the visible diagrams.[32]

[Footnote 28: Ibid. ix. p. 75, b. 37-p. 76, a. 30.]

[Footnote 29: Ibid. x. p. 76, a. 31-b. 22.]

[Footnote 30: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. x. p. 76, b. 29-34: [Greek:
e)a\n me\n dokou=nta lamba/nê| tô=| mantha/nonti, u(poti/thetai, kai\
e)/stin ou)/ch a(plô=s u(po/thesis, a)lla\ pro\s e)kei=non mo/non,
a)\n de\ ê)\ mêdemi/a=s e)nou/sês do/xês ê)\ kai\ e)nanti/as
e)nou/sês lamba/nê| to\ au)to/, ai)tei=tai. kai\ tou/tô| diaphe/rei
_u(po/thesis_ kai\ _ai)/têma_], &c. Themistius, Paraphras. p. 37,
Spengel.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. p. 76, b. 36: [Greek: tou=to d' ou)ch
u(po/thesis, ei) mê\ kai\ _to\ a)kou/ein_ u(po/thesi/n tis ei)=nai
phê/sei]. For the meaning of [Greek: _to\ a)kou/ein_], compare
[Greek: o( a)kou/ôn], infra, Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 22.]

[Footnote 32: Ibid. p. 77, a. 1: [Greek: o( de\ geôme/três ou)de\n
sumperai/netai tô=| tê/nde ei)=nai tê\n grammê\n ê(\n au)to\s
e)/phthegktai, a)lla\ ta\ dia\ tou/tôn dêlou/mena.]

Themistius, Paraphr. p. 37: [Greek: ô(/sper ou)d' oi( geôme/trai
ke/chrêntai tai=s grammai=s u(pe\r ô(=n diale/gontai kai\
deiknu/ousin, a)ll' a(\s e)/chousin e)n tê=| psuchê=|, ô(=n ei)si\
su/mbola ai( grapho/menai.]

A similar doctrine is asserted, Analyt. Prior. I. xli. p. 49, b. 35,
and still more clearly in De Memoria et Reminiscentia, p. 450,
a. 2-12.]

The process of Demonstration neither requires, nor countenances, the
Platonic theory of Ideas--universal substances beyond and apart from
particulars. But it does require that we should admit universal
predications; that is, one and the same predicate truly applicable in
the same sense to many different particulars. Unless this be so,
there can be no universal major premiss, nor appropriate middle term,
nor valid demonstrative syllogism.[33]

[Footnote 33: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. xi. p. 77, a. 5-9.]

The Maxim or Axiom of Contradiction, in its most general enunciation,
is never formally enunciated by any special science; but each of them
assumes the Maxim so far as applicable to its own purpose, whenever
the _Reductio ad Absurdum_ is introduced.[34] It is in this and the
other common principles or Axioms that all the sciences find their
point of contact and communion; and that Dialectic also comes into
communion with all of them, as also the science (First Philosophy)
that scrutinizes the validity or demonstrability of the Axioms.[35]
The dialectician is not confined to any one science, or to any
definite subject-matter. His liberty of interrogation is unlimited;
but his procedure is essentially interrogatory, and he is bound to
accept the answer of the respondent--whatever it be, affirmative or
negative--as premiss for any syllogism that he may construct. In this
way he can never be sure of demonstrating any thing; for the
affirmative and the negative will not be equally serviceable for that
purpose. There is indeed also, in discussions on the separate
sciences, a legitimate practice of scientific interrogation. Here the
questions proper to be put are limited in number, and the answers
proper to be made are determined beforehand by the truths of the
science--say Geometry; still, an answer thus correctly made will
serve to the interrogator as premiss for syllogistic
demonstration.[36] The respondent must submit to have such answer
tested by appeal to geometrical _principia_ and to other geometrical
propositions already proved as legitimate conclusions from the
_principia_; if he finds himself involved in contradictions, he is
confuted _quâ_ geometer, and must correct or modify his answer. But
he is not bound, _quâ_ geometer, to undergo scrutiny as to the
geometrical _principia_ themselves; this would carry the dialogue out
of the province of Geometry into that of First Philosophy and
Dialectic. Care, indeed, must be taken to keep both questions and
answers within the limits of the science. Now there can be no
security for this restriction, except in the scientific competence of
the auditors. Refrain, accordingly, from all geometrical discussions
among men ignorant of geometry and confine yourself to geometrical
auditors, who alone can distinguish what questions and answers are
really appropriate. And what is here said about geometry, is equally
true about the other special sciences.[37] Answers may be improper
either as foreign to the science under debate, or as appertaining to
the science, yet false as to the matter, or as equivocal in middle
term; though this last is less likely to occur in Geometry, since the
demonstrations are accompanied by diagrams, which help to render
conspicuous any such ambiguity.[38] To an inductive proposition,
bringing forward a single case as contributory to an ultimate
generalization, no general objection should be offered; the objection
should be reserved until the generalization itself is tendered.[39]
Sometimes the mistake is made of drawing an affirmative conclusion
from premisses in the Second figure; this is formally wrong, but the
conclusion may in some cases be true, if the major premiss happens to
be a reciprocating proposition, having its predicate co-extensive
with its subject. This, however, cannot be presumed; nor can a
conclusion be made to yield up its principles by necessary
reciprocation; for we have already observed that, though the truth of
the premisses certifies the truth of the conclusion, we cannot say
_vice versâ_ that the truth of the conclusion certifies the truth of
the premisses. Yet propositions are more frequently found to
reciprocate in scientific discussion than in Dialectic; because, in
the former, we take no account of accidental properties, but only of
definitions and what follows from them.[40]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. a. 10, seq.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. a. 26-30: [Greek: kai\ ei)/ tis katho/lou
peirô=|to deiknu/nai ta\ koina/, oi(=on o(/ti a(/pan pha/nai ê)\
a)popha/nai, ê)\ o(/ti i)/sa a)po\ i)/sôn, ê)\ tô=n toiou/tôn
a)/tta.] Compare Metaph. K. p. 1061**, b. 18.]

[Footnote 36: Aristot. Analyt. Post. I. xii, p. 77, a. 36-40;
Themistius, p. 40.

The text is here very obscure. He proceeds to distinguish Geometry
especially (also other sciences, though less emphatically) from
[Greek: ta\ e)n toi=s dialo/gois] (I. xii. p. 78, a. 12).

Julius Pacius, ad Analyt. Post. I. viii. (he divides the chapters
differently), p. 417, says:--"Differentia interrogationis dialecticæ
et demonstrativæ hæc est. Dialecticus ita interrogat, ut optionem det
adversario, utrum malit affirmare an negare. Demonstrator vero
interrogat ut rem evidentiorem faciat; id est, ut doceat ex
principiis auditori notis."]

[Footnote 37: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 1-15; Themistius, p. 41:
[Greek: ou) ga\r ô(/sper tô=n e)ndo/xôn oi( polloi\ kritai/, ou(/tô
kai\ tô=n kat' e)pistê/mên oi( a)nepistê/mones].]

[Footnote 38: Analyt. Post. I. xii. p. 77, b. 16-33. Propositions
within the limits of the science, but false as to matter, are styled
by Aristotle [Greek: pseudographê/mata]. See Aristot. Sophist.
Elench. xi. p. 171, b. 14; p. 172, a. 1.

"L'interrogation syllogistique se confondant avec la proposition, il
s'ensuit que l'interrogation doit être, comme la proposition, propre
à la science dont il s'agit." (Barthélemy St Hilaire, note, p. 70).
Interrogation here has a different meaning from that which it bears
in Dialectic.]

[Footnote 39: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77**, b. 34 seq. This passage is to
me hardly intelligible. It is differently understood by commentators
and translators. John Philoponus in the Scholia (p. 217, b. 17-32,
Brandis), cites the explanation of it given by Ammonius, but rejects
that explanation, and waits for others to supply him with a better.
Zabarella (Comm. in Analyt. Post. pp. 426, 456, ed. Venet 1617)
admits that as it stands, and where it stands, it is unintelligible,
but transposes it to another part of the book (to the end of cap.
xvii., immediately before the words [Greek: phanero\n de\ kai\
o(/ti], &c., of c. xviii.), and gives an explanation of it in this
altered position. But I do not think he has succeeded in clearing it
up.]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. I. xii. p. 77, b. 40-p. 78, a. 13.]

Knowledge of Fact and knowledge of the Cause must be distinguished,
and even within the same Science.[41] In some syllogisms the
conclusion only brings out [Greek: to\ o(/ti]--the reality of certain
facts; in others, it ends in [Greek: to\ dio/ti]--the affirmation of
a cause, or of the _Why_. The syllogism of the _Why_ is, where the
middle term is not merely the cause, but the proximate cause, of the
conclusion. Often, however, the effect is more notorious, so that we
employ it as middle term, and conclude from it to its reciprocating
cause; in which case our syllogism is only of the [Greek: o(/ti]; and
so it is also when we employ as middle term a cause not proximate but
remote, concluding from that to the effect.[42] Sometimes the
syllogisms of the [Greek: o(/ti] may fall under one science, those of
the [Greek: dio/ti] under another, namely, in the case where one
science is subordinate to another, as optics to geometry, and
harmonics to arithmetic; the facts of optics and harmonics belonging
to sense and observation, the causes thereof to mathematical
reasoning. It may happen, then, that a man knows [Greek: to\ dio/ti]
well, but is comparatively ignorant [Greek: tou= o(/ti]: the geometer
may have paid little attention to optical facts.[43] Cognition of the
[Greek: dio/ti] is the maximum, the perfection, of all cognition; and
this, comprising arithmetical and geometrical theorems, is almost
always attained by syllogisms in the First figure. This figure is the
most truly scientific of the three; the other two figures depend upon
it for expansion and condensation. It is, besides, the only one in
which universal affirmative conclusions can be obtained; for in the
Second figure we get only negative conclusions; in the Third, only
particular. Accordingly, propositions declaring Essence or
Definition, obtained only through universal affirmative conclusions,
are yielded in none but the First figure.[44]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. I. xiii. p. 77, a. 22 seq.]

[Footnote 42: Themistius, p. 45: [Greek: polla/kis sumbai/nei kai\
a)ntistre/phein a)llê/lois to\ ai)tion kai\ to\ sêmei=on kai\ a)/mphô
dei/knusthai di' a)llê/lôn, dia\ tou= sêmei/ou me\n ô(s to\ o(/ti,
dia\ thate/rou de\ ô(s to\ dio/ti.]

"Cum enim vera demonstratio, id est [Greek: tou= dio/ti], fiat per
causam proximam, consequens est, ut demonstratio vel per effectum
proximum, vel per causam remotam, sit demonstratio [Greek: tou=
o(/ti]" (Julius Pacius, Comm. p. 422).

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire observes (Note, p. 82):--"La cause éloignée
non immédiate, donne un syllogisme dans la seconde figure.--Il est
vrai qu'Aristote n'appelle cause que la cause immédiate; et que la
cause éloignée n'est pas pour lui une véritable cause."

See in Schol. p. 188, a. 19, the explanation given by Alexander of
the syllogism [Greek: tou= dio/ti].]

[Footnote 43: Analyt. Post. I. xiii. p. 79, a. 2, seq.: [Greek:
e)ntau=tha ga\r to\ me\n o(/ti tô=n ai)sthêtikô=n ei)de/nai, to\ de\
dio/ti tô=n mathêmatikô=n], &c. Compare Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p.
67, a. 11; and Metaphys. A. p. 981, a. 15.]

[Footnote 44: Analyt. Post. I. xiv. p. 79, a. 17-32.]

As there are some affirmative propositions that are indivisible,
_i.e._, having affirmative predicates which belong to a subject at
once, directly, immediately, indivisibly,--so there are also some
indivisible negative propositions, _i.e._, with predicates that
belong negatively to a subject at once, directly, &c. In all such
there is no intermediate step to justify either the affirmation of
the predicate, or the negation of the predicate, respecting the given
subject. This will be the case where neither the predicate nor the
subject is contained in any higher genus.[45]

[Footnote 45: Ibid. I. xv. p. 79, a. 33-b. 22. The point which
Aristotle here especially insists upon is, that there may be and are
immediate, undemonstrable, _negative_ (as well as affirmative)
predicates: [Greek: phanero\n ou)=n o(/ti e)nde/chetai/ te a)/llo
a)/llô| _mê\ u(pa/rchein_ a)to/môs]. (Themistius, Paraphr. p. 48,
Spengel: [Greek: a)/mesoi de\ prota/seis ou) katapha/seis mo/non
ei)si/n, a)lla\ kai\ a)popha/seis o(moi/ôs ai(\ mê\ du/nantai dia\
sullogismou= deichthê=nai, au(=tai d' ei)si\n e)ph' ô(=n ou)dete/rou
tô=n o(/rôn a)/llos tis o(/lou katêgorei=tai.]) It had been already
shown, in an earlier chapter of this treatise (p. 72, b. 19), that
there were _affirmative_ predicates immediate and undemonstrable.
This may be compared with that which Plato declares in the Sophistes
(pp. 253-254, seq.) about the intercommunion [Greek: tô=n genô=n kai\
tô=n ei)dô=n] with each other. Some of them admit such
intercommunion, others repudiate it.]

In regard both to these propositions immediate and indivisible, and
to propositions mediate and deducible, there are two varieties of
error.[46] You may err simply, from ignorance, not knowing better,
and not supposing yourself to know at all; or your error may be a
false conclusion, deduced by syllogism through a middle term, and
accompanied by a belief on your part that you do know. This may
happen in different ways. Suppose the negative proposition, No B is
A, to be true immediately or indivisibly. Then, if you conclude the
contrary of this[47] (All B is A) to be true, by syllogism through
the middle term C, your syllogism must be in the First figure; it
must have the minor premiss false (since B is brought under C, when
it is not contained in any higher genus), and it may have both
premisses false. Again, suppose the affirmative proposition, All B is
A, to be true immediately or indivisibly. Then if you conclude the
contrary of this (No B is A) to be true, by syllogism through the
middle term C, your syllogism may be in the First figure, but it may
also be in the Second figure, your false conclusion being negative.
If it be in the First figure, both its premisses may be false, or one
of them only may be false, either indifferently.[48] If it be in the
Second figure, either premiss singly may be wholly false, or both may
be partly false.[49]

[Footnote 46: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 23: [Greek: a)/gnoia
kat' a)po/phasin--a)/gnoia kata\ dia/thesin]. See Themistius, p. 49,
Spengel. In regard to simple and uncombined ideas, ignorance is not
possible as an erroneous combination, but only as a mental blank. You
either have the idea and thus know so much truth, or you have not the
idea and are thus ignorant to that extent; this is the only
alternative. Cf. Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: Th]. p. 1051, a. 34; De
Animâ, III. vi. p. 430, a. 26.]

[Footnote 47: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 79, b. 29. M. Barthélemy St.
Hilaire remarks (p. 95, n.):--"Il faut remarquer qu'Aristote ne
s'occupe que des modes universels dans la première et dans la seconde
figure, parceque, la démonstration étant toujours universelle, les
propositions qui expriment l'erreur opposée doivent l'être comme
elle. Ainsi ce sont les propositions contraires, et non les
contradictoires, dont il sera question ici."

For the like reason the Third figure is not mentioned here, but only
the First and Second: because in the Third figure no universal
conclusion can be proved (Julius Pacius, p. 431).]

[Footnote 48: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 80, a. 6-26.]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 27-b. 14: [Greek: e)n de\ tô=| me/sô|
schê/mati o(/las me\n ei)=nai ta\s prota/seis a)mphote/ras pseudei=s
ou)k e)nde/chetai--e)pi/ ti d' e(kate/ran ou)de\n kôlu/ei pseudê=
ei)=nai.]]

Let us next assume the affirmative proposition, All B is A, to be
true, but mediate and deducible through the middle term C. If you
conclude the contrary of this (No B is A) through the same middle
term C, in the First figure, your error cannot arise from falsity in
the minor premiss, because your minor (by the laws of the figure)
must be affirmative; your error must arise from a false major,
because a negative major is not inconsistent with the laws of the
First figure. On the other hand, if you conclude the contrary in the
First figure through a different middle term, D, either both your
premisses will be false, or your minor premiss will be false.[50] If
you employ the Second figure to conclude your contrary, both your
premisses cannot be false, though either one of them singly may be
false.[51]

[Footnote 50: Analyt. Post. I. xvi. p. 80, b. 17-p. 81, a. 4.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. p. 81, a. 5-14.]

Such will be the case when the deducible proposition assumed to be
true is affirmative, and when therefore the contrary conclusion which
you profess to have proved is negative. But if the deducible
proposition assumed to be true is negative, and if consequently the
contrary conclusion must be affirmative,--then, if you try to prove
this contrary through the same middle term, your premisses cannot
both be false, but your major premiss must always be false.[52] If,
however, you try to prove the contrary through a different and
inappropriate middle term, you cannot convert the minor premiss to
its contrary (because the minor premiss must continue affirmative, in
order that you may arrive at any conclusion at all), but the major
can be so converted. Should the major premiss thus converted be true,
the minor will be false; should the major premiss thus converted be
false, the minor may be either true or false. Either one of the
premisses, or both the premisses, may thus be false.[53]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. xvii. p. 81, a. 15-20.]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. a. 20-34. Mr. Poste's translation (pp. 65-70) is
very perspicuous and instructive in regard to these two difficult
chapters.]

Errors of simple ignorance (not concluded from false syllogism) may
proceed from defect or failure of sensible perception, in one or
other of its branches. For without sensation there can be no
induction; and it is from induction only that the premisses for
demonstration by syllogism are obtained. We cannot arrive at
universal propositions, even in what are called abstract sciences,
except through induction of particulars; nor can we demonstrate
except from universals. Induction and Demonstration are the only two
ways of learning; and the particulars composing our inductions can
only be known through sense.[54]

[Footnote 54: Analyt. Post. I. xviii. p. 81, a. 38-b. 9. In this
important chapter (the doctrines of which are more fully expanded in
the last chapter of the Second Book of the Analyt. Post.), the text
of Waitz does not fully agree with that of Julius Pacius. In Firmin
Didot's edition the text is the same as in Waitz; but his Latin
translation remains adapted to that of Julius Pacius. Waitz gives the
substance of the chapter as follows (ad Organ. II. p. 347):--
"Universales propositiones omnes inductione comparantur, quum etiam
in iis, quæ a sensibus maxime aliena videntur et quæ, ut mathematica
([Greek: ta\ e)x a)phaire/seôs]), cogitatione separantur à materia
quacum conjuncta sunt, inductione probentur ea quæ de genero (e. g.,
de linea vel de corpore mathematico), ad quod demonstratio pertineat,
prædicentur [Greek: kath' au(ta/] et cum ejus natura conjuncta sint.
Inductio autem iis nititur quæ sensibus percipiuntur; nam res
singulares sentiuntur, scientia vero rerum singularium non datur sine
inductione, non datur inductio sine sensu."]

Aristotle next proceeds to show (what in previous passages he had
assumed)[55] that, if Demonstration or the syllogistic process be
possible--if there be any truths supposed demonstrable, this implies
that there must be primary or ultimate truths. It has been explained
that the constituent elements assumed in the Syllogism are three
terms and two propositions or premisses; in the major premiss, A is
affirmed (or denied) of all B; in the minor, B is affirmed of all C;
in the conclusion, A is affirmed (or denied) of all C.[56] Now it is
possible that there may be some one or more predicates higher than A,
but it is impossible that there can be an infinite series of such
higher predicates. So also there may be one or more subjects lower
than C, and of which C will be the predicate; but it is impossible
that there can be an infinite series of such lower subjects. In like
manner there may perhaps be one or more middle terms between A and B,
and between B and C; but it is impossible that there can be an
infinite series of such intervening middle terms. There must be a
limit to the series ascending, descending, or intervening.[57] These
remarks have no application to reciprocating propositions, in which
the predicate is co-extensive with the subject.[58] But they apply
alike to demonstrations negative and affirmative, and alike to all
the three figures of Syllogism.[59]

[Footnote 55: Analyt. Prior. I. xxvii. p. 43, a. 38; Analyt. Post. I.
ii. p. 71, b. 21.]

[Footnote 56: Analyt. Post. I. xix. p. 81, b. 10-17.]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. p. 81, b. 30-p. 82, a. 14.]

[Footnote 58: Ibid. p. 82, a. 15-20. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p.
117:--"Ceci ne saurait s'appliquer aux termes réciproques, parce que
dans les termes qui peuvent être attribués réciproquement l'un à
l'autre, on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait ni premier ni dernier
rélativement à l'attribution."]

[Footnote 59: Analyt. Post. I. xx., xxi. p. 82, a. 21-b. 36.]

In Dialectical Syllogism it is enough if the premisses be admitted or
reputed as propositions immediately true, whether they are so in
reality or not; but in Scientific or Demonstrative Syllogism they
must be so in reality: the demonstration is not complete unless it
can be traced up to premisses that are thus immediately or directly
true (without any intervening middle term).[60] That there are and
must be such primary or immediate premisses, Aristotle now undertakes
to prove, by some dialectical reasons, and other analytical or
scientific reasons.[61] He himself thus distinguishes them; but the
distinction is faintly marked, and amounts, at most, to this, that
the analytical reasons advert only to essential predication, and to
the conditions of scientific demonstration, while the dialectical
reasons dwell upon these, but include something else besides, viz.,
accidental predication. The proof consists mainly in the declaration
that, unless we assume some propositions to be true immediately,
indivisibly, undemonstrably,--Definition, Demonstration, and Science
would be alike impossible. If the ascending series of predicates is
endless, so that we never arrive at a highest generic predicate; if
the descending series of subjects is endless, so that we never reach
a lowest subject,--no definition can ever be attained. The essential
properties included in the definition, must be finite in number; and
the accidental predicates must also be finite in number, since they
have no existence except as attached to some essential subject, and
since they must come under one or other of the nine later
Categories.[62] If, then, the two extremes are thus fixed and
finite--the highest predicate and the lowest subject--it is
impossible that there can be an infinite series of terms between the
two. The intervening terms must be finite in number. The
Aristotelian theory therefore is, that there are certain
propositions directly and immediately true, and others derived from
them by demonstration through middle terms.[63] It is alike an error
to assert that every thing can be demonstrated, and that nothing can
be demonstrated.

[Footnote 60: Ibid. xix. p. 81, b. 18-29.]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. xxi. p. 82, b. 35; xxii. p. 84, a. 7: [Greek:
_logikô=s_ me\n ou)=n e)k tou/tôn a)/n tis pisteu/seie peri\ tou=
lechthe/ntos, _a)nalutikô=s_ de\ dia\ tô=nde phanero\n
suntomô/teron.] In Scholia, p. 227, a. 42, the same distinction is
expressed by Philoponus in the terms [Greek: logikô/tera] and [Greek:
pragmatôde/stera]. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles,
pp. 134, 261; Bassow, De Notionis Definitione, pp. 19, 20; Heyder,
Aristot. u. Hegel. Dialektik, pp. 316, 317.

Aristotle, however, does not always adhere closely to the
distinction. Thus, if we compare the _logical_ or _dialectical_
reasons given, p. 82, b. 37, seq., with the _analytical_, announced
as beginning p. 84, a. 8, seq., we find the same main topic dwelt
upon in both, namely, that to admit an infinite series excludes the
possibility of Definition. Both Alexander and Ammonius agree in
announcing this as the capital topic on which the proof turned; but
Alexander inferred from hence that the argument was purely
_dialectical_ ([Greek: logiko\n e)pichei/rêma]), while Ammonius
regarded it as a reason thoroughly convincing and evident: [Greek: o(
me/ntoi philo/sophos] (Ammonius) [Greek: e)/lege mê\ dia\ tou=to
le/gein _logika\_ ta\ e)picheirê/mata; e)narge\s ga\r o(/ti ei)si\n
o(rismoi/, ei) mê\ a)katalêpsi/an ei)saga/gômen] (Schol. p. 227, a.
40, seq., Brand.).]

[Footnote 62: Analyt. Post. I. xxii. p. 83, a. 20, b. 14. Only eight
of the ten Categories are here enumerated.]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. I. xxii. p. 84, a. 30-35. The paraphrase of
Themistius (pp. 55-58, Spengel) states the Aristotelian reasoning in
clearer language than Aristotle himself. Zabarella (Comm. in Analyt.
Post. I. xviii.; context. 148, 150, 154) repeats that Aristotle's
proof is founded upon the undeniable fact that there _are_
definitions, and that without them there could be no demonstration
and no science. This excludes the supposition of an infinite series
of predicates and of middle terms:--"Sumit rationem à definitione; si
in _predicatis in quid_ procederetur ad infinitum, sequeretur auferri
definitionem et omnino essentiæ cognitionem; sed hoc dicendum non
est, quum omnium consensioni adversetur" (p. 466, Ven. 1617).]

It is plain from Aristotle's own words[64] that he intended these
four chapters (xix.-xxii.) as a confirmation of what he had already
asserted in chapter iii. of the present treatise, and as farther
refutation of the two distinct classes of opponents there indicated:
(1) those who said that everything was demonstrable, demonstration in
a circle being admissible; (2) those who said that nothing was
demonstrable, inasmuch as the train of predication upwards,
downwards, and intermediate, was infinite. Both these two classes of
opponents agreed in saying, that there were no truths immediate and
indemonstrable; and it is upon this point that Aristotle here takes
issue with them, seeking to prove that there are and must be such
truths. But I cannot think the proof satisfactory; nor has it
appeared so to able commentators either of ancient or modern
times--from Alexander of Aphrodisias down to Mr. Poste.[65] The
elaborate amplification added in these last chapters adds no force to
the statement already given at the earlier stage; and it is in one
respect a change for the worse, inasmuch as it does not advert to the
important distinction announced in chapter iii., between universal
truths known by Induction (from sense and particulars), and universal
truths known by Deduction from these. The truths immediate and
indemonstrable (not known through a middle term) are the inductive
truths, as Aristotle declares in many places, and most emphatically
at the close of the Analytica Posteriora. But in these chapters, he
hardly alludes to Induction. Moreover, while trying to prove that
there must be immediate universal truths, he neither gives any
complete list of them, nor assigns any positive characteristic
whereby to identify them. Opponents might ask him whether these
immediate universal truths were not ready-made inspirations of the
mind; and if so, what better authority they had than the Platonic
Ideas, which are contemptuously dismissed.

[Footnote 64: Analyt. Post. I. xxii. p. 84, a. 32: [Greek: o(/per
e)/phame/n tinas le/gein kat' a)rcha/s], &c.]

[Footnote 65: See Mr. Poste's note, p. 77, of his translation of this
treatise. After saying that the first of Aristotle's _dialectical_
proofs is faulty, and that the second is a _petitio principii_, Mr.
Poste adds, respecting the so-called _analytical_ proof given by
Aristotle:--"It is not so much a proof, as a more accurate
determination of the principle to be postulated. This postulate, the
existence of first principles, as concerning the constitution of the
world, appears to belong properly to Metaphysics, and is merely
borrowed by Logic. See Metaph. ii. 2, and Introduction." In the
passage of the Metaphysica ([Greek: a]. p. 994) here cited the main
argument of Aristotle is open to the same objection of _petitio
principii_ which Mr. Poste urges against Aristotle's second
_dialectical_ argument in this place.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, takes for granted that
there _must_ be immediate, indemonstrable truths, to serve as a basis
for deduction; "that there cannot be a chain of proof suspended from
nothing;" that there must be ultimate laws of nature, though we
cannot be sure that the laws now known to us are ultimate.

On the other hand, we read in the recent work of an acute
contemporary philosopher, Professor Delboeuf (Essai de Logique
Scientifique, Liège, 1865, Pref. pp. v, vii, viii, pp. 46, 47:)--"Il
est des points sur lesquels je crains de ne m'être pas expliqué assez
nettement, entre autres la question du fondement de la certitude. Je
suis de ceux qui repoussent de toutes leurs forces l'axiome si
spécieux qu'on ne peut tout démontrer; cette proposition aurait, à
mes yeux, plus besoin que toute autre d'une démonstration. Cette
démonstration ne sera en partie donnée que quand on aura une bonne
fois énuméré toutes les propositions indémontrables; et quand on aura
bien défini le caractère auquel on les reconnait. Nulle part on ne
trouve ni une semblable énumération, ni une semblable définition. On
reste à cet égard dans une position vague, et par cela même facile à
défendre."

It would seem, by these words, that M. Delboeuf stands in the most
direct opposition to Aristotle, who teaches us that the [Greek:
a)rchai\] or _principia_ from which demonstration starts cannot be
themselves demonstrated. But when we compare other passages of M.
Delboeuf's work, we find that, in rejecting all undemonstrable
propositions, what he really means is to reject all _self-evident
universal truths_, "C'est donc une véritable illusion d'admettre des
vérités évidentes par elles-mêmes. Il n'y a pas de proposition fausse
que nous ne soyons disposés d'admettre comme axiome, quand rien ne
nous a encore autorisés à la repousser" (p. ix.). This is quite true
in my opinion; but the immediate indemonstrable truths for which
Aristotle contends as [Greek: a)rchai\] of demonstration, are not
announced by him as _self-evident_, they are declared to be results
of sense and induction, to be raised from observation of particulars
multiplied, compared, and permanently formularized under the
intellectual _habitus_ called Noûs. By Demonstration Aristotle means
deduction in its most perfect form, beginning from these [Greek:
a)rchai\] which are inductively known but not demonstrable (_i. e._
not knowable deductively). And in this view the very able and
instructive treatise of M. Delboeuf mainly coincides, assigning even
greater preponderance to the inductive process, and approximating in
this respect to the important improvements in logical theory advanced
by Mr. John Stuart Mill.

Among the universal propositions which are not derived from
Induction, but which serve as [Greek: a)rchai\] for Deduction and
Demonstration, we may reckon the religious, ethical, æsthetical,
social, political, &c., beliefs received in each different community,
and impressed upon all newcomers born into it by the force of
precept, example, authority. Here the major premiss is felt by each
individual as carrying an authority of its own, stamped and enforced
by the sanction of society, and by the disgrace or other penalties in
store for those who disobey it. It is ready to be interpreted and
diversified by suitable minor premisses in all inferential
applications. But these [Greek: a)rchai\] for deduction, differing
widely at different times and places, though generated in the same
manner and enforced by the same sanction, would belong more properly
to the class which Aristotle terms [Greek: ta\ e)/ndoxa].]

We have thus recognized that there exist immediate (ultimate or
primary) propositions, wherein the conjunction between predicate and
subject is such that no intermediate term can be assigned between
them. When A is predicated both of B and C, this may perhaps be in
consequence of some common property possessed by B and C, and such
common property will form a middle term. For example, equality of
angles to two right angles belongs both to an isosceles and to a
scalene triangle, and it belongs to them by reason of their common
property--triangular figure; which last is thus the middle term. But
this need not be always the case.[66] It is possible that the two
propositions--A predicated of B, A predicated of C--may both of them
be immediate propositions; and that there may be no community of
nature between B and C. Whenever a middle term can be found,
demonstration is possible; but where no middle term can be found,
demonstration is impossible. The proposition, whether affirmative or
negative, is then an immediate or indivisible one. Such propositions,
and the terms of which they are composed, are the ultimate elements
or _principia_ of Demonstration. Predicate and subject are brought
constantly into closer and closer conjunction, until at last they
become one and indivisible.[67] Here we reach the unit or element of
the syllogizing process. In all scientific calculations there is
assumed an unit to start from, though in each branch of science it is
a different unit; _e.g._ in barology, the pound-weight; in harmonics,
the quarter-tone; in other branches of science, other units.[68]
Analytical research teaches us that the corresponding unit in
Syllogism is the affirmative or negative proposition which is
primary, immediate, indivisible. In Demonstration and Science it is
the Noûs or Intellect.[69]

[Footnote 66: Analyt. Post. I. xxiii. p. 84, b. 3-18. [Greek: tou=to
d' ou)k a)ei\ ou(/tôs e)/chei.]]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. b. 25-37. [Greek: a)ei\ to\ me/son puknou=tai,
e(/ôs a)diai/reta ge/nêtai kai\ e(/n. e)/sti d' e(/n, o(/tan a)/meson
ge/nêtai kai\ mi/a pro/tasis a(plô=s ê( a)/mesos.]]

[Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. I. xxiii. p. 84, b. 37: [Greek: kai\
ô(/sper e)n toi=s a)/llois ê( a)rchê\ a(plou=n, tou=to d' ou) tau)to\
pantachou=, a)ll' e)n barei= me\n mna=, e)n de\ me/lei di/esis,
a)/llo d' e)n a)/llô|, ou(/tôs e)n sullogismô=| to\ e(\n pro/tasis
a)/mesos, e)n d' a)podei/xei kai\ e)pistê/mê| o( nou=s.]]

[Footnote 69: Ibid. b. 35-p. 85, a. 1.]

Having thus, in the long preceding reasoning, sought to prove that
all demonstration must take its departure from primary undemonstrable
_principia_--from some premisses, affirmative and negative, which are
directly true in themselves, and not demonstrable through any middle
term or intervening propositions, Aristotle now passes to a different
enquiry. We have some demonstrations in which the conclusion is
Particular, others in which it is Universal: again, some Affirmative,
some Negative, Which of the two, in each of these alternatives, is
the best? We have also demonstrations Direct or Ostensive, and
demonstrations Indirect or by way of _Reductio ad Absurdum_. Which of
these two is the best? Both questions appear to have been subjected
to debate by contemporary philosophers.[70]

[Footnote 70: Ibid. xxiv. p. 85, a. 13-18. [Greek: a)mphisbêtei=tai
pote/ra belti/ôn; ô(s d' au(/tôs kai\ peri\ tê=s a)podeiknu/nai
legome/nês kai\ tê=s ei)s to\ a)du/naton a)gou/sês a)podei/xeôs.]]

Aristotle discusses these points dialectically (as indeed he points
out in the Topica that the comparison of two things generally, as to
better and worse, falls under the varieties of
**dialectical enquiry[71]), first stating and next refuting
the arguments on the weaker side. Some persons may think (he says)
that demonstration of the Particular is better than demonstration of
the Universal: first, because it conducts to fuller cognition of that
which the thing is in itself, and not merely that which it is
_quatenus_ member of a class; secondly, because demonstrations of the
Universal are apt to generate an illusory belief, that the Universal
is a distinct reality apart from and independent of all its
particulars (_i.e._, that figure in general has a real existence
apart from all particular figures, and number in general apart from
all particular numbers, &c.), while demonstrations of the Particular
do not lead to any such illusion.[72]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 1, seq.]

[Footnote 72: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, a. 20-b. 3. Themistius,
pp. 58-59, Spengel: [Greek: ou) ga\r o(mô/numon to\ katho/lou
e)sti/n, ou)de\ phônê\ mo/non, a)ll' u(po/stasis, ou) chôristê\ me\n
ô(/sper ou)de\ ta\ sumbebêko/ta, e)nargô=s d' ou)=n emphainome/nê
toi=s pra/gmasin.] The Scholastic doctrine of _Universalia in re_ is
here expressed very clearly by Themistius.]

To these arguments Aristotle replies:--1. It is not correct to say
that cognition of the Particular is more complete, or bears more upon
real existence, than cognition of the Universal. The reverse would be
nearer to the truth. To know that the isosceles, _quatenus_ triangle,
has its three angles equal to two right angles, is more complete
cognition than knowing simply that the isosceles has its three angles
equal to two right angles. 2. If the Universal be not an equivocal
term--if it represents one property and one definition common to many
particulars, it then has a real existence as much or more than any
one or any number of the particulars. For all these particulars are
perishable, but the class is imperishable. 3. He who believes that
the universal term has one meaning in all the particulars, need not
necessarily believe that it has any meaning _apart_ from all
particulars; he need not believe this about Quiddity, any more than
he believes it about Quality or Quantity. Or if he does believe so,
it is his own individual mistake, not imputable to the demonstration.
4. We have shown that a complete demonstration is one in which the
middle term is the cause or reason of the conclusion. Now the
Universal is most of the nature of Cause; for it represents the First
Essence or the _Per Se_, and is therefore its own cause, or has no
other cause behind it. The demonstration of the Universal has thus
more of the Cause or the _Why_, and is therefore better than the
demonstration of the Particular. 5. In the Final Cause or End of
action, there is always some ultimate end for the sake of which the
intermediate ends are pursued, and which, as it is better than they,
yields, when it is known, the only complete explanation of the
action. So it is also with the Formal Cause: there is one highest
form which contains the _Why_ of the subordinate forms, and the
knowledge of which is therefore better; as when, for example, the
exterior angles of a given isosceles triangle are seen to be equal to
four right angles, not because it is isosceles or triangle, but
because it is a rectilineal figure. 6. Particulars, as such, fall
into infinity of number, and are thus unknowable; the Universal tends
towards oneness and simplicity, and is thus essentially knowable,
more fully demonstrable than the infinity of particulars. The
demonstration thereof is therefore better. 7. It is also better, on
another ground; for he that knows the Universal does in a certain
sense know also the Particular;[73] but he that knows the Particular
cannot be said in any sense to know the Universal. 8. The
_principium_ or perfection of cognition is to be found in the
immediate proposition, true _per se_. When we demonstrate, and thus
employ a middle term, the nearer the middle term approaches to that
_principium_, the better the demonstration is. The demonstration of
the Universal is thus better and more accurate than that of the
Particular.[74]

[Footnote 73: Compare Analyt. Post. I. i. p. 71, a. 25; also
Metaphys. A. p. 981, a. 12.]

[Footnote 74: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, b. 4-p. 86, a. 21. Schol.
p. 233, b. 6: [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ o)/ntôn gnôri/môn, ê( di'
e)latto/nôn me/sôn ai(retôte/ra; ma=llon ga\r e)ggute/rô tê=s tou=
nou= e)nergei/as.]]

Such are the several reasons enumerated by Aristotle in refutation of
the previous opinion stated in favour of the Particular. Evidently he
does not account them all of equal value: he intimates that some are
purely dialectical ([Greek: logika/]); and he insists most upon the
two following:--1. He that knows the Universal knows in a certain
sense the Particular; if he knows that every triangle has its three
angles equal to two right angles, he knows potentially that the
isosceles has its three angles equal to the same, though he may not
know as yet that the isosceles _is_ a triangle. But he that knows the
Particular does not in any way know the Universal, either actually or
potentially.[75] 2. The Universal is apprehended by Intellect or
Noûs, the highest of all cognitive powers; the Particular terminates
in sensation. Here, I presume, he means, that, in demonstration of
the Particular, the conclusion teaches you nothing more than you
might have learnt from a direct observation of sense; whereas in that
of the Universal the conclusion teaches you more than you could have
learnt from direct sensation, and comes into correlation with the
highest form of our intellectual nature.[76]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 86**, a. 22: [Greek: a)lla\
tô=n me\n ei)rême/nôn e)/nia logika/ e)sti; _ma/lista_ de\ dê=lon
o(/ti ê( katho/lou kuriôte/ra, o(/ti--o( de\ tau/tên e)/chôn tê\n
pro/tasin] (the Particular) [Greek: _to\ katho/lou ou)damô=s oi)=den,
ou)/te duna/mei ou)/t' e)nergei/a|_.]]

[Footnote 76: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: kai\ ê( me\n katho/lou noêtê/, ê(
de\ kata\ me/ros ei)s ai)/sthêsin teleuta=|.] Compare xxiii. p. 84,
b. 39, where we noticed the doctrine that [Greek: Nou=s] is the
_unit_ of scientific demonstration.]

Next, Aristotle compares the Affirmative with the Negative
demonstration, and shows that the Affirmative is the better. Of two
demonstrations (he lays it down) that one which proceeds upon a
smaller number of postulates, assumptions, or propositions, is better
than the other; for, to say nothing of other reasons, it conducts you
more speedily to knowledge than the other, and that is an advantage.
Now, both in the affirmative and in the negative syllogism, you must
have three terms and two propositions; but in the affirmative you
assume only that something _is_; while in the negative you assume
both that something _is_, and that something _is not_. Here is a
double assumption instead of a single; therefore the negative is the
worse or inferior of the two.[77] Moreover, for the demonstration of
a negative conclusion, you require one affirmative premiss (since
from two negative premisses nothing whatever can be concluded); while
for the demonstration of an affirmative conclusion, you must have two
affirmative premisses, and you cannot admit a negative. This, again,
shows that the affirmative is logically prior, more trustworthy, and
better than the negative.[78] The negative is only intelligible and
knowable through the affirmative, just as _Non-Ens_ is knowable only
through _Ens_. The affirmative demonstration therefore, as involving
better principles, is, on this ground also, better than the
negative.[79] _A fortiori_, it is also better than the demonstration
by way of _Reductio ad Absurdum_, which was the last case to be
considered. This, as concluding only indirectly and from
impossibility of the contradictory, is worse even than the negative;
much more therefore is it worse than the direct affirmative.[80]

[Footnote 77: Analyt. Post. I. xxv. p. 86, a. 31-b. 9.]

[Footnote 78: Ibid. b. 10-30.]

[Footnote 79: Ibid. b. 30-39.]

[Footnote 80: Ibid. I. xxvi. p. 87, a. 2-30. Waitz (II. p. 370),
says: "deductio (ad absurdum), quippe quæ per ambages cogat, post
ponenda, est demonstrationi rectæ."

Philoponus says (Schol. pp. 234-235**, Brand.) that the
Commentators all censured Aristotle for the manner in which he here
laid out the Syllogism [Greek: di' a)duna/tou]. I do not, however,
find any such censure in Themistius. Philoponus defends Aristotle
from the censure.]

If we next compare one Science with another, the prior and more
accurate of the two is, (1) That which combines at once the [Greek:
o(/ti] and the [Greek: dio/ti]; (2) That which is abstracted from
material conditions, as compared with that which is immersed
therein--for example, arithmetic is more accurate than harmonics;
(3) The more simple as compared with the more complex: thus,
arithmetic is more accurate than geometry, a monad or unit is a
substance without position, whereas a point (more concrete) is a
substance with position.[81] One and the same science is that which
belongs to one and the same generic subject-matter. The premisses of
a demonstration must be included in the same genus with the
conclusion; and where the ultimate premisses are heterogeneous, the
cognition derived from them must be considered as not one but a
compound of several.[82] You may find two or more distinct middle
terms for demonstrating the same conclusion; sometimes out of the
same logical series or table, sometimes out of different tables.[83]

[Footnote 81: Analyt. Post. I. xxvii. p. 87, a. 31-37. Themistius,
Paraphras. p. 60, ed. Speng.: [Greek: kat' a)/llon de\ (tro/pon),
e)a\n ê( me\n peri\ u(pokei/mena/ tina kai\ ai)sthêta\
pragmateu/êtai, ê( de\ peri\ noêta\ kai\ katho/lou.]

Philoponus illustrates this (Schol. p. 235, b. 41, Br.): [Greek:
oi(=on ta\ Theodosi/ou sphairika\ a)kribe/stera/ e)stin e)pistê/mê|
tê=s tô=n Au)tolu/kou peri\ kinoume/nês sphai/ras.] &c.]

[Footnote 82: Analyt. Post. I. xxviii. p. 87, a. 38-b. 5. Themistius,
p. 61: [Greek: dê=lon de\ tou=to gi/netai proi+ou=sin e)pi\ ta\s
a)napodei/ktous a)rcha/s; au(=tai ga\r ei) mêdemi/an e)/choien
sugge/neian, e(/terai ai( e)pistê=mai.]]

[Footnote 83: Analyt. Post. I. xxix. p. 87, b. 5-18. Aristotle gives
an example to illustrate this general doctrine: [Greek: ê(/desthai,
to\ kinei=sthai, to\ ê)remi/zesthai, to\ metaba/llein]. As he
includes these terms und this subject among the topics for
demonstration, it is difficult to see where he would draw a distinct
line between topics for Demonstration and topics for Dialectic.]

There cannot be demonstrative cognition of fortuitous events,[84] for
all demonstration is either of the necessary or of the customary. Nor
can there be demonstrative cognition through sensible perception. For
though by sense we perceive a thing as such and such (through its
sensible qualities), yet we perceive it inevitably as _hoc aliquid_,
_hic_, _et nunc_. But the Universal cannot be perceived by sense; for
it is neither _hic_ nor _nunc_, but _semper et ubique_.[85] Now
demonstrations are all accomplished by means of the Universal, and
demonstrative cognition cannot therefore be had through sensible
perception. If the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two
right angles were a fact directly perceivable by sense, we should
still have looked out for a demonstration thereof: we should have no
proper scientific cognition of it (though some persons contend for
this): for sensible perception gives us only particular cases, and
Cognition or Science proper comes only through knowing the
Universal.[86] If, being on the surface of the moon, we had on any
one occasion seen the earth between us and the sun, we could not have
known from that single observation that such interposition is the
cause universally of eclipses. We cannot directly by sense perceive
the Universal, though sense is the _principium_ of the Universal. By
multiplied observation of sensible particulars, we can hunt out and
elicit the Universal, enunciate it clearly and separately, and make
it serve for demonstration.[87] The Universal is precious, because it
reveals the Cause or [Greek: dio/ti], and is therefore more precious,
not merely than sensible observation, but also than intellectual
conception of the [Greek: o(/ti] only, where the Cause or [Greek:
dio/ti] lies apart, and is derived from a higher genus. Respecting
First Principles or _Summa Genera_, we must speak elsewhere.[88] It
is clear, therefore, that no demonstrable matter can be known,
properly speaking, from direct perception of sense; though there are
cases in which nothing but the impossibility of direct observation
drives us upon seeking for demonstration. Whenever we can get an
adequate number of sensible observations, we can generalize the fact;
and in some instances we may perhaps not seek for any demonstrative
knowledge (_i.e._ to explain it by any higher principle). If we could
see the pores in glass and the light passing through them, we should
learn through many such observations why combustion arises on the
farther side of the glass; each of our observations would have been
separate and individual, but we should by intellect generalize the
result that all the cases fall under the same law.[89]

[Footnote 84: Analyt. Post. I. xxx. p. 87, b. 19-27.]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. xxxi. p. 87, b. 28: [Greek: ei) ga\r kai\ e)/stin
ê( ai)/sthêsis tou= toiou=de kai\ mê\ tou=de/ tinos, a)ll'
ai)stha/nesthai/ ge a)nagkai=on to/de ti kai\ pou= kai\ nu=n.]]

[Footnote 86: Ibid. b. 35: [Greek: dê=lon o(/ti kai\ ei) ê)=n
ai)stha/nesthai to\ tri/gônon o(/ti dusi\n o)rthai=s i)/sas e)/chei
ta\s gôni/as, e)zêtou=men a)\n a)po/deixin, kai\ ou)ch (_ô(/sper
phasi/ tines_) ê)pista/metha; ai)stha/nesthai me\n ga\r a)na/gkê
kath' e(/kaston, ê( d' e)pistê/mê tô=| to\ katho/lou gnôri/zein
e)sti/n.]

Euclid, in the 20th Proposition of his first Book, demonstrates that
any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side.
According to Proklus, the Epikureans derided the demonstration of
such a point as absurd; and it seems that some contemporaries of
Aristotle argued in a similar way, judging by the phrase [Greek:
ô(/sper phasi/ tines].]

[Footnote 87: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 2: [Greek: ou) mê\n
a)ll' e)k tou= theôrei=n tou=to polla/kis sumbai=non, to\ katho/lou
a)\n thêreu/santes a)po/deixin ei)/chomen; e)k ga\r tô=n kath'
e(/kasta pleio/nôn to\ katho/lou dê=lon.] Themistius, p. 62, Sp.:
[Greek: a)rchê\ me\n ga\r a)podei/xeôs ai)/sthêsis, kai\ to\
katho/lou e)nnoou=men dia\ to\ polla/kis ai)sthe/sthai.]]

[Footnote 88: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 6: [Greek: to\ de\
katho/lou ti/mion, o(/ti dêloi= to\ ai)/tion; ô(/ste peri\ tô=n
toiou/tôn ê( katho/lou timiôte/ra tô=n ai)sthê/seôn kai\ tê=s
noê/seôs, o(/sôn e(/teron to\ ai)/tion; peri\ de\ tô=n prô/tôn
a)/llos lo/gos.]

By [Greek: ta\ prô=ta], he means the [Greek: a)rchai\] of
Demonstration, which are treated especially in II. xix. See Biese,
Die Philos. des Aristoteles, p. 277.]

[Footnote 89: Analyt. Post. I. xxxi. p. 88, a. 9-17. [Greek: e)/sti
me/ntoi e)/nia a)nago/mena ei)s ai)sthê/seôs e)/kleipsin e)n toi=s
problê/masin; e)/nia ga\r ei) e(ô/rômen, ou)k a)\n e)zêtou=men, ou)ch
ô(s ei)do/tes tô=| o(ra=|n, a)ll' ô(s e)/chontes to\ katho/lou e)k
tou= o(ra=|n.]

The text of this and the succeeding words seems open to doubt, as
well as that of Themistius (p. 63). Waitz in his note (p. 374)
explains the meaning clearly:--"non ita quidem ut ipsa sensuum
perceptio scientiam afferat; sed ita ut quod in singulis accidere
videamus, idem etiam in omnibus accidere coniicientes universe
intelligamus."]

Aristotle next proceeds to refute, at some length, the supposition,
that the _principia_ of all syllogisms are the same. We see at once
that this cannot be so, because some syllogisms are true, others
false. But, besides, though there are indeed a few Axioms essential
to the process of demonstration, and the same in all syllogisms, yet
these are not sufficient of themselves for demonstration. There must
farther be other premisses or matters of evidence--propositions
immediately true (or established by prior demonstrations) belonging
to each branch of Science specially, as distinguished from the
others. Our demonstration relates _to_ these special matters or
premisses, though it is accomplished _out of_ or by means of the
common Axioms.[90]

[Footnote 90: Analyt. Post. I. xxxii. p. 88, a. 18-b. 29. [Greek: ai(
ga\r a)rchai\ dittai/, e)x ô(=n te kai\ peri\ o(\; ai( me\n ou)=n e)x
ô(=n koinai/, ai( de\ peri\ o(/ i)/diai, oi(=on a)rithmo/s,
me/gethos.] Compare xi. p. 77, a. 27. See Barthélemy St. Hilaire,
Plan Général des Derniers Analytiques, p. lxxxi.]

Science or scientific Cognition differs from true Opinion, and the
_cognitum_ from the _opinatum_, herein, that Science is of the
Universal, and through necessary premisses which cannot be otherwise;
while Opinion relates to matters true, yet which at the same time may
possibly be false. The belief in a proposition which is immediate
(_i. e._, undemonstrable) yet not necessary, is Opinion; it is not
Science, nor is it Noûs or Intellect--the _principium_ of Science or
scientific Cognition. Such beliefs are fluctuating, as we see every
day; we all distinguish them from other beliefs, which we cannot
conceive not to be true and which we call cognitions.[91] But may
there not be Opinion and Cognition respecting the same matters? There
may be (says Aristotle) in different men, or in the same man at
different times; but not in the same man at the same time. There may
also be, respecting the same matter, true opinion in one man's mind,
and false opinion in the mind of another.[92]

[Footnote 91: Analyt. Post. I. xxxiii. p. 88, b. 30-p. 89, a. 10.]

[Footnote 92: Ibid. p. 89, a. 11-b. 6. That eclipse of the sun is
caused by the interposition of the moon was to the astronomer
Hipparchos scientific Cognition; for he saw that it _could not_ be
otherwise. To the philosopher Epikurus it was Opinion; for he thought
that it _might_ be otherwise (Themistius, p. 66, Spengel).]

With some remarks upon Sagacity, or the power of divining a middle
term in a time too short for reflection (as when the friendship of
two men is on the instant referred to the fact of their having a
common enemy), the present book is brought to a close.[93]

[Footnote 93: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 89, b. 10-20.]



CHAPTER VIII.

ANALYTICA POSTERIORA II.

Aristotle begins the Second Book of the Analytica Posteriora by an
enumeration and classification of Problems or Questions suitable for
investigation. The matters knowable by us may be distributed into
four classes:--

[Greek: O(/ti]. [Greek: Dio/ti]. [Greek: Ei) e)/sti]. [Greek: Ti/
e)sti].

1. Quod. 2. Cur. 3. An sit. 4. Quid sit.

Under the first head come questions of Fact; under the second head,
questions of Cause or Reason; under the third, questions of
Existence; under the fourth, questions of Essence. Under the first
head we enquire, Whether a fact or event is so or so? Whether a given
subject possesses this or that attribute, or is in this or that
condition? enumerating in the question the various supposable
alternatives. Under the second head, we assume the first question to
have been affirmatively answered, and we proceed to enquire, What is
the cause or reason for such fact, or such conjunction of subject and
attribute? Under the third head, we ask, Does a supposed subject
exist? And if the answer be in the affirmative, we proceed to
enquire, under the fourth head, What is the essence of the
subject?[1]

[Footnote 1: Analyt. Post. II. i. p. 89, b. 23, seq. Themistius
observes, p. 67, Speng.: [Greek: zêtou=men ti/nun ê)\ peri\ a(plou=
tino\s kai\ a)sunthe/tou, ê)\ peri\ sunthe/tou kai\ e)n prota/sei.]
Themistius has here changed Aristotle's order, and placed the third
and fourth heads before the first and second. Compare Schol. p. 240,
b. 30; p. 241, a. 18. The Scholiast complains of the enigmatical
style of Aristotle: [Greek: tê=| griphô/dei tou= r(êtou= e)paggeli/a]
(p. 240, b. 25).]

We have here two distinct pairs of _Quæsita_: Obviously the second
head presupposes the first, and is consequent thereupon; while the
fourth also presupposes the third. But it might seem a more suitable
arrangement (as Themistius and other expositors have conceived) that
the third and fourth heads should come first in the list, rather than
the first and second; since the third and fourth are simpler, and
come earlier in the order of philosophical exposition, while the
first and second are more complicated, and cannot be expounded
philosophically until after the philosophical exposition of the
others. This is cleared up by adverting to the distinction, so often
insisted on by Aristotle, between what is first in order of cognition
relatively to us (_nobis notiora_), and what is first in order of
cognition by nature (_naturâ notiora_). _To us_ (that is to men taken
individually and in the course of actual growth) the phenomena of
nature[2] present themselves as particulars confused and complicated
in every way, with attributes essential and accidental implicated
together: we gradually learn first to see and compare them as
particulars, next to resolve them into generalities, bundles,
classes, and partially to explain the _Why_ of some by means of
others. Here we start from facts embodied in propositions, that
include subjects clothed with their attributes. But in the _order of
nature_ (that is, in the order followed by those who know the
_scibile_ as a whole, and can expound it scientifically) that which
comes first is the Universal or the simple Subject abstracted from
its predicates or accompaniments: we have to enquire, first, whether
a given subject exists; next, if it does exist, what is its real
constituent essence or definition. We thus see the reason for the
order in which Aristotle has arranged the two co-ordinate pairs of
_Quæsita_ or Problems, conformable to the different processes
pursued, on the one hand, by the common intellect, growing and
untrained--on the other, by the mature or disciplined intellect,
already competent for philosophical exposition and applying itself to
new _incognita_.

[Footnote 2: **Schol. Philopon. p. 241, a. 18-24: [Greek:
tou/tôn to\ ei) e)/sti kai\ to\ ti/ e)stin ei)si\n a(pla=, to\ de\
o(/ti kai\ to\ dio/ti su/ntheta--pro/tera ga\r ê(mi=n kai\
gnôrimô/tera ta\ su/ntheta, ô(s tê=| phu/sei ta\ a(pla=.]

Mr. Poste observes upon this quadruple classification by Aristotle
(p. 96):--"The two last of these are problems of Inductive, but first
principles of Deductive, Science; the one being the hypothesis, the
other the definition. The **attribute as well as the subject
must be defined (I. x.), so that to a certain degree the second
problem also is assumed among the principles of Demonstration."]

Comparing together these four _Quæsita_, it will appear that in the
first and third (_Quod_ and _An_), we seek to find out whether there
is or is not any middle term. In the second and fourth (_Cur_ and
_Quid_), we already know or assume that there is a middle term; and
we try to ascertain what that middle term is.[3] The enquiry _Cur_,
is in the main analogous to the enquiry _Quid_; in both cases, we aim
at ascertaining what the cause or middle term is. But, in the enquiry
_Cur_, what we discover is perhaps some independent fact or event,
which is the cause of the event _quæsitum_; while, in the enquiry
_Quid_, what we seek is the real essence or definition of the
substance--the fundamental, generating, immanent cause of its
concomitant attributes. Sometimes, however, the _Quid_ and the _Cur_
are only different ways of stating the same thing. _E.g._, _Quid est
eclipsis lunæ_? Answer: The essence of an eclipse is a privation of
light from the moon, through intervention of the earth between her
and the sun. _Cur locum habet eclipsis lunæ_? Answer: Because the
light of the sun is prevented from reaching the moon by intervention
of the earth. Here it is manifest that the answers to the enquiries
_Quid_ and _Cur_ are really and in substance the same fact, only
stated in different phrases.[4]

[Footnote 3: Analyt. Post. II. i. p. 889, b. 37-p. 90, a. 7. [Greek:
sumbai/nei a)/ra e)n a(pa/sais tai=s zêtê/sesi zêtei=n ê)\ ei) e)/sti
me/son, ê)\ ti/ e)sti to\ me/son; to\ me\n ga\r ai)/tion to\ me/son,
e)n a(/pasi de\ tou=to zêtei=tai.] Compare Schol. p. 241, b. 10, Br.]

[Footnote 4: Analyt. Post. II. ii. p. 90, a. 14-23, 31: [Greek: to\
ti/ e)stin ei)de/nai tau)to/ e)sti kai\ dia\ ti/ e)stin.]]

That the _quæsitum_ in all these researches is a middle term or
medium, is plain from those cases wherein the medium is perceivable
by sense; for then we neither require nor enter upon research. For
example, if we were upon the moon, we should see the earth coming
between us and the sun, now and in each particular case of eclipse.
Accordingly, after many such observations, we should affirm the
universal proposition, that such intervention of the earth was the
cause of eclipses; the universal becoming known to us through
induction of particular cases.[5] The middle term, the Cause, the
_Quid_, and the _Cur_, are thus all the same enquiry, in substance;
though sometimes such _quæsitum_ is the quiddity or essential nature
of the thing itself (as the essence of a triangle is the cause or
ground of its having its three angles equal to two right angles, as
well as of its other properties), sometimes it is an extraneous
fact.[6]

[Footnote 5: Ibid. a. 24-30. [Greek: e)k ga\r tou= ai)sthe/sthai kai\
to\ katho/lou e)ge/neto a)\n ê(mi=n ei)de/nai; ê( me\n ga\r
ai)/sthêsis o(/ti nu=n a)ntiphra/ttei; kai\ ga\r dê=lon o(/ti nu=n
e)klei/pei; e)k de\ tou/tou to\ katho/lou a)\n e)ge/neto.]

The purport and relation of this quadruple classification of problems
is set forth still more clearly in the sixth book of the Metaphysica
(Z. p. 1041) with the explanations of Bonitz, Comm. pp. 358, 359.]

[Footnote 6: Analyt. Post. II. ii. p. 90, a. 31.]

But how or by what process is this _quæsitum_ obtained and made
clear? Is it by Demonstration or by Definition? What is Definition,
and what matters admit of Definition?[7] Aristotle begins by treating
the question dialectically; by setting out a series of doubts and
difficulties. First, Is it possible that the same cognition, and in
the same relation, can be obtained both by Definition and by
Demonstration? No; it is not possible. It is plain that much that is
known by Demonstration cannot be known by Definition; for we have
seen that conclusions both particular and negative are established by
Demonstration (in the Third and Second figures), while every
Definition is universal and affirmative. But we may go farther and
say, that even where a conclusion universal and affirmative is
established (in the First figure) by Demonstration, that same
conclusion can never be known by Definition; for if it could be known
by Definition, it might have been known without Demonstration. Now we
are assured, by an uncontradicted induction, that this is not the
fact; for that which we know by Demonstration is either a proprium of
the subject _per se_, or an accident or concomitant; but no
Definition ever declares either the one or the other: it declares
only the essence.[8]

[Footnote 7: Ibid. iii. p. 90, a. 37: [Greek: ti/ e)stin o(rismo/s,
kai\ ti/nôn, ei)/pômen, diaporê/santes prô=ton peri\ au)tô=n.]]

[Footnote 8: Analyt. Post. II. iii. p. 90, b. 13: [Greek: i(kanê\ de\
pi/stis kai\ e)k tê=s e)pagôgê=s; ou)de\n ga\r pô/pote o(risa/menoi
e)/gnômen, ou)/te tô=n kath' au(to\ u(parcho/ntôn ou)/te tô=n
sumbebêko/tôn. e)/ti ei) o( o(rismo\s ou)si/as tis gnôrismo/s, ta\ ge
toiau=ta phanero\n o(/ti ou)k ou)si/ai.]]

Again, let us ask, _vice versâ_, Can everything that is declared by
Definition, or indeed anything that is declared by Definition, be
known also by Demonstration? Neither is this possible. One and the
same _cognitum_ can be known only by one process of cognition.
Definitions are the _principia_ from which Demonstration departs; and
we have already shown that in going back upon demonstrations, we must
stop somewhere, and must recognize some _principia_
undemonstrable.[9] The Definition can never be demonstrated, for it
declares only the essence of the subject, and does not predicate
anything concerning the subject; whereas Demonstration assumes the
essence to be known, and deduces from such assumption an attribute
distinct from the essence.[10]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. b. 18-27.]

[Footnote 10: Ibid. b. 33, seq.: [Greek: e)/ti pa=sa a)po/deixis ti\
kata/ tinos dei/knusin, oi(=on o(/ti e)/stin ê)\ ou)k e)/stin; e)n
de\ tô=| o(rismô=| ou)de\n e(/teron e(te/rou katêgorei=tai, oi(=on
ou)/te to\ zô=|on kata\ tou= di/podos ou)de\ tou=to kata\ tou=
zô=|ou--o( me\n ou)=n o(rismo\s ti/ e)sti dêloi=, ê( de\ a)po/deixis
o(/ti ê)\ e)/sti to/de kata\ tou=de ê)\ ou)k e)/stin.]

Themistius (p. 71, Speng.) distinguishes the [Greek: o(rismo/s]
itself from [Greek: ê( pro/tasis ê( to\n o(rismo\n katêgorou/menon
e)/chousa].]

Prosecuting still farther the dialectical and dubitative
treatment,[11] Aristotle now proceeds to suggest, that the Essence
(that is, the entire Essence or Quiddity), which is declared by
Definition, can never be known by Demonstration. To suppose that it
could be so known, would be inconsistent with the conditions of the
syllogistic proof used in demonstrating. You prove by syllogism,
through a middle term, some predicate or attribute; _e.g._ because A
is predicable of all B, and B is predicable of all C, therefore A is
predicable of all C. But you cannot prove, through the middle term B,
that A is the essence or quiddity of C, unless by assuming in the
premisses that B is the essence of C, and that A is the essence of B;
accordingly, that the three propositions, AB, BC, AC, are all
co-extensive and reciprocate with each other. Here, then, you have
assumed as your premisses two essential propositions, AB, BC, in
order to prove as an essential proposition the conclusion AC. But
this is inadmissible; for your premisses require demonstration as
much as your conclusion. You have committed a _Petitio
Principii_;[12] you have assumed in your minor premiss the very point
to be demonstrated.

[Footnote 11: Analyt. Post. II. iv. p. 91, a. 12: [Greek: tau=ta me\n
ou)=n me/chri tou/tou diêporê/sthô]. One would think, by these words,
that [Greek: to\ diaporei=n] (or the dubitative treatment) finished
here. But the fact is not so: that treatment is continued for four
chapters more, to the commencement of ch. viii. p. 93.]

[Footnote 12: Analyt. Post. II. iv. p. 91, a. 12-32: [Greek: tau=ta
d' a)na/gkê antistre/phein; ei) ga\r to\ A tou= G i)/dion, dê=lon
o(/ti kai\ tou= B kai\ tou=to tou= G, ô(/ste pa/nta
a)llê/lôn.--lamba/nei ou)=n o(\ dei= dei=xai; kai\ ga\r to\ B e)/sti
ti/ e)stin a)/nthrôpos.] Themistius, pp. 72, 73: [Greek: to\n
a)podeiknu/nta to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai tou= a)nthrô/pou, a)/llo ti dei=
prolabei=n tou= au)tou= to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai.--ou(= ga\r bou/letai
to\n o(rismo\n a)podei=xai, tou/tou prolamba/nei tina\ o(rismo\n
ei)=nai chôti\s a)podei/xeôs.]

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, notes, p. 205:--"Il faut donc, pour
conclure par syllogisme que A est la définition essentielle de C, que
A soit la définition essentielle de B, et que B soit lui-même la
définition essentielle de C. Mais alors la définition de la chose
sera dans le moyen terme lui-même, avant d'être dans la conclusion;
en effet, la mineure: B est la définition essentielle de C, donne la
définition essentielle de C, sans qu'il soit besoin d'aller jusqu'**à
la conclusion. Donc la démonstration de l'essence ainsi entendue est
absurde."]

If you cannot obtain Definition as the conclusion of syllogistic
Demonstration, still less can you obtain it through the method of
generic and specific Division; which last method (as has been already
shown in the Analytica Priora) is not equal even to the Syllogism in
respect of usefulness and efficacy.[13] You cannot in this method
distinguish between propositions both true and essential, and
propositions true but not essential; you never obtain, by asking
questions according to the method of generic subdivision, any
premisses from which the conclusion follows by necessity. Yet this is
what you ought to obtain for the purpose of Demonstration; for you
are not allowed to enunciate the full actual conclusion among the
premisses, and require assent to it. Division of a genus into its
species will often give useful information, as Induction also
will;[14] but neither the one nor the other will be equivalent to a
demonstration. A definition obtained only from subdivisions of a
genus, may always be challenged, like a syllogism without its middle
term.

[Footnote 13: Analyt. Post. II. v. p. 91, b. 12, seq.; Analyt. Prior.
I. xxxi. p. 46, a. 31. Aristotle here alludes to the method pursued
by Plato in the Sophistes and Politicus, though he does not name
Plato: [Greek: ê( dia\ tô=n diaire/seôn o(do/s], &c.]

[Footnote 14: Analyt. Post. II. v. p. 91, b. 15-33: [Greek: ou)de\
ga\r o( e)pa/gôn i)/sôs a)podei/knusin, a)ll' o(/môs dêloi= ti.]
Compare Themistius, p. 74.]

Again, neither can you arrive at the definition of a given subject,
by assuming in general terms what a definition ought to be, and then
declaring a given form of words to be conformable to such assumption;
because your minor premiss must involve _Petitio Principii_. The same
logical fault will be committed, if you take your departure from an
hypothesis in which you postulate the definition of a certain
subject, and then declare inferentially what the definition of its
contrary must be. The definition which you here assume requires proof
as much as that which you infer from it.[15] Moreover, neither by
this process, nor by that of generic subdivision, can you show any
reason why the parts of the definition should coalesce into one
essential whole. If they do not thus coalesce--if they be nothing
better than distinct attributes conjoined in the same subject, like
_musicus_ and _grammaticus_--the real essence is not declared, and
the definition is not a good one.[16]

[Footnote 15: Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 6-28. Themist. p. 76.

Rassow renders [Greek: e)x u(pothe/seôs]--"assumptâ generali
definitionis notione;" and also says: "[Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n
ei)=nai]--generalem definitionis notionem; [Greek: to\ ti/
e)stin]--certam quandam definitionem, significare perspicuum est."
(Aristotelis de Notionis Definitione Doctrina, p. 65).]

[Footnote 16: Analyt. Post. II. vi. p. 92, a. 32. That the parts of
the definition must coalesce into one unity is laid down again in the
Metaphysica, Z. pp. 1037, 1038, where Aristotle makes reference to
the Analytica as haying already treated the same subject, and
professes an intention to complete what has been begun in the
Analytica; [Greek: e)ph' o(/son e)n toi=s A)nalutikoi=s peri\
o(rismou= mê\ ei)/rêtai.]]

After stating some other additional difficulties which seem to leave
the work of Definition inexplicable, Aristotle relinquishes the
dubitative treatment, and looks out for some solution of the puzzle:
How may it be possible that the Definition shall become known?[17] He
has already told us that to know the essence of a thing is the same
as to know the cause or reason of its existence; but we must first
begin by knowing that the _definiendum_ exists; for there can be no
definition of a non-entity, except a mere definition of the word, a
nominal or verbal definition. Now sometimes we know the existence of
the subject by one or other of its accidental attributes; but this
gives us no help towards finding the definition.[18] Sometimes,
however, we obtain a partial knowledge of its essence along with the
knowledge of its existence; when we know it along with some constant
antecedent, or through some constant, though derivative, consequent.
Knowing thus much, we can often discover the cause or fundamental
condition thereof, which is the essence or definition of the
subject.[19] Indeed, it may happen that the constant derivative, and
the fundamental essence on which it depends, become known both
together; or, again, the cause or fundamental condition may perhaps
not be the essence of the subject alone, but some fact including
other subjects also; and this fact may then be stated as a middle
term. Thus, in regard to eclipse of the moon, we know the constant
phenomenal fact about it, that, on a certain recurrence of the time
of full moon, the moon casts no light and makes no shadow. Hence we
proceed to search out the cause. Is it interposition of the earth, or
conversion of the moon's body, or extinction of her light, &c.? The
new fact when shown, must appear as a middle term, throwing into
syllogistic form (in the First figure) the cause or rational
explanation of a lunar eclipse; showing not merely that there is an
eclipse, but what an eclipse is, or what is its definition.[20]

[Footnote 17: Analyt. Post. II. vii. p. 92, a. 34, seq. The [Greek:
a)po/riai] continue to the end of ch. vii. He goes on, ch. viii. p.
93, a. 1-2: [Greek: pa/lin de\ skepte/on ti/ tou/tôn le/getai kalô=s,
kai\ ti/ ou) kalô=s], &c. "Tout ce qui précède ne représente pas la
théorie proprement dite; ce n'est qu'une discussion préliminaire"
(Barth. St. Hilaire, not. p. 222). These difficult chapters are well
illustrated by Hermann Rassow, ch, i. pp. 9-14.]

[Footnote 18: Analyt. Post. II. viii. p. 93, a. 3: [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)sti/n, ô(s e)/phamen, tau)to\n to\ ei)de/nai ti/ e)sti kai\ to\
ei)de/nai to\ ai)/tion tou= ei) e)/sti;] Ibid. a. 24: [Greek: o(/sa
me\n ou)=n kata\ sumbebêko\s oi)/damen o(/ti e)/stin, a)nagkai=on
mêdamô=s e)/chein pro\s to\ ti/ e)stin; **ou)de\ ga\r o(/ti
e)/stin i)/smen; to\ de\ zêtei=n ti/ e)sti mê\ e)/chontas o(/ti
e)/sti, mêde\n zêtei=n e)sti/n. kath' o(/sôn d' e)/chome/n ti,
r(a=|on; ô(/ste ô(s e)/chomen o(/ti e)/stin, ou(/tôs e)/chomen kai\
pro\s to\ ti/ e)stin.] Compare Brentano, Ueber die Bedeutung des
Seienden nach Aristoteles, p. 17.]

[Footnote 19: Analyt. Post. II. viii. p. 93, a. 21. Themistius, p.
79, Speng.: [Greek: o(/sa de\ a)po\ tô=n oi)kei/ôn te kai\ e)x
au)tou= tou= pra/gmatos, a)po\ tou/tôn ê)/dê r(a=|on ei)s to\ ti/
e)sti metabai/nomen.]]

[Footnote 20: Ibid. p. 93, a. 30-b. 14.]

Aristotle has thus shown how the Essence or Quiddity ([Greek: ti/
e)sti]) may become known in this class of cases. There is neither
syllogism nor demonstration thereof, yet it is declared through
syllogism and demonstration: though no demonstration thereof is
possible, yet you cannot know it without demonstration, wherever
there is an extraneous cause.[21]

[Footnote 21: Ibid. b. 15-20: [Greek: ô(/ste sullogismo\s me\n tou=
ti/ e)stin ou) gi/netai ou)d' a)po/deixis, dê=lon me/ntoi dia\
sullogismou= kai\ di' a)podei/xeôs.]

Mr. Poste translates an earlier passage (p. 93, a. 5) in this very
difficult chapter as follows (p. 107): "If one cause is demonstrable,
another indemonstrable cause must be the intermediate; and the proof
is in the first figure, and the conclusion affirmative and universal.
In this mode of demonstrating the essence, we prove one definition by
another, for the intermediate that proves an essence or a peculiar
predicate must itself be an essence or a peculiar predicate. Of two
definitions, then, one is proved and the other assumed; and, as we
said before, this is not a demonstration but a dialectical proof of
the essence." Mr. Poste here translates [Greek: logiko\s
sullogismo/s] "dialectical proof." I understand it rather as meaning
a syllogism, [Greek: tou= u(pa/rchein] simply (Top. I. v. p. 102, b.
5), in which all that you really know is that the predicate belongs
to the subject, but in which you _assume_ besides that it belongs to
the subject _essentially_. It is not a demonstration because, in
order to obtain Essence in the conclusion, you are obliged to
postulate Essence in your premiss. (See Alexander ad Topic. I. p.
263, Br.). You have therefore postulated a premiss which required
proof as much as the conclusion.]

But the above doctrine will hold only in cases where there _is_ a
distinct or extraneous cause; it will not hold in cases where there
is none. It is only in the former (as has been said) that a middle
term can be shown; rendering it possible that Quiddity or Essence
should be declared by a valid formal syllogism, though it cannot be
demonstrated by syllogism. In the latter, where there is no distinct
cause, no such middle term can be enunciated: the Quiddity or Essence
must be assumed as an immediate or undemonstrable principium, and
must be exposed or set out in the best manner practicable as an
existent reality, on Induction or on some other authority. The
arithmetician makes his first steps by assuming both what a monad is
and that there exists such a monad.[22]

[Footnote 22: Analyt. Post. II. ix. p. 93, b. 21. [Greek: e)/sti de\
tô=n me\n e(/tero/n ti ai)/tion, tô=n d' ou)k e)/stin. ô(/ste dê=lon
o(/ti kai\ tô=n ti/ e)sti ta\ me\n a)/mesa kai\ a)rchai/ ei)sin, a(\
kai\ ei)=nai kai\ ti/ e)stin u(pothe/sthai dei= ê)\ a)/llon tro/pon
phanera\ poiê=sai. o(/per o( a)rithmêtiko\s poiei=; kai\ ga\r ti/
e)sti tê\n mona/da u(poti/thetai, kai\ o(/ti e)/stin.]

Themistius, p. 80: [Greek: a(\ kai\ ei)=nai kai\ ti/ e)stin
u(pothe/sthai dei=, ê)\ a)/llon tro/pon phanera\ poiê=sai e)x
e)pagôgê=s ê)\ pi/steôs ê)\ e)mpeiri/as.] Rassow, De Notionis
Definitione, pp. 18-22.]

We may distinguish three varieties of Definition. 1. Sometimes it is
the mere explanation what a word signifies; in this sense, it has
nothing to do with essence or existence; it is a nominal definition
and nothing more.[23] 2. Sometimes it enunciates the Essence, cause,
or reason of the _definitum_; this will happen where the cause is
distinct or extraneous, and where there is accordingly an intervening
middle term: the definition will then differ from a demonstration
only by condensing into one enunciation the two premisses and the
conclusion which together constitute the demonstration.[24] 3.
Sometimes it is an immediate proposition, an indemonstrable
hypothesis, assuming Essence or Quiddity; the essence itself being
cause, and no extraneous cause--no intervening middle term--being
obtainable.[25]

[Footnote 23: Analyt. Post. II. x. p. 93, b. 29-37.]

[Footnote 24: Ibid. p. 93, b. 38, seq. [Greek: oi(=on a)po/deixis
tou= ti/ e)stin, tê=| the/sei diaphe/rôn tê=s
a)podei/xeôs;--sullogismo\s tou= ti/ e)sti, ptô/sei diaphe/rôn tê=s
a)podei/xeôs]--differing "situ et positione terminorum" (Julius
Pacius, p. 493).]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. p. 94, a. 9: [Greek: o( de\ tô=n a)me/sôn
o(rismo/s, the/sis e)sti\ tou= ti/ e)stin a)napo/deiktos.] Compare I.
xxiv. p. 85, b. 24: [Greek: ô(=| ga\r kath' au(to\ u(pa/rchei ti,
tou=to au)to\ au(tô=| ai)/tion.] See Kampe, Die Erkenntniss-theorie
des Aristoteles, p. 212, seq.]

To know or cognize is, to know the Cause; when we know the Cause, we
are satisfied with our cognition. Now there are four Causes, or
varieties of Cause:--

1. The Essence or Quiddity (Form)--[Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai].

2. The necessitating conditions (Matter)--[Greek: to/ ti/nôn o)/ntôn
a)na/gkê tou=t' ei)=nai].

3. The proximate mover or stimulator of change (Efficient)--[Greek:
ê( ti/ prô=ton e)ki/nêse].

4. That for the sake of which (Final Cause or End)--[Greek: to\
ti/nos e(/neka].

All these four Causes (Formal, Material, Efficient, Final) appear as
middle terms in demonstrating. We can proceed through the medium
either of Form, or of Matter, or of Efficient, or of End. The first
of the four has already been exemplified--the demonstration by Form.
The second appears in demonstrating that the angle in a semi-circle
is always a right angle; where the middle term (or matter of the
syllogism, ([Greek: to\ e)x ou(=]) is, that such angle is always the
half of two right angles.[26] The Efficient is the middle term, when
to the question, Why did the Persians invade Athens? it is answered
that the Athenians had previously invaded Persia along with the
Eretrians. (All are disposed to attack those who have attacked them
first; the Athenians attacked the Persians first; _ergo_, the
Persians were disposed to attack the Athenians.) Lastly, the Final
Cause serves as middle term, when to the question, Why does a man
walk after dinner? the response is, For the purpose of keeping up his
health. In another way, the middle term here is digestion: walking
after dinner promotes digestion; digestion is the efficient cause of
health.[27]

[Footnote 26: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 21-36. Themistius, p.
83: [Greek: ma/lista me\n ga\r e)pi\ pa/sês a)podei/xeôs o( me/sos
e)/stin oi(=on ê( u(/lê tô=| sullogismô=|; ou(/tos ga\r o( poiô=n
ta\s du/o prota/seis, e)ph' ai(=s to\ sumpe/rasma.]]

[Footnote 27: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 36-b. 21.]

The Final Cause or End is prior in the order of nature, but posterior
to the terms of the conclusion in the order of time or generation;
while the Efficient is prior in the order of time or generation. The
Formal and Material are simultaneous with the effect, neither prior
nor posterior.[28] Sometimes the same fact may proceed both from a
Final cause, and from a cause of Material Necessity; thus the light
passes through our lantern for the purpose of guiding us in the dark,
but also by reason that the particles of light are smaller than the
pores in the glass. Nature produces effects of finality, or with a
view to some given end; and also effects by necessity, the necessity
being either inherent in the substance itself, or imposed by
extraneous force. Thus a stone _falls_ to the ground by necessity of
the first kind, but _ascends_ by necessity of the second kind. Among
products of human intelligence some spring wholly from design without
necessity; but others arise by accident or chance and have no final
cause.[29]

[Footnote 28: Analyt. Post. II. xi. p. 94, a. 21-26. Themistius, p.
83: [Greek: ê( ge/nesis ou)=n tou= me/sou kai\ ai)ti/ou tê\n au)tê\n
ou)k e)/chei ta/xin e)ph' a(pa/ntôn, a)ll' ou(= me\n prô/tên ô(s
e)pi\ tô=n kinêtikô=n, ou(= de\ teleutai/an ô(s e)pi\ tô=n telô=n
kai\ ô(=n e(/neka, ou(= d' a(/ma ô(s e)pi\ tô=n o(rismô=n kai\ tou=
ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai.]]

[Footnote 29: Analyt. Post. II. p. 94, b. 27-p. 95, a. 9.]

That the middle term is the Cause, is equally true in respect to
_Entia_, _Fientia_, _Præterita_, and _Futura_; only that in respect
to _Entia_, the middle term or Cause must be an _Ens_; in respect to
_Fientia_ it must be a _Fiens_; in respect to _Præterita_, a
_Præteritum_; and in respect to _Futura_, a _Futurum_; that is, in
each case, it must be generated at the corresponding time with the
major and minor terms in the conclusion.[30] What is the cause of an
eclipse of the moon? The cause is, that the earth intervenes between
moon and sun; and this is true alike of eclipses past, present, and
future. Such an intervention is the essence or definition of a lunar
eclipse: the cause is therefore Formal, and cause and effect are
simultaneous, occurring at the same moment of time. But in the other
three Causes--Material, Efficient, Final--where phenomena are
successive and not simultaneous, can we say that the antecedent is
cause and the consequent effect, time being, as seems to us, a
_continuum_? In cases like this, we can syllogize from the consequent
backward to the antecedent; but not from the antecedent forward to
the consequent. If the house has been built, we can infer that the
foundations have been laid; but, if the foundations have been laid,
we cannot infer that the house has been built.[31] There must always
be an interval of time during which inference from the antecedent
will be untrue; perhaps, indeed, it may never become true. Cause and
_causatum_ in these three last varieties of Cause, do not universally
and necessarily reciprocate with each other, as in the case of the
Formal cause. Though time is continuous, events or generations are
distinct points marked in a continuous line, and are not continuous
with each other.[32] The number of these points that may be taken is
indeed infinite; yet we must assume some of them as ultimate and
immediate _principia_, in order to construct our syllogism, and
provide our middle term.[33] Where the middle term reciprocates and
is co-extensive with the major and the minor, in such cases we have
generation of phenomena in a cycle; _e.g._, after the earth has been
made wet, vapour rises of necessity: hence comes a cloud, hence
water; which again falls, and the earth again becomes wet.[34]
Finally, wherever our conclusion is not universally and necessarily
true, but true only in most cases, our immediate _principia_ must
also be of the same character, true in most cases, but in most cases
only.[35]

[Footnote 30: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, a. 10, 36: [Greek: to\
ga\r me/son o(mo/gonon dei= ei)=nai], &c.]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. a. 24 seq., b. 32; Julius Pacius, ad loc.; Biese,
Die Philosophie des Aristot. pp. 302-303.]

[Footnote 32: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, a. 39-b. 8; Themistius,
p. 86.]

[Footnote 33: Analyt. Post. II. xii. p. 95, b. 14-31: [Greek: a)rchê\
de\ kai\ e)n tou/tois a)/mesos lêpte/a].]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. b. 38-p. 96, a**. 7.]

[Footnote 35: Ibid. p. 96, a. 8-19.]

How are we to proceed in hunting out those attributes that are
predicated _in Quid_,[36] as belonging to the Essence of the subject?
The subject being a lowest species, we must look out for such
attributes as belong to all individuals thereof, but which belong
also to individuals of other species under the same genus. We shall
thus find one, two, three, or more, attributes, each of which,
separately taken, belongs to various individuals lying out of the
species; but the assemblage of which, collectively taken, does not
belong to any individual lying out of the species. The Assemblage
thus found is the Essence; and the enunciation thereof is the
Definition of the species. Thus, the triad is included in the genus
number; in searching for its definition, therefore, we must not go
beyond that genus, nor include any attributes (such as _ens_, &c.)
predicable of other subjects as well as numbers. Keeping within the
limits of the genus, we find that every triad agrees in being an odd
number. But this oddness belongs to other numbers also (pentad,
heptad, &c.). We therefore look out for other attributes, and we find
that every triad agrees in being a prime number, in two distinct
senses; first, that it is not measured by any other number; secondly,
that it is not compounded of any other numbers. This last attribute
belongs to no other odd number except the triad. We have now an
assemblage of attributes, which belong each of them to every triad,
universally and necessarily, and which, taken all together, belong
_exclusively_ to the triad, and therefore constitute its essence or
definition. The triad is a number, odd, and prime in the two
senses.[37] The _definitum_ and the definition are here exactly
co-extensive.

[Footnote 36: Ibid. xiii. p. 96, a. 22: [Greek: pô=s dei=
_thêreu/ein_ ta\ e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorou/mena?]]

[Footnote 37: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, a. 24-b. 14. [Greek: ei)
toi/nun mêdeni\ u(pa/rchei a)/llô| ê)\ tai=s a)to/mois tria/si,
tou=t' a)\n ei)/ê to\ tria/di ei)=nai. u(pokei/sthô ga\r kai\ tou=to,
ê( ou)si/a ê( e(ka/stou ei)=nai ê( e)pi\ tai=s a)to/mois e)/schatos
toiau/tê katêgori/a. ô(/ste o(moi/ôs kai\ a)/llô| o(tô|ou=n tô=n
ou(/tô deichthe/ntôn to\ _au)tô=| ei)=nai_ e)/stai.]]

Where the matter that we study is the entire genus, we must begin by
distributing it into its lowest species; _e.g._ number into dyad,
triad, &c.; in like manner, taking straight line, circle, right
angle, &c.[38] We must first search out the definitions of each of
these lowest species; and these having been ascertained, we must next
look above the genus, to the Category in which it is itself
comprised, whether _Quantum_, _Quale_, &c. Having done thus much we
must study the derivative attributes or propria of the lowest species
through the common generalities true respecting the larger. We must
recollect that these derivative attributes are derived from the
essence and definition of the lowest species, the complex flowing
from the simple as its _principium_: they belong _per se_ only to the
lowest species thus defined; they belong to the higher genera only
through those species.[39] It is in this way, and not in any other,
that the logical Division of genera, according to specific
differences, can be made serviceable for investigation of essential
attributes; that is, it can only be made to demonstrate what is
derivative from the essence. We have shown already that it cannot
help in demonstrating essence or Definition itself. We learn to
marshal in proper order the two constituent elements of our
definition, and to attach each specific difference to the genus to
which it properly belongs. Thus we must not attempt to distribute the
genus animal according to the difference of having the wing divided
or undivided: many animals will fall under neither of the two heads;
the difference in question belongs to the lower genus winged animal,
and distributes the same into two species. The characteristic or
specific difference must be enunciated and postulated by itself, and
must be attached to its appropriate genus in order to form the
definition. It is only by careful attention to the steps of
legitimate logical Division that we can make sure of including all
the particulars and leaving out none.[40]

[Footnote 38: Ibid. b. 18. The straight line is the first or lowest
of all lines: no other line can be understood, unless we first
understand what is meant by a straight line. In like manner the right
angle is the first of all angles, the circle the first of all
curvilinear figures (Julius Pacius, ad loc. p. 504).]

[Footnote 39: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, b. 19-25: [Greek: meta\
de\ tou=to, la/bo/nta ti/ to\ ge/nos, oi(=on po/teron tô=n posô=n ê)\
tô=n poiô=n, ta\ i)/dia pa/thê theôrei=n dia\ tô=n koinô=n prô/tôn.
toi=s ga\r suntitheme/nois e)k tô=n a)to/môn] (speciebus infimis)
[Greek: ta\ sumbai/nonta e)k tô=n o(rismô=n e)/stai dê=la, dia\ to\
a)rchê\n ei)=nai pa/ntôn to\n o(rismo/n kai\ to\ a(plou=n, kai\ toi=s
a(ploi=s kath' au(ta\ u(pa/rchein ta\ sumbai/nonta mo/nois, toi=s d'
a)/llois kat' e)kei=na.]

Themistius illustrates this obscure passage, p. 89. The definitions
of [Greek: eu)thei=a grammê/, keklasme/nê grammê/, peripherê\s
grammê/], must each of them contain the definition of [Greek: grammê/
(= mê=kos a)plate/s)], since it is in the Category [Greek: Poso/n
(poso\n mê=kos a)plate/s)]. But the derivative properties of the
circle ([Greek: peripherê\s grammê/]) are deduced from the definition
of a circle, and belong to it in the first instance _quâ_ [Greek:
peripherê\s grammê/], in a secondary way _quâ_ [Greek: grammê/].]

[Footnote 40: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 96, b. 25-p. 97, a. 6.]

Some contemporaries of Aristotle, and among them Speusippus,
maintained that it was impossible either to define, or to divide
logically, unless you knew all particulars without exception. You
cannot (they said) know any one thing, except by knowing its
differences from all other things; which would imply that you knew
also all these other things.[41] To these reasoners Aristotle
replies: It is not necessary to know _all_ the differences of every
thing; you know a thing as soon as you know its essence, with the
properties _per se_ which are derivative therefrom. There are many
differences not belonging to the essence, but distinguishing from
each other two things having the same essence: you may know the
thing, without knowing these accidental differences.[42] When you
divide a genus into two species, distinguished by one proximate
specific difference, such that there cannot be any thing that does
not fall under one or other of these _membra condividentia_, and when
you have traced the subject investigated under one or other of these
members, you can always follow this road until no lower specific
difference can be found, and you have then the final essence and
definition of the subject; even though you may not know how many
_other_ subjects each of the two members may include.[43] Thus does
Aristotle reply to Speusippus, showing that it is not necessary, for
the definition of one thing, that you should know _all_ other things.
His reply, as in many other cases, is founded on the distinction
between the Essential and the Accidental.

[Footnote 41: Ibid. p. 97, a. 6-10; Themistius, p. 92. Aristotle does
not here expressly name Speusippus, but simply says [Greek: phasi/
tines]. It is Themistius who names Speusippus; and one of the
Scholiasts refers to Eudemus as having expressly indicated Speusippus
(Schol. p. 248, a. 24, Br.).]

[Footnote 42: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, a. 12: [Greek: pollai\
ga\r diaphorai\ u(pa/rchousi toi=s au)toi=s tô=| ei)/dei, a)ll' ou)
kat' ou)si/an ou)de\ kath' au(ta/.]]

[Footnote 43: Ibid. a. 18-22: [Greek: phanero\n ga\r o(/ti a)\n
ou(/tô badi/zôn e)/lthê| ei)s tau=ta ô(=n mêke/ti e)sti\ diaphora/,
e(/xei to\n lo/gon tê=s ou)si/as.]]

To obtain or put together a definition through logical Division,
three points are to be attended to.[44] Collect the predicates _in
Quid_; range them in the proper order; make sure that there are no
more, or that you have collected all. The essential predicates are
genera, to be obtained not otherwise than by the method (dialectical)
used in concluding accidents. As regards order, you begin with the
highest genus, that which is predicable of all the others, while none
of these is predicable of it, determining in like fashion the
succession of the rest respectively. The collection will be complete,
if you divide the highest genus by an exhaustive specific difference,
such that every thing must be included in one or other of the two
proximate and opposed portions; and then taking the species thus
found as your _dividendum_, subdivide it until no lower specific
difference can be found, or you obtain from the elements an exact
equivalent to the subject.[45]

[Footnote 44: Ibid. a. 23: [Greek: ei)s de\ to\ kataskeua/zein o(/ron
dia\ diaire/seôn]. The Scholiast, p. 248, a. 41, explains [Greek:
kataskeua/zein] by [Greek: eu(rei=n, sunthei=nai, a)podou=nai]. He
distinguishes it from [Greek: a)podeiknu/nai]; demonstration of the
definition being impracticable.]

[Footnote 45: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, a. 23 seq. See Waitz,
Comm. p. 418.]

When the investigation must proceed by getting together a group of
similar particulars, you compare them, and note what is the same in
all; then turn to another group which are the same _in genere_ yet
differ _in specie_ from the first group, and have a different point
of community among themselves. You next compare the point of
community among the members of the first group, and that among the
members of the second group. If the two points of community can be
brought under one rational formula, that will be the definition of
the subject; but if at the end of the process, the distinct points of
community are not found resolvable into any final one, this proves
that the supposed _definiendum_ is not one but two or more.[46] For
example, suppose you are investigating, What is the essence or
definition of magnanimity? You must study various magnanimous
individuals, and note what they have in common _quâ_ magnanimous.[47]
Thus, Achilles, Ajax, Alkibiades were all magnanimous. Now, that
which the three had in common was, that they could not endure to be
insulted; on that account Alkibiades went to war with his countrymen,
Achilles was angry and stood aloof from the Greeks, Ajax slew
himself. But, again, you find two other magnanimous men, Sokrates and
Lysander. These two had in common the quality, that they maintained
an equal and unshaken temper both in prosperity and adversity. Now
when you have got thus far, the question to be examined is, What is
the point of identity between the temper that will not endure insult,
and the temper that remains undisturbed under all diversities of
fortune? If an identity can be found, this will be the essence or
definition of magnanimity; to which will belong equanimity as one
variety, and intolerance of insult as another. If, on the contrary,
no identity can be found, you will then have two distinct mental
dispositions, without any common definition.[48]

[Footnote 46: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 7-15. [Greek: pa/lin
skopei=n ei) tau)to\n e(/ôs a)\n ei)s e(/na e)/lthê| lo/gon; ou(=tos
ga\r e)/stai tou= pra/gmatos o(rismo/s. e)a\n de\ mê\ badi/zê| ei)s
e(/na a)ll' ei)s du/o ê)\ plei/ô, dê=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\n ei)/ê e(/n
ti ei)=nai to\ zêtou/menon, a)lla\ plei/ô.]]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 16: [Greek: skepte/on e)pi/ tinôn
megalopsu/chôn, ou(\s i)/smen, ti/ e)/chousin e(\n pa/ntes ê(=|
_toiou=toi_.]]

[Footnote 48: Ibid. b. 17-25. [Greek: tau=ta du/o labô\n skopô= ti/
to\ au)to\ e)/chousin ê(/ te a)pa/theia ê( peri\ ta\s tu/chas kai\ ê(
mê\ u(pomonê\ a)timazome/nôn. ei) de\ mêde/n, du/o ei)/dê a)\n ei)/ê
tê=s megalopsuchi/as.]

  Æquam memento rebus in arduis
  Servare mentem: non secus in bonis
    Ab insolenti temperatam
      Lætitiâ.--Horace. _Ode_, ii. 3.

Aristotle says that there will be two species of magnanimity. But
surely if the two so-called species connote nothing in common they
are not rightly called species, nor is magnanimity rightly called a
genus. Equanimity would be distinct from magnanimity; Sokrates and
Lysander would not properly be magnanimous but equanimous.]

Every definition must be an universal proposition, applicable, not
exclusively to one particular object, but to a class of greater or
less extent. The lowest species is easier to define than the higher
genus; this is one reason why we must begin with particulars, and
ascend to universals. It is in the higher genera that equivocal terms
most frequently escape detection.[49] When you are demonstrating,
what you have first to attend to is, the completeness of the form of
syllogizing: when you are defining, the main requisite is to be
perspicuous and intelligible; _i.e._ to avoid equivocal or
metaphorical terms.[50] You will best succeed in avoiding them, if
you begin with the individuals, or with examples of the lowest
species, and then proceed to consider not their resemblances
generally, but their resemblances in certain definite ways, as in
colour or figure. These more definite resemblances you will note
first; upon each you will found a formula of separate definition;
after which you will ascend to the more general formula of less
definite resemblance common to both. Thus, in regard to the acute or
sharp, you will consider the acute in sound, and in other matters
(tastes, pains, weapons, angles, &c.), and you will investigate what
is the common point of identity characterizing all. Perhaps there may
be no such identity; the transfer of the term from one to the other
may be only a metaphor: you will thus learn that no common definition
is attainable. This is an important lesson; for as we are forbidden
to carry on a dialectical debate in metaphorical terms, much more are
we forbidden to introduce metaphorical terms in a definition.[51]

[Footnote 49: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 29: [Greek: kai\ ga\r
ai( o(mônumi/ai **lantha/nousi ma=llon e)n toi=s katho/lou
ê)\ e)n toi=s a)diapho/rois.]]

[Footnote 50: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 31: [Greek: ô(/sper
de e)n tai=s a)podei/xesi dei= to/ ge sullelogi/sthai u(pa/rchein,
ou(/tô kai\ e)n toi=s o(/rois _to\ saphe/s_.]

By [Greek: to\ saphe/s], he evidently means the avoidance of
equivocal or metaphorical terms, and the adherence to true genera and
species. Compare Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristot. pp. 308-310.]

[Footnote 51: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 35-39.--([Greek:
diale/gesthai/ phêsi, to\ dialektikô=s o(milei=n].--Schol. p. 248, b.
23, Brand.). Aristotle considers it metaphorical when the term
_acute_ is applied both to a sound and to an angle.

The treatment of this portion of the Aristotelian doctrine by Prantl
(Geschichte der Logik, vol. I. ch. iv. pp. 246, 247, 338), is
instructive. He brings out, in peculiar but forcible terms, the idea
of "notional causality" which underlies Aristotle's Logic. "So also
ist die Definition das Aussprechen _des schöpferischen
Wesensbegriffes_. . . . . Soweit der schöpferische Wesensbegriff
erreicht werden kann, ist durch denselben die begriffliche Causalität
erkannt; und die Einsicht in diese _primitive Ursächlichkeit_ wird in
dem Syllogismus vermittelst des Mittelbegriffes erreicht. Ueber den
schöpferischen Wesensbegriff hinauszugehen, ist nicht möglich. . . .
. Sobald die Definition mehr als eine blosse Namenserklärung ist--und
sie muss mehr seyn--erkennt sie den Mittelbegriff als schöpferische
Causalität. . . . . Die ontologische Bedeutung des Mittelbegriffes
ist, dass er schöpferischer Wesensbegriff ist." Rassow (pp. 51, 63,
&c.) adopts a like metaphorical phrase:--"Definitionem est, explicare
notionem; quæ quidem est _creatrix rerum causa_."]

To obtain and enunciate correctly the problems suitable for
discussion in each branch of science, you must have before you tables
of dissection and logical division, and take them as guides;[52]
beginning with the highest genus and proceeding downward through the
successively descending scale of sub-genera and species. If you are
studying animals, you first collect the predicates belonging to all
animals; you then take the highest subdivision of the genus animal,
such as bird, and you collect the predicates belonging to all birds;
and so on to the next in the descending scale. You will be able to
show cause why any of these predicates must belong to the man
Sokrates, or to the horse Bukephalus; because it belongs to the genus
animal, which includes man and horse. Animal will be the middle term
in the demonstration.[53] This example is taken from the class-terms
current in vulgar speech. But you must not confine yourself to these;
you must look out for new classes, bound together by the possession
of some common attribute, yet not usually talked of as classes, and
you must see whether other attributes can be found constantly
conjoined therewith. Thus you find that all animals having horns,
have also a structure of stomach fit for rumination, and teeth upon
one jaw only. You know, therefore, what is the cause that oxen and
sheep have a structure of stomach fit for rumination. It is because
they have horns. Having-horns is the middle term of the
demonstration.[54] Cases may also be found in which several objects
possess no common nature or attribute to bind them into a class, but
are yet linked together, by analogy, in different ways, to one and
the same common term.[55] Some predicates will be found to accompany
constantly this analogy, or to belong to all the objects _quâ_
analogous, just as if they had one and the same class-nature.
Demonstration may be applied to these, as to the former cases.

[Footnote 52: Analyt. Post. II. xiv. p. 98**, a. 1. [Greek: pro\s de\
to\ e)/chein ta\ problê/mata, le/gein dei= ta/s te _a)natoma\s_ kai\
ta\s diaire/seis, ou(/tô de\ diale/gein, u(pothe/menon to\ ge/nos to\
koino\n a(pa/ntôn.] This is Waitz's text, which differs from Julius
Pacius and from Firmin Didot.

Themistius (pp. 94-95) explains [Greek: ta\s a)natoma\s] to be
anatomical drawings or exercises prepared by Aristotle for teaching:
[Greek: kai\ ta\s a)natoma\s e)/chein dei= prochei/rôs, o(/sai
pepoi/êntai A)ristote/lei].

The collection of Problems or questions for investigation was much
prosecuted, not merely by Aristotle but by Theophrastus (Schol. p.
249, a. 12, Br.).]

[Footnote 53: Analyt. Post. II. xiv. p. 98, a. 5-12.]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. a. 13-19. Aristotle assumes that the material
which ought to have served for the upper teeth, is appropriated by
Nature for the formation of horns.]

[Footnote 55: Ibid. a. 20-23: [Greek: e)/ti d' a)/llos tro/pos e)sti\
_kata\ to\ a)na/logon_ e)kle/gein]. He gives as examples, [Greek:
sê/pion, a)/kantha, o)stou=n].]

Problems must be considered to be the same, when the middle term of
the demonstration is the same for each, or when the middle term in
the one is a subordinate or corollary to that in the other. Thus, the
cause of echo, the cause of images in a mirror, the cause of the
rainbow, all come under the same general head or middle term
(refraction), though with a specific difference in each case. Again,
when we investigate the problem, Why does the Nile flow with a more
powerful current in the last half of the (lunar) month? the reason is
that the month is then more wintry. But why _is_ the month then more
wintry? Because the light of the moon is then diminishing. Here are
two middle terms, the one of which depends upon the other. The
problem for investigation is therefore the same in both.[56]

[Footnote 56: Analyt. Post. II. xv. p. 98, a. 24-34. Theophrastus is
said to have made collections of "_like problems_," problems of which
the solution depended upon the same middle term (Schol. p. 249, a.
11**, Brand.).]

Respecting _Causa_ and _Causatum_ question may be made whether it is
necessary that when the _causatum_ exists, the _causa_ must exist
also? The answer must be in the affirmative, if you include the cause
in the definition of _causatum_. Thus, if you include in the
definition of a lunar eclipse, the cause thereof, viz., intervention
of the earth between moon and sun--then, whenever an eclipse occurs,
such intervention must occur also. But it must not be supposed that
there is here a perfect reciprocation, and that as the _causatum_ is
in this case demonstrable from the cause, so there is the like
demonstration of the cause from the _causatum_. Such a demonstration
is never a demonstration of [Greek: dio/ti]; it is only a
demonstration of [Greek: o(/ti]. The _causatum_ is not included in
the definition of the cause; if you demonstrate that because the moon
is eclipsed, therefore the earth is interposed between the moon and
the sun, you prove the fact of the interposition, but you learn
nothing about the cause thereof. Again, in a syllogism the middle
term is the cause of the conclusion (_i.e._, it is the reason why the
major term is predicated of the minor, which predication is the
conclusion); and in this sense the cause and _causatum_ may sometimes
reciprocate, so that either may be proved by means of the other. But
the _causatum_ here reciprocates with the _causa_ only as premiss and
conclusion (_i.e._, we may know either by means of the other), not as
cause and effect; the _causatum_ is not cause of the _causa_ as a
fact and reality, as the _causa_ is cause of the _causatum_.[57]

[Footnote 57: Analyt. Post. II. xvi. p. 98, a. 35, seq. Themistius,
pp. 96-97: [Greek: ou) ga/r e)stin ai)/tion tou= tê\n gê=n e)n me/sô|
ei)=nai to\ tê\n selê/nên e)klei/pein, a)lla\ me/son tou=
sullogismou=; kai\ tou= sumpera/smatos i)/sôs ai)/tion, _tou=
pra/gmatos de\ ou)damô=s_.] Themistius here speaks with a precision
which is not always present to the mind of Aristotle; for he
discriminates the cause of _the fact_ from the cause of the _affirmed
fact_ or _conclusion_. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire says (Plan Général
des Derniers Analytiques, p. cxl.):--"Ainsi, la démonstration de
l'effet par la cause apprend pourquoi la chose est; la démonstration
par l'effet apprend seulement que la chose est. On sait que la terre
s'interpose, mais on ne sait pas pourquoi elle s'interpose: et ce qui
le montre bien, c'est que l'idée de l'interposition de la terre est
indispensable à la définition essentielle de l'éclipse tandis que
l'idée de l'éclipse n'a que faire dans la définition de
l'interposition. L'interposition de la terre fait donc comprendre
l'éclipse; tandis que l'éclipse ne fait pas du tout comprendre
l'interposition de la terre."]

The question then arises, Can there be more than one cause of the
same _causatum_? Is it necessary that the same effect should be
produced in all cases by the same cause? In other words, when the
same predicate is demonstrated to be true of two distinct minors, may
it not be demonstrated in one case by one middle term, and in the
other case by a different middle term?[58] Answer: In genuine and
proper scientific problems the middle term is the rational account
(definition, interpretation) of the major extreme; this middle term
therefore, or the cause, must in all cases be one and the same. The
demonstration in these cases is derived from the same essence; it is
_per se_, not _per accidens_. But there are other problems, not
strictly and properly scientific, in which cause and _causatum_ are
connected merely _per accidens_; the demonstration being operated by
a middle term which is not of the essence of the major, but is only a
sign or concomitant.[59] According as the terms of the conclusion are
related to each other, so also will the middle term be related to
both. If the conclusion be equivocal, the middle term will be
equivocal also; if the predicate in the conclusion be in generic
relation to the subject, the major also will be in generic relation
to the middle. Thus, if you are demonstrating that one triangle is
similar to another, and that one colour is similar to another, the
word similar in these two cases is not univocal, but equivocal;
accordingly, the middle term in the demonstration will also be
equivocal. Again, if you are demonstrating that four proportionals
will also be proportionals alternately, there will be one cause or
middle term, if the subject of the conclusion be lines; another, if
the subject be numbers. Yet the middle term or cause in both is the
same, in as far as both involve a certain fact of increment.[60]

[Footnote 58: Analyt. Post. II. xvi. p. 98, b. 25.]

[Footnote 59: Ibid. xvii. p. 99, a. 4: [Greek: e)/sti de\ kai\ ou(=
ai)/tion kai\ ô(=| skopei=n kata\ sumbebêko/s; ou) mê\n dokei=
problê/mata ei)=nai.]

"Veluti si probemus grammaticum esse aptum ad ridendum, quia homo est
aptus ad ridendum." (Julius Pacius, p. 514.)]

[Footnote 60: Analyt. Post. II. xvii. p. 99, a. 8-16.]

The major term of the syllogism will in point of extension be larger
than any particular minor, but equal or co-extensive with the sum
total of the particulars. Thus the predicate deciduous, affirmable of
all plants with broad leaves, is greater in extension than the
subject vines, also than the subject fig-trees; but it is equal in
extension to the sum total of vines and fig-trees (the other
particular broad-leaved plant). The middle also, in an universal
demonstration, reciprocates with the major, being its definition.
Here the true middle or cause of the effect that vines and fig-trees
shed their leaves, is not that they are broad-leaved plants, but
rather a coagulation of sap or some such fact.[61]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. a. 16 seq.]

The last chapter of the present treatise is announced by Aristotle as
the appendix and completion of his entire theory of Demonstrative
Science, contained in the Analytica Priora, which treats of
Syllogism, and the Analytica Posteriora, which treats of
Demonstration. After formally winding up the whole enquiry, he
proceeds to ask regarding the _principia_ of Demonstrative Science:
What are they? How do they become known? What is the mental habit or
condition that is cognizant of them?[62]

[Footnote 62: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 15-19: [Greek: peri\
me\n ou)=n sullogismou= kai\ a)podei/xeôs, ti/ te e(ka/tero/n e)sti
kai\ pô=s gi/netai, phanero/n, a(/ma **de\ kai\ peri\ e)pistê/mês
a)podeiktikê=s; tau)to\n ga/r e)stin. peri\ de\ tô=n a)rchô=n, pô=s
te gi/nontai gnô/rimoi, kai\ _ti/s ê( gnôri/zousa e(/xis_,
e)nteu=the/n e)sti dê=lon proaporê/sasi prô=ton.]

Bekker and Waitz, in their editions, include all these words in ch.
xix.: the older editions placed the words preceding [Greek: peri\
de\] in ch. xviii. Zabarella observes the transition to a new subject
(Comm. ad Analyt. Post. II. ch. xv. p. 640):--"Postremum hoc caput
(beginning at [Greek: peri\ de\]) extra primariam tractationem
positum esse manifestum est: quum præcesserit epilogus respondens
prooemio quod legitur in initio primi libri Priorum Analyticorum."]

Aristotle has already laid down that there can be no Demonstration
without certain _præcognita_ to start from; and that these
_præcognita_ must, in the last resort, be _principia_ undemonstrable,
immediately known, and known even more accurately than the
conclusions deduced from them. Are they then cognitions, or cognizant
habits and possessions, born along with us, and complete from the
first? This is impossible (Aristotle declares); we cannot have such
valuable and accurate cognitions from the first moments of childhood,
and yet not be at all aware of them. They must therefore be acquired;
yet how is it possible for us to acquire them?[63] The fact is, that,
though we do not from the first possess any such complete and
accurate cognitions as these, we have from the first an inborn
capacity or potentiality of arriving at them. And something of the
same kind belongs to all animals.[64] All of them possess an
apprehending and discriminating power born with them, called Sensible
Perception; but, though all possess such power, there is this
difference, that with some the act of perception dwells for a longer
or shorter time in the mind; with others it does not. In animals with
whom it does not dwell, there can be no knowledge beyond perception,
at least as to all those matters wherein perception is evanescent;
but with those that both perceive and retain perceptions in their
minds, ulterior knowledge grows up.[65] There are many such retentive
animals, and they differ among themselves: with some of them reason
or rational notions arise out of the perceptions retained; with
others, it is not so. First, out of perception arises memory; next,
out of memory of the same often repeated, arises experience, since
many remembrances numerically distinct are summed up into one
experience. Lastly, out of experience, or out of the universal
notion, the _unum et idem_ which pervades and characterizes a
multitude of particulars, when it has taken rest and root in the
mind, there arises the _principium_ of art and science: of science,
in respect to objects existent; of art, in respect to things
generable.[66] And thus these mental habits or acquirements neither
exist in our minds determined from the beginning, nor do they spring
from other acquirements of greater cognitive efficacy. They spring
from sensible perception; and we may illustrate their growth by what
happens in the panic of a terrified host, where first one runaway
stops in his flight, then a second, then a third, until at last a
number docile to command is collected. One characteristic feature of
the mind is to be capable of this process.[67]

[Footnote 63: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 25-30: [Greek:
po/teron ou)k e)nou=sai ai( e(/xeis e)ggi/nontai, ê)\ e)nou=sai
lelê/thasin. ei) me\n dê\ e)/chomen au)ta/s, a)/topon; sumbai/nei
ga\r a)kribeste/ras e)/chontas gnô/seis a)podei/xeôs lantha/nein; ei)
de\ lamba/nomen mê\ e)/chontes pro/teron, pô=s a)\n gnôri/zoimen kai\
mantha/noimen e)k mê\ prou+parchou/sês gnô/seôs?] Compare, supra,
Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30; Metaphys. A. ix. p. 993, a. 1,
with the Comment. of Alexander, p. 96, Bonitz.]

[Footnote 64: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30: [Greek: phanero\n
toi/nun ou)/t' e)/chein oi(=o/n te, ou)/t' a)gnoou=si kai\ mêdemi/an
e)/chousin e(/xin e)ggi/nesthai; a)na/gkê a)/ra e)/chein me/n tina
du/namin, mê\ toiau/tên d' e)/chein ê)\ e)/stai tou/tôn timiôte/ra
kat' a)kri/beian. phai/netai de\ tou=to/ ge pa=sin u(pa/rchon toi=s
zô/|ois.]]

[Footnote 65: Analyt. Post II. xix. p. 99, b. 37: [Greek: o(/sois
me\n ou)=n mê\ e)ggi/netai, ê)\ o(/lôs ê)\ peri\ a(\ mê\ e)ggi/netai,
ou)k e)/sti tou/tois gnô=sis e)/xô tou= ai)stha/nesthai; e)n oi(=s d'
e)/nestin ai)sthanome/nois e)/chein e)/ti e)n tê=| psuchê=|. pollô=n
de\ toiou/tôn ginome/nôn ê)/dê diaphora/ tis gi/netai, ô(/ste toi=s
me\n gi/nesthai lo/gon e)k tê=s tô=n toiou/tôn monê=s, toi=s de\
mê/.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. p. 81, a. 38, seq., where the
dependence of Induction on the perceptions of sense is also affirmed.
See Themistius, pp. 50-51, ed. Spengel. The first chapter of the
Metaphysica (p. 981), contains a striking account of this generation
of universal notions from memory and comparison of sensible
particulars: [Greek: gi/netai de\ te/chnê, o(/tan e)k pollô=n tê=s
e)mpeiri/as e)nnoêma/tôn mi/a katho/lou ge/nêtai peri\ tô=n o(moi/ôn
u(po/lêpsis] ("_intellecta similitudo"_). Also in the Physica VII. p.
247, b. 20 (in the Paraphrase of Themistius, as printed in the Berlin
edition, at bottom of page): [Greek: e)k ga\r tê=s kata\ me/ros
e)mpeiri/as tê\n katho/lou lamba/nomen e)pistê/mên.]]

[Footnote 66: Analyt Post II. xix. p. 100, a. 3-10: [Greek: e)k me\n
ou)=n ai)sthê/seôs gi/netai mnê/mê, ô(/sper le/gomen, e)k de\ mnê/mês
polla/kis tou= au)tou= ginome/nês e)mpeiri/a; ai( ga\r pollai\
mnê=mai tô=| a)rithmô=| e)mpeiri/a mi/a e)sti/n. e)k d' e)mpeiri/as,
ê)\ e)k panto\s ê)remê/santos tou= katho/lou e)n tê=| psuchê=|, tou=
e(no\s para\ ta\ polla/, o(\ a)\n e)n a(/pasin e(\n e)nê=| e)kei/nois
to\ au)to/, te/chnês a)rchê\ kai\ e)pistê/mês; e)a\n me\n peri\
ge/nesin, te/chnês, e)a\n de\ peri\ to\ o)/n, e)pistê/mês.]

A theory very analogous to this (respecting the gradual generation of
scientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of
sense) is stated in the Phædon of Plato, ch. xlv. p. 96, B., where
Sokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in
philosophy: [Greek: kai\ po/teron to\ ai(=ma/ e)stin ô(=|
phronou=men, ê)\ o( a)ê\r, ê)\ to\ pu=r, ê)\ tou/tôn me\n ou)de/n, o(
de\ e)gke/phalo/s e)stin o( ta\s ai)sthê/seis pare/chôn tou=
a)kou/ein kai\ o(pa=n kai\ o)sphrai/nesthai, e)k _tou/tôn de\
gi/gnoito mnê/mê kai\ do/xa_, e)k _de\ mnê/mês kai\ do/xês, labou/sês
to\ ê)remei=n, kata\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)pistê/mên_.]

Boethius says, Comm. in Ciceronis Topica, p. 805:--"Plato ideas
quasdam esse ponebat, id est, species incorporeas, substantiasque
constantes et per se ab aliis naturæ ratione separatas, ut hoc ipsum
_homo_, quibus participantes cæteræ res homines vel animalia fierent.
At vero Aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias; sed
_intellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium
substantialem_, genus putat esse vel speciem. Nam cum homo et equus
differunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate, horum _intellecta
similitudo_ efficit genus. Ergo communitas quædam et plurimorum inter
se differentium similitudo _notio_ est; cujus notionis aliud _genus_
est, aliud _forma_. Sed quoniam _similium intelligentia_ est omnis
notio, in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum
discretio, idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione;
velut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit," &c.

The phrase _intellecta similitudo plurimorum_ embodies both Induction
and Intellection in one. A like doctrine appears in the obscure
passages of Aristotle, De Animâ, III. viii. p. 429, b. 10; also p.
432, a. 3: [Greek: o( nou=s, ei)=dos ei)dô=n, kai\ ê( ai)/sthêsis,
ei)=dos ai)sthêtô=n. e)pei\ de\ ou)de\ pra=gma ou)the/n e)sti para\
ta\ mege/thê, ô(s dokei=, ta\ ai)sthêta\ kechôrisme/non, e)n toi=s
ei)/desi toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s ta\ noêta/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 67: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 10-14: [Greek: ou)/te
dê\ e)nupa/rchousin a)phôrisme/nai ai( e(/xeis, ou)/t' a)p' a)/llôn
e(/xeôn gi/nontai gnôrimôte/rôn, a)ll' a)po\ ai)sthê/seôs,--ê( de\
psuchê\ u(pa/rchei toiau/tê ou)=sa oi(/a du/nasthai pa/schein
tou=to.]

The varieties of intellectual [Greek: e(/xeis] enumerated by
Aristotle in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethica, are elucidated
by Alexander in his Comment. on the Metaphysica. (A. p. 981) pp. 7,
8, Bonitz. The difference of [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: dia/thesis],
the durable condition as contrasted with the transient, is noted in
Categoriæ, pp. 8, 9. See also Eth. Nikom. II. i. ii. pp 1103, 4.]

Aristotle proceeds to repeat the illustration in clearer terms--at
least in terms which he thinks clearer.[68] We perceive the
particular individual; yet sensible perception is of the universal in
the particular (as, for example, when Kallias is before us, we
perceive man, not the man Kallias). Now, when one of a set of
particulars dwells some time in the mind, first an universal notion
arises; next, more particulars are perceived and detained, and
universal notions arise upon them more and more comprehensive, until
at last we reach the highest stage--the most universal and simple.
From Kallias we rise to man; from such and such an animal, to animal
_in genere_; from animal _in genere_, still higher, until we reach
the highest or indivisible genus.[69] Hence it is plain that the
first and highest _principia_ can become known to us only by
Induction; for it is by this process that sensible perception builds
up in us the Universal.[70] Now among )those intellective habits or
acquirements, whereby we come to apprehend truth, there are some
(Science and Noûs) that are uniformly and unerringly true, while
others (Opinion and Ratiocination) admit an alternative of
falsehood.[71] Comparing Science with Noûs, the latter, and the
latter only, is more accurate and unerring than Science. But all
Science implies demonstration, and all that we know by Science is
conclusions deduced by demonstration. We have already said that the
_principia_ of these demonstrations cannot be themselves
demonstrated, and therefore cannot be known by Science; we have also
said that they must be known more accurately than the conclusions.
How then can these _principia_ themselves be known? They can be known
only by Noûs, and from particulars. It is from the _principia_ known
by Noûs, with the maximum of accuracy, that Science demonstrates her
conclusions. Noûs is the great _principium_ of Science.[72]

[Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 14: [Greek: o(\ d'
_e)le/chthê me\n pa/lai_, ou) saphô=s de\ e)le/chthê, pa/lin
ei)/pômen.]

Waitz supposes that Aristotle here refers to a passage in the first
book of the Analytica Posteriora, c. xxxi. p. 87, b. 30. M.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire thinks (p. 290) that reference is intended to
an earlier sentence of this same chapter. Neither of these
suppositions seems to suit (least of all the last) with the meaning
of [Greek: pa/lai]. But whichever he meant, Aristotle has not done
much _to clear up_ what was obscure in the antecedent statements.]

[Footnote 69: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 15: [Greek: sta/ntos
ga\r tô=n a)diapho/rôn e(no/s, prô=ton me\n e)n tê=| psuchê=|
katho/lou (kai\ ga\r ai)sthêsis tou= katho/lou e)sti/n, oi(=on
a)nthrô/pou, a)ll' ou) Kalli/ou a)nthrô/pou) pa/lin d' e)n tou/tois
i(/statai, _e(/ôs a)\n ta\ a)merê= stê=| kai\ ta\ katho/lou_, oi(=on
toiondi\ zô=|on, e(/ôs zô=|on; kai\ e)n tou/tô| ô(sau/tôs.]

These words are obscure: [Greek: ta\ a)merê=] must mean the highest
genera; indivisible, _i.e._ being a _minimum_ in respect of
_comprehension_. Instead of [Greek: ta\ katho/lou], we might have
expected [Greek: ta\ ma/lista katho/lou], or, perhaps, that [Greek:
kai\] should be omitted. Trendelenburg comments at length on this
passage, Arist. De Animâ Comment. pp. 170-174.]

[Footnote 70: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 3: [Greek: dê=lon dê\
o(/ti ê(mi=n ta\ prô=ta e)pagôgê=| gnôri/zein a)nagkai=on; kai\ ga\r
kai\ ai)/sthêsis ou(/tô to\ katho/lou e)mpoiei=.] Compare, supra,
Analyt. Post. I. xviii. p. 81, b. 1. Some commentators contended that
Aristotle did not mean to ascribe an inductive origin to the common
Axioms properly so called, but only to the special _principia_
belonging to each science. Zabarella refutes this doctrine, and
maintains that the Axioms (Dignitates) are derived from Induction
(Comm. in Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 649, ed. Venet., 1617):--"Quum
igitur inductio non sit proprie discursus, nec ratio, jure dicit
Aristoteles principiorum notitiam non esse cum ratione, quia non ex
aliis innotescunt, sed ex seipsis dum per inductionem innotescunt.
Propterea in illa propositione, quæ in initio **primi libri
legitur, sub doctrina discursiva cognitio principiorum non
comprehenditur, quia non est dianoëtica. Hoc, quod modo diximus, si
nonnulli advertissent, fortasse non negassent principia communia, quæ
dicuntur Dignitates, inductione cognosci. Dixerunt enim Aristotelem
hic de principiis loquentem sola principia propria considerasse, quæ
cum non proprio lumine cognoscantur, inductione innotescunt; at
Dignitates (inquiunt) proprio lumine ab intellectu nostro
cognoscuntur per solam terminorum intelligentiam, ut quod omne totum
majus est suâ parte; hoc enim non magis est evidens sensui in
particulari, quam intellectui in universali, proinde inductione non
eget. Sed hanc sententiam hic Averroes refutat, dicens hæc quoque
inductione cognosci, sed non animadverti nobis tempus hujus
inductionis; id enim omnino confitendum est, omnem intellectualem
doctrinam à sensu originem ducere, et nihil esse in intellectu quod
prius in sensu non fuerit, ut ubique asserit Aristoteles."

To the same purpose Zabarella expresses himself in an earlier portion
of his Commentary on the Analyt. Post., where he lays it down that
the truth of the proposition, Every whole is greater than its part,
is known from antecedent knowledge of particulars by way of
Induction. Compare the Scholion of Philoponus, ad Analyt. Post. p.
225, a. 32, Brand., where the same is said about the Axiom, Things
equal to the same are equal to each other.]

[Footnote 71: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 5: [Greek: e)pei\ de\
tô=n peri\ tê\n dia/noian e(/xeôn, ai(=s a)lêtheu/omen, ai( me\n
a)ei\ a)lêthei=s ei)si/n, ai( de\ e)pide/chontai to\ pseu=dos], &c.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. fin. p. 100.]

The manner in which Aristotle here describes how the _principia_ of
Syllogism become known to the mind deserves particular attention. The
march up to _principia_ is not only different from, but the reverse
of, the march down from _principia_; like the athlete who runs first
to the end of the stadium, and then back.[73] Generalizing or
universalizing is an acquired intellectual habit or permanent
endowment; growing out of numerous particular acts or judgments of
sense, remembered, compared, and coalescing into one mental group
through associating resemblance. As the ethical, moral, practical
habits, are acquirements growing out of a repetition of particular
acts, so also the intellectual, theorizing habits are mental results
generated by a multitude of particular judgments of sense, retained
and compared, so as to imprint upon the mind a lasting stamp of some
identity common to all. The Universal (_notius naturâ_) is thus
generated in the mind by a process of Induction out of particulars
which are _notiora nobis_; the potentiality of this process, together
with sense and memory, is all that is innate or connatural.

[Footnote 73: Aristot. Eth. Nikom. I. iv. p. 1095, b. 1.]

The _principia_, from which the conclusions of Syllogism are deduced,
being thus obtained by Induction, are, in Aristotle's view,
appreciated by, or correlated with, the infallible and unerring Noûs
or Intellect.[74] He conceives repeated and uncontradicted Induction
as carrying with it the maximum of certainty and necessity: the
syllogistic deductions constituting Science he regards as also
certain; but their certainty is only derivative, and the _principia_
from which they flow he ranks still higher, as being still more
certain.[75] Both the one and the other he pointedly contrasts with
Opinion and Calculation, which he declares to be liable to error.

[Footnote 74: The passages respecting [Greek: a)rchai\] or
_principia_, in the Nikomachean Ethica (especially Books I. and VI.),
are instructive as to Aristotle's views. The _principia_ are
universal notions and propositions, not starting up ready-made nor as
original promptings of the intellect, but gradually built up out of
the particulars of sense and Induction, and repeated particular acts.
They are judged and sanctioned by [Greek: Nou=s] or Intellect, but it
requires much care to define them well. They belong to the [Greek:
o(/ti], while demonstration belongs to the [Greek: dio/ti]. Eth. Nik.
I. vii. p. 1098, a. 33: [Greek: ou)k a)paitête/on d' ou)de\ tê\n
ai)ti/an e)n a(/pasin o(moi/ôs, a)ll' i(kano\n e)/n tisi to\ o(/ti
deichthê=nai kalô=s, oi(=on kai\ peri\ ta\s a)rcha/s; to\ d' o(/ti
prô=ton kai\ a)rchê/. tô=n a)rchô=n d' ai( me\n e)pagôgê=|
theôrou=ntai, ai( d' ai)sthê/sei, ai( d' e)thismô=| tini, kai\
a)/llai d' a)llô=s. metie/nai de\ peirate/on e(ka/stas ê(=|
pephu/kasin, kai\ spoudaste/on o(/pôs o(risthô=si kalô=s; mega/lên
ga\r e)/chousi r(opê\n pro\s ta\ e(po/mena.]

Compare Eth. Nik. VI. iii. p. 1139, b. 25, where the Analytica is
cited by name--[Greek: ê( me\n dê\ e)pagôgê\ a)rchê/ e)sti kai\ tou=
katho/lou, o( de\ sullogismo\s e)k tô=n katho/lou; ei)si\n a)/ra
a)rchai\ e)x ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ô(=n ou)/k e)sti sullogismo/s;
e)pagôgê\ a)/ra.]--ib. p. 1141, a. 7: [Greek: lei/petai nou=n ei)=nai
tô=n a)rchô=n.]--p. 1142, a. 25: [Greek: o( me\n ga\r nou=s tô=n
o(/rôn, ô(=n ou)/k e)sti lo/gos].--p. 1143, b. 1.]

[Footnote 75: Analyt. Post. I. ii. p. 72, a. 37: [Greek: to\n de\
me/llonta e(/xein tê\n e)pistê/mên tê\n di' a)podei/xeôs ou) mo/non
dei= ta\s a)rcha\s gnôri/zein kai\ ma=llon au)tai=s pisteu/ein ê)\
tô=| deiknume/nô|, a)lla\ mêd' a)/llo au)tô=| pisto/teron ei)=nai
mêde\ gnôrimô/teron tô=n a)ntikeime/nôn tai=s a)rchai=s, e)x ô(=n
e)/stai sullogismo\s o( tê=s e)nanti/as a)pa/tês, ei)/per dei= to\n
e)pista/menon a(plô=s a)meta/peiston ei)=nai.]]

Aristotle had inherited from Plato this doctrine of an infallible
Noûs or Intellect, enjoying complete immunity from error. But,
instead of connecting it (as Plato had done) with reminiscences of an
anterior life among the Ideas, he assigned to it a position as
terminus and correlate to the process of Induction.[76] The like
postulate and pretension passed afterwards to the Stoics, and various
other philosophical sects: they could not be satisfied without
finding infallibility somewhere. It was against this pretension that
the Academics and Sceptics entered their protest; contending, on
grounds sometimes sophistical but often very forcible, that it was
impossible to escape from the region of fallibility, and that no
criterion of truth, at once universal and imperative, could be set
up.

[Footnote 76: Ibid. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30. [Greek: kai\ ou) mo/non
e)pistê/mên a)lla\ kai\ a)rchê\n e)pistê/mês ei)=nai tina/ phamen,
ê(=| tou\s o(/rous gnôri/zomen.]

Themistius, p. 14: [Greek: ô(=n dê\ a)/rchei pa/lin o( nou=s ô(=|
tou\s o(/rous thêreu/omen, e)x ô(=n sugkei\tai ta\ a)xiô/mata.]

The Paraphrase of Themistius (pp. 100-104) is clear and instructive,
where he amplifies the last chapter, and explains [Greek: Nou=s] as
the generalizing or universalizing aptitude of the soul, growing up
gradually out of the particulars furnished by Sense and Induction.]

It is to be regretted that Aristotle should have contented himself
with proclaiming this Inductive process as an ideal, culminating in
the infallible Noûs; and that he should only have superficially
noticed those conditions under which it must be conducted in reality,
in order to avoid erroneous or uncertified results. This is a
deficiency however which has remained unsupplied until the present
century.[77]

[Footnote 77: Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, Vol. III. Lect.
xix. p. 380, says:--"In regard to simple syllogisms, it was an
original dogma of the Platonic School, and an early dogma of the
Peripatetic, that philosophy (science strictly so-called) was only
conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and
the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general
knowledge is only an induction from an observation of particulars,
was too easily forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus
obtained almost the force of an acknowledged principle, that
everything to be known must be known under some general form or
notion. Hence the exaggerated importance attributed to definition and
deductions, it not being considered that we only take out of a
general notion what we had previously placed therein, and that the
amplification of our knowledge is not to be sought for from above but
from below,--not from speculation about abstract generalities, but
from the observation of concrete particulars. But however erroneous
and irrational, the persuasion had its day and influence, and it
perhaps determined, as one of its effects, the total neglect of one
half, and that not the least important half, of the reasoning
process. For while men thought only of looking upward to the more
extensive notions, as the only objects and the only media of science,
they took little heed of the more comprehensive notions, and
absolutely contemned individuals, as objects which could neither be
scientifically known in themselves nor supply the conditions of
scientifically knowing aught besides. The Logic of Comprehension and
of Induction was therefore neglected or ignored,--the Logic of
Extension and Deduction exclusively cultivated, as alone affording
the rules by which we might evolve higher notions into their
subordinate concepts."

(Hamilton, in this passage, considers the Logic of _Induction_ to be
the same as the Logic of _Comprehension_.)]



CHAPTER IX.

TOPICA.


I.

In treating of the Analytica Posteriora I have already adverted, in
the way of contrast, to the Topica; and, in now approaching the
latter work, I must again bring the same contrast before the mind of
the reader.

The treatise called Topica (including that which bears the separate
title De Sophisticis Elenchis, but which is properly its Ninth or
last Book, winding up with a brief but memorable recapitulation of
the Analytica and Topica considered as one scheme) is of considerable
length, longer than the Prior and Posterior Analytics taken together.
It contains both a theory and precepts of Dialectic; also, an
analysis of the process called by Aristotle Sophistical Refutation,
with advice how to resist or neutralize it.

All through the works of Aristotle, there is nothing which he so
directly and emphatically asserts to be his own original performance,
as the design and execution of the Topica: _i.e._, the deduction of
Dialectic and Sophistic from the general theory of Syllogism. He had
to begin from the beginning, without any model to copy or any
predecessor to build upon: and in every sort of work, he observes
justly, the first or initial stages are the hardest.[1] In regard to
Rhetoric much had been done before him; there were not only masters
who taught it, but writers who theorized well or ill, and laid down
precepts about it; so that, in his treatise on that subject, he had
only to enlarge and improve upon pre-existing suggestions. But in
regard to Dialectic as he conceives it--in its contrast with
Demonstration and Science on the one hand, and in its analogy or
kinship with Rhetoric on the other--nothing whatever had been done.
There were, indeed, teachers of contentious dialogue, as well as of
Rhetoric;[2] but these teachers could do nothing better than
recommend to their students dialogues or orations ready made, to be
learnt by heart. Such a mode of teaching (he says), though speedy,
was altogether unsystematic. The student acquired no knowledge of the
art, being furnished only with specimens of art-results. It was as if
a master, professing to communicate the art of making the feet
comfortable, taught nothing about leather-cutting or shoe-making, but
furnished his pupils with different varieties of ready-made shoes;
thus supplying what they wanted for the protection of the feet, but
not imparting to them any power of providing such protection for
themselves.[3] "In regard to the process of syllogizing (says
Aristotle, including both Analytic and Dialectic) I found positively
nothing said before me: I had to work it out for myself by long and
laborious research."[4]

[Footnote 1: Aristot. Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 22: [Greek:
me/giston ga\r i)/sôs a)rchê\ panto/s, ô(/sper le/getai; dio\ kai\
chalepô/taton. o(/sô| ga\r kra/tiston tê=| duna/mei, tosou/tô|
mikro/taton o)\n tô=| mege/thei chalepô/tato/n e)stin o)phthê=nai.]]

[Footnote 2: Sophist. Elench. xxxiv. p. 183, b. 34: [Greek: tau/tês
de\ tê=s pragmatei/as ou) to\ me\n ê)=n to\ d' ou)k ê)=n
proexeirgasme/non, a)ll' ou)de\n pantelô=s u(pê=rchen. kai\ ga\r tô=n
peri\ tou\s e)ristikou\s lo/gous mistharnou/ntôn o(moi/a tis ê)=n ê(
pai/deusis tê=| Gorgi/ou pragmatei/a|; lo/gous ga\r oi( me\n
r(êtorikou\s oi( de\ e)rôtêti/kous e)di/dosan e)kmantha/nein, ei)s
ou(\s pleista/kis e)mpi/ptein ô)ê/thêsan e(ka/teroi tou\s a)llê/lôn
lo/gous.]]

[Footnote 3: Ibid. xxxiv. p. 184, a. 2.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid. a. 7: [Greek: kai\ peri\ me\n tô=n r(êtorikô=n
polla\ kai\ palaia\ ta\ lego/mena, peri\ de\ tou= sullogi/zesthai
pantelô=s ou)de\n ei)/chomen pro/teron a)/llo le/gein, a)ll' ê)\
tribê=| zêtou=ntes polu\n chro/non e)ponou=men.]]

This is one of the few passages, throughout the philosopher's varied
and multitudinous works, in which he alludes to his own speciality of
method. It is all the more interesting on that account. If we turn
back to Sokrates and Plato, we shall understand better what the
innovation operated by Aristotle was; what the position of Dialectic
had been before his time, and what it became afterwards.

In the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the great antithesis was between
Dialectic and Rhetoric--interchange of short question and answer
before a select audience, as contrasted with long continuous speech
addressed to a miscellaneous crowd with known established sentiments
and opinions, in the view of persuading them on some given
interesting point requiring decision. In such Dialectic Sokrates was
a consummate master; passing most of his long life in the
market-place and palæstra, and courting disputation with every one.
He made formal profession of ignorance, disclaimed all power of
teaching, wrote nothing at all, and applied himself almost
exclusively to the cross-examining _Elenchus_ by which he exposed and
humiliated the ablest men not less than the vulgar. Plato, along with
the other companions of Sokrates, imbibed the Dialectic of his master,
and gave perpetuity to it in those inimitable dialogues which are still
preserved to us from his pen. He composed nothing but dialogues; thus
giving expression to his own thoughts only under borrowed names, and
introducing that of Sokrates very generally as chief spokesman. But
Plato, though in some dialogues he puts into the mouth of his
spokesman the genuine Sokratic disclaimer of all power and all
purpose of teaching, yet does not do this in all. He sometimes
assumes the didactic function; though he still adheres to the form of
dialogue, even when it has become inconvenient and unsuitable. In the
Platonic Republic Sokrates is made to alternate his own peculiar vein
of cross-examination with a vein of dogmatic exposition not his own;
but both one and the other in the same style of short question and
answer. In the Leges becomes still more manifest the inconvenience of
combining the substance of dogmatic exposition with the form of
dialogue: the same remark may also be made about the Sophistes and
Politicus; in which two dialogues, moreover, the didactic process is
exhibited purely and exclusively as a logical partition,
systematically conducted, of a genus into its component species.
Long-continued speech, always depreciated by Plato in its rhetorical
manifestations, is foreign to his genius even for purposes of
philosophy: the very lecture on cosmogony which he assigns to Timæus,
and the mythical narrative (unfinished) delivered by Kritias, are
brought into something like the form of dialogue by a prefatory
colloquy specially adapted for that end.

It thus appears that, while in Sokrates the dialectic process is
exhibited in its maximum of perfection, but disconnected altogether
from the didactic, which is left unnoticed,--in Plato the didactic
process is recognized and postulated, but is nevertheless confounded
with or absorbed into the dialectic, and admitted only as one
particular, ulterior, phase and manifestation of it. At the same
time, while both Sokrates and Plato bring out forcibly the side of
antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic, they omit entirely to
notice the side of analogy or parallelism between them. On both these
points Aristotle has corrected the confusion, and improved upon the
discrimination, of his two predecessors. He has pointedly
distinguished the dialectic process from the didactic; and he has
gone a step farther, furnishing a separate theory and precepts both
for the one and for the other. Again, he has indicated the important
feature of analogy between Dialectic and Rhetoric, in which same
feature both of them contrast with Didactic--the point not seized
either by Sokrates or by Plato.

Plato, in his Sokratic dialogues or dialogues of Search, has given
admirable illustrative specimens of that which Sokrates understood
and practised orally as Dialectic. Aristotle, in his Topica, has in
his usual vein of philosophy theorized on this practice as an art. He
had himself composed dialogues, which seem as far as we can judge
from indirect and fragmentary evidence, to have been Ciceronian or
rhetorical colloquies--a long pleading _pro_ followed by a long
pleading _con_, rather than examples of Sokratic brachylogy and
cross-examination. But his theory given in the Topica applies to
genuine Sokratic fencing, not to the Ciceronian alternation of set
speeches. He disallows the conception of Plato, that Dialectic is a
process including not merely dispute but all full and efficacious
employment of general terms and ideas for purposes of teaching: he
treats this latter as a province by itself, under the head of
Analytic: and devotes the Topica to the explanation of argumentative
debate, pure and simple. He takes his departure from the Syllogism,
as the type of deductive reasoning generally; the conditions under
which syllogistic reasoning is valid and legitimate, having been
already explained in his treatise called Analytica Priora. So
obtained, and regulated by those conditions, the Syllogism may be
applied to one or other of two distinct and independent
purposes:--(1) To Demonstration or Scientific Teaching, which we
have had before us in the last two chapters, commenting on the
Analytica Posteriora; (2) To Dialectic, or Argumentative Debate,
which we are now about to enter on in the Topica.

The Dialectic Syllogism, explained in the Topica, has some points in
common with the Demonstrative Syllogism, treated in the Analytica
Posteriora. In both, the formal conditions are the same, and the
conclusions will certainly be true, if the premisses are true; in
both, the axioms of deductive reasoning are assumed, namely, the
maxims of Contradiction and Excluded Middle. But, in regard to the
subject-matter, the differences between them are important. The
Demonstrative Syllogism applies only to a small number of select
sciences, each having special _principia_ of its own, or primary,
undemonstrable truths, obtained in the first instance by induction
from particulars. The premisses being thus incontrovertibly certain,
the conclusions deduced are not less certain; there is no necessary
place for conflicting arguments or counter-syllogisms, although in
particular cases paralogisms may be committed, and erroneous
propositions or majors for syllogism may be assumed. On the contrary,
the Dialectic Syllogism applies to all matters without exception; the
premisses on which it proceeds are neither obtained by induction, nor
incontrovertibly certain, but are borrowed from some one among the
varieties of accredited or authoritative opinion. They may be
opinions held by the multitude of any particular country, or by an
intelligent majority, or by a particular school of philosophers or
wise individuals, or from transmission as a current proverb or dictum
of some ancient poet or seer. From any one of these sources the
dialectician may borrow premisses for syllogizing. But it often
happens that the premisses which they supply are disparate, or in
direct contradiction to each other; and none of them is entitled to
be considered as final or peremptory against the rest. Accordingly,
it is an essential feature of Dialectic as well as of Rhetoric that
they furnish means of establishing conclusions contrary or
contradictory, by syllogisms equally legitimate.[5] The dialectic
procedure is from its beginning intrinsically contentious, implying a
debate between two persons, one of whom sets up a thesis to defend,
while the other impugns it by interrogation: the assailant has gained
his point, if he can reduce the defendant to the necessity of
contradicting himself; while the defendant on his side has to avoid
giving any responses which may drive him to the necessity of such
contradiction.

[Footnote 5: Aristot. Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 29: [Greek: e)/ti
de\ ta)nanti/a dei= du/nasthai pei/thein, katha/per kai\ e)n toi=s
sullogismoi=s, ou)ch o(/pôs a)mpho/tera pra/ttômen, (ou) ga\r dei=
ta\ phau=la pei/thein), a)ll' i(/na mê/te lantha/nê| pô=s e)/chei,
kai\ o(/pôs a)/llou chrôme/nou toi=s lo/gois mê\ dikai/ôs au)toi\
lu/ein e)/chômen. tô=n me\n ou)=n a)/llôn technô=n ou)demi/a
ta)nanti/a sullogi/zetai; ê( de\ dialektikê\ kai\ ê( r(êtorikê\
mo/nai tou=to poiou=sin; o(moi/ôs ga/r ei)sin a)mpho/terai tô=n
e)nanti/ôn.]]

Aristotle takes great pains to enforce the separation both of
Dialectic and Rhetoric from Science or Instruction with its purpose
of teaching or learning. He disapproves of those (seemingly intending
Plato) who seek to confound the two. Dialectic and Rhetoric (he says)
have for their province words and discourse, not facts or things:
they are not scientific or didactic processes, but powers or
accomplishments of discourse; and whoever tries to convert them into
means of teaching or learning particular subjects, abolishes their
characteristic feature and restricts their universality of
application.[6] Both of them deal not with scientific facts, but with
the sum total of accredited opinions, though each for its own
purpose: both of them lay hold of any one among the incoherent
aggregate of accepted generalities, suitable for the occasion; the
Dialectician trying to force his opponent into an inconsistency, the
Rhetor trying to persuade his auditors into a favourable decision.
Neither the one nor the other goes deeper than opinion for his
premisses, nor concerns himself about establishing by induction
primary or special _principia_, such as may serve for a basis of
demonstration.

[Footnote 6: Ibid. iv. 2, p. 1359, b. 12: [Greek: o(/sô| d' a)/n tis
ê)\ tê\n dialektikê\n ê)\ tau/tên (tê\n r(êtorikê\n) mê\ katha/per
a)\n duna/meis, a)ll' e)pistê/mas, peira=tai kataskeua/zein, lê/setai
tê\n phu/sin au)tô=n a)phani/sas, tô=| metabai/nein e)piskeua/zôn
ei)s e)pistê/mas u(pokeime/nôn tinô=n pragma/tôn, a)lla\ mê\ mo/non
lo/gôn.]]

In every society there are various floating opinions and beliefs,
each carrying with it a certain measure of authority, often
inconsistent with each other, not the same in different societies,
nor always the same even in the same society. Each youthful citizen,
as he grows to manhood, imbibes these opinions and beliefs insensibly
and without special or professional teaching.[7] The stock of
opinions thus transmitted would not be identical even at Athens and
Sparta: the difference would be still greater, if we compared Athens
with Rome, Alexandria, or Jerusalem. Such opinions all carry with
them more or less of authority, and it is from them that the
reasonings of common life, among unscientific men, are supplied. The
practice of dialectical discussion, prevalent in Athens during and
before the time of Aristotle, was only a more elaborate, improved,
and ingenious exhibition of this common talk; proceeding on the same
premisses, but bringing them together from a greater variety of
sources, handling them more cleverly, and having for its purpose to
convict an opponent of inconsistency. The dialecticians dwelt
exclusively in the region of these received opinions; and the purpose
of their debates was to prove inconsistency, or to repel the proof of
inconsistency, between one opinion and another.

[Footnote 7: For an acute and interesting description of this
unsystematic transmission of opinions, see, in the Protagoras of
Plato, the speech put into the mouth of Protagoras, pp. 323-325. See
also 'Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates,' Vol. II. ch. xxi.
p. 45, seq.]

This dialectic debate, which Aristotle found current at Athens, he
tries in the Topica to define and reduce to system. The dialectician
must employ Syllogism; and we are first taught to distinguish the
Syllogism that he employs from others. The Dialectic syllogism is
discriminated on one side from the Demonstrative, on the other from
the Eristic (or litigious); also from the scientific Paralogism or
Pseudographeme. This discrimination is founded on the nature of the
evidence belonging to the premisses. The Demonstrative syllogism
(which we have already gone through in the Analytica Posteriora) has
premisses noway dependent upon opinion: it deduces conclusions from
true first principles, obtained by Induction in each science, and
different in each different science. The Dialectic syllogism does not
aspire to any such evidence, but borrows its premisses from Opinion
of some sort; accredited either by numbers, or by wise individuals,
or by some other authoritative holding. As this evidence is very
inferior to that of the demonstrative syllogism, so again it is
superior to that of the third variety--the Eristic syllogism. In this
third variety,[8] the premisses do not rest upon any real opinion,
but only on a fallacious appearance or simulation of opinion;
insomuch that they are at once detected as false, by any person even
of moderate understanding; whereas (according to Aristotle) no real
opinion ever carries with it such a merely superficial semblance, or
is ever so obviously and palpably false. A syllogism is called
Eristic also when it is faulty in form, though its premisses may be
borrowed from real opinion, or when it is both faulty in form and
false in the matter of the premisses. Still a fourth variety of
syllogism is the scientific Paralogism: where the premisses are not
borrowed from any opinion, real or simulated, but belong properly to
the particular science in which they are employed, yet nevertheless
are false or erroneous.[9]

[Footnote 8: Topic. I. p. 100, b. 23: [Greek: e)ristiko\s d' e)/sti
sullogismo\s o( e)k phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn, mê\ o)/ntôn de/, kai\ o(
e)x e)ndo/xôn ê)\ phainome/nôn e)ndo/xôn phaino/menos. ou) ga\r pa=n
to\ phaino/menon e)/ndoxon kai\ e)/stin e)/ndoxon. ou)the\n ga\r tô=n
legome/nôn e)ndo/xôn e)pipo/laion e)/chei pantelô=s tê\n phantasi/an,
katha/per peri\ ta\s tô=n e)ristikô=n lo/gôn a)rcha\s sumbe/bêken
e)/chein; parachrê=ma ga\r kai\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu\ toi=s kai\ mikra\
sunora=n duname/nois kata/dêlos e)n au)toi=s ê( tou= pseu/dous e)sti\
phu/sis.]]

[Footnote 9: Ibid. i. p. 101, a. 5-17.]

Upon the classification of syllogisms here set forth by Aristotle, we
may remark that the distinction between the Demonstrative and the
Dialectic is true and important; but that between the Dialectic and
the Eristic is faint and unimportant; the class called Eristic
syllogisms being apparently introduced merely to create a difference,
real or supposed, between the Dialectician and the Sophist, and thus
to serve as a prelude to the last book of this treatise, entitled
Sophistici Elenchi. The class-title Eristic (or litigious) is founded
upon a supposition of dishonest intentions on the part of the
disputant; but it is unphilosophical to make this the foundation of a
class, and to rank the same syllogism in the class, or out of it,
according as the intentions of the disputant who employs it are
honest or dishonest. Besides, a portion of Aristotle's definition
tells us that the Eristic syllogism is one of which the premisses can
impose upon no one; being such that a very ordinary man can at once
detect their falsity. The dishonest disputant, surely, would argue to
little purpose, if he intentionally employed such premisses as these.
Lastly, according to another portion of Aristotle's definition, every
syllogism faulty in form, or yielding no legitimate conclusion at
all, will fall under the class Eristic, and this he himself in
another place explicitly states;[10] which would imply that the bad
syllogism must always emanate from litigious or dishonest intentions.
But in defining the Pseudographeme, immediately afterwards, Aristotle
does not imply that the false scientific premiss affords presumption
of litigious disposition on the part of those who advance it; nor
does there seem any greater propriety in throwing all bad dialectic
syllogisms under the general head of Eristic.

[Footnote 10: Topic. VIII. xii. p. 162, b. 4.]

The dialectician, then, will carry on debate only by means of
premisses sustained by real opinion; which not only always carry some
authority, but are assumed as being never obviously fallacious;
though often inconsistent with each other, and admitting of
argumentation _pro_ and _con_. These are what Aristotle calls
_Endoxa_; opposed to _Adoxa_, or propositions which are
discountenanced, or at least not countenanced, by opinion, and to
_Paradoxa_ (a peculiar variety of _Adoxa_),[11] or propositions
which, though having ingenious arguments in their favour, yet are
adverse to some proclaimed and wide-spread opinions, and thus have
the predominant authority of opinion against them.

[Footnote 11: Ibid. I. xi. p. 104, b. 24: [Greek: peri\ ô(=n lo/gon
e)/chomen e)nanti/on tai=s do/xais.]]

Of these three words, _Paradox_ is the only one that has obtained a
footing in modern languages, thanks to Cicero and the Latin authors.
If the word _Endox_ had obtained the like footing, we should be able
to keep more closely to the thought and views of Aristotle. As it is,
we are obliged to translate the Greek _Endoxon_ as Probable, and
_Adoxon_ as Improbable:[12] which, though not incorrect, is neither
suitable nor exactly coincident. Probable corresponds more nearly to
what Aristotle (both in this treatise and in the Analytica) announces
sometimes as [Greek: to\ ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]--that which happens in
most cases but not in all, as distinguished from the universal and
necessary on one side, and from the purely casual on the other;[13]
sometimes, also, as [Greek: to\ ei)ko/s] or [Greek: to\ sêmei=on].
Now this is a different idea from (though it has a point of analogy
with) the _Endoxon_: which is not necessarily true even in part, but
may be wholly untrue; which always has some considerations against
it, though there may be more in its favour; and which, lastly, may be
different, or even opposite, in different ages and different states
of society. When Josephus distinguished himself as a disputant in the
schools of Jerusalem on points of law and custom,[14] his arguments
must have been chiefly borrowed from the _Endoxa_ or prevalent
opinions of the time and place; but these must have differed widely
from the _Endoxa_ found and argued upon by the contemporaries of
Aristotle at Athens. The _Endoxon_ may indeed be rightly called
probable, because, whenever a proposition is fortified by a certain
body of opinion, Aristotle admits a certain presumption (greater or
less) that it is true. But such probability is not essential to the
_Endoxon_: it is only an accident or accompaniment (to use the
Aristotelian phrase), and by no means an universal accompaniment. The
essential feature of the _Endoxon_ is, that it has acquired a certain
amount of recognition among the mass of opinions and beliefs floating
and carrying authority at the actual time and place. The English word
whereby it is translated ought to express this idea, and nothing
more; just as the correlative word Paradox does express its
implication, approached from the other side. Unfortunately, in the
absence of Endox, we have no good word for the purpose.

[Footnote 12: Aristotle gives a double meaning of [Greek: a)/doxon]
(Topic. VIII. ix. ix. 160, b. 17):-- 1. That which involves absurd or
strange consequences ([Greek: a)/topa]). 2. That which affords
presumption of a bad disposition, such as others will
disapprove--[Greek: oi(=on o(/ti ê(donê\ ta)gatho\n kai\ to\
a)dikei=n be/ltion tou= a)dikei=sthai].]

[Footnote 13: Topic. II. vi. p. 112, b. 1: [Greek: e)pei\ de\ tô=n
pragma/tôn ta\ me\n e)x a)na/gkês e)sti/, ta\ d' ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/,
ta\ d' o(po/ter' e)/tuchen], &c. Compare also Analyt. Post. I. xxx.,
et alib.]

[Footnote 14: See Josephus, De Vitâ Suâ, c. ii.]

It is within this wide field of floating opinions that dialectical
debate and rhetorical pleading are carried on. Dialectic supposes a
questioner or assailant, and a respondent or defendant. The
respondent selects and proclaims a problem or thesis, which he
undertakes to maintain: the assailant puts to him successive
questions, with the view of obtaining concessions which may serve as
premisses for a counter-syllogism, of which the conclusion is
contradictory or contrary to the thesis itself, or to some other
antecedent premiss which the respondent has already conceded. It is
the business of the respondent to avoid making any answers which may
serve as premisses for such a counter-syllogism. If he succeeds in
this, so as not to become implicated in any contradiction with
himself, he has baffled his assailant, and gained the victory. There
are, however, certain rules and conditions, binding on both parties,
under which the debate must be carried on. It is the purpose of the
Topica to indicate these rules; and, in accordance therewith, to
advise both parties as to the effective conduct of their respective
cases--as to the best thrusts and the best mode of parrying. The
assailant is supplied with a classified catalogue of materials for
questions, and with indications of the weak points which he is to
look out for in any new subject which may turn up for debate. He is
farther instructed how to shape, marshal, and disguise his questions,
in such a way that the respondent may least be able to foresee their
ultimate bearing. The respondent, on his side, is told what he ought
to look forward to and guard against. Such is the scope of the
present treatise; the entire process being considered in the large
and comprehensive spirit customary with Aristotle, and distributed
according to the Aristotelian terminology and classification.

It is plain that neither the direct purpose of the debaters, nor the
usual result of the debate, is to prove truth or to disprove
falsehood. Such may indeed be the result occasionally; but the only
certain result is, that an inconsistency is exposed in the
respondent's manner of defending his thesis, or that the assailant
fails in his purpose of showing up such inconsistency. Whichever way
the debate may turn, no certain inference can be drawn as to the
thesis itself: not merely as to whether it is true or false, but even
as to whether it consists or does not consist with other branches of
received opinions. Such being the case, what is the use or value of
dialectic debate, or of a methodized procedure for conducting it?
Aristotle answers this question, telling us that it is useful for
three purposes.[15] First, the debate is a valuable and stimulating
mental exercise; and, if a methodized procedure be laid down, both
parties will be able to conduct it more easily as well as more
efficaciously. Secondly, it is useful for our intercourse with the
multitude;[16] for the procedure directs us to note and remember the
opinions of the multitude, and such knowledge will facilitate our
intercourse with them: we shall converse with them out of their own
opinions, which we may thus be able beneficially to modify. Thirdly,
dialectic debate has an useful though indirect bearing even upon the
processes of science and philosophy, and upon the truths thereby
acquired.[17] For it accustoms us to study the difficulties on both
sides of every question, and thus assists us in detecting and
discriminating truth and falsehood. Moreover, apart from this mode of
usefulness, it opens a new road to the scrutiny of the first
_principia_ of each separate science. These _principia_ can never be
scrutinized through the truths of the science itself, which
presuppose them and are deduced from them. To investigate and verify
them, is the appropriate task of First Philosophy. But Dialectic
also, carrying investigation as it does everywhere, and familiarized
with the received opinions on both sides of every subject, suggests
many points of importance in regard to these _principia_.

[Footnote 15: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, a. 26: [Greek: e)/sti dê\ pro\s
tri/a, pro\s gumnasi/an, pro\s ta\s e)nteu/xeis, pro\s ta\s kata\
philosophi/an e)pistê/mas.]]

[Footnote 16: Ibid. a. 30: [Greek: pro\s de\ ta\s e)nteu/xeis, dio/ti
ta\s tô=n pollô=n katêrithmême/noi do/xas ou)k e)k tô=n a)llotri/ôn
a)ll' e)k tô=n oi)kei/ôn dogma/tôn o(milê/somen pro\s au)tou/s,
metabiba/zontes o(/ ti a)\n mê\ kalô=s phai/nôntai le/gein ê(mi=n.]]

[Footnote 17: Ibid. a. 34: [Greek: pro\s de\ ta\s kata\ philosophi/an
e)pistê/mas], &c.]

The three heads just enumerated illustrate the discriminating care of
Aristotle. The point of the first head is brought out often in the
Platonic Dialogues of Search: the stimulus brought to bear in
awakening dormant intellectual power, and in dissipating that false
persuasion of knowledge which is the general infirmity of mankind, is
frequently declared by Plato to be the most difficult, but the
indispensable, operation of the teacher upon his pupil. Under the
third head, Aristotle puts this point more justly than Plato, not as
a portion of teaching, nor as superseding direct teaching, but as a
preliminary thereunto; and it is a habit of his own to prefix this
antecedent survey of doubts and difficulties on both sides, as a
means of sharpening our insight into the dogmatic exposition which
immediately follows.

Under the second head, we find exhibited another characteristic
feature of Aristotle's mind--the value which he sets upon a copious
acquaintance with received opinions, whether correct or erroneous.
The philosophers of his day no longer talked publicly in the
market-place and with every one indiscriminately, as Sokrates had
done: scientific study, and the habit of written compositions
naturally conducted them into a life apart, among select companions.
Aristotle here indicates that such estrangement from the multitude
lessened their means of acting beneficially on the multitude, and in
the way of counteraction he prescribes dialectical exercise. His own
large and many-sided observation, extending to the most vulgar
phenomena, is visible throughout his works, and we know that he drew
up a collection of current proverbs.[18]

[Footnote 18: Diog. Laert. v. 26. Kephisodorus, the disciple of
Isokrates, in defending his master, depreciated this Aristotelian
collection; see in Athenæus II. lvi., comparing Schweighäuser's
Animadversiones I. p. 406.]

Again, what we read under the third head shows that, while Aristotle
everywhere declares Demonstration and teaching to be a process apart
from Dialectic, he at the same time recognizes the legitimate
function of the latter, for testing and verifying the _principia_ of
Demonstration:[19] which _principia_ cannot be reached by
Demonstration itself, since every demonstration presupposes them. He
does not mean that these _principia_ can be proved by Dialectic, for
Dialectic does not prove any thing; but it is necessary as a test or
scrutinizing process to assure us that all the objections capable of
being offered against them can be met by sufficient replies. In
respect of universal competence and applicability, Dialectic is the
counterpart, or rather the tentative companion and adjunct, of what
Aristotle calls First Philosophy or Ontology; to which last he
assigns the cognizance of _principia_, as we shall see when we treat
of the Metaphysica.[20] Dialectic (he repeats more than once) is not
a definite science or body of doctrine, but, like rhetoric or
medicine, a practical art or ability of dealing with the ever varying
situations of the dialogue; of imagining and enunciating the question
proper for attack, or the answer proper for defence, as the case may
be. As in the other arts, its resources are not unlimited. Nor can
the dialectician, any more than the rhetor or the physician, always
guarantee success. Each of them has an end to be accomplished; and if
he employs for its accomplishment the best means that the situation
permits, he must be considered a master of his own art and
procedure.[21] To detect truth, and to detect what is like truth,
belong (in Aristotle's judgment) to the same mental capacity. Mankind
have a natural tendency towards truth, and the common opinions
therefore are, in most cases, coincident with truth. Accordingly, the
man who divines well in regard to verisimilitude, will usually divine
well in regard to truth.[22]

[Footnote 19: Topic. I. ii. p. 101, b. 3: [Greek: e)xetastikê\ ga\r
ou)=sa pro\s ta\s a(pasô=n tô=n metho/dôn a)rcha\s o(do\n e)/chei.]]

[Footnote 20: Metaphys. [Greek: G]. iii. p. 1005, a. 20-b. 10;
[Greek: G]. ii. p. 1004, b. 15-30.]

[Footnote 21: Topic. I. iii. p. 101, b. 5: [Greek: e(/xomen de\
tele/ôs tê\n me/thodon, o(/tan o(moi/ôs e)/chômen ô(/sper e)pi\
r(êtorikê=s kai\ i)atrikê=s kai\ tô=n toiou/tôn duna/meôn. tou=to d'
e)sti\ to\ e)k tô=n e)ndechome/nôn poiei=n a(\ proairou/metha. ou)/te
ga\r o( r(êtoriko\s e)k panto\s tro/pou pei/sei, ou)/th' o(
i)atriko\s u(gia/sei; a)ll' e)a\n tô=n e)ndechome/nôn mêde\n
parali/pê|, i(kanô=s au)to\n e)/chein tê\n e)pistê/mên phê/somen.]

The word [Greek: e)pistê/mên] in the last line is used loosely, since
Aristotle, in the Rhetorica (p. 1369, b. 12), explicitly states that
Rhetoric and Dialectic are not to be treated as [Greek: e)pistê/mas]
but as mere [Greek: duna/meis].]

[Footnote 22: Rhetoric. I. i. p. 1355, a. 17.]

The subject-matter of dialectic debate, speaking generally, consists
of Propositions and Problems, to be propounded as questions by the
assailant and to be admitted or disallowed by the defendant. They
will relate either to _Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_, or they must bear,
at least indirectly, upon some point of scientific truth or observed
cognition.[23] They will be either ethical, physical, or logical;
class-terms which Aristotle declines to define, contenting himself
with giving an example to illustrate each of them, while adding that
the student should collect other similar examples, and gradually
familiarize himself with the full meaning of the general term,
through such inductive comparison of particulars.[24]

[Footnote 23: Topic. I, xi. p. 104, b. 2.]

[Footnote 24: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 20-29: [Greek: ai( me\n ga\r
ê)thikai\ prota/seis ei)si/n, ai( de\ phusikai/, ai( de\
logikai/.--poi=ai d' e(/kastai tô=n proeirême/nôn, o(rismô=| me\n
ou)k eu)pete\s a)podou=nai peri\ au)tô=n, tê=| de\ _dia\ tê=s
e)pagôgê=s sunêthei/a|_ peirate/on gnôri/zein e(ka/stên au)tô=n,
kata\ ta\ proeirême/na paradei/gmata e)piskopou=nta.]

This illustrates Aristotle's view of the process of Induction and its
results; the acquisition of the import of a general term, through
comparison of numerous particulars comprehended under it.

The term _logical_ does not exactly correspond with Aristotle's
[Greek: logikai/], but on the present occasion no better term
presents itself.]

But it is not every problem coming under one of these three heads
that is fit for dialectic debate. If a man propounds as subject for
debate, Whether we ought to honour the gods or to love our parents,
he deserves punishment instead of refutation: if he selects the
question, Whether snow is white or not, he must be supposed deficient
in perceptive power.[25] What all persons unanimously believe, is
unsuitable:[26] what no one believes is also unsuitable, since it
will not be conceded by any respondent. The problem must have some
doubts and difficulties, in order to afford scope for discussion; yet
it must not be one of which the premisses are far-fetched or
recondite, for that goes beyond the limits of dialectic exercise.[27]
It ought to be one on which opinions are known to be held, both in
the affirmative and in the negative; on which either the multitude
differ among themselves, the majority being on one side, while yet
there is an adverse minority; or some independent authority stands
opposed to the multitude, such as a philosopher of eminence, a
professional man or artist speaking on his own particular craft, a
geometer or a physician on the specialities of his department.
Matters such as these are the appropriate subjects for dialectic
debate; and new matters akin to them by way of analogy may be
imagined and will be perfectly admissible.[28] Even an ingenious
paradox or thesis adverse to prevailing opinions may serve the
purpose, as likely to obtain countenance from some authority, though
as yet we know of none.[29]

[Footnote 25: Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 67: [Greek:
kola/seôs--ai)sthê/seôs, de/ontai]. Yet he considers the question,
Whether we ought rather to obey the laws of the state or the commands
of our parents, in case of discrepancy between the two,--as quite fit
for debate (xiv. p. 105, b. 22).]

[Footnote 26: Ibid. x. p. 104, a. 5.]

[Footnote 27: Ibid. xi. p. 105, a. 7: [Greek: ou)de\ dê\ ô(=n
su/neggus ê( a)po/deixis, ou)/d' ô(=n li/an po/r)r(ô; ta\ me\n ga\r
ou)k e)/chei a)pori/an, ta\ de\ **plei/on ê)\ kata\
gumnastikê/n.] The loose use of the word [Greek: a)po/deixis]
deserves note here: it is the technical term of the Analyt. Post.,
denoting that application of the syllogism which contrasts with
Dialectic altogether.

Aristotle here means only that problems falling within these limits
are the best for dialectic discussion; but, in his suggestions later
on, he includes problems for discussion involving the utmost
generalities of philosophy. For example, he often adverts to
dialectic debate on the Platonic Ideas or Forms (Topic. II. vii. p.
113, a. 25; V. vii. p. 137, b. 7; VI. vi. p. 143, b. 24. Compare also
I. xi. p. 104, b. 14.)]

[Footnote 28: Topic. I. x. p. 104, a. 11-37.]

[Footnote 29: Ibid. xi. p. 104, b. 24-28: [Greek: ê)\ peri\ ô(=n
lo/gon e)/chomen e)nanti/on tai=s do/xais--tou=to ga/r, ei) kai/ tini
mê\ dokei=, do/xeien a)\n dia\ to\ lo/gon e)/chein.]]

These conditions apply both to problems propounded for debate, and to
premisses tendered on either side during the discussion. Both the
interrogator and the respondent--the former having to put appropriate
questions, and the latter to make appropriate answers--must know and
keep in mind these varieties of existing opinion among the multitude
as well as among the special dissident authorities above indicated.
The dialectician ought to collect and catalogue such _Endoxa_, with
the opinions analogous to them, out of written treatises and
elsewhere;[30] distributing them under convenient heads, such as
those relating to good and evil generally, and to each special class
of good, &c. Aristotle, however, admonishes him that he is debating
problems not scientifically, but dialectically: having reference not
to truth, but to opinion.[31] If the interrogator were proceeding
scientifically and didactically, he would make use of all true and
ascertained propositions, whether the respondent conceded them or
not, as premisses for his syllogism. But in Dialectic he is dependent
on the concession of the respondent, and can construct his syllogisms
only from premisses that have been conceded to him.[32] Hence he must
keep as closely as he can to opinions carrying extrinsic authority,
as being those which the respondent will hesitate to disallow.[33]

[Footnote 30: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 1-18. [Greek: e)kle/gein de\
chrê\ kai\ e)k tô=n gegramme/nôn lo/gôn.]]

[Footnote 31: Ibid. b. 30: [Greek: pro\s me\n ou)=n philosophi/an
kat' a)lê/theian peri\ au)tô=n pragmateute/on, dialektikô=s de\ pro\s
do/xan.]]

[Footnote 32: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 10: [Greek: pro\s e(/teron
ga\r pa=n to\ toiou=ton, tô=| de\ philoso/phô| kai\ zêtou=nti kath'
e(auto\n ou)de\n me/lei, e)a\n a)lêthê= me\n ê)=| kai\ gnô/rima di'
ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, mê\ thê=| d' au)ta\ o( a)pokrino/menos], &c.]

[Footnote 33: Ibid. i. p. 156, b. 20: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ to\
e)pile/gein o(/ti su/nêthes kai\ lego/menon to\ toiou=ton; _o)knou=si
ga\r kinei=n to\ ei)ôtho/s_, e)/nstasin mê\ e)/chontes.]]

Moreover, the form of the interrogation admissible in dialectic
debate is peculiar. The respondent is not bound to furnish any
information in his answer: he is bound only to admit, or to deny, a
proposition tendered to him. You must not ask him, What is the genus
of man? You must yourself declare the genus, and ask whether he
admits it, in one or other of the two following forms--(1) Is animal
the genus of man? (2) Is animal the genus of man, or not? to which
the response is an admission or a denial.[34]

[Footnote 34: Ibid. I. iv. p. 101, b. 30. The first of these two
forms Aristotle calls a [Greek: pro/tasis], the second he calls a
[Greek: pro/blêma]. But this distinction between these two words is
not steadily adhered to: it is differently declared in Topic. I. x.,
xi. p. 104, as Alexander has remarked in the Scholia, p. 258, b. 4,
Brand. Compare also De Interpretat. p. 20, b. 26; and Topic. VIII.
ii. p. 158, a. 14: [Greek: ou) dokei= de\ pa=n to\ katho/lou
dialektikê\ pro/tasis ei)=nai, oi(=on ti/ e)stin a)/nthrôpos, ê)\
posachô=s le/getai ta)gatho/n? e)/sti ga\r pro/tasis dialektikê\
pro\s ê(\n e)/stin a)pokri/nasthai nai\ ê)\ ou)/; pro\s de\ ta\s
ei)rême/nas ou)k e)/stin. dio\ ou) dialektika/ e)sti ta\ toiau=ta
tô=n e)rôtêma/tôn, a)\n mê\ au)to\s diori/sas ê)\ dielo/menos
ei)/pê|.]]

Dialectic procedure, both of the assailant and of the defendant, has
to do with propositions and problems; accordingly, Aristotle
introduces a general distribution of propositions under four heads.
The predicate must either be Genus, or Proprium, or Accident, of its
subject. But the Proprium divides itself again into two. It always
reciprocates with, or is co-extensive with, its subject; but
sometimes it declares the essence of the subject, sometimes it does
not. When it declares the essence of the subject, Aristotle calls it
the Definition; when it does not declare the essence of the subject,
although reciprocating therewith, he reserves for it the title of
Proprium. Every proposition, and every problem, the entire material
of Dialectic, will declare one of these four--Proprium, Definition,
Genus, or Accident.[35] The Differentia, as being attached to the
Genus, is ranked along with the Genus.[36]

[Footnote 35: Topic. I. iv. p. 101, b. 17-36.]

[Footnote 36: Ibid. b. 18: [Greek: tê\n diaphora\n ô(s ou)=san
genikê\n o(mou= tô=| ge/nei takte/on.]]

The above four general heads include all the Predicables, which were
distributed by subsequent logicians (from whom Porphyry borrowed)
into five heads instead of four--Genus, Species, Differentia,
Proprium, Accident; the Differentia being ranked as a separate item
in the quintuple distribution, and the Species substituted in place
of the Definition. It is under this quadruple classification that
Aristotle intends to consider propositions and problems as matters
for dialectic procedure: he will give argumentative suggestions
applicable to each of the four successively. It might be practicable
(he thinks) to range all the four under the single head of
Definition; since arguments impugning Genus, Proprium, and Accident,
are all of them good also against Definition. But such a
simplification would be perplexing and unmanageable in regard to
dialectic procedure.[37]

[Footnote 37: Topic. I. vi. p. 102, b. 27-38. [Greek: a)ll' ou) dia\
tou=to mi/an e)pi\ pa/ntôn katho/lou me/thodon zêtête/on; ou)/te ga\r
r(a/|dion eu(rei=n tou=t' e)sti/n, ei)/ th' eu(rethei/ê, pantelô=s
a)saphê\s kai\ du/schrêstos a)\n ei)/ê pro\s tê\n prokeime/nên
pragmatei/an.]]

That the quadruple classification is exhaustive, and that every
proposition or problem falls under one or other of the four heads,
may be shown in two ways. First, by Induction: survey and analyse as
many propositions as you will, all without exception will be found to
belong to one of the four.[38] Secondly, by the following Deductive
proof:--In every proposition the predicate is either co-extensive and
reciprocating with the subject, or it is not. If it does reciprocate,
it either declares the essence of the subject, or it does not: if the
former, it is the Definition; if the latter, it is a Proprium. But,
supposing the predicate not to reciprocate with the subject, it will
either declare something contained in the Definition, or it will not.
If it does contain a part of the Definition, that part must be either
a Genus or a Differentia, since these are the constituents of the
Definition. If it does not contain any such part, it must be an
Accident.[39] Hence it appears that every proposition must belong to
one or other of the four, and that the classification is exhaustive.

[Footnote 38: Ibid. viii. p. 103, b. 3: [Greek: mi/a me\n pi/stis ê(
dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s; ei) ga/r tis e)piskopoi/ê e(ka/stên tô=n
prota/seôn kai\ tô=n problêma/tôn, phai/noit' a)\n ê)\ a)po\ tou=
o(/rou ê)\] &c.]

[Footnote 39: Topic. I. **viii. p. 103, b. 6-19:
[Greek: a)/llê de\ pi/stis ê( dia\ sullogismou=].

It will be observed that Aristotle here resolves Definition into
Genus and Differentiæ--[Greek: e)peidê\ o( o(rismo\s e)k ge/nous kai\
diaphorô=n e)sti/n]. Moreover, though he does not recognize Species
as a separate head, yet in his definition of Genus he implies Species
as known--[Greek: ge/nos e)sti\ to\ kata\ pleio/nôn kai\
_diaphero/ntôn tô=| ei)/dei_ e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorou/menon] (p.
102, a. 31).

It thus appears that the quintuple classification is the real and
logical one; but the quadruple may perhaps be more suitable for the
Topica, with a view to dialectic procedure, since debates turn upon
the attack and defence of a Definition.]

Moreover, each of the four Predicables must fall under one or other
of the ten Categories or Predicaments. If the predicate be either of
Genus or Definition, declaring the essence of the subject, it may
fall under any one of the ten Categories; if of Proprium or Accident,
not declaring essence, it cannot belong to the first Category
([Greek: Ou)si/a]), but must fall under one of the remaining
nine.[40]

[Footnote 40: Ibid. ix. p. 103, b. 20-39.]

The notion of Sameness or Identity occurs so often in dialectic
debate, that Aristotle discriminates its three distinct senses or
grades: (1) _Numero_; (2) _Specie_; (3) _Genere_. Water from the same
spring is only _idem specie_, though the resemblance between two cups
of water from the same spring is far greater than that between water
from different sources. Even _Idem Numero_ has different
significations: sometimes there are complete synonyms; sometimes an
individual is called by its proprium, sometimes by its peculiar
temporary accident.[41]

[Footnote 41: Ibid. vii. p. 103, a. 6-39.]

Having thus classified dialectic propositions, Aristotle proceeds to
the combination of propositions, or dialectic discourse and argument.
This is of two sorts, either Induction or Syllogism; of both which we
have already heard in the Analytica. Induction is declared to be
plainer, more persuasive, nearer to sensible experience, and more
suitable to the many, than Syllogism; while this latter carries
greater compulsion and is more irresistible against professed
disputants.[42] A particular example is given to illustrate what
Induction is. But we remark that though it is always mentioned as an
argumentative procedure important and indispensable, yet neither here
nor elsewhere does Aristotle go into any discriminative analysis of
the conditions under which it is valid, as he does about Syllogism in
the Analytica Priora.

[Footnote 42: Ibid. xii. p. 105, a. 10-19: [Greek: po/sa tô=n lo/gôn
ei)/dê tô=n dialektikô=n], &c.]

What helps are available to give to the dialectician a ready and
abundant command of syllogisms? Four distinct helps may be named:[43]
(1) He must make a large collection of Propositions; (2) He must
study and discriminate the different senses in which the Terms of
these propositions are used; (3) He must detect and note Differences;
(4) He must investigate Resemblances.

[Footnote 43: Topic. I. xiii. p. 105, a. 21: [Greek: ta\ d' o)/rgana,
di' ô(=n eu)porê/somen tô=n sullogismô=n, e)sti\ te/ttara, e(/n me\n
to\ prota/seis labei=n, deu/teron de\ posachô=s e(/kaston le/getai
du/nasthai dielei=n, tri/ton ta\s diaphora\s eu(rei=n, te/tarton de\
ê( tou= o(moi/ou ske/psis.]

The term [Greek: o)/rgana], properly signifying _instruments_,
appears here by a strained metaphor. It means simply _helps_ or
_aids_, as may be seen by comparing Top. VIII. xiv. p. 163, b. 9.
Waitz says truly (Prolegg. ad Analyt. Post. p. 294): "unde fit, ut
[Greek: o)/rgana] dicat quæcunque ad aliquam rem faciendam adiumentum
afferant."]

1. About collecting Propositions, Aristotle has already indicated
that those wanted are such as declare _Endoxa_, and other modes of
thought cognate or **analogous to the _Endoxa_:[44] opinions
of the many, and opinions of any small sections or individuals
carrying authority. All such are to be collected (out of written
treatises as well as from personal enquiry); nor are individual
philosophers (like Empedokles) to be omitted, since a proposition is
likely enough to be conceded when put upon the authority of an
illustrious name.[45] If any proposition is currently admitted as
true in general or in most cases, it must be tendered with confidence
to the respondent as an universal principle; for he will probably
grant it, not being at first aware of the exceptions.[46] All
propositions must be registered in the most general terms possible,
and must then be resolved into their subordinate constituent
particulars, as far as the process of subdivision can be carried.[47]

[Footnote 44: Topic. I. xiv. p. 105, b. 4: [Greek: e)kle/gein mê\
mo/non ta\s ou)/sas e)ndo/xous, a)lla\ kai\ ta\s o(moi/as tau/tais.]]

[Footnote 45: Ibid. b. 17: [Greek: thei/ê ga\r a)/n tis to\ u(po/
tinos ei)rême/non e)ndo/xou].]

[Footnote 46: Ibid. b. 10: [Greek: o(/sa e)pi\ pa/ntôn ê)\ tô=n
plei/stôn phai/netai, lêpte/on ô(s a)rchê\n kai\ dokou=san the/sin;
tithe/asi ga\r oi( mê\ sunorô=ntes e)pi\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/tôs.]]

[Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 31-37: [Greek: lêpte/on d' o(/ti ma/lista
katho/lou pa/sas ta\s prota/seis, kai\ tê\n mi/an polla\s
poiête/on--diairete/on, e(/ôs a)\n e)nde/chêtai diairei=n], &c.]

2. The propositions having been got together, they must be examined
in order to find out Equivocation or double meaning of terms. There
are various ways of going about this task. Sometimes the same
predicate is applied to two different subjects, but in different
senses; thus, courage and justice are both of them good, but in a
different way. Sometimes the same predicate is applied to two
different classes of subjects, each admitting of being defined; thus,
health is good in itself, and exercise is good as being among those
things that promote health.[48] Sometimes the equivocal meaning of a
term is perceived by considering its contrary; if we find that it has
two or more distinct contraries, we know at once that it has
different meanings. Sometimes, though there are not two distinct
contraries, yet the mere conjunction of the same adjective with two
substantives shows us at once that it cannot mean the same in
both[49] ([Greek: leukê\ phônê/--leuko\n chrô=ma]). In one sense, the
term may have an assignable contrary, while in another sense it may
have no contrary; showing that the two senses are distinct: for
example, the pleasure of drinking has for its contrary the pain of
thirst; but the pleasure of scientifically contemplating that the
diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the side, has no
contrary; hence, we see that pleasure is an equivocal term.[50] In
one sense, there may be a term intermediate between the two
contraries; in another sense, there may be none; or there may be two
distinct intermediate terms for the two distinct senses; or there may
be several intermediate terms in one of the senses, and only one or
none in the other: in each of these ways the equivocation is
revealed.[51] We must look also to the contradictory opposite (of a
term), which may perhaps have an obvious equivocation of meaning;
thus, [Greek: mê\ ble/pein] means sometimes to be blind, sometimes
not to be seeing actually, whence we discover that [Greek: ble/pein]
also has the same equivocation.[52] If a positive term is equivocal,
we know that the privative term correlating with it must also be
equivocal; thus, [Greek: to\ ai)stha/nesthai] has a double sense,
according as we speak with reference to mind or body; and this will
be alike true of the correlating privative--[Greek: to\ a)nai/sthêton
ei)=nai].[53] Farther, an equivocal term will have its derivatives
equivocal in the same manner; and conversely, if the derivative be
equivocal, the radical will be so likewise.[54] The term must also be
looked at in reference to the ten Categories: if its meanings fall
under more than one Category, we know that it is equivocal.[55] If it
comprehends two subjects which are not in the same genus, or in
genera not subordinate one to the other, this too will show that it
is equivocal.[56] The contrary, also, of the term must be looked at
with a view to the same inference.[57]

[Footnote 48: Topic. I. xv. p. 106, a. 1-8: [Greek: to\ de\
posachô=s, pragmateute/on mê\ mo/non o(/sa le/getai kath' e(/teron
tro/pon, a)lla\ kai\ tou\s lo/gous au)tôn peirate/on a)podido/nai.]]

[Footnote 49: Ibid. a. 9-35.]

[Footnote 50: Ibid. a. 36.]

[Footnote 51: Ibid. b. 4.]

[Footnote 52: Ibid. b. 13-20.]

[Footnote 53: Ibid. b. 21-28.]

[Footnote 54: Ibid. b. 28.]

[Footnote 55: Ibid. p. 107, a. 3-17.]

[Footnote 56: Ibid. a. 18.]

[Footnote 57: Ibid. a. 32-35.]

Again, it will be useful to bring together the same term in two
different conjunctions, and to compare the definitions of the two.
Define both of them, and then deduct what is peculiar to each
_definitum_: if the remainder be different, the term will be
equivocal; if the remainder be the same, the term will be univocal.
Thus, [Greek: leuko\n sô=ma] will be defined, a body having such and
such a colour: [Greek: leukê\ phônê/], a voice easily and distinctly
heard: deduct [Greek: sô=ma] from the first definition, and [Greek:
phônê\] from the second, the remainder will be totally disparate;
therefore, the term [Greek: leuko/n] is equivocal.[58] Sometimes,
also, the ambiguity may be found in definitions themselves, where the
same term is used to explain subjects that are not the same; whether
such use is admissible, has to be considered.[59] If the term be
univocal, two conjunctions of it may always be compared as to greater
or less, or in respect of likeness; whenever this cannot be, the term
is equivocal.[60] If, again, the term is used as a differentia for
two genera quite distinct and independent of each other, it must be
equivocal; for genera that are unconnected and not subordinate one to
the other, have their differentiæ also disparate.[61] And,
conversely, if the term be such that the differentiæ applied to it
are disparate, we may know it to be an equivocal term. The like, if
the term be used as a species in some of its conjunctions, and as a
differentia in others.[62]

[Footnote 58: Topic. I. xv. p. 107, a. 36-b. 3.]

[Footnote 59: Ibid. b. 8.]

[Footnote 60: Ibid. b. 13-18: [Greek: e)/ti ei) mê\ sumblêta\ kata\
to\ ma=llon ê)\ o(moi/ôs,--to\ ga\r sunô/numon pa=n sumblêto/n.]]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. b. 19-26.]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 27-37.]

3. Aristotle has thus indicated, at considerable length, the points
to be looked for when we are examining whether a term is univocal or
equivocal. He is more concise when he touches on the last two out of
the four helps ([Greek: o)/rgana]) enumerated for supplying
syllogisms when needed,--viz. the study of Differences and of
Resemblances. In regard to the study of Differences, standing third,
while he remarks that, where these are wide and numerous, they are
sure without any precept to excite our attention, he advises that we
should study the differences of subjects that are nearly
allied,--those within the same genus, or comprehended in genera not
much removed from one another, such as, the distinction between
sensible perception and science. But he goes into no detail.[63]

[Footnote 63: Ibid. xvi. p. 107, b. 39.]

4. In regard to the study of Resemblances, he inverts the above
precept, and directs us to note especially the points of resemblance
between subjects of great apparent difference.[64] We must examine
what is the quality common to all species of the same genus--man,
horse, dog, &c.; for it is in this that they are similar. We may also
compare different genera with each other, in respect to the analogies
that are to be found in each: _e.g._, as science is to the
cognizable, so is perception to the perceivable; as sight is in the
eye, so is intellection in the soul; as [Greek: galê/nê] is in the
sea, so is [Greek: nênemi/a] in the air.[65]

[Footnote 64: Ibid. xvii. p. 108, a. 12: [Greek: ma/lista d' e)n
toi=s polu\ diestô=si gumna/zesthai dei=; r(a=|on ga\r e)pi\ tô=n
loipô=n dunêso/metha ta\ o(/moia sunora=n.]]

[Footnote 65: Topic. I. xvii. p. 108, a. 7.]

Such are the four distinct helps, towards facility of syllogizing,
enumerated by Aristotle. It will be observed that the third and
fourth (study of Resemblances and Differences) bear more upon matters
of fact and less upon words; while the second ([Greek: to\
posachô=s]), though doubtless also bearing on matters of fact and
deriving from thence its main real worth, yet takes its departure
from terms and propositions, and proceeds by comparing multiplied
varieties of these in regard to diversity of meaning. Upon this
ground it is, apparently, that Aristotle has given so much fuller
development to the second head than to the third and fourth; for, in
the Topica, he is dealing with propositions and
counter-propositions--with opinions and counter-opinions, not with
science and truth.

He proceeds to indicate the different ways in which these three helps
(the second, third, and fourth) further the purpose of the
dialectician--respondent as well as assailant. Unless the different
meanings of the term be discriminated, the respondent cannot know
clearly what he admits or what he denies; he may be thinking of
something different from what the assailant intends, and the
syllogisms constructed may turn upon a term only, not upon any
reality.[66] The respondent will be able to protect himself better
against being driven into contradiction, if he can distinguish the
various meanings of the same term; for he will thus know whether the
syllogisms brought against him touch the real matter which he has
admitted.[67] On the other hand, the assailant will have much
facility in driving his opponent into contradiction, if he (the
assailant) can distinguish the different meanings of the term, while
the respondent cannot do so; in those cases at least where the
proposition is true in one sense of the term and false in
another.[68] This manner of proceeding, however, is hardly consistent
with genuine Dialectic. No dialectician ought ever to found his
interrogations and his arguments upon a mere unanalysed term, unless
he can find absolutely nothing else to say in the debate.[69]

[Footnote 66: Ibid. xviii. p. 108, a. 22.]

[Footnote 67: Ibid. a. 26: [Greek: chrê/simon de\ kai\ pro\s to\ mê\
paralogisthê=nai kai\ pro\s to\ paralogi/sasthai. ei)do/tes ga\r
posachô=s le/getai ou) mê\ paralogisthô=men, a)ll' ei)dê/somen e)a\n
mê\ pro\s to\ au)to\ to\n lo/gon poiê=tai o( e)rôtô=n.]]

[Footnote 68: Ibid. a. 29: [Greek: au)toi/ te e)rôtô=ntes
dunêso/metha paralogi/sasthai e)a\n mê\ tugcha/nê| ei)dô\s o(
a)pokrino/menos posachô=s le/getai; tou=to d' ou)k e)pi\ pa/ntôn
dunato/n, a)ll' o(/tan ê)=| tô=n pollachô=s legome/nôn ta\ me\n
a)lêthê=, ta\ de\ pseudê=.]]

[Footnote 69: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, a. 34: [Greek: dio\ pantelô=s
eu)labête/on toi=s dialektikoi=s to\ toiou=nton, to\ pro\s tou)/noma
diale/gesthai, _e)a\n mê/ tis a)/llôs e)xadunatê=| peri\ tou=
prokeime/nou diale/gesthai_.]]

The third help (an acquaintance with Differences) will be of much
avail on all occasions where we have to syllogize upon Same and
Different, and where we wish to ascertain the essence or definition
of any thing; for we ascertain this by exclusion of what is foreign
thereunto, founded on the appropriate differences in each case.[70]

[Footnote 70: Ibid. b. 2.]

Lastly, the fourth help (the intelligent survey of Resemblances)
serves us in different ways:--(1) Towards the construction of
inductive arguments; (2) Towards syllogizing founded upon assumption;
(3) Towards the declaration of definitions. As to the inductive
argument, it is founded altogether on a repetition of similar
particulars, whereby the universal is obtained.[71] As to the
syllogizing from an assumption, the knowledge of resemblances is
valuable, because we are entitled to assume, as an _Endoxon_ or a
doctrine conformable to common opinion, that what happens in any one
of a string of similar cases will happen also in all the rest. We lay
down this as the major proposition of a syllogism; and thus, if we
can lay hold of any one similar case, we can draw inference from it
to the matter actually in debate.[72] Again, as to the declaration of
definitions, when we have once discovered what is the same in all
particular cases, we shall have ascertained to what genus the subject
before us belongs;[73] for that one of the common predicates which is
most of the essence, will be the genus. Even where the two matters
compared are more disparate than we can rank in the same genus, the
knowledge of resemblances will enable us to discover useful
analogies, and thus to obtain a definition at least approximative.
Thus, as the point is in a line, so is the unit in numbers; each of
them is a _principium_; this, therefore, is a common genus, which
will serve as a tolerable definition. Indeed this is the definition
of them commonly given by philosophers; who call the unit
_principium_ of number, and the point _principium_ of a line, thus
putting one and the other into a genus common to both.[74]

[Footnote 71: Ibid. b. 9.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid. b. 12: [Greek: pro\s de\ tou\s e)x u(pothe/seôs
sullogsismou/s, _dio/ti e)/ndoxo/n e)stin_, ô(/s pote e)ph' e(no\s
tô=n o(moi/ôn e)/chei, ou(/tôs kai\ e)i\ tô=n loipô=n; ô(/ste pro\s
o(/ ti a)\n au)tô=n eu)porô=men diale/gesthai,
_prodiomologêso/metha_, ô(/s pote e)pi\ tou/tôn e)/chei, ou(/tô kai\
e)pi\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein. dei/xantes de\ e)kei=no kai\
**to\ prokei/menon _e)x u(pothe/seôs dedeicho/tes e)so/metha;
u(pothe/menoi_ ga/r, ô(/s pote e)pi\ tou/tôn e)/chei,
ou(/tô kai\ e)pi\ tou= prokeime/nou e)/chein, tê\n a)po/deixin
pepoiê/metha.] For [Greek: to\ e)x u(pothe/seôs], compare Topic. III.
vi. p. 119, b. 35.]

[Footnote 73: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 19.]

[Footnote 74: Topic. I. xviii. p. 108, b. 27: [Greek: ô(/ste to\
koino\n e)pi\ pa/ntôn ge/nos a)podi/dontes _do/xomen ou)k a)llotri/ôs
o(ri/zesthai_.] It will be recollected that all the work of Dialectic
(as Aristotle tells us often) has reference to [Greek: do/xa] and not
to scientific truth. "We shall _seem to define_ not in a manner
departing from the reality of the subject" is, therefore, an
appropriate dialectic artifice.]


II.

The First Book of the Topica, which we have thus gone through, was
entitled by some ancient commentators [Greek: ta\ pro\ tô=n
To/pôn]--matters preliminary to the _Loci_. This is quite true, as a
description of its contents; for Aristotle in the last words of the
book, distinctly announces that he is about to enumerate the _Loci_
towards which the four above-mentioned _Organa_ will be useful.[75]

[Footnote 75: Ibid. p. 108, b. 32: [Greek: oi( de\ to/poi pro\s ou(\s
chrê/sima ta\ lechthe/nta oi(/de ei)si/n.]]

_Locus_ ([Greek: to/pos]) is a place in which many arguments
pertinent to one and the same dialectical purpose, may be found--
_sedes argumentorum_. In each _locus_, the arguments contained
therein look at the thesis from the same point of view; and the
_locus_ implies nothing distinct from the arguments, except this
manner of view common to them all. In fact, the metaphor is a
convenient one for designating the relation of every Universal
generally to its particulars: the Universal is not a new particular,
nor any adjunct superimposed upon all its particulars, but simply a
_place_ in which all known similar particulars may be found grouped
together, and in which there is room for an indefinite number of new
ones. If we wish to arm the student with a large command of
dialectical artifices, we cannot do better than discriminate the
various groups of arguments, indicating the point of view common to
each group, and the circumstances in which it becomes applicable. By
this means, whenever he is called upon to deal with a new debate, he
will consider the thesis in reference to each one of these different
_loci_, and will be able to apply arguments out of each of them,
according as the case may admit.

The four _Helps_ ([Greek: o)/rgana]) explained in the last book
differ from the _Loci_ in being of wider and more undefined bearing:
they are directions for preparatory study, rather than for dealing
with any particular situation of a given problem; though it must be
confessed that, when Aristotle proceeds to specify the manner in
which the three last-mentioned helps are useful, he makes
considerable approach towards the greater detail and
particularization of the _Loci_. In entering now upon these, he
reverts to that quadruple classification of propositions and problems
(according to the four Predicables), noted at the beginning of the
treatise, in which the predicate is either Definition, Proprium,
Genus, or Accident, of the subject. He makes a fourfold distribution
of _Loci_, according as they bear upon one or other of these four. In
the Second and Third Books, we find those which bear upon
propositions predicating Accident; in the Fourth Book, we pass to
Genus; in the Fifth, to Proprium; in the Sixth and Seventh, to
Definition.

The problem or thesis propounded for debate may have two faults on
which it may be impugned: either it may be untrue; or it may be
expressed in a way departing from the received phraseology.[76] It
will be universal, or particular, or indefinite; and either
affirmative or negative; but, in most cases, the respondent propounds
for debate an affirmative universal, and not a negative or a
particular.[77] Aristotle therefore begins with those _loci_ that are
useful for refuting an Affirmative Universal; though, in general, the
same arguments are available for attack and defence both of the
universal and of the particular; for if you can overthrow the
particular, you will have overthrown the universal along with it,
while if you can defend the universal, this will include the defence
of the particular. As the thesis propounded is usually affirmative,
the assailant undertakes the negative side or the work of refutation.
And this indeed (as Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle, remarked, after
his master[78]) is the principal function and result of dialectic
exercise; which refutes much and proves very little, according to the
analogy of the Platonic Dialogues of Search.

[Footnote 76: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 27: [Greek: diori/sasthai de\
dei= kai\ ta\s a(marti/as ta\s e)n toi=s problê/masin, o(/ti ei)si\
dittai/, ê)\ tô=| pseu/desthai, ê)\ tô=| parabai/nein tê\n keime/nên
le/xin.]

Alexander remarks (Schol. p. 264, b. 23, Br.) that [Greek: pro/blêma]
here means, not the interrogation, but [Greek: to\ ô(risme/non ê)/dê
kai\ kei/menon--ou(= proi+/statai/ tis, o(/n o( dialektiko\s
e)le/gchein e)picheirei=].]

[Footnote 77: Topic. II. i. p. 109, a. 8: [Greek: dia\ to\ ma=llon
ta\s the/seis komi/zein e)n tô=| u(pa/rchein ê)\ mê/, tou\s de\
dialegome/nous a)naskeua/zein.]]

[Footnote 78: Alexander ap. Schol. p. 264, a. 27, Br.: [Greek: o(/ti
de\ oi)keio/teron tô=| dialektikô=| to\ a)naskeua/zein tou=
kataskeua/zein, e)n tô=| prô/tô| tô=n e)pigraphome/nôn Eu)dêmei/ôn
A)nalutikô=n (e)pigra/phetai de\ au)to\ kai\ Eu)dê/mou u(pe\r tô=n
A)nalutikô=n) ou(/tôs le/getai, o(/ti o( dialektiko\s a(\ me\n
kataskeua/zei mikra/ e)sti, to\ de\ polu\ tê=s duna/meôs au)tou=
pro\s to\ a)nairei=n ti e)sti/n.]]

Aristotle takes the four heads--Accident, Genus, Proprium, and
Definition, in the order here enumerated. The thesis of which the
predicate is enunciated as Accident, affirms the least, is easiest to
defend, and hardest to upset.[79] When we enunciate Genus or
Proprium, we affirm, not merely that the predicate belongs to the
subject (which is all that is affirmed in the case of Accident), but,
also something more--that it belongs to the subject in a certain
manner and relation. And when we enunciate Definition, we affirm all
this and something reaching yet farther--that it declares the whole
essence of the _definitum_, and is convertible therewith.
Accordingly, the thesis of Definition, affirming as it does so very
much, presents the most points of attack and is by far the hardest to
defend.[80] Next in point of difficulty, for the respondent, comes
the Proprium.

[Footnote 79: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 27: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\
pa/ntôn kataskeua/sai to\ sumbebêko/s--a)naskeua/zein de\
chalepô/taton to\ sumbebêko/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)tô=|
de/dotai; ou) ga\r prossêmai/nei e)n tô=| sumbebêko/ti pô=s
u(pa/rchei, ô(/st' e)pi\ me\n tô=n a)/llôn dichô=s e)/stin a)nelei=n,
ê)\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei ê)\ o(/ti ou)ch ou(/tôs
u(parchei, e)pi\ de\ tou= sumbebêko/tos ou)k e)/stin a)nelei=n a)ll'
ê)\ dei/xanta o(/ti ou)ch u(pa/rchei.]]

[Footnote 80: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3. [Greek: pa/ntôn r(a=|ston
o(/ron a)naskeua/sai; plei=sta ga\r e)n au)tô=| ta\ dedome/na pollô=n
ei)rême/nôn.] a. 23: [Greek: tô=n d' a)/llôn to\ i)/dion ma/lista
toiou=ton.]]

Beginning thus with the thesis enunciating Accident, Aristotle
enumerates no less than thirty-seven distinct _loci_ or argumentative
points of view bearing upon it. Most of them suggest modes of
assailing the thesis; but there are also occasionally intimations to
the respondent how he may best defend himself. In this numerous list
there are indeed some items repetitions of each other, or at least
not easily distinguishable.[81] As it would be tedious to enumerate
them all, I shall select some of the most marked and illustrative.

[Footnote 81: Aristotle himself admits the repetition in some cases,
Topic. II. ii. p. 110, a. 12: the fourth _locus_ is identical
substantially with the second _locus_.

Theophrastus distinguished [Greek: para/ggelma] as the general
precept, from [Greek: to/pos] or _locus_, as any proposition
specially applying the precept to a particular case (Schol. p. 264,
b. 38).]

1. The respondent has enunciated a certain predicate as belonging in
the way of accident, to a given subject. Perhaps it may belong to the
subject; yet not as accident, but under some one of the other three
Predicables. Perhaps he may have enunciated (either by explicit
discrimination, or at least by implication contained in his
phraseology) the genus as if it were an accident,--an error not
unfrequently committed.[82] Thus, if he has said, To be a colour is
an accident of white, he has affirmed explicitly the genus as if it
were an accident. And he has affirmed the same by implication, if he
has said, White (or whiteness) is coloured. For this is a form of
words not proper for the affirmation of a genus respecting its
species, in which case the genus itself ought to stand as a literal
predicate (White is a colour), and not to be replaced by one of its
derivatives (White is coloured). Nor can the proposition be intended
to be taken as affirming either proprium or definition; for in both
these the predicate would reciprocate and be co-extensive with the
subject, whereas in the present case there are obviously many other
subjects of which it may be predicated that they are coloured.[83] In
saying, White is coloured, the respondent cannot mean to affirm
either genus, proprium, or definition; therefore he must mean to
affirm _accident_. The assailant will show that this is erroneous.

[Footnote 82: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, a. 34: [Greek: ei(=s me\n dê\
to/pos to\ e)pible/pein ei) to\ kat' a)/llon tina\ tro/pon u(pa/rchon
ô(s sumbebêko\s a)pode/dôken. a(marta/netai de\ ma/lista tou=to peri\
ta\ ge/nê, oi(=on ei)/ tis tô=| leukô=| phai/ê sumbebêke/nai
chrô/mati ei)=nai; ou) ga\r sumbe/bêke tô=| leukô=| chrô/mati
ei)=nai, a)lla\ ge/nos au)tou= to\ chrô=ma/ e)stin.]]

[Footnote 83: We may find cases in which Aristotle has not been
careful to maintain the strict logical sense of [Greek: sumbebêko/s]
or [Greek: sumbe/bêken] where he applies these terms to Genus or
Proprium: _e.g._ Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 24; Soph. El. vi. p. 168,
b. 1.]

2. Suppose the thesis set up by the respondent to be an universal
affirmative, or an universal negative. You (the interrogator or
assailant) should review the particulars contained under these
universals. Review them not at once as separate individuals, but as
comprised in subordinate genera and species; beginning from the
highest, and descending down to the lowest species which is not
farther divisible except into individuals. Thus, if the thesis
propounded be, The cognition of opposites is one and the same
cognition; you will investigate whether this can be truly predicated
respecting all the primary species of _Opposita_: respecting _Relata_
and _Correlata_, respecting Contraries, respecting Contradictories,
respecting _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. If, by going thus far, you
obtain no result favourable to your purpose,[84] you must proceed
farther, and subdivide until you come to the lowest species:--Is the
cognition of just and unjust one and the same? that of double and
half? of sight and blindness? of existence and non-existence? If in
all, or in any one, of these cases you can show that the universal
thesis does not hold, you will have gained your point of refuting it.
On the other hand, if, when you have enumerated many particulars, the
thesis is found to hold in all, the respondent is entitled to require
you to grant it as an universal proposition, unless you can produce a
satisfactory counter-example. If you decline this challenge, you will
be considered an unreasonable debater.[85]

[Footnote 84: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 20: [Greek: ka)\n e)pi\
tou/tôn mê/pô phanero\n ê)=|, pa/lin tau=ta diairete/on me/chri tô=n
a)to/môn, oi(=on ei) tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn], &c.]

[Footnote 85: Ibid. b. 25-30. [Greek: e)a\n ga\r mêde/teron tou/tôn
poiê=|, a)/topos phanei=tai mê\ tithei/s.]]

3. You will find it useful to define both the accident predicated in
the thesis, and the subject respecting which it is predicated, or at
least one of them: you will see then whether these definitions reveal
anything false in the affirmation of the thesis. Thus, if the thesis
affirms that it is possible to do injustice to a god, you will define
what is meant by doing injustice. The definition is--hurting
intentionally: you can thus refute the thesis by showing that no
injustice to a god can possibly be done; for a god cannot be
hurt.[86] Or let the thesis maintained be, The virtuous man is
envious. You define envy, and you find that it is--vexation felt by
reason of the manifest success of some meritorious man. Upon this
definition it is plain that the virtuous man cannot feel envy: he
would be worthless, if he did feel it. Perhaps some of the terms
employed in your definition may themselves require definition; if so,
you will repeat the process of defining until you come to something
plain and clear.[87] Such an analysis will often bring out some error
at first unperceived in the thesis.

[Footnote 86: Topic. II. ii. p. 109, b. 34: [Greek: ou) ga\r
e)nde/chetai bla/ptesthai to\n theo/n.]]

[Footnote 87: Ibid. p. 110, a. 4: [Greek: lamba/nein de\ kai\ a)nti\
tô=n e)n toi=s lo/gois o)noma/tôn lo/gous, kai\ mê\ a)phi/stasthai
e(/ôs a)\n ei)s gnô/rimon e)/lthê|.]]

4. It will be advisable, both for assailant and respondent, to
discriminate those cases in which the authority of the multitude is
conclusive from those in which it is not. Thus, in regard to the
meaning of terms and in naming objects, we must speak like the
multitude; but, when the question is as to what objects deserve to be
denominated so and so, we must not feel bound by the multitude, if
there be any special dissentient authority.[88] That which produces
good health we must call wholesome, as the multitude do; but, in
calling this or that substance wholesome, the physician must be our
guide.

[Footnote 88: Ibid. a. 14-22.]

5. Aristotle gives more than one suggestion as to those cases in
which the terms of the thesis have a double or triple sense, yet in
which the thesis is propounded either as an universal affirmative or
as an universal negative. If the respondent is himself not aware of
the double sense of his thesis, while you (the questioner) are aware
of it, you will prove the point which you are seeking to establish
against him in one or other of the two senses, if you cannot prove it
in both. If he is aware of it in the double sense, he will insist
that you have chosen the sense which he did not intend.[89] This mode
of procedure will be available to the respondent as well as to you;
but it will be harder to him, since his thesis is universal. For, in
order to make good an universal thesis, he must obtain your assent to
a preliminary assumption or convention, that, if he can prove it in
one sense of the terms, it shall be held proved in both; and, unless
the proposition be so plausible that you are disposed to grant him
this, he will not succeed in the procedure.[90] But you on your side,
as refuting, do not require any such preliminary convention or
acquiescence; for, if you prove the negative in any single case, you
succeed in overthrowing the universal affirmative, while, if you
prove the affirmative in any single case, you succeed in overthrowing
the universal negative.[91] Such procedure, however, is to be adopted
only when you can find no argument applicable to the equivocal thesis
in all its separate meanings; this last sort of argument, wherever it
can be found, being always better.[92]

[Footnote 89: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 24.]

[Footnote 90: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: kataskeua/zousi de\
prodiomologête/on o(/ti ei) o(tô|ou=n u(pa/rchei, panti\ u(pa/rchei,
a)\n pithano\n ê)=| to\ a)xi/ôma; ou) ga\r a)po/chrê pro\s to\
dei=xai o(/ti panti\ u(pa/rchei to\ e)ph' e(no\s dialechthê=nai.]]

[Footnote 91: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, a. 32: [Greek: plê\n
a)naskeua/zonti me\n ou)de\n dei= e)x o(mologi/as diale/gesthai].]

[Footnote 92: Ibid. b. 4.]

In cases where the double meaning is manifest, the two meanings must
be distinguished by both parties, and the argument conducted
accordingly. Where the term has two or more meanings (not equivocal
but) related to each other by analogy, we must deal with each of
these meanings distinctly and separately.[93] If our purpose is to
refute, we select any one of them in which the proposition is
inadmissible, neglecting the others: if our purpose is to prove, we
choose any one in which the proposition is true, neglecting the
others.[94]

[Footnote 93: Topic. II. iii. p. 110, b. 16-p. 111, a. 7. This
_locus_ is very obscurely stated by Aristotle.]

[Footnote 94: Ibid. p. 110, b. 29-32: [Greek: e)a\n boulô/metha
kataskeua/sai, ta\ toiau=ta prooiste/on o(/sa e)nde/chetai, kai\
diairete/on _ei)s tau=ta mo/non_ o(/sa kai\ chrê/sima pro\s to\
kataskeua/sai; a)\n d' a)naskeua/sai, o(/sa mê\ e)nde/chetai, _ta\
de\ loipa\ paraleipte/on_.]

Aristotle's precepts indicate the way of managing the debate _with a
view to success._]

6. Observe that a predicate which belongs to the genus does not
necessarily belong to any one of its species, but that any predicate
which belongs to one of the species does belong also to the genus; on
the other hand, that any predicate which can be denied of the genus
may be denied also of all its contained species, but that any
predicate which can be denied of some one or some portion of the
contained species cannot for that reason be denied of the genus. You
may thus prove from one species to the genus, and disprove from the
genus to each one species; but not _vice versâ_. Thus, if the
respondent grants that there exist cognitions both estimable and
worthless, you are warranted in inferring that there exist habits of
mind estimable and worthless; for cognition is a species under the
genus habit of mind. But if the negative were granted, that there
exist no cognitions both estimable and worthless, you could not for
that reason infer that there are no habits of mind estimable and
worthless. So, if it were granted to you that there are judgments
correct and erroneous, you could not for that reason infer that there
were perceptions of sense correct and erroneous; perceiving by sense
being a species under the genus judging. But, if it were granted that
there were no judgments correct and erroneous, you might thence infer
the like negative about perceptions of sense.[95]

[Footnote 95: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 14-32. [Greek: nu=n me\n
ou)=n e)k tou= ge/nous peri\ to\ ei)=dos ê( a)po/deixis; to\ ga\r
kri/nein ge/nos tou= ai)stha/nesthai; o( ga\r ai)sthano/menos kri/nei
pôs--o( me\n ou)=n pro/teros to/pos pseudê/s e)sti pro\s to\
kataskeua/sai, o( de\ deu/teros a)lêthê/s.--pro\s de\ to\
a)naskeua/zein o( me\n pro/teros a)lêthê/s, o( de\ deu/teros
pseudê/s.]

It is here a point deserving attention, that Aristotle ranks [Greek:
to\ ai)stha/nesthai] as a species under the genus [Greek: to\
kri/nein]. This is a notable circumstance in the Aristotelian
psychology.]

7. Keep in mind also that if there be any subject of which you can
affirm the genus, of that same subject you must be able to affirm one
or other of the species contained under the genus. Thus, if science
be a predicate applicable, grammar, music, or some other of the
special sciences must also be applicable: if any man can be called
truly a scientific man, he must be a grammarian, a musician, or some
other specialist. Accordingly, if the thesis set up by your
respondent be, The soul is moved, you must examine whether any one of
the known varieties of motion can be truly predicated of the soul,
_e.g._, increase, destruction, generation, &c. If none of these
special predicates is applicable to the soul, neither is the generic
predicate applicable to it; and you will thus have refuted the
thesis. This _locus_ may serve as a precept for proof as well as for
refutation; for, equally, if the soul be moved in any one species of
motion, it is moved, and, if the soul be not moved in any species of
motion, it is not moved.[96]

[Footnote 96: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, a. 33-b. 11.]

8. Where the thesis itself presents no obvious hold for
interrogation, turn over the various definitions that have been
proposed of its constituent terms; one or other of these definitions
will often afford matter for attack.[97] Look also to the antecedents
and consequents of the thesis--what must be assumed and what will
follow, if the thesis be granted. If you can disprove the consequent
of the proposition, you will have disproved the proposition itself.
On the other hand, if the antecedent of the proposition be proved,
the proposition itself will be proved also.[98] Examine also whether
the proposition be not true at some times, and false at other times.
The thesis, What takes nourishment grows necessarily, is true not
always, but only for a certain time: animals take nourishment during
all their lives, but grow only during a part of their lives. Or, if a
man should say that knowing is remembering, this is incorrect; for we
remember nothing but events past, whereas we know not only these, but
present and future also.[99]

[Footnote 97: Ibid. b. 12-16.]

[Footnote 98: Ibid. b. 17-23.]

[Footnote 99: Topic. II. iv. p. 111, b. 24-31.]

9. It is a sophistical procedure (so Aristotle terms it) to transfer
the debate to some point on which we happen to be well provided with
arguments, lying apart from the thesis defended. Such transfer,
however, may be sometimes necessary. In other cases it is not really
but only apparently necessary; in still other cases it is purely
gratuitous, neither really nor apparently necessary. It is really
necessary, when the respondent, having denied some proposition
perfectly relevant to his thesis, stands to his denial and accepts
the debate upon it, the proposition being one on which a good stock
of arguments may be found against him; also, when you are
endeavouring to disprove the thesis by an induction of negative
analogies.[100] It is only apparently, and not really, necessary, when
the proposition in debate is not perfectly relevant to the thesis,
but merely has the semblance of being so. It is neither really nor
apparently necessary, when there does not exist even this semblance
of relevance, and when some other way is open of bringing
bye-confutation to bear on the respondent. You ought to avoid
entirely such a procedure in this last class of cases; for it is an
abuse of the genuine purpose of Dialectic. If you do resort to it,
the respondent should grant your interrogations, but at the same time
notify that they are irrelevant to the thesis. Such notification will
render his concessions rather troublesome than advantageous for your
purpose.[101]

[Footnote 100: Ibid. v. p. 111, b. 32-p. 112, a. 2: [Greek: e)/ti o(
sophistiko\s tro/pos, to\ a)/gein ei)s toiou=ton pro\s o(\
eu)porê/somen e)picheirêma/tôn], &c.]

[Footnote 101: Ibid. p. 112, a. 2-15. [Greek: dei= d' eu)labei=sthai
to\n e)/schaton tô=n r(êthe/ntôn tro/pôn; pantelô=s ga\r
a)pêrtême/nos kai\ a)llo/trios e)/oiken ei)=nai tê=s dialektikê=s.]

The epithet [Greek: sophistiko\s tro/pos] is probably intended by
Aristotle to apply only to this last class of cases.

This paragraph is very obscure, and is not much elucidated by the
long Scholion of Alexander (pp. 267-268, Br.).]

10. You will recollect that every proposition laid down or granted by
the respondent carries with it by implication many other
propositions; since every affirmation has necessary consequences,
more or fewer. Whoever says that Sokrates is a man, has said also
that he is an animal, that he is a living creature, biped, capable of
acquiring knowledge. If you can disprove any of these necessary
consequences, you will have disproved the thesis itself. You must
take care, however, that you fix upon some one of the consequences
which is really easier, and not more difficult, to refute than the
thesis itself.[102]

[Footnote 102: Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 16-23.]

11. Perhaps the thesis set up by the respondent may be of such a
nature that one or other of two contrary predicates must belong to
the subject; _e.g._, either health or sickness. In that case, if you
are provided with arguments bearing on one of the two contraries, the
same arguments will also serve indirectly for proof, or for disproof,
of the other. Thus, if you show that one of the two contraries does
belong to the subject, the same arguments prove that the other does
not; _vice versâ_, if you show that one of them does not belong, it
follows that the other does.[103]

[Footnote 103: Topic. II. vi. p. 112, a. 25-31. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n
o(/ti pro\s a)mphô chrê/simos o( to/pos.]]

12. You may find it advantageous, in attacking the thesis, to
construe the terms in their strict etymological sense, rather than in
the sense which common **usage gives them.[104]

[Footnote 104: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: e)/ti to\ e)picheirei=n
metaphe/ronta tou)/noma e)pi\ to\n lo/gon, ô(s ma/lista prosê=kon
e)klamba/nein ê)\ ô(s kei=tai tou)/noma.]

The illustrative examples which follow prove that [Greek: lo/gon]
here means the etymological origin, and not the definition, which is
its more usual meaning.]

13. The predicate may belong to its subject either necessarily, or
usually, or by pure hazard. You will take notice in which of these
three ways the respondent affirms it, and whether that which he
chooses is conformable to the fact. If he affirms it as necessary,
when it is really either usual or casual, the thesis will be open to
your attacks. If he affirms it without clearly distinguishing in
which of the three senses he intends it to be understood, you are at
liberty to construe it in that one of the three senses which best
suits your argument.[105]

[Footnote 105: Ibid. b. 1-20. This _locus_ seems unsuitable in that
part of the Topica where Aristotle professes to deal with theses
[Greek: tou= symbebêko/tos], or theses affirming or denying
_accidental_ predicates. It is one of the suppositions here that the
respondent affirms the predicate as _necessary_.]

14. Perhaps the thesis may have predicate and subject exactly
synonymous, so that the same thing will be affirmed as an accident of
itself. On this ground it will be assailable.[106]

[Footnote 106: Ibid. b. 21-26.]

15. Sometimes the thesis will have more than one proposition contrary
to it. If so, you may employ in arguing against it that one among its
various contraries which is most convenient for your purpose.[107]
Perhaps the predicate (accidental) of the thesis may have some
contrary: if it has, you will examine whether that contrary belongs
to the subject of the thesis; and, should such be the case, you may
use it as an argument to refute the thesis itself.[108] Or the
predicate of the thesis may be such that, if the thesis be granted,
it will follow as a necessary consequence that contrary predicates
must belong to the same subject. Thus, if the thesis be that the
Platonic Ideas exist _in us_, it follows necessarily that they are
both in motion and at rest; both perceivable by sense, and cogitable
by intellect.[109] As these two predicates (those constituting the
first pair as well as the second pair) are contrary to each other,
and cannot both belong to the same subject, this may be used as an
argument against the thesis from which such consequence follows.

[Footnote 107: Ibid. vii. p. 112, b. 28-p. 113, a. 19. [Greek: dê=lon
ou)=n e)k tô=n ei)rême/nôn o(/ti tô=| au)tô=| plei/ona e)nanti/a
sumbai/nei gi/nesthai.--lamba/nein ou)=n tô=n e)nanti/ôn o(po/teron
a)\n ê)=| pro\s tê\n the/sin chrê/simon.]]

[Footnote 108: Ibid. viii. p. 113, a. 20-23.]

[Footnote 109: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, a. 24-32: [Greek: ê)\ ei)/ ti
toiou=ton ei)/rêtai kata/ tinos, ou(= o)/ntos a)na/gkê ta\ e)nanti/a
u(pa/rchein; oi(=on ei) ta\s i)de/as e)n ê(mi=n e)/phêsen ei)=nai;
kinei=sthai/ te ga\r kai\ ê)remei=n au)ta\s sumbê/setai, e)/ti de\
ai)sthêta\s kai\ noêta\s ei)=nai.] Aristotle then proceeds to state
how this consequence arises. Those who affirm the Platonic Ideas,
assign to them as fundamental characteristic, that they are at rest
and cogitable. But, if the Ideas exist _in us_, they must be
moveable, because _we_ are moved; they must also be perceivable by
sense, because it is through vision only that we discriminate and
know differences of form. Waitz observes (in regard to the last pair,
[Greek: kai\ ai)sthêtai/]): "Nam singulæ ideæ certam quandam rerum
speciem et formam exprimunt: species autem et forma oculis cernitur."
I do not clearly see, however, that this is a consequence of
affirming Ideas to be [Greek: e)n ê(mi=n]; it is equally true if they
are _not_ [Greek: e)n ê(mi=n].]

16. We know that whatever is the recipient of one of two contraries,
is capable also of becoming recipient of the other. If, therefore,
the predicate of the thesis has any contrary, you will examine
whether the subject of the thesis is capable of receiving such
contrary. If not, you have an argument against the thesis. Let the
thesis be, The appetitive principle is ignorant. If this be true,
that principle must be capable of knowledge.[110] Since this last is
not generally admitted, you have an argument against the thesis.

[Footnote 110: Topic. II. vii. p. 113, a. 33-b. 10.]

17. We recognize four varieties of _Opposita_: (1) Contradictory; (2)
Contrary; (3) _Habitus_ and _Privatio_; (4) _Relata_. You will
consider how the relation in each of these four varieties bears upon
the thesis in debate.

In regard to Contradictories, you are entitled, converting the terms
of the thesis, to deny the predicate of the converted proposition
respecting the negation of the subject. Thus, if man is an animal,
you are entitled to infer, What is not an animal is not a man. You
will prove this to be an universal rule by Induction; that is, by
citing a multitude of particular cases in which it is indisputably
true, without possibility of finding any one case in which it does
not apply. If you can prove or disprove the converted obverse of the
thesis--What is not an animal is not a man--you will have proved or
disproved, the thesis itself, Man is an animal. This _locus_ is
available both for assailant and respondent.[111]

[Footnote 111: Ibid. viii. p. 113, b. 15-26: [Greek: e)pei\ d' ai(
a)ntithe/sis te/ssares, skopei=n e)k me\n tô=n a)ntipha/seôn e)k tê=s
a)kolouthê/seôs kai\ a)nairou=nti kai\ kataskeua/zonti; _lamba/nein
d' e)x e)pagôgê=s_, oi(=on ei) o( a)/nthrôpos zô=|on, to\ mê\ zô=|on
ou)k a)/nthrôpos; _o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn--e)pi\
pa/ntôn ou)=n to\ toiou=ton a)xiôte/on_.]

Aristotle's declaration, that this great logical rule can only be
proved by Induction, deserves notice. I have remarked the same thing
about his rules for the conversion of propositions, in the beginning
of the Analytica Priora. See above, p. 145, seq.]

In regard to Contraries, you will study the thesis, to see whether
the contrary of the predicate can be truly affirmed respecting the
contrary of the subject, or whether the contrary of the subject can
be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the predicate. This last
alternative occurs sometimes, but not often; in general the first
alternative is found to be true. You must make good your point here
also by Induction, or by repetition of particular examples. This
_locus_ will serve either for the purpose of refutation or for that
of defence, according to circumstances. If neither of the two
alternatives above-mentioned is found correct, this is an argument
against the thesis.[112]

[Footnote 112: Topic. II. viii. p. 113, b. 27-p. 114, a. 6. [Greek:
lamba/nein de\ kai\ ta\ toiau=ta e)x e)pagôgê=s, e)ph' o(/son
chrê/simon.--spa/nion de\ to\ a)na/palin e)pi\ tô=n e)nanti/ôn
sumbai/nei, a)lla\ toi=s plei/stois e)pi\ tau)ta ê( a)kolou/thêsis.
ei) ou)=n mêt' e)pi\ tau)ta\ tô=| e)nanti/ô| to\ e)nanti/on
a)kolouthei= mê/te a)na/palin, dê=lon o(/ti ou)de\ tô=n r(êthe/ntôn
a)kolouthei= to\ e(/teron tô=| e(te/rô|.]]

In regard to _Habitus_ and _Privatio_, the rule is the same as about
Contraries; only that the first of the two above alternatives always
holds, and the second never occurs.[113] If sensible perception can
be predicated of vision, insensibility also can be predicated of
blindness; otherwise, the thesis fails.

[Footnote 113: Ibid. p. 114, a. 7-12.]

In regard to _Relata_, the inference holds from the correlate of the
subject to the correlate of the predicate. If knowledge is belief,
that which is known is believed; if vision is sensible perception,
that which is visible is sensibly perceivable. Some say that there
are cases in which the above does not hold; _e.g._, That which is
sensibly perceivable is knowable; yet sensible perception is not
knowledge. But this objection is not valid; for many persons dispute
the first of the two propositions. This _locus_ will be equally
available for the purpose of refutation--thus, you may argue--That
which is sensibly perceivable is not knowable, because sensible
perception is not knowledge.[114]

[Footnote 114: Ibid. a. 13-25.]

18. You will look at the terms of the proposition, also, in regard to
their Derivatives, Inflections, &c., and to matters associated with
them in the way of production, preservation, &c. This _locus_ serves
both for proof and for refutation. What is affirmable of the subject,
is affirmable also of its derivatives: what is not affirmable of the
derivatives, is not affirmable of the subject itself.[115]

[Footnote 115: Ibid. ix. p. 114, a. 26-b. 5. [Greek: du/stoicha,
ptô/seis, ta\ poiêtika\ kai\ phulaktika/--dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti e(no\s
o(poiouou=n deichthe/ntos tô=n kata\ tê\n au)tê\n sustoichi/an
a)gathou= ê)\ e)painetou=, kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/nta dedeigme/na
gi/netai.]--b. 23: [Greek: ô(=n me\n ga\r ta\ poiêtika\ a)gatha/,
kai\ au)ta\ tô=n a)gathô=n, ô(=n de\ ta\ phthartika\ a)gatha/, au)ta\
tô=n kakô=n.]]

19. Arguments may often be drawn, both for proof and for refutation,
from matters Similar or Analogous to the subject or predicate of the
thesis. Thus, if one and the same cognition comprehends many things,
one and the same opinion will also comprehend many things. If to
possess vision is to see, then also to possess audition is to hear.
If to possess audition is _not_ to hear, then neither is to possess
vision to see. The argument may be urged whether the resemblance is
real or only generally supposed. Sometimes, however, the inference
will not hold from one to many. Thus, if to know is to cogitate, then
to know many things should be to cogitate many things. But this last
is impossible. A man may know many things, but he cannot cogitate
many things; therefore, to know is _not_ to cogitate.[116]

[Footnote 116: Topic. II. x. p. 114, b. 25-36: [Greek: pa/lin e)pi\
tô=n o(moi/ôn, ei) o(moi/ôs e)/chei,--kai\ e)pi\ tô=n o)/ntôn kai\
tô=n dokou/ntôn; chrê/simos d' o( to/pos pro\s a)/mphô;--skopei=n de\
kai\ ei) e)ph' e(no\s kai\ ei) e)pi\ pollô=n o(moi/ôs e)/chei;
e)niachou= ga\r diaphônei=.]]

20. There are various _loci_ for argument, arising from degrees of
Comparison--more, less, equally. One is the argument from concomitant
variations, which is available both for proof and for disproof. If to
do injustice is evil, to do more injustice is more evil. If an
increase in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of
the predicate, then the predicate is truly affirmed; if not, not.
This may be shown by Induction, or repetition of particular
instances.[117] Again, suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of
two distinct subjects A and B, but to be more probably affirmable of
A than of B. Then, if you can show that it does _not_ belong to A,
you may argue (_à fortiori_) that it does _not_ belong to B; or, if
you can show that it belongs to B, you may argue (_à fortiori_) that
it belongs also to A. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable
respecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability,
then, if you can disprove the more probable of the two, you may argue
from thence in disproof of the less probable; and, if you can prove
the less probable, you may argue from thence in proof of the more
probable. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two
distinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if
you can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against
the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you are
furnished with an argument in proof of the more probable.[118] If the
degrees of probability, instead of being unequal, are equal or alike,
you may still, in the cases mentioned, argue in like manner from
proof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other.[119]

[Footnote 117: Ibid. b. 37-p. 115, a. 5: [Greek: ei)si\ de\ tou=
ma=llon to/poi te/ssares, ei(=s me\n ei) a)kolouthei= to\ ma=llon
tô=| ma=llon,--chrê/simos de\ pro\s a)/mphô o( to/pos; ei) me\n ga\r
a)kolouthei= tê=| tou= u(pokeime/nou e)pido/sei ê( tou= sumbebêko/tos
e)pi/dosis, katha/per ei)/rêtai, dê=lon o(/ti sumbe/bêken, ei) de\
mê\ a)kolouthei=, ou) sumbe/bêken. tou=to d' e)pagôgê=| lêpte/on.]]

[Footnote 118: Topic. II. x. p. 115, a. 5-14.]

[Footnote 119: Ibid. a. 15-24: [Greek: e)k tou= o(moi/ôs u(pa/rchein
ê)\ dokei=n u(pa/rchein], &c.]

21. Another _locus_ for argument is, that _ex adjuncto_. If the
subject, prior to adjunction of the attribute, be not white or good,
and if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good, then, you
may argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good. And you
might argue in like manner, if the subject prior to adjunction were
to a certain extent white or good, but became more white or more good
after such adjunction.[120] But this _locus_ will not be found
available for the negative inference or refutation. You cannot argue,
because the adjunction does not make the subject white or good, that
therefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good.[121]

[Footnote 120: Ibid. xi. p. 115, a. 26-33.]

[Footnote 121: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]

22. If the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less
degree, it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely.
Unless the subject be one that can be called white or good, you can
never call it more white or more good. This _locus_ again, however,
cannot be employed in the negative, for the purpose of refutation.
Because the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or
less degree, you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be
affirmed of the subject at all. Sokrates cannot be called in greater
or less degree a man; but you cannot thence infer that he is not
called a man simply.[122] If the predicate can be denied of the
subject simply and absolutely, it can be denied thereof with every
sort of qualification: if it can be affirmed of the subject with
qualification, it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely,
as a possible predicate.[123] This, however, when it comes to be
explained, means only that it can be affirmed of some among the
particulars called by the name of the subject. Aristotle recognizes
that the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subject
_secundum quid_, and denied of the subject simply and absolutely. In
some places (as among the Triballi), it is honourable to sacrifice
your father; simply and absolutely, it is not honourable. To one who
is sick, it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment; speaking
simply and absolutely (_i.e._, to persons generally in the ordinary
state of health), it is not advantageous. It is only when you can
truly affirm the proposition, without adding any qualifying words,
that the proposition is true simply and absolutely.[124]

[Footnote 122: Ibid. b. 3-10.]

[Footnote 123: Ibid. b. 11-35. [Greek: ei) ga\r kata/ ti
e)nde/chetai, kai\ a(plô=s e)nde/chetai.]]

[Footnote 124: Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 33: [Greek: ô(/ste o(\ a)\n
mêdeno\s prostitheme/nou dokê=| ei)=nai kalo\n ê)\ ai)schro\n ê)\
a)/llo ti tô=n toiou=tôn, a(plô=s r(êthê/setai.]]


III.

Such are the chief among the thirty-seven _Loci_ which Aristotle
indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the
predication is only of Accident--not of Genus, or Proprium, or
Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal
separately with one special branch of such theses, respecting
_Expetenda_ and _Fugienda_: where the question put is, Of two or more
distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The
cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the
two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where
there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as
to warrant doubt and debate.[125]

[Footnote 125: Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: [Greek: Po/teron d'
ai(retô/teron ê)\ be/ltion duei=n ê)\ pleio/nôn, e)k tô=nde
skepte/on.] &c.]

We must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently
among the dialectical debates of Aristotle's contemporaries; so that
he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in
the best manner.

1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable
which is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good
man; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law;
or by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or
simply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the
better cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is
declared to be better by his own cognition.[126]

[Footnote 126: Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.]

2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than
what is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account
and _per se_, is better than what is desirable only on account of
something else and _per accidens_; the cause of what is good in
itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by
accident.[127]

[Footnote 127: Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.]

3. What is good absolutely and simply (_i.e._, to all and at all
times) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or
individual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for
the stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by
nature; _e.g._, justice (good by nature), than the just individual,
whose character must have been acquired.[128] What is good, or what
is peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is
better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good,
having its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of
any subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative,
secondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in
proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of
the body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or
beauty--strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper
symmetry of the limbs.[129] Next, an end is superior to that which is
means thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is
nearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great
end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end;
means to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the
possible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with
another subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is
more superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end
produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first
subject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health,
if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater
proportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means
producing happiness is better than the end health.[130]

[Footnote 128: Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.]

[Footnote 129: Ibid. b. 12-22: [Greek: kai\ to\ e)n belti/osin ê)\
prote/rois ê)\ timiôte/rois be/ltion, oi(=on u(gi/eia i)schu/os kai\
ka/llous. ê( me\n ga\r e)n u(groi=s kai\ xêroi=s kai\ thermoi=s kai\
psuchroi=s, a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n e)x ô(=n prô/tôn sune/stêke to\
zô=|on, ta\ d' e)n toi=s u(ste/rois; ê( me\n ga\r i)schu\s e)n toi=s
neu/rois kai\ o)stoi=s, to\ de\ ka/llos tô=n melô=n tis summetri/a
dokei= ei)=nai.]

The reason given in this _locus_ for superior estimation is a very
curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than
compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the
definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty
to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of
the face.]

[Footnote 130: Ibid. b. 22-36.]

Again, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthy
_per se_, is better than what possesses these same attributes in
equal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus,
friendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one
values wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem
friendship _per se_, even though no consequences ensue from it.[131]

[Footnote 131: Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.]

Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal
that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to
the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the
consequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of
evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which
they respectively belong.[132] The larger lot of good things is
preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if
cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to
another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not _per se_
good, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice
and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with
the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or
along with pain.[133] Everything is better, at the season when it
tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence
and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than
in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required,
and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is
useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is
useful only now and then; _e.g._, justice and moderation, as compared
with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other
would not be required; _e.g._, justice is better than courage, for,
if every one were just, courage would not be required.[134]

[Footnote 132: Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.]

[Footnote 133: Ibid. a. 16-25.]

[Footnote 134: Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.]

Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation
or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or
the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to
the _Summum Bonum_ or to that which is better than itself (unless
indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of
a caricature, as the ape is to man[135]); that which is the more
conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and
peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that
which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our
friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (_e.g._, doing justice or
conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we
prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer
seeming to do so[136]); that which we cannot obtain from others, as
compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally
desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have
something else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground
of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;[137] that
which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the
proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);[138] that which is
eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that
which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.[139]
Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are
sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life
simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes
necessaries are more eligible, as, _e.g._, to a starving man.
Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are
better.[140]

[Footnote 135: Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei)
e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera ei)/ê o(/moion, katha/per o( pi/thêkos tô=|
a)nthrô/pô|, tou= i(/ppou mê\ o)/ntos o(moi/ou; ou) ga\r ka/llion o(
pi/thêkos, o(moio/teron de\ tô=| a)nthrô/pô|.]]

[Footnote 136: Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. [Greek: a(\ pro\s to\n
phi/lon pra=xai ma=llon boulo/metha ê)\ a(\ pro\s to\n tucho/nta,
tau=ta ai(retô/tera, oi(=on to\ dikaiopragei=n kai\ eu)= poiei=n
ma=llon ê)\ to\ dokei=n; tou\s ga\r phi/lous eu)= poiei=n boulo/metha
ma=llon ê)\ dokei=n, _tou\s de\ tucho/ntas a)na/palin_.]]

[Footnote 137: Topic. III. ii. p. 118, a. 16-26.]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. iii. p. 118, a. 29.]

[Footnote 139: Ibid. b. 20. The definition of this last condition
is--that we should not care to possess the thing if no one knew that
we possessed it: [Greek: o(/ros de\ tou= pro\s do/xan, to\ mêdeno\s
suneido/tos mê\ a)\n spouda/sai u(pa/rchein.]]

[Footnote 140: Ibid. p. 118, a. 6-14. [Greek: ou) ga\r ei) belti/ô,
a)nagkai=on kai\ ai(retô/tera; to\ gou=n philosophei=n be/ltion tou=
chrêmati/zesthai, a)ll' ou)ch ai(retô/teron tô=| e)ndeei= tô=n
a)nagkai/ôn. to\ d' e)k periousi/as e)sti/n, o(/tan u(parcho/ntôn
tô=n a)nagkai/ôn a)/lla tina\ proskataskeua/zêtai/ tis tô=n kalô=n.
schedo\n d' i)/sôs ai(retô/teron to\ a)nagkai=o/n e)sti, be/ltion de\
to\ e)k periousi/as.]]

Among many other _loci_, applicable to this same question of
comparative excellence between two different subjects, one more will
suffice here. You must distinguish the various ends in relation to
which any given subject is declared to be eligible: the advantageous,
the beautiful, the agreeable. That which conduces to all the three is
more eligible than that which conduces to one or two of them only. If
there be two subjects, both of them conducive to the same end among
the three, you must examine which of them conduces to it most. Again,
that which conduces to the better end (_e.g._, to virtue rather than
to pleasure) is the more eligible. The like comparison may be applied
to the _Fugienda_ as well as to the _Expetenda_. That is most to be
avoided which shuts us out most from the desirable acquisitions:
_e.g._, sickness is more to be avoided than ungraceful form; for
sickness shuts us out more completely both from virtue and from
pleasure.[141]

[Footnote 141: Ibid. iii. p. 118, b. 27-36.]

The same _loci_ which are available for the question of comparison
will also be available in the question of positive eligibility or
positive ineligibility.[142] Further, it holds for all cases of the
kind that you should enunciate the argument in the most general terms
that each case admits: in this way it will cover a greater number of
particulars. Slight mutations of language will often here strengthen
your case: that which is (good) by nature is more (good) than that
which is (good) not by nature; that which makes the subject to which
it is better than that which does not make the subject good.[143]

[Footnote 142: Ibid. iv. p. 119, a. 1.]

[Footnote 143: Topic. III. v. p. 119, a. 12: [Greek: lêpte/on d'
o(/ti ma/lista katho/lou tou\s to/pous peri\ tou= ma=llon kai\ tou=
mei/zonos; lêphthe/ntes ga\r ou(/tôs pro\s plei/ô chrê/simoi a)\n
ei)/êsan.]]

The _loci_ just enumerated are Universal, and applicable to the
debate of theses propounded in universal terms; but they will also be
applicable, if the thesis propounded be a Particular proposition.

If you prove the universal affirmative, you will at the same time
prove the particular; if you prove the universal negative, you prove
the particular negative also. The universal _loci_ from Opposites,
from Conjugates, from Inflections, will be alike applicable to
particular propositions. Thus, if we look at the universal _locus_
from Contraries, If all pleasure is good, then all pain is
evil,--this will apply also to the particular, If some pleasure is
good, then some pain is evil: in the particular as in the universal
form the proposition is alike an _Endox_ or conformable to common
received opinion. The like may be said about the _loci_ from
_Habitus_ and _Privatio_; also about those from Generation and
Destruction;[144] again, from More, Less, and Equally--this last,
however, with some restriction, for the _locus_ from Less will
serve only for proving an affirmative. Thus, if some capacity is a
less good than science, while yet some capacity is a good, then, _à
fortiori_, some science is a good. But, if you take the same _locus_
in the negative and say that the capacity is a good, you will not be
warranted in saying, for that reason, that no science is a good.[145]
You may apply this same _locus_ from Less to compare, not merely two
subjects in different genera, but also two subjects of different
degrees under the same genus. Thus, let the thesis be, Some science
or cognition is a good. You will disprove this thesis, if you can show
that prudence ([Greek: phro/nêsis]) is not a good; for, if prudence,
which in common opinion is most confidently held to be a good, be
really not so, you may argue that, _à fortiori_ no other science can
be so. Again, let the thesis be propounded with the assumption that,
if it can be proved true or false in any one case, it shall be
accepted as true or false in all universally (for example, that, if
the human soul is immortal, all other souls are immortal also; or if
not that, then none of the others): evidently, the propounder of such
a thesis extends the particular into an universal. If he propounds
his thesis affirmatively, you must try to prove the negative in some
particular case; for this, under the conditions supposed, will be
equivalent to proving an universal negative. If, on the other hand,
he puts his thesis negatively, you will try to prove some particular
affirmative; which (always under the given conditions) will carry
the universal affirmative also.[146]

[Footnote 144: Ibid. vi. p. 119, a. 32-b. 16. [Greek: o(moi/ôs ga\r
e)/ndoxon to\ a)xiô=sai, ei) pa=sa ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên
pa=san ei)=nai kako/n, tô=| ei)/ tis ê(donê\ a)gatho/n, kai\ lu/pên
ei)=nai/ tina kako/n--e)n a(/pasi ga\r o(moi/ôs to\ e)/ndoxon.]]

[Footnote 145: Ibid. b. 17-30. [Greek: dê=lon ou)=n o(/ti
kataskeua/zein mo/non e)k tou= ê(=tton e)/stin.]]

[Footnote 146: Topic. III. vi. p. 119, b. 31-p. 120, a. 5.]

Suppose the respondent to propound his thesis indefinitely, not
carrying the indication either of universal or particular; _e.g._,
Pleasure is good. This can be proved by showing either that all
pleasure is good, or that some pleasure is good; while it can be
refuted only through the universal negative--by showing that no
pleasure is good.[147] But, if the thesis be divested of its
indefinite character and propounded either as universal or as
particular, there will then be two distinct ways of refuting it. If
it be farther specialized--_e.g._, One pleasure only is good--there
will be three ways of refuting: you may show either that all
pleasures are good; or that no pleasure is good; or that more
pleasures than one are good. If the proposition be specialized
farther still--_e.g._, Prudence alone among all the virtues is
science,--there are four lines of argument open for refuting it: you
may prove either that all virtue is science; or that no virtue is
science; or that some other virtue (such as justice) is science; or
that prudence is not science.[148]

[Footnote 147: Ibid. p. 120, a. 6-20: [Greek: a)diori/stou me\n ou)=n
o)/ntos tou= problê/matos monachô=s a)naskeua/zein
e)nde/chetai--a)nairei=n me\n monachô=s e)nde/chetai, kataskeua/zein
de\ dichô=s.] &c.]

[Footnote 148: Ibid. a. 15-31.]

In dealing with a particular proposition as thesis, still other
_loci_ already indicated for dealing with universal propositions will
be available. You will run through the particulars comprised in the
subject, distributed into genera and species. When you have produced
a number of particulars successively to establish the universal,
affirmative or negative, you are warranted in calling on the
respondent either to admit the universal, or to produce on his side
some adverse particular.[149] You will also (as was before
recommended) distribute the predicate of the thesis into the various
species which it comprehends. If no one of these species be truly
affirmable of the subject, then neither can the genus be truly
affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to
be affirmative. If, on the contrary, any one of the species be truly
affirmable of the subject, then the genus will also be truly
affirmable; so that you will have refuted the thesis, supposing it to
be negative. Thus, if the thesis propounded be, The soul is a number:
you divide number into its two species, odd and even, and prove that
the soul is neither odd nor even; wherefore, it is not a number.[150]

[Footnote 149: Ibid. a. 32-38: [Greek: a)/n te ga\r panti\ phai/nêtai
u(pa/rchon a)/n te mêdeni/, polla\ proene/gkanti a)xiôte/on katho/lou
o(mologei=n, ê)\ phe/rein e)/nstasin e)pi\ ti/nos ou)ch ou(/tôs.]]

[Footnote 150: Topic. III. vi. p. 120, a. 37-b. 6. It would appear
from the examples here given by Aristotle--[Greek: o( chro/nos ou)
kinei=tai, o( chro/nos ou)/k e)sti ki/nêsis, ê( psuchê\ ou)/k e)stin
a)rithmo/s], that he considers these propositions as either
indefinite or particular.]


IV.

After this long catalogue of _Loci_ belonging to debate on
propositions of Accident, Aristotle proceeds to enumerate those
applicable to propositions of Genus and of Proprium. Neither Genus
nor Proprium is often made subject of debate as such; but both of
them are constituent elements of the debate respecting Definition,
which is of frequent occurrence.[151] For that reason, both deserve
to be studied.

[Footnote 151: Ibid. IV. i. p. 120, b. 12: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta
peri\ tô=n pro\s to\ ge/nos kai\ to\ i)/dion e)piskepte/on; e)/sti
de\ tau=ta stoichei=a tô=n pro\s tou\s o(/rous; peri\ au)tô=n de\
tou/tôn o)liga/kis ai( ske/pseis gi/nontai toi=s dialegome/nois.]]

When the thesis propounded affirms that A is genus of B, you will run
over all the cognates of B, and see whether there is any one among
them respecting which A cannot be affirmed as genus. If there be,
this is a good argument against the thesis; for the genus ought to be
predicable of all. Next, whether what is really no more than an
accident is affirmed as genus, which ought to belong to the essence
of the subject. Perhaps (_e.g._) white is affirmed in the thesis as
being genus of snow; but white cannot be truly so affirmed; for it is
not of the essence of snow, but is only a quality or accident.[152]
Examine whether the predicate A comes under the definition already
given of an Accident,--that which may or may not be predicated of the
subject; also, whether A and B both fall under the same one out of
the ten Categories or Predicaments. If B the subject comes under
_Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, the predicate ought also to
belong to _Essentia_, or _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_: the species and
the genus ought to come under the same Category.[153] If this be not
the case in a thesis of Genus, the thesis cannot be maintained.

[Footnote 152: Ibid. b. 23-29.]

[Footnote 153: Ibid. p. 120, b. 36-p. 121, a. 9. [Greek: katho/lou d'
ei)pei=n u(po\ tê\n au)tê\n diai/resin dei= to\ ge/nos tô=| ei)/dei
ei)=nai.]

Aristotle here enunciates this as universally true, whereas if we
turn to Categor. p. 11, a. 24, seq. we shall find him declaring it
not to be universally true. Compare also Topic. IV. iv. p. 124, b.
15.]

You are aware that the species always partakes of the genus, while
the genus never partakes of the species; to _partake_ meaning that
the species includes the essence or definition of the genus, but the
genus never includes the essence or definition of the species. You
will examine, therefore, whether in the thesis propounded to you this
condition is realized; if not, the thesis may be refuted. Suppose,
_e.g._, that it enunciates some superior genus as including _Ens_ or
_Unum_. If this were true, the genus so assigned would still partake
of _Ens_ and _Unum_; for _Ens_ and _Unum_ maybe predicated of all
existences whatever. Therefore what is enunciated in the thesis as a
genus, cannot be a real genus.[154]

[Footnote 154: Topic. IV. i. p. 121, a. 10-19.]

Perhaps you may find something respecting which the subject (species)
may be truly affirmed, while the predicate (genus) cannot be truly
affirmed. If so, the predicate is not a real genus. Thus, the thesis
may enunciate _Ens_ or _Scibile_ as being the genus of _Opinabile_.
But this last, the species or subject _Opinabile_, may be affirmed
respecting _Non-Ens_ also; while the predicates _Ens_ or _Scibile_
(given as the pretended genus of _Opinabile_) cannot be affirmed
respecting _Non-Ens_. You can thus show that _Ens_ or _Scibile_ is
not the real genus of _Opinabile_.[155] The pretended species
_Opinabile_ (comprising as it does both _Ens_ and _Non-Ens_)
stretches farther than the pretended genus _Ens_ or _Scibile_:
whereas every real genus ought to stretch farther than any one or any
portion of its constituent species.[156] The thesis may thus be
overthrown, if there be any one species which stretches even equally
far or is co-extensive with the pretended genus.[157]

[Footnote 155: Ibid. a. 20-26.]

[Footnote 156: Ibid. b. 1-14. [Greek: stoichei=on de\ pro\s a(/panta
ta\ toiau=ta, to\ e)pi\ ple/on to\ ge/nos ê)\ to\ ei)=dos kai\ tê\n
diaphora\n le/gesthai; e)p' e)/latton ga\r kai\ ê( diaphora\ tou=
ge/nous le/getai.]]

[Footnote 157: Ibid. b. 4.]

It is a general truth that the same species cannot belong to two
distinct genera, unless one of the two be subordinate to the other,
or unless both of them be comprehended under some common higher
genus. You will examine, therefore, whether there is any other genus,
besides the predicate of the thesis, to which the subject of the
thesis can be referred. If there be some other genus, not under
either of the two conditions above indicated, the predicate
enunciated by the thesis cannot be the real genus of the subject.
Thus, if the thesis declares justice to be science (or to belong to
the genus science), you may remark that there is another distinct
genus (virtue) to which justice also belongs. In this particular
case, however, it would be replied that science and virtue can both
be referred to one and the same higher genus, viz., habit and
disposition. Therefore the thesis, Justice is science, will not be
truly open to objection on this ground.[158]

[Footnote 158: Topic. IV. ii. p. 121, b. 24, seq.]

Again, if the predicate of the thesis be the true genus of the
subject, all the higher genera in which the predicate is contained
must also be predicated _in Quid_ (as the predicate itself is**)
respecting the subject. This you must show by an induction of
particular instances, no counter-instance being producible.[159] If
the thesis enunciated does not conform to this condition, you will
have a good argument against it. You will also run over the
sub-species that are comprehended in the subject of the thesis,
considered as a genus; and you will examine whether the predicate of
the thesis (together with all its superior genera) is predicable
essentially or _in Quid_ of all these sub-species. If you can find
any one among these sub-species, of which it is not essentially
predicable, the predicate of the thesis is not the true genus of the
subject;[160] the like also, if the definitions of those genera are
not predicable of the subject or its sub-species.[161]

[Footnote 159: Ibid. p. 122, a. 5-19. [Greek: o(/ti de\ e(no\s e)n
tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgoroume/nou pa/nta ta\ loipa/, a)/nper
katêgorê=tai, e)n tô=| ti/ e)sti katêgorêthê/setai, di' e)pagôgê=s
lêpte/on.]]

[Footnote 160: Ibid. a. 21-b. 6.]

[Footnote 161: Ibid. b. 7-11. [Greek: ei) ou)=n diaphônei=, dê=lon
o(/ti ou) ge/nos to\ a)podothe/n.]]

Perhaps the thesis may enunciate as a genus what is really nothing
more than a differentia. It may also enunciate the differentia either
as a part of the genus or as a part of the species; or it may
enunciate the genus either as a part of the differentia or as a part
of the species. All these are attackable. The differentia is not a
genus, nor does it respond to the question _Quid est_, but to the
question _Quale quid est_. It is always either **more
extensive than the species, or co-extensive therewith.[162] If none
of the differentiæ belonging to a genus can be predicated of a
species, neither can the genus itself be predicated thereof. Thus,
neither odd nor even can be predicated of the soul; accordingly,
neither can the genus (number) be predicated of the soul.[163] If the
species be _prius naturâ_, so that when it disappears the enunciated
genus disappears along with it, this cannot be the real genus; nor,
if the enunciated genus or differentia can be supposed to disappear
and yet the species does not disappear along with them.[164] If the
species partakes of (includes in its essence) something contrary to
the enunciated genus, this last cannot be the real genus; nor, if the
species includes something which cannot possibly belong to what is in
that genus. Thus, if the soul partakes of (or includes in its
essence) life, and if no number can possibly live, the soul cannot be
a species of number.[165]

[Footnote 162: Ibid. b. 12-p. 123, a. 10. [Greek: ou)de\ dokei=
mete/chein ê( diaphora\ tou= ge/nous; pa=n ga\r to\ mete/chon tou=
ge/nous ê)\ ei)=dos ê)\ a)/tomo/n e)stin. a)ei\ ga\r ê( diaphora\
e)p' i)/sês ê)\ e)pi\ plei=on tou= ei)/dous le/getai.--e)pi\ ple/on
te ga\r to\ ge/nos tê=s diaphora=s dei= le/gesthai, kai\ mê\
mete/chein tê=s diaphora=s.]

As an example to illustrate the enclosing of the genus within the
species ([Greek: ei) to\ ge/nos ei)s to\ ei)=dos e)/thêken]),
Aristotle cites a definition given by Plato, who defined [Greek: tê\n
kata\ to/pon ki/nêsin], as [Greek: phora/n]. Now [Greek: phora\] is
less extensive in its meaning than [Greek: ê( kata\ to/pon ki/nêsis],
which includes [Greek: ba/disis] and other terms of motion apart from
or foreign to [Greek: phora/].--Example of enunciating differentia as
a genus is, if immortal be given as the genus to which a god belongs.
Immortal is the differentia belonging to [Greek: zô=|on], and
constituting therewith the species god.--Example of enclosing the
differentia in the genus is, if odd be given as the essence of number
([Greek: o(/per a)rithmo/n]).--Example of enclosing differentia in
the species is, if immortal be put forward as the essence of a god
([Greek: o(/per theo/n]).--Example of enclosing the genus in the
differentia is, number given as the essence of the odd.--Example of
enunciating the genus as a differentia is, when change of place is
given as the differentia of [Greek: phora/].]

[Footnote 163: Topic. IV. ii. p. 123, a. 11-14.]

[Footnote 164: Ibid. a. 14-19.]

[Footnote 165: Ibid. iii. a. 20-26.]

Again, the generic term and the specific term ought to be univocal in
signification. You must examine (according to the tests indicated in
the First Book of the Topica) whether it be taken equivocally in the
thesis. If it be so, you have a ground of attack, and also if it be
taken metaphorically; for every genus ought to be enunciated in the
proper sense of the term, and no metaphor can be allowed to pass as a
genus.[166] Note farther that every true genus has more than one
distinct species. You will, therefore, examine whether any other
species, besides the subject of the thesis, can be suggested as
belonging to the predicate of the thesis. If none, that predicate
cannot be the true genus of the subject.[167]

[Footnote 166: Ibid. a. 27-37. [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\ ei) to\
metaphora=| lego/menon ô(s ge/nos a)pode/dôken, oi(=on tê\n
sôphrosu/nên sumphôni/an; pa=n ga\r ge/nos kuri/ôs kata\ tô=n ei)dô=n
katêgorei=tai, ê( de\ sumphôni/a kata\ tê=s sôphrosu/nês ou) kuri/ôs
a)lla\ metaphora=|; pa=sa ga\r sumphôni/a e)n phtho/ggois.]]

[Footnote 167: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, a. 30.]

Several _loci_ are furnished by Contraries, either to the species or
the genus. If there be something contrary to the species, but nothing
contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species
ought to be included under the same genus as the species itself; but,
if there be something contrary to the species, and also something
contrary to the genus, then that which is contrary to the species
ought to be included in that which is contrary to the genus. Each of
these doctrines you will have to make good by induction of particular
cases.[168] If that which is contrary to the species be a genus
itself (_e.g._, _bonum_) and not included in any superior genus, then
the like will be true respecting the species itself: it will not be
included in any genus; and the predicate of the thesis will not be a
true genus. _Bonum_ and _malum_ are not included in any common
superior genus; each is a genus _per se_.[169] Or suppose that the
subject (species) of the thesis, and the predicate (genus) of the
thesis, have both of them contraries; but that in the one there is an
intermediate between the two contraries, and in the other, not. This
shows that the predicate cannot be the true genus of the species;
for, wherever there is an intermediate between the two contraries of
the species, there also is an intermediate between the two contraries
of the genus; and _vice versâ_.[170] If there be an intermediate
between the two contraries of the species, and also an intermediate
between the two contraries of the genus, you will examine whether
both intermediates are of like nature, designated by analogous terms.
If it be not so (if, _e.g._, the one intermediate is designated by a
positive term, and the other only by a negative term), you will have
ground for contending against the thesis, that the predicate
enunciated therein is not the true genus of the subject. At any rate,
this is a probable ([Greek: e)/ndoxon]) dialectical argument--to
insist upon analogy between the two intermediates; though there are
some particular cases in which the doctrine does not hold.[171]

[Footnote 168: Ibid. b. 1-8. [Greek: phanero\n de\ tou/tôn e(/kaston
dia\ tê=s e)pagôgê=s].]

[Footnote 169: Ibid. b. 8-12.]

[Footnote 170: Topic. IV. iii. p. 123, b. 12, seq.]

[Footnote 171: Ibid. b. 17-23: [Greek: e)/nstasis tou/tou o(/ti
u(giei/as kai\ no/sou ou)de\n metaxu/, kakou= de\ kai\ a)gathou=; ê)\
ei) e)/sti me/n ti a)mphoi=n a)na\ me/son, kai\ tô=n ei)dô=n kai\
tô=n genô=n, mê\ o(moi/ôs de/, a)lla\ tô=n me\n kat' a)po/phasin,
tô=n d' ô(s u(pokei/menon. _e)/ndoxon ga\r to\ o(moi/ôs a)mphoi=n_,
katha/per e)p' a)retê=s kai\ kaki/as, kai\ dikaiosu/nês kai\
a)diki/as; a)mphoi=n ga\r kata\ a)po/phasin ta\ a)na\ me/son.]]

Again, suppose different conditions: that there is no contrary to the
genus, but that there is a contrary to the species. You will examine
whether not merely the contrary of the species, but also the
intermediate between its two contraries, is included in the same
genus; for, if the two contraries are included therein, the
intermediate ought also to be included. This is a line of argument
_probable_ (_i.e._, conformable to general presumption, and
recommendable in a dialectical debate), though there are not wanting
examples adverse to it: thus, excess and defect are included in the
same genus evil, but the moderate or measured ([Greek: to\ me/trion])
is not in the genus evil, but in the genus good.[172] We must remark,
moreover, that though it be a probable dialectical argument, that,
wherever the genus has a contrary, the species will also have a
contrary, yet there are cases adverse to this principle. Thus,
sickness in general has for its contrary health in general; but
particular species of sickness (such as fever, ophthalmia, gout, &c.)
have no contrary.[173]

[Footnote 172: Ibid. b. 23-30.]

[Footnote 173: Ibid. b. 30-37.]

Such will be your way of procedure, if the thesis propounded be
Affirmative, and if you have to make out a negative against it. But
if, on the contrary, the thesis be Negative, so that you have to make
out an affirmative against it, you have then three lines of procedure
open. 1. The genus may have no contrary, while the species has a
contrary: in that case, you may perhaps be able to show that the
contrary of the species (subject) is included in the predicate of the
thesis (genus); if so, then the species also will be included
therein. 2. Or, if you can show that the intermediate between the
species and its contrary is included in the predicate (genus), then
that same genus will also include the species and its contrary; for,
wherever the intermediate is, there also are the two extremes between
which it is intermedi