Title: The Public Orations of Demosthenes, volume 2
Author: Demosthenes
Language: English
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  THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
  IN TWO VOLUMES
  VOL II

  TRANSLATED BY
  ARTHUR WALLACE PICKARD



ON THE CHERSONESE (OR. VIII)


[_Introduction_. Late in the year 343 (some time after the acquittal of
Aeschines) Philip invaded Epirus, made Alexander, brother of his wife
Olympias, king of the Molossi instead of Arybbas, and so secured, his
own influence in that region. Arybbas was honourably received at
Athens. Philip next threatened Ambracia and Leucas, which were colonies
of Corinth, and promised to restore Naupactus, which was in the hands
of the Achaeans, to the Aetolians. But Athens sent Demosthenes,
Hegesippus, Polyeuctus and others to rouse the Corinthians to
resistance, and also dispatched a force of citizens to Acarnania to
help in the defence against Philip. Philip thereupon returned, captured
Echinus and Nicaea on the Malian Gulf, and established a tetrarch in
each division of Thessaly (343 B.C., or early in 342). In 342
Philistides was established, by Philip's influence, as tyrant at Oreus
in Euboea (as Cleitarchus had been at Eretria in the preceding year),
and the democratic leader Euphraeus committed suicide in prison.[1] The
town of Chalcis, however, under Callias and Taurosthenes, remained
friendly to Athens, and made a treaty of alliance with her.

About the same time a controversy, begun in the previous year, in
regard to Halonnesus, was renewed. This island had belonged to Athens,
but had been occupied by pirates. At some time not recorded (but
probably since the Peace of 346) Philip had expelled the pirates and
taken possession of the island. He now sent a letter, offering to give
Halonnesus to Athens, but not to _give it back_ (since this would
concede their right to it); or else to submit the dispute to
arbitration. He also offered to discuss a treaty for the settlement of
private disputes between Athenians and Macedonians, and to concert
measures with Athens for clearing the Aegean of pirates. He was willing
to extend the advantages of the Peace to other Greek States, but not to
agree that he and Athens should respectively possess 'what was their
own', instead of 'what they held'; though he was ready to submit to
arbitration in regard to Cardia and other disputed places. He again
denied having made the promises attributed to him, and asked for the
punishment of those who slandered him. Hegesippus replied in an extant
speech ('On Halonnesus'), while Demosthenes insisted that no impartial
arbitrator could possibly be found. Philip's terms in regard to
Halonnesus were refused, but the Athenian claim to the island was not
withdrawn.

Philip spent the greater part of 342 and 341 in Thrace, mainly in the
valley of the Hebrus, where he endured very great hardships through the
winter, and founded colonies of Macedonian soldiers, the chief of these
being Philippopolis and Cabyle. He also entered into relations with the
Getae, beyond the Haemus, and garrisoned Apollonia on the Euxine. These
operations were all preparatory to his projected attack upon Byzantium.
(Byzantium and Athens were at this time on unfriendly terms, owing to
the part taken by the latter in the Social War.)

But the immediate subject of the present Speech was the state of
affairs in the Chersonese in 342. The Chersonese (with the exception of
Cardia) had been secured for Athens in 357, but had been threatened by
Philip in 352,[2] when he made alliance with Cardia, and forced the
neighbouring Thracian Prince Cersobleptes to submit. Soon after the
Peace of Philocrates, Athens sent settlers to the Chersonese under
Diopeithes. Cardia alone refused to receive them, and Diopeithes, with
a mercenary force, prepared to compel the Cardians to admit them; while
Philip sent troops to hold the town, and complained to Athens in
threatening terms of the actions of Diopeithes, and more particularly
of an inroad which Diopeithes had made upon Philip's territory in
Thrace. Diopeithes had been ill-supported with money and men by Athens,
and had had recourse to piratical actions, in order to obtain supplies,
thus arousing some indignation at Athens; but the prospect of the heavy
expenditure which would be necessary, if an expedition were sent to his
aid, was also unattractive. Demosthenes, however, proposed that
Diopeithes should be vigorously supported, on the ground that Philip
was really at war with Athens, and that this was not the time to
interfere with the general who alone was pushing the Athenian cause.
The speech was delivered early in the spring of 341. It is a
masterpiece of oratory, at once statesmanlike and impassioned, and
shows a complete command of every variety of tone. The latter part of
it contains a strong denunciation of the Macedonian party in Athens, a
defence of the orator's own career, and an urgent demand for the
punishment of disloyalty. At the same time Demosthenes does not embody
the policy which he advises in any formal motion. For this we have to
wait for the Third Philippic.]


{1} It was the duty, men of Athens, of every speaker not to allow
either malice or favour to influence any speech which he might make,
but simply to declare the policy which he considered to be the best,
particularly when your deliberations were concerned with public affairs
of great importance. But since there are some who are led on to address
you, partly out of contentiousness, partly from causes which I need not
discuss, it is for you, men of Athens--you, the People--to dismiss all
other considerations, and both in the votes that you give and in the
measures that you take to attend solely to what you believe to be for
the good of the city. {2} Now our present anxiety arises out of affairs
in the Chersonese, and the campaign, now in its eleventh month, which
Philip is conducting in Thrace. But most of the speeches which we have
heard have been about the acts and intentions of Diopeithes. For my
part, I conceive that all charges made against any one who is amenable
to the laws and can be punished by you when you will are matters which
you are free to investigate, either immediately or after an interval,
as you think fit; and there is no occasion for me or any one else to
use strong language about them. {3} But all those advantages which an
actual enemy of the city, with a large force in the Hellespont, is
trying to snatch from you, and which, if we once fall behind-hand, we
shall no longer be able to recover--these, surely, are matters upon
which our interest demands that our plans be formed and our
preparations made with the utmost dispatch; and that no clamour, no
accusations about other matters, be allowed to drive us from this point.

{4} Often as I am surprised at the assertions which are habitually made
in your presence, nothing, men of Athens, has surprised me more than
the remark which I heard only lately in the Council--that one who
advises you ought, forsooth, to advise you plainly either to go to war
or to keep the peace. {5} Very good.[3] If Philip is remaining
inactive, if he is keeping nothing that is ours, in violation of the
Peace, if he is not organizing all mankind against us, there is nothing
more to be said--we have simply to observe the Peace; and I see that,
for your part, you are quite ready to do so. But what if the oath that
we swore, and the terms upon which we made the Peace, stand inscribed
for our eyes to see? {6} What if it is proved that from the outset,
before Diopeithes sailed from Athens with the settlers who are now
accused of having brought about the war, Philip wrongfully seized many
of our possessions--and here, unrepealed, are your resolutions charging
him with this--and that all along he has been uninterruptedly seizing
the possessions of the other Hellenic and foreign peoples, and uniting
their resources against us? What is _then_ the meaning of the statement
that we ought either to go to war or to keep the Peace? {7} For we have
no choice in the matter: nothing remains open to us but the most
righteous and most necessary of all acts--the act that they
deliberately refuse to consider--I mean the act of retaliation against
the aggressor: unless indeed, they intend to argue that, so long as
Philip keeps away from Attica and the Peiraeus, he does the city no
wrong and is not committing acts of war. {8} But if _this_ is their
criterion of right and wrong, if _this_ is their definition of peace,
then, although what they say is iniquitous, intolerable, and
inconsistent with your security, as all must see, at the same time
these very statements are actually contradictory of the charges which
they are making against Diopeithes. {9} Why, I beg to ask,[n] are we to
give Philip full leave to act in whatever way he chooses, so long as he
does not touch Attica, when Diopeithes is not to be allowed even to
assist the Thracians, without being accused of initiating war? But even
if this inconsistency is brought home to them, still, we are told, the
conduct of the mercenaries in ravaging the Hellespontine country is
outrageous, and Diopeithes has no right to drive the vessels to
shore,[n] and ought to be stopped. {10} I grant it: let it be done: I
have nothing to say against it. Yet nevertheless, if their advice is
genuinely based on considerations of right, and right alone, I consider
that they are bound to prove that, as surely as they are seeking to
break up the force on which _Athens_ at present relies, by slandering
its commander to you when he tries to provide funds to support it, so
surely _Philip's_ force will be disbanded if you accept their advice.
If they fail to prove this, you must consider that they are simply
setting the city once more upon the same course which has already
resulted in the utter ruin of her fortunes. {11} For surely you know
that nothing in the world has contributed so much to Philip's
successes, as his being always first on the scene of action. With a
standing force always about him, and knowing beforehand what he intends
to do, he suddenly falls upon whomsoever he pleases: while we wait
until we learn that something is happening, and only then, in a
turmoil, make our preparations. {12} It follows, of course, that every
position which he has attacked, he holds in undisturbed possession;
while we are all behindhand; all our expenditure proves to have been so
much useless waste; we have displayed our hostility and our desire to
check him; but we are too late for action, and so we add disgrace to
failure.

{13} You must therefore not fail to recognize, men of Athens, that now,
as before, all else that you hear consists of mere words and pretexts;
and that the real aim of all that is being done is to secure that you
may remain at home, that Athens may have no force outside the city, and
that thus Philip may give effect to all his desires without let or
hindrance. Consider, in the first place, what is actually occurring at
the present moment. {14}  He is at present passing the time[n] in
Thrace, with a great army under him; and, as we are told by those who
are on the spot,[n] he is sending for a large addition to it from
Macedonia and Thessaly. Now if he waits for the Etesian winds,[n] and
then goes to Byzantium and besieges it, tell me first whether you think
that the Byzantines will persist in their present infatuation,[n] and
will not call upon you and entreat you to go to their aid? {15} I do
not think so. Why, I believe that they would open their gates to men
whom they distrust even more than they distrust you (if such exist),
rather than surrender the city to Philip--supposing, that is, that he
does not capture them first. And then, if we are unable to set sail
from Athens, and if there are no forces there on the spot to help them,
nothing can prevent their destruction. {16} 'Of course,' you say, 'for
the men are possessed, and their infatuation passes all bounds.' Very
true; and yet they must be preserved; for the interests of Athens
require it. And besides, we cannot by any means be certain that he will
not invade the Chersonese. Indeed, if we are to judge by the letter
which he has sent to you, he there says that he _will_ punish the
settlers[n] in the Chersonese. {17} If then the army that is now formed
there is in existence, it will be able to help the Chersonese, and to
injure some part of Philip's country. But when once it is dissolved,
what shall we do if he marches against the Chersonese? 'We shall of
course put Diopeithes on his trial.' And how will that improve our
position? 'Well, we should go to the rescue from Athens ourselves.'
What if the winds make it impossible? {18} 'But, of course, he will not
really get there.' And who can guarantee that? Do you realize, men of
Athens, or take into account, what the coming season of the year is,
the season against which some think you ought to evacuate the
Hellespont and hand it over to Philip? What if, when he leaves Thrace,
he does not go near the Chersonese or Byzantium at all--for this, too,
is a possibility which you must consider--but comes to Chalcis[n] or
Megara, just as he lately came to Oreus? Is it better to resist him
here, and to allow the war to come into Attica, or to provide something
to keep him busy there? The latter course is surely the better.

{19} Realizing these things, therefore, as you all must, and taking due
account of them, you must not, Heaven knows, look askance at the force
which Diopeithes is trying to provide for Athens, or attempt to disband
it. You must yourselves prepare another force to support it: you must
help him freely with money, and give him in all other respects your
loyal co-operation. {20} If Philip were asked to say whether he would
wish these soldiers who are now with Diopeithes--describe them as you
will, for I in no way dispute your description--to be prosperous and in
high favour with the Athenians, and to be augmented in numbers by the
co-operation of the city; or whether he would rather see them broken up
and destroyed in consequence of calumnious charges against them; he
would prefer, I imagine, the latter alternative. Can it then be, that
there are men among us here who are trying to bring about the very
thing that Philip would pray Heaven for? And if so, do you need to seek
any further for the cause of the total ruin of the city's fortunes?

{21} I wish, therefore, to examine without reserve the present crisis
of our affairs, to inquire what we ourselves are now doing, and how we
are dealing with it. We do not wish to contribute funds, nor to serve
with the forces in person; we cannot keep our hands from the public
revenues;[n] we do not give the contributions of the allies[n] to
Diopeithes, nor do we approve of such supplies as he raises for
himself; {22} but we look malignantly at him, we ask whence he gets
them, what he intends to do, and every possible question of that kind:
and yet we are still not willing to confine ourselves to our own
affairs, in consequence of the attitude which we have adopted; we still
praise with our lips those who uphold the dignity of the city, though
in our acts we are fighting on the side of their opponents. {23} Now
whenever any one rises to speak, you always put to him the question
'What are we to do?' I wish to put to _you_ the question, 'What are we
to _say_?' For if you will neither contribute, nor serve in person, nor
leave the public funds alone, nor grant him the contributions, nor let
him get what he can for himself, nor yet confine yourselves to your own
affairs, I do not know what I can say. For when you give such licence
to those who desire to make charges and accusations, that you listen to
them even when they denounce him by anticipation for his alleged
intentions--well, what _can_ one say?

{24} The possible effect of this is a matter which some of you require
to understand, and I will speak without reserve; for indeed I could not
speak otherwise. All the commanders who have ever yet sailed from
Athens--if I am wrong, I consent to any penalty that you
please[n]--take money from the Chians, from the Erythraeans,[n] from
any people from whom they can severally get it--I mean, any of the
Asiatic settlers who are now in question. {25} Those who have one or
two ships take less, those who have a larger force take more. And those
who give to them do not give either little or much for nothing; they
are not so insane: in fact, with these sums they buy immunity from
injury for the merchants who sail from their ports, freedom from
piracy, the convoying of their vessels, and so on. They call the gifts
'benevolences',[n] and that is the name given to the sums thus
obtained. {26} And in the present case, when Diopeithes is there with
his army, it is obvious that all these peoples will give him money.
From what other source do you imagine that a general can maintain his
troops, when he has received nothing from you, and has no resources
from which he can pay his men? Will money drop from the sky? Of course
not. He subsists upon what he can collect or beg or borrow. {27} The
real effect, therefore, of the accusations made against him here, is
simply to warn every one that they should refuse to give him anything,
since he is to pay the penalty for his very intentions, not to speak of
any action that he may have taken or any success that he may have
achieved. That is the only meaning of the cry that 'he is preparing a
blockade', or 'he is surrendering[n] the Hellenes'. Do any of his
critics care about the Hellenes who live in Asia? {28} Were it so, they
would be more thoughtful for the rest of mankind than for their own
country. And the proposal to send another general to the Hellespont
amounts to no more than this. For if Diopeithes is acting outrageously
and is driving the vessels to shore, then, gentlemen, one little
wax-tablet[n] is enough to put an end to it all: and what the laws
command is that for these offences we should impeach the
wrong-doers--not that we should keep a watch upon our own forces at
such expense and with so many ships.[n] {29} Such insanity really
passes all bounds. No! Against the enemy whom we cannot arrest and
render amenable to the laws, it is both right and necessary to maintain
a force, to send war-ships, and to contribute war-funds: but against
one of ourselves, a decree, an impeachment, a dispatch-boat[n] will
answer our purpose. These are the means which sensible men would use:
the policy of the other side is the policy of men whose spitefulness[n]
is ruining your fortunes. {30} And that there should be some such men,
bad though it is, is not the worst. No! for you who sit there are
already in such a frame of mind, that if any one comes forward and says
that Diopeithes is the cause of all the mischief, or Chares,[n] or
Aristophon,[n] or any Athenian citizen that he happens to name, you at
once agree, and clamorously declare that he is right; {31} but if any
one comes forward and tells you the truth, and says, 'Men of Athens,
this is nonsense. It is Philip that is the cause of all this mischief
and trouble; for if he were quiet, the city would have nothing to
disturb her,' you cannot, indeed, deny the truth of his words, but you
seem, I think, to be annoyed, as though you were losing something.[n]
{32} And the cause of these things is this--and I beseech you, in
Heaven's name, to let me speak unreservedly, when I am speaking for
your true good--that some of your politicians have contrived that you
should be terrifying and severe in your assemblies, but easy-going and
contemptible in your preparations for war. And accordingly, if any one
names as the culprit some one whom you know you can arrest in your own
midst, you agree and you wish to act; but if one is named whom you must
first master by force of arms, if you are to punish him at all, you are
at a loss, I fancy, what to do, and you are vexed when this is brought
home to you. {33} For your politicians, men of Athens, should have
treated you in exactly the opposite way to this; they should train you
to be kind and sympathetic in your assemblies; for there it is with the
members of your own body and your own allies that your case is argued:
but your terrors and your severity should be displayed in your
preparations for war, where the struggle is with your enemies and your
rivals. {34} As it is, by their popular speeches, and by courting your
favour to excess, they have brought you into such a condition that,
while in your assemblies you give yourselves airs and enjoy their
flattery, listening to nothing but what is meant to please you, in the
world of facts and events you are in the last extremity of peril.
Imagine, in God's name, what would happen, if the Hellenes were to call
you to account for the opportunities which, in your indolence, you have
now let pass, and were to put to you the question, {35} 'Is it true,
men of Athens, that you send envoys to us on every possible occasion,
to tell us of Philip's designs against ourselves and all the Hellenes,
and of the duty of keeping guard against the man, and to warn us in
every way?' We should have to confess that it was true. We do act thus.
'Then,' they would proceed, 'is it true, you most contemptible of all
men, that though the man has been away for ten months, {36} and has
been cut off from every possibility of returning home, by illness and
by winter and by wars, you have neither liberated Euboea nor recovered
any of your own possessions? Is it true that you have remained at home,
unoccupied and healthy--if such a word can be used of men who behave
thus--and have seen him set up two tyrants in Euboea, one to serve as a
fortress directly menacing Attica, the other to watch Sciathus; {37}
and that you have not even rid yourselves of these dangers--granted
that you did not want to do anything more--but have let them be?
Obviously you have retired in his favour, and have made it evident that
if he dies ten times over, you will not make any move the more. Why
trouble us then with your embassies and your accusations?' If they
speak thus to us, what will be our answer? What shall we say,
Athenians? I do not see what we can say.

{38} Now there are some who imagine that they confute a speaker, as
soon as they have asked him the question, 'What then are we to do?' I
will first give them this answer--the most just and true of all--'Do
not do what you are doing now.' {39} But at the same time I will give
them a minute and detailed reply; and then let them show that their
willingness to act upon it is not less than their eagerness to
interrogate. First, men of Athens, you must thoroughly make up your
minds to the fact that Philip is at war with Athens, and has broken the
Peace--you must cease to lay the blame at one another's doors--and that
he is evilly-disposed and hostile to the whole city, down to the very
ground on which it is built; {40} nay, I will go further--hostile to
every single man in the city, even to those who are most sure that they
are winning his favour. (If you think otherwise, consider the case of
Euthycrates[n] and Lasthenes of Olynthus, who fancied that they were on
the most friendly terms with him, but, after they had betrayed their
city, suffered the most utter ruin of all.) But his hostilities and
intrigues are aimed at nothing so much as at our constitution, whose
overthrow is the very first object in the world to him. {41} And in a
sense it is natural that he should aim at this. For he knows very well
that even if he becomes master of all the rest of the world, he can
retain nothing securely, so long as you are a democracy; and that if he
chances to stumble anywhere, as may often happen to a man, all the
elements which are now forced into union with him will come and take
refuge with you. {42} For though you are not yourselves naturally
adapted for aggrandizement or the usurpation of empire, you have the
art of preventing any other from seizing power and of taking it from
him when he has it; and in every respect you are ready to give trouble
to those who are ambitious of dominion, and to lead all men forth into
liberty. And so he would not have Freedom, from her home in Athens,
watching for every opportunity he may offer--far from it--and there is
nothing unsound or careless in his reasoning. {43} The first essential
point, therefore, is this--that you conceive him to be the
irreconcilable foe of your constitution and of democracy: for unless
you are inwardly convinced of this, you will not be willing to take an
active interest in the situation. Secondly, you must realize clearly
that all the plans which he is now so busily contriving are in the
nature of preparations against this country; and wherever any one
resists him, he there resists him on our behalf. {44} For surely no one
is so simple as to imagine that when Philip is covetous of the wretched
hamlets[n] of Thrace--one can give no other name to Drongilum, Cabyle,
Masteira, and the places which he is now seizing--and when to get these
places he is enduring heavy labours, hard winters, and the extremity of
danger;--{45} no one can imagine, I say, that the harbours and the
dockyards, and the ships of the Athenians, the produce of your
silver-mines, and your huge revenue, have no attraction for him, or
that he will leave you in possession of these, while he winters in the
very pit of destruction[n] for the sake of the millet and the spelt in
the silos[n] of Thrace. No, indeed! It is to get these into his power
that he pursues both his operations in Thrace and all his other
designs. {46} What then, as sensible men, must you do? Knowing and
realizing your position, as you do, you must lay aside this excessive,
this irremediable[n] indolence: you must contribute funds, and require
them from your allies; you must so provide and act, that this force
which is now assembled may be held together; in order that, as Philip
has the force in readiness that is to injure and enslave all the
Hellenes, you may have in readiness that which shall preserve and
succour them. {47} You cannot effect by isolated expeditions any of the
things which must be effected. You must organize a force, and provide
maintenance for it, and paymasters, and a staff of servants; and when
you have taken such steps as will ensure the strictest possible watch
being kept over the funds, you must hold these officials accountable
for the money, and the general for the actual operations. If you act
thus, and honestly make up your minds to take this course, you will
either compel Philip to observe a righteous peace and remain in his own
land--and no greater blessing could you obtain than that--or you will
fight him on equal terms.

{48} It may be thought that this policy demands heavy expenditure, and
great exertions and trouble. That is true indeed; but let the objector
take into account what the consequences to the city must be, if he is
unwilling to assent to this policy, and he will find that the ready
performance of duty brings its reward. {49} If indeed some god is
offering us his guarantee--for no human guarantee would be sufficient
in so great a matter--that if you remain at peace and let everything
slide, Philip will not in the end come and attack yourselves; then,
although, before God and every Heavenly Power, it would be unworthy of
you and of the position that the city holds, and of the deeds of our
forefathers, to abandon all the rest of the Hellenes to slavery for the
sake of our own ease--although, for my part, I would rather have died
than have suggested such a thing--yet, if another proposes it and
convinces you, let it be so: do not defend yourselves: let everything
go. {50} But if no one entertains such a belief, if we all know that
the very opposite is true, and that the wider the mastery we allow him
to gain, the more difficult and powerful a foe we shall have to deal
with, what further subterfuge is open to us? Why do we delay? {51} When
shall we ever be willing, men of Athens, to do our duty? 'When we are
compelled,' you say. But the hour of compulsion, as the word is applied
to free men, is not only here already, but has long passed; and we must
surely pray that the compulsion which is put upon slaves may not come
upon us. And what is the difference? It is this--that for a free man
the greatest compelling force is his shame at the course which events
are taking--I do not know what greater we can imagine; but the slave is
compelled by blows and bodily tortures, which I pray may never fall to
our lot; it is not fit to speak of them.

{52} I would gladly tell you the whole story, and show how certain
persons are working for your ruin by their policy. I pass over,
however, every point but this. Whenever any question of our relations
with Philip arises, at once some one stands up and talks of the
blessings of peace, of the difficulty of maintaining a large force, and
of designs on the part of certain persons to plunder our funds; with
other tales of the same kind, which enable them to delay your action,
and give Philip time to do what he wishes unopposed. {53} What is the
result? For you the result is your leisure, and a respite from
immediate action--advantages which I fear you will some day feel to
have cost you dear; and for them it is the favour they win, and the
wages for these services. But I am sure that there is no need to
persuade you to keep the Peace--you sit here fully persuaded. It is the
man who is committing acts of war that we need to persuade; for if he
is persuaded, you are ready enough. {54} Nor is it the expenditure
which is to ensure our preservation that ought to distress us, but the
fate which is in prospect for us, if we are not willing to take this
action: while the threatened 'plunder of our funds' is to be prevented
by the proposal of some safeguard which will render them secure, not by
the abandonment of our interests. {55} And even so, men of Athens, I
feel indignant at the very fact that some of you are so much pained at
the prospect of the plunder of our funds, when you have it in your
power both to protect them and to punish the culprits, and yet feel no
pain when Philip is seizing all Hellas piecemeal for his plunder, and
seizing it to strengthen himself against you. {56} What then is the
reason, men of Athens, that though Philip's campaigns, his aggressions,
his seizure of cities, are so unconcealed, none of my opponents has
ever said that _he_ was bringing about war? Why is it those who advise
you not to allow it, not to make these sacrifices, that they accuse,
and say that _they_ will be the cause of the war? I will inform you.
{57} It is because[n] they wish to divert the anger which you are
likely to show, if you suffer at all from the war, on to the heads of
those who are giving you the best advice in your own interests. They
want you to sit and try such persons, instead of resisting Philip; and
they themselves are to be the prosecutors, instead of paying the
penalty for their present actions. That is the meaning of their
assertion that there are some here, forsooth, who want to bring about
war. {58} That is the real point of these allegations of
responsibility. But this I know beyond all doubt--that without waiting
for any one in Athens to propose the declaration of war, Philip has not
only taken many other possessions of ours, but has just now sent an
expedition to Cardia. If, in spite of this, we wish to pretend that he
is not making war on us, he would be the most senseless man living,
were he to attempt to convince us of our error. {59} But what shall we
say, when his attack is made directly upon ourselves? He of course will
say that he is not at war with us--just as he was not at war with
Oreus,[n] when his soldiers were in the land; nor with the
Pheraeans,[n] before that, when he was assaulting their walls; nor with
the Olynthians, first of all, until he and his army were actually
within their territory. Or shall we still say that those who urge
resistance are bringing about war? If so, all that is left to us is
slavery. If we may neither offer resistance, nor yet be suffered to
remain at peace, no other compromise[n] is possible. {60} And further,
the issues at stake are not for you merely what they are for other
states. What Philip desires is not your subjection, but your utter
annihilation. For he knows full well that you will never consent to be
his slaves, and that even if you were willing, you would not know the
way, accustomed as you are to govern; and he knows that you will be
able to give him more trouble, if you get the opportunity, than all the
rest of the world. {61} The struggle, then, is a struggle for
existence; and as such you ought to think of it: and you should show
your abhorrence of those who have sold themselves to Philip by beating
them to death. For it is impossible, utterly impossible, to master your
enemies outside the city, before you punish your enemies in the city
itself. {62} Whence comes it, think you, that he is insulting us now
(for his conduct seems to me to be nothing less than this), and that
while he at least deceives all other peoples by doing them favours, he
is using threats against you without more ado? For instance, he enticed
the Thessalians by large gifts into their present servitude; and words
cannot describe how greatly he deceived the Olynthians at first by the
gift of Poteidaea and much beside. {63} At this moment he is alluring
the Thebans, by delivering up Boeotia to them, and ridding them of a
long and arduous campaign. Each of these peoples has first reaped some
advantage, before falling into those calamities which some of them have
already suffered, as all the world knows, and some are destined to
suffer whenever their time comes. But as for yourselves, to pass over
all that you have been robbed of at an earlier period,[n] what
deception, what robbery have been practised upon you in the very act of
making the Peace! {64} Have not the Phocians, and Thermopylae, and the
Thracian seaboard--Doriscus, Serrhium, Cersobleptes himself--been taken
from you? Does not Philip at this moment occupy the city of the
Cardians, and avow it openly? Why is it then, that he behaves as he
does to all others, and so differently to you? Because yours is the one
city in the world where men are permitted to speak on behalf of the
enemy without fear; because here a man may take bribes, and still
address you with impunity, even when you have been robbed of your own.
In Olynthus it was only safe to take Philip's side when the people of
Olynthus as a whole had shared Philip's favours, and was enjoying the
possession of Poteidaea. {65} In Thessaly it was only safe to take
Philip's side when the Thessalian commons had shared Philip's favours;
for he had expelled the tyrants for them, and restored to them their
Amphictyonic position. In Thebes it was not safe, until he had restored
Boeotia to Thebes and annihilated the Phocians. {66} But at
Athens--though Philip has not only robbed you of Amphipolis and the
territory of the Cardians, but has turned Euboea into a fortress
overlooking your country, and is now on his way to attack Byzantium--at
Athens it _is_ safe to speak in Philip's interest. Aye, and you know
that, of such speakers, some who were poor are rapidly growing rich;
and some who were without name or fame are becoming famous and
distinguished, while you, on the other hand, are becoming inglorious
instead of famous, bankrupt instead of wealthy. For a city's wealth
consists, I imagine, in allies, confidence, loyalty--and of all these
you are bankrupt. {67} And because you are indifferent to these
advantages, and let them drift away from you, he has become prosperous
and powerful, and formidable to all, Hellenes and foreigners alike;
while you are deserted and humbled, with a splendid profusion of
commodities in your market, and a contemptible lack of all those things
with which you should have been provided. But I observe that certain
speakers do not follow the same principles in the advice which they
give you, as they follow for themselves. _You_, they tell you, ought to
remain quiet, even when you are wronged; but _they_ cannot remain quiet
in your presence, even when no one is wronging them.

{68} But now some one or other comes forward and says, 'Ah, but you
will not move a motion or take any risk. You are a poor-spirited
coward.' Bold, offensive, shameless, I am not, and I trust I may never
be; and yet I think I have more courage than very many of your dashing
statesmen. {69} For one, men of Athens, who overlooks all that the
city's interest demands--who prosecutes, confiscates, gives,
accuses--does so not from any bravery, but because in the popular
character of his speeches and public actions he has a guarantee of his
personal safety, and therefore is bold without risk. But one who in
acting for the best sets himself in many ways against your wishes--who
never speaks to please, but always to advise what is best; one who
chooses a policy in which more issues must be decided by chance than by
calculation, and yet makes himself responsible to you for both--that is
the courageous man, {70} and such is the citizen who is of value to his
country, rather than those who, to gain an ephemeral popularity, have
ruined the supreme interests of the city. So far am I from envying
these men, or thinking them worthy citizens of their country, that if
any one were to ask me to say, what good _I_ had really done to the
city, although, men of Athens, I could tell how often I had been
trierarch and choregus,[n] how I had contributed funds, ransomed
prisoners, and done other like acts of generosity, I would mention none
of these things; {71} I would say only that my policy is not one of
measures like theirs--that although, like others, I could make
accusations and shower favours and confiscate property and do all that
my opponents do, I have never to this day set myself to do any of these
things; I have been influenced neither by gain nor by ambition; but I
continue to give the advice which sets me below many others in your
estimation, but which must make you greater, if you will listen to it;
for so much, perhaps, I may say without offence. {72} Nor, I think,
should I be acting fairly as a citizen, if I devised such political
measures as would at once make me the first man in Athens, and you the
last of all peoples. As the measures of a loyal politician develop, the
greatness of his country should develop with them; and it is the thing
which is best, not the thing which is easiest, that every speaker
should advocate. Nature will find the way to the easiest course
unaided. To the best, the words and the guidance of the loyal citizen
must show the way.

{73} I have heard it remarked before now, that though what I _say_ is
always what is best, still I never contribute anything but words;
whereas the city needs work of some practical kind. I will tell you
without any concealment my own sentiments on this matter. There _is_ no
work that can be demanded of any of your public advisers, except that
he should advise what is best; and I think I can easily show you that
this is so. {74} No doubt you know how the great Timotheus[n] delivered
a speech to the effect that you ought to go to the rescue and save the
Euboeans, when the Thebans were trying to reduce them to servitude; and
how, in the course of his speech, he spoke somewhat in this
strain:--'What?' said he, 'when you actually have the Thebans in the
island, do you debate what you are to do with them, and how you are to
act? Will you not cover the sea with warships, men of Athens? Will you
not rise from your seats and go instantly to the Peiraeus and launch
your vessels?' {75} So Timotheus spoke, and you acted as he bade you;
and through his speech and your action the work was done. But if he had
given you the best possible advice (as in fact he did), and you had
lapsed into indolence and paid no attention to it, would the city have
achieved any of the results which followed on that occasion?
Impossible! And so it is with all that I say to-day, and with all that
this or that speaker may say. For the actions you must look to
yourselves; from the speaker you must require that he give you the best
counsel that he can.[n]

{76} I desire now to sum up my advice and to leave the platform. I say
that we must contribute funds, and must keep together the force now in
existence, correcting anything that may seem amiss in it, but not
disbanding the whole force because of the possible criticisms against
it. We must send envoys everywhere to instruct, to warn, and to act.
Above all, we must punish those who take bribes in connexion with
public affairs, and must everywhere display our abhorrence of them; in
order that reasonable men, who offer their honest services, may find
their policy justified in their own eyes and in those of others. {77}
If you treat the situation thus, and cease to ignore it altogether,
there is a chance--a chance I say, even now--that it may improve. If,
however, you sit idle, with an interest that stops short at applause
and acclamation, and retires into the background when any action is
required, I can imagine no oratory, which, without action on your part,
will be able to save your country.


FOOTNOTES

[1] See Third Philippic §§ 59 sqq.

[2] See Introduction to First Philippic.

[3] [Greek: est_o d_e.]



THE THIRD PHILIPPIC (Or. IX)

[_Introduction_. The Third Philippic seems to have been delivered in
the late spring or early summer of 341 B. C., about two months after
the Speech on the Chersonese, which apparently had little positive
result, though it probably prevented the recall and prosecution of
Diopeithes. The immediate occasion of the Third Philippic was a request
from the forces in the Chersonese for supplies. The general situation
is the same as at the date of the last speech, but the danger to
Byzantium is more pressing. Demosthenes now takes the broad ground of
Panhellenic policy, and formally proposes to send envoys throughout
Greece, to unite all the Greek states against Philip, as well as to
send immediate reinforcements and supplies to the Chersonese.

Many critics, ancient and modern, have regarded this as the greatest of
all Demosthenes' political orations. The lessons of history (from the
speaker's point of view) are repeated and enforced by the citation of
instance after instance. The tone of the speech, while less varied than
that of the last, is grave and intense. The passage (§§ 36 ff.) in
which the orator contrasts the spirit of Athenian political life in the
past with that of his own day is one of the most impressive in all his
works, and the nobility of his appeal to the traditional ideals of
Athenian policy has been universally recognized even by his most severe
critics.

The speech is found in the MSS. in two forms, of which the shorter
omits a number of passages[1] which the longer includes, though there
are signs of an imperfect blending of the two versions in certain
places. It seems probable that both versions are due to Demosthenes,
and the speech may have been more than once revised by him before
publication or republication. In which form it was delivered there is
not sufficient evidence to show.]


{1} Many speeches are made, men of Athens, at almost every meeting of
the Assembly, with reference to the aggressions which Philip has been
committing, ever since he concluded the Peace, not only against
yourselves but against all other peoples; and I am sure that all would
agree, however little they may act on their belief, that our aim, both
in speech and in action, should be to cause him to cease from his
insolence and to pay the penalty for it. And yet I see that in fact the
treacherous sacrifice of our interests has gone on, until what seems an
ill-omened saying may, I fear, be really true--that if all who came
forward desired to propose, and you desired to carry, the measures
which would make your position as pitiful as it could possibly be, it
could not (so I believe), be made worse than it is now. {2} It may be
that there are many reasons for this, and that our affairs did not
reach their present condition from any one or two causes. But if you
examine the matter aright, you will find that the chief responsibility
rests with those whose aim is to win your favour, not to propose what
is best. Some of them, men of Athens, so long as they can maintain the
conditions which bring them reputation and influence, take no thought
for the future [and therefore think that you also should take none];
while others, by accusing and slandering those who are actively at
work,[n] are simply trying to make the city spend its energies in
punishing the members of its own body, and so leave Philip free to say
and do what he likes. {3} Such political methods as these, familiar to
you as they are, are the real causes of the evil. And I beg you, men of
Athens, if I tell you certain truths outspokenly, to let no resentment
on your part fall upon me on this account. Consider the matter in this
light. In every other sphere of life, you believe that the right of
free speech ought to be so universally shared by all who are in the
city, that you have extended it both to foreigners and to slaves; and
one may see many a servant in Athens speaking his mind with greater
liberty than is granted to citizens in some other states: but from the
sphere of political counsel you have utterly banished this liberty. {4}
The result[n] is that in your meetings you give yourselves airs and
enjoy their flattery, listening to nothing but what is meant to please
you, while in the world of facts and events, you are in the last
extremity of peril. If then you are still in this mood to-day, I do not
know what I can say; but if you are willing to listen while I tell you,
without flattery, what your interest requires, I am prepared to speak.
For though our position is very bad indeed, and much has been
sacrificed, it is still possible, even now, if you will do your duty,
to set all right once more. {5} It is a strange thing, perhaps, that I
am about to say, but it is true. The worst feature in the past is that
in which lies our best hope for the future. And what is this? It is
that you are in your present plight because you do not do any part of
your duty, small or great; for of course, if you were doing all that
you should do, and were still in this evil case, you could not even
hope for any improvement. As it is, Philip has conquered your indolence
and your indifference; but he has not conquered Athens. You have not
been vanquished--you have never even stirred. {6} [Now if it was
admitted by us all that Philip was at war with Athens, and was
transgressing the Peace, a speaker would have to do nothing but to
advise you as to the safest and easiest method of resistance to him.
But since there are some who are in so extraordinary a frame of mind
that, though he is capturing cities, though many of your possessions
are in his hands, and though he is committing aggressions against all
men, they still tolerate certain speakers, who constantly assert at
your meetings that it is some of _us_ who are provoking the war, it is
necessary to be on our guard and come to a right understanding on the
matter. {7} For there is a danger lest any one who proposes or advises
resistance should find himself accused of having brought about the war.]

[Well, I say this first of all, and lay it down as a principle, that if
it is open to us to deliberate whether we should remain at peace or
should go to war ...]

{8} Now if it is possible for the city to remain at peace--if the
decision rests with us (that I may make this my starting-point)--then,
I say that we ought to do so, and I call upon any one who says that it
is so to move his motion, and to act and not to defraud us.[n] But if
another with weapons in his hands and a large force about him holds out
to you the _name_ of peace, while his own acts are acts of war, what
course remains open to us but that of resistance? though if you wish to
profess peace in the same manner as he, I have no quarrel with you. {9}
But if any man's conception of peace is that it is a state in which
Philip can master all that intervenes till at last he comes to attack
ourselves, such a conception, in the first place, is madness; and, in
the second place, this peace that he speaks of is a peace which you are
to observe towards Philip, while he does not observe it towards you:
and this it is--this power to carry on war against you, without being
met by any hostilities on your part--that Philip is purchasing with all
the money that he is spending.

{10} Indeed, if we intend to wait till the time comes when he admits
that he is at war with us, we are surely the most innocent persons in
the world. Why, even if he comes to Attica itself, to the very
Peiraeus, he will never make such an admission, if we are to judge by
his dealings with others. {11} For, to take one instance, he told the
Olynthians, when he was five miles from the city, that there were only
two alternatives--either they must cease to live in Olynthus, or he to
live in Macedonia: but during the whole time before that, whenever any
one accused him of any such sentiments, he was indignant and sent
envoys to answer the charge. Again, he marched into the Phocians'
country, as though visiting his allies:[n] it was by Phocian envoys
that he was escorted on the march; and most people in Athens contended
strongly that his crossing the Pass would bring no good to Thebes. {12}
Worse still, he has lately seized Pherae[n] and still holds it, though
he went to Thessaly as a friend and an ally. And, latest of all, he
told those unhappy citizens of Oreus[n] that he had sent his soldiers
to visit them and to make kind inquiries; he had heard that they were
sick, and suffering from faction, and it was right for an ally and a
true friend to be present at such a time. {13} Now if, instead of
giving them warning and using open force, he deliberately chose to
deceive these men, who could have done him no harm, though they might
have taken precautions against suffering any themselves, do you imagine
that he will make a formal declaration of war upon you before he
commences hostilities, and that, so long as you are content to be
deceived? {14} Impossible! For so long as you, though you are the
injured party, make no complaint against him, but accuse some of your
own body, he would be the most fatuous man on earth if _he_ were to
interrupt your strife and contentions with one another--to bid you turn
upon himself, and so to cut away the ground from the arguments by which
his hirelings put you off, when they tell you that _he_ is not at war
with Athens.

{15} In God's name, is there a man in his senses who would judge by
words, and not by facts, whether another was at peace or at war with
him? Of course there is not. Why, from the very first, when the Peace
had only just been made, before those who are now in the Chersonese had
been sent out, Philip was taking Serrhium[n] and Doriscus, and
expelling the soldiers who were in the castle of Serrhium and the
Sacred Mountain, where they had been placed by your general. {16} But
what was he doing, in acting thus? For he had sworn to a Peace.[n] And
let no one ask, 'What do these things amount to? What do they matter to
Athens?' For whether these acts were trifles which could have no
interest for you is another matter; but the principles of religion[n]
and justice, whether a man transgress them in small things or great,
have always the same force. What? When he is sending mercenaries into
the Chersonese, which the king and all the Hellenes have acknowledged
to be yours; when he openly avows that he is going to the rescue, and
states it in his letter, what is it that he is doing? {17} He tells
you, indeed, that he is not making war upon you. But so far am I from
admitting that one who acts in this manner is observing the Peace which
he made with you, that I hold that in grasping at Megara, in setting up
tyrants in Euboea, in advancing against Thrace at the present moment,
in pursuing his machinations in the Peloponnese, and in carrying out
his entire policy with the help of his army, he is violating the Peace
and is making war against you;--unless you mean to say that even to
bring up engines to besiege you is no breach of the Peace, until they
are actually planted against your walls. But you will not say this; for
the man who is taking the steps and contriving the means which will
lead to my capture is at war with me, even though he has not yet thrown
a missile or shot an arrow. {18} Now what are the things which would
imperil your safety, if anything should happen?[n] The alienation of
the Hellespont, the placing of Megara and Euboea in the power of the
enemy, and the attraction of Peloponnesian sympathy to his cause. Can I
then say that one who is erecting such engines of war as these against
the city is at peace with you? {19} Far from it! For from the very day
when he annihilated the Phocians--from that very day, I say, I date the
beginning of his hostilities against you. And for your part, I think
that you will be wise if you resist him at once; but that if you let
him be, you will find that, when you wish to resist, resistance itself
is impossible. Indeed, so widely do I differ, men of Athens, from all
your other advisers, that I do not think there is any room for
discussion to-day in regard to the Chersonese or Byzantium. {20} We
_must_ go to their defence, and take every care that they do not suffer
[and we must send all that they need to the soldiers who are at present
there]. But we _have_ to take counsel for the good of all the Hellenes,
in view of the grave peril in which they stand. And I wish to tell you
on what grounds I am so alarmed at the situation, in order that if my
reasoning is correct, you may share my conclusions, and exercise some
forethought for yourselves at least, if you are actually unwilling to
do so for the Hellenes as a whole; but that if you think that I am
talking nonsense, and am out of my senses, you may both now and
hereafter decline to attend to me as though I were a sane man.

{21} The rise of Philip to greatness from such small and humble
beginnings; the mistrustful and quarrelsome attitude of the Hellenes
towards one another; the fact that his growth out of what he was into
what he is was a far more extraordinary thing than would be his
subjugation of all that remains, when he has already secured so
much;--all this and all similar themes, upon which I might speak at
length, I will pass over. {22} But I see that all men, beginning with
yourselves, have conceded to him the very thing which has been at issue
in every Hellenic war during the whole of the past. And what is this?
It is the right to act as he pleases --to mutilate and to strip the
Hellenic peoples, one by one, to attack and to enslave their cities.
{23} For seventy-three years[n] you were the leading people of Hellas,
and the Spartans for thirty years save one;[n] and in these last times,
after the battle of Leuctra,[n] the Thebans too acquired some power:
yet neither to you nor to Thebes nor to Sparta was such a right ever
conceded by the Hellenes, as the right to do whatever you pleased. Far
from it! {24} First of all it was your own behaviour--or rather that of
the Athenians of that day--which some thought immoderate; and all, even
those who had no grievance against Athens, felt bound to join the
injured parties, and to make war upon you. Then, in their turn, the
Spartans, when they had acquired an empire and succeeded to a supremacy
like your own, attempted to go beyond all bounds and to disturb the
established order[n] to an unjustifiable extent; and once more, all,
even those who had no grievance against them, had recourse to war. {25}
Why mention the others? For we ourselves and the Spartans, though we
could originally allege no injury done by the one people to the other,
nevertheless felt bound to go to war on account of the wrongs which we
saw the rest suffering. And yet all the offences of the Spartans in
those thirty years of power, and of your ancestors in their seventy
years, were less, men of Athens, than the wrongs inflicted upon the
Greeks by Philip, in the thirteen years, not yet completed, during
which he has been to the fore. Less do I say? {26} They are not a
fraction of them. [A few words will easily prove this.] I say nothing
of Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities in the
Thracian region,[n] all annihilated by him with such savagery, that a
visitor to the spot would find it difficult to tell that they had ever
been inhabited. I remain silent in regard to the extirpation of the
great Phocian race. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not
robbed their very cities of their governments,[n] and set up
tetrarchies, that they may be enslaved, not merely by whole cities, but
by whole tribes at a time? {27} Are not the cities of Euboea even now
ruled by tyrants, and that in an island that is neighbour to Thebes and
Athens? Does he not write expressly in his letters, 'I am at peace with
those who choose to obey me'? And what he thus writes he does not fail
to act upon; for he is gone to invade the Hellespont; he previously
went to attack Ambracia;[n] the great city of Elis[n] in the
Peloponnese is his; he has recently intrigued against Megara;[n] and
neither Hellas nor the world beyond it is large enough to contain the
man's ambition. {28} But though all of us, the Hellenes, see and hear
these things, we send no representatives to one another to discuss the
matter; we show no indignation; we are in so evil a mood, so deep have
the lines been dug which sever city from city, that up to this very day
we are unable to act as either our interest or our duty require. {29}
We cannot unite; we can form no combination for mutual support or
friendship; but we look on while the man grows greater, because every
one has made up his mind (as it seems to me) to profit by the time
during which his neighbour is being ruined, and no one cares or acts
for the safety of the Hellenes. For we all know that Philip is like the
recurrence or the attack of a fever or other illness, in his descent
upon those who fancy themselves for the present well out of his reach.
{30} And further, you must surely realize that all the wrongs that the
Hellenes suffered from the Spartans or ourselves they at least suffered
at the hands of true-born sons of Hellas; and (one might conceive) it
was as though a lawful son, born to a great estate, managed his affairs
in some wrong or improper way;--his conduct would in itself deserve
blame and denunciation, but at least it could not be said that he was
not one of the family, or was not the heir to the property. {31} But
had it been a slave or a supposititious son that was thus ruining and
spoiling an inheritance to which he had no title, why, good Heavens!
how infinitely more scandalous and reprehensible all would have
declared it to be. And yet they show no such feeling in regard to
Philip, although not only is he no Hellene, not only has he no kinship
with Hellenes, but he is not even a barbarian from a country that one
could acknowledge with credit;--he is a pestilent Macedonian, from
whose country it used not to be possible to buy even a slave of any
value.

{32} And in spite of this, is there any degree of insolence to which he
does not proceed? Not content with annihilating cities, does he not
manage the Pythian games,[n] the common meeting of the Hellenes, and
send his slaves to preside over the competition in his absence? [Is he
not master of Thermopylae, and of the passes which lead into Hellenic
territory? Does he not hold that district with garrisons and
mercenaries? Has he not taken the precedence in consulting the oracle,
and thrust aside ourselves and the Thessalians and Dorians and the rest
of the Amphictyons, though the right is not one which is given even to
all of the Hellenes?] {33} Does he not write to the Thessalians to
prescribe the constitution under which they are to live? Does he not
send one body of mercenaries to Porthmus, to expel the popular party of
Eretria, and another to Oreus, to set up Philistides as tyrant? And yet
the Hellenes see these things and endure them, gazing (it seems to me)
as they would gaze at a hailstorm--each people praying that it may not
come their way, but no one trying to prevent it. Nor is it only his
outrages upon Hellas that go unresisted. {34} No one resists even the
aggressions which are committed against himself. Ambracia and Leucas
belong to the Corinthians--he has attacked them: Naupactus to the
Achaeans--he has sworn to hand it over to the Aetolians: Echinus[n] to
the Thebans--he has taken it from them, and is now marching against
their allies the Byzantines--is it not so? {35} And of our own
possessions, to pass by all the rest, is not Cardia, the greatest city
in the Chersonese, in his hands? Thus are we treated; and we are all
hesitating and torpid, with our eyes upon our neighbours, distrusting
one another, rather than the man whose victims we all are. But if he
treats us collectively in this outrageous fashion, what do you think he
will do, when he has become master of each of us separately?

{36} What then is the cause of these things? For as it was not without
reason and just cause that the Hellenes in old days were so prompt for
freedom, so it is not without reason or cause that they are now so
prompt to be slaves. There was a spirit, men of Athens, a spirit in the
minds of the people in those days, which is absent to-day--the spirit
which vanquished the wealth of Persia, which led Hellas in the path of
freedom, and never gave way in face of battle by sea or by land; a
spirit whose extinction to-day has brought universal ruin and turned
Hellas upside down. What was this spirit? [It was nothing subtle nor
clever.] {37} It meant that men who took money from those who aimed at
dominion or at the ruin of Hellas were execrated by all; that it was
then a very grave thing to be convicted of bribery; that the punishment
for the guilty man was the heaviest that could be inflicted; that for
him there could be no plea for mercy, nor hope of pardon. {38} No
orator, no general, would then sell the critical opportunity whenever
it arose--the opportunity so often offered to men by fortune, even when
they are careless and their foes are on their guard. They did not
barter away the harmony between people and people, nor their own
mistrust of the tyrant and the foreigner, nor any of these high
sentiments. {39} Where are such sentiments now? They have been sold in
the market and are gone; and those have been imported in their stead,
through which the nation lies ruined and plague-stricken--the envy of
the man who has received his hire; the amusement which accompanies his
avowal; [the pardon granted to those whose guilt is proved;] the hatred
of one who censures the crime; and all the appurtenances of corruption.
{40} For as to ships, numerical strength, unstinting abundance of funds
and all other material of war, and all the things by which the strength
of cities is estimated, every people can command these in greater
plenty and on a larger scale by far than in old days. But all these
resources are rendered unserviceable, ineffectual, unprofitable, by
those who traffic in them.

{41} That these things are so to-day, you doubtless see, and need no
testimony of mine: and that in times gone by the opposite was true, I
will prove to you, not by any words of my own, but by the record
inscribed by your ancestors on a pillar of bronze, and placed on the
Acropolis [not to be a lesson to themselves--they needed no such record
to put them in a right mind--but to be a reminder and an example to you
of the zeal that you ought to display in such a cause]. {42} What then
is the record? 'Arthmius,[n] son of Pythonax, of Zeleia, is an outlaw,
and is the enemy of the Athenian people and their allies, he and his
house.' Then follows the reason for which this step was taken--'because
he brought the gold from the Medes into the Peloponnese.' {43} Such is
the record. Consider, in Heaven's name, what must have been the mind of
the Athenians of that day, when they did this, and their conception of
their position. They set up a record, that because a man of Zeleia,
Arthmius by name, a slave of the King of Persia (for Zeleia is in
Asia), as part of his service to the king, had brought gold, not to
Athens, but to the Peloponnese, he should be an enemy of Athens and her
allies, he and his house, and that they should be outlaws. {44} And
this outlawry is no such disfranchisement as we ordinarily mean by the
word. For what would it matter to a man of Zeleia, that he might have
no share in the public life of Athens? But there is a clause in the Law
of Murder, dealing with those in connexion with whose death the law
does not allow a prosecution for murder [but the slaying of them is to
be a holy act]: 'And let him die an outlaw,' it runs. The meaning,
accordingly, is this--that the slayer of such a man is to be pure from
all guilt. {45} They thought, therefore, that the safety of all the
Hellenes was a matter which concerned themselves--apart from this
belief, it could not have mattered to them whether any one bought or
corrupted men in the Peloponnese; and whenever they detected such
offenders, they carried their punishment and their vengeance so far as
to pillory their names for ever. As the natural consequence, the
Hellenes were a terror to the foreigner, not the foreigner to the
Hellenes. It is not so now. Such is not your attitude in these or in
other matters. {46} But what is it? [You know it yourselves; for why
should I accuse you explicitly on every point? And that of the rest of
the Hellenes is like your own, and no better; and so I say that the
present situation demands our utmost earnestness and good counsel.[n]]
And what counsel? Do you bid me tell you, and will you not be angry if
I do so?

[_He reads from the document_.]

{47} Now there is an ingenuous argument, which is used by those who
would reassure the city, to the effect that, after all, Philip is not
yet in the position once held by the Spartans, who ruled everywhere
over sea and land, with the king for their ally, and nothing to
withstand them; and that, none the less, Athens defended herself even
against them, and was not swept away. Since that time the progress in
every direction, one may say, has been great, and has made the world
to-day very different from what it was then; but I believe that in no
respect has there been greater progress or development than in the art
of war. {48} In the first place, I am told that in those days the
Spartans and all our other enemies would invade us for four or five
months--during, that is, the actual summer--and would damage Attica
with infantry and citizen-troops, and then return home again. And so
old-fashioned were the men of that day--nay rather, such true
citizens--that no one ever purchased any object from another for money,
but their warfare was of a legitimate and open kind. {49} But now, as I
am sure you see, most of our losses are the result of treachery, and no
issue is decided by open conflict or battle; while you are told that it
is not because he leads a column of heavy infantry[n] that Philip can
march wherever he chooses, but because he has attached to himself a
force of light infantry, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar
troops. {50} And whenever, with such advantages,[n] he falls upon a
State which is disordered within, and in their distrust of one another
no one goes out in defence of its territory, he brings up his engines
and besieges them. I pass over the fact that summer and winter are
alike to him--that there is no close season during which he suspends
operations. {51} But if you all know these things and take due account
of them, you surely must not let the war pass into Attica, nor be
dashed from your seat through looking back to the simplicity of those
old hostilities with Sparta. You must guard against him, at the
greatest possible distance, both by political measures and by
preparations; you must prevent his stirring from home, instead of
grappling with him at close quarters in a struggle to the death. {52}
For, men of Athens, we have many natural advantages for a war,[n] if we
are willing to do our duty. There is the character of his country, much
of which we can harry and damage, and a thousand other things. But for
a pitched battle he is in better training than we.

{53} Nor have you only to recognize these facts, and to resist him by
actual operations of war. You must also by reasoned judgement and of
set purpose come to execrate those who address you in his interest,
remembering that it is impossible to master the enemies of the city,
until you punish those who are serving them in the city itself. {54}
And this, before God and every Heavenly Power--this you will not be
able to do; for you have reached such a pitch of folly or distraction
or--I know not what to call it; for often has the fear actually entered
my mind, that some more than mortal power may be driving our fortunes
to ruin--that to enjoy their abuse, or their malice, or their jests, or
whatever your motive may chance to be, you call upon men to speak who
are hirelings, and some of whom would not even deny it; and you laugh
to hear their abuse of others. {55} And terrible as this is, there is
yet worse to be told. For you have actually made political life safer
for these men, than for those who uphold your own cause. And yet
observe what calamities the willingness to listen to such men lays up
in store. I will mention facts known to you all.

{56} In Olynthus, among those who were engaged in public affairs, there
was one party who were on the side of Philip, and served his interests
in everything; and another whose aim was their city's real good, and
the preservation of their fellow citizens from bondage. Which were the
destroyers of their country? which betrayed the cavalry, through whose
betrayal Olynthus perished? Those whose sympathies were with Philip's
cause; those who, while the city still existed brought such dishonest
and slanderous charges against the speakers whose advice was for the
best, that, in the case of Apollonides at least, the people of Olynthus
was even induced to banish the accused.

{57} Nor is this instance of the unmixed evil wrought by these
practices in the case of the Olynthians an exceptional one, or without
parallel elsewhere. For in Eretria,[n] when Plutarchus and the
mercenaries had been got rid of, and the people had control of the city
and of Porthmus, one party wished to entrust the State to you, the
other to entrust it to Philip. And through listening mainly, or rather
entirely, to the latter, these poor luckless Eretrians were at last
persuaded to banish the advocates of their own interests. {58} For, as
you know, Philip, their ally, sent Hipponicus with a thousand
mercenaries, stripped Porthmus of its walls, and set up three
tyrants--Hipparchus, Automedon, and Cleitarchus; and since then he has
already twice expelled them from the country when they wished to
recover their position [sending on the first occasion the mercenaries
commanded by Eurylochus, on the second, those under Parmenio].

{59} And why go through the mass of the instances? Enough to mention
how in Oreus Philip had, as his agents, Philistides, Menippus,
Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus--the very men who are now in possession
of the city--and every one knew the fact; while a certain Euphraeus,[n]
who once lived here in Athens, acted in the interests of freedom, to
save his country from bondage. {60} To describe the insults and the
contumely with which he met would require a long story; but a year
before the capture of the town he laid an information of treason
against Philistides and his party, having perceived the nature of their
plans. A number of men joined forces, with Philip for their paymaster
and director, and haled Euphraeus off to prison as a disturber of the
peace. {61} Seeing this, the democratic party in Oreus, instead of
coming to the rescue of Euphraeus, and beating the other party to
death, displayed no anger at all against them, and agreed with a
malicious pleasure that Euphraeus deserved his fate. After this the
conspirators worked with all the freedom they desired for the capture
of the city, and made arrangements for the execution of the scheme;
while any of the democratic party, who perceived what was going on,
maintained a panic-stricken silence, remembering the fate of Euphraeus.
So wretched was their condition, that though this dreadful calamity was
confronting them, no one dared open his lips, until all was ready and
the enemy was advancing up to the walls. Then the one party set about
the defence, the other about the betrayal of the city. {62} And when
the city had been captured in this base and shameful manner, the
successful party governed despotically: and of those who had been their
own protectors, and had been ready to treat Euphraeus with all possible
harshness, they expelled some and murdered others; while the good
Euphraeus killed himself, thus testifying to the righteousness and
purity of his motives in opposing Philip on behalf of his countrymen.

{63} Now for what reason, you may be wondering, were the peoples of
Olynthus and Eretria and Oreus more agreeably disposed towards Philip's
advocates than towards their own? The reason was the same as it is with
you--that those who speak for your true good can never, even if they
would, speak to win popularity with you; they are constrained to
inquire how the State may be saved: while their opponents, in the very
act of seeking popularity, are co-operating with Philip. {64} The one
party said, 'You must pay taxes;' the other, 'There is no need to do
so.' The one said, 'Go to war, and do not trust him;' the other,
'Remain at peace,'--until they were in the toils. And--not to mention
each separately--I believe that the same thing was true of all. The one
side said what would enable them to win favour; the other, what would
secure the safety of their State. And at last the main body of the
people accepted much that they proposed--not now from any such desire
for gratification, nor from ignorance, but as a concession to
circumstances, thinking that their cause was now wholly lost. {65} It
is this fate, I solemnly assure you, that I dread for you, when the
time comes that you make your reckoning, and realize that there is no
longer anything that can be done. May you never find yourselves, men of
Athens, in such a position! Yet in any case, it were better to die ten
thousand deaths, than to do anything out of servility towards Philip
[or to sacrifice any of those who speak for your good]. A noble
recompense did the people in Oreus receive, for entrusting themselves
to Philip's friends, and thrusting Euphraeus aside! {66} and a noble
recompense the democracy of Eretria, for driving away your envoys, and
surrendering to Cleitarchus! They are slaves, scourged and butchered! A
noble clemency did he show to the Olynthians, who elected Lasthenes to
command the cavalry, and banished Apollonides! {67} It is folly, and it
is cowardice, to cherish hopes like these, to give way to evil
counsels, to refuse to do anything that you should do, to listen to the
advocates of the enemy's cause, and to fancy that you dwell in so great
a city that, whatever happens, you will not suffer any harm. {68} Aye,
and it is shameful to exclaim after the event, 'Why, who would have
expected this? Of course, we ought to have done, or not to have done,
such and such things!' The Olynthians could tell you of many things, to
have foreseen which in time would have saved them from destruction. So
too could the people of Oreus, and the Phocians, and every other people
that has been destroyed. {69} But how does that help them now? So long
as the vessel is safe, be it great or small, so long must the sailor
and the pilot and every man in his place exert himself and take care
that no one may capsize it by design or by accident: but when the seas
have overwhelmed it, all their efforts are in vain. {70} So it is, men
of Athens, with us. While we are still safe, with our great city, our
vast resources, our noble name, what are we to do? Perhaps some one
sitting here has long been wishing to ask this question. Aye, and I
will answer it, and will move my motion; and you shall carry it, if you
wish. We ourselves, in the first place, must conduct the resistance and
make preparation for it--with ships, that is, and money, and soldiers.
For though all but ourselves give way and become slaves, we at least
must contend for freedom. {71} And when we have made all these
preparations ourselves, and let them be seen, then let us call upon the
other states for aid, and send envoys to carry our message [in all
directions--to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, to the king; for
it is not unimportant for his interests either that Philip should be
prevented from subjugating the world]; that so, if you persuade them,
you may have partners to share the danger and the expense, in case of
need; and if you do not, you may at least delay the march of events.
{72} For since the war is with a single man, and not against the
strength of a united state, even delay is not without its value, any
more than were those embassies[n] of protest which last year went round
the Peloponnese, when I and Polyeuctus, that best of men, and
Hegesippus and the other envoys went on our tour, and forced him to
halt, so that he neither went to attack Acarnania, nor set out for the
Peloponnese. {73} But I do not mean that we should call upon the other
states, if we are not willing to take any of the necessary steps
ourselves. It is folly to sacrifice what is our own, and then pretend
to be anxious for the interests of others--to neglect the present, and
alarm others in regard to the future. I do not propose this. I say that
we must send money to the forces in the Chersonese, and do all that
they ask of us; that we must make preparation ourselves, while we
summon, convene, instruct, and warn the rest of the Hellenes. That is
the policy for a city with a reputation such as yours. {74} But if you
fancy that the people of Chalcis or of Megara will save Hellas, while
you run away from the task, you are mistaken. They may well be content
if they can each save themselves. The task is yours. It is the
prerogative that your forefathers won, and through many a great peril
bequeathed to you. {75} But if each of you is to sit and consult his
inclinations, looking for some way by which he may escape any personal
action, the first consequence will be that you will never find any one
who will act; and the second, I fear, that the day will come when we
shall be forced to do, at one and the same time, all the things we wish
to avoid.

{76} This then is my proposal, and this I move. If the proposal is
carried out, I think that even now the state of our affairs may be
remedied. But if any one has a better proposal to make, let him make
it, and give us his advice. And I pray to all the gods that whatever be
the decision that you are about to make, it may be for your good.


FOOTNOTES

[1] These are printed in square brackets in the translation.



ON THE CROWN (Or. XVIII)

[_Introduction_. The advice given by Demosthenes in the Third Philippic
(spoken before the middle of 341) was in the main followed. He himself
was sent almost immediately to Byzantium, where he renewed the alliance
between that city and Athens, and at the same time entered into
relations with Abydos and the Thracian princes. Rhodes, and probably
Chios and Cos, were also conciliated, and an embassy was sent to the
King of Persia to ask for aid against Philip. The king appears to have
sent assistance to Diopeithes, and it is also stated (not on the best
authority) that he sent large sums of money to Demosthenes and
Hypereides. Demosthenes further succeeded, in conjunction with Callias
of Chalcis, in organizing a league against Philip, which included
Corinth, Megara, Corcyra, and the Acarnanians, and which at least
supplied a considerable number of men and some funds. The cities of
Euboea, most of which had been in the hands of Philip's party, were
also formed into a confederacy, in alliance with Athens, under the
leadership of Chalcis; Philistides was expelled from Oreus, about July
341, by the allied forces under Cephisophon; and later in the summer,
Phocion drove Cleitarchus from Eretria. On the motion of Aristonicus,
the Athenians voted Demosthenes a golden crown, which was conferred on
him in the theatre at the Great Dionysia in March 340. The arrest of
Anaxinus of Oreus, and his condemnation as a spy, acting in Philip's
interest, must have occurred about the same time. Not long afterwards
Demosthenes succeeded in carrying out a complete reorganization of the
trierarchic system, by which he made the burden of the expense vary
strictly according to property, and secured a regular and efficient
supply of ships, money, and men.

In the meantime (in 341 or 340) the island of Peparethus was attacked
by Philip's ships, in revenge for the seizure of the Macedonian
garrison in Halonnesus by the Peparethians: and the Athenian admirals
were ordered to retaliate. Philip himself had been pursuing his course
in Thrace; and on the rejection of his request to Byzantium for an
alliance, he laid siege (late in 340) to Perinthus (which lay on his
way to Byzantium), sending part of his forces through the Chersonese.
Aided by Byzantine and Persian soldiers, Perinthus held out, till at
last Philip took off most of his forces and besieged Byzantium itself.
He had shortly before this sent to Athens an express declaration of
war, and received a similar declaration from her, the formal excuse for
which was found in the recent seizure by his ships of some Athenian
merchant-vessels. But with help from Athens, Chios, Rhodes, and Cos,
the Byzantines maintained the defence. Philip's position became
serious; but he managed by a ruse to get his ships away into the open
sea, and even to do some damage to the Athenian settlers in the
Chersonese. In the winter he withdrew from Byzantium, and in 339 made
an incursion into Scythia; but, returning through the country of the
Triballi, he sustained some loss, and was severely wounded. Later in
the year a new Sacred War which had arisen gave him a convenient
opportunity for the invasion of Greece.

At the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council in the autumn of 340,[1]
Aeschines was one of the representatives of Athens. The Athenians had
recently offended Thebes by re-gilding and dedicating in the restored
temple at Delphi fifty shields, with an inscription stating that they
were spoil 'taken from the Medes and the Thebans, when they fought
against the Hellenes' (probably at Plataeae in 479). The Locrians of
Amphissa intended (according to Aeschines' account) to propose that the
Council should fine Athens fifty talents. Aeschines rose to state the
case for Athens; but a delegate from Amphissa forbade all mention of
the Athenians, and demanded their exclusion from the temple, on the
ground of their alliance with the accursed Phocians. Aeschines retorted
by charging the Amphisseans with cultivating and building upon the
sacred plain of Cirrha--acts forbidden for all time in 586 B.C.--and
roused the Council to such indignation that they gathered a body of men
and destroyed the harbour and the unlawful buildings of Cirrha; but
they were severely handled by the Amphisseans, and the Council now
voted that the Amphictyonic states should send representatives, to
discuss the question of war against Amphissa, to a meeting to be held
at Thermopylae before the spring meeting of the Council. To this
preliminary meeting, the Athenians (though inclined to view Aeschines'
performance with favour), on the advice of Demosthenes, sent no
representatives; nor did the Thebans (the allies of Amphissa). War was
declared by the Amphictyons against Amphissa; but Cottyphus, the
Thessalian, who had been appointed general, made little headway, and
(at the spring or the autumn meeting of the Council) declared that the
Amphictyonic states must either send men and money, or else make Philip
their general. Philip was, of course, at once appointed; but instead of
proceeding against Amphissa, marched to Elateia and fortified it. This
caused the greatest alarm at Athens. Demosthenes was immediately
dispatched to Thebes, where he succeeded, by what appear to have been
liberal and judicious proposals, in making an alliance between Thebes
and Athens, in spite of the attempts of Philip's envoys to counteract
his influence. Euboea, Megara, Corinth, and other members of the league
also sent help. Philip himself called upon his own friends in the
Peloponnese for aid, and at last moved towards Amphissa. Demosthenes
seems now to have succeeded in applying the festival-money to purposes
of war, and with the aid of Lycurgus, who became Controller of the
Festival Fund, to have amassed a large sum for the use of the State. At
the Dionysia of 338 he was again crowned, on the proposal of Demomeles
and Hypereides. The allies at first won some successes and refortified
some of the Phocian towns, but afterwards unfortunately divided their
forces, and so enabled Philip to defeat the two divisions separately,
and to destroy Amphissa. Philip's proposals of peace found supporters
both in Thebes and in Athens, but were counteracted by Demosthenes.
Late in the summer of 338, the decisive battle was fought at
Chaeroneia, and resulted in the total rout of the allies. Demosthenes
himself was one of the fugitives. Philip placed a Macedonian garrison
in Thebes, restored his exiled friends to power there, established a
Council of Three Hundred, and (through them) put to death or banished
his enemies. He also gave Orchomenus, Thespiae, and Plataeae their
independence. After a moment of panic, the Athenians, led by
Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Hypereides, proceeded to take all possible
measures for the defence of the city, while private munificence
supplied the treasury. Demosthenes himself superintended the repair of
the fortifications, and went on a mission to secure a supply of corn.
But Philip, instead of marching upon Athens, sent a message by Demades,
whom he had taken prisoner at Chaeroneia; and the Assembly, in reply,
instructed Demades, Aeschines, and Phocion to ask Philip to release his
Athenian prisoners. Philip released them without ransom, and sent
Antipater and Alexander (with the ashes of the Athenian dead) to offer
terms of peace. By the 'Peace of Demades', concluded while Demosthenes
was still absent, the alliance between Athens and Philip was renewed;
the independence of Athens was guaranteed; Oropus was taken from Thebes
and restored to Athens; and she was permitted to retain Salamis, Samos,
Delos, and probably Lemnos and Imbros. On the other hand, she lost all
her possessions on the Hellespont and in the Chersonese, and promised
to join the league which Philip intended to form for the invasion of
Persia. Demosthenes was selected by the Assembly to deliver the funeral
oration upon those who fell at Chaeroneia; and although the Macedonian
party attacked him repeatedly in the law-courts, he was always
acquitted. Philip paid a long visit to the Peloponnese, in the course
of which he placed a Macedonian garrison in Corinth, ravaged Laconia,
giving parts of it to his allies, the Argives and Arcadians, and
announced his plans for the invasion of Persia at the head of the
Greeks; he then returned to Macedonia.

In 337 Demosthenes was again Commissioner of Fortifications, as well as
Controller of the Festival Fund--the most important office in the
State. He not only performed his work most efficiently, but gave
considerable sums for public purposes out of his private fortune; and
early in 336 Ctesiphon proposed, and the Council resolved, that he
should once more be crowned at the Dionysia. But before the proposal
could be brought before the Assembly, Aeschines indicted Ctesiphon for
its alleged illegality. The trial did not take place until late in the
summer of 330. We do not know the reason for so long a delay, but
probably the events of the intervening time were such as to render the
state of public feeling unfavourable to Aeschines. In 336 Philip was
assassinated, and was succeeded by Alexander. In 335 Alexander
destroyed Thebes, which had revolted, and sold its inhabitants into
slavery. He also demanded from Athens the surrender of Demosthenes and
other anti-Macedonian politicians and generals, but was persuaded to be
content with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, and the
promise of the prosecution of Demosthenes for using subsidies from
Persia to help Thebes--a prosecution which was allowed to drop. From
334 onwards Alexander was pursuing his conquests in the East, and we
know practically nothing of the history of Athens until the trial of
Ctesiphon came on in 330.

Aeschines alleged against Ctesiphon (1) that it was illegal to propose
to crown any one who had not passed his examination before the Board of
Auditors at the end of his term of office; and that Demosthenes, who
had been Commissioner of Fortifications and Controller of the Festival
Fund, was still in this position: (2) that it was illegal to proclaim
the grant of a crown at the Dionysia, except in the case of crowns
conferred by foreign states: (3) that it was illegal to insert untrue
statements in the public records, and that the language in which
Ctesiphon's decree described the political career of Demosthenes was
untrue. On the first point Aeschines was almost certainly right:
Demosthenes' defence is sophistical, and all that could really be said
was that the rule had often been broken before. On the second point,
certainty is impossible: the most probable view (though it also has its
difficulties) is that there were two inconsistent laws, and that one of
them permitted the proclamation in the theatre, if expressly voted by
the people; but the alleged illegality had certainly been often
committed. The third point, which raised the question of the value to
Athens of Demosthenes' whole political life, was that upon which the
case really turned; and it is to this that Demosthenes devotes the
greater part of his speech, breaking up his reply into convenient
stages by discussions (of a far less happy description) of the other
counts of the indictment, and of the character and career of Aeschines.
As in the Speech on the Embassy, certain facts are misrepresented, and
there are passages which are in bad taste; but Demosthenes proves
beyond doubt his unswerving loyalty to the high ideal of policy which
he had formed for his country, and it is with good reason that parts of
this speech have always been felt to reach a height of eloquence which
has never been surpassed.

The jury acquitted Ctesiphon: and Aeschines, failing to obtain a fifth
part of the votes, and thus incurring a heavy fine and the loss of some
of the rights of a citizen, left Athens, and lived most of the
remainder of his life at Rhodes.

The following is an analysis of the speech in outline:--


  I. Introduction (§§ 1-8).
  II. Defence against charges irrelevant to the indictment (§§ 9-52).
    (1) Introduction (§ 9).
    (2) Postponement of reply to charges against his private life
         (§§ 10, 11).
    (3) Reply to charges against his public life (§§ 12-52).
      (a) Criticism of Aeschines' method of attack (§§ 12-16).
      (b) Reply in reference to the Peace of Philocrates (§§ 17-52).
  III. Defence against the indictment itself (§§ 53-125).
    (1) Introduction (§§ 53-9).
    (2) Defence of his policy B.C. 346-340 (§§ 60-109).
    (3) The alleged illegality of crowning him before he had passed
         his audit (§§ 110-19).
    (4) The alleged illegality of the proclamation in the theatre
         (§§ 120, 121).
    (5) Conclusion, including criticism of Aeschines' method of attack
         (§§ 122-5).

  IV. Aeschines' life and character (§§ 126-59).
    (1) Introduction (§§ 126-8).
    (2) Parentage and early life of Aeschines (§§ 129-31).
    (3) Aeschines' connexion with Antiphon, Python, Anaxinus, and
         others (§§ 132-8).
    (4) Aeschines' part in stirring up the war against Amphissa in
         339 (§§ 139-59).

  V. Demosthenes' own policy in 339 and 338 (§§ 160-226).
    (1) Narrative and defence of the alliance with Thebes (§§ 160-95).
    (2) Why did not Aeschines protest at the time? (§§ 196-8).
    (3) Defence of his policy as true to the spirit of Athenian history
         (§§ 199-210).
    (4) Narrative and defence, continued (§§ 211-22).
    (5) Further criticism of Aeschines' method of attack (§§ 223-6).

  VI. Replies to various arguments of Aeschines (§§ 227-96).
    (1) Aeschines' comparison of the inquiry to the examination of
         a balance-sheet (§§ 227-31).
    (2) A proper inquiry would show that Demosthenes had increased
         the resources of Athens (§§ 232-7).
    (3) Reply to the charge of saddling Athens with an undue share
         of the expense of the war (§§ 238-43).
    (4) Reply to the charge of responsibility for the defeat of Chaeroneia
         (§§ 244-7).
    (5) Vindication of his policy after the battle of Chaeroneia
         (§§ 248-51).
    (6) Reply to Aeschines' remarks about the harm done to Athens
         by Demosthenes' bad fortune (§§ 252-75).
      (a) General remarks (§§ 252-5).
      (b) The fortune of Demosthenes (§§ 257, 258).
      (c) The fortune of Aeschines (§§ 259-64).
      (d) Comparison of the two (§§ 265, 266).
      (e) Demosthenes' use of his fortune for purposes of public and
           private munificence (§§ 267-9).
      (f) Demosthenes not responsible for the misfortunes of Athens
           (§§ 270-5).
    (7) Reply to Aeschines' warning against Demosthenes' cleverness
         (§§ 276-90).
      (a) Comparison of the use made of their talents by the two
           orators (§§ 276-84).
      (b) The choice of Demosthenes, not Aeschines, to deliver the
           Funeral Oration (§§ 285-90).
    (8) Aeschines' feelings about the defeat of Chaeroneia (§§ 291-3).
    (9) The part played by traitors in recent history (§§ 294-6).

  VII. Epilogue (§§ 297-324).
    (1) Demosthenes' incorruptibility (§§ 297, 298).
    (2) Demosthenes' measures for the protection of Athens (§§ 299-305).
    (3) Comparison of the services of the two orators to Athens
         (§§ 306-13).
    (4) Reply to the comparison of Demosthenes with the men of old,
         by a final comparison of the two orators (§§ 314-23).
    (5) Peroration (§ 324).]


{1} I pray first, men of Athens, to every god and goddess, that the
goodwill, which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you,
may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this present trial:
and secondly--a prayer which especially touches yourselves, your
consciences, and your reputation--that the gods may put it into your
minds not to take counsel of my adversary[n] in regard to the spirit in
which you ought to hear me (for that would surely be a cruel thing),
{2} but of the laws and of your oath; wherein besides all other
precepts of justice, this also is written--that you shall listen to
both sides with a like mind. And this means, not only that you should
have formed no prejudice, and should accord equal goodwill to each, but
also that you should give leave to every man who pleads before you to
adopt that order, and make that defence, upon which he has resolved and
fixed his choice.

{3} I am in many respects at a disadvantage in the present controversy,
as compared with Aeschines; and particularly, men of Athens, in two
points of importance. The first is that I am not contending for the
same stake as he. It is not the same thing for me to lose your goodwill
now, as it is for him to fail to win his case; since for me--but I
would say nothing unpleasant [n]* at the opening of my address--I say
only that Aeschines can well afford to risk this attack upon me. The
second disadvantage lies in the natural and universal tendency of
mankind to hear invective and denunciation with pleasure, and to be
offended with those who praise themselves. {4} And of the two courses
in question, that which contributes to men's pleasure has been given to
Aeschines, and that which annoys (I may say) every one is left for me.
If, to avoid giving such annoyance, I say nothing of all that I myself
have done, it will be thought that I am unable to clear myself of the
charges against me, or to show the grounds upon which I claim to
deserve distinction. If, on the other hand, I proceed to speak of my
past acts and my political life, I shall often be compelled to speak of
myself. I will endeavour, then, to do this as modestly as possible; and
for all that the necessities of the case compel me to say, the blame
must in fairness be borne by the prosecutor, who initiated a trial of
such a kind as this.

{5} I think, men of Athens, that you would all admit that this present
trial equally concerns myself and Ctesiphon, and demands no less
earnest attention from me than from him. For while it is a painful and
a grievous thing for a man to be robbed of anything, particularly if it
is at the hands of an enemy that this befalls him, it is especially so,
when he is robbed of your goodwill and kindness, just in proportion as
to win these is the greatest possible gain. {6} And because such is the
issue at stake in the present trial, I request and entreat you all
alike to give me, while I make my defence upon the charges that have
been brought against me, a fair hearing, as you are commanded to do by
the laws--those laws to which their original maker, your well-wisher
and the People's friend, Solon, thought fit to give the sanction not of
enactment only, but also of an oath on the part of those who act as
judges: {7} not because he distrusted you (so at least it seems to me),
but because he saw that a defendant cannot escape from the imputations
and the slanders which fall with special force from the prosecutor,
because he is the first to speak, unless each of you who sit in
judgement, keeping his conscience pure in the sight of God, will
receive the pleadings of the later speaker also with the same favour,
and will thus, because his attention has been given equally and
impartially to both sides, form his decision upon the case in its
entirety.

{8} And now, when I am about, as it seems, to render an account of my
whole private life and public career, I would once more invoke the aid
of the gods; and in the presence of you all I pray, first, that the
goodwill which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you,
may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this trial; and
secondly, that whatsoever judgement upon this present suit will conduce
to your public reputation, and the purity of each man's conscience,
that judgement they may put it into all your minds to give.

{9} Now if Aeschines had confined his charges to the subject of the
indictment, I too, in making my defence, would have dealt at once with
the actual resolution of the Council. But since he has devoted no less
a portion of his speech to the relation of other matters, and for the
most part has spoken against me falsely, I think it is necessary, and
at the same time just, that I should deal briefly, men of Athens, with
these, in order that none of you may be led by irrelevant arguments to
listen less favourably to my pleas in answer to the indictment itself.

{10} As for his slanderous vituperation of my private life, mark how
straightforward and how just is the reply that I make. If you know me
as the man that he charged me with being (for my life has been spent
nowhere but in your own midst), do not even suffer me to speak--no, not
though my whole public career has been one of transcendent merit--but
rise and condemn me without delay. But if, in your judgement and
belief, I am a better man than Aeschines, and come of better men; if I
and mine are no worse than any other respectable persons (to use no
offensive expression); then do not trust him even in regard to other
points, for it is plain that all that he said was equally fictitious;
but once more accord to me to-day the goodwill which throughout the
past you have so often displayed towards me in previous trials. {11}
Knave as you are,[n] Aeschines, you were assuredly more fool than
knave, when you thought that I should dismiss all that I had to say
with regard to my past acts and political life, and should turn to meet
the abuse that fell from you. I shall not do so; I am not so
brain-sick; but I will review the falsehoods and the calumnies which
you uttered against my political career; and then, if the court desires
it, I will afterwards refer to the ribald language that has been so
incontinently used.

{12} The offences charged against me are many; and for some of them the
laws assign heavy and even the most extreme penalties. But I will tell
you what is the motive which animates the present suit. It gives play
to the malice of a personal enemy, to his insolence, his abuse, his
contumelies, and every expression of his hostility: and yet, assuming
that the charges and the imputations which have been made are true, it
does not enable the State[n] to exact a penalty that is adequate, or
nearly adequate, to the offences. {13} For it is not right to seek to
debar another from coming before the people[n] and receiving a hearing,
nor to do so in a spirit of malice and envy. Heaven knows, it is
neither straightforward, nor citizen-like, nor just, men of Athens! If
the crimes by which he saw me injuring the city were of such a
magnitude as he just now so theatrically set forth, he should have had
recourse to the punishments enjoined by the laws at the time of the
crimes themselves. If he saw me so acting as to deserve impeachment, he
should have impeached me, and so brought me to trial before you; if he
saw me proposing illegal measures, he should have indicted me for their
illegality. For surely, if he can prosecute Ctesiphon on my account, he
would not have failed to indict me in person, had he thought that he
could convict me. {14} And further, if he saw me committing any of
those other crimes against you, which he just now slanderously
enumerated, or any other crimes whatsoever, there are laws which deal
with each, and punishments, and lawsuits and judgements involving
penalties that are harsh and severe: to all of these he could have had
recourse; and from the moment when it was seen that he had acted so,
and had conducted his hostilities against me on that plan, his present
accusation of me would have been in line with his past conduct. {15}
But as it is, he has forsaken the straight path of justice; he has
shrunk from all attempts to convict me at the time; and after all these
years, with the imputations, the jests, the invectives, that he has
accumulated, he appears to play his part. So it is, that though his
accusations are against me, it is Ctesiphon that he prosecutes; and
though he sets his quarrel with me in the forefront of the whole suit,
he has never faced me in person to settle the quarrel, and it is
another whom we see him trying to deprive of his civil rights. {16} Yet
surely, besides everything else that may be pleaded on behalf of
Ctesiphon, this, I think, may surely be most reasonably urged--that we
ought in justice to have brought our own quarrel to the test by
ourselves, instead of avoiding all conflict with one another, and
looking for a third party to whom we could do harm. Such iniquity
really passes all bounds.

{17} From this one may see the nature of all his charges alike,
uttered, as they have been, without justice or regard for truth. Yet I
desire also to examine them severally, and more particularly the false
statements which he made against me in regard to the Peace and the
Embassy, when he ascribed to me[n] the things which he himself had done
in conjunction with Philocrates. And here it is necessary, men of
Athens, and perhaps appropriate,[n] that I should remind you of the
state of affairs subsisting during that period, so that you may view
each group of actions in the light of the circumstances of the time.

{18} When the Phocian war had broken out[n] (not through any action of
mine, for I had not yet entered public life), your own attitude, in the
first place, was such, that you wished for the preservation of the
Phocians, although you saw that their actions were unjustifiable; while
you would have been delighted at anything that might happen to the
Thebans, against whom you felt an indignation that was neither
unreasonable nor unfair; for they had not used their good fortune at
Leuctra with moderation. And, in the second place, the Peloponnese was
all disunited: those who detested the Spartans [n] were not strong
enough to annihilate them, and those who had previously governed with
the support of Sparta [n] were no longer able to maintain their control
over their cities; but both these and all the other states were in a
condition of indeterminate strife and confusion. {19} When Philip saw
this (for it was not hard to see), he tried, by dispensing money to the
traitors whom each state contained, to throw them all into collision
and stir up one against another; and thus, amid the blunders and
perversity of others, he was making his own preparations, and growing
great to the danger of all. And when it became clear to all that the
then overbearing (but now unhappy) Thebans, distressed by the length of
the war, would be forced to fly to you for aid,[n] Philip, to prevent
this--to prevent the formation of any union between the cities--made
offers of peace to you, and of assistance to them. {20} Now what was it
that helped him, and enabled him to find in you his almost willing
dupes? It was the baseness (if that is the right name to use), or the
ignorance, or both, of the rest of the Hellenes, who, though you were
engaged in a long and continuous war, and that on behalf of the
interests of all, as has been proved by the event, never assisted you
either with money or with men, or in any other way whatsoever. And in
your just and proper indignation with them, you listened readily to
Philip. It was for these reasons, therefore, and not through any action
of mine, that the Peace which we then conceded was negotiated; and any
one who investigates the matter honestly will find that it is the
crimes and the corrupt practices of these men, in the course of the
negotiations, that are responsible for our position to-day. {21} It is
in the interests of truth that I enter into all these events with this
exactitude and thoroughness; for however strong the appearance of
criminality in these proceedings may be, it has, I imagine, nothing to
do with me. The first man to suggest or mention the Peace was
Aristodemus[n] the actor; and the person who took the matter up and
moved the motion, and sold his services for the purpose, along with
Aeschines, was Philocrates of Hagnus--your partner, Aeschines, not
mine, even if you split your sides with lying; while those who
supported him, from whatever motive (for of that I say nothing at
present), were Eubulus and Cephisophon. I had no part in the matter
anywhere. {22} And yet, although the facts are such as with absolute
truth I am representing them to be, he carried his effrontery so far as
to dare to assert that I was not only responsible for the Peace, but
had also prevented the city from acting in conjunction with a general
assembly of the Hellenes in making it. What? and you--oh! how can one
find a name that can be applied to you?--when you saw me (for you were
there) preventing the city from taking this great step and forming so
grand an alliance as you just now described, did you once raise a
protest or come forward to give information and to set forth the crimes
with which you now charge me? {23} If I had covenanted with Philip for
money that I would prevent the coalition of the Hellenes, your only
course was to refuse to keep silence--to cry aloud, to protest, to
reveal the fact to your fellow countrymen. On no occasion did you do
this: no such utterance of yours was ever heard by any one. In fact
there was no embassy away at the time on a mission to any Hellenic
state; the Hellenes had all long ago been tried and found wanting;[n]
and in all that he has said upon this matter there is not a single
sound word. {24} And, apart from that, his falsehoods involve the
greatest calumnies upon this city. For if you were at one and the same
time convoking the Hellenes with a view to war, and sending ambassadors
yourselves to Philip to discuss peace, it was a deed for a
Eurybatus,[n] not a task for a state or for honest men, that you were
carrying out. But that is not the case; indeed it is not. For what
could possibly have been your object in summoning them at that moment?
Was it with a view to peace? But they all had peace already. Or with a
view to war? But you were yourselves discussing peace. It is therefore
evident that neither was it I that introduced or was responsible for
the Peace in its original shape, nor is one of all the other falsehoods
which he told of me shown to be true.

{25} Again, consider the course of action which, when the city had
concluded the Peace, each of us now chose to adopt. For from this you
will know who it was that co-operated with Philip throughout, and who
it was that acted in your interest and sought the good of the city. As
for me, I proposed, as a member of the Council, that the ambassadors
should sail as quickly as possible to any district in which they should
ascertain Philip to be, and receive his oath from him. {26} But even
when I had carried this resolution, they would not act upon it. What
did this mean, men of Athens? I will inform you. Philip's interest
required that the interval before he took the oath should be as long as
possible; yours, that it should be as short as possible. And why?
Because you broke off all your preparations for the war, not merely
from the day when he took the oath, but from the day when you first
hoped that Peace would be made; and for his part, this was what he was
all along working for; for he thought (and with truth) that whatever
places he could snatch from Athens before he took the oath, would
remain securely his, since no one would break the Peace for their sake.
{27} Foreseeing and calculating upon this, men of Athens, I proposed
this decree--that we should sail to any district in which Philip might
be, and receive his oath as soon as possible, in order that the oaths
might be taken while the Thracians, your allies, were still in
possession of those strongholds[n] of which Aeschines just now spoke
with contempt--Serrhium, Myrtenum, and Ergiske; and that Philip might
not snatch from us the keys of the country and make himself master of
Thrace, nor obtain an abundant supply of money and of soldiers, and so
proceed without difficulty to the prosecution of his further designs.
{28} And now, instead of citing or reading this decree he slanders me
on the ground that I thought fit, as a member of the Council, to
introduce the envoys. But what should I have done? Was I to propose
_not_ to introduce those who had come for the express purpose of
speaking with you? or to order the lessee of the theatre not to assign
them seats? But they would have watched the play from the threepenny
seats,[n] if this decree had not been proposed. Should I have guarded
the interests of the city in petty details, and sold them wholesale, as
my opponents did? Surely not. (_To the clerk_.) Now take this decree,
which the prosecutor passed over, though he knew it well, and read it.

{29} [_The decree of Demosthenes is read_.]

{30} Though I had carried this decree, and was seeking the good not of
Philip, but of the city, these worthy ambassadors paid little heed to
it, but sat idle in Macedonia for three whole months,[n] until Philip
arrived from Thrace, after subduing the whole country; when they might,
within ten days, or equally well[n] within three or four, have reached
the Hellespont, and saved the strongholds, by receiving his oath before
he could seize them. For he would not have touched them when we were
present; or else, if he had done so, we should have refused to
administer the oath to him; and in that case he would have failed to
obtain the Peace: he would not have had both the Peace and the
strongholds as well.

{31} Such was Philip's first act of fraud, during the time of the
Embassy, and the first instance of venality on the part of these wicked
men; and over this I confess that then and now and always I have been
and am at war and at variance with them. Now observe, immediately after
this, a second and even greater piece of villainy. {32} As soon as
Philip had sworn to the Peace, after first gaining possession of Thrace
because these men did not obey my decree, he obtained from them--again
by purchase--the postponement of our departure from Macedonia, until
all should be in readiness for his campaign against the Phocians; in
order that, instead of our bringing home a report of his intentions and
his preparations for the march, which would make you set out and sail
round to Thermopylae with your war-ships as you did before,[n] you
might only hear our report of the facts when he was already on this
side of Thermopylae, and you could do nothing. {33} And Philip was
beset with such fear and such a weight of anxiety, lest in spite of his
occupation of these places, his object should slip from his grasp, if,
before the Phocians were destroyed, you resolved to assist them, that
he hired this despicable creature, not now in company with his
colleagues, but by himself alone, to make to you a statement and a
report of such a character that owing to them all was lost. {34} But I
request and entreat you, men of Athens, to remember throughout this
whole trial, that, had Aeschines made no accusation that was not
included in the indictment, I too would not have said a word that did
not bear upon it; but since he has had recourse to all kinds of
imputation and slander at once, I am compelled also to give a brief
answer to each group of charges. {35} What then were the statements
uttered by him that day, in consequence of which all was lost? 'You
must not be perturbed,' he said, 'at Philip's having crossed to this
side of Thermopylae; for you will get everything that you desire, if
you remain quiet; and within two or three days you will hear that he
has become the friend of those whose enemy he was, and the enemy of
those whose friend he was, when he first came. For,' said he, 'it is
not phrases that confirm friendships' (a finely sententious
expression!) 'but identity of interest; and it is to the interest of
Philip and of the Phocians and of yourselves alike, to be rid of the
heartless and overbearing demeanour of the Thebans.' {36} To these
statements some gave a ready ear, in consequence of the tacit
ill-feeling towards the Thebans at the time. What then followed--and
not after a long interval, but immediately? The Phocians were
overthrown; their cities were razed to the ground; you, who had
believed Aeschines and remained inactive, were soon afterwards bringing
in your effects from the country; while Aeschines received his gold;
and besides all this, the city reaped the ill-will of the Thebans and
Thessalians, while their gratitude for what had been done went to
Philip. {37} To prove that this is so, (_to the clerk_) read me both
the decree of Callisthenes,[n] and Philip's letter. (_To the jury_.)
These two documents together will make all the facts plain. (_To the
clerk_.) Read.

{38} [_The decree of Callisthenes is read_.]

Were these the hopes, on the strength of which you made the Peace? Was
this what this hireling promised you? {39} (_To the clerk_.) Now read
the letter which Philip sent after this.

[_Philip's letter is read_.]

{40} You hear how obviously, in this letter sent to you, Philip is
addressing definite information to his own allies. 'I have done these
things,' he tells them, 'against the will of the Athenians, and to
their annoyance; and so, men of Thebes and Thessaly, if you are wise,
you will regard them as enemies, and will trust me.' He does not write
in those actual terms, but that is what he intends to indicate. By
these means he so carried them away, that they did not foresee or
realize any of the consequences, but allowed him to get everything into
his own power: and that is why, poor men, they have experienced their
present calamities. {41} But the man who helped him to create this
confidence, who co-operated with him, who brought home that false
report and deluded you, he it is who now bewails the sufferings of the
Thebans and enlarges upon their piteousness--he, who is himself the
cause both of these and of the misery in Phocis, and of all the other
evils which the Hellenes have endured. Yes, it is evident that you are
pained at what has come to pass, Aeschines, and that you are sorry for
the Thebans, when you have property in Boeotia[n] and are farming the
land that was theirs; and that I rejoice at it--I, whose surrender was
immediately demanded by the author of the disaster! {42} But I have
digressed into subjects of which it will perhaps be more convenient to
speak presently. I will return to the proofs which show that it is the
crimes of these men that are the cause of our condition to-day.

For when you had been deceived by Philip, through the agency of these
men, who while serving as ambassadors had sold themselves and made a
report in which there was not a word of truth--when the unhappy
Phocians had been deceived and their cities annihilated--what followed?
{43} The despicable Thessalians and the slow-witted Thebans regarded
Philip as their friend, their benefactor, their saviour. Philip was
their all-in-all. They would not even listen to the voice of any one
who wished to express a different opinion. You yourselves, though you
viewed what had been done with suspicion and vexation, nevertheless
kept the Peace; for there was nothing else that you could have done.
And the other Hellenes, who, like yourselves, had been deluded and
disappointed of their hopes,[n] also kept the Peace, and gladly;[n]
since in a sense they also were remotely aimed at by the war. {44} For
when Philip was going about and subduing the Illyrians and Triballi and
some of the Hellenes as well, and bringing many large forces into his
own power, and when some of the members of the several States were
taking advantage of the Peace to travel to Macedonia, and were being
corrupted--Aeschines among them--at such a time all of those whom
Philip had in view in thus making his preparations were really being
attacked by him. {45} Whether they failed to realize it is another
question, which does not concern me. For I was continually uttering
warnings and protests, both in your midst and wherever I was sent. But
the cities were stricken with disease: those who were engaged in
political and practical affairs were taking bribes and being corrupted
by the hope of money; while the mass of private citizens either showed
no foresight, or else were caught by the bait of ease and leisure from
day to day; and all alike had fallen victims to some such delusive
fancy, as that the danger would come upon every one but themselves, and
that through the perils of others they would be able to secure their
own position as they pleased. {46} And so, I suppose, it has come to
pass that the masses have atoned for their great and ill-timed
indifference by the loss of their freedom, while the leaders in
affairs, who fancied that they were selling everything except
themselves, have realized that they had sold themselves first of all.
For instead of being called friends and guest-friends, as they were
called at the time when they were taking their bribes, they now hear
themselves called flatterers, and god-forsaken, and all the other names
that they deserve. {47} For no one, men of Athens, spends his money out
of a desire to benefit the traitor; nor, when once he has secured the
object for which he bargains, does he employ the traitor to advise him
with regard to other objects: if it were so, nothing could be happier
than a traitor. But it is not so, of course. Far from it! When the
aspirant after dominion has gained his object, he is also the master of
those who have sold it to him: and because then he knows their
villainy, he then hates and mistrusts them, and covers them with
insults. {48} For observe--for even if the time of the events is past,
the time for realizing truths like these is ever present to wise men.
Lasthenes[n] was called his 'friend'; but only until he had betrayed
Olynthus. And Timolaus;[n] but only until he had destroyed Thebes. And
Eudicus and Simus[n] of Larissa; but only until they had put Thessaly
in Philip's power. And now, persecuted as they are, and insulted, and
subjected to every kind of misery, the whole inhabited world has become
filled with such men. And what of Aristratus[n] at Sicyon? what of
Perillus[n] at Megara? Are they not outcasts? {49} From these instances
one can see very clearly, that it is he who best protects his own
country and speaks most constantly against such men, that secures for
traitors and hirelings like yourselves, Aeschines, the continuance of
your opportunities for taking bribes. It is the majority of those who
are here, those who resist your will, that you must thank for the fact
that you live and draw your pay; for, left to yourselves, you would
long ago have perished.

{50} There is still much that I might say about the transactions of
that time, but I think that even what I have said is more than enough.
The blame rests with Aeschines, who has drenched me with the stale
dregs[n] of his own villainy and crime, from which I was compelled to
clear myself in the eyes of those who are too young to remember the
events; though perhaps you who knew, even before I said a single word,
of Aeschines' service as a hireling, may have felt some annoyance as
you listened. {51} He calls it, forsooth, 'friendship' and
'guest-friendship'; and somewhere in his speech just now he used the
expression, 'the man who casts in my teeth my guest-friendship with
Alexander.' _I_ cast in your teeth your guest-friendship with
Alexander? How did you acquire it? How came you to be thought worthy of
it? Never would I call you the guest-friend of Philip or the friend of
Alexander--I am not so insane--unless you are to call harvesters and
other hired servants the friends and guest-friends of those who have
hired them. [But that is not the case, of course. Far from it!] {52}
Nay, I call you the hireling, formerly of Philip, and now of Alexander,
and so do all who are present. If you disbelieve me, ask them--or
rather I will ask them for you. Men of Athens, do you think of
Aeschines as the hireling or as the guest-friend of Alexander? You hear
what they say.

{53} I now wish, without more delay, to make my defence upon the
indictment itself, and to go through my past acts, in order that
Aeschines may hear (though he knows them well) the grounds on which I
claim to have a right both to the gifts which the Council have
proposed, and even to far greater than these. (_To the clerk_.) Now
take the indictment and read it.

{54, 55} [The indictment is read.]

{56} These, men of Athens, are the points in the resolution which the
prosecutor assails; and these very points will, I think, afford me my
first means of proving to you that the defence which I am about to
offer is an absolutely fair one. For I will take the points of the
indictment in the very same order as the prosecutor: I will speak of
each in succession, and will knowingly pass over nothing. {57} Any
decision upon the statement that I 'consistently do and say what is
best for the People, and am eager to do whatever good I can', and upon
the proposal to vote me thanks for this, depends, I consider, upon my
past political career: for it is by an investigation of my career that
either the truth and the propriety, or else the falsehood, of these
statements which Ctesiphon has made about me will be discovered. {58}
Again, the proposal to crown me, without the addition of the clause
'when he has submitted to his examination', and the order to proclaim
the award of the crown in the theatre, must, I imagine, stand or fall
with my political career; for the question is whether I deserve the
crown and the proclamation before my fellow countrymen or not. At the
same time I consider myself further bound to point out to you the laws
under which the defendant's proposal could be made. In this honest and
straightforward manner, men of Athens, I have determined to make my
defence; and now I will proceed to speak of my past actions themselves.
{59} And let no one imagine that I am detaching my argument from its
connexion with the indictment, if I break into a discussion of
international transactions. For it is the prosecutor who, by assailing
the clause of the decree which states that I do and say what is best,
and by indicting it as false, has rendered the discussion of my whole
political career essentially germane to the indictment; and further,
out of the many careers which public life offers, it was the department
of international affairs that I chose; so that I have a right to derive
my proofs also from that department.

{60} I will pass over all that Philip snatched from us and secured, in
the days before I took part in public life as an orator. None of these
losses, I imagine, has anything to do with me. But I will recall to
you, and will render you an account of all that, from the day when I
entered upon this career, he was _prevented_ from taking, when I have
made one remark. {61} Philip, men of Athens, had a great advantage in
his favour. For in the midst of the Hellenic peoples--and not of some
only, but of all alike--there had sprung up a crop of
traitors--corrupt, god-forsaken men--more numerous than they have ever
been within the memory of man. These he took to help and co-operate
with him; and great as the mutual ill-will and dissensions of the
Hellenes already were, he rendered them even worse, by deceiving some,
making presents to others, and corrupting others in every way; and at a
time when all had in reality but one interest--to prevent his becoming
powerful--he divided them into a number of factions. {62} All the
Hellenes then being in this condition, still ignorant of the growing
and accumulating evil, you have to ask yourselves, men of Athens, what
policy and action it was fitting for the city to choose, and to hold me
responsible for this; for the person who assumed that responsibility in
the State was myself. {63} Should she, Aeschines, have sacrificed her
pride and her own dignity? Should she have joined the ranks of the
Thessalians and Dolopes,[n] and helped Philip to acquire the empire of
Hellas, cancelling thereby the noble and righteous deeds of our
forefathers? Or, if she should not have done this (for it would have
been in very truth an atrocious thing), should she have looked on,
while all that she saw would happen, if no one prevented it--all that
she realized, it seems, at a distance--was actually taking place? {64}
Nay, I should be glad to ask to-day the severest critic of my actions,
which party he would have desired the city to join--the party which
shares the responsibility for the misery and disgrace which has fallen
upon the Hellenes (the party of the Thessalians and their supporters,
one may call it), or the party which looked on while these calamities
were taking place, in the hope of gaining some advantage for
themselves--in which we should place the Arcadians and Messenians and
Argives. {65} But even of these, many--nay, all--have in the end fared
worse than we. For if Philip had departed immediately after his
victory, and gone his way; if afterwards he had remained at peace, and
had given no trouble whatever to any of his own allies or of the other
Hellenes; then there would have been some ground for blaming and
accusing those who had opposed his plans. But if he has stripped them
all alike of their dignity, their paramountcy, and their
independence--nay, even of their free constitutions,[n] wherever he
could do so--can it be denied that the policy which you adopted on my
advice was the most glorious policy possible?

{66} But I return to my former point. What was it fitting for the city
to do, Aeschines, when she saw Philip establishing for himself a
despotic sway over the Hellenes? What language should have been used,
what measures proposed, by the adviser of the people at Athens (for
that it was at Athens makes the utmost difference), when I knew that
from the very first, up to the day when I myself ascended the platform,
my country had always contended for pre-eminence, honour, and glory,
and in the cause of honour, and for the interests of all, had
sacrificed more money and lives than any other Hellenic people had
spent for their private ends: {67} when I saw that Philip himself, with
whom our conflict lay, for the sake of empire and absolute power, had
had his eye knocked out, his collar-bone broken, his hand and his leg
maimed, and was ready to resign any part of his body that Fortune chose
to take from him, provided that with what remained he might live in
honour and glory? {68} And surely no one would dare to say that it was
fitting that in one bred at Pella, a place then inglorious and
insignificant, there should have grown up so lofty a spirit that he
aspired after the empire of Hellas, and conceived such a project in his
mind; but that in you, who are Athenians, and who day by day in all
that you hear and see behold the memorials of the gallantry of your
forefathers, such baseness should be found, that you would yield up
your liberty to Philip by your own deliberate offer and deed. {69} No
man would say this. One alternative remained, and that, one which you
were bound to take--that of a righteous resistance to the whole course
of action by which he was doing you injury. You acted thus from the
first, quite rightly and properly; while I helped by my proposals and
advice during the time of my political activity, and I do not deny it.
But what ought I to have done? For the time has come to ask you this,
Aeschines, and to dismiss everything else. {70} Amphipolis, Pydna,
Poteidaea, Halonnesus--all are blotted from my memory. As for Serrhium,
Doriscus, the sack of Peparethus, and all the other injuries inflicted
upon the city, I renounce all knowledge of their ever having
happened--though you actually said that _I_ involved my countrymen in
hostility by talking of these things, when the decrees which deal with
them were the work of Eubulus and Aristophon[n] and Diopeithes,[n] and
not mine at all--so glibly do you assert anything that suits your
purpose! {71} But of this too I say nothing at present. I only ask you
whether Philip, who was appropriating Euboea,[n] and establishing it as
a stronghold to command Attica; who was making an attempt upon Megara,
seizing Oreus, razing the walls of Porthmus, setting up Philistides as
tyrant at Oreus and Cleitarchus at Eretria, bringing the Hellespont
into his own power, besieging Byzantium, destroying some of the cities
of Hellas, and restoring his exiled friends to others--whether he, I
say, in acting thus, was guilty of wrong, violating the truce and
breaking the Peace, or not? Was it fit that one of the Hellenes should
arise to prevent it, or not? {72} If it was not fit--if it was fit that
Hellas should become like the Mysian booty[n] in the proverb before
men's eyes, while the Athenians had life and being, then I have lost my
labour in speaking upon this theme, and the city has lost its labour in
obeying me: then let everything that has been done be counted for a
crime and a blunder, and those my own! But if it was right that one
should arise to prevent it, for whom could the task be more fitting
than for the people of Athens? That then, was the aim of _my_ policy;
and when I saw Philip reducing all mankind to servitude, I opposed him,
and without ceasing warned and exhorted you to make no surrender.

{73} But the Peace, Aeschines, was in reality broken by Philip, when he
seized the corn-ships, not by Athens. (_To the clerk_.) Bring the
decrees themselves, and the letter of Philip, and read them in order.
(_To the jury_.) For they will make it clear who is responsible, and
for what.

{74} [_A decree is read_.]

{75} This decree then was proposed by Eubulus, not by me; and the next
by Aristophon; he is followed first by Hegesippus, and he by Aristophon
again, and then by Philocrates, then by Cephisophon, and then by all of
them. But I proposed no decree upon this subject. (_To the clerk_.)
Read.

[_Decrees are read_.]

{76} As then I point to these decrees, so, Aeschines, do you point to a
decree of any kind, proposed by me, which makes me responsible for the
war. You cannot do so: for had you been able, there is nothing which
you would sooner have produced. Indeed, even Philip himself makes no
charge against me as regards the war, though he complains of others.
(_To the clerk_.) Read Philip's letter itself.

{77, 78} [_Philip's letter is read_.]

{79} In this letter he has nowhere mentioned the name of Demosthenes,
nor made any charge against me. Why is it then that, though he
complains of others, he has not mentioned my own actions? Because, if
he had written anything about me, he must have mentioned his own acts
of wrong; for it was these acts upon which I kept my grip, and these
which I opposed. First of all, when he was trying to steal into the
Peloponnese, I proposed the embassy to the Peloponnese;[n] then, when
he was grasping at Euboea, the embassy to Euboea;[n] then the
expedition--not an embassy any more--to Oreus,[n] and that to Eretria,
when he had established tyrants in those cities. {80} After that I
dispatched all the naval expeditions, in the course of which the
Chersonese and Byzantium and all our allies were saved. In consequence
of this, the noblest rewards at the hands of those who had benefited by
your action became yours--votes of thanks, glory, honours, crowns,
gratitude; while of the victims of his aggression, those who followed
your advice at the time secured their own deliverance, and those who
neglected it had the memory of your warnings constantly in their minds,
and regarded you not merely as their well-wishers, but as men of wisdom
and prophetic insight; for all that you foretold has come to pass. {81}
And further, that Philistides would have given a large sum to retain
Oreus, and Cleitarchus to retain Eretria, and Philip himself, to be
able to count upon the use of these places against you, and to escape
all exposure of his other proceedings and all investigation, by any one
in any place, of his wrongful acts--all this is not unknown to any one,
least of all to you, Aeschines. {82} For the envoys sent at that time
by Cleitarchus and Philistides lodged at your house, when they came
here, and you acted as their patron.[n] Though the city rejected them,
as enemies whose proposals were neither just nor expedient, to you they
were friends. None of their attempts succeeded, slander me though you
may, when you assert that I say nothing when I receive money, but cry
out when I spend it. That, certainly, is not _your_ way: for you cry
out with money in your hands, and will never cease, unless those
present cause you to do so by taking away your civil rights[n] to-day.
{83} Now on that occasion, gentlemen, you crowned me for my conduct.
Aristonicus proposed a decree whose very syllables were identical with
those of Ctesiphon's present proposal; the crown was proclaimed in the
theatre; and this was already the second proclamation[n] in my honour:
and yet Aeschines, though he was there, neither opposed the decree, nor
indicted the mover. (_To the clerk_.) Take this decree also and read it.

{84} [_The decree of Aristonicus is read_.]

{85} Now is any of you aware of any discredit that attached itself to
the city owing to this decree? Did any mockery or ridicule ensue, such
as Aeschines said must follow on the present occasion, if I were
crowned? But surely when proceedings are recent and well known to all,
then it is that, if they are satisfactory, they meet with gratitude,
and if they are otherwise, with punishment. It appears, then, that on
that occasion I met with gratitude, not with blame or punishment.

{86} Thus the fact that, up to the time when these events took place, I
acted throughout as was best for the city, has been acknowledged by the
victory of my advice and my proposals in your deliberations, by the
successful execution of the measures which I proposed, and the award of
crowns in consequence of them to the city and to myself and to all, and
by your celebration of sacrifices to the gods, and processions, in
thankfulness for these blessings.

{87} When Philip had been expelled from Euboea--and while the arms
which expelled him were yours, the statesmanship and the decrees (even
though some of my opponents may split their sides) were mine--he
proceeded to look for some other stronghold from which he could
threaten the city. And seeing that we were more dependent than any
other people upon imported corn, and wishing to get our corn-trade into
his power, he advanced to Thrace. First, he requested the Byzantines,
his own allies, to join him in the war against you; and when they
refused and said (with truth) that they had not made their alliance
with him for such a purpose, he erected a stockade against the city,
brought up his engines, and proceeded to besiege it. {88} I will not
ask again what you ought to have done when this was happening; it is
manifest to all. But who was it that went to the rescue of the
Byzantines, and saved them? Who was it that prevented the Hellespont
from falling into other hands at that time? It was you, men of
Athens--and when I say 'you', I mean this city. And who was it that
spoke and moved resolutions and acted for the city, and gave himself up
unsparingly to the business of the State? It was I. {89} But of the
immense benefit thus conferred upon all, you no longer need words of
mine to tell you, since you have had actual experience of it. For the
war which then ensued, apart from the glorious reputation that it
brought you, kept you supplied with the necessaries of life in greater
plenty and at lower prices than the present Peace, which these worthy
men are guarding to their country's detriment, in their hopes of
something yet to be realized. May those hopes be disappointed! May they
share the fortune which you, who wish for the best, ask of the gods,
rather than cause you to share that upon which their own choice is
fixed! (_To the clerk_.) Read out to the jury the crowns awarded to the
city in consequence of her action by the Byzantines and by the
Perinthians.

{90, 91} [_The decree of the Byzantines is read_.]

{92} Read out also the crowns awarded by the peoples of the Chersonese.

[_The decree of the peoples of the Chersonese is read_.]

{93} Thus the policy which I had adopted was not only successful in
saving the Chersonese and Byzantium, in preventing the Hellespont from
falling at that time into the power of Philip, and in bringing honours
to the city in consequence, but it revealed to the whole world the
noble gallantry of Athens and the baseness of Philip. For all saw that
he, the ally of the Byzantines, was besieging them--what could be more
shameful or revolting? {94} and on the other hand, it was seen that
you, who might fairly have urged many well-founded complaints against
them for their inconsiderate conduct[n] towards you at an earlier
period, not only refused to remember your grudge and to abandon the
victims of aggression, but actually delivered them; and in consequence
of this, you won glory and goodwill on all hands. And further, though
every one knows that you have crowned many public men before now, no
one can name any but myself--that is to say, any public counsellor and
orator--for whose merits the city has received a crown.

{95} In order to prove to you, also, that the slanders which he uttered
against the Euboeans and Byzantines, as he recalled to you any
ill-natured action that they had taken towards you in the past, are
disingenuous calumnies, not only because they are false (for this, I
think, you may all be assumed to know), but also because, however true
they might be, it was still to your advantage to deal with the
political situation as I have done, I desire to describe, and that
briefly, one or two of the noble deeds which this city has done in your
own time. For an individual and a State should strive always, in their
respective spheres, to fashion their future conduct after the highest
examples that their past affords. {96} Thus, men of Athens, at a time
when the Spartans were masters of land and sea,[n] and were retaining
their hold, by means of governors and garrisons, upon the country all
round Attica--Euboea, Tanagra, all Boeotia, Megara, Aegina, Ceos, and
the other islands--and when Athens possessed neither ships nor walls,
you marched forth to Haliartus, and again, not many days later, to
Corinth, though the Athenians of that day might have borne a heavy
grudge against both the Corinthians and the Thebans for the part they
had played in reference to the Deceleian War.[n] {97} But they bore no
such grudge. Far from it! And neither of these actions, Aeschines, was
taken by them to help benefactors; nor was the prospect before them
free from danger. Yet they did not on that account sacrifice those who
fled to them for help. For the sake of glory and honour they were
willing to expose themselves to the danger; and it was a right and a
noble spirit that inspired their counsels. For the life of all men must
end in death, though a man shut himself in a chamber and keep watch;
but brave men must ever set themselves to do that which is noble, with
their joyful hope for their buckler, and whatsoever God gives, must
bear it gallantly. {98} Thus did your forefathers, and thus did the
elder among yourselves: for, although the Spartans were no friends or
benefactors of yours, but had done much grievous wrong to the city,
yet, when the Thebans, after their victory at Leuctra, attempted to
annihilate them, you prevented it, not terrified by the strength or the
reputation which the Thebans then enjoyed, nor reckoning up what the
men had done to you, for whom you were to face this peril. {99} And
thus, as you know, you revealed to all the Hellenes, that whatever
offences may be committed against you, though under all other
circumstances you show your resentment of them, yet if any danger to
life or freedom overtakes the transgressors, you will bear no grudge
and make no reckoning. Nor was it in these instances only that you were
thus disposed. For once more, when the Thebans were appropriating
Euboea,[n] you did not look on while it was done; you did not call to
mind the wrong which had been done to you in the matter of Oropus[n] by
Themison and Theodorus: you helped even these; and it was then that the
city for the first time had voluntary trierarchs, of whom I was one.[n]
But I will not speak of this yet. {100} And although to save the island
was itself a noble thing to do, it was a yet nobler thing by far, that
when their lives and their cities were absolutely in your power, you
gave them back, as it was right to do, to the very men who had offended
against you, and made no reckoning, when such trust had been placed in
you, of the wrongs which you had suffered. I pass by the innumerable
instances which I might still give--battles at sea, expeditions [by
land, campaigns] both long ago and now in our day; in all of which the
object of the city has been to defend the freedom and safety of the
other Hellenic peoples. {101} And so, when in all these striking
examples I had beheld the city ever ready to strive in defence of the
interests of others, what was I likely to bid her do, what action was I
likely to recommend to her, when the debate to some extent concerned
her own interests? 'Why,' you would say, 'to remember her grudge
against those who wanted deliverance, and to look for excuses for
sacrificing everything!' And who would not have been justified in
putting me to death, if I had attempted to bring shame upon the city's
high traditions, though it were only by word? The deed itself you would
never have done, I know full well; for had you desired to do it, what
was there to hinder you? Were you not free so to act? Had you not these
men here to propose it?

{102} I wish now to return to the next in succession of my political
acts; and here again you must ask yourselves, what was the best thing
for the city? For, men of Athens, when I saw that your navy was
breaking up, and that, while the rich were obtaining exemption on the
strength of small payments,[n] citizens of moderate or small means were
losing all that they had; and further, that in consequence of these
things the city was always missing her opportunities; I enacted a law
in accordance with which I compelled the former--the rich--to do their
duty fairly; I put an end to the injustice done to the poor, and (what
was the greatest service of all to the State) I caused our preparations
to be made in time. {103} When I was indicted for this, I appeared
before you at the ensuing trial, and was acquitted; the prosecutor
failed to obtain the necessary fraction of the votes. But what sums do
you think the leaders of the Taxation-Boards, or those who stood second
or third, offered me, to induce me, if possible, not to enact the law,
or at least to let it drop and lie under sworn notice of
prosecution?[n] They offered sums so large, men of Athens, that I
should hesitate to mention them to you. It was a natural course for
them to take. {104} For under the former laws it was possible for them
to divide their obligation between sixteen persons, paying little or
nothing themselves, and grinding down their poorer fellow citizens:
while by my law each must pay down a sum calculated in proportion to
his property; and a man came to be charged with two warships, who had
previously been one of sixteen subscribers to a single one (for they
used now to call themselves no longer captains of their ships, but
subscribers). Thus there was nothing that they were not willing to
give, if only the new plan could be brought to nothing, and they could
escape being compelled to do their duty fairly. (_To the clerk_.) {105}
Now read me, first, the decree[n] in accordance with which I had to
meet the indictment; and then the lists of those liable under the
former law, and under my own, respectively. Read.

[_The decree is read_.]

{106} Now produce that noble list.

[_A list is read_.]

Now produce, for comparison with this, the list under my own law.

[_A list is read_.]

Was this, think you, but a trifling assistance which I rendered to the
poor among you? {107} Would the wealthy have spent but a trifling sum
to avoid doing their duty fairly? I am proud not only of having refused
all compromise upon the measure, not only of having been acquitted when
I was indicted, but also of having enacted a law which was beneficial,
and of having given proof of it in practice. For throughout the war the
armaments were equipped under my law, and no trierarch ever laid the
suppliants' branch[n] before you in token of grievance, nor took
sanctuary at Munychia; none was imprisoned by the Admiralty Board; no
warship was abandoned at sea and lost to the State, or left behind here
as unseaworthy. Under the former laws all these things used to happen;
{108} and the reason was that the obligation rested upon the poor, and
in consequence there were many cases of inability to discharge it. I
transferred the duties of the trierarchy from the poor to the rich; and
therefore every duty was properly fulfilled. Aye, and for this very
reason I deserve to receive praise--that I always adopted such
political measures as brought with them accessions of glory and honour
and power to the city. No measure of mine is malicious, harsh, or
unprincipled; none is degrading or unworthy of the city. The same
spirit will be seen both in my domestic and my international policy.
{109} For just as in home affairs I did not set the favour of the rich
above the rights of the many, so in international affairs I did not
embrace the gifts and the friendship of Philip, in preference to the
common interests of all the Hellenes.

It still remains for me, I suppose, to speak about the proclamation,
and about my examination. {110} The statement that I acted for the
best, and that I am loyal to you throughout and eager to do you good
service, I have proved, I think, sufficiently, by what I have said. At
the same time I am passing over the most important parts of my
political life and actions; for I conceive that I ought first to render
to you in their proper order my arguments in regard to the alleged
illegality itself: which done, even if I say nothing about the rest of
my political acts, I can still rely upon that personal knowledge of
them which each of you possesses.

{111} Of the arguments which the prosecutor jumbled together in utter
confusion with reference to the laws accompanying his indictment,[n] I
am quite certain that you could not follow the greater part, nor could
I understand them myself; but I will simply address you
straightforwardly upon the question of right. So far am I from claiming
(as he just now slanderously declared) to be free from the liability to
render an account, that I admit a life-long liability to account for
every part of my administration and policy. {112} But I do not admit
that I am liable for one single day--you hear me, Aeschines?--to
account for what I have given to the People as a free-will offering out
of my private estate; nor is any one else so liable, not even if he is
one of the nine archons. What law is so replete with injustice and
churlishness, that when a man has made a present out of his private
property and done an act of generosity and munificence, it deprives him
of the gratitude due to him, hales him before a court of disingenuous
critics, and sets them to audit accounts of sums which he himself has
given? There is no such law. If the prosecutor asserts that there is,
let him produce it, and I will resign myself and say no more. {113} But
the law does not exist, men of Athens; this is nothing but an
informer's trick on the part of Aeschines, who, because I was
Controller of the Festival Fund when I made this donation, says,
'Ctesiphon proposed a vote of thanks to him when he was still liable to
account.' The vote of thanks was not for any of the things for which I
was liable to account; it was for my voluntary gift, and your charge is
a misrepresentation. 'Yes,' you say, 'but you were also a Commissioner
of Fortifications.' I was, and thanks were rightly accorded me on the
very ground that, instead of charging the sums which I spent, I made a
present of them. A statement of account, it is true, calls for an audit
and scrutineers; but a free gift deserves gratitude and thanks; and
that is why the defendant proposed this motion in my favour. {114} That
this principle is not merely laid down in the laws, but rooted in your
national character, I shall have no difficulty in proving by many
instances. Nausicles,[n] to begin with, has often been crowned by you,
while general, for sacrifices which he had made from his private funds.
Again, when Diotimus[n] gave the shields, and Charidemus[n] afterwards,
they were crowned. And again, Neoptolemus here, while still director of
many public works, has received honours for his voluntary gifts. It
would really be too bad, if any one who held any office must either be
debarred thereby from making a present to the State, or else, instead
of receiving due gratitude, must submit accounts of the sums given.
{115} To prove the truth of my statements, (_to the clerk_) take and
read the actual decrees which were passed in honour of these persons.
Read.

{116} [_Two decrees are read_.]

{117} Each of these persons, Aeschines, was accountable as regards the
office which he held, but not as regards the services for which he was
crowned. Nor am I, therefore; for I presume that I have the same rights
as others with reference to the same matters. I made a voluntary gift.
For this I receive thanks; for I am not liable to account for what I
gave. I was holding office. True, and I have rendered an account of my
official expenditure, but not of what I gave voluntarily. Ah! but I
exercised my office iniquitously! What? and you were there, when the
auditors brought me before them, and did not accuse me?

{118} Now that the court may see that the prosecutor himself bears me
witness that I was crowned for services of which I was not liable to
render an account, (_to the clerk_) take and read the decree which was
proposed in my honour, in its entirety. (_To the jury_.) The points
which he has omitted to indict in the Council's resolution will show
that the charges which he does make are deliberate misrepresentations.
(_To the clerk_.) Read.

[_The decree is read_.]

{119} My donations then, were these, of which you have not made one the
subject of indictment. It is the reward for these, which the Council
states to be my due, that you attack. You admit that it was legal to
accept the gifts offered, and you indict as illegal the return of
gratitude for them. In Heaven's name, what must the perfect scoundrel,
the really heaven-detested, malignant being be like? Must he not be a
man like this?

{120} But as regards the proclamation in the theatre, I pass by the
fact that ten thousand persons have been thus proclaimed on ten
thousand different occasions, and that my own name has often been so
proclaimed before. But, in Heaven's name, Aeschines, are you so
perverse and stupid, that you cannot grasp the fact that the recipient
of the crown feels the same pride wherever the crown is proclaimed, and
that it is for the benefit of those who confer it that the proclamation
is made in the theatre? For those who hear are stimulated to do good
service to the State, and commend those who return gratitude for such
service even more than they commend the recipient of the crown. That is
why the city has enacted this law. (_To the clerk_.) Take the law
itself and read it.

[_The law is read_.]

{121} Do you hear, Aeschines, the plain words of the law? 'Except such
as the People or the Council shall resolve so to proclaim. But let
these be proclaimed.' Why, wretched man, do you lay this dishonest
charge? Why do you invent false arguments? Why do you not take
hellebore[n] to cure you? What? Are you not ashamed to bring a case
founded upon envy, not upon any crime--to alter some of the laws, and
to leave out parts of others, when they ought surely, in justice, to be
read entire to those who have sworn to give their votes in accordance
with the laws? {122} And then, while you act in this way, you enumerate
the qualities which should be found in a friend of the People, as if
you had contracted for a statue, and discovered on receiving it that it
had not the features required by the contract; or as if a friend of the
People was known by a definition, and not by his works and his
political measures! And you shout out expressions, proper and improper,
like a reveller on a cart[n]--expressions which apply to you and your
house, not to me. I will add this also, men of Athens. {123} The
difference between abuse and accusation is, I imagine, that an
accusation is founded upon crimes, for which the penalties are assigned
by law; abuse, upon such slanders as their own character leads enemies
to utter about one another. And I conceive that our forefathers built
these courts of law, not that we might assemble you here and revile one
another with improper expressions suggested by our adversary's private
life, but that we might convict any one who happens to have committed
some crime against the State. {124} Aeschines knew this as well as I;
and yet he chose to make a ribald attack instead of an accusation. At
the same time, it is not fair that he should go off without getting as
much as he gives, even in this respect; and when I have asked him one
question, I will at once proceed to the attack. Are we to call you,
Aeschines, the enemy of the State, or of myself? Of myself, of course.
What? And when you might have exacted the penalty from me, on behalf of
your fellow countrymen, according to the laws--at public examinations,
by indictment, by all other forms of trial--did you always omit to do
so? {125} And yet to-day, when I am unassailable upon every ground--on
the ground of law, of lapse of time, of the statutable limit,[n] of the
many previous trials which I have undergone upon every charge, without
having once been convicted of any crime against you to this day--and
when the city must necessarily share to a greater or smaller degree in
the glory of acts which were really acts of the people, have you
confronted me upon such an issue as this? Take care lest, while you
profess to be _my_ enemy, you prove to be the enemy of your fellow
countrymen!

{126} Since then I have shown you all what is the vote which religion
and justice demand of you, I am now obliged, it would seem, by the
slanders which he has uttered (though I am no lover of abuse) to reply
to his many falsehoods by saying just what is absolutely necessary
about himself, and showing who he is, and whence he is sprung, that he
so lightly begins to use bad language, pulling to pieces certain
expressions of mine, when he has himself used expressions which any
respectable man would have shrunk from uttering; {127} for if the
accuser were Aeacus or Rhadamanthus or Minos,[n] instead of a
scandal-monger,[n] an old hand in the marketplace,[n] a pestilent
clerk, I do not believe that he would have spoken thus, or produced
such a stock of ponderous phrases, crying aloud, as if he were acting a
tragedy, 'O Earth and Sun and Virtue,'[n] and the like; or again,
invoking 'Wit and Culture, by which things noble and base are discerned
apart'--for, of course, you heard him speaking in this way. {128} Scum
of the earth! What have you or yours to do with virtue? How should
_you_ discern what is noble and what is not? Where and how did you get
your qualification to do so? What right have _you_ to mention culture
anywhere? A man of genuine culture would not only never have asserted
such a thing of himself, but would have blushed to hear another do so:
and those who, like you, fall far short of it, but are tactless enough
to claim it, succeed only in causing distress to their hearers, when
they speak--not in seeming to be what they profess.

{129} But though I am not at a loss to know what to say about you and
yours, I am at a loss to know what to mention first. Shall I tell
first[n] how your father Tromes was a slave in the house of Elpias, who
kept an elementary school near the temple of Theseus, and how he wore
shackles and a wooden halter? Or how your mother, by celebrating her
daylight nuptials in her hut near the shrine of the Hero of the
Lancet,[n] was enabled to rear you, her beautiful statue, the prince of
third-rate actors? But these things are known to all without my telling
them. Shall I tell how Phormio, the ship's piper, the slave of Dion of
Phrearrii, raised her up out of this noble profession? But, before God
and every Heavenly Power, I shudder lest in using expressions which are
fitly applied to you, I may be thought to have chosen a subject upon
which it ill befits myself to speak. {130} So I will pass this by, and
will begin with the acts of his own life; for they were not like any
chance actions,[n] but such as the people curses. For only
lately--lately, do I say? only yesterday or the day before--did he
become at once an Athenian and an orator, and by the addition of two
syllables converted his father from Tromes into Atrometus, and gave his
mother the imposing name of Glaucothea,[n] when every one knows that
she used to be called Empusa[n]--a name which was obviously given her
because there was nothing that she would not do or have done to her;
for how else should she have acquired it? {131} Yet, in spite of this,
you are of so ungrateful and villainous a nature, that though, thanks
to your countrymen, you have risen from slavery to freedom, and from
poverty to wealth, far from feeling gratitude to them, you devote your
political activity to working against them as a hireling. I will pass
over every case in which there is any room for the contention that he
has spoken in the interests of the city, and will remind you of the
acts which he was manifestly proved to have done for the good of her
enemies.

{132} Which of you has not heard of Antiphon,[n] who was struck off the
list of citizens,[n] and came into the city in pursuance of a promise
to Philip that he would burn the dockyards? I found him concealed in
the Peiraeus, and brought him before the Assembly; but the malignant
Aeschines shouted at the top of his voice, that it was atrocious of me,
in a democratic country, to insult a citizen who had met with
misfortune, and to go to men's houses without a decree;[n] and he
obtained his release. {133} And unless the Council of Areopagus had
taken notice of the matter, and, seeing the inopportuneness of the
ignorance which you had shown, had made a further search for the man,
and arrested him, and brought him before you again, a man of that
character would have been snatched out of your hands, and would have
evaded punishment, and been sent out of the country by this pompous
orator. As it was, you tortured and executed him--and so ought you also
to have treated Aeschines. {134} The Council of Areopagus knew the part
which he had played in this affair; and for this reason, when, owing to
the same ignorance which so often leads you to sacrifice the public
interests, you elected him[n] to advocate your claims in regard to the
Temple of Delos, the Council (since you had appointed it to assist you
and entrusted it with full authority to act in the matter) immediately
rejected Aeschines as a traitor, and committed the case to Hypereides.
When the Council took this step, the members took their votes from the
altar,[n] and not one vote was given for this abominable man. {135} To
prove that what I say is true, (_to the clerk_) call the witnesses who
testify to it.

[_The witnesses are called_.]

{136} Thus when the Council rejected him from the office of advocate,
and committed the case to another, it declared at the same time that he
was a traitor, who wished you ill.

Such was one of the public appearances of this fine fellow, and such
its character--so like the acts with which he charges me, is it not?
Now recall a second. For when Philip sent Python of Byzantium,[n] and
with him envoys from all his allies, in the hope of putting the city to
shame and showing her to be in the wrong, I would not give way before
the torrent of insolent rhetoric which Python poured out upon you, but
rose and contradicted him, and would not betray the city's rights, but
proved the iniquity of Philip's actions so manifestly, that even his
own allies rose up and admitted it. But Aeschines supported Python; he
gave testimony in opposition to his country, and that testimony false.

{137} Nor was this sufficient for him; for again after this he was
detected going to meet Anaxinus[n] the spy in the house of Thrason. But
surely one who met the emissary of the enemy alone and conferred with
him, must himself have been already a born spy and an enemy of his
country. To prove the truth of what I say, (_to the clerk_) call the
witnesses to these facts.

[_The witnesses are called_.]

{138} There are still an infinite number of things which I might relate
of him; but I pass them over. For the truth is something like this. I
could still point to many instances in which he was found to be serving
our enemies during that period, and showing his spite against me. But
you do not store such things up in careful remembrance, to visit them
with the indignation which they deserve; but, following a bad custom,
you have given great freedom to any one who wishes to trip up the
proposer of any advantageous measure by dishonest charges--bartering,
as you do, the advantage of the State for the pleasure and
gratification which you derive from invective; and so it is always
easier and safer to be a hireling in the service of the enemy, than a
statesman who has chosen to defend your cause.

{139} To co-operate with Philip before we were openly at war with him
was --I call Earth and Heaven to witness--atrocious enough. How could
it be otherwise--against his own country? Nevertheless, concede him
this, if you will, concede him this. But when the corn-ships had been
openly plundered, and the Chersonese was being ravaged, and the man was
on the march against Attica; when the position of affairs was no longer
in doubt, and war had begun; what action did this malignant mouther of
verses ever do for your good? He can point to none. There is not a
single decree, small or great, with reference to the interests of the
city, standing in the name of Aeschines. If he asserts that there is,
let him produce it in the time allotted to me. But no such decree
exists. In that case, however, only two alternatives are possible:
either he had no fault to find at the time with my policy, and
therefore made no proposal contrary to it; or else he was seeking the
advantage of the enemy, and therefore refrained from bringing forward
any better policy than mine.

{140} Did he then abstain from speaking, as he abstained from proposing
any motion, when any mischief was to be done? On the contrary, no one
else had a chance of speaking. But though, apparently, the city could
endure everything else, and he could do everything else unobserved,
there was one final deed which was the culmination of all that he had
done before. Upon this he expended all that multitude of words, as he
went through the decrees relating to the Amphisseans, in the hope of
distorting the truth. But the truth cannot be distorted. It is
impossible. Never will you wash away the stain of your actions there!
You will not say enough for that!

{141} I call upon all the gods and goddesses who protect this land of
Attica, in the presence of you all, men of Athens; and upon Apollo of
Pytho, the paternal deity[n] of this city, and I pray to them all, that
if I should speak the truth to you--if I spoke it at that very time
without delay, in the presence of the people, when first I saw this
abominable man setting his hand to this business (for I knew it, I knew
it at once),--that then they may give me good fortune and life: but if,
to gratify my hatred or any private quarrel, I am now bringing a false
accusation against this man, then they may take from me the fruition of
every blessing.

{142} Why have I uttered this imprecation with such vehemence and
earnestness? Because, although I have documents, lying in the public
archives, by which I will prove the facts clearly; although I know that
you remember what was done; I have still the fear that he may be
thought too insignificant a man to have done all the evil which he has
wrought--as indeed happened before, when he caused the ruin of the
unhappy Phocians by the false report which he brought home. {143} For
the war at Amphissa, which was the cause of Philip's coming to Elateia,
and of one being chosen[n] commander of the Amphictyons, who overthrew
the fortunes of the Hellenes--_he_ it is who helped to get it up; he,
in his sole person, is to blame for disasters to which no equal can be
found. I protested at the time, and cried out, before the Assembly,
'You are bringing war into Attica, Aeschines--an Amphictyonic War.' But
a packed group of his supporters refused to let me speak, while the
rest were amazed, and imagined that I was bringing a baseless charge
against him, out of personal animosity. {144} But what the true nature
of these proceedings was, men of Athens--why this plan was contrived,
and how it was executed--you must hear from me to-day, since you were
prevented from doing so at the time. You will behold a business
cunningly organized; you will advance greatly in your knowledge of
public affairs; and you will see what cleverness there was in Philip.

{145} Philip had no prospect of seeing the end of the war with you, or
ridding himself of it, unless he could make the Thebans and Thessalians
enemies of Athens. For although the war was being wretchedly and
inefficiently conducted by your generals, he was nevertheless suffering
infinite damage from the war itself and from the freebooters. The
exportation of the produce of his country and the importation of what
he needed were both impossible. {146} Moreover, he was not at that time
superior to you at sea, nor could he reach Attica, if the Thessalians
would not follow him, or the Thebans give him a passage through their
country; and although he was overcoming in the field the generals whom
you sent out, such as they were (for of this I say nothing), he found
himself suffering from the geographical conditions themselves, and from
the nature of the resources[n] which either side possessed. {147} Now
if he tried to encourage either the Thessalians or the Thebans to march
against you in order to further his own quarrel, no one, he thought,
would pay any attention to him; but if he adopted their own common
grounds of action and were chosen commander, he hoped to find it easier
to deceive or to persuade them, as the case might be. What then does he
do? He attempts (and observe with what skill) to stir up an
Amphictyonic War, and a disturbance in connexion with the meeting of
the Council. {148} For he thought that they would at once find that
they needed his help, to deal with these. Now if one of his own or his
allies' representatives on the Council[n] brought the matter forward,
he thought that both the Thebans and the Thessalians would regard the
proceeding with suspicion, and that all would be on their guard: but if
it was an Athenian, sent by you, his adversaries, that did so, he would
easily escape detection--as, in fact, happened. {149}* How then did he
manage this? He hired Aeschines. No one, I suppose, either realized
beforehand what was going on or guarded against it--that is how such
affairs are usually conducted here; Aeschines was nominated a delegate
to the Council; three or four people held up their hands for him, and
he was declared elected. But when, bearing with him the prestige of
this city, he reached the Amphictyons, he dismissed and closed his eyes
to all other considerations, and proceeded to perform the task for
which he had been hired. He composed and recited a story, in attractive
language, of the way in which the Cirrhaean territory had come to be
dedicated; {150} and with this he persuaded the members of the Council,
who were unused to rhetoric and did not foresee what was about to
happen, that they should resolve to make the circuit of the
territory,[n] which the Amphisseans said they were cultivating because
it was their own, while he alleged that it was part of the consecrated
land. The Locrians were not bringing any suit against us, or taking any
such action as (in order to justify himself) he now falsely alleges.
You may know this from the following consideration. It was clearly
impossible[n] for the Locrians to bring a suit against Athens to an
actual issue, without summoning us. Who then served the summons upon
us? Before what authority was it served? Tell us who knows: point to
him. You cannot do so. It was a hollow and a false pretext of which you
thus made a wrongful use. {151} While the Amphictyons were making the
circuit of the territory in accordance with Aeschines' suggestion, the
Locrians fell upon them and came near to shooting them all down with
their spears; some of the members of the Council they even carried off
with them. And now that complaints and hostilities had been stirred up
against the Amphisseans, in consequence of these proceedings, the
command was first held by Cottyphus, and his force was drawn from the
Amphictyonic Powers alone. But since some did not come, and those who
came did nothing, the men who had been suborned for the
purpose--villains of long standing, chosen from the Thessalians and
from the traitors in other States--took steps with a view to entrusting
the affair to Philip, as commander, at the next meeting of the Council.
{152} They had adopted arguments of a persuasive kind. Either, they
said, the Amphictyons must themselves contribute funds, maintain
mercenaries, and fine those who refused to do so; or they must elect
Philip. To make a long story short, the result was that Philip was
appointed. And immediately afterwards, having collected a force and
crossed the Pass, ostensibly on his way to the territory of Cirrha, he
bids a long farewell to the Cirrhaeans and Locrians, and seizes
Elateia. {153} Now if the Thebans had not changed their policy at once,
upon seeing this, and joined us, the trouble would have descended upon
the city in full force, like a torrent in winter. As it was, the
Thebans checked him for the moment; chiefly, men of Athens, through the
goodwill of some Heavenly Power towards us; but secondarily, so far as
it lay in one man's power, through me also. (_To the clerk_.) Now give
me the decrees in question, and the dates of each proceeding; (_to the
jury_) that you may know what trouble this abominable creature stirred
up, unpunished. (_To the clerk_.) Read me the decrees.

{154} [_The decrees of the Amphictyons are read_.]

{155} (_To the clerk_.) Now read the dates of these proceedings. (_To
the jury_.) They are the dates at which Aeschines was delegate to the
Council. (_To the clerk_.) Read.

[_The dates are read_.]

{156} Now give me the letter which Philip sent to his allies in the
Peloponnese, when the Thebans failed to obey his summons. For from
this, too, you may clearly see that he concealed the real reason for
his action--the fact that he was taking measures against Hellas and the
Thebans and yourselves--and pretended to represent the common cause and
the will of the Amphictyons. And the man who provided him with all
these occasions and pretexts was Aeschines. (_To the clerk_.) Read.

{157} [_Philip's letter is read_.]

{158} You see that he avoids the mention of his own reasons for action,
and takes refuge in those provided by the Amphictyons. Who was it that
helped him to prepare such a case? Who put such pretexts at his
disposal? Who is most to blame for the disasters that have taken place?
Is it not Aeschines? And so, men of Athens, you must not go about
saying that Hellas has suffered such things as these at the hands of
one man.[n] I call Earth and Heaven to witness, that it was at the
hands, not of one man, but of many villains in each State. {159} And of
these Aeschines is one; and, had I to speak the truth without any
reserve, I should not hesitate to describe him as the incarnate curse
of all alike--men, regions or cities--that have been ruined since then.
For he who supplied the seed is responsible for the crop. I wonder that
you did not turn away your eyes at the very sight of him: but a cloud
of darkness seems to hang between you and the truth.

{160} I find that in dealing with the measures taken by Aeschines for
the injury of his country, I have reached the time when I must speak of
my own statesmanship in opposition to these measures; and it is fair
that you should listen to this, for many reasons, but above all because
it will be a shameful thing, if, when I have faced the actual realities
of hard work for you, you will not even suffer the story of them to be
told. {161} For when I saw the Thebans, and (I may almost say)
yourselves as well, being led by the corrupt partisans of Philip in
either State to overlook, without taking a single precaution against
it, the thing which was really dangerous to both peoples and needed
their utmost watchfulness--the unhindered growth of Philip's power;
while, on the contrary, you were quite ready to entertain ill-feeling
and to quarrel with one another; I kept unceasing watch to prevent
this. Nor did I rely only on my own judgement in thinking that this was
what your interest required. {162} I knew that Aristophon, and
afterwards Eubulus, always wished to bring about this friendly union,
and that, often as they opposed one another in other matters, they
always agreed in this. Cunning fox! While they lived, you hung about
them and flattered them; yet now that they are dead, you do not see
that you are attacking them. For your censure of my policy in regard to
Thebes is far more a denunciation of them than of me, since they were
before me in approving of that alliance. {163} But I return to my
previous point--that it was when Aeschines had brought about the war at
Amphissa, and the others, his accomplices, had effectually helped him
to create the ill-feeling against the Thebans, that Philip marched
against us. For it was to render this possible that their attempt to
throw the two cities into collision was made; and had we not roused
ourselves a little before it was too late, we should never have been
able to regain the lost ground; to such a length had these men carried
matters. What the relations between the two peoples already were, you
will know when you have heard these decrees and replies. (_To the
clerk_.) Take these and read them.

{164, 165} [_The decrees are read_.]

{166} (_To the clerk_.) Now read the replies.

{167} [_The replies are read_.]

{168} Having established such relations between the cities, through the
agency of these men, and being elated by these decrees and replies,
Philip came with his army and seized Elateia, thinking that under no
circumstances whatever should we and the Thebans join in unison after
this. And though the commotion which followed in the city is known to
you all, let me relate to you briefly just the bare facts.

{169} It was evening, and one had come to the Prytanes[n] with the news
that Elateia had been taken. Upon this they rose up from supper without
delay; some of them drove the occupants out of the booths in the
market-place and set fire to the wicker-work;[n] others sent for the
generals and summoned the trumpeter; and the city was full of
commotion. On the morrow, at break of day, the Prytanes summoned the
Council to the Council-Chamber, while you made your way to the
Assembly; and before the Council had transacted its business and passed
its draft-resolution,[n] the whole people was seated on the
hill-side.[n] {170} And now, when the Council had arrived, and the
Prytanes had reported the intelligence which they had received, and had
brought forward the messenger, and he had made his statement, the
herald proceeded to ask, 'Who wishes to speak?' But no one came
forward; and though the herald repeated the question many times, still
no one rose, though all the generals were present, and all the orators,
and the voice of their country was calling for some one to speak for
her deliverance. For the voice of the herald, uttered in accordance
with the laws, is rightly to be regarded as the common voice of our
country. {171} And yet, if it was for those to come forward who wished
for the deliverance of the city, all of you and all the other Athenians
would have risen, and proceeded to the platform, for I am certain that
you all wished for her deliverance. If it was for the wealthiest, the
Three Hundred[n] would have risen; and if it was for those who had both
these qualifications--loyalty to the city and wealth--then those would
have risen, who subsequently made those large donations; for it was
loyalty and wealth that led them so to do. {172} But that crisis and
that day called, it seems, not merely for a man of loyalty and wealth,
but for one who had also followed the course of events closely from the
first, and had come to a true conclusion as to the motive and the aim
with which Philip was acting as he was. For no one who was unacquainted
with these, and had not scrutinized them from an early period, was any
the more likely, for all his loyalty and wealth, to know what should be
done, or to be able to advise you. {173} The man who was needed was
found that day in me. I came forward and addressed you in words which I
ask you to listen to with attention, for two reasons--first, because I
would have you realize that I was the only orator or politician who did
not desert his post as a loyal citizen in the hour of danger, but was
found there, speaking and proposing what your need required, in the
midst of the terror; and secondly, because by the expenditure of a
small amount of time, you will be far better qualified for the future
in the whole art of political administration. {174} My words then were
these: 'Those who are unduly disturbed by the idea that Philip can
count upon the support of Thebes do not, I think, understand the
present situation. For I am quite sure that, if this were so, we should
have heard of his being, not at Elateia, but on our own borders. At the
same time, I understand quite well, that he has come to prepare the way
for himself at Thebes. {175} Listen,' I said, 'while I tell you the
true state of affairs. Philip already has at his disposal all the
Thebans whom he could win over either by bribery or by deception; and
those who have resisted him from the first and are opposing him now, he
has no chance of winning. What then is his design and object in seizing
Elateia? He wishes, by making a display of force in their neighbourhood
and bringing up his army, to encourage and embolden his own friends,
and to strike terror into his enemies, that so they may either concede
out of terror what they now refuse, or may be compelled. {176} Now,' I
said, 'if we make up our minds at the present moment to remember any
ill-natured action which the Thebans may have done us, and to distrust
them on the assumption that they are on the side of our enemies, we
shall be doing, in the first place, just what Philip would pray for:
and further, I am afraid that his present opponents may then welcome
him, that all may philippize[n] with one consent, and that he and they
may march to Attica together. If, however, you follow my advice, and
give your minds to the problem before us, instead of to contentious
criticism of anything that I may say, I believe that I shall be able to
win your approval for my proposals, and to dispel the danger which
threatens the city. {177} What then must you do? You must first
moderate your present alarm, and then change your attitude, and be
alarmed, all of you, for the Thebans. They are far more within the
reach of disaster than we: it is they whom the danger threatens first.
Secondly, those who are of military age, with the cavalry, must march
to Eleusis,[n] and let every one see that you yourselves are in arms;
in order that those who sympathize with you in Thebes may be enabled to
speak in defence of the right, with the same freedom that their
opponents enjoy, when they see that, just as those who are trying to
sell their country to Philip have a force ready to help them at
Elateia, so those who would struggle for freedom have you ready at hand
to help them, and to go to their aid, if any one attacks them. {178}
Next I bid you elect ten envoys, and give them full authority, with the
generals, to decide the time of their own journey to Thebes, and to
order the march of the troops. But when the envoys arrive in Thebes,
how do I advise that they should handle the matter? I ask your special
attention to this. They must require nothing of the Thebans--to do so
at such a moment would be shameful; but they must undertake that we
will go to their aid, if they bid us do so, on the ground that they are
in extreme peril, and that we foresee the future better than they; in
order that, if they accept our offer and take our advice, we may have
secured our object, and our action may wear an aspect worthy of this
city; or, if after all we are unsuccessful, the Thebans may have
themselves to blame for any mistakes which they now make, while we
shall have done nothing disgraceful or ignoble.' {179} When I had
spoken these words, and others in the same strain, I left the platform.
All joined in commending these proposals; no one said a word in
opposition; and I did not speak thus, and then fail to move a motion;
nor move a motion, and then fail to serve as envoy; nor serve as envoy,
and then fail to persuade the Thebans. I carried the matter through in
person from beginning to end, and gave myself up unreservedly to meet
the dangers which encompassed the city. (_To the clerk_.) Bring me the
resolution which was then passed.

{180} But now, Aeschines, how would you have me describe your part, and
how mine, that day? Shall I call myself, as you would call me by way of
abuse and disparagement, _Battalus_?[n] and you, no ordinary hero even,
but a real stage-hero, _Cresphontes_ or _Creon_,[n] or--the character
which you cruelly murdered at Collytus[n]--_Oenomaus_? Then I, Battalus
of Paeania, proved myself of more value to my country in that crisis
than Oenomaus of Cothocidae. In fact you were of no service on any
occasion, while I played the part which became a good citizen
throughout. (_To the clerk_.) Read this decree.

{181-7} [_The decree of Demosthenes is read_.]

{188} This was the first step towards our new relations with Thebes,
and the beginning of a settlement. Up to this time the cities had been
inveigled into mutual hostility, hatred, and mistrust by these men. But
this decree caused the peril that encompassed the city to pass away
like a cloud. It was for an honest citizen, if he had any better plan
than mine, to make it public at the time, instead of attacking me now.
{189} The true counsellor and the dishonest accuser, unlike as they are
in everything, differ most of all in this: the one declares his opinion
before the event, and freely surrenders himself as responsible, to
those who follow his advice, to Fortune, to circumstances, to any
one.[n] The other is silent when he ought to speak, and then carps at
anything untoward that may happen. {190} That crisis, as I have said,
was the opportunity for a man who cared for his country, the
opportunity for honest speaking. But so much further than I need will I
go, that if any one can _now_ point to any better course--or any course
at all except that which I chose--I admit my guilt. If any one has
discovered any course to-day, which would have been for our advantage,
had we followed it at the time, I admit that it ought not to have
escaped me. But if there neither is nor was such a possibility; if even
now, even to-day, no one can mention any such course, what was the
counsellor of the people to do? Had he not to choose the best of the
plans which suggested themselves and were feasible? {191} This I did.
For the herald asked the question, Aeschines, 'Who wishes to speak?'
not 'Who wishes to bring accusations about the past?' nor 'Who wishes
to guarantee the future?' And while you sat speechless in the Assembly
throughout that period, I came forward and spoke. Since, however, you
did not do so then, at least inform us now, and tell us what words,
which should have been upon my lips, were left unspoken, what precious
opportunity, offered to the city, was left unused, by me? What alliance
was there, what course of action, to which I ought, by preference, to
have guided my countrymen?

{192} But with all mankind the past is always dismissed from
consideration, and no one under any circumstances proposes to
deliberate about it. It is the future or the present that make their
call upon a statesman's duty. Now at that time the danger was partly in
the future, and partly already present; and instead of cavilling
disingenuously at the results, consider the principle of my policy
under such circumstances. For in everything the final issue falls out
as Heaven wills; but the principle which he follows itself reveals the
mind of the statesman. {193} Do not, therefore, count it a crime on my
part, that Philip proved victorious in the battle. The issue of that
event lay with God, not with me. But show me that I did not adopt every
expedient that was possible, so far as human reason could calculate;
that I did not carry out my plan honestly and diligently, with
exertions greater than my strength could bear; or that the policy which
I initiated was not honourable, and worthy of Athens, and indeed
necessary: and then denounce me, but not before. {194} But if the
thunderbolt [or the storm] which fell has proved too mighty, not only
for us, but for all the other Hellenes, what are we to do? It is as
though a ship-owner, who had done all that he could to ensure safety,
and had equipped the ship with all that he thought would enable her to
escape destruction, and had then met with a tempest in which the
tackling had been strained or even broken to pieces, were to be held
responsible for the wreck of the vessel. 'Why,' he would say, 'I was
not steering the ship'--just as I was not the general[n]--'I had no
power over Fortune: she had power over everything.' But consider and
observe this point. {195} If it was fated that we should fare as we
did, even when we had the Thebans to help us in the struggle, what must
we have expected, if we had not had even them for our allies, but they
had joined Philip?--and this was the object for which Philip
employed[n] every tone that he could command. And if, when the battle
took place, as it did, three days' march from Attica, the city was
encompassed by such peril and terror, what should we have had to
expect, if this same disaster had occurred anywhere within the borders
of our own country? Do you realize that, as it was, a single day, and a
second, and a third gave us the power to rally, to collect our forces,
to take breath, to do much that made for the deliverance of the city:
but that had it been otherwise--it is not well, however, to speak of
things which we have not had to experience, thanks to the goodwill of
one of the gods, and to the protection which the city obtained for
herself in this alliance, which you denounce.

{196} The whole of this long argument, gentlemen of the jury, is
addressed to yourselves and to the circle of listeners outside the bar;
for to this despicable man it would have been enough to address a
short, plain sentence. If to you alone, Aeschines, the future was
clear, before it came, you should have given warning, when the city was
deliberating upon the subject; but if you had no such foreknowledge,
you have the same ignorance to answer for as others. Why then should
you make these charges against me, any more than I against you? {197}
For I have been a better citizen than you with regard to this very
matter of which I am speaking--I am not as yet talking of anything
else--just in so far as I gave myself up to the policy which all
thought expedient, neither shrinking from nor regarding any personal
risk; while you neither offered any better proposals than mine (for
then they would not have followed mine), nor yet made yourself useful
in advancing mine in any way. What the most worthless of men, the
bitterest enemy of the city, would do, you are found to have done, when
all was over; and at the same time as the irreconcilable enemies of the
city, Aristratus in Naxos, and Aristoleos in Thasos, are bringing the
friends of Athens to trial, Aeschines, in Athens itself, is accusing
Demosthenes. {198} But surely one who treasured up[n] the misfortunes
of the Hellenes, that he might win glory from them for himself,
deserved to perish rather than to stand as the accuser of another; and
one who has profited by the very same crisis as the enemies of the city
cannot possibly be loyal to his country. You prove it, moreover, by the
life you live, the actions you do, the measures you take --and the
measures, too, that you do not take. Is anything being done which seems
advantageous to the city? Aeschines is speechless. Has any obstruction,
any untoward event occurred? There you find Aeschines, like a rupture
or a sprain, which wakes into life, so soon as any trouble overtakes
the body.

{199} But since he bears so hardly upon the results, I desire to say
what may even be a paradox; and let no one, in the name of Heaven, be
amazed at the length to which I go, but give a kindly consideration to
what I say. Even if what was to come was plain to all beforehand; even
if all foreknew it; even if you, Aeschines, had been crying with a loud
voice in warning and protestation--you who uttered not so much as a
sound; even then, I say, it was not right for the city to abandon her
course, if she had any regard for her fame, or for our forefathers, or
for the ages to come. {200} As it is, she is thought, no doubt, to have
failed to secure her object--as happens to all alike, whenever God
wills it: but then, by abandoning in favour of Philip her claim to take
the lead of others, she must have incurred the blame of having betrayed
them all. Had she surrendered without a struggle those claims in
defence of which our forefathers faced every imaginable peril, who
would not have cast scorn upon you, Aeschines--upon you, I say; not, I
trust, upon Athens nor upon me? {201} In God's name, with what faces
should we have looked upon those who came to visit the city, if events
had come round to the same conclusion as they now have--if Philip had
been chosen as commander and lord of all, and we had stood apart, while
others carried on the struggle to prevent these things; and that,
although the city had never yet in time past preferred an inglorious
security to the hazardous vindication of a noble cause? {202} What
Hellene, what foreigner, does not know, that the Thebans, and the
Spartans, who were powerful still earlier, and the Persian king would
all gratefully and gladly have allowed Athens to take what she liked
and keep all that was her own, if she would do the bidding of another,
and let another take the first place in Hellas? {203} But this was not,
it appears, the tradition of the Athenians; it was not tolerable; it
was not in their nature. From the beginning of time no one had ever yet
succeeded in persuading the city to throw in her lot with those who
were strong, but unrighteous in their dealings, and to enjoy the
security of servitude. Throughout all time she has maintained her
perilous struggle for pre-eminence, honour, and glory. {204} And this
policy you look upon as so lofty, so proper to your own national
character, that, of your forefathers also, it is those who have acted
thus that you praise most highly. And naturally. For who would not
admire the courage of those men, who did not fear to leave their
land[n] and their city, and to embark upon their ships, that they might
not do the bidding of another; who chose for their general Themistocles
(who had counselled them thus), and stoned Cyrsilus to death, when he
gave his voice for submission to a master's orders--and not him alone,
for your wives stoned his wife also to death. {205} For the Athenians
of that day did not look for an orator or a general who would enable
them to live in happy servitude; they cared not to live at all, unless
they might live in freedom. For every one of them felt that he had come
into being, not for his father and his mother alone, but also for his
country. And wherein lies the difference? He who thinks he was born for
his parents alone awaits the death which destiny assigns him in the
course of nature: but he who thinks he was born for his country also
will be willing to die, that he may not see her in bondage, and will
look upon the outrages and the indignities that he must needs bear in a
city that is in bondage as more to be dreaded than death.

{206} Now were I attempting to argue that _I_ had induced you to show a
spirit worthy of your forefathers, there is not a man who might not
rebuke me with good reason. But in fact, I am declaring that such
principles as these are your own; I am showing that _before_ my time
the city displayed this spirit, though I claim that I, too, have had
some share, as your servant, in carrying out your policy in detail.
{207} But in denouncing the policy as a whole, in bidding you be harsh
with me, as one who has brought terrors and dangers upon the city, the
prosecutor, in his eagerness to deprive me of my distinction at the
present moment, is trying to rob you of praises that will last
throughout all time. For if you condemn the defendant on the ground
that my policy was not for the best, men will think that your own
judgement has been wrong, and that it was not through the unkindness of
fortune that you suffered what befell you. {208} But it cannot,[n] it
cannot be that you were wrong, men of Athens, when you took upon you
the struggle for freedom and deliverance. No! by those who at Marathon
bore the brunt of the peril--our forefathers. No! by those who at
Plataeae drew up their battle-line, by those who at Salamis, by those
who off Artemisium fought the fight at sea, by the many who lie in the
sepulchres where the People laid them, brave men, all alike deemed
worthy by their country, Aeschines, of the same honour and the same
obsequies--not the successful or the victorious alone! And she acted
justly. For all these have done that which it was the duty of brave men
to do; but their fortune has been that which Heaven assigned to each.
{209} Accursed, poring pedant![n] if you, in your anxiety to deprive me
of the honour and the kindness shown to me by my countrymen, recounted
trophies and battles and deeds of long ago--and of which of them did
this present trial demand the mention?--what spirit was I to take upon
me, when I mounted the platform, I who came forward to advise the city
how she should maintain her pre-eminence? Tell me, third-rate actor!
The spirit of one who would propose things unworthy of this people?
{210} I should indeed have deserved to die! For you too, men of Athens,
ought not to judge private suits and public in the same spirit. The
business transactions of everyday life must be viewed in the light of
the special law and practice associated with each; but the public
policy of statesmen must be judged by the principles that your
forefathers set before them. And if you believe that you should act
worthily of them, then, whenever you come into court to try a public
suit, each of you must imagine that with his staff[n] and his ticket
there is entrusted to him also the spirit of his country.

{211} But I have entered upon the subject of your forefathers'
achievements, and have passed over certain decrees and transactions. I
desire, therefore, to return to the point from which I digressed.

When we came to Thebes, we found envoys there from Philip, and from the
Thessalians and his other allies--our friends in terror, his full of
confidence. And to show you that I am not saying this now to suit my
own purpose, read the letter which we, your envoys, dispatched without
delay. {212} The prosecutor, however, has exercised the art of
misrepresentation to so extravagant a degree, that he attributes to
circumstances, not to me, any satisfactory result that was achieved;
but for everything that fell out otherwise, he lays the blame upon me
and the fortune that attends me. In his eyes, apparently, I, the
counsellor and orator, have no share in the credit for what was
accomplished as the result of oratory and debate; while I must bear the
blame alone for the misfortunes which we suffered in arms, and as a
result of generalship. What more brutal, more damnable
misrepresentation can be conceived? (_To the clerk_.) Read the letter.

[_The letter is read_.]

{213} When they had convened the Assembly, they gave audience to the
other side first, on the ground that they occupied the position of
allies; and these came forward and delivered harangues full of the
praises of Philip and of accusations against yourselves, recalling
everything that you had ever done in opposition to the Thebans. The sum
of it all was that they required the Thebans to show their gratitude
for the benefits which they had received from Philip, and to exact the
penalty for the injuries they had received from you, in whichever way
they preferred--either by letting them march through their country
against you, or by joining them in the invasion of Attica; and they
showed (as they thought) that the result of the course which they
advised would be that the herds and slaves and other valuables of
Attica would find their way into Boeotia; while the result of what (as
they alleged) you were about to propose would be that those of Boeotia
would be plundered in consequence of the war. {214} They said much
more, but all tending to the same effect. As for our reply, I would
give my whole life to tell it you in detail; but I fear lest, now that
those times have gone by, you may feel as if a very deluge[n] had
overwhelmed all, and may regard anything that is said on the subject as
vanity and vexation. But hear at least what we persuaded them to do,
and their answer to us. (_To the clerk_.) Take this and read it.

[_The answer of the Thebans is read_.]

{215} After this they invited and summoned you; you marched; you went
to their aid; and (to pass over the events which intervened) they
received you in so friendly a spirit that while their infantry and
cavalry were encamped outside the walls,[n] they welcomed your troops
into their houses, within the city, among their children and wives, and
all that was most precious to them. Three eulogies did the Thebans
pronounce upon you before the world that day, and those of the most
honourable kind--the first upon your courage, the second upon your
righteousness, the third upon your self-control. For when they chose to
side with you in the struggle, rather than against you, they judged
that your courage was greater, and your requests more righteous, than
Philip's; and when they placed in your power what they and all men
guard most jealously, their children and wives, they showed their
confidence in your self-control. {216} In all these points, men of
Athens, your conduct proved that their judgement had been correct. For
the force came into the city; but no one made a single complaint--not
even an unfounded complaint--against you; so virtuously did you conduct
yourselves. And twice you fought by their side, in the earliest
battles-the battle by the river[n] and the winter-battle[n]--and showed
yourselves, not only irreproachable, but even admirable, in your
discipline, your equipment, and your enthusiasm. These things called
forth expressions of thanks to you from other states, and sacrifices
and processions to the gods from yourselves. {217} And I should like to
ask Aeschines whether, when all this was happening, and the city was
full of pride and joy and thanksgiving, he joined in the sacrifices and
the rejoicing of the multitude, or whether he sat at home grieving and
groaning and angry at the good fortune of his country. If he was
present, and was seen in his place with the rest, surely his present
action is atrocious--nay, even impious--when he asks you, who have
taken an oath by the gods, to vote to-day that those very things were
not excellent, of whose excellence he himself on that day made the gods
his witnesses. If he was not present, then surely he deserves to die
many times, for grieving at the sight of the things which brought
rejoicing to others. (_To the clerk_.) Now read these decrees also.

[_The decrees ordering sacrifices are read_.]

{218} Thus we were occupied at that time with sacrifices, while the
Thebans were reflecting how they had been saved by our help; and those
who, in consequence of my opponents' proceedings, had expected that
they would themselves stand in need of help, found themselves, after
all, helping others, in consequence of the action they took upon my
advice. But what the tone of Philip's utterance was, and how greatly he
was confounded by what had happened, you can learn from his letter,
which he sent to the Peloponnese. (_To the clerk_.) Take these and read
them: (_to the jury_) that you may know what was effected by my
perseverance, by my travels, by the hardships I endured, by all those
decrees of which Aeschines spoke so disparagingly just now.

{219} You have had, as you know, many great and famous orators, men of
Athens, before my time--Callistratus himself, Aristophon, Cephalus,
Thrasybulus, and a vast number of others. Yet not one of these ever
gave himself up entirely to the State for any purpose: the mover of a
decree would not serve as ambassador, the ambassador would not move the
decree. Each left himself, at one and the same time, some respite from
work, and somewhere to lay the blame,[n] in case of accidents. {220}
'Well,' some one may say, 'did _you_ so excel them in force and
boldness, as to do everything yourself?' I do not say that. But so
strong was my conviction of the seriousness of the danger that had
overtaken the city, that I felt that I ought not to give my personal
safety any place whatever in my thoughts; it was enough for a man to do
his duty and to leave nothing undone. {221} And I was convinced with
regard to myself--foolishly perhaps, but still convinced--that no mover
would make a better proposal, no agent would execute it better, no
ambassador would be more eager or more honest in his mission, than I.
For these reasons, I assigned every one of these offices to myself.
(_To the clerk_.) Read Philip's letters.

[_Philip's letters are read_.]

{222} To this condition, Aeschines, was Philip reduced by my
statesmanship. This was the tone of his utterances, though before this
he used to threaten the city with many a bold word. For this I was
deservedly crowned by those here assembled, and though you were
present, you offered no opposition; while Diondas, who indicted the
proposer, did not obtain the necessary fraction of the votes. (_To the
clerk_.) Read me these decrees, (_to the jury)_ which escaped
condemnation, and which Aeschines did not even indict.

[_The decrees are read_.]

{223} These decrees, men of Athens, contain the very same syllables,
the very same words, as those which Aristonicus previously employed in
his proposal, and which Ctesiphon, the defendant, has employed now; and
Aeschines neither prosecuted the proposer of them himself, nor
supported the person who indicted him. Yet surely, if the charges which
he is bringing against me to-day are true, he would have had better
reason then for prosecuting Demomeles (the proposer of the decree) and
Hypereides, than he has for prosecuting Ctesiphon. And why? {224}
Because Ctesiphon can refer you to them--to the decision of the courts,
to the fact that Aeschines himself did not accuse them, though they had
moved exactly what he has moved now, to the prohibition by law of
further prosecution in such cases, and to many other facts: whereas
then the case would have been tried on its merits, before the defendant
had got the advantage of any such precedent. {225} But of course it was
impossible then for Aeschines to act as he has acted now--to select out
of many periods of time long past, and many decrees, matters which no
one either knew or thought would be mentioned to-day; to misrepresent
them, to change the dates, to put false reasons for the actions taken
in place of the true, and so appear to have a case. {226} At the time
this was impossible. Every word spoken then must have been spoken with
the truth in view, at no distance of time from the events, while you
still remembered all the facts and had them practically at your
fingers' ends. For that reason he evaded all investigation at the time;
and he has come before you now, in the belief (I fancy) that you will
make this a contest of oratory, instead of an inquiry into our
political careers, and that it is upon our eloquence, not upon the
interests of the city, that you will decide.

{227} Yes, and he ingeniously suggests that you ought to disregard the
opinion which you had of each of us when you left your homes and came
into court; and that just as, when you draw up an account in the belief
that some one has a balance, you nevertheless give way when you find
that the counters all disappear[n] and leave nothing over, so now you
should give your adhesion to the conclusion which emerges from the
argument. Now observe how inherently rotten everything that springs
from dishonesty seems to be. {228} By his very use of this ingenious
illustration he has confessed that to-day, at all events, our
respective characters are well established--that I am known to speak
for my country's good, and he to speak for Philip. For unless that were
your present conception of each of us, he would not have sought to
change your view. {229} And further, I shall easily show you that it is
not fair of him to ask you to alter this opinion--not by the use of
counters--that is not how a political reckoning is made--but by briefly
recalling each point to you, and treating you who hear me both as
auditors of my account and witnesses to the facts. For that policy of
mine which he denounces caused the Thebans, instead of joining Philip,
as all expected them to do, in the invasion of our country, to range
themselves by our side and stay his progress. {230} It caused the war
to take place not in Attica, but on the confines of Boeotia, eighty
miles from the city. Instead of our being harried and plundered by
freebooters from Euboea, it gave peace to Attica from the side of the
sea throughout the war. Instead of Philip's taking Byzantium and
becoming master of the Hellespont, it caused the Byzantines to join us
in the war against him. {231} Can such achievements, think you, be
reckoned up like counters? Are we to cancel them out,[n] rather than
provide that they shall be remembered for all time? I need not now add
that it fell to others to taste the barbarity which is to be seen in
every case in which Philip got any one finally into his power; while
you reaped (and quite rightly) the fruits of the generosity which he
feigned while he was bringing within his grasp all that remained. But I
pass this over.

{232} Nay, I will not even hesitate to say, that one who wished to
review an orator's career straightforwardly and without
misrepresentation, would not have included in his charges such matters
as you just now spoke of--making up illustrations, and mimicking words
and gestures. Of course the fortune which befell the Hellenes--surely
you see this?--was entirely due to my using this word instead of that,
or waving my hand in one direction rather than the other! {233} He
would have inquired, by reference to the actual facts, what resources
and what forces the city had at her command when I entered political
life; what I subsequently collected for her when I took control; and
what was the condition of our adversaries. Then if I had diminished our
forces, he would have proved that the fault lay at my door; but if I
had greatly increased them, he would have abstained from deliberate
misrepresentation. But since you have avoided such an inquiry, I will
undertake it; and do you, gentlemen, observe whether my argument is
just.

{234} The military resources of the city included the islanders--and
not all, but only the weakest. For neither Chios nor Rhodes nor Corcyra
was with us. Their contribution in money came to 45 talents, and these
had been collected in advance.[n] Infantry and cavalry, besides our
own, we had none. But the circumstance which was most alarming to us
and most favourable to our enemies was that these men had contrived
that all our neighbours should be more inclined to enmity than to
friendship--the Megareans, the Thebans, and the Euboeans. {235} Such
was the position of the city at the time; and what I say admits of no
contradiction. Now consider the position of Philip, with whom our
conflict lay. In the first place, he held absolute sway over his
followers--and this for purposes of war is the greatest of all
advantages. Next, his followers had their weapons in their hands
always. Then he was well off for money, and did whatever he resolved to
do, without giving warning of it by decrees, or debating about it in
public, or being put on trial by dishonest accusers, or defending
himself against indictments for illegality, or being bound to render an
account to any one. He was himself absolute master, commander, and lord
of all. {236} But I who was set to oppose him--for this inquiry too it
is just to make--what had I under my control? Nothing! For, to begin
with, the very right to address you--the only right I had--you extended
to Philip's hirelings in the same measure as to me; and as often as
they defeated me--and this frequently happened, whatever the reason on
each occasion--so often you went away leaving a resolution recorded in
favour of the enemy. {237} But in spite of all these disadvantages, I
won for you the alliance of the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians,
Thebans, Megareans, Leucadians, and Corcyreans, from whom were
collected--apart from their citizen-troops--15,000 mercenaries and
2,000 cavalry. {238} And I instituted a money-contribution, on as large
a scale as I could. But if you refer,[n] Aeschines, to what was fair as
between ourselves and the Thebans or the Byzantines or the Euboeans--if
at this time you talk to us of equal shares--you must be ignorant, in
the first place, of the fact that in former days also, out of those
ships of war, three hundred [n] in all, which fought for the Hellenes,
Athens provided two hundred, and did not think herself unfairly used,
or let herself be seen arraigning those who had counselled her action,
or taking offence at the arrangement. It would have been shameful. No!
men saw her rendering thanks to Heaven, because when a common peril
beset the Hellenes, she had provided double as much as all the rest to
secure the deliverance of all. {239} Moreover, it is but a hollow
benefit that you are conferring upon your countrymen by your dishonest
charges against me. Why do you tell them _now_, what course they ought
to have taken? Why did you not propose such a course at the time (for
you were in Athens, and were present) if it was possible in the midst
of those critical times, when we had to accept, not what we chose, but
what circumstances allowed; since there was one at hand, bidding
against us, and ready to welcome those whom we rejected, and to pay
them into the bargain.

{240} But if I am accused to-day, for what I have actually done, what
if at the time I had haggled over these details, and the other states
had gone off and joined Philip, and he had become master at once of
Euboea and Thebes and Byzantium? What do you think these impious men
would then have done? {241} What would they have said? Would they not
have declared that the states had been surrendered? that they had been
driven away, when they wished to be on your side? 'See,' they would
have said (would they not?), 'he has obtained through the Byzantines
the command of the Hellespont and the control of the corn trade of
Hellas; and through the Thebans a trying border war has been brought
into Attica; and owing to the pirates who sail from Euboea, the sea has
become unnavigable,' and much more in addition. {242} A villainous
thing, men of Athens, is the dishonest accuser always--villainous, and
in every way malignant and fault-finding! Aye, and this miserable
creature is a fox by nature, that has never done anything honest or
gentlemanly--a very tragical ape, a clodhopping Oenomaus, a counterfeit
orator! {243} Where is the profit to your country from your cleverness?
Do you instruct us now about things that are past? It is as though a
doctor, when he was paying his visits to the sick, were to give them no
advice or instructions to enable them to become free from their
illness, but, when one of his patients died and the customary
offerings[n] were being paid him, were to explain, as he followed to
the tomb, 'if this man had done such and such things, he would not have
died.' Crazy fool! Do you tell us this _now_?

{244} Nor again will you find that the defeat--if you exult at it, when
you ought to groan, accursed man!--was determined by anything that was
within my control. Consider the question thus. In no place to which I
was sent by you as ambassador, did I ever come away defeated by the
ambassadors of Philip--not from Thessaly nor from Ambracia, not from
the Illyrians nor from the Thracian princes, not from Byzantium nor
from any other place, nor yet, on the last occasion, from Thebes. But
every place in which his ambassadors were defeated in argument, he
proceeded to attack and subdue by force of arms. {245} Do you then
require those places at _my_ hands? Are you not ashamed to jeer at a
man as a coward, and in the same breath to require him to prove
superior, by his own unaided efforts, to the army of Philip--and that
with no weapons to use but words? For what else was at my disposal? I
could not control the spirit of each soldier, or the fortune of the
combatants, or the generalship displayed, of which, in your perversity,
you demand an account from me. {246} No; but every investigation that
can be made as regards those duties for which an orator should be held
responsible, I bid you make. I crave no mercy. And what are those
duties? To discern events in their beginnings, to foresee what is
coming, and to forewarn others. These things I have done. Again, it is
his duty to reduce to the smallest possible compass, wherever he finds
them, the slowness, the hesitation, the ignorance, the contentiousness,
which are the errors inseparably connected with the constitution of all
city-states; while, on the other hand, he must stimulate men to unity,
friendship, and eagerness to perform their duty. All these things I
have done, and no one can discover any dereliction of duty on my part
at any time. {247} If one were to ask any person whatever, by what
means Philip had accomplished the majority of his successes, every one
would reply that it was by means of his army, and by giving presents
and corrupting those in charge of affairs. Now I had no control or
command of the forces: neither, then, does the responsibility for
anything that was done in that sphere concern me. And further, in the
matter of being or not being corrupted by bribes, I have defeated
Philip. For just as the bidder has conquered one who accepts his money,
if he effects his purchase, so one who refuses to accept it [and is not
corrupted] has conquered the bidder. In all, therefore, in which I am
concerned, the city has suffered no defeat.

{248} The justification, then, with which I furnished the defendant for
such a motion as he proposed with regard to me, consisted (along with
many other points) of the facts which I have described, and others like
them. I will now proceed to that justification which all of you
supplied. For immediately after the battle, the People, who knew and
had seen all that I did, and now stood in the very midst of the peril
and terror, at a moment when it would not have been surprising if the
majority had shown some harshness towards me--the People, I say, in the
first place carried my proposals for ensuring the safety of the city;
and all the measures undertaken for its protection--the disposition of
the garrisons, the entrenchments, the funds for the
fortifications--were all provided for by decrees which I proposed. And,
in the second place, when the People chose a corn-commissioner, out of
all Athens they elected me. {249} Subsequently all those who were
interested in injuring me combined, and assailed me with indictments,
prosecutions after audit, impeachments, and all such proceedings--not
in their own names at first, but through the agency of men behind whom,
they thought, they would best be screened against recognition. For you
doubtless know and remember that during the early part of that period I
was brought to trial every day; and neither the desperation of
Sosicles, nor the dishonest misrepresentations of Philocrates,[n] nor
the frenzy of Diondas and Melantus, nor any other expedient, was left
untried by them against me. And in all these trials, thanks to the gods
above all, but secondarily to you and the rest of the Athenians, I was
acquitted--and justly; for such a decision is in accordance both with
truth and with the credit of jurors who have taken their oath, and
given a verdict in conformity with it. {250} So whenever I was
impeached, and you absolved me and did not give the prosecutor the
necessary fraction of the votes, you were voting that my policy was the
best. Whenever I was acquitted upon an indictment, it was a proof that
my motion and proposals were according to law. Whenever you set your
seal to my accounts at an audit, you confessed in addition that I had
acted throughout with uprightness and integrity. And this being so,
what epithet was it fitting or just that Ctesiphon should apply to my
actions? Was it not that which he saw applied by the People, and by
juries on their oath, and ratified by Truth in the judgement of all men?

{251} 'Yes,' he replies, 'but Cephalus'[n] boast was a noble one--that
he had never been indicted at all.' True, and a happy thing also it was
for him. But why should one who has often been tried, but has never
been convicted of crime, deserve to incur criticism any the more on
that account? Yet in truth, men of Athens, so far as Aeschines is
concerned, I too can make this noble boast that Cephalus made. For he
has never yet preferred or prosecuted any indictment against me; so
that by you at least, Aeschines, I am admitted to be no worse a citizen
than Cephalus.

{252} His want of feeling and his malignity may be seen in many ways,
and not least in the remarks which he made about fortune. For my part,
I think that, as a rule, when one human being reproaches another with
his fortune, he is a fool. For when he who thinks himself most
prosperous and fancies his fortune most excellent, does not know
whether it will remain so until the evening, how can it be right to
speak of one's fortune, or to taunt another with his? But since
Aeschines adopts a tone of lofty superiority upon this as upon many
other subjects, observe, men of Athens, how much more truthful and more
becoming in a human being my own remarks upon Aeschines' fortune will
be. {253} I believe that the fortune of this city is good; and I see
that the God of Dodona also declares this to you through his oracle.
But I think that the prevailing fortune of mankind as a whole to-day is
grievous and terrible. For what man, Hellene or foreigner, has not
tasted abundance of evil at this present time? {254} Now the fact that
we chose the noblest course, and that we are actually better off than
those Hellenes who expected to live in prosperity if they sacrificed
us, I ascribe to the good fortune of the city. But in so far as we
failed, in so far as everything did not fall out in accordance with our
wishes, I consider that the city has received the share which was due
to us of the fortune of mankind in general. {255} But my personal
fortune, and that of every individual among us, ought, I think, in
fairness to be examined with reference to our personal circumstances.
That is my judgement with regard to fortune, and I believe (as I think
you also do) that my judgement is correct and just. But Aeschines
asserts that my personal fortune has more influence than the fortune of
the city as a community--the insignificant and evil more than the good
and important! How can this be?

{256} If, however, you determine at all costs to scrutinize my fortune,
Aeschines, then compare it with your own; and if you find that mine is
better than yours, then cease to revile it. Examine it, then, from the
very beginning. And, in Heaven's name, let no one condemn me for any
want of good taste. For I neither regard one who speaks insultingly of
poverty, nor one who prides himself on having been brought up in
affluence, as a man of sense. But the slanders and misrepresentations
of this unfeeling man oblige me to enter upon a discussion of this
sort; and I will conduct it with as much moderation as the facts allow.

{257} I then, Aeschines, had the advantage as a boy of attending the
schools which became my position, and of possessing as much as one who
is to do nothing ignoble owing to poverty must possess. When I passed
out of boyhood, my life corresponded with my upbringing--I provided
choruses and equipped warships; I paid the war-tax; I neglected none of
the paths to distinction in public or private life, but gave my
services both to my country and my friends; and when I thought fit to
enter public life, the measures which I decided to adopt were of such a
character that I have been crowned many times both by my country and by
many other Hellenic peoples, while not even you, my enemies, attempt to
say that my choice was not at least an honourable one. {258} Such is
the fortune which has accompanied my life, and though I might say much
more about it, I refrain from doing so, in my anxiety not to annoy any
one by the expression of my pride. And you--the lofty personage, the
despiser of others--what has been your fortune when compared with
this?--the fortune, thanks to which you were brought up as a boy in the
depths of indigence, in close attendance upon the school along with
your father, pounding up the ink, sponging down the forms, sweeping the
attendants' room,[n] occupying the position of a menial, not of a
free-born boy! {259} Then, when you became a man, you used to read out
the books[n] to your mother at her initiations, and help her in the
rest of the hocus-pocus, by night dressing the initiated[n] in
fawnskins, drenching them from the bowl, purifying them and wiping them
down with the clay and the bran, and (when they were purified) bidding
them stand up and say, 'The ill is done, the good begun,' priding
yourself upon raising the shout of joy more loudly than any one had
ever done before--and I can believe it, for, when his voice is so loud,
you dare not imagine that his shout is anything but superlatively fine.
{260} But by day you used to lead those noble companies through the
streets, men crowned with fennel and white poplar,[n] throttling the
puff-adders and waving them over your head, crying out 'Euoe,
Saboe,'[n] and dancing to the tune of 'Hyes Attes, Attes
Hyes'--addressed by the old hags as leader, captain, ivy-bearer,
fan-bearer, and so on; and as the reward of your services getting sops
and twists and barley-bannocks! Who would not congratulate himself with
good reason on such things, and bless his own fortune? {261} But when
you were enrolled among your fellow parishioners,[n] by whatever means
(for of that I say nothing)--when, I say, you _were_ enrolled, you at
once selected the noblest of occupations, that of a clerk and servant
to petty magistrates. {262} And when at length you escaped from this
condition also, after yourself doing all that you impute to others, you
in no way--Heaven knows!--disgraced your previous record by the life
which you subsequently lived; for you hired yourself out to the actors
Simylus and Socrates--the Roarers, they were nicknamed --and played as
a third-rate actor, collecting figs[n] and bunches of grapes and
olives, like a fruiterer gathering from other peoples' farms, and
getting more out of this than out of the dramatic competitions in which
you were competing for your lives; for there was war without truce or
herald between yourselves and the spectators; and the many wounds you
received from them make it natural for you to jeer at the cowardice of
those who have had no such experiences. {263} But I will pass over all
that might be accounted for by your poverty, and proceed to my charges
against your character itself. For you chose a line of political action
(when at length it occurred to you to take up politics too), in
pursuance of which, when your country's fortune was good, you lived the
life of a hare, in fear and trembling, always expecting a thrashing for
the crimes which lay on your conscience; whereas all have seen your
boldness amid the misfortunes of others. {264} But when a man plucks up
courage at the death of a thousand of his fellow citizens, what does he
deserve to suffer at the hands of the living? I have much more to say
about him, but I will leave it unsaid. It is not for me, I think, to
mention lightly all the infamy and disgrace which I could prove to be
connected with him, but only so much as it is not discreditable to
myself to speak of.

{265} And now review the history of your life and of mine, side by
side--good temperedly, Aeschines, not unkindly: and then ask these
gentlemen which fortune, of the two, each of them would choose. You
taught letters; I attended school. You conducted initiations; I was
initiated. You were a clerk; I a member of the Assembly: you, a
third-rate actor, I a spectator of the play. You used to be driven from
the stage, while I hissed. Your political life has all been lived for
the good of our enemies, mine for the good of my country. {266} To pass
over all besides, even on this very day, I am being examined with
regard to my qualification for a crown--it is already admitted that I
am clear of all crimes; while you have already the reputation of a
dishonest informer, and for you the issue at stake is whether you are
to continue such practices, or to be stopped once for all, through
failing to obtain a fifth part of the votes. A good fortune indeed--can
you not see?--is that which has accompanied your life, that you should
denounce mine!

{267} And now let me read to you the evidence of the public burdens
which I have undertaken; and side by side with them, do you, Aeschines,
read the speeches which you used to murder--

  'I leave the abysm of death and gates of gloom,'[n]

and

  'Know that I am not fain ill-news to bring';

and 'evil in evil wise',[n] may you be brought to perdition, by the
gods above all, and then by all those here present, villainous citizen,
villainous third-rate actor that you are. (_To the clerk_.) Read the
evidence.

[_The evidence is read_.]

{268} Such was I in my relation to the State. And as to my private
life, unless you all know that I was open-hearted and generous and at
the disposal of all who had need of me, I am silent; I prefer to tell
you nothing, and to produce no evidence whatever, to show whether I
ransomed some from the enemy, or helped others to give their daughters
in marriage, or rendered any such services. {269} For my principle may
perhaps be expressed thus. I think that one who has received a kindness
ought to remember it all his life; but that the doer of the kindness
should forget it once for all; if the former is to behave like a good
man, the latter like one free from all meanness. To be always recalling
and speaking of one's own benefactions is almost like upbraiding the
recipients of them. I will do nothing of the kind, and will not be led
into doing so. Whatever be the opinion that has been formed of me in
these respects, with that I am content.

{270} But I desire to be rid of personal topics, and to say a little
more to you about public affairs. For if, Aeschines, you can mention
one of all those who dwell beneath the sun above us, Hellene or
foreigner, who has not suffered under the absolute sway, first of
Philip, and now of Alexander, so be it! I concede that it is my fortune
or misfortune, whichever you are pleased to call it, that has been to
blame for everything. {271} But if many of those who have never once
even seen me or heard my voice have suffered much and terribly--and not
individuals alone, but whole cities and nations--how much more just and
truthful it is to regard the common fortune (as it seems to be) of all
mankind, and a certain stubborn drift of events in the wrong direction,
as the cause of these sufferings. {272} Such considerations, however,
you discard. You impute the blame to me, whose political life has been
lived among my own fellow countrymen--and that, though you know that
your slander falls in part (if not entirely) upon all of them, and
above all upon yourself. For if, when I took part in the discussion of
public affairs, I had had absolute power, it would have been possible
for all of you, the other orators, to lay the blame on me. {273} But if
you were present at every meeting of the Assembly; if the city always
brought forward questions of policy for public consideration; if at the
time my policy appeared the best to every one, and above all to you
(for it was certainly from no goodwill that you relinquished to me the
hopes, the admiration, the honours, which all attached themselves to my
policy at that time, but obviously because the truth was too strong for
you, and you had nothing better to propose); then surely you are guilty
of monstrous iniquity, in finding fault to-day with a policy, than
which, at the time, you could propose nothing better. {274} Among all
the rest of mankind, I observe that some such principles as the
following have been, as it were, determined and ordained. If a man
commits a deliberate crime, indignation and punishment are ordained
against him. If he commits an involuntary mistake, instead of
punishment, he is to receive pardon. If, without crime or mistake, one
who has given himself up wholly to that which seems to be for the
advantage of all has, in company with all, failed to achieve success,
then it is just, not to reproach or revile such a man, but to
sympathize with him. {275} Moreover, it will be seen that all these
principles are not so ordained in the laws alone. Nature herself has
laid them down in her unwritten law, and in the moral consciousness of
mankind. Aeschines, then, has so far surpassed all mankind in brutality
and in the art of misrepresentation, that he actually denounces me for
things which he himself mentioned under the name of misfortunes.

{276} In addition to everything else, as though he had himself always
spoken straightforwardly and in loyalty, he bade you keep your eyes on
me carefully, and make sure that I did not mislead or deceive you. He
called me 'a clever speaker', 'a wizard', 'a sophist', and so on: just
as if it followed that when a man had the first word and attributed his
own qualities to another, the truth was really as he stated, and his
hearers would not inquire further who he himself was, that said such
things. But I am sure that you all know this man, and are aware that
these qualities belong to him far more than to me. And again, {277} I
am quite sure that my cleverness--yes, let the word pass; though I
observe that the influence of a speaker depends for the most part on
his audience; for in proportion to the welcome and the goodwill which
you accord to each speaker is the credit which he obtains for
wisdom;--I am sure, I say, that if I too possess any such skill, you
will all find it constantly fighting on your behalf in affairs of
State, never in opposition to you, never for private ends; while the
skill of Aeschines, on the contrary, is employed, not only in upholding
the cause of the enemy, but in attacking any one who has annoyed him or
come into collision with him anywhere. He neither employs it uprightly,
nor to promote the interests of the city. {278} For a good and
honourable citizen ought not to require from a jury, who have come into
court to represent the interests of the community, that they shall give
their sanction to his anger, or his enmity, or any other such passion;
nor ought he to come before you to gratify such feelings. It were best
that he had no such passions in his nature at all; but if they are
really inevitable, then he should keep them tame and subdued. Under
what circumstances, then, should a politician and an orator show
passion? {279} When any of the vital interests of his country are at
stake; when it is with its enemies that the People has to deal: those
are the circumstances. For then is the opportunity of a loyal and
gallant citizen. But that when he has never to this day demanded my
punishment, either in the name of the city or in his own, for any
public--nor, I will add, for any private--crime, he should have come
here with a trumped-up charge against the grant of a crown and a vote
of thanks, and should have spent so many words upon it--that is a sign
of personal enmity and jealousy and meanness, not of any good quality.
{280} And that he should further have discarded every form of lawsuit
against myself, and should have come here to-day to attack the
defendant, is the very extremity of baseness. It shows, I think,
Aeschines, that your motive in undertaking this suit was your desire,
not to exact vengeance for any crime, but to give a display of rhetoric
and elocution. Yet it is not his language, Aeschines, that deserves our
esteem in an orator, nor the pitch of his voice, but his choice of the
aims which the people chooses, his hatred or love of those whom his
country loves or hates. {281} He whose heart is so disposed will always
speak with loyal intent; but he who serves those from whom the city
foresees danger to herself, does not ride at the same anchor as the
People, and therefore does not look for safety to the same quarter. But
I do, mark you! For I have made the interests of my countrymen my own,
and have counted nothing as reserved for my own private advantage.
What? {282} You have not done so either? How can that be, when
immediately after the battle you went your way as an ambassador to
Philip, the author of the calamities which befell your country at that
time; and that, despite the fact that until then you always denied this
intimacy[n] with him, as every one knows? But what is meant by a
deceiver of the city? Is it not one who does not say what he thinks?
Upon whom does the herald justly pronounce the curse? Is it not upon
such a man as this? With what greater crime can one charge a man who is
an orator, than that of saying one thing and thinking another? Such a
man you have been found to be. {283} And after this do you open your
mouth, or dare to look this audience in the face? Do you imagine that
they do not know who you are? or that the slumber of forgetfulness has
taken such hold upon them all, that they do not remember the speeches
which you used to deliver during the war, when you declared with
imprecations and oaths that you had nothing to do with Philip, and that
I was bringing this accusation against you, when it was not true, to
satisfy my personal enmity? {284} But so soon as the news of the battle
had come, you thought no more of all this, but at once avowed and
professed that you stood on a footing of friendship and
guest-friendship with him; though these were nothing but your
hireling-service under other names; for upon what honest or equal basis
could Aeschines, the son of Glaucothea the tambourine--player,[n] enjoy
the guest-friendship, or the friendship, or the acquaintance of Philip?
I cannot see. In fact, you had been hired by him to ruin the interests
of these your countrymen. And yet, though your own treason has been so
plainly detected--though you have been an informer against yourself
after the event--you still revile me, and reproach me with crimes of
which, you will find, any one is more guilty than I.

{285} Many a great and noble enterprise, Aeschines, did this city
undertake and succeed in, inspired by me; and she did not forget them.
It is a proof of this, that when, immediately after the event, the
People had to elect one who should pronounce the oration over the dead,
and you were nominated, they did not elect you, for all your fine
voice, nor Demades, who had just negotiated the Peace, nor Hegemon,[n]
nor any other member of your party: they elected me. And when you and
Pythocles[n] came forward in a brutal and shameless fashion, God knows!
and made the same charges against me as you are making again to-day,
and abused me, the People elected me even more decidedly. {286} And the
reason you know well; but I will tell it you nevertheless. They knew
for themselves both the loyalty and zeal which inspired my conduct of
affairs, and the iniquity of yourself and your friends. For what you
denied with oaths when our cause was prosperous, you admitted in the
hour of the city's failure; and those, accordingly, who were only
enabled by the misfortunes of their country to express their views
without fear, they decided to have been enemies of their own for a long
while, though only then did they stand revealed.{287} And further, they
thought that one who was to pronounce an oration over the dead, and to
adorn their valour, should not have come beneath the same roof, nor
shared the same libation,[n] as those who were arrayed against them;
that he should not there join with those who with their own hands had
slain them, in the revel[n] and the triumph-song over the calamities of
the Hellenes, and then come home and receive honour--that he should not
play the mourner over their fate with his voice, but should grieve for
them in his heart. What they required they saw in themselves and in me,
but not in you; and this was why they appointed me, and not any of you.
{288} Nor, when the people acted thus, did the fathers and brothers of
the slain, who were then publicly appointed to conduct the funeral, act
otherwise. For since (in accordance with the ordinary custom) they had
to hold the funeral-feast in the house of the nearest of kin, as it
were, to the slain, they held it at my house, and with reason; for
though by birth each was more nearly akin to his dead than I, yet none
stood nearer to them all in common. For he who had their life and their
success most at heart, had also, when they had suffered what I would
they had not, the greatest share of sorrow for them all.

(_To the clerk _) {289} Read him the epitaph which the city resolved to
inscribe above them at the public cost; (_to Aeschines_) that even by
these very lines, Aeschines, you may know that you are a man destitute
of feeling, a dishonest accuser, an abominable wretch!


  _The Inscription_.[n]

  These for their country, fighting side by side,
  By deeds of arms dispelled the foemen's pride.
  heir lives they saved not, bidding Death make clear--
  Impartial Judge!--their courage or their fear.
  For Greece they fought, lest, 'neath the yoke brought low,
  In thraldom she th' oppressor's scorn should know.
  Now in the bosom of their fatherland
  After their toil they rest--'tis God's command.
  'Tis God's alone from failure free to live;[n]
  Escape from Fate to no man doth He give.

{290} Do you hear, Aeschines [in these very lines], 'Tis God's alone
from failure free to live'? Not to the statesman has he ascribed the
power to secure success for those who strive, but to the gods. Why
then, accursed man, do you revile _me_, for our failure, in words which
I pray the gods to turn upon the heads of you and yours?

{291} But, even after all the other lying accusations which he has
brought against me, the thing which amazed me most of all, men of
Athens, was that when he mentioned what had befallen the city, he did
not think of it as a loyal and upright citizen would have thought. He
shed no tears; he felt no emotion of sorrow in his heart: he lifted up
his voice, he exulted, he strained his throat, evidently in the belief
that he was accusing me, though in truth he was giving us an
illustration, to his own discredit, of the utter difference between his
feelings and those of others, at the painful events which had taken
place. {292} But surely one who professes, as Aeschines professes now,
to care for the laws and the constitution, ought to show, if nothing
else, at least that he feels the same griefs and the same joys as the
People, and has not, by his political profession, ranged himself on the
side of their opponents. That you have done the latter is manifest
today, when you pretend that the blame for everything is mine, and that
it is through me that the city was plunged in trouble: though it was
not through my statesmanship or my policy, gentlemen, {293} that you
began to help the Hellenes: for were you to grant me this--that it was
through me that you had resisted the dominion which was being
established over the Hellenes--you would have granted me a testimonial
which all those that you have given to others together could not equal.
But neither would I make such an assertion; for it would be unjust to
you; nor, I am sure, would you concede its truth: and if Aeschines were
acting honestly, he would not have been trying to deface and
misrepresent the greatest of your glories, in order to satisfy his
hatred towards me.

{294} But why do I rebuke him for this, when he has made other lying
charges against me, which are more outrageous by far? For when a man
charges me--I call Heaven and Earth to witness!--with philippizing,
what will he not say? By Heracles and all the gods, if one had to
inquire truthfully, setting aside all calumny and all expression of
animosity, who are in reality the men upon whose heads all would
naturally and justly lay the blame for what has taken place, you would
find that it was those in each city who resemble Aeschines, not those
who resemble me. {295} For they, when Philip's power was weak and quite
insignificant--when we repeatedly warned and exhorted you and showed
you what was best--they, to satisfy their own avarice, sacrificed the
interests of the community, each group deceiving and corrupting their
own fellow citizens, until they brought them into bondage. Thus the
Thessalians were treated by Daochus, Cineas, and Thrasydaeus; the
Arcadians by Cercidas, Hieronymus and Eucampidas; the Argives by
Myrtis, Teledamus, and Mnaseas; the Eleans by Euxitheus, Cleotimus and
Aristaechmus; the Messenians by the sons of the godforsaken
Philiadas--Neon and Thrasylochus; the Sicymians by Aristratus and
Epichares; the Corinthians by Deinarchus and Demaretus; the Megareans
by Ptoeodorus, Helixus and Perillus; the Thebans by Timolaus,
Theogeiton, and Anemoetas; the Euboeans by Hipparchus and Sosistratus.
{296} Daylight will fail me before the list of the traitors is
complete. All these, men of Athens, are men who pursue the same designs
in their own cities, as my opponents pursue among you--abominable men,
flatterers, evil spirits, who have hacked the limbs each of his own
fatherland, and like boon companions have pledged away their freedom,
first to Philip and now to Alexander; men whose measure of happiness is
their belly, and their lowest instincts; while as for freedom, and the
refusal to acknowledge any man as lord--the standard and rule of good
to the Hellenes of old--they have flung it to the ground.

{297} Of this shameful and notorious conspiracy and wickedness--or
rather (to speak with all earnestness, men of Athens), of this treason
against the freedom of the Hellenes--Athens has been guiltless in the
eyes of all men, in consequence of my statesmanship, as I have been
guiltless in your eyes. And do you then ask me for what merits I count
myself worthy to receive honour? I tell you that at a time when every
politician in Hellas had been corrupted--beginning with
yourself--[firstly by Philip, and now by Alexander], {298} no
opportunity that offered, no generous language, no grand promises, no
hopes, no fears, nor any other motive, tempted or induced me to betray
one jot of what I believed to be the rights and interests of the city;
nor, of all the counsel that I have given to my fellow countrymen, up
to this day, has any ever been given (as it has by you) with the scales
of the mind inclining to the side of gain, but all out of an upright,
honest, uncorrupted soul. I have taken the lead in greater affairs than
any man of my own time, and my administration has been sound and honest
throughout all. {299} That is why I count myself worthy of honour. But
as for the fortifications and entrenchments, for which you ridiculed
me, I judge them to be deserving, indeed, of gratitude and
commendation--assuredly they are so--but I set them far below my own
political services. Not with stones, nor with bricks, did I fortify
this city. Not such are the works upon which I pride myself most. But
would you inquire honestly wherein my fortifications consist? You will
find them in munitions of war, in cities, in countries, in harbours, in
ships, in horses, and in men ready to defend my fellow countrymen.
{300} These are the defences I have set to protect Attica, so far as by
human calculation it could be done; and with these I have fortified our
whole territory--not the circuit of the Peiraeus or of the city alone.
Nor in fact, did _I _prove inferior to Philip in calculations--far from
it!--or in preparations for war; but the generals of the
confederacy,[n] and their forces, proved inferior to him in fortune.
Where are the proofs of these things? They are clear and manifest. I
bid you consider them.

{301} What was the duty of a loyal citizen--one who was acting  with
all forethought and zeal and uprightness for his country's good? Was it
not to make Euboea the bulwark of Attica on the side of the sea, and
Boeotia on that of the mainland, and on that of the regions towards the
Peloponnese, our neighbours[n] in that direction? Was it not to provide
for the corn-trade, and to ensure that it should pass along a
continuously friendly coast all the way to the Peiraeus? {302} Was it
not to preserve the places which were ours--Proconnesus, the
Chersonese, Tenedos--by dispatching expeditions to aid them, and
proposing and moving resolutions accordingly; and to secure the
friendship and alliance of the rest--Byzantium, Tenedos, Euboea? Was it
not to take away the greatest of the resources which the enemy
possessed, and to add what was lacking to those of the city? {303} All
this has been accomplished by my decrees and by the measures which I
have taken; and all these measures, men of Athens, will be found by any
one who will examine them without jealousy, to have been correctly
planned, and executed with entire honesty: the opportunity for each
step was not, you will find, neglected or left unrecognized or thrown
away by me, and nothing was left undone, which it was within the power
and the reasoning capacity of a single man to effect. But if the might
of some Divine Power, or the inferiority of our generals, or the
wickedness of those who were betraying your cities, or all these things
together, continuously injured our whole cause, until they effected its
overthrow, how is Demosthenes at fault? {304} Had there been in each of
the cities of Hellas one man, such as I was, as I stood at my own post
in your midst--nay, if all Thessaly and all Arcadia had each had but
one man animated by the same spirit as myself--not one Hellenic people,
either beyond or on this side of Thermopylae, would have experienced
the evils which they now suffer. {305} All would have been dwelling in
liberty and independence, free from all fears, secure and prosperous,
each in their own land, rendering thanks for all these great blessings
to you and the rest of the Athenian people, through me. But that you
may know that in my anxiety to avoid jealousy, I am using language
which is far from adequate to the actual facts, (_to the clerk_) read
me this; and take and recite the list of the expeditions sent out in
accordance with my decrees.

[_The list of expeditions is read]_

{306} These measures, and others like them, Aeschines, were the
measures which it was the duty of a loyal and gallant citizen to take.
If they were successful, it was certain that we should be indisputably
the strongest power, and that with justice as well as in fact: and now
that they have resulted otherwise, we are left with at least an
honourable name. No man casts reproach either upon the city, or upon
the choice which she made: they do but upbraid Fortune, who decided the
issue thus. {307} It was not, God knows, a citizen's duty to abandon
his country's interests, to sell his services to her opponents, and
cherish the opportunities of the enemy instead of those of his country.
Nor was it, on the one hand, to show his malice against the man who had
faced the task of proposing and moving measures worthy of the city, and
persisting in that intention; while, on the other hand, he remembered
and kept his eyes fixed upon any private annoyance which another had
caused him: nor was it to maintain a wicked and festering inactivity,
as you so often do. {308} Assuredly there is an inactivity that is
honest and brings good to the State--the inactivity which you,[n] the
majority of the citizens, observe in all sincerity. But that is not the
inactivity of Aeschines. Far from it! He, on the contrary, retires just
when he chooses, from public life (and he often chooses to do so), that
he may watch for the moment when you will be sated with the continual
speeches of the same adviser, or when fortune has thrown some obstacle
in your path, or some other disagreeable event has happened (for in the
life of man many things are possible); and then, when such an
opportunity comes, suddenly, like a gale of wind, out of his retirement
he comes forth an orator, with his voice in training, and his phrases
and his sentences collected; and these he strings together lucidly,
without pausing for breath, though they bring with them no profit, no
accession of anything good, but only calamity to one or another of his
fellow citizens, and shame to all alike. {309} Surely, Aeschines, if
all this practice and study sprang from an honest heart, resolved to
pursue the interests of your country, the fruits of it should have been
noble and honourable and profitable to all--alliances of cities,
supplies of funds, opening of ports,[n] enactment of beneficial laws,
acts of opposition to our proved enemies. {310} It was for all such
services that men looked in bygone days; and the past has offered, to
any loyal and gallant citizen, abundant opportunities of displaying
them: but nowhere in the ranks of such men will you ever be found to
have stood--not first, nor second, nor third, nor fourth, nor fifth,
nor sixth, nor in any position whatsoever; at least, not in any matters
whereby your country stood to gain. {311} For what alliance has the
city gained by negotiations of yours? What assistance, what fresh
access of goodwill or fame? What diplomatic or administrative action of
yours has brought new dignity to the city? What department of our home
affairs, or our relations with Hellenic and foreign states, over which
you have presided, has shown any improvement? Where are your ships?
Where are your munitions of war? Where are your dockyards? Where are
the walls that you have repaired? Where are your cavalry? Where in the
world _is_ your sphere of usefulness? What pecuniary assistance have
you ever given, as a good and generous fellow citizen,[n] either to
rich or poor? {312} 'But, my good sir, 'you say, 'if I have done none
of these things, I have at least given my loyalty and goodwill.' Where?
When? Why, even at a time when all who ever opened their lips upon the
platform contributed voluntarily to save the city, till, last of all,
Aristonicus gave what he had collected to enable him to regain his
civil rights--even then, most iniquitous of men! you never came forward
or made any contribution whatever: and assuredly it was not from
poverty, when you had inherited more than five talents out of the
estate of your father-in-law Philo, and had received two talents
subscribed by the leaders of the Naval Boards,[n] for your damaging
attack upon my Naval Law.[n] {313} But I will say no more about this,
lest by passing from subject to subject I should break away from the
matter in hand. It is at least plain that your failure to contribute
was not due to your poverty, but to your anxiety to do nothing in
opposition to those whose interest is the guide of your whole public
life. On what occasions, then, do your spirit and your brilliancy show
themselves? When something must be done to injure your fellow
countrymen--then your voice is most glorious, your memory most perfect;
then you are a prince of actors, a Theocrines[n] on the tragic stage!

{314} Again, you have recalled the gallant men of old, and you do well
to do so. Yet it is not just, men of Athens, to take advantage of the
good feeling which you may be relied upon to entertain towards the
dead, in order to examine me before you by their standard, and compare
me, who am still living amongst you, with them. {315} Who in all the
world does not know that against the living there is always more or
less of secret jealousy, while none, not even their enemies, hate the
dead any more? And am I, in spite of this law of nature, to be judged
and examined to-day by the standard of those who were before me? By no
means! It would be neither just nor fair, Aeschines. But let me be
compared with yourself, or with any of those who have adopted the same
policy as yourself, and are still alive. {316} And consider this also.
Which of these alternatives is the more honourable? Which is better for
the city?--that the good services done by men of former
times--tremendous, nay even beyond all description though they may
be--should be made an excuse for exposing to ingratitude and contumely
those that are rendered to the present generation? or that all who act
in loyalty should have a share in the honours and the kindness which
our fellow citizens dispense? {317} Aye, and (if I must say this after
all) the policy and the principles which I have adopted will be found,
if rightly viewed, to resemble and to have the same aims as those of
the men who in that age received praise; while yours resemble those of
the dishonest assailants of such persons in those days. For in their
time also there were obviously persons who disparaged the living and
praised the men of old, acting in the same malicious way as yourself.
{318} Do you say then, that I am in no way like them? But are you like
them, Aeschines? or your brother? or any other orator of the present
day? For my part, I should say, 'None.' Nay, my good sir--to use no
other epithet--compare the living with the living, their
contemporaries, as men do in every other matter, whether they are
comparing poets or choruses or competitors in the games. {319} Because
Philammon was not so powerful as Glaucus of Carystus[n] and some other
athletes of former times, he did not leave Olympia uncrowned: but
because he fought better than all who entered against him, he was
crowned and proclaimed victor. Do you likewise examine me beside the
orators of the day--beside yourself, beside any one in the world that
you choose. {320} I fear no man's rivalry. For, while the city was
still free to choose the best course, and all alike could compete with
one another in loyalty to their country, I was found the best adviser
of them all. It was by my laws, by my decrees, by my diplomacy, that
all was effected. Not one of your party appeared anywhere, unless some
insult was to be offered to your fellow countrymen. But when there
happened, what I would had never happened--when it was not statesmen
that were called to the front, but those who would do the bidding of a
master, those who were anxious to earn wages by injuring their country,
and to flatter a stranger--then, along with every member of your party,
you were found at your post, the grand and resplendent owner of a
stud;[n] while I was weak, I confess, yet more loyal to my fellow
countrymen than you. {321} Two characteristics, men of Athens, a
citizen of a respectable character (for this is perhaps the least
invidious phrase that I can apply to myself) must be able to show: when
he enjoys authority, he must maintain to the end the policy whose aims
are noble action and the pre-eminence of his country: and at all times
and in every phase of fortune he must remain loyal. For this depends
upon his own nature; while his power and his influence are determined
by external causes. And in me, you will find, this loyalty has
persisted unalloyed. For mark this. {322} Not when my surrender was
demanded, not when I was called to account before the Amphictyons, not
in face either of threats or of promises, not when these accursed men
were hounded on against me like wild beasts, have I ever been false to
my loyalty towards you. For from the very first, I chose the straight
and honest path in public life: I chose to foster the honour, the
supremacy, the good name of my country, to seek to enhance them, and to
stand or fall with them. {323} I do not walk through the market,
cheerful and exultant over the success of strangers, holding out my
hand and giving the good tidings to any whom I expect to report my
conduct yonder, but shuddering, groaning, bowing myself to the earth,
when I hear of the city's good fortune, as do these impious men, who
make a mock of the city --not remembering that in so doing they are
mocking themselves--while they direct their gaze abroad, and, whenever
another has gained success through the failure of the Hellenes, belaud
that state of things, and declare that we must see that it endures for
all time.

{324} Never, O all ye gods, may any of you consent to their desire! If
it can be, may you implant even in these men a better mind and heart.
But if they are verily beyond all cure, then bring them and them alone
to utter and early destruction, by land and sea. And to us who remain,
grant the speediest release from the fears that hang over us, and
safety that naught can shake!


FOOTNOTES

[1] Some writers suppose that it was at the meeting in the spring of
339. The evidence is not conclusive, but appears to point to the date
given here.



NOTES


ON THE NAVAL BOARDS

§ 1. _who praise your forefathers_. The advocates of war with Persia
had doubtless appealed to the memory of Marathon and Salamis, and the
old position of Athens as the champion of Greece against Persia.

§ 10, 11. The argument is this: 'If a war with Persia needed a special
kind of force, we could not prepare for it without being detected: but
as all wars need the same kind of force, our preparations need rouse no
suspicion in Persia particularly.'

_acknowledged foes_: i.e. probably Thebes, or the revolted allies of
Athens, with whom a disadvantageous peace had, perhaps, just been made.
It is not, however, impossible that Philip also is in the orator's
mind; for though at the time he was probably engaged in war with the
Illyrians and Paeonians, his quarrel with Athens in regard to
Amphipolis had not been settled. The Olynthians may also be thought of.
(See Introd. to Phil. I and Olynthiacs.)

§ 12. _rhapsodies_. The rhapsodes who went about Greece reciting Homer
and other poets had lost the distinction they once enjoyed, and
'rhapsody' became a synonym for idle declamation.

§ 14. _a bold speech_: i.e. a demand for instant war, helped out by
rhetorical praises of the men of old.

§ 16. _unmarried heiresses and orphans_. These would be incapable of
discharging the duties of the trierarchy, though their estates were
liable for the war-tax. Partners were probably exempted, when none of
them possessed so large a share in the common property as would render
him liable for trierarchy.

_property outside Attica_. According to the terms made by Athens with
her allies when the 'Second Delian League' was formed in 378, Athens
undertook that no Athenian should hold property in an allied State. But
this condition had been broken, and the multiplication of Athenian
estates [Greek: _kl_erhouchiai_] in allied territories had been one of
the causes of the war with the allies.

_unable to contribute_: e. g. owing to no longer possessing the estate
which he had when the assessment was made.

§ 17. _to associate, &c_. The sections which contained a very rich man
were to have poor men included in it, so that the total wealth of every
section might be the same, and the distribution of the burden between
the sections fair.

§ 18. _the first hundred, &c_. Demosthenes thinks of the fleet as
composed, according to need, of 100, 200, or 300 vessels, and treats
each hundred as a separate squadron, to be separately divided among the
Boards.

_by lot_. In this and other clauses of his proposal, Demosthenes
stipulates for the use of the lot ([Greek: _sunkl_er_osai_], [Greek:
epikl_erosai]) to avoid all unfair selection. It is only in the
distribution of duties among the smaller sections within each Board
that assignment by arrangement ([Greek: _apodounai_], a word suggesting
distribution according to fitness or convenience) is to be allowed.

§ 19. _taxable capital_ ([Greek: _tim_ema_]). The war-tax and the
trierarchic burdens were assessed on a valuation of the contributor's
property. Upon this valuation of his taxable capital he paid the
percentage required. (The old view that he was taxed not upon his
capital, as valued, but upon a fraction of it varying with his wealth,
rests upon an interpretation of passages in the Speeches against
Aphobus, which is open to grave question.) The total amount of the
single valuations was the 'estimated taxable capital of the country'
([Greek: _tim_ema t_es ch_oras_]). This, in the case of the trierarchy,
would be the aggregate amount of the valuations of the 1,200 wealthiest
men, viz. 6,000 talents. (Of course the capital taxable for the war-tax
would be considerably larger. Even at a time when the prosperity of
Attica was much lower, in 378-377 B.C., it was nearly 6,000 talents,
according to Polybius, ii. 62. 6.)

§ 20. A tabular statement will make this plain:--

                   _Persons         _Total capital taxable
  _Ships_.       responsible_.          for each ship_.

    100              12                     60 tal.
    200               6                     30  "
    300               4                     20  "

The percentage payable on the taxable capital was of course higher, the
larger the number of ships required. Each ship appears to have cost on
the average a talent to equip. The percentages in the three cases
contained in the table would therefore be 1-2/3, 3-1/3, and 5,
respectively. (Compare § 27.)

§ 21. _fittings ... in arrear_. Apparently former trierarchs had not
always given back the fittings of their vessels, which had either been
provided at the expense of the State, or lent to the trierarchs by the
State.

§ 23. _wards_ ([Greek: _trittyes_]). The trittys or ward was one-third
of a tribe.

§ 25. _you see ... city_. The Assembly met on the Pnyx, whence there
was a view of the Acropolis and of the greater part of the ancient city.

_prophets_. The Athenian populace seems always to have been liable to
the influence of soothsayers, who professed to utter oracles from the
gods, particularly when war was threatening. This was so (e. g.) at the
time of the Peloponnesian War (Thucyd. ii. 8, v. 26), and the
soothsayer is delightfully caricatured by Aristophanes in the _Birds_
and elsewhere.

§ 29. _two hundred ships ... one hundred were Athenian_. In the Speech
on the Crown, § 238, Demosthenes gives the numbers as 300 and 200.
Perhaps a transcriber at an early stage in the history of the text
accidentally wrote HH (the symbol for 200) instead of HHH, in the case
of the first number, and a later scribe then 'corrected' the second
number into H instead of HH. The numbers given by Herodotus are 378 and
180, and, for the Persian ships, 1,207.

§ 31. _against Egypt_, which was now in rebellion against Artaxerxes.
Orontas, Satrap of Mysia, was more or less constantly in revolt during
this period.

§ 32. _even more certainly_ [Greek: _palai_]: lit. 'long ago'. The
transition from temporal to logical priority is paralleled in certain
uses of other temporal adverbs, e.g. [Greek: _euthys_] (Aristotle,
_Poet_. v), and [Greek: _schol_e_] (of which, as Weil notes, [Greek:
_palai_] is the exact opposite).

§ 34. _sins against Hellas_. This refers to the support given to the
Persian invaders by Thebes in the Persian Wars (Herod. viii. 34).


FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS

§ 4. _Plataeae_ (which had been overthrown by the enemies of Athens in
the course of the Peloponnesian War, but rebuilt, with the aid of
Sparta, in 378) was destroyed by Thebes in 373-372. About the same time
Thebes destroyed Thespiae, which, like Plataeae, was well-disposed
towards Athens; and in 370 the Thebans massacred the male population of
Orchomenus, and sold the women and children into slavery.

§ 11. _Oropus_ had sometimes belonged to Thebes and sometimes to
Athens. In 366 it was taken from Athens by Themison, tyrant of Eretria
(exactly opposite Oropus, on the coast of Euboea), and placed in the
hands of Thebes until the ownership should be decided. Thebes retained
it until it was restored to Athens by Philip in 338.

§ 12. _when all the Peloponnesians, &c_. The reference seems to be to
the year 370, shortly after the battle of Leuctra, when the
Peloponnesian States sought the protection of Athens against Sparta,
and, being refused, became allies of Thebes (Diodorus xv. 62). In 369
Athens made an alliance with Sparta.

§ 14. _saved the Spartans_. See last note. Athens also assisted the
Spartans at Mantineia in 362.

_the Thebans_. In 378 and the following years Athens assisted Thebes
against the Spartans under Agesilaus and Cleombrotus.

_the Euboeans_. In 358 or 357 Euboea succeeded in obtaining freedom
from the domination of Thebes by the aid of Athenian troops under
Timotheus.

§ 16. _Triphylia_, a district between Elis and Messenia, was the
subject of a long-standing dispute between the Eleans and the
Arcadians, and seems to have been in the hands of the latter since
(about) 368.

_Tricaranum_, a fortress in the territory of Phlius, had been seized by
the Argives in 369, and used as a centre from which incursions were
made into Phliasian territory.

§ 20. _allies of Thebes_: in order to preserve the balance of power
between Thebes and Sparta.

§ 21. _the Theban confederacy_. The reference is particularly to the
Arcadian allies of Thebes, but the wider expression perhaps suggests a
general policy of a more ambitious kind.

§ 22. _you, I think, know_. He refers to the older members of the
Assembly, who would remember the tyrannical conduct of Sparta during
the period of her supremacy (the first quarter of the fourth century
B.C.).

§ 27. _pillars_. The terms of an alliance were usually recorded upon
pillars erected by each State on some site fixed by agreement or custom.

§ 28. _in the war_: i.e. the 'Sacred War', against the Phocians.


FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE RHODIANS

§ 3. _now it will be seen_: i.e. if you come to a right decision, and
help the Rhodians.

§ 5. _the Egyptians_. See Speech on Naval Boards, § 31 n.

§ 6. _to advise you_: i.e. in the Speech on the Naval Boards (see
especially §§ 10, 11 of that Speech).

§ 9. _Ariobarzanes_, Satrap of the Hellespont, joined in the general
revolt of the princes of Asia Minor against Persia in 362, at first
secretly (as though making war against other satraps) but afterwards
openly. Timotheus was sent to help him, on the understanding that he
must not break the Peace of Antalcidas (378 B.C.), according to which
the Greek cities in Asia were to belong to the king, but the rest were
to be independent (except that Athens was to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and
Scyros). When Ariobarzanes broke out in open revolt, Timotheus could
not help him without breaking the first provision; but the Persian
occupation tion of Samos was itself a violation of the second, and he
was therefore justified in relieving the town.

§ 11. _while he is in her neighbourhood_. Artaxerxes almost certainly
went in person to Egypt about this time. (That he went before 346 is
proved by Isocrates, _Philippus_, § 101; and he was no doubt expected
to go, even before he went.) The alternative rendering, 'since he is
still to be a neighbouring power to herself,' is less good, since he
would be this, whether he conquered Egypt or not.

§ 14. _Rhodians who are now in possession_: i.e. the oligarchs, who
held the town with the help of Caria.

_some of their fellow-citizens_: i.e. some of the democratic party.

§ 15. _official patron_ ([Greek: _proxenos_]). The 'official patron' of
another State in Athens was necessarily an Athenian, and so differed
from the modern consul, whom he otherwise resembled in many ways (cf.
Phillipson, _International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome_,
vol. i, pp. 147-56).

§ 17. _publicly provided_: i.e. in treaties between the States.

§ 22. _when our democracy_, &c.: i.e. in 404, when, at the conclusion
of the Peloponnesian War, the tyranny of the Thirty was established,
and a very large number of democratic citizens were driven into exile.
The Argives refused the Spartan demand for the surrender of some of
these to the Thirty (Diodorus xiv. 6).

§ 23. _one who is a barbarian-aye, and a woman_ ([Greek: _barbaron
anthr_opon kai tauta gynaika_]). This has been taken to refer (1) to
Artaxerxes and Artemisia. But [Greek: _kai tauta_] cannot be simply
[Greek: _pros tont_o_], and [Greek: _kai tauta gynaika_] must refer to
the same person as [Greek: _barbaron anthr_opon_]; (2) to Artaxerxes
alone, the words [Greek: _kai tauta gynaika_] being a gratuitous insult
such as it was customary for Athenians to level at any Persian; (3) to
Artemisia alone, [Greek: anthr_opos] being feminine here as often. It
is not possible to decide certainly between (2) and (3). Artemisia is
more prominent in the speech than the king, but it is the king who is
referred to in the next sentence.

§ 24. _rendered Athens weak_. The success of Sparta in the
Peloponnesian War was rendered possible, to a great extent, by the
supply of funds from Persia. In 401 Cyrus made his famous expedition
against Artaxerxes II, and Clearchus (with other generals) commanded
the Greek troops which assisted him. The death of Cyrus in the battle
of Cunaxa in 401 put an end to his rebellion.

§ 25. _rights of the rest of the world_. Weil suggests that it may have
been argued that to intervene in Rhodian affairs would be to break the
treaty made with the allies in 355 (about), at the end of the Social
War, whereby their independence was guaranteed.

§ 26. _Chalcedon_ was on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, and
therefore by the Peace of Antalcidas belonged to the king (see n. on §
9). By the same treaty, Selymbria, on the north coast of the Propontis,
ought to have been independent. The Byzantines, who had obtained their
independence of Athens in the Social War, were extending their
influence greatly at this time.

§ 27. _the treaty_: again the Peace of Antalcidas.

_even if there actually are such advisers_: or, 'even if any one
actually asserts the existence of such persons.'

§ 29. _two treaties_. The first must be the Peace of Callias (444
B.C.), the terms of which are given in the Speech on the Embassy, §
273. The second was the Peace of Antalcidas.

§ 30. _the knowledge of what is right_. The parallel passage in § 1
seems to confirm this rendering, rather than the alternative, 'the
intention to do what is right.'

§ 33. _oligarchical_. This expression is partly directed at those who,
in opposing the exiled democrats, supported the oligarchs of Rhodes;
and it may be partly explained by the fact that the policy of Eubulus,
who wished to avoid all interferences which might lead to war, was
particularly satisfactory to the wealthier classes in Athens. But it
was a common practice to accuse an opponent of anti-democratic
sentiments, and of trying to get the better of the people by
illegitimate means (cf. Speech on Embassy, § 314, &c.).

§ 35. Cf. Speech on Naval Boards, § 41.


THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

§ 3. _the war with Sparta_. Probably the Boeotian War (378-371 B.C.),
when Athens supported Thebes against Sparta.

_in defence of the right_. The attempt of the Spartans to conquer
Boeotia was a violation of the Peace of Antalcidas (see n. on Speech
for Rhodians, § 6). But Demosthenes' expression may be quite general in
its meaning.

§ 4. _tribes_. Probably refers especially to the Thracians (see Introd.
to the Speech). The Paeonian and Illyrian chieftains also made alliance
with Athens in 356.

§ 17. _to Euboea_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, § 14 n.

_to Haliartus_: in 395, when Athens sent a force to aid the Thebans
against the Spartans under Lysander. (For other allusions see Introd.
to the Speech.)

§ 19. _paper-armies_ ([Greek: epistolimaious ... dynameis]): lit.
'armies existing in dispatches.'

§ 24. _Athens once maintained_, &c. The reference is to the Corinthian
war of 394-387 B.C. The Athenian general Iphicrates organized a
mercenary force of peltasts in support of Corinth, and did great damage
to Sparta; he was succeeded in the command by Chabrias. Nothing more is
certainly known of Polystratus than is told us here, though he may be
referred to in the Speech against Leptines, § 84, as receiving honours
from Athens.

_to Artabazus_. In 356 Chares was sent to oppose the revolted allies of
Athens, but being short of funds, assisted Artabazus in his rebellion
against Persia, and was richly rewarded. (See Introd. to Speech on
Naval Boards.)

§ 25. _spectators of these mysteries of generalship_ ([Greek: epoptai
t_on ] [Greek: *_strat_egoumen_on_]). The word [Greek: _epopt_es_] is
chiefly used of spectators of the mysteries, and is here applied
sarcastically to the citizens whom Demosthenes desires to see what has
hitherto been a hidden thing from them--the conduct of their generals.

§ 26. _ten captains and generals, &c_. There was one general ([Greek:
_strat_egos_]) and one captain ([Greek: _taxiarchos_]) of infantry, and
one general of cavalry ([Greek: _phylarchos_]), for each of the ten
tribes. There were two regular masters of the horse ([Greek:
_hipparchoi_]), and a third appointed for the special command of the
Athenian troops in Lemnos. The generals ([Greek: _strat_egoi_]) had
various civil duties, among them the organization of the military
processions at the Panathenaea and other great festivals.

§ 27. _Menelaus_. Either a Macedonian chieftain, who had assisted the
Athenian commander Timotheus against Poteidaea in 364, and probably
received Athenian citizenship; or else Philip's half-brother Menelaus.
But there is no evidence that the latter ever served in the Athenian
forces, and probably the former is meant.

§ 31. _Etesian winds_. These blow strongly from the north over the
Aegean from July to September.

§ 33. _the whole force in its entirety_. So with Butcher's punctuation.
But it is perhaps better to place a comma after [Greek: _dynamin_], and
translate, 'after making ready ... soldiers, ships, cavalry--the entire
force complete--you bind them,' &c.

§ 34. See Introd. to the Speech. Geraestus was the southernmost most
point of Euboea. The 'sacred trireme', the Paralus, when conveying the
Athenian deputation to the Festival of Delos, put in on its way at
Marathon, where there was an altar of the Delian Apollo, to offer
sacrifice.

§ 35. The festival of the Panathenaea was managed by the Athlothetae,
who were appointed by lot, and consequently could not be specially
qualified; whereas the stewards ([Greek: _epimel_etai_]) who assisted
the Archon in the management of the Dionysia, were at this time
elected, presumably on the ground of their fitness.

_an amount of trouble_ ([Greek: _ochlon_]). Possibly 'a larger crowd'.
But there is no point in mentioning the crowd; the point lies in the
pains taken; and Thucyd. vi. 24 ([Greek: _upo tou ochl_odous t_es
parhaskeu_es_]) confirms the rendering given.

§ 36. The choregus paid the expenses of a chorus at the Dionysiac (and
certain other) festivals. The gymnasiarchs, or stewards of the games,
managed the games and torch-races which formed part of the Panathenaea
and many other festivals. The offices were imposed by law upon men who
possessed a certain estate, but any one who felt that another could
bear the burden better might challenge him either to perform the duty
or to exchange property with him. (See Appendix to Goodwin's edition of
Demosthenes' Speech against Meidias.)

_independent freedmen_: lit. 'dwellers apart,' i.e. freedmen who no
longer lived with the master whose slaves they had been.

§ 43. _empty ships_. If these are the ships referred to in Olynth. III,
Section 4, the date of the First Philippic must be later than October
351 B.C.

§ 46. _promises_. The 'promises of Chares' became almost proverbial.

§ 47. _examination_, or 'audit'. A general, like every other
responsible official, had to report his proceedings, at the end of his
term of office, to a Board of Auditors, and might be prosecuted before
a jury by any one who was dissatisfied with his report.

§ 48. _negotiating with Sparta, &c_. As a matter of fact, Philip had
evidently come to an understanding with Thebes by this time; but he may
have caused some such rumours to be spread, in order to get rid of any
possible opposition from Sparta. The 'breaking-up of the free states'
probably refers to the desire of Sparta to destroy Megalopolis, which
was in alliance with Thebes.

_sent ambassadors to the king_. Arrian, ii. 14, mentions a letter of
Darius to Alexander, recalling how Philip had been in friendship and
alliance with Artaxerxes Ochus. It is possible, therefore, that the
rumour to which Demosthenes alludes had some foundation.


THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC

(_Note_.--Most of the allusions in the Olynthiacs are explained by the
Introduction to the First Philippic.)

§ 4. _power over everything, open or secret_. The translation generally
approved, 'power to publish or conceal his designs,' is hardly
possible. The [Greek: kai] in the phrase [Greek: rh_eta kai aporr_eta]
(or [Greek: arr_eta]) cannot be taken disjunctively here, when it is
always conjunctive in this phrase elsewhere, the whole phrase being
virtually equivalent to 'everything whatever'.

§ 5. _how he treated_, &c. The scholiast says that Philip killed the
traitors at Amphipolis first, saying that if they had not been faithful
to their own countrymen, they were not likely to be faithful to
himself; and that the traitors at Pydna, finding that they were not
likely to be spared, took sanctuary, and having been persuaded to
surrender themselves on promise of their lives, were executed
nevertheless. Neither story is confirmed by other evidence.

§ 8. _in aid of the Euboeans_: in 358 or 357. See Speech for
Megalopolitans, § 14 n.

§ 13. _Magnesia_. There seems to have been a town of the same name as
the district.

_attacked the Olynthians_. This refers to the short invasion of 351
(see vol. i, p. 70), not to that which is the subject of the Olynthiacs.

_Arybbas_ was King of the Molossi, and uncle of Philip's wife,
Olympias. Nothing is known of this expedition against him. He was
deposed by Philip in 343. (See vol. ii, p. 3.)

§ 17. _these towns_: the towns of the Chalcidic peninsula, over which
Olynthus had acquired influence. This sentence shows that Olynthus
itself had not yet been attacked.

§ 26. _But, my good Sir_, &c. This must be the objection of an
imaginary opponent. It can hardly be taken (as seems to be intended by
Butcher) as Demosthenes' reply to the question, 'Or some other power?'
('But, my good Sir, the other power will not want to help him.') There
is, however, much to be said for Sandys's punctuation, [Greek: _ean m_e
bo_eth_es_eth umeis _e allos tis_], 'unless you or some other power go
to their aid.' After the death of Onomarchus in 352, the Phocians were
incapable of withstanding invasion without help.


THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC

§ 14. _Timotheus, &c_. In 364 an Athenian force under Timotheus invaded
the territory of the Olynthian League, and took Torone, Poteidaea, and
other towns, with the help of Perdiccas, King of Macedonia.

_ruling dynasty_: i.e. the dynasty of Lycophron and Peitholaus at
Pherae. (See Introd. to First Philippic.)

§ 28. _this war_: i.e. the war with Philip generally. The reference is
supposed to be to the conduct of Chares in 356 (cf. Phil. I, Section 24
ii.), though in fact it was against the revolted allies, not against
Philip, that he had been sent. Sigeum was a favourite resort of Chares,
and it is conjectured that he may have obtained possession of Lampsacus
and Sigeum (both on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont) in 356. The
explanation of the conduct of the generals is to be found in the fact
that in Asia Minor they could freely appropriate prizes of war and
plunder, since under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, Athens could
claim nothing in Asia for her own.

§ 29. _taxes by Boards_. Each of the Boards constituted in 378-377 for
the collection of the war-tax (see vol. i, p. 31) had a leader or
chairman ([Greek: __hegem_on_]), one of the 300 richest men in Athens,
whose duty it was to advance the sums required by the State, recovering
them afterwards from the other members of the Boards. Probably the
Three Hundred were divided equally among the 100 Boards, a leader, a
'second', and a 'third' (Speech on Crown, § 103) being assigned to
each. The 'general' here perhaps corresponds to the 'second'.


THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC

§ 4. _two or three years ago_ (lit. 'this is the third or fourth year
since). It was in November 352 B.C. If the present Speech was delivered
before November 349, not quite three years would have elapsed. (The
Greek words, [Greek: triton _he tetarton etos touti], must, on the
analogy of the Speech against Meidias, § 13, against Stephanus, II. §
13, and against Aphobus, I. § 24, &c., mean 'two or three', not 'three
or four years ago'). The vagueness of the expression is more likely to
be due to the date of the Third Olynthiac being not far short of three
years from that of the siege of Heraeon Teichos, than to the
double-dating (on the one hand by actual lapse of time, and on the
other by archon-years--from July to July--or by military campaigning
seasons) which most commentators assume to be intended here, but which
seems to me over-subtle and unlike Demosthenes.

_that year_: i.e. the archonship of Aristodemus, which ran from July
352 B.C. to July 351.

§ 5. _the mysteries_. These were celebrated from the 14th to the 27th
of Boedromion (late in September).

_Charidemus_, of Oreus in Euboea, was a mercenary leader who had served
many masters at different times--Athens, Olynthus, Cotys, and
Cersobleptes--and had played most of them false at some time or other.
But he was given the citizenship in 357 for the part which he had taken
in effecting the cession of the Chersonese to Athens, and was a
favourite with the people. He was sent on the occasion here referred to
with ten ships, for which he was to find mercenary soldiers.

§ 6. _with might ... power_. A quotation, probably from the text of the
treaty of alliance between Athens and Olynthus.

§ 8. _funds of the Phocians are exhausted_. The Phocian leader
Phalaecus had been using the temple-treasures of Delphi, but they were
now exhausted.

§ 10. _a Legislative Commission_: i.e. a Special Commission on the
model of the regular Commission which was appointed annually from the
jurors for the year (if the Assembly so decreed), and before which
those who wished to make or to oppose changes in the laws appeared, the
proceedings taking the form of a prosecution and defence of the laws in
question. The Assembly itself did not legislate, though it passed
decrees, which had to be consistent with the existing laws. As regards
legislation, it merely decided whether in any given year alterations in
the laws should or should not be allowed.

§ 11. _malingerers_. The scholiast says that the choregi were persuaded
to choose persons as members of their choruses, in order to enable them
to escape military service, choreutae being legally exempted. Other
exemptions also existed.

§ 12. _persons who proposed them_. This can only refer to Eubulus and
his party.

§ 20. _Corinthians and Megareans_. From the pseudo-Demosthenic Speech
on the Constitution ([Greek: _pe_ri suntaxe_os_]) and from Philochorus
(quoted in the Scholia of Didymus upon that Speech) it appears that the
Athenians had in 350 invaded Megara, under the general Ephialtes, and
forced the Megareans to agree to a delimitation of certain land sacred
to the two goddesses of Eleusis, which the Megareans had violated,
perhaps for some years past (see Speech against Aristocrates, § 212). A
scholiast also refers to the omission by Corinth to invite the
Athenians to the Isthmian games, in consequence of which the Athenians
sent an armed force to attend the games. Probably this was also a
recent occurrence, and due to an understanding between Corinth and
Megara.

§ 21. _my own namesake_: i.e. Demosthenes, who was a distinguished
general during the Peloponnesian War, and perished in the Sicilian
expedition.

§ 24. _for forty-five years_: i.e. between the Persian and
Peloponnesian Wars, 476-431 B.C.

_the king_: i.e. Perdiccas II, who, however, took the side of Sparta
shortly after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He died in 413.
(The date of the beginning of his reign is unknown, but he did not
become sole king of the whole of Macedonia until 436.)

§ 27. _Spartans had been ruined_: sc. by the battles of Leuctra (in
371) and Mantineia (in 362).

_Thebans had their hands full_, owing to the war with the Phocians,
from 356 onwards.

§ 28. _in the war_, when Athens joined Thebes against Sparta (in 378).
'The allies' are those members of the Second Delian League (formed in
378) who had been lost in the Social War which ended in or about 355,
when Athens was at peace with Thebes and Sparta. (See Introduction,
vol. i, p. 9.)

§ 31. _procession at the Boedromia_. The Boedromia was a festival held
in September in honour of Apollo and Artemis Agrotera, Probably a
procession was not a regular part of the festival at this time. The
importance which the populace attached to such processions is
illustrated by the Speech against Timocrates, § 161.

§ 34. _is it then paid service, &c_.: almost, 'do you then suggest that
we should _earn_ our money?'

§ 35. _adding or subtracting_: sc. from the sums dispensed by the State
to the citizens.

_somebody's mercenaries_. The reference is probably to the successes of
Charidemus when first sent (see Introd. to Olynthiacs).


ON THE PEACE

§ 5. _disturbances in Euboea_. Plutarchus of Eretria applied for
Athenian aid against Callias of Chalcis, who was attacking him with the
aid of Macedonian troops. Demosthenes was strongly opposed to granting
the request, but it was supported by Eubulus and Meidias, and a force
was sent under Phocion, probably early in 348 (though the chronology
has been much debated, and some place the expedition in 350 or 349).
Owing to the premature action or the treachery of Plutarchus at Tamynae
(where the Athenian army was attacked), Phocion had some difficulty in
winning a victory. Plutarchus afterwards seized a number of Athenian
soldiers, and Athens had actually to ransom them. Phocion's successor,
Molossus, was unsuccessful. When peace was made in the summer of 348,
the Euboeans became for the most part independent of Athens, and were
regarded with ill-feeling by Athens for some years. There is no proof
that the proposers of the expedition were bribed, as Demosthenes
alleges.

§ 6. _Neoptolemus_. See Speech on Embassy, §§ 12, 315.

§ 8. _public service_: i.e. as trierarch or choregus or gymnasiarch,
&c. See n. on Phil. I. § 36.

§ 10. _there were some_ : i.e. Aeschines and his colleagues. (See
Introd.)

_Thespiae and Plataeae_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, Section 4 n.

§ 14. _self-styled Amphictyons_. The Amphictyonic Council represented
the ancient Amphictyonic League of Hellenic tribes (now differing
widely in importance, but equally represented on the Council), and was
supreme in all matters affecting the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. (See
n. on Speech on Crown, § 148.) The Council summoned by Philip was open
to criticism (1) because only certain members of it were present, of
whom the Thebans and Thessalians were the chief, (2) because Philip had
been given the vote of the dispossessed Phocians.

§ 15. _however stupid, &c_. It had been conventional for over a century
to apply this adjective to the Boeotians, and therefore to the Thebans.
For a more favourable view, see W. Rhys Roberts, _Ancient Boeotians_,
chap. i.

§ 16. _Oropus_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, § ii n.

§ 18. _Argives, &c_. See Speech for Megalopolitans throughout (with
Introd.).

_those whom they have exiled_: especially the refugees from Orchomenus
and Coroneia. See vol. i, p. 124.

_Phocian fugitives_. The Amphictyonic Council had recently declared
that these had been guilty of sacrilege, and might be seized wherever
they might be.

§ 20. _all that they themselves had toiled for_: i.e. the conquest of
the Phocians in the Sacred War.

§ 22. _some persons_: i.e. Aeschines and others who tried to excuse
Philip's treatment of the Phocians to the Athenian people.

§ 23. _admission ... Delphi_. The Phocians had formerly contrived their
exclusion from the Amphictyonic meeting and from the temple and oracle
of Delphi. The Council now restored them, and excluded the Phocians.

§ 24. _refuse to submit_: reading [Greek: (_oud) otioun upomeinai_.]
The insertion of [Greek: _oude_] (after Cobet) seems necessary, [Greek:
_otioun upomeinai_] alone would mean 'face any risk', but this would be
contradicted by the next clause. To translate, 'who think that we
should face any risk, but do not see that the risk would be one of
war,' is to narrow the meaning of [Greek: _otioun_] unduly.

§ 25. _Treaty of Peace_: i.e. the Peace of Philocrates.

_Cardians_. The Athenians claimed Cardia (the key of the Chersonese on
the Thracian side) as an ally, though in fact it was expressly excluded
from the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes in 357, and had made
alliance with Philip in 352.

_prince of Caria_. See Speech for Rhodians (with Introd.).

_drive our vessels to shore_: a regular form of ancient piracy (see
Speech on Chersonese, § 28). The Byzantines drove the Athenian
corn-ships into their own harbour. The victims were relieved of their
money or their corn.

_shadow at Delphi_: i.e. the empty privilege (as Demosthenes here
chooses to represent it) of membership of the Amphictyonic League and
Council, now claimed by Philip.


THE SECOND PHILIPPIC

§ 1. _sympathetic_: i.e. towards other Greek states, desirous of
securing independence.

§ 2. _Alexander_, &c. Alexander of Macedon was sent by Mardonius, the
Persian commander, to offer Athens alliance with Persia on favourable
terms. Demosthenes has confused the order of events, and speaks as if
this message was brought before the battle of Salamis. The Athenians
left the city twice, before the battle of Salamis and before that of
Plataeae; it was after Salamis that Alexander was sent (Herod. viii.
140, &c.).

§ 14. _fortify Elateia_. This would be a menace to Thebes (cf. Speech
on the Crown, §§ 174, 175). Elateia commands the road from Thermopylae
to Thebes.

§ 19. _well-balanced_ ([Greek: _s_ophronousi_]), or 'free from
passion', i.e. not liable to be carried away by ambition or cupidity as
the Thebans were. This is different from mere 'good sense' ([Greek:
_syphronein, noun echea_]). For Theban 'stupidity', see Speech on
Peace, § 15 (and n.).

§ 22. _Council of Ten_ ([Greek: _dekadarchian_]). It is clear that some
sort of oligarchical government, nominated by Philip, is referred to;
but the relation of this to the tetrarchies mentioned in the Speech on
the Chersonese, § 26, as established by Philip, is uncertain. These
corresponded to the four tribes or divisions of Thessaly (Thessaliotis,
Phthiotis, Pelasgiotis, Histiaeotis); and this is confirmed by a
statement in Theopompus' forty-fourth book, to which Harpocration (s.v.
[Greek: _dekadarchia_]) refers. Harpocration states that Philip did not
establish a decadarchy in Thessaly; and if he is right, then either (a)
Demosthenes purposely used an inaccurate word, in order to suggest to
the Messenians the idea of a government like that of the Councils of
Ten established some sixty years before by Sparta in the towns subject
to her; or (b) the text is wrong, and [Greek: _dekadarchian_] is a
misreading of [Greek: DARCHIAN], in which [Greek: D] was the numeral (=
4), and the whole stood for [Greek: _tetrarchian_]. As to (a), it is
difficult to suppose that the Messenians would not know what had
happened in Thessaly so well that the innuendo would fall flat. There
is no evidence that 'decadarchy' could be used simply as a synonym for
'oligarchy'. As to (b), the supposed corruption is possible; but then
we are left with [Greek: _tetrarchian_] where we should expect [Greek:
_tetrarchias_]: for there is no parallel to [Greek: _tetrarchia_]
(sing.) in the sense of 'a system of tetrarchies'. It is, however,
quite possible that Demosthenes was thinking especially of the
Thessalians of Pherae, and of the particular tetrarchy established over
them: and this seems on the whole the best solution. If, on the other
hand, Harpocration is wrong, the reference here may be to a Council of
Ten, either established previously to the tetrarchies, and superseded
by them, or else coexistent with and superior to them; in either case,
since the singular is used, this decadarchy must have been a single
government over the whole of Thessaly (or perhaps of the district about
Pherae only), not a number of Councils, one in each city or division of
Thessaly. (Theopompus' forty-fourth book probably dealt with 342 B.C.,
two years after the present speech, though before the Speech on the
Chersonese; but we are not told that he assigned the establishment of
the tetrarchies to that year.)

§ 25. _find yourselves slaves_: lit. 'find your master.'

§ 28. _by yourselves_: i.e. in the absence of the ambassadors from
Philip and other States.

_who conveyed the promises_: i.e. Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, and
Neoptolemus (see Speech on Embassy, §§ 12, 94, 315, &c.): but
Demosthenes has probably Aeschines also in view.

§ 30. _water-drinker_. See Speech on Embassy, § 46.

§ 32. _secure myself as good a hearing_. Most editions accept this
rendering of [Greek: _emaut_o logon poi_es-o_]. But though [Greek:
_logon didonai_] = 'grant a hearing,' and [Greek: _logon tychein_] =
'get a hearing,' [Greek: _logon eaut_o poiein_] is strange for 'secure
oneself a hearing', and the passage regularly quoted from the Speech
against Aristocrates, § 81, is not parallel, since [Greek: _tout_o_] in
that passage is not a reflexive pronoun, and [Greek: _logon pepoi_eke_]
almost = [Greek: _logon ded_oki_]. Possibly the text is corrupt, and we
should either read [Greek: _psogon_] (with H. Richards) or [Greek:
_emautou_] ('make you take as much account of me as of my opponents').

_further claim_: since an attack on the part of Demosthenes would
incite them to make out a plausible case for Philip once more, and so
earn his gratitude.


ON THE EMBASSY

[The literal translation of the title is 'On the misconduct as
ambassador'.]

§ 1. _drawing your lots_. The jurors who were to serve in each trial
were selected by lot out of the total number of jurors for the year.

§ 2. _one of those_: i.e. Timarchus (see Introd.).

_supremacy_. The sovereignty of the people was exercised to a great
extent through the law-courts, the jury being always large enough to be
fairly representative of popular opinion, though probably there was
generally a rather disproportionate preponderance of poorer men among
the jurors, the payment being insufficient to attract others. (See
Introduction, vol. i, pp. 18, 19, 23.)

§ 11. _the Ten Thousand_: the General Assembly of the Arcadians at
Megalopolis.

§ 13. _he came to me_, &c. Aeschines denies this, saying that it would
have been absurd, when he knew that Demosthenes and Philocrates had
acted together throughout (see Introd.).

§ 16. _in the very presence_, &c.: contrast Speech on the Crown,

§ 23 (and see n. there). Aeschines states that he was in fact replying
to inflammatory speeches made by orators who pointed to the Propylaea,
and appealed to the memory of ancestral exploits; and that he simply
urged that it was possible for the Athenians to copy the wisdom of
their forefathers without giving way to an unseasonable passion for
strife.

§ 17. _had again acted_: i.e. as on the First Embassy, if the reading
is correct (or perhaps, 'had committed a fresh series of wrongful
acts'). But possibly [Greek: _peprhakot_on_] is right, 'had sold fresh
concessions' to Philip.

§ 20. Aeschines replies that every one expected Philip to turn against
Thebes; and that for the rest, he was only reporting the gossip of the
Macedonian camp, where the representatives of many states were gathered
together, and not making promises at all. It is noteworthy, however,
that in the Speech on the Peace, § 10, shortly after the events in
question, when the speeches made would be fresh in every one's memory,
Demosthenes gives the same account of his opponent's assertions; and
Aeschines probably said something very like what is attributed to him.

§ 21. _debt due to the god_: i.e. the value of the Temple-treasure of
Delphi, which the Phocians had plundered.

§ 30. _for however contemptible_, &c. The argument seems to be this.
'You must not say that a man like Aeschines could not have brought
about such vast results. Athens may employ inferior men, but any one
who represents Athens has to deal with great affairs, and so his acts
may have great consequences. And again, although it may have been
Philip who actually ruined the Phocians, and although Aeschines could
never have done it alone, still he did his best to help.'

§ 31. _the Town Hall_, or Prytaneum, where the Prytanes (the acting
Committee of the Council) met, and other magistrates had their offices.

_Timagoras_ was accused (according to Xenophon) by his colleague Leon
of having conspired with Pelopidas of Thebes against the interests of
Athens, when on a mission to the court of Artaxerxes in 357. In § 137
Demosthenes also states that he received large sums of money from
Artaxerxes.

§ 36. Aeschines denies that he wrote the letter for Philip, and his
denial is fairly convincing.

§ 40. _a talent_. According to Aristotle (_Eth. Nic_. v. 7) the
conventional amount payable as ransom was one mina per head. But from §
169 it appears that the Macedonians sometimes asked for more than this.

_laudable ambition_: i.e. to get credit for having thought of the
ransom of the prisoners.

§ 47. _handed in_: either to the Clerk or to the Proedroi (the
committee of Chairmen of the Assembly).

§ 51. Aeschines states that Philip's invitation was declined because it
was suggested that Philip would keep the soldiers sent as hostages.

§ 65. _on our way to Delphi_. Demosthenes had been one of the Athenian
representatives at the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi
this year.

_gave its vote_, &c. After the battle of Aegospotami at the end of the
Peloponnesian War, the representative of Thebes proposed to the
Spartans and their allies that Athens should be destroyed and its
inhabitants sold into slavery.

§ 70. _read this law over_: i.e. that the herald might proclaim it
after him.

§ 72. For the Spartans see § 76. The Phocians had treated the Athenians
badly when Proxenus was sent to Thermopylae (see Introd. to Speech on
Peace). Hegesippus may have opposed the acceptance of Philip's
invitation to the Athenians to join him. Aeschines (on the Embassy, §§
137, 138) mentions no names in connexion with the refusal, but
represents it as the sacrifice of a unique opportunity of saving the
Phocians (cf. § 51 n.).

§ 76. _deceit and cunning, and of nothing else_ ([Greek: _pasa
apat_e_]). The argument is, 'Aeschines will try to allege wrongful acts
on the part of the Phocians; but there was no time for such acts in the
five days; and this proves that there were no such acts to justify
their ruin, and that their overthrow was due to nothing but trickery.'
This is better than to translate '_every kind of_ deceit and trickery
was concocted for the ruin of the Phocians'; for this is not the point,
nor is it what would be inferred from the fact that there was only a
five-days' interval between the speech of Aeschines and the
capitulation of the Phocians. There is no need to emend to [Greek: _h_e
pasa apat_e_].

_on account of the Peace_: i.e. of the negotiations for the Peace,
before it was finally arranged.

_all that they wished_: viz. the restoration of the Temple of Delphi to
their kinsmen, the Dorians of Mount Parnassus.

§ 78. _four whole months_: in reality, three months and a few days.

§ 81. _Phocian people_: i.e. those who were left in Phocis, as distinct
from the exiles just referred to.

§ 86. _of Diophantus_. In 352, when Philip had been repulsed by
Onomarchus, Diophantus proposed that public thanksgivings should be
held (see Introd. to First Philippic).

_of Callisthenes_: in 346, after the Phocians had surrendered to Philip.

_the sacrifice to Heracles_: perhaps one of the two festivals which
were respectively held at Marathon and at Cynosarges.

§ 99. _constitutional_: lit. 'an excuse for a citizen,' under a
constitution by which no one was compelled to enter public life, and
any one who did so without the requisite capacity had to take the
responsibility for his errors.

§ 103. _impeached_. An impeachment was brought before the Council (or,
more rarely, the Assembly). The procedure was only applied to cases of
extraordinary gravity, and particularly to what would now be called
cases of treason.

§ 114. _by torture_. The evidence of slaves might be given under
torture, in response to a challenge from one or other of the parties to
a suit. The most diverse opinions as to the value of such evidence are
expressed by the orators, according to the requirements of their case.
The consent of both sides was necessary; and in a very large number of
cases, one side or the other appears to have refused to allow evidence
to be taken in this way.

_was going_: i.e. to Philip.

§ 118. _accept his discharge_. There seems to be a play on two senses
of the verb [Greek: aphienai], viz. 'to discharge from the obligations
of a contract', and 'to acquit'.

§ 120. _Why, this is the finest_, &c. The expression ([Greek: touto gar
esti to lamprhon]) recurs in § 279, a closely parallel passage, and
need not be regarded as an interpolation in either case. The
interpretation given seems slightly preferable, and is approved by
Weil. It is almost equally possible to translate the Greek by 'such is
the brilliant defence which he offers'; but perhaps this does not suit
§ 279 so well.

_stand up_. Apparently Aeschines declined the invitation, which was
quite within the custom of the Athenian courts. Either of the principal
parties could ask the other questions, and have the answers taken down
as evidence.

_cases that have all_, &c. The reference is to the prosecution of
Timarchus, when advanced in age, for offences committed in early youth.
There may also be an allusion to Aeschines' early career as an actor.

§ 122. _declined on oath_. An elected official could refuse to serve,
if he took an oath that there was some good reason (such as illness)
for excusing him.

§ 126. _though not elected_. Aeschines (on the Embassy, § 94) replies
that in fact the commission was renewed at a second meeting of the
Assembly, and that he was then well enough to go and was elected. (That
there was a second election of ambassadors is confirmed by Demosthenes'
own statement in § 172 of the present speech, that he himself was twice
elected and twice refused to serve.)

§ 128. _Thesmothetae_: the six archons who did not hold the special
offices of archon eponymus, polemarch, or king archon.

_Aeschines went_, &c. To have refused to be present would really have
been to make a political demonstration against Thebes, which would have
had perilous results. Aeschines defends himself on the ground that in
his view the Peace was no disadvantage to Athens, so that he might well
join in the honours paid to the Gods.

§ 129. _Metroon_. The temple of the Great Mother (Cybele), which was
the Athenian record-office.

_the name of Aeschines_: i.e. its removal from the list of ambassadors.

§ 131. _in their interest_. If the words are not corrupt, the meaning
is probably 'in the interest of Philip and the Thebans'; or possibly,
'in reference to these matters.'

§ 136. _as his informant_. The text is possibly corrupt, though as it
stands it might perhaps bear the meaning given, if [Greek: hyparchei]
were understood with [Greek: autos]. Others (with or without
emendation) take the sense to be 'to manage his business ... just as he
would manage it in person '.

§ 137. For Timagoras see § 31 n.

§ 144. _summon Philip's envoys_: i.e. in order to report the decision
of the Assembly, and so close the matter.

§ 147. _ask him whether_, &c. The argument seems to be this 'if
Aeschines was the ambassador of a city which had been victorious
against Philip, the latter would naturally wish to buy easy terms of
peace; and Aeschines might undertake to procure such terms, without
committing a particularly heinous offence, since he would only be
getting some advantage for himself out of the general good fortune of
his country. But to secure advantages for himself at his country's
expense, when his country was already suffering disaster, would be far
worse. And as Aeschines complains that the generals had incurred
disaster, he convicts himself of the worse offence.'

§ 148. The _Tilphossaeum_ was apparently a mountain near Lake Copais in
Boeotia. The town which Strabo calls Tilphusium may have been on the
mountain. Neones, or Neon, was a Phocian village; Hedyleion, a mountain
in Boeotia.

§ 149. _Ah! he will say_, &c. Either the words are interpolated, or
there is a lacuna. The objection is nowhere refuted.

§ 156. Doriscus, &c. The places mentioned did not really belong to
Athens, but to Cersobleptes, who was being assisted by Athenian troops,
so that, strictly speaking, Philip was within his rights; and in fact
(according to Aeschines), Cersobleptes and the Sacred Mountain were
taken by Philip the day before the Athenians and their allies swore to
the Peace at Athens.

§ 162. _Eucleides_ had been sent to protest against Philip's attack
upon Cersobleptes in 346 (see vol. i, p. 122). Philip replied that he
had not yet been officially informed by the Athenian ambassadors of the
conclusion of the Peace, and was therefore not yet bound by it.

§ 166. _procure their ransom_: i.e. from the various Macedonians who
had captured them, or to whom they had been given or sold.

§ 176. _committed to writing_, &c. Formal evidence (as distinct from
the mere assertions of a speaker) was written down, and the witness was
asked to swear to it. A witness who was called upon might swear that he
had no knowledge of the matter in question ([Greek: _exomnysthai_]). By
writing down his evidence and swearing to it, Demosthenes took the risk
of prosecution for perjury.

§ 180. _might be proved in countless ways_: or 'would need a speech of
infinite length '. But as [Greek: _kai_] and not [Greek: _de_] follows,
I slightly prefer the former rendering. (The latter is supported by the
Third Philippic, § 60, but there the next clause is connected by
[Greek: _de_].)

_Ergophilus_ was heavily fined in 362 (see Speech against Aristocrates,
§ 104); Cephisodotus in 358 (ibid. § 167, and Aeschines against
Ctesiphon, § 52); Timomachus went into exile in 360 to escape
condemnation (against Aristocrates, § 115, &c.). Ergocles was perhaps
the friend of Thrasybulas (see Lysias, Orations xxviii, xxix), and may
have been condemned for his conduct in Thrace, as well as for
malversation at Halicarnassus. Dionysius is unknown.

§ 187. _has got beyond_, &c.: an ironical way of saying that he has so
much overdone his application to himself of the title of (prospective)
'benefactor' of Athens, that another word (e.g. 'deceiver') would be
more appropriate. The word [Greek: _psychrhon_] is (at least by Greek
literary critics) applied to strong expressions out of place, and here
also, probably, of an exaggerated phrase which falls flat. This is
perhaps the best interpretation of a very difficult passage.

§ 191. For Timagoras, see § 31 n. Tharrex and Smicythus are unknown.
Adeimantus was one of the generals at Aegospotami, the only Athenian
prisoner spared by Lysander, and on that account suspected of treason
by the Athenians, and prosecuted by Conon (called 'the elder', to
distinguish him from his grandson, who was a contemporary of
Demosthenes).

§ 194. guest-friend. The term ([Greek: xenos]) was applied to the
relationship (more formal than that of simple friendship) between
citizens of different states, who were bound together by ties of
hospitality and mutual goodwill.

§ 196. _the Thirty_: i.e. the 'Thirty Tyrants' who ruled Athens (with
the support of Sparta) for a few months in 403. See n. on § 277.

§ 198. Aeschines warmly denies this story. He says that Demosthenes
tried to bribe Aristophanes of Olynthus to swear that it was true, and
that the woman was his own wife. He adds that the jury, on an appeal
from Eubulus, refused to let Demosthenes complete the story.

§ 199. _initiations_: see Speech on Crown, §§ 259 ff., with notes.

§ 200. _played the rogue_. The scholiast says that clerks were
sometimes bribed to alter the laws and decrees which they read to the
Court; and a magistrates' clerk had doubtless plenty of opportunities
for conniving at petty frauds.

§ 204. _should not have been sworn to_. This is out of chronological
order as it stands, and emendations have been proposed, but
unnecessarily.

§ 209. _would not have him for your representative_: in the question
about Athenian rights at Delos. See Introduction to the Speech.

§ 213. _I have no further time, &c_.: lit. 'no one will pour water for
me' into the water-clock, by which all trials were regulated.

§ 221. _consider_, &c. There is an anacoluthon in the Greek, which may
be literally translated, 'Consider, if, where I who am absolutely
guiltless was afraid of being ruined by them--what ought these men
themselves, the actual criminals, to suffer?'

§ 222. _get money out of you_: i.e. to be bought off.

§ 230. _choregus and trierarch_: see Introd. to Speech on Naval Boards,
and n. on Philippic I. § 36.

§ 231. _all was well_ ([Greek: eupenespai]). The reading is almost
certainly wrong. Weil rightly demands some word contrasting with
[Greek: agnoein] ('did not understand his country') in the
corresponding clause.

§ 237. _vase-cases_: i.e. boxes to contain bottles of oil or perfume
for toilet use.

§ 245. _the cock-pit_. That this is the meaning seems to be proved by
the words of Aeschines (against Timarchus, § 53); otherwise the natural
translation would be 'to the bird-market'. Cocks were no doubt sold in
the bird-market; but Aeschines refers directly to cock-fighting, not to
the purchase of the birds.

§ 246. _hack-writers_: lit. 'speech-writers,' who composed speeches for
litigants, and no doubt padded them out with quotations from poets, as
well as with rhetorical commonplaces. Demosthenes taunts Aeschines
particularly with ransacking unfamiliar plays, instead of those he knew
well.

§ 249. _reared up... greatness_: or possibly, 'reared up all these sons
of hers.'

_Hero-Physician_. See Speech on the Crown, § 129 n.

_Round Chamber_, in the Prytaneum or Town Hall (see § 31 n.).

§ 252. _at the risk of his own life_. He tried to avoid the risk by
feigning madness. Salamis was in the hands of the Megareans, and the
Athenians had become so weary of their unsuccessful attempts to recover
it, that they decreed the penalty of death upon any one who proposed to
make a fresh attempt. The verses, however, which are quoted in the
text, are probably derived not from the poem which Solon composed for
this purpose, but from another of his political poems.

§ 255. _with a cap on your head_. Plutarch (Solon 82 c) says that
'Solon burst into the market-place suddenly, with a cap on his head'.
The cap was intended to suggest that he had just returned from Salamis,
since it was the custom to wear a cap only when on a journey, or in
case of illness (of. Plato, _Republic_, iii. 406_d_). There may
possibly be an allusion also to Aeschines' own alleged sickness (§ 136
above), but this is very doubtful. The words more probably mean,
'however closely you copy Solon' (as you copied his attitude in
speaking), 'when you run about declaiming against me.'

§ 257. _accepted the challenge_. At the examination before the Board of
Auditors (Logistae) the question was almost certainly put, whether any
one present wished to challenge the report of the ambassador under
examination.

§ 259. _claim_ ([Greek: axioumenoi]): or, 'are thought worthy'; but the
first sense is much better in the parallel passage in § 295, and this
'middle' use seems to be sufficiently attested, though the active voice
is used in the same sense in § 338.

§ 260. _paramount position_: i.e. among the tribes of North Greece
(Magnetes, Perrhaebi, &c.).

§ 264. _concluded the war, &c_. In 383 B.C. In fact, however, they only
obtained peace by joining the Spartan alliance.

§ 271. _Arthmius_: see Philippic III. § 42 (and note).

§ 273. _Callias_, in 444 B.C. Cf. Speech for the Rhodians, § 29. The
Chelidonian Islands lay off the south coast of Lycia, the Cyanean rocks
at the northern mouth of the Bosporus.

§ 277. _Epicrates_ was sent as ambassador to Persia early in the fourth
century, and received large presents. According to Plutarch he escaped
condemnation; but he may have been tried more than once. The comic
poets make fun of his long beard.

_who brought the people back from the Peiraeus_. Thrasybulus occupied
the Peiraeus in 403, secured the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants from
Athens, and restored the democracy.

§ 278. _the decree_: i.e. the decree by which Epicrates and his
colleagues were condemned.

§ 279. _for this is the splendid thing_: cf. § 120 n.

§ 280. _exiled_ and _punished_. We should perhaps (with Weil) read
[Greek: _e] ('or') for [Greek: kai] ('and').

_descendant of Harmodius_: i.e. Proxenus, who had been only recently
condemned, and is therefore not named.

§ 281. _another priestess_. According to the scholiast, the reference
is to Ninus, a priestess of Sabazios, who was prosecuted by Menecles
for making love-potions for young men. The connexion of this offence
with the meetings of the initiated is left to be understood.

§ 282. _the burden undertaken_. Such burdens as the duties of choregus,
trierarch, &c., might be voluntarily undertaken, as they were by
Demosthenes (see n. on Philippic I. § 36).

§ 287. _Cyrebion_, or 'Light-as-Chaff', was the nickname of Epicrates,
Aeschines' brother-in-law (not the Epicrates of § 277). _as a
reveller_, no doubt in some Dionysiac revel, in which it was not
considered decent to take part without a mask. (The original purpose of
masks, however, was not to conceal one's identity from motives of
shame, though Demosthenes suggests it as a motive here.)

_were water flowing upstream_. A half-proverbial expression implying
that the world was being turned upside-down, when such a person could
prosecute for such offences.

§ 290. _Hegesilaus_ was one of the generals sent to Euboea to help
Plutarchus; cf. Speech on the Peace, § 5 n. He was accused of abetting
Plutarchus in the deception which he practised upon Athens. For
Thrasybulus, cf. § 277.

_the primary question_: i.e. of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. If he was pronounced guilty, the question of sentence (or
damages) had to be argued and decided separately.

§ 295. _claim to be_: cf. n. on § 259.

_churning the butter_ ([Greek: etyrheue]): i.e. concocting the plot.
(For the metaphor cf. Aristophanes, _Knights_ 479.)

§ 299. _Zeus and Dione_. These names show that the oracles referred to
were probably given at Dodona.

§ 303. _oath of the young soldiers_. When the young Athenian came of
age, he received a shield and spear in the temple of Aglaurus, and
swore to defend his country and to uphold its constitution (cf.
Lycurgus, _Against Leocrates_, § 76).

§ 314. _keeping step with Pythocles_, who was a tall man, while
Aeschines was short.

§ 326. _Drymus and Panactum_ were on the border between Boeotia and
Attica. Nothing else is known of the expedition.

§ 332. _Chares_. See nn. on Philippic I. §§ 24, 46; Olynthiac II. § 28,
and Introductions.

§ 333. _of one of whom_, &c.: i.e. of Philip (see § 111 ff., and
Introd. to Speech on the Peace).

§ 342. _Euthycrates_. See Introd. to Olynthiacs.


ON THE CHERSONESE

§ 9. The argument is, 'if Philip is not committing hostilities so long
as he keeps away from Attica, Diopeithes is not doing so, so long as he
keeps away from Macedonia, and only operates in Thrace.'

_drive the vessels_, &c. See Speech on the Peace, § 25 n.

§ 14. _passing the time_: i.e. until a convenient season for an attack
arrives.

_those who are on the spot_: i.e. in Thrace, and who had doubtless sent
messages to Athens. Others think that the words mean 'those who are
here from Thrace'.

_Etesian winds_. See First Philippic, § 31 n.

_infatuation_: i.e. hostility to Athens.

§ 16. _punish the settlers_: i.e. those who were sent with Diopeithes
and demanded admission to Cardia.

§ 18. _Chalcis_, in Euboea (see Introd.).

§ 21. _keep our hands ... revenues_: a reference to the distributions
of Festival-Money (see Third Olynthiac, with Introduction and notes).

_contributions of the allies_. This interpretation seems on the whole
better warranted than 'contributions promised to Diopeithes'.

§ 24. _I consent to any penalty_: lit. *'I assess my own penalty at
anything'--a metaphor from the practice of the law-courts, which
allowed a convicted prisoner to propose an alternative penalty to that
suggested by the prosecutor.

_Erythraeans_: Erythrae was on the coast of Asia Minor, opposite Chios.

§ 25. _benevolences_: the same word as was used of the forced
contributions levied by English kings.

§ 27. _surrendering_: i.e. to his soldiers, to be plundered (if the
phrase is meant to convey anything but a vague accusation).

§ 28. _wax-tablet_: i.e. a summons.

_so many ships_. The critics of Diopeithes must have proposed the
sending of a definite force to control him.

§ 29. _a dispatch-boat_: lit. 'the _Paralus_'. This ship, and the
_Salaminia_, were the two vessels regularly employed on public errands.

_spitefulness_: i.e. towards Diopeithes.

§ 30. _Chares_: see references in n. on Speech on Embassy, § 332.

_Aristophon_. The reference may be to his conduct as general in the
early days of the war with Philip about Amphipolis. His activity as a
statesman began as far back as 403, and he was one of the most
influential politicians in Athens from about 361 to 354.

§ 31. _losing something_: _sc_. a scapegoat whom you could punish.

§ 40. _Euthycrates_, &c. See Introd. to Olynthiacs.

§ 44. _wretched hamlets_ ([Greek: kak_on]): lit. 'evils' or 'miseries';
but the word is possibly corrupt. (The original reading may possibly
have been [Greek: kalyb_on].) According to the scholiast, Drongilum and
Cabyle are near Amphipolis and the Strymon; but others assign different
localities to them. Masteira is quite unknown.

§ 45. _pit of destruction_ ([Greek: barhathrh_o]). This was literally
the pit into which the bodies of condemned criminals were thrown at
Athens.

_silos_: underground store-houses for grain, such as were found in Ceos
not many years ago, and may still be in use.

§ 46. _irremediable_ ([Greek: an_ekeston]). The reading of two good
manuscripts [Greek: aneikaston] (otherwise only known as a late Greek
word) may be correct. If so, it may mean 'unparalleled', or
'inexplicable'.

§ 57. The meaning is, that by denouncing those who propose active
measures now, they are preparing the way in order to prosecute them so
soon as you find the war burdensome; whereas they should themselves be
prosecuted for letting things go as far as they have gone.

§ 59. _Oreus_. See Introd.

_Pheraeans_, in 344. See Introd. to Second Philippic; and cf. Third
Philippic, § 12.

_compromise_. Slavery seems to be ironically regarded as a compromise
between activity and quiescence.

§ 63. _robbed of at an earlier period_. The sense must either be this,
or else 'all that you have lost in open war '. In either case
emendation is required.

§ 70. _trierarch and choregus_. Demosthenes was choregus in 348, and
trierarch in 363, 359, and 357.

§ 74. _Timotheus_: in 358, when Athens liberated Euboea from the
Thebans. Cf. First Philippic, § 17, First Olynthiac, § 8. The effect of
Timotheus' speech was such that the expedition started within three
days. (Speech against Androtion, § 14.)

§ 75. _best counsel that he can_. The text is probably corrupt; but
this was probably the sense of the original.


THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

§ 2. _actively at work_: the reference is to Diopeithes (see Speech on
Chersonese, § 57).

§§ 4, 5. Passages are repeated from the Speech on the Chersonese, § 4,
and First Philippic, § 2.

§ 8. _not to defraud us_: i.e. by making statements which he is not
prepared to act upon.

§ 11. _as though visiting his allies_. This is not true, though envoys
from the Phocians, as from most other Greek states of importance, were
in Philip's camp. With the whole passage, cf. Speech on Embassy, §§ 20
ff.

§ 12. _Pherae_. See Speech on Chersonese, § 59 n. For Oreus see Introd.
to Speech on Chersonese, and § 33 and 59 ff. of this Speech.

§ 15. _Serrhium, &c_. See Introd. to Speech on Peace.

_he had sworn to a Peace_. This is untrue; see Speech on Embassy, §
156, where it is part of the charge against Aeschines' party, that they
had enabled Philip to take these places _before_ he had sworn to the
Peace.

§16. _religion_: with special reference here to the sanctity of the
oath.

_into the Chersonese_: i.e. to help Cardia. The claim of Athens to
Cardia was not good, and it appears from the Speech of Hegesippus
against Halonnesus, § 2, that the Athenians had recognized the
independence of the town.

§ 18. _if anything should happen_: e.g. the outbreak of open war, or
(more probably) a defeat.

§ 23. _seventy-three years_: i.e. 476-404 B. c.

_thirty years save one_: i.e. 404-376 B.C. (in the latter year Chabrias
defeated the Spartans off Naxos).

_battle of Leucira_: in 371 B.C.

§ 24. _disturb the established order_: i.e. by establishing
oligarchical governments in place of democracy.

§ 26. _in the Thracian region_: strictly, in Chalcidice and the
neighbourhood. See Introd. to Olynthiacs.

_robbed their very cities of their governments_. This is preferable to
the (grammatically) equally possible rendering, 'robbed them of their
constitutions and their cities,' as it suits the facts better. Philip
seems to have substituted tetrarchies for separate city-states. (See
Speech on Chersonese, §26, and Second Philippic, § 22 n.)

§ 27. _Ambracia_. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese. _Elis_: Introd.
to Speech on Embassy. _Megara_: Speech on Embassy, §§ 294, 295.

§ 32. _Pythian games_. See Introd. to Speech on Peace. In 342 Philip
sent a deputy to preside in his name.

§§ 33, 34. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese. Echinus was a Theban
colony in Thessaly, on the north coast of the Malian Gulf.

§ 42. _Arthmius_, &c. (cf. Speech on Embassy, §271). Zeleia was in the
Troad, near Cyzicus. Arthmius was apparently proxenus of Athens at
Zeleia, and as such had probably certain rights at Athens, of which the
decree deprived him; so that Demosthenes' remarks at the beginning of
§44 are slightly misleading.

§ 46. At the end of this section two versions are imperfectly blended,
and it does not appear what were the contents of the document. Some
suppose that the insertion 'He reads from the document' is an early
conjectural interpolation.

§ 49. _because be leads_, &c. Philip did, in fact, bring the Macedonian
heavy infantry to great perfection for the purposes of a pitched
battle, though the decisive action was generally that of the cavalry.
But the other troops which Demosthenes names would enable him to
execute rapid movements with success. The use of light-armed troops had
already been developed by the Athenian general, Iphicrates.

§ 50. _with such advantages_: lit. 'under these conditions' (_not_ 'to
crown all', nor 'at the head of these troops').

§ 52. Contrast Speech on Naval Boards, Section 9.

§§ 57 ff. See Introd. to Speech on Embassy.

§ 59. Euphraeus had been a disciple of Plato, and an adviser of
Perdiccas, Philip's elder brother. It was he who recommended Perdiccas
to entrust the government of part of Macedonia to Philip, whom he
afterwards so strongly opposed.

§ 72. _embassies_. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese.


ON THE CROWN

§ 1. _to take counsel_, &c. Aeschines had asked the jury to refuse
Demosthenes a hearing, or at least to require him to follow the same
order of treatment as himself.

§ 3. _unpleasant_. Many render [Greek: duocheres] 'inauspicious',
'ill-omened'; but as we do not know exactly what was in Demosthenes'
mind, it is better not to give the word a meaning which it does not
bear elsewhere. It may, however, mean 'vexatious'.

§ 11. _knave as you are_, &c. The assonance of the original might
perhaps be partly reproduced by rendering 'evil-minded as you are, it
was yet a very simple-minded idea that your mind conceived', &c.

§ 12. _it does not enable the State_: lit. 'it is not possible for the
State.' The point is that the prosecution of Ctesiphon, while
expressing the malice of Aeschines towards Demosthenes, does not enable
the State to punish Demosthenes himself for his alleged offences, since
any penalty inflicted would fall on Ctesiphon.

§ 13. _to debar another_, &c. This probably refers to the attempt to
deprive Demosthenes of a hearing, not (as some have thought) to the
attempt to get so heavy a fine inflicted upon Ctesiphon that he would
be unable to pay it, and would therefore lose his rights as a citizen.

§ 17. _ascribed to me_, &c. Aeschines was anxious, in view of the
existing state of feeling at Athens, to disown his part in connexion
with the Peace of Philocrates; while Demosthenes undoubtedly assisted
Philocrates in the earlier of the negotiations and discussions which
led to the Peace.

_appropriate_. 'The recapitulation of the history is not a mere
argumentative necessity, but has a moral fitness also; in fact, the
whole defence of Demosthenes resolves itself into a proof that he only
acted in the spirit of Athenian history' (Simcox).

§ 18. _When the Phocian war bad broken out_: i.e. in 356-5. Demosthenes
made his first speech in the Assembly in 354.

_those who detested the Spartans_: i.e. the Messenians and Arcadians.

_those who had previously governed_, &c.: e.g. the oligarchies which
had governed with the help of Sparta in Phlius and Mantinea, and were
overthrown after the battle of Leuctra.

§ 19. _would be forced_, &c. This is a misrepresentation, since Philip
and the Thebans had been in alliance for some time, and Thebes had no
such grounds for apprehending evil from Philip, as would make her apply
to Athens.

§ 21. _Aristodemus_, &c. See Introd. to Speech on the Peace. As a
matter of fact, Demosthenes acted with Philocrates at least down to the
return of the First Embassy, and himself proposed to crown Aristodemus
for his services (Aeschines, On the Embassy, §§ 15-17).

§ 23. _the Hellenes bad all_, &c. It is not easy to reconcile this
passage with § 16 of the Speech on the Embassy, from which it appears
that representatives of other states were present in Athens; but these
so-called envoys may have been private visitors, and in any case there
was no real hope of uniting Greece against Philip.

§ 24. _Eurybatus_ is said to have been sent as an envoy by Croesus to
Cyrus, and to have turned traitor. The name came to be proverbial.

§ 27. _those strongholds_. See Introd. to Speech on the Peace.

§ 28. _But they would have watched_, &c. The passage has been taken in
several ways: (1) 'They would have had to watch,' &c., and this would
have been discreditable to Athens; (2) 'They would have watched,' &c.,
i.e. they would not have been excluded, as you desired, in any case;
(3) 'But, you say, they would have paid two obols apiece,' and the city
would have gained this. The sentence which follows favours (3), but
perhaps (2) is best. The petty interests of the city would include
(from the point of view assumed by Aeschines) the abstention from
showing civility to the enemy's envoys. The two-obol (threepenny) seats
were the cheapest.

§ 30. _three whole months_. In fact the ambassadors were only absent
from Athens about ten weeks altogether.

_equally well_. The reading ([Greek: homoios]) is probably wrong; but
if it is right, this must be the meaning.

§ 32. _as you did before_, in 352. See Introd. to First Philippic.

§ 36. _decree of Callisthenes_. This ordered the bringing in of effects
from the country. See Speech on Embassy, §§ 86, 125.

§ 41. _property in Boeotia_. See Speech on Embassy, § 145.

§ 43. _their hopes_: sc. of the humiliation of Thebes.

_and gladly_: i.e. they were glad to be free from a danger which
(though remotely) threatened themselves, as the next sentence explains.
I can see no good reason for taking the participle [Greek:
polemoumenoi] as concessive ('_although_ they also,' &c.).

§ 48. For Lasthenes see Introd. to Olynthiacs. Timolaus probably
contrived the surrender of Thebes after the battle of Chaeroneia.
Eudicus is unknown. Simus invoked Philip's aid against the tyrants at
Pherae in 352 (see Introd, to First Philippic). Aristratus was tyrant
of Sicyon, and made alliance with Philip in 338. For Perillus, see
Speech on Embassy, Section 295.

§ 50. _stale dregs_: strictly the remains, and especially the wine left
in the cups, from the previous night's feast; here the long-admitted
responsibility of Aeschines for the Peace of 346.

§ 63. _Dolopes_: a small tribe living to the south-west of Thessaly.

§ 65. _free constitutions_. This refers especially to the Thessalians,
who had been placed under tetrarchies (see Philippic III. § 26).

§ 70. _Aristophon_. See Speech on Chersonese, § 30 n. Diopeithes is
perhaps Diopeithes of Sphettus (mentioned by Hypereides, Speech against
Euxenippus, § 39), not the general sent by Athens to the Chersonese.

§ 71. For the events mentioned in this section, see Introd. to Speech
on the Embassy.

§ 72. _Mysian booty_. A proverbial expression derived from the helpless
condition of Mysia (according to legend) in the absence of its king,
Telephus.

§ 79. _to the Peloponnese_, in 344 (see Introd. to Second Philippic):
_to Euboea_ in 343-2 (see Introd. to Speech on Embassy); _to Oreus_,
&c., in 341 (see Introd. to this Speech).

§ 82. _as their patron_, i.e. as consul (or official patron) of Oreus
in Athens. See n. on Speech for Rhodians, § 15. civil rights. See vol.
i, p. 52.

§ 83. _this was already the second proclamation_: i.e. the proclamation
in accordance with the decree of Aristonicus. It is indeed just
possible that the reference is to the proposal of Ctesiphon, 'for this
is now the second proclamation,' &c. If so, we should have to assume
that the proclamation under the decree of Demomeles in 338 was
prevented by the disaster of Chaeroneia. But the first sentence of §
120 is against this (see Goodwin's edition _ad loc_.).

§ 94. _inconsiderate conduct_: i.e. in joining the revolt of the
Athenian allies in 356.

§ 96. _when the Spartans_, &c. The section refers to the events of 395.

_Deceleian War_: i.e. the last part of the Peloponnesian War (413-404
B.C.), when Deceleia (in Attica) was occupied by the Spartans.

§ 99. _Thebans... Euboea_: in 358 or 357. See Speech for
Megalopolitans, § 14 n.

§ 100. _Oropus_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, Section 11 n.

_I was one_. Demosthenes was, in fact, co-trierarch with Philinus
(Speech against Meidias, § 161).

§ 102. See Speech on Naval Boards (with Introd. and notes), and n. on
Olynthiac II, § 29.

_obtaining exemption_. The undertaking of the trierarchy conferred
exemption from other burdens for the year, and (conversely) no one
responsible for another public burden need be trierarch. The leaders of
the Taxation Boards referred to in § 103 are probably not (as generally
supposed) the richest men in the _Naval_ Boards [Footnote: They may
indeed have been so, but it was in virtue of their function as leading
members of the Hundred Boards (for collecting the war tax) that they
were grouped together as the Three Hundred.] (responsible for
trierarchy), but those in the Hundred Boards responsible for the war
tax. In each of these Boards there was a leader, a 'second', and a
'third', and these, all together, are almost certainly identical with
the 'Three Hundred' responsible for advancing the sum due. When these
were already advancing the war tax, they became exempt from trierarchy,
and their poorer colleagues in the Naval Boards (to which of course
they also belonged) had to bear the burden without them. But under
Demosthenes' law the trierarchic payment was required from all alike,
in strict proportion to their valuation as entered for the purposes of
the war tax; and the Three Hundred (the leaders, seconds, and thirds)
were no longer exempted. (This explains their anxiety to get the law
shelved.) Even in years when they were not exempt, before Demosthenes'
law was passed, they only paid a very small share in proportion to
their wealth, since all the members of each Naval Board paid the same
sum. It appears, however, that (though the Three Hundred as such cannot
be shown to have had any office in connexion with the trierarchy) the
richer men in the Naval Boards arranged the contracts for the work of
equipment, and that when they had contracted that the work should be
done (e.g.) for a talent, they sometimes recovered the whole talent
from their poorer colleagues. (Speech against Meidias, § 155.)

§ 103. _lie under sworn notice_, &c. ([Greek: en hupomosia]). One who
intended to indict the proposer of a law for illegality had probably to
give sworn notice of his intention, and the suggestion made to
Demosthenes was that when such notice had been given, he should let the
law drop.

§ 105. _the decree_, &c.: i.e. either a decree suspending the law until
the indictment should be heard, or one ordering the trial on the
indictment to be held.

§ 107. _no trierarch_, &c. A trierarch who thought the burden too heavy
for him could appeal against it by laying a branch on the altar in the
Pnyx, or by taking sanctuary in the Temple of Artemis at Munychia. A
dilatory or recalcitrant trierarch could be arrested by order of the
ten commissioners ([Greek: apostuleis]) who constituted a sort of
Admiralty Board.

§ 111. _the laws_, &c. The laws alleged to have been violated were
copied out, and accompanied the indictment. With regard to the laws in
the present case, see Goodwin's edition, pp. 313-6.

§ 114. _Nausides_ was sent to oppose Philip at Thermopylae in 352 (see
Introd. to First Philippic). Diotimus had a command at sea in 338, and
his surrender was demanded by Alexander in 335, as was also that of
Charidernus (see n. on Olynthiac III, § 5), who had now been a regular
Athenian general for many years, and had been sent to assist Byzantium
in 340 (see Speech against Aristocrates, _passim_).

§ 121. _hellebore_: supposed in antiquity to cure madness.

§ 122. _reveller on a cart_, e.g. on the second day of the Anthesteria,
when masked revellers rode in wagons and assailed the bystanders with
abusive language. Such ceremonial abuse was perhaps originally supposed
to have power to avert evil, and occurs in primitive ritual all over
the world.

§ 125. _the statutable limit_. There was a limit of time (differing
according to the alleged offence) after which no action could be
brought. Demosthenes could not now be prosecuted for any of the
offences with which Aeschines charged him.

§ 127. _Aeacus_, &c.: the judges of the dead in Hades, according to
popular legend.

_scandal-monger_. The Greek word ([Greek: spermologos]) is used
primarily of a small bird that pecks up seeds, and hence of a person
who picks up petty gossip. (In Acts xvii. 18 it is the word which is
applied to St. Paul, and translated 'this babbler'.)

_an old band in the market-place_: i.e. a rogue. A clerk would perhaps
often be found in the offices about the market-place; or the reference
may be to the market-place as a centre of gossip.

_O Earth_, &c. Demosthenes quotes from the peroration of Aeschines'
speech.

§ 129. The stories which Demosthenes retails in these sections deal
with a time which must have been forty or fifty years before the date
of this speech, and probably contain little truth, beyond the facts
that Aeschines' father was a schoolmaster (not a slave), and was
assisted by Aeschines himself; and that his mother was priestess of a
'thiasos' or voluntary association of worshippers of Dionysus-Sabazios,
among whose ceremonies was doubtless one symbolizing a marriage or
mystical union between the god and his worshippers. (Whether the form
of 'sacred marriage' which was originally intended to promote the
fertility of the ground by 'sympathetic magic' entered into the ritual
of Sabazios is doubtful.) Such a rite, though probably in fact quite
innocent, gave rise to suspicions, of which Demosthenes takes full
advantage; and the fact that well-known courtesans (such as Phryne and
perhaps Ninus) sometimes organized such 'mysteries' would lend colour
to the suspicions.

_Hero of the Lancet_ ([Greek: to kalamit_e aer_oi]). The interpretation
is very uncertain (see Goodwin, pp. 339 ff.); and, according as [Greek:
kalamos] is taken in the sense of 'lancet', 'splints', or 'bow',
editors render the phrase 'hero of the lancet', 'hero of the splints',
'archer-hero' (identified by some with Toxaris, the Scythian physician,
whose arrival in Athens in Solon's time is described in Lucian's
[Greek: Skuth_es ae Proxenos]). That the Hero was a physician is shown
by the Speech on the Embassy, § 249.

§ 130. _for they were not like_, &c. ([Greek: ouge gar h_onetuchen _en,
all ois hu daemos kataratai]). The meaning is quite uncertain. The most
likely interpretations are: (1) that given in the text, [Greek: a
bebioken] being understood as the subject of [Greek: _en], and [Greek:
_on etuchen] as = [Greek: tout_on a etuchen], i.e. 'not belonging to
the class of acts which were such as chance made them,' but acts of a
quite definite kind, viz. the kind which the People curses (through the
mouth of the herald at each meeting of the Assembly); (2) 'for he was
not of ordinary parents, but of such as the People curses'; the subject
of [Greek: _en] being Aeschines. But there is the difficulty that, with
this subject for [Greek: _en, _on etuchen] can only represent [Greek:
tout_on _on etuchen _on], whereas the sense required is [Greek: tout_on
oi etuchon], or (the regular idiom) [Greek: t_on tuchunt_on]; and the
sense is not so good, for the context [Greek: opse gar]) shows that the
clause ought to refer to the _acts_ of Aeschines about which he is
going to speak, not to his parentage, which the orator has done with.

_Glaucothea_. Her real name is said to have been Glaucis. Glaucothea
was the name of a sea-nymph. The change of the father's name Tromes
('Trembler') to Atrometus ('Dauntless') would also betoken a rise in
the world.

_Empusa_, or 'The Foul Phantom': a female demon capable of assuming any
shape. Obscene ideas were sometimes associated with her.

§ 132. For Antiphon, see Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.

_struck off the list_: at the revision of the lists in 346. (Each deme
revised the list of its own members, subject to an appeal to the
courts.)

_without a decree_: i.e. a decree authorizing a domiciliary visit.

§ 134. _when ... you elected him_. See Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.

_from the altar_: a peculiarly solemn form of voting; it is mentioned
in the Speech against Macartatus, § 14.

§ 136. _when Philip sent_, &c. See Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.

§ 137. The ostensible purpose of Anaxinus' visit was to make purchases
for Olympias, Philip's wife. Aeschines states that Anaxinus had once
been Demosthenes' own host at Oreus.

§ 141. _paternal deity_: as father of Ion, the legendary ancestor of
the Ionians, and so of the Athenians.

§ 143. _and of one_, &c. I have followed the general consensus of
recent editors; but I do not feel at all sure that the antecedent of
[Greek: us] is not [Greek: polemos]. In that case we should translate,
'which led to Philip's coming to Elateia and being chosen commander of
the Amphictyons, and which overthrew,' &c.

§ 146. _nature of the resources_, &c.: i.e. especially the possession
by Athens of a strong fleet.

§ 148. _representatives on the Council_. The Amphictyonic Council was
composed of two representatives (Hieromnemones) from each of twelve
primitive tribes, of which the Thessalians, the Boeotians, the Ionians
(one of whose members was appointed by Athens), and the Dorians (one
member appointed by Sparta) were the chief, while some of the tribes
were now very obscure. There were also present delegates (Pylagori)
from various towns. These were not members of the Council, and had no
vote, but might speak. Athens sent three such delegates to each
meeting. (See Goodwin, pp. 338, 339.)

§ 150. _make the circuit_, or 'beat the bounds'. The actual proceedings
(according to Aeschines' account, summarized in the Introd. to this
Speech) were much more violent.

_It was clearly impossible_, &c. The argument is unconvincing.
Aeschines may have known of the intention of the Locrians without their
having served a formal summons.

§ 158. _one man_: i.e. Philip.

§ 169. _the Prytanes_: the acting Committee of the Council.

_set fire to the wicker-work_: i.e. probably the hurdles, &c., of which
the booths were partly composed. Probably a bonfire was a
well-understood form of summons to an Assembly called in an emergency.

_the draft-resolution_. See Introd., vol. i, p. 18.

_on the hill-side_: i.e. on the Pnyx, the meeting-place of the Assembly.

§ 171. _the Three Hundred_. See n. on § 102.

§ 176. _philippize_. The word was coined during the wars with Philip,
on the analogy of 'medize'--the term used of the action of the traitors
who supported the invading Persians (Medes) early in the fifth century.

§ 177. _to Eleusis_, which was on the most convenient (though not the
shortest) route for an army marching to Thebes.

§ 180. _Battalus_: a nickname given to Demosthenes by his nurse on
account of the impediment in his speech from which he suffered in early
days, or of his general delicacy. Aeschines had tried to fix an obscene
interpretation upon it.

_Creon_. See Speech on the Embassy, § 247.

_at Collytus_: i.e. at the Rural Dionysia held in that deme.

§ 189. _any one_: lit. 'any one who chooses,' i.e. to call him to
account. The expression ([Greek: ho boulomenos]) is apparently half
technical, as applied to a self-appointed prosecutor. (Cf.
Aristophanes, _Plutus_ 908 and 918.)

§ 194. _the general_: i.e. at Chaeroneia.

§ 195. _Philip employed_. Most editors say '_Aeschines_ employed'. But
this would require [Greek: outos] not [Greek: ekeinos], and § 218 also
supports the interpretation here given.

§ 198. _treasured up_, &c. The suggestion seems to be that Aeschines
foresaw the disasters, but concealed his knowledge, 'storing them up'
in order to make a reputation out of them later.

§ 204. _to leave their land_, &c.: i.e. at the time of Xerxes' invasion
in 480, when the Athenians abandoned the city and trusted to the
'wooden walls' of their ships.

§ 208. On this magnificent passage, see the treatise _On the Sublime_,
chaps, xvi, xvii.

§ 209. _poring pedant_: lit. 'one who stoops over writings'. Here used
perhaps with reference to Aeschines' having 'worked up' allusions to
the past for the purpose of his Speech, while he remained blind to the
great issues of the present. Many editors think that the reference is
to his earlier occupation as a schoolmaster or a clerk; but this is
perhaps less suitable to the context.

§ 210. _staff...ticket_. The colour of the staff indicated the court in
which the juror was to sit; the ticket was exchanged for his pay at the
end of the day.

§ 214. _a very deluge_. He is thinking, no doubt, of the disaster at
Chaeroneia and the destruction of Thebes.

§ 215. _while their infantry_, &c. The Theban forces when prepared for
action would naturally camp outside the walls (see Olynth. I, § 27,
where Demosthenes similarly thinks of the Athenian army encamping
outside Athens). But although they were thus encamped outside, and had
left their wives and children unguarded within, they allowed the
Athenian soldiers to enter the city freely.

§ 216. _the river_: probably the Cephisus. Both battles are otherwise
unknown. If one of them was in winter, it must have taken place not
long after the capture of Elateia, and several months before the battle
of Chaeroneia.

§ 219. _somewhere to lay the blame_: or possibly, 'some opportunity of
recovering himself,' or 'some place of retreat'. But the interpretation
given (which is that of Harpocration) is supported by the use of
[Greek: anenenkein] in § 224.

§ 227. _counters all disappear_. The calculation was made by taking
away, for each item of debt or expenditure, so many counters from the
total representing the sum originally possessed. When the frame (or
_abacus_) containing the counters was left clear, it meant that there
was no surplus. (The right reading, however, may be [Greek: an
kathair_osin], 'if the counters are decisive,' or [Greek: han
kathair_osin], 'whatever the counters prove, you concede.')

§ 231. _cancel them out_ ([Greek: antanelein]): strictly, to strike
each out of the account in view of something on the opposite side (i.e.
in view of the alternative which you would have proposed).

§ 234. _collected in advance_: i.e. Athens had been anticipating her
income.

§ 238. _if you refer_, &c. Aeschines had accused Demosthenes of
saddling Athens with two-thirds of the expense of the war, and Thebes
with only one-third.

_three hundred_, &c. See Speech on Naval Boards, § 29 n.

§ 243. _customary offerings_, made at the tomb on the third and ninth
days after the death.

§ 249. _Philocrates_: not Philocrates of Hagnus, the proposer of the
Peace of 346, but an Eleusinian. For Diondas, see § 222. The others are
unknown.

§ 251. _Cephalus_. Cf. § 219. He was an orator and statesman of the
early part of the fourth century. (The best account of him is in
Beloch, _Attische Politik_, p. 117.)

§ 258. _the attendants' room_. The 'attendants' are those who escorted
the boys to and from school--generally slaves.

§ 259. _the books_, &c. Cf. § 129 and notes. The books probably
contained the formulae of initiation, or the hymns which were chanted
by some Dionysiac societies. The service described here is probably
that of the combined worship of Dionysus-Sabazios and the Great Mother
(Cybele).

_dressing_, &c. The candidate for initiation was clothed in a
fawn-skin, and was 'purified' by being smeared with clay (while sitting
down, with head covered) and rubbed clean with bran, and after the
initiation was supposed to enter upon a new and higher life. It is
possible that the veiling and disguising with clay originally signified
a death to the old life, such as is the ruling idea in many initiations
of a primitive type. (Cf. Aristophanes, travesty of an
initiation-ceremony in the _Clouds_ 256.)

§ 260. _fennel and white poplar_. These were credited with magical and
protective properties.

_Euoe, Saboe_: the cry to Sabazios. One is tempted to render it by
'Glory! Hallelujah!' In fact, the Dionysiac 'thiasoi', or some of them,
had many features, good as well as bad, in common with the Salvation
Army. The cry 'Euoe, Saboe' is of Thracian origin; 'Hyes Attes' is
Phrygian. The serpents, the ivy, and the winnowing-fan figured in more
than one variety of Dionysiac service. It is not certain that for
'ivy-bearer' ([Greek: kittophorhos]) we should not read 'chest-bearer'
([Greek: kistophoros]) used with reference to the receptacle containing
sacred objects, of which we hear elsewhere in connexion with similar
rites.

§ 261. _fellow-parishioners_; lit. 'members of your deme'. Each deme
kept the register of citizens belonging to it. Enrolment was possible
at the age of 18 years, and had to be confirmed by the Council. (See
Aristotle, _Constitution of Athens_, chap. xiii.)

§ 262. _collecting figs_, &c. Two interpretations are possible: (1)
that the spectators in derision threw fruit--probably not of the
best--at Aeschines on the stage, and he gathered it up, as a fruiterer
collects fruit from various growers, and lived on it; or (2) that while
he was a strolling player, Aeschines used to rob orchards. Of these (1)
seems by far the better in the context.

§ 267. _I leave the abysm_, &c. The opening of Euripides' _Hecuba_. The
line next quoted is unknown. 'Evil in evil wise' ([Greek: kakon
kak_os]) is found in a line of Lynceus, a fourth-century tragedian.

§ 282. _denied this intimacy with him_: or possibly (with the
scholiast), 'declined this office.'

§ 284. _the tambourine-player_. Such instruments were used in orgiastic
rites.

§ 285. Hegemon and Pythocles were members of the Macedonian party, who
were put to death in 317 by order of the Assembly. (See Speech on
Embassy, §§ 215, 314.)

§ 287. _same libation_: i.e. the same banquet. The libation preceded
the drinking. To 'go beneath the same roof' with a polluted person was
supposed to involve contamination.

_in the revel_. Cf. Speech on the Embassy, § 128. The reference,
however, is here more particularly to Philip's revels after the battle
of Chaeroneia, in which, Demosthenes suggests, the Athenian envoys took
part.

§ 289. The genuineness of the epitaph is doubtful. Line 2 is singularly
untrue. The text is almost certainly corrupt in places (e.g. ll. 3 and
10).

_their lives_, &c. As the text stands, [Greek: aret_es] and [Greek:
deimatos] must be governed by [Greek: brab_e,], 'made Hades the judge
of their valour or their cowardice.' But this leaves [Greek: ouk
esa_osan psuchas] as a quasiparenthesis, very difficult to accept in so
simple and at the same time so finished a form of composition as the
epigram. There are many emendations.

_'Tis God's_, &c. The line, [Greek: m_eden hamartein esti the_on kai
panta katorhthoun], is taken from Simonides' epitaph on the heroes of
Marathon. The sense of the couplet is plain from § 290; but [Greek: en
biot_e] in l. 10 is possibly corrupt.

§ 300. _the confederacy_, i.e. Athens, Thebes, and their allies at
Chaeroneia.

§ 301. _our neighbours_, especially Megara and Corinth.

§ 308. _the inactivity which you_, &c.: i.e. abstention from taking a
prominent part in public life.

§ 309. _opening of ports_: i.e. to Athenian commerce.

§ 311. _What pecuniary assistance_, &c. Demosthenes is thinking of his
own services in ransoming prisoners, &c. Some editors translate, 'What
public financial aid have you ever given to rich or poor?' i.e. 'When
have you ever dispensed State funds in such a way as to benefit any
one?' It is impossible to decide with certainty between the two
alternatives; but the meanings of [Greek: politik_e] ('citizen-like',
'such as one would expect from a good fellow-citizen') and [Greek:
koin_e], which I assume, seem to be supported by §§ 13 and 268
respectively.

§ 312. _leaders of the Naval Boards_. See Introd. to Speech on Naval
Boards.

_damaging attack_, &c. This probably refers to modifications introduced
on Aeschines' proposal into Demosthenes' Trierarchic Law of 340, not at
the time of its enactment, but after some experience of its working.
(See Aeschines, 'Against Ctesiphon,' § 222.)

§ 313. Theocrines was a tragic actor, who was attacked in the
pseudo-Demosthenic Speech 'Against Theocrines'. Harpocration's
description of him as a 'sycophant', or dishonest informer, may be
merely an inference from the Speech.

§ 318. _your brother_. See Speech on the Embassy, §§ 237, 249. It is
not known which brother is here referred to.

§ 319. Philammon was a recent Olympic victor in the boxing match;
Glaucus, a celebrated boxer early in the fifth century.

§ 320. _owner of a stud_. To keep horses was a sign of great wealth in
Athens.



  INDEX

  Abdera, i.
  Abydos, ii.
  Acarnania, Acarnanians, ii.
  Achaeans, ii.
  Acropolis, i.; ii.
  Adeimantus, i.
  Admiralty Board ([Greek: apostoleis]), ii.
  Aeacus, ii.
  Aegina, ii.
  Aeschines, i.; ii.
  Aetolia, Aetolians, ii.
  Agapaeus, ii.
  Aglaurus, temple of, i.; ii.
  Agyrrhius, i.
  Alcidamas, i.
  Alenadae, i.
  Alexander (480 B.C.), i.;  ii.
  Alexander the Great, ii.
  Amadocus, i.
  Ambassadors, duties of, i.
  Ambracia, ii.
  Amphictyonic Council,
    its constitution and functions, i.; ii.
    from 346-343 B.C., i.; ii.
    and the Amphissean War, ii.
    Demosthenes at the, ii.
  Amphipolis, i.; ii.
  Amphissa, Amphissean War:
    _see_ Amphictyonic Council.
  Anaximenes, i.
  Anaxinus, ii.
  Androtion, i.
  Anemoetas, ii.
  Antalcidas: _see_ Peace.
  Anthemus, i.
  Antipater, i.
  Antiphon, i.; ii.
  Aphobetus, i.
  Apollodorus, i.
  Apollonia, ii.
  Apollonides,
    of Cardia, i.
    of Olynthus, ii.
  Apollophanes, i.
  Arcadia, Arcadians, i.; ii.
    (_See_ also Megalopolis.)
  Areopagus,
    Council of, i.; ii.
  Argaeus, i.
  Argives, Argos, i.; ii.
  Ariobarzanes, i.; ii.
  Aristaechmus, ii.
  Aristides, i.
  Aristocrates, i.
  Aristodemus, i.; ii.
  Aristoleos, ii.
  Aristonicus, ii.
  Aristophanes, ii.
  Aristophon, i.; ii.
  Aristotle, i.
  Aristratus,
    of Naxos, ii.
    of Sicyon, ii.
  Arrhidaeus, i.
  Artabazus, i.; ii.
  Artaxerxes, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Persia.)
  Artemisia, i.; ii.
  Artemisium, ii.
  Arthmius, i.; ii.
  Arybbas, i.; ii.
  Asiatic Greeks, i.; ii.
  Assembly, the Athenian,
    its functions, character, and defects, i.; ii.
    debates in, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Athenian People.)
  Athenian People,
    their indifference and procrastination, i.; ii.
    their incalculability, i.
    their traditions and traditional policy, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Assembly, Democracy.)
  Atrestidas, i.
  Atrometus, i.; ii.
  Auditors, Board of (Logistae), i.; ii.
  Automedon, ii.

  Balance of Power, principle of, i.
  Battalus, ii.
  Boedromia, i.; ii.
  Boeotia, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Thebes.)
  Boeotian War, ii.
  Brougham, Lord; Preface; i.
  Byzantium, i; ii.

  Cabyle, ii.
  Callias
    (Author of Peace), i.
    (_See also _Peace.)
    (of Chalcis), ii.
    (public slave), i.
  Callisthenes, i.; ii.
  Callistratus, i.; ii.
  Cardia, Cardians, i.; ii.
  Caria, Prince of, i.
    (_See also_ Artemisia, Mausolus.)
  Ceos, ii.
  Cephalus, ii.
  Cephisodotus, i.; ii.
  Cephisophon, ii.
  Cercidas, ii.
  Cersobleptes, i.; ii.
  Chabrias, i.; ii.
  Chaeroneia, battle of, ii.
  Chalcedon, i.; ii.
  Chalcidic League, i.; ii.
  Chalcis, ii.
  Chares, i.; ii.
  Charidemus, i.; ii.
  Chelidonian Islands, ii.
  Chersonese, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Cardia.)
  Chios, i.; ii.
  Cineas, ii.
  Cirrha, Cirrhaean plain, ii.
  Clearchus, i.; ii.
  Cleitarchus, i.; ii.
  Cleophon, i.
  Cleotimus, ii.
  Collytus, ii.
  Conon, i.
  Corcyra, i.; ii.
  Corinth, Corinthians, i.; ii.
  Corn-supply, &c. (Athenian), i.; ii.
  Coroneia, i.; ii.
  Corsia, i.
  Cos, i.; ii.
  Cottyphus, ii.
  Council,
     of Areopagus.
    (_See_ Areopagus.)
    of Five Hundred, i.; ii.
  Crenides, i.
  Creon, i.; ii.
  Cresphontes, ii.
  Ctesiphon
    (negotiator of Peace), i.; ii.
    (indicted by Eubulus), i.
    (proposer of Crown), ii.
  Curse, public, i.; ii.
  Cyanean Rocks, ii.
  Cyprothemis, i.
  Cyrebion, i.; ii.
  Cyrsilus, ii.
  Cyrus, i.; ii.

  Daochus, ii.
  Dardani, i.
  Deceleian War, ii.
  Deinarchus, ii.
  Delos, i.; ii.
  Delphi, temple at, i.; ii.
  Demades, i.; ii.
  Demaretus, ii.
  Democracy,
    and Oligarchy, i.
    and Tyranny, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Athenian People.)
  Demomeles, ii.
  Demosthenes (General), i.; ii.
  Dercylus, i.
  Diodorus, i.
  Dion, ii.
  Diondas, ii.
  Dionysia, i.; ii.
  Dionysius (General), i.; ii.
  Dionysius of Halicarnassus, i.
  Dionysus, ii.
  Diopeithes
    (General), ii.
    (of Sphettus?), ii.
  Diophantus, i.; ii.
  Diotimus, ii.
  Disunion of the Hellenes, i.; ii.
  Dium, i.
  Dodona, oracle of, ii.
  Dolopes, ii.
  Dorians of Parnassus, ii.
  Doriscus, i.; ii.
  Drongilum, ii.
  Drymus, i.

  Echinus, ii.
  Egypt, i; ii.
  Elateia, i.; ii.
  Election by lot, i.
  Eleusis, ii.
  Elis, i.; ii.
  Elpias, ii.
  Embassies to Peloponnesian States, ii.
  Embassy,
    the First, i.
    the Second, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Peace of Philocrates.)
    the Third, i.; ii.
  Empusa, ii.
  Ephialtes, ii.
  Epichares, ii.
  Epicrates, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Cyrebion).
  Epirus, ii.
  Eretria, i.; ii.
  Ergiske, ii.
  Ergocles, i.; ii.
  Ergophilus, i.; ii.
  Erythraeans, ii.
  Etesian Winds, i.; ii.
  Euboea, Euboeans, i.; ii.
  Eubulus, i.; ii.
  Eucleides, i.; ii.
  Eudicus, ii.
  Euphraeus, ii.
  Eurybatus, ii.
  Eurylochus, i.
  Euripides, i.
  Euthycles, i.
  Euthycrates, i.; ii.
  Execcstus, i.

  Festival Fund, i.; ii.
  Financial System (Athenian),  i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Military System, Naval System.)
  Fortifications,
    Commissioner of, ii.
    of Athens, ii.
  Fortune, i.; ii.
  Funeral Oration, after Chaeroneia, ii.

  Geraestus, i.; ii.
  Getae, ii.
  Glaucothea, i.; ii.
  Glaucus, ii.
  Gods,
    and crime, i.
    and perjury, i.
    command issues of events, ii.
    protect Athens, i.; ii.
  Guest-friendship, ii.

  Haliartus, i.; ii.
  Halonnesus, ii.
  Halus, i.
  Harmodius, i.
  Hedyleum, i.; ii.
  Hegemon, ii.
  Hegesilaus, i.; ii.
  Hegesippus, i.; ii.
  Hellespont, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Chersonese, Thrace.)
  Heracles, sacrifice to, i.; ii.
  Heraeon Teichos, i.; ii.
  Hero of the Lancet (Hero-Physician), i.; ii.
  Hierax, i.
  Hieronymus, i.
  Hipparchus, ii.
  Hipponicus, ii.
  Hypereides, i.; ii.

  Iatrocles, i.
  Illyria, Illyrians, i.; ii.
  Imbros, i.; ii.
  Iphicrates, i.; ii.
  Isaeus, i.
  Ischander, i.
  Isocrates, i.; ii.

  Lacedaemon, Lacedaemonians.
    (_See_ Sparta, Spartans.)
  Lampsacus, i.; ii.
  Lasthenes, i.; ii.
  Larissa, i.; ii.
  Law-Courts, supremacy of, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Trials.)
  Legislative Commission, i.; ii.
  Lemnos, i.; ii.
  Leon, i.; ii.
  Leptines, i.
  Leucas, ii.
  Leuctra, battle of, i.; ii.
  Locrians, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Amphissa.)
  Logistae.
    (_See_ Auditors.)
  Longinus, i.
  Lycophron, i.
  Lycurgus, ii.

  Macedonian Empire, i.
  Magnesia, i.; ii.
  Mantineia,
    battle of, i.; ii.
    oligarchy in, ii.
  Marathon, i.; ii.
    battle of, i.; ii.
  Mardonius, ii.
  Maroneia, i.
  Masteira, ii.
  Mausolus, i.
  Mecyberna, i.
  Megalopolis, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Arcadia.)
  Megara, Megareans, i.; ii.
  Meidias, ii.
  Melantus, ii.
  Menecles, ii.
  Menelaus, i.; ii.
  Menippus, ii.
  Mercenaries, i.; ii.
  Messene, Messenians, i.; ii.
  Methone, i.; ii.
  Metroon, i.; ii.
  Military System (Athenian), i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Mercenaries, Naval System.)
  Miltiades, i.
  Mnaseas, ii.
  Moerocles, i.
  Molon, i.
  Molossi, ii.
  Molossus, ii.
  Minos, ii.
  Mother, the Great, ii.
  Mountain, Sacred, i.; ii.
  Munychia, ii.
  Murder, Law of, ii.
  Myrtenum, ii.
  Myrtis, ii.
  'Mysian booty,' ii.
  Mysteries, the, ii.
  Mytilene, i.

  Naval Boards, i.; ii.
  Naval System (Athenian), i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Financial System, Military System.)
  Naupactus, ii.
  Nausicles, ii.
  Neapolis, i.
  Neoptolemus, i.; ii.
    (another?), ii.
  Neon, ii.
  Neones, i.; ii.
  Nicaea, i.; ii.
  Nicias
    (General), i.
    (another), i.
  Ninus, ii.

  Oenomaus, ii.
  Oligarchy, i.; ii.
  Olympian games, i.
  Olympias, ii.
  Olynthus, Olynthians, i.; ii.
  Onomarchus, i.
  Orators,
    corrupt and disloyal, i.; ii.
    and Speech on the Crown, _passim_.
    (_See also_ Traitors.)
    difficulties and risks of, i.; ii.
    duties of, i.; ii.
    past and present Athenian, i.; ii.
    position of, in Athens, i.; ii.
    recriminations of, i.; ii.
    seeking popularity, i.; ii.
  Orchomenus, i.; ii.
  Oreus, i.; ii.
  Orontas, i.; ii.
  Oropus, i.; ii.
  Paeonians, i.; ii.
  Pagasae, i.
  Pammenes, i.
  Panactum, i.; ii.
  Panathenaea, i.; ii.
  Pangaeus, Mount, i.
  Parmenio, i.
  Peace
    of Antalcidas, i.; ii.
    of Callias, i.; ii.
    of Demades, ii.
    of Philocrates, i.; ii.
  Peitholaus, i.
  Peiraeus, i.; ii.
  Pella, i.; ii.
  Pelopidas, ii.
  Peparethus, ii.
  Periander, Law of, i.
  Perdiccas, ii.
  Pericles, i.
  Perillus, i.; ii.
  Perinthus, i.; ii.
  Persia, Persian King, i.; ii.
  Phalaecus, i.; ii.
  Pharsalus, i.
  Pherae, Pheraeans, i.; ii.
  Philammon, ii.
  Philiadas, ii.
  Philinus, ii.
  Philip,
    his advantages over Athens, i.; ii.
    his army, ii.
    his character, i.; ii.
    his policy, i.; ii.
  Philippi, i.
  Philippopolis, ii.
  Philo, i.; ii.
  Philochares, i.
  Philocrates
    (author of Peace), i.; ii.
    (another), ii.
  Philonicus, i.
  Philistides, ii.
  Phlius, Phliasians, i.; ii.
  Phocians, Phocis, i.; ii.
  Phocion, i.; ii.
  Phormio, ii.
  Phryne, ii.
  Phrynon, i.
  Phyle, i.
  Pirates, &c., ii.
  Pittalacus, i.
  Plataeae, i.; ii.
    (battle of), ii.
  Plutarchus, i.; ii.
  Pnyx, ii.
  Polyeuctus, ii.
  Polystratus, i.; ii.
  Porthmus, i.; ii.
  Poteidaea, i.; ii.
  Prisoners, ransom of, i.; ii.
  Proconnesus, ii.
  Proedroi, ii.
  Prophets, i.; ii.
  Proxenus, i.; ii.
  Prytanes, i.; ii.
  Ptoeodorus, i.; ii.
  Pydna, i.; ii.
  Pythian Games, i.; ii.
  Pythocles, i.; ii.
  Python, i.; ii.

  Rhadamanthus, ii.
  Rhodes, Rhodians, i.; ii.
  River, battle by the, ii.
  Round Chamber, i.; ii.

  Sabazios.
    (_See_ Dionysus.)
  Sacred War, i.
    (_See also_ Amphissean War.)
  Salamis, Salaminians, i.; ii.
    battle of, i.; ii.
  Samos, i.; ii.
  Satyrus, i.
  Schools (Athenian), i.; ii.
  Sciathus, i.; ii.
  Scyros, i.
  Scythia, ii.
  Selymbria, i.; ii.
  Serrhium, i.; ii.
  Sicyon, ii.
  Sigeum, i.; ii.
  Simonides, ii.
  Simus, ii.
  Simylus, ii.
  Smicythus, i.; ii.
  Socrates
    (of Oreus), ii.
    (actor), ii.
  Solon, i.; ii.
  Sophocles, i.
  Sosicles, ii.
  Sosistratus, ii.
  Sparta, Spartans, i.; ii.
  Stageira, i.
  Symmories.
    (_See_ Naval Boards.)

  Tamynae, ii.
  Tanagra, ii.
  Taurosthenes, ii.
  Taxation.
    (_See_ Financial System.)
  Teledamus, ii.
  Tenedos, ii.
  Tetrarchies, ii.
  Tharrex, i.; ii.
  Thasos, i.
  Thebans, Thebes, i.; ii.
  Themison, ii.
  Themistocles, i.; ii.
  Theocrines, ii.
  Theodoras
    (actor), i.
    (of Oropus), ii.
  Theogeiton, ii.
  Theopompus, ii.
  Theoric Fund.
    (_See_ Festival Fund.)
  Thermopylae, i.; ii.
  Theseus, temple of, ii.
  Thesmothetae, i.; ii.
  Thessalians, Thessaly, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Magnesia, Pagasae, Pharsalus, Pherae.)
  Thirty Tyrants, the, i.; ii.
  Thoas, ii.
  Thrace, Thracians, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Cersobleptes, Chersonese, Hellespont.)
  Thrason, ii.
  Thrasybulus, i.; ii.
  Thrasydaeus, ii.
  Thrasylochus, ii.
  Thucydides, i.
  Tigranes, i.
  Tilphossaeum, i; ii.
    173.
  Timagoras, i.; ii.
  Timarchus, i.; ii.
  Timocrates, i.
  Timolaus, ii.
  Timomachus, i.
  Timotheus, i.; ii.
  Torone, i.; ii.
  Torture, i.; ii.
  Traitors, i.; ii.
    (_See also_ Orators, corruption of.)
  Trials, Athenian (character and
    procedure), i.
    (_See also_ Law-Courts.)
  Triballi, i.; ii.
  Tricaranum, i.; ii.
  Trierarchy.
    (_See_ Naval Boards Naval System.)
  Triphylia, i.; ii.
  Tromes, ii.

  Walls, the, i.
  Winter-battle, the, ii.

  Xenocleides, i.
  Xenophron, i.

  Zeleia, i.; ii.





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