Title: Public Opinion
Author: Lippmann, Walter
Language: English
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PUBLIC OPINION

BY

WALTER LIPPMANN


TO
FAYE LIPPMANN

Wading River,
Long Island.
1921.

_"Behold! human beings living in a sort of underground den,
which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all across
the den; they have been here from their childhood, and have their
legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only
see before them; for the chains are arranged in such a manner as
to prevent them from turning round their heads. At a distance
above and behind them the light of a fire is blazing, and between
the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will
see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen
which marionette players have before them, over which they show
the puppets.

I see, he said.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying
vessels, which appear over the wall; also figures of men and
animals, made of wood and stone and various materials; and some
of the prisoners, as you would expect, are talking, and some of
them are silent?

This is a strange image, he said, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows,
or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the
opposite wall of the cave?

True, he said: how could they see anything but the shadows if
they were never allowed to move their heads?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they
would see only the shadows?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to talk with one another, would they not
suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?"_
--The Republic of Plato, Book Seven. (Jowett Translation.)


CONTENTS

PART I. INTRODUCTION

I. The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads

PART II. APPROACHES TO THE WORLD OUTSIDE

II. Censorship and Privacy

III. Contact and Opportunity

IV. Time and Attention

V. Speed, Words, and Clearness

PART III. STEREOTYPES

VI. Stereotypes

VII. Stereotypes as Defense

VIII. Blind Spots and Their Value

IX. Codes and Their Enemies

X. The Detection of Stereotypes

PART IV. INTERESTS

XI. The Enlisting of Interest

XII. Self-Interest Reconsidered

PART V. THE MAKING OF A COMMON WILL

XIII. The Transfer of Interest

XIV. Yes or No

XV. Leaders and the Rank and File

PART VI. THE IMAGE OF DEMOCRACY

XVI. The Self-Centered Man

XVII. The Self-Contained Community

XVIII. The Role of Force, Patronage, and Privilege

XIX. The Old Image in a New Form: Guild Socialism

XX. A New Image

PART VII. NEWSPAPERS

XXI. The Buying Public

XXII. The Constant Reader

XXIII. The Nature of News

XXIV. News, Truth, and a Conclusion

PART VIII. ORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE

XXV. The Entering Wedge

XXVI. Intelligence Work

XXVII. The Appeal to the Public

XXVIII. The Appeal to Reason



PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE WORLD OUTSIDE AND THE PICTURES
IN OUR HEADS



CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

THE WORLD OUTSIDE AND THE PICTURES
IN OUR HEADS

There is an island in the ocean where in 1914 a few Englishmen,
Frenchmen, and Germans lived. No cable reaches that island, and the
British mail steamer comes but once in sixty days. In September it had
not yet come, and the islanders were still talking about the latest
newspaper which told about the approaching trial of Madame Caillaux
for the shooting of Gaston Calmette. It was, therefore, with more than
usual eagerness that the whole colony assembled at the quay on a day
in mid-September to hear from the captain what the verdict had been.
They learned that for over six weeks now those of them who were
English and those of them who were French had been fighting in behalf
of the sanctity of treaties against those of them who were Germans.
For six strange weeks they had acted as if they were friends, when in
fact they were enemies.

But their plight was not so different from that of most of the
population of Europe. They had been mistaken for six weeks, on the
continent the interval may have been only six days or six hours. There
was an interval. There was a moment when the picture of Europe on
which men were conducting their business as usual, did not in any way
correspond to the Europe which was about to make a jumble of their
lives. There was a time for each man when he was still adjusted to an
environment that no longer existed. All over the world as late as July
25th men were making goods that they would not be able to ship, buying
goods they would not be able to import, careers were being planned,
enterprises contemplated, hopes and expectations entertained, all in
the belief that the world as known was the world as it was. Men were
writing books describing that world. They trusted the picture in their
heads. And then over four years later, on a Thursday morning, came the
news of an armistice, and people gave vent to their unutterable relief
that the slaughter was over. Yet in the five days before the real
armistice came, though the end of the war had been celebrated, several
thousand young men died on the battlefields.

Looking back we can see how indirectly we know the environment in
which nevertheless we live. We can see that the news of it comes to us
now fast, now slowly; but that whatever we believe to be a true
picture, we treat as if it were the environment itself. It is harder
to remember that about the beliefs upon which we are now acting, but
in respect to other peoples and other ages we flatter ourselves that
it is easy to see when they were in deadly earnest about ludicrous
pictures of the world. We insist, because of our superior hindsight,
that the world as they needed to know it, and the world as they did
know it, were often two quite contradictory things. We can see, too,
that while they governed and fought, traded and reformed in the world
as they imagined it to be, they produced results, or failed to produce
any, in the world as it was. They started for the Indies and found
America. They diagnosed evil and hanged old women. They thought they
could grow rich by always selling and never buying. A caliph, obeying
what he conceived to be the Will of Allah, burned the library at
Alexandria.

Writing about the year 389, St. Ambrose stated the case for the
prisoner in Plato's cave who resolutely declines to turn his head. "To
discuss the nature and position of the earth does not help us in our
hope of the life to come. It is enough to know what Scripture states.
'That He hung up the earth upon nothing' (Job xxvi. 7). Why then argue
whether He hung it up in air or upon the water, and raise a
controversy as to how the thin air could sustain the earth; or why, if
upon the waters, the earth does not go crashing down to the bottom?...
Not because the earth is in the middle, as if suspended on even
balance, but because the majesty of God constrains it by the law of
His will, does it endure stable upon the unstable and the void."
[Footnote: Hexaemeron, i. cap 6, quoted in _The Mediæval Mind_,
by Henry Osborn Taylor, Vol. i, p. 73.]

It does not help us in our hope of the life to come. It is enough to
know what Scripture states. Why then argue? But a century and a half
after St. Ambrose, opinion was still troubled, on this occasion by the
problem of the antipodes. A monk named Cosmas, famous for his
scientific attainments, was therefore deputed to write a Christian
Topography, or "Christian Opinion concerning the World." [Footnote:
Lecky, _Rationalism in Europe_, Vol. I, pp. 276-8.] It is clear
that he knew exactly what was expected of him, for he based all his
conclusions on the Scriptures as he read them. It appears, then, that
the world is a flat parallelogram, twice as broad from east to west as
it is long from north to south., In the center is the earth surrounded
by ocean, which is in turn surrounded by another earth, where men
lived before the deluge. This other earth was Noah's port of
embarkation. In the north is a high conical mountain around which
revolve the sun and moon. When the sun is behind the mountain it is
night. The sky is glued to the edges of the outer earth. It consists
of four high walls which meet in a concave roof, so that the earth is
the floor of the universe. There is an ocean on the other side of the
sky, constituting the "waters that are above the firmament." The space
between the celestial ocean and the ultimate roof of the universe
belongs to the blest. The space between the earth and sky is inhabited
by the angels. Finally, since St. Paul said that all men are made to
live upon the "face of the earth" how could they live on the back
where the Antipodes are supposed to be? With such a passage before
his eyes, a Christian, we are told, should not 'even speak of the
Antipodes.'" [Footnote: _Id._]

Far less should he go to the Antipodes; nor should any Christian
prince give him a ship to try; nor would any pious mariner wish to
try. For Cosmas there was nothing in the least absurd about his map.
Only by remembering his absolute conviction that this was the map of
the universe can we begin to understand how he would have dreaded
Magellan or Peary or the aviator who risked a collision with the
angels and the vault of heaven by flying seven miles up in the air. In
the same way we can best understand the furies of war and politics by
remembering that almost the whole of each party believes absolutely in
its picture of the opposition, that it takes as fact, not what is, but
what it supposes to be the fact. And that therefore, like Hamlet, it
will stab Polonius behind the rustling curtain, thinking him the king,
and perhaps like Hamlet add:

  "Thou wretched, rash, intruding fool, farewell!
  I took thee for thy better; take thy fortune."

2

Great men, even during their lifetime, are usually known to the public
only through a fictitious personality. Hence the modicum of truth in
the old saying that no man is a hero to his valet. There is only a
modicum of truth, for the valet, and the private secretary, are often
immersed in the fiction themselves. Royal personages are, of course,
constructed personalities. Whether they themselves believe in their
public character, or whether they merely permit the chamberlain to
stage-manage it, there are at least two distinct selves, the public
and regal self, the private and human. The biographies of great people
fall more or less readily into the histories of these two selves. The
official biographer reproduces the public life, the revealing memoir
the other. The Charnwood Lincoln, for example, is a noble portrait,
not of an actual human being, but of an epic figure, replete with
significance, who moves on much the same level of reality as Aeneas or
St. George. Oliver's Hamilton is a majestic abstraction, the sculpture
of an idea, "an essay" as Mr. Oliver himself calls it, "on American
union." It is a formal monument to the state-craft of federalism,
hardly the biography of a person. Sometimes people create their own
facade when they think they are revealing the interior scene. The
Repington diaries and Margot Asquith's are a species of
self-portraiture in which the intimate detail is most revealing as an
index of how the authors like to think about themselves.

But the most interesting kind of portraiture is that which arises
spontaneously in people's minds. When Victoria came to the throne,
says Mr. Strachey, [Footnote: Lytton Strachey, _Queen Victoria_,
p. 72.] "among the outside public there was a great wave of
enthusiasm. Sentiment and romance were coming into fashion; and the
spectacle of the little girl-queen, innocent, modest, with fair hair
and pink cheeks, driving through her capital, filled the hearts of the
beholders with raptures of affectionate loyalty. What, above all,
struck everybody with overwhelming force was the contrast between
Queen Victoria and her uncles. The nasty old men, debauched and
selfish, pigheaded and ridiculous, with their perpetual burden of
debts, confusions, and disreputabilities--they had vanished like the
snows of winter and here at last, crowned and radiant, was the
spring."

M. Jean de Pierrefeu [Footnote: Jean de Pierrefeu, _G. Q. G. Trois
ans au Grand Quartier General_, pp 94-95.] saw hero-worship at
first hand, for he was an officer on Joffre's staff at the moment of
that soldier's greatest fame:

"For two years, the entire world paid an almost divine homage to the
victor of the Marne. The baggage-master literally bent under the
weight of the boxes, of the packages and letters which unknown people
sent him with a frantic testimonial of their admiration. I think that
outside of General Joffre, no commander in the war has been able to
realize a comparable idea of what glory is. They sent him boxes of
candy from all the great confectioners of the world, boxes of
champagne, fine wines of every vintage, fruits, game, ornaments and
utensils, clothes, smoking materials, inkstands, paperweights. Every
territory sent its specialty. The painter sent his picture, the
sculptor his statuette, the dear old lady a comforter or socks, the
shepherd in his hut carved a pipe for his sake. All the manufacturers
of the world who were hostile to Germany shipped their products,
Havana its cigars, Portugal its port wine. I have known a hairdresser
who had nothing better to do than to make a portrait of the General
out of hair belonging to persons who were dear to him; a professional
penman had the same idea, but the features were composed of thousands
of little phrases in tiny characters which sang the praise of the
General. As to letters, he had them in all scripts, from all
countries, written in every dialect, affectionate letters, grateful,
overflowing with love, filled with adoration. They called him Savior
of the World, Father of his Country, Agent of God, Benefactor of
Humanity, etc.... And not only Frenchmen, but Americans, Argentinians,
Australians, etc. etc.... Thousands of little children, without their
parents' knowledge, took pen in hand and wrote to tell him their love:
most of them called him Our Father. And there was poignancy about
their effusions, their adoration, these sighs of deliverance that
escaped from thousands of hearts at the defeat of barbarism. To all
these naif little souls, Joffre seemed like St. George crushing the
dragon. Certainly he incarnated for the conscience of mankind the
victory of good over evil, of light over darkness.

Lunatics, simpletons, the half-crazy and the crazy turned their
darkened brains toward him as toward reason itself. I have read the
letter of a person living in Sydney, who begged the General to save
him from his enemies; another, a New Zealander, requested him to send
some soldiers to the house of a gentleman who owed him ten pounds and
would not pay.

Finally, some hundreds of young girls, overcoming the timidity of
their sex, asked for engagements, their families not to know about it;
others wished only to serve him."

This ideal Joffre was compounded out of the victory won by him, his
staff and his troops, the despair of the war, the personal sorrows,
and the hope of future victory. But beside hero-worship there is the
exorcism of devils. By the same mechanism through which heroes are
incarnated, devils are made. If everything good was to come from
Joffre, Foch, Wilson, or Roosevelt, everything evil originated in the
Kaiser Wilhelm, Lenin and Trotsky. They were as omnipotent for evil as
the heroes were omnipotent for good. To many simple and frightened
minds there was no political reverse, no strike, no obstruction, no
mysterious death or mysterious conflagration anywhere in the world of
which the causes did not wind back to these personal sources of evil.

3

Worldwide concentration of this kind on a symbolic personality is rare
enough to be clearly remarkable, and every author has a weakness for
the striking and irrefutable example. The vivisection of war reveals
such examples, but it does not make them out of nothing. In a more
normal public life, symbolic pictures are no less governant of
behavior, but each symbol is far less inclusive because there are so
many competing ones. Not only is each symbol charged with less feeling
because at most it represents only a part of the population, but even
within that part there is infinitely less suppression of individual
difference. The symbols of public opinion, in times of moderate
security, are subject to check and comparison and argument. They come
and go, coalesce and are forgotten, never organizing perfectly the
emotion of the whole group. There is, after all, just one human
activity left in which whole populations accomplish the union sacrée.
It occurs in those middle phases of a war when fear, pugnacity, and
hatred have secured complete dominion of the spirit, either to crush
every other instinct or to enlist it, and before weariness is felt.

At almost all other times, and even in war when it is deadlocked, a
sufficiently greater range of feelings is aroused to establish
conflict, choice, hesitation, and compromise. The symbolism of public
opinion usually bears, as we shall see, [Footnote: Part V.] the marks
of this balancing of interest. Think, for example, of how rapidly,
after the armistice, the precarious and by no means successfully
established symbol of Allied Unity disappeared, how it was followed
almost immediately by the breakdown of each nation's symbolic picture
of the other: Britain the Defender of Public Law, France watching at
the Frontier of Freedom, America the Crusader. And think then of how
within each nation the symbolic picture of itself frayed out, as party
and class conflict and personal ambition began to stir postponed
issues. And then of how the symbolic pictures of the leaders gave way,
as one by one, Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, ceased to be the
incarnation of human hope, and became merely the negotiators and
administrators for a disillusioned world.

Whether we regret this as one of the soft evils of peace or applaud it
as a return to sanity is obviously no matter here. Our first concern
with fictions and symbols is to forget their value to the existing
social order, and to think of them simply as an important part of the
machinery of human communication. Now in any society that is not
completely self-contained in its interests and so small that everyone
can know all about everything that happens, ideas deal with events
that are out of sight and hard to grasp. Miss Sherwin of Gopher
Prairie, [Footnote: See Sinclair Lewis, _Main Street_.] is aware
that a war is raging in France and tries to conceive it. She has never
been to France, and certainly she has never been along what is now the
battlefront.

Pictures of French and German soldiers she has seen, but it is
impossible for her to imagine three million men. No one, in fact, can
imagine them, and the professionals do not try. They think of them as,
say, two hundred divisions. But Miss Sherwin has no access to the
order of battle maps, and so if she is to think about the war, she
fastens upon Joffre and the Kaiser as if they were engaged in a
personal duel. Perhaps if you could see what she sees with her mind's
eye, the image in its composition might be not unlike an Eighteenth
Century engraving of a great soldier. He stands there boldly unruffled
and more than life size, with a shadowy army of tiny little figures
winding off into the landscape behind. Nor it seems are great men
oblivious to these expectations. M. de Pierrefeu tells of a
photographer's visit to Joffre. The General was in his "middle class
office, before the worktable without papers, where he sat down to
write his signature. Suddenly it was noticed that there were no maps
on the walls. But since according to popular ideas it is not possible
to think of a general without maps, a few were placed in position for
the picture, and removed soon afterwards." [Footnote: _Op. cit._,
p. 99.]

The only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not
experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of that event.
That is why until we know what others think they know, we cannot truly
understand their acts. I have seen a young girl, brought up in a
Pennsylvania mining town, plunged suddenly from entire cheerfulness
into a paroxysm of grief when a gust of wind cracked the kitchen
window-pane. For hours she was inconsolable, and to me incomprehensible.
But when she was able to talk, it transpired that if a window-pane
broke it meant that a close relative had died. She was, therefore,
mourning for her father, who had frightened her into running away
from home. The father was, of course, quite thoroughly alive as a
telegraphic inquiry soon proved. But until the telegram came, the
cracked glass was an authentic message to that girl. Why it was
authentic only a prolonged investigation by a skilled psychiatrist
could show. But even the most casual observer could see that the girl,
enormously upset by her family troubles, had hallucinated a complete
fiction out of one external fact, a remembered superstition, and a
turmoil of remorse, and fear and love for her father.

Abnormality in these instances is only a matter of degree. When an
Attorney-General, who has been frightened by a bomb exploded on his
doorstep, convinces himself by the reading of revolutionary literature
that a revolution is to happen on the first of May 1920, we recognize
that much the same mechanism is at work. The war, of course, furnished
many examples of this pattern: the casual fact, the creative
imagination, the will to believe, and out of these three elements, a
counterfeit of reality to which there was a violent instinctive
response. For it is clear enough that under certain conditions men
respond as powerfully to fictions as they do to realities, and that in
many cases they help to create the very fictions to which they
respond. Let him cast the first stone who did not believe in the
Russian army that passed through England in August, 1914, did not
accept any tale of atrocities without direct proof, and never saw a
plot, a traitor, or a spy where there was none. Let him cast a stone
who never passed on as the real inside truth what he had heard someone
say who knew no more than he did.

In all these instances we must note particularly one common factor. It
is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment.
To that pseudo-environment his behavior is a response. But because it
_is_ behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in
the pseudo-environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the
real environment where action eventuates. If the behavior is not a
practical act, but what we call roughly thought and emotion, it may
be a long time before there is any noticeable break in the texture of
the fictitious world. But when the stimulus of the pseudo-fact results
in action on things or other people, contradiction soon develops.
Then comes the sensation of butting one's head against a stone wall,
of learning by experience, and witnessing Herbert Spencer's tragedy
of the murder of a Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts, the
discomfort in short of a maladjustment. For certainly, at the level of
social life, what is called the adjustment of man to his environment
takes place through the medium of fictions.

By fictions I do not mean lies. I mean a representation of the
environment which is in lesser or greater degree made by man himself.
The range of fiction extends all the way from complete hallucination
to the scientists' perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic model,
or his decision that for his particular problem accuracy beyond a
certain number of decimal places is not important. A work of fiction
may have almost any degree of fidelity, and so long as the degree of
fidelity can be taken into account, fiction is not misleading. In
fact, human culture is very largely the selection, the rearrangement,
the tracing of patterns upon, and the stylizing of, what William James
called "the random irradiations and resettlements of our
ideas." [Footnote: James, _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. II, p.
638] The alternative to the use of fictions is direct exposure to the
ebb and flow of sensation. That is not a real alternative, for however
refreshing it is to see at times with a perfectly innocent eye,
innocence itself is not wisdom, though a source and corrective of
wisdom. For the real environment is altogether too big, too complex,
and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal
with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and
combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have
to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it. To
traverse the world men must have maps of the world. Their persistent
difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone
else's need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia.

4

The analyst of public opinion must begin then, by recognizing the
triangular relationship between the scene of action, the human picture
of that scene, and the human response to that picture working itself
out upon the scene of action. It is like a play suggested to the
actors by their own experience, in which the plot is transacted in the
real lives of the actors, and not merely in their stage parts. The
moving picture often emphasizes with great skill this double drama of
interior motive and external behavior. Two men are quarreling,
ostensibly about some money, but their passion is inexplicable. Then
the picture fades out and what one or the other of the two men sees
with his mind's eye is reënacted. Across the table they were
quarreling about money. In memory they are back in their youth when
the girl jilted him for the other man. The exterior drama is
explained: the hero is not greedy; the hero is in love.

A scene not so different was played in the United States Senate. At
breakfast on the morning of September 29, 1919, some of the Senators
read a news dispatch in the _Washington Post_ about the landing
of American marines on the Dalmatian coast. The newspaper said:

FACTS NOW ESTABLISHED

"The following important facts appear already _established_. The
orders to Rear Admiral Andrews commanding the American naval forces in
the Adriatic, came from the British Admiralty via the War Council and
Rear Admiral Knapps in London. The approval or disapproval of the
American Navy Department was not asked....

WITHOUT DANIELS' KNOWLEDGE

"Mr. Daniels was admittedly placed in a peculiar position when cables
reached here stating that the forces over which he is presumed to have
exclusive control were carrying on what amounted to naval warfare
without his knowledge. It was fully realized that the _British
Admiralty might desire to issue orders to Rear Admiral Andrews_ to
act on behalf of Great Britain and her Allies, because the situation
required sacrifice on the part of some nation if D'Annunzio's
followers were to be held in check.

"It was further realized that _under the new league of nations plan
foreigners would be in a position to direct American Naval forces in
emergencies_ with or without the consent of the American Navy
Department...." etc. (Italics mine).

The first Senator to comment is Mr. Knox of Pennsylvania. Indignantly
he demands investigation. In Mr. Brandegee of Connecticut, who spoke
next, indignation has already stimulated credulity. Where Mr. Knox
indignantly wishes to know if the report is true, Mr. Brandegee, a
half a minute later, would like to know what would have happened if
marines had been killed. Mr. Knox, interested in the question, forgets
that he asked for an inquiry, and replies. If American marines had
been killed, it would be war. The mood of the debate is still
conditional. Debate proceeds. Mr. McCormick of Illinois reminds the
Senate that the Wilson administration is prone to the waging of small
unauthorized wars. He repeats Theodore Roosevelt's quip about "waging
peace." More debate. Mr. Brandegee notes that the marines acted "under
orders of a Supreme Council sitting somewhere," but he cannot recall
who represents the United States on that body. The Supreme Council is
unknown to the Constitution of the United States. Therefore Mr. New of
Indiana submits a resolution calling for the facts.

So far the Senators still recognize vaguely that they are discussing a
rumor. Being lawyers they still remember some of the forms of
evidence. But as red-blooded men they already experience all the
indignation which is appropriate to the fact that American marines
have been ordered into war by a foreign government and without the
consent of Congress. Emotionally they want to believe it, because they
are Republicans fighting the League of Nations. This arouses the
Democratic leader, Mr. Hitchcock of Nebraska. He defends the Supreme
Council: it was acting under the war powers. Peace has not yet been
concluded because the Republicans are delaying it. Therefore the
action was necessary and legal. Both sides now assume that the report
is true, and the conclusions they draw are the conclusions of their
partisanship. Yet this extraordinary assumption is in a debate over a
resolution to investigate the truth of the assumption. It reveals how
difficult it is, even for trained lawyers, to suspend response until
the returns are in. The response is instantaneous. The fiction is
taken for truth because the fiction is badly needed.

A few days later an official report showed that the marines were not
landed by order of the British Government or of the Supreme Council.
They had not been fighting the Italians. They had been landed at the
request of the Italian Government to protect Italians, and the
American commander had been officially thanked by the Italian
authorities. The marines were not at war with Italy. They had acted
according to an established international practice which had nothing
to do with the League of Nations.

The scene of action was the Adriatic. The picture of that scene in the
Senators' heads at Washington was furnished, in this case probably
with intent to deceive, by a man who cared nothing about the Adriatic,
but much about defeating the League. To this picture the Senate
responded by a strengthening of its partisan differences over the
League.

5

Whether in this particular case the Senate was above or below its
normal standard, it is not necessary to decide. Nor whether the Senate
compares favorably with the House, or with other parliaments. At the
moment, I should like to think only about the world-wide spectacle of
men acting upon their environment, moved by stimuli from their
pseudo-environments. For when full allowance has been made for
deliberate fraud, political science has still to account for such
facts as two nations attacking one another, each convinced that it is
acting in self-defense, or two classes at war each certain that it
speaks for the common interest. They live, we are likely to say, in
different worlds. More accurately, they live in the same world, but
they think and feel in different ones.

It is to these special worlds, it is to these private or group, or
class, or provincial, or occupational, or national, or sectarian
artifacts, that the political adjustment of mankind in the Great
Society takes place. Their variety and complication are impossible to
describe. Yet these fictions determine a very great part of men's
political behavior. We must think of perhaps fifty sovereign
parliaments consisting of at least a hundred legislative bodies. With
them belong at least fifty hierarchies of provincial and municipal
assemblies, which with their executive, administrative and legislative
organs, constitute formal authority on earth. But that does not begin
to reveal the complexity of political life. For in each of these
innumerable centers of authority there are parties, and these parties
are themselves hierarchies with their roots in classes, sections,
cliques and clans; and within these are the individual politicians,
each the personal center of a web of connection and memory and fear
and hope.

Somehow or other, for reasons often necessarily obscure, as the result
of domination or compromise or a logroll, there emerge from these
political bodies commands, which set armies in motion or make peace,
conscript life, tax, exile, imprison, protect property or confiscate
it, encourage one kind of enterprise and discourage another,
facilitate immigration or obstruct it, improve communication or censor
it, establish schools, build navies, proclaim "policies," and
"destiny," raise economic barriers, make property or unmake it, bring
one people under the rule of another, or favor one class as against
another. For each of these decisions some view of the facts is taken
to be conclusive, some view of the circumstances is accepted as the
basis of inference and as the stimulus of feeling. What view of the
facts, and why that one?

And yet even this does not begin to exhaust the real complexity. The
formal political structure exists in a social environment, where there
are innumerable large and small corporations and institutions,
voluntary and semi-voluntary associations, national, provincial, urban
and neighborhood groupings, which often as not make the decision that
the political body registers. On what are these decisions based?

"Modern society," says Mr. Chesterton, "is intrinsically insecure
because it is based on the notion that all men will do the same thing
for different reasons.... And as within the head of any convict may be
the hell of a quite solitary crime, so in the house or under the hat
of any suburban clerk may be the limbo of a quite separate philosophy.
The first man may be a complete Materialist and feel his own body as a
horrible machine manufacturing his own mind. He may listen to his
thoughts as to the dull ticking of a clock. The man next door may be a
Christian Scientist and regard his own body as somehow rather less
substantial than his own shadow. He may come almost to regard his own
arms and legs as delusions like moving serpents in the dream of
delirium tremens. The third man in the street may not be a Christian
Scientist but, on the contrary, a Christian. He may live in a fairy
tale as his neighbors would say; a secret but solid fairy tale full of
the faces and presences of unearthly friends. The fourth man may be a
theosophist, and only too probably a vegetarian; and I do not see why
I should not gratify myself with the fancy that the fifth man is a
devil worshiper.... Now whether or not this sort of variety is
valuable, this sort of unity is shaky. To expect that all men for all
time will go on thinking different things, and yet doing the same
things, is a doubtful speculation. It is not founding society on a
communion, or even on a convention, but rather on a coincidence. Four
men may meet under the same lamp post; one to paint it pea green as
part of a great municipal reform; one to read his breviary in the
light of it; one to embrace it with accidental ardour in a fit of
alcoholic enthusiasm; and the last merely because the pea green post
is a conspicuous point of rendezvous with his young lady. But to
expect this to happen night after night is unwise...." [Footnote: G.
K. Chesterton, "The Mad Hatter and the Sane Householder," _Vanity
Fair_, January, 1921, p. 54]

For the four men at the lamp post substitute the governments, the
parties, the corporations, the societies, the social sets, the trades
and professions, universities, sects, and nationalities of the world.
Think of the legislator voting a statute that will affect distant
peoples, a statesman coming to a decision. Think of the Peace
Conference reconstituting the frontiers of Europe, an ambassador in a
foreign country trying to discern the intentions of his own government
and of the foreign government, a promoter working a concession in a
backward country, an editor demanding a war, a clergyman calling on
the police to regulate amusement, a club lounging-room making up its
mind about a strike, a sewing circle preparing to regulate the
schools, nine judges deciding whether a legislature in Oregon may fix
the working hours of women, a cabinet meeting to decide on the
recognition of a government, a party convention choosing a candidate
and writing a platform, twenty-seven million voters casting their
ballots, an Irishman in Cork thinking about an Irishman in Belfast, a
Third International planning to reconstruct the whole of human
society, a board of directors confronted with a set of their
employees' demands, a boy choosing a career, a merchant estimating
supply and demand for the coming season, a speculator predicting the
course of the market, a banker deciding whether to put credit behind a
new enterprise, the advertiser, the reader of advertisments.... Think
of the different sorts of Americans thinking about their notions of
"The British Empire" or "France" or "Russia" or "Mexico." It is not so
different from Mr. Chesterton's four men at the pea green lamp post.

6

And so before we involve ourselves in the jungle of obscurities about
the innate differences of men, we shall do well to fix our attention
upon the extraordinary differences in what men know of the world.
[Footnote: _Cf_. Wallas, _Our Social Heritage_, pp. 77 _et seq_.]
I do not doubt that there are important biological differences. Since
man is an animal it would be strange if there were not. But as
rational beings it is worse than shallow to generalize at all
about comparative behavior until there is a measurable similarity
between the environments to which behavior is a response.

The pragmatic value of this idea is that it introduces a much needed
refinement into the ancient controversy about nature and nurture,
innate quality and environment. For the pseudo-environment is a hybrid
compounded of "human nature" and "conditions." To my mind it shows the
uselessness of pontificating about what man is and always will be from
what we observe man to be doing, or about what are the necessary
conditions of society. For we do not know how men would behave in
response to the facts of the Great Society. All that we really know is
how they behave in response to what can fairly be called a most
inadequate picture of the Great Society. No conclusion about man or
the Great Society can honestly be made on evidence like that.

This, then, will be the clue to our inquiry. We shall assume that what
each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on
pictures made by himself or given to him. If his atlas tells him that
the world is flat he will not sail near what he believes to be the
edge of our planet for fear of falling off. If his maps include a
fountain of eternal youth, a Ponce de Leon will go in quest of it. If
someone digs up yellow dirt that looks like gold, he will for a time
act exactly as if he had found gold. The way in which the world is
imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do. It does
not determine what they will achieve. It determines their effort,
their feelings, their hopes, not their accomplishments and results.
The very men who most loudly proclaim their "materialism" and their
contempt for "ideologues," the Marxian communists, place their entire
hope on what? On the formation by propaganda of a class-conscious
group. But what is propaganda, if not the effort to alter the picture
to which men respond, to substitute one social pattern for another?
What is class consciousness but a way of realizing the world? National
consciousness but another way? And Professor Giddings' consciousness
of kind, but a process of believing that we recognize among the
multitude certain ones marked as our kind?

Try to explain social life as the pursuit of pleasure and the
avoidance of pain. You will soon be saying that the hedonist begs the
question, for even supposing that man does pursue these ends, the
crucial problem of why he thinks one course rather than another likely
to produce pleasure, is untouched. Does the guidance of man's
conscience explain? How then does he happen to have the particular
conscience which he has? The theory of economic self-interest? But how
do men come to conceive their interest in one way rather than another?
The desire for security, or prestige, or domination, or what is
vaguely called self-realization? How do men conceive their security,
what do they consider prestige, how do they figure out the means of
domination, or what is the notion of self which they wish to realize?
Pleasure, pain, conscience, acquisition, protection, enhancement,
mastery, are undoubtedly names for some of the ways people act. There
may be instinctive dispositions which work toward such ends. But no
statement of the end, or any description of the tendencies to seek it,
can explain the behavior which results. The very fact that men
theorize at all is proof that their pseudo-environments, their
interior representations of the world, are a determining element in
thought, feeling, and action. For if the connection between reality
and human response were direct and immediate, rather than indirect and
inferred, indecision and failure would be unknown, and (if each of us
fitted as snugly into the world as the child in the womb), Mr. Bernard
Shaw would not have been able to say that except for the first nine
months of its existence no human being manages its affairs as well as
a plant.

The chief difficulty in adapting the psychoanalytic scheme to
political thought arises in this connection. The Freudians are
concerned with the maladjustment of distinct individuals to other
individuals and to concrete circumstances. They have assumed that if
internal derangements could be straightened out, there would be little
or no confusion about what is the obviously normal relationship. But
public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, and puzzling facts, and
there is nothing obvious about them. The situations to which public
opinions refer are known only as opinions. The psychoanalyst, on the
other hand, almost always assumes that the environment is knowable,
and if not knowable then at least bearable, to any unclouded
intelligence. This assumption of his is the problem of public opinion.
Instead of taking for granted an environment that is readily known,
the social analyst is most concerned in studying how the larger
political environment is conceived, and how it can be conceived more
successfully. The psychoanalyst examines the adjustment to an X,
called by him the environment; the social analyst examines the X,
called by him the pseudo-environment.

He is, of course, permanently and constantly in debt to the new
psychology, not only because when rightly applied it so greatly helps
people to stand on their own feet, come what may, but because the
study of dreams, fantasy and rationalization has thrown light on how
the pseudo-environment is put together. But he cannot assume as his
criterion either what is called a "normal biological career"
[Footnote: Edward J. Kempf, _Psychopathology_, p. 116.] within
the existing social order, or a career "freed from religious
suppression and dogmatic conventions" outside. [Footnote: _Id_.,
p. 151.] What for a sociologist is a normal social career? Or one
freed from suppressions and conventions? Conservative critics do, to
be sure, assume the first, and romantic ones the second. But in
assuming them they are taking the whole world for granted. They are
saying in effect either that society is the sort of thing which
corresponds to their idea of what is normal, or the sort of thing
which corresponds to their idea of what is free. Both ideas are merely
public opinions, and while the psychoanalyst as physician may perhaps
assume them, the sociologist may not take the products of existing
public opinion as criteria by which to study public opinion.

7

The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out
of sight, out of mind. It has to be explored, reported, and imagined.
Man is no Aristotelian god contemplating all existence at one glance.
He is the creature of an evolution who can just about span a
sufficient portion of reality to manage his survival, and snatch what
on the scale of time are but a few moments of insight and happiness.
Yet this same creature has invented ways of seeing what no naked eye
could see, of hearing what no ear could hear, of weighing immense
masses and infinitesimal ones, of counting and separating more items
than he can individually remember. He is learning to see with his mind
vast portions of the world that he could never see, touch, smell,
hear, or remember. Gradually he makes for himself a trustworthy
picture inside his head of the world beyond his reach.

Those features of the world outside which have to do with the behavior
of other human beings, in so far as that behavior crosses ours, is
dependent upon us, or is interesting to us, we call roughly public
affairs. The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the
pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and
relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures which are
acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name
of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters. And so in the
chapters which follow we shall inquire first into some of the reasons
why the picture inside so often misleads men in their dealings with
the world outside. Under this heading we shall consider first the
chief factors which limit their access to the facts. They are the
artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the
comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention
to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be
compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small
vocabulary express a complicated world, and finally the fear of facing
those facts which would seem to threaten the established routine of
men's lives.

The analysis then turns from these more or less external limitations
to the question of how this trickle of messages from the outside is
affected by the stored up images, the preconceptions, and prejudices
which interpret, fill them out, and in their turn powerfully direct
the play of our attention, and our vision itself. From this it
proceeds to examine how in the individual person the limited messages
from outside, formed into a pattern of stereotypes, are identified
with his own interests as he feels and conceives them. In the
succeeding sections it examines how opinions are crystallized into
what is called Public Opinion, how a National Will, a Group Mind, a
Social Purpose, or whatever you choose to call it, is formed.

The first five parts constitute the descriptive section of the book.
There follows an analysis of the traditional democratic theory of
public opinion. The substance of the argument is that democracy in its
original form never seriously faced the problem which arises because
the pictures inside people's heads do not automatically correspond
with the world outside. And then, because the democratic theory is
under criticism by socialist thinkers, there follows an examination of
the most advanced and coherent of these criticisms, as made by the
English Guild Socialists. My purpose here is to find out whether these
reformers take into account the main difficulties of public opinion.
My conclusion is that they ignore the difficulties, as completely as
did the original democrats, because they, too, assume, and in a much
more complicated civilization, that somehow mysteriously there exists
in the hearts of men a knowledge of the world beyond their reach.

I argue that representative government, either in what is ordinarily
called politics, or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no
matter what the basis of election, unless there is an independent,
expert organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those
who have to make the decisions. I attempt, therefore, to argue that
the serious acceptance of the principle that personal representation
must be supplemented by representation of the unseen facts would alone
permit a satisfactory decentralization, and allow us to escape from
the intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a
competent opinion about all public affairs. It is argued that the
problem of the press is confused because the critics and the
apologists expect the press to realize this fiction, expect it to make
up for all that was not foreseen in the theory of democracy, and that
the readers expect this miracle to be performed at no cost or trouble
to themselves. The newspapers are regarded by democrats as a panacea
for their own defects, whereas analysis of the nature of news and of
the economic basis of journalism seems to show that the newspapers
necessarily and inevitably reflect, and therefore, in greater or
lesser measure, intensify, the defective organization of public
opinion. My conclusion is that public opinions must be organized for
the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case
today. This organization I conceive to be in the first instance the
task of a political science that has won its proper place as
formulator, in advance of real decision, instead of apologist, critic,
or reporter after the decision has been made. I try to indicate that
the perplexities of government and industry are conspiring to give
political science this enormous opportunity to enrich itself and to
serve the public. And, of course, I hope that these pages will help a
few people to realize that opportunity more vividly, and therefore to
pursue it more consciously.



PART II

APPROACHES TO THE WORLD OUTSIDE


CHAPTER 2. CENSORSHIP AND PRIVACY
   "    3. CONTACT AND OPPORTUNITY
   "    4. TIME AND ATTENTION
   "    5. SPEED, WORDS, AND CLEARNESS



CHAPTER II

CENSORSHIP AND PRIVACY

1

The picture of a general presiding over an editorial conference at the
most terrible hour of one of the great battles of history seems more
like a scene from The Chocolate Soldier than a page from life. Yet we
know at first hand from the officer who edited the French communiqués
that these conferences were a regular part of the business of war;
that in the worst moment of Verdun, General Joffre and his cabinet met
and argued over the nouns, adjectives, and verbs that were to be
printed in the newspapers the next morning.

"The evening communiqué of the twenty-third (February 1916)" says M.
de Pierrefeu, [Footnote: _G. Q. G_., pp. 126-129.] "was edited in
a dramatic atmosphere. M. Berthelot, of the Prime Minister's office,
had just telephoned by order of the minister asking General Pellé to
strengthen the report and to emphasize the proportions of the enemy's
attack. It was necessary to prepare the public for the worst outcome
in case the affair turned into a catastrophe. This anxiety showed
clearly that neither at G. H. Q. nor at the Ministry of War had the
Government found reason for confidence. As M. Berthelot spoke, General
Pellé made notes. He handed me the paper on which he had written the
Government's wishes, together with the order of the day issued by
General von Deimling and found on some prisoners, in which it was
stated that this attack was the supreme offensive to secure peace.
Skilfully used, all this was to demonstrate that Germany was letting
loose a gigantic effort, an effort without precedent, and that from
its success she hoped for the end of the war. The logic of this was
that nobody need be surprised at our withdrawal. When, a half hour
later, I went down with my manuscript, I found gathered together in
Colonel Claudel's office, he being away, the major-general, General
Janin, Colonel Dupont, and Lieutenant-Colonel Renouard. Fearing that I
would not succeed in giving the desired impression, General Pellé had
himself prepared a proposed communiqué. I read what I had just done.
It was found to be too moderate. General Pellé's, on the other hand,
seemed too alarming. I had purposely omitted von Deimling's order of
the day. To put it into the communiqué _would be to break with the
formula to which the public was accustomed_, would be to transform
it into a kind of pleading. It would seem to say: 'How do you suppose
we can resist?' There was reason to fear that the public would be
distracted by this change of tone and would believe that everything
was lost. I explained my reasons and suggested giving Deimling's text
to the newspapers in the form of a separate note.

"Opinion being divided, General Pellé went to ask General de Castelnau
to come and decide finally. The General arrived smiling, quiet and
good humored, said a few pleasant words about this new kind of
literary council of war, and looked at the texts. He chose the simpler
one, gave more weight to the first phrase, inserted the words 'as had
been anticipated,' which supply a reassuring quality, and was flatly
against inserting von Deimling's order, but was for transmitting it to
the press in a special note ... " General Joffre that evening read the
communiqué carefully and approved it.

Within a few hours those two or three hundred words would be read all
over the world. They would paint a picture in men's minds of what was
happening on the slopes of Verdun, and in front of that picture people
would take heart or despair. The shopkeeper in Brest, the peasant in
Lorraine, the deputy in the Palais Bourbon, the editor in Amsterdam or
Minneapolis had to be kept in hope, and yet prepared to accept
possible defeat without yielding to panic. They are told, therefore,
that the loss of ground is no surprise to the French Command. They are
taught to regard the affair as serious, but not strange. Now, as a
matter of fact, the French General Staff was not fully prepared for
the German offensive. Supporting trenches had not been dug,
alternative roads had not been built, barbed wire was lacking. But to
confess that would have aroused images in the heads of civilians that
might well have turned a reverse into a disaster. The High Command
could be disappointed, and yet pull itself together; the people at
home and abroad, full of uncertainties, and with none of the
professional man's singleness of purpose, might on the basis of a
complete story have lost sight of the war in a melee of faction and
counter-faction about the competence of the officers. Instead,
therefore, of letting the public act on all the facts which the
generals knew, the authorities presented only certain facts, and these
only in such a way as would be most likely to steady the people.

In this case the men who arranged the pseudo-environment knew what the
real one was. But a few days later an incident occurred about which
the French Staff did not know the truth. The Germans announced
[Footnote: On February 26, 1916. Pierrefeu, _G. Q. G._, pp. 133
_et seq_.] that on the previous afternoon they had taken Fort
Douaumont by assault. At French headquarters in Chantilly no one
could understand this news. For on the morning of the twenty-fifth,
after the engagement of the XXth corps, the battle had taken a turn
for the better. Reports from the front said nothing about Douaumont.
But inquiry showed that the German report was true, though no one as
yet knew how the fort had been taken. In the meantime, the German
communiqué was being flashed around the world, and the French had to
say something. So headquarters explained. "In the midst of total
ignorance at Chantilly about the way the attack had taken place, we
imagined, in the evening communiqué of the 26th, a plan of the attack
which certainly had a thousand to one chance of being true." The
communiqué of this imaginary battle read:

"A bitter struggle is taking place around Fort de Douaumont which is
an advanced post of the old defensive organization of Verdun. The
position taken this morning by the enemy, _after several
unsuccessful assaults that cost him very heavy losses_, has been
reached again and passed by our troops whom the enemy has not been
able to drive back." [Footnote: This is my own translation: the
English translation from London published in the New York Times of
Sunday, Feb. 27, is as follows:

London, Feb. 26 (1916). A furious struggle has been in progress around
Fort de Douaumont which is an advance element of the old defensive
organization of Verdun fortresses. The position captured this morning
by the enemy after several fruitless assaults which cost him extremely
heavy losses, [Footnote: The French text says "pertes tres elevees."
Thus the English translation exaggerates the original text.] was
reached again and gone beyond by our troops, which all the attempts of
the enemy have not been able to push back."]

What had actually happened differed from both the French and German
accounts. While changing troops in the line, the position had somehow
been forgotten in a confusion of orders. Only a battery commander and
a few men remained in the fort. Some German soldiers, seeing the door
open, had crawled into the fort, and taken everyone inside prisoner. A
little later the French who were on the slopes of the hill were
horrified at being shot at from the fort. There had been no battle at
Douaumont and no losses. Nor had the French troops advanced beyond it
as the communiqués seemed to say. They were beyond it on either side,
to be sure, but the fort was in enemy hands.

Yet from the communiqué everyone believed that the fort was half
surrounded. The words did not explicitly say so, but "the press, as
usual, forced the pace." Military writers concluded that the Germans
would soon have to surrender. In a few days they began to ask
themselves why the garrison, since it lacked food, had not yet
surrendered. "It was necessary through the press bureau to request
them to drop the encirclement theme." [Footnote: Pierrefeu, _op.
cit._, pp. 134-5.]

2

The editor of the French communiqué tells us that as the battle
dragged out, his colleagues and he set out to neutralize the
pertinacity of the Germans by continual insistence on their terrible
losses. It is necessary to remember that at this time, and in fact
until late in 1917, the orthodox view of the war for all the Allied
peoples was that it would be decided by "attrition." Nobody believed
in a war of movement. It was insisted that strategy did not count, or
diplomacy. It was simply a matter of killing Germans. The general
public more or less believed the dogma, but it had constantly to be
reminded of it in face of spectacular German successes.

"Almost no day passed but the communiqué.... ascribed to the Germans
with some appearance of justice heavy losses, extremely heavy, spoke
of bloody sacrifices, heaps of corpses, hecatombs. Likewise the
wireless constantly used the statistics of the intelligence bureau at
Verdun, whose chief, Major Cointet, had invented a method of
calculating German losses which obviously produced marvelous results.
Every fortnight the figures increased a hundred thousand or so. These
300,000, 400,000, 500,000 casualties put out, divided into daily,
weekly, monthly losses, repeated in all sorts of ways, produced a
striking effect. Our formulae varied little: 'according to prisoners
the German losses in the course of the attack have been considerable' ...
'it is proved that the losses' ... 'the enemy exhausted by his losses
has not renewed the attack' ... Certain formulae, later abandoned
because they had been overworked, were used each day: 'under
our artillery and machine gun fire' ... 'mowed down by our artillery
and machine gun fire' ... Constant repetition impressed the neutrals
and Germany itself, and helped to create a bloody background in spite
of the denials from Nauen (the German wireless) which tried vainly to
destroy the bad effect of this perpetual repetition." [Footnote: _Op.
cit._, pp. 138-139.]

The thesis of the French Command, which it wished to establish
publicly by these reports, was formulated as follows for the guidance
of the censors:

"This offensive engages the active forces of our opponent whose
manpower is declining. We have learned that the class of 1916 is
already at the front. There will remain the 1917 class already being
called up, and the resources of the third category (men above
forty-five, or convalescents). In a few weeks, the German forces
exhausted by this effort, will find themselves confronted with all the
forces of the coalition (ten millions against seven millions)."
[Footnote: _Op. cit._, p. 147.]

According to M. de Pierrefeu, the French command had converted itself
to this belief. "By an extraordinary aberration of mind, only the
attrition of the enemy was seen; it appeared that our forces were not
subject to attrition. General Nivelle shared these ideas. We saw the
result in 1917."

We have learned to call this propaganda. A group of men, who can
prevent independent access to the event, arrange the news of it to
suit their purpose. That the purpose was in this case patriotic does
not affect the argument at all. They used their power to make the
Allied publics see affairs as they desired them to be seen. The
casualty figures of Major Cointet which were spread about the world
are of the same order. They were intended to provoke a particular kind
of inference, namely that the war of attrition was going in favor of
the French. But the inference is not drawn in the form of argument. It
results almost automatically from the creation of a mental picture of
endless Germans slaughtered on the hills about Verdun. By putting the
dead Germans in the focus of the picture, and by omitting to mention
the French dead, a very special view of the battle was built up. It
was a view designed to neutralize the effects of German territorial
advances and the impression of power which the persistence of the
offensive was making. It was also a view that tended to make the
public acquiesce in the demoralizing defensive strategy imposed upon
the Allied armies. For the public, accustomed to the idea that war
consists of great strategic movements, flank attacks, encirclements,
and dramatic surrenders, had gradually to forget that picture in favor
of the terrible idea that by matching lives the war would be won.
Through its control over all news from the front, the General Staff
substituted a view of the facts that comported with this strategy.

The General Staff of an army in the field is so placed that within
wide limits it can control what the public will perceive. It controls
the selection of correspondents who go to the front, controls their
movements at the front, reads and censors their messages from the
front, and operates the wires. The Government behind the army by its
command of cables and passports, mails and custom houses and blockades
increases the control. It emphasizes it by legal power over
publishers, over public meetings, and by its secret service. But in
the case of an army the control is far from perfect. There is always
the enemy's communiqué, which in these days of wireless cannot be kept
away from neutrals. Above all there is the talk of the soldiers, which
blows back from the front, and is spread about when they are on
leave. [Footnote: For weeks prior to the American attack at St. Mihiel
and in the Argonne-Meuse, everybody in France told everybody else the
deep secret.] An army is an unwieldy thing. And that is why the naval
and diplomatic censorship is almost always much more complete. Fewer
people know what is going on, and their acts are more easily
supervised.

3

Without some form of censorship, propaganda in the strict sense of the
word is impossible. In order to conduct a propaganda there must be
some barrier between the public and the event. Access to the real
environment must be limited, before anyone can create a
pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable. For while people
who have direct access can misconceive what they see, no one else can
decide how they shall misconceive it, unless he can decide where they
shall look, and at what. The military censorship is the simplest form
of barrier, but by no means the most important, because it is known to
exist, and is therefore in certain measure agreed to and discounted.

At different times and for different subjects some men impose and
other men accept a particular standard of secrecy. The frontier
between what is concealed because publication is not, as we say,
"compatible with the public interest" fades gradually into what is
concealed because it is believed to be none of the public's business.
The notion of what constitutes a person's private affairs is elastic.
Thus the amount of a man's fortune is considered a private affair, and
careful provision is made in the income tax law to keep it as private
as possible. The sale of a piece of land is not private, but the price
may be. Salaries are generally treated as more private than wages,
incomes as more private than inheritances. A person's credit rating is
given only a limited circulation. The profits of big corporations are
more public than those of small firms. Certain kinds of conversation,
between man and wife, lawyer and client, doctor and patient, priest
and communicant, are privileged. Directors' meetings are generally
private. So are many political conferences. Most of what is said at a
cabinet meeting, or by an ambassador to the Secretary of State, or at
private interviews, or dinner tables, is private. Many people regard
the contract between employer and employee as private. There was a
time when the affairs of all corporations were held to be as private
as a man's theology is to-day. There was a time before that when his
theology was held to be as public a matter as the color of his eyes.
But infectious diseases, on the other hand, were once as private as
the processes of a man's digestion. The history of the notion of
privacy would be an entertaining tale. Sometimes the notions violently
conflict, as they did when the bolsheviks published the secret
treaties, or when Mr. Hughes investigated the life insurance
companies, or when somebody's scandal exudes from the pages of Town
Topics to the front pages of Mr. Hearst's newspapers.

Whether the reasons for privacy are good or bad, the barriers exist.
Privacy is insisted upon at all kinds of places in the area of what is
called public affairs. It is often very illuminating, therefore, to
ask yourself how you got at the facts on which you base your opinion.
Who actually saw, heard, felt, counted, named the thing, about which
you have an opinion? Was it the man who told you, or the man who told
him, or someone still further removed? And how much was he permitted
to see? When he informs you that France thinks this and that, what
part of France did he watch? How was he able to watch it? Where was he
when he watched it? What Frenchmen was he permitted to talk to, what
newspapers did he read, and where did they learn what they say? You
can ask yourself these questions, but you can rarely answer them. They
will remind you, however, of the distance which often separates your
public opinion from the event with which it deals. And the reminder is
itself a protection.



CHAPTER III

CONTACT AND OPPORTUNITY

1

While censorship and privacy intercept much information at its source,
a very much larger body of fact never reaches the whole public at all,
or only very slowly. For there are very distinct limits upon the
circulation of ideas.

A rough estimate of the effort it takes to reach "everybody" can be
had by considering the Government's propaganda during the war.
Remembering that the war had run over two years and a half before
America entered it, that millions upon millions of printed pages had
been circulated and untold speeches had been delivered, let us turn to
Mr. Creel's account of his fight "for the minds of men, for the
conquest of their convictions" in order that "the gospel of
Americanism might be carried to every corner of the globe."
[Footnote: George Creel, _How We Advertised America._]

Mr. Creel had to assemble machinery which included a Division of News
that issued, he tells us, more than six thousand releases, had to
enlist seventy-five thousand Four Minute Men who delivered at least
seven hundred and fifty-five thousand, one hundred and ninety speeches
to an aggregate of over three hundred million people. Boy scouts
delivered annotated copies of President Wilson's addresses to the
householders of America. Fortnightly periodicals were sent to six
hundred thousand teachers. Two hundred thousand lantern slides were
furnished for illustrated lectures. Fourteen hundred and thirty-eight
different designs were turned out for posters, window cards, newspaper
advertisements, cartoons, seals and buttons. The chambers of commerce,
the churches, fraternal societies, schools, were used as channels of
distribution. Yet Mr. Creel's effort, to which I have not begun to do
justice, did not include Mr. McAdoo's stupendous organization for the
Liberty Loans, nor Mr. Hoover's far reaching propaganda about food,
nor the campaigns of the Red Cross, the Y. M. C. A., Salvation Army,
Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, not to mention the
independent work of patriotic societies, like the League to Enforce
Peace, the League of Free Nations Association, the National Security
League, nor the activity of the publicity bureaus of the Allies and of
the submerged nationalities.

Probably this is the largest and the most intensive effort to carry
quickly a fairly uniform set of ideas to all the people of a nation.
The older proselyting worked more slowly, perhaps more surely, but
never so inclusively. Now if it required such extreme measures to
reach everybody in time of crisis, how open are the more normal
channels to men's minds? The Administration was trying, and while the
war continued it very largely succeeded, I believe, in creating
something that might almost be called one public opinion all over
America. But think of the dogged work, the complicated ingenuity, the
money and the personnel that were required. Nothing like that exists
in time of peace, and as a corollary there are whole sections, there
are vast groups, ghettoes, enclaves and classes that hear only vaguely
about much that is going on.

They live in grooves, are shut in among their own affairs, barred out
of larger affairs, meet few people not of their own sort, read little.
Travel and trade, the mails, the wires, and radio, railroads,
highways, ships, motor cars, and in the coming generation aeroplanes,
are, of course, of the utmost influence on the circulation of ideas.
Each of these affects the supply and the quality of information and
opinion in a most intricate way. Each is itself affected by technical,
by economic, by political conditions. Every time a government relaxes
the passport ceremonies or the customs inspection, every time a new
railway or a new port is opened, a new shipping line established,
every time rates go up or down, the mails move faster or more slowly,
the cables are uncensored and made less expensive, highways built, or
widened, or improved, the circulation of ideas is influenced. Tariff
schedules and subsidies affect the direction of commercial enterprise,
and therefore the nature of human contracts. And so it may well
happen, as it did for example in the case of Salem, Massachusetts,
that a change in the art of shipbuilding will reduce a whole city from
a center where international influences converge to a genteel
provincial town. All the immediate effects of more rapid transit are
not necessarily good. It would be difficult to say, for example, that
the railroad system of France, so highly centralized upon Paris, has
been an unmixed blessing to the French people.

It is certainly true that problems arising out of the means of
communication are of the utmost importance, and one of the most
constructive features of the program of the League of Nations has been
the study given to railroad transit and access to the sea. The
monopolizing of cables, [Footnote: Hence the wisdom of taking Yap
seriously.] of ports, fuel stations, mountain passes, canals, straits,
river courses, terminals, market places means a good deal more than
the enrichment of a group of business men, or the prestige of a
government. It means a barrier upon the exchange of news and opinion.
But monopoly is not the only barrier. Cost and available supply are
even greater ones, for if the cost of travelling or trading is
prohibitive, if the demand for facilities exceeds the supply, the
barriers exist even without monopoly.

2

The size of a man's income has considerable effect on his access to
the world beyond his neighborhood. With money he can overcome almost
every tangible obstacle of communication, he can travel, buy books and
periodicals, and bring within the range of his attention almost any
known fact of the world. The income of the individual, and the income
of the community determine the amount of communication that is
possible. But men's ideas determine how that income shall be spent,
and that in turn affects in the long run the amount of income they
will have. Thus also there are limitations, none the less real,
because they are often self-imposed and self-indulgent.

There are portions of the sovereign people who spend most of their
spare time and spare money on motoring and comparing motor cars, on
bridge-whist and post-mortems, on moving-pictures and potboilers,
talking always to the same people with minute variations on the same
old themes. They cannot really be said to suffer from censorship, or
secrecy, the high cost or the difficulty of communication. They suffer
from anemia, from lack of appetite and curiosity for the human scene.
Theirs is no problem of access to the world outside. Worlds of
interest are waiting for them to explore, and they do not enter.

They move, as if on a leash, within a fixed radius of acquaintances
according to the law and the gospel of their social set. Among men the
circle of talk in business and at the club and in the smoking car is
wider than the set to which they belong. Among women the social set
and the circle of talk are frequently almost identical. It is in the
social set that ideas derived from reading and lectures and from the
circle of talk converge, are sorted out, accepted, rejected, judged
and sanctioned. There it is finally decided in each phase of a
discussion which authorities and which sources of information are
admissible, and which not.

Our social set consists of those who figure as people in the phrase
"people are saying"; they are the people whose approval matters most
intimately to us. In big cities among men and women of wide interests
and with the means for moving about, the social set is not so rigidly
defined. But even in big cities, there are quarters and nests of
villages containing self-sufficing social sets. In smaller communities
there may exist a freer circulation, a more genuine fellowship from
after breakfast to before dinner. But few people do not know,
nevertheless, which set they really belong to, and which not.

Usually the distinguishing mark of a social set is the presumption
that the children may intermarry. To marry outside the set involves,
at the very least, a moment of doubt before the engagement can be
approved. Each social set has a fairly clear picture of its relative
position in the hierarchy of social sets. Between sets at the same
level, association is easy, individuals are quickly accepted,
hospitality is normal and unembarrassed. But in contact between sets
that are "higher" or "lower," there is always reciprocal hesitation, a
faint malaise, and a consciousness of difference. To be sure in a
society like that of the United States, individuals move somewhat
freely out of one set into another, especially where there is no
racial barrier and where economic position changes so rapidly.

Economic position, however, is not measured by the amount of income.
For in the first generation, at least, it is not income that
determines social standing, but the character of a man's work, and it
may take a generation or two before this fades out of the family
tradition. Thus banking, law, medicine, public utilities, newspapers,
the church, large retailing, brokerage, manufacture, are rated at a
different social value from salesmanship, superintendence, expert
technical work, nursing, school teaching, shop keeping; and those, in
turn, are rated as differently from plumbing, being a chauffeur,
dressmaking, subcontracting, or stenography, as these are from being a
butler, lady's maid, a moving picture operator, or a locomotive
engineer. And yet the financial return does not necessarily coincide
with these gradations.

3

Whatever the tests of admission, the social set when formed is not a
mere economic class, but something which more nearly resembles a
biological clan. Membership is intimately connected with love,
marriage and children, or, to speak more exactly, with the attitudes
and desires that are involved. In the social set, therefore, opinions
encounter the canons of Family Tradition, Respectability, Propriety,
Dignity, Taste and Form, which make up the social set's picture of
itself, a picture assiduously implanted in the children. In this
picture a large space is tacitly given to an authorized version of
what each set is called upon inwardly to accept as the social standing
of the others. The more vulgar press for an outward expression of the
deference due, the others are decently and sensitively silent about
their own knowledge that such deference invisibly exists. But that
knowledge, becoming overt when there is a marriage, a war, or a social
upheaval, is the nexus of a large bundle of dispositions classified by
Trotter [Footnote: W. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in War and Peace.]
under the general term instinct of the herd.

Within each social set there are augurs like the van der Luydens and
Mrs. Manson Mingott in "The Age of Innocence," [Footnote: Edith
Wharton, _The Age of Innocence._] who are recognized as the
custodians and the interpreters of its social pattern. You are made,
they say, if the van der Luydens take you up. The invitations to their
functions are the high sign of arrival and status. The elections to
college societies, carefully graded and the gradations universally
accepted, determine who is who in college. The social leaders,
weighted with the ultimate eugenic responsibility, are peculiarly
sensitive. Not only must they be watchfully aware of what makes for
the integrity of their set, but they have to cultivate a special gift
for knowing what other social sets are doing. They act as a kind of
ministry of foreign affairs. Where most of the members of a set live
complacently within the set, regarding it for all practical purposes
as the world, the social leaders must combine an intimate knowledge of
the anatomy of their own set with a persistent sense of its place in
the hierarchy of sets.

The hierarchy, in fact, is bound together by the social leaders. At
any one level there is something which might almost be called a social
set of the social leaders. But vertically the actual binding together
of society, in so far as it is bound together at all by social
contact, is accomplished by those exceptional people, frequently
suspect, who like Julius Beaufort and Ellen Olenska in "The Age of
Innocence" move in and out. Thus there come to be established personal
channels from one set to another, through which Tarde's laws of
imitation operate. But for large sections of the population there are
no such channels. For them the patented accounts of society and the
moving pictures of high life have to serve. They may develop a social
hierarchy of their own, almost unnoticed, as have the Negroes and the
"foreign element," but among that assimilated mass which always
considers itself the "nation," there is in spite of the great
separateness of sets, a variety of personal contacts through which a
circulation of standards takes place.

Some of the sets are so placed that they become what Professor Ross
has called "radiant points of conventionality." [Footnote: Ross,
_Social Psychology_, Ch. IX, X, XI.] Thus the social superior is
likely to be imitated by the social inferior, the holder of power is
imitated by subordinates, the more successful by the less successful,
the rich by the poor, the city by the country. But imitation does not
stop at frontiers. The powerful, socially superior, successful, rich,
urban social set is fundamentally international throughout the western
hemisphere, and in many ways London is its center. It counts among its
membership the most influential people in the world, containing as it
does the diplomatic set, high finance, the upper circles of the army
and the navy, some princes of the church, a few great newspaper
proprietors, their wives and mothers and daughters who wield the
scepter of invitation. It is at once a great circle of talk and a real
social set. But its importance comes from the fact that here at last
the distinction between public and private affairs practically
disappears. The private affairs of this set are public matters, and
public matters are its private, often its family affairs. The
confinements of Margot Asquith like the confinements of royalty are,
as the philosophers say, in much the same universe of discourse as a
tariff bill or a parliamentary debate.

There are large areas of governments in which this social set is not
interested, and in America, at least, it has exercised only a
fluctuating control over the national government. But its power in
foreign affairs is always very great, and in war time its prestige is
enormously enhanced. That is natural enough because these
cosmopolitans have a contact with the outer world that most people do
not possess. They have dined with each other in the capitals, and
their sense of national honor is no mere abstraction; it is a concrete
experience of being snubbed or approved by their friends. To Dr.
Kennicott of Gopher Prairie it matters mighty little what Winston
thinks and a great deal what Ezra Stowbody thinks, but to Mrs. Mingott
with a daughter married to the Earl of Swithin it matters a lot when
she visits her daughter, or entertains Winston himself. Dr. Kennicott
and Mrs. Mingott are both socially sensitive, but Mrs. Mingott is
sensitive to a social set that governs the world, while Dr.
Kennicott's social set governs only in Gopher Prairie. But in matters
that effect the larger relationships of the Great Society, Dr.
Kennicott will often be found holding what he thinks is purely his own
opinion, though, as a matter of fact, it has trickled down to Gopher
Prairie from High Society, transmuted on its passage through the
provincial social sets.

4

It is no part of our inquiry to attempt an account of the social
tissue. We need only fix in mind how big is the part played by the
social set in our spiritual contact with the world, how it tends to
fix what is admissible, and to determine how it shall be judged.
Affairs within its immediate competence each set more or less
determines for itself. Above all it determines the detailed
administration of the judgment. But the judgment itself is formed on
patterns [Footnote: _Cf_. Part III] that may be inherited from
the past, transmitted or imitated from other social sets. The highest
social set consists of those who embody the leadership of the Great
Society. As against almost every other social set where the bulk of
the opinions are first hand only about local affairs, in this Highest
Society the big decisions of war and peace, of social strategy and the
ultimate distribution of political power, are intimate experiences
within a circle of what, potentially at least, are personal
acquaintances.

Since position and contact play so big a part in determining what can
be seen, heard, read, and experienced, as well as what it is
permissible to see, hear, read, and know, it is no wonder that moral
judgment is so much more common than constructive thought. Yet in
truly effective thinking the prime necessity is to liquidate
judgments, regain an innocent eye, disentangle feelings, be curious
and open-hearted. Man's history being what it is, political opinion on
the scale of the Great Society requires an amount of selfless
equanimity rarely attainable by any one for any length of time. We are
concerned in public affairs, but immersed in our private ones. The
time and attention are limited that we can spare for the labor of not
taking opinions for granted, and we are subject to constant
interruption.



CHAPTER IV

TIME AND ATTENTION

NATURALLY it is possible to make a rough estimate only of the amount
of attention people give each day to informing themselves about public
affairs. Yet it is interesting that three estimates that I have
examined agree tolerably well, though they were made at different
times, in different places, and by different methods. [Footnote: July,
1900. D. F. Wilcox, _The American Newspaper: A Study in Social
Psychology_, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, vol. xvi, p. 56. (The statistical tables are reproduced in
James Edward Rogers, _The American Newspaper_.)

1916 (?) W. D. Scott, _The Psychology of Advertising_, pp.
226-248. See also Henry Foster Adams, _Advertising and its Mental
Laws_, Ch. IV.

1920 _Newspaper Reading Habits of College Students_, by Prof.
George Burton Hotchkiss and Richard B. Franken, published by the
Association of National Advertisers, Inc., 15 East 26th Street, New
York City.]

A questionnaire was sent by Hotchkiss and Franken to 1761 men and
women college students in New York City, and answers came from all but
a few. Scott used a questionnaire on four thousand prominent business
and professional men in Chicago and received replies from twenty-three
hundred. Between seventy and seventy-five percent of all those who
replied to either inquiry thought they spent a quarter of an hour a
day reading newspapers. Only four percent of the Chicago group guessed
at less than this and twenty-five percent guessed at more. Among the
New Yorkers a little over eight percent figured their newspaper
reading at less than fifteen minutes, and seventeen and a half at
more.

Very few people have an accurate idea of fifteen minutes, so the
figures are not to be taken literally. Moreover, business men,
professional people, and college students are most of them liable to a
curious little bias against appearing to spend too much time over the
newspapers, and perhaps also to a faint suspicion of a desire to be
known as rapid readers. All that the figures can justly be taken to
mean is that over three quarters of those in the selected groups rate
rather low the attention they give to printed news of the outer world.

These time estimates are fairly well confirmed by a test which is less
subjective. Scott asked his Chicagoans how many papers they read each
day, and was told that

  14 percent read but one paper
  46    "      "  two papers
  21    "      "  three papers
  10    "      "  four papers
   3    "      "  five papers
   2    "      "  six papers
   3    "      "  all the papers (eight
          at the time of this inquiry).

The two- and three-paper readers are sixty-seven percent, which comes
fairly close to the seventy-one percent in Scott's group who rate
themselves at fifteen minutes a day. The omnivorous readers of from
four to eight papers coincide roughly with the twenty-five percent who
rated themselves at more than fifteen minutes.

2

It is still more difficult to guess how the time is distributed. The
college students were asked to name "the five features which interest
you most." Just under twenty percent voted for "general news," just
under fifteen for editorials, just under twelve for "politics," a
little over eight for finance, not two years after the armistice a
little over six for foreign news, three and a half for local, nearly
three for business, and a quarter of one percent for news about
"labor." A scattering said they were most interested in sports,
special articles, the theatre, advertisements, cartoons, book reviews,
"accuracy," music, "ethical tone," society, brevity, art, stories,
shipping, school news, "current news," print. Disregarding these,
about sixty-seven and a half percent picked as the most interesting
features news and opinion that dealt with public affairs.

This was a mixed college group. The girls professed greater interest
than the boys in general news, foreign news, local news, politics,
editorials, the theatre, music, art, stories, cartoons,
advertisements, and "ethical tone." The boys on the other hand were
more absorbed in finance, sports, business page, "accuracy" and
"brevity." These discriminations correspond a little too closely with
the ideals of what is cultured and moral, manly and decisive, not to
make one suspect the utter objectivity of the replies.

Yet they agree fairly well with the replies of Scott's Chicago
business and professional men. They were asked, not what features
interested them most, but why they preferred one newspaper to another.
Nearly seventy-one percent based their conscious preference on local
news (17.8%), or political (15.8%) or financial (11.3%), or foreign
(9.5%), or general (7.2%), or editorials (9%). The other thirty
percent decided on grounds not connected with public affairs. They
ranged from not quite seven who decided for ethical tone, down to one
twentieth of one percent who cared most about humor.

How do these preferences correspond with the space given by newspapers
to various subjects? Unfortunately there are no data collected on this
point for the newspapers read by the Chicago and New York groups at
the time the questionnaires were made. But there is an interesting
analysis made over twenty years ago by Wilcox. He studied one hundred
and ten newspapers in fourteen large cities, and classified the
subject matter of over nine thousand columns.

Averaged for the whole country the various newspaper matter was found
to fill:

                        { (a) War News       17.9
                        {                          { Foreign   1.2
                        { (b) General "      21.8  { Politics  6.4
I. News            55.3 {                          { Crime     3.1
                        {                          { Misc.    11.1
                        {
                        {                          { Business  8.2
                        { (c) Special "       15.6  { Sport     5.1
                                                   { Society   2.3

II. Illustrations   3.1

III. Literature     2.4
                        { (a) Editorials          3.9
IV. Opinion         7.1 { (b) Letters & Exchange  3.2

V. Advertisements  32.1


In order to bring this table into a fair comparison, it is necessary
to exclude the space given to advertisements, and recompute the
percentages. For the advertisements occupied only an infinitesimal
part of the conscious preference of the Chicago group or the college
group. I think this is justifiable for our purposes because the press
prints what advertisements it can get, [Footnote: Except those which it
regards as objectionable, and those which, in rare instances, are
crowded out.] whereas the rest of the paper is designed to the taste
of its readers. The table would then read:

                         {War News      26.4-
                         {                    {Foreign   1.8-
  I. News           81.4+{General News  32.0+ {Political 9.4+
                         {                    {Crime     4.6-
                         {                    {Misc.    16.3+
                         {
                         {                    {Business 12.1-
                         {Special  "    23.0- {Sporting  7.5+
                                              {Society   3.3-
 II. Illustrations   4.6-
III. Literature      3.5+
 IV. Opinion        10.5- {Editorials       5.8-
                          {Letters          4.7+


In this revised table if you add up the items which may be supposed to
deal with public affairs, that is to say war, foreign, political,
miscellaneous, business news, and opinion, you find a total of 76.5%
of the edited space devoted in 1900 to the 70.6% of reasons given by
Chicago business men in 1916 for preferring a particular newspaper,
and to the five features which most interested 67.5% of the New York
College students in 1920.

This would seem to show that the tastes of business men and college
students in big cities to-day still correspond more or less to the
averaged judgments of newspaper editors in big cities twenty years
ago. Since that time the proportion of features to news has
undoubtedly increased, and so has the circulation and the size of
newspapers. Therefore, if to-day you could secure accurate replies
from more typical groups than college students or business and
professional men, you would expect to find a smaller percentage of
time devoted to public affairs, as well as a smaller percentage of
space. On the other hand you would expect to find that the average man
spends more than the quarter of an hour on his newspaper, and that
while the percentage of space given to public affairs is less than
twenty years ago the net amount is greater.

No elaborate deductions are to be drawn from these figures. They help
merely to make somewhat more concrete our notions of the effort that
goes day by day into acquiring the data of our opinions. The
newspapers are, of course, not the only means, but they are certainly
the principal ones. Magazines, the public forum, the chautauqua, the
church, political gatherings, trade union meetings, women's clubs, and
news serials in the moving picture houses supplement the press. But
taking it all at the most favorable estimate, the time each day is
small when any of us is directly exposed to information from our
unseen environment.



CHAPTER V

SPEED, WORDS, AND CLEARNESS

1

The unseen environment is reported to us chiefly by words. These words
are transmitted by wire or radio from the reporters to the editors who
fit them into print. Telegraphy is expensive, and the facilities are
often limited. Press service news is, therefore, usually coded. Thus a
dispatch which reads,--

"Washington, D. C. June I.--The United States regards the question of
German shipping seized in this country at the outbreak of hostilities
as a closed incident,"

may pass over the wires in the following form:

"Washn i. The Uni Stas rgds tq of Ger spg seized in ts cou at t outbk
o hox as a clod incident." [Footnote: Phillip's Code.]

A news item saying:

"Berlin, June 1, Chancellor Wirth told the Reichstag to-day in
outlining the Government's program that 'restoration and
reconciliation would be the keynote of the new Government's policy.'
He added that the Cabinet was determined disarmament should be carried
out loyally and that disarmament would not be the occasion of the
imposition of further penalties by the Allies."

may be cabled in this form:

"Berlin 1. Chancellor Wirth told t Reichstag tdy in outlining the gvts
pgn tt qn restoration & reconciliation wd b the keynote f new gvts
policy. qj He added ttt cabinet ws dtmd disarmament sd b carried out
loyally & tt disarmament wd n b. the ocan f imposition of further
penalties bi t alis."

In this second item the substance has been culled from a long speech
in a foreign tongue, translated, coded, and then decoded. The
operators who receive the messages transcribe them as they go along,
and I am told that a good operator can write fifteen thousand or even
more words per eight hour day, with a half an hour out for lunch and
two ten minute periods for rest.

2

A few words must often stand for a whole succession of acts, thoughts,
feelings and consequences. We read:

"Washington, Dec. 23--A statement charging Japanese military
authorities with deeds more 'frightful and barbarous' than anything
ever alleged to have occurred in Belgium during the war was issued
here to-day by the Korean Commission, based, the Commission said, on
authentic reports received by it from Manchuria."

Here eyewitnesses, their accuracy unknown, report to the makers of
'authentic reports'; they in turn transmit these to a commission five
thousand miles away. It prepares a statement, probably much too long
for publication, from which a correspondent culls an item of print
three and a half inches long. The meaning has to be telescoped in such
a way as to permit the reader to judge how much weight to give to the
news.

It is doubtful whether a supreme master of style could pack all the
elements of truth that complete justice would demand into a hundred
word account of what had happened in Korea during the course of
several months. For language is by no means a perfect vehicle of
meanings. Words, like currency, are turned over and over again, to
evoke one set of images to-day, another to-morrow. There is no
certainty whatever that the same word will call out exactly the same
idea in the reader's mind as it did in the reporter's. Theoretically,
if each fact and each relation had a name that was unique, and if
everyone had agreed on the names, it would be possible to communicate
without misunderstanding. In the exact sciences there is an approach
to this ideal, and that is part of the reason why of all forms of
world-wide cooperation, scientific inquiry is the most effective.

Men command fewer words than they have ideas to express, and language,
as Jean Paul said, is a dictionary of faded metaphors. [Footnote:
Cited by White, _Mechanisms of Character Formation._] The
journalist addressing half a million readers of whom he has only a dim
picture, the speaker whose words are flashed to remote villages and
overseas, cannot hope that a few phrases will carry the whole burden
of their meaning. "The words of Lloyd George, badly understood and
badly transmitted," said M. Briand to the Chamber of Deputies,
[Footnote: Special Cable to _The New York Times,_ May 25, 1921,
by Edwin L, James. ] "seemed to give the Pan-Germanists the idea that
the time had come to start something." A British Prime Minister,
speaking in English to the whole attentive world, speaks his own
meaning in his own words to all kinds of people who will see their
meaning in those words. No matter how rich or subtle--or rather the
more rich and the more subtle that which he has to say, the more his
meaning will suffer as it is sluiced into standard speech and then
distributed again among alien minds. [Footnote: In May of 1921,
relations between England and France were strained by the insurrection
of M. Korfanty in Upper Silesia. The London Correspondence of the
_Manchester Guardian_ (May 20, 1921), contained the following
item:

"The Franco-English Exchange in Words.

"In quarters well acquainted with French ways and character I find a
tendency to think that undue sensibility has been shown by our press
and public opinion in the lively and at times intemperate language of
the French press through the present crisis. The point was put to me
by a well-informed neutral observer in the following manner.

"Words, like money, are tokens of value. They represent meaning,
therefore, and just as money, their representative value goes up and
down. The French word 'etonnant' was used by Bossuet with a terrible
weight of meaning which it has lost to-day. A similar thing can be
observed with the English word 'awful.' Some nations constitutionally
tend to understate, others to overstate. What the British Tommy called
an unhealthy place could only be described by an Italian soldier by
means of a rich vocabulary aided with an exuberant mimicry. Nations
that understate keep their word-currency sound. Nations that overstate
suffer from inflation in their language.

"Expressions such as 'a distinguished scholar,' 'a clever writer,'
must be translated into French as 'a great savant,' 'an exquisite
master.' It is a mere matter of exchange, just as in France one pound
pays 46 francs, and yet one knows that that does not increase its
value at home. Englishmen reading the French press should endeavour to
work out a mental operation similar to that of the banker who puts
back francs into pounds, and not forget in so doing that while in
normal times the change was 25 it is now 46 on account of the war. For
there is a war fluctuation on word exchanges as well as on money
exchanges.

"The argument, one hopes, works both ways, and Frenchmen do not fail
to realize that there is as much value behind English reticence as
behind their own exuberance of expression."]

Millions of those who are watching him can read hardly at all.
Millions more can read the words but cannot understand them. Of those
who can both read and understand, a good three-quarters we may assume
have some part of half an hour a day to spare for the subject. To them
the words so acquired are the cue for a whole train of ideas on which
ultimately a vote of untold consequences may be based. Necessarily the
ideas which we allow the words we read to evoke form the biggest part
of the original data of our opinions. The world is vast, the
situations that concern us are intricate, the messages are few, the
biggest part of opinion must be constructed in the imagination.

When we use the word "Mexico" what picture does it evoke in a resident
of New York? Likely as not, it is some composite of sand, cactus, oil
wells, greasers, rum-drinking Indians, testy old cavaliers flourishing
whiskers and sovereignty, or perhaps an idyllic peasantry à la Jean
Jacques, assailed by the prospect of smoky industrialism, and fighting
for the Rights of Man. What does the word "Japan" evoke? Is it a vague
horde of slant-eyed yellow men, surrounded by Yellow Perils, picture
brides, fans, Samurai, banzais, art, and cherry blossoms? Or the word
"alien"? According to a group of New England college students, writing
in the year 1920, an alien was the following: [Footnote: _The New
Republic_: December 29, 1920, p. 142. ]

"A person hostile to this country."
"A person against the government."
"A person who is on the opposite side."
"A native of an unfriendly country."
"A foreigner at war."
"A foreigner who tries to do harm to the country he is in."
"An enemy from a foreign land."
"A person against a country." etc....

Yet the word alien is an unusually exact legal term, far more exact
than words like sovereignty, independence, national honor, rights,
defense, aggression, imperialism, capitalism, socialism, about which
we so readily take sides "for" or "against."

3

The power to dissociate superficial analogies, attend to differences
and appreciate variety is lucidity of mind. It is a relative faculty.
Yet the differences in lucidity are extensive, say as between a newly
born infant and a botanist examining a flower. To the infant there is
precious little difference between his own toes, his father's watch,
the lamp on the table, the moon in the sky, and a nice bright yellow
edition of Guy de Maupassant. To many a member of the Union League
Club there is no remarkable difference between a Democrat, a
Socialist, an anarchist, and a burglar, while to a highly
sophisticated anarchist there is a whole universe of difference
between Bakunin, Tolstoi, and Kropotkin. These examples show how
difficult it might be to secure a sound public opinion about de
Maupassant among babies, or about Democrats in the Union League Club.

A man who merely rides in other people's automobiles may not rise to
finer discrimination than between a Ford, a taxicab, and an
automobile. But let that same man own a car and drive it, let him, as
the psychoanalysts would say, project his libido upon automobiles, and
he will describe a difference in carburetors by looking at the rear
end of a car a city block away. That is why it is often such a relief
when the talk turns from "general topics" to a man's own hobby. It is
like turning from the landscape in the parlor to the ploughed field
outdoors. It is a return to the three dimensional world, after a
sojourn in the painter's portrayal of his own emotional response to
his own inattentive memory of what he imagines he ought to have seen.

We easily identify, says Ferenczi, two only partially similar things:
[Footnote: Internat. Zeitschr, f. Arztl. Psychoanalyse, 1913.
Translated and republished by Dr. Ernest Jones in S. Ferenczi,
_Contributions to Psychoanalysis_, Ch. VIII, _Stages in the
Development of the Sense of Reality_.] the child more easily than
the adult, the primitive or arrested mind more readily than the
mature. As it first appears in the child, consciousness seems to be an
unmanageable mixture of sensations. The child has no sense of time,
and almost none of space, it reaches for the chandelier with the same
confidence that it reaches for its mother's breast, and at first with
almost the same expectation. Only very gradually does function define
itself. To complete inexperience this is a coherent and
undifferentiated world, in which, as someone has said of a school of
philosophers, all facts are born free and equal. Those facts which
belong together in the world have not yet been separated from those
which happen to lie side by side in the stream of consciousness.

At first, says Ferenczi, the baby gets some of the things it wants by
crying for them. This is "the period of magical hallucinatory
omnipotence." In its second phase the child points to the things it
wants, and they are given to it. "Omnipotence by the help of magic
gestures." Later, the child learns to talk, asks for what it wishes,
and is partially successful. "The period of magic thoughts and magic
words." Each phase may persist for certain situations, though overlaid
and only visible at times, as for example, in the little harmless
superstitions from which few of us are wholly free. In each phase,
partial success tends to confirm that way of acting, while failure
tends to stimulate the development of another. Many individuals,
parties, and even nations, rarely appear to transcend the magical
organization of experience. But in the more advanced sections of the
most advanced peoples, trial and error after repeated failure has led
to the invention of a new principle. The moon, they learn, is not
moved by baying at it. Crops are not raised from the soil by spring
festivals or Republican majorities, but by sunlight, moisture, seeds,
fertilizer, and cultivation. [Footnote: Ferenczi, being a pathologist,
does not describe this maturer period where experience is organized as
equations, the phase of realism on the basis of science.]

Allowing for the purely schematic value of Ferenczi's categories of
response, the quality which we note as critical is the power to
discriminate among crude perceptions and vague analogies. This power
has been studied under laboratory conditions. [Footnote: See, for
example, Diagnostische Assoziation Studien, conducted at the
Psychiatric University Clinic in Zurich under the direction of Dr. C.
G. Jung. These tests were carried on principally under the so-called
Krapelin-Aschaffenburg classification. They show reaction time,
classify response to the stimulant word as inner, outer, and clang,
show separate results for the first and second hundred words, for
reaction time and reaction quality when the subject is distracted by
holding an idea in mind, or when he replies while beating time with a
metronome. Some of the results are summarized in Jung, _Analytical
Psychology_, Ch. II, transl. by Dr. Constance E. Long.] The Zurich
Association Studies indicate clearly that slight mental fatigue, an
inner disturbance of attention or an external distraction, tend to
"flatten" the quality of the response. An example of the very "flat"
type is the clang association (cat-hat), a reaction to the sound and
not to the sense of the stimulant word. One test, for example, shows a
9% increase of clang in the second series of a hundred reactions. Now
the clang is almost a repetition, a very primitive form of analogy.

4

If the comparatively simple conditions of a laboratory can so readily
flatten out discrimination, what must be the effect of city life? In
the laboratory the fatigue is slight enough, the distraction rather
trivial. Both are balanced in measure by the subject's interest and
self-consciousness. Yet if the beat of a metronome will depress
intelligence, what do eight or twelve hours of noise, odor, and heat
in a factory, or day upon day among chattering typewriters and
telephone bells and slamming doors, do to the political judgments
formed on the basis of newspapers read in street-cars and subways? Can
anything be heard in the hubbub that does not shriek, or be seen in
the general glare that does not flash like an electric sign? The life
of the city dweller lacks solitude, silence, ease. The nights are
noisy and ablaze. The people of a big city are assaulted by incessant
sound, now violent and jagged, now falling into unfinished rhythms,
but endless and remorseless. Under modern industrialism thought goes
on in a bath of noise. If its discriminations are often flat and
foolish, here at least is some small part of the reason. The sovereign
people determines life and death and happiness under conditions where
experience and experiment alike show thought to be most difficult.
"The intolerable burden of thought" is a burden when the conditions
make it burdensome. It is no burden when the conditions are favorable.
It is as exhilarating to think as it is to dance, and just as natural.

Every man whose business it is to think knows that he must for part of
the day create about himself a pool of silence. But in that
helter-skelter which we flatter by the name of civilization, the
citizen performs the perilous business of government under the worst
possible conditions. A faint recognition of this truth inspires the
movement for a shorter work day, for longer vacations, for light, air,
order, sunlight and dignity in factories and offices. But if the
intellectual quality of our life is to be improved that is only the
merest beginning. So long as so many jobs are an endless and, for the
worker, an aimless routine, a kind of automatism using one set of
muscles in one monotonous pattern, his whole life will tend towards an
automatism in which nothing is particularly to be distinguished from
anything else unless it is announced with a thunderclap. So long as he
is physically imprisoned in crowds by day and even by night his
attention will flicker and relax. It will not hold fast and define
clearly where he is the victim of all sorts of pother, in a home which
needs to be ventilated of its welter of drudgery, shrieking children,
raucous assertions, indigestible food, bad air, and suffocating
ornament.

Occasionally perhaps we enter a building which is composed and
spacious; we go to a theatre where modern stagecraft has cut away
distraction, or go to sea, or into a quiet place, and we remember how
cluttered, how capricious, how superfluous and clamorous is the
ordinary urban life of our time. We learn to understand why our addled
minds seize so little with precision, why they are caught up and
tossed about in a kind of tarantella by headlines and catch-words, why
so often they cannot tell things apart or discern identity in apparent
differences.

5

But this external disorder is complicated further by internal.
Experiment shows that the speed, the accuracy, and the intellectual
quality of association is deranged by what we are taught to call
emotional conflicts. Measured in fifths of a second, a series of a
hundred stimuli containing both neutral and hot words may show a
variation as between 5 and 32 or even a total failure to respond at
all. [Footnote: Jung, _Clark Lectures_.] Obviously our public
opinion is in intermittent contact with complexes of all sorts; with
ambition and economic interest, personal animosity, racial prejudice,
class feeling and what not. They distort our reading, our thinking,
our talking and our behavior in a great variety of ways.

And finally since opinions do not stop at the normal members of
society, since for the purposes of an election, a propaganda, a
following, numbers constitute power, the quality of attention is still
further depressed. The mass of absolutely illiterate, of
feeble-minded, grossly neurotic, undernourished and frustrated
individuals, is very considerable, much more considerable there is
reason to think than we generally suppose. Thus a wide popular appeal
is circulated among persons who are mentally children or barbarians,
people whose lives are a morass of entanglements, people whose
vitality is exhausted, shut-in people, and people whose experience has
comprehended no factor in the problem under discussion. The stream of
public opinion is stopped by them in little eddies of misunderstanding,
where it is discolored with prejudice and far fetched analogy.

A "broad appeal" takes account of the quality of association, and is
made to those susceptibilities which are widely distributed. A
"narrow" or a "special" appeal is one made to those susceptibilities
which are uncommon. But the same individual may respond with very
different quality to different stimuli, or to the same stimuli at
different times. Human susceptibilities are like an alpine country.
There are isolated peaks, there are extensive but separated plateaus,
and there are deeper strata which are quite continuous for nearly all
mankind. Thus the individuals whose susceptibilities reach the
rarefied atmosphere of those peaks where there exists an exquisitive
difference between Frege and Peano, or between Sassetta's earlier and
later periods, may be good stanch Republicans at another level of
appeal, and when they are starving and afraid, indistinguishable from
any other starving and frightened person. No wonder that the magazines
with the large circulations prefer the face of a pretty girl to any
other trade mark, a face, pretty enough to be alluring, but innocent
enough to be acceptable. For the "psychic level" on which the stimulus
acts determines whether the public is to be potentially a large or a
small one.

6

Thus the environment with which our public opinions deal is refracted
in many ways, by censorship and privacy at the source, by physical and
social barriers at the other end, by scanty attention, by the poverty
of language, by distraction, by unconscious constellations of feeling,
by wear and tear, violence, monotony. These limitations upon our
access to that environment combine with the obscurity and complexity
of the facts themselves to thwart clearness and justice of perception,
to substitute misleading fictions for workable ideas, and to deprive
us of adequate checks upon those who consciously strive to mislead.



PART III

STEREOTYPES

CHAPTER 6. STEREOTYPES
   "    7. STEREOTYPES AS DEFENSE
   "    8. BLIND SPOTS AND THEIR VALUE
   "    9. CODES AND THEIR ENEMIES
   "   10. THE DETECTION OF STEREOTYPES



CHAPTER VI

STEREOTYPES

1

Each of us lives and works on a small part of the earth's surface,
moves in a small circle, and of these acquaintances knows only a few
intimately. Of any public event that has wide effects we see at best
only a phase and an aspect. This is as true of the eminent insiders
who draft treaties, make laws, and issue orders, as it is of those who
have treaties framed for them, laws promulgated to them, orders given
at them. Inevitably our opinions cover a bigger space, a longer reach
of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe.
They have, therefore, to be pieced together out of what others have
reported and what we can imagine.

Yet even the eyewitness does not bring back a naéve picture of the
scene. [Footnote: _E. g. cf._ Edmond Locard, _L'Enquête Criminelle
et les Méthodes Scientifiques._ A great deal of interesting material has
been gathered in late years on the credibility of the witness, which
shows, as an able reviewer of Dr. Locard's book says in _The
Times_ (London) Literary Supplement (August 18, 1921), that
credibility varies as to classes of witnesses and classes of events,
and also as to type of perception. Thus, perceptions of touch, odor,
and taste have low evidential value. Our hearing is defective and
arbitrary when it judges the source and direction of sound, and in
listening to the talk of other people "words which are not heard will
be supplied by the witness in all good faith. He will have a theory of
the purport of the conversation, and will arrange the sounds he heard
to fit it." Even visual perceptions are liable to great error, as in
identification, recognition, judgment of distance, estimates of
numbers, for example, the size of a crowd. In the untrained observer,
the sense of time is highly variable. All these original weaknesses
are complicated by tricks of memory, and the incessant creative
quality of the imagination. _Cf_. also Sherrington, _The  Integrative
Action of the Nervous System_, pp. 318-327.

The late Professor Hugo Münsterberg wrote a popular book on this
subject called _On the Witness Stand_.] For experience seems to
show that he himself brings something to the scene which later he
takes away from it, that oftener than not what he imagines to be the
account of an event is really a transfiguration of it. Few facts in
consciousness seem to be merely given. Most facts in consciousness
seem to be partly made. A report is the joint product of the knower
and known, in which the role of the observer is always selective and
usually creative. The facts we see depend on where we are placed, and
the habits of our eyes.

An unfamiliar scene is like the baby's world, "one great, blooming,
buzzing confusion." [Footnote: Wm. James, _Principles of
Psychology_, Vol. I, p. 488.] This is the way, says Mr. John Dewey,
[Footnote: John Dewey, _How We Think_, pg 121.] that any new
thing strikes an adult, so far as the thing is really new and strange.
"Foreign languages that we do not understand always seem jibberings,
babblings, in which it is impossible to fix a definite, clear-cut,
individualized group of sounds. The countryman in the crowded street,
the landlubber at sea, the ignoramus in sport at a contest between
experts in a complicated game, are further instances. Put an
inexperienced man in a factory, and at first the work seems to him a
meaningless medley. All strangers of another race proverbially look
alike to the visiting stranger. Only gross differences of size or
color are perceived by an outsider in a flock of sheep, each of which
is perfectly individualized to the shepherd. A diffusive blur and an
indiscriminately shifting suction characterize what we do not
understand. The problem of the acquisition of meaning by things, or
(stated in another way) of forming habits of simple apprehension, is
thus the problem of introducing (1) _definiteness_ and _distinction_
and (2) _consistency_ or _stability_ of meaning into what is
otherwise vague and wavering."

But the kind of definiteness and consistency introduced depends upon
who introduces them. In a later passage [Footnote: _op. cit._, p.
133.] Dewey gives an example of how differently an experienced layman
and a chemist might define the word metal. "Smoothness, hardness,
glossiness, and brilliancy, heavy weight for its size ... the
serviceable properties of capacity for being hammered and pulled
without breaking, of being softened by heat and hardened by cold, of
retaining the shape and form given, of resistance to pressure and
decay, would probably be included" in the layman's definition. But the
chemist would likely as not ignore these esthetic and utilitarian
qualities, and define a metal as "any chemical element that enters
into combination with oxygen so as to form a base."

For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define
first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the
outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us,
and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form
stereotyped for us by our culture. Of the great men who assembled at
Paris to settle the affairs of mankind, how many were there who were
able to see much of the Europe about them, rather than their
commitments about Europe? Could anyone have penetrated the mind of M.
Clemenceau, would he have found there images of the Europe of 1919, or
a great sediment of stereotyped ideas accumulated and hardened in a
long and pugnacious existence? Did he see the Germans of 1919, or the
German type as he had learned to see it since 1871? He saw the type,
and among the reports that came to him from Germany, he took to heart
those reports, and, it seems, those only, which fitted the type that
was in his mind. If a junker blustered, that was an authentic German;
if a labor leader confessed the guilt of the empire, he was not an
authentic German.

At a Congress of Psychology in Göttingen an interesting experiment was
made with a crowd of presumably trained observers. [Footnote: A. von
Gennep, _La formation des légendes_, pp. 158-159. Cited F. van
Langenhove, _The Growth of a Legend_, pp. 120-122.]

"Not far from the hall in which the Congress was sitting there was a
public fete with a masked ball. Suddenly the door of the hall was
thrown open and a clown rushed in madly pursued by a negro, revolver
in hand. They stopped in the middle of the room fighting; the clown
fell, the negro leapt upon him, fired, and then both rushed out of the
hall. The whole incident hardly lasted twenty seconds.

"The President asked those present to write immediately a report since
there was sure to be a judicial inquiry. Forty reports were sent in.
Only one had less than 20% of mistakes in regard to the principal
facts; fourteen had 20% to 40% of mistakes; twelve from 40% to 50%;
thirteen more than 50%. Moreover in twenty-four accounts 10% of the
details were pure inventions and this proportion was exceeded in ten
accounts and diminished in six. Briefly a quarter of the accounts were
false.

"It goes without saying that the whole scene had been arranged and
even photographed in advance. The ten false reports may then be
relegated to the category of tales and legends; twenty-four accounts
are half legendary, and six have a value approximating to exact
evidence."

Thus out of forty trained observers writing a responsible account of a
scene that had just happened before their eyes, more than a majority
saw a scene that had not taken place. What then did they see? One
would suppose it was easier to tell what had occurred, than to invent
something which had not occurred. They saw their stereotype of such a
brawl. All of them had in the course of their lives acquired a series
of images of brawls, and these images flickered before their eyes. In
one man these images displaced less than 20% of the actual scene, in
thirteen men more than half. In thirty-four out of the forty observers
the stereotypes preempted at least one-tenth of the scene.

A distinguished art critic has said [Footnote: Bernard Berenson,
_The Central Italian Painters of the Renaissance_, pp. 60, _et
seq_.] that "what with the almost numberless shapes assumed by an
object. ... What with our insensitiveness and inattention, things
scarcely would have for us features and outlines so determined and
clear that we could recall them at will, but for the stereotyped
shapes art has lent them." The truth is even broader than that, for
the stereotyped shapes lent to the world come not merely from art, in
the sense of painting and sculpture and literature, but from our moral
codes and our social philosophies and our political agitations as
well. Substitute in the following passage of Mr. Berenson's the words
'politics,' 'business,' and 'society,' for the word 'art' and the
sentences will be no less true: "... unless years devoted to the study
of all schools of art have taught us also to see with our own eyes, we
soon fall into the habit of moulding whatever we look at into the
forms borrowed from the one art with which we are acquainted. There is
our standard of artistic reality. Let anyone give us shapes and colors
which we cannot instantly match in our paltry stock of hackneyed forms
and tints, and we shake our heads at his failure to reproduce things
as we know they certainly are, or we accuse him of insincerity."

Mr. Berenson speaks of our displeasure when a painter "does not
visualize objects exactly as we do," and of the difficulty of
appreciating the art of the Middle Ages because since then "our manner
of visualizing forms has changed in a thousand ways." [Footnote:
_Cf._ also his comment on _Dante's Visual Images, and his Early
Illustrators_ in _The Study and Criticism of Italian Art_ (First
Series), p. 13. "_We_ cannot help dressing Virgil as a Roman,
and giving him a 'classical profile' and 'statuesque carriage,' but
Dante's visual image of Virgil was probably no less mediaeval, no
more based on a critical reconstruction of antiquity, than his entire
conception of the Roman poet. Fourteenth Century illustrators make
Virgil look like a mediaeval scholar, dressed in cap and gown, and
there is no reason why Dante's visual image of him should have been
other than this."] He goes on to show how in regard to the human
figure we have been taught to see what we do see. "Created by
Donatello and Masaccio, and sanctioned by the Humanists, the new canon
of the human figure, the new cast of features ... presented to the
ruling classes of that time the type of human being most likely to win
the day in the combat of human forces... Who had the power to break
through this new standard of vision and, out of the chaos of things,
to select shapes more definitely expressive of reality than those
fixed by men of genius? No one had such power. People had perforce to
see things in that way and in no other, and to see only the shapes
depicted, to love only the ideals presented...." [Footnote: _The
Central Italian Painters_, pp. 66-67.]

2

If we cannot fully understand the acts of other people, until we know
what they think they know, then in order to do justice we have to
appraise not only the information which has been at their disposal,
but the minds through which they have filtered it. For the accepted
types, the current patterns, the standard versions, intercept
information on its way to consciousness. Americanization, for example,
is superficially at least the substitution of American for European
stereotypes. Thus the peasant who might see his landlord as if he were
the lord of the manor, his employer as he saw the local magnate, is
taught by Americanization to see the landlord and employer according
to American standards. This constitutes a change of mind, which is, in
effect, when the inoculation succeeds, a change of vision. His eye
sees differently. One kindly gentlewoman has confessed that the
stereotypes are of such overweening importance, that when hers are not
indulged, she at least is unable to accept the brotherhood of man and
the fatherhood of God: "we are strangely affected by the clothes we
wear. Garments create a mental and social atmosphere. What can be
hoped for the Americanism of a man who insists on employing a London
tailor? One's very food affects his Americanism. What kind of American
consciousness can grow in the atmosphere of sauerkraut and Limburger
cheese? Or what can you expect of the Americanism of the man whose
breath always reeks of garlic?" [Footnote: Cited by Mr. Edward Hale
Bierstadt, _New Republic_, June 1 1921 p. 21.]

This lady might well have been the patron of a pageant which a friend
of mine once attended. It was called the Melting Pot, and it was given
on the Fourth of July in an automobile town where many foreign-born
workers are employed. In the center of the baseball park at second
base stood a huge wooden and canvas pot. There were flights of steps
up to the rim on two sides. After the audience had settled itself, and
the band had played, a procession came through an opening at one side
of the field. It was made up of men of all the foreign nationalities
employed in the factories. They wore their native costumes, they were
singing their national songs; they danced their folk dances, and
carried the banners of all Europe. The master of ceremonies was the
principal of the grade school dressed as Uncle Sam. He led them to the
pot. He directed them up the steps to the rim, and inside. He called
them out again on the other side. They came, dressed in derby hats,
coats, pants, vest, stiff collar and polka-dot tie, undoubtedly, said
my friend, each with an Eversharp pencil in his pocket, and all
singing the Star-Spangled Banner.

To the promoters of this pageant, and probably to most of the actors,
it seemed as if they had managed to express the most intimate
difficulty to friendly association between the older peoples of
America and the newer. The contradiction of their stereotypes
interfered with the full recognition of their common humanity. The
people who change their names know this. They mean to change
themselves, and the attitude of strangers toward them.

There is, of course, some connection between the scene outside and the
mind through which we watch it, just as there are some long-haired men
and short-haired women in radical gatherings. But to the hurried
observer a slight connection is enough. If there are two bobbed heads
and four beards in the audience, it will be a bobbed and bearded
audience to the reporter who knows beforehand that such gatherings are
composed of people with these tastes in the management of their hair.
There is a connection between our vision and the facts, but it is
often a strange connection. A man has rarely looked at a landscape,
let us say, except to examine its possibilities for division into
building lots, but he has seen a number of landscapes hanging in the
parlor. And from them he has learned to think of a landscape as a rosy
sunset, or as a country road with a church steeple and a silver moon.
One day he goes to the country, and for hours he does not see a single
landscape. Then the sun goes down looking rosy. At once he recognizes
a landscape and exclaims that it is beautiful. But two days later,
when he tries to recall what he saw, the odds are that he will
remember chiefly some landscape in a parlor.

Unless he has been drunk or dreaming or insane he did see a sunset,
but he saw in it, and above all remembers from it, more of what the
oil painting taught him to observe, than what an impressionist
painter, for example, or a cultivated Japanese would have seen and
taken away with him. And the Japanese and the painter in turn will
have seen and remembered more of the form they had learned, unless
they happen to be the very rare people who find fresh sight for
mankind. In untrained observation we pick recognizable signs out of
the environment. The signs stand for ideas, and these ideas we fill
out with our stock of images. We do not so much see this man and that
sunset; rather we notice that the thing is man or sunset, and then see
chiefly what our mind is already full of on those subjects.

3

There is economy in this. For the attempt to see all things freshly
and in detail, rather than as types and generalities, is exhausting,
and among busy affairs practically out of the question. In a circle of
friends, and in relation to close associates or competitors, there is
no shortcut through, and no substitute for, an individualized
understanding. Those whom we love and admire most are the men and
women whose consciousness is peopled thickly with persons rather than
with types, who know us rather than the classification into which we
might fit. For even without phrasing it to ourselves, we feel
intuitively that all classification is in relation to some purpose not
necessarily our own; that between two human beings no association has
final dignity in which each does not take the other as an end in
himself. There is a taint on any contact between two people which does
not affirm as an axiom the personal inviolability of both.

But modern life is hurried and multifarious, above all physical
distance separates men who are often in vital contact with each other,
such as employer and employee, official and voter. There is neither
time nor opportunity for intimate acquaintance. Instead we notice a
trait which marks a well known type, and fill in the rest of the
picture by means of the stereotypes we carry about in our heads. He is
an agitator. That much we notice, or are told. Well, an agitator is
this sort of person, and so _he_ is this sort of person. He is an
intellectual. He is a plutocrat. He is a foreigner. He is a "South
European." He is from Back Bay. He is a Harvard Man. How different
from the statement: he is a Yale Man. He is a regular fellow. He is a
West Pointer. He is an old army sergeant. He is a Greenwich Villager:
what don't we know about him then, and about her? He is an
international banker. He is from Main Street.

The subtlest and most pervasive of all influences ere those which
create and maintain the repertory of stereotypes. We are told about
the world before we see it. We imagine most things before we
experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made
us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception. They
mark out certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasizing the
difference, so that the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar,
and the somewhat strange as sharply alien. They are aroused by small
signs, which may vary from a true index to a vague analogy. Aroused,
they flood fresh vision with older images, and project into the world
what has been resurrected in memory. Were there no practical
uniformities in the environment, there would be no economy and only
error in the human habit of accepting foresight for sight. But there
are uniformities sufficiently accurate, and the need of economizing
attention is so inevitable, that the abandonment of all stereotypes
for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human
life.

What matters is the character of the stereotypes, and the gullibility
with which we employ them. And these in the end depend upon those
inclusive patterns which constitute our philosophy of life. If in that
philosophy we assume that the world is codified according to a code
which we possess, we are likely to make our reports of what is going
on describe a world run by our code. But if our philosophy tells us
that each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence
catches at best only phases and aspects in a coarse net of ideas,
then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only
stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly. We tend,
also, to realize more and more clearly when our ideas started, where
they started, how they came to us, why we accepted them. All useful
history is antiseptic in this fashion. It enables us to know what
fairy tale, what school book, what tradition, what novel, play,
picture, phrase, planted one preconception in this mind, another in
that mind.

4

Those who wish to censor art do not at least underestimate this
influence. They generally misunderstand it, and almost always they are
absurdly bent on preventing other people from discovering anything not
sanctioned by them. But at any rate, like Plato in his argument about
the poets, they feel vaguely that the types acquired through fiction
tend to be imposed on reality. Thus there can be little doubt that the
moving picture is steadily building up imagery which is then evoked by
the words people read in their newspapers. In the whole experience of
the race there has been no aid to visualization comparable to the
cinema. If a Florentine wished to visualize the saints, he could go to
the frescoes in his church, where he might see a vision of saints
standardized for his time by Giotto. If an Athenian wished to
visualize the gods he went to the temples. But the number of objects
which were pictured was not great. And in the East, where the spirit
of the second commandment was widely accepted, the portraiture of
concrete things was even more meager, and for that reason perhaps the
faculty of practical decision was by so much reduced. In the western
world, however, during the last few centuries there has been an
enormous increase in the volume and scope of secular description, the
word picture, the narrative, the illustrated narrative, and finally
the moving picture and, perhaps, the talking picture.

Photographs have the kind of authority over imagination to-day, which
the printed word had yesterday, and the spoken word before that. They
seem utterly real. They come, we imagine, directly to us without human
meddling, and they are the most effortless food for the mind
conceivable. Any description in words, or even any inert picture,
requires an effort of memory before a picture exists in the mind. But
on the screen the whole process of observing, describing, reporting,
and then imagining, has been accomplished for you. Without more
trouble than is needed to stay awake the result which your imagination
is always aiming at is reeled off on the screen. The shadowy idea
becomes vivid; your hazy notion, let us say, of the Ku Klux Klan,
thanks to Mr. Griffiths, takes vivid shape when you see the Birth of a
Nation. Historically it may be the wrong shape, morally it may be a
pernicious shape, but it is a shape, and I doubt whether anyone who
has seen the film and does not know more about the Ku Klux Klan than
Mr. Griffiths, will ever hear the name again without seeing those
white horsemen.

5

And so when we speak of the mind of a group of people, of the French
mind, the militarist mind, the bolshevik mind, we are liable to
serious confusion unless we agree to separate the instinctive
equipment from the stereotypes, the patterns, and the formulae which
play so decisive a part in building up the mental world to which the
native character is adapted and responds. Failure to make this
distinction accounts for oceans of loose talk about collective minds,
national souls, and race psychology. To be sure a stereotype may be so
consistently and authoritatively transmitted in each generation from
parent to child that it seems almost like a biological fact. In some
respects, we may indeed have become, as Mr. Wallas says, [Footnote:
Graham Wallas, _Our Social Heritage_, p. 17.] biologically
parasitic upon our social heritage. But certainly there is not the
least scientific evidence which would enable anyone to argue that men
are born with the political habits of the country in which they are
born. In so far as political habits are alike in a nation, the first
places to look for an explanation are the nursery, the school, the
church, not in that limbo inhabited by Group Minds and National Souls.
Until you have thoroughly failed to see tradition being handed on from
parents, teachers, priests, and uncles, it is a solecism of the worst
order to ascribe political differences to the germ plasm.

It is possible to generalize tentatively and with a decent humility
about comparative differences within the same category of education
and experience. Yet even this is a tricky enterprise. For almost no
two experiences are exactly alike, not even of two children in the
same household. The older son never does have the experience of being
the younger. And therefore, until we are able to discount the
difference in nurture, we must withhold judgment about differences of
nature. As well judge the productivity of two soils by comparing their
yield before you know which is in Labrador and which in Iowa, whether
they have been cultivated and enriched, exhausted, or allowed to run
wild.



CHAPTER VII

STEREOTYPES AS DEFENSE

1

THERE is another reason, besides economy of effort, why we so often
hold to our stereotypes when we might pursue a more disinterested
vision. The systems of stereotypes may be the core of our personal
tradition, the defenses of our position in society.

They are an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the world, to
which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and our
hopes have adjusted themselves. They may not be a complete picture of
the world, but they are a picture of a possible world to which we are
adapted. In that world people and things have their well-known places,
and do certain expected things. We feel at home there. We fit in. We
are members. We know the way around. There we find the charm of the
familiar, the normal, the dependable; its grooves and shapes are where
we are accustomed to find them. And though we have abandoned much that
might have tempted us before we creased ourselves into that mould,
once we are firmly in, it fits as snugly as an old shoe.

No wonder, then, that any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like an
attack upon the foundations of the universe. It is an attack upon the
foundations of _our_ universe, and, where big things are at
stake, we do not readily admit that there is any distinction between
our universe and the universe. A world which turns out to be one in
which those we honor are unworthy, and those we despise are noble, is
nerve-racking. There is anarchy if our order of precedence is not the
only possible one. For if the meek should indeed inherit the earth, if
the first should be last, if those who are without sin alone may cast
a stone, if to Caesar you render only the things that are Caesar's,
then the foundations of self-respect would be shaken for those who
have arranged their lives as if these maxims were not true. A pattern
of stereotypes is not neutral. It is not merely a way of substituting
order for the great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It is not
merely a short cut. It is all these things and something more. It is
the guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world
of our own sense of our own value, our own position and our own
rights. The stereotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the
feelings that are attached to them. They are the fortress of our
tradition, and behind its defenses we can continue to feel ourselves
safe in the position we occupy.

2

When, for example, in the fourth century B. C., Aristotle wrote his
defense of slavery in the face of increasing skepticism, [Footnote:
Zimmern: _Greek Commonwealth_. See his footnote, p. 383.] the
Athenian slaves were in great part indistinguishable from free
citizens Mr. Zimmern quotes an amusing passage from the Old Oligarch
explaining the good treatment of the slaves. "Suppose it were legal
for a slave to be beaten by a citizen, it would frequently happen that
an Athenian might be mistaken for a slave or an alien and receive a
beating;--since the Athenian people is not better clothed than the
slave or alien, nor in personal appearance is there any superiority."
This absence of distinction would naturally tend to dissolve the
institution. If free men and slaves looked alike, what basis was there
for treating them so differently? It was this confusion which
Aristotle set himself to clear away in the first book of his Politics.
With unerring instinct he understood that to justify slavery he must
teach the Greeks a way of _seeing_ their slaves that comported
with the continuance of slavery.

So, said Aristotle, there are beings who are slaves by nature.
[Footnote: _Politics_, Bk. 1, Ch. 5.] "He then is by nature
formed a slave, who is fitted to become the chattel of another person,
_and on that account is so_." All this really says is that
whoever happens to be a slave is by nature intended to be one.
Logically the statement is worthless, but in fact it is not a
proposition at all, and logic has nothing to do with it. It is a
stereotype, or rather it is part of a stereotype. The rest follows
almost immediately. After asserting that slaves perceive reason, but
are not endowed with the use of it, Aristotle insists that "it is the
intention of nature to make the bodies of slaves and free men
different from each other, that the one should be robust for their
necessary purposes, but the other erect; useless indeed for such
servile labours, but fit for civil life... It is clear then that some
men are free by nature, and others are slaves. ..."

If we ask ourselves what is the matter with Aristotle's argument, we
find that he has begun by erecting a great barrier between himself and
the facts. When he had said that those who are slaves are by nature
intended to be slaves, he at one stroke excluded the fatal question
whether those particular men who happened to be slaves were the
particular men intended by nature to be slaves. For that question
would have tainted each case of slavery with doubt. And since the fact
of being a slave was not evidence that a man was destined to be one,
no certain test would have remained. Aristotle, therefore, excluded
entirely that destructive doubt. Those who are slaves are intended to
be slaves. Each slave holder was to look upon his chattels as natural
slaves. When his eye had been trained to see them that way, he was to
note as confirmation of their servile character the fact that they
performed servile work, that they were competent to do servile work,
and that they had the muscles to do servile work.

This is the perfect stereotype. Its hallmark is that it precedes the
use of reason; is a form of perception, imposes a certain character on
the data of our senses before the data reach the intelligence. The
stereotype is like the lavender window-panes on Beacon Street, like
the door-keeper at a costume ball who judges whether the guest has an
appropriate masquerade. There is nothing so obdurate to education or
to criticism as the stereotype. It stamps itself upon the evidence in
the very act of securing the evidence. That is why the accounts of
returning travellers are often an interesting tale of what the
traveller carried abroad with him on his trip. If he carried chiefly
his appetite, a zeal for tiled bathrooms, a conviction that the
Pullman car is the acme of human comfort, and a belief that it is
proper to tip waiters, taxicab drivers, and barbers, but under no
circumstances station agents and ushers, then his Odyssey will be
replete with good meals and bad meals, bathing adventures,
compartment-train escapades, and voracious demands for money. Or if he
is a more serious soul he may while on tour have found himself at
celebrated spots. Having touched base, and cast one furtive glance at
the monument, he buried his head in Baedeker, read every word through,
and moved on to the next celebrated spot; and thus returned with a
compact and orderly impression of Europe, rated one star, or two.

In some measure, stimuli from the outside, especially when they are
printed or spoken words, evoke some part of a system of stereotypes,
so that the actual sensation and the preconception occupy
consciousness at the same time. The two are blended, much as if we
looked at red through blue glasses and saw green. If what we are
looking at corresponds successfully with what we anticipated, the
stereotype is reinforced for the future, as it is in a man who knows
in advance that the Japanese are cunning and has the bad luck to run
across two dishonest Japanese.

If the experience contradicts the stereotype, one of two things
happens. If the man is no longer plastic, or if some powerful interest
makes it highly inconvenient to rearrange his stereotypes, he pooh-
poohs the contradiction as an exception that proves the rule,
discredits the witness, finds a flaw somewhere, and manages to forget
it. But if he is still curious and open-minded, the novelty is taken
into the picture, and allowed to modify it. Sometimes, if the incident
is striking enough, and if he has felt a general discomfort with his
established scheme, he may be shaken to such an extent as to distrust
all accepted ways of looking at life, and to expect that normally a
thing will not be what it is generally supposed to be. In the extreme
case, especially if he is literary, he may develop a passion for
inverting the moral canon by making Judas, Benedict Arnold, or Caesar
Borgia the hero of his tale.

3

The role played by the stereotype can be seen in the German tales
about Belgian snipers. Those tales curiously enough were first refuted
by an organization of German Catholic priests known as Pax. [Footnote:
Fernand van Langenhove, _The Growth of a Legend._ The author is a
Belgian sociologist.] The existence of atrocity stories is itself not
remarkable, nor that the German people gladly believed them. But it is
remarkable that a great conservative body of patriotic Germans should
have set out as early as August 16, 1914, to contradict a collection
of slanders on the enemy, even though such slanders were of the utmost
value in soothing the troubled conscience of their fellow countrymen.
Why should the Jesuit order in particular have set out to destroy a
fiction so important to the fighting morale of Germany?

I quote from M. van Langenhove's account:

"Hardly had the German armies entered Belgium when strange rumors
began to circulate. They spread from place to place, they were
reproduced by the press, and they soon permeated the whole of Germany.
It was said that the Belgian people, _instigated by the clergy,_
had intervened perfidiously in the hostilities; had attacked by
surprise isolated detachments; had indicated to the enemy the
positions occupied by the troops; that old men, and even children, had
been guilty of horrible atrocities upon wounded and defenseless German
soldiers, tearing out their eyes and cutting off fingers, nose or
ears; _that the priests from their pulpits had exhorted the people
to commit these crimes, promising them as a reward the kingdom of
heaven, and had even taken the lead in this barbarity._

"Public credulity accepted these stories. The highest powers in the
state welcomed them without hesitation and endorsed them with their
authority...

"In this way public opinion in Germany was disturbed and a lively
indignation manifested itself, _directed especially against the
priests_ who were held responsible for the barbarities attributed
to the Belgians... By a natural diversion _the anger_ to which
they were a prey _was directed_ by the Germans _against the
Catholic clergy generally._ Protestants allowed the old religious
hatred to be relighted in their minds and delivered themselves to
attacks against Catholics. A new _Kulturkampf_ was let loose.

"The Catholics did not delay in taking action against this hostile
attitude." (Italics mine) [Footnote: _Op. cit._, pp. 5-7]

There may have been some sniping. It would be extraordinary if every
angry Belgian had rushed to the library, opened a manual of
international law, and had informed himself whether he had a right to
take potshot at the infernal nuisance tramping through his streets. It
would be no less extraordinary if an army that had never been under
fire, did not regard every bullet that came its way as unauthorized,
because it was inconvenient, and indeed as somehow a violation of the
rules of the Kriegspiel, which then constituted its only experience of
war. One can imagine the more sensitive bent on convincing themselves
that the people to whom they were doing such terrible things must be
terrible people. And so the legend may have been spun until it reached
the censors and propagandists, who, whether they believed it or not,
saw its value, and let it loose on the German civilians. They too were
not altogether sorry to find that the people they were outraging were
sub-human. And, above all, since the legend came from their heroes,
they were not only entitled to believe it, they were unpatriotic if
they did not.

But where so much is left to the imagination because the scene of
action is lost in the fog of war, there is no check and no control.
The legend of the ferocious Belgian priests soon tapped an old hatred.
For in the minds of most patriotic protestant Germans, especially of
the upper classes, the picture of Bismarck's victories included a long
quarrel with the Roman Catholics. By a process of association, Belgian
priests became priests, and hatred of Belgians a vent for all their
hatreds. These German protestants did what some Americans did when
under the stress of war they created a compound object of hatred out
of the enemy abroad and all their opponents at home. Against this
synthetic enemy, the Hun in Germany and the Hun within the Gate, they
launched all the animosity that was in them.

The Catholic resistance to the atrocity tales was, of course,
defensive. It was aimed at those particular fictions which aroused
animosity against all Catholics, rather than against Belgian Catholics
alone. The _Informations Pax_, says M. van Langenhove, had only
an ecclesiastical bearing and "confined their attention almost
exclusively to the reprehensible acts attributed to the priests." And
yet one cannot help wondering a little about what was set in motion in
the minds of German Catholics by this revelation of what Bismarck's
empire meant in relation to them; and also whether there was any
obscure connection between that knowledge and the fact that the
prominent German politician who was willing in the armistice to sign
the death warrant of the empire was Erzberger, [Footnote: Since this
was written, Erzberger has been assassinated.] the leader of the
Catholic Centre Party.



CHAPTER VIII

BLIND SPOTS AND THEIR VALUE

1

I HAVE been speaking of stereotypes rather than ideals, because the
word ideal is usually reserved for what we consider the good, the true
and the beautiful. Thus it carries the hint that here is something to
be copied or attained. But our repertory of fixed impressions is wider
than that. It contains ideal swindlers, ideal Tammany politicians,
ideal jingoes, ideal agitators, ideal enemies. Our stereotyped world
is not necessarily the world we should like it to be. It is simply the
kind of world we expect it to be. If events correspond there is a
sense of familiarity, and we feel that we are moving with the movement
of events. Our slave must be a slave by nature, if we are Athenians
who wish to have no qualms. If we have told our friends that we do
eighteen holes of golf in 95, we tell them after doing the course in
110, that we are not ourselves to-day. That is to say, we are not
acquainted with the duffer who foozled fifteen strokes.

Most of us would deal with affairs through a rather haphazard and
shifting assortment of stereotypes, if a comparatively few men in each
generation were not constantly engaged in arranging, standardizing,
and improving them into logical systems, known as the Laws of
Political Economy, the Principles of Politics, and the like. Generally
when we write about culture, tradition, and the group mind, we are
thinking of these systems perfected by men of genius. Now there is no
disputing the necessity of constant study and criticism of these
idealized versions, but the historian of people, the politician, and
the publicity man cannot stop there. For what operates in history is
not the systematic idea as a genius formulated it, but shifting
imitations, replicas, counterfeits, analogies, and distortions in
individual minds.

Thus Marxism is not necessarily what Karl Marx wrote in Das Kapital,
but whatever it is that all the warring sects believe, who claim to be
the faithful. From the gospels you cannot deduce the history of
Christianity, nor from the Constitution the political history of
America. It is Das Kapital as conceived, the gospels as preached and
the preachment as understood, the Constitution as interpreted and
administered, to which you have to go. For while there is a
reciprocating influence between the standard version and the current
versions, it is these current versions as distributed among men which
affect their behavior. [Footnote: But unfortunately it is ever so much
harder to know this actual culture than it is to summarize and to
comment upon the works of genius. The actual culture exists in people
far too busy to indulge in the strange trade of formulating their
beliefs. They record them only incidentally, and the student rarely
knows how typical are his data. Perhaps the best he can do is to
follow Lord Bryce's suggestion [_Modern Democracies_, Vol. i, p.
156] that he move freely "among all sorts and conditions of men," to
seek out the unbiassed persons in every neighborhood who have skill in
sizing up. "There is a _flair_ which long practise and 'sympathetic
touch' bestow. The trained observer learns how to profit by small
indications, as an old seaman discerns, sooner than the landsman,
the signs of coming storm." There is, in short, a vast amount of
guess work involved, and it is no wonder that scholars, who enjoy
precision, so often confine their attentions to the neater formulations
of other scholars.]

"The theory of Relativity," says a critic whose eyelids, like the Lady
Lisa's, are a little weary, "promises to develop into a principle as
adequate to universal application as was the theory of Evolution. This
latter theory, from being a technical biological hypothesis, became an
inspiring guide to workers in practically every branch of knowledge:
manners and customs, morals, religions, philosophies, arts, steam
engines, electric tramways--everything had 'evolved.' 'Evolution'
became a very general term; it also became imprecise until, in many
cases, the original, definite meaning of the word was lost, and the
theory it had been evoked to describe was misunderstood. We are hardy
enough to prophesy a similar career and fate for the theory of
Relativity. The technical physical theory, at present imperfectly
understood, will become still more vague and dim. History repeats
itself, and Relativity, like Evolution, after receiving a number of
intelligible but somewhat inaccurate popular expositions in its
scientific aspect, will be launched on a world-conquering career. We
suggest that, by that time, it will probably be called _Relativismus_.
Many of these larger applications will doubtless be justified; some will
be absurd and a considerable number will, we imagine, reduce to truisms.
And the physical theory, the mere seed of this mighty growth, will become
once more the purely technical concern of scientific men." [Footnote:
_The Times_ (London), _Literary Supplement_, June 2, 1921, p.
352. Professor Einstein said when he was in America in 1921 that
people tended to overestimate the influence of his theory, and to
under-estimate its certainty.]

But for such a world-conquering career an idea must correspond,
however imprecisely, to something. Professor Bury shows for how long a
time the idea of progress remained a speculative toy. "It is not
easy," he writes, [Footnote: J. B. Bury, _The Idea of Progress_,
p. 324.] "for a new idea of the speculative order to penetrate and
inform the general consciousness of a community until it has assumed
some external and concrete embodiment, or is recommended by some
striking material evidence. In the case of Progress both these
conditions were fulfilled (in England) in the period 1820-1850." The
most striking evidence was furnished by the mechanical revolution.
"Men who were born at the beginning of the century had seen, before
they had passed the age of thirty, the rapid development of steam
navigation, the illumination of towns and houses by gas, the opening
of the first railway." In the consciousness of the average householder
miracles like these formed the pattern of his belief in the
perfectibility of the human race.

Tennyson, who was in philosophical matters a fairly normal person,
tells us that when he went by the first train from Liverpool to
Manchester (1830) he thought that the wheels ran in grooves. Then he
wrote this line:

"Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves of
change." [Footnote: 2 Tennyson, _Memoir by his Son_, Vol. I, p.
195. Cited by Bury, _op. cit_., p. 326.]

And so a notion more or less applicable to a journey between Liverpool
and Manchester was generalized into a pattern of the universe "for
ever." This pattern, taken up by others, reinforced by dazzling
inventions, imposed an optimistic turn upon the theory of evolution.
That theory, of course, is, as Professor Bury says, neutral between
pessimism and optimism. But it promised continual change, and the
changes visible in the world marked such extraordinary conquests of
nature, that the popular mind made a blend of the two. Evolution first
in Darwin himself, and then more elaborately in Herbert Spencer, was a
"progress towards perfection."

2

The stereotype represented by such words as "progress" and
"perfection" was composed fundamentally of mechanical inventions. And
mechanical it has remained, on the whole, to this day. In America more
than anywhere else, the spectacle of mechanical progress has made so
deep an impression, that it has suffused the whole moral code. An
American will endure almost any insult except the charge that he is
not progressive. Be he of long native ancestry, or a recent immigrant,
the aspect that has always struck his eye is the immense physical
growth of American civilization. That constitutes a fundamental
stereotype through which he views the world: the country village will
become the great metropolis, the modest building a skyscraper, what is
small shall be big; what is slow shall be fast; what is poor shall be
rich; what is few shall be many; whatever is shall be more so.

Not every American, of course, sees the world this way. Henry Adams
didn't, and William Allen White doesn't. But those men do, who in the
magazines devoted to the religion of success appear as Makers of
America. They mean just about that when they preach evolution,
progress, prosperity, being constructive, the American way of doing
things. It is easy to laugh, but, in fact, they are using a very great
pattern of human endeavor. For one thing it adopts an impersonal
criterion; for another it adopts an earthly criterion; for a third it
is habituating men to think quantitatively. To be sure the ideal
confuses excellence with size, happiness with speed, and human nature
with contraption. Yet the same motives are at work which have ever
actuated any moral code, or ever will. The desire for the biggest, the
fastest, the highest, or if you are a maker of wristwatches or
microscopes the smallest; the love in short of the superlative and the
"peerless," is in essence and possibility a noble passion.

Certainly the American version of progress has fitted an extraordinary
range of facts in the economic situation and in human nature. It
turned an unusual amount of pugnacity, acquisitiveness, and lust of
power into productive work. Nor has it, until more recently perhaps,
seriously frustrated the active nature of the active members of the
community. They have made a civilization which provides them who made
it with what they feel to be ample satisfaction in work, mating and
play, and the rush of their victory over mountains, wildernesses,
distance, and human competition has even done duty for that part of
religious feeling which is a sense of communion with the purpose of
the universe. The pattern has been a success so nearly perfect in the
sequence of ideals, practice, and results, that any challenge to it is
called un-American.

And yet, this pattern is a very partial and inadequate way of
representing the world. The habit of thinking about progress as
"development" has meant that many aspects of the environment were
simply neglected. With the stereotype of "progress" before their eyes,
Americans have in the mass seen little that did not accord with that
progress. They saw the expansion of cities, but not the accretion of
slums; they cheered the census statistics, but refused to consider
overcrowding; they pointed with pride to their growth, but would not
see the drift from the land, or the unassimilated immigration. They
expanded industry furiously at reckless cost to their natural
resources; they built up gigantic corporations without arranging for
industrial relations. They grew to be one of the most powerful nations
on earth without preparing their institutions or their minds for the
ending of their isolation. They stumbled into the World War morally
and physically unready, and they stumbled out again, much
disillusioned, but hardly more experienced.

In the World War the good and the evil influence of the American
stereotype was plainly visible. The idea that the war could be won by
recruiting unlimited armies, raising unlimited credits, building an
unlimited number of ships, producing unlimited munitions, and
concentrating without limit on these alone, fitted the traditional
stereotype, and resulted in something like a physical miracle.
[Footnote: I have in mind the transportation and supply of two million
troops overseas. Prof. Wesley Mitchell points out that the total
production of goods after our entrance into the war did not greatly
increase in volume over that of the year 1916; but that production for
war purposes did increase.] But among those most affected by the
stereotype, there was no place for the consideration of what the
fruits of victory were, or how they were to be attained. Therefore,
aims were ignored, or regarded as automatic, and victory was
conceived, because the stereotype demanded it, as nothing but an
annihilating victory in the field. In peace time you did not ask what
the fastest motor car was for, and in war you did not ask what the
completest victory was for. Yet in Paris the pattern did not fit the
facts. In peace you can go on endlessly supplanting small things with
big ones, and big ones with bigger ones; in war when you have won
absolute victory, you cannot go on to a more absolute victory. You
have to do something on an entirely different pattern. And if you lack
such a pattern, the end of the war is to you what it was to so many
good people, an anticlimax in a dreary and savorless world.

This marks the point where the stereotype and the facts, that cannot
be ignored, definitely part company. There is always such a point,
because our images of how things behave are simpler and more fixed
than the ebb and flow of affairs. There comes a time, therefore, when
the blind spots come from the edge of vision into the center. Then
unless there are critics who have the courage to sound an alarm, and
leaders capable of understanding the change, and a people tolerant by
habit, the stereotype, instead of economizing effort, and focussing
energy as it did in 1917 and 1918, may frustrate effort and waste
men's energy by blinding them, as it did for those people who cried
for a Carthaginian peace in 1919 and deplored the Treaty of Versailles
in 1921.

3

Uncritically held, the stereotype not only censors out much that needs
to be taken into account, but when the day of reckoning comes, and the
stereotype is shattered, likely as not that which it did wisely take
into account is ship-wrecked with it. That is the punishment assessed
by Mr. Bernard Shaw against Free Trade, Free Contract, Free
Competition, Natural Liberty, Laissez-faire, and Darwinism. A hundred
years ago, when he would surely have been one of the tartest advocates
of these doctrines, he would not have seen them as he sees them
to-day, in the Infidel Half Century, [Footnote: _Back to
Methuselah_. Preface.] to be excuses for "'doing the other fellow
down' with impunity, all interference by a guiding government, all
organization except police organization to protect legalized fraud
against fisticuffs, all attempt to introduce human purpose and design
and forethought into the industrial welter being 'contrary to the laws
of political economy'" He would have seen, then, as one of the
pioneers of the march to the plains of heaven [Footnote: _The
Quintessence of Ibsenism_] that, of the kind of human purpose and
design and forethought to be found in a government like that of Queen
Victoria's uncles, the less the better. He would have seen, not the
strong doing the weak down, but the foolish doing the strong down. He
would have seen purposes, designs and forethoughts at work,
obstructing invention, obstructing enterprise, obstructing what he
would infallibly have recognized as the next move of Creative
Evolution.

Even now Mr. Shaw is none too eager for the guidance of any guiding
government he knows, but in theory he has turned a full loop against
laissez-faire. Most advanced thinking before the war had made the same
turn against the established notion that if you unloosed everything,
wisdom would bubble up, and establish harmony. Since the war, with its
definite demonstration of guiding governments, assisted by censors,
propagandists, and spies, Roebuck Ramsden and Natural Liberty have
been readmitted to the company of serious thinkers.

One thing is common to these cycles. There is in each set of
stereotypes a point where effort ceases and things happen of their own
accord, as you would like them to. The progressive stereotype,
powerful to incite work, almost completely obliterates the attempt to
decide what work and why that work. Laissez-faire, a blessed release
from stupid officialdom, assumes that men will move by spontaneous
combustion towards a pre-established harmony. Collectivism, an
antidote to ruthless selfishness, seems, in the Marxian mind, to
suppose an economic determinism towards efficiency and wisdom on the
part of socialist officials. Strong government, imperialism at home
and abroad, at its best deeply conscious of the price of disorder,
relies at last on the notion that all that matters to the governed
will be known by the governors. In each theory there is a spot of
blind automatism.

That spot covers up some fact, which if it were taken into account,
would check the vital movement that the stereotype provokes. If the
progressive had to ask himself, like the Chinaman in the joke, what he
wanted to do with the time he saved by breaking the record, if the
advocate of laissez-faire had to contemplate not only free and
exuberant energies of men, but what some people call their human
nature, if the collectivist let the center of his attention be
occupied with the problem of how he is to secure his officials, if the
imperialist dared to doubt his own inspiration, you would find more
Hamlet and less Henry the Fifth. For these blind spots keep away
distracting images, which with their attendant emotions, might cause
hesitation and infirmity of purpose. Consequently the stereotype not
only saves time in a busy life and is a defense of our position in
society, but tends to preserve us from all the bewildering effect of
trying to see the world steadily and see it whole.



CHAPTER IX

CODES AND THEIR ENEMIES

ANYONE who has stood at the end of a railroad platform waiting for a
friend, will recall what queer people he mistook for him. The shape of
a hat, a slightly characteristic gait, evoked the vivid picture in his
mind's eye. In sleep a tinkle may sound like the pealing of a great
bell; the distant stroke of a hammer like a thunderclap. For our
constellations of imagery will vibrate to a stimulus that is perhaps
but vaguely similar to some aspect of them. They may, in
hallucination, flood the whole consciousness. They may enter very
little into perception, though I am inclined to think that such an
experience is extremely rare and highly sophisticated, as when we gaze
blankly at a familiar word or object, and it gradually ceases to be
familiar. Certainly for the most part, the way we see things is a
combination of what is there and of what we expected to find. The
heavens are not the same to an astronomer as to a pair of lovers; a
page of Kant will start a different train of thought in a Kantian and
in a radical empiricist; the Tahitian belle is a better looking person
to her Tahitian suitor than to the readers of the _National
Geographic Magazine_.

Expertness in any subject is, in fact, a multiplication of the number
of aspects we are prepared to discover, plus the habit of discounting
our expectations. Where to the ignoramus all things look alike, and
life is just one thing after another, to the specialist things are
highly individual. For a chauffeur, an epicure, a connoisseur, a
member of the President's cabinet, or a professor's wife, there are
evident distinctions and qualities, not at all evident to the casual
person who discusses automobiles, wines, old masters, Republicans, and
college faculties.

But in our public opinions few can be expert, while life is, as Mr.
Bernard Shaw has made plain, so short. Those who are expert are so on
only a few topics. Even among the expert soldiers, as we learned
during the war, expert cavalrymen were not necessarily brilliant with
trench-warfare and tanks. Indeed, sometimes a little expertness on a
small topic may simply exaggerate our normal human habit of trying to
squeeze into our stereotypes all that can be squeezed, and of casting
into outer darkness that which does not fit.

Whatever we recognize as familiar we tend, if we are not very careful,
to visualize with the aid of images already in our mind. Thus in the
American view of Progress and Success there is a definite picture of
human nature and of society. It is the kind of human nature and the
kind of society which logically produce the kind of progress that is
regarded as ideal. And then, when we seek to describe or explain
actually successful men, and events that have really happened, we read
back into them the qualities that are presupposed in the stereotypes.


These qualities were standardized rather innocently by the older
economists. They set out to describe the social system under which
they lived, and found it too complicated for words. So they
constructed what they sincerely hoped was a simplified diagram, not so
different in principle and in veracity from the parallelogram with
legs and head in a child's drawing of a complicated cow. The scheme
consisted of a capitalist who had diligently saved capital from his
labor, an entrepreneur who conceived a socially useful demand and
organized a factory, a collection of workmen who freely contracted,
take it or leave it, for their labor, a landlord, and a group of
consumers who bought in the cheapest market those goods which by the
ready use of the pleasure-pain calculus they knew would give them the
most pleasure. The model worked. The kind of people, which the model
assumed, living in the sort of world the model assumed, invariably
coöperated harmoniously in the books where the model was described.

With modification and embroidery, this pure fiction, used by
economists to simplify their thinking, was retailed and popularized
until for large sections of the population it prevailed as the
economic mythology of the day. It supplied a standard version of
capitalist, promoter, worker and consumer in a society that was
naturally more bent on achieving success than on explaining it. The
buildings which rose, and the bank accounts which accumulated, were
evidence that the stereotype of how the thing had been done was
accurate. And those who benefited most by success came to believe they
were the kind of men they were supposed to be. No wonder that the
candid friends of successful men, when they read the official
biography and the obituary, have to restrain themselves from asking
whether this is indeed their friend.

2

To the vanquished and the victims, the official portraiture was, of
course, unrecognizable. For while those who exemplified progress did
not often pause to inquire whether they had arrived according to the
route laid down by the economists, or by some other just as
creditable, the unsuccessful people did inquire. "No one," says
William James, [Footnote: _The Letters of William James,_ Vol. I,
p.65] "sees further into a generalization than his own knowledge of
detail extends." The captains of industry saw in the great trusts
monuments of (their) success; their defeated competitors saw the
monuments of (their) failure. So the captains expounded the economies
and virtues of big business, asked to be let alone, said they were the
agents of prosperity, and the developers of trade. The vanquished
insisted upon the wastes and brutalities of the trusts, and called
loudly upon the Department of Justice to free business from
conspiracies. In the same situation one side saw progress, economy,
and a splendid development; the other, reaction, extravagance, and a
restraint of trade. Volumes of statistics, anecdotes about the real
truth and the inside truth, the deeper and the larger truth, were
published to prove both sides of the argument.

For when a system of stereotypes is well fixed, our attention is
called to those facts which support it, and diverted from those which
contradict. So perhaps it is because they are attuned to find it, that
kindly people discover so much reason for kindness, malicious people
so much malice. We speak quite accurately of seeing through
rose-colored spectacles, or with a jaundiced eye. If, as Philip
Littell once wrote of a distinguished professor, we see life as
through a class darkly, our stereotypes of what the best people and
the lower classes are like will not be contaminated by understanding.
What is alien will be rejected, what is different will fall upon
unseeing eyes. We do not see what our eyes are not accustomed to take
into account. Sometimes consciously, more often without knowing it, we
are impressed by those facts which fit our philosophy.

3

This philosophy is a more or less organized series of images for
describing the unseen world. But not only for describing it. For
judging it as well. And, therefore, the stereotypes are loaded with
preference, suffused with affection or dislike, attached to fears,
lusts, strong wishes, pride, hope. Whatever invokes the stereotype is
judged with the appropriate sentiment. Except where we deliberately
keep prejudice in suspense, we do not study a man and judge him to be
bad. We see a bad man. We see a dewy morn, a blushing maiden, a
sainted priest, a humorless Englishman, a dangerous Red, a carefree
bohemian, a lazy Hindu, a wily Oriental, a dreaming Slav, a volatile
Irishman, a greedy Jew, a 100% American. In the workaday world that is
often the real judgment, long in advance of the evidence, and it
contains within itself the conclusion which the evidence is pretty
certain to confirm. Neither justice, nor mercy, nor truth, enter into
such a judgment, for the judgment has preceded the evidence. Yet a
people without prejudices, a people with altogether neutral vision, is
so unthinkable in any civilization of which it is useful to think,
that no scheme of education could be based upon that ideal. Prejudice
can be detected, discounted, and refined, but so long as finite men
must compress into a short schooling preparation for dealing with a
vast civilization, they must carry pictures of it around with them,
and have prejudices. The quality of their thinking and doing will
depend on whether those prejudices are friendly, friendly to other
people, to other ideas, whether they evoke love of what is felt to be
positively good, rather than hatred of what is not contained in their
version of the good.

Morality, good taste and good form first standardize and then
emphasize certain of these underlying prejudices. As we adjust
ourselves to our code, we adjust the facts we see to that code.
Rationally, the facts are neutral to all our views of right and wrong.
Actually, our canons determine greatly what we shall perceive and how.

For a moral code is a scheme of conduct applied to a number of typical
instances. To behave as the code directs is to serve whatever purpose
the code pursues. It may be God's will, or the king's, individual
salvation in a good, solid, three dimensional paradise, success on
earth, or the service of mankind. In any event the makers of the code
fix upon certain typical situations, and then by some form of
reasoning or intuition, deduce the kind of behavior which would
produce the aim they acknowledge. The rules apply where they apply.

But in daily living how does a man know whether his predicament is the
one the law-giver had in mind? He is told not to kill. But if his
children are attacked, may he kill to stop a killing? The Ten
Commandments are silent on the point. Therefore, around every code
there is a cloud of interpreters who deduce more specific cases.
Suppose, then, that the doctors of the law decide that he may kill in
self-defense. For the next man the doubt is almost as great; how does
he know that he is defining self-defense correctly, or that he has not
misjudged the facts, imagined the attack, and is really the aggressor?
Perhaps he has provoked the attack. But what is a provocation? Exactly
these confusions infected the minds of most Germans in August, 1914.

Far more serious in the modern world than any difference of moral code
is the difference in the assumptions about facts to which the code is
applied. Religious, moral and political formulae are nothing like so
far apart as the facts assumed by their votaries. Useful discussion,
then, instead of comparing ideals, reexamines the visions of the
facts. Thus the rule that you should do unto others as you would have
them do unto you rests on the belief that human nature is uniform. Mr.
Bernard Shaw's statement that you should not do unto others what you
would have them do unto you, because their tastes may be different,
rests on the belief that human nature is not uniform. The maxim that
competition is the life of trade consists of a whole tome of
assumptions about economic motives, industrial relations, and the
working of a particular commercial system. The claim that America will
never have a merchant marine, unless it is privately owned and
managed, assumes a certain proved connection between a certain kind of
profit-making and incentive. The justification by the bolshevik
propagandist of the dictatorship, espionage, and the terror, because
"every state is an apparatus of violence" [Footnote: See _Two Years
of Conflict on the Internal Front_, published by the Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, Moscow, 1920. Translated by
Malcolm W. Davis for the _New York Evening Post_, January 15,
1921.] is an historical judgment, the truth of which is by no means
self-evident to a non-communist.

At the core of every moral code there is a picture of human nature, a
map of the universe, and a version of history. To human nature (of the
sort conceived), in a universe (of the kind imagined), after a history
(so understood), the rules of the code apply. So far as the facts of
personality, of the environment and of memory are different, by so far
the rules of the code are difficult to apply with success. Now every
moral code has to conceive human psychology, the material world, and
tradition some way or other. But in the codes that are under the
influence of science, the conception is known to be an hypothesis,
whereas in the codes that come unexamined from the past or bubble up
from the caverns of the mind, the conception is not taken as an
hypothesis demanding proof or contradiction, but as a fiction accepted
without question. In the one case, man is humble about his beliefs,
because he knows they are tentative and incomplete; in the other he is
dogmatic, because his belief is a completed myth. The moralist who
submits to the scientific discipline knows that though he does not
know everything, he is in the way of knowing something; the dogmatist,
using a myth, believes himself to share part of the insight of
omniscience, though he lacks the criteria by which to tell truth from
error. For the distinguishing mark of a myth is that truth and error,
fact and fable, report and fantasy, are all on the same plane of
credibility.

The myth is, then, not necessarily false. It might happen to be wholly
true. It may happen to be partly true. If it has affected human
conduct a long time, it is almost certain to contain much that is
profoundly and importantly true. What a myth never contains is the
critical power to separate its truths from its errors. For that power
comes only by realizing that no human opinion, whatever its supposed
origin, is too exalted for the test of evidence, that every opinion is
only somebody's opinion. And if you ask why the test of evidence is
preferable to any other, there is no answer unless you are willing to
use the test in order to test it.

4

The statement is, I think, susceptible of overwhelming proof, that
moral codes assume a particular view of the facts. Under the term
moral codes I include all kinds: personal, family, economic,
professional, legal, patriotic, international. At the center of each
there is a pattern of stereotypes about psychology, sociology, and
history. The same view of human nature, institutions or tradition
rarely persists through all our codes. Compare, for example, the
economic and the patriotic codes. There is a war supposed to affect
all alike. Two men are partners in business. One enlists, the other
takes a war contract. The soldier sacrifices everything, perhaps even
his life. He is paid a dollar a day, and no one says, no one believes,
that you could make a better soldier out of him by any form of
economic incentive. That motive disappears out of his human nature.
The contractor sacrifices very little, is paid a handsome profit over
costs, and few say or believe that he would produce the munitions if
there were no economic incentive. That may be unfair to him. The point
is that the accepted patriotic code assumes one kind of human nature,
the commercial code another. And the codes are probably founded on
true expectations to this extent, that when a man adopts a certain
code he tends to exhibit the kind of human nature which the code
demands.

That is one reason why it is so dangerous to generalize about human
nature. A loving father can be a sour boss, an earnest municipal
reformer, and a rapacious jingo abroad. His family life, his business
career, his politics, and his foreign policy rest on totally different
versions of what others are like and of how he should act. These
versions differ by codes in the same person, the codes differ somewhat
among persons in the same social set, differ widely as between social
sets, and between two nations, or two colors, may differ to the point
where there is no common assumption whatever. That is why people
professing the same stock of religious beliefs can go to war. The
element of their belief which determines conduct is that view of the
facts which they assume.

That is where codes enter so subtly and so pervasively into the making
of public opinion. The orthodox theory holds that a public opinion
constitutes a moral judgment on a group of facts. The theory I am
suggesting is that, in the present state of education, a public
opinion is primarily a moralized and codified version of the facts. I
am arguing that the pattern of stereotypes at the center of our codes
largely determines what group of facts we shall see, and in what light
we shall see them. That is why, with the best will in the world, the
news policy of a journal tends to support its editorial policy; why a
capitalist sees one set of facts, and certain aspects of human nature,
literally sees them; his socialist opponent another set and other
aspects, and why each regards the other as unreasonable or perverse,
when the real difference between them is a difference of perception.
That difference is imposed by the difference between the capitalist
and socialist pattern of stereotypes. "There are no classes in
America," writes an American editor. "The history of all hitherto
existing society is the history of class struggles," says the
Communist Manifesto. If you have the editor's pattern in your mind,
you will see vividly the facts that confirm it, vaguely and
ineffectively those that contradict. If you have the communist
pattern, you will not only look for different things, but you will see
with a totally different emphasis what you and the editor happen to
see in common.

5

And since my moral system rests on my accepted version of the facts,
he who denies either my moral judgments or my version of the facts, is
to me perverse, alien, dangerous. How shall I account for him? The
opponent has always to be explained, and the last explanation that we
ever look for is that he sees a different set of facts. Such an
explanation we avoid, because it saps the very foundation of our own
assurance that we have seen life steadily and seen it whole. It is
only when we are in the habit of recognizing our opinions as a partial
experience seen through our stereotypes that we become truly tolerant
of an opponent. Without that habit, we believe in the absolutism of
our own vision, and consequently in the treacherous character of all
opposition. For while men are willing to admit that there are two
sides to a "question," they do not believe that there are two sides to
what they regard as a "fact." And they never do believe it until after
long critical education, they are fully conscious of how second-hand
and subjective is their apprehension of their social data.

So where two factions see vividly each its own aspect, and contrive
their own explanations of what they see, it is almost impossible for
them to credit each other with honesty. If the pattern fits their
experience at a crucial point, they no longer look upon it as an
interpretation. They look upon it as "reality." It may not resemble
the reality, except that it culminates in a conclusion which fits a
real experience. I may represent my trip from New York to Boston by a
straight line on a map, just as a man may regard his triumph as the
end of a straight and narrow path. The road by which I actually went
to Boston may have involved many detours, much turning and twisting,
just as his road may have involved much besides pure enterprise, labor
and thrift. But provided I reach Boston and he succeeds, the airline
and the straight path will serve as ready made charts. Only when
somebody tries to follow them, and does not arrive, do we have to
answer objections. If we insist on our charts, and he insists on
rejecting them, we soon tend to regard him as a dangerous fool, and he
to regard us as liars and hypocrites. Thus we gradually paint
portraits of each other. For the opponent presents himself as the man
who says, evil be thou my good. He is an annoyance who does not fit
into the scheme of things. Nevertheless he interferes. And since that
scheme is based in our minds on incontrovertible fact fortified by
irresistible logic, some place has to be found for him in the scheme.
Rarely in politics or industrial disputes is a place made for him by
the simple admission that he has looked upon the same reality and seen
another aspect of it. That would shake the whole scheme.

Thus to the Italians in Paris Fiume was Italian It was not merely a
city that it would be desirable to include within the Italian kingdom.
It was Italian. They fixed their whole mind upon the Italian majority
within the legal boundaries of the city itself. The American
delegates, having seen more Italians in New York than there are in
Fiume, without regarding New York as Italian, fixed their eyes on
Fiume as a central European port of entry. They saw vividly the
Jugoslavs in the suburbs and the non-Italian hinterland. Some of the
Italians in Paris were therefore in need of a convincing explanation
of the American perversity. They found it in a rumor which started, no
one knows where, that an influential American diplomat was in the
snares of a Jugoslav mistress. She had been seen.... He had been
seen.... At Versailles just off the boulevard. ... The villa with the
large trees.

This is a rather common way of explaining away opposition. In their
more libelous form such charges rarely reach the printed page, and a
Roosevelt may have to wait years, or a Harding months, before he can
force an issue, and end a whispering campaign that has reached into
every circle of talk. Public men have to endure a fearful amount of
poisonous clubroom, dinner table, boudoir slander, repeated,
elaborated, chuckled over, and regarded as delicious. While this sort
of thing is, I believe, less prevalent in America than in Europe, yet
rare is the American official about whom somebody is not repeating a
scandal.

Out of the opposition we make villains and conspiracies. If prices go
up unmercifully the profiteers have conspired; if the newspapers
misrepresent the news, there is a capitalist plot; if the rich are too
rich, they have been stealing; if a closely fought election is lost,
the electorate was corrupted; if a statesman does something of which
you disapprove, he has been bought or influenced by some discreditable
person. If workingmen are restless, they are the victims of agitators;
if they are restless over wide areas, there is a conspiracy on foot.
If you do not produce enough aeroplanes, it is the work of spies; if
there is trouble in Ireland, it is German or Bolshevik "gold." And if
you go stark, staring mad looking for plots, you see all strikes, the
Plumb plan, Irish rebellion, Mohammedan unrest, the restoration of
King Constantine, the League of Nations, Mexican disorder, the
movement to reduce armaments, Sunday movies, short skirts, evasion of
the liquor laws, Negro self-assertion, as sub-plots under some
grandiose plot engineered either by Moscow, Rome, the Free Masons, the
Japanese, or the Elders of Zion.



CHAPTER X

THE DETECTION OF STEREOTYPES

1

Skilled diplomatists, compelled to talk out loud to the warring
peoples, learned how to use a large repertory of stereotypes. They
were dealing with a precarious alliance of powers, each of which was
maintaining its war unity only by the most careful leadership. The
ordinary soldier and his wife, heroic and selfless beyond anything in
the chronicles of courage, were still not heroic enough to face death
gladly for all the ideas which were said by the foreign offices of
foreign powers to be essential to the future of civilization. There
were ports, and mines, rocky mountain passes, and villages that few
soldiers would willingly have crossed No Man's Land to obtain for
their allies.

Now it happened in one nation that the war party which was in control
of the foreign office, the high command, and most of the press, had
claims on the territory of several of its neighbors. These claims were
called the Greater Ruritania by the cultivated classes who regarded
Kipling, Treitschke, and Maurice Barres as one hundred percent
Ruritanian. But the grandiose idea aroused no enthusiasm abroad. So
holding this finest flower of the Ruritanian genius, as their poet
laureate said, to their hearts, Ruritania's statesmen went forth to
divide and conquer. They divided the claim into sectors. For each
piece they invoked that stereotype which some one or more of their
allies found it difficult to resist, because that ally had claims for
which it hoped to find approval by the use of this same stereotype.

The first sector happened to be a mountainous region inhabited by
alien peasants. Ruritania demanded it to complete her natural
geographical frontier. If you fixed your attention long enough on the
ineffable value of what is natural, those alien peasants just
dissolved into fog, and only the slope of the mountains was visible.
The next sector was inhabited by Ruritanians, and on the principle
that no people ought to live under alien rule, they were re-annexed.
Then came a city of considerable commercial importance, not inhabited
by Ruritanians. But until the Eighteenth Century it had been part of
Ruritania, and on the principle of Historic Right it was annexed.
Farther on there was a splendid mineral deposit owned by aliens and
worked by aliens. On the principle of reparation for damage it was
annexed. Beyond this there was a territory inhabited 97% by aliens,
constituting the natural geographical frontier of another nation,
never historically a part of Ruritania. But one of the provinces which
had been federated into Ruritania had formerly traded in those
markets, and the upper class culture was Ruritanian. On the principle
of cultural superiority and the necessity of defending civilization,
the lands were claimed. Finally, there was a port wholly disconnected
from Ruritania geographically, ethnically, economically, historically,
traditionally. It was demanded on the ground that it was needed for
national defense.

In the treaties that concluded the Great War you can multiply examples
of this kind. Now I do not wish to imply that I think it was possible
to resettle Europe consistently on any one of these principles. I am
certain that it was not. The very use of these principles, so
pretentious and so absolute, meant that the spirit of accommodation
did not prevail and that, therefore, the substance of peace was not
there. For the moment you start to discuss factories, mines,
mountains, or even political authority, as perfect examples of some
eternal principle or other, you are not arguing, you are fighting.
That eternal principle censors out all the objections, isolates the
issue from its background and its context, and sets going in you some
strong emotion, appropriate enough to the principle, highly
inappropriate to the docks, warehouses, and real estate. And having
started in that mood you cannot stop. A real danger exists. To meet it
you have to invoke more absolute principles in order to defend what is
open to attack. Then you have to defend the defenses, erect buffers,
and buffers for the buffers, until the whole affair is so scrambled
that it seems less dangerous to fight than to keep on talking.

There are certain clues which often help in detecting the false
absolutism of a stereotype. In the case of the Ruritanian propaganda
the principles blanketed each other so rapidly that one could readily
see how the argument had been constructed. The series of
contradictions showed that for each sector that stereotype was
employed which would obliterate all the facts that interfered with the
claim. Contradiction of this sort is often a good clue.

2

Inability to take account of space is another. In the spring of 1918,
for example, large numbers of people, appalled by the withdrawal of
Russia, demanded the "reestablishment of an Eastern Front." The war,
as they had conceived it, was on two fronts, and when one of them
disappeared there was an instant demand that it be recreated. The
unemployed Japanese army was to man the front, substituting for the
Russian. But there was one insuperable obstacle. Between Vladivostok
and the eastern battleline there were five thousand miles of country,
spanned by one broken down railway. Yet those five thousand miles
would not stay in the minds of the enthusiasts. So overwhelming was
their conviction that an eastern front was needed, and so great their
confidence in the valor of the Japanese army, that, mentally, they had
projected that army from Vladivostok to Poland on a magic carpet. In
vain our military authorities argued that to land troops on the rim of
Siberia had as little to do with reaching the Germans, as climbing
from the cellar to the roof of the Woolworth building had to do with
reaching the moon.

The stereotype in this instance was the war on two fronts. Ever since
men had begun to imagine the Great War they had conceived Germany held
between France and Russia. One generation of strategists, and perhaps
two, had lived with that visual image as the starting point of all
their calculations. For nearly four years every battle-map they saw
had deepened the impression that this was the war. When affairs took a
new turn, it was not easy to see them as they were then. They were
seen through the stereotype, and facts which conflicted with it, such
as the distance from Japan to Poland, were incapable of coming vividly
into consciousness.

It is interesting to note that the American authorities dealt with the
new facts more realistically than the French. In part, this was
because (previous to 1914) they had no preconception of a war upon the
continent; in part because the Americans, engrossed in the
mobilization of their forces, had a vision of the western front which
was itself a stereotype that excluded from _their_ consciousness
any very vivid sense of the other theatres of war. In the spring of
1918 this American view could not compete with the traditional French
view, because while the Americans believed enormously in their own
powers, the French at that time (before Cantigny and the Second Marne)
had the gravest doubts. The American confidence suffused the American
stereotype, gave it that power to possess consciousness, that
liveliness and sensible pungency, that stimulating effect upon the
will, that emotional interest as an object of desire, that congruity
with the activity in hand, which James notes as characteristic of what
we regard as "real." [Footnote: _Principles of Psychology_, Vol.
II, p. 300.] The French in despair remained fixed on their accepted
image. And when facts, gross geographical facts, would not fit with
the preconception, they were either censored out of mind, or the facts
were themselves stretched out of shape. Thus the difficulty of the
Japanese reaching the Germans five thousand miles away was, in
measure, overcome by bringing the Germans more than half way to meet
them. Between March and June 1918, there was supposed to be a German
army operating in Eastern Siberia. This phantom army consisted of some
German prisoners actually seen, more German prisoners thought about,
and chiefly of the delusion that those five thousand intervening miles
did not really exist. [Footnote: See in this connection Mr. Charles
Grasty's interview with Marshal Foch, _New York Times_, February
26, 1918. "Germany is walking through Russia. America and Japan, who
are in a position to do so, should go to meet her in Siberia." See
also the resolution by Senator King of Utah, June 10, 1918, and Mr.
Taft's statement in the _New York Times_, June 11, 1918, and the
appeal to America on May 5, 1918, by Mr. A. J. Sack, Director of the
Russian Information Bureau: "If Germany were in the Allied place...
she would have 3,000,000 fighting on the East front within a year."]

3

A true conception of space is not a simple matter. If I draw a
straight line on a map between Bombay and Hong Kong and measure the
distance, I have learned nothing whatever about the distance I should
have to cover on a voyage. And even if I measure the actual distance
that I must traverse, I still know very little until I know what ships
are in the service, when they run, how fast they go, whether I can
secure accommodation and afford to pay for it. In practical life space
is a matter of available transportation, not of geometrical planes, as
the old railroad magnate knew when he threatened to make grass grow in
the streets of a city that had offended him. If I am motoring and ask
how far it is to my destination, I curse as an unmitigated booby the
man who tells me it is three miles, and does not mention a six mile
detour. It does me no good to be told that it is three miles if you
walk. I might as well be told it is one mile as the crow flies. I do
not fly like a crow, and I am not walking either. I must know that it
is nine miles for a motor car, and also, if that is the case, that six
of them are ruts and puddles. I call the pedestrian a nuisance who
tells me it is three miles and think evil of the aviator who told me
it was one mile. Both of them are talking about the space they have to
cover, not the space I must cover.

In the drawing of boundary lines absurd complications have arisen
through failure to conceive the practical geography of a region. Under
some general formula like self-determination statesmen have at various
times drawn lines on maps, which, when surveyed on the spot, ran
through the middle of a factory, down the center of a village street,
diagonally across the nave of a church, or between the kitchen and
bedroom of a peasant's cottage. There have been frontiers in a grazing
country which separated pasture from water, pasture from market, and
in an industrial country, railheads from railroad. On the colored
ethnic map the line was ethnically just, that is to say, just in the
world of that ethnic map.

4

But time, no less than space, fares badly. A common example is that of
the man who tries by making an elaborate will to control his money
long after his death. "It had been the purpose of the first William
James," writes his great-grandson Henry James, [Footnote: _The
Letters of William James_, Vol. I, p. 6.] "to provide that his
children (several of whom were under age when he died) should qualify
themselves by industry and experience to enjoy the large patrimony
which he expected to bequeath to them, and with that in view he left a
will which was a voluminous compound of restraints and instructions.
He showed thereby how great were both his confidence in his own
judgment and his solicitude for the moral welfare of his descendants."
The courts upset the will. For the law in its objection to
perpetuities recognizes that there are distinct limits to the
usefulness of allowing anyone to impose his moral stencil upon an
unknown future. But the desire to impose it is a very human trait, so
human that the law permits it to operate for a limited time after
death.

The amending clause of any constitution is a good index of the
confidence the authors entertained about the reach of their opinions
in the succeeding generations. There are, I believe, American state
constitutions which are almost incapable of amendment. The men who
made them could have had but little sense of the flux of time: to them
the Here and Now was so brilliantly certain, the Hereafter so vague or
so terrifying, that they had the courage to say how life should run
after they were gone. And then because constitutions are difficult to
amend, zealous people with a taste for mortmain have loved to write on
this imperishable brass all kinds of rules and restrictions that,
given any decent humility about the future, ought to be no more
permanent than an ordinary statute.

A presumption about time enters widely into our opinions. To one
person an institution which has existed for the whole of his conscious
life is part of the permanent furniture of the universe: to another it
is ephemeral. Geological time is very different from biological time.
Social time is most complex. The statesman has to decide whether to
calculate for the emergency or for the long run. Some decisions have
to be made on the basis of what will happen in the next two hours;
others on what will happen in a week, a month, a season, a decade,
when the children have grown up, or their children's children. An
important part of wisdom is the ability to distinguish the
time-conception that properly belongs to the thing in hand. The person
who uses the wrong time-conception ranges from the dreamer who ignores
the present to the philistine who can see nothing else. A true scale
of values has a very acute sense of relative time.

Distant time, past and future, has somehow to be conceived. But as
James says, "of the longer duration we have no direct 'realizing'
sense." [Footnote: _Principles of Psychology_, Vol. I, p. 638.]
The longest duration which we immediately feel is what is called the
"specious present." It endures, according to Titchener, for about six
seconds. [Footnote: Cited by Warren, _Human Psychology_, p. 255.]
"All impressions within this period of time are present to us _at
once_. This makes it possible for us to perceive changes and events
as well as stationary objects. The perceptual present is supplemented
by the ideational present. Through the combination of perceptions with
memory images, entire days, months, and even years of the past are
brought together into the present."

In this ideational present, vividness, as James said, is proportionate
to the number of discriminations we perceive within it. Thus a
vacation in which we were bored with nothing to do passes slowly while
we are in it, but seems very short in memory. Great activity kills
time rapidly, but in memory its duration is long. On the relation
between the amount we discriminate and our time perspective James has
an interesting passage: [Footnote: _Op. cit._, Vol. I, p. 639.]

"We have every reason to think that creatures may possibly differ
enormously in the amounts of duration which they intuitively feel, and
in the fineness of the events that may fill it. Von Baer has indulged
in some interesting computations of the effect of such differences in
changing the aspect of Nature. Suppose we were able, within the length
of a second, to note 10,000 events distinctly, instead of barely 10 as
now; [Footnote: In the moving picture this effect is admirably produced
by the ultra-rapid camera.] if our life were then destined to hold the
same number of impressions, it might be 1000 times as short. We should
live less than a month, and personally know nothing of the change of
seasons. If born in winter, we should believe in summer as we now
believe in the heats of the carboniferous era. The motions of organic
beings would be so slow to our senses as to be inferred, not seen. The
sun would stand still in the sky, the moon be almost free from change,
and so on. But now reverse the hypothesis and suppose a being to get
only one 1000th part of the sensations we get in a given time, and
consequently to live 1000 times as long. Winters and summers will be
to him like quarters of an hour. Mushrooms and the swifter growing
plants will shoot into being so rapidly as to appear instantaneous
creations; annual shrubs will rise and fall from the earth like
restless boiling water springs; the motions of animals will be as
invisible as are to us the movements of bullets and cannon-balls; the
sun will scour through the sky like a meteor, leaving a fiery trail
behind him, etc."

5

In his Outline of History Mr. Wells has made a gallant effort to
visualize "the true proportions of historical to geological time"
[Footnote: 1 Vol. II, p. 605. See also James Harvey Robinson, _The
New History,_ p. 239.] On a scale which represents the time from
Columbus to ourselves by three inches of space, the reader would have
to walk 55 feet to see the date of the painters of the Altamara caves,
550 feet to see the earlier Neanderthalers, a mile or so to the last
of the dinosaurs. More or less precise chronology does not begin until
after 1000 B.C., and at that time "Sargon I of the Akkadian-Sumerian
Empire was a remote memory,... more remote than is Constantine the
Great from the world of the present day.... Hammurabi had been dead a
thousand years... Stonehedge in England was already a thousand years
old."

Mr. Wells was writing with a purpose. "In the brief period of ten
thousand years these units (into which men have combined) have grown
from the small family tribe of the early neolithic culture to the vast
united realms--vast yet still too small and partial--of the present
time." Mr. Wells hoped by changing the time perspective on our present
problems to change the moral perspective. Yet the astronomical measure
of time, the geological, the biological, any telescopic measure which
minimizes the present is not "more true" than a microscopic. Mr.
Simeon Strunsky is right when he insists that "if Mr. Wells is
thinking of his subtitle, The Probable Future of Mankind, he is
entitled to ask for any number of centuries to work out his solution.
If he is thinking of the salvaging of this western civilization,
reeling under the effects of the Great War, he must think in decades
and scores of years." [Footnote: In a review of _The Salvaging of
Civilization, The Literary Review of the N. Y. Evening Post_, June
18, 1921, p. 5.] It all depends upon the practical purpose for which
you adopt the measure. There are situations when the time perspective
needs to be lengthened, and others when it needs to be shortened.

The man who says that it does not matter if 15,000,000 Chinese die of
famine, because in two generations the birthrate will make up the
loss, has used a time perspective to excuse his inertia. A person who
pauperizes a healthy young man because he is sentimentally
overimpressed with an immediate difficulty has lost sight of the
duration of the beggar's life. The people who for the sake of an
immediate peace are willing to buy off an aggressive empire by
indulging its appetite have allowed a specious present to interfere
with the peace of their children. The people who will not be patient
with a troublesome neighbor, who want to bring everything to a
"showdown" are no less the victims of a specious present.

6

Into almost every social problem the proper calculation of time
enters. Suppose, for example, it is a question of timber. Some trees
grow faster than others. Then a sound forest policy is one in which
the amount of each species and of each age cut in each season is made
good by replanting. In so far as that calculation is correct the
truest economy has been reached. To cut less is waste, and to cut more
is exploitation. But there may come an emergency, say the need for
aeroplane spruce in a war, when the year's allowance must be exceeded.
An alert government will recognize that and regard the restoration of
the balance as a charge upon the future.

Coal involves a different theory of time, because coal, unlike a tree,
is produced on the scale of geological time. The supply is limited.
Therefore a correct social policy involves intricate computation of
the available reserves of the world, the indicated possibilities, the
present rate of use, the present economy of use, and the alternative
fuels. But when that computation has been reached it must finally be
squared with an ideal standard involving time. Suppose, for example,
that engineers conclude that the present fuels are being exhausted at
a certain rate; that barring new discoveries industry will have to
enter a phase of contraction at some definite time in the future. We
have then to determine how much thrift and self-denial we will use,
after all feasible economies have been exercised, in order not to rob
posterity. But what shall we consider posterity? Our grandchildren?
Our great grandchildren? Perhaps we shall decide to calculate on a
hundred years, believing that to be ample time for the discovery of
alternative fuels if the necessity is made clear at once. The figures
are, of course, hypothetical. But in calculating that way we shall be
employing what reason we have. We shall be giving social time its
place in public opinion. Let us now imagine a somewhat different case:
a contract between a city and a trolley-car company. The company says
that it will not invest its capital unless it is granted a monopoly of
the main highway for ninety-nine years. In the minds of the men who
make that demand ninety-nine years is so long as to mean "forever."
But suppose there is reason to think that surface cars, run from a
central power plant on tracks, are going out of fashion in twenty
years. Then it is a most unwise contract to make, for you are
virtually condemning a future generation to inferior transportation.
In making such a contract the city officials lack a realizing sense of
ninety-nine years. Far better to give the company a subsidy now in
order to attract capital than to stimulate investment by indulging a
fallacious sense of eternity. No city official and no company official
has a sense of real time when he talks about ninety-nine years.

Popular history is a happy hunting ground of time confusions. To the
average Englishman, for example, the behavior of Cromwell, the
corruption of the Act of Union, the Famine of 1847 are wrongs suffered
by people long dead and done by actors long dead with whom no living
person, Irish or English, has any real connection. But in the mind of
a patriotic Irishman these same events are almost contemporary. His
memory is like one of those historical paintings, where Virgil and
Dante sit side by side conversing. These perspectives and
foreshortenings are a great barrier between peoples. It is ever so
difficult for a person of one tradition to remember what is
contemporary in the tradition of another.

Almost nothing that goes by the name of Historic Rights or Historic
Wrongs can be called a truly objective view of the past. Take, for
example, the Franco-German debate about Alsace-Lorraine. It all
depends on the original date you select. If you start with the Rauraci
and Sequani, the lands are historically part of Ancient Gaul. If you
prefer Henry I, they are historically a German territory; if you take
1273 they belong to the House of Austria; if you take 1648 and the
Peace of Westphalia, most of them are French; if you take Louis XIV
and the year 1688 they are almost all French. If you are using the
argument from history you are fairly certain to select those dates in
the past which support your view of what should be done now.

Arguments about "races" and nationalities often betray the same
arbitrary view of time. During the war, under the influence of
powerful feeling, the difference between "Teutons" on the one hand,
and "Anglo-Saxons" and French on the other, was popularly believed to
be an eternal difference. They had always been opposing races. Yet a
generation ago, historians, like Freeman, were emphasizing the common
Teutonic origin of the West European peoples, and ethnologists would
certainly insist that the Germans, English, and the greater part of
the French are branches of what was once a common stock. The general
rule is: if you like a people to-day you come down the branches to the
trunk; if you dislike them you insist that the separate branches are
separate trunks. In one case you fix your attention on the period
before they were distinguishable; in the other on the period after
which they became distinct. And the view which fits the mood is taken
as the "truth."

An amiable variation is the family tree. Usually one couple are
appointed the original ancestors, if possible, a couple associated
with an honorific event like the Norman Conquest. That couple have no
ancestors. They are not descendants. Yet they were the descendants of
ancestors, and the expression that So-and-So was the founder of his
house means not that he is the Adam of his family, but that he is the
particular ancestor from whom it is desirable to start, or perhaps the
earliest ancestor of which there is a record. But genealogical tables
exhibit a deeper prejudice. Unless the female line happens to be
especially remarkable descent is traced down through the males. The
tree is male. At various moments females accrue to it as itinerant
bees light upon an ancient apple tree.

7

But the future is the most illusive time of all. Our temptation here
is to jump over necessary steps in the sequence; and as we are
governed by hope or doubt, to exaggerate or to minimize the time
required to complete various parts of a process. The discussion of the
role to be exercised by wage-earners in the management of industry is
riddled with this difficulty. For management is a word that covers
many functions. [Footnote: Cf. Carter L. Goodrich, The Frontier of
Control.] Some of these require no training; some require a little
training; others can be learned only in a lifetime. And the truly
discriminating program of industrial democratization would be one
based on the proper time sequence, so that the assumption of
responsibility would run parallel to a complementary program of
industrial training. The proposal for a sudden dictatorship of the
proletariat is an attempt to do away with the intervening time of
preparation; the resistance to all sharing of responsibility an
attempt to deny the alteration of human capacity in the course of
time. Primitive notions of democracy, such as rotation in office, and
contempt for the expert, are really nothing but the old myth that the
Goddess of Wisdom sprang mature and fully armed from the brow of Jove.
They assume that what it takes years to learn need not be learned at
all.

Whenever the phrase "backward people" is used as the basis of a
policy, the conception of time is a decisive element. The Covenant of
the League of Nations says, [Footnote: Article XIX.] for example, that
"the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of
the development of the people," as well as on other grounds. Certain
communities, it asserts, "have reached a stage of development" where
their independence can be provisionally recognized, subject to advice
and assistance "until such time as they are able to stand alone." The
way in which the mandatories and the mandated conceive that time will
influence deeply their relations. Thus in the case of Cuba the
judgment of the American government virtually coincided with that of
the Cuban patriots, and though there has been trouble, there is no
finer page in the history of how strong powers have dealt with the
weak. Oftener in that history the estimates have not coincided. Where
the imperial people, whatever its public expressions, has been deeply
convinced that the backwardness of the backward was so hopeless as not
to be worth remedying, or so profitable that it was not desirable to
remedy it, the tie has festered and poisoned the peace of the world.
There have been a few cases, very few, where backwardness has meant to
the ruling power the need for a program of forwardness, a program with
definite standards and definite estimates of time. Far more
frequently, so frequently in fact as to seem the rule, backwardness
has been conceived as an intrinsic and eternal mark of inferiority.
And then every attempt to be less backward has been frowned upon as
the sedition, which, under these conditions, it undoubtedly is. In our
own race wars we can see some of the results of the failure to realize
that time would gradually obliterate the slave morality of the Negro,
and that social adjustment based on this morality would begin to break
down.

It is hard not to picture the future as if it obeyed our present
purposes, to annihilate whatever delays our desire, or immortalize
whatever stands between us and our fears.

8

In putting together our public opinions, not only do we have to
picture more space than we can see with our eyes, and more time than
we can feel, but we have to describe and judge more people, more
actions, more things than we can ever count, or vividly imagine. We
have to summarize and generalize. We have to pick out samples, and
treat them as typical.

To pick fairly a good sample of a large class is not easy. The problem
belongs to the science of statistics, and it is a most difficult
affair for anyone whose mathematics is primitive, and mine remain
azoic in spite of the half dozen manuals which I once devoutly
imagined that I understood. All they have done for me is to make me a
little more conscious of how hard it is to classify and to sample, how
readily we spread a little butter over the whole universe.

Some time ago a group of social workers in Sheffield, England, started
out to substitute an accurate picture of the mental equipment of the
workers of that city for the impressionistic one they had. [Footnote:
_The Equipment of the Worker_.] They wished to say, with some
decent grounds for saying it, how the workers of Sheffield were
equipped. They found, as we all find the moment we refuse to let our
first notion prevail, that they were beset with complications. Of the
test they employed nothing need be said here except that it was a
large questionnaire. For the sake of the illustration, assume that the
questions were a fair test of mental equipment for English city life.
Theoretically, then, those questions should have been put to every
member of the working class. But it is not so easy to know who are the
working class. However, assume again that the census knows how to
classify them. Then there were roughly 104,000 men and 107,000 women
who ought to have been questioned. They possessed the answers which
would justify or refute the casual phrase about the "ignorant workers"
or the "intelligent workers." But nobody could think of questioning
the whole two hundred thousand.

So the social workers consulted an eminent statistician, Professor
Bowley. He advised them that not less than 408 men and 408 women would
prove to be a fair sample. According to mathematical calculation this
number would not show a greater deviation from the average than 1 in
22. [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p. 65.] They had, therefore, to
question at least 816 people before they could pretend to talk about
the average workingman. But which 816 people should they approach? "We
might have gathered particulars concerning workers to whom one or
another of us had a pre-inquiry access; we might have worked through
philanthropic gentlemen and ladies who were in contact with certain
sections of workers at a club, a mission, an infirmary, a place of
worship, a settlement. But such a method of selection would produce
entirely worthless results. The workers thus selected would not be in
any sense representative of what is popularly called 'the average run
of workers;' they would represent nothing but the little coteries to
which they belonged.

"The right way of securing 'victims,' to which at immense cost of time
and labour we rigidly adhered, is to get hold of your workers by some
'neutral' or 'accidental' or 'random' method of approach." This they
did. And after all these precautions they came to no more definite
conclusion than that on their classification and according to their
questionnaire, among 200,000 Sheffield workers "about one quarter"
were "well equipped," "approaching three-quarters" were "inadequately
equipped" and that "about one-fifteenth" were "mal-equipped."

Compare this conscientious and almost pedantic method of arriving at
an opinion, with our usual judgments about masses of people, about the
volatile Irish, and the logical French, and the disciplined Germans,
and the ignorant Slavs, and the honest Chinese, and the untrustworthy
Japanese, and so on and so on. All these are generalizations drawn
from samples, but the samples are selected by a method that
statistically is wholly unsound. Thus the employer will judge labor by
the most troublesome employee or the most docile that he knows, and
many a radical group has imagined that it was a fair sample of the
working class. How many women's views on the "servant question" are
little more than the reflection of their own treatment of their
servants? The tendency of the casual mind is to pick out or stumble
upon a sample which supports or defies its prejudices, and then to
make it the representative of a whole class.

A great deal of confusion arises when people decline to classify
themselves as we have classified them. Prophecy would be so much
easier if only they would stay where we put them. But, as a matter of
fact, a phrase like the working class will cover only some of the
truth for a part of the time. When you take all the people, below a
certain level of income, and call them the working class, you cannot
help assuming that the people so classified will behave in accordance
with your stereotype. Just who those people are you are not quite
certain. Factory hands and mine workers fit in more or less, but farm
hands, small farmers, peddlers, little shop keepers, clerks, servants,
soldiers, policemen, firemen slip out of the net. The tendency, when
you are appealing to the "working class," is to fix your attention on
two or three million more or less confirmed trade unionists, and treat
them as Labor; the other seventeen or eighteen million, who might
qualify statistically, are tacitly endowed with the point of view
ascribed to the organized nucleus. How very misleading it was to
impute to the British working class in 1918-1921 the point of view
expressed in the resolutions of the Trades Union Congress or in the
pamphlets written by intellectuals.

The stereotype of Labor as Emancipator selects the evidence which
supports itself and rejects the other. And so parallel with the real
movements of working men there exists a fiction of the Labor Movement,
in which an idealized mass moves towards an ideal goal. The fiction
deals with the future. In the future possibilities are almost
indistinguishable from probabilities and probabilities from
certainties. If the future is long enough, the human will might turn
what is just conceivable into what is very likely, and what is likely
into what is sure to happen. James called this the faith ladder, and
said that "it is a slope of goodwill on which in the larger questions
of life men habitually live." [Footnote: William James, _Some
Problems of Philosophy_, p. 224.]

"1. There is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true,
nothing contradictory;

2. It _might_ have been true under certain conditions;

3. It _may_ be true even now;

4. It is _fit_ to be true;

5. It _ought_ to be true;

6. It _must_ be true;

7. It _shall_ be true, at any rate true for me."

And, as he added in another place, [Footnote: _A Pluralistic
Universe_, p. 329.] "your acting thus may in certain special cases
be a means of making it securely true in the end." Yet no one would
have insisted more than he, that, so far as we know how, we must avoid
substituting the goal for the starting point, must avoid reading back
into the present what courage, effort and skill might create in the
future. Yet this truism is inordinately difficult to live by, because
every one of us is so little trained in the selection of our samples.

If we believe that a certain thing ought to be true, we can almost
always find either an instance where it is true, or someone who
believes it ought to be true. It is ever so hard when a concrete fact
illustrates a hope to weigh that fact properly. When the first six
people we meet agree with us, it is not easy to remember that they may
all have read the same newspaper at breakfast. And yet we cannot send
out a questionnaire to 816 random samples every time we wish to
estimate a probability. In dealing with any large mass of facts, the
presumption is against our having picked true samples, if we are
acting on a casual impression.

9

And when we try to go one step further in order to seek the causes and
effects of unseen and complicated affairs, haphazard opinion is very
tricky. There are few big issues in public life where cause and effect
are obvious at once. They are not obvious to scholars who have devoted
years, let us say, to studying business cycles, or price and wage
movements, or the migration and the assimilation of peoples, or the
diplomatic purposes of foreign powers. Yet somehow we are all supposed
to have opinions on these matters, and it is not surprising that the
commonest form of reasoning is the intuitive, post hoc ergo propter
hoc.

The more untrained a mind, the more readily it works out a theory that
two things which catch its attention at the same time are causally
connected. We have already dwelt at some length on the way things
reach our attention. We have seen that our access to information is
obstructed and uncertain, and that our apprehension is deeply
controlled by our stereotypes; that the evidence available to our
reason is subject to illusions of defense, prestige, morality, space,
time, and sampling. We must note now that with this initial taint,
public opinions are still further beset, because in a series of events
seen mostly through stereotypes, we readily accept sequence or
parallelism as equivalent to cause and effect.

This is most likely to happen when two ideas that come together arouse
the same feeling. If they come together they are likely to arouse the
same feeling; and even when they do not arrive together a powerful
feeling attached to one is likely to suck out of all the corners of
memory any idea that feels about the same. Thus everything painful
tends to collect into one system of cause and effect, and likewise
everything pleasant.

"IId IIm (1675) This day I hear that G[od] has shot an arrow into the
midst of this Town. The small pox is in an ordinary ye sign of the
Swan, the ordinary Keepers name is Windsor. His daughter is sick of
the disease. It is observable that this disease begins at an alehouse,
to testify God's displeasure agt the sin of drunkenness & yt of
multiplying alehouses!" [Footnote: _The Heart of the Puritan_, p.
177, edited by Elizabeth Deering Hanscom.]

Thus Increase Mather, and thus in the year 1919 a distinguished
Professor of Celestial Mechanics discussing the Einstein theory:

"It may well be that.... Bolshevist uprisings are in reality the
visible objects of some underlying, deep, mental disturbance,
world-wide in character.... This same spirit of unrest has invaded
science." [Footnote: Cited in _The New Republic_, Dec. 24, 1919,
p. 120.]

In hating one thing violently, we readily associate with it as cause
or effect most of the other things we hate or fear violently. They may
have no more connection than smallpox and alehouses, or Relativity and
Bolshevism, but they are bound together in the same emotion. In a
superstitious mind, like that of the Professor of Celestial Mechanics,
emotion is a stream of molten lava which catches and imbeds whatever
it touches. When you excavate in it you find, as in a buried city, all
sorts of objects ludicrously entangled in each other. Anything can be
related to anything else, provided it feels like it. Nor has a mind in
such a state any way of knowing how preposterous it is. Ancient fears,
reinforced by more recent fears, coagulate into a snarl of fears where
anything that is dreaded is the cause of anything else that is
dreaded.

10

Generally it all culminates in the fabrication of a system of all
evil, and of another which is the system of all good. Then our love of
the absolute shows itself. For we do not like qualifying
adverbs. [Footnote: _Cf_. Freud's discussion of absolutism in
dreams, _Interpretation of Dreams_, Chapter VI, especially pp.
288, _et seq_.] They clutter up sentences, and interfere with
irresistible feeling. We prefer most to more, least to less, we
dislike the words rather, perhaps, if, or, but, toward, not quite,
almost, temporarily, partly. Yet nearly every opinion about public
affairs needs to be deflated by some word of this sort. But in our
free moments everything tends to behave absolutely,--one hundred
percent, everywhere, forever.

It is not enough to say that our side is more right than the enemy's,
that our victory will help democracy more than his. One must insist
that our victory will end war forever, and make the world safe for
democracy. And when the war is over, though we have thwarted a greater
evil than those which still afflict us, the relativity of the result
fades out, the absoluteness of the present evil overcomes our spirit,
and we feel that we are helpless because we have not been
irresistible. Between omnipotence and impotence the pendulum swings.

Real space, real time, real numbers, real connections, real weights
are lost. The perspective and the background and the dimensions of
action are clipped and frozen in the stereotype.



PART IV

INTERESTS

CHAPTER 11. THE ENLISTING OF INTEREST
   "    12. SELF-INTEREST RECONSIDERED



CHAPTER XI

THE ENLISTING OF INTEREST

I

BUT the human mind is not a film which registers once and for all each
impression that comes through its shutters and lenses. The human mind
is endlessly and persistently creative. The pictures fade or combine,
are sharpened here, condensed there, as we make them more completely
our own. They do not lie inert upon the surface of the mind, but are
reworked by the poetic faculty into a personal expression of
ourselves. We distribute the emphasis and participate in the action.

In order to do this we tend to personalize quantities, and to
dramatize relations. As some sort of allegory, except in acutely
sophisticated minds, the affairs of the world are represented. Social
Movements, Economic Forces, National Interests, Public Opinion are
treated as persons, or persons like the Pope, the President, Lenin,
Morgan or the King become ideas and institutions. The deepest of all
the stereotypes is the human stereotype which imputes human nature to
inanimate or collective things.

The bewildering variety of our impressions, even after they have been
censored in all kinds of ways, tends to force us to adopt the greater
economy of the allegory. So great is the multitude of things that we
cannot keep them vividly in mind. Usually, then, we name them, and let
the name stand for the whole impression. But a name is porous. Old
meanings slip out and new ones slip in, and the attempt to retain the
full meaning of the name is almost as fatiguing as trying to recall
the original impressions. Yet names are a poor currency for thought.
They are too empty, too abstract, too inhuman. And so we begin to see
the name through some personal stereotype, to read into it, finally to
see in it the incarnation of some human quality.

Yet human qualities are themselves vague and fluctuating. They are
best remembered by a physical sign. And therefore, the human qualities
we tend to ascribe to the names of our impressions, themselves tend to
be visualized in physical metaphors. The people of England, the
history of England, condense into England, and England becomes John
Bull, who is jovial and fat, not too clever, but well able to take
care of himself. The migration of a people may appear to some as the
meandering of a river, and to others like a devastating flood. The
courage people display may be objectified as a rock; their purpose as
a road, their doubts as forks of the road, their difficulties as ruts
and rocks, their progress as a fertile valley. If they mobilize their
dread-naughts they unsheath a sword. If their army surrenders they are
thrown to earth. If they are oppressed they are on the rack or under
the harrow.

When public affairs are popularized in speeches, headlines, plays,
moving pictures, cartoons, novels, statues or paintings, their
transformation into a human interest requires first abstraction from
the original, and then animation of what has been abstracted. We
cannot be much interested in, or much moved by, the things we do not
see. Of public affairs each of us sees very little, and therefore,
they remain dull and unappetizing, until somebody, with the makings of
an artist, has translated them into a moving picture. Thus the
abstraction, imposed upon our knowledge of reality by all the
limitations of our access and of our prejudices, is compensated. Not
being omnipresent and omniscient we cannot see much of what we have to
think and talk about. Being flesh and blood we will not feed on words
and names and gray theory. Being artists of a sort we paint pictures,
stage dramas and draw cartoons out of the abstractions.

Or, if possible, we find gifted men who can visualize for us. For
people are not all endowed to the same degree with the pictorial
faculty. Yet one may, I imagine, assert with Bergson that the
practical intelligence is most closely adapted to spatial
qualities. [Footnote: _Creative Evolution_, Chs. III, IV.] A
"clear" thinker is almost always a good visualizer. But for that same
reason, because he is "cinematographic," he is often by that much
external and insensitive. For the people who have intuition, which is
probably another name for musical or muscular perception, often
appreciate the quality of an event and the inwardness of an act far
better than the visualizer. They have more understanding when the
crucial element is a desire that is never crudely overt, and appears
on the surface only in a veiled gesture, or in a rhythm of speech.
Visualization may catch the stimulus and the result. But the
intermediate and internal is often as badly caricatured by a
visualizer, as is the intention of the composer by an enormous soprano
in the sweet maiden's part.

Nevertheless, though they have often a peculiar justice, intuitions
remain highly private and largely incommunicable. But social
intercourse depends on communication, and while a person can often
steer his own life with the utmost grace by virtue of his intuitions,
he usually has great difficulty in making them real to others. When he
talks about them they sound like a sheaf of mist. For while intuition
does give a fairer perception of human feeling, the reason with its
spatial and tactile prejudice can do little with that perception.
Therefore, where action depends on whether a number of people are of
one mind, it is probably true that in the first instance no idea is
lucid for practical decision until it has visual or tactile value. But
it is also true, that no visual idea is significant to us until it has
enveloped some stress of our own personality. Until it releases or
resists, depresses or enhances, some craving of our own, it remains
one of the objects which do not matter.

2

Pictures have always been the surest way of conveying an idea, and
next in order, words that call up pictures in memory. But the idea
conveyed is not fully our own until we have identified ourselves with
some aspect of the picture. The identification, or what Vernon Lee has
called empathy, [Footnote: _Beauty and Ugliness_.] may be almost
infinitely subtle and symbolic. The mimicry may be performed without
our being aware of it, and sometimes in a way that would horrify those
sections of our personality which support our self-respect. In
sophisticated people the participation may not be in the fate of the
hero, but in the fate of the whole idea to which both hero and villain
are essential. But these are refinements.

In popular representation the handles for identification are almost
always marked. You know who the hero is at once. And no work promises
to be easily popular where the marking is not definite and the choice
clear. [Footnote: A fact which bears heavily on the character of news.
_Cf_. Part VII.] But that is not enough. The audience must have
something to do, and the contemplation of the true, the good and the
beautiful is not something to do. In order not to sit inertly in the
presence of the picture, and this applies as much to newspaper stories
as to fiction and the cinema, the audience must be exercised by the
image. Now there are two forms of exercise which far transcend all
others, both as to ease with which they are aroused, and eagerness
with which stimuli for them are sought. They are sexual passion and
fighting, and the two have so many associations with each other, blend
into each other so intimately, that a fight about sex outranks every
other theme in the breadth of its appeal. There is none so engrossing
or so careless of all distinctions of culture and frontiers.

The sexual motif figures hardly at all in American political imagery.
Except in certain minor ecstasies of war, in an occasional scandal, or
in phases of the racial conflict with Negroes or Asiatics, to speak of
it at all would seem far-fetched. Only in moving pictures, novels, and
some magazine fiction are industrial relations, business competition,
politics, and diplomacy tangled up with the girl and the other woman.
But the fighting motif appears at every turn. Politics is interesting
when there is a fight, or as we say, an issue. And in order to make
politics popular, issues have to be found, even when in truth and
justice, there are none,--none, in the sense that the differences of
judgment, or principle, or fact, do not call for the enlistment of
pugnacity. [Footnote: _Cf_. Frances Taylor Patterson, _Cinema
Craftsmanship_, pp. 31-32. "III. If the plot lacks suspense: 1. Add
an antagonist, 2. Add an obstacle, 3. Add a problem, 4. Emphasize one
of the questions in the minds of the spectator.,.."]

But where pugnacity is not enlisted, those of us who are not directly
involved find it hard to keep up our interest. For those who are
involved the absorption may be real enough to hold them even when no
issue is involved. They may be exercised by sheer joy in activity, or
by subtle rivalry or invention. But for those to whom the whole
problem is external and distant, these other faculties do not easily
come into play. In order that the faint image of the affair shall mean
something to them, they must be allowed to exercise the love of
struggle, suspense, and victory.

Miss Patterson [Footnote: _Op. cit._, pp. 6-7.] insists that
"suspense... constitutes the difference between the masterpieces in
the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the pictures at the Rivoli or the
Rialto Theatres." Had she made it clear that the masterpieces lack
either an easy mode of identification or a theme popular for this
generation, she would be wholly right in saying that this "explains
why the people straggle into the Metropolitan by twos and threes and
struggle into the Rialto and Rivoli by hundreds. The twos and threes
look at a picture in the Art Museum for less than ten minutes--unless
they chance to be art students, critics, or connoisseurs. The hundreds
in the Rivoli or the Rialto look at the picture for more than an hour.
As far as beauty is concerned there can be no comparison of the merits
of the two pictures. Yet the motion picture draws more people and
holds them at attention longer than do the masterpieces, not through
any intrinsic merit of its own, but because it depicts unfolding
events, the outcome of which the audience is breathlessly waiting. It
possesses the element of struggle, which never fails to arouse
suspense."

In order then that the distant situation shall not be a gray flicker
on the edge of attention, it should be capable of translation into
pictures in which the opportunity for identification is recognizable.
Unless that happens it will interest only a few for a little while. It
will belong to the sights seen but not felt, to the sensations that
beat on our sense organs, and are not acknowledged. We have to take
sides. We have to be able to take sides. In the recesses of our being
we must step out of the audience on to the stage, and wrestle as the
hero for the victory of good over evil. We must breathe into the
allegory the breath of our life.

3

And so, in spite of the critics, a verdict is rendered in the old
controversy about realism and romanticism. Our popular taste is to
have the drama originate in a setting realistic enough to make
identification plausible and to have it terminate in a setting
romantic enough to be desirable, but not so romantic as to be
inconceivable. In between the beginning and the end the canons are
liberal, but the true beginning and the happy ending are landmarks.
The moving picture audience rejects fantasy logically developed,
because in pure fantasy there is no familiar foothold in the age of
machines. It rejects realism relentlessly pursued because it does not
enjoy defeat in a struggle that has become its own.

What will be accepted as true, as realistic, as good, as evil, as
desirable, is not eternally fixed. These are fixed by stereotypes,
acquired from earlier experiences and carried over into judgment of
later ones. And, therefore, if the financial investment in each film
and in popular magazines were not so exorbitant as to require instant
and widespread popularity, men of spirit and imagination would be able
to use the screen and the periodical, as one might dream of their
being used, to enlarge and to refine, to verify and criticize the
repertory of images with which our imaginations work. But, given the
present costs, the men who make moving pictures, like the church and
the court painters of other ages, must adhere to the stereotypes that
they find, or pay the price of frustrating expectation. The
stereotypes can be altered, but not in time to guarantee success when
the film is released six months from now.

The men who do alter the stereotypes, the pioneering artists and
critics, are naturally depressed and angered at managers and editors
who protect their investments. They are risking everything, then why
not the others? That is not quite fair, for in their righteous fury
they have forgotten their own rewards, which are beyond any that their
employers can hope to feel. They could not, and would not if they
could, change places. And they have forgotten another thing in the
unceasing war with Philistia. They have forgotten that they are
measuring their own success by standards that artists and wise men of
the past would never have dreamed of invoking. They are asking for
circulations and audiences that were never considered by any artist
until the last few generations. And when they do not get them, they
are disappointed.

Those who catch on, like Sinclair Lewis in "Main Street," are men who
have succeeded in projecting definitely what great numbers of other
people were obscurely trying to say inside their heads. "You have said
it for me." They establish a new form which is then endlessly copied
until it, too, becomes a stereotype of perception. The next pioneer
finds it difficult to make the public see Main Street any other way.
And he, like the forerunners of Sinclair Lewis, has a quarrel with the
public.

This quarrel is due not only to the conflict of stereotypes, but to
the pioneering artist's reverence for his material. Whatever the plane
he chooses, on that plane he remains. If he is dealing with the
inwardness of an event he follows it to its conclusion regardless of
the pain it causes. He will not tag his fantasy to help anyone, or cry
peace where there is no peace. There is his America. But big audiences
have no stomach for such severity. They are more interested in
themselves than in anything else in the world. The selves in which
they are interested are the selves that have been revealed by schools
and by tradition. They insist that a work of art shall be a vehicle
with a step where they can climb aboard, and that they shall ride, not
according to the contours of the country, but to a land where for an
hour there are no clocks to punch and no dishes to wash. To satisfy
these demands there exists an intermediate class of artists who are
able and willing to confuse the planes, to piece together a
realistic-romantic compound out of the inventions of greater men, and,
as Miss Patterson advises, give "what real life so rarely does-the
triumphant resolution of a set of difficulties; the anguish of virtue
and the triumph of sin... changed to the glorifications of virtue and
the eternal punishment of its enemy." [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p.
46. "The hero and heroine must in general possess youth, beauty,
goodness, exalted self-sacrifice, and unalterable constancy."]

4

The ideologies of politics obey these rules. The foothold of realism
is always there. The picture of some real evil, such as the German
threat or class conflict, is recognizable in the argument. There is a
description of some aspect of the world which is convincing because it
agrees with familiar ideas. But as the ideology deals with an unseen
future, as well as with a tangible present, it soon crosses
imperceptibly the frontier of verification. In describing the present
you are more or less tied down to common experience. In describing
what nobody has experienced you are bound to let go. You stand at
Armageddon, more or less, but you battle for the Lord, perhaps.... A
true beginning, true according to the standards prevailing, and a
happy ending. Every Marxist is hard as nails about the brutalities of
the present, and mostly sunshine about the day after the dictatorship.
So were the war propagandists: there was not a bestial quality in
human nature they did not find everywhere east of the Rhine, or west
of it if they were Germans. The bestiality was there all right. But
after the victory, eternal peace. Plenty of this is quite cynically
deliberate. For the skilful propagandist knows that while you must
start with a plausible analysis, you must not keep on analyzing,
because the tedium of real political accomplishment will soon destroy
interest. So the propagandist exhausts the interest in reality by a
tolerably plausible beginning, and then stokes up energy for a long
voyage by brandishing a passport to heaven.

The formula works when the public fiction enmeshes itself with a
private urgency. But once enmeshed, in the heat of battle, the
original self and the original stereotype which effected the junction
may be wholly lost to sight.



CHAPTER XII

SELF-INTEREST RECONSIDERED

1

THEREFORE, the identical story is not the same story to all who hear
it. Each will enter it at a slightly different point, since no two
experiences are exactly alike; he will reenact it in his own way, and
transfuse it with his own feelings. Sometimes an artist of compelling
skill will force us to enter into lives altogether unlike our own,
lives that seem at first glance dull, repulsive, or eccentric. But
that is rare. In almost every story that catches our attention we
become a character and act out the role with a pantomime of our own.
The pantomime may be subtle or gross, may be sympathetic to the story,
or only crudely analogous; but it will consist of those feelings which
are aroused by our conception of the role. And so, the original theme
as it circulates, is stressed, twisted, and embroidered by all the
minds through which it goes. It is as if a play of Shakespeare's were
rewritten each time it is performed with all the changes of emphasis
and meaning that the actors and audience inspired.

Something very like that seems to have happened to the stories in the
sagas before they were definitively written down. In our time the
printed record, such as it is, checks the exuberance of each
individual's fancy. But against rumor there is little or no checks and
the original story, true or invented, grows wings and horns, hoofs and
beaks, as the artist in each gossip works upon it. The first
narrator's account does not keep its shape and proportions. It is
edited and revised by all who played with it as they heard it, used it
for day dreams, and passed it on. [Footnote: For an interesting
example, see the case described by C. J. Jung, _Zentralblatt für
Psychoanalyse_, 1911, Vol. I, p. 81. Translated by Constance Long,
in _Analytical Psychology_, Ch. IV.]

Consequently the more mixed the audience, the greater will be the
variation in the response. For as the audience grows larger, the
number of common words diminishes. Thus the common factors in the
story become more abstract. This story, lacking precise character of
its own, is heard by people of highly varied character. They give it
their own character.

2

The character they give it varies not only with sex and age, race and
religion and social position, but within these cruder classifications,
according to the inherited and acquired constitution of the
individual, his faculties, his career, the progress of his career, an
emphasized aspect of his career, his moods and tenses, or his place on
the board in any of the games of life that he is playing. What reaches
him of public affairs, a few lines of print, some photographs,
anecdotes, and some casual experience of his own, he conceives through
his set patterns and recreates with his own emotions. He does not take
his personal problems as partial samples of the greater environment.
He takes his stories of the greater environment as a mimic enlargement
of his private life.

But not necessarily of that private life as he would describe it to
himself. For in his private life the choices are narrow, and much of
himself is squeezed down and out of sight where it cannot directly
govern his outward behavior. And thus, beside the more average people
who project the happiness of their own lives into a general good will,
or their unhappiness into suspicion and hate, there are the outwardly
happy people who are brutal everywhere but in their own circle, as
well as the people who, the more they detest their families, their
friends, their jobs, the more they overflow with love for mankind.

As you descend from generalities to detail, it becomes more apparent
that the character in which men deal with their affairs is not fixed.
Possibly their different selves have a common stem and common
qualities, but the branches and the twigs have many forms. Nobody
confronts every situation with the same character. His character
varies in some degree through the sheer influence of time and
accumulating memory, since he is not an automaton. His character
varies, not only in time, but according to circumstance. The legend of
the solitary Englishman in the South Seas, who invariably shaves and
puts on a black tie for dinner, bears witness to his own intuitive and
civilized fear of losing the character which he has acquired. So do
diaries, and albums, and souvenirs, old letters, and old clothes, and
the love of unchanging routine testify to our sense of how hard it is
to step twice in the Heraclitan river.

There is no one self always at work. And therefore it is of great
importance in the formation of any public opinion, what self is
engaged. The Japanese ask the right to settle in California. Clearly
it makes a whole lot of difference whether you conceive the demand as
a desire to grow fruit or to marry the white man's daughter. If two
nations are disputing a piece of territory, it matters greatly whether
the people regard the negotiations as a real estate deal, an attempt
to humiliate them, or, in the excited and provocative language which
usually enclouds these arguments, as a rape. For the self which takes
charge of the instincts when we are thinking about lemons or distant
acres is very different from the self which appears when we are
thinking even potentially as the outraged head of a family. In one
case the private feeling which enters into the opinion is tepid, in
the other, red hot. And so while it is so true as to be mere tautology
that "self-interest" determines opinion, the statement is not
illuminating, until we know which self out of many selects and directs
the interest so conceived.

Religious teaching and popular wisdom have always distinguished
several personalities in each human being. They have been called the
Higher and Lower, the Spiritual and the Material, the Divine and the
Carnal; and although we may not wholly accept this classification, we
cannot fail to observe that distinctions exist. Instead of two
antithetic selves, a modern man would probably note a good many not so
sharply separated. He would say that the distinction drawn by
theologians was arbitrary and external, because many different selves
were grouped together as higher provided they fitted into the
theologian's categories, but he would recognize nevertheless that here
was an authentic clue to the variety of human nature.

We have learned to note many selves, and to be a little less ready to
issue judgment upon them. We understand that we see the same body, but
often a different man, depending on whether he is dealing with a
social equal, a social inferior, or a social superior; on whether he
is making love to a woman he is eligible to marry, or to one whom he
is not; on whether he is courting a woman, or whether he considers
himself her proprietor; on whether he is dealing with his children,
his partners, his most trusted subordinates, the boss who can make him
or break him; on whether he is struggling for the necessities of life,
or successful; on whether he is dealing with a friendly alien, or a
despised one; on whether he is in great danger, or in perfect
security; on whether he is alone in Paris or among his family in
Peoria.

People differ widely, of course, in the consistency of their
characters, so widely that they may cover the whole gamut of
differences between a split soul like Dr. Jekyll's and an utterly
singleminded Brand, Parsifal, or Don Quixote. If the selves are too
unrelated, we distrust the man; if they are too inflexibly on one
track we find him arid, stubborn, or eccentric. In the repertory of
characters, meager for the isolated and the self-sufficient, highly
varied for the adaptable, there is a whole range of selves, from that
one at the top which we should wish God to see, to those at the bottom
that we ourselves do not dare to see. There may be octaves for the
family,--father, Jehovah, tyrant,--husband, proprietor, male,--lover,
lecher,--for the occupation,--employer, master, exploiter,--competitor,
intriguer, enemy,--subordinate, courtier, snob. Some never come out
into public view. Others are called out only by exceptional circumstances.
But the characters take their form from a man's conception of the
situation in which he finds himself. If the environment to which he
is sensitive happens to be the smart set, he will imitate the character
he conceives to be appropriate. That character will tend to act as
modulator of his bearing, his speech, his choice of subjects, his
preferences. Much of the comedy of life lies here, in the way people
imagine their characters for situations that are strange to them: the
professor among promoters, the deacon at a poker game, the
cockney in the country, the paste diamond among real diamonds.

3

Into the making of a man's characters there enters a variety of
influences not easily separated. [Footnote: For an interesting sketch
of the more noteworthy early attempts to explain character, see the
chapter called "The Antecedents of the Study of Character and
Temperament," in Joseph Jastrow's _The Psychology of Conviction_.]
The analysis in its fundamentals is perhaps still as doubtful as it
was in the fifth century B. C. when Hippocrates formulated the
doctrine of the humors, distinguished the sanguine, the
melancholic, the choleric, and the phlegmatic dispositions, and
ascribed them to the blood, the black bile, the yellow bile, and the
phlegm. The latest theories, such as one finds them in Cannon,
[Footnote: _Bodily Changes in Pleasure, Pain and Anger_.] Adler,
[Footnote: _The Neurotic Constitution_.] Kempf, [Footnote: _The
Autonomic Functions and the Personality; Psychopathology. Cf_. also
Louis Berman: _The Glands Regulating Personality_.] appear to
follow much the same scent, from the outward behavior and the inner
consciousness to the physiology of the body. But in spite of an
immensely improved technique, no one would be likely to claim that
there are settled conclusions which enable us to set apart nature from
nurture, and abstract the native character from the acquired. It is
only in what Joseph Jastrow has called the slums of psychology that
the explanation of character is regarded as a fixed system to be
applied by phrenologists, palmists, fortune-tellers, mind-readers, and
a few political professors. There you will still find it asserted that
"the Chinese are fond of colors, and have their eyebrows much vaulted"
while "the heads of the Calmucks are depressed from above, but very
large laterally, about the organ which gives the inclination to
acquire; and this nation's propensity to steal, etc., is admitted."
[Footnote: _Jastrow, op. cit._, p. 156.]

The modern psychologists are disposed to regard the outward behavior
of an adult as an equation between a number of variables, such as the
resistance of the environment, repressed cravings of several
maturities, and the manifest personality. [Footnote: Formulated by
Kempf, _Psychopathology_, p. 74, as follows:

Manifest wishes                }
     over                      }
Later Repressed Wishes         }
     Over                      } opposed by the resistance of the
Adolescent Repressed Wishes    }       environment=Behavior
     Over                      }
Preadolescent Repressed Wishes }
] They permit us to suppose, though I have not seen the notion
formulated, that the repression or control of cravings is fixed not in
relation to the whole person all the time, but more or less in respect
to his various selves. There are things he will not do as a patriot
that he will do when he is not thinking of himself as a patriot. No
doubt there are impulses, more or less incipient in childhood, that
are never exercised again in the whole of a man's life, except as they
enter obscurely and indirectly into combination with other impulses.
But even that is not certain, since repression is not irretrievable.
For just as psychoanalysis can bring to the surface a buried impulse,
so can social situations. [Footnote: _Cf._ the very interesting
book of Everett Dean Martin, _The Behavior of Crowds_.

Also Hobbes, _Leviathan_, Part II, Ch. 25. "For the passions of
men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand, in an
assembly are like many brands, that inflame one another, especially
when they blow one another with orations...."

LeBon, _The Crowd_, elaborates this observation of Hobbes's.] It
is only when our surroundings remain normal and placid, when what is
expected of us by those we meet is consistent, that we live without
knowledge of many of our dispositions. When the unexpected occurs, we
learn much about ourselves that we did not know.

The selves, which we construct with the help of all who influence us,
prescribe which impulses, how emphasized, how directed, are
appropriate to certain typical situations for which we have learned
prepared attitudes. For a recognizable type of experience, there is a
character which controls the outward manifestations of our whole
being. Murderous hate is, for example, controlled in civil life.
Though you choke with rage, you must not display it as a parent,
child, employer, politician. You would not wish to display a
personality that exudes murderous hate. You frown upon it, and the
people around you also frown. But if a war breaks out, the chances are
that everybody you admire will begin to feel the justification of
killing and hating. At first the vent for these feelings is very
narrow. The selves which come to the front are those which are attuned
to a real love of country, the kind of feeling that you find in Rupert
Brooke, and in Sir Edward Grey's speech on August 3,1914, and in
President Wilson's address to Congress on April 2, 1917. The reality
of war is still abhorred, and what war actually means is learned but
gradually. For previous wars are only transfigured memories. In that
honeymoon phase, the realists of war rightly insist that the nation is
not yet awake, and reassure each other by saying: "Wait for the
casualty lists." Gradually the impulse to kill becomes the main
business, and all those characters which might modify it,
disintegrate. The impulse becomes central, is sanctified, and
gradually turns unmanageable. It seeks a vent not alone on the idea of
the enemy, which is all the enemy most people actually see during the
war, but upon all the persons and objects and ideas that have always
been hateful. Hatred of the enemy is legitimate. These other hatreds
have themselves legitimized by the crudest analogy, and by what, once
having cooled off, we recognize as the most far-fetched analogy. It
takes a long time to subdue so powerful an impulse once it goes loose.
And therefore, when the war is over in fact, it takes time and
struggle to regain self-control, and to deal with the problems of
peace in civilian character.

Modern war, as Mr. Herbert Croly has said, is inherent in the
political structure of modern society, but outlawed by its ideals. For
the civilian population there exists no ideal code of conduct in war,
such as the soldier still possesses and chivalry once prescribed. The
civilians are without standards, except those that the best of them
manage to improvise. The only standards they possess make war an
accursed thing. Yet though the war may be a necessary one, no moral
training has prepared them for it. Only their higher selves have a
code and patterns, and when they have to act in what the higher
regards as a lower character profound disturbance results.

The preparation of characters for all the situations in which men may
find themselves is one function of a moral education. Clearly then, it
depends for its success upon the sincerity and knowledge with which
the environment has been explored. For in a world falsely conceived,
our own characters are falsely conceived, and we misbehave. So the
moralist must choose: either he must offer a pattern of conduct for
every phase of life, however distasteful some of its phases may be, or
he must guarantee that his pupils will never be confronted by the
situations he disapproves. Either he must abolish war, or teach people
how to wage it with the greatest psychic economy; either he must
abolish the economic life of man and feed him with stardust and dew,
or he must investigate all the perplexities of economic life and offer
patterns of conduct which are applicable in a world where no man is
self-supporting. But that is just what the prevailing moral culture so
generally refuses to do. In its best aspects it is diffident at the
awful complication of the modern world. In its worst, it is just
cowardly. Now whether the moralists study economics and politics and
psychology, or whether the social scientists educate the moralists is
no great matter. Each generation will go unprepared into the modern
world, unless it has been taught to conceive the kind of personality
it will have to be among the issues it will most likely meet.

4

Most of this the naive view of self-interest leaves out of account. It
forgets that self and interest are both conceived somehow, and that
for the most part they are conventionally conceived. The ordinary
doctrine of self-interest usually omits altogether the cognitive
function. So insistent is it on the fact that human beings finally
refer all things to themselves, that it does not stop to notice that
men's ideas of all things and of themselves are not instinctive. They
are acquired.

Thus it may be true enough, as James Madison wrote in the tenth paper
of the Federalist, that "a landed interest, a manufacturing interest,
a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,
grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into
different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views." But if
you examine the context of Madison's paper, you discover something
which I think throws light upon that view of instinctive fatalism,
called sometimes the economic interpretation of history. Madison was
arguing for the federal constitution, and "among the numerous
advantages of the union" he set forth "its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction." Faction was what worried Madison.
And the causes of faction he traced to "the nature of man," where
latent dispositions are "brought into different degrees of activity,
according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for
different opinions concerning religion, concerning government and many
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to
different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power, or
to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting
to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more
disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to coöperate for their
common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into
mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents
itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most
violent conflicts. But the _most common_ and _durable_ source
of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property."

Madison's theory, therefore, is that the propensity to faction may be
kindled by religious or political opinions, by leaders, but most
commonly by the distribution of property. Yet note that Madison claims
only that men are divided by their relation to property. He does not
say that their property and their opinions are cause and effect, but
that differences of property are the causes of differences of opinion.
The pivotal word in Madison's argument is "different." From the
existence of differing economic situations you can tentatively infer a
probable difference of opinions, but you cannot infer what those
opinions will necessarily be.

This reservation cuts radically into the claims of the theory as that
theory is usually held. That the reservation is necessary, the
enormous contradiction between dogma and practice among orthodox
socialists bears witness. They argue that the next stage in social
evolution is the inevitable result of the present stage. But in order
to produce that inevitable next stage they organize and agitate to
produce "class consciousness." Why, one asks, does not the economic
situation produce consciousness of class in everybody? It just
doesn't, that is all. And therefore the proud claim will not stand
that the socialist philosophy rests on prophetic insight into destiny.
It rests on an hypothesis about human nature. [Footnote: _Cf._
Thorstein Veblen, "The Socialist Economics of Karl Marx and His
Followers," in _The Place of Science in Modern Civilization,_
esp. pp. 413-418.]

The socialist practice is based on a belief that if men are
economically situated in different ways, they can then be induced to
hold certain views. Undoubtedly they often come to believe, or can be
induced to believe different things, as they are, for example,
landlords or tenants, employees or employers, skilled or unskilled
laborers, wageworkers or salaried men, buyers or sellers, farmers or
middle-men, exporters or importers, creditors or debtors. Differences
of income make a profound difference in contact and opportunity. Men
who work at machines will tend, as Mr. Thorstein Veblen has so
brilliantly demonstrated, [Footnote: _The Theory of Business
Enterprise_.] to interpret experience differently from handicraftsmen
or traders. If this were all that the materialistic conception of politics
asserted, the theory would be an immensely valuable hypothesis that
every interpreter of opinion would have to use. But he would often
have to abandon the theory, and he would always have to be on
guard. For in trying to explain a certain public opinion, it is rarely
obvious which of a man's many social relations is effecting a particular
opinion. Does Smith's opinion arise from his problems as a landlord,
an importer, an owner of railway shares, or an employer? Does
Jones's opinion, Jones being a weaver in a textile mill, come from
the attitude of his boss, the competition of new immigrants, his wife's
grocery bills, or the ever present contract with the firm which is
selling him a Ford car and a house and lot on the instalment plan?
Without special inquiry you cannot tell. The economic determinist
cannot tell.

A man's various economic contacts limit or enlarge the range of his
opinions. But which of the contacts, in what guise, on what theory,
the materialistic conception of politics cannot predict. It can
predict, with a high degree of probability, that if a man owns a
factory, his ownership will figure in those opinions which seem to
have some bearing on that factory. But how the function of being an
owner will figure, no economic determinist as such, can tell you.
There is no fixed set of opinions on any question that go with being
the owner of a factory, no views on labor, on property, on management,
let alone views on less immediate matters. The determinist can predict
that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the owner will resist
attempts to deprive him of ownership, or that he will favor
legislation which he thinks will increase his profits. But since there
is no magic in ownership which enables a business man to know what
laws will make him prosper, there is no chain of cause and effect
described in economic materialism which enables anyone to prophesy
whether the owner will take a long view or a short one, a competitive
or a cooperative.

Did the theory have the validity which is so often claimed for it, it
would enable us to prophesy. We could analyze the economic interests
of a people, and deduce what the people was bound to do. Marx tried
that, and after a good guess about the trusts, went wholly wrong. The
first socialist experiment came, not as he predicted, out of the
culmination of capitalist development in the West, but out of the
collapse of a pre-capitalist system in the East. Why did he go wrong?
Why did his greatest disciple, Lenin, go wrong? Because the Marxians
thought that men's economic position would irresistibly produce a
clear conception of their economic interests. They thought they
themselves possessed that clear conception, and that what they knew
the rest of mankind would learn. The event has shown, not only that a
clear conception of interest does not arise automatically in everyone,
but that it did not arise even in Marx and Lenin themselves. After all
that Marx and Lenin have written, the social behavior of mankind is
still obscure. It ought not to be, if economic position alone
determined public opinion. Position ought, if their theory were
correct, not only to divide mankind into classes, but to supply each
class with a view of its interest and a coherent policy for obtaining
it. Yet nothing is more certain than that all classes of men are in
constant perplexity as to what their interests are. [Footnote: As a
matter of fact, when it came to the test, Lenin completely abandoned
the materialistic interpretation of politics. Had he held sincerely to
the Marxian formula when he seized power in 1917, he would have said
to himself: according to the teachings of Marx, socialism will develop
out of a mature capitalism... here am I, in control of a nation that
is only entering upon a capitalist development... it is true that I am
a socialist, but I am a scientific socialist... it follows that for
the present all idea of a socialist republic is out of the question...
we must advance capitalism in order that the evolution which Marx
predicted may take place. But Lenin did nothing of the sort. Instead
of waiting for evolution to evolve, he tried by will, force, and
education, to defy the historical process which his philosophy
assumed.

Since this was written Lenin has abandoned communism on the ground
that Russia does not possess the necessary basis in a mature
capitalism. He now says that Russia must create capitalism, which will
create a proletariat, which will some day create communism. This is at
least consistent with Marxist dogma. But it shows how little
determinism there is in the opinions of a determinist.]

This dissolves the impact of economic determinism. For if our economic
interests are made up of our variable concepts of those interests,
then as the master key to social processes the theory fails. That
theory assumes that men are capable of adopting only one version of
their interest, and that having adopted it, they move fatally to
realize it. It assumes the existence of a specific class interest.
That assumption is false. A class interest can be conceived largely or
narrowly, selfishly or unselfishly, in the light of no facts, some
facts, many facts, truth and error. And so collapses the Marxian
remedy for class conflicts. That remedy assumes that if all property
could be held in common, class differences would disappear. The
assumption is false. Property might well be held in common, and yet
not be conceived as a whole. The moment any group of people failed to
see communism in a communist manner, they would divide into classes on
the basis of what they saw.

In respect to the existing social order Marxian socialism emphasizes
property conflict as the maker of opinion, in respect to the loosely
defined working class it ignores property conflict as the basis of
agitation, in respect to the future it imagines a society without
property conflict, and, therefore, without conflict of opinion. Now in
the existing social order there may be more instances where one man
must lose if another is to gain, than there would be under socialism,
but for every case where one must lose for another to gain, there are
endless cases where men simply imagine the conflict because they are
uneducated. And under socialism, though you removed every instance of
absolute conflict, the partial access of each man to the whole range
of facts would nevertheless create conflict. A socialist state will
not be able to dispense with education, morality, or liberal science,
though on strict materialistic grounds the communal ownership of
properties ought to make them superfluous. The communists in Russia
would not propagate their faith with such unflagging zeal if economic
determinism were alone determining the opinion of the Russian people.

5

The socialist theory of human nature is, like the hedonistic calculus,
an example of false determinism. Both assume that the unlearned
dispositions fatally but intelligently produce a certain type of
behavior. The socialist believes that the dispositions pursue the
economic interest of a class; the hedonist believes that they pursue
pleasure and avoid pain. Both theories rest on a naive view of
instinct, a view, defined by James, [Footnote: _Principles of
Psychology_, Vol. II, p. 383.] though radically qualified by him,
as "the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends,
without foresight of the ends and without previous education in the
performance."

It is doubtful whether instinctive action of this sort figures at all
in the social life of mankind. For as James pointed out: [Footnote:
_Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 390.] "every instinctive act in an animal
with memory must cease to be 'blind' after being once repeated."
Whatever the equipment at birth, the innate dispositions are from
earliest infancy immersed in experience which determines what shall
excite them as stimulus. "They become capable," as Mr. McDougall
says, [Footnote: Introduction to _Social Psychology_, Fourth
Edition, pp. 31-32.] "of being initiated, not only by the perception
of objects of the kind which directly excite the innate disposition,
the natural or native excitants of the instinct, but also by ideas of
such objects, and by perceptions and by ideas of objects of other
kinds." [Footnote: "Most definitions of instincts and instinctive
actions take account only of their conative aspects... and it is a
common mistake to ignore the cognitive and affective aspects of the
instinctive mental process." Footnote _op. cit._, p. 29.]

It is only the "central part of the disposition" [Footnote: p. 34.]
says Mr. McDougall further, "that retains its specific character and
remains common to all individuals and all situations in which the
instinct is excited." The cognitive processes, and the actual bodily
movements by which the instinct achieves its end may be indefinitely
complicated. In other words, man has an instinct of fear, but what he
will fear and how he will try to escape, is determined not from birth,
but by experience.

If it were not for this variability, it would be difficult to conceive
the inordinate variety of human nature. But when you consider that all
the important tendencies of the creature, his appetites, his loves,
his hates, his curiosity, his sexual cravings, his fears, and
pugnacity, are freely attachable to all sorts of objects as stimulus,
and to all kinds of objects as gratification, the complexity of human
nature is not so inconceivable. And when you think that each new
generation is the casual victim of the way a previous generation was
conditioned, as well as the inheritor of the environment that
resulted, the possible combinations and permutations are enormous.

There is no prima facie case then for supposing that because persons
crave some particular thing, or behave in some particular way, human
nature is fatally constituted to crave that and act thus. The craving
and the action are both learned, and in another generation might be
learned differently. Analytic psychology and social history unite in
supporting this conclusion. Psychology indicates how essentially
casual is the nexus between the particular stimulus and the particular
response. Anthropology in the widest sense reinforces the view by
demonstrating that the things which have excited men's passions, and
the means which they have used to realize them, differ endlessly from
age to age and from place to place.

Men pursue their interest. But how they shall pursue it is not fatally
determined, and, therefore, within whatever limits of time this planet
will continue to support human life, man can set no term upon the
creative energies of men. He can issue no doom of automatism. He can
say, if he must, that for his life there will be no changes which he
can recognize as good. But in saying that he will be confining his
life to what he can see with his eye, rejecting what he might see with
his mind; he will be taking as the measure of good a measure which is
only the one he happens to possess. He can find no ground for
abandoning his highest hopes and relaxing his conscious effort unless
he chooses to regard the unknown as the unknowable, unless he elects
to believe that what no one knows no one will know, and that what
someone has not yet learned no one will ever be able to teach.



PART V

THE MAKING OF A COMMON WILL

CHAPTER 13. THE TRANSFER OF INTEREST
   "    14. YES OR NO
   "    15. LEADERS AND THE RANK AND FILE



CHAPTER XIII

THE TRANSFER OF INTEREST

This goes to show that there are many variables in each man's
impressions of the invisible world. The points of contact vary, the
stereotyped expectations vary, the interest enlisted varies most
subtly of all. The living impressions of a large number of people are
to an immeasurable degree personal in each of them, and unmanageably
complex in the mass. How, then, is any practical relationship
established between what is in people's heads and what is out there
beyond their ken in the environment? How in the language of democratic
theory, do great numbers of people feeling each so privately about so
abstract a picture, develop any common will? How does a simple and
constant idea emerge from this complex of variables? How are those
things known as the Will of the People, or the National Purpose, or
Public Opinion crystallized out of such fleeting and casual imagery?

That there is a real difficulty here was shown by an angry tilt in the
spring of 1921 between the American Ambassador to England and a very
large number of other Americans. Mr. Harvey, speaking at a British
dinner table, had assured the world without the least sign of
hesitancy what were the motives of Americans in 1917. [Footnote: _New
York Times_, May 20, 1921.] As he described them, they were not the
motives which President Wilson had insisted upon when _he_
enunciated the American mind. Now, of course, neither Mr. Harvey nor
Mr. Wilson, nor the critics and friends of either, nor any one else,
can know quantitatively and qualitatively what went on in thirty or
forty million adult minds. But what everybody knows is that a war was
fought and won by a multitude of efforts, stimulated, no one knows in
what proportion, by the motives of Wilson and the motives of Harvey
and all kinds of hybrids of the two. People enlisted and fought,
worked, paid taxes, sacrificed to a common end, and yet no one can
begin to say exactly what moved each person to do each thing that he
did. It is no use, then, Mr. Harvey telling a soldier who thought this
was a war to end war that the soldier did not think any such thing.
The soldier who thought that _thought that_. And Mr. Harvey, who
thought something else, thought _something else_.

In the same speech Mr. Harvey formulated with equal clarity what the
voters of 1920 had in their minds. That is a rash thing to do, and, if
you simply assume that all who voted your ticket voted as you did,
then it is a disingenuous thing to do. The count shows that sixteen
millions voted Republican, and nine millions Democratic. They voted,
says Mr. Harvey, for and against the League of Nations, and in support
of this claim, he can point to Mr. Wilson's request for a referendum,
and to the undeniable fact that the Democratic party and Mr. Cox
insisted that the League was the issue. But then, saying that the
League was the issue did not make the League the issue, and by
counting the votes on election day you do not know the real division
of opinion about the League. There were, for example, nine million
Democrats. Are you entitled to believe that all of them are staunch
supporters of the League? Certainly you are not. For your knowledge of
American politics tells you that many of the millions voted, as they
always do, to maintain the existing social system in the South, and
that whatever their views on the League, they did not vote to express
their views. Those who wanted the League were no doubt pleased that
the Democratic party wanted it too. Those who disliked the League may
have held their noses as they voted. But both groups of Southerners
voted the same ticket.

Were the Republicans more unanimous? Anybody can pick Republican
voters enough out of his circle of friends to cover the whole gamut of
opinion from the irreconcilability of Senators Johnson and Knox to the
advocacy of Secretary Hoover and Chief Justice Taft. No one can say
definitely how many people felt in any particular way about the
League, nor how many people let their feelings on that subject
determine their vote. When there are only two ways of expressing a
hundred varieties of feeling, there is no certain way of knowing what
the decisive combination was. Senator Borah found in the Republican
ticket a reason for voting Republican, but so did President Lowell.
The Republican majority was composed of men and women who thought a
Republican victory would kill the League, plus those who thought it
the most practical way to secure the League, plus those who thought it
the surest way offered to obtain an amended League. All these voters
were inextricably entangled with their own desire, or the desire of
other voters to improve business, or put labor in its place, or to
punish the Democrats for going to war, or to punish them for not
having gone sooner, or to get rid of Mr. Burleson, or to improve the
price of wheat, or to lower taxes, or to stop Mr. Daniels from
outbuilding the world, or to help Mr. Harding do the same thing.

And yet a sort of decision emerged; Mr. Harding moved into the White
House. For the least common denominator of all the votes was that the
Democrats should go and the Republicans come in. That was the only
factor remaining after all the contradictions had cancelled each other
out. But that factor was enough to alter policy for four years. The
precise reasons why change was desired on that November day in 1920
are not recorded, not even in the memories of the individual voters.
The reasons are not fixed. They grow and change and melt into other
reasons, so that the public opinions Mr. Harding has to deal with are
not the opinions that elected him. That there is no inevitable
connection between an assortment of opinions and a particular line of
action everyone saw in 1916. Elected apparently on the cry that he
kept us out of war, Mr. Wilson within five months led the country into
war.

The working of the popular will, therefore, has always called for
explanation. Those who have been most impressed by its erratic working
have found a prophet in M. LeBon, and have welcomed generalizations
about what Sir Robert Peel called "that great compound of folly,
weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy and
newspaper paragraphs which is called public opinion." Others have
concluded that since out of drift and incoherence, settled aims do
appear, there must be a mysterious contrivance at work somewhere over
and above the inhabitants of a nation. They invoke a collective soul,
a national mind, a spirit of the age which imposes order upon random
opinion. An oversoul seems to be needed, for the emotions and ideas in
the members of a group do not disclose anything so simple and so
crystalline as the formula which those same individuals will accept as
a true statement of their Public Opinion.

2

But the facts can, I think, be explained more convincingly without the
help of the oversoul in any of its disguises. After all, the art of
inducing all sorts of people who think differently to vote alike is
practiced in every political campaign. In 1916, for example, the
Republican candidate had to produce Republican votes out of many
different kinds of Republicans. Let us look at Mr. Hughes' first
speech after accepting the nomination. [Footnote: Delivered at Carnegie
Hall, New York City, July 31, 1916.] The context is still clear enough
in our minds to obviate much explanation; yet the issues are no longer
contentious. The candidate was a man of unusually plain speech, who
had been out of politics for several years and was not personally
committed on the issues of the recent past. He had, moreover, none of
that wizardry which popular leaders like Roosevelt, Wilson, or Lloyd
George possess, none of that histrionic gift by which such men
impersonate the feelings of their followers. From that aspect of
politics he was by temperament and by training remote. But yet he knew
by calculation what the politician's technic is. He was one of those
people who know just how to do a thing, but who can not quite do it
themselves. They are often better teachers than the virtuoso to whom
the art is so much second nature that he himself does not know how he
does it. The statement that those who can, do; those who cannot,
teach, is not nearly so much of a reflection on the teacher as it
sounds.

Mr. Hughes knew the occasion was momentous, and he had prepared his
manuscript carefully. In a box sat Theodore Roosevelt just back from
Missouri. All over the house sat the veterans of Armageddon in various
stages of doubt and dismay. On the platform and in the other boxes the
ex-whited sepulchres and ex-second-story men of 1912 were to be seen,
obviously in the best of health and in a melting mood. Out beyond the
hall there were powerful pro-Germans and powerful pro-Allies; a war
party in the East and in the big cities; a peace party in the middle
and far West. There was strong feeling about Mexico. Mr. Hughes had to
form a majority against the Democrats out of people divided into all
sorts of combinations on Taft vs. Roosevelt, pro-Germans vs.
pro-Allies, war vs. neutrality, Mexican intervention vs.
non-intervention.

About the morality or the wisdom of the affair we are, of course, not
concerned here. Our only interest is in the method by which a leader
of heterogeneous opinion goes about the business of securing a
homogeneous vote.

"This _representative_ gathering is a happy augury. It means the
strength of _reunion._ It means that the party of _Lincoln_
is restored...."

The italicized words are binders: _Lincoln_ in such a speech has
of course, no relation to Abraham Lincoln. It is merely a stereotype
by which the piety which surrounds that name can be transferred to the
Republican candidate who now stands in his shoes. Lincoln reminds the
Republicans, Bull Moose and Old Guard, that before the schism they had
a common history. About the schism no one can afford to speak. But it
is there, as yet unhealed.

The speaker must heal it. Now the schism of 1912 had arisen over
domestic questions; the reunion of 1916 was, as Mr. Roosevelt had
declared, to be based on a common indignation against Mr. Wilson's
conduct of international affairs. But international affairs were also
a dangerous source of conflict. It was necessary to find an opening
subject which would not only ignore 1912 but would avoid also the
explosive conflicts of 1916. The speaker skilfully selected the spoils
system in diplomatic appointments. "Deserving Democrats" was a
discrediting phrase, and Mr. Hughes at once evokes it. The record
being indefensible, there is no hesitation in the vigor of the attack.
Logically it was an ideal introduction to a common mood.

Mr. Hughes then turns to Mexico, beginning with an historical review.
He had to consider the general sentiment that affairs were going badly
in Mexico; also, a no less general sentiment that war should be
avoided; and two powerful currents of opinion, one of which said
President Wilson was right in not recognizing Huerta, the other which
preferred Huerta to Carranza, and intervention to both. Huerta was the
first sore spot in the record...

"He was certainly in fact the head of the Government in Mexico."

But the moralists who regarded Huerta as a drunken murderer had to be
placated.

"Whether or not he should be recognized was a question to be
determined in the exercise of a sound discretion, but according to
correct principles."

So instead of saying that Huerta should have been recognized, the
candidate says that correct principles ought to be applied. Everybody
believes in correct principles, and everybody, of course, believes he
possesses them. To blur the issue still further President Wilson's
policy is described as "intervention." It was that in law, perhaps,
but not in the sense then currently meant by the word. By stretching
the word to cover what Mr. Wilson had done, as well as what the real
interventionists wanted, the issue between the two factions was to be
repressed.

Having got by the two explosive points "_Huerta_" and
"_intervention_" by letting the words mean all things to all men,
the speech passes for a while to safer ground. The candidate tells the
story of Tampico, Vera Cruz, Villa, Santa Ysabel, Columbus and
Carrizal. Mr. Hughes is specific, either because the facts as known
from the newspapers are irritating, or because the true explanation
is, as for example in regard to Tampico, too complicated. No contrary
passions could be aroused by such a record. But at the end the
candidate had to take a position. His audience expected it. The
indictment was Mr. Roosevelt's. Would Mr. Hughes adopt his remedy,
intervention?

"The nation has no policy of aggression toward Mexico. We have no
desire for any part of her territory. We wish her to have peace,
stability and prosperity. We should be ready to aid her in binding up
her wounds, in relieving her from starvation and distress, in giving
her in every practicable way the benefits of our disinterested
friendship. The conduct of this administration has created
difficulties which we shall have to surmount.... _We shall have to
adopt a new policy,_ a policy of _firmness_ and consistency
through which alone we can promote an enduring _friendship._"

The theme friendship is for the non-interventionists, the theme "new
policy" and "firmness" is for the interventionists. On the
non-contentious record, the detail is overwhelming; on the issue
everything is cloudy.

Concerning the European war Mr. Hughes employed an ingenious formula:

"I stand for the unflinching maintenance of _all_ American rights
on land and sea."

In order to understand the force of that statement at the time it was
spoken, we must remember how each faction during the period of
neutrality believed that the nations it opposed in Europe were alone
violating American rights. Mr. Hughes seemed to say to the pro-Allies:
I would have coerced Germany. But the pro-Germans had been insisting
that British sea power was violating most of our rights. The formula
covers two diametrically opposed purposes by the symbolic phrase
"American rights."

But there was the Lusitania. Like the 1912 schism, it was an
invincible obstacle to harmony.

"... I am confident that there would have been no destruction of
American lives by the sinking of the Lusitania."

Thus, what cannot be compromised must be obliterated, when there is a
question on which we cannot all hope to get together, let us pretend
that it does not exist. About the future of American relations with
Europe Mr. Hughes was silent. Nothing he could say would possibly
please the two irreconcilable factions for whose support he was
bidding.

It is hardly necessary to say that Mr. Hughes did not invent this
technic and did not employ it with the utmost success. But he
illustrated how a public opinion constituted out of divergent opinions
is clouded; how its meaning approaches the neutral tint formed out of
the blending of many colors. Where superficial harmony is the aim and
conflict the fact, obscurantism in a public appeal is the usual
result. Almost always vagueness at a crucial point in public debate is
a symptom of cross-purposes.

3

But how is it that a vague idea so often has the power to unite deeply
felt opinions? These opinions, we recall, however deeply they may be
felt, are not in continual and pungent contact with the facts they
profess to treat. On the unseen environment, Mexico, the European war,
our grip is slight though our feeling may be intense. The original
pictures and words which aroused it have not anything like the force
of the feeling itself. The account of what has happened out of sight
and hearing in a place where we have never been, has not and never can
have, except briefly as in a dream or fantasy, all the dimensions of
reality. But it can arouse all, and sometimes even more emotion than
the reality. For the trigger can be pulled by more than one stimulus.

The stimulus which originally pulled the trigger may have been a
series of pictures in the mind aroused by printed or spoken words.
These pictures fade and are hard to keep steady; their contours and
their pulse fluctuate. Gradually the process sets in of knowing what
you feel without being entirely certain why you feel it. The fading
pictures are displaced by other pictures, and then by names or
symbols. But the emotion goes on, capable now of being aroused by the
substituted images and names. Even in severe thinking these
substitutions take place, for if a man is trying to compare two
complicated situations, he soon finds exhausting the attempt to hold
both fully in mind in all their detail. He employs a shorthand of
names and signs and samples. He has to do this if he is to advance at
all, because he cannot carry the whole baggage in every phrase through
every step he takes. But if he forgets that he has substituted and
simplified, he soon lapses into verbalism, and begins to talk about
names regardless of objects. And then he has no way of knowing when
the name divorced from its first thing is carrying on a misalliance
with some other thing. It is more difficult still to guard against
changelings in casual politics.

For by what is known to psychologists as conditioned response, an
emotion is not attached merely to one idea. There are no end of things
which can arouse the emotion, and no end of things which can satisfy
it. This is particularly true where the stimulus is only dimly and
indirectly perceived, and where the objective is likewise indirect.
For you can associate an emotion, say fear, first with something
immediately dangerous, then with the idea of that thing, then with
something similar to that idea, and so on and on. The whole structure
of human culture is in one respect an elaboration of the stimuli and
responses of which the original emotional capacities remain a fairly
fixed center. No doubt the quality of emotion has changed in the
course of history, but with nothing like the speed, or elaboration,
that has characterized the conditioning of it.

People differ widely in their susceptibility to ideas. There are some
in whom the idea of a starving child in Russia is practically as vivid
as a starving child within sight. There are others who are almost
incapable of being excited by a distant idea. There are many
gradations between. And there are people who are insensitive to facts,
and aroused only by ideas. But though the emotion is aroused by the
idea, we are unable to satisfy the emotion by acting ourselves upon
the scene itself. The idea of the starving Russian child evokes a
desire to feed the child. But the person so aroused cannot feed it. He
can only give money to an impersonal organization, or to a
personification which he calls Mr. Hoover. His money does not reach
that child. It goes to a general pool from which a mass of children
are fed. And so just as the idea is second hand, so are the effects of
the action second hand. The cognition is indirect, the conation is
indirect, only the effect is immediate. Of the three parts of the
process, the stimulus comes from somewhere out of sight, the response
reaches somewhere out of sight, only the emotion exists entirely
within the person. Of the child's hunger he has only an idea, of the
child's relief he has only an idea, but of his own desire to help he
has a real experience. It is the central fact of the business, the
emotion within himself, which is first hand.

Within limits that vary, the emotion is transferable both as regards
stimulus and response. Therefore, if among a number of people,
possessing various tendencies to respond, you can find a stimulus
which will arouse the same emotion in many of them, you can substitute
it for the original stimuli. If, for example, one man dislikes the
League, another hates Mr. Wilson, and a third fears labor, you may be
able to unite them if you can find some symbol which is the antithesis
of what they all hate. Suppose that symbol is Americanism. The first
man may read it as meaning the preservation of American isolation, or
as he may call it, independence; the second as the rejection of a
politician who clashes with his idea of what an American president
should be, the third as a call to resist revolution. The symbol in
itself signifies literally no one thing in particular, but it can be
associated with almost anything. And because of that it can become the
common bond of common feelings, even though those feelings were
originally attached to disparate ideas.

When political parties or newspapers declare for Americanism,
Progressivism, Law and Order, Justice, Humanity, they hope to
amalgamate the emotion of conflicting factions which would surely
divide, if, instead of these symbols, they were invited to discuss a
specific program. For when a coalition around the symbol has been
effected, feeling flows toward conformity under the symbol rather than
toward critical scrutiny of the measures. It is, I think, convenient
and technically correct to call multiple phrases like these symbolic.
They do not stand for specific ideas, but for a sort of truce or
junction between ideas. They are like a strategic railroad center
where many roads converge regardless of their ultimate origin or their
ultimate destination. But he who captures the symbols by which public
feeling is for the moment contained, controls by that much the
approaches of public policy. And as long as a particular symbol has
the power of coalition, ambitious factions will fight for possession.
Think, for example, of Lincoln's name or of Roosevelt's. A leader or
an interest that can make itself master of current symbols is master
of the current situation. There are limits, of course. Too violent
abuse of the actualities which groups of people think the symbol
represents, or too great resistance in the name of that symbol to new
purposes, will, so to speak, burst the symbol. In this manner, during
the year 1917, the imposing symbol of Holy Russia and the Little
Father burst under the impact of suffering and defeat.

4

The tremendous consequences of Russia's collapse were felt on all the
fronts and among all the peoples. They led directly to a striking
experiment in the crystallization of a common opinion out of the
varieties of opinion churned up by the war. The Fourteen Points were
addressed to all the governments, allied, enemy, neutral, and to all
the peoples. They were an attempt to knit together the chief
imponderables of a world war. Necessarily this was a new departure,
because this was the first great war in which all the deciding
elements of mankind could be brought to think about the same ideas, or
at least about the same names for ideas, simultaneously. Without
cable, radio, telegraph, and daily press, the experiment of the
Fourteen Points would have been impossible. It was an attempt to
exploit the modern machinery of communication to start the return to a
"common consciousness" throughout the world.

But first we must examine some of the circumstances as they presented
themselves at the end of 1917. For in the form which the document
finally assumed, all these considerations are somehow represented.
During the summer and autumn a series of events had occurred which
profoundly affected the temper of the people and the course of the
war. In July the Russians had made a last offensive, had been
disastrously beaten, and the process of demoralization which led to
the Bolshevik revolution of November had begun. Somewhat earlier the
French had suffered a severe and almost disastrous defeat in Champagne
which produced mutinies in the army and a defeatist agitation among
the civilians. England was suffering from the effects of the submarine
raids, from the terrible losses of the Flanders battles, and in
November at Cambrai the British armies met a reverse that appalled the
troops at the front and the leaders at home. Extreme war weariness
pervaded the whole of western Europe.

In effect, the agony and disappointment had jarred loose men's
concentration on the accepted version of the war. Their interests were
no longer held by the ordinary official pronouncements, and their
attention began to wander, fixing now upon their own suffering, now
upon their party and class purposes, now upon general resentments
against the governments. That more or less perfect organization of
perception by official propaganda, of interest and attention by the
stimuli of hope, fear, and hatred, which is called morale, was by way
of breaking down. The minds of men everywhere began to search for new
attachments that promised relief.

Suddenly they beheld a tremendous drama. On the Eastern front there
was a Christmas truce, an end of slaughter, an end of noise, a promise
of peace. At Brest-Litovsk the dream of all simple people had come to
life: it was possible to negotiate, there was some other way to end
the ordeal than by matching lives with the enemy. Timidly, but with
rapt attention, people began to turn to the East. Why not, they asked?
What is it all for? Do the politicians know what they are doing? Are
we really fighting for what they say? Is it possible, perhaps, to
secure it without fighting? Under the ban of the censorship, little of
this was allowed to show itself in print, but, when Lord Lansdowne
spoke, there was a response from the heart. The earlier symbols of the
war had become hackneyed, and had lost their power to unify. Beneath
the surface a wide schism was opening up in each Allied country.

Something similar was happening in Central Europe. There too the
original impulse of the war was weakened; the union sacrée was broken.
The vertical cleavages along the battle front were cut across by
horizontal divisions running in all kinds of unforeseeable ways. The
moral crisis of the war had arrived before the military decision was
in sight. All this President Wilson and his advisers realized. They
had not, of course, a perfect knowledge of the situation, but what I
have sketched they knew.

They knew also that the Allied Governments were bound by a series of
engagements that in letter and in spirit ran counter to the popular
conception of what the war was about. The resolutions of the Paris
Economic Conference were, of course, public property, and the network
of secret treaties had been published by the Bolsheviks in November of
1917. [Footnote: President Wilson stated at his conference with the
Senators that he had never heard of these treaties until he reached
Paris. That statement is perplexing. The Fourteen Points, as the text
shows, could not have been formulated without a knowledge of the
secret treaties. The substance of those treaties was before the
President when he and Colonel House prepared the final published text
of the Fourteen Points.] Their terms were only vaguely known to the
peoples, but it was definitely believed that they did not comport with
the idealistic slogan of self-determination, no annexations and no
indemnities. Popular questioning took the form of asking how many
thousand English lives Alsace-Lorraine or Dalmatia were worth, how
many French lives Poland or Mesopotamia were worth. Nor was such
questioning entirely unknown in America. The whole Allied cause had
been put on the defensive by the refusal to participate at
Brest-Litovsk.

Here was a highly sensitive state of mind which no competent leader
could fail to consider. The ideal response would have been joint
action by the Allies. That was found to be impossible when it was
considered at the Interallied Conference of October. But by December
the pressure had become so great that Mr. George and Mr. Wilson were
moved independently to make some response. The form selected by the
President was a statement of peace terms under fourteen heads. The
numbering of them was an artifice to secure precision, and to create
at once the impression that here was a business-like document. The
idea of stating "peace terms" instead of "war aims" arose from the
necessity of establishing a genuine alternative to the Brest-Litovsk
negotiations. They were intended to compete for attention by
substituting for the spectacle of Russo-German parleys the much
grander spectacle of a public world-wide debate.

Having enlisted the interest of the world, it was necessary to hold
that interest unified and flexible for all the different possibilities
which the situation contained. The terms had to be such that the
majority among the Allies would regard them as worth while. They had
to meet the national aspirations of each people, and yet to limit
those aspirations so that no one nation would regard itself as a
catspaw for another. The terms had to satisfy official interests so as
not to provoke official disunion, and yet they had to meet popular
conceptions so as to prevent the spread of demoralization. They had,
in short, to preserve and confirm Allied unity in case the war was to
go on.

But they had also to be the terms of a possible peace, so that in case
the German center and left were ripe for agitation, they would have a
text with which to smite the governing class. The terms had,
therefore, to push the Allied governors nearer to their people, drive
the German governors away from their people, and establish a line of
common understanding between the Allies, the non-official Germans, and
the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary. The Fourteen Points were a
daring attempt to raise a standard to which almost everyone might
repair. If a sufficient number of the enemy people were ready there
would be peace; if not, then the Allies would be better prepared to
sustain the shock of war.

All these considerations entered into the making of the Fourteen
Points. No one man may have had them all in mind, but all the men
concerned had some of them in mind. Against this background let us
examine certain aspects of the document. The first five points and the
fourteenth deal with "open diplomacy," "freedom of the seas," "equal
trade opportunities," "reduction of armaments," no imperialist
annexation of colonies, and the League of Nations. They might be
described as a statement of the popular generalizations in which
everyone at that time professed to believe. But number three is more
specific. It was aimed consciously and directly at the resolutions of
the Paris Economic Conference, and was meant to relieve the German
people of their fear of suffocation.

Number six is the first point dealing with a particular nation. It was
intended as a reply to Russian suspicion of the Allies, and the
eloquence of its promises was attuned to the drama of Brest-Litovsk.
Number seven deals with Belgium, and is as unqualified in form and
purpose as was the conviction of practically the whole world,
including very large sections of Central Europe. Over number eight we
must pause. It begins with an absolute demand for evacuation and
restoration of French territory, and then passes on to the question of
Alsace-Lorraine. The phrasing of this clause most perfectly
illustrates the character of a public statement which must condense a
vast complex of interests in a few words. "And the wrong done to
France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has
unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be
righted. ..." Every word here was chosen with meticulous care. The
wrong done should be righted; why not say that Alsace-Lorraine should
be restored? It was not said, because it was not certain that all of
the French _at that time_ would fight on indefinitely for
reannexation if they were offered a plebiscite; and because it was
even less certain whether the English and Italians would fight on. The
formula had, therefore, to cover both contingencies. The word
"righted" guaranteed satisfaction to France, but did not read as a
commitment to simple annexation. But why speak of the wrong done by
_Prussia_ in _1871_? The word Prussia was, of course, intended
to remind the South Germans that Alsace-Lorraine belonged not to
them but to Prussia. Why speak of peace unsettled for "fifty years,"
and why the use of "1871"? In the first place, what the French and
the rest of the world remembered was 1871. That was the nodal
point of their grievance. But the formulators of the Fourteen Points
knew that French officialdom planned for more than the Alsace-Lorraine
of 1871. The secret memoranda that had passed between the Czar's
ministers and French officials in 1916 covered the annexation of the
Saar Valley and some sort of dismemberment of the Rhineland. It was
planned to include the Saar Valley under the term "Alsace-Lorraine"
because it had been part of Alsace-Lorraine in 1814, though it had
been detached in 1815, and was no part of the territory at the close
of the Franco-Prussian war. The official French formula for annexing
the Saar was to subsume it under "Alsace-Lorraine" meaning the
Alsace-Lorraine of 1814-1815. By insistence on "1871" the President
was really defining the ultimate boundary between Germany and France,
was adverting to the secret treaty, and was casting it aside.

Number nine, a little less subtly, does the same thing in respect to
Italy. "Clearly recognizable lines of nationality" are exactly what
the lines of the Treaty of London were not. Those lines were partly
strategic, partly economic, partly imperialistic, partly ethnic. The
only part of them that could possibly procure allied sympathy was that
which would recover the genuine Italia Irredenta. All the rest, as
everyone who was informed knew, merely delayed the impending Jugoslav
revolt.

5

It would be a mistake to suppose that the apparently unanimous
enthusiasm which greeted the Fourteen Points represented agreement on
a program. Everyone seemed to find something that he liked and
stressed this aspect and that detail. But no one risked a discussion.
The phrases, so pregnant with the underlying conflicts of the
civilized world, were accepted. They stood for opposing ideas, but
they evoked a common emotion. And to that extent they played a part in
rallying the western peoples for the desperate ten months of war which
they had still to endure.

As long as the Fourteen Points dealt with that hazy and happy future
when the agony was to be over, the real conflicts of interpretation
were not made manifest. They were plans for the settlement of a wholly
invisible environment, and because these plans inspired all groups
each with its own private hope, all hopes ran together as a public
hope. For harmonization, as we saw in Mr. Hughes's speech, is a
hierarchy of symbols. As you ascend the hierarchy in order to include
more and more factions you may for a time preserve the emotional
connection though you lose the intellectual. But even the emotion
becomes thinner. As you go further away from experience, you go higher
into generalization or subtlety. As you go up in the balloon you throw
more and more concrete objects overboard, and when you have reached
the top with some phrase like the Rights of Humanity or the World Made
Safe for Democracy, you see far and wide, but you see very little. Yet
the people whose emotions are entrained do not remain passive. As the
public appeal becomes more and more all things to all men, as the
emotion is stirred while the meaning is dispersed, their very private
meanings are given a universal application. Whatever you want badly is
the Rights of Humanity. For the phrase, ever more vacant, capable of
meaning almost anything, soon comes to mean pretty nearly everything.
Mr. Wilson's phrases were understood in endlessly different ways in
every corner of the earth. No document negotiated and made of public
record existed to correct the confusion. [Footnote: The American
interpretation of the fourteen points was explained to the allied
statesmen just before the armistice.] And so, when the day of
settlement came, everybody expected everything. The European authors
of the treaty had a large choice, and they chose to realize those
expectations which were held by those of their countrymen who wielded
the most power at home.

They came down the hierarchy from the Rights of Humanity to the Rights
of France, Britain and Italy. They did not abandon the use of symbols.
They abandoned only those which after the war had no permanent roots
in the imagination of their constituents. They preserved the unity of
France by the use of symbolism, but they would not risk anything for
the unity of Europe. The symbol France was deeply attached, the symbol
Europe had only a recent history. Nevertheless the distinction between
an omnibus like Europe and a symbol like France is not sharp. The
history of states and empires reveals times when the scope of the
unifying idea increases and also times when it shrinks. One cannot say
that men have moved consistently from smaller loyalties to larger
ones, because the facts will not bear out the claim. The Roman Empire
and the Holy Roman Empire bellied out further than those national
unifications in the Nineteenth Century from which believers in a World
State argue by analogy. Nevertheless, it is probably true that the
real integration has increased regardless of the temporary inflation
and deflation of empires.

6

Such a real integration has undoubtedly occurred in American history.
In the decade before 1789 most men, it seems, felt that their state
and their community were real, but that the confederation of states
was unreal. The idea of their state, its flag, its most conspicuous
leaders, or whatever it was that represented Massachusetts, or
Virginia, were genuine symbols. That is to say, they were fed by
actual experiences from childhood, occupation, residence, and the
like. The span of men's experience had rarely traversed the imaginary
boundaries of their states. The word Virginian was related to pretty
nearly everything that most Virginians had ever known or felt. It was
the most extensive political idea which had genuine contact with their
experience.

Their experience, not their needs. For their needs arose out of their
real environment, which in those days was at least as large as the
thirteen colonies. They needed a common defense. They needed a
financial and economic regime as extensive as the Confederation. But
as long as the pseudo-environment of the state encompassed them, the
state symbols exhausted their political interest. An interstate idea,
like the Confederation, represented a powerless abstraction. It was an
omnibus, rather than a symbol, and the harmony among divergent groups,
which the omnibus creates, is transient.

I have said that the idea of confederation was a powerless
abstraction. Yet the need of unity existed in the decade before the
Constitution was adopted. The need existed, in the sense that affairs
were askew unless the need of unity was taken into account. Gradually
certain classes in each colony began to break through the state
experience. Their personal interests led across the state lines to
interstate experiences, and gradually there was constructed in their
minds a picture of the American environment which was truly national
in scope. For them the idea of federation became a true symbol, and
ceased to be an omnibus. The most imaginative of these men was
Alexander Hamilton. It happened that he had no primitive attachment to
any one state, for he was born in the West Indies, and had, from the
very beginning of his active life, been associated with the common
interests of all the states. Thus to most men of the time the question
of whether the capital should be in Virginia or in Philadelphia was of
enormous importance, because they were locally minded. To Hamilton
this question was of no emotional consequence; what he wanted was the
assumption of the state debts because they would further nationalize
the proposed union. So he gladly traded the site of the capitol for
two necessary votes from men who represented the Potomac district. To
Hamilton the Union was a symbol that represented all his interests and
his whole experience; to White and Lee from the Potomac, the symbol of
their province was the highest political entity they served, and they
served it though they hated to pay the price. They agreed, says
Jefferson, to change their votes, "White with a revulsion of stomach
almost convulsive." [Footnote: _Works,_ Vol. IX, p. 87. Cited by
Beard, _Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy,_ p. 172.]

In the crystallizing of a common will, there is always an Alexander
Hamilton at work.



CHAPTER XIV

YES OR NO

1

Symbols are often so useful and so mysteriously powerful that the word
itself exhales a magical glamor. In thinking about symbols it is
tempting to treat them as if they possessed independent energy. Yet no
end of symbols which once provoked ecstasy have quite ceased to affect
anybody. The museums and the books of folklore are full of dead
emblems and incantations, since there is no power in the symbol,
except that which it acquires by association in the human mind. The
symbols that have lost their power, and the symbols incessantly
suggested which fail to take root, remind us that if we were patient
enough to study in detail the circulation of a symbol, we should
behold an entirely secular history.

In the Hughes campaign speech, in the Fourteen Points, in Hamilton's
project, symbols are employed. But they are employed by somebody at a
particular moment. The words themselves do not crystallize random
feeling. The words must be spoken by people who are strategically
placed, and they must be spoken at the opportune moment. Otherwise
they are mere wind. The symbols must be earmarked. For in themselves
they mean nothing, and the choice of possible symbols is always so
great that we should, like the donkey who stood equidistant between
two bales of hay, perish from sheer indecision among the symbols that
compete for our attention.

Here, for example, are the reasons for their vote as stated by certain
private citizens to a newspaper just before the election of 1920.

For Harding:

"The patriotic men and women of to-day, who cast their ballots for
Harding and Coolidge will be held by posterity to have signed our
Second Declaration of Independence."

Mr. Wilmot--, inventor.

"He will see to it that the United States does not enter into
'entangling alliances,' Washington as a city will benefit by changing
the control of the government from the Democrats to the Republicans."

Mr. Clarence--, salesman.

For Cox:

"The people of the United States realize that it is our duty pledged
on the fields of France, to join the League of Nations. We must
shoulder our share of the burden of enforcing peace throughout the
world."

Miss Marie--, stenographer.

"We should lose our own respect and the respect of other nations were
we to refuse to enter the League of Nations in obtaining international
peace."

Mr. Spencer--, statistician.

The two sets of phrases are equally noble, equally true, and almost
reversible. Would Clarence and Wilmot have admitted for an instant
that they intended to default in our duty pledged on the fields of
France; or that they did not desire international peace? Certainly
not. Would Marie and Spencer have admitted that they were in favor of
entangling alliances or the surrender of American independence? They
would have argued with you that the League was, as President Wilson
called it, a disentangling alliance, as well as a Declaration of
Independence for all the world, plus a Monroe Doctrine for the planet.

2

Since the offering of symbols is so generous, and the meaning that can
be imputed is so elastic, how does any particular symbol take root in
any particular person's mind? It is planted there by another human
being whom we recognize as authoritative. If it is planted deeply
enough, it may be that later we shall call the person authoritative
who waves that symbol at us. But in the first instance symbols are
made congenial and important because they are introduced to us by
congenial and important people.

For we are not born out of an egg at the age of eighteen with a
realistic imagination; we are still, as Mr. Shaw recalls, in the era
of Burge and Lubin, where in infancy we are dependent upon older
beings for our contacts. And so we make our connections with the outer
world through certain beloved and authoritative persons. They are the
first bridge to the invisible world. And though we may gradually
master for ourselves many phases of that larger environment, there
always remains a vaster one that is unknown. To that we still relate
ourselves through authorities. Where all the facts are out of sight a
true report and a plausible error read alike, sound alike, feel alike.

Except on a few subjects where our own knowledge is great, we cannot
choose between true and false accounts. So we choose between
trustworthy and untrustworthy reporters. [Footnote: See an
interesting, rather quaint old book: George Cornewall Lewis, _An
Essay on the Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion_.]

Theoretically we ought to choose the most expert on each subject. But
the choice of the expert, though a good deal easier than the choice of
truth, is still too difficult and often impracticable. The experts
themselves are not in the least certain who among them is the most
expert. And at that, the expert, even when we can identify him, is,
likely as not, too busy to be consulted, or impossible to get at. But
there are people whom we can identify easily enough because they are
the people who are at the head of affairs. Parents, teachers, and
masterful friends are the first people of this sort we encounter. Into
the difficult question of why children trust one parent rather than
another, the history teacher rather than the Sunday school teacher, we
need not try to enter. Nor how trust gradually spreads through a
newspaper or an acquaintance who is interested in public affairs to
public personages. The literature of psychoanalysis is rich in
suggestive hypothesis.

At any rate we do find ourselves trusting certain people, who
constitute our means of junction with pretty nearly the whole realm of
unknown things. Strangely enough, this fact is sometimes regarded as
inherently undignified, as evidence of our sheep-like, ape-like
nature. But complete independence in the universe is simply
unthinkable. If we could not take practically everything for granted,
we should spend our lives in utter triviality. The nearest thing to a
wholly independent adult is a hermit, and the range of a hermit's
action is very short. Acting entirely for himself, he can act only
within a tiny radius and for simple ends. If he has time to think
great thoughts we can be certain that he has accepted without
question, before he went in for being a hermit, a whole repertory of
painfully acquired information about how to keep warm and how to keep
from being hungry, and also about what the great questions are.

On all but a very few matters for short stretches in our lives, the
utmost independence that we can exercise is to multiply the
authorities to whom we give a friendly hearing. As congenital amateurs
our quest for truth consists in stirring up the experts, and forcing
them to answer any heresy that has the accent of conviction. In such a
debate we can often judge who has won the dialectical victory, but we
are virtually defenseless against a false premise that none of the
debaters has challenged, or a neglected aspect that none of them has
brought into the argument. We shall see later how the democratic
theory proceeds on the opposite assumption and assumes for the
purposes of government an unlimited supply of self-sufficient
individuals.

The people on whom we depend for contact with the outer world are
those who seem to be running it. [Footnote: _Cf._ Bryce, _Modern
Democracies_ Vol. II, pp. 544-545.] They may be running only a
very small part of the world. The nurse feeds the child, bathes it, and
puts it to bed. That does not constitute the nurse an authority on
physics, zoology, and the Higher Criticism. Mr. Smith runs, or at least
hires, the man who runs the factory. That does not make him an
authority on the Constitution of the United States, nor on the effects
\of the Fordney tariff. Mr. Smoot runs the Republican party in the State
of Utah. That in itself does not prove he is the best man to consult
about taxation. But the nurse may nevertheless determine for a while
what zoology the child shall learn, Mr. Smith will have much to say on
what the Constitution shall mean to his wife, his secretary, and perhaps
even to his parson, and who shall define the limits of Senator Smoot's
authority?

The priest, the lord of the manor, the captains and the kings, the
party leaders, the merchant, the boss, however these men are chosen,
whether by birth, inheritance, conquest or election, they and their
organized following administer human affairs. They are the officers,
and although the same man may be field marshal at home, second
lieutenant at the office, and scrub private in politics, although in many
institutions the hierarchy of rank is vague or concealed, yet in every
institution that requires the cooperation of many persons, some such
hierarchy exists. [Footnote: _Cf._ M. Ostrogorski, _Democracy and the
Organization of Political Parties, passim;_ R. Michels, _Political Parties,
passim;_ and Bryce, _Modern Democracies,_ particularly Chap.
LXXV; also Ross, _Principles of Sociology,_ Chaps. XXII-XXIV. ]
In American politics we call it a machine, or "the organization."

3

There are a number of important distinctions between the members of
the machine and the rank and file. The leaders, the steering committee
and the inner circle, are in direct contact with their environment.
They may, to be sure, have a very limited notion of what they ought to
define as the environment, but they are not dealing almost wholly with
abstractions. There are particular men they hope to see elected,
particular balance sheets they wish to see improved, concrete
objectives that must be attained. I do not mean that they escape the
human propensity to stereotyped vision. Their stereotypes often make
them absurd routineers. But whatever their limitations, the chiefs are
in actual contact with some crucial part of that larger environment.
They decide. They give orders. They bargain. And something definite,
perhaps not at all what they imagined, actually happens.

Their subordinates are not tied to them by a common conviction. That
is to say the lesser members of a machine do not dispose their loyalty
according to independent judgment about the wisdom of the leaders. In
the hierarchy each is dependent upon a superior and is in turn
superior to some class of his dependents. What holds the machine
together is a system of privileges. These may vary according to the
opportunities and the tastes of those who seek them, from nepotism and
patronage in all their aspects to clannishness, hero-worship or a
fixed idea. They vary from military rank in armies, through land and
services in a feudal system, to jobs and publicity in a modern
democracy. That is why you can breakup a particular machine by
abolishing its privileges. But the machine in every coherent group is,
I believe, certain to reappear. For privilege is entirely relative,
and uniformity is impossible. Imagine the most absolute communism of
which your mind is capable, where no one possessed any object that
everyone else did not possess, and still, if the communist group had
to take any action whatever, the mere pleasure of being the friend of
the man who was going to make the speech that secured the most votes,
would, I am convinced, be enough to crystallize an organization of
insiders around him.

It is not necessary, then, to invent a collective intelligence in
order to explain why the judgments of a group are usually more
coherent, and often more true to form than the remarks of the man in
the street. One mind, or a few can pursue a train of thought, but a
group trying to think in concert can as a group do little more than
assent or dissent. The members of a hierarchy can have a corporate
tradition. As apprentices they learn the trade from the masters, who
in turn learned it when they were apprentices, and in any enduring
society, the change of personnel within the governing hierarchies is
slow enough to permit the transmission of certain great stereotypes
and patterns of behavior. From father to son, from prelate to novice,
from veteran to cadet, certain ways of seeing and doing are taught.
These ways become familiar, and are recognized as such by the mass of
outsiders.

4

Distance alone lends enchantment to the view that masses of human
beings ever coöperate in any complex affair without a central machine
managed by a very few people. "No one," says Bryce, [Footnote: _Op.
cit._, Vol. II, p. 542.] "can have had some years' experience of
the conduct of affairs in a legislature or an administration without
observing how extremely small is the number of persons by whom the
world is governed." He is referring, of course, to affairs of state.
To be sure if you consider all the affairs of mankind the number of
people who govern is considerable, but if you take any particular
institution, be it a legislature, a party, a trade union, a
nationalist movement, a factory, or a club, the number of those who
govern is a very small percentage of those who are theoretically
supposed to govern.

Landslides can turn one machine out and put another in; revolutions
sometimes abolish a particular machine altogether. The democratic
revolution set up two alternating machines, each of which in the
course of a few years reaps the advantage from the mistakes of the
other. But nowhere does the machine disappear. Nowhere is the idyllic
theory of democracy realized. Certainly not in trades unions, nor in
socialist parties, nor in communist governments. There is an inner
circle, surrounded by concentric circles which fade out gradually into
the disinterested or uninterested rank and file.

Democrats have never come to terms with this commonplace of group
life. They have invariably regarded it as perverse. For there are two
visions of democracy: one presupposes the self-sufficient individual;
the other an Oversoul regulating everything.

Of the two the Oversoul has some advantage because it does at least
recognize that the mass makes decisions that are not spontaneously
born in the breast of every member. But the Oversoul as presiding
genius in corporate behavior is a superfluous mystery if we fix our
attention upon the machine. The machine is a quite prosaic reality. It
consists of human beings who wear clothes and live in houses, who can
be named and described. They perform all the duties usually assigned
to the Oversoul.

5

The reason for the machine is not the perversity of human nature. It
is that out of the private notions of any group no common idea emerges
by itself. For the number of ways is limited in which a multitude of
people can act directly upon a situation beyond their reach. Some of
them can migrate, in one form or another, they can strike or boycott,
they can applaud or hiss. They can by these means occasionally resist
what they do not like, or coerce those who obstruct what they desire.
But by mass action nothing can be constructed, devised, negotiated, or
administered. A public as such, without an organized hierarchy around
which it can gather, may refuse to buy if the prices are too high, or
refuse to work if wages are too low. A trade union can by mass action
in a strike break an opposition so that the union officials can
negotiate an agreement. It may win, for example, the _right_ to
joint control. But it cannot exercise the right except through an
organization. A nation can clamor for war, but when it goes to war it
must put itself under orders from a general staff.

The limit of direct action is for all practical purposes the power to
say Yes or No on an issue presented to the mass. [Footnote: _Cf_.
James, _Some Problems of Philosophy_, p. 227. "But for most of
our emergencies, fractional solutions are impossible. Seldom can we
act fractionally." _Cf_. Lowell, _Public Opinion and Popular
Government_, pp. 91, 92.] For only in the very simplest cases does
an issue present itself in the same form spontaneously and
approximately at the same time to all the members of a public. There
are unorganized strikes and boycotts, not merely industrial ones,
where the grievance is so plain that virtually without leadership the
same reaction takes place in many people. But even in these
rudimentary cases there are persons who know what they want to do more
quickly than the rest, and who become impromptu ringleaders. Where
they do not appear a crowd will mill about aimlessly beset by all its
private aims, or stand by fatalistically, as did a crowd of fifty
persons the other day, and watch a man commit suicide.

For what we make out of most of the impressions that come to us from
the invisible world is a kind of pantomime played out in revery. The
number of times is small that we consciously decide anything about
events beyond our sight, and each man's opinion of what he could
accomplish if he tried, is slight. There is rarely a practical issue,
and therefore no great habit of decision. This would be more evident
were it not that most information when it reaches us carries with it
an aura of suggestion as to how we ought to feel about the news. That
suggestion we need, and if we do not find it in the news we turn to
the editorials or to a trusted adviser. The revery, if we feel
ourselves implicated, is uncomfortable until we know where we stand,
that is, until the facts have been formulated so that we can feel Yes
or No in regard to them.

When a number of people all say Yes they may have all kinds of reasons
for saying it. They generally do. For the pictures in their minds are,
as we have already noted, varied in subtle and intimate ways. But this
subtlety remains within their minds; it becomes represented publicly
by a number of symbolic phrases which carry the individual emotion
after evacuating most of the intention. The hierarchy, or, if it is a
contest, then the two hierarchies, associate the symbols with a
definite action, a vote of Yes or No, an attitude pro or con. Then
Smith who was against the League and Jones who was against Article X,
and Brown who was against Mr. Wilson and all his works, each for his
own reason, all in the name of more or less the same symbolic phrase,
register a vote _against_ the Democrats by voting for the
Republicans. A common will has been expressed.

A concrete choice had to be presented, the choice had to be connected,
by the transfer of interest through the symbols, with individual
opinion. The professional politicians learned this long before the
democratic philosophers. And so they organized the caucus, the
nominating convention, and the steering committee, as the means of
formulating a definite choice. Everyone who wishes to accomplish
anything that requires the cooperation of a large number of people
follows their example. Sometimes it is done rather brutally as when
the Peace Conference reduced itself to the Council of Ten, and the
Council of Ten to the Big Three or Four; and wrote a treaty which the
minor allies, their own constituents, and the enemy were permitted to
take or leave. More consultation than that is generally possible and
desirable. But the essential fact remains that a small number of heads
present a choice to a large group.

6

The abuses of the steering committee have led to various proposals
such as the initiative, referendum and direct primary. But these
merely postponed or obscured the need for a machine by complicating
the elections, or as H. G. Wells once said with scrupulous accuracy,
the selections. For no amount of balloting can obviate the need of
creating an issue, be it a measure or a candidate, on which the voters
can say Yes, or No. There is, in fact, no such thing as "direct
legislation." For what happens where it is supposed to exist? The
citizen goes to the polls, receives a ballot on which a number of
measures are printed, almost always in abbreviated form, and, if he
says anything at all, he says Yes or No. The most brilliant amendment
in the world may occur to him. He votes Yes or No on that bill and no
other. You have to commit violence against the English language to
call that legislation. I do not argue, of course, that there are no
benefits, whatever you call the process. I think that for certain
kinds of issues there are distinct benefits. But the necessary
simplicity of any mass decision is a very important fact in view of
the inevitable complexity of the world in which those decisions
operate. The most complicated form of voting that anyone proposes is,
I suppose, the preferential ballot. Among a number of candidates
presented the voter under that system, instead of saying yes to one
candidate and no to all the others, states the order of his choice.
But even here, immensely more flexible though it is, the action of the
mass depends upon the quality of the choices presented. [Footnote:
_Cf._ H. J. Laski, _Foundations of Sovereignty,_ p. 224. "...
proportional representation... by leading, as it seems to lead, to the
group system... may deprive the electors of their choice of leaders."
The group system undoubtedly tends, as Mr. Laski says, to make the
selection of the executive more indirect, but there is no doubt also
that it tends to produce legislative assemblies in which currents of
opinion are more fully represented. Whether that is good or bad
cannot be determined a priori. But one can say that successful
cooperation and responsibility in a more accurately representative
assembly require a higher organization of political intelligence and
political habit, than in a rigid two-party house. It is a more complex
political form and may therefore work less well.] And those choices
are presented by the energetic coteries who hustle about with
petitions and round up the delegates. The Many can elect after the Few
have nominated.



CHAPTER XV

LEADERS AND THE RANK AND FILE

I

BECAUSE of their transcendent practical importance, no successful
leader has ever been too busy to cultivate the symbols which organize
his following. What privileges do within the hierarchy, symbols do for
the rank and file. They conserve unity. From the totem pole to the
national flag, from the wooden idol to God the Invisible King, from
the magic word to some diluted version of Adam Smith or Bentham,
symbols have been cherished by leaders, many of whom were themselves
unbelievers, because they were focal points where differences merged.
The detached observer may scorn the "star-spangled" ritual which
hedges the symbol, perhaps as much as the king who told himself that
Paris was worth a few masses. But the leader knows by experience that
only when symbols have done their work is there a handle he can use to
move a crowd. In the symbol emotion is discharged at a common target,
and the idiosyncrasy of real ideas blotted out. No wonder he hates
what he calls destructive criticism, sometimes called by free spirits
the elimination of buncombe. "Above all things," says Bagehot, "our
royalty is to be reverenced, and if you begin to poke about it you
cannot reverence it." [Footnote: _The English Constitution,_ p.
127. D. Appleton & Company, 1914.] For poking about with clear
definitions and candid statements serves all high purposes known to
man, except the easy conservation of a common will. Poking about, as
every responsible leader suspects, tends to break the transference of
emotion from the individual mind to the institutional symbol. And the
first result of that is, as he rightly says, a chaos of individualism
and warring sects. The disintegration of a symbol, like Holy Russia,
or the Iron Diaz, is always the beginning of a long upheaval.

These great symbols possess by transference all the minute and
detailed loyalties of an ancient and stereotyped society. They evoke
the feeling that each individual has for the landscape, the furniture,
the faces, the memories that are his first, and in a static society,
his only reality. That core of images and devotions without which he
is unthinkable to himself, is nationality. The great symbols take up
these devotions, and can arouse them without calling forth the
primitive images. The lesser symbols of public debate, the more casual
chatter of politics, are always referred back to these proto-symbols,
and if possible associated with them. The question of a proper fare on
a municipal subway is symbolized as an issue between the People and
the Interests, and then the People is inserted in the symbol American,
so that finally in the heat of a campaign, an eight cent fare becomes
unAmerican. The Revolutionary fathers died to prevent it. Lincoln
suffered that it might not come to pass, resistance to it was implied
in the death of those who sleep in France.

Because of its power to siphon emotion out of distinct ideas, the
symbol is both a mechanism of solidarity, and a mechanism of
exploitation. It enables people to work for a common end, but just
because the few who are strategically placed must choose the concrete
objectives, the symbol is also an instrument by which a few can fatten
on many, deflect criticism, and seduce men into facing agony for
objects they do not understand.

Many aspects of our subjection to symbols are not flattering if we
choose to think of ourselves as realistic, self-sufficient, and
self-governing personalities. Yet it is impossible to conclude that
symbols are altogether instruments of the devil. In the realm of
science and contemplation they are undoubtedly the tempter himself.
But in the world of action they may be beneficent, and are sometimes a
necessity. The necessity is often imagined, the peril manufactured.
But when quick results are imperative, the manipulation of masses
through symbols may be the only quick way of having a critical thing
done. It is often more important to act than to understand. It is
sometimes true that the action would fail if everyone understood it.
There are many affairs which cannot wait for a referendum or endure
publicity, and there are times, during war for example, when a nation,
an army, and even its commanders must trust strategy to a very few
minds; when two conflicting opinions, though one happens to be right,
are more perilous than one opinion which is wrong. The wrong opinion
may have bad results, but the two opinions may entail disaster by
dissolving unity. [Footnote: Captain Peter S. Wright, Assistant
Secretary of the Supreme War Council, _At the Supreme War
Council,_ is well worth careful reading on secrecy and unity of
command, even though in respect to the allied leaders he wages a
passionate polemic.]

Thus Foch and Sir Henry Wilson, who foresaw the impending disaster to
Cough's army, as a consequence of the divided and scattered reserves,
nevertheless kept their opinions well within a small circle, knowing
that even the risk of a smashing defeat was less certainly
destructive, than would have been an excited debate in the newspapers.
For what matters most under the kind of tension which prevailed in
March, 1918, is less the rightness of a particular move than the
unbroken expectation as to the source of command. Had Foch "gone to
the people" he might have won the debate, but long before he could
have won it, the armies which he was to command would have dissolved.
For the spectacle of a row on Olympus is diverting and destructive.

But so also is a conspiracy of silence. Says Captain Wright: "It is in
the High Command and not in the line, that the art of camouflage is
most practiced, and reaches to highest flights. All chiefs everywhere
are now kept painted, by the busy work of numberless publicists, so as
to be mistaken for Napoleons--at a distance....It becomes almost
impossible to displace these Napoleons, whatever their incompetence,
because of the enormous public support created by hiding or glossing
failure, and exaggerating or inventing success.... But the most
insidious and worst effect of this so highly organized falsity is on
the generals themselves: modest and patriotic as they mostly are, and
as most men must be to take up and follow the noble profession of
arms, they themselves are ultimately affected by these universal
illusions, and reading it every morning in the paper, they also grow
persuaded they are thunderbolts of war and infallible, however much
they fail, and that their maintenance in command is an end so sacred
that it justifies the use of any means.... These various conditions,
of which this great deceit is the greatest, at last emancipate all
General Staffs from all control. They no longer live for the nation:
the nation lives, or rather dies, for them. Victory or defeat ceases
to be the prime interest. What matters to these semi-sovereign
corporations is whether dear old Willie or poor old Harry is going to
be at their head, or the Chantilly party prevail over the Boulevard
des Invalides party." [Footnote: _Op. cit._, pp. 98, 101-105.]

Yet Captain Wright who can be so eloquent and so discerning about the
dangers of silence is forced nevertheless to approve the silence of
Foch in not publicly destroying the illusions. There is here a
complicated paradox, arising as we shall see more fully later on,
because the traditional democratic view of life is conceived, not for
emergencies and dangers, but for tranquillity and harmony. And so
where masses of people must coöperate in an uncertain and eruptive
environment, it is usually necessary to secure unity and flexibility
without real consent. The symbol does that. It obscures personal
intention, neutralizes discrimination, and obfuscates individual
purpose. It immobilizes personality, yet at the same time it
enormously sharpens the intention of the group and welds that group,
as nothing else in a crisis can weld it, to purposeful action. It
renders the mass mobile though it immobilizes personality. The symbol
is the instrument by which in the short run the mass escapes from its
own inertia, the inertia of indecision, or the inertia of headlong
movement, and is rendered capable of being led along the zigzag of a
complex situation.

2

But in the longer run, the give and take increases between the leaders
and the led. The word most often used to describe the state of mind in
the rank and file about its leaders is morale. That is said to be good
when the individuals do the part allotted to them with all their
energy; when each man's whole strength is evoked by the command from
above. It follows that every leader must plan his policy with this in
mind. He must consider his decision not only on "the merits," but also
in its effect on any part of his following whose continued support he
requires. If he is a general planning an attack, he knows that his
organized military units will scatter into mobs if the percentage of
casualties rises too high.

In the Great War previous calculations were upset to an extraordinary
degree, for "out of every nine men who went to France five became
casualties." [Footnote: _Op. cit_., p. 37. Figures taken by
Captain Wright from the statistical abstract of the war in the
Archives of the War Office. The figures refer apparently to the
English losses alone, possibly to the English and French.] The limit
of endurance was far greater than anyone had supposed. But there was a
limit somewhere. And so, partly because of its effect on the enemy,
but also in great measure because of its effect on the troops and
their families, no command in this war dared to publish a candid
statement of its losses. In France the casualty lists were never
published. In England, America, and Germany publication of the losses
of a big battle were spread out over long periods so as to destroy a
unified impression of the total. Only the insiders knew until long
afterwards what the Somme had cost, or the Flanders battles;
[Footnote: _Op cit._, p. 34, the Somme cost nearly 500,000
casualties; the Arras and Flanders offensives of 1917 cost 650,000
British casualties.] and Ludendorff undoubtedly had a very much more
accurate idea of these casualties than any private person in London,
Paris or Chicago. All the leaders in every camp did their best to
limit the amount of actual war which any one soldier or civilian could
vividly conceive. But, of course, among old veterans like the French
troops of 1917, a great deal more is known about war than ever reaches
the public. Such an army begins to judge its commanders in terms of
its own suffering. And then, when another extravagant promise of
victory turns out to be the customary bloody defeat, you may find that
a mutiny breaks out over some comparatively minor blunder, [Footnote:
The Allies suffered many bloodier defeats than that on the Chemin des
Dames.] like Nivelle's offensive of 1917, because it is a cumulative
blunder. Revolutions and mutinies generally follow a small sample of a
big series of evils. [Footnote: _Cf._ Pierrefeu's account, _op.
cit._, on the causes of the Soissons mutinies, and the method
adopted by Pétain to deal with them. Vol. I, Part III, _et seq._]

The incidence of policy determines the relation between leader and
following. If those whom he needs in his plan are remote from the
place where the action takes place, if the results are hidden or
postponed, if the individual obligations are indirect or not yet due,
above all if assent is an exercise of some pleasurable emotion, the
leader is likely to have a free hand. Those programs are immediately
most popular, like prohibition among teetotalers, which do not at once
impinge upon the private habits of the followers. That is one great
reason why governments have such a free hand in foreign affairs. Most
of the frictions between two states involve a series of obscure and
long-winded contentions, occasionally on the frontier, but far more
often in regions about which school geographies have supplied no
precise ideas. In Czechoslovakia America is regarded as the Liberator;
in American newspaper paragraphs and musical comedy, in American
conversation by and large, it has never been finally settled whether
the country we liberated is Czechoslavia or Jugoslovakia.

In foreign affairs the incidence of policy is for a very long time
confined to an unseen environment. Nothing that happens out there is
felt to be wholly real. And so, because in the ante-bellum period,
nobody has to fight and nobody has to pay, governments go along
according to their lights without much reference to their people. In
local affairs the cost of a policy is more easily visible. And
therefore, all but the most exceptional leaders prefer policies in
which the costs are as far as possible indirect.

They do not like direct taxation. They do not like to pay as they go.
They like long term debts. They like to have the voters believe that
the foreigner will pay. They have always been compelled to calculate
prosperity in terms of the producer rather than in terms of the
consumer, because the incidence on the consumer is distributed over so
many trivial items. Labor leaders have always preferred an increase of
money wages to a decrease in prices. There has always been more
popular interest in the profits of millionaires, which are visible but
comparatively unimportant, than in the wastes of the industrial
system, which are huge but elusive. A legislature dealing with a
shortage of houses, such as exists when this is written, illustrates
this rule, first by doing nothing to increase the number of houses,
second by smiting the greedy landlord on the hip, third by
investigating the profiteering builders and working men. For a
constructive policy deals with remote and uninteresting factors, while
a greedy landlord, or a profiteering plumber is visible and immediate.

But while people will readily believe that in an unimagined future and
in unseen places a certain policy will benefit them, the actual
working out of policy follows a different logic from their opinions. A
nation may be induced to believe that jacking up the freight rates
will make the railroads prosperous. But that belief will not make the
roads prosperous, if the impact of those rates on farmers and shippers
is such as to produce a commodity price beyond what the consumer can
pay. Whether the consumer will pay the price depends not upon whether
he nodded his head nine months previously at the proposal to raise
rates and save business, but on whether he now wants a new hat or a
new automobile enough to pay for them.

3

Leaders often pretend that they have merely uncovered a program which
existed in the minds of their public. When they believe it, they are
usually deceiving themselves. Programs do not invent themselves
synchronously in a multitude of minds. That is not because a multitude
of minds is necessarily inferior to that of the leaders, but because
thought is the function of an organism, and a mass is not an organism.

This fact is obscured because the mass is constantly exposed to
suggestion. It reads not the news, but the news with an aura of
suggestion about it, indicating the line of action to be taken. It
hears reports, not objective as the facts are, but already stereotyped
to a certain pattern of behavior. Thus the ostensible leader often
finds that the real leader is a powerful newspaper proprietor. But if,
as in a laboratory, one could remove all suggestion and leading from
the experience of a multitude, one would, I think, find something like
this: A mass exposed to the same stimuli would develop responses that
could theoretically be charted in a polygon of error. There would be a
certain group that felt sufficiently alike to be classified together.
There would be variants of feeling at both ends. These classifications
would tend to harden as individuals in each of the classifications
made their reactions vocal. That is to say, when the vague feelings of
those who felt vaguely had been put into words, they would know more
definitely what they felt, and would then feel it more definitely.

Leaders in touch with popular feeling are quickly conscious of these
reactions. They know that high prices are pressing upon the mass, or
that certain classes of individuals are becoming unpopular, or that
feeling towards another nation is friendly or hostile. But, always
barring the effect of suggestion which is merely the assumption of
leadership by the reporter, there would be nothing in the feeling of
the mass that fatally determined the choice of any particular policy.
All that the feeling of the mass demands is that policy as it is
developed and exposed shall be, if not logically, then by analogy and
association, connected with the original feeling.

So when a new policy is to be launched, there is a preliminary bid for
community of feeling, as in Mark Antony's speech to the followers of
Brutus. [Footnote: Excellently analyzed in Martin, _The Behavior of
Crowds,_ pp. 130-132,] In the first phase, the leader vocalizes the
prevalent opinion of the mass. He identifies himself with the familiar
attitudes of his audience, sometimes by telling a good story,
sometimes by brandishing his patriotism, often by pinching a
grievance. Finding that he is trustworthy, the multitude milling
hither and thither may turn in towards him. He will then be expected
to set forth a plan of campaign. But he will not find that plan in the
slogans which convey the feelings of the mass. It will not even always
be indicated by them. Where the incidence of policy is remote, all
that is essential is that the program shall be verbally and
emotionally connected at the start with what has become vocal in the
multitude. Trusted men in a familiar role subscribing to the accepted
symbols can go a very long way on their own initiative without
explaining the substance of their programs.

But wise leaders are not content to do that. Provided they think
publicity will not strengthen opposition too much, and that debate
will not delay action too long, they seek a certain measure of
consent. They take, if not the whole mass, then the subordinates of
the hierarchy sufficiently into their confidence to prepare them for
what might happen, and to make them feel that they have freely willed
the result. But however sincere the leader may be, there is always,
when the facts are very complicated, a certain amount of illusion in
these consultations. For it is impossible that all the contingencies
shall be as vivid to the whole public as they are to the more
experienced and the more imaginative. A fairly large percentage are
bound to agree without having taken the time, or without possessing
the background, for appreciating the choices which the leader presents
to them. No one, however, can ask for more. And only theorists do. If
we have had our day in court, if what we had to say was heard, and
then if what is done comes out well, most of us do not stop to
consider how much our opinion affected the business in hand.

And therefore, if the established powers are sensitive and
well-informed, if they are visibly trying to meet popular feeling, and
actually removing some of the causes of dissatisfaction, no matter how
slowly they proceed, provided they are seen to be proceeding, they
have little to fear. It takes stupendous and persistent blundering,
plus almost infinite tactlessness, to start a revolution from below.
Palace revolutions, interdepartmental revolutions, are a different
matter. So, too, is demagogy. That stops at relieving the tension by
expressing the feeling. But the statesman knows that such relief is
temporary, and if indulged too often, unsanitary. He, therefore, sees
to it that he arouses no feeling which he cannot sluice into a program
that deals with the facts to which the feelings refer.

But all leaders are not statesmen, all leaders hate to resign, and
most leaders find it hard to believe that bad as things are, the other
fellow would not make them worse. They do not passively wait for the
public to feel the incidence of policy, because the incidence of that
discovery is generally upon their own heads. They are, therefore,
intermittently engaged in mending their fences and consolidating their
position.

The mending of fences consists in offering an occasional scapegoat, in
redressing a minor grievance affecting a powerful individual or
faction, rearranging certain jobs, placating a group of people who
want an arsenal in their home town, or a law to stop somebody's vices.
Study the daily activity of any public official who depends on
election and you can enlarge this list. There are Congressmen elected
year after year who never think of dissipating their energy on public
affairs. They prefer to do a little service for a lot of people on a
lot of little subjects, rather than to engage in trying to do a big
service out there in the void. But the number of people to whom any
organization can be a successful valet is limited, and shrewd
politicians take care to attend either the influential, or somebody so
blatantly uninfluential that to pay any attention to him is a mark of
sensational magnanimity. The far greater number who cannot be held by
favors, the anonymous multitude, receive propaganda.

The established leaders of any organization have great natural
advantages. They are believed to have better sources of information.
The books and papers are in their offices. They took part in the
important conferences. They met the important people. They have
responsibility. It is, therefore, easier for them to secure attention
and to speak in a convincing tone. But also they have a very great
deal of control over the access to the facts. Every official is in
some degree a censor. And since no one can suppress information,
either by concealing it or forgetting to mention it, without some
notion of what he wishes the public to know, every leader is in some
degree a propagandist. Strategically placed, and compelled often to
choose even at the best between the equally cogent though conflicting
ideals of safety for the institution, and candor to his public, the
official finds himself deciding more and more consciously what facts,
in what setting, in what guise he shall permit the public to know.

4

That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no
one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is
certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages, and
the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the
process are plain enough.

The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which
was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it
has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic,
because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. And
so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern
means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner.
A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any
shifting of economic power.

Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs,
persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of
popular government. None of us begins to understand the consequences,
but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of how to
create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every
political premise. Under the impact of propaganda, not necessarily in
the sinister meaning of the word alone, the old constants of our
thinking have become variables. It is no longer possible, for example,
to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge
needed for the management of human affairs comes up spontaneously from
the human heart. Where we act on that theory we expose ourselves to
self-deception, and to forms of persuasion that we cannot verify. It
has been demonstrated that we cannot rely upon intuition, conscience,
or the accidents of casual opinion if we are to deal with the world
beyond our reach.



PART VI

THE IMAGE OF DEMOCRACY

"I confess that in America I saw more than America;
I sought the image of democracy itself."

Alexis de Tocqueville.

CHAPTER 16. THE SELF-CENTERED MAN
   "    17. THE SELF-CONTAINED COMMUNITY
   "    18. THE ROLE OF FORCE, PATRONAGE AND PRIVILEGE
   "    19. THE OLD IMAGE IN A NEW FORM: GUILD SOCIALISM
   "    20. A NEW IMAGE



CHAPTER XVI

THE SELF-CENTERED MAN

I

SINCE Public Opinion is supposed to be the prime mover in democracies,
one might reasonably expect to find a vast literature. One does not
find it. There are excellent books on government and parties, that is,
on the machinery which in theory registers public opinions after they
are formed. But on the sources from which these public opinions arise,
on the processes by which they are derived, there is relatively
little. The existence of a force called Public Opinion is in the main
taken for granted, and American political writers have been most
interested either in finding out how to make government express the
common will, or in how to prevent the common will from subverting the
purposes for which they believe the government exists. According to
their traditions they have wished either to tame opinion or to obey
it. Thus the editor of a notable series of text-books writes that "the
most difficult and the most momentous question of government (is) how
to transmit the force of individual opinion into public
action." [Footnote: Albert Bushnell Hart in the Introductory note to A.
Lawrence Lowell's _Public Opinion and Popular Government. _]

But surely there is a still more momentous question, the question of
how to validate our private versions of the political scene. There is,
as I shall try to indicate further on, the prospect of radical
improvement by the development of principles already in operation. But
this development will depend on how well we learn to use knowledge of
the way opinions are put together to watch over our own opinions when
they are being put together. For casual opinion, being the product of
partial contact, of tradition, and personal interests, cannot in the
nature of things take kindly to a method of political thought which is
based on exact record, measurement, analysis and comparison. Just
those qualities of the mind which determine what shall seem
interesting, important, familiar, personal, and dramatic, are the
qualities which in the first instance realistic opinion frustrates.
Therefore, unless there is in the community at large a growing
conviction that prejudice and intuition are not enough, the working
out of realistic opinion, which takes time, money, labor, conscious
effort, patience, and equanimity, will not find enough support. That
conviction grows as self-criticism increases, and makes us conscious
of buncombe, contemptuous of ourselves when we employ it, and on guard
to detect it. Without an ingrained habit of analyzing opinion when we
read, talk, and decide, most of us would hardly suspect the need of
better ideas, nor be interested in them when they appear, nor be able
to prevent the new technic of political intelligence from being
manipulated.

Yet democracies, if we are to judge by the oldest and most powerful of
them, have made a mystery out of public opinion. There have been
skilled organizers of opinion who understood the mystery well enough
to create majorities on election day. But these organizers have been
regarded by political science as low fellows or as "problems," not as
possessors of the most effective knowledge there was on how to create
and operate public opinion. The tendency of the people who have voiced
the ideas of democracy, even when they have not managed its action,
the tendency of students, orators, editors, has been to look upon
Public Opinion as men in other societies looked upon the uncanny
forces to which they ascribed the last word in the direction of
events.

For in almost every political theory there is an inscrutable element
which in the heyday of that theory goes unexamined. Behind the
appearances there is a Fate, there are Guardian Spirits, or Mandates
to a Chosen People, a Divine Monarchy, a Vice-Regent of Heaven, or a
Class of the Better Born. The more obvious angels, demons, and kings
are gone out of democratic thinking, but the need for believing that
there are reserve powers of guidance persists. It persisted for those
thinkers of the Eighteenth Century who designed the matrix of
democracy. They had a pale god, but warm hearts, and in the doctrine
of popular sovereignty they found the answer to their need of an
infallible origin for the new social order. There was the mystery, and
only enemies of the people touched it with profane and curious hands.

2

They did not remove the veil because they were practical politicians
in a bitter and uncertain struggle. They had themselves felt the
aspiration of democracy, which is ever so much deeper, more intimate
and more important than any theory of government. They were engaged,
as against the prejudice of ages, in the assertion of human dignity.
What possessed them was not whether John Smith had sound views on any
public question, but that John Smith, scion of a stock that had always
been considered inferior, would now bend his knee to no other man. It
was this spectacle that made it bliss "in that dawn to be alive." But
every analyst seems to degrade that dignity, to deny that all men are
reasonable all the time, or educated, or informed, to note that people
are fooled, that they do not always know their own interests, and that
all men are not equally fitted to govern.

The critics were about as welcome as a small boy with a drum. Every
one of these observations on the fallibility of man was being
exploited ad nauseam. Had democrats admitted there was truth in any of
the aristocratic arguments they would have opened a breach in the
defenses. And so just as Aristotle had to insist that the slave was a
slave by nature, the democrats had to insist that the free man was a
legislator and administrator by nature. They could not stop to explain
that a human soul might not yet have, or indeed might never have, this
technical equipment, and that nevertheless it had an inalienable right
not to be used as the unwilling instrument of other men. The superior
people were still too strong and too unscrupulous to have refrained
from capitalizing so candid a statement.

So the early democrats insisted that a reasoned righteousness welled
up spontaneously out of the mass of men. All of them hoped that it
would, many of them believed that it did, although the cleverest, like
Thomas Jefferson, had all sorts of private reservations. But one thing
was certain: if public opinion did not come forth spontaneously,
nobody in that age believed it would come forth at all. For in one
fundamental respect the political science on which democracy was based
was the same science that Aristotle formulated. It was the same
science for democrat and aristocrat, royalist and republican, in that
its major premise assumed the art of government to be a natural
endowment. Men differed radically when they tried to name the men so
endowed; but they agreed in thinking that the greatest question of all
was to find those in whom political wisdom was innate. Royalists were
sure that kings were born to govern. Alexander Hamilton thought that
while "there are strong minds in every walk of life... the
representative body, with too few exceptions to have any influence on
the spirit of the government, will be composed of landholders,
merchants, and men of the learned professions." [Footnote: _The
Federalist_, Nos. 35, 36. _Cf_. comment by Henry Jones Ford in
his _Rise and Growth of American Politics_. Ch. V.] Jefferson
thought the political faculties were deposited by God in farmers and
planters, and sometimes spoke as if they were found in all the people.
[Footnote: See below p. 268.] The main premise was the same: to govern
was an instinct that appeared, according to your social preferences,
in one man or a chosen few, in all males, or only in males who were
white and twenty-one, perhaps even in all men and all women.

In deciding who was most fit to govern, knowledge of the world was
taken for granted. The aristocrat believed that those who dealt with
large affairs possessed the instinct, the democrats asserted that all
men possessed the instinct and could therefore deal with large
affairs. It was no part of political science in either case to think
out how knowledge of the world could be brought to the ruler. If you
were for the people you did not try to work out the question of how to
keep the voter informed. By the age of twenty-one he had his political
faculties. What counted was a good heart, a reasoning mind, a balanced
judgment. These would ripen with age, but it was not necessary to
consider how to inform the heart and feed the reason. Men took in
their facts as they took in their breath.

3

But the facts men could come to possess in this effortless way were
limited. They could know the customs and more obvious character of the
place where they lived and worked. But the outer world they had to
conceive, and they did not conceive it instinctively, nor absorb
trustworthy knowledge of it just by living. Therefore, the only
environment in which spontaneous politics were possible was one
confined within the range of the ruler's direct and certain knowledge.
There is no escaping this conclusion, wherever you found government on
the natural range of men's faculties. "If," as Aristotle said,
[Footnote: _Politics_, Bk. VII, Ch. 4.] "the citizens of a state
are to judge and distribute offices according to merit, then they must
know each other's characters; where they do not possess this
knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of law suits
will go wrong."

Obviously this maxim was binding upon every school of political
thought. But it presented peculiar difficulties to the democrats.
Those who believed in class government could fairly claim that in the
court of the king, or in the country houses of the gentry, men did
know each other's characters, and as long as the rest of mankind was
passive, the only characters one needed to know were the characters of
men in the ruling class. But the democrats, who wanted to raise the
dignity of all men, were immediately involved by the immense size and
confusion of their ruling class--the male electorate. Their science
told them that politics was an instinct, and that the instinct worked
in a limited environment. Their hopes bade them insist that all men in
a very large environment could govern. In this deadly conflict between
their ideals and their science, the only way out was to assume without
much discussion that the voice of the people was the voice of God.

The paradox was too great, the stakes too big, their ideal too
precious for critical examination. They could not show how a citizen
of Boston was to stay in Boston and conceive the views of a Virginian,
how a Virginian in Virginia could have real opinions about the
government at Washington, how Congressmen in Washington could have
opinions about China or Mexico. For in that day it was not possible
for many men to have an unseen environment brought into the field of
their judgment. There had been some advances, to be sure, since
Aristotle. There were a few newspapers, and there were books, better
roads perhaps, and better ships. But there was no great advance, and
the political assumptions of the Eighteenth Century had essentially to
be those that had prevailed in political science for two thousand
years. The pioneer democrats did not possess the material for
resolving the conflict between the known range of man's attention and
their illimitable faith in his dignity.

Their assumptions antedated not only the modern newspaper, the
world-wide press services, photography and moving pictures, but, what
is really more significant, they antedated measurement and record,
quantitative and comparative analysis, the canons of evidence, and the
ability of psychological analysis to correct and discount the
prejudices of the witness. I do not mean to say that our records are
satisfactory, our analysis unbiased, our measurements sound. I do mean
to say that the key inventions have been made for bringing the unseen
world into the field of judgment. They had not been made in the time
of Aristotle, and they were not yet important enough to be visible for
political theory in the age of Rousseau, Montesquieu, or Thomas
Jefferson. In a later chapter I think we shall see that even in the
latest theory of human reconstruction, that of the English Guild
Socialists, all the deeper premises have been taken over from this
older system of political thought.

That system, whenever it was competent and honest, had to assume that
no man could have more than a very partial experience of public
affairs. In the sense that he can give only a little time to them,
that assumption is still true, and of the utmost consequence. But
ancient theory was compelled to assume, not only that men could give
little attention to public questions, but that the attention available
would have to be confined to matters close at hand. It would have been
visionary to suppose that a time would come when distant and
complicated events could conceivably be reported, analyzed, and
presented in such a form that a really valuable choice could be made
by an amateur. That time is now in sight. There is no longer any doubt
that the continuous reporting of an unseen environment is feasible. It
is often done badly, but the fact that it is done at all shows that it
can be done, and the fact that we begin to know how badly it is often
done, shows that it can be done better. With varying degrees of skill
and honesty distant complexities are reported every day by engineers
and accountants for business men, by secretaries and civil servants
for officials, by intelligence officers for the General Staff, by some
journalists for some readers. These are crude beginnings but radical,
far more radical in the literal meaning of that word than the
repetition of wars, revolutions, abdications and restorations; as
radical as the change in the scale of human life which has made it
possible for Mr. Lloyd George to discuss Welsh coal mining after
breakfast in London, and the fate of the Arabs before dinner in Paris.

For the possibility of bringing any aspect of human affairs within the
range of judgment breaks the spell which has lain upon political
ideas. There have, of course, been plenty of men who did not realize
that the range of attention was the main premise of political science.
They have built on sand. They have demonstrated in their own persons
the effects of a very limited and self-centered knowledge of the
world. But for the political thinkers who have counted, from Plato and
Aristotle through Machiavelli and Hobbes to the democratic theorists,
speculation has revolved around the self-centered man who had to see
the whole world by means of a few pictures in his head.



CHAPTER XVII

THE SELF-CONTAINED COMMUNITY

1

THAT groups of self-centered people would engage in a struggle for
existence if they rubbed against each other has always been evident.
This much truth there is at any rate in that famous passage in the
Leviathan where Hobbes says that "though there had never been any time
wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another,
yet at all times kings and _persons_ of _sovereign authority
because_ of their _independency_, are in continual jealousies
and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons
pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another..." [Footnote:
_Leviathan_, Ch. XIII. Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as
concerning their Felicity and Misery.]

2

To circumvent this conclusion one great branch of human thought, which
had and has many schools, proceeded in this fashion: it conceived an
ideally just pattern of human relations in which each person had well
defined functions and rights. If he conscientiously filled the role
allotted to him, it did not matter whether his opinions were right or
wrong. He did his duty, the next man did his, and all the dutiful
people together made a harmonious world. Every caste system
illustrates this principle; you find it in Plato's Republic and in
Aristotle, in the feudal ideal, in the circles of Dante's Paradise, in
the bureaucratic type of socialism, and in laissez-faire, to an
amazing degree in syndicalism, guild socialism, anarchism, and in the
system of international law idealized by Mr. Robert Lansing. All of
them assume a pre-established harmony, inspired, imposed, or innate,
by which the self-opinionated person, class, or community is
orchestrated with the rest of mankind. The more authoritarian imagine
a conductor for the symphony who sees to it that each man plays his
part; the anarchistic are inclined to think that a more divine concord
would be heard if each player improvised as he went along.

But there have also been philosophers who were bored by these schemes
of rights and duties, took conflict for granted, and tried to see how
their side might come out on top. They have always seemed more
realistic, even when they seemed alarming, because all they had to do
was to generalize the experience that nobody could escape. Machiavelli
is the classic of this school, a man most mercilessly maligned,
because he happened to be the first naturalist who used plain language
in a field hitherto preempted by supernaturalists. [Footnote: F. S.
Oliver in his _Alexander Hamilton_, says of Machiavelli (p. 174):
"Assuming the conditions which exist--the nature of man and of
things--to be unchangeable, he proceeds in a calm, unmoral way, like a
lecturer on frogs, to show how a valiant and sagacious ruler can best
turn events to his own advantage and the security of his dynasty."] He
has a worse name and more disciples than any political thinker who
ever lived. He truly described the technic of existence for the
self-contained state. That is why he has the disciples. He has the bad
name chiefly because he cocked his eye at the Medici family, dreamed
in his study at night where he wore his "noble court dress" that
Machiavelli was himself the Prince, and turned a pungent description
of the way things are done into an eulogy on that way of doing them.

In his most infamous chapter [Footnote: _The Prince_, Ch. XVIII.
"Concerning the way in which Princes should keep faith." Translation
by W. K. Marriott.] he wrote that "a prince ought to take care that he
never lets anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the
above-named five qualities, that he may appear to him who hears and
sees him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and
religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this
last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by
the hand, because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come
in touch with you. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few really
know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the
opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them;
and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is
not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.... One prince of
the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything
else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and
either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and
kingdom many a time."

That is cynical. But it is the cynicism of a man who saw truly without
knowing quite why he saw what he saw. Machiavelli is thinking of the
run of men and princes "who judge generally more by the eye than by
the hand," which is his way of saying that their judgments are
subjective. He was too close to earth to pretend that the Italians of
his day saw the world steadily and saw it whole. He would not indulge
in fantasies, and he had not the materials for imagining a race of men
that had learned how to correct their vision.

The world, as he found it, was composed of people whose vision could
rarely be corrected, and Machiavelli knew that such people, since they
see all public relations in a private way, are involved in perpetual
strife. What they see is their own personal, class, dynastic, or
municipal version of affairs that in reality extend far beyond the
boundaries of their vision. They see their aspect. They see it as
right. But they cross other people who are similarly self-centered.
Then their very existence is endangered, or at least what they, for
unsuspected private reasons, regard as their existence and take to be
a danger. The end, which is impregnably based on a real though private
experience justifies the means. They will sacrifice any one of these
ideals to save all of them,... "one judges by the result..."

3

These elemental truths confronted the democratic philosophers.
Consciously or otherwise, they knew that the range of political
knowledge was limited, that the area of self-government would have to
be limited, and that self-contained states when they rubbed against
each other were in the posture of gladiators. But they knew just as
certainly, that there was in men a will to decide their own fate, and
to find a peace that was not imposed by force. How could they
reconcile the wish and the fact?

They looked about them. In the city states of Greece and Italy they
found a chronicle of corruption, intrigue and war. [Footnote:
"Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention...
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been
violent in their deaths." Madison, _Federalist_, No. 10.] In
their own cities they saw faction, artificiality, fever. This was no
environment in which the democratic ideal could prosper, no place
where a group of independent and equally competent people managed
their own affairs spontaneously. They looked further, guided somewhat
perhaps by Jean Jacques Rousseau, to remote, unspoiled country
villages. They saw enough to convince themselves that there the ideal
was at home. Jefferson in particular felt this, and Jefferson more
than any other man formulated the American image of democracy. From
the townships had come the power that had carried the American
Revolution to victory. From the townships were to come the votes that
carried Jefferson's party to power. Out there in the farming
communities of Massachusetts and Virginia, if you wore glasses that
obliterated the slaves, you could see with your mind's eye the image
of what democracy was to be.

"The American Revolution broke out," says de Tocqueville, [Footnote:
_Democracy in America,_ Vol. I, p. 51. Third Edition] "and the
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, which had been nurtured in
the townships, took possession of the state." It certainly took
possession of the minds of those men who formulated and popularized
the stereotypes of democracy. "The cherishment of the people was our
principle," wrote Jefferson. [Footnote: Cited in Charles Beard,
_Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy._ Ch. XIV. ] But the
people he cherished almost exclusively were the small landowning
farmers: "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God,
if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made his peculiar
deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which
He keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the
face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is
a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example."

However much of the romantic return to nature may have entered into
this exclamation, there was also an element of solid sense. Jefferson
was right in thinking that a group of independent farmers comes nearer
to fulfilling the requirements of spontaneous democracy than any other
human society. But if you are to preserve the ideal, you must fence
off these ideal communities from the abominations of the world. If the
farmers are to manage their own affairs, they must confine affairs to
those they are accustomed to managing. Jefferson drew all these
logical conclusions. He disapproved of manufacture, of foreign
commerce, and a navy, of intangible forms of property, and in theory
of any form of government that was not centered in the small
self-governing group. He had critics in his day: one of them remarked
that "wrapt up in the fullness of self-consequence and strong enough,
in reality, to defend ourselves against every invader, we might enjoy
an eternal rusticity and live, forever, thus apathized and vulgar
under the shelter of a selfish, satisfied indifference." [Footnote:
_Op. cit_., p. 426.]

4

The democratic ideal, as Jefferson moulded it, consisting of an ideal
environment and a selected class, did not conflict with the political
science of his time. It did conflict with the realities. And when the
ideal was stated in absolute terms, partly through exuberance and
partly for campaign purposes, it was soon forgotten that the theory
was originally devised for very special conditions. It became the
political gospel, and supplied the stereotypes through which Americans
of all parties have looked at politics.

That gospel was fixed by the necessity that in Jefferson's time no one
could have conceived public opinions that were not spontaneous and
subjective. The democratic tradition is therefore always trying to see
a world where people are exclusively concerned with affairs of which
the causes and effects all operate within the region they inhabit.
Never has democratic theory been able to conceive itself in the
context of a wide and unpredictable environment. The mirror is
concave. And although democrats recognize that they are in contact
with external affairs, they see quite surely that every contact
outside that self-contained group is a threat to democracy as
originally conceived. That is a wise fear. If democracy is to be
spontaneous, the interests of democracy must remain simple,
intelligible, and easily managed. Conditions must approximate those of
the isolated rural township if the supply of information is to be left
to casual experience. The environment must be confined within the
range of every man's direct and certain knowledge.

The democrat has understood what an analysis of public opinion seems
to demonstrate: that in dealing with an unseen environment decisions
"are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly they ought not to
be." [Footnote: Aristotle, _Politics_, Bk. VII, Ch. IV.] So he
has always tried in one way or another to minimize the importance of
that unseen environment. He feared foreign trade because trade
involves foreign connections; he distrusted manufactures because they
produced big cities and collected crowds; if he had nevertheless to
have manufactures, he wanted protection in the interest of
self-sufficiency. When he could not find these conditions in the real
world, he went passionately into the wilderness, and founded Utopian
communities far from foreign contacts. His slogans reveal his
prejudice. He is for Self-Government, Self-Determination,
Independence. Not one of these ideas carries with it any notion of
consent or community beyond the frontiers of the self-governing
groups. The field of democratic action is a circumscribed area. Within
protected boundaries the aim has been to achieve self-sufficiency and
avoid entanglement. This rule is not confined to foreign policy, but
it is plainly evident there, because life outside the national
boundaries is more distinctly alien than any life within. And as
history shows, democracies in their foreign policy have had generally
to choose between splendid isolation and a diplomacy that violated
their ideals. The most successful democracies, in fact, Switzerland,
Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, and America until recently, have had
no foreign policy in the European sense of that phrase. Even a rule
like the Monroe Doctrine arose from the desire to supplement the two
oceans by a glacis of states that were sufficiently republican to have
no foreign policy.

Whereas danger is a great, perhaps an indispensable condition of
autocracy, [Footnote: Fisher Ames, frightened by the democratic
revolution of 1800, wrote to Rufus King in 1802: "We need, as all
nations do, the compression on the outside of our circle of a
formidable neighbor, whose presence shall at all times excite stronger
fears than demagogues can inspire the people with towards their
government." Cited by Ford, _Rise and Growth of American
Politics,_ p. 69.] security was seen to be a necessity if democracy
was to work. There must be as little disturbance as possible of the
premise of a self-contained community. Insecurity involves surprises.
It means that there are people acting upon your life, over whom you
have no control, with whom you cannot consult. It means that forces
are at large which disturb the familiar routine, and present novel
problems about which quick and unusual decisions are required. Every
democrat feels in his bones that dangerous crises are incompatible
with democracy, because he knows that the inertia of masses is such
that to act quickly a very few must decide and the rest follow rather
blindly. This has not made non-resistants out of democrats, but it has
resulted in all democratic wars being fought for pacifist aims. Even
when the wars are in fact wars of conquest, they are sincerely
believed to be wars in defense of civilization.

These various attempts to enclose a part of the earth's surface were
not inspired by cowardice, apathy, or, what one of Jefferson's critics
called a willingness to live under monkish discipline. The democrats
had caught sight of a dazzling possibility, that every human being
should rise to his full stature, freed from man-made limitations. With
what they knew of the art of government, they could, no more than
Aristotle before them, conceive a society of autonomous individuals,
except an enclosed and simple one. They could, then, select no other
premise if they were to reach the conclusion that all the people could
spontaneously manage their public affairs.

5

Having adopted the premise because it was necessary to their keenest
hope, they drew other conclusions as well. Since in order to have
spontaneous self-government, you had to have a simple self-contained
community, they took it for granted that one man was as competent as
the next to manage these simple and self-contained affairs. Where the
wish is father to the thought such logic is convincing. Moreover, the
doctrine of the omnicompetent citizen is for most practical purposes
true in the rural township. Everybody in a village sooner or later
tries his hand at everything the village does. There is rotation in
office by men who are jacks of all trades. There was no serious
trouble with the doctrine of the omnicompetent citizen until the
democratic stereotype was universally applied, so that men looked at a
complicated civilization and saw an enclosed village.

Not only was the individual citizen fitted to deal with all public
affairs, but he was consistently public-spirited and endowed with
unflagging interest. He was public-spirited enough in the township,
where he knew everybody and was interested in everybody's business.
The idea of enough for the township turned easily into the idea of
enough for any purpose, for as we have noted, quantitative thinking
does not suit a stereotype. But there was another turn to the circle.
Since everybody was assumed to be interested enough in important
affairs, only those affairs came to seem important in which everybody
was interested.

This meant that men formed their picture of the world outside from the
unchallenged pictures in their heads. These pictures came to them well
stereotyped by their parents and teachers, and were little corrected
by their own experience. Only a few men had affairs that took them
across state lines. Even fewer had reason to go abroad. Most voters
lived their whole lives in one environment, and with nothing but a few
feeble newspapers, some pamphlets, political speeches, their religious
training, and rumor to go on, they had to conceive that larger
environment of commerce and finance, of war and peace. The number of
public opinions based on any objective report was very small in
proportion to those based on casual fancy.

And so for many different reasons, self-sufficiency was a spiritual
ideal in the formative period. The physical isolation of the township,
the loneliness of the pioneer, the theory of democracy, the Protestant
tradition, and the limitations of political science all converged to
make men believe that out of their own consciences they must extricate
political wisdom. It is not strange that the deduction of laws from
absolute principles should have usurped so much of their free energy.
The American political mind had to live on its capital. In legalism it
found a tested body of rules from which new rules could be spun
without the labor of earning new truths from experience. The formulae
became so curiously sacred that every good foreign observer has been
amazed at the contrast between the dynamic practical energy of the
American people and the static theorism of their public life. That
steadfast love of fixed principles was simply the only way known of
achieving self-sufficiency. But it meant that the public opinions of
any one community about the outer world consisted chiefly of a few
stereotyped images arranged in a pattern deduced from their legal and
their moral codes, and animated by the feeling aroused by local
experiences.

Thus democratic theory, starting from its fine vision of ultimate
human dignity, was forced by lack of the instruments of knowledge for
reporting its environment, to fall back upon the wisdom and experience
which happened to have accumulated in the voter. God had, in the words
of Jefferson, made men's breasts "His peculiar deposit for substantial
and genuine virtue." These chosen people in their self-contained
environment had all the facts before them. The environment was so
familiar that one could take it for granted that men were talking
about substantially the same things. The only real disagreements,
therefore, would be in judgments about the same facts. There was no
need to guarantee the sources of information. They were obvious, and
equally accessible to all men. Nor was there need to trouble about the
ultimate criteria. In the self-contained community one could assume,
or at least did assume, a homogeneous code of morals. The only place,
therefore, for differences of opinion was in the logical application
of accepted standards to accepted facts. And since the reasoning
faculty was also well standardized, an error in reasoning would be
quickly exposed in a free discussion. It followed that truth could be
obtained by liberty within these limits. The community could take its
supply of information for granted; its codes it passed on through
school, church, and family, and the power to draw deductions from a
premise, rather than the ability to find the premise, was regarded as
the chief end of intellectual training.



CHAPTER XVIII

THE ROLE OF FORCE, PATRONAGE AND PRIVILEGE

1

"IT has happened as was to have been foreseen," wrote Hamilton,
[Footnote: _Federalist,_ No. 15] "the measures of the Union have
not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by step,
matured themselves to an extreme which has at length arrested all the
wheels of the national government and brought them to an awful
stand."... For "in our case the concurrence of thirteen distinct
sovereign wills is requisite, under the confederation, to the complete
execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union."
How could it be otherwise, he asked: "The rulers of the respective
members... will undertake to judge of the propriety of the measures
themselves. They will consider the conformity of the thing proposed or
required to their immediate interests or aims; the momentary
conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its adoption. All
this will be done, and in a spirit of interested and suspicious
scrutiny, without that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons
of state which is essential to right judgment, and with that strong
predilection in favor of local objects which can hardly fail to
mislead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every
member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of the
plans framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluctuate on
the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every
part. Those who have been conversant in the proceedings of popular
assemblies, who have seen how difficult it often is, when there is no
exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious
resolutions on important points, will readily conceive how impossible
it must be to induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a
distance from each other, at different times, and under different
impressions, long to coöperate in the same views and pursuits."

Over ten years of storm and stress with a congress that was, as John
Adams said, [Footnote: Ford, _op. cit._, p. 36.] "only a diplomatic
assembly," had furnished the leaders of the revolution "with an
instructive but afflicting lesson" [Footnote: _Federalist_,  No. 15.]
in what happens when a number of self-centered  communities
are entangled in the same environment. And so,  when they went
to Philadelphia in May of 1787, ostensibly to revise the Articles of
Confederation, they were really in full reaction against the
fundamental premise of Eighteenth Century democracy. Not only
were the leaders consciously opposed to the democratic spirit of
the time, feeling, as Madison said, that "democracies have ever
been spectacles of turbulence and contention," but within the
national frontiers they were determined to offset as far as they could
the ideal of self-governing communities in self-contained environments.
The collisions and failures of concave democracy, where men
spontaneously managed all their own affairs, were before their eyes.
The problem as they saw it, was to restore government as against
democracy. They understood government to be the power to make
national decisions and enforce them throughout the nation;
democracy they believed was the insistence of localities and classes
upon self-determination in accordance with their immediate interests
and aims.

They could not consider in their calculations the possibility of such
an organization of knowledge that separate communities would act
simultaneously on the same version of the facts. We just begin to
conceive this possibility for certain parts of the world where there
is free circulation of news and a common language, and then only for
certain aspects of life. The whole idea of a voluntary federalism in
industry and world politics is still so rudimentary, that, as we see
in our own experience, it enters only a little, and only very
modestly, into practical politics. What we, more than a century later,
can only conceive as an incentive to generations of intellectual
effort, the authors of the Constitution had no reason to conceive at
all. In order to set up national government, Hamilton and his
colleagues had to make plans, not on the theory that men would
coöperate because they had a sense of common interest, but on the
theory that men could be governed, if special interests were kept in
equilibrium by a balance of power. "Ambition," Madison said,
[Footnote: _Federalist_, No. 51, cited by Ford, _op. cit._,
p. 60.] "must be made to counteract ambition."

They did not, as some writers have supposed, intend to balance every
interest so that the government would be in a perpetual deadlock. They
intended to deadlock local and class interest to prevent these from
obstructing government. "In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men," wrote Madison, [Footnote: _Id_.]
"the great difficulty lies in this: _you must first enable the
government to control the governed_, and in the next place, oblige
it to control itself." In one very important sense, then, the doctrine
of checks and balances was the remedy of the federalist leaders for
the problem of public opinion. They saw no other way to substitute
"the mild influence of the magistracy" for the "sanguinary agency of
the sword" [Footnote: _Federalist, No. 15.] except by devising an
ingenious machine to neutralize local opinion. They did not understand
how to manipulate a large electorate, any more than they saw the
possibility of common consent upon the basis of common information. It
is true that Aaron Burr taught Hamilton a lesson which impressed him a
good deal when he seized control of New York City in 1800 by the aid
of Tammany Hall. But Hamilton was killed before he was able to take
account of this new discovery, and, as Mr. Ford says, [Footnote: Ford,
_op. cit._, p. 119.] Burr's pistol blew the brains out of the
Federal party.

2

When the constitution was written, "politics could still be managed by
conference and agreement among gentlemen" [Footnote: _Op. cit._,
p. 144] and it was to the gentry that Hamilton turned for a
government. It was intended that they should manage national affairs
when local prejudice had been brought into equilibrium by the
constitutional checks and balances. No doubt Hamilton, who belonged to
this class by adoption, had a human prejudice in their favor. But that
by itself is a thin explanation of his statecraft. Certainly there can
be no question of his consuming passion for union, and it is, I think,
an inversion of the truth to argue that he made the Union to protect
class privileges, instead of saying that he used class privileges to
make the Union. "We must take man as we find him," Hamilton said, "and
if we expect him to serve the public we must interest his passions in
doing so." [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p. 47] He needed men to govern,
whose passions could be most quickly attached to a national interest.
These were the gentry, the public creditors, manufacturers, shippers,
and traders, [Footnote: Beard, _Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution, passim._] and there is probably no better instance in
history of the adaptation of shrewd means to clear ends, than in the
series of fiscal measures, by which Hamilton attached the provincial
notables to the new government.

Although the constitutional convention worked behind closed doors, and
although ratification was engineered by "a vote of probably not more
than one-sixth of the adult males," [Footnote: Beard, _op. cit._,
p. 325.] there was little or no pretence. The Federalists argued for
union, not for democracy, and even the word republic had an unpleasant
sound to George Washington when he had been for more than two years a
republican president. The constitution was a candid attempt to limit
the sphere of popular rule; the only democratic organ it was intended
the government should possess was the House, based on a suffrage
highly limited by property qualifications. And even at that, the
House, it was believed, would be so licentious a part of the
government, that it was carefully checked and balanced by the Senate,
the electoral college, the Presidential veto, and by judicial
interpretation.

Thus at the moment when the French Revolution was kindling popular
feeling the world over, the American revolutionists of 1776 came under
a constitution which went back, as far as it was expedient, to the
British Monarchy for a model. This conservative reaction could not
endure. The men who had made it were a minority, their motives were
under suspicion, and when Washington went into retirement, the
position of the gentry was not strong enough to survive the inevitable
struggle for the succession. The anomaly between the original plan of
the Fathers and the moral feeling of the age was too wide not to be
capitalized by a good politician.

3

Jefferson referred to his election as "the great revolution of 1800,"
but more than anything else it was a revolution in the mind. No great
policy was altered, but a new tradition was established. For it was
Jefferson who first taught the American people to regard the
Constitution as an instrument of democracy, and he stereotyped the
images, the ideas, and even many of the phrases, in which Americans
ever since have described politics to each other. So complete was the
mental victory, that twenty-five years later de Tocqueville, who was
received in Federalist homes, noted that even those who were "galled
by its continuance"--were not uncommonly heard to "laud the delights
of a republican government, and the advantages of democratic
institutions when they are in public." [Footnote: _Democracy in
America_, Vol. I, Ch. X (Third Edition, 1838), p. 216.]

The Constitutional Fathers with all their sagacity had failed to see
that a frankly undemocratic constitution would not long be tolerated.
The bold denial of popular rule was bound to offer an easy point of
attack to a man, like Jefferson, who so far as his constitutional
opinions ran, was not a bit more ready than Hamilton to turn over
government to the "unrefined" will of the people. [Footnote:
_Cf._ his plan for the Constitution of Virginia, his ideas for a
senate of property holders, and his views on the judicial veto. Beard,
_Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy_, pp. 450 _et
seq._] The Federalist leaders had been men of definite convictions
who stated them bluntly. There was little real discrepancy between
their public and their private views. But Jefferson's mind was a mass
of ambiguities, not solely because of its defects, as Hamilton and his
biographers have thought, but because he believed in a union and he
believed in spontaneous democracies, and in the political science of
his age there was no satisfactory way to reconcile the two. Jefferson
was confused in thought and action because he had a vision of a new
and tremendous idea that no one had thought out in all its bearings.
But though popular sovereignty was not clearly understood by anybody,
it seemed to imply so great an enhancement of human life, that no
constitution could stand which frankly denied it. The frank denials
were therefore expunged from consciousness, and the document, which is
on its face an honest example of limited constitutional democracy, was
talked and thought about as an instrument for direct popular rule.
Jefferson actually reached the point of believing that the Federalists
had perverted the Constitution, of which in his fancy they were no
longer the authors. And so the Constitution was, in spirit, rewritten.
Partly by actual amendment, partly by practice, as in the case of the
electoral college, but chiefly by looking at it through another set of
stereotypes, the facade was no longer permitted to look oligarchic.

The American people came to believe that their Constitution was a
democratic instrument, and treated it as such. They owe that fiction
to the victory of Thomas Jefferson, and a great conservative fiction
it has been. It is a fair guess that if everyone had always regarded
the Constitution as did the authors of it, the Constitution would have
been violently overthrown, because loyalty to the Constitution and
loyalty to democracy would have seemed incompatible. Jefferson
resolved that paradox by teaching the American people to read the
Constitution as an expression of democracy. He himself stopped there.
But in the course of twenty-five years or so social conditions had
changed so radically, that Andrew Jackson carried out the political
revolution for which Jefferson had prepared the tradition. [Footnote:
The reader who has any doubts as to the extent of the revolution that
separated Hamilton's opinions from Jackson's practice should turn to
Mr. Henry Jones Ford's _Rise and Growth of American Politics_.]

4

The political center of that revolution was the question of patronage.
By the men who founded the government public office was regarded as a
species of property, not lightly to be disturbed, and it was
undoubtedly their hope that the offices would remain in the hands of
their social class. But the democratic theory had as one of its main
principles the doctrine of the omnicompetent citizen. Therefore, when
people began to look at the Constitution as a democratic instrument,
it was certain that permanence in office would seem undemocratic. The
natural ambitions of men coincided here with the great moral impulse
of their age. Jefferson had popularized the idea without carrying it
ruthlessly into practice, and removals on party grounds were
comparatively few under the Virginian Presidents. It was Jackson who
founded the practice of turning public office into patronage.

Curious as it sounds to us, the principle of rotation in office with
short terms was regarded as a great reform. Not only did it
acknowledge the new dignity of the average man by treating him as fit
for any office, not only did it destroy the monopoly of a small social
class and appear to open careers to talent, but "it had been advocated
for centuries as a sovereign remedy for political corruption," and as
the one way to prevent the creation of a bureaucracy. [Footnote: Ford,
_op. cit._, p. 169.] The practice of rapid change in public
office was the application to a great territory of the image of
democracy derived from the self-contained village.

Naturally it did not have the same results in the nation that it had
in the ideal community on which the democratic theory was based. It
produced quite unexpected results, for it founded a new governing
class to take the place of the submerged federalists. Unintentionally,
patronage did for a large electorate what Hamilton's fiscal measures
had done for the upper classes. We often fail to realize how much of
the stability of our government we owe to patronage. For it was
patronage that weaned natural leaders from too much attachment to the
self-centered community, it was patronage that weakened the local
spirit and brought together in some kind of peaceful cooperation, the
very men who, as provincial celebrities, would, in the absence of a
sense of common interest, have torn the union apart.

But of course, the democratic theory was not supposed to produce a new
governing class, and it has never accommodated itself to the fact.
When the democrat wanted to abolish monopoly of offices, to have
rotation and short terms, he was thinking of the township where anyone
could do a public service, and return humbly to his own farm. The idea
of a special class of politicians was just what the democrat did not
like. But he could not have what he did like, because his theory was
derived from an ideal environment, and he was living in a real one.
The more deeply he felt the moral impulse of democracy, the less ready
he was to see the profound truth of Hamilton's statement that
communities deliberating at a distance and under different impressions
could not long coöperate in the same views and pursuits. For that
truth postpones anything like the full realization of democracy in
public affairs until the art of obtaining common consent has been
radically improved. And so while the revolution under Jefferson and
Jackson produced the patronage which made the two party system, which
created a substitute for the rule of the gentry, and a discipline for
governing the deadlock of the checks and balances, all that happened,
as it were, invisibly.

Thus, rotation in office might be the ostensible theory, in practice
the offices oscillated between the henchmen. Tenure might not be a
permanent monopoly, but the professional politician was permanent.
Government might be, as President Harding once said, a simple thing,
but winning elections was a sophisticated performance. The salaries in
office might be as ostentatiously frugal as Jefferson's home-spun, but
the expenses of party organization and the fruits of victory were in
the grand manner. The stereotype of democracy controlled the visible
government; the corrections, the exceptions and adaptations of the
American people to the real facts of their environment have had to be
invisible, even when everybody knew all about them. It was only the
words of the law, the speeches of politicians, the platforms, and the
formal machinery of administration that have had to conform to the
pristine image of democracy.

5

If one had asked a philosophical democrat how these self-contained
communities were to coöperate, when their public opinions were so
self-centered, he would have pointed to representative government
embodied in the Congress. And nothing would surprise him more than the
discovery of how steadily the prestige of representative government
has declined, while the power of the Presidency has grown.

Some critics have traced this to the custom of sending only local
celebrities to Washington. They have thought that if Congress could
consist of the nationally eminent men, the life of the capital would
be more brilliant. It would be, of course, and it would be a very good
thing if retiring Presidents and Cabinet officers followed the example
of John Quincy Adams. But the absence of these men does not explain
the plight of Congress, for its decline began when it was relatively
the most eminent branch of the government. Indeed it is more probable
that the reverse is true, and that Congress ceased to attract the
eminent as it lost direct influence on the shaping of national policy.

The main reason for the discredit, which is world wide, is, I think,
to be found in the fact that a congress of representatives is
essentially a group of blind men in a vast, unknown world. With some
exceptions, the only method recognized in the Constitution or in the
theory of representative government, by which Congress can inform
itself, is to exchange opinions from the districts. There is no
systematic, adequate, and authorized way for Congress to know what is
going on in the world. The theory is that the best man of each
district brings the best wisdom of his constituents to a central
place, and that all these wisdoms combined are all the wisdom that
Congress needs. Now there is no need to question the value of
expressing local opinions and exchanging them. Congress has great
value as the market-place of a continental nation. In the coatrooms,
the hotel lobbies, the boarding houses of Capitol Hill, at the
tea-parties of the Congressional matrons, and from occasional entries
into the drawing rooms of cosmopolitan Washington, new vistas are
opened, and wider horizons. But even if the theory were applied, and
the districts always sent their wisest men, the sum or a combination
of local impressions is not a wide enough base for national policy,
and no base at all for the control of foreign policy. Since the real
effects of most laws are subtle and hidden, they cannot be understood
by filtering local experiences through local states of mind. They can
be known only by controlled reporting and objective analysis. And just
as the head of a large factory cannot know how efficient it is by
talking to the foreman, but must examine cost sheets and data that
only an accountant can dig out for him, so the lawmaker does not
arrive at a true picture of the state of the union by putting together
a mosaic of local pictures. He needs to know the local pictures, but
unless he possesses instruments for calibrating them, one picture is
as good as the next, and a great deal better.

The President does come to the assistance of Congress by delivering
messages on the state of the Union. He is in a position to do that
because he presides over a vast collection of bureaus and their
agents, which report as well as act. But he tells Congress what he
chooses to tell it. He cannot be heckled, and the censorship as to
what is compatible with the public interest is in his hands. It is a
wholly one-sided and tricky relationship, which sometimes reaches such
heights of absurdity, that Congress, in order to secure an important
document has to thank the enterprise of a Chicago newspaper, or the
calculated indiscretion of a subordinate official. So bad is the
contact of legislators with necessary facts that they are forced to
rely either on private tips or on that legalized atrocity, the
Congressional investigation, where Congressmen, starved of their
legitimate food for thought, go on a wild and feverish man-hunt, and
do not stop at cannibalism.

Except for the little that these investigations yield, the occasional
communications from the executive departments, interested and
disinterested data collected by private persons, such newspapers,
periodicals, and books as Congressmen read, and a new and excellent
practice of calling for help from expert bodies like the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Tariff
Commission, the creation of Congressional opinion is incestuous. From
this it follows either that legislation of a national character is
prepared by a few informed insiders, and put through by partisan
force; or that the legislation is broken up into a collection of local
items, each of which is enacted for a local reason. Tariff schedules,
navy yards, army posts, rivers and harbors, post offices and federal
buildings, pensions and patronage: these are fed out to concave
communities as tangible evidence of the benefits of national life.
Being concave, they can see the white marble building which rises out
of federal funds to raise local realty values and employ local
contractors more readily than they can judge the cumulative cost of
the pork barrel. It is fair to say that in a large assembly of men,
each of whom has practical knowledge only of his own district, laws
dealing with translocal affairs are rejected or accepted by the mass
of Congressmen without creative participation of any kind. They
participate only in making those laws that can be treated as a bundle
of local issues. For a legislature without effective means of
information and analysis must oscillate between blind regularity,
tempered by occasional insurgency, and logrolling. And it is the
logrolling which makes the regularity palatable, because it is by
logrolling that a Congressman proves to his more active constituents
that he is watching their interests as they conceive them.

This is no fault of the individual Congressman's, except when he is
complacent about it. The cleverest and most industrious representative
cannot hope to understand a fraction of the bills on which he votes.
The best he can do is to specialize on a few bills, and take
somebody's word about the rest. I have known Congressmen, when they
were boning up on a subject, to study as they had not studied since
they passed their final examinations, many large cups of black coffee,
wet towels and all. They had to dig for information, sweat over
arranging and verifying facts, which, in any consciously organized
government, should have been easily available in a form suitable for
decision. And even when they really knew a subject, their anxieties
had only begun. For back home the editors, the board of trade, the
central federated union, and the women's clubs had spared themselves
these labors, and were prepared to view the Congressman's performance
through local spectacles.

6

What patronage did to attach political chieftains to the national
government, the infinite variety of local subsidies and privileges do
for self-centered communities. Patronage and pork amalgamate and
stabilize thousands of special opinions, local discontents, private
ambitions. There are but two other alternatives. One is government by
terror and obedience, the other is government based on such a highly
developed system of information, analysis, and self-consciousness that
"the knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state" is
evident to all men. The autocratic system is in decay, the voluntary
system is in its very earliest development; and so, in calculating the
prospects of association among large groups of people, a League of
Nations, industrial government, or a federal union of states, the
degree to which the material for a common consciousness exists,
determines how far cooperation will depend upon force, or upon the
milder alternative to force, which is patronage and privilege. The
secret of great state-builders, like Alexander Hamilton, is that they
know how to calculate these principles.



CHAPTER XIX

THE OLD IMAGE IN A NEW FORM: GUILD SOCIALISM.

Whenever the quarrels of self-centered groups become unbearable,
reformers in the past found themselves forced to choose between two
great alternatives. They could take the path to Rome and impose a
Roman peace upon the warring tribes. They could take the path to
isolation, to autonomy and self-sufficiency. Almost always they chose
that path which they had least recently travelled. If they had tried
out the deadening monotony of empire, they cherished above all other
things the simple freedom of their own community. But if they had seen
this simple freedom squandered in parochial jealousies they longed for
the spacious order of a great and powerful state.

Whichever choice they made, the essential difficulty was the same. If
decisions were decentralized they soon floundered in a chaos of local
opinions. If they were centralized, the policy of the state was based
on the opinions of a small social set at the capital. In any case
force was necessary to defend one local right against another, or to
impose law and order on the localities, or to resist class government
at the center, or to defend the whole society, centralized or
decentralized, against the outer barbarian.

Modern democracy and the industrial system were both born in a time of
reaction against kings, crown government, and a regime of detailed
economic regulation. In the industrial sphere this reaction took the
form of extreme devolution, known as laissez-faire individualism. Each
economic decision was to be made by the man who had title to the
property involved. Since almost everything was owned by somebody,
there would be somebody to manage everything. This was plural
sovereignty with a vengeance.

It was economic government by anybody's economic philosophy, though it
was supposed to be controlled by immutable laws of political economy
that must in the end produce harmony. It produced many splendid
things, but enough sordid and terrible ones to start counter-currents.
One of these was the trust, which established a kind of Roman peace
within industry, and a Roman predatory imperialism outside. People
turned to the legislature for relief. They invoked representative
government, founded on the image of the township farmer, to regulate
the semi-sovereign corporations. The working class turned to labor
organization. There followed a period of increasing centralization and
a sort of race of armaments. The trusts interlocked, the craft unions
federated and combined into a labor movement, the political system
grew stronger at Washington and weaker in the states, as the reformers
tried to match its strength against big business.

In this period practically all the schools of socialist thought from
the Marxian left to the New Nationalists around Theodore Roosevelt,
looked upon centralization as the first stage of an evolution which
would end in the absorption of all the semi-sovereign powers of
business by the political state. The evolution never took place,
except for a few months during the war. That was enough, and there was
a turn of the wheel against the omnivorous state in favor of several
new forms of pluralism. But this time society was to swing back not to
the atomic individualism of Adam Smith's economic man and Thomas
Jefferson's farmer, but to a sort of molecular individualism of
voluntary groups.

One of the interesting things about all these oscillations of theory
is that each in turn promises a world in which no one will have to
follow Machiavelli in order to survive. They are all established by
some form of coercion, they all exercise coercion in order to maintain
themselves, and they are all discarded as a result of coercion. Yet
they do not accept coercion, either physical power or special
position, patronage, or privilege, as part of their ideal. The
individualist said that self-enlightened self-interest would bring
internal and external peace. The socialist is sure that the motives to
aggression will disappear. The new pluralist hopes they
will. [Footnote: See G. D. H. Cole, _Social Theory,_ p. 142.]
Coercion is the surd in almost all social theory, except the
Machiavellian. The temptation to ignore it, because it is absurd,
inexpressible, and unmanageable, becomes overwhelming in any man who
is trying to rationalize human life.

2

The lengths to which a clever man will sometimes go in order to escape
a full recognition of the role of force is shown by Mr. G. D. H.
Cole's book on Guild Socialism. The present state, he says, "is
primarily an instrument of coercion;" [Footnote: Cole, _Guild
Socialism_, p. 107.] in a guild socialist society there will be no
sovereign power, though there will be a coordinating body. He calls
this body the Commune.

He then begins to enumerate the powers of the Commune, which, we
recall, is to be primarily not an instrument of coercion. [Footnote:
_Op. cit._ Ch. VIII.] It settles price disputes. Sometimes it
fixes prices, allocates the surplus or distributes the loss. It
allocates natural resources, and controls the issue of credit. It also
"allocates communal labor-power." It ratifies the budgets of the
guilds and the civil services. It levies taxes. "All questions of
income" fall within its jurisdiction. It "allocates" income to the
non-productive members of the community. It is the final arbiter in
all questions of policy and jurisdiction between the guilds. It passes
constitutional laws fixing the functions of the functional bodies. It
appoints the judges. It confers coercive powers upon the guilds, and
ratifies their by-laws wherever these involve coercion. It declares
war and makes peace. It controls the armed forces. It is the supreme
representative of the nation abroad. It settles boundary questions
within the national state. It calls into existence new functional
bodies, or distributes new functions to old ones. It runs the police.
It makes whatever laws are necessary to regulate personal conduct and
personal property.

These powers are exercised not by one commune, but by a federal
structure of local and provincial communes with a National commune at
the top. Mr. Cole is, of course, welcome to insist that this is not a
sovereign state, but if there is a coercive power now enjoyed by any
modern government for which he has forgotten to make room, I cannot
think of it.

He tells us, however, that Guild society will be non-coercive: "we
want to build a new society which will be conceived in the spirit, not
of coercion, but of free service." [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p.
141.] Everyone who shares that hope, as most men and women do, will
therefore look closely to see what there is in the Guild Socialist
plan which promises to reduce coercion to its lowest limits, even
though the Guildsmen of to-day have already reserved for their
communes the widest kind of coercive power. It is acknowledged at once
that the new society cannot be brought into existence by universal
consent. Mr. Cole is too honest to shirk the element of force required
to make the transition. [Footnote: _Cf. op. cit._, Ch. X. ] And
while obviously he cannot predict how much civil war there might be,
he is quite clear that there would have to be a period of direct
action by the trade unions.

3

But leaving aside the problems of transition, and any consideration of
what the effect is on their future action, when men have hacked their
way through to the promised land, let us imagine the Guild Society in
being. What keeps it running as a non-coercive society?

Mr. Cole has two answers to this question. One is the orthodox Marxian
answer that the abolition of capitalist property will remove the
motive to aggression. Yet he does not really believe that, because if
he did, he would care as little as does the average Marxian how the
working class is to run the government, once it is in control. If his
diagnosis were correct, the Marxian would be quite right: if the
disease were the capitalist class and only the capitalist class,
salvation would automatically follow its extinction. But Mr. Cole is
enormously concerned about whether the society which follows the
revolution is to be run by state collectivism, by guilds or
cooperative societies, by a democratic parliament or by functional
representation. In fact, it is as a new theory of representative
government that guild socialism challenges attention.

The guildsmen do not expect a miracle to result from the disappearance
of capitalist property rights. They do expect, and of course quite
rightly, that if equality of income were the rule, social relations
would be profoundly altered. But they differ, as far as I can make
out, from the orthodox Russian communist in this respect: The
communist proposes to establish equality by force of the dictatorship
of the proletariat, believing that if once people were equalized both
in income and in service, they would then lose the incentives to
aggression. The guildsmen also propose to establish equality by force,
but are shrewd enough to see that if an equilibrium is to be
maintained they have to provide institutions for maintaining it.
Guildsmen, therefore, put their faith in what they believe to be a new
theory of democracy.

Their object, says Mr. Cole, is "to get the mechanism right, and to
adjust it as far as possible to the expression of men's social wills."
[Reference: _Op. cit._, p. 16.] These wills need to be given
opportunity for self-expression in self-government "in any and every
form of social action." Behind these words is the true democratic
impulse, the desire to enhance human dignity, as well as the
traditional assumption that this human dignity is impugned, unless
each person's will enters into the management of everything that
affects him. The guildsman, like the earlier democrat therefore, looks
about him for an environment in which this ideal of self-government
can be realized. A hundred years and more have passed since Rousseau
and Jefferson, and the center of interest has shifted from the country
to the city. The new democrat can no longer turn to the idealized
rural township for the image of democracy. He turns now to the
workshop. "The spirit of association must be given free play in the
sphere in which it is best able to find expression. This is manifestly
the factory, in which men have the habit and tradition of working
together. The factory is the natural and fundamental unit of
industrial democracy. This involves, not only that the factory must be
free, as far as possible, to manage its own affairs, but also that the
democratic unit of the factory must be made the basis of the larger
democracy of the Guild, and that the larger organs of Guild
administration and government must be based largely on the principle
of factory representation." [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p. 40.]

Factory is, of course, a very loose word, and Mr. Cole asks us to take
it as meaning mines, shipyards, docks, stations, and every place which
is "a natural center of production." [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p.
41] But a factory in this sense is quite a different thing from an
industry. The factory, as Mr. Cole conceives it, is a work place where
men are really in personal contact, an environment small enough to be
known directly to all the workers. "This democracy if it is to be
real, must come home to, and be exercisable directly by, every
individual member of the Guild." [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p. 40.]
This is important, because Mr. Cole, like Jefferson, is seeking a
natural unit of government. The only natural unit is a perfectly
familiar environment. Now a large plant, a railway system, a great
coal field, is not a natural unit in this sense. Unless it is a very
small factory indeed, what Mr. Cole is really thinking about is the
shop. That is where men can be supposed to have "the habit and
tradition of working together." The rest of the plant, the rest of the
industry, is an inferred environment.

4

Anybody can see, and almost everybody will admit, that self-government
in the purely internal affairs of the shop is government of affairs
that "can be taken in at a single view." [Footnote: Aristotle,
_Politics_, Bk. VII, Ch. IV.] But dispute would arise as to what
constitute the internal affairs of a shop. Obviously the biggest
interests, like wages, standards of production, the purchase of
supplies, the marketing of the product, the larger planning of work,
are by no means purely internal. The shop democracy has freedom,
subject to enormous limiting conditions from the outside. It can deal
to a certain extent with the arrangement of work laid out for the
shop, it can deal with the temper and temperament of individuals, it
can administer petty industrial justice, and act as a court of first
instance in somewhat larger individual disputes. Above all it can act
as a unit in dealing with other shops, and perhaps with the plant as a
whole. But isolation is impossible. The unit of industrial democracy
is thoroughly entangled in foreign affairs. And it is the management
of these external relations that constitutes the test of the guild
socialist theory.

They have to be managed by representative government arranged in a
federal order from the shop to the plant, the plant to the industry,
the industry to the nation, with intervening regional grouping of
representatives. But all this structure derives from the shop, and all
its peculiar virtues are ascribed to this source. The representatives
who choose the representatives who choose the representatives who
finally "coordinate" and "regulate" the shops are elected, Mr. Cole
asserts, by a true democracy. Because they come originally from a
self-governing unit, the whole federal organism will be inspired by
the spirit and the reality of self-government. Representatives will
aim to carry out the workers' "actual will as understood by themselves,"
[Footnote: _Op. cit._, p. 42.] that is, as understood by the
individual in the shops.

A government run literally on this principle would, if history is any
guide, be either a perpetual logroll, or a chaos of warring shops. For
while the worker in the shop can have a real opinion about matters
entirely within the shop, his "will" about the relation of that shop
to the plant, the industry, and the nation is subject to all the
limitations of access, stereotype, and self-interest that surround any
other self-centered opinion. His experience in the shop at best brings
only aspects of the whole to his attention. His opinion of what is
right within the shop he can reach by direct knowledge of the
essential facts. His opinion of what is right in the great complicated
environment out of sight is more likely to be wrong than right if it
is a generalization from the experience of the individual shop. As a
matter of experience, the representatives of a guild society would
find, just as the higher trade union officials find today, that on a
great number of questions which they have to decide there is no
"actual will as understood" by the shops.

5

The guildsmen insist, however, that such criticism is blind because it
ignores a great political discovery. You may be quite right, they
would say, in thinking that the representatives of the shops would
have to make up their own minds on many questions about which the
shops have no opinion. But you are simply entangled in an ancient
fallacy: you are looking for somebody to represent a group of people.
He cannot be found. The only representative possible is one who acts
for "some particular function," [Footnote: _Op. cit._, pp. 23-24.]
and therefore each person must help choose as many representatives "as
there are distinct essential groups of functions to be performed."

Assume then that the representatives speak, not for the men in the
shops, but for certain functions in which the men are interested. They
are, mind you, disloyal if they do not carry out the will of the group
about the function, as understood by the group. [Footnote: _Cf._
Part V, "The Making of a Common Will."] These functional
representatives meet. Their business is to coordinate and regulate. By
what standard does each judge the proposals of the other, assuming, as
we must, that there is conflict of opinion between the shops, since if
there were not, there would be no need to coordinate and regulate?

Now the peculiar virtue of functional democracy is supposed to be that
men vote candidly according to their own interests, which it is
assumed they know by daily experience. They can do that within the
self-contained group. But in its external relations the group as a
whole, or its representative, is dealing with matters that transcend
immediate experience. The shop does not arrive spontaneously at a view
of the whole situation. Therefore, the public opinions of a shop about
its rights and duties in the industry and in society, are matters of
education or propaganda, not the automatic product of shop-consciousness.
Whether the guildsmen elect a delegate, or a representative, they do
not escape the problem of the orthodox democrat. Either the group
as a whole, or the elected spokesman, must stretch his mind beyond
the limits of direct experience. He must vote on questions coming up
from other shops, and on matters coming from beyond the frontiers of
the whole industry. The primary interest of the shop does not even
cover the function of a whole industrial vocation. The function of a
vocation, a great industry, a district, a nation is a concept, not an
experience, and has to be imagined, invented, taught and believed.
And even though you define function as carefully as possible, once
you admit that the view of each shop on that function will not
necessarily coincide with the view of other shops, you are saying
that the representative of one interest is concerned in the proposals
made by other interests. You are saying that he must conceive a
common interest. And in voting for him you are choosing a man who
will not simply represent your view of your function, which is all that
you know at first hand, but a man who will represent your views
about other people's views of that function. You are voting as
indefinitely as the orthodox democrat.

6

The guildsmen in their own minds have solved the question of how to
conceive a common interest by playing with the word function. They
imagine a society in which all the main work of the world has been
analysed into functions, and these functions in turn synthesized
harmoniously. [Footnote: _Cf. op. cit._, Ch. XIX.] They suppose
essential agreement about the purposes of society as a whole, and
essential agreement about the role of every organized group in
carrying out those purposes. It was a nice sentiment, therefore, which
led them to take the name of their theory from an institution that
arose in a Catholic feudal society. But they should remember that the
scheme of function which the wise men of that age assumed was not
worked out by mortal man. It is unclear how the guildsmen think the
scheme is going to be worked out and made acceptable in the modern
world. Sometimes they seem to argue that the scheme will develop from
trade union organization, at other times that the communes will define
the constitutional function of the groups. But it makes a considerable
practical difference whether they believe that the groups define their
own functions or not.

In either case, Mr. Cole assumes that society can be carried on by a
social contract based on an accepted idea of "distinct essential
groups of functions." How does one recognize these distinct essential
groups? So far as I can make out, Mr. Cole thinks that a function is
what a group of people are interested in. "The essence of functional
democracy is that a man should count as many times over as there are
functions in which he is interested." [Footnote: _Social Theory,_
p. 102 _et seq._] Now there are at least two meanings to the word
interested. You can use it to mean that a man is involved, or that his
mind is occupied. John Smith, for example, may have been tremendously
interested in the Stillman divorce case. He may have read every word
of the news in every lobster edition. On the other hand, young Guy
Stillman, whose legitimacy was at stake, probably did not trouble
himself at all. John Smith was interested in a suit that did not
affect his "interests," and Guy was uninterested in one that would
determine the whole course of his life. Mr. Cole, I am afraid, leans
towards John Smith. He is answering the "very foolish objection" that
to vote by functions is to be voting very often: "If a man is not
interested enough to vote, and cannot be aroused to interest enough to
make him vote, on, say, a dozen distinct subjects, he waives his right
to vote and the result is no less democratic than if he voted blindly
and without interest."

Mr. Cole thinks that the uninstructed voter "waives his right to
vote." From this it follows that the votes of the instructed reveal
their interest, and their interest defines the function. [Footnote:
_Cf._ Ch. XVIII of this book. "Since everybody was assumed to be
interested enough in important affairs, only those affairs came to
seem important in which everybody was interested."] "Brown, Jones, and
Robinson must therefore have, not one vote each, but as many different
functional votes as there are different questions calling for
associative action in which they are interested." [Footnote: _Guild
Socialism,_ p. 24. ] I am considerably in doubt whether Mr. Cole
thinks that Brown, Jones and Robinson should qualify in any election
where they assert that they are interested, or that somebody else, not
named, picks the functions in which they are entitled to be
interested. If I were asked to say what I believe Mr. Cole thinks, it
would be that he has smoothed over the difficulty by the enormously
strange assumption that it is the uninstructed voter who waives his
right to vote; and has concluded that whether functional voting is
arranged by a higher power, or "from below" on the principle that a
man may vote when it interests him to vote, only the instructed will
be voting anyway, and therefore the institution will work.

But there are two kinds of uninstructed voter. There is the man who
does not know and knows that he does not know. He is generally an
enlightened person. He is the man who waives his right to vote. But
there is also the man who is uninstructed and does not know that he
is, or care. He can always be gotten to the polls, if the party
machinery is working. His vote is the basis of the machine. And since
the communes of the guild society have large powers over taxation,
wages, prices, credit, and natural resources, it would be preposterous
to assume that elections will not be fought at least as passionately
as our own.

The way people exhibit their interest will not then delimit the
functions of a functional society. There are two other ways that
function might be defined. One would be by the trade unions which
fought the battle that brought guild socialism into being. Such a
struggle would harden groups of men together in some sort of
functional relation, and these groups would then become the vested
interests of the guild socialist society. Some of them, like the
miners and railroad men, would be very strong, and probably deeply
attached to the view of their function which they learned from the
battle with capitalism. It is not at all unlikely that certain
favorably placed trade unions would under a socialist state become the
center of coherence and government. But a guild society would
inevitably find them a tough problem to deal with, for direct action
would have revealed their strategic power, and some of their leaders
at least would not offer up this power readily on the altar of
freedom. In order to "coordinate" them, guild society would have to
gather together its strength, and fairly soon one would find, I think,
that the radicals under guild socialism would be asking for communes
strong enough to define the functions of the guilds.

But if you are going to have the government (commune) define
functions, the premise of the theory disappears. It had to suppose
that a scheme of functions was obvious in order that the concave shops
would voluntarily relate themselves to society. If there is no settled
scheme of functions in every voter's head, he has no better way under
guild socialism than under orthodox democracy of turning a
self-centered opinion into a social judgment. And, of course, there
can be no such settled scheme, because, even if Mr. Cole and his
friends devised a good one, the shop democracies from which all power
derives, would judge the scheme in operation by what they learn of it
and by what they can imagine. The guilds would see the same scheme
differently. And so instead of the scheme being the skeleton that
keeps guild society together, the attempt to define what the scheme
ought to be, would be under guild socialism as elsewhere, the main
business of politics. If we could allow Mr. Cole his scheme of
functions we could allow him almost everything. Unfortunately he has
inserted in his premise what he wishes a guild society to
deduce. [Footnote: I have dealt with Mr. Cole's theory rather than with
the experience of Soviet Russia because, while the testimony is
fragmentary, all competent observers seem to agree that Russia in 1921
does not illustrate a communist state in working order. Russia is in
revolution, and what you can learn from Russia is what a revolution is
like. You can learn very little about what a communist society would
be like. It is, however, immensely significant that, first as
practical revolutionists and then as public officials, the Russian
communists have relied not upon the spontaneous democracy of the
Russian people, but on the discipline, special interest and the
noblesse oblige of a specialized class-the loyal and indoctrinated
members of the Communist party. In the "transition," on which no time
limit has been set, I believe, the cure for class government and the
coercive state is strictly homeopathic.

There is also the question of why I selected Mr. Cole's books rather
than the much more closely reasoned "Constitution for the Socialist
Commonwealth of Great Britain" by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. I admire
that book very much; but I have not been able to convince myself that
it is not an intellectual tour de force. Mr. Cole seems to me far more
authentically in the spirit of the socialist movement, and therefore,
a better witness.]



CHAPTER XX

A NEW IMAGE

1

THE lesson is, I think, a fairly clear one. In the absence of
institutions and education by which the environment is so successfully
reported that the realities of public life stand out sharply against
self-centered opinion, the common interests very largely elude public
opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose
personal interests reach beyond the locality. This class is
irresponsible, for it acts upon information that is not common
property, in situations that the public at large does not conceive,
and it can be held to account only on the accomplished fact.

The democratic theory by failing to admit that self-centered opinions
are not sufficient to procure good government, is involved in
perpetual conflict between theory and practice. According to the
theory, the full dignity of man requires that his will should be, as
Mr. Cole says, expressed "in any and every form of social action." It
is supposed that the expression of their will is the consuming passion
of men, for they are assumed to possess by instinct the art of
government. But as a matter of plain experience, self-determination is
only one of the many interests of a human personality. The desire to
be the master of one's own destiny is a strong desire, but it has to
adjust itself to other equally strong desires, such as the desire for
a good life, for peace, for relief from burdens. In the original
assumptions of democracy it was held that the expression of each man's
will would spontaneously satisfy not only his desire for
self-expression, but his desire for a good life, because the instinct
to express one's self in a good life was innate.

The emphasis, therefore, has always been on the mechanism for
expressing the will. The democratic El Dorado has always been some
perfect environment, and some perfect system of voting and
representation, where the innate good will and instinctive
statesmanship of every man could be translated into action. In limited
areas and for brief periods the environment has been so favorable,
that is to say so isolated, and so rich in opportunity, that the
theory worked well enough to confirm men in thinking that it was sound
for all time and everywhere. Then when the isolation ended, and
society became complex, and men had to adjust themselves closely to
one another, the democrat spent his time trying to devise more perfect
units of voting, in the hope that somehow he would, as Mr. Cole says,
"get the mechanism right, and adjust it as far as possible to men's
social wills." But while the democratic theorist was busy at this, he
was far away from the actual interests of human nature. He was
absorbed by one interest: self-government. Mankind was interested in
all kinds of other things, in order, in its rights, in prosperity, in
sights and sounds and in not being bored. In so far as spontaneous
democracy does not satisfy their other interests, it seems to most men
most of the time to be an empty thing. Because the art of successful
self-government is not instinctive, men do not long desire
self-government for its own sake. They desire it for the sake of the
results. That is why the impulse to self-government is always
strongest as a protest against bad conditions.

The democratic fallacy has been its preoccupation with the origin of
government rather than with the processes and results. The democrat
has always assumed that if political power could be derived in the
right way, it would be beneficent. His whole attention has been on the
source of power, since he is hypnotized by the belief that the great
thing is to express the will of the people, first because expression
is the highest interest of man, and second because the will is
instinctively good. But no amount of regulation at the source of a
river will completely control its behavior, and while democrats have
been absorbed in trying to find a good mechanism for originating
social power, that is to say a good mechanism of voting and
representation, they neglected almost every other interest of men. For
no matter how power originates, the crucial interest is in how power
is exercised. What determines the quality of civilization is the use
made of power. And that use cannot be controlled at the source.

If you try to control government wholly at the source, you inevitably
make all the vital decisions invisible. For since there is no instinct
which automatically makes political decisions that produce a good
life, the men who actually exercise power not only fail to express the
will of the people, because on most questions no will exists, but they
exercise power according to opinions which are hidden from the
electorate.

If, then, you root out of the democratic philosophy the whole
assumption in all its ramifications that government is instinctive,
and that therefore it can be managed by self-centered opinions, what
becomes of the democratic faith in the dignity of man? It takes a
fresh lease of life by associating itself with the whole personality
instead of with a meager aspect of it. For the traditional democrat
risked the dignity of man on one very precarious assumption, that he
would exhibit that dignity instinctively in wise laws and good
government. Voters did not do that, and so the democrat was forever
being made to look a little silly by tough-minded men. But if, instead
of hanging human dignity on the one assumption about self-government,
you insist that man's dignity requires a standard of living, in which
his capacities are properly exercised, the whole problem changes. The
criteria which you then apply to government are whether it is
producing a certain minimum of health, of decent housing, of material
necessities, of education, of freedom, of pleasures, of beauty, not
simply whether at the sacrifice of all these things, it vibrates to
the self-centered opinions that happen to be floating around in men's
minds. In the degree to which these criteria can be made exact and
objective, political decision, which is inevitably the concern of
comparatively few people, is actually brought into relation with the
interests of men.

There is no prospect, in any time which we can conceive, that the
whole invisible environment will be so clear to all men that they will
spontaneously arrive at sound public opinions on the whole business of
government. And even if there were a prospect, it is extremely
doubtful whether many of us would wish to be bothered, or would take
the time to form an opinion on "any and every form of social action"
which affects us. The only prospect which is not visionary is that
each of us in his own sphere will act more and more on a realistic
picture of the invisible world, and that we shall develop more and
more men who are expert in keeping these pictures realistic. Outside
the rather narrow range of our own possible attention, social control
depends upon devising standards of living and methods of audit by
which the acts of public officials and industrial directors are
measured. We cannot ourselves inspire or guide all these acts, as the
mystical democrat has always imagined. But we can steadily increase
our real control over these acts by insisting that all of them shall
be plainly recorded, and their results objectively measured. I should
say, perhaps, that we can progressively hope to insist. For the
working out of such standards and of such audits has only begun.



PART VII

NEWSPAPERS

CHAPTER   XXI. THE BUYING PUBLIC
   "     XXII. THE CONSTANT READER
   "    XXIII. THE NATURE OF NEWS
   "     XXIV. NEWS, TRUTH, AND A CONCLUSION



CHAPTER XXI

THE BUYING PUBLIC

1

THE idea that men have to go forth and study the world in order to
govern it, has played a very minor part in political thought. It could
figure very little, because the machinery for reporting the world in
any way useful to government made comparatively little progress from
the time of Aristotle to the age in which the premises of democracy
were established.

Therefore, if you had asked a pioneer democrat where the information
was to come from on which the will of the people was to be based, he
would have been puzzled by the question. It would have seemed a little
as if you had asked him where his life or his soul came from. The will
of the people, he almost always assumed, exists at all times; the duty
of political science was to work out the inventions of the ballot and
representative government. If they were properly worked out and
applied under the right conditions, such as exist in the
self-contained village or the self-contained shop, the mechanism would
somehow overcome the brevity of attention which Aristotle had
observed, and the narrowness of its range, which the theory of a
self-contained community tacitly acknowledged. We have seen how even
at this late date the guild socialists are transfixed by the notion
that if only you can build on the right unit of voting and
representation, an intricate cooperative commonwealth is possible.

Convinced that the wisdom was there if only you could find it,
democrats have treated the problem of making public opinions as a
problem in civil liberties. [Footnote: The best study is Prof.
Zechariah Chafee's, _Freedom of Speech_.] "Who ever knew Truth
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" [Footnote: Milton,
_Areopagitica_, cited at the opening of Mr. Chafee's book. For
comment on this classic doctrine of liberty as stated by Milton, John
Stuart Mill, and Mr. Bertrand Russel, see my _Liberty and the
News_, Ch. II.] Supposing that no one has ever seen it put to the
worse, are we to believe then that the truth is generated by the
encounter, like fire by rubbing two sticks? Behind this classic
doctrine of liberty, which American democrats embodied in their Bill
of Rights, there are, in fact, several different theories of the
origin of truth. One is a faith that in the competition of opinions,
the truest will win because there is a peculiar strength in the truth.
This is probably sound if you allow the competition to extend over a
sufficiently long time. When men argue in this vein they have in mind
the verdict of history, and they think specifically of heretics
persecuted when they lived, canonized after they were dead. Milton's
question rests also on a belief that the capacity to recognize truth
is inherent in all men, and that truth freely put in circulation will
win acceptance. It derives no less from the experience, which has
shown that men are not likely to discover truth if they cannot speak
it, except under the eye of an uncomprehending policeman.

No one can possibly overestimate the practical value of these civil
liberties, nor the importance of maintaining them. When they are in
jeopardy, the human spirit is in jeopardy, and should there come a
time when they have to be curtailed, as during a war, the suppression
of thought is a risk to civilization which might prevent its recovery
from the effects of war, if the hysterics, who exploit the necessity,
were numerous enough to carry over into peace the taboos of war.
Fortunately, the mass of men is too tolerant long to enjoy the
professional inquisitors, as gradually, under the criticism of men not
willing to be terrorized, they are revealed as mean-spirited creatures
who nine-tenths of the time do not know what they are talking
about. [Footnote: _Cf._ for example, the publications of the Lusk
Committee in New York, and the public statements and prophecies of Mr.
Mitchell Palmer, who was Attorney-General of the United States during
the period of President Wilson's illness.]

But in spite of its fundamental importance, civil liberty in this
sense does not guarantee public opinion in the modern world. For it
always assumes, either that truth is spontaneous, or that the means of
securing truth exist when there is no external interference. But when
you are dealing with an invisible environment, the assumption is
false. The truth about distant or complex matters is not self-evident,
and the machinery for assembling information is technical and
expensive. Yet political science, and especially democratic political
science, has never freed itself from the original assumption of
Aristotle's politics sufficiently to restate the premises, so that
political thought might come to grips with the problem of how to make
the invisible world visible to the citizens of a modern state.

So deep is the tradition, that until quite recently, for example,
political science was taught in our colleges as if newspapers did not
exist. I am not referring to schools of journalism, for they are trade
schools, intended to prepare men and women for a career. I am
referring to political science as expounded to future business men,
lawyers, public officials, and citizens at large. In that science a
study of the press and the sources of popular information found no
place. It is a curious fact. To anyone not immersed in the routine
interests of political science, it is almost inexplicable that no
American student of government, no American sociologist, has ever
written a book on news-gathering. There are occasional references to
the press, and statements that it is not, or that it ought to be,
"free" and "truthful." But I can find almost nothing else. And this
disdain of the professionals finds its counterpart in public opinions.
Universally it is admitted that the press is the chief means of
contact with the unseen environment. And practically everywhere it is
assumed that the press should do spontaneously for us what primitive
democracy imagined each of us could do spontaneously for himself, that
every day and twice a day it will present us with a true picture of
all the outer world in which we are interested.

2

This insistent and ancient belief that truth is not earned, but
inspired, revealed, supplied gratis, comes out very plainly in our
economic prejudices as readers of newspapers. We expect the newspaper
to serve us with truth however unprofitable the truth may be. For this
difficult and often dangerous service, which we recognize as
fundamental, we expected to pay until recently the smallest coin
turned out by the mint. We have accustomed ourselves now to paying two
and even three cents on weekdays, and on Sundays, for an illustrated
encyclopedia and vaudeville entertainment attached, we have screwed
ourselves up to paying a nickel or even a dime. Nobody thinks for a
moment that he ought to pay for his newspaper. He expects the
fountains of truth to bubble, but he enters into no contract, legal or
moral, involving any risk, cost or trouble to himself. He will pay a
nominal price when it suits him, will stop paying whenever it suits
him, will turn to another paper when that suits him. Somebody has said
quite aptly that the newspaper editor has to be re-elected every day.

This casual and one-sided relationship between readers and press is an
anomaly of our civilization. There is nothing else quite like it, and
it is, therefore, hard to compare the press with any other business or
institution. It is not a business pure and simple, partly because the
product is regularly sold below cost, but chiefly because the
community applies one ethical measure to the press and another to
trade or manufacture. Ethically a newspaper is judged as if it were a
church or a school. But if you try to compare it with these you fail;
the taxpayer pays for the public school, the private school is endowed
or supported by tuition fees, there are subsidies and collections for
the church. You cannot compare journalism with law, medicine or
engineering, for in every one of these professions the consumer pays
for the service. A free press, if you judge by the attitude of the
readers, means newspapers that are virtually given away.

Yet the critics of the press are merely voicing the moral standards of
the community, when they expect such an institution to live on the
same plane as that on which the school, the church, and the
disinterested professions are supposed to live. This illustrates again
the concave character of democracy. No need for artificially acquired
information is felt to exist. The information must come naturally,
that is to say gratis, if not out of the heart of the citizen, then
gratis out of the newspaper. The citizen will pay for his telephone,
his railroad rides, his motor car, his entertainment. But he does not
pay openly for his news.

He will, however, pay handsomely for the privilege of having someone
read about him. He will pay directly to advertise. And he will pay
indirectly for the advertisements of other people, because that
payment, being concealed in the price of commodities is part of an
invisible environment that he does not effectively comprehend. It
would be regarded as an outrage to have to pay openly the price of a
good ice cream soda for all the news of the world, though the public
will pay that and more when it buys the advertised commodities. The
public pays for the press, but only when the payment is concealed.

3

Circulation is, therefore, the means to an end. It becomes an asset
only when it can be sold to the advertiser, who buys it with revenues
secured through indirect taxation of the reader. [Footnote: "An
established newspaper is entitled to fix its advertising rates so that
its net receipts from circulation may be left on the credit side of
the profit and loss account. To arrive at net receipts, I would deduct
from the gross the cost of promotion, distribution, and other expenses
incidental to circulation." From an address by Mr. Adolph S. Ochs,
publisher of _the New York Times,_ at the Philadelphia Convention
of the Associated Advertising Clubs of The World, June 26, 1916.
Cited, Elmer Davis, _History of The New York Times,_ 1851-1921,
pp. 397-398.] The kind of circulation which the advertiser will buy
depends on what he has to sell. It may be "quality" or "mass." On the
whole there is no sharp dividing line, for in respect to most
commodities sold by advertising, the customers are neither the small
class of the very rich nor the very poor. They are the people with
enough surplus over bare necessities to exercise discretion in their
buying. The paper, therefore, which goes into the homes of the fairly
prosperous is by and large the one which offers most to the
advertiser. It may also go into the homes of the poor, but except for
certain lines of goods, an analytical advertising agent does not rate
that circulation as a great asset, unless, as seems to be the case
with certain of Mr. Hearst's properties, the circulation is enormous.

A newspaper which angers those whom it pays best to reach through
advertisements is a bad medium for an advertiser. And since no one
ever claimed that advertising was philanthropy, advertisers buy space
in those publications which are fairly certain to reach their future
customers. One need not spend much time worrying about the unreported
scandals of the dry-goods merchants. They represent nothing really
significant, and incidents of this sort are less common than many
critics of the press suppose. The real problem is that the readers of
a newspaper, unaccustomed to paying the cost of newsgathering, can be
capitalized only by turning them into circulation that can be sold to
manufacturers and merchants. And those whom it is most important to
capitalize are those who have the most money to spend. Such a press is
bound to respect the point of view of the buying public. It is for
this buying public that newspapers are edited and published, for
without that support the newspaper cannot live. A newspaper can flout
an advertiser, it can attack a powerful banking or traction interest,
but if it alienates the buying public, it loses the one indispensable
asset of its existence.

Mr. John L. Given, [Footnote: _Making a Newspaper_, p. 13. This
is the best technical book I know, and should be read by everyone who
undertakes to discuss the press. Mr. G. B. Diblee, who wrote the
volume on _The Newspaper_ in the Home University Library says (p.
253), that "on the press for pressmen I only know of one good book,
Mr. Given's."] formerly of the New York Evening Sun, stated in 1914
that out of over two thousand three hundred dailies published in the
United States, there were about one hundred and seventy-five printed
in cities having over one hundred thousand inhabitants. These
constitute the press for "general news." They are the key papers which
collect the news dealing with great events, and even the people who do
not read any one of the one hundred and seventy-five depend ultimately
upon them for news of the outer world. For they make up the great
press associations which coöperate in the exchange of news. Each is,
therefore, not only the informant of its own readers, but it is the
local reporter for the newspapers of other cities. The rural press and
the special press by and large, take their general news from these key
papers. And among these there are some very much richer than others,
so that for international news, in the main, the whole press of the
nation may depend upon the reports of the press associations and the
special services of a few metropolitan dailies.

Roughly speaking, the economic support for general news gathering is
in the price paid for advertised goods by the fairly prosperous
sections of cities with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants.
These buying publics are composed of the members of families, who
depend for their income chiefly on trade, merchandising, the direction
of manufacture, and finance. They are the clientele among whom it pays
best to advertise in a newspaper. They wield a concentrated purchasing
power, which may be less in volume than the aggregate for farmers and
workingmen; but within the radius covered by a daily newspaper they
are the quickest assets.

4

They have, moreover, a double claim to attention. They are not only
the best customers for the advertiser, they include the advertisers.
Therefore the impression made by the newspapers on this public matters
deeply. Fortunately this public is not unanimous. It may be
"capitalistic" but it contains divergent views on what capitalism is,
and how it is to be run. Except in times of danger, this respectable
opinion is sufficiently divided to permit of considerable differences
of policy. These would be greater still if it were not that publishers
are themselves usually members of these urban communities, and
honestly see the world through the lenses of their associates and
friends.

They are engaged in a speculative business, [Footnote: Sometimes so
speculative that in order to secure credit the publisher has to go
into bondage to his creditors. Information on this point is very
difficult to obtain, and for that reason its general importance is
often much exaggerated.] which depends on the general condition of
trade, and more peculiarly on a circulation based not on a marriage
contract with their readers, but on free love. The object of every
publisher is, therefore, to turn his circulation from a medley of
catch-as-catch-can news stand buyers into a devoted band of constant
readers. A newspaper that can really depend upon the loyalty of its
readers is as independent as a newspaper can be, given the economics
of modern journalism. [Footnote: "It is an axiom in newspaper
publishing--'more readers, more independence of the influence of
advertisers; fewer readers and more dependence on the advertiser' It
may seem like a contradiction (yet it is the truth) to assert: the
greater the number of advertisers, the less influence they are
individually able to exercise with the publisher." Adolph S. Ochs,
_of. supra._] A body of readers who stay by it through thick and
thin is a power greater than any which the individual advertiser can
wield, and a power great enough to break up a combination of
advertisers. Therefore, whenever you find a newspaper betraying its
readers for the sake of an advertiser, you can be fairly certain
either that the publisher sincerely shares the views of the
advertiser, or that he thinks, perhaps mistakenly, he cannot count
upon the support of his readers if he openly resists dictation. It is
a question of whether the readers, who do not pay in cash for their
news, will pay for it in loyalty.



CHAPTER XXII

THE CONSTANT READER

I

THE loyalty of the buying public to a newspaper is not stipulated in
any bond. In almost every other enterprise the person who expects to
be served enters into an agreement that controls his passing whims. At
least he pays for what he obtains. In the publishing of periodicals
the nearest approach to an agreement for a definite time is the paid
subscription, and that is not, I believe, a great factor in the
economy of a metropolitan daily. The reader is the sole and the daily
judge of his loyalty, and there can be no suit against him for breach
of promise or nonsupport.

Though everything turns on the constancy of the reader, there does not
exist even a vague tradition to call that fact to the reader's mind.
His constancy depends on how he happens to feel, or on his habits. And
these depend not simply on the quality of the news, but more often on
a number of obscure elements that in our casual relation to the press,
we hardly take the trouble to make conscious. The most important of
these is that each of us tends to judge a newspaper, if we judge it at
all, by its treatment of that part of the news in which we feel
ourselves involved. The newspaper deals with a multitude of events
beyond our experience. But it deals also with some events within our
experience. And by its handling of those events we most frequently
decide to like it or dislike it, to trust it or refuse to have the
sheet in the house. If the newspaper gives a satisfactory account of
that which we think we know, our business, our church, our party, it
is fairly certain to be immune from violent criticism by us. What
better criterion does the man at the breakfast table possess than that
the newspaper version checks up with his own opinion? Therefore, most
men tend to hold the newspaper most strictly accountable in their
capacity, not of general readers, but of special pleaders on matters
of their own experience.

Rarely is anyone but the interested party able to test the accuracy of
a report. If the news is local, and if there is competition, the
editor knows that he will probably hear from the man who thinks his
portrait unfair and inaccurate. But if the news is not local, the
corrective diminishes as the subject matter recedes into the distance.
The only people who can correct what they think is a false picture of
themselves printed in another city are members of groups well enough
organized to hire publicity men.

Now it is interesting to note that the general reader of a newspaper
has no standing in law if he thinks he is being misled by the news. It
is only the aggrieved party who can sue for slander or libel, and he
has to prove a material injury to himself. The law embodies the
tradition that general news is not a matter of common concern,
[Footnote: The reader will not mistake this as a plea for censorship.
It might, however, be a good thing if there were competent tribunals,
preferably not official ones, where charges of untruthfulness and
unfairness in the general news could be sifted. _Cf. Liberty and the
News,_ pp. 73-76. ] except as to matter which is vaguely described
as immoral or seditious.

But the body of the news, though unchecked as a whole by the
disinterested reader, consists of items about which some readers have
very definite preconceptions. Those items are the data of his
judgment, and news which men read without this personal criterion,
they judge by some other standard than their standard of accuracy.
They are dealing here with a subject matter which to them is
indistinguishable from fiction. The canon of truth cannot be applied.
They do not boggle over such news if it conforms to their stereotypes,
and they continue to read it if it interests them. [Footnote: Note, for
example, how absent is indignation in Mr. Upton Sinclair against
socialist papers, even those which are as malignantly unfair to
employers as certain of the papers cited by him are unfair to
radicals.]

2

There are newspapers, even in large cities, edited on the principle
that the readers wish to read about themselves. The theory is that if
enough people see their own names in the paper often enough, can read
about their weddings, funerals, sociables, foreign travels, lodge
meetings, school prizes, their fiftieth birthdays, their sixtieth
birthdays, their silver weddings, their outings and clambakes, they
will make a reliable circulation.

The classic formula for such a newspaper is contained in a letter
written by Horace Greeley on April 3, 1860, to "Friend Fletcher" who
was about to start a country newspaper: [Footnote: Cited, James Melvin
Lee, _The History of American Journalism,_ p. 405.]

"I. Begin with a clear conception that the subject of deepest interest
to an average human being is himself; next to that he is most
concerned about his neighbors. Asia and the Tongo Islands stand a long
way after these in his regard.... Do not let a new church be
organized, or new members be added to one already existing, a farm be
sold, a new house raised, a mill set in motion, a store opened, nor
anything of interest to a dozen families occur, without having the
fact duly, though briefly, chronicled in your columns. If a farmer
cuts a big tree, or grows a mammoth beet, or harvests a bounteous
yield of wheat or corn, set forth the fact as concisely and
unexceptionally as possible."

The function of becoming, as Mr. Lee puts it, "the printed diary of
the home town" is one that every newspaper no matter where it is
published must in some measure fill. And where, as in a great city
like New York, the general newspapers circulated broadcast cannot fill
it, there exist small newspapers published on Greeley's pattern for
sections of the city. In the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx there
are perhaps twice as many local dailies as there are general
newspapers. [Footnote: _Cf._ John L. Given, _Making a Newspaper,_
p. 13.] And they are supplemented by all kinds of special publications for
trades, religions, nationalities.

These diaries are published for people who find their own lives
interesting. But there are also great numbers of people who find their
own lives dull, and wish, like Hedda Gabler, to live a more thrilling
life. For them there are published a few whole newspapers, and
sections of others, devoted to the personal lives of a set of
imaginary people, with whose gorgeous vices the reader can in his
fancy safely identify himself. Mr. Hearst's unflagging interest in
high society caters to people who never hope to be in high society,
and yet manage to derive some enhancement out of the vague feeling
that they are part of the life that they read about. In the great
cities "the printed diary of the home town" tends to be the printed
diary of a smart set.

And it is, as we have already noted, the dailies of the cities which
carry the burden of bringing distant news to the private citizen. But
it is not primarily their political and social news which holds the
circulation. The interest in that is intermittent, and few publishers
can bank on it alone. The newspaper, therefore, takes to itself a
variety of other features, all primarily designed to hold a body of
readers together, who so far as big news is concerned, are not able to
be critical. Moreover, in big news the competition in any one
community is not very serious. The press services standardize the main
events; it is only once in a while that a great scoop is made; there
is apparently not a very great reading public for such massive
reporting as has made the New York Times of recent years indispensable
to men of all shades of opinion. In order to differentiate themselves
and collect a steady public most papers have to go outside the field
of general news. They go to the dazzling levels of society, to scandal
and crime, to sports, pictures, actresses, advice to the lovelorn,
highschool notes, women's pages, buyer's pages, cooking receipts,
chess, whist, gardening, comic strips, thundering partisanship, not
because publishers and editors are interested in everything but news,
but because they have to find some way of holding on to that alleged
host of passionately interested readers, who are supposed by some
critics of the press to be clamoring for the truth and nothing but the
truth.

The newspaper editor occupies a strange position. His enterprises
depend upon indirect taxation levied by his advertisers upon his
readers; the patronage of the advertisers depends upon the editor's
skill in holding together an effective group of customers. These
customers deliver judgment according to their private experiences and
their stereotyped expectations, for in the nature of things they have
no independent knowledge of most news they read. If the judgment is
not unfavorable, the editor is at least within range of a circulation
that pays. But in order to secure that circulation, he cannot rely
wholly upon news of the greater environment. He handles that as
interestingly as he can, of course, but the quality of the general
news, especially about public affairs, is not in itself sufficient to
cause very large numbers of readers to discriminate among the dailies.

This somewhat left-handed relationship between newspapers and public
information is reflected in the salaries of newspaper men. Reporting,
which theoretically constitutes the foundation of the whole
institution, is the most poorly paid branch of newspaper work, and is
the least regarded. By and large, able men go into it only by
necessity or for experience, and with the definite intention of being
graduated as soon as possible. For straight reporting is not a career
that offers many great rewards. The rewards in journalism go to
specialty work, to signed correspondence which has editorial quality,
to executives, and to men with a knack and flavor of their own. This
is due, no doubt, to what economists call the rent of ability. But
this economic principle operates with such peculiar violence in
journalism that newsgathering does not attract to itself anything like
the number of trained and able men which its public importance would
seem to demand. The fact that the able men take up "straight
reporting" with the intention of leaving it as soon as possible is, I
think, the chief reason why it has never developed in sufficient
measure those corporate traditions that give to a profession prestige
and a jealous self-respect. For it is these corporate traditions which
engender the pride of craft, which tend to raise the standards of
admission, punish breaches of the code, and give men the strength to
insist upon their status in society.

3

Yet all this does not go to the root of the matter. For while the
economics of journalism is such as to depress the value of news
reporting, it is, I am certain, a false determinism which would
abandon the analysis at that point. The intrinsic power of the
reporter appears to be so great, the number of very able men who pass
through reporting is so large, that there must be some deeper reason
why, comparatively speaking, so little serious effort has gone into
raising the vocation to the level say of medicine, engineering, or
law.

Mr. Upton Sinclair speaks for a large body of opinion in
America, [Footnote: Mr. Hilaire Belloc makes practically the same
analysis for English newspapers. _Cf. The Free Press._] when he
claims that in what he calls "The Brass Check" he has found this
deeper reason:

"The Brass Check is found in your pay envelope every week--you who
write and print and distribute our newspapers and magazines. The Brass
check is the price of your shame--you who take the fair body of truth
and sell it in the market place, who betray the virgin hopes of
mankind into the loathsome brothel of Big Business." [Footnote: Upton
Sinclair, _The Brass Check. A Study of American Journalism._ p.
116.]

It would seem from this that there exists a body of known truth, and a
set of well founded hopes, which are prostituted by a more or less
conscious conspiracy of the rich owners of newspapers. If this theory
is correct, then a certain conclusion follows. It is that the fair
body of truth would be inviolate in a press not in any way connected
with Big Business. For if it should happen that a press not controlled
by, and not even friendly with, Big Business somehow failed to contain
the fair body of truth, something would be wrong with Mr. Sinclair's
theory.

There is such a press. Strange to say, in proposing a remedy Mr.
Sinclair does not advise his readers to subscribe to the nearest
radical newspaper. Why not? If the troubles of American journalism go
back to the Brass Check of Big Business why does not the remedy lie in
reading the papers that do not in any remote way accept the Brass
Check? Why subsidize a "National News" with a large board of directors
"of all creeds or causes" to print a paper full of facts "regardless
of what is injured, the Steel Trust or the I. W. W., the Standard Oil
Company or the Socialist Party?" If the trouble is Big Business, that
is, the Steel Trust, Standard Oil and the like, why not urge everybody
to read I. W. W. or Socialist papers? Mr. Sinclair does not say why
not. But the reason is simple. He cannot convince anybody, not even
himself, that the anti-capitalist press is the remedy for the
capitalist press. He ignores the anti-capitalist press both in his
theory of the Brass Check and in his constructive proposal. But if you
are diagnosing American journalism you cannot ignore it. If what you
care about is "the fair body of truth," you do not commit the gross
logical error of assembling all the instances of unfairness and lying
you can find in one set of newspapers, ignore all the instances you
could easily find in another set, and then assign as the cause of the
lying, the one supposedly common characteristic of the press to which
you have confined your investigation. If you are going to blame
"capitalism" for the faults of the press, you are compelled to prove
that those faults do not exist except where capitalism controls. That
Mr. Sinclair cannot do this, is shown by the fact that while in his
diagnosis he traces everything to capitalism, in his prescription he
ignores both capitalism and anti-capitalism.

One would have supposed that the inability to take any non-capitalist
paper as a model of truthfulness and competence would have caused Mr.
Sinclair, and those who agree with him, to look somewhat more
critically at their assumptions. They would have asked themselves, for
example, where is the fair body of truth, that Big Business
prostitutes, but anti-Big Business does not seem to obtain? For that
question leads, I believe, to the heart of the matter, to the question
of what is news.



CHAPTER XXIII

THE NATURE OF NEWS

1

ALL the reporters in the world working all the hours of the day could
not witness all the happenings in the world. There are not a great
many reporters. And none of them has the power to be in more than one
place at a time. Reporters are not clairvoyant, they do not gaze into
a crystal ball and see the world at will, they are not assisted by
thought-transference. Yet the range of subjects these comparatively
few men manage to cover would be a miracle indeed, if it were not a
standardized routine.

Newspapers do not try to keep an eye on all mankind. [Footnote: See the
illuminating chapter in Mr. John L. Given's book, already cited, on
"Uncovering the News," Ch. V.] They have watchers stationed at certain
places, like Police Headquarters, the Coroner's Office, the County
Clerk's Office, City Hall, the White House, the Senate, House of
Representatives, and so forth. They watch, or rather in the majority
of cases they belong to associations which employ men who watch "a
comparatively small number of places where it is made known when the
life of anyone... departs from ordinary paths, or when events worth
telling about occur. For example, John Smith, let it be supposed,
becomes a broker. For ten years he pursues the even tenor of his way
and except for his customers and his friends no one gives him a
thought. To the newspapers he is as if he were not. But in the
eleventh year he suffers heavy losses and, at last, his resources all
gone, summons his lawyer and arranges for the making of an assignment.
The lawyer posts off to the County Clerk's office, and a clerk there
makes the necessary entries in the official docket. Here in step the
newspapers. While the clerk is writing Smith's business obituary a
reporter glances over his shoulder and a few minutes later the
reporters know Smith's troubles and are as well informed concerning
his business status as they would be had they kept a reporter at his
door every day for over ten years. [Footnote: _Op. cit._, p. 57.]

When Mr. Given says that the newspapers know "Smith's troubles" and
"his business status," he does not mean that they know them as Smith
knows them, or as Mr. Arnold Bennett would know them if he had made
Smith the hero of a three volume novel. The newspapers know only "in a
few minutes" the bald facts which are recorded in the County Clerk's
Office. That overt act "uncovers" the news about Smith. Whether the
news will be followed up or not is another matter. The point is that
before a series of events become news they have usually to make
themselves noticeable in some more or less overt act. Generally too,
in a crudely overt act. Smith's friends may have known for years that
he was taking risks, rumors may even have reached the financial editor
if Smith's friends were talkative. But apart from the fact that none
of this could be published because it would be libel, there is in
these rumors nothing definite on which to peg a story. Something
definite must occur that has unmistakable form. It may be the act of
going into bankruptcy, it may be a fire, a collision, an assault, a
riot, an arrest, a denunciation, the introduction of a bill, a speech,
a vote, a meeting, the expressed opinion of a well known citizen, an
editorial in a newspaper, a sale, a wage-schedule, a price change, the
proposal to build a bridge.... There must be a manifestation. The
course of events must assume a certain definable shape, and until it
is in a phase where some aspect is an accomplished fact, news does not
separate itself from the ocean of possible truth.

2

Naturally there is room for wide difference of opinion as to when
events have a shape that can be reported. A good journalist will find
news oftener than a hack. If he sees a building with a dangerous list,
he does not have to wait until it falls into the street in order to
recognize news. It was a great reporter who guessed the name of the
next Indian Viceroy when he heard that Lord So-and-So was inquiring
about climates. There are lucky shots but the number of men who can
make them is small. Usually it is the stereotyped shape assumed by an
event at an obvious place that uncovers the run of the news. The most
obvious place is where people's affairs touch public authority. De
minimis non curat lex. It is at these places that marriages, births,
deaths, contracts, failures, arrivals, departures, lawsuits,
disorders, epidemics and calamities are made known.

In the first instance, therefore, the news is not a mirror of social
conditions, but the report of an aspect that has obtruded itself. The
news does not tell you how the seed is germinating in the ground, but
it may tell you when the first sprout breaks through the surface. It
may even tell you what somebody says is happening to the seed under
ground. It may tell you that the sprout did not come up at the time it
was expected. The more points, then, at which any happening can be
fixed, objectified, measured, named, the more points there are at
which news can occur.

So, if some day a legislature, having exhausted all other ways of
improving mankind, should forbid the scoring of baseball games, it
might still be possible to play some sort of game in which the umpire
decided according to his own sense of fair play how long the game
should last, when each team should go to bat, and who should be
regarded as the winner. If that game were reported in the newspapers
it would consist of a record of the umpire's decisions, plus the
reporter's impression of the hoots and cheers of the crowd, plus at
best a vague account of how certain men, who had no specified position
on the field moved around for a few hours on an unmarked piece of sod.
The more you try to imagine the logic of so absurd a predicament, the
more clear it becomes that for the purposes of newsgathering, (let
alone the purposes of playing the game) it is impossible to do much
without an apparatus and rules for naming, scoring, recording. Because
that machinery is far from perfect, the umpire's life is often a
distracted one. Many crucial plays he has to judge by eye. The last
vestige of dispute could be taken out of the game, as it has been
taken out of chess when people obey the rules, if somebody thought it
worth his while to photograph every play. It was the moving pictures
which finally settled a real doubt in many reporters' minds, owing to
the slowness of the human eye, as to just what blow of Dempsey's
knocked out Carpentier.

Wherever there is a good machinery of record, the modern news service
works with great precision. There is one on the stock exchange, and
the news of price movements is flashed over tickers with dependable
accuracy. There is a machinery for election returns, and when the
counting and tabulating are well done, the result of a national
election is usually known on the night of the election. In civilized
communities deaths, births, marriages and divorces are recorded, and
are known accurately except where there is concealment or neglect. The
machinery exists for some, and only some, aspects of industry and
government, in varying degrees of precision for securities, money and
staples, bank clearances, realty transactions, wage scales. It exists
for imports and exports because they pass through a custom house and
can be directly recorded. It exists in nothing like the same degree
for internal trade, and especially for trade over the counter.

It will be found, I think, that there is a very direct relation
between the certainty of news and the system of record. If you call to
mind the topics which form the principal indictment by reformers
against the press, you find they are subjects in which the newspaper
occupies the position of the umpire in the unscored baseball game. All
news about states of mind is of this character: so are all
descriptions of personalities, of sincerity, aspiration, motive,
intention, of mass feeling, of national feeling, of public opinion,
the policies of foreign governments. So is much news about what is
going to happen. So are questions turning on private profit, private
income, wages, working conditions, the efficiency of labor,
educational opportunity, unemployment, [Footnote: Think of what guess
work went into the Reports of Unemployment in 1921.] monotony, health,
discrimination, unfairness, restraint of trade, waste, "backward
peoples," conservatism, imperialism, radicalism, liberty, honor,
righteousness. All involve data that are at best spasmodically
recorded. The data may be hidden because of a censorship or a
tradition of privacy, they may not exist because nobody thinks record
important, because he thinks it red tape, or because nobody has yet
invented an objective system of measurement. Then the news on these
subjects is bound to be debatable, when it is not wholly neglected.
The events which are not scored are reported either as personal and
conventional opinions, or they are not news. They do not take shape
until somebody protests, or somebody investigates, or somebody
publicly, in the etymological meaning of the word, makes an
_issue_ of them.

This is the underlying reason for the existence of the press agent.
The enormous discretion as to what facts and what impressions shall be
reported is steadily convincing every organized group of people that
whether it wishes to secure publicity or to avoid it, the exercise of
discretion cannot be left to the reporter. It is safer to hire a press
agent who stands between the group and the newspapers. Having hired
him, the temptation to exploit his strategic position is very great.
"Shortly before the war," says Mr. Frank Cobb, "the newspapers of New
York took a census of the press agents who were regularly employed and
regularly accredited and found that there were about twelve hundred of
them. How many there are now (1919) I do not pretend to know, but what
I do know is that many of the direct channels to news have been closed
and the information for the public is first filtered through publicity
agents. The great corporations have them, the banks have them, the
railroads have them, all the organizations of business and of social
and political activity have them, and they are the media through which
news comes. Even statesmen have them." [Footnote: Address before the
Women's City Club of New York, Dec. 11, 1919. Reprinted, _New
Republic_, Dec. 31, 1919, p. 44.]

Were reporting the simple recovery of obvious facts, the press agent
would be little more than a clerk. But since, in respect to most of
the big topics of news, the facts are not simple, and not at all
obvious, but subject to choice and opinion, it is natural that
everyone should wish to make his own choice of facts for the
newspapers to print. The publicity man does that. And in doing it, he
certainly saves the reporter much trouble, by presenting him a clear
picture of a situation out of which he might otherwise make neither
head nor tail. But it follows that the picture which the publicity man
makes for the reporter is the one he wishes the public to see. He is
censor and propagandist, responsible only to his employers, and to the
whole truth responsible only as it accords with the employers'
conception of his own interests.

The development of the publicity man is a clear sign that the facts of
modern life do not spontaneously take a shape in which they can be
known. They must be given a shape by somebody, and since in the daily
routine reporters cannot give a shape to facts, and since there is
little disinterested organization of intelligence, the need for some
formulation is being met by the interested parties.

3

The good press agent understands that the virtues of his cause are not
news, unless they are such strange virtues that they jut right out of
the routine of life. This is not because the newspapers do not like
virtue, but because it is not worth while to say that nothing has
happened when nobody expected anything to happen. So if the publicity
man wishes free publicity he has, speaking quite accurately, to start
something. He arranges a stunt: obstructs the traffic, teases the
police, somehow manages to entangle his client or his cause with an
event that is already news. The suffragists knew this, did not
particularly enjoy the knowledge but acted on it, and kept suffrage in
the news long after the arguments pro and con were straw in their
mouths, and people were about to settle down to thinking of the
suffrage movement as one of the established institutions of American
life. [Footnote: _Cf._ Inez Haynes Irwin, _The Story of the
Woman's Party._ It is not only a good account of a vital part of a
great agitation, but a reservoir of material on successful,
non-revolutionary, non-conspiring agitation under modern conditions of
public attention, public interest, and political habit.]

Fortunately the suffragists, as distinct from the feminists, had a
perfectly concrete objective, and a very simple one. What the vote
symbolizes is not simple, as the ablest advocates and the ablest
opponents knew. But the right to vote is a simple and familiar right.
Now in labor disputes, which are probably the chief item in the
charges against newspapers, the right to strike, like the right to
vote, is simple enough. But the causes and objects of a particular
strike are like the causes and objects of the woman's movement,
extremely subtle.

Let us suppose the conditions leading up to a strike are bad. What is
the measure of evil? A certain conception of a proper standard of
living, hygiene, economic security, and human dignity. The industry
may be far below the theoretical standard of the community, and the
workers may be too wretched to protest. Conditions may be above the
standard, and the workers may protest violently. The standard is at
best a vague measure. However, we shall assume that the conditions are
below par, as par is understood by the editor. Occasionally without
waiting for the workers to threaten, but prompted say by a social
worker, he will send reporters to investigate, and will call attention
to bad conditions. Necessarily he cannot do that often. For these
investigations cost time, money, special talent, and a lot of space.
To make plausible a report that conditions are bad, you need a good
many columns of print. In order to tell the truth about the steel
worker in the Pittsburgh district, there was needed a staff of
investigators, a great deal of time, and several fat volumes of print.
It is impossible to suppose that any daily newspaper could normally
regard the making of Pittsburgh Surveys, or even Interchurch Steel
Reports, as one of its tasks. News which requires so much trouble as
that to obtain is beyond the resources of a daily press. [Footnote: Not
long ago Babe Ruth was jailed for speeding. Released from jail just
before the afternoon game started, he rushed into his waiting
automobile, and made up for time lost in jail by breaking the speed
laws on his way to the ball grounds. No policeman stopped him, but a
reporter timed him, and published his speed the next morning. Babe
Ruth is an exceptional man. Newspapers cannot time all motorists. They
have to take their news about speeding from the police.]

The bad conditions as such are not news, because in all but
exceptional cases, journalism is not a first hand report of the raw
material. It is a report of that material after it has been stylized.
Thus bad conditions might become news if the Board of Health reported
an unusually high death rate in an industrial area. Failing an
intervention of this sort, the facts do not become news, until the
workers organize and make a demand upon their employers. Even then, if
an easy settlement is certain the news value is low, whether or not
the conditions themselves are remedied in the settlement. But if
industrial relations collapse into a strike or lockout the news value
increases. If the stoppage involves a service on which the readers of
the newspapers immediately depend, or if it involves a breach of
order, the news value is still greater.

The underlying trouble appears in the news through certain easily
recognizable symptoms, a demand, a strike, disorder. From the point of
view of the worker, or of the disinterested seeker of justice, the
demand, the strike, and the disorder, are merely incidents in a
process that for them is richly complicated. But since all the
immediate realities lie outside the direct experience both of the
reporter, and of the special public by which most newspapers are
supported, they have normally to wait for a signal in the shape of an
overt act. When that signal comes, say through a walkout of the men or
a summons for the police, it calls into play the stereotypes people
have about strikes and disorders. The unseen struggle has none of its
own flavor. It is noted abstractly, and that abstraction is then
animated by the immediate experience of the reader and reporter.
Obviously this is a very different experience from that which the
strikers have. They feel, let us say, the temper of the foreman, the
nerve-racking monotony of the machine, the depressingly bad air, the
drudgery of their wives, the stunting of their children, the dinginess
of their tenements. The slogans of the strike are invested with these
feelings. But the reporter and reader see at first only a strike and
some catchwords. They invest these with their feelings. Their feelings
may be that their jobs are insecure because the strikers are stopping
goods they need in their work, that there will be shortage and higher
prices, that it is all devilishly inconvenient. These, too, are
realities. And when they give color to the abstract news that a strike
has been called, it is in the nature of things that the workers are at
a disadvantage. It is in the nature, that is to say, of the existing
system of industrial relations that news arising from grievances or
hopes by workers should almost invariably be uncovered by an overt
attack on production.

You have, therefore, the circumstances in all their sprawling
complexity, the overt act which signalizes them, the stereotyped
bulletin which publishes the signal, and the meaning that the reader
himself injects, after he has derived that meaning from the experience
which directly affects him. Now the reader's experience of a strike
may be very important indeed, but from the point of view of the
central trouble which caused the strike, it is eccentric. Yet this
eccentric meaning is automatically the most interesting. [Footnote:
_Cf_. Ch. XI, "The Enlisting of Interest."] To enter imaginatively
into the central issues is for the reader to step out of himself, and into
very different lives.

It follows that in the reporting of strikes, the easiest way is to let
the news be uncovered by the overt act, and to describe the event as
the story of interference with the reader's life. That is where his
attention is first aroused, and his interest most easily enlisted. A
great deal, I think myself the crucial part, of what looks to the
worker and the reformer as deliberate misrepresentation on the part of
newspapers, is the direct outcome of a practical difficulty in
uncovering the news, and the emotional difficulty of making distant
facts interesting unless, as Emerson says, we can "perceive (them) to
be only a new version of our familiar experience" and can "set about
translating (them) at once into our parallel facts." [Footnote: From
his essay entitled _Art and Criticism_. The quotation occurs in a
passage cited on page 87 of Professor R. W. Brown's, _The Writer's
Art._]

If you study the way many a strike is reported in the press, you will
find, very often, that the issues are rarely in the headlines, barely
in the leading paragraphs, and sometimes not even mentioned anywhere.
A labor dispute in another city has to be very important before the
news account contains any definite information as to what is in
dispute. The routine of the news works that way, with modifications it
works that way in regard to political issues and international news as
well. The news is an account of the overt phases that are interesting,
and the pressure on the newspaper to adhere to this routine comes from
many sides. It comes from the economy of noting only the stereotyped
phase of a situation. It comes from the difficulty of finding
journalists who can see what they have not learned to see. It comes
from the almost unavoidable difficulty of finding sufficient space in
which even the best journalist can make plausible an unconventional
view. It comes from the economic necessity of interesting the reader
quickly, and the economic risk involved in not interesting him at all,
or of offending him by unexpected news insufficiently or clumsily
described. All these difficulties combined make for uncertainty in the
editor when there are dangerous issues at stake, and cause him
naturally to prefer the indisputable fact and a treatment more readily
adapted to the reader's interest. The indisputable fact and the easy
interest, are the strike itself and the reader's inconvenience.

All the subtler and deeper truths are in the present organization of
industry very unreliable truths. They involve judgments about
standards of living, productivity, human rights that are endlessly
debatable in the absence of exact record and quantitative analysis.
And as long as these do not exist in industry, the run of news about
it will tend, as Emerson said, quoting from Isocrates, "to make of
moles mountains, and of mountains moles." [Footnote: _Id.,
supra_] Where there is no constitutional procedure in industry, and
no expert sifting of evidence and the claims, the fact that is
sensational to the reader is the fact that almost every journalist
will seek. Given the industrial relations that so largely prevail,
even where there is conference or arbitration, but no independent
filtering of the facts for decision, the issue for the newspaper
public will tend not to be the issue for the industry. And so to try
disputes by an appeal through the newspapers puts a burden upon
newspapers and readers which they cannot and ought not to carry. As
long as real law and order do not exist, the bulk of the news will,
unless consciously and courageously corrected, work against those who
have no lawful and orderly method of asserting themselves. The
bulletins from the scene of action will note the trouble that arose
from the assertion, rather than the reasons which led to it. The
reasons are intangible.

4

The editor deals with these bulletins. He sits in his office, reads
them, rarely does he see any large portion of the events themselves.
He must, as we have seen, woo at least a section of his readers every
day, because they will leave him without mercy if a rival paper
happens to hit their fancy. He works under enormous pressure, for the
competition of newspapers is often a matter of minutes. Every bulletin
requires a swift but complicated judgment. It must be understood, put
in relation to other bulletins also understood, and played up or
played down according to its probable interest for the public, as the
editor conceives it. Without standardization, without stereotypes,
without routine judgments, without a fairly ruthless disregard of
subtlety, the editor would soon die of excitement. The final page is
of a definite size, must be ready at a precise moment; there can be
only a certain number of captions on the items, and in each caption
there must be a definite number of letters. Always there is the
precarious urgency of the buying public, the law of libel, and the
possibility of endless trouble. The thing could not be managed at all
without systematization, for in a standardized product there is
economy of time and effort, as well as a partial guarantee against
failure.

It is here that newspapers influence each other most deeply. Thus when
the war broke out, the American newspapers were confronted with a
subject about which they had no previous experience. Certain dailies,
rich enough to pay cable tolls, took the lead in securing news, and
the way that news was presented became a model for the whole press.
But where did that model come from? It came from the English press,
not because Northcliffe owned American newspapers, but because at
first it was easier to buy English correspondence, and because, later,
it was easier for American journalists to read English newspapers than
it was for them to read any others. London was the cable and news
center, and it was there that a certain technic for reporting the war
was evolved. Something similar occurred in the reporting of the
Russian Revolution. In that instance, access to Russia was closed by
military censorship, both Russian and Allied, and closed still more
effectively by the difficulties of the Russian language. But above all
it was closed to effective news reporting by the fact that the hardest
thing to report is chaos, even though it is an evolving chaos. This
put the formulating of Russian news at its source in Helsingfors,
Stockholm, Geneva, Paris and London, into the hands of censors and
propagandists. They were for a long time subject to no check of any
kind. Until they had made themselves ridiculous they created, let us
admit, out of some genuine aspects of the huge Russian maelstrom, a
set of stereotypes so evocative of hate and fear, that the very best
instinct of journalism, its desire to go and see and tell, was for a
long time crushed. [Footnote: _Cf. A Test of the News,_ by Walter
Lippmann and Charles Merz, assisted by Faye Lippmann, _New
Republic,_ August 4, 1920.]

5

Every newspaper when it reaches the reader is the result of a whole
series of selections as to what items shall be printed, in what
position they shall be printed, how much space each shall occupy, what
emphasis each shall have. There are no objective standards here. There
are conventions. Take two newspapers published in the same city on the
same morning. The headline of one reads: "Britain pledges aid to
Berlin against French aggression; France openly backs Poles." The
headline of the second is "Mrs. Stillman's Other Love." Which you
prefer is a matter of taste, but not entirely a matter of the editor's
taste. It is a matter of his judgment as to what will absorb the half
hour's attention a certain set of readers will give to his newspaper.
Now the problem of securing attention is by no means equivalent to
displaying the news in the perspective laid down by religious teaching
or by some form of ethical culture. It is a problem of provoking
feeling in the reader, of inducing him to feel a sense of personal
identification with the stories he is reading. News which does not
offer this opportunity to introduce oneself into the struggle which it
depicts cannot appeal to a wide audience. The audience must
participate in the news, much as it participates in the drama, by
personal identification. Just as everyone holds his breath when the
heroine is in danger, as he helps Babe Ruth swing his bat, so in
subtler form the reader enters into the news. In order that he shall
enter he must find a familiar foothold in the story, and this is
supplied to him by the use of stereotypes. They tell him that if an
association of plumbers is called a "combine" it is appropriate to
develop his hostility; if it is called a "group of leading business
men" the cue is for a favorable reaction.

It is in a combination of these elements that the power to create
opinion resides. Editorials reinforce. Sometimes in a situation that
on the news pages is too confusing to permit of identification, they
give the reader a clue by means of which he engages himself. A clue he
must have if, as most of us must, he is to seize the news in a hurry.
A suggestion of some sort he demands, which tells him, so to speak,
where he, a man conceiving himself to be such and such a person, shall
integrate his feelings with the news he reads.

"It has been said" writes Walter Bagehot, [Footnote: On the Emotion of
Conviction, _Literary Studies_, Vol. Ill, p. 172.] "that if you
can only get a middleclass Englishman to think whether there are
'snails in Sirius,' he will soon have an opinion on it. It will be
difficult to make him think, but if he does think, he cannot rest in a
negative, he will come to some decision. And on any ordinary topic, of
course, it is so. A grocer has a full creed as to foreign policy, a
young lady a complete theory of the sacraments, as to which neither
has any doubt whatever."

Yet that same grocer will have many doubts about his groceries, and
that young lady, marvelously certain about the sacraments, may have
all kinds of doubts as to whether to marry the grocer, and if not
whether it is proper to accept his attentions. The ability to rest in
the negative implies either a lack of interest in the result, or a
vivid sense of competing alternatives. In the case of foreign policy
or the sacraments, the interest in the results is intense, while means
for checking the opinion are poor. This is the plight of the reader of
the general news. If he is to read it at all he must be interested,
that is to say, he must enter into the situation and care about the
outcome. But if he does that he cannot rest in a negative, and unless
independent means of checking the lead given him by his newspaper
exists, the very fact that he is interested may make it difficult to
arrive at that balance of opinions which may most nearly approximate
the truth. The more passionately involved he becomes, the more he will
tend to resent not only a different view, but a disturbing bit of
news. That is why many a newspaper finds that, having honestly evoked
the partisanship of its readers, it can not easily, supposing the
editor believes the facts warrant it, change position. If a change is
necessary, the transition has to be managed with the utmost skill and
delicacy. Usually a newspaper will not attempt so hazardous a
performance. It is easier and safer to have the news of that subject
taper off and disappear, thus putting out the fire by starving it.



CHAPTER XXIV

NEWS, TRUTH, AND A CONCLUSION

As we begin to make more and more exact studies of the press, much
will depend upon the hypothesis we hold. If we assume with Mr.
Sinclair, and most of his opponents, that news and truth are two words
for the same thing, we shall, I believe, arrive nowhere. We shall
prove that on this point the newspaper lied. We shall prove that on
that point Mr. Sinclair's account lied. We shall demonstrate that Mr.
Sinclair lied when he said that somebody lied, and that somebody lied
when he said Mr. Sinclair lied. We shall vent our feelings, but we
shall vent them into air.

The hypothesis, which seems to me the most fertile, is that news and
truth are not the same thing, and must be clearly distinguished.
[Footnote: When I wrote _Liberty and the News,_ I did not
understand this distinction clearly enough to state it, but _cf._
p. 89 ff.] The function of news is to signalize an event, the function
of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into
relation with each other, and make a picture of reality on which men
can act. Only at those points, where social conditions take
recognizable and measurable shape, do the body of truth and the body
of news coincide. That is a comparatively small part of the whole
field of human interest. In this sector, and only in this sector, the
tests of the news are sufficiently exact to make the charges of
perversion or suppression more than a partisan judgment. There is no
defense, no extenuation, no excuse whatever, for stating six times
that Lenin is dead, when the only information the paper possesses is a
report that he is dead from a source repeatedly shown to be
unreliable. The news, in that instance, is not "Lenin Dead" but
"Helsingfors Says Lenin is Dead." And a newspaper can be asked to take
the responsibility of not making Lenin more dead than the source of
the news is reliable; if there is one subject on which editors are
most responsible it is in their judgment of the reliability of the
source. But when it comes to dealing, for example, with stories of
what the Russian people want, no such test exists.

The absence of these exact tests accounts, I think, for the character
of the profession, as no other explanation does. There is a very small
body of exact knowledge, which it requires no outstanding ability or
training to deal with. The rest is in the journalist's own discretion.
Once he departs from the region where it is definitely recorded at the
County Clerk's office that John Smith has gone into bankruptcy, all
fixed standards disappear. The story of why John Smith failed, his
human frailties, the analysis of the economic conditions on which he
was shipwrecked, all of this can be told in a hundred different ways.
There is no discipline in applied psychology, as there is a discipline
in medicine, engineering, or even law, which has authority to direct
the journalist's mind when he passes from the news to the vague realm
of truth. There are no canons to direct his own mind, and no canons
that coerce the reader's judgment or the publisher's. His version of
the truth is only his version. How can he demonstrate the truth as he
sees it? He cannot demonstrate it, any more than Mr. Sinclair Lewis
can demonstrate that he has told the whole truth about Main Street.
And the more he understands his own weaknesses, the more ready he is
to admit that where there is no objective test, his own opinion is in
some vital measure constructed out of his own stereotypes, according
to his own code, and by the urgency of his own interest. He knows that
he is seeing the world through subjective lenses. He cannot deny that
he too is, as Shelley remarked, a dome of many-colored glass which
stains the white radiance of eternity.

And by this knowledge his assurance is tempered. He may have all kinds
of moral courage, and sometimes has, but he lacks that sustaining
conviction of a certain technic which finally freed the physical
sciences from theological control. It was the gradual development of
an irrefragable method that gave the physicist his intellectual
freedom as against all the powers of the world. His proofs were so
clear, his evidence so sharply superior to tradition, that he broke
away finally from all control. But the journalist has no such support
in his own conscience or in fact. The control exercised over him by
the opinions of his employers and his readers, is not the control of
truth by prejudice, but of one opinion by another opinion that it is
not demonstrably less true. Between Judge Gary's assertion that the
unions will destroy American institutions, and Mr. Gomper's assertion
that they are agencies of the rights of man, the choice has, in large
measure, to be governed by the will to believe.

The task of deflating these controversies, and reducing them to a
point where they can be reported as news, is not a task which the
reporter can perform. It is possible and necessary for journalists to
bring home to people the uncertain character of the truth on which
their opinions are founded, and by criticism and agitation to prod
social science into making more usable formulations of social facts,
and to prod statesmen into establishing more visible institutions. The
press, in other words, can fight for the extension of reportable
truth. But as social truth is organized to-day, the press is not
constituted to furnish from one edition to the next the amount of
knowledge which the democratic theory of public opinion demands. This
is not due to the Brass Check, as the quality of news in radical
papers shows, but to the fact that the press deals with a society in
which the governing forces are so imperfectly recorded. The theory
that the press can itself record those forces is false. It can
normally record only what has been recorded for it by the working of
institutions. Everything else is argument and opinion, and fluctuates
with the vicissitudes, the self-consciousness, and the courage of the
human mind.

If the press is not so universally wicked, nor so deeply conspiring,
as Mr. Sinclair would have us believe, it is very much more frail than
the democratic theory has as yet admitted. It is too frail to carry
the whole burden of popular sovereignty, to supply spontaneously the
truth which democrats hoped was inborn. And when we expect it to
supply such a body of truth we employ a misleading standard of
judgment. We misunderstand the limited nature of news, the illimitable
complexity of society; we overestimate our own endurance, public
spirit, and all-round competence. We suppose an appetite for
uninteresting truths which is not discovered by any honest analysis of
our own tastes.

If the newspapers, then, are to be charged with the duty of
translating the whole public life of mankind, so that every adult can
arrive at an opinion on every moot topic, they fail, they are bound to
fail, in any future one can conceive they will continue to fail. It is
not possible to assume that a world, carried on by division of labor
and distribution of authority, can be governed by universal opinions
in the whole population. Unconsciously the theory sets up the single
reader as theoretically omnicompetent, and puts upon the press the
burden of accomplishing whatever representative government, industrial
organization, and diplomacy have failed to accomplish. Acting upon
everybody for thirty minutes in twenty-four hours, the press is asked
to create a mystical force called Public Opinion that will take up the
slack in public institutions. The press has often mistakenly pretended
that it could do just that. It has at great moral cost to itself,
encouraged a democracy, still bound to its original premises, to
expect newspapers to supply spontaneously for every organ of
government, for every social problem, the machinery of information
which these do not normally supply themselves. Institutions, having
failed to furnish themselves with instruments of knowledge, have
become a bundle of "problems," which the population as a whole,
reading the press as a whole, is supposed to solve.

The press, in other words, has come to be regarded as an organ of
direct democracy, charged on a much wider scale, and from day to day,
with the function often attributed to the initiative, referendum, and
recall. The Court of Public Opinion, open day and night, is to lay
down the law for everything all the time. It is not workable. And when
you consider the nature of news, it is not even thinkable. For the
news, as we have seen, is precise in proportion to the precision with
which the event is recorded. Unless the event is capable of being
named, measured, given shape, made specific, it either fails to take
on the character of news, or it is subject to the accidents and
prejudices of observation.

Therefore, on the whole, the quality of the news about modern society
is an index of its social organization. The better the institutions,
the more all interests concerned are formally represented, the more
issues are disentangled, the more objective criteria are introduced,
the more perfectly an affair can be presented as news. At its best the
press is a servant and guardian of institutions; at its worst it is a
means by which a few exploit social disorganization to their own ends.
In the degree to which institutions fail to function, the unscrupulous
journalist can fish in troubled waters, and the conscientious one must
gamble with uncertainties.

The press is no substitute for institutions. It is like the beam of a
searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then
another out of darkness into vision. Men cannot do the work of the
world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes,
incidents, and eruptions. It is only when they work by a steady light
of their own, that the press, when it is turned upon them, reveals a
situation intelligible enough for a popular decision. The trouble lies
deeper than the press, and so does the remedy. It lies in social
organization based on a system of analysis and record, and in all the
corollaries of that principle; in the abandonment of the theory of the
omnicompetent citizen, in the decentralization of decision, in the
coordination of decision by comparable record and analysis. If at the
centers of management there is a running audit, which makes work
intelligible to those who do it, and those who superintend it, issues
when they arise are not the mere collisions of the blind. Then, too,
the news is uncovered for the press by a system of intelligence that
is also a check upon the press.

That is the radical way. For the troubles of the press, like the
troubles of representative government, be it territorial or
functional, like the troubles of industry, be it capitalist,
cooperative, or communist, go back to a common source: to the failure
of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and
their prejudice, by inventing, creating, and organizing a machinery of
knowledge. It is because they are compelled to act without a reliable
picture of the world, that governments, schools, newspapers and
churches make such small headway against the more obvious failings of
democracy, against violent prejudice, apathy, preference for the
curious trivial as against the dull important, and the hunger for
sideshows and three legged calves. This is the primary defect of
popular government, a defect inherent in its traditions, and all its
other defects can, I believe, be traced to this one.



PART VIII

ORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER    XXV. THE ENTERING WEDGE
   "      XXVI. INTELLIGENCE WORK
   "     XXVII. THE APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC
   "    XXVIII. THE APPEAL TO REASON



CHAPTER XXV

THE ENTERING WEDGE

1

If the remedy were interesting, American pioneers like Charles
McCarthy, Robert Valentine, and Frederick W. Taylor would not have had
to fight so hard for a hearing. But it is clear why they had to fight,
and why bureaus of governmental research, industrial audits, budgeting
and the like are the ugly ducklings of reform. They reverse the
process by which interesting public opinions are built up. Instead of
presenting a casual fact, a large screen of stereotypes, and a
dramatic identification, they break down the drama, break through the
stereotypes, and offer men a picture of facts, which is unfamiliar and
to them impersonal. When this is not painful, it is dull, and those to
whom it is painful, the trading politician and the partisan who has
much to conceal, often exploit the dullness that the public feels, in
order to remove the pain that they feel.

2

Yet every complicated community has sought the assistance of special
men, of augurs, priests, elders. Our own democracy, based though it
was on a theory of universal competence, sought lawyers to manage its
government, and to help manage its industry. It was recognized that
the specially trained man was in some dim way oriented to a wider
system of truth than that which arises spontaneously in the amateur's
mind. But experience has shown that the traditional lawyer's equipment
was not enough assistance. The Great Society had grown furiously and
to colossal dimensions by the application of technical knowledge. It
was made by engineers who had learned to use exact measurements and
quantitative analysis. It could not be governed, men began to
discover, by men who thought deductively about rights and wrongs. It
could be brought under human control only by the technic which had
created it. Gradually, then, the more enlightened directing minds have
called in experts who were trained, or had trained themselves, to make
parts of this Great Society intelligible to those who manage it. These
men are known by all kinds of names, as statisticians, accountants,
auditors, industrial counsellors, engineers of many species,
scientific managers, personnel administrators, research men,
"scientists," and sometimes just as plain private secretaries. They
have brought with them each a jargon of his own, as well as filing
cabinets, card catalogues, graphs, loose-leaf contraptions, and above
all the perfectly sound ideal of an executive who sits before a
flat-top desk, one sheet of typewritten paper before him, and decides
on matters of policy presented in a form ready for his rejection or
approval.

This whole development has been the work, not so much of a spontaneous
creative evolution, as of blind natural selection. The statesman, the
executive, the party leader, the head of a voluntary association,
found that if he had to discuss two dozen different subjects in the
course of the day, somebody would have to coach him. He began to
clamor for memoranda. He found he could not read his mail. He demanded
somebody who would blue-pencil the interesting sentences in the
important letters. He found he could not digest the great stacks of
type-written reports that grew mellow on his desk. He demanded
summaries. He found he could not read an unending series of figures.
He embraced the man who made colored pictures of them. He found that
he really did not know one machine from another. He hired engineers to
pick them, and tell him how much they cost and what they could do. He
peeled off one burden after another, as a man will take off first his
hat, then his coat, then his collar, when he is struggling to move an
unwieldy load.

3

Yet curiously enough, though he knew that he needed help, he was slow
to call in the social scientist. The chemist, the physicist, the
geologist, had a much earlier and more friendly reception.
Laboratories were set up for them, inducements offered, for there was
quick appreciation of the victories over nature. But the scientist who
has human nature as his problem is in a different case. There are many
reasons for this: the chief one, that he has so few victories to
exhibit. He has so few, because unless he deals with the historic
past, he cannot prove his theories before offering them to the public.
The physical scientist can make an hypothesis, test it, revise the
hypothesis hundreds of times, and, if after all that, he is wrong, no
one else has to pay the price. But the social scientist cannot begin
to offer the assurance of a laboratory test, and if his advice is
followed, and he is wrong, the consequences may be incalculable. He is
in the nature of things far more responsible, and far less certain.

But more than that. In the laboratory sciences the student has
conquered the dilemma of thought and action. He brings a sample of the
action to a quiet place, where it can be repeated at will, and
examined at leisure. But the social scientist is constantly being
impaled on a dilemma. If he stays in his library, where he has the
leisure to think, he has to rely upon the exceedingly casual and
meager printed record that comes to him through official reports,
newspapers, and interviews. If he goes out into "the world" where
things are happening, he has to serve a long, often wasteful,
apprenticeship, before he is admitted to the sanctum where they are
being decided. What he cannot do is to dip into action and out again
whenever it suits him. There are no privileged listeners. The man of
affairs, observing that the social scientist knows only from the
outside what he knows, in part at least, from the inside, recognizing
that the social scientist's hypothesis is not in the nature of things
susceptible of laboratory proof, and that verification is possible
only in the "real" world, has developed a rather low opinion of social
scientists who do not share his views of public policy.

In his heart of hearts the social scientist shares this estimate of
himself. He has little inner certainty about his own work. He only
half believes in it, and being sure of nothing, he can find no
compelling reason for insisting on his own freedom of thought. What
can he actually claim for it, in the light of his own conscience?
[Footnote: Cf. Charles E. Merriam, _The Present State of the Study
of Politics_, _American Political Science Review_, Vol. XV.
No. 2, May, 1921.] His data are uncertain, his means of verification
lacking. The very best qualities in him are a source of frustration.
For if he is really critical and saturated in the scientific spirit,
he cannot be doctrinaire, and go to Armageddon against the trustees
and the students and the Civic Federation and the conservative press
for a theory of which he is not sure. If you are going to Armageddon,
you have to battle for the Lord, but the political scientist is always
a little doubtful whether the Lord called him.

Consequently if so much of social science is apologetic rather than
constructive, the explanation lies in the opportunities of social
science, not in "capitalism." The physical scientists achieved their
freedom from clericalism by working out a method that produced
conclusions of a sort that could not be suppressed or ignored. They
convinced themselves and acquired dignity, and knew what they were
fighting for. The social scientist will acquire his dignity and his
strength when he has worked out his method. He will do that by turning
into opportunity the need among directing men of the Great Society for
instruments of analysis by which an invisible and made intelligible.

But as things go now, the social scientist assembles his data out of a
mass of unrelated material. Social processes are recorded
spasmodically, quite often as accidents of administration. A report to
Congress, a debate, an investigation, legal briefs, a census, a
tariff, a tax schedule; the material, like the skull of the Piltdown
man, has to be put together by ingenious inference before the student
obtains any sort of picture of the event he is studying. Though it
deals with the conscious life of his fellow citizens, it is all too
often distressingly opaque, because the man who is trying to
generalize has practically no supervision of the way his data are
collected. Imagine medical research conducted by students who could
rarely go into a hospital, were deprived of animal experiment, and
compelled to draw conclusions from the stories of people who had been
ill, the reports of nurses, each of whom had her own system of
diagnosis, and the statistics compiled by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue on the excess profits of druggists. The social scientist has
usually to make what he can out of categories that were uncritically
in the mind of an official who administered some part of a law, or who
was out to justify, to persuade, to claim, or to prove. The student
knows this, and, as a protection against it, has developed that branch
of scholarship which is an elaborated suspicion about where to
discount his information.

That is a virtue, but it becomes a very thin virtue when it is merely
a corrective for the unwholesome position of social science. For the
scholar is condemned to guess as shrewdly as he can why in a situation
not clearly understood something or other may have happened. But the
expert who is employed as the mediator among representatives, and as
the mirror and measure of administration, has a very different control
of the facts. Instead of being the man who generalizes from the facts
dropped to him by the men of action, he becomes the man who prepares
the facts for the men of action. This is a profound change in his
strategic position. He no longer stands outside, chewing the cud
provided by busy men of affairs, but he takes his place in front of
decision instead of behind it. To-day the sequence is that the man of
affairs finds his facts, and decides on the basis of them; then, some
time later, the social scientist deduces excellent reasons why he did
or did not decide wisely. This ex post facto relationship is academic
in the bad sense of that fine word. The real sequence should be one
where the disinterested expert first finds and formulates the facts
for the man of action, and later makes what wisdom he can out of
comparison between the decision, which he understands, and the facts,
which he organized.

4

For the physical sciences this change in strategic position began
slowly, and then accelerated rapidly. There was a time when the
inventor and the engineer were romantic half-starved outsiders,
treated as cranks. The business man and the artisan knew all the
mysteries of their craft. Then the mysteries grew more mysterious, and
at last industry began to depend upon physical laws and chemical
combinations that no eye could see, and only a trained mind could
conceive. The scientist moved from his noble garret in the Latin
Quarter into office buildings and laboratories. For he alone could
construct a working image of the reality on which industry rested.
From the new relationship he took as much as he gave, perhaps more:
pure science developed faster than applied, though it drew its
economic support, a great deal of its inspiration, and even more of
its relevancy, from constant contact with practical decision. But
physical science still labored under the enormous limitation that the
men who made decisions had only their commonsense to guide them. They
administered without scientific aid a world complicated by scientists.
Again they had to deal with facts they could not apprehend, and as
once they had to call in engineers, they now have to call in
statisticians, accountants, experts of all sorts.

These practical students are the true pioneers of a new social
science. They are "in mesh with the driving wheels" [Footnote: Cf. The
Address of the President of the American Philosophical Association,
Mr. Ralph Barton Perry, Dec. 28, 1920. Published in the Proceedings of
the Twentieth Annual Meeting.] and from this practical engagement of
science and action, both will benefit radically: action by the
clarification of its beliefs; beliefs by a continuing test in action.
We are in the earliest beginnings. But if it is conceded that all
large forms of human association must, because of sheer practical
difficulty, contain men who will come to see the need for an expert
reporting of their particular environment, then the imagination has a
premise on which to work. In the exchange of technic and result among
expert staffs, one can see, I think, the beginning of experimental
method in social science. When each school district and budget, and
health department, and factory, and tariff schedule, is the material
of knowledge for every other, the number of comparable experiences
begins to approach the dimensions of genuine experiment. In
forty-eight states, and 2400 cities, and 277,000 school houses,
270,000 manufacturing establishments, 27,000 mines and quarries, there
is a wealth of experience, if only it were recorded and available. And
there is, too, opportunity for trial and error at such slight risk
that any reasonable hypothesis might be given a fair test without
shaking the foundations of society.

The wedge has been driven, not only by some directors of industry and
some statesmen who had to have help, but by the bureaus of municipal
research, [Footnote: The number of these organizations in the United
States is very great. Some are alive, some half dead. They are in
rapid flux. Lists of them supplied to me by Dr. L. D. Upson of the
Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, Miss Rebecca B. Rankin of the
Municipal Reference Library of New York City, Mr. Edward A.
Fitzpatrick, Secretary of the State Board of Education (Wisconsin),
Mr. Savel Zimand of the Bureau of Industrial Research (New York City),
run into the hundreds.] the legislative reference libraries, the
specialized lobbies of corporations and trade unions and public
causes, and by voluntary organizations like the League of Women
Voters, the Consumers' League, the Manufacturers' Associations: by
hundreds of trade associations, and citizens' unions; by publications
like the _Searchlight on Congress_ and the _Survey_; and by
foundations like the General Education Board. Not all by any means are
disinterested. That is not the point. All of them do begin to
demonstrate the need for interposing some form of expertness between
the private citizen and the vast environment in which he is entangled.



CHAPTER XXVI

INTELLIGENCE WORK

1

THE practice of democracy has been ahead of its theory. For the theory
holds that the adult electors taken together make decisions out of a
will that is in them. But just as there grew up governing hierarchies
which were invisible in theory, so there has been a large amount of
constructive adaptation, also unaccounted for in the image of
democracy. Ways have been found to represent many interests and
functions that are normally out of sight.

We are most conscious of this in our theory of the courts, when we
explain their legislative powers and their vetoes on the theory that
there are interests to be guarded which might be forgotten by the
elected officials. But the Census Bureau, when it counts, classifies,
and correlates people, things, and changes, is also speaking for
unseen factors in the environment. The Geological Survey makes mineral
resources evident, the Department of Agriculture represents in the
councils of the nation factors of which each farmer sees only an
infinitesimal part. School authorities, the Tariff Commission, the
consular service, the Bureau of Internal Revenue give representation
to persons, ideas, and objects which would never automatically find
themselves represented in this perspective by an election. The
Children's Bureau is the spokesman of a whole complex of interests and
functions not ordinarily visible to the voter, and, therefore,
incapable of becoming spontaneously a part of his public opinions.
Thus the printing of comparative statistics of infant mortality is
often followed by a reduction of the death rate of babies. Municipal
officials and voters did not have, before publication, a place in
their picture of the environment for those babies. The statistics made
them visible, as visible as if the babies had elected an alderman to
air their grievances.

In the State Department the government maintains a Division of Far
Eastern Affairs. What is it for? The Japanese and the Chinese
Governments both maintain ambassadors in Washington. Are they not
qualified to speak for the Far East? They are its representatives. Yet
nobody would argue that the American Government could learn all that
it needed to know about the Far East by consulting these ambassadors.
Supposing them to be as candid as they know how to be, they are still
limited channels of information. Therefore, to supplement them we
maintain embassies in Tokio and Peking, and consular agents at many
points. Also, I assume, some secret agents. These people are supposed
to send reports which pass through the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
to the Secretary of State. Now what does the Secretary expect of the
Division? I know one who expected it to spend its appropriation. But
there are Secretaries to whom special revelation is denied, and they
turn to their divisions for help. The last thing they expect to find
is a neat argument justifying the American position.

What they demand is that the experts shall bring the Far East to the
Secretary's desk, with all the elements in such relation that it is as
if he were in contact with the Far East itself. The expert must
translate, simplify, generalize, but the inference from the result
must apply in the East, not merely on the premises of the report. If
the Secretary is worth his salt, the very last thing he will tolerate
in his experts is the suspicion that they have a "policy." He does not
want to know from them whether they like Japanese policy in China. He
wants to know what different classes of Chinese and Japanese, English,
Frenchmen, Germans, and Russians, think about it, and what they are
likely to do because of what they think. He wants all that represented
to him as the basis of his decision. The more faithfully the Division
represents what is not otherwise represented, either by the Japanese
or American ambassadors, or the Senators and Congressmen from the
Pacific coast, the better Secretary of State he will be. He may decide
to take his policy from the Pacific Coast, but he will take his view
of Japan from Japan.

2

It is no accident that the best diplomatic service in the world is the
one in which the divorce between the assembling of knowledge and the
control of policy is most perfect. During the war in many British
Embassies and in the British Foreign Office there were nearly always
men, permanent officials or else special appointees, who quite
successfully discounted the prevailing war mind. They discarded the
rigmarole of being pro and con, of having favorite nationalities, and
pet aversions, and undelivered perorations in their bosoms. They left
that to the political chiefs. But in an American Embassy I once heard
an ambassador say that he never reported anything to Washington which
would not cheer up the folks at home. He charmed all those who met
him, helped many a stranded war worker, and was superb when he
unveiled a monument.

He did not understand that the power of the expert depends upon
separating himself from those who make the decisions, upon not caring,
in his expert self, what decision is made. The man who, like the
ambassador, takes a line, and meddles with the decision, is soon
discounted. There he is, just one more on that side of the question.
For when he begins to care too much, he begins to see what he wishes
to see, and by that fact ceases to see what he is there to see. He is
there to represent the unseen. He represents people who are not
voters, functions of voters that are not evident, events that are out
of sight, mute people, unborn people, relations between things and
people. He has a constituency of intangibles. And intangibles cannot
be used to form a political majority, because voting is in the last
analysis a test of strength, a sublimated battle, and the expert
represents no strength available in the immediate. But he can exercise
force by disturbing the line up of the forces. By making the invisible
visible, he confronts the people who exercise material force with a
new environment, sets ideas and feelings at work in them, throws them
out of position, and so, in the profoundest way, affects the decision.

Men cannot long act in a way that they know is a contradiction of the
environment as they conceive it. If they are bent on acting in a
certain way they have to reconceive the environment, they have to
censor out, to rationalize. But if in their presence, there is an
insistent fact which is so obtrusive that they cannot explain it away,
one of three courses is open. They can perversely ignore it, though
they will cripple themselves in the process, will overact their part
and come to grief. They can take it into account but refuse to act.
They pay in internal discomfort and frustration. Or, and I believe
this to be the most frequent case, they adjust their whole behavior to
the enlarged environment.

The idea that the expert is an ineffectual person because he lets
others make the decisions is quite contrary to experience. The more
subtle the elements that enter into the decision, the more
irresponsible power the expert wields. He is certain, moreover, to
exercise more power in the future than ever he did before, because
increasingly the relevant facts will elude the voter and the
administrator. All governing agencies will tend to organize bodies of
research and information, which will throw out tentacles and expand,
as have the intelligence departments of all the armies in the world.
But the experts will remain human beings. They will enjoy power, and
their temptation will be to appoint themselves censors, and so absorb
the real function of decision. Unless their function is correctly
defined they will tend to pass on the facts they think appropriate,
and to pass down the decisions they approve. They will tend, in short,
to become a bureaucracy.

The only institutional safeguard is to separate as absolutely as it is
possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which
investigates. The two should be parallel but quite distinct bodies of
men, recruited differently, paid if possible from separate funds,
responsible to different heads, intrinsically uninterested in each
other's personal success. In industry, the auditors, accountants, and
inspectors should be independent of the manager, the superintendents,
foremen, and in time, I believe, we shall come to see that in order to
bring industry under social control the machinery of record will have
to be independent of the boards of directors and the shareholders.

3

But in building the intelligence sections of industry and politics, we
do not start on cleared ground. And, apart from insisting on this
basic separation of function, it would be cumbersome to insist too
precisely on the form which in any particular instance the principle
shall take. There are men who believe in intelligence work, and will
adopt it; there are men who do not understand it, but cannot do their
work without it; there are men who will resist. But provided the
principle has a foothold somewhere in every social agency it will make
progress, and the way to begin is to begin. In the federal government,
for example, it is not necessary to straighten out the administrative
tangle and the illogical duplications of a century's growth in order
to find a neat place for the intelligence bureaus which Washington so
badly needs. Before election you can promise to rush bravely into the
breach. But when you arrive there all out of breath, you find that
each absurdity is invested with habits, strong interests, and chummy
Congressmen. Attack all along the line and you engage every force of
reaction. You go forth to battle, as the poet said, and you always
fall. You can lop off an antiquated bureau here, a covey of clerks
there, you can combine two bureaus. And by that time you are busy with
the tariff and the railroads, and the era of reform is over. Besides,
in order to effect a truly logical reorganization of the government,
such as all candidates always promise, you would have to disturb more
passions than you have time to quell. And any new scheme, supposing
you had one ready, would require officials to man it. Say what one
will about officeholders, even Soviet Russia was glad to get many of
the old ones back; and these old officials, if they are too ruthlessly
treated, will sabotage Utopia itself.

No administrative scheme is workable without good will, and good will
about strange practices is impossible without education. The better
way is to introduce into the existing machinery, wherever you can find
an opening, agencies that will hold up a mirror week by week, month by
month. You can hope, then, to make the machine visible to those who
work it, as well as to the chiefs who are responsible, and to the
public outside. When the office-holders begin to see themselves,--or
rather when the outsiders, the chiefs, and the subordinates all begin
to see the same facts, the same damning facts if you like, the
obstruction will diminish. The reformer's opinion that a certain
bureau is inefficient is just his opinion, not so good an opinion in
the eyes of the bureau, as its own. But let the work of that bureau be
analysed and recorded, and then compared with other bureaus and with
private corporations, and the argument moves to another plane.

There are ten departments at Washington represented in the Cabinet.
Suppose, then, there was a permanent intelligence section for each.
What would be some of the conditions of effectiveness? Beyond all
others that the intelligence officials should be independent both of
the Congressional Committees dealing with that department, and of the
Secretary at the head of it; that they should not be entangled either
in decision or in action. Independence, then, would turn mainly on
three points on funds, tenure, and access to the facts. For clearly if
a particular Congress or departmental official can deprive them of
money, dismiss them, or close the files, the staff becomes its
creature.

4

The question of funds is both important and difficult. No agency of
research can be really free if it depends upon annual doles from what
may be a jealous or a parsimonious congress. Yet the ultimate control
of funds cannot be removed from the legislature. The financial
arrangement should insure the staff against left-handed, joker and
rider attack, against sly destruction, and should at the same time
provide for growth. The staff should be so well entrenched that an
attack on its existence would have to be made in the open. It might,
perhaps, work behind a federal charter creating a trust fund, and a
sliding scale over a period of years based on the appropriation for
the department to which the intelligence bureau belonged. No great
sums of money are involved anyway. The trust fund might cover the
overhead and capital charges for a certain minimum staff, the sliding
scale might cover the enlargements. At any rate the appropriation
should be put beyond accident, like the payment of any long term
obligation. This is a much less serious way of "tying the hands of
Congress" than is the passage of a Constitutional amendment or the
issuance of government bonds. Congress could repeal the charter. But
it would have to repeal it, not throw monkey wrenches into it.

Tenure should be for life, with provision for retirement on a liberal
pension, with sabbatical years set aside for advanced study and
training, and with dismissal only after a trial by professional
colleagues. The conditions which apply to any non-profit-making
intellectual career should apply here. If the work is to be salient,
the men who do it must have dignity, security, and, in the upper ranks
at least, that freedom of mind which you find only where men are not
too immediately concerned in practical decision.

Access to the materials should be established in the organic act. The
bureau should have the right to examine all papers, and to question
any official or any outsider. Continuous investigation of this sort
would not at all resemble the sensational legislative inquiry and the
spasmodic fishing expedition which are now a common feature of our
government. The bureau should have the right to propose accounting
methods to the department, and if the proposal is rejected, or
violated after it has been accepted, to appeal under its charter to
Congress.

In the first instance each intelligence bureau would be the connecting
link between Congress and the Department, a better link, in my
judgment, than the appearance of cabinet officers on the floor of both
House and Senate, though the one proposal in no way excludes the
other. The bureau would be the Congressional eye on the execution of
its policy. It would be the departmental answer to Congressional
criticism. And then, since operation of the Department would be
permanently visible, perhaps Congress would cease to feel the need of
that minute legislation born of distrust and a false doctrine of the
separation of powers, which does so much to make efficient
administration difficult.

5

But, of course, each of the ten bureaus could not work in a watertight
compartment. In their relation one to another lies the best chance for
that "coordination" of which so much is heard and so little seen.
Clearly the various staffs would need to adopt, wherever possible,
standards of measurement that were comparable. They would exchange
their records. Then if the War Department and the Post Office both buy
lumber, hire carpenters, or construct brick walls they need not
necessarily do them through the same agency, for that might mean
cumbersome over-centralization; but they would be able to use the same
measure for the same things, be conscious of the comparisons, and be
treated as competitors. And the more competition of this sort the
better.

For the value of competition is determined by the value of the
standards used to measure it. Instead, then, of asking ourselves
whether we believe in competition, we should ask ourselves whether we
believe in that for which the competitors compete. No one in his
senses expects to "abolish competition," for when the last vestige of
emulation had disappeared, social effort would consist in mechanical
obedience to a routine, tempered in a minority by native inspiration.
Yet no one expects to work out competition to its logical conclusion
in a murderous struggle of each against all. The problem is to select
the goals of competition and the rules of the game. Almost always the
most visible and obvious standard of measurement will determine the
rules of the game: such as money, power, popularity, applause, or Mr.
Veblen's "conspicuous waste." What other standards of measurement does
our civilization normally provide? How does it measure efficiency,
productivity, service, for which we are always clamoring?

By and large there are no measures, and there is, therefore, not so
much competition to achieve these ideals. For the difference between
the higher and the lower motives is not, as men often assert, a
difference between altruism and selfishness. [Footnote: _Cf._
Ch. XII] It is a difference between acting for easily understood aims,
and for aims that are obscure and vague. Exhort a man to make more
profit than his neighbor, and he knows at what to aim. Exhort him to
render more social service, and how is he to be certain what service
is social? What is the test, what is the measure? A subjective
feeling, somebody's opinion. Tell a man in time of peace that he ought
to serve his country and you have uttered a pious platitude, Tell him
in time of war, and the word service has a meaning; it is a number of
concrete acts, enlistment, or buying bonds, or saving food, or working
for a dollar a year, and each one of these services he sees definitely
as part of a concrete purpose to put at the front an army larger and
better armed, than the enemy's.

So the more you are able to analyze administration and work out
elements that can be compared, the more you invent quantitative
measures for the qualities you wish to promote, the more you can turn
competition to ideal ends. If you can contrive the right index numbers
[Footnote: I am not using the term index numbers in its purely
technical meaning, but to cover any device for the comparative
measurement of social phenomena.] you can set up a competition between
individual workers in a shop; between shops; between factories;
between schools; [Footnote: See, for example, _An Index Number for
State School Systems_ by Leonard P. Ayres, Russell Sage Foundation,
1920. The principle of the quota was very successfully applied in the
Liberty Loan Campaigns, and under very much more difficult
circumstances by the Allied Maritime Transport Council.] between
government departments; between regiments; between divisions; between
ships; between states; counties; cities; and the better your index
numbers the more useful the competition.

6

The possibilities that lie in the exchange of material are evident.
Each department of government is all the time asking for information
that may already have been obtained by another department, though
perhaps in a somewhat different form. The State Department needs to
know, let us say, the extent of the Mexican oil reserves, their
relation to the rest of the world's supply, the present ownership of
Mexican oil lands, the importance of oil to warships now under
construction or planned, the comparative costs in different fields.
How does it secure such information to-day? The information is
probably scattered through the Departments of Interior, Justice,
Commerce, Labor and Navy. Either a clerk in the State Department looks
up Mexican oil in a book of reference, which may or may not be
accurate, or somebody's private secretary telephones somebody else's
private secretary, asks for a memorandum, and in the course of time a
darkey messenger arrives with an armful of unintelligible reports. The
Department should be able to call on its own intelligence bureau to
assemble the facts in a way suited to the diplomatic problem up for
decision. And these facts the diplomatic intelligence bureau would
obtain from the central clearing house. [Footnote: There has been a
vast development of such services among the trade associations. The
possibilities of a perverted use were revealed by the New York
Building Trades investigation of 1921.]

This establishment would pretty soon become a focus of information of
the most extraordinary kind. And the men in it would be made aware of
what the problems of government really are. They would deal with
problems of definition, of terminology, of statistical technic, of
logic; they would traverse concretely the whole gamut of the social
sciences. It is difficult to see why all this material, except a few
diplomatic and military secrets, should not be open to the scholars of
the country. It is there that the political scientist would find the
real nuts to crack and the real researches for his students to make.
The work need not all be done in Washington, but it could be done in
reference to Washington. The central agency would, thus, have in it
the makings of a national university. The staff could be recruited
there for the bureaus from among college graduates. They would be
working on theses selected after consultation between the curators of
the national university and teachers scattered over the country. If
the association was as flexible as it ought to be, there would be, as
a supplement to the permanent staff, a steady turnover of temporary
and specialist appointments from the universities, and exchange
lecturers called out from Washington. Thus the training and the
recruiting of the staff would go together. A part of the research
itself would be done by students, and political science in the
universities would be associated with politics in America.

7

In its main outlines the principle is equally applicable to state
governments, to cities, and to rural counties. The work of comparison
and interchange could take place by federations of state and city and
county bureaus. And within those federations any desirable regional
combination could be organized. So long as the accounting systems were
comparable, a great deal of duplication would be avoided. Regional
coordination is especially desirable. For legal frontiers often do not
coincide with the effective environments. Yet they have a certain
basis in custom that it would be costly to disturb. By coordinating
their information several administrative areas could reconcile
autonomy of decision with cooperation. New York City, for example, is
already an unwieldy unit for good government from the City Hall. Yet
for many purposes, such as health and transportation, the metropolitan
district is the true unit of administration. In that district,
however, there are large cities, like Yonkers, Jersey City, Paterson,
Elizabeth, Hoboken, Bayonne. They could not all be managed from one
center, and yet they should act together for many functions.
Ultimately perhaps some such flexible scheme of local government as
Sidney and Beatrice Webb have suggested may be the proper
solution. [Footnote: "The Reorganization of Local Government" (Ch. IV),
in _A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great
Britain_.] But the first step would be a coordination, not of
decision and action, but of information and research. Let the
officials of the various municipalities see their common problems in
the light of the same facts.

8

It would be idle to deny that such a net work of intelligence bureaus
in politics and industry might become a dead weight and a perpetual
irritation. One can easily imagine its attraction for men in search of
soft jobs, for pedants, for meddlers. One can see red tape, mountains
of papers, questionnaires ad nauseam, seven copies of every document,
endorsements, delays, lost papers, the use of form 136 instead of form
2gb, the return of the document because pencil was used instead of
ink, or black ink instead of red ink. The work could be done very
badly. There are no fool-proof institutions.

But if one could assume that there was circulation through the whole
system between government departments, factories, offices, and the
universities; a circulation of men, a circulation of data and of
criticism, the risks of dry rot would not be so great. Nor would it be
true to say that these intelligence bureaus will complicate life. They
will tend, on the contrary, to simplify, by revealing a complexity now
so great as to be humanly unmanageable. The present fundamentally
invisible system of government is so intricate that most people have
given up trying to follow it, and because they do not try, they are
tempted to think it comparatively simple. It is, on the contrary,
elusive, concealed, opaque. The employment of an intelligence system
would mean a reduction of personnel per unit of result, because by
making available to all the experience of each, it would reduce the
amount of trial and error; and because by making the social process
visible, it would assist the personnel to self-criticism. It does not
involve a great additional band of officials, if you take into account
the time now spent vainly by special investigating committees, grand
juries, district attorneys, reform organizations, and bewildered
office holders, in trying to find their way through a dark muddle.

If the analysis of public opinion and of the democratic theories in
relation to the modern environment is sound in principle, then I do
not see how one can escape the conclusion that such intelligence work
is the clue to betterment. I am not referring to the few suggestions
contained in this chapter. They are merely illustrations. The task of
working out the technic is in the hands of men trained to do it, and
not even they can to-day completely foresee the form, much less the
details. The number of social phenomena which are now recorded is
small, the instruments of analysis are very crude, the concepts often
vague and uncriticized. But enough has been done to demonstrate, I
think, that unseen environments can be reported effectively, that they
can be reported to divergent groups of people in a way which is
neutral to their prejudice, and capable of overcoming their
subjectivism.

If that is true, then in working out the intelligence principle men
will find the way to overcome the central difficulty of
self-government, the difficulty of dealing with an unseen reality.
Because of that difficulty, it has been impossible for any
self-governing community to reconcile its need for isolation with the
necessity for wide contact, to reconcile the dignity and individuality
of local decision with security and wide coordination, to secure
effective leaders without sacrificing responsibility, to have useful
public opinions without attempting universal public opinions on all
subjects. As long as there was no way of establishing common versions
of unseen events, common measures for separate actions, the only image
of democracy that would work, even in theory, was one based on an
isolated community of people whose political faculties were limited,
according to Aristotle's famous maxim, by the range of their vision.

But now there is a way out, a long one to be sure, but a way. It is
fundamentally the same way as that which has enabled a citizen of
Chicago, with no better eyes or ears than an Athenian, to see and hear
over great distances. It is possible to-day, it will become more
possible when more labor has gone into it, to reduce the discrepancies
between the conceived environment and the effective environment. As
that is done, federalism will work more and more by consent, less and
less by coercion. For while federalism is the only possible method of
union among self-governing groups, [Footnote: _Cf._ H. J. Laski,
_The Foundations of Sovereignty_, and other Essays, particularly
the Essay of this name, as well as the Problems of Administrative
Areas, The Theory of Popular Sovereignty, and The Pluralistic State.]
federalism swings either towards imperial centralization or towards
parochial anarchy wherever the union is not based on correct and
commonly accepted ideas of federal matters. These ideas do not arise
spontaneously. They have to be pieced together by generalization based
on analysis, and the instruments for that analysis have to be invented
and tested by research.

No electoral device, no manipulation of areas, no change in the system
of property, goes to the root of the matter. You cannot take more
political wisdom out of human beings than there is in them. And no
reform, however sensational, is truly radical, which does not
consciously provide a way of overcoming the subjectivism of human
opinion based on the limitation of individual experience. There are
systems of government, of voting, and representation which extract
more than others. But in the end knowledge must come not from the
conscience but from the environment with which that conscience deals.
When men act on the principle of intelligence they go out to find the
facts and to make their wisdom. When they ignore it, they go inside
themselves and find only what is there. They elaborate their
prejudice, instead of increasing their knowledge.



CHAPTER XXVII

THE APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC

1

IN real life no one acts on the theory that he can have a public
opinion on every public question, though this fact is often concealed
where a person thinks there is no public question because he has no
public opinion. But in the theory of our politics we continue to think
more literally than Lord Bryce intended, that "the action of Opinion
is continuous," [Footnote: _Modern Democracies_, Vol. I, p. 159.]
even though "its action... deals with broad principles only."
[Footnote: Id., footnote, p. 158.] And then because we try to think of
ourselves having continuous opinions, without being altogether certain
what a broad principle is, we quite naturally greet with an anguished
yawn an argument that seems to involve the reading of more government
reports, more statistics, more curves and more graphs. For all these
are in the first instance just as confusing as partisan rhetoric, and
much less entertaining.

The amount of attention available is far too small for any scheme in
which it was assumed that all the citizens of the nation would, after
devoting themselves to the publications of all the intelligence
bureaus, become alert, informed, and eager on the multitude of real
questions that never do fit very well into any broad principle. I am
not making that assumption. Primarily, the intelligence bureau is an
instrument of the man of action, of the representative charged with
decision, of the worker at his work, and if it does not help them, it
will help nobody in the end. But in so far as it helps them to
understand the environment in which they are working, it makes what
they do visible. And by that much they become more responsible to the
general public.

The purpose, then, is not to burden every citizen with expert opinions
on all questions, but to push that burden away from him towards the
responsible administrator. An intelligence system has value, of
course, as a source of general information, and as a check on the
daily press. But that is secondary. Its real use is as an aid to
representative government and administration both in politics and
industry. The demand for the assistance of expert reporters in the
shape of accountants, statisticians, secretariats, and the like, comes
not from the public, but from men doing public business, who can no
longer do it by rule of thumb. It is in origin and in ideal an
instrument for doing public business better, rather than an instrument
for knowing better how badly public business is done.

2

As a private citizen, as a sovereign voter, no one could attempt to
digest these documents. But as one party to a dispute, as a
committeeman in a legislature, as an officer in government, business,
or a trade union, as a member of an industrial council, reports on the
specific matter at issue will be increasingly welcome. The private
citizen interested in some cause would belong, as he does now, to
voluntary societies which employed a staff to study the documents, and
make reports that served as a check on officialdom. There would be
some study of this material by newspaper men, and a good deal by
experts and by political scientists. But the outsider, and every one
of us is an outsider to all but a few aspects of modern life, has
neither time, nor attention, nor interest, nor the equipment for
specific judgment. It is on the men inside, working under conditions
that are sound, that the daily administrations of society must rest.

The general public outside can arrive at judgments about whether these
conditions are sound only on the result after the event, and on the
procedure before the event. The broad principles on which the action
of public opinion can be continuous are essentially principles of
procedure. The outsider can ask experts to tell him whether the
relevant facts were duly considered; he cannot in most cases decide
for himself what is relevant or what is due consideration. The
outsider can perhaps judge whether the groups interested in the
decision were properly heard, whether the ballot, if there was one,
was honestly taken, and perhaps whether the result was honestly
accepted. He can watch the procedure when the news indicates that
there is something to watch. He can raise a question as to whether the
procedure itself is right, if its normal results conflict with his
ideal of a good life. [Footnote: _Cf._ Chapter XX. ] But if he
tries in every case to substitute himself for the procedure, to bring
in Public Opinion like a providential uncle in the crisis of a play,
he will confound his own confusion. He will not follow any train of
thought consecutively.

For the practice of appealing to the public on all sorts of intricate
matters means almost always a desire to escape criticism from those
who know by enlisting a large majority which has had no chance to
know. The verdict is made to depend on who has the loudest or the most
entrancing voice, the most skilful or the most brazen publicity man,
the best access to the most space in the newspapers. For even when the
editor is scrupulously fair to "the other side," fairness is not
enough. There may be several other sides, unmentioned by any of the
organized, financed and active partisans.

The private citizen, beset by partisan appeals for the loan of his
Public Opinion, will soon see, perhaps, that these appeals are not a
compliment to his intelligence, but an imposition on his good nature
and an insult to his sense of evidence. As his civic education takes
account of the complexity of his environment, he will concern himself
about the equity and the sanity of procedure, and even this he will in
most cases expect his elected representative to watch for him. He will
refuse himself to accept the burden of these decisions, and will turn
down his thumbs in most cases on those who, in their hurry to win,
rush from the conference table with the first dope for the reporters.

Only by insisting that problems shall not come up to him until they
have passed through a procedure, can the busy citizen of a modern
state hope to deal with them in a form that is intelligible. For
issues, as they are stated by a partisan, almost always consist of an
intricate series of facts, as he has observed them, surrounded by a
large fatty mass of stereotyped phrases charged with his emotion.
According to the fashion of the day, he will emerge from the
conference room insisting that what he wants is some soulfilling idea
like Justice, Welfare, Americanism, Socialism. On such issues the
citizen outside can sometimes be provoked to fear or admiration, but
to judgment never. Before he can do anything with the argument, the
fat has to be boiled out of it for him.

3

That can be done by having the representative inside carry on
discussion in the presence of some one, chairman or mediator, who
forces the discussion to deal with the analyses supplied by experts.
This is the essential organization of any representative body dealing
with distant matters. The partisan voices should be there, but the
partisans should find themselves confronted with men, not personally
involved, who control enough facts and have the dialectical skill to
sort out what is real perception from what is stereotype, pattern and
elaboration. It is the Socratic dialogue, with all of Socrates's
energy for breaking through words to meanings, and something more than
that, because the dialectic in modern life must be done by men who
have explored the environment as well as the human mind.

There is, for example, a grave dispute in the steel industry. Each
side issues a manifesto full of the highest ideals. The only public
opinion that is worth respect at this stage is the opinion which
insists that a conference be organized. For the side which says its
cause is too just to be contaminated by conference there can be little
sympathy, since there is no such cause anywhere among mortal men.
Perhaps those who object to conference do not say quite that. Perhaps
they say that the other side is too wicked; they cannot shake hands
with traitors. All that public opinion can do then is to organize a
hearing by public officials to hear the proof of wickedness. It cannot
take the partisans' word for it. But suppose a conference is agreed
to, and suppose there is a neutral chairman who has at his beck and
call the consulting experts of the corporation, the union, and, let us
say, the Department of Labor.

Judge Gary states with perfect sincerity that his men are well paid
and not overworked, and then proceeds to sketch the history of Russia
from the time of Peter the Great to the murder of the Czar. Mr. Foster
rises, states with equal sincerity that the men are exploited, and
then proceeds to outline the history of human emancipation from Jesus
of Nazareth to Abraham Lincoln. At this point the chairman calls upon
the intelligence men for wage tables in order to substitute for the
words "well paid" and "exploited" a table showing what the different
classes _are_ paid. Does Judge Gary think they are all well paid?
He does. Does Mr. Foster think they are all exploited? No, he thinks
that groups C, M, and X are exploited. What does he mean by exploited?
He means they are not paid a living wage. They are, says Judge Gary.
What can a man buy on that wage, asks the chairman. Nothing, says Mr.
Foster. Everything he needs, says Judge Gary. The chairman consults
the budgets and price statistics of the government. [Footnote: See an
article on "The Cost of Living and Wage Cuts," in the _New
Republic_, July 27, 1921, by Dr. Leo Wolman, for a brilliant
discussion of the naive use of such figures and "pseudo-principles."
The warning is of particular importance because it comes from an
economist and statistician who has himself done so much to improve the
technic of industrial disputes.] He rules that X can meet an average
budget, but that C and M cannot. Judge Gary serves notice that he does
not regard the official statistics as sound. The budgets are too high,
and prices have come down. Mr. Foster also serves notice of exception.
The budget is too low, prices have gone up. The chairman rules that
this point is not within the jurisdiction of the conference, that the
official figures stand, and that Judge Gary's experts and Mr. Foster's
should carry their appeals to the standing committee of the federated
intelligence bureaus.

Nevertheless, says Judge Gary, we shall be ruined if we change these
wage scales. What do you mean by ruined, asks the chairman, produce
your books. I can't, they are private, says Judge Gary. What is
private does not interest us, says the chairman, and, therefore,
issues a statement to the public announcing that the wages of workers
in groups C and M are so-and-so much below the official minimum living
wage, and that Judge Gary declines to increase them for reasons that
he refuses to state. After a procedure of that sort, a public opinion
in the eulogistic sense of the term [Footnote: As used by Mr. Lowell
in his _Public Opinion and Popular Government_.] can exist.

The value of expert mediation is not that it sets up opinion to coerce
the partisans, but that it disintegrates partisanship. Judge Gary and
Mr. Foster may remain as little convinced as when they started, though
even they would have to talk in a different strain. But almost
everyone else who was not personally entangled would save himself from
being entangled. For the entangling stereotypes and slogans to which
his reflexes are so ready to respond are by this kind of dialectic
untangled.

4

On many subjects of great public importance, and in varying degree
among different people for more personal matters, the threads of
memory and emotion are in a snarl. The same word will connote any
number of different ideas: emotions are displaced from the images to
which they belong to names which resemble the names of these images.
In the uncriticized parts of the mind there is a vast amount of
association by mere clang, contact, and succession. There are stray
emotional attachments, there are words that were names and are masks.
In dreams, reveries, and panic, we uncover some of the disorder,
enough to see how the naive mind is composed, and how it behaves when
not disciplined by wakeful effort and external resistance. We see that
there is no more natural order than in a dusty old attic. There is
often the same incongruity between fact, idea, and emotion as there
might be in an opera house, if all the wardrobes were dumped in a heap
and all the scores mixed up, so that Madame Butterfly in a Valkyr's
dress waited lyrically for the return of Faust. "At Christmas-tide"
says an editorial, "old memories soften the heart. Holy teachings are
remembered afresh as thoughts run back to childhood. The world does
not seem so bad when seen through the mist of half-happy, half-sad
recollections of loved ones now with God. No heart is untouched by the
mysterious influence.... The country is honeycombed with red
propaganda--but there is a good supply of ropes, muscles and
lampposts... while this world moves the spirit of liberty will burn in
the breast of man."

The man who found these phrases in his mind needs help. He needs a
Socrates who will separate the words, cross-examine him until he has
defined them, and made words the names of ideas. Made them mean a
particular object and nothing else. For these tense syllables have got
themselves connected in his mind by primitive association, and are
bundled together by his memories of Christmas, his indignation as a
conservative, and his thrills as the heir to a revolutionary
tradition. Sometimes the snarl is too huge and ancient for quick
unravelling. Sometimes, as in modern psychotherapy, there are layers
upon layers of memory reaching back to infancy, which have to be
separated and named.

The effect of naming, the effect, that is, of saying that the labor
groups C and M, but not X, are underpaid, instead of saying that Labor
is Exploited, is incisive. Perceptions recover their identity, and the
emotion they arouse is specific, since it is no longer reinforced by
large and accidental connections with everything from Christmas to
Moscow. The disentangled idea with a name of its own, and an emotion
that has been scrutinized, is ever so much more open to correction by
new data in the problem. It had been imbedded in the whole
personality, had affiliations of some sort with the whole ego: a
challenge would reverberate through the whole soul. After it has been
thoroughly criticized, the idea is no longer _me_ but _that_.
It is objectified, it is at arm's length. Its fate is not bound up with my
fate, but with the fate of the outer world upon which I am acting.

5

Re-education of this kind will help to bring our public opinions into
grip with the environment. That is the way the enormous censoring,
stereotyping, and dramatizing apparatus can be liquidated. Where there
is no difficulty in knowing what the relevant environment is, the
critic, the teacher, the physician, can unravel the mind. But where
the environment is as obscure to the analyst as to his pupil, no
analytic technic is sufficient. Intelligence work is required. In
political and industrial problems the critic as such can do something,
but unless he can count upon receiving from expert reporters a valid
picture of the environment, his dialectic cannot go far.

Therefore, though here, as in most other matters, "education" is the
supreme remedy, the value of this education will depend upon the
evolution of knowledge. And our knowledge of human institutions is
still extraordinarily meager and impressionistic. The gathering of
social knowledge is, on the whole, still haphazard; not, as it will
have to become, the normal accompaniment of action. And yet the
collection of information will not be made, one may be sure, for the
sake of its ultimate use. It will be made because modern decision
requires it to be made. But as it is being made, there will accumulate
a body of data which political science can turn into generalization,
and build up for the schools into a conceptual picture of the world.
When that picture takes form, civic education can become a preparation
for dealing with an unseen environment.

As a working model of the social system becomes available to the
teacher, he can use it to make the pupil acutely aware of how his mind
works on unfamiliar facts. Until he has such a model, the teacher
cannot hope to prepare men fully for the world they will find. What he
can do is to prepare them to deal with that world with a great deal
more sophistication about their own minds. He can, by the use of the
case method, teach the pupil the habit of examining the sources of his
information. He can teach him, for example, to look in his newspaper
for the place where the dispatch was filed, for the name of the
correspondent, the name of the press service, the authority given for
the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was
secured. He can teach the pupil to ask himself whether the reporter
saw what he describes, and to remember how that reporter described
other events in the past. He can teach him the character of
censorship, of the idea of privacy, and furnish him with knowledge of
past propaganda. He can, by the proper use of history, make him aware
of the stereotype, and can educate a habit of introspection about the
imagery evoked by printed words. He can, by courses in comparative
history and anthropology, produce a life-long realization of the way
codes impose a special pattern upon the imagination. He can teach men
to catch themselves making allegories, dramatizing relations, and
personifying abstractions. He can show the pupil how he identifies
himself with these allegories, how he becomes interested, and how he
selects the attitude, heroic, romantic, economic which he adopts while
holding a particular opinion. The study of error is not only in the
highest degree prophylactic, but it serves as a stimulating
introduction to the study of truth. As our minds become more deeply
aware of their own subjectivism, we find a zest in objective method
that is not otherwise there. We see vividly, as normally we should
not, the enormous mischief and casual cruelty of our prejudices. And
the destruction of a prejudice, though painful at first, because of
its connection with our self-respect, gives an immense relief and a
fine pride when it is successfully done. There is a radical
enlargement of the range of attention. As the current categories
dissolve, a hard, simple version of the world breaks up. The scene
turns vivid and full. There follows an emotional incentive to hearty
appreciation of scientific method, which otherwise it is not easy to
arouse, and is impossible to sustain. Prejudices are so much easier
and more interesting. For if you teach the principles of science as if
they had always been accepted, their chief virtue as a discipline,
which is objectivity, will make them dull. But teach them at first as
victories over the superstitions of the mind, and the exhilaration of
the chase and of the conquest may carry the pupil over that hard
transition from his own self-bound experience to the phase where his
curiosity has matured, and his reason has acquired passion.



CHAPTER XXVIII

THE APPEAL TO REASON

1

I HAVE written, and then thrown away, several endings to this book.
Over all of them there hung that fatality of last chapters, in which
every idea seems to find its place, and all the mysteries, that the
writer has not forgotten, are unravelled. In politics the hero does
not live happily ever after, or end his life perfectly. There is no
concluding chapter, because the hero in politics has more future
before him than there is recorded history behind him. The last chapter
is merely a place where the writer imagines that the polite reader has
begun to look furtively at his watch.

2

When Plato came to the point where it was fitting that he should sum
up, his assurance turned into stage-fright as he thought how absurd it
would sound to say what was in him about the place of reason in
politics. Those sentences in book five of the Republic were hard even
for Plato to speak; they are so sheer and so stark that men can
neither forget them nor live by them. So he makes Socrates say to
Glaucon that he will be broken and drowned in laughter for telling
"what is the least change which will enable a state to pass into the
truer form," [Footnote: _Republic_, Bk. V, 473. Jowett transl.]
because the thought he "would fain have uttered if it had not seemed
too extravagant" was that "until philosophers are kings, or the kings
and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and
political greatness and wisdom meet in one... cities will never cease
from ill,--no, nor the human race..."

Hardly had he said these awful words, when he realized they were a
counsel of perfection, and felt embarrassed at the unapproachable
grandeur of his idea. So he hastens to add that, of course, "the true
pilot" will be called "a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing."
[Footnote: 2 Bk. VI, 488-489.] But this wistful admission, though it
protects him against whatever was the Greek equivalent for the charge
that he lacked a sense of humor, furnished a humiliating tailpiece to
a solemn thought. He becomes defiant and warns Adeimantus that he must
"attribute the uselessness" of philosophers "to the fault of those who
will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly
beg the sailors to be commanded by him--that is not the order of
nature." And with this haughty gesture, he hurriedly picked up the
tools of reason, and disappeared into the Academy, leaving the world
to Machiavelli.

Thus, in the first great encounter between reason and politics, the
strategy of reason was to retire in anger. But meanwhile, as Plato
tells us, the ship is at sea. There have been many ships on the sea,
since Plato wrote, and to-day, whether we are wise or foolish in our
belief, we could no longer call a man a true pilot, simply because he
knows how to "pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars
and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art." [Footnote: Bk. VI,
488-489.] He can dismiss nothing which is necessary to make that ship
sail prosperously. Because there are mutineers aboard, he cannot say:
so much the worse for us all... it is not in the order of nature that
I should handle a mutiny... it is not in the order of philosophy that
I should consider mutiny... I know how to navigate... I do not know
how to navigate a ship full of sailors... and if they do not see that
I am the man to steer, I cannot help it. We shall all go on the rocks,
they to be punished for their sins; I, with the assurance that I knew
better....

3

Whenever we make an appeal to reason in politics, the difficulty in
this parable recurs. For there is an inherent difficulty about using
the method of reason to deal with an unreasoning world. Even if you
assume with Plato that the true pilot knows what is best for the ship,
you have to recall that he is not so easy to recognize, and that this
uncertainty leaves a large part of the crew unconvinced. By definition
the crew does not know what he knows, and the pilot, fascinated by the
stars and winds, does not know how to make the crew realize the
importance of what he knows. There is no time during mutiny at sea to
make each sailor an expert judge of experts. There is no time for the
pilot to consult his crew and find out whether he is really as wise as
he thinks he is. For education is a matter of years, the emergency a
matter of hours. It would be altogether academic, then, to tell the
pilot that the true remedy is, for example, an education that will
endow sailors with a better sense of evidence. You can tell that only
to shipmasters on dry land. In the crisis, the only advice is to use a
gun, or make a speech, utter a stirring slogan, offer a compromise,
employ any quick means available to quell the mutiny, the sense of
evidence being what it is. It is only on shore where men plan for many
voyages, that they can afford to, and must for their own salvation,
deal with those causes that take a long time to remove. They will be
dealing in years and generations, not in emergencies alone. And
nothing will put a greater strain upon their wisdom than the necessity
of distinguishing false crises from real ones. For when there is panic
in the air, with one crisis tripping over the heels of another, actual
dangers mixed with imaginary scares, there is no chance at all for the
constructive use of reason, and any order soon seems preferable to any
disorder.

It is only on the premise of a certain stability over a long run of
time that men can hope to follow the method of reason. This is not
because mankind is inept, or because the appeal to reason is
visionary, but because the evolution of reason on political subjects
is only in its beginnings. Our rational ideas in politics are still
large, thin generalities, much too abstract and unrefined for
practical guidance, except where the aggregates are large enough to
cancel out individual peculiarity and exhibit large uniformities.
Reason in politics is especially immature in predicting the behavior
of individual men, because in human conduct the smallest initial
variation often works out into the most elaborate differences. That,
perhaps, is why when we try to insist solely upon an appeal to reason
in dealing with sudden situations, we are broken and drowned in
laughter.

4

For the rate at which reason, as we possess it, can advance itself is
slower than the rate at which action has to be taken. In the present
state of political science there is, therefore, a tendency for one
situation to change into another, before the first is clearly understood,
and so to make much political criticism hindsight and little else. Both in
the discovery of what is unknown, and in the propagation of that which
has been proved, there is a time-differential,  which ought to, in a much
greater degree than it ever has, occupy the political philosopher. We
have begun, chiefly under the inspiration of Mr. Graham Wallas, to
examine the effect of an invisible environment upon our opinions.
We do not, as yet, understand, except a little by rule of thumb, the
element of time in politics, though it bears most directly upon the
practicability of any constructive proposal. [Footnote: _Cf_. H. G.
Wells in the opening chapters of _Mankind in the Making._] We
can see, for example, that somehow the relevancy of any plan depends
upon the length of time the operation requires. Because on the length
of time it will depend whether the data which the plan assumes as
given, will in truth remain the same. [Footnote: The better the
current analysis in the intelligence work of any institution, the less
likely, of course, that men will deal with tomorrow's problems in the
light of yesterday's facts.] There is a factor here which realistic
and experienced men do take into account, and it helps to mark
them off somehow from the opportunist, the visionary, the philistine
and the pedant. [Footnote: Not all, but some of the differences
between reactionaries, conservatives, liberals, and radicals are
due, I think, to a different intuitive estimate of the rate of change
in social affairs.] But just how the calculation of time enters into
politics we do not know at present in any systematic way.

Until we understand these matters more clearly, we can at least
remember that there is a problem of the utmost theoretical difficulty
and practical consequence. It will help us to cherish Plato's ideal,
without sharing his hasty conclusion about the perversity of those who
do not listen to reason. It is hard to obey reason in politics,
because you are trying to make two processes march together, which
have as yet a different gait and a different pace. Until reason is
subtle and particular, the immediate struggle of politics will
continue to require an amount of native wit, force, and unprovable
faith, that reason can neither provide nor control, because the facts
of life are too undifferentiated for its powers of understanding. The
methods of social science are so little perfected that in many of the
serious decisions and most of the casual ones, there is as yet no
choice but to gamble with fate as intuition prompts.

But we can make a belief in reason one of those intuitions. We can use
our wit and our force to make footholds for reason. Behind our
pictures of the world, we can try to see the vista of a longer
duration of events, and wherever it is possible to escape from the
urgent present, allow this longer time to control our decisions. And
yet, even when there is this will to let the future count, we find
again and again that we do not know for certain how to act according
to the dictates of reason. The number of human problems on which
reason is prepared to dictate is small.

5

There is, however, a noble counterfeit in that charity which comes
from self-knowledge and an unarguable belief that no one of our
gregarious species is alone in his longing for a friendlier world. So
many of the grimaces men make at each other go with a flutter of their
pulse, that they are not all of them important. And where so much is
uncertain, where so many actions have to be carried out on guesses,
the demand upon the reserves of mere decency is enormous, and it is
necessary to live as if good will would work. We cannot prove in every
instance that it will, nor why hatred, intolerance, suspicion,
bigotry, secrecy, fear, and lying are the seven deadly sins against
public opinion. We can only insist that they have no place in the
appeal to reason, that in the longer run they are a poison; and taking
our stand upon a view of the world which outlasts our own
predicaments, and our own lives, we can cherish a hearty prejudice
against them.

We can do this all the better if we do not allow frightfulness and
fanaticism to impress us so deeply that we throw up our hands
peevishly, and lose interest in the longer run of time because we have
lost faith in the future of man. There is no ground for this despair,
because all the _ifs_ on which, as James said, our destiny hangs,
are as pregnant as they ever were. What we have seen of brutality, we
have seen, and because it was strange, it was not conclusive. It was
only Berlin, Moscow, Versailles in 1914 to 1919, not Armageddon, as we
rhetorically said. The more realistically men have faced out the
brutality and the hysteria, the more they have earned the right to say
that it is not foolish for men to believe, because another great war
took place, that intelligence, courage and effort cannot ever contrive
a good life for all men.

Great as was the horror, it was not universal. There were corrupt, and
there were incorruptible. There was muddle and there were miracles.
There was huge lying. There were men with the will to uncover it. It
is no judgment, but only a mood, when men deny that what some men have
been, more men, and ultimately enough men, might be. You can despair
of what has never been. You can despair of ever having three heads,
though Mr. Shaw has declined to despair even of that. But you cannot
despair of the possibilities that could exist by virtue of any human
quality which a human being has exhibited. And if amidst all the evils
of this decade, you have not seen men and women, known moments that
you would like to multiply, the Lord himself cannot help you.





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