Title: De Officiis
Author: Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Language: English
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  [Illustration: M. TULLIUS CICERO.
  _FROM THE JAMES LOEB COLLECTION._]



  CICERO

  DE OFFICIIS


  WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
  WALTER MILLER


  LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN
  NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.
  MCMXIII



CONTENTS


  Introduction                    _Page_ ix

  Bibliography                         xiii

  Book I                                  1

  Book II                               167

  Book III                              269

  Index                                 405



INTRODUCTION


In the _de Officiis_ we have, save for the latter Philippics, the great
orator's last contribution to literature. The last, sad, troubled years
of his busy life could not be given to his profession; and he turned his
never-resting thoughts to the second love of his student days and made
Greek philosophy a possibility for Roman readers. The senate had been
abolished; the courts had been closed. His occupation was gone; but
Cicero could not surrender himself to idleness. In those days of
distraction (46-43 B.C.) he produced for publication almost as much as
in all his years of active life.

The liberators had been able to remove the tyrant, but they could not
restore the republic. Cicero's own life was in danger from the fury of
mad Antony and he left Rome about the end of March, 44 B.C. He dared not
even stop permanently in any one of his various country estates, but,
wretched, wandered from one of his villas to another nearly all the
summer and autumn through. He would not suffer himself to become a prey
to his overwhelming sorrow at the death of the republic and the final
crushing of the hopes that had risen with Caesar's downfall, but worked
at the highest tension on his philosophical studies.

The Romans were not philosophical. In 161 B.C. the senate passed a
decree excluding all philosophers and teachers of rhetoric from the
city. They had no taste for philosophical speculation, in which the
Greeks were the world's masters. They were intensely, narrowly
practical. And Cicero was thoroughly Roman. As a student in a Greek
university he had had to study philosophy. His mind was broad enough and
his soul great enough to give him a joy in following after the mighty
masters, Socrates, Plato, Zeno, Cleanthes, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and
the rest. But he pursued his study of it, like a Roman, from a
"practical" motive--to promote thereby his power as an orator and to
augment his success and happiness in life. To him the goal of philosophy
was not primarily to know but to do. Its end was to point out the course
of conduct that would lead to success and happiness. The only side of
philosophy, therefore, that could make much appeal to the Roman mind was
ethics; pure science could have little meaning for the practical Roman;
metaphysics might supplement ethics and religion, without which true
happiness was felt to be impossible.

Philosophical study had its place, therefore, and the most important
department of philosophy was ethics. The treatise on Moral Duties has
the very practical purpose of giving a practical discussion of the basic
principles of Moral Duty and practical rules for personal conduct.

As a philosopher, if we may so stretch the term as to include him,
Cicero avows himself an adherent of the New Academy and a disciple of
Carneades. He had tried Epicureanism under Phaedrus and Zeno, Stoicism
under Diodotus and Posidonius; but Philo of Larissa converted him to the
New Academy.

Scepticism declared the attainment of absolute knowledge impossible. But
there is the easily obtainable golden mean of the probable; and that
appealed to the practical Roman. It appealed especially to Cicero; and
the same indecision that had been his bane in political life naturally
led him first to scepticism, then to eclecticism, where his choice is
dictated by his bias for the practical and his scepticism itself
disappears from view. And while Antiochus, the eclectic Academician of
Athens, and Posidonius, the eclectic Stoic of Rhodes, seem to have had
the strongest influence upon him, he draws at his own discretion from
the founts of Stoics, Peripatetics, and Academicians alike; he has only
contempt for the Epicureans, Cynics, and Cyrenaics. But the more he
studied and lived, the more of a Stoic in ethics he became.

The cap-sheaf of Cicero's ethical studies is the treatise on the Moral
Duties. It takes the form of a letter addressed to his son Marcus (see
Index), at this time a youth of twenty-one, pursuing his university
studies in the Peripatetic school of Cratippus in Athens, and sowing for
what promised to be an abundant crop of wild oats. This situation gives
force and definiteness to the practical tendencies of the father's
ethical teachings. And yet, be it observed, that same father is not
without censure for contributing to his son's extravagant and riotous
living by giving him an allowance of nearly £870 a year.

Our Roman makes no pretensions to originality in philosophic thinking.
He is a follower--an expositor--of the Greeks. As the basis of his
discussion of the Moral Duties he takes the Stoic Panaetius of Rhodes
(see Index), Περὶ Καθήκοντος, drawing also from many other sources, but
following him more or less closely in Books I and II; Book III is more
independent and much inferior. He is usually superficial and not always
clear. He translates and paraphrases Greek philosophy, weaving in
illustrations from Roman history and suggestions of Roman mould in a
form intended to make it, if not popular, at least comprehensible, to
the Roman mind. How well he succeeded is evidenced by the comparative
receptivity of Roman soil prepared by Stoic doctrine for the teachings
of Christianity. Indeed, Anthony Trollope labels our author the "Pagan
Christian." "You would fancy sometimes," says Petrarch, "it is not a
Pagan philosopher but a Christian apostle who is speaking." No less an
authority than Frederick the Great has called our book "the best work on
morals that has been or can be written." Cicero himself looked upon it
as his masterpiece.

It has its strength and its weakness--its sane common sense and noble
patriotism, its self-conceit and partisan politics; it has the master's
brilliant style, but it is full of repetitions and rhetorical
flourishes, and it fails often in logical order and power; it rings true
in its moral tone, but it shows in what haste and distraction it was
composed; for it was not written as a contribution to close scientific
thinking; it was written as a means of occupation and diversion.



BIBLIOGRAPHY


The following works are quoted in the critical notes:--

  _MSS._ A = _codex Ambrosianus_. Milan. 10th century.
         B = _codex Bambergensis_. Hamburg. 10th century.
         H = _codex Herbipolitanus_. Würzburg. 10th century.
         L = _codex Harleianus_. London. 9th century.
       a b = _codices Bernenses_. Bern. 10th century.
         c = _codex Bernensis_. Bern. 13th century.
         p = _codex Palatinus_. Rome. 12th century.

  _Editio Princeps_: The first edition of the _de Officiis_ was from the
         press of Sweynheim and Pannartz at the Monastery of Subiaco;
         possibly the edition published by Fust and Schöffer at Mainz is
         a little older. Both appeared in 1465. The latter was the first
         to print the Greek words in Greek type. The _de Officiis_ is,
         therefore, the first classical book to be issued from a
         printing press, with the possible exception of Lactantius and
         Cicero's _de Oratore_ which bear the more exact date of October
         30, 1465, and were likewise issued from the Monastery press at
         Subiaco.

  _Baiter & Kayser_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera quae supersunt omnia.
         Lipsiae, 1860-69.

  _Beier_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres ... cum
         commentariis editi a Carolo Beiero. Lipsiae, 1820.

  _Erasmus_:     }  M. Tullii Ciceronis Officia, diligenter restituta.
  _Melanchthon_: }  Ejusdem de Amicitia et Senectute dialogi...: cum
         annotationibus Erasmi et P. Melanchthonis. Parisiis, 1533.

  _Ed._: M. Tullii Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia recognovit
         C. F. W. Müller. Teubner: Lipsiae, 1879. This edition is the
         basis of the text of the present volume.

  _Ernesti_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera ex recensione novissima. J. A.
         Ernesti; cum eiusdem notis, et clave Ciceroniana. Editio prima
         Americana. Bostoniae, 1815-16.

  _Facciolati_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres, de
         Senectute, de Amicitia, de Somnio Scipionis, et Paradoxa.
         Accedit Q. fratris commentariolum petitionis. Ex recensione J.
         Facciolati. Venetiis, 1747.

  _Fleckeisen, Alf._: Kritische Miscellen. Dresden, 1864.

  _Gernhard_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres. Rec. et
         scholiis Iac. Facciolati suisque animadversionibus instruxit
         Aug. G. Gernhard. Lipsiae, 1811.

  _Graevius_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres; ... de
         Senectute; ... de Amicitia; Paradoxa; Somnium Scipionis; ex
         recensione J. G. Graevii. Amstelodami, 1689.

  _Gulielmus_: }  M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae extant ...
  _Gruter_:    }  emendata studio ... J. Gulielmi et J. Gruteri.
         Hamburgi, 1618-19.

  _Heine, Otto_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis ad Marcum Filium Libri
         tres. 6te Aufl. Berlin, 1885.

  _Heusinger_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres ... recensuit
         adjectisque J. M. Heusingeri e suis annotationibus ... editurus
         erat J. F. Heusinger. (Edited by C. Heusinger.) Brunsvigae,
         1783.

  _Holden_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres, with
         Introduction, Analysis and Commentary by Herbert Ashton Holden.
         7th Edition. Cambridge, 1891. To his full notes the translator
         is indebted for many a word and phrase.

  _Klotz_: M. Tullii Ciceronis Scripta quae manserunt omnia. Recognovit
         Reinholdus Klotz. Lipsiae, 1850-57, 1869-74.

  _Lambinus_: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia quae extant, a D. Lambino
         ... ex codicibus manuscriptis emendata et aucta ... Lutetiae,
         1566-84.

  _Lange_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis lib. III. Cato Major vel de
         Senectute ... Laelius vel de Amicitia ... Paradoxa Stoicorum
         sex, Somnium Scipionis ... opera C. Langii recogniti ...
         ejusdem in hosce ... libros annotationes. Cum annotationibus
         P. Manutii, etc. Antverpiae, 1568.

  _Lund_: De emendandis Ciceronis libris de Officiis observationes
         criticae. Scripsit G. F. G. Lund. Kopenhagen, 1848.

  _Manutius_: M. Tullii Ciceronis Officiorum libri tres: Cato Maior, vel
         de Senectute: Laelius, vel de Amicitia: Paradoxa Stoicorum sex
         ... additae sunt ... variae lectiones. (Edited by P. Manuzio.)
         P. Manutius: Venetiis, 1541.

  _Müller, C. F. W._: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Für den
         Schulgebrauch erklärt. Leipzig, 1882.

  _Muretus_: M. Antoni Mureti Scholia in Cic. officia. Mureti opera ed.
         Ruhnken. Lugd. Bat., 1879.

  _Orelli_: }  M. Tullii Ciceronis opera quae supersunt omnia, ac
  _Baiter_: }  deperditorum fragmenta ... Edidit J. C. Orellius (M.
  _Halm_:   }  Tullii Ciceronis Scholiastae. C. M. Victorinus, Rufinus,
         C. Julius Victor, Boethius, Favonius Eulogius, Asconius
         Pedianus, Scholia Bobiensia, Scholiasta Gronovianus, Ediderunt
         J. C. Orellius et J. G. Baiter. Turici, 1826-38). Ed. 2. Opus
         morte Orellii interruptum contin. J. G. Baiterus et C. Halmius,
         1845-62.

  _Pearce_: M. Ciceronis de Officiis ad Marcum filium libri tres. Notis
         illustravit et ... emendavit Z. Pearce. Londini, 1745.

  _Stuerenburg_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Recensuit
         R. Stuerenburg. Accedit Commentarius. Lipsiae, 1843.

  _Unger_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri III. Erklärt v. G. F.
         Unger. Leipzig, 1852.

  _Victorius, P._: M. Tullii Ciceronis opera, omnium quae hactenus
         excusa sunt castigatissima, nunc primum in lucem edita. 4 tom.
         Venetiis, 1532-34-36.

  _Zumpt_: M. Tullii Ciceronis de Officiis libri tres cum selectis J. M.
         et J. F. Heusingerorum suisque notis. Scholarum in usum iterum
         edidit Car. Tim. Zumptius. Brunsvigae, 1849.



CICERO DE OFFICIIS



BOOK I

MORAL GOODNESS



LIBER PRIMUS / BOOK I


*1* I. Quamquam te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum, idque
Athenis, abundare oportet praeceptis institutisque philosophiae propter
summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scientia
augere potest, altera exemplis, tamen, ut ipse ad meam utilitatem semper
cum Graecis Latina coniunxi neque id in philosophia solum, sed etiam in
dicendi exercitatione feci, idem tibi censeo faciendum, ut par sis in
utriusque orationis facultate. Quam quidem ad rem nos, ut videmur,
magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris, ut non modo Graecarum
litterarum rudes, sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et
ad dicendum[1] et ad iudicandum.

*2* Quam ob rem disces tu quidem a principe huius aetatis philosophorum,
et disces, quam diu voles; tam diu autem velle debebis, quoad te,
quantum proficias, non paenitebit; sed tamen nostra legens non multum a
Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici
volumus esse, de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio),
orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem.
Nec vero hoc arroganter dictum existimari velim. Nam philosophandi
scientiam concedens multis, quod est oratoris proprium, apte, distincte,
ornate dicere, quoniam in eo studio aetatem consumpsi, si id mihi
assumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare.

*3* Quam ob rem magnopere te hortor, mi Cicero, ut non solum orationes
meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se[2]
aequarunt, studiose legas; vis enim maior in illis dicendi, sed hoc
quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus. Et id
quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in
genere elaboraret[3] sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc
quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero
haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen,
ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantum in utroque
profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, utrumque certe secuti sumus.

*4* Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare
voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere, et Demosthenem,
si illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset,
ornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque modo de Aristotele et
Isocrate iudico, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit
alterum.

    [1] _dicendum_ Edd.; _discendum_ MSS. (i.e. acquisition of
    learning).

    [2] _se_ A c, Edd.; not in B H a b p.

    [3] _elaboraret_ Lambin., Edd.; laboraret MSS.


#Introduction: the importance of combining Greek and Latin studies.#

*1* I. My dear son Marcus, you have now been studying a full year under
Cratippus, and that too in Athens, and you should be fully equipped with
the practical precepts and the principles of philosophy; so much at
least one might expect from the pre-eminence not only of your teacher
but also of the city; the former is able to enrich you with learning,
the latter to supply you with models. Nevertheless, just as I for my own
improvement have always combined Greek and Latin studies--and I have
done this not only in the study of philosophy but also in the practice
of oratory--so I recommend that you should do the same, so that you may
have equal command of both languages. And it is in this very direction
that I have, if I mistake not, rendered a great service to our
countrymen, so that not only those who are unacquainted with Greek
literature but even the cultured consider that they have gained much
both in oratorical power and in mental training.

#Greek Philosophy and Cicero's own.#

*2* You will, therefore, learn from the foremost of present-day
philosophers, and you will go on learning as long as you wish; and your
wish ought to continue as long as you are not dissatisfied with the
progress you are making. For all that, if you will read my philosophical
books, you will be helped; my philosophy is not very different from that
of the Peripatetics (for both they and I claim to be followers of
Socrates and Plato). As to the conclusions you may reach, I leave that
to your own judgment (for I would put no hindrance in your way), but by
reading my philosophical writings you will be sure to render your
mastery of the Latin language more complete. But I would by no means
have you think that this is said boastfully. For there are many to whom
I yield precedence in knowledge of philosophy; but if I lay claim to the
orator's peculiar ability to speak with propriety, clearness, elegance,
I think my claim is in a measure justified, for I have spent my life in
that profession.

#Philosophy and oratory.#

*3* And therefore, my dear Cicero, I cordially recommend you to read
carefully not only my orations but also these[A] books of mine on
philosophy, which are now about as extensive. For while the orations
exhibit a more vigorous style, yet the unimpassioned, restrained style
of my philosophical productions is also worth cultivating. Moreover, for
the same man to succeed in both departments, both in the forensic style
and in that of calm philosophic discussion has not, I observe, been the
good fortune of any one of the Greeks so far, unless, perhaps, Demetrius
of Phalerum can be reckoned in that number--a clever reasoner, indeed,
and, though rather a spiritless orator, he is yet charming, so that you
can recognize in him the disciple of Theophrastus. But let others judge
how much I have accomplished in each pursuit; I have at least attempted
both.

*4* I believe, of course, that if Plato had been willing to devote
himself to forensic oratory, he could have spoken with the greatest
eloquence and power; and that if Demosthenes had continued the studies
he pursued with Plato and had wished to expound his views, he could have
done so with elegance and brilliancy. I feel the same way about
Aristotle and Isocrates, each of whom, engrossed in his own profession,
undervalued that of the other.

    [A] Cicero is alluding to his Republic, Tusculan
    Disputations, Theories of the Supreme Good and Evil, The
    Nature of the Gods, Academics, Hortensius, his essays on
    Friendship (Laelius), Old Age (Cato), Fate, Divination, etc.
    (15 in all).


II. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa
posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui, quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum
et auctoritati meae. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et
utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere
videntur ea, quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt. Nulla
enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque
domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero
contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eoque et colendo sita vitae est
honestas omnis et neglegendo[4] turpitudo.

*5* Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium philosophorum; quis
est enim, qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat
dicere? Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et
malorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam qui summum bonum sic
instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis,
non honestate metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum
naturae bonitate vincatur neque amicitiam colere possit nec iustitiam
nec liberalitatem; fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut
temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest.

#de Fin. II, 12 ff.; Tusc. Disp. IV-V; de Off. III, 117#

*6* Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat,
tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi
consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla
officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi
aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se
dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum,
Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam
pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de
officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum[5] reliquissent, ut ad officii
inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur[6] igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac
in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e
fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo
videbitur, hauriemus.

*7* Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante
definire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror.
Omnis enim, quae [a] ratione[7] suscipitur de aliqua re institutio,
debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo
disputetur....[8]

    [4] _et neglegendo_ A H a b, Edd.; _et in neglegendo_ B c.

    [5] _dilectum_ B H a b, Edd.; _delectum_ A c.

    [6] _sequemur_ Graevius, Edd.; _sequimur_ MSS.

    [7] [_a_] _ratione_ Ed.; _a ratione_ MSS.; _ratione_ Müller.

    [8] Cicero's definition must have followed here, something
    like _Omne igitur, quod ratione actum est officium
    appellamus_ Unger.


#Statement of subject.#

II. But since I have decided to write you a little now (and a great deal
by and by), I wish, if possible, to begin with a matter most suited at
once to your years and to my position. Although philosophy offers many
problems, both important and useful, that have been fully and carefully
discussed by philosophers, those teachings which have been handed down
on the subject of moral duties seem to have the widest practical
application. For no phase of life, whether public or private, whether in
business or in the home, whether one is working on what concerns oneself
alone or dealing with another, can be without its moral duty; on the
discharge of such duties depends all that is morally right, and on their
neglect all that is morally wrong in life.

#The philosophic schools and ethical teaching.#

*5* Moreover, the subject of this inquiry is the common property of all
philosophers; for who would presume to call himself a philosopher, if he
did not inculcate any lessons of duty? But there are some schools that
distort all notions of duty by the theories they propose touching the
supreme good and the supreme evil. For he who posits the supreme good as
having no connection with virtue and measures it not by a moral standard
but by his own interests--if he should be consistent and not rather at
times over-ruled by his better nature, he could value neither friendship
nor justice nor generosity; and brave he surely cannot possibly be that
counts pain the supreme evil, nor temperate he that holds pleasure to be
the supreme good.

#Reasons for choice of subject and authorities.#

*6* Although these truths are so self-evident that the subject does not
call for discussion, still I have discussed it in another connection.
If, therefore, these schools should claim to be consistent, they could
not say anything about duty; and no fixed, invariable, natural rules of
duty can be posited except by those who say that moral goodness is worth
seeking solely or chiefly for its own sake. Accordingly, the teaching of
ethics is the peculiar right of the Stoics, the Academicians, and the
Peripatetics; for the theories of Aristo, Pyrrho, and Erillus have been
long since rejected; and yet they would have the right to discuss duty
if they had left us any power of choosing between things, so that there
might be a way of finding out what duty is. I shall, therefore, at this
time and in this investigation follow chiefly the Stoics, not as a
translator, but, as is my custom, I shall at my own option and
discretion draw from those sources in such measure and in such manner as
shall suit my purpose.

*7* Since, therefore, the whole discussion is to be on the subject of
duty, I should like at the outset to define what duty is, as, to my
surprise, Panaetius has failed to do. For every systematic development
of any subject ought to begin with a definition, so that every one may
understand what the discussion is about.


III. Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet
ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in
omnis partis usus vitae conformari[9] possit. Superioris generis huius
modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium
aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem
officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum,
tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis
spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque
etiam alia divisio est officii.

*8* Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum
officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci κατόρθωμα, hoc autem
commune officium καθῆκον vocant.[10] Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum
quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id
esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit.

*9* Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi
deliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in
deliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contrarias
sententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt[11] aut consultant, ad
vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad
opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id
necne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis
cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id,
quod videtur esse utile; cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra
revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus
afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi.

*10* Hac divisione, cum praeterire aliquid maximum vitium in dividendo
sit, duo praetermissa sunt; nec enim solum utrum honestum an turpe sit,
deliberari solet, sed etiam duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius,
itemque duobus propositis utilibus utrum utilius. Ita, quam ille
triplicem putavit esse rationem, in quinque partes distribui debere
reperitur. Primum igitur est de honesto, sed dupliciter, tum pari
ratione de utili, post de comparatione eorum disserendum.

    [9] _conformari_ Edd.; _confirmari_ MSS. (i.e. fortified).

    [10] _officium_ καθῆκον _vocant_ Pearce, Ed., Heine;
    _officium vocant_ MSS., Bt.

    [11] _anquirunt_ A B H b; _inquirunt_ a c.


#Classification of duties.#

III. Every treatise on duty has two parts: one, dealing with the
doctrine of the supreme good; the other, with the practical rules by
which daily life in all its bearings may be regulated. The following
questions are illustrative of the first part: whether all duties are
absolute; whether one duty is more important than another; and so on.
But as regards special duties for which positive rules are laid down,
though they are affected by the doctrine of the supreme good, still the
fact is not so obvious, because they seem rather to look to the
regulation of every-day life; and it is these special duties that I
propose to treat at length in the following books.

*8* And yet there is still another classification of duties: we
distinguish between "mean"[B] duty, so-called, and "absolute" duty.
Absolute duty we may, I presume, call "right," for the Greeks call it
κατόρθωμα, while the ordinary duty they call καθῆκον. And the meaning of
those terms they fix thus: whatever is right they define as absolute
duty, but "mean" duty, they say, is duty for the performance of which an
adequate reason may be rendered.

#The threefold classification of Panaetius.#

*9* The consideration necessary to determine conduct is, therefore, as
Panaetius thinks, a threefold one: first, people question whether the
contemplated act is morally right or morally wrong; and in such
deliberation their minds are often led to widely divergent conclusions.
And then they examine and consider the question whether the action
contemplated is or is not conducive to comfort and happiness in life, to
the command of means and wealth, to influence, and to power, by which
they may be able to help themselves and their friends; this whole matter
turns upon a question of expediency. The third type of question arises
when that which seems to be expedient seems to conflict with that which
is morally right; for when expediency seems to be pulling one way, while
moral right seems to be calling back in the opposite direction, the
result is that the mind is distracted in its inquiry and brings to it
the irresolution that is born of deliberation.

#The question is fivefold.#

*10* Although omission is a most serious defect in classification, two
points have been overlooked in the foregoing:[C] for we usually consider
not only whether an action is morally right or morally wrong, but also,
when a choice of two morally right courses is offered, which one is
morally better; and likewise, when a choice of two expedients is
offered, which one is more expedient. Thus the question which Panaetius
thought threefold ought, we find, to be divided into five parts. First,
therefore, we must discuss the moral--and that, under two sub-heads;
secondly, in the same manner, the expedient; and finally, the cases
where they must be weighed against each other.

    [B] Cicero's technical terms are difficult because he has to
    invent them to translate Greek that is perfectly simple:

    _rectum_ is 'right,' i.e. perfect, absolute. Its opposite is
    _medium_, 'mean,' i.e. intermediate, falling short of the
    'absolute' and occupying a middle ground; common; ordinary.

    _honestum_ is 'morally right'; as a noun, 'moral goodness'
    (= _honestas_); its opposite is _turpe_, 'morally wrong.'

    _honestas_ is 'moral rectitude,'--'moral goodness';
    'morality'; its opposite _turpitudo_, 'moral wrong,'
    'immorality.'

    _honestus_, on the other hand, is always 'honourable'; and
    _honores_ are always 'offices of honour.'

    [C] For Panaetius was a Stoic, and the Stoics did not admit
    that there were any degrees of right or wrong.


*11* IV. Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se,
vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura videantur, omniaque,
quae sint ad vivendum necessaria, anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut
latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item[12] animantium omnium
est coniunctionis adpetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae
procreata sint[13]; sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest,
quod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque
praesens est, se accommodat paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut
futurum; homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia
cernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus[14] et quasi
antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus
adiungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad
eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.

*12* Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad
orationis et ad vitae societatem ingeneratque in primis praecipuum
quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt, impellitque, ut hominum
coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ob easque causas
studeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nec sibi
soli, sed coniugi, liberis ceterisque, quos caros habeat tuerique
debeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam
facit.

*13* In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque
investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum
avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut
occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex
quo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae
hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio
quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura
velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et
legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi existit humanarumque rerum
contemptio.

*14* Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc
animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis dictisque
qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud
animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam
similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo
etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque
conservandam[15] putat cavetque, ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat,
tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat
aut cogitet.

Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus, honestum,
quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere
dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile.

    [12] _item_ Manutius, Edd.; _autem_ MSS.

    [13] _procreata sint_ B H a b; _procreata sunt_ A (?), Bt.;
    _procreantur_ c.

    [14] _praegressus_ A H a b, Edd.; _progressus_ B c.

    [15] _conservandam_ MSS.; _conservanda_ codd. aliquot
    recentiores, Bt.


#The essential differences between man and the lower animals.#

*11* IV. First of all, Nature has endowed every species of living
creature with the instinct of self-preservation, of avoiding what seems
likely to cause injury to life or limb, and of procuring and providing
everything needful for life--food, shelter, and the like. A common
property of all creatures is also the reproductive instinct (the purpose
of which is the propagation of the species) and also a certain amount of
concern for their offspring. #Instinct and Reason.# But the most marked
difference between man and beast is this: the beast, just as far as it
is moved by the senses and with very little perception of past or
future, adapts itself to that alone which is present at the moment;
while man--because he is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends
the chain of consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands
the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies,
and connects and associates the present and the future--easily surveys
the course of his whole life and makes the necessary preparations for
its conduct.

#Family ties.#

*12* Nature likewise by the power of reason associates man with man in
the common bonds of speech and life; she implants in him above all, I
may say, a strangely tender love for his offspring. She also prompts
men to meet in companies, to form public assemblies and to take part in
them themselves; and she further dictates, as a consequence of this, the
effort on man's part to provide a store of things that minister to his
comforts and wants--and not for himself alone, but for his wife and
children and the others whom he holds dear and for whom he ought to
provide; and this responsibility also stimulates his courage and makes
it stronger for the active duties of life.

#Search after truth.#

*13* Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are
peculiar to man. And so, when we have leisure from the demands of
business cares, we are eager to see, to hear, to learn something new,
and we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders of creation as
indispensable to a happy life. Thus we come to understand that what is
true, simple, and genuine appeals most strongly to a man's nature. To
this passion for discovering truth there is added a hungering, as it
were, for independence, so that a mind well-moulded by Nature is
unwilling to be subject to anybody save one who gives rules of conduct
or is a teacher of truth or who, for the general good, rules according
to justice and law. From this attitude come greatness of soul and a
sense of superiority to worldly conditions.

#Moral sensibility.#

*14* And it is no mean manifestation of Nature and Reason that man is
the only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for
moderation in word and deed. And so no other animal has a sense of
beauty, loveliness, harmony in the visible world; and Nature and Reason,
extending the analogy of this from the world of sense to the world of
spirit, find that beauty, consistency, order are far more to be
maintained in thought and deed, and the same Nature and Reason are
careful to do nothing in an improper or unmanly fashion, and in every
thought and deed to do or think nothing capriciously.

It is from these elements that is forged and fashioned that moral
goodness which is the subject of this inquiry--something that, even
though it be not generally ennobled, is still worthy of all honour[D];
and by its own nature, we correctly maintain, it merits praise, even
though it be praised by none.

    [D] Cicero plays on the double meaning of _honestum_: (1)
    'moral goodness,' and (2) 'honourable,' 'distinguished,' etc.


#Phaedr., 250 D#

*15* V. Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti
vides, "quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores," ut ait Plato,
"excitaret sapientiae." Sed omne, quod est honestum, id quattuor partium
oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicientia veri sollertiaque versatur
aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum
contractarum fide aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac
robore aut in omnium, quae fiunt quaeque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in
quo inest modestia et temperantia.

*(15)* Quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt,
tamen ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur, velut ex ea parte,
quae prima discripta[16] est, in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus,
inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est
proprium. *16* Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit, quid in re quaque
verissimum sit, quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et
explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi
solet. Quocirca huic quasi materia, quam tractet et in qua versetur,
subiecta est veritas.

*17* Reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad
eas res parandas tuendasque, quibus actio vitae continetur, ut et
societas hominum coniunctioque servetur et animi excellentia
magnitudoque cum in augendis opibus utilitatibusque et sibi et suis
comparandis, tum multo magis in his ipsis despiciendis eluceat. Ordo
autem[17] et constantia et moderatio et ea, quae sunt his similia,
versantur in eo genere, ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum
mentis agitatio. Iis enim rebus, quae tractantur in vita, modum quendam
et ordinem adhibentes honestatem et decus conservabimus.

    [16] _discripta_ Heine; _descripta_ MSS., Bt.

    [17] _autem_ MSS., Müller, Heine; _item_ Pearce, Ed., Bt.


*15* V. You see here, Marcus, my son, the very form and as it were the
face of Moral Goodness; "and if," as Plato says, "it could be seen with
the physical eye, it would awaken a marvellous love of wisdom." #The
four Cardinal Virtues.# But all that is morally right rises from some
one of four sources: it is concerned either (1) with the full perception
and intelligent development of the true; or (2) with the conservation of
organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the
faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and
strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness
and moderation of everything that is said and done, wherein consist
temperance and self-control.

#Their several provinces.#

*(15)* Although these four are connected and interwoven, still it is in
each one considered singly that certain definite kinds of moral duties
have their origin: in that category, for instance, which was designated
first in our division and in which we place wisdom and prudence, belong
the search after truth and its discovery; and this is the peculiar
province of that virtue. *16* For the more clearly anyone observes the
most essential truth in any given case and the more quickly and
accurately he can see and explain the reasons for it, the more
understanding and wise he is generally esteemed, and justly so. So,
then, it is truth that is, as it were, the stuff with which this virtue
has to deal and on which it employs itself.

*17* Before the three remaining virtues, on the other hand, is set the
task of providing and maintaining those things on which the practical
business of life depends, so that the relations of man to man in human
society may be conserved, and that largeness and nobility of soul may be
revealed not only in increasing one's resources and acquiring advantages
for one's self and one's family but far more in rising superior to these
very things. But orderly behaviour and consistency of demeanour and
self-control and the like have their sphere in that department of things
in which a certain amount of physical exertion, and not mental activity
merely, is required. For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and
order into the transactions of daily life, we shall be conserving moral
rectitude and moral dignity.


*18* VI. Ex quattuor autem locis, in quos honesti naturam vimque
divisimus, primus ille, qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam
attingit humanam. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et
scientiae cupiditatem, in qua excellere pulchrum putamus, labi autem,
errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus.[18] In hoc genere et
naturali et honesto duo vitia vitanda sunt, unum, ne incognita pro
cognitis habeamus iisque temere assentiamur; quod vitium effugere qui
volet (omnes autem velle debent), adhibebit ad considerandas res et
tempus et diligentiam. *19* Alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum
studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt
easdemque non necessarias.

Quibus vitiis declinatis quod in rebus honestis et cognitione dignis
operae curaeque ponetur, id iure laudabitur, ut in astrologia C.
Sulpicium audivimus, in geometria Sex. Pompeium ipsi cognovimus, multos
in dialecticis, plures in iure civili, quae omnes artes in veri
investigatione versantur; cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra
officium est. Virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit; a qua tamen
fit intermissio saepe multique dantur ad studia reditus; tum agitatio
mentis, quae numquam acquiescit, potest nos in studiis cognitionis[19]
etiam sine opera nostra continere. Omnis autem cogitatio motusque animi
aut in consiliis capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene
beateque vivendum aut in studiis scientiae cognitionisque versabitur.

Ac de primo quidem officii fonte diximus.

    [18] _ducimus_ c, Edd.; _dicimus_ A B H a b.

    [19] _cognitionis_ A, Bt., Müller, Heine; _cogitationis_ BH
    a b c (error caused by _cogitatio_ in next line).


#A. Wisdom.#

*18* VI. Now, of the four divisions which we have made of the essential
idea of moral goodness, the first, consisting in the knowledge of truth,
touches human nature most closely. For we are all attracted and drawn to
a zeal for learning and knowing; and we think it glorious to excel
therein, while we count it base and immoral to fall into error, to
wander from the truth, to be ignorant, to be led astray. In this
pursuit, which is both natural and morally right, two errors are to be
avoided: first, we must not treat the unknown as known and too readily
accept it; and he who wishes to avoid this error (as all should do)
will devote both time and attention to the weighing of evidence. *19*
The other error is that some people devote too much industry and too
deep study to matters that are obscure and difficult and useless as
well.

If these errors are successfully avoided, all the labour and pains
expended upon problems that are morally right and worth the solving will
be fully rewarded. Such a worker in the field of astronomy, for example,
was Gaius Sulpicius, of whom we have heard; in mathematics, Sextus
Pompey, whom I have known personally; in dialectics, many; in civil law,
still more. All these professions are occupied with the search after
truth; but to be drawn by study away from active life is contrary to
moral duty. For the whole glory of virtue is in activity; activity,
however, may often be interrupted, and many opportunities for returning
to study are opened. Besides, the working of the mind, which is never at
rest, can keep us busy in the pursuit of knowledge even without
conscious effort on our part. Moreover, all our thought and mental
activity will be devoted either to planning for things that are morally
right and that conduce to a good and happy life, or to the pursuits of
science and learning.

With this we close the discussion of the first source of duty.


*20* VII. De tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio, qua
societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur; cuius
partes duae,[20] iustitia, in qua virtutis est splendor maximus, ex qua
viri boni nominantur, et huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel
benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.

Sed iustitiae primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat nisi lacessitus
iniuria, deinde ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis.

*21* Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, ut qui
quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut
lege, pactione, condicione, sorte; ex quo fit, ut ager Arpinas
Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; similisque est privatarum
possessionum discriptio.[21] Ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum, quae
natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat; e
quo[22] si quis sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis.

#Ep. IX, ad Archytam, 358 A#

*22* Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum
nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque,
ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia
creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se
aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi,
communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando
accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum
inter homines societatem.

*23* Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum
conventorumque constantia et veritas. Ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur
fortasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose
exquirunt, unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat, quod dictum
est, appellatam fidem.

Sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt, unum eorum, qui inferunt, alterum
eorum, qui ab iis, quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam.
Nam qui iniuste impetum in quempiam facit aut ira aut aliqua
perturbatione incitatus, is quasi manus afferre videtur socio; qui autem
non defendit nec obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, tam est in vitio, quam
si parentes aut amicos aut patriam deserat. *24* Atque illae quidem
iniuriae, quae nocendi causa de industria inferuntur, saepe a metu
proficiscuntur, cum is, qui nocere alteri cogitat, timet ne, nisi id
fecerit, ipse aliquo afficiatur incommodo. Maximam autem partem ad
iniuriam faciendam aggrediuntur, ut adipiscantur ea, quae concupiverunt;
in quo vitio latissime patet avaritia.

    [20] _partes duae_ BH b; _partes duae sunt_ c, Bt., Heine.

    [21] _discriptio_ B, Edd.; _descriptio_ A H a b c.

    [22] _e quo_ A^1 H a b c, Müller; _eo_ B, _de quo_ Bt.
    (suppl.), Heine.


#B. Justice.#

*20* VII. Of the three remaining divisions, the most extensive in its
application is the principle by which society and what we may call its
"common bonds" are maintained. Of this again there are two
divisions--justice, in which is the crowning glory of the virtues and on
the basis of which men are called "good men"; and, close akin to
justice, charity, which may also be called kindness or generosity.

The first office of justice is to keep one man from doing harm to
another, unless provoked by wrong; and the next is to lead men to use
common possessions for the common interests, private property for their
own.

#Public _vs._ private interests.#

*21* There is, however, no such thing as private ownership established
by nature, but property becomes private either through long occupancy
(as in the case of those who long ago settled in unoccupied territory)
or through conquest (as in the case of those who took it in war) or by
due process of law, bargain, or purchase, or by allotment. On this
principle the lands of Arpinum are said to belong to the Arpinates, the
Tusculan lands to the Tusculans; and similar is the assignment of
private property. Therefore, inasmuch as in each case some of those
things which by nature had been common property became the property of
individuals, each one should retain possession of that which has fallen
to his lot; and if anyone appropriates to himself anything beyond that,
he will be violating the laws of human society.

*22* But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for
ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our
friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the
earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for
the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in
this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to
the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and
receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to
cement human society more closely together, man to man.

#Good faith.#

*23* The foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith--that is, truth
and fidelity to promises and agreements. And therefore we may follow the
Stoics, who diligently investigate the etymology of words; and we may
accept their statement that "good faith" is so called because what is
promised is "made good," although some may find this derivation[E]
rather far-fetched.

#Injustice: active and passive.#

There are, on the other hand, two kinds of injustice--the one, on the
part of those who inflict wrong, the other on the part of those who,
when they can, do not shield from wrong those upon whom it is being
inflicted. For he who, under the influence of anger or some other
passion, wrongfully assaults another seems, as it were, to be laying
violent hands upon a comrade; but he who does not prevent or oppose
wrong, if he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he deserted his
parents or his friends or his country. *24* Then, too, those very wrongs
which people try to inflict on purpose to injure are often the result of
fear: that is, he who premeditates injuring another is afraid that, if
he does not do so, he may himself be made to suffer some hurt. But for
the most part, people are led to wrong-doing in order to secure some
personal end; in this vice, avarice is generally the controlling motive.

    [E] Of course, 'good faith' and 'made good' have just as
    little etymological connection as _fiat_ and _fidem_.


*25* VIII. Expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, tum
ad perfruendas voluptates. In quibus autem maior est animus, in iis
pecuniae cupiditas spectat ad opes et ad gratificandi facultatem, ut
nuper M. Crassus negabat ullam satis magnam pecuniam esse ei, qui in re
publica princeps vellet esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non
posset. Delectant etiam magnifici apparatus vitaeque cultus cum
elegantia et copia; quibus rebus effectum est, ut infinita pecuniae
cupiditas esset. Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens
vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est.

*26* Maxime autem adducuntur plerique, ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio,
cum in imperiorum, honorum, gloriae cupiditatem inciderunt.[23] Quod
enim est apud Ennium:

#Fab. inc. (Thyestes?) Vahlen^2, 404#

              Núlla sancta sócietas
    Néc fides regni ést,

id latius patet. Nam quicquid eius modi est, in quo non possint plures
excellere, in eo fit plerumque tanta contentio, ut difficillimum sit
servare "sanctam societatem." Declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris,
qui omnia iura divina et humana pervertit propter eum, quem sibi ipse
opinionis errore finxerat, principatum. Est autem in hoc genere
molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque
exsistunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae cupiditates. Quo magis
cavendum est, ne quid in eo genere peccetur.

*27* Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest, utrum perturbatione
aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et
cogitata[24] fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt ea, quae repentino aliquo
motu accidunt, quam ea, quae meditata et praeparata inferuntur.

Ac de inferenda quidem iniuria satis dictum est.

    [23] _inciderunt_ A B H L a b; _inciderint_ c.

    [24] _cogitata_ A B H a b p, Edd.; _cogitatu_ c, _cogitato_
    alii, Madvig (ad De Fin. p. 696).


*25* VIII. Again, men seek riches partly to supply the needs of life,
partly to secure the enjoyment of pleasure. #The dangers of ambition.#
With those who cherish higher ambitions, the desire for wealth is
entertained with a view to power and influence and the means of
bestowing favours; Marcus Crassus, for example, not long since declared
that no amount of wealth was enough for the man who aspired to be the
foremost citizen of the state, unless with the income from it he could
maintain an army. Fine establishments and the comforts of life in
elegance and abundance also afford pleasure, and the desire to secure it
gives rise to the insatiable thirst for wealth. Still, I do not mean to
find fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody,
but unjust acquisition of it is always to be avoided.

*26* The great majority of people, however, when they fall a prey to
ambition for either military or civil authority, are carried away by it
so completely that they quite lose sight of the claims of justice. For
Ennius says:

    "There is no fellowship inviolate,
    No faith is kept, when kingship is concerned;"

and the truth of his words has an uncommonly wide application. For
whenever a situation is of such a nature that not more than one can hold
pre-eminence in it, competition for it usually becomes so keen that it
is an extremely difficult matter to maintain a "fellowship inviolate."
#Caesar.# We saw this proved but now in the effrontery of Gaius Caesar,
who, to gain that sovereign power which by a depraved imagination he had
conceived in his fancy, trod underfoot all laws of gods and men. But the
trouble about this matter is that it is in the greatest souls and in the
most brilliant geniuses that we usually find ambitions for civil and
military authority, for power, and for glory, springing up; and
therefore we must be the more heedful not to go wrong in that direction.

#The motives to wrong.#

*27* But in any case of injustice it makes a vast deal of difference
whether the wrong is done as a result of some impulse of passion, which
is usually brief and transient, or whether it is committed wilfully and
with premeditation; for offences that come through some sudden impulse
are less culpable than those committed designedly and with malice
aforethought.

But enough has been said on the subject of inflicting injury.


*28* IX. Praetermittendae autem defensionis deserendique officii plures
solent esse causae; nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus
suscipere nolunt aut etiam neglegentia, pigritia, inertia aut suis
studiis quibusdam occupationibusve sic impediuntur, ut eos, quos tutari
debeant, desertos esse patiantur. #Rep. VI, 485 ff. VII, 520 D# Itaque
videndum est, ne non satis sit id, quod apud Platonem est in philosophos
dictum, quod in veri investigatione versentur quodque ea, quae plerique
vehementer expetant,[25] de quibus inter se digladiari soleant,
contemnant et pro nihilo putent, propterea iustos esse. Nam alterum
[iustitiae genus] assequuntur,[26] ut[27] inferenda ne cui noceant
iniuria, in alterum incidunt[28]; discendi enim studio impediti, quos
tueri debent, deserunt. #Rep. I, 347 C# Itaque eos ne ad rem publicam
quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate
fieri; nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium.

*29* Sunt etiam, qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendae aut odio quodam
hominum suum se negotium agere dicant nec facere cuiquam videantur
iniuriam. Qui altero genere iniustitiae vacant, in alterum incurrunt;
deserunt enim vitae societatem, quia nihil conferunt in eam studii,
nihil operae, nihil facultatum.

Quando igitur duobus generibus iniustitiae propositis adiunximus causas
utriusque generis easque res ante constituimus, quibus iustitia
contineretur, facile, quod cuiusque temporis officium sit, poterimus,
nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus, iudicare; *30* est enim difficilis
cura rerum alienarum. #Heaut. Tim. 77# Quamquam Terentianus ille Chremes
"humani nihil a se alienum putat"; sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus
atque sentimus, quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt, quam
illa, quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus,
aliter de illis ac de nobis iudicamus. Quocirca bene praecipiunt, qui
vetant quicquam agere, quod dubites aequum sit an iniquum. Aequitas enim
lucet ipsa per se, dubitatio cogitationem significat iniuriae.

    [25] _expetant_ A B a b; _expectant_ H; _exspectant_ c.

    [26] _alterum iustitiae genus assequuntur_ MSS.; _alterum
    assequuntur_ Pearce, J. M. Heusinger, et al.; _alterum genus
    assequuntur_ Beier.

    [27] _ut_ Halm; _in_ MSS.; om. Bt.

    [28] _in alterum incidunt_ A B H a b; _in altero delinqunt_
    c, Bt. (_delinquunt_, i.e. they offend in the other
    direction).


#Motives to passive injustice;#

*28* IX. The motives for failure to prevent injury and so for slighting
duty are likely to be various: people either are reluctant to incur
enmity or trouble or expense; #a. Preoccupation.# or through
indifference, indolence, or incompetence, or through some preoccupation
or self-interest they are so absorbed that they suffer those to be
neglected whom it is their duty to protect. And so there is reason to
fear that what Plato declares of the philosophers may be inadequate,
when he says that they are just because they are busied with the pursuit
of truth and because they despise and count as naught that which most
men eagerly seek and for which they are prone to do battle against each
other to the death. For they secure one sort of justice, to be sure, in
that they do no positive wrong to anyone, but they fall into the
opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave
to their fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks,
they will not even assume their civic duties except under compulsion.
But in fact it were better that they should assume them of their own
accord; for an action intrinsically right is just only on condition that
it is voluntary.

#b. Self-interest.#

*29* There are some also who, either from zeal in attending to their own
business or through some sort of aversion to their fellow-men, claim
that they are occupied solely with their own affairs, without seeming to
themselves to be doing anyone any injury. But while they steer clear of
the one kind of injustice, they fall into the other: they are traitors
to social life, for they contribute to it none of their interest, none
of their effort, none of their means.

#Rules of duty required by Justice.#

Now since we have set forth the two kinds of injustice and assigned the
motives that lead to each, and since we have previously established the
principles by which justice is constituted, we shall be in a position
easily to decide what our duty on each occasion is, unless we are
extremely self-centred; *30* for indeed it is not an easy matter to be
really concerned with other people's affairs; and yet in Terence's play,
we know, Chremes "thinks that nothing that concerns man is foreign to
him." Nevertheless, when things turn out for our own good or ill, we
realize it more fully and feel it more deeply than when the same things
happen to others and we see them only, as it were, in the far distance;
and for this reason we judge their case differently from our own. It is,
therefore, an excellent rule that they give who bid us not to do a
thing, when there is a doubt whether it be right or wrong; for
righteousness shines with a brilliance of its own, but doubt is a sign
that we are thinking of a possible wrong.


*31* X. Sed incidunt saepe tempora, cum ea, quae maxime videntur digna
esse iusto homine eoque, quem virum bonum dicimus, commutantur fiuntque
contraria, ut reddere depositum, facere promissum; quaeque pertinent ad
veritatem et ad fidem, ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum.
#Ch. VII# Referri enim decet ad ea, quae posui principio, fundamenta
iustitiae, primum ut ne cui noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati
serviatur. Ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper
est idem. *32* Potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum, ut
id effici sit inutile vel ei, cui promissum sit, vel ei, qui promiserit.
#e.g. Eur. Hipp. 1315-1319# Nam si, ut in fabulis est, Neptunus, quod
Theseo promiserat, non fecisset, Theseus Hippolyto filio non esset
orbatus; ex tribus enim optatis, ut scribitur, hoc erat tertium, quod de
Hippolyti interitu iratus optavit; quo impetrato in maximos luctus
incidit. Nec promissa igitur servanda sunt ea, quae sint iis, quibus
promiseris, inutilia, nec, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint,
cui[29] promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori; ut, si
constitueris cuipiam te advocatum in rem praesentem esse venturum atque
interim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non
facere, quod dixeris, magisque ille, cui promissum sit, ab officio
discedat, si se destitutum queratur. Iam illis promissis standum non
esse quis non videt, quae coactus quis metu, quae deceptus dolo
promiserit? quae quidem pleraque iure praetorio liberantur, non nulla
legibus.

*33* Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida,
sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud "Summum ius summa
iniuria" factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium. Quo in genere etiam
in re publica multa peccantur, ut ille, qui, cum triginta dierum essent
cum hoste indutiae factae, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent
pactae, non noctium indutiae. Ne noster quidem probandus, si verum est
Q. Fabium Labeonem seu quem alium (nihil enim habeo praeter auditum)
arbitrum Nolanis et Neapolitanis de finibus a senatu datum, cum ad locum
venisset, cum utrisque separatim locutum, ne cupide quid agerent, ne
appetenter, atque ut regredi quam progredi mallent. Id cum utrique
fecissent, aliquantum agri in medio relictum est. Itaque illorum finis
sic, ut ipsi dixerant, terminavit; in medio relictum quod erat, populo
Romano adiudicavit. Decipere hoc quidem est, non iudicare. Quocirca in
omni est re fugienda talis sollertia.

    [29] _cui_ B a, Edd.; _cui quod_ H b; _cui quid_ A c.


#Change of duty in change of circumstances.#

*31* X. But occasions often arise, when those duties which seem most
becoming to the just man and to the "good man," as we call him, undergo
a change and take on a contrary aspect. It may, for example, not be a
duty to restore a trust or to fulfil a promise, and it may become right
and proper sometimes to evade and not to observe what truth and honour
would usually demand. For we may well be guided by those fundamental
principles of justice which I laid down at the outset: first, that no
harm be done to anyone; second, that the common interests be conserved.
When these are modified under changed circumstances, moral duty also
undergoes a change, and it does not always remain the same. *32*
#Non-fulfilment of promises.# For a given promise or agreement may turn
out in such a way that its performance will prove detrimental either to
the one to whom the promise has been made or to the one who has made it.
If, for example, Neptune, in the drama, had not carried out his promise
to Theseus, Theseus would not have lost his son Hippolytus; for, as the
story runs, of the three wishes[F] that Neptune had promised to grant
him the third was this: in a fit of anger he prayed for the death of
Hippolytus, and the granting of this prayer plunged him into unspeakable
grief. Promises are, therefore, not to be kept, if the keeping of them
is to prove harmful to those to whom you have made them; and, if the
fulfilment of a promise should do more harm to you than good to him to
whom you have made it, it is no violation of moral duty to give the
greater good precedence over the lesser good. For example, if you have
made an appointment with anyone to appear as his advocate in court, and
if in the meantime your son should fall dangerously ill, it would be no
breach of your moral duty to fail in what you agreed to do; nay, rather,
he to whom your promise was given would have a false conception of duty,
if he should complain that he had been deserted in his time of need.
Further than this, who fails to see that those promises are not binding
which are extorted by intimidation or which we make when misled by
false pretences? Such obligations are annulled in most cases by the
praetor's edict in equity,[G] in some cases by the laws.

#Chicanery.#

*33* Injustice often arises also through chicanery, that is, through an
over-subtle and even fraudulent construction of the law. This it is that
gave rise to the now familiar saw, "More law, less justice." Through
such interpretation also a great deal of wrong is committed in
transactions between state and state; thus, when a truce had been made
with the enemy for thirty days, a famous general[H] went to ravaging
their fields by night, because, he said, the truce stipulated "days,"
not nights. Not even our own countryman's action is to be commended, if
what is told of Quintus Fabius Labeo is true--or whoever it was (for I
have no authority but hearsay): appointed by the Senate to arbitrate a
boundary dispute between Nola and Naples, he took up the case and
interviewed both parties separately, asking them not to proceed in a
covetous or grasping spirit, but to make some concession rather than
claim some accession. When each party had agreed to this, there was a
considerable strip of territory left between them. And so he set the
boundary of each city as each had severally agreed; and the tract in
between he awarded to the Roman People. Now that is swindling, not
arbitration. And therefore such sharp practice is under all
circumstances to be avoided.

    [F] The three wishes were: (1) safe return from Hades; (2)
    escape from the Labyrinth; (3) the death of Hippolytus.

    [G] Each praetor, at his inauguration, announced publicly the
    principles and policies that should guide him in the
    administration of his office. These were the source of the
    _Ius Praetorium_, which explained and supplemented the common
    law (_Ius Civile_) and even modified its ancient rigour so as
    to conform with a more advanced public sentiment, and form a
    most valuable part of the body of Roman Law.

    [H] This story is told of Cleomenes, King of Sparta (520-491
    B.C.), in the war with Argos. (Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. 223
    A.)


XI. Sunt autem quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda, a quibus
iniuriam acceperis. Est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus; atque haud
scio an satis sit eum, qui lacessierit, iniuriae suae paenitere, ut et
ipse ne quid tale posthac et ceteri sint ad iniuriam tardiores.

*34* Atque in re publica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli. Nam cum
sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim,
cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad
posterius, si uti non licet superiore. *35* Quare suscipienda quidem
bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur, parta autem
victoria conservandi ii, qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt,
ut maiores nostri Tusculanos, Aequos, Volscos, Sabinos, Hernicos in
civitatem etiam acceperunt, at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus
sustulerunt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem
loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bellum faciendum locus ipse
adhortari. Mea quidem sententia paci, quae nihil habitura sit
insidiarum, semper est consulendum. In quo si mihi esset optemperatum,
si non optimam, at aliquam rem publicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus.

Et cum iis, quos vi deviceris, consulendum est, tum ii, qui armis
positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries
percusserit, recipiendi. In quo tantopere apud nostros iustitia culta
est, ut ii, qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem
recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.

*36* Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure
perscripta est. Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi
quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum.
[Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam, in cuius exercitu Catonis filius
tiro militabat. Cum autem Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem,
Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum
amore pugnandi in exercitu remansisset, Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut,
si eum patitur[30] in exercitu remanere, secundo eum obliget militiae
sacramento, quia priore amisso iure cum hostibus pugnare non poterat.
*37* Adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo.][31] M. quidem Catonis
senis est epistula ad M. filium, in qua scribit se audisse eum missum
factum esse a consule, cum in Macedonia bello Persico miles esset. Monet
igitur, ut caveat, ne proelium ineat; negat enim ius esse, qui miles non
sit, cum hoste pugnare.

    [30] _patitur_ A B H a b; _patiatur_ c.

    [31] _Popilius ... movendo_ bracketed by Madvig, Edd.;
    _Popilius ... poterat_ bracketed by Unger.


#Our duty to those who have wronged us.#

XI. Again, there are certain duties that we owe even to those who have
wronged us. For there is a limit to retribution and to punishment; or
rather, I am inclined to think, it is sufficient that the aggressor
should be brought to repent of his wrong-doing, in order that he may
not repeat the offence and that others may be deterred from doing wrong.

*34* Then, too, in the case of a state in its external relations, the
rights of war must be strictly observed. For since there are two ways of
settling a dispute: first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and
since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we
must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of
discussion. *35* #Excuse for war.# The only excuse, therefore, for going
to war is that we may live in peace unharmed; and when the victory is
won, we should spare those who have not been blood-thirsty and barbarous
in their warfare. #Justice toward the vanquished.# For instance, our
forefathers actually admitted to full rights of citizenship the
Tusculans, Aequians, Volscians, Sabines, and Hernicians, but they razed
Carthage and Numantia to the ground. I wish they had not destroyed
Corinth; but I believe they had some special reason for what they
did--its convenient situation, probably--and feared that its very
location might some day furnish a temptation to renew the war. In my
opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall
not admit of guile. And if my advice had been heeded on this point, we
should still have at least some sort of constitutional government, if
not the best in the world, whereas, as it is, we have none at all.

Not only must we show consideration for those whom we have conquered by
force of arms but we must also ensure protection to those who lay down
their arms and throw themselves upon the mercy of our generals, even
though the battering-ram has hammered at their walls. And among our
countrymen justice has been observed so conscientiously in this
direction, that those who have given promise of protection to states or
nations subdued in war become, after the custom of our forefathers, the
patrons of those states.

#The humanity of Rome's laws of war.#

*36* As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code
of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; and from this
it may be gathered that no war is just, unless it is entered upon after
an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has
been given and a formal declaration made. Popilius was general in
command of a province. In his army Cato's son was serving on his first
campaign. When Popilius decided to disband one of his legions, he
discharged also young Cato who was serving in that same legion. But when
the young man out of love for the service stayed on in the field, his
father wrote to Popilius to say that if he let him stay in the army, he
should swear him into service with a new oath of allegiance, for in view
of the voidance of his former oath he could not legally fight the foe.
So extremely scrupulous was the observance of the laws in regard to the
conduct of war. *37* There is extant, too, a letter of the elder Marcus
Cato to his son Marcus, in which he writes that he has heard that the
youth has been discharged by the consul,[I] when he was serving in
Macedonia in the war with Perseus. He warns him, therefore, to be
careful not to go into battle; for, he says, the man who is not legally
a soldier has no right to be fighting the foe.

    [I] Lucius Aemilius Paulus (B.C. 168).


XII. Equidem etiam illud animadverto, quod, qui proprio nomine
perduellis esset, is hostis vocaretur, lenitate verbi rei tristitiam
mitigatam. Hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur, quem nunc
peregrinum dicimus. Indicant duodecim tabulae: AUT STATUS DIES CUM
HOSTE, itemque: ADVERSUS HOSTEM AETERNA AUCTORITAS. Quid ad hanc
mansuetudinem addi potest, eum, quicum bellum geras, tam molli nomine
appellare? Quamquam id nomen durius effecit[32] iam vetustas; a
peregrino enim recessit et proprie in eo, qui arma contra ferret,
remansit.

*38* Cum vero de imperio decertatur belloque quaeritur gloria, causas
omnino subesse tamen oportet easdem, quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas
esse bellorum. Sed ea bella, quibus imperii proposita gloria est, minus
acerbe gerenda sunt. Ut enim cum civi aliter contendimus, si[33] est
inimicus, aliter, si competitor (cum altero certamen honoris et
dignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famae), sic cum Celtiberis, cum
Cimbris bellum ut cum inimicis gerebatur, uter esset, non uter
imperaret, cum Latinis, Sabinis, Samnitibus, Poenis, Pyrrho de imperio
dimicabatur. Poeni foedifragi, crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores.
Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis illa praeclara:

#Ennius, Ann. VI, Vahlen^2, xii, 194-201#

    Nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederitis,
    Nec[34] cauponantes bellum, sed belligerantes
    Ferro, non auro vitam cernamus utrique.
    Vosne velit an me regnare era, quidve ferat Fors,
    Virtute experiamur. Et hoc simul accipe dictum:
    Quorum virtuti[35] belli fortuna pepercit,
    Eorundem libertati me parcere certum est.
    Dono, ducite, doque volentibus cum magnis dis.

Regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sententia.

    [32] _effecit_ Edd.; _efficit_ MSS.

    [33] _cum cive_ [Edd.: _civi_] _aliter contendimus si_ L,
    Anemoecius, Edd.; _cum civiliter contendimus aliter si_ A B H
    a b c.

    [34] _Nec_ A B H b c; _Non_ L p, Bt., Heine.

    [35] _virtuti_ A B^2 L c, Edd.; _virtute_ B^1 H b; _virtutei_
    Vahlen.


XII. This also I observe--that he who would properly have been called "a
fighting enemy" (_perduellis_) was called "a guest" (_hostis_), thus
relieving the ugliness of the fact by a softened expression; for "enemy"
(_hostis_) meant to our ancestors what we now call "stranger"
(_peregrinus_). This is proved by the usage in the Twelve Tables: "Or a
day fixed for trial with a stranger" (_hostis_). And again: "Right of
ownership is inalienable for ever in dealings with a stranger"
(_hostis_). What can exceed such charity, when he with whom one is at
war is called by so gentle a name? And yet long lapse of time has given
that word a harsher meaning: for it has lost its signification of
"stranger" and has taken on the technical connotation of "an enemy under
arms."

#Justice in war.#

*38* But when a war is fought out for supremacy and when glory is the
object of war, it must still not fail to start from the same motives
which I said a moment ago were the only righteous grounds for going to
war. But those wars which have glory for their end must be carried on
with less bitterness. For we contend, for example, with a fellow-citizen
in one way, if he is a personal enemy, in another, if he is a rival:
with the rival it is a struggle for office and position, with the enemy
for life and honour. So with the Celtiberians and the Cimbrians we
fought as with deadly enemies, not to determine which should be supreme,
but which should survive; but with the Latins, Sabines, Samnites,
Carthaginians, and Pyrrhus we fought for supremacy. The Carthaginians
violated treaties; Hannibal was cruel; the others were more merciful.
From Pyrrhus we have this famous speech on the exchange of prisoners:

    "Gold will I none, nor price shall ye give; for I ask none;
    Come, let us not be chaff'rers of war, but warriors embattled.
    Nay; let us venture our lives, and the sword, not gold, weigh the
      outcome.
    Make we the trial by valour in arms and see if Dame Fortune
    Wills it that ye shall prevail or I, or what be her judgment.
    Hear thou, too, this word, good Fabricius: whose valour soever
    Spared hath been by the fortune of war--their freedom I grant them.
    Such my resolve. I give and present them to you, my brave Romans;
    Take them back to their homes; the great gods' blessings attend
      you."

A right kingly sentiment this and worthy a scion of the Aeacidae.


*39* XIII. Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti
promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda, ut primo Punico bello
Regulus captus a Poenis cum de captivis commutandis Romam missus esset
iurassetque se rediturum, primum, ut venit, captivos reddendos in senatu
non censuit, deinde, cum retineretur a propinquis et ab amicis, ad
supplicium redire maluit quam fidem hosti datam fallere.

*40* [Secundo autem Punico bello post Cannensem pugnam quos decem
Hannibal Romam astrictos misit iure iurando se redituros esse, nisi de
redimendis iis, qui capti erant, impetrassent, eos omnes censores, quoad
quisque eorum vixit, qui peierassent, in aerariis reliquerunt nec minus
illum, qui iuris iurandi fraude culpam invenerat. Cum enim Hannibalis
permissu exisset de castris, rediit paulo post, quod se oblitum nescio
quid diceret; deinde egressus e castris iure iurando se solutum putabat,
et erat verbis, re non erat. Semper autem in fide quid senseris, non
quid dixeris, cogitandum.

Maximum autem exemplum est iustitiae in hostem a maioribus nostris
constitutum, cum a Pyrrho perfuga senatui est pollicitus se venenum regi
daturum et eum necaturum, senatus et C. Fabricius perfugam Pyrrho
dedidit. Ita ne hostis quidem et potentis et bellum ultro inferentis
interitum cum scelere approbavit.][36]

*41* Ac de bellicis quidem officiis satis dictum est.

Meminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iustitiam esse servandam. Est
autem infima condicio et fortuna servorum, quibus non male praecipiunt
qui ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda.

Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus
quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed
fraus odio digna maiore. Totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam
eorum, qui tum, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse
videantur.

De iustitia satis dictum.

    [36] _Secundo ... re non erat_ om. L c; _Secundo ...
    approbavit_ om. A B H a b p, Edd.


#Fidelity to a promise:#

*39* XIII. Again, if under stress of circumstances individuals have made
any promise to the enemy, they are bound to keep their word even then.
#(1) Regulus.# For instance, in the First Punic War, when Regulus was
taken prisoner by the Carthaginians, he was sent to Rome on parole to
negotiate an exchange of prisoners; he came and, in the first place, it
was he that made the motion in the senate that the prisoners should not
be restored; and in the second place, when his relatives and friends
would have kept him back, he chose to return to a death by torture
rather than prove false to his promise, though given to an enemy.

#(2) Hannibal's envoys.#

*40* And again in the Second Punic War, after the Battle of Cannae,
Hannibal sent to Rome ten Roman captives bound by an oath to return to
him, if they did not succeed in ransoming his prisoners; and as long as
any one of them lived, the censors kept them all degraded and
disfranchised, because they were guilty of perjury in not returning.
And they punished in like manner the one who had incurred guilt by an
evasion of his oath: with Hannibal's permission this man left the camp
and returned a little later on the pretext that he had forgotten
something or other; and then, when he left the camp the second time, he
claimed that he was released from the obligation of his oath; and so he
was, according to the letter of it, but not according to the spirit. In
the matter of a promise one must always consider the meaning and not the
mere words.

Our forefathers have given us another striking example of justice toward
an enemy: when a deserter from Pyrrhus promised the senate to administer
poison to the king and thus work his death, the senate and Gaius
Fabricius delivered the deserter up to Pyrrhus. Thus they stamped with
their disapproval the treacherous murder even of an enemy who was at
once powerful, unprovoked, aggressive, and successful.

*41* With this I will close my discussion of the duties connected with
war.

#Justice toward slaves.#

But let us remember that we must have regard for justice even towards
the humblest. Now the humblest station and the poorest fortune are those
of slaves; and they give us no bad rule who bid us treat our slaves as
we should our employees: they must be required to work; they must be
given their dues.

#Injustice of hypocrisy.#

While wrong may be done, then, in either of two ways, that is, by force
or by fraud, both are bestial: fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox,
force to the lion; both are wholly unworthy of man, but fraud is the
more contemptible. But of all forms of injustice, none is more flagrant
than that of the hypocrite who, at the very moment when he is most
false, makes it his business to appear virtuous.

This must conclude our discussion of justice.


#Ch. VII#

*42* XIV. Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de beneficentia ac de
liberalitate dicatur, qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis
accommodatius, sed habet multas cautiones. Videndum est enim, primum ne
obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, et
ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit quam facultates, tum ut pro
dignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam
haec referenda sunt omnia. Nam et qui gratificantur cuipiam, quod obsit
illi, cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberales, sed
perniciosi assentatores iudicandi sunt, et qui aliis nocent, ut in alios
liberales sint, in eadem sunt iniustitia, ut si in suam rem aliena
convertant.

*43* Sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui
eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, iique arbitrantur se beneficos in
suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem
tantum abest ab[37] officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse
contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur, quae prosit
amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum
translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil
est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum.

*44* Alter locus erat cautionis, ne benignitas maior esset quam
facultates, quod, qui benigniores volunt esse, quam res patitur, primum
in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his[38]
et suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos.
Inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas plerumque rapiendi et
auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae. Videre etiam
licet plerosque non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria ductos, ut
benefici videantur, facere multa, quae proficisci ab ostentatione magis
quam a voluntate videantur. Talis autem simulatio vanitati est
coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati.

*45* Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset
dignitatis; in quo et mores eius erunt spectandi in quem beneficium
conferetur, et animus erga nos et communitas ac societas vitae et ad
nostras utilitates officia ante collata; quae ut concurrant omnia,
optabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt.

    [37] _ab_ c, Edd.; not in A B H L b.

    [38] _his_ H a, Edd.; _iis_ A B b; _eis_ L c.


#Justice and generosity.#

*42* XIV. Next in order, as outlined above, let us speak of kindness and
generosity. Nothing appeals more to the best in human nature than this,
but it calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars: we must,
in the first place, see to it that our act of kindness shall not prove
an injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the
second place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, that
it shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient; for this is
the corner-stone of justice; and by the standard of justice all acts of
kindness must be measured. For those who confer a harmful favour upon
some one whom they seemingly wish to help are to be accounted not
generous benefactors but dangerous sycophants; and likewise those who
injure one man, in order to be generous to another, are guilty of the
same injustice as if they diverted to their own accounts the property of
their neighbours.

#Generosity must be#

#(1) hurtful to no one,#

*43* Now, there are many--and especially those who are ambitious for
eminence and glory--who rob one to enrich another; and they expect to be
thought generous towards their friends, if they put them in the way of
getting rich, no matter by what means. Such conduct, however, is so
remote from moral duty that nothing can be more completely opposed to
duty. We must, therefore, take care to indulge only in such liberality
as will help our friends and hurt no one. The conveyance of property by
Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to the hands of
strangers should, for that reason, not be regarded as generosity; for
nothing is generous, if it is not at the same time just.

#(2) within our means,#

*44* The second point for the exercise of caution was that our
beneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish to be more
open-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty of two faults:
first, they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to
strangers property which would more justly be placed at their service or
bequeathed to them. And second, such generosity too often engenders a
passion for plundering and misappropriating property, in order to supply
the means for making large gifts. We may also observe that a great many
people do many things that seem to be inspired more by a spirit of
ostentation than by heart-felt kindness; for such people are not really
generous but are rather influenced by a sort of ambition to make a show
of being open-handed. Such a pose is nearer akin to hypocrisy than to
generosity or moral goodness.

#(3) according to merit.#

*45* The third rule laid down was that in acts of kindness we should
weigh with discrimination the worthiness of the object of our
benevolence; we should take into consideration his moral character, his
attitude toward us, the intimacy of his relations to us, and our common
social ties, as well as the services he has hitherto rendered in our
interest. It is to be desired that all these considerations should be
combined in the same person; if they are not, then the more numerous and
the more important considerations must have the greater weight.


*46* XV. Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque
sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra
virtutis, etiam hoc intellegendum puto, neminem omnino esse neglegendum,
in quo aliqua significatio virtutis appareat, colendum autem esse ita
quemque maxime, ut quisque maxime virtutibus his lenioribus erit
ornatus, modestia, temperantia, hac ipsa, de qua multa iam dicta sunt,
iustitia. Nam fortis animus et magnus in homine non perfecto nec
sapiente[39] ferventior plerumque est, illae virtutes bonum virum
videntur potius attingere.

Atque haec in moribus.

*47* De benivolentia autem, quam quisque habeat erga nos, primum illud
est in officio, ut ei plurimum tribuamus, a quo plurimum diligamur,[40]
sed benivolentiam non adulescentulorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed
stabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus. Sin erunt merita, ut non
ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia, maior quaedam cura adhibenda est;
nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium est.

#Op. 349-351#

*48* Quodsi ea, quae utenda acceperis, maiore mensura, si modo possis,
iubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus? an
imitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt quam acceperunt? Etenim
si in eos, quos speramus nobis profuturos, non dubitamus officia
conferre, quales in eos esse debemus, qui iam profuerunt? Nam cum duo
genera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi, demus
necne, in nostra potestate est, non reddere viro bono non licet,
modo[41] id facere possit sine iniuria.

*49* Acceptorum autem beneficiorum sunt dilectus habendi, nec dubium,
quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur. In quo tamen in primis, quo
quisque animo, studio, benivolentia facerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim
faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio vel morbo in omnes vel
repentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; quae beneficia aeque
magna non sunt habenda atque ea, quae iudicio, considerate constanterque
delata sunt.

Sed in collocando beneficio et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria
sunt, hoc maxime officii est, ut quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei
potissimum opitulari; quod contra fit a plerisque; a quo enim plurimum
sperant,[42] etiamsi ille iis non eget, tamen ei potissimum inserviunt.

    [39] _sapiente_ MSS.; _sapienti_ Wesenberg, Bt.

    [40] _diligamur_ A B^2 H L b c; _diligimur_ B^1, Bt^1.

    [41] _modo_ A H L b c; _si modo_ B.

    [42] _sperant_ Marg. A, Edd.; _spectant_ A b (_spernant_
    Marg. b).


*46* XV. Now, the men we live with are not perfect and ideally wise,
but men who do very well, if there be found in them but the semblance of
virtue. I therefore think that this is to be taken for granted, that no
one should be entirely neglected who shows any trace of virtue; but
the more a man is endowed with these finer virtues--temperance,
self-control, and that very justice about which so much has already been
said--the more he deserves to be favoured. I do not mention fortitude,
for a courageous spirit in a man who has not attained perfection and
ideal wisdom is generally too impetuous; it is those other virtues that
seem more particularly to mark the good man.

So much in regard to the character of the object of our beneficence.

#Motives to generosity:#

#(1) love,#

*47* But as to the affection which anyone may have for us, it is the
first demand of duty that we do most for him who loves us most; but we
should measure affection, not like youngsters, by the ardour of its
passion, but rather by its strength and constancy. #(2) requital,# But
if there shall be obligations already incurred, so that kindness is not
to begin with us, but to be requited, still greater diligence, it seems,
is called for; for no duty is more imperative than that of proving one's
gratitude.

*48* But if, as Hesiod bids, one is to repay with interest, if possible,
what one has borrowed in time of need, what, pray, ought we to do when
challenged by an unsought kindness? Shall we not imitate the fruitful
fields, which return more than they receive? For if we do not hesitate
to confer favours upon those who we hope will be of help to us, how
ought we to deal with those who have already helped us? For generosity
is of two kinds: doing a kindness and requiting one. Whether we do the
kindness or not is optional; but to fail to requite one is not allowable
to a good man, provided he can make the requital without violating the
rights of others.

*49* Furthermore, we must make some discrimination between favours
received; for, as a matter of course, the greater the favour, the
greater is the obligation. But in deciding this we must above all give
due weight to the spirit, the devotion, the affection, that prompted the
favour. For many people often do favours impulsively for everybody
without discrimination, prompted by a morbid sort of benevolence or by a
sudden impulse of the heart, shifting as the wind. Such acts of
generosity are not to be so highly esteemed as those which are performed
with judgment, deliberation, and mature consideration.

But in bestowing a kindness, as well as in making a requital, the first
rule of duty requires us--other things being equal--to lend assistance
preferably to people in proportion to their individual need. #(3)
self-interest,# Most people adopt the contrary course: they put
themselves most eagerly at the service of the one from whom they hope to
receive the greatest favours, even though he has no need of their help.


*50* XVI. Optime autem societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur, si, ut
quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum
conferetur.

Sed, quae naturae principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae,
repetendum videtur altius; est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi
generis humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae
docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter
se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate; neque ulla re longius
absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus,
ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam, aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus;
sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.

*51* Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter
omnes societas haec est; in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum
usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut, quae discripta[43] sunt
legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum legibus
ipsis,[44] cetera sic observentur, ut in Graecorum proverbio est,
amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnium[45] autem communia hominum videntur
ea, quae sunt generis eius, quod ab Ennio positum in una re transferri
in permultas potest:

#(Telephus?) Vahlen^2, Fab. Inc. 398#

    Homó, qui erranti cómiter monstrát viam,
    Quasi lúmen de suo lúmine accendát, facit.
    Nihiló minus ipsi lúcet,[46] cum illi accénderit.

Una ex re satis praecipit, ut, quicquid sine detrimento commodari
possit, id tribuatur vel ignoto; *52* ex quo sunt illa communia: non
prohibere aqua profluente, pati ab igne ignem capere, si qui velit,
consilium fidele deliberanti dare, quae sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt,
danti non molesta. Quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad
communem utilitatem afferendum. Sed quoniam copiae parvae singulorum
sunt, eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita est multitudo, vulgaris
liberalitas referenda est ad illum Ennii finem: "Nihilo minus ipsi
lucet," ut facultas sit, qua in nostros simus liberales.

    [43] _discripta_ H b, Edd.; _descripta_ A B L a c.

    [44] _legibus ipsis_ Gulielmus, Edd.; _e_ (_ex_ c) _quibus
    ipsis_ MSS.

    [45] _Omnium_ Zumpt, Edd.; _omnia_ MSS.

    [46] _ipsi lucet_ Edd.; _ipsi luceat_ A B H b c; _ipsi ut
    luceat_ a.


#(4) relationship.#

*50* XVI. The interests of society, however, and its common bonds will
be best conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion
to the closeness of his relationship.

#The principles of human society.#

But it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles
of fellowship and society that nature has established among men. The
first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting
between all the members of the human race; and that bond of connection
is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning,
of communicating, discussing, and reasoning associate men together and
unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are
we farther removed from the nature of beasts; for we admit that they may
have courage (horses and lions, for example); but we do not admit that
they have justice, equity, and goodness; for they are not endowed with
reason or speech.

*51* This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men
as men and all to all; and under it the common right to all things that
nature has produced for the common use of man is to be maintained, with
the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by
the statutes and by civil law shall be so held as prescribed by those
same laws, everything else shall be regarded in the light indicated by
the Greek proverb: "Amongst friends all things in common."[J]
Furthermore, we find the common property of all men in things of the
sort defined by Ennius; and though restricted by him to one instance,
the principle may be applied very generally:

    "Who kindly sets a wand'rer on his way
    Does e'en as if he lit another's lamp by his:
    No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit."

In this example he effectively teaches us all to bestow even upon a
stranger what it costs us nothing to give. *52* On this principle we
have the following maxims:

"Deny no one the water that flows by;" "Let anyone who will take fire
from our fire;" "Honest counsel give to one who is in doubt;"

for such acts are useful to the recipient and cause the giver no loss.
We should, therefore, adopt these principles and always be contributing
something to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are
limited and the number of the needy is infinite, this spirit of
universal liberality must be regulated according to that test of
Ennius--"No less shines his"--in order that we may continue to have the
means for being generous to our friends.

    [J] κοινὰ τὰ (τῶν) φίλων (Plato, Phaedr. 279 C; Aristotle,
    Eth. VIII, 11).


*53* XVII. Gradus autem plures sunt societatis hominum. Ut enim ab illa
infinita discedatur, propior[47] est eiusdem gentis, nationis, linguae,
qua maxime homines coniunguntur; interius etiam est eiusdem esse
civitatis; multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia, forum, fana,
porticus, viae, leges, iura, iudicia, suffragia, consuetudines praeterea
et familiaritates multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae.

Artior vero colligatio est societatis propinquorum; ab illa enim immensa
societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur. *54* Nam
cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi,
prima societas in ipso coniugio est, proxima in liberis, deinde una
domus, communia omnia; id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium
rei publicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum
sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos
tamquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur conubia et affinitates, ex quibus
etiam plures propinqui; quae propagatio et suboles origo est rerum
publicarum. Sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines
_et_[48] caritate; *55* magnum est enim eadem habere monumenta maiorum,
eisdem uti sacris, sepulcra habere communia.

Sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior, quam cum
viri boni moribus similes sunt familiaritate coniuncti; illud enim
honestum, quod saepe dicimus, etiam si in alio cernimus, [tamen][49] nos
movet atque illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit. *56* Et
quamquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit facitque, ut eos diligamus, in
quibus ipsa inesse videatur, tamen iustitia et liberalitas id maxime
efficit. Nihil autem est amabilius nec copulatius quam morum similitudo
bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt, eaedem voluntates, in iis fit
ut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso, efficiturque id, quod
Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut[50] unus fiat ex pluribus.

Magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et
citro datis acceptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea
sunt, firma devinciuntur societate.

*57* Sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla
est gravior, nulla carior quam ea, quae cum re publica est uni cuique
nostrum. Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiares, sed
omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est, pro qua quis bonus
dubitet mortem oppetere, si ei sit profuturus? Quo est detestabilior
istorum immanitas, qui lacerarunt omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus
delenda occupati et sunt et fuerunt.

*58* Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat, quibus plurimum
tribuendum sit officii, principes sint patria et parentes, quorum
beneficiis maximis obligati sumus, proximi liberi totaque domus, quae
spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium, deinceps
bene convenientes propinqui, quibuscum communis etiam fortuna plerumque
est.

Quam ob rem necessaria praesidia vitae debentur iis maxime, quos ante
dixi, vita autem victusque communis, consilia, sermones, cohortationes,
consolationes, interdum etiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime,
estque ea iucundissima amicitia, quam similitudo morum coniugavit.

    [47] _propior_ A a c (ex corr.), Edd.; _proprior_ B H b.

    [48] _et_ Perizonius, Edd.; not in MSS.

    [49] _tamen_ MSS., Müller; del. Unger, Bt., Heine.

    [50] _efficiturque id quod P. ultimum in amicitia putavit ut_
    Nonius (s.v. ultimum) (i.e. Pythagoras's ideal of friendship
    is realized).


#Degrees of social relationship:#

#(1) citizenship,#

*53* XVII. Then, too, there are a great many degrees of closeness or
remoteness in human society. To proceed beyond the universal bond of our
common humanity, there is the closer one of belonging to the same
people, tribe, and tongue, by which men are very closely bound together;
it is a still closer relation to be citizens of the same city-state; for
fellow-citizens have much in common--forum, temples, colonnades,
streets, statutes, laws, courts, rights of suffrage, to say nothing of
social and friendly circles and diverse business relations with many.

#(2) kinship,#

But a still closer social union exists between kindred. Starting with
that infinite bond of union of the human race in general, the conception
is now confined to a small and narrow circle. *54* For since the
reproductive instinct is by nature's gift the common possession of all
living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and
wife; the next, that between parents and children; then we find one
home, with everything in common. And this is the foundation of civil
government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. Then follow the bonds
between brothers and sisters, and next those of first and then of second
cousins; and when they can no longer be sheltered under one roof, they
go out into other homes, as into colonies. Then follow between these,
in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these again a
new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth
states have their beginnings. The bonds of common blood hold men fast
through good-will and affection; *55* for it means much to share in
common the same family traditions, the same forms of domestic worship,
and the same ancestral tombs.

#(3) friendship,#

But of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none more noble, none more
powerful than when good men of congenial character are joined in
intimate friendship; for really, if we discover in another that moral
goodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts us and makes us friends
to the one in whose character it seems to dwell. *56* And while every
virtue attracts us and makes us love those who seem to possess it, still
justice and generosity do so most of all. Nothing, moreover, is more
conducive to love and intimacy than compatibility of character in good
men; for when two people have the same ideals and the same tastes, it is
a natural consequence that each loves the other as himself; and the
result is, as Pythagoras requires of ideal friendship, that several are
united in one.

Another strong bond of fellowship is effected by mutual interchange of
kind services; and as long as these kindnesses are mutual and
acceptable, those between whom they are interchanged are united by the
ties of an enduring intimacy.

#(4) love of country.#

*57* But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field,
there is no social relation among them all more close, none more dear
than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are
dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; but one native land
embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his
life for her, if by his death he could render her a service? So much the
more execrable are those monsters who have torn their fatherland to
pieces with every form of outrage and who are[K] and have been[L]
engaged in compassing her utter destruction.

*58* Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where
most of our moral obligation is due, country would come first, and
parents; for their services have laid us under the heaviest obligation;
next come children and the whole family, who look to us alone for
support and can have no other protection; finally, our kinsmen, with
whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our lot is
one.

All needful material assistance is, therefore, due first of all to those
whom I have named; but intimate relationship of life and living,
counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even
reproof flourish best in friendships. And that friendship is sweetest
which is cemented by congeniality of character.

    [K] Antony and his associates.

    [L] Caesar, Clodius, Catiline.


*59* XVIII. Sed in his omnibus officiis tribuendis videndum erit, quid
cuique maxime necesse sit, et quid quisque vel sine nobis aut possit
consequi aut non possit. Ita non iidem erunt necessitudinum gradus, qui
temporum; suntque officia, quae aliis magis quam aliis debeantur; ut
vicinum citius adiuveris in fructibus percipiendis quam aut fratrem aut
familiarem, at, si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius et amicum quam
vicinum defenderis. Haec igitur et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni
officio [et consuetudo exercitatioque capienda],[51] ut boni
ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus et addendo deducendoque[52]
videre, quae reliqui summa fiat, ex quo, quantum cuique debeatur,
intellegas.

*60* Sed ut nec medici nec imperatores nec oratores, quamvis artis
praecepta perceperint, quicquam magna laude dignum sine usu et
exercitatione consequi possunt, sic officii conservandi praecepta
traduntur illa quidem, ut facimus ipsi, sed rei magnitudo usum quoque
exercitationemque desiderat.

Atque ab iis[53] rebus, quae sunt in iure societatis humanae, quem ad
modum ducatur honestum, ex quo aptum est officium, satis fere diximus.

*61* Intelligendum autem est, cum proposita sint genera quattuor, e
quibus honestas officiumque manaret, splendidissimum videri, quod animo
magno elatoque humanasque res despiciente factum sit. Itaque in probris
maxime in promptu est si quid tale dici potest:

#Inc. inc. fab., Ribbeck^2, 210#

    "Vós enim,[54] iuvenes, ánimum geritis múliebrem, ílla" virgo
      "viri"[55]

et si quid eius modi:

#Enn. Aj., Vahlen^2, 18#

    Salmácida, spolia síne sudore et sánguine.

Contraque in laudibus, quae magno animo et fortiter excellenterque gesta
sunt, ea nescio quo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc rhetorum
campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis, Leuctris, hinc
noster Cocles,[56] hinc Decii, hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones, hinc M.
Marcellus, innumerabiles alii, maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi
magnitudine excellit. Declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod
statuas quoque videmus ornatu fere militari.

    [51] _et ... capienda_ om. Facciolati, Edd.

    [52] _deducendoque_ p; _ducendoque_ A B H L a b (superscr.
    sec. m. _demendo_); _demendoque_ c.

    [53] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.

    [54] _enim_ A B H b c; _etenim_ a.

    [55] _illa" virgo "viri"_ Ed.; _illa virgo viri_ MSS.;
    _virago_ Orelli.

    [56] _Leuctris, hinc noster Cocles_ Baldwin, Edd.; _leutris
    stercocles_ A B H a b; _leutrister chodes_ c; _leutris
    stercodes_ L.


#Duties may vary under varying circumstances.#

*59* XVIII. But in the performance of all these duties we shall have to
consider what is most needful in each individual case and what each
individual person can or cannot procure without our help. In this way we
shall find that the claims of social relationship, in its various
degrees, are not identical with the dictates of circumstances; for there
are obligations that are due to one individual rather than to another:
for example, one would sooner assist a neighbour in gathering his
harvest than either a brother or a friend; but should it be a case in
court, one would defend a kinsman and a friend rather than a neighbour.
Such questions as these must, therefore, be taken into consideration in
every act of moral duty [and we must acquire the habit and keep it up],
in order to become good calculators of duty, able by adding and
subtracting to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is
due to each individual.

*60* But as neither physicians nor generals nor orators can achieve any
signal success without experience and practice, no matter how well they
may understand the theory of their profession, so the rules for the
discharge of duty are formulated, it is true, as I am doing now, but a
matter of such importance requires experience also and practice.

This must close our discussion of the ways in which moral goodness, on
which duty depends, is developed from those principles which hold good
in human society.

#C. Fortitude.#

*61* We must realize, however, that while we have set down four cardinal
virtues from which as sources moral rectitude and moral duty emanate,
that achievement is most glorious in the eyes of the world which is won
with a spirit great, exalted, and superior to the vicissitudes of
earthly life. And so, when we wish to hurl a taunt, the very first to
rise to our lips is, if possible, something like this:

    "For ye, young men, show a womanish soul, yon maiden[M] a man's;"

and this:

    "Thou son of Salmacis, win spoils that cost nor sweat nor blood."

When, on the other hand, we wish to pay a compliment, we somehow or
other praise in more eloquent strain the brave and noble work of some
great soul. Hence there is an open field for orators on the subjects of
Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra, and hence our own
Cocles, the Decii, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio, Marcus Marcellus, and
countless others, and, above all, the Roman People as a nation are
celebrated for greatness of spirit. Their passion for military glory,
moreover, is shown in the fact that we see their statues usually in
soldier's garb.

    [M] Cloelia (see Index).


*62* XIX. Sed ea animi elatio, quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus,
si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi, sed pro suis
commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est
potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. Itaque probe definitur
a Stoicis fortitudo, cum eam virtutem esse dicunt propugnantem pro
aequitate. Quocirca nemo, qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est
insidiis et malitia, laudem est adeptus; nihil enim[57] honestum esse
potest, quod iustitia vacat.

#Menex. 246 E; Laches 197 B#

*63* Praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: "Non," inquit, "solum scientia,
quae est remota ab iustitia, calliditas potius quam sapientia est
appellanda, verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate,
non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat quam
fortitudinis." Itaque viros fortes et[58] magnanimos eosdem bonos et
simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt
ex media laude iustitiae.

*64* Sed illud odiosum est, quod in hac elatione et magnitudine animi
facillime pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur. #Laches
182 E# Ut enim apud Platonem est, omnem morem Lacedaemoniorum
inflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi, sic, ut quisque animi magnitudine
maxime excellet,[59] ita maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus
esse. Difficile autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, servare
aequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria. Ex quo fit, ut neque
disceptatione vinci se nec ullo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur,
existuntque in re publica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam
maximas consequantur et sint vi[60] potius superiores quam iustitia
pares. Sed quo difficilius, hoc praeclarius; nullum enim est tempus,
quod iustitia vacare debeat.

*65* Fortes igitur et magnanimi sunt habendi, non qui faciunt, sed qui
propulsant iniuriam. Vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum
illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria
iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri; etenim qui ex errore
imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus.
Facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo
est, gloriae cupiditate[61]; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix
invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi
mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.

    [57] _enim_ A C, Edd.; not in A B H L b, Bt^2.

    [58] _et_ a, Edd.; not in A B H L b c p.

    [59] _excellet_ A B H L b c; _excellit_ a, Bt.

    [60] _vi_ a, Edd.; _ut_ A B H b; _utcumque_ L c.

    [61] _altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate_ Pearce
    (confirmed by several MSS.), Edd.; _alt. an. et gloriae
    cupiditate_ A B H b p; _est alt. an. et gloria et cupiditate_
    L c.


#Fortitude in the light of justice.#

*62* XIX. But if the exaltation of spirit seen in times of danger and
toil is devoid of justice and fights for selfish ends instead of for the
common good, it is a vice; for not only has it no element of virtue, but
its nature is barbarous and revolting to all our finer feelings. The
Stoics, therefore, correctly define courage as "that virtue which
champions the cause of right." Accordingly, no one has attained to true
glory who has gained a reputation for courage by treachery and cunning;
for nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.

*63* This, then, is a fine saying of Plato's: "Not only must all
knowledge that is divorced from justice be called cunning rather than
wisdom," he says, "but even the courage that is prompt to face danger,
if it is inspired not by public spirit, but by its own selfish purposes,
should have the name of effrontery rather than of courage." And so we
demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same
time be good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to
deception; for these qualities are the centre and soul of justice.

*64* But the mischief is that from this exaltation and greatness of
spirit spring all too readily self-will and excessive lust for power.
For just as Plato tells us that the whole national character of the
Spartans was on fire with passion for victory, so, in the same way, the
more notable a man is for his greatness of spirit, the more ambitious he
is to be the foremost citizen, or, I should say rather, to be sole
ruler. But when one begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to
preserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely essential to
justice. The result is that such men do not allow themselves to be
constrained either by argument or by any public and lawful authority;
but they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators in public
life, seeking to obtain supreme power and to be superiors through force
rather than equals through justice. But the greater the difficulty, the
greater the glory; for no occasion arises that can excuse a man for
being guilty of injustice.

#True greatness of spirit.#

*65* So then, not those who do injury but those who prevent it are to be
considered brave and courageous. Moreover, true and philosophic
greatness of spirit regards the moral goodness to which nature most
aspires as consisting in deeds, not in fame, and prefers to be first in
reality rather than in name. And we must approve this view; for he who
depends upon the caprice of the ignorant rabble cannot be numbered among
the great. Then, too, the higher a man's ambition, the more easily he is
tempted to acts of injustice by his desire for fame. We are now, to be
sure, on very slippery ground; for scarcely can the man be found who has
passed through trials and encountered dangers and does not then wish for
glory as a reward for his achievements.


*66* XX. Omnino fortis animus et magnus duabus rebus maxime cernitur,
quarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur, cum persuasum
est[62] nihil hominem, nisi quod honestum decorumque sit, aut admirari
aut optare aut expetere oportere nullique neque homini neque
perturbationi animi nec fortunae succumbere. Altera est res, ut, cum ita
sis affectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas illas quidem et
maxime utiles, sed [ut] vehementer arduas plenasque laborum et
periculorum cum vitae, tum multarum rerum, quae ad vitam pertinent.

*67* Harum rerum duarum splendor omnis, amplitudo, addo etiam
utilitatem, in posteriore est, causa autem et ratio efficiens magnos
viros in priore; in eo est enim illud, quod excellentes animos et humana
contemnentes facit. Id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id,
quod honestum sit, bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber
sis. Nam et ea, quae eximia plerisque et praeclara videntur, parva
ducere eaque ratione stabili firmaque contemnere fortis animi magnique
ducendum est, et ea, quae videntur acerba, quae multa et varia in
hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre, ut nihil a statu naturae
discedas, nihil a dignitate sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque
constantiae. *68* Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur,
eum frangi cupiditate nec, qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci
a voluptate. Quam ob rem et haec vitanda[63] et pecuniae fugienda
cupiditas; nihil enim est tam angusti animi tamque parvi quam amare
divitias, nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si
non habeas, si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre.

Cavenda etiam est gloriae cupiditas, ut supra dixi; eripit enim
libertatem, pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nec
vero imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut
deponenda non numquam.

*69* Vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et
metu, tum etiam aegritudine et voluptate nimia[64] et iracundia, ut
tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae affert cum constantiam, tum
etiam dignitatem. Multi autem et sunt et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico,
tranquillitatem expetentes a negotiis publicis se removerint ad otiumque
perfugerint; in his et nobilissimi philosophi longeque principes et
quidam homines severi et graves nec populi nec principum mores ferre
potuerunt, vixeruntque non nulli in agris delectati re sua familiari.
*70* His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne
cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere, ut
velis.

    [62] _persuasum est_ Madvig (ad de Fin. p. 448 ff.), Edd.;
    _p. sit_ MSS.

    [63] _vitanda_ Edd. (cum duobus codd. Guelpherbytanis);
    _videnda_ MSS.

    [64] _voluptate nimia_ Orelli, Müller; _voluptate animi_ A H
    L a b c; _vol. animi et securitas_ (_et iracundia ut tr.
    animi_ by a later hand on the margin) B; _voluptate_
    [_animi_], Bt., Heine.


#Characteristics of Fortitude:#

*66* XX. The soul that is altogether courageous and great is marked
above all by two characteristics: one of these is indifference to
outward circumstances; for such a person cherishes the conviction that
nothing but moral goodness and propriety deserves to be either admired
or wished for or striven after, and that he ought not to be subject to
any man or any passion or any accident of fortune. The second
characteristic is that, when the soul is disciplined in the way above
mentioned, one should do deeds not only great and in the highest degree
useful, but extremely arduous and laborious and fraught with danger both
to life and to many things that make life worth living.

#(1) Moral courage.#

*67* All the glory and greatness and, I may add, all the usefulness of
these two characteristics of courage are centred in the latter; the
rational cause that makes men great, in the former. #Indifference to
outward fortunes.# For it is the former that contains the element that
makes souls pre-eminent and indifferent to worldly fortune. And this
quality is distinguished by two criteria: (1) if one account moral
rectitude as the only good; and (2) if one be free from all passion. For
we must agree that it takes a brave and heroic soul to hold as slight
what most people think grand and glorious, and to disregard it from
fixed and settled principles. And it requires strength of character and
great singleness of purpose to bear what seems painful, as it comes to
pass in many and various forms in human life, and to bear it so
unflinchingly as not to be shaken in the least from one's natural state
of the dignity of a philosopher. *68* Moreover, it would be inconsistent
for the man who is not overcome by fear to be overcome by desire, or for
the man who has shown himself invincible to toil to be conquered by
pleasure. We must, therefore, not only avoid the latter, but also
beware of ambition for wealth; for there is nothing so characteristic of
narrowness and littleness of soul as the love of riches; and there is
nothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if
one does not possess it, and to devote it to beneficence and liberality,
if one does possess it.

As I said before, we must also beware of ambition for glory; for it robs
us of liberty, and in defence of liberty a high-souled man should stake
everything. And one ought not to seek military authority; nay, rather it
ought sometimes to be declined,[N] sometimes to be resigned.[O]

#(3) Freedom from passion.#

*69* Again, we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion,
not only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and
pleasure, and from anger, so that we may enjoy that calm of soul and
freedom from care which bring both moral stability and dignity of
character. #The retired life.# But there have been many and still are
many who, while pursuing that calm of soul of which I speak, have
withdrawn from civic duty and taken refuge in retirement. Among such
have been found the most famous and by far the foremost philosophers[P]
and certain other[Q] earnest, thoughtful men who could not endure the
conduct of either the people or their leaders; some of them, too, lived
in the country and found their pleasure in the management of their
private estates. *70* Such men have had the same aims as kings--to
suffer no want, to be subject to no authority, to enjoy their liberty,
that is, in its essence, to live just as they please.

    [N] As Cicero did at the expiration of his consulship.

    [O] As Sulla did in his dictatorship. The contrast to Caesar
    is the more striking for Cicero's not mentioning it.

    [P] e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras.

    [Q] Such as Cicero's friend, Atticus, and Marcus Piso.


XXI. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi,
otiosis, alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas
habeant, alteri, si contenti sint et suo et parvo. In quo neutrorum
omnino contemnenda sententia est, sed et facilior et tutior et minus
aliis gravis aut molesta vita est otiosorum, fructuosior autem hominum
generi et ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior eorum, qui se ad rem
publicam et ad magnas res gerendas accommodaverunt.

*71* Quapropter et iis forsitan concedendum sit rem publicam non
capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt, et iis,
qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a
re publica recesserunt, cum eius administrandae potestatem aliis
laudemque concederent. Quibus autem talis nulla sit causa, si despicere
se dicant ea, quae plerique mirentur, imperia et magistratus, iis non
modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto; quorum iudicium in eo,
quod gloriam contemnant et pro nihilo putent, difficile factu est non
probare; sed videntur labores et molestias, tum offensionum et
repulsarum quasi quandam ignominiam timere et infamiam. Sunt enim, qui
in rebus contrariis parum sibi constent, voluptatem severissime
contemnant, in dolore sint molliores, gloriam neglegant, frangantur
infamia, atque ea quidem non satis constanter.

*72* Sed iis, qui habent a natura adiumenta rerum gerendarum, abiecta
omni cunctatione adipiscendi magistrates et gerenda res publica est; nec
enim aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo potest.
Capessentibus autem rem publicam nihilo[65] minus quam philosophis, haud
scio an magis etiam et magnificentia et despicientia adhibenda est[66]
rerum humanarum, quam saepe dico, et tranquillitas animi atque
securitas, siquidem nec anxii futuri sunt et cum gravitate constantiaque
victuri. *73* Quae faciliora sunt philosophis, quo minus multa patent in
eorum vita, quae fortuna feriat, et quo minus multis rebus egent, et
quia, si quid adversi eveniat, tam graviter cadere non possunt. Quocirca
non sine causa maiores motus animorum concitantur maioraque studia
efficiendi[67] rem publicam gerentibus quam quietis, quo magis iis et
magnitudo est animi adhibenda et vacuitas ab angoribus.

Ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit, caveat, ne id modo consideret, quam
illa res honesta sit, sed etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem; in quo
ipso considerandum est, ne aut temere desperet propter ignaviam aut
nimis confidat propter cupiditatem. In omnibus autem negotiis, prius
quam aggrediare, adhibenda est praeparatio diligens.

    [65] _nihilo_ Wesenberg, Edd.; _nihil_ MSS.

    [66] _est_ Manutius, Edd.; _sit_ MSS.

    [67] _maioraque studia efficiendi_ Unger, Müller; _maioraque
    efficiendi_ A^1 B H L b c; _maiorque cura efficiendi_ a, Bt.,
    Heine; _maioraque efficienda_ A^2 p.


#The life of public service _vs._ the life of retirement.#

XXI. So, while this desire is common to men of political ambitions and
men of retirement, of whom I have just spoken, the one class think they
can attain their end if they secure large means; the other, if they are
content with the little they have. And in this matter, neither way of
thinking is altogether to be condemned; but the life of retirement is
easier and safer and at the same time less burdensome or troublesome to
others, while the career of those who apply themselves to statecraft and
to conducting great enterprises is more profitable to mankind and
contributes more to their own greatness and renown.

*71* So perhaps those men of extraordinary genius who have devoted
themselves to learning must be excused for not taking part in public
affairs; likewise, those who from ill-health or for some still more
valid reason have retired from the service of the state and left to
others the opportunity and the glory of its administration. But if those
who have no such excuse profess a scorn for civil and military offices,
which most people admire, I think that this should be set down not to
their credit but to their discredit; for in so far as they care little,
as they say, for glory and count it as naught, it is difficult not to
sympathize with their attitude; in reality, however, they seem to dread
the toil and trouble and also, perhaps, the discredit and humiliation of
political failure and defeat. For there are people who in opposite
circumstances do not act consistently: they have the utmost contempt for
pleasure, but in pain they are too sensitive; they are indifferent to
glory, but they are crushed by disgrace; and even in their inconsistency
they show no great consistency.

#Public service a duty.#

*72* But those whom Nature has endowed with the capacity for
administering public affairs should put aside all hesitation, enter the
race for public office, and take a hand in directing the government; for
in no other way can a government be administered or greatness of spirit
be made manifest. Statesmen, too, no less than philosophers--perhaps
even more so--should carry with them that greatness of spirit and
indifference to outward circumstances to which I so often refer,
together with calm of soul and freedom from care, if they are to be free
from worries and lead a dignified and self-consistent life. *73* This is
easier for the philosophers; as their life is less exposed to the
assaults of fortune, their wants are fewer; and if any misfortune
overtakes them, their fall is not so disastrous. Not without reason,
therefore, are stronger emotions aroused in those who engage in public
life than in those who live in retirement, and greater is their ambition
for success; the more, therefore, do they need to enjoy greatness of
spirit and freedom from annoying cares.

If anyone is entering public life, let him beware of thinking only of
the honour that it brings; but let him be sure also that he has the
ability to succeed. At the same time, let him take care not to lose
heart too readily through discouragement nor yet to be over-confident
through ambition. In a word, before undertaking any enterprise, careful
preparation must be made.


*74* XXII. Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam
urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio. Multi enim bella saepe quaesiverunt
propter gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque
plerumque contingit, eoque magis, si sunt ad rem militarem apti et
cupidi bellorum gerendorum; vere autem si volumus iudicare, multae res
exstiterunt urbanae maiores clarioresque quam bellicae.

*75* Quamvis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit eius nomen quam
Solonis illustrius citeturque Salamis clarissimae testis victoriae, quae
anteponatur consilio Solonis ei, quo primum constituit Areopagitas, non
minus praeclarum hoc quam illud iudicandum est; illud enim semel
profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati; hoc consilio leges Atheniensium,
hoc maiorum instituta servantur; et Themistocles quidem nihil dixerit,
in quo ipse Areopagum adiuverit, at ille vere a[68] se adiutum
Themistoclem; est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone
erat constitutus.

*76* Licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, quorum rebus gestis
quamquam imperium Lacedaemoniis partum[69] putatur, tamen ne minima
quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae conferendi sunt; quin
etiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habuerunt exercitus et
fortiores. Mihi quidem neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum
versaremur in re publica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur; parvi
enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi; nec plus Africanus,
singularis et vir et imperator, in exscindenda Numantia rei publicae
profuit quam eodem tempore P. Nasica privatus, cum Ti. Gracchum
interemit; quamquam haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione
(attingit etiam bellicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta est), sed tamen id
ipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine exercitu.

#Cic., de temp. suis, iii#

*77* Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et
invidis audio:

    "Cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi."

Ut enim alios omittam, nobis rem publicam gubernantibus nonne togae arma
cesserunt? neque enim periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam nec
maius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus
audacissimorum civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. Quae res igitur
gesta umquam in bello tanta? *78* qui triumphus conferendus? licet enim
mihi, M. fili, apud te gloriari, ad quem et hereditas huius gloriae et
factorum imitatio pertinet. Mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis
laudibus, Cn. Pompeius, multis audientibus hoc tribuit, ut diceret
frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse, nisi meo in rem
publicam beneficio, ubi triumpharet, esset habiturus.

Sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus; in
quibus plus etiam quam in his operae studiique ponendum est.

    [68] _a_ Edd.; not in MSS.; _se adiutum_ A B H b, Edd.;
    _adiuvit_ L^1 c p; _se adiutum ab illo dixerit (?)
    Themistocles_ L^2.

    [69] _L. partum_ Lambinus, Müller; _partum L._, Bt.; om.
    _partum_ A^1 B H L^1 a b; _L. dilatatum_ A^2; _dilatatum L._
    L^2 c.


#Victories of war _vs._ victories of peace.#

*74* XXII. Most people think that the achievements of war are more
important than those of peace; but this opinion needs to be corrected.
For many men have sought occasions for war from the mere ambition for
fame. This is notably the case with men of great spirit and natural
ability, and it is the more likely to happen, if they are adapted to a
soldier's life and fond of warfare. But if we will face the facts, we
shall find that there have been many instances of achievement in peace
more important and no less renowned than in war.

#Themistocles _vs._ Solon.#

*75* However highly Themistocles, for example, may be extolled--and
deservedly--and however much more illustrious his name may be than
Solon's, and however much Salamis may be cited as witness of his most
glorious victory--a victory glorified above Solon's statesmanship in
instituting the Areopagus--yet Solon's achievement is not to be
accounted less illustrious than his. For Themistocles's victory served
the state once and only once; while Solon's work will be of service for
ever. For through his legislation the laws of the Athenians and the
institutions of their fathers are maintained. And while Themistocles
could not readily point to any instance in which he himself had rendered
assistance to the Areopagus, the Areopagus might with justice assert
that Themistocles had received assistance from it; for the war was
directed by the counsels of that senate which Solon had created.

#Pausanias and Lysander _vs._ Lycurgus.#

*76* The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander. Although it is
thought that it was by their achievements that Sparta gained her
supremacy, yet these are not even remotely to be compared with the
legislation and discipline of Lycurgus. Nay, rather, it was due to these
that Pausanias and Lysander had armies so brave and so well disciplined.
For my own part, I do not consider that Marcus Scaurus was inferior to
Gaius Marius, when I was a lad, or Quintus Catulus to Gnaeus Pompey,
when I was engaged in public life. For arms are of little value in the
field unless there is wise counsel at home. So, too, Africanus, though
a great man and a soldier of extraordinary ability, did no greater
service to the state by destroying Numantia than was done at the same
time by Publius Nasica, though not then clothed with official authority,
by removing Tiberius Gracchus. This deed does not, to be sure, belong
wholly to the domain of civil affairs; it partakes of the nature of war
also since it was effected by violence; but it was, for all that,
executed as a political measure without the help of an army.

#Cicero's great victory.#

*77* The whole truth, however, is in this verse, against which, I am
told, the malicious and envious are wont to rail:

    "Yield, ye arms, to the toga; to civic praises,[R] ye laurels."[S]

Not to mention other instances, did not arms yield to the toga, when I
was at the helm of state? For never was the republic in more serious
peril, never was peace more profound. Thus, as the result of my counsels
and my vigilance, their weapons slipped suddenly from the hands of the
most desperate traitors--dropped to the ground of their own accord! What
achievement in war, then, was ever so great? *78* What triumph can be
compared with that? For I may boast to you, my son Marcus; for to you
belong the inheritance of that glory of mine and the duty of imitating
my deeds. And it was to me, too, that Gnaeus Pompey, a hero crowned with
the honours of war, paid this tribute in the hearing of many, when he
said that his third triumph would have been gained in vain, if he were
not to have through my services to the state a place in which to
celebrate it.

There are, therefore, instances of civic courage that are not inferior
to the courage of the soldier. Nay, the former calls for even greater
energy and greater devotion than the latter.

    [R] The praises of Cicero for his overthrow of the conspiracy
    of Catiline.

    [S] The laurels of the triumphant general.


*79* XXIII. Omnino illud honestum, quod ex animo excelso magnificoque
quaerimus, animi efficitur, non corporis viribus. Exercendum tamen
corpus et ita afficiendum est, ut oboedire consilio rationique possit in
exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando. Honestum autem id, quod
exquirimus, totum est positum in animi cura et cogitatione; in quo non
minorem utilitatem afferunt, qui togati rei publicae praesunt, quam qui
bellum gerunt. Itaque eorum consilio saepe aut non suscepta aut confecta
bella sunt, non numquam etiam illata, ut M. Catonis bellum tertium
Punicum, in quo etiam mortui valuit auctoritas. *80* Quare expetenda
quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo, sed
cavendum, ne id bellandi magis fuga quam utilitatis ratione faciamus.
Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur.

Fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nec
tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti et
consilio nec a ratione discedere.

*81* Quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni est, praecipere
cogitatione futura et aliquanto[70] ante constituere, quid accidere
possit in utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec
committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: "Non putaram."

Haec sunt opera magni animi et excelsi et prudentia consilioque
fidentis; temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere
immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque
postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique
anteponenda.

    [70] _aliquanto_ Edd.; _aliquando_ MSS.


#(2) Physical courage.#

*79* XXIII. That moral goodness which we look for in a lofty,
high-minded spirit is secured, of course, by moral, not by physical,
strength. And yet the body must be trained and so disciplined that it
can obey the dictates of judgment and reason in attending to business
and in enduring toil. But that moral goodness which is our theme depends
wholly upon the thought and attention given to it by the mind. And in
this way, the men who in a civil capacity direct the affairs of the
nation render no less important service than they who conduct its wars:
by their statesmanship oftentimes wars are either averted or terminated;
sometimes also they are declared. Upon Marcus Cato's counsel, for
example, the Third Punic War was undertaken, and in its conduct his
influence was dominant, even after he was dead. *80* And so diplomacy in
the friendly settlement of controversies is more desirable than courage
in settling them on the battlefield; but we must be careful not to take
that course merely for the sake of avoiding war rather than for the sake
of public expediency. War, however, should be undertaken in such a way
as to make it evident that it has no other object than to secure peace.

But it takes a brave and resolute spirit not to be disconcerted in
times of difficulty or ruffled and thrown off one's feet, as the saying
is, but to keep one's presence of mind and one's self-possession and not
to swerve from the path of reason.

#Courage and discretion.#

*81* Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also
for great intellectual ability by reflection to anticipate the future,
to discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for
ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be
reduced to having to say "I had not thought of that."

These are the activities that mark a spirit, strong, high, and
self-reliant in its prudence and wisdom. But to mix rashly in the fray
and to fight hand to hand with the enemy is but a barbarous and brutish
kind of business. Yet when the stress of circumstances demands it, we
must gird on the sword and prefer death to slavery and disgrace.


#Ch. XXII#

*82* XXIV. De evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde
considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. Idque est magni
viri, rebus agitatis punire sontes, multitudinem conservare, in omni
fortuna recta atque honesta retinere. Ut enim sunt, quem ad modum supra
dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponant, sic reperias multos, quibus
periculosa et calida[71] consilia quietis et cogitatis[72] splendidiora
et maiora videantur.

*83* Nunquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est, ut imbelles
timidique videamur, sed fugiendum illud etiam, ne offeramus nos
periculis sine causa, quo esse nihil potest stultius. Quapropter in
adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter
aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas
curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur. Quare in tranquillo
tempestatem adversam optare dementis est, subvenire autem tempestati
quavis ratione sapientis, eoque magis, si plus adipiscare re explicata
boni quam addubitata mali.

Periculosae autem rerum actiones partim iis[73] sunt, qui eas
suscipiunt, partim rei publicae. Itemque alii de vita, alii de gloria et
benivolentia civium in discrimen vocantur. Promptiores igitur debemus
esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia dimicareque paratius de honore
et gloria quam de ceteris commodis.

*84* Inventi autem multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed etiam vitam
profundere pro patria parati essent, iidem gloriae iacturam ne minimam
quidem facere vellent, ne re publica quidem postulante; ut
Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello
multaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non
paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nec cum Atheniensibus
dimicandum putabant; quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios classe illa
amissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Atque
haec quidem Lacedaemoniis[74] plaga mediocris, illa pestifera, qua, cum
Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset
Lacedaemoniorum opes corruerunt.

#Ann. xii, Vahlen^2, 370-372#

Quanto Q. Maximus melius! de quo Ennius:

    Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.
    Noenum rumores ponebat[75] ante salutem.
    Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret.

Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in rebus urbanis. Sunt enim, qui,
quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audeant[76]
dicere.

    [71] _calida_ Nonius, Edd.; _callida_ MSS.

    [72] _consilia quietis et cogitatis_ Edd.; _consilia et
    quietis et cogitationis_ A B H a b; _consilia et quietis
    cogitationibus_ c p.

    [73] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.

    [74] _quidem Lacedaemoniis_ Edd., _quidem de Lacedaemoniis_
    MSS.

    [75] _Noenum rumores ponebat_ Lachmann (ad Lucr. III, 198);
    _Non enim rumores ponebat_ MSS.; _Non ponebat enim_ alii.

    [76] _audeant_ Ernesti; _audent_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine.


*82* XXIV. As to destroying and plundering cities, let me say that great
care should be taken that nothing be done in reckless cruelty or
wantonness. And it is a great man's duty in troublous times to single
out the guilty for punishment, to spare the many, and in every turn of
fortune to hold to a true and honourable course. For whereas there are
many, as I have said before, who place the achievements of war above
those of peace, so one may find many to whom adventurous, hot-headed
counsels seem more brilliant and more impressive than calm and
well-considered measures.

#Courage in times of doubt and danger.#

*83* We must, of course, never be guilty of seeming cowardly and craven
in our avoidance of danger; but we must also beware of exposing
ourselves to danger needlessly. Nothing can be more foolhardy than that.
Accordingly, in encountering danger we should do as doctors do in their
practice: in light cases of illness they give mild treatment; in cases
of dangerous sickness they are compelled to apply hazardous and even
desperate remedies. It is, therefore, only a madman who, in a calm,
would pray for a storm; a wise man's way is, when the storm does come,
to withstand it with all the means at his command, and especially, when
the advantages to be expected in case of a successful issue are greater
than the hazards of the struggle.

#Patriotism and self-sacrifice.#

The dangers attending great affairs of state fall sometimes upon those
who undertake them, sometimes upon the state. In carrying out such
enterprises, some run the risk of losing their lives, others their
reputation and the good-will of their fellow-citizens. It is our duty,
then, to be more ready to endanger our own than the public welfare and
to hazard honour and glory more readily than other advantages.[T]

*84* Many, on the other hand, have been found who were ready to pour
out not only their money but their lives for their country and yet would
not consent to make even the slightest sacrifice of personal glory--even
though the interests of their country demanded it. For example, when
Callicratidas, as Spartan admiral in the Peloponnesian War, had won many
signal successes, he spoiled everything at the end by refusing to listen
to the proposal of those who thought he ought to withdraw his fleet from
the Arginusae and not to risk an engagement with the Athenians. His
answer to them was that "the Spartans could build another fleet, if they
lost that one, but he could not retreat without dishonour to himself."
And yet what he did dealt only a slight blow to Sparta; there was
another which proved disastrous, when Cleombrotus in fear of criticism
recklessly went into battle against Epaminondas. In consequence of that,
the Spartan power fell.

How much better was the conduct of Quintus Maximus! Of him Ennius says:

    "One man--and he alone--restored our state by delaying.
    Not in the least did fame with him take precedence of safety;
    Therefore now does his glory shine bright, and it grows ever
      brighter."

This sort of offence[U] must be avoided no less in political life. For
there are men who for fear of giving offence do not dare to express
their honest opinion, no matter how excellent.

    [T] Such as the esteem and good-will of fellow-citizens;
    life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the existence of
    the state and all the advantages it brings.

    [U] Sacrificing public interests to personal glory.


*85* XXV. Omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt, duo Platonis
praecepta teneant, #Rep. i. 342 E# unum, ut utilitatem civium sic
tueantur, ut, quaecumque agunt, ad eam referant obliti commodorum
suorum, #Rep. iv, 420 B# alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent,
ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Ut enim tutela, sic
procuratio rei publicae ad eorum utilitatem, qui commissi sunt, non ad
eorum, quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Qui autem parti civium
consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt,
seditionem atque discordiam; ex quo evenit, ut alii populares, alii
studiosi optimi cuiusque videantur, pauci universorum.

*86* Hinc apud Atheniensis magnae discordiae, in nostra re publica non
solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia; quae gravis et
fortis civis et in re publica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit
tradetque se totum rei publicae neque opes aut potentiam consectabitur
totamque eam sic tuebitur, ut omnibus consulat; nec vero criminibus
falsis in odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit omninoque ita iustitiae
honestatique adhaerescet, ut, dum ea conservet, quamvis graviter
offendat mortemque oppetat potius quam deserat illa, quae dixi.

#Rep. vi, 488 B; 489 C#

*87* Miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio, de qua praeclare
apud eundem est Platonem, "similiter facere eos, qui inter se
contenderent, uter potius rem publicam administraret, ut si nautae
certarent, quis eorum potissimum gubernaret." #Rep. viii, 567 C; Leg.
ix, 856 B# Idemque praecipit, ut "eos adversarios existimemus, qui arma
contra ferant, non eos, qui suo iudicio tueri rem publicam velint,"
qualis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio.

*88* Nec vero audiendi, qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque
magnanimi et fortis viri esse censebunt; nihil enim laudabilius, nihil
magno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque clementia. In
liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est
facilitas et altitudo animi, quae dicitur, ne, si irascamur aut
intempestive accedentibus aut impudenter rogantibus, in morositatem
inutilem et odiosam incidamus. Et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo
atque clementia, ut adhibeatur rei publicae causa severitas, sine qua
administrari civitas non potest. Omnis autem et animadversio et
castigatio contumelia vacare debet neque ad eius, qui punitur[77]
aliquem aut verbis castigat,[78] sed ad rei publicae utilitatem referri.

*89* Cavendum est etiam, ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et ne isdem de
causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem. Prohibenda autem
maxime est ira in puniendo; numquam enim, iratus qui accedet ad poenam,
mediocritatem illam tenebit, quae est inter nimium et parum, quae placet
Peripateticis, et recte placet, modo ne laudarent iracundiam et dicerent
utiliter a natura datam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est
optandumque, ut ii, qui praesunt rei publicae, legum similes sint, quae
ad puniendum non iracundia, sed aequitate dicuntur.

    [77] _punitur_ Nonius, Edd.; _punit_ a; _puniet_ A B H b c.

    [78] _castigat_ MSS.; _fatigat_ Nonius, Orelli.


#Public administration must be free from#

*85* XXV. Those who propose to take charge of the affairs of government
should not fail to remember two of Plato's rules: first, to keep the
good of the people so clearly in view that regardless of their own
interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to
care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the
interests of some one party to betray the rest. #(1) partisanship,# For
the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must
be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of
those to whom it is entrusted. Now, those who care for the interests of
a part of the citizens and neglect another part, introduce into the
civil service a dangerous element--dissension and party strife. The
result is that some are found to be loyal supporters of the democratic,
others of the aristocratic party, and few of the nation as a whole.

*86* As a result of this party spirit bitter strife arose at Athens,[V]
and in our own country not only dissensions[W] but also disastrous civil
wars[X] broke out. All this the citizen who is patriotic, brave, and
worthy of a leading place in the state will shun with abhorrence; he
will dedicate himself unreservedly to his country, without aiming at
influence or power for himself; and he will devote himself to the state
in its entirety in such a way as to further the interests of all.
Besides, he will not expose anyone to hatred or disrepute by groundless
charges, but he will surely cleave to justice and honour so closely that
he will submit to any loss, however heavy, rather than be untrue to
them, and will face death itself rather than renounce them.

#(2) self-seeking,#

*87* A most wretched custom, assuredly, is our electioneering and
scrambling for office. Concerning this also we find a fine thought in
Plato: "Those who compete against one another," he says, "to see which
of two candidates shall administer the government, are like sailors
quarrelling as to which one of them shall do the steering." And he
likewise lays down the rule that we should regard only those as
adversaries who take up arms against the state, not those who strive to
have the government administered according to their convictions. This
was the spirit of the disagreement between Publius Africanus and Quintus
Metellus: there was in it no trace of rancour.

#(3) vindictiveness,#

*88* Neither must we listen to those who think that one should indulge
in violent anger against one's political enemies and imagine that such
is the attitude of a great-spirited, brave man. For nothing is more
commendable, nothing more becoming in a pre-eminently great man than
courtesy and forbearance. Indeed, in a free people, where all enjoy
equal rights before the law, we must school ourselves to affability and
what is called "mental poise"[Y]; for if we are irritated when people
intrude upon us at unseasonable hours or make unreasonable requests, we
shall develop a sour, churlish temper, prejudicial to ourselves and
offensive to others. And yet gentleness of spirit and forbearance are to
be commended only with the understanding that strictness may be
exercised for the good of the state; for without that, the government
cannot be well administered. On the other hand, if punishment or
correction must be administered, it need not be insulting; it ought to
have regard to the welfare of the state, not to the personal
satisfaction of the man who administers the punishment or reproof.

#(4) anger.#

*89* We should take care also that the punishment shall not be out of
proportion to the offence, and that some shall not be chastised for the
same fault for which others are not even called to account. In
administering punishment it is above all necessary to allow no trace of
anger. For if anyone proceeds in a passion to inflict punishment, he
will never observe that happy mean which lies between excess and defect.
This doctrine of the mean is approved by the Peripatetics--and wisely
approved, if only they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us that
it is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good purpose. But in
reality, anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated; and it is to
be desired that they who administer the government should be like the
laws, which are led to inflict punishment not by wrath but by justice.

    [V] From the death of Pericles on.

    [W] Such as the conspiracy of Catiline.

    [X] The civil wars of Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey.

    [Y] The quality elsewhere expressed by Cicero with
    βαθύτης--'depth,' 'reserve,' the art of concealing and
    controlling one's feelings under an outward serenity of
    manner.


*90* XXVI. Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram
fluentibus superbiam magnopere, fastidium arrogantiamque fugiamus. Nam
ut adversas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre levitatis est,
praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus
eademque frons, ut de Socrate itemque[79] de C. Laelio accepimus.[80]
Philippum quidem, Macedonum regem, rebus gestis et gloria superatum a
filio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse; itaque alter
semper magnus, alter saepe turpissimus; ut recte praecipere videantur,
qui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius.
Panaetius quidem Africanum, auditorem et familiarem suum, solitum ait
dicere, "ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum ferocitate
exsultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, ut iis[81] facilioribus possint
uti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos sibique praefidentes tamquam
in gyrum rationis et doctrinae duci oportere, ut perspicerent rerum
humanarum imbecillitatem varietatemque fortunae."

*91* Atque etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime est utendum consilio
amicorum iisque maior etiam quam ante tribuenda auctoritas. Isdemque
temporibus cavendum est, ne assentatoribus patefaciamus auris neve[82]
adulari nos sinamus, in quo falli facile est; tales enim nos esse
putamus, ut iure laudemur; ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata, cum
homines inflati opinionibus turpiter irridentur et in maximis versantur
erroribus.

Sed haec quidem hactenus.

*92* Illud autem sic est iudicandum, maximas geri res et maximi animi ab
iis,[83] qui res publicas regant, quod earum administratio latissime
pateat ad plurimosque pertineat; esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos
etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam
seseque suarum rerum finibus continerent aut interiecti inter
philosophos et eos, qui rem publicam administrarent, delectarentur re
sua familiari non eam quidem omni ratione exaggerantes neque excludentes
ab eius usu suos potiusque et amicis impertientes et rei publicae, si
quando usus esset. Quae primum bene parta[84] sit nullo neque turpi
quaestu neque odioso, deinde augeatur ratione, diligentia,
parsimonia,[85] tum quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat nec
libidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati et beneficentiae pareat.

Haec praescripta servantem licet magnifice, graviter animoseque vivere
atque etiam simpliciter, fideliter,† vere hominum amice.

    [79] _itemque_ H^2 a, Edd.; _idemque_ A B H^1 L b c.

    [80] _accepimus_ B^2 a c, Edd.; _accipimus_ A B^1 H b.

    [81] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.

    [82] _neve_ Nonius, Edd.; _nec_ MSS.

    [83] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.

    [84] _parta_ B^1, Edd.; _parata_ A B^2 H L a b c.

    [85] _deinde ... parsimonia_ Edd., after Unger, transpose; in
    MSS. it follows _tum ... pareat_.


#Fortitude in prosperity.#

*90* XXVI. Again, when fortune smiles and the stream of life flows
according to our wishes, let us diligently avoid all arrogance,
haughtiness, and pride. For it is as much a sign of weakness to give way
to one's feelings in success as it is in adversity. But it is a fine
thing to keep an unruffled temper, an unchanging mien, and the same cast
of countenance in every condition of life; this, history tells us, was
characteristic of Socrates and no less of Gaius Laelius. Philip, king of
Macedon, I observe, however surpassed by his son in achievements and
fame, was superior to him in affability and refinement. Philip,
accordingly, was always great; Alexander, often infamously bad.
#Humility.# There seems to be sound advice, therefore, in this word of
warning: "The higher we are placed, the more humbly should we walk."
Panaetius tells us that Africanus, his pupil and friend, used to say:
"As, when horses have become mettlesome and unmanageable on account of
their frequent participation in battles, their owners put them in the
hands of trainers to make them more tractable; so men, who through
prosperity have become restive and over self-confident, ought to be put
into the training-ring, so to speak, of reason and learning, that they
may be brought to comprehend the frailty of human affairs and the
fickleness of fortune."

*91* The greater our prosperity, moreover, the more should we seek the
counsel of friends, and the greater the heed that should be given to
their advice. Under such circumstances also we must beware of lending an
ear to sycophants or allowing them to impose upon us with their
flattery. For it is easy in this way to deceive ourselves, since we thus
come to think ourselves duly entitled to praise; and to this frame of
mind a thousand delusions may be traced, when men are puffed up with
conceit and expose themselves to ignominy and ridicule by committing the
most egregious blunders.

So much for this subject.

#Greatness of mind in public and in private life.#

*92* To revert to the original question[Z]--we must decide that the most
important activities, those most indicative of a great spirit, are
performed by the men who direct the affairs of nations; for such public
activities have the widest scope and touch the lives of the most people.
But even in the life of retirement there are and there have been many
high-souled men who have been engaged in important inquiries or embarked
on most important enterprises and yet kept themselves within the limits
of their own affairs; or, taking a middle course between philosophers on
the one hand and statesmen on the other, they were content with managing
their own property--not increasing it by any and every means nor
debarring their kindred from the enjoyment of it, but rather, if ever
there were need, sharing it with their friends and with the state. Only
let it, in the first place, be honestly acquired, by the use of no
dishonest or fraudulent means; let it, in the second place, increase by
wisdom, industry, and thrift; and, finally, let it be made available for
the use of as many as possible (if only they are worthy) and be at the
service of generosity and beneficence rather than of sensuality and
excess.

By observing these rules, one may live in magnificence, dignity, and
independence, and yet in honour, truth and charity toward all.

    [Z] § 70.


*93* XXVII. Sequitur, ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit,
in qua verecundia et quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et
modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur.
Hoc loco continetur id, quod dici Latine decorum potest; Graece enim
πρέπον dicitur. Huius[86] vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari;
*94* nam et, quod decet, honestum est et, quod honestum est, decet;
qualis autem differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intellegi quam
explanari potest. Quicquid est enim, quod deceat, id tum apparet, cum
antegressa est honestas. Itaque non solum in hac parte honestatis, de
qua hoc loco disserendum est, sed etiam in tribus superioribus quid
deceat apparet. Nam et ratione uti atque oratione prudenter et agere,
quod agas, considerate omnique in re quid sit veri videre et tueri
decet, contraque falli, errare, labi, decipi tam dedecet quam delirare
et mente esse captum; et iusta omnia decora sunt, iniusta contra, ut
turpia, sic indecora.

Similis est ratio fortitudinis. Quod enim viriliter animoque magno fit,
id dignum viro et decorum videtur, quod contra, id ut turpe, sic
indecorum.

*95* Quare pertinet quidem ad omnem honestatem hoc, quod dico, decorum,
et ita pertinet, ut non recondita quadam ratione cernatur, sed sit in
promptu. Est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur in omni virtute, quod
deceat; quod cogitatione magis a virtute potest quam re separari. Ut
venustas et pulchritudo corporis secerni non potest a valetudine, sic
hoc, de quo loquimur, decorum totum illud quidem est cum virtute
confusum, sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur.

*96* Est autem eius discriptio[87] duplex; nam et generale quoddam
decorum intellegimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic
subiectum, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atque illud
superius sic fere definiri solet: decorum id esse, quod consentaneum sit
hominis excellentiae in eo, in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus
differat. Quae autem pars subiecta generi est, eam sic definiunt, ut id
decorum velint esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo
moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.

    [86] _dicitur. Huius_ Edd.; _dicitur decorum. huius_ MSS.

    [87] _discriptio_ b, Edd.; _descriptio_ A B H a; _distinctio_
    L c.


#D. Temperance.#

*93* XXVII. We have next to discuss the one remaining division of moral
rectitude. That is the one in which we find considerateness and
self-control, which give, as it were, a sort of polish to life; it
embraces also temperance, complete subjection of all the passions, and
moderation in all things. #Propriety.# Under this head is further
included what, in Latin, may be called _decorum_[AA] (propriety); for in
Greek it is called πρέπον.[AA] Such is its essential nature, that it is
inseparable from moral goodness; *94* for what is proper is morally
right, and what is morally right is proper. The nature of the difference
between morality and propriety can be more easily felt than expressed.
For whatever propriety may be, it is manifested only when there is
pre-existing moral rectitude. And so, not only in this division of moral
rectitude which we have now to discuss but also in the three preceding
divisions, it is clearly brought out what propriety is. #Propriety and
the Cardinal Virtues.# For to employ reason and speech rationally, to do
with careful consideration whatever one does, and in everything to
discern the truth and to uphold it--that is proper. To be mistaken, on
the other hand, to miss the truth, to fall into error, to be led
astray--that is as improper as to be deranged and lose one's mind. And
all things just are proper; all things unjust, like all things immoral,
are improper.

The relation of propriety to fortitude is similar. What is done in a
manly and courageous spirit seems becoming to a man and proper; what is
done in a contrary fashion is at once immoral and improper.

*95* This propriety, therefore, of which I am speaking belongs to each
division of moral rectitude; and its relation to the cardinal virtues is
so close, that it is perfectly self-evident and does not require any
abstruse process of reasoning to see it. For there is a certain element
of propriety perceptible in every act of moral rectitude; and this can
be separated from virtue theoretically better than it can be
practically. As comeliness and beauty of person are inseparable from the
notion of health, so this propriety of which we are speaking, while in
fact completely blended with virtue, is mentally and theoretically
distinguishable from it.

#Propriety defined.#

*96* The classification of propriety, moreover, is twofold: (1) we
assume a general sort of propriety, which is found in moral goodness as
a whole; then (2) there is another propriety, subordinate to this, which
belongs to the several divisions of moral goodness. The former is
usually defined somewhat as follows: "Propriety is that which harmonizes
with man's superiority in those respects in which his nature differs
from that of the rest of the animal creation." And they so define the
special type of propriety which is subordinate to the general notion,
that they represent it to be that propriety which harmonizes with
nature, in the sense that it manifestly embraces temperance and
self-control, together with a certain deportment such as becomes a
gentleman.

    [AA] _Decorum_ Cicero's attempt to translate πρέπον, means an
    appreciation of the fitness of things, propriety in inward
    feeling or outward appearance, in speech, behaviour, dress,
    etc. _Decorum_ is as difficult to translate into English as
    πρέπον is to reproduce in Latin; as an adjective, it is here
    rendered by 'proper,' as a noun, by 'propriety.'


#Cic., Or. xxii, 71#

*97* XXVIII. Haec ita intellegi possumus existimare ex eo decoro, quod
poëtae sequuntur; de quo alio loco plura dici solent. Sed tum[88]
servare illud poëtas, quod deceat, dicimus, cum id, quod quaque persona
dignum est, et fit et dicitur; ut, si Aeacus aut Minos diceret:

#Attius, Atreus, Ribbeck^2, 203#

    óderint, dum métuant,

aut:

#Ibid., 226#

    natís sepulchro ipse ést parens,

indecorum videretur, quod eos fuisse iustos accepimus; at Atreo dicente
plausus excitantur; est enim digna persona oratio. Sed poëtae, quid
quemque deceat, ex persona iudicabunt; nobis autem personam imposuit
ipsa natura magna cum excellentia praestantiaque animantium
reliquarum.[89]

*98* Quocirca poëtae in magna varietate personarum, etiam vitiosis quid
conveniat et quid deceat, videbunt, nobis autem cum a natura
constantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes datae sint,
cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere, quem ad modum nos adversus
homines geramus, efficitur, ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem
pertinet, decorum quam late fusum sit, appareat et hoc, quod spectatur
in uno quoque genere virtutis. Ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta
compositione membrorum movet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se
omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum, quod elucet
in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et
constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.

*99* Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines et optimi
cuiusque et reliquorum. Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non
solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. Est autem, quod
differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam.
Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in
quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.

His igitur expositis, quale sit id, quod decere dicimus, intellectum
puto.

*100* Officium autem, quod ab eo ducitur, hanc primum habet viam, quae
deducit ad convenientiam conservationemque naturae; quam si sequemur
ducem, numquam aberrabimus sequemurque et id, quod acutum et perspicax
natura est, et id, quod ad hominum consociationem accommodatum, et id,
quod vehemens atque forte. Sed maxima vis decori in hac inest parte, de
qua disputamus; neque enim solum corporis, qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed
multo etiam magis animi motus probandi, qui item ad naturam accommodati
sunt.

*101* Duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura;[90] una pars in
appetitu posita est, quae est ὁρμή Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc
rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et[91] explanat, quid faciendum
fugiendumque[92] sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet.

    [88] _Sed tum_ L c, Edd.; _sed ut tum_ A B H b.

    [89] _reliquarum_ A^1 B^1 H a b; _reliquorum_ A^2 B^2 c.

    [90] _natura_ Edd.; _naturae_ MSS.

    [91] _et_ L c, Edd.; not in A B H b.

    [92] _fugiendumque_ A B H a b; _fugiendumve_ L c p.


#Poetic propriety.#

*97* XXVIII. That this is the common acceptation of propriety we may
infer from that propriety which poets aim to secure. Concerning that, I
have occasion to say more in another connection. Now, we say that the
poets observe propriety, when every word or action is in accord with
each individual character. For example, if Aeacus or Minos said:

    "Let them hate, if only they fear,"

or:

    "The father is himself his children's tomb,"

that would seem improper, because we are told that they were just men.
But when Atreus speaks those lines, they call forth applause; for the
sentiment is in keeping with the character. But it will rest with the
poets to decide, according to the individual characters, what is proper
for each; but to us Nature herself has assigned a character of
surpassing excellence, far superior to that of all other living
creatures, and in accordance with that we shall have to decide what
propriety requires.

*98* The poets will observe, therefore, amid a great variety of
characters, what is suitable and proper for all--even for the bad.
#Moral propriety.# But to us Nature has assigned the rôles of
steadfastness, temperance, self-control, and considerateness of others;
Nature also teaches us not to be careless in our behaviour towards our
fellow-men. Hence we may clearly see how wide is the application not
only of that propriety which is essential to moral rectitude in general,
but also of the special propriety which is displayed in each particular
subdivision of virtue. For, as physical beauty with harmonious symmetry
of the limbs engages the attention and delights the eye, for the very
reason that all the parts combine in harmony and grace, so this
propriety, which shines out in our conduct, engages the approbation of
our fellow-men by the order, consistency, and self-control it imposes
upon every word and deed.

#Considerateness.#

*99* We should, therefore, in our dealings with people show what I may
almost call reverence toward all men--not only toward the men who are
the best, but toward others as well. For indifference to public opinion
implies not merely self-sufficiency, but even total lack of principle.
There is, too, a difference between justice and considerateness in one's
relations to one's fellow-men. It is the function of justice not to do
wrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to wound their
feelings; and in this the essence of propriety is best seen.

With the foregoing exposition, I think it is clear what the nature is of
what we term propriety.

#Duties prescribed by propriety:#

*100* Further, as to the duty which has its source in propriety, the
first road on which it conducts us leads to harmony with Nature and the
faithful observance of her laws. #(1) Follow Nature,# If we follow
Nature as our guide, we shall never go astray, but we shall be pursuing
that which is in its nature clear-sighted and penetrating (Wisdom), that
which is adapted to promote and strengthen society (Justice), and that
which is strong and courageous (Fortitude). But the very essence of
propriety is found in the division of virtue which is now under
discussion (Temperance). For it is only when they agree with Nature's
laws that we should give our approval to the movements not only of the
body, but still more of the spirit.

#(2) subject appetite to reason.#

*101* Now we find that the essential activity of the spirit is twofold:
one force is appetite (that is, ὁρμή, in Greek), which impels a man this
way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what
should be done and what should be left undone. The result is that reason
commands, appetite obeys.


XXIX. Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia nec vero
agere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est
enim fere discriptio[93] officii.

*102* Efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus rationi oboediant eamque neque
praecurrant nec propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant sintque
tranquilli atque omni animi perturbatione careant; ex quo elucebit omnis
constantia omnisque moderatio. Nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et
tamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione
retinentur, ii[94] sine dubio finem et modum transeunt; relinquunt enim
et abiciunt oboedientiam nec rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege
naturae; a quibus non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiam corpora. Licet
ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum, qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu
commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium voltus, voces,
motus statusque mutantur.

*103* Ex quibus illud intellegitur, ut ad officii formam revertamur,
appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse excitandamque
animadversionem et diligentiam, ut ne quid temere ac fortuito,
inconsiderate neglegenterque agamus. Neque enim ita generati a natura
sumus, ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse videamur, ad severitatem potius
et ad quaedam studia graviora atque maiora. Ludo autem et ioco uti illo
quidem licet, sed sicut somno et quietibus ceteris tum, cum gravibus
seriisque rebus satis fecerimus. Ipsumque genus iocandi non profusum nec
immodestum, sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet. Ut enim pueris non omnem
ludendi licentiam damus, sed eam, quae ab honestatis actionibus non sit
aliena, sic in ipso ioco aliquod probi ingenii lumen eluceat. *104*
Duplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum illiberale, petulans, flagitiosum,
obscenum, alterum elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum. Quo genere non
modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam
philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt, multaque multorum facete
dicta, ut ea, quae a sene Catone collecta sunt, quae vocant ἀποφθέγματα.
Facilis igitur est distinctio ingenui et illiberalis ioci. Alter est, si
tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, _gravissimo_ homine dignus,[95] alter
ne libero quidem, si rerum turpitudini adhibetur verborum[96]
obscenitas.

Ludendi etiam est quidam modus retinendus, ut ne nimis omnia profundamus
elatique voluptate in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur. Suppeditant autem
et campus noster et studia venandi honesta exempla ludendi.

    [93] _discriptio_ B H, Bt.^1; _descriptio_ A L a b c, Bt.^2,
    Müller, Heine.

    [94] _ii_ Edd.; _hi_ a; _hii_ H; _hij_ c.

    [95] _fit, ut si remisso animo, gravissimo homine dignus_
    Ed.; _fit, ut_ (_et_ c) _remisso animo homine dignus_ MSS.;
    _fit aut si rem. an. magno homine_ Madvig; _fit, ut sit
    remissio animo, homine dignus_ Unger.

    [96] _turpitudini adhibetur verborum_ A B H a b, Edd.;
    _turpitudo adhibetur et verborum_ L c.


XXIX. Again, every action ought to be free from undue haste or
carelessness; neither ought we to do anything for which we cannot assign
a reasonable motive; for in these words we have practically a definition
of duty.

*102* The appetites, moreover, must be made to obey the reins of reason
and neither allowed to run ahead of it nor from listlessness or
indolence to lag behind; but people should enjoy calm of soul and be
free from every sort of passion. #Self-control in# #(1) passions,# As a
result strength of character and self-control will shine forth in all
their lustre. For when appetites overstep their bounds and galloping
away, so to speak, whether in desire or aversion, are not well held in
hand by reason, they clearly overleap all bound and measure; for they
throw obedience off and leave it behind and refuse to obey the reins of
reason, to which they are subject by Nature's laws. And not only minds
but bodies as well are disordered by such appetites. We need only to
look at the faces of men in a rage or under the influence of some
passion or fear or beside themselves with extravagant joy: in every
instance their features, voices, motions, attitudes undergo a change.

*103* From all this--to return to our sketch of duty--we see that all
the appetites must be controlled and calmed and that we must take
infinite pains not to do anything from mere impulse or at random,
without due consideration and care. #(2) amusements,# For Nature has not
brought us into the world to act as if we were created for play or jest,
but rather for earnestness and for some more serious and important
pursuits. We may, of course, indulge in sport and jest, but in the same
way as we enjoy sleep or other relaxations, and only when we have
satisfied the claims of our earnest, serious tasks. #(3) raillery,#
Further than that, the manner of jesting itself ought not to be
extravagant or immoderate, but refined and witty. For as we do not grant
our children unlimited licence to play, but only such freedom as is not
incompatible with good conduct, so even in our jesting let the light of
a pure character shine forth. *104* There are, generally speaking, two
sorts of jest: the one, coarse, rude, vicious, indecent; the other,
refined, polite, clever, witty. With this latter sort not only our own
Plautus and the Old Comedy of Athens, but also the books of Socratic
philosophy abound; and we have many witty sayings of many men--like
those collected by old Cato under the title of _Bons Mots_ (or
Apophthegms). So the distinction between the elegant and the vulgar jest
is an easy matter: the one kind, if well timed (for instance, in hours
of mental relaxation), is becoming to the most dignified person; the
other is unfit for any gentleman, if the subject is indecent and the
words obscene.

Then, too, certain bounds must be observed in our amusements and we must
be careful not to carry things too far and, swept away by our passions,
lapse into some shameful excess. Our Campus, however, and the amusements
of the chase are examples of wholesome recreation.


*105* XXX. Sed pertinet ad omnem officii quaestionem semper in promptu
habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedat;
illae nihil sentiunt nisi voluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni impetu,
hominis autem mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut
anquirit aut agit videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin
etiam, si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior, modo ne sit ex
pecudum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non re, sed nomine), sed si
quis est paulo erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat et
dissimulat appetitum voluptatis propter verecundiam.

*106* Ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam
hominis praestantia, eamque contemni et reici oportere; sin sit
quispiam, qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse
eius fruendae modum. Itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem
referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam si considerare
volumus,[97] quae sit in natura excellentia et dignitas, intellegemus,
quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere quamque
honestum parce, continenter, severe, sobrie.

*107* Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse
personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus
rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne
honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii
exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in
corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad
cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis
dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores
etiam varietates. *108* Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos,
maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem
temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas,
in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior,
vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis
atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem εἴρωνα Graeci[98] nominarunt,
Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem
consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex
nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere,
dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere
Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque
versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset
et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit.

*109* Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti, qui nihil ex
occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis
inimici, itemque alii, qui[99] quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant,
dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo
in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum
accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post
Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium [quemque], quamvis[100]
praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in
Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio† Mancia[101]
vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica,
contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos
vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis [ne Xenocratem quidem,
severissimum philosophorum,][102] ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum
fuisse.

Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen
vituperandorum.

    [97] _volumus_ A B^1 H^1 b; _volemus_ B^2 H^2, Bt., Heine;
    _velimus_ L; _vellemus_ c.

    [98] εἴρωνα _Graeci_ Edd.; _ironia graeci_ A B H b; _ironian
    graeci_ a; _greci mironian_ c.

    [99] _qui_ A L c; _si_ B H a b.

    [100] _alium_ [_quemque_] _quamvis_ Ed.; _alium quemque
    quamvis_ MSS.; _quemque alium quamvis_ p; _aliquem, quamvis_
    Pearce, Bt.; _alium quamvis_, Facciolati, Heine.

    [101] _et in patre et in filio_ A B b, Edd.; _et in patre et
    filio_ H a; _et patre et filio_ L c. _itemque_ B H^2, Bt.^1,
    Müller; _idemque_ A H^1 L a b c, Bt.^2, Heine. _in Q
    Mucio_† _Mancia_ Heine, Bt.^2; _in q. mucio mantia_ B; _in
    q. mutio mancia_ H L c; _in q. mutio mantia_ a; _inque mucio
    mantia_ b; _inque mutio mantia_ A; _in q. muntio mantia_ p;
    _in Q. Mucio, Mancia_ Müller.

    [102] _ne_ (_nec_ c) _Xenocratem_ (_-n_ L c) ...
    _philosophorum_ MSS.; bracketed by Heumann, Edd.


*105* XXX. But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep
before our eyes how far superior man is by nature to cattle and other
beasts: they have no thought except for sensual pleasure and this they
are impelled by every instinct to seek; but man's mind is nurtured by
study and meditation; he is always either investigating or doing, and he
is captivated by the pleasure of seeing and hearing. #(4) pleasure.#
Nay, even if a man is more than ordinarily inclined to sensual
pleasures, provided, of course, that he be not quite on a level with the
beasts of the field (for some people are men only in name, not in
fact)--if, I say, he is a little too susceptible to the attractions of
pleasure, he hides the fact, however much he may be caught in its toils,
and for very shame conceals his appetite.

*106* From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the
dignity of man and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us; but
if some one should be found who sets some value upon sensual
gratification, he must keep strictly within the limits of moderate
indulgence. One's physical comforts and wants, therefore, should be
ordered according to the demands of health and strength, not according
to the calls of pleasure. And if we will only bear in mind the
superiority and dignity of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is
to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness,
and how right it is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and
sobriety.

#The universal and the individual nature of man.#

*107* We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two
characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact
of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority
which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are
derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our
duty. #Individual endowments.# The other character is the one that is
assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical
endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for
the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal
appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. *108* Diversities
of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had
a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund
and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them,
Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual
seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate
friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere
life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and
witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴρων--in
every conversation, pretending to need information and professing
admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on
the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any
seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian
generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at
concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their
movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these
qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all
others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to
make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger
service for his country, feigned insanity.

*109* Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward
and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or
treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others
still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may
gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most
crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we
are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander
as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent
he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear
but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in
the case of Catulus--both father and son--and also of Quintus Mucius
Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was
another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand--the man
who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings--had no
such gracious manner in social intercourse [...], and because of that
very fact he rose to greatness and fame.

Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and
they are not in the least to be criticized.


*110* XXXI. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen
propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic
enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea
tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia
graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae
regula[103] metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam
sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum
illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante
et repugnante natura.

*111* Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam
aequabilitas _cum_[104] universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam
conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim
sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus[105] est nobis, ne, ut quidam,
Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque
vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. *112* Atque haec
differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse
consciscere alius debeat, alius [in eadem causa] non debeat.[106] Num
enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari
tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se
interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant
faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque
ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque
consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus
fuit.

*113* Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et
mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et
in omni sermone omnibus affabilem [et iucundum][107] esse se vellet!
domi vero etiam contumelias servorum ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id
aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies
oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset.

Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque
moderari nec velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime
quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum.

*114* _Suum_[108] quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum
et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur
habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas
fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu,
Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam,
non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non
videbit sapiens vir in vita?

Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin
aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non
erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non
decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam[109] est
enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia
fugiamus.

    [103] _studia nostra nostrae naturae regula_ Ernesti, Bt.,
    Heine; _studia nostra nostra_ (corr. ex _nostri_) _regula_ A;
    _studia nostrae regulae_ B; _studia nostrae regulā_ H;
    _studia nostra regula_ a; _studia_ (corr. in _studii_)
    _nostri regula_ b; _studia nostra naturae regula_ L c,
    Nonius; _studia nostrae naturae regula_ Müller.

    [104] _cum_ Lambinus, Edd.; not in MSS.

    [105] _innatus_ Bt., Edd.; _notus_ MSS.

    [106] _alius in eadem causa non debeat_ L c p, Müller, Heine;
    not in A B H b; _alius non debeat_ a; _alius_ [_in eadem
    causa_] _non debeat_ Bt., Ed.

    [107] _et iocundum_ L c p; not in A B H a b; [_et iucundum_]
    Bt., Ed.

    [108] _Suum_ Orelli; not in MSS.; but p has _ingenium suum_.

    [109] _tam_ L c, Edd.; _tam_ (i.e. _tamen_) A B H b.


#Conduct must accord with individual endowments.#

*110* XXXI. Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own
peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in
order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more
easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal
laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent
of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better
and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of
our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or
to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of
that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as
nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is--that
is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius.

*111* If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing
more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and
all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not
maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's
own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain
people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well
deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything
foreign into our actions or our life in general. *112* #The same course
may be right for one, wrong for another.# Indeed, such diversity of
character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for
one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did
Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who
surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they
would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode
of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But
Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he
himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained
ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die
rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant.

*113* How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he
submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be
called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant
to all! And arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his
men-servants and maid-servants, in order to attain in the end the object
of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having,
would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such
indignities!

#Let every one sustain his own character.#

If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's
duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to
regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would
suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the
better it fits him.

*114* Every one, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own
natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and
defects; in this respect, we should not let actors display more
practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the
ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality
of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more
stress upon the action, choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra;
Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely
in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle
upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in
life?

We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we
are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall
thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all
possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform
it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as
possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of
excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults
we have.


*115* XXXII. Ac duabus iis personis, quas supra dixi, tertia adiungitur,
quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit; quarta etiam, quam nobismet ipsi
iudicio nostro accommodamus. Nam regna, imperia, nobilitas, honores,
divitiae,[110] opes eaque, quae sunt his contraria, in casu sita
temporibus gubernantur; ipsi autem gerere quam personam velimus, a
nostra voluntate proficiscitur. Itaque se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad
ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant, ipsarumque virtutum in alia
alius mavult excellere.

*116* Quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii
student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f.
in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari. Quidam autem ad
eas laudes, quas a patribus acceperunt, addunt aliquam suam, ut hic idem
Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam; quod idem fecit
Timotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam
pater, ad eam laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit. Fit autem
interdum, ut non nulli omissa imitatione maiorum suum quoddam institutum
consequantur, maximeque in eo plerumque elaborant ii,[111] qui magna
sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus.

*117* Haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus, quid deceat, complecti animo et
cogitatione debemus; in primis autem constituendum est, quos nos et
quales esse velimus et in quo genere vitae, quae deliberatio est omnium
difficillima. Ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima imbecillitas
consilii, tum id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod
maxime adamavit; itaque ante implicatur aliquo certo genere cursuque
vivendi, quam potuit, quod optimum esset, iudicare.

#Mem. II, i, 21-34#

*118* Nam quod[112] Herculem Prodicus[113] dicit, ut est apud
Xenophontem, cum primum pubesceret, quod tempus a natura ad deligendum,
quam quisque viam vivendi sit ingressurus, datum est, exisse in
solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse, cum duas
cerneret vias, unam Voluptatis, alteram Virtutis, utram ingredi melius
esset, hoc Herculi "Iovis satu edito" potuit fortasse contingere, nobis
non item,[114] qui imitamur, quos cuique visum est, atque ad eorum
studia institutaque impellimur; plerumque autem parentium praeceptis
imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur; alii multitudinis
iudicio feruntur, quaeque maiori parti pulcherrima videntur, ea maxime
exoptant; non nulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae
sine[115] parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.

    [110] _nobilitas, h., divitiae_ Unger; _nobilitatem, h.,
    divitias_ MSS.

    [111] _ii_ Edd.; _hii_ A H b; _hij_ c; _hi_ B a.

    [112] _Nam quod_ L c, Edd.; _namque_ A B H a b.

    [113] _Prodicus_ Manutius, Edd.; _prodigus_ L c; _prodigum_ B
    H b.

    [114] _item_ Edd.; _idem_ MSS.

    [115] _sine_ Stuerenburg, Edd. plerique; _sive_ MSS., Bt.^1


*115* XXXII. To the two above-mentioned characters[AB] is added a third,
which some chance or some circumstance imposes, and a fourth also, which
we assume by our own deliberate choice. Regal powers and military
commands, nobility of birth and political office, wealth and influence,
and their opposites depend upon chance and are, therefore, controlled
by circumstances. #Selection of a career:# But what rôle we ourselves
may choose to sustain is decided by our own free choice. And so some
turn to philosophy, others to the civil law, and still others to
oratory, while in case of the virtues themselves one man prefers to
excel in one, another in another.

#(1) inheritance,#

*116* They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved distinction in
some particular field, often strive to attain eminence in the same
department of service: for example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius,
in the law; Africanus, the son of Paulus, in the army. And to that
distinction which they have severally inherited from their fathers some
have added lustre of their own; for example, that same Africanus, who
crowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence. Timotheus,
Conon's son, did the same: he proved himself not inferior to his father
in military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture
and intellectual power. #(2) choice,# It happens sometimes, too, that a
man declines to follow in the footsteps of his fathers and pursues a
vocation of his own. And in such callings those very frequently achieve
signal success who, though sprung from humble parentage, have set their
aims high.

*117* All these questions, therefore, we ought to bear thoughtfully in
mind, when we inquire into the nature of propriety; but above all we
must decide who and what manner of men we wish to be and what calling in
life we would follow; and this is the most difficult problem in the
world. For it is in the years of early youth, when our judgment is most
immature, that each of us decides that his calling in life shall be that
to which he has taken a special liking. And thus he becomes engaged in
some particular calling and career in life, before he is fit to decide
intelligently what is best for him.

#Hercules at the parting of the ways.#

*118* For we cannot all have the experience of Hercules, as we find it
in the words of Prodicus in Xenophon: "When Hercules was just coming
into youth's estate (the time which Nature has appointed unto every man
for choosing the path of life on which he would enter), he went out into
a desert place. And as he saw two paths, the path of Pleasure and the
path of Virtue, he sat down and debated long and earnestly which one it
were better for him to take." This might, perhaps, happen to a Hercules,
"scion of the seed of Jove"; but it cannot well happen to us; for we
copy, each the model he fancies, and we are constrained to adopt their
pursuits and vocations. But usually, we are so imbued with the teachings
of our parents, that we fall irresistibly into their manners and
customs. #(3) accident,# Others drift with the current of popular
opinion and make especial choice of those callings which the majority
find most attractive. Some, however, as the result either of some happy
fortune or of natural ability, enter upon the right path of life,
without parental guidance.

    [AB] The universal and the individual; § 107.


*119* XXXIII. Illud autem maxime rarum genus est eorum, qui aut
excellenti[116] ingenii magnitudine aut praeclara eruditione atque
doctrina aut utraque re ornati spatium etiam deliberandi habuerunt, quem
potissimum vitae cursum sequi vellent; in qua deliberatione ad suam
cuiusque naturam consilium est omne revocandum. Nam cum in omnibus, quae
aguntur, ex eo, quo modo quisque natus est, ut supra dictum est, quid
deceat, exquirimus, tum in tota vita constituenda multo est ei rei[117]
cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus
nobismet ipsis nec in ullo officio claudicare.

*120* Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna
proximam, utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae,
sed naturae magis; multo enim et firmior est et constantior, ut fortuna
non numquam tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur.
Qui igitur ad naturae suae non vitiosae genus consilium vivendi omne
contulerit, is constantiam teneat (id enim maxime decet), nisi forte se
intellexerit errasse in deligendo genere vitae. Quod si acciderit
(potest autem accidere), facienda morum institutorumque mutatio est. Eam
mutationem si tempora adiuvabunt, facilius commodiusque faciemus; sin
minus, sensim erit pedetemptimque facienda, ut amicitias, quae minus
delectent et minus probentur, magis decere censent sapientes sensim
diluere quam repente praecidere. *121* Commutato autem genere vitae omni
ratione curandum est, ut id bono consilio fecisse videamur.

Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores, primum illud
exceptum sit, ne vitia sint imitanda, deinde si natura non feret, ut
quaedam imitari possit[118] (ut superioris filius Africani, qui hunc
Paulo natum adoptavit, propter infirmitatem valetudinis non tam potuit
patris similis esse, quam ille fuerat sui); si igitur non poterit sive
causas defensitare sive populum contionibus tenere sive bella gerere,
illa tamen praestare debebit, quae erunt in ipsius potestate, iustitiam,
fidem, liberalitatem, modestiam, temperantiam, quo minus ab eo id, quod
desit, requiratur. Optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis
omnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rerumque gestarum, cui
dedecori esse nefas [et vitium][119] iudicandum est.

    [116] _excellenti_ L c; _excellente_ A B H a b; _excellentis_
    p.

    [117] _est ei rei_ Gruter, Edd.; _est eius rei_ L c p; _est
    rei_ A B H b; _est ei_ a.

    [118] _possit_ J. M. Heusinger, Edd.; _possint_ MSS.

    [119] _et_ (_sed_ b) _vitium_ A B H a b; [_et vitium_] Bt.^2,
    Ed.; _et vicium_ c; _et impium_ L p, Bt.^1, Heine.


*119* XXXIII. There is one class of people that is very rarely met with:
it is composed of those who are endowed with marked natural ability, or
exceptional advantages of education and culture, or both, and who also
have time to consider carefully what career in life they prefer to
follow; and in this deliberation the decision must turn wholly upon each
individual's natural bent. #(4) natural bias.# For we try to find out
from each one's native disposition, as was said above, just what is
proper for him; and this we require not only in case of each individual
act but also in ordering the whole course of one's life; and this last
is a matter to which still greater care must be given, in order that we
may be true to ourselves throughout all our lives and not falter in the
discharge of any duty.

*120* But since the most powerful influence in the choice of a career is
exerted by Nature, and the next most powerful by Fortune, we must, of
course, take account of them both in deciding upon our calling in life;
but of the two, Nature claims the more attention. For Nature is so much
more stable and steadfast, that for Fortune to come into conflict with
Nature seems like a combat between a mortal and a goddess. If,
therefore, anyone has conformed his whole plan of life to the kind of
nature that is his (that is, his better nature), let him go on with it
consistently--for that is the essence of Propriety--unless, perchance,
he should discover that he has made a mistake in choosing his life work.
#Change of vocation.# If this should happen (and it can easily happen),
he must change his vocation and mode of life. If circumstances favour
such change, it will be effected with greater ease and convenience. If
not, it must be made gradually, step by step, just as, when friendships
become no longer pleasing or desirable, it is more proper (so wise men
think) to undo the bond little by little than to sever it at a stroke.
*121* And when we have once changed our calling in life, we must take
all possible care to make it clear that we have done so with good
reason.

But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to follow in the steps of
our fathers, let me make the following exceptions: first, we need not
imitate their faults; second, we need not imitate certain other things,
if our nature does not permit such imitation; for example, the son of
the elder Africanus (that Scipio who adopted the younger Africanus, the
son of Paulus) could not on account of ill-health be so much like his
father as Africanus had been like his. If, then, a man is unable to
conduct cases at the bar or to hold the people spell-bound with his
eloquence or to conduct wars, still it will be his duty to practise
these other virtues, which are within his reach--justice, good faith,
generosity, temperance, self-control--that his deficiencies in other
respects may be less conspicuous. The noblest heritage, however, that is
handed down from fathers to children, and one more precious than any
inherited wealth, is a reputation for virtue and worthy deeds; and to
dishonour this must be branded as a sin and a shame.


*122* XXXIV. Et quoniam officia non eadem disparibus aetatibus
tribuuntur aliaque sunt iuvenum, alia seniorum, aliquid etiam de hac
distinctione dicendum est.

Est igitur adulescentis maiores natu vereri exque iis deligere optimos
et probatissimos, quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur; ineuntis
enim aetatis inscitia senum constituenda et regenda prudentia est.
Maxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est exercendaque in labore
patientiaque et animi et corporis, ut eorum et in bellicis et in
civilibus officiis vigeat industria. Atque etiam cum relaxare animos et
dare se iucunditati volent, caveant intemperantiam, meminerint
verecundiae, quod erit facilius, si _ne_ in eius modi quidem rebus
maiores natu nolent[120] interesse.

*123* Senibus autem labores corporis minuendi, exercitationes animi
etiam augendae videntur; danda vero opera, ut et amicos et iuventutem et
maxime rem publicam consilio et prudentia quam plurimum adiuvent. Nihil
autem magis cavendum est senectuti, quam ne languori se desidiaeque
dedat; luxuria vero cum omni aetati turpis, tum senectuti foedissima
est; sin autem etiam libidinum intemperantia accessit, duplex malum est,
quod et ipsa senectus dedecus concipit et facit adulescentium
impudentiorem intemperantiam.

*124* Ac ne illud quidem alienum est, de magistratuum, de privatorum,
[de civium,][121] de peregrinorum officiis dicere.

Est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam
civitatis debereque eius dignitatem et decus sustinere, servare leges,
iura discribere,[122] ea fidei suae commissa meminisse.

Privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque
summissum et abiectum neque se efferentem,[123] tum in re publica ea
velle, quae tranquilla et honesta sint; talem enim solemus et sentire
bonum civem et dicere.

*125* Peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil praeter suum
negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena re
publica curiosum.

Ita fere officia reperientur, cum quaeretur, quid deceat, et quid aptum
sit personis, temporibus, aetatibus. Nihil est autem, quod tam deceat,
quam in omni re gerenda consilioque capiendo servare constantiam.

    [120] _si ne in ... nolent_ Stuerenburg, Edd.; _si in ...
    nolint_ A B H a b; _si in ... volent_ L c; _si in ... non
    nolint_ Lambinus.

    [121] _de civium_ MSS.; [_de civium_] Hieron., Wolff, Edd.

    [122] _discribere_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _describere_ MSS.

    [123] _efferentem_ A H^1 L a b c; _ecferentem_ B H^2, Ed.


*122* XXXIV. Since, too, the duties that properly belong to different
times of life are not the same, but some belong to the young, others to
those more advanced in years, a word must be said on this distinction
also.

#Duties of#

#(1) youth,#

It is, then, the duty of a young man to show deference to his elders and
to attach himself to the best and most approved of them, so as to
receive the benefit of their counsel and influence. For the inexperience
of youth requires the practical wisdom of age to strengthen and direct
it. And this time of life is above all to be protected against
sensuality and trained to toil and endurance of both mind and body, so
as to be strong for active duty in military and civil service. And even
when they wish to relax their minds and give themselves up to enjoyment
they should beware of excesses and bear in mind the rules of modesty.
And this will be easier, if the young are not unwilling to have their
elders join them even in their pleasures.

#(2) age,#

*123* The old, on the other hand, should, it seems, have their physical
labours reduced; their mental activities should be actually increased.
They should endeavour, too, by means of their counsel and practical
wisdom to be of as much service as possible to their friends and to the
young, and above all to the state. But there is nothing against which
old age has to be more on its guard than against surrendering to
feebleness and idleness, while luxury, a vice in any time of life, is in
old age especially scandalous. But if excess in sensual indulgence is
added to luxurious living, it is a twofold evil; for old age not only
disgraces itself; it also serves to make the excesses of the young more
shameless.

*124* At this point it is not at all irrelevant to discuss the duties of
magistrates, of private individuals, [of native citizens,] and of
foreigners.

#(3) magistrates,#

It is, then, peculiarly the place of a magistrate to bear in mind that
he represents the state and that it is his duty to uphold its honour and
its dignity, to enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional
rights, and to remember that all this has been committed to him as a
sacred trust.

#(4) private citizens,#

The private individual ought first, in private relations, to live on
fair and equal terms with his fellow-citizens, with a spirit neither
servile and grovelling nor yet domineering; and second, in matters
pertaining to the state, to labour for her peace and honour; for such a
man we are accustomed to esteem and call a good citizen.

#(5) aliens.#

*125* As for the foreigner or the resident alien, it is his duty to
attend strictly to his own concerns, not to pry into other people's
business, and under no condition to meddle in the politics of a country
not his own.

#Duty and Propriety.#

In this way I think we shall have a fairly clear view of our duties when
the question arises what is proper and what is appropriate to each
character, circumstance, and age. But there is nothing so essentially
proper as to maintain consistency in the performance of every act and in
the conception of every plan.


*126* XXXV. Sed quoniam decorum illud in omnibus factis, dictis, in
corporis denique motu et statu cernitur idque positum est in tribus
rebus, formositate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto, difficilibus ad
eloquendum, sed satis erit intellegi, in his autem tribus continetur
cura etiam illa, ut probemur iis, quibuscum apud quosque vivamus, his
quoque de rebus pauca dicantur.

Principio corporis nostri magnam natura ipsa videtur habuisse rationem,
quae formam nostram reliquamque figuram, in qua esset species honesta,
eam posuit in promptu, quae partes autem corporis ad naturae
necessitatem datae aspectum essent deformem habiturae atque foedum,[124]
eas contexit atque abdidit. *127* Hanc naturae tam diligentem fabricam
imitata est hominum verecundia. Quae enim natura occultavit, eadem
omnes, qui sana mente sunt, removent ab oculis ipsique necessitati dant
operam ut quam occultissime pareant; quarumque partium corporis usus
sunt necessarii, eas neque partes neque earum usus suis nominibus
appellant; quodque facere turpe non est,[125] modo occulte, id dicere
obscenum est. Itaque nec actio rerum illarum aperta petulantia vacat nec
orationis obscenitas.

*128* Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene
Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae turpia[126] non sint,
verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia[127] sint, nominibus
appellemus suis. Latrocinari, fraudare, adulterare re[128] turpe est,
sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine
obscenum; pluraque in eam sententiam ab eisdem contra verecundiam
disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur et ab omni, quod abhorret ab
oculorum auriumque approbatione, fugiamus; status incessus, sessio
accubitio, vultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum.

*129* Quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut
molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit. Nec vero histrionibus
oratoribusque concedendum est, ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta.
Scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam, ut in
scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim, ne, si quo casu
evenerit, ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspiciantur non decore.
Nostro quidem more cum parentibus puberes filii, cum soceris generi non
lavantur. Retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim
natura ipsa magistra et duce.

    [124] _foedum_ Klotz, Müller, Heine; _formam_ A B H a b;
    _turpem_ L c, Bt.

    [125] _turpe non est_ a, Edd.; _non turpe est_ L; _non turpe_
    (om. _est_) c; _turpe non turpe est_ A B H b (the first
    _turpe_ crossed out in A B).

    [126] _quae turpia_ B b, Edd.; _quae re turpia_, L c; _quae
    ... autem_ om. H.

    [127] _quae turpia_ B H b, Edd.; _quae re turpia_ L c.

    [128] _re_ B H, Edd.; not in A L b c p.


#Propriety in bodily actions.#

*126* XXXV. But the propriety to which I refer shows itself also in
every deed, in every word, even in every movement and attitude of the
body. And in outward, visible propriety there are three
elements--beauty, tact, and taste; these conceptions are difficult to
express in words, but it will be enough for my purpose if they are
understood. In these three elements is included also our concern for the
good opinion of those with whom and amongst whom we live. For these
reasons I should like to say a few words about this kind of propriety
also.

First of all, Nature seems to have had a wonderful plan in the
construction of our bodies. Our face and our figure generally, in so far
as it has a comely appearance, she has placed in sight; but the parts of
the body that are given us only to serve the needs of nature and that
would present an unsightly and unpleasant appearance she has covered up
and concealed from view. *127* #Modesty.# Man's modesty has followed
this careful contrivance of Nature's; all right-minded people keep out
of sight what Nature has hidden and take pains to respond to nature's
demands as privately as possible; and in the case of those parts of the
body which only serve nature's needs, neither the parts nor the
functions are called by their real names. To perform these functions--if
only it be done in private--is nothing immoral; but to speak of them is
indecent. And so neither public performance of those acts nor vulgar
mention of them is free from indecency.

*128* But we should give no heed to the Cynics (or to some Stoics who
are practically Cynics) who censure and ridicule us for holding that the
mere mention of some actions that are not immoral is shameful, while
other things that are immoral we call by their real names. Robbery,
fraud, and adultery, for example, are immoral in deed, but it is not
indecent to name them. To beget children in wedlock is in deed morally
right; to speak of it is indecent. And they assail modesty with a great
many other arguments to the same purport. But as for us, let us follow
nature and shun everything that is offensive to our eyes or our ears.
So, in standing or walking, in sitting or reclining, in our expression,
our eyes, or the movements of our hands, let us preserve what we have
called "propriety."

*129* In these matters we must avoid especially the two extremes: our
conduct and speech should not be effeminate and over-nice, on the one
hand, nor coarse and boorish, on the other. And we surely must not admit
that while this rule applies to actors and orators, it is not binding
upon us. As for stage-people, their custom, because of its traditional
discipline, carries modesty to such a point that an actor would never
step out upon the stage without a breech-cloth on, for fear he might
make an improper exhibition, if by some accident certain parts of his
person should happen to become exposed. And in our own custom, grown
sons do not bathe with their fathers, nor sons-in-law with their
fathers-in-law. We must, therefore, keep to the path of this sort of
modesty, especially when Nature is our teacher and guide.


*130* XXXVI. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero
venustas sit, in altero dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere debemus,
dignitatem virilem. Ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus
ornatus, et huic simile vitium in gestu motuque caveatur. Nam et
palaestrici motus sunt saepe odiosiores, et histrionum non nulli gestus
ineptiis non vacant,[129] et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et
simplicia, laudantur. Formae autem dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda est,
color exercitationibus corporis. Adhibenda praeterea munditia est non
odiosa neque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam
neglegentiam. Eadem ratio est habenda vestitus, in quo, sicut in
plerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est.

*131* Cavendum autem est, ne aut tarditatibus utamur _in_[130] ingressu
mollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in
festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates, quae cum fiunt,
anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur; ex quibus magna
significatio fit non adesse constantiam. Sed multo etiam magis
elaborandum est, ne animi motus a natura recedant; quod assequemur, si
cavebimus, ne in perturbationes atque exanimationes incidamus, et si
attentos animos ad decoris conservationem tenebimus.

*132* Motus autem animorum duplices sunt, alteri cogitationis, alteri
appetitus; cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus
impellit ad agendum. Curandum est igitur, ut cogitatione ad res quam
optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus.

    [129] _ineptiis non vacant_ A B H a b; _inepti non vacant
    offensione_ L c p.

    [130] _in_ Edd.; not in MSS.


#Propriety:#

#(1) in outward appearance;#

*130* XXXVI. Again, there are two orders of beauty: in the one,
loveliness predominates; in the other, dignity; of these, we ought to
regard loveliness as the attribute of woman, and dignity as the
attribute of man. Therefore, let all finery not suitable to a man's
dignity be kept off his person, and let him guard against the like fault
in gesture and action. The manners taught in the palaestra,[AC] for
example, are often rather objectionable, and the gestures of actors on
the stage are not always free from affectation; but simple, unaffected
manners are commendable in both instances. Now dignity of mien is also
to be enhanced by a good complexion; the complexion is the result of
physical exercise. We must besides present an appearance of
neatness--not too punctilious or exquisite, but just enough to avoid
boorish and ill-bred slovenliness. We must follow the same principle in
regard to dress. In this, as in most things, the best rule is the golden
mean.

#(2) in inward self-control.#

*131* We must be careful, too, not to fall into a habit of listless
sauntering in our gait, so as to look like carriers in festal
processions, or of hurrying too fast, when time presses. If we do this,
it puts us out of breath, our looks are changed, our features distorted;
and all this is clear evidence of a lack of poise. But it is much more
important that we succeed in keeping our mental operations in harmony
with nature's laws. And we shall not fail in this if we guard against
violent excitement or depression, and if we keep our minds intent on the
observance of propriety.

*132* Our mental operations, moreover, are of two kinds: some have to do
with thought, others with impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly with the
discovery of truth; impulse prompts to action. We must be careful,
therefore, to employ our thoughts on themes as elevating as possible and
to keep our impulses under the control of reason.

    [AC] The Greek palaestra, a public school of wrestling and
    athletics, adopted by the Romans became a place of exercise
    where the youth were trained in gestures and attitudes, a
    nursery of foppish manners.


XXXVII. Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaque duplex, altera
contentionis, altera sermonis, contentio disceptationibus tribuatur
iudiciorum, contionum, senatus, sermo in circulis, disputationibus,
congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivia.
Contentionis praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud scio
an possint haec quoque esse. Sed discentium studiis inveniuntur
magistri, huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli, rhetorum turba referta
omnia; quamquam, quae[131] verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt,
eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt.

*133* Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus, in voce autem duo
sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis, utrumque omnino a natura petundum
est, verum alterum exercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio presse
loquentium et leniter.

Nihil fuit in Catulis, ut eos exquisito iudicio putares uti litterarum,
quamquam erant litterati; sed et alii; hi autem optime uti lingua Latina
putabantur; sonus erat dulcis, litterae neque expressae neque oppressae,
ne aut obscurum esset aut putidum, sine contentione vox nec languens nec
canora. Uberior oratio L. Crassi nec minus faceta, sed bene loquendi de
Catulis opinio non minor. Sale vero et facetiis Caesar, Catuli patris
frater, vicit omnes, ut in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones
aliorum sermone vinceret.

In omnibus igitur his elaborandum est, si in omni re quid deceat
exquirimus.

*134* Sit ergo hic sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis
minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos; nec vero, tamquam in possessionem
suam venerit, excludat alios, sed cum reliquis in rebus, tum in sermone
communi vicissitudinem non iniquam putet; ac videat in primis, quibus de
rebus loquatur; si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem; in
primisque provideat, ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus;
quod maxime tum solet evenire, cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi
causa aut per ridiculum aut severe maledice contumelioseque dicitur.

*135* Habentur autem plerumque sermones aut de domesticis negotiis aut
de re publica aut de artium studiis atque doctrina. Danda igitur opera
est, ut, etiamsi aberrare ad alia coeperit, ad haec revocetur oratio,
sed utcumque aderunt; neque enim isdem[132] de rebus nec omni tempore
nec similiter delectamur. Animadvertendum est etiam, quatenus sermo
delectationem habeat, et, ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit desinendi
modus.

    [131] _quae_ A^2 c, Edd.; _quoniam_ (per compend.) A^1 B H a
    b.

    [132] _enim isdem_ (_hisdem_ B H) A B H b, Müller; _enim
    omnes isdem_ L c, most Edd.


#Propriety in speech: oratory and conversation.#

XXXVII. The power of speech in the attainment of propriety is great, and
its function is twofold: the first is oratory; the second, conversation.
Oratory is the kind of discourse to be employed in pleadings in court
and speeches in popular assemblies and in the senate; conversation
should find its natural place in social gatherings, in informal
discussions, and in intercourse with friends; it should also seek
admission at dinners. There are rules for oratory laid down by
rhetoricians; there are none for conversation; and yet I do not know why
there should not be. But where there are students to learn, teachers are
found; there are, however, none who make conversation a subject of
study, whereas pupils throng about the rhetoricians everywhere. And yet
the same rules that we have for words and sentences in rhetoric will
apply also to conversation.

*133* Now since we have the voice as the organ of speech, we should aim
to secure two properties for it: that it be clear, and that it be
musical. We must, of course, look to nature for both gifts. But
distinctness may be improved by practice; the musical qualities, by
imitating those who speak with smooth and articulate enunciation.

There was nothing in the two Catuli to lead one to suppose that they had
a refined literary taste; they were men of culture, it is true; and so
were others; but the Catuli were looked upon as the perfect masters of
the Latin tongue. Their pronunciation was charming; their words were
neither mouthed nor mumbled: they avoided both indistinctness and
affectation; their voices were free from strain, yet neither faint nor
shrill. More copious was the speech of Lucius Crassus and not less
brilliant, but the reputation of the two Catuli for eloquence was fully
equal to his. But in wit and humour Caesar, the elder Catulus's
half-brother, surpassed them all: even at the bar he would with his
conversational style defeat other advocates with their elaborate
orations.

If, therefore, we are aiming to secure propriety in every circumstance
of life, we must master all these points.

#Conversation as an art.#

*134* Conversation, then, in which the Socratics are the best models,
should have these qualities. It should be easy and not in the least
dogmatic; it should have the spice of wit. And the one who engages in
conversation should not debar others from participating in it, as if he
were entering upon a private monopoly; but, as in other things, so in a
general conversation he should think it not unfair for each to have his
turn. He should observe, first and foremost, what the subject of
conversation is. If it is grave, he should treat it with seriousness; if
humorous, with wit. And above all, he should be on the watch that his
conversation shall not betray some defect in his character. This is most
likely to occur, when people in jest or in earnest take delight in
making malicious and slanderous statements about the absent, on purpose
to injure their reputations.

*135* The subjects of conversation are usually affairs of the home or
politics or the practice of the professions and learning. Accordingly,
if the talk begins to drift off to other channels, pains should be taken
to bring it back again to the matter in hand--but with due consideration
to the company present; for we are not all interested in the same things
at all times or in the same degree. We must observe, too, how far the
conversation is agreeable and, as it had a reason for its beginning, so
there should be a point at which to close it tactfully.


*136* XXXVIII. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut
perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non
optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira
exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid
appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus,
et vereri et diligere videamur.

Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum
est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore,
id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et
secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam
nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul
absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. *137* Magnam
autem partem[133] clementi castigatione licet uti, gravitate tamen
adiuncta, ut severitas adhibeatur et contumelia repellatur, atque etiam
illud ipsum, quod acerbitatis habet obiurgatio, significandum est,
ipsius id causa, qui obiurgetur, esse susceptum.

Rectum est autem etiam in illis contentionibus, quae cum inimicissimis
fiunt, etiamsi nobis indigna audiamus, tamen gravitatem retinere,
iracundiam pellere. Quae enim cum aliqua perturbatione fiunt, ea nec
constanter fieri possunt neque iis, qui adsunt, probari.

Deforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare falsa praesertim et cum
irrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.

    [133] _magnam autem partem_ Lambinus, Edd.; _magna autem
    parte_ MSS.


#Propriety of speech#

*136* XXXVIII. But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of
life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that
is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be
free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or
inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the
kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and
consideration toward those with whom we converse.

#(1) in reproofs,#

It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On
such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and
more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being
angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to
cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly--never at all, unless it
is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry,
but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious
can be done. *137* In most cases, we may apply a mild reproof, so
combined, however, with earnestness, that while severity is shown,
offensive language is avoided. Nay more, we must show clearly that even
that very harshness which goes with our reproof is designed for the good
of the person reproved.

#(2) in disputes,#

The right course, moreover, even in our differences with our bitterest
enemies, is to maintain our dignity and to repress our anger, even
though we are treated outrageously. For what is done under some degree
of excitement cannot be done with perfect self-respect or the approval
of those who witness it.

#(3) in self-praise.#

It is bad taste also to talk about oneself--especially if what one says
is not true--and, amid the derision of one's hearers, to play "The
Braggart Captain."[AD]

    [AD] Like Pyrgopolinices in the _Miles Gloriosus_ of Plautus,
    or Thraso in the _Eunuchus_ of Terence.


*138* XXXIX. Et quoniam omnia persequimur, volumus quidem certe,
dicendum est etiam, qualem hominis honorati et principis domum placeat
esse, cuius finis est usus,[134] ad quem accommodanda est aedificandi
descriptio et tamen adhibenda commoditatis dignitatisque diligentia.

Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex illa familia consul factus est, honori fuisse
accepimus, quod praeclaram aedificasset in Palatio et plenam dignitatis
domum; quae cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino, novo homini, ad
consulatum putabatur; hanc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit
aedibus. Itaque ille in suam domum consulatum primus attulit, hic, summi
et clarissimi viri filius, in domum multiplicatam non repulsam solum
rettulit, sed ignominiam etiam et[135] calamitatem. *139* Ornanda enim
est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo dominus, sed
domino domus honestanda est, et, ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sua
solum, sed etiam aliorum, sic in domo clari hominis, in quam et hospites
multi recipiendi et admittenda hominum cuiusque modi multitudo,
adhibenda cura est laxitatis; aliter ampla domus dedecori saepe domino
fit,[136] si est in ea solitudo, et maxime, si aliquando alio domino
solita est frequentari. Odiosum est enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur:

#Inc. inc. fab., Ribbeck^2, 184-185#

    o domus ántiqua, heu[137] quam díspari
    domináre domino!

quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere.

*140* Cavendum autem est, praesertim si ipse aedifices, ne extra modum
sumptu et magnificentia prodeas; quo in genere multum mali etiam in
exemplo est. Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hanc partem facta
principum imitantur, ut L. Luculli, summi viri, virtutem quis? at quam
multi villarum magnificentiam imitati! quarum quidem certe est
adhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque[138] revocandus. Eademque
mediocritas ad omnem usum cultumque vitae transferenda est.

Sed haec hactenus.

*141* In omni autem actione suscipienda tria sunt tenenda, primum ut
appetitus rationi pareat, quo nihil est ad officia conservanda
accommodatius, deinde ut animadvertatur, quanta illa res sit, quam
efficere velimus, ut neve maior neve minor cura et opera suscipiatur,
quam causa postulet. Tertium est, ut caveamus, ut ea, quae pertinent ad
liberalem speciem et dignitatem,[139] moderata[140] sint. Modus autem
est optimus decus ipsum tenere, de quo ante diximus, nec progredi
longius. Horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum optemperare
rationi.

    [134] _est usus_ L c, Edd.; _et usus_ B H a b.

    [135] _et_ L c, Edd.; not in B H b.

    [136] _fit_ Bt., Ed.; _sit_ B H a b; _est_ L (corr. ex _sit_
    b), Müller, Heine; not in c.

    [137] _heu_ Edd.; _et_ MSS.; _ei_ Schenkl.

    [138] _mediocritatemque_: _que_ italicized by Ed. but
    attested by B H L b c.

    [139] _ad liberalem speciem et dignitatem_ B H b, Edd.; _ad
    liberalitatem specie et dignitate_ L c p.

    [140] _moderata_ L c p, Edd.; _moderanda_ B H a b.


#The proper home.#

*138* XXXIX. But since I am investigating this subject in all its phases
(at least, that is my purpose), I must discuss also what sort of house a
man of rank and station should, in my opinion, have. Its prime object is
serviceableness. To this the plan of the building should be adapted; and
yet careful attention should be paid to its convenience and distinction.

We have heard that Gnaeus Octavius--the first of that family to be
elected consul--distinguished himself by building upon the Palatine an
attractive and imposing house. Everybody went to see it, and it was
thought to have gained votes for the owner, a new man, in his canvass
for the consulship. That house Scaurus demolished, and on its site he
built an addition to his own house. Octavius, then, was the first of his
family to bring the honour of a consulship to his house; Scaurus, though
the son of a very great and illustrious man, brought to the same house,
when enlarged, not only defeat, but disgrace and ruin. *139* The truth
is, a man's dignity may be enhanced by the house he lives in, but not
wholly secured by it; the owner should bring honour to his house, not
the house to its owner. And, as in everything else a man must have
regard not for himself alone but for others also, so in the home of a
distinguished man, in which numerous guests must be entertained and
crowds of every sort of people received, care must be taken to have it
spacious. But if it is not frequented by visitors, if it has an air of
lonesomeness, a spacious palace often becomes a discredit to its owner.
This is sure to be the case if at some other time, when it had a
different owner, it used to be thronged. For it is unpleasant, when
passers-by remark:

    "O good old house, alas! how different
    The owner who now owneth thee!"

And in these times that may be said of many a house![AE]

*140* One must be careful, too, not to go beyond proper bounds in
expense and display, especially if one is building for oneself. For much
mischief is done in this way, if only in the example set. For many
people imitate zealously the foibles of the great, particularly in this
direction: for example, who copies the virtues of Lucius Lucullus,
excellent man that he was? But how many there are who have copied the
magnificence of his villas! Some limit should surely be set to this
tendency and it should be reduced at least to a standard of moderation;
and by that same standard of moderation the comforts and wants of life
generally should be regulated.

But enough on this part of my theme.

#Three rules for the duty of propriety.#

*141* In entering upon any course of action, then, we must hold fast to
three principles: first, that impulse shall obey reason; for there is no
better way than this to secure the observance of duties; second, that we
estimate carefully the importance of the object that we wish to
accomplish, so that neither more nor less care and attention may be
expended upon it than the case requires; the third principle is that we
be careful to observe moderation in all that is essential to the outward
appearance and dignity of a gentleman. Moreover, the best rule for
securing this is strictly to observe that propriety which we have
discussed above, and not to overstep it. Yet of these three principles,
the one of prime importance is to keep impulse subservient to reason.

    [AE] Members of Caesar's party were now occupying the houses
    that had been the homes of Pompey's friends. Antony, for
    example, lived in Pompey's house.


*142* XL. Deinceps de ordine rerum et de opportunitate temporum dicendum
est. Haec autem scientia continentur ea, quam Graeci εὐταξίαν nominant,
non hanc, quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest, sed
illa est εὐταξία, in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio. Itaque, ut
eandem nos modestiam appellemus, sic definitur a Stoicis, ut modestia
sit scientia rerum earum, quae agentur aut dicentur, loco suo
collocandarum. Ita videtur eadem vis ordinis et collocationis fore; nam
et ordinem sic definiunt: compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis
locis; locum autem actionis opportunitatem[141] temporis esse dicunt;
tempus autem actionis opportunum[142] Graece εὐκαιρία, Latine appellatur
occasio. Sic fit, ut modestia haec, quam ita interpretamur, ut dixi,
scientia sit opportunitatis[143] idoneorum ad agendum temporum.

#Ch. VI#

*143* Sed potest eadem esse prudentiae definitio, de qua principio
diximus; hoc autem loco de moderatione et temperantia et harum similibus
virtutibus quaerimus. Itaque, quae erant prudentiae propria, suo loco
dicta sunt; quae autem harum virtutum, de quibus iam diu loquimur, quae
pertinent ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem, quibuscum vivimus,
nunc dicenda sunt.

*144* Talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus, ut, quem ad modum in
oratione constanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se et
convenientia; turpe enim valdeque vitiosum in re severa convivio
digna[144] aut delicatum aliquem inferre sermonem. Bene Pericles, cum
haberet collegam in praetura Sophoclem poëtam iique de communi officio
convenissent et casu formosus puer praeteriret dixissetque Sophocles: "O
puerum pulchrum, Pericle!" "At enim praetorem, Sophocle, decet non solum
manus, sed etiam oculos abstinentes habere." Atqui[145] hoc idem
Sophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione
caruisset. Tanta vis est et loci et temporis. Ut, si qui, cum causam sit
acturus, in itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur, aut si quid
aliud attentius cogitet, non reprehendatur, at hoc idem si in convivio
faciat, inhumanus videatur inscitia temporis.

*145* Sed ea, quae multum ab humanitate discrepant, ut si qui in foro
cantet, aut si qua est alia magna perversitas, facile apparet nec
magnopere admonitionem et praecepta desiderat; quae autem parva videntur
esse delicta neque a multis intellegi possunt, ab iis[146] est
diligentius declinandum. Ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paulum
discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet, sic videndum[147] est
in vita ne forte quid discrepet, vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et
melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est.

    [141] _oportunitate(m)_ Ed.

    [142] _oportunum_ Ed.

    [143] _oportunitatis_ Ed.

    [144] _convivio digna_ B H a b, Edd.; _convivio dignum_ c;
    _convivii dicta_ L p.

    [145] _Atqui_ Müller, Heine; _atque_ MSS., Bt.

    [146] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ MSS.

    [147] _videndum_ L c, Edd.; _vivendum_ B H a b.


#Orderliness--the right thing at the right time.#

*142* XL. Next, then, we must discuss orderliness of conduct and
seasonableness of occasions. These two qualities are embraced in that
science which the Greeks call εὐταξία--not that εὐταξία which we
translate with _moderation_ [_modestia_], derived from _moderate_; but
this is the εὐταξία by which we understand _orderly conduct_. And so, if
we may call it also _moderation_, it is defined by the Stoics as
follows: "Moderation is the science of disposing aright everything that
is done or said." So the essence of orderliness and of right-placing, it
seems, will be the same; for _orderliness_ they define also as "the
arrangement of things in their suitable and appropriate places." By
"place of action," moreover, they mean _seasonableness of circumstance_;
and the _seasonable circumstance_ for an action is called in Greek
εὐκαιρία, in Latin _occasio_ (occasion). So it comes about that in this
sense _moderation_, which we explain as I have indicated, is the
science of doing the right thing at the right time.

*143* A similar definition can be given for prudence, of which I have
spoken in an early chapter. But in this part we are considering
temperance and self-control and related virtues. Accordingly, the
properties which, as we found, are peculiar to prudence, were discussed
in their proper place, while those are to be discussed now which are
peculiar to these virtues of which we have for some time been speaking
and which relate to considerateness and to the approbation of our
fellow-men.

*144* Such orderliness of conduct is, therefore, to be observed, that
everything in the conduct of our life shall balance and harmonize, as in
a finished speech. #Seasonableness of speech.# For it is unbecoming and
highly censurable, when upon a serious theme, to introduce such jests as
are proper at a dinner, or any sort of loose talk. When Pericles was
associated with the poet Sophocles as his colleague in command and they
had met to confer about official business that concerned them both, a
handsome boy chanced to pass and Sophocles said: "Look, Pericles; what a
pretty boy!" How pertinent was Pericles's reply: "Hush, Sophocles, a
general should keep not only his hands but his eyes under control." And
yet, if Sophocles had made this same remark at a trial of athletes, he
would have incurred no just reprimand. So great is the significance of
both place and circumstance. For example, if anyone, while on a journey
or on a walk, should rehearse to himself a case which he is preparing to
conduct in court, or if he should under similar circumstances apply his
closest thought to some other subject, he would not be open to censure;
but if he should do that same thing at a dinner, he would be thought
ill-bred, because he ignored the proprieties of the occasion.

#The little things that count.#

*145* But flagrant breaches of good breeding, like singing in the
streets or any other gross misconduct, are easily apparent and do not
call especially for admonition and instruction. But we must even more
carefully avoid those seemingly trivial faults which pass unnoticed by
the many. However slightly out of tune a harp or flute may be, the fault
is still detected by a connoisseur; so we must be on the watch lest
haply something in our life be out of tune--nay, rather, far greater is
the need for painstaking, inasmuch as harmony of actions is far better
and far more important than harmony of sounds.


*146* XLI. Itaque, ut in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt,
sic nos, si acres ac diligentes esse volumus animadversores[que][148]
vitiorum, magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis. Ex oculorum optutu,
superciliorum aut remissione aut contractione, ex maestitia, ex
hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia, ex contentione vocis,
ex summissione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte
fiat, quid ab officio naturaque discrepet. Quo in genere non est
incommodum, quale quidque eorum sit, ex aliis iudicare, ut, si quid
dedeceat in illis,[149] vitemus ipsi; fit enim nescio quo modo, ut magis
in aliis cernamus quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur. Itaque
facillime corriguntur in discendo, quorum vitia imitantur emendandi
causa magistri.

*147* Nec vero alienum est ad ea eligenda, quae dubitationem afferent,
adhibere doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos et, quid iis de quoque
officii genere placeat, exquirere. Maior enim pars eo fere deferri
solet, quo a natura ipsa deducitur. In quibus videndum est, non modo
quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque sentiat atque etiam de qua
causa quisque sentiat. Ut enim pictores et ii, qui signa fabricantur, et
vero etiam poëtae suum quisque opus a vulgo considerari vult, ut, si
quid reprehensum sit a pluribus, id corrigatur, iique et secum et ab
aliis,[150] quid in eo peccatum sit, exquirunt, sic aliorum iudicio
permulta nobis et facienda et non facienda et mutanda et corrigenda
sunt.

*148* Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de iis nihil est
praecipiendum; illa enim ipsa praecepta sunt, nec quemquam hoc errore
duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem
consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sint, idem sibi arbitretur
licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc licentiam assequebantur.
Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae,
sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.

*149* Eos autem, quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis atque magnis
est, bene de re publica sentientes ac bene meritos aut merentes sic
ut[151] aliquo honore aut imperio affectos observare et colere debemus,
tribuere etiam multum senectuti, cedere iis, qui magistratum habebunt,
habere dilectum civis et peregrini in ipsoque peregrino, privatimne an
publice venerit. Ad summam, ne agam de singulis, communem totius generis
hominum conciliationem et consociationem colere, tueri, servare debemus.

    [148] _animadversores_ [_que_] Ed.; _animadversoresque_ MSS.;
    *_animadversoresque_ Bt.; _animadversores_ Orelli, Müller,
    Heine.

    [149] _dedeceat_ a c, Edd.; _deceat_ H L b; _non deceat_ B.
    _in illis_ a Bt.^1, Ed.; _in illos_ B H b c; _illos_ L, Bt.^2

    [150] _et ab aliis_ a, Bt., Ed.; _aliis_ B H b; _et cum
    aliis_ c; _et ex aliis_ Unger, Müller.

    [151] _sic ut_ L p, Nonius; not in B H b c.


#We correct our faults#

#(1) by observing others,#

*146* XLI. As, therefore, a musical ear detects even the slightest
falsity of tone in a harp, so we, if we wish to be keen and careful
observers of moral faults, shall often draw important conclusions from
trifles. We observe others and from a glance of the eyes, from a
contracting or relaxing of the brows, from an air of sadness, from an
outburst of joy, from a laugh, from speech, from silence, from a raising
or lowering of the voice, and the like, we shall easily judge which of
our actions is proper, and which is out of accord with duty and nature.
And, in the same manner, it is not a bad plan to judge of the nature of
our every action by studying others, that so we may ourselves avoid
anything that is unbecoming in them. For it happens somehow or other
that we detect another's failings more readily than we do our own; and
so in the school-room those pupils learn most easily to do better whose
faults the masters mimic for the sake of correcting them.

#(2) by the criticisms of the wise.#

*147* Nor is it out of place in making a choice between duties involving
a doubt, to consult men of learning or practical wisdom and to ascertain
what their views are on any particular question of duty. For the
majority usually drift as the current of their own natural inclinations
carries them; and in deriving counsel from one of these, we have to see
not only what our adviser says, but also what he thinks, and what his
reasons are for thinking as he does. For, as painters and sculptors and
even poets, too, wish to have their works reviewed by the public, in
order that, if any point is generally criticized, it may be improved;
and as they try to discover both by themselves and with the help of
others what is wrong in their work; so through consulting the judgment
of others we find that there are many things to be done and left undone,
to be altered and improved.

#The laws of the state are rules of duty.#

*148* But no rules need to be given about what is done in accordance
with the established customs and conventions of a community; for these
are in themselves rules; and no one ought to make the mistake of
supposing that, because Socrates or Aristippus did or said something
contrary to the manners and established customs of their city, he has a
right to do the same; it was only by reason of their great and
superhuman virtues that those famous men acquired this special
privilege. But the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected,
for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility
nothing can be upright, nothing morally good.

#Special rules.#

*149* It is, furthermore, our duty to honour and reverence those whose
lives are conspicuous for conduct in keeping with their high moral
standards, and who, as true patriots, have rendered or are now rendering
efficient service to their country, just as much as if they were
invested with some civil or military authority; it is our duty also to
show proper respect to old age, to yield precedence to magistrates, to
make a distinction between a fellow-citizen and a foreigner, and, in the
case of the foreigner himself, to discriminate according to whether he
has come in an official or a private capacity. In a word, not to go into
details, it is our duty to respect, defend, and maintain the common
bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all the members of the
human race.


*150* XLII. Iam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberales habendi, qui
sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus. Primum improbantur ii quaestus, qui
in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratorum. Illiberales
autem et sordidi quaestus mercennariorum omnium, quorum operae, non
quorum artes emuntur; est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum
servitutis. Sordidi etiam putandi, qui mercantur a mercatoribus, quod
statim vendant; nihil enim proficiant, nisi admodum mentiantur; nec vero
est quicquam turpius vanitate. Opificesque omnes in sordida arte
versantur; nec enim quicquam ingenuum habere potest officina. Minimeque
artes eae probandae, quae ministrae sunt voluptatum:

#Eunuchus II, 2, 26#

    Cetárii, lanií, coqui, fartóres, piscatóres,

ut ait Terentius; adde huc, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores totumque
ludum talarium.

*151* Quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris
utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum
honestarum, eae sunt iis, quorum ordini conveniunt, honestae. Mercatura
autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; sin magna et copiosa, multa
undique apportans multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum
vituperanda, atque etiam, si satiata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut
saepe ex alto in portum, ex ipso portu se in agros possessionesque
contulit, videtur iure optimo posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex
quibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius,
nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero[152] dignius; #C.M. XV-XVII# de qua
quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim[153] assumes, quae
ad hunc locum pertinebunt.

    [152] _homine libero_ Edd.; _homine nihil libero_ B H L a b
    c.

    [153] _illim_ B^1, Edd.; _illum_ H; _illa_ B^2 p; _illinc_ a
    b c; _illic_ L.


#Occupations:#

#(1) vulgar,#

*150* XLII. Now in regard to trades and other means of livelihood, which
ones are to be considered becoming to a gentleman and which ones are
vulgar, we have been taught, in general, as follows. First, those means
of livelihood are rejected as undesirable which incur people's ill-will,
as those of tax-gatherers and usurers. Unbecoming to a gentleman, too,
and vulgar are the means of livelihood of all hired workmen whom we pay
for mere manual labour, not for artistic skill; for in their case the
very wages they receive is a pledge of their slavery. Vulgar we must
consider those also who buy from wholesale merchants to retail
immediately; for they would get no profits without a great deal of
downright lying; and verily, there is no action that is meaner than
misrepresentation. And all mechanics are engaged in vulgar trades; for
no workshop can have anything liberal about it. Least respectable of all
are those trades which cater to sensual pleasures:

    "Fishmongers, butchers, cooks, and poulterers,
    And fishermen,"

as Terence says. Add to these, if you please, the perfumers, dancers,
and the whole _corps de ballet_.[AF]

#(2) liberal.#

*151* But the professions in which either a higher degree of
intelligence is required or from which no small benefit to society is
derived--medicine and architecture, for example, and teaching--these are
proper for those whose social position they become. Trade, if it is on a
small scale, is to be considered vulgar; but if wholesale and on a large
scale, importing large quantities from all parts of the world and
distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be greatly
disparaged. Nay, it even seems to deserve the highest respect, if those
who are engaged in it, satiated, or rather, I should say, satisfied with
the fortunes they have made, make their way from the port to a country
estate, as they have often made it from the sea into port. But of all
the occupations by which gain is secured, none is better than
agriculture, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more
becoming to a freeman. But since I have discussed this quite fully in my
Cato Major, you will find there the material that applies to this point.

    [AF] The _ludus talarius_ was a kind of low variety show,
    with loose songs and dances and bad music.


*152* XLIII. Sed ab iis partibus, quae sunt honestatis, quem ad modum
officia ducerentur, satis expositum videtur. Eorum autem ipsorum, quae
honesta sunt, potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, de duobus
honestis utrum honestius, qui locus a Panaetio est praetermissus. Nam
cum omnis honestas manet a partibus quattuor, quarum una sit
cognitionis, altera communitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta
moderationis, haec in deligendo officio saepe inter se comparentur
necesse est.

*153* Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex
communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur, idque hoc argumento
confirmari potest, quod, si contigerit ea vita sapienti, ut omnium rerum
affluentibus copiis [quamvis] omnia,[154] quae cognitione digna sint,
summo otio secum ipse consideret et contempletur, tamen, si solitudo
tanta sit, ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita. Princepsque
omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam σοφίαν Graeci vocant--prudentiam
enim, quam Graeci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est
rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam
principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua
continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; ea si
maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est, quod a communitate ducatur
officium, id esse maximum. Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca
quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea
autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur; pertinet igitur
ad societatem generis humani; ergo haec cognitioni anteponenda est.

*154* Atque id optimus quisque re ipsa[155] ostendit et iudicat. Quis
enim est tam cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura, ut, si
ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit
allatum periculum discrimenque patriae, cui subvenire opitularique
possit, non illa omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se
stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur? atque hoc idem
in parentis, in amici re aut periculo fecerit.

*155* Quibus rebus intellegitur studiis officiisque scientiae
praeponenda esse officia iustitiae, quae pertinent ad hominum
utilitatem,[156] qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius.

    [154] _copiis_ [_quamvis_] _omnia_, Ed.; _copiis quamvis omnia_
    MSS.; _copiis omnia_ Lambinus, Bt., Müller, Heine.

    [155] _re ipsa_ B H a b, Bt., Ed.; _re ab se_ L c (i.e.
    _reapse_ Orelli, Müller, Heine); _ab ipsa re_ p.

    [156] _utilitatem_ B H a b; _caritatem_ L c p (affection).


#Comparative estimate of duties.#

*152* XLIII. Now, I think I have explained fully enough how moral duties
are derived from the four divisions of moral rectitude. But between
those very actions which are morally right, a conflict and comparison
may frequently arise, as to which of two moral actions is morally
better--a point overlooked by Panaetius. For, since all moral rectitude
springs from four sources (one of which is prudence; the second, social
instinct; the third, courage; the fourth, temperance) it is often
necessary in deciding a question of duty that these virtues be weighed
against one another.

#Justice _vs._ Wisdom.#

*153* My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to nature
which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon
knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: (1)
suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that, with an
abundance of everything pouring in upon him, he might in perfect peace
study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the
solitude were so complete that he could never see a human being, he
would die. And then, the foremost of all virtues is wisdom--what the
Greeks call σοφία; for by prudence, which they call φρόνησις, we
understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to
be sought for and of things to be avoided. (2) Again, that wisdom which
I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things human and
divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and
men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of
the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty
which is connected with the social obligation is the most important
duty.[AG] And (3) service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for
the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and
defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover,
are best seen in the safe-guarding of human interests. It is essential,
then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above
speculative knowledge.

*154* Upon this all the best men agree, as they prove by their conduct.
For who is so absorbed in the investigation and study of creation, but
that, even though he were working and pondering over tasks never so much
worth mastering and even though he thought he could number the stars and
measure the length and breadth of the universe, he would drop all those
problems and cast them aside, if word were suddenly brought to him of
some critical peril to his country, which he could relieve or repel? And
he would do the same to further the interests of parent or friend or to
save him from danger.

*155* From all this we conclude that the duties prescribed by justice
must be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and the duties
imposed by it; for the former concern the welfare of our fellow-men; and
nothing ought to be more sacred in men's eyes than that.

    [AG] Cicero is guilty of a curious fallacy. If it follows
    from his premises, (1) some one virtue is the highest virtue,
    and (2) the duties derived from the highest virtue are the
    highest duties, and if (3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then
    it can only follow that the duties derived from wisdom are
    the highest duties. But Cicero throws in a fourth premise
    that the "bonds of union between gods and men and the
    relations of man to man" are derived from wisdom, and
    therewith sidetracks wisdom and gives the duties derived from
    the social instinct the place from which wisdom has been
    shunted.

    Cicero could not refrain from introducing a bit of
    theoretical speculation that has no value for his practical
    position--it actually prejudices it and confuses the reader.


XLIV. Atque illi, quorum studia vitaque omnis in rerum cognitione
versata est, tamen ab augendis hominum utilitatibus et commodis non
recesserunt: nam et erudiverunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresque
rebus suis publicis essent, ut Thebanum Epaminondam Lysis Pythagoreus,
Syracosium Dionem Plato multique multos, nosque ipsi, quicquid ad rem
publicam attulimus, si modo aliquid attulimus, a doctoribus atque
doctrina instructi ad eam et ornati accessimus. *156* Neque solum vivi
atque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt atque docent, sed hoc idem
etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum assequuntur. Nec enim locus
ullus est praetermissus ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad
disciplinam rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium
contulisse videantur. Ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae
dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam prudentiam intellegentiamque
potissimum conferunt; ob eamque etiam causam eloqui copiose, modo
prudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod
cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum
communitate iuncti sumus.

*157* Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur,
sed, cum congregabilia natura sint, fingunt favos, sic homines, ac multo
etiam magis, natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique[157]
sollertiam. Itaque, nisi ea virtus, quae constat ex hominibus tuendis,
id est ex societate generis humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga
cognitio et ieiuna videatur, itemque magnitudo animi remota
communitate[158] coniunctioneque humana feritas sit quaedam et
immanitas. Ita fit, ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum
atque communitas.

#Plato, Rep. II, 369 B; Arist., Pol. I, 1253 A#

*158* Nec verum est, quod dicitur a quibusdam, propter necessitatem
vitae, quod ea, quae natura desideraret, consequi sine aliis atque
efficere non possemus, idcirco initam esse cum hominibus communitatem et
societatem; quodsi omnia nobis, quae ad victum cultumque pertinent,
quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, tum optimo quisque
ingenio negotiis omnibus omissis totum se in cognitione et scientia
collocaret. Non est ita; nam et solitudinem fugeret et socium studii
quaereret, tum docere tum discere vellet, tum audire tum dicere. Ergo
omne officium, quod ad coniunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam
valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia
continetur.

    [157] _cogitandique_ L c p, Edd.; _congregandique_ B H a b.

    [158] _communitate_ p (per compendium), Bt.^2, Müller, Heine;
    _comitate_ A B H L a b c.


#Wisdom in the service of Justice.#

XLIV. And yet scholars, whose whole life and interests have been devoted
to the pursuit of knowledge, have not, after all, failed to contribute
to the advantages and blessings of mankind. For they have trained many
to be better citizens and to render larger service to their country. So,
for example, the Pythagorean Lysis taught Epaminondas of Thebes; Plato,
Dion of Syracuse; and many, many others. As for me myself, whatever
service I have rendered to my country--if, indeed, I have rendered
any--I came to my task trained and equipped for it by my teachers and
what they taught me. *156* And not only while present in the flesh do
they teach and train those who are desirous of learning, but by the
written memorials of their learning they continue the same service after
they are dead. For they have overlooked no point that has a bearing
upon laws, customs, or political science; in fact, they seem to have
devoted their retirement to the benefit of us who are engaged in public
business. The principal thing done, therefore, by those very devotees of
the pursuits of learning and science is to apply their own practical
wisdom and insight to the service of humanity. And for that reason also
much speaking (if only it contain wisdom) is better than speculation
never so profound without speech; for mere speculation is self-centred,
while speech extends its benefits to those with whom we are united by
the bonds of society.

*157* And again, as swarms of bees do not gather for the sake of making
honeycomb but make the honeycomb because they are gregarious by nature,
so human beings--and to a much higher degree--exercise their skill
together in action and thought because they are naturally gregarious.
#Justice more valuable than Wisdom and Fortitude.# And so, if that
virtue [Justice] which centres in the safeguarding of human interests,
that is, in the maintenance of human society, were not to accompany the
pursuit of knowledge, that knowledge would seem isolated and barren of
results. In the same way, courage [Fortitude], if unrestrained by the
uniting bonds of society, would be but a sort of brutality and savagery.
Hence it follows that the claims of human society and the bonds that
unite men together take precedence of the pursuit of speculative
knowledge.

*158* And it is not true, as certain people maintain, that the bonds of
union in human society were instituted in order to provide for the needs
of daily life; for, they say, without the aid of others we could not
secure for ourselves or supply to others the things that nature
requires; but if all that is essential to our wants and comfort were
supplied by some magic wand, as in the stories, then every man of
first-rate ability could drop all other responsibility and devote
himself exclusively to learning and study. Not at all. For he would seek
to escape from his loneliness and to find some one to share his studies;
he would wish to teach, as well as to learn; to hear, as well as to
speak. Every duty, therefore, that tends effectively to maintain and
safeguard human society should be given the preference over that duty
which arises from speculation and science alone.


*159* XLV. Illud forsitan quaerendum sit, num haec communitas, quae
maxime est apta naturae, sit etiam moderationi modestiaeque semper
anteponenda. Non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita
flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservandae quidem patriae causa sapiens facturus
sit. Ea Posidonius collegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita
obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia. Haec igitur non suscipiet rei
publicae causa, ne res publica quidem pro se suscipi volet. Sed hoc[159]
commodius se res habet, quod non potest accidere tempus, ut intersit rei
publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.

*160* Quare hoc quidem effectum sit, in officiis deligendis id[160]
genus officiorum excellere, quod teneatur hominum societate. [Etenim
cognitionem prudentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit, ut agere
considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter.][161]

Atque haec quidem hactenus. Patefactus enim locus est ipse, ut non
difficile sit in exquirendo officio, quid cuique sit praeponendum,
videre. In ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum, ex quibus,
quid cuique praestet, intellegi possit, ut prima dis immortalibus,
secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis
debeantur.

*161* Quibus ex rebus breviter disputatis intellegi potest non solum id
homines solere dubitare, honestumne an turpe sit, sed etiam duobus
propositis honestis utrum honestius sit. Hic locus a Panaetio est, ut
supra dixi, praetermissus. Sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.

    [159] _hoc_ L c p, Edd.; _haec_ B H a b.

    [160] _id_ a, Edd.; _ut_ b; _hoc_ B H L c p.

    [161] _Etenim ... prudenter_ bracketed by Unger.


#Justice _vs._ Temperance.#

*159* XLV. The following question should, perhaps, be asked: whether
this social instinct, which is the deepest feeling in our nature, is
always to have precedence over temperance and moderation also. I think
not. For there are some acts either so repulsive or so wicked, that a
wise man would not commit them, even to save his country. Posidonius has
made a large collection of them; but some of them are so shocking, so
indecent, that it seems immoral even to mention them. The wise man,
therefore, will not think of doing any such thing for the sake of his
country; no more will his country consent to have it done for her. But
the problem is the more easily disposed of because the occasion cannot
arise when it could be to the state's interest to have the wise man do
any of those things.

#Order of precedence of duties.#

*160* This, then, may be regarded as settled: in choosing between
conflicting duties, that class takes precedence which is demanded by the
interests of human society. [And this is the natural sequence; for
discreet action will presuppose learning and practical wisdom; it
follows, therefore, that discreet action is of more value than wise (but
inactive) speculation.]

So much must suffice for this topic. For, in its essence, it has been
made so clear, that in determining a question of duty it is not
difficult to see which duty is to be preferred to any other. Moreover,
even in the social relations themselves there are gradations of duty so
well defined that it can easily be seen which duty takes precedence of
any other: our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to
country; our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the
rest.

*161* From this brief discussion, then, it can be understood that people
are often in doubt not only whether an action is morally right or wrong,
but also, when a choice is offered between two moral actions, which one
is morally better. This point, as I remarked above, has been overlooked
by Panaetius. But let us now pass on to what remains.



CICERO DE OFFICIIS



BOOK II

EXPEDIENCY



LIBER SECUNDUS / BOOK II


*1* I. Quem ad modum officia ducerentur ab honestate, Marce fili, atque
ab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore.
Sequitur, ut haec officiorum genera persequar, quae pertinent ad vitae
cultum et ad earum rerum, quibus utuntur homines, facultatem, ad opes,
ad copias[; in quo tum quaeri dixi, quid utile, quid inutile, tum ex
utilibus quid utilius aut quid maxime utile].[162] De quibus dicere
aggrediar, si pauca prius de instituto ac de iudicio meo dixero.

*2* Quamquam enim libri nostri complures non modo ad legendi, sed etiam
ad scribendi studium excitaverunt, tamen interdum vereor, ne quibusdam
bonis viris philosophiae nomen sit invisum mirenturque in ea tantum me
operae et temporis ponere.

Ego autem, quam diu res publica per eos gerebatur, quibus se ipsa
commiserat, omnis meas curas cogitationesque in eam conferebam; cum
autem dominatu unius omnia tenerentur neque esset usquam consilio aut
auctoritati locus, socios denique tuendae rei publicae, summos viros,
amisissem, nec me angoribus dedidi, quibus essem confectus, nisi iis
restitissem, nec rursum indignis homine docto voluptatibus.

*3* Atque utinam res publica stetisset, quo coeperat, statu nec in
homines non tam commutandarum quam evertendarum rerum cupidos
incidisset! Primum enim, ut stante re publica facere solebamus, in
agendo plus quam in scribendo operae poneremus, deinde ipsis scriptis
non ea, quae nunc, sed actiones nostras mandaremus, ut saepe fecimus.
Cum autem res publica, in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera poni
solebat, nulla esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt
forenses et senatoriae. *4* Nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in
his studiis ab initio versatus aetatis existimavi honestissime
molestias[163] posse deponi, si me ad philosophiam rettulissem. Cui cum
multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, posteaquam
honoribus inservire coepi meque totum rei publicae tradidi, tantum erat
philosophiae loci, quantum superfuerat amicorum et rei publicae
temporibus;[164] id autem omne consumebatur in legendo, scribendi otium
non erat.

    [162] _in quo ... maxime utile_ bracketed by Heumann,
    Facciolati, Edd.; _tum ex ... maxime utile_ not in B H a b.

    [163] _molestias_ L c p, Nonius, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [164] _temporibus_ Victorius, Edd.; _temporis_ B H a b;
    _tempori_ L c p.


#Statement of subject.#

*1* I. I believe, Marcus, my son, that I have fully explained in the
preceding book how duties are from moral rectitude, or rather from each
of virtue's four divisions. My next step is to trace out those kinds of
duty which have to do with the comforts of life, with the means of
acquiring the things that people enjoy, with influence, and with wealth.
[In this connection, the question is, as I said: (1) what is expedient,
and what is inexpedient; and (2) of several expedients, which is of more
and which of most importance.] These questions I shall proceed to
discuss, after I have said a few words in vindication of my present
purpose and my principles of philosophy.

#Why Cicero wrote on philosophy.#

*2* Although my books have aroused in not a few men the desire not only
to read but to write, yet I sometimes fear that what we term philosophy
is distasteful to certain worthy gentlemen, and that they wonder that I
devote so much time and attention to it.

Now, as long as the state was administered by the men to whose care she
had voluntarily entrusted herself, I devoted all my effort and thought
to her. But when everything passed under the absolute control of a
despot and there was no longer any room for statesmanship or authority
of mine; and finally when I had lost the friends[AH] who had been
associated with me in the task of serving the interests of the state,
and who were men of the highest standing, I did not resign myself to
grief, by which I should have been overwhelmed, had I not struggled
against it; neither, on the other hand, did I surrender myself to a life
of sensual pleasure unbecoming to a philosopher.

*3* I would that the government had stood fast in the position it had
begun to assume and had not fallen into the hands of men who desired not
so much to reform as to abolish the constitution. For then, in the first
place, I should now be devoting my energies more to public speaking than
to writing, as I used to do when the republic stood; and in the second
place, I should be committing to written form not these present essays
but my public speeches, as I often formerly did. But when the republic,
to which all my care and thought and effort used to be devoted, was no
more, then, of course, my voice was silenced in the forum and in the
senate. *4* And since my mind could not be wholly idle, I thought, as I
had been well-read along these lines of thought from my early youth,
that the most honourable way for me to forget my sorrows would be by
turning to philosophy. As a young man, I had devoted a great deal of
time to philosophy as a discipline; but after I began to fill the high
offices of state and devoted myself heart and soul to the public
service, there was only so much time for philosophical studies as was
left over from the claims of my friends and of the state; all of this
was spent in reading; I had no leisure for writing.

    [AH] Such as Pompey, Cato, Hortensius, and Piso.


*5* II. Maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni assecuti videmur, ut ea
litteris mandaremus, quae nec erant satis nota nostris et erant
cognitione dignissima. Quid enim est, per deos, optabilius sapientia,
quid praestantius, quid homini melius, quid homine dignius? Hanc igitur
qui expetunt,[165] philosophi nominantur, nec quicquam aliud est
philosophia, si interpretari velis, praeter studium sapientiae.
Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum
divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur,
scientia; cuius studium qui vituperat, haud sane intellego, quidnam sit,
quod laudandum putet. *6* Nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque
curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid
anquirunt, quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? sive ratio
constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino, per
quam eas assequamur. Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum
minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium
atque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autem est aliqua disciplina
virtutis, ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab hoc discendi genere discesseris?

#Hortensius, de Div., II, 1.#

Sed haec, cum ad philosophiam cohortamur, accuratius disputari solent,
quod alio quodam libro fecimus; hoc autem tempore tantum nobis
declarandum fuit, cur orbati rei publicae muneribus ad hoc nos studium
potissimum contulissemus.

*7* Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis quaerentibus,
satisne constanter facere videamur, qui, cum percipi nihil posse
dicamus, tamen et aliis de rebus disserere soleamus et hoc ipso tempore
praecepta officii persequamur. Quibus vellem satis cognita esset nostra
sententia. Non enim sumus ii, quorum vagetur animus errore nec habeat
umquam, quid sequatur. Quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius
non modo disputandi, sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata? Nos autem, ut
ceteri alia certa, alia incerta esse dicunt, sic ab his dissentientes
alia probabilia, contra alia dicimus.

*8* Quid est igitur, quod me impediat ea, quae probabilia mihi
videantur, sequi, quae contra, improbare atque affirmandi arrogantiam
vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapientia dissidet plurimum? Contra
autem omnia disputatur[166] a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere
non posset,[167] nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio.

#II, 20 ff.#

Sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror,
diligenter. Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima
nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris iis simillimo, qui
ista praeclara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra finitima vestris ignota
esse nolui.

Sed iam ad instituta pergamus.

    [165] _expetunt_ L c p, Edd.; _expetant_ H; _expectant_ B a
    b.

    [166] _disputatur_ Edd.; _disputantur_ MSS.

    [167] _posset_ a c; _possit_ B H b.


#Why philosophy is worth while.#

*5* II. Therefore, amid all the present most awful calamities I yet
flatter myself that I have won this good out of evil--that I may commit
to written form matters not at all familiar to our countrymen but still
very much worth their knowing. For what, in the name of heaven, is more
to be desired than wisdom? What is more to be prized? What is better
for a man, what more worthy of his nature? Those who seek after it are
called philosophers; and philosophy is nothing else, if one will
translate the word into our idiom, than "the love of wisdom." Wisdom,
moreover, as the word has been defined by the philosophers of old, is
"the knowledge of things human and divine and of the causes by which
those things are controlled." And if the man lives who would belittle
the study of philosophy, I quite fail to see what in the world he would
see fit to praise. *6* For if we are looking for mental enjoyment and
relaxation, what pleasure can be compared with the pursuits of those who
are always studying out something that will tend toward and effectively
promote a good and happy life? Or, if regard is had for strength of
character and virtue, then this is the method by which we can attain to
those qualities, or there is none at all. And to say that there is no
"method" for securing the highest blessings, when none even of the least
important concerns is without its method, is the language of people who
talk without due reflection and who blunder in matters of the utmost
importance. Furthermore, if there is really a way to learn virtue, where
shall one look for it, when one has turned aside from this field of
learning?

Now, when I am advocating the study of philosophy, I usually discuss
this subject at greater length, as I have done in another of my books.
For the present I meant only to explain why, deprived of the tasks of
public service, I have devoted myself to this particular pursuit.

#Position of the New Academy.#

*7* But people raise other objections against me--and that, too,
philosophers and scholars--asking whether I think I am quite consistent
in my conduct: for although our school maintains that nothing can be
known for certain, yet, they urge, I make a habit of presenting my
opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to
formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding
of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in
uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of
mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should
dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? Not so with
us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others
uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable,
others improbable.

*8* What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be
probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning
the presumption of dogmatism, while keeping clear of that recklessness
of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom? And
as to the fact that our school argues against everything, that is only
because we could not get a clear view of what is "probable," unless a
comparative estimate were made of all the arguments on both sides.

But this subject has been, I think, quite fully set forth in my
"Academics." And although, my dear Cicero, you are a student of that
most ancient and celebrated school of philosophy, with Cratippus as your
master--and he deserves to be classed with the founders of that
illustrious sect[AI]--still I wish our school, which is closely related
to yours, not to be unknown to you.

Let us now proceed to the task in hand.

    [AI] Aristotle and Theophrastus.


*9* III. Quinque igitur rationibus propositis officii persequendi,
quarum duae ad decus honestatemque pertinerent, duae ad commoda vitae,
copias, opes, facultates, quinta ad eligendi iudicium, si quando ea,
quae dixi, pugnare inter se viderentur, honestatis pars confecta est,
quam quidem tibi cupio esse notissimam.

Hoc autem, de quo nunc agimus, id ipsum est, quod "utile" appellatur. In
quo verbo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via sensimque eo deducta est, ut
honestatem ab utilitate secernens constitueret esse honestum aliquid,
quod utile non esset, et utile, quod non honestum, qua nulla pernicies
maior hominum vitae potuit afferri.

*10* Summa quidem auctoritate philosophi severe sane atque honeste haec
tria genera confusa[168] cogitatione distinguunt. [Quicquid enim iustum
sit, id etiam utile esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum; ex
quo efficitur, ut, quicquid honestum sit, idem sit utile.][169] Quod qui
parum perspiciunt, ii saepe versutos homines et callidos admirantes
malitiam sapientiam iudicant. Quorum error eripiendus est opinioque
omnis ad eam spem traducenda, ut honestis consiliis iustisque factis,
non fraude et malitia se intellegant ea, quae velint, consequi posse.

*11* Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, partim sunt inanima,
ut aurum, argentum, ut ea, quae gignuntur e terra, ut alia generis
eiusdem, partim animalia, quae habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus.
Eorum autem alia[170] rationis expertia sunt, alia ratione utentia;
expertes rationis equi, boves, reliquae pecudes, [apes,][171] quarum
opere efficitur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam; ratione autem
utentium duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alterum hominum. Deos placatos
pietas efficiet et sanctitas, proxime autem et secundum deos homines
hominibus maxime utiles esse possunt.

*12* Earumque item rerum, quae noceant et obsint, eadem divisio est. Sed
quia deos nocere non putant, iis exceptis homines hominibus obesse
plurimum arbitrantur.

Ea enim ipsa, quae inanima diximus, pleraque sunt hominum operis
effecta; quae nec haberemus, nisi manus et ars accessisset, nec iis sine
hominum administratione uteremur. Neque enim valetudinis curatio neque
navigatio neque agri cultura neque frugum fructuumque reliquorum
perceptio et conservatio sine hominum opera ulla esse potuisset. *13*
Iam vero et earum rerum, quibus abundaremus, exportatio et earum, quibus
egeremus, invectio certe nulla esset, nisi his[172] muneribus homines
fungerentur. #(Attius, Prometheus?), Inc. inc. fab. Ribbeck^2, 154#
Eademque ratione nec lapides ex terra exciderentur ad usum nostrum
necessarii, nec "ferrum, aes, aurum, argentum" effoderetur "penitus
abditum" sine hominum labore et manu.

    [168] _haec tria genera confusa_ B H a b, Bt.^2, Heine; _haec
    tria genere confusa_ c, Bt.^1, Müller; _haec tria genera, re
    confusa_ J. F. Heusinger.

    [169] _Quicquid ... sit utile_ bracketed by Unger, Bt.^2,
    Müller, Heine.

    [170] _alia_ H^2 (inserted above the line) a, Edd.; not in B
    H^1 b; _partim_ c.

    [171] _apes_ MSS.; bracketed by Facciolati, Edd.

    [172] _his_ H, Edd.; _iis_ B L b; _hijs_ c.


#Expediency and Moral Rectitude identical.#

*9* III. Five principles, accordingly, have been laid down for the
pursuance of duty: two of them have to do with propriety and moral
rectitude; two, with the external conveniences of life--means, wealth,
influence; the fifth, with the proper choice, if ever the four first
mentioned seem to be in conflict. The division treating of moral
rectitude, then, has been completed, and this is the part with which I
desire you to be most familiar.

The principle with which we are now dealing is that one which is called
Expediency. The usage of this word has been corrupted and perverted and
has gradually come to the point where, separating moral rectitude from
expediency, it is accepted that a thing may be morally right without
being expedient, and expedient without being morally right. No more
pernicious doctrine than this could be introduced into human life.

*10* There are, to be sure, philosophers of the very highest reputation
who distinguish theoretically between these three conceptions,[AJ]
although they are indissolubly blended together; and they do this, I
assume, on moral, conscientious principles. [For whatever is just, they
hold, is also expedient; and in like manner, whatever is morally right
is also just. It follows, then, that whatever is morally right, is also
expedient.] Those who fail to comprehend that theory do often, in their
admiration for shrewd and clever men, take craftiness for wisdom. But
they must be disabused of this error and their way of thinking must be
wholly converted to the hope and conviction that it is only by moral
character and righteousness, not by dishonesty and craftiness, that they
may attain to the objects of their desires.

#Classification of expedients.#

*11* Of the things, then, that are essential to the sustenance of human
life, some are inanimate (gold and silver, for example, the fruits of
the earth, and so forth), and some are animate and have their own
peculiar instincts and appetites. Of these again some are rational,
others irrational. Horses, oxen, and the other cattle, [bees,] whose
labour contributes more or less to the service and subsistence of man,
are not endowed with reason; of rational beings two divisions are
made--gods and men. Worship and purity of character will win the favour
of the gods; and next to the gods, and a close second to them, men can
be most helpful to men.

*12* The same classification may likewise be made of the things that are
injurious and hurtful. But as people think that the gods bring us no
harm, they decide (leaving the gods out of the question) that men are
most hurtful to men.

#Necessity of man's helpfulness to man.#

As for mutual helpfulness, those very things which we have called
inanimate are for the most part themselves produced by man's labours; we
should not have them without the application of manual labour and skill
nor could we enjoy them without the intervention of man. And so with
many other things: for without man's industry there could have been no
provisions for health, no navigation, no agriculture, no ingathering or
storing of the fruits of the field or other kinds of produce. *13* Then,
too, there would surely be no exportation of our superfluous commodities
or importation of those we lack, did not men perform these services. By
the same process of reasoning, without the labour of man's hands, the
stone needful for our use would not be quarried from the earth, nor
would "iron, copper, gold, and silver, hidden far within," be mined.

    [AJ] That is, they make a false distinction between (1) moral
    rectitude that is at the same time expedient; (2) moral
    rectitude that is (apparently) not expedient; and (3) the
    expedient that is (apparently) not morally right.


IV. Tecta vero, quibus et frigorum vis pelleretur et calorum molestiae
sedarentur, unde aut initio generi humano dari potuissent aut postea
subveniri,[173] si aut vi tempestatis aut terrae motu aut vetustate
cecidissent, nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere
didicisset? *14* Adde ductus aquarum, derivationes fluminum, agrorum
irrigationes, moles oppositas fluctibus, portus manu factos, quae unde
sine hominum opere habere possemus? Ex quibus multisque aliis perspicuum
est, qui fructus quaeque utilitates ex rebus iis, quae sint inanimae,
percipiantur, eas nos nullo modo sine hominum manu atque opera capere
potuisse.

Qui denique ex bestiis fructus aut quae commoditas, nisi homines
adiuvarent, percipi posset? Nam et qui principes inveniendi fuerunt,
quem ex quaque belua usum habere possemus, homines certe fuerunt, nec
hoc tempore sine hominum opera aut pascere eas aut domare aut tueri aut
tempestivos fructus ex iis capere possemus; ab eisdemque et, quae
nocent,[174] interficiuntur et, quae usui possunt esse, capiuntur.

*15* Quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla
esse potuisset? Qui enim aegris subveniretur,[175] quae esset oblectatio
valentium, qui victus aut cultus, nisi tam multae nobis artes
ministrarent? quibus rebus exculta hominum vita tantum distat[176] a
victu et cultu bestiarum. Urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent
nec aedificari nec frequentari; ex quo leges moresque constituti, tum
iuris aequa discriptio[177] certaque vivendi disciplina; quas res et
mansuetudo animorum consecuta et verecundia est effectumque, ut esset
vita munitior, atque ut dando et accipiendo mutuandisque facultatibus et
commodandis[178] nulla re egeremus.

    [173] _subveniri_ L c, Müller, Heine; _subvenire_ B H a b,
    Bt., Ed.

    [174] _et, quae nocent_ Bt.^2; _et eae, quae nocent_ B H b,
    Bt.^1; _et ea quae nocent_ L; _ea quae nocent_ c.

    [175] _qui ... subveniretur_ Gernhard, Edd.; _qui ...
    subvenire_ B H; _quis ... subveniret_ L c; _quid ...
    subveniret_ a b.

    [176] _distat_ L c p, Müller, Heine; _destitute_ B H a b, Bt.

    [177] _discriptio_ H b; _descriptio_ B a c.

    [178] _mutuandisque facultatibus et commodandis_ Nonius,
    Bt.^2, Müller; _mutandisque facultatibus et commodis_ MSS.,
    Bt.^1, Heine.


#Mutual helpfulness the key to civilization.#

IV. And how could houses ever have been provided in the first place for
the human race, to keep out the rigours of the cold and alleviate the
discomforts of the heat; or how could the ravages of furious tempest or
of earthquake or of time upon them afterward have been repaired, had not
the bonds of social life taught men in such events to look to their
fellow-men for help? *14* Think of the aqueducts, canals, irrigation
works, breakwaters, artificial harbours; how should we have these
without the work of man? From these and many other illustrations it is
obvious that we could not in any way, without the work of man's hands,
have received the profits and the benefits accruing from inanimate
things.

Finally, of what profit or service could animals be, without the
co-operation of man? For it was men who were the foremost in discovering
what use could be made of each beast; and to-day, if it were not for
man's labour, we could neither feed them nor break them in nor take care
of them nor yet secure the profits from them in due season. By man, too,
noxious beasts are destroyed, and those that can be of use are captured.

*15* Why should I recount the multitude of arts without which life would
not be worth living at all? For how would the sick be healed? What
pleasure would the well enjoy? What comforts should we have, if there
were not so many arts to minister to our wants? In all these respects
the civilized life of man is far removed from the standard of the
comforts and wants of the lower animals. And without the association of
men, cities could not have been built or peopled. In consequence of city
life, laws and customs were established, and then came the equitable
distribution of private rights and a definite social system. Upon these
institutions followed a more humane spirit and consideration for others,
with the result that life was better supplied with all it requires, and
by giving and receiving, by mutual exchange of commodities and
conveniences, we succeeded in meeting all our wants.


*16* V. Longiores hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. Quis est enim, cui
non perspicua sint illa, quae pluribus verbis a Panaetio commemorantur,
neminem neque ducem bello[179] nec principem domi magnas res et
salutares sine hominum studiis gerere potuisse? Commemoratur ab eo
Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine
adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. Utitur in re non dubia
testibus non necessariis.

Atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque
consensu, sic nulla tam detestabilis pestis est, quae non homini ab
homine nascatur. Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici
magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae,
vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet
quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures
deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus, quam
omni reliqua calamitate.

*17* Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines
plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo esse
virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere. Itaque,
quae in rebus inanimis quaeque in usu et[180] tractatione beluarum fiunt
utiliter ad hominum vitam, artibus ea tribuuntur operosis, hominum autem
studia ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata [virorum
praestantium][181] sapientia et virtute excitantur. *18* Etenim virtus
omnis tribus in rebus fere vertitur, quarum una est in perspiciendo,
quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid
consequens, ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit,
alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci πάθη nominant,
appetitionesque, quas illi ὁρμάς, oboedientes efficere rationi, tertium
iis, quibuscum congregemur, uti moderate et scienter, quorum studiis ea,
quae natura desiderat, expleta cumulataque habeamus, per eosdemque, si
quid importetur nobis incommodi, propulsemus ulciscamurque eos, qui
nocere nobis conati sint, tantaque poena afficiamus, quantam aequitas
humanitasque patitur.

    [179] _bello_ B H a b, Müller, Heine; _belli_ L c p, Bt.

    [180] _usu et_ L c p; not in B H a b; bracketed by Bt.^1

    [181] _virorum praestantium_ bracketed by Ed.


*16* V. I have dwelt longer on this point than was necessary. For who is
there to whom those facts which Panaetius narrates at great length are
not self-evident--namely, that no one, either as a general in war or as
a statesman at home could have accomplished great things for the benefit
of the state, without the hearty co-operation of other men? He cites the
deeds of Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, who, he
says, could not have achieved so great success without the support of
other men. He calls in witnesses, whom he does not need, to prove a fact
that no one questions.

#Man's hurtfulness to man.#

And yet, as, on the one hand, we secure great advantages through the
sympathetic co-operation of our fellow-men; so, on the other, there is
no curse so terrible but it is brought down by man upon man. There is a
book by Dicaearchus on "The Destruction of Human Life." He was a famous
and eloquent Peripatetic and he gathered together all the other causes
of destruction--floods, epidemics, famines, and sudden incursions of
wild animals in myriads, by whose assaults, he informs us, whole tribes
of men have been wiped out. And then he proceeds to show by way of
comparison how many more men have been destroyed by the assaults of
men--that is, by wars or revolutions--than by any and all other sorts of
calamity.

#Co-operation and the virtues.#

*17* Since, therefore, there can be no doubt on this point, that man is
the source of both the greatest help and the greatest harm to man, I set
it down as the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and
to attach them to one's own service. And so those benefits that human
life derives from inanimate objects and from the employment and use of
animals are ascribed to the industrial arts; the co-operation of men, on
the other hand, prompt and ready for the advancement of our interests,
is secured through wisdom and virtue [in men of superior ability]. *18*
And, indeed, virtue in general may be said to consist almost wholly in
three properties: the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in
any given instance is true and real, what its relations are, its
consequences, and its causes; the second is [Temperance,] the ability to
restrain the passions (which the Greeks call πάθη) and make the impulses
(ὁρμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to
treat with consideration and wisdom those with whom we are associated,
in order that we may through their co-operation have our natural wants
supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward off any
impending trouble, avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to
injure us, and visit them with such retribution as justice and humanity
will permit.


*19* VI. Quibus autem rationibus hanc facultatem assequi possimus, ut
hominum studia complectamur eaque teneamus, dicemus, neque ita multo
post, sed pauca ante dicenda sunt.

Magnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, vel secundas ad res vel
adversas, quis ignorat? Nam et, cum prospero flatu eius utimur, ad
exitus pervehimur optatos et, cum reflavit, affligimur. Haec igitur ipsa
fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet, primum ab inanimis procellas,
tempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia, deinde a bestiis ictus,
morsus, impetus; haec ergo, ut dixi, rariora. *20* At vero interitus
exercituum, ut proxime trium, saepe multorum, clades imperatorum, ut
nuper summi et singularis viri, invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob
eas bene meritorum saepe civium expulsiones, calamitates, fugae,
rursusque secundae res, honores, imperia, victoriae, quamquam fortuita
sunt, tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici
possunt.

Hoc igitur cognito dicendum est, quonam modo hominum studia ad
utilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus. Quae si longior
fuerit oratio, cum magnitudine utilitatis comparetur; ita fortasse
etiam brevior videbitur.

*21* Quaecumque igitur homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque
honestandum, aut benivolentiae gratia faciunt, cum aliqua de causa
quempiam diligunt, aut honoris, si cuius virtutem suspiciunt, quemque
dignum fortuna quam amplissima putant, aut cui fidem habent et bene
rebus suis consulere arbitrantur, aut cuius opes metuunt, aut contra, a
quibus aliquid exspectant, ut cum reges popularesve homines largitiones
aliquas proponunt, aut postremo pretio ac mercede ducuntur, quae
sordidissima est illa quidem ratio et inquinatissima et iis, qui ea
tenentur, et illis, qui ad eam[182] confugere conantur; *22* male enim
se res habet, cum, quod virtute effici debet, id temptatur pecunia. Sed
quoniam non numquam hoc subsidium necessarium est, quem ad modum sit
utendum eo, dicemus, si prius iis[183] de rebus, quae virtuti propiores
sunt, dixerimus.

Atque etiam subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et potestati de causis
pluribus. Ducuntur enim aut benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine
aut dignitatis praestantia aut spe sibi id utile futurum aut metu, ne vi
parere cogantur, aut spe largitionis promissisque[184] capti aut
postremo, ut saepe in nostra re publica videmus, mercede conducti.

    [182] _eam_ c, Edd.; _ea_ B H a b.

    [183] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [184] _promissisque_ L c, Edd.; _promissionisque_ B H a b;
    _promissionibusque_ alii.


*19* VI. I shall presently discuss the means by which we can gain the
ability to win and hold the affections of our fellow-men; but I must say
a few words by way of preface.

#Co-operation _vs._ Fortune.#

Who fails to comprehend the enormous, two-fold power of Fortune for weal
and for woe? When we enjoy her favouring breeze, we are wafted over to
the wished for haven; when she blows against us, we are dashed to
destruction. Fortune herself, then, does send those other less usual
calamities, arising, first, from inanimate nature--hurricanes, storms,
shipwrecks, catastrophes, conflagrations; second, from wild
beasts--kicks, bites, and attacks. But these, as I have said, are
comparatively rare. *20* But think, on the one side, of the destruction
of armies (three lately, and many others at many different times), the
loss of generals (of a very able and eminent commander recently), the
hatred of the masses, too, and the banishment that as a consequence
frequently comes to men of eminent services, their degradation and
voluntary exile; think, on the other hand, of the successes, the civil
and military honours, and the victories;--though all these contain an
element of chance, still they cannot be brought about, whether for good
or for ill, without the influence and the co-operation of our
fellow-men.

With this understanding of the influence of Fortune, I may proceed to
explain how we can win the affectionate co-operation of our fellows and
enlist it in our service. And if the discussion of this point is unduly
prolonged, let the length be compared with the importance of the object
in view. It will then, perhaps, seem even too short.

#How men are led to promote another's interests.#

*21* Whenever, then, people bestow anything upon a fellow-man to raise
his estate or his dignity, it may be from any one of several motives:
(1) it may be out of good-will, when for some reason they are fond of
him; (2) it may be from esteem, if they look up to his worth and think
him deserving of the most splendid fortune a man can have; (3) they may
have confidence in him and think that they are thus acting for their own
interests; or (4) they may fear his power; (5) they may, on the
contrary, hope for some favour--as, for example, when princes or
demagogues bestow gifts of money; or, finally, (6) they may be moved by
the promise of payment or reward. This last is, I admit, the meanest and
most sordid motive of all, both for those who are swayed by it and for
those who venture to resort to it. *22* For things are in a bad way,
when that which should be obtained by merit is attempted by money. But
since recourse to this kind of support is sometimes indispensable, I
shall explain how it should be employed; but first I shall discuss those
qualities which are more closely allied to merit.

Now, it is by various motives that people are led to submit to another's
authority and power: they may be influenced (1) by good-will; (2) by
gratitude for generous favours conferred upon them; (3) by the eminence
of that other's social position or by the hope that their submission
will turn to their own account; (4) by fear that they may be compelled
perforce to submit; (5) they may be captivated by the hope of gifts of
money and by liberal promises; or, finally, (6) they may be bribed with
money, as we have frequently seen in our own country.


*23* VII. Omnium autem rerum nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac
tenendas quam diligi nec alienius quam timeri. Praeclare enim Ennius:

#(Thyestes?) Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 402#

Quém metuunt, odérunt; quem quisque ódit, periisse éxpetit.

Multorum autem odiis nullas opes posse obsistere, si antea fuit ignotum,
nuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa
pertulit civitas ac paret cum maxime mortuo,[185] interitus declarat,
quantum odium hominum valeat[186] ad pestem, sed reliquorum similes
exitus tyrannorum, quorum haud fere quisquam talem interitum effugit;
malus enim est custos diuturnitatis metus contraque benivolentia fidelis
vel ad perpetuitatem.

*24* Sed iis, qui vi oppressos imperio coërcent, sit sane adhibenda
saevitia, ut eris[187] in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt; qui
vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt, ut metuantur, iis[188] nihil
potest esse dementius. Quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus,
quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis
tacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis. Acriores autem morsus sunt
intermissae libertatis quam retentae. Quod igitur latissime patet neque
ad incolumitatem solum, sed etiam ad opes et potentiam valet plurimum,
id amplectamur, ut metus absit, caritas retineatur. Ita facillime quae
volemus, et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur.

Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi
necesse est. *25* Quid enim censemus superiorem illum Dionysium quo
cruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente
carbone sibi adurebat capillum? quid Alexandrum Pheraeum quo animo
vixisse arbitramur? qui, ut scriptum legimus, cum uxorem Theben admodum
diligeret, tamen ad eam ex epulis in cubiculum veniens barbarum, et eum
quidem, ut scriptum est, compunctum notis Thraeciis, destricto gladio
iubebat anteire praemittebatque de stipatoribus suis, qui scrutarentur
arculas muliebres et, ne quod in vestimentis telum occultaretur,
exquirerent. O miserum, qui fideliorem et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret
quam coniugem! Nec eum fefellit; ab ea est enim ipsa propter pelicatus
suspicionem interfectus.

Nec vero ulla vis imperii tanta est, quae premente metu possit esse
diuturna. *26* Testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter ceteros nobilitata
crudelitas, qui non ex insidiis interiit, ut is, quem modo dixi,
Alexander, non a paucis, ut hic noster, sed in quem universa
Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit.

Quid? Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt universique se ad Pyrrhum
contulerunt? Quid? Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente omnes
fere socii deseruerunt spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt Leuctricae
calamitatis?

    [185] _ac paret cum maxime mortuo_, Halm, Müller, Heine;
    _paretque cum maxime mortuo_ c^1, Bt.; _paretque, c. m. m._
    L; _apparet, cuius maxime mortui_ b; _apparet cuius maxime
    portui_ B H a.

    [186] _valeat_ c; _valet_ B H a b.

    [187] _ut eris_ Baiter; _ut eriis_ B; _uteris_ L; _utere
    hiis_ H; _utere iis_ b; _utere his_ a; _utantur eis_ c.

    [188] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H L a; _hijs_ c; _hiis_ b.


#The motive of love _vs._ that of fear.#

*23* VII. But of all motives, none is better adapted to secure influence
and hold it fast than love; nothing is more foreign to that end than
fear. For Ennius says admirably:

    "Whom they fear they hate. And whom one hates, one hopes to see him
      dead."

And we recently discovered, if it was not known before, that no amount
of power can withstand the hatred of the many. #Hatred of tyranny.# The
death of this tyrant,[AK] whose yoke the state endured under the
constraint of armed force and whom it still obeys more humbly than ever,
though he is dead, illustrates the deadly effects of popular hatred; and
the same lesson is taught by the similar fate of all other despots, of
whom practically no one has ever escaped such a death. For fear is but a
poor safeguard of lasting power; while affection, on the other hand, may
be trusted to keep it safe for ever.

*24* But those who keep subjects in check by force would of course have
to employ severity--masters, for example, toward their servants, when
these cannot be held in control in any other way. But those who in a
free state deliberately put themselves in a position to be feared are
the maddest of the mad. For let the laws be never so much overborne by
some one individual's power, let the spirit of freedom be never so
intimidated, still sooner or later they assert themselves either through
unvoiced public sentiment, or through secret ballots disposing of some
high office of state. Freedom suppressed and again regained bites with
keener fangs than freedom never endangered. Let us, then, embrace this
policy, which appeals to every heart and is the strongest support not
only of security but also of influence and power--namely, to banish fear
and cleave to love. And thus we shall most easily secure success both in
private and in public life.

Furthermore, those who wish to be feared must inevitably be afraid of
those whom they intimidate. *25* #The wretchedness of fear.# What, for
instance, shall we think of the elder Dionysius? With what tormenting
fears he used to be racked! For through fear of the barber's razor he
used to have his hair singed off with a glowing coal. In what state of
mind do we fancy Alexander of Pherae lived? We read in history that he
dearly loved his wife Thebe; and yet, whenever he went from the banquet
hall to her in her chamber, he used to order a barbarian--one, too,
tattooed like a Thracian, as the records state--to go before him with a
drawn sword; and he used to send ahead some of his bodyguard to pry into
the lady's caskets and to search and see whether some weapon were not
concealed in her wardrobe. Unhappy man! To think a barbarian, a branded
slave, more faithful than his own wife! Nor was he mistaken. For he was
murdered by her own hand, because she suspected him of infidelity.

And indeed no power is strong enough to be lasting, if it labours under
the weight of fear. *26* Witness Phalaris, whose cruelty is notorious
beyond that of all others. He was slain, not treacherously (like that
Alexander whom I named but now), not by a few conspirators (like that
tyrant of ours), but the whole population of Agrigentum rose against him
with one accord.

Again, did not the Macedonians abandon Demetrius and march over as one
man to Pyrrhus? And again, when the Spartans exercised their supremacy
tyrannically, did not practically all the allies desert them and view
their disaster at Leuctra, as idle spectators?

    [AK] Julius Caesar.


VIII. Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor. Verum tamen,
quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis,
bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum
aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum portus erat et
refugium senatus, *27* nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac
una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios
aequitate et fide defendissent; *(27)* itaque illud patrocinium orbis
terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.

Sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamus, post vero
Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus; desitum est enim videri quicquam in
socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta crudelitas. Ergo in illo
secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria; est enim ausus dicere,
hasta posita cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum et locupletium
et certe civium, "praedam se suam vendere." Secutus est, qui in causa
impia, victoria etiam foediore non singulorum civium bona publicaret,
sed universas provincias regionesque uno calamitatis iure
comprehenderet.

*28* Itaque vexatis ac perditis exteris nationibus ad exemplum amissi
imperii portari in triumpho Massiliam vidimus et ex ea urbe triumphari,
sine qua numquam nostri imperatores ex Transalpinis bellis triumpharunt.
Multa praeterea commemorarem nefaria in socios, si hoc uno quicquam sol
vidisset indignius. Iure igitur plectimur. Nisi enim multorum impunita
scelera tulissemus, numquam ad unum tanta pervenisset licentia; a quo
quidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit
hereditas. *29* Nec vero umquam bellorum civilium semen et causa deerit,
dum homines perditi hastam illam cruentam et meminerint et sperabunt;
quam P.[189] Sulla cum vibrasset dictatore propinquo suo, idem sexto
tricesimo anno post a sceleratiore hasta non recessit; alter autem, qui
in illa dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus. Ex quo
debet intellegi talibus praemiis propositis numquam defutura bella
civilia.

Itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam extrema
scelera metuentes, rem vero publicam penitus amisimus. Atque in has
clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum), dum metui quam cari
esse et diligi malumus. Quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere
potuerunt, quid debent putare singuli? Quod cum perspicuum sit,
benivolentiae vim esse magnam, metus imbecillam sequitur, ut disseramus,
quibus rebus facillime possimus eam, quam volumus, adipisci cum honore
et fide caritatem.

*30* Sed ea non pariter omnes egemus; nam ad cuiusque vitam institutam
accommodandum est, a multisne opus sit an satis sit a paucis diligi.
Certum igitur hoc sit, idque et primum et maxime necessarium,
familiaritates habere fidas amantium nos amicorum et nostra mirantium;
haec enim una[190] res prorsus, ut non multum differat inter summos et
mediocris viros, aeque[191] utrisque est propemodum comparanda.

*31* Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omnes
egent, sed tamen, si cui haec suppetunt, adiuvant aliquantum cum ad
cetera, tum ad amicitias comparandas.

    [189] _P._ c, Edd.; _L._ B H a b.

    [190] _enim una_ Baiter; _enim est una_ MSS.

    [191] _aeque_ Lund; _eaque_ MSS.


#The old Republic and the new despotism.#

VIII. I prefer in this connection to draw my illustrations from foreign
history rather than from our own. Let me add, however, that as long as
the empire of the Roman People maintained itself by acts of service, not
of oppression, wars were waged in the interest of our allies or to
safeguard our supremacy; the end of our wars was marked by acts of
clemency or by only a necessary degree of severity; the senate was a
haven of refuge for kings, tribes, and nations; *27* and the highest
ambition of our magistrates and generals was to defend our provinces and
allies with justice and honour. *(27)* And so our government could be
called more accurately a protectorate of the world than a dominion.

This policy and practice we had begun gradually to modify even before
Sulla's time; but since his victory we have departed from it altogether.
For the time had gone by when any oppression of the allies could appear
wrong, seeing that atrocities so outrageous were committed against Roman
citizens. In Sulla's case, therefore, an unrighteous victory disgraced a
righteous cause. For when he had planted his spear[AL] and was selling
under the hammer in the forum the property of men who were patriots and
men of wealth and, at least, Roman citizens, he had the effrontery to
announce that "he was selling his spoils." After him came one who, in an
unholy cause, made an even more shameful use of victory; for he did not
stop at confiscating the property of individual citizens, but actually
embraced whole provinces and countries in one common ban of ruin.

*28* And so, when foreign nations had been oppressed and ruined, we have
seen a model of Marseilles carried in a triumphal procession, to serve
as proof to the world that the supremacy of the people had been
forfeited; and that triumph we saw celebrated over a city without whose
help our generals have never gained a triumph for their wars beyond the
Alps. I might mention many other outrages against our allies, if the sun
had ever beheld anything more infamous than this particular one. #The
wages of the sin of Rome.# Justly, therefore, are we being punished. For
if we had not allowed the crimes of many to go unpunished, so great
licence would never have centred in one individual. His estate descended
by inheritance to but a few individuals, his ambitions to many
scoundrels. *29* And never will the seed and occasion of civil war be
wanting, so long as villains remember that blood-stained spear and hope
to see another. As Publius Sulla wielded that spear, when his kinsman
was dictator, so again thirty-six years later he did not shrink from a
still more criminal spear. And still another Sulla, who was a mere clerk
under the former dictatorship, was under the later one a city quaestor.
From this, one would realize that, if such rewards are offered, civil
wars will never cease to be.

And so in Rome only the walls of her houses remain standing--and even
they wait now in fear of the most unspeakable crimes--but our republic
we have lost for ever. But to return to my subject: it is while we have
preferred to be the object of fear rather than of love and affection,
that all these misfortunes have fallen upon us. And if such retribution
could overtake the Roman People for their injustice and tyranny, what
ought private individuals to expect? And since it is manifest that the
power of good-will is so great and that of fear is so weak, it remains
for us to discuss by what means we can most readily win the affection,
linked with honour and confidence, which we desire.

#The acquisition of friends.#

*30* But we do not all feel this need to the same extent; for it must be
determined in conformity with each individual's vocation in life whether
it is essential for him to have the affection of many or whether the
love of a few will suffice. Let this then be settled as the first and
absolute essential--that we have the devotion of friends, affectionate
and loving, who value our worth. For in just this one point there is but
little difference between the greatest and the ordinary man; and
friendship is to be cultivated almost equally by both.

*31* All men do not, perhaps, stand equally in need of political honour,
fame, and the good-will of their fellow-citizens; nevertheless, if these
honours come to a man, they help in many ways, and especially in the
acquisition of friends.

    [AL] The Romans were accustomed to set up a spear as a sign
    of an auction-sale--a symbol derived from the sale of booty
    taken in war.


IX. Sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; nunc
dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri, sed
attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat
plurimum.

Summa igitur et perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit
multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos
putat. Haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus
pariuntur a singulis, eisdem fere a multitudine. Sed est alius quoque
quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universorum animos tamquam influere
possimus.

*32* Ac primum de illis tribus, quae ante dixi, benivolentiae praecepta
videamus; quae quidem capitur beneficiis maxime, secundo autem loco
voluntate benefica benivolentia movetur, etiamsi res forte non suppetit;
vehementer autem amor multitudinis commovetur ipsa fama et opinione
liberalitatis, beneficentiae, iustitiae, fidei omniumque earum virtutum,
quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facilitatem. Etenim illud
ipsum, quod honestum decorumque dicimus, quia per se nobis placet
animosque omnium natura et specie sua commovet maximeque quasi perlucet
ex iis, quas commemoravi, virtutibus, idcirco illos, in quibus eas
virtutes esse remur, a natura ipsa diligere cogimur. Atque hae quidem
causae diligendi gravissimae; possunt enim praeterea non nullae esse
leviores.

*33* Fides autem ut habeatur, duabus rebus effici potest, si
existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam. Nam et iis
fidem habemus, quos plus intellegere quam nos arbitramur quosque et
futura prospicere credimus et, cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum
sit, expedire rem et consilium ex tempore capere posse; hanc enim utilem
homines existimant veramque prudentiam. Iustis autem et fidis[192]
hominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur, ut nulla sit in
iis[193] fraudis iniuriaeque suspicio. Itaque his salutem nostram, his
fortunas, his liberos rectissime committi arbitramur.

*34* Harum igitur duarum ad fidem faciendam iustitia plus pollet, quippe
cum ea sine prudentia satis habeat auctoritatis, prudentia sine iustitia
nihil valet ad faciendam fidem. Quo enim quis versutior et callidior,
hoc invisior et suspectior est detracta opinione probitatis. Quam ob rem
intellegentiae iustitia coniuncta, quantum volet, habebit ad faciendam
fidem virium; iustitia sine prudentia multum poterit, sine iustitia
nihil valebit prudentia.

    [192] _et fidis_ MSS.; del. Facciolati, Pearce; [_et fidis_]
    Bt., Ed.

    [193] _iis_ B; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c.


IX. But friendship has been discussed in another book of mine, entitled
"Laelius." #The attainment of glory.# Let us now take up the discussion
of Glory, although I have published two books[AM] on that subject also.
Still, let us touch briefly on it here, since it is of very great help
in the conduct of more important business.

The highest, truest glory depends upon the following three things: the
affection, the confidence, and the mingled admiration and esteem of the
people. Such sentiments, if I may speak plainly and concisely, are
awakened in the masses in the same way as in individuals. #How to gain
popularity:# But there is also another avenue of approach to the masses,
by which we can, as it were, steal into the hearts of all at once.

#(1) through good-will,#

*32* But of the three above-named requisites, let us look first at
good-will and the rules for securing it. Good-will is won principally
through kind services[AN]; next to that, it is elicited by the will to
do a kind service, even though nothing happen to come of it. Then, too,
the love of people generally is powerfully attracted by a man's mere
name and reputation for generosity, kindness, justice, honour, and all
those virtues that belong to gentleness of character and affability of
manner. And because that very quality which we term moral goodness and
propriety is pleasing to us by and of itself and touches all our hearts
both by its inward essence and its outward aspect and shines forth with
most lustre through those virtues named above, we are, therefore,
compelled by Nature herself to love those in whom we believe those
virtues to reside. Now these are only the most powerful motives to
love--not all of them; there may be some minor ones besides.

#(2) through confidence,#

*33* Secondly, the command of confidence can be secured on two
conditions: (1) if people think us possessed of practical wisdom
combined with a sense of justice. For we have confidence in those who we
think have more understanding than ourselves, who, we believe, have
better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arises and a
crisis comes, can clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision
according to the exigencies of the occasion; for that kind of wisdom the
world accounts genuine and practical. But (2) confidence is reposed in
men who are just and true--that is, good men--on the definite assumption
that their characters admit of no suspicion of dishonesty or
wrong-doing. And so we believe that it is perfectly safe to entrust our
lives, our fortunes, and our children to their care.

#Justice _vs._ Wisdom;#

*34* Of these two qualities, then, justice has the greater power to
inspire confidence; for even without the aid of wisdom, it has
considerable weight; but wisdom without justice is of no avail to
inspire confidence; for take from a man his reputation for probity, and
the more shrewd and clever he is, the more hated and mistrusted he
becomes. Therefore, justice combined with practical wisdom will command
all the confidence we can desire; justice without wisdom will be able to
do much; wisdom without justice will be of no avail at all.

    [AM] Now lost, though they were still known to Petrarch.

    [AN] Cicero means by "kind services" the services of the
    lawyer; he was forbidden by law to accept a fee; his
    services, if he contributed them, were "acts of kindness."


*35* X. Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, cum inter omnes philosophos
constet a meque ipso saepe disputatum sit, qui unam haberet, omnes
habere virtutes, nunc ita seiungam, quasi possit quisquam, qui non idem
prudens sit, iustus esse, alia est illa, cum veritas ipsa limatur in
disputatione, subtilitas, alia, cum ad opinionem communem omnis
accommodatur oratio. Quam ob rem, ut volgus, ita nos hoc loco loquimur,
ut alios fortes, alios viros bonos, alios prudentes esse dicamus;
popularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur[194] de
opinione populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius. Sed ad propositum
revertamur.

*36* Erat igitur ex iis[195] tribus, quae ad gloriam pertinerent, hoc
tertium, ut cum admiratione hominum honore ab iis[196] digni
iudicaremur. Admirantur igitur communiter illi quidem omnia, quae magna
et praeter opinionem suam animadverterunt, separatim autem, in singulis
si perspiciunt necopinata quaedam bona. Itaque eos viros suspiciunt
maximisque efferunt laudibus, in quibus existimant se excellentes
quasdam et singulares perspicere virtutes, despiciunt autem eos et
contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum
putant. Non enim omnes eos contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam
quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos putant et ad faciendam iniuriam
instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem,[197] sed de iis[198] male
existimant. Quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii,[199] qui "nec
sibi nec alteri," ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria,
nulla cura est.

*37* Admiratione autem afficiuntur ii, qui anteire ceteris virtute
putantur et cum omni carere dedecore, tum vero iis vitiis, quibus alii
non facile possunt obsistere. Nam et voluptates, blandissimae dominae,
maioris partis animos[200] a virtute detorquent et, dolorum cum
admoventur faces, praeter modum plerique exterrentur; vita mors,
divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. Quae qui in
utramque partem excelso animo magnoque despiciunt, cumque aliqua iis
ampla et honesta res obiecta est, totos ad se convertit et rapit, tum
quis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque virtutis?

    [194] _loquimur_ B; _loquamur_ H a b; _loquemur_ c.

    [195] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H; _hijs_ c; not in a b.

    [196] _iis_ Bt.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [197] _haud contemnunt quidem_ b, Bt.^2; _contemnunt quidem
    nautiquam_ B H a p, Bt.^1, Heine; _contemnunt quidem
    nequaquam_ c; _non contemnunt quidem_ Madvig, Müller.

    [198] _iis_ B, Edd.; _his_ H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [199] _ii_ B b; _hii_ H; _hi_ a; _hij_, c. So § 37.

    [200] _maioris partis animos_ c, Edd.; _maiores partis animi_
    B; _maiores partes animi_ H a b.


*35* X. But I am afraid some one may wonder why I am now separating the
virtues--as if it were possible for anyone to be just who is not at the
same time wise; for it is agreed upon among all philosophers, and I
myself have often argued, that he who has one virtue has them all. The
explanation of my apparent inconsistency is that the precision of speech
we employ, when abstract truth is critically investigated in philosophic
discussion, is one thing; and that employed, when we are adapting our
language entirely to popular thinking, is another. And therefore I am
speaking here in the popular sense, when I call some men brave, others
good, and still others wise; for in dealing with popular conceptions we
must employ familiar words in their common acceptation; and this was the
practice of Panaetius likewise. But let us return to the subject.

#(3) through esteem and admiration.#

*36* The third, then, of the three conditions I named as essential to
glory is that we be accounted worthy of the esteem and admiration of our
fellow-men. While people admire in general everything that is great or
better than they expect, they admire in particular the good qualities
that they find unexpectedly in individuals. And so they reverence and
extol with the highest praises those men in whom they see certain
pre-eminent and extraordinary talents; and they look down with contempt
upon those who they think have no ability, no spirit, no energy. For
they do not despise all those of whom they think ill. For some men they
consider unscrupulous, slanderous, fraudulent, and dangerous; they do
not despise them, it may be; but they do think ill of them. And
therefore, as I said before, those are despised who are "of no use to
themselves or their neighbours," as the saying is, who are idle, lazy,
and indifferent.

*37* On the other hand, those are regarded with admiration who are
thought to excel others in ability and to be free from all dishonour and
also from those vices which others do not easily resist. For sensual
pleasure, a most seductive mistress, turns the hearts of the greater
part of humanity away from virtue; and when the fiery trial of
affliction draws near, most people are terrified beyond measure. Life
and death, wealth and want affect all men most powerfully. But when
men, with a spirit great and exalted, can look down upon such outward
circumstances, whether prosperous or adverse, and when some noble and
virtuous purpose, presented to their minds, converts them wholly to
itself and carries them away in its pursuit, who then could fail to
admire in them the splendour and beauty of virtue?


*38* XI. Ergo et haec animi despicientia admirabilitatem magnam facit et
maxime iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, mirifica
quaedam multitudini videtur, nec iniuria; nemo enim iustus esse potest,
qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exsilium, qui egestatem timet, aut qui ea,
quae sunt his contraria, aequitati anteponit. Maximeque admirantur eum,
qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro perspectum sit, hunc igni
spectatum arbitrantur.

Itaque illa tria, quae proposita sunt ad gloriam, omnia iustitia
conficit, et benivolentiam, quod prodesse vult plurimis, et ob eandem
causam fidem et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit, ad quas
plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur.

*39* Ac mea quidem sententia omnis ratio atque institutio vitae
adiumenta hominum desiderat, in primisque ut habeat, quibuscum possit
familiares conferre sermones; quod est difficile, nisi speciem prae te
boni viri feras. Ergo etiam solitario homini atque in agro vitam agenti
opinio iustitiae necessaria est, eoque etiam magis, quod, eam si non
habebunt, [iniusti habebuntur,][201] nullis praesidiis saepti multis
afficientur iniuriis. *40* #I, 96# Atque iis[202] etiam, qui vendunt
emunt, conducunt locant contrahendisque negotiis implicantur, iustitia
ad rem gerendam necessaria est, cuius tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem,
qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula
iustitiae vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur
aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum,
ille autem, qui archipirata dicitur, nisi aequabiliter praedam
dispertiat, aut interficiatur a sociis aut relinquatur; quin etiam leges
latronum esse dicuntur, quibus pareant, quas observent. Itaque propter
aequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est
apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit et multo maiores Viriathus
Lusitanus; cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt;
quem C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit
ferocitatemque eius ita repressit, ut facile bellum reliquis traderet.

Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet
atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constituta
re publica fore putamus?

    [201] _iniusti habebuntur_ B H b; bracketed by Facciolati,
    Edd.

    [202] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b, not in c.


#Justice is the best way to popularity.#

*38* XI. As, then, this superiority of mind to such externals inspires
great admiration, so justice, above all, on the basis of which alone men
are called "good men," seems to people generally a quite marvellous
virtue--and not without good reason; for no one can be just who fears
death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above
equity. And people admire especially the man who is uninfluenced by
money; and if a man has proved himself in this direction, they think him
tried as by fire.

Those three requisites, therefore, which were presupposed as the means
of obtaining glory, are all secured by justice: (1) good-will, for it
seeks to be of help to the greatest number; (2) confidence, for the same
reason; and (3) admiration, because it scorns and cares nothing for
those things, with a consuming passion for which most people are carried
away.

*39* Now, in my opinion at least, every walk and vocation in life calls
for human co-operation--first and above all, in order that one may have
friends with whom to enjoy social intercourse. And this is not easy,
unless one is looked upon as a good man. So, even to a man who shuns
society and to one who spends his life in the country a reputation for
justice is essential--even more so than to others; for they who do not
have it [but are considered unjust] will have no defence to protect
them and so will be the victims of many kinds of wrong. *40* So also to
buyers and sellers, to employers and employed, and to those who are
engaged in commercial dealings generally, justice is indispensable for
the conduct of business. #Honour among thieves.# Its importance is so
great, that not even those who live by wickedness and crime can get on
without some small element of justice. For if a robber takes anything by
force or by fraud from another member of the gang, he loses his standing
even in a band of robbers; and if the one called the "Pirate Captain"
should not divide the plunder impartially, he would be either deserted
or murdered by his comrades. Why, they say that robbers even have a code
of laws to observe and obey. And so, because of his impartial division
of booty, Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we read in Theopompus,
acquired great power, Viriathus, of Lusitania, much greater. He actually
defied even our armies and generals. But Gaius Laelius--the one surnamed
"the Wise"--in his praetorship crushed his power, reduced him to terms,
and so checked his intrepid daring, that he left to his successors an
easy conquest.

Since, therefore, the efficacy of justice is so great that it
strengthens and augments the power even of robbers, how great do we
think its power will be in a constitutional government with its laws and
courts?


*41* XII. Mihi quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam
apud maiores nostros iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati
reges constituti. Nam cum premeretur inops[203] multitudo ab iis, qui
maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem;
qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituenda summos cum
infimis[204] pari iure retinebat.[205] Eademque constituendarum legum
fuit causa, quae regum. *42* Ius enim semper est quaesitum aequabile;
neque enim aliter esset ius. Id si ab uno iusto et bono viro
consequebantur, erant eo contenti; cum id minus contingeret, leges sunt
inventae, quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur.

Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum
de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis. Adiuncto vero, ut idem
etiam prudentes haberentur, nihil erat, quod homines iis auctoribus non
posse consequi se arbitrarentur. Omni igitur ratione colenda et
retinenda iustitia est cum ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non
esset), tum propter amplificationem honoris et gloriae.

Sed ut pecuniae non quaerendae solum ratio est, verum etiam collocandae,
quae perpetuos sumptus suppeditet, nec solum necessarios, sed etiam
liberales, sic gloria et quaerenda et collocanda ratione est. *43* #Xen.
Mem. II, 6, 39# Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam
proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut,
qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quodsi qui simulatione et inani
ostentatione et ficto non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se
gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices
agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi
decidunt, nec simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. Testes sunt
permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia contenti
erimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria
rerum Romanarum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur bonis et
mortui numerum optinent iure caesorum.

    [203] _inops_ inferior MSS., Edd.; _in otio_ (i.e. "at will")
    B H a b p; _inicio_ (= _initio_) c.

    [204] _infimis_ c, Edd.; _infirmis_ B a b; _infirmos_ H.

    [205] _retinebat_ c, Edd.; _pertinebat_ B H a p;
    _pertinebant_ b.


#Kings chosen for the sake of justice.#

*41* XII. Now it seems to me, at least, that not only among the Medes,
as Herodotus tells us, but also among our own ancestors, men of high
moral character were made kings in order that the people might enjoy
justice. For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the
strong, they appealed for protection to some one man who was
conspicuous for his virtue; and as he shielded the weaker classes from
wrong, he managed by establishing equitable conditions to hold the
higher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The reason for
making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings. *42*
For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law.
For rights that were not open to all alike would be no rights. If the
people secured their end at the hands of one just and good man, they
were satisfied with that; but when such was not their good fortune, laws
were invented, to speak to all men at all times in one and the same
voice.

This, then, is obvious: nations used to select for their rulers those
men whose reputation for justice was high in the eyes of the people. If
in addition they were also thought wise, there was nothing that men did
not think they could secure under such leadership. Justice is,
therefore, in every way to be cultivated and maintained, both for its
own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the enhancement
of personal honour and glory.

But as there is a method not only of acquiring money but also of
investing it so as to yield an income to meet our continuously recurring
expenses--both for the necessities and for the more refined comforts of
life--so there must be a method of gaining glory and turning it to
account. *43* #The way to glory is Justice.# And yet, as Socrates used
to express it so admirably, "the nearest way to glory--a short-cut, as
it were--is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if
anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show,
by hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory
strikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences
soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit
can be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts; but for
brevity's sake, I shall confine myself to one family: Tiberius Gracchus,
Publius's son, will be held in honour as long as the memory of Rome
shall endure; but his sons were not approved by patriots while they
lived, and since they are dead they are numbered among those whose
murder was justifiable.


XIII. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam[206] volet, iustitiae fungatur
officiis. #I, 20-41# Ea quae essent, dictum est in libro superiore.

    [206] _veram gloriam_ Edd.; _veram iustitiae gloriam_ MSS.


#Ways of winning a good name:#

XIII. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge
the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in
the course of the preceding book.


*44* (XIII.) Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi
in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii, qui haberi velimus, tamen
quaedam praecepta danda sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam
celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero,
arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium
coniciuntur atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, inquiritur et,
tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec
dictum eius esse nec factum. *45* Quorum autem prima aetas propter
humilitatem et obscuritatem in hominum ignoratione versatur, ii,[207]
simul ac iuvenes esse coeperunt, magna spectare et ad ea rectis studiis
debent contendere: quod eo firmiore animo facient, quia non modo non
invidetur illi aetati, verum etiam favetur.

Prima igitur est adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis
rebus comparari potest, in qua multi apud maiores nostros exstiterunt;
semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum,
cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis parum. Quo
tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae [alteri][208] praefecisset, magnam
laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando, iaculando,
omni militari labore tolerando. Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re
publica cecidit.

Mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto; quam
ob rem pergamus ad ea, quae restant.

*46* Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam
corporis, sic eae res, quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur, gratiores
sunt quam illae, quas viribus. Prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a
modestia cum[209] pietate in parentes, in suos benivolentia. Facillime
autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur adulescentes, qui se ad claros
et sapientes viros bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt; quibuscum
si frequentes sunt, opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes,
quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum. *47* P. Rutili adulescentiam ad
opinionem et innocentiae et iuris scientiae P. Muci commendavit domus.
Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adulescens, non aliunde
mutuatus est, sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione
nobili et gloriosa, et, qua[210] aetate qui exercentur, laude affici
solent, ut de Demosthene accepimus, ea aetate L. Crassus ostendit id se
in foro optime iam facere, quod etiam tum poterat domi cum laude
meditari.

    [207] _ii_ B, Edd.; _hi_ H; _iis_ b; _hij_ c; _his_ a.

    [208] _alteri_ MSS.; om. Graevius, Edd.

    [209] _cum_ Victorius, Edd.; _tum_ MSS.

    [210] _et, qua_ Manutius, Edd.; _ex qua_ MSS.


*44* (XIII.) But although the very essence of the problem is that we
actually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be
laid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being
what we are. For if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of
living up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from
his father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by
some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world
are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if
he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be
kept a secret. *45* Those, on the other hand, whose humble and obscure
origin has kept them unknown to the world in their early years ought, as
soon as they approach young manhood, to set a high ideal before their
eyes and to strive with unswerving zeal towards its realization. This
they will do with the better heart, because that time of life is
accustomed to find favour rather than to meet with opposition.

#(1) by a military career,#

Well, then, the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for
glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career. Among
our forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for warfare
was almost continuous then. The period of your own youth, however, has
coincided with that war in which the one side was too prolific in crime,
the other in failure. And yet, when Pompey placed you in command of a
cavalry squadron in this war, you won the applause of that great man and
of the army for your skill in riding and spear-throwing and for
endurance of all the hardships of the soldier's life. But that credit
accorded to you came to nothing along with the fall of the republic.

The subject of this discussion, however, is not your personal history,
but the general theme. Let us, therefore, proceed to the sequel.

#(2) by personal character,#

*46* As, then, in everything else brain-work is far more important than
mere hand-work, so those objects which we strive to attain through
intellect and reason gain for us a higher degree of gratitude than those
which we strive to gain by physical strength. The best recommendation,
then, that a young man can have to popular esteem proceeds from
self-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk. #(3) by
association with the great,# Next to that, young men win recognition
most easily and most favourably, if they attach themselves to men who
are at once wise and renowned as well as patriotic counsellors in public
affairs. And if they associate constantly with such men, they inspire in
the public the expectation that they will be like them, seeing that they
have themselves selected them for imitation. *47* His frequent visits
to the home of Publius Mucius assisted young Publius Rutilius to gain a
reputation for integrity of character and for ability as a jurisconsult.
Not so, however, Lucius Crassus; for though he was a mere boy, he looked
to no one else for assistance, but by his own unaided ability he won for
himself in that brilliant and famous prosecution[AO] a splendid
reputation as an orator. And at an age when young men are accustomed
with their school exercises to win applause as students of oratory, this
Roman Demosthenes, Lucius Crassus, was already proving himself in the
law-courts a master of the art which he might even then have been
studying at home with credit to himself.

    [AO] At the age of 21 Crassus conducted the case against
    Gaius Papirius Carbo, a former supporter of the Gracchi. The
    prosecution was so ably conducted that Carbo committed
    suicide to escape certain condemnation.


*48* XIV. Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo
sit, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio
[orationis][211] maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam (ea est enim, quam
eloquentiam dicimus); sed tamen difficile dictu est, quantopere
conciliet animos comitas affabilitasque sermonis. Exstant epistulae et
Philippi ad Alexandrum et Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad
Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus); quibus
praecipiunt, ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benivolentiam
alliciant militesque blande appellando [sermone][212] deliniant. Quae
autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea saepe universam
excitat [gloriam][213]; magna est enim admiratio copiose sapienterque
dicentis; quem qui audiunt, intellegere etiam et sapere plus quam
ceteros arbitrantur. Si vero inest in oratione mixta modestia gravitas,
nihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis, si ea sunt in adulescente.

*49* Sed cum sint plura causarum genera, quae eloquentiam desiderent,
multique in nostra re publica adulescentes et apud iudices et apud
populum[214] et apud senatum dicendo laudem assecuti sint, maxima est
admiratio in iudiciis.

Quorum ratio duplex est. Nam ex accusatione et ex defensione constat;
quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata
persaepe est. Dixi paulo ante de Crasso; idem fecit adulescens M.
Antonius. Etiam P. Sulpici eloquentiam accusatio illustravit, cum
seditiosum et inutilem civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit. *50* Sed
hoc quidem non est saepe faciendum nec umquam nisi aut rei publicae
causa, ut ii, quos ante dixi, aut ulciscendi, ut duo Luculli, aut
patrocinii, ut nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis in Albucio Iulius. In
accusando etiam M'. Aquilio L. Fufi cognita industria est. Semel igitur
aut non saepe certe. Sin erit, cui faciendum sit saepius, rei publicae
tribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos ulcisci saepius non est
reprehendendum; modus tamen adsit. Duri enim hominis vel potius vix
hominis videtur periculum capitis inferre multis. Id cum periculosum
ipsi est, tum etiam sordidum ad famam, committere, ut accusator
nominere; quod contigit M. Bruto summo genere nato, illius filio, qui
iuris civilis in primis peritus fuit.

*51* Atque etiam hoc praeceptum officii diligenter tenendum est, ne quem
umquam innocentem iudicio capitis arcessas; id enim sine scelere fieri
nullo pacto potest. Nam quid est tam inhumanum quam eloquentiam a natura
ad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam ad bonorum pestem
perniciemque convertere? Nec tamen, ut hoc fugiendum est, item est
habendum religioni nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium[215] impiumque,
defendere; vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas.
Iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni non numquam veri
simile, etiamsi minus sit verum, defendere; quod scribere, praesertim
cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo
Stoicorum, Panaetio. Maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia
defensionibus, eoque maior, si quando accidit, ut ei subveniatur, qui
potentis alicuius opibus circumveniri urguerique videatur, ut nos et
saepe alias et adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex.
Roscio Amerino fecimus quae, ut scis, exstat oratio.

    [211] _orationis_ MSS., Ed.; bracketed by Fleckeisen, Bt.^2,
    Müller, Heine.

    [212] _blande appellando sermone_ a c, Edd.; _blando
    appellando sermone_ B H b; _blande appellando_ Gulielmus
    (with three inferior MSS.), Bt., Heine; [_sermone_] Ed.

    [213] _excitat gloriam_ MSS.; _excitat_ [_gloriam_] Ed.;
    _excitat_ Lange.

    [214] _et apud populum_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [215] _modo ne nefarium_ L c, Edd.; _modo nefarium_ Nonius;
    _et nefarium_ B H a b.


#(4) by eloquence.#

*48* XIV. But as the classification of discourse is a twofold
one--conversation, on the one side; oratory, on the other--there can be
no doubt that of the two this debating-power (for that is what we mean
by eloquence) counts for more toward the attainment of glory; and yet,
it is not easy to say how far an affable and courteous manner in
conversation may go toward winning the affections. We have, for
instance, the letters of Philip to Alexander, of Antipater to Cassander,
and of Antigonus to Philip the Younger. The authors of these letters
were, as we are informed, three of the wisest men in history; and in
them they instruct their sons to woo the hearts of the populace to
affection by words of kindness and to keep their soldiers loyal by a
winning address. But the speech that is delivered in a debate before an
assembly often stirs the hearts of thousands at once; for the eloquent
and judicious speaker is received with high admiration, and his hearers
think him understanding and wise beyond all others. And if his speech
have also dignity combined with moderation, he will be admired beyond
all measure, especially if these qualities are found in a young man.

*49* But while there are occasions of many kinds that call for
eloquence, and while many young men in our republic have obtained
distinction by their speeches in the courts, in the popular assemblies,
and in the senate, yet it is the speeches before our courts that excite
the highest admiration.

#Prosecution _vs._ defence.#

The classification of forensic speeches also is a twofold one: they are
divided into arguments for the prosecution and arguments for the
defence. And while the side of the defence is more honourable, still
that of the prosecution also has very often established a reputation. I
spoke of Crassus a moment ago; Marcus Antonius, when a youth, had the
same success. A prosecution brought the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius
into favourable notice, when he brought an action against Gaius
Norbanus, a seditious and dangerous citizen. *50* But this should not be
done often--never, in fact, except in the interest of the state (as in
the cases of those above mentioned) or to avenge wrongs (as the two
Luculli, for example, did) or for the protection of our provincials (as
I did in the defence of the Sicilians, or Julius in the prosecution of
Albucius in behalf of the Sardinians). The activity of Lucius Fufius in
the impeachment of Manius Aquilius is likewise famous. This sort of
work, then, may be done once in a lifetime, or at all events not often.
But if it shall be required of anyone to conduct more frequent
prosecutions, let him do it as a service to his country; for it is no
disgrace to be often employed in the prosecution of her enemies. And
yet a limit should be set even to that. For it requires a heartless man,
it seems, or rather one who is well-nigh inhuman, to be arraigning one
person after another on capital charges.[AP] It is not only fraught with
danger to the prosecutor himself, but is damaging to his reputation, to
allow himself to be called a prosecutor. Such was the effect of this
epithet upon Marcus Brutus, the scion of a very noble family and the son
of that Brutus who was an eminent authority in the civil law.

#Spare the innocent; defend the guilty.#

*51* Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefully observed:
never prefer a capital charge against any person who may be innocent.
For that cannot possibly be done without making oneself a criminal. For
what is so unnatural as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men
the eloquence bestowed by nature for the safety and protection of our
fellow-men? And yet, while we should never prosecute the innocent, we
need not have scruples against undertaking on occasion the defence of a
guilty person, provided he be not infamously depraved and wicked. For
people expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it. It is
always the business of the judge in a trial to find out the truth; it is
sometimes the business of the advocate to maintain what is plausible,
even if it be not strictly true, though I should not venture to say
this, especially in an ethical treatise, if it were not also the
position of Panaetius, that strictest of Stoics. Then, too, briefs for
the defence are most likely to bring glory and popularity to the
pleader, and all the more so, if ever it falls to him to lend his aid to
one who seems to be oppressed and persecuted by the influence of some
one in power. This I have done on many other occasions; and once in
particular, in my younger days, I defended Sextus Roscius of Ameria
against the power of Lucius Sulla when he was acting the tyrant. The
speech is published, as you know.

    [AP] A "capital charge" meant to the Roman a charge
    endangering a person's _caput_, or civil status. A conviction
    on such a charge resulted in his civil degradation and the
    loss of his privileges as a Roman citizen.


*52* XV. Sed expositis adulescentium officiis, quae valeant ad gloriam
adipiscendam, deinceps de beneficentia[216] ac de liberalitate dicendum
est; cuius est ratio duplex; nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut
pecunia. Facilior est haec posterior, locupleti praesertim, sed illa
lautior ac splendidior et viro forti claroque dignior. Quamquam enim in
utroque inest gratificandi liberalis voluntas, tamen altera ex arca,
altera ex virtute depromitur, largitioque, quae fit ex re familiari,
fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollitur;
qua quo in plures usus sis, eo minus in multos uti possis. *53* At qui
opera, id est virtute et industria, benefici et liberales erunt, primum,
quo pluribus profuerint, eo plures ad benigne faciendum adiutores
habebunt, dein consuetudine beneficentiae paratiores erunt et tamquam
exercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendum.

Praeclare in[217] epistula[218] quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus
accusat, quod largitione benivolentiam Macedonum consectetur: "Quae te,
malum!" inquit, "ratio in istam spem induxit, ut eos tibi fideles
putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut Macedones non
te regem suum, sed ministrum et praebitorem[219] sperent fore?"

Bene "ministrum et praebitorem,"[220] quia sordidum regi, melius etiam,
quod largitionem "corruptelam" dixit esse; fit enim deterior, qui
accipit, atque ad idem semper exspectandum paratior.

*54* Hoc ille filio, sed praeceptum putemus omnibus.

Quam ob rem id quidem non dubium est, quin illa benignitas, quae constet
ex opera et industria, et honestior sit et latius pateat et possit
prodesse pluribus; non numquam tamen est largiendum, nec hoc
benignitatis genus omnino repudiandum est et saepe idoneis hominibus
indigentibus de re familiari impertiendum, sed diligenter atque
moderate; multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo. Quid
autem est stultius quam, quod libenter facias, curare, ut id diutius
facere non possis? Atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae; cum enim
dando egere coeperunt, alienis bonis manus afferre coguntur. Ita, cum
benivolentiae comparandae causa benefici esse velint, non tanta studia
assequuntur eorum, quibus dederunt, quanta odia eorum, quibus ademerunt.

*55* Quam ob rem nec ita claudenda res est familiaris, ut eam benignitas
aperire non possit, nec ita reseranda, ut pateat omnibus; modus
adhibeatur, isque referatur ad facultates. Omnino meminisse debemus, id
quod a nostris hominibus saepissime usurpatum iam in proverbii
consuetudinem venit, "largitionem fundum non habere"; etenim quis potest
modus esse, cum et idem, qui consuerunt, et idem illud alii desiderent?

    [216] _beneficentia_ Edd.; _beneficientia_ MSS. (ubique).

    [217] _in_ B H a b; not in L c p.

    [218] _epistula_ H, Heine; _epistola_ B L a b c.

    [219] _praebitorem_ B H L b c p; _praebitorem putant_ a.

    [220] _sperent ... praebitorem_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.


#Generosity of two kinds:#

*52* XV. Now that I have set forth the moral duties of a young man, in
so far as they may be exerted for the attainment of glory, I must next
in order discuss kindness and generosity. The manner of showing it is
twofold: kindness is shown to the needy either by personal service, or
by gifts of money. The latter way is the easier, especially for a rich
man; but the former is nobler and more dignified and more becoming to a
strong and eminent man. For although both ways alike betray a generous
wish to oblige, still in the one case the favour makes a draft upon
one's bank account, in the other upon one's personal energy; and the
bounty which is drawn from one's material substance tends to exhaust the
very fountain of liberality. Liberality is thus forestalled by
liberality: for the more people one has helped with gifts of money, the
fewer one can help. *53* But if people are generous and kind in the way
of personal service--that is, with their ability and personal
effort--various advantages arise: first, the more people they assist,
the more helpers they will have in works of kindness; and second, by
acquiring the habit of kindness they are better prepared and in better
training, as it were, for bestowing favours upon many.

In one of his letters Philip takes his son Alexander sharply to task for
trying by gifts of money to secure the good-will of the Macedonians:
"What in the mischief induced you to entertain such a hope," he says,
"as that those men would be loyal subjects to you whom you had
corrupted with money? Or are you trying to do what you can to lead the
Macedonians to expect that you will be not their king but their steward
and purveyor?"

"Steward and purveyor" was well said, because it was degrading for a
prince; better still, when he called the gift of money "corruption." For
the recipient goes from bad to worse and is made all the more ready to
be constantly looking for one bribe after another.

*54* It was to his son that Philip gave this lesson; but let us all take
it diligently to heart.

That liberality, therefore, which consists in personal service and
effort is more honourable, has wider application, and can benefit more
people. There can be no doubt about that. #(1) gifts of money,#
Nevertheless, we should sometimes make gifts of money; and this kind of
liberality is not to be discouraged altogether. We must often distribute
from our purse to the worthy poor, but we must do so with discretion and
moderation. For many[AQ] have squandered their patrimony by
indiscriminate giving. But what is worse folly than to do the thing you
like in such a way that you can no longer do it at all? Then, too,
lavish giving leads to robbery[AR]; for when through over-giving men
begin to be impoverished, they are constrained to lay their hands on the
property of others. And so, when men aim to be kind for the sake of
winning good-will, the affection they gain from the objects of their
gifts is not so great as the hatred they incur from those whom they
despoil.

*55* One's purse, then, should not be closed so tightly that a generous
impulse cannot open it, nor yet so loosely held as to be open to
everybody. A limit should be observed and that limit should be
determined by our means. We ought, in a word, to remember the phrase,
which, through being repeated so very often by our countrymen, has come
to be a common proverb: "Bounty has no bottom." For indeed what limit
can there be, when those who have been accustomed to receive gifts claim
what they have been in the habit of getting, and those who have not wish
for the same bounty?

    [AQ] Julius Caesar was a striking example of this.

    [AR] Cicero evidently had in mind such instances as Sulla,
    Caesar, Antony, and Catiline--_alieni appetens, sui profusus_
    (Sall., Cat. V).


XVI. Omnino duo sunt genera largorum, quorum alteri prodigi, alteri
liberales: prodigi, qui epulis et viscerationibus et gladiatorum
muneribus, ludorum venationumque apparatu pecunias profundunt in eas
res, quarum memoriam aut brevem aut nullam omnino sint relicturi, *56*
liberales autem, qui suis facultatibus aut captos a praedonibus redimunt
aut aes alienum suscipiunt amicorum aut in filiarum collocatione
adiuvant aut opitulantur in re vel quaerenda vel augenda. *(56)* Itaque
miror, quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro, quem de divitiis
scripsit; in quo multa praeclare, illud absurde: est enim multus in
laudanda magnificentia et apparatione popularium munerum taliumque
sumptuum facultatem fructum divitiarum putat. Mihi autem ille fructus
liberalitatis, cuius pauca exempla posui, multo et maior videtur et
certior.

#Not found in our Aristotle.#

Quanto Aristoteles gravius et verius nos reprehendit! qui has pecuniarum
effusiones non admiremur, quae fiunt ad multitudinem deliniendam. _Ait
enim_,[221] "qui ab hoste obsidentur, si emere aquae sextarium
cogerentur[222] mina, hoc primo incredibile nobis videri, omnesque
mirari, sed cum attenderint, veniam necessitati dare, in his immanibus
iacturis infinitisque sumptibus nihil nos magnopere mirari, cum
praesertim neque necessitati subveniatur nec dignitas augeatur ipsaque
illa delectatio multitudinis ad breve exiguumque tempus _capiatur_,[223]
eaque a levissimo quoque, in quo tamen ipso una cum satietate memoria
quoque moriatur voluptatis." *57* Bene etiam colligit "haec pueris et
mulierculis et servis et servorum simillimis liberis esse grata, gravi
vero homini et ea, quae fiunt, iudicio certo ponderanti probari posse
nullo modo."

Quamquam intellego in nostra civitate inveterasse iam bonis temporibus,
ut splendor aedilitatum ab optimis viris postuletur.[224] Itaque et P.
Crassus cum cognomine dives, tum copiis functus est aedilicio maximo
munere, et paulo post L. Crassus cum omnium hominum moderatissimo Q.
Mucio magnificentissima aedilitate functus est, deinde C. Claudius App.
f., multi post, Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus; omnes autem P. Lentulus me
consule vicit superiores; hunc est Scaurus imitatus; magnificentissima
vero nostri Pompei munera secundo consulatu; in quibus omnibus quid mihi
placeat, vides.

    [221] _Ait enim_ Ed.; _at hi_ a; _at hii_ H; _at ii_ B b; _at
    hij_ c.

    [222] _cogerentur_ B H a b; _cogantur_ L c p.

    [223] _capiatur_ Beier; not in MSS.

    [224] _postuletur_ B H a b, Heine; _postularetur_ L c p, Bt.


#Extravagant waste of the public games.#

XVI. There are, in general, two classes of those who give largely: the
one class is the lavish, the other the generous. The lavish are those
who squander their money on public banquets, doles of meat among the
people, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast
fights--vanities of which but a brief recollection will remain, or none
at all. *56* The generous, on the other hand, are those who employ their
own means to ransom captives from brigands, or who assume their friends'
debts or help in providing dowries for their daughters, or assist them
in acquiring property or increasing what they have. *(56)* And so I
wonder what Theophrastus could have been thinking about when he wrote
his book on "Wealth." It contains much that is fine: but his position is
absurd, when he praises at great length the magnificent appointments of
the popular games, and it is in the means for indulging in such
expenditures that he finds the highest privilege of wealth. But to me
the privilege it gives for the exercise of generosity, of which I have
given a few illustrations, seems far higher and far more certain.

How much more true and pertinent are Aristotle's words, as he rebukes us
for not being amazed at this extravagant waste of money, all to win the
favour of the populace. "If people in time of siege," he says, "are
required to pay a mina for a pint of water, this seems to us at first
beyond belief, and all are amazed; but when they think about it, they
make allowances for it on the plea of necessity. But in the matter of
this enormous waste and unlimited expenditure we are not very greatly
astonished, and that, too, though by it no extreme need is relieved, no
dignity is enhanced, and the very gratification of the populace is but
for a brief, passing moment; such pleasure as it is, too, is confined to
the most frivolous, and even in these the very memory of their enjoyment
dies as soon as the moment of gratification is past." *57* His
conclusion, too, is excellent: "This sort of amusement pleases children,
silly women, slaves, and the servile free; but a serious-minded man who
weighs such matters with sound judgment cannot possibly approve of
them."

#Magnificent entertainments expected of an aedile.#

And yet I realize that in our country, even in the good old times, it
had become a settled custom to expect magnificent entertainments from
the very best men in their year of aedileship. So both Publius Crassus,
who was not merely surnamed "The Rich" but was rich in fact, gave
splendid games in his aedileship; and a little later Lucius Crassus
(with Quintus Mucius, the most unpretentious man in the world, as his
colleague) gave most magnificent entertainments in his aedileship. Then
came Gaius Claudius, the son of Appius, and, after him, many others--the
Luculli, Hortensius, and Silanus. Publius Lentulus, however, in the year
of my consulship, eclipsed all that had gone before him, and Scaurus
emulated him. And my friend Pompey's exhibitions in his second
consulship were the most magnificent of all. And so you see what I
think about all this sort of thing.


*58* XVII. Vitanda tamen suspicio est avaritiae. Mamerco, homini
divitissimo, praetermissio aedilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit.
Quare et, si postulatur a populo, bonis viris si non desiderantibus, at
tamen approbantibus faciundum est, modo pro facultatibus, nos ipsi ut
fecimus, et, si quando aliqua res maior atque utilior populari
largitione acquiritur, ut Oresti nuper prandia in semitis decumae nomine
magno honori fuerunt. Ne M.[225] quidem Seio vitio datum est, quod in
caritate asse modium populo dedit; magna enim se et inveterata invidia
nec turpi iactura, quando erat aedilis, nec maxima liberavit. Sed honori
summo nuper nostro Miloni fuit, qui gladiatoribus emptis rei publicae
causa, quae salute nostra continebatur, omnes P. Clodi conatus
furoresque compressit.

Causa igitur largitionis est, si aut necesse est aut utile. *59* In
his[226] autem ipsis mediocritatis regula optima est. L. quidem
Philippus Q. f., magno vir ingenio in primisque clarus, gloriari solebat
se sine ullo munere adeptum esse omnia, quae haberentur amplissima.
Dicebat idem Cotta, Curio. Nobis quoque licet in hoc quodam modo
gloriari; nam pro amplitudine honorum, quos cunctis suffragiis adepti
sumus nostro quidem anno, quod contigit eorum nemini, quos modo
nominavi, sane exiguus sumptus aedilitatis fuit.

*60* Atque etiam illae impensae meliores, muri, navalia, portus, aquarum
ductus omniaque, quae ad usum rei publicae pertinent. Quamquam, quod
praesens tamquam in manum datur, iucundius est; tamen haec in posterum
gratiora. Theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprehendo propter
Pompeium, sed doctissimi non probant, ut et his ipse Panaetius, quem
multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus, et Phalereus
Demetrius, qui Periclem, principem Graeciae, vituperat, quod tantam
pecuniam in praeclara illa propylaea coniecerit. #The portion here
referred to is lost.# Sed de hoc genere toto in iis libris, quos de re
publica scripsi, diligenter disputatum.

Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus
necessaria, et tum ipsum et ad facultates accommodanda et mediocritate
moderanda est.

    [225] _M._ Orelli, Ed.; _Marco_ MSS.

    [226] _his_ H, Edd.; _hijs_ c; _iis_ B b; _is_ L.


*58* XVII. Still we should avoid any suspicion of penuriousness.
Mamercus was a very wealthy man, and his refusal of the aedileship was
the cause of his defeat for the consulship. #Justification of such
extravagance.# If, therefore, such entertainment is demanded by the
people, men of right judgment must at least consent to furnish it, even
if they do not like the idea. But in so doing they should keep within
their means, as I myself did. They should likewise afford such
entertainment, if gifts of money to the people are to be the means of
securing on some occasion some more important or more useful object.
Thus Orestes recently won great honour by his public dinners given in
the streets, on the pretext of their being a tithe-offering. Neither did
anybody find fault with Marcus Seius for supplying grain to the people
at an _as_[AS] the peck at a time when the market-price was prohibitive;
for he thus succeeded in disarming the bitter and deep-seated prejudice
of the people against him at an outlay neither very great nor
discreditable to him in view of the fact that he was aedile at the time.
But the highest honour recently fell to my friend Milo, who bought a
band of gladiators for the sake of the country, whose preservation then
depended upon my recall from exile, and with them put down the desperate
schemes, the reign of terror, of Publius Clodius.

The justification for gifts of money, therefore, is either necessity or
expediency. *59* #The golden mean is best.# And in making them even in
such cases, the rule of the golden mean is best. To be sure, Lucius
Philippus, the son of Quintus, a man of great ability and unusual
renown, used to make it his boast that without giving any
entertainments he had risen to all the positions looked upon as the
highest within the gift of the state. Cotta could say the same, and
Curio. I, too, may make this boast my own--to a certain extent[AT]; for
in comparison with the eminence of the offices to which I was
unanimously elected at the earliest legal age--and this was not the good
fortune of any one of those just mentioned--the outlay in my aedileship
was very inconsiderable.

#Lavish expenditure on public works.#

*60* Again, the expenditure of money is better justified when it is made
for walls, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and all those works which are of
service to the community. There is, to be sure, more of present
satisfaction in what is handed out, like cash down; nevertheless public
improvements win us greater gratitude with posterity. Out of respect for
Pompey's memory I am rather diffident about expressing any criticism of
theatres, colonnades, and new temples; and yet the greatest philosophers
do not approve of them--our Panaetius himself, for example, whom I am
following, not slavishly translating, in these books; so, too, Demetrius
of Phalerum, who denounces Pericles, the foremost man of Greece, for
throwing away so much money on the magnificent, far-famed Propylaea. But
this whole theme is discussed at length in my books on "The Republic."

To conclude, the whole system of public bounties in such extravagant
amount is intrinsically wrong; but it may under certain circumstances be
necessary to make them; even then they must be proportioned to our
ability and regulated by the golden mean.

    [AS] The _as_ was a copper coin worth somewhat less than a
    penny. Selling grain to the people at such a price was
    practically giving it away to purchase their good-will.

    [AT] The saving clause is added, because Cicero never filled
    the office of Censor.


*61* XVIII. In illo autem altero genere largiendi, quod a liberalitate
proficiscitur, non uno modo in disparibus causis affecti esse debemus.
Alia causa est eius, qui calamitate premitur, et eius, qui res meliores
quaerit nullis suis rebus adversis. *62* Propensior benignitas esse
debebit in calamitosos, nisi forte erunt digni calamitate. In iis tamen,
qui se adiuvari volent, non ne affligantur, sed ut altiorem gradum
ascendant, restricti omnino esse nullo modo debemus, sed in deligendis
idoneis iudicium et diligentiam adhibere. Nam praeclare Ennius:

#Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 409#

    Bene fácta male locáta male facta árbitror.

*63* Quod autem tributum est bono viro et grato, in eo cum ex ipso
fructus est, tum etiam ex ceteris. Temeritate enim remota gratissima est
liberalitas, eoque eam studiosius plerique laudant, quod summi cuiusque
bonitas commune perfugium est omnium. Danda igitur opera est, ut iis
beneficiis quam plurimos afficiamus, quorum memoria liberis posterisque
prodatur, ut iis ingratis esse non liceat. Omnes enim immemorem
beneficii oderunt eamque iniuriam in deterrenda liberalitate sibi etiam
fieri eumque, qui faciat, communem hostem tenuiorum putant.

Atque haec benignitas etiam rei publicae est utilis, redimi e servitute
captos, locupletari tenuiores; quod quidem volgo solitum fieri ab ordine
nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus. Hanc ergo[227]
consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe[228] antepono; haec
est gravium hominum atque magnorum, illa quasi assentatorum populi
multitudinis levitatem voluptate quasi titillantium.

*64* Conveniet autem cum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non
acerbum in omnique re contrahenda, vendundo emendo, conducendo locando,
vicinitatibus et confiniis, aequum, facilem, multa multis de suo iure
cedentem, a litibus vero, quantum liceat et nescio an paulo plus etiam,
quam liceat, abhorrentem. Est enim non modo liberale paulum non numquam
de suo iure decedere, sed interdum etiam fructuosum. Habenda autem ratio
est rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi[229] sinere flagitiosum est, sed
ita, ut illiberalitatis avaritiaeque absit suspicio; posse enim
liberalitate uti non spoliantem se patrimonio nimirum est pecuniae
fructus maximus.

Recte etiam a Theophrasto est laudata hospitalitas; est enim, ut mihi
quidem videtur, valde decorum patere domus hominum illustrium hospitibus
illustribus, idque etiam rei publicae est ornamento, homines externos
hoc liberalitatis genere in urbe nostra non egere. Est autem etiam
vehementer utile iis, qui honeste posse multum volunt, per hospites apud
externos populos valere opibus et gratia. Theophrastus quidem scribit
Cimonem Athenis etiam in suos curiales Laciadas hospitalem fuisse; ita
enim instituisse et vilicis imperavisse, ut omnia praeberentur,
quicumque Laciades in villam suam devertisset.

    [227] _ergo_ B H a b, Müller; _ego_ L c p, Lactantius, Bt.,
    Heine.

    [228] _longe_ L c p, Lactantius, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [229] _dilabi_ L c, Ed., Heine; _delabi_ B H a b, Bt.


#General rules for beneficence.#

*61* XVIII. Now, as touching that second division of gifts of money,
those which are prompted by a spirit of generosity, we ought to look at
different cases differently. The case of the man who is overwhelmed by
misfortune is different from that of the one who is seeking to better
his condition, though he suffers from no actual distress. *62* It will
be the duty of charity to incline more to the unfortunate, unless,
perchance, they deserve their misfortune. But of course we ought by no
means to withhold our assistance altogether from those who wish for aid,
not to save them from utter ruin but to enable them to reach a higher
degree of fortune. But in selecting worthy cases, we ought to use
judgment and discretion. For, as Ennius says so admirably,

    "Good deeds misplaced, methinks, are evil deeds."

*63* Furthermore, the favour conferred upon a man who is good and
grateful finds its reward, in such a case, not only in his own good-will
but in that of others. For when generosity is not indiscriminate giving,
it wins most gratitude and people praise it with more enthusiasm,
because goodness of heart in a man of high station becomes the common
refuge of everybody. Pains must, therefore, be taken to benefit as many
as possible with such kindnesses that the memory of them shall be handed
down to children and to children's children, so that they too may not be
ungrateful. For all men detest ingratitude and look upon the sin of it
as a wrong committed against themselves also, because it discourages
generosity; and they regard the ingrate as the common foe of all the
poor.

Ransoming prisoners from servitude and relieving the poor is a form of
charity that is a service to the state as well as to the individual.
And we find in one of Crassus's orations the full proof given that such
beneficence used to be the common practice of our order. This form of
charity, then, I much prefer to the lavish expenditure of money for
public exhibitions. The former is suited to men of worth and dignity,
the latter to those shallow flatterers, if I may call them so, who
tickle with idle pleasure, so to speak, the fickle fancy of the rabble.

*64* It will, moreover, befit a gentleman to be at the same time liberal
in giving and not inconsiderate in exacting his dues, but in every
business relation--in buying or selling, in hiring or letting, in
relations arising out of adjoining houses and lands--to be fair,
reasonable, often freely yielding much of his own right, and keeping out
of litigation as far as his interests will permit and perhaps even a
little farther. For it is not only generous occasionally to abate a
little of one's rightful claims, but it is sometimes even advantageous.
We should, however, have a care for our personal property, for it is
discreditable to let it run through our fingers; but we must guard it in
such a way that there shall be no suspicion of meanness or avarice. For
the greatest privilege of wealth is, beyond all peradventure, the
opportunity it affords for doing good, without sacrificing one's
fortune.

#Another expression of beneficence is hospitality.#

Hospitality also is a theme of Theophrastus's praise, and rightly so.
For, as it seems to me at least, it is most proper that the homes of
distinguished men should be open to distinguished guests. And it is to
the credit of our country also that men from abroad do not fail to find
hospitable entertainment of this kind in our city. It is, moreover, a
very great advantage, too, for those who wish to obtain a powerful
political influence by honourable means to be able through their social
relations with their guests to enjoy popularity and to exert influence
abroad. For an instance of extraordinary hospitality, Theophrastus
writes that at Athens Cimon was hospitable even to the Laciads, the
people of his own deme; for he instructed his bailiffs to that end and
gave them orders that every attention should be shown to any Laciad who
should ever call at his country home.


*65* XIX. Quae autem opera, non largitione beneficia dantur, haec tum in
universam rem publicam, tum in singulos cives conferuntur. Nam in iure
cavere [,consilio iuvare,][230] atque hoc scientiae genere prodesse quam
plurimis vehementer et ad opes augendas pertinet et ad gratiam.

Itaque cum multa praeclara maiorum, tum quod optime constituti iuris
civilis summo semper in honore fuit cognitio atque interpretatio; quam
quidem ante hanc confusionem temporum in possessione sua principes
retinuerunt, nunc, ut honores, ut omnes dignitatis gradus, sic huius
scientiae splendor deletus est, idque eo indignius, quod eo tempore hoc
contigit, cum is esset, qui omnes superiores, quibus honore par esset,
scientia facile vicisset. Haec igitur opera grata multis et ad
beneficiis obstringendos homines accommodata.

*66* Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi [gravior] facultas[231] et
gratior et ornatior. Quid enim eloquentia praestabilius vel admiratione
audientium vel spe indigentium vel eorum, qui defensi sunt, gratia? Huic
[quoque] ergo[232] a maioribus nostris est in toga dignitatis[233]
principatus datus. Diserti igitur hominis et facile laborantis, quodque
in patriis est moribus, multorum causas et non gravate et gratuito
defendentis beneficia et patrocinia late patent.

*67* Admonebat me res, ut hoc quoque loco intermissionem eloquentiae, ne
dicam interitum, deplorarem, ni vererer, ne de me ipso aliquid viderer
queri. Sed tamen videmus, quibus exstinctis oratoribus quam in paucis
spes, quanto in paucioribus facultas, quam in multis sit audacia. Cum
autem omnes non possint, ne multi quidem, aut iuris periti esse aut
diserti, licet tamen opera prodesse multis beneficia petentem,
commendantem iudicibus, magistratibus, vigilantem pro re alterius, eos
ipsos, qui aut consuluntur aut defendunt, rogantem; quod qui faciunt,
plurimum gratiae consequuntur, latissimeque eorum manat industria.

*68* Iam illud non sunt admonendi (est enim in promptu), ut
animadvertant, cum iuvare alios velint, ne quos offendant. Saepe enim
aut eos laedunt, quos non debent, aut eos, quos non expedit; si
imprudentes, neglegentiae est, si scientes, temeritatis. Utendum etiam
est excusatione adversus eos, quos invitus offendas, quacumque possis,
quare id, quod feceris, necesse fuerit nec aliter facere potueris,
ceterisque operis et officiis erit id, quod violatum videbitur,[234]
compensandum.

    [230] _consilio iuvare_ MSS., Ed.; bracketed by Muther,
    Müller, Heine.

    [231] _dicendi gravior facultas_ B H b; _gravior facultas_ L
    c p; _dicendi_ [_gravior_] _facultas_ Ed.; _dicendi facultas_
    Lambinus.

    [232] _huic quoque ergo_ B H L b c, Bt.; _huic ergo_
    Facciolati; _huic_ [_quoque_] _ergo_ Ed.

    [233] _in toga dignitatis_ L c p, Edd.; _in tota dignitatis_
    B H b; _in tota dignitate_ a.

    [234] _videbitur_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H b; _est_ a.


#(2) personal service.#

*65* XIX. Again, the kindnesses shown not by gifts of money but by
personal service[AU] are bestowed sometimes upon the community at large,
sometimes upon individual citizens. To protect a man in his legal rights
[,to assist him with counsel,] and to serve as many as possible with
that sort of knowledge tends greatly to increase one's influence and
popularity.

#The profession of the law.#

Thus, among the many admirable ideas of our ancestors was the high
respect they always accorded to the study and interpretation of the
excellent body of our civil law. And down to the present unsettled times
the foremost men of the state have kept this profession exclusively in
their own hands; but now the prestige of legal learning has departed
along with offices of honour and positions of dignity; and this is the
more deplorable, because it has come to pass in the lifetime of a
man[AV] who in knowledge of the law would easily have surpassed all his
predecessors, while in honour he is their peer. Service such as this,
then, finds many to appreciate it and is calculated to bind people
closely to us by our good services.

#Eloquence at the bar.#

*66* Closely connected with this profession, furthermore, is the gift of
eloquence; it is at once more popular and more distinguished. For what
is better than eloquence to awaken the admiration of one's hearers or
the hopes of the distressed or the gratitude of those whom it has
protected? It was to eloquence, therefore, that our fathers assigned the
foremost rank among the civil professions. The door of opportunity for
generous patronage to others, then, is wide open to the orator whose
heart is in his work and who follows the custom of our forefathers in
undertaking the defence of many clients without reluctance and without
compensation.

#The decline of eloquence.#

*67* My subject suggests that at this point I express once more my
regret at the decadence, not to say the utter extinction, of eloquence;
and I should do so, did I not fear that people would think that I were
complaining on my own account. We see, nevertheless, what orators have
lost their lives and how few of any promise are left, how far fewer
there are who have ability, and how many there are who have nothing but
presumption. But though not all--no, not even many--can be learned in
the law or eloquent as pleaders, still anybody may be of service to many
by canvassing in their support for appointments, by witnessing to their
character before juries and magistrates, by looking out for the
interests of one and another, and by soliciting for them the aid of
jurisconsults or of advocates. Those who perform such services win the
most gratitude and find a most extensive sphere for their activities.

#A warning to eloquence.#

*68* Of course, those who pursue such a course do not need to be warned
(for the point is self-evident) to be careful when they seek to oblige
some, not to offend others. For oftentimes they hurt those whom they
ought not or those whom it is inexpedient to offend. If they do it
inadvertently, it is carelessness; if designedly, inconsiderateness. A
man must apologize also, to the best of his ability, if he has
involuntarily hurt anyone's feelings, and explain why what he has done
was unavoidable and why he could not have done otherwise; and he must by
future services and kind offices atone for the apparent offence.

    [AU] Acts of kindness and personal service mean to Cicero
    throughout this discussion the services of the lawyer, which
    were voluntary and gratis.

    [AV] This eminent jurist was Servius Sulpicius Lemonia Rufus,
    a close friend of Cicero, author of the well-known letter of
    condolence to Cicero on the death of his daughter Tullia.


*69* XX. Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna
soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque volgo loquuntur, se in
beneficiis collocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi. Honesta oratio
est; sed quis est tandem, qui inopis et optimi viri causae non anteponat
in opera danda gratiam fortunati et potentis? a quo enim expeditior et
celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra
propensior. Sed animadvertendum est diligentius, quae natura rerum sit.
Nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiamsi referre gratiam non
potest, habere certe potest. Commode autem, quicumque dixit, "pecuniam
qui habeat, non reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem
et, qui rettulerit, habere[235] et, qui habeat, rettulisse."

At qui se locupletes, honoratos, beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem
beneficio volunt; quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur, cum ipsi
quamvis magnum aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut
exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se[236] usos aut
clientes appellari mortis instar putant. *70* At vero ille tenuis, cum,
quicquid factum sit, se spectatum, non fortunam putet,[237] non modo
illi, qui est meritus, sed etiam illis, a quibus exspectat (eget enim
multis), gratum se videri studet neque vero verbis auget suum munus, si
quo forte fungitur, sed etiam extenuat. Videndumque illud est, quod, si
opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in uno illo aut, si[238] forte, in
liberis eius manet gratia; sin autem inopem, probum tamen et modestum,
omnes non improbi humiles, quae magna in populo multitudo est,
praesidium sibi paratum vident. *71* Quam ob rem melius apud bonos quam
apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto.

Danda omnino opera est, ut omni generi satis facere possimus; sed si res
in contentionem veniet, nimirum Themistocles est auctor adhibendus; qui
cum consuleretur, utrum bono viro pauperi an minus probato diviti filiam
collocaret: "Ego vero," inquit, "malo virum, qui pecunia egeat, quam
pecuniam, quae viro." Sed corrupti mores depravatique sunt admiratione
divitiarum; quarum magnitudo quid ad unum quemque nostrum pertinet?
Illum fortasse adiuvat, qui habet. Ne id quidem semper; sed fac iuvare;
utentior[239] sane sit, honestior vero quo modo? Quodsi etiam bonus erit
vir, ne impediant divitiae, quo minus iuvetur, modo ne adiuvent, sitque
omne iudicium, non quam locuples, sed qualis quisque sit!

Extremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis operaque danda, ne quid contra
aequitatem contendas, ne quid pro iniuria; fundamentum enim est
perpetuae commendationis et famae iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse
laudabile.

    [235] _gratiam ... habere_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [236] _vero se_ B H a b; _vero tuo se_ L c p.

    [237] _putet_ Ed.; _putat_ MSS.

    [238] _si_ L c p, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [239] _utentior_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine; _potentior_ later MSS.;
    _opulentior_ one MS. (C. Lange), Lambinus, Bt.^2, Müller.


#The basis for personal service is character not fortune.#

*69* XX. Now in rendering helpful service to people, we usually consider
either their character or their circumstances. And so it is an easy
remark, and one commonly made, to say that in investing kindnesses we
look not to people's outward circumstances, but to their character. The
phrase is admirable! But who is there, pray, that does not in performing
a service set the favour of a rich and influential man above the cause
of a poor, though most worthy, person? For, as a rule, our will is more
inclined to the one from whom we expect a prompter and speedier return.
But we should observe more carefully how the matter really stands: the
poor man of whom we spoke cannot return a favour in kind, of course, but
if he is a good man he can do it at least in thankfulness of heart. As
some one has happily said, "A man has not repaid money, if he still has
it; if he has repaid it, he has ceased to have it. But a man still has
the sense of favour, if he has returned the favour; and if he has the
sense of the favour, he has repaid it."

On the other hand, they who consider themselves wealthy, honoured, the
favourites of fortune, do not wish even to be put under obligations by
our kind services. Why, they actually think that they have conferred a
favour by accepting one, however great; and they even suspect that a
claim is thereby set up against them or that something is expected in
return. Nay more, it is bitter as death to them to have accepted a
patron or to be called clients. *70* Your man of slender means, on the
other hand, feels that whatever is done for him is done out of regard
for himself and not for his outward circumstances. #The poor man's
gratitude.# Hence he strives to show himself grateful not only to the
one who has obliged him in the past but also to those from whom he
expects similar favours in the future--and he needs the help of many;
and his own service, if he happens to render any in return, he does not
exaggerate, but he actually depreciates it. This fact, furthermore,
should not be overlooked--that if one defends a wealthy favourite of
fortune, the favour does not extend further than to the man himself or,
possibly, to his children. But if one defends a man who is poor but
honest and upright, all the lowly who are not dishonest--and there is a
large proportion of that sort among the people--look upon such an
advocate as a tower of defence raised up for them. *71* I think,
therefore, that kindness to the good is a better investment than
kindness to the favourites of fortune.

We must, of course, put forth every effort to oblige all sorts and
conditions of men, if we can. But if it comes to a conflict of duty on
this point, we must, I should say, follow the advice of Themistocles:
when some one asked his advice whether he should give his daughter in
marriage to a man who was poor but honest or to one who was rich but
less esteemed, he said: #Wealth no inducement nor a bar to personal
service# "For my part, I prefer a man without money to money without a
man." But the moral sense of to-day is demoralized and depraved by our
worship of wealth. Of what concern to any one of us is the size of
another man's fortune? It is, perhaps, an advantage to its possessor;
but not always even that. But suppose it is; he may, to be sure, have
more money to spend: but how is he any the better man for that? Still,
if he is a good man, as well as a rich one, let not his riches be a
hindrance to his being aided, if only they are not the motive to it; but
in conferring favours our decision should depend entirely upon a man's
character, not on his wealth.

The supreme rule, then, in the matter of kindnesses to be rendered by
personal service is never to take up a case in opposition to the right
nor in defence of the wrong. For the foundation of enduring reputation
and fame is justice, and without justice there can be nothing worthy of
praise.


*72* XXI. Sed, quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum dictum est, quae ad
singulos spectant, deinceps de iis, quae ad universos quaeque ad rem
publicam pertinent, disputandum est. Eorum autem ipsorum partim[240]
eius modi sunt, ut ad universos cives pertineant, partim, singulos ut
attingant; quae sunt etiam gratiora. Danda opera est omnino, si possit,
utrisque, nec minus, ut etiam singulis consulatur, sed ita, ut ea res
aut prosit aut certe ne obsit rei publicae. C. Gracchi frumentaria magna
largitio; exhauriebat igitur aerarium; modica M. Octavi et rei publicae
tolerabilis et plebi necessaria; ergo et civibus et rei publicae
salutaris.

*73* In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit,
ut suum quisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat.
Perniciose enim Philippus, in tribunatu cum legem agrariam ferret, quam
tamen antiquari facile passus est et in eo vehementer se moderatum
praebuit--sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male, "non esse
in civitate duo milia hominum, qui rem haberent." Capitalis oratio est,
ad aequationem bonorum pertinens; qua peste quae potest esse maior? Hanc
enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, res publicae civitatesque
constitutae sunt. Nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen
spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant.

*74* Danda etiam opera est, ne, quod apud maiores nostros saepe fiebat
propter aerarii tenuitatem assiduitatemque bellorum, tributum sit
conferendum, idque ne eveniat, multo ante erit providendum. Sin quae
necessitas huius muneris alicui rei publicae obvenerit (malo enim[241]
quam nostrae ominari; neque tamen de nostra, sed de omni re publica
disputo), danda erit opera, ut omnes intellegant, si salvi esse velint,
necessitati esse parendum. Atque etiam omnes, qui rem publicam
gubernabunt, consulere debebunt, ut earum rerum copia sit, quae
sunt[242] necessariae. Quarum qualis comparatio fieri soleat et debeat,
non est necesse disputare; est enim in promptu; tantum locus attingendus
fuit.

*75* Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotii et muneris publici, ut
avaritiae pellatur etiam minima suspicio. "Utinam," inquit C. Pontius
Samnis, "ad illa tempora me fortuna reservavisset et tum essem natus,
quando Romani dona accipere[243] coepissent! non essem passus diutius
eos imperare." Ne illi multa saecula exspectanda fuerunt; modo enim hoc
malum in hanc rem publicam invasit. Itaque facile patior tum potius
Pontium fuisse, siquidem in illo tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum et
decem anni sunt, cum de pecuniis repetundis a L. Pisone lata lex est,
nulla antea cum fuisset. At vero postea tot leges et proximae quaeque
duriores, tot rei, tot damnati, tantum [Italicum][244] bellum propter
iudiciorum metum excitatum, tanta sublatis legibus et iudiciis expilatio
direptioque sociorum, ut imbecillitate aliorum, non nostra virtute
valeamus.

    [240] _partim_ L c p, Edd.; _quae_ (_que_ = _quae_ H)
    _partim_ B H a b.

    [241] _malo enim_ B H L b p; _malo enim alii_ a; _malo enim
    aliene_ (_alienae_) c.

    [242] _sunt_ B H b, Bt.^2; _sunt ad victum_ L c p, Bt.^1,
    Heine.

    [243] _dona accipere_ B H L a p c; _accipere dona_ b, Ed.

    [244] _tantum [Italicum]_ Bake, Edd.; _tantum Italicum_ L c
    p; _tantum Iliacum_ B H; _tanti militari cum_ b.


#Service to the state through personal service to individuals.#

*72* XXI. Now, since we have finished the discussion of that kind of
helpful services which concern individuals, we must next take up those
which touch the whole body politic and the state. Of these public
services, some are of such a nature that they concern the whole body of
citizens; others, that they affect individuals only. And these latter
are the more productive of gratitude. If possible, we should by all
means attend to both kinds of service; but we must take care in
protecting the interests of individuals that what we do for them shall
be beneficial, or at least not prejudicial to the state. Gaius Gracchus
inaugurated largesses of grain on an extensive scale; this had a
tendency to exhaust the exchequer. Marcus Octavius inaugurated a
moderate dole; this was both practicable for the state and necessary for
the commons; it was, therefore, a blessing both to the citizens and to
the state.

#The statesman's duty toward#

#(1) property rights,#

*73* The man in an administrative office, however, must make it his
first care that every one shall have what belongs to him and that
private citizens suffer no invasion of their property rights by act of
the state. It was a ruinous policy that Philippus proposed when in his
tribuneship he introduced his agrarian bill. However, when his law was
rejected, he took his defeat with good grace and displayed extraordinary
moderation. But in his public speeches on the measure he often played
the demagogue, and that time viciously, when he said that "there were
not in the state two thousand people who owned any property." That
speech deserves unqualified condemnation, for it favoured an equal
distribution of property; and what more ruinous policy than that could
be conceived? For the chief purpose in the establishment of
constitutional state and municipal governments was that individual
property rights might be secured. For although it was by Nature's
guidance that men were drawn together into communities, it was in the
hope of safeguarding their possessions that they sought the protection
of cities.

#(2) taxation,#

*74* The administration should also put forth every effort to prevent
the levying of a property tax, and to this end precautions should be
taken long in advance. Such a tax was often levied in the times of our
forefathers on account of the depleted state of their treasury and their
incessant wars. But if any state (I say "any," for I would rather speak
in general terms than forebode evils to our own; however, I am not
discussing our own state but states in general)--if any state ever has
to face a crisis requiring the imposition of such a burden, every
effort must be made to let all the people realize that they must bow to
the inevitable, if they wish to be saved. #(3) necessities of life,# And
it will also be the duty of those who direct the affairs of the state to
take measures that there shall be an abundance of the necessities of
life. It is needless to discuss the ordinary ways and means; for the
duty is self-evident; it is necessary only to mention the matter.

#(4) official integrity.#

*75* But the chief thing in all public administration and public service
is to avoid even the slightest suspicion of self-seeking. "I would,"
says Gaius Pontius, the Samnite, "that fortune had withheld my
appearance until a time when the Romans began to accept bribes, and that
I had been born in those days! I should then have suffered them to hold
their supremacy no longer." Aye, but he would have had many generations
to wait; for this plague has only recently infected our nation. And so I
rejoice that Pontius lived then instead of now, seeing that he was so
mighty a man! It is not yet a hundred and ten years since the enactment
of Lucius Piso's bill to punish extortion; there had been no such law
before. But afterward came so many laws, each more stringent than the
other, so many men were accused and so many convicted, so horrible a
war[AW] was stirred up on account of the fear of what our courts would
do to still others, so frightful was the pillaging and plundering of the
allies when the laws and courts were suppressed,[AX] that now we find
ourselves strong not in our own strength but in the weakness of others.

    [AW] The Italian or Social War, B.C. 100-88.

    [AX] During the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar.


*76* XXII. Laudat Africanum Panaetius, quod fuerit abstinens. Quidni
laudet? Sed in illo alia maiora; laus abstinentiae[245] non hominis est
solum, sed etiam temporum illorum. Omni Macedonum gaza, quae fuit
maxima, potitus [est][246] Paulus tantum in aerarium pecuniae invexit,
ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. At hic nihil
domum suam intulit[247] praeter memoriam nominis sempiternam. Imitatus
patrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa. Quid? qui eius
collega fuit in censura, L. Mummius, numquid copiosior, cum
copiosissimam urbem funditus sustulisset? Italiam ornare quam domum suam
maluit; quamquam Italia ornata domus ipsa mihi videtur ornatior.

*77* Nullum igitur vitium taetrius est, ut eo, unde egressa est, referat
se oratio, quam avaritia, praesertim in principibus et rem publicam
gubernantibus. Habere enim quaestui rem publicam non modo turpe est, sed
sceleratum etiam et nefarium. #Plut. Inst. Lacon. 239 F# Itaque, quod
Apollo Pythius oraclum edidit, Spartam nulla re alia nisi avaritia esse
perituram, id videtur non solum Lacedaemoniis, sed etiam omnibus
opulentis populis praedixisse. Nulla autem re conciliare facilius
benivolentiam multitudinis possunt ii, qui rei publicae praesunt, quam
abstinentia et continentia.

*78* Qui vero se populares volunt ob eamque causam aut agrariam rem
temptant, ut possessores pellantur suis sedibus, aut pecunias creditas
debitoribus condonandas putant, labefactant fundamenta rei publicae,
concordiam primum, quae esse non potest, cum aliis adimuntur, aliis
condonantur pecuniae, deinde aequitatem, quae tollitur omnis, si habere
suum cuique non licet. #§ 73# Id enim est proprium, ut supra dixi,
civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque
custodia. *79* Atque in hac pernicie rei publicae ne illam quidem
consequuntur, quam putant, gratiam; nam cui res erepta est, est
inimicus, cui data est, etiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse et maxime
in pecuniis creditis occultat suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse
solvendo; at vero ille, qui accepit[248] iniuriam, et meminit et prae se
fert dolorem suum, nec, si plures sunt ii, quibus inprobe datum est,
quam illi, quibus iniuste ademptum est, idcirco plus etiam valent; non
enim numero haec iudicantur, sed pondere. Quam autem habet aequitatem,
ut agrum multis annis aut etiam saeculis ante possessum, qui nullum
habuit, habeat, qui autem habuit, amittat?

    [245] _abstinentiae_ L c p, Edd.; _sapientiae_ B H a b.

    [246] _potitus_ J. F. Heusinger; _potitus [est]_ Edd.;
    _potitus est_ MSS.

    [247] _intulit_ B H b, Edd.; _detulit_ L c p.

    [248] _accepit_ L c, Edd.; _accipit_ B H a b p.


*76* XXII. Panaetius praises Africanus for his integrity in public life.
Why should he not? But Africanus had other and greater virtues. The
boast of official integrity belongs not to that man alone but also to
his times. When Paulus got possession of all the wealth of Macedon--and
it was enormous--he brought into our treasury so much money[AY] that the
spoils of a single general did away with the need for a tax on property
in Rome for all time to come. But to his own house he brought nothing
save the glory of an immortal name. Africanus emulated his father's
example and was none the richer for his overthrow of Carthage. And what
shall we say of Lucius Mummius, his colleague in the censorship? Was he
one penny the richer when he had destroyed to its foundations the
richest of cities? He preferred to adorn Italy rather than his own
house. And yet by the adornment of Italy his own house was, as it seems
to me, still more splendidly adorned.

#Integrity _vs._ avarice.#

*77* There is, then, to bring the discussion back to the point from
which it digressed, no vice more offensive than avarice, especially in
men who stand foremost and hold the helm of state. For to exploit the
state for selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal, infamous.
And so the oracle, which the Pythian Apollo uttered, that "Sparta should
not fall from any other cause than avarice," seems to be a prophecy not
to the Lacedaemonians alone, but to all wealthy nations as well. They
who direct the affairs of state, then, can win the good-will of the
masses by no other means more easily than by self-restraint and
self-denial.

#The menace of agrarian laws.#

*78* But they who pose as friends of the people, and who for that reason
either attempt to have agrarian laws passed, in order that the occupants
may be driven out of their homes, or propose that money loaned should
be remitted to the borrowers, are undermining the foundations of the
commonwealth: first of all, they are destroying harmony, which cannot
exist when money is taken away from one party and bestowed upon another;
and second, they do away with equity, which is utterly subverted, if the
rights of property are not respected. For, as I said above, it is the
peculiar function of the state and the city to guarantee to every man
the free and undisturbed control of his own particular property. *79*
And yet, when it comes to measures so ruinous to public welfare, they do
not gain even that popularity which they anticipate. For he who has been
robbed of his property is their enemy; he to whom it has been turned
over actually pretends that he had no wish to take it; and most of all,
when his debts are cancelled, the debtor conceals his joy, for fear that
he may be thought to have been insolvent; whereas the victim of the
wrong both remembers it and shows his resentment openly. Thus even
though they to whom property has been wrongfully awarded be more in
number than they from whom it has been unjustly taken, they do not for
that reason have more influence; for in such matters influence is
measured not by numbers but by weight. And how is it fair that a man who
never had any property should take possession of lands that had been
occupied for many years or even generations, and that he who had them
before should lose possession of them?

    [AY] Nearly two million pounds sterling.


*80* XXIII. Ac[249] propter hoc iniuriae genus Lacedaemonii Lysandrum
ephorum expulerunt, Agim regem, quod numquam antea apud eos acciderat,
necaverunt, exque eo tempore tantae discordiae secutae sunt, ut et
tyranni exsisterent et optimates exterminarentur et praeclarissime
constituta res publica dilaberetur; nec vero solum ipsa cecidit, sed
etiam reliquam Graeciam evertit contagionibus malorum,[250] quae a
Lacedaemoniis profectae manarunt latius. Quid? nostros Gracchos, Ti.
Gracchi summi viri filios, Africani nepotes, nonne agrariae contentiones
perdiderunt?

*81* At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur, qui, cum eius civitas
quinquaginta annos a tyrannis teneretur, profectus Argis Sicyonem
clandestino introitu urbe est potitus, cumque tyrannum Nicoclem
improviso oppressisset,[251] sescentos exsules, qui locupletissimi
fuerant eius civitatis, restituit remque publicam adventu suo liberavit.
Sed cum magnam animadverteret in bonis et possessionibus difficultatem,
quod et eos, quos ipse restituerat, quorum bona alii possederant, egere
iniquissimum esse arbitrabatur et quinquaginta annorum possessiones
moveri[252] non nimis aequum putabat, propterea quod tam longo spatio
multa hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus tenebantur sine
iniuria, iudicavit neque illis adimi nec iis non satis fieri, quorum
illa fuerant, oportere. *82* Cum igitur statuisset opus esse ad eam rem
constituendam pecunia, Alexandream se proficisci velle dixit remque
integram ad reditum suum iussit esse, isque celeriter ad Ptolomaeum,
suum hospitem, venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandream conditam.
Cui[253] cum exposuisset patriam se liberare velle causamque docuisset,
a rege opulento vir summus facile impetravit, ut grandi pecunia
adiuvaretur. Quam cum Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consilium
quindecim principes, cum quibus causas cognovit et eorum, qui aliena
tenebant, et eorum, qui sua amiserant, perfecitque aestimandis
possessionibus, ut persuaderet aliis, ut pecuniam accipere mallent,
possessionibus cederent, aliis, ut commodius putarent numerari sibi,
quod tanti esset, quam suum recuperare. Ita perfectum est, ut omnes
concordia constituta sine querella discederent.

*83* O virum magnum dignumque, qui in re publica nostra natus esset! Sic
par est agere cum civibus, non, ut bis iam vidimus, hastam in foro
ponere et bona civium voci subicere[254] praeconis. At ille Graecus, id
quod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus consulendum putavit,
eaque est summa ratio et sapientia boni civis, commoda civium non
divellere atque omnis aequitate eadem continere. Habitent gratis in
alieno. Quid ita? ut, cum ego emerim, aedificarim, tuear, impendam, tu
me invito fruare meo? Quid est aliud aliis sua eripere, aliis dare
aliena? *84* Tabulae vero novae quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea
pecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam?

    [249] _Ac_ Edd.; _at_ MSS.

    [250] _malorum_ L c p, Edd.; _maiorum_ B H a b.

    [251] _oppressisset_ L c p, Edd.; _pressisset_ B H a b.

    [252] _moveri_ L c p, Edd.; _movere_ B H a b.

    [253] _cui_ Edd.; _qui_ MSS.

    [254] _subicere_ L c p, Edd.; _subiacere_ B H a b.


#Instances of agrarian legislation.#

*80* XXIII. Now, it was on account of just this sort of wrong-doing that
the Spartans banished their ephor Lysander, and put their king Agis to
death--an act without precedent in the history of Sparta. From that time
on--and for the same reason--dissensions so serious ensued that tyrants
arose, the nobles were sent into exile, and the state, though most
admirably constituted, crumbled to pieces. Nor did it fall alone, but by
the contagion of the ills that, starting in Lacedaemon, spread widely
and more widely, it dragged the rest of Greece down to ruin. What shall
we say of our own Gracchi, the sons of that famous Tiberius Gracchus and
grandsons of Africanus? Was it not strife over the agrarian issue that
caused their downfall and death?

#Aratus of Sicyon.#

*81* Aratus of Sicyon, on the other hand, is justly praised. When his
city had been kept for fifty years in the power of its tyrants, he came
over from Argos to Sicyon, secretly entered the city and took it by
surprise; he fell suddenly upon the tyrant Nicocles, recalled from
banishment six hundred exiles who had been the wealthiest men of the
city, and by his coming made his country free. But he found great
difficulty in the matter of property and its occupancy; for he
considered it most unjust, on the one hand, that those men should be
left in want whom he had restored and of whose property others had taken
possession; and he thought it hardly fair, on the other hand, that
tenure of fifty years' standing should be disturbed. For in the course
of that long period many of those estates had passed into innocent hands
by right of inheritance, many by purchase, many by dower. He therefore
decided that it would be wrong either to take the property away from the
present incumbents or to let them keep it without compensation to its
former possessors. *82* So, when he had come to the conclusion that he
must have money to meet the situation, he announced that he meant to
make a trip to Alexandria and gave orders that matters should remain
as they were until his return. And so he went in haste to his friend
Ptolemy, then upon the throne, the second king after the founding of
Alexandria. To him he explained that he wished to restore constitutional
liberty to his country and presented his case to him. And, being a man
of the highest standing, he easily secured from that wealthy king
assistance in the form of a large sum of money. And when he had returned
with this to Sicyon, he called into counsel with him fifteen of the
foremost men of the city. With them he investigated the cases both of
those who were holding possession of other people's property and of
those who had lost theirs. And he managed by a valuation of the
properties to persuade some that it was more desirable to accept money
and surrender their present holdings; others he convinced that it was
more to their interest to take a fair price in cash for their lost
estates than to try to recover possession of what had been their own. As
a result, harmony was preserved, and all parties went their way without
a word of complaint.

#Justice the corner-stone of statecraft.#

*83* A great statesman, and worthy to have been born in our
commonwealth! That is the right way to deal with one's fellow-citizens,
and not, as we have already witnessed on two occasions, to plant the
spear in the forum and knock down the property of citizens under the
auctioneer's hammer. But yon Greek, like a wise and excellent man,
thought that he must look out for the welfare of all. And this is the
highest statesmanship and the soundest wisdom on the part of a good
citizen, not to divide the interests of the citizens but to unite all on
the basis of impartial justice. "Let them live in their neighbour's
house rent-free."[AZ] Why so? In order that, when I have bought, built,
kept up, and spent my money upon a place, you may without my consent
enjoy what belongs to me? What else is that but to rob one man of what
belongs to him and to give to another what does not belong to him? *84*
And what is the meaning of an abolition of debts, except that you buy a
farm with my money; that you have the farm, and I have not my money?

    [AZ] An assumed appeal to one of Caesar's edicts.


XXIV. Quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum, quod rei publicae noceat,
providendum est, quod multis rationibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit,
ut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum; nec enim ulla
res vehementius rem publicam continet quam fides, quae esse nulla
potest, nisi erit necessaria solutio rerum creditarum. Numquam
vehementius actum est quam me consule, ne solveretur; armis et castris
temptata res est ab omni genere hominum et ordine; quibus ita restiti,
ut hoc totum malum de re publica tolleretur. Numquam nec maius aes
alienum fuit nec melius nec facilius dissolutum est; fraudandi enim spe
sublata solvendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor, tum
quidem victus, quae cogitarat, ea[255] perfecit, cum eius iam nihil
interesset. Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum
delectaret, peccare, etiamsi causa non esset.

*85* Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, ut aliis detur, aliis auferatur,
aberunt ii, qui rem publicam tuebuntur, in primisque operam dabunt, ut
iuris et iudiciorum aequitate suum quisque teneat et neque tenuiores
propter humilitatem circumveniantur neque locupletibus ad sua vel
tenenda vel recuperanda obsit invidia, praeterea, quibuscumque rebus vel
belli vel domi poterunt, rem publicam augeant imperio, agris,
vectigalibus.

Haec magnorum hominum sunt, haec apud maiores nostros factitata, haec
genera officiorum qui persequentur,[256] cum summa utilitate rei
publicae magnam ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam.

*86* In his autem utilitatum praeceptis Antipater Tyrius Stoicus, qui
Athenis nuper est mortuus, duo praeterita censet esse a Panaetio,
valetudinis curationem et pecuniae; quas res a summo philosopho
praeteritas arbitror, quod essent faciles; sunt certe utiles. Sed
valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis et observatione, quae res aut
prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu
corporis tuendi causa [praetermittendis voluptatibus],[257] postremo
arte eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent.

*87* Res autem familiaris quaeri debet iis rebus, a quibus abest
turpitudo, conservari autem diligentia et parsimonia, eisdem etiam rebus
augeri. Has res commodissime Xenophon Socraticus persecutus est in eo
libro, qui Oeconomicus inscribitur, quem nos, ista fere aetate cum
essemus, qua es tu nunc, e Graeco in Latinum convertimus. [258]Sed toto
hoc de genere, de quaerenda, de collocanda pecunia, (vellem[259] etiam
de utenda) commodius a quibusdam optimis viris ad Ianum[260] medium
sedentibus quam ab ullis philosophis ulla in schola disputatur. Sunt
tamen ea cognoscenda; pertinent enim ad utilitatem, de qua hoc libro
disputatum est.[258]

    [255] _cogitarat, ea_ B H a b, Bt.^2, Müller; _cogitarat, cum
    ipsius intererat, tum ea_ c p, Bt.^1, Heine.

    [256] _persequentur_ c; _persequuntur_ b, Bt.^2;
    _persecuntur_ B H p, Bt.^1, Heine.

    [257] _praetermittendis voluptatibus_ MSS.; del. Heine, Edd.

    [258] _Sed ... disputatum est_ transposed from § 90 by Unger,
    Edd.

    [259] _vellem_ c p, Bt.^1, Ed.; not in B H a b, Bt.^2

    [260] _Ianum_ c, Edd.; _ianuae_ B H a b p.


#Economics of debts.#

XXIV. We must, therefore, take measures that there shall be no
indebtedness of a nature to endanger the public safety. It is a menace
that can be averted in many ways; but should a serious debt be incurred,
we are not to allow the rich to lose their property, while the debtors
profit by what is their neighbour's. For there is nothing that upholds a
government more powerfully than its credit; and it can have no credit,
unless the payment of debts is enforced by law. Never were measures for
the repudiation of debts more strenuously agitated than in my
consulship. Men of every sort and rank attempted with arms and armies to
force the project through. But I opposed them with such energy that this
plague was wholly eradicated from the body politic. Indebtedness was
never greater; debts were never liquidated more easily or more fully;
for the hope of defrauding the creditor was cut off and payment was
enforced by law. But the present victor, though vanquished then, still
carried out his old design, when it was no longer of any personal
advantage to him.[BA] So great was his passion for wrong-doing that the
very doing of wrong was a joy to him for its own sake, even when there
was no motive for it.

*85* Those, then, whose office it is to look after the interests of the
state will refrain from that form of liberality which robs one man to
enrich another. #Administration of the courts in equity.# Above all,
they will use their best endeavours that every one shall be protected in
the possession of his own property by the fair administration of the law
and the courts, that the poorer classes shall not be oppressed because
of their helplessness, and that envy shall not stand in the way of the
rich, to prevent them from keeping or recovering possession of what
justly belongs to them; they must strive, too, by whatever means they
can, in peace or in war, to advance the state in power, in territory,
and in revenues.

Such service calls for great men; it was commonly rendered in the days
of our ancestors; if men will perform duties such as these, they will
win popularity and glory for themselves and at the same time render
eminent service to the state.

#Sanitation.#

*86* Now, in this list of rules touching expediency, Antipater of Tyre,
a Stoic philosopher who recently died at Athens, claims that two points
were overlooked by Panaetius--the care of health and of property. I
presume that the eminent philosopher overlooked these two items because
they present no difficulty. At all events they are expedient. Although
they are a matter of course, I will still say a few words on the
subject. Individual health is preserved by studying one's own
constitution, by observing what is good or bad for one, by constant
self-control in supplying physical wants and comforts (but only to the
extent necessary to self-preservation), by foregoing sensual pleasures,
and finally, by the professional skill of those to whose science these
matters belong.

#Finance.#

*87* As for property, it is a duty to make money, but only by honourable
means; it is a duty also to save it and increase it by care and thrift.
These principles Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, has set forth most
happily in his book entitled "Oeconomicus." When I was about your
present age, I translated it from the Greek into Latin.

But this whole subject of acquiring money, investing money (I wish I
could include also spending money) is more profitably discussed by
certain worthy gentlemen on "Change" than could be done by any
philosophers of any school. For all that, we must take cognizance of
them; for they come fitly under the head of expediency, and that is the
subject of the present book.

    [BA] Caesar, it seems, had had some part in the schemes of
    Catiline in B.C. 63 and possibly in the plot of B.C. 66-65.
    When his conquests in Gaul had freed him from his debts and
    made him rich, his party, with his consent, passed (B.C. 49)
    the obnoxious legislation here referred to--that all interest
    in arrears should be remitted, and that that which had been
    paid should be deducted from the principal.


*88* XXV. Sed utilitatum comparatio, quoniam hic locus erat quartus, a
Panaetio praetermissus, saepe est necessaria. Nam et corporis commoda
cum externis [et externa cum corporis][261] et ipsa inter se corporis et
externa cum externis comparari solent. Cum externis corporis hoc modo
comparantur, valere ut malis quam dives esse, [cum corporis externa hoc
modo, dives esse potius quam maximis corporis viribus,][262] ipsa inter
se corporis sic, ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur, vires
celeritati, externorum autem, ut gloria divitiis, vectigalia urbana
rusticis. *89* Ex quo genere comparationis illud est Catonis senis: a
quo cum quaereretur, quid maxime in re familiari expediret, respondit:
"Bene pascere"; quid secundum: "Satis bene pascere"; quid tertium:[263]
"Male pascere"; quid quartum: "Arare"; et cum ille, qui quaesierat,
dixisset: "Quid faenerari?", tum Cato: "Quid hominem," inquit,
"occidere?"

Ex quo et multis aliis intellegi debet utilitatum comparationes fieri
solere, recteque hoc adiunctum esse quartum exquirendorum officiorum
genus.[264]

Reliqua deinceps persequemur.

    [261] [_et ... corporis_] bracketed by Unger, Edd.

    [262] [_cum corporis ... corporis viribus_] bracketed by
    Unger, Edd.

    [263] _quid tertium: "Male pascere"_ c p, Edd.; not in B H a
    b.

    [264] _officiorum genus._ Here follows in MSS. _Sed toto ...
    disputatum est_ transposed to § 87.


#Comparison of expediencies.#

*88* XXV. But it is often necessary to weigh one expediency against
another;--for this, as I stated, is a fourth point overlooked by
Panaetius. For not only are physical advantages regularly compared with
outward advantages [and outward, with physical], but physical advantages
are compared with one another, and outward with outward. Physical
advantages are compared with outward advantages in some such way as
this: one may ask whether it is more desirable to have health than
wealth; [external advantages with physical, thus: whether it is better
to have wealth than extraordinary bodily strength;] while the physical
advantages may be weighed against one another, so that good health is
preferred to sensual pleasure, strength to agility. Outward advantages
also may be weighed against one another: glory, for example, may be
preferred to riches, an income derived from city property to one derived
from the farm. *89* To this class of comparisons belongs that famous
saying of old Cato's: when he was asked what was the most profitable
feature of an estate, he replied: "Raising cattle successfully." What
next to that? "Raising cattle with fair success." And next? "Raising
cattle with but slight success." And fourth? "Raising crops." And when
his questioner said, "How about money-lending?" Cato replied: "How about
murder?"

From this as well as from many other incidents we ought to realize that
expediencies have often to be weighed against one another and that it is
proper for us to add this fourth division in the discussion of moral
duty.

Let us now pass on to the remaining problems.



CICERO DE OFFICIIS



BOOK III

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND THE EXPEDIENT



LIBER TERTIUS / BOOK III


*1* I. P. Scipionem, M.[265] fili, eum, qui primus Africanus appellatus
est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui fuit eius fere aequalis, numquam
se minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus
esset. Magnifica vero vox et magno viro ac sapiente digna; quae declarat
illum et in otio de negotiis cogitare et in solitudine secum loqui
solitum, ut neque cessaret umquam et interdum colloquio alterius non
egeret. Ita duae res, quae languorem afferunt ceteris, illum acuebant,
otium et solitudo. Vellem nobis hoc idem vere dicere liceret; sed si
minus imitatione tantam ingenii praestantiam consequi possumus,
voluntate certe proxime accedimus; nam et a re publica forensibusque
negotiis armis impiis vique prohibiti otium persequimur et ob eam causam
urbe relicta rura peragrantes saepe soli sumus.

*2* Sed nec hoc otium cum Africani otio nec haec solitudo cum illa
comparanda est. Ille enim requiescens a rei publicae pulcherrimis
muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e[266] coetu hominum
frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat,
nostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum
est. Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est quod dignum
nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus? *3* Ita, qui in maxima
celebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes
conspectum sceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, abdimus nos, quantum
licet, et saepe soli sumus. Sed quia sic ab hominibus doctis accepimus,
non solum ex malis eligere minima oportere, sed etiam excerpere ex his
ipsis,[267] si quid inesset boni, propterea et otio fruor, non illo
quidem, quo debebat is,[268] qui quondam peperisset otium civitati, nec
eam solitudinem languere patior, quam mihi affert necessitas, non
voluntas.

*4* Quamquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio assequebatur. Nulla
enim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum
solitudinis munus exstat; ex quo intellegi debet illum mentis agitatione
investigationeque earum rerum, quas cogitando consequebatur, nec otiosum
nec solum umquam fuisse; nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habemus, ut
cogitatione tacita a[269] solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc scribendi
operam omne studium curamque convertimus. Itaque plura brevi tempore
eversa quam multis annis stante re publica scripsimus.

    [265] _M._ Nonius; _Marce_ MSS.

    [266] _e_ c, Edd.; _a_ a; not in B H b.

    [267] _ex his ipsis_ c, Edd.; _ex his_ a; _ex ipsis_ B H b.

    [268] _debebat is_ c, Edd.; _debeat_ B H b; _debeat is_ corr.
    in _debeat_ a.

    [269] _a_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.


#Preface: Scipio and Cicero.#

*1* I. Cato, who was of about the same years, Marcus, my son, as that
Publius Scipio who first bore the surname of Africanus, has given us the
statement that Scipio used to say that he was never less idle than when
he had nothing to do and never less lonely than when he was alone. An
admirable sentiment, in truth, and becoming to a great and wise man. It
shows that even in his leisure hours his thoughts were occupied with
public business and that he used to commune with himself when alone; and
so not only was he never unoccupied, but he sometimes had no need for
company. The two conditions, then, that prompt others to
idleness--leisure and solitude--only spurred him on. I wish I could say
the same of myself and say it truly. But if by imitation I cannot attain
to such excellence of character, in aspiration, at all events, I
approach it as nearly as I can; for as I am kept by force of armed
treason away from practical politics and from my practice at the bar, I
am now leading a life of leisure. For that reason I have left the city
and, wandering in the country from place to place, I am often alone.

*2* But I should not compare this leisure of mine with that of
Africanus, nor this solitude with his. For he, to find leisure from his
splendid services to his country, used to take a vacation now and then
and to retreat from the assemblies and the throngs of men into solitude,
as into a haven of rest. #The orator's retirement.# But my leisure is
forced upon me by want of public business, not prompted by any desire
for repose. For now that the senate has been abolished and the courts
have been closed, what is there, in keeping with my self-respect, that I
can do either in the senate-chamber or in the forum? *3* So, although I
once lived amid throngs of people and in the greatest publicity, I am
now shunning the sight of the miscreants with whom the world abounds and
withdrawing from the public eye as far as I may, and I am often alone.
But I have learned from philosophers that among evils one ought not only
to choose the least, but also to extract even from these any element of
good that they may contain. For that reason, I am turning my leisure to
account--though it is not such repose as the man should be entitled to
who once brought the state repose from civil strife--and I am not
letting this solitude, which necessity and not my will imposes on me,
find me idle.

*4* And yet, in my judgment, Africanus earned the higher praise. For no
literary monuments of his genius have been published, we have no work
produced in his leisure hours, no product of his solitude. From this
fact we may safely infer that, because of the activity of his mind and
the study of those problems to which he used to direct his thought, he
was never unoccupied, never lonely. But I have not strength of mind
enough by means of silent meditation to forget my solitude; and so I
have turned all my attention and endeavour to this kind of literary
work. I have, accordingly, written more in this short time since the
downfall of the republic than I did in the course of many years, while
the republic stood.


*5* II. Sed cum tota philosophia, mi Cicero, frugifera et fructuosa nec
ulla pars eius inculta ac deserta sit, tum nullus feracior in ea locus
est nec uberior[270] quam de officiis, a quibus constanter honesteque
vivendi praecepta ducuntur. Quare, quamquam a Cratippo nostro, principe
huius memoriae philosophorum, haec te assidue audire atque accipere
confido, tamen conducere arbitror talibus aures tuas vocibus undique
circumsonare, nec eas, si fieri possit, quicquam aliud audire. *6* Quod
cum omnibus est faciendum, qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant, tum haud
scio an nemini potius quam tibi; sustines enim non parvam exspectationem
imitandae industriae nostrae, magnam honorum, non nullam fortasse
nominis. Suscepisti onus praeterea grave et Athenarum et Cratippi; ad
quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem
redire turpissimum est dedecorantem et urbis auctoritatem et magistri.
Quare, quantum coniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere, si
discendi labor est potius quam voluptas, tantum fac ut efficias neve
committas, ut, cum[271] omnia suppeditata sint a nobis, tute tibi
defuisse videare.

Sed haec hactenus; multa enim saepe ad te cohortandi gratia scripsimus;
nunc ad reliquam partem propositae divisionis revertamur.

*7* Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime
disputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti
sumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et
consultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, honestumne id
esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile,
tertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile
videretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis
tribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit
dicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat. *8* Quod eo magis miror, quia
scriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta annis vixisse
Panaetium, posteaquam illos libros edidisset. Quem locum miror a
Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis, praesertim cum
scribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia tam necessarium.

*9* Minime vero assentior iis, qui negant eum locum a Panaetio
praetermissum, sed consulto relictum, nec omnino scribendum fuisse, quia
numquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare. De quo alterum potest
habere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit hoc genus, quod in divisione
Panaeti tertium est, an plane omittendum, alterum dubitari non potest,
quin a Panaetio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui e divisione
tripertita duas partes absolverit, huic necesse est restare tertiam;
praeterea in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps
esse dicturum. *10* Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, qui etiam
scribit in quadam epistula P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui
Panaetium audierat, ut nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam
partem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim
pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat), sic ea, quae
Panaetius praetermisisset [et non perfecisset][272] propter eorum, quae
perfecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum.

    [270] _uberior_ c, Edd.; _uerior_ B H a b.

    [271] _ut, cum_ c, Edd.; _ut ne, cum_ B H a b.

    [272] _et non perfecisset_ MSS.; del. Muretus; bracketed by
    Edd.


#Young Cicero admonished to diligence in his studies.#

*5* II. But, my dear Cicero, while the whole field of philosophy is
fertile and productive and no portion of it barren and waste, still no
part is richer or more fruitful than that which deals with moral duties;
for from these are derived the rules for leading a consistent and moral
life. And therefore, although you are, as I trust, diligently studying
and profiting by these precepts under the direction of our friend
Cratippus, the foremost philosopher of the present age, I still think it
well that your ears should be dinned with such precepts from every side
and that, if it could be, they should hear nothing else. *6* These
precepts must be laid to heart by all who look forward to a career of
honour, and I am inclined to think that no one needs them more than you.
For you will have to fulfil the eager anticipation that you will imitate
my industry, the confident expectation that you will emulate my course
of political honours, and the hope that you will, perhaps, rival my name
and fame. You have, besides, incurred a heavy responsibility on account
of Athens and Cratippus: for since you have gone to them for the
purchase, as it were, of a store of liberal culture, it would be a great
discredit to you to return empty-handed, thereby disgracing the high
reputation of the city and of your master. Therefore, put forth the best
mental effort of which you are capable; work as hard as you can (if
learning is work rather than pleasure); do your very best to succeed;
and do not, when I have put all the necessary means at your disposal,
allow it to be said that you have failed to do your part.

But enough of this. For I have written again and again for your
encouragement. Let us now return to the remaining section of our
subject as outlined.

#Panaetius on Moral Duties.#

*7* Panaetius, then, has given us what is unquestionably the most
thorough discussion of moral duties that we have, and I have followed
him in the main--but with slight modifications. He classifies under
three general heads the ethical problems which people are accustomed to
consider and weigh: first, the question whether the matter in hand is
morally right or morally wrong; second, whether it is expedient or
inexpedient; third, how a decision ought to be reached, in case that
which has the appearance of being morally right clashes with that which
seems to be expedient. He has treated the first two heads at length in
three books; but while he has stated that he meant to discuss the third
head in its proper turn, he has never fulfilled his promise. *8* And I
wonder the more at this, because Posidonius, a pupil of his, records
that Panaetius was still alive thirty years after he published those
three books. And I am surprised that Posidonius has but briefly touched
upon this subject in certain memoirs of his, and especially, as he
states that there is no other topic in the whole range of philosophy so
essentially important as this.

#Why Panaetius omitted the "Conflict" of the moral and the expedient.#

*9* Now, I cannot possibly accept the view of those who say that that
point was not overlooked but purposely omitted by Panaetius, and that it
was not one that ever needed discussion, because there never can be such
a thing as a conflict between expediency and moral rectitude. But with
regard to this assertion, the one point may admit of doubt--whether that
question which is third in Panaetius's classification ought to have been
included or omitted altogether; but the other point is not open to
debate--that it was included in Panaetius's plan but left unwritten. For
if a writer has finished two divisions of a threefold subject, the third
must necessarily remain for him to do. Besides, he promises at the close
of the third book that he will discuss this division also in its proper
turn. *10* We have also in Posidonius a competent witness to the fact.
He writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus, who also
was a pupil of Panaetius's, used to say that "as no painter had been
found to complete that part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles had left
unfinished (for the beauty of her face made hopeless any attempt
adequately to represent the rest of the figure), so no one, because of
the surpassing excellence of what Panaetius did complete, would venture
to supply what he had left undone."


*11* III. Quam ob rem de iudicio Panaeti dubitari non potest; rectene
autem hanc tertiam partem ad exquirendum officium adiunxerit an secus,
de eo fortasse disputari potest. Nam, sive honestum solum bonum est, ut
Stoicis placet, sive, quod honestum est, id ita summum bonum est, quem
ad modum Peripateticis vestris videtur, ut omnia ex altera parte
collocata vix minimi momenti instar habeant, dubitandum non est, quin
numquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere. Itaque accepimus
Socratem exsecrari solitum eos, qui primum haec natura cohaerentia
opinione distraxissent. Cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi, ut et,
quicquid honestum esset, id utile esse censerent nec utile quicquam,
quod non honestum.

*12* Quodsi is esset Panaetius, qui virtutem propterea colendam diceret,
quod ea efficiens utilitatis esset, ut ii, qui res expetendas vel
voluptate vel indolentia metiuntur, liceret ei dicere utilitatem
aliquando cum honestate pugnare; sed cum sit is, qui id solum bonum
iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem huic repugnent specie quadam
utilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem vitam fieri nec decessione
peiorem, non videtur debuisse eius modi deliberationem introducere, in
qua, quod utile videretur, cum eo, quod honestum est, compararetur. *13*
Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere,
id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam: cum virtute congruere semper,
cetera autem, quae secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti
non repugnarent. Quod cum ita sit, putant quidam hanc comparationem non
recte introductam, nec omnino de eo genere quicquam praecipiendum
fuisse.

Atque[273] illud quidem honestum, quod proprie vereque dicitur, id in
sapientibus est solis neque a virtute divelli umquam potest; in iis
autem, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem
perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt. *14*
Haec enim officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici
appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent; quae et ingenii bonitate
multi assequuntur et progressione discendi. Illud autem officium, quod
rectum idem appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt,
omnes numeros habet nec praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest.
*15* Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant,[274]
id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus, quid absit a
perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat
praetermissum; quod idem[275] in poematis, in picturis usu venit in
aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae
laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis[276] aliquid
probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem,[277] quid in una quaque re vitii
sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt
facile sententia.

    [273] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, Müller, Heine; _atqui_ Fleckeisen,
    Bt.^2, Ed.

    [274] _compareant_ Anemoecius, Edd.; _comparant_ B H a b;
    _appareant_ c; _comparent_ p.

    [275] _idem_ Nonius, Müller, Heine; _autem_ B H a b; _item_
    c, Bt.

    [276] _iis_ Baiter, Müller, Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [277] _qui quidem_ many MSS., Bt.^1, Müller; _qui idem_ B H a
    b c; _qui [idem]_ Bt.^2, Heine.


#The conflict between Expediency and Moral Rectitude only apparent.#

*11* III. In regard to Panaetius's real intentions, therefore, no doubt
can be entertained. But whether he was or was not justified in adding
this third division to the inquiry about duty may, perhaps, be a matter
for debate. For whether moral goodness is the only good, as the Stoics
believe, or whether, as your Peripatetics think, moral goodness is in so
far the highest good that everything else gathered together into the
opposing scale would have scarcely the slightest weight, it is beyond
question that expediency can never conflict with moral rectitude. And
so, we have heard, Socrates used to pronounce a curse upon those who
first drew a conceptual distinction between things naturally
inseparable. With this doctrine the Stoics are in agreement in so far as
they maintain that if anything is morally right, it is expedient, and
if anything is not morally right, it is not expedient.

*12* But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that virtue is worth
cultivating only because it is productive of advantage, as do certain
philosophers who measure the desirableness of things by the standard of
pleasure or of absence of pain, he might argue that expediency sometimes
clashes with moral rectitude. But since he is a man who judges that the
morally right is the only good, and that those things which come in
conflict with it have only the appearance of expediency and cannot make
life any better by their presence nor any worse by their absence, it
follows that he ought not to have raised a question involving the
weighing of what seems expedient against what is morally right. *13*
Furthermore, when the Stoics speak of the supreme good as "living
conformably to nature," they mean, as I take it, something like this:
that we are always to be in accord with virtue, and from all other
things that may be in harmony with nature to choose only such as are not
incompatible with virtue. This being so, some people are of the opinion
that it was not right to introduce this counterbalancing of right and
expediency and that no practical instruction should have been given on
this question at all.

And yet moral goodness, in the true and proper sense of the term, is the
exclusive possession of the wise and can never be separated from virtue;
but those who have not perfect wisdom cannot possibly have perfect moral
goodness, but only a semblance of it. *14* #The "absolute" and the
"mean."# And indeed these duties under discussion in these books the
Stoics call "mean duties"[BB]; they are a common possession and have
wide application; and many people attain to the knowledge of them
through natural goodness of heart and through advancement in learning.
But that duty which those same Stoics call "right" is perfect and
absolute and "satisfies all the numbers,"[BC] as that same school says,
and is attainable by none except the wise man. *15* On the other hand,
when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested,
that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the
common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of
real perfection; but as far as their comprehension does go, they think
there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the
estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art:
ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The
reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of
excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have
not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular
piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts,
they readily abandon their former opinion.

    [BB] See note on I, 8.

    [BC] I.e., fills all the requirements of absolute
    perfection--an allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine that
    specific numbers stand for perfection of specific kinds;
    "absolute duty" combines them all.


IV. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda
quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni
hominum genere communia. *16* Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis
indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes
viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius [aut Aristides][278] iustus
nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc[279] iustitiae tamquam a
sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem
volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et
C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum
officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque
sapientium.

*17* Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis
repugnantia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod
colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam
est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam
cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie
dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non
potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.

Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni.

*18* Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt
praeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo, quod
utile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo
Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc
ipsum sensisse, quod dixerit, "solere" modo, non etiam "oportere."
Etenim non modo pluris putare, quod utile videatur, quam quod honestum
sit,[280] sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare
turpissimum est.

Quid ergo est, quod non numquam dubitationem afferre soleat
considerandumque videatur? Credo, si quando dubitatio accidit, quale sit
id, de quo consideretur. *19* Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe
plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; exempli causa
ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse[281] scelus
quam non modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur
se astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo
quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud
pulcherrimum existimat. Vicit ergo utilitas honestatem? Immo vero
honestas utilitatem secuta est.[282]

Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo,
quod honestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile,
formula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione
rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus. *20* Erit autem haec formula
Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his
libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a
Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae
honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius
haec ab eis disseruntur,[283] quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile
videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis,[284] quibus
et honestum aliquid non utile et utile[285] non honestum. Nobis autem
nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile
occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam.

    [278] _aut Aristides_ (_Aristidesve_ p) MSS., Lactantius;
    bracketed by J. M. Heusinger, Edd.

    [279] _hoc_ Lactantius, Edd., _his_ MSS.

    [280] _sit_ c, Bt.^2, Müller; not in B H a b, Bt.^1; _est_
    Heine.

    [281] _esse_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

    [282] _utilitatem secuta est_ MSS., Müller, Heine;
    _utilitatem; honestatem utilitas secuta est_ Baiter, Ed.

    [283] _disseruntur_ certain MSS., C. Lange and Fr. Fabricius,
    Müller, Heine; _disserentur_ MSS., Bt.

    [284] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ (_hijs_ c) MSS.

    [285] _et honestum ... et utile_ Lambinus, Bt.^2, Müller,
    Heine, _et honestum ... aut utile_ B H a b; _aut honestum ...
    aut utile_ c, Bt.^1


#Absolute goodness and imperfect humanity.#

IV. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these
books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness,
not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all
mankind. *16* Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a
natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios
are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius [or Aristides] is called "the
just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of
courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one
of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense
in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and
Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed
"the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their
constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and
likeness to wise men.

*17* For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality
against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated
by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable;
but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right
which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the
truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally
right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we
cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of
virtue.

So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their
careful observance of duty.

#Moral rectitude and apparent expediency.#

*18* Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by a standard of
profits and personal advantage and refuse to have these outweighed by
considerations of moral rectitude are accustomed, in considering any
question, to weigh the morally right against what they think the
expedient; good men are not. And so I believe that when Panaetius stated
that people were accustomed to hesitate to do such weighing, he meant
precisely what he said--merely that "such was their custom," not that
such was their duty. And he gave it no approval; for it is most immoral
to think more highly of the apparently expedient than of the morally
right, or even to set these over against each other and to hesitate to
choose between them.

#Occasion for doubt.#

What, then, is it that may sometimes give room for a doubt and seem to
call for consideration? It is, I believe, when a question arises as to
the character of an action under consideration. *19* For it often
happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed
under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not
to be morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us assume some
particular case that admits of wider application: what more atrocious
crime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate
friend? But if anyone kills a tyrant--be he never so intimate a
friend--he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People,
at all events, are not of that opinion; for of all glorious deeds they
hold such an one to be the most noble. Has expediency, then, prevailed
over moral rectitude? Not at all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand
with expediency.

#Need of a rule for guidance.#

Some general rule, therefore, should be laid down to enable us to decide
without error, whenever what we call the expedient seems to clash with
what we feel to be morally right; and if we follow that rule in
comparing courses of conduct, we shall never swerve from the path of
duty. *20* That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the
Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following
in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your
Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is
morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the
discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider
whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is
not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if
conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally
right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New
Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend
any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to
my rule.


*21* V. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo
suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas,
quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus
externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim
sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut
violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum
naturam, humani generis societatem. *22* Ut, si unum quodque membrum
sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri
valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus
necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum
detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum
et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad
usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non
repugnante natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras
facultates, copias, opes augeamus.

*23* Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus
populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem
modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc
enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem;
quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coërcent.

Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et
humana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam
volent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri
detraxerit, sibi adsumat. *24* Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam
excelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas
quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro
nihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi
est. [Detrahere autem de altero sui commodi causa magis est contra
naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem.][286]

*25* Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri
possit, conservandis aut iuvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere
imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in
concilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere in solitudine non modo sine
ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus
copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus.

Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic
anteponit. Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere
non posse.

*26* Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur,
aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam[287]
censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum,
propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat
contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui
omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet,
sed[288] multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo,
quod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius
existimat.

    [286] _Detrahere ... generis eiusdem_ MSS.; bracketed by
    Baiter, Edd.

    [287] _fugiendam_ b, Ed.; _fugienda_ B H a c.

    [288] _sed_ c, Edd.; _et_ B H a b.


#Wrongful gains are against the laws:#

#(1) of nature,#

*21* V. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to
profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to nature than is death
or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or
our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life
and fellowship between man and man. For if we are so disposed that each,
to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then
those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with nature's
laws, must of necessity be broken. *22* Suppose, by way of comparison,
that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and
imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself
the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would
necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize
upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could
appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably
be annihilated. For, without any conflict with nature's laws, it is
granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for
his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but nature's
laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by
despoiling others.

#(2) of nations,#

*23* But this principle is established not by nature's laws alone (that
is, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of
particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states
the public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord
ordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage
to injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard;
this is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should
not be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by
the penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine.

#(3) of gods and men.#

Again, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the
Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone
will hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live
in accord with nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting
anything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he
has taken from his neighbour. *24* Then, too, loftiness and greatness of
spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more in harmony
with nature than are selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself; but it
requires a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and count them
as naught, when one weighs them over against the common weal.
#Self-seeking _vs._ self-sacrifice.# [But for anyone to rob his
neighbour for his own profit is more contrary to nature than death,
pain, and the like.]

*25* In like manner it is more in accord with nature to emulate the
great Hercules and undergo the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of
aiding or saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, not
only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures and abounding in
wealth, while excelling others also in beauty and strength. Thus
Hercules denied himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the
world, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular belief has given
him a place in the council of the gods.

The better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is
endowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of
pleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to nature,
cannot do harm to his fellow-man.

*26* Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for
himself, he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of
nature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of
children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of
injustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of
nature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the
individual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he
believes that while such a course should be avoided, the other
alternatives are much worse--namely, death, poverty, pain--he is
mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his
property are more serious than those affecting his soul.


VI. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius
cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis
humana consortio.

*27* Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque
sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est
secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita
est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est,
certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum
igitur extremum. *28* Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt,
parenti se aut fratri nihil detracturos sui commodi causa, aliam
rationem esse civium reliquorum. Hi sibi nihil iuris, nullam societatem
communis utilitatis causa statuunt esse cum civibus, quae sententia
omnem societatem distrahit civitatis.

Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii[289]
dirimunt communem humani generis societatem: qua sublata beneficentia,
liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur; quae qui tollunt,
etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. Ab iis enim
constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt, cuius societatis
artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem
homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire vel
externa vel corporis ... vel etiam ipsius animi, quae vacent
iustitia[290]; haec enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina
virtutum.

*29* Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse
conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? [Minime
vero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio,
neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.][291] Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem
tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu
spoliare possit, nonne faciat?

*30* Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam
partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris
contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei
publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis,
si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin
autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius
quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra
naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque
appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est;
est enim iniusta. *31* Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum
conservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque
inutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum
necessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit,
modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens
hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati
consulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati.

*32* Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est
enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque
est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare,
atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate
exterminandum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa
sanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus
corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a
communi tamquam humanitatis corpore[292] segreganda est.

Huius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium
exquiritur.

    [289] _ii_ Bt., Ed.; _hi_ B a b; _hii_ H; _hij_ c.

    [290] _quae vacent iustitia_ MSS., Ed., Heine; _quae vacent
    iniustitia_ cod. Ubaldini, Bt.^1; _quae non v. iustitia_ O.

    [291] Bracketed by Unger, Edd.

    [292] _humanitatis corpore_ Muret, cod. Guelf., Ed., Bt.,
    Heine; _humanitate corporis_ MSS., Müller; Unger strikes out
    _corporis_.


#The interest of society is the interest of the individual.#

VI. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the
interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For
if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to
the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed.

*27* And further, if nature ordains that one man shall desire to
promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because
he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same
nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And if
this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of nature; and
if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature's law to
wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the
conclusion is likewise true. *28* For that is an absurd position which
is taken by some people, who say that they will not rob a parent or a
brother for their own gain, but that their relation to the rest of their
fellow-citizens is quite another thing. Such people contend in essence
that they are bound to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations,
social ties, or common interests. This attitude demolishes the whole
structure of civil society.

#Better endure any loss than wrong a fellow man for gain.#

Others again who say that regard should be had for the rights of
fellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, would destroy the universal
brotherhood of mankind; and when this is annihilated, kindness,
generosity, goodness, and justice must utterly perish; and those who
work all this destruction must be considered as wickedly rebelling
against the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship which the gods
have established between human beings, and the closest bond of this
fellowship is the conviction that it is more repugnant to nature for man
to rob a fellow-man for his own gain than to endure all possible loss,
whether to his property or to his person ... or even to his very
soul--so far as these losses are not concerned with justice[BD]; for
this virtue is the sovereign mistress and queen of all the virtues.

*29* But, perhaps, some one may say: "Well, then, suppose a wise man
were starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly
useless member of society?" [Not at all; for my life is not more
precious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing
wrong to anybody for my own advantage.] "Or again; supposing a righteous
man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of
clothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?"

*30* These cases are very easy to decide. For if merely for one's own
benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a
perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary
to nature's law. #The interests of society must decide about
exceptions.# But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to
render signal service to the state and to human society--if from that
motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter
for censure. But if such is not the case, each one must bear his own
burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not
to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is
more repugnant to nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's
neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests
is repugnant to nature; for it is unjust. *31* And therefore nature's
law itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely
determine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency
have the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is
idle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to
the common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do
not find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing.
But thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his
duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so
fond of dwelling.

#No duty due to a tyrant.#

*32* As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no
ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it
is not opposed to nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally
right to kill;--nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be
exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper
measures; for as certain members are amputated, if they show signs
themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize
the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage
monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the
common body of humanity.

Of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what
moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances.

    [BD] I.e., there are no circumstances of loss or gain that
    can warrant a violation of justice.


*33* VII. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi
aliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset. Ad quas ipsas
consultationes superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex
quibus[293] perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum,
quid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, quod omnino turpe non sit.

Sed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto tamquam fastigium
imponimus, ut geometrae solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, ut
quaedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius, quae volunt, explicent, sic ego
a te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi concedas, si potes, nihil praeter id,
quod honestum sit, propter se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per
Cratippum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime
propter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis satis est et tum hoc, tum illud
probabilius videtur nec praeterea quicquam probabile.

*34* Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, quod non utilia cum
honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed
ea, quae viderentur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum,
nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, saepe testatur negatque ullam
pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, qui ista
distraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando anteponeremus utilia honestis,
sed ut ea sine errore diiudicaremus, si quando incidissent,[294] induxit
eam, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugnantiam. Hanc igitur
partem relictam explebimus nullis adminiculis, sed, ut dicitur, Marte
nostro. Neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium explicatum,
quod quidem mihi probaretur, de iis, quae in manus meas venerunt.[295]

    [293] _superioribus ... ex quibus_ Walker, Bt.^2, Ed.; _ex
    superioribus ... quibus_ MSS., Bt.^1; _superioribus ...
    quibus_, Heine.

    [294] _ea ... incidissent_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine, Ed.; _eam_
    [repugnantiam] ... _incidisset_ Unger, Bt.^2

    [295] _venerunt_ Manutius, Edd.; _venerint_ MSS.


*33* VII. It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would
have followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his
design. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his
former books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be
avoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided
for the reason that it is not immoral at all.

We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which
is unfinished to be sure, but still almost completed; and as
mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition
but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily
to explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with
me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake
except what is morally right. #Moral Right the only good or the chief
good.# But if Cratippus[BE] does not permit this assumption, you will
still grant this at least--that what is morally right is the object most
worth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for
my purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more
probable; and besides these, there is no other alternative that seems
probable at all.[BF]

#Vindication of Panaetius: nothing can be expedient that is not morally
right.#

*34* In the first place, I must undertake the defence of Panaetius on
this point; for he has said not that the truly expedient could under
certain circumstances clash with the morally right (for he could not
have said that conscientiously[BG]), but only that what _seemed_
expedient could do so. For he often bears witness to the fact that
nothing is really expedient that is not at the same time morally right,
and nothing morally right that is not at the same time expedient; and he
says that no greater curse has ever assailed human life than the
doctrine of those who have separated these two conceptions. And so he
introduced an apparent, not a real, conflict between them, not to the
end that we should under certain circumstances give the expedient
preference over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get in
each other's way, we might decide between them without uncertainty. This
part, therefore, which was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to
completion without any auxiliaries, but fighting my own battle, as the
saying is. For of all that has been worked out on this line since the
time of Panaetius, nothing that has come into my hands is at all
satisfactory to me.

    [BE] As a Peripatetic, Cratippus insisted that there was
    _natural_ good as well as _moral_ good; thus health, honour,
    etc., were good and worth seeking for their own sake, though
    in less degree than virtue. But the Stoics (and Cicero is now
    speaking as a Stoic) called all those other blessings not
    "good" nor "worth seeking for their own sake," but
    "indifferent."

    [BF] With this he waves aside, without even the honour of
    mentioning them, the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, etc.

    [BG] Because he was a Stoic.


*35* VIII. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri
necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas
adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas
relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitudo sit, ibi utilitatem
esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo
(recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque
contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem
re utilitas et turpitudo[296] esse non potest.

Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut
Zenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua
omnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse
aut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile: ita,
quicquid honestum, id utile.

*36* Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid, quod utile visum
est, arripuit, id continuo secernit ab honesto. Hinc sicae, hinc venena,
hinc falsa testamenta nascuntur, hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes
direptionesque sociorum et civium, hinc opum nimiarum, potentiae non
ferendae, postremo etiam in liberis civitatibus regnandi exsistunt
cupiditates, quibus nihil nec taetrius nec foedius excogitari potest.
Emolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudiciis vident, poenam non dico legum,
quam saepe perrumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quae acerbissima est,
non vident.

*37* Quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est
enim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant, utrum id sequantur,
quod honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere contaminent; in ipsa
enim dubitatione facinus inest, etiamsi ad id non pervenerint. Ergo ea
deliberanda omnino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio.

Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et occultandi spes opinioque
removenda est. Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid
profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare
possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, nihil libidinose, nihil
incontinenter esse faciendum.

    [296] _re utilitas et turp._ c, Edd.; _re utili turpitudo_ B
    H a b.


#Expediency and immorality incompatible.#

*35* VIII. Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or
other, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer
inspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what
presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to
sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency
where there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugnant to
nature as immorality (for nature demands right and harmony and
consistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly
in accord with nature as expediency, then surely expediency and
immorality cannot coexist in one and the same object.

#The morally right is also expedient.#

Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only
thing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as
infinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it
necessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or
the supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient;
consequently, that which is morally right is also expedient.

#The evils resulting from contrary view.#

*36* Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly upright to seize
upon something that seems to be expedient and straightway to dissociate
that from the question of moral right. To this error the assassin's
dagger, the poisoned cup, the forged wills owe their origin; this gives
rise to theft, embezzlement of public funds, exploitation and plundering
of provincials and citizens; this engenders also the lust for excessive
wealth, for despotic power, and finally for making oneself king even in
the midst of a free people; and anything more atrocious or repulsive
than such a passion cannot be conceived. For with a false perspective
they see the material rewards but not the punishment--I do not mean the
penalty of the law, which they often escape, but the heaviest penalty of
all, their own demoralization.

*37* Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is
wicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course
which they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they
know is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even
though they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those
actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere
consideration of which is itself morally wrong.

#Moral rectitude and secret sin.#

Furthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and
thought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we
have only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought
to be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods
and men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice,
of lust or of intemperance.


#Rep. II, 359 C#

*38* IX. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, qui, cum terra
discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, descendit in illum hiatum
aëneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus
fores essent; quibus apertis corpus hominis mortui vidit magnitudine
invisitata[297] anulumque aureum in digito; quem ut detraxit, ipse
induit (erat autem regius pastor), tum in concilium se pastorum recepit.
Ibi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse
autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum
inverterat. Itaque hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit
eaque adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit, quos obstare
arbitrabatur, nec in his eum facinoribus quisquam potuit videre. Sic
repente anuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiae.

Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo[298] plus sibi licere
putet peccare, quam si non haberet[299]; honesta enim bonis viris, non
occulta quaeruntur.

*39* Atque hoc loco philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non
satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone;
quasi vero ille aut factum id esse aut fieri potuisse defendat! Haec est
vis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus
quidem sit, cum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis
causa feceris, si id dis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne
facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Nequaquam[300] potest id quidem; sed
quaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. Urguent
rustice sane; negant enim posse et in eo perstant; hoc verbum quid
valeat, non vident. Cum enim quaerimus, si celare possint, quid facturi
sint, non quaerimus, possintne celare, sed tamquam tormenta quaedam
adhibemus, ut, si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos, quod
expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur, si negent, omnia turpia per se
ipsa fugienda esse concedant.

Sed iam ad propositum revertamur.

    [297] _invisitata_ B H^1, Edd.; _inusitata_ H^2 a b c.

    [298] _ni(c)hilo_ c, Edd.; _nihil_ B H a b.

    [299] _peccare ... haberet_ MSS.; bracketed by Madv., Bt.

    [300] _nequaquam_ Manutius, Bt., Ed., Heine; _quamquam_ (and
    yet it is possible) MSS., Müller.


#The story of Gyges and his ring.#

*38* IX. By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar
story of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of
heavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes,
a horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw
the body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his
finger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to
an assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As
often as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his
hand, he became invisible to every one, while he himself saw everything;
but as often as he turned it back to its proper position, he became
visible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he
debauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal
master and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without
anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the
ring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia.

Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that
he was free to do wrong any more than if he did not have it; for good
men aim to secure not secrecy but the right.

*39* And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all
vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related
by Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was
actually true or even possible! #The moral of the story.# But the force
of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even
to suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or
sovereignty or sensual gratification--if your act should be hidden for
ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition,
they say, is impossible. Of course it is. But my question is, if that
were possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one
do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy: they assert
that it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning
of my words, "if possible." For when we ask what they would do, if they
could escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape
detection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer
that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their
selfish interest, that would be a confession that they are criminally
minded; should they say that they would not do so, they would be
granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided.

But let us now return to our theme.


*40* X. Incidunt multae saepe causae, quae conturbent animos utilitatis
specie, non cum hoc deliberetur, relinquendane sit honestas propter
utilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est), sed illud,
possitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. Cum Collatino
collegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, poterat videri facere id iniuste;
fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor.
Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, cognationem Superbi
nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile,
patriae consulere, id erat ita honestum, ut etiam ipsi Collatino placere
deberet. Itaque utilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua ne utilitas
quidem esse potuisset.

At in eo rege, qui urbem condidit, non item; *41* species enim
utilitatis animum pepulit eius; cui cum visum esset utilius solum quam
cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit. Omisit his et pietatem et
humanitatem, ut id, quod utile videbatur neque erat, assequi posset, et
tamen muri causam[301] opposuit, speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec
sane idoneam. Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.

*42* Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque
tradendae, cum iis[302] ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod
sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa:
"Qui stadium," inquit, "currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime
possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum[303] certet, aut manu
depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod
pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est."

*43* Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non
tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra
officium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum
est. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera
generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque
contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir
bonus faciet, ne si index quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam
amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam
esse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet.
*44* Cum vero iurato sententia dicenda erit,[304] meminerit deum se
adhibere[305] testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil
homini dedit deus ipse divinius. Itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus
morem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, QUAE SALVA FIDE FACERE POSSIT.
Haec rogatio ad ea pertinet, quae paulo ante dixi honeste amico a iudice
posse concedi; nam si omnia facienda sint, quae amici velint, non
amicitiae tales, sed coniurationes putandae sint. *45* Loquor autem de
communibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris perfectisque nihil potest
esse tale.

Damonem et Phintiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut,
cum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset et is, qui
morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa
postulavisset, vas factus sit[306] alter eius sistendi, ut, si ille non
revertisset, moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset,
admiratus eorum fidem tyrannus petivit, ut se ad amicitiam tertium
ascriberent.

*46* Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo, quod
honestum est, comparatur, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas;
cum autem in amicitia, quae honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et
fides anteponatur amicitiae. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, dilectus
officii.

    [301] _causam_ c, Edd.; _causa_ B H a b.

    [302] _iis_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [303] _quicum_ MSS., Bt., Heine; _quocum_ Ed.

    [304] _erit_ Ed., Bt.^2, Heine; _sit_ MSS.; _est_ Bt.^1

    [305] _adhibere_ B H a, Bt., Ed.; _habere_ b c, Lact.,
    Müller.

    [306] _sit_ Manubius, Edd.; _est_ MSS., Nonius.


#Conflicts between:#

#(1) apparent Expediency and Justice,#

*40* X. Many cases oftentimes arise to perplex our minds with a specious
appearance of expediency: the question raised in these cases is not
whether moral rectitude is to be sacrificed to some considerable
advantage (for that would of course be wrong), but whether the apparent
advantage can be secured without moral wrong. When Brutus deposed his
colleague Collatinus from the consular office, his treatment of him
might have been thought unjust; for Collatinus had been his associate,
and had helped him with word and deed in driving out the royal family.
But when the leading men of the state had determined that all the
kindred of Superbus and the very name of the Tarquins and every reminder
of the monarchy should be obliterated, then the course that was
expedient--namely, to serve the country's interests--was so
pre-eminently right, that it was even Collatinus's own duty to acquiesce
in its justice. And so expediency gained the day because of its moral
lightness; for without moral rectitude there could have been no possible
expediency.

Not so in the case of the king[BH] who founded the city: *41* it was the
specious appearance of expediency that actuated him; and when he decided
that it was more expedient for him to reign alone than to share the
throne with another, he slew his brother.[BI] He threw to the winds his
brotherly affection and his human feelings, to secure what seemed to
him--but was not--expedient; and yet in defence of his deed he offered
the excuse about his wall--a specious show of moral rectitude, neither
reasonable nor adequate at all. He committed a crime, therefore, with
due respect to him let me say so, be he Quirinus or Romulus.[BJ]

#(2) individual and general interests,#

*42* And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interests and
surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should
consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his
neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his
usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive
with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or
with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is
not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own
advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour."

#(3) obligations to friends and duty,#

*43* It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions
of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to
do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not
right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is
short and easy to master: apparent advantages--political preferment,
riches, sensual pleasures, and the like--should never be preferred to
the obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a
friend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his
oath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's
case; for he lays aside the rôle of friend when he assumes that of
judge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will
prefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the
time for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit
his friend's convenience. *44* But when he comes to pronounce the
verdict under oath, he should remember that he has God as his
witness--that is, as I understand it, his own conscience, than which God
himself has bestowed upon man nothing more divine. From this point of
view it is a fine custom that we have inherited from our forefathers (if
we were only true to it now) to appeal to the juror with this
formula--"to do what he can consistently with his sacred honour." This
form of appeal is in keeping with what I said a moment ago would be
morally right for a judge to concede to a friend. For supposing that we
were bound to do everything that our friends desired, such relations
would have to be accounted not friendships but conspiracies. *45* But I
am speaking here of ordinary friendships; for among men who are ideally
wise and perfect such situations cannot arise.

#Damon and Phintias.#

They say that Damon and Phintias, of the Pythagorean school, enjoyed
such ideally perfect friendship, that when the tyrant Dionysius had
appointed a day for the execution of one of them, and the one who had
been condemned to death requested a few days' respite for the purpose of
putting his loved ones in the care of friends, the other became surety
for his appearance, with the understanding that if his friend did not
return, he himself should be put to death. And when the friend returned
on the day appointed, the tyrant in admiration for their faithfulness
begged that they would enrol him as a third partner in their friendship.

#Rules of precedence.#

*46* Well then, when we are weighing what seems to be expedient in
friendship against what is morally right, let apparent expediency be
disregarded and moral rectitude prevail; and when in friendship requests
are submitted that are not morally right, let conscience and scrupulous
regard for the right take precedence of the obligations of friendship.
In this way we shall arrive at a proper choice between conflicting
duties--the subject of this part of our investigation.

    [BH] Romulus.

    [BI] Remus.

    [BJ] I.e., whether he be god or man.


XI. Sed utilitatis specie in re publica saepissime peccatur, ut in
Corinthi disturbatione nostri; durius etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt,
ut Aeginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices praeciderentur. Hoc visum
est utile; nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo.
Sed nihil, quod crudele, utile; est enim hominum naturae, quam sequi
debemus, maxime inimica crudelitas. *47* Male etiam, qui peregrinos
urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant, ut Pennus apud patres nostros,
Papius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non
licere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola;
usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est.

Illa praeclara, in quibus publicae utilitatis species prae honestate
contemnitur. Plena exemplorum est nostra res publica cum saepe, tum
maxime bello Punico secundo; quae Cannensi calamitate accepta maiores
animos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis; nulla timoris significatio,
nulla mentio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, ut speciem utilitatis
obscuret.

*48* Athenienses cum Persarum impetum nullo modo possent sustinere
statuerentque, ut urbe relicta coniugibus et liberis Troezene depositis
naves conscenderent libertatemque Graeciae classe defenderent, Cyrsilum
quendam suadentem, ut in urbe manerent Xerxemque[307] reciperent,
lapidibus obruerunt. Atqui[308] ille utilitatem sequi videbatur; sed ea
nulla erat repugnante honestate.

*49* Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit
in contione se habere consilium rei publicae salutare, sed id sciri non
opus esse; postulavit, ut aliquem populus daret, quicum communicaret;
datus est Aristides; huic ille, classem Lacedaemoniorum, quae subducta
esset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemoniorum
opes necesse esset. Quod Aristides cum audisset, in contionem magna
exspectatione venit dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles
afferret, sed minime honestum. Itaque Athenienses, quod honestum non
esset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt totamque eam rem, quam ne audierant
quidem, auctore Aristide repudiaverunt. Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas
immunes, socios vectigales habemus.

    [307] _Xerxemque_ B H a b, Bt., Heine; _Xersenque_ c;
    _Xersemque_ Nonius, Ed.

    [308] _Atqui_ Victorius, Fl., Bt.^2, Ed.; _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1


#(4) apparent political expediency and duty to humanity.#

XI. Through a specious appearance of expediency wrong is very often
committed in transactions between state and state, as by our own country
in the destruction of Corinth. A more cruel wrong was perpetrated by the
Athenians in decreeing that the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their
navy, should have their thumbs cut off. This, seemed to be expedient;
for Aegina was too grave a menace, as it was close to the Piraeus. But
no cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human
nature, whose leadings we ought to follow. *47* They, too, do wrong who
would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and
would exclude them from its borders, as was done by Pennus in the time
of our fathers, and in recent times by Papius. It may not be right, of
course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and
privileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two
of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners
from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the
laws of humanity.

#Moral right far outweighs apparent expediency.#

There are splendid examples in history where the apparent expediency of
the state has been set at naught out of regard for moral rectitude. Our
own country has many instances to offer throughout her history, and
especially in the Second Punic War when news came of the disaster at
Cannae, Rome displayed a loftier courage than ever she did in success;
never a trace of faint-heartedness, never a mention of making terms. The
influence of moral right is so potent, that it eclipses the specious
appearance of expediency.

*48* When the Athenians could in no way stem the tide of the Persian
invasion and determined to abandon their city, bestow their wives and
children in safety at Troezen, embark upon their ships, and fight on the
sea for the freedom of Greece, a man named Cyrsilus proposed that they
should stay at home and open the gates of their city to Xerxes. They
stoned him to death for it. And yet he was working for what he thought
was expediency; but it was not--not at all, for it clashed with moral
rectitude.

*49* After the victorious close of that war with Persia, Themistocles
announced in the Assembly that he had a plan for the welfare of the
state, but that it was not politic to let it be generally known. He
requested the people to appoint some one with whom he might discuss it.
They appointed Aristides. Themistocles confided to him that the Spartan
fleet, which had been hauled up on shore at Gytheum, could be secretly
set on fire; this done, the Spartan power would inevitably be crushed.
When Aristides heard the plan, he came into the Assembly amid the eager
expectation of all and reported that the plan proposed by Themistocles
was in the highest degree expedient, but anything but morally right. The
result was that the Athenians concluded that what was not morally right
was likewise not expedient, and at the instance of Aristides they
rejected the whole proposition without even listening to it. Their
attitude was better than ours; for we let pirates go scot free, while we
make our allies pay tribute.[BK]

    [BK] The Cilician pirates had been crushed by Pompey and
    settled at Soli (Pompeiopolis). They gathered strength again
    during the distractions of the civil wars, and Antony is even
    said to have sought their aid in the war against Brutus and
    Cassius.

    Marseilles and King Deiotarus of Armenia had supported Pompey
    and in consequence were made tributary by Caesar's party.


XII. Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id numquam esse utile, ne tum quidem,
cum id, quod esse utile putes, adipiscare; hoc enim ipsum, utile putare,
quod turpe sit, calamitosum est. *50* #§ 40# Sed incidunt, ut supra
dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut
animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi.
Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus
Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia
et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores
Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum
viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo
venditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et
consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe
iudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit.

*51* In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et
gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo.
Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit,
emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum
sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam
vendat, velle quam optime vendere.

"Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quam ceteri, fortasse etiam
minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria?"

*52* Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: "Quid ais? tu cum
hominibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus
sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas,
ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua
sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae?"

Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: "Aliud est celare, aliud tacere;
neque ego nunc te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui
sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici
vilitas[309]; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem[310] mihi
dicere necesse est."

*53* "Immo vero," inquiet ille, "necesse est,[311] siquidem meministi
esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem."

"Memini," inquiet ille; "sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum
cuiusque sit? Quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed
donandum."

    [309] _vilitas_ a, Edd.; _utilitas_, B H b c.

    [310] _idem_ B H a b; _id_ c, Bt.

    [311] _immo ... est_ c, Ed., Heine; _immo vero necesse est_
    p; _immo vero_ [_inquiet ille_] _necesse est_ Bt.


XII. Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is
morally wrong can never be expedient--not even when one secures by means
of it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a
course expedient, when it is morally wrong, is demoralizing. *50*
#Expediency _vs._ moral rectitude in business relations.# But, as I said
above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with
moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether
their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The
following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of
dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and
suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from
Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other
importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has
sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to
report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and
sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case
of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man
would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians
if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt
whether such silence would really be immoral.

#Diogenes _vs._ Antipater.#

*51* In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and
highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater,
a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the
facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any
detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should
declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is
prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has
goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage,
provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation.

"I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have
offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my
competitors--perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is
wronged?"

*52* "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it
is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve
society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have
these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow,
that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely
that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; #Is
concealment of truth immoral?# will you, in view of all these facts,
conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close
at hand for them?"

"It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; "not to
reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not
concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of
the gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more
advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am
under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your
interest to be told."

*53* "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you
will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by nature and
existing between man and man."

"I do not forget them," the other will reply; "but do you mean to say
that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as
private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at
all, but freely give everything away."


XIII. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: "Quamvis hoc turpe
sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam," sed ita expedire, ut turpe non
sit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum.

*54* Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit,
ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in
omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae _sint_,[312]
ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus
venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se
venditurum putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit.

*55* "Ille vero," inquit Antipater; "quid est enim aliud erranti viam
non monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc
non est, emptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam fraudem
incurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in
errorem alterum inducere."

*(55)* Diogenes contra: "Num te emere coëgit, qui ne hortatus quidem
est? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti.
Quodsi, qui proscribunt villam bonam beneque aedificatam, non
existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec aedificata
ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium
emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum
non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas?
Quid vero est stultius quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia
narrare? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita praeco
praedicet: 'Domum pestilentem vendo?'"

*56* Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte defenditur
honestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, ut id, quod utile
videatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec
est illa, quae videtur utilium fieri cum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae
diiudicanda sunt;[313] non enim, ut quaereremus, exposuimus, sed ut
explicaremus. *57* Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios[314]
nec hic aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est
celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare
emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem
celandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non
aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti
potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris,
vafri. Haec tot et alia plura nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina?

    [312] _sint_ Bt.^1, Ed., Heine; not in MSS., Bt^2.

    [313] _sunt_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine, Ed.; _est_ [dissensio]
    Unger, Bt.^2

    [314] _Rhodios_ c, Edd.; _Rhodius_ B H a b.


XIII. In this whole discussion, you see, no one says "However wrong
morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do
it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without
being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be
done, because it is morally wrong.

#A vendor's duty.#

*54* Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on
account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but
which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the
reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that
vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is
built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows
about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser
these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could
reasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is
unjust or dishonourable.

*55* "Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty
in closing a deal and through mistaken judgment to incur a very serious
loss, if this is not refusing 'to set a man right when he has lost his
way' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of public
execration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to set a man on
his way: it is deliberately leading a man astray."

*(55)* "Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to
purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he
did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered
guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards FOR SALE: A FINE
VILLA, WELL BUILT, even when it is neither good nor properly built,
still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For
where the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there
be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly
stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good
what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a
vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale?
And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's
bidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale?'"

*56* In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is
defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency
is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what
seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the
contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the
morally right. #Cicero's decision in the cases.# But I must give my
decision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise
the questions, but to offer a solution. *57* I think, then, that it was
the duty of that grain dealer not to keep back the facts from the
Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with
his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a
thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in
trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something
that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails
to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person
would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or
straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty,
sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and
subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of
reproach and many more besides?


*58* XIV. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum
est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec
infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere
solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat[315] se hortulos
aliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine
interpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam,
qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere,
sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in
hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius,
qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se
convocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie
piscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori[316]
venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos
multitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi
pisces abiciebantur.

*59* Tum Canius: "Quaeso," inquit, "quid est hoc, Pythi? tantumne
piscium? tantumne cumbarum?"

Et ille: "Quid mirum?" inquit, "hoc loco est Syracusis quicquid est
piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt."

Incensus Canius cupiditate contendit a Pythio, ut venderet; gravate ille
primo; quid multa? impetrat. Emit homo cupidus et locuples tanti, quanti
Pythius voluit, et emit instructos; nomina facit, negotium conficit.
Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos, venit ipse mature; scalmum
nullum videt, quaerit ex proximo vicino, num feriae quaedam piscatorum
essent, quod eos nullos videret.

"Nullae, quod sciam," inquit; "sed hic piscari nulli solent; itaque heri
mirabar, quid accidisset."

*60* Stomachari Canius; sed quid faceret? nondum enim C. Aquilius,
collega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas; in quibus
ipsis, cum ex eo quaereretur,[317] quid esset dolus malus, respondebat:
cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Hoc quidem sane luculente ut ab
homine perito definiendi. Ergo et Pythius et omnes aliud agentes, aliud
simulantes perfidi, improbi, malitiosi. Nullum igitur eorum factum
potest utile esse, cum sit tot vitiis inquinatum.

    [315] _dictitabat_ c, Edd.; _dictabat_ B H a b.

    [316] _tempori_ B H b, Bt.^1, Ed.; _tempore_ a c; _temperi_
    Fl., Bt.^2, Heine.

    [317] _quaereretur_ Edd., with authority; _quaererem_ MSS.


#Concealment of truth _vs._ misrepresentation and falsehood.#

*58* XIV. If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what
are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius,
a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once
went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for
business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little
country-seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself,
uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad,
one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an
estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself
at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the
estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might
be expected of a money-lender, could command favours of all classes,
called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the
next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to
do. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous
banquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes;
each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the
fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius.

*59* "Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, "what does this mean?--all
these fish?--all these boats?"

"No wonder," answered Pythius; "this is where all the fish in Syracuse
are; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get
along without this estate."

Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it
to him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained
his point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country-seat,
he paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire
equipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed
the transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early
himself. Not so much as a thole-pin was in sight. He asked his next-door
neighbour whether it was a fisherman's holiday, for not a sign of them
did he see.

"Not so far as I know," said he; "but none are in the habit of fishing
here. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday."

#Criminal fraud.#

*60* Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my
colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the established forms
to apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal
fraud," as specified in these forms, he would reply: "Pretending one
thing and practising another"--a very felicitous definition, as one
might expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all
others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless,
dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be
expedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices.


*61* XV. Quodsi Aquiliana definitio vera est, ex omni vita simulatio
dissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita, nec ut emat melius nec ut vendat,
quicquam simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus. Atque[318] iste dolus
malus et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela[319] duodecim tabulis,
circumscriptio adulescentium lege Plaetoria, et sine lege iudiciis, in
quibus additur EX FIDE BONA. Reliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba
maxime excellunt: in arbitrio rei uxoriae MELIUS AEQUIUS, in fiducia UT
INTER BONOS BENE AGIER. Quid ergo? aut in eo, QUOD MELIUS AEQUIUS,
potest ulla pars inesse fraudis? aut, cum dicitur INTER BONOS BENE
AGIER, quicquam agi dolose aut malitiose potest? Dolus autem malus in
simulatione, ut ait Aquilius, continetur. Tollendum est igitur ex rebus
contrahendis omne mendacium; non illicitatorem[320] venditor, non, qui
contra se liceatur, emptor apponet; uterque, si ad eloquendum venerit,
non plus quam semel eloquetur. *62* Q. quidem Scaevola P. f., cum
postulasset, ut sibi fundus, cuius emptor erat, semel indicaretur idque
venditor ita fecisset, dixit se pluris aestimare; addidit centum milia.
Nemo est, qui hoc viri boni fuisse neget, sapientis negant, ut si
minoris, quam potuisset, vendidisset. Haec igitur est illa pernicies,
quod alios bonos, alios sapientes existimant. #Medea, Vahlen^2, 273# Ex
quo Ennius "nequiquam sapere sapientem, qui ipse sibi prodesse non
quiret." Vere id quidem, si, quid esset "prodesse," mihi cum Ennio
conveniret.

*63* Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris,
quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere "sapientis esse nihil
contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris.
Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis,
amicis maximeque rei publicae. Singulorum enim facultates et copiae
divitiae sunt civitatis." Huic[321] Scaevolae factum, de quo paulo ante
dixi, placere nullo modo potest; etenim omnino tantum se negat facturum
compendii sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda nec
gratia est.

*64* Sed, sive et simulatio et dissimulatio dolus malus est, perpaucae
res sunt, in quibus non dolus malus iste versetur, sive vir bonus est
is, qui prodest, quibus potest, nocet nemini, certe[322] istum[323]
virum bonum non facile reperimus.

Numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper
est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile.

    [318] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, Müller, Heine; _Atqui_ Manutius,
    Ed., Bt.^2

    [319] _ut tutela_ MSS., Bt., Müller; _ut in tutela_ Heine,
    Ed.

    [320] _non illicitatorem_ c (_inl._) p, Edd.; _non
    licitatorem_ B H a b.

    [321] _huic_ c, Edd.; _huius_ B H a b.

    [322] _certe_ Lamb., Edd.; _recte_ MSS.

    [323] _istum_ p c, Edd.; _iustum_ B H a b.


*61* XV. But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and
concealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily
life. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or
concealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. #Criminal
fraud and the law.# Besides, your "criminal fraud" had previously been
prohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships,
for example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of
minors, by the Plaetorian law. The same prohibition is effective,
without statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that
the decision shall be "as good faith requires."[BL] In all other cases
in equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a
case calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is
"the fairer is the better"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust:
"honest dealing, as between honest parties." Pray, then, can there be
any element of fraud in what is adjusted for the "better and fairer"? Or
can anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when "honest dealing
between honest parties" is stipulated? But "criminal fraud," as Aquilius
says, consists in false pretence. #Criminal fraud in the light of moral
rectitude.# We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of
business transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run
prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them
down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all
what he will give or take. *62* Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of
Publius Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he desired to
purchase be definitely named and the vendor named it, he replied that
he considered it worth more, and paid him 100,000 sesterces over and
above what he asked. No one could say that this was not the act of an
honest man; but people do say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise
man, any more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than he could
have commanded. Here, then, is that mischievous idea--the world
accounting some men upright, others wise; and it is this fact that gives
Ennius occasion to say:

    "In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself."

And Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed upon the meaning
of "benefit."

*63* Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in
his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that #The standard
of selfishness.# "it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private
interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs,
laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking
prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our
children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the
private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton
could not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment
ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own
profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great
praise nor gratitude.

*64* Be that as it may, if both pretence and concealment constitute
"criminal fraud," there are very few transactions into which "criminal
fraud" does not enter; or, if he only is a good man who helps all he
can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to
find the good man as thus defined.

To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is
always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness
is always moral.

    [BL] See § 70 below.


*65* XVI. Ac de iure quidem praediorum sanctum apud nos est iure civili,
ut in iis vendendis vitia dicerentur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam,
cum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea praestari, quae essent lingua
nuncupata, quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli poenam subiret, a iuris
consultis etiam reticentiae poena est constituta; quicquid enim
esset[324] in praedio vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi
nominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere. *66* Ut, cum in arce
augurium augures acturi essent iussissentque Ti.[325] Claudium
Centumalum, qui aedes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri ea, quorum
altitudo officeret auspiciis, Claudius proscripsit insulam
[vendidit],[326] emit P. Calpurnius Lanarius. Huic ab auguribus illud
idem denuntiatum est. Itaque Calpurnius cum demolitus esset cognossetque
Claudium aedes postea proscripsisse, quam esset ab auguribus demoliri
iussus, arbitrum illum adegit, QUICQUID SIBI DARE FACERE OPORTERET EX
FIDE BONA. M. Cato sententiam dixit, huius nostri Catonis pater (ut enim
ceteri ex patribus, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit ex filio est
nominandus)--is igitur iudex ita pronuntiavit: "cum in vendendo rem eam
scisset et non pronuntiasset, emptori damnum praestari oportere."

*67* Ergo ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere notum esse emptori vitium,
quod nosset venditor. Quod si recte iudicavit, non recte frumentarius
ille, non recte aedium pestilentium venditor tacuit. Sed huius modi
reticentiae iure civili comprehendi[327] non possunt; quae autem
possunt, diligenter tenentur. M. Marius Gratidianus, propinquus noster,
C. Sergio Oratae vendiderat aedes eas, quas ab eodem ipse paucis ante
annis emerat. Eae serviebant,[328] sed hoc in mancipio Marius non
dixerat. Adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum
defendebat Antonius. Ius Crassus urguebat, "quod vitii venditor non
dixisset sciens, id oportere praestari," aequitatem Antonius, "quoniam
id vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas aedes vendidisset, nihil
fuisse necesse dici, nec eum esse deceptum, qui, id, quod emerat, quo
iure esset, teneret."

*68* Quorsus haec? Ut illud intellegas, non placuisse maioribus nostris
astutos.

    [324] _esset_ p c, Edd.; _est_ B H a b.

    [325] _Ti._ Lange, Edd.; _titum_ MSS.

    [326] _vendidit_ B H a b; _et vendidit_ p c.; Edd. omit.

    [327] _comprehendi_ MSS.; _omnes comprehendi_ Bt., Heine.

    [328] _serviebant_ Heus., Edd.; _sergio serviebant_ B H a b;
    _sergio alii serviebant_ c.


#Concealment of truth about real estate prohibited by law.#

*65* XVI. In the laws pertaining to the sale of real property it is
stipulated in our civil code that when a transfer of any real estate is
made, all its defects shall be declared as far as they are known to the
vendor. According to the laws of the Twelve Tables it used to be
sufficient that such faults as had been expressly declared should be
made good and that for any flaws which the vendor expressly denied, when
questioned, he should be assessed double damages. A like penalty for
failure to make such declaration also has now been secured by our
jurisconsults: they have decided that any defect in a piece of real
estate, if known to the vendor but not expressly stated, must be made
good by him. *66* For example, the augurs were proposing to take
observations from the citadel and they ordered Tiberius Claudius
Centumalus, who owned a house upon the Caelian Hill, to pull down such
parts of the building as obstructed the augurs' view by reason of their
height. Claudius at once advertised his block for sale, and Publius
Calpurnius Lanarius bought it. The same notice was served also upon him.
And so, when Calpurnius had pulled down those parts of the building and
discovered that Claudius had advertised it for sale only after the
augurs had ordered them to be pulled down, he summoned the former owner
before a court of equity to decide "what indemnity the owner was under
obligation 'in good faith' to pay and deliver to him." The verdict was
pronounced by Marcus Cato, the father of our Cato (for as other men
receive a distinguishing name from their fathers, so he who bestowed
upon the world so bright a luminary must have his distinguishing name
from his son); he, as I was saying, was presiding judge and pronounced
the verdict that "since the augurs' mandate was known to the vendor at
the time of making the transfer and since he had not made it known, he
was bound to make good the purchaser's loss."

#Scope of Cato's decision.#

*67* With this verdict he established the principle that it was
essential to good faith that any defect known to the vendor must be made
known to the purchaser. If his decision was right, our grain dealer and
the vendor of the unsanitary house did not do right to suppress the
facts in those cases. But the civil code cannot be made to include all
cases where facts are thus suppressed; but those cases which it does
include are summarily dealt with. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, a kinsman
of ours, sold back to Gaius Sergius Orata the house which he himself had
bought a few years before from that same Orata. It was subject to an
encumbrance, but Marius had said nothing about this fact in stating the
terms of sale. The case was carried to the courts. Crassus was counsel
for Orata; Antonius was retained by Gratidianus. Crassus pleaded the
letter of the law that "the vendor was bound to make good the defect,
for he had not declared it, although he was aware of it"; Antonius laid
stress upon the equity of the case, pleading that, "inasmuch as the
defect in question had not been unknown to Sergius (for it was the same
house that he had sold to Marius), no declaration of it was needed, and
in purchasing it back he had not been imposed upon, for he knew to what
legal liability his purchase was subject."

*68* What is the purpose of these illustrations? To let you see that our
forefathers did not countenance sharp practice.


XVII. Sed aliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias, leges,
quatenus manu tenere possunt, philosophi, quatenus ratione et
intellegentia. Ratio ergo hoc postulat, ne quid insidiose, ne quid
simulate, ne quid fallaciter. Suntne igitur insidiae tendere plagas,
etiamsi excitaturus non sis nec agitaturus? ipsae enim ferae nullo
insequente saepe incidunt. Sic tu aedes proscribas, tabulam tamquam
plagam ponas, [domum propter vitia vendas,][329] in eam aliquis incurrat
imprudens?

*69* Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more
turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege
sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est
tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes,
interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem
civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse
voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium,
idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam
et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas
ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis
exemplis. 70* Nam quanti verba illa: UTI NE PROPTER TE FIDEMVE TUAM
CAPTUS FRAUDATUSVE SIM! quam illa aurea: UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER
OPORTET ET SINE FRAUDATIONE! Sed, qui sint "boni," et quid sit "bene
agi," magna quaestio est.

Q. quidem Scaevola, pontifex maximus, summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus
iis arbitriis, in quibus adderetur EX FIDE BONA, fideique bonae nomen
existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis societatibus,
fiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis venditis, conductis locatis, quibus
vitae societas contineretur; in iis magni esse iudicis statuere,
praesertim cum in plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quemque
cuique praestare oporteret.

*71* Quocirca astutiae tollendae sunt eaque malitia, quae volt illa
quidem videri se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea distatque plurimum.
Prudentia est enim locata in dilectu bonorum et malorum, malitia, si
omnia, quae turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis ponit ante.

Nec vero in praediis solum ius civile ductum a natura malitiam
fraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiorum venditione venditoris
fraus omnis excluditur. Qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de fuga, de
furtis, praestat edicto aedilium. Heredum alia causa est.

*72* Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit, hoc secundum
naturam esse, neminem id agere, ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia. Nec
ulla pernicies vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malitia simulatio
intellegentiae; ex quo ista innumerabilia nascuntur, ut utilia cum
honestis pugnare videantur. Quotus enim quisque reperietur, qui
impunitate et ignoratione omnium proposita abstinere possit iniuria?

    [329] Bracketed by Unger, Edd.


#Law _vs._ philosophy in dealing with knavery.#

XVII. Now the law disposes of sharp practices in one way, philosophers
in another: the law deals with them as far as it can lay its strong arm
upon them; philosophers, as far as they can be apprehended by reason and
conscience. Now reason demands that nothing be done with unfairness,
with false pretence, or with misrepresentation. Is it not deception,
then, to set snares, even if one does not mean to start the game or to
drive it into them? Why, wild creatures often fall into snares undriven
and unpursued. Could one in the same way advertise a house for sale,
post up a notice "To be sold," like a snare, and have somebody run into
it unsuspecting?

#Civil law _vs._ moral law.#

*69* Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of
procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor
forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is
forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship--although
I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and
again--which has the very widest application, uniting all men together
and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong
to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are
citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our
forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and
another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the
universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But
we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine
Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we
were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the
excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. *70* #"Good faith" in
performance of contracts.# For how weighty are the words: "That I be not
deceived and defrauded through you and my confidence in you"! How
precious are these: "As between honest people there ought to be honest
dealing, and no deception"! But who are "honest people," and what is
"honest dealing"--these are serious questions.

It was Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who used to attach the
greatest importance to all questions of arbitration to which the formula
was appended "as good faith requires;" and he held that the expression
"good faith" had a very extensive application, for it was employed in
trusteeships and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buying and
selling, in hiring and letting--in a word, in all the transactions on
which the social relations of daily life depend; in these, he said, it
required a judge of great ability to decide the extent of each
individual's obligation to the other, especially when counter-claims
were admissible in most cases.

*71* Away, then, with sharp practice and trickery, which desires, of
course, to pass for wisdom, but is far from it and totally unlike it.
For the function of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil;
whereas, inasmuch as all things morally wrong are evil, trickery
prefers the evil to the good.

It is not only in the case of real estate transfers that the civil law,
based upon a natural feeling for the right, punishes trickery and
deception, but also in the sale of slaves every form of deception on the
vendors part is disallowed. For by the aediles' ruling the vendor is
answerable for any deficiency in the slave he sells, for he is supposed
to know if his slave is sound, or if he is a runaway, or a thief. The
case of those who have just come into the possession of slaves by
inheritance is different.

#Cunning is not wisdom.#

*72* From this we come to realize that since nature is the source of
right, it is not in accord with nature that anyone should take advantage
of his neighbour's ignorance. And no greater curse in life can be found
than knavery that wears the mask of wisdom. Thence come those countless
cases in which the expedient seems to conflict with the right. For how
few will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if assured of the
power to keep it an absolute secret and to run no risk of punishment!


*73* XVIII. Periclitemur, si placet, et in iis quidem exemplis, in
quibus peccari volgus hominum fortasse non putet. Neque enim de
sicariis, veneficis, testamentariis, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco
disserendum est, qui non verbis sunt et disputatione philosophorum, sed
vinclis et carcere fatigandi, sed haec[330] consideremus, quae faciunt
ii, qui habentur boni.

L. Minuci Basili, locupletis hominis, falsum testamentum quidam e
Graecia Romam attulerunt. Quod quo facilius optinerent, scripserunt
heredes secum M. Crassum et Q. Hortensium, homines eiusdem aetatis
potentissimos; qui cum illud falsum esse suspicarentur, sibi autem
nullius essent conscii culpae, alieni facinoris munusculum non
repudiaverunt. Quid ergo? satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse videantur?
Mihi quidem non videtur, quamquam alterum vivum amavi, alterum non odi
mortuum; *74* sed, cum Basilus M. Satrium, sororis filium, nomen suum
ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem (hunc dico patronum agri Piceni
et Sabini; o turpem notam temporum [nomen illorum]!),[331] non erat
aequum principes civis rem habere, ad Satrium nihil praeter nomen
pervenire. Etenim, si is, qui non defendit iniuriam neque
propulsat,[332] cum potest, iniuste facit, #§ 23# ut in primo libro
disserui, qualis habendus est is, qui non modo non repellit, sed etiam
adiuvat iniuriam? Mihi quidem etiam verae hereditates non honestae
videntur, si sunt malitiosis blanditiis, officiorum non veritate, sed
simulatione quaesitae.

Atqui in talibus rebus aliud utile interdum, aliud honestum videri
solet. *75* Falso; nam eadem utilitatis, quae honestatis, est regula.
*(75)* Qui hoc non perviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum
facinus. Sic enim cogitans: "Est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc
expedit," res a natura copulatas audebit errore divellere, qui fons est
fraudium, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium.

    [330] _haec_ c. Edd.; _hoc_ B H a b.

    [331] _turpem notam temporum nomen illorum_ H a (_turpe_) b,
    Bt.; excl. _nomen illorum_ Victorius, Ed.; _turpe nomen
    illorum temporum_ c.

    [332] _propulsat_ cod. Bern., O., Edd.; _propulsat a suis_
    Edd.


*73* XVIII. Let us put our principle to the test, if you please, and see
if it holds good in those instances in which, perhaps, the world in
general finds no wrong; for in this connection we do not need to discuss
cut-throats, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, and embezzlers of
public moneys, who should be repressed not by lectures and discussions
of philosophers, but by chains and prison walls; but let us study here
the conduct of those who have the reputation of being honest men.

Certain individuals brought from Greece to Rome a forged will,
purporting to be that of the wealthy Lucius Minucius Basilus. The more
easily to procure validity for it, they made joint-heirs with themselves
two of the most influential men of the day, Marcus Crassus and Quintus
Hortensius. Although these men suspected that the will was a forgery,
still, as they were conscious of no personal guilt in the matter, they
did not spurn the miserable boon procured through the crime of others.
What shall we say, then? Is this excuse competent to acquit them of
guilt? I cannot think so, although I loved the one while he lived, and
do not hate the other now that he is dead. *74* Be that as it may,
Basilus had in fact desired that his nephew Marcus Satrius should bear
his name and inherit his property. (I refer to the Satrius who is the
present patron of Picenum and the Sabine country--and oh, what a
shameful stigma it is upon the times![BM]) And therefore it was not
right that two of the leading citizens of Rome should take the estate
and Satrius succeed to nothing except his uncle's name. For if he does
wrong who does not ward off and repel injury when he can--as I explained
in the course of the First Book--what is to be thought of the man who
not only does not try to prevent wrong, but actually aids and abets it?
For my part, I do not believe that even genuine legacies are moral, if
they are sought after by designing flatteries and by attentions
hypocritical rather than sincere.

#The same standard for expediency as for moral rectitude.#

And yet in such cases there are times when one course is likely to
appear expedient and another morally right. *75* The appearance is
deceptive; for our standard is the same for expediency and for moral
rectitude. *(75)* And the man who does not accept the truth of this will
be capable of any sort of dishonesty, any sort of crime. For if he
reasons "That is, to be sure, the right course, but this course brings
advantage," he will not hesitate in his mistaken judgment to divorce two
conceptions that nature has made one; and that spirit opens the door to
all sorts of dishonesty, wrong-doing, and crime.

    [BM] The shame was that states enjoying the rights of Roman
    citizenship should need a patron to protect their interests
    in the Roman capital.


XIX. Itaque, si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit,
possit in locupletium testamenta nomen eius inrepere, hac vi non utatur,
ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam suspicaturum. At
dares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus
esse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo
autem iustus isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se
transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus,
nescire fateatur. *76* At vero, si qui voluerit animi sui complicatam
notionem evolvere, iam se ipse doceat eum virum bonum esse, qui prosit,
quibus possit, noceat nemini nisi lacessitus iniuria. Quid ergo? hic non
noceat, qui quodam quasi veneno perficiat, ut veros heredes moveat, in
eorum locum ipse succedat? "Non igitur faciat," dixerit quis, "quod
utile sit, quod expediat?" Immo intellegat nihil nec expedire nec utile
esse, quod sit iniustum; hoc qui non didicerit, bonus vir esse non
poterit.

*77* _C._[333] Fimbriam consularem audiebam de patre nostro puer iudicem
M. Lutatio Pinthiae fuisse, equiti Romano sane honesto, cum is
sponsionem fecisset, NI VIR BONUS ESSET. Itaque ei dixisse Fimbriam se
illam rem numquam iudicaturum, ne aut spoliaret fama probatum hominem,
si contra iudicavisset, aut statuisse videretur virum bonum esse
aliquem, cum ea res innumerabilibus officiis et laudibus contineretur.

Huic igitur viro bono, quem Fimbria etiam, non modo Socrates noverat,
nullo modo videri potest quicquam esse utile, quod non honestum sit.
Itaque talis vir non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam
audebit, quod non audeat praedicare. Haec non turpe est dubitare
philosophos, quae ne rustici quidem dubitent? a quibus natum est id,
quod iam contritum est vetustate, proverbium. Cum enim fidem alicuius
bonitatemque laudant, dignum esse dicunt, "quicum in tenebris mices."
Hoc quam habet vim nisi illam, nihil expedire, quod non deceat, etiamsi
id possis nullo refellente optinere?

*78* Videsne hoc proverbio neque Gygi illi posse veniam dari neque huic,
quem paulo ante fingebam digitorum percussione hereditates omnium posse
converrere? Ut enim, quod turpe est, id, quamvis occultetur, tamen
honestum fieri nullo modo potest, sic, quod honestum non est, id utile
ut sit, effici non potest adversante et repugnante natura.

    [333] _C._ Bt., Ed., Heine; not in MSS.


#The good man not tempted to unrighteous gain.#

XIX. Suppose, then, that a good man had such power that at a snap of his
fingers his name could steal into rich men's wills, he would not avail
himself of that power--no, not even though he could be perfectly sure
that no one would ever suspect it. Suppose, on the other hand, that one
were to offer a Marcus Crassus the power, by the mere snapping of his
fingers, to get himself named as heir, when he was not really an heir,
he would, I warrant you, dance in the forum. But the righteous man, the
one whom we feel to be a good man, would never rob anyone of anything to
enrich himself. If anybody is astonished at this doctrine, let him
confess that he does not know what a good man is. *76* #Who is the good
man?# If, on the other hand, anyone should desire to unfold the idea of
a good man which lies wrapped up in his own mind,[BN] he would then at
once make it clear to himself that a good man is one who helps all whom
he can and harms nobody, unless provoked by wrong. What shall we say,
then? Would he not be doing harm who by a kind of magic spell should
succeed in displacing the real heirs to an estate and pushing himself
into their place? "Well," some one may say, "is he not to do what is
expedient, what is advantageous to himself?" Nay, verily; he should
rather be brought to realize that nothing that is unjust is either
advantageous or expedient; if he does not learn this lesson, it will
never be possible for him to be a "good man."

*77* When I was a boy, I used to hear my father tell that Gaius Fimbria,
an ex-consul, was judge in a case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, a Roman
knight of irreproachable character. On that occasion Pinthia had laid a
wager to be forfeited "if he did not prove in court that he was a good
man." Fimbria declared that he would never render a decision in such a
case, for fear that he might either rob a reputable man of his good
name, if he decided against him, or be thought to have pronounced some
one a good man, when such a character is, as he said, established by the
performance of countless duties and the possession of praiseworthy
qualities without number.

#To a good man moral wrong is never expedient.#

To this type of good man, then, known not only to a Socrates but even to
a Fimbria, nothing can possibly seem expedient that is not morally
right. Such a man, therefore, will never venture to think--to say
nothing of doing--anything that he would not dare openly to proclaim. Is
it not a shame that philosophers should be in doubt about moral
questions on which even peasants have no doubts at all? For it is with
peasants that the proverb, already trite with age, originated: when they
praise a man's honour and honesty, they say "He is a man with whom you
can safely play at odd and even[BO] in the dark." What is the point of
the proverb but this--that what is not proper brings no advantage, even
if you can gain your end without any one's being able to convict you of
wrong?

*78* Do you not see that in the light of this proverb no excuse is
available either for the Gyges of the story or for the man who I assumed
a moment ago could with a snap of his fingers sweep together everybody's
inheritance at once. For as the morally wrong cannot by any possibility
be made morally right, however successfully it may be covered up, so
what is not morally right cannot be made expedient, for nature refuses
and resists.

    [BN] The Platonic doctrine of ideas known in a previous
    existence and gradually developing into renewed
    consciousness. Learning is but a remembering of what the soul
    has known before.

    [BO] Lit. 'flash with the fingers'; shoot out some fingers
    the number of which had to be guessed.


*79* XX. At enim, cum permagna praemia sunt, est causa peccandi.

C. Marius cum a spe consulatus longe abesset et iam[334] septimum annum
post praeturam iaceret, neque petiturus umquam consulatum videretur, Q.
Metellum, cuius legatus erat, summum virum et civem, cum ab eo,
imperatore suo, Romam missus esset, apud populum Romanum criminatus est
bellum illum ducere; si se consulem fecissent; brevi tempore aut vivum
aut mortuum Iugurtham se in potestatem populi Romani redacturum. Itaque
factus est ille quidem consul, sed a fide iustitiaque discessit, qui
optimum et gravissimum civem, cuius legatus et a quo missus esset, in
invidiam falso crimine adduxerit.

*80* Ne noster quidem Gratidianus officio viri boni functus est tum, cum
praetor esset collegiumque praetorium tribuni plebi adhibuissent, ut res
nummaria de communi sententia constitueretur; iactabatur enim temporibus
illis nummus sic, ut nemo posset scire, quid haberet. Conscripserunt
communiter edictum cum poena atque iudicio constitueruntque, ut omnes
simul in rostra post meridiem escenderent. Et ceteri quidem alius alio,
Marius ab subselliis in rostra recta idque, quod communiter compositum
fuerat, solus edixit. Et ea res, si quaeris, ei magno honori fuit;
omnibus vicis statuae, ad eas tus, cerei; quid multa? nemo umquam
multitudini fuit carior.

*81* Haec sunt, quae conturbent in deliberatione non numquam, cum id, in
quo violatur aequitas, non ita magnum, illud autem, quod ex eo paritur,
permagnum videtur, ut Mario praeripere collegis et tribunis plebi
popularem gratiam non ita turpe, consulem ob eam rem fieri, quod sibi
tum proposuerat, valde utile videbatur. Sed omnium una regula est, quam
tibi cupio esse notissimam, aut illud, quod utile videtur, turpe ne sit
aut, si turpe est, ne videatur esse utile. Quod igitur? possumusne aut
illum Marium virum bonum iudicare aut hunc[335]? Explica atque excute
intellegentiam tuam, ut videas, quae sit in ea [species] forma[336] et
notio viri boni. Cadit ergo in virum bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causa,
criminari, praeripere, fallere? Nihil profecto minus.

*82* Est ergo ulla res tanti aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut viri
boni et splendorem et nomen amittas? Quid est, quod afferre tantum
utilitas ista, quae dicitur, possit, quantum auferre, si boni viri nomen
eripuerit, fidem iustitiamque detraxerit? Quid enim interest, utrum ex
homine se convertat quis in beluam an hominis figura immanitatem gerat
beluae?

    [334] _et iam_ Edd.; _etiam_ MSS.

    [335] _aut hunc_ c, Edd.; _atque hunc_ B H a b.

    [336] _ea species forma_ B H a b; _ea specie forma_ c p; _ea
    forma_, Klotz, Heine, Ed.; _ea species_, Bt.


#The moral loss that comes from wrong ambitions:#

*79* XX. "But stay," some one will object, "when the prize is very
great, there is excuse for doing wrong."

#(1) Marius,#

Gaius Marius had been left in obscurity for more than six whole years
after his praetorship and had scarcely the remotest hope of gaining the
consulship. It looked as if he would never even be a candidate for that
office. He was now a lieutenant under Quintus Metellus, who sent him on
a furlough to Rome. There before the Roman People he accused his own
general, an eminent man and one of our first citizens, of purposely
protracting the war and declared that if they would make him consul, he
would within a short time deliver Jugurtha alive or dead into the hands
of the Roman People. And so he was elected consul, it is true, but he
was a traitor to his own good faith and to justice; for by a false
charge he subjected to popular disfavour an exemplary and highly
respected citizen, and that too, although he was his lieutenant and
under leave of absence from him.

#(2) Gratidianus,#

*80* Even our kinsman Gratidianus failed on one occasion to perform what
would be a good man's duty: in his praetorship the tribunes of the
people summoned the college of praetors to counsel, in order to adopt by
joint resolution a standard of value for our currency; for at that time
the value of money was so fluctuating that no one could tell how much he
was worth. In joint session they drafted an ordinance, defining the
penalty and the methods of procedure in cases of violation of the
ordinance, and agreed that they should all appear together upon the
rostra in the afternoon to publish it. And while all the rest withdrew,
some in one direction, some in another, Marius (Gratidianus) went
straight from the council chamber to the rostra and published
individually what had been drawn up by all together. And that coup, if
you care to know, brought him vast honour; in every street statues of
him were erected; before these incense and candles burned. In a word, no
one ever enjoyed greater popularity with the masses.

#No material gain can compensate for moral loss.#

*81* It is such cases as these that sometimes perplex us in our
consideration, when the point in which justice is violated does not seem
so very significant, but the consequences of such slight transgression
seem exceedingly important. For example, it was not so very wrong
morally, in the eyes of Marius,[BP] to overreach his colleagues and the
tribunes in turning to himself alone all the credit with the people; but
to secure by that means his election to the consulship, which was then
the goal of his ambition,[BQ] seemed very greatly to his interest. But
for all cases we have one rule, with which I desire you to be perfectly
familiar: that which seems expedient must not be morally wrong; or, if
it is morally wrong, it must not seem expedient. What follows? Can we
account either the great Marius or our Marius Gratidianus a good man?
Work out your own ideas and sift your thoughts so as to see what
conception and idea of a good man they contain. Pray, tell me, does it
coincide with the character of your good man to lie for his own profit,
to slander, to overreach, to deceive? Nay, verily; anything but that!

*82* Is there, then, any object of such value or any advantage so worth
the winning that, to gain it, one should sacrifice the name of a "good
man" and the lustre of his reputation? What is there that your so-called
expediency can bring to you that will compensate for what it can take
away, if it steals from you the name of a "good man" and causes you to
lose your sense of honour and justice? For what difference does it make
whether a man is actually transformed into a beast or whether, keeping
the outward appearance of a man, he has the savage nature of a beast
within?

    [BP] Gratidianus's.

    [BQ] Never attained, however. For his conspicuous position as
    a popular leader made him an early mark for Sulla's
    proscriptions.


XXI. Quid? qui omnia recta et honesta neglegunt, dum modo potentiam
consequantur, nonne idem faciunt, quod is, qui etiam socerum habere
voluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset? Utile ei videbatur plurimum
posse alterius invidia; id quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset,
non videbat. Ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis
habebat, quos dicam, ut potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen, ut res
possit intellegi:

#Eur. Phoen. 524-525#

    Nam sí violandum est iús, regnandi grátia
    Violándum est; aliis rébus pietatém colas.

Capitalis [Eteocles vel potius Euripides],[337] qui id unum, quod omnium
sceleratissimum fuerit, exceperit! *83* Quid igitur minuta colligimus,
hereditates, mercaturas, venditiones fraudulentas? ecce tibi, qui rex
populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque
perfecerit! Hanc cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est;
probat enim legum et libertatis interitum earumque oppressionem taetram
et detestabilem gloriosam putat. Qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in
ea civitate, quae libera fuerit quaeque[338] esse debeat, regnare, sed
ei, qui id facere possit, esse utile, qua hunc obiurgatione aut quo
potius convicio a tanto errore coner avellere? Potest enim, di
immortales! cuiquam esse utile foedissimum et taeterrimum parricidium
patriae, quamvis is, qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab oppressis civibus parens
nominetur? Honestate igitur dirigenda[339] utilitas est, et quidem sic,
ut haec duo verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare videantur.

*84* Non habeo, ad volgi opinionem quae maior utilitas quam regnandi
esse possit; nihil contra inutilius ei, qui id iniuste consecutus sit,
invenio, cum ad veritatem coepi revocare rationem. Possunt enim cuiquam
esse utiles angores, sollicitudines, diurni et nocturni metus, vita
insidiarum periculorumque plenissima?

#_Inc. Fab._, Ribbeck^2, 651#

    Múlti iniqui atque ínfideles régno, pauci bénivoli,[340]

inquit Accius. At cui regno? Quod a Tantalo et Pelope proditum iure
optinebatur. Nam quanto pluris ei regi putas, qui exercitu populi Romani
populum ipsum Romanum oppressisset civitatemque non modo liberam, sed
etiam gentibus imperantem servire sibi coëgisset? *85* Hunc tu quas
conscientiae labes in animo censes habuisse, quae vulnera? Cuius autem
vita ipsi potest utilis esse, cum eius vitae ea condicio sit, ut, qui
illam eripuerit, in maxima et gratia futurus sit et gloria? Quodsi haec
utilia non sunt, quae maxime videntur, quia plena sunt dedecoris ac
turpitudinis, satis persuasum esse debet nihil esse utile, quod non
honestum sit.

    [337] Bracketed by Ed., Heine, et al.

    [338] _fuerit quaeque_ c, Edd.; _fuit_ B H a b.

    [339] _dirigenda_ MSS., Edd. plerique; _derigenda_ Ed.

    [340] _beni(e)voli_ Stürenbg.; _benivoli sunt_ c; _boni sunt_
    B H a b.


XXI. Again, when people disregard everything that is morally right and
true, if only they may secure power thereby, #(3) Pompey,# are they not
pursuing the same course as he[BR] who wished to have as a father-in-law
the man by whose effrontery he might gain power for himself? He thought
it advantageous to secure supreme power while the odium of it fell upon
another; and he failed to see how unjust to his country this was, and
how wrong morally. #(4) Caesar.# But the father-in-law himself used to
have continually upon his lips the Greek verses from the Phoenissae,
which I will reproduce as well as I can--awkwardly, it may be, but still
so that the meaning can be understood:

    "If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake
    Were wrong most right:--be God in all else feared!"[BS]

Our tyrant deserved his death for having made an exception of the one
thing that was the blackest crime of all. *83* Why do we gather
instances of petty crime--legacies criminally obtained and fraudulent
buying and selling? Behold, here you have a man who was ambitious to be
king of the Roman People and master of the whole world; and he achieved
it! #Even to gain a throne by moral wrong is not expedient.# The man who
maintains that such an ambition is morally right is a madman; for he
justifies the destruction of law and liberty and thinks their hideous
and detestable suppression glorious. But if anyone agrees that it is not
morally right to be king in a state that once was free and that ought to
be free now, and yet imagines that it is advantageous for him who can
reach that position, with what remonstrance or rather with what appeal
should I try to tear him away from so strange a delusion? For, oh ye
immortal gods! can the most horrible and hideous of all murders--that of
fatherland--bring advantage to anybody, even though he who has committed
such a crime receives from his enslaved fellow-citizens the title of
"Father of his Country"[BT]? #Identity of expediency and moral
rectitude.# Expediency, therefore, must be measured by the standard of
moral rectitude, and in such a way, too, that these two words shall seem
in sound only to be different but in real meaning to be one and the
same.

*84* What greater advantage one could have, according to the standard of
popular opinion, than to be a king, I do not know; when, however, I
begin to bring the question back to the standard of truth, then I find
nothing more disadvantageous for one who has risen to that height by
injustice. For can occasions for worry, anxiety, fear by day and by
night, and a life all beset with plots and perils be of advantage to
anybody?

    "Thrones have many foes and friends untrue, but few devoted
      friends,"

says Accius. But of what sort of throne was he speaking? Why, one that
was held by right, handed down from Tantalus and Pelops. Aye, but how
many more foes, think you, had that king who with the Roman People's
army brought the Roman People themselves into subjection and compelled a
state that not only had been free but had been mistress of the world to
be his slave? *85* What stains do you think he had upon his conscience,
what scars upon his heart? But whose life can be advantageous to
himself, if that life is his on the condition that the man who takes it
shall be held in undying gratitude and glory? But if these things which
seem so very advantageous are not advantageous because they are full of
shame and moral wrong, we ought to be quite convinced that nothing can
be expedient that is not morally right.

    [BR] Pompey, who in 59 married Caesar's daughter Julia,
    twenty-four years his junior, and already betrothed to
    Caepio.

    [BS] From A. S. Way's translation.

    [BT] The title bestowed on Cicero for saving the republic (in
    63) and on Caesar for overthrowing it (after the battle of
    Munda, in 45).


*86* XXII. Quamquam id quidem cum saepe alias, tum Pyrrhi bello a C.
Fabricio consule iterum et a senatu nostro iudicatum est. Cum enim rex
Pyrrhus populo Romano bellum ultro intulisset, cumque de imperio
certamen esset cum rege generoso ac potenti,[341] perfuga ab eo venit in
castra Fabrici eique est pollicitus, si praemium sibi proposuisset, se,
ut clam venisset, sic clam in Pyrrhi castra rediturum et eum veneno
necaturum. Hunc Fabricius reducendum curavit ad Pyrrhum, idque eius
factum laudatum a senatu est. Atqui, si speciem utilitatis opinionemque
quaerimus, magnum illud bellum perfuga unus et gravem adversarium
imperii sustulisset, sed magnum dedecus et flagitium, quicum laudis
certamen fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatum.

*87* Utrum igitur utilius vel Fabricio, qui talis in hac urbe, qualis
Aristides Athenis, fuit, vel senatui nostro, qui numquam utilitatem a
dignitate seiunxit, armis cum hoste certare an venenis? Si gloriae causa
imperium expetendum est, scelus absit, in quo non potest esse gloria;
sin ipsae opes expetuntur quoquo modo, non poterunt utiles esse cum
infamia.

Non igitur utilis illa L. Philippi Q. f. sententia, quas civitates L.
Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberavisset, ut eae rursus
vectigales essent neque iis pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant,
redderemus. Ei senatus est assensus. Turpe imperio! piratarum enim
melior fides quam senatus. At aucta vectigalia, utile igitur. Quousque
audebunt dicere quicquam utile, quod non honestum? *88* potest autem
ulli imperio, quod gloria debet fultum esse et benivolentia sociorum,
utile esse odium et infamia?

Ego etiam cum Catone meo saepe dissensi; nimis mihi praefracte videbatur
aerarium vectigaliaque defendere, omnia publicanis negare, multa sociis,
cum in hos benefici esse deberemus, cum illis sic agere, ut cum colonis
nostris soleremus, eoque magis, quod[342] illa ordinum coniunctio ad
salutem rei publicae pertinebat. Male etiam Curio, cum causam
Transpadanorum aequam esse dicebat, semper autem addebat: "Vincat
utilitas!" Potius doceret non esse aequam, quia non esset utilis rei
publicae, quam, cum utilem non esse diceret, esse aequam fateretur.

    [341] _potenti_ Nonius, Edd.; _potente_ MSS.

    [342] _quod_ L c, Edd.; _quo_ B H a b.


#Apparent conflicts between expediency and moral rectitude:#

#(1) Fabricius and the deserter,#

*86* XXII. And yet this very question has been decided on many occasions
before and since; but in the war with Pyrrhus the decision rendered by
Gaius Fabricius, in his second consulship, and by our senate was
particularly striking. Without provocation King Pyrrhus had declared war
upon the Roman People; the struggle was against a generous and powerful
prince, and the supremacy of power was the prize; a deserter came over
from him to the camp of Fabricius and promised, if Fabricius would
assure him of a reward, to return to the camp of Pyrrhus as secretly as
he had come, administer poison to the king, and bring about his death.
Fabricius saw to it that this fellow was taken back to Pyrrhus; and his
action was commended by the senate. And yet, if the mere show of
expediency and the popular conception of it are all we want, this one
deserter would have put an end to that wasting war and to a formidable
foe of our supremacy; but it would have been a lasting shame and
disgrace to us to have overcome not by valour but by crime the man with
whom we had a contest for glory.

*87* Which course, then, was more expedient for Fabricius, who was to
our city what Aristides was to Athens, or for our senate, who never
divorced expediency from honour--to contend against the enemy with the
sword or with poison? If supremacy is to be sought for the sake of
glory, crime should be excluded, for there can be no glory in crime; but
if it is power for its own sake that is sought, whatever the price, it
cannot be expedient if it is linked with shame.

#(2) the senate and the tributary allies,#

That well-known measure, therefore, introduced by Philippus, the son of
Quintus, was not expedient. With the authority of the senate, Lucius
Sulla had exempted from taxation certain states upon receipt of a lump
sum of money from them. Philippus proposed that they should again be
reduced to the condition of tributary states, without repayment on our
part of the money that they had paid for their exemption. And the senate
accepted his proposal. Shame upon our government! The pirates' sense of
honour is higher than the senate's. "But," some one will say, "the
revenues were increased, and therefore it was expedient." How long will
people venture to say that a thing that is not morally right can be
expedient? *88* Furthermore, can hatred and shame be expedient for any
government? For government ought to be founded upon fair fame and the
loyalty of allies?

#(3) Cato and the publicans,#

On this point I often disagreed even with my friend Cato; it seemed to
me that he was too rigorous in his watchful care over the claims of the
treasury and the revenues; he refused everything that the farmers of the
revenue asked for and much that the allies desired; whereas, as I
insisted, it was our duty to be generous to the allies and to treat the
publicans as we were accustomed individually to treat our tenants--and
all the more, because harmony between the orders was essential to the
welfare of the republic.[BU] #(4) Curio and the colonies.# Curio, too,
was wrong, when he pleaded that the demands of the people beyond the Po
were just, but never failed to add "Let expediency prevail." He ought
rather to have proved that the claims were not just, because they were
not expedient for the republic, than to have admitted that they were
just, when, as he maintained, they were not expedient.

    [BU] The publicans, farmers of the revenue, were the moneyed
    men of the times and belonged to the equestrian order. They
    purchased from the senate the farming of the revenues and
    then sublet their contract to the collectors. Sometimes they
    found that they had agreed to pay too high a rate and
    petitioned the senate to release them from their contract or
    reduce their obligations, as on this occasion (B.C. 61). The
    opposition of Cato and others strained the relations between
    the senate, who had control of the business, and the
    equestrian order, driving many of the equites over to
    Caesar's side. Complete harmony between the senate and the
    knights, as Cicero says, was the only thing that could have
    saved Rome from the popular party and Caesar.


*89* XXIII. Plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium
quaestionum: "sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non
alere."

In utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate, ut putat,
officium dirigit[343] magis quam humanitate.

Quaerit, si in mari iactura facienda sit, equine pretiosi potius
iacturam faciat an servoli vilis. Hic alio res familiaris, alio ducit
humanitas.

"Si tabulam de naufragio stultus arripuerit, extorquebitne eam sapiens,
si potuerit?"

Negat, quia sit iniurium.

"Quid? dominus navis eripietne suum?"

"Minime, non plus quam navigantem[344] in alto eicere de navi velit,
quia sua sit. Quoad enim perventum est[345] eo, quo sumpta navis est,
non domini est navis, sed navigantium."

*90* "Quid? si una tabula sit, duo naufragi, eique sapientes, sibine
uter_que_[346] rapiat, an alter cedat alteri?"

"Cedat vero, sed ei, cuius magis intersit vel sua vel rei publicae causa
vivere."

"Quid, si haec paria in utroque?"

"Nullum erit certamen, sed quasi sorte aut micando victus alteri cedet
alter."

"Quid? si pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad aerarium, indicetne id
magistratibus filius?"

"Nefas id quidem est, quin etiam defendat patrem, si arguatur."

"Non igitur patria praestat omnibus officiis?"

"Immo vero, sed ipsi patriae conducit pios habere cives in parentes."

"Quid? si tyrannidem occupare, si patriam prodere conabitur pater,
silebitne filius?"

"Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si nihil proficiet,
accusabit, minabitur etiam, ad extremum, si ad perniciem patriae res
spectabit, patriae salutem anteponet saluti patris."

*91* Quaerit etiam, si sapiens adulterinos nummos acceperit imprudens
pro bonis, cum id rescierit, soluturusne sit eos, si cui[347] debeat,
pro bonis. Diogenes ait, Antipater negat, cui potius assentior.

Qui vinum[348] fugiens vendat sciens, debeatne dicere. Non necesse putat
Diogenes, Antipater viri boni existimat. Haec sunt quasi controversa
iura Stoicorum. "In mancipio vendendo dicendane vitia, non ea, quae nisi
dixeris, redhibeatur mancipium iure civili, sed haec, mendacem esse,
aleatorem, furacem, ebriosum?" Alteri dicenda videntur, alteri non
videntur.

*92* "Si quis aurum vendens orichalcum se putet vendere, indicetne ei
vir bonus aurum illud esse an emat denario, quod sit mille denarium?"

Perspicuum est iam, et quid mihi videatur, et quae sit inter eos
philosophos, quos nominavi, controversia.

    [343] _dirigit_ MSS., Edd. plerique; _derigit_ Ed.

    [344] _quam navigantem_ Heus., Edd.; _quam si navigantem_
    MSS.

    [345] _est_ c, Nonius; _sit_ B H a b.

    [346] _sibine uterque_ Victorius, Edd.; _sibi neuter_ MSS.

    [347] _si cui_ c, Nonius, Edd.; _sicut_ B H a b.

    [348] _vinum_ c, Nonius, Edd.; _venenum_ B H a b p.


#Hecaton debates the question of expediency _vs._ moral rectitude.#

*89* XXIII. The sixth book of Hecaton's "Moral Duties" is full of
questions like the following: "Is it consistent with a good man's duty
to let his slaves go hungry when provisions are at famine prices?"

Hecaton gives the arguments on both sides of the question; but still in
the end it is by the standard of expediency, as he conceives it, rather
than by one of human feeling, that he decides the question of duty.

Then he raises this question: supposing a man had to throw part of his
cargo overboard in a storm, should he prefer to sacrifice a high-priced
horse or a cheap and worthless slave? In this case regard for his
property interest inclines him one way, human feeling the other.

"Suppose that a foolish man has seized hold of a plank from a sinking
ship, shall a wise man wrest it away from him if he can?"

"No," says Hecaton; "for that would be unjust."

"But how about the owner of the ship? Shall he take the plank away
because it belongs to him?"

"Not at all; no more than he would be willing when far out at sea to
throw a passenger overboard on the ground that the ship was his. For
until they reach the place for which the ship is chartered, she belongs
to the passengers, not to the owner."

*90* "Again; suppose there were two to be saved from the sinking
ship--both of them wise men--and only one small plank, should both seize
it to save themselves? Or should one give place to the other?"

"Why of course, one should give place to the other, but that other must
be the one whose life is more valuable either for his own sake or for
that of his country."

"But what if these considerations are of equal weight in both?"

"Then there will be no contest, but one will give place to the other, as
if the point were decided by lot or at a game of odd and even."

"Again, suppose a father were robbing temples or making underground
passages to the treasury, should a son inform the officers of it?"

"Nay; that were a crime; rather should he defend his father, in case he
were indicted."

"Well, then, are not the claims of country paramount to all other
duties?"

"Aye, verily; but it is to our country's interest to have citizens who
are loyal to their parents."

"But once more--if the father attempts to make himself king, or to
betray his country, shall the son hold his peace?"

"Nay, verily; he will plead with his father not to do so. If that
accomplishes nothing, he will take him to task; he will even threaten;
and in the end, if things point to the destruction of the state, he will
sacrifice his father to the safety of his country."

#A similar debate by Diogenes _vs._ Antipater.#

*91* Again, he raises the question: "If a wise man should inadvertently
accept counterfeit money for good, will he offer it as genuine in
payment of a debt after he discovers his mistake?" Diogenes says "Yes";
Antipater, "No," and I agree with him.

If a man knowingly offers for sale wine that is spoiling, ought he tell
his customers? Diogenes thinks that it is not required; Antipater holds
that an honest man would do so. These are like so many points of the law
disputed among the Stoics. "In selling a slave, should his faults be
declared--not those only which the seller is bound by the civil law to
declare or have the slave returned to him, but also the fact that he is
untruthful, or disposed to gamble, or steal, or get drunk?" The one
thinks such facts should be declared, the other does not.

*92* "If a man thinks that he is selling brass, when he is actually
selling gold, should an upright man inform him that his stuff is gold,
or go on buying for one shilling[BV] what is worth a thousand?"

It is clear enough by this time what my views are on these questions,
and what are the grounds of dispute between the above-named
philosophers.

    [BV] The _denarius_ was worth at this time about ninepence.


XXIV. Pacta et promissa semperne servanda sint, QUAE NEC VI NEC DOLO
MALO, ut praetores solent, FACTA SINT.

Si quis medicamentum cuipiam dederit ad aquam intercutem pepigeritque,
si eo medicamento sanus factus esset, ne illo medicamento umquam postea
uteretur, si eo medicamento sanus factus sit et annis aliquot post
inciderit in eundem morbum nec ab eo, quicum pepigerat, impetret, ut
iterum eo[349] liceat uti, quid faciendum sit. Cum sit is inhumanus, qui
non concedat, nec ei quicquam fiat iniuriae, vitae et saluti
consulendum.

*93* Quid? si qui sapiens rogatus sit ab eo, qui eum heredem faciat, cum
ei testamento sestertium milies relinquatur, ut, ante quam hereditatem
adeat, luce palam in foro saltet, idque se facturum promiserit, quod
aliter heredem eum scripturus ille non esset, faciat, quod promiserit,
necne? Promisisse nollem et id arbitror fuisse gravitatis; quoniam
promisit, si saltare in foro turpe ducet, honestius mentietur, si ex
hereditate nihil ceperit, quam si ceperit, nisi forte eam pecuniam in
rei publicae magnum aliquod tempus contulerit, ut vel saltare, cum
patriae consulturus sit, turpe non sit.

    [349] _iterum eo_ Pearce, Edd.; _item eo_ B H a b; _item tum_
    c.


#Promises not binding:#

#(1) when life or health is at stake,#

XXIV. The question arises also whether agreements and promises must
always be kept, "when," in the language of the praetors' edicts, "they
have not been secured through force or criminal fraud."

If one man gives another a remedy for the dropsy, with the stipulation
that, if he is cured by it, he shall never make use of it again; suppose
the patient's health is restored by the use of it but some years later
he contracts the same disease once more; and suppose he cannot secure
from the man with whom he made the agreement permission to use the
remedy again, what should he do? That is the question. Since the man is
unfeeling in refusing the request, and since no harm could be done to
him by his friend's using the remedy, the sick man is justified in doing
what he can for his own life and health.

#(2) when reputation is at stake,#

*93* Again: suppose that a millionaire is making some wise man his heir
and leaving him in his will a hundred million sesterces[BW]; and suppose
that he has asked the wise man, before he enters upon his inheritance,
to dance publicly in broad daylight in the forum; and suppose that the
wise man has given his promise to do so, because the rich man would not
leave him his fortune on any other condition; should he keep his promise
or not? I wish he had made no such promise; that, I think, would have
been in keeping with his dignity. But seeing that he has made it, it
will be morally better for him, if he believes it morally wrong to dance
in the forum, to break his promise and refuse to accept his inheritance
rather than to keep his promise and accept it--unless, perhaps, he
contributes the money to the state to meet some grave crisis. In that
case, to promote thereby the interests of one's country, it would not
be morally wrong even to dance, if you please, in the forum.

    [BW] Approximately £750,000.


*94* XXV. Ac ne illa quidem promissa servanda sunt, quae non sunt
iis[350] ipsis utilia, quibus illa promiseris. Sol Phaëthonti filio, ut
redeamus ad fabulas, facturum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset; optavit,
ut in currum patris tolleretur; sublatus est. Atque[351] is, ante quam
constitit, ictu fulminis deflagravit. Quanto melius fuerat in hoc
promissum patris non esse servatum! Quid, quod Theseus exegit promissum
a Neptuno? cui cum tres optationes Neptunus dedisset, optavit interitum
Hippolyti filii, cum is patri suspectus esset de noverca; quo optato
impetrato Theseus in maximis fuit luctibus. *95* Quid, _quod_[352]
Agamemnon cum devovisset Dianae, quod in suo regno pulcherrimum natum
esset illo anno, immolavit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno
natum pulchrius? Promissum potius non faciendum quam tam taetrum facinus
admittendum fuit.

Ergo et promissa non facienda non numquam, neque semper deposita
reddenda. Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat
insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere. Quid? si is, qui
apud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patriae, reddasne depositum?
Non credo; facias[353] enim contra rem publicam, quae debet esse
carissima. Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus
fiunt non honesta; facere promissa, stare conventis, reddere deposita
commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta.

Ac de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam
simulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror dictum.

*96* Sed quoniam a quattuor fontibus honestatis #§§ 15 ff.# primo libro
officia duximus, in eisdem versemur, cum docebimus ea, #§§ 40-70# quae
videantur esse utilia neque sint, #§§ 71-95# quam sint virtutis inimica.
Ac de prudentia quidem, quam vult imitari malitia, itemque de iustitia,
quae semper est utilis, disputatum est. Reliquae sunt duae partes
honestatis, quarum altera in animi excellentis magnitudine et
praestantia cernitur, altera in conformatione et moderatione
continentiae et temperantiae.

    [350] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [351] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, Müller, Heine; _Atqui_ Fl., Bt.^2,
    Ed.

    [352] _quod_ Ed.; not in MSS., Bt., et al.

    [353] _facias_ c, Bt., Ed., Heine; _facies_ A B H a b,
    Müller.


#(3) when not expedient for him to whom the promise is made.#

*94* XXV. No more binding are those promises which are inexpedient for
the persons themselves to whom they have been given. To go back to the
realm of story, the sungod promised his son Phaëthon to do for him
whatever he should wish. His wish was to be allowed to ride in his
father's chariot. It was granted. And before he came back to the ground
he was consumed by a stroke of lightning. How much better had it been,
if in his case the father's promise had not been kept. And what of that
promise, the fulfilment of which Theseus required from Neptune? When
Neptune offered him three wishes, he wished for the death of his son
Hippolytus, because the father was suspicious of the son's relations
with his step-mother. And when this wish was granted, Theseus was
overwhelmed with grief. *95* And once more; when Agamemnon had vowed to
Diana the most beautiful creature born that year within his realm, he
was brought to sacrifice Iphigenia; for in that year nothing was born
more beautiful than she. He ought to have broken his vow rather than
commit so horrible a crime.

#Trusts not always to be restored.#

Promises are, therefore, sometimes not to be kept; and trusts are not
always to be restored. Suppose that a person leaves his sword with you
when he is in his right mind, and demands it back in a fit of insanity;
it would be criminal to restore it to him; it would be your duty not to
do so. Again, suppose that a man who has entrusted money to you proposes
to make war upon your common country, should you restore the trust? I
believe you should not; for you would be acting against the state,
which ought to be the dearest thing in the world to you. Thus there are
many things which in and of themselves seem morally right, but which
under certain circumstances prove to be not morally right: to keep a
promise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a trust may, with a change
of expediency, cease to be morally right.

With this I think I have said enough about those actions which
masquerade as expedient under the guise of prudence, while they are
really contrary to justice.

*96* Since, however, in Book One we derived moral duties from the four
sources of moral rectitude, let us continue the same fourfold division
here in pointing out how hostile to virtue are those courses of conduct
which seem to be, but really are not, expedient. We have discussed
wisdom, which cunning seeks to counterfeit, and likewise justice, which
is always expedient. There remain for our discussion two divisions of
moral rectitude, the one of which is discernible in the greatness and
pre-eminence of a superior soul, the other, in the shaping and
regulation of it by temperance and self-control.


*97* XXVI. Utile videbatur Ulixi, ut quidem poëtae tragici prodiderunt
(nam apud Homerum, optimum auctorem, talis de Ulixe nulla suspicio est),
sed insimulant eum tragoediae simulatione insaniae militiam subterfugere
voluisse. Non honestum consilium, at utile, ut aliquis fortasse dixerit,
regnare et Ithacae vivere otiose cum parentibus, cum uxore, cum filio.
Ullum tu decus in cotidianis laboribus et periculis cum hac
tranquillitate conferendum putas?

Ego vero istam contemnendam et abiciendam, quoniam, quae honesta non
sit, ne utilem quidem esse arbitror. *98* Quid enim auditurum putas
fuisse Ulixem, si in illa simulatione perseveravisset? qui cum maximas
res gesserit in bello, tamen haec audiat ab Aiace:

#(Accius or Pacuvius, Judicium Armorum?) _Inc. inc. fab._, Ribbeck^2
55-60#

    Cuius ípse princeps iúris iurandí fuit,
    Quod ómnes scitis, sólus neglexít fidem;
    Furere ássimulare, né coiret, ínstitit.
    Quodní Palamedi pérspicax prudéntia
    Istíus percepset[354] málitiosam audáciam,
    Fidé sacratae[355] iús perpetuo fálleret.

*99* Illi vero non modo cum hostibus, verum etiam cum fluctibus, id quod
fecit, dimicare melius fuit quam deserere consentientem Graeciam ad
bellum barbaris inferendum.

Sed omittamus et fabulas et externa; ad rem factam nostramque veniamus.
M. Atilius Regulus cum consul iterum in Africa ex insidiis captus esset
duce Xanthippo Lacedaemonio, imperatore autem patre Hannibalis
Hamilcare, iuratus missus est ad senatum, ut, nisi redditi essent Poenis
captivi nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem. Is cum Romam venisset,
utilitatis speciem videbat, sed eam, ut res declarat, falsam iudicavit;
quae erat talis: manere in patria, esse domui suae cum uxore, cum
liberis, quam calamitatem accepisset in bello, communem fortunae
bellicae iudicantem tenere consularis dignitatis gradum. Quis haec negat
esse utilia? quem censes? Magnitudo animi et fortitudo negat. *100*
XXVII. Num[356] locupletiores quaeris auctores? Harum enim est virtutum
proprium nihil extimescere, omnia humana despicere, nihil, quod homini
accidere possit, intolerandum putare. Itaque quid fecit? In senatum
venit, mandata exposuit, sententiam ne diceret recusavit, quam diu iure
iurando hostium teneretur, non esse se senatorem. Atque illud etiam ("O
stultum hominem," dixerit quispiam, "et repugnantem utilitati suae!"),
reddi captivos negavit esse utile; illos enim adulescentes esse et bonos
duces, se iam confectum senectute. Cuius cum valuisset auctoritas,
captivi retenti sunt, ipse Carthaginem rediit, neque eum caritas patriae
retinuit nec suorum. Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem
et ad exquisita supplicia proficisci, sed ius iurandum conservandum
putabat. Itaque tum, cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa,
quam si domi senex captivus, periurus consularis remansisset.

*101* At stulte, qui non modo non censuerit captivos remittendos, verum
etiam dissuaserit.

Quo modo stulte? etiamne, si rei publicae conducebat? potest autem, quod
inutile rei publicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse?

    [354] _percepset_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _percepisset_ MSS.;
    _perspexet_ Müller.

    [355] _sacratae_ Edd.; _sacrata_ B H a b; _sacratum_ c.

    [356] _num_ A L c, Edd.; _nam_ B H a b.


#Apparent Expediency _vs._ Fortitude:#

#(1) Ulysses's ruse,#

*97* XXVI. Ulysses thought his ruse expedient, as the tragic poets, at
least, have represented him. In Homer, our most reliable authority, no
such suspicion is cast upon him; but the tragedies charge him with
trying to escape a soldier's service by feigning madness. The trick was
not morally right, but, some one may perhaps say, "It was expedient for
him to keep his throne and live at ease in Ithaca with parents, wife,
and son. Do you think that there is any glory in facing daily toil and
danger that can be compared with a life of such tranquillity?"

Nay; I think that tranquillity at such a price is to be despised and
rejected; for if it is not morally right, neither is it expedient. *98*
For what do you think would have been said of Ulysses, if he had
persisted in that pretended madness, seeing that, notwithstanding his
deeds of heroism in the war, he was nevertheless upbraided by Ajax thus:

    "'Twas he himself who first proposed the oath; ye all
    Do know; yet he alone of all his vow did break;
    He feigned persistently that he was mad, that thus
    He might not have to join the host. And had not then
    Palamedes, shrewd and wise, his tricky impudence
    Unmasked, he had evaded e'en for aye his vow."

*99* Nay, for him it had been better to battle not only with the enemy
but also with the waves, as he did, than to desert Greece when she was
united for waging the war against the barbarians.

But let us leave illustrations both from story and from foreign lands
and turn to real events in our own history. #(2) the example of
Regulus.# Marcus Atilius Regulus in his second consulship was taken
prisoner in Africa by the stratagem of Xanthippus, a Spartan general
serving under the command of Hannibal's father Hamilcar.[BX] He was sent
to the senate on parole, sworn to return to Carthage himself, if certain
noble prisoners of war[BY] were not restored to the Carthaginians. When
he came to Rome, he could not fail to see the specious appearance of
expediency, but he decided that it was unreal, as the outcome proves.
His apparent interest was to remain in his own country, to stay at home
with his wife and children, and to retain his rank and dignity as an
ex-consul, regarding the defeat which he had suffered as a misfortune
that might come to anyone in the game of war. Who says that this was not
expedient? Who, think you? Greatness of soul and courage say that it was
not. *100* #The violation of his oath could not have been expedient for
him.# XXVII. Can you ask for more competent authorities? The denial
comes from those virtues, for it is characteristic of them to await
nothing with fear, to rise superior to all the vicissitudes of earthly
life, and to count nothing intolerable that can befall a human being.
What, then, did he do? He came into the senate and stated his mission;
but he refused to give his own vote on the question; for, he held, he
was not a member of the senate so long as he was bound by the oath sworn
to his enemies. And more than that, he said--"What a foolish fellow,"
some one will say, "to oppose his own best interests"--he said that it
was not expedient that the prisoners should be returned; for they were
young men and gallant officers, while he was already bowed with age. And
when his counsel prevailed, the prisoners were retained and he himself
returned to Carthage; affection for his country and his family failed to
hold him back. And even then he was not ignorant of the fact that he was
going to a most cruel enemy and to exquisite torture; still, he thought
his oath must be sacredly kept. And so even then, when he was being
slowly put to death by enforced wakefulness, he enjoyed a happier lot
than if he had remained at home an aged prisoner of war, a man of
consular rank forsworn.

*101* "But," you will say, "it was foolish of him not only not to
advocate the exchange of prisoners but even to plead against such
action."

How was it foolish? Was it so, even if his policy was for the good of
the state? Nay; can what is inexpedient for the state be expedient for
any individual citizen?

    [BX] Cicero is careless in his dates. Regulus was consul in
    267 and 256. He was defeated and taken prisoner in his second
    proconsulship at the battle of Tunes in 255. And the Hamilcar
    of 255 was not Hannibal's father, for his career does not
    begin until 247, when he was a mere youth, and he was still
    in his prime when he fell in battle in Spain, in 229.

    [BY] At the battle of Panormus in 250 Lucius Caecilius
    Metellus took among the prisoners no less than thirteen
    Carthaginian generals--all men of noble birth.


XXVIII. Pervertunt homines ea, quae sunt fundamenta naturae, cum
utilitatem ab honestate seiungunt. Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad
eamque rapimur nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. Nam quis est, qui
utilia fugiat? aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissime persequatur?
Sed quia nusquam possumus nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia
reperire, propterea illa prima et summa habemus, utilitatis nomen non
tam splendidum quam necessarium ducimus.

*102* Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in iure iurando? num iratum timemus
Iovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo,
qui deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, nihil exhibere alteri, sed
eorum etiam, qui deum semper agere aliquid et moliri volunt, numquam nec
irasci deum nec nocere. Quid autem iratus Iuppiter plus nocere
potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus? Nulla igitur vis fuit
religionis, quae tantam utilitatem perverteret.

An ne turpiter faceret? Primum minima de malis. Num[357] igitur tantum
mali turpitudo ista habebat,[358] quantum ille cruciatus? Deinde illud
etiam apud Accium:

#Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 227-228#

                          Fregistín[359] fidem?
    Néque dedi neque do ínfideli cuíquam

quamquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculente tamen dicitur.

*103* Addunt etiam, quem ad modum nos dicamus videri quaedam utilia,
quae non sint, sic se dicere videri quaedam honesta, quae non sint, "ut
hoc ipsum videtur honestum, conservandi iuris iurandi causa ad cruciatum
revertisse; sed fit non honestum, quia, quod per vim hostium esset
actum, ratum esse non debuit."

Addunt etiam, quicquid valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, etiamsi antea
non videretur.

Haec fere contra Regulum. Sed prima _quaeque_[360] videamus.

    [357] _Num_ Edd.; _non_ MSS.

    [358] _habebat_ L c, Edd.; _habebit_ A B H a b.

    [359] _fregistin_ Edd.; _fregistine_ A B H a b; _fregisti_ L
    c.

    [360] _quaeque_ Forchhammer, Müller, Heine; not in MSS., Bt.,
    Ed.


#Expediency inseparable from moral rectitude.#

XXVIII. People overturn the fundamental principles established by
nature, when they divorce expediency from moral rectitude. For we all
seek to obtain what is to us expedient; we are irresistibly drawn toward
it, and we cannot possibly be otherwise. For who is there that would
turn his back upon what is to him expedient? Or rather, who is there
that does not exert himself to the utmost to secure it? But because we
cannot discover it anywhere except in good report, propriety, and moral
rectitude, we look upon these three for that reason as the first and the
highest objects of endeavour, while what we term expediency we account
not so much an ornament to our dignity as a necessary incident to
living.

#Arguments against Regulus's fidelity to his oath:#

#(1) he had no need to fear God's wrath,#

*102* "What significance, then," some one will say, "do we attach to an
oath? It is not that we fear the wrath of Jove, is it? Not at all; it is
the universally accepted view of all philosophers that God is never
angry, never hurtful. This is the doctrine not only of those[BZ] who
teach that God is Himself free from troubling cares and that He imposes
no trouble upon others, but also of those[CA] who believe that God is
ever working and ever directing His world. Furthermore, suppose Jupiter
had been wroth, what greater injury could He have inflicted upon
Regulus than Regulus brought upon himself? Religious scruple, therefore,
had no such preponderance as to outweigh so great expediency."

#(2) "Of two evils choose the less,"#

"Or was he afraid that his act would be morally wrong? As to that, first
of all, the proverb says 'Of evils choose the least.' Did that moral
wrong, then, really involve as great an evil as did that awful torture?
And secondly, there are the lines of Accius:

    _Thyestes._ 'Hast thou broke thy faith?'
    _Atreus._ 'None have I giv'n; none give I ever to the faithless.'

Although this sentiment is put into the mouth of a wicked king, still it
is illuminating in its correctness."

#(3) oaths extorted by constraint not binding,#

*103* Their third argument is this: just as we maintain that some things
seem expedient but are not, so they maintain, some things seem morally
right but are not. "For example," they contend, "in this very case it
seems morally right for Regulus to have returned to torture for the sake
of being true to his oath. But it proves not to be morally right,
because what an enemy extorted by force ought not to have been binding."

#(4) exceptional expediency makes right.#

As their concluding argument, they add: whatever is highly expedient may
prove to be morally right, even if it did not seem so in advance.

These are in substance the arguments raised against the conduct of
Regulus. Let us consider them each in turn.

    [BZ] The Epicureans.

    [CA] The Stoics.


*104* XXIX. "Non fuit Iuppiter metuendus ne iratus noceret, qui neque
irasci solet nec nocere."

Haec quidem ratio non magis contra Reguli quam contra omne ius iurandum
valet. Sed in iure iurando non qui metus, sed quae vis sit, debet
intellegi; est enim ius iurandum affirmatio religiosa; quod autem
affirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. Iam enim non ad
iram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinet. Nam
praeclare Ennius:

#(Thyestes?) _Fab. inc._, Vahlen^2, 403#

    Ó Fides alma ápta pinnis ét ius iurandúm Iovis!

Qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam in Capitolio
"vicinam Iovis optimi maximi," #Unknown# ut in Catonis oratione est,
maiores nostri esse voluerunt.

*105* At enim ne iratus quidem Iuppiter plus Regulo nocuisset, quam sibi
nocuit ipse Regulus.

Certe, si nihil malum esset nisi dolere. Id autem non modo [non][361]
summum malum, sed ne malum quidem esse maxima auctoritate philosophi
affirmant. Quorum quidem testem non mediocrem, sed haud scio an
gravissimum Regulum nolite, quaeso, vituperare. Quem enim locupletiorem
quaerimus quam principem populi Romani, qui retinendi officii causa
cruciatum subierit voluntarium?

Nam quod aiunt: "minima de malis," id est ut turpiter potius quam
calamitose, an est ullum maius malum turpitudine? quae si in deformitate
corporis habet[362] aliquid offensionis, quanta illa depravatio et
foeditas turpificati animi debet videri! *106* Itaque nervosius qui ista
disserunt, solum audent malum dicere id, quod turpe sit, qui autem
remissius, ii tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere.

Nam illud quidem:

#Accius, Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 228#

    Néque dedi neque do ínfideli cuíquam

idcirco recte a poëta, quia, cum tractaretur Atreus, personae serviendum
fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sument, nullam esse fidem, quae infideli data sit,
videant, ne quaeratur latebra periurio.

*107* Est autem ius etiam bellicum fidesque iuris iurandi saepe cum
hoste servanda.[363] Quod enim ita iuratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri
oportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est
periurium. Ut, si praedonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris,
nulla fraus sit,[364] ne si iuratus quidem id non feceris; nam pirata
non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium; cum
hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune. *108* Non enim falsum
iurare periurare est, sed, quod EX ANIMI TUI SENTENTIA iuraris, sicut
verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite
enim[365] Euripides:

#Hippolytus 612#

    Iurávi lingua, méntem iniuratám gero.

Regulus vero non debuit condiciones pactionesque bellicas et hostiles
perturbare periurio. Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur,
adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. Quod ni
ita esset, numquam claros viros senatus vinctos[366] hostibus
dedidisset.

    [361] _non modo non_ B H a; _non modo nos_ c; _non modo_ L c
    p, Edd.

    [362] _habet_ L c, Edd.; _habeat_ A B H a b.

    [363] _Est ... servanda_ bracketed by Unger, Bt.^2, Ed.

    [364] _sit_ Edd. plerique; _est_ MSS., Bt.^1

    [365] _Scite enim_ A L c, Edd.; _scit enim_ B H a b.

    [366] _vinctos_ A L c, Edd.; _victos_ B H a b.


#Rebuttal.#

*104* XXIX. "He need not have been afraid that Jupiter in anger would
inflict injury upon him; he is not wont to be angry or hurtful."

#(1) An oath is a covenant with Justice and Good Faith;#

This argument, at all events, has no more weight against Regulus's
conduct than it has against the keeping of any other oath. But in taking
an oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to fear in case
of violation but wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance
backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God
as one's witness, is to be sacredly kept. For the question no longer
concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing) but the
obligations of justice and good faith. For, as Ennius says so admirably:

    "Gracious Good Faith, on wings upborne; thou oath in Jupiter's
      great name!"

Whoever, therefore, violates his oath violates Good Faith; and, as we
find it stated in Cato's speech, our forefathers chose that she should
dwell upon the Capitol "neighbour to Jupiter Supreme and Best."

*105* "But," objection was further made, "even if Jupiter had been
angry, he could not have inflicted greater injury upon Regulus than
Regulus brought upon himself."

#What is evil?#

Quite true, if there is no evil except pain. But philosophers[CB] of the
highest authority assure us that pain is not only not the supreme evil
but no evil at all. And pray do not disparage Regulus, as no unimportant
witness--nay, I am rather inclined to think he was the very best
witness--to the truth of their doctrine. For what more competent witness
do we ask for than one of the foremost citizens of Rome, who voluntarily
faced torture for the sake of being true to his moral duty?

#(2) no evil can be greater than moral wrong;#

Again, they say "Of evils choose the least"--that is, shall one "choose
moral wrong rather than misfortune," or is there any evil greater than
moral wrong? For if physical deformity excites a certain amount of
aversion, how offensive ought the deformity and hideousness of a
demoralized soul to seem! *106* Therefore, those[CC] who discuss these
problems with more rigour make bold to say that moral wrong is the only
evil, while those[CD] who treat them with more laxity do not hesitate to
call it the supreme evil.

Once more, they quote the sentiment:

    "None have I given, none give I ever to the faithless."

It was proper for the poet to say that, because, when he was working out
his Atreus, he had to make the words fit the character. But if they mean
to adopt it as a principle, that a pledge given to the faithless is no
pledge, let them look to it that it be not a mere loophole for perjury
that they seek.

#What is perjury?#

*107* Furthermore, we have laws regulating warfare, and fidelity to an
oath must often be observed in dealings with an enemy: for an oath sworn
with the clear understanding in one's own mind that it should be
performed must be kept; but if there is no such understanding, it does
not count as perjury if one does not perform the vow. For example,
suppose that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon with pirates as
the price of one's life, that would be accounted no deception--not even
if one should fail to deliver the ransom after having sworn to do so;
for a pirate is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is the
common foe of all the world; and with him there ought not to be any
pledged word nor any oath mutually binding. *108* For swearing to what
is false is not necessarily perjury, but to take an oath "upon your
conscience," as it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to
perform it, that is perjury. For Euripides aptly says:

    "My tongue has sworn; the mind I have has sworn no oath."

#Oaths made to an enemy as binding as treaties.#

But Regulus had no right to confound by perjury the terms and covenants
of war made with an enemy. For the war was being carried on with a
legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such an
enemy, we have our whole fetial[CE] code as well as many other laws that
are binding in common between nations. Were this not the case, the
senate would never have delivered up illustrious men of ours in chains
to the enemy.

    [CB] The Stoics.

    [CC] The Stoics.

    [CD] The Peripatetics.

    [CE] See Index, s.v.


*109* XXX. At vero T. Veturius et Sp. Postumius cum iterum consules
essent, quia, cum male pugnatum apud Caudium esset, legionibus nostris
sub iugum missis pacem cum Samnitibus fecerant, dediti sunt iis; iniussu
enim populi senatusque fecerant. Eodemque tempore Ti. Numicius, Q.
Maelius, qui tum tribuni pl. erant, quod eorum auctoritate pax erat
facta, dediti sunt, ut pax Samnitium repudiaretur; atque huius
deditionis ipse Postumius, qui dedebatur, suasor et auctor fuit.

Quod idem multis annis post C. Mancinus, qui, ut Numantinis, quibuscum
sine senatus auctoritate foedus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem suasit
eam, quam L. Furius, Sex. Atilius ex senatus consulto ferebant; qua
accepta est hostibus deditus. Honestius his quam Q. Pompeius, quo, cum
in eadem causa esset, deprecante accepta lex non est. Hic ea, quae
videbatur utilitas, plus valuit quam honestas, apud superiores
utilitatis species falsa ab honestatis auctoritate superata est.

#§ 103#

*110* At non debuit ratum esse, quod erat actum per vim.--Quasi vero
forti viro vis possit adhiberi.

Cur igitur ad senatum proficiscebatur, cum praesertim de captivis
dissuasurus esset?

Quod maximum in eo est, id reprehenditis. Non enim suo iudicio stetit,
sed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium senatus; cui nisi ipse auctor
fuisset, captivi profecto Poenis redditi essent; ita incolumis in patria
Regulus restitisset. Quod quia patriae non utile putavit, idcirco sibi
honestum et sentire illa et pati credidit.

#§ 103#

Nam quod aiunt, quod valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, immo vero esse,
non fieri. Est enim nihil utile, quod idem non honestum, nec, quia
utile, honestum, sed, quia honestum, utile.

Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis haud facile quis dixerit hoc
exemplo aut laudabilius aut praestantius.


#Roman strictness.#

*109* XXX. And yet that very thing happened. Titus Veturius and Spurius
Postumius in their second consulship lost the battle at the Caudine
Forks, and our legions were sent under the yoke. And because they made
peace with the Samnites, those generals were delivered up to them, for
they had made the peace without the approval of the people and senate.
And Tiberius Numicius and Quintus Maelius, tribunes of the people, were
delivered up at the same time, because it was with their sanction that
the peace had been concluded. This was done in order that the peace with
the Samnites might be annulled. And Postumius, the very man whose
delivery was in question, was the proposer and advocate of the said
delivery.

Many years later,[CF] Gaius Mancinus had a similar experience: he
advocated the bill, introduced in accordance with a decree of the senate
by Lucius Furius and Sextus Atilius, that he should be delivered up to
the Numantines, with whom he had made a treaty without authorization
from the senate; and when the bill was passed, he was delivered up to
the enemy. His action was more honourable than Quintus Pompey's;
Pompey's situation was identical with his, and yet at his own entreaty
the bill was rejected. In this latter case, apparent expediency
prevailed over moral rectitude; in the former cases, the false semblance
of expediency was overbalanced by the weight of moral rectitude.

#(3) the interests of the state higher than personal advantage;#

*110* "But," they argued against Regulus, "an oath extorted by force
ought not to have been binding." As if force could be brought to bear
upon a brave man!

"Why, then, did he make the journey to the senate, especially when he
intended to plead against the surrender of the prisoners of war?"

Therein you are criticizing what is the noblest feature of his conduct.
For he was not content to stand upon his own judgment but took up the
case, in order that the judgment might be that of the senate; and had it
not been for the weight of his pleading, the prisoners would certainly
have been restored to the Carthaginians; and in that case, Regulus would
have remained safe at home in his country. But because he thought this
not expedient for his country, he believed that it was therefore morally
right for him to declare his conviction and to suffer for it.

#(4) nothing expedient unless morally right.#

When they argued also that what is highly expedient may prove to be
morally right, they ought rather to say not that it "may prove to be"
but that it actually is morally right. For nothing can be expedient
which is not at the same time morally right; neither can a thing be
morally right just because it is expedient, but it is expedient because
it is morally right.

From the many splendid examples in history, therefore, we could not
easily point to one either more praiseworthy or more heroic than the
conduct of Regulus.

    [CF] 184 years, i.e., in B.C. 137.


*111* XXXI. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione
dignum, quod captivos retinendos censuit. Nam quod rediit, nobis nunc
mirabile videtur, illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit;
itaque ista laus non est hominis, sed temporum. Nullum enim vinculum ad
astringendam fidem iure iurando maiores artius esse voluerunt. Id
indicant leges in duodecim tabulis, indicant sacratae, indicant foedera,
quibus etiam cum hoste devincitur fides, indicant notiones
animadversionesque censorum, qui nulla de re diligentius quam de iure
iurando iudicabant.

*112* L. Manlio A. f., cum dictator fuisset, M. Pomponius tr. pl. diem
dixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidisset;
criminabatur etiam, quod Titum filium, qui postea est Torquatus
appellatus, ab hominibus relegasset et ruri habitare iussisset. Quod cum
audivisset adulescens filius, negotium exhiberi patri, accurrisse Romam
et cum primo luci[367] Pomponi domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset
nuntiatum, qui illum iratum allaturum ad se aliquid contra patrem
arbitraretur, surrexit e lectulo remotisque arbitris ad se adulescentem
iussit venire. At ille, ut ingressus est, confestim gladium destrinxit
iuravitque se illum statim interfecturum, nisi ius iurandum sibi
dedisset se patrem missum esse facturum. Iuravit hoc terrore coactus
Pomponius; rem ad populum detulit, docuit, cur sibi causa desistere
necesse esset, Manlium missum fecit. Tantum temporibus illis ius
iurandum valebat.

Atque hic T. Manlius is est, qui ad Anienem Galli, quem ab eo provocatus
occiderat, torque detracto cognomen invenit, cuius tertio consulatu
Latini ad Veserim fusi et fugati, magnus vir in primis et, qui
perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe severus in filium.

    [367] _primo luci_ Beier, Heine, Ed.; _primo lucis_ c; _prima
    luce_ A B H a b.


#The most striking lesson in the story of Regulus.#

*111* XXXI. But of all that is thus praiseworthy in the conduct of
Regulus, this one feature above all others calls for our admiration: it
was he who offered the motion that the prisoners of war be retained. For
the fact of his returning may seem admirable to us nowadays, but in
those times he could not have done otherwise. That merit, therefore,
belongs to the age, not to the man. For our ancestors were of the
opinion that no bond was more effective in guaranteeing good faith than
an oath. That is clearly proved by the laws of the Twelve Tables, by the
"sacred" laws,[CG] by the treaties in which good faith is pledged even
to the enemy, by the investigations made by the censors and the
penalties imposed by them; for there were no cases in which they used to
render more rigorous decisions than in cases of violation of an oath.

#The sanctity of an oath in the old days.#

*112* Marcus Pomponius, a tribune of the people, brought an indictment
against Lucius Manlius, Aulus's son, for having extended the term of his
dictatorship a few days beyond its expiration. He further charged him
with having banished his own son Titus (afterward surnamed Torquatus)
from all companionship with his fellow-men, and with requiring him to
live in the country. When the son, who was then a young man, heard
that his father was in trouble on his account, he hastened to Rome--so
the story goes--and at daybreak presented himself at the house of
Pomponius. The visitor was announced to Pomponius. Inasmuch as he
thought that the son in his anger meant to bring him some new evidence
to use against the father, he arose from his bed, asked all who were
present to leave the room, and sent word to the young man to come in.
Upon entering, he at once drew a sword and swore that he would kill the
tribune on the spot, if he did not swear an oath to withdraw the suit
against his father. Constrained by the terror of the situation,
Pomponius gave his oath. He reported the matter to the people,
explaining why he was obliged to drop the prosecution, and withdrew his
suit against Manlius. Such was the regard for the sanctity of an oath in
those days.

And that lad was the Titus Manlius who in the battle on the Anio killed
the Gaul by whom he had been challenged to single combat, pulled off his
torque and thus won his surname. And in his third consulship he routed
the Latins and put them to flight in the battle on the Veseris. He was
one of the greatest of the great, and one who, while more than generous
toward his father, could yet be bitterly severe toward his son.

    [CG] "Sacred" laws, according to Festus (p. 318), were laws
    that placed their transgressor, together with his household
    and his property, under the ban of some divinity; other
    authorities limit the term to the laws enacted upon the
    Sacred Mount (B.C. 394).


*113* XXXII. Sed, ut laudandus Regulus in conservando iure iurando, sic
decem illi, quos post Cannensem pugnam iuratos ad senatum misit Hannibal
se in castra redituros ea, quorum erant potiti Poeni, nisi de redimendis
captivis impetravissent, si non redierunt, vituperandi. De quibus non
omnes uno modo; nam Polybius, bonus auctor in primis, ex decem
nobilissimis, qui tum erant missi, novem revertisse dicit re a senatu
non impetrata; unum ex decem, qui paulo post, quam erat[368] egressus e
castris, redisset, quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romae remansisse; reditu
enim in castra liberatum se esse iure iurando interpretabatur, non
recte; fraus enim astringit,[369] non dissolvit periurium. Fuit igitur
stulta calliditas perverse imitata prudentiam. Itaque decrevit senatus,
ut ille veterator et callidus vinctus ad Hannibalem duceretur.

*114*[370] Sed illud maximum: octo hominum milia tenebat Hannibal, non
quos in acie cepisset, aut qui periculo mortis diffugissent, sed qui
relicti in castris fuissent a Paulo et a Varrone consulibus. Eos senatus
non censuit redimendos, cum id parva pecunia fieri posset, ut esset
insitum militibus nostris aut vincere aut emori. Qua quidem re audita
fractum animum Hannibalis scribit idem, quod senatus populusque Romanus
rebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis comparatione
ea, quae videntur utilia, vincuntur.

*115* _C._[371] Acilius autem, qui Graece scripsit historiam, plures ait
fuisse, qui in castra revertissent eadem fraude, ut iure iurando
liberarentur, eosque a censoribus omnibus ignominiis notatos.

Sit iam huius loci finis. Perspicuum est enim ea, quae timido animo,
humili, demisso fractoque fiant, quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de
captivis, quod ipsi opus esse videretur, non quod rei publicae,
censuisset aut domi remanere voluisset, non esse utilia, quia sint
flagitiosa, foeda, turpia.

    [368] _Novem ... quam erat_ c, Bt.^1, Ed.; om. A B H a b;
    _unum qui_ Unger, Bt.^2

    [369] _astringit_ c p, Ed., Heine; _distringit_ A B H a b,
    Unger, Bt.

    [370] § 114 bracketed by Heus., Bt., as un-Ciceronian.

    [371] _C._ Heine, Ed.; not in MSS.


#Contrast between Regulus and the ten envoys from Hannibal.#

*113* XXXII. Now, as Regulus deserves praise for being true to his oath,
so those ten whom Hannibal sent to the senate on parole after the battle
of Cannae deserve censure, if it is true that they did not return; for
they were sworn to return to the camp which had fallen into the hands of
the Carthaginians, if they did not succeed in negotiating an exchange
of prisoners. Historians are not in agreement in regard to the facts.
Polybius, one of the very best authorities, states that of the ten
eminent nobles who were sent at that time, nine returned when their
mission failed at the hands of the senate. But one of the ten, who, a
little while after leaving the camp, had gone back on the pretext that
he had forgotten something or other, remained behind at Rome; he
explained that by his return to the camp he was released from the
obligation of his oath. He was wrong; for deceit does not remove the
guilt of perjury--it merely aggravates it. #The ancient Roman
discipline.# His cunning that impudently tried to masquerade as prudence
was, therefore, only folly. And so the senate ordered that the cunning
scoundrel should be taken back to Hannibal in chains.

*114* But the most significant part of the story is this: the eight
thousand prisoners in Hannibal's hands were not men that he had taken in
the battle or that had escaped in the peril of their lives, but men that
the consuls Paulus and Varro had left behind in camp. Though these might
have been ransomed by a small sum of money, the senate voted not to
redeem them, in order that our soldiers might have the lesson planted in
their hearts that they must either conquer or die. When Hannibal heard
this news, according to that same writer, he lost heart completely,
because the senate and the people of Rome displayed courage so lofty in
a time of disaster. Thus apparent expediency is outweighed when placed
in the balance against moral rectitude.

*115* Gaius Acilius, on the other hand, the author of a history of Rome
in Greek, says that there were several who played the same trick of
returning to the camp to release themselves thus from the obligation of
their oath, and that they were branded by the censors with every mark of
disgrace.

#Expediency and Courage identical.#

Let this be the conclusion of this topic. For it must be perfectly
apparent that acts that are done with a cowardly, craven, abject, broken
spirit, as the act of Regulus would have been if he had supported in
regard to the prisoners a measure that seemed to be advantageous for him
personally, but disadvantageous for the state, or if he had consented to
remain at home--that such acts are not expedient because they are
shameful, dishonourable, and immoral.


*116* XXXIII. Restat quarta pars, quae decore, moderatione, modestia,
continentia, temperantia continetur.

Potest igitur quicquam utile esse, quod sit huic talium virtutum choro
contrarium? Atqui ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii philosophi
nominati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt virtutemque censuerunt ob eam
rem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis. Quibus obsoletis
floret Epicurus, eiusdem fere adiutor auctorque sententiae. Cum his
"viris[372] equisque," ut dicitur, si honestatem tueri ac retinere
sententia est, decertandum est.

*117* Nam si non modo utilitas, sed vita omnis beata corporis firma
constitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro
scriptum est, continetur, certe haec utilitas, et quidem summa (sic enim
censent), cum honestate pugnabit. Nam ubi primum prudentiae locus
dabitur? an ut conquirat undique suavitates? Quam miser virtutis
famulatus servientis voluptati! Quod autem munus prudentiae? an legere
intellegenter voluptates? Fac nihil isto esse iucundius, quid cogitari
potest turpius?

Iam, qui dolorem summum malum dicat, apud eum quem habet locum
fortitudo, quae est dolorum laborumque contemptio? Quamvis enim multis
locis dicat Epicurus, sicuti[373] dicit, satis fortiter de dolore, tamen
non id spectandum est, quid dicat, sed quid consentaneum sit ei dicere,
qui bona voluptate terminaverit, mala dolore.

Et,[374] si illum audiam, de continentia et temperantia dicit ille
quidem multa multis locis, sed aqua haeret, ut aiunt; nam qui potest
temperantiam laudare is, qui ponat summum bonum in voluptate? est enim
temperantia libidinum inimica, libidines autem consectatrices
voluptatis.

*118* Atque in his tamen tribus generibus, quoquo modo possunt, non
incallide tergiversantur; prudentiam introducunt scientiam suppeditantem
voluptates, depellentem dolores; fortitudinem quoque aliquo modo
expediunt, cum tradunt rationem neglegendae mortis, perpetiendi doloris;
etiam temperantiam inducunt non facillime illi quidem, sed tamen quoquo
modo possunt; dicunt enim voluptatis magnitudinem doloris detractione
finiri. Iustitia vacillat vel iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes, quae
in communitate cernuntur et in societate generis humani. Neque enim
bonitas nec liberalitas nec comitas esse potest, non plus quam amicitia,
si haec non per se expetantur,[375] sed ad voluptatem utilitatemve
referantur.

Conferamus igitur in pauca.

*119* Nam ut utilitatem nullam esse docuimus, quae honestati esset
contraria, sic omnem voluptatem dicimus honestati esse contrariam. Quo
magis reprehendendos Calliphontem et Dinomachum iudico, qui se
dirempturos controversiam putaverunt, si cum honestate voluptatem
tamquam cum homine pecudem copulavissent. Non recipit istam
coniunctionem honestas, aspernatur, repellit. Nec vero finis bonorum [et
malorum],[376] qui simplex esse debet, ex dissimillimis rebus misceri et
temperari potest. #De Finibus, II# Sed de hoc (magna enim res est) alio
loco pluribus; nunc ad propositum.

*120* Quem ad modum igitur, si quando ea, quae videtur[377] utilitas,
honestati repugnat, diiudicanda res sit, satis est supra disputatum. Sin
autem speciem utilitatis etiam voluptas habere dicetur, nulla potest
esse ei cum honestate coniunctio. Nam, ut tribuamus aliquid voluptati,
condimenti fortasse non nihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit.

*121* Habes a patre munus, Marce fili, mea quidem sententia magnum, sed
perinde erit, ut acceperis. Quamquam hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi
commentarios tamquam hospites erunt recipiendi; sed, ut, si ipse
venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factum, nisi me e medio cursu clara
voce patria revocasset), aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his
voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues iis[378] temporis
quantum poteris, poteris autem, quantum voles. Cum vero intellexero te
hoc scientiae genere gaudere, tum et praesens tecum propediem, ut spero,
et, dum aberis, absens loquar.

Vale igitur, mi Cicero, tibique persuade esse te quidem mihi carissimum,
sed multo fore cariorem, si talibus monitis[379] praeceptisque
laetabere.

    [372] _viris_ c p, Edd.; _veris_ A B H b.

    [373] _sicuti_ L c, Edd.; _sicut id_ A B H a b.

    [374] _dolore. Et_ Müller, Heine; _dolore: ut_ MSS., Bt.;
    _dolore. Ut_ Ed.

    [375] _expetantur_ A, Edd.; _expectantur_ B a; _exspectantur_
    c.

    [376] Omitted by Muretus; bracketed by Heine, Ed., et al.

    [377] _videtur_ c, Edd.; _videretur_ B H a b; _viderentur_ A.

    [378] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ A B H a b; _hijs_ c.

    [379] _monitis_ Lambinus, Edd.; _monumentis_ A B H a b;
    _monimentis_ c.


#Apparent Expediency _vs._ Temperance.#

*116* XXXIII. We have still left our fourth division, comprising
propriety, moderation, temperance, self-restraint, self-control.

Can anything be expedient, then, which is contrary to such a chorus of
virtues? And yet the Cyrenaics, adherents of the school of Aristippus,
and the philosophers who bear the name of Anniceris find all good to
consist in pleasure and consider virtue praiseworthy only because it is
productive of pleasure. Now that these schools are out of date, Epicurus
has come into vogue--an advocate and supporter of practically the same
doctrine. Against such a philosophy we must fight it out "with horse and
foot," as the saying is, if our purpose is to defend and maintain our
standard of moral rectitude.

#The fallacy of Epicureanism.#

*117* For if, as we find it in the writings of Metrodorus, not only
expediency but happiness in life depends wholly upon a sound physical
constitution and the reasonable expectation that it will always remain
sound, then that expediency--and what is more, the highest expediency,
as they estimate it--will assuredly clash with moral rectitude. For,
first of all, what position will wisdom occupy in that system? The
position of collector of pleasures from every possible source? What a
sorry state of servitude for a virtue--to be pandering to sensual
pleasure! And what will be the function of wisdom? To make skilful
choice between sensual pleasures? Granted that there may be nothing more
pleasant, what can be conceived more degrading for wisdom than such a
rôle?

Then again, if anyone hold that pain is the supreme evil, what place in
his philosophy has fortitude, which is but indifference to toil and
pain? For however many passages there are in which Epicurus speaks right
manfully of pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but
what it is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms
of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.

And further, if I should listen to him, I should find that in many
passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control;
but "the water will not run," as they say. For how can he commend
self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? For
self-control is the foe of the passions, and the passions are the
handmaids of pleasure.

#Epicureanism and the Cardinal Virtues.#

*118* And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, those
philosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without
cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that
provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude
also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it
is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for
enduring pain. They bring even temperance in--not very easily, to be
sure, but still as best they can; for they hold that the height of
pleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters or rather, I
should say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which
are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For
neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, any more than
friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are
cultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.

Let us now recapitulate briefly.

#Sensual pleasure and moral rectitude incompatible.#

*119* As I have shown that such expediency as is opposed to moral
rectitude is no expediency, so I maintain that any and all sensual
pleasure is opposed to moral rectitude. And therefore Calliphon and
Dinomachus, in my judgment, deserve the greater condemnation; they
imagined that they should settle the controversy by coupling pleasure
with moral rectitude; as well yoke a man with a beast! But moral
rectitude does not accept such a union; she abhors it, spurns it. Why,
the supreme good, which ought to be simple, cannot be a compound and
mixture of absolutely contradictory qualities. But this theory I have
discussed more fully in another connection; for the subject is a large
one. Now for the matter before us.

*120* We have, then, fully discussed the problem how a question is to be
decided, if ever that which seems to be expediency clashes with moral
rectitude. But if, on the other hand, the assertion is made that
pleasure admits of a show of expediency also, there can still be no
possible union between it and moral rectitude. For, to make the most
generous admission we can in favour of pleasure, we will grant that it
may contribute something that possibly gives some spice to life, but
certainly nothing that is really expedient.

#Conclusion.#

*121* Herewith, my son Marcus, you have a present from your father--a
generous one, in my humble opinion; but its value will depend upon the
spirit in which you receive it. And yet you must welcome these three
books as fellow-guests, so to speak, along with your notes on
Cratippus's lectures. But as you would sometimes give ear to me also, if
I had come to Athens (and I should be there now, if my country had not
called me back with accents unmistakable, when I was half-way there), so
you will please devote as much time as you can to these volumes, for in
them my voice will travel to you; and you can devote to them as much
time as you will. And when I see that you take delight in this branch of
philosophy, I shall then talk further with you--at an early date,[CH] I
hope, face to face--but as long as you are abroad, I shall converse with
you thus at a distance.

Farewell, my dear Cicero, and be assured that, while you are the object
of my deepest affection, you will be dearer to me still, if you find
pleasure in such counsel and instruction.

    [CH] But Cicero never saw his son Marcus again.



INDEX


References are to Book and Section; all dates, given in parentheses
(...), are B.C.

Academicians.
  1. adherents of the New Academy (_q.v._);
    their right to teach ethics, I, 6;
    attitude toward knowledge, II, 7;
    Cicero's philosophy, II, 1-8.
  2. adherents of the Old Academy, III, 20.

Academy,
  1. the Older, a school of philosophy founded by Plato and so called
      from its home;
    their doctrine of ideas, III, 76, 81;
    the pre-existence and immortality of the soul;
    monotheism;
    the goodness of God;
    striving after His perfection.
  2. the New, a modification of the Old, sceptical, anti-dogmatic,
      eclectic, III, 20.

Accius, Lucius, a tragic poet (born 170). His tragedies were mostly
      imitations from the Greek. Cicero knew him personally;
  quotes from him, III, 84, 102, 106.

Acilius;
  Gaius Acilius Glabrio (tribune, 197);
  interpreter, when Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus came to Rome;
  author of History of Rome, III, 115.

Admiration, how won with dignity, II, 31 fg.

Aeacidae, descendants of Aeacus (_q.v._), the father of Peleus and
      Telamon and grandfather of Achilles and Ajax, I, 38.

Aeacus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and king of Aegina (_q.v._);
  renowned for his justice and piety, I, 97;
  after his death he became with Minos and Rhadamanthus judge in Hades.

Aedileship, cost of, II, 57-60.

Aegina, an island in the Saronic Gulf, a dangerous rival to Athens,
      directly in front of Piraeus and only twelve miles away, III, 46;
  unjustly appropriated by Athens (429), III, 46.

Aeginetans, the people of Aegina (_q.v._).

Aelius;
  _see_ Tubero.

Aemilius;
  _see_ Paulus and Scaurus.

Aequians, a warlike mountain tribe on the upper Anio, warring against
      Rome (till 304), I, 35.

Aesopus, Claudius, an intimate friend of Cicero, Rome's greatest tragic
      actor, I, 114.

Africa, the province in which Carthage was, I, 112 (Thapsus);
  III, 99 (Carthage).

Africanus;
  _see_ Scipio.

Agamemnon, leader of the war against Troy;
  when detained at Aulis he sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia to save
      the expedition, III, 95. For this he was slain on his return from
      Troy by his wife Clytaemnestra.

Agesilaus, king of Sparta (398-360);
  waged war in Asia (396-394), victor at Coronea, saviour of Sparta
      after Mantinea (362); II, 16.

Agis IV, king of Sparta (244-240);
  attempted to re-establish the institutions of Lycurgus and reform
      property abuses;
  put to death through organized wealth, II, 80.

Agrarian Laws, a menace to the stability of the government, II, 78-83.

Agriculture, impossible without man, II, 12;
  man's noblest calling, I, 151.

Agrigentum, a city on the south coast of Sicily, once "the most
      beautiful city of mortals," ruled by Phalaris (560), II, 26.

Ajax, son of Telamon; could brook no wrong, went mad, and committed
      suicide when the arms of Achilles were awarded to Odysseus,
      I, 113;
  rebuked Odysseus, III, 98.
  Subject of a tragedy by Ennius, I, 114.

Albucius, Titus, an Epicurean;
  praetor in Sardinia (105);
  prosecuted for extortion, II, 50.

Alexander, the Great (356-323), son of Philip of Macedon, II, 16, 48;
  greater than his father in achievement, inferior in courtliness,
      I, 90;
  governor of Macedonia (340), II, 53;
  conquered Greece (338-335), subdued Asia (334-331), Egypt (331),
      invaded India (329-327), founded Alexandria and other cities, and
      died of a drunken debauch (I, 90).

Alexander, tyrant of Pherae (369);
  brother, son-in-law, and successor of Jason (_q.v._), defeated and
      slew Pelopidas of Thebes at Cynocephalae (364);
  murdered by his wife and her three brothers, II, 25, 26.

Alexandria, the metropolis of Egypt at the mouth of the Nile;
  founded by Alexander (332);
  centre of wealth (II, 82);
  grain market, III, 50.

Alps, the mountains between Italy and further Gaul, II, 28.

Ambition, a cause of injustice, I, 25-26, 46, 65;
  of moral wrong, III, 82;
  of treason, III, 82-83;
  the foe of freedom, I, 68; II, 28.

Amusements, wholesome, I, 103-104.

Anger, never excusable, I, 89.

Anio, the Sabine river, tributary to the Tiber;
  the battle on (340), which gave Rome supremacy over all Latium,
      III, 112.

Anniceris, of Cyrene (4th century), a successor of Aristippus;
  his school a cross between the Epicurean and the Cyrenaic: he denied
      that pleasure was merely absence of pain;
  he held that every act had its own distinct purpose and that the
      virtues are good in themselves;
  his teachings were not permanent, III, 116.

Antigonus, one of Alexander's generals, governor of Asia (323-301),
      king of Asia (306-301);
  father of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Philip, II, 48.

Antiope, mother of Amphion and Zethus, by whom she was saved from the
      persecutions of her former husband Lycus and his wife Dirce;
  her vengeance on Dirce drove her mad;
  subject of a tragedy of Pacuvius, I, 114.

Antipater, vice-regent of Macedon (334);
  father of Cassander, II, 48.

Antipater, of Tarsus (2nd century), pupil and successor of Diogenes of
      Babylonia;
  teacher of Panaetius;
  his ethical teachings, III, 51-55, 91.

Antipater, of Tyre (1st century), friend of Cato the younger;
  a Stoic, II, 86.

Antonius, Marcus, the famous orator (143-87), II, 49;
  advocate, III, 67;
  father of Cicero's colleague and grandfather of the triumvir.

Apelles, of Cos (4th century), the greatest painter of his age;
  court painter to Alexander the Great;
  his masterpiece was a Venus rising from the sea;
  another Venus left unfinished, III, 10.

Apollo, god of the light of day;
  giver of oracles at Pytho, II, 77.

Appetite, subject to Reason, I, 101-103, 132, 141.

Appius Claudius Pulcher, father of Gaius, II, 57.

Aquilius;
  Gaius Aquilius Gallus, famous jurist;
  Cicero's colleague in the praetorship;
  author of formulae on criminal fraud, III, 60-61.

Aquilius, Manius, consul (101) with Marius;
  victorious in the Servile War in Sicily;
  prosecuted (98) but acquitted, II, 50.

Aratus, of Sicyon, soldier and statesman (271-213), removed the tyrant
      Nicocles (251) and averted financial ruin, II, 81, 82;
  leader of the Achaean League;
  poisoned by order of Philip of Macedon.

Areopagites, members of the Council of Areopagus.

Areopagus, "Mars Hill," a spur of the Acropolis, seat of the highest
      court of Athens;
  the court itself, with powers of senate and supreme court, reorganized
      and enlarged in function by Solon, I, 75.

Arginusae, a group of islands off the coast of Asia Minor, near Lesbos,
      scene of the victory of the Athenian fleet (406), I, 84.

Argos, the chief city of Argolis, II, 81.

Aristides, "the Just," III, [16], 49, 87;
  fought at Marathon (490), Salamis (480), and commanded the Athenians
      at Plataea (479);
  exiled (483) because his policies clashed with those of Themistocles.

Aristippus, of Cyrene (flourished 370), founder of the Cyrenaic school,
      III, 116;
  disciple of Socrates, but taught that the chief end of man was to get
      enjoyment from everything (hedonism), to subject all things and
      circumstances to himself for pleasure;
  but pleasure must be the slave not the master;
  good and bad identical with pleasure and pain;  I, 148.

Aristo, of Chios (3rd century), a Stoic philosopher, pupil of Zeno;
  he taught indifference to externals, nothing good but virtue, nothing
      evil but vice;
  his theories rejected, I, 6.

Aristotle (385-322), disciple of Plato and teacher of Alexander the
      Great;
  founder of the Peripatetic school;
  greatest of philosophers, master of all knowledge--physics,
      metaphysics, natural philosophy, ethics, politics, poetics,
      sociology, logic, rhetoric, etc.; II, 56; III, 35;
  might have been a great orator, I, 4.

Arpinates, the people of Arpinum, owners of public lands, I, 21.

Arpinum, a town in Latium, birthplace of Cicero and Gaius Marius, I, 21.

Athenians, the people of Athens, I, 75, 84;
  their cruel subjugation of Aegina, III, 46;
  left their homes to fight at Salamis, III, 48;
  political strife, I, 86;
  high moral principles of, III, 49, 55.

Athens, II, 64, 86; III, 55, 87;
  the intellectual and artistic centre of the world;
  led Greece in the Persian wars (490-479);
  humbled by Sparta (404);
  the university city of the Roman world, I, 1; III, 6, 121.

Atilius;
  _see_ Regulus.

Atilius;
  Sextus Atilius Serranus, consul (136), III, 109.

Atreus, son of Pelops and father of Agamemnon and Menelaus, murderer of
      his half-brother Chrysippus and of his brother Thyestes's
      children;
  murdered by his nephew Aegisthus;
  a fruitful theme for tragedy, I, 97;  III, 106.

Attic, belonging to Attica, the province in which Athens is situated;
  Attic comedy, the comedy of Aristophanes, Eupolis, Menander, etc.,
      I, 104.

Avarice, the great temptation, II, 38, 77;
  the root of evil, III, 73-75;
  due to delusion as to expediency, III, 36;
  avoided by the statesman, II, 76-77;
  contrary to all law, III, 21-23;
  _see also_ Covetousness.


Babylonia, the district around Babylon at the head of the Persian Gulf,
      III, 51.

Bardulis, king of Illyria, conquered a large part of Macedonia from
      Perdiccas, the brother and predecessor of Philip;
  defeated and slain by Philip (358);
  called a "brigand," because his career did not tend to promote
      civilization, II, 40.

Basilus, Lucius Minucius, otherwise unknown;
  perhaps Sulla's lieutenant, III, 73-74.

Beauty, physical, I, 98, 126;
  types of, I, 130.

Beneficence;
  _see_ Generosity.

Bribery, in Rome, II, 21-22, 75.

Brutus, Lucius Junius, led the Romans to expel the Tarquins;
  helped by Collatinus, who shared with him the first consulship (509),
      III, 40.

Brutus, Marcus Junius, an eminent jurist, one of the three founders of
      the civil law;
  father of "the Accuser," II, 50.

Brutus; Marcus Junius Brutus Accusator, orator and vigorous prosecutor,
      son of the preceding, II, 50.


Caelian Hill, the south-east hill of Rome, III, 66.

Caesar, Gaius Julius, son of Lucius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus, candidate
      for the consulship (88), slain by Marius (87);
  poet and orator, I, 108, 133.

Caesar, Gaius Julius (100-44), consul (59), in Gaul (58-50), conquered
      Pompey at Pharsalus (48), dictator (48-44), assassinated (44);
  orator, statesman, scholar, soldier;
  despot, II, 2;
  tyrant, I, 112; II, 23-28, 83;
  confiscator, I, 43; II, 84;
  enslaver of Rome, III, 85;
  treatment of Marseilles, II, 28;
  a victim of depraved ambition, I, 26; III, 83;
  a conspirator with Catiline, his love of wrong, II, 84;
  deserved his death, III, 19, 32, 82.

Caesar, Lucius Julius, father of the Dictator, I, 108.

Callicratidas, succeeded Lysander as admiral of the Spartan fleet,
      I, 109;
  defeated Conon, took Lesbos, lost the battle and his life at Arginusae
      (406), I, 84.

Calliphon, a Greek philosopher, probably a disciple of Epicurus, taught
      that the supreme good was a union between moral rectitude and
      pleasure, III, 119.

Calpurnius;
  Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi;
  _see_ Piso.

Calpurnius;
  Publius Calpurnius Lanarius;
  _see_ Lanarius.

Calypso, the nymph of Ogygia, who kept Odysseus (Ulysses) with her seven
      years, I, 113.

Campus (Martius), the open plain next to the Tiber outside the north
      wall of Rome;
  playground and drillground, I, 104.

Canius, Gaius, a Roman knight, III, 58-60.

Cannae, a town on the Aufidus in Apulia, scene of Hannibal's
      overwhelming defeat of the Romans (216), I, 40; III, 47, 113.

Capitolium, the Capitoline Hill, between the forum and the Tiber, the
      citadel of Rome, with the temple of Jupiter and Good Faith,
      III, 104;
  place of augury, III, 66.

Carthage, once a mighty city, on the north central coast of Africa,
      III, 99, 100;
  the most formidable commercial and military rival of Rome;
  conquered by Rome in the First Punic War (264-241), I, 39;
  Second Punic War (219-202), I, 40; III, 47;
  destroyed in the Third (149-146), I, 35; II, 76.

Carthaginians, the people of Carthage, I, 39, 108; III, 99, 110, 113;
  treacherous, III, 102;
  cruel, III, 100, 102;
  treaty-breaking, I, 38.

Cassander, son of Antipater, disinherited by his father, gained the
      throne of Macedonia (306) by wars and murders (319-301), II, 48.

Cato, Marcus Porcius, the Censor (or Major, the Elder, I, 37) (234-149),
      author, I, 104; III, 1;
  orator, III, 104;
  soldier, served in Second Punic War (217-202);
  statesman, responsible for the destruction of Carthage (146), I, 79;
  "the Wise," III, 16;
  consul (195);
  censor (184);
  stalwart champion of the simple life and stern morals, II, 89;
  bitterly opposed luxury and Greek culture; yielded in old age.

Cato, Marcus Porcius, son of the preceding;
  jurist;
  served under Paulus in Macedon (168), I, 37;
  [under Marcus Popilius Laenas in Liguria (172), I, 36].

Cato, Marcus Porcius, grandson of the Censor and father of Cato
      Uticensis, III, 66.

Cato;
  Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis (95-46), son of the preceding and
      great-grandson of the Censor;
  a Stoic philosopher;
  orator;
  soldier, I, 112;
  defeated at Thapsus (46);
  judge, III, 66;
  stern and unyielding as his great-grandfather, I, 112; III, 88;
  his suicide, I, 112;
  close friend of Cicero (II, 2); III, 88.

Catulus, Quintus Lutatius, half-brother of Julius Caesar Strabo, I, 133;
  orator;
  scholar, I, 133;
  author;
  soldier;
  consul with Marius (102) in the war against the Cimbri (101);
  gentleman, I, 109;
  committed suicide to escape the proscriptions of Marius (87).

Catulus, Quintus Lutatius, son of the preceding, defeated Lepidus at the
      Milvian bridge;
  statesman, I, 76;
  scholar, I, 133.

Caudium, a little town in the mountains of Samnium;
  near it are the Caudine Forks, the scene of the disastrous battle
      (321); III, 109; (II, 79).

Celtiberians, a powerful people of central Spain, opposed Rome in Second
      Punic War, were reduced in the Numantian War (134), submitted on
      the death of Sertorius (72), I, 38.

Centumalus, Tiberius Claudius;
  unknown, III, 66.

Chicanery, I, 33.

Chremes, a character in Terence's _Heauton Timorumenus_, I, 30.

Chrysippus, of Soli (250-207), studied Stoic philosophy at Athens under
      Cleanthes, whom he succeeded;
  voluminous writer. "Had there been no Chrysippus, there had been no
      Stoa," III, 42.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, the orator's father, III, 77;
  died (64).

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, the orator (106-43), born at Arpinum, educated
      at Rome under Archias, the Scaevolas, and the teachers of
      philosophy (_see_ Introduction), at Athens, in Asia, and at
      Rhodes;
  his training was all for service, I, 155;
  as consul (63) he crushed the conspiracy of Catiline, I, 84;
  banished (58), II, 58;
  his enforced retirement from his profession, III, 2-4;
  as a philosopher and orator, I, 1-3;
  follower of Socrates and Plato, I, 2;
  of the New Academy, II, 7-8;
  why he wrote on philosophy, II, 2-8; III, 1-5;
  attitude on the downfall of the Republic, II, 2.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, the orator's only son, I, 1, 15, 78; II, 1-8,
      44; III, 1, 5, 33;
  born in 65;
  served with credit under Pompey, II, 45, and Sextus Pompey;
  a student of Peripatetic philosophy under Cratippus in Athens (44-43),
      I, 1;
  admonished to read also his father's works, I, 3; III, 121;
  served under Brutus (43-42);
  consul with Octavian (30).

Cimbrians, a Celtic people, migrating in a vast horde toward Italy, were
      cut to pieces by Marius and Catulus in the Raudian Plains near
      Verona (101), I, 38.

Cimon, of Athens, son of the great Miltiades;
  victorious admiral;
  statesman;
  genial and generous, II, 64;
  died (449).

Circe, nymph of Aeaea, a sorceress;
  she kept Odysseus (Ulysses) in her halls a year, I, 113.

Civic, compared with military service, I, 74 fg.

Claudius;
  _see_ Appius and Centumalus and Pulcher.

Cleombrotus, son of Pausanias, king of Sparta, fell at Leuctra (371),
      I, 84.

Cleomenes;
  _see_ note to I, 33.

Clodius; Publius Clodius Pulcher, Cicero's inveterate enemy, one of the
      most turbulent and corrupt characters of Rome, guilty of mutiny in
      the army, bribery in the courts, profligacy in his public and
      private life;
  secured Cicero's banishment;
  hired gladiators to force his own election to the praetorship, but was
      killed in a broil with Milo's rival gang of ruffians, II, 58.

Cloelia, a Roman girl sent as a hostage to Porsena;
  she made her escape by swimming the Tiber, was sent back, but restored
      by the king with rewards for her courage, (I, 61).

Clytaemnestra, daughter of Tyndareus, wife of Agamemnon, paramour of
      Aegisthus, with whom she murdered her husband on his return from
      Troy;
  she was in turn slain by her son Orestes.
  Subject of a tragedy by Accius, I, 114.

Cocles, Horatius, the hero who with two others kept the bridge against
      Porsena and Tarquin, I, 61.

Collatinus, Lucius Tarquinius, husband of Lucretia, associate of Brutus
      in driving out the Tarquins and his colleague in the first
      consulship (509), III, 40.

Comedy;
  _see_ Old Comedy.

Concealment, of guilt, III, 37-39.

Conon, famous Athenian admiral, defeated by Lysander at Aegospotami
      (405), victorious over Pisander of Sparta at Cnidus (394),
      restored the long walls, I, 116.

Considerateness, a subdivision of the virtue of Temperance, I, 99, 143.

Conversation, a division of speech, I, 132-133; II, 48;
  an art, I, 134-135.

Co-operation, and civilization, II, 12-16;
  and the virtues, II, 17-18;
  _vs._ Fortune, II, 19;
  a universal need, II, 39;
  how secured, II, 21 fg.

Corinth, a famous city at the Isthmus of Corinth;
  wealthy;
  next to Athens, richest in treasures of art;
  head of the Achaean League;
  sacked and utterly destroyed by the Romans under Mummius (146), I, 35;
      II, 76; III, 46.

Cornelius;
  _see_ Scipio and Spinther and Sulla.

Cos, chief city of the island of Cos, one of the Sporades;
  famed for its silks;
  the birthplace of Apelles, painter of the Coan Venus, III, 10.

Cotta, Gaius Aurelius, distinguished orator;
  one of the speakers in Cicero's _de Oratore_ and _de Natura Deorum_;
  consul (75); II, 59.

Courage;
  _see_ Fortitude.

Covetousness, I, 68; III, 30;
  _see_ Avarice.

Crassus, Lucius Licinius, the famous orator, II, 63; III, 67;
  at 21 (119) he won renown by his prosecution of Carbo, the one-time
      friend of the Gracchi, II, 47, 49;
  his aedileship most splendid, II, 57;
  as consul (95), he secured the expulsion from Rome of all who were not
      citizens, III, 47;
  this was a cause of the Social War.
  He was the greatest orator of Rome before Cicero, fluent, graceful,
      witty, I, 108, 133;
  Cicero's mouthpiece in the _de Oratore_.

Crassus;
  Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives, the triumvir;
  his wealth and ambition, I, 25;
  sided with Sulla against Marius and grew enormously rich by the
      proscriptions;
  his avarice did not shrink from any meanness or even crime, I, 109;
      III, 73-75.
  He defeated Spartacus (71);
  slain in Parthia (53).

Crassus;
  Publius Licinius Crassus Dives, II, 57;
  father of the triumvir, consul (97);
  ended his own life to escape the prescriptions of Marius (87);
  Cicero bought his house.

Cratippus, of Mitylene, an eminent Peripatetic, came to Athens (about
      50) to lecture;
  foremost of contemporary philosophers and teacher of young Cicero,
      I, 1, 2; II, 8; III, 5, 6, 33, 121.

Cunning, not wisdom, II, 10; III, 72, 96.

Curio, Gaius Scribonius, II, 59;
  orator and statesman, III, 88;
  consul, (76).

Cynics, a school of philosophy so called from the Athenian gymnasium,
      Cynosarges, where they met, later adapted to their snarling manner
      and dirty habits;
  its leaders were Antisthenes of Athens, a disciple of Socrates, and
      Diogenes of Sinope;
  they taught the virtue of poverty and want, indifference to all
      convention and decency;
  Cicero's contempt for them and their so-called philosophy, I, 128,
      148.

Cyrenaics, the philosophic sect founded by Aristippus (_q.v._),
      III, 116.

Cyrsilus, a Medizing Athenian, III, 48.

Cyrus, the Great, founder of the Persian Empire;
  wonderfully gifted in winning the co-operation of men and nations,
      II, 16.


Damon, a Pythagorean and friend of Phintias, III, 45.

Debts, cancellation of, II, 78-79, 83-85;
  avoidance of, II, 84;
  payment enforced, II, 84.

Decius;
  Publius Decius Mus, father and son, I, 61; III, 16;
  the former, consul with Manlius Torquatus (360), devoted himself to
      death in the battle on the Veseris.
  The son did the same at the battle of Sentinum (295) and brought the
      Samnite wars to an end.

Demetrius of Phalerum (345-283), orator, statesman, II, 60;
  philosopher, poet;
  pupil of Theophrastus, I, 3;
  the only Greek who was both orator and philosopher, I, 3;
  he inspired the founding of the Alexandrine library.

Demetrius Poliorcetes, II, 26;
  son of Antigonus and king of Macedon (294-287).
  His life was occupied with continuous warfare against enemies in
      Egypt, Asia, Greece, Macedonia, Epirus.

Demosthenes, the greatest orator of Athens (385-322);
  pupil of Isaeus and of Plato, I, 4;
  might have been a great philosopher, I, 4;
  at 18 he prosecuted his defaulting guardian with success, II, 47;
  then turned to public speaking and statecraft as a profession.

Diana, goddess of the light of the night, identified with Artemis,
      III, 95.

Dicaearchus, of Messana (4th century), a Peripatetic philosopher,
      geographer, and historian, II, 16;
  pupil of Aristotle and friend of Theophrastus.

Dinomachus, a Greek philosopher, always named with Calliphon (_q.v._),
      III, 119.

Diogenes, of Babylonia, pupil and successor of Chrysippus;
  best known for his part in the famous embassy with Carneades and
      Critolaus from Athens to Rome (156) where, on motion of Cato, they
      were not permitted to remain;
  his ethics rather loose, III, 51-55, 91.

Dion, a kinsman of the elder Dionysius and tyrant of Syracuse (356-353);
  a devoted disciple of Plato at Syracuse and Athens, I, 155.

Dionysius, the elder (430-367), tyrant of Syracuse (405-367), a
      typically cruel tyrant, suspicious and fearful, II, 25;
      III, 45 (?);
  devoted to art and literature, himself a poet crowned with a prize at
      Athens.

Dionysius, the younger, son of the preceding and tyrant of Syracuse
      (367-356, 346-343);
  devoted to literature;
  Plato, Aristippus, Archytas, and others were brought to his court.
  Whether the Damon and Phintias story is to be connected with him or
      his father is uncertain, III, 45 (?).

Drusus, Marcus Livius, son of Gaius Gracchus's colleague in the
      tribuneship;
  an eloquent orator, I, 108;
  as tribune (91) he attempted to renew the social and agrarian
      legislation of Gracchus and was assassinated.

Duty, the most important subject in philosophy, I, 4;
  the most fruitful field, III, 5;
  the philosophic sects and duty, I, 4-6;
  best presentation, III, 7;
  classification, I, 7-9;
  order of importance, I, 58, 152-160; III, 90;
  to those who have wronged us, I, 33;
  to an enemy, I, 35-40; III, 98-115;
  to a slave, I, 41; III, 89;
  toward the laws, I, 148;
  of generosity, I, 42-60;
  of Temperance-Propriety, I, 100-151; III, 116-121;
  of Fortitude, III, 97-115;
  to be prosperous, II, 87;
  duties of youth, I, 122; II, 52;
  of age, I, 123;
  of magistrates, I, 124;
  of statesmen, I, 73-85;
  of private citizens, I, 124;
  of aliens, I, 125;
  _vs._ claims of friendship, III, 43-44;
  change of duty in change of circumstance, I, 31, 59; III, 32;
  "mean" and "absolute" duty, I, 8; III, 14;
  doubts as to, I, 147.


Eloquence, at the bar, II, 66;
  its decline, II, 67;
  _see_ Oratory.

Ennius, Quintus (239-169), a Greek by birth, the father of Roman poetry,
      wrote an epic (the Annals), I, 84;
  tragedies, I, 26, 51, 52; II, 23, 62; III, 62, 104;
  comedies and satires.

Epaminondas, one of the greatest men of Greece, a student of Pythagorean
      philosophy, I, 155;
  the greatest general of Thebes, victorious at Leuctra (371), I, 84;
  humbled Sparta and made Thebes the leading city of Greece;
  fell at Mantinea (362).

Epicurus (342-270), founded at Athens the school that bears his name;
  author of 300 books, natural and ethical philosophy;
  held happiness to be the highest good;
  Cicero confuses his teaching here with that of Aristippus and the
      Cyrenaics;
  with the latter, happiness consists in individual pleasures;
  with Epicurus, it is permanent calm of soul and freedom from pain,
      with pure and lasting pleasures--the pleasures that come from a
      life of righteousness, III, 12, 117;
  the gods existed but had nothing to do with human life, III, 102;
  adopted the atomic theory.
  His own life was temperate even to abstinence;
  his followers went to excess.
  A very popular school, III, 116;
  represented by Cicero as illogical, III, 39;
  their theory of society, I, 158.

Epigoni, the sons of the Seven against Thebes;
  under Alcmaeon, Diomedes, etc., they conquered and destroyed the city.
  Subject of a tragedy of Accius, I, 114.

Erillus, of Carthage, pupil of Zeno the Stoic, held that knowledge is
      the only good, while everything else is neither good nor evil;
  his ethical theories rejected, I, 6.

Eteocles, son of Oedipus, drove out his brother Polynices, in order to
      reign alone, and brought on the war of the Seven against Thebes;
  the brothers fell by each other's hands; III, 82.

Euripides (480-406), tragic poet of Athens; disciple of Anaxagoras and
      friend of Socrates;
  wrote 75 to 90 plays;
  17 are extant;
  Cicero quotes from the _Hippolytus_, III, 82;
  the _Phoenissae_, III, 108.

Evil, the supreme, I, 5; III, 119;
  not pain, I, 5; III, 105, 117;
  but moral wrong, III, 105, 106;
  the only, III, 106.

Expediency, definition, II, 1, 11;
  indispensable, III, 101;
  identical with Moral Rectitude, II, 9-10; III, 20, 35, 49, 83, 85,
      110;
  conflict with Moral Rectitude impossible, III, 9, 11, 18, 34, 40, 48,
      72;
  incompatible with immorality, III, 35, 77, 81, 82, 87; II, 64;
  one standard for both, III, 75;
  relative, II, 88 fg.;
  possible change of, III, 95;
  occasion for doubt, III, 19;
  apparent conflict with justice, III, 40, 86;
  apparent political expediency _vs._ humanity, III, 46-49;
  in business, III, 50 fg.;
  apparent conflict with Fortitude, III, 97-115;
  apparent conflict with Temperance, III, 116.


Fabius;
  _see_ Maximus.

Fabricius;
  Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, hero of old Rome, famed for integrity and
      moral dignity;
  called "the Just," III, 16, 87;
  consul (282);
  served against Pyrrhus (280);
  ambassador to Pyrrhus to negotiate exchange of prisoners;
  Pyrrhus tried to gain his favour by appeals to his ambition, avarice,
      and fears--in vain, I, 38;
  consul again (278), he sent back to Pyrrhus the traitor, I, 40;
      III, 86-87;
  a rigorous censor (275);
  lived and died in poverty.

Fame;
  _see_ Glory.

Fear, the wretchedness of, II, 25-26;
  _vs._ love, II, 23-26;
  dangerous to the one who employs it, II, 26.

Fetial Law, the laws of the _Fetiales_, a college of four priests who
      served as guardians of the public faith;
  they conducted the ceremonies attendant upon demands for redress,
      declarations of war, ratification of treaties, establishment of
      peace; I, 36; III, 108.

Fides;
  _see_ Good Faith;
  the goddess, III, 104;
  etymology of, I, 23.

Fimbria, Gaius Flavius, colleague of Marius in his second consulship
      (104);
  orator and jurist, III, 77.

Finance, II, 87;
  reform of currency, III, 80-81.

Fortitude, the third Cardinal Virtue, I, 15, 61-92;
  its characteristics, I, 66;
  in the light of justice, I, 62, 157;
  dangers attending, I, 46, 62-63;
  _vs._ expediency, III, 97-115;
  in Epicurus's system, III, 117.

Fraud, criminal, III, 60 fg.

Friendship, motives to, I, 55-56;
  acquisition of friends, II, 30;
  ideal, I, 56; III, 45-46;
  _vs._ duty, III, 43-44.

Fufius, Lucius, an orator of no great ability, II, 50.

Furius;
  Lucius Furius Philus, consul (136), proconsul in Spain, III, 109;
  a learned interlocutor in Cicero's _Republic_.


Galus, Gaius Sulpicius;
  _see_ Sulpicius.

Gaul, an inhabitant of Gaul, the land north of the Apennines, III, 112.

Generosity, divisions of, II, 52;
  close to nature, III, 24;
  must not harm its object, I, 42-43;
  in proportion to one's means, I, 42-44; II, 55;
  to the recipient's merits, I, 45-60;
  motives to, I, 47-49; III, 118;
  means to winning popularity, II, 32;
  gifts of money, II, 52-60;
  personal service, II, 52, 53;
  to individuals, II, 65-71;
  to the state, II, 72 fg.;
  when most appreciated, II, 63.

Glory, a means to popularity, II, 31, 43;
  preferred to wealth, II, 88.

Gods, favour of, won by piety, II, 11;
  do no harm, II, 12; III, 102;
  free from care, III, 102;
  slow to anger, III, 102, 104, 105.

Golden Mean, I, 89;
  in generosity, II, 58, 59, 60;
  in personal adornment, I, 130.

Good, the supreme, I, 5, 7; III, 52, 119;
  not pleasure, I, 5; III, 116, 117, 118;
  but moral goodness, III, 11, 35;
  living in harmony with nature, III, 13;
  the only, moral goodness, I, 67; III, 12.

Good faith, III, 104;
  even to an enemy, III, 86 fg., 111, 113.

Good man, what constitutes a, III, 63, 75-77.

Gracchus, Gaius Sempronius, brother of the younger Tiberius;
  a more radical reformer;
  tribune (123 and 122);
  fell (121) a martyr to his reforms for the restoration of the public
      lands and the reduction of the cost of living, II, 72, 80;
  his death applauded by Cicero, II, 43.

Gracchus, Publius Sempronius, father of the elder Tiberius, II, 43.

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, father of the tribunes, II, 43;
  in his own tribuneship he defended Scipio (187);
  a great soldier, II, 80;
  twice consul, triumphed twice;
  a just ruler in Spain;
  son-in-law of the elder, father-in-law of the younger Africanus, an
      ardent aristocrat;
  hence Cicero's praise, II, 43.

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, son of the foregoing;
  a persuasive orator;
  friend of the people and helper of the poor and oppressed;
  murdered for attempting as tribune (133) to reform agrarian abuses and
      build up a class of small farmers, I, 76, 109; II, 80;
  his death applauded by Cicero, II, 43.

Gratidianus, Marcus Marius;
  _see_ Marius.

Gratitude, how won, II, 63.

Greece, the land of liberty, letters, art, and civilization, II, 60;
      III, 48, 73, 99;
  cause of fall, II, 80.

Greek, belonging to or a native of Greece, I, 108, 111; II, 83; III, 82;
  leaders in literature, I, 3;
  masters of philosophy, I, 8, 51, 142, 153; II, 18;
  Greek and Latin studies, I, 1.

Gyges, the shepherd who dethroned Candaules and became king of Lydia
      (716-678), III, 38, 78.

Gytheum, the harbour-town and arsenal of Sparta, III, 49.


Hamilcar, a successful Carthaginian general in the First Punic War,
      defeated by Regulus at Ecnomus;
  opposed Regulus in Africa, III, 99;
  confused with Hamilcar Barca (_q.v._), III, 99.

Hamilcar Barca, famous commander of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily
      (247-241);
  in Spain (238-229);
  father of Hannibal, III, 99.

Hannibal (247-183), one of the world's greatest generals, I, 108;
  son of Hamilcar Barca, III, 99;
  sacked Saguntum (219), crossed the Alps and defeated the Romans on the
      Trebia and Ticinus (218), at Trasimenus (217), Cannae (216),
      I, 40; III, 113-114;
  defeated at Zama (202);
  maligned by the Romans as treacherous and cruel, I, 38.

Harm, from gods to men, II, 12; III, 102;
  men to men, II, 16 fg.

Health, impossible without man's co-operation, II, 12, 15;
  care of, II, 86.

Hecaton, of Rhodes, a Stoic, pupil of Panaetius, III, 63, 89.

Hercules, the greatest of heroes, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and Alcmena,
      I, 118;
  his choice of his path in life, I, 118;
  performer of the twelve labours;
  benefactor of humanity, III, 25;
  his attainment of heaven, III, 25.

Hernicians, a tribe in the Sabine mountains, subdued by Rome (306),
      I, 35.

Herodotus, of Halicarnassus (5th century), lived also at Athens and
      Thurii;
  the father of history;
  travelled widely and wrote the history of Persia and Greece, II, 41.

Hesiod, the Boeotian didactic poet (8th century);
  author of the Theogony, the Works and Days, etc., I, 48.

Hippolytus, son of Theseus;
  his stepmother Phaedra fell in love with him;
  he rejected her advances but promised not to tell, III, 108;
  she accused him falsely;
  his innocence proved, Phaedra hanged herself and Theseus suffered
      lifelong remorse, I, 32; III, 94.

Home, of man of rank;
  _see_ House.

Homer, the poet, author of Iliad and Odyssey, III, 97.

Honesty, the bond of human society, III, 21 fg.;
  the corner-stone of government, II, 78 fg.

House, suitable for a man of rank, I, 138-140.

Hortensius, Quintus (114-50), Cicero's famous rival as orator and
      advocate;
  his close friend (after 63), III, 73;
  enormously wealthy;
  lavish in his aedileship (75), II, 57;
  not always scrupulous, III, 73-74.

Hospitality, the duty of, II, 64.

Humility, in prosperity, I, 90-91.


Illyria, the country between Macedonia and the Adriatic, II, 40.

Ingratitude, abhorred, II, 63.

Injustice, active and passive, I, 23, 28;
  never expedient, III, 84;
  of hypocrisy, I, 41.

Instinct and Reason, difference between man and beast, I, 11.

Integrity, official, II, 75, 76, 77.

Iphigenia, daughter of Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra (_q.v._);
  sacrificed at Aulis, III, 95.

Isocrates (436-338), one of the ten Attic orators, pupil of Gorgias and
      Socrates;
  a polished speaker;
  greater as a teacher than as an orator;
  might have been a great philosopher, I, 4.

Italian War (90-88), caused by Rome's injustice to the allies, provoked
      by the fear of prosecution on the part of the corrupt aristocrats,
      II, 75;
  resulted in Rome's granting the contentions of the allies.

Italy, in government identified with Rome, II, 76.

Ithaca, the home of Odysseus (Ulysses), an island of the Ionian group
      west of Greece, probably the historical Leucas, III, 97.


Janus, an old Italian sun-god;
  a covered passage (commonly called his temple) adjoining the forum
      accommodated the banking houses of Rome, II, 87.

Jason, tyrant of Pherae (395-370), generalissimo of Thessaly (374-370),
      an able soldier and diplomat, I, 108.

Jests;
  _see_ Wit.

Jove;
  _see_ Jupiter.

Jugurtha, king of Numidia (118-106), campaigned with Scipio against
      Numantia;
  war with Rome (112-106) protracted by his bribes as much as by his
      arms, III, 79;
  executed in Rome (104).

Julius;
  _see_ Caesar.

Junius;
  _see_ Brutus and Pennus and Silanus.

Jupiter, the greatest of the gods of Italy, III, 102, 105;
  "Supreme and Best," III, 104;
  father of Hercules, I, 118.

Justice, the second Cardinal Virtue, I, 15, 17, 20-41;
  in what consisting, I, 20;
  not fully comprehended, III, 69;
  queen of all the virtues, III, 28;
  most important, I, 153;
  close to nature, I, 153; III, 24;
  rule of duty, I, 29-30;
  in war, I, 38-40;
  and generosity, I, 42;
  _vs._ Wisdom, I, 152-157;
  _vs._ Fortitude, I, 157;
  _vs._ Temperance, I, 159-160;
  indispensable in business, II, 40;
  inspires most confidence, II, 34;
  the best means to popularity, II, 39;
  to glory, II, 43;
  always expedient, III, 96;
  in conflict with apparent expediency, III, 40, 86.


Labeo, Quintus Fabius, grandson of Fabius Maximus, consul (183);
  injustice of, I, 33.

Lacedaemon; _see_ Sparta.

Laciads, citizens of the deme of Lacia, west of Athens, the home of
      Miltiades, II, 64.

Laelius, Gaius, surnamed "the Wise," III, 16;
  statesman; soldier under Scipio at Carthage, successful against
      Viriathus, II, 40;
  a Stoic, pupil of Diogenes and Panaetius; a man of endless charm and
      wit, I, 90, 108;
  his friendship for Africanus immortalized, II, 31;
  a man of letters, centre of the literary group comprising also Scipio,
      Panaetius, Polybius, Terence, Lucilius.

Lanarius, Gaius Calpurnius, III, 66.

Latin, study of combined with Greek, I, 1-2.

Latins, the people of Latium, the province in which Rome is situated,
      the first territory added to Rome, I, 38;
  decisive battle on the Anio, III, 112.

Law, the origin of, II, 41-42;
  the majesty of, I, 148;
  as a profession, II, 65;
  its decline with the end of the Republic, II, 67; III, 2.

Lentulus;
  Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, the splendour of his aedileship
      (63), II, 57;
  as consul (57) he was largely instrumental in securing Cicero's recall
      from banishment.

Leuctra, a town of Boeotia, where the Spartans under Cleombrotus were
      disastrously defeated by Epaminondas and the Thebans (371), I, 61;
      II, 26.

Love, how won, II, 32;
  _vs._ fear, II, 23-26.

Lucullus, Lucius Licinius (110-56), surnamed Ponticus for his victories
      over Mithradates (84-66);
  famed for his wealth and magnificence, I, 140;
  for the splendour of his aedileship with his brother Marcus (79),
      II, 57;
  with him prosecuted Servilius to avenge their father whom he had
      accused of bribery and corruption, II, 50;
  patron of letters, especially of the poet Archias.

Lucullus, Marcus Licinius, associated with his brother Lucius (_q.v._),
      II, 50, 57;
  soldier and orator.

Lusitania, western Spain, practically modern Portugal, II, 40.

Lutatius; _see_ Catulus.

Luxury, a vice, I, 92, 106, 123.

Lycurgus (9th century), the famous lawgiver of Sparta, author (?) of the
      Spartan constitution, I, 76.

Lydia, the central country of western Asia Minor, III, 38.

Lysander, the Spartan admiral who defeated the Athenians at Aegospotami
      (405), received the capitulation of Athens (404), established the
      Thirty Tyrants (403), and gave Sparta her leadership, I, 76, 109.

Lysander, the ephor (241), a descendant of the admiral, a friend of King
      Agis (_q.v._), sought to bring about agrarian reforms based upon
      the constitution of Lycurgus;
  for this he was banished, II, 80.

Lysis, of Tarentum, a Pythagorean; expelled from Italy, he came to
      Thebes and taught Epaminondas, I, 155.


Macedonia, until the time of Philip a small country north of Thessaly,
      I, 37.

Macedonians, the people of Macedon, I, 90; II, 53;
  deserted to Pyrrhus, II, 26;
  Paulus and their wealth, II, 76.

Maelius, Quintus, tribune (321), more probably tribune-elect, as
      tribunes could not leave the city, III, 109.

Magnificence, in the home, I, 140.

Mamercus;
  Aemilius Lepidus Mamercus Livianus, a kinsman of Caesar;
  though defeated once, II, 58, he was later (77) consul.

Mancia, Quintus Mucius, unknown, I, 109.

Mancinus, Gaius Hostilius;
  in his consulship (137) he was defeated by the Numantines;
  his delivery to the enemy, III, 109.

Manlius;
  Aulus Manlius Capitolinus, father of Lucius (_q.v._), III, 112.

Manlius;
  Lucius Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosus;
  named dictator to mark the year (363), he used his office to engage in
      a war;
  that he transgressed but a "few days" was due to the intervention of
      the tribunes, III, 112.

Manlius;
  Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, his son, a famous hero of Roman
      story;
  as consul at the time of the battle on the Veseris he executed his own
      son for disobeying orders, though the disobedience won the _spolia
      opima_, III, 112.

Marathon, a plain about twenty miles north of Athens where (490)
      Miltiades and his ten thousand defeated the hosts of Darius,
      I, 61.

Marcellus, Marcus Claudius, campaigned against Hannibal in Italy, took
      Syracuse (212), five times consul, a brave but cruel soldier,
      over-praised by the Romans, I, 61.

Marcus;
  _see_ Cicero--Marcus Tullius, the son.

Marcius;
  _see_ Philippus.

Marius, Gaius (157-87), seven times consul;
  gained his first consulship dishonourably, III, 79, 81;
  conquered Jugurtha (107);
  saved Rome from the invading Cimbri (102) and Teutons (101);
  a military genius, I, 76;
  cruel and selfish, he flooded the streets of Rome with her best blood
      in the civil war with Sulla.

Marius;
  Marcus Marius Gratidianus, the son (or grandson) of Marcus Gratidius
      whose sister married Cicero's grandfather;
  adopted by a kinsman of the great Marius;
  hence his name;
  twice praetor;
  murdered by Catiline during Sulla's proscriptions, III, 67;
  his unbounded popularity in his first praetorship (86), III, 80-81.

Mars, the god of war, III, 34.

Marseilles (Massilia), a Greek city on the southern coast of Gaul,
      independent of the province;
  it sided with Pompey;
  Caesar captured the city after a protracted siege and exacted cruel
      vengeance, II, 28.

Maximus;
  Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator, consul four times;
  in his second dictatorship (217) he won his surname by harassing
      Hannibal, watching his plans and working on the defensive,
      I, 84, 108.

Medes, the people of Media, a great kingdom in central Asia Minor added
      to Persia by Cyrus, II, 41.

Medus, a son of Medea and Aegeus;
  wandering in search of his mother he came to Colchis, where Medea
      saved his life;
  the subject of a tragedy of Pacuvius, I, 114.

Melanippa, mother of Boeotus and Aeolus by Posidon (Neptune);
  blinded and imprisoned by her father, she was at last rescued by her
      sons and her sight was restored by Posidon;
  subject of a tragedy of Ennius, I, 114.

Metellus;
  Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, won his surname by his
      victories over Andriscus (148);
  a political rival and yet a good friend of the younger Scipio, I, 87.

Metellus;
  Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, nephew of the preceding,
      statesman and soldier;
  as consul (109), carried on the war with Jugurtha with distinguished
      success, III, 79.

Metrodorus, of Lampsacus (330-277), the most distinguished of the
      disciples of Epicurus;
  his Epicureanism was of the grossly sensual sort;
  his conception of happiness misunderstood by Cicero, III, 117.

Milo, Titus Annius, an unscrupulous and turbulent fellow;
  as tribune (57) he did much for Cicero's recall and made a sworn enemy
      of Clodius (_q.v._);
  hired gladiators to force his own election, II, 58;
  defended without success by Cicero for killing Clodius.

Minerva, goddess of thought, temperament, wit, I, 97.

Minos, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and king of Crete;
  because of his upright life he was made judge with Aeacus (_q.v._) in
      Hades, I, 97.

Moderation, defined, I, 142.

Modesty, I, 126-129.

Mucius;
  _see_ Scaevola.

Mummius;
  Lucius Mummius Achaicus, as consul (146) broke up the Achaean League,
      razed Corinth to the ground, I, 35; II, 46;
  carried to Italy untold treasures of wealth and art, II, 76.


Naples, the beautiful Greek city of Campania, I, 33.

Nasica;
  _see_ Scipio.

Neptune, god of the sea, I, 32;
  III, 94.

New Academy;
  _see_ Academy.

Nicocles, tyrant of Sicyon, II, 81.

Nola, a city in Campania, loyal to Rome, I, 33.

Norbanus, Gaius, tribune (95), impeached (94) for treason, II, 49;
      consul (83).

Numantia, the capital of Celtiberia, razed to the ground after a long
      siege by the younger Scipio, I, 35, 76;
  treacherously treated by Rome, III, 109.

Numicius, Tiberius, colleague of Quintus Maelius (_q.v._), III, 109.


Oath, significance of, I, 39, 40; III, 102 fg.;
  fidelity to, I, 39, 40; III, 99-112;
  violation of, III, 113 fg.;
  _see_ Perjury.

Octavius, Gnaeus, as praetor commanded the fleet against Perseus (168)
      and gained a triumph;
  consul (165), I, 138.

Octavius, Marcus, tribune (120);
  had the corn law of Gaius Gracchus repealed and secured the passage of
      a new and more conservative one, II, 72.

Old Age, duties peculiar to, I, 123;
  worst vices of, I, 123.

Old Comedy, that of Aristophanes, Cratinus, Eupolis, etc., the comedy of
      personal abuse, I, 104.

Orata, Gaius Sergius Silus, praetor (97), III, 67.

Oratory, a division of speech, I, 132;
  divisions of, II, 49;
  a means for winning favour, II, 48;
  a means for service, II, 65-71;
  a power to save, II, 51.

Orderliness, defined, I, 142;
  of action, I, 142-145.

Orestes;
  Gnaeus Aufidius Orestes Aurelianus, consul (71), II, 58.


Palamedes, the inventor;
  exposed Ulysses's trick, III, 98;
  treacherously done to death in revenge.

Palatine, the hill above the forum on the south;
  east of the capital, I, 138.

Panaetius, of Rhodes (180-111 _ca._), Stoic philosopher, disciple of
      Diogenes and Antipater (_q.v._) at Athens, close friend of Laelius
      (_q.v._) and Scipio, I, 90; II, 76;
  popularized philosophy, II, 35;
  wrote a book on moral duty, III, 7;
  failed to define duty, I, 7;
  classification of duty, I, 9;
  omits third division, I, 152, 161; II, 88;
  reasons for omission, III, 7-18, 34;
  how it would have been met, III, 33;
  other omissions, II, 86;
  on co-operation, II, 16;
  defends lawyer's efforts in a bad case, II, 51;
  on expensive public buildings, II, 60;
  Cicero's model, II, 60; III, 7;
  Hecaton's teacher, III, 63.

Papius, Gaius, as tribune (65), revived the law of Pennus (_q.v._),
      III, 47.

Patriotism, I, 83;
  duty to country, I, 160; III, 90, 95;
  to die for country, I, 57;
  sacrifice for, I, 84; III, 100;
  right to do wrong for one's country, I, 159; III, 93, 95.

Paulus, Lucius Aemilius, consul (216), defeated and slain at Cannae,
      I, 114.

Paulus;
  Lucius Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus, son of the preceding;
  in his second consulship he conquered Perseus of Macedon at Pydna
      (168) and enriched Rome with spoils, II, 76;
  the father of the younger Africanus, I, 116, 121.

Pausanias, king of Sparta, commander-in-chief of the forces of Greece at
      Plataea (479) to the glory of Sparta, I, 76.

Peloponnesian War, the death-struggle of Athens with Sparta (431-404),
      I, 84.

Peloponnesus, the lower peninsula of Greece, in which Sparta was the
      chief city, I, 84.

Pelops, son of Tantalus and king of Mycenae, father of Atreus and
      Thyestes, III, 84.

Pennus, Marcus Junius;
  as tribune (126) he secured a law expelling all foreigners from Rome,
      III, 47.

Pericles, the peerless statesman of Athens, II, 16;
  philosopher, friend of Anaxagoras and Socrates;
  orator of mighty power, serious and deep, I, 108;
  general, I, 144;
  his administration made Athens unequalled in the splendour of her
      public buildings, II, 60.

Peripatetics, followers of Aristotle (_q.v._), empiricists, II, 16;
  students of exact science;
  lack the poetry and eloquence of Plato but not very different from the
      New Academy, I, 2; III, 20;
  followers of Socrates and Plato, I, 2;
  their right to teach ethics, I, 6;
  seek the golden mean, I, 89;
  moral rectitude the supreme good, III, 11;
  moral wrong the supreme evil, III, 106;
  young Cicero their follower, I, 1; II, 8.

Perjury, III, 106-103, 113.

Perseus, the last king of Macedon, conquered by Paulus (_q.v._), I, 37.

Persians, the people of Persia, the great empire of western Asia;
  under Darius they invaded Greece and were beaten back at Marathon
      (490), I, 61;
  under Xerxes were overwhelmingly defeated at Salamis (480), I, 61;
      III, 48, 49;
  and at Plataea (479), I, 61.

Phaedra, daughter of Minos, wife of Theseus and stepmother of Hippolytus
      (_q.v._), III, 94.

Phaëthon, his story, III, 94.

Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum (6th century), type of inhuman cruelty,
      II, 26; III, 29, 32;
  slain in an uprising of his people, II, 26;
  typical of Caesar.

Phalerum, a deme of Attica on the bay of Phalerum, I, 3; II, 60.

Pherae, a town of south-eastern Thessaly, the home of Admetus;
  of Jason, I, 108;
  of Alexander, II, 25.

Philip, conqueror, king of Macedon (359-336), educated at Thebes,
      cultured, I, 90;
  wise, II, 48;
  eloquent, tactful and firm in discipline, II, 53.

Philip, the younger, son of Antigonus (_q.v._), II, 48.

Philippus, Lucius Marcius, orator second only to Crassus and Antonius,
      I, 108;
  statesman, II, 59;
  as tribune (104), proposed agrarian reforms, II, 73;
  dishonest policy toward the Asiatic states, III, 87.

Philippus, Quintus Marcius, father of preceding, consul (186 and 169),
      II, 59; III, 87.

Philosophers, why righteous, I, 28;
  attitude toward civic duty, I, 28;
  as teachers, I, 155.

Philosophy, the study of, I, 1-4;
  theoretical speculation, I, 153;
  meaning, II, 5;
  spirit of, II, 7;
  as a discipline, II, 4;
  worth while, II, 5 fg.;
  why Cicero turned to it, II, 2-8; III, 1-6.

Phintias, the friend of Damon (_q.v._) III, 45.

Phoenissae, the Phoenician Women, a tragedy of Euripides dealing with
      the war of the Seven against Thebes, III, 82.

Picenum, state of north-east Italy, on the Adriatic, III, 74.

Pinthia, Marcus Lutatius, unknown, III, 77.

Piraeus, the great, landlocked harbour of Athens, about five miles from
      the city, III, 46.

Piso;
  Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi, so surnamed for his integrity;
  author and statesman;
  tribune (149);
  law against extortion, II, 75;
  consul (133).

Plaetorian Law, enacted (192), III, 61.

Plataea, the heroic little city at the foot of Mount Cithaeron in
      Boeotia;
  alone with Athens at Marathon (490);
  the scene of the final defeat of the Persians in Hellas (479), I, 61.

Plato (429-347), pupil and friend of Socrates, profound philosopher and
      brilliant author, I, 22, 63;
  ideal statesman, I, 85, 87;
  might have been a great orator, I, 4;
  founder of the Academy (_q.v._);
  a great teacher, I, 155;
  often quoted by Cicero, I, 15 22, 28, 63, 64, 85, 87; III, 38, 39.

Plautus, Titus Maccius (254-184), the greatest of Rome's comic poets;
      rich in wit, I, 104.

Po, the great river of Cisalpine Gaul, III, 88.

Poeni;
  _see_ Carthaginians.

Polybius, of Megalopolis (204-122), president of the Achaean League,
      detained at Rome in the house of Aemilius Paulus;
  friend of Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius;
  author of a history of Rome, III, 113.

Pompey;
  Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106-48), warrior, I, 76; (II, 20;)
  politician, the enemy of Caesar, the idol of Cicero, II, 2;
  conquered the pirates, Sertorians, Mithradates, Judaea, I, 78;
  triumvir;
  married Julia, III, 82;
  adorned Rome with great buildings, II, 60;
  magnificent shows, II, 57;
  defeated at Pharsalus (48), II, 45.

Pompey;
  Quintus Pompeius Rufus, consul (141);
  as commander in the war with Numantia (140) made the unfortunate
      peace, III, 109.

Pompey, Sextus, cousin of Pompey the Great, Stoic, scholar,
      geometrician, I, 19.

Pomponius, Marcus, tribune (363);
  accuser of Lucius Manlius, III, 112.

Pontius, Gaius, the Samnite general, victor at the Caudine Forks (321),
      II, 75;
  faithlessly treated, defeated (292), and executed in Rome.

Poor, services to the, II, 61 fg.;
  their gratitude, II, 63, 69-71.

Popilius [Marcus Popilius Laenas, as consul (172) campaigning in
      Liguria, I, 36].

Popular esteem, a means to glory, II, 31;
  how gained, II, 44 fg.

Posidonius, of Apamea (135-51), a Stoic, disciple of Panaetius at
      Athens, III, 8;
  established a school at Rhodes where Cicero studied under him;
  later he lived with Cicero in Rome;
  author of many works, I, 159; III, 10.

Postumius;
  Spurius Postumius Albinus, defeated in his second consulship (321) at
      the Caudine Forks, III, 109.

Prodicus, of Ceos (fifth century), a respected sophist;
  his "Choice of Hercules," I, 118.

Profession;
  _see_ Vocation.

Promises, non-fulfilment sometimes a duty, I, 32; III, 92-95;
  sacred though given to an enemy, I, 39-40.

Property, private, how obtained, I, 92;
  rights of, I, 21; II, 73-79, 85; III, 53;
  public, rights of, I, 21, 51.

Propriety, defined, I, 96;
  its relations to the Cardinal Virtues, I, 93-100;
  poetic, I, 97;
  moral, I, 98-99;
  conduct in accord with personal endowment, I, 110-117;
  in choosing a career, I, 115-121;
  in outward appearance, I, 130;
  in inward self-control, I, 131-132;
  in speech, I, 132 fg.;
  in the home, I, 138-140.

Propylaea, the magnificent gateway to the Acropolis of Athens, built
      (437-431) by Pericles and Mnesicles at a cost of £500,000, II, 60.

Prosecution, II, 49;
  to be rarely undertaken, II, 50;
  a public service, II, 50.

Prudence;
  _see_ Wisdom.

Ptolemy, Philadelphus (309-247), king of Egypt, patron of art and
      letters, had the Bible translated;
  vastly rich, II, 82.

Public Lands, private occupation to be maintained, I, 21.

Public Service, as a career, I, 70 fg.;
  as a duty, I, 72;
  as an honour, I, 73;
  free from partisanship, I, 85-86;
  self-seeking, I, 87;
  vindictiveness, I, 88;
  anger, I, 89;
  guided by wisdom, I, 155-156.

Public shows, extravagant expenditures, II, 55-60;
  expected of an aedile, II, 57-60.

Pulcher, Gaius Claudius, son of Appius, aedile (99), II, 57;
  consul (92).

Punic Wars;
  _see_ Carthage.

Pyrrho, of Elis (fourth century), founder of the school of the Sceptics;
  held that virtue is the only good, that truth and knowledge are
      unattainable;
  his ethical theories rejected, I, 6.

Pyrrhus (318-272), king of Epirus, descended from Achilles and Aeacus,
      I, 38;
  a daring soldier and a gallant enemy, I, 38;
  a career of adventure and conquest, I, 38; III, 86;
  invaded Italy (280-275);
  the story of the poisoner, I, 40; III, 86;
  (_see also_ Fabricius);
  invaded Macedonia (273) and the enemy's troops joined him, II, 26;
  killed in Argos (272).

Pythagorean, a follower of Pythagoras or member of his secret
      fraternity, I, 155; III, 45.

Pythagoras, of Samos (sixth century), studied in the Orient, great
      mathematician;
  moral and religious teacher;
  serious, ascetic, I, 108;
  taught transmigration of souls;
  founded a secret brotherhood of ideal friendship, I, 56;
  asceticism was the rule of practice, with deep meditation and lofty
      aspiration.

Pythian, epithet of Apollo, from Pytho, another name for Delphi, II, 77.

Pythius, of Syracuse, his dishonesty, III, 58.


Quirinus, the Sabine name for the deified Romulus, III, 41.


Recklessness, to be avoided, I, 81, 83.

Regulus, Marcus Atilius, a favourite hero of old Rome;
  consul (267 and 256), annihilated the Carthaginian fleet, took many
      towns, was finally (255) defeated and taken prisoner, I, 39;
      III, 99;
  his famous embassy and the ethics of his conduct, III, 99-115.

Remus, twin brother of Romulus, slain for leaping in derision over the
      new walls of Rome, III, 41.

Reproof, how administered, I, 136.

Republic, the Roman;
  its glory, II, 2;
  the protectorate of the world, II, 27;
  its downfall, I, 35; II, 2-5, 29, 65; III, 2, 4, 83;
  the tyrant's sway, II, 23-29; III, 81-85;
  enslaved, III, 84-85.

Retirement, the life of, I, 69-70.

Rhodes, a large island off the coast of Caria, III, 50.

Rhodian, a native of Rhodes, III, 50, 57; III, 63.

Riches, the object of acquiring, I, 25;
  proper use of, I, 68;
  compared with virtue, III, 24;
  (_see_ Wealth).

Roman, of or belonging to Rome, III, 58;
  people, I, 33; III, 79, 83-86, 105, 109, 114;
  the people of Rome, II, 75;
  celebrated for courage, I, 61;
  champion of justice, I, 36; II, 26;
  hatred of tyranny and injustice, III, 19;
  atonement for tyranny and injustice, II, 27-29;
  their enslavement, III, 85-86.

Rome, the capital of the Empire and mistress of the world, I, 39, 40;
      III, 73, 79, 99, 112, 113.

Romulus, the mythical king, founder of Rome, III, 40;
  builder of its walls;
  not justified in slaying his brother, III, 41.

Roscius, Sextus, of Ameria, accused by Chrysogonus, a freedman of
      Sulla's, of murdering his father;
  bravely and successfully defended by Cicero at the age of twenty-six,
      II, 51.

Rupilius, an actor otherwise unknown, I, 114.

Rutilius;
  Publius Rutilius Rufus, a disciple of Publius Scaevola, II, 47;
  of Panaetius, III, 10;
  with Quintus Scaevola in Asia he repressed the extortion of the
      publicans, was banished, and devoted his life to philosophy and
      literature, III, 10.


Sabine, belonging to the province of central Italy, III, 74;
  the Sabines, unfriendly to Rome till subdued and added to the empire
      (290), I, 35, 38.

Sacred Laws;
  the _Leges Sacratae_, laws for the violation of which the offender was
      nominally consecrated to some god--i.e., laden with a curse,
      III, 111.

Salamis, the island and straits directly in front of the Piraeus
      (_q.v._), where (480) Themistocles and the allied Greeks virtually
      annihilated the fleets of Persia, I, 61, 75.

Sale, fraud in sale of real estate, III, 54-64;
  laws concerning, III, 65-71;
  of slaves, III, 71-72.

Salmacis, a fountain (and nymph) at Halicarnassus, whose waters made men
      who drank them weak and effeminate, I, 61.

Samnites, the brave, liberty-loving people of Samnium, a province of
      south-central Italy;
  after seventy-one years (343-272) of war with Rome admitted to
      citizenship, I, 38;
  famous for their victory at the Caudine Forks, III, 109;
  Gaius Pontius, II, 75.

Sanitation;
  _see_ Health.

Sardinia, the large island north of Sicily, made a province (238),
      misgoverned, II, 50.

Satrius;
  Marcus Minucius Basilus Satrianus, adopted by Lucius Minucius Basilus,
      his inheritance, III, 74.

Scaevola, Publius Mucius, father of the pontifex maximus, consul (133)
      and friend of Tiberius Gracchus, an expert in the pontifical law,
      II, 47.

Scaevola, Quintus Mucius, the Augur, son of the preceding, son-in-law of
      Laelius, friend of Africanus, consul (117), preceptor to Cicero;
  simple in his greatness, I, 109.

Scaevola, Quintus Mucius, the Pontifex Maximus, son of Publius,
      preceptor of Cicero;
  orator, jurist;
  authority on the civil law, his business honour, III, 62, 70;
  followed his father's calling, I, 116;
  magnificent aedileship, II, 57;
  consul (95), III, 47.

Scaurus, Marcus Aemilius, consul (115);
  partisan rather than statesman, I, 76;
  ambassador to Jugurtha (112), notorious corruptionist, but loyal
      aristocrat;
  hence Cicero's praise, I, 108.

Scaurus, Marcus Aemilius, son of the preceding, step-son of Sulla,
      aedile (58) with extraordinary magnificence, II, 57;
  governor of Sardinia (56), which he plundered outrageously;
  successfully defended by Cicero and Hortensius;
  later (52) condemned and banished, I, 138;
  palace on the Palatine, I, 138.

Scipio, Gnaeus Cornelius, brother of Publius (_see_ following);
  consul (222) with Marcus Marcellus;
  with Publius in Spain (217-211);
  a gallant soldier, I, 61; III, 16.

Scipio, Publius Cornelius, brother of Gnaeus and father of the elder
      Africanus, I, 121;
  consul (218), defeated by Hannibal at the Ticinus;
  waged war in Spain (217-211);
  a gallant soldier, I, 61; III, 16.

Scipio;
  Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major (234-183), the son of
      Publius, I, 121;
  grandfather of the Gracchi, II, 80;
  defeated Hannibal at Zama (202) and closed the war;
  never idle in his zeal for Rome, III, 1-4.

Scipio, Publius Cornelius, son of Africanus Major, adoptive father of
      Africanus Minor;
  gifted mentally but physically disqualified for an active career,
      I, 121.

Scipio;
  Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Minor, son of Aemilius
      Paulus Macedonicus, I, 116, 121;
  adopted son of Publius Africanus's son, I, 121;
  friend and pupil of Panaetius, I, 90;
  intimate friend of Laelius (_q.v._) and devoted to literature;
  serious, earnest, I, 108;
  self-control, II, 76;
  a great soldier, I, 76, 116;
  at Pydna (168) with his father;
  captured and destroyed Carthage (136) and Numantia (133), I, 35;
      II, 76;
  statesman of high ideals, a bitter rival and yet a friend of
      Quintus Metellus, I, 87.

Scipio;
  Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, known chiefly as the man who
      led the riot and murdered Tiberius Gracchus, I, 76, 109.

Scipio;
  Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica, son of the preceding;
  died in his consulship (111);
  a charming gentleman and a brilliant speaker, I, 109.

Secret sin, II, 37 fg.

Seius, Marcus, reduced the price of corn and regained his lost
      popularity, II, 58.

Self-control;
  _see_ Temperance.

Self-sacrifice, III, 25;
  of Regulus, III, 97-115.

Sergius, Gaius;
  _see_ Orata.

Sicily, the great island south-west of Italy, fertile and rich, occupied
      along the coasts by prosperous Greek colonies, a Roman province
      (212 on), an easy prey for rapacious governors, as Verres whom
      Cicero prosecuted (70), II, 50.

Sicyon, a city near Corinth, famous as a centre of art;
  Aratus and the tyranny, II, 81-82.

Silanus, Decimus Junius, stepfather of Marcus Brutus, consul (62),
      aedile, II, 57.

Slaves, duty toward, I, 41; III, 89.

Social Instinct, man and beast, I, 12, 50;
  bees, I, 157;
  leads to justice, I, 157;
  weighed against justice, I, 159 fg.

Society, principles of, I, 50-57; III, 53;
  rights of, I, 21;
  service to, I, 153, 155.

Socrates (469-399), the great philosopher and teacher, II, 43;
  his ethics, III, 11, 77;
  his perfect poise, I, 90;
  brilliant dialectician, with a profound meaning in every word, I, 108;
  personal eccentricities, I, 148.
  "The noblest, ay, and the wisest and most righteous man that we have
      ever known."

Socratic, following Socrates, I, 104, 134; II, 87;
  most schools of philosophy are based on the teaching of Socrates--the
      Academy, I, 2;
  the Peripatetic, I, 2; III, 20;
  the Cynic, I, 128;
  the Cyrenaic, III, 116;
  the Stoic, I, 6;
  etc.

Sol, the sun-god, father of Phaëthon, III, 94.

Solon, the great lawgiver of Athens (638-558 _ca._), poet, soldier,
      statesman;
  his feigned madness and the acquisition of Salamis, I, 108;
  his constitution and the reorganized Areopagus, I, 75.

Sophocles, the great tragic poet (495-406), supreme on the Athenian
      stage (468-441);
  general in the war against Samos (440), I, 144.

Sparta, capital of Lacedaemon in the south-eastern part of the
      Peloponnesus, III, 99;
  constitution of Lycurgus, I, 76;
  national character, I, 64;
  position at end of Persian wars, I, 76;
  at end of Peloponnesian war, I, 76;
  her arsenal, III, 49;
  disasters, I, 84;
  despotic, II, 26;
  cause of her fall, II, 77, 80.

Stoics, adherents of the school founded by Zeno, an offshoot from
      Cynicism, I, 128;
  refounded by Chrysippus;
  philosophy with them is practical, making life accord with Nature's
      laws, III, 13;
  virtue and philosophy are identical;
  virtue the only good, I, 6; III, 11, 12;
  moral wrong the only evil, III, 106;
  pain no evil, III, 105;
  no degrees of right or wrong, I, 10;
  etymologists, I, 23;
  define fortitude, I, 62;
  temperance, I, 142;
  duties, III, 14;
  controversies, III, 91;
  their right to teach ethics, I, 6;
  Cicero adopts their teaching, I, 6; III, 20;
  common interests, I, 22;
  their theology a pantheistic materialism, God working in his
      providence, III, 102;
  representative Stoics, II, 51, 86; III, 51.

Sulla;
  Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix (138-78), noble, profligate, brilliant
      genius;
  would stoop to anything, I, 109;
  soldier against Jugurtha, Mithradates, Marius, Rome;
  statesman;
  reformed the constitution;
  absolute monarch of Rome (81-79);
  treatment of tributary allies, III, 87;
  confiscator, I, 43; II, 29;
  overturned the old morals, II, 27;
  Cicero opposed him, II, 51.

Sulla, Publius Cornelius, nephew of the dictator, II, 29;
  defended by Cicero on charge of complicity in Catiline's conspiracy.

Sulla, Cornelius, a freedman of the dictator, II, 29.

Sulpicius;
  Gaius Sulpicius Galus, consul (166);
  famous astronomer, I, 19;
  predicted an eclipse of the moon.

Sulpicius;
  Publius Sulpicius Rufus (124-88), an eminent orator of little
      character, II, 49.

Sungod;
  _see_ Sol.

Superbus;
  _see_ Tarquin.

Syracuse, a great Greek city in south-eastern Sicily, rich in art and in
      goods;
  ruled by Dion, I, 155;
  Dionysius, II, 25; III, 45;
  a popular resort, III, 58.


Tantalus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and father of Pelops (_q.v._), III, 84.

Tarquin;
  Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, the last king of Rome (535-510), a cruel
      tyrant, expelled by Brutus and Collatinus, III, 40.

Tarquins, the kinsmen of Tarquinius Superbus, all expelled (510),
      III, 40.

Taxation, levying of, II, 74.

Temperance, the fourth Cardinal Virtue, I, 93-151;
  definition, I, 93;
  the passions, I, 102;
  speech, I, 103;
  _vs._ Justice, I, 159-160;
  essential to success, II, 77;
  _vs._ apparent Expediency, III, 116 fg.

Terence;
  Publius Terentius Afer (195-159), a comic poet, friend of Laelius and
      Scipio;
  six plays are left;
  quotation from the _Heauton Timorumenus_, I, 30;
  the _Eunuchus_, I, 150.

Thebe, daughter of Jason and wife of Alexander of Pherae, II, 25.

Thebes, the capital of Boeotia, home of Pindar and Epaminondas, I, 155.

Themistocles, brilliant statesman of Athens, II, 16;
  gave Athens her fleet and saved Greece at Salamis (480), I, 75;
  consummate general, I, 108;
  not always scrupulous in his methods, III, 49;
  his valuation of character, II, 71.

Theophrastus, of Lesbos, favourite pupil and successor of Aristotle, a
      marvellous teacher, master of Demetrius of Phalerum, I, 3;
  a prolific author;
  cited, II, 56, 64.

Theopompus, of Chios (fourth century), pupil of Isocrates, orator and
      historian, II, 40.

Thermopylae, a narrow pass on the seashore between Thessaly and Locris,
      held by Leonidas and his three hundred against the hosts of Xerxes
      (480), I, 61.

Theseus, the great legendary hero of Athens, benefactor of the world;
  uniter of Athens and Attica;
  father of Hippolytus (_q.v._) by Antiope;
  husband of Phaedra;
  his son's death, I, 32; III, 94.

Thrace, the vast country north of the Aegean;
  though the home of Orpheus, Linus, etc., it was generally considered
      barbarous, II, 25.

Thyestes, son of Pelops and brother of Atreus (_q.v._), (III, 102).

Timotheus, admiral of the Athenian fleet (378-356), compared with his
      father Conon, I, 116.

Torquatus;
  _see_ Manlius.

Trades;
  _see_ Vocation.

Troezen, a city of Argolis, near the shore opposite Aegina;
  the asylum of the Athenians at the approach of Xerxes, III, 48.

Trusts, when not to be restored, III, 95.

Truth, the search after, I, 13.

Tubero, Quintus Aelius, the Stoic, a pupil of Panaetius, praetor (123);
      a talented jurist, III, 63.

Tusculum, a town in the Alban hills, the oldest municipium in Italy,
      admitted (381), I, 35;
  public lands of, I, 21;
  Cicero's favourite country home.

Twelve Tables, the laws of, drawn up (450);
  quoted, I, 37; III, 111.

Tyranny, II, 23-29;
  inspired by false perspective, III, 36;
  right and duty toward the tyrant, III, 19, 85.

Tyre, the great commercial city on the coast of Phoenice, II, 86.


Ulysses (Odysseus), son of Laertes of Ithaca, the shrewdest of the Greek
      heroes at Troy, III, 97;
  the hero of the Odyssey, I, 113.


Varro, Gaius Terentius, consul (216) with Paulus, responsible for the
      disaster at Cannae, III, 114.

Venus (Aphrodite), the goddess of beauty and love;
  of Cos, III, 10.

Veseris, a little stream near Mount Vesuvius;
  scene of the battle of Manlius Torquatus and the elder Decius,
      III, 112.

Veturius;
  Titus Veturius Calvinus, consul with Spurius Postumius (321) at the
      Caudine Forks, III, 109.

Vice, luxurious living, I, 123;
  sensual pleasure, I, 102, 104-106, 122-123; II, 37;
  avarice, II, 77;
  extravagance, I, 140;
  misrepresentation, I, 150;
  untruth, I, 150;
  corrected by observing others, I, 146;
  by the criticism of the wise, I, 147.

Viriathus, II, 40.

Virtue, defined, II, 18;
  chief function of, II, 17;
  the four Cardinal Virtues described, I, 15-17;
  the sources of moral rectitude, I, 152; III, 96;
  Nature's leadings to, I, 100;
  endangered by sensual pleasure, II, 37;
  rulers chosen for, II, 41.

Vocation, choice of, I, 115-120;
  change of, I, 120-121;
  vulgar and liberal, I, 150-152.

Volscians, a people of lower Latium, subdued (303), given full
      citizenship (188), I, 35.


War, rights of, to be enforced, I, 34;
  Cato's son, I, 36-37;
  excuse for war, I, 35, 80;
  justice in war, I, 38;
  war for supremacy, I, 38;
  for glory, I, 38;
  needless cruelty, I, 82.

Wealth, Theophrastus on, II, 56;
  insatiable thirst for, I, 25;
  why sought, I, 25-27;
  the real good of wealth, II, 56;
  _see_ Riches.

Wisdom, the first of the Cardinal Virtues, I, 15-19;
  most important, I, 153; II, 6;
  absolute, III, 16;
  and propriety, I, 94, 100;
  _vs._ Justice, I, 152-157, 160;
  confounded with cunning, II, 10; III, 72, 96;
  in Epicurus's system, III, 117.

Wit, kinds of, I, 103-104;
  representatives of, I, 108.


Xanthippus, a Spartan soldier of fortune, whose generalship defeated
      Regulus, III, 99.

Xenocrates, of Chalcedon (396-314), a pupil of Plato, president of the
      Academy, industrious and severe, I, 109.

Xenophon, soldier, historian, disciple of Socrates, II, 87;
  the story of Hercules's choice, I, 118.

Xerxes, king of Persia (485-465), son of Darius, invaded Greece (480),
      came to grief at Salamis and Plataea, III, 48.


Youth, duties peculiar to, I, 123; II, 52;
  time for choosing profession, I, 117.


Zeno, of Cytium (fourth century), pupil of Crates the Cynic and founder
      of the Stoic school (_see_ Stoics), III, 35.


LETCHWORTH: AT THE ARDEN PRESS.



CORRECTIONS:


  page     original text                   correction
  190 sn   Fab. inc. Valhen^2, 402         Fab. inc. Vahlen^2, 402
  230 fn   _Ma co_ MSS.                    _Marco_ MSS.
  344      set etiam adiuvat iniuriam?     sed etiam adiuvat iniuriam?
  413      treacherous and crue, I, 38.    treacherous and cruel, I, 38.
  421      friend o Quintus Metellus,      friend of Quintus Metellus,
  422      father of Phaethon, III, 94.    father of Phaëthon, III, 94.





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