The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576 - The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II

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Title: The Wars of Religion in France 1559-1576 - The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici and Philip II
Author: Thompson, James Westfall
Language: English
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:

—Obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected.

—Whereas adequate character is unavalaible, superscripts are rendered
as word^[sup].

The
Wars of Religion in France
1559-1576

[Illustration: VIEW OF PARIS
From a sketch by Jacques Callot (1592-1635).]

The
Wars of Religion in France

1559-1576

The Huguenots Catherine de Medici
and Philip II

BY
JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON, PH.D.

_Associate Professor of European History in
the University of Chicago_

[Illustration: LOGO ARMS DE LA ROCHELLE]

CHICAGO:
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

LONDON:
T. FISHER UNWIN, 1 ADELPHI TERRACE

1909

Published May 1909

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.

TO
MARY HAWES WILMARTH
THE LARGESS OF WHOSE SPIRIT HAS MADE THE
WORLD RICHER AND LIFE NOBLER

PREFACE

No one acquainted with the history of historical writing can have
failed to observe how transitory are its achievements. Mark Pattison’s
aphorism that “history is one of the most ephemeral forms of
literature” has much of truth in it. The reasons of this are not far
to seek. In the first place, the most laborious historian is doomed to
be superseded in course of time by the accumulation of new material.
In the second place, the point of view and the interpretation of one
generation varies from that which preceded it, so that each generation
requires a rewriting of history in terms of its own interest.

These reasons must be my excuse for venturing to write a new book upon
an old subject. It is now nearly thirty years since the appearance
of the late Professor Henry M. Baird’s excellent work, _The Rise of
the Huguenots_ (New York, 1879), and little that is comprehensive has
since been written upon the subject in English, with the exception
of Mr. A. W. Whitehead’s admirable _Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of
France_ (London, 1904). But the limitations imposed by biographical
history compel an author inevitably to ignore movements or events not
germane to his immediate subject, which, nevertheless, may be of great
importance for general history. Moreover, a biography is limited by the
term of life of the hero, and his death may not by any means terminate
the issue in which he was a factor—as indeed was the case with Coligny.

An enumeration of the notable works—sources and authorities—which
have been published since the appearance of Professor Baird’s work
may serve to justify the present volume. First and foremost must be
mentioned the notable _Lettres de Catherine de Médicis_, the lack of
which Ranke deplored, edited by the late Count Hector de la Ferrière
and M. Baguenault de la Puchesse (9 vols.), the initial volume of
which appeared in 1880. Of diplomatic correspondence we have the
_Ambassade en Espagne de Jean Ebrard, seigneur de St. Sulpice de 1562
à 1565_ (Paris, 1902), edited by M. Edmond Cabié, and thé _Dépêches de
M. Fourquevaux, ambassadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne, 1565-72_,
in three volumes, edited by the Abbé Douais (Paris, 1896). Other
sources which have seen the light within the last three decades are
M. Delaborde’s _Vie de Coligny_ (3 vols., 1877-), the title of which
is somewhat misleading, for it is really a collection of Coligny’s
letters strung upon the thread of his career; the Baron Alphonse de
Ruble’s _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_ (4 vols., 1881); M.
Ludovic Lalanne’s new annotated edition of _D’Aubigné_ (1886), and
the new edition of Beza’s _Histoire ecclésiastique_ (ed. of Baum,
1883). Finally, among sources should be included many volumes in the
“Calendar of State Papers.” Professor Baird has rightly said that “Too
much weight can scarcely be given to this source of information and
illustration.” His praise would probably have been even greater if he
could have used the correspondence of Dale and Smith as freely as he
did that of Throckmorton and Norris.

When we pass from sources to authorities the list of notable works
is even longer. La Ferrière’s _Le XVI^[e] siècle et les Valois_—the
fruit of researches in the Record Office in London—appeared in 1879;
M. Forneron’s _Histoire de Philippe II_ (4 vols.) was published in
1887, and is even more valuable than his earlier _Histoire des ducs de
Guise_ (1877). Besides these, in the decade of the 80’s, are Durier’s
_Les Huguenots en Bigorre_ (1884); Communay’s _Les Huguenots dans le
Béarn et la Navarre_ (1886); Lettenhove’s _Les Huguenots et les Gueux_
(1885); the baron de Ruble’s _Le traité de Cateau-Cambrésis_ (1889),
and the abbé Marchand’s _Charles de Cossé, Comte de Brissac_ (1889).
M. de Crue’s notable _Anne, duc de Montmorency_ appeared in the same
year and his no less scholarly _Le parti des politiques au lendemain
de Saint Barthélemy_ three years later. M. Marlet’s _Le comte de
Montgomery_ was published in 1890; M. Georges Weill’s _Les théories
sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de religion_, in
1891; M. Henri Hauser’s _François de La Noue_ in 1892; M. Bernard de
Lacombe’s _Catherine de Médicis entre Guise et Condé_ in 1899, and,
most recently of all, M. Courteault’s _Blaise de Montluc_ (1908).
Many contributions in the _Revue historique_, the _Revue des questions
historiques_, the _English Historical Review_, the _Revue d’histoire
diplomatique_, the _Revue des deux mondes_, and one article in the
_American Historical Review_, January, 1903, by M. Hauser, “The
Reformation and the Popular Classes in the Sixteenth Century,” are
equally valuable, as the notes will show. I have also consulted many
articles in the proceedings of various local or provincial historical
societies, as the Société de Paris et de l’Ile de France; the Société
de l’histoire de Normandie, the Société d’histoire et d’archéologie de
Genève, etc., and the admirable series known as the _Bulletin de la
Société du protestantisme français_, which is a mine of historical lore.

While the present work falls in the epoch of the French Reformation,
no attempt has been made to treat that subject in so far as
the Reformation is assumed primarily to have been a religious
manifestation. Doctrine, save when it involved polity, has been
ignored. But into the political, diplomatic, and economic activities of
the period I have tried to go at some length. As to the last feature,
it is not too much to say that our interpretation of the sixteenth
century has been profoundly changed within the last twenty years by the
progress made in economic history. Such works as Weiss’s _La chambre
ardente_ and Hauser’s _Ouvriers du temps passé_ have revolutionized the
treatment of this subject.

Such an interpretation is merely a reflection of our own present-day
interest in economic and social problems. In this particular it is the
writer’s belief that he is the first to present some of the results of
recent research into the economic history of sixteenth-century France
to English readers. My indebtedness to M. Hauser is especially great
for the help and suggestion he has given me in the matter of industrial
history. But I have tried to widen the subject and attempted to show
the bearing of changes in the agricultural régime, the influence of
the failure of crops owing to adverse weather conditions, and the
disintegration of society as the result of incessant war and the
plague, upon the progress of the Huguenot movement. In an agricultural
country like France in the sixteenth century, the distress of the
provinces through the failure of the harvests was sometimes nearly
universal, and the retroactive effect of such conditions in promoting
popular discontent had a marked influence upon the religious and
political issues.

It has been pointed out that “the religious wars of France furnish
the most complete instance of the constant intersection of native and
foreign influences.”[1] The bearing of the Huguenot movement upon
Spanish and Dutch history was intimate and marked, and this I have also
attempted to set forth. In so doing the fact that has impressed me
most of all is the development and activity of the provincial Catholic
leagues and their close connection with Spain’s great Catholic machine
in France, the Holy League.

The history of the Holy League in France is usually represented as
having extended from 1576 to 1594. This time was the period of its
greatest activity and of its greatest power. But institutions do not
spring to life full armed in a moment, like Athené from the head of
Zeus. “The roots of the present lie deep in the past,” as Bishop Stubbs
observed. Institutions are a growth, a development. The Holy League was
a movement of slow growth and development, although it has not been
thus represented, and resulted from the combination of various acts
and forces—political, diplomatic, religious, economic, social, even
psychological—working simultaneously both within and without France
during the civil wars. I have tried to set forth the nature and extent
of these forces; to show how they originated; how they operated; and
how they ultimately were combined to form the Holy League. Certain
individual features of the history here covered have been treated in an
isolated way by some writers. The late baron de Ruble and M. Forneron
have disclosed the treasonable negotiations of Montluc with Philip II.
M. Bouillé and more recently M. Forneron have followed the tortuous
thread of the cardinal of Lorraine’s secret negotiations with Spain.
Various historians, chiefly in provincial histories or biographies
like Pingaud’s _Les Saulx-Tavannes_, have noticed the local work of
some of the provincial Catholic associations. But the relation of all
these various movements, one to the other, and their ultimate fusion
into a single united movement has not yet been fully brought out.
What was the number and form of organization of these local Catholic
leagues? What influenced their combination? What bearing did they
have upon the course of Montluc and the cardinal of Lorraine? Or upon
Philip II’s policy? How did the great feud between the Guises and the
Montmorencys influence the formation of the Holy League and its hostile
counterpart—the Association of the Huguenots and the Politiques? These
questions I have tried to answer and in so doing two or three new
facts have been brought to light. For example, an undiscovered link
in the history of the Guises’ early secret intercourse with Philip II
has been found in the conduct of L’Aubespine, the French ambassador in
Spain in 1561; the treasonable course of the cardinal of Lorraine, it
is shown, began in 1565 instead of 1566, a fact which makes the petty
conflict known as the “Cardinal’s War” of new importance; the history
of the Catholic associations in the provinces, hitherto isolated in
many separate volumes, has been woven into the whole and some new
information established regarding them.[2]

The notes, it is hoped, will sufficiently indicate the sources used and
enable the reader to test the treatment of the subject, or guide him to
sources by which he may form his own judgment if desired.

In the matter of maps, the very complete apparatus of maps in Mr.
Whitehead’s _Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France_, has greatly
lightened my task, and I express my cordial thanks to Mr. Whitehead
and Messrs. Methuen & Co., his publishers, for permission to reproduce
those in that work. My thanks are also due to M. Ch. de Coynart and MM.
Firmin Didot et Cie for permission to reproduce the map illustrating
the battle of Dreux from the late Commandant de Coynart’s work entitled
_L’Année 1562 et la bataille de Dreux_; and to M. Steph. C. Gigon,
author of _La bataille de Jarnac et la campagne de 1569 en Angoumois_,
for permission to use his two charts of the battle of Jarnac. Those
illustrating the Tour of the Provinces in 1564-66, the march of the
duke of Alva and Montgomery’s great raid in Gascony are my own. Some
lesser maps and illustrations are from old prints which I have gathered
together, in the course of years, except that illustrating the siege of
Havre-de-Grace and the large picture of the battle of St. Denis, which
have been photographed from the originals in the Record Office.

During the preparation of this volume, which has entailed two prolonged
visits to Paris and other parts of France, and to London, I have
become the debtor to many persons. Among those of whose courtesy and
assistance I would make special acknowledgment are the following: His
Excellency, M. Jean-Jules Jusserand, French ambassador at Washington;
M. Henri Vignaud, chargé d’affaires of the American legation in Paris;
MM. Charles de la Roncière and Viennot of the Bibliothèque Nationale;
MM. Le Grand and Viard of the Archives Nationales, where I chiefly
worked in the K. Collection. At the Record Office, Mr. Hubert Hall and
his assistant, Miss Mary Trice Martin, were unfailing in the aid given
me. For the transcript of the “Discorso sopra gli humori del Regno di
Francia,” from the Barberini Library in Rome, I am indebted to P. Franz
Ehrle, prefect of the Vatican archives. I also hold in grateful memory
the friendship and assistance of the late Woodbury Lowery, author
of _The Spanish Settlements within the Present Limits of the United
States: Florida_ (1562-74), New York, 1905, with whom I was a fellow
worker at the Archives Nationales in the spring and early summer of
1903.

Finally, I owe much to the suggestive criticism of my friend and
colleague, Professor Ferdinand Schevill, and my friends, Professor
Herbert Darling Foster, of Dartmouth College, and Professor Roger B.
Merriman, of Harvard University, each of whom has read much of the
manuscript.

JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
January 1909

CONTENTS

PAGE

LIST OF MAPS AND PLATES xv

CHAPTER

I. THE BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT. THE CONSPIRACY OF
AMBOISE 1

II. CATHERINE DE MEDICI BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDÉ. PROJECT OF A
NATIONAL COUNCIL 40

III. THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS 69

IV. THE FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE 91

V. THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY. THE ESTATES OF PONTOISE. THE EDICT
OF JANUARY, 1562 106

VI. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR. THE MASSACRE OF VASSY (MARCH 1, 1562).
THE SIEGE OF ROUEN 131

VII. THE FIRST CIVIL WAR (_Continued_). THE BATTLE OF DREUX
(DECEMBER 19, 1562). THE PEACE OF AMBOISE (MARCH 19, 1563) 172

VIII. THE WAR WITH ENGLAND. THE PEACE OF TROYES (1563-64) 198

IX. EARLY LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES 206

X. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES. THE BAYONNE EPISODE 232

XI. THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES (_Continued_). THE INFLUENCE
OF THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS UPON FRANCE. THE AFFAIR
OF MEAUX 283

XII. THE SECOND CIVIL WAR (1567-68) 326

XIII. THE THIRD CIVIL WAR (1568). NEW CATHOLIC LEAGUES. THE
BATTLE OF JARNAC 349

XIV. THE THIRD CIVIL WAR (_Continued_). THE PEACE OF ST. GERMAIN 378

XV. THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW 422

XVI. THE FOURTH CIVIL WAR 454

XVII. THE LAST DAYS OF CHARLES IX. THE CONSPIRACY OF THE
POLITIQUES 469

XVIII. HENRY III AND THE POLITIQUES. THE PEACE OF MONSIEUR (1576) 486

GENEALOGICAL TABLES 525

APPENDICES 529

INDEX 605

LIST OF MAPS AND PLATES

VIEW OF PARIS _Frontispiece_

FACING PAGE

HUGUENOT MARCH TO ORLEANS, MARCH 29-APRIL 2, 1562 139

CAMPAIGN OF DREUX, NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1562 180

BATTLE OF DREUX, ACCORDING TO COMMANDANT DE COYNART 181

SKETCH MAP OF THE FORTIFICATIONS OF HAVRE-DE-GRACE 202

THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES, 1564-66 232

MARCH OF THE DUKE OF ALVA THROUGH SAVOY, FRANCHE COMTÉ, AND
LORRAINE 308

EXECUTION OF EGMONT AND HOORNE IN THE MARKET SQUARE AT BRUSSELS 314

PARIS AND ITS FAUBOURGS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 327

BLOCKADE OF PARIS BY THE HUGUENOTS, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1567 328

HUGUENOT MARCH TO PONT-À-MOUSSON AFTER THE BATTLE OF ST.
DENIS 329

THE BATTLE OF ST. DENIS _between_ pp. 332, 333

AUTUMN CAMPAIGN OF 1568 368

CROQUIS DU THÉATRE DE LA GUERRE POUR LA PÉRIODE DU 24 FÉVRIER AU
13 MARS 1569, ACCORDING TO M. S. C. GIGON 376

BATAILLE DE JARNAC, ACCORDING TO M. S. C. GIGON 377

CAMPAIGN OF THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN OF 1569 380

POITIERS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 386

PLAN OF THE FORTRESS OF NAVARRENS MADE BY JUAN MARTINEZ
DESCURRA, A SPANISH SPY 398

VOYAGE OF THE PRINCES AFTER THE BATTLE OF MONCONTOUR; MONTGOMERY’S
ITINERARY IN BIGORRE AND GASCONY; UNION OF COLIGNY AND MONTGOMERY
IN DECEMBER, 1569, AT PORT STE. MARIE 402

THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW 422

PLAN DE LA ROCHELLE EN 1572 458

LETTER OF HENRY III OF FRANCE TO THE DUKE OF SAVOY 484

LETTER OF HENRY III TO THE SWISS CANTONS 485

MAP OF FRANCE SHOWING PROVINCES 602

CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNING OF THE HUGUENOT REVOLT. THE CONSPIRACY OF AMBOISE

The last day of June, 1559, was a gala day in Paris. The marriages
of Philip II of Spain with Elizabeth of France, daughter of King
Henry II and Catherine de Medici, and that of the French King’s
sister, Marguerite with Emanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, were to be
celebrated. But “the torches of joy became funeral tapers”[3] before
nightfall, for Henry II was mortally wounded in the tournament given
in honor of the occasion.[4] It was the rule that challengers, in this
case the King, should run three courses and their opponents one. The
third contestant of the King had been Gabriel, sieur de Lorges, better
known as the count of Montgomery, captain of the Scotch Guard,[5] a
young man, “grand et roidde,” whom Henry rechallenged because his
pride was hurt that he had not better kept his seat in the saddle in
the first running. Montgomery tried to refuse, but the King silenced
his objections with a command and reluctantly[6] Montgomery resumed
his place. But this time the Scotch guardsman failed to cast away the
trunk of the splintered lance as he should have done at the moment of
the shock, and the fatal accident followed. The jagged point crashed
through the King’s visor into the right eye.[7] For a minute Henry
reeled in his saddle, but by throwing his arms around the neck of his
horse, managed to keep his seat. The King’s armor was stripped from him
at once and “a splint taken out of good bigness.”[8] He moved neither
hand nor foot, and lay as if benumbed or paralyzed,[9] and so was
carried to his chamber in the Tournelles,[10] entrance being denied to
all save physicians, apothecaries, and those valets-de-chambre who were
on duty. None were permitted for a great distance to come near until
late in the day, when the duke of Alva, who was to be proxy for his
sovereign at the marriage, the duke of Savoy, the prince of Orange, the
cardinal of Lorraine, and the constable were admitted.[11]

[Illustration: MONTGOMERY IN TOURNAMENT COSTUME

(Bib. Nat., Estampes, _Hist. de France_, reg. Q. b. 19)]

After the first moment of consternation was past, it was thought that
the King would recover, though losing the sight of his eye,[12] since
on the fourth day Henry recovered his senses and his fever was abated.
Meanwhile five or six of the ablest physicians in France had been
diligently experimenting upon the heads of four criminals who were
decapitated for the purpose in the Conciergerie and the prisons of
the Châtelet. On the eighth day Vesalius, Philip II’s physician, who
had long been with the emperor Charles V, and who enjoyed a European
reputation, arrived and took special charge of the royal patient.[13]
In the interval of consciousness Henry commanded that the interrupted
marriages be solemnized. Before they were celebrated the King had lost
the use of speech and lapsed into unconsciousness, and on the morrow
of the marriages he died (July 10, 1559). On August 13 the corpse was
interred at St. Denis.[14] When the ceremony was ended the king of arms
stood up, and after twice pronouncing the words “Le roi est mort,” he
turned around toward the assembly, and the third time cried out: “Vive
le roi, très-chretien François le deuzième de ce nom, par la grace de
Dieu, roi de France.” Thereupon the trumpets sounded and the interment
was ended.[15] A month later, on September 18, Francis II was crowned
at Rheims. Already Montgomery had been deprived of the captaincy of
the Scotch Guard and his post given to “a mere Frenchman,” much to the
indignation of the members of the Guard.[16]

[Illustration: DEATHBED OF HENRY II

A. Catherine de Medici D. Couriers
B. Cardinal of Lorraine E. Courtiers
C. Constable Montmorency F. Physicians]

The reign of Henry II had not been a popular one. He had neither the
mind nor the application necessary in public affairs.[17] On the
very day of the accident the English ambassador wrote to Cecil: “It
is a marvel to see how the noblemen, gentlemen, and ladies do lament
this misfortune, and contrary-wise, how the townsmen and people do
rejoice.”[18] The wars of Henry II in Italy and in the Low Countries
had drained France of blood and treasure, so that the purses of the
people were depleted by an infinity of exactions and confiscations;
offices and benefices had been bartered, even those of justice, and
to make the feeling of the people worse, Henry II was prodigal to
his favorites.[19] Finally the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) was
regarded as not less disadvantageous than dishonorable.[20]

Meanwhile much politics had been in progress.[21] The new king was not
yet sixteen years of age.[22] He was of frail health and insignificant
intellect, being quite unlike his wife, the beautiful and brilliant
Mary Stuart, who was a niece of the Guises, Francis, duke of Guise,
and his brother Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, who had been in no
small favor under Henry II. Even in the king’s lifetime the ambition
of the Guises had been a thing of wonderment and his unexpected death
opened before them the prospect of new and prolonged power. Henry II
had scarcely closed his eyes when the duke of Guise and the cardinal of
Lorraine took possession of the person of Francis II and conducted him
to the Louvre, in company with the queen-mother, ignoring the princes
of the blood, the marshals, the admiral of France, and “many Knights
of the Order, or grand seigneurs who were not of their retinue.” There
they deliberated without permitting anyone to approach, still less
to speak to the King except in the presence of one of them. Francis
II gave out that his uncles were to manage his affairs.[23] In order
to give color to this assumption of authority, as if their intention
was to restore everything to good estate again, the Guises recalled
the chancellor Olivier, who had been driven from office by Diane de
Poitiers, Henry II’s mistress.[24]

Even before these events the Guises had shown their hand, for on the
day of Henry II’s decease the constable, the cardinal Châtillon and his
brother, the admiral Coligny, had been appointed to attend upon the
royal corse at the Tournelles, by which maneuver they were excluded
from all active work and the way was cleared for the unhampered rule
of the King’s uncles. Rumor prevailed that D’Andelot, the third of the
famous Châtillon brothers, was to be dismissed from the command of
the footmen and the place be given to the count de Rochefoucauld.[25]
Before the end of the month the duke of Guise was given charge of the
war office and the cardinal of Lorraine that of finance and matters of
state.[26] At the same time, on various pretexts, the princes of the
blood were sent away,[27] the prince of Condé to Flanders, ostensibly
to confer with Philip II regarding the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis,[28]
the prince of La Roche-sur-Yon and the cardinal Bourbon to conduct
Elizabeth of France into Spain, so that by November “there remained
no more princes with the King save those of Guise,”[29] who had
influential agents in the two marshals, St. André[30] and Brissac.[31]

Much depended upon the attitude of Antoine of Bourbon, sieur de
Vendôme and king of Navarre, who was first prince of the blood, and
the person to whom the direction of affairs would naturally fall. At
the time of Henry II’s death he was in Béarn, whither La Mare, the
King’s valet-de-chambre, was sent to notify him,[32] the Guises having
shrewdly arranged to have the ground cleared of the opposition of the
Bourbons and Châtillons when he should arrive.[33]

But not all the opposition had been overcome. While Henry II had been
generous to the Guises, he had been even fonder of the constable
Montmorency, a bluff, hearty man of war, who became the royal favorite
upon the fall of the admiral Hennebault, after the death of Francis
I.[34] Montmorency was the uncle of the three Châtillons, Odet, the
cardinal-bishop of Beauvais, Gaspard, the admiral Coligny, and François
de Châtillon, sieur d’Andelot, and the King was openly accused of
having made a disadvantageous peace in order to protect the constable
and secure the ransom of Coligny, who was captured at the battle of
St. Quentin.[35] In order to prevent the constable and the king of
Navarre from meeting one another and concerting an arrangement, the
Guises contrived Montmorency’s summary dismissal from court,[36]
Francis II at their instigation sending him word to retire at once
(August 15). The old war-dog[37] took the affront gallantly, and like
an artful courtier said that he was glad to be relieved of active
duties on account of his age.[38] In the absence of the princes of the
blood, the opposition to the Guises gathered around Montmorency and
the Châtillons, the faction for a short time taking its name from the
constable’s title, being known as “connestablistes.”[39] The political
line of division was drawn very sharply, and the growing influence
of Huguenot teachings gave it a religious accentuation as well. The
less significant portion of the noblesse was inclined to repose after
the long wars and was indifferent to politics; but the upper nobility
were eager partisans, either having hopes of preferment or being, in
principle, opposed both to the usurpation and the religious intolerance
of the Guises.[40]

As to the clergy, its members almost without exception were supporters
of the faith and the government of the Guises. The mass of the people
as yet were disregarded by both factions, but were soon to come
forward into prominence for financial and other reasons.[41] Henry
II, unlike his father, had never suffered French Protestantism to
flourish,[42] but, on the contrary, had undertaken rigorous repressive
measures. The edicts of Paris (1549), of Fontainebleau (1550), and of
Chateaubriand (1551), made the Huguenots[43] subject to both secular
and ecclesiastical tribunals.

The Protestant issue was both a religious and a political one, for to
many men it seemed impossible to alter the religious beliefs of the
time without destruction of the state. Francis I recognized this state
of things in the rhymed aphorism:

Un roi
Une loi
Une foi

and his son rigidly sustained the dictum. The Edict of Compiègne, of
July 24, 1557[44] imposed the death penalty upon those who publicly or
secretly professed a religion other than the Catholic apostolic faith;
the preamble declaring that “to us alone who have received from the
hand of God the administration of the public affairs of our realm,”
clearly shows the intimate relation of the French state and the French
church. It is significant that the _Chambre ardente_ was established to
prosecute the Huguenots in Henry II’s reign.[45]

Ever since the duke of Alva had been in Paris the impression had
prevailed that Henry II and Philip II purposed to establish the
Inquisition in France,[46] and that the project had been foiled by the
French king’s sudden death. The Huguenots were convinced of it and keen
politicians like the prince of Orange and Count Egmont taxed Granvella
with the purpose in 1561.[47] What the government did do has been
carefully stated by another:

The Government largely increased the powers of the Ecclesiastical
Courts, and, _pari passu_, detracted from those of the regular Law
Courts called the Parlements. The Parlement of Paris protested
not only against the infringement of its privileges, but against
conversion by persecution, and the same feelings existed at Rouen,
where several members had to be excluded for heretical opinions.
The introduction of the Spanish form of inquisition, under a bull
of Paul IV, in 1557, still further exasperated the profession. The
Inquisitors were directed to appoint diocesan tribunals, which
should decide without appeal. The Parlement of Paris flatly refused
to register the royal edict, and continued to receive appeals.
The finale was the celebrated Wednesday meeting of the assembled
chambers, the Mercuriale, where the King in person interfered with the
constitutional freedom of speech, and ordered the arrest of the five
members, thus giving his verdict for the ultra-Catholic minority of
Parlement against the moderate majority. Marshal Vieilleville, himself
a sound Catholic, strongly dissuaded this course of action. Its
result was that one of the most influential elements of the State was
not indeed brought into connection with Reform, but as placed in an
attitude of hostility to the Government, and as the grievance was the
consequence of the religious policy of the Crown, it had at all events
a tendency to bring about a _rapprochement_ between the Reformers and
the judicial classes.[48]

[Illustration: EXECUTION OF DU BOURG

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

Five of the advocates of the Parlement of Paris, of whom Du Bourg
and Du Four were the most prominent, protested against this action,
both because of its intolerance and because they believed it to be a
political measure, at least in part, and were put under arrest for
this manifestation of courage. Men reasoned very differently regarding
this edict. The politicians and intense Catholics regarded it as
necessary, both to preserve the church and in order to suppress those
seditious spirits, who, under color of religion, aimed to alter or
subvert the government. Others, who had no regard either for policy
or religion, likewise approved of it, not as tending to extirpate the
Protestants, for they believed it would rather increase their numbers,
but because they hoped to be enriched by confiscations and that the
King might thereby be enabled to pay his debts, amounting to forty-two
millions, according to Castelnau, and thus restore his finances.[49]
The trial of the parliamentary councilors was postponed for some time
on account of Henry II’s death, but soon afterward they were brought
before “the bishops and Sorbonnists.”[50] Du Four, upon retraction, was
suspended from office for five years;[51] three others were fined and
ignominiously punished; but Du Bourg[52] was condemned and executed on
December 23, 1559, in spite of the solicitations of Marguerite, wife
of the duke of Savoy, and the count palatine who wrote to the King for
his life.[53]

At the same time the measures of the government were redoubled. In
November, 1559, a new edict ordained that all who went to conventicles,
or assisted at any private assemblies, should be put to death, and
their houses be pulled down and never rebuilt. By special decree the
provost of the city was authorized, because Huguenot sessions were
more frequent in Paris and its suburbs than elsewhere, to proclaim
with the trumpet that all people who had information of Protestant
assemblies should notify the magistrates, on pain of incurring the same
punishment; and promise of pardon and a reward of five hundred livres
was to be given to every informer. The _commissaires des quartiers_
of Paris were enjoined to be diligent in seeking out offenders and to
search the houses of those under suspicion from time to time using
the _archers de la ville_ for that purpose. Letters-patent were also
given to the lieutenant-criminal of the Châtelet and certain other
judges chosen by the cardinal of Lorraine to judge without appeal.
The curés and vicars in the parishes were to excommunicate all those
who had knowledge of Protestant doings and failed to report them.[54]
In order to discover those who were Calvinists, priests bore the host
(_corpus Domini_) through the streets and images of the Virgin were
set up at the street corners, and all who refused to bow the head and
bend the knee in adoration were arrested.[55] Similar measures were
adopted in Poitou, at Toulouse, and at Aix in Provence where the double
enginery of state and church was brought to bear in the suppression of
heresy.[56] So great was the volume of judicial business as a result
of these new measures that four criminal chambers were established at
the end of the year, one to try offenses carrying the death penalty,
the second for trial of those who might be condemned to make _amende
honorable_, the third to judge those who might be publicly burned,
the last to punish various other offenses.[57] The saner Catholic
opinion, as, for example, that of Tavannes, the brilliant cavalry
leader, reprobated this recourse to extraordinary tribunals on the
ground that the judging of criminals by special commissioners, who were
persons chosen according to the passion of the ruler, was bound to be
unjust or tyrannical, and that those counselors who were drawn from the
courts of the parlements to be so employed offended their consciences
and mingled in that which did not pertain to them. Tavannes justified
his contention, legally as well as morally, on the ground that the
King, being a party in the cause could not justly change the ordinary
judges.[58]

The assassination of Minard, vice-president of the Grand Chamber of
the Parlement of Paris, and one of the judges, who was shot in his
coach[59] on the night of December 18, the same day that Du Bourg
was degraded, was the protest against this order of things.[60] The
murder was committed in such a way that the author of it could never be
discovered.[61] This was followed by that of Julien Frène, a messenger
of the Parlement, while bearing some papers and instructions relating
to the prosecution of certain Protestants. These two crimes undoubtedly
hardened the government[62] and hastened the prosecution of Du Bourg,
who was put to death just a week later, on December 23, and led to some
new regulations. In order to protect the Parlement, it was commanded to
adjourn before four o’clock, from St. Martin’s Eve (November 10) until
Easter; a general police order forbade the carrying of any firearms
whatsoever[63] and in order to prevent their concealment, the wearing
of long mantles or large hunting-capes was forbidden.[64]

It is to be observed that the Huguenots were concerted not only for
religious, but for political interests. The distinction was fully
appreciated at the time, the former being called “Huguenots of
religion” and the latter “Huguenots of state.”[65] The former were
Calvinists who were resolved no longer to endure the cruelties of
religious oppression; the latter—mostly nobles—those opposed to the
monopoly of power enjoyed by the Guises.[66] The weight of evidence
is increasingly in favor of the view that the causes of the Huguenot
movement were as much if not more political and economic than religious.

It was only in the general dislocation and _désœuvrement_ of society
that followed the cessation of the foreign wars that the French began
to realize the weight of the burdens which their governmental system
laid upon them. Until the religious sense gave a voice to the dumb
discontent, social or political, first in the Huguenot rising and
afterward in the outbreak of the League, there was little to show the
real force of the opposition to the established order.[67]

Abstractly considered, the religious Huguenots were not very dangerous
to the state so long as they confined their activity to the discussion
of doctrine. This could not easily be done, however, nor did the
opponents of the church so desire; for the church was a social and
political fabric, as well as a spiritual institution, and to challenge
or deny its spiritual sovereignty meant also to invalidate its social
and political claims, so that the whole structure was compromised. Thus
the issue of religion raised by the Huguenots merged imperceptibly
into that of the political Huguenots, who not only wanted to alter
the foundations of belief, but to change the institutional order of
things, and who used the religious opposition as a means to attack the
authority of the crown. The most active of this class were the nobles,
possessed of lands or bred to the profession of arms, whom a species
of political atavism actuated to endeavor to recover that feudal power
which the noblesse had enjoyed before the powerful kings like Louis
IX and Philip IV coerced the baronage; before the Hundred-Years’ War
ruined them; before Louis XI throttled the League of the Public Weal
in 1465. The weakness of Francis II, the minority of the crown under
Charles IX, and, above all, the dissatisfaction of the princes of the
blood and the old aristocracy, like the Montmorencys, with the upstart
pretensions and power of the Guises—these causes united to make the
Huguenots of state a formidable political party. Religion and politics
together provoked the long series of civil wars whose termination was
not until Henry IV brought peace and prosperity to France again in
1598.[68]

It is necessary to picture the state of France at this time. The
French were not essentially an industrial or commercial nation in the
sixteenth century. France had almost no maritime power and its external
commerce was not great. The great majority of the French people was
composed of peasants, small proprietors, artisans, and officials.
If we analyze city society, we find first some artisans and small
merchants—the bourgeois and the _gens-de-robe_ forming the upper
class. The towns had long since ceased to govern themselves. Society
was aristocratic and controlled by the clergy and nobility. The upper
clergy was very rich. High prelates were all grand seigneurs, while the
lower clergy was very dependent. Monks abounded in the towns, and the
curates possessed a certain influence. The most powerful class was the
nobles, seigneurs, and gentlemen, who possessed a great portion of the
rural properties, and still had fortified castles. They were wholly
employed either at court or in war, or held appointments as governors
of provinces and captains of strongholds. The nobles alone constituted
the regular companies of cavalry, that is to say, the dominant element
of the army. This class was therefore of influence in the state and
the most material force in society. The government was an absolute
monarchy. The king was theoretically uncontested master and obeyed
by all; he exercised an arbitrary and uncontrolled power, and could
decide according to his pleasure, with reference to taxes, laws, and
affairs both of the state and of the church, save in matters of faith.
He named and revoked the commissions of all the governors and acted
under the advice of a council composed of the princes of the blood and
favorites. But this absolute authority was still personal. The king
was only obeyed upon condition of giving the orders himself. There was
no conception of an abstract kingship. If the king abandoned the power
to a favorite, the other great personages of the court would refuse
to obey, and declare that the sovereign was a prisoner. Everything
depended upon a single person. No one thought of resisting Francis I
or Henry II because they were men grown at their accession. But after
1559 we find a series of royal infants or an indolent monarch like
Henry III. Then began the famous rivalries between the great nobles,
rivalries out of which were born the political parties of the times, in
which the Guises, the Montmorencys, and the famous Châtillon brothers
figure so prominently.

Fundamentally speaking, the aims of both classes of Huguenots were
revolutionary, and were directed, the one against the authority
of the mediaeval church, the other against the authority of the
French monarchy. The latter was a feudal manifestation, not yet
republican. The republican nature of early political Huguenotism
has been exaggerated. There was no such feeling at all as nearly as
1560,[69] and even at the height of Huguenot activity and power in
1570-72, most men still felt that the state of France was _vrayement
monarchique_,[70] and that the structure of society and the genius
of the people was strongly inclined to the form of government which
eight centuries of development had evolved; that it was searching for
false liberty by perilous methods to seek fundamentally to alter the
state.[71] In a word, most political Huguenots in 1560 were reformers,
not revolutionists; the extremists were Calvinist zealots and those
of selfish purposes who were working for their own ends. For in every
great movement there are always those who seek to exploit the cause.
Mixed with both classes of Huguenots were those who sought to fish in
troubled waters, who, under the guise of religion or the public good,
took occasion to pillage and rob all persons, of whatever degree
or quality; who plundered cities, pulled down churches, carried off
relics, burnt towns, destroyed castles, seized the revenues of the
church and the king, informed for the sake of reward, and enriched
themselves by the confiscated property of others. Similar things are
not less true of the Catholics. For there were zealots and fanatics
among them also, who under pretext of religion and patriotism were
guilty of great iniquity and heaped up much ill-gotten wealth.[72]

The ascendency of the Guises quite as much as the suppressive measures
of the government against Calvinism served to bring this disaffection
to a head. The issues, either way, cannot be separated. The practical
aims of the Guises were large enough to create dismay without it being
necessary to believe that as early as 1560 they aimed to secure the
crown by deposing the house of Valois. It was unreasonable to suppose,
though it proved to be so in the end, that the four sons of Henry II
would all die heirless, and even in the event of that possibility,
the house of Bourbon still remained to sustain the principle of
primogeniture.

The Guises came from Lorraine, their father having been brother of
the old duke of Lorraine; and through their mother they were related
to the house of Bourbon. They were thus cousins-german of the king of
Navarre and the prince of Condé and related to the King and the princes
of the blood. Their income, counting their patrimony, church property,
pensions and benefits received from the king, amounted to 600,000
francs (nearly $500,000 today), the cardinal of Lorraine alone having
the disposal of half that sum. This wealth, united with the splendor of
their house, their religious zeal, the popularity of the duke of Guise,
and the concord which prevailed among them, put them ahead of all the
nobles of the realm. The provincial governments and the principal
offices were in their hands or those of their partisans.

The cardinal, who was the head of the house, was in the early prime
of life. He was gifted with great insight which enabled him to see in
a flash the intention of those who came in contact with him; he had
an astonishing memory; a striking figure; an eloquence which he was
not loath to display, especially in politics; he knew Greek, Latin,
and Italian, speaking the last with a facility that astonished even
Italians themselves; he was trained in theology; outwardly his life
was very dignified and correct, but, like many churchmen of the time
he was licentious. His chief fault was avarice, and for this he was
execrated. His cupidity went to criminal limits, and coupled with it
was a duplicity so great that he seemed almost never to tell the truth.
He was quick to take offense, vindictive, envious. His death would have
been as popular as that of Henry II.[73]

On the other hand, the duke of Guise was a man of war, famed as the
recoverer of Calais and the captor of Metz. He was as popular as his
brother was otherwise. But, like him, he was avaricious stealing even
from his own soldiers.[74] According to their opponents the ambition
of the Guises was not to be content with the throne of France merely.
The throne of St. Peter and the crown of Naples were also believed to
be goals of their ambition, the cardinal of Lorraine aspiring to the
first and his brother, the duke, aspiring to the other in virtue of the
relationship of the Guises to the house of Anjou, one-time occupants
of the Neapolitan throne.[75] Even this programme was to be excelled.
Their enterprises in Scotland in favor of Mary Stuart[76] are known to
every student of English history; and after having vanquished Scotland
many of the German princes feared that they might move their forces
into Denmark in order to put the duke of Lorraine, their relative and
the brother-in-law of the king of Denmark, into possession of the
kingdom.[77]

“La tyrannie guisienne”[78] was a practical ascendency, not a mere
fiction of their opponents. As uncles of Francis II, destined morally
to be a minor always, owing to his weakness of will and mediocre
ability, having in their hands the chief offices of state, the Guises
proceeded to build up a system of government wholly their own, not only
in central but in provincial affairs, to compass which the removal of
the constable and the princes of the blood from the vicinity of the
King was the first step. Then followed an attempt to acquire control
of the provincial governments. Montmorency, the late constable, was
deprived of the government of Languedoc;[79] the governments of
Touraine and Orleans, in the very heart of France, were given to
the duke of Montpensier and the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon. Trouble
arose, though, in January, 1560, when the Guises excluded the prince
of Condé from the government of Picardy and gave it to the marshal
Brissac, although “the office had been faithfully administered by his
predecessors.”[80]

The cardinal of Lorraine’s position with reference to the finances
enabled him to provide the Guise faction with the resources necessary
to back up its political intentions.[81] The onerous taxation of
Francis I had been increased by Henry II, both the taille and the
gabelle, the collection of which had caused a fierce outbreak at
Bordeaux in the middle of the last reign; loans were resorted to, “not
without great suspicion of their being applied to the King’s finances;”
and the wages of the soldiers in garrisons and officers withheld.[82]
This condition of things naturally drew the constable[83] and his
partisans toward the prince of Condé, who vainly endeavored to persuade
the king of Navarre, as first prince of the blood, and therefore the
natural supporter of the crown instead of the Guises, to take a firm
stand, Condé especially representing to him how great a humiliation it
was to the crown that the administration of the kingdom should fall
so completely into the hands of the “foreigners” of Lorraine; that,
considering the weakness of the King, the fact that the provincial
governorships and those of the frontier fortresses and the control of
finances (which enabled the Guises to subject the judiciary to their
devotion) were in their hands, foreboded ill to France.

Antoine of Bourbon listened to the complaints against the the Guises,
but did little. At this time he was forty-two years of age. He was tall
of stature, well-knit, robust; affable to everybody without affectation
or display. His manners were open and frank, and his generosity was
so great that he was always in debt. By the two merits of urbanity
and generosity he made a superficial impression that did not last. In
speech he was vain, and imprudent and inconstant in word and deed,
not having the strength of will to adhere to a fixed purpose. He was
suspected of indifference to religion and even of impiety at this time
because he renounced the mass, though it was generally thought that
this was with the purpose of making himself chief of the Huguenot party
and not for religious zeal. The Protestants themselves called him a
hypocrite.[84] Antoine would not make common cause with the constable
partly from natural vacillation of character, partly because he
believed that the constable had not supported his claims to the kingdom
of Navarre, which he had been in hopes of recovering during the late
negotiations at Cateau-Cambrésis.[85] With the conceit of a weak man
in a prominent position, the king of Navarre entertained schemes of
his own, which he proceeded to develop. His purpose was to play Spain
and England against one another, in the hope that he either might
persuade Philip II to restore the kingdom of Navarre to him by a firm
advocacy of Catholicism in France, which, of course, prevented him from
affiliating with the Huguenot party to which Condé and the Châtillons
were attached; or, in the event of failure in this, to side with the
Huguenots and enlist English support. Accordingly, shortly after his
arrival at the court from Béarn, on August 23, 1559, Antoine sent a
gentleman to Throckmorton, the English ambassador in France, desiring
him to meet him “in cape” in the cloister of the Augustine Friars on
that night. When they met, after a long declaration of his affection
for Elizabeth, he said that he would write to her with his own hand,
since he would trust no one except himself, for if either the Guises or
the Spanish ambassador knew of it, “it would be dangerous to both and
hinder their good enterprise.”[86]

In the interval, while waiting to hear from the English queen, Antoine
of Bourbon, who had been coldly received at court, found that there
was no room for a third party between those of the constable and the
Guises.[87] At the same time the latter were made fully aware of his
doings through the treachery of D’Escars, his chamberlain and special
favorite,[88] and shrewdly schemed to rid themselves of his presence
by sending him to Spain as escort for Elizabeth, the celebration of
whose marriage (by proxy) to the King of Spain had come to such a
fatal termination, and whose departure had been necessarily delayed
by her father’s death.[89] In order to bait the hook the Guises
represented to the beguiled king of Navarre that the opportunity was a
most excellent one to urge his claims to his lost kingdom, and called
in Chantonnay, the Spanish ambassador in France, to enforce this
argument.[90]

The spirit of unrest in France, both political and religious, was so
great that only a head was wanting, not members, in order to bring
things to a focus. The whole of Aquitaine and Normandy was reported, in
December, 1559, to be in such “good heart” as to be easily excited to
action if they perceived any movement elsewhere;[91] in February, 1560,
the turbulence in Paris was so great that Coligny was appointed to go
thither in advance of the King’s entrance “for the appeasing of the
garboil there.”[92] In order to repress this spirit of rebellion the
government diligently prosecuted the Huguenots.[93] The Guises hoped
that the severity exercised during the last few months in Paris and
many other cities against persons condemned for their religion, of whom
very great numbers were burnt alive,[94] would terrify the Calvinists
and the political Huguenots into obedience. But on the contrary,
local rebellion increased. At Rouen, at Bordeaux, and between Blois
and Orleans, Huguenots arrested by the King’s officers were rescued by
armed bands, in some cases the officers being killed. Indeed, so common
did these practices become that they were at last heard of without
surprise.[95]

Imagine a young king [wrote the Venetian ambassador] without
experience and without authority; a council rent by discord; the
royal authority in the hands of a woman alternately wise, timid, and
irresolute, and always a woman; the people divided into factions and
the prey of insolent agitators who under pretense of religious zeal
trouble the public repose, corrupt manners, disparage the law, check
the administration of justice, and imperil the royal authority.[96]

The interests of the religious Huguenots and the political Huguenot’s
continued to approach during the autumn and winter of 1559-60. In
order to make head against the usurpation of the Guises,[97] which
they represented as a foreign domination, the latter contended that it
was necessary to call the estates of France in order to interpret the
laws, just as the Calvinists contended for an interpretation of the
Scriptures. The contentions of the Huguenots, the tyrannical conduct of
the Guises, the menaces which they did not hesitate to utter against
the high nobles of the realm, the retirement into which they had driven
the constable, the removal of the princes of the blood which they had
brought about upon one pretext or another, the contempt they expressed
for the States-General, the corruption of justice, their exorbitant
financial policy, the disposal of offices and benefices which they
practiced—all these causes, united with religious persecutions,
constituted a body of grievances for which redress inevitably would
be demanded. The question was, How? The leaders of the Huguenots—and
the term is used even more in a political sense than in a religious
one—were not ignorant of the history of the Reformation in Germany,
nor unaware of the fact that politics had been commingled with religion
there.[98] The question of ways and means being laid before the legists
of the Reformation and other men of renown in both France and Germany,
it was answered that the government of the Guises could be _legally_
opposed and recourse made to force of arms, provided that the princes
of the blood, who, in such case had legitimate right to bear rule in
virtue of their birth, or any one of their number, could be persuaded
to endeavor to do so.[99] But the attempt necessarily would have to be
of the nature of a _coup de main_, for the reason that the King was
in the hands of the Guises and the council composed of them and their
partisans. After long deliberation it was planned, under pretext of
presenting a petition to the King, to seize the cardinal of Lorraine
and the duke of Guise, then to assemble the States-General for the
purpose of inquiring into their administration, and before them to
prosecute the ministers for high treason.[100] Three classes of men
found themselves consorting together in this movement: those actuated
by a sentiment of patriotism, conceiving this to be the right way to
serve their prince and their country; second, those moved by ambition
and fond of change; finally, zealots who were filled with religious
enthusiasm and a wish to avenge the intolerance and persecution which
they and theirs had suffered.[101] For such an enterprise Louis of
Bourbon, the prince of Condé, was the logical leader, both because of
his position as a prince of the blood and on account of his resentment
toward the Guises for having been excluded from the government of
Picardy. But the prince, when besought to attempt the overthrow of
the Guises for the deliverance of the King and the state, in view of
the dubious conduct of his brother, concluded that it would be too
perilous to the cause for him to be overtly compromised, in event
of failure.[102] Montmorency was not possible as a leader, for his
religious leanings were in no sense Calvinistic; he was not a prince of
the blood, and therefore his contentions could not politically have the
weight of Condé’s; and finally, his grievance was more a personal than
a party one.[103]

The conspirators found a leader in the person of a gentleman of
Limousin or Périgord, one Godfrey de Barry, sieur de la Renaudie,[104]
who had been imprisoned at Dijon, escaped and found refuge in
Switzerland;[105] he had a special grievance against the Guises, who
had lately (September 4, 1558) put his brother-in-law, Gaspard de Heu,
sieur de Buy, to death.[106]

The active participants were, in the main, recruited from the Breton
border, Anjou, Saintonge, and Poitou, with individual captains
from Picardy, Normandy, Guyenne, Provence, and Languedoc.[107]
Their rendezvous was at Nantes, in a house owned, it is said, by
D’Andelot.[108] But the author of the whole daring project was the
famous François Hotman, a French refugee at Geneva, and the real
inspiration of the movement came from Switzerland, for the unexpected
death of Henry II seemed to the French exiles in Switzerland to open
the door of the mother country again to them.[109]

[Illustration: CONSPIRACY OF AMBOISE

SURRENDER OF THE CHÂTEAU DE NOIZAY

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

The whole plot was concerted in a meeting held at Nantes on February
1, 1560,[110] which was chosen partly because of its remoteness,
partly because the Parlement of Brittany being in session, the
conspirators could conceal their purpose by pretending to be there
on legal business. A marriage festival also helped to disguise their
true purpose; and for the sake of greater caution, the principals were
careful not to recognize one another in public.[111] It was determined
to muster two hundred cavalry from each town in the provinces of
Guyenne, Gascony, Périgord, Limousin, and Agenois. For the maintenance
of this force they intended to avail themselves of the revenues and
effects of the abbeys and monasteries of each province, taxing them
arbitrarily and using force if unable to obtain payment in any other
way.[112] The initiative was to have been taken on March 6,[113]
under the form of presenting a petition to the King against the
usurpation of the Guises.[114] Unfortunately for the success of the
enterprise, it was too long in preparation and too widely spread to
keep secret.[115] The magnitude of the plot alarmed the Guises, in
spite of the full warning they had received.[116] Aside from outside
sources of information, the conspiracy was revealed by one of those
in it, an advocate of the Parlement named Avenelles, whose courage
failed him at the critical moment.[117] Thereupon, for precaution’s
sake, the court moved from Blois to the castle of Amboise, which the
duke, having the King’s authority to support him, immediately set about
fortifying. He likewise secured the garrison and townspeople, and found
a plausible pretext to watch the prince of Condé, by giving him one
of the gates to defend; but, at the same time, sent his brother, the
grand prior along with a company of men-at-arms of assured fidelity.
In view of alarming rumors a posse was sent on March 11 under command
of the count of Sancerre to Tours, where some ten or twelve of those
in the plot, notably the baron de Castelnau, the captain Mazères,
and a gentleman named Renay were already awaiting the money which was
to be distributed among companies of theirs secretly stationed in
the neighboring villages.[118] Twenty-five of the conspirators were
arrested without opposition, whilst incautiously walking outside the
Château de Noizay, between three and four leagues from Amboise, which
belonged to the wife of Renay, and the whole number of them, with
five others arrested at Tours by the count de Sancerre, were taken to
Amboise. Immediate examination, though, showed that some of them had
risen in arms, partly from friendship for certain captains under whom
they had served, while others had been tempted by a trifle of earnest
money in lieu of pay, as usual when soldiers were raised for companies,
without knowing the place of their service, or its purpose. They were
all dismissed, with the exception of one or two who remained prisoners,
the chancellor Olivier having admonished them and told them that though
they deserved to die the king of his clemency, for this once granted
them their lives.[119] To enable them to return home, the King had a
crown (teston = 10 to 11 sous) given to each man. But the alarm was not
yet ended. That night (March 14) several couriers arrived at the court
bringing new advices. The next morning at daybreak there was greater
commotion than ever before the castle, for two hundred cavalry made
their appearance in the town. They thought themselves almost sure of
not finding any sort of resistance and that they consequently would
be able to effect their purpose, as all the princes and lords, like
all the rest of the court, had no sort of defensive armour except
some coats of mail, and very few even of those, while their offensive
weapons were merely swords and daggers, with a few pistols, whereas,
on the contrary, the insurgents were well armed with both kinds of
weapons and were for the most part well horsed. Some boatmen saw the
insurgents following the course of the Loire, and their shouts aroused
the castle. One or two were killed, whereupon the rest took to flight
toward the country. But several were captured and two of them having
been recognized as among the company who had been pardoned on the
evening before, they were instantly hanged, with two others taken on
the preceding day, on the battlements over the castle gate.

[Illustration: THE EXECUTION OF AMBOISE, DEATH OF CASTELNAU

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

As a result of the new alarm there was a general scattering of bands
of arrest on the next day (March 15). The marshal St. André was
dispatched to Tours with nearly two hundred horse, with orders to
take five companies of men-at-arms from the garrison in the immediate
neighborhood. He was followed by Claude of Guise, the duke d’Aumale,
the duke de Nemours and the prince of Condé.[120] Marshal Termes
was sent to Blois; the marshal Vieilleville to Orleans; the duke
of Montpensier to Angers; La Rochefoucault to Bourges; Burie to
Poitiers.[121] During the day some forty others were taken. Fifteen
of those pursued retreated into a house and defended themselves most
obstinately, wounding many of their assailants who surrounded it, so
that the house was set on fire: one of them, rather than surrender,
burned himself alive by throwing himself into the flames. Toward
nightfall six or seven more of them were hanged. The duke of Guise,
whom the King in the exigency of the moment, made lieutenant-general
on March 17,[122] did not fail to take every precaution; he appointed
two princes and two knights of St. Michael for each quarter of Amboise,
keeping sentries there and sending out scouts as if the town were
besieged. The most exposed parts of the castle were repaired and
supplied with food, and above all with money, weapons, and artillery.
The most useful remedy, however, was the publication and transmission
for publication to all the towns and places in France of a general
pardon for all the insurgents who within twenty-four hours after its
notification should return to their homes, or otherwise they would
be proclaimed rebels and traitors, and license would be given to all
persons to slay them and inherit their property; but assuring the
insurgents, nevertheless, that if they wished to say anything, or to
present any request to the King they would be heard willingly, without
hurt, provided they made their appearance as loyal subjects.[123]

[Illustration: DEATH OF LA RENAUDIE

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

The prisoners confessed that in all the neighboring towns, viz.,
Blois, Orleans, Chartres, Chateaudun, and others, a great supply of
arms had been made in secret, most especially of arquebuses, one of
the men who were hanged having revealed that in one single house at
Blois there were six large chests full of these. During the next three
days nothing was attended to but fortifying the castle, repairing the
weakest places around it, and making a trench in front of the principal
gate, which opened on the country, in which some arquebuses and three
or four small pieces of artillery found accidentally and brought there
from neighboring places, were fixed. Round the town, besides cutting
the bridges which were at its gates, except the principal bridge over
the Loire, the moats were cleansed and restored, leaving but one gate
open.[124] Scouting parties were daily sent out, and on March 19 a
company of five fell in with an equal number of insurgents; after a
long and stout fight the posse at length killed their commander and
two of his men and made the other two prisoners. One of those killed
proved to be La Renaudie.[125]

But the Guises did not stop with these acts of punishment near by.
Besides sending letters of authority to all bailiffs and seneschals
ordering the arrest of all men, whether on foot or on horseback, to
be found in the country surrounding Amboise,[126] Tavannes, on April
12,1560, was ordered to do the like in Dauphiné, being actually armed
with _lettres de cachet_ issued in blank.[127]

Few other disturbances developed except at Lyons, and in Provence and
Dauphiné[128] but the government was anxious with regard to Gascony and
Normandy, “their populations being much more daring,”[129] “The whole
of Normandy is filled with Huguenotism,” wrote the Venetian ambassador,
“the people by thousands sing every night until ten o’clock the Psalms
of David and the men-at-arms dare not touch them. The people of
Dieppe every night in the market-place sing psalms and some days have
sermons preached to them in the fields; in most towns in Normandy
and many other places they do the same thing.”[130] In consequence
of this state of things, the marshal de Termes was appointed with
royal authority and full and absolute powers throughout the province
summarily to confiscate, imprison, condemn and put to death whomsoever
he pleased.[131]

In the end the government sent 1,200 of those implicated in the
conspiracy of Amboise or under suspicion to execution. A morbid desire
to witness the shedding of blood seized upon society, and it became a
customary thing for the ladies and gentlemen of the court to witness
the torture of those condemned after the manner of the _auto da fé_
in Spain.[132] D’Aubigné[133] the eminent historian of the French
Reformation, was an eye-witness of such incidents, and though but ten
years of age, swore like young Hannibal before his father, to devote
his life to vengeance of such atrocities.[134]

CHAPTER II

CATHERINE DE MEDICI BETWEEN GUISE AND CONDÉ. PROJECT OF A NATIONAL
COUNCIL

The insurrection of Amboise was not wholly displeasing to many even in
the court. Huguenot dissidence and the discontent of many persons with
the government gave the cardinal and the duke of Guise many troubled
thoughts even after every external sign of disquiet had ceased. Strong
suspicion rested upon the prince of Condé[135] who was forbidden to
leave the court and so closely watched that he was afraid to speak
to any of his friends. The Guises were in a dilemma, not having the
courage to shed the blood royal,[136] yet, on the other hand, they
feared lest, by letting their suspicion pass in silence, the prince
might be rendered more daring and confident for the future.

So pointed did the accusation become that Condé finally demanded a
hearing before the Council, where he cast down the gauntlet to the
Guises, declaring that “whoever should say that he had any hand in
conspiring against the King’s person or government was a liar and would
lie as often as he said so;” he then offered to waive his privilege
as a prince of the blood in order to have personal satisfaction and
withdrew. But the cardinal of Lorraine, instead of accepting the
challenge, made a sign to the King to break up the session.[137]

Antoine of Navarre had been in the south of France during these events
but, nevertheless, he also did not escape suspicion; a secretary of
his who was staying in Paris to look after his affairs was searched
and all the furniture of his house ransacked to discover incriminating
papers, if possible.[138] The Bourbon prince was doubly alarmed at
the suspicion of guilt because his name was associated with that of
the English queen.[139] The king of Navarre may have had imperfect
knowledge that something was in the wind when he left the court
to visit his dominions in the south, but he was no party to the
conspiracy.[140] Of Queen Elizabeth’s indirect participation there
is no doubt at all. The belief prevailed in Paris that great offers
had been made to the earl of Arran by Gascony, Poitou, Brittany, and
Normandy, if he would lead an English descent into those parts,[141]
and in the two last-named provinces English merchants and sailors
animated the people to rebellion against the house of Guise by means of
proclamations in the French language _printed in England_.[142] But if
the Guises shrank from shedding the blood of the princes, they struck
as near to them as they dared, by urging the pursuit of Visières, a
former lieutenant of Montgomery, for whose apprehension, dead or alive,
a reward of 2,000 crowns was offered,[143] and Maligny, a lieutenant of
the prince of Condé.

Although the initial purpose of the conspiracy had failed, namely
to take the King and drive out the Guises,[144] Condé and his
followers did not fail to perceive that things were not entirely
unfavorable.[145] Catherine de Medici, who while jealous of the
position of the Guises in a place which naturally, and by tradition,
if the regencies of Blanche of Castille and Anne of Beaujeu counted as
precedents, belonged to her, had nevertheless sustained the drastic
policy followed out after the execution of Du Bourg, in spite of the
arguments of the admiral.[146] Now, however, she saw her opportunity
to make head against the cardinal and his brother and played into the
hands of Coligny and Condé.[147] She prevailed upon the King to send
the admiral upon a special mission to Normandy late in July, where
he was expected to take the edge off the Marshal Termes’ conduct, and
secretly abetted the faction of the constable.[148] The opportunity
was the better to do these things owing to the death of the chancellor
Olivier on March 27,[149] who had been an instrument of the Guises,
and the queen mother was quick to seize it. The famous Michel de
l’Hôpital[150] was immediately appointed to the vacancy. He was a man
of great knowledge in the law and of great culture; at the moment he
was president of the _chambre des comptes_ and had been chancellor to
Madame Marguerite of France, the duchess of Savoy (who had Protestant
leanings, and had interceded for Du Bourg), and was a member of the
_conseil privé_ of the King. L’Hôpital’s accession was followed by the
proclamation of letters of pardon to all recent offenders, provided
they lived as good Catholics, the King declaring that he was unwilling
to have the first year of his reign made notorious to posterity for
its bloody atrocities and the sufferings of his people.[151] This was
followed in May, 1560, by the royal edict of Romorantin, whereby the
jurisdiction of legal processes relating to religion was completely
taken away from the courts of parlement and from lay judges who had
power to pass summary judgments, and was remitted to the ecclesiastical
judges; which was interpreted as an assurance to accused persons
that they needed no longer fear the penalty of death, owing to the
opportunity of delaying sentences by means of appeals from the acts
and sentences of bishops to archbishops and from thence to Rome.[152]
In August a supplementary decree ordered the bishops and all curates
to reside at their churches, the bishops being prohibited in the
future from proceeding against anyone in the matter of religion except
the Calvinist preachers or persons in whose houses Huguenot meetings
were held, the government thus tacitly permitting others to live in
their own way, which was interpreted as a virtual “interim.”[153]
The spirit of this legislation, as well as the skilful use of the
law made therein, is certainly due to the heart and brain of the
chancellor L’Hôpital, although Coligny is not without credit for his
influence.[154]

These changes had the double effect, first, of persuading the queen
to take the management of affairs upon herself and endeavor to remove
the house of Guise from court; and second, in giving the Huguenots
and their partisans the opportunity of strengthening themselves. The
leniency of the government drew back into France numbers of those who
had withdrawn, among them preachers from Geneva and England who gave
new life to the party by exhorting them to continue their assemblies
and the exercise of their religion.[155] There was fear that the
“interim” would be used by the Huguenots like the edge of a wedge to
open the way to possess churches of their own, and such a demand was
shortly to be made openly in the King’s council at Fontainebleau in
August, 1560.

It was apparent that there was not a province which was not affected,
and there were many in which the new religion was even spreading into
the country, as in Normandy, Brittany, almost all Touraine, Poitou,
Guyenne, Gascony, the great part of Languedoc, Dauphiné, Provence, and
Champagne.[156] The “religion of Geneva” extended to all classes, even
to the clergy—priests, monks, nuns, whole convents almost, bishops,
and many of the chief prelates. The movement seemed to be widest
among the common people, who had little to lose, now that life seemed
safe. Those who feared to lose their property were less moved. But
nevertheless all classes of society seemed deeply pervaded. While the
“interim” lasted only those were punished who were actually preaching
and holding public assemblies. The prisons of Paris and other towns
were emptied, and in consequence there was a great number of persons
throughout the kingdom who went around glorying in the victory over the
“papists,” the name which they give their adversaries. To add to the
discomfiture of the Guises, the breach between them and Montmorency was
widened.[157] The duke of Guise had purchased the right of the sieur de
Rambures to the county of Dammartin, not far from Paris, and adjacent
to that of Nanteuil,[158] which the duke had shortly before acquired,
the lower court of which was held in relief of Dammartin. In order to
do so the duke of Guise had persuaded Philippe de Boulainvilliers,
who had lately sold the property to the constable, to rescind the
contract which had been made, and sell it to him.[159] But the duke met
with a straight rebuff, for when he sent word of the transaction, the
constable answered by Damville, his son, that “as he had bought it, so
would he keep it.”[160] The feud between the Guises and Montmorency
naturally threw the “connestablistes” more than ever to the side of
Condé. Damville was sent to the King and the queen mother, who were
staying at Chateaudun, to inform them that the Guises were his declared
adversaries, and then went to confer with the prince of Condé, whom he
met, “environ le jour appelé la feste de Dieu au mois de Mai,”[161]
between Etampes and Chartres, near Montlhéry, when on his way to
Guyenne, to see his brother of Navarre. The Guises, who had information
of the interview, enlarged upon the dangerous conduct of Condé and
pushed the suit for the lands of Dammartin in the courts.[162]

Catholic zealots made much of the events of Amboise to enlarge
the reputation of the Guises. “During the whole of this Passion
week,” wrote the Venetian ambassador, “nothing has been attended to
but the sermons of the cardinal of Lorraine, which gathered very
great congregations, not only to his praise, but to the universal
astonishment and admiration, both on account of his doctrines and by
reason of his very fine gesticulation, and incomparable eloquence and
mode of utterance.”[163]

On the other hand, those who abhorred him on account of religion and
for other causes did not fail to defame him by libels and writings
placarded publicly in several places in Paris, where they were seen and
read by everyone who wished.[164] Scarcely a day passed without finding
in the chambers and halls of the King’s own palace notes and writings
of a defamatory nature abusing the cardinal of Lorraine. In Paris
the Palais de Cluny, belonging to the Guise family, full of furniture
of great value, was nearly burnt by a mob.[165] In several places the
cardinal’s painted effigy, in his cardinal’s robes, was to be seen,
at one time hanging by the feet, at another with the head severed and
the body divided into four quarters, as was done to those who were
condemned. In the Place Maubert he was hanged in effigy and burnt with
squibs.[166]

But worse disturbances than violent manifestoes disquieted the
government. On June 1, 1560, the day of the Corpus Domini at Rouen,
when the procession passed through the city with the customary
solemnities, it was remarked that in front of a certain house before
which the procession passed no tapestry or any other decoration had
been placed. Villebonne, the King’s officer, “who on account of these
disturbances about religion remained there,” perceived the omission and
being suspicious of some clandestine meeting of the Huguenots, chose to
verify the fact instantly. He attempted to enter the house by force,
but met with such stout resistance on the part of its inmates that
the procession was interrupted, and a great tumult arose, both sides
having recourse to arms. After much fighting, each party having several
wounded, at length with the death of some defenders of the house and
after very great effort, the authorities quieted the uproar as well
as they could. Next morning upward of 2,000 persons appeared before
the royal magistrates, not only very vehemently to demand justice and
satisfaction for the death of those persons who had been killed, but
to present also the “Confession” of what they believed and the mode in
which they intended it should be allowed them to live, demanding that
the “Confession” should be sent to the King that it might be granted,
and protesting that if on that account his ministers proceeded
against any of them by arrest or capital punishment or other penalty,
they would put to death an equal number of Catholic officials of the
government. The president and four councilors of the Parlement of
Rouen journeyed to Paris to present the “Confession.” They assured the
King that the whole of Normandy was of the same opinion as those who
declared themselves. In its quandary the government blamed Villebonne,
accusing him of too much zeal and inquisitiveness. Moreover, fresh
commotions were heard of daily, and the government plainly feared some
sudden attack like that of Amboise.[167]

The Guises plucked courage, however, from the fact that under the
pretext of still preparing for the war in Scotland in support of Marv
Stuart,[168] they could fill France with soldiery.[169] Months before
the outbreak of the conspiracy of Amboise their agents had been at work
in Germany, using French gold for the purchase of arms, ammunition,
and above all, men, for Germany was filled with small nobles of broken
fortune, vagabond soldiers,[170] and lansquenets ready to serve
wherever the pay was sure and the chance for excitement and plunder
good.[171]

On March 30, 1560, Guido Giannetti, Elizabeth’s secret agent at Venice,
wrote to Cecil, “France will have enough to do in her religious wars
that have just sprung up, which will be worse than the civil war of
the League of the Public Weal, in 1465 under Louis XI.”[172] The
prophecy soon became true. In spite of the formidable preparations made
to continue the war in Scotland,[173] the more necessary since the
death of the queen dowager of Scotland, news of which reached France
on June 18,[174] France—or rather the French party in Scotland—on
July 6, 1560, signed the treaty of Edinburgh, which, so far as
the Guises were concerned, was the renunciation on their part of
aggression abroad.[175] Nothing but the grave state of home politics
could have induced the Guises so to yield the cause of their niece in
Scotland.[176]

The Huguenot issue promised to come to a climax during the summer
of 1560.[177] From all over France came reports of sedition and
insurrection. The Protestants were masters of Provence.[178] The
cardinal Tournon, returning from Rome, dared not bring with him the
cross of the legation, for fear of its meeting with disrespect by
the people of the places through which he would have to pass.[179]
From another source came the report that “very free sermons have been
delivered in the churches of Bayonne.”[180] The bishop of Agen wrote
the council that all the inhabitants of that city were in a state
of furious insurrection; that they went to the churches, destroyed
all the images, and maltreated certain priests. The queen mother
was mysteriously warned that unless she released certain preachers
imprisoned at Troyes she would become the most unhappy princess
living.[181] The Pope’s legate left Avignon in disgust at the license
of the “Lutherans,”[182] and when the pontiff proposed to send thither
the cardinal Farnese, who was willing to go provided a suitable escort
of Italian and Swiss infantry was furnished, France refused to consent,
being unwilling to allow a foreign prince to enter the kingdom on such
a warlike footing.[183]

At the same time the personal attack upon the Guises became more
venomous.[184] The enmity between the Guises and the house of
Montmorency had become so open and proceeded so far, owing to the
dispute about Dammartin, that it was expected they would take up arms.
To crown all, the government received information through several
channels of a design against the King and his ministers of worse
quality than the recent Amboise conspiracy.[185] The information
that came to light caused the greatest anxiety because this time the
evidence seemed strongly to compromise the vidame de Chartres,[186]
and the prince of Condé.[187]

Although the war in Scotland was practically at an end, the Guises
had not relaxed their efforts to raise men and money.[188] Philip II,
knowing what was in progress, seems to have made a partial offer of
assistance. In July fifteen German captains were dispatched beyond the
Rhine, each commissioned to bring back three hundred pistoleers for the
King’s service;[189] letters were sent to the Rhinegrave and Duke John
William of Saxony, urging them to form a league of the German princes
and procure forces in case there should be need of them.[190] La Mothe
Gondrin was sent into Provence and Dauphiné, and another agent into
Champagne, on similar errands.[191] Fifteen hundred men with armor
and munitions were sent to the castle of Guise.[192] The Guises even
endeavored to effect a reconciliation with the constable through the
mediation of the marshal Brissac.[193]

The prevailing alarm was not allayed by the admiral, Gaspard de
Coligny, who at a full council meeting held at Fontainebleau, on
August 20, 1560, presented two petitions,[194] one for the King, the
other for his mother, asking the King, in the matter of religion, to
concede the petitioners two places of worship in two parts of the
kingdom for greater convenience, that they might there exercise their
rites and ceremonies as private congregations, without being molested
by anyone, arguing that meetings in private residences would thus be
obviated.[195] Coligny claimed to speak with authority, having been
officially sent into Normandy by the queen mother to inquire into the
cause of the disturbances there. A hot altercation ensued between the
admiral and the cardinal of Lorraine. Coligny had prudently omitted
signatures to the petition, but declared that he “could get 50,000
persons in Normandy to sign it,” to which the cardinal retorted
that “the King could get a million of his own religion to sign the
contrary.”[196] L’Hôpital, the chancellor, however, deftly diverted
the discussion into a political channel by a long discourse[197] upon
the condition of the realm, comparing it to a sick man, asserting
that the estates were troubled and corrupt, that religious dissidence
existed, that the nobility were dissatisfied, and concluded by saying
that if the source and root of all the calamities visiting France could
be discovered, the remedy would be easy.[198] In reply the cardinal
of Lorraine offered to answer publicly for the administration of the
finances and showed by an abstract of the government accounts that
the ordinary expenses exceeded the revenue by 2,500,000 livres (over
seven and one-half million dollars); his brother, the duke of Guise,
as lieutenant-general, laid papers upon the table with reference to
the army and forces of the kingdom.[199] An adjournment was then taken
until August 23, when, upon reassembling, each member of the Council
was provided with a memorandum containing a list of the topics which
the crown wished to have debated.[200]

Montluc, the bishop of Valence,[201] as the youngest privy-councilor,
began the discussion when the Council reconvened.[202] But the speech
of the occasion was that of Marillac, the liberal archbishop of Vienne,
who, taking his cue from the chancellor, in a long discourse[203]
enlarged upon the religious, political, and economic distress of
France. His address is a complete statement of the Huguenot programme
in church and state. He began by saying that the true “ancient and
customary” remedy was a general council, but failing that, recourse
must be had to a national council, and then proceeded to enumerate
the things to be considered therein; first, the intrusion of foreign
prelates—chiefly Italians—into French ecclesiastical offices,[204]
“who fill a third portion of the benefices of the kingdom, who have an
infinite number of pensions, who suck our blood like leeches, and who
in their hearts, laugh at us for being so stupid as not to see that
we are being abused;” secondly, he demanded that the clergy of France
show by some notable act that they were sincerely bent upon reform
and not merely seeking to fortify their prerogatives and privileges
under the pretension of reform; and to this end the illicit use of
money—“that great Babylonian beast, which is avarice, in whose path
follow so many superstitions and abominations”—must be guarded
against; thirdly, the wicked must make sincere repentance; fourthly,
for the adjustment of the political and economic questions vexing the
people the States-General must be convened. Then followed a statement
of conditions: that the king must live upon the income of the royal
domains, the spoliation of which should cease; that his wars be
supported by the old feudal aids and not by recourse to extraordinary
taxes.

This speech highly pleased the admiral, who added three points,
namely, that, a religious “interim” be officially granted until the
findings of the Council of Trent, which the Pope was to be asked to
reconvene; that in event of refusal to do so, a national council of
the clergy of France be called in which the Huguenots should have
a representation;[205] and that the number of guards around the
court, “which were very expensive and only served to infuse fears and
jealousies into the people’s minds” be reduced.[206]

The upshot of the conference was the resolution to call a meeting of
the States-General for December 10 at Meaux (later changed to Orleans),
and in default of the convening of a general church council, to convene
a national body of the clergy at Paris on January 10, 1561, the long
interval being allowed in order to permit the Pope to act.[207] In the
meantime the _status quo_ was maintained with reference to the worship
of the Protestants, but for the sake of precaution, an edict was
issued by which all subjects of the realm, whether princes or no, were
prohibited from making any levy of men, arms, armor, horses, or moneys,
on pain of being declared rebels against his majesty.[208]

There is no doubt that the resolution of the Council of Fontainebleau
conformed to the conviction of a large element in France, the religious
troubles having stirred up a strong demand for another general council
of the church (the second session of the Council of Trent having been
interrupted by the defeat of the emperor Charles V in the Smalkald
war), or a national council, if the convocation of the former proved
impossible.[209] Even the cardinal of Lorraine, desirous of acquiring
fame by reforming the church of France, urged the course, though it
was hostile to the interest of the Holy See, until the development of
events at home persuaded him to change his tactics.[210]

The project of a national council was not pleasing to the Pope, who
cherished the hope of reconvoking the Council of Trent,[211] either
in France, Spain, or Germany.[212] When the cardinal of Lorraine
urged it, the Pope’s rejoinder was that he would not divide Christ’s
garment.[213] The Holy Father was in a quandary, being unable with
safety to grant a free council, or to refuse the general one. He wanted
to regard the prospective council as a _continuation_ of the Council
of Trent, and not as a new council.[214] But there were political
difficulties in the way of so doing, for not all the German princes
were in favor of the decrees of Trent, and the Emperor was bound by
his oath not to attempt execution of the decrees lest the princes of
the Confession of Augsburg become alarmed for fear that the Emperor,
His Catholic Majesty and the Most Christian King had formed a Catholic
concert.[215] The Kings of Spain and France, moreover, although in
favor of the general council, had reservations of their own regarding
the application of the Tridentine decrees.[216]

The matter of the council was of much importance to every ruler in
Europe. France, although resolved to convene the national clergy if
the Pope protracted things, nevertheless urged the latter to hasten to
grant a free and general council, not only by means of the bishop of
Angoulême, the French ambassador in Rome, and the cardinals, but also
through Bochetel, the bishop of Rennes, ambassador to the Emperor, and
Sebastian de l’Aubespine, the bishop of Limoges, ambassador to Philip
II. The Venetian senate, too, was importuned to use its influence. But
the Pope hesitated for a long time, because the secular governments and
himself were divided upon the question as to whether such a council
should be regarded as a continuation of the Council of Trent (as the
Pope wished), or as a council _de novo_. The Pope was fearful of
compromising the papal authority by admitting the French contention
of an authority superior to himself, for this he could never grant,
taking the ground that, whether present or absent, he was always the
head of and superior to all councils. Finally, Pius IV, alarmed by the
resolution of the French government to assemble a national council if
the general council should not be held, both because it would diminish
his authority and because, even though nothing should be resolved on
in opposition to the see of Rome, yet the assembling of a council by
France without its consent would be prejudicial, and might be made a
precedent by other states, came to the conclusion that further delay
was dangerous, and convoked the general council for Easter, 1561, at
Trent, “to extirpate heresy and schism and to correct manners,”[217]
declaring that the canons of the church could permit of no other course.

The resolution of the French government had forced the hand of the
Pontiff, who, however, consoled himself by the thought that either the
national council would not now take place, or that the Guises would
prevail in the States-General, so that the national council could
be silenced, if held.[218] The Pope figured that he would force the
Catholic princes to side with him, lest by hazarding a change of
religion in a national council they would also endanger their kingdoms.
Philip II concurred in this belief. A king so orthodox as he had not
failed to watch the course of the movement in France upon the ground of
religious interests. But the Spanish King had also a political interest
in France. His own Flemish and Dutch provinces were turbulent with
revolt, and Granvella wrote truly when he said that it was a miracle
that with the bad example of France, things were no worse in the Low
Countries.[219] Accordingly, Philip II sent Don Antonio de Toledo
into France to divert the French King from the idea of a national
council.[220] The means of persuasion were readily at hand, for the
French King was already far too compromised with Philip II to refuse
his request. After the arrest of the vidame of Chartres, Francis II, in
a long ciphered letter of August 31, 1560, to his ambassador in Spain,
had besought the Spanish king to be prepared to assist him, in case it
should be necessary.[221] To forefend the proposed national council,
Philip II now offered at his own expense to give the French aid in
suppressing all rebellion and schism.[222]

Warlike preparations accordingly went forward under cover of a proposed
intervention in Scotland,[223] which the uncertainty regarding Condé
and Antoine of Bourbon facilitated, for it was currently believed
that both the king of Navarre and the prince absented themselves from
court on purpose.[224] At the court the rumor prevailed that both
were plotting recourse to arms, so much so that on September 2 the
cardinal Bourbon was sent to them, desiring them in the name of the
King to repair to the court, which, on the next day, was moved from
Fontainebleau to St. Germain.[225] The marshal Brissac was transferred
from the government of Picardy to that of Normandy, and Du Bois, master
of the footmen, was instructed to conduct all the footmen he could levy
with great secrecy into Normandy, while all the men in the ordinary
garrison of Picardy and other frontier points were drawn in toward
Orleans.[226] At the same time the Rhinegrave was notified to come, but
met unexpected opposition.[227]

Parallel with these military preparations new financial measures
were taken. On October 11, 1560, the King demanded 100,000 crowns
(testons—a silver coin valued at ten or eleven sous; the amount was
between $750,000 and $775,000) from the members of the Parlement, the
provost, the chief merchants of Paris,[228] and “certain learned men
of the Sorbonne.”[229] The Parisians murmured because they thought the
military display was meant to intimidate them. In November the crown
imposed 10,000 francs (approximately $7,500) upon Orleans and demanded
100,000 more to pay the troops.[230] Lyons furnished a loan[231] and
money was also secured by confiscations from the Huguenots on the part
of the local authorities in many places.[232]

In the provinces disturbances continued to take place.[233] In Amboise
and Tours the people stormed the prisons and released all those who had
been confined as agitators on account of religion.[234] The valley
of the Loire seems to have been the storm center of these provincial
uprisings, and in the middle of October[235] the king came hastily to
Orleans with three companies of veteran infantry from the garrisons
of Picardy.[236] It was now decided to convene the States-General at
Orleans instead of Meaux.[237] On October 30 the prince of Condé,
who all along had borne himself as if innocent and who came with his
brother to Orleans, was arrested,[238] and the vidame of Chartres, who
had been incarcerated in the Bastille, was sent for from Paris that he
might be examined face to face with Condé.[239] Besides being accused
of implication in the conspiracy of Amboise, he was accused of being
the author of the recent insurrection at Lyons.[240]

A significant change was made in the provincial administration at
this time. The Guises, having observed the dissatisfaction that
prevailed because so many offices, dignities, and commissions had
been distributed among them, in order to fling a sop to the princes
of the blood and their faction, advised the King to create two
new governments in the middle of the kingdom in favor of the duke
of Montpensier and his brother, the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon. In
compliance with this suggestion the government of Touraine, to which
province was added the duchies of Anjou and Vendôme and the counties
of Maine, Blois, and Dunois, was created in favor of the former, and
the government of Orleans, to which was added the duchies of Berry,
the _pays_ Chartrain, the Beauce, Montargis, and adjacent places,
in favor of the latter. But the new office was reduced to a shadowy
power by the revolutionary step of appointing provincial lieutenants
over the governors, who were responsible to the duke of Guise as
lieutenant-general of the realm, in this case the sieur de Sipierre
being lieutenant in the Orléannais and Savigny in Touraine, each of
whom was a servitor of the Guises.[241]

There is little reason to doubt that the Huguenots would have made
a formidable revolt at this early day if they had been certain of
effective leadership. But the cowardice of Antoine of Navarre, the
logical leader of the party, prevented them from so doing. The great
influence he might have exerted as first prince of the blood was in
singular contrast with his weak character.[242] His policy, which he
flattered himself to be a skilful one of temporization, was looked upon
with contempt by the Huguenots, who despised him for weakly suffering
his brother to be so treated and then added to his pusillanimity
by foregoing his governorship of Guyenne, which was given to the
marshal Termes.[243] In vain the Huguenot leaders urged upon him their
supplications and their remonstrances;[244] in vain they laid before
him the details of their organization; that six or seven thousand
footmen throughout Gascony and Poitou were already enrolled under
captains; that between three and four thousand, both foot and horse,
would come from Provence and Languedoc; that from Normandy would come
as many or even more, with a great number of cavalry; that with the aid
of all these he would be able to seize Orleans (thus controlling the
States-General), and Bourges, with Orleans the two most important towns
in central France. They assured him that thousands were merely waiting
for a successful stroke to declare themselves and that money was to be
had in plenty; for every cavalryman and every footman was supplied with
enough money for two months and that much more would be forthcoming,
provided only the king of Navarre would declare himself the protector
of the King and the realm and oppose the tyranny of the Guises.[245]

This was the moment chosen by Catherine de Medici to assert herself.
Hitherto, there had been no room for her between the two parties, each
of which aspired to absolute control of the King. The queen mother had
no mind to see herself reduced to a simple guardian of the persons
of her children, utterly dependent upon the action of the council,
without political authority nor “control of a single denier,”[246]
and perceived that she might now fish to advantage in the troubled
waters; to change the figure, she determined to play each party against
the other[247] in the hope of herself being able to hold the balance
of power between them. This explains her double-dealing after the
conspiracy of Amboise, when she represented to Coligny that she wished
to be instructed in the Huguenot teachings in order, if possible,
that she might be able to discover the “true source and origin of
the troubles,” and conferred with Chaudien, the Protestant pastor in
Paris, and Duplessis, the Huguenot minister at Tours, at the same time
also inquiring into the political claims of the Huguenots, having the
cardinal of Lorraine concealed, like Polonius, behind the arras;[248]
why, too, she used fair words at the conference at Fontainebleau and
simultaneously saw Francis II write to Philip II asking for Spanish aid
in the event of civil war.

The Venetian ambassador said truly that the famous Roman temporizer,
Fabius Cunctator, would have recognized his daughter in this astute
woman of Etruria.[249] For fear of being sent back to Italy or of
staying in France without influence, she aimed to play the two parties
against one another. She did not hesitate to hazard the crown in
order to keep the government in her hands, although, as the Venetian
ambassador said, “to wish to maintain peace by division is to wish to
make white out of black.”[250]

The time was a peculiarly propitious one. With the prince of Condé
out of the way[251] she counted upon the vacillation and hesitancy of
the king of Navarre to keep the Huguenots from overt action, while
the prospect of the coming States-General, which had grown out of the
assembly at Fontainebleau, as the bishop of Valence had predicted,[252]
filled the Guises with dismay, so much so that when the demand for the
summons of that body began to grow, they had endeavored to persuade
the King to ordain that whoever spoke of their convocation should be
declared guilty of _lèse-majesté_.[253] The reason of their alarm is
not far to seek. The demand for the States-General was the voice of
France, speaking through the noblesse and the bourgeoisie. crying
out for a thorough inquiry into the administration of the Guises and
reformation of the governmental system of both state and church; as
such it was a menace to the cardinal and his brother and in alignment
with the demands of the political Huguenots. The costly wars of
Henry II, the extravagance of the court; the burdensome taxation;
the venality of justice; the lawlessness and disorder prevailing
everywhere; the impoverishment of many noble families, and the rise
of new nobles out of the violence of the wars in Picardy and Italy,
more prone to license and less softened by the social graces that
characterized the old families;[254] the dilapidation of ancestral
fortunes and the displacements of wealth; the religious unrest; the
corruption of the church—all these grievances, none of which was
wholly new, were piling up with a cumulative force, whose impending
attack the Guises regarded with great apprehension.[255]

The administration of the cardinal of Lorraine and his ducal brother
had not mended matters, but in justice to them it should be said
that their ministry was quite as much the _occasion_ as the _cause_
of the popular outcry for reform. The evils of the former reign
were reaching a climax which their haughtiness and ambition served
to accentuate.[256] Misappropriation of public moneys, exorbitant
taxation, denial of justice, spoliation of the crown lands, especially
the forests, the dilapidation of church property, and the corruption
of manners, were undoubtedly the deepest popular grievances. In the
demand for redress of these grievances all honest men were united. In
1560 the cry of the Huguenots for freedom of worship was the voice of
a minority of them only. Most Huguenots at this time were political
and not religious Huguenots, who simply used the demand of the new
religionists as a vehicle of expression; this sentiment also for local
risings to rescue arrested Calvinists, the participants in many cases
being actuated more by the desire to make a demonstration against the
government than by sympathy with the Calvinist doctrines.[257]

The debts of the crown at the accession of Francis II aggregated
forty-three millions of livres,[258] upon which interest had to be
paid, without including pensions and salaries due to officers and
servants of the royal household, and the gendarmerie, which were from
two to five years in arrears,[259] a sum so great that if the entire
revenue of the crown for a decade could have been devoted to its
discharge, it would not have been possible to liquidate it. The result
was the provinces abounded with poor men driven to live by violence and
crime, while even the nobility, because of their reduced incomes, and
the soldiery on account of arrears of wages, were driven to plunder the
people.[260] Even members of the judiciary and the clergy had recourse
to illicit practices.[261] The regular provincial administration was
powerless to suppress evils so prevalent, whose roots were found in
the condition of society. It was in vain that the crown announced that
it was illegal to have recourse to arms for redress of injuries and
commanded the governors in the provinces, the bailiffs, seneschals,
and other similar officers to stay within their jurisdictions and
vigilantly to sustain the provost-marshals in suppressing sedition or
illegal assemblies. Some men thought the remedy lay in more drastic
penalties and advocated the abolishment of appeal in criminal causes,
as in Italy and Flanders.[262] But history in many epochs shows that
the social maladies of a complex society cannot be so cured. Obviously
the true remedy lay in searching out the causes of the trouble and
destroying them, and this was the intent of the demand for the
States-General.

The summons of the States-General of Orleans and the further act of
the government in announcing that it would summon a national council
of the French clergy to meet in Paris on January 10, 1561, unless
the Council General was called in the meantime, were equivalent to
promises that reform would be undertaken in both state and church.
The double announcement was the simultaneous recognition of one
necessity—reformation.

CHAPTER III

THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS

The prosecution of the prince of Condé and the vidame of Chartres was
pushed during the month of November in order to overcome any Huguenot
activity in the coming States-General.[263] The Guises assured both the
Pope and Spain that their intention was, after the execution of the
prince, to send soldiery into the provinces under the command of the
marshals St. André, Termes, Brissac, and Sipierre, whose Catholicism
was of a notoriously militant type, and thus either to crush the
Huguenots, or drive them out of the country.[264] Condé claimed, upon
the advice of his counsel, the advocates Claudius Robert and Francis
Marillac, that as a prince of the blood he had to give account to the
King alone and to judges suitable to his condition, as peers of France,
denying the jurisdiction of the ordinary judges.[265] This the latter
refused to allow, on the ground that there was no appeal from the King
in council (which at least had been the practice of the crown since
Francis I) because the judgment so given was an absolute declaration of
the king’s pleasure; whereupon Condé, after the example of Marchetas,
when condemned by Philip of Macedon, appealed from the King in bad
council to the King in good council. The prince, however, adhered to
his claim, until by a subterfuge he was made, in a way, to commit
himself; for at last he signed an answer _to his counsel_, Robert,
whereby the prosecution gained a point prejudicial to him, although
good lawyers affirmed that a defendant’s counsel could not be made his
judge. Thereupon the government organized a court in which there was
a sprinkling of peers, in order to seem to comply with the law.[266]
Under such practices the judgment was a foregone conclusion, although
even after being declared guilty, the general opinion was that the
prince would not be put to death, but that the worst that could befall
him would be imprisonment in the dungeons of Loches, where Ludovic
Sforza died in the reign of Louis XII; or that he would be kept in
confinement elsewhere pending greater age on the part of the king and
new developments.[267]

What Condé’s fate would have been still remains a problematical
question, for Francis II died at Orleans on December 5, 1560, and his
death put an end to all proceedings against the prince.[268] The prince
of Condé was released on December 24, and immediately went to La
Fère in Picardy.[269] The crown descended to the dead king’s younger
brother, Charles IX, a boy ten years of age. His accession was not an
auspicious one. Well might the Venetian ambassador exclaim: “Vae tibi
terra cujus rex puer est.”[270] The execution of two Calvinists in
Rouen on December 3 occasioned a riot during which the gates of the
city were shut,[271] and at Bordeaux a serious insurrection of 1,200
persons had taken place in consequence of the arrest of Condé, so that
the general pardon of religious offenders issued on January 3, 1561,
was a wise step.[272] All the plans designed and prepared for execution
at Orleans were broken by the death of the King. The Guises were
furious.[273]

It was hoped that the new reign might be established tranquilly,
without an appeal to arms, but there was much misgiving owing to “the
bad spirit among the people on account of the religious question, and
of their dislike of the existing government.”[274] Many had thought
that in the event of the death of the king a general uprising might
result throughout the realm, for religious and administrative reform,
since Charles IX, being a minor, would be placed under the guidance of
the king of Navarre, the oldest and nearest prince of the blood, who
by consenting to the demands of the Huguenots, either from inclination
or from inability to repress them, would open the door to such a
course. Others believed that the Guises would not be put down, but
that with the military resources concentrated around Orleans, at their
disposal, they would seek to overawe the opposition and retain their
power, finding means, through papal dispensation, to marry Mary Stuart
to the new king.[275] There was a third class who rightly surmised
that the queen mother, if not able to establish the regency in her
favor, would play the parties against each other in such a way as to
be able to exercise large control herself. In pursuance of this double
course, Catherine secretly incited the king of Navarre and the prince
of Condé, giving out that the action lately taken against the latter
had been by the advice of the Guises. At the same time she gave the
Guises to understand that the hard feeling which the Bourbon princes
felt for them was contrary to her wish and pleasure and that it was
they who had sought to compel the Guises to render account of their
administration.[276]. As the constable seemed to command the balance
of power, both the queen mother and the Guises began to compete for
his favor,[277] Catherine overcoming her old enmity on account of her
fear of the Guises.[278] Between the Guises and Montmorency the enmity
was too great for any _rapprochement_, so that the Guises endeavored
to counter the coalition of Catherine de Medici and the constable
by overtures to Antoine of Navarre, whose own pliant nature readily
yielded to their blandishments, telling him that Philip II probably
would be inclined to restore his lost kingdom of Navarre or give him
an equivalent in Sardinia, in the event of the adoption of a strong
Catholic policy on his part.[279]

Catherine de Medici, however, by the promptness of her action, and
perhaps not a little owing to the unpopularity of the cardinal of
Lorraine,[280] got the better of the Guises, the government being
organized around the queen mother and the three Bourbon princes, the
king of Navarre, the cardinal of Bourbon, the prince of Condé the
constable, the three Châtillons—the admiral Coligny, the cardinal
Odet, and D’Andelot—the duke de Montpensier and the prince de la
Roche-sur-Yon.[281] The duke of Aumale, the marquis of Elbœuf, the
grand prior of France, and the cardinals of Lorraine and Guise, all
brothers of the duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine left the
court at the same time,[282] but if the pride of the Guises was
wounded, they did not show it. They were followed by all the companies
of ordinance, both cavalry and infantry, which had been sent to Orleans.

But Catherine de Medici looked farther than the present order of things
and schemed to have the coronation effected as soon as possible,
thinking that it would remove many difficulties alleged of the King’s
minority[283] and make him of sufficient authority to appoint such
governors as he pleased.[284] She found means to have it arranged in
the Privy Council (March 27, 1561) that she and the king of Navarre,
in the capacity of lieutenant-general, should rule jointly, the King’s
seal being in the custody of both and kept in a coffer to which each
should carry a different key. This astute move gave Catherine exclusive
guardianship of the person of Charles IX, and assured her at least an
equal power in the regency.[285] At the same time orders were given
for the ambassadors and others who wished for audience to ask it of
the queen mother through the secretaries.[286] By this new arrangement
it became unnecessary to give account of one’s business first of all
either to the cardinal of Lorraine or the constable, or to anyone else,
as was usually done before; but at once to address the queen, who,
should the matter need to be referred to the council, could propose
it and give reply according to their decision. As not one of these
councilors was superior to another, the power was all in Catherine’s
hands. She had played her cards well and had won. The duke of Guise
ceased to be of influence at court and the constable “was satisfied to
lose his authority in order to damage his enemies.”[287] France began
to awaken to the fact that the queen who had led a life of retirement
during her husband’s reign, in that of her son was evincing that
capacity for public affairs which was an hereditary possession in her
family. In her quality as queen mother, she kept the King well in hand.
She would not permit anyone but herself to sleep in his bed-chamber;
she never left him alone. She governed as if she were king. She
appointed to offices and to benefices; she granted pardon; she kept the
seal; she had the last word to say in council; she opened the letters
of the ambassadors and other ministers. Those who used to think she was
a timid woman discovered that her courage was great; and that, like Leo
X and all his house, she possessed the art of dissimulation.[288]

The Huguenots had hoped for much politically from the sudden
revolution, and looked forward to organizing the States-General,
while the Catholics hoped that the precautions taken during the
elections had insured the election of men opposed to any novelty in
the matter of religion.[289] The first session took place on December
13.[290] L’Hôpital, the chancellor, made an eloquent and earnest
plea in favor of harmony among the members, endeavoring to draw them
away from religious animosities by pointing out the great necessity
of administrative and political reform, urging that the root of the
present evils was to be found in the miscarriage of justice, the
burdensome taxes, the corruption of office, etc.[291]

He ascribed the religious inquietude to the degeneracy of the church
and advocated thorough reform of it, saying that the clergy gave
occasion for the introducing of a new religion, though he avoided
entering into the matter of merit of its doctrines.[292] He pointed out
the needs of France and the necessity for civil and religious concord,
and, in the peroration pleaded for earnest, patriotic support of the
boy-King, “for there never was a father, no matter of what estate or
condition, who ever left a little orphan more involved, more in debt,
more hampered than our young prince is by the death of the kings, his
father and his brother. All the cost and expenses of twelve or thirteen
years of long and continuous war have fallen upon him; three grand
marriages are to be paid for, and other things too long to tell of now;
the domain, the aids, the salt storehouses, and part of the _taille_
have been alienated.”[293]

In spite of the efforts of the chancellor, however, to smooth the
way, the ship of state encountered rough water at the very beginning.
It was doubtful whether anything would come of the session, as the
difficulties between the delegates were endless, partly from the
diversity of their commissions and of the requests they had to make,
partly from individual caprice. The commons and the clergy readily
agreed to meet together, but many of the nobility made difficulty.
Some of those of Guyenne and of some parts of Brittany, Normandy, and
Champagne would not consent to treat with the government without a
fresh commission, saying that their commission was to the late king,
Francis II—an invention of those who were not satisfied with the
present government and disliked the queen’s supremacy.[294] Perceiving
this obstacle, the queen sent for the president of La Rochelle and told
him to have an autograph list made of all those who dissented and to
bring it to her. But no one dared to be the first to sign this list.
This was admirable adroitness on Catherine’s part. She was playing for
a large stake, because if the estates treated with the new government,
they would in a certain way approve its legitimacy by general consent.

Finally, after a week’s delay, during which the _cahiers_ of the
delegates were handed in and classified, deliberations were resumed.
The three chief questions before the estates of Orleans were religion,
the finances, and the regulation of the courts of judicature. The
three estates in order, beginning with the commons, presented each its
cause. The orator of the third estate, an _avocat du roi_ at Bordeaux,
demanded a general council for the settlement of religious controversy;
the discipline of the clergy, whom he denounced in scathing terms;
their reformation in manners and morals; revision of justice, and
alleviation of taxes.[295] As a whole, the commons seemed to wish for
a general pardon for all the insurgents, and that everybody should be
restored to favor; that the election of prelates should be regulated,
so as to insure the nomination of fitting persons to reform the life
and customs of the clergy; and that the revenues of the churches should
be limited to persons appointed for that purpose.[296]

The spokesman of the noblesse, one Jacques de Silly, sieur de
Rochefort, invoked biblical authority, besides Assyrian and classical
history, to prove that the nobility had been ordained of God and
recognized by men of all times as the pillar of the state. The harangue
was a carefully worded assertion of the political interests and claims
of the nobility. Even religion was subordinated to their political
ends, a written memorial being presented by some of the nobles asking
for leave for each great feudal proprietor to ordain what worship he
might choose within his lands, after the manner of the settlement at
Augsburg in 1555 (_cujus regio, ejus religio_).[297]

[Illustration: STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

The clergy naturally were in conformity with the canons and the
Catholic ritual. They were declared to be “the organ and mouth” of
France, much history and doctrinal writing being cited to prove their
supremacy. Liberty of election in the matter of church offices,
abolition of the abuse of the _dîme_, which, it was complained, had
been extorted from the church, not once, but four, five, six, and even
nine times in a year, and prelates put in prison for failure to pay, to
the destruction of worship in the churches; suppression of heresy (thus
early stigmatized as _la prétendue réformation_), and royal support
of the authority of the priest-class, were the four demands of the
clerical order.[298] The sittings were rendered less tedious by a bold
attack made upon the persecution of religion by a deputy who demanded
that the Huguenots be permitted to have their own church edifices—a
plea which was reinforced by a hot protest of the admiral Coligny
against an utterance of Quintin, the clerical orator.[299]

As to religion, grave questions arose. Would the toleration of religion
occasion civil war? Would it cause an ultimate alteration of the faith
of France? Would it, finally, alter the state, too? The States-General
refused to enter deeply into these problems. The petition of the
Protestants was not mentioned.[300] In the end it was determined to
grant a general pardon to all throughout the kingdom, without obliging
anyone to retract, or to make any other canonical recantation—a
proposal which was quite at variance with the constitution of the
church and was regarded by Rome as exceeding the bounds of the
authority of the King and his Council, cognizance of matters of this
nature appertaining to ecclesiastics and not to laymen.[301] The
pressure of the third estate as well as the influence of Coligny,
L’Hôpital, and others, is discernible in this measure. For it had been
determined in the Privy Council that should the Council-General not
be held before June, the National Council would assemble in France.
This could not be denied to the estates who demanded it; and this
concession apparently at first caused all the three estates to agree
not to renounce the old religion. To this must be added another reason,
viz., that although the greater part of the clergy, more especially the
bishops, approved the old religion, yet many of the nobility approved
the new one.[302]

Even more favorable action toward the Huguenots might have been taken
if Catherine’s caution and her fear of antagonizing the Guises too
much had not acted as a restraint. The pardon of the government was
theoretically not understood to be granted to those who _preached_ the
Calvinistic doctrine, nor to the King’s judges who had authority in
the cities and provinces of France who espoused it. But it was tacitly
admitted that no one was to be prosecuted for heresy on this account.
In Orleans the people worshiped in Huguenot form and in Paris—wonder
of wonders—_Catholic_ preachers were admonished to cease inveighing
against “Lutherans” and Huguenots, and not to speak against their sects
or their opinions—an order generally interpreted as consent from the
Privy Council for all to follow such opinions about faith as most
pleased their ideas.[303]

A corollary to the question of religion was that touching the
government of the church. Several excellent ordinances were passed for
reforming the abuses of the church, particularly for preventing the
sale of benefices. The election of the bishops was taken out of the
King’s direct jurisdiction and remitted to the clergy, and to satisfy
the people it was added that twelve noblemen and twelve commoners
together with the governor and judges of the city in which a bishop was
to be elected were to unite with the clergy in election, giving laymen
the same authority as ecclesiastics. Another matter also was determined
which was sure to displease the Pope, viz., that moneys should no
longer be sent to Rome for the annates or for other compositions on
account of benefices, on the ground that these charges drew large sums
of money from the kingdom and were the cause of its poverty. Even
the payment of the Peter’s Pence was resented by some. The bishop of
Vienne publicly asserted that it was with astonishment and sorrow that
he observed the patience with which the French people endured these
taxes “as if,” said he, “the wax and lead of the King was not worth
as much as the lead and the wax of Rome which cost so much.”[304] As
it would have seemed strange were the Pope not first informed of
it, the estates elected one of the presidents of the Parlement to go
to Rome to give an account to the Pope of the matter, not so much to
ask it as a favor from the Pope as merely to state the causes which
moved the government thus to decide. The strong inclination of many
in France whose catholicity could not be impugned, to diminish the
papal authority and assert the old Gallican liberties, is noticeable.
Pontifical authority would have been quite at an end if the estates had
determined to lay hands on the church property, as was desired by many
persons.

The two other questions before the estates were those of justice and
finance. In the matter of the former nothing was done. For although
there was universal dissatisfaction, the issue was too complicated,
as all judicial offices were sold, and in order to displace those
who had bought them it would have been necessary to reimburse the
holders, which could not have been done then. The chances, accordingly,
were that the administration of justice was likely to go from bad to
worse.[305]

The main work of the estates of Orleans had to do with the
reorganization of the finances of the kingdom, the administration of
which was intimately connected with the future government. The crown
was over forty million francs (exceeding eighteen million crowns) in
debt.[306]

It may be well at this point to give a short survey of the financial
policy of the French crown during the sixteenth century. Under Louis
XII the _taille_, which was the principal tax, and which fell upon
the peasant, was reduced to about six hundred thousand écus, a sum
little superior to the amount originally fixed under Charles VII. It
was raised by Francis I to two millions. In the time of Louis XII the
total revenue amounted to barely two millions; his successor brought
it up to five, the _dîmes_ of the clergy being included.[307] When the
expenses of the government came to exceed the receipts, Francis I had
recourse to extraordinary measures, that is to say, to augmentation
of the taxes, to new loans, or to new forms of taxation. In 1539 he
introduced the lottery from Italy. These extraordinary practices
were not submitted to any process of approval, not even in the _pays
d’état_. Foreigners were astonished at the ease with which the king
of France procured money at his pleasure. Francis I quadrupled the
_taille_ upon land, and even had the effrontery to raise it to the
fifth power. In general the people paid without murmuring, although in
1535 an insurrection broke out at Lyons on account of an alteration
in the _aides_ demanded by the crown; and in 1542 there was a serious
outbreak at La Rochelle owing to burdensome imposition of the _gabelle_.

The author of the new financial measures of 1539 was the chancellor
Poyet, a man of ability, who owed his advancement to the favor
of Montmorency. Several very excellent measures are due to him,
pre-eminently numerous ordinances relating to the inalienability of
the royal domain, which he promulgated as a fundamental law of the
monarchy, a law which the weak successors of Henry II repudiated. He
also endeavored to suppress dishonest administration in the provinces.
Thus he called to account both the marshal Montjean, whose exactions in
the Lyonnais produced wide complaint, and Galiot de Genoullac, the sire
d’Acir, whose stealings were enormous. These measures would have had a
salutary effect if the administration of justice had been independent
and honest in France. Unfortunately Poyet’s reputation for integrity
was not as great as it should have been in a minister, and his policy
made him many enemies.

The incomes of Francis I, great as they were, did not suffice for Henry
II, the renewal of the war continuing to increase his necessities.
Under him the increase of the _gabelle_ and the tithes and other
special taxes brought the total of the revenues up to six and a half
million écus, which did not yet save the King from being reduced to
the necessity of making alienations and loans, which reached on the day
of his death fourteen millions of écus, about thirty-six millions of
francs.[308]

The practice of the French government of making loans, a practice which
has today become familiar to us on a colossal scale, both in Europe and
America, antedates the Hundred Years’ War. St. Louis contracted various
loans with the Templars and Italian merchants for his crusades.[309]
Philip the Fair borrowed from Italian merchants, from the Templars,
and from his subjects.[310] His war with Edward I of England and his
enterprises in Italy increased the amount, so that his sons inherited a
considerable public debt. The Hundred Years’ War enormously increased
it. We have few means of knowing what rates of interest obtained upon
most of the public loans of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
but they were probably high in most cases. Charles VIII in 1487 fixed
the rate of interest upon a loan made in Normandy at twelve _deniers
tournois_ for each livre, which would not be over 5 per cent. Seven
years later, when he was preparing for the Italian campaign, a rate of
two sous per livre obtained, which would be approximately equivalent to
10 per cent.

In the time of the direct Valois kings, most of the government’s loans
were arranged in the provinces, as in Normandy and Languedoc. But,
beginning with Francis I, the city of Paris became increasingly the
place where the crown obtained financial aid, so much so indeed that
the supervision of the _rentes_ of the Hôtel-de-Ville became a separate
administrative bureau of the royal treasury, although it must not be
understood that the government’s operations were henceforth exclusively
confined to Paris; for loans continued to be made wherever possible
with towns, corporations, the clergy, and private loan brokers and
bankers. These _rentes_ of the capital, it should be understood,
were technically a substitution of the credit of the city of Paris
for the somewhat dubious credit of the crown.[311] From that date
(1522) forward in France, government loans took the form of perpetual
annuities, payable at the Hôtel-de-Ville in Paris. But other cities,
such as Orleans, Troyes, Toulouse, and Rouen, also furnished the King
with money in the form of annuities.

Aside from Paris, the church of France was the grand pillar of the
government’s finances, and as the initiation of the _rentes_ is due to
Francis I, so to this king also is the second expedient to be ascribed.
In 1516, on the occasion of the _concordat_, Leo X allowed Francis I to
exact a new tenth, theoretically to be distinguished from the _dîme_
of the clergy of France, the pretext being a war projected against the
Turks. The new tithe was levied by the King’s officers alone, on the
basis of a grand survey of the property of the clergy (_Description
générale du bien d’église_) made in this year. In this financial survey
the tax or quota of each benefice and the total of the tithe in every
diocese were indicated. Thenceforth it was easy for numerous tithes to
be levied by the will of the King alone. However, in order to conceal
the arbitrariness of this conduct, the crown sometimes indicated its
purpose to Rome which issued the necessary validation, but more often
the King addressed the clergy itself united in assemblies of the
bishops at Paris and in provincial or diocesan assemblies. The consent
of the clergy was nothing but a formality, for the royal authority
fixed in advance the sum to be paid. The diocesan assembly had nothing
to do but distribute the impost. This concession of the Pope was
successively renewed, under different pretexts, for a number of years,
under the name of a _don caritatif_, and was equivalent to another
tithe, the practice, prolonged year after year, at last hardening
into a permanent form of taxation required of the clergy, so much so
that under Henry II receivers of the “gift” were established in every
diocese.[312]

Wastefulness and bad management characterized the reign of Henry II
from the very first. The treasury was soon completely exhausted.
A reserve of four hundred thousand écus d’or, which Francis I had
amassed to carry the war into Germany, with little owing save to the
Swiss, payments to whom Francis I had continued in order to prolong
his alliance with them, was dissipated within a few months, and the
government had resort to increased taxation and the creation of new
taxes. The _gabelle_ upon salt, from which Poitou, Saintonge, and
Guyenne had hitherto been exempt, and which was now introduced into
those provinces, raised a terrible revolt which was not crushed until
much violence had been done and much blood shed. The renewal of the war
against Charles V and the invasion of Lorraine, added to the insatiable
demands of the court, required new financial expedients. Not less than
eighteen times during the twelve years of the reign of Henry II were
the _échevins_ of Paris called upon to supply the King with sums of
money. Four millions and a half were thus demanded of the capital.
In order to obtain these sums, which the people refused to advance
gratuitously, the King was forced to humiliate himself exceedingly.
Thus in 1550, in a general assembly of the sovereign courts of the
clergy and of the bourgeois it was reported that “the King, being
obliged to give money to the English, and not having any money in his
treasury except mutilated and debased currency which could not be
recoined, is under the necessity of offering this debased and mutilated
coin as security for a public loan.” As might be expected, this not
very tempting offer did not entice the provost of the merchants, much
to the chagrin of the King, who, however, consented to a short delay.
But three years later Henry II was even less shameless. Although there
was still just as much unwillingness on the part of the merchants of
the city to take the King’s notes, this little difficulty was easily
overcome by the King’s agents. If the money were not forthcoming, the
sideboards of the wealthy bourgeois of Paris contained enough gold and
silver plate to answer the purpose, and an edict of February 19, 1553,
ordered certain specified persons to bring to the mint their vessels of
gold and of silver, for which the government issued its notes.

But Paris was not the only city which was almost incessantly called
upon to supply the King’s needs. Each year, and even each month, was
characterized by a new demand, and numbers of the cities of France
were from time to time taxed for sums which were not secured, however,
without resistance to the royal treasurers. Lyons, which was at this
epoch the seat of a commerce greater even than that of Paris, was
more often mulcted than any other in this way. Conduct so high-handed
naturally resulted not only in creating bitterness against the
government, but demoralized trade as well. The credit of the government
depreciated to such an extent that the rate of interest rose as high as
14 per cent.[313] During the twelve years of Henry II’s reign a greater
amount in taxes had been imposed upon the people of France than in the
fourscore years preceding, besides which many of the crown lands had
been dissipated. Naturally “hard times” prevailed.[314]

Some members of the States-General were for bringing the officers of
finance to account and obliging them to submit the list of all the
grants which had been made in favor of the great and influential at
the court of Henry II. But the cooler element thought that this policy
could not be followed out on account of the powerful position of those
involved and that occasion for new commotions only would ensue.[315]
Instead, retrenchment was resolved upon. The stipends of the gentlemen
of the King’s household and of the _gens de finance_ were reduced
one-half and all pensions were abridged one-third,[316] except in the
case of foreigners in the King’s service, who were supposed to have
no other source of income. This last provision created an outcry, on
the ground that foreigners could only be so employed in time of war,
save in the case of the Scotch Guard.[317] Even this was cut down,
one hundred men-at-arms and one hundred archers being dismissed. The
royal stables and mews were also broken up and the horses and falcons
sold.[318]

Something more constructive than mere economy, however, was necessary,
and the burden of paying the King’s debts fell heaviest upon the
clergy. This was partly owing to the great wealth of the church; partly
to the fact that the clergy had rushed in where others feared to tread,
and, officiously asserting their superiority in matters of state as
well as of church, had proceeded to examine the royal accounts, which
the nobles and the commons were too wary to inspect.[319] The nobles
took the ground that they were not concerned in the matter of paying
the King’s debts, claiming that they paid their dues to the crown by
personal service in war time.[320]

As far back as the assembly at Fontainebleau far-sighted councilors
of the king had pointed out that the revenues of the church would
have to be made to do duty for the government, and intercourse with
Rome had been under way looking to such an arrangement.[321] The Pope
was not as bitterly opposed to such a policy as one might at first be
led to think, for he was thoroughly frightened at the prospect of a
national council of the French clergy being convened in France and was
disposed to be accommodating. But of course a roundabout method had
to be resorted to, for the church would not have suffered a barefaced
taxation of ecclesiastical revenues by the political authority. The
resulting arrangement was in the nature of a political “deal.” Upon the
understanding that no French council should be convened, the French
crown was permitted to appropriate three hundred and sixty thousand
ducats _per annum_ for five years from the incomes of the church,[322]
the condition of the subsidy, theoretically, being that France was to
maintain a fleet to serve against the Turks.[323]

When these things had been done and the King had received in writing
the _doléances_ and requests of the three orders, the States-General
were prorogued[324] until the first of May, to meet at Pontoise
in order to complete the settlement of affairs,[325] for time was
necessary to make the arrangements with the church, since the prelates
present had not been commissioned to enter into such a compact.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE

The factional rivalry which had been engendered during the course of
the session of the States-General at Orleans was so great that this
discord, combined with the agitation prevailing on account of religion,
seemed ominous of civil war, and “every accident was interpreted
according to the passions of the persons concerned.”[326] The affair
of the custody of the seal created bitter feeling for a time between
the duke of Guise and the king of Navarre, until the former out of
policy and the latter either from policy or lack of courage, affected
to become reconciled. The Guises realized that they had suffered a
serious blow politically through the death of Francis II and Catherine
was shrewd enough to know that while she controlled the seal, she was
the keeper of the King’s authority. The prince of Condé was a double
source of friction. In the first place, his trial for treason was
still pending before the Parlement of Paris.[327] The queen mother
was anxious to have the cause settled out of court, for if condemned
(which was unlikely) the whole Bourbon family would be disgraced as
formerly through the treason of the constable Bourbon in 1527, and if
acquitted, the prince would not rest until he had been avenged of his
enemies. Accordingly, she caused a letter to be written in the King’s
name instructing the Parlement to dismiss the case. But the mettlesome
spirit of the prince resented this process, and his discontent was
increased to furious anger when the duke of Guise recommended that all
the evidence be burned and prosecution be dropped, although his opinion
was that legally Condé could not be acquitted as the trial so far had
proved him to have been implicated in the revolt of Lyons.[328] To
both parties Catherine de Medici steadily replied that she had written
the letter in order to adjust the affairs of the prince of Condé to
his honor and to the satisfaction of all, and that the seal was in
her hands. On March 15 the prince was readmitted to the Privy Council;
but the Parlement was not disposed to drop the case so easily and
deliberated at length upon the matter, finally on June 13, going on
record, in a delicately balanced pronouncement which was intended to
please all parties concerned and satisfied none.[329]

A new source of friction was the vacant government of Champagne
which the queen gave to the duke of Nemours. This offended Antoine
of Navarre, because he wanted to have it conferred upon the prince
of Condé.[330] To these dissensions, finally, must be added a recent
ruling of the Privy Council, in compliance with one of the resolutions
of the States-General, that all bishops, including the cardinals, were
to return to their sees.[331] This regulation eliminated some of the
leaders of both parties, the cardinal of Lorraine on the one hand and
the cardinal de Châtillon on the other, to the discomfiture of both
parties. Only the cardinal Tournon, whose great age made him harmless
and who really wanted to pass the rest of his life in retirement, and
the cardinal of Bourbon whose easy disposition also made him harmless,
were permitted to stay with the court.

Philip II of Spain had been an attentive follower of all that had
happened in France since the early autumn of 1560 and had been kept
thoroughly informed by his indefatigable ambassador. His disquietude
over the death of Francis II and the new direction of affairs in France
was so great[332] that in January Philip sent Don Juan de Manrique,
his grand master of artillery, to Orleans, ostensibly to perform the
office of condolence and congratulation,[333] but in reality to win
over the constable, to harden the policy of the French government
toward the Huguenots, to persuade it against the project of a national
council,[334] and to promote Philip’s purposes regarding the marriage
of Mary Queen of Scots, to Don Carlos, Philip’s son.

Catherine de Medici soon divined both the purpose and the danger, and
her alarm was correspondingly great, because the increasing confusion
in the realm on account of religion every day made Spanish intervention
more possible,[335] One of two results seemed certain to happen: either
that things would end with the Huguenots having churches in which they
could preach, read, and perform their rites according to their doctrine
without hindrance, as they had temporarily obtained churches by the
declaration of Fontainebleau, at the end of August, in compliance with
the resolution presented by the admiral; or else that obedience to the
Pope and to the Catholic rites would be enforced at the point of the
sword, and a manifest and certain division in the kingdom would result,
with civil war as the consequence. When Francis II died, a great number
who had fled to Geneva and Germany after the conspiracy of Amboise
came back to France. For the government of Charles IX had inaugurated
the new reign by a declaration of toleration (January 7, 1561) which,
although Calvin disapproved it,[336] may yet with reason be regarded
as a liberal edict. The Protestants were not slow to profit by the
change, and flocked back from Switzerland and Germany and resumed
their propaganda, one phase of which was a vilification of Rome and
the Guises to such an extent that the King protested to the Senate of
Geneva regarding their abuse.[337] Paris soon abounded with Huguenot
preachers from Geneva, who relied upon the division in the council
or the protection of persons in power for the maintenance of the new
edict.[338]

In some provinces, such as Normandy,[339] Touraine, Poitou,
Gascony,[340] and the greater part of Languedoc, Dauphiné, and
Provence, congregations and meetings were openly held. Guyenne save
Bordeaux, was badly infected with heresy.[341] The new religion
penetrated so deeply that it affected every class of persons, even the
ecclesiastical body itself, not only priests, friars, and nuns, but
even bishops and many of the principal prelates. Among all classes
there were Huguenot sympathizers, the nobility perhaps more manifestly
than any other class.[342] The congregations of Rouen and Dieppe sent
to the King for license to preach the word of God openly. In Dieppe the
Calvinists once a day met in a great house, “of men, women and children
above 2,000 in company.”[343] There were Huguenot outbursts at Angers,
Mans, Beauvais, and Pontoise, in April, and at Toulouse in June.[344]
At Beauvais when the cardinal of Châtillon, who was bishop there,
caused the Calvinist service to be conducted and communion administered
in his chapel, “after the manner of Geneva,” the canons and many of the
people “assembled to good numbers to have wrought their wicked wills
upon the cardinal.” Some were hurt and killed in the trouble, and one
poor wretch was brought before the cardinal’s gate and burned.[345] A
similar riot took place in Paris, on April 28, in the evening, near the
Pré-aux-Clercs.

As a result of these excesses things took a sterner turn. A new measure
interdicted Huguenot meetings, even in private houses; and all persons
of every condition _in Paris_ were required to observe the Catholic
religion.[346] The attitude of Paris was ominous for the future. The
populace was wholly Catholic and hostile to religious change,[347] and
was strongly supported by the Sorbonne and the Parlement.[348] The
Sorbonne freely let it be understood that it would never obey any order
issued to the injury of the Catholic religion, asserting that whenever
the crown changed faith and religion, the people were absolved from
the oath of fealty and were not bound to obey.[349] The words “civil
war” were on the lips of all who were attentively observing events.
“Between the two parties, justice is so little feared,” wrote the duke
of Bedford, “and policy has so little place that greater things are to
be dreaded.”[350]

The responsibility for the government’s vacillation at this season
is not to be imputed wholly to Catherine de Medici.[351] It is to
be remembered that France was under a double regency, and that the
weakness of the king of Navarre materially embarrassed affairs. At this
moment he seemed to be inclined toward the faith of Rome in the hope
of conciliating Philip II of Spain, in order to recover the kingdom
of Navarre. The Spanish ambassador and the Guises naturally made the
most of his aspiration, the former telling Antoine that although it was
impossible to obtain what he claimed from His Catholic Majesty by mere
force, he might make a fair agreement with Philip by maintaining France
in the true faith.[352]

During these months of tension and tumult, the ambassador worked out
a scheme, which in principle was that of Philip II, but the details
were of Chantonnay’s own arrangement. The aim was to form a group of
influential persons at the court, who should begin by complaints of
the government’s policy and then proceed to threats and dark hints
of the displeasure of Spain, finally presenting a bold front to
Catherine, and compelling her to abandon her policy of temporizing
and moderation. The constable Montmorency was the objective leader
of this cabal, and his persuasion to the enterprise was one of the
secret purposes of the mission of Don Juan de Manrique. While this
envoy bore letters expressing Philip’s esteem to all the most notable
Catholics at the French court, there was a distinction between them.
The king of Spain wrote in common to the duke of Guise, the constable,
the duke of Montpensier, the chancellor, and the marshals St. André
and Brissac,[353] and a joint note to the cardinals of Lorraine
and Tournon.[354] But Montmorency and St. André each also received
a separate letter. The discrimination shows the wonderfully keen
penetration of Philip’s ambassador, for these two were destined to be
two of the three pillars of the famous Triumvirate.[355] In reply the
cardinal of Lorraine hastened to inform Philip II of his deep interest
in maintaining the welfare of Catholicism.[356] But it required time
and adroitness to overcome the constable’s prejudice against Spain, and
his attachment to his nephews.[357]

In the meantime, before the constable was persuaded, the cabal made
formidable headway by winning Claude de l’Aubespine to its cause. This
paved the way for an action which, if Catherine de Medici could have
known it, would have thrown her into consternation indeed. For Claude
de l’Aubespine’s brother Sebastian, the bishop of Limoges, was Charles
IX’s ambassador in Spain. On April 4, 1561, the latter addressed a
secret letter to Philip II of Spain describing the turmoil in France
and thanking him, in the queen’s name, for the “bons et roiddes
offices” of Chantonnay.[358]

Coincident with this event, things in France had come to a head
precisely as Philip and his ambassador had planned to have them. At
this juncture Montmorency took a decisive stand. When the constable
saw that meat was being freely eaten during these Lenten days; that
Protestant service was held in the chambers of the admiral and the
prince of Condé; that Catherine de Medici invited Jean de Montluc,
the heretic bishop of Valence, to preach at court on Easter Sunday,
the old warrior’s spirit rose in revolt. In vain his eldest son, the
marshal Montmorency, pleaded that his father’s fears were exaggerated
and his prejudices too deep-seated. The old man was firm in his
convictions, in which he was sustained by his wife, Madeleine of Savoy,
a bitter adversary of Calvinism.[359] Moreover, the political as well
as religious demands of the Huguenot party, especially the demands
of certain of the local estates, which advocated drastic reform,
alarmed him. The whole power of the political Huguenots was directed
against the constable, the duke of Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine,
and the marshals Brissac and St. André, the leaders of the party being
determined to call them to account for their peculations during the
reign of Henry II and his successor, and to force them to surrender the
excessive grants which had been given them.[360]

On the evening of April 6, 1561, Montmorency, after having expostulated
with the queen, invited the duke of Guise, the duke de Montpensier the
prince of Joinville, the marshal St. André, and the cardinal Tournon to
dine with him. In his apartments that famous association named by the
Huguenots the Triumvirate, in which the constable, Guise, and St. André
were principals, was formed.[361]

The preparations of the Guises during the former year enabled the
Triumvirate rapidly to lay its plans. Spanish, Italian, German, and
Swiss forces could be counted upon and procured within a very short
time. These forces were to be divided under the command of the duke
of Aumale and the three marshals, Brissac, Termes, and St. André. In
order to support these troops, the Catholic clergy were to be assessed
according to the incomes they enjoyed; cardinals 4,000 to 5,000 livres
per annum; bishops 1,000 to 1,200; abbots 300 to 400, priors 100 to
120; and so on down to chaplains, whose annual stipend was but 30
livres, and who were only assessed a few sous. But as some immediate
means were necessary, the gold and the silver of some of the churches,
and the treasure of certain monasteries was to be appropriated at once,
receipts being given for the value of the gold taken, and promise being
made that reimbursement would be made shortly out of the confiscations
made from the heretics.[362]

Catherine de Medici’s plan to govern through the constable
Montmorency and the admiral,[363] leaving Antoine of Navarre only
nominal authority, received an abrupt shock when the Triumvirate was
established. Her policy partook of both doubt and fear, and vacillated
more than ever.[364]

But more formidable than the project to organize insurrection at
home, thus promoted by the Triumvirate, was the foreign policy it
adopted. The Triumvirate formally appealed to Philip II for aid.[365]
The response was not slow in forthcoming, though the royal word was
prudently couched in vague terms.[366] To make matters worse, Antoine
of Navarre inclined more than ever toward the faith of Rome in the hope
of conciliating Philip II of Spain.[367]

To a man less vain and gullible than Antoine of Bourbon such a
proposition, upon its very face, as the restoration of Navarre, would
have appeared to have been preposterous. Aside from the blow to its
prestige which any loss of territory entails upon a nation, it is
only necessary to look at the position of Spanish Navarre to perceive
that Spain could better afford to lose a war abroad than to part with
this key to the passes of the western Pyrenees. There is no need to
relate at length the story of Antoine’s alternate hopes and fears, of
his great expectations, and of the empty promises made him.[368] The
office Antoine held, not the man, made him important to France and
Spain. For this reason, he was alternately wheedled and cajoled, mocked
and threatened, for more than a year; and all the time the pitiable
weakling shifted and vacillated in his policy.[369] It is amazing to
see how successfully Antoine was led along by the dexterous suggestions
of Chantonnay, and the evasive answers of Philip II. It was a delicate
game to play, for there was continual fear lest he would discover
that he was being made the dupe of Spain, and prevail upon the queen
mother and the prince of Condé to join him in avenging his wrongs, a
not impossible development, as Granvella observed, “considering that
prudence does not always preside over the actions of men.”[370]

The game was the more difficult because Antoine wanted the restoration
of his kingly title more than anything else. If he had been willing to
become vassal to Spain, as Chantonnay said to St. André, there were a
thousand ways to satisfy him. But Spain could not think of alienating
any of her provinces, least of all any frontier possession like Navarre
or Roussillon.[371] Time and again the prince of Condé told his brother
he was a fool to be so wheedled, and Jeanne d’Albret sarcastically said
that she would let her son go to mass when his father’s inheritance
was restored.[372] When the game was likely to be played out, and
Antoine, discovering that fine words did not butter parsnips, began
to complain or boldly to bluster,[373] a possible substitute for the
kingdom of Navarre which Antoine did not want to hold as a Spanish
dependency[374] was suggested. At one moment it was Sienna; at another
the county of Avignon; at a third the crown of Denmark—to be gotten
through the influence of the Guises. The most alluring offer in
Antoine’s eyes, however, was Sardinia.[375] In return for the crown
of Sardinia, Antoine was willing to leave all the fortresses of the
island in Spain’s possession; and to put his children in Philip’s hands
as hostages.[376]

This digression has somewhat anticipated the progress of events.
Charles IX had been crowned at Rheims on May 15 (Ascension Day).[377]
The declared majority and the coronation of her son seems to have
given Catherine new courage, for in spite of the menace implied in the
formation of the Triumvirate, she still labored in the interest of the
Huguenot cause. On June 13, as we have seen, the definite exoneration
of the prince of Condé was pronounced by the Parlement of Paris,[378]
and in the following August an outward reconciliation, at least, was
effected between the prince and the duke of Guise.[379]

Encouraged by the positive attitude of the queen mother and the
vacillation of the king of Navarre, the Huguenots urged the cause
of toleration and presented a request to the King on June 11, 1561,
through the deputies of the churches dispersed throughout the realm of
France.[380] They declared that the reports of their refusing to pay
the taxes and being seditious were false and calumnious; they begged
the King to cause all persecutions against them to cease; that he would
liberate those of them who were in prison, and that he would permit
them to build churches as their numbers were so great that private
houses would no longer suffice; finally offering to give pledges that
there would be no sedition in their assemblies, and promising all
lawful obedience.

The queen mother referred this petition to the Privy Council, but as
it involved so important a matter the council was of opinion that it
ought to be laid before the Parlement as well as to be considered by
the princes of the blood and all the peers and councilors of the Court
of Parlement.[381] The Catholic party was quite willing to have this
course followed, feeling confident that the Parlement in its official
capacity would refuse to register an edict for such purpose. But
L’Hôpital[382] and Coligny had hopes that the interest and authority
of the princes of the blood and other persons of influence might carry
it through the Parlement after all.[383] However, in the end nothing
positive was concluded, final resolution being deferred until a
colloquy of the bishops and other clergy, who were convoked at Poissy,
near St. Germain, for the end of the month, took place.[384] Meanwhile
a tentative ordinance—the Edict of July, similar to the Edict of
Romorantin—was to obtain. This gave the church, as before, entire
cognizance of the crime of heresy and deprived the Parlement, the
bailiffs, seneschals, and other judges of any jurisdiction. In every
case local ecclesiastical courts had to act first; banishment was to be
the severest punishment for heresy; false accusers were to be punished
in the same way that the accused would have been if really guilty;
amnesty was granted for past offenses; and firearms were forbidden
to be carried in towns or elsewhere, with certain exceptions, under
a penalty of 50 gold crowns.[385] Within a short time, accordingly,
the Protestant assemblies appeared as frequently as before, although
the Calvinist clergy seemed to have become more discreet in their
utterances.[386]

This cleverly designed edict, while seeming to pronounce judgment,
really avoided the question at issue. There was sufficient leeway still
for the holding of Protestant assemblies, and moreover, even though
ecclesiastical affairs were to be referred to the spiritual courts,
the Huguenots were protected by a saving clause (except for offenses
cognizable by the secular power).[387] Such qualified toleration, so
guardedly given, was probably all that might with safety have been
granted to the Huguenots at this early date. But they were far from
seeing things in this light. The hotheads among them, in their meetings
and in public places, used the most violent language in detraction of
the Catholic church and its sacraments.[388] In some places popular
feeling against priests was so strong that they were compelled, for the
safety of their lives, to disguise their costumes and not to wear the
clerical habit abroad, nor long hair, nor have the beard shaved, nor
exhibit any other mark which would indicate that they were priests or
monks.[389]

CHAPTER V

THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY. THE ESTATES OF PONTOISE. THE EDICT OF JANUARY,
1562

In the summer of 1561, France saw two separate assemblies convene: the
adjourned session of the States-General at Pontoise and the conference
of the leaders of the two religions at Poissy. In a sense the cause
of the political Huguenots was represented in the former, that of the
religious Huguenots in the latter, although the deliberations of the
two assemblies were finally combined in an instrument known as the
Act of Poissy. The elections in the provinces, each of which sent
up two[390] representatives from each bailiwick of the kingdom, had
enabled the opposition to go on record,[391] so that the crown had
early intimation of the sort of legislation that was likely to be
demanded. The business of the estates was to find a way out of the
financial difficulties which overwhelmed the King.[392]

The spokesman of the third estate, one Jean Bretaigne, mayor of Autun,
after a tedious prologue copiously laden with biblical and classic
lore, at last came to the pith of things: he summed up in a paragraph
of portentous dimensions the burden imposed upon the people by war and
the extravagance of the court during the past twenty years, declaring
that the people were so penniless that they had nothing to give the
King, “save a good and loyal will.” Things had come to such a pass
that mere economy and retrenchment, nor even an honest and effective
administration, although that was demanded and was promised by the
King, could save the future.[393] The immense resources of the clergy
must be made to restore the dilapidated finances of the monarchy;
the church must come to the material rescue of the state, as in the
days of Charles Martel. The entire revenue he argued, must be taken
of all offices, benefices, and ecclesiastical dignities not actually
officiated either in person or in a titular capacity, the Knights of
Rhodes and the Hospitalers of St. James included; all the fruits,
also, of benefices in litigation which the collators were accustomed
to take during the time of litigation should be appropriated by the
state, as well as the moneys of deceased bishops and monks. Moreover,
one-quarter of the income should be taken of all beneficiaries actually
resident in their benefices, in cases where the revenue was from 500
to 1,000 livres; of those having a revenue of 1,000 to 3,000 livres,
one-third; of those with incomes running from 3,000 to 6,000 livres,
one-half; of those ranging from 6,000 to 12,000 livres, two-thirds.
Those of the clergy whose incomes exceeded 12,000 livres and above were
to be permitted to retain 4,000 livres, the surplus being applied to
liquidate the King’s debts, save in cases where the beneficiaries were
bishops, archbishops, primates, and cardinals, to whom 6,000 livres
revenue was to be allowed. As to the monastic orders, their whole
treasury and revenues were to be appropriated, save enough for their
support, for the maintenance of their buildings, and for charity. And
this was not all: all houses, gardens, and real property within either
cities or faubourgs not actually employed for ecclesiastical uses, were
to be confiscated by the government; the clergy were to be made to pay
taxes upon the rich furniture and works of art or adornment given them
to enjoy either for a length of years or in perpetuity. Finally, all
lands providing revenues, either in money or in kind, as oil, wine, and
grain, in case of being let to contract or change of control, were to
be declared redeemable. If these measures should prove insufficient,
then recourse must be had to more drastic means, namely the direct
sale of the property of the church. Twenty-six million livres’ worth
of this could be readily sold, the speaker argued, which would be no
more than one-third of the church’s possession; the remainder should
be administered by a trustworthy commission, which, after paying the
stipends of the clergy in the amounts above indicated, should devote
the balance to the payment of the debts of the crown.[394]

This formidable programme, which suggests the policy actually followed
by France in 1789, in spite of the hot declaration of the constable
that the speaker presenting it ought to be hanged,[395] proved so
reasonable that the government, without going to the extreme proposed,
saw that the moment was a favorable one to secure important aid from
the clergy. The clergy, on the other hand, were sharp enough to
see that in order to save their property, they would have to make
sacrifice of a portion of it. At first they offered the crown a bonus
of ten million livres, which it refused as being too small a sum, and
demanded a greater subsidy.[396] A temporary settlement at last was
made on the basis of 1,600,000 livres annual revenue to be levied upon
the vineyards of the clergy, in order to relieve the King’s present
needs.[397] But something more fundamental than this had to be done,
for these measures only supplied the King with funds for current
expenses, and did not admit of redemption of the debt or resumption of
the crown lands, which had been mortgaged for about thirty millions of
francs. This matter was the subject of investigation and debate through
the ensuing November and December. Finally, a scheme was worked out
whereby the royal domain was all to be redeemed by the clergy within
six years, and the remainder of the debt to be discharged within
another six.[398]

The contract of Poissy-Pontoise presents two important stipulations:
one, a gift of money to the King; second, the repurchase by the clergy
of the domains of the crown and the redemption of the debt. If this
contract had been observed, it would have rendered the other assemblies
of the clergy useless, but the failure to execute it made necessary the
subsequent assemblies of 1563 and 1567, which established a rule of
periodicity, as it were, and fixed the next session at 1573. By 1567,
the clergy had fulfilled its first obligation and declared itself ready
to resume the second by giving to the provost of the merchants and
to the _échevins_ of Paris the guarantees desired for the redemption
of the _rentes_. But the King at the same time insisted upon the
continuation of the subsidy of 1,600,000 livres. The clergy protested,
demanding his adherence to the contract of Poissy. The crown enforced
continuation, but as “an easement” waived claim to the “secular tithe”
heretofore exacted, and granted to the clergy, for the first time, the
right to collect taxes by its own agents, and the right to judge in a
sovereign capacity all cases which might arise from these financial
matters. The government observed this convention no better than the
first, and in addition to extraordinary subventions—two million livres
in 1572, nearly half of which was squandered by the duke of Anjou in
Poland—resorted to compulsory alienations of church property, as in
1563, 1568, 1574, which were made upon order of the King, without
recourse to papal affirmation. Purchasers were not wanting for the
new credit. The rate of interest fell to 5 per cent. in the autumn of
1561 as a result of these expedients, and, provided civil war could
be averted, it seemed probable that the dilapidated finances might be
rehabilitated.[399]

Simultaneous with the sitting of the estates at Pontoise to settle
the financial issue, the religious issue was being debated by the
doctrinal leaders of Catholicism and Calvinism, at Poissy.[400] This
solemn assembly had been summoned in June to meet on the second of
the following month,[401] in spite of the opposition of the clergy
and Spain, who warned Catherine that such a concession would lead to
disaster.[402] But delay ensued, and the assembly did not actually
convene until September, for the members were slow in coming.[403] The
conditions governing the meeting at Poissy were published in council
on August 8, namely, that the clergy should not be umpires; that the
princes of the blood should preside at the disputation, and that the
different proceedings should be faithfully recorded by trustworthy
persons.[404] With respect to the other matters the Calvinists were
required to make some concessions in order to avoid the reproach of
seeming to evade the colloquy. While awaiting the formal opening of the
conference at Poissy, Beza was invited by the court to speak before the
King, the queen mother, the king of Navarre, and the Council. He was
listened to with great attention by all until he began to deny the Real
Presence, when the Catholic party tried to stop his address, exclaiming
that it was blasphemy, and Beza and his partisans would certainly have
been ejected if their opponents had not been restrained by the royal
authority and compelled to listen to the end. At its conclusion the
cardinal Tournon exhorted the King to continue firm in the faith of his
ancestors,[405] and not to permit France to be reduced to the Swiss
cantonal system.[406]

Many of the clergy said that it was not pertinent for the colloquy to
determine these points, but that it was for the General Council to
decide; moreover, it was argued that as the delegates of the Spanish
clergy would shortly be coming through France on their way to Trent,
why should not they assist as well as the others?[407] Catherine, it
is said, had intended that there should be no disputation about dogma.
But there is some reason to believe that she confounded dogma with the
rites and observances of the church,[408] and it is certain that the
Huguenots were determined to push their privilege of free speech to
the very limit. Indeed, the conditions predicated by Beza formed the
substance of a petition presented by the Reformed leaders to Charles
IX.[409]

When the conference met a great attempt to maintain secrecy was made.
No one was permitted to enter except those who had been formally
appointed;[410] the duke of Guise carried the keys to the conference
hall, and careful search was made at the beginning of each sitting to
find any who might be hid.[411]

The principal points in dispute turned upon the use of images; the
administration of the sacrament of baptism; the communion; the mass;
the laying-on of hands and the vocation of ministers, and finally the
consideration of a possible accord in doctrine, in which points the
usages of the primitive church and the reasons of separation were
involved.[412]

[Illustration: THE COLLOQUY OF POISSY

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

On the second day of the conference (September 16) the cardinal of
Lorraine spoke, dwelling upon these principal points: first, that the
King, being a member of the church and not its head, could not set
himself up as a judge in matters of religion and faith, but was subject
to the church like every other Christian; second, the definition of the
authority of the church was extended even over princes.[413]

Before long, however, it became evident, both that the attempt to
reconcile the Catholic and the Calvinist parties was an impossibility,
and that the government’s policy of accommodation was exciting
discontent.[414] The demands of the Huguenots, based on Beza’s
arguments, were as follows:

1. That bishops, abbots, and other ecclesiastics should not be
constituted in any way judges of the Huguenots, in view of the fact
that they were their opponents.

2. That all points of difference be judged and decided according to
the simple word of God, as contained in the New and Old Testaments,
since the Reformed faith was founded on this alone, and that where any
difficulties arose concerning the interpretation of words, reference
should be made to the original Hebrew and Greek text.[415]

This second article was a rock of contention from the very beginning.
The whole Catholic doctrine of tradition having equal weight with
Scripture was denied in this article. It was manifest, indeed, from the
first that three things would _not_ be suffered to be considered: (1)
a change of religion; (2) the authority of the Pope; (3) the possible
alienation of church property.[416] This state of things, together
with the fact that the prolongation of the session entailed great
expense,[417] brought about a change of plan. Five persons, the bishop
of Valence, the archbishop of Sens, and MM. Salignac, d’Espence, and
Boutellier, were appointed by the queen and agreed to by the clergy,
to confer with five representatives of the Calvinists, viz., Peter
Martyr,[418] Beza, De Gallars, Marborat, and D’Espine.[419] Within ten
days more the prelates and ministers had ceased to confer and were
taking their departure.[420] The assembly of Poissy dissolved of itself
on October 18, having accomplished nothing,[421] except doctrinally
still further to disunite the Protestant world, which otherwise might
possibly have had a council of its own, composed of French, Scotch,
English, Germans, Danes, Swiss and Swedes, to face the Council of
Trent.[422]

Two days later the cardinal and the duke of Guise departed from the
court, in spite of the urgency of the queen mother to have them remain,
accompanied by the dukes of Nemours and Longueville and other great
personages and mustering six or seven hundred horse. Outwardly there
was no sign of disaffection. Immediately afterward the constable also
left, expressing dissatisfaction with the tolerant policy of the
government. It was plain throughout the proceedings at Pontoise (and
at Poissy) that the chancellor of France, L’Hôpital, and the admiral,
had the chief direction of affairs in their hands, although the queen
mother and the king of Navarre had the greater show of authority.[423]

The Vatican had been an anxious observer of affairs in France, and
early in June, 1561, the Pope had resolved to send the cardinal of
Ferrara, Hippolyte d’Este, to France as legate.[424] The principal
points of his mission to the French court, where he arrived on
September 14, were to entreat the French crown that the annates might
still remain as the Pope’s revenue; that there might be no change of
religion and observance in the church; to solicit the King to recognize
the Council of Trent and to break off the colloquy at Poissy.[425]
But when the legate presented his credentials, at the instance of the
chancellor, who impugned his powers, the estates protested against
the entry of any of the Pope’s bulls or letters without the King’s
consent and seal.[426] The Parlement of Paris went even farther, and
refused to confirm the King’s letters-patent. But the King’s council
overrode this resolution, and recognized the legate’s credentials,
although L’Hôpital steadfastly refused to affix the seal of state to
the council’s action.

The cardinal began his negotiations by offering on the part of the
Pope to resign the tenths and subsidies exacted by the church, and
promising all the help His Holiness could give with honor, on condition
that the resolution of the estates of Orleans, prohibiting payment
of the annates, which the estates of Pontoise had reasserted, should
not be executed. The nuncio argued that this action was a violation
of the concordat of 1516, and that the principle in the case had been
decided by the council of Basel, and accepted by Charles VII in the
Pragmatic Sanction. Accordingly, the nuncio asked for a revocation
of the actions taken touching the property of the church, and that
things be restored to the state in which they originally were.[427]
But the cardinal’s arguments were of no effect. The execution of the
new law went forward. The first province where it was applied was
Guyenne—within the government of the king of Navarre, then Touraine,
and the Orleannais.[428]

An even more interested observer, perhaps, of French affairs than
the Pope, was Philip of Spain. The progress of heresy in France, the
seizure of the property of the church there, the attitude of the
French crown toward the Council of Trent, the uncertainty of Antoine
of Bourbon’s conduct—these were all disquieting facts to the Spanish
ruler. Philip curtly told Catherine and her son that her government
must abandon its policy of weakness and dissimulation, that too many
souls were being imperiled by her course, and that coercive measures
must be used.[429] The duke of Alva had the boldness to declare that
unless the government of France revived the rigorous suppressive
measures of Henry II, and punished every heretic, His Catholic Majesty
was resolved to sacrifice the welfare of Spain and even his own life
in order to stamp out a pest which he regarded as menacing to both
France and Spain.[430] Singly and together the bishop of the Limoges
(who was still at the Spanish court) and D’Ozances, while deploring
the malice of the times and “the disasters of which everyone knew,”
tried to justify their government on the ground that Calvinism had
become a necessary evil in France and that it was better to give it
qualified toleration than to plunge the country into fire and war.
They pointed to the deliberations of the assembly of Fontainebleau, to
the States-General of Orleans, to the _arrêts_ of the Parlement, and
the findings of Pontoise and Poissy in proof; they asserted that the
queen mother and the king of Navarre—they were cautious not to style
him thus in Philip’s presence, however—were “of perfect and sincere
intention” not to let heresy increase in France; “the scandal and
outrage” of heretical preaching never would be permitted in Paris or
at the court, although it was necessary to permit the Protestants to
have their own worship outside of some of the towns; that the purpose
of the crown was fixed never to change or alter the true religion; that
France was not hostile to the Council of Trent, but in her distress was
naturally impatient; and finally they importuned the king of Spain not
to show his anger, but to give “advice and comfort” for the sake of the
friendship which existed between their country and his, and for the
repose of Christendom.[431]

The appeal fell upon deaf ears. Philip coldly replied that it was
useless for France to expect the advice or assistance of Spain so long
as her government tolerated heresy in any degree whatsoever; that those
at the court who were Huguenots, like the admiral and the prince of
Condé, should be sent away forthwith, and all others should be coerced;
that from the point of view of religion it was blasphemy to permit the
Huguenots to have any places of worship, and from the political point
of view it was suicide to tolerate them, for “there could never be new
things in religion without loss of obedience to the temporal power,” in
proof of which the King pointed out that in certain of the provinces
of France the people were refusing to pay tithes and taxes, at the
same time triumphantly asserting that he was better informed of things
happening in France than in Spain; that as to the Council of Trent, the
Germans would have nothing to do with it and Spain had no need of it,
while France was torn by heretical controversy, so that it might well
be said that the council sat for the benefit of France alone.[432]

One of the points upon which Philip II dwelt with earnestness in the
interviews he granted the two ambassadors of France was the vicious
education under which Charles IX’s brother Henry, duke of Orleans, was
being brought up. He emphatically condemned the Huguenot environment
of the young prince. It did not seem a coincidence therefore, when a
plot was discovered in November to seize the duke of Orleans—afterward
Henry III—who was to have been made _capo di parti_ by the Catholics.
It was even said the conspirators aimed also to remove the king and
queen of Navarre, Condé, and the admiral, by poison. The duke of
Nemours was charged with being the principal author of it, and was
to have carried the young duke off to Lorraine or Savoy.[433] This
supposition was given greater probability when the whole company of
the Guises suddenly left the court and departed for Lorraine. But
Catherine was not yet intimidated, though she prudently dropped the
investigation which she had set on foot when she discovered clues
that led to the Escurial and the Vatican.[434] In spite of the omens,
she still adhered to a middle course. The government resolved to send
twenty-five bishops and two archbishops to Trent, although they went
“very unwillingly.”[435] At the same time permission was granted to
the ministers of the Reformed churches to preach in private houses
or in gardens environed with houses (the erection of churches being
prohibited), if it was done without tumult.[436] At court the ministers
of the Reformed churches preached one day, when the queen of Navarre,
the prince of Condé, and the admiral would be present. The next
day either some Cordelier, Jesuit, Jacobin, Minim, or other of the
cloistered sects, preached, on which occasion, the King, the queen
mother, the king of Navarre, the cardinal of Ferrara, accompanied
by those who leaned toward the see of Rome, would be present. But
moderation was exacted of both sects. On one occasion a famous preacher
of the Minims, who had won some credit with the Catholics for his
railings, was in the night secretly taken from his lodgings and carried
to the court to answer for his rabid utterances.[437]

But it was increasingly manifest that events, both within and without
France, were passing beyond the grasp of the government. The Huguenots,
sometimes from fear no doubt, but not infrequently for effrontery, went
to their services with pistols and matchlocks, in spite of the laws
against the bearing of arms; and they even were bold enough to march
through the streets singing their psalms, to the anger and scandal of
Catholic Christians.[438] An outbreak was imminent at any time.

In Paris, on October 12, the Protestants assembled together to the
number of 7,000 or 8,000 to hear one of their ministers preach, half a
mile from the town. The Catholics thereupon shut the gates to prevent
their re-entry. Finding the gates closed, the Protestants forced them,
and many were wounded and some slain on both sides.[439] From the
provinces word had come in July that the duke of Montpensier, going to
his house in Touraine for the burial of his mother, and finding numbers
in many towns who made open profession of Calvinism, by virtue of his
governorship of that country, imprisoned about one hundred and forty
in Chinon. Whereupon the people, not forgetting his conduct toward
them in the previous reign, when he razed the houses of several who
were reported to him to be Huguenots, assembled in great numbers—about
12,000 or 15,000, we are told—surely a great exaggeration, and marched
so fast upon him that he was besieged in his house and forced to
release all the prisoners in order to appease the multitude.[440]

The organized nature of the Huguenot agitations in various localities,
especially in southern France, did not escape the keen observation of
Philip’s ambassador.[441] At Montpellier in Languedoc the Protestant
organizations, by September, had taken the form of a definite league,
with the sweeping motto: “No mass, no more than at Geneva,” whose
operations were so thorough that many Catholics were on the point of
emigrating to Catalonia.[442]

Quite as formidable as armed and insurrectionary religion at home was
the drift of the negotiations of both parties abroad. The formation
of the Triumvirate had been taken as a sign by both parties that the
issue between them was, as in Germany before the Smalkald war, likely
soon to pass from religious difference and political rivalry into
military combat; and both sides accordingly prepared against this
fatal day. Naturally, the Protestant German princes who had followed
the proceedings at Poissy with intense interest[443] were the ones
looked to for assistance by the Huguenots. In May, 1561, the prince
of Condé had sent Hotman to the chief German princes, begging them
not to desert the cause of the true religion in France and saying
that Philip II was endeavoring to terrify the queen from making any
concessions to the Huguenots.[444] The fact that some of these, as
the count palatine of the Rhine, and the landgrave of Thuringia were
Calvinists, while others were Lutherans, was not an insuperable barrier
to co-operation, although the Lutherans wished that the confession
of Augsburg might first be recognized in France. But the prevailing
opinion was that the adherents of both of the Protestant faiths should
first unite in endeavoring to secure freedom of worship and liberty
of conscience in France, and then they might proceed to establish
uniformity of religion, if possible.[445] Two propositions were made to
the German princes. The first was that if the Guises, or any of their
confederates, tried to enlist soldiers in Germany, measures should
be taken to stop the effort; secondly, that if the Guises or their
accomplices resorted to the use of arms against Condé and Coligny and
were supported by Spain, then assistance should be given them. Some of
the German princes agreed at once to this latter proposition, provided
the expenses of such military support were defrayed by the Huguenots;
but others thought that the matter could only be settled in a general
assembly of the princes. The circle of Huguenot negotiations at this
moment was a wide one and their prospects were bright. For at this
time Denmark, too, was suing for French favor. Among the ambassadors
who came to offer the condolences of their sovereigns for the death of
Francis II and to congratulate young Charles, had come an envoy of the
Danish king proposing the marriage of his sister to a French prince
and himself to marry Mary Stuart. This proposed Franco-Danish alliance
could have produced no other effect than to facilitate the Protestant
cause in France.[446] On the other hand, the prospect of Swiss support
of the Catholic cause in France was not good. Aside from the great
expense this alliance had always entailed, the number of the Catholic
cantons had been diminished by the secession of Glaris, which had
lately gone over to Protestantism, in consequence of which the rest,
seeing themselves weakened, had asked aid from the duke of Savoy and
the Pope.[447]

The Catholics adroitly emphasized the difference between the two
Protestant faiths, with the hope not only of preventing Lutheran
support of the Huguenots, but even of securing their aid against the
French Calvinists. The duke of Guise went in person to confer with
the duke of Württemberg at Saverne (February 15, 1562),[448] while
Philip II redoubled his efforts to alienate the king of Navarre.[449]
The support of the Spanish monarch was the vital factor in French
politics. The French Calvinists had no single _most powerful ally_ to
support them, such as the Catholic party enjoyed in the assistance of
Spain. England was the only Protestant power capable of being a rival
to Spain, and England was too cautious or too much occupied with home
politics to risk embroilment abroad.

Both Rome and Spain at this moment took a resolute attitude. Shortly
after the conference of Poissy came to an end, a consistory of the
curia, on October 10, 1561, had resolved to resist the Protestants in
France.[450] The counter-reformation programme deliberated at Trent
recognized Philip II as the secular head of the movement (“à ceste
fin d’un commun consentement le tout chef et conducteur de toute
l’enterprise”) who was to wheedle or compel the king of Navarre to
commit himself in favor of the Catholic cause in France, of which the
duke of Guise was to be formally recognized as leader. The Spanish
monarch was also to bring pressure to bear upon the Emperor to compel
the Catholic princes of Germany to prevent the Lutherans and Rhenish
Calvinists from supporting the Protestants of France. France must be
saved from self-ruin for the sake both of religion and the preservation
of other Catholic nations. Time and circumstances would show the hour
of such intervention, but everything must be prepared in advance.[451]

Aside from his inflexible religious convictions, in Philip’s eyes,
policy also pointed toward Spanish intervention in France. Spain,
Spanish Burgundy, and Flanders were, as Montluc of Valence declared,
“les trois plus belles fleurs de chapeau du roy Philippe;” each of them
bordered France, and France lay between Spain and them, splitting the
Spanish empire like a wedge. Under these circumstances the prevention
of heresy in France was not merely an act of religious duty but an act
dictated by political expediency. Moreover, Spain might territorially
profit by such a policy. The son of Charles V dreamed of acquiring
ducal Burgundy, which his father had failed to secure; the Three
Bishoprics might be wrested away from Charles IX, either violently or
as the price of Spanish aid, and joined to Franche Comté they would
materially strengthen Spain’s midcontinental road from Lombardy to the
mouths of the Rhine.[452]

Fear of Spain and of the Guises gave Catherine de Medici more anxiety
than the insurrections of the Huguenots.[453] The government was
justly apprehensive of Philip II’s movements and warned Joyeuse to be
on his guard against any effort to throw Spanish troops across the
frontier.[454] Reinforcements were sent to Calais.[455] At the same
time more captains and companies were sent to Metz, where Vieilleville,
the governor, was ordered not to admit anyone known to be a Guisard
into the city, as the Guises were suspected of wishing to hand it over
to Philip.[456] Precautionary changes were also made in the military
posts, in the case of those known to be well-affected to the Guises,
the changes all being in favor of the Huguenot party.[457] De Gourdan
was removed from Calais and the command given to the sieur de Grammont,
who had married a sister of the vidame de Chartres; the prince de la
Roche-sur-Yon was made king’s lieutenant in Paris; the admiral made
governor of Normandy in place of the duke of Bouillon; Condé was sent
to Picardy, where the marshal Brissac had lately resigned on account of
illness.[458]

“Here is new fire, new green wood reeking, new smoke and much contrary
wind blowing,” wrote Shakerley to Elizabeth’s ambassador, Throckmorton,
on December 15, 1561.[459] The words were wisely as well as quaintly
used. From the capital to every edge of France unrest, suspicion,
conspiracy, insurrection prevailed. The Catholic orders began to
fortify the abbeys. Every day Catherine’s determination to maintain an
even balance of the two religions was producing greater tension and
more heat. Violence was ominously on the increase.[460] Robbery was
common under pretense of searching for heretics.[461] In the hope of
bettering things, the crown relieved the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon of
the lieutenancy and committed it to the marshal Montmorency, from whose
religious moderation and popularity much was expected.[462] The capital
of France at this season presented a strange and terrible appearance.
Armed bands roamed the streets. The city more resembled a frontier
city in a state of siege than a mercantile or university town. The
students of the Sorbonne paraded the streets and went armed to mass,
the authorities being powerless to control them.[463]

The condition in the provinces was as bad; only here the odds seem to
have been in favor of the Protestants. In Guyenne a Huguenot mob sacked
a town, committed many outrages, and finally besieged the governor,
Burie, in his house.[464] A worse occurrence was the murder of Fumel,
an eminent lawyer in Languedoc, as an “enemy of the religion.”[465]
There were riots in Troyes, Orleans, Auxerre, Rouen, Meaux, Vendôme,
Bourges, Lyons, Tours, Angers,[466] Bazas.[467] The Huguenots of Sens
erected a church outside the town. Then finding that they outnumbered
the Catholics they pillaged the treasury of the cathedral and robbed
the monasteries.[468]

Still the queen mother persevered, taking her counsel from the
chancellor L’Hôpital, the admiral Coligny, the prince of Condé, and
his brother, D’Andelot, and adhered to her resolution to permit
the Huguenots to enjoy freedom of worship. On January 3, 1562, the
chancellor made an earnest plea for religious toleration before the
Court of Parlement,[469] which was followed by the most decisive
action the government had yet taken, namely the issuance of the famous
edict of toleration of January 17, known as the Edict of January,
which was the first that granted exercise of the Reformed religion _in
public_.[470]

This edict was expressly declared to be _provisional_ in its nature,
pending the decisions of the Council of Trent, which, by a coincidence,
was opened on the day following, January 18, 1562, the first formal
session being set for the second Thursday in Lent.[471] The preamble
recited that the government’s action was taken in consideration of
the state of affairs prevailing in the kingdom; that it was not to be
construed as approving the new religion; and that it was to remain
in force no longer than the King should order; it deprecated the
“disobedience, obstinacy, and evil intentions of the people” which made
even provisional recognition of Calvinism necessary. Specifically, the
edict provided for the restoration by the Huguenots of all property
unlawfully possessed by them; it forbade them to _erect_ any churches,
either within or without the cities and towns (Art. 1) or to assemble
for worship within the walls thereof either by day or night, or under
arms (Arts. 2, 5). Protestant worship was required to be in the
daytime, outside the town gates, in the open, or, if under cover, in
buildings occasionally used, and not formally consecrated as churches.
For this reason the Reformed ministers preached, some in the fields,
others in gardens, old houses, and barns, according to their particular
inclinations or convenience. For they were expressly forbidden to build
any chapels, or meddle with the churches, upon any account. Access
to their meetings was always to be permitted to the King’s officers,
i.e., bailiffs, seneschals, provosts, or their lieutenants, but _not_
to officers of judicature (Arts. 3, 6; and supplementary declaration
of interpretation, February 14, 1562). Furthermore, the raising of
money among the Huguenots was to be wholly voluntary and not in the
form of assessment or imposition. They were to keep the political
laws of the Roman church, as to holidays and marriage, in order to
avoid litigation and confusion of property rights; and to refrain from
harboring any person who might be accused, prosecuted, or condemned
by the government, under penalty of a fine of 1,000 crowns, to be
devoted to charity, together with whipping and banishment (Arts. 8,
9, 12). The use of reproachful or vituperative language touching the
faith or practice of the Catholic church was made a misdemeanor (Art.
10). Finally, all Protestant synods or consistories were required to
be held by permission of or in presence of the lieutenant-general of
the province concerned, or his representative, and the statutes of the
churches were to be communicated to him (Art. 7, and supplementary
declaration and interpretation of February 14, 1562).

In order to prevent seditions, an edict was sent to the judges of the
towns, in the name of the King, by which the authorities were ordered
to disarm all Catholics in their towns of every species of weapon and
to make them deposit their arms in the local city hall or other common
point, where they were to be kept under the guard of the _procureur_
and the _échevins_.[472]

It is a question worthy of consideration, whether the preachings
of the Reformed might not have been peaceably maintained after the
Edict of January, the provisional form gradually being modified until
complete religious toleration would have been secured, if Spain had not
continued to tamper with French politics, and if the persistence of the
political Huguenots had not continued to push things to such a point
that at last the two causes, originally separate, became the obverse
and reverse sides of the same issue and had to stand or fall together.
On the other hand, had not these concessions of the crown been too long
delayed? Was the edict “dead from birth,” as Pasquier wrote?[473]

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST CIVIL WAR. THE MASSACRE OF VASSY (MARCH 1, 1562). THE SIEGE
OF ROUEN

The progress of events had developed so rapidly as to bely the Edict
of January almost as soon as it was passed. The continued absence of
the Guises from the court made them open to suspicion, particularly
as messengers were passing frequently between Joinville and St.
Germain.[474] The nets of conspiracy woven by the Triumvirate were
daily being drawn tighter around France. Directed by Chantonnay and the
cardinal of Ferrara (who generally spoke in Spanish when together in
public, that those near by might not understand),[475] the plans of the
Triumvirate were concerted, the Spanish ambassador looking ahead to the
day when force would supplant diplomacy.[476]

Ever since its formation, as we have seen, the Triumvirate had sought
to win over the king of Navarre. As he was, therefore, sought by both
parties, he was much inflated with a sense of his own importance.
Antoine still lived in hope of compounding with Philip for the
kingdom of Navarre, and to that end still negotiated both with the
Vatican and with Spain.[477] But he was getting very tired of the
procrastination of the Spanish king, so that there was danger of the
thread of his patience being snapped.[478] If war broke out in France
and found him in such a mood, an attempt might possibly be made to
overrun Navarre.[479] In consequence, it became necessary to make a
more tangible proposition to the Bourbon prince. It took the form of
a demand and a promise. The demand was that every Huguenot should
be banished from court and the Protestant clergy expelled from the
country together with the prince of Condé, the Châtillon brothers,
the chancellor, and Montluc, the bishop of Valence. In return Antoine
was to receive the “kingdom of Tunis” as a reward. This was the new
prize used by Spain to bait the hook, and gradually Antoine was drawn
over to the side of Spain and the Triumvirate. The amusing feature
of this proffer was not so manifest to the men of that day as to us.
Geographical knowledge, even of the Mediterranean coast, was hazy. The
constable, for example, thought that Tunis was an island! But Antoine
knew more history and geography than Montmorency; he knew that Tunis
was a Turkish possession which Charles V had vainly tried to seize, and
had to be beguiled with visions of oriental splendor and large plans
for its conquest before he became passive. Pending its acquisition,
Philip II renewed the offer of Sardinia. Meanwhile Antoine received
instruction in the Catholic faith from a teacher recommended to him by
the general of the Jesuits,[480] and quarreled with Jeanne d’Albret
because she would not let the future Henry IV be taken to mass, or
permit him to be present at the christening of the infant son of the
Spanish ambassador.[481] By March (1562) it was evident that the king
of Navarre was “never so earnest on the Protestant side as he was now
furious on the other.”[482]

But if the Spanish ambassador used smooth words to the king of
Navarre, his language was quite otherwise toward Catherine de Medici.
In the name of his sovereign he demanded the banishment of Jeanne
d’Albret from court, the compulsory education of Henry of Navarre
in the Catholic religion, and so soundly rated her for harboring
Coligny and D’Andelot at court that the outraged queen mother
demanded his retirement,[483] ordered the marshal St. André back
to his government,[484] and the constable to retire to Chantilly,
and contemplated doing the same with the old cardinal Tournon. This
procedure offended Antoine who imputed her conduct to Coligny and his
brother, and in consequence he inclined more than ever toward the
Triumvirate.[485] Finally on Palm Sunday (March 22) Antoine cast the
die and went to mass, coming from the service with the emblem of the
celebration in his hand.[486]

A superficial aspect of peace still prevailed at court, but in the
provinces a state of war already prevailed. Sens,[487] Abbeville,[488]
Tours, Toulouse, Marseilles, Toul in Lorraine,[489] and most of all
Cahors and Agen,[490] where the terrible Montluc figured, were all
scenes of riot and bloodshed during the winter months, in which the
Huguenots were generally worsted.[491] In Agen it was so bad that the
government had to take more than ordinary notice of the situation.
Charles IX called upon the governor of Guyenne to repress “les excès,
forces, violences, sacagements d’églises, séditions et escandalles
advenus en nôtre pays d’Agenais,” and ordered the consuls of the city
to send him the names of those who disturbed the peace.

In this condition of things only a spark was needed to throw the whole
country into flames. Force alone could settle the irreconcilable
conflict, and it was soon to be invoked. War was certainly anticipated
by both parties. But contrary to expectation it was not precipitated
by Spanish intervention, but by outbreak within France. It was the
massacre of Vassy on March 1, 1562, that threw the country into civil
war.

[Illustration: THE MASSACRE OF VASSY, MARCH 1, 1652

(Bib. Nat., Estampes. _Histoire de France_, Q. b.)]

The duke of Guise had spent the winter, as we have seen, working
in the interest of the Triumvirate. On February 15, 1562, he had a
conference at Saverne with the duke of Württemberg, whom he adroitly
persuaded into the belief that the Calvinists were aiming to involve
the German Protestants in their own quarrel, thereby securing his
neutrality in event of civil war. Shortly after his return to France
the duke left Joinville with the intention of rejoining the court. As
he was passing through Vassy,[492] his retinue encountered a Huguenot
congregation worshiping in a barn outside of the town. Though the
service was strictly in conformity with the Edict of January, the
sight angered the duke, whose followers fell upon the company, and the
famous massacre ensued. It was March 1, 1562. How much provocation
was made by the Protestants for this attack is a matter of dispute.
The duke himself and Catholic partisans ever since have asserted that
stones were first thrown at him. Probably the absolute truth will never
be known. Ranke, perhaps, sums up the verdict of history best in the
statement that “whether the duke intended the massacre or not, it is
enough that he did not prevent it.”[493] Two weeks later, on March 16,
the duke of Guise, accompanied by the chief members of his house, save
the cardinal of Lorraine and the duke of Elbœuf, arrived in Paris. The
capital, which long since had learned the news of Vassy, received him
joyfully.[494] At the St. Denis gate he was met by the constable and
his four stalwart sons, the eldest of whom was governor of the city,
the four marshals of France, and twenty-one knights of the Order.
Having arrived at his hotel, the provost of the merchants, who was
syndic of Paris, accompanied by many of the chief merchants, visited
him, “testifying his joyful welcome,” which was further attested by
the proffer of two millions of gold in favor of the Catholic cause.
The duke made an adroit reply, assuring them that the queen mother and
the king of Navarre, with the aid and advice of the King’s council,
would pacify the realm; that he, as a faithful and loyal subject, must
abide where the King commanded, and that he hourly expected a summons
to court. On the same day the prince of Condé, returning from the court
to Paris with the intention of going to Picardy, finding the duke of
Guise in the capital, changed his plans and tarried in Paris, though
offering to leave the town by one gate if the duke, the constable, and
the marshal St. André would leave by the other.[495] When the Guises
perceived that the Huguenots were undismayed by the events, they began
to increase their adherents in the city, so that in a short time, it
was thronged with nearly ten thousand horsemen. It was impossible, on
the other hand, for the Huguenots to concert measures of defense in
Paris, and accordingly the prince of Condé soon quitted the capital
(March 23) “like another Pompey,”[496] going to Meaux, where Coligny
and D’Andelot soon joined him.[497]

Meanwhile Catherine de Medici, fearful lest the person of the King
would be forcibly seized by the Guises, and recognizing that the king
of Navarre had surrendered completely to the Triumvirate, endeavored to
remove the King to Blois. But Antoine hotly protested against so overt
a move in favor of the Huguenots and Spain’s ambassador fulminated
so strongly against “the evil reputation” of L’Hôpital,[498] that
the court was compelled to go to Fontainebleau instead.[499] Even
this place met with small favor on the part of the Guises, who would
have preferred keeping the court in Paris. But when they urged the
necessity of the queen’s presence in the council in consideration of
the grave state of affairs, Catherine caustically rejoined that she
thought “it more meet to have regard to the health of the King than to
inform so many wise men what was necessary to be done.” This speech
of the queen mother, however, was not said altogether in sarcasm. For
instead of following the advice of the constable, who showed signs of
resenting the Guise ascendency, that the crown repudiate and condemn
the massacre of Vassy and announce its determination to maintain the
Edict of January,[500] Catherine in her alarm lest the rising of the
Huguenots sweep the Valois dynasty from the throne began to incline
toward Spain.[501] For the time being the Triumvirate professed itself
satisfied, intending after Easter to compel the court to repair to
Bois de Vincennes, in order to have the King in their midst and thus
strengthen with his name the authority of their actions.[502] Great
was the alarm, therefore, when the prince of Condé, accompanied by
the admiral Coligny and D’Andelot, appeared before the gates of Paris
on March 29 with three thousand horse.[503] Immediately all the
bridges were drawn up and preparations made to meet an attack.[504]
Already extraordinary arrangements had been made for the defense of
Paris. Strangers were compelled to leave the city; no persons except
gentlemen were permitted to wear arms and these were limited to sword
and dagger; only six gates were open and these were under double
guard.[505] Failing to enter the city, the prince quartered his troops
at St. Cloud and took possession of the highroad from Paris to Orleans
at Longjumeau, while in Paris the duke of Guise, the king of Navarre,
and the constable hastened forward the preparations for war.[506]
But the prince of Condé refrained from the use of force. He gave out
that he had as much right to enter the city under arms as had Guise,
and complained of the fact that Guise and his following, on March 27,
which was Good Friday, had visited the King and Queen at Fontainebleau,
where the latter “made them strange countenance because the train
came in arms to the court.”[507] The apparent purpose of the prince
of Condé was to cut Fontainebleau off from Paris, for the admiral lay
at Montreuil, but four leagues distant, and thus force a reasonable
settlement, or push matters to an extremity by making himself master
of the Loire, thus cutting France in twain and having all Guyenne and
Poitou and much of Languedoc at his back. Color was lent to this belief
by the fact that so many men from the northern and eastern provinces
were passing southward that a special body of troops was set to guard
the line of the Seine.[508]

[Illustration:

HUGUENOT MARCH
TO
ORLEANS

March 29.-April 2. 1562

Methuen &. Co.
]

But the Catholic leaders guessed Condé’s purpose and by a _coup
de main_ seized the King and his mother and carried them off from
Fontainebleau to Melun, a town strong enough to be withheld against any
sudden enterprise. Thereupon the prince, perceiving that he had been
outreached, marched toward Orleans[509] in spite of an order sent from
the King, and undoubtedly inspired by Guise, that he should lay down
his arms. An attempt to prevent him from reaching Orleans was blocked
by a rapid advance of D’Andelot.

Meanwhile the constable had assumed the direction of affairs in
Paris, where on April 5 the Huguenot house of worship near the Port
St. Antoine was torn down, the pulpit, forms, and choir burned, and
fragments carried away as souvenirs by the mob. Troops patrolled the
streets, arresting suspects, and a house to house visitation was made
in search of Calvinist preachers. The same day the court came to Bois
de Vincennes. During the next few days vain overtures were made to
the prince. Coligny and D’Andelot offered to meet the queen mother at
such a place as she would appoint, provided the prince of Navarre, the
future Henry IV, Damville, the constable’s second son, and one of the
Guises, were given into Orleans as hostages for them. Catherine was
willing to accept the offer, but was overruled by Antoine of Bourbon,
the duke of Guise, and Montmorency.[510] Those who were least alarmed
still looked for settlement at the hands of the General Council. But
there were serious political difficulties, as well as those religious,
in the way of this, the three principal ones being: (1) the summons of
the council, which many Catholics even wished to be convoked by the
Emperor, and not by the Pope; (2) the place of the council; (3) the
authority of the council, which many Catholics wished to be above the
Pope.[511]

On April 12, 1562, at Orleans, the prince of Condé formally assumed
command of the Huguenot forces,[512] his chief lieutenants being the
admiral Coligny and D’Andelot.[513] The first civil war was a reality.
The city on the Loire for some years to come was destined to be the
capital of the Protestants, dominating all the surrounding country.
Blois and its château, Tours and its castle, Amboise, Saumur, Angers,
and many other towns on the Loire and in Maine, were occupied by the
Protestants. Orleans was reputed to have bread and wine enough in
store to withstand a two years’ siege,[514] and the Huguenots seemed
to have plenty of money for immediate necessities, thanks to their
despoilment of the churches of the region, especially the rich abbey
of Marmoutier.[515] Although the purposes of the Huguenots were
clandestinely more political than religious, it was expedient to cloak
them under a mantle of faith.[516] The political organization of the
Huguenots was effected through the medium of an association, a form
of organization of which there are many examples, both Protestant and
Catholic, during this troubled period. The preamble of the instrument
of government disclaimed any private motives or considerations on
the part of those who were parties to the association, and asserted
that their sole purpose was to liberate the King from “captivity” and
punish the insolence and tyranny of the disloyal and the enemies of
the church. Idolatry, blasphemy, violence, and robbery, were forbidden
within the territory of the association, in order that all might know
that it had “the fear of God before it.” The association was to expire
after the King had attained his majority.[517]

The essential difficulties in the situation as it obtained at this
time are manifest. The Huguenots declared the King to be a captive in
the hands of the Guises and themselves claimed to be loyal subjects
in rebellion against tyranny.[518] The Guises, on the other hand,
branded the Huguenots as rebels and schismatics, although Catherine de
Medici still had a lingering hope of restoring peace, and in official
utterances carefully refrained from alluding to the prince of Condé as
a rebel.[519] Neither side would agree to lay down its arms without
the other doing likewise, and neither dared take the initiative in
this matter. The situation, therefore, was an irreconcilable one,
which nothing but war could settle. The political determinations of
the Huguenots were quite as fixed as their religious convictions, for
part of their platform was the article agreed upon by the estates
at Orleans to the effect that the cardinal of Lorraine, the duke of
Guise, the constable, and the marshals Brissac and St. André, should
render an account of their stewardship.[520] How far politics governed
the situation is evidenced by the fact that late in April the king of
Navarre and Montmorency began to weaken in their attitude when it was
known that Condé dominated the middle Loire country, Touraine, Maine,
Anjou, and much of Normandy; when it was learned that the cities of
Lyons,[521] Toulouse, Caen, Rouen,[522] Dieppe, Troyes, Bourges,[523]
and the provinces of Dauphiné, Provence, and Poitou, had declared
for the Huguenot cause; and when troops were pouring into Orleans by
thousands.[524]

If the Guises and the marshals Brissac and St. André could have
acquitted themselves with so little discredit as Antoine of Bourbon
or the constable, it is possible that a compromise might have been
made even yet.[525] But such an issue was impossible under the
circumstances. The guilt of Vassy still hung over the duke, for he had
not yet been absolved either by the Court of Parlement or by the peers
of France. Having appealed to force, force remained the only method
of settling the great dispute that divided France, and Guise daily
assembled horse and foot in Paris in expectation of battle.[526]

The formidable nature of the Huguenot rising by this time had so
increased the fear of Catherine de Medici that she completely
surrendered to the Triumvirate and resolved to appeal to Spain for
help. On April 19 she sent for Antoine of Navarre, the duke of Guise,
the constable, and the two marshals, Brissac and St. André, to whom
she declared that she had been badly advised hitherto, and that she
now trusted to their support. Montmorency at once proposed to ask the
nuncio to petition His Holiness to send money and troops to the help
of Catholic France. But Spain, not Rome, was the political cornerstone
of the Catholic world, and it was now that the momentous resolution
was taken to invite Philip II to lend assistance. Catherine de Medici,
who shortly before this time had looked upon the prospect of Spanish
intervention with apprehension, was now in favor of it. At Catherine’s
instance the Triumvirate formally invited Spain’s support in a joint
letter which was accompanied by Antoine of Navarre’s written profession
of the Catholic faith.[527] Two weeks later, May 8, Charles IX himself
formally solicited military assistance of Philip II.[528] Catholic
Switzerland,[529] Catholic Germany,[530] Savoy, the Pope,[531] and
other princes of Italy were also looked to.[532] The queen mother
did not know that already the Triumvirate had anticipated her request
by asking the Spanish King to instruct the regent of Flanders to
hold the troops there in readiness “because Madame de Parma would not
let a single horse go out of Flanders without orders.”[533] By the
end of June these troops were ready. They were almost all Spaniards
and Italians, then universally regarded as the best soldiers in the
world.[534] Philip II, though, was actuated by other motives besides
zeal for Catholicism.[535] He feared lest the south of France might
attack Navarre, owing to the identification of Jeanne d’Albret with the
Huguenot cause, and so sent reinforcements to Fontarabia and Pampeluna;
a movement which weakened the prince of Condé by preventing Grammont’s
Gascon troops from going to Orleans.[536]

The war went forward in spite of lack of funds on both sides. In order
to pay the expenses of the war in Brittany Catherine authorized the
seizure of the plate in the churches. But the duke of Etampes, who was
governor of Brittany, was cautious about carrying out this order. “The
people are so religious and scrupulous in these things,” he wrote,
“that if they found out that we wanted to take it, they would not
readily endure it, especially in Lower Brittany.” Instead he advised
that the plate of the churches be deposited in some principal town in
each bishopric, “under color of retaining and guarding it there, and
that a tax of from 15 to 20 livres be imposed upon each person for this
purpose,” figuring that this expedient would produce from 15 to 20,000
livres.[537] The Huguenots let no money pass from the provinces under
their control, even going so far as to destroy the government registers
in the towns they took.[538]

Every day increased the interest of the populace in the struggle.[539]
“If the prince of Condé should come to Paris,” wrote an Englishman
in Paris, “they could not tarry there, on account of the fury of
his soldiers and the populace.”[540] In Dauphiné, De la Mothe
Gondrin, lieutenant of the duke of Guise, was slain at Valence by the
Protestants. It is just to say, however, that he was the aggressor.
Accompanied by sixty or eighty gentlemen he went out into the country
and came upon a worshiping company of Calvinists “and left not one
of them alive.” A Huguenot nobleman, Des Adresse who styled himself
“lieutenant of the King in Dauphiné,” acquired a reputation in the
region as sinister as that of Montluc in Gascony. The whole southeast
of France seemed up in arms.[541] Grenoble, Macon in Burgundy, Châlons
in Champagne, Moulins in Bourbonnais, where they destroyed the tombs
of Antoine’s ancestors,[542] were taken by the Huguenots. Lyons, by
reason of its proximity to Geneva, was radically Huguenot, and this
sentiment was stimulated still more by the great discontent that
prevailed among the lower classes, engaged in silk manufacturing and
other industries.[543] In Normandy it was even worse. At Rouen the
Huguenots routed the Catholics and seized the government.[544] On May
14 Maligny took Havre-de-Grace, which astonished and affrighted the
Catholics because it stood at the mouth of the Seine and made open
communication between the Huguenots and the English easy. At Caen,[545]
Bayeux, and most places in Lower Normandy, the inhabitants defaced
the images in the monasteries and parish churches, and arrested the
King’s revenues coming to Paris.[546] Caudebec, which revolted on May
15, was besieged by the Guisards, but had placed men in it previously
and so saved itself. In Dieppe, where the revolt followed hard upon
news of Vassy, a conflict between Protestants and Catholics resulted
in the death of 150 persons.[547] Terrible cruelties were committed at
Angers[548] by the Protestants.

Amid this almost spontaneous insurrection involving provinces widely
separated from one another, the Ile-de-France and Burgundy adhered to
the crown and the Catholic cause, the former wholly from inclination,
the latter in part because of the adroitness of Tavannes, the
brilliant captain, who foiled the Huguenot assault upon Dijon,[549] and
saved Châlons-sur-Saône.[550]

In spite of these occurrences, however, abortive negotiations for peace
filled the ten days between the 18th and the 28th of May.[551] In Paris
it was expected that Condé would attack the city. The government’s
force was not sufficient to take the field, and twenty-five pieces
of artillery were paraded through the streets to make an impression
and to induce the clergy and Parisians to contribute money for this
religious war-making.[552] Popular opinion in Paris was bitterly
hostile to the Huguenots, but the bourgeois were not inclined to go
down into their pockets and so, when the cowardly king of Navarre
published a proclamation on May 26[553] expelling all Protestants from
Paris and leaving their goods at the mercy of their adversaries, it
was hailed with delight by the capital. Mobs of Catholics forcibly
expelled Huguenots from the city and destroyed their goods. The city
was so full of men-at-arms, highwaymen, and robbers at this time that
every householder was required to keep a light in his street window
until daybreak.[554] Risings in many parts of the country continued to
be heard of;[555] Vendôme, La Charité, Auxerre, Montargis, Poitiers,
together with most of the towns of Saintonge and Angoumois,[556] either
declared for the prince of Condé or were taken by him. But at Toulouse
the Huguenots suffered heavily.[557] In Normandy, there was great fear
of English intervention.[558]

Overtures for peace came to nothing because the Huguenots made the
withdrawal of the Triumvirate a condition precedent to their laying
down of arms.[559] The prince contended that he could not be secure
unless the duke of Guise, the constable, and the marshal St. André
retired from the court. The queen mother in reply represented that it
was not right, during the King’s minority, to remove from him such
important personages; that the Catholics in Paris had taken up arms to
oppose the Edict of January, and that if the Huguenot soldiery would
retire to their homes they might live there as they liked, while a
council (of which he should be a member) considered some better means
of settlement.[560] Gradually the hostile armies—the prince of Condé
at the head of the Huguenots and the duke of Guise, the constable,
the marshal St. André and the recreant king of Navarre with the
Catholic host—drew near to each other.[561] An attempt was made to
take Jargeau, eight miles from Orleans; but fearing lest its capture
would cut supplies off from Orleans, Coligny and D’Andelot destroyed
the bridge there. This forced the Catholic captains to change their
intention, and they traversed the Beauce so as to surprise Beaugency,
fourteen miles from Orleans, midway between Orleans and Blois, where
there was a bridge across the river. On June 15 the two forces arrived
near the bridge at almost the same time and a fight seemed imminent.
The two armies were about five miles apart, and about the same distance
from Orleans. Both being south of the Loire, there was no river to
hinder an engagement. There were many vineyards between them, which
was an advantage to the prince, who had more infantry than cavalry,
while Guise had 7,000 horse, D’Aumale having come from Normandy with
his force. The Catholic forces were divided: Guise lay north of the
river, beyond Beaugency, Paris-ward; D’Aumale’s detachment was on
the other side of the river at Clerie, midway between Orleans and
Beaugency, having the town and the bridge in his hands; while Navarre
was established at Vernon, a league from Beaugency.[562]

The condition of the country around Orleans at this time, considering
that a state of war existed, was not bad. Condé had plenty of money
for the moment, having secured the riches of the churches of Bourges.
Food was good and plentiful in Orleans and bread was cheap. Everything
the Huguenots took they paid for, as a matter of policy,[563] although
large funds were not in sight and they looked anxiously to England for
100,000 crowns, offering the notes of the leaders as security or else
the bonds of some of the most notable Reformed churches, as Rouen and
Lyons. The Huguenot army made a brave display. Many of the gentlemen
were rich and wore long white coats (_casaque blanche_) of serge,
kersey, or stramell, after the old manner, with long sleeves over
their armour.[564] The truce expired on June 21 (Sunday), but only
light skirmishing was indulged in while specious negotiations were
continued by Montmorency.[565] But the Catholic leaders offered such
hard conditions that Condé would not accept them. Among others it was
demanded that all preachers should be banished from France, together
with the prince himself, the brothers Châtillon, and the other Huguenot
leaders, until the King was of age.

During this delay the prince lost the advantage he had possessed. For
the duke of Guise, the constable and Marshal St. André returned from
Chartres to the camp again, which was between Beaugency and Blois,
which lends color to the theory that it was they who overruled Antoine
of Navarre and Catherine. After the rupture of the truce, the Catholic
army marched to Blois, which they battered for a day and a night,
assaulted and entered, although the inhabitants offered to let them in
at the gates. When the magistrates of the city offered the keys to the
duke of Guise, he pointed to the cannon with him, saying they were the
keys he would enter by. At the same time St. André took Poitiers and
Angoulême and drove La Rochefoucauld into Saintonge with the aid of
Spanish troops.[566] When informed of the duke’s proceedings at Blois,
Condé marched to Beaugency, which, after bombardment, was entered
on July 3, the most part of those who were left to guard it being
killed.[567] Then seeing his own fortunes diminishing daily, he retired
to Orleans, with scarcely 3,000 horse and 6,000 footmen. The prince
was in doubt what next to do; whether to retire to Lyons and join
with the baron des Adresse,[568] who had acquired Grenoble, Valence,
and Châlons in Burgundy, despite Tavannes who kept the field with his
forces,[569] and was reputed to have 8,000 foot and 1,500 horse besides
6,000 Swiss sent from Bern and Lucerne, or to retire to Gascony where
the queen of Navarre was, or thirdly to go to Rouen and thereby keep
Normandy. In the end, however, he and Coligny stayed in Orleans. The
remainder of his force was either dispersed in the various towns or
dismissed.

The Protestants stood in dire need of outside aid during this
summer.[570] A few days after Condé had retired within Orleans,
D’Aumale took Honfleur (July 21). In Paris mobs killed almost hourly
men, women, and children, notwithstanding an edict to the contrary
under pain of death. Arms were in the people’s hands, not only in Paris
but in the villages. Neither the King nor the queen mother had the
means to rule them, for the king of Navarre and the duke of Guise were
then at Blois, with the result that Paris did much as it pleased. The
leaders contemplated the recovery of Touraine, Anjou, and Maine, and
all the towns upon the Loire, and then proposed to go into Normandy
and recover Havre-de-Grace, Dieppe, and Rouen. In pursuance of this
project the duke of Guise took Loudon and Chinon in Touraine. In the
same month Mondidier was entered by the Catholics upon assurance that
all the Protestants therein should live safely; but notwithstanding the
promises they were all cut to pieces, robbed, or driven forth. Numbers
of men, women, and children were drowned in the night with stones
about their necks, at Blois, Tours, and Amboise, and those towns which
surrendered to the king of Navarre.

While these events were taking place in the Loire country, the duke
of Aumale again approached Rouen on the 29th of June, and planted his
batteries before St. Catherine’s Mount, but succeeded in doing little
in spite of his long battery. He hoped to recover Havre-de-Grace after
Guise had seized the towns upon the Loire. The great fear of the French
was lest Havre-de-Grace should be given by the Huguenots into the hands
of the English, and the atrocious practice of D’Aumale was likely to
further such conduct on the part of the Huguenots,[571] for he promised
the peasantry not only the privilege of sacking the châteaux of the
nobles, but also to relieve them of all taxes. As a result of this
vicious policy, trade was dead and whole families of the nobility
retired to Dieppe, abandoning their homes.[572]

Violence increased both in the cities and in the provinces. In the
southeast Somarive committed great cruelties in Orange, killing men,
women, and children wherever he went.[573] But the achievements of
Montluc, “the true creator of the French infantry”[574] were the
conspicuous feature of the war in the south. By his own confession
this famous soldier “rather inclined to violence than to peace, and
was more prone to fighting and cutting of throats than to making of
speeches.”[575] The war in the southern provinces, it is plain, was
one of both politics and religion. The practices of the Huguenots
penetrated the whole administrative machinery. The sieur de Burie,
king’s lieutenant in Guyenne, was old and overcautious, and not without
suspicion of Calvinism,[576] while Duras, the Huguenot leader was so
active that the crown had sent the veteran of the siege of Sienna into
Guyenne in January, 1560, with a special commission.[577] The Huguenots
tried to buy Montluc off through one of their captains formerly with
him before Sienna, who came to him saying that the church at Nérac had
made him their captain. Montluc’s reply nearly took the captain off his
feet. “What the devil churches are those that make captains?” was his
fierce question.[578] He speedily began to make his name formidable by
hanging six Huguenots without process of law “which shook great fear
into the whole party.”

Montluc’s arrival was in the nick of time for the Catholics of the
south. He thought that if the Huguenots had been more led by soldiers
and not so “guided by ministers, they had not failed of carrying
Bordeaux and Toulouse. But God preserved those two forts, the
bulwarks of Guyenne, to save all the rest.” Montluc was everywhere at
once, never resting long in any place, holding his foes in suspense
everywhere, and not only was himself in continual motion, but also
with letters and messages perpetually solicited and employed all the
friends he had.[579] His troops were few in numbers and so ill-paid
that he sometimes was reluctantly compelled to ransom his prisoners.
“We were so few that we were not enough to kill them all,” he
comments. “Had the King paid his companies I should not have suffered
ransom to have been in use in this quarrel. It is not in this case as
in a foreign war where men fight for love and honor. In a civil war we
must either be master or man, being we live as it were, all under a
roof.” He was as good as his word and “shook a great terror into the
country everywhere.” When he appeared before Agen he “wondered that the
people should be so damnably timorous and did not better defend their
religion.” Instead “they no sooner heard my name but they fancied the
rope already about their necks.” Yet terrible as the old war-dog was,
he still waged war according to the rules of the game. He is outspoken
in condemnation of the conduct of the Spanish companies sent by Philip
II which joined him before Agen.[580] The importance of Montluc’s
services in the south was great. He helped save Toulouse and Bordeaux
to the government and the subsequent capture of Lectoure, and the
notable battle of Vergt in Périgord (October 9, 1562) prevented the
Huguenots south of the Loire from joining the forces of the prince of
Condé, who thus narrowly lost the battle of Dreux.[581]

As the Catholic cause mended, the situation of the Huguenots darkened.
Four thousand Swiss in June had joined Tavannes in Burgundy and
thereby Dijon, Macon, and Châlons-sur-Saône were made safe. Late in
July 6,000 lansquenets passed through Paris toward the camp at Blois.
Pope Pius IV sent his own nephew to the aid of Joyeuse with 2,500
footmen, one thousand of whom were “Hispainolz.”[582] The Huguenots
impatiently awaited the coming of German pistoleers and footmen, to be
brought by Casimir, the second son of the count palatine, accompanied
by D’Andelot who had been sent into Germany for assistance. But the
German princes were slow in responding, especially to the demand for
money,[583] so that the prince of Condé actually promised to give them
the pillage of Paris![584] D’Andelot passed the Rhine on September
22, 1562—three weeks too late to relieve Bourges—with 2,000 German
horse and 2,000 musketeers, who figured in the battle of Dreux in the
next December.[585] France had seen nothing like these reiters in days
heretofore. Their coming created both consternation[586] and curiosity.
Claude Haton in vain sought the meaning of the word.

The word reiter had never had vogue in France within the life of the
oldest of men, and one had never used the word until the present,
although the kings of France had been served in all their wars by
Germans, Swiss, and lansquenets, who are included under this word
and name of Germany or Allemaigne. I have taken pains to inquire
of numerous persons, who are deemed to know much what was the
signification of this word “reiter,” but I have not found a man who
has been wise enough to tell me what I wished to know.[587]

In order to pay the reiters and to find money, a _taille_ was imposed
upon the Huguenots of all classes, in all towns and villages under
their control, upon nobles, priests, merchants, bourgeois, and
artisans. But as this means was very tedious, the prince had recourse
to the gold and silver vessels, chalices, and crosses of the churches
which the Huguenots had pillaged. He also seized upon the government
receipts from the _gabelle_ and other taxes of the King in all the
villages and _élections_ controlled by the Huguenots, even the moneys
of the royal domain, and the revenues of the churches.[588]

Meanwhile on August 19 the siege of Bourges had begun. The city was
defended by about 3,500 soldiers, but the circuit of its walls was
very great. It was well provisioned for a time, and had considerable
munitions and artillery of an inferior sort, but neither cannon nor
culverin. Half the town was protected by a great marsh near by; the
other half was fortified. It was the plan of D’Andelot, who had
entered Lorraine with 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot, commanded by the
duke of Deuxponts, feeling he could do nothing in time for Bourges,
to cut off Paris by securing the passages of the river at St. Cloud
and Charenton.[589] Accordingly the constable and the duke of Guise,
learning of the approach of the reiters, dispatched D’Aumale with a
commission to levy all men of war in Champagne, Brie, and Burgundy,
both foot and horse, and to sound the tocsin for the purpose of raising
new levies for the King if those which he first raised should not
suffice, and to make a great camp of all these men for the purpose of
combating the reiters.[590] But D’Aumale dallied so long,[591] to the
intense chagrin of his army, which clamored to “frapper dessus les
lif-lof de reistres,”[592] that the German troopers were able to cross
the river Seine at Chanceaux, whence they took the road above Auxerre,
crossed the Yonne, and so joined the prince of Condé at Orleans.

It would have been much better for France, and especially for the
provinces of Champagne, Brie, and Burgundy, if D’Aumale had attempted
to repulse the reiters, for his soldiers were the ruin of the villages
where they lodged, and any action, even defeat, would have been better
than license and idleness. When it was known that the reiters had
evaded the force sent against them, the King, seeing new villages of
France taken every day, sent orders to all those who still adhered
to the crown to the effect that they should be on their guard night
and day, for fear of being taken by surprise. For greater security
commissions were dispatched authorizing the election of a gentleman of
honor and credit to be town-captain in every town.[593]

The Catholic and Huguenot position with reference to each other
between Paris and the Loire was now somewhat as follows: the former
held Chartres, Bonneval, Chateaudun, Blois; the latter St. Marthurin,
Montargis, and Gien. On August 31, 1562, the surrender of Bourges
took place. The crown guaranteed life, property, and liberty of
conscience to the commandant and soldiers and inhabitants of the town,
in consideration of an indemnity of 50,000 livres “pour avoir été si
gracieusement traités.”[594] But the Catholic leaders were in doubt
what next to do, for all the Huguenots were within the towns, neither
occupying the open country nor having a camp outside the walls. The
king of Navarre urged the siege of Orleans, but the council was not in
agreement with him for two reasons: first, on account of the plague
which was there; secondly because they had hopes that Navarre might
prevail upon his brother to desert the Huguenot cause, and so spare
them the exercise of force. For these reasons it was resolved not to
push the siege of Orleans and to attack Rouen instead, where the duke
of Aumale was already.[595]

The Guises were now fully aware of the formidable nature of the revolt
of Normandy, there being danger of their also losing western Normandy,
where the duke de Bouillon held Caen castle, but was disposed to be
neutral. They planned, therefore, to send the greater portion of their
new forces, Germans and Swiss, to the aid of D’Aumale, who had advanced
against Rouen after D’Andelot gave him the slip, for they were little
needed in the Loire country. Roggendorf, Guise’s chief German agent,
at this time arrived in Paris with 1,200 German pistoleers, well armed
and mounted; the Swiss captain, Froelich had brought fifteen ensigns of
Swiss, and the Rhinegrave was in Champagne with two regiments of foot
and three hundred pistoleers.[596]

The constable and the duke of Guise in fear of English support,
resolved to concentrate the greatest part of their force against Rouen
and Havre-de-Grace. Another motive lay in the fact that Paris was
in want; for the Huguenots recognized that if Rouen, Havre-de-Grace
and Dieppe were well held, coercion of Paris was not impossible. The
condition at Dieppe and Havre-de-Grace was the source of more anxiety
to the government than any other matter. These towns, owing to their
situation, were the chief keys to France, without which neither Paris
nor Rouen could be free. Havre-de-Grace was of more use to France than
Calais as a port of supply, and daily all those who escaped from Pont
Audemer, Honfleur, Harfleur, and the Protestants between Dieppe[597]
and Rouen were flocking thither.

The chief hope of the French Protestants was based upon the expected
aid of England. Early in April, 1562, the prince of Condé and the
admiral had solicited her support.[598] But the anxiety of Elizabeth
in the welfare of Protestantism beyond sea was not disinterested,
any more than Philip II’s catholicism. The legality of her position
as queen required her adherence to everything anti-Catholic, to
which may be added the influence of the political aims of Philip II
with reference to England, especially his interest in the doings of
Mary Stuart and Spanish tyranny in the Low Countries, both of which
jeopardized England. Her ambassador in France observed truly when he
wrote her: “It standeth Your Majesty, for the conservation of your
realm in the good terms it is in, to countenance the Protestants as
much as you may.”[599] Another practical end to be gained by English
support of the Huguenots was the possibility of recovering Calais.[600]
Yet in spite of their deep religious animosity and their political
hostility to one another, England and Spain were in so peculiarly
complicated a relation that neither state wished to go to war. Philip
II assured Charles IX that although Elizabeth would squirm at sight
of Spanish assistance given to France, she dared not strike back in
aid of the Huguenots, and would have to compel herself to view things
from afar.[601] The key to this extraordinary situation is to be found
in the commerce of the Low Countries. The duke of Alva flatly said
that his master could not afford to break with the English because
of the commercial injury he would sustain in the Netherlands.[602]
The same proposition, reversed, was in like stead true of England;
her commercial interests in Holland and Flanders were too great to be
risked.

But the good prospect of regaining Calais coupled with the fear lest
the reduction of France to Spanish suzerainty would entail greater
danger to England in the long run than the loss of her commerce
beyond sea, at last persuaded Elizabeth to support the Huguenots,
upon certain conditions, the ultimate one being restoration of Calais
to England.[603] Accordingly, in September, 1562, the queen offered
to land 6,000 men to guard the towns in Normandy, to take Havre and
Dieppe under her protection, and receive into them the refugees of the
Reformed church, and promised not to abandon Havre without the prince’s
consent, nor receive Calais from the opposite party. The vidame of
Chartres agreed to deliver the custody of Havre-de-Grace to the queen’s
lieutenant on condition that the latter would recompense him and Condé
by annual pensions or assigned lands, because of the loss of their
estates and goods in France. In pursuance of this compact, on September
24, 1562, the English proclamation for the expedition into Normandy
was published. It was time, if success were to crown the enterprise,
for in Havre troubles and enemies multiplied and patience with the
English was on the point of breaking. “No prey happens to a sleeping
fox,” wrote the vidame impatiently to the English admiral. On October
1, 1562, the English sailed from Portsmouth for Havre, and on Sunday,
October 4, entered the roadstead of Havre at three in the afternoon,
and immediately landed as many men as they could with the tide.

The English occupation of Havre-de-Grace startled the government
into new activity before Rouen, and the King determined to take it
before English assistance could be afforded.[604] The town was well
supplied with provisions and had plenty of small arms, but was short
of artillery and gunpowder. The garrison numbered about 4,000, under
command of Montgomery, the guardsman who had accidentally killed Henry
II in tournament, for Morvilliers, the former chief in command in
Rouen, had hesitated about the introduction of English soldiers and had
been replaced.

In the first week of October the attack of the royal forces upon Rouen
was renewed with fury and the fortress on St. Catherine’s Mount was
taken by them. Desperation soon prevailed in the beleaguered city and
there was talk of conditional surrender if that could be effected,
until the arrival of a few companies of English revived the courage
of the Rouennais and the fight was renewed. But the procrastinating
caution of the English by this time overreached itself. In spite
of the importunities of Throckmorton,[605] the English government
was reluctant to venture its arms beyond the seaboard,[606] although
Throckmorton’s arguments were reinforced by every other English agent
in France, Rouen being represented as “such a jewel for them that by
no means is it sufferable to become an enemy.”[607] All urgency was in
vain. The instructions to the earl of Warwick, the English commander
in Havre-de-Grace, were to the effect that if requested to send aid to
Rouen or other places he should make some “reasonable delay,” without
offending them.[608] It is easy to see from such instructions and the
policy pursued by the English government in France that its interest
was purely practical and in no sense sentimental or religious. England
wanted to hold Havre-de-Grace in pawn for Calais, under cover of
pretending to support the Huguenots.

By mid-October, however, it had become plain that this narrow policy
could not be so rigidly adhered to. The success of the Catholic armies
in Normandy was even endangering Havre-de-Grace, and Havre-de-Grace was
not nearly so favorable a point of vantage for the English as Calais
had been, for there the pale protected the city proper; in the city at
the Seine’s mouth the fortifications were weak and, worst of all, the
location was a poor one for defense.[609] With the coming of winter,
it would be possible for the French with slight effort to prevent much
intercourse by sea between Havre and the English ports, while already
the country roundabout was being devastated by the German reiters.
D’Aumale was reported to have said—and there was justification of the
statement—that the English garrison might make merry as it pleased,
the winter and famine would cause them to pack homeward faster than
they had come. Too late the English at last determined to succor
Rouen after the fall of St. Catherine’s Mount,[610] and relief troops
were sent forward to Rouen from Havre-de-Grace and Dieppe. An intrepid
English captain named Leighton (he was afterward made governor of
Guernsey), with a handful of men, made his way into the city, but
substantial assistance did not come until the middle of October. Even
then misfortune overtook the English. The approach was made by the
river in six small ships, but one of them struck on a sand bar near
Caudebec and was intercepted by Damville, so that only 600 English got
into the town.[611]

On the morning of the 16th, Montgomery and two of the chief men of
the city came out of Rouen, under a flag of truce, and spoke with
the queen, returning a second time with fresh proposals, but nothing
resulted. The Huguenots demanded, first of all, liberty of preaching,
and of living according to their religion. Besides this, they insisted
that the King should not put a garrison in Rouen, and as security for
the observance of these conditions they required hostages from the
King, to be kept by them at Havre-de-Grace. In the second interview
they enlarged the conditions; namely, that the Edict of January might
be observed and that they might preach freely _in the cities_, although
by the edict preaching was permitted only _outside_ of cities.[612]
Moreover, they insisted on this agreement being extended to _all_ towns
of France; and in order to give this convention a general effect, the
prince of Condé was to confirm it. For the observance of all these
conditions they demanded as hostages the prince de Joinville, eldest
son of the duke of Guise, and brother of the marshal Brissac,[613]
superintendent of the King’s revenues.

Although Montgomery was unaware of it, the government already, alarmed
by the English intervention, had made overtures to the prince of
Condé in Orleans. But in each case, a condition required would not
be yielded. The demand of the Rouennais that the Edict of January be
revised so as to permit Protestant worship _in all towns_ broke off
negotiations with them. In the overtures made to Condé and Coligny,
restitution of all in rebellion to their estates and offices was
promised, as also the assurance to the Huguenots that they might enjoy
their religion peaceably _in their houses_, but _public_ worship, even
without the towns, was not to be permitted. The Protestant leaders seem
to have been inclined to yield to these terms, although they implied a
reduction of their religious privileges, but insisted that the crown
should assume the payments due to Condé’s German auxiliaries. The
government balked at this proposal, and the prince and the admiral
themselves balked when the king of Navarre declared that D’Andelot’s
German troopers and the Huguenots should unite to expel the English
from France, so that in the end neither set of negotiations was
successful.[614]

During the successful assault upon Fort St. Catherine which followed
the rupture of these negotiations both Antoine of Navarre and the duke
of Guise were wounded, the former by an arquebus-shot in the joint of
the shoulder, as it proved, mortally, because mortification of the
wound could not be stayed.[615] Montgomery fought furiously in the
assault, which lasted seven hours, and threatened to use his sword
upon any who might seek to yield. It was a desperate and vain battle,
however.[616] The King’s forces mined clear to the walls of the town,
and the havoc of their explosions could not be remedied. The breach
in the walls made by both mine and shot was so wide that some of the
royal force rode through on horseback.[617] On Monday, October 26, the
besiegers fought their way through and over the walls. In this supreme
movement the English and the Catholic Germans came sharply together.
No quarter was given the English in the town, the command being given
“that they should all pass the sword.” Many of them were stripped
naked by the victors. The wounded English who were found had their
throats cut; the rest were sent to the galleys. The King entered Rouen
the day after its capture, making his way over dead bodies which had
been spoiled by the soldiers.[618] The royal forces now had unlimited
control of the Seine below Rouen; at Caudebec they staked half the
river, so that ships and boats were compelled to pass close under their
guns.

The Guises now anticipated a swift collapse of the Huguenot cause. All
the chief towns in France save Orleans[619] and Lyons were either by
inclination or compulsion obedient to the crown, which found powerful
support from the property-owning and lawyer class. Politically and
financially the government was stronger, although the court was in want
of money at this time. The duke of Guise, the most notable captain and
soldier in France, the constable and veteran marshals like Brissac
and St. André, had made a combination too strong to be overcome. In
this strait, the Huguenot leaders grasped at the last straw—the
hope that the prince of Condé might succeed the king of Navarre as
lieutenant of the realm by winning the support of liberal Catholics
and the anti-Guisard element.[620] There was ground for this hope if
the Calvinists could be persuaded to be a little less radical, and if
the Catholic religion would be suffered without criticism to be and
remain the religion of France, and the Huguenots would make no further
alteration in their form of worship than the English Reformation had
done.[621]

Antoine of Bourbon, since sustaining the wound received at Rouen, had
been gradually sinking, and died on board a boat on his way to Paris,
October 26, after prolonged suffering.[622] Condé now, by virtue of
the arrangement made at the meeting of the States-General at Orleans,
legally succeeded to his brother’s office as lieutenant of the realm,
and proceeded forthwith to send out commissions to the constable,
marshals, and to all the governors of provinces and places, to repair
to him as the King’s lieutenant-general and governor of France. But in
spite of the regulation of the estates, the court and Catholic party,
by the advice of the cardinals of Ferrara, Lorraine, and Guise, the
duke of Guise, the constable, and marshal St. André, with the special
solicitation of the Spanish ambassador who voiced his master’s wishes
with “a lusty swelling tongue,” resolved to establish the cardinal of
Bourbon in the authority the king of Navarre had held.[623]

CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST CIVIL WAR (_Continued_). THE BATTLE OF DREUX (DECEMBER 19,
1562). THE PEACE OF AMBOISE (MARCH 19, 1563)

After the fall of Rouen, the chief military design of the Guises seems
to have been to protract the war, without giving battle, until the
Germans with D’Andelot and Condé either deserted for lack of pay or
were corrupted by them. Catherine’s wish, on the other hand, was to end
the war by composition and not by the sword, fearing to have either
party become flushed with success. In pursuance of this policy numbers
of the soldiers were permitted to go home, the war being considered to
be practically at an end until the spring, except that garrisons of
horse and foot were kept in the towns round about Orleans after the
manner of a flying siege (_siège volante_). But the rapid advance of
the prince toward Paris from Orleans, where he had been waiting for
D’Andelot, who mustered his German horse in Lorraine in the middle of
September, after he learned of his brother’s death, required the duke
of Guise to change his plans. Passing by Etampes, which the Guises
abandoned at his approach,[624] the prince of Condé marched toward
Corbeil in order to win the passage of the Seine, where 4,000 footmen
and 2,000 horse of the enemy lay in order to keep the Marne and the
Seine open above Paris for provisioning the capital. The Huguenot army
numbered about 6,000 footmen; 4,000 of them Germans, and nearly 3,000
horsemen. Most of the Germans were well armed and mounted, and all
“very Almain soldiers, who spoil all things where they go.”[625]

The duke of Guise, having received word of the approach of the
Huguenots upon Paris, abandoned his purpose of going to Havre, in
order to return to the succor of the city. Great difficulty was
experienced in accomplishing the return of the army, because it was
the depth of winter and the days were short and the roads heavy.
“Nevertheless everyone in camp took courage, because he was returning
to the good French wines and no more needed to drink the cider of
Normandy.”[626]

To combat the Protestant force, Guise and the constable had not
over 6,000 footmen and 1,000 horsemen at Paris, though this force
could be somewhat enlarged by drawing in the troops around Rouen
and before Havre-de-Grace. It was fully expected that the prince of
Condé would march upon the capital or else take the straight road
to Normandy in order to unite with the English and with their help
attempt to regain possession of Rouen and Dieppe. Paris was in the
greatest alarm. All the people living in the faubourgs were compelled
to abandon their houses. The state of the royal army was bad; the
soldiers were scattered and disorganized, for the spoil of Rouen had
induced every kind of license and debauchery. Moreover, the plague
was raging everywhere. In this exigency the duke of Guise abandoned
the country roundabout, within two or three leagues of Paris, to the
pillage of the Protestants, withdrew his scattered forces within the
walls, and feverishly employed every available person in the erection
of fortifications, principally upon the side toward Orleans, for which
certain unfinished erections of Francis I were utilized. The city
was so crowded with people even before the appearance of the troops
of the prince that it seemed to be in a state of siege. If Condé at
this time could have seized the river above and below the capital by
which provisions were received into Paris, the city could have been
speedily reduced to famine, as there was even at this time a scarcity
of food.[627]

But Louis of Condé was not a man of good judgment and, while
personally brave, he lacked political daring. To gain time for the
arrival of reinforcements, Catherine and the Guises wheedled him with
empty overtures for peace and sent the marshal Brissac’s brother to
the Protestant camp near Etampes to propose a plausible settlement,
saying that the Huguenots might have what they desired if they would
aid in expelling the Germans, and especially the English. The last
possibility was what the English agents in France had most feared, the
more because of the undeniable strength of the Catholic crown party,
which had won to itself a great number of the nobility, and because
of the approaching winter, the lack of money among the Huguenots, the
scarcity of food, and the weariness of the country. Such abandonment
of the English by the prince of Condé could hardly have been construed
as a breach of faith, seeing the apathy of the English participation
after the seizure of Havre-de-Grace and Elizabeth’s slowness in sending
him financial assistance. But the prince refused to treat with an
agent and continued his march toward Paris. On November 25 his cavalry
appeared in sight of the city and the queen mother and the constable
went out to parley further. The prince of Condé demanded the post of
lieutenant-general of the realm; for the Huguenots the right to have
churches in all towns except Paris and its _banlieue_ and frontier
towns; the right of all gentlemen to have private worship in their own
houses, and the retirement of the foreign troops. To these demands,
the queen replied that no one should have her authority, adding that
the government was already well made up of gentlemen, officers, and
ministers, among whom the responsibilities of state had been divided,
so that the government was capable of being well conducted until the
King had attained his majority. As to toleration, she declared that to
grant it would only be to encourage civil war.[628]

Too late Condé found that he had been trifled with[629] in order to
give the government time to bring up reinforcements[630] and that the
terms he offered had not even been considered. The blame for this
unfortunate turn in the war must rest, not upon the queen mother,
but upon the Guises. For the duke of Guise and his brother, with the
constable, could not but fear, that in the event of peace they would
be ruined, and the duke used his own popularity with the masses and
the enmity felt by the Parisians toward the queen to gain his ends.
When duplicity failed, then Catherine’s adversaries used intimidation,
and the Spanish ambassador at their instigation was sent to her,
“either threatening or protesting, or promising and offering aid,
and thus upsetting everything.”[631] When Paris was full of soldiers
negotiations were broken off, the prince of Condé declaring defiantly
that the Huguenots would sharpen their swords as they would have need
of them.

The only advantage the prince had gained was that he had been able
to draw his force close in toward Paris, so that in the last week in
November he was camped near the Pont de Charenton. On the 26th he
planted his camp on the left bank, a mile from the faubourgs. If the
prince of Condé had attacked Paris at once, instead of wasting time
at Corbeil in vain _pourparlers_, the whole Huguenot cause might have
triumphed, for the government would have been forced to yield almost
everything. He might have won the suburbs with little loss, although
in want of heavy artillery, and the city could not then have held out
long. But now the case was such that he either had to fight—with small
hope of winning, let alone of taking Paris—or else come to an accord
upon his enemy’s terms.[632]

The prevailing opinion was that the prince would not be able to keep
his army together for want of provisions and money, especially in
mid-winter.[633] This proved to be true. On December 9 he broke camp
and marched off crestfallen, toward Normandy, after burning the camp,
to effect a juncture with the English.[634] By this time he had barely
7,000 men, the time of the year telling hard upon the army, for it
was compelled to live in the open, while his adversaries had 15,000
or 16,000 men of all nations, one-quarter of whom were mounted. The
difficulty of his position was the greater because he was on the left
bank of the Seine, with no prospect of passing the river, for the duke
of Guise lay at Poissy,[635] while the Rhinegrave and Villebonne were
guarding Pont de l’Arche lower down. Warwick was unwilling to venture
forth from Havre to the prince’s assistance, but hoped, by stopping
the shipment of salt and other merchandise up the Seine, to be able
to compel the towns of Normandy, as Honfleur, Harfleur, Caudebec, and
Rouen, for necessity’s sake to come to terms.[636] Being unable to pass
the Seine, Condé drew off toward Chartres, followed at the distance of
about five leagues by the duke of Guise and the constable, and came to
a halt near Montfort not far from Evreux, while Guise lay at a point
about ten leagues west of St. Denis, from whence, including Paris,
he drew his supplies.[637] All around the two armies the country was
destroyed.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF DREUX, DECEMBER 19, 1562

(Bib. Nat., Estampes, _Histoire de France_, Q. b)]

The prince’s inability to secure provisions, combined with the failure
of English support, finally compelled him to give battle to the duke of
Guise near Dreux on December 19, the engagement being precipitated by
his attempt to force the passage of the Eure, although the odds were
against him in every particular, for the duke of Guise was posted at
a point so chosen that he could fall back on Dreux if compelled to do
so; his flank was protected by a stream and a wood; and his artillery
was more numerous than that of Condé.[638] The advance guard of the
Huguenots was commanded by the admiral; the “battle,” in which were the
German reiters, by D’Andelot; the rear guard by the prince of Condé
himself. The Huguenot ministers and preachers, armed and mounted,
moved about among the men, who sang their psalms in such a loud voice
that the camp of the King could easily hear them. On the Catholic side
the marshal St. André was pitted against D’Andelot; the constable
Montmorency commanded the rear guard, with instructions to hold off
until the Huguenot rear guard entered the fight; while the duke of
Guise himself commanded the advance guard against the admiral.[639]

The battle was begun about noon by a victorious charge of the Huguenot
horse, headed by Condé and Coligny, which drove back the Catholic Swiss
and resulted in the capture of six pieces of cannon and the constable
Montmorency who was slightly wounded in the mouth. His captors “sent
him to Orleans with such speed, that he drank but once by the way and
that on horseback.”[640] The second charge was less effective owing
chiefly to the slowness of the prince’s German reiters who had to have
their orders interpreted to them, and partly to the effective artillery
fire of the enemy, and culminated in the capture of Condé, whose horse
was shot under him. Too late to save the prince of Condé the admiral
made a partial rally of the French and German cavalry, in the course of
whose attack the marshal St. André was killed.[641] Even then the issue
might have been different if the Huguenot footmen had not behaved like
cowards.[642] The Protestant loss included about 800 of the noblesse,
and nearly 6,000 footmen and reiters according to those who buried the
dead.[643] The Catholic loss was about 2,000, the most conspicuous
among the fallen being the marshal St. André and Montbrun, the youngest
son of the constable Montmorency.[644]

The battle of Dreux was fought on the day of the feast of St.
Thomas—almost the shortest day of the year—and the Huguenots had to
thank the oncoming of darkness for saving them from pursuit. Under its
cover Coligny drew off toward Auneau where he pitched camp, but some
of the Huguenot horse galloped all night toward Orleans. Fortunate was
the Calvinist who could find a cross to put upon his clothing on the
morrow.[645] Twenty-two standards of the prince of Condé were found
upon the ground, which were sent to the King and hung in the cathedral
of Notre Dame. Almost all Condé’s German footmen were taken prisoners,
about 2,000, three-quarters of whom were sent back to Germany on
parole, without weapons, and bearing white rods in witness of their
abdication; the rest entered the service of the King and were joined
with the Rhinegrave’s forces under command of Bassompierre, an Alsatian
in the service of Charles IX.[646]

[Illustration:

CAMPAIGN OF DREUX
NOV.-DEC. 1562

_Methuen & Co._
]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF DREUX according to COMMANDANT de COYNART

_Methuen & Co._
]

The battle of Dreux, while not a complete rout of the Huguenots, was
no less a disaster, because it foiled the efforts of Coligny to effect
a junction with the English in Havre and compelled him to fall back
on Orleans. Even Spain breathed easier, for anxiety lest the English
get Calais was dispelled.[647] Moreover, the French Protestants were
in need of money, both Coligny’s and D’Andelot’s troops being in
arrears of pay, the latter’s reiters having gone three months without
wages.[648] On the other hand the government was in better financial
condition through the efforts of the cardinal of Lorraine, who
collected some money at the Council of Trent[649] in order to continue
the war, and the active efficiency of the Spanish ambassador and the
papal legate, who were excellent coworkers.[650] Yet, in spite of
defeat, Coligny was resolved to continue the fight, though uncertain
what policy to follow. At first he was inclined to go into Dauphiné and
join forces with Des Adresse against the duke of Nemours,[651] but the
prospect of Catholic relief from Germany in the early spring made it
advisable to abandon this plan.

The military situation was much as follows in mid-January, 1563: the
Huguenot center was at Orleans, where D’Andelot lay, in control of the
middle line of the Loire above Blois and as far northward as Chateaudun
and the vicinity of Chartres;[652] Coligny lay at Villefranche
(January 12); Montgomery was in Dieppe and the English in Havre. But
communication between the Protestant coreligionists was prevented by
the way in which the Catholic troops were disposed. Etampes, which the
duke of Guise recovered in January, restored the necessary connecting
link between Blois and Paris, and the whole line of the Seine was in
the hands of the Catholics; Warwick was being besieged in Havre by
Vieilleville (he had succeeded the Marshal St. André and was also
governor of Normandy), who lay at Caudebec.[653] The marshal Brissac
was at Rouen with seventeen ensigns. The marshal Bourdillon who had
been given the bâton of the late marshal Termes was in Piedmont. Paris
of course was in the government’s hands. In Berry where the upper
waters of the Loire and the Seine flow close together the lines of the
two hostile parties came in contact. The admiral in the second week in
January, 1563, passed the Loire at Beaugency and distributed his men
at St. Aignan, Celles, and Montrichard, which lay on the right bank
of the stream.[654] At the same time Guise had been minded to cross
the river the other way and attack Orleans. This move on the part of
each commander brought about a collision of forces near Cléry, in
which Guise was repulsed. The condition of the country at the time
was terrible, especially for the duke, whose troopers were so pressed
that they had to forage twelve leagues from camp.[655] Everywhere the
reiters were held in terror, for these raiders frequently made long
and rapid marches and fell suddenly upon places, carrying death and
destruction with them.

In the meanwhile, the constable had been kept in light captivity at
Orleans,[656] a treatment in contrast with that experienced by Condé,
who was first kept under strong guard by Damville in the little abbey
of St. Pierre at Chartres, both the windows and the street being
barred, and later, on January 24, 1563, brought to Paris.[657] Ever
since Dreux, the queen mother and the constable had been constantly
employed in the endeavor to make a settlement.[658] In the case of
the constable, self-interest was the chief motive: he chafed under
confinement and was envious of the duke of Guise.[659] On the other
hand, Catherine’s anxiety was of a political nature. She was fearful
lest England permanently acquire Havre-de-Grace. Her purpose was to
make peace with the Huguenots and then unite the parties in a war for
the recovery of Havre.[660] But the mistrust of the Huguenots that the
overtures of peace were meant to be an accord in appearance only; the
ambition of the Guises who saw their power thrive in the struggle; the
opposition of Paris, and perhaps above all, the opposition of Spain,
were difficulties in the way.[661] Philip II’s joy over Dreux was
tempered by his anxiety, and he secretly aimed to thwart any terms of
peace at all favorable to the Protestants.[662] Catherine probably
would have preferred to abide by anything rather than have the Guises
gain greater profit.[663] The queen mother urged the necessity of
peace on account of lack of funds to carry on the war.[664] But her
arguments were cast to the winds by the triumphant Guises when money
began to pour into France from Spain, Venice, the duke of Tuscany, and
from some of the Catholic German princes.[665]

On the other hand, the penury of the Protestants increased from day
to day. Coligny was in daily fear lest the reiters would desert
him on account of the delay in paying them.[666] In vain he wrote
to Elizabeth, urging the speedy remittance of money. The cautious
procrastination and niggardly policy of Elizabeth in the end was
fatal to his purpose. In vain her ambassador in France, the faithful
Throckmorton, urged immediate and liberal action. Warwick also added
his plea, informing the home government and the queen that the admiral
would be “ruined and unable to hold up his head without her aid in men
and money.”[667] Elizabeth’s notorious parsimony led her to deceive
the French Protestants with vague promises, a policy so short-sighted
that it ultimately lost England the support of the Huguenots and
compelled the evacuation of Havre-de-Grace, which otherwise they might
have made another Calais. By February the admiral’s patience was
well-nigh exhausted, and his troops in mutiny, the reiters raiding the
country to such an extent that the court and the foreign ambassadors
were compelled to retire from Chartres to Blois, not daring to try
to go to Paris. As his position became more desperate from want of
funds, Coligny determined to strike northward, if possible to effect a
juncture with the English on the coast of Normandy, and so while his
agents parleyed for peace in order to gain time and deceive the enemy,
the admiral, leaving his wagons and baggage behind him in order that
his reiters might ride unimpeded, stole away from Jargau on the night
of February 1 with 2,000 reiters, 1,000 mounted arquebusiers, and 500
gentry. His purpose was to join Warwick, but when he reached Dreux,
where the battle had been fought six weeks earlier, he discovered that
it was impossible for him to cross the Seine, and hence, after sending
word to the earl that he was in hard straits for money to pay his men
and had “much ado to keep them together,” he drew off toward Caen.[668]

While Coligny lay at Dives, Throckmorton—it must have been against
his own convictions—was sent to confer with him, informing him that
if the admiral counted that the payment of his army and the support of
the war depended upon Elizabeth alone, he was to understand that the
people of England would not willingly contribute to such an expense,
since the war was of little profit to them. Therefore Elizabeth advised
the Huguenots not to refuse reasonable conditions of peace, the English
queen including in the sphere of “reasonable conditions” Huguenot
insistence that Calais be restored to England.[669]

In the meantime, while Coligny’s position was growing worse and
worse, the position of D’Andelot in Orleans had also become serious.
The duke of Guise invested the city on February 4, and got possession
of Portereau (February 6), a faubourg of Orleans across the river,
which had been fortified during the previous summer. But the Huguenots
still held the town at their end of the bridge and broke several of
the arches down. A tiny island lay in the stream and this the duke
planned to reach by filling thousands of sacks with sand and gravel
and throwing them into the river between the banks at Portereau and
the island from whence he would be more able to attack Orleans with
cannon.[670] But it being winter time, the river was too deep and the
current too strong. Failing this, he planned to cut the river above
Orleans in order to let the water into the meadow lands.[671] The
spirited siege lasted many days. Every kind of metal was impressed into
service by those of Orleans, including shells made of brass, “which was
a new device and very terrible,” and their ammunition seemed likely to
outlast that of their enemy. The Catholic position around Orleans was
by no means an enviable one. Food, money, and ammunition were lacking.
All Guise’s men-at-arms and light horsemen lived at discretion—that
is, they quartered themselves on the surrounding villages and forced
the poor people of the country to feed them and their horses. The
court was doing the same at Blois to the “marvellous destruction” of
the country. The lack of powder bade fair to be fatal to the duke’s
success, for the government’s powder factories at Chartres, Chateaudun,
and Paris were all blown up, accidentally or otherwise, about this
time, that of Paris having occurred on January 28, 1563, with great
destruction of property and some lives.[672] In consequence of these
disasters, the Catholic artillery had to send all the way to Flanders
for gunpowder. Although some breaches were made in the wall by the
Catholics, the duke of Guise delayed final assault, for two reasons:
first, because the queen mother hoped to take the city by composition,
secondly, because Catholic reinforcements were looked for late in March
out of Germany, Switzerland, and Gascony, to the number of ten thousand.

No such silver lining lightened the cloud on the Huguenot horizon.
D’Andelot from Orleans, the princess of Condé, Eleanor de Roye, from
Strasburg, her imprisoned husband, and Coligny all implored the English
queen in vain for speedy relief. The admiral’s position by the end
of February was desperate. He had been compelled to move into the
western part of Normandy, for his 5,000 reiters were “in such rage
for their money that he could scarce keep them together,” and were
being so corrupted by the enemy that he might otherwise have lost
them utterly.[673] Powder also was wanting.[674] The condition of
Montgomery[675] in Dieppe and of Warwick in Havre was quite as bad.
In Havre food was so scarce that rations were reduced to a two-penny
loaf to four persons; wood was unprocurable; the water was bad.[676]
The spoiling of Normandy from the devastation of Coligny’s reiters who
were levying upon the country without law or order, and burning and
destroying villages without regard to religion, was terrible. “If
the reiters understand that another messenger has arrived here (Caen)
from the queen and the money not come,” wrote the admiral, “it will be
impossible to save our throats from being cut.” Fortunately the very
next day the English ambassador arrived in Caen with word for Coligny
to the effect that eight thousand pounds in English sovereigns, French
crowns, angels, and pistolets were on the way from Portsmouth to
Caen.[677] Fire opened on Caen castle on March 1, and the next day the
marquis D’Elbœuf surrendered it. Bayeux also capitulated.[678] The fall
of these two places and the fearful state of the country,[679] might
have broken the resolution of the crown to continue the war.[680] But
another fate intervened.

[Illustration: ASSASSINATION OF THE DUKE OF GUISE, FEBRUARY 18, 1563
(Tortorel and Perissin)]

Henry of Guise was mortally wounded on the night of February 18, 1563,
by a Huguenot assassin named Poltrot[681] and died on Ash Wednesday
following, February 24. The death of the duke of Guise was a heavy blow
to the Catholics. His following, because of his personal magnetism,
was greater than that of any other Catholic leader, for many noblemen
and gentlemen adhered to the Catholic cause more for love of him than
for loyalty to the established religion. Moreover, he was an able
general uniting quickness of intelligence, determination, experience,
popularity, and physical endurance in his talented person. Immediately
after Guise was hurt, the queen mother went to the camp with the
desire to see the constable. The prince of Condé and the constable
were obviously the men of the hour, and as they could not conduct
negotiations while they were prisoners, they were both liberated on
March 8, and held a conference together on that day.[682] On March 19
the King, with the assent of his council, formally decreed religious
toleration and appointed the prince of Condé lieutenant-general of the
realm with exemption for seizure of any of the royal revenues by him
during the troubles.[683] It was high time for peace to be made, for
the revolt of the provinces was increasing. In La Rochelle, Poitou,
Guyenne, and Picardy the “Howegenosys” had again rebelled in February,
and the lieutenants of these provinces sent to Blois for aid.[684]

[Illustration: INTERVIEW ON THE ILE-AUX-BŒUFS

(Bib. Nat., Estampes, _Histoire de France_, Q. b)]

The terms of Amboise are interesting because they mark the triumph of
the aristocratic element in the Huguenot party, whose interests were
identified with their political purposes and their feudal position,
over the “Geneva party,” who were austere Calvinists, and who had an
eye single to religion only.[685] D’Andelot, and to a less degree the
admiral, were representatives of this latter group.[686] The terms of
peace provided that the prince of Condé was to succeed to the place
of the late king of Navarre; that the Huguenot army was to be paid
by the government; that in all towns where the Reformed religion
prevailed, save Paris, it was to be protected; that in every bailiwick
the King was to appoint one town where the gospel might be preached;
that all gentlemen holding fiefs in low or mean justice might have
preaching in their houses for the benefit of their families; that all
nobles enjoying high justice might have preaching on their estates;
that property confiscated from either church was to be restored.[687]
Paris firmly refused at first to tolerate any terms of peace,[688] its
Catholic prejudices being aggravated by desire to revenge the murder of
the duke of Guise; but the King replied to the demur of the Parlement
that the city must make up its mind to accept the conditions.[689]
On the other hand, Lyons as obstinately refused to receive the mass,
so that the country round about it remained turbulent well into the
autumn.[690] Rouen, Dijon, Toulouse, encouraged by the opposition of
the Parlement, refused to recognize the edict.[691] The roads were
filled with robbers, and the continued presence of the reiters, to whom
an enormous sum in wages was due, was a perpetual menace.

The Germans who had been in the service of the King and those of the
prince of Condé fraternized on the road home. They made a great troop
to the number of 10,000 or 12,000, taking the road from Orleans by way
of Pluvières and Etampes to Paris, and arrived there in Easter week,
where they stayed for five weeks at least. When they left they were an
entire day crossing the bridge over the Seine, because of the enormous
amount of baggage which they had. After having crossed the Seine, the
reiters divided into two bands for better living, one of them skirting
the right bank of the Seine, the other crossing Brie to the Marne,
in order to find better provisions for themselves and their horses.
These latter traversed Champagne to the River Aube and encamped at
Montier-en-Der near Vassy for six entire weeks, marauding the country
for five or six leagues about. Their depredations drove the peasantry
to such despair that protective associations composed of the peasantry
and nobles were formed to resist their aggressions, and these fell upon
stragglers whenever they found a little group of them, and cut their
throats. Gradually, however, these despoilers were drawn off out of the
land, being accompanied to the frontier by the French infantry under
the command of the prince de Porcien, who was then at Metz, where he
had been stationed to foil any effort the Emperor might make for its
recovery.[692] The priest-historian of Provins has graphically depicted
the depredations of the reiters:

At the beginning of this war [he says] the people of the villages
were so rich and well provided for, so well furnished in their houses
with all kinds of furniture, so well provided with poultry and
animals, that it was noble to see.... But the soldiers destroyed their
beautiful tables, their shining brass-bound chests, and killed a great
quantity of poultry without paying for it, or else offering a paltry
sum in proportion to the number of soldiers who were lodged in the
house. It was all one whether one man or many were so lodged, because
the soldier who had a house to himself seized everything to his own
profit. The wives and daughters of the peasantry were compelled to
defend their honor. Property was seized and every sort of villainy was
done by the soldiers, within the space of the three or four days that
they might remain at a place.[693]

Not since the Hundred Years’ War had France beheld a people more
fearful and formidable than were these reiters. They plundered the
wretched people of all their goods, loading their horses and wagons
therewith. Amid their equipment they carried winnowing fans to winnow
the grain, flails to beat it in the granges, and sacks to bind it up
in. They had with them mills to grind the grain and little ovens to
bake bread in. Wherever they lodged they tore up floors, broke into
closets, and ransacked gardens, courts, and chimneys, in order to find
booty. They even fell upon the houses and châteaux of the nobles, where
they passed, if they saw they were not strong or well defended.[694]
For this reason those living in poorly fortified houses vacated them
and fled to the towns. Those who owned strong and well-fortified houses
levied soldiers for their defense. What happened at Provins happened,
doubtless, in many other places, too.

In the carrefours of Provins, it was proclaimed that no inhabitant of
the town, under pain of a fine of one hundred livres _tournois_ and
imprisonment, should leave it, and that every man at the hour of ten in
the morning must report with his arms before the house of his sergeant
(_dizainier_) for the purpose of mounting guard upon the walls, each in
his own part of the city. Everybody in the surrounding country began
to vacate their houses and to drive their cattle into the town. On the
evening before Easter messengers of Provins reported that the reiters
were near. At this news watchers were set upon the wall of the town,
and a _corps de garde_ posted by the town authorities. On the morning
of the morrow, which was Easter Sunday, the gates of the town were not
opened until eight o’clock, upon which there poured into the town an
infinite number of wagons and pack-animals laden with the possessions
of the villagers round about. There was hardly room to bestow so many
people and so many animals. Divine service was celebrated in the parish
churches, for it was expected that the reiters would take their course
toward the town, and the people were resolved not to let them enter,
but to resist to the very last drop of blood.

In order to ascertain what was the equipment and the arms of each
inhabitant of the town, a general meeting was called at midday for
a view of arms, but it was not possible to hold the meeting because
all the streets and squares were packed with the refugees and their
animals. In consequence of this, local meetings were held in each
of the quarters of the city. Thus the day wore on and consternation
abated only when it was learned that the reiters had gone off toward
the Marne, which they crossed above Coulumiers On the morrow, Easter
Monday, there was no procession in the streets as usual, for fear of
a surprise, and it was not until evening that the people who had found
refuge within the town, began to depart.[695]

But the undisguised hostility of Spain to the Edict of Amboise was
a greater source of danger to France than protests of the Parlement
or popular violence. “If the heretics obtain their demands with the
aid of the English queen,” Chantonnay had threatened on March 6, “the
Catholics in their turn will rise, and they will be sustained by the
King my master and by all the Catholic princes.”[696] But Catherine was
in no mood to be intimidated. She openly told him that he treated her
as if he governed the country, and charged him with wilful fabrication,
sarcastically adding that she could excuse him for so doing in some
degree because she knew from whom he derived his opinions, meaning the
constable and the two deceased members of the Triumvirate.[697] Philip
II’s religious convictions were outraged by the toleration of Calvinism
allowed in the Edict of Amboise, the more so because the queen mother,
in justification of the course of the government, compromised the
church at large by declaring that the sole practical solution of
the difficulty could be accomplished by a true general council of
the church, and _not_ by the one sitting at Trent, in defiance of
whose conclusions she asserted the legality and inviolability of the
edict.[698]

Catherine de Medici was deeply concerned over the conduct of the
Council of Trent. For the programme of zealous advocates of the
counter-Reformation there aimed at church consolidation and the
enlargement of papal authority to such an extent that the immemorial
liberties of the Gallican church, confirmed by the great concordat of
1516, and the rights of the crown over the temporalities of the church
in France were seriously threatened. The complication of the Huguenots
with England and the murder of the duke of Guise had brought this issue
to a head. In the month in which the duke was assassinated there was
a significant meeting of the ambassadors of the ultra-Catholic powers
resident at the French court, in which it was resolved to support
the Council in matters of religion; to prevent future appropriation
of church revenues by the state under pain of excommunication; to
stamp out heresy; and to avenge the murder of the duke of Guise.[699]
The cardinal of Lorraine was the chief representative of France at
Trent and perhaps the most conspicuous prelate there. He was bitter
against the policy of Charles IX, advocating utter suppression of the
Huguenots. His continuance at Trent, therefore, became a danger to
France and Catherine de Medici dexterously found means to remove him by
sending him on special errands to Vienna and Venice, leaving the case
of France at Trent in the hands of the sieur de Lansac, whose loyalty
to the Catholic faith did not subvert his patriotism.[700]

Aside from his religious antagonism, Philip II regarded his own
political interests as also jeopardized by the French situation. He
was alarmed at the possible recovery of Calais by England,[701] and
the progress of heresy and rebellion in the Netherlands, especially at
Valenciennes and Tournay, was certain to be encouraged by the example
of France, while a common effort of the Huguenots of Picardy and those
of the religion across the Flemish border was seriously feared.[702]

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR WITH ENGLAND—THE PEACE OF TROYES[703] (1563-64)

The closure of the civil war was a necessary condition precedent to
the war France now planned to wage with her “adversary of England”
for the recovery of Havre-de-Grace. Catherine de Medici had paid
Coligny’s reiters in order to close the chasm as soon as possible. The
keen-witted representatives of Queen Elizabeth in France—Throckmorton
and Smith—had done all in their power to diussade the Protestants
from making peace.[704] Too late Elizabeth perceived the result of
her procrastination. War between England and France over Havre was
inevitable,[705] though in March the French government dissembled its
real intention, giving the English to understand that the last portion
of the fourth article of the peace, which referred to putting strangers
out of the realm, applied to the German reiters.[706]

The English declared that if the French would restore Calais to the
queen, Elizabeth would surrender Havre-de-Grace and Dieppe, with all
that was held by the English in Normandy.[707] But the French contended
that the English, having occupied Havre-de-Grace, were deprived of all
right to Calais,[708] and declined to entertain such a proffer, hoping
to recover Havre-de-Grace by force[709] and also to remain masters
of Calais by virtue of the treaty of 1559, which provided that if,
during the term of the treaty, which was to endure for the space of
eight years, the English acquired other possessions in France, they
would immediately lose their right to Calais. To this England replied
that France had been the first offender, when French troops were sent
into Scotland in aid of Queen Mary; and that thereby the treaty was
broken and Calais was due her. Elizabeth refused to see that her own
selfish conduct had compelled the Huguenots to make terms, and bitterly
upbraided the Huguenot leaders for their “desertion.”[710]

The determination to push the war proceeded entirely from the queen,
the chief members of the government having opposed it both because
of the strength of the fortress, which they thought difficult to
take, and also because of the confusion which still prevailed in
the kingdom. On April 7 the prince of Condé was established in the
lieutenantship. Marshal Brissac, who was chief military commander, a
week later quitted Paris for Normandy in company with the Swiss, and
the whole artillery lately used before Orleans was sent forward.[711]
Artillery and ammunition were sent by the river, and provisions also
were forwarded. The campaign was delayed until this time for two
reasons: first, to ascertain whether the internal disturbances could
be quelled and the reiters gotten out of the kingdom, as otherwise it
would have been perilous to make any movement in the direction of the
coast; secondly, all the territory of Normandy had been so devasted by
the war that the army could not be maintained except at very great
cost and inconvenience. Fortunately for the French government anxiety
with reference to the Emperor’s designs regarding Metz was now removed,
the cardinal of Lorraine having persuaded Ferdinand that if the Three
Bishoprics were restored they would become a refuge for the heretics
from Lower Germany and Luxembourg.[712]

The queen mother appealed to Paris to obtain 200,000 crowns, and a
royal edict commanded the clergy to contribute 100,000 _écus de rentes_
annual revenue.[713] At the same time a government _octroi_ upon wines
was laid for six years, to the dismay of many towns, which opposed
the execution of the edict, claiming that the vine and wine were
their sole means of livelihood.[714] The King also went to Parlement
to obtain pecuniary supplies there against England, saying that the
200,000 crowns from the city was to be used to pay the reiters of the
Rhinegrave, who had mutinied for their pay in Champagne, to quit the
kingdom.[715] Paris readily responded, “the Parisians caring not what
they gave to recover Newhaven;” it had been “a scourge and loss to them
of many millions of francs” during that year.[716]

Meanwhile the position of Warwick in Havre had grown so bad that he
had expelled all strangers from the town.[717] Anticipating a siege,
a new fosse 30 feet wide, 10 feet broad, and 8 feet deep had been
constructed outside of the old ditch around the town. The delay of
the English government, however, was fatal to the success of Warwick.
All his labors went for naught.[718] On May 22 the French assault
upon Havre began in earnest.[719] In the midst of the tedium and
the anxiety Catherine de Medici dominated all, having no regard for
her own convenience, but being in vigorous action at all hours, and
under great mental strain most of the time. Yet her patience, her
address, and her assiduous attention during the time of the siege to
the councils of the government, and to her continual audiences, were
remarkable. “Her Majesty,” wrote the Venetian ambassador, “exceeds all
that could be expected from her sex, and even from an experienced man
of valor, or from a powerful king and military captain.” She insisted
on being present at all the assaults, and even in the trenches, where
cannon-balls and arquebus-bullets were flying.[720]

The character of Catherine de Medici from this time forth, throughout
her long and varied career, continued to fill her subjects with
astonishment. Not even the most consummate courtier could have
praised her beauty. She had big eyes and thick lips, like Leo X, her
great-uncle.[721] She possessed, too, the characteristics of her
family. She loved to erect public edifices; to collect books. She made
a profession of satisfying everybody, at least in words, of which she
was not saving. Her industry in public business was the subject of
astonishment. Nothing was too small for her notice. She could neither
eat nor drink without talking politics. She followed the army without
regard to her health or even her life. Her physical characteristics, if
not the admiration, were certainly the wonder of all. She was fond of
good-living, eating much and irregularly, and was addicted to physical
exercise, especially hunting, which she also followed for the purpose
of reducing her weight. With this design, incredible as it may seem,
she often rode clad in heavy furs.[722] When fifty years of age she
could walk so fast that no one in the court was willing to follow her.

The difficulties of the French in the siege of Havre-de-Grace were
very great. The locality was surrounded for the distance of a mile by
marsh and by the waters of the sea, which were cut by inaccessible
canals. There was a strand of sand on the seaside only about thirty
yards distant from the wall at low tide. The besiegers passed along the
shore, somewhat concealed by the sand and gravel cast up by the sea,
and wedged themselves and their artillery between this strand and the
sea, and opened fire. By the end of July the French had approached so
near the walls of Havre-de-Grace that they were almost able to batter
them point-blank, and the besieged went out to parley and demanded four
days’ time to communicate with England.[723]

[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF THE FORTIFICATIONS OF HAVRE-DE-GRACE

Dated July 15, 1563. Original in Public Record Office, State Papers,
Foreign, Elizabeth, Vol. XL, No. 919.]

The garrison was reduced to a sorry plight, for the French were about
to storm the place, as they had already battered effectually and
dismantled a bulwark and several towers of the fort and filled up the
whole moat, so that with but a little more work they would have opened
a road for themselves securely with a spade. They had, moreover, a
battery of forty cannon, so that while only twenty or thirty shots each
day formed the usual feature of a siege at this time, the French now
fired more than a hundred and twenty shots.[724] At last on July 28
Warwick agreed to surrender Havre-de-Grace, and to embark in four days.
Two days later the English admiral Clinton appeared in sight, with
thirty ships and five galliots. The French artillery was then directed
toward the sea, so the admiral set sail the next evening with the
fleet, and the French army entered on Sunday, August 1, 1563.[725]

The capture of Havre was of immense immediate advantage to France,
especially to Normandy, Havre being the door through which all
the traffic and commerce entered, not only to Rouen, but also to
Normandy, and to a great part of France. Without this commerce
Normandy-of-the-Seine suffered greatly.[726]

But Elizabeth was reluctant to believe that she had been beaten,
and the autumn of the year witnessed tedious negotiations.[727] The
chief difficulty between the two crowns turned on the restitution of
Calais. The French insisted that they were absolved from the terms of
Cateau-Cambrésis through the action taken by England in the matter of
Havre-de-Grace; that thereby forfeiture of the English right to Calais
was made.[728] Elizabeth, on the other hand, would not make peace
unless her pretensions were recognized.[729]

In the meanwhile, in the seas of Flanders, France, and England
thousands of acts of piracy were committed, and trade in the Channel
was quite interrupted.[730] A partial agreement at last was patched
up. On April 11, 1564, the treaty of peace was signed at Troyes,[731]
the articles yielding Havre-de-Grace to France, in return for 120,000
gold crowns, a sum which the English grudgingly took, though they
had demanded a half million, the terms also providing for property
indemnifications and freedom of commerce between the two nations.

Nothing was specified as to Calais. After three years of negotiations
the question still remained unsettled. In June, 1567, Sir Thomas Smith,
Elizabeth’s ambassador, demanded the restitution of Calais. Charles was
evasive, saying that the messenger must be content to wait till the
King had obtained the consent of his council, before whom the King told
Smith openly that he would not restore Calais, but would hold it as the
possession of his ancestors, to which the queen of England had no just
right. When the ambassador replied, citing the word of the treaty, the
chancellor answered that the promise had been given under the express
conditions that the English queen should not in any way molest the
subjects or territory of France or Scotland, but from what had taken
place at Havre-de-Grace it appeared manifest that she had forfeited all
claims which she might have had to Calais. The King’s rejoinder was
notable in that it is so excellent an example of the French doctrine of
“natural frontiers,” Charles IX replying to the effect that the queen
ought not to regret the loss of Calais, knowing that of old it was the
possession of the crown of France, and that God had willed it to return
to its first master, and that the two realms ought to remain content
with the frontiers created for them by nature and with a boundary so
clearly defined as the sea.[732]

CHAPTER IX

EARLY LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL CATHOLIC LEAGUES

Thanks to her own enterprise in pushing the war which had culminated
with so much honor to France, and partly also to her skilful handling
of the factions at court, Catherine de Medici was now in enjoyment
of supreme power. The entire weight of the government rested on her
shoulders, there being no longer any other person who controlled public
affairs. The Guises and Châtillon factions were full of animosity
toward one another, for Madame de Guise refused to recognize the
admiral’s acquittal for the murder of her husband;[733] Montmorency
was deeply offended because the young duke of Guise received the
grand-mastership and the gift of the duchy of Châtellerault, and so
feigned to have the gout in order to avoid service before Havre; Condé
was doubly angry at the queen, both because she withheld the promised
lieutenant’s commission and because the daughter of Marshal St. André,
who left a great fortune, was not permitted to marry his son. The
parties were, therefore, in a triangular relation toward one another
and Catherine’s art was bent upon maintaining the balance in order to
hold her own.[734]

The population of the wittiest city in Europe was quick to perceive
the animosities and paradoxes that existed. “The Parisians have three
things to wonder at,” the saying went, “the constable’s beads, the
chancellor’s mass, and the cardinal Châtillon’s red cap. One is ever
mumbling over his beads and his head is ever occupied with other
affairs; the other hears mass daily and is the chief Huguenot in
France; the third wears a cardinal’s cap and defies the Pope.”[735] The
queen mother had hoped that religious animosities would be forgotten
in the course of the war with England. But she was disappointed. The
peace of Amboise could not be enforced. Even in Paris armed troops
and armed guards had to patrol the streets to prevent outbreaks of
violence.[736] It was impossible to disarm the Catholics, who made
house-to-house searches to ferret out Huguenots.[737] Under the terms
of pacification the Protestants were permitted to return to Paris,
but who dared avail himself of so precarious a liberty? Instead, they
were compelled to sacrifice their property.[738] In the provinces the
same condition of things prevailed—in Languedoc, in the Orléannais,
in the Lyonnais.[739] In Languedoc the association of the Huguenots
maintained its organization, raised money, levied troops.[740] Yet in
spite of its failure to enforce pacification, the government required
the demolition of the walls of towns known to be Huguenot strongholds,
as Orleans, Montauban, and St. Lô, a procedure which the Protestants
strongly resisted; so that a condition of petty civil war existed
throughout much of France, the Edict of Amboise notwithstanding.[741]
Summarized, the troubles of France at this time may be said to have
been the feud between the house of Guise and that of Châtillon—a feud
which compromised the crown and most of the other great families of
the kingdom; the queen’s ambition to govern, which led her to nourish
the quarrel; religious intolerance; the poverty of the crown; the
uncertainty of its foreign relations; and finally the detriment to its
commerce on account of the war with England, which deprived France of
four or five millions of gold.[742]

Even before peace was made between France and England it had been
decided that the King should make a tour of the provinces for the
better pacification of the country.[743] A programme of administrative
and financial reform was developed at the same time. The army was to
be reduced; in place of the royal garrisons there was to be a “belle
milice” of forty ensigns of footmen, ten each in Picardy, Normandy,
Languedoc, and Dauphiné. These troops were to be supported partly by
the crown, partly by the provinces. The Scotch Guard was to be cut
down. Through the church’s aid twelve millions of the public debt,
including the unpaid balance of the dowries of Elizabeth of Spain and
the duchess of Savoy, were to be paid off within six years and the
alienated domains of the crown redeemed.[744] Already Charles IX’s
majority had been declared at Rouen, during the course of the siege
of Havre[745]—a dexterous stroke of the queen mother to thwart the
ambitions of the factions.[746]

In the early spring of 1564 the court set out from Fontainebleau, and
thence went to Sens and Troyes, where the peace was signed; from Troyes
the way led to Bar-le-Duc and Nancy. But the journey of the King,
instead of allaying the disquietude of the Huguenots, alarmed them
still more. For the strongest overtures were made to the King to break
the peace of Amboise, not only by provincial authorities[747] but also
through the ambassadors of certain of the Catholic powers.

The Council of Trent had finished its labors with somewhat unseemly
haste on December 4, 1563, on account of the anticipated decease
of Pius IV,[748] and strong pressure was brought upon the French
and Spanish governments to accept its findings.[749] The Pope, in
consistory, accepted them in their integrity, on January 26, 1564.[750]
But various European governments, especially France, strongly objected
to the findings as prejudicial to the interests of monarchy.[751]
On the first Monday in Lent the cardinal of Lorraine presented the
decrees of Trent to the King in council and others of the Parlement,
urging that their adoption was necessary for the repose of the kingdom.
The debate which followed, in a certain sense was a test of strength
between the moderate Catholic party, led by the chancellor L’Hôpital
and the Guises. Much objection was made to the findings, especially by
the chancellor, who asserted that they were contrary to the privileges
of the Gallican church, and that the cardinal’s party was now trying
to compass by craft what they had failed to do by force of arms. The
cardinal rejoined with words to the effect that L’Hôpital was unmindful
of the benefits he had received of them (the Guises), using the word
“ingrate” (_ingrat_). To this the chancellor haughtily returned that he
had never received any benefits from the cardinal or his family, that
he had only filled the post of _maître de requêtes_, which was not a
high office, and that he did not desire to pay his debts at the expense
of the King’s sovereignty by voting in favor of the decrees. In the
end, France refused to accept all of the findings.[752]

With the closing of the Council of Trent, the representatives of
the ultra-Catholic powers, notably Spain and Savoy, intimated to
Charles IX that their sovereigns would assist him in the extirpation
of heresy in France. The offer was both a promise and a menace, the
implication being that the Catholic world at large would not tolerate
the recognition of Protestantism accorded by France and that a joint
action of the powers most concerned might compel the king of France to
live up to his title of Most Christian King. The cardinal of Lorraine
had carried the idea of the Triumvirate to Trent with him,[753] and on
the floor of the Council had proposed the formation of an association
to be called “The Brotherhood of Catholics in France.” He offered to
secure the co-operation of his nephews, relatives, and friends, and
returned to France with the consent of the Pope for that purpose.[754]
The Triumvirate, as we have seen, had already made overtures to Spain,
to which Philip II had responded with cordial, if no very definite
sentiments, and from the time of the promulgation of the Edict of
January and the formation of the Triumvirate, the idea of a Catholic
league in which the Pope and the king of Spain were to be the chief
pillars, begins to take shape.[755] The mission of Louis de St. Gelais,
sieur de Lansac, to Trent and Rome in this month, was partly to prevent
the formation of such a league, and partly to persuade the Pope to
approve the French government’s appropriation of the property of the
church. Granvella was not unfavorable to the idea, though in his eyes
such a league should be formed, not for the purpose of intervening in
France, but as a defensive measure, lest Catherine endeavor to profit
by the critical situation prevailing in the Spanish Netherlands and
interfere there in order to divert the discontent of the French from
home affairs, and to prevent the Protestants of the Netherlands from
assisting their coreligionists in France.[756]

The outbreak of civil war after the massacre of Vassy and the seizure
of Havre-de-Grace by the English had convinced Philip II that the time
to act had come in France, and Spanish troops and Spanish money were
put at the disposal of the Guises, although Philip denied to England
that he was giving succor to Catholic France.[757] In May, and again
in August of 1562, the Triumvirate appealed to Philip II,[758] and
on June 6 the Spanish King wrote to the regent in the Netherlands to
send the Triumvirate assistance. But the order was easier to give
than to execute, and exactly a month later (July 6) both Margaret and
Granvella replied, asserting the impracticability of carrying out
Philip’s wishes on the ground that no money could be procured from the
estates for such a purpose.[759] In the meantime, the cardinal-legate
in France, convinced that “in order to lay the ax at the root of the
evil, there was no shorter way and no better expedient than recourse to
arms,”[760] and impatient of Spain’s slow reply to the petition of the
Triumvirate,[761] stirred up both the Vatican and the court of Madrid
to livelier action.[762] As a result, although it was against their
better judgment, Margaret and Granvella prevailed upon the Council of
State in August to appropriate 50,000 écus for the war in France, and
in September 3,000 Italians were sent from Franche Comté to the aid of
Tavannes in Burgundy.[763]

The elements of the future Holy League are here manifest as early as
1561-62. But apart from the course being followed out in high political
circles, at the same time, popular associations for the maintenance
of the Catholic religion were being formed within France. The years
1562-63 witnessed the formation of several provincial leagues and town
associations, which were the real roots of the Holy League.

The people of the capital had begun to manifest their prejudices in an
organized military form as early as 1562, and the government, instead
of suppressing this tendency, encouraged it. On May 2, 1562, the
Parlement of Paris passed an ordinance ordering the _échevins_ and all
loyal Catholics in each quarter of the city to organize under arms,
with captains, corporals, and sergeants.[764] But the preponderance of
Paris in the formation of the Holy League has been exaggerated. When it
became a national affair, Paris, as the capital and most Catholic city
of France, seized hold of it and made it her own. But it is inverting
things to say that Paris gave the League to the provinces. Rather
Paris identified herself with their interests, and reflected their
passions and their character, “fierce in Languedoc, sullenly obstinate
in Brittany, everywhere modified in its nature and its devotion by the
politics of the towns.”[765]

The south of France was far more aggressive than the north in this
particular, and anti-Protestant associations were formed in many
provinces to the disquietude of the government, which knew not how to
control them.[766] The earliest of such local associations formed by
the Catholics seems to have been one of Bordeaux, where the people
were organized after the Protestant attempt to gain possession of the
Château Trompette in Francis II’s reign.[767] This association formed
in Bordeaux is the germ of the Catholic League which later expanded
over the Bordelais and Gascony. Other portions of France followed
suit. In November, 1562, the Association of Provence was formed at
Aix and terrorized the Huguenots.[768] Toulouse was notoriously
Catholic, and street wars between Catholics and Protestants were of
common occurrence. A more than usually violent outburst of popular
fury here culminated on March 2, 1563, in the formation of a Catholic
League, of which the cardinals Armagnac and Strozzi, lieutenants of
the King in the sénéschaussées of Toulouse and Albi, the president of
the Parlement, Du Faur, who was advocate-general of the crown, certain
eminent knights of the Order, and the famous Montluc, were sponsors.
The immediate occasion of this outbreak at Toulouse seems to have
been the combination of fury and fear of a plot which the Catholics
felt when they learned of the duke of Guise’s assassination. When the
outbreak began, the president of the Parlement of Toulouse hastily
dispatched a messenger to Montluc entreating him to come to their
assistance. Upon Montluc’s arrival at Toulouse the leaders prayed him
to put himself at the head of the troops in the province against the
Huguenots.

Montluc at first made some difficulty about consenting to this request,
because he had no permission from Damville, the governor of Languedoc,
in which province Toulouse was located, and who, moreover, was not
one of his friends.[769] Finally, however, he yielded to their
request, and measures were taken to put an army on foot in thirty days.
Those who composed this assembly drew up the compact of a league or
association on March 2, 1563, which was to be observed by the clergy,
the nobility, and the third estate in the towns and dioceses within
the jurisdiction of the parlement of Toulouse, both in Languedoc and
Guyenne. According to the articles of this association the members
engaged to bear arms, and to make oath between the hands of those
commissioned by the Parlement, or by the King’s lieutenant in the
country, to march whenever required for the defense of the Catholic
religion. The parlement of Toulouse approved and authorized this
association on March 20, provisionally and without charges, “subject
to the good pleasure of the King.” In the name of this league taxes
were laid, men were levied, and an inventory of arms made in every
_généralité_ and diocese.[770]

Montluc had come to Toulouse, fresh from the formation of another and
earlier league for the preservation of the Catholic faith, in Agen,
which had been organized on February 4, 1563. This league was a direct
consequence of the siege of Lectoure and the battle of Vergt. Montluc
had received orders to report, with the marshal Termes, to the King in
the camp before Orleans. But the Agenois was not quite pacified and the
gentry of the country were so filled with alarm, that they concluded,
so Montluc naïvely says, “that in case I should resolve to go away to
the King, as his Majesty commanded, and offer to leave them without a
head, they must be fain to detain me in the nature of a prisoner.”[771]
The upshot of things was that the “Confederation and Association
of the town and city of Agen and other towns and jurisdictions of
Agen” was formed and organized on February 4, 1563, with a captain,
lieutenant, sergeants, corporals, and other necessary officers, in
order to extirpate the Huguenots from the region. It was an oath-bound
covenant.[772]

The examples of Agen and Toulouse were contagious, and the popular
hatred of the Huguenots, on account of the assassination of the duke of
Guise, induced the spread of these local leagues. On March 13, 1563,
the Catholic lords of Guyenne also entered into a league at Cadillac
on the same plan and for the same object as that of the Catholics of
Agen and Languedoc.[773] Like the earlier ones, the league of Guyenne
was organized by parishes, districts, sénéschaussées and provinces,
under the direction of one supreme chief assisted by a council chosen
from the third estate. In the north of France, as has been observed,
the tendency of the Catholics to associate was not so strong as in
the south. There is evidence of a weak association of the Catholics
in the towns of the Rouennais and the lower part of the Ile-de-France
in 1563,[774] and of a town league in Anjou and Maine.[775] But no
formidable Catholic association was formed north of the Loire, until
the appearance of the Confrérie du St. Esprit in 1568, under the
marshal Tavannes.

The nucleus of many of these Catholic associations, before they
expanded into provincial leagues, in most cases seems to have been a
local guild or confraternity[776] of some nature. These were closely
connected with the body of tradesmen, each trade having its patron
saint, its sacred banner, and devoted bands; but some of the more
aristocratic people were joined with the artisans. The members had
fixed places of meeting and certain days on which to assemble, common
exercises, and often a common meal. They swore to use their wealth and
their life, if need be, for the defense of their faith.[777]

The new rôle now begun to be played by these ancient guilds is an
interesting phase of the religious wars. If France in the sixteenth
century was laboring in the throes of a religious revolution, she was
also in a state of industrial transformation. In origin the economic
revolution was independent of the Reformation, yet so influential
were its social and economic effects upon the Reformation that in a
very true sense the religious movement may be said to have been the
subordinate one.[778] The identity and fulness of this change in the
old order of things coincides with the Reformation, which in large
part became the vehicle of its expression. The crisis coincides with
the reign of Charles IX and Henry III, although the beginnings of
it are very manifest in the time of Louis XI (cf. the ordinances of
1467, 1474-76, 1479). The change particularly involved the guilds,
whose traditional practices had now reached the point of an industrial
tyranny. More and more, from the middle of the fifteenth century,
control of the guilds had tended to fall into the hands of a few. This
growth of a social hierarchy within the guilds had serious political
and economic results. For inasmuch as city government was so largely
an out-growth of guild life, this exclusiveness threw political
control of the cities into the hands of a “ring” composed of the upper
bourgeoisie, who formed an oligarchy and gradually squeezed the lower
classes out of all participation in the government. The general body of
the commonalty everywhere, in France, in Germany, in England, tended to
disappear or to be replaced by a select group from the inner circle of
the guild. The lower bourgeoisie was shut out of the council at Nevers
in 1512, at Sens in 1530, at Rheims in 1595.

But the economic revolution implied in this change was of far
greater importance than the political. The _gens de métier_ became
a monopolist, a capitalist class, controlling the “hoards” of the
guilds as well as being the ruling class in local politics. The old
guild was transformed into a mercantile association, operated in favor
of a few rich families who were possessed of capital and regulated
wages and fixed the term of apprenticeship to their own advantage.
In order to secure cheap labor the masters increased the number of
apprentices, lengthened the time of service, raised the requirements
of the _chef-d’œuvre_, made membership in the guild increasingly
difficult, and reduced wages by employing raw, underpaid workmen in
competition with skilled labor. The result was that the distance
widened continually between the upper and lower working classes.[779]
The social democracy and honorable estate of guild life, as it had
been in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, passed away and was
replaced by a strife between labor and capital, between organized labor
and free labor, which brings the sixteenth century, remote as it is in
time, very near to us in certain of its economic conditions.

To be sure there were some things which partially neutralized this
antagonism, such as better facility in communication, the increase of
production, the activity of exchange, the invention of new industrial
processes, and the opening of new industries, notably printing and
silk manufacture.[780] But nothing compensated the workman for the
rise in the price of necessities of life due to the influx of gold and
silver from America, for his wages did not rise in proportion. In
consequence the cleavage grew more and more sharp. The result of this
tendency was that poor workmen, despairing of getting economic justice
from the guilds, took to working in their own quarters. So common was
this practice in the sixteenth century that a new word was coined to
define this unapprenticed class—- _chambrelons_. These plied their
trades in their own houses and sold the product of their handicraft
anywhere. As early as 1457, and again in 1467, the masters complain of
this practice.[781] It is easy to understand the disastrous influence
of this new form of industry upon guild labor, since the new class of
workmen was not subject either to the same money charges or to the same
restrictive regulations. It was “unfair” competition for the old order
of things which reposed upon the maintenance of an economic equilibrium
between demand and supply, between labor and capital, was upset by the
new tendencies.

To the toiling masses trodden down by the masters and economically
tyrannized over, the Reformation came as the first _organized_ movement
of discontent, and hosts of dissatisfied workmen throughout Germany
and France hastened to identify themselves with Protestantism, not for
religious reasons, but because the Reformation constituted exactly
that for which they were seeking—a protest. The situation was further
aggravated by the influx of foreign workmen, chiefly from Germany,
where this economic revolution was earlier and more fully developed
than elsewhere in Europe, in great industrial centers like Nürnberg,
and where small German workmen were more completely shut out than was
the case in France or England. These men—such as cobblers, shoemakers,
carpenters, wool-carders, and other simple artisans—wandered over the
country from one province to another, carrying the economic gospel
of free labor and the religion of Lutheranism with them. Naturally
they imbued their French fellow-workmen with their sentiments—and
to such an extent that for years, during the early course of the
civil wars, the Huguenots were commonly called “Lutherans.” Before
1560, the greater portion of the Protestant party was made up of
woolcombers, fullers, drapers, weavers, shoemakers, hosiers, dyers,
tailors, hatters, joiners, glaziers, bookbinders, locksmiths, cutlers,
pewterers, coopers, etc.[782] Even as late as 1572, when the Huguenot
movement had for twelve years been led by noblemen like the Châtillons
and the Rohans, the Venetian ambassador still characterized the
Huguenots as “a sect which consists for the most part of craftsmen, as
cobblers, tailors, and such ignorant people.”[783]

Coupled with this religious and economic revolution, went also a change
in the manners of society, which pervaded all classes—a change which
began in the reign of Francis I and was continued under Henry II. The
new internationalism of France, due to the Italian wars, was probably
the initial cause of this. Returned soldiers, laden with the pay of
booty of warfare, brought back into France the manners and customs
of Italy, which commingled with the manners and customs introduced by
wandering workmen from Germany and Switzerland.[784]

The revision of the statutes of the guilds was one of the minor
features of the reform programme of the political Huguenots in the
States-General of Orleans, and the _Cahier-général_ of the third
estate which was compiled from the local _cahiers_ presented by the
deputies shows traces of the interest of France at large in the issue.
Unfortunately these fuller local records are lost.[785] But this
revision only looked to a modernizing of the mediaeval language of
the _ordonnances_, which chiefly dated from the fourteenth century,
and did not contemplate an entire recasting of them, so as to make
them harmonize with the new industrial conditions. Only one man
in the assembly seems to have appreciated the real condition of
things. This was the chancellor L’Hôpital. Not content with the mild
reorganization of the guilds recommended by the third estate, on the
last day of the session, January 31, 1561, the chancellor drew up
the famous ordinance of Orleans.[786] The intent of this statute was
indirectly to restrain the enlarged economic tyranny of the guilds, to
lessen the burden of apprenticeship, and to establish freer laboring
conditions. This purpose the government aimed to attain by dissolving
the confraternities, for by striking at these it really struck the
guilds, since many of these associations were one and the same. No
distinction was made between associations whose character was religious
or charitable, and those composed of patrons and workingmen; all the
confraternities were grouped together and governmental supervision was
provided for. They were not legislated out of existence by the new
action, but reduced to a partial dissolution. Their accumulated hoards
of capital were ordered to be expended for the support of schools and
hospitals and similar institutions in the towns and villages where
these various guilds were, and only a limited amount of money was left
in their hands. The municipal officers, in co-operation with those of
the crown were made personally responsible for the execution of this
measure in every bailiwick. It is important to notice the significance
of this course. The government, in fact, was pursuing a policy of
partial secularization of the property of these confraternities for
the benefit of the people at large, and compelling distribution of the
great sums locked up in the hands of the guilds in much the same way
that the church had come to possess enormous sums in mortmain. This
legislation, if it had really been effective, would have destroyed the
guilds.

The guilds thus put upon the defensive, owing to the reforming policy
of the crown and the political Huguenots, sought to save themselves by
pleading that they were religious associations. By this adroit movement
they gained the support of the Catholic party. But the crown refused
to yield, and we find the _Confréries de métiers_ directly supervised
in letters-patent of February 5, 1562, and December 14, 1565. Coupled
with these measures, we find others forbidding banquets, festivals,
and like celebrations (edicts of December 11, 1566, and of February
4, 1567) which by this time had become centers of religious agitation
among the Catholics. But the government could not maintain its course.
The identification of the guilds and confraternities with the Catholic
party gave them great and unexpected support. Under the new order
of things they became the nuclei of local and provincial Catholic
leagues.[787] In other words, the labor party became identified with
the Huguenots, while the upper bourgeoisie, controlling the guilds,
adhered to the Catholic cause—at Rouen in 1560 the merchants actually
declared a lock-out against workmen who attended preachings[788]—and
became the nuclei of the provincial leagues, exactly as in France in
1793 every Jacobin club became an arm of the Terror government.

It was said at the time, and has often been asserted since, that
these local Catholic leagues were but protective associations in the
beginning and formed to repel Huguenot violence.[789] The Huguenots
practiced as violent methods as their religious opponents and their
offenses were as numerous; but with the exception of the Huguenot
association in Dauphiné, there is no early example of a Protestant
association similar to the leagues of the Catholics in the provinces.
The Protestant local organizations were not so highly developed, in
a military sense, as early as this, nor were they of the same form
as those of the Catholics. Montluc himself, than whom there is no
better judge, testifies that in the war in Guyenne in 1562 “they
showed themselves to be novices, and indeed they were guided by their
ministers.” The Protestants had a sort of triumvirate, it is true, in
the two Châtillon brothers, and the prince of Condé, but their work
only remotely partakes of the policy of the real Triumvirate; even
their appeal to Elizabeth did not contemplate such radical conduct as
the Triumvirate displayed.[790]

No Huguenot leader ever thought of subordinating the government of
France to a foreign ruler for the maintenance of the faith he believed
in,[791] as the Guises, Montmorency, and St. André did. Condé’s
declaration that the civil war was caused by the Triumvirate’s action
had much truth in it. The rules of the association which the Huguenots
formed at Orleans, on April 11, 1562, were as much a body of military
regulations for the discipline of the army as they were a political
compact, as a reading of the articles will prove.[792] There was little
of the politico-military character of the Catholic leagues about
it. It is not until after the Bayonne episode that we find a solid
federation of the Reformed churches beginning to form, and the first
test of the Protestant organization was made at the beginning of the
second civil war.[793] This is not the place, however, to dwell upon
its development. In due time the subject will be taken up.

The edict confirming the act of pacification (March 19, 1563) in its
sixth article forbade the formation of any leagues in the future,
and ordered the dissolution of those already in existence.[794] This
prohibition was a dead letter from the beginning. The government not
only was unable to prevent the formation of new leagues; it was even
unable to suppress those already in existence.[795] When the first
civil war ended, there were three well-organized Catholic leagues in
southern France, namely those of Provence, of Toulouse, and of Agen.
Catherine de Medici, who, for some months to come, continued to give
substantial manifestation of her desire for peace,[796] in announcing
the act of Amboise to Montluc, demanded the dissolution of these
associations. Instead of so doing, however, Candalle, Montluc’s chief
agent in Guyenne, continued his activities. On March 13, 1563, as has
been noticed, in defiance of the impending edict of pacification (which
was completed and only awaited promulgation) the Catholic seigneurs of
Guyenne, at Cadillac (near Bordeaux) entered into a league identical
in purpose and in form with those of Agen and Languedoc.[797] This
league, which is the germ of that which spread over Gascony, seems to
have been denounced to the government by Lagebaston, the president of
the parlement of Bordeaux, between whom and Montluc there was friction,
partly because of Montluc’s preference for Agen as a working capital
for the region, partly because of his notorious dislike of the lawyer
class, whose disposition to regard forms of law and vested right
interfered with Montluc’s high-handed and arbitrary management of
affairs.[798] This new league in such glaring violation of the edict,
called forth a sharp letter of rebuke from the queen mother to Montluc
on March 31. After alluding in a general way to “les maulx” due to the
existence of “les partialitez et les associations, qui se sont faictes”
she says:

J’ay esté advertye qu’il s’en est faicte une autre en la Guyenne dont
est chef Monsieur de Candalle, laquelle encores qu’elle ayt esté
faicte à bonne intention durant la guerre, si n’est-ce que, cessant
la dicte guerre et se faisant la paix, elle n’est plus nécessaire
et ne la peult ung roy trouver bonne, ny que ceulx qui veullent
estre estimez obéyssans ne peuvent soustenir sans encourir le mesme
cryme de rebellion dont ilz ont accusé leurs adversaires. Et pour
ceste cause, et que le Roy monsieur mon filz n’est pas délibéré d’en
souffrir plus aucun, de quelque costé qu’elle procedde ny permectre
plus à ses subjectz, de quelque religion qu’ilz soient, d’avoir
autre association qu’avec luy et selon son obéyssance, il fault,
Monsieur de Monluc, que, pour le bien de son service, comme il le
vous commande expressément par ses lettres, que vous, qui estes son
lieutenant-général par delà, faciez rompre celle qui s’est faicte
sans permectre qu’ilz ayent aucune force, puissance ou authorité que
celle que vous leur baillerez, ny aucune volunté que d’obéyr à ce que
par vous, pour le bien du service du Roy monsieur mon filz, leur sera
commandé; pour lequel effect j’en scriptz, comme faict le Roy monsieur
mon filz, une lectre audit s^[r] de Candalle et à tous ceulx qui y sont
comprins, comme nous en avons esté bien amplement advertiz.[799]

Until the ambition of the Guises created an opposition to them among
the old-line nobility, and so identified the Huguenot movement with
the interests of the aristocracy,[800] the French Reformation found
its chief support among the lower bourgeois class in the towns. The
proportion naturally varied from place to place. Lyons, partly from
its proximity to Geneva, but more because of its strong commercial
position and its great manufacturing interests, among which the silk
industry was of most importance, was the greatest Huguenot city
in France.[801] Where we find Protestantism prevailing in feudal
districts, it is largely to be ascribed to the influence of Protestant
gentleman-farmers, often retired bourgeois, who purchased the county
estates of the older nobility who had been bankrupted by the wars in
Italy and Flanders, or else preferred to live at court. The strongholds
of French Protestantism were the river towns, on the highways of trade,
or sea-ports like Rouen and La Rochelle. Dauphiné, which fattened on
the commerce out of Italy through the Alpine passes, and Provence which
bordered the Mediterranean, both of which “cleared” through Lyons;
Lower Poitou, where La Rochelle was, and Normandy on the Channel were
the chief Protestant provinces of France. Normandy was probably the
most Protestant province of all, for here Calvinism not only obtained
in the ports and “good” towns, but in the country areas as well.[802]

But there are evidences of the penetration of Protestantism into the
country districts elsewhere as well—in Orléannais, Nivernais, Blésois,
the diocese of Nîmes and even in isolated parts of Champagne and
Gascony.[803] In general, however, the French peasantry were strongly
Catholic.

The reason for this is, first, a social one: while the revolution of
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was ruinous for the artisan,
it was profitable to the peasant. The rent paid to the landlord,
immutably fixed in the twelfth or thirteenth century, represented
under the new values of money a very light burden, while the fall
in the price of silver considerably raised the nominal worth of
the products of the soil, when the villein sold them. The price of
land was falling rapidly at the very time when the French gentry,
ceasing to be an aristocracy of gentlemen-farmers and becoming a
court-nobility, were compelled to sell their estates to meet their
expenses and, as was said, to put their mills and meadows on their
shoulders. When a lord wished to sell at any price a part of his
estates, there was always, in the parish, a countryman who had been,
as one may say, saving money for centuries, and who, realizing at last
the dream of bygone generations, bought land. Thus did the French
villein become a landowner. The reign of Louis XII and the beginning
of that of Francis I was for the French peasants an epoch of real
prosperity; his situation presented a striking contrast with that of
the German peasant who, at the same date, was in danger of relapsing
into bondage. We may easily understand why there was not in France, as
in Germany, a peasants’ revolution both social and religious.[804]

But there are other reasons for the religious growth of the Huguenot
cause among the people not so hard to find. Their ministers preached
in the French language and avoided the use of Latin, which tended
to mystery and obscurity; after sermons the service was continued
with prayer and the singing of psalms in French rhyme, with vocal
and instrumental music in which the congregation joined. In their
church polity, the Huguenots had carried changes farther than had the
Reformation elsewhere in Europe. In Germany and England the Reformation
still adhered to many of the institutions of the mediaeval church,
retaining the episcopate and inferior clergy, as deacons, archdeacons,
canons, curates, together with vestures, canonical habits, and the use
of ornaments.[805]

No reliable estimate can be made of the proportion between Catholics
and Huguenots in the sixteenth century. A remonstrance of 1562 to the
Pope declared that one-fourth of France was separate from the communion
of Rome.[806] The Venetian ambassador thought “hardly a third part of
the people heretical” in 1567.[807] The _échevins_ of Amiens declared
three-quarters of the inhabitants of Amiens were Protestant in the
same year.[808] Charles IX in a remonstrance to Pius IV asserted
that a fourth part of France was Protestant.[809] Montluc, no mean
observer, estimated that one-tenth of the population of Guyenne was
Protestant.[810] If this proportion be applied to France at large,
the Huguenots would have numbered something like 1,600,000. Beza,
who presided over the synod of La Rochelle in 1571, claimed that the
Huguenots had 2,150 congregations, some of them very large, as in the
case of the church of Orleans, which was said to have 7,000 members.
At the time of the Colloquy of Poissy, Normandy was said to have 305
pastors, Provence 60.[811] But the number of Huguenots in Normandy,
Provence, or the Orléannais was exceptionally large. The average
congregation must have been small. If we assume that the population
of France was sixteen millions[812] and that one-tenth of the people
were Calvinist, we would have a total of 1,600,000 Protestants for
all France, which would give an average of about 750 members to each
congregation on the basis of Beza’s statement as to the number of the
Huguenot churches. This is certainly much too high a figure. Personally
I believe the average was less than half of this. If the congregation
averaged 400 members each, on Beza’s calculation there would have
been 860,000 Huguenots in France. A Venetian source of the year 1562
sets the number at 600,000.[813] This may be too low, but all things
considered, I believe it not far from the truth. The total Protestant
population of France I do not believe to have exceeded three-quarters
of a million before 1572, and after that date it is often difficult to
distinguish between Huguenots and Politiques.

Such was the state of things when the first civil war came to an end.

CHAPTER X

THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES.[814] THE BAYONNE EPISODE

“I am always _en voyage_,” wrote the Venetian ambassador to the senate.
“Since the beginning of my embassy the King has not staid more than
fifteen days in any one place. He goes from Lorraine to Poitou, and
then to Normandy and the edge of Belgium, back again to Normandy, then
to Paris, Picardy, Champagne, Burgundy.”[815] Dr. Dale wrote in the
same strain to Lord Burghley: “The Spanish ambassador has a saying that
ambassadors in France are eaten up by their horses, since they are
constrained to keep so many because of the habit of the court of moving
from place to place continually.”[816]

But there was point to Charles IX’s famous tour of the provinces in
1564-66. The unsettled condition of the country, if no other reason,
accounts for Catherine’s great design of completing the pacification
of the kingdom by having the King tour the realm. The route lay
through Sens[817] (March 15) to Troyes (March 23)[818] where the peace
with England was signed on April 13; thence to Châlons-sur-Marne,
Bar-le-Duc, Dijon (May 15), Macon (June 8), and thence to Lyons, where
the court arrived on June 13. The King traveled with his ordinary
train, that is, with his mother, his brother, the duke of Anjou,
the constable, and the archers of the guard, in order to spare the
people the burden of great entertainment, and those princes and
nobles who wished to follow were accompanied only by their ordinary
servants.[819] If the Huguenots viewed the King’s sojourn at Bar-le-Duc
with apprehension,[820] it was not without anxiety that his Catholic
subjects saw Charles IX visit the great city located at the junction
of the Rhone and the Saône rivers.[821] Lyons seems to have imbibed
something of Calvinism from the very waters of the arrowy river whose
source was the lake of the citadel of Calvinism.[822] The rumor was
current that a greater conspiracy than that of Amboise was on foot;
that the King and queen were to be deposed and slain, and that Lyons
would unite with Geneva to form a greater Calvinistic republic.[823]

[Illustration: The Tour of the Provinces, 1564-66]

But Lyons welcomed the King graciously, and gave him sumptuous
accommodation.[824] Charles was charmed with the reception given him
and amazed at the wealth and commercial prosperity of the city.[825]
Situated at the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône rivers, the
wines and grain of Burgundy came to Lyons for market, while it was
the natural entrepôt of the commerce out of Italy, besides much that
came from Spain and Flanders. There were four fairs there each year.
The great industry of the city was silk manufacturing. In 1450 Charles
VII had granted it the monopoly in this. Francis I in 1536 relieved
the silk operatives of all taxes and military service. The bulk of the
commerce was in the hands of Italians, of whom there were said to be
above twelve thousand in the city—chiefly Florentines, Genoese, and
Milanese.[826] There were also many Germans and Swiss, whose presence
gave the governor, the duke of Nemours,[827] great anxiety, because
large quantities of arms were smuggled into the city in the guise of
merchandise.[828]

The court had not been long upon its tour through the provinces before
Catherine de Medici discovered that the petition of the estates of
Burgundy for the abolition of Protestant worship was not merely a local
prejudice, but the sense of the provinces.[829] The elements of this
public opinion were various: The clergy—not all, however—wanted the
findings of the Council of Trent accepted _in toto_; all of them were
dissatisfied with the recognition of the rights of the Protestants;
the alienation of their lands was a grievance to the clergy, the more
so because speculators had bought them at a low price because of the
doubt as to the validity of the title.[830] The Guises were angry
that the prosecution of Coligny for the murder of the duke had been
abandoned.[831] Among high and low alike there were unprincipled folk
who had hopes of profiting by confiscations and forfeitures imposed
upon the Huguenots.[832]

The queen mother was too good a politician not to pay heed to these
signs of popular feeling, more especially as the voice of the provinces
chimed with those in high authority, who not only urged that the war
be renewed against the Protestants but also hinted broadly of foreign
support in aid of the crown. At first Catherine answered graciously,
yet guardedly, to the effect that a peace which had been so solemnly
made, by the advice of the princes of the blood and the council, could
not be too lightly cast aside.

The miserable effects of the war were everywhere evident. Agriculture
had almost ceased in a country famous for its fertility, and the whole
country had been so plundered and harassed by both parties that the
poor people, being stripped of all their substance, often preferred
to fly to the forests rather than to remain continually exposed to
the mercy of their enemies. Wandering soldiers and dissolute women,
with stolen goods in their possession, infested the roads.[833] As to
trade and manufacturing, the mechanic arts still were plied only in
the largest and strongest towns; even here merchants and tradesmen had
shut up shop and gone off to war, not always out of religious zeal,
but in the hope of enriching themselves by spoliation. The nobility
were divided; the clergy incensed. The civil war had been accompanied
by the attendant aids of violence, robbery, murder, rape, and justice
had not been administered in the courts for months. The very methods
resorted to for the preservation of religion rendered it hateful in the
eyes of many men of both parties. Both parties were bigoted in belief
and in practice. The iconoclasm of the Protestants, who tore down
church edifices hoary with age and sanctified by tradition, expelling
the inmates, both male and female, if doing them no worse injury,
familiarized society with changes wrought by violence and made the
people callous to one of the most precious possessions of a nation—a
reverence for tradition.[834]

To all these difficulties the prevalence of the plague must be added.
Since the century of the Black Death Europe had not so suffered
from this scourge as in the sixteenth. It recurred intermittently,
being especially violent in the years 1531, 1533, 1544, 1546, 1548,
1553, 1562-64, 1568, 1577-80.[835] No part of Europe was spared.
France, England, Spain, the Low Countries, Germany, and Italy, all
suffered. But certain portions of France suffered more than others,
as Bas-Languedoc, Provence, the Lyonnais, Burgundy, Champagne, the
Ile-de-France, and Normandy. The west and especially the southwest were
relatively exempt. Apparently the disease followed the trades-routes
along the river valleys, for Toulouse, Lyons, Châlons-sur-Saône,
Macon, Châlons-sur-Marne, Langres, Bourges, La Charité, Orleans,
Tours, Moulins, Sens, Melun, Dijon, Troyes, Château-Thierry, Soissons,
Beauvais, Pontoise, Paris, Rouen, and the Norman ports suffered
most.[836] As always, Italy was the immediate source of the epidemic,
which was communicated from place to place by the movements of trade.
Lyons paid dearly for its commercial pre-eminence, for the ravages of
the plague were terrible there.[837] It was at its height when the
court was there in July, 1564. The English ambassador, Smith, gives a
fearful picture of the state of the city. Men died in the street before
his lodgings. His servant who went daily for his provisions sometimes
saw ten and twelve corpses, some naked, lying in the streets where they
lay till “men clothed in yellow” removed them. A great many bodies
were cast into the river, “because they will not be at the cost to
make graves. This day,” he writes on July 12, “from break of day till
ten o’clock there laid a man naked in the street, groaning and drawing
his last breath, not yet dead. Round the town there are tents of the
pestiferous, besides those which are shut up in their houses.”[838]
Almost every third house was closed because of the plague. The city
authorities vainly tried to combat the disease by providing that
visits were to be made twice a day by those appointed; but as there
were but five “master surgeons” in the whole city, medical attention
must have been slight. Persons affected with the plague were to be
removed to the hospital—the oldest and one of the best in Europe at
that time. Corpses were to be buried at night and the clothes of the
dead burned.[839] “About the Rhone men dare eat no fish nor fishers
lay their engines and nets, because instead of fish they take up the
pestiferous carcasses which are thrown in.” New sanitary regulations
were made. All filth was to be cast into the river and not allowed to
pollute the streets or the river banks. Fires of scented wood were kept
burning between every ten houses in the street. Pigs and other animals
were not allowed at large. Meat, fish, and vegetable stalls were to be
inspected and all decayed provisions destroyed.[840]

It is interesting to observe the efforts made by local authorities to
prevent the spread of the disease and the relief measures that were
taken. As soon as the plague was discovered, the town authorities
usually set guards to watch the houses of those stricken and appointed
barbers and gravediggers to treat ill and to inter the dead. These
attendants were supported and paid by a tax laid upon the town. Those
who were ill were sent to a house of isolation appointed to be a
hospital, which was often upon the walls of the town, remote from the
people. In Provins the church and cemetery were immediately adjacent
to the hospital! The mortality was great. In Provins in 1562 there
were eighty persons stricken, of whom sixty died, among them four of
the attendants. Two of the barber-surgeons refused to serve and were
proceeded against by the town bailiff and were hanged in effigy because
the principals in the case had made their escape. Diseased houses were
sprinkled with perfumes and aromatic herbs were burned in them in order
to purify them.[841] As always, the dislocation of society and the
depravation of morals worked havoc in the community. Crimes of violence
were common.[842]

Little by little, however, this picture of misery faded into the
background of the queen’s mind and the question of political
expediency, which was always the lodestar of her policy, became her
primary consideration.[843] The Catholics plucked up courage as the
court progressed[844] and Huguenot suspicion of the queen’s course was
early aroused. Shortly after the tour of the provinces had begun, and
while the court was still at Troyes pending the signature of the treaty
of peace, there was a jar between D’Andelot and the queen mother, who
would not permit him to choose his own captains and other officers as
was customarily permitted to colonels. Partially in consequence of
this affront, and partially to avoid being compromised more with Queen
Elizabeth, D’Andelot, the prince of Condé, and the cardinal Châtillon
all remained away from the sessions of the council while the terms
of peace were under consideration, and when the court resumed its
migration, no one of these attended it.[845] Indeed, after the court
left Châlons-sur-Marne, so wide was the breach between the prince of
Condé, the admiral and all of that faction, and the court, that the
chancellor L’Hôpital was the only official who continued to treat them
with deference.[846] The consideration shown Jeanne d’Albret only
partially relieved the suspicions of the Protestants.[847]

We find the anxiety of the Protestants over the situation reflected in
the proceedings of the provincial synod of the Reformed churches of the
region through which the court had been traveling during this season,
namely the churches of Champagne, Brie, Picardy, the Ile-de-France, and
the French Vexin.[848] This synod assembled on April 27, 1564, at La
Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and was composed of forty-five ministers. Letters
were read from many parts of France and abroad, among which was one
from Beza bidding the Huguenots to be on their guard as the priests
were contributing money for the purpose of rooting out the truth. It
was agreed by the body to reply that the Protestants were suspicious of
the intentions of the queen mother.[849] In its resolutions the synod
condemned the policy of the magistrates who cloaked their religious
animosity under the guise of the law,[850] and complained that the
Catholics were carrying the King about the country in order to show
him the ruin of their churches.[851] The moderate La Roche even went so
far as to declare that the Reformed church never could have peace while
the queen mother governed.

Justice and historical accuracy, however, require that it be said that
the Huguenots’ own conduct was sometimes in violation of the privileges
granted them by the Edict of Amboise. Their iconoclasm toward the
images and the pictures which the Catholics considered sacred was
outrageous; they failed to confine their worship to authorized places,
so that the magistrates were acting within their rights in so far
repressing Protestant worship; their provincial synods not infrequently
were inflammatory political assemblies.[852] On the other hand, the
Catholics wilfully molested the Huguenots, interfering in their
congregations, and compelling them to pay tithes and other dues for the
support of the Catholic poor and even—Castelnau says—to support their
provincial leagues.[853]

But the Huguenots went too far in their suspicion of the government.
Beza, at the synod of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre had been apprehensive of
a joint attack of France and Savoy upon Geneva, not knowing that the
French aim was to renew the alliance with the Catholic cantons in
order to prevent Spanish ascendency there.[854] Bern and Zurich were
the pillars of French ascendency in the Alpine country. France counted
upon them more than upon all else to prevent Spanish recruiting, and
to close the Alpine passes to Spain’s army. To this end Bellièvre, the
marshal Vieilleville, and the bishop of Limoges, who had returned
from Madrid, where he was succeeded by St. Sulpice, were sent into
Switzerland in the early spring of 1564 to penetrate the designs
of Spain, and to promise an early payment of the French debts due
to the cantons in return for their military support in the wars of
Henry II.[855] Bellièvre’s particular mission was to the Grisons. The
position of the Grisons was a precarious one, for Spain could attack
them from the Valteline, or starve them by prohibiting the exportation
of grain into the country from Lombardy. By using such threats the
Spanish governor of Milan hoped to compel the adherence of the Grisons
to a treaty which would open to Spanish and imperial arms the great
Alpine routes of the Splügen, the Bernina, and the Stelvio, thus
connecting the territories of the two branches of the Hapsburg house
and shutting France out from eastern Switzerland. Bellièvre fraternized
with the popular element, and by May, 1564, had almost completely
neutralized the success of his Spanish rival in spite of Spanish gold.
Fortunately for France the Ten Jurisdictions declared in her favor and
the Grisons, though very Spaniardized, luckily had a French pensioner
as its chief magistrate, the Swiss captain Florin.

Meanwhile the negotiations of the bishop of Limoges and the marshal
Vieilleville had progressed so far that the treaty of alliance was all
but signed. Late in October Bellièvre received from Freiburg the text
of the articles of alliance which the bishop of Limoges and the marshal
Vieilleville proposed to submit to the Swiss diet. Encouraged by this
success, he went to Glarus in order to overcome the influence of the
Zurich preachers who were outspoken enemies of the French alliance, and
if possible to settle the difference between that state and Schwytz. By
great dexterity he prevailed upon the two cantons to accept a uniform
treaty. But he could not push negotiations to a conclusion until
hearing from his colleagues.

Spain made a supreme effort to secure the opening of the passages
between the Tyrol and the Milanais, but failed because the Grisons
promised France that they would accept the principle of a renewed
alliance, leaving the settlement of details pending, so that although
the supremacy of France in Switzerland was not absolutely assured, at
least the adherence of the three leagues to her seemed assured.

But the Escurial and the Vatican were leagued to destroy French
influence in Switzerland. Spain gave up hope of compelling the cantons
to make a direct alliance with her, but by means of commercial threats
and commercial inducements counted on still keeping the Alpine passes
open to her arms. Her maxim was, where the grain of Lombardy goes,
there Spain’s armies may go, too. To neutralize this danger the French
energetically opposed any renewal of an alliance between the Vatican
and the Swiss cantons. The Grey League, later won by the commercial
promises of Spain, separated from the other two in the end, but its
defection was not so serious as it might have been, since according to
the joint constitution the vote of two leagues in matters of foreign
policy compelled the adherence of the third. But in order further to
strengthen the hold of France, the French ambassadors had recourse to
a sort of referendum in order to secure an approval of the majority of
all the Swiss towns in favor of the French alliance, in addition to the
official action of the three leagues. The success of this stroke was
complete and the general diet of the three leagues gave its adherence
to the treaty of Freiburg concluded by the bishop of Limoges and the
marshal Vieilleville on December 7, 1564.[856] The poverty of France,
however, seriously endangered the continuance of this alliance. When it
was concluded, France tried to stave off payment of her debts, which
amounted to more than 600,000 livres, yet demanded the execution of the
articles of Freiburg. Glarus, Lucerne, Schwytz, Appenzell, Valais, the
Grisons, Schaffhausen, and Basel bitterly complained, the last also
because of the burdens laid upon the importations of her commerce into
France through Lyons.

In this conflict which France carried on against Spain and the Holy See
in Switzerland, Charles IX was supported by the German Protestants, who
of course were hostile to both houses of Hapsburg, and France may be
credited with considerable address in smoothing the ruffled feelings
of Basel and Schaffhausen, and softening the Protestant prejudices of
Zurich. This is simply another way of saying that the foreign policy
of France in Switzerland was a Protestant policy. Even Bern yielded
and joined the general treaty of alliance instead of insisting upon a
particular treaty, as she had at first done.[857]

The Huguenots, however, suspicious of the impending reaction at home
and misreading the diplomacy of France in Switzerland, grew more and
more fearful and began to turn their eyes again toward the prince of
Condé as a leader. But fortune and the craft of Catherine had lured
the prince away from his own; he had become a broken reed, dangerous
to lean upon. In July, 1564, Eleanor de Roye, the brave princess of
Condé, died.[858] The Guises and the queen mother, who were now in
co-operation,[859] at once began to practice to lure Condé away forever
from his party, and the former at the same time, in order to make the
alliance between France and Scotland more firm, conceived the idea of
marrying the prince of Condé to Mary Queen of Scots.[860] As another
possibility the Guises cherished the hope of marrying their niece to
Charles IX and thus recovering the ascendency they had enjoyed under
Francis II.[861] The corollary of such a plan was the reduction of the
Protestants of France. To these ideas Philip II, was stoutly opposed,
though he concealed his opposition thereto; Mary was too valuable for
his projects to be suffered to become a tool of the Guises. Their
purposes were limited to France; his purposes embraced Christendom.[862]

In 1575 the Venetian ambassador wrote, à propos of one of the
courtships of Queen Elizabeth: “Princes are wont to avail themselves
of matrimonial negotiations in many ways.”[863] These words sagely
summarize the efforts of much of the diplomacy of the sixteenth
century. By a singular combination of events and lineages, Mary Stuart
was necessarily almost the cornerstone of the universal monarchy Philip
II dreamed of forming in Europe; her possession of the Scottish crown,
her claims to England, her relationship with the Guises, united with
the religion she professed, made the furtherance of her power the most
practicable means to that end. Whether Mary’s future husband were Don
Carlos or the Austrian archduke was a matter of detail in Philip’s
plan—the end remained constant. Mary Stuart was of too much value to
Philip II’s political designs to risk such a marriage as the Guises
contemplated.[864] Her hand might be disposed elsewhere with greater
advantage.

Those intense religious convictions of the Spanish King which
made him believe he was the divinely ordained instrument of the
counter-Reformation, united with his political purposes and ambitions,
required him to keep a watchful eye upon France.[865] The Netherlands,
France, Italy, England, Scotland were like so many squares of a vast
political chessboard upon which he aimed so to move the pieces he was
in command of as ultimately to seize possession of those countries,
and redeem them from heresy. Mary Stuart was an important personage
in Philip’s purposes. He wanted to put her on the throne of Elizabeth
and thus unite Scotland and England under a common Catholic rule.
For a time he dreamed of marrying her to his own son, Don Carlos,
until Catherine interfered and offered her daughter Marguerite as a
less dangerous alternative to France. The death of Don Carlos,[866]
the eternal irresolution of the Spanish King, the development of new
events, continually altered the details of Philip’s purposes, but his
essential aim never varied an iota.[867]

The subjugation of France, not in the exact terms of loss of
sovereignty, perhaps, but no less in loss of true national independence
was a necessary condition of Philip’s purposes. The kingdom of France
was situated in the very center of those dominions whose consolidation
was to be the Spanish King’s realization of universal rule. Spain
bordered her on the south; the Netherlands on the north; in the east
lay Franche Comté. Besides these territories which were directly
Spanish, the Catholic cantons of Switzerland and Savoy were morally in
vassalage to Spain. Beyond Franche Comté lay the Catholic Rhinelands,
bound to the other branch of the house of Hapsburg. Beyond Switzerland
and Savoy lay Italy, save Venice entirely, and Rome in part, a group of
Spanish dominions.

Catherine de Medici combated Philip II both at Madrid and Vienna.
But by the side of the negative purpose to thwart Philip’s proposed
alliances, Catherine de Medici had purposes of her own of the same
sort. The daughter of a house made rich by banking and which never
lived down the bourgeois tradition of its ancestry in spite of all its
wealth and power, even though popes had come from its house, Catherine
was fascinated by the thought of marrying Charles IX to the eldest
daughter of the Hapsburgs, and her favorite son, the future Henry III,
then known as the duke of Orleans-Anjou, to the Spanish princess Juana,
sister of Philip, hoping to see some of Spain’s numerous dominions pass
to France as part of Juana’s dowry.

In the pursuance of this double marriage project, the queen early began
to beset Philip II for a personal interview, and urged her daughter
to persuade the king to the same end, using Pius IV’s cherished idea
of a concert of the great Catholic powers to consider the condition
and needs of Christendom with some adroitness as a screen to her own
personal purposes.[868]

Much of her correspondence with St. Sulpice relates to an interview
with Philip II for the purpose of arranging these matters, upon which
she had set her heart, and the time of both the ambassador and the
Spanish King was consumed with repeated interviews none of which was
ever satisfactory, and all of which were tedious.[869] The natural
reluctance of Philip II to commit himself to any positive course,
united with the great aversion he felt toward the queen mother because
of her wavering religious policy—for rigid adherence to Catholicism
was Philip’s one inflexible feature—led the King to follow a course
of procrastination and duplicity for months, during which, however, he
never evinced any outward sign of impatience; his countenance remained
as imperturbable as that of a Hindu idol, and never by any expression
reflected his thought.[870]

Foolish pride and undue affection led Catherine even to use the Turk
as a means of pressure upon Spain in order to accomplish this double
marriage project. In the year 1562 an ambassador of the Sultan passed
through France, having come by way of Venice to Lyons, and going
thence via Dijon and Troyes to Paris.[871] Turkey, after crushing
the revolt of Bajazet,[872] was seeking to avenge the accumulated
grievances which she had suffered from Austria and Spain, especially
the latter, for Philip II’s expedition to Oran and his capture of its
fortress, which was regarded as impregnable, had been a bitter blow
to the Porte.[873] Exasperated by Spain, Turkey whose war policy was
guided by the able grand vizier, Mohammed Sokolli, prepared a vast
expedition to expel her from all points which she occupied in Africa.
But such a campaign was not possible until Malta, lying midway in the
straits of the Mediterranean, was overcome.[874] Europe, which still
preserved an acute memory of the protracted siege of Rhodes, looked
forward with dismay to the prospective attack upon Malta, so that
Catherine de Medici’s cordial reception at Dax of another Turkish
ambassador—he was a Christian Pole in the employ of the Sultan—in the
course of the tour of the provinces was a political act that was daring
to rashness.[875] In order to force Philip II’s hand Catherine even
intimated that Charles IX might marry Queen Elizabeth, although this
proposition was too great a strain upon the credulity of Europe to be
given any consideration.[876] Soon after St. Sulpice reached Spain, we
find Toulouse suggested as the place for the desired interview,[877]
and thereafter for thirty-eight months this conference was one of the
dominant thoughts in Catherine’s mind.[878]

The queen mother’s original plan had been to avoid the heat of the
south by passing the winter at Moulins, and visiting Languedoc and
Guyenne in the next spring.[879] But the influence of impending
change impelled her forward in the maze of tournaments, balls, and
masques.[880] Although she was in “a country full of mountains and
brigands,”[881] so that she feared “que cette canaille sacageassent
quelques uns de sa cour,” and strengthened Strozzi’s band as a
precaution, nevertheless Catherine’s resolution seems to have increased
in degree as she moved southward. Probably the fact that the prince
of Condé was in the toils encouraged her; certainly the necessity of
exhibiting something positive that would please Spain, in view of the
approaching interview, actuated her. But apart from her own motives,
outside pressure had been brought to bear upon her to this end, when
at Bar-le-Duc, where the King went to attend the baptism of the infant
child of Charles III, duke of Lorraine, who had married Charles IX’s
sister, Claudine, in March.[882] Later “when the court came to Lyons
information was brought to it that if the King and his advisers should
continue to resist the general rising against the Huguenots, it would
be turned against itself.”[883] In this instance, however, the pressure
came, not from Spain, but from Pope Pius IV whose agent, the Florentine
Ludovico Antinori, was sent to France to urge the extirpation of
Calvinism and to plead the cause of the findings of the Council of
Trent.[884] Catherine obeyed the signs. But as a sudden rupture of the
peace of Amboise would have been attended with dangerous consequences
she proceeded cautiously.[885]

The first[886] definite intimation of the reaction was an edict issued
on July 24, prohibiting Calvinist worship within ten leagues of the
court, notwithstanding the fact that authorized places of Protestant
worship were affected by it. A fortnight later, on August 4, came a
more sweeping edict—the so-called Edict of Roussillon[887] which
forbade all persons of whatever religion, quality, or condition to
molest one another, or to violate or maltreat images, or to lay hands
upon any sacred objects upon pain of death; magistrates were likewise
enjoined to prevent the Huguenots from performing their devotions in
any suspected places, but to confine them to such places as had been
specified; finally, the Huguenots were forbidden to hold any synods
or other assemblies except in the presence of certain of the King’s
officers, who were appointed to be present at them.[888] The pretext
of both of these edicts was the trespass upon the terms of Amboise by
the Protestants, and fear of a Protestant conspiracy. But in reality
the action of the government constituted a partial yielding to that
Catholic pressure which already had made itself manifest at Nancy.

The Edict of Roussillon completely ignored a petition of the Huguenots
presented to the King while at Roussillon, which shows the pernicious
activity of the local Catholic leagues already. The complaint
specified that infractions of the Edict of Amboise had been committed
by the Catholics, especially in Burgundy; that Catholic associations
everywhere were being formed against them; that the priests openly
lauded the King of Spain from their pulpits; that their synods were
broken up by the enemies of their religion.[889]

After a sojourn of a month at Roussillon, the pilgrimage of the court
was again resumed. At Valence (August 22) Catherine received word
that Elizabeth of Spain had given birth to still-born twin babes. On
September 24 Avignon was reached, where a stay of two weeks was made
during which Catherine consulted the famous astrologer Nostradamus.
Hyères and Aix were stages on the road to Marseilles[890] (November
3-10), whence it led to Nîmes[891] (December 12), and Montpellier[892]
(December 17), and thence to Agde and Beziers,[893] where progress
for some time was blocked by heavy snow-falls. The snows irritated
Catherine and to placate her impatience she was shown historical
evidence that both Blanche of Castile and the queen of Charles VII had
once been snowed-in in these parts for three months.[894] Unlike his
mother, Charles IX enjoyed it, building a snow fort in which he and his
pages withstood a siege by some of the gentlemen of the household.[895]

During this enforced sojourn Catherine de Medici received word of the
famous conflict between the marshal Montmorency, who had been made
governor of Paris,[896] when the court started _en tour_, and the
cardinal of Lorraine. On January 8, 1565, the cardinal of Lorraine
sought to enter Paris with a great rout of armed retainers. The marshal
demanded the disarming of the company, in compliance with a royal
_ordonnance_ of 1564 forbidding the carrying of arquebuses, pistols,
or other firearms,[897] not knowing that the cardinal had a warrant
from the queen mother authorizing his men to wear arms if so desired.
The cardinal haughtily refused to obey, and a fight took place in
the street near the corner of St. Innocents, in which one man was
killed.[898]

The reactionary policy of the government stimulated the local Catholic
leagues in Languedoc during this winter of 1564-65.[899] The religious
prejudice which these associations manifested was influenced by the
bitter jealousy existing between the Guises and the Montmorencys. From
the hour of the clash between the cardinal and the marshal, the Guises
plotted to compass the ruin of the house of Montmorency, and sought to
find support in the Catholic leagues of the southern provinces. The
tolerant policy of the marshal Montmorency and his brother Damville
was seized upon by the Guises to make them odious.[900] The secular
clergy and still more the Jesuits and Capuchins were very active in
this work, going from town to town and village to village, urging
Catholics vigorously to defend their faith, and their fiery preaching
materially advanced the tendency to union among the provincial
leagues.[901]

Under the effective leadership of the sieur de Candalle, the league
of Agen had had an astonishing spread over Guyenne, exhibiting a
strength of organization and an audacity which foreshadows that of
the Holy League of 1576, in whose genesis, indeed, it represents an
evolutionary stage. What made the league of Guyenne so peculiarly
formidable, however, was not so much its perfection of organization and
its wide expansion, as the fact that it was organized and had existence
without the knowledge or consent of the crown, and in transgression
of the royal authority, which forbade such associations. This highly
developed stage of existence was arrived at by the league of Agen in
August, 1564, from which date it may properly be called the league of
Guyenne.[902]

Naturally the Guises approached Montluc with their plan. While the
court was sojourning at Mont-de-Marsan (March 9-24, 1565), waiting
the arrival of the Spanish queen and the duke of Alva at Bayonne,
an intimation was given to Montluc that a league was in process of
formation in France “wherein were several great persons, princes
and others,” and an agent of the Guises at this time endeavored
to persuade Montluc to join the association.[903] But Montluc was
cautious; he had no great affection for the Guises and, moreover,
leagues and such associations were against the law, which he, as a
crown officer, was pledged to support. Grammont who was opposed to
Montluc had already complained of his conduct to the queen mother.[904]
Besides, there were private reasons, whose nature will be soon
developed, which made him hesitate. Montluc carried his information to
Catherine de Medici, who, not yet perceiving that the ambition of the
Guises was the chief motive, was not at once seriously alarmed, since
the anti-Protestant policy of the government made it indifferent now
to such associations. Accordingly, when the court reached Bordeaux
(it arrived there on April 9) and the Huguenots renewed their
complaints against Candalle and his associates, the King ignored the
petition, recognizing that many of the nobles were members of the
league of Guyenne. Instead, he gave the league a quasi-legal status
by proclaiming that the crown would not listen to any more complaints
against Candalle and his associates.[905]

But the queen mother was genuinely alarmed a few weeks later when
the real purpose and scope of the proposed league were revealed
to her through an intercepted letter which the duke of Aumale had
written on February 27, 1565, to the marquis d’Elbœuf. The duke of
Montpensier, the vicomte de Martigues, Chavigny, who was a Guise
protégé, D’Angennes, and the bishop of Mans, were named in this letter
as the chiefs of an association, which had for its avowed end the
abasement of the house of Montmorency.[906] Catherine, apprehending
the consequences certain to result from such an extension of the feud
of the two houses, implored the King, at a large meeting of the council
held on May 18, 1565, to divulge what had been ascertained—that a
secret association had been discovered in defiance of the law, having
political aims detrimental to the monarchy, and a system of government
for the levying of men and money without the King’s authority. The
counselors, with one accord, denied their knowledge or implication,
and protested their devotion to the cause and the law. Catherine was
thoroughly alarmed, and appealed to Montluc for advice. What followed
may be told in his own words:

I heard then some whisper of a league that was forming in France,
wherein were several very great persons, both Princes and others,
whom nevertheless I have nothing to do to name, being engaged by
promise to the contrary. I cannot certainly say to what end this
League was contrived; but a certain gentleman named them to me every
one, endeavoring at the same time to persuade me to make one in the
Association, assuring me it was to a good end; but he perceived by my
countenance that it was not a dish for my palate. I presently gave
the Queen private intimation of it; for I could not endure such kind
of doings, who seemed to be very much astonished at it, telling me
it was the first syllable she had ever heard of any such thing; and
commanding me to enquire further into the business, which I did, but
could get nothing more out of my gentleman; for he now lay upon his
guard.

Her Majesty then was pleased to ask my advice, how she should behave
herself in this business, whereupon I gave her counsel to order it
so that the King himself should say in public that he had heard
of a League that was forming in his Kingdom, which no one could do
without giving him some jealousy and offence; and that therefore he
must require everyone without exception to break off this League,
and that he would make an Association in his Kingdom, of which he
himself would be the Head; for so for some time it was called, though
they afterwards changed the name, and called it the Confederation of
the King. The Queen at the time that I gave her this advice did by
no means approve of it, objecting, that should the King make one, it
was to be feared that others would make another; but I made answer
and said that the King must engage in his own all such as were in
any capacity of doing the contrary, which, however, was a thing that
could not be concealed, and might well enough be provided against. Two
days after, her Majesty being at supper, called me to her and told
me that she had considered better of the affair I had spoke to her
about, and found my counsel to be very good, and that the next day,
without further delay, she would make the King propound the business
to his Council; which she accordingly did, and sent to enquire for me
at my lodging, but I was not within. In the evening she asked me why
I did not come to her, and commanded me not to fail to come the next
day, because there were several great difficulties in the Council, of
which they had not been able to determine. I came according to her
command, and there were several disputes. Monsieur de Nemours made a
very elegant speech, remonstrating “That it would be very convenient
to make a League and Association for the good of the King and his
Kingdom, to the end, that if affairs should so require, every one
with the one and the same will might repair to his Majesty’s person,
to stake their lives and fortunes for his service, and also in case
any one of what religion soever, should offer to invade or assault
them, or raise any commotion in the state, that they might with one
accord unite, and expose their lives in their common defence.” The
Duke of Montpensier was of the same opinion, and several others saying
that they could not choose but so much the more secure the peace of
the Kingdom, when it should be known that all the Nobility were thus
united for the defence of the Crown.

The Queen then did me the honor to command me to speak; whereupon
I began, and said, “That the League proposed could be no ways
prejudicial to the King, being that it tended to a good end for his
Majesty’s service, the good of his Kingdom, and the peace and security
of his People; but that one which should be formed in private could
produce nothing but disorder and mischief; for the good could not
answer for the evil disposed; and should the cards once be shuffled
betwixt League and League, it would be a hard matter to make of it a
good game; that being the most infallible way to open a door to let
strangers into the kingdom, and to expose all things to spoil and
ruin; but that all of us in general, both Princes and others, ought to
make an Association, which should bear the title of the League, or
the Confederation of the King, and to take a great and solemn oath,
not to decline or swerve from it upon penalty of being declared such
as the oath should import; and that his Majesty having so concluded,
ought to dispatch messengers to all parts of the kingdom, with
commission to take the oaths of such as were not there present, by
which means it would be known, who were willing to live and die in
the service of the king and state. And should anyone be so foolish
or impudent as to offer to take arms, let us all swear to fall upon
them; I warrant your Majesty I will take such order in these parts,
that nothing shall stir to the prejudice of your royal authority.
And in like manner let us engage by the faith we owe to God, that if
any Counter-League shall disclose itself, we will give your Majesty
immediate notice of it; and let your Majesty’s be subscribed by all
the great men of your kingdom. The feast will not be right without
them, and they also are easy to be persuaded to it, and the fittest to
provide against any inconvenience that may happen.”

This was my proposition, upon which several disputes ensued; but in
the end the King’s Association was concluded on, and it was agreed,
that all the Princes, great Lords, Governors of Provinces, and
Captains of Gens d’armes should renounce all Leagues and Confederacies
whatsoever, as well without as within the Kingdom, excepting that of
the King, and should take the oath upon pain of being declared rebels
to the crown; to which there were also other obligations added, which
I do not remember.... In the end all was past and concluded, and the
Princes began to take the oath, and to sign the articles.[907]

The weakness of the crown’s position in these circumstances is evident.
Recognizing its inability to crush these local associations and fearing
lest control of them would pass over wholly to the Guises, the crown
tried to save its power and its dignity by fusing them into a single
confederation under the King and forbidding the formation of future
associations without royal consent. But the power of the crown was
not commensurate with its show of authority. The leagues continued to
multiply and to remain independent of the crown’s coercion. In the year
1565 the situation is different in degree but not in kind from that
which existed in 1576 when the Holy League was formed.

Even the Spanish affiliations of the Holy League existed potentially
at this time through the treason of Montluc.[908] For the wily Gascon,
whose character was a combination of daring determination, religious
bigotry and envy, in recommending the measures he did was really taking
steps to cover up his own tracks. Montluc, despite his professions of
allegiance, was angry at the queen mother, and quite ready to knife her
in the dark. His heart was filled with rebellious envy of Vieilleville,
because the latter had been given a marshal’s bâton. Disappointed
in this expectation he asked for the post of colonel-general which
D’Andelot filled.[909] Instead Montluc had to be satisfied with the
office of governor of Guyenne, which he regarded as ill compensation
of his services.[910] In consequence of these grievances, even before
the recovery of Havre, Montluc had entered into correspondence with
Philip II, to whom he represented the necessity of Spanish intervention
in France, on account of the double danger by which France was
threatened through the purposes of the Protestants and Catherine de
Medici’s toleration of them. The Spanish King at first hesitated,
but soon availed himself of the opportunity thus afforded, for two
strings were better than one to his bow. Profound secrecy covered the
negotiations. Philip’s love of mystery and the delicacy of the matter
led him to conceal the plan even from his ambassador in France, and
operate through Bardaxi, a cousin of a Spanish captain of that name,
who had been pursued by the Inquisition and had fled to France, where
he sought service under Montluc in recompense of which he finally was
rehabilitated.[911] Montluc proposed the formation of a league between
the Pope, the Emperor, the Spanish King, and the leading Catholic
princes of Germany and Italy to avert a union of the Huguenots with
outside Protestant princes for the overthrow of the Catholic religion
in France.[912] He enlarged upon the moral “benefit” of such a league
to France, now ridden by the Huguenots to the imminent ruin of the
monarchy, and pointed out to Philip II the peculiar interest he had in
crushing Calvinism.[913] The plan was for Philip II to kidnap Jeanne
d’Albret who was to be given over to the Inquisition, and to seize
possession of Béarn, and thus accomplish two purposes at once—destroy
the hearth of Calvinism in France, and establish Spanish power north
of the Pyrenees.[914] Fortunately for France, the French ambassador at
Madrid, St. Sulpice, was informed of the plan, though he did not know
of Montluc’s treason, by a servant of the Spanish queen, and Catherine
de Medici’s energetic steps in the protection of Béarn nipped the
scheme in the bud.[915]

This joint plan of Montluc and Philip II for the seizure of Béarn
and the capture of its queen telescoped with another plot against her
to which Philip and Pope Pius IV were parties. On September 28, 1563,
a papal bull excommunicated the queen for heresy, and she was cited
before the Holy Office for trial.[916] To Catherine’s credit she at
once took a firm stand in favor of the queen of Navarre.[917]

It was not in the nature of Philip II to be daring in daylight.
Precaution was second nature to him. Lansac’s mission to Madrid
to protest against the action of Pius IV coincided with Montluc’s
overtures to the Spanish King. The discovery of part of the plan made
Philip timid about pushing it at all until a more favorable time at
least. Accordingly he gave Montluc little encouragement, save offering
him an asylum in Spain if events should compel him to quit France on
account of his treasonable correspondence,[918] while to Lansac he
said that “what the Pope had done against ‘Madame de Vendôme’ was
very inopportune and would be remedied.”[919] In a word, Philip II
dissembled his participation in the Pope’s conduct, asserting that
the procedure had been taken without his knowledge, and that while he
deplored the queen of Navarre’s apostasy he could not be unmindful of
the fact that she was kith and kin of the queen of Spain, his wife![920]

There probably was a certain amount of spite work in Philip’s
repudiation of the Pope at this time. One of the important political
issues raised at the Council of Trent was the question of precedence
between the ambassadors of France and Spain. Lansac, Charles IX’s
ambassador to the Council, claimed the honor of going before the
count of Lara, Spain’s representative, at which Philip was “picqué
oultre mesure.”[921] The papal party in vain implored Lansac to yield.
Lansac replied that “la France ne pouvait renoncer aux droits qui lui
avaient été reconnus dans tous les précédents conciles, et que, plutôt
que de laisser rien innover sur ce point, ‘j’étais résolu, selon le
commandement de mon maître, après avoir protesté de nullité de ce
concile, de m’en aller incontinent avec tous les prélats de notre
nation, sans entrer dans aucune dispute ne composition.’”[922] Philip
II refrained from making any observation to France upon the disputed
point[923] pending the decision of the Pope.[924] But such a course
was impossible. The contest over the question became the absorbing
topic of conversation at Rome.[925] The Pope was between Scylla and
Charybdis.[926] Spain claimed precedence for Philip II through the
crown of Castile—“chose peu véritable”—and argued that the services
of Philip II to the church justified her pretension; to which France
rejoined that her king was historically first son of the church, the
Most Christian King, who “had bled and suffered for the preservation of
the Catholic religion in his kingdom, for which he had combated to the
hazarding of his entire state.”[927] Finally being compelled to decide,
Pius IV made a choice in favor of France, to the immense chagrin of
Philip II who actually fell sick of the humiliation and recalled his
ambassador Vargas from Rome as a sign of his displeasure.[928]

The catalogue of Spain’s grievances against France, besides the
question of religion, the dispute over precedence, and France’s refusal
to accept the findings of Trent which Philip II had recognized[929]
included still another complaint. This was the border difficulty
between the Spanish provinces of Artois and Luxembourg, and France.
It was a complex question, partly religious, partly political, partly
commercial. Like the Huguenot rebellion, the growing insurrection in
the Low Countries was of a double nature—religious and political.
Each side looked to the other for sympathy and support and neither was
disappointed. The Huguenots retaliated for the assistance afforded the
government of France by Spain during the first civil war by aiding the
revolt of the Netherlands. This intimate connection of events on each
side of the line is an important fact to be observed.

It was in 1563, as Granvella had divined,[930] that the intrigues
of the French Protestants in Flanders became a matter of serious
apprehension. Valenciennes was the most aggressive city of the religion
in Flanders, and Margaret of Parma actually was afraid of Montigny
doing as Maligny had done at Havre. Already the prince of Orange was
the recognized leader of those who sympathized with the Huguenots.
To this class England’s support of the prince of Condé, and above
all, the assassination of the duke of Guise, came as a real stimulus.
Valenciennes, Tournay, Antwerp, even Brussels were stirred. In May,
1563, the demonstrations of the Calvinists at Valenciennes and Tournay
became so bold that it required six companies of infantry to keep
them overawed. But this measure, instead of accomplishing the result
expected, aggravated the situation, for the marquis de Berghes, the
commander, was so ostracized by the nobles, that he lost courage.
Philip II grew alarmed and wrote to his sister on June 13, 1563, that
the example of France counseled most drastic suppression. In reply
the regent and the cardinal Granvella implored Philip to come to the
Netherlands, but he pleaded ignorance of the language and poverty as
excuse. Meanwhile the Orange party practiced so successfully with the
duchess of Parma that she inclined toward conciliation instead of
coercion. This threw the regent and De Berghes into alignment, who
proposed to convoke the States-General to remedy the evils—a programme
which the nobles enthusiastically advocated.

The similarity between the Flemish movement and the programme of the
political Huguenots in France is very close.[931] With the design of
suppressing heresy in its two most active centers, Granvella proposed
to imitate the method used at Paris, of exacting a profession of faith
together with a pledge to observe the laws, of all citizens who wished
to stay in the city. Recalcitrants were to be disarmed, compelled to
sell their property, one-third of the proceeds of which was to be
confiscated for the support of the soldiers and municipal expenses, and
the culprits were then to be banished from the country. This drastic
policy called forth a mingled protest and threat from the prince of
Orange, whose wealth and German connections, aside from other qualities
he possessed, gave him great influence. The government begged for money
and troops, “como la liga va cresciendo.”[932] Orange’s tactics were
to persuade the provincial estates to refuse to vote subsidies or to
throw the weight of the finances upon the church much after the manner
of things done at Pontoise. This he began to do in Brabant where the
indefinite postponement of a grant of money provoked mutiny among
the soldiers. In September De Berghes went out from office, having
distinguished himself by not putting a single heretic to death. The
change was immediately followed by the burning alive of a Protestant
preacher and the protestations of the quartet, Orange, Hoorne, Egmont,
and Montigny, became bolder.[933] Finally the nobles of Flanders
resolved to protest to the King of Spain. Philip II, always hesitating
and undecided, did not respond. To a petition which was sent him
demanding the recall of the cardinal, he replied by a flat refusal. The
nobles showed their offense by absenting themselves from the Council
of State and used their influence to detach the regent from Granvella.
At last, after months of negotiation, Philip II yielded. Granvella
retired to his splendid palace at Besançon in Franche Comté and the
nobles resumed their seats in the council. But the four were irritated
at Philip II’s delay in responding to their demands for reform. It was
evident, moreover, by November, 1563, that something like a common
purpose actuated the chief provinces—Flanders, Artois, Holland,
Zealand, and Utrecht.[934]

The Calvinists were especially numerous in the Walloon provinces,
and preachers from Geneva and England were active among them. The
government undertook to restrain their assemblies, and the conflict
broke out. This conflict, it is important to remark, did not turn
upon the question of religion in and of itself, but upon the manner
of treating the heretics. Philip wanted to apply the edicts of his
father, which required the death penalty for heresy; but the government
and Spanish officials in the Low Countries, Catholics though they were,
were opposed to so severe a penalty and would rather have treated
those offending as criminals than as heretics. But with Philip the
extirpation of heresy was a question of conscience.

Valenciennes still remained the most prominent place of
disaffection,[935] but Brussels was much infected.[936] But more
formidable than local spirit was the marked tendency toward a union
of the provinces[937] and the growing interest of the Huguenots in
the Dutch and Flemish cause,[938] so much so that Cardinal Granvella
strongly hinted at Spanish pressure being forcibly exerted upon France
for the reduction of the Huguenots.[939] The cardinal hoped to see
Charles IX and his mother more docile in receiving the advice of Spain
since the withdrawal of Chantonnay, who was made Philip II’s ambassador
at Vienna. But the theft of Alava’s cipher by the Huguenots threw him
into despair.[940] The reciprocal connection between politics and
religion in France and the Low Countries made the Spanish government
watch the movement of events in France with vigilance.[941] So acute
was the situation owing to Huguenot sympathy with the cause of
insurrection across the border,[942] that although Granvella ridiculed
the wild rumor that Montgomery was coming to Flanders, he nevertheless
apprehended the possibility of a rupture with France and was relieved
to know that precautions had been taken against any chance enterprise
of the Huguenots along the edge of Artois and Hainault.[943]

Margaret of Parma and the nobles sent ambassadors to Spain to ask
concession on two points: (1) that the provinces be governed by
native officials; (2) that the punishment of heresy be moderated. The
King hesitated long. It was not until October 17, 1565, that he gave
decisive pronouncement in dispatches issued from Segovia. In them he
ordered the maintenance of the Inquisition, the enforcement of the
edicts, and the impoverishment of those who resisted. In a word, Philip
II would not yield. The discontent against the administration of the
King of Spain now turned against the King himself. William of Orange
used the notable words, “We are witnessing the beginning of a great
tragedy.”

In the face of the growing resistance the duke of Alva strongly advised
Philip II to convert the towns into fortresses.[944] For the Flemish
cities were, as yet, commercial groups, not fortified burgs. With the
possible exception of Gravelines, no one of them was capable of making
a sustained defense.

This suggestion happened to coincide with the English occupation
of Havre-de-Grace and the possible return of Calais to England in
return therefor. Such a contingency could but be viewed with anxiety
by Spain,[945] and this fact, coupled with the uncertainty of
developments in France induced Philip to follow out Alva’s suggestion
by strengthening Gravelines. France at once became alarmed over Calais
and protested in the same breath against the building of fortifications
at Gravelines and the duty upon her wines.[946] In retaliation the
French government also strengthened the garrisons on the edge of
Picardy, under the direction of the prince of Condé (who was governor
of the province), to the immense indignation of Spain.[947] The
Spanish erections around Gravelines reacted also upon the state of
things in Flanders. For new and heavier taxation was the indispensable
point of departure for carrying out such measures, “unless one were
willing to see everything said upon the subject vanish in smoke.”
The sole effective remedy for the state of things prevailing in the
Flemish provinces was, of course, to reorganize the finances and the
administration of justice in accordance with the demands made by the
nobles. But instead of attempting to do this, the government aimed to
weaken the opposition by dividing the leaders, and the long silence of
Philip II covered an attempt to draw away Egmont, who was regarded as
the ringleader of the Flemish nobles at this time.[948] The Spanish
government dreaded to summon the estates, as Orange insisted should be
done, for fear of things in Brabant and the other provinces going the
road of things in France under like conditions.[949]

In order, therefore, to provide for funds without asking the estates to
vote subsidies, over which there was sure to be a conflict, the Spanish
government in the Netherlands undertook to raise the needed money
by tariffs. The cloth trade of England and the wine trade of France
were the two commodities so taxed. In 1563 a duty was laid on French
wine.[950] In the case of England, the excuse given for the high duty
placed on imported cloth was precaution against the plague.[951] France
at once protested against the tariff and threatened to retaliate by
taxing the herring and cod trade, though the Spanish ambassador at
Paris represented that such action would entirely destroy the wine
trade and would compel reprisal.[952]

Flemish merchants were doubly alarmed at the state of things, for
England, too, threatened reprisal by removing the cloth market from
Antwerp to Embden and imposing tonnage duties on merchant ships of
Flanders driven by stress of weather into English ports for safety
during storm.[953] But the government in Flanders was obdurate.
Granvella declared England’s threat to remove the staple to Embden
to be “puerile rhodomontade.” He believed that not only would the
prohibition against the import of English cloth compel Elizabeth
to redress the grievances of Spanish subjects against England, but
that it might even make the English government more lenient toward
the Catholic religion. Furthermore, he argued, the tax would operate
like a protective tariff to stimulate the manufacture of cloth in
the Low Countries. “If not a single bolt of English cloth ever comes
into Flanders again,” he wrote “it will be to the permanent profit
of the Pays-Bas. We saw this clearly last year during the plague
when the prohibition having temporarily suspended the importation of
this kind of goods, there was manufactured in the single county of
Flanders 60,000 pieces of cloth, or more than the sum total of the
three preceding years.”[954] In the case of French wines the Flemish
government even established a maximum law for their sale which cut the
throat of French merchants worse than ever.[955] The French government
carried the action of the Flemish government up to Madrid, where for
months the duty on wine and the buttresses of Gravelines were matters
of repeated interviews between St. Sulpice and the King, and were still
unsettled questions at the time of the conference at Bayonne.[956]
Meanwhile the conflict of the Flemish reform party became more acute
because it became complicated with the question of religion.

In the light of all these circumstances, it is no wonder that Philip II
hesitated long before giving his consent to an interview with Catherine
de Medici.[957] Even then he imposed a number of conditions and
regulations. He would not go in person to Bayonne—the place appointed;
his wife was to be accompanied by the duke of Alva; display was to
be avoided by either side both for motives of economy and to prevent
having undue political significance attached to an interview which
was to be understood to be purely personal. Philip II’s most striking
regulations, however, were those which had to do with the French
_entourage_. No one in the least tainted with heresy was to accompany
the court. The queen of Navarre, whom the Spanish King carefully
alluded to as “Madame de Vendôme,” the prince of Condé, the admiral,
and the cardinal Châtillon were specifically named with abhorrence. The
queen mother acquiesced in this prohibition, save in the case of the
prince of Condé, protesting that, on account of his rank, it would give
great offense to forbid his presence, as well as create belief among
the Huguenots that the meeting contemplated something disadvantageous
to them. History has shown that Catherine’s instincts were perfectly
right in this particular; since after the massacre of St. Bartholomew
the Huguenots—indeed almost the whole Protestant world—jumped to the
conclusion that that disaster was preconcerted at Bayonne. In vain St.
Sulpice argued political expediency, saying France and Spain must not
be judged alike, and that “experience had proved that the way of arms
had resulted in more dangers than profit to France.” Philip II’s answer
was metallically hard; he would not consent to the presence either of
Jeanne d’Albret or the prince of Condé at Bayonne, because it would be
a reproach to him and to Spain for his wife to have had converse with a
heretic.[958]

The last stage of Charles IX’s long tour of the provinces was from
Bordeaux[959] to Bayonne[960] where the French court arrived on May
22, 1565. But that indolence of spirit which is so much associated
with Spanish character seems as early as the sixteenth century to have
become habitual,[961] so that the Spanish queen was forced to travel in
the heat (six soldiers of Strozzi’s band died with their armor on from
heat prostration), which aggravated the plague prevailing in certain
parts.[962]

In conferences of state, especially international conferences, things
of importance are confined within four walls. The sixteenth century
was _par excellence_ the age of closet politics. The world upon the
outside saw only the fêtes[963] that marked the interview at Bayonne.
But these festivities were no more than the flecks or wreaths of
glittering foam that float upon the bosom of the water for an instant
and then are gone. The real business at Bayonne was politics. But the
great importance for three hundred years[964] attributed to this famous
interview is today proved to have had slight foundation in fact. The
light of recent research has dissipated the traditional belief that
Philip II and Catherine de Medici planned the massacre of the French
Protestants at Bayonne, and finally consummated it on St. Bartholomew’s
Day.[965] The truth is that not what was contemplated but _what was
imagined was contemplated_ at Bayonne became the important historical
influence of the future. An assumed fact came to have all the force
of reality. The principals in this unfortunate conference, in point
of truth, were far apart from one another. Philip II’s interests were
wholly political, and personalities were merely incidental to his main
purpose. On the other hand, the queen mother’s interests were chiefly
personal, being centered in plans to achieve brilliant marriage
alliances for her children, for whose sake she ruinously compromised
herself and France.

If Catherine had been less vain and less foolishly affectionate, she
would have striven harder for the solution of things more vital to
France. It is true she was far from ignoring these issues entirely, but
she weakened the cause of France in respect to them by subordinating
these to her main purpose, so that she awakened the greater suspicion
of Spain by her attempts to avoid answering in those matters of most
concern to Philip II and by her continual harping upon the things that
were nearest to her heart, but not of most moment either to France or
to Spain. When the duke of Alva drove her into a corner and compelled
her to answer the questions he put to her concerning greater politics,
Catherine’s replies were fatal to her aspirations. What were these
matters?

Alva’s instructions were strict. He was to demand the expulsion of the
Huguenot ministers from France within thirty days; the interdiction
of Protestant worship; acceptance of the decrees of the Council of
Trent; profession of the Catholic religion by all office holders.[966]
This policy of suppression and compulsion outlined by his sovereign
was wholly in keeping with his, the duke’s, own judgment. But with
greater penetration and less hesitation than Philip II, Alva recognized
clearly the intimate connection between the politics of Flanders and
the politics of France, and favored the adoption of a parallel line
of conduct at once in the Low Countries. He was convinced that France
was incapable of managing her own affairs and was a menace to other
states, politically and religiously.[967] The means of repression
which Spain had often urged had not produced the results desired:
they had only delayed the total ruin of the nation. Suggestion and
insinuation must be replaced by a more drastic policy. Assassination
was a recognized, perhaps a quasi-legitimate political recourse in the
eyes of the men of the sixteenth century. The old generation of French
Catholics upon whom Spain could rely, the cardinal de Tournon, the
duke of Guise, the marshal St. André, had passed away—one of them
assassinated at the hands of a Huguenot. Tavannes and Vieilleville
were reluctant to sacrifice country to religion, especially when a
rival nation would profit thereby. The constable was the only old-time
figure of prominence remaining, and he could not be relied on since the
conflict between the marshal Montmorency and the cardinal of Lorraine,
for he favored the side of his nephews and so was believed to be not
far distant from the party of the admiral.[968] Power had fallen into
the hands of the Huguenots, whose leaders now excelled in personal
force. “The shortest, the most expeditious way, is to behead Condé, the
admiral, D’Andelot, La Rochefoucauld, and Grammont,” Alva told the duke
of Montpensier[969] and Montluc, the two most earnest French converts
to this policy.[970]

But it was yet a far cry from this cool advocacy of assassination of
the Protestant leaders to the wholesale slaughter of August 24, 1572.
There is really no positive connection between the conference of
Bayonne and the massacre of St. Bartholomew.[971] The slaughter of the
French Protestants _as a sect_ was never advocated by any prince in
Europe, not even Philip II. There is no evidence at the Vatican of any
Catholic or papal league for the extirpation of the Protestants. Such
a solution of the religious problem was not contemplated, save by one
person in Europe at this time—Pope Pius V. It is this pontiff who has
the sinister distinction of having advocated general destruction of the
Protestants, rather than a discriminating assassination of the Huguenot
leaders.[972] The most radical action touching the Huguenots at large,
it may safely be said, that was regarded practicable in 1564-65 was
to forbid and prevent future conversion,[973] or else the wholesale
exile of the Huguenots from the realm.[974] The alternative of total
destruction was not contemplated anywhere in Europe or at any time,
except in the single case mentioned.

No such crime as the massacre of the Huguenots was planned at Bayonne,
nor perpetrated as the result of that conference. The principals in the
case were too far apart in intention and conviction for so gigantic
a programme. The paramount purpose of the queen mother was to marry
Charles IX to the elder daughter of the Emperor, Margaret of Valois to
Don Carlos, and the duke of Orleans (the future Henry III) to Donna
Juana, Philip II’s sister. But Alva was crafty. By a series of adroit
questions which tantalized her hopes and preyed upon her fears, he
compelled Catherine de Medici to commit herself upon the very political
issues which she wished to avoid discussing, until she was hopelessly
compromised. In vain she doubled like a fox pursued by the hounds and
tried to throw the duke off upon a false scent.

“France must be cleared of this vicious sect,” said Alva. In order
to avoid replying, Catherine attempted, by a question, to turn the
conversation to the subject of a universal league, whether it should be
against the Turk or against the heretic. Alva was not thrown off. The
queen resorted to sarcasm.

“Since you understand the evil from which France is suffering so well,”
she said, “tell me the remedy.”

Alva sidestepped the direct shot, by suavely rejoining:

“Madame, who knows better than yourself?”

“The King, your master,” said Catherine ironically, “knows better than
I everything that passes in France. What means would he employ to
overcome the rebellious Protestants?”

Alva resorted to the Socratic method, hoping to involve the queen in
the toils of argument.

“Has the religion gained or lost since the peace of Amboise?” he
inquired insidiously.

“It has gained,” replied she.

The answer, in Spain’s eyes, was a condemnation of the policy of
France; it was a thorn in the road of the queen’s ambitious hopes
of marriage alliance. In her exasperation, Catherine upbraided her
daughter for out-Spaniarding the Spaniard.

“I am a Spaniard, I admit,” said Elizabeth. “ It is my duty.”[975]

Catherine broached anew the possibility of Philip II consenting to have
his sister marry her Benjamin—Henry duke of Orleans—and conferring
Artois as dowry upon the pair.

“The king would never consent to sacrifice one of his provinces,” said
Alva brusquely.

“But to give a Spanish province to the duke of Orleans,” argued the
queen mother, blinded by maternal affection, “would be the same then as
giving it to his own brother.”

Alva taxed the queen with maintaining a heretic, L’Hôpital, in the
chancellorship, and of opposing the Tridentine decrees. Catherine
emphatically denied the first charge, although her daughter again
supported Alva’s indictment by declaring that even during the life of
her father, L’Hôpital had passed for a Huguenot; as to the second,
she said the crown of France objected to the political application
of certain findings of the Council of Trent, which she hoped to have
adjusted. Alva saw the vulnerable point in her reply and inquired if
she aimed to call another assembly like the Colloquy of Poissy.

“I recognize the danger of such assemblies,” said Catherine, “but the
king, my son, is strong enough to compel discussion only of those
subjects which he may designate.”

“Was it so at Poissy?” sneered Alva.

The queen’s reply was a tirade against the cardinal of Lorraine, whom
she blamed for the failure of the colloquy.

In the end there _was_ a promise given by the queen mother at Bayonne.
But it was verbal, not written, and so governed by circumstances that
the edge of Spain’s intentions was dulled. Compromising the agreement
certainly was; convicting it is not, for, aside from the fact that
its fulfilment was dependent upon an impossible condition of things,
Catherine never permitted herself to express in writing what the terms
of this promise were. Our knowledge of it is dependent upon Alva’s
letters of June 15 and July 4; upon Philip II’s construction of it in
a letter addressed by him to the cardinal Pacheco[976] on August 24,
1565, and the dispatch of the Venetian ambassador Suriano, who was
with the French queen, to the senate on July 22, supplemented by what
information St. Sulpice picked up during the last days of his mission
in Spain.

It is evident from the careful reading of these documents that the real
triumph at Bayonne was scored by the papacy; that Spain won a sterile
victory, and France met an indecisive defeat. Spain and France, being
unable to carry their own purpose through as each desired, compromised
on a course which was an intermediate plane of agreement to them, but
which, _according to the letter_, was a supreme triumph for Rome, and
would have been a complete victory for Rome _if the terms had ever been
executed_. The man of the hour was the cardinal Santa Croce, nuncio in
France. His services are thus reported by the Venetian ambassador in
France on July 2:

On the eve of departure, the queen, perceiving the discontent of the
duke of Alva, summoned the nuncio, who was not far away, to Bayonne,
in order to have him at hand. It is he who has found a solution; he
has satisfied both parties. I shall be able to inform you shortly as
to the nature of his solution.[977]

Three weeks later (July 22) the promised word was sent to Venice in
the form of a cipher dispatch,[978] the information in which had been
communicated to him in strictest secrecy.[979] This intensely important
document reads as follows:

Now that I have received positive information, I shall tell everything
to your Signory that has happened. Since his arrival, the duke of Alva
has not ceased to urge the queen to give his master a manifestation of
her good will toward the cause of religion by some manifest act, and
he had urged her to cause the decisions of the Council of Trent to be
observed throughout the whole realm of France, for which his Catholic
majesty would show his satisfaction. The queen had yielded readily
to this proposition and had told him that she was very inclined to
convene an assembly of prelates, of theologians, and savants, to
examine the decisions made at Trent, _without occupying themselves
with doctrine_, but confining themselves to the reform of abuses. The
duke had found this offer strange and had not concealed his discontent
over it. According to him, this was to oppose a council to a council,
which would be the worst of results and mightily displease the king
his master. Since he urged the necessity of this measure, before
passing to any other consideration, and was so obdurate, the queen,
being very pained to see him depart so unsatisfied, and things being
so desperate, notified the nuncio, who was not lodged at Bayonne
like all the ambassadors, and ordered the _mareschal de logis_ of
the palace to prepare accommodation for him and to have him come
immediately. He came at once and being informed by the queen, went to
find the duke, but was very badly received by him. The duke blamed
and reproached him for not remaining firm in his opinion. The queen
holding to the idea of this assembly of prelates and theologians, and
the duke opposing it, the nuncio found another expedient which seemed
to give satisfaction to all. He broached it to the queen, and with
her consent communicated it to the duke. This remedy, at the twelfth
hour, was very opportune. It is this: This assembly shall be held:
but under certain conditions. The first is that the persons chosen to
participate in it shall be of such influence as to be able to demand
that no Huguenot shall sit in it; secondly, the assembly must conform
to that which the queen had at first proposed; that is to say, all
disputes over dogma and doctrine shall be forbidden. The queen, having
accepted this, authorized the nuncio to communicate her consent to the
duke, who showed himself satisfied. Both of them then came together
to find the queen again, and on the next day, in the presence of the
queen of Spain, the cardinal Bourbon, the marshal Bourdillon, and the
leading nobles, the whole was confirmed.

Great benefit can come from this: by eliminating everything that
pertains to dogma, and avoiding doctrinal difficulties, all the
other resolutions which are of less importance will be strengthened,
especially as the Huguenots, the only ones who can give trouble will
be excluded. There is no doubt about both the king and the queen being
disposed to the Catholic religion, since they have given proofs of
it. I am, moreover, assured by what the queen has said, that there
is no intention to touch any of the privileges of the Holy See, nor,
per contra, any of the concessions made by the popes to the kings who
were predecessors of the king now reigning. The execution of this
convention thus arranged is not to take place until the return of the
king to Paris.

The King of Spain, in the letter cited to Cardinal Pacheco, expressed
his contentment with this agreement,[980] not perceiving that the
application of it was capable of a great amount of flexibility. In his
blindness he thought that the nuncio had broken the loaf so as to give
the greater portion to Spain; while in reality the greater part was in
the hands of the Pope, Philip II having actually but the difference
between a fragment and no bread. In fine, no plot was entered into
at Bayonne; no crime was ever committed in pursuance of an agreement
arranged there. The “plot” agreed upon at Bayonne between Catherine
de Medici and Philip II of Spain consisted of an ambiguous promise,
the fulfilment of which was dependent upon an impossible condition of
things.[981]

The affair of Bayonne was not a crime; it was a colossal blunder. The
destruction of the ambitious marriage expectations of the Valois was
the least loss. The irreparable thing was that France forfeited the
confidence of her Protestant subjects. The secrecy that enveloped
the conference made the Huguenots apprehensive of the worst. They
believed that a Franco-Spanish alliance was made at Bayonne for their
overwhelming; and the second civil war was the outcome of their
misgivings.[982] And when finally, _for other reasons_, the massacre
of St. Bartholomew befell them, not merely Protestant France but
Protestant Europe was convinced that the false hypothesis had been
demonstrated. The count Hector la Ferrière admirably summarizes the
situation:

To maintain and loyally to adhere to the edict of pacification; to
open to the daring sailors of France the Indies and America, which
Spain and Portugal were endeavoring to close to them; and finally to
rally Catholics and Protestants under the same banner against the
foreigner—this was the only true French policy. The Spaniard at this
time was the enemy of France. She encountered him everywhere in her
path; at Rome, at Vienna, at the Council of Trent he disputed her
precedence; in Switzerland by gold and by the menaces of his agents he
interfered with the renewals of the French treaties with the Catholic
cantons; at the very time when Catherine and Elizabeth of Valois were
exchanging false promises of alliance and friendship, Menendez was
sailing for Florida, bearing orders for the massacre of all the French
found there.[983]

CHAPTER XI

THE TOUR OF THE PROVINCES (_Continued_). THE INFLUENCE OF THE REVOLT OF
THE NETHERLANDS UPON FRANCE. THE AFFAIR OF MEAUX

From the field of Philip II’s empty victory the court resumed its
pilgrimage, crossing the Loire and traversing Guyenne which was “in
good repose,” visiting Angoulême, Cognac, Saintes, La Rochelle, and
Niort _en route_ to Nantes. The country was the veritable dominion
of Calvinism in France, but as yet the Huguenots let their hopes
belie their fears.[984] The progress through the western provinces
was purposely slow, for Catherine still hoped against hope that
Fourquevaux, who had succeeded St. Sulpice at the Spanish court,
might persuade Philip II to think more favorably of her matrimonial
schemes,[985] until finally, late in December, the bitter truth came
out; only the younger daughter of the Hapsburgs might marry a Valois,
even though he was king of France. The queen mother had been weighed
in the balance by Catholic-Hapsburg Europe and had been found wanting.
Then it was that Catherine turned her eyes toward eastern Europe in the
hope of finding in Poland a recompense for the fondled and despicable
Henry of Valois. Strange are the vicissitudes of history! The effect
of Philip II’s resolution was to put a mountebank on the throne of
Poland and cast Marguerite of Valois into the arms of the son of Jeanne
d’Albret.[986]

Long before this time, however, Spain had begun to be impatient for
the fulfilment of the compact of Bayonne. But procrastination was
Catherine’s trump suit. She averred that the plague was too prevalent
to make it safe for the court to return to Paris until winter,[987] and
when the cold weather diminished the danger from that source, pleaded
the poverty and famine of the realm as an excuse.[988] It was an excuse
the validity of which was everywhere manifest. France truly had been in
the dire pangs of hunger and intense cold during the celebrated winter
of 1564-65.[989] Claude Haton, the priest-historian of Provins, who
was a close observer of meteorological phenomena has given a graphic
description of this season.

The winter at its commencement in November [he says] was very mild
and was so until December 20, the vigil of St. Thomas the apostle,
without either cold or frost in the mornings. The rain was so warm
that it was thought that the winter would be mild and open, but on
the vigil of St. Thomas there came a great cold, accompanied in the
morning by a cold rain, which by midday turned into snow, and which
fell all the rest of the day in so great abundance that the earth,
which was very wet, was covered on the morrow to the depth of a foot,
king’s measure, and more, with snow. With this snow came a northeast
wind, which froze everything under a coating of thick ice. This cold
continued down to the last day of December. The ice was so thick that
a man could cross the river without breaking through. The snow lay
so heavy upon the fields that in the open places the drifts were as
high as a man. After the snow-storm had passed the cold redoubled, so
that even the best clad suffered whenever they went out doors. There
was not a house in the village where the water did not freeze, if it
was not set close by the fire; and I do not exaggerate when I say
that in many good and well-built houses wine froze before the great
chimney, though the latter was heaped up with wood. I saw in many
houses iron pots suspended above the fire with icicles hanging over
the edge. Every night and morning when the people got up there was
frost upon the coverlet, from the evaporation of the bodies of the
sleepers. There was not a wine-cellar where the wine did not freeze
in the casks, unless care was taken to keep charcoal fires burning
there. In some wine-cellars it was necessary to close every aperture
in order to prevent the wine from freezing. It frequently froze so
hard that it was necessary to pierce the bung-hole with a red hot
poker in order to draw it out. On the night of the 23-24 December, as
also on Christmas night, the ice was so heavy upon the trees that the
boughs were broken. These things had not been seen in France since
the year 1480.[990] The greatest cold was on the day of the feast of
the Innocents (December 28). Many men who were exposed died in the
roads. The crests of cocks and poultry were frozen and fell off some
days afterwards, and many were found dead under their roosts. The
sheep also died.

Early in January the ice began to melt. It grew uncommonly warm for
the season, so that fire became unnecessary. On the day following
the edict of the king, about noon, a soft warm rain began to fall,
which caused the snow to vanish rapidly. This lasted for five days,
so that the earth was covered with water. And then came a second cold
for three entire weeks, until the 28th of the month, and snow with a
high wind came, which drove the snow everywhere and piled it in great
drifts. The winter grain was frozen in the furrows. God knows how much
the poor people who had no wood suffered. Most of them stayed in bed
night and day without getting up except to eat once in twenty-four
hours. The poor of Paris and others who had no means, were compelled
to burn their furniture. Those who had made no provision for the
winter, chiefly of wood, were compelled to purchase at high prices,
for it was not possible to do carting because of the condition of
the roads; in many cases, moreover, the bridges were destroyed. When
the thaw came, the high waters penetrated houses and churches in
Provins to the depth of three, four, and even five feet, washing out
the very dead in the cemetery.[991] At Paris the flood damaged the
Pont-au-Change and caused many houses to topple. Vine-growers found
themselves in great difficulty. Those who were wise cut their vines
back to the root, in order that they might sprout better again, and
were repaid for so doing, for they were the only ones that bore.

The spring was fair and mild, so that barley and oats were sown. Yet
much ground lay bare because in the fields sown with winter wheat
the roots were all killed, so that no grain grew. The walnut trees
seemed to be dead through all the month of April and half of May,
for they did not put forth their buds. Pear and apple trees bore a
few blossoms. In some places there were plums and cherries, but not
everywhere.[992]

The winter was just as bad in Gascony, Provence, and Languedoc. On the
day of the Feast of St. John the Baptist (June 24) it snowed![993]
Even the poor people were compelled to build fires, though they could
not afford the fuel. The vines throughout central France were so badly
injured that not a third part of the crop remained. The grain likewise
was destroyed. Water courses were swollen and overflowed their banks,
and in the meadows of the Seine people had to take care lest they be
drowned. As a result of the cold spring, the harvest of 1565 failed
over almost all the realm to such an extent that it was necessary to
abolish the tolls between provinces and to permit free trade in grain.
Paris imported wheat from Champagne, Picardy, Anjou, Lower Brittany,
Burgundy, and Auvergne, the least stricken of the provinces.[994]
The Parlement of Paris passed an ordinance forbidding speculation in
foodstuffs and compelled those possessed of a surplus of grain to throw
what was not needed for their own necessity upon the market.[995] A
measure (_boisseau_) of wheat, from January to April cost from 12-15
sous (= 1½ pecks at from 36 to 45 cents), and after April the price
rose every week until harvest time, to the sum of 25 sous _tournois_
(approximately 75 cents). Wheat was very dear in Paris and throughout
all Brie, the Ile-de-France, Valois, Soissonais, and Picardy; less
so in Champagne, Burgundy, and Lorraine, where there was rye and
barley enough for the people. The stock starved because the grain
was consumed by the people. Many people went over into Champagne in
order to purchase rye and barley to make bread with until the harvest
came. Fortunately grain was plentiful in Champagne, and wheat fell
to 7 and 6 sous per measure (from 19 to 22 cents), and corn in like
proportion after the harvest. Because of the hard times which they had
experienced, many accumulated great stores in the expectation that in a
short time there would again be a dearth.

Wine was very dear until the vintage. In the months of August and
September before the grapes were gathered, it was not possible to
purchase wine by the cup at taverns, even for silver; it was with
great difficulty that sufficient wine was procurable for church
service. But after the vintage the price dropped to 14 _livres
tournois_ ($8.70) _la queue du creu_, whereas it had been as high as
80 before ($49.60).[996]

As so often appears elsewhere in history, the economic distress and
strain of poverty was followed by psychological manifestations of
a religio-sociological sort, among the lower and poor classes. In
1565, in the villages of Champagne and Brie and especially in the
bailiwicks of Sens, Melun, Montereau, Nogent, Troyes, Châlons, Rheims,
Epernay, Château-Thierry, Meaux, and Provins, the belief spread among
the peasantry that in honor of the Virgin they ought to refrain from
working in the fields on Saturday after midday, and that this Saturday
rest had been formally ordered by the Virgin in revelations and
apparitions. A young girl of Charly-sur-Marne, near Epernay, boasted
of having received these confidences, and showed miraculous signs of
her mission. But the cardinal of Lorraine caused her to be arrested and
questioned, and she was burned alive as a witch.[997]

Instead of going to Paris, the court passed the winter at Moulins in
Bourbonnais,[998] where the famine was most slightly felt. By this
time the expectations of the Catholics and the fears of the Huguenots
were beginning to bear their bitter fruit, and in the state of public
tension every incident was magnified. At Angers, in November, the
Rohans, having forbidden Catholic worship upon their domains, the King
had had to compel them to reinstate it by threatening to dispossess
them of their châteaux; at Blois the cardinal Bourbon reproached the
queen mother for suffering the edict to be violated by permitting the
queen of Navarre and the prince of Condé to maintain court-preachers
in their entourage. The Catholics of Dijon demanded that in future
Calvinist ministers be forbidden to attend the last hours of the dying,
a petition which the cardinal of Lorraine supported in order to make
the chancellor L’Hôpital commit himself. The answer of the latter
sustained the edict’s grant of the right of selection in the matter of
religion. Of greater anxiety still was the influx of Huguenots into
the town of Moulins, Montgomery among the rest, who for the first time
since the fatal tournament of June 30, 1559, looked upon the court.[999]

The memory of the conspiracy of Amboise haunted the queen like a
specter, and was the more vivid because of the _rapprochement_ between
the leaders of the Huguenots and the Montmorencys, who had met together
at Paris in November at the marriage of the amorous prince of Condé
to Mlle. de Longueville. The incident was sharp enough to strike fire
between the Catholic-Guisard and the Huguenot-Montmorency party. For
when the papal nuncio indignantly demanded the cardinal of Beauvais’
renunciation of the purple, the constable bluffly said: “I am a papist.
But if the Pope and his agents still seek to trouble the kingdom, my
sword will be Huguenot. My nephew will never renounce his dignity. The
edict gives him the right to it.” It is no wonder Catherine de Medici
was anxious to hear of the report of these words at Madrid and what
Philip II would say.[1000] The interdiction of the Protestant worship
at Moulins on January 9, 1566, on the very day that Coligny returned
from the wedding festivities, was her own reply.

The very next day she guarded against new fire being struck between
the factions by compelling at least outward reconciliation between
the admiral and the cardinal of Lorraine. On January 10, 1566, in the
presence of the court, she addressed the cardinal, saying that the
repose of the kingdom was destroyed by private quarrels and especially
by two of his, the one with the marshal Montmorency, the other with
the admiral for the murder of the duke of Guise.[1001] At the same
time the queen mother, in order to preserve peace between the rivals,
hit upon the novel scheme of lodging the cardinal and the admiral in
the same house, so that each had to use the same stairway in order to
reach his apartments, telling both that each was keeper of the other,
and that if either of them experienced any injury it would be imputed
to the other.[1002] The cardinal of Lorraine, for fear of losing all
his influence, accepted the situation (he did not stir from the side of
the queen),[1003] and was compelled to abide by the situation _telle
quelle_, as Sir Thomas Smith wrote to Cecil.[1004] But nothing could
mollify the anger of the constable against the Guises, and when the
duke of Guise at length came to court in February, Montmorency left it
forthwith.[1005]

While the factional feeling thus grew more embittered, serious
and noble effort was yet made to carry out the demands of the
States-General of Orleans and Pontoise—demands which were principles
of the political Huguenots. This programme was supported by the queen
mother, who seems in this way to have sought to placate the fears of
the Huguenots for their faith. The year 1566 is notable for the fact
that greater recognition was then accorded the political demands of the
Huguenots than at any time hitherto, so that large progress was made in
the betterment of the administrative system of France.

The King in his address to the council said that at his accession he
had wanted to travel through all the provinces desolated by the late
civil wars, in order to hear the complaints of his subjects and to
remedy conditions in the best manner possible; that it was for this
cause that he had convoked the assembly and so enjoined them, in virtue
of the royal authority, to apply themselves diligently to affairs.

Then the chancellor spoke: after dwelling upon the general evils of
the state, he asserted that the root of all the evils was the bad
administration of justice; that the King had become convinced of this
in the course of the tour of the provinces; that for himself he could
not refrain from calling things by their right name and from speaking
as he thought; that those who were appointed to administer justice were
guilty of great excesses; that these evils had increased owing to the
impunity and the license which obtained.

I do not deny [he added] that there are too many laws and ordinances
in France and that the multitude of the laws and the number of the
judges is the cause of much unnecessary and tyrannical litigation.
But it is no less true that when new evils arise there is a necessity
of new remedies, and that when the ancient laws have been abrogated
either by inobservance or by license, it is necessary to make new ones
in order to cure current evils and to arrest the course of public
calamity. The public welfare requires new legislation. If the new
laws are not observed, on account of the venality and avarice of the
ministers of justice, they must be punished severely and these public
pests who fatten upon the blood of a miserable people must be driven
from office. Superfluous offices, moreover, must be abolished and the
ruinous multiplication of legal causes stopped.

The justice of the last charge was particularly manifest. Since the
time of Francis I it had been the practice of the crown to sell offices
and even to create them for purposes of revenue only.

The chancellor further asserted that the King could not suffer those
who had not the right to make laws to attribute to themselves the
power to interpret them; he proposed to diminish the excessive number
of the courts, and raised the question whether the demands of justice
would not be better met if the Parlement ceased to be so sedentary and
became ambulatory instead—a suggestion which, it is interesting to
observe, found a partial realization in the seventeenth century in the
establishment of the Grands Jours d’Auvergne. He insinuated that it was
advisable to subject the judges to censure and to compel them to render
account of the manner in which they exercised their office, and that
it might be better to establish judges for two or three years than to
permit the holding of office in perpetuity.

After longer deliberation, in February, 1566, the famous ordinance
of Moulins was framed. It contained eighty-six articles, and dealt
radically with the evils of the time and imposed drastic reform,
especially in the administration of justice.

This act declared the royal domain inalienable, limited and regulated
the right of remonstrances of parlement, organized circuits of
inspection by magistrates especially appointed to go throughout the
realm, instituted certain changes in the judicial administration,
and pledged the word of the crown to appoint capable and honest
magistrates.[1006]

It profoundly modified both the public and private law of France. In
the former sphere the ordinance strengthened the legislative power of
the crown by laying down the principle that the King’s ordinances must
be observed in spite of remonstrances on the part of the parlements,
and even if the latter refused to register them; the _maîtres des
requêtes_ were enjoined to punish severely any infraction or failure to
observe the ordinances. The powers of the governors in the provinces
were much reduced; they were forbidden to exercise the right of pardon,
to levy taxes, or to institute fairs and markets. The judicial power
of the great _villes_ was almost entirely suppressed. The communal
judges were deprived of all civil jurisdiction and retained cognizance
only of petty offenses; at the same time, the attempt was made to
restrain seigneurial jurisdiction. The right of written proof was
recognized in cases involving 100 livres or more.[1007] No less than
1,500 superfluous offices, treasurerships, secretaryships, etc., were
abolished. In the matter of religion some of the articles were a
confirmation of the edict of 1563. Another article abolished entirely
all confraternities, and prohibited the formation of all leagues.[1008]

The financial administration came in for a most searching
investigation. The flaunting arrogance of some of the King’s treasurers
is remarkable. Numbers of them had had houses, and even châteaux
which rivaled the King’s own in elegance, the means to purchase and
furnish which they had secured by plundering the people and robbing
the government. One treasurer—among four who were hanged at
Montfaucon—was found to owe the crown over three million livres.[1009]

The young duke of Guise, who had refused to be a party to the farcical
reconciliation between his house and the Châtillons soon found means
to leave the court. In May the duke of Nemours and the duchess of
Guise were married at St. Maur-des-Fosses. It was a match which sowed
dragon’s teeth once more. For Nemours forsook his wife, who was a
Rohan, having induced the Pope to nullify the marriage. The Huguenots
murmured indignantly against the insult done the Rohan clan whose
powerful family influence was now joined with the Châtillons and
Montmorencys.[1010]

Catherine de Medici was not the ruler to govern France with a firm yet
facile hand under the circumstances that existed in 1566. Irrespective
of foreign influences, which we shall presently come to, the economic
distress[1011] of the country, the rivalry of the great houses, and
the religious acrimony prevailing made a combination of forces that
needed another sort of ruler to reconcile them—a ruler such as Henry
of Navarre was to be. The queen mother, while a woman of force, was so
deficient in sincerity that no one could have confidence in her; so
jealous of power that she would brook no other control of the King,
whose sovereignty she confounded with her maternal oversight of him,
making no distinction between Charles IX the ruler and Charles IX
the son. Catherine time and again marred or ruined the progress she
had made with the aid of one party’s support by her own envious fear
of that party’s predominance. Her “bridge policy,”[1012] instead of
uniting France, kept it divided. To maintain the balance of power—an
immemorial Italian policy—her Italian nature resorted to duplicity and
deception continually. Accordingly, suspicion prevailed at court and
suspicion prevailed in the provinces, the more so in the latter because
of the Huguenots’ uncertainty about what was done at Bayonne, and doubt
as to Philip II’s course. Men were doubtful of their neighbors; towns
were fearful of other nearby towns. “All the way of my coming hither,”
reported Sir Thomas Hoby, the new English ambassador to France, “I
found the strong towns marvelously jealous of strangers, insomuch that
only by the sound of a bell they discovered a number of horsemen or
footmen before they come; but also, after they are entered they have an
eye to them.”[1013]

When the court finally moved to Paris, the great nobles came thither
with such numerous trains[1014] that the queen sent four companies
of the King’s guard ahead of his coming, and ordered the marshal
Montmorency to require the retirement from the city of all those who
were not of the ordinary household of each nobleman and gentleman. In
vain the marshal, anxious to protect his party against the Guisards,
resisted the order and complained that the queen was interfering with
his authority. The King ordered Lansac and De la Garde to accomplish
what Montmorency was unwilling to do.

If choice must be made as to who were the worst offenders in this
respect, the greater blame lies with the Protestants. It was not
only impolitic, it was insolent on their part to permit Montgomery
to swagger around Paris as he did, “booted and spurred with all
his men.”[1015] Apparently the queen had not the daring to compel
his withdrawal, as she did that of the Guises’ recruiting sergeant,
Roggendorf.[1016] Her policy for the time being was to favor the
Châtillon-Montmorency faction.[1017] Backed by the joint support of
the admiral and the constable, the queen accordingly undertook to
bring certain unsettled or indefinite matters of religion and the
church to a conclusion. On May 31, 1566, Charles IX sent a series of
articles to the cardinal Bourbon for consideration by the clergy of
Paris, then sitting at St. Germain des Près. Two of these had to do
with the baptism of infants where one of the parents was a Catholic,
and the maintenance of Protestants schools. Three concerned church
temporalities, namely, the redemption of the fourth part of the
temporals of the church, given to the King during the late civil war;
the subsidy which was to expire in eighteen months; and the preparation
of an edict defining the privileges and jurisdiction of the church.
The residue of the articles dealt with infractions of the Edict of
Amboise, such as restraint of preaching according to the edict, and the
molestation of former Protestants who had returned to the church of
Rome by the Huguenots. By an awkward coincidence, the sending of these
articles exactly coincided with the arrival of the papal legate in
Paris, who came to request the promulgation of the decrees of Trent in
conformity with the agreement made with the cardinal de Santa Croce at
Bayonne.[1018]

Catherine de Medici’s policy at this time was that of the political
Huguenots. She hoped that the question of religion would settle
itself with time, and to divert attention from that issue, and also
because there was great need of it, she energetically continued the
administrative and economic reforms begun at Moulins. L’Hôpital began
so searching an investigation of the conduct of the King’s treasurers
that some of them were hanged and others banished. The constable was
of service here, although his notorious avarice tarnished the honesty
of his work.[1019] Yet there was peril even in a policy so just and so
much needed by France. Sooner or later such a course would unearth the
dishonesty of bigger thieves than the small collectors of the revenue
who, in many cases undoubtedly suffered for the peculation of their
superiors. The administration was full of “grafters” such as St. André
had been, who would not scruple to conceal their thievery behind the
smoke of another civil war. The queen mother knew this only too well
from former experience, not being unaware of the fact that one of the
causes of “the late unpleasantness” was the demand of the estates that
the Guises should make an accounting and be forced to disgorge their
ill-gotten gains. The government resorted to various devices to raise
money and an imposition was laid upon inn-keepers. The most singular
expedient, though, was the offer of a Genoese syndicate to pay the King
a lump sum for the privilege of taxing dowry gifts and for a license
to endure eight years to levy a crown on every first-born infant, and
after, for every boy born into a family five sous, and for every girl
babe, three sous.[1020] This preposterous measure actually passed the
council, and was only prevented from becoming law by the good sense of
the Parlement.[1021]

But the events happening in the Netherlands were of greater importance
to France at this time than anything within her borders. From the
beginning of the insurrection there the Huguenots had recognized
the important bearing of that struggle upon their own movement, and
as the shadow of Philip II fell in greater length each year across
France, the interest of the French Protestants in the rebellion of
the Low Countries increased.[1022] As Huguenot preachers in Flanders
sowed the double seed of Calvinism and revolt, so Protestant preachers
exiled from the Low Countries sought refuge in France.[1023] This
intercourse became a formidable historical issue by 1566. The issue
was understood from the beginning by all parties concerned, and Philip
II and his ministers were determined to profit by the lesson of France
and to prevent similar trouble by crushing all opposition in the bud.
The Turkish attack upon Malta[1024] had been very favorable to the
Protestant cause, and the raising of the siege in September, 1565,
probably influenced the King of Spain in his resolution to extirpate
heresy in the Low Countries.[1025] The Flemish government suspected
William of Orange who by July was openly allied with the Gueux[1026]
and his brother, Louis of Nassau, of direct intercourse with Condé and
Coligny,[1027] and sent Montigny—the faithless member of the patriotic
quartette composed of Orange, Egmont, Hoorne, and himself—to Paris in
the spring to pick up information.[1028] The fear lest Montgomery might
come to Flanders, which Granvella had once laughed at, by the summer of
1566 had some basis of reality, although the braggadocio character of
this adventurer discounted alarm.[1029]

Knowledge of the solidarity existing between his revolted subjects in
Flanders and the Huguenots[1030] which Montluc had warned Philip of
even two years before,[1031] coupled with information concerning the
dealings of Louis of Nassau with Protestant Germany[1032] and France,
stirred the Spanish King’s habitual indecision into action. He sounded
Charles IX as to the possibility of sending Spanish troops directly
across France to the Low Countries and asked him to restrain his
subjects from coming thither with arms,[1033] crowds of whom went to
Flanders disguised as merchants.[1034] Simultaneously Margaret of Parma
begged the Emperor to take the same course.[1035] But the government
of France could not have honored Philip II’s request, even if it had
been so minded, without risking an immediate rising of the Huguenots.
As a matter of fact, it had no desire to do so. The resentment felt by
France toward Spain on account of past scores at Trent, Rome, and in
Switzerland, was now all eclipsed in her rancor because of the massacre
by the Spaniards of her ill-fated colony in Florida in September,
1565.[1036]

Alexander VI’s bull had divided the western hemisphere between the
Spanish and the Portuguese. Florida belonged to Spain. France had built
Fort Caroline on Spanish territory. As peace existed in 1565, France
argued that the massacre by Menendez was a violation of international
law. To this Spain replied that Florida belonged to her by discovery
and as all treaties between Spain and France were silent as to any
change of ownership, there really had been no such change in law.
Consequently the French settlers were intruders and heretics to boot.
The answer was crushing, Fourquevaux was heavily handicapped, for he
could not openly espouse the cause of Frenchmen who were heretics.
Before news of the massacre reached France, Philip II, knowing the
facts, inquired if the French expedition had been commanded or
sanctioned by the French King. The only answer possible was a negative.
An affirmative answer would have been tantamount to a declaration of
war. “Then the incident is closed,” was the Spanish reply. This was
followed by a demand that Coligny, under whose sanction the expedition
had sailed, should be punished.

France was likewise at odds with the Emperor. The reason for this is
to be found in the strong attitude the empire had lately taken on
the question of Metz.[1037] Understanding of this question entails
a glance backward. In 1564 the baron Bolwiller, a native of upper
Alsace, but at that time bailiff of the Emperor in the grand bailiwick
of Haguenau, revived the plan he had conceived in 1558, of recovering
Metz by a surprise.[1038] Bolwiller represented that no time was to
be lost if France was to be prevented from fixing her hold upon the
Three Bishoprics forever. Philip II favored the enterprise and offered
20,000 sous cash, and the assignment of 8,000 écus annual revenue of
the territory, “pour celluy ou ceulx qui’lz luy rendroyent la ville
du dict Metz.”[1039] For with Metz in the hands of the Hapsburgs once
more, the chain of provinces connecting the Netherlands with Spain
through mid-Europe would have been practically complete, lying as Metz,
Toul, and Verdun did, between Franche-Comté and Luxembourg.[1040] This
was at the time when Condé was recreant to his people and was dallying
with the widow of the marshal St. André, and the idea was conceived and
abandoned of buying the prince over and bribing him to betray Metz to
Spain.[1041] Spain, however, in order to avoid a rupture with France
wished to conceal her own participation in the plot to recover Metz,
and urged the Emperor Maximilian to undertake the venture.[1042] The
plot was to tempt Metz to revolt against France by offering to convert
it into a free imperial city, it being expected that the Lutherans in
the city would support the movement.[1043] The alertness of the French
government, however, foiled the project’s being undertaken in April.
In August Bolwiller renewed his plan, alleging to Chantonnay that the
people of Metz were ready to provide 20,000 écus, and that there were
arms in plenty stored in secret. He urged prompt action now for the
French government had begun the erection of a citadel in the city.[1044]

By this time Philip II was so anxious to see France despoiled of Metz
and so impatient at Maximilian’s delay, that it was even considered
advisable by some to take advantage of the check given the Turks at
Malta and have the Emperor make peace with them in order to have his
hands free in the Three Bishoprics.[1045] As for himself, Philip II
dared not make an overt move against France, lest in the event of war
with Spain, Charles IX appeal to the Huguenots, with the result that
Protestantism would profit by the diversion.[1046]

But meanwhile things in Metz had got beyond control of either Spain
or the empire. The Calvinists in both France and the Netherlands had
been quick to see the advantage afforded, for the former by gaining
possession of the territory could connect France and the Palatinate,
thus aiding themselves and their coreligionists at one and the same
time, since by so doing the land route of Spain through Central Europe,
via Milan, Besançon, and Luxembourg, would be cut in half. Matters came
to a head in May and June, 1565, in what is known as the “Cardinal’s
War.” On May 5 the Emperor Maximilian had issued a decree affirming
his suzerainty over Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The cardinal of Lorraine
at once recognized the validity of this decree, which was equivalent
to treason to France. Thereupon, in the name of Charles IX Salzedo an
ex-Spaniard[1047] and leader of the French party in Metz assumed the
title of governor of Metz and appealed to the French King for support
against the cardinal. The issue was really one between France and
Spain. The Guises naturally supported the cardinal. The “war” which
followed was not formidable, although the issue as stake was of great
importance. But the cardinal soon discovered that discretion was the
better part of valor and yielded to the King, more especially as
neither Philip II nor Maximilian raised a hand for fear of betraying
themselves, for the cardinal feared that if he resisted longer Charles
IX would refuse to pardon his treasonable conduct. He was not unaware
of the fact—he did not even deny it—that it was known that he had
been in treasonable communication with Bolwiller and the archbishop of
Trèves.[1048]

If Charles IX and the queen mother had known the full extent of the
cardinal of Lorraine’s treasonable conduct at this time they might
not have been so lenient toward him. For he was guilty not only of
treasonable intercourse with the empire, but directly with Spain also.
The one supremely important result of this petty war over Metz is that
at this time the cardinal—and with him the whole Guise house—began
those secret negotiations with Philip of Spain which culminated
in the establishment of the Holy League. Shortly after the end of
his ignominious war around Metz, burning with anger and shame, the
cardinal sent a secret agent to Franche Comté, who found Granvella
at Beaudencourt in July, 1565, to whom he recited the cardinal’s
grievances, saying that owing to the death of his brother the duke of
Guise and the insolence of the marshal Montmorency, he had no hope
in the justice of Charles IX. The agent then went on to point out
the great danger threatening Catholic Europe by reason of what had
recently happened at Metz, and, speaking for the cardinal of Lorraine,
expressed the wish that Philip II would enter into a league with the
house of Guise, the duke of Montpensier—Alva’s convert at Bayonne—and
certain others for the protection of the Catholic faith in France
and the overthrow of the Châtillons, the prince of Condé, “Madame de
Vendôme,” and other Huguenots. This formidable overture was made under
the seal of secrecy. The cautious Granvella listened but refrained
from committing his master to the proposition.[1049] Again, Philip II
hesitated to implicate himself so directly in French affairs, as the
cardinal of Lorraine urged, just as he had hesitated the year before
with Montluc, and while he waited events in the Low Countries went
from bad to worse.

In August, 1566, a furious outburst of iconoclasm swept through the
churches of Flanders.

Commencing at St. Omer, the contagion rapidly spread, and in a
fortnight 400 churches were sacked in Flanders alone, while in Antwerp
the cathedral was stripped of all its treasures. Images, relics,
shrines, paintings, manuscripts, and books shared a common fate.[1050]

The event stirred Philip to action. He determined to send the duke of
Alva to Flanders to repress things with an iron hand.[1051]

On November 18, 1566, the duke of Alva formally requested the French
ambassador at Madrid to secure Charles IX’s permission for a Spanish
army to cross France.

The remedy has become little by little so difficult [said the duke]
that deeds not words and remonstrances, are now necessary. Having
exhausted all good and gracious means to reduce things in the Low
Countries, the King is constrained, to his great regret, to have
recourse to force. Public assemblies, preaching, the bearing of arms,
and violence prevail in the land and the King’s ministers amount to
nothing.

The duke then outlined the plan. Ten thousand new Spanish recruits
under three ensigns were to be sent to Luxembourg, Naples, Sardinia,
and Sicily to take the places of as many veteran troops there,
for the King was unwilling to use Italian infantry. A thousand
heavy-armed footmen and three or four hundred mounted arquebusiers,
all Spanish, were to be drawn from Milan, the most loyal of Spain’s
Italian dependencies. An indefinite number of reiters and other
mercenaries could be had for the asking. These troops would proceed
to the Netherlands through Savoy by way of Val d’Aoste or Mt. Cenis,
Montmélian, Chambéry, and La Bresse, into Franche Comté and Lorraine,
unless—and this was the crux of Alva’s interview with Fourquevaux—the
winter season made it impossible to traverse the mountain passes, in
which case His Catholic Majesty desired leave of France to take them by
sea to Marseilles or Toulon and thence to march them northward up the
Rhône to La Bresse and so reach Franche Comté.

No one knew better than Alva the formidable nature of this proposition
to France and he used all his artifice to conceal its danger, dwelling
on the mutual connection between the Huguenot and the Flemish movement
and the benefit that France would derive from the crushing of the
rebellion in the Low Countries. Fourquevaux in reply declared that
the Huguenots would fly to arms again, if a Spanish army should enter
France, to which the duke rejoined that the presence of a Spanish army
would so overawe them that they would not dare to do so. The ambassador
then inquired whether the Emperor could support Philip, seeing that
he was engaged in a war with the Turks[1052] and was incapable of
raising funds in his behalf. Alva told him that the German princes
would perceive that the Flemings were merely rebels and that “no prince
or soldier in Germany, even were he a Lutheran, would refuse to take
the pay of Spain.”[1053] But Fourquevaux refused to be convinced by
Alva’s smooth words. He had information that Spain was borrowing ships
from Malta, Genoa, and the papacy and Savoy and warned Charles IX to
strengthen the garrisons in Languedoc and Provence.[1054]

This information threw the court of France into great excitement.
Catherine de Medici declared that the heretics would take up arms
immediately, under such circumstances.[1055] The King wrote to
Fourquevaux on December 24 not to spare any efforts to penetrate
the designs of Spain.[1056] Sixteen thousand troops were sent into
the Lyonnais at once.[1057] The marshal Vieilleville returned to
Metz.[1058] The government began the erection of a great citadel in
Verdun and to fortify the frontier against Luxembourg.[1059] D’Andelot
was sent to Switzerland to make new enrolments.[1060] An agent was sent
into Normandy with instructions to pass along the coast and take the
names of master-mariners and sailors.[1061] The queen of Navarre began
to mobilize forces in Béarn.[1062] All this time the duke of Alva kept
endeavoring to quiet French alarm by reiterating that he would use all
means in his power to avoid troubling France and that the army destined
for Flanders, now increased by 1,500 light horse composed of Spaniards,
Italians, and Albanians, would go by the valley of the Rhône only as a
last recourse.[1063]

Finally, in the middle of February, the duke of Alva’s preparations
were made. Don Juan de Acuna, who had been sent to Savoy to make
arrangements with the duke for the transit of the Spanish army,
returned, after having made a satisfactory settlement. The army
was to go through Savoy, via the Mt. Cenis and Chambéry, cross the
Rhône at Yenne, and so proceed to Besançon in Franche Comté, where
it was to be joined by German contingents. This averted the danger
threatening Languedoc and Dauphiné, but threw it upon French Burgundy
and Champagne.[1064] It was a roundabout route for the Spanish troops
in the Milanais, but it was impossible to send them directly through
Switzerland by way of the Grisons, Constance, Basel, and Strasburg
without inflaming these localities; above all, Geneva would thereby
have been menaced, and any movement imperiling that city would have
fired the entire Calvinist world.[1065]

[Illustration: March of the DUKE of ALVA

THROUGH SAVOY, FRANCHE COMTÉ AND LORRAINE.

———————- Conjectured route]

In the face of common peril Bern, Freiburg, and Valais concluded a
defensive league on February 20, while Basel and Zurich took up arms
with French approval. Fear of a joint attack of Spain and Savoy upon
Geneva prevailed throughout Switzerland, which was divided into two
camps, the five cantons of the center favoring designs upon Geneva
and the Vaud. Spain aimed to profit by the impression produced by the
passage of her troops close to the Swiss frontier to force certain
military advantages and dispossess France from the exceptional
situation she had lately secured in the Alps. The western cantons
were offered cheap salt from Franche Comté, and those of the center
grain from the Milanais. The duke of Lorraine also offered salt at a
low price from his duchy. As a result Bern found herself deserted by
western Switzerland and apparently single-handed about to be called
upon to protect Geneva from Spanish attack. Perhaps if Spain had been
certain of the support of Savoy at this juncture, this might have
happened, but the duke of Savoy was content to profit by the fear of
the Bernois to compel them to restore the three bailiwicks which they
had formerly agreed to do in the treaty of Lausanne, October 30, 1564,
but had delayed to fulfil. Charles IX himself advised Bern to yield in
this particular and in August the settlement with the duke of Savoy was
made.[1066]

All that Philip now requested of France was leave for French subjects
to provide the army with supplies in its course. Again Fourquevaux
urged his sovereign to be cautious; the fact that France was just
recovering from a year of famine and could ill spare sustenance for
others was not so important as the necessity of avoiding every occasion
of civil war.[1067]

On May 10, 1567, the duke of Alva sailed from Cartagena and arrived at
Genoa on May 27. St. Ambroise at the foot of the Alps was the point
where his munitions and provisions were concentrated. Here on June
2 the duke had a grand review of his troops. There were 19 ensigns
(3,230 men), from Naples, under the command of Alonzo de Uloa; 10
ensigns from Sicily (1,620 men) under command of Julian Romero; 10
ensigns of Lombard troops (2,200 men) under command of Don Sancho
de Londono; 10 Sardinian ensigns with four companies of recruits in
addition (1,728 men) under command of Don Gonzalo de Bracamonte, making
a total of 49 ensigns of Spanish infantry (8,778 men). The duke’s
cavalry was composed of five companies of Spanish light horse and
three Italian and two Albanian companies and two companies of Spanish
arquebusiers on horseback, in all 1,200 horses.[1068] On the march a
company of 15 musketeers was placed between each ensign. This was the
first instance in modern warfare when muskets were used in the field.
Hitherto this weapon had been so enormously heavy that it was used in
siege work only, balanced upon a triangle of wood or iron.[1069]

The route lay via Alessandria de la Paille, St. Ambroise, Aosta,
Turin, the Mont Cenis, St. Jean de Maurienne, and the valley of the
Arve through Savoy. In spite of his small array it was necessary to
divide the army into three parts, the advance guard, the “battle,” and
the rear guard. The “battle” each day occupied the place abandoned by
the advance guard and was itself in turn replaced by the rear guard,
the three divisions of the army marching one day apart. The duke of
Alva commanded the advance guard, his son Don Ferdinand Alvarez de
Toledo the “battle;” while the rear guard was under the command of the
Italian, Ciappin-Vitelli, Marquis of Cetona formally in the service
of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The army thus divided occupied fourteen
days in traversing Savoy. It was a long and toilsome journey through a
wild and mountainous country, where the difficulties of the march were
increased by constant dread of famine. In many places the country was
completely sterile. In Burgundy the march was easier and twelve days
brought the army via Dôle and Gray to Fonteney near Toul, whence twelve
days more brought Alva by Thionville to Luxembourg (July 29), where he
was joined by new forces.[1070]

In spite of the length of the march and the hardships of it, the duke
retained his traditional iron discipline and the soldiers were not
allowed to forage upon the country or to break ranks.[1071]

On August 12, 1567, the duke of Alva entered Brussels. General terror
prevailed in the Low Countries upon his arrival. The Prince of Orange
left the land. Count Egmont, naïvely declaring that he had done nothing
wrong, remained; his friend Hoorne imitated his example. Alva at
once sent away all the Flemish soldiers and quartered the city with
the new troops. In order to facilitate his policy the duke created a
special tribunal, _not_ composed of lawyers “because they would not
condemn without proofs.” This was the famous Council of Troubles which
the people called the “Council of Blood.” The members of it held no
commissions from the King, but were the simple agents of the duke of
Alva. The most celebrated of them was a certain Vargas, a criminal
himself, against whom action had been suspended in return for his
infamous services.

If the policy of the Spanish government in Flanders took a new and
different form with the coming of Alva, the revolution there was no
less changed. The cardinal Granvella some months before this time had
written to Philip II: “It is a general rule, in matters of state, that
popular enterprises, if they do not terminate in the first outburst,
generally vanish in smoke if the remedy for them be applied before they
have time to follow up the movement.”[1072] He added that contemporary
history afforded some striking examples of the truth of this
observation. But the provinces he had lately governed were not of this
category. For it is clear that a change had taken place in the nature
of the Flemish revolt in the years 1565-67. The revolution by this time
had passed through the earlier stages of defiance and rebellion and
developed an organization with a definite, set purpose before it. The
formation of the Gueux was the clearest manifestation of this change.
In its inception this famous group was an aristocratic body, composed
solely of nobles, and the Spanish government had little fear then of
its becoming a popular association.[1073] Granvella saw the similarity
of the Gueux to the Huguenot association formed at Orleans in 1562, but
he did not anticipate the popular nature it was soon to develop.[1074]

He was soon disillusioned. What was believed by the Spanish government
to be a somewhat close political and aristocratic combination of nobles
before long became a popular confederation of congregations having a
religious propaganda, as well as a political purpose.[1075] Despite
this change, however, Philip’s minister did not yet believe the Gueux
to be formidable. As Alva had declared at Bayonne that all that was
necessary to destroy the Huguenot party in France was to kill the “big
fish,” so he now believed that if the leaders of the Gueux were cut
off, their movement would die too.[1076] But Alva soon discovered
that the Gueux were hardly ever weakened by the detachment of certain
of the nobles either by bribery or intimidation.[1077] By the time
of his arrival, under Brederode’s able leadership, the Calvinists of
the Flemish provinces had worked out a scheme of union in which every
congregation was at once a parish, a rating precinct, a military
hundred, and a political unit. Antwerp, whose population was so large
and so cosmopolitan that police scrutiny could be easily evaded, and
from which it was easy to make one’s escape, was the capital of the
association, as Orleans first, and later La Rochelle, was for the
Huguenots.[1078]

The Flemish government was soon alive to the necessity of breaking the
power of this confederation.[1079] Membership in the confederation,
if proved, was heavily punished. The retirement of the prince of
Orange from the land was believed by the government to be due to a
prudent effort to avoid being so compromised. It was certainly true
of Brederode. But Egmont and Hoorne remained, declaring they had done
nothing, and renewed their oath of allegiance to the King.[1080]
Nevertheless Granvella sarcastically quoted Lycurgus that neutrals were
more odious than enemies. “After the towns have been cleared out,”
wrote the provost Morillon, “it will be time to attack the garden in
order to destroy the weeds and roots there,” and Spain’s agent at
Amsterdam at the same time wrote: “God may pardon those who are the
cause of _one_ and the _other_ league; but I assure you, unless I am
much mistaken, that those who have made others to dance, have some
other purpose than we know. Time will discover it.”[1081]

[Illustration: EXECUTION OF EGMONT AND HOORNE IN THE MARKET SQUARE AT
BRUSSELS

Original copper plate by Franz Hogenberg.]

This somewhat long dissertation upon the nature and development of the
confederation formed by Philip’s II revolted subjects in Flanders is
not a digression beside the mark. The number of Huguenots to be found
in the Low Countries in 1566-67, intriguing with their coreligionists
against Spain was very great. The duke of Bouillon and the prince
of Porcien were the most prominent of these.[1082] In the aggregate
the number was so great and their participation so serious a matter
for the government, that the maintenance of the frontier against the
French was urged upon Alva as the first necessity, immediately after
his arrival at Brussels.[1083] France for her own part began to erect
a citadel at Verdun and to strengthen the Picard frontier, whose towns
received new troops in June, and when word came that there were German
troops in Luxembourg awaiting Alva’s arrival, D’Andelot was sent to
the frontier of Champagne with 6,000 Swiss which the government had
levied.[1084] This action ruffled Philip II’s temper, for to him it was
flaunting his failure to break the alliance of the Swiss with France
in his very face. His ambassador in France protested energetically and
charged the queen with duplicity.[1085] At Madrid the nuncio inquired
with curiosity of Fourquevaux, in what spirit Philip II—who had had
an audience with the ambassador the day before—received the news of
France’s activities in Switzerland. “I told him,” wrote the ambassador
to Charles IX, “that it was the usage and custom of great kings and
princes whenever they saw their neighbors arming, to assure themselves
also of their realms and states.”[1086] Calais was a double source of
anxiety, first because Spain, in pursuance of Alva’s recommendation,
had not been content with fortifying Gravelines, but had actually built
a fort of earth only five paces from the turnpike which marked the
French limit; secondly, because at this embarrassing time Elizabeth
of England had conceived the thought of reviving the English claim to
Calais.[1087] With the purpose of fathoming her son-in-law’s designs
Catherine sent the younger L’Aubespine to Madrid.[1088] War with Spain
was already on the lips of some in France.[1089]

In spite of the wisdom of these military precautions on the part of
the French crown, the Huguenots grew alarmed lest there was a movement
on foot to repress the edict.[1090] There was designed intention in
the unadmirable conduct of the prince of Condé, and perhaps some in
that of Coligny too. The prince craved chief command of the army, and
a war with Spain was in a direct line with his aspirations. He had
been well treated since the peace of Amboise, having been given the
government of Picardy and the county of Rotrou, which was erected
into a duchy under the name of Enghien-le-François. But his appetite
for power was insatiable. In July, after angry speech with the King,
Condé had retired from court, and was followed by the admiral, who gave
out that he had discovered “some practice that wholly tended to his
confusion.”[1091]

It was small politics. In this time of external danger from the
furtive designs of Philip II and the blustering enmity of England,
the honorable course of every subject of France was to stand by the
King and the nation. The Huguenot leaders compromised the cause at
large by indulging their personal vanity, their petty spite, their
pique at such an hour. Friction there was, disagreement there was over
the interpretation and the working of certain parts of the edict of
Amboise. The Catholics, for example, complained that the intention of
the edict was evaded by the Huguenots, asserting that in cases where
the right of preaching was permitted to all barons and high justiciars
only for themselves and their tenants, and for others of lower degree
for their household only, congregational worship was held under cover
thereof.[1092]

The bigotry of Paris and its vicinity, though, was the worst source
of disaffection. In the city district captains were chosen by the
populace to watch against Protestant activity—the nucleus of the
famous Sixteen (_Seize_) of Paris in 1589-94. It would have been the
height of political inexpediency, under such circumstances, to have
tried to enforce the letter of the edict in the Ile-de-France. The July
amendment of the edict of Amboise prohibiting exercise of Protestant
worship throughout the Ile-de-France except in such places as should
be licensed by the King, and the further one prohibiting Protestants
from filling public offices in the cities,[1093] I believe was framed
for the purpose of avoiding conflict and not with any reactionary
purpose. It is certainly of significance that the liberal chancellor
L’Hôpital favored them.[1094] Patience and experience would have worked
out the solution of such difficulties as these. It was criminal in
the prince of Condé to fan the ashes of the late civil war into flame
once more. For in this tense state the prince deliberately exaggerated
and misrepresented things for his own purpose and a spark from
Flanders—Alva’s arrest of the counts Egmont and Hoorne on September
9—kindled France into flame again.

The arrival of the news in France unfortunately coincided with the
session of two synods of the Huguenots, one at Châtillon-sur-Loing,
the other at Valéry.[1095] Dismay prevailed in them. The preachers
cried out that the arrest of Egmont and Hoorne[1096] was the proof
of a secret alliance between Spain and France for the overthrow of
Calvinism. The truth of Bayonne was out at last! Coligny’s iron will
might still have kept them in order, however, if in the midst of this
excitement word had not also come that 6,000 Swiss whom Charles IX had
enrolled to cover the French frontier against the duke of Alva had
entered France. The double news was too much for the excited minds of
the Huguenots. The admiral and the prince who had failed to perceive
the true policy of France in Switzerland, in desperation turned to the
constable for a word of truth and comfort. But the old Montmorency,
who desired to have his son, the marshal Montmorency, succeed him in
the office of constable[1097] (which the prince of Condé coveted for
himself), roughly rejoined: “The Swiss have their pay; don’t you expect
them to be used?”[1098] The words were brutally and thoughtlessly said.
They merely imported anger. The Huguenots interpreted them to mean that
they were to be overcome by military force, and Protestantism coerced,
if not extinguished. The synod of the Huguenots at Valéry[1099]
resolved upon war. The conference was held in the admiral’s château
at Châtillon under the outward guise of a banquet. There were present
the prince of Condé, La Rochefoucault, the cardinal of Châtillon,
D’Andelot, Bricquemault, Teligny, Mouy, Montgomery, and other nobles of
mark, besides some Huguenot ministers. The conference lasted the entire
week, at the end of which it was resolved that all the Huguenots in
France should be notified in every _bailliage_ and _sénéschaussée_, by
the deacons and other officers of their congregation; that they should
be called upon to furnish money according to the means which they had,
for the payment of reiters from Germany, which the count palatine of
the Rhine was to levy; and that all the young men of the religion
capable of bearing arms were to be enrolled for military service.[1100]

The plan was as bold as it was simple. It was to gain possession of the
King’s person by a sudden _coup de main_, for which purpose a force
of 1,500 horse was to be brought secretly to Valéry. The court at
this time was residing at the Château de Monceaux near Meaux, and was
without more than nominal military protection.[1101] On the evening
of September 24, the queen learned of the rendezvous at Rosay-en-Brie.
A midnight council was called. The Swiss, who had reached Château
Thierry, were hastily summoned. The Lorraine party and the duke
of Nemours advised immediate return to Paris. The chancellor and
Montmorency endeavored to persuade the King against so doing.[1102] The
former pointed out that to go to Paris would be for the King to commit
himself to the most bigoted of his subjects and destroy the possibility
of an amicable settlement, while the constable argued that Meaux was a
fortified city capable of withstanding a siege, and that to leave it
might be to court defeat in the open country. In the dilemma the Swiss
colonel Pfiffer cast the die.

“May it please your Majesty,” cried he, “to entrust your person and
that of the queen mother to the valor and fidelity of the Swiss. We are
6,000 men, and with the points of our pikes we will open a path wide
enough for you to pass through the army of your enemies.”[1103]

“Enough,” Charles rejoined. “I would rather die free with you than live
a captive among rebels.”[1104]

The return to Paris began at four o’clock in the morning. “When the
Swiss arrived at Meaux,” wrote Correro, “I vow they were the most
villainous looking gang I have ever seen. Yet in battle array they were
admirable. Three times they turned upon the enemy and lowering their
pikes charged upon them like savage dogs in serried ranks and in good
order, without one being a pace in advance of another. Thus the King
was able with his suite to get to Paris.”[1105] He reached the Louvre
that night, travel-worn, hot, famished, and so angry that his fierce
disposition never lost the memory of that humiliation.[1106]

The affair of Meaux came like a thunder-clap to most of France. The
suddenness of the Huguenot action and the all but complete success of
it astonished men. “This movement,” wrote the Venetian ambassador,
“of which several thousand men had knowledge, was conducted with such
precaution that nothing leaked out until it was all but an accomplished
fact. This could not possibly have been done without the perfect
intelligence that exists among the Huguenots, and is a striking
manifestation of their organization throughout the realm.”[1107]

In the light of this judgment, it remains to describe the Huguenot form
of government.

The ecclesiastical—and political unit—of French Calvinism was the
congregation. Congregations were grouped “according to number and
convenience” into colloquies or classes which met from two to four
times each year, the division being made by the authority of the
provincial synod.[1108] In church matters, no church had any primacy
or jurisdiction over another, nor one province over another.[1109]
Ministers brought with them to local classes or provincial synods
one or two elders chosen out of their consistories.[1110] Elders
who were deputies of churches had an equal power of voting with the
pastors.[1111] The authority of a provincial synod was subordinate
to that of the national synod,[1112] and whatever had been decreed
by provincial synods for the government of the churches in their
province had to be brought before the national synod.[1113] The
grand lines of division followed the historic provincial divisions
of France, but smaller provinces and parts of the larger ones, as
Guyenne and Languedoc, were associated together. The national synod
of 1559 divided France into sixteen Protestant provinces, as follows:
(1) The Ile-de-France, Chartrain, Picardy, Champagne and Brie; (2)
Normandy; (3) Brittany; (4) Orleans, Blesois, Dunois, Nivernais, Berry,
Bourbonnais, and La Marche; (5) Touraine, Anjou, Loudunois, Maine,
Vendôme, and Perche; (6) Upper and Lower Poitou; (7) Saintonge, Aunis,
La Rochelle, and Angoumois; (8) Lower Guyenne, Périgord, Gascony,
and Limousin; (9) Upper and Lower Vivarais, together with Velay,
and Le Forêt; (10) Lower Languedoc, including Nîmes, Montpellier,
and Beziers; (11) Upper Languedoc, Upper Guyenne, Toulouse,
Carcassonne, Quercy, Rouergue, Armagnac, and Upper Auvergne; (12)
Burgundy, Lyonnais, Beaujolais, Bresse, Lower Auvergne, and Gex; (13)
Provence; (14) Dauphiné and Orange; (15) Béarn; (16) the Cevennes and
Gévaudan.[1114]

This administrative partition, however, did not remain fixed. Some
provinces, like Brittany, had so few Protestants in them, that the
Huguenots therein could not stand alone, and the first civil war
brought out the weakness of this system. Accordingly, in 1563, the map
of France was partitioned anew, and the former sixteen “provinces”
were reduced to nine. Some of the changes made are interesting. For
example, the Chartrain was cut off from the Ile-de-France and attached
to the “province” of Orleans, manifestly in the endeavor to keep a
connecting link between Normandy and the Loire country. Brittany was
strengthened by the annexation of Anjou, Maine, and Touraine which
formerly constituted an independent “province,” which obviously drew
it into closer connection with the stronger Calvinistic provinces.
The “province” of Upper and Lower Poitou was combined with Saintonge,
Aunis, and Angoumois, thus knitting together all the country watered
by the Charente, the Clain, and lesser streams. Burgundy, Lyonnais,
Beaujolais, Bresse, Lower Auvergne, and Gex absorbed the small
Huguenot province composed of Vivarais, Velay, and Le Forêt. But the
most interesting consolidation was in the south of France. Formerly
Upper Languedoc, in which were Nîmes, Montpellier, and Beziers;
Lower Languedoc, comprising Upper Guyenne, Toulouse, Carcassonne,
Quercy, Rouergue, Armagnac, and Upper Auvergne; Provence; Dauphiné,
and Cevennes-Gévaudan had each formed separate “provinces.” But in
1563 this immense territory was all united to form the great Huguenot
province of Languedoc. The only ancient provinces which remained
unchanged in 1563 were Normandy,[1115] Béarn, and Lower Guyenne, with
Périgord and Limousin.

The Huguenot ecclesiastical organization and its political organization
were one and the same. The congregations, the “colloquia,” the synods,
constituted both taxation units and military _cadres_.[1116] The
strength of the Huguenot organization, however, before the massacre
of St. Bartholomew, I believe has been exaggerated, except in Guyenne
where, in the vicinity of Nérac especially, Montluc early came in
contact with a powerful combination of the Huguenots.[1117] The strong
elements in the Protestant organization were its simplicity and the
vigilance of all, from provincial chiefs to simple pastors, who
made up for scarcity of numbers by the most zealous activity.[1118]
“If our priests,” wrote the Venetian Correro in 1569, “were half
so energetic, of a certainty Christianity would not be in danger
in this country.”[1119] It was not until after 1572 that the
Huguenot organization reached a high point of military and political
development, when a solid federation of the Reformed churches was
formed at Milhaud in 1574, with rating precincts, military hundreds and
civil jurisdictions.[1120]

Exactly as the early organization of the Huguenots has been
overemphasized, so has the republican nature of the early Huguenot
movement been exaggerated. Apart from whatever religious motives may
have actuated them, the Protestant nobles were influenced by political
ambition; the bourgeoisie by the hope of administrative and economic
reform; the masses by the general spirit of discontent. The Huguenots
did not present a united front until after St. Bartholomew, when
the fusion of the political Huguenots with the Politiques reduced
the “religious” Huguenots to a left-wing minority. Before 1572 the
political ideas of the Reformed, if not still inchoate, were not
harmonized into one homogeneous cause, backed up by a compact and
highly organized political system. Individual political theorists or
fanatic devotees, of course, were to be found in the Huguenot ranks,
but there was no systematic political philosophy to guide their conduct
before the massacre of St. Bartholomew. It was this catastrophe that
crystallized Huguenot opinion and organized combination on a large
scale.[1121] In Guyenne, alone, where, as has been said, the Huguenot
organization was most completely developed at an early date, does any
clear republican idea seem to have early obtained.[1122]

CHAPTER XII

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR (1567-68)

In this wise, after a respite of four years, the second civil war was
precipitated. There was an exodus of Huguenots at once from Paris, some
repairing to the prince of Condé, some to the duke de Rohan, others
to Montgomery in Lower Normandy where a war of the partisans began at
once.[1123] The capital was in a furious mood and the King’s presence
alone prevented the Parisians from massacring the Protestants there and
the Montmorencys.[1124]

[Illustration: PARIS AND ITS FAUBOURGS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY]

The chief effort of the Huguenots was to seize the towns on the
Seine above and below Paris, in order to stay provisions, and so to
compel the government to submit.[1125] The capture of the Pont de
Charenton[1126] by Condé’s forces was a heavy blow to the government,
as Charenton chiefly supplied Paris with wheat and flour. The Parisians
fully expected to be attacked and made preparations therefor by
breaking up the stones in the streets and piling them in heaps for
ready service or taking them into their houses; at the same time they
destroyed pent-houses and other similar insignificant structures
in order that they might the better hurl their missiles.[1127] So
suddenly had the war been begun that the blockade of Paris for the
time being was almost complete. Lagny on the Marne,[1128] Charenton,
Porchefontaine, Busanval, Argenteuil, St. Ouen, Ambervilliers, and St.
Denis constituted the inner zone of Huguenot control while farther out
Montereau on the highroad to Sens, Etampes on the road to Orleans and
in the heart of the wheat district that supplied the capital,[1129]
Dourdan at the junction of the Blois-Chartres roads, and Dreux on the
road toward Normandy, formed an outer circle. So closely was Paris
invested that the windmills in the faubourgs of St. Denis, St. Honoré,
and Port St. Martin were burned by the Huguenots. The churches for
leagues around were plundered of copes, chasubles, tunics, and other
rich silk and satin garments. The Huguenot gentry made shirts and
handkerchiefs out of the lace and linen of the clergy. But all gold
and silver taken, as altar-vessels, crosses, chalices, were turned into
the general spoil for the sake of the cause.[1130] Forced loans were
imposed upon small merchants and even the peasantry were constrained to
forced labor,[1131] so that the latter fled by hundreds to Paris.

The ravages of the Huguenots were so great that they defeated the very
purpose they had in mind. For thousands of the peasantry, under cover
of a liberal ordinance intended to provision Paris,[1132] drove their
cattle into the city and carted thither the grain and provisions they
had stored up against the winter, where they sold it cheap, rather
than see it destroyed by “volleurs quilz pillent et brulent granges,
maisons, moulins et font tout le mal qu’ilz peullent faire.”[1133]
Wine, meat, and bread were not dear in Paris; beechnut oil and oats
were at a reasonable price.

[Illustration: BLOCKADE OF PARIS

by the Huguenots

OCT.-NOV. 1567

Huguenot positions ...

_Methuen & Co_
]

[Illustration: HUGUENOT MARCH TO PONT-à-MOUSSON after the battle of
S^[T]. DENIS

_Methuen & Co._
]

The queen mother, who looked to Alva for the most immediate aid,[1134]
sent the chancellor L’Hôpital, the liberal marshal Vieilleville, and
Jean de Morvilliers, bishop of Orleans, to confer with the prince of
Condé in order to gain time. But the prince was so elated with his
successful blockade of Paris that his demands rose in degree, and could
not be accepted by the government. Yet the nature of these demands is
to be observed, for it is evidence of the fact that the conflict was
becoming more and more a _political_ one, and that the religious issue,
if not a minor issue, at least was but an element in the programme of
the Huguenots. Moreover, these demands are interesting for the reason
that they represent a new stage in the evolution of the struggle and
that henceforth they are a permanent contention of the Huguenots and
ultimately are embodied in the Edict of Toleration. The prince, whose
chief object was to overthrow the Guises and get the government of the
King and the management of affairs into his own hands[1135] insisted on
the free exercise of religion throughout the realm without limitation
or distinction of places or persons; that all taxes lately authorized
should be remitted and all new forms of taxation imposed since the
reign of Louis XII abolished; that an accounting be made of the money
granted for defraying the King’s debts; that all those who had been
deposed from their offices on account of religion should be reinstated;
and that four fortified towns be placed in his hands as security for
the good intentions of the crown. Furthermore, the prince demanded the
dismissal of the Swiss and Spanish regiments.[1136]

In due time the prince of Condé discovered that delay was disastrous.
Although his force had daily increased by new accessions from the
south,[1137] nevertheless the Huguenot position was not so strong
as it appeared. Paris rallied to the cause of the King and gave him
400,000 écus, while the clergy advanced 250,000.[1138] The duke of
Guise was in Champagne with troops of Champagne and Burgundy, besides
eight companies of men-at-arms.[1139] Moreover, recruits were pouring
in to help the King, some from the duke of Savoy,[1140] some from
Piedmont under command of Strozzi, whose approach the admiral and De
Mouy tried to prevent, and some from Pope Pius V, who bestirred himself
in behalf of France as soon as he was informed of the renewal of
hostilities once more.[1141] The Huguenots made strenuous efforts to
break the Swiss alliance and to persuade the Protestant Swiss cantons
to withdraw. But fortunately for the French crown, the cantons remained
firm, for without the assistance of Swiss troops, Charles IX would have
been hard put to it for an army, for he dared not accept the all too
interested offers of Philip II.[1142] As in the first civil war, both
parties looked to Germany for assistance[1143] and the queen mother
sent Lignerolles “to practice the stay of the reiters, and on his
return, to the count palatine to desire him not to succor the prince
and his associates, affirming that their rising was not of any zeal of
religion, but only to rebel against their prince.”[1144] The Huguenots
also made overtures to Philip II’s revolted subjects.[1145]

By the middle of October the prince of Condé discovered that he was
lying between two enemies, Paris and the new troops coming up, and
every day added to his peril. There can be little doubt but that the
queen mother purposely protracted the negotiations, knowing that by so
doing Condé’s security would be diminished. Signs were not wanting to
indicate that matters were coming to a head. On October 7 the King sent
a herald to the prince to proclaim that all who were with him should
unarm and repair to Paris, whereby they might save their lives and
goods, which, if they refused to do so, should be confiscated.

The same day the constable declared how the King, trusting to bring
certain of his subjects to good conformity by his clemency, had sent
his chancellor to assure them that his edicts made for religion and
pacification should be inviolably kept, and that no man should be
molested for the same; and that touching other small articles he was
in full mind to have satisfied them. Notwithstanding, they would not
submit themselves to any reason; wherefore the King was fully resolved
to declare them rebels and prosecute them accordingly, for the
maintenance whereof he would venture both body and goods. On October
8 proclamation was made that if the prince with his associates would
submit themselves to the King within three days he would freely pardon
all that was past; but if they refused, they were to be accounted as
rebels and it was to be lawful to all the King’s subjects to kill
all such as they should find armed. In expectation of battle, the
constable was made lieutenant-general of the King’s army.[1146]

Yet despite the precariousness of his situation the prince was still
confident. His pride was hardened by the capture of Orleans by La
Noue on September 28,[1147] and of Soissons.[1148] He enlarged the
Protestants’ demands, requiring that Calais, Boulogne, and Metz[1149]
be delivered to them as surety, that the King disarm first and that
one church of every “good town” in France be permitted to those of the
religion; and that 300,000 francs be granted the prince to pay his
troops, “whereby they may return hence without pillage.”[1150] The
crown scornfully rejected the terms and assumed a rapid offensive. On
the night of November 6 Strozzi’s band destroyed a bridge of boats
planked together which the prince had made in order more effectually
to cut off Paris; on the following day another point on the river
which threatened Paris was captured by the duke of Nemours, and on
the 9th Condé was compelled to withdraw from Charenton after breaking
the bridge and firing the town. On November 8 the prince had made the
blunder of weakening his main force by sending D’Andelot to seize
Poissy and Montgomery to get possession of Pontoise, the two open
places in the inner zone of steel drawn around Paris.[1151] The crisis
of real battle came in their absence, on November 10, the battle of St.
Denis. It was a fierce and bloody fray beginning about 3 o’clock and
lasting till dark, in which both sides suffered severely. Montmorency,
“more famous than fortunate in arms,” was twice slashed in the face by
a cutlass and then shot in the neck and the small of his back by pistol
bullets fired by the Scotch captain named Robert Stuart[1152] serving
with the Huguenots. The old veteran, thinking his assailant did not
recognize him, cried out: “You do not know me. I am the constable.”
But the Scot, as he fired, replied: “Because I know you, I give you
this!”[1153] Though the white-liveried horsemen of Condé passed through
and through the King’s soldiery and though the constable was mortally
wounded the battle was not won by the prince.[1154] On November 14
the Huguenot army filed out of St. Denis “without sound of trumpet
or stroke of drum.” The prince established temporary headquarters at
Montereau toward Sens, but later moved up the Marne to the vicinity of
Troyes with the duke of Guise following slowly after him, in order to
effect a junction with the reiters of duke Casimir of the Palatinate,
which the government was unable to prevent.[1155]

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF ST. DENIS

From photograph of the original sketch, probably made by the son of Sir
Henry Norris, English ambassador in France. Original in Public Record
Office, State Papers, Foreign, Elizabeth, Vol. XCV, No. 1813. It is
dated November 10, 1567, and measures 31½ × 23⅛

The presence of the Huguenot forces seemed like the return of the
reiters to the folk in Champagne, who hid their treasures in stables,
gardens, chimneys, and the like. Some concealed their money and jewels
in crannies in the walls; others hid them in the swaddling clothes of
babes. But even this was to no purpose, for the soldiers plucked the
children from the very breasts of their mothers and stripped them in
order to find what was hidden upon them.[1156]

After the battle of St. Denis two opinions divided the King’s council.
Some urged the queen, who was at Fontainebleau, to make new overtures;
others, who reflected the opinion of Paris, were for pursuing the war.
The queen mother acted upon the first suggestion, but nothing came
of the overtures because the King insisted upon disarmament of the
Huguenots before considering their terms.[1157] Active preparations
were therefore made to push the war in the provinces, somewhat to the
surprise of the Catholic gentry who had thought it was finished on the
field of St. Denis.[1158] Camps of artillery, the infantry, and the
Swiss were established at Voulton, St. Martin-des-Champs, Gymbrois,
and other points in Champagne and Brie, while the cavalry was lodged
in other parishes. Garrisons were also posted in the châteaux and
_maisons fortes_ of the Huguenots in the region. Without counting the
territory covered by the advance guard of the King’s army, a strip of
territory was occupied over ten miles long and six wide, and containing
more than fifty thousand persons.[1159] For the feeding of this host,
an ordinance of the master of the camp ordered the seizure of all
the local bakeries, the necessary grain being commandeered from the
merchants and farmers of the locality. Besides these provisions the
soldiery, since they were quartered on households, freely consumed
bread, meat, wine, and other food where they were, without payment.

The presence of the King’s troops was a heavy drain upon the resources
of the region, more especially since the summer had been so dry that
the crops were thin. Indeed so great was the drought that even swamps
grew dry and there were public prayers and processions for rain in all
the parishes of France. Fortunately rain fell in time to save the vines
so that the wine did not fail, else the condition of France would have
been one of great distress.[1160]

On November 20 two thousand horsemen arrived in Paris from Flanders.
The hope of the French Protestants was chiefly pinned upon John Casimir
of the Palatinate, son of the elector Frederick, and a force of German
reiters, the expectation of whose coming had induced Condé to move
eastward toward Troyes. The count palatine drew a sharp line in his own
mind between religion and politics. He would have been quick to resent
any invasion of his rights as a ruler. But he did not understand French
politics, and looked upon the Huguenot movement as a purely religious
one to which he felt bound to give support because he was a zealous
Protestant.[1161] The French government sent the bishop of Rennes and
Lignerolles to endeavor to dissuade the count palatine; they affirmed
that the rebellion of Condé was not for any zeal of religion but for
political advantage. But the prince’s emissary outmatched the bishop
and his colleague, assuring the count palatine that the sole cause of
the Huguenot insurrection was the preservation of the free exercise
of religion, together with their honor, lives, and goods.[1162] The
argument of Charles IX that the estate of himself and realm was so
intermingled with that of religion that the count palatine could
not touch one without offense to the other, was not convincing to
Casimir.[1163]

To add to Catherine’s anxiety the Emperor revived the old project to
seize the Three Bishoprics,[1164] a project made doubly dangerous by
the new machinations of the cardinal of Lorraine. For, in order to
safeguard the Catholic cause in France and to save Metz from being lost
entirely after the Huguenots had captured the citadel in October, the
cardinal of Lorraine, had resumed his secret negotiations with Spain.
Instead, however, of writing direct to Philip II he wrote to Alva,
for time was pressing and the danger great. On November 1, 1567, a
chaplain of the cardinal appeared before the duke in Antwerp bearing
a letter imploring Alva to come to the assistance of the French crown
and offered to put him in possession of certain places in France. At
first Alva was so incredulous that he imprisoned the bearer[1165]
until he was satisfied of the verity of his mission. Nevertheless he
immediately sent 3,000 horsemen into the country of Seyn (between Wied
and Bas-Isenberg) whose ruler was a pensioner of Spain, ordered count
Mansfeldt to go to Luxembourg, and dispatched a message to the margrave
of Baden for 1,000 horsemen with the object of preventing Germans going
to France or the war there from spreading to the Spanish provinces.
Finally, when persuaded of the truth of the cardinal’s overtures, Alva
said that if circumstances so developed as to make such action on his
part an imperative duty before the King of France could be apprised, he
would do so; and that if the King were overwhelmed by the Huguenots, he
would believe it his duty for the sake of protecting the Catholic faith
to occupy the places offered by the cardinal, which might be held in
pawn by Spain as collateral for French repayment of her services.[1166]
But the treasonable designs of the cardinal of Lorraine went even
farther than an offer to surrender some of the border fortresses
of France into Spanish hands. As early as this time the possible
deposition of the house of Valois was contemplated by the Guises in
favor of the Spanish-Hapsburg dynasty. For the cardinal went on to say
that in event of the early death of Charles IX and his brothers Philip
II of Spain would be heir to the throne of France through his wife,
Elizabeth of Valois. “The Salic law is a pleasantry,” he added, “and
force of arms could overcome any opposition”![1167] “This last,” wrote
Alva to Philip, “is a different matter and I cannot risk taking a hand
in it without express instructions from your Majesty.”

The habitual self-control of the Spanish monarch must have been heavily
taxed to subdue his emotion when he learned of this astonishing
negotiation. But he was true to his second-nature. Without apparent
excitement he endorsed the document thus: “This point is one upon which
more time is needed to reflect, because it would be difficult to do
what the cardinal asks without compromise. On the other hand, it is
hard to decline for such a cause what is thrown into my arms. However,
I think that a decision in this matter is not urgent. Let the duke
inform me what he thinks about it, according to the state of things
there.”[1168] Was it caution, or hesitation, or procrastination?

As an intermediate course, one less compromising and perhaps quite
as effective in the long run, Alva suggested, although with some
misgiving, to the cardinal of Lorraine that he come in person to
the relief of the French crown.[1169] While he was debating this
question with himself, news came of the battle of St. Denis and of the
approach of the reiters; and hard upon this, word from Catherine de
Medici asking for the aid of 2,000 Spanish arquebusiers against the
reiters.[1170] The duke of Alva, in reply, after chiding Catherine for
not accepting the offers of assistance he had made immediately after
Meaux,[1171] offered to send 2,000 arquebusiers and 2,000 cavalry—he
could not now spare the great force he had proffered earlier—to
the assistance of the duke of Aumale against the reiters,[1172]
although admitting, with grim pleasantry, that there was a certain
humor in casting firebrands into a neighbor’s house when one’s own
was burning.[1173] But the offer came too late to be of service,
thus fortunately sparing Catherine from the humiliation of having
introduced in France a power whose purpose was the overthrow of
France.[1174]

In the meantime, while Condé was encamped between Sens[1175] and
Troyes, the reiters had entered Lorraine to the number of about six
thousand.[1176] Their coming thwarted the plans of the duke of Guise,
who was on the frontier with the marshal Tavannes, for it prevented the
French commanders from joining with Count Mansfeldt and the duke of
Lorraine and compelled them to fall back.[1177] The junction of Condé
and the reiters was effected on December 28, and a camp established at
Dessay. The King’s army of all sorts comprised 30,000 footmen and half
as many horse.[1178] Nevertheless, despite the adverse prospect, the
government did not waver. The capital was intensely loyal. In response
to a call of the King, the Parisians made a general muster of 30,000
and offered 1,200,000 francs for the maintenance of the war.[1179]

Tentative efforts, however, were even yet made to make peace, to the
indignation of the Parisians.[1180] The insistence of Charles IX,
though, upon an immediate laying-down of arms was an effective obstacle
to any cartel that might have been arranged. In reply to the articles
sent by the King to the prince of Condé, the latter responded that
the Protestants had no intention to prescribe the law to the King,
but only humbly to require such things as were necessary for the
liberty of their consciences and the preservation of their lives and
goods, namely, that the edict of Orleans should be observed without
any alterations; that bailiwicks should be appointed for the free
exercise of religion; that they should be preserved in the enjoyment
of their estates and offices; that those of Lyons should have the same
liberty as the rest of the subjects of the realm; that synods should
be permitted, and that the Edict of Pacification should be declared
irrevocable.[1181]

In his answer Charles IX declared that he would never agree to treat
with the prince of Condé or any other subject as with an equal; he
promised to pardon what had passed if the Protestants would lay down
their arms within three days and retire to their houses and give up the
places taken by them; that where certain gentlemen complained of having
been prosecuted for exercising their religion in their houses, he was
content that this should cease, provided that there were not more than
fifty persons present exclusive of their families; that he intended
to keep his forces in his hands and to dispose of and govern towns as
he pleased; that the town of Lyons, being full of strangers, should
not be allowed the exercise of religion; that all enrolment of men,
associations, and synods, must cease; and finally, that the King would
immediately dispatch his letters-patent to assure the prince and his
company of their lives, goods, and the liberty of their consciences, if
these conditions were complied with.[1182]

The truth is, the French government prepared for war with great
reluctance. Philip II’s anxiety lest the queen would come to terms with
her adversaries was a just one.[1183] The King’s expenses amounted to
nearly a million livres per month,[1184] and he had “to quiet such
storms as daily arose in his camp amongst his nobility, partly for
religion and partly for ambition.”[1185] Unless Spain came strongly
to the relief of the Catholic cause in France, it was apparent that
Condé could go almost wherever he pleased in the country, his force was
so great.[1186] Many of the King’s soldiers were ill-minded to fight
against their countrymen and many deserted. The Swiss were wearied
by travel and the inclemency of the season and there was much disease
among them.[1187] The leaders wrangled for the command.[1188] There
was mutiny and desertion in the ranks of the Scotch Guard, thirty
of whom deserted to the prince, or rather to their old commander
Montgomery.[1189] All along the line of the King’s forces there was
opposition to the war. The chevalier Battres told Charles IX that many
of the nobles were determined to hazard the King’s displeasure rather
than to stain their hands in their kinsmen’s blood.[1190] The marshal
Cossé showed unwonted courage in his advocacy of moderation[1191]—a
policy which he openly admitted and approved in the Council meeting
(February 10). The germ of the Politique party is thus early
discoverable.[1192]

The duke of Anjou, who had been made commander-in-chief of the Catholic
forces,[1193] seeing the Protestant army considerably augmented and
that they had crossed the Seine and controlled the passages over
the Yonne and the Loire, sent most of his troops back to Paris, and
scattered the rest along the banks of the Seine, to guard the road
between Troyes and Paris. The Catholic camp in Paris was established in
the faubourg St. Marceau, where were lodged all the gendarmerie, both
foot and horse, the artillery and the Swiss. But most of the cavalry
was quartered in the villages, where the horses could get better
grazing, to the detriment of the country round about, for the soldiers
amused themselves by pillage, so that the better towns and châteaux
were compelled to fortify themselves as though against the enemy.[1194]
Strenuous efforts were made to provision Paris against a future siege,
and to establish magazines of provisions and ammunition in the towns
of the Ile-de-France and Champagne. To this end the government bought
up grain in the early spring of 1568, paying 50 livres per muid, or 10
sous, 5 deniers, per bichet.[1195]

As the prince drew nearer to the city, the conduct of Paris became
a matter of anxiety. Although bigotedly Catholic, the populace of
the capital had no mind to experience another siege in the cause of
religion, and the popular rage against the government, especially
toward Catherine de Medici, became so intense that she dared not go
abroad without being heavily guarded. The popular voice claimed that
the queen mother nourished the quarrel and consumed the revenues of the
King,[1196] a belief which the Guises cleverly fostered, if they were
not the immediate authors of it.[1197]

“The money of the kingdom today is in the hands of a single class,”
wrote the Venetian ambassador. “The clergy is ruined. Without counting
the property of the church which has been mortgaged or sold with
the authorization of the Pope, the church since 1561 has paid out
12,000,000 écus for the King. This would be immaterial, for it is but a
seventh of its annual revenue, if the church had not suffered so much
from the civil war. The nobles are at their wits’ ends and have not
a sou on account of the war. The country folk have been so pillaged
by the soldiery, whose license is frightful, that they are reduced to
beggary. Only the bourgeoisie and the _gens de robe longue_ still have
money. It is difficult for the King to obtain money without force. In
addition to these troubles with his subjects the King has lost all
his credit with foreign merchants and cannot raise an écu outside
the kingdom without giving collateral. But good may come out of this
calamitous state, for the King and his subjects have come to such a
dead stop that peace may result.”[1198]

Under these circumstances the crown earnestly renewed negotiations for
peace. Even astrology was invoked by the superstitious Catherine and
the signs of the zodiac were sagely said to point toward peace. For
the queen, walking one day in her garden, discoursing of the peace,
called unto her Messire Nonio, an Italian famed for his knowledge of
astrology, of whom she asked what he found by the stars touching peace;
to which he presently answered that the heavens did not promise it, nor
was the earth yet ready to receive it; since the effect of the eclipse
of the sun was then in its greatest force, and likewise the virtue of
the conjunction of Saturn and Mars which was in Aries last year; but
the wise man concluded with the oracular statement that the heavens did
not _constrain_ the inferior powers but only _disposed_ them.[1199]

On February 28 the King sent the marshal Montmorency, Morvilliers,
the bishop of Limoges, and D’Allny, one of his secretaries, to
confer with representatives appointed by the prince of Condé, the
cardinal Châtillon, the bishop of Valence, and Teligny at Longjumeau.
The prince made two notable conditions to the demands already
outlined—that all the articles, agreements, and capitulations should
be confirmed by _all_ the Parlements of the realm, and that certain
cautionary towns—he named Boulogne or La Rochelle[1200]—be given to
the Protestants as guarantees of the just purposes of the government.
These two demands are of interest because they became invariable
demands of the Huguenots in the future and foreshadowed important terms
in the edict of Bergerac (1576) and that of Nantes of 1598. Those
of the King replied that to make such demands impugned the King’s
honor, that the prince of Condé ought to trust the crown without
requiring guaranties of assurance. As to the particular demands,
Charles IX declared he did not think it meet to make the edict of
1563 perpetual[1201] and protested against the political and military
organization of the Protestants, “insomuch as this liberty remaining,
the King shall never be assured in his realm.” On March 4 the
commissioners of the prince, tired of the parleying and vexed at the
diversion the King tried to introduce by proposing a double alliance
between the warring houses in the marriage of the duke of Guise with
the prince’s eldest daughter, and of D’Andelot’s eldest son to the
duke’s sister, demanded express answer regarding church edifices;
better observance of the edict by the King’s officers; Huguenot
schools, etc. To these Charles IX assented and the Huguenots waived
the matter of confirmation by provincial Parlements and the surrender
of certain cautionary places for the time being. It remained to settle
the question of the reiters’ pay. Five hundred thousand livres in the
royal chest at Amboise were appropriated by the crown and the balance
of the obligation was provided for by the cardinal of Bourbon and the
dukes of Montmorency and Longueville, who went security for it.[1202]

As finally concluded on March 26 the terms of Longjumeau were in
reality a confirmation of the edict of March, 1563, which was not
enlarged as the prince of Condé had at first demanded, except that the
edict in its new form also applied to Provence.[1203] The terms of
Longjumeau were suppressed for a short time and the army not dismissed,
however, because it was thought perilous to disarm until the reiters
had taken their leave. These marauders, who followed war as a trade
and with whom faith and piety were not virtues, had not ceased their
depredations during the course of the negotiations. The people “being
everywhere environed both with their own or foreign enemies, dared
not approach town or village, all being replenished with reiters or
those who entreated them as ill, whereby they miserably died in the
fields.”[1204]

The publication of the edict encountered bitter opposition throughout
the country.[1205] At Toulouse the King’s messenger who brought the
royal order for its registration by the Parlement was actually tried,
condemned, and executed for the “offense,” so inflamed was the public
mind.[1206] At Rouen a furious multitude assailed the magistrates and
mobbed the dwellings of those of Huguenot inclination. The same thing
happened at Bourges. At Orleans the soldiers murdered several at the
gates of the city, with impunity. In Languedoc there were commotions
and slaughters.[1207]

The strife in the south of France, in Provence, Languedoc, and Guyenne,
had never entirely ceased since the inception of the first civil war.
The King’s tour of the provinces had overawed the combatants to a
certain extent and in Languedoc Damville, who had succeeded his father
on April 28, 1563,[1208] managed to keep things with a pretty even
hand, enforcing the edict of Amboise throughout his jurisdiction.[1209]
But the hostility of Montluc, whose government of Guyenne adjoined
Languedoc, toward Damville, was a serious bar to pacification, for
Montluc not only sought to diminish Damville’s authority by complaining
to the King of him, but also secretly connived with the doings of
ultra-Catholic partisans in Toulouse and elsewhere.[1210]

So intense was the hatred in the south of France between the Catholics
and the Huguenots that there was scarce any intermission of hostilities
at all after the peace of Longjumeau, especially in Provence. The
duke of Joyeuse, who commanded the royal forces here, was a man after
Montluc’s own heart. Early in 1568 he had passed up the Rhone for the
purpose of aiding the counts of Tende and Suze. He had with him 2,000
foot and from five to six hundred horse, and easily overcame the little
fortresses until he reached Pont St. Esprit in February. Failing to
take this, the army was divided. Joyeuse crossed the Rhone at Avignon
on March 7, took Loudun, Orsenne, and Tresques, then, retracing his
steps, he again joined the count of Tende and renewed the siege of
Pont St. Esprit. The Protestants under the command of Montbrun gave
battle in the plains of Montfran near Aramon, and were badly defeated
May 24, 1568. When peace was made Joyeuse returned to Avignon. Most
of the towns of lower Languedoc were carefully garrisoned by him, but
Montauban, Castres, and Montpellier resisted. Everywhere he exacted
disarmament and the oath of fidelity.[1211]

CHAPTER XIII

THE THIRD CIVIL WAR (1568). NEW CATHOLIC LEAGUE. THE BATTLE OF JARNAC

The peace of Longjumeau, more than any treaty of the civil wars, was
a tentative settlement, an armistice merely. It was chiefly compelled
by the lack of funds of both parties and from its signature was more
openly opposed and protested against than any other of the treaties.
Suspense over the probability of a third and worse war prevailed from
the beginning. For while many on each side returned to their homes,
there were many others who had no place to which to retire, for whom
vagabond life had attractions and who preferred war to peace and
plundering to honest labor.[1212] Both sides were too suspicious and
too fearful to lay down their arms. So many of the Huguenot captains
kept their troops in the fields that the King wrote to no less than
212 places charging the governors thereof to scatter these bands.
Many known to have been in arms hid them in secret places and were,
in consequence, not permitted to return to their native places until
such arms were given up. The Catholic resentment seems to have been
strongest in Paris[1213] and Burgundy, though in the former the provost
of the merchants made the singularly sane plea to the King to have an
especial regard for justice lest its denial might stir the Protestants
to new strife. In general, though, wherever the King’s garrisons were
stationed there was trouble.

It was not long before the Guise opposition organized. Failing of
their hold upon Charles IX, the Guises directed their efforts upon
his brother, Henry, duke of Anjou, whose Catholic sentiments[1214]
were less impeachable than those of Charles and who began to “show
some tokens of an ambitious heart,” was a sworn Catholic, and showed
great offense at his royal brother’s action in “very courteously”
entertaining the cardinal Châtillon, the count Rochefoucauld, and
Brocarde, the Protestant governor of Orleans.[1215] On the night of
March 29 a secret conference was held at the Louvre of the leaders
among the Guise party, in which it was proposed that a pacific attitude
be pretended until the disarming of the prince of Condé’s forces and
the withdrawal of the reiters had taken place, and then suddenly
to seize Orleans, Soissons, Auxerre, and La Rochelle—the Huguenot
strongholds—for which duty Lansac, Martigues, Chavigny, and Brissac
were to be appointed, reinforce the garrison of Paris, and send the
ferocious Montluc into Gascony to subjugate the strongest Protestant
provinces, seize the sea-ports, and drive a Catholic wedge in between
Poitou and the territories of the queen of Navarre, who already had
taken the precaution to strengthen her defenses. By some means, perhaps
through the marshal Cossé, who was a Politique at heart, the cardinal
Châtillon learned of the plot the very next day, and straightway
informed the marshal Montmorency, another moderate, of it. At the same
time the plan was discovered from another source to the prince of
Condé. When Charles IX was taxed with information of it, he swore that
the whole thing was done without his knowledge, accused the cardinal
of Lorraine of treasonable practice, and calling for pen and ink wrote
to Condé promising “good and sincere” observation of all that had been
agreed upon at Longjumeau.[1216]

It will be observed how completely this plan of the Guises for the
subjugation of Guyenne and Gascony is in alignment with the views
of Montluc which he had expressed to Philip II.[1217] Hitherto
the King of Spain had been sustaining two separate lines of secret
correspondence, one with Montluc direct; the other with the cardinal of
Lorraine through the duke of Alva. These two lines now are fused into a
larger whole, at least so far as the Spanish king is concerned.[1218]
Montluc is the military, the cardinal of Lorraine the diplomatic, agent
of Philip’s purposes.

The development of the Holy League has now advanced another stage
in its evolution. The old warrior had not discontinued his secret
relations with Spain, in spite of his warm denial of the fact to the
queen mother, who taxed him with it,[1219] but through Bardaxi still
kept in communication with Philip II. We find him writing twice to the
King in February 1567 and Philip responding in terms of encouragement
in the following month.[1220] Guyenne was peculiarly vulnerable to such
an attack as was now contemplated, and Montluc was certainly the best
captain to execute it. The army of the Huguenots there was in a bad
state.[1221]

The instrument was already forged to Philip II’s hand in the local
Catholic leagues in France. His interest in these was one of the
silent activities at Bayonne. The instructions to the duke of Alva and
to Bardaxi were almost identical. “As the queen mother lacks either
fixity of ideas or honesty of purpose”—the words are those of the
_procès-verbal_ framed in the Spanish council-chamber, it is necessary
to encourage the practices of Montluc and the Catholics.[1222] It must
have been a source of delight to the Spanish king to observe the rapid
increase of these associations. There are two changes to be noticed in
these provincial leagues: their increasingly popular character, and
their tendency to fuse together. Hitherto they had been local in their
operations. Now a process of federation is to be observed by which
the provincial leagues are gradually welded into one whole—in a word
the mighty Sainte Ligue of 1576 potentially exists now.[1223] The
federative tendency of these associations was a natural result of their
increase in number and membership. It was not a haphazard development
at all. Design is evident throughout.[1224]

The renewal of civil war in 1567 had given a great impulse to this
spirit of association.[1225] Nowhere was it more pronounced than in
Burgundy. Tavannes, who was governor of Burgundy, in the year 1567
(July 18), formed a league under the name of the Confrérie du St.
Esprit. Churchmen, the nobility of Burgundy, and wealthy bourgeois who
wished to preserve the Catholic religion were united together in the
service of the King. The version of its origin in the _Mémoires de
Tavannes_ is so interesting that I venture to quote it:

Seeing so much discontent and so many threatening enterprises among
the Huguenots, the queen, for safety’s sake, in the beginning of the
year 1567 caused a levy of 9,000 Swiss [the actual number was 6,000]
to be made under pretext that they were to be for the service of
the duke of Alva in the Flemish War. The prevailing unrest and the
rumors of insurrection gave the sieur de Tavannes, who penetrated the
designs of the queen and the purpose of the Huguenots, the thought
that a prudent man might also take precautions of his own. He reasoned
that the Huguenots did not have more zeal for their cause than the
Catholics for the old religion, and that those who would preserve
it would give their lives and employ their last sou to succor the
King; in a word, oppose league to league. He therefore organized
the Confrérie du St. Esprit, which in reality was a league of the
ecclesiastics and the nobility of Burgundy, with rich men from the
towns, who voluntarily swore to serve in the interest of the Catholic
religion against the Huguenots, sacrificing both person and property
for the sake of the King. Without using coercion he gave orders for
the enrolment of men-at-arms and the collection of money, created
warders, spies, and messengers, in imitation of the Huguenots, in
order to discover their machinations. The oath subscribed to justified
this design. Each parish of Dijon paid its men for three months,
and each town contributed 200 horse and 250 footmen. Burgundy could
furnish 1,500 horse and 400 men on foot, paid for three months of the
year. The sieur de Tavannes summoned an assembly in the Maison du Roi,
... and there caused the oath to be read.

The oath began:

We swear by the most holy and incomprehensible name of God, the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in whose name we have been baptized, and
we promise on our honor and the peril of our lives that, henceforth,
at all times, through the chiefs and those who shall be named by the
King under these articles, we will make known any enterprise that
may work contrary to our said law and faith of which we have made
profession in our baptism, and which we have maintained by the grace
of God to the present, and also to make known every enterprise, which
may clothe itself in hatred of the maintenance of the said faith,
against the said royal Majesty, madame his mother, and messieurs his
brothers, who rule over us by divine permission.

And further on in the oath:

We swear and promise in the present writing to render all friendship
and fraternity the one to the other, to aid each other reciprocally
against all phases of the opposite party, if they shall undertake any
enterprise against any one of the signatories to the cause of this
party; and for the sake of said aid we promise respectively, the one
and the other, to employ all our persons, our credit, and our favors
without sparing anything. And we promise to observe all the articles
above sworn to without regard to friends, parents, or any relationship
which we may have with those who undertake the contrary.[1226]

In the following year, on April 2, 1568, “La Fraternité des Catholiques
de Châlons-sur-Saône” emerged.

A l’imitation de la majesté du Roy nostre sire [so runs the
instrument], et soubs sa protection et bon plaisir ... nous avons
faict entre nous et pour tous autres Catholiques qui adjoindre se
vouldront une fraternité qui s’appellera Confrairie et Société des
Catholiques.

And it is added—sign of omen—

Et au cas qu’il advint que Dieu ne veuille que les persones de sa
majesté et de messieurs ses frères ... fussent oppressés de sorte
que ne sceussions avoir advertissement de leurs volontez, promettons
rendre toute obeissance au général chef qui sera esleu.[1227]

Six weeks later, on May 18, 1568, through the activity of Tavannes, a
similar association was formed in Berry and was confirmed at Bourges by
the archbishop, Jacques le Roy.[1228] A month later La Ligue Chrétienne
et Royale, “for the defense of the Catholic church in France and for
maintaining the royal authority in the House of Valois,” to which
was appended the significant proviso, “so long as it shall govern in
the Catholic and Apostolic religion” appeared in Champagne under the
auspices of Henry of Guise, then eighteen years of age and governor of
the province. The nobility, the bishop, and the clergy, in a meeting
at Troyes, concluded, signed, and took an oath to this league on June
25.[1229] Exactly a month later, on July 25, the Beauvaisis followed
the lead of Burgundy, Berry, and Champagne, and formed an “Association
Catholique” for the same purpose.[1230] The movement also spread west
of the Seine, into Maine and Anjou, where the clergy, the nobility,
and the third estate, on July 11, 1568, established an association
whose members swore “de vivre et mourir en la religion catholique et de
nous secourir les uns et les autres contre les rebelles et hérétiques
sectaires de la nouvelle religion.” Forty persons signed the oath.[1231]

In Toulouse, the former league was revived in September, 1568, with
new energy under the patronage of the cardinal of Armagnac and actual
leadership of a secular priest who preached war upon the Protestants
with a crusader’s zeal. On September 12 the latter gathered those
desirous of reviving the association in the cathedral of St. Etienne
where a solemn oath was taken by all, who promised to devote life and
property to the support of the catholic religion. The league thus
formed was officially entitled La Croisade, with the motto: “Eamus
nos, moriamur cum Christo.” All its members wore a white cross.[1232]
Even some of the smaller towns followed the example of the provinces
and large cities. At Anduze in Lower Languedoc at this same time the
churches formed a Catholic union.[1233] The movement actually spread
into Lower Navarre where in the same month, September, the sieur de
Luxe and some others, at the instigation of the cardinal of Lorraine,
perhaps, formed a league at St. Palais for the purpose of driving out
the Calvinist preachers in St. Palais. They seized La Rive, the pastor
at St. Palais, Tarde, pastor at Ostabanès, both of whom were imprisoned
in the house of De Luxe. But the prompt conduct of Jeanne d’Albret
and the prince of Navarre, who won his spurs in the siege of Garris,
speedily crushed this association.[1234]

In view of this spontaneous organization of the Catholics everywhere,
it was inevitable that the peace of Longjumeau would be of short
duration, even if there had been no special circumstances to bring
it to an end.[1235] The Guises, after the discovery of their secret
conference of March 29, for the time being sought to dissemble their
feelings and purposes, and not to offend the King’s anger. When it was
observed in the royal presence that great inconvenience was likely to
arise in France for want of obedience to the edict, the cardinal of
Lorraine, hearing the remark, replied “Sur ma conscience, il n’y a rien
plus necessaire.”

The feud between the Guises and Montmorencys seemed likely to involve
the state in war before very long.[1236] The quarrel between the two
houses was the more intense at this time owing to the fact that the
duke of Anjou’s retention of the lieutenantship, in which office the
Guises supported and maintained him for their own purposes, gave
offense to the marshals, Montmorency, Damville, and Vieilleville; the
more so because they were all moderate Catholics and were dissatisfied
with the duke’s bigoted Catholic leanings and affiliation with the
Guises; they argued that “it had not been seen heretofore, that the
King should have a lieutenant,” that the continuance of such a title,
especially in time of peace, was a prejudice to their station,[1237]
adding significantly that they “being marshals knew what appertained
to their charges.” The strife between the factions soon became so
severe as to dismay some, especially the cardinal of Bourbon, who
threatened “that in case the King would take no better order than he
had done, he would depart the court and give the world to understand
how he had at heart the honour of his house and the welfare of his
friends.” The chancellor L’Hôpital, having vainly endeavored to soften
the strife, asked leave to be discharged of his office—an event which
the cardinal of Lorraine would have hailed with delight. As it was, the
Guises used Anjou to abuse the position of the chancellor.[1238]

The continued presence of the reiters and the Swiss also added to
the anxiety of those who were peaceably inclined, for “there was
not a town or a village in the Ile-de-France that was not furnished
with soldiers,” the country indeed teeming so much with them that
traveling now was more perilous even than during the wars.[1239] The
6,000 Swiss still remained within four leagues of Paris at the last
of May. The reiters of the prince stopped in Burgundy and plundered
the country; while the prince of Condé vainly demanded that they be
paid at once.[1240] At Dijon five of them were slain by the desperate
populace and a massacre of thirteen of the inhabitants followed.[1241]
Many thought that the war would be renewed the moment the harvest was
gathered.[1242]

Late in May the duke of Montmorency left Paris for Chantilly, while
his brother Damville stayed in the capital. The action of each was
significant. At Chantilly the cardinal Châtillon and other Protestant
nobles deliberated, while in Paris Damville’s house was frequented by
those hostile to the cardinal of Lorraine’s authority, notably the four
marshals, all of whom inveighed against him and were popularly believed
to be forming a new opposition to him.[1243] The Huguenot leaders,
Condé, Coligny, D’Andelot, all lay in various castles throughout the
Ile-de-France, with captains, soldiers, and gentlemen around them,
and so distributed that no river separated them one from the other,
while one ford between Paris and Rouen was kept open to enable those
of the religion in Picardy to keep in touch with the prince.[1244] So
skilfully was the distribution made that the leaders could have been
able to unite within a day and a half if necessary.[1245]

The strain upon Charles IX soon began to tell. He was heard to say that
he would rather lose his crown outright than live in continual fear,
and as the feud became intenser, the King yielded and finally showed
his hand by displacing the marshal Montmorency as governor of Paris,
though he dared not go quite so far as to put Henri d’Anjou in his
room, but chose his youngest brother, the duke of Alençon.[1246]

We discover at this time the germ of the Politique party.[1247]
If the Guises had been aware of the astonishing diplomatic stroke
Montmorency had conceived in his retreat at Chantilly and which he
had communicated to the Huguenot leaders, they might not have pressed
the case of Anjou so insistently. This scheme was to separate the
King’s brother from his attachment to the Guises and at the same time
enlist English aid in support of religious toleration in France—the
aim of the Politique party—by nothing less than bringing about the
marriage of the Valois prince with Queen Elizabeth. At the same time
Montmorency, by gaining the favor of the duke, would work the cardinal
out of power. To this end the duke approached the English envoy in
France.[1248]

Day by day the animosity of the parties grew. In a certain sense the
peril of the times was greater than during a state of war. Daily
murder by dagger and by drowning, and violation of property took place
throughout France, to such an extent that it was said more had been
murdered since the publication of the peace than were in the war which
it was supposed to have concluded.[1249] But although the animosity
of the parties was strong enough to incite them to war, the renewal
of hostilities was yet very dependent upon the fluctuation of events
in the Netherlands,[1250] and at this moment the balance there was
inclined in Spain’s favor.[1251]

William of Orange, while not in alliance with the French, nevertheless
sought to avail himself of the services of the 4,000 reiters which
John Casimir had raised for the French Protestants, whose use was no
longer required by the Huguenots after the peace of Longjumeau. A
horror of Spanish cruelty was beginning to pervade Germany and brought
him sympathy and support.[1252] Calvinist Europe built high hopes
upon this assistance for the Dutch.[1253] But Orange was straitened
for money[1254] and it was not until the middle of August that he was
ready to return to give Alva battle with an army of 6,000 horsemen and
four regiments of foot, besides the Lorrainers and Gascons who were
all gunners. According to the plan of the prince, three armies were to
enter the Netherlands at once, the French under a Huguenot leader named
Cocqueville, through Artois; the Count of Hoogstraeten between the
Rhine and the Meuse, and Louis of Nassau through Groningen.

But the whole plan failed. Cocqueville raised seven or eight hundred
men with the intention of provoking Artois to revolt.[1255] Failing
to take Doulens by surprise, Cocqueville pillaged the abbey-town of
Dammartin. The duke of Alva energetically protested to Charles IX
against this violation of the Spanish provinces by French subjects,
and the marshal Cossé was sent into Picardy. The foreigners in
Cocqueville’s band were summarily beheaded at St. Valéry, the leader
himself was sent to Abbeville for trial for treason and executed,
and the whole expedition came to naught.[1256] The enforced delay of
the prince of Orange, united with this repulse, was fatal to the
Netherland project. On July 21, 1568, Louis of Nassau was defeated at
Jemmingen by Alva, Spanish tyranny was fixed more firmly in the Low
Countries, and Egmont and Hoorne were shortly afterward sent to the
scaffold.[1257]

Everything was now out of joint. The success of the Dutch would have
emboldened their French coreligionists to renew the struggle with some
hope of success.[1258] But the Catholic victory in the Low Countries
hardened the resolution of the French government. Hitherto chiefly
the lesser nobility of France had been successfully coerced by the
French crown. Now the cardinal of Lorraine intended to do the like with
the higher nobles, compelling them either to abandon their religious
and political contentions or to take up arms.[1259] At the same time
military preparations began to be made which could not but be viewed
with alarm by the Huguenots. The crown was stronger in cavalry, in
infantry, in artillery, and in munitions. The country as a whole was
with the King, and the chief cities were in his hands. “The great
cities,” said Coligny mournfully, “are the tombs of our armies.”[1260]

So carefully were the preparations made that the King remained armed
while the Huguenots were scattered and unarmed,[1261] saving large
numbers of individual nobles who yet stood upon their guard. In
northern and central France, La Rochelle excepted, the government
controlled all the towns. In Provence and Languedoc, however, many
of the towns were governed by the Protestants.[1262] In order to
prevent the communication of intelligence between the various parts
of France under Protestant control, Charles IX even had refused to
permit Condé to levy money upon the Huguenots for payment of the
reiters, notwithstanding the governments’ own poverty, although the
prince cunningly suggested such an action.[1263] The outlook was dark
indeed. The Huguenots nowhere save in the south seemed strong enough
to take the field, and it seemed hopeless for them to expect to join
with their coreligionists of the north owing to the vigilance of
Montluc in Languedoc and Tavannes in Burgundy and to the fact that the
whole course of the Loire was patrolled by forces of the government.
Moreover, the general contribution being stopped, both resources and
communication were at an end; the gentry too were impoverished by the
late war to a very great extent, having “consumed as much in eight
months as they had gathered in four years before,”[1264] so that the
wisest of the Huguenot leaders were of the opinion that the religion
was not in a state to attempt anything by open arms.

While he tried to augment his forces Condé sought to remedy matters
by appeal to the King,[1265] complaining of the outrages inflicted
on the Huguenots[1266] (Montluc had even hanged seven gentlemen of
the entourage of the queen of Navarre, in Languedoc), being careful
not to impute these wrongs, however, to the King, but reprobating the
malignancy of the cardinal of Lorraine and accusing him of secret
intelligence with Spain.[1267] The cardinal, thus assailed, parried
through the King, who two days later issued a proclamation, which after
reciting the complaints of murder, robberies and other wrongs alleged
by those of “the pretended Reformed religion,” declared that the King,
having sent his _maîtres des requêtes_ into the provinces where these
acts of violence had been perpetrated, was satisfied of the substantial
justice of the administration, and asserted that the complaints had
either been manufactured by the Huguenot leaders, or else grossly
exaggerated. The proclamation closed by commanding all judges and other
officers, on pain of deprivation, to search out and punish wrong-doers,
so that those of the religion might not have ground for complaining
that justice was not done them.[1268]

Such a proclamation was mere verbiage, however, and was intended to
lull the anxiety of the Huguenots while the government’s preparations
went forward. It deceived none of the Protestant leaders. The signs of
the times were too plain to be concealed. Arms were secretly levied and
stored in La Rochelle, Saintes, Châtellerault, St. Jean-d’Angély.[1269]
To these signs was now added another unmistakable indication. In
August, 1568 the concentration of fourteen companies of gendarmes and
several bands of infantry in Burgundy, where the two most conspicuous
of the leaders of the Huguenots then were—the prince of Condé and
Coligny[1270]—ostensibly to prevent the prince from delivering his
German reiters to the prince of Orange, precipitated civil war anew.

Protestant historians have contended that the government of Charles IX
was wholly to blame for the renewal of war. But it may be fairly said
that Charles IX acted not only according to his right, but according
to policy in seeking to prevent the union of the Huguenot and Dutch
interests. France was not yet prepared to espouse an open anti-Spanish
policy, though she was already secretly so inclining,[1271] and
the projected alliance of the prince of Condé and the prince of
Orange[1272] would have been certain seriously to compromise her
with Spain. Finally, it may be added, that there was not a little of
self-ambition in Condé’s action.[1273]

This attempted co-operation of the prince of Condé and the prince of
Orange drew the French government into close association with the duke
of Alva. But the diplomatic relations now established between the
courts of Paris and Madrid were of much greater importance and the
negotiations were energetically forwarded by the cardinal of Lorraine,
who on November 21, sent the cardinal of Guise into Spain charged to
treat of marriage between Philip II and Marguerite of Valois,[1274] or
if that proved unacceptable, to suggest Philip’s marriage with one of
the daughters of the Emperor, while Charles IX was to marry the other.
At the same time Alva proposed that the duke of Anjou—the future
Henry III—should marry the queen of Portugal.[1275] The far-reaching
effect of such a series of alliances is manifest. The two houses of
Hapsburg would become dynastically united again in a common family and
politico-religious purpose, into which association France would be
woven.

The government had secretly prepared for the sudden investment of
La Rochelle, intending to “spring” the war suddenly at that point,
but had been compelled to alter the plan. This change of plan induced
the resolution to attempt to capture the prince and Coligny,[1276]
the purpose of the Guises (with whom the King and his mother were not
acting) probably being to send them to the scaffold, as Alva had done
with Egmont and Hoorne.

But the deception and duplicity which they used to allay the suspicions
of the prince and the admiral offended the bluff, soldierly honor of
Tavannes, who, though a bigoted Catholic, would not stoop to such a
dishonorable course of action.[1277] While feigning to obey the orders
to capture the two leaders, he contrived to apprise them of their
danger by managing so as to have his letters intercepted by them.[1278]
Thanks to this timely warning, escape was made possible. On August 23,
1568 Condé and Coligny, accompanied by the members of their families
and D’Andelot’s—the princess of Condé being pregnant—crossed the
Loire in sudden flight, guarded on the road by a hundred horsemen. The
fugitives were bound for La Rochelle, which was safely reached without
mishap, though not without peril.

From the safe retreat of this famous port and stronghold the prince of
Condé issued a manifesto protesting that he and his followers intended
nothing prejudicial to the King, but only to protect those of the
religion from the tyranny and oppression of their enemies. A form of
oath was adopted, to be taken by the nobility, officers, and others
of the prince’s army, regulations were issued for the maintenance
of discipline in the army, for the prevention of desertion, private
plundering, and avoidance of excess of baggage, camp-followers,
disorders, and quarrels.[1279]

The government at once took up the gage of battle and prepared to
push the war. On September 25, 1568, an edict proscribed the Reformed
faith, exiled the pastors thereof, and excluded Protestants from
public offices and from the universities.[1280] As far back as July
the government had begun negotiations with the Pope to secure license
to alienate from the lands of the church 200,000 crowns per annum.
This had failed when first petitioned,[1281] but the cardinal of
Lorraine by the end of August had managed to raise 1,200,000 francs,
although half of it had to go to pay old debts to the Parisians.[1282]
The holy father, having at last been persuaded of the good of the
cause, consented to the alienation of 100,000 crowns annual rent
of the clerical lands, upon condition that the money be strictly
employed for the compulsion of those who denied the authority of Rome
and the revocation of the Edict of Toleration.[1283] The debate upon
the measure pertaining to the church lands brought about a clash in
the King’s Privy Council between the cardinal of Lorraine and the
chancellor L’Hôpital, on September 19. The latter protested against
the withdrawal of the Edict of Toleration, on the ground that it would
induce the war at once and lead to the overrunning of the country
again by the reiters, and refused to affix the royal seal to the
proposed ordinance, without which the papal writing was of no force in
France. The cardinal retaliated by taunting the chancellor with being
a hypocrite and asserted that his wife and daughter were Calvinists.
L’Hôpital retorted by sarcastically alluding to the notorious
administrative practices of the Guises, at which the cardinal became
so angry that he would have seized the venerable chancellor by his
great white beard if the marshal Montmorency had not stepped between
them. In his rage the cardinal, turning to the queen mother, declared
the chancellor’s vicious policy of toleration was at the bottom of
the evils of France and that if he were in the hands of the Parlement
of Paris his head would not tarry on his shoulders twenty-four hours
longer.[1284] The issue of this episode was not long in forthcoming.
On September 28 Michel de l’Hôpital was dismissed from office[1285]
and the seal given to the archbishop of Sens, Biragues, a pupil of the
Guises and a henchman of Philip of Spain.[1286] It was he who rescinded
the Edict of January and the other two edicts of pacification and
exiled all Huguenot preachers from France within twenty days, forbade
all exercise of the Reformed religion on pain of death, and dismissed
from office and the universities all those who were Protestants.

The new civil war was represented as a war of religion; indeed as
a crusade, the King going to evensong at La Sainte-Chapelle, on
Michaelmas Eve, where the heart of St. Louis was interred, and on the
morrow marching in procession with the relics of St. Denis, as did the
former kings of France before they took the road of the cross. The
duke of Anjou, the King’s brother, was appointed lieutenant-general
of the realm on September 1, and proclamation made to the companies
of gendarmerie and the bands of archers, to assemble at Orleans, now
become the Catholic headquarters.[1287]

Charles IX, in October, went in person to Orleans, in order by his
presence, to enlarge the enlistments, and also to overcome the
suspicion that the whole movement was made at the instigation of
the Guises. The government of Paris was left to the King’s youngest
brother, the duke of Alençon, assisted by the duke of Montmorency. In
the meantime the prince of Condé had remained in the vicinity of La
Rochelle during September, while his army was gathering.[1288] When the
army was massed, he moved up the Loire with his forces.

The emulation that had characterized the Huguenot nobility in the last
war now served Condé well. The provinces were alive with activity
during this autumn. The young prince of Navarre, the future Henry
IV, was to win eminence in the coming struggle, and at this time
was at Bergerac where forces were assembled to assist Condé.[1289]
The Catholic and governmental forces were no less alert. The King’s
captains were employed in all parts of the realm to levy men. Montluc,
discovering a plot in Bordeaux to deliver the town to those of the
Reformed religion, executed the greater part of those so accused. At
Toulouse, Auxerre, and Lyons all men were constrained to go to mass. In
Provence and Languedoc the peasantry even rose against the Protestants.
To crown all both sides levied reiters in Germany.[1290]

[Illustration: AUTUMN CAMPAIGN OF 1568

_Methuen & Co._
]

The lower course of the Loire was the fighting-line, for command of
which both sides aimed.[1291] The tactics of Anjou were to avoid
an engagement, if possible, and to prevent Condé’s forces from
crossing, which he succeeded in doing through a stratagem.[1292] The
passage of the Loire being stopped, and the river towns being all
garrisoned, especially Saumur, the prince of Condé, after taking the
castle of Champigny which belonged to the duke de Montpensier, fell
back on Loudun. The country was so wet that neither horse nor foot
could do much. The prince excelled in cavalry, the Catholic army in
infantry.[1293] In the provinces the Catholic preponderance was marked.
The duke of Aumale in Champagne had 18 companies of men-at-arms and 25
ensigns of footmen, awaiting the coming of the reiters; Marshal Cossé
was in Picardy with 15 companies of men-at-arms and 2,000 footmen. The
reason for the presence of so many troops so far from the actual seat
of the war is to be found in the fact that the movements of the prince
of Orange, who had entered France in December,[1294] gave great anxiety
to the government. The prince was now on the borders of Picardy, but
his horsemen rode as far as Compiègne and Rheims, to the amazement
of the court and the consternation of the Guises, who dispatched the
cardinal of Guise to Madrid for the help of Philip II.[1295] If the two
princes could have effected a junction in the meantime, Paris would
have been between hammer and anvil. As it was, the danger was so great
that the King hastily began to raise an additional army in December,
calling out ban and arrière-ban, and in order that the capital might
be able to withstand a siege, if worst came to worst, drew all the
provisions of the country roundabout Paris for a space of ten miles
into the city.

The position of the various armies was an interesting one. In east
France the reiters of the duke of Deuxponts were endeavoring to join
Orange who delayed his movement to await their coming,[1296] while
Alva dogged his steps.[1297] In the west Condé was vainly striving to
cross the Loire in order to join Orange and the Protestant reiters,
while the duke of Anjou was straining every nerve to keep him back.
In the midst of all, Paris lay calm but tense[1298]—the undisturbed
center of the cyclone of war. Both armies suffered from the terrible
weather of December. The soldiers of each side were dying of famine and
privation.[1299]

The hope long deferred that Condé had cherished of Orange joining him
made him heartsick at last; the latter could not come, for Alva, the
duke of Aumale, and the Catholic reiters under a German colonel named
Schomberg—a name destined to become illustrious—were too closely
watching his movements.[1300] Even had these impediments been removed,
the Seine and the Loire would have had to be crossed—an impossible
feat.

The winter of 1568-69 was occupied with Huguenot and Catholic
negotiations for foreign support and with preparations for a renewal
of the war when the spring came. Meanwhile the delay of France to pay
its debts in Switzerland had gradually provoked a change of public
sentiment in the forest cantons, which pushed them a few years later
into espousal of Spain. The loss of its ascendency in Switzerland was
a particularly hard blow to France. For the policy of Spain had been
to rouse a religious war in the Alpine lands, so that her intervention
would find easy entrance. The five cantons of the center were the
fulcrum of Spain’s diplomatic efforts. Day by day the tension became
greater, the five cantons inclining more to Spain, their neighbors
leaning to France, while between the two groups Bern and Zurich
continued neutral, refusing to aid the prince of Condé with either men
or money.[1301]

Military events were insignificant. Anjou remained with his army in
Limousin, and the prince of Condé in Périgord. On December 23, 1568,
there was a skirmish near Loudun. In January Condé marched to the
relief of Sancerre. The town was of very strong situation and Brocbart,
the Huguenot commandant, filled a great number of wine-vats with sand
and earth and used them for gabions, and so managed to hold out against
five assaults,[1302] although the place was so invested by the Catholic
army that the prince could do nothing to relieve it. Failing this,
he marched upon Saumur in the vain hope of forcing a crossing of the
Loire at some point, on the way putting the garrison of 150 men in the
abbey of St. Florens at Pont-de-Cé to the sword. Both armies suffered
terribly from the weather and the condition of the country.[1303]

In the King’s council the Politique party still labored for peace, and
in the interim made an unsuccessful effort to restore the Edict of
Toleration.[1304] The cessation of hostilities, however, was complete
enough to alarm the Pope, who feared another truce would be made and
used exhortation and promise in order to prevent any compromise with
heresy.[1305]

The Dutch and English were attentive observers of the movement in
France, the former especially, for they felt that they and the French
Protestants were engaged in a common cause. From England came numbers
of English gentlemen to La Rochelle, in order to follow Condé in the
war, and the Channel and the Bay of Biscay were thronged with English
and Dutch privateers.[1306] Elizabeth, as the saying went, wanted “to
throw the stone and hide the arm.” Although the English ambassador,
Sir Henry Norris, protested the innocence of his government and the
queen wrote with her own hand that she would not interfere in France,
Englishmen were landed at La Rochelle and in Brittany and English
vessels brought over gunpowder, shoes, and arms.[1307]

While Anjou held the line of the Loire, the French government
established its military base at Château-Thierry on the Marne
in order to prevent communication between the Protestant German
princes, especially the elector palatine and the duke of Deuxponts;
or between the Dutch and its own revolted subjects. To this end it
was planned that the duke of Aumale, with a force of reiters sent by
the margrave of Baden and the count of Westelburg, and some troops
proferred by Count Mansfeldt[1308] should be sent against the prince
of Orange, while the duke of Anjou was to go against the prince of
Condé.[1309] But William of Orange effected a junction with the duke
of Deuxponts[1310] in spite of D’Aumale’s effort to prevent him.[1311]

The attitude of the Lutheran princes had now become more definite in
favor of the Huguenots.[1312]

The international Protestant plan was to drive its blows in on either
side of Lorraine and thus sever the chain through central Europe by
which Philip II held his dominions together, and to separate the two
houses of Hapsburg.[1313] The conduct of the Emperor furthered this
project, for when Charles IX sent La Forrest to the Emperor to protest
against the action of the Lutheran princes of Germany and to continue
the talk of his marriage with the Emperor’s daughter, Ferdinand,
while expressing his regret at the troubled state of France, received
the marriage proposition coldly and complained of the damage done
by the French army under the duke of Aumale within the limits of the
empire,[1314] and recommended that Charles try peaceful methods instead
of force for the pacification of his kingdom.[1315] Parallel with
the project to co-operate with the prince of Orange and the duke of
Deuxponts, Coligny planned a revival of Huguenot activity in the south
of France so that this diversion would weaken resistance to the other.
The aim was, with the aid of the “viscounts” to break a way across the
upper Loire, and so open the road to German assistance.[1316]

The combined array against D’Aumale was too great for him to make
head.[1317] Nor was the adverse double military situation the sole
anxiety of the French government. Montmorency and the duke of Bouillon
were so disaffected that there was even expectation of their openly
joining the Huguenots. The cost of the two armies amounted to 900,000
livres a month, besides the gendarmerie and artillery, which was about
two million each quarter.[1318] There was owing to the gendarmerie
12,000,000 of livres for six quarters; to the 6,000 Swiss with the
duke of Anjou 300,000 livres; to those with the duke of Aumale 100,000
livres besides what was owing to the French infantry. Both of the
King’s commanders were so short of funds that they were forced to seize
church-plate and even reliquaries.[1319]

In these extremities Charles IX viewed the renewal of war on the
opening of spring with alarm and began to think of making peace for a
term, with no intention of keeping it, but merely in order to avoid
a catastrophe and with the hope that some of the Huguenots might be
disarmed in the interim. But suddenly the cloud was lifted. The
royal army under the nominal command of the duke of Anjou, but really
commanded by the veteran Tavannes, who had orders to give battle at
all cost before the duke of Deuxponts could arrive, won the decisive
victory of Jarnac on March 13, 1569. It was a fierce and bloody battle.

The prince of Condé, after having been dangerously wounded and taken
prisoner, suffered a foul death at the hands of some unknown assassin
in the royal army, who shot him with a pistol-ball.[1320] In the
engagement the Scotchman, Stuart, who had killed the constable at St.
Denis, was taken and brought to the duke, who said to him: “So here
you are, you traitor, you who have frequently boasted that you wished
to kill the queen, my mother. Now you shall receive your deserts.” At
that moment the marquis de Villars, the old constable’s brother-in-law,
appeared, and with his own hands executed vengeance.[1321]

[Illustration: _Croquis_

THÉATRE DE LA GUERRE

pour la

_Période du 24 Février au 13 Mars 1569._

Reproduced by permission of the author from M. S. C. Gigon’s _La
bataille de Jarnac et la campagne de 1569 en Angoumais_ #/ ]

[Illustration: BATAILLE DE JARNAC

par

S C GIGON

_Methuen & Co._
]

In Paris when news of the battle of Jarnac was brought a grand
procession was authorized by the clergy and the Parlement. All the
stores and shops were closed as though it were a holiday. The clergy,
bearing the relics of the saints, marched first to the convent of the
Cordeliers, and then to that of the Jacobins, where a fiery sermon was
preached by a Jacobin of Auxerre named Mammerot. After the sermon the
_Te Deum_ was celebrated, and then the militia of the city assembled
under the command of the four captains, and a grand review was held in
the streets. The celebration ended by a great bonfire in front of the
Hotel-de-Ville, and the firing of cannon.[1322]

The Pope took the victory of Jarnac as a direct answer to prayer.[1323]

CHAPTER XIV

THE THIRD CIVIL WAR (_Continued_). THE PEACE OF ST. GERMAIN

By the death of Condé the Admiral Coligny became the actual leader of
the Protestant cause in France,[1324] the more so when his brother
d’Andelot died on May 7,[1325] although the young prince of Condé and
his cousin, Henry of Navarre, were theoretically so regarded.[1326]
In the nature of things, the leadership of two boys—the former was
seventeen, the other sixteen years of age—could only be a nominal one.

After the first shock of dismay at the prince’s death had passed,
the Huguenots were not dispirited. It is true that numbers of the
Protestant gentry returned home.[1327] But the Huguenot position
was strong in upper and lower Poitou, for the line of the Charente
from Angoulême to Saintes was theirs, besides St. Jean-d’Angély, La
Rochelle, and the islands of Marins and Oléron.[1328] The admiral
rallied his forces at Tonnay-Charente,[1329] which he could do with
impunity since the duke of Anjou raised the siege of Angoulême on April
12.[1330]

The hope of the court was to prolong the war, since the King controlled
most of the towns and the river passages, “while the religion, their
conquered country excepted, had but the fields,”[1331] until the
resources of the Huguenots would at last become exhausted—money,
men, munitions. But the queen of England loaned 20,000 livres to the
Protestants, the jewels of Condé and Jeanne d’Albret being taken
as security.[1332] Jeanne d’Albret in person directed the foreign
negotiations of the Huguenots.[1333] The anxiety of the Huguenots
was greatest over the effect which Condé’s death might have upon the
foreign assistance which they were looking for, and letters from
the prince of Navarre and the other leaders of the Huguenot army in
Saintonge earnestly urged the reiters’ advance to the Loire.[1334]
Coligny’s hope was by making a detour by way of Cognac and Chalais to
reach the Loire and effect a junction with Deuxponts. To his great
relief, the prince of Orange and the duke of Deuxponts wrote assuring
the admiral of their continued adherence.[1335] As good as his word,
Deuxponts, who was at Pont-à-Mousson on January 11, 1569, entered
France near Langres, having passed by Joinville, the seat of the Guises
in Lorraine, where the old duchess of Guise was then staying,[1336] and
advanced upon Dijon where he arrived on April 26.[1337]

The real center of the government’s activity was Metz, which became the
basis of operations against Deuxponts and Orange.[1338] Active efforts
were made to repair the duke of Anjou’s losses and to strengthen his
position.[1339] The offer of Spanish support which Alva had made was
now formally accepted, for after the mission of Castelnau to the
margrave of Baden to get relief, he was sent into Flanders to solicit
the assistance of Alva, since it now had become the common interest
of both crowns to crush the Protestants.[1340] The French commanders,
the dukes of Nemours and Aumale, had received orders to prevent the
approach of Deuxponts at all cost,[1341] but Aumale, partially on
account of carelessness, partly because of misinformation, failed in
his task, and by clever management Deuxponts at last succeeded in
crossing the Saône above Bar into Auxerre and Berry, scaled the walls
of Nevers, thereby shortening the road between him and the Huguenot
army, and finally captured La Charité upon the Loire on May 20, after
ten days of siege, and thus controlled the link which united Huguenots
and reiters.[1342]

[Illustration: CAMPAIGN OF THE SUMMER & AUTUMN OF 1569

_Methuen & Co._
]

If the Huguenots had been dispirited after Jarnac, they had reason
to feel elated after the capture of La Charité. Although the duke of
Anjou kept the field in Saintonge, Angoumois, and Limousin, the army
was so mutinous for want of pay, so depleted by desertion and disease,
that it was far from formidable.[1343] Paris was in consternation
after the capture of La Charité and anticipated seeing the high hats
and great feathers of the reiters before long.[1344] The _échevins_ of
the city were ordered with all speed to make sale of the property of
the Protestants to provide means for a new army, which had to be made
up of peasant levies, “all their soldiers and men of the greatest
value being already abroad.”[1345] The queen mother, having received
letters complaining of lack of funds and mutiny in his army, bitterly
reproached Aumale for negligence and cowardice in letting the duke
of Deuxponts capture La Charité, and hastily started for the army in
Saintonge, in company with the cardinals of Lorraine and Bourbon, where
she went right among the soldiers with words of encouragement.[1346]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF LA ROCHE-L’ABEILLE, JUNE 25, 1569

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

But mutiny of the army, and the capture of La Charité, with the
prospective union of Coligny and the duke of Deuxponts, was not all
that worried the queen and the cardinal. Casimir of the County Palatine
was reported to be coming with 6,000 horse and as many foot; moreover,
the Emperor was hostile.[1347] The extremity of the government was so
great that compromise was necessary, and Catherine had in mind to patch
matters up by offering her daughter Marguerite of France in marriage
to the young Henry of Navarre—a plan whose consummation three years
later precipitated the massacre of St. Bartholomew.[1348] Marshal
Damville, the second son of the old constable, whose Politique leanings
already had made him conspicuous, was significantly appointed the
King’s lieutenant in Languedoc. Toleration was in the air once more.

But all of a sudden the Catholic cause revived for an instant.[1349]
Coligny fell ill, and the progress of the Huguenot army was thereby
impeded. Worse still, the duke of Deuxponts was stricken with a burning
fever, so that he died the very day of his arrival in La Marche.[1350]
Strozzi with some Italian forces attacked Coligny at La Roche-L’Abeille
on June 25, when the rain was pouring in such torrents that the
matchlocks of the Italians were useless, so that the soldiers on both
sides clubbed their weapons—in the expressive words of D’Aubigné,
“rompre croce sur cap”—that is, broke the crosses of their arquebuses
over the heads of their antagonists.[1351] In the conflict Strozzi was
taken prisoner. From this time forth the army of the King was simply
a disorderly mass of men. Famine and fever so reduced it that the
duke of Anjou was not able to defend himself, let alone invading the
enemy’s territory. To increase his forces, he put arms in the hands of
the peasantry of Limousin, with the result that a local _jacquerie_
prevailed in the province. Lansac was repulsed in assaulting La
Charité; Châtellerault (July 12) and Lusignan (July 20) were taken by
the Huguenots.[1352] The Catholics failed before Niort, to whose relief
the brilliant La Noue came after his own seizure of Luçon.[1353]

Under these circumstances the government was compelled to content
itself with maintaining the line of the Loire save at La Charité, while
it sought foreign succor.[1354] But the Swiss could not be expected
until the middle of September, and Coligny sought to profit by the
situation to take Saumur and thus secure a crossing on the lower
Loire also, and Poitiers, for which purpose he divided the Protestant
army,[1355] to the intense alarm of the government, which tried,
through the queen mother, to delay action by drawing the admiral into
an empty parley. This is the moment when the marriage of Henry of
Navarre with Marguerite of France was first broached. But the admiral
and Jeanne d’Albret were not to be deceived, and the siege of Poitiers
was resolutely continued. (It lasted from July 25 to September 7,
1569.) The Catholic party fully appreciated that the importance of the
war depended upon the success or failure of the Huguenots before this
city, into which the young duke of Guise, then but nineteen years of
age, had thrown himself on July 12 with all the ardor of his father
before Metz. If Coligny took the town, some notable prisoners of war
would have fallen into his hands, the dukes of Guise and Mayenne and
the abbess of La Trinité, a sister of the cardinal of Bourbon[1356]
and the ill-starred prince of Condé, the ransom of whom would have
abundantly provided for the reiters in the service of the Protestants.

[Illustration: SIEGE OF POITIERS, 1569

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

Poitiers was one of the most mediaeval towns in France. The remains of
its towers and fortifications, its narrow bridges, the ruined palace
of the ancient dukes of Aquitaine, everything recalled the life of a
vanished past.[1357] The admiral’s guns soon made two breaches in the
wall, but the fire from the castle and platform drove his men back and
the breaches were repaired. The town, however, was too large in circuit
for Guise to defend the whole,[1358] since many vineyards and fields
were within its walls, in consequence of which the French had made a
line of double trenches within the town. On August 19 the Huguenots
made a furious assault, broke through the wall, and drove the Guisard
forces back of the inside trenches. The enemy was “so straitly pent”
that for sixteen days the soldiers had to live upon horse-flesh. The
most remarkable incident of the siege was the driving-out of a great
number of people, old men and women and children, who were unable to
fight and could not be fed on account of the lack of provisions. So
reluctant were they to go that they had to be whipped through the
gates. Fortunately the duke of Guise took pity upon them at last,
although in the city bread was so scarce that the food of one had to
suffice for ten. All the horses and asses in the town were slain,
the gentry out of honor to their position sating their hunger on the
former. Of wheat, barley, and other grain there was none, nor was
there a green thing left growing in the city. Even rats and mice were
consumed.[1359]

[Illustration: POITIERS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY]

The strength of Coligny (he had about 10,000 footmen and 8,000 to 9,000
horse) made it impossible for Anjou to dislodge him by direct attack.
His own strength, as appeared by a general muster on September 3,
consisted of 1,500 French gendarmes, 700 Italian horse, 1,000 Walloons,
and 4,000 reiters, besides La Vallette’s regiment of 400 horse—it was
much reduced during the siege—and the duke of Longueville’s and some
other companies. Of footmen he had 6,000 French, 4,000 Swiss, 2,500
Italians, and 2,000 Walloons. Although this army in actual numbers
excelled that of Coligny, in reality it was considerably inferior.
The troops were many of them without officers, the 6,000 French were
drafted peasantry unused to the use of arms; all of them were suffering
from hunger and many from fever. The duke of Anjou, therefore, with
the approval of his mother, determined to try to draw off Coligny from
before Poitiers by a feigned attack upon Châtellerault.[1360] For this
purpose he crossed the river Creuse on September 4 and planted his
artillery before the town. The honor of the first assault was given
to the Italians, which offended the French, who refused to support
them.[1361] Nevertheless a breach 40 feet wide was made in the wall, so
that the admiral, judging the place to be in great danger, sent 7,000
horse and 8,000 foot to the city’s relief, September 7. It was fatal
impatience on Coligny’s part, for the action relieved Poitiers from the
danger of being taken.

There was now no other recourse for the Huguenots except to give
battle. But Coligny was unwilling to do this at once, desiring to wait
until the devastation of the country round about still further reduced
Anjou’s forces. In the interval he withdrew across the Vienne. But the
mercenaries in both armies clamored for battle, for there was great
want of money on both sides, the King’s Swiss being unpaid for three
months, the reiters five, the admiral’s also being behindhand for three
months’ wages.[1362]

On September 30, at Moncontour, the two armies clashed in a preliminary
engagement. But three days later on Monday, October 3, 1569, the real
battle was joined. It must have been an impressive and thrilling sight
before the conflict began. In the Huguenot army the preachers moved
about encouraging the men, who sang the solemn psalms of the Calvinist
worship with fervor. Across the plain, the Swiss and Germans in the
royal host, after the German fashion, knelt and kissed the ground.[1363]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF MONCONTOUR, OCTOBER 3, 1569 (Tortorel and
Perissin)]

At the first shock it seemed as if the Huguenots would win, and they
cried in exaltation, “Victory, victory! The Evangel has won the victory
and has vanquished the mass of the popes. Down with the Papists!”[1364]
The admiral began the fray by charging Anjou’s center with 2,000
reiters and such French gendarmes as he had, but was himself attacked
on the flank by the duke of Aumale and Villars so furiously that he was
compelled to fall back. The Protestant infantry which had followed
the horse into the battle, was thus left unsustained, and when the
duke of Guise’s light horse charged, the lansquenets broke in flight,
abandoning the artillery. In the midst of the melée various companies
of reiters, seeing the battle lost, ran to their baggage, seized their
most valuable effects, and decamped in haste. Mansfeldt’s reiters
alone fought well; the others were of slight service. Matters were
little better with the hirelings of the King. Many of the leaders on
both sides were injured in the course of the battle; Guise in the hand
and foot, Bassompierre, a German captain destined to become a very
prominent man at court, in both arms; Anjou was borne to the ground
off his horse but escaped injury; Coligny was hurt in the face by a
pistol-ball. Among the Catholic dead was Montbrun, captain of the Swiss
guard. He was haughty and cruel, and a despot with his men, but it is
to his credit that he sought to prevent the soldiery from abusing the
peasantry.[1365] The most of the Huguenot dead were the German reiters
and lansquenets, many of whom were killed by their Catholic compatriots
or the Swiss, who distinguished themselves by their ferocity.[1366] The
fight endured for four hours, from 11 until 3 o’clock, at the end of
which time the forces of Anjou overthrew the admiral, routed both his
horse and foot, and captured his artillery and baggage. But for the
good fortune that some of Coligny’s horse intercepted a treasurer of
the King coming out of Limousin with 30,000 francs, the distribution of
which among his reiters quieted their murmurs, Coligny might have been
all but deserted by the German horse.[1367] As it was, he was able to
fall back on Niort and thence make his retreat to the far south.[1368]

Fortunately for the Huguenots, the enemy did not attempt pursuit of
them, but instead undertook the siege of St. Jean-d’Angély, which lay
directly in the way southward, to the disgust of the liberal marshal
Cossé and even Tavannes, who urged that the King, in the light of this
great victory, might now make peace with good grace.[1369] Others,
considering the strength of St. Jean-d’Angély thought that the war
would be protracted into the depth of winter and that the capture of
St. Jean-d’Angély would be of small importance while La Rochelle still
remained. Instead of accepting the advice, the government hardened
its policy. A reward of 50,000 crowns was offered for the head of
Coligny,[1370] 600,000 francs were distributed among the soldiers and
300,000 sent into Germany to make a new levy against the spring.[1371]

On October 16 Charles IX arrived before St. Jean-d’Angély and beheld
the greatest part of the royal troops ranged in order of battle.
Anticipating a desperate resistance upon the part of those in the
city, the King’s infantry requested to be equipped with the gendarmes’
cuirasses. One incident will illustrate the desperate valor of the
besieged. On the night of October 21 they made a sortie, entered the
enemy’s trenches, slew twenty men, took two ensigns prisoner, and all
the arms they found in the _corps de garde_, and returned into the
town. The Protestant garrison was not over 1,500 men, but in spite
of the odds against him (he had no artillery except falconets and
muskets, while Anjou had eleven guns, great and small), the Huguenot
commander, Pilles, refused to surrender. Instead, when the governor
of the town urged him to surrender rather than make resistance, the
desperate captain had him hanged and his body cast into the river.
The attack upon St. Jean-d’Angély opened on October 25, but although
the wall was badly battered, no sufficient breach was made for days.
The town resisted every attack until December 2, when it at last
surrendered.[1372]

Yet in spite of the double victory of Moncontour and at St.
Jean-d’Angély, hard experience was proving the wisdom of the course
advised by Tavannes and Cossé. The King was without money to pay the
Swiss and the reiters who threatened to mutiny at any minute. The
country round about the army was so denuded that there was great misery
for want of food and multitudes of the soldiers fell sick.[1373]
Finally, on November 24, in a sitting of the King’s council, Charles
IX was formally petitioned by certain of its members to make peace
overtures to his revolted subjects,[1374] and expressed his willingness
to comply with the request.

The hand of the government was forced by events; the courageous
resistance of St. Jean-d’Angély, Montluc’s action in resigning his
commission, and the growing strength of the Reformed among the southern
“viscounts,” made the crown think eagerly of peace. As an earnest
of this purpose, the King sent the liberal marshal Cossé in company
with De Losses, the new captain of the Scotch Guard, to La Rochelle
to confer with the queen of Navarre and La Rochefoucault. But Jeanne
d’Albret was not minded to use haste, to which the marshal meaningly
rejoined that “there were many of rank in the Protestant army who
would not give her that advice.”[1375] Yet even if she had wanted
to, the queen of Navarre could not have hastened a settlement. For
at this time there was a real division of opinion existing between
the Huguenot nobles and the people of the Huguenot towns like St.
Jean-d’Angély and La Rochelle. The former class were weary of war and
wanted to return to their homes and were in favor of peace and inclined
to make their own terms, even to the extent of ignoring the claims
of their coreligionists of the towns. The latter felt aggrieved at
seeing themselves thus deserted, when they had done so much to maintain
the general cause of the Huguenots, not merely in contributing money
but by making such heroic resistance as that of the people of St.
Jean-d’Angély, and Jeanne D’Albret sympathized with them. She would
not listen to talk of peace, being firmly convinced that it was but
another ruse, like that at Longjumeau, and resolutely declared that
there would be time enough to consider terms of peace when their
forces were more equal; that nothing short of the free exercise of
the religion as granted by former edicts would avail; that even if
all the Huguenot nobles consented to the terms, her own signature and
that of Henry of Navarre would never be affixed to any half-way terms
of pacification.[1376] But at last, after long debate, the queen of
Navarre yielded, and sent the admiral’s future son-in-law, Teligny,
who had conferred with Coligny, to the King to request “a good assured
and inviolable peace,”[1377] probably being in part influenced by the
treatment of St. Jean-d’Angély, whose garrison was suffered to march
out, bag and baggage, with colors flying. The Huguenots demanded
liberty of conscience, the restitution of their goods, estates, and
offices to those of the religion, and the reversal of all sentences
against them, together with guaranties for the observance of the
articles.[1378]

The essential issue, and that which protracted the debate so long was
the demand for _chambres mi-parties_,[1379] and that the crown give
over certain cities into the hands of the Huguenots to be garrisoned
and governed by them alone. On February 3, 1570, the King replied,
promising to grant amnesty for the past, the restoration of their
estates and offices to the Huguenots, the expulsion of the reiters,
with liberty of the religion within private dwellings and in two towns
which he would appoint.[1380] But Jeanne d’Albret, who conducted the
negotiations for the Huguenots, refused to be satisfied. In a long
letter to the queen mother a week later she recapitulated the former
negotiations at great length and complained of the government’s want
of good faith, especially alluding to the cardinal of Lorraine and the
duke of Alva.[1381] As a matter of fact the government was not yet
willing to give in. The cardinal of Lorraine still hoped to hasten
forward a new levy of reiters in Germany when spring should open, and
held out the vain hope of the restoration of the Three Bishoprics if
the Emperor would lend France this assistance and stay the Protestant
levies.[1382] But the Emperor himself had something to say about the
matter and asserted that he would not consider the proposed marriage
of his daughter with the French King until peace was concluded in
France.[1383] Aware of the Emperor’s attitude, the queen of Navarre
resolutely demanded terms of peace in conformity with the demands of
the Huguenots.[1384]

The arguments of peace urged by the marshal Cossé and others who shared
his thought had less influence upon the King and his counselors as the
storm of war drove off toward the south,[1385] to the elation of Pius
V, who overwhelmed Charles IX with protests against pacification.[1386]
South of the Loire the principal interest of the third civil war is
attached to the doings of that famous group of Huguenot warriors known
as the “viscounts,” with whom Coligny had failed to connect before
the battle of Jarnac. A brief account of the earlier achievements of
this group, who sometimes fought together, sometimes separately, and
had three or four thousand footmen and three or four hundred horsemen
in their command,[1387] is necessary at this point. There were ten
of these captains: Bernard Roger de Cominges, vicomte de Bruniquel;
Bertrand de Rabastenis, vicomte de Paulin; Antoine de Rabastenis,
vicomte de Montclaire; the vicomte de Montaigu; the vicomte de Caumont;
the vicomte de Parat; Geraud de Lomagne, vicomte de Sevignac (near
Beaucaire), a brother of Terride, who was a Catholic and implicated
with Montluc in the project to deliver Guyenne to the King of
Spain;[1388] the vicomte d’Arpajon; the vicomte de Rapin; and the
vicomte de Gourdon.[1389] Three of these, and the most conspicuous,
save Rapin, the viscounts of Paulin, Bruniquel, and Arpajon were
natives of the diocese of Albi, a stronghold of heresy from mediaeval
times; the first had seen service in Piedmont in the reign of Henry II,
and the ancestors of all three of them had fought against Ferdinand of
Aragon in 1495.[1390] The viscount of Rapin was a leader of the great
Huguenot rising in Toulouse in 1562, and was made Protestant governor
of Montauban in 1564 by the prince of Condé.[1391] He was so bitterly
hated by the people of Toulouse that he was accused of wanting to
destroy the city utterly and remove the very stones to Montauban. He
had fought in the second civil war, but was betrayed into the hands
of the magistrates of Toulouse and condemned and executed there on
April 13, 1569, in defiance of the King’s orders to the contrary. The
Huguenots took terrible reprisal for this outrage, devastating the
environs of Toulouse for leagues around, even inscribing on the ruins
“Vengeance de Rapin.”[1392]

These four viscounts were the nucleus of the group and began their
career in the first civil war. But save Rapin, none became conspicuous
then. During the second war the others were drawn to the standard.
They operated in Languedoc and Quercy at first, aided by the peasantry
who seem to have turned toward them as natural enemies of the higher
nobles.[1393] In the summer and autumn of 1568 their united hosts
made a mighty raid up the valley of the Rhone from Montauban through
Rouergue and the Cévennes, where part of the troops crossed the Rhone
under the viscount of Rapin and joined the Protestant army of Dauphiné
and Provence under a former lieutenant of Des Adresse. The rest
remained in Languedoc. Later Rapin recrossed the river into Vivarais
with the hope of joining the prince of Condé. But the governor of
Provence, the count of Tende, aided by the viscount of Joyeuse, the
Catholic general in these parts, blocked his passage. In the midst of
this plight relief came to the viscount of Rapin in the person of his
former comrade in arms. But at least Joyeuse had prevented the union of
the viscounts with the prince of Condé.

The people of Vivarais resented the occupation of the country by these
guerrilla chieftains, much as their ancestors two hundred years before
had risen against the Free Companies during the reign of Charles V.
The towns organized an army of their own and distinguished themselves
by routing the viscounts upon one occasion. In January, 1568, the
viscounts succeeded in their early purpose, penetrated the Catholic
army and crossed the Loire at Blois. The relief of Orleans and their
union with the prince of Condé before Chartres hastened the peace of
Longjumeau.[1394]

During the interim between the armistice of Longjumeau and the outbreak
of the third war, the viscounts, in common with most of the Protestant
forces of the south, seem not to have disarmed, but stayed in the
vicinity of Montauban, the Huguenot capital of the far south. When war
was renewed, Joyeuse and Gordes, governor of Dauphiné, unsuccessfully
tried to keep the Huguenots east of the Rhone from joining them in
Languedoc. At Milhaud in Rouergue a great council of war was held at
which practically all the Protestant fighting forces of the south save
Guyenne and Gascony were represented.[1395] In conformity with the
plan there arranged, the viscounts remained in Quercy and Languedoc
while the main army crossed the Dordogne with the purpose of joining
the prince of Condé. But in Périgord it was met and scattered, on
October 25, 1568, by the duke of Montpensier and Marshal Brissac.
The viscounts continued to operate in Languedoc against Joyeuse and
others. The success of their activities, especially the destruction
of Gaillac (September 8, 1568) was what led to the revival of the
league at Toulouse under the cardinal of Armagnac on September 12, in
the cathedral of St. Etienne. The recall of Joyeuse with the Catholic
troops of Languedoc to the north to assist the duke of Anjou, left a
clear field in Provence and Languedoc. The loss of Jarnac, March 13,
1569, where the prince of Condé was killed, may in part be ascribed
to the fact that the viscounts refused to respond to his orders for
them to come to him, so that the united forces of Anjou and Joyeuse
overwhelmed the Huguenots. A similar reverse befell the Protestants on
June 8 following, in the Ariège near Toulouse, where Bellegarde, the
seneschal of Toulouse, routed the viscounts and captured the viscount
of Paulin, who would have suffered the fate of the viscount of Rapin,
had not Charles IX, less for magnanimity’s sake than to rebuke the
parlement of Toulouse for violating the royal orders before, refused to
have him delivered up to it.[1396] The shattered bands of the viscounts
joined Montgomery, a leader of their own kind, who had been detached by
Coligny from his own army, in the same month.

The reason for Montgomery’s appearance in the south is to be found
in the peril threatening Béarn and Navarre at this time. Montluc had
conceived the idea that Béarn might be conquered while its ruler was
absent. The parlement of Toulouse energetically favored the project
and on November 15, 1568, had issued an _arrêt_ placing Béarn under
its jurisdiction.[1397] In the early months of 1569 efforts were made
with some success to corrupt the captains in the Béarnais army.[1398]
When the plan was broached to the duke of Anjou he enthusiastically
approved it. The time was auspicious, for it so happened that the
suggestion coincided with his victory at Jarnac. Exactly a week after
the battle[1399] he detached the seigneur de Terride with instructions
to report to Montluc, for the duke thought Montluc could not be spared
from Guyenne.[1400] This order was a bitter disappointment to Montluc,
who wanted to conquer Béarn himself, and he ever thereafter cherished a
hatred against Marshal Damville[1401] who was away from his government
at the time with the duke of Anjou, believing that Damville’s jealousy
of him was responsible for it. This may very probably have been so,
for, as will be seen later, the enmity between the two was extreme.

Terride’s campaign began well. One by one, in rapid order, the
fortified towns of Béarn collapsed before him—Pontacq, Morlaas,
Orthez, Sauveterre, and Pau—the birthplace of Henry of Navarre, while
the country round about was wasted with fire and sword. The queen of
Navarre’s lieutenant was driven to find refuge in Navarrens, whose
château, reputed to be impregnable, had been built by Henri d’Albret
during his enterprises against Spain. On April 27, 1569, Terride began
the siege of the castle of Navarrens.[1402]

Montgomery, who arrived at Castres on June 21[1403] bearing the double
commission of the two Protestant princes,[1404] in the course of four
weeks found himself in the neighborhood of Toulouse and at the head of
the united forces of the viscounts and some levies made in Albigeois.
Montgomery’s energy amazed Montluc who was soldier enough to give his
enemy credit for really wonderful achievement. He had never been in
the country before and all the forces he had brought with him were
three score and ten horses, and he had no other forces but those of the
viscounts in the beginning. He had to cross the Garonne river, too,
the entire length of which was watched by spies. The belief of the
Catholic captains in Languedoc was that Montgomery intended to organize
the defense of the places the Protestants were possessed of, and this
erroneous opinion seems to have been given currency by the Huguenots
themselves, “who had ever that quality to conceal their designs better
than we,” testifies Montluc. “They are a people that rarely discover
their counsels, and that is the reason why their enterprises seldom
fail of taking effect.”

[Illustration: PLAN OF THE FORTRESS OF NAVARRENS MADE BY JUAN MARTINEZ
DESCURRA, A SPANISH SPY

In Archives nationales, K. 1499, No. 84.]

By rapid marching Montgomery reached Navarrens incredibly soon.
Terride, his soldiers wearied out by a siege which had endured for
three months and a half in midsummer, loaded with spoil, licentious
and mutinous to an extent that shamed even the reiters, abandoned the
siege and fell back on Orthez. But the city was not proof against the
attacks of the viscounts. In broad daylight the walls were carried
_par escalade_. On August 13, Terride, who had taken refuge in the
castle with so much haste that he was without provisions or munitions,
surrendered. He himself was spared by Montgomery for the purpose of
being exchanged for the latter’s brother, but died before the transfer
was made. His captains, almost to a man, were put to death. Some of
these were former officers in the Béarnais army and were legally guilty
of treason, but the real motive of Montgomery was reprisal for the
ravages done by Terride’s army. At the beginning of the war the queen’s
lieutenant, the heroic baron de Larboust, either in the hope of sparing
Béarn, or anticipating what would be meted out again, had proposed to
neutralize Béarn, putting it into the custody of the count de Grammont,
even offering to oppose Montgomery if it were done. Terride refused
and paid the price of his wilfulness and bigotry. Béarn was saved by
Montgomery, in the most brilliant and most honorable campaign of his
checkered career.[1405]

The Catholic failure to conquer Béarn goaded Montluc’s slumbering
hatred of Damville to fury, for he believed the utter collapse of the
Protestant cause would have followed the conquest.[1406] He blamed
Damville for it, asserting that Terride’s overthrow was due to his
slowness. But the marshal had had great difficulty in returning to his
government. The Huguenots were in full possession of Quercy and the
Albigeois, and the region around Toulouse was so much overrun by them
that Damville was unable to reach Toulouse until the end of June.[1407]
It took Montgomery even with the viscounts immediately at hand, nearly
five weeks (June 21-July 27) to prepare for the relief of Navarrens,
though the desperate condition of things there required haste, and with
the entire civil as well as military burden of Languedoc upon him,
a burden that necessarily had accumulated, too, during his absence,
Damville could hardly be expected, with justice, to have got ready
to go against Montgomery before the middle of August, by which time
the siege of Navarrens was over. The truth is, Montluc and Damville
radically disagreed as to the policy to be pursued in the south.
Montluc’s patent covered the territory of Guyenne only. But Montluc,
with a mere soldier’s disregard for forms of law, believed that it
was a soldier’s duty to go where the need was greatest. He made the
proposal that when Damville should have won a town in Languedoc he
would come to attack another in Guyenne. To this the marshal demurred,
asserting that it was his duty to attempt to recover what had been
lost in his government and pointed to his commission. Montluc derided
the plea and accused Damville of being so proud “a grand lord, son to a
constable and a marshal of France,” that he would not work with a poor
gentleman.[1408]

In the late summer (1569) Montgomery victoriously returned from Béarn,
having reached the highest point of his reputation. Within six weeks
he had gathered an army, marched leagues through a strange and hostile
country, crossed the Garonne and raised a siege against equal forces,
and turned the Catholic conquest of Béarn into defeat. It seemed a
dream both to friend and foe. Nobly did his enemy say: “In all the
wars there never was performed a more notable exploit.” If Montgomery
had failed, Coligny would have had no place to retire to after the loss
of Moncontour. For he came from that field of Protestant overthrow
with the relics of an army only, mostly gentry and reiters, for the
infantry was almost all cut to pieces or captured, without baggage,
without money, even the horses needing to be reshod. It was well that
the admiral could throw himself into the arms of Montgomery and the
viscounts who enriched him with the spirit of their success and drew
thousands, literally, to the Huguenot standard by the magic of their
achievements. His following increased so rapidly that by the time
he reached Montpellier he again had between ten and twelve thousand
men.[1409] On January 3, 1570, Coligny and Montgomery united their
forces. The dissension between Montluc[1410] and Damville gave them
and the viscounts almost unrestrained freedom in Upper Gascony and
Languedoc, where they grew enormously rich on the spoils of war, and
carried their depredations to the very walls of Toulouse which was
actually invested from January 22 to February 20, 1570.[1411]

[Illustration:

Voyage of the Princes after the
Battle of Moncontour Oct. 1569 July, 1570
in blue ——

Montgomery’s Itinerary in
Bigorre and Gascony, July-Nov. 1569
in black ——

Union of Coligny and Montgomery in
Dec. 1569 at Port St. Marie.

——}
——} Conjectured route
]

When the news of Terride’s downfall was known to Montluc he made
overtures to Damville in spite of his resentment. A council of war was
held at Auch, but instead of coming himself the marshal sent Joyeuse to
say that he thought it his duty to pass his time in his own government,
considering the charge the country was under to sustain the war. It
is interesting to observe the ancient ideas of provincial separation
and autonomy asserting themselves at this time. In vain Montluc argued
that the real enemy was in Guyenne and that the local hostility of the
Huguenots in Languedoc was a little matter in comparison; that all
Catholics were equally the King’s subjects and that the country was the
King’s.[1412] Joyeuse answered that the estates of Languedoc would not
pay for Montluc’s army unless he employed their money in recovering
the places in their province. The decision abandoned Guyenne, leaving
it alone and single handed, for the King’s forces were engaged in the
protracted siege of St. Jean-d’Angély and could not come to its relief.
“J’ay tousjours ouy dire que plus près est la chemise que la robbe,”
said Montluc satirically.[1413]

The old man was on the point of discharging his army and retiring
to Libourne or Agen, but the duty of a soldier forbade him. If he
now abandoned the open country in so critical a condition, it would
ever have been a reproach to him. He thought better of himself and
attacked Mont-de-Marsan instead, where he placated his outraged
feelings by refusing the petition of the garrison to capitulate and
secretly gave orders for the massacre of the entire number save
the captain, Favas.[1414] This feat of arms insured the future of
Gascony and the Landes, for the city served as a granary for all the
surrounding country from whence, however, to the detriment of France,
much grain was exported to Spain.[1415] After this exploit, feeling
the impossibility of maintaining his forces in the field, Montluc
disbanded his army, sending his son to Lectoure and himself retiring to
Agen. It goaded him to the quick that the crown approved throughout of
Damville’s conduct and either ignored his own complaints, or criticized
him for what he had done. “I was born under a planet to be ever subject
to calumny,” he growled. “Age deprives a man of his heat: for in my
younger days the greatest prince upon earth could not have made me
swallow such a pill.”

It may have been that Damville had friends at court and Montluc none;
it may have been that the marshal’s pride of long descent made him
indifferent or even contemptuous of Montluc in some degree. But if we
look closely at things it is evident that the spirit of provincial
separation was the fundamental source of the difficulty between them.
This spirit penetrated to the very bottom. Both Montluc and Damville
were making war with men levied from the country in which they
were—with militia instead of regular troops. The consequence of this
was that every man in the host had an eye to the welfare of his family
or his friends instead of to the King’s business; moreover, many had
relatives or friends with the enemy, which made them fight reluctantly;
finally, they were ill-paid and had to subsist on plunder, which
debauched discipline. The true remedy would have been for Charles IX to
have raised the useless siege of St. Jean-d’Angély and to have come in
person into the southland, where the authority of the King might have
overcome the local forces of separation; and where the regulars would
have plied war as a trade, as the circumstances demanded.

The Catholics of the south had an example before their eyes in the
reiters with the admiral, of the efficiency of regular troops over
local forces. Coligny owed his future to them and Montgomery. The
way the reiters made war excited the admiration of trained soldiers
like Montluc. They so barricaded the villages in which they quartered
themselves that nothing was to be got by assault and in the open
country they were always mounted at the least alarm. It was very hard
to surprise them. They were careful of their horses and arms and so
terrible in action “that a man could see nothing but fire and steel.”
The very grooms fought.[1416]

The reverses experienced at Poitiers, Moncontour, and St. Jean-d’Angély
had not been fatal to the Protestants. In the middle of December
Coligny wrote to the captain of La Charité that he felt ready to resume
the offensive in the spring, having in La Rochelle, Cognac, Angoulême,
Montauban, Castres, La Charité, and Montpellier a chain of impregnable
fortresses extending from the seaboard clear to the heart of France,
and controlling the Loire.[1417] A survey of the map will show the
strength of the Huguenots in this part of France. All of Provence and
Lower Languedoc was in full control of the Protestants, Montauban,
Albi, and Castres, constituting a line of defense on the west. In Upper
Languedoc they were not so strong and the condition of the Catholics
was less precarious, since Toulouse, Auch, Agen, and Cahors, formed a
quadrilateral in the very center. The Huguenots controlled many of the
lesser towns, so that Montluc complained that time and again he had to
pass through their hands “and for the least affair trot up and down
with great trouble from city to city. Would to God that, as they do in
Spain, we had made our constant abode in the good towns; we had then
both more riches and more authority.”[1418]

Guyenne was safely Catholic if it could continue to hold its own; for
this important fact Montluc richly deserves credit.[1419] But Guyenne,
Gascony, and Upper Languedoc were isolated from the Catholic north by
a broad Protestant strip running southeastward from La Rochelle to
Montpellier through Saintes, Cognac, Angoulême, Chalais, Bergerac,
Montauban, Albi, Castres, Béziers, and Montpellier, which united
Saintonge on the seaboard with Provence and Dauphiné. But, on the
other hand, Béarn was separated from the main trunk of Calvinism and
was not yet safe, in spite of Montgomery’s success, unless it were
bound to the main trunk. The Huguenot leaders realized this, and one
of Coligny’s adroitest strokes, after Moncontour, was the seizure of
Port-Ste. Marie, below Agen on the Garonne, with the aid of the German
reiters.[1420] The capture of this place (November 29, 1569) insured
the passage of the Garonne to the Huguenots[1421] and accomplished
for those of the far south what the possession of La Charité insured
to those of central France, for it bridged the Garonne. Later, when
Bernard d’Astarac, baron de Martamot, early in the following January
(1570) recovered Tarbes[1422] on the Adour, the Huguenots had a chain
of fortresses running straight north from Béarn through Condom and
Nérac to Bergerac and Angoulême, and Catholic Gascony and Guyenne were
cut in twain.

Montluc, having fortified Agen, the capture of which would have been
another disaster to the Catholics, then set to work to contrive how
to break the bridge of boats which Coligny had constructed. A mason
who had once built a floating mill for the marquis de Villars above
Port-Ste. Marie came to him and suggested loading the mill with stone,
cutting it loose, and letting it float down stream with the hope of
breaking the bridge. The Garonne at this time was swollen with winter
rains. The leaders were skeptical of the scheme, as the bridge was
known to be protected by heavy cables above stream. But the captain
Thodeas, an engineer with Montluc, supported the mason, after secretly
surveying the structure. The novel battering-ram accomplished the
work intended. Shortly before midnight the mill was loosed from its
moorings, one of the soldiers being drowned in unchaining it. Coligny’s
artillery, when it loomed through the darkness, made a desperate
attempt to sink it by fire from the batteries at either end of the
bridge, but in vain. The mill struck the bridge with such a shock that
cables, chains, and boats all went to pieces with a crash. Two of the
boats went down as far as St. Macaire and some, it was said, were
picked up as far down as Bordeaux.[1423]

The destruction of the bridge was a heavy blow to the Protestants for
it cut their forces into two parts. Besides Montgomery, very many of
the reiters were caught on that side of the river toward Gascony. But
Coligny’s enterprise robbed adversity of its sting. He improvised a
bridge of two boats, upon which five or six horses could be carried
at once, the boats being hauled by cable, after the Italian manner.
It required an hour and a half to go and return, yet at last, with
great pains and difficulty the whole company of reiters was got across
stream. Montluc had proposed to Candale and La Valette that an attack
be made upon Montgomery who was quartered at Condom, south of Nérac.
But they were so slow in responding that Montgomery, too, was able to
pass over, first his horse and then his foot, one after the other, it
requiring five or six days for all his forces to make the transit.[1424]

But the admiral and Montgomery followed up this clever deed by a
blunder so bad that the Reformed suffered for it for years afterward,
and were saved from losing Béarn, perhaps, as they had almost lost it
before, by the intervention of the Peace of St. Germain. Coligny’s
original plan was to pass the rest of the winter and until harvest
in Gascony and Guyenne, with Port Ste. Marie as his base and to have
heavy artillery brought from the fortresses of Béarn with which to take
all the towns upon the Garonne as far as Bordeaux. The bridge assured
them control of two of the richest provinces of France, for they were
absolute masters of the field. By this means Bordeaux would have been
at their mercy, for the sea power of the Huguenots at Blaye[1425] was
sufficient to close the city upon the sea side. It could not have held
out for more than three months, for already corn was selling there at
ten livres per sack. Bordeaux itself was rich and strong but situated
in a barren country, so that, deprived of the Garonne and Dordogne, it
could presently be reduced to famine. As for the Protestant army it
would have fared well. The lesser towns like Libourne and Lectoure must
inevitably have succumbed with their stores, and the viscounts were in
full possession of Comenge and Loumaigne, the most fertile counties
of all Guyenne. There were numerous stores of grain here, for it was
a practice of the dealers and even gentlemen, to accumulate three or
four years’ store in anticipation of a dear year. Had the Huguenots
once got Bordeaux in their clutches, they might have boasted that they
had the best and strongest angle of the kingdom, both by land and
sea, commanding five navigable rivers. The bridges over the Charente
at Saintes and Cognac, being in their hands, no one could pass from
Saintonge to Bordeaux where La Noue lay, “as valiant a man as any that
ever was in France.” The river system of the southwest—the Charente,
Ile, Dordogne, Lot, and Garonne—could have been made to bind the whole
region into a compact whole if this plan had been carried out, and from
behind these natural barriers the Protestants might have defied all the
King’s armies.

Yet although Coligny’s army tasted of Bordeaux wine and his reiters
watered their horses in the Garonne, he did not go on. He failed to
see that the most vital need of the Huguenots was to gain complete
mastery of the sea. This is what La Noue perceived and Coligny did
not. After the loss of Rouen they had but one important port town at
their command, La Rochelle, which the blunders of the government in
the second civil war had permitted the Protestants to make their own,
on which depended Brouage, reputed the fairest and most commodious
haven in all the kingdom, and the chief staple for salt in all the
southwest.[1426]

The sequel to such a course, it is true, must probably have been the
erection of the southwest of France into an independent state. Such a
result, looking at the France of today, is repugnant to our feelings.
But we must look at things as they were then and judge accordingly
and without prejudice. In the first place, it is to be remembered
that in Béarn there was already the nucleus of such a state to build
upon; and secondly that Guyenne and Gascony for centuries had been
possessions of another sovereignty, and that their attachment to
France was barely over a century old. In the sixteenth century it was
impossible to divorce religion from politics and the only solution
was the separation of those which disagreed on matters of religion,
as the division between the Protestant Dutch and the Catholic Flemish
provinces in 1578-79 proves. The Peace of Augsburg had laid down the
principle _cujus regio, ejus religio_, and no other policy could have
prevailed in Germany at that time. But France was trying to make a
monarchy, institutionally and necessarily Catholic, adapt itself to two
religions, which could not be done as long as politics and religion,
church and state, were united. Even after twenty-eight years more of
struggle, neither the trial and experience of all those years nor the
genius of Henry IV ever made the Edict of Nantes anything more than a
_modus vivendi_ which first proved intolerable to the Huguenots because
of their own political ambitions, and finally to the monarchy of Louis
XIV, whose motto was as truly: “Un roi, une loi, une foi” as it was
“l’état, c’est moi.” The French monarchy in the nature of things, in
the sixteenth century, could not be one-half Catholic and one-half
Protestant, any more than the United States, as Lincoln said, could
exist one-half slave and one-half free. What France would have lost
by the creation of an independent state in the southwest would have
been compensated for by other gains in other ways. Such a state in
southwest Europe would have been an effective agency for peace, in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It not only would have relieved
its Catholic neighbors of the religious dissidents within their
borders; it would have been a checkmate upon the undue aggrandizement
of either France or Spain, operating like Holland and Switzerland as
a buffer state and for the maintenance of the balance of power. The
Spanish marriages of France in the next century probably never would
have been, with their attendant train of dynastic and territorial
complications during the reign of Louis XIV. The Grand Monarque perhaps
never would have conceived the thought of browbeating the rest of
Europe, and certainly never would have been able to carry the idea out
to the extent he did.

In abandoning his original plan in January, 1570, Coligny not merely
altered the immediate future of France; perhaps he changed its destiny
for centuries to come. Instead of securing peace and security for the
Huguenots by cutting the Gordian knot and establishing an independent
Huguenot state, with Béarn as its cornerstone, he threw the solution
of the question back upon France. He had dreamed of a Huguenot France
beyond sea. Why not one at home? Instead Coligny had become possessed
with the idea that neither the King nor his ministers would seriously
think of peace as long as the war could be kept confined to provinces
remote from Paris and therefore, in order to force the hand of the
King, it was necessary to force war upon him in the very heart of the
kingdom. In other words, he conceived a new design, namely, to throw
the war into the center of France once more, to march upon Paris, and,
before its gates, dictate the terms he desired.

In pursuance of this new policy, the army of the admiral and the
viscounts, with Montgomery, moved up the Garonne. Toulouse was invested
for a month (January 22-February 20, 1570), as we have seen, without
success and the country fearfully wasted.[1427] Want of provisions
for men and horses at the end of this time compelled the host to
move toward Carcassonne and Montréal.[1428] As the country between
Montpellier and Avignon was almost totally in control of the Huguenots,
Coligny soon moved thither, whence he followed up the right bank of the
Rhone to Vivarais and Forez. Illness overtook him here and he was in
great danger.[1429] For a time it seemed certain that fate would call
Louis of Nassau who had joined him from Orange, to the leadership of
the army.[1430] By the time of the admiral’s recovery, it was time for
action if his design was to be executed, for things were in a greater
state of doubt and uncertainty regarding the peace than ever.

[Illustration: HUGUENOT ATTACK UPON A CATHOLIC CHURCH

(Bib. Nat., Estampes, _Histoire de France_, Q. b)]

The prospect of peace darkened as the winter began to break and
preparations in both camps grew more active. In February the marshal
Cossé prepared to expel the Huguenots from La Charité in order to
deprive them of their only means of communication across the Loire
River, by which assistance could be brought from Germany. This place
had been one of the cities demanded from the government as pledge
of good behavior, but the crown was determined not to yield in this
particular. Queen Elizabeth had strongly assured the King that she
had not directed nor licensed any of her subjects to carry arms
or munitions to La Rochelle, but guarded herself against possible
compromising evidence being discovered in future by adding that
she “generally must permit merchants to resort indifferently to
France.”[1431]

While the negotiations thus dragged on through March and April,[1432] a
new element of excitement was introduced by the conduct of the reiters
in the Catholic army. These adventurers, many of whom were Protestant
in faith, tired of idleness and determined either to renew the war or
secure their wages, on April 17 sent the King an address in which,
in the same breath, they asserted their loyalty to Charles IX and
their belief that those of the Reformed religion were only fighting
for liberty of conscience and the preservation of their lives. Though
guardedly put, reading between the lines, this memorial implied peace
at once or immediate renewal of the war. Coincident with this manifesto
the princes of Navarre and Condé joined in a note to the King declaring
their resolution never to yield. To these causes of disaffection must
be added the further one that many in the rank and file of the Huguenot
party believed that the Protestant leaders were seeking to serve their
own ends more than the common good; and accused them of being more
anxious for the preservation of their privileges than for the free
exercise of religion.

Matters continued thus to hang fire for several weeks. The King went
to Mont St. Michel in the middle of May to keep the feast of Corpus
Christi there, where, while professing his desire to conclude the
peace, Charles IX nevertheless imposed a tax of 60,000 francs monthly
upon those who had failed to bear arms in the late conflict. At the
same time there was a large exodus of nobles from the court, many
gentlemen, weary of long service in arms, soliciting and securing
leave to retire. The talk of peace, too, continued to be current in
the court,[1433] although Charles IX’s secret dealings with Montluc,
the alienation of 50,000 _écus de rente_ of the property of the
church,[1434] and the fact that the marshal Cossé at this same time
advanced out of Orleans with 2,000 horse and 4,000 French footmen and
was soon joined by 8,000 Swiss and 30 companies of men-at-arms belied
this.

Montluc had been on the point of resigning his commission for months
past on account of the friction with Damville, but repented when there
was prospect of the liberal marshal Cossé succeeding him, fearing
lest, with another such as Damville, the Catholic cause throughout
the south would be ruined.[1435] He still clung to the hope of seeing
Béarn conquered notwithstanding Terride’s failure, and in June, 1570,
the opportunity seemed to have come. With the aim of diverting the
war from the Ile-de-France, and throwing it into the provinces once
more—the farther the better—Charles IX grasped at a new expedition
against Béarn. Montluc was given the commission.[1436] Notwithstanding
his years and his infirmity and the penury of the government, which
had neither munitions nor money to spare, Montluc managed to raise a
considerable force.[1437]

He had resolved to besiege the little fortified town of Rabastens, near
Tarbes, which he had chosen as the point of attack because he could
draw upon Gascony for supplies from this place more easily than by
beginning at St. Severs, which bordered on the Landes, “a country only
fruitful in sands.”[1438] But the expedition came to an untimely end.
In an unguarded moment Montluc exposed himself and “a harquebus-shot
clapt into his face” with such force as to break his whole visage in,
so that the cheek-bones were taken out in splinters. The town was
taken, nevertheless. How it suffered may be read in the words of him
who meted out its punishment.

My Lieutenant, who had marcht on the one hand of me when I went on
to the Assault ... came to see if I was dead, and said to me: “Sir,
cheer up your spirits, and rejoyce, we have entred the Castle, and the
Soldiers are laying about them, who put all to the sword; and assure
your self we will revenge your wound.” I then said to him, “Praised
be God that I see the Victory ours before I dye. I now care not for
death. I beseech you return back, and as you have ever been my friend,
so now do me that act of friendship not to suffer so much as one man
to escape with life.” Whereupon he immediately returned and all my
servants went along with him, so that I had no body left with me but
two Pages, Monsieur de Las, and the Chirurgeon. They would fain have
sav’d the Minister, and the Governor, whose name was Captain Ladon, to
have hang’d them before my Lodging, but the Soldiers took them from
those who had them in their custody, whom they had also like to have
kill’d for offring to save them, and cut them in a thousand pieces.
They made also fifty or threescore to leap from the high Tower into
the Moat, which were there all drown’d. There were two only saved who
were hid, and such there were who offer’d four thousand Crowns to save
their lives, but not a man of ours would hearken to any Ransom; and
most of the women were kill’d who also did us a great deal of mischief
with throwing stones. There was found within a Spanish Merchant whom
the Enemy had kept prisoner there, and another Catholick Merchant
also, who were both saved; and these were all that were left alive
of the men that we found in the place, namely the two that some one
help’t away, and the two Catholick Merchants. Do not think, you who
shall read this Book, that I caused this slaughter to be made so much
out of revenge for the wound I had received, as to strike terror into
the Country, that they might not dare to make head against our Army.
And in my opinion all Souldiers in the beginning of a Conquest ought
to proceed after that manner, with such as are so impudent as to abide
Canon; he must bar his ears to all Capitulation and Composition, if he
do not see great difficulties in his Enterprize, and that his Enemy
have put him to great trouble in making a Breach. And as severity
(call it cruelty if you please) is requisite in case of a resolute
opposition, so on the other side mercy is very commendable, and fit,
if you see that they in good time surrender to your discretion.[1439]

Since his assumption of the command at La Rochelle La Noue had
displayed an energy that drove the enemy to despair. On land and on sea
he became a terror to them. Sometimes it was by arresting the King’s
galleys and bringing them as prizes to La Rochelle or Brouage;[1440]
sometimes it was by driving them out, as at Rochefort, by digging a
trench which poured waters waist deep down upon them; sometimes it
was by battle in the open field. La Noue outmatched Puygaillard at
every point, notwithstanding that his antagonist had the King’s picked
troops. In the plain of Ste. Gemme, near Luçon, their armies clashed
in a fierce, stubbornly fought engagement. Nearly all the captains
of his enemy’s two regiments and 500 arquebusiers were killed and as
many more taken prisoner. The brilliant captain at last won, although
he was so badly injured by an arquebus shot in the left arm that
amputation was necessary. Yet in the hour of his own intense suffering
he magnanimously lamented “the death of so many brave gentlemen.”[1441]

Much more decisive than this engagement, however, was Coligny’s
action. The admiral had been lingering at Montbrison in Auvergne
during May for the purpose of guarding the upper Loire.[1442]
Alarmed by the formidable army under the marshal Cossé, Coligny
now determined to strike suddenly and hard in order to preserve La
Charité. This resolution precipitated the battle of Arnay-le-Duc on
June 15, 1570.[1443] The result of this victory was startling. The
government capitulated almost at once. All the essential terms of
peace had been thrashed over during the spring and in less than a
week after the battle Charles IX held in his hands the articles of
pacification demanded by the Huguenots, chiefly stipulating for the
free exercise of religion within three towns in every province and
at Charenton, amnesty for the past and restitution of offices and
estates. But the crown flatly refused the right within ten miles of
Paris, or even for Protestant noblemen attending court in their own
chambers and offered two towns in each province instead of three. When
this was refused it was finally settled to adopt August 1, 1570, as
an _annus normalis_, and permit Calvinist worship to be held in all
towns in the possession of the Huguenots on that date. The two points
of contention still unsettled were the payment of the reiters and
determination of the surety-towns. The government at first proposed
that the payment of the reiters be equally apportioned between the
subjects of both religions, but finally shouldered the burden. As to
the surety-towns—the most important point of all as far as practical
politics was concerned—great difficulty was experienced before
agreement was made. The King at first offered to yield La Rochelle,
Angoulême, and Montauban, and to trade Perpignan or Lansac for La
Charité.[1444] Later, Angoulême was withdrawn and Cognac substituted,
to the displeasure of the Huguenots, and La Charité definitely yielded.
As to other matters, namely, restitution of honors, offices, estates,
privileges, equality of justice, amnesty, release of prisoners, and
the like, these of course were provided for, and Protestant nobles
enjoying “high justice” were to be permitted to enjoy free exercise
of the Calvinist faith, including baptism in their houses, for their
families, and all others in their dependence,[1445] an evidence that
the feudal element in the Huguenot party was more considered than the
bourgeoisie.[1446]

The papal nuncio, understanding that the Huguenots had demanded the
exercise of their religion in the counties of Verre and Avignon, which
belonged to the Pope, declared that no peace could be made with those
who were outside of the church.[1447] At the same time the Spanish
ambassador, being informed that it was part of the Huguenot programme
to secure the restitution of William of Orange and his brother Louis
of Nassau to their French possessions, also protested warmly against
the peace. Spain offered direct assistance to France of men and
money, and the city of Paris and the clergy offered to maintain the
war at their own expense for eight months longer. But these protests
were ineffectual. The Spanish ambassador’s mouth was stopped by the
rejoinder that the French King had as much right to make a treaty of
peace with his subjects as Philip of Spain had to make terms with the
Moriscos,[1448] and so, though apprehensive of French and German
Protestant assistance being given to Orange and fearful of an attack
upon Franche Comté, the Spanish ambassador was forced to be content
with the promise of France that no hostility was intended or would be
permitted in France toward Spain.

The Peace of St. Germain was the broadest and most substantial body of
privileges yet secured by the French Protestants. Antedating the Edict
of Nantes by twenty-eight years, it might have been as great and as
permanent an instrument as the latter, if the ambition of the Guises
and the intervention of Spain in French affairs had not overthrown
it. France itself, government and people, was tired of ten years of
strife and disposed to peace. The economic interests of the country
were anxious for peace. Only zealots for the religion and those who
sought to fish in troubled waters reprobated the terms of St. Germain
and sought to continue the struggle. It is true that mutual suspicion
still prevailed. Some of the Huguenots anticipated new encroachments
again, destructive of the peace, and that the King only aimed to
disarm the Protestants in order to overwhelm them later. But time, in
all probability, would have qualified this feeling. Religion, unless
artificially exaggerated, had ceased to be the primary issue of France
by 1570. The real issue was Spain. For all parties alike in France
had begun to chafe because of the power acquired by foreign military
influences, especially that of Philip—a feeling which ultimately was
destined to unite the country on the basis of a national patriotism
and embolden Henry of Navarre to expel the Spaniard and establish the
Bourbon throne on a truly national basis.

An incident which took place at the court in mid-July, when the terms
of peace were under consideration, illustrates this all but universal
hatred of Spain. One day the Spanish ambassador entered the King’s
chamber for audience. Soon afterward the marshal Tavannes came in, who
was somewhat deaf and accustomed to speak in a loud voice. Perceiving
the ambassador he gruffly remarked in a voice so audible as to be heard
by Alava:

These Spaniards would do better to govern their own members and not
interfere by trying to govern other people’s countries. For I well
know that the Spaniards have no wish but to foment civil wars, so
that both one party and the other may be weakened and they themselves
become stronger than both. For my own part, I would rather see a
hundred white capes [the Huguenot costume] than one red cross [the
device the Spaniards wore]; because, after all, the first are our
brethren and our kindred, while the latter are the natural enemies of
our country.[1449]

It was an opportune time for France to undertake an anti-Spanish
policy, and it was soon predicted that she would follow such a
course.[1450] Aside from the discomfiture of the Guises owing to the
peace, a condition which peculiarly discountenanced the cardinal
of Lorraine, the duke of Guise was in disgrace also. For he was
discovered to have made overtures of marriage to Madame Marguerite,
the King’s sister, and the lady herself for whom a Portuguese match
was being considered as a blow to Spain, was reputed to have expressed
a preference rather to stay in France than “to eat figs in Portugal.”
Guise, when the discovery was made that he had raised his eyes to
the princess, hastily attempted to divert suspicion by marrying the
princess of Porcien. But the episode injured the influence of the
Guises, and brought Montmorency forward as the man of the hour.[1451]

Under the new régime, the government set about carrying out the terms
of pacification, enforcement of which chiefly depended upon the upright
and just conduct of the four marshals.[1452] By the end of September
the camps were wholly broken up and the reiters either over or on
their way across the frontier.[1453] To be sure, radical Protestants
continued to complain of infractions of the edict.[1454] But the one
serious infraction of the edict was in the fifteenth article, providing
that all scholars, the sick and the poor, should be received in the
universities, schools, and hospitals without difference or distinction
on account of religion. The Catholic party, in the hope of abridging
the development of the competing religion soon persuaded the King to
nullify this provision. In compliance with a petition praying that the
crown would forbid any of the Reformed religion from holding any post
of authority in the University of Paris, and also that the university
authorities might have power to search for and seize all heretical
books, Charles IX on October 8, 1570, issued a proclamation forbidding
any Calvinist from holding any office or teaching in the University
of Paris and giving the authorities thereof the right of search for
heretical books.[1455] On November 20, this was followed by a more
sweeping decree forbidding any persons from keeping schools or holding
office in any college, or lecturing on any art or science in public or
in private unless recognized and approved by the Roman church.[1456]
Nevertheless, these petitions, complaining of infractions of the edict,
were more smoke than fire. The only internal issue of great importance
was an economic one.

Apart from the destructiveness of the war, nature again dealt hardly
with France in this year. There were heavy rains over all Europe
which either rotted the grain in the fields or washed it out. A great
inundation of the Seine occurred on June 2, 1570, and the plague began
to grow more virulent once more.[1457] There was a certain amount of
reason in the demand for a new session of the Estates to consider
the economic distress of France, but the King was wise in refusing
the request, for in event of its meeting, the enemies of Spain would
have been sure to endeavor to fan the ashes of the late civil war
into flames again. As a solace to those demanding economic relief
Charles IX promised to abolish sundry superfluous offices and to tax
the nobles instead of the commons for the relief of his debts which
amounted to 37,000,000 francs. An earnest of this intention is manifest
in an ordinance requiring parish wardens to keep accounts and to
make a declaration of the revenue of their churches and to send this
information to the royal bailiffs. Every parish was forced to obey this
edict, which was a novelty indeed. But the parish authorities took
advantage of the situation and not merely rendered an account of their
incomes, but also gave the King a minute account of the ruin they had
suffered at the hands of the Huguenots. The bailiffs received these
declarations and sent them to the Privy Council of the King, where the
evidence was reviewed and every church taxed accordingly. The churches
which had been burned by the Protestants were lightly taxed, and those
which were found to be incapable of payment were authorized to sell
their possessions, their vessels, jewels, or lands, or else impose a
tax on the parish.[1458]

But the thrifty bourgeoisie of France were too lucrative a source of
income for the King to keep his promise not to tax them more. In March,
1571, an edict was issued providing that bolts of woolen cloth should
be sealed with a leaden seal before sale, and that each bolt should be
taxed 3 francs, 4 deniers. The new impost, which was very unpopular,
was ascribed to the Italian influence at court.[1459]

CHAPTER XV

THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW

The dominant politics of France in the years 1570-72 were foreign, not
domestic, and had to do with Spain. The clouds hung heavy over Spain’s
dominions in spite of the suppression of the Moriscos, and dark was the
prospect ahead for Philip II. In the east only was light. The great
victory at Lepanto over the Turks, fought on October 7, 1571, though of
general benefit to Christendom, was of greatest advantage to Spain.

It is at this juncture that the duke of Anjou, the King’s brother,
becomes a conspicuous political figure, one, indeed, of international
importance. In order to confirm the confidence of the Huguenots, but
especially to strengthen France against Spanish preponderance, the idea
was again put forward of marrying Anjou to Queen Elizabeth.[1460] At
the same time the plan was broached of marrying young Henry of Navarre
to the sister of the duke of Württemberg. But again Montmorency came to
the forefront and revived the plan suggested in 1569 of marrying the
princess Marguerite, Charles IX’s youngest sister, to Henry of Navarre.
Coligny for the Huguenots, and Walsingham and Norris for England,
urged the double plan.[1461] The Ridolfi plot proved to Elizabeth that
England, like France, had her greatest enemy in Spain.

[Illustration: THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW

From a picture by François Du Bois of Amiens († 1584 at Geneva). The
original, in the Museum Urlaud at Lausanne, is 3½ × 5 feet.

In the middle of the picture Coligny is being thrown out of the
window, below which stand the dukes of Guise and Aumale and the
bastard of Angoulême. Teligny, the admiral’s son-in-law is trying
to escape over the roof. In the background is the Louvre, with
Pilles being beset in the doorway. The bodies of Bricquemault and
Cavagnies are hanging from the gibbet in the street. On the hill-top
in the right of the picture the gibbet of Montfaucon is seen. On
the left bank of the Seine some Huguenots are escaping by the Porte
de Nesles—Montgomery is the man on horseback outside the gate. The
windmill stands on Mont Sainte Geneviève.]

The consternation of the Guises and Spain at the discovery of this
double marriage project was great. The Guises sought to break the
proposed marriage of Anjou and Queen Elizabeth by offering him Mary
Stuart, and that of Henry of Navarre with the King’s sister by offering
the cardinal d’Este as a prospective husband, since he was universally
expected to succeed his brother, the duke of Ferrara who was without
issue. Tuscan influence was used to this end. Spain and the papacy,
for their part, dangled before the eyes of the duke of Anjou the post
of command over the fleet preparing against the Turks.[1462] The gulf
between France and Spain, however, was too wide to be bridged by such
an offer. Disappointed at Bayonne, Catherine was dreaming of the elder
daughter of the Hapsburgs as the future wife of Charles IX. Such a
marriage appealed to her as a practical way of playing one house of
Hapsburg against the other, although she plausibly represented it as a
new tie that would bind France and the Hapsburgs in greater amity.[1463]

The counter-claims of France and Austria to the Three Bishoprics, and
the renewal by France of her former relations with Turkey, retarded
this negotiation.[1464] The greatest hindrance, though, was the
opposition of Philip II. It was with the object of frustrating the
designs of France that Philip II had transferred his ambassador in
France, Chantonnay, from Paris to Vienna.[1465] At Bayonne, the queen
mother had exerted all her influence in vain to prevail upon the court
of Spain to commit itself. When Fourquevaux succeeded St. Sulpice at
Madrid, he, in turn, continued to urge that Charles IX should marry
the princess Anne; that Marguerite of Valois should marry Don Carlos,
and Henry of Anjou the infanta Juana, Philip’s sister. But Philip II
still hesitated between Mary Stuart and Anne of Austria, and suggested
the younger daughter of Maximilian as prospective spouse for Charles
IX.[1466] Matters remained thus undetermined for years. The marriage
of Mary Stuart to Darnley in 1565 and the death of Don Carlos in July,
1568 raised Catherine’s hopes. But they were dashed to pieces after
the death of Elizabeth of Valois, on October 3, 1568, when Philip II
himself became the suitor for the hand of Anne of Austria. French and
Spanish diplomacy thereafter plotted and counterplotted, until in 1570
the French King had to endure the chagrin of seeing his expected queen
become the fourth bride of Philip of Spain and himself be satisfied
with the younger sister, whose physical charms[1467] did not compensate
for the injury to his pride.[1468]

But Philip gained another point of advantage over the French King, a
point which the latter never discovered. The duchy of Lorraine, was a
fief of the empire and had been so ever since the Middle Ages. Situated
in the penumbra between France and Germany, the duke of Lorraine’s
position had become a complex one and he was a vassal of France for
the border duchy of Bar. As a sign of his amity toward the Emperor,
Charles IX at the time of his marriage agreed to release the duke of
Lorraine from his fealty to France. This waiver stirred the patriotic
indignation of the keeper of the seal, Morvilliers, who resigned his
office, declaring that he would not be an agent for separating from the
crown of France any principality owing allegiance to it. Unfortunately
for the future, the King appointed a secret partisan of Spain to the
post. This was Biragues, a Milanese by birth, whose sinister influence
was to play no mean part in the future.[1469]

As might be expected, the winter and spring of 1571-72 were filled with
cross-negotiations of great importance. The greatest Catholic-Spanish
fear was lest a positive alliance be made between France, England, and
Holland, and perhaps the Protestant German states for the liberation
of the Netherlands, that league to have greater binding force through
the double marriage of the duke of Anjou and Queen Elizabeth and Henry
of Bourbon to Marguerite of France.[1470] Spain, to prove France, made
final demand of Charles IX: namely, that he forcibly suppress the
activity of the prince of Orange in France; that Spain be permitted
to levy Catholics in France to serve in the Low Countries; that
France restrain the preparations of the Huguenots, especially those
of La Rochelle, from aiding the Dutch cause on the sea; that France
renounce her alliance with Turkey and join the Holy League against the
Ottoman; and finally, that Charles IX abandon the project of marrying
his sister to the prince of Navarre. Charles IX’s replies were very
vague. To the first of these demands he replied that his country was
too much exhausted by the late wars to take up arms for any cause; to
the second he said that if he permitted Catholic levies to be made in
France, the Huguenots would not believe them to be for service abroad
but would again take up arms; as to the preparations at La Rochelle,
it remained to be seen if their purpose was not mercantile instead of
military.[1471]

The attitude of the various parties in France toward the crown’s
Spanish policy was a peculiar one. The Huguenots and moderate Catholics
of course urged the marriage of the King’s brother to Queen Elizabeth
with the greatest zeal. But even intense Catholics, like Tavannes,
singular as it seems, urged the match, with Machiavellian ingenuity
estimating that the King, by incurring the deeper enmity of Spain,
would be compelled to avail himself of their services, and thus, in the
end, the cause of Catholicism in France would be promoted.[1472] The
queen mother, with characteristic caution, professed much inclination
for the match, but urged that it could not be attempted without
hazarding the King’s honor. Meanwhile Montmorency, pushed it with all
his ability, alternately urging Catherine de Medici and Lord Burghley
by an assiduous correspondence.[1473]

How purely political as an issue religion had become by this time in
Europe is made almost cynically manifest in the conferences between the
advocates of the French-English match for the purpose of overcoming the
religious disparities represented by the principals in the proposed
match. From the beginning of the negotiations it was evident that
every compromise made in religion would have to be made by France. The
incongruities of age and religion and the complications of politics
were great. The hardest thing, perhaps, to estimate, is the influence
of Elizabeth’s vacillation. Catherine de Medici, on the whole, seems to
have been anxious for the match. So protracted and so intricate were
the negotiations that the duke of Anjou, with mingled prejudice and
despair, declared that “all was but dalliance.”[1474] It was speciously
urged upon the duke that no attempt was being made to effect his sudden
conversion to the Anglican religion, but that he should forego the use
of private mass, and “examine whether he might not with good devotion
use the forms of prayers appointed throughout her realm, the same being
in effect nothing but that which the Church of Rome uses, saving that
it is in the English tongue, which, if he pleased, might be translated
into French; and further, that the usage of the divine service in
England did not properly compel any man to alter his opinion in the
great matters being now in controversy in the church.”[1475] To this
it was rejoined that “religion was a constant persuasion confirmed by
time” and that “relenting in religion, being a matter of conscience,
was an inconvenience of more weight than any that might happen to
the queen.”[1476] For a while Anjou, although after the Edict of
St. Germain he had staunchly protested that no preaching be allowed
anywhere in his territories—which the King granted—wavered between
policy and conscience. One day while visiting Madame Carnevalet, the
wife of his tutor, he said with affected gaiety: “Carnevalet, thou and
I were once Huguenots, and now again are become good Catholics.” “Aye,”
she said, “we were so, and if you proceed in the matter you wot of, you
will then return to be a Huguenot.”[1477]

Spain did everything possible to thwart the negotiation. Her ambassador
in the presence of the King’s council inveighed against the plan,
asserting that the kingdom of France was going to ruin, but he was
cautious not to allege any ground but that of religion.[1478] Finally
the counter-practices of the Guises and the Spanish ambassador, partly
by appeals to religious scruples and partly by the means of lavish
promises, overcame Anjou’s hesitation and he flatly refused to consider
the marriage.[1479] The King was furious. “Brother,” he said, “you
should have used some plainness with me in this matter and not leave
me to wade so far to abuse a prince I so much esteem and honour. You
allege conscience to be the cause but I know it is a late pension
offered unto you by the clergy, who would have you still remain here
for a champion of the Catholic faith. I tell you plainly, I will have
no other champion here but myself, and seeing you have such a desire to
remain here on such respects, it behooves me the more narrowly to look
to you; and as for the clergy, seeing they have so great superfluity,
and I so great necessity, the benefices being at my disposition, I will
take a new order; and as for those who make the offer, I will make some
of them shorter by the head.”[1480]

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the cause was a lost one, the
matter was protracted so long that the negotiators of the affair
themselves perceived the humor in it. Elizabeth protested that “of
herself she had no mind thereto, yet the continual crying unto her
of her Privy Council, the necessity of the time, and the love of her
subjects, had turned her mind to marriage,” while the duke of Anjou
reasserted his belief in his future damnation if he yielded anything
in the matter of religion. Smith, the English envoy, solemnly averred
that “the matter of religion would be the most honourable to break off
with,” both for his mistress and the duke, and in the same breath asked
whether it would suffice if the duke were suffered for a time to have
his mass private in some little oratory or chapel—this so that there
should be no scandal to any of the Queen’s subjects. The queen mother
replied that the duke must have the exercise of his religion open, lest
he should seem to be ashamed of it, and that he was now of late so
devout that he heard two or three masses every day, and fasted the Lent
and vigils so precisely “that he began to be lean and evil-coloured,”
so that she was angry with him and told him that she “had rather he
were an Huguenot than be so foolishly precise to hurt his health.” She
told the English ambassador that he would not be content to have his
mass in a corner, but insisted upon “high mass and all the ceremonies
thereof according to the time, and in song after all solemn fashion
of the Roman church, and a church or chapel appointed where he might
openly have his priests and singers and use all their ceremonies.”

“Why, Madame,” ejaculated Smith, “then he may require also the four
orders of friars, monks, canons, pilgrimages, pardons, oil and cream,
relics, and all such trumperies. The queen of England will never agree
to any mass, let alone great high mass, with all the ceremonies of Rome
according to the season, priest, deacon, subdeacon, chalice, altar,
bells, candlesticks, paten, singing men, ‘les quatre mendiants et tous
les mille diables’”—at which tirade all but Anjou laughed.[1481]

It is at this moment that the duke of Alençon comes forward into
the light around the throne. Since the duke of Anjou was “so
extraordinarily, papistically superstitious”[1482] both sides turned
toward him, notwithstanding the absurd disparity between his age and
that of Queen Elizabeth. Even Elizabeth’s hardy modesty blushed at the
thought of such a match,[1483] and the objection of inequality in their
ages was backed up by guarded expressions of repugnance on account of
the disfigurement the young duke had suffered from smallpox.[1484]

The Huguenot pressure eagerly supported the proposed marriage between
Queen Elizabeth and the duke of Alençon, for the duke was as easy in
religion as his brother was straight.[1485] The admiral Coligny urged
it upon Lord Burghley, pointing out that it would strengthen the treaty
of Blois,[1486] while others urged that England would have a practical
advantage from the fact that Alençon was as rich in lands as his
brother, and that the duchy of Alençon adjoined Normandy, where the
whole of the nobility was devoted to the duke, and hoped by his means
to be restored to their ancient privileges and liberties, and that
then England could make “a bulwark and defense” out of Normandy for her
own protection.[1487]

It is a difficult story to take seriously, for each one of the actors
felt its hollowness and unreality. One feels that it was a gigantic
bubble produced by English and French councilors of state to amuse and
occupy each other by its brilliancy and wavering instability. Yet the
greatest statesmen in England were driven nearly to distraction by
their endeavors to keep it in the air. At first this diplomatic affair
assumes an almost farcical comedy aspect: then it darkens into tragedy.
It is a game of chess in which the players are grave and reverend
statesmen and the pieces queens and princes, with this distinction,
that the pieces are always likely to move of themselves and create
unexpected combinations. Yet, for all its hollowness, the story
deserves attention, for as long as it lasted it absorbed the attention
of the persons concerned, and it illustrates most admirably Elizabeth’s
and Catherine’s tortuous methods of diplomacy.

When the negotiations began, Elizabeth was already thirty-eight years
old and of vast experience in promoting and then avoiding marriages.
As a coy and bashful damsel, she could always plead her repugnance to
the marriage state, and as the head of a Protestant nation, religion
was another rock of refuge when anxious or angry suitors pressed her
too closely. She had fooled Philip and she had kept the poor Austrian
archduke gamboling before her. What could the pockmarked François
d’Alençon expect but disaster? Yet it was he who came the nearest to
pinning her down to a state of matrimonial stability.

The two things in Catherine’s character which seem to be especially
prominent in this tale of love and lying are her thirst for power for
herself and a mother’s natural ambition for her children.

Alençon’s appearance is the one thing about him which is seriously
discussed. He was born 1555 and was therefore twenty-two years
younger than Elizabeth. This was, of course, an enormous objection,
or, at least, one which could always be urged. His age is the official
and public objection, but his face and stature affected Elizabeth
far more.[1488] As to his character we have the testimony of the
English and Venetian ambassadors. Smith, in January, 1572, calls him
“a good fellow and a lusty prince” and says “he is not so obstinate,
papistical, and restive like a mule as his brother is.” Dale, in the
quaint letter in a Hatfield MS says of him: “As touching his behavior
he ys the most moderate yn all the court; never present at any of the
licentious acts of his brethren, nor here nor at Rochelle; of much
credit, and namely with them of the religion; thus he ys and hath ben
hetherto; what may be hereafter God knoweth.” On the whole, the English
ambassadors favored him, Walsingham the least. Evidently he was not an
unpleasant person, but a young and inexperienced lad, ambitious to do
great things, resenting his treatment at the court, and so plunged into
the current of things, only to be deceived and ruined by the superior
cunning of his supposed friends. His shortcomings may be excused on the
ground of his environment and bringing up; may even be praised as being
more manly and significant than the effeminate Henry.

Alençon’s motives in attempting to win Elizabeth are obvious. His
position in France was most unpleasant to him: suspected by his
brothers, made fun of and pestered by the Guises and the “mignons” of
the court; condemned to a life of subordination and idleness by the
accident of his birth, the prospect of the hand of the Queen of England
seemed most glowing, even though she was a heretic and more than twenty
years older than he. But why should Catherine and Elizabeth ever
consider such an intrinsically absurd proposition?

Elizabeth was face to face with several problems, foreign and domestic,
upon the solution of which depended her throne and her very existence.
It is hard to remember as one looks back upon her long and splendid
reign that there was hardly a moment in it when she was free from the
danger of overthrow and execution. This danger, at this time, had just
manifested itself in the Ridolfi plot in which the duke of Norfolk,
the greatest noblemen of England, Spain, Mary Stuart, and the Pope had
all combined. Naturally the Catholic nobles rallied around Mary, the
probable successor to the throne, while the Protestants were at a loss
to know what to do in view of the unsettled succession. So great was
the excitement that Elizabeth always hesitated to call a Parliament
for fear it would attempt to urge her on to marriage. Negotiations,
not to speak of marriage, with France would immensely relieve the
situation. They could be used before Parliament to show that Elizabeth
was doing her best; hopes of a settled succession would at once
reassure the country and diminish Mary’s importance, both as a center
of conspiracy and as a source of danger in other ways. To be sure, this
possible marriage might excite the Catholics to renewed efforts to
save their faith, but the fact that France was Catholic and that from
it might come much of their help would militate against disturbance.
Negotiations might bring about most of these results and would in any
case gain time and postpone the solution of the difficulties.

A second problem before Elizabeth was the maintenance of the Protestant
faith. So far as this enters the negotiations it is mostly a pretext,
but there was, nevertheless, an actual problem. Negotiations for
marriage with a Catholic prince might stir up the Catholics to renewed
activities and raise hopes which it might be difficult to allay, but,
on the other hand, Elizabeth could hope for relief from the Huguenot
movement in France, and the rebellious Dutch, while the alliance with
a Catholic prince would immensely strengthen her in her own middle
ground. To allow him to bring the mass with him might cause trouble,
but still one prince could not do much when queen and council were
carefully watching him.

Scotland was another source of continual anxiety to the English
ministry. The government was unsettled and the power likely to
fall at any time into the hands of those who would turn it over to
France. Of course this danger would be entirely removed by a French
marriage, though as events proved, negotiations did not stop the
intrigues. A similar point of attack existed in Ireland where the least
encouragement was sure to raise rebellion. A French marriage would make
danger in that quarter also less likely.

But perhaps the greatest source of danger was from Spain. There were
countless reasons why Philip should declare war—religion, the seizure
of his treasure by Elizabethan seamen, the treatment of Mary (though
this did not at first much concern him), and Spanish repression in
the Netherlands. English negotiation with France would be of value to
England, if for nothing else, in keeping France and Spain apart. It
was hoped, moreover, that once England and France were united, the
combination might check Philip in his dealing with the Netherlands and
the English Catholics and in the cruelties visited on Englishmen in
Spain.

But there were grave objections to a marriage. It would introduce a
new and unknown element into English councils. Suppose, as a Catholic,
the King should join that party; or worse, ally himself with Mary
herself, plot the death of Elizabeth and a Catholic restoration. Or
suppose he should become king of France? or that his child should be
heir to both thrones? The thought of becoming a French dependency was
intolerable to England. In any case it would mean a break with Spain
and how could England be sure that France was not merely tempting her
to that, finally to leave her to face Spain alone? Plainly, marriage
was too close and dangerous a union—as for negotiations, that was
another matter, and it was simply for the negotiations themselves
that Elizabeth entered upon them. This is proved, I think, by her
entire policy. Whenever France seems most willing she draws away; but
when France seems likely to abandon such fruitless endeavors, she
at once becomes affable and yielding. Sometimes her ministers urged
her to definite and decided action, but she always managed to find
a loop-hole, if either they or circumstance had forced her into too
dangerous agreement.

France, on the other hand, could not be content with mere negotiations.
She, too, had several definite problems. Rent by civil war, with
enormously powerful barons on the one side and a clamorous people
on the other, while outside the realm stood Spain and England, only
too glad to promote and foster her difficulties, the crown was in a
struggle for existence as real as that of Elizabeth. To join Spain
would be for France to lose her integral existence and to be swallowed
up in the maw of the Hapsburgs. Therefore the English alliance was
the only refuge. Besides there were many other advantages. It would
stop England’s meddling in French affairs and would calm and reassure
the Huguenots. But there was the rub: did the Huguenots need to be
reassured? Could France safely commit herself to a liberal policy? To
Catherine it was not so much that, as the question of her own authority
and personal ambition for her family; she had no intention of giving
place to the Huguenots any more than she had to the Guises. And so she
wavered when the Guises were becoming too powerful, and helped along
the marriage; when the Huguenots began to be too authoritative, she
frowned on it.

To the Huguenots the marriage was a question of enormous advantage—if
it were accomplished, the Calvinists might hope, not only for success
in France, but in the Low Countries as well; while to the Guises, on
the contrary, the alliance meant the ruin of their hopes for Mary and
for absolute dominion in France.

But to all the risk was great. Elizabeth was by no means firmly seated
upon her throne and seemed to be manifesting a reckless carelessness
in the leniency of her treatment of the late conspirators. The English
ambassadors noted that any “roundness” of treatment at home at once
caused a quickening of the negotiations. The real objection, both with
France and with England, was fear of duplicity. Neither could trust the
other. Each insisted that the other should commit itself first; neither
would consent, with the result that all came to naught. This was just
what Philip expected. Naturally a French-English league would have
seriously hampered him, but he had found by long and trying experience
that when Elizabeth talked of marriage, she was only amusing herself
with a polite fiction. Not once does he take the matter seriously. So
the Spanish attitude was one of unconcern, which in itself added to the
fear of both Elizabeth and Catherine, for each supposed some secret
understanding with Spain on the part of the other.

With such motives and in such troubled waters the negotiations went
on. In the end Elizabeth could not “digest the inconvenience” of the
proposed marriage, and failing to cement the new friendship of France
and England by this form of alliance, it was then suggested that a
political compact, not a marriage alliance, be made between the two
powers.[1489] But there were great difficulties in the way of this
project. For, although the English desired a closer union with France,
they were nevertheless not unprepared to treat with Spain, and to use
the prospective alliance with France for the purpose of bringing Philip
II to terms. England was unwilling yet to be considered as an open
enemy of Spain, in spite of the fact she was well aware of Alva’s plot
with Lord Seton and other Scotch and English refugees in Flanders.[1490]

Trade considerations were of great influence in governing this
attitude. England could not afford to forfeit her commercial
intercourse with Spain and Flanders for the none-too-sure friendship of
France, since the staple in Flanders was worth between two and three
millions.[1491] France could not offer any staple or port advantages
to England comparable with those England enjoyed elsewhere.[1492]
England accordingly proposed that the league be extended to include
the Protestant princes of Germany and that they should join together
“in defense against any who for matters of religion should use force
against any of them;” secondly, that France would bind herself not to
support the cause of Mary Stuart in Scotland; and thirdly, that France
would not seek any greater trade advantages in the Low Countries than
she had in former times. France balked at the proposed extension of
the alliance to Germany and it was dropped; as to Scotland, she was
willing to make a partial sacrifice of honor for the sake of political
advantage.[1493]

But England’s fear of contributing to the aggrandizement of France was
too keen to permit her to have free rein in the Netherlands,[1494]
though Walsingham proposed a way to prevent the possibility of French
ascendency there, and declared that the grandeur of France abroad was
less to be feared by England than the continuance of civil war in
France or the destructive policy of Alva in the Netherlands.[1495]
Burghley was as cautious as his mistress. “If the sea-ports fall into
the hands of the French,” he wrote, “they will regulate not only the
commerce of our merchants abroad but the sovereignty of the Channel,
which belongs to us.”[1496] The jealous determination of England to
monopolize the commerce of the Low Countries was, the greatest obstacle
to the formation of the alliance. For England most of all feared lest
France would not content herself with Flanders and Artois.[1497]

In the delicate business of state which burdened him at this season,
Charles IX showed more acumen than either his new-found friends of
Protestant faith or the Catholics had expected to find, because while
exerting himself to keep the peace with Spain on the one hand, on the
other he endeavored to conciliate his Protestant subjects. Unlike his
elder brother, Francis II, Charles IX was of strong physical frame,
being big boned and vigorous, until the fatal taint of his heritage
and his excesses undermined his constitution[1498] and brought on the
disease of consumption of which he died. He was gross, even brutish
in inclination, rejoicing in base physical sport and disinclined to
books.[1499] But in the present politics Charles IX showed little
of the rashness of his physical nature.[1500] Nevertheless the King
went farther than caution approved in dealing with his new-found
friends. He would have disarmed the suspicion of Spain, and the
Guises[1501] to some degree, at least, if he had drawn close to the
duke of Montmorency, whose moderate Catholicism, however impeachable,
was not the detested heresy of the French Protestants. But instead of
so doing, the King, unable to dissemble as much as his mother, openly
manifested a great admiration for the admiral Coligny, than whom
neither the Guises nor Spain had a more resolute foe. The admiral was
received in Paris upon his arrival there early in September, 1571, with
distinguished honors.[1502] His popularity with the King was at once
a menace and a challenge to Philip II and the Guises.[1503] An added
difficulty, as the result of this policy, was that Catherine de Medici,
seeing her son so well affected toward the admiral, grew jealous of the
latter’s influence, lest it supplant her own, and intrigued against him.

Despite the failure of the marriage alliance, France still had two
strings to the Ulysses bow she was drawing against Spain—support
of the Dutch, and the union of France by means of the marriage of
Henry of Navarre and the princess Marguerite. Spain’s suspicions
that the Huguenot naval preparations at La Rochelle were in favor of
the Dutch[1504] had not been based on groundless suspicion. William
of Orange’s own brother, Louis of Nassau, had remained in France
after the Peace of St. Germain, urging an alliance between France
and England against Spain,[1505] or else French intervention in the
Netherlands.[1506] The count of Nassau enlarged upon the vast designs
of the Spanish monarch and showed how sinister they were to France as
well as Holland, artfully alluding to the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis,
“a peace dishonorable to France;” he dwelt upon the tyranny of Alva
and the horrors of the inquisition; he demonstrated that all the
inhabitants of the Low Countries, both Catholics and Protestants,
hated the Spanish domination; that all the maritime towns were ready
to receive French and Dutch garrisons, if but those of Spain could be
driven out; that with the sea-power of France thrown into the scale,
the Dutch could conquer Spain; and finally proposed the formation of
an international league to overthrow Spain, and asserted that France
might acquire Flanders and Artois and the empire Brabant, Guelders, and
Luxembourg as reward of their services. So alluring was the prospect
portrayed to Charles IX that he almost cast off the mask he wore of
pretended friendship for Spain.[1507] He told Philip’s minister,
Alava, than whom “there was no prouder man or one more disdainful in
countenance”[1508] when the ambassador complained to the French King
that certain ships of the prince of Orange were being harbored at
La Rochelle,[1509] that “his master should not look to give laws to
France.”[1510]

Meantime the proposed marriage of Henry of Navarre to Marguerite,
the King’s sister, progressed. A full year before the nuptials were
concluded, the jewels and apparel for the ceremony were already
provided. The difficulty of arranging a religious form for the
ceremony acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants was the great
hindrance.[1511]

Again Spain made unavailing protest. Henry of Bourbon still bore the
title of king of Navarre, though the kingdom had been lost to the house
long before his birth and was, in fact, entirely in the possession of
Spain. Her fear was lest the new bond of marriage might unite the
parties of France in war for the acquisition of Navarre. It was in
vain, however, that Spain sought to prey upon the fears of Charles IX,
endeavoring to excite the King’s jealousy against the growing power
of the house of Bourbon and pointing out that of the twelve provinces
of the kingdom ten were in the hands of governors who were bound by
blood or interest to the Bourbons.[1512] So eager were many of the
gentry of France for war with Spain, either in Navarre or Flanders,
that one of Coligny’s officers, when asked whether France meant to lose
the favorable opportunity of attacking Spain, scornfully rejoined,
“What can we do? We are good for nothing, for we have to deal with a
scared King and a timid queen, who will not come to any decision.” By
December, 1571, war with Spain was on every lip and the government
began to collect money.[1513]

At this juncture, when all Europe was keyed to concert pitch of
political tension, when anything seemed likely to happen and no one of
the great powers dared make an overt move, the Gordian knot was cut.
On April 1, 1572, the most notable event in the Low Countries since
the iconoclastic outburst occurred. For on that day the count van
der Marck, commander of the Beggars of the Sea, captured the port of
Brille. From that time onward the Dutch and Flemings had a maritime
point of their own on the mainland and were no longer dependent on the
precarious shelter of English and Norman ports. The effect of this blow
to Spain was great. Within the week—on Easter Day—Flushing, and soon
afterward Middelburg, rebelled against the billeting of Spanish troops
sent by Alva to replace the Walloon garrison there.[1514]

The Gueux were masters of the sea and when Dordrecht also rebelled,
the inland water routes were endangered too. No vessel could come
from Holland, Guelders, or Frisia and no communication could be made
from the north with Brabant. Even Amsterdam could be starved and
Alva determined to retire all his forces to Ghent and Antwerp.[1515]
On April 14 William of Orange issued a proclamation from Dillenburg
expressing his grief at the miseries suffered from the exactions,
outrages, and cruelties inflicted by the Spaniards, and assured the
people of his determination to liberate the land from their tyranny.
As many towns and ports had already recognized him as their ruler, he
urged others to follow their example, pledging his word to use all his
power to restore the ancient privileges and liberties of each.[1516]

When news of these wondrous deeds reached France, Charles IX’s
hesitation was swept away by the combined fervor of Louis of Nassau
and the admiral. On April 19, the Anglo-French treaty of alliance was
signed at Blois.[1517]

Du Plessis-Mornay, a young Huguenot gentleman of twenty-three, of
marked literary ability and destined to be the intellectual leader
of the Protestants in coming years, who had lately traveled through
the Netherlands and visited England,[1518] in collaboration with the
admiral drew up a remarkable memorial advocating French intervention in
the Low Countries,[1519] which Coligny presented to the King. English
and French volunteers soon poured into the land.[1520] Louis of Nassau
left for Valenciennes, which had successfully revolted, accompanied
by La Noue and Genlis.[1521] On May 24, by a stratagem, Genlis secured
possession of Mons, one of the most important fortresses to Spain
in the Low Countries in the present state of mind that France was
in.[1522] From this point of vantage he wrote hopefully to Charles IX
for more soldiers, a “good minister,” a surgeon, some cannon founders,
and drugs.[1523] While these events were happening on land, on the sea
the Zealanders attacked and dispersed the Spanish fleet in the Sluys on
June 8, and seized twenty merchantmen under its convoy:[1524] and, to
the elation of France,[1525] far down in the Bay of Biscay the fleet of
Flushing three days later scattered another of Spain’s armadas.[1526]
All Holland, Amsterdam and Rotterdam excepted, was lost to Spain.[1527]
Sir Humphrey Gilbert with 1,200 English and some French and Walloons
landed in the Low Countries, on July 10, and captured Sluys and
Bruges.[1528] Money poured in upon William of Orange, who in June went
to Frankfurt to purchase supplies and enlist men.[1529] The duke of
Alva was in desperate straits. The Walloons everywhere in the army
mutinied and deserted, and he was short of munitions.[1530]

But such successes were too great to last. Louis of Nassau found he
could not hope to hold Mons for long with the slender forces at his
command and sent Genlis back to France for reinforcements. Charles
IX, under pressure from Coligny, provided men and money secretly,
but Genlis’ relief column was intercepted on July 16 and captured by
the duke of Alva.[1531] It was only a question of time before Mons
surrendered.[1532] The blow was a heavy one to France. It mattered
little to France that French subjects were killed or taken prisoner
during the siege. But it was of tremendous consequence to France that
Alva found on Genlis’ person a letter written by Charles IX to Louis of
Nassau on April 27, 1572, in which the King said that he was resolved
as soon as the condition of affairs at home permitted him, to employ
the armies of France for the liberation of the Low Countries.[1533]
Well might Alva’s secretary write “I have in my possession a letter
of the king of France which would strike you with astonishment if you
could see it.”[1534] Spain possessed indubitable proof at last of
French duplicity.

The capture of Genlis and the knowledge that Spain had penetrated
the whole secret of her design, filled the French government with
consternation, though Charles IX affected a show of courage he did not
feel.[1535] That consternation became abject dismay when it was learned
that Elizabeth of England, partially out of reluctance to have war with
Spain, more because of fear lest French foothold in the Low Countries
would jeopardize her commercial ascendency there, repudiated the treaty
of alliance.[1536] As one reviews the months before the massacre one
asks just how far Elizabeth herself may have been responsible for it.
It was she who, by her tortuous and insincere policy alarmed Charles IX
and Catherine, causing the Flanders expedition to be abandoned; it was
this which caused Coligny to turn upon Catherine in the King’s council,
saying, “This war the King renounced. God grant he may not find himself
involved in another less easy to renounce.” The line comes straight
from Elizabeth surely, but can be emphasized too strongly. That some
blame must rest on the English cannot be denied, however. Did Catherine
de Medici plan the massacre of St. Bartholomew to save herself from the
wrath of the Huguenots? Or, in her terror did she seek to appease the
wrath of the Catholic dragon with human lives? Was the massacre of St.
Bartholomew the bloody price of Spain’s satisfaction?

But there is another element to be considered in any endeavor to
unravel the causes of that event. All the art of Catherine de Medici
for years past had been expended in an endeavor to maintain control
by balancing the parties against one another. At this minute she was
insanely jealous of the admiral Coligny, whose political ascendency
seemed all the greater because of the conduct of the Protestants who
crowded Paris for the coming nuptials, enjoying their superficial
popularity with too much arrogance in many cases, and angering the
sentiment of the Parisians, the most Catholic populace in France.

The massacre seems primarily due to the jealousy and hatred felt by
Catherine de Medici toward Coligny on account of his great ascendency
over Charles IX, coupled with panic after the failure of her deliberate
attempt to have him murdered, and fear of war with Spain—a fear all
the greater because of England’s desertion of France in Flanders
at this critical moment, lest English commercial ascendency there
should suffer.[1537] It was a crime of fear, a horrible resource in
a difficult emergency; partly a craven attempt to placate Spain for
what had been done against her; partly a crime of jealousy. Perhaps
jealousy of Coligny was even a stronger motive than fear of Spain.
The attempt upon Coligny’s life on August 22, would seem to indicate
this.[1538] Was the general slaughter of the Huguenots the consequence
of the failure of this attempt? If the shot of August 22 had killed the
admiral, would the massacre have taken place? I think not. The failure
to kill the admiral was the immediate occasion of the massacre of St.
Bartholomew’s Day. If Coligny had been killed then and there, the
massacre probably would not have happened.

The failure to compass the death of the admiral made Catherine frantic
with mingled rage and fear lest the Huguenots concentrated in Paris
would rise in reprisal. She took council with Guise, Anjou, Madame de
Nemours, and Gondi, the Italian bishop of Paris. The resolution of the
King, who at first believed that the duke of Guise was the author of
the attempted assassination, was beaten down by his mother, and when
his fierce instincts were at last aroused, the way was easy. The hatred
of Paris could be relied upon to do its worst, under the guidance of
the provost who was taken into the plot.[1539]

There is no need to detail the history of this famous day. At
one-thirty on the morning of August 24 the tocsin sounded from the
tower of St. Germain-l’Auxerrois. Coligny was the first victim. From
the Louvre the murderous spirit spread to the Ville, to the Cité,
to the university quarter. Henry of Navarre and the prince of Condé
saved themselves by abjuration. Montgomery escaped on a fleet horse to
the south. Estimates of the dead are so different that any positive
opinion is impossible. La Popelinière gives 1,000 for Paris, the Tuscan
ambassador 3,000, Davila 10,000. Brantôme says nearly 4,000 bodies were
thrown into the Seine.

From Paris the massacre spread to the provinces. On August 25 the fury
reached Meaux and Troyes; on the 26th La Charité, on the 27th Orleans
and Bourges, on the 28th Caen, on the 30th Lyons. Bordeaux and Toulouse
followed. At Rouen, Carrouges, the governor, would not obey the
King’s warrant until doubly convinced, when he retired to his country
house and refused to execute it, though he did not have the courage
to prevent the massacre, as was the case at Dijon, Limoges, Blois,
Nantes.[1540]

There is no reason for doubting that the massacre of St. Bartholomew
was unpremeditated. It was not plotted years before, or even many days
before. The light of modern investigation[1541] has proved this to
the satisfaction of every unprejudiced historian, whether Protestant
or Catholic. The combination of causes that led to the action; the
motives of the principals; the responsibility for the massacre are
today known with as much certainty as moral forces having relative
and not absolute values can be. Even unprejudiced contemporaries, La
Noue and Henry IV himself, did not believe the massacre to have been
premeditated. A general slaughter of the Protestants was an old idea,
but never regarded as a practical one, save by the papacy. The guilt of
the massacre in all its monstrous proportions and consequences rests
upon Catherine de Medici first of all. Fundamentally considered, it
was the crime of a tigerishly hateful and essentially cowardly woman’s
heart. Catherine was the author and instigator of it. The Guises
entered into the plot chiefly to avenge themselves upon the admiral and
really had little interest in prosecuting it beyond his death.[1542]
The duke of Anjou and Tavannes were the fanatics. Charles IX was the
creature of his mother’s malign influence and the victim of his own
ferocious temperament which he had long indulged, and to which he now
allowed monstrous license. For the rest the massacre of St. Bartholomew
was perpetrated by men whose natures were compounded out of religious
bigotry, political enmity, personal resentment or mere ruffianism and
love of violence. The massacre of St. Bartholomew could not possibly
have been of the remotest political benefit to any person. It was
both a crime and a blunder. But Catherine de Medici was a ruler whose
political conduct was governed by her personal feelings and prejudices.
In the crisis in which she was, she had not the acumen to discern, or
the courage to dare to follow, the course that lay open before her if
she had had eyes to see and an understanding instead of a passionate
heart. That course lay toward Italy and not toward the Netherlands.
If France had reasserted her claims to Naples and Milan, then in the
possession of Philip II, the nation would have been united in a common
cause that would have appealed to ancient pride and achievement as well
as existing animosity against Spain. England would have had no reason
to be jealous, for her hand would have been free in Flanders. Moreover,
in Italy France might have looked for support from Tuscany and Ferrara.
Switzerland would have supported the enterprise; Venice would have
made no opposition and the Emperor, for all his Spanish attachments,
could not have done so. With the Turk in the Mediterranean on her side,
France could have gone into war with Spain and the Pope without fear
and with great promise of success.[1543]

CHAPTER XVI

THE FOURTH CIVIL WAR

The massacre of St. Bartholomew, like a bolt out of a clear sky,
precipitated a new storm—the fourth civil war. La Rochelle was the
storm center, though Sancerre and Montauban were rocks of safety for
the Huguenots of the center and south of France, no less than three
thousand Protestants and Politiques of Toulouse finding refuge in the
latter place.[1544] When Charles IX’s murderous passion was overpast
and reason returned, he attempted to avert a new war by offering
favorable terms to the Rochellois.[1545] But when the town fortified
itself and refused to trust the “favorable” terms offered by Biron and
turned toward England for aid, the marshal was commanded to take the
city by storm.[1546] The government was heavily embarrassed in its
military preparations. Money was scarce and the rate of interest 15
per cent.[1547] Soldiers of judgment and experience pointed out that
without either Swiss or Germans the King could not successfully batter
the town, “for Frenchmen were not fit for the keeping of artillery,
or to make the body of the ‘battle’ of footmen,” and the Swiss diet
refused to let France draw more mercenaries from the Alpine lands. The
King was equally unsuccessful in his endeavor to recruit footmen in
Germany.[1548]

The enigmatical policy of Elizabeth was also a deterrant in the
beginning of the war. While she sent the earl of Worcester into France
in January, 1573, to treat of commerce and to dangle the prospect of
her marrying Charles IX’s youngest brother, the duke of Alençon, before
the eyes of the French court,[1549] the English queen did not turn a
deaf ear to the petition of the Rochellois.[1550] If after the massacre
there was less fear of strengthening France by giving aid to the Low
Countries, on the contrary it became doubly necessary for England not
to break with Spain, so that the policy of Queen Elizabeth was a timid
and hesitating one.

When England’s policy was perceived to be so weak, the government
pushed forward its military preparations against the city and the
Italian artillery commander, Strozzi, in mid-December, took Marans,
not far from La Rochelle, and put the garrison to the sword. But
the Rochellois maintained the ramparts against all onslaught. The
attacking army, under command of the duke of Anjou, lay in the dike
under the curtain of the town walls, but could get no farther. To add
to the discomfiture of the Catholics, the King’s army was in want
of foodstuffs on account of the rising of the country roundabout,
especially Poitou and Limousin.[1551]

The dearth, however, was more than local. The winter of 1572-73 was
again a hard one, and though the spring of 1573 opened early and mild,
there came recurrence of cold; so much so that processions were held,
imploring the grace of God upon the fields where much of the grain was
killed. The ensuing high prices of grain were made higher owing to
the fact that great amounts of it were stored by the dealers against
the market. There were bread riots and popular tumults in various
localities and many towns fixed a maximum price. This condition of
things aggravated the state of war throughout the country. Multitudes
of people crowded the towns. These refugees brought their possessions
with them, their linen and household goods, their sheep and their
cattle, which they were forced to sell for a song in order to buy bread.

The hard times also led to the migration of people from province to
province and increased the vagabondage that already existed. The hunger
was so great that men and women devoured vegetables, and even grain,
raw. In consequence of the lack of food or the way in which it was
consumed, suffering and disease ensued. Those who were fortunate enough
to possess a garden plot with a few vines or fruits or vegetables were
compelled to guard them by night and by day against the spoiler. It
was considered an act of charity for those who had fruit trees, after
themselves gathering the fruit, to permit those more wretched than
they to strip the branches of their leaves and consume them. Paris
suffered with the rest of France, for it was impossible to supply
the city with food from the Beauce and Picardy and Champagne. Grain
was imported from Spain and even from the Barbary coast, the timely
arrival of six vessels, on one occasion, saving the capital from the
pinch of famine.[1552] The “hard times,” which lasted more than a
year, naturally bore heaviest upon the poorer classes, whose wretched
condition contrasted with the luxury and vanity of the wealthier
classes, with whom extravagance reached an extreme.[1553]

During the winter there was a complete cessation of hostilities before
La Rochelle. Not a cannon was discharged all through the months of
December, January, and February.[1554] In derision of the King’s camp,
some of the more daring of the Huguenot soldiery strutted about adorned
with cards and dice to signify that the King’s troops were better
gamesters than soldiers.[1555] The truth is, Protestant France was not
all of one mind to continue the resistance. There were two parties
in the Huguenot capital, the irreconcilables, who wanted war to the
knife and favored looking to England for support; and a more moderate
faction led by that Bayard of the Protestants, the heroic La Noue,
who, believing that the great enemy of France and of the Huguenots was
Spain,[1556] with proper guarantees stood ready to forget and forgive
the massacre, so far as it was possible for human memory and feeling
to do so, recognizing that that event was a catastrophe to Catholic
as well as to Protestant France; that, however monstrous it was as a
crime, as a blunder its effects were even more calamitous.

As for the crown, it was even more anxious than the moderate Huguenots
to avoid a protracted siege and come to some form of settlement.[1557]
With this aim Charles IX, through the medium of the duke of
Longueville, governor of Picardy, early in October had made overtures
to La Noue, who was still in Flanders. After some hesitation La Noue
came to Paris where he had a conference with the King and the queen
mother. So trusted and so capable was he that Charles IX gave him
practically discretionary powers to bring about a settlement, and in
the middle of November La Noue went to La Rochelle.

For days the intrepid leader vainly endeavored to secure entrance into
the city.[1558] Finally, on November 26 he was reluctantly admitted.
During the cold and weary weeks of December, January, and February,
while besieged and besiegers were lying on their arms upon the walls
or in the trenches, La Noue alternately entreated and expostulated,
urging the necessity of peace in the face of vilification, the Huguenot
minister La Place even calling him “perfide traistre, déserteur de
son parti.” “The word of the King,” said Catherine de Medici, to the
deputies of the Reformed on one occasion, “ought to be sufficient for
you.” “No,” replied one of them, “not since St. Bartholomew.”[1559]
Even La Noue’s influence could not overcome the radical party in La
Rochelle which imprisoned as many as advocated capitulation no matter
what the terms might be. At last on March 12, 1573, the brave man gave
up hope of persuading the zealot populace and returned to the King’s
camp. Angry at the failure of these pacific overtures, the government
forces redoubled their attacks. On March 22 the royal artillery opened
a terrible fire upon the city, more than 1,500 cannon-balls being
thrown. On April 7 there was a furious assault, even women fighting on
the wall, and the attack was repeated on the 10th, 13th, and 14th, on
the last day there being five separate attempts to take the city by
storm.

Montgomery, who had been sent to England for assistance,[1560] appeared
with about seventy ships, and was on the point of giving battle in
the bay, when a fleet of forty vessels from the ports of Brittany and
Normandy hove in sight. These ships, with what Anjou could muster,
made too great a body for Montgomery to risk an engagement, and so he
retired to Belle-Ile, which was made a Protestant naval base.[1561]

[Illustration:

Plan de la
Rochelle en M·D·LXXII.

From _Histoire au siège de La Rochelle en 1573_, traduite du Latin de
Philippe Cauriana (La Rochelle, 1856).]

Meanwhile, the Swiss in camp had toiled in the trenches and “swamp
angel” guns were established in the marshes to batter the port of St.
Nicholas. On June 11 the supreme assault on La Rochelle was made and
repulsed. The attacking force by an escalade gained possession of
the rampart but found a mighty trench before them, so that they were
constrained to beat their way along the rampart in the hopes of finding
a place to cross it. Those in the camp, seeing their comrades gain the
ramparts, cried, “ville gaignée!” But the Rochellois lured the enemy
along the wall “and when they were entered set upon them both before
and behind with such fury that they were all either slain or hurt, and
the rest who were coming to succor the foremost were repulsed with
great loss.”[1562]

After the failure of the great assault, because the soldiery without
was so much discouraged by failure, angry for lack of pay,[1563] and
weakened by losses and disease, the only recourse of the crown was
to capitulate with the Rochellois[1564] with as much reservation as
possible. Villeroy’s report on the condition of things before La
Rochelle was too convincing to be ignored[1565]. In the first week
of July, after two days’ deliberation, Charles IX signed the terms,
although they were not published at once.[1566]

The general provisions were that those of La Rochelle should have life,
goods, and liberty of conscience and that the town, together with
Montauban, Sancerre, and Nîmes should also have “free exercise of
the religion and find a garrison for themselves.” The edict declared
that the memory of all things which had happened since the 24th of
August should be extinguished; that the Catholic religion was to be
established throughout the country, except at the four cities named.
Bailiffs and judges ordinary were to see to the decent interment of
those who died in the Reformed religion. Those who gave security
that they would change their religion should be admitted to the
universities, schools, hospitals, without hindrance, and finally that
any French Protestant might sell or alienate his goods and retire to
any country he pleased, provided it were not to the territory of any
princes where war obtained, a provision obviously intended to protect
Spain in the Netherlands.[1567]

But the fourth war of religion was not yet entirely over. While La
Rochelle with 2,000 men daily labored to repair its battered walls,
Sancerre was not to be tempted by the terms, and the south of France
still held out. The heroic resistance of Sancerre, perched like an
eagle’s nest on a steep hill above the Loire, is one of the epic
stories of the sixteenth century. For nearly eight months (January 3 to
August 19, 1573) the city withstood every assault and only succumbed
at last when reduced to direst famine. Horses, asses, dogs, cats, rats
were all consumed. Soup made of boiled parchment became a luxury. The
inhabitants ate “pain de paille haschée et d’ordorze y meslant du
fumier de chevaux et tout ce qu’ils pensoient avoir quelque suc.” Even
the bodies of the dead were disinterred and consumed. When human nature
could endure no more, Sancerre threw itself upon the mercy of its
conqueror. It was granted liberty of worship and the people spared from
massacre and pillage for the price of forty thousand livres; but its
mediaeval glory was shorn from it. The splendid clock-tower of the town
was destroyed, its ramparts razed.[1568]

In spite of the pacification at La Rochelle and the fall of Sancerre,
the Midi still resisted. In Languedoc and Dauphiné the Huguenots were
especially strong.[1569] Their harvests were garnered into walled
towns; their army included 2,000 arquebusiers besides the Huguenot
gentry and they were well prepared for further war.[1570] On the
anniversary of the massacre (August 24, 1573) deputies of all the
churches of the south convened at Montauban and took the preliminary
steps in the formation of the great Huguenot confederation which in
December assumed the direction of the war, the regulation of finances,
civil administration, and religious protection.[1571]

Languedoc was divided into two governments with Montauban and Nîmes as
centers under the authority of the viscounts of Paulin and St. Romain,
each assisted and controlled by a council. The councils, in turn, in
all important matters were required to consult the local assemblies
of Protestants. All these assemblies were elective. The Protestant
organization thus constituted an all but full-fledged state within a
state, asserting its own power to lay taxes, to administer justice, to
carry on war, and to make peace. It was estimated that 20,000 men in
these regions were able to bear arms.

In consequence of the continuance of the war in the south the Swiss
and the rest of the soldiery not yet licensed were sent from the camp
before La Rochelle into Dauphiné and Languedoc. But the government
was heavily embarrassed financially and had been compelled to resort
to forced loans in Paris and the old shift of mortgaging the revenue
until the grant of the clergy was made in June.[1572] Even then it did
not urge war. Charles IX, jealous of the Guises and of the military
reputation which his brother had acquired, was again manifesting his
hatred of the restraint imposed upon him, and desirous of recovering
his independence.

The tendency of France was to return to its earlier policy which
had been interrupted by the massacre.[1573] Charles again inclined
to sustain Holland in its rebellion against Spain,[1574] at least
underhandedly. To strike Spain was at the same time to strike at all
the influences which he hated. Accordingly France made overtures anew
to the prince of Orange, although it was not without repugnance that
William of Orange brought himself to listen to them.[1575] But the
voice of policy was stronger than sentiment.[1576] For on December
11, 1572, the famous siege of Haarlem had begun. It was Alva’s purpose
by the capture of this city to cut the communications between south
Holland, where the prince of Orange was, and north Holland.[1577]

From Germany the faithful and far-sighted Schomberg earnestly urged
the project and so artfully did he fulfil his mission that the elector
palatine, the landgrave, and the archbishop of Cologne all espoused
it.[1578] “The repose of the kingdom, the security of the state, the
ruin of the great enemy of France, direct and firm alliance with the
princes of Germany, the subversion of all the designs of the house
of Austria, and the culmination of your desires, is in the hands of
your majesty,” he wrote to Catherine on March 23.[1579] At last,
after months of deliberation and delay, the threads of these tortuous
negotiations were all drawn together at a secret interview of Catherine
de Medici with Louis of Nassau at Blamont in Lorraine, in December,
1573.[1580]

But there was yet another reason why the crown of France was desirous
of closing the conflict at home, which goes far to explain the
government’s willingness to compromise with La Rochelle. The throne
of Poland had become vacant upon the death of Sigismund Augustus, the
last of the Jagiello house, on July 7, 1572. The crown of Poland was
an elective one, the suffrage being in the hands of the diet, composed
solely of the two privileged orders. In the factional strife that too
often ensued, the deadlock was sometimes broken by the election of an
outside prince. This vicious and unnational policy triumphed in 1573.
The Emperor, the King of Spain, and France had each a candidate. But
Poland had no mind to experience the fate of Bohemia and pass under
the suzerainty of the Hapsburgs. Spain, too, in the person of her
ambassador, was deprived of a hearing and compelled to make overtures
in writing. In this wise the way was cleared for French diplomacy. In
the autumn of 1572, Charles IX had been sounded by the Poles as to the
candidacy of the duke of Anjou and had intimated the conditions to be
expected.[1581] On December 19, the secretary of the bishop of Valence,
the French agent who had been hastily dispatched to Poland, arrived
in Paris, and gave great hope for the election of the duke of Anjou,
though the Polish diet had not met yet on account of the plague.[1582]

When it convened on April 15, 1573, the dexterous feat was accomplished
by the papal legate, Cardinal Commendone, who, for his spiritual
master, was hostile to the Emperor for having lately made a three
years’ truce with the Turks and thus marred the glory of Lepanto, and
opposed in principle to the widening of Spain’s activities anywhere,
in view of the supreme struggle of the faith in France and the Low
Countries, where the cause of Rome was in sore need of Spanish support.
The French envoys[1583] then skilfully introduced the name of the
duke of Anjou, lauding his Catholic virtues in the ears of a Catholic
populace; promising that if elected Henry of Valois would spend all
his revenues—how little these were the Poles could not know—in
Poland for the benefit of the kingdom; they promised, too, that the
prospective king would recover from the Muscovite all the territories
whereof the kingdom of Poland had been despoiled in times past, as well
as Wallachia from the Turks.[1584] The arguments told, and on May 19,
1573, the duke of Anjou was elected king of Poland.

On August 8, 1573, the official deputation of Polish nobles sent to
France to notify the duke of Anjou of his election reached Metz, and
soon afterward (June 24, St. John’s Day) arrived at Paris. They were
the advance guard of almost two thousand Polish nobles and gentry who
visited the kingdom during this summer. They were all magnificently
lodged and entertained in the city at the expense of the crown, or
rather at the expense of the people, for a new tax was imposed for
purposes of entertainment. The appearance of the Poles struck the
French with amazement. They were all tall, handsome men, “speaking
Latin down to the very hostlers,” but marvelously given to drink and
great gourmands. The wine-shops of the capital were almost drunk dry.
Two Poles, the saying went, drank more wine and consumed more meat than
six Frenchmen.[1585]

The honor of the crown of Poland salved the wounded pride of Anjou,
still before La Rochelle. But the army murmured so much that a royal
mandate was issued making it a misdemeanor to argue or to discuss the
Polish election in the streets of Paris, or to discountenance the
election of the duke of Anjou to the throne of Poland in written work
or speech.[1586] Without victory, without pay, without even enough to
eat, the soldiers grumbled to the point of mutiny and averred that the
government was bribed, and took the Huguenot money in order to provide
funds for the King’s trip to Poland.[1587] Henry dared not openly
leave the camp for fear of their rebellion and was compelled to make a
feint of going boating in the bay and then effect an escape by sea to
Nantes.[1588]

Distance lent enchantment to the view. Poland was in a wretched
condition through the dissensions of the nobility. The Emperor was
angry and talked of stopping the duke _en route_.[1589] Lithuania
seceded and entered into an alliance with the duke of Prussia, the
king of Sweden, and Russia, to overthrow the Polish government.[1590]
The Hanseatic cities, too, like Dantzig, Riga, and Revel, were very
dissatisfied, for it was open knowledge that Poland aspired to the
control of their commerce.[1591] The Poles themselves soon discovered
that their new king was a goose without a golden egg. For the French
lawyers found an interpretation of the promise that the French would
discharge the debts of the realm to the effect that the promise meant
only those arising since the death of the late king. The Polish
agents in Paris made wry faces at the finding, but so the agreement
was registered by the Parlement of Paris on September 17, 1573.[1592]
In the same month the duke of Anjou set out for his new kingdom,
going via Nancy, Heidelberg, and Frankfurt to Cracow. Metz he avoided
because the Emperor, still sullen and still smarting from the loss of
the city twenty-one years before (1552), had commanded the imperial
commissioners appointed to conduct him, to receive him in Metz as
though it were a free city of the empire, which the French naturally
refused to permit.

Again the foolish affection of Catherine de Medici for one of her
children,[1593] again her political fatuity, threw France far off
from the course she should have followed. As before the massacre, so
now that course was the path to Italy.[1594] Instead of narrowing the
field of her ambition for her children and concentrating her power,
not content with Poland for the duke of Anjou, she even dreamed of the
Hapsburg crown for Charles IX,[1595] and that of England for Alençon.
Schomberg’s missions in 1572-73 to Germany[1596] were not merely to
dispose the German princes in favor of France’s projected enterprise
in the Netherlands, but also to persuade them, especially the electors
of Cologne and the Palatinate, in favor of the French King’s imperial
ambition. France’s policy in Poland[1597] and her policy in Germany
were two parts of one grand design and in a large sense had to stand
or fall together. Peace with the Huguenots was an essential element in
the forwarding of this project, especially with the Protestant German
princes, as Schomberg pointed out.[1598]

But there were two great obstacles in the way of advance—German
resentment because of the massacre of St. Bartholomew[1599] and
the counter-diplomacy of Spain.[1600] The Guisard-Spanish party at
home naturally exerted itself to thwart the prosecution of these
designs.[1601] Morvilliers warned Charles IX that their continuance
would involve France in a war with Spain.[1602]

CHAPTER XVII

THE LAST DAYS OF CHARLES IX. THE CONSPIRACY OF THE POLITIQUES

The war in the south, during the months of these negotiations, had
gone on in its own course almost unhindered by the government. Many of
the men of service had gone with Anjou into Poland and many others,
especially the Swiss, were licensed. In consequence the Huguenots
made themselves masters of the Rhone, even seizing Avignon, to the
great anger of the Pope, who refused to receive Paul de Foix as French
ambassador to Rome on the double ground that he was of the Huguenot
persuasion and because the French King would not give safe-conduct
to troops from Italy to go to Avignon for the purpose of recovering
it.[1603] After the departure of his brother for Poland, Charles IX
weakly took up the Protestant issue again, and he and his mother spent
three days at Chantilly with Montmorency in consideration of the course
to follow.[1604] Deputations from various provinces came to the King to
petition immediate reduction of the taxes on account of the exhausted
state of the country, but there was a unanimous wish against calling
another session of the estates on account of the expense.[1605] As an
earnest of the King’s good intentions, the prince of Condé was made
governor of Picardy, an office made vacant by the timely decease of the
duke of Longueville, the prince, to the chagrin of the duke of Nevers
who was an aspirant for the post, having recovered from the smallpox,
with which the duke of Alençon also fell ill.[1606] The King had
planned to convene deputies of the Huguenots of Languedoc and Dauphiné
at least at Compiègne, but fell ill of smallpox[1607] and the project
came to an end.[1608] To add to embarrassments Paris and Rouen, where
the populace were of the opposing religions, entered into war for the
restraint of foodstuffs, Paris stopping all wine passing down the
Seine and Rouen in turn preventing corn from passing up the river to
Paris.[1609] The economic condition of the country gave the government
great concern. Hard times and high prices still prevailed and the
measures of the government only irritated things the more, though some
of them were wisely meant. For example, in February, 1574, an edict of
the King forbade the circulation of all foreign silver coin, as well
as that which was mutilated or debased. When the merchants of Troyes
learned of this condemnation of all foreign or cut coin, they sent a
deputation to remonstrate with the King, saying that their town and the
county of Champagne as well as all Lorraine and Burgundy abounded with
this money and no other; and it was not possible to exclude these coins
from the country without entailing ruin, if the edict were enforced.
They further urged that the edict would act as a serious bar to traffic
across the frontier. But the King refused to rescind the ordinance.
In consequence, those familiar with money palmed off the forbidden
currency upon the simpler folk, who found to their dismay that they had
been cheated, when the King’s officers refused to accept these coins in
payment of taxes. Nevertheless, in the long run, the action raised the
standard of coin in France.[1610] Less wise action was the new sale of
offices—those of the _procureurs du roi_—and it was even suggested
that the office of advocate be made a salable one, but fortunately for
the administration of justice, this was not done.[1611]

Popular suspicion was also attached to an ordinance commanding the
governors of the provinces, through the bailiffs and seneschals, to
take a census in their localities, giving the name, surname, and
employment of all men between the ages of twenty-one and sixty. It
was beyond the imagination of the people to know the reason of this
action, or to divine what the King meant to do. Some thought that the
crown was going to establish a local constabulary for the arrest of the
numerous robbers and vagabonds, who, under the guise of war, looted
and pillaged the country, and that men would be chosen in each parish
like the francs-archers of the days of Louis XII and Francis I. Others
thought that the King merely wanted to raise a new army to send into
Languedoc where the Huguenots and the Politiques were now making common
cause together. Others still thought that the device was one for taxing
purposes.[1612]

Worst of all, however, was an event that happened late in December,
1573, which threatened to make the war general again. This event was
the discovery of a plot to overthrow the Protestants in La Rochelle.
The King seems to have been innocent of the project, and repudiated
the government’s part in it. The author of the plot was La Haye, the
president of Poitiers, who ingratiated himself with the people of
the town and managed to secure some of his accomplices positions in
the guard. The gate of the city was to be treacherously opened to a
strong force secretly brought up under cover of darkness on the night
of December 15. But on the day before, one of the company betrayed
the plan to the authorities of the city.[1613] Tremendous indignation
prevailed in Huguenot circles as a result of this disclosure. English
merchants in Rouen, Dieppe, and the Norman ports for a time apprehended
local massacres, for Montgomery was known to be in England.[1614]
In the provinces, from day to day, news came of the doings of the
Huguenots. La Noue was in Lusignan; there were Huguenot movements in
Poitou, Limousin, and Guyenne;[1615] again it was word from Sedan, the
seat of the duke of Bouillon, that there was a suspicious rendezvous
of Huguenots there; another time that there were 500 Protestant horse
and 1,200 footmen assembled at St. Lô.[1616] The government was under
apprehension lest suddenly, either at home some danger might assail
France, or that abroad, by the actions of Germany and England, material
assistance might be given to the Huguenots to carry their designs into
effect, for the waters of the Channel and the Bay of Biscay swarmed
with privateers.[1617] On February 25 the Reformed party issued a
famous declaration “printed at Rochelle in diverse languages that
the truth of our cause and purpose may be known to all Christians.”
Finally, news of real material importance came that Montgomery, whom
Guitery had joined, had landed near Coutances and marched to Carentan,
which surrendered within two days. Since then Montgomery had taken
various forts and castles, among them Argentan, and ten pieces of
artillery.[1618] Charles IX immediately commissioned the sieur de
Torcy, lieutenant-general in the government of the Ile-de-France and
the viscount of Turenne to treat with him, making promise of favor and
protection if he would lay down his arms. But Montgomery replied that
the memory of St. Bartholomew was too fresh for him to do so; and for
that matter he would have to refer the King’s terms to the body of the
Reformed, of which he was only a member.[1619]

The Huguenots possessed a hierarchy of religious assemblies which
served to unite their forces, through consistories, colloquies, and
provincial synods, into a national body. Yet there was not an absolute
uniformity in this organization. In the north of France each town
maintained its own particular administration, separate and distinct.
La Rochelle is a type of this kind and was fiercely jealous of its
“franchises and liberties” after the manner of the German cities.[1620]
In the south, however, these local governments fused to form the
great association, which rendered possible the creation of a genuine
Huguenot political state. This development was materially aided by the
Politiques. For one of the results of the massacre of St. Bartholomew
was the crystallization of the liberal Catholic element represented
by the marshal Montmorency and his brother, Damville, into a real
political party. It was composed of a group of young nobles, ambitious
and ill satisfied, with whom politics was of more importance than
religion, and who were hostile to the queen mother and to the Guises.
Among them were the duke of Alençon, who perhaps dreamed of succeeding
his brother, when Henry of Anjou was far away in Poland, for Charles
IX’s days were evidently numbered; the young princes of Navarre and
Condé, who had been driven to espouse Catholicism by terror, the
viscount of Turenne and the whole house of Montmorency. Even in the
camp before La Rochelle this faction of the Politiques laid its plots,
endeavoring to put the fleet under command of the duke of Alençon, and
probably upon the advice of the king of Navarre opened intercourse
with La Noue.[1621] La Noue was persuaded that much might be gained
by the fusion of the Huguenots and the Politiques. The significance of
this development must not pass unnoticed. The whole character of the
war was ultimately changed by it. La Noue first, and later Damville,
became the genius of this alliance. He negotiated with Damville, with
Alençon, with Henry of Navarre. He sent Du Plessis-Mornay to England.
But his greatest feat of diplomacy was the persuasion of the people of
La Rochelle to adopt the new course. It required all the eloquence, all
the charm, and all the strategy of a born leader of men to convince the
hot-headed and impetuous Rochellois, but he finally succeeded, and the
alliance was at last concluded between the Huguenots of religion and
the Huguenots of state, the connecting link being the new party of the
Politiques.[1622]

The Protestants and the Politiques speedily converted theories into
practice in the south of France, where their confederation spread over
all Languedoc and much of Guyenne. Two towns in each province were
appointed as “Confederate towns.” Special parlements pronounced upon
all law cases which arose between litigants of either group. Liberty of
worship was recognized as sacred right and this _de facto_ government
even undertook the trial and condemnation of the authors of the
massacre of 1572.

We get clear intimations of these new political ideas in the literature
of the time.

In the last days of Charles IX a political treatise appeared entitled
_Du droit des magistrats sur les sujets_, purporting to have been
published in Magdeburg, which advanced the thesis that the kingship,
although established by God, was a popular institution, and that, if
the king were unfaithful to his office, he could be set aside.[1623]
The _Franco-Gallia_ of Hotman proclaimed the sovereignty of the people
and the dependency of the crown upon its will. The same idea dominates
the _Junius Brutus_ of Hubert Languet. Popular sanction, he says,
alone makes the king; election is an inalienable right of the people to
whom the king is responsible. A pamphlet inspired by the Montmorencys
and called _La France-Turquie_ compared Charles IX to the Sultan and
accused him of endeavoring to reduce his subjects to eastern servility.

An incident that occurred at this time shows how far the idea of
limited monarchy obtained among the Huguenots. In the course of one
of the negotiations the prince of Condé was asked to sign a paper for
his party. His reply was that he and the king of Navarre “had no other
authority in that party than that which they had received with the
articles of their election,” which did not attribute a monarchical
power to them, the party being composed of a great number of the
nobility and the third estate, who had given power to them.[1624]

Yet there was not complete homogeneity in the new order of things. The
Politiques, except high nobles, and the rank and file of the Huguenots
represented liberal democratic ideas. But the nobles could not forget
their ancient lineage. The _assemblées de généralité_, created in
1573, included the chief members of the nobility, and although the
third estate occupied an important place in them, the generals were
all nobles.[1625] The nobility were not slow to resume their ancient
superiority owing to the influence of the king of Navarre, who was not
as pliable as the prince of Condé, particularly after the Huguenot
alliance with the Politiques.[1626]

An enormous amount of provincial spirit had been aroused during the
course of the wars. One of the speakers in the _Reveille-matin_ speaks
of the half-independence of Dauphiné, and points out the strong
tendency to re-establish the ancient provincial organization. This
theory of the Huguenots was in harmony with their constant assertion
that they were restorers of the past, not revolutionists. Feudal
traditions were too strong in France to be displaced by this new
change. While the bourgeoisie formed town groups, the Protestant
and Politique nobles appealed to the provincial spirit. By a species
of political atavism the régime of the Middle Ages began again to
prevail.[1627] Every captain considered himself a petty sovereign.
When the King ordered Montbrun to respect the majesty of the law, the
haughty rejoinder was that arms made men equal in the game of politics.
“In time of war when one carries a weapon in his hand and sits in the
saddle, the whole world is comrade.”

The government accordingly made renewed endeavors to carry on the war.
The provost of Paris was authorized on March 30 to make proclamation
that all vassals and others in Paris belonging to the ban and
arrière-ban, should assemble, fully equipped on April 15; all gendarmes
were ordered to repair to the governors and lieutenant-governors of
their several provinces, by April 20.[1628] Montpensier was sent into
Anjou with instructions to do nothing against La Noue, but to keep the
passages of the Loire and prevent him from joining with Montgomery. The
hope was yet to arrange terms with the Huguenots and for that reason
Strozzi, for whom La Noue had been exchanged after Moncontour, and
Pinart were sent to La Noue, bearing credentials from Henry of Navarre,
and Villeroy dispatched to Languedoc. Simultaneously emissaries were
also sent to Sedan, for fear lest the prince of Condé and the duke
of Bouillon might conspire with Louis of Nassau. East, west, south,
the clouds of war hung over France.[1629] In the court intrigue and
accusation were rife all this time. In February the duke of Guise
feigned, or believed, that he discovered a plot to assassinate him, of
which Montmorency was the author.[1630]

The absence of Henry of Anjou at this critical stage filled Catherine
with alarm, and strenuous efforts were made to bring about a
settlement. A secret agent of the queen mother named Pierre Brisson at
this time tried to bribe La Noue by the offer of 10,000 _écus de rente_
to retire to England. It must have been a great temptation, for already
the intrepid leader was ruined by the war; but his nature was too noble
to accept the terms. Charles IX for a season shook himself out of the
apathy of mortal illness, while the Huguenots and the Politiques bent
every endeavor to perfect their plans during the absence of the heir to
the throne in Poland. The scheme was to declare Henry of Anjou deprived
of his rights to the crown and to recognize the duke of Alençon as
heir-presumptive with the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom.
Elizabeth of England[1631] and William of Orange were counted upon for
influence and assistance. With this purpose a conspiracy was set on
foot much like that attempted at Meaux in 1567. The duke of Alençon and
the king of Navarre were to make their escape from court and effect a
union with Guitery, chief of the confederates in Normandy. They were
then suddenly to seize St. Germain and carry off the King and queen
mother. The plot was that the king of Navarre, the duke of Alençon, and
some of their gentlemen should go forth from the court on the morning
of this day as if to hunt, and ride toward Mantes, which was a town in
the appanage of the duke, and garrisoned by a company of the marshal
Montmorency under the command of a brother of Du Plessis-Mornay. The
gate was to be opened upon their appearance.[1632] March 1, 1574,
was the day set for the enterprise, but there was a misunderstanding
between the leaders, and unfortunately, as in 1560, there were too many
informed of it. Catherine had vague information, and was on her guard.
But final failure was due to a false move of Guitery, who arrived upon
the scene a day ahead of the appointed time, and with insufficient
forces.

Success depended upon Guitery’s arriving at the hour of six on the
morning of March 1 with 300 gentlemen and some footmen, but on February
27 the wild rumor was spread that there were some 700 or 800 horsemen
of the religion seen within three leagues of St. Germain. Everybody
made ready for flight “removing of stuff as if they had fled before an
enemy.” In the morning the march was made in battle array to Paris,
Charles being so weak that he could scarcely ride his mule.[1633]

At Paris, fearful of going to the Louvre, the King lodged in the
house of De Retz in the Faubourg St. Honoré and then went to Bois
de Vincennes. Failing in his purpose Guitery sought to cross the
Seine at Mantes, probably with the intention of joining La Noue who,
having taken Lusignan and other towns in Poitou, as unsuccessfully
was endeavoring to cross the Loire to join Guitery.[1634] When the
first alarm was over, the King and queen mother tried to make light
of the episode. But it was a symptom the lesson of which could not be
mistaken. It is plain that Charles IX and his mother feared greatly
what Alençon might be planning, but he affirmed vigorously that he was
only trying to escape from court.[1635] When questioned, he disclaimed
any treasonable intent or purpose to disturb the kingdom, but admitted
his hatred for the court party and his sympathy for the Politiques. In
a long harangue the duke accused the King of undue favoritism of his
brother, the duke of Anjou. The ground of his reproaches seems to have
been pique because of the fact that, while in camp before La Rochelle,
affairs of importance were never discussed in his presence.

After the departure of the king of Poland, when he hoped to have more
insight into public affairs, he had not been admitted, nor was he able
to obtain the dignity and functions which had belonged to his brother.
And these facts had lowered his reputation in the court to such an
extent that the Guises not only desired to quarrel with him but were
continually laboring to effect that result.[1636]

Further, Alençon complained

that the king and his mother threw difficulties in the way of his
intentions in Flanders; and made use of such well-reasoned arguments
that it was clear the case that he put forward had been prepared by
persons possessing greater experience and knowledge than his capacity
could pretend to have. But he did not reveal any names. He alleged
that he would have to remain a poor prince unless by force of arms
he could acquire a position whereby he might obtain a sufficient
reputation to accomplish a marriage with the queen of England; that in
France the authorities and powers enjoyed by his brother, the King of
Poland, were not given him, and that what little power he had was only
in name, while, on the other hand, the prince of Orange has sought his
aid by very large offers and many great promises had also been made to
him from Germany and England, and that in the kingdom of France many
persons had pledged their word to follow his fortunes everywhere.[1637]

The Guisard faction and Biragues, the chancellor, in order to strike
Montmorency, who with Damville was the leader of the Politiques, urged
a drastic course. At the meeting of the King’s council, the chancellor
said to the King:

You should take into account the continual fear for your own person,
and the imminent ruin which threatens the whole kingdom given you by
God, the governor; and these considerations without doubt should move
your majesty to follow the example of King Louis XI, your ancestor,
who was so renowned in history, and to cause the world to know that
while your Majesty is full of clemency, so you can also punish when
the occasion demands.[1638]

In view of the high estate of those involved, Catherine de Medici,
however, refused to follow out this resolute policy. But both princes
and Montmorency were kept under surveillance though nominally allowed
their liberty. This Scotch verdict of “not proven” was a great
disappointment to the Guises who probably are responsible for the
“conspiracy” trumped up two weeks later. It was alleged that a plot had
been “discovered” against the King and the queen mother which was to
have been carried into effect on Easter Day. On April 8, Alençon, Henry
of Navarre, and the marshal Montmorency, were together in the castle of
Bois de Vincennes when suddenly the gates were shut and double guards
set, for there was a rumor of the appearance of strange horsemen in
the vicinity. At the same time the gates of Paris were closed and no
one was permitted to pass out with any horse or weapon. La Mole, one
of the gentlemen attached to Alençon, was suddenly arrested, and with
him another gentleman of Alençon’s entourage, the count Coconnas.
Both were imprisoned in the Conciergerie, and refused converse with
the duke. The prince of Navarre, Alençon, and Montmorency, however,
still were suffered to go abroad but “with such company as might be
masters.”[1639] Things now rapidly passed from farce to tragedy.
Alençon and Navarre would confess nothing,[1640] the latter showing
“a very bold face without any fear of consequences.” The examination
was with the purpose of acquiring colorable information from the
inquisition of La Mole and Coconnas in order to implicate the duke
of Montmorency. The poor wretches had nothing of the divinity that
hedged the princes of the blood and were inquisitorially examined and
judicially murdered.[1641] The duke of Alençon in vain entreated for
the lives of his friends. Charles IX, who was morbid and savage and
stricken unto death[1642] would only allow that, instead of being
executed in public, they should be put to death in prison.[1643] On
April 30 La Mole and Coconnas were beheaded and quartered.[1644]

But for once the ascendency of the queen mother over the King was of
good effect. Charles IX was urged to mete out the same penalty to his
brother, the marshals Cossé and Montmorency, and Henry of Navarre.
If it had not been for powerful intervention this might have been
the case.[1645] Imagine the astonishment of the world that expressed
surprise when Philip II imprisoned his son if such an act had been
done! In the ferocious mood now become habitual with the King, such a
thing is conceivably possible. But Catherine de Medici spared Henry
of Navarre now, as in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, because the
Bourbons were needful as a checkmate to the Guises. Such conduct, too,
might have driven England and the German Protestant princes into active
support of the Huguenots—a consideration which had made Catherine
hesitate before August 24, 1572. A living dog was better than a dead
lion.[1646] “The King told that he should bear in mind that while the
duke and Navarre were alive, he could do what he pleased, but if they
were dead there would be no remedy.”[1647]

The real motive and animus of the whole cruel affair—the destruction
of the Montmorencys by the Guises—was not long in forthcoming.
Hitherto the duke had been allowed guarded freedom, even to go hunting.
But within a few days after the death of La Mole and Coconnas came
word of the capture of Damville, Montmorency’s brother, in Languedoc.
Immediately the duke of Montmorency and the marshal Cossé were shut up
in the Bastille. The ancient and bitter grudge of the Guises against
the Montmorency-Châtillon house, half of which had been paid in the
murder of the admiral, narrowly missed being sated at this hour. In
the blood-thirsty mood in which the King was, the purple of kingship
probably would not have protected the duke. But at heart Charles IX
and his mother were craven cowards, and the latter, at least, was not
wholly lost to prudence. Fortunately for the duke of Montmorency and
for France, the word of Damville’s capture was a false report. He
had intercepted the instructions sent to Joyeuse and the governor of
Narbonne for his apprehension and taken his precautions. Damville was
too great a lion to rouse the anger of, while he was at large, and
nothing but treachery could overthrow him, for he was in possession
of Beziers, Montpellier, Pasenas, Beaucaire, Boignelles, and Pont St.
Esprit, and as leader of the united Politiques and Huguenots of the
south, in control of Languedoc, Dauphiné, and Provence.[1648]

The great political anxiety he labored under aggravated the condition
of Charles IX, whose constitution, undermined by smallpox and his
indulgences, had now been attacked by consumption. He was reduced to
skin and bone and so weak that he could not stand and suffered from
effusion of blood through the mouth.[1649] But the ferocity of his
nature remained unsubdued. The faculty of medicine, the members of
which were called in consultation, pronounced the King’s condition
hopeless. “I believe you speak truly,” was Charles’ comment on the
verdict. “Draw the curtain down that I may have some rest.”[1650] On
the night of May 29 a violent hemorrhage foretold the end. The King
died on May 30, 1574, at two hours after noon.[1651]

The queen mother at once assumed the regency[1652] in compliance with
one of the last commands of Charles IX, and removed from the Bois de
Vincennes to the Louvre, where Alençon and Navarre were kept under
close scrutiny, for until the return of Henry from Poland there was
great uncertainty as to what might happen. The two were without money
to corrupt the guards if so dangerous an expedient were hazarded; the
windows of their chamber “grated like a prison.”[1653] Catherine’s
policy was to promise redress of grievances and reconciliation of
all at the coming of Henry III, who learned of his brother’s death
at Cracow on June 15.[1654] To that end she appealed to La Noue and
Damville but the Iron Arm flouted her overtures from his strongholds
of Lusignan and Niort, condemning the queen for her treatment of
Montmorency,[1655] and the imprisonment of Alençon and Henry of
Navarre.

[Illustration: LETTER OF HENRY III OF FRANCE TO THE DUKE OF SAVOY

Relates to the pay of his troops. Written from Lyons, September 20,
1574, within a few days after his arrival in France from Poland.
Original owned by the author.]

[Illustration: LETTER OF HENRY III TO THE SWISS CANTONS

Regrets his inability to visit Switzerland on his way to France, and
assures them of French protection. Written from Mantua, August 3, 1574.
Original owned by the author.]

The last stage in the eventful career of Montgomery was also reached
at this time. He had suddenly left Carentan with about 650 horse,
attacked the city of Alençon and then attempted to raise the siege of
St. Lô. But Matignon had more forces than he had supposed and drove him
into Domfront. After a vigorous defense he yielded the place upon the
promise that his life would be spared. But Catherine de Medici hated
him above all men in the earth and had no scruples about inaugurating
the reign of Henry III with bloodshed. She refused to honor Matignon’s
pledge.[1656] Montgomery was brought under heavy guard to Paris, being
viewed by curious gazers all along the road, and was beheaded and then
quartered on June 26, before an enormous crowd of people.

CHAPTER XVIII

HENRY III AND THE POLITIQUES. THE PEACE OF MONSIEUR (1576)

The attention of Europe was fixed upon France by these events. What
was going to happen in the absence of the heir to the throne? Would
a frightful wave of retaliatory vengeance for the massacre of St.
Bartholomew and the process of Vincennes sweep over the land? These
were the questions that were asked, not only everywhere in France,
but in many quarters of Europe. The Tuscan ambassador wrote that the
châteaux of the Montmorencys were filled with provisions and munitions
of war.[1657]

The Politiques, as a class, being imbued with Hotman’s teachings
in the _Franco-Gallia_, inveighed against Catherine for having
assumed the regency without consent of the estates. They and the
political Huguenots were at one, and demanded searching reform.
It was their hope to prevail upon the queen mother to come to a
definite agreement before the arrival of Henry III in France, in the
expectation that the King upon his arrival would find it expedient
to accept it. They demanded the reorganization of justice and the
army; they condemned the alienation of the crown lands, increase of
the tithe, and the new taxes; they insisted upon an examination of
the accounts of those who had managed the public finances and the
royal revenue, this investigation to include not only the ministers
who had enriched themselves, but also the superintendents of finance
from Henry II down to the present time, not excepting the cardinal
of Lorraine. They demanded the expulsion of the “foreigners,” naming
the chancellor Biragues, the marshal de Retz, and the duke of Nevers
who were all Italians. They hated the Guises as a foreign house and
quasi-German.[1658]

It was high time for some sort of settlement. The country was crying
out against the thieves and brigands, who frequented the roads in great
numbers under the guise of war and pretended to be in the service of
the King.[1659]

But Catherine refused to deal with any matter of state until the
arrival of the King. She showed an almost feverish anxiety for her
son’s coming, fearing that the duke of Alençon would be put forward
for the crown by the Politiques.[1660] In Germany, at the same time,
the Orange party, with the aid of Schomberg, labored to promote the
cause of the Politiques and liberal Huguenots, and in September a
deputation came from the count palatine to urge the cause of toleration
in France.[1661] But it was slow and hard work, for as La Noue had
bitterly said the year before: “The iron of the German nation was heavy
and hard to work; it was silver that made things move.”[1662] Moreover,
the agents of Spain and the Guises were encountered at every turn.

In the meantime Henry III had left Cracow on June 16, running away
from his kingdom like a thief in the night,[1663] and came home by
way of Italy, via Venice, where he was extravagantly entertained by
the senate,[1664] Ferrara (July 29), Mirandola, Mantua, and Turin,
which he left on August 28, and arrived at Lyons on September 6.[1665]
Catherine, who showed great impatience, met him there (she arrived
at Lyons on August 27). So fearful was she lest Alençon and Henry of
Navarre would escape that the young princes had traveled in the coach
with her.[1666] The procession moved as if through a hostile country by
way of Burgundy and Chalons-sur-Saône, some of the guard marching in
advance, the rest bringing up the rear. “Marshal de Retz was always on
the wing of her. Some of the guard marched two leagues before and some
two leagues after.”[1667]

Those who were at all optimistic had clung to the belief, until the
development of events shattered their hopes, that Henry III would
endeavor to pacify his subjects, arguing that if he were inclined to
war, he would not have refused the assistance proffered him in Italy of
men and money, and that the French crown could not further hazard the
reduction of the kingdom piecemeal.[1668] Damville had met the King at
Turin, having come there under a safe-conduct of the duke of Savoy, to
persuade Henry III to adopt a conciliatory policy, which he at first
inclined to follow.

But the moment he came under the sinister influence of Catherine de
Medici, he cast this prudent advice to the winds. It was she who
dissuaded him from what was wisely counseled[1669] and in advance
of his arrival had made military preparations to resume the war
by importing Swiss mercenaries and German reiters again.[1670]
Accordingly, instead of extending the olive branch, the King expressed
his determination to wage unremitting war upon the Huguenots and
Politiques rather than grant the demands they made. The deputies of
La Rochelle who came to Lyons, requesting a surcease of arms, were
repulsed by the King and told it was but a scheme of the Huguenots
to gain time for preparation. The establishment of three camps was
ordered, one in Dauphiné, the second in Provence and Languedoc, and the
third in Poitou. At the same time Schomberg and Fregoso were sent into
Germany for assistance.[1671]

When Henry III definitely resolved to follow out a policy of
suppression Damville was summoned to Lyons to answer for his
governorship. It was a fatal blunder on the part of the King, for
the action of the crown hardened the tentative co-operation of the
Protestants and the Politiques into a positive alliance. At Milhau,
in August, 1574 the Protestants recognized Damville, while he in
turn admitted their leaders into his council. The form of government
established at Montauban the year before acquired new strength and
greater extent. Provincial and general assemblies were formed without
distinction between Protestants and Politiques, upon the basis of
mutual toleration; in places where the two creeds obtained each side
promised to observe the peace and Damville engaged not to introduce the
Catholic religion in any town of which the Huguenots were masters.

The men who took this step justified it by alleging that a foreign
faction had acquired control over the sovereign; that it was destroying
the kingdom, the nobles, the princes of the blood, and with them the
very institutions and civilization of France; and that it was their
hope to arrest this process. The programme of the Huguenot-Politique
party, in addition to complete religious toleration, insisted upon the
abolition of the practice of selling offices, the convocation of the
States-General, the reduction of the taxes. In this demand they were
supported by the provincial states of Dauphiné, Provence, and Burgundy.
The confessional idea was deliberately kept in the background. Men no
longer talked of a war of religion, but of a “Guerre du Bien Public” as
in the reign of Louis XI.

With the nobles Damville’s was a name to conjure with. A large portion
of the Catholic nobility, who for a long time had been severely
reproached for not seriously opposing the Huguenots, sympathized
with his attitude. If the bench and bar of France was strongly
attached to the principles of the Catholic religion, the nobility
who were hereditary enemies of the legists, whose teachings had for
three centuries tended to abridge their feudal rights, out of sheer
self-interest, aside from any other motives, now inclined toward the
Calvinists. Only radical Calvinists, like Du Plessis-Mornay, opposed
the union and were bitter in denunciation of the overtures made by
their more moderate brethren, notably La Noue, to Damville and the
Politiques.[1672]

A royal edict let the Huguenots understand what was to be expected. The
King’s determination was to clear the valley of the Rhone from Lyons
to Avignon with the aid of the Swiss and then to subdue Languedoc on
the one side and Dauphiné on the other. Such a plan was more bold than
practicable, and Henry was likely to find it too hard to accomplish,
especially by winter sieges. The Protestants had fortified themselves
in Livron on the left bank of the Rhone and at Pouzin across the river,
which was inaccessible except by one approach and then only four men
could advance abreast.

But there was another matter, the difficulty of which Henry III
underestimated, namely the army. The Protestants were so entrenched
in their strongholds as to make the use of horsemen against them
impracticable. The Swiss were low-class mercenaries, good as ordinary
footmen but useless for a siege. Moreover, all of them, reiters and
Swiss, were not disposed to move unless they saw their pay in their
hands and were utter strangers to discipline, wasting the country “to
make a Christian man’s heart bleed.”[1673] In one case the wretched
peasantry followed their despoilers to the confines of Lyons and fell
upon them in desperation, recovering what had been taken from them.
What did the King do? He actually had to punish these wretched subjects
of his in order to retain the services of the reiters at all!

Yet the King for a moment showed some of the old fire he displayed at
Moncontour and amazed the Protestants by taking Pouzin after three
weeks of siege. The victory was marred, though, by the shameful conduct
of the Swiss, the reiters, and the Italians in the royal army, who
sacked and burned it. Much the same state of things prevailed wherever
these riotous plunderers penetrated—in Picardy, in Champagne, in
Poitou. But Henry III having reached Avignon, discovered that he was
no better off for his success. Meanwhile Damville, with whom the duke
of Savoy had honorably dealt, returned from Turin, and reached the
vicinity of Montpellier and Beaucaire before the King was aware of
it.[1674]

When the King sent the cardinal of Bourbon to talk with him, Damville
sent back word that he thought the example of his brother “too
dangerous to come to court where they who sought the ruin of his
house had too much credit,”[1675] and advised the King to remove
the strangers within his gates, meaning Biragues and De Retz.[1676]
Henry III could accomplish nothing at Avignon and yet knew not how
to get away. He could not go up-river on account of the current. The
Huguenots at Livron barred the road on the left bank; Montbrun was
in the hills in Auvergne; La Noue’s men were stopping the King’s
post daily and Damville controlled Provence and Languedoc; La Haye,
King’s lieutenant in the _séné-chaussée_ of Poitou seceded to the
Politiques.[1677] Vivarais declared its neutrality and refused to side
with King or Politiques. The people of Tulle refused to pay taxes
either to Catholics or Protestants until overpowered by the latter,
and thus the country continued to endure a war which it hated. Henry
truly was in a plight. He was without money, too, and could not hope to
get any so far from Paris. He even feared that the soldiery with him
might be bribed to desert.[1678] To crown the royal anxiety Damville’s
declaration was so public and so bold that the King feared that foreign
aid would soon be forthcoming in the Protestant service. The fear
was not without ground. For the marshal actually proposed to make a
league with the Sultan and introduce a Turkish fleet into the harbor
of Aigues-Mortes.[1679] Coupled with this possibility was a projected
enterprise against Spain in Franche-Comté in which the Huguenots of
Champagne and Burgundy were interested, but which was primarily the
project of the elector palatine and the prince of Orange.[1680]

It is a significant fact that the war has now lost almost all
confessional character and become a factional conflict between the
rival houses of Guise and Montmorency. Catholicism and political
corruption on the one hand were opposed to administrative reform and
religious toleration. After the creation of the Politique party, the
Huguenots of state had merged with them. Except in the case of radical
Calvinists and bigoted Catholics, religion had become a minor issue
with the French unless it were artificially exaggerated.[1681] It was
a mortal enmity on either side, and one which there was slight hope of
settling. The hostility of the Guises and the Montmorencys was the real
seed of the civil war.[1682] It depended upon the individual in almost
every case whether his participation one way or the other was motived
by convictions as to the public good or by private interests. The
number of those who directly or indirectly were attached to the warring
houses almost divided the realm between them and the wretched people
were badly treated by both parties.[1683] So widespread and deep rooted
was this mutual enmity throughout France, that the Venetian ambassador,
no mean observer, wondered when it would end, because it was to the
interest of each to sustain it. The King was a shuttlecock in this
game of political battledore. The ruin of the crown, instead of being
feared by them, was regarded as a possible way to give their enmity
freer rein. Each party counted not only upon paying its debts, which
were enormous, by victory, but in establishing the power of its house
more permanently than ever for the future. While the war cost the King
and the country _écus par milliers_, it cost them nothing, at least of
their own. The weakness of the crown was the strength of the rivals.
They fattened on war, for peace deprived them of their authority, their
power, and their partisans. Until one or the other faction was crushed,
the hostility was certain to endure, and thus the war seemed doomed to
last indefinitely. If, as the result of fatigue or a truce, a respite
was made, the time was brief, and was terminated as soon as one or the
other side had accumulated some substance again. The only remedy for
such a state of affairs was to be found in a foreign war, either in
Flanders or Italy.[1684]

The union of the Huguenots and the Politiques made them very strong,
especially in the south. But on the other hand the duke of Guise
received much assistance from Flanders. When the successor of Alva,
Requesens, learned of the death of Charles IX, he had offered the aid
of Spanish troops to Catherine de Medici.[1685] Although the proffer
was declined, the practical result was the same, for owing to lack of
pay in the Low Countries, thousands of reiters and Walloon and German
footmen flocked across the border in the summer and autumn, where they
were welcomed by the duke of Guise, who, somewhere and somehow, found
the means to pay them.[1686] But below the stratum of professional
soldiers in France there was another class in arms which feudal society
was not used to see in such a capacity. This was the people; not town
militia, for town and provincial leagues had made men familiar with
them, but the peasantry. The protracted wars by economically ruining
and morally debauching this class had generated a breed of men who
sprang from the soil like the dragon’s teeth of Greek fable, men who
by observation and practice were used to the matchlock and the sword,
brutalized by oppression, long made desperate by burdensome taxes and
the wrongs of war.[1687]

[Illustration: PIKEMAN AND COLOR-BEARER

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

The weariness of vigil in the depth of winter and overconfidence seem
to have relaxed the alertness of Henry III’s foes. At any rate, having
extorted 50,000 francs from the noblemen and gentlemen in his train
in order to pay the soldiery around him, the King, raising the siege
of Livron on January 24, 1575, managed to slip through the defiles to
Rheims for his coronation. The coronation was a triumph of the Guises.
For far from being set back by the death of the cardinal of Lorraine
on December 29, at Avignon[1688] their star seemed to be higher than
before. The cardinal of Guise took the place of his deceased uncle as
primate of Rheims; the duke of Guise was grand chamberlain; and the
duke of Mayenne and the marquis d’Elbœuf were the chief lay peers.
The sole outsider was De Retz who officiated as constable for the
occasion. The crowning took place on February 15. Shortly after the
event, apparently in a sudden whim of passion, Henry III married Louise
de Vaudmont, whose father was uncle of the duke of Lorraine and whose
mother had been sister of the unfortunate Egmont. But the marriage was
without political significance—indeed the new queen was of so little
station that Catherine de Medici, in a letter to Queen Elizabeth,
expressed her humiliation at her son’s marriage.[1689]

[Illustration: ARQUEBUSIER

(Tortorel and Perissin)]

The main issues of France, religious toleration and political reform,
were now more obscured than ever by the rivalry of the factions around
the throne. The queen mother bore the Guises greater hatred than before
because of their new ascendency and had little less spleen toward the
Montmorencys, but carefully dissimulated and sought on one pretext
and another to remove them from around her son. For this purpose
Bellegarde, who was an old attaché of the house of Montmorency and
owed his popularity with the King to a handsome face and a well-turned
leg, was made a special ambassador to Poland in order to get him out
of the way. His comrade on the mission was Elbœuf—an ill-matched
pair indeed. Their business was to carry 200,000 crowns of the Paris
bourgeois to Poland to bribe the Polish diet not to elect a successor
to the absent Henry. If the Poles were obdurate, Elbœuf was to advocate
the election of the duke of Ferrara, who had Guisard blood in his
veins. At the same time Biron and Matignon were made marshals to
counterpoise the influence of De Retz who forthwith resigned his office
and vowed he would “meddle no more.” There were heart-burnings, also,
over the bestowal of the government of Normandy, vacated by the death
of the duke of Bouillon. The duke of Nevers claimed that it had been
promised him while in Poland; the duchess of Nemours demanded the post
for the duke and declared that Nevers was “a foreigner.” Henry III
finally sought to compromise by giving the office to his insignificant
father-in-law, whereupon the duke of Nevers quit the court in a rage.
Squabbles of precedence, too, vexed the King’s mind. Montpensier
challenged the claims of the Guises to court precedence before the
Parlement, and Madame de Nemours therefore quarreled with her daughter.
“They were all bent to preparations of war,” quaintly wrote Dale to
Walsingham, “but these domestic discords do tame them. It is a very
hell among them, not one content or in quiet with another, nor mother
with son, nor brother with brother, nor mother with daughter.”[1690]

The state of the finances was deplorable, and Henry resorted to various
devices to provide himself with funds. The mission of Elbœuf and
Bellegarde to Poland was delayed, while the King implored the Pope,
the duke of Savoy, and Venice for the money needed;[1691] the pay
of the King’s household servants was nine months in arrears and the
last money wages of his guards had been paid by an assessment levied
by the King upon the noblemen and gentlemen of the court. Paris, as
usual, was heavily mulcted by a forced loan of 600,000 francs, besides
heavy contributions extorted from the foreign merchants there. But the
mass of the money had to come from the church lands. A letter-patent
in the form of an edict was forced through the Parlement authorizing
the alienation of 200,000 livres de rente of the temporalities of
the clergy, the King reckoning to raise a million and a half of
francs by the process, but few were ready purchasers. In addition to
these practices the “parties casuelles” were farmed to a Florentine
money-broker named Diaceto for 60,000 francs per month. Henry III
resorted to worse expedients than these, though. He sold four seats
in his council for 15,000 livres each; forced the collectors of
the revenue to anticipate the revenue for a twelve-month and then
dispossessed them of their posts after he had deprived them of the
profits thereof and sold them to others; and dilapidated the forest
domain by selling two trees in each arpent.[1692]

The position and conduct of Damville afforded the greatest hope for
the future if Henry III could have been made to see things in the
right way. Damville himself dominated all Languedoc and Provence;
his lieutenant, Montbrun, controlled Dauphiné; Turenne was in
possession of Auvergne; the Rochellois had agents at court seeking
for a firm settlement of affairs; even the cardinal Bourbon and the
duke of Montpensier leaned to the side of the Politiques. In 1575 the
existence of the old party of Huguenots, the Huguenots of religion,
was practically at an end. Individual radical Calvinists there were
in plenty but the Protestant _organization_ was that of the political
Huguenots.

It was manifest by the spring of 1575 that the prince of Condé and
Henry of Navarre on the one hand, and Damville and his brother,
together with Alençon, were bound to join hands in the common purpose
to establish permanent religious and greater civil liberty in France.
“Liberty and reform” was the policy of the hour, if not the watchword.
The declaration of the assembly of Milhau in August of the previous
year had been the handwriting on the wall—a message which the
misguided Henry III obdurately refused to read. On April 25, 1575, that
message was repeated in even clearer terms in the form of a manifesto
issued by Damville which defined the joint policy of the Politiques and
the political Huguenots. It was the declaration of a patriot, and not
a partisan, least of all a rebel, who, like Cromwell, found himself
compelled to lead a movement for political reform against an obstinate
crown that either would not or could not understand the issues.[1693]

Reading between the lines of the constitution agreed upon at Nîmes,
the republican nature of the government therein provided for is
noticeable.[1694] The right to exercise the sovereign rights of
legislation, of justice, of taxation, of making war and peace, of
regulating commerce no longer were vested in the King where the Act of
Union prevailed, but in a representative body. Languedoc, Provence, and
Dauphiné were _de facto_ independent of the crown.[1695] Supplementary
articles of Condé and Damville, and of the Catholics and Protestants of
Languedoc, Provence, and Dauphiné demanded (1) that freedom of exercise
of religion without distinction be permitted; (2) that the parlements
should be composed half of Catholics, and half of Protestants, the
latter to be nominated by the prince of Condé; (3) that justice be
done upon the authors of the massacre of St. Bartholomew and the
forfeit and attainder of the admiral be reversed; (4) that the places
at present held by the Huguenots be retained besides Boulogne and La
Charité, and that for additional defense the King should give them in
each province two out of three towns to be named to him by the prince
of Condé; (5) that the King pay 200,000 crowns for expenses of the
war; (6) that neither the marshal de Retz, nor the chancellor Biragues
should have any part in the negotiations for peace; (7) that the duke
of Montmorency and the marshal Cossé should be set at liberty, and
their innocence declared in full Parlement “en robe rouge;” (8) that
the heirs of those who have been murdered should have their estates
returned to them; (9) that the queen of England, the elector palatine,
and the dukes of Savoy and Deuxponts should be parties to the peace;
(10) that within three months after peace the States-General be
assembled to establish good order in France.[1696]

For a while there seemed to be a prospect of the King yielding to these
demands. He was growing jealous of the influence of the Guises, and
began to perceive that coercion was impossible.[1697] At the first
audience Henry received the deputies graciously, saying he “liked
their speech, but their articles were hard.” The articles were debated
_seriatim_ by the King, both with the deputies and with the council.
The chief hitch was upon the fourth demand. The King was willing to
permit exercise of Protestant worship in _one_ town in each bailiwick,
_except closed_ towns, whereas the deputies demanded freedom of worship
in all places _in the suburbs_ as provided by the Edict of January. As
a matter of prudence, it would seem to have been better policy for the
crown to permit worship in the suburbs of all towns rather than exact
a provision requiring concentration of the Protestants in one place in
each bailiwick; however, the King probably thought Calvinism would be
less likely to spread under such a restriction than if the Huguenots
enjoyed numerous places of worship.[1698] The queen mother sought to
persuade Montmorency to use his influence to abate the demands with
promise of release from the Bastille as his reward. But the duke
replied that “if his imprisonment might do the King pleasure or profit
he was content to be there all his life; but to meddle in the peace,
or to write of that matter, never understanding their doings, were to
make himself guilty in it, and to be thought to make himself to be an
instrument to their ruin, and therefore it were ill for him.”[1699]
Thereupon Henry III broke off the negotiations hoping still, as
earlier, to be able to separate the Huguenots and the united Catholics.

Events thereafter thickened rapidly. Narbonne, Perigueux, and Tournon
in Lyonnais were taken by the Huguenot-Politique armies. The last place
was got by Damville himself. Tournon was an especially strong town on
the Rhone about three leagues from Valence, with Livron to the south
of it. The capture so discouraged the duke d’Uzes that he requested
leave to resign on account of the desertions among his following.[1700]
Instead command was given him, “to spoil Languedoc in order to famish
them against winter.” But the duke was too wise to obey and Damville
was permitted to gather in the harvest without molestation. For if
the King had tried ravaging, the whole country would have risen
against him. St. Jean-d’Angély, Angoulême, and Nérac revolted so far
as to expel the garrisons in the town. In Burgundy, where Tavannes
had founded the League of the Holy Spirit, a Politique league was
formed.[1701] The narrow escape Damville had at this time from death
by poison drew men more than ever to him. As a climax to the woes of
Henry III on July 15, 1575, the Polish diet declared the throne vacant,
absolving all from allegiance to him.[1702]

The _spontaneous_ nature of the rising of the country in the summer
of 1575 is an interesting historical phenomenon. It was by no means
confined to the south of France. In Champagne, the nobles, some of
them vassals of Guise, and _peasants_ united to fall upon the reiters.
Madame de Guise fled from Joinville in fear of being surprised by a
sixteenth-century Jacquerie. In Brittany there was a similar stir
when the King attempted to confiscate the extensive lands of the duke
of Rohan upon his death. Certain things remind one of happenings in
the French Revolution. Many in Champagne left the land and went into
the borders of Germany like the “émigrés” after August 4, 1789. In
Paris there were house-to-house visits not unlike those of September,
1793. There was universal feeling against the reiters. In Normandy
an association of gentlemen was formed for the special purpose of
protecting the country from them.[1703]

The anxiety of the government was all the greater because it was
not exactly known what relations existed between the Huguenots and
Politiques and the English. The treaty which had obtained between
Charles IX and Elizabeth was renewed by the latter on April 1, 1575,
and confirmed by Henry III on May 4.[1704] But Elizabeth was not the
person to be bound by official word. On the Picardy-Flemish border
mutual distrust prevailed. In December, 1574, Requesens had advised
Philip II of his fear of the renewal of Huguenot activity in the Low
Countries, which had been dead since the Genlis disaster,[1705] and the
garrisons on the frontiers had been increased accordingly. The marriage
of Henry III to Louise de Vaudemont gave the Spanish governor great
inquietude, for the unfortunate Egmont was her uncle, and Egmont’s
eldest son, in March, visited his royal cousin of France.[1706]
Requesens was apprehensive, too, of a marriage between the duke of
Alençon and the daughter of William of Orange,[1707] and over the fact
that the French envoy in Flanders, the sieur de Mondoucet, prudently
avoided using the official post, but employed his own couriers in
dispatching missives to Paris.[1708] “All the neighboring states are
actuated by malicious intentions,” he wailed to Philip II. “The French
and the English are in correspondence, and both are inspired by the
same spirit of hostility against the Catholic religion and against your
majesty, as the sole protector thereof.”[1709]

The arrest of a secretary of Montmorency at Boulogne in March, as
he arrived from England, and who admitted he was going to find
Damville,[1710] coupled with the absence of the prince of Condé and
Charles de Meru, the youngest Montmorency, in Germany, so disquieted
the King that early in June Schomberg was dispatched across the Rhine
to discover what Condé was doing; if he found that levies of cavalry
were being made for service in France, he was instructed to enroll
8,000 soldiers for the service of the King.

Schomberg proved a good agent, for he shortly afterward wrote that he
believed a secret engagement existed between Queen Elizabeth, some of
the German princes, and the enemies of the French King at home; and
that Condé, having expended 30,000 crowns, had raised 8,000 cavalry
which might be expected to arrive at the frontier by the middle of
August, although it was given out, and believed by some, that these
reiters were intended for service in the Netherlands.[1711] On the
strength of these suspicions, especially when the duke of Guise sent
word in the first week of September that 2,500 reiters had crossed
the Rhine, the English ambassador, Dr. Dale, who hitherto had lodged
in the Faubourg St. Germain, was advised to remove into the city,
ostensibly for his greater security, but really to prevent him from
receiving unknown persons secretly at night, as was possible where he
resided.[1712]

At this juncture, when everything was tense and everybody was on
edge, the duke of Alençon managed to make his escape from the
court (September 15). While not actually confined, like the duke
of Montmorency, he and Henry of Navarre had both been kept under
continuous surveillance for months and various efforts made by them
to get away had failed. Dismay prevailed at court when the escape was
known. The King was “as a man out of courage,” and betook himself to
extravagant religious demonstration, as before, when at Avignon, “going
from church, as though deserted by all his people.”[1713] He knew that
his brother’s presence would draw many of the gentry, who were yet
hesitating, to the ranks of the Politiques.[1714] He had no means to
levy an army, nor the resources to sustain it.

In this crisis Catherine de Medici kept the clearest head of all at
the court. While she sought to wheedle the runaway prince with smooth
words, going as far as Dreux to meet him, detachments were ordered out
from Rouen, Orleans, and Chartres to surround him. But Alençon was not
to be trapped and rode swiftly off toward the Loire in the hope of
falling in with La Noue or the viscount of Turenne. At the same time
the duke of Guise was ordered to make a vigorous resistance against
the coming of Condé’s reiters. But even his army was in a bad state
on account of the defection of officers and men, who had gone over
to Alençon, so that new troops had to be sent him.[1715] Almost all
the soldiery in the service of the King was withdrawn from Dauphiné
and Languedoc and concentrated in Burgundy and Champagne.[1716] Much
depended upon the result of the coming battle with the reiters. If the
King’s troops were beaten, Paris would be in a serious strait between
the King’s enemies. Already, in consequence of the withdrawal of
troops, all Auvergne, Bourbonnais, Nivernais, Gâtinais, and the Beauce
were in arms, and the gentlemen of these regions had gone over to the
duke of Alençon. Only the vigilance of the garrisons at Orleans and
Tours, Moulins and Nevers, enabled the crown to maintain the line of
the Loire river.

The reiters attempted to evade Guise and find another way of entrance
into France, so that the duke left his artillery in Lorraine and by
forced marches went to Sedan, with the intention of giving battle
there. But the reiters, about 2,500, under Thoré, avoided an engagement
and maneuvered to join a Protestant force of 2,000 Picards, and Guise
fell back on Rheims in order to hold the crossing of the Aisne,
meantime asking the King for reinforcements which were so slow in
coming that the duke was compelled to retire to the Marne. On October
9 he established his headquarters between Château-Thierry and Epernay,
near Port-à-Pinson. The encounter took place near Fismes, on the Marne,
above Dormans, on October 10. Not more than fifty were killed on either
side and the combat did not deter the reiters from continuing their
course and crossing the Seine near Nogent-sur-Seine, which they were
able to do on account of low water. Their chief loss was of two or
three cornets of reiters whom Guise bribed to desert. De Thoré owed
his easy escape, however, to the serious wound which the duke of Guise
sustained. For a bullet struck him in the side of the face, tearing his
ear clear away and so mangling the cheek that he was fearfully scarred
for the rest of his life and always wore a velvet mask.[1717]

The insignificance of the victory of the duke, however, did not deter
the King from proclaiming a solemn procession and _Te Deum_ in honor of
the day. The “victory” also was made the justification of a new tax.
On October 12, 1575, by command of the King, the burgesses of Paris
assembled in the grand room of the Hôtel-de-Ville where the provost of
the merchants, Charron, made known a new demand of the King for aid in
the form of a capitation tax upon the burgesses of the city and other
places in the _prévôté_ of Paris for the payment of 3,000 Swiss, making
half of the 6,000 which the King required for defense of the realm, in
addition to the sum of 15,000 francs expected for each of the ensuing
months.

Once again were the people of Champagne made the victims of the
spoiler. All the horses of the poor laborers whom the reiters
encountered on the road were forcibly seized, as was also the case in
the hostelries where they lodged. A single parish lost thirty horses.
The only payment the poor peasantry got was to be beaten for their
protests.

For the space of three or four days one might see along the roads and
in the villages soldiers all of the time, making for the crossing
of the Seine at La Motte de Tilly. Two troopers rode one horse and
their presence was hard upon the merchants and the priests, whom
they met in the way. The smaller merchants were despoiled of their
property, and those known to be wealthy had their riches extorted from
them by force, or else were held prisoner until ransomed. To make
matters worse, in the wake of the army came a rabble of looters and
plunderers, mostly French.[1718]

It was obvious that as long as the reiters were in the field, the King
could send no force against his brother. He blamed the queen mother
for everything that had happened, especially for the escape of Alençon,
and Catherine, by way of reply, is said to have sent him a copy of
Commines to read with the advice to emulate the policy of his crafty
predecessor. But as a contemporary scornfully observed, Henry of Valois
was not Louis XI. What could be expected from a King who spent his time
“going from abbey to abbey and devising with women.”[1719] In sorrow
and anxiety, sustained by the dukes of Montmorency and Montpensier and
the fine old marshal Cossé, Catherine made earnest efforts to negotiate
a truce with the duke of Alençon.

Prefacing his demands by the caution that he could not negotiate
finally without Condé or Damville, Alençon demanded surrender of
Pont-de-Cé on the Loire, besides La Charité, Bourges, Angoulême,
Niort, Saumur, and Angers for the Huguenots; and Mezières in
Champagne, Langres in Burgundy, or La Fère in Picardy for the prince
of Condé;[1720] a large settlement for himself; a promise that the
States-General should be convened for the Politiques; the crown to pay
200,000 crowns to the Protestant reiters; the exercise of Calvinist
worship in as ample terms as obtained in 1570 (till more fully provided
for in the ultimate articles of peace); the revolted provinces to
remain in arms, except in the case of mercenaries, it being understood
that no acts of hostility be done and commerce and trade to be free
during the interim. The King’s council, when these sweeping terms
were laid before it, advised the King to yield, seeing no way out on
account of lack of means to carry on the war. But Henry III was furious
and threw the articles in the fire. In defiance of the advice of his
friends, who told him to employ what few funds he had in corrupting the
reiters with Condé, he sent 30,000 crowns more to Germany to purchase
assistance.

In this strait, money came suddenly, as from heaven. The papal nuncio
proffered 100,000 crowns at once and promised 200,000 more, while the
Venetian government, in memory of his visit there in the year previous,
made him a gift of his jewels that were in pawn. Finally, to crown
the King’s jubilation at this sudden turn of events, word came from
Germany that the reiters hired by Schomberg and Bassompierre were
coming “and would not be stayed by the truce.” Henry III at once broke
off negotiations. The hope was to sever Alençon from the prince of
Condé and then, preferably by bribery, by war if necessary, overcome
the latter, for Schomberg persuaded the King that this course was
practicable. To this end commissioners were sent abroad to levy new
taxes.[1721] Great ingenuity was shown in the devising of new forms of
taxation. In June, 1575, two edicts had been issued, one requiring the
fixing of new seals to bolts of woolen cloth and the establishment of
a _greffier des tailles_ in each parish;[1722] the other creating the
office of four _arpenteurs_ (land commissioners) in each jurisdiction
of the realm. The number of notaries was also augmented.[1723] In
December the King made a pretext of the coming of the reiters to demand
a new subsidy from the pliant and obedient people of France, under
cover of raising men for the war. Of the Parisians he demanded the sum
of 200,000 livres, to pay three thousand Swiss. Another pretext was the
repair of the bridge at Charenton, which the Huguenots had broken in
1567.[1724] These taxes fell all the more heavily because in addition
to the ruin of the country by war, the crops were short throughout the
land on account of the dry summer. “The rivers everywhere were so low
that in many places one could wade them. Every morning the sun rose and
every evening it set red and inflamed.”[1725]

In the meantime, fear prevailed in Paris lest the forces of Damville
and the viscount of Turenne would effect a junction with those of the
duke of Alençon and the united body march upon Paris, and garrisons
were hastily put in Montereau, Corbeil, Charenton, St. Cloud, and St.
Denis. The old trenches on both sides of the river were repaired and
platforms erected in the fields around the city. Montmartre especially
was fortified. The townspeople of the capital as well as villagers
from the outside were impressed into the work with picks, shovels,
and baskets. Mills were erected within the city, and the city was
provisioned. The King issued an edict ordering the peasantry within
thirty leagues around the capital to thrash their grain and to store it
in fortified towns known to be faithful to the crown, unless they were
dwelling within nine leagues of Paris, in which case the grain was to
be brought into the city. All the passages of the Loire were guarded.
The result of all this was a reign of terror in the Ile-de-France.
The soldiery indulged in all sorts of brigandage, so that in sheer
desperation the villagers sometimes fired their towns. Provisions
were commandeered without recompense. To such outrages were the poor
people subjected that the inhabitants of one town, Jogny, begged the
commander to have mercy upon them. But instead of so doing, Puygaillard
loaded the little deputation with reproaches and had them beaten by the
soldiers in the presence of all.[1726]

With the memory of the elder prince of Condé’s presence before the
walls of Paris, and the battle of St. Denis, where the constable
Montmorency was killed, the Parisians were willing to labor in the
trenches for the safety of Paris. But they were not willing to be taxed
further. In a remarkable remonstrance, joined in by the clergy, the
Parlement, the Chambre des Comptes, the Cour des Aides, the provost of
Paris, and the bourgeois and citizens of every quarter of the city,
protest was made against the extortion of 200,000 livres, which Henry
III proposed to raise in this hour of extremity. After reciting that
civil discord had prevailed in France since 1560, and that during the
space of fifteen years the crown had obtained 36,000,000 francs from
Paris and other towns, and 60,000,000 from the clergy, besides other
gifts and subsidies, with little progress to show either in politics
or religion, the memorial proceeded to point out some of the causes of
this universal corruption in scathing terms:

Simony is openly permitted. Benefices are held by married gentlewomen
who employ the revenues far differently to the intention of the
founders. The people are left without religious instruction and
thus stray from the true religion. There is but little justice to
be obtained through the venality of the tribunals, causing their
neighbors to hold them in abomination. The number of those holding
office is very great and part of them notoriously incapable and the
rest poor, being thereby prone to evil actions. Justice is further
impeded by the impunity with which murder is committed. Great
cruelties and barbarities are committed by the foot soldiers and
by the gendarmerie, which does not now consist of gentlemen but of
persons of vile condition. Not only by these, but by the soldiers of
his guard, is pillage made on the houses of his people, ecclesiastical
holdings, and hospitals even in Paris itself, so that the poor cannot
obtain common necessaries.[1727]

During these weeks Montmorency had earnestly labored in favor of peace,
pleading, arguing, expostulating both with his own younger brothers
and Alençon. He was as earnestly supported by Catherine de Medici, now
converted to a peace policy by the force of events,[1728] but both
were continually thwarted either by the King’s inconstancy or the
machinations of the Guises.

The illness of the queen mother—she suffered so much from sciatica
that often she was unable to leave her chamber—and the frivolity of
the King were a positive advantage to the Guises’ policy.

It will be remembered that the fortress of La Fère had been tentatively
demanded of the King for the prince of Condé. Henry III had replied
offering Doulens in Picardy instead of either La Fère or Peronne, which
was later suggested, on the plea that he could not exact obedience from
the inhabitants of the latter places. This demand for a border fortress
near Flanders was made by the duke of Alençon, in reality to further
his own advantage in the Spanish Netherlands, and he took the method
of having Condé take title to it as a means of concealing his purpose.

The possible disposal of any border fortress in Picardy in such a way
tremendously alarmed the king of Spain and the Guises who concerted to
break the peace.[1729] This plan is the true origin of the formation
of the famous Holy League, which, although it assumed organized form
only after the peace of Bergerac (September 17, 1576), nevertheless
existed in a tentative state this early, in the combined action of the
dukes of Guise, Nemours, Mayenne, and Nevers, Biragues the chancellor,
and other satellites of the house of Guise to prevent peace being made
on such terms, and to break it in event of its being made.[1730] Twice
this cabal called upon the King to give battle before all the forces
of the opposition were united and twice the queen mother foiled their
purpose by securing delay. On February 22 a violent scene took place
between her and the council—Henry III was sick—in which Catherine
branded those who said her son was a traitor as liars and declared that
in spite of opposition “it shall be peace.”

The indifference of Henry III to the gravity of the situation and
his supreme egotism are remarkable, yet thoroughly in keeping with
his character. For hours together he would prate of poetry and
philosophy—“de primis causis, de sensu et sensibili and such like
questions”—with his favorites, in the retirement of a cabinet, while
the realm was going to rack and ruin. The Venetian ambassador describes
one of these symposiums with minute care in a dispatch of February 3,
1576.

For the last few days [he says] his Majesty has taken his pleasure
by retiring into a small apartment which has no window, and to his
apartment his Majesty summons four or five youths of the city who
follow the profession of poets and light literature, and to meet
these people his Majesty invites the Duke of Nevers, the Grand Prior,
Biragues, Monseigneur, De Soure, the queen of Navarre, his sister,
Madame de Nevers, and the marshal de Retz, all of whom profess to
delight in poetry. When they are thus assembled his Majesty orders one
of these youths to speak in praise of one of the virtues, exalting it
above all the others, and as soon as he has concluded his reasoning
each person in turn argues against the proposal which has been made.
His Majesty consumes many hours in this exercise, to the small
satisfaction of the queen mother and everybody else, who would desire
to see in times so calamitous his Majesty attending to his urgent
affairs, and not to amusements, which, however praiseworthy at other
times, are now from the necessity of the case condemned by all, seeing
that the King for this cause fails to be present at his council and
there to discuss matters which are of the greatest importance and
which having regard to his own position and that of his kingdom can
easily be imagined to require attention.[1731]

Strange as it may seem, the Guises’ determination to continue the war
comported with the wishes of some of their enemies—a circumstance
which illustrates how singular was the alliance existing between
the Huguenots and the Politiques. The religious Huguenots already,
in the middle of December, had remonstrated against the terms of
peace proposed on the ground that the offers made did not promise
as much of advantage or security as a continuation of the war. It
was argued that the truce would result in greater prejudice to them
since the King would still be prepared for war and that if they now
let the opportunity pass of establishing their fortune by the aid of
the reiters, the result would bring calamity to them.[1732] These
narrow-minded dissidents looked with ill favor upon the politic course
of the duke of Alençon in avoiding the pillage of the towns he took,
even of trusting to their loyalty and refraining from putting garrisons
in them (some of these towns were Dreux, Romorantin, Thouars, and
Loudun), and censured him for his pacific overtures to the Parlement
of Paris.[1733] Accordingly they hailed with delight the escape of
Henry of Navarre (February 5, 1576), and his immediate abjuration[1734]
of the Catholic faith which he had been forced to confess on St.
Bartholomew’s Day, and the renewed advance of the reiters into
Burgundy and Auvergne and thence across the Loire into Bourbonnais,
notwithstanding the fact that these mounted mercenaries “made a
terrible spoil with fire and fagots” wherever they went.

The reiters took the road toward Langres, crossed the Seine above
Châtillon into Auxerre, making for the passage of the Loire River at
La Charité, in order to effect a junction with the duke of Alençon,
who was in Berry, not far from Bourges. Champagne and Brie were filled
with robbers in the wake of their advance, who, pretending that they
were soldiers, plundered the townspeople and robbed wayfarers and
travelers. There were regular bands of these freebooters, the members
of which were paid regular wages by their captains. But the anarchy
in the provinces did not compel the King to stop his dallying with
philosophy, or his love for mad-cap pranks. He went off on a Shrovetide
frolic in March, “riding about the town to cast eggs and such other
disorders,” leaving Mayenne to labor with those nobles who refused to
be commanded “by a boy that never saw wars and a soldiery whose pay
was a whole quarter in arrears.”[1735] Mayenne made his headquarters at
Moulins to prevent the reiters uniting with Alençon and the Huguenots
of Poitou and Guyenne. It required all the address of the marshal Biron
to restrain the young commander from throwing himself upon them, almost
careless of the outcome, for defeat could have been little worse than
the daily shrinkage of his army from desertion.[1736]

Henry III at first had pretended to make light of the escape of his
cousin. But the presence of Henry of Navarre in the field soon had
an important influence. It was the one thing needful to complete the
organization of the Huguenots, many of whom looked upon the prince of
Condé more as a Politique than as one of them. The harmonious working
of the two parties opposed to the crown was now possible in greater
degree than before. Henry of Navarre, the prince of Condé, the duke
of Alençon, and Damville united, were in a position to bring things
to a focus. The actual territory controlled by Henry III at this time
was little, if any, greater than the ancient Ile-de-France, Burgundy,
and Champagne of his ancestors in the twelfth century. The Huguenots
and Politiques so divided the realm among themselves that a map of
the kingdom at this time reminds one of that of France in the feudal
age. Henry of Navarre had made his headquarters at Saumur and thus
was able easily to control Anjou; the allegiance of Guyenne, Béarn,
and Poitou was certain; the duke of Alençon was in occupation of
the “midlands”—Berry (except Bourges) and most of Bourbonnais and
Nivernais. Young Coligny, who had succeeded Montbrun, was in Dauphiné,
and his fealty to the religion was unswerving; Damville and his
lieutenants controlled all Languedoc, Provence, and Auvergne; young
Montgomery was in Lower Normandy where English assistance secretly
helped him, while the prince of Condé, backed by the count palatine,
endangered Picardy.

The winning cards were all in the hands of the Huguenots and the
Politiques. Without territory, without funds, with an unpaid army or
hireling mercenaries only, the crown had no other recourse than to
accept the situation and make peace unless Henry III and the queen
mother stooped to the worse humiliation of receiving the support of
Philip II. And so it came to pass that while Paris daily expected to
withstand a siege and the faubourgs and gates were so crowded with
those living outside the walls and refugees from the environs “that
a man could scarce enter the gates for the people, carriages, and
cattle,”[1737] Henry III signed the Act of Peace, May 2, 1576.

The peace of 1576, sometimes called the Peace of Monsieur, from the
duke of Alençon’s prominent part in its formation, was the most
complete and elaborate charter yet given the Huguenots, embodying
the wisdom that experience had taught. It is to be noticed that the
settlement involved both toleration of the religion and political
reform. The provisions of this composite peace may be classified
under four heads, each of which was an essential element in the late
opposition to the crown, viz:—the Huguenots, Henry of Navarre, the
duke of Alençon, the Politiques.

The King granted to the Huguenots public exercise of the Calvinist
religion throughout France except within two leagues of the court and
four leagues of Paris. The Huguenots were declared eligible to all
offices and dignities without discrimination on account of religion.
As a security for the King’s justice against possible abuse of these
rights, the crown engaged to establish mixed parlements, half Catholic,
half Protestant, at Poitiers, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier,
Grenoble, Aix, Dijon, Rheims, and Rouen, and a new chamber in the
Parlement of Paris with two presidents and eighteen councilors,
nine of them Catholic, nine Protestant. Protestant advocates,
_procureurs-généraux_ and _greffiers_ civil and criminal were to be
connected with each of these mixed parlements.

For further protection of the Huguenots, eight cautionary towns were
to be ceded to them, to wit: Aigues-Mortes and Beaucaire in Languedoc;
Périgueux and Le Mas de Verdun in Guyenne; La Rochelle in Poitou;
Yssoire in Auvergne; Nions and Serres (château included) in Dauphiné;
Cennes “la grande tour et le circuit” in Provence. Additional demands
were for general oblivion for all conduct and action by persons of
either side; revocation of all decrees, judgments, and proclamations
hitherto made; rehabilitation of the memory of Admiral Coligny and
restoration of their livings and honors to his children as well as
in the cases of Montgomery, Montbrun, Bricquemault, and Cavagnies.
No prosecution was to be made with regard to the actions done at St.
Germain-en-Laye and Bois de Vincennes.

Two of these provisions were received with great dissatisfaction by
the Huguenot deputies and when published were decried by many of the
Protestants. The first of them was the prohibition of Protestant
worship within the faubourgs of Paris, the act specifically declaring
that St. Denis, St. Maur-des-Fosses, Pont-de-Charenton, Bourg-la-Reine
and Port de Neuilly were within the prohibited confines. The other
one which met with great objection was that touching the security
towns.[1738] The deputies demanded two towns in every government (there
were fourteen governments). But the King would yield only eight, these
to be chosen from the towns already in possession of the Huguenots, a
proviso which eliminated such important points as Niort, Angoulême, and
Cognac. In the case of La Charité and Saumur, over which the longest
discussion arose, a compromise was reached by giving them to Alençon
in appanage. Long and acrimonious debate was made over this article,
and at one stage the negotiations were so nearly broken off that Paris
was notified to be prepared for a renewal of the war. The crown’s
demands in this matter were really not unreasonable, for these eight
towns were not included in the number given to Henry of Navarre or the
prince of Condé, or in the appanage of the duke of Alençon.[1739]

If the demands of the Huguenots were excessive, those of Henry of
Navarre were still more sweeping. He not only aimed to live like a king
in the future in his own country of Béarn, but sought to commit the
crown to the recovery of the kingdom of Navarre as well. All the past
claims and grievances of his ancestry were embodied. He demanded: That
the King of Navarre command in his government of Guyenne extending from
Pilles to Bayonne, in such manner as his ancestors had done; that all
captains and governors obey him as the governor and lieutenant-general
of the King; that he have the providing of the necessary garrisons;
that all his lands and seignories should recognize no other government
than he appointed and that all towns and fortresses belonging to
him should be at once surrendered; that his right to his kingdom be
preserved, and that his subjects should not be taxed for the services
of the king of France, according to their ancient immunities; that all
gentlemen being his servants, officers, or subjects should come and go
and traffic freely through all France without molestation; that his
officers and servants should enjoy such privileges as if they served
the royal family of France; that he and his heirs should be discharged
from the guarantee given by himself and his mother toward the purchases
of ecclesiastical property, and for the payment of the reiters; that in
view of the fact that the late king had granted 200,000 livres to his
mother, the late queen of Navarre, for the celebration of the nuptials
of himself and his queen, the King’s sister, which has never been paid,
and furthermore, because there was also yet due 120,000 livres, arrears
of the pension of the late king of Navarre, he prayed the King to deal
with him as favorably as he could for payment; that if any offices or
benefices fell vacant in seignories of the king of Navarre, he should
have the nominating and presenting of such persons; that the King
would preserve to him in his lands and seignories his privileges and
accustomed sources of revenue, such as the _droit de tabellionage_ and
_de sceaux_.

Having so far required everything that could conceivably be based
upon things present, Henry endeavored to revive the ancient claims of
his house in a startling fashion. The old feudal spirit of William
of Aquitaine and Raymond of Toulouse seems to have been reincarnated
in his person at this time. For Henry demanded further that he be
recompensed for the 6,000 livres promised in time past, in virtue of
the right that Françoise de Bretagne, wife of Aleyne, sieur d’Albret,
father of John of Navarre, had had to the duchy of Brittany.[1740] But
even this was not all, for Henry of Navarre finally made the demand
that the pension of 46,000 livres which his grandfather had enjoyed in
recompense for the loss of Navarre, from which his great grandfather
had been expelled in 1512 by Ferdinand of Aragon, be continued to him,
and _that the King of France should promise to help him to recover
Navarre!_[1741]

In the nature of things, not a tithe of these demands could be granted
by the crown, least of all the last. The massacre of St. Bartholomew
had proved how perilous it was to try to drive Catholic France into a
war with Spain, and France was less ready now than in 1570-72 to join
battle with Philip. Perforce Henry of Navarre had to be content with a
restoration of things as they were on August 24, 1572.[1742]

The duke of Alençon had created for him a position stronger than that
of Henry of Navarre. As a prince of the blood and as a Politique
he occupied middle ground between the crown and the Huguenots;
in consequence, many of the places which neither of the chief
principals was willing to resign were included in the grant to him.
While technically all the territories so concerned were regarded
as appanages,[1743] it is plain that a distinction may easily be
made between the duchies of Alençon, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, and
La Roche—which had originally been given him as a prince of the
blood—and places like Bourges, Moulins, Loches, Saumur, La Charité,
Pont-de-Sel, Amiens, Moulans, and Mantes. These latter possessions were
practically a class apart of security cities intrusted by compromise to
the duke. This was particularly true of Saumur and La Charité, which
insured the Protestants of passage across the lower and upper Loire,
and so linked the South with Normandy on the North and the Palatinate
and the German Protestant states to the east. Moreover, Moulins in
Bourbonnais and Bourges in Berry assured the Protestants of position
there, so that the whole left bank of the Loire from Auvergne to Nantes
was in their control. Mantes was meant to compensate the Huguenots in
the vicinity of Paris for the loss of Charenton.

The King yielded the government of Picardy again to the prince of
Condé, but the matter of what town should be his created much heated
argument. The prince himself at first stoutly contended for Boulogne,
although he did not say that its convenience to England was the chief
reason for his desire. But Henry III as stoutly refused. Then Amiens
was suggested, and as compromise this city was given to the King’s
brother. Condé then demanded Peronne. Although the King would have
preferred Doulens or even St. Quentin to this concession, he yielded.
The only other detail concerning the prince was the obligation to pay
his and his father’s debts in Germany, which the crown assumed.

Damville did not come in for as much honor as his colleagues, but
was far from being ignored. As the chief of the Politiques or “les
catholiques associez,” as they were defined in the interest of peace,
Damville was and remained the leading man in Languedoc. Aside from
the retention of Damville in his government, promise was made the
Politiques to summon the States-General at Blois within six months for
the reformation and reorganization of the administration.[1744]

It follows as a matter of course that the maintenance and protection of
the multitude of social and civil rights that made the web and woof of
a civilized society was guaranteed, such as the validity of Protestant
marriage, land and property titles, freedom of education, commerce and
trade, etc.

A very delicate matter to adjust was the future relation of the
electoral count palatine and the duke John Casimir, his son. A
secret alliance had existed between the count palatine, England, and
the prince of Condé since July, 1575. In November, Alençon and the
Politiques joined the alliance. One of the terms of that alliance was
that Metz, Toul, and Verdun were to pass to Casimir as the price of
his support and both Huguenots and Politiques—at least Alençon—stood
pledged to assist him in securing these Three Bishoprics. But it
was manifestly impossible to expect the French crown to grant such
a cession, nor is it probable, now that peace had come, that any in
France looked with amiability upon this article of the contract of
Heidelberg. It were too great a humiliation to have this brilliant
conquest of 1552 thus passively surrendered. Fortunately it was found
possible to placate John Casimir with less distinguished sacrifices.
His claims were purchased for an enormous sum of money—or at least
the promise of it; no less than two million florins (three million
francs), part to be paid in the coming June and the balance at the next
two fairs at Frankfurt, in addition to which he received the whole
seigneury of Château-Thierry[1745]—worth 20,000 francs per annum—a
perpetual colonelcy of 4,000 horse, a company of 100 men-at-arms and
12 reitmeisters, all of which was confirmed by Henry III’s declaration
that he would “repute and esteem the count palatine and Duke Casimir as
good neighbors.”

The terms of the Peace of Monsieur[1746] were exceedingly unpopular
in Paris, whose citizens had been the heaviest contributors to the
expenses of the war thus closed and who had made strenuous military
preparations in defense of the capital, and the unpopularity of Henry
III was not enhanced in the eyes of the Parisians by the King’s
repudiation of a part of the _rentes_, the incomes of which were the
chief means of support with many. But when Charron, the provost of
the merchants, and the counselor Abot, at the head of a deputation
of the foremost citizens of the capital protested against this
high-handed action to the King’s own face, Henry III with a sneer which
carried with it a covert threat rejoined: “Hang a man and he tells no
tales.”[1747]

The camps of the duke of Alençon and the Protestants were broken up
when the peace was published. The soldiery around La Rochelle and in
Poitou, Anjou, and Berry, returned home, except some troops which were
reserved until it was seen what Casimir and his reiters, who were near
Langres, would do. These marauders with many French of Champagne and
Brie, crossed the Yonne above Sens and arrived in Champagne between
May 10 and 11 and remained there for a week, living on the land.
After having sojourned six or seven days between the Seine and the
Vauluisant, on the 16th they moved on to a place between Troyes and the
village of Mery-sur-Seine, where they remained for fifteen days to the
distress of the people and absolutely destroyed the little village of
Marigny, which had but two persons left in it. In order to find food
they foraged for miles. The peasantry turned their cattle loose or
drove them, together with their possessions, into the fortified towns
or châteaux. But the gentry were less safe than the peasantry even,
for the latter had already been so despoiled that nothing was left to
be taken. Out of this frightful state of affairs rose an organized
resistance which is very interesting to observe, for the nobility and
gentry of the region and the local peasantry, forgetting their class
antagonism, made common cause together. Whenever these “vigilance
committees” found themselves to be stronger or happened upon stragglers
from the main band, they threw themselves upon them; sometimes the
victims were bound and cast alive in the river Aube or Seine. Between
St. Loup-de-la-Fosse-Gelane and St. Martin-de-Bossenay, a group of ten
or twelve reiters were thus set upon and only one escaped. But the
vengeance their comrades meted out upon the offenders was terrible, for
the troopers, numbering over a hundred horsemen, the next night burned
all the villages round about.[1748]

Not until September was this scourge removed from the land. By that
time they were bought off and were conducted to the frontier by
Bassompierre, the Alsatian gentleman in the King’s service, who was
well rewarded, as he deserved to be, for the accomplishment of the
perilous task. But the licensing of the regular troops immediately
afterward still prolonged the agony of the province for a season.[1749]

The Peace of Monsieur may fittingly be said to have terminated the
period of the _religious_ wars of France. The dominant issue of the
succeeding years of conflict from 1576 to 1598 was not a religious,
but a political one. Why permanent peace did not result it is not the
work of this volume to narrate. Suffice to say that Spain and Spain’s
instrument, the Holy League, were to blame for the ensuing years of
strife.

The germ of the provincial Catholic leagues had been the desire, on the
part of the Catholics of France, to resist the progress of Calvinism.
But in the hands of the French nobles these local leagues, controlled
by the aristocracy and welded into one mighty organization under the
leadership of the duke of Guise, backed by Spanish gold, became a new
league of the public weal, which, under the cloak of religion revived
the feudal ambition of the French nobility to acquire power at the
expense of the crown.

CHÂTILLON—COLIGNY

John III, † 1480
│
├——————————————————┐
│ │
James II Gaspard I, married
† 1512 † 1522
│
┌——————————————————┼————————————————————————┐
│ │ │
Odet, Gaspard II, Admiral Coligny François d’Andelot
bishop of murdered at † 1569
Beauvais St. Bartholomew, 1572
† 1571 │
│
Louise m. _a_) Charles de Teligny, † 1572
_b_) William the Silent

MONTMORENCY

William, † 1531
│
┌————————————————————————————————┤
│ │
Louise of Anne, d. of Montmorency and constable of France,
Montmorency killed at battle of St. Denis, 1567
│
┌—————————————————┬———————————┴—————┬—————————————┬——————————┐
│ │ │ │ │
Francis, Marshal Henry Damville, Gabriel, sieur de Charles, William,
Montmorency governor of Montberon, killed sieur sieur
† 1579 Languedoc at battle of Dreux de Méru de Thoré
† 1614 1562
│
┌————————┴——————————┐
│ │
Henry II, Charlotte, m. Henry II,
† 1632 Prince of Condé
│
Louis II, The Great Condé

HOUSE OF LORRAINE AND GUISE

René le Bon, d. of Anjou and titular
king of Naples and Sicily. m.
Isabella, d. of _Lorraine_
│
┌—————————————————┬————————————————————————————┤
│ │ │
Margaret, m. John II, d. of Yolande, d. of Lorraine, m.
Henry VI, k. of _Lorraine_ and Ferri II, c. of Vaudemont,
England Bar _Guise_, etc.
│ │
│ │
Nicholas, d. of _Lorraine_ René II, d. of _Lorraine_
and Bar. † 1473, no and Bar, c. of Vaudemont,
male issue _Guise_, etc. † 1508
│
┌—————————————————————————————————————————┴——————┐
│ │
Antoine, d. of _Lorraine_ Claude I, c. of Aumale,
and Bar, † 1544 d. of _Guise_, † 1527
│ │
│ ┌———————┬————————┬——————┬———┴———┐
│ │ │ │ │ │
Francis I, d. of │ Charles, Card. │ Louis, Card. │
_Lorraine_ and Bar │ of _Lorraine_, │ of _Guise_, │
│ │ † 1574 │ † 1578 │
│ │ │ │
│ Francis, d. of Claude, d. Mary, m. James V
│ _Guise_, assassinated of Aumale of Scotland
│ before Orleans, 1563 │
│ │ │
Charles I, m. │ Mary, queen of
Claude of France │ Scots, † 1587
│ │
│ │
│ ├—————————————————┬——————————————┐
│ │ │ │
Charles II, d. Henry, d. of _Guise_, Charles, d. Louis, Cardinal
of _Lorraine_ assassinated of Mayenne, of _Guise_,
and Bar, † 1608 1588 † 1611 † 1588

HOUSE OF BOURBON

Louis IX, † 1270
│
┌——————————————————┴———————————————┐
│ │
Philip III, † 1285 Robert, c. of
│ Clermont, m.
┌———————————┴—————————————┐ Beatrix, heiress
│ │ of Bourbon, † 1317
Philip IV, † 1314 Charles, c. of │
│ Valois., † 1325 Louis, d. of
┌———————┼————————————┐ │ Bourbon, † 1341
│ │ │ │ │
Louis X Philip V Charles IV Philip VI, ┌———————┴———————┐
† 1316 † 1322 † 1328 † 1350 │ │
│ │ Peter, d. James, c. de la
│ John II, of Bourbon, Marche, † 1361
John I, † 1364 † 1356 │
† 1431 │ │ John, c. de la
│ Louis, d. Marche, † 1393,
┌——————————┬—————————┬————┴——┐ of Bourbon, m. Catharine
│ │ │ │ † 1410 heiress of
Charles V, Duke of Duke of Duke of │ Vendôme
† 1380 Anjou Berri Burgundy │ │
│ │ │
┌————┴————————————————┐ John, d. ┌———————┴—┐
│ │ of Bourbon, │ │
Charles VI, Louis, d. of † 1433 │ Louis, c.
† 1422 Orleans, † 1407 │ │ of Vendôme,
│ │ │ │ † 1446
│ │ │ │ │
Charles VII, │ │ James, c. de la │
† 1461 │ │ Marche, † 143 │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌———————┴—————┐ ┌———┴————————┐ John, c. of
│ │ │ │ │ Vendôme,
│ │ │ │ │ † 1478
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ Charles, d. John, c. of Charles, Louis, c. of │
Louis XI, of Orleans, Angoulême, d. of Montpensier │
† 1483 † 1467 † 1467 Bourbon, │ │
│ │ │ † 1456 │ Francis, c.
│ │ │ │ │ of Vendôme,
│ │ │ │ │ † 1495
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ Gilbert, c. o │
│ │ │ │ Montpensier, │
│ │ │ │ † 1496 │
Charles VIII Louis XII Charles, c. ┌——┴—┬————┐ │ │
† 1498 † 1515 of Angoulême, │ │ │ │ │
† 1496 │ Charles │ │ │
│ │ † 1488 │ │ Charles, d.
│ │ │ │ of Vendôme,
│ John II Peter II │ † 1537
│ † 1488 │ │
│ │ │
┌————————————————————————————┘ ┌————————————————┘ ┌————┘
│ │ │
Francis I, ┌———————————————┴———————┐ │
† 1547 │ │ │
│ Charles, constable Francis, │
│ of France, † 1527 † 1525 │
│ │
│ ┌—————————————┬———————————┬——————————————┬————————┴————┐
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ Antoine, d. Francis, c. Charles, Louis, prince Marguerite,
│ of Vendôme, of Enghien cardinal of Condé, m. Duke of
│ m. Jeanne † 1546 of Bourbon killed at Nevers.
│ d’Albret, q. Charles (X) Jarnac, 1569
│ of Navarre, │
│ † 1562 │
│ │ │
Henry II, │ Henry I, of Condé, † 1588
† 1559 │ │
│ │ │
│ Henry IV, † 1610. │
│ m. (1) Margaret of Henry II, of Condé,
│ Valois m. (2) Mary m. Charlotte of Montmorency,
│ de Medici of whom was born the Great Condé.
│
├——————┬——————┬——————┬———————┬————————┬———————┐
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
Francis II │ Henry III │ Elizabeth m. │ Margaret m.
† 1560 │ † 1589 │ Philip II │ Henry IV
│ │ │
Charles IX Francis, d. of Claude m.
† 1574 Alençon † 1584 Charles, d.
of Lorraine

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

[P. 49, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. XIII, NO. 456

[_The Cardinal of Lorraine and Duke of Guise to the Queen-Dowager of
Scotland_]

Madame nous avons receu votre lettre par ce marinier present porteur et
sceu par icelle lestat en quoy sont les affaires de dela [_two pages in
cipher_].

Quant aux nouvelles de deca nous voullons bien que vous sachez que
depuis quinze ou vingt jours aucuns malheureux ont essaye icy demectre
a fin une conjuration quilz avoient faicte pour tuer le Roy et ne nous
y oublyoient [pas][1750] tout cela fonde sur la religion dont aucuns
des principaulx autheurs [ont este pris] et pugniz. Maiz tant plus
nous allons avant et plus trouvons nous [que ceste conspiration] a
longue queue ayant este bastie de longue main et appuyee par daucuns
gr[andz qui se] sont trouvez bien trompez. Car nostre Seigneur a bien
sceu defendre sa cause. S’est quasi le mesmes train qui ont prins voz
Rebelles mais ilz voulloient commancer par le sang et lespee une autre
fois vous en scaurez plus par le menu. Et pour fin de ceste lettre vous
dirons madame que la compaignye faict Dieu mercy tresbonne chere et
nous recommandons treshumblement a votre bonne grace, Priant Dieu ma
dame vous donner en sante tresbonne et treslongue vye. De Marmoustre le
ixº jour davril 1559.

[_Signed_] Voz treshumbles et tresobeissans freres
C. Car^[al] de Lorraine Francoys s^[r] de Lorraine.

[_Addressed_] A la Royne
Douairiere et regente Descosse.

[_Not endorsed_]

[_Pencil note by editor_] This is dated “more Gallicano” which
commences the year at Easter. In 1560, Easter day fell on the 14 of
April, consequently this letter dated on the 9th would appear to be,
as it is dated, in 1559, being in fact 1560.

No. 460

[“_A portion of the previous letter in French_” (Calendar)]

Estant que avecques plus de commodité et de moyen vous navez esté et
nestez secourue autant que nous voyons et jugeons trop bien quil seroit
necessaire ce que n’a pas este retardi par faulte de debvoir de soing
et de diligence. Car nous en avons cherche ...[1751] moyenes possibles
et mesmes po^[r] essayer si ceste Royne dangleterre s ... addoucir et
contenir par quelques remedes qui n’ont ... en son endroict, car apres
avoir faict du cousté du Roy tout ... de penser po^[r] luy oster la
jalousie et le soupcon qu’elle monstre au ... nous y avons employe
le Roy catholicque tant que par son ambassadeur il luy ... quil ne
souffriroit pas que elle donnast faveur aux rebelles ... aulcune
chose au preiudice des droictz et authorite du Roy et de ... fille en
Escosse. Depuis y a este envoyé l’evesque de Valence conseillier au
... po^[r] luy rendre raison plus pertinente de l’intention du Roy, et
quil ne ch ... l’obeissance de ses subiectz, resolu de retirer ses
forces apres qu ... restablies au bon chemin, tout cela n’a de rien
servi si elle n’a ... vous avez peu veoir par les articles qu’elle a f
... son Ambassadeur si honteux que nous croyons qu’elle sass ... nous
n’en ferions rien et par ainsy elle passeroit oultre ... qui est de
la guerre, dont nous veryons peu de moyen de ... si ce n’est po^[r] ...
refuge l’ ... de Sieur de Glayon ques^[r] les ... y envoye po^[r] luy en
parler des grosses contz ayant delibere si ... obstinee de secourir le
Roy de tout ce de luy qu’il vouldra et ... a accorde luy bailler gens
et vaiss ... po^[r] remettre lobeissance ... dont il a este prins au mot.
Et y a este envoye ... scavoir de la duchesse de Parme de quel nombre
ou ... lad. dame charge expresse d’en accommoder le Roy de tout....
Cependant Madame nous ne perdons point le temps a faire ad ... qui sera
dun si bon nombre de vaisseaulx et si bien formy de gens et de toutes
choses convenables que nous esperons que lad. Royne ne ses forces
n’auront pas le moyen de les garder de vous secourir tout le p ...
veryons est qu’elle ne peult estre preste que vers la fin de Iuillet.
Mais si ferons nous tout ce que sera possible au monde po^[r] la mettre
plustost a la voyle et ne espargner argent soing ni diligence comme
nous nous asseurons que vous croyez bien. Et neantmoins cherchons nous
tous aultres moyens de vous faire secourir de deniers soit de Flandres
ou d’ailleurs et aussy ne craindrons nous en adventurer par petites
pommes cependant et pour y commencer avons nous advise vous renvoyer
... eur dedans vng aultre petit vaisseau que luy avons faict equipper,
ne luy ... espargne aussy argent car il a eu po^[r] estre venu icy et
le hazard qu’il a douze centz francz que le Roy luy a donnes et trois
centz escus po^[r] son retour. Avecq luy nous vous envoyons par ung clerc
qui l’accompaigne la somme de mille livres et vingt cacques de pouldre
menue grevée par ce que nous avons sceu par les lettres des sieurs de
la Brosse et Doysell qui vous en avez besoing par dela ce sera pour
attendre toutz jours mieulx estantz bien deliberez de ... perdre une
seule occasion de vous secourir ainsy par le menu au danger ... perdre
quelque chose.

Cependant, Madame, il fauldra que de vostre coste vous faciez le mieulx
... pourrez et sur tout qu’il soit donné ordre a tenir les places
bien.... rnies louant sa ma^[te] bien fort la defensive sur la quelle
les capitaines de dela sont d’advis que vous vous mettiez qui est ung
moyen pour avoir la raison de la legerete et mal consyderée entreprise
de lad. Royne dont nous esperons que le mal tombera a la fin sur elle
et qui Dieu ne laissera impunye la faulte qu’elle faict.

... a este grande consolation au Roy et a toute ceste compaignie
d’avoir entendu ... les souldatz de dela ayent si bonne volonté, cela
nous faict ... Dieu qui tout yra mieulx qu’elle ne vouldroit car si
led.... gneur Roy catholicque chemine en cecy de bon pied dont il nous
asseure il est impossible que la chose ne tourne a sa confusion.

Quant aux nouvelles de ca nous voulons bien que vous scachez que
depuis xv ou vingt jo^[rs] aulcuns malheureux ont essaye icy de mettre
a fin une conjuration quilz avoient faicte po^[r] tuer le Roy et ne
nous y oublioient pas. Tout cela fondé sur religion dont aulcuns des
principaulx autheurs ont esté pris et punis. Mais tant plus nous allons
avant et plus trouvons nous que ceste conspiration a longue queue ayant
este bastie de longue main et appuyee par daulcuns grandz qui se sont
trouvez bien trompez. Car nostre Seign^[r] a bien sceu defendre sa cause.
Ceste [quasi le mesmes][1752] train qui ont prins voz rebelles, mais
ilz vouloient [commancer par le] sang et l’espee. Un autre foys vous en
scaurez [plus par le menu] Et po^[r] fin de ceste lettre.

[_Not signed_]

[_Not addressed_]

[_Endorsed_] 12 April, 1559[1753] (1560) Card. & D of Guise to the
queen Dowager whereof another copy was sent to the Q. Ma^[te] the 3 of
Aprill and was dated at Mayremoustier the viij^[th] of the same.

STATE PAPERS, SCOTLAND

ELIZABETH, VOL. III, NO. 58. (Translation. The parts in italics have
been deciphered.)[1754]

[_The cardinall of Lor: and duke of Guise to the Quene douag_:][1755]

[April 29]

Madame This bearar hath made verie good diligence to bring us yo^[r]
lettres wherof we wer verie gladde, for that by the same we understoode
yo^[r] newes, and the rath^[r], for that we had receyvid none from yo^[w],
sins the comminge of _Protestant the courrone_. Sins which tyme the
_Quene of England_ hath ever kept us in allarme to begynne the _warre_
and to shew _by all her dealinges that she_ had sent to be doinge and
sturringe the coles. We beleeve she hath forgotten nothinge, wherby
she might thinke to draw anye fruict of her evell disposicion: yf
she had fownde thinges in cace to go through w^[th] her businesse.
Neverthelesse shee hath gyven us the fairest wordes of the world.
_Wherunto the Frenche King hath not so muche trustyd_ but that he hathe
advertisid the king of Spaine of all that _she hath doon_ who having
well considered the mater, hath made answer that there is no cause why
to disalow his entent specially to go through w^[th] the maters on that
side, and that to chastise the Rebelles he will gyve the King, as manye
vessells, men, and vitailes, as he will, and so hath writen to the said
queene, who knowing that she can hope for nothing of that, that she
maketh a rekening of, begynnithe to use oth^[r] languaige, and causythe
her ambassad^[r] to saye that that she hath done hath ben for none oth^[r]
cause, but for the jalousye she hath of her Realme, and fearinge to be
sodaynly taken unwares. So that it seemithe, that she repentethe to
have gon so farre furth in the mater. And we beleeve that before theese
lettres come to yo^[r] handes, yo^[w] shall have well perceyved, that her
intentes ar waxed verye colde. And yf that which she hathe caused to
be said by her Ambassado^[r] be true, yo^[w] shall have understand all the
hole storie, by a man whome the S^[r] de Sevre the kinges ambassad^[r] in
Englande, hathe sent unto yo^[w]. Neverthelesse we have thought good
to sende yo^[w] backe againe this said bearar, by the waye of Flandres
to advertise yo^[w], that we thinke that your Rebelles wilbe farre
from their rekeninge, yf they make their accompte of the said Ladyes
protection. Or elles there is much dissimulation.

And yet the King knowing after what sorte he must trust Englishemen,
leavithe not of, to prepare xxiiij great ships to thintent (yf neede
requyre, and that it do appeere, that the sayd Ladye doth contynue
her evell disposicion) to gyue ordre w^[th] the same and oth^[r] forces
w^[ch] he keepith in a readinesse, to souccour yo^[w] in such sorte, as
he shall have the reason that he requyrethe, of thone and thoth^[r].

Yn the meane tyme he hathe sent the busshoppe of Valence, counsello^[r]
in the K^[es] pryvie counsell, towardes the Queene, to understande
plainely her meaninge, and in cace that the same be good, then to come
to yo^[w] w^[th] good and large memorialles, to assaye to appease thinges
on that side and to fynde the meanes to wynne tyme.

The thing (Madame,) that greevithe us most, is, that the meanes is
hindred and stopped, to soucco^[r] yow w^[th] money as ofte and as
readily as we wold be glad to do, and as yo^[w] have neede of it. Which
we durst not aventure, nor also o^[r] brother Mons^[r] le Marquis for the
evident danger that might happen. But yt cannot be longe before we see
some waye open, and yow maye be sure (Madame) that we will not lose one
quarter of an houre.

Now (Madame) we must w^[th] yo^[w], lament the Evell, that the mater
of religion maye bring into a Realme, which hath so gone to worke on
this side, that w^[th]in these xij or xv dayes, there is discouvered
a conspiracy, made to kill us bothe, and then to take the King, and
gyve him masters and gouvernours to instruct and bring him up in this
wretched doctryne. For which pourpose there shuld assemble a great
nombre of personnes heerabowtes who ar not w^[th]out the comforte
and favour of some great ones. And betwixt the sixth and xv^[th] of
this monethe, they shuld execute the same. So that w^[th]out the
healpe of God and thintelligences w^[ch] we have had from all partes
of christendome, and also of some of the conspiratours, that have
disclosed it, the matter had taken effect. But God hath provyded heerin
for us. The mater being discouvered, and manye beinge prissoners,
we hope that the same shall be bowlted out, and so the danger
avoyded. Wherof, and how the same shall breake out, yo^[w] shalbe more
particularly advertised heerafter, specially if the waye be freer,
then hitherto it hath ben. Yn the meane tyme yo^[w] shall receyve (if
yt please yo^[w]) our humble commendacions prayeng God &c. Montignac is
presently arryved upon the depeche, wherupon ordre shall be taken out
of hande.

[_Not signed_]

[_Not addressed_]

[_This and other deciphered letters_ (Queen Dowager of Scotland to MM.
d’Oysel and de la Brosse 29 [April] and “a private man’s letter to
d’Oysell” [29 April] 1560) _are written on the same sheets of paper,
and are endorsed together_: “The interceptyd lettres discyphred,”
_and endorsed in Burghley’s hand_: “B. 12. Martii. 20. Martii lettres
deciphred from France to the Q. dowag.”[1756]]

APPENDIX II

[P. 98, n. 1]

ARCHIVES NATIONALES,

K. 1,494, PIÈCE NO. 70

[_L’Ambassadeur de France, Mr. de L’Aubespine, évêque de Limoges, au
Roi d’Espagne, Philippe II_]

Tolède, 4 avril 1561

[_Suscription_] Au Roy.

[_Au dos, alia manu_] A Su Magestad. Del obispo de Limoges, a IIIIº de
Abril 1561.

Sire, par ce que la Royne aura peu escrire à Vostre Majesté et Monsieur
le Prince d’Evoly aussi, vous aurez entendu l’estat auquel les choses
se retrouvoient parmy les Estatz particuliers en France il y a vingt
jours par la malice de quelques ungs mal sentans de la foy, lesquelz
avoient faict une menée en certaines provinces afin que l’on feist
tomber le gouvernement du royaume en autre main que celuy de la Royne
vostre mere, la sentans ferme et constante a n’endurer leurs erreurs
et a les punir. Depuis est arrivé l’un de mes gens avec deux pacquetz
de Monsieur de Chantone, lesquelz j’ay faict mectre entre les mains de
Sajas.[1757] M’advertissant ladicte dame par le mesme courrier que le
Roy de Navarre s’est monstré si conforme en tout ce qu’elle a desiré
et peu approuvant la temerité de telles entreprinses, qu’il s’est
accommodé pour aussi recevoir quelque lieu et contentemant d’estre seul
lieutenant general du Roy vostre bon frere en France soubz ladicte
dame, afin que la multitude des autres seigneurs et gouverneurs de
tout le royaume n’amenast point la confuzion qui y estoit, que l’on
eust quelque adresse, et que, par ce moien aussi il feust plus honnoré
et respecté d’ung chascun sans aucune diminution de l’authorité de
ladicte dame, laquelle, Sire, demeure chef de toutes choses, ayant
les quatre secrétaires d’Estat soubz elle, les pacquetz, finances,
dons et autres graces avec la personne du Roy, et commande au conseil
ainsi que de coustume, tellement que chacun espere, comme aussi faict
Sa Majesté et ainsi qu’elle me commande vous dire, Sire, que desormès
il y a certaine apparance de toute tranquilité et repos, car ce que
dessus est passé, arresté et signé entre eulx et de leurs mains pour
articles irrevocables, ayant pour ceste cause mandé aux Estatz qu’ilz
eussent à ne penser ne disputter plus sur telz pointz, ains seulement
en ce qui concerne le mesnaige du royaume, les reculans et remettans
a s’assambler a la fin de l’esté prochain. Et ce pendant, suivant
l’instante requeste du peuple, le Roy vostre bon frere, Sire, partira
de Fontainebleau incontinent après ce Quasimodo pour se faire sacrer
à Reims dedans le XX^[e] de May, et incontinent après sus le mois de
Juing faire son entrée à Paris, d’autant que ces deux actes sollemnelz
donnent plus d’authorité et contentement à tous nos subjectz, et que,
cela faict, la Royne vostre mère pourra aussi, comme elle désire,
plus soigneusement user de la main forte et justice en tout ce qui
se presentera. Ce que dessus, Sire, amandera, s’il vous plaist, en
vostre endroit l’opinion mauvaise que nous avions quant je parlay a
Monsieur le prince d’Evoly de l’yssue de noz Estatz, lesquelz, par ce
remede, sont frustrez de plus rien toucher ne negotier qui concerne le
gouvernement. Me commandant tres expressement la Royne de remercier
fort affectionneement Vostre Majesté des bons et roiddes offices
desquelz Monsieur de Chantoné a usé près d’elle pendant ces disputz, et
asseurant Vostre Majesté que ce luy est obligation telle qu’elle peult
faire estat de son amour et affection autant que de sa propre mère,
comme de son costé elle se confie tant en sa bonté et amitié que, si
l’on eust voulu faire plus de tord a son honneur et preminance, elle
eust usé de ce que Dieu a mis. Sire, soubz vostre obeissance, comme
de son meilleur amy, desirant que Vostre Majesté face en semblable
estat de tout ce que sera en elle. Ceulx, Sire, qui avoient tramé ce
que dessus pensoient remuer en nostre conseil et autres endroitz les
hommes et honneurs à leur guise; mais, par ce moien, ilz sont hors de
leurs desseings. S’estant Monsieur le prince de Condé contenté d’une
declaration qu’on luy a donnée pour sa justification, à la charge qu’il
peust, quant bon luy sembleroit, estre à la Court près ladicte dame,
ainsi qu’il y a esté permis. Monsieur le connestable a, Sire, faict
de bons et saiges offices en cet establissement, me chargeant de vous
presenter ses tres humbles recomandations, vous requerant, comme font
Leurs Majestez, qu’il vous plaise en sa faveur confirmer en Flandres
une abbaie de dames à l’une de ses parentes que les religieuses
desirent fort depuis le decez de feu madame de Lallain, comme j’éscris
à Monsieur le conte d’Horne. Ce que, Sire, j’eusse de bouche esté
faire entendre à Vostre Majesté; mais la crainte que j’ay eu de le
troubler parmy ces sainctz et devots jours m’excusera s’il luy plaist,
et commandera á Monsieur le prince d’Evoly qui cy est, de me faire
donner quelque responce sur ceste lettre et sus une precedente que je
vous escrivis il y a deux jours, afin que je puisse faire entendre
à la Royne vostre bonne mère le contentement que recevrez de ce que
dessus et vostre bon conseil. Quant mon courrier partit, Monsieur le
conte d’Heu avoit desja esté licencié du Roy et de la Royne mère, et
suis attendant, Sire, Monsieur de Montrueil, lieutenant de Monsieur
le prince de la Roche-sur-Yon, lequel arrivera icy dedans quatre ou
cinq jours, venant devant pour preparer ce qu’il sera de besoing et
pour aussi visiter la Royne, qui me faict estimer que ledict seigneur
Conte ne sera pas en ceste ville que quatre ou cinq jours après
Quasimodo,[1758] dont noz dames ne sont pas contentes, la Royne pour le
desir qu’elle a de reveoir Vostre Majesté plustost, et les autres pour
leur interest particulier

Sire, je me recommande très humblement à vostre bonne grâce, priant le
Créateur vous donner entres bonne santé tres heureuse et longue vye.

De Toledo, ce IIII^[e] d’avril 1561.

Vostre tres humble serviteur
S. DE L’AUBESPINE
E[vesque] de Lymoges

APPENDIX III

[P. 153, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. XXXVIII, NO. 179

[_Letter of the duke of Guise to the cardinal of Lorraine_]

[_1562, June 25_]

Extraict de la lettre de Guyse escripte de sa main au cardinal.

Ie vous envoye ce porteur en dilligence pour vous advertir que tout
fut yer accorde. Et puis vous dire que le commancement est l’honneur
de Dieu service du Roy bien et repoz de ce royaume. Cedit porteur est
suffisant et nauront noz chers cardinaulx que part ceste lettre comme
aussi nostre mareschal de Brissac qui congnoistra quil y en a qui sont
bien loing de leurs desseins. Nostre mere et son frere ne jurent que
par la foy quilz nous doibvent et quilz ne veullent plus de conseil
que de ceulx que scavez qui vont le bon chemyn. Conclusion la Religion
reformee en nous conduisant et tenant bon sen va a baz leaue et les
amyraulx mal ce qui est de possible. Toutes noz forces nous demeurent
entierement les leurs rompues les billeez rendues sans parler dedictz
ne de preches et administracion des sacremens a leur mode. Ces bons
seigneurs croiront sil leur plaist cedit porteur de ce quil leur dira
de la part de trois de leurs meilleurs amys et bayse la main. De
Baugency ce xxv^[e] jour de Iuing 1562.

[_No signature_]

[_No address_]

[_Endorsed_] Extraict d’une lettre escripte de
la main de m^[r] de Guyse au
Cardinal de Lorraine deXXV^[e]
Iuing 1562.

APPENDIX IV

[P. 155, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. XXXIX, NO. 211, vj

[_Letter of the duke of Aumale to Catherine de Medici_]

[_1562, Iuly 9_]

Madame, je viens presentement de recevoyr la lettre quil vous a pleu
mescripre touchant quelques marchandz anglois que lambassadeur de leur
Royne vous a faict entendre avoyr este prys par les gens de guerre qui
sont icy pres de moy pour le service du Roy et le vostre. Dont encores
Madame je navois ouy parler, bien de quelques soldatz anglois qui
furent pris y a assez long temps par le s^[r] Dallegre qui voulloient
entrer a Rouen et lesquelz tost aprez je feiz renvoyer sinon quelques
ungs qui se sont voluntairement mys a vostre service parmy noz bandes
vous pourrant asseurer Madame, que tant sen fault que je permecte
telles choses Que tout ce que jay en plus grande recommendation, est
de les laisser librement et tous les autres estrangers qui sont icy
mesmes voz subiectz de quelque religion quilz soient de trafficquer et
negotier comme ilz faisoient au paravant ses troubles, sachant trop
bien de quelle consequence cella est pour vostre service. Et ne puis
penser dou viendroit ceste prise si ce nest par ceulx mesmes de Rouen
Dieppe et le Havre qui pillent et prennent indifferemment sur les ungs
et les autres sans aucune exception. Toutesfois Madame, je mectray
peyne de faire si bien rechercher parmy ses trouppes que sil y en a
aucuns qui en ayent quelque chose je la feray delivrer et nen sera
perdu ung seul denyer, ainsy que je lay faict entendre a ce present
porteur que ledit ambassadeur ma envoye expres.

Madame je prye Dieu vous avoyr en sante et donner tresbonne et longue
vye. Au Mesnil devant S^[te] Catherine le ix^[e] jour de Juillet 1562.

Vostre treshumble et tresobeissant
serviteur et subiect
CLAUDE DE LORAYNE

[_No address_]

[_Endorsed_] 9 Iulii 1562.

The coppye of the duke d’aumalles
letter to the Quene mother.

[_Enclosed in a letter from Throckmorton to the Queen, from Paris, 12
July, 1562_ (_No. 211_)]

APPENDIX V

[P. 177, n. 3]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. XLVI, NO. 973

[_Letter of the prince of Condé to the earl of Warwick_]

[_1562, December 14_]

Mons^[r] le Conte. Attendant que la commodite se presente plus propre
de vous pouvoir voir et diviser privement avecques vous envoiant
maintenant ceste depesche en Angleterre je nay voulu oublier a vous
ramentevoir le besoing que nous avons de joir en vostre secours,
auquel jespere moiennant la grace de Dieu me joindre de brief pour
par apres mectre quelque fin a tant de calamitez. Si Mons^[r] le Conte
de Montgoumery est de retour avecques quelques forces, je serois
bien dadvis se pour nous devancer, vous vous acheminissiez droict a
Honnefleur pour plus faciliter le chemin et a lune et a laultre armee.
Me recommandant sur ceste esperance a vostre bonne grace je supplieray
le Createur vous donner Mons^[r] le Conte avecques sa tressaincte grace
ce que plus desirez. Escript au camp de S^[t] Arnoul ce xiiij^[e] jour de
Decembre 1562.

Vostre plus afecsionne et parfayt amy
LOYS DE BOURBON

[_Addressed_] A Mons^[r]

Mons^[r] le Conte de Quarruich.

[_Endorsed in Cecil’s hand_] 184 December. Prince of Cond. to the Er.
of Warwyk.

APPENDIX VI

[P. 203, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC

ELIZABETH, VOL. XXIX, NO. 50

[_Admiral Clinton to Cecil_]

S^[r] I am sure that yo^[w] are advertysed of the Appoyntement for New
haven I would gladly understand the quenes ma^[tes] plesure for my
farther Servyce. I lefte the Philipp and Mary the Lyon the Sakar and
twoo gales w^[th] viij victualers wyth m^[r] Wynter in the roade of New
haven to joyne w^[th] the shipps under his charge for the Dyspayche
of the men and such thinges as is to be brought thense and lefte m^[r]
Holstocke to assyste m^[r] Winter and I w^[th] the Elizabeth Jonas and
the Victorie cam hither this evenyng and synse my comyng w^[th] the
advyse of m^[r] vycechamberlen I have dyspayched a suffycyent nomber of
shippes that I founde presentely here to goo to New haven to fetch all
thinges thense that is to be brought. I cam to New haven yester day at
one a cloke in the after none & departyd thense at twoo a clok this
morning fyndyng my lord of Warwycke a shippborde redy to departe and at
my fyrst coming Edward Horsey came to me w^[th] monser de Lynerols from
the Frenche King the quene and the constable as he sayd to vysyt me
w^[th] offer of any thing that was their for my comoditie and sayd that
the king desyryd me to com on land to hym and their w^[th] he tould me
the Appoyntement for New haven. I sayd to hym that the plage of dedly
infexion had don for them that I thynke all the force of France could
never a don for yf the mortalitie had not taken a way and consumynyd
our Captens & Soldiors in so grete nombers they could never a prevailyd
nor a proched so neare the towne yet ys it apparant vnto yo^[w] the noble
coraige of the lorde lyevetenaunt and the valeantnes of his soldiors
hath bene shewyd as moch as might be in men having fought agaynst an
unsesable plage of pestylence & the whole force of France. And as I
doo reioyce that my contreymen hath so worthely behavyd them selfes so
am I hartely sorry that yo^[r] chanse is to recover that towne, and so
I desyryd hym to geve my humble thankes to the King the quene & the
constable for their corteous mesaige and offer sent to me but I having
charge by the quenes Ma^[tes] comandement my mistres of thes shipps
and nombers of men I can not departe from them and so we departyd
and afore the comyng of Edward Horsey & the sayd frenshe man to me I
not knowyng at that tyme where my L of Warwyk was sent William Drury
w^[th] a Trompet to New haven to speke w^[th] my lord from me. And at
his landing the Prynce of Condy & dyverse of the noble men found hym
their and usyd hym verey curteosly and offeryd hym a horse to ryde to
se the towne and a jentilman to attend on hym and declaryd to hym that
my lord of Warwyk was gone to the See and had taken a shipp to departe.
And this moche I thought mete to let yo^[w] understand prayng yo^[w] that
I may know the quenes Ma^[tes] plesure for my dyspayche hense. Thus I
take my leave. From Portesmowth the last of Iuly a^[o] 1563.

[_Signed_] Your assured friend to comand
E. CLYNTON

[_Addressed_] to the right hono^[r]able

S^[r] William Cicill Knight
pryncipall Secretare
to the quenes Ma^[ty].

[_Endorsed_] xxxj. July 1563.

to m^[r] Secretary from the
L. admyrall.

APPENDIX VII

[P. 253, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. LXXVII, NO. 846

[_Letter of the prince of Condé to his sister_]

[_1565, March_]

The copy of the Prynce of Condes letter to his sister the Abbesse of
Chelis.[1759]

Ma Soeur, lennuy ou je suis de linjure que lon a faict a Monsieur le
Cardinal de Lorraine m’a mis au lict, comme vous dira vostre homme, de
la fascherie que jay de veoir ainsy traicter les Princes. Qui me faict
dire que lunion de noz maisons est plus que necessaire; comme il le
peult bien congnoistre a ceste heure, et sil leust plustost faict, il
leust tenu en peur et crainte ceulx qui nous doibvent obeissance et non
par les armes eussent puissance de commandement. Surquoy jay faict a
ce porteur entendre mon oppinion, et de la facon que mondict seigneur
le Cardinal se doibt gouverner. Qui me gardera vous en faire plus
longue lettre, hors mir que je veux confesser que si jeusse sceu ce qui
cy est passe; jeusse veu lhistoire pour empescher une telle honte et
oultraige, qui est plus grand que je nay jamais ouy parler que Prince
ayt eu. Je luy suis et seray, tel que je luy ay promis. Et si jeusse
este aupres de luy, je luy eusse faict prevue de ma volunte, plus par
effect que par parolle. Je vous iray veoir quand le me manderez. Qui
sera la fin apres avoir prie Dieu etc.

[_No signature_]

[_No address_]

[_Endorsed in Cecil’s hand_] March 1565.

Copy[1760] of a letter from the Marischall
Montmorency to the Duke
of Montpensyar
and a letter from the Prince of Conde
to the Abbass of Cheliss.

APPENDIX VIII

[P. 259, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXI, NO. 612

[_Montluc’s Treason_]

[1570, March 27]

[Sidenote: Ont deferes avec luy les sieurs de Larride de Mirepoix et
Negrepelice]

[Sidenote: Le sieur de Marchassetel est ung jeune gentilhomme dune
maise de xii a xv. mille livres tournois de rente et a fiance nagueres
la soeur de Monsieur de Crussol]

Le sieur de Montluc charge davoir intelligence avec le Roy despaigne
pour mettre en ses mains le pais de Guienne de quoy il reste accuse
envers le Roy de France et la Royne sa mere par le sieur de Peres en
Quercy et son filz le sieur de Marchassetel beau frere du sieur de
Crussol qui ont envoye tout expres ung gentilhomme en court a ceste
fin instruit de lettres et memoires par lesquelles est porte que le
seneschal de Quercy a dit ausdits sieurs de Peres et Marchassetel quil
avoit este solicitte de faire mutiner la ville de Montaubain a fin de
donner occasion audit de Montluc de la piller se plaignant que ses
services nestoient recongneuz mais quil sen vengeroit et plusieurs
autres propos sembles quilz veullent maintenir avoir este proferez
par ledit de Montluc qui est aussi charge de sestre assemble lieu ung
lieu nomme Granale distant quatre lieues de Tholose avec le cardinal
Darmaignac et ung seigneur despaigne pour conferer de cest affaire d
aultre part que les prelats de Guyenne et Languedoc ont fait certaines
assemblees et accorde entre eulx quelques levees de deniers et
contribucions necessaires a cest entreprise et ont deputte secrettement
levesque de Lodene vers le roy despaigne.

Le seneschal de Quercy arrivant nagueres en court adverti de ce que
dessus se veult purger a levesque de Vallence frere dudit sieur de
Montluc disant ne scavoir que cestoit et quon le mettoit a tort en
cest affaire. Toutesfoys ledit sieur de Vallence homme collere de
son naturel et passionne et laffaire de son frere aisne estant de
telle consequence obtient du roy que lesdits seneschal de Quercy et
gentilhomme seroient ouis au conseil prive ou le seneschal a nye
publicquement ce que dessus Neantmoings le bruit est quen particulier
parlant a la royne luy aie dit beaucoup de grandes choses. Le
gentilhomme apersevere monstrant sesdites lettres et memoires et quil
estoit prest se rendre prisonnier ou submettre a telle autre peine pour
soustenir son dire. Comme aussi feroient ceulx qui lavoient envoye
lesquelz viennent maintenant en court pour maintenir tout le contenu
desdites memoires et proposer plusieurs aultres griefs contre ledit de
Montluc tel est le bruit la royne apres avoir ouy lesdits seneschal et
gentilhomme depesche ung nomme Duplessis varlet de chambre du roy vers
ledit sieur de Montluc. Pour entendre la veritte lequel de Montluc au
lieu de se purger commenca a hault louer ses faicts et services et a
se plaindre de la mescognoissance quen avoit le roy et dont pouvoit
venir quon soubson de luy et mauvaise oppinion que sestoit tousjours
honnestement acquicte des charges quon luy avoit donnees. Bien aict
confesse avoir parle a Granale avec le Cardinal Darmagnac mais que
cestoit en passant chemin pour aller a Tholose et communicquer avec luy
des affaires du roy ou lon dit sestre trouve ou ung nomme Don Pierre de
Navarre bastard dalbert evesque de Cominges. Ce quencores est trouve
mauvais pour ce que lun et lautre nen ont rien escript au roy ny a la
royne. Pourquoy sont mandez en court lesdits de Montluc et Marchassetel
pour se representer devant leurs maiestez.

Cest la cause pourquoy le sieur de Montluc a envoye cartel contre tous
ses adversaires &c. disant que tous ceulx que vouldront maintenir quil
aict intelligence avec le roy despaigne ont menty sauf et excepte les
princes du sang et autres ses superieurs ausquelz il doit honneur et
reverence quil est prest de les combatre a toutes sortes darmes en quoy
il espere ne faire moings de devoir que il navoit que vingt ung ans &c.

[_No signature_]

[_No address_]

[Endorsed] 27º Martii. Informacion
contre Mons^[r] de Monluc.

APPENDIX IX

[P. 303, n. 2]

BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE

FONDS FRANÇAIS, MS. NO. 3,197, F^[O] 92, RECTO

[_The Cardinal’s War_]

[2 juillet 1565]

[_Au dos_] Coppie. De Mons^[r] de Salzede à Mons^[r] d’Auzances, du II^[e]
Juillet 1565.

Cause de l’empeschement faict à Monseigneur le Cardinal par le S^[r] de
Salcede.

Monsieur, comme le diable qui ne cerche jamais que de mectre des choses
en avant, il est survenu que, estant arrivé Monseigneur le cardinal de
Lorraine a Ramberviller, ses officiers m’ont dict aultre commandement
de publier et attacher par touttes les villes et chastellenyes la
protection et sauvegarde qu’il a recouvert de l’Empereur, le double de
laquelle je vous envoye signé et collationné de son chancellyer. Et
avec cela, je suis esté adverty de bon lieu certainement qu’il veult et
a despeché capitaines pour mettre ès place lesquelles je conserve il y
a environ dix ans aux despens du Roy et avec ses soldatz; et veoir à
ceste heure ung remuement devant moy avec ceste saulvegarde et[1761]
une particularité que je sçay je ne suis deliberé de le souffrir que
premièrement le Roy et la Royne ou vous (comme les representans) vous
n’ayez bien pensé le faict et la consequence que cela peult advenir
pour l’advenir.[1762] Je vous asseure, Monsieur, que je suis bien mary
qu’ayant tant faict de services à Monseigneur le Cardinal et à sa
maison, comme tout le monde sçayt bien, il[1763] me contraigne pour mon
honneur de thumber en sa malle grace. Et quant luy au aultre vouldront
mectre quelques particularitez en avant, vous vous bien asseurer avec
tous mes seigneurs et amys que je mouray et me coustera ma vye et
mon bien que je ne serviray jamais aultre que à monseigneur et roy,
auquel je suis tant tenu. S’il vous plaist de me envoyer la coche de
madame d’Auzances[1764] par Florymont,[1765] je vous envoyeray à Metz
en charge ma femme et enffans avec le peu de bien que j’ay en France,
pour vous asseurer que je ne feray jamais chose qui ne soit pour le
service du Roy, synon pour sa grandeur et authorité. Et, en ce pendant
que j’aurai de voz nouvelles, j’entretiendray les choses en l’estat que
j’ay deliberé, avec la plus grande modeste que je pouray, sy je ne suis
contrainct aultrement. Et sur ce, je me recommande de bien bon cuer a
vostre bonne grace et prye Dieu

Monsieur, vous donner très heureuse et longue vye.

De Vic, ce II^[e] jour de Juillet. Ainsy signé:

P^[O] DE SALCEDE.

APPENDIX X

[P. 307, n. 7]

STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC

ELIZABETH, ADDENDA, VOL. XIII, NO. 71

[_George Poulet to Sir Hugh Poulet_]

[1567, April 22]

It may pleas yo^[u] to be advertysed that wheras (aswell at my last being
w^[th] yowe, as by your severall letters) yowe have geven me specyall
charg for then quyring of such currauntes as might be learned from the
frenche partyes, wherin having hetherto desysted, rather for want of
convenient matter then of dew remembraunce, I have therefore thought yt
my duty w^[th] all convenyent speede to advertise yo^[u] of soche newes,
as I have benne presently enfourmed of by certeyne of this isle w^[ch]
came upon Satterday last from Normandy, who have declared that there
was a greate rumo^[r] of warres, and the newes so certayne as a boy of
myne being at Constaunces for the recovery of a grief w^[ch] he hath,
was hydden by his host the space of one day, and so pryvely w^[th]
dyvers others of this Isle conveyed over with all speede. Moreover I
understand that there were taken up at Constaunces and theraboutes
iij^[c] soldio^[r]s w^[ch] ar now in garrisson at Graundville and that
there ar viij^[xx] soldio^[r]s in Shawsey and two greate shippes well
appointed. Also that a servaunte of the frenche Kinges hath passed
alongest the sea coastes of Normandy and hath taken the names of the
principall masters and marryners in thos partes. The leke brute of
warres and preparacion for the same ys in Bryttayne as I have learned
by a barke of Lyme w^[ch] came from S^[t] Malos and aryved in this
Isle upon Sonday last at night, who declareth that they were prevely
admonished w^[th] all speede to departe from thens, and that Mons^[r]
Martigues governo^[r] of Bryttayne was appointed to com this present
Tusday with a greate company in to the sayd towne of S^[t] Malos where
greate preparacion was made for the receyving of him and his retynewe.
Thes ar the specialst and most credybel yntellygences w^[ch] I have
as yet lerned from thos partes, the presumpcions wherof as they ar
very manyfest and dangeros so can they not be to myche credyted and
dylligently prevented, wherefore I have w^[th] all speede sent this
bearer unto yo^[u] w^[th] thes my advertysementes whom I have charged
not to slacke his duty in conveyaunce of the same, to thend that yo^[u]
being enfourmed of thes premysses may returne youre pleasure and
advise for ower better procedinges in the same, as to yo^[r] discrete
wysdom may seme most expedyent, beseching yo^[u] yt may be as briefly
as ys possyble. And in this meane tyme I shall not fayle God willing
to enforce and make redy the power of this castle and isle for the
resisting of all daungers and sudden attemptes w^[ch] may be geven by
the ennymy to the uttermost of ower power. Although the estate and
furnyture of this castle ys not unknowen unto yo^[u], yet have I thought
good to send herew^[th] enclosed a byll of suche necessaryes as ar
specyally wanting in the same. There ys no other speciall matter worthy
the certifyeng for this present from this yo^[r] charge where all thinges
remayne in the accoustomed good and quyet estate thankes be to God,
whom I beseche long to preserve yo^[u]. From Iersey the xxij^[th] of
Aprill 1567.

Yowr most obedyent sonne
GEORGE POULET

[_Addressed_] To his right wurshipfull father
S^[r] Hugh Poulet Knight.

[_Endorsed_] 22 April, 1567.

M^[r] George Poulett to his father
S^[r] Hugh Poulet from Jersey.

APPENDIX XI

[P. 326, n. 3]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. XCIV, NO. 1,338

[_Sir Henry Norris to Queen Elizabeth_]

Yt may like yo^[r] Maiesty to be advertized.... Wryttin at Paris this
last of Septemb^[r] 1567, in haste.

Yt is here reported for truthe that Amyans Abevill and Calleis are
takin to the princes beholfe wherof I doubte not by y^[r] Ma^[ty] is
advertized or this. Also they have Lanne[1766] Soyzon[1767] Abevill
Bollein[1768] Ameins and so alonge the riuer of Sene which be the best
appointid townes of Artillery in Fraunce.

By y^[r] highnes most humble and
obedient subiect and servant
HENRY NORREYS

[_Addressed_] To the Quene’s most excellent
Maiesty:

[_Endorsed_] 30 September 1567
S^[r] H. Norreys to the
Q. Ma^[ty].

APPENDIX XII

[P. 334, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. XCV, NO. 1,457

[_Printed Pamphlet of 6 pages_]

LETTRES DU ROY, | PAR LESQUELLES | IL

ENIOINT DE FAI | RE DILIGENTE PERQUISITION
& RE | CHERCHE DE TOUS LES GENTILS-HOM | MES,
TANT D’VN PARTY QUE D’AUL | TRE, QUI SE SONT
RETIREZ EN LEURS | MAISONS DEPUIS LA
BATAILLE DONN | EE PRES S. DENYS.
A. PARIS,
PAR ROB. ESTIENE IMPRIMEUR DU ROY
M. D. LXVII
AUEC PRIUILEGE AUDICT SEIGNEUR
DE PAR LE ROY.

[_Signé_] CHARLES

[_Et au dessous_] ROBERTET

[_Et sur la superscription est es | cript_]

A nostre ami & fealle le Prevost de | Paris, ou son Lieutenant.

ROSSIGNOL

APPENDIX XIII

[P. 352, n. 2]

BIBLIOTECA BARBERINIANA

VATICAN LIBRARY, NO. 5,269, FOLIO 63

[_Discorso sopra gli humori del Regno di Francia, di Mons. Nazaret_]

Quante uolte il Rè Christianissimo ha ricerco Nostro Sig^[re] di
danari contanti, ò di permissioni di cauarne somme maggiori, et
grossissime dal Clero di Francia, ò di soccorso di gente Italiana, ò
di altro aiuto, che si potesse cauare da sua Beatitudine, tante n’è
stato in somma compiaciuto, conciosia, che la bontà del Papa, et la
prontezza, et uolontà grande, che Sua Santità ha del continuo hauuto
d’ impiegare ogni sua forza, et autorità a salute di quella Corona, et
ad esterminatione degli Heretici gli ha fatto prestare più fede alle
promesse, che loro M^[ta], faceuano a parole del ben futuro che alle
uere ragioni di coloro, i quali predicauano il Male, et la corruttione
presente, et palpabile tale, secondo essi da mettere per perduto
qualunque cosa si donaua ò porgeua per quel aiuto con il medesimo zelo
ha proceduto sua Santità nell’ aduertire al Re, alla Reina, et alli
altri Ministri suoi fideli, et Catholici degl’ inganni, et male opere
di certi, i quali si uedeua chiaramente, come proponendo fallacie, et
usando falsità et tradimenti, cercauano con sommo artificio di leuare
l’ obedienza al Rè, et corrompere la giustitia, et Religione di quel
Regno, come in gran parte è loro riuscito, cosi non ha mancato di
mettere qualche uolta in consideratione qualche rimedio per troncare
i disegni delli Ugonotti, parendoli, come Papa et Padre commune,
che se gli appartenesse di ricordar quello tocca al bene de fideli,
et come Vicario di Christo in Terra di doversi intromettere in cosa
appartenente all’ uffitio suo per quanto concerne il riformare la
Chiesa di Dio, cioè renderle in quel Paese la sua debita forma, et
dignità essendouene il bisogno, ò la necessità grandissima, mà in parte
alcuna non è mai riuscito di far frutto, anzi quando le loro M^[ta]
non hanno hauto per fine di ualersi degli aiuti; et autorità del Papa,
manco hanno tenuto conto, nè pur mostro di curarsi di corrispondere con
quella dimostratione di parole, che ci conuiene ad ubedienti fig^[li]
et deuoti a questa Santa Sede; Perciochè all’ altre cose, che l’hanno
dechiarato, lo fece manifesto, et palpabile, quando dopo la battaglia
ultima di Mócontor, essendo il tempo appunto proprio de uenire a dare
castigo à chi lo meritaua, come ricordauano i Ministri di Nostro
Sig^[re] per parte sua, che era tempo di fare, et ne mostrauano il
modo, fu risposto loro dalla Reina propria con parole assai espresse,
come il Rè si trouaua in età di autorità, et con forze, et prudenza di
saper gouernare lo Stato suo, da sè, senza hauere à pigliare consiglio,
nè Legge da Principi esterni. Onde meritamente da quel tempo in quà è
parso a Sua Santità di uolere andare un poco più consideratamente, non
giudicando che se gli conuenisse di doversi ingenire in cosa d’altri
più oltre di quelche fosse grato alli Padroni, sperando pure, che come
l’ era affirmato, così asseueratamente l’età del Rè con il ualoroso
animo suo, et con le prouisioni, che loroM^[ta] presumeuano di fare
più che à bastanza per trouarsi al sicuro in ogni accidente, potessero
superare la peruersità de Ribaldi, et ogni altra difficultà.

Hora che dalli intollerabili Capitoli da questa ultima impia pace
apparisce tutto il contrario, ueggendosi come restano del tutto
oppressi i Cat^[ci] et gli Ugonotti tanto solleuati, che non si
preuagliano in qualche parte: mà che mettano necessità, et in loro
soggettione il Rè medesimo.

Non può ne deue sua Beatitudine mancare di tutti quei Uffity, che
si appartengono al grado suo per aprire la mente del Rè con modo,
che sia cauato dalle tenebre, oue altri cerca di tenerlo, et sia
illuminato delle prouisioni, che Sua M^[ta] può porgere per la salute,
et conseruatione dello Stato, et uita di tutti i buoni, che senza
pronto, et potente rimedio se ne andranno in perditione, non potendo
mai reggersi quel Regno senza buona giustistia, et religione; le
quali sono corrottissime con l’Intervento delli Heretici in esse,
li quali Heretici non accade dubitare, che hanno sempre hauuta, et
hanno tutavia più che mai la principale mira loro fissa alla rouina
del Rè et uaglionsi apparentemente di quelle due cose, che sono
generalissime per chiunque cerca di distruggere un Dominio, ò una
Monarchia, cioè la prima di mettere in diffidenza à chi lo regge quei
Prencipi massimamente, che lo possono sostenere, et porgere consigli;
et aiuti da conseruarsi il suo debito imperiò, come si sà, che hanno
tanto tempo procurato di conseguire più, et sopra ogni altra cosa li
Ugonotti del Rè di Spagna con dar ombra, et metter gelosia, che Sua
M^[ta] Catt.^[ca] et suoi Ministri ancor d’auantaggio fussero sempre
per procurare, non che desiderare la divisione della Francia; perchè
la bassezza del Rè Christianissimo, redondaua à grandezza del l’altro
interpretando perpetuamente, et le parole, et i fatti, che ueniuano da
quella parte al peggior senso, il quale argomento, sebene in superficie
hauesse del propabile in qualche parte, nondimeno la natura del Rè
Cat.^[co] tanto inclinata al bene, et alla quiete, fà conoscere a pieno
il contrario, come dimostra pur troppo chiaramente l’occasione, che ha
lassato passare, con il non havere con effetto animo di nuocere alla
Francia per pensiero di accrescere se stesso; Ma è assai alli Ugonotti
di hauere messo Zizania da ogni parte, tanto che l’uno non si fidi
dell’ altro, sicome hanno cerco, che gli riesca di consequire del Papa,
sebene non è uenuto loro fatta, perche Sua Beat.^[ne] per sua troppa
bontà pospone ogni altra occasione, hauendo risguardo solo al seruitio
di Dio, et al bene di quella Corona et del Rè.

L’altra seconda cosa è di mettere diuisione nel Popolo, che di ciò
non accade produrne ragioni, ueggendosi pur troppo per gl’ istessi
capitoli dell’ accordo. E necessaria adunque inanzi ad ogni altra cosa
di provare con buone ragioni, come la setta delli Ugonotti con li suoi
capi, sono sforzati a tenere in perpetuo la persona del Rè per inimica
implacabile, perchè oltre à quello che è detto di sopra l’hanno troppo
grauemente offesa, nello Stato nell’ honore, et quanto ad essi nella
uita sicome testifica quella giornata di Meos, nella quale fu forza a
Sua M^[ta] trottare sino a Parigi nel modo che è notorio.

Molte altre congiure, et conspirationi fatte da essi contra la persona
di Sua M^[ta] et tanti trattati, et ribellioni usate per occuparle
le sue Terre, sono palesi, et n’appariscono i processi fatti per le
scritture, che furono trovate à Sciantiglione di Coligni, et che
offende non perdona, onde considerata la natura loro, non resta
dubbio, che come consij di havere macchinato contra alla uita del Suo
Sovrano Padrone, et offesolo nell’ honore, et nello Stato tante uolte
così abbomineuolmente, come è nonsolo palese; ma prouato a chiunque
lo uole sapere, non potranno in eterno essere fideli, nè obedienti
Vassalli; anzi non staranno mai quieti se non per fraude, et con
intentione d’ingannare Sua M^[ta] quando uegghino le cose in termine,
che li habbia da riuscire, et se gli mancarà il modo con l’ Armi
scoperte, et con congiurationi palesi, come per lo passato; perchè
la loro setta hauesse declinato, forse per il danno riceuuto nelle
battaglie, che Dio benedetto hà fatto loro perdere, ò perchè dubitino
di poter essere oppressi dal ualore, et uirtu, che uede essere nel Rè
è non solo uerisimile, ma chiara, et sicura cosa, che procureranno
di aiutarsi per ogni uia etia indirettissima, et seguitaranno il lor
costume solito, et però non perdoneranno à ueleno, nè ad altra sorte
di scelerata uiolenza, come la morte del Marescial di Bordiglione,
quella di Monsig^[r] di Ghisa, et infinite altre simili ci ammaestrano,
perchè conosceranno, come niuna uia è più certa di assicurarli ad ogni
misfatto, et insieme da conseguire il fine del colorire i loro peruersi
dissegni; onde si può fare uera conseguenza, che niuna persona fidele
al Rè, et prudente possa, ne debba persuadere Sua M^[ta] a disarmare,
ò à fidarsi in alcun modo poco, ne molto delli ribelli di Christo, et
suoi.

Hè che intenda d’huer concordato con essi altrimenti, che con
l’intentione, che hebbe già il Rè Luigi XI. il quale considerata
l’unione de Grandi contra di se uolse rendersi facile di promettere
ogni condittione, benchè iniqua, che da ciascuno l’ era chiesta, mà
dissipati che hebbe i capi della ribellione, come furono deposte l’
armi, incontinente gli troncò tutti, senza indugio, ne risguardo
alcuno. Anzi hà da guardarsi Sua M^[ta] ben diligentemente da tutti
coloro i quali con si gran carità gridano pacis bona, et abusando della
clemenza, et benignità del Rè, si sforzano d’ingannarlo, commendando
questa pace particolare con le lode della pace in genere; perchè con le
sue proprie non lo potriano fare: Chi non sà che la pace per se stessa
è buona? Mà chi non sa ancora che Sicary, i Venefici, gli Assassini
gli Assassinatori, gli Incendiarij, i Sacrilegij, gli Heretici, et gli
huomini senza fede, ne honore meritano punitione, et esterminatione.
Chi non sà similmente, che hauer preso per trattata la Roccella per
forza Angolem, et tante, et tante altre Città, et Terre in tutti i
modi, che l’ hauere assediato il suo Rè, che l’abbruciare le Chiese,
dar il guasto alle Prouincie, et distruggere, et esterminare, ò
ribellare i Popoli è cattiva cosa, et peccato irremediabile. Mà che
il liberarsi da si graue indignità, et oppressioni, et che il cauar
lo Stato suo, et suoi buoni Vassalli, et se stesso da tale calamità,
et miserie, come è la uile, et abbietta seruitù di chiunque si troua
sottoposto alle crudeli Tirannide, et rapina de’ capi delli Ugonotti,
non è esser seuero, et rigido, mà à fare il douere, il dritto, et
quelche ricerca la Giustitia; Come può il Rè uolgere gli occhi pieni di
quel generoso spirito che hanno mostro i suoi antecessori in tante et
si grande Imprese, da i quali ha riceuuto il titolo di Christianissimo,
acquistato d’essi per i loro meriti verso la Roccella, et tutto il
Paese, che chiamano di conquista, et tolerare di uederselo tolto con
i Popoli ribellati, et in tutto alienati dalla sua obedienza, et
Religione con le Chiese antichissime, et si eccellenti, et nobili
edifitij tutte demolite, la qual cosa auuiene non solo ne Paesi doue
hanno pensato d’annidarsi, ma da tutte le parti del Regno, douunque
sono passati con l’armi, che se ne uederanno i uestigii per li secoli
auuenire, nonchè per li successori nostri, talmente hanno adoperato il
ferro, et il foco contro la fede di Christo, et la giurisdittione, et
l’autorità Regia.

Si che quando per qualsiuogla mondana ragione pur uolesse Sua M^[ta]
scordarsi l’offese si graui fatte alla Corona, à sè, et all’honore,
et dignità sua, non può, ne deue posponere quelle, che sono commesse
contra Christo, et alla sua legge, et non può mancare di giustitia
alli suoi Popoli fideli, et Cat.^[ci] che chieggono pietà, et gridano
uendetta, chiari di non douere, nè poter, ne uoler havere mai pace, nè
triegua à modo alcuno, sapendo di non potersi mai fidare d’essi, come
l’esperienza gli ha dimostro molte uolte a troppo loro gran costo. Però
quando uedessero di essere abbandonati, et derelitti dal Rè, et dal
Gouerno, piutosto che restare a descrittione di gente si scelerata per
fuggire la rapacita, et enormissime crudeltà loro saranno forzati di
ricorrere ad ogni ultimo refugio.

Si può dunque proporre in consideratione al Rè qual sia più pietoso
uffitio, quanto a Dio, et più glorioso quanto al mondo, hauer fatto
un accordo con l’inique, et intollerabili condittioni, che si ueggano
con Vassalli, et ribelli reintegrandoli nè beni, et dignità, gradi
preminentie, uffitij, et benefitij, cedendoli parte dello Stato
proprio, con il lassar loro delle principali Fortezze del suo Regno
in diverse Prouincie, pagandoli danari di nuouo, oltre all’assoluerli
di quanto hanno rubbato alla Corona, et al Popolo, et quello che
importa più di tutto il resto, permetterli il libero esercitio delle
loro Heresie, o l’hauere liberato i suoi fideli soggetti, et se la
Casa Sua, et il suo Regno, et la Christianità, da si pestifera et
perniciosa Canaglia, Bella usanza certo si potrebbe chiamare l’usurpare
con la Tirannia, che s’hanno fatto gli Ugonotti, le Città et gli Stati
pertinenti alla Corona, saccheggiare et espilare tutte le Prouincie,
doue si sono potuti cacciare con ogni sorte di tradimento, et quando
non si hà havuto altro refugio, ricorrere alla pace, et al perdono
per non restituire quello che si è rubbato, et occupato à forza, et
Tirannicamente. Tollerassi, che uno, ò pochi transfugi, infame, si
facciano capi di una setta, et senza cagione, ò ragione pur finta,
ò apparente; non chè con autorità, et giusto titolo, sotto colore di
uolersi fare riformatori dé Preti diformati, et disobedienti, pigliano
l’ armi contra il Rè, lo minacciano, faccino le battaglie seco, lo
mettino nelle necessità, doue Sua M^[ta], è stata, et si truoua
tuttauia, et li diano le leggi piutosto, che castigare chi lo merita,
et reintegrare la giustitia, et la Religione nel suo Dominio, senza le
quali due cose mai si uisse, nè si potrà uiuere rettamente in alcun
luogo.

Anzi è troppo chiara cosa, come questo male non corretto: mà così
trasandato andarà augumentando si ogni giorno maggiormente di sorte,
che si habbia da mutare Imperio, come si uede che desiderano, et
procurano con ogni diligenza gli Ugonotti che segua. E adunque la
pace, cosi fatta pericolosa, et dannosa, come si è dimostro, sicome al
punir li malfattori sarà sempre trouato necessario, honesto, et utile.
Bisogna hora poi considerare, posto, che si debba fare se il Rè hà il
modo da reintegrarsi nel suo prestino Stato, et autorità, et obedienza,
et di ciò forse si potrebbe uenire in certa cognitione col misurare
qual sia più il numero de Cat^[ci] ò quello degli Ugonotti, qual siano
maggiori, et più gagliarde le forze, et armi de ribelli, ò quelle del
Rè, quale delle due parti habbia più facile il modo da cauare gente
forastiera, et sia meglio appoggiata d’amicitie de Prencipi Potentati,
et de danari.

Et in fine secondo tali propositioni farne la conseguentia, per
due Ugonotti, che siano nel Regno, si ode calcolare, che si ha da
contraporre più di otto Cat.^[ci] gli ribelli hanno perduto nelle
battaglie oltre alla reputatione, et la quantità degli huomini molti
Capi grandi, che haueuano come il Prencipe di Condè, Dandalotto, et
tanti altri, talmente che non accade far paragone dell’ armi sue a
quelle del Rè, essi sono senza denari, et non possono così a loro posta
più cauare nuoui soccorsi d’Alemagna, et Sua M^[ta] ne ha da sborsare
ad essi a millione, et può hauer Reistri, Suizzari, Italiani, et
Spagnuoli quanto li piace, et purchè uolesse sarebbe aiutato da tutta
la Christianità, et quello che importa non meno di tutto il Resto, ha
ad arbitrio, et disposition sua la giustitia, con la quale sola non è
dubbio, che sarebbe bastante de regolare il tutto.

Sono accettate queste ragioni perchè non si può negare, Ma si risponde,
che la Nobiltà di Francia, che è quella dalla quale depende il Popolo,
totalmente è corrotta per la maggior parte, et da questo procede
tutto il male, che la grandezza del Rè proprio in ogni tempo è stata
principalmente per il seguito, et obedienza de i Nobili, et mancandogli
essi Sua M^[ta] resterebbe debolissima, et allegano le battaglie
guadagnate per diuina dispositione, che non si sono poi proseguite,
nè cauatone quel frutto, che si speraua, et douenasi. Onde si uà
imprimendo nell’ animo di Sua M^[ta] che per quel verso mai si potrà
uedere il fine, et che però manco mal sia essere ricorso all’ accordo
in quei modi, che si è potuto, perchè il tempo farà ben lui. Le quali
fallacie sono troppo palpabili, toccandosi con mano, et uedendosi con
l’occhio chiaramente doue stà la magagna: percioche il Re uorrà recarsi
la mente al petto, e redursi a memoria delle cagioni, perchè non fù
seguitata la Vittoria dopo la battaglia di San Dionigi, et perchè si
diede tempo tante, et tante settimane alli Ribelli di riunirsi, et
stabilirsi nelloro capo, et non si uolse mai obedire d’andare a cauarli
da Monteri, o Faulnona, come sa chiunque si trouò, che si poteua
fare senza alcun pericolo, et perchè a Craton in Campagna, quando si
seguitauano li Ribelli non si uolse combatterli, nè manco andarli
appresso da uicino, ò tagliargli i passi, come è palese, che si poteua
per non impedirgli la congiuntione con il soccorso, che ueniua loro di
Germania, conoscerà manifestamente Sua M^[ta] di essere stata tradita,
et sa da chi, et lo proua da far punire i malfattori per giustitia,
ma non è stata consigliata da uenirne mai all’ esecutione, perchè Sua
M^[ta] non hà uoluto consigliarsi con altri, che con coloro che la
tradiscono. Veggasi quel che seguì poi con l’altra pace fatta con mira,
et intentione di dare la stretta alii capi di quella maledetta setta,
dopo che hauessero deposte l’ armi, et reso le Fortezze; acciochè con
tal mezo si conseguisca l’ intento, che si deue hauere senza tanto
sangue per non debilitare le forze proprie. Ma i traditori, che dauano
il Consiglio, o almeno erano partecipi di esso, seppero guidare le cose
in modo, et si lasciò uscire la uolpe dalla tana, et portò il caso,
che appunto quelli di cui altri si fidaua più, et che haueua l’ordine
di fare l’ essecutione, auuertissero si a tempo i Ribelli, che furono
i primi a repigliare l’ armi, et uscirne di Noyrs, et conseruaronsi la
Roccella, et hebbero in ordine di poter pigliare Angoslen per forza,
prima che le forze del Re fossero unite esse da opponesseli, che anco
questo, come il resto uiene procedette tutto dalli traditori tiranti
adrieto le prouisioni Regie per dar tempo a complici di lauorare,
Piacque pur poi a Dio, che miracolosamente fosse ammazzato, il Prencipe
di Condè, et disfatto parte delle genti di Moners, ma non si seguitò,
come si poteua doueua, et conueniuasi. Venne ancora il Duco di
Dupponti, che si poteua combatterlo, et uincerlo al sicuro, et non si
fece per le cagioni, che si seppero, et pure non ci si prouidde.

Fu seguitato, et verso Limoges si hebbero diuerse occasioni di romperlo
senza alcun risico, et non fù esseguito per la colpa di chi n’ impediua
la essecutione con l’autorità, che haueua nell’ essercito Regio;
accioche si lasciasse se unire col Coligni, anzi fù procurato con buona
cura di guardare l’ Essercito Regio in forma, et in siti, che la fame,
et gli stenti l’ hauessero a fare sbandare, dando andito, commodità, et
aiuto à ribelli di godere il Paese, et d’impatronirsi de’ magazzeni,
de uittouaglie munitioni, et artigliarie preparate da alcune persone,
che si era troppo apparentemente ueduto, che erano colpeuoli, in ciò
si uenne al paragone, come questi tali scellerati traditori erano di
più autorità, essi appresso le loro Maestà, che qualunque recordaua
la salute, et il seruitio di esse, come riusci similmente quando si
era fatta deliberatione de Suizzeri, et Italiani, così all’ ingrosso,
che il Re auesse facoltà di farsi la ragione con l’ armi à malgrado de
Francesi, che la seruiuano male, i quali misero sù Mons^[r] Duca d’Angiù
che la impregnò, come cosa che offendesse la dignità, et honor proprio
di Sua Altezza, conoscendo chiaramente, che l’ intenteone de chi
gouernaua, et consigliaua Sua M^[ta] non era uolta ad altro fine, che
fargli inimici, ouero diffidenti tutti gli altri Prencipi, et in somma
priuarlo di tutti gli aiuti esterni.

Le difficoltà, che furono interposte, per consumar tempo nell’ andare
al soccorso di Poiters, sono anco loro ben note, perchè ùhebbero
da interuenire diuersi capi, che andarono con le genti Italiane,
finalmente, come Piacque a Dio seguì la battaglia di Moncontor, dopo
la quale il Rè medesimo sa, come fù tenuto a bada sotto San Giouanni
d’Angelin, nè si uolse mai mandare parte della Cauallaria, non che
tutto l’Essercito dietro alli Ribelli rotti, et in fuga, di sorte che
non era possibile, che si riunissero, se non se gli fusse lasciato in
preda le migliori, et più opulenti Prouincie di Francia per accrescere
loro il seguito de Padroni, et lasciarli reinferscare, et rimettere
insieme. Dalle quali cose si ode, che il Rè medesimo hà scorto qualche
cosa, che gli ha fatto nausea. Ma essendo Sua M^[ta] attorniata di
gente, che lo cerca d’ingannare, et tradire per ogni uerso, ella
non può discernere i Lacci, che gli sono tesi ne i pericoli doue si
troua, però e da cercare di far la molto ben capace delle sopradette
cose, mostrandoli, che es non si lieua da torno quei ribaldi, che
cercauano così grandi artificij di rouinarla, ella si prouocherà l’
ira di Dio, ne douerà più sperare nella sua diuina misericordia, che
così miracolosamente l’ ha sostenuto, et protetto fino al presente,
ma restarà in preda di coloro, che non hanno altra mira, che di fare
andare in precipitio la Sua Corona.

Di sopra e fatto mentione di alcuni particolari dè più sostantiali,
accioche accadendosi si sappiano addurre per essempio al Rè, alla
persona del quale pare, che si debba far capo direttamente, et parlare
a Sua M^[ta] senza maschera, perchè certo non se gli può far maggior
benefitio, che id storarli le orecchie, et aprirgli occhi, et la mente
per farli bene intendere liberamente, come non resta, che da lei
medesima, se non uorrà porre rimedio a tanti mali, à quali tutti può
prouedere facilmente, con punire quelli, che nominatamente si daranno
in una lista, et degli altri, che gli paia, che lo meritino, secondo
il riscontro, che trouarà su le scritture cauate da Casa Coligni, et
ancora, che alli ribelli di Christo, et suoi, che hanno fatto tutte, et
si grandi, et inaudite sceleratezze, secondo l’ opinione di alcuni, non
accade considerare di guardar Fede ò promessa fatta, nondimeno si può
fare di castigare solo quelli, che hanno tradito, mentre seruiuano nel
campo, ò nel Consiglio regio, che fia senza alcun dubio a bastanza.

Hassi d’ auuertire ancora il Rè, come fin che Sua M^[ta] se n’ è ita
presso alle grida, et è stata con effetti del tutto Ingannata, ella può
esser scusata appresso Dio, et al Mondo, ma dopo che saranno scoperte
le magagne, et rappresentatole la uerità, et il modo di non star più
in preda, et alla descrittione de’ traditori se non ci può: uederà la
colpa di tutti i male, si ridurranno sopra le sue spalle, et restarà
abbandonata da Sua Diuina M^[ta] appresso della quale più non uarranno
i prieghi, et oratione del Papa, et de gli buoni, et fedeli, che forse
hanno giouato più di ogni altro aiuto humano a sostenerla. Vedesi, che
gli Heredi uanno cercando sottilmente a qualunque occasione di fare che
il Rè offenda Dio per prouocargli il suo giusto sdegno, mettendogli
inanzi con la sua pelosa carità di conseruarsi l’ amicitia del Turco
di usurpare i beni Ecc^[ci]. et fino a mettersi a fare nuove Imprese
fuora del Regno col mezo delle loro Armi, la qual ultima cosa non è
incredibile in alcun mode se già il Re non uolesse darsi loro in preda
del tutto, perciochè quando quell’ armi si uoltassero contra qualunque
si sia stato di Prencipe Catholico Nostro Sig^[re] non potrebbe
mancare di far quanto si appartiene al debito dell’ offitio suo, senza
risguardo d’ altra mondana consideratione, trattandosi della gloria
di Dio, et conseruatione della Sua Santa Legge, nel qual caso Sua
Beatitudine sarebbe forzata di procurare con la medesima caldezza di
souuenire, et aiutare altri contra gli Heretici, che ha fatto con il Rè
Cat^[co]. et con Venettiani, la qual Lega si hà da ricercare, che sia
uolta contra gli Heretici, et Infedeli, piutosto, che altroue.

Sopra la competenza, et gara de grandi, si possono dir moltj
particolari in uoie, che sarià troppo lunga cosa mettere in scrittura,
basta, che tutto seruono a negare la debita obedienza al Padrone, et
al uoler portar l’ armi con le quali s’ impedisce la giustitia, et
fino a tanto che il Re non punisce a qualche uno de buoni, che lo
meriti, perchè altri non preuarichi poi in modo, che una parte, et l’
altre si chiarisca per effetto, come Sua M^[ta] uuole conseruarsi la
superiorità, che se gli conuiene, mai sarà libera da queste molestie,
et sempre si starà in preda di ogni uno.

E. uerisimile, che la Reina ami più di tutti gli altri lo Stato, et la
uita del Re et l’ unione, et conseruatione de gli altri suoi Figliuoli,
essendo essa prudente quanto si sa, et hauendo tanta cognitione delli
humori, quanta le ha fatta imparare la lunga amministratione del
Gouerno, che ella ha hauuto, però non si può dubitare, che Sua M^[ta]
per ambitione di conseruarsi l’ autorità preuarichi in parte alcuna di
quel che deue, ma la proua ci ammonisce troppo, che da lei non si può
aspettare quelle esecutioni, che ha mostro al Duca d’Alua in Fiandra,
che basta a stabilire le solleuationi, et ribellione, perchè il sesso
non gli lo promette, et anco in uerità di essere scusata, essendo stata
Forastiera, et senza appoggio di potersi reggere secondo lei in simili
casi, bisognando delle cotai deliberationi persona di gran cuore, et
che habbia oltre l’ autorità l’ attitudine di fare con le mani proprie,
quando l’ occasioni lo ricerchi, però con la M^[ta] della Reina, non
pare che accada pensare di poter profittare per tal uerso, si che il
trattarne con essa non si deue hauere per opportuno, et anco di questo
si potrebbe pigliar Conseglio sul luogo per gouernarsene secondo che
giudicassero meglio quelli che si sà, che sono buoni, et ueri Cat^[ci]
et che non hanno più mira alle passioni particolari per il desiderio
di hauer maggior partecipatione nel Gouerno, che al seruitio, et ben
publico.

Intorno alle quali cose è ben necessario, che chi sarà impiegato
habbia molta prattica, et gran prudenza da saper usare la descrittione
essendoci bisogno di somma consideratone, percioche quando si trouasse
tanto in preda a chi gl’ Inganna, che altri si disperasse di poter
illuminarlo, et che si restasse ben chiaro di non douer cauar Frutto
dalla persona di Sua M^[ta] sarebbe da uoltarsi forse ad altra strada,
cioè uerso quei Prencipi, et grandi, che si conseruano Catholici, et
che restano essosi et esclusi dal Re, et dal gouerno, et priui di
autorità, et reputatione, i quali se haueranno un capo dependente dal
Papa del quale sappino di potersi fidare, sono atti a uolersene, et
con il mezo della sua autorità far tale unione d’ arme di Cat^[ci]
in quel Regno, che il Re sia forzato a riconoscersi del suo errore,
perchè la maggior parte delle Prouincie di quel Regno sono sotto il
gouerno de Prencipe, o Sig^[re] Cat^[co]. ciascuno de quali saprà, et
potrà ridurre le associationi, che furono incominciate con i loro Capi
minori, et mediocri, et supremi da ualersi dell’ arme, nel modo stesso,
che hanno sempre usato gli Ugonotti, et con esse dare adosso a gli
Ugonotti da ogni parte per estinguerne la prima razza, che anco sopra
ciò in uoce si può esprimere uarie cose, le quali sarebbono noiose a
mettere in scritto, et a tal proposito si può ridarre a memoria quello
che loro M^[ta] mandarono ad offerire al Papa per sicurtà della loro
rissolutione di non uolere mancare subbito, che potessero liberare quel
Regno dalla Heresia, cioè di capitulare espressamente, che a detti
Gouernatori delle Prouincie se le usurpassero in caso di tal mancamento.

L’ abbandonare questa causa non è secondo la bontà, et pietà di
Nostro Sig^[re] nè a ragion di Stato conciosiache non si prouedendo
è da dubitare, et da tener per certo, che gli Ugonotti anderanno
sependo, et cercando d’ impatronirsi se gli riuscisse à fatto del
Regno per procedere poi anco più oltre con imprese esterne, et forse
hanno dissegno col mettere su il Re a nuoue Imprese di conseguir l’
una, et l’ altra Impresa in un medesimo tempo col far morire il Re,
et li Fratelli, et altri grandi, che potessero per uia di congiure,
et di tradimenti preualersi dell’ entrata della Corona, et del Clero
a sostenere solo l’ Imprese cominciate in compagnia del Re, la qual
consideratione, sebene paresse lontana non è da gettarsi dopo lè
spalle; anzi è consentaneo alla ragione di permeditarsi, et fare con la
prudenza quei rimedy, che sono giudicati più conuenienti.

Frà quali s’ intenda il mandare al Re, et alli Cat^[ci]. una persona
sola, o due, una diretta a Sua M^[ta]. et l’ altra alli Cat^[ci]. che
si riferisca, et obedisca al principale.

Forse non sarebbe inconueniente di mandare anco uerso il Re Cat^[co].
persona ben confidente, et sincera et rissoluta, che potesse cauare Sua
M^[ta] Cat^[ca]. de Generali, parlandogli con buona intelligenza delli
humori prefati di Francia, et mostrandogli quanto sia il pericolo,
che portano gli Stati di Fiandra, si perchè con il tempo diuentando
Heretica la Francia, quelli Stati infetti di già non si potranno a
modo alcuno conseruare da Sua M^[ta]. Cat^[ca] quali remedij ella
presume di farci, et sapere, accioche si potesse disponere, et pensare
se con i Vinetiani et altri Prencipi si potesse fare simili offitij per
tastarli il polso douendo essi presumere, che sempre, che fusse mosso
guerra alli Stati del Re di Spagna a loro non rincrescesse di potersi
aiutare della Lega fatta, ma necessario, non che opportuno, in ogni
caso pare il far prouisione quà de danari, de quali Sua Beat^[ne]. ha
a ualersi grossamente, si per aiutare quelle cose, come per diffondere
Italia, et il resto della Christianità dalle forze di questa scelerata
setta. Et perchè le deliberationi di tanta importanza, nella quale si
tratta della salute del Regno, et della conseruatione della Santa Sede,
et della Christianità si hanno da fare con matura consideratione, si
potrebbe per auentura discernere meglio qual partito fosse da pigliare
prima, o poi, et come, et fino a qual termine udendone il parere di
quelle persone, che paressero, et fussero giudicate intelligenti, et
confidenti. Quanto alle richieste fatte adesso dal Re, la risposta
fatta da N^[ro] Sig^[re] sopra la dispensa del Duca di Ghisa, et
della Prencipessa di Portiano, non può essere più giusta, ma è facile
a temperarla col mandare la dispensa del tutto spedita per chi
andasse, accioche si uaglia di darla, o non appalesarla, secondo, che
trouerà, che sia più a proposito per li humori; Conciosiache se si
conclude affatto il Matrimonio di Portogallo, come è da stimare, che
sia il disegno, chi sa che Madama Margherita non diuentasse moglie
del Duca di Ghisa, piutosto che del Prencipe di Nauarra. Et circa
il permettere che gli Ugonotti possino habitare sicuramente nella
Città, et Contado di Auignone, non parche accada stare in dubbio, che
Sua Santità, non lo può, ne deue concedere, ma di restituire i loro
beni, et lasciarli contrattare, perchè ne sgombrano, si può ben forse
hauerci consideratione, se con questa gratia fatta al Re si uedesse di
accomodare con Sua M^[ta] qualche una delle cose più sostantiali, et
anco ciò pare, che bisogni rimettere alla descrittone, et prudenza di
chi si uolesse mandare, il quale deue hauere per massima, che sempre,
che il Re uoglia essere così impio, che si risolua di fare quello,
che può per leuare al Papa, et alla Santa Sede quello Stato, non ci è
rimedio a diffendersi, ne essendo Auignone troppo circondato dalle sue
forze, però conuiene auitarsi di conseruarselo, come si è fatto per l’
adietro in tutti i tempi con l’ autorità, et beneuolenza, et fauore
del Re, al quale se può rimostrare che N^[ro] Sig^[re]. non uuole,
ne intende tenere con l’ armi perturbato il suo Regno, mà solo tanta
guardia nella Città, et Terre, che ui sono, che basti a non lasciarle
rubbare per tradimento a quattro di quei scalzi Ugonotti, come ne sono
state tolte tante a Sua M^[ta].

Douendo questa scrittura seruire solo per informatione delli humori di
quel Regno, non pare, che accade farla ordinata, ne limitata, però sarà
fatta, come si è potuto all’ imprescia &c.

APPENDIX XIV

[P. 354, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. XCVII, NO. 1,711

[_Printed pamphlet of 6 pages_]

[_Title page_]

ESTABLISSEMENT
DE LA FRATERNITE
DES CATHOLICQUES DE CHAALON SUR
SAONE ERIGÉE À L’HONNEUR
DU BENOIST SAINCT
ESPRIT EN L’AN
1568

[_Woodcut representing the Holy Trinity_]

AU NOM DE DIEV
AMEN

Comme Secretaires esleus en ladicte fraternité & par ordonnance
du superieur en icelle.

LAMBERT.
[1769]
BELYE.

[_Not endorsed_]

APPENDIX XV

[P. 354, n. 4]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. C, NO. 1,862

[_Catholic League in Maine_]

Nous soubsignez confederez et alliez par saincte et divine alliance
pour la continuation et maintention de lhonneur souverain deu a notre
Dieu le createur et aux commandementz & ordonnances de la saincte
eglise catholique apostolique & romaine et pour la maintention de
lestat du Roy treschrestien et trescatholique, notre souverain prince
esleu & a nous baille par la grace et providence divine pour notre chef
& souverain terrien debateur & conservateur de lad. eglise catholique &
romaine et des sainctz decretz & concilies dicelle, et de lobeissance
que nous et tous ses bons subiectz luy devons et a noz seigneurs ses
freres aussi treschrestiens & trescatholiques, repoz de son Royaume
& de tout son peuple Et afin de maintenir lad. eglise et religion
catholique apostolique & romaine pour obvier par tous moyens licites
raisonnables et permis de Dieu aux damnees entreprinses machinations
et conspirations que Sathan a mys es cueurs daucuns malheureux qui
ont tendu & tendent par tout lesd. artz dyaboliques de non seulement
imminer mais du tout subvertir lad. religion catholique apostolique &
romaine et lestat & auctorite du Roy notre bon souverain catholique et
treschrestien Prince & legitime defenseur dicelle et de nosd. s^[rs]
ses freres, et pour tenir moyennant layde de Dieu et le consentement &
accord de leurs ma^[tes] tout le peuple en repoz Pour servir a Dieu & a
notre mere saincte eglise et rendre lobeissance deue a leurs Ma^[tes],
faire obeir la justice tant de ses courtz de parlementz que autres ses
juges magistratz, Promettons et jurons vivre et mourir en lad. religion
catholique apostolique & Romaine et lobeissance deue ausd. Ma^[tes] et
a leur justice Nous promettons aussi & jurons ensemble toute obeissance
service et ayde et de noz personnes & biens pour empescher & courir
sus avec leurs auctoritez contre tous perturbateurs innovateurs et
contrevenantz a lad. religion; en estats desd. ma^[tes] & a leurs
sainctz & catholiques edictz & ordonnances divines & polytiques et de
nous secourir les ungs les autres aux effectz susd. par tous moyens
contre tous rebelles heretiques sectaires de la nouvelle religion
en quelque lieu quilz soient & qui en sont suspectz ou nadherentz a
notre party et tendans a fins contraires. Le tout jusques a la mort
inclusivement. Le xj^[e] Iuillet 1568.

Depuis ces presentes signees par la noblesse mercredy dernier elles
furent signees en cahier distinct toutesfois en mesme livre par les
presbytres. Et vendredy portees par lesd. presbytres auturs estat Et
y ont soubsigne les eschevins & procureurs de la ville plusieurs des
officiers du Roy et des bourgeois avec menasses a ceulx qui nont voulu
signer destre tenuz suspectz. Et par la conference quils ont eue tous
ensemble, la noblesse sest chargee du reiglement pour assembler et
dresser les gens de guerre et ceulx qui peuvent porter les armes et
dadviser et eslire les chefz pour leur communte. Et les presbytres et
le tiers estat sen sont de tout submys a la noblesse. Ils font signer &
jurer par les bourgades aux procureurs & plus apparentz des parroisses.

Lesgail sest faict en la ville du Mans pour la solde des harquebuziers
a cheval pour mons^[r] le seneschal de Maine. Et ayant a son arrivee
trouve les portes assez mal gardies a faict publier la garde avec
injunction des peynes.

[_Not signed_]

[_Endorsed_] Copie de lassociation faicte | par les provinces.

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. C, NO. 1,863

Cest le Roole de la saincte union contenant quarante rooles en
parchemin cestluy compris.

Nous soubsignez confederez & alliez par saincte et divine aliance es
Duché Canton et Conté du Maine, pour la continution et manutention
de l’honneur deu a Dieu notre createur, de ses sainctz comandementz,
et ordonnances de la saincte Eglise catholicque, apostolicque et
Romaine: Et pour la manutention de lestat du Roy treschrestien et
trescatholicque notre Souverain Prince, esleu et a nous baille par
la grace et providence divine pour notre Chef et Souverain terrien
dominateur et conservate^[r] de lad. saincte Eglise Catholicque,
Apostolicque et Romaine, et des sainctz decretz et conciles d’icelle,
et de lobeyssance que nous et tous ses bons subiectz luy debuons, et a
tous nos Seigneurs ses freres aussy treschrestiens et trescatholicques
Princes, repos de son Royaume, et de tout son peuple: Et afin de
maintenir lad. s^[te] eglise et Religion catholicque, Apostolique et
Romaine, po^[r] obvier par tous moyens licites raisonnables et permis
de Dieu, aux damnees entreprinses, machinations et conspirations que
Sathan a mises es cueurs d’aucuns malheureux qui ont tendu et tendent
par tous artz diaboliques de non seulement imminuer mais du tout
subvertir lad. Religion catholique; Prince treschrestien et legitime
defenseur, et de nosd. Sieurs ses freres. Et pour tenir moyennant layde
de Dieu, consentement et accord de leurs maiestez, tout le peuple en
repos pour servir a Dieu et rendre lobeyssance deue a leursd^[es]
maiestes, faire obeyr la justice, tant de ses Cours de parlement que
aultres des juges et magistratz. Promettons et jurons vivre et mourir
en lad^[e] Religion Catholique Apostolique et Romaine et obeyssance deue
ausd^[es] Maiestes Ausquelles Maiestez et Iustice nous promettons
et jurons toute obeyssance, secours, et ayde, et de nos personnes
empescher et courir sus, aveq leurs authoritez, a tous perturbateurs,
innovateurs, et contrevenants a lad. Religion, et Estatz desd^[es]
Maiestez, et a leurs sainctz et catholiques Edictz, et ordonnances
divines et politiques: Et nous secourir les uns les autres aux effectz
susd^[es] par tous moyens contre tous rebelles, heretiques, sectaires
tendantz a fin contraires. Le tout jusques a la mort inclusivement.
Faict et arresté au Mans lunz^[me] jour de Iullet 1568.

[_Not signed_]

[_Endorsed in Cecil’s hand_]

Copy of a Conspyracion by | vow, in France by the | Catholicques
ag. the contraryes.

APPENDIX XVI

[P. 359, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC

ELIZABETH, VOL. XLVII, NO. 72

[_Walsingham to Cecil_]

S^[r]

Notw^[th]standynge my frend doothe assure me that he is advertysed by
sooche as he doothe imploye in that behalfe, that ther wer of late
certeyne lodged in Sowthewerke whoe nowe are departed, whos clos keping
of them selves gave great cause of suspytion of no dyrect meanynge.
At this p^[r]sent s^[r] I am requested by him to advertyce you that in
taulke that passed of late betwene the new come Cardynaule and him,
towching the undyrect dealynges of the Cardynaule of Loreyne emongest
other thinges he shewed him that thre of late were sent by the sayde
Car. of Loreyne to exequte the lewde practyce in the searche wherof
yt pleasethe you to imploye us two of the partyes, he thus descrybed
them unto him as followethe. The one to be of natyon an englysheman,
of complexion sangwine, his beard read, and cot (as commonly they
terme yt marchesetto) of vysage leane, of stature hye. The other of
natyon an Italyan, of complexion cholerycke and swarte, his bearde of
leeke hue, and cot, of vysage full faced, of stature and proportyon
lowe, and sooche as commonly we tearme a trubbe. After I had herde
the descryptyon of them I declared unto him that alreadye ye were
advertysed of the leeke and that you towld me that thos descryptyons
were so generayle, as they myght as well towche the innocent as the
gyltye. I further towlde him (as of my selfe) that the Cardynall
Shatyllglion myght use this as a meane to make his ennemye the more
odyowse to this estate. To the fyrst he replyed, that the rather he
had cause to be iealowse of thos descryptyons, for that he knewe an
Inglysheman of leeke descryptyon, havinge the Italyan tonge verry well,
and the Frenche reasonably well, that passed to and fro betwene the
pope and the Card. of L. and also the seyde partye resorted myche to
the noble man that at that tyme was lodged in my frendes howse; and
therfor the rather he seyde he was leeke to be imployed in so lewd a
practyce. To the seconde he seyd that he hath had so good exsperyence
of the synceryte and dyrect dealynge of the howse of Shatiglion as he
knowethe assuredly that they woold not seeke by so undyrect a meane to
make any man odyowse: And saythe he further to assure you, that sooche
a practyce may be in hande: I knowe by letters that I sawe by a secret
meane wrytten from Roome unto the bysshop of Viterbo, abowt syxe years
passed, in the tyme of B. Francys (of late memorye) the leeke practyce
was in hande the cavse also I knowe whie yt tooke no place, and therof
can advertyce m^[r] Secretarye when yt shall please him to deal w^[th] me
in that behalfe. Besides to provoke me to wryte he added further, that
he understood by sooche as he imployed in searche at Sowthewerk that
one of thos whom they holde for suspected shoold have a redd berde,
w^[th] the rest of the merks aboverecyted: and therfor for that he is
not to be fownde in Sowthewerke, he dowbtethe he may be repeyred to the
coorte: wherfor he desyerethe you most earnestly, that ther may be some
appoynted by you fytt for the purpose to have regarde in that behalfe.
Thus levinge any further to troble your honor I commyt you to God. From
London the xv^[th] of September a^[o] 1568.

Y^[r] honors to commaunde
FRA: WALSYNGHAM

[_Addressed_] To the right Honorable S^[r] William
Cicill principall Secretarye and
one of her Ma^[tes] privie counsell
At the
Court.

[_Endorsed_] 15 fbr, 1568.
M^[r] Francis Walsingham to
my m^[r]

APPENDIX XVII

[P. 375, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CX, NO. 533

[_News from La Rochelle_]

Monsieur l’Amiral escript du commencement du moys de Ianvier, que
larmee de Messeigneurs les Princes se trouve fort gaillarde et plus
saine quelle n’a esté depuis ung an, et estime quele changement d’air
a esté ung des moyens, dont Dieu s’est servy pour faire cesser les
maladies qui y ont regné jusques a lors. Lad. armee estoit au port
de s^[te]. Marie a trois lieues d’Agen et tenoit tout le bord de la
riviere de la Garonne depuis les portes d’Agen jusqs pardela Marmande
et du long de la riviere du Loth jusqs a Villeneufve ou y a de petites
villes mais riches & abondantes de toutes choses necessaires a une
armee, et desquelles on tire quelques finances.

Mon: le Conte de Montgommery est de l’autre bord de la riviere de la
Garonne tenant tout le pais de la jusqs en Bearn et jusques a Lengon,
et au hault de la riviere jusqs a Haultvillar qui de son coste amasse
le plus de finances quil peut. Il ny a point dennemys qui facent teste,
ou donnent empeschemt. Ilz se tiennent clos & couverts dedans les
villes et laissent la campaigne libre aux dictzs^[rs] Princes. Mons. le
Mar^[al] Danville se tient a Tholose, et mons^[r] de Montluc a Agen. Ilz
ont des forces mais separees & mal unies de voluntez et de lieux. Le
S^[r] de la Vallette avoit este envoyé pour les rassembler et s’essayer
de faire plus que lesditz S^[rs] Danville et Montluc mais il s’en est
retourné sans rien faire.

Mons^[r] de Pilles et ceux qui estoient dedans S^[t] Iehan sont venuz au
camp bien sains et gaillards, ayans soubstenu le siege tant que les
pouldres ont duré & faict actes aussy belliqueux & magnanimes qui se
sount faictz de notre cage en siege de ville.

Il avoit este faict ung pont a batteaux sur lad. riviere de la Garonne
sur lequel hommes, chivaux charettes et artillerie avoient passé huyt
jo^[rs] durant, mais tant par la rive des eaux que par la faulte dung
qui estoit alle prendre ung moulin des ennemys po^[r] lamener aud. port
de S^[te] Marie. lad. moulin luy est eschappe et a choque et rompu
led. pont. Si est ce quon y a depuis donne tel ordre quon ne laisse de
passer.

Il y a plus^[rs] advertissements quil y a quatre mil Espaignolz a la
frontiere d’Lespaigne & que le Prince Daulphin s’en va les trouver avec
une troupe de cavalerie po^[r] le^[r] faire escorte.

M^[r] de Lavauguyon est venu entre les deux rivieres de la Dordogne et
du Loth avec vingt cornettes de cavalerie pour tenir les passages
desdictes rivieres. doubtant que Mess^[rs] les Princes les veillent
repasser, mais cela na empesché le S^[r] de Pilles de passer le Loth, et
saprocher desdictes cornettes, esperant les reveoir de plus pres en
brief.

Les reistres des dictz seigneurs Princes ont receu ung payement, et
son, si bien satisfaictz et contens que jamais ne fut veu une plus
obeissante nationt. Ilz sont partie dela la riviere auec M. le Conte
de Montgommery et partie decha, ne faisans difficulte de se separer et
recevoir le commandant de tous ceux quil est ordonné et d’aller en tous
lieux ou il le^[r] est commande.

Mons. le Conte de Mansfeld faict infiniz bons offices tous les jo^[rs],
esquelz il monstre ung zele a ceste cause avec une magnanimité, de
laquelle il ne cede a person quelconques. Et ne fault doubter que Dieu
ne layt envoyé pour ung tresgrand bien et necessaire comme aussy le
Conte Ludovic de Nassau prince tresvertueux et fort advisé.

Quand a la negotiation de la paix, les admis de la Rochelle portent que
ung moys durant le Roy et la Royne ont souvent envoye devers la Royne
de Navarre pour l’exhorter a entendre au bien de la paix et haster les
deputez, lesquelz ont longuement differé a cause des difficultez qui
ont este mises en avant tant po^[r] le peu de seurete quon trouvoit aux
passeportz qui estoient envoyez de la partie de le^[rs] majestez, que
po^[r] la distance du lieu, ou le pourparte de lad. paix estoit assigné
et ordonné, qui est la ville d’Angiers, en laquelle a Co^[rt] se
retrouve a present.

Finalement leurs majestes ont renvoyé autres passeportz, et depesché
le s^[r] du Croq le^[r] m^[e] d’hostel, pour conduire lesdictz deputez,
lesquelz furent nomez au conseil tenu a la Rochelle le x^[me] de
Ianvier, ascavoir, les s^[rs] de Beauvoir la Nocle lieutenant de feu
Mons. d’Andelot, Cargeoy gentilhomme de Bretaigne, Compain chancelier
et la Chassetiere Brodeau secretaire de la Royne de Navarre. Le
S^[r] de Theligny est aussy des deputez, mais avec sauf conduit pour
et retourner quand bon luy semblera et besoing sera, pour raporter
no^[les] de lad. negotiation a lad. Dame Royne et a Messeigneurs les
Princes et Mons. l’Amiral selon les occurrences.

Et encore qu il semble que le Roy desire la paix et quon ayt advis quil
la veult faire a quelque pris que ce soit, si est ce que pour le peu de
foy et seurete quon a esprouve par deux foys en celle qui a este faute,
on est resolu de la faire a ce coup avec laide de Dieu bonne, asseuree
et inviolable. Et a ceste fin on a baille aux dictz deputez ung pouvoir
si restraint quilz ne peuvent rien conclure sans premier avoir ladvis
de lad. dame Royne desdicts S^[rs] Princes et dud. S^[r] Amiral, et jusqs
a ce quil ayt este par les susdictz dame Princes et S^[rs] arreste. Ce
qui ne se fera sans pallablement avoir surce le conseil et deliberation
de nos confederez et de ceux qui nous ont favorise, aide et secouru en
ceste cause comme il est raisonable, et a fin de pouvoir mieux asseurer
lad. paix; esperans que en y procedant de ceste facon et establissant
le pur service de Dieu par dessus toutes choses il honora les actions
de ceux qui y seront employez.

Au reste la charge desdictz deputez consiste en trois points ascavoir
la liberte des consciences et exercice de la Religion sans distinction
de lieux ou personnes. La seurete & protection de nos vies et personnes
& la restitution de biens honne^[urs] charges, estatz et dignites.

Ceux qui sont hors de ce Roy^[me] quon a resolu dadvertir premier
que de conclure aucune chose sur le traicte et pourparte de la paix
sont dune pt les princes D’allemaigne et mesmes monsie^[r] le Prince
d’Aurenge, et dautre pt Monsie^[r] Le Car^[al] de Chastillon par ce quil
y a eu si estroictes promesses et obligations faictes par ceux qui ont
en pouvoirs de Messeu^[rs] les Princes, quil a este trouvé raisonable
de ne rien faire sans le commun advis de tous ceux qui sont participans
en ceste cause et qui lont favorisee.

Le Baron de la garde se vante desja si la paix se conclut de faire ung
voyage en Escosse avec ses galeres.

[_Not signed_]

[_Not addressed_]

[_Endorsed in Cecil’s hand_] Ianvar 1569
Extract of letters from Rochelle &c.

APPENDIX XVIII

[P. 387, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CVIII, NO. 359

[_Catherine de Medici to the duke of Anjou_]

[1569, September 10]

Extraict de la lettre de la Royne escritte de sa propre main a
Monseigneur le Duc du dix^[me] Sep^[re] Dclxix escritte au Plessis les
Tours.

Mon filz, Sanger irent tout a ceste heure darriver de vostre frere
par lequel nous a mande la bonne et utile nouvelle de l’heureux
desassiegement de Poittiers avec ung tresgrand honeur de mons^[r] de
Guise et de tous ceulx qui y estoient pour le grand et notable service
quilz ont fait a Dieu au roy et a ce royaume et de vostre frere de les
avoir si bien secouruz qen faisant semblant dassieger Chastellerault
et de donner ung faulx assault il a fait a quil vouloit et pourquoy
le roy lavoit envoye et a ceste heure il regardera de mettre peine
dabreger toute ceste guerre que avec layde de Dieu il mettra bien tost
le repoz en ce royaume et me semble que jamais ny eust plus doccacion
de remercier Dieu et le continuer de prier a fin quil nous mette hors
de tant de maulx.

[_No signature_]

[_No address_]

[_Endorsed_] Copie de la lettre de la Royne a Monseigneur le Duc.

APPENDIX XIX

[P. 389, n. 4]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CIX, NO. 444

[_Norris to Cecil_]

Right honorable The Admirall hathe lately written to the Cap^[en] of
la Charite that praise be givin to Gode he maye now joyne w^[th] the
vicountes at his pleas^[r] & that he hadd forces sufficient to make hedd
to his Ennemis, Praying the Governo^[r] to loke carefully to the places
on the frontiers & provide all thinges necessarie for the commyng of
Mons^[r] de Lizy, withe the Armey of Allemagnes whiche puttithe these in
great feare & use all meanes to treat a Peax that possibly the can.
Wrytten at Tours thise 19^[th] of December 1569.

Yo^[r] honours ever assuride to commaunde
HENRY NORREYS

[_Addressed_] to the Right Honorable S^[r] William Cisill Knight principall
Secretarie to the Quene’s most Excellent Maiestie & of hir
highnes preavy Cownsell.

[_Endorsed_] 19 xbr 1569
S^[r] Henry Norreys to my m^[r]
from Tours.

APPENDIX XX

[P. 392, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXI, NO. 580

Double de la responce faicte par le Roy aux ar^[cles] presentez a
sa Ma^[te] par les deputez de la Roine de Navarre.

Le Roy ayant entendu ce qui luy a este exposé de la part des deputez
de la Roine de Navarre des Princes de Navarre de Conde S^[rs]
Gentils-hommes & autres de toutes qualitez qui sont avec eulx les
_treshumbles requestes_ faictes a sa Ma^[te] de leur donner la paix
avec les seuretez qui sont en son pouvoir pour les faire jouir du
benefice dicelle. Ensemble les submissions qui luy ont este faictes de
luy rendre lobeissance & fidelité quilz lui doibvent Sadite Ma^[te]
pour la _singuliere affection quelle a tousjours_ portée a la Roine de
Navarre Princes de Navarre & de Conde pour la proximité de sang dont
ilz luy appartiennent. Le desir quelle a de la conservacion de ses
subgectz _speciallement de sa noblesse_ pour monstrer a eulx & a tous
les dessusditz son affection & clemence paternelle & royalle envers
eulx et la volunté quelle a de voir ses subgectz ensemble revinz
soubz son obeissance & son royaulme en repos de troubles qui y sont
de present leur a accordé pour parvenir a une bonne syncere & entiere
pacification desditz troubles les choses qui sensuyvent.

Car les treshumbles req^[tes] presentees a sa Ma^[te] de la part de
la Royne de Navarre et de Messeigneurs les Princes il est manifeste
que le but de lad. dame et desd. Seigneurs Princes n’est et ne fut
onques d’oster au Roy sa couronne comme ilz ont esté calumniez, mais
d’entretenir le vray pur et libre service de Dieu, come le Roy suyvant
la req^[te] des estatz la accordé a tous ses subgectz.

Nous sommes persuadez de la bonne affection que sa Ma^[te] a portee a
la Roine de Navarre et a Messieurs les Princes au paravant que ceulx
qui aujourdhuy soubz le nom du Roy oppriment le Royaulme eussent
chassé d’aupres de sa personne tous ses meilleurs et plus loyaux
conseillers et mesmes qu’au paravant ces dernieres troubles nonobstant
les fausses accusations calumnies et impostures dont on avoit charge
lad. Dame Roine et Messieurs les Princes, ce neantmoins n’avoient
tant sceu faire ceulx de Guyse que de faire oublier a sa Ma^[te] son
bon naturel, tellement que personne na doubté si sa Ma^[te] se fust
conduicte selon sa bonne inclination que sa bonne affection ne se fust
tousjours monstree en leur endroict et eussent este traictez comme
bons et prochains parens loyaulx subgectz et tresobeissans serviteurs.
Toutesfois il est cogneu notoirement que par les mauvaises praticques
desquelles ont use ceulx qui sont aupres de sa Ma^[te] lad. dame
Messieurs les Princes, les S^[rs] Gentils-hommes et autres estans a
leur suyte ont este beaucoup plus cruellement traictez que les poures
Chrestiens qui tombent entre les mains des Turcqs et Infidelles.

Ceulx de Guise ont assez faict de preuve de la bonne affection
quilz ont a la conservation des subgectz de sa Ma^[te], quand par
les secrettes Intelligences quilz ont avec la maison Despaigne et
speciallement avec le Duc d’Albe depuis huict ans en ça ils ont faict
mourir la meilleure partie de la noblesse et autres subgectz de lune
et lautre religion et mesmement les plus loyaulx & affectionnez au
service de sa Ma^[te]. Et quant a aymer la noblesse il est certain
que ce sont ceulx qui la haissent et craignent le plus et apres eux
les gens de lettres comme ceulx qui naturellement sont ennemys de la
tyrannie, et de lusurpation quilz ont voulu faire de la couronne et en
particulier des comtez d’Aniou et de Provence, et que ne promections
jamais lalienation de la souveraincté de Bar, que ceulx de Guise ont
essaie de praticquer depuis la mort du Roy Henry plus^[rs] fois et on
scait encores ce quilz ont faict dernierement. Et quant au repos public
il est certain que la paix et le Cardinal de Lorraine ne peuvent loger
en ung mesme royaulme.

Premierement que la memoire de toutes choses passées demeurera
esteincte & supprimée comme de choses non jamais advenues. Quil ne
sera loizible ne permis en quelque temps ne pour quelque occasion
que ce soit den faire jamais mention ne procés en quelque court
jurisdiction que ce soit ne ailleurs, et a ceste fin sera imposé
silence a ses procureurs generaulx en toutes ses courtz de parlemens &
leurs substitudz, sera aussy defendu a toutes personnes princes d’en
renouveller la memoire ny en faire reproche sur peine destre puniz
comme infracteurs de paix & perturbateurs du repos public.

Semblables choses nous ont este promises deux foix mais les courtz de
parlemens et autres juges inférieures n’ont laisse de faire mourir
ceulx quilz ont peu apprehender, le peuple a massacre par tout ou ils
a esté le plus fort, les assassinats ont este tous publics, de justice
ils ny en a point eu les injures plus grandes que jamais ce mot de
rebelle a este familier en la bouche des Gouverneurs des Provinces et
singulierement des soubz Gouverneurs dont la France est infectée, et
consequemment des pctis, partant pour effectuer ceste promesse est de
besoing que sa Ma^[te] pourveoie a la justice et a son prive conseil
comme elle seulle le peult et doibt faire autrement ces promesses sont
trappes et pieges.

Que tous arrestz sentences jugemens & procedures faictes en quelque
Court et devant quelques juges que ce soit durant les presens troubles
& aux precedens pour raison des choses passees durant ou a cause
desditz troubles a lencontre des dessusditz ou aucuns deceulx seront
mis a neant cassez & revoquez.

Il nest rien si naturel que tous affaires soyent dissoutes par le moyen
quel les ont este assemblees et partant est de besoing que les courtz
qui ont faict la playe facent la guarison donnans arrestz et sentences
contraires a leurs premiers arrestz et sentences, aillent en personne
despendre les effigiez et ossemens des executez ou en effigie ou apres
leur mort pour le moins en semblable sollemnité quilz les ont executez
comme il fut faict a Rouen en la personne des seigneurs de Harcourt
et de Granville. Et quant a ceulx qui ont este executez de faict que
punition exemplaire soit faicte des Iuges qui ont este autheurs de
telles sentences mesmes contre le vouloir et intention du Roy et que
les heritiers des defunctz prennent leurs interestz sur les biens desd.
criminelz.

Quilz ou aucuns d’eulx ne pourront jamais estre recerchez pour raison
des praticques ou intelligences quilz pourront auoir eves avec Princes
Potentatz Communautez ou personnes privees estrangeres ny a cause des
traictez ou contractz quilz pourraient avoir faictz ou passez avec
eulx pour raison des choses concernans lesdictz troubles & dependances
diceulx dont le Roy les a entierement deschargez et leur en baillera
toutes tres & seuretez qui seront a ceste fin necessaires en la
meilleure & plus autentique forme que faire se pourra.

Ce seroit a ceulx de Guise a prendre lettres d’abolition pour avoir eu
secrettes praticques avec les antiens ennemys de la couronne, les avoir
mis dedans le Royaulme pour parvenir a leur damnable desseing dusurper
le Royaulme et au contraire ceulx qui en une extreme necessité ont eu
recours a leurs antiens amys et confederez pour secouer ce joug et
mainitenir le Roy et la Couronne meritent toutes sortes de louanges et
de recognoissance pour leur grande valleur & pour tant de pertes.

Que par le benefice de ceste paix tous les dessusditz seront remis &
reintegrez en leurs honneurs & biens pour diceulx jouir eulx leurs
enfans heritiers successeurs ou ayans cause paisiblement et sans aucun
empeschement.

Cest article ne peult avoir lieu si ce que est dict cy dessus sur
lar^[cle] 3 nest execute. Item puis que ceulx qui ont tué de sang froid
Monseigneur le Prince de Condé et contre la loy de la guerre. Ceulx
qui ont emprisonne Monsieur d’Andelot et ce trahistre qui a tué le s^[r]
de Mouy ont este hault esleuez et renumirez Messieurs leurs enfans ne
peuvent estre remis en leurs honneurs sinon que punition exemplaire
soit faicte de si pernicieux hommes de leurs complices & adherens que
si Dieu mesmes a desja faict la vangeance d’aucuns (comme il la faict)
si leur memoire nest condamne.

Et pour gratifier particulierement lesditz Princes & ceulx de la
noblesse qui auront estatz charges & pensions de sadite Ma^[te] le Roy
les remectra en sesditz estatz charges et pensions pour en jouir ainsy
comme dessus est dit.

Cest article ne tend qu’a diviser les grands davec les petis pour les
opprimer les ungs apres les autres.

Et quant au faict de la religion le Roy, leur permectra de demeurer
& vivre paisiblement dedans son Royaulme en entiere liberté de leur
conscience sans estre recerchez en leurs maisons ny les abstreindre a
faire chose pour le regard de ladite religion contre leur volunté. Et
encores pour plus grande seureté sadite Ma^[te] leur accordera deux
villes lesquelles le s^[r] de Biron leur nommera, dedans lesquelles
ilz pourront faire tout ce que bon leur semblera et quilz vouldront
sans estre recerchez. Et neantmoins en chascune desdites villes sadite
Ma^[te] aura ung Gentilhomme capable & ydoine pour avoir loeil a ce
quil ne soit faict chose qui contrevienne a son auctorité & repos
de son Royaulme et qui mainctienne ung chacun en paix et repos. Ne
voulant sadite Ma^[te] quil y ayt au reste de tout son Roiaulme aucun
ministre ne quil soit faict autre exercice de religion que de la
sienne.

Dautant que cest ar^[cle] est le noud de la matière il est aussy
captieux en toutes ses parties.

Premièrement il est couché si a propos quon ne scavoit recueillir sil
s’entend seulement des Princes et de la noblesse oubien generallement
de tous. Et on scait comment on sest servy par cydevant de telles
facons de parler.

Secondement il y a de la contradiction manifeste en ce quil est dict
expres, quil y aura entiere liberté de conscience et neantmoins quil ny
aura point de ministres en France.

Tiercement de limpossibilité, car quelle peut estre la liberté de la
conscience ou il n’y a point dexercice de religion? Le Cardinal de
Lorraine pense que liberte de conscience et stupidite de conscience
soit ung. Or la liberte de conscience est en la liberté de la foy qui
est en Christ comment se peut engendrer entretenir et augmenter la foy
que par la parolle delaquelle estans privez il ne reste aucune liberté.
Le Cardinal se trompe en ce quil pense que la liberté gise a avoir
congé de n’aller point a la Messe, de n’aller point aux pardons et
choses semblables, mais la liberte de la conscience ne gist point a ne
point faire ce qui est mauvais, mais a faire ce qui est bon. La verite
dict qui oyt ma parolle et qui la mect en effect est bien heureux. Il
sensuyt doncq que qui ne loyt point est malheureux Il ne dit point qui
ne va point a la Messe. En somme notre liberte nest point composee de
negatives, mais fondee sur propositions affirmatives quil fault faire.
Item si le Cardinal ne peut comprendre quelle est ceste liberté des
Chrestiens, comme il ne peult ne luy ne quiconques soit en ce monde
sil n’est regendre denhault, au moins peult il bien entendre que quand
nous n’avons moyen de contracter mariages, baptizer les enfans, et
enterrer noz mortz que nous n’avons aucune liberté en noz consciences,
mainctenant quil me dise comment (ayans en horre^[r] les actes de la
papauté) nous pouvons faire ces choses estans privez du ministere de la
parolle de Dieu, et consequemment de pasteurs legitimes, mais il semble
que nous sommes comme luy cest adire que la religion ne nous est que
jeu et que nous serions contentz que tous le monde vinst en Atheisme
comme il est certain que si cest ar^[cle] avoit lieu avant peu de
temps la France seroit pleine de Payens et en peu de temps il seroit
a craindre comme desja il est de trop, que ce mauvais conseil ne fust
dommageable a ceulx qui l’ont donné et mesmes a tout lestat en general.

Quartement, cest ar^[cle] est ung piege pour attrapper tous ceulx
qu’on vouldra exposer a la mercy dung juge de village, car jusques on
sestendra ceste liberté? Si ung homme prie soir et matin ou a quelque
autre heure du jour, on dire quil aura faict acte de ministere comme
on trouvera desja assez de gens condamnez voire a la mort et executez
pour avoir prie Dieu, si on chante ung pseaume en sa maison ou en sa
bouticque on en sera recerché car on dira comme il a esté desja souvent
juge que cest autre exercice que de la religion du Roy cest adire de
ceulx qui sont prez de sa personne qui toutesfois nen ont point du
tout. Si on lit en la bible ou en quelque bon livure si ung maistre
apprend a ung enfant a lire dedans ung nouveau testament, si on luy
apprend son oraison en francoys on sera en peine. Brief, accorder aux
hommes une telle liberté de conscience est autant comme qui osteroit
les fers a ung homme et neantmoins on luy osteroit aussy tous les
moyens de recouvrer pain et vin et le laisserait en mourir de faim.

Finallement quant aux villes qui nommera le S^[r] de Biron, on verra
quils nommera ou des bicocques ou sil nomme de bonnes villes que ce
sera pour praticquer de les aliener de la cause commune soubz lumbre
de quelque promesse; mais quoy quil y ayt, comment se peult accorder
que dedans ces villes on fera ce quon vouldra, et quil y ayt ung
Gentilhomme qui y commande, il est aise a juger que mectre ung homme de
Commandement dedans une place, cest lavoir a se devotion toutesfois et
quantes et quand cela ne sera point, quest ce que deux villes en France
quelques grandes et fortes quelles puissent estre les forces estans une
fois rompues et divisees, et mesmes en ung si grand Royaulme quelle
commodite pourraient apporter deux villes a ceulx qui en seraient
infiniment eslougnez, mais le but de tout cela est faictes comme en lan
1568, et on vous traictera aussy de mesmes.

Et quant aux offices de justice finances & autres inferieurs actendu
que depuis la privation faicte diceulx par decretz & ordonnances
de justice suyvant les edictz du Roy autres ont esté pourveuz en
leurs places et sont aujourdhuy en exercice diceulx. Que largent qui
en est provenu a este despendu & emploie pour soustenir les fraiz
de la guerre le Roy ne les peut aucunement restituer ne retracter
lexecution de ses edictz pour ce regard Actendu mesmes les grandes
plainctes & demandes que font ceulx du clerge de sondict Royaulme &
autres ses subgectz catholiques pour avoir reparation du dommage par
eulx souffert tant en leurs biens qu’en la desmolition des eglises
et maisons du patrimoine dicelles par tous les endroictz de sondit
royaulme a lencontre de ceulx qui ont faict lesdites demolitions &
dommages. Ausquelz ne pourrait justement desnier de faire droict &
justice a lencontre de ceulx contre lesquelz ilz vouldroient pretendre
sil falloit entrer en cognoissance de cause et reparation des dommages
souffertz dune part & dautre.

Il ne s’est jamais veu et ne se peult faire sinon par une tirannie
extreme (ce que nous n’estimons pas que sa Ma^[te] face jamais) qu’en
France les officiers n’ayant forfaict soient deposez de leur charge, si
que quand les Roys lont voulu procurer les particuliers ont tousjours
en droict gaigne leur cause contre les Roys mesmes. Et quant a largent
despensé il y a assez de moyens recouvrer argent par la vendition des
biens temporelz des ecclesiastiques Car puisque nous ne sommes point
autheurs des troubles, ains deffendeurs en necessité extreme, que
ceulx qui se pouvoient bien passer de la guerre et vivre en paix, en
leurs maisons, puis quilz ont tant desiré la guerre quilz ne cornoyent
entre chose doibvent aussy en porter la folle enchere comme encores
silz ne nous font autre raison nous esperons que Dieu la nous fera et
en briefe. Que si il estoit question d’entrer en compensation il se
trouvera que nous avons souffert infinies pertes plus que les autheurs
des troubles, en quoy quil y ayt tant de gens et bien meurdriz par
des juges et officiers massacrez par le peuple depuis la derniere
pacification tant de femmes violees par les gens de guerre et mesmes
des plus remarquez qui cela surpasse toute perte & que toutes fois
nous esperons que Dieu ne laissera pour impuny quoy que les vivans en
rien ne regardans point aux jugemens quil en a desja faictz sur les
plus mauvais d’entreulx qui se jouoient ainsy de son Nom de Ma^[te]
glorieuse.

Voulant sadite Ma^[te] pour lobservation des choses susdites avec
toute bonne foy & syncerité leur bailler toutes leurs seuretez
qui sont en son pouvoir et quilz luy vouldront honnestement &
raisonnablement requerir lesquelles seuretez le Roy fera esmolloguer &
passer par ses courtz de parlemens & autres juges quil appartiendra.

Les bons subgectz (telz que nous sommes) n’ont point acoustumé de
demander les formes de seuretez cest a sa Ma^[te] de nous les donner
bonnes et asseurees, et puis quil na este en sa puissance de nous
garder sa foy il nous donnera sil luy plaist les moyens de nous
garentir contre ceulx qui la vouldroient enfraindre en notre endroict,
et quant a ses courtz de parlemens nous ne pensons pas que pendant
quelles serons composees de telles gens quelles sont quil nous garde
foy et administre justice veu quilz sont noz parties formelles.

Veut et entend sadite Ma^[te] que les dessusditz reciproquement pour
luy rendre la fidele obeissance quilz luy doibvent ayent a se departir
de toute alliance, confederation, et association quilz, ont avec
les Princes Potentatz ou Communautez estrangeres hors du Roiaulme
pareillement de toutes intelligences praticques & associations quilz
ont dedans & dehors icelluy.

Quilz ne feront aucunes assemblées contribution ne cullettes de
deniers sans expresse permission du Roy declarée par ses lettres
patentes.

Quant a ces deux ar^[cles] sa Ma^[te] scait que nous n’avons rien
promis que nous n’ayons tenu ce que nous ferons encores la paix estant
bien asseurer.

Quentieront & feront sortir hors sondit Roiaulme dedans ung moys apres
la conclusion de ladite Pacification par le chemin qui leur sera
prescript par sadite Ma^[te] sans foulle ne oppression de ses subgectz
tous estrangers estans a leur service, et conviendront avec eux de
leur paiement a leurs propres coustz & despens. Et a ceste fin leur
donnera le Roy telle permission quil sera besoing pour entr’eulx leuer
les sommes qui leur seront necessaires.

Cest ar^[cle] est impossible en toutes ses parties, car les estrangers
ne peuvent en ung mois se retirer, ilz ne peuvent ny ne doibvent
sortir par le chemin qui leur sera prescript sinon quilz veulent se
precipiter eulx mesmes a leur mort, ce que nous ne leur conseilleront
jamais, plustost choisirons nous de mourir avec eulx. Et davantage ilz
sont assez fortz pour se faire voye par ou bon leur semblera. Si nous
promectons que les subgectz de sa Ma^[te] ne soient point foullez cest
une trappe, car nestant aucunement en notre puissance de laccomplir
ceulx de Guise diront que nous avons rompu la paix. Il ne nous est non
plus possible de les paier de noz deniers particuliers car la cruauté
de noz ennemys nous a osté tous les moyens que nous avions au paravant
et mesmes dedans ung mois une telle cuillette ne sa pourrait faire et
quand elle le seroit il nous souvient comment nous fusmes traictez a
Auxerre et qui est le pis les particuliers ne vouldront contribuer, se
souvenans bien comme ilz ont esté traictez pour avoir contribué aux
troubles precedens suyvant les tres patentes de sa Ma^[te].

Laisseront aussy les armes et separeront toutes leurs autres forces
tant de pied que de cheval par mer & par terre se retireront chacun en
leurs maisons qon bon leur semblera incontinent apres la conclusion de
ladite paix pour la ou ilz seront vivre paisiblement.

Les seuretez de la paix estans bonnes se departiront voluntairement des
armees, mais ilz se ressentent de plus de dix mil hommes des leurs qui
ont esté cruellement meurdriz aux dernières troubles obeissans a ung
semblable article que cestuy. Partant il est necessaire que sa Ma^[te]
y pourveoie.

Remectront entre les mains du Roy ou de ceulx quil commectra les
villes chasteaux & places quilzdetiennent pour le present et en
feront sortir les forces quilz y ont y déllaissant semblablement
lartillerie & autres munitions qui sont en icelles, au pouvoir de
ceulx qu’ordonnera sadite Ma^[te].

Et generallement restitueront de bonne foy a sadite Ma^[te] ou a
ceulx quil commectra toutes les choses a elle appartenantes qui se
trouveront encores en nature soit es villes & places quilz tiennent ou
autres lieux quilz soient ou par mer ou par terre. Faict a Angiers le
iiij^[e] jour de Feburier 1570. Ainsy signe CHARLES et au dessoubz DE
LAUBESPINE.

Quant a ces deux ar^[cles] la paix estant asseuree feront ce quilz
promectront. Toutesfois lexperience a monstre a Orleans, Auxerre,
Autun, Vallence, Montpellier et autres villes comment sil ne plaist a
sa Ma^[te] de pourveoir a lestat de gouverneurs de gens dautre humeur
que ceulx qui ont este commis au gouvernement des places depuis les
secondes troubles il seroit beaucoup plus expedient aux poures habitans
des villes de mourir vaillamment a la breche que de voir devant leurs
yeulx les horribles meschancetez quilz ont veues, et qui sont telles
que nous avons honte seullement de les nommer.

[_Not signed_]

[_Endorsed in Burghley’s hand_] 8 Martii 1569 (1570).
Respons to the articles of the
fr. K^[es] answer to the Q. of
Navarrs Deputees.

APPENDIX XXI

[P. 396, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXV, NO. 990

Distribution des gouvernementz d’aulcunes Provences en France
dernièrement faict par les Protestantz et Premierement

Le Segneur de Montbrun general pour le pais de daulphine et Provence,
Monser de S^[t] Romain general pour le duche de Nismes, Montpellier.
Mande, Vivaretz, Uses, et le puis avec 600 livres en pention per
chascun moys 200 harquebusiers et trois cornettes de Cavallerie.

Le vicounte de Paulin pour les duches d’alby, Castres, S^[t] Pol,
Carcassonne, Narbonne, Bessiers, Aix et Lodesve.

Le S^[r] de Serignac Montauban et tout le pais bas, Quercy, Agenois,
diocese de Thoulouse, Rioux, La Nur Mereboix et Albert.

Le Cap: de Guynieres pour les dioceses de Palmes Costrance Comiges, et
toute la counte de Foix.

Le Baron darroy les pais de Ricaon, Besomiris, Cascogne et Armignac.

Le Viconte de Pimal toute la seneschalce d’avergne.

Le Visconte de Gordon Loyer et le hault guibry Limosin et leurs
adjacentes.

Laissant lentier sang aux S^[rs] de la Noe et de Montgomery des
affaires qui concerneront la Rochelle lesquieux pourvoieront de choses
aux gouvernementz des paix de Guienne, Poictou, Torenne, Le Meine,
Bourgoigne, Bretaigne, Normandie et autres adjacentes.

A este en oultre ordonne par l’assemblee generalle desdits protestantz
que chascun desdict chefs comandiria en son departement quilz prendrent
tous les deniers du Roy. Item tous les revenus des ecclesiastiques
cotiseront de gre ceulx de la Religion selon l’exigence des affaires,
et les Catholiques de gre ou de force, et contrainderont le solvable
pour insolvable.

[_Not signed_]

[_Endorsed_] Distribution de provences
par les protestans.

APPENDIX XXII

[P. 399, n. 1]

ITINERAIRE DE MONTGOMERY EN GASCOGNE

PENDANT L’ANNEE 1569[1770]

8 juin. Quitte Nontron, nanti des pleins pouvoirs de la reine de
Navarre (France protestante).

21 juin. Arrive à Castres et y organise l’expédition du Béarn.

27 juillet. Part de Castres à midi pour se rendre en Béarn (Mémoires
de Jacques Gaches. Lettre de Montgomery à Jeanne d’Albret).

28 juillet. Occupe Mazères, en Foix, et traverse l’Ariège (Mémoires de
J. Gaches.)

_Il franchit l’Ariège probablement au pont d’Auterive, puis le Salat.
Il était le i^[er] août à Montbrun; le 2, ayant passé sans encombre la
Garonne au pont de Miramont_ (Courteault, _Blaise de Montluc_, p. 544).

2 août. Pille Saint-Gaudens (Durier, Huguenots en Bigorre).

5 et 6 août. Traverse la plaine de Tarbes et loge à Pontac, le 6 au
soir (_ibid._; Bordenave, _Histoire de Béarn_, p. 259).

7 août. Passe le Gave à Coarraze (Bordenave, _loc. cit._).

9 août. Entre à Navarrenx (Lettre du 11 août).

11 août. Quitte Navarrenx et arrive sous les murs d’Orthez vers midi
(Bordenave, p. 266; Lettre du 11 août).

12-14 août. Assiège Orthez.

15 août. Signe la capitulation.

16 août. Occupe la ville, où il a une entrevue avec le comte de Gramont
(Bordenave, p. 276).

18-19 août. Prend Artix et fait massacrer les frères mineurs du couvent
(_ibid._, p. 280).

22 août. Fait rendre des actions de grace à Pau (_ibid._, p. 280).

23 août. Séjourne à Pau (Lettre à Jeanne d’Albret).

24-29 août. Oleron, Mauleon de Soule.

30 août. Entre en Bigorre, par le Vic-Bilh.

31 août. Traverse Maubourguet.

1^[er] septembre. S’empare de Tarbes et met tout à feu et à sang
(Durier, Huguenots en Bigorre).

2-4 septembre. A Tarbes.

5 septembre. Quitte cette ville (Lettre à Jeanne d’Albret), pour aller
en Chalosse (Bordenave, p. 286).

6 septembre. Occupe et rançonne Marciac (Lettre).[1771]

7 septembre. Entre à Aire-sur-Adour (Lettre).

11 septembre. A Grenade-sur-Adour (Lettre).[1772]

_12-18 septembre._ _Capitulation de Sainte Sever_ (Bordenave, p. 287)
_et Mont de Marsan vers Montault et Mugron delà l’Adour_ (Courteault p.
553 n. 2).

19 septembre. Traverse Amou (_ibid._).[1773]

20-28 septembre. _A Orthéz_ (Courteault, p. 555). Va à Navarrens, ou il
ordonne l’exécution de Bassillon, gouverneur de cette ville.

28 septembre. Arrive à Salies de Béarn (Lettre).[1774]

1-6 octobre. Séjourne à Salies, où il réorganise la justice.

10 octobre. Ouvre le synode de Lescar et part pour la Bigorre.

13 octobre. Occupe Betplan (Huguenots en Bigorre).

14-17 octobre. Etablit son camp à Lahitole (_ibid._).

18 octobre. Quitte Lahitole et se dirige vers Marciac (_ibid._).

21 octobre. Arrive à Nogaro (Lettre), qu’il pille et brûle (Huguenots
en Bigorre).

22 octobre. Traverse Eauze (Comment.).

3 novembre. Occupe Condom (Huguenots en Bigorre), d’où il écrit aux
consuls d’Auch.

3-17 novembre. Fait des courses dans l’Armagnac; menace Auch et Lombez;
ravage Samatan (_ibid._).

17 novembre. Rentre à Condom (Dupleix), d’où il écrit aux consuls de
Bagnères (Huguenots en Bigorre).

Décembre. Faict sa jonction avec l’armée des princes.

APPENDIX XXIII

[P. 402, n. 1]

ARCHIVES NATIONALES

K 1,515, PIÈCE NO. 23 A

[Montauben, janvier 1570.]

[_Au dos_] Proclamation des Rebelles de France.

De par Messeigneurs les Princes de Navarre et de Condé.

Il est tres expressement commandé et enjoinct a tous gentilzhommes,
capitaines, soldatz faisans profession de la religion reformée non
enrollés soubz les enseignes et compaignies retenues pour la garde
et deffence des villes tenues soubz l’obeyssance du Roy et desdictz
Sieurs Princes, de in continent et sans delay se rendre en leur armée
pour y estre employez au service de Dieu et du Roy sellon leur degré
et quallité, et ce, sur peyne d’estre tenuz pour ennemys de la cause
de Dieu et de la religion. Enjoinct aux gouverneurs des villes ou ilz
seront sans expresse licence desdictz S^[rs] Princes, d’iceulx faire
vuyder et desloger promptement, deffendre leur estre baillé logis
ne vivres et les soldatz desvalizés et desgradés de leurs armes et
chevaulx. Sy ont lesdictz Sieurs Princes estroictement deffendu et
inhibé a toutz capitaines, soldatz et aultres estans de la presente
armée de brusler, desmolir ny ruyner aulcuns chasteaulx, maisons ne
ediffices apartenans aux gentilzhommes de quelque religion qu’ilz
soyent, ne aussy des paisans et peuble estans ez bourez et villages
du plat pais. Et d’aultant que les Courtz de Parlement et aultres
officiers de la justice et conseil des villes, principalement ceulx
de la ville de Tholouze se sont renduz, par une hayne trop cruelle et
incapable, refracteurs, voyre directement oppozés à la publication
et entretenement de la paciffication dernierement establye en ce
royaulme, jusques à faire mourir inhumainement et ignominieusement
le Sieur Rappin, maistre d’hostel du Sieur feu prince de Condé,
nostre tres chere et tres amé oncle et tres honnoré seigneur et pere,
contre toute foy et seureté publique a luy octroyée tant par le edict
de paciffication que par expres sauf conduict et passeport a luy
baillés especiallement par Sa Majesté aux fins d’apporter et faire
publyer ledict edict de la paciffication; oultre le cruel meurtre
contre les loix et debvoirs de la guerre commis en la personne du
baron de Castelnau et aultres gentilzhommes, capitaines et soldatz
prins en guerre durant les troubles. Lesdictz Sieurs Princes, pour
reprimer et faire cesser de leur pouvoir telles inhumanitez non ouyes
entre les plus barbares nations de la terre, et, par le chastiment
des perturbateurs de la paix et foy publicque, parvenir à quelque
tranquillité stable entre ceulx qui désirent la seureté et conservation
de cest Estat et coronne de France, ont habandonné en proye, pillage
et feu toutes maisons, ediffices, bestail, meubles, danrées et biens
quelzquonques qui se trouveront appartenir aux presidents conseilliers
de ladicte Court de Parlement de Tholouze et aultres lieux, justiciers
et administrateurs et generallement officiers de ladicte ville,
pappistes ou atteistes; et pour cest effect permis aux capitaines,
soldatz et aultres quelzconques estans en ceste armée uzer de tous
lesdictz actes d’hostillité à l’endroict des dessusdictz. Deffendant
tres expressement mesfaire en aulcune façon, ains conserver de tout
leur pouvoir les maisons et biens appartenans à ceulx qui font
profession de la religion reformée, de quelque qualité ou condition
qu’ilz soyent. Et, affin que nul ne puisse ignorer lesdictes deffences
et provision, ensemble les causes et occasions d’icelle, ont volu ces
presentes estre cryées a cry publicque tant en la ville de Montauban
que en la presente armée.

Faict à Montauban, au mois de janvier mil cinq cens soixante dix.

APPENDIX XXIV

[P. 412, n. 2]

ARCHIVES NATIONALES

K 1,515, PIÈCE NO. 68

[11 mars 1570.]

[_Au dos, propria manu_] Lo que se dixo de parte de los Principes de
Bearne y Conde a Biron.

Dicho y pronunciado a los XI de março, a tres horas despues
de mediodia, delante de Mos^[res] los Principes y Almirante,
gentileshombres y cabeças de lexercito de los dichos Señores Principes.

Mos de la Caçe ha dicho a Mos de Biron que tenia mandamiento de todos
los Señores y gentileshombres del exercito para dezirle:

Que, como ellos loan infinitamente a Dios por la gracia que ha hecho al
Rey de le tocar el coraçon e inclinarle a la paz tan necessaria, assi
davan muy humildes gracias a Su Magestad de la buena voluntad que tenia
de les estender sus braçocs y abraçallos como buenos y fieles subditos,
mas, porque estiman y creen que la privacion de los exercicios de la
religion es para ellos mas dura muerte que ninguna que se les pudiesse
dar, supplican muy humilmente a Su Magestad les otorgue un medio con
que acquieten sus consciencias para con Dios, al qual si se mostrassen
desleales, Su Magestad no podria esperar que ellos le fuessen muy
fieles, porque quien no es fiel á Dios no lo puede ser á los hombres,
que no es libertad de consciencia estar sin palabra de Dios, sino una
insoportable servidumbre, que si huvieran consentido de vivir en esta
licencia llamandola libertad de consciencia, Su Magestad con razon
devria tomar resolucion de no se fiar jamas dellos y de no los tener
jamas en estima de hombres de bien.

Que Dios dize que sobre nosotros ha embiado la muerte, es a saber que
cien muertes nos vienen mas a cuenta que alexarnos voluntariamente del
derecho camino de la vida eterna.

En lo demas dize que ellos havian (con muy grande desplazer suyo)
sido forçados por muchas causas de emplear sus vidas por defender a
los que avian sido sus defensores, cosa que no les devia ser imputada
a mal, ni delante de Dios, ni delante de los hombres, sino solo a
aquellos que contra justicia y contra las leyes han siempre oprimido
sus consciencias y sus honrras y sus vidas. Al presente, dessearian
por quanto su dever les obliga, podellos emplear en el servicio de Su
Magestad y cumplimiento de su Estado, en prejuyzio de aquellos que se
reyan de sus miserias comunes y esperavan dello provecho.

Por el particular de Mos^[r] de Biron, el dize que todos sentian una
grande obligacion para con el, por la buena intencion que mostrava
al acrescentamiento del reposo publico, que si fuesse en su mano de
le poder mostrar quanto lo estimavan, el veria en lo que tenian y
estimavan aquellos que, como el, no dependian de alguna particularidad,
mas de la sola voluntad del Rey y de la consideracion de la utilidad
publica; que el Rey no podia hazer election de señor de su Corte mas
agradable a toda la compañia ni mas proprio para la execucion divina
entan sancta impressa, en la qual rogava a Dios le llegasse a effecto,
de manera que ellos viessen presto un buen fin que fuesse a gloria de
Dios y contentamiento de Su Magestad y reposo de sus consciencias y
alegria de todos sus subditos.

Finalmente le dixo que ellos quedavan persuadidos que, como el avia
valerosamente aventurado su vida en campaña por les hazer mucho mal sin
razon, agora con razon el emplearia sus officios y buenos medios para
les procurar el bien que desseavan, sin el qual podian menos passar que
sin el pan que comian ordinariamente.

A loqual Mos de Biron respondio lo mas sabia y graciosamente que fue
possible, dandoles siempre segundad del desseo que Su Magestad tenia de
hazer paz, y representandoles el alegria que ternia de representar a Su
Magestad las buenas razones que el les avia oydo, y hazerle testimonio
del buen proposito en que todos en general y en particular estavan de
querer dar a Su Magestad la obediencia que le era devida, y que este
era solo el medio por el qual podia Su Magestad ser vencido. En fin,
el uso de muy honestos agradescimientos, y assi mismo dio seguridad de
emplear sus buenos officios en un negocio que el creya havia de causar
tanta utilidad al Rey y a sus subditos.[1775]

APPENDIX XXV

[P. 413, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXII, NO. 693, j

[_Extraict des Lettres du S^[r] card^[al] de Lorraine_]

Quant a la paix discessum est re infesta, qui nous faict esperer bien.
Et se reassemblent a cest heure tant de grandes personnaiges mesmes
messieurs de Conseil de Paris. Chacun y fera & dira son opinion et oyra
parler le Roy ainy chacun en pourra dire a cueur ouverts. Les offres
que leur auroent este faictez cestoient les villes de la Rochelle
Sancerre & Montauban usque ad biennium ut civitates refugii sans tenir
offices ny benefices. Et que les haultz justiciers & plains fiefs de
haubert en Normandie ne seroient empesches ny recherches faisant dedans
leurs maisons & ceulx presant tantum tout ce que bon leur sembleraient
en leur religion alibi nusquam itaque ilz ont demande temps de
deliberer & feront respons dedans six sepmaines. Ce Chateaubriant ce
iiij^[e] May 1570.

[_Enclosed in a letter by Sir Henry Norris to Sir William Cecil from
Paris, May 24, 1570_]

APPENDIX XXVI

[P. 417, n. 3]

ARCHIVES NATIONALES

K. 1,515, PIÈCE NO. 118

[_Au dos, alia manu_] Copia de carta del Nuncio a Su Magestad. De
Madrid al Escurial, a 26 de Junio 1570.

Para escrivir a Francia, como se hizo. Lo de Mos. de Fox.

Copia di una lettera, che il Nuntio scrisse a S. M^[ta] Cat^[ca].]

Mi è doluto assai intendere che V. M^[ta] Cat^[ca] senta qualche
indispositione di stomaco, il che deve ser residuo de la incomodità del
camino. Il Signor Dio la mantenga sana lungamente, con ogni contento et
felicita.

Per le ultime lettere d’Italia ch’io trovai in Madrid, quali sono di
17 de maggio, S. S^[tà] mi avvisa d’havere inteso che la Regina di
Francia sta in animo di far cancelliere di quel regno di Francia Mons^[r]
di Foys, hora Imbasciatore in Venetia. Et perche questo homo, oltre
l’essere indiciato grandemente nel Santo Offitio de la Inquisitione
di Roma e parente e dependente da quella buona donna chiamata la
Regina di Navarra, et è persona superba, inquieta di spirito, amica di
novita et discordia, et di piu si tiene offeso da Sua Santità per non
havere consentito ch’egli vadi a Roma, et credo il medesimo sia con V.
M^[tà] por una causa simile di non haverlo accettato in Spagna; queste
cause, dico, et altre che Sua Santita considera, gli da gran sospetto
che, se questo homo fosse posto in tale administratione, la quale può
infinitamente in quel regno, come nel Cancellier passato s’è veduto per
esperientia, non cercarebbe altro che di unire le voluntà de queste due
donne, et non solo, favorendo la parte ugonota, travagliare le cose di
Francia (pur troppo travagliate), ma anchora quelle de li circunvicini,
maxime nelli Stati ecclesiastici et di V. M^[tà] Cat.^[ca], non solo
per vendetta de la offesa, et per l’odio che a l’uno et l’altro
verisimilmente porta, ma anchora per la propria inclinatione sua. Onde
Sua Beatitudine, facendo sopra cio quello che puo per la sua parte,
desidera e ne prega V. M^[tà] a volere similmente cercare ogni via
di impedire tale elettione, et quando non si possi altro, si degni
scrivere a l’Imbasciatore, et vedendo passar inanti tal cosa, si unisca
con il Nuntio, et insieme si lassino intendere apertamente dalla Regina
che Sua Beatitudine et S. M^[tà] Cat^[ca] haveranno per male ch’ella
dia uno orficio di tanta importantia in mano di persona tale il che
non deve fare, si ella desidera di essere tenuta fautrice de la fede
cattolica desiderosa de la grandezza et quiete del Re suo figliuo lo
et della unione e^[t] bene de la Christianità. Spera Sua Santità che,
con questo rimedio si possi obviare a quello inconveniente, peroche la
Regina prefata mostra pure di havere qualche consideratione in simili
attioni di non far cosa che possi con ragione dispiacere a Sua Santità
et a V. M^[tà]. Et perche da una parte questo negotio ricerca presta
provisione, et da l’altra non è honesto che in questo tempo io dia
perturbatione a V. M^[tà] con la mia presentia, ho voluto communicarla
con il Cardinale, et scrivere a V. M^[tà] Cat^[ca] la presente,
supplicandola humilmente si degni farmi dare quella grata risposta che
comandara ch’io scriva a Sua Beatitudine sopra questa materia. Et,
basando reverentemente le regali mani a V. M^[ta], prego N. S^[r]. Dio la
concervi longamente felice.

Di Madrid, li 26 di Giugno 1570.

APPENDIX XXVII

[P. 422, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXV, NO. 937.

[_The Vidame de Charters to Marshal Montmorency_]

Monseigneur, j’ay receu une lettre quil vous a pleu m’escripre pour
responce a ce que vous avois escript par monsieur de Saragosse. Iay
congneu que pensiez que je fusses encores au lieu dont vous avois
escript. Si jeuse pense que ma presente y eust este requise j’euse
differé tant quil vous eust pleu le me faire entendre. Mais il vous
estoit fort aise a penser que si lon prenoit goust par deça a ceste
negociation elle seroit adressee a monsieur le cardinal de Chastillon,
ou a l’ambassadeur du roy. On seroit envoye quelqu’ng des francoys
favoris. Quand a moy ie n’ay pretendu en cest affaire que le service
du roy et de la couronne de France, et si les affaires succedoient
comme je y voy une telle espoirance et asseurance sil estoit poursuivy
diligemment. Le contentement que je desire ne me pouroit fuir. Il est
vray que je serais fort marry si jamais j’oyois dire que par faulte de
diligence cest affaire fust demoure imparfaict, aussy seroit ce ung
domage public oultre le particullier du prince au quel les premiers
fruicts en appartiennent. Monsieur une lettre que jay receue de mons^[r]
de Saragosse me faict entrer en soupçon et craincte que en atendant
entre deux personnes qui ne se sont jamais veues qui ostera prenner le
bonnet il ne se mette quelqung entre deux qui face perdre l’occasion
de contracter une grande amitie & fort utille a la France, la quelle
estant perdue sensuyviroit le dommage et le regret (mais en vain). Je
suis bien asseure que larcheduc d’Austriche ne sendormira pas et ne
laisera perdre l’occassion qui se presente a une assemblee des estatz
qui se vont tenyr voire les previendra sil peult ne perdra pas une
heure, que pendant quil voyt que la royne est en deffiance et doubte
pour les affaires de la royne D’escosse et des differens quelle a avec
le roy D’espaigne et quilz voyoient que l’empereur avent en pouppe,
et quil faict des mariages telz quil scavroit souhaiter. Il ne se
serve de l’occassion & faveur du temps et pendant que les amis simulez
paistront la jeunesse animeuse et la rempliront de grande espoirance,
luy prometant par adventure des plus grandes choses (combien quelles
ne soient pas aysees a trouver), et pour moy je ne les scay pas ilz
prendront cest advantage sur la partye et renforceront leur grandeur
de la puissance et faveur d’un royaulme qui nest point petit. Et vous
ose bien dire quil y a de la part de ceux en qui gist la resolucion de
cest affaire une grande inclinacion et une grande consideracion de long
service de cest ancyen serviteur et de la subjection et humiliacion
quil a monstree de la quelle vous scavez que le sexe se delecte. Ausy
est ce leur façon de regner la quelle toutes veulent exercer, tant plus
les roynes. Il ne fault penser que les dificultes pour la religion
puissent engendrer quelques difficultez aux capitulacions qui facent
plus de retardement. Car je scay par la bouche de la dame et ausy par
ceux qui ont sceu toute ceste negotiacion passee, et par ung qui y a
este employe qui ne parle pour metre le beau devers elle nestant de
ses subjects mais estranger, que la charte blanche luy a este donnee.
Et sest contente l’Archeduc pour le faict de la religion de si peu
que cella se doibt estimer pour rien. Davantage la consideracion de
lage qui est plus vivill et meur donne ung beau lustre aux persuasions
et jugement de ceux qui tendent de ce costé la. Avec ses advantages
du long service et age convenable, je crains que ceux qui tiennent
le party contraire ne persuadent avec aparence a cause du trop long
silence ou froide poursuite quil y aye du contemnement ou de la
froideur en ceux de la France estant chose propre au sexe de faire plus
de choses par despit que par amour est a craindre quel la froideur de
ceste part ne soit cause de l’eschauffer et faire haster plus quelle
ne fairoit si nestoit pour se faire regretter apres a loisir par ceulx
qui se seroient portez trop froidement en son endroit. Larticle de la
lettre du gentilhomme qui vous porta ma lettre (qui me faict craindre
que en voulant traicter de la part de la France avec fort grand respect
et par adventure prendre l’honneur devers nous l’affaire nen sera
pire) est quil dict que si lon estoit asseure par deça de la bonne
volonte de ceux de dela la mer on y pouroit entendre ce qui me semble
estrange de vouloir qu’une ville se rende avant quelle soit sommee. Il
me semble que cest beaucoup quelle parlamente, sans avoir ouyr parler
le canon. Et nest par peu de chose qu’estant sa principalle defence
de la difference de laage et de linconstance de la jeunesse et la
crainte destre dicy a quelques anees, peu aymes et mesprisee et en
danger de veoir de ses yeulx aymer dautres, lon luy a faict abandonner
ceste contre escarppe et le corrider tellement que lon peult veoir au
pied de la muraille que je vous asseure nest point veue de flans. Des
particularitez et moyens que lon a tenue en ses approches jusques la
jen ay dice quelque chose a ce gentilhomme qui est fort affectionne
a cest affaire en faveur du bien de la France. Et dabondant en hayne
de la grandeur qui se voit preparer a la maison d’Autriche si elle
s’impatronize de ce royaume, tellement quil nest a craindre si non
que la tradiuite ne donne loisir a ceux qui de long temps ont faict
deseing de se saisir de ce pais de venyr au bout de leur intencions
lesquelles sont fort favorablement receues, et croy quils jouyront en
bref si leurs conseilz ne sont troublez par une diuersion & par obiect
nouveau plus desirable que celuy qui ce presente Ce qui me semble
estre indubitablement en la jeunesse d’un prince qui a la reputacion
davoir le sens meur devant les ans et ausi courageux et dausy grande
espoirance que prince ne soit ne de lage des hommes. Monsieur vous
scavez trop bien combien la maisson d’Autriche seroit agrandie sur
la maison de France si elle estoit renforcee de ce royaume. Et ny a
point de doubte quelle ne donnast pour tousjours par cy apres la loy
a la France et est chose seure quelle contraindroit le roy a rompre
la paix quil a donnee a ses subiectz. Davantage si par ce mariage
nest donne satisfaction au grand coeur de mons^[r] frere du roy pour
loccuper et luy donner matiere de faire plus grandz deseingz Il ne
fault point doubter que tous ceux qui prennent la couleur et pretexte
de la religion pour advancer les moiens de la divission et ruyne de la
France afin d’agrandir la maison d’Autriche ne proposent a monsieur
duc danjou quelques mariages qui sera au despens de la couronne de
France si la bonne nature et amitie dentre les freres ne resiste a leur
malicieux deseingz. Mais il ne sen scauroit proposer du quel se doive
espoirer plus de grandeur, non seulement a luy mais a toute la maison
de France en gaignant le dessus sur la maison d Autriche, la quelle
veult soubz couverture & douceur du mariage du roy faire avaller ceste
curee & gaigner ung royaume sans ce quil luy soit donne empeschement
et ne fault point doubter que si le mariage de larcheduc se faict quil
ne soit en peu de temps mieulx obey que na este le roy Philippe et ce
moiennant le danger de la religion et leur sera aise de nous donner la
loy ou pour le mains de nous faire redoubler la ruyne de la France par
division et guerre civille. Au contraire si ce bien est resceue pour
noz princes il y aura bien de quoy rendre la pareille a ceux qui ont
dresse tous leurs conseilz a procurer que la France se ruynast par une
guerre civille Voyans que par guerres ouvertes jamais ilz n’auroient
peu paruenir a leur intencion. Pour amour du mal quilz ont faict mons^[r]
pouroit iustement avec forces du roy faveur dangleterre et moiens
du prince dorenge avoir la confiscacion de la Flandre par droict de
feodalite pour felonnie commise. Et ausy la maison d Autriche qui se
bastit lempire hereditaire et la monarchie se trouveroit en ung instant
deux freres roys ausy puissans lun que lautre pour contrepois de son
ambition liggnez avec les princes protestans de lallemaigne et auroient
les deux freres plus de part en lempire que ceux qui se veulent
atribuer par la ruyne des anciennes maisons de la Germanye come de la
maison de Saxe et des princes palatins qui sont amateurs de la couronne
de France. Le partage de monsieur d allençon seroit aise a trouver en
la duche de Millan auec la faueur de lallemaigne, des Suises ausy et
des princes Italliens devotieux de la France Et si besoing estoit po^[r]
le recouvrement du royaume de Naples, la fave^[r] du Turc se trouveroit
par apres ung a propos. Mons^[r] il ma semble que cela est si aparent, et
si facille a persuader que puis que vous en aurez une fois ouvert la
bouche il ny faudra plus autre soliciteur que le roy mesmes qui peult
veoir par ce moyen son royaume luy demourer uny ses freres partagez.
Sa force telle et si grande quil ne poura estre offence ny commande
par menasses qui contraignent faire la guerre a ses subiects pour
complaire a ceux qui sont envieux de sa grandeur et n’ont peu trouver
moyen de la diminuer que par elle mesmes. Lors ce pouroit faire une
legue parfaicte entre noz princes & les protestans de la Germanie & les
suisses. De ceste facon ung grand plaisir viendroit a la royne de veoir
tous ses enfans roys. Lors leglisse galicane pouroit sexempter des
erreurs de leglisse Romayne comme elle a faict plusieurs fois le temps
passe, lors se pouroit faire ung concille general au quel les erreurs
introduictes par lambition et advarice de leglisse romayne ne seroient
favorisses et confirmees par praticques et corruptions, et en la France
l’allemaigne et langleterre s’introduiroient une ordre et pollice
de religion et unite de doctrine que toutes les autres provinces
de la cristiente seroient contraintes dembrasser et finiroient les
differens des subiectz avec leurs princes desquelles Sathan se sert
pour la destruction de la Christeente et pour donner loisir au turc
d’usurper pendant que les princes Chrestiens s’amussent a defendre les
supersticions du Pape et maintenyr sa grande^[r].

Monseigneur je me recommande treshumblement a votre bonne grace et
vous suplie de rechef me departir de votre faveur et conseil touchant
comment je me doibs gouverner a escripre a leurs ma^[tes] ou non:
Mons^[r] je prie Dieu vous donner tresheureuse et treslongue vye. De la
Ferte ce—— [1776] jour doctobre 1570.

[_Not signed_]

[_Not addressed_]

[_Endorsed in Cecil’s hand_] Octob. 1570.
The vidam of Chartres to the Marshall Montmorency.

[_Enclosed by Sir Henry Norreys to Cecil, 4 November, 1570._][1777]

APPENDIX XXVIII

[P. 426, n. 3]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXVIII, NO. 1,174

[_Marshal Montmorency to Cecil_]

Mons^[r] jay este tresaise davoir entendu tant par la lettre que mauez
escripte du xxij^[e] du passe, que par le s^[r] du Pui present porteur le
desir qui vous avez de veoir bien tost affectuer ce qui a este miz
en avant pour estraindre une bonne & ferme alliance, entre ces deux
royaumes, ayant par votre prudence & longue experience de lestat &
cours des affaires, passez & presens tresbien cogneu combien cella
seroyt en ce temps, non seullement convenable Mais aussi necessaire,
pour le bien seurette & grandeur de lun & de lautre, a quoy de ma part
je ne fauldray de tenir la main de tout mon pouvoir et de my employer
syncerement, de cueur & daffection Vous priant a ceste cause Mons^[r],
que desormays avec une bonne Intelligence & correspondance, que pour
cest effect nous aurons ensemble Nous mections peine de vaincre les
difficultez & rompre les obstacles. Que aucuns y mectent tous les
jours, artificieusement, de sorte que au plustost, avecques votre bon
ayde, nous y puissyons veoir lheureux suites, que nous desirons. Qui
tourne avec occasion, de raisonable tantement dune part & dautre, au
repoz unyon & grandeur de ces deux couronnes, et a la confuzion de
ceux qui sefforcent d empescher ung si bon euvre ce que masseurant,
que vous vouldrez faire et cheminer en ce faict avec votre Integritte
acoustumee, je ne mestandray plus avant en ce propoz. Si ce nest pour
vous prier de creoire ced. porteur, de ce quil vous dira de ma part,
come moy mesmes Qui surce me recomanderan tresaffectueus^[t] a votre
bonne s^[r] Priant Dieu vous donner Mons^[r] en parfaicte sante bonne &
longue vye. De Gaillon le xxv^[e] jour de May 1571.

[_Signed_] Votre obeissant et parfaict amy
MONTMORENCY

[_Addressed_] A Mons^[r]
Mons^[r] de Burghley.

[_Endorsed_] 20 May 1571
Montmorency to my L.

APPENDIX XXIX

[P. 448, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC

ADDENDA, ELIZABETH, VOL. XXI, NO. 58

[_French-English Alliance, 1572_]

Good m^[r] Hoggyns.... We allso here of a gret lege made w^[th] France
w^[ch] ys thowghte that thereby the Frenche pretendith some further
feche to serve there tourne: God of his goodnesse kepe the noble yle
of Inglande to lyve w^[th]out givynge ower much credith to forren
fryndshipe. Here ys gret preparation as ever I sawe for w^[th] in this
xx dayes there wyll be x thousant horsmen & fyfty thousant fotmen:
lykewyse by se 80. saylle of men of warre. Don Jhon de Austria ys come
w^[th] his galles to Genova & the Venecians goith outwarde agaynst the
tourke who hath augmentyd there forces. The deuke of Savoye armyth for
the Kynge 8000 fottemen and as it ys sayd commyth hym sellf in parson.
Flushynge saluted the deuk de Medina cely very vyle at his commynge &
burnte iij shipes of marchantes onlye by treson of a Floshynge verlet
that came out of Spayne w^[th] them & toke apon hym to led them in
to the port of Sleuce & set then on grond hym sellf wente his waye
yet the daye after the wynd beynge very good the rest of the deuks
armey housted vp saylle, and in dyspite of the toune of Flushynge
passed to the Raynykyns w^[th] out hurt more then one gonner slayne.
The portyngall flyte of this contry lyke fallse trayters strok ancker
before Flushynge w^[ch] ys lyk that many thereby ar undone. The gensys
tok off the iij shyppes that wer bornet xxvj. spaynyardes & in the
toune honge them. Lykewyse the Spayniardes aboute xv. dayes past toke
xxx frenche horsmen commynge to Monsse amonge w^[ch] as yt ys sayd the
sone of monsir Mongomvrey was one who offerryd for his ransome 5000
crounes he & the rest his compaynyons wer hanged at Flyford vj. dayes
past so that here ys no favor but hangynge on both sydes. Our cuntrymen
& wemen as my lade of Northumberland lieth at Maklynge & so doth m^[r]
Daykeres where not dayes past [two] of my l. Setones sones wer lyk to
have byn slayne in the tumolte w^[ch] standeth yet but in a mamerynge
yet nowe they begyne to come coler & to obbey the maigestrates. The
pore erle of Westmarland lieth at Lovayne & so doth my lade Hungerford
my old knyght & otheres. Thoughe I begone, wryte I pray you to me &
send yo^[r] letters to my l. to Brugys & in so doynge I wyll wryt to you
wekelye from the campe of our occurrance, in hast wryten this present
tewsdaye the xvij of Iune at Brugys 1572.

Yo^[r] lovynge frende
THOMAS PARKER

[_Addressed_] To his lovyng fryend m^[r] Robert
Hoggyns at m^[r] Edmunde Hoggyns
his house in Mylke Streete give
thes. At London.

[_Endorsed_]17 Iunii 1572.
m^[r] Tho. Parker to m^[r]
Hogans from Brugis.

APPENDIX XXX

[P. 457, n. 3]

BIBLIOTHEQUE DE L’INSTITUT, COLLECTION GODEFROY

VOL. 256, FO. 71, RECTO (NO. 39 DU CATALOGUE)

[_Le duc d’Anjou à Charles IX._]

[La Guerche, 19 janvier 1573.]

[_Suscription, au dos_] Au Roy, Monseigneur et frere.

[_Au dos, alia manu_] Monseigneur, de XIX^[e] janvier 1573.

Monseigneur, par la depesche que je vous fiz hyer, je vous ay adverty
que le S^[r] de Biron m’avoit escript que, quand toutes les compaignyes
de gens de pied françoyses dont nous avons faict estat seroient la,
après avoir demeuré dix ou douze jours aux tranchées, il n’en scauroit
rester plus hault de six mil hommes, et qu’il estoit nécessaire d’en
avoir plus grand nombre. Sur quoy j’avois advisé d’envoyer devers
Mons^[r] l’amyral pour avoir quarante enseignes de celles qui sont auprès
de luy. Et estant presentement, venu devers moy le S^[r] de Beaulieu
Ruzé, que le S^[r] de Biron m’a depesché expres, tant pour aucunes
particularitez que j’ay donné charge au S^[r] de Lanconne (que j’envoye
devers vous) vous dire, que pour m’advertir, encores que les forces y
soient si petites qu’elles sont, qu’ilz estoient neanmoins d’adviz que
je ne laissasse pas de m’acheminer au camp. Ce que j’ay resolu de faire
et de partir demain de ce lieu, pour m’en aller a Châtellerault et de
la à Poictiers. Et cependant je renvoye ledict Ruzé devers ledict S^[r]
de Biron pour me revenir trouver en chemin, et me rapporter au vray
ce que sera survenu depuis. Et ay depesché incontinant ung courrier
devers ledict S^[r] Amyral, pour faire partir tout aussy tost lesdictes
quarante enseignes, ou ce qu’il me pourra envoyer, et qu’il les face
embarquer à Moyssac, d’ou elles peulvent venir par eaue, jusques à La
Rochelle, luy ayant mandé les lieux par ou elles auront a passer et
par mesmes moien audict S^[r] admiral et de Montferrant de pourveoir
qu’il y ait des batteaulx et estappes des vivres. Et ne veoy aucune
chose qui puisse apporter retardement a vostre service, que de n’avoir
les deniers, pour pouvoir faire faire monstre a mon arrivée au camp,
principallement aux gens de pied, d’autant qu’il est a craindre que,
n’estans poinct payez et s’asseurans que je ferois porter argent avec
moy (comme je l’avois promis a celles de vostre garde et du capitaine
Gadz), ilz se desbendent et que le nombre que je m’attendz y estre n’y
soit poinct. Je vous supplie tres humblement, Monseigneur, de commander
que l’on regarde de cercher tous les moyens dont l’on se pourra adviser
pour m’envoyer les troys cens mil livres que je debvois avoir avant mon
partement de la Court.

Au demeurant, Monseigneur, j’ay receu la lettre qu’il vous a pleu
m’escripre du XIII^[e] de ce moys, et veu par le contenu d’icelle comme
vous avez resolu deux poinctz. Le premier, de la suppression de tous
offices qui vacqueront, pour congnoistre la grand charge que cela
apporte à vous et à voz subgectz, pour les gaiges qu’il leur fault
payer. Et l’autre, que vous avez commandé qu’il ne soit depesché cy
apres aucun office ou benefice dont il vous sera baillé memoire ou
placet, que troys moys apres que vous verrez les roolles qui en seront
faictz, pour les departir à ceulx qui font service, principallement
en ce camp auprès de moy. Ce que je ne fauldray leur faire entendre,
suivant ce qu’il vous plaist me mander. J’ay aussy veu le memoire
que vous a esté baillé de ce que l’on vous propose pour la conqueste
que vous pouvez faire à l’Yndie avec peu de despence, laquelle je ne
puis trouver que très bonne, lorsque vous serez en paix et que voz
affaires le pourront permectre, y estans les richesses et commoditez
portées par ledict memoire. Vous sçavez combien telles entreprises et
conquestes ont apporté de proffict au feu Empereur et Roy Catholique,
pour le grand nombre d’or qu’il a tiré et tire ordinairement du Peyrou,
tellement que, sans cela, il n’eust eu moyen d’entretenir et soldoyer
les armées et forces qu’il a entretenues jusques à present, qui me
faict vous conseiller (soubz vostre meilleur adviz) de ne laisser
poinct perdre ceste occasion, quand vous congnoistrez qu’elle pourra
estre mise a execution. Presentement, j’ay eu nouvelles que le S^[r]
Paul Emille a tant faict que ceulx de La Rochelle qui le detiennent
prisonnier l’ont mis à rançon pour mil escruz, dont aulcuns de ses amys
ont respondu pour luy. Laquelle somme il n’a aucun moyen de fournir,
si ce n’est de vostre liberalité, grace et specialle faveur, laquelle
je vous supplie vouloir estendre en luy pour cest effect, et luy faire
paroistre la souvenance que vous avez tousjours eu de ceulx qui vous
font service. Aussy, Monseigneur, j’ay esté adverty que l’estat de
viceneschal de la Haulte et Basse Marche, qui est ès terres de mon
apennaige est a present vacant par mort, la disposition et provision
duquel neanmoins vous appartient. A ceste cause, je vous supplie
encores le vouloir accorder aux Sieurs de Villequier, pour lesquelz je
vous en faictz requeste, et commander que la depesche et provision soit
faicte en leur faveur au nom de tel personnaige suffisant et cappable
qu’ilz nommeront et non autrement. Sur ce je supplieray le Createur
vous donner,

Monseigneur, en tres bonne santé, très longue et très heureuse vie.

Escript à la Guierche, le XIX^[me] jour de janvier 1573.

[_Propria manu_] Vostre tres humble et tres obeissant frere et subget.

HENRY

[Original]

APPENDIX XXXI

[P. 458, n. 3]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXXVI, NO. 419

[_Charles IX to Montgomery_]

Mons^[r] le Conte j’ay este bien ayse d’entendre par le s^[r] de S^[t]
Iehan votre frere la bonne volunte en laquelle il vous trouva de vous
contenir doulcement par dela et sans entreprendre ou favoriser aucune
chose qui soit contre le bien de mon service, qui est ce que je desire
de vous, et me semble que ne scauriez mieulx faire pour votre honne^[r]
& advantaige, ayant pour ceste cause advise vous envoyer le s^[r] de
Chasteauneuf present porteur expres pour vous dire & asseurer que vous
comportant d[1778] je vous feray conserver en tout ce qui vous touchera
il vous maintiendray ainsy que mes autres bons & loyaulx subjects comme
vous entenderez plus particullierem^[t] dud. S^[r] de Chasteauneuf Sur
lequel me remectant du surplus dont je vous prie le croire, je priray
Dieu Mons^[r] le Conte vous avoir en sa s^[te] & digne garde. Escript a
Paris le ix^[me] jo^[r] de feurier 1573.

[_Signed_] CHARLES
PINART

Mons^[r] le Conte, j’ay faict desgaiger votre vaisselle de trois cens
escuz, et ay commande au tresor^[r] de mon eschiequer la garde po^[r] la
vous faire rendre comme je luy ay ordonne.[1779]

[_Addressed_] Mons^[r] le Conte de Montgommery.

[_Endorsed in Burghley’s hand_]
9 Februar, 1572. (_Sic._)
fr. Kyng to the Count
Montgomery by Chasteaunevff.

APPENDIX XXXII

[P. 461, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXXI, NO. 1,428

Liste des villes des quelles ceuex de la relligion sasseurent en France.

_Mons^[r] le Prince de
Conde et Mons^[r] de
Rohan y
commaundent_

En Xainctongne, La Rochelle

S^[t] Jehan, S^[t] Angely ou commaunde Mons^[r] de S^[t] Mosmes.

Roian, Port de Mer

Pons

Bouteville, et quelques Chasteaux

_Mons^[r] de S^[t] Geniez,
Mons^[r] de Longe_

Sur la Riviere de Dordonne

Bergirac imprenable

S^[t] Foy

Chastillon

Pinnoymant &c. Et sur disces il ny a presques pas un Papiste, ny mesme
en tout le Pays.

_Mons^[r] de Madailham,
Le Baron de Beauville_

Sur le Riviere du Lot

Villeneufve d’Agenois

Clerac.

S^[t] Linerade.

_Mons^[r] de Turène_

En Perigort, Perigueux Ville Capitale et Plusieurs Chasteaux

Montflanquin

_Mons^[r] de Chappes,
Lieutenan: le Baron
d’Uzac, &c.,_

Figiac

Bellie

Puynirol }
Tournon } ces trois sont imprenables; et sont au R. de N.
Lanzarte }

Turene ave toutes les terres de Monsieur de Turene en Lymosin.

Briene la gagliarde.

Usurstie. qui sont des meilleures: Toutes les surd. places sont bien
accommodees et sont toutes deçe la Riviere de Garonne.

_Mons^[r] le Baron de
Luzignian, Mons^[r]
de Fauaz_

Sur la Garonne au bord de deca sont

Agen ville Capitale d’Agenois grande et riche

La Reolle, Lonne ville, dont le Chasteau est imprenable; et sur le
Rivage dela sont

Lengon

Millau

Le mas de Verdoun &c.

_Le Roy de Navar
parce que c’est son
patrimonie y a
partout Portien
de les plus affectionez_

Entre le Garonne et le pays de Bearn nous tenons

Leystoure ville Episcopale richen et imprenable patrimonie de R. de N.

Mauvesin

Fleurance

Cauze, bonne et forte ville

Nerac

Castel Jalouz

Balas ville riche, episcopale

Le mont de Marsan; forte

Tout le conte de Bigorces et les pays de Marsan, Tarsan Gavardan

Tarbe}
Aire } villes episcopales

La principaute de Bearn

La basse Navarre

Le Pays des basques, a quoy on a donne tiel ordre que nouristant la
paix il ne si changera rien.

Au contrarie de puis la paix Grenade Beaumont et Verdun villes ont
reconut le Roy de Navarre p^[r] governeur et se sont mises soubz sa
protection et tous les jours si la paix tient quelque peu si en mettra
de nouvelles. M. L. Amirall a assiege Beaumont a cause de cela ou il a
este tresbien battu.

_M. le Vicount
de Terides_

Pays de Quercy nous tenons

Montauban imprenable et une des belles villes de guerre du monde.

_M. la Vicount
de Gourdon_

Figeac capitale de Haut Quercy

Caussade

Realville

S^[t] Antonin

Villemur &c. en ces villes tout le peuple est de la religion.

_Vicont
de Paulini_

Au pays de Rourgue.

Millaut ville episcopale

Vabres ville episcopale

Creissel et autres en grand nombre fortes d’assietes dont nous ne
scavons le nom. Le peuple aussi est de fort longtemps de la religion
et sont en tous ces pays des relliques des vieux.

_Le Baron de
Audon_

En Languedoc, toute la Conte de Foix qui tient depuis les montz
Pirenees jusques aux portes de Thoulouse Patrimonie du R. de N. en
icelle sont Pasmicas ville forte peuplee, presque de la religion
episcopale.

Foix ville et chasteu imprenable.

Sa Verdan

Mazores

Le Carla

Le mas d’Azil, toutes riches et imprenables. Et ceste derniere se
faict une quantite purniable de Saltpetre pour muner tout le pays de
poudre.

_Le baron de
Monbardies_

En Lauraignais partie du bas Languedoc sont

Puylaurens

Revel

Soureze

S^[t] Paul

Cramain &c.

Castres ville episcopale imprenable

L’Isle d et plusieurs autres en la montagne.

_M. de Chastilon,
M. de Thore,
M. de S^[t] Romain, &c._

Au hout Languedoc, y en a infinies, les plus notables sont

Monpelier

Nismes

Aiguesmortes

Lunel

Aimargnes

Marsilargnes

Sommieres

Uzez

Auz

Aleth

Lodeve la pluspart episcopale

Tout le Pays de Vivarez; et le Pays de Sevènes.

_M. de_ [_L_] _Ediguieres_

En Daulphine nous tenons tout le haut Pays, et du bas pays presque
toutes les villes[1780] quatre ou cinq. Gap et Dis villes principales
sont a nous et cinq cens gentilihomines tous de la religion entre les
quels y a tresbon ordre.

_Le Baron d’Alemagne_

En Provence nous avons quelques bonnes villes, entre autres Seine, le
grand Tour, et tout le meilleur du Conte de Venisse, appartenant au
Pope à cause d’Avignon.

Le Roy de Navarre ces places fournies de garnissons necessaires tant de
pied que de cheval, peut sans sortir de Guienne mettre huict mil hommes
de pied en campagne et mille gentilihomines et fournir l’equippage de
six canons et deux couleurines &c. et quand il sera joinct avec les
forces de Languedoc (car le Daulphine a le Rhosne entredeux) il poura
faire estat de 10000 hommes de pied 2000 chevaux des meilleurs qui se
virent jamais en France, et 10 canons, quatre couleurines et la pouldre
et munitions et equipage d’iceux.

Pour les affaires de la guerre en son conseil il est assisté de M^[r] de
Meru. Monsieur de Turene qui a esgarde sur la Perigort et Lymosin en sa
absence.

M^[r] de la Nouë chef et superintendant de sa maison.

M^[r] de viconte de Terride, Baron de Serignac, vieux Capitaine.

M^[r] de S^[t] Geniez, vieux Capitaine et homme de bon entendement.

M^[r] le Baron de Lusignan. Gouverneur de Agenois.

M^[r] de Fontralles, M^[r] le Baron d’ Audon.

M^[r] de Guitry qui sont tous des meilleurs Cap: de France.

Pour le mainement des negotiations, outre les susd. il est assiste de
M^[r] de Grateinx son Chauncelier, M^[r] des Aginz President et M^[r] des
Requestes et plus^[rs] autres de mesme reing.

Outre ceux y y a plusieurs Princes, Seignurs, Vicontes, et Barons
affectes de tout temps au party de la religion. Toutesfois je les ay
lieu voulu mettre icy croire ilz me sont vennues en memorie.

Le R. de N.
M’ le P. de Conde
M. de Rohan
M. de Nemours
M. de Laval
M. de Rochebernard son frere
M. de Meru
M. de Thore
M. de Turene
M. de Chastillon
M. de Clermont
M. de la Noué
M. de S. Genie et ses freres
M. le Viconte de Tirrede
M. de St. Romain
Le Baron de Fontrailles
Le Baron de Ardon
Le Baron de Senegaz
Le Baron de Mirambeau
M. de Languillier
Le Baron de Verac
Le Vic: de Savailhan
Le Baron de S. Gehniz
Le Baron de Mombardices
Le Vicount de Lalant
Le Baron de Montanhils
Le Baron de Monlieu
Le Baron de la Rochalais
Le Prince de Chalais
M. de Mouy
M. de la Forse gendre de M. de Biron
Le Vicont de Chasteauneuf
Le Baron de Piersebuffiere
Le Baron de Salignac
Le Baron de Beinac
Le Baron de Bresolles
Le Vicont de Paulini
Le Vicont de Panart
Le Vicont de Gourdon
Le Vicont de Arpajon
Le Baron de Cabrere
M. de Ediguires
M. de Guitry
Le Baron de Longa
M. de Campagnac
M. de Boesse
M. de Montguiron
Le Baron de Montandie
Le Baron de Luzignan
M. de Bonevall
M. de Ussac
Le Vicont de Rochouart
Le Baron de Almagne
Le Baron de Beauville
Le Baron de Reine
Le Baron de Vercillac
Le Baron de S. Nauphan
Le Baron de S. Arlaye
Le Vicont de Meherin
Le Vicont de Belsane et autres.

Tous les desus nommes sont en Guienne et de Guienne ou Languedoc ou p^[r]
le moins ont porte les armes a ceste dernier guerre. Quant aux autres
Seigneurs et Capitaines des autres Provinces de France qui ont pareille
ulcouse[?] et la monsteront au besoing, ascavoir es provinces assises
deca la Riviere de Loure, ilz sont sans comparison en plus grand nombre
pour respost des lieux ou ilz sont; nous ne les avons point nommés
pas ce quilz ont attendu une armée de Reistres present s’y jettes,
attendant la quelle ilz se sont le mieux quilz ont peu compertes en
leurs maisons.

[_Not signed_]

[_Endorsed_] Les villes des quelles ceux de la
Religion s’asseurent en France.

APPENDIX XXXIII

[P. 474, n. 2]

BIBLIOTHEQUE D L’INSTITUT, COLLECTION GODEFROY

VOL. 256, FO. 83 RECTO, NO. 45 DU CATALOGUE

[_Le duc d’Anjou à Charles IX_][1781]

[Camp devant La Rochelle, 17 février 1573].[1782]

Monseigneur. Par le jeune Seguier que j’ay depesché depuis deux jours
devers Vostre Majesté, elle aura entendu comme j’estois sur le poinct
envoyer devers icelle le S^[r] de Bourrique, l’un de mes maistres
d’hostelz, pour la sattisfaire de tout ce que je pouvois avoir à
luy faire entendre de l’estat de ceste armée. Suivant ce, je l’ay
presantement faict partir si bien instruict de touttes choses que je
ne doubte qu’il ne luy en sçache rendre très bon compte. Me restera à
supplier, comme je fais très humblement, Vostre Majesté le voulloir en
ce qu’il vous dira de ma part oyr avec la mesme foy et creance dont
elle a tousjours voullu m’honnorer. J’ay veu ce qu’il luy a pleu me
mander par sa depesche du XI^[me] de ce mois sur la proposition que
aucuns avoient faicte de donner la charge de vostre armée de mer à mon
frere Mons^[r] le Duc et au Roy de Navarre chose que je rejectay aussi
tost pour les mesmes considérations, que Vostredicte Majesté a bien
sceu prendre, et n’estois pour le permectre en aucune sorte, de maniere
que Vostredicte Majesté demourera, s’il luy plaist, en repos de ce
cousté la.

Monseigneur, je supplie le Createur donner à Vostredicte Majesté en
très bonne santé et prosperité tres longue et tres heureuse vye.

Escript au camp devant La Rochelle, le XVII^[me] jour de febvrier 1573.

* * * * *

Monseigneur, j’ay veu par les dernieres depesches qui vous sont venues
d’Angleterre de S^[r] de La Mothe Fenellon, la demonstration que ceulx de
vos subiectz qui sont refugiez par dela font de procurer de leur part
l’entier repos de vostre royaume avec ceulx de leur religion. Chose qui
me semble estre très avantageuse au bien de vostre service, et que,
pour l’effect de leur bonne intention, il vous plaise leur bailler
touttes les seuretez necessaires pour venir par deça. Estant ceste
voye, si elle peult proffiter, beaucoup plus aisée et seure que celle
de la force, outre le moien que ce vous seroit de conserver beaucoup
de voz bons subiectz et serviteurs et soulaiger d’autant vostre
bourse.[1783]

[_Propria manu_] Vostre treshumble et tres obeissant frere et subget

HENRY.

[_Au dos, Suscription_] Au Roy, Monseigneur et frere.

[_Au dos, alia manu_] Monseigneur, du XVII^[me] febrier. M^[r] de
Bourricques.

[Original]

APPENDIX XXXIV

[P. 503, n. 1]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXXXIV, NO. 186, iij

[_Dr. Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley_]

Es co tempore quo proximè ad te scripsi nullum fuit mihi prorsus
tempus animi laxandi, ita fui partim itineribus partim multis gravibus
& impeditis rebus administrandis distractus, nec satis etiam nunc
scio an mihi liceat aliqua intermissione frui ut de liberioribus ac
amœnioribus studiis possim aliquantisper cogitare. Neque verò tuam nunc
volo sive tarditatem sive negligentiam in scribendo accusare nulla
est enim mihi remissæ erga me tuæ amicitiæ vel minima suspitio. Ut
scias igitur quid rerum hic agatur Nunquam tanta animorum consentione
ad pacem conspiratum est nec unquam tamen magis diversis studiis
de pacis conditionibus ineundis actum est Coguntur enim planè jam
omnes longo & ancipiti bello fessi & ad inopiam atque egestatem
usque redacti necessario nunc tandem ac serio de pace cogitare.
Neque enim aut æris alieni quo infinito premuntur dissolvendi ratio
est, nec sumptus qui sunt apud istos profusissimi diutius sustinere
possunt. Vectigalia autem ac ceteri reditus regii aut oppignorata
aut distracta sunt ut annui regis proventus ne ad erogationes quidem
domesticas satis sufficiant. Vident igitur omnes si bellum gerendum
sit, infinita contributione opus esse, cum nullæ sint principis ad
bellum gerendum facultates, & omnis qua opus sit regi pecunia ab
aliis sumenda aut potius extorquenda sit. Homines autem nobiles per
quos bellum precipuè geritur quorum amplissimæ sunt facultates (nam
hi pæne soli prædia possident & vicena aut tricena aut etiam centena
plerique millia aureorum nummum habent annua). Hi quantam alicunde
pecuniam corradere possunt eam prodige & profuse ilico profundunt,
nulla est enim eis cura rei familiaris, sed tanqam in diem viventes
quibus opus habent rebus quantivis comparant eam quam habent pecuniam
negligentes & quam non habent quibusvis rationibus vel quamvis cum
jactura conquirentes. Solent autem illis ut plurimum belli presertim
tempore sumptus a rege subministrari. Nunc autem quum videant nihil
esse regi, quod det, corpora sua periculis libenter non subjiciunt,
inviti autem hoc presertim tempore ad bellum non adiguntur, itaque
fit ut qui ferè uni pro principe soliti sint decertare hi bellum in
primis detrectent. Plebs autem rustica inops semper est atque egena,
non enim ut nostri improvidos reperiunt prediorum dominos, a quibus
prerogata quadam modica pecunia exili reditu conductis agris, ad magnas
opes perveniant, sed aut Coloni partiarii agrum magno labore parvo
autem cum compendio colunt, aut justum fructuum precium pendunt. Hoc
verò tempore vastationibus populationibus & direptionibus ita sunt
expilati, ut nec bos ad arandum nec frumentum ad sementes faciendas
supersit: tantum abest ut illorum pecunia bellum geri possit. Reliqua
sunt oppida que sanè sunt multa & cives certe ditissimi Nam que
magna ut scis nostris est trium millium coronatorum pecunia, apud
istos ducentorum aut trecentorum millium exiguè sunt facultates, &
qui urbes incolunt soli aut sub pignoribus & hypothecis nobilium
proventus possident, aut eorum facultates fœnere exhauriunt. Inter
istos autem cives opifices non nomino, quorum infinitus est numerus
qui admodum difficulter victum magnis laboribus in urbibus querunt
non enim in agris locus illis est ubi se ac suos tenuiter colendis
agris aut pecore pascendo, ut nostri faciunt, alant. Itaque in urbis
quisque proximas se confert, ubi officinas instituunt & vitam labore
producunt. Multo minus inter cives numerandi sunt hi, qui passim in
viis scatent omnibus oratoriis preceptis ac artibus instructi quo
hominum mentes ad elemosinam & commiserationem permoveant. Neque etiam
bonos illos viros hic nomino, quorum magnus est numerus qui se fratres
dici volunt, quamvis inter se odiis plusquam fraternis dissideant quos
ego planè eos esse existimo quos Chaucerus noster ex loco illo parum
honesto sese proripere scribit, qui nugas ac nenias venditando in eam
authoritatem pervenerunt. Ut æquum existiment rogari potius sese quam
rogare: tanquam viri omnibus virtutibus excellentes ad quorum pedes
bona nostra projicere debeamus, quanquam illorum pæne jam explosa
est disciplina ab illis quorum novum est ancupium qui se Jesuistas
appellant, & perfecti volunt esse, juxta illud. Estote perfecti sicut
ego sum, inter quos Darbesherus noster non est minimus apostolorum si
noster dicendus est qui & nos & seipsum deservit & aliam vitam alios
mores sequitur, illi autem quos dixi Cives qui tantum opibus valent,
clientelis miseorum opificum in quos imperium habent & suis divitiis
freti, pecuniam sibi imperari non patiuntur, sciunt enim neminem
esse qui eos cogere possit, cum rex parum fisus nobilibus, tutelam
urbium arma, machinas, bellicas, mœnia, & quicquid est roboris illis
commiserit, rogati autem immensas & crebras priores pensitationes &
tributa causantur itaque pauxillulam tandem aliquam pecuniam prout nec
causa postulat tanquam ab invitis quasi vi sibi exprimi patiuntur.
Jam Episcopi Abbates & alii quibus opima sunt sacerdotia cum videant
omnium oculos in se ac bona sua esse conjectos nec aliquam aliam
esse rationem conficiende pecuniæ nisi quæ ex eorum bonis & prediis
distrahendis redigatur. Quis erit (inquiunt) tandem nostri expilandi
finis si bellum adhuc duret. An non sex decimas annuas fructuum
nostrorum pensitamus. Vix annus adhuc est quod octingenta millia
francorum que sunt centena millia librarum nostrarum in profectionem
Polonicam dedimus jamque nos urgent Questores regii ad solutionem
unius millionis & dimidiæ francorum, que summa est quingentorum
millium coronatorum gallicorum, quos rex approbante pontifice nobis
extorquet: cujus pecuniæ solvendæ rationem nullam adhuc habemus. Non
tametsi pontifex ad rem tam piam nempe ad bellum intestinum alendum,
predia ecclesiastica ad eum summam venire permiserit, emptores tamen
non reperiuntur, coguntque nos officiales & ministri regii pecuniam
quam non habemus, nostro periculo representare: recepturos aliquando
ex distractione bonorum, si qui tandem reperiantur, qui tam dubio jure
litem futuram presenti pecunia velint comparare non enim ignotæ sunt
artes pontificiæ: Veniet namque facile tempus cum Pontifex iste aut
successor aliquis ejus restitutionem in integrum pro ecclesia non sine
dirarum etiam imprecatione a se impetrari facillime patiatur, nulla
habita eorum ratione qui in bona ecclesiastica pecuniam impenderunt.
Itaque eo ventum est ut hi quorum causa bellum hoc geritur & qui
evangelicos plurimum oderunt hi nunc pacem maximè expetant, & quemvis
Dei cultum potius permittant, quam se indies argento emungi patiantur
imò quidvis inquiunt potius in malam rem doceant Hugonoti, neque enim
magis ab illis quam ab istis possumus expilari. Nec est illorum non
inepta sanè oratio. Jam homines miseri qui sedibus pulsi patria carent,
inopes vagantur, quibus insidiæ undique tenduntur, supplicia & mortes
intentantur, qui deserti ab omnibus, perpetuas excubias ad sese tuendos
agunt hi pacem si unqam antehac nunc certè fessi ac defatigati miserè
cupiunt, ut aliquis tandem sit laborum finis & patria terra quiescere
liceat. Nemo est igitur qui non uno ore pacem affectet, ad pacem
oculos, animum & omnes cogitationes convertat. Quin & Pontifex ipse
sibi timens & veritus quem res nec sit habitura exitum, & precipuè de
comitatu Avinionensi sollicitus, alios non lacessitos esse malit, quam
de suis rebus in periculum venire: sperans futurum ut rex intermisso
bello integris viribus eos facile opprimat, quos nunc lacerato regno
satis vexare non possit. Ex qua re factum est, ut sermonibus hominum
certa pax facta, & negocium prorsus transactum esse diceretur, & ea
fama per uniuersum orbem sparsa sit, pacem jam manibus teneri. Sed
cum de pacis conditionibus agi ceptum est, longe fuerunt alie hominum
voluntates, longè alius rei exitus. Nam quibus antea sua facilitate
impositum est, ne in idem discrimen inciderent Evangelicæ libertati
& saluti sue presidiis, urbibus ac rebus aliis que ad vitam tuendam
pertinent sibi consulere voluerunt, nec se aliorum fidei committendos
esse censuerunt quin rebus omnibus integris arma sumere possent, ut si
non melior at saltem non deterior istis pactionibus illorum conditio
fieret. Alii contra qui spe miseros illos homines devorarant & sibi
occasionem egregiam oblatam existimabant, incautos homines vafricia
& insidiis prorsus opprimendi, cum viderent non esse locum dolis
quin potius futurum ut Evangelium propagaretur, nec esse in illorum
potestate, ut istis conditionibus homines Evangelici exterminarentur,
quidvis potius faciendum esse suadebant, quam locum illis dari quos
extinctos esse cupiunt, hi & se & sua omnia regi offerunt, & quoduis
discrimen subeundum esse censent. Itaque nunc Pontifex bellum alioqui
formidans pecuniam mutuam satis amplam u(l)troneus offert: (sibi tamen
satis callide pignoribus cavens) ut regis animum a pacis cogitatione
avertat. Sunt etiam alii viri providi & rebus suis prospicientes, qui
sciunt vetus illud esse, mobilia esse gallorum ingenia ad suscipiendum
bellum (neque enim in tanta penuria & tantes difficultatibus de aliis
perturbandis desinunt cogitare, nec istis unquam aut voluntas aut
pecunia ad alios vexandos deest) qui ista penitius perspiciunt & sibi
prudenter cavent, hi frigidam suffundunt, pristinam gloriam nominis
gallici commemorantes, & ignominiam ob oculos ponentes, si tale dedecus
subeatur ut quasi victi manus tendere, & leges jam non dare sed
accipere cogantur, futurum ut tempore vires regia crescant, alii contra
vel simultatibus solvantur, vel insidiis opprimantur, vel premiis &
pollicitationibus separentur, qua ex re fiet aliquando ut rex victor
stirpem illam hominum prorsus exterminet, & ecclesiæ Romane vindex
eternam sibi famam ad posteros transmittat. Hic ego si tibi que fuerint
postulata, que responsa, que argumenta in utramque partem adducta,
qua constantia permansum sit in petitis, quibus artibus Evangelicorum
legati tentati sint, quibus intercessoribus res tractata sit, historiam
tibi non epistolam scriberem nolo tamen tibi ignotum esse egregiam
fuisse in hac re Helvetiorum protestantium operam, ego autem quod potui
porro ut est apud comicum nostrum. His igitur rebus effectum est ut
post multas & longas de pace disceptationes incertiores simus multo
quam dudum, pacem enim facere noluit bellum autem gerere non possunt.

Cum ista superiora aliquot dies scripta apud me haberem, nec
describendi esset ocium accepi tandem tuas vicesimo quarto Maii
scriptas, ex quibus intelligo esse etiam apud vos fidefragos, ut tuo
verbo utar, nam fœdifragos usquam gentium reperiri non est fas dicere,
itaque nactus ocium te istis quibuscunque carere nolui, nec si tibi
sit cordi ullum laborem recusabo, quin priores etiam meas queas tu le
amisisse tantopere quereris descriptas ad te mittam. Vale & nostros
omnes meo nomine diligenter saluta nam eos de mea salute sollicitos
esse scio. Lutetie Parisiorum ultimo Junii 1575.

Tui amantissimus
V. D.

[_Not addressed_]

[_Endorsed_] Ult^[o]. Junii[1784] 1575
M^[r] D. Dale to m l.
from Paris.

[_In Burghley’s hand_] a lettre wrytten in latin concerning the state
of France.

APPENDIX XXXV

[P. 503, n. 2]

STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN

ELIZABETH, VOL. CXXXI, NO. 895

[_Henry III to Queen Elizabeth_]

Treshaulte tresexellente, et trespuissante princesse Nostre treschere
et tresamee bonne seur et cousine ayant entendu le trespas ces jours
passez advenu du feu Roy nostre trecher s^[r] et frere nous en avons
receu ung tresgrand regret enuy & desplaisir pour la singulliere
affection et fraternelle amitie quil nous a tousjours portee et
demonstrée par tous bons offices. Et aussy pour la perte grande
qui en demeure generallement a toute la Chrestiente, et a nous
particulierement, qui luy avions tant dobligation comme nous avons
encores en sa memoire, pour tant d’honneurs et de faveurs quil luy
a pleu tousjours nous departir de son vivant. Ce que saichant que
les princes ses voisins auront pareillement porte avec douleur,
et mesmement vous, avec qui il avoit et a tousjours eu si bonne &
parfaicte amitye, voisinaige et intelligence. Nous avons pense estre
bien convenable a l’amitye mutuelle qui est aussy entre nous noz
Royaumes et pais de nous en condoulloir avec vous, comme nous faisons
par la presente en attendant qu’estant arrivé en nostre Royaume de
France (ainsy que nous l’esperons bien tost avec layde de Dieu) nous
puissions nous acquicter plus dignement de cest office. Voullans bien
vous dire & asseurer cependant que si vous avez congneu le feu Roy
notred. S^[r] et frere desireulx de conserver la bonne et sincere amitye
voisinance et intelligence que vous aviez ensemble, vous n’en debuez
pas moings attendre & esperer de nous son successeur a la corone
de France Ne voullant seullement continuer en lad. amitye, mais la
fortifier asseurer et augmenter par tous honnorables & dignes offices
que doibuent les princes amis les ungz aux autres ainsy qu’avons donne
charge au s^[r] de la Mothe Fennelon vous faire entendre que vous prions
recevoir et avoir agreable aupres de vous pour y estre notre conseiller
et ambassadeur resident, tout ainsy quil estoit du feu roy nostre feu
S^[r] et frere Et ne pouvons aussy trouver que tresbon l’exercice quil a
faict de ladicte legation de puis ledict decedz advenu, tant suivant
les tres de feu notred. S^[r] & frere que celles de la Royne nostre
treshonnoree dame et mere qui en avoit tout pouvoir et a laquelle nous
envoyons presentement le nostre le plus ample quil nous est possible.
Saichant combien elle merite de cested. corone, et combien elle sest
aussy tousjours rendue affectionnée au bien de nous tous ses enfens,
et des affaires et prosperite de notred. Royaulme, vous priant croire
ledict s^[r] de la Mothe de ce quil vous dire sur tout ce que dessus et
y adjouster foy comme feriez a nous mesmes Qui prions Dieu treshaulte
tresexellente et trespuissante princesse Nostre treschere et tresamee
bonne seur et cousine vous avoir en sa tressainte et tresdigne garde.
Escript a Cracovye le xv^[ne] jour de Juing 1574.

[_Signed_] Vostre bon frere et cousin
HENRY
WARSEVICZ

[_Addressed_] A treshaulte tresexcellente et
trespuissante princesse Nostre
treschere et tresamee bonne
seur & cousine la Royne
D’Angleterre.

[_Endorsed_] June xv^[th] 1574.
From the K. of Polonia to her Ma^[tie]. Dated at Cracovia.
He condolethe the deathe of the K. his brother offreth and
requireth lyke contynewance of amitie as was betwene her
and his brother Desiereth her Ma^[tie] to accept Mon^[sr]
de la Mothe for his Ambassadeur.

APPENDIX XXXVI

[P. 504, n. 2]

ARCHIVES NATIONALES

K. 1,537, PIECE NO. 22

[_Report of a Spanish Spy about Calais_ (Deciphered)]

[_Au dos_] Descifrado.

Avisos de Cales à XVIIIº de Março 1575

[_En tete_] Avisos de Cales à XVIIIº de Março 1575

Quiero dezir el runrun que anda entre estos Franceses, no porque me
passe por el pensamiento que deva ser assi, pero en secreto se dize
que el Rey de Francia anda tramando para yr sobre los Estados, ó
tomarlos, y que su her, mano se casa con hija del Principe, y otros
muchos casamientos que se hazen-y que se haze armada en toda Francia
para ello, y oy ha llegado aqui aquel Embaxador con treynta cavallos,
que va á la Reyna de Inglaterra, y viene de Paris, y assi mismo se
aguarda (segun se dize) el que esta en Brusselas, para yr tambien a la
dicha Inglaterra. De suerte que no se sabe otro sino esto, que, como
digo, se dize en secreto, y en partes que nos lo han dicho. Plegue a
Dios que nos guarde dello, que bien creo si suspection dello huviesse,
lo sabria el Embaxador que esta en Paris y lo advertiria a essa Bolsa,
pues importa. Aunque, como digo, no creo nada dello, y no he querido
dexar de escrivirlo en esta, para que se tenga aviso dello, sin que se
entienda, pues no se suffre dezir.

APPENDIX XXXVII

[P. 505, n. 3]

STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC

ELIZABETH, VOL. CV. NO. 51

[_Walsingham to Lord Burghley_]

My verry good L. I send your L. sooche letters as I receyved from owre
Imb. dyrectid unto you by the w^[ch] yt may appeare unto you that Q.
mother had some intentyon under the cullore of a Parle w^[t] her sonne to
have intrapped him. I thinke the gentleman hathe to good exsperyence
of her to truste her (thowghe nature myght somewhat move him therin)
I longe to heare that he were past the Ryvere of Loyre: for before
that tyme I shall be greatly jealouse of his savetye. Her ma^[t] was
perswaded under the cullor of scooryng the seas to have set owt two of
her shipps to have receyved him yf being not well assysted he shoold
be forced to flye but she can not be drawen to yelde therto. This daye
ther came letters from the justyces of Devonshire that the seconde of
this monethe ther arryved on ther cost 48 sayle of Spanyshe men of
warre whoe desyered herborrowynge but were denyed for that they had no
passeporte of her ma^[t]. Notw^[t]standyng they suffered the Admyrall
and vyceadmirall to come in to the porte of Darmouthe: wher as the
gentlemen advertyce yt is thowght they wyll lande some treasvre to be
conveyed by lande unto London The rest of the ships are gon towardes
Dunkyrke. The Generall of them is Don Petro de Baldis whoe maryed
Petro Malendas daughter. The arryvall of this armye makethe me greatly
to dowbt the P. of Oranges well doinge: whoe alreadye seamethe to be
in verry harde case. I praye God owre merchauntes fynde them good
neyghebowres. Owt of the northe we have hearde nothing laetly And so
having nothing ells to advertyce I commyt your L. to Goods good kepyng
most humbly takyng my leave. At Rycot the vj^[th] of Octobre 1575.

Y^[r] L. to commavnde
FRA: WALSYNGHAM

[_Addressed_] To the right honorable
my vearie good Lord the
L. treasurer.

[_Endorsed_] 6. Octob. 1575.
M^[r] Secret: Walsingham
the Spanish flete in
the west.

[Illustration: Map of FRANCE showing PROVINCES.]

INDEX

Abbeville, riot at, 133.

Acuna, Don Juan de, mission of, to Savoy, 308.

Adresse, baron des, Huguenot chieftain in Dauphiné, 147;
prince of Condé thinks of joining, 153;
lieutenant of, in Provence, 395.

Agde, court at, 252.

Agen, riot at, 133, 134;
Catholic league of, 215, 225, 254;
Montluc thinks of retiring to, 403;
Montluc fortifies, 406.

Aides, 82.

Aigues Mortes, Damville introduces Turkish fleet into, 492.

Aix, association of Provence formed at, 214, 225;
court at, 251.

Alava, Spanish ambassador in France:
theft of cipher of, 266, 317, n. 6;
exceeds instructions in threatening war, 266, n.;
charges Catherine de Medici with duplicity, 315;
protests against overtures for peace, 417;
incident with Tavannes, 418, 419;
haughty reply of Charles IX to, 441.

Albanian troops with Alva, 307, 310.

Albi, 395, 405, 406.
_See also_ Viscounts.

Albret, Jeanne d’, queen of Navarre, wife of Antoine of Bourbon and
mother of Henry IV: mentioned, 120;
Antoine of Bourbon quarrels with, 132;
demand for banishment of, by Spanish ambassador, 133;
consideration shown, 239;
plot of Montluc and Spain to kidnap, 260;
excommunicated, 261;
maintains court preacher to anger of Catholics, 288;
mobilizes troops in Béarn, 307;
territories of, 350;
crushes Catholic League at St. Palais, 355;
crosses Garonne River “under the nose of Montluc”, 368, n.;
pawns her jewels, 378;
directs foreign negotiations with Huguenots, 379;
negotiations of government with, 391-93.

Alençon, François, duke of, youngest brother of Charles IX:
governor of Paris, 358;
marriage negotiations with Queen Elizabeth, 430 ff.;
character and appearance of, 432;
Huguenot-Politique plot to recognize, as heir apparent, 477, 478;
complaint of, to Charles IX, 479;
arrested, 480;
escape of, 505;
revolt of provinces to, 506;
terms demanded of Henry III, 508;
privileges of, in Peace of Monsieur, 519, 520.

Alessandria de la Paille, Alva at, 311.

Alexander VI, bull of, 300.

Allny, secretary sent to confer about peace, 344.

Alsace, Baron Bolwiller of, 301.

Alva, duke of, proxy for Philip II at marriage of Elizabeth of Valois,
3;
suspected of urging inquisition in France, 12;
favors repressive policy of Henry II, 117;
upon commerce of Low Countries, 163;
purposes to have Havre put in hands of Philip II for mediation
between France and England, 198;
advises fortification of Gravelines, 267, 268;
instructions at Bayonne, 273;
advises execution of Huguenot leaders, 274;
relations with Catherine de Medici at Bayonne, 277;
influence over duke of Montpensier, 304;
Philip II determines to send, to Netherlands, 305;
march of, through Savoy, Franche Comté, and Lorraine, 305-11;
sails from Cartagena and arrives at Genoa, 309;
arrives at Brussels, 312;
and the Gueux, 314;
arrests Egmont and Hoorne, 318;
opinion of, of cardinal of Lorraine, 336, n.;
appealed to by cardinal of Lorraine, 336, 337;
offers aid to Catherine of Medici, 338;
suggests coming in person to relief of French crown, 338;
instructions to, 351;
protests against Huguenot activity in Flanders, 360;
defeats Louis of Nassau at Jemmingen, 361;
executes Egmont and Hoorne, 361;
offer of aid accepted by France, 380;
Jeanne d’Albret protests against, 393;
tyranny of, in the Netherlands, 441;
revolt of Flushing and Middelburg against, 444;
determines to retire his forces into Ghent and Antwerp, 444;
desperate straits of, 446;
intercepts Genlis’ relief column, 447.

Amboise, 140;
drownings at, 154;
royal chest at, 346.
_See also_ Amboise, Edict of.

Amboise, conspiracy of:
origin, 28-31;
participation of D’Andelot in, 30;
secret of, discovered, 32;
crushed, 33-39;
Condé accused of complicity in, 40;
Catherine de Medici accused of being secret party to, by Tavannes,
42, n.;
return of French exiles after, 194;
memory of, haunts Catherine de Medici, 288.

Amboise, Edict of, 191;
hostility of Spain to, 194;
cannot be enforced, 207;
overtures to break, 209;
rupture of, 250;
amendments to, 295, 318.

Amiens, three-fourths of population said to be Huguenot, 230.

Amsterdam, endangered, 444;
all Holland lost to Spain, save Rotterdam and, 446.

Andelot, François de Châtillon, sieur d’, 6, 8;
in conspiracy of Amboise, 30;
counsels Catherine de Medici, 128;
Spanish ambassador objects to presence of, at court, 133;
joins Condé at Meaux, 137;
appears before Paris, 137;
overtures made by, 139;
lieutenant to Condé, 140;
destroys bridge at Jargeau, 151;
sent to Germany for assistance, 154, n., 158;
plans to cut Paris off, 159;
gives Aumale the slip, 162;
German horse of, 172;
serious position of, in Orleans, 186;
asks aid of Queen Elizabeth, 187;
quarrels with Catherine de Medici, 238;
sent to Switzerland, 307;
sent to protect Champagne against Alva, 315;
sent to seize Poissy, 332;
proposition to marry son of, to sister of duke of Guise, 345;
mentioned, 358;
death of, 378.

Anduze, Catholic league at, 355.

Angennes, 255.

Angers, Huguenot outburst at, 95, 127;
mentioned, 140;
cruelties at, 148, 288;
duke of Alençon demands, 508.

Angoulême, bishop of, French ambassador in Rome, 57, 283;
duke of Anjou raises siege of, 378, 405, 406;
Charles IX offers to yield to Huguenots, 416;
revolts, 502;
duke of Alençon demands, 508.

Angoumois, revolt in, 150;
duke of Anjou in, 381.

Anjou, 141, 154, 286;
Catholic league in, 216.

Annates, 80.

Antinori, agent of Pius IV, 250.

Antoine of Bourbon, king of Navarre, wife of Jeanne d’Albret and
father of Henry IV:
mentioned, 8;
character and policy of, 23, 24;
attends Elizabeth of Valois into Spain, 24;
suspected of complicity in conspiracy of Amboise, 42;
Huguenot overtures to, 63;
appreciated by Catherine de Medici, 72;
promised Sardinia, 73;
inclines to Spain, 96;
nominal authority of, 99;
hopes for restoration of Navarre, 100;
relations of, with Spanish ambassador, 100-2;
uncertain conduct of, 116, 117;
plot against, 119;
hopes to compound with Philip II, 131;
negotiates with Vatican, 131;
promised “kingdom” of Tunis, 132;
instructed in Catholic faith, 132;
quarrels with Jeanne d’Albret, 132;
offended at Coligny, 133;
surrenders to Triumvirate, 137;
protests against Charles IX’s removal to Blois, 137;
supports duke of Guise, 138;
overtures to Catherine de Medici, 139;
weakens, 141;
publishes proclamation against Huguenots in Paris, 149;
at Vernon, 152;
at Blois, 154;
mortally wounded at siege of Rouen, 169;
dies, 170;
confesses religion of Augsburg, 171, n.

Antwerp, population of, 314;
Alva determines to retire his forces into, 444.

Aosta, duke of Alva at, 311.

Aquitaine, 26, 45.

Aragon, Ferdinand of, 395.

Argentan, Montgomery takes, 472.

Argenteuil, 327.

Armagnac, cardinal of:
helps form Catholic league at Toulouse, 214;
revives Catholic league at Toulouse, 354, 397.

Arnay-le-Duc, battle of, 416.

Arpajon, viscount of, 294, 395.

Artois, frontier difficulty with France, 263;
revolt in, 265;
mentioned, 267.

Association:
of Huguenots in Languedoc, 207;
Catholic associations, 213;
of Bordeaux, 213, 214;
of Provence, 214, 225;
of Catholic towns in Rouennais, 216;
Huguenot, in Dauphiné, 223;
Association catholique at Beauvais, 354.
_See also_ Brotherhood of Catholics; Confraternity; Guild; League.

Aubespine, Sebastian de, bishop of Limoges: French ambassador in
Spain, 51, 97;
letter of, about Philip II, 93, n.;
secret letter of, to Philip II, 97, 98;
argues with Philip II, 117;
sent to Switzerland, 241, 242;
sent to Spain, 316;
confers about peace, 344.

Aubigné, Huguenot historian, eye-witness of executions of Amboise,
39.

Auch, 405.

Augsburg, Confession of, 122;
Antoine of Bourbon dies in, 271, n.;
Peace of, 409.

Aumale, Claude of Guise, duke of, 35, 73;
joins duke of Guise before Orleans, 152;
captures Honfleur, 154;
approaches Rouen, 155;
atrocious practice of, 155;
Swiss and Germans sent to aid of, 162;
lets D’Andelot slip by, 162;
levies troops in Champagne, 168;
blunder of, 168;
letter of, intercepted, 255;
reiters of, 338;
army of, in Champagne, 369;
cost of army of, 375;
fails to intercept duke of Deuxponts, 380;
reproached by Catherine de Medici for negligence and cowardice, 382.

Auvergne, 286;
Grands Jours d’, 291;
Coligny in, 416.

Auxerre, 127, 388;
rising in, 150;
plot to seize, 350;
duke of Deuxponts in, 380.

Avenelles, betrays conspiracy of Amboise, 33.

Avignon, 50;
court at, 256;
Joyeuse returns to, 348;
Huguenots at, 411;
papal nuncio protests against Huguenots in, 417.

Baden, margrave of, 336, 373;
mission of Castelnau to, 380.

Bajazet, revolt of, 248.

Bar, duchy of, in vassalage to duke of Lorraine, 425.

Bardaxi, agent of Philip II in negotiations with Montluc, 260;
instructions to, 351.

Bar-le-Duc, Huguenot alarm over Charles IX’s sojourn at, 233, 249.

Basel, alarm at, over Alva’s approach, 308.

Bassompierre, 180 and n.;
wounded at Moncontour, 389.

Bayeux, Huguenots of, 148;
capitulation of, 188.

Bayonne, 50;
conference at, 225, 272-81;
Spain impatient for fulfilment of promise made at, 283;
uncertainty as to what was done at, 294;
cardinal Santa Croce at, 295;
no proof of alliance between France and Spain at, 318;
Philip II’s interest in Catholic provincial leagues at, 351.

Béarn, plot to seize, by Spain, 260;
Jeanne d’Albret mobilizes troops in, 307, 350;
Montluc’s plan to conquer, 397, 413;
proposal to neutralize, 399, 406, 407.

Beaugency, surprise of, 151, 152;
Condé marches to, 153;
Coligny at, 182.

Beauvais, Huguenot outburst at, 95;
Association catholique at, 354.

Beggars of the Sea, capture of Brille by, 444.

Bellegarde, sensechal of Toulouse: routs viscounts, 397;
sent to Poland, 497.

Bellièvre, sent to Switzerland, 240, 241.

Bergerac, 406;
Edict of, 345;
Peace of, 540.

Berghes, De, Flemish noble, 264, 265.

Bern, 154, 240;
forms league with Valais, 308;
treaty of, with Savoy, 309;
neutrality of, 371.

Bernina Pass, 241.

Berry, Tavannes organizes Catholic league in, 354;
duke of Deuxponts in, 380.

Besançon, Granvella returns to, 265;
Alva’s route through, 308.

Beza, at Colloquy of Poissy, 111, 113, 114;
at Synod of La Rochelle, 230;
at Synod of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, 240.

Beziers, court at, 252, 406.

Biragues, a Milanese, archbishop of Sens: made chancellor, 367;
made keeper of the seal, 425;
treachery of, 425, n.;
urges Charles IX to imprison marshal Montmorency, 479;
protests against, 492.

Biron, sent to La Rochelle, 454;
made a marshal, 407.

Blamont, interview of Catherine de Medici and Louis of Nassau at, 463.

Blanche of Castile, 252.

Blaye, 408.

Blésois, Protestantism in, 238.

Blois, 27, 36, 161, 288;
Charles IX removed to, 137, 140;
camp at, 151;
drownings at, 154;
court returns to, 185;
working capital of France, 190;
viscounts cross Loire at, 396;
treaty of, 430;
Charles IX signs treaty of, 445;
repudiated by Queen Elizabeth, 448;
no massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Bochetel, bishop of Rennes, French ambassador in Vienna, 57, 371.

Bohemia, 464.

Bois de Vincennes, 137;
court at, 139.

Bolwiller, plans recovery of Metz, 301, 302.
_See also_ Cardinal’s War.

Bonneval, 161.

Bordeaux, 27, 408;
saved by Montluc, 151;
association of, 213, 214;
court at, 255, 271;
Huguenot plot in, 368;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450;
Alençon demands, 508.
_See also_ Château Trompette.

Bouillon, duke of, 126;
neutrality of, 162;
activity of, in Low Countries, 315;
disaffection of, 375;
Spain’s anxiety over presence of, at Sedan, 472;
fear of co-operation of, with Louis of Nassau and prince of Condé,
476;
death of, 498.

Boulogne, demanded by Huguenots, 332, 345.

Bourbon. _See_ Antoine of Bourbon.

Bourbon, Charles, cardinal of, accompanies Elizabeth of Valois to
Spain, 7, 73;
reproaches Catherine de Medici, 288;
assumes pay of reiters, 346;
with army in Saintonge, 382.

Bourbonnais, famine slight in, 288.

Bourdillon, marshal, succeeds Marshal Termes, 182.

Bourges, 64, 127, 142;
siege of, 159-61;
Catholic league established at, 354;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Brabant, 265, 268.

Brie, troops levied in, 160;
wheat dear in, 286;
Catholic army in, 334.

Brille, capture of, by Beggars of the Sea, 444.

Brissac, marshal, 7;
transferred from Picardy to Normandy, 60;
Philip II writes to, 97;
hostility of Huguenots toward, 98;
relations with Triumvirate, 98;
resigns, 126;
charged with corrupt practice, 140;
in Rouen, 182;
quits Paris for Normandy, 199;
mentioned, 350;
defeats viscounts in Périgord, 396.

Brittany, 31, 45, 76, 146, 286.

Brochart, Huguenot commander at Sancerre, 372.

Brotherhood of Catholics in France, proposed at Council of Trent by
cardinal of Lorraine, 211.
_See also_ League; Association; Confraternity.

Brouage, salt staple at, 409, 415.

Brucamonte, Don Gonzalo de, Spanish captain, 310.

Bruges, capture by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 446.

Bruniquel, Bernard Roger, viscount of, 394, 395.

Brussels, infected with heresy, 266;
Alva’s arrival at, 312.

Burghley, Lord, letter of Dale, English ambassador in France to, 232.

Burgundy, 124, 132, 148, 329;
troops levied in, 160;
petition of Estates for abolition of Protestant worship in, 234;
price of wheat in, 286;
endangered by Alva’s march, 308;
Catholic resentment in, 349;
Confrérie du St. Esprit in, 352, 353;
vigilance of Tavannes in, 362;
concentration of troops in, 363.
_See also_ Tavannes; Dijon; Châlons-sur-Saône.

Burie, governor of Guyenne, 36, 127, 156.

Busanval, 327.

Cadillac, Catholic league formed at, 216, 226.

Caen, 142, 162;
Huguenots of, 148;
arrival of English money at, 188;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Cahors, 405;
riot at, 133.

Calais, capture of, 21;
mentioned, 125, 126;
and Havre-de-Grace, 162;
English hope to recover, 163, 164;
pale of, 166;
Spanish fear lest England acquire, 181;
Havre might have been another, 185;
England proposes to trade Havre and Dieppe for, 198;
English right to, 199;
France claims forfeiture of English rights to, 203;
restitution of, demanded by English ambassador, 204;
Spain’s anxiety over, 267;
French alarm over, 316;
Condé demands, 332.

Candalle, activity of, in Guyenne, 226;
helps to form league of Agen, 254;
plans to attack Montgomery at Condom, 407.

Capuchins, 251.

Cardinal’s War, 303.
_See also_ Metz; Lorraine, cardinal of.

Carlos, Don, son of Philip II:
proposed marriage of, with Mary Stuart, 94, 245, 246;
madness of, 246;
proposed as husband of Marguerite of Valois, 424;
death of, 424.

Carnavalet, Madame, 428.

Cartagena, Alva sails from, 309.

Casimir, count palatine, 158;
reiters of, 333, 360;
hopes of Huguenots pinned on, 335;
reported to be coming, 382;
ambition “to Calvinize the world”, 444.
_See also_ Count Palatine.

Castlenau, mission of, to margrave of Baden, 380.

Castres, resists Joyeuse, 348;
Montgomery at, 405, 406.

Cateau-Cambrésis, Treaty of, 5, 199, 203, 441;
commercial importance of, 204.

Catherine de Medici, Queen of France, 1;
policy after conspiracy of Amboise, 42, 64;
Venetian ambassador’s description of, 65;
policy of, after death of Francis II, 72, 73;
has custody of seal, 74;
control of government by, 75;
adroitness of, 77;
shrewdness of, 91;
fears Spanish intervention, 94;
vacillation of, 96;
invites bishop of Valence to preach at court, 98;
alarmed by formation of Triumvirate, 99;
labors for Huguenot cause, 102;
warned against policy of toleration, 110;
not intimidated, 119, 122;
in fear of Guises, 124;
endeavors to maintain balance of parties, 126;
perseveres in policy of toleration, 128;
upbraided by Chantonnay, 133;
demands his recall, 133;
sends St. André back to his government, 133;
offended at Cardinal Tournon, 133;
fear lest Guises seize King, 137;
overruled by constable and king of Navarre, 139;
surrenders to Triumvirate and asks aid of Spain, 143;
seizes church plate, 146;
supports Triumvirate, 150;
wants to end first civil war by composition, 172;
activity after battle of Dreux, 182;
justifies Edict of Amboise, 195;
pays Coligny’s reiters, 198;
determines to push war against England, 199;
appeals to Paris for loan, 200;
enterprise in siege of Havre, 201;
character of, 202;
in supreme control, 206;
demands dissolution of Catholic leagues, 225, 226;
seeks to pacify the kingdom, 232;
quarrels with D’Andelot, 238;
co-operates with the Guises, 243;
ambition of, 247;
offends Philip II by favorable policy toward Turks, 248;
Catholic pressure upon, 249, 250;
visits Nostradamus, the astrologer, 251;
alarmed at growth of Catholic leagues, 255, 256;
interview with Alva at Bayonne, 277;
ambition of, in Poland, 283;
reproached by Cardinal Bourbon, 288;
haunted by conspiracy of Amboise, 288;
weakness of, 293, 294;
demands withdrawal of Roggendorf, 295;
espouses policy of political Huguenots, 295;
alarmed at Alva’s march, 307;
accused of stealing Spanish ambassador’s cipher, 317, n.;
looks to Alva for aid, 328;
sends Lignerolles “to practice the stay of the reiters”, 330;
urged to make overtures after battle of St. Denis, 333;
anxiety over Emperor’s claim to Three Bishoprics, 336;
asks aid of Spanish troops against the reiters, 338;
popular rage against, 343;
consults Nonio, the astrologer, 344;
accuses Montluc of secret dealings with Philip II, 351;
reproaches Aumale for negligence and cowardice, 382;
joins army in Saintonge, 382;
approves feigned attack on Châtellerault by duke of Anjou, 387;
disappointed at Bayonne, 423;
dreams of marrying Charles IX to elder daughter of the Emperor, 424;
attitude of, toward proposed marriage of duke of Anjou and Queen
Elizabeth, 427;
double policy of, 435;
jealous of Coligny, 440;
responsibility of, for massacre of St. Bartholomew, 449, 452, 453;
interview of, with Louis of

Nassau at Blamont, 463;
folly of Polish ambition of, 467;
tries to bribe La Noue, 477;
refuses to put Henry of Navarre to death, 481;
assumes regency on death of Charles IX, 484;
anxiety for return of Henry III, 488;
sinister influence over Henry III, 488, 489;
Spanish troops offered to, by Requesens, 494;
tries to wheedle Alençon, 505;
illness of, 511.

Catholic lines in August, 1562, 161.

Catholics, violence of, 240.

Caudebec, revolts, 148;
mentioned, 164, 177, 181.

Caumont, viscount of, 394.

Celles, Coligny at, 182.

Cévennes, viscounts in, 395.

Chalais, 379, 406.

Châlons-sur-Marne, 147, 232.

Châlons-sur-Saône, saved by Tavannes, 149;
mentioned, 154, 157;
organization of La fraternité des catholiques at, 353, 354.

Chambéry, Alva’s route through, 308.

Chambre ardente, 11.

Chambres mi-parties, 393.

Champagne, 45, 52, 76, 92, 202, 329, 344;
troops levied in, 168;
reiters meeting in, 200;
Protestantism in, 228;
price of wheat in, 286;
endangered by Alva’s march, 308;
ravages of Huguenot army in, 333;
Catholic army in, 334;
Catholic league formed in, 354;
Aumale’s army in, 369;
ravages of reiters in, 507.

Champagne, Fair of, devastated by reiters, 420 and note.

Chantilly, Marshal Montmorency goes to, 357.

Chantonnay, Perrinot, sieur de, brother of Cardinal Granvella,
Spanish ambassador in France, 25, 32, n.;
endeavors to persuade Antoine of Bourbon, 90, 100-2;
threatens Catherine de Medici, 97;
directs Triumvirate, 131;
son of, is christened, 133;
upbraids Catherine de Medici, 133;
recall of, demanded, 133;
protests against Chancellor L’Hôpital, 137;
tries to intimidate Catherine de Medici, 176, 195;
traverses south of France in disguise, 245, n.;
withdrawal of, from France, 266;
aids plot to recover Metz, 302;
transferred to Vienna, 424.

Charenton, 159;
capture of Pont de, by Condé, 326;
Condé withdraws from, 332;
Huguenot demand for freedom of worshiping at, 416.

Charles III of Lorraine, marries sister of Charles IX, 249.

Charles V, Emperor, 3, 55, 85, 124;
fails to capture Tunis, 132.

Charles V, Free Companies in reign of, 396.

Charles VII, Pragmatic Sanction of, 116;
grants silk monopoly to Lyons, 234;
mentioned, 252.

Charles VIII, fiscal policy of, 83.

Charles IX, King of France (1560-74):
accession of, 71, 74, 123;
begins reign with policy of toleration, 94;
coronation of, 101;
urged to stand fast in the faith by Cardinal Tournon, 111;
demands repression of sedition in Agenois, 134;
fear lest he be seized by Guises, 136;
removed to Blois, 137;
asks aid of Philip II, 143;
unable to control Paris, 154;
bitter against cardinal of Lorraine, 196;
majority of, declared, 208;
reply of, about Calais, 204;
industrial crisis in reign of, 217;
remonstrance of, to Pope, 230;
purpose of tour of provinces, 232;
Guises want him to marry Mary Stuart, 244;
wants to marry a Hapsburg princess, 247;
proposed marriage of, with Queen Elizabeth, 249;
threatens to dispossess the Rohans, 288;
advocates administrative reform, 290;
proposes amendments to Edict of Amboise, 295;
asked to permit Spanish troops to cross France to Flanders, 299,
305;
Spain fears appeal of, to Huguenots, 302;
strengthens garrisons in Languedoc and Provence, 306;
sends troops into Lyonnais, 307;
Huguenots attempt to kidnap, 319-21 (_see_ Meaux);
dares not accept offers of Philip II, 330;
insists in disarmament of Huguenots, 333;
argues with count palatine, 335;
reply to Condé, 341;
poverty of, 344;
reply of, to demands of Huguenots, 345;
accuses cardinal of Lorraine, 350;
promises to maintain peace of Longjumeau, 350;
displaces Marshal Montmorency as governor of Paris, 358;
to marry daughter of Emperor, 364;
views renewal of war with alarm, 375;
at siege of St. Jean-d’Angély, 390;
petitioned to make peace by his council, 391;
Teligny sent to, 392;
protests against peace made to, 394;
goes to Mont St. Michel, 413;
secret dealings of, with Montluc, 413;
influence of battle of Arnay-le-Duc upon, 416;
offers to yield La Rochelle, Angoulême, and Montauban, 416;
offers to trade Perpignan or Lansac for La Charité, 416;
infractions of Peace of St. Germain by, 420;
promises reform of taxes, 421;
imposes new taxes, 421;
marries Elizabeth of Austria, 424;
releases duke of Lorraine from vassalage to France for duchy of
Bar, 425;
vague replies of, to demands of Spain, 426;
character of, 438;
haughty reply of, to Alava, 441;
signs Treaty of Blois, 445;
letter of, found on person of Genlis promising aid in liberation of
Low Countries, 447;
consternation of, at failure of Genlis’ expedition, 448;
overtures of, to La Rochelle, 454;
unsuccessful in recruiting footmen in Germany, 454;
sends duke of Longueville to La Noue, 467;
signs peace with La Rochelle, 459, 460;
jealous of Guises, 462;
inclines to aid Netherlands again, 462;
warned by Morvilliers, 468;
plans to convene Huguenot deputies of Languedoc and Dauphiné, 469;
ill of smallpox, 469;
forbids circulation of bad money in France, 470;
makes sale of new offices, 470;
orders census to be taken in each bailiwick, 471;
sends Torcy and Turenne to Montgomery, 472;
tract against, comparing to sultan, 475;
plot to seize at St. Germain, 477, 478;
urged to execute Cossé and Montmorency, 481;
last illness of, 483, 484.

Charron, provost to Paris, Henry III’s threat to, 522.

Chartres, 36, 161, 181;
Catholic camp at, 153;
Condé retires toward, 177;
Condé imprisoned at, 182;
court leaves, 185;
gunpowder factory at, blows up, 186.

Chartres, vidame of, suspected of conspiracy, 51;
arrested, 59;
imprisoned in Bastille, 62;
prosecution of, 69;
sister of, 126;
agrees to deliver Havre-de-Grace to English, 164.

Châteaudun, 36, 161, 181;
gunpowder factory at, blows up, 186.

Château-Thierry, Swiss at, 320;
military base of Catholics, 373;
granted to Casimir, count palatine, 521 and n.

Châtelet, 3.

Châtellerault, duchy of, given to young duke of Guise, 206;
taken by Huguenots, 384;
attacked by duke of Anjou, 387.

Châtillon, cardinal-bishop of Beauvais, 8, 93, 350;
proposal to expel from country, 132;
banishment of, demanded, 153;
feud of, with Guises, 206, 207;
resignation of, demanded, 289;
sent to confer about peace, 344;
learns of plot of Guises, 350.
_See also_ Coligny; Andelot.

Châtillons, young duke of Guise refuses to be reconciled with, 293.

Chaudien, Protestant pastor in Paris, 64.

Chavigny, 255;
taken by Condé, 350.

Chinon, taken by duke of Guise, 154.

Ciappini Vitelle, marquis of, Italian commander, 311.

Claudine, sister of Charles IX, wife of Charles III of Lorraine, 249.

Clergy, supports Guises, 9;
demands at States-General of Orleans, 77, 78;
contribute 100,000 écus, 200;
loan made by, 329;
heavy taxation imposed upon, 344;
offer to maintain war at their own expense, 417.
_See also_ States-General.

Clérie, 152;
combat at, 182.

Cluny, Hôtel de, belonging to the Guises, attacked by a mob, 47.

Coconnas, arrest and execution of, 480, 481.

Cocqueville, failure of his invasion of Artois, 360.

Cognac, 283, 379, 405, 406.

Coligny, Gaspard de, admiral of France, 6;
captured at battle of St. Quentin, 8;
policy of, after conspiracy of Amboise, 42;
sent to Normandy, 43;
offers Huguenot petition, 52, 54, 73;
influence of, 79;
at Council of Fontainebleau, 94;
efforts of, for toleration, 103;
plot against, 119;
made governor of Normandy, 126;
counsels Catherine de Medici, 128;
Spanish ambassador objects to presence of, at court, 133;
Antoine of Bourbon offended with, 133;
joins Condé at Meaux after massacre of Vassy, 137;
appears before Paris, 137;
at Montreuil, 138;
aims to seize line of Loire River, 138;
overtures to, 139;
destroys bridge at Jargeau, 151;
at Orleans, 154;
solicits English aid, 162;
in battle of Dreux, 179;
at Villefranche, 181;
crosses Loire, 182;
tries to join earl of Warwick in Havre, 185;
confers with Throckmorton, 185;
in fear of his own reiters, 184, 187;
asks aid of Queen Elizabeth, 187;
desperate position of, 187;
Madame de Guise refuses to recognize acquittal of, for murder of
duke of Guise, 206;
violence of Paris toward, 206, n.;
not responsible for surrender of Havre-de-Grace to England, 224, n.;
Alva advises his execution, 274;
at Moulins, 289;
hypocritical reconciliation of, with cardinal of Lorraine, 289;
Spain demands banishment of, 300;
unadmirable conduct of, 316;
retires from court, 317;
tries to prevent Strozzi’s coming, 329;
saying of, 361;
attempt to capture, 365;
plans activity in south of France, 375;
becomes actual leader of Huguenots after death of prince of Condé,
378;
hopes to join duke of Deuxponts, 379;
illness of, 383;
fights battle of La Roche l’Abeille, 383;
aims to take Saumur, 385;
besieges Poitiers, 385-87;
wounded at battle of Moncontour, 389;
falls back on Niort after battle of Moncontour, 389;
price put upon head of, 390;
confers with Teligny, 392;
joins Montgomery, 402;
assumes offensive, 405;
captures Port Ste. Marie, 406;
and plans to winter there, 408;
great blunder of, 410;
besieges Toulouse, 410;
illness of, 411;
at Montbrison, 416;
fights battle of Arnay-le-Duc, 416;
urges marriage of Henry of Navarre with Marguerite of Valois and
that of duke of Anjou to Queen Elizabeth, 422, 430 ff.;
honorably received in Paris by Charles IX, and made member of
Conseil du Roi, 439 and n.;
persuades Charles IX to sign Treaty of Blois, 445;
upbraids Charles IX for abandonment of Flemish enterprise, 448;
attempt to kill, on August 22, 449;
murdered in massacre of St. Bartholomew, 450.
_See also_ Dreux; Jarnac; Moncontour; Arnay-le-Duc;
St. Bartholomew, etc.

Colloquy of Poissy. _See_ Poissy.

Cologne, elector of, 467.

Cominges, Bernard Roger, viscount of Bruniquel, 394.

Commendone, cardinal, at Polish Diet, 464.

Commerce:
of Low Countries, 163, 267;
through Havre-de-Grace, 203;
Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, 204;
of Lyons, 233, 234;
influence of civil war upon, 235;
exportation of grain from Lombardy, 241;
commercial promises of Spain, 242;
cloth-trade of England, 268, 269;
wine trade of France, 267-69;
free trade in grain, 286;
high price of wine, 287;
Huguenots enter Flanders as merchants, 299;
in salt, 309;
Fair of Champagne devastated by reiters, 420 and n.;
English in Flanders, 436, 437;
Poland covets Hanseatic, 466;
strife between Paris and Rouen, 470.
_See also_ Embden; Cateau-Cambrésis.

Compiègne, endangered by William of Orange, 370;
Charles IX ill of smallpox at, 469.

Conciergerie, 3;
La Mole and Coconnas imprisoned in, 480.

Concordat of 1516, 84, 196.

Condé, Louis de Bourbon, prince of:
sent to Flanders, 7;
accused of conspiracy of Amboise, 40;
confers with Damville, 46;
suspected of new conspiracy, 51;
arrested, 62;
prosecution of, 69-71;
approached by Catherine de Medici, 72;
acquittal of, 91, 92;
seeks government of Champagne, 92;
relations of, with Antoine of Bourbon, 100;
plot against, 119;
sends Hotman to Germany, 122;
sent into Picardy, 126;
counsels Catherine de Medici, 128;
proposal to banish, 132;
in Paris when duke of Guise arrives after massacre of Vassy, 136;
leaves Paris for Meaux, 137;
appears before Paris, 137;
occupies St. Cloud, 138;
complains of Guises, 139;
assumes command of Huguenot forces, 140;
controls middle Loire, 141;
weakened by Grammont’s failure to reach Orleans, 146;
Paris fears coming of, 147, 149;
demands withdrawal of Triumvirate, 150;
refuses conditions of peace, 153;
retires into Orleans, 153;
thinks of retiring into Gascony, 154;
solicits English aid, 162;
overtures made to, 168;
hope that he may succeed Antoine of Bourbon as lieutenant-general,
170, 171;
advances upon Paris, 172;
wheedled by Catherine de Medici and the Guises, 174;
fails to attack Paris, 176;
retires to Normandy, 177;
falls back on Chartres, 177;
captured at battle of Dreux, 179;
imprisoned at Chartres, 182;
promised post of lieutenant-general, 190, 199;
anger of, at Catherine de Medici, 206;
project of, to marry Mary Stuart, 243;
liaison of, with Isabel de Limeuil, 245, n., 249;
Alva advises execution of, 274;
maintains court preacher to anger of Catholics, 288;
marries Mlle. de Longueville, 289;
suspected of intercourse with William of Orange, 297;
unadmirable conduct of, 316;
retires from court, 317;
captures Pont de Charenton, 326;
extraordinary demands of, 328, 329;
aims to overthrow Guises, 329;
precarious position of, before Paris, 331;
demands Calais, Boulogne, and Metz, 332;
withdraws to Troyes after battle of St. Denis, 333;
attempts to effect junction with reiters, 333;
camped between Sens and Troyes, 339;
joins reiters, 339;
demands of, in favor of Huguenots, 340;
power of, 342;
appoints Cardinal Châtillon, bishop of Valence, and Teligny, to
confer about peace, 344;
complains of outrages on Huguenots, 362;
manifesto of, 365;
takes Champigny and falls back on Loudun, 369;
defeated at Jazeneuil, 369, n.;
attempts to join William of Orange, 370;
marches to relief of Sancerre, 372;
killed at battle of Jarnac, 376;
jewels of, are pawned, 378;
makes viscount of Rapin governor of Montauban, 395.
_See also_ Dreux; Jarnac.

Condé, prince of (the younger):
with Henry of Navarre theoretical leader of Huguenot party, 378;
refuses to compromise with the crown, 412;
abjuration of, on St. Bartholomew’s Day, 450;
made governor of Picardy, 469;
gets 8,000 cavalry out of Germany, 504;
privileges in Peace of Monsieur, 520.

Condom, Montgomery at, 407.

Confraternities (Confréries), nucleus of local Catholic leagues, 216.
_See also_ Association; Brotherhood of Catholics; Guilds; League.

Confrérie de Ste. Barbe, 313, n.

Confrérie du St. Esprit, 216, 353-55.
_See also_ Association; Brotherhood of Catholics; Guild; League.

Constance, 308.

Correro, Venetian ambassador, describes the Swiss at Meaux, 321.

Cossé, marshal, in Picardy, 369;
protests against siege of St. Jean-d’Angély, 390;
sent to La Rochelle, 391;
urges peace, 394;
sent to recover La Charité, 412;
Charles IX urged to execute, 481;
arrested, 482.

Council, General, of the church, 139.

Council, National, question of, 57, 79, 87.

Council of Blood, 312.

Count palatine, 373, 467;
sends deputation to France, 481;
claims Three Bishoprics, 521;
receives Château-Thierry, 521 and n.
_See also_ Casimir.

Counter-Reformation, 124, 196.

Coutances, Montgomery lands near, 472.

Cracow, duke of Anjou arrives at, 467.

Croisade, La, name of new Catholic league at Toulouse, 355.
_See also_ League; Armagnac, cardinal of.

Dale, Dr. Valentine, English ambassador in France:
quoted, 232;
suspected by French government, 505.

Damville, Henry de Montmorency, sieur de:
confers with Condé, 46;
guards Condé in prison after battle of Dreux, 182;
strained relations of, with Montluc, 214;
just government of, in Languedoc, 347;
moderation of, 356;
in Paris, 357;
made king’s lieutenant in Languedoc, 383;
Politique leanings of, 382;
Montluc’s hatred of, 347, 398, 400, 401, 404, 413;
Montluc’s overtures to, 403;
party of, 474;
failure of attempt to seize, 483;
leader of joint Huguenot and Politique party, 489;
interviews duke of Savoy at Turin, 491;
introduces Turkish fleet into Aigues Mortes, 492;
attempt to poison, 502;
complicity with England suspected, 504;
privileges granted to, in Peace of Monsieur, 521.

Dantzig, disaffected by French election in Poland, 466.

Darnley, marries Mary Stuart, 424.

Dauphiné, 38, 45, 52, 142, 147;
Huguenots in, 95;
militia of, 208;
Huguenot association in, 223;
viscount of Rapin in, 395, 406;
strength of Huguenots in, 461;
Huguenot deputies of, 469.

Dax, Turkish ambassador received at, by Catherine de Medici, 248.

Debts, of crown, 13, 67, 208, 366, 371;
to Swiss, 242, 371;
of Charles IX, 421.
_See also_ Finances; Loans; Clergy.

De Losses, captain of Scotch Guard, sent to La Rochelle, 391.

Denmark, 21;
sues for French favor, 123.

De Retz, protest against, 492;
resigns office as constable, 497.

Dessay, Condé’s camp at, 339.

Deuxponts (Zweibrücken), duke of, 159;
reiters of, 370;
junction of, with William of Orange, 373, 374;
Coligny hopes to join, 379;
enters France, 379;
captures Nevers and La Charité, 380;
death of, 383.

Diaceto, a Florentine banker, 498.

Diane de Poitiers, mistress of Henry II, 6, 11, n.

Dieppe, 39, 142, 162;
Calvinists in, 95;
revolts, 148;
plan for recovery, 154;
precarious condition of Montgomery in, 187;
England offers to trade Dieppe and Havre for Calais, 198.

Dijon, Tavannes foils attack upon, 149;
objects to Edict of Amboise, 192;
Catholics of, 288;
ravages of reiters around, 357;
mentioned, 157, 232;
duke of Deuxponts advances upon, 379;
no massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Dillenberg, proclamation of William of Orange from, 444.

Dîme, 81, 84.

Dives, Coligny at, 185.

Dole, Alva at, 311.

Don Caratif. _See_ Dîme.

Dordrecht, revolt of against Alva, 444.

Dourdon, 357.

Dreux, battle of, 157, 158, 178-81;
Philip II’s joy over, 183, 327.

D’Scars, chamberlain of Antoine of Bourbon, secret agent of Guises,
24.

Du Bourg, protests against inquisitorial practices of Henry II, 12;
executed, 13, 15;
policy of crown after death of, 42;
interceded for by Marguerite of Savoy, 43.

Du Faur, protests against inquisitorial practices of Henry II, 12;
suspended from office, 13.

Du Faur (advocate of Toulouse), helps in formation of Catholic league
at Toulouse, 241.

Du Plessis, Huguenot pastor at Tours, 64.

Du Plessis-Mornay, memoir of, upon, French intervention in
Netherlands, 445;
sent to England, 474;
radicalism of, 490.

Duras, Huguenot leader, activity of in Guyenne, 156.

Dutch, union of Huguenot and Dutch interests, 364.
_See also_ Flanders; Louis of Nassau; Low Countries; Netherlands;
William of Orange.

Edict of Nantes, 409.

Edict: of Paris (1549), 10;
of Fontainebleau (1550), 10;
of Chateaubriand (1551), 10;
of Compiègne (1557), 11;
of November, 1559, 14;
of Romorantin (1560), 43, 104;
of January, 94, 128-31, 151, 167, 168;
of Rouissillon, 250, 251;
of Amboise, evasion of, 377, 378.
_See also_ Amboise; Bergerac; January; Longjumeau; Monsieur;
Nantes; Romorantin; Rouissillon.

Edward I, war with Philip IV, 83.

Egmont, Lamoral, count, Flemish noble, 12;
leader of Flemish revolt, 215;
Spain attempts to draw him away from the Gueux, 268;
association of, with William of Orange and Hoorne, 298, 312;
arrested, 318;
sent to scaffold, 361;
son of, visits Henry III, 503.

Elbœuf, René of Guise, marquis of, 73;
enters Paris, 135;
surrenders Caen castle, 188.

Elbœuf, duke of, sent to Poland, 497.

Elizabeth, Queen of England:
connection of, with conspiracy of Amboise, 41;
precarious position of, 163;
offers to aid Huguenots, 164;
procrastination of, 174, 198;
parsimony of, 184;
advises Huguenots to accept “reasonable” terms of peace, 185;
implored to send relief, 187;
offers to exchange Havre and Dieppe for Calais, 198;
her conduct compels Huguenots to make peace, 199;
courtships of, 244;
proposed marriage of, with Charles IX, 249;
revives claim to Calais, 316;
project of marriage of, to duke of Anjou, 358, 359;
makes loan to Huguenots, 378;
duplicity of, 412;
marriage negotiations of, with duke of Anjou, 422, 428-30;
marriage negotiations of, with duke of Alençon, 430, 431;
political problems of reign of, 432-34;
repudiates Treaty of Blois, 448;
indirectly responsible for massacre of St. Bartholomew, 449, n. 1;
enigmatical policy of, 455.

Elizabeth of Austria, marriage of, to Charles IX, 424.

Elizabeth of Valois, daughter of Henry II and queen of Spain:
married to Philip II, 1;
goes to Spain, 24;
dowry of, 207;
gives birth to still-born twins, 251;
at Bayonne, 278;
death of, 364, n. 424.

Embden, staple at, 269.

Emperor, revives claim to Three Bishoprics, 336;
Charles IX to marry daughter of, 364, 374;
hostility of, to France, 382;
refuses to consider marriage of his daughter to Charles IX, 393;
asked to stop progress of Protestant reiters, 393;
makes truce with Turks, 464;
interest in Poland, 464.
_See also_ Ferdinand; Maximilian; Three Bishoprics.

England (English), contrasted with Spain, 123;
aid expected from, 162;
commercial interests in Low Countries, 163;
occupy Havre-de-Grace, 165;
“adversary of”, 198;
and Philip II, 245;
adventurers flock to La Rochelle, 372;
alliance with France proposed, 440, 441;
dares not break with Spain, 455;
treaty with William of Orange, 463, n.;
Du Plessis-Mornay sent to, 474.
_See also_ Elizabeth, Queen; Commerce; Dale; Norris; Smith;
Throckmorton; Treaty of Blois.

Este, Hippolyte d’, cardinal of Ferrara. _See_ Ferrara.

Estouteville, 115, n. 2.

Etampes, duke of, 146.

Etampes, Protestant camp near, 174;
recovered by duke of Guise, 181;
granary of Paris, 327.

Evreux, 177.

Famine, 286.
_See also_ “Hard Times;” Plague; Commerce.

Ferdinand, petitioned by Margaret of Parma, 299, 374.
_See also_ Emperor; Three Bishoprics.

Ferdinand of Aragon, ancestors of viscounts in war against, 395.

Ferrara, Hippolyte d’ Este, cardinal of:
opposed by Chancellor L’Hôpital, 116;
likely to succeed his brother as duke of, 423;
marriage of, with Marguerite of Valois proposed, 423.

Finances, early history of French, 81 ff., 200;
reform of, 292;
of Henry III, 498.
_See also_ Clergy; Debts; Dîme; Estates-General; Henry II; Loans;
Swiss.

Fismes, duke of Guise wounded at battle of, 506.

Flanders, gunpowder brought from, 186, 188;
revolt in, 265;
change in nature of revolt in, 312, 313;
2000 troops from, arrive in Paris, 335;
trade with England, 436, 437.
_See also_ Alva; Artois; Brabant; Egmont; Gueux; Hoorne; Low
Countries; Valenciennes; William of Orange.

Florida, massacre of French colony in, 299, 300.
_See also_ Menendez.

Flushing, revolt of, 444;
fleet of, captures Spanish merchantmen, 446.

Foix, Paul de, pope refuses to receive, 469.

Fontainebleau, council at (1560), 54, 52, 65, 89, 94, 117, 333;
court goes to, 137;
Condé aims to cut off, from Paris, 138;
court removes from, to Melun, 139;
mentioned, 209.

Fontarabia, Philip II strengthens, 146.

Fontenay (near Toul), Alva at, 311.

Forez, Coligny in, 411.

Fourquevaux, French ambassador in Spain, 306, 307;
succeeds St. Sulpice, 283;
embarrassed by massacre of French in Florida, 300;
urges Charles IX to be cautious, 309;
reply to papal nuncio, 315;
urges marriage of Charles IX to Princess Anne of Hapsburg and that
of Marguerite of Valois to Don Carlos, 424.
_See also_ Alva; Florida.

France, social structure of, in sixteenth century, 18, 19;
relations with Denmark, 123;
possibility of war in, 132;
and Philip II, 245;
William of Orange enters, 369;
state of, described by Sir Thomas Hoby, 294;
alliance with England proposed, 440-41;
prospect of war with Spain, 443.

Franche Comté, 124, 246, 301;
Spain fears French attack on, 418;
Huguenot plot in, 492, 493.

Francis I (1515-47), 69, 291;
financial policy of, 81-85;
fortifications of, around Paris, 173;
influence of, upon silk industry, 234.

Francis II, King of France (1559-60), 4, 6, 8, 11;
character of, 17, 22;
appeals to Philip II, 59;
death of, 70, 76, 93, 94, 123.

_Franco-Gallia_, a pamphlet by Hotman, 475.

Frankfort, duke of Anjou passes through, 467.

Frankfort Fair, William of Orange at, 446.

Fraternité des catholiques de Châlons-sur-Saône, 353, 354.
_See also_ Association; Brotherhood of Catholics in France;
Confraternity; Confrérie; League.

Freiburg, treaty of, 242;
league with Bern and Valais, 308.

Frene, messenger of Parlement of Paris, assassinated, 15.

Froelich, Swiss colonel, 162.

Gabelle, 82;
Guyenne exempt from, 8.

Gaillac, destruction of, by viscounts, 396.

Gallican church, liberties of, 196.

Garde, De la, 294.

Garonne River, Huguenots masters of, at Port Ste. Marie, 406.

Garris, siege of, 355.

Gascony, 41, 286;
Condé thinks of retiring to, 154;
germ of Catholic League in, 226;
Protestantism in, 228;
influence of provincial traditions upon, 409.

Geneva, exiles from, 44, 94;
“Geneva party” among Huguenots, 191;
influence upon Lyons, 227, 233;
preachers from, in Netherlands, 265;
fears joint attack of Spain and Savoy upon, 308.

Genlis, captures Mons, 446;
relief column of, intercepted, 447;
letter of Charles IX found upon person of, 447.

Genoa, syndicate of, 296;
Spain borrows ships from, 306;
Alva at, 309.

Genoullac, administrative corruption of, 82.

Germany, activity of Guises in, 48, 52, 85;
return of French exiles from, 94;
Smalkald war in, 121;
chief Protestant princes of, 121, n.;
Hotman sent to, 122;
Huguenots await aid from, 158;
troops sent to duke of Aumale from, 162;
refugees from lower, 200;
Protestants of, 243;
Louis of Nassau’s dealings with Protestant princes of, 299;
attitude of Protestant princes of, to French civil wars, 374;
reiters levied in, 368;
looked to for assistance, 380;
Protestants, assistance from, 418;
Charles IX unable to recruit in, 454;
Schomberg’s missions to, 463, 467, 504;
French ambition in, 467, 468;
feeling in, because of St. Bartholomew, 468.

Ghent, Alva determines to retire his forces into, 444.

Gien, 161.

Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, captures Sluys and Bruges, 446.

Gondi, bishop of Paris, part of, in massacre of St. Bartholomew, 450.

Gordes, governor of Dauphiné, 396.

Gourdon, viscount of, 394.

Grammont, 126;
prevented from reaching Orleans, 146;
Alva advises execution of, 274;
proposal to neutralize Béarn under, 399.

Grands Jours d’Auvergne, 291.

Granvella, cardinal, 12;
gives warning of conspiracy of Amboise, 32;
favors international Catholic league, 211;
asserts impracticability of helping Triumvirate, 212;
discovers Huguenot intrigues in Flanders, 264;
implores Philip II to come to Netherlands, 264;
retires to Besançon, 265;
advises Spanish pressure upon France 266;
ridicules rumor of Montgomery’s coming to Flanders, 298;
secretly petitioned by cardinal of Lorraine, 304;
comment on Flemish revolution, 312.

Gravelines, fortified, 267, 268, 316.

Gray, Alva at, 311.

Gregory XIII. _See_ St. Bartholomew.

Grenoble, 147, 154.

Grisons, Bellièvre sent to, 241, 308.

Guernsey, governor of, 167.
_See also_ Leighton.

Gueux, William of Orange and Louis of Nassau allied with, 297;
formation of, 312-14;
masters of the sea, 444.
_See also_ Egmont; William of Orange.

Guilds, revolution in, 217-23.
_See also_ Confraternity; Confrérie; Industry; Leagues.

Guise, duchess of, widow of Francis:
refuses to recognize acquittal of Coligny, 206;
marries duke of Nemours, 293.

Guise, Francis, duke of, 5;
in charge of war office, 6;
opposition to, 9;
character of, 20;
captures Metz and Calais, 21;
lieutenant-general, 36;
leaves court, 73;
loses influence, 75;
letter of, to Philip II, 97;
Huguenot hatred of, 98;
peculations of, 98, 141;
at Colloquy of Poissy, 112;
leaves court, 114;
conference of, with duke of Württemberg at Saverne, 123;
responsibility for massacre of Vassy, 134, 135, 142;
enters Paris, 135, 136;
assembles forces in Paris, 142;
Condé demands withdrawal of, 150;
takes Loudun and Chinon, 154;
wounded at siege of Rouen, 169;
fortifies Paris, 173;
holds Seine River, 177;
follows Condé’s retreat, 177;
repulsed at Clérie, 182;
besieges Orleans, 186;
assassinated, 188, 189, 216, 264.

Guise, Henry, duke of, made grand master, 206;
given duchy of Châtellerault, 206;
returns to court, 290;
refuses to be reconciled with Châtillons, 293;
in Champagne, 329;
follows Condé, 333;
organizes opposition, 349;
establishes Catholic league in Champagne, 354;
defends Poitiers, 385-87;
wounded at Moncontour, 389;
makes love to Marguerite of Valois, 419;
marries princess of Porcien, 419;
part of, in massacre of St. Bartholomew, 450-53;
Charles IX’s jealousy of, 462;
accuses Montmorency of plot to assassinate, 473;
urges arrest of Montmorency, 479;
feud with Montmorency, 491-94;
Spanish soldiery flock to, 494;
feud with duke of Montpensier, 498;
ordered to resist coming of the reiters, 506;
wounded, 506.

Guises, ancestry and wealth of, 20;
ambition of, 21;
usurpation of, 27;
fear assassination, 27, n.;
alarmed at conspiracy of Amboise, 32;
accuse Condé, 40;
pursue Visières and Maligny, 41;
feud of, with Montmorencys, 45, 50, 73, 333, n., 356, 357;
and war in Scotland, 48;
activity in Germany, 48, 221;
popular feeling against, 50;
make changes in provincial administration, 62, 63;
grievances against, 65, 66;
designs of, to crush Huguenots, 69;
fury of, at release of Condé, 71, 72;
aim of, to control regency, 72, n.;
overtures of, to Antoine of Bourbon, 73;
leave the court, 73;
adverse condition of, after death of Francis II, 91;
make use of aspirations of Antoine of Bourbon, 96;
leave court, 119;
Catherine de Medici in fear of, 124;
absence of, from court creates suspicion, 131;
fear lest they seize King, 137;
angry at court’s removal to Blois, 137;
tyranny of, 141;
besiege Caudebec, 148;
maladministration of, 296;
interest of, in the “Cardinal’s War”, 303;
secret negotiations with Spain, 304;
contemplate deposition of house of Valois, 337;
plans of, thwarted by reiters, 339;
hatred of, 343;
proposition to marry daughter of, to prince of Condé, 345;
secret conference of, at Louvre, 350;
plan to subjugate Gascony and Guyenne, 350;
abuse Chancellor L’Hôpital 357;
plan to capture Coligny, 365;
responsible for continuance of war, 175;
feud with Châtillons, 206, 207;
tilt with Chancellor L’Hôpital, 210;
co-operate with Catherine de Medici, 243;
approach Montluc, 254, 255;
discomfiture of, after peace of St. Germain, 419;
endeavor to break match between duke of Anjou and Elizabeth, 422,
423.
_See also_ Aumale, duke of; Elbœuf, duke of; Guise, duke of;
Lorraine, cardinal of.

Guitery, joins Montgomery in Normandy, 472;
his blunder ruins the plot to seize Charles IX, 478.

Guyenne, Marshal Termes made governor of, 63;
exempt from gabelle, 85;
badly infected with heresy, 95, 127;
rebellion in, 190;
Catholic league in, 216;
activity of Candalle in, 226;
Protestantism in, 230, 283;
early republicanism of Huguenots in, 326;
civil war in, 347;
plan of Montluc to deliver to Spain, 394;
saved to Catholics by Montluc, 406;
influence of provincial traditions upon, 409;
Huguenot movement in, 472.

Gymbrois, 334.

Haarlem, siege of, 463.

Haguenau, grand bailiwick of, 301.

Hainault, 267.

Hanseatic cities. _See_ Dantzig; Revel; Riga.

Hapsburg, union of house of, 364;
international plan to break dominion of, 374.

“Hard Times”, 86, 284-87, 391, 421, 455, 456, 470, 509.
_See also_ Commerce; Plague; Wheat.

Harfleur, 162.

Haton, Claude, quoted, 284, 285.

Havre-de-Grace, seized by Maligny, 148, 267;
fear lest it be given to English, 154, 155;
and Calais, 162;
occupied by England, 165, 166;
question of evacuation of, 185;
precarious position of Warwick in, 187;
war with England over, inevitable, 198;
Alva proposes, be put in Philip II’s hands pending mediation, 198;
England proposes to trade, for Calais, 198;
English possession of, jeopardizes commerce of Paris, 200;
French assault begins upon, 201;
difficulties of siege of, 201;
Warwick agrees to surrender, 203;
yielded to France, 204;
Coligny not responsible for surrender of, to England, 224, n.;
English occupation of, 267.
_See also_ Warwick.

Heidelberg, duke of Anjou passes through, 467.

Hennebault, admiral, fall of, 8.

Henry II, King of France (1547-59):
mortally wounded in tournament with Montgomery, 1;
dies, 4;
character of reign of, 5;
suspected of favoring inquisition, 12;
French exiles return after death of, 30;
government of, 22, 82, 85, 86;
wars of, 241.

Henry, duke of Orleans-Anjou, later Henry III (1574-89):
industrial crisis of reign of, 217;
marriage of, to Juana of Spain proposed, 247;
interest of, in Poland, 283;
bigotry of, 349, 350;
Alva proposes marriage of, to queen of Portugal, 364;
project of marriage of, to Queen Elizabeth, 358, 359;
lieutenant-general, 367;
endeavors to prevent junction between Condé and William of Orange,
370;
raises siege of Angoulême, 378;
endeavors to repair his losses, 380;
keeps the field in Saintonge, Angoumois, and Limousin, 381;
wretched state of army of, 381;
arms peasantry in Limousin, 384;
withdraws across Vienne River, 387;
feigns attack on Châtellerault, 387;
fights battle of Moncontour, 388, 389;
at siege of St. Jean-d’Angély, 390;
approves Montluc’s plan to conquer Béarn, 397;
marriage negotiations of, with Queen Elizabeth, 422, 427-30;
proposed marriage of, to Mary Stuart, 423;
offered command of fleet against Turks, 423;
part of, in massacre of St. Bartholomew, 450;
prospects of, in Poland, 464;
elected king of Poland, 465;
leaves for Poland, 467;
Huguenot-Politique plot to thwart succession of, 467;
leaves Poland, 487;
arrives at Lyons, 488;
hardens his policy toward Huguenots, 489;
determines to clear valley of Rhone, 490;
raises siege of Livron, 495;
coronation of, 495;
marries Louise de Vaudemont, 496;
debates terms of peace, 501;
deposed by Polish Diet, 502;
attempts to confiscate lands of the Rohans, 502;
excesses of, 508;
imposes new taxes, 509;
frivolity of, 512, 513;
makes light of Henry of Navarre’s escape, 515;
grants Peace of Monsieur, 515-21.

Henry of Navarre, not permitted to go to mass, 133;
demanded as hostage, 139, 293;
at siege of Garris, 355;
edict of Nantes and, 409;
refuses to make terms with the crown, 412;
marriage of, with sister of duke of Württemberg proposed, 422;
marriage of, with Marguerite of Valois proposed, 383, 385, 422;
marriage of, 442;
abjuration of, on St. Bartholomew’s Day, 450;
opinion of, on massacre of St. Bartholomew, 452;
arrested, 480;
escape of, 514;
demands of, and terms granted in Peace of Monsieur, 518, 519.

Hoby, Sir Thomas, his description of France, 294.

Holland, revolt in, 265;
all lost to Spain except Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 446.
_See also_ Louis of Nassau; William of Orange.

Honfleur, captured by Aumale, 154, 162, 177.

Hoogstraeten, failure of his expedition, 360.

Hoorne, Flemish noble, leader of the revolt, 265;
association with William of Orange and Egmont, 298;
arrested, 318;
sent to scaffold, 361.

Hospitals, 93, n.

Hotman, originator of conspiracy of Amboise, 30;
author of _Le Tigre_, a pamphlet, 39, n.;
on States-General of Orleans, 90;
sent to Germany for aid, 122;
author of _Franco-Gallia_, 475.

Huguenots, under Henry II, 10;
origin of the word, 10, n.;
“of religion”, 16, 17;
“political”, 16, 17, 328;
early republicanism of, exaggerated, 19, 324, 325;
demand convocation of States-General, 27;
in Normandy, 38, 39;
Edict of Romorantin (1560) and the, 44, 104;
strength of, in the provinces, 45, 95;
riot of, in Rouen, 47, 70;
and council of Fontainebleau, 53, 54;
overtures of, to Antoine of Bourbon, 63;
grievances of, 65, 66;
hope to organize States-General, 75;
Philip II seeks to harden policy of France toward, 93;
violence of, 95;
hostility of, to Guises, 98;
urge cause of toleration, 103;
refuse to pay tithes, 118;
effrontery of, 120;
organized nature of agitation of, 121;
diplomatic negotiations of, 122, 123;
riots of, 127;
proposal to banish from court, 132;
undismayed by massacre of Vassy, 137;
house of worship of, in Paris destroyed, 139;
association of, 140, 141;
destroy tax-registers 147;
demolish Bourbon tombs at Moulins, 148;
communication of, with English, 148;
hostility of Paris to, 149;
demand withdrawal of Triumvirate, 150;
look for English financial aid, 152;
await aid from Germany, 158;
pillage churches, 159;
lines of, in August, 1562, 161;
hope for English aid, 162;
radicals among, 170;
Elizabeth advises, not to refuse reasonable terms, 185;
English complication of, 196;
procrastination of Elizabeth compels, to make terms, 199;
house-to-house search for, in Paris, 207;
association of Languedoc, 207;
disquietude, 209;
party of, made up of working classes, 220;
organization of, 225, 319, 321-24;
church polity of, 229;
proportion of, to Catholics, 229, 230;
alarmed at Charles IX’s sojourn at Bar-le-Duc, 233;
confiscations imposed upon, 235;
iconoclasm of, 236, 240;
alarm of, in south France, 252, n.;
complain of Candalle and league of Agen, 255;
Pius V advocates wholesale slaughter of, 275;
fears of, 288;
influx into Moulins, 288;
rapprochement between, and Montmorencys, 289;
principles of, 290;
backed by Catherine de Medici, 295;
influence of Netherlands upon, 296-98;
preachers of, in Low Countries, 297;
in Netherlands, 315;
alarm of, 316;
dismayed at arrest of Egmont and Hoorne, 318;
exodus of, from Paris, 326;
efforts of, to cut off Paris, 326;
plunder churches around Paris, 327, 328;
try to break Swiss alliance, 330;
overtures of, to revolted Flemings, 331;
capture citadel of Metz, 336;
terms demanded by, 340, 345;
interest of, in Dutch revolt, 364;
proscription of, 366;
spirit of, 368;
not dismayed by death of prince of Condé, 378;
strength of, in Saintonge and Rochellois, 378;
anxiety of, over effect of death of prince of Condé on foreign
negotiations, 379;
elated by capture of La Charité, 381;
capture Châtellerault and Lusignan, 384;
besiege Poitiers, 385-87;
intercept King’s treasurer in Limousin, 389;
division of party between nobles and bourgeoisie, 391, 412;
demands of, 392, 393;
Joyeuse tries to prevent co-operation of, east and west of Rhone,
396;
council at Milhaud, 396;
strength of, in Provence and Languedoc, 405;
strength of, in southwestern France, 408-10;
new demands of, for peace, 416;
papal nuncio protests against, in Avignon, 417;
demand restoration of William of Orange and Louis of Nassau, 417;
feudal interests of, 417 and n.;
excluded from universities, 420;
organization of, formed at Montauban in 1573, 461;
deputies of, from Languedoc and Dauphiné plan to meet Charles IX,
469;
make common cause with Politiques, 471;
declaration of, of La Rochelle, 472;
division in party of, 474;
political theory of, 475, 476;
demand of, 486;
provincial system of, 480, 490;
union with Politiques, 499, 500;
relations with England, 503;
terms of, in Peace of Monsieur, 516, 517.

Hyères, court at, 251.

Ile-de-France, 148;
wheat dear in, 286;
Huguenot leaders in, 358;
Torcy made lieutenant-general in, 473.

Industry, revolution in, 218, 219.

Inquisition, urged in France under Henry II, 12;
Philip II orders maintenance of, in Flanders, 267.

Interest, rates of, in fifteenth century, 83;
in sixteenth century, 85, 86, n.

Ireland, 434.

Italians, in battle of La Roche l’Abeille, 383;
at siege of Poitiers, 387.
_See also_ Strozzi.

Italy, lottery introduced from, 82;
wars in, 220, 228;
Philip II and, 245;
French interests in, 453;
French ambition in, 467.

Jacquerie, 502.
_See also_ Peasantry.

Jagiello house, last king of, in Poland dies, 464.

Jargeau, attempt to take, 151.

Jarnac, battle of, 376, 377, 397.

Jazeneuil, Condé defeated at, 369, n.

Jemmingen, Louis of Nassau defeated at, 361.

Jesuits, 132 and n., 254.

Joinville, 131, 168;
duke of Deuxponts passes by, 379;
Madame de Guise flees from, 502.

Joinville, prince de, and Triumvirate, 98.

Joyeuse, viscount of, 125;
Pius V sends troops to aid of, 157;
campaign in valley of Rhone, fails to take Pont St. Esprit, 348;
takes Loudun, Orsennes, and Tresques, 348;
defeats Montbrun, 348;
garrisons towns of Lower Languedoc and returns to Avignon, 348;
tries to prevent co-operation of Huguenots on both banks of the
Rhone River, 396;
joins duke of Anjou, 397;
blocks viscount of Rapin, 448;
fails in attempt to seize Damville, 483.

Juana, sister of Philip II, marriage with Henry duke of Anjou
suggested, 247, 277.

Junius, Francis, driven from Antwerp 297, n.

La Charité, rising in, 156;
captured by duke of Deuxponts, 380, 405;
unsuccessfully assaulted by Lansac, 383;
Marshal Cossé sent to recover, 405, 416;
Charles IX, offers to trade Perpignan or Lansac for, 416;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450;
duke of Alençon demands, 508.

La Fére, 71;
duke of Alençon demands, 508;
dispute over cession of, 511, 512.

La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Synod of, 246.

Lagebaston, president of parlement of Bordeaux, complains of conduct
of Montluc, 226.

Lagny, 327.

La Haye, plots to seize La Rochelle, 471;
secedes to Politiques, 492.

La Marche, duke of Deuxponts dies in, 382.

La Mare, valet-de-chambre to Henry II, 8.

La Mole, arrest and execution of, 480, 481.

La Mothe Gondrin, 53;
killed, 147.

Langres, duke of Deuxponts passes by, 379;
duke of Alençon demands, 508.

Languedoc, loans in, 83;
Huguenots of, 95, 127;
militia of, 207, 208;
Charles IX strengthens garrisons of, 306;
civil war in, 347;
Damville’s government of, 347;
Catholic league in Lower, 355;
towns controlled by Huguenots in, 362;
peasantry rise against Huguenots, 368;
viscounts in, 395;
control of Huguenots in Lower, 405, 406;
divided into two governments by Huguenots, 461;
Huguenot deputies of, 469.

La Noue, captures Orleans, 331;
seizes Luçon, 384;
comes to relief of Niort, 384;
in Saintonge, 408;
wounded at Ste. Gemme, 415;
at La Rochelle, 415;
at Rochefort, 418;
goes to Netherlands, 446;
opinion of, of St. Bartholomew, 452;
moderate policy of, 457;
overtures to, by Charles IX, 457;
negotiations of, in La Rochelle, 457, 458;
in Lusignan, 472;
persuades La Rochelle to join Politique party, 474;
efforts to prevent joining Montgomery, 476;
exchanged for Strozzi, 476;
attempts to bribe, 477;
takes Lusignan, 478;
saying of, 487.

Lansac, Charles IX offers to trade for La Charité, 416.

Lansac, sent to Trent, 196;
to Rome, 211;
to Madrid, 261, 294, 350;
repulsed in assault on La Charité, 384.

La Place, vilification of La Noue by, 458.

Lara, Spanish ambassador at Trent, 261.

Larboust, baron, proposes to neutralize Béarn, 399.

La Rive, pastor of church at St. Palais, 355.

La Roche l’Abeille, battle of, 383.

La Rochelle, president of, 77;
outbreak at, in 1542, 82;
port of, 228;
demanded by Huguenots, 345;
plot to seize, 350;
synod of, 230;
arms secretly stored at, 363;
secret plan to attack, 365;
king sends peace envoys to, 391;
townsmen of, 391, 392;
sea power of Huguenots at, 408, 409;
La Noue at, 415;
Charles IX offers to yield, 416;
aids Dutch, 426;
naval preparations at, in favor of Dutch, 440;
terms of peace granted by Charles IX, 459, 460;
reply of, to Charles IX, 454;
turns to England for aid, 454;
siege of, 455-59;
radical party in, 458;
plot to betray, 471.

Lausanne, treaty of, 309.

La Valette, plans to attack Montgomery at Condom, 407.

League, Gray, 242.
_See also_ Switzerland.

League, Holy, 212, 254, 259;
interest of Spain information of, 523, 524.

League, idea of Catholic, favored by Granvella, 211;
provincial, 212;
of Agen, 215, 254;
in Anjou and Maine, 216;
at Toulouse, 214, 215, 225;
influence of guilds upon, 223;
pernicious activity of Catholic, 251;
in Languedoc, 253;
Montluc’s advice concerning, 256-58;
forbidden by ordonnance of Moulins, 259;
overtures to Philip II for formation of, 304;
Holy League, establishment of, 304;
between Bern, Freiburg, and Valois, 308;
Philip II’s interest in provincial leagues, 351;
development of Holy League, 351, 352;
Ligue chrétienne et royale in Berry, 354;
in Anjou and Maine, 354;
revival of, at Toulouse, 354, 355;
at St. Palais, 355;
Politique league formed in Burgundy, 502.
_See also_ Association; Brotherhood of Catholics; Confrérie; Guilds.

League of the Public Weal (1465), 49.

League of Toulouse, 397.

Lectoure, siege of, 215, 408.

Legate, papal, advises recourse to arms, 103.
_See also_ Ferrara; Santa Croce.

Leighton, English captain, at siege of Rouen, 167.

Lepanto, battle of, 422.

L’Hôpital, Michel de, chancellor:
made chancellor, 43;
author of Edict of Romorantin, 44;
at council of Fontainebleau, 53;
pleads for harmony at States-General of Orleans, 76, 77;
influence of, 79;
labors for toleration, 103;
counsels Catherine de Medici, 128;
proposal to expel from country, 132;
Chantonnay protests against, 137;
protests against findings of Council of Trent, 210;
tilt with Guises, 210;
policy toward the guilds, 221;
Alva’s objection to, 278;
supports petition in favor of Huguenots, 288;
advocates reform, 290, 291, 296;
favors changes in Edict of Amboise, 318;
sent to confer with Condé, 328;
abused by Guises, 357;
clashes with cardinal of Lorraine, 366, 367;
dismissal of, 367.

Libourne, Montluc thinks of retiring to, 403, 408.

Lignerolles, sent “to practice the stay of the reiters”, 330;
sent to count palatine, 335.

Limeuil, Isabella de, liaison of Condé with, 245, n., 249.

Limoges, Sebastian de l’Aubespine, bishop of. _See_ Aubespine.

Limousin, duke of Anjou in, 372, 382;
treasurer of, intercepted by Huguenots, 389;
no massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450;
Huguenot movement in, 472.

Lithuania, secedes from Poland, 466.

Livron, 490;
Henry III raises siege of, 495.

Loans, history of French public, 8.

Loches, 70.

Loire River, Coligny aims to master line of, 138;
Condé controls middle, 141;
towns of, 154, 155;
fighting line, 181, 369;
Condé unable to cross, 371;
government maintains line of, 384;
viscounts cross at Blois, 396;
duke of Montpensier instructed to hold passage of, 476.

Lombardy, 124;
exportation of grain from, 241.

Londono, Don Sancho, Spanish commander, 310.

Longjumeau, Condé seizes highroad at, 138;
Peace of, 345-50, 360;
influence of viscounts on Peace of, 396.

Longueville, duke of, 114;
assumes pay of reiters, 346;
at siege of Poitiers, 387;
sent to interview La Noue, 457;
death of, 469.

Longueville, Madamoiselle de, marries Condé, 289.

Lorraine, 85;
wheat in, 286.

Lorraine, Charles of Guise, cardinal of, († 1574), 5;
charge of financial administration of, 20;
altercation of, with Coligny, 53;
character of administration of, 65;
leaves court, 73, 74;
Philip II writes to, 97;
hostility to Huguenots, 98;
at Colloquy of Poissy, 113;
leaves court again, 114;
corrupt practice of, 141;
collects money at Trent for the war, 181;
at Council of Trent, 196;
bitter against policy of Charles IX, 196;
sent to Vienna, 196;
persuades Emperor Ferdinand, 200;
proposes to form “The Brotherhood of Catholics in France”, 211;
feud with Marshal Montmorency, 252, 253;
opposes Chancellor L’Hôpital, 288;
hypocritical reconciliation with Coligny, 289;
accepts situation “telle quelle”, 290;
treasonable negotiations of, with Emperor, 303;
Alva’s opinion of, 336, n.;
negotiations with Spain, 336, 337, 362;
political “trimming” of, 356;
policy of, hardens, 361;
proposes marriage of Philip II and Marguerite of Valois, 364;
clashes with L’Hôpital, 363, 367;
with army in Saintonge, 382;
Jeanne d’Albret protests against, 392;
hastens coming of reiters, 392;
death of, 396.

Lorraine, duke of, 21;
prevented from joining Aumale, 339;
vassal for duchy of Bar, 425.

Loudun, taken by duke of Guise, 154;
Condé falls back on, 369;
skirmish near, 372.

Loudun (in valley of Rhone), taken by Joyeuse, 348.

Louis IX, loans of, 83, 367, 490.

Louis XI, ordonnance of, 217.

Louis XII, 70;
financial policy of, 81, 329, 471.

Louis of Nassau, relations of, with the Gueux, 297;
dealings of, with Protestant Germany, 298, 299;
defeated at Jemmingen, 360, 361;
joins Coligny, 411;
restoration of, demanded by Huguenots, 417;
urges alliance of France and England, 440, 441;
persuades Charles IX to sign Treaty of Blois, 445;
leaves France for Valenciennes, 445, 446;
interviews Catherine de Medici at Blamont, 463;
Spain fears co-operation of, with prince of Condé and duke of
Bouillon, 476.

Louise de Vaudemont, marries Henry III, 496.

Louvre, 6, 321;
secret conference of Guises at, 350.

Low Countries, revolt in, 59, 263;
Huguenots in, 315;
Huguenot activity in, 503.
_See also_ Alva; Flanders; Granvella; Louis of Nassau; Valenciennes;
William of Orange.

Lucerne, 154.

Luçon, La Noue seizes, 384, 415.

Lusignan, taken by Huguenots, 384;
taken by La Noue, 478.

Lutherans, 122.

Luxembourg, heretics from, 200;
difficulty of, with France, 263;
France fortifies frontier of, 307;
Alva at, 311, 315;
Mansfeldt sent to, 336;
mentioned, 301, 303.
_See also_ Alva; Mansfeldt.

Lyons, loan imposed upon, 61;
riot in 1542, 82;
commerce of, 86, 233, 234, 237;
revolt of, 91;
influence of Geneva upon, 148, 227, 233;
Reformed church in, 152;
recovery of, 154;
refuses to tolerate the mass, 192;
silk industry at, 227;
plague at, 236-38;
Catholic pressure upon Catherine de Medici at, 250;
Charles IX sends troops to, 307, 368;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Maarck, Count Van der. _See_ Beggars of the Sea.

Macon, 147, 151.

Madrid, L’Aubespine returns from, 241.

Maine, 141, 154;
Catholic league of, 216, 354.

Maligny, lieutenant of prince of Condé:
pursued by Guises, 41;
seizes Havre-de-Grace, 148, 264.

Malta, siege of, 248, 297, 302;
Spain borrows ships from, 306.

Manrique, Don Juan de, ambassador of Philip II, 93, 97.

Mans, Huguenot outburst at, 95;
bishop of, 255.

Mansfeldt, Count, sent to Luxembourg by Alva, 336;
prevented from joining Aumale, 339;
troops of, 373;
at battle of Moncontour, 380.

Marcel, provost of Paris: participation of, in massacre of
St. Bartholomew, 450, n.

Margaret of Parma, half-sister of Philip II and regent of
Netherlands:
refuses aid to France, 146;
urged to send assistance to Triumvirate, 211;
asserts impracticability, 212;
sends aid, 212;
fearful of revolt of Valenciennes, 264;
implores Philip II for aid, 264;
asks concessions for Netherlands, 267;
petitions Emperor for aid, 299.

Marguerite of Valois, sister of Charles IX, marriage of, proposed to
Don Carlos, 277;
to Philip II, 283;
marriage of, with Henry of Navarre proposed, 383;
duke of Guise makes love to, 419;
duke of Ferrara proposed as husband of, 423;
Don Carlos proposed as husband of, 424;
marries Henry of Navarre, 442.

Marguerite, sister of Henry II, married to Emanuel Philibert of Savoy,
1.

Marillac, archbishop of Vienne, 53.

Marillac, François, counsel of Condé, 69.

Marmoutier, abbey of, plundered by Huguenots, 140.

Marseilles, riot at, 133;
court at, 251, 306.

Martamot, Bernard Astarac, baron of, recovers Tarbes, 406.

Martigues, 255, 350.

Martyr, Peter, 114.

Matignon, captures Montgomery, 485;
made marshal of France, 497.

Maximilian, Emperor:
France at odds with, 300;
urged to recover Metz, 301;
affirms suzerainty over, 303;
daughter of, 424.

Meaux, 177;
Condé goes to, after massacre of Vassy, 137;
court at, 310, 338;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Melun, court removes to, 139.

Menendez, massacres French colony in Florida, 300.

Merchant adventurers, 437, n.

Metz, 21, 125;
fear lest Emperor try to seize, 193, 194;
imperial designs upon, 200, 300, 301;
Emperor affirms suzerainty over, 303;
Vieilleville sent to, 307;
importance of Calvinists in, 307;
Condé demands, 332;
citadel captured by Huguenots, 336;
center of government’s activity against duke of Deuxponts and
William of Orange, 379;
expulsion of Calvinists from, 379, n.;
duke of Anjou avoids, on way to Poland, 467.
_See also_ Cardinal’s War; Three Bishoprics; Vieilleville.

Mezières, duke of Alençon demands, 508.

Middelburg, revolt of, 444.

Milan, Spanish governor of, 241, 303;
French claim to, 453.

Milhaud, Huguenot association at, 324;
Huguenot camp at, 396;
alliance of Huguenots and Politiques at, 499.

Minard, vice-president of Parlement of Paris, murdered, 15, 41, n.

Moncontour, battle of, 388, 389.

Mons, capture of, Genlis, 446;
surrenders, 447.

Monsieur, Peace of, 516-21.

Montaigu, viscount of, 394.

Montargis, rising in, 150, 161.

Montaubon, demolition of walls of, 207;
viscounts at, 306;
mentioned, 405, 406;
Charles IX offers to yield to Huguenots, 416;
resists Joyeuse, 348;
three thousand Huguenots and Politiques of Toulouse find refuge in,
454;
Huguenot convention at, 461.

Montbrison (in Auvergne), Coligny at, 416.

Montbrun, captain of Scotch Guard killed at battle of Moncontour, 389.

Montbrun, defeated by Joyeuse, 348.

Montbrun, son of the constable, killed at Dreux, 179.

Mont Cenis, Alva’s route over, 308.

Montclaire, Antoine de Rabastenis, viscount of, 394.

Mont de Marsan, court at, 255;
massacre at., by Montluc, 403, 404.

Montdidier, entered by Catholic army, 154.

Montereau, Condé establishes headquarters at, 333.

Montfort, 177.

Montfran, battle near, 348.

Montgomery, Gabriel de Lorges, sieur de, captain of the Scotch Guard:
mortally wounds Henry II in tournament, 1;
at Havre-de-Grace, 165;
asks for terms during siege of Rouen, 167;
escapes, 168;
in Dieppe, 181;
precarious condition of, 187;
rumor of coming of, to Flanders, 266;
attends court at Moulins, 288;
swaggers around Paris, 294;
fear lest he come to Netherlands, 298;
in Lower Normandy, 326;
sent to Pontoise, 332;
some of the Scotch Guard desert to, 342;
in Languedoc, 397;
at Castres, 398;
near Toulouse, 398;
raises siege of Navarrens, 399;
campaign in Béarn, 398-402;
joins Coligny, 402;
Montluc plans to attack at Condom, 407;
ravages environs of Toulouse with Coligny, 410;
escapes from massacre of St. Bartholomew, 450;
appears with fleet before La Rochelle, 458;
in England, 471;
lands near Coutances and joins Guitery in Normandy, 472;
reply of, to Charles IX, 472;
takes Carentan and Argentan, 473;
captured and put to death, 484, 485.

Montigny, one of the leaders of the Flemish revolt, 265;
faithlessness of, 298.

Montjean, marshal, exactions of, 82.

Montluc, Blaise de, suppresses riot at Agen, 134;
reputation of, 147;
“true creator of the French infantry”, 155;
at Sienna, 156;
hostility of, to Huguenots, 156;
saves Toulouse and Bordeaux, 157;
helps form Catholic league at Toulouse, 214;
ordered to report to Marshal Termes at Orleans, 215;
helps form Catholic league at Agen, 215;
protest against, 226;
estimate of, of number of Huguenots in Guyenne, 230;
approached by Guises, 254, 255;
advice of, concerning formation of provincial Catholic leagues,
256-58;
proposes formation of international Catholic league, 260;
joint plan of, with Philip II, 261;
offered asylum in Spain, 261;
warns Philip II of connection between Huguenots and revolted
Flemings, 298;
on political theory of the Huguenots, 325, n.;
hatred of, of Damville, 347, 348, 398, 400, 404, 413;
sent to Gascony, 350;
dealings of, with Philip II, 350, 351;
vigilance of, 362;
outrages of, 362;
Jeanne d’Albret crosses Garonne “under the nose of”, 368, n.;
discovers plot in Bordeaux, 368;
resigns commission, but retracts resignation, 391;
plans with Terride to deliver Guyenne to Spain, 394;
plan of, to conquer Béarn, 397;
praises Montgomery, 398-402;
makes overtures to Damville, 403;
thinks of retiring to Libourne or Agen, 403;
massacres Mont de Marsan, 403, 404;
admiration of, for the reiters, 405;
saves Guyenne to Catholic cause, 406;
fortifies Agen, 406;
plans to attack Montgomery at Condom, 407;
secret dealings of, with Charles IX, 413;
still hopes to conquer Béarn, 413;
terribly wounded in siege of Rabastens, 414, 415.

Montluc, Jean de, bishop of Valence, 52, 53, 65, 80;
preaches at court, 98;
at Colloquy of Poissy, 114;
proposal to expel from country, 312;
sent to confer about peace, 344;
commissioner of finances in Guyenne, 416, n.;
sent on mission to Poland, 464.

Montmorency, Anne de, constable of France:
favorite of Henry II, 8;
feud of, with Guises, 18, 45, 50, 73;
not a party to conspiracy of Amboise 29, n.;
holds balance of power after death of Francis II, 72;
Philip II writes to, 97;
forms Triumvirate, 98;
welcomes duke of Guise after massacre of Vassy, 126;
advises king to repudiate responsibility for Vassy, 137;
organizes Paris, 137;
over-rules Catherine de Medici, 139;
charged with corrupt practice, 141;
begins to weaken, 141;
proposes to petition the Pope for aid, 143;
Condé demands retirement of, 150;
fears English intervention, 162;
captured at battle of Dreux, 179;
imprisonment of, 182;
endeavors to make a settlement, 183;
destruction of house of, plotted by Guises, 255;
quarrel with cardinal of Lorraine, 289;
protest in favor of Cardinal Châtillon, 289;
anger of, at Guises, 290;
quits court, 290;
avarice of, 296;
rash reply of, 319;
lieutenant-general, 331;
killed at battle of St. Denis, 332.

Montmorency, marshal and duke of, eldest son of the constable:
governor of Paris, 127, 294;
feud with cardinal of Lorraine, 252, 253, 356, 357;
approaches Huguenots, 289;
succeeds to constableship, 319;
Paris furious at, 326;
confers about peace, 344;
assumes pay of reiters, 346;
informed of plot of Guises, 350;
moderation of, 356;
leaves Paris, 357;
advocates marriage of Henry of Anjou and Queen Elizabeth, 358, 359;
deposed as governor of Paris, 358;
disaffection of, 375;
the man of the hour, 419;
urges marriage of duke of Anjou and Elizabeth and Henry of Navarre
with Marguerite of Valois, 422-26;
relations of, with Charles IX, 439;
Charles IX urged to execute, 481;
arrested, 482;
feud with Guises, the “seed of the war”, 493, 494.

Montpellier, Huguenot league at, 121;
court at, 252;
resists Joyeuse, 348, 405, 406, 411.

Montpensier, duke of, 36, 63, 73;
Philip II writes to, 97;
and the Triumvirate, 98;
mobbed by Huguenots, 120, 121;
Alva’s convert at Bayonne, 304;
castle belonging to, taken, 369;
defeats viscounts in Périgord, 396;
sent into Anjou, 476;
feud of, with the Guises, 498.

Montreuil, Coligny at, 138.

Montrichard, Coligny at, 182.

Mont St. Michel, Charles IX at, 413.

Morillon, provost, upon Flemish revolt, 314.

Moriscos, revolt of, 417, 418, 422.

Morlaas (in Béarn), captured by Terride, 398.

Morvilliers, bishop of Orleans, 165;
confers with Condé, 328;
as keeper of the seal protests against feudal release of duchy of
Bar and resigns, 425;
warns Charles IX, 468.

Moulins, Huguenots destroy Bourbon tombs at, 148, 249;
court passes winter at, 288;
influx of Huguenots into, 288;
interdiction of Protestant worship at, 289;
ordonnance of, 291-96.

Mouy, tries to prevent Strozzi’s coming, 329.

Muscovite, Polish hostility to, 465.

Musket, introduction of field, 310.

Nancy, duke of Anjou passes through, on way to Poland, 467.

Nantes, conspiracy of Amboise plotted at, 30, 283;
Edict of, 345, 409;
no massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Naples, 21;
troops from, 310;
French claim to, 453.

Narbonne, taken by Huguenot-Politique party, 502.

Nassau. _See_ Louis of Nassau.

“Natural frontiers”, 205.

Navarre, Philip II fears attack upon, 146.

Navarrens, siege of, by Terride, 398, 399;
raised by Montgomery, 399, 400.

Nemours, duke of:
made governor of Champagne, 92;
implicated in plot to kidnap Henry, duke of Orleans-Anjou, 119;
forsakes his wife and marries duchess of Guise, 293;
breaks Condé’s blockade of Paris, 332;
ordered to intercept duke of Deuxponts, 380.

Nemours, Madame de (duchess of Guise):
complicity of, in massacre of St. Bartholomew, 450;
demands governorship of Normandy for husband, 498.

Nérac, Huguenot church at, 156;
Montgomery at, 407;
revolts, 502.

Netherlands, progress of heresy in, 197;
critical situation in, 211;
Philip II and, 245;
revolt of, 263, 264, 360;
connection of revolt of, with Huguenots, 266, 296;
Huguenot preachers in, 297;
fear lest Montgomery come, 298;
influence of France upon, 359, 360;
proposed alliance for liberation of, 425.
_See also_ Alva; Egmont; Flanders; Granvella; Holland; Hoorne;
Louis of Nassau; Margaret of Parma; Philip II; Valenciennes;
William of Orange.

Nevers, 218;
captured by duke of Deuxponts, 380.

Nevers, duke of, claims government of Normandy, 498.

Newhaven. _See_ Havre-de-Grace.

Nîmes, Protestantism at, 228;
court at, 252.

Niort, 283;
La Noue relieves, 384;
Coligny falls back on, after battle of Moncontour, 389;
duke of Alençon demands, 508.

Nivernais, Protestantism in, 228.

Nobility, policy of, in 1559, 9;
impoverishment of, 344.

Noizay, château de, rendezvous of conspirators of Amboise, 34.

Nonio, an astrologer, 344.

Normandy, 26, 41, 45, 60, 76;
loans made in, 83;
Huguenots in, 95, 142, 148, 232;
Coligny made governor of, 126;
fear of English intervention in, 150;
formidable nature of revolt in, 162;
militia of, 208;
Protestantism in, 228, 230;
coast defense of, 307;
war of partisans in Lower, 326, 430;
apprehension in ports of, 471;
dispute over governorship of, 498.
_See also_ Bayeux; Caen; Caudebec; Dieppe; Havre; Rouen.

Norris, Sir Henry, English ambassador, protests innocence of English
government’s conduct, 373;
urges marriage of Queen Elizabeth with duke of Anjou, 422.

Nostradamus, astrologer, 251.

Nuncio, papal, demands that Cardinal Châtillon resign, 289;
at Madrid, 315;
protests against Huguenots in Avignon and Verre, 417.
_See also_ Ferrara; Santa Croce.

Nürnberg, 219.

Olivier, chancellor, 34;
death, 43.

Oran, Philip II’s expedition to, 248.

Orange, cruelties practiced at, 155.

Orange, William of, at deathbed of Henry II, 12;
leader of revolt of Netherlands, 264;
tactics of, 265;
insists upon convocation of States-General, 268;
allied with Gueux, 297;
relations with Condé, 297;
with Egmont and Hoorne, 298;
leaves Flanders, 312;
seeks to use reiters of Casimir, 360;
enters France, 369;
anxiety over movements of, 369;
effects junction with Deuxponts, 373, 374.
_See also_ Egmont; Gueux; Hoorne; Louis of Nassau; Netherlands.

Orléannais, 207;
Protestantism in, 228, 230.

Orleans, 36, 61, 63, 64, 70, 74, 127, 314;
Huguenot worship at, 80;
States-General at, 91, 221, 290;
Condé assumes command of Huguenot forces at, 139, 140;
troops pour into, 142;
Grammont fails to reach, 146;
fear lest supplies be cut off from, 151;
condition of country around, 152;
Condé retires to, 153;
Catholic garrisons around, 172;
Huguenot center at, 181;
D’Andelot’s serious position in, 186;
siege of, 186-88;
demolition of walls of, 207;
captured by La Noue, 331;
plot to seize, by Catholics, 350;
Catholic headquarters at, 367;
relief of, 396;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Orleans, Henry, duke of Orleans-Anjou. _See_ Henry III.

Orsenne, taken by Joyeuse, 348.

Orthez, captured by Terride, 398.

Ostabanés, 355.

Ozances, French ambassador in Spain, 117.

Pacheco, cardinal, 279, 281.

Palatine, count, 122, 158, 303.
_See also_ Casimir.

Pampeluna, Philip II strengthens, 146.

Pamphlets, Huguenot, 475, 476.
_See also_ _Franco-Gallia_; Hotman; Huguenots; _Le Tigre_.

Parat, viscount of, 394.

Paris, 1, 26, 45, 47, 48;
loan demanded of, 61;
Chaudien, Protestant pastor in, 64;
Catholic preachers of, admonished, 80;
rentes of, 83-85 (_see_ Finances; Debt);
abounds with Huguenot preachers, 94;
riot in, 94-96, 120;
prince de la Roche-sur-Yon made governor of, 126;
Marshal Montmorency made governor of, 127;
violence of, 127;
receives duke of Guise joyfully after massacre of Vassy, 135, 136;
weakness of Huguenots in, 137;
prince of Condé leaves, 137;
alarm of, 137-39;
troops collected in, 143;
fears attack by Condé, 147, 149;
hostility to Huguenots, 149;
people of, armed, 154;
Condé advances upon, 172, 173;
gunpowder factory at, blown up, 186;
refuses to tolerate terms of peace, 191;
appealed to for loan, 200;
hatred of, of Coligny, 206, n.;
witticism of, 207;
preponderance of, in formation of Holy League exaggerated, 213;
plague at, 284;
wheat dear in, 286;
Montgomery in, 294;
court moves to, 294;
bigotry of, 217;
exodus of Huguenots from, 326;
blockade of, 326;
makes loan to king, 329;
precarious condition of Condé before, 331;
Flemish troops arrive at, 335;
loyalty of, 339, 340;
prepares for siege, 343;
Catholic resentment of, 349;
garrison of, 350;
Alençon made governor of, 368;
anxiety of Guises over, 370;
elation at news of Jarnac, 376;
frightened by capture of La Charité, 381;
offers to maintain war, 417;
forced loan in, 461;
commercial dispute with Rouen, 470;
military preparations in, 476;
attacks upon, 507;
preparations to defend, 510;
remonstrances of, to Henry III, 510, 511;
resents Peace of Monsieur, 522.

Parlement of Paris, hostility of, to Huguenots, 96;
acquits prince of Condé, 102;
hopes of L’Hôpital and Coligny about, 103;
forbids speculation in grain, 286;
good sense of, 296.

Pau, captured by Terride, 398.

Paulin, Bertrand de Rabastenis, viscount of, 394, 395;
captured, 397;
Huguenot governor in Languedoc, 461.

Peasantry, armed by duke of Anjou, 384;
in Languedoc and Quercy, allied with viscounts, 395;
wretchedness of, 491;
arms in hands of, 494, 495;
revolt of, 502.

Périgord, Condé in, 372.

Perigueux, taken by Huguenots-Politiques, 502.

Perpignan, Charles offers to trade for La Charité, 416.

Peter’s Pence, 80.

Pfiffer, Swiss colonel at Meaux, 320.

Philip II, King of Spain (1557-98):
marries Elizabeth of Valois, 1;
notified of death of Henry II, 7;
suspected of urging inquisition in France, 12;
offers aid to Guises, 52;
alarmed at project of a national council in France, 59;
appealed to by Francis II, 59, 65;
said to be inclined to restore Navarre, 73;
seeks to harden policy of France toward Huguenots, 93;
writes to Catholic leaders, 97;
appealed to by Triumvirate, 99;
alarmed at policy of France, 116-18;
redoubles efforts with Antoine of Bourbon, 123;
continental designs of, 124, 125;
procrastination of, 131;
offers Sardinia to Antoine of Bourbon, 132;
asked for aid, 143;
fears attack on Navarre and strengthens Fontarabia and Pampeluna,
146;
and England, 163;
joy over battle of Dreux, 182;
hostility to Edict of Amboise, 195;
alarmed at England’s possible recovery of Calais, 197;
resolved to act after massacre of Vassy, 211;
opposed to marriage of Charles IX or Condé to Mary Stuart, 244;
and France, 245;
and Italy, 245, 247;
and England, 245;
and Scotland, 245;
character of, 247, 248;
interest of, in crushing Calvinism, 260;
joint plan of, with Pius IV and Montluc, 261;
orders maintenance of inquisition in Flanders, 262;
implored to come to Netherlands, 264;
consents to interview with Catherine de Medici, 270;
letter of, to Cardinal Pacheco, 270, 281;
consents to have Charles IX marry Elizabeth of Austria, 283;
anxiety of, 289;
doubt as to his course, 294;
overshadows France, 297;
worried at connection between Huguenots and revolted Flemings, 298;
refused permission to have Spanish troops cross France, 299;
knowledge of, of massacre of French in Florida, 300;
favors plan to recover Metz, 301, 302;
dares not make overt move against France, 302;
determines to send Alva to Flanders, 305;
angry at alliance of France and Switzerland, 315;
self-control of, 337;
fears Catherine de Medici will make termswith Huguenots, 341;
secret relations of, with Montluc, 350, 351;
interest of, in provincial Catholic leagues, 351;
proposed as husband of Marguerite of Valois, 364;
marries Anne of Austria, 364, 424;
war of, with the Moriscos, 417, 418, 422;
plans with reference to Mary Stuart, 424;
advised by Requesens of Huguenot activity of, in Low Countries, 503.

Philip IV, financial policy of, 83.

Picardy, 60, 70, 126, 204, 232, 268;
rebellion in, 190;
Huguenots in, 197;
militia of, 208;
wheat dear in, 286;
frontier strengthened, 315;
government of, promised to Condé, 316;
Marshal Cossé in, 369;
prince of Condé made governor of, 469;
danger on border of, 503;
Spain alarmed at situation in, 511, 512.

Piedmont, Marshal Termes in, 182;
viscount of Paulin in, 395.

Pilles, defends St. Jean-d’Angély, 390.

Piracy, 373.

Pius IV, alarmed at plan of National Council in France, 57;
offended at action of States-General, 81, 89;
sends cardinal of Ferrara to France, 115;
petitioned for aid, 143, 144;
sends troops to Joyeuse, 151;
anticipated death of, 200;
remonstrance of Charles IX to, 230;
idea of, of a European concert, 247;
brings pressure upon Catherine de Medici, 250;
joint plan with Philip II and Montluc, 261;
favors France at Trent, 261.

Pius V, advocates wholesale slaughter of Huguenots, 275;
troops of, 329;
takes victory of Jarnac as answer to prayer, 377;
elation of, 394.

Plague, at Lyons, 236-38, 283, 284.

Poissy, Colloquy of, 103, 106, 109, 110-14, 117, 230;
interest of German princes in, 121, 123;
Andelot sent to seize, 332.

Poitiers, 14, 41, 64, 142, 350;
exempt from gabelle, 85;
Huguenots in, 95;
rising in, 150;
captured by St. André, 153;
rebellion in, 190;
Protestantism in, 228;
siege of, 385-87.

Poitou, Huguenot movement in, 472.
_See also_ Poitiers.

Poland, 283;
duke of Anjou elected king of, 465;
French ambition in, 464, 465.

Politiques, difficult to distinguish between, and Huguenots, 231;
germ of, 358;
labor for peace, 372;
make common cause with Huguenots, 471;
political theory of, 475, 476;
imbued with Hotman’s teachings, 486;
alliance with Huguenots at Milhaud, 489, 499, 500;
Politique league in Burgundy, 502.

Poltrot, assassin of duke of Guise, 188.

Pontacq (in Béarn), captured by Terride, 398.

Pont-à-Mousson, duke of Deuxponts at, 379.

Pont Audemer, 162.

Pont de Cé, 372;
duke of Alençon demands, 508.

Pontoise, adjourned session of States-General at, 89, 106-9, 117;
Huguenot outburst at, 95;
demands of States-General of, 290;
Montgomery sent to seize, 332.

Pont St. Esprit, Joyeuse fails to take, 348.

Pope, nullifies marriage of duke of Nemours and offends the Rohans,
293;
consents to alienation of church property, 366;
takes victory of Jarnac as answer to prayer, 377;
opposed to Spain’s Polish aspirations, 464, 465;
refuses to receive Paul de Foix, 469.
_See also_ Pius IV; Pius V; Gregory XIII.

Porcien, prince of, activity of, in Low Countries, 315.

Porcien, princess of, marries duke of Guise, 419.

Portereau, a faubourg of Orleans, 186.

Port Ste. Marie, captured by Coligny, 406;
destruction of bridge at, 406, 407.

Port St. Martin, faubourg of Paris, windmills in, burned by Huguenots,
327.

Portsmouth, 188.

Portugal, proposal that queen of, marry duke of Anjou, 364;
Portuguese marriage planned for Marguerite of Valois, 419.

Portuguese, 300.

Pouzin, Huguenot stronghold, 490;
captured by Henry III, 491.

Poyet, chancellor of Francis I, reforms of, 82.

Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VII, 116.

Provence, 45, 49, 52, 64, 142;
Huguenots in, 95, 286;
association of, 214;
Protestantism in, 230;
Charles IX strengthens garrisons of, 306;
civil war in, 347;
towns controlled by Huguenots in, 361;
viscount of Rapin in, 305;
Huguenot control of, 405, 406.

Provins, 161, n., 284.

Prussia, Lithuania makes alliance with Russia, Sweden, and, 466.

Puygaillard, outmatched by La Noue, 415.

Quercy, viscounts in, 395.

Rabastens Montluc terribly wounded at siege of, 415, 416.

Ranke, quoted on massacre of Vassy, 135.

Rapin, viscount of, 394;
in rising of Toulouse in 1562, 395;
governor of Montauban, 395;
crosses Rhone into Dauphiné and Provence, 395;
ravages in Vivarais, 396.

Reformation in England and Germany, 229.

Regency, of Blanche of Castille, 42;
of Anne of Beaujeu, 42;
and Salic Law, 72, n.
_See also_ Antoine of Bourbon; Catherine de Medici; Charles IX;
Francis II.

Reiters, 145, n., 157, 158, 333, 335, 338, 373;
cross Seine, 160;
introduce German words into French language, 160, n.;
in Normandy, 166;
at battle of Dreux, 179;
Coligny in fear of his own, 184;
spoliation of Normandy by, 187, 188;
return of, to Germany, 192;
depredations of, 193-95;
paid by Catherine de Medici, 198;
of Rhinegrave, 200;
Lignerolles sent “to practice the stay of”, 330;
enter Lorraine, 339;
effect junction with Condé, 339;
pay of, 345, 346;
ravages of, 357;
effort to prevent, joining William of Orange, 363;
levied in Germany, 368;
of duke of Deuxponts, 370;
urged to advance to Loire River, 370;
Paris fears coming of, after capture of La Charité, 381;
in battle of Moncontour, 388, 389;
threaten to mutiny, 391;
hastened forward by cardinal of Lorraine, 393;
tentative offer of restoration of Three Bishoprics if Emperor will
stay progress of, 393;
effective warfare of, 405;
mutiny of, 412;
devastate Fair of Champagne, 420, n.;
plundering of, 491;
cross Rhine, 505;
ravages in Champagne, 506, 507;
return of, to Germany, 522, 523.

Renaudie, Godfrey de Barry, sieur de; leader of conspiracy of Amboise,
30;
death of, 38.

Rennes, Bochetel, bishop of, sent to count palatine, 335.

Rentes, 83.
_See also_ Finances; Debts; Loans; Paris.

Requesens, succeeds Alva as governor of Spanish Netherlands, 404;
offers Spanish troops to Catherine de Medici, 494;
warns Philip II of Huguenot activity in Low Countries, 503;
fears daughter of William of Orange will marry duke of Alençon, 503.

Revel, discontent with Polish election, 466.

Rheims, 218;
endangered by William of Orange, 370;
Henry III crowned at, 495.

Rhine, 124;
D’Andelot crosses, 158.

Rhinegrave, 177;
reiters of, mutiny in Champagne, 200.

Rhinelands, 246.

Rhone river, Joyeuse’s campaign in valley of, 348;
Henry III attempts to clear valley of, 490.

Ridolfi plot, 433, 462.

Riga, discontent with French election in Poland, 466.

Robert, Claudius, counsel of prince of Condé, 69.

Rochefort, La Noue at, 415.

Rochefoucauld, count of, 6;
driven into Saintonge, 153;
Alva advises execution of, 274, 350.

Rochelle. _See_ La Rochelle.

Roche-sur-Yon, prince de, accompanies Elizabeth of France to Spain, 7;
governor of Orleans, 63;
governor of Paris, 126;
supplanted by Marshal Montmorency, 127.

Roggendorf, recruiting sergeant of Guises in Germany, 145, n.;
arrives in Paris, 162;
Catherine de Medici demands withdrawal of, from Paris, 295.
_See also_ Reiters.

Rohan, duke de, forbids Catholic worship in his domains, 288;
anger of, at duke of Nemours for divorce of his wife, 293;
Huguenots flee to protection of, 326;
Henry III attempts to confiscate the lands of, 502.

Rome, 50, 299.
_See also_ Gregory XIII; Pius IV; Pius V.

Romero, Julian, Spanish commander, 310.

Romorantin, Edict of, 104.
_See also_ Edict.

Rosay-en-Brie, rendezvous of Huguenots at, 320.

Rotrou, county of, given to Condé, 316.

Rotterdam, all Holland lost to Spain save Amsterdam and, 446.

Rouen, 27, 127, 177;
riots in, 47, 48, 71, 84, 142, 148;
Reformed church in, 152;
Condé thinks of going to, 154;
Aumale approaches, 155;
resolve to attack, 161, 162;
siege of, 165-70;
Marshal Brissac at, 182;
objects to Edict of Amboise, 192;
Catholic association in Rouennais, 216;
port of, 228;
opposition to Peace of Longjumeau in, 347;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450;
commercial dispute of, with Paris, 470.

Rouergue, raid of viscounts in, 395.
_See also_ Milhaud.

Rouissillon, Edict of, 250, 251.
_See also_ Edict.

Roy, Jacques le, archbishop of Bourges, aids in establishment of
Catholic league in Berry, 354.

Roye, Eleanor de, princess of Condé, asks Elizabeth for aid, 187;
death, 243.

St. Aignan, Coligny at, 182.

St. Ambroise, Alva at, 309, 311.

St. André, marshal, 7, 35, 69;
Philip II writes to, 97;
hostility of, to Huguenots, 98;
joins Triumvirate, 98, 99;
reprimanded by Catherine de Medici, 133;
charged with corrupt practice, 141, 296;
Condé demands retirement of, 150;
captures Poitiers, 153;
killed at battle of Dreux, 179;
succeeded by Marshal Vieilleville, 181;
daughter of, not permitted to marry young prince of Condé, 206.

St. Bartholomew, massacre of, influence of Bayonne Conference upon,
271, 281;
Huguenot organization before and after, 324, 325, 383;
massacre of, 449-53;
responsibility of Catherine de Medici for, 449;
causes fourth civil war, 474;
German resentment because of, 468.

St. Catherine’s Mount, fortress of Rouen, 155, 167.
_See also_ Rouen.

St. Cloud, 21, 138, 159;
war in, 48, 49, 60.

St. Denis, 177;
windmills in faubourg of, burned by Huguenots, 327;
battle of, 332, 338.

St. Florens, abbey of, Condé massacres garrison of, 372.

Ste. Gemme, La Noue wounded at battle of, 415.

St. Germain, 131;
Peace of, 416-18;
infractions of, 420;
plot to seize king at, 477, 478.

St. Honoré, faubourg of, windmills burned in, 327.

St. Jean-d’Angély, arms secretly stored at, 363;
siege of, 389-90;
townsmen of, 391, 392;
honorable treatment of garrison of, by Charles IX, 392;
revolts, 502.

St. Jean de Maurienne, Alva at, 311.

St. Lô, demolition of walls of, 207;
Huguenot forces in, 472.

St. Louis (Louis IX), 367.

St. Marceau, Catholic camp in faubourg of, 343.

St. Martin-des-champs, 334.

St. Mathurin, 161.

St. Maur-des-Fosses, 293.

St. Omer, “Spanish Fury” at, 305.

St. Ouen, 327.

St. Palais, Catholic league at, 355.

St. Pierre, abbey of, Condé imprisoned in, 182.

St. Quentin, battle of, 8.

St. Roman, viscount of, made Huguenot governor in Languedoc, 461.

St. Sulpice, French ambassador in Spain:
Catherine de Medici’s correspondence with, 247, 249;
discovers plot to kidnap Jeanne d’Albret and seize Béarn, 266;
succeeded by Fourquevaux, 283, 424.

Saintes, 283;
arms secretly stored at, 363, 406.

Saintonge, exempt from gabelle, 85;
revolt in, 150;
mentioned, 379;
duke of Anjou in, 381;
La Noue in, 408.

Salic Law, 337.

Salzedo. _See_ Cardinal’s War.

Sancerre, count of, 33.

Sancerre, siege of, 460.

Santa Croce, cardinal of, 295.

Sardinia, 73;
offered to Antoine of Bourbon, 132;
troops from, 310.

Saumur, 141;
garrison at, 309;
Coligny plans to take, 385;
duke of Alençon demands, 508.

Sauveterre (in Béarn), captured by Terride, 398.

Saverne, conference between dukes of Guise and Würtemburg at, 123.

Savigny, lieutenant in Touraine, 63, 64.

Savoy, 119, 144, 246;
dowry of duchess of, 208;
Alva’s march through, 311;
troops of, 329.

Savoy, Emanuel Philibert, duke of, marries sister of Henry II, 1;
urges extirpation of heresy, 210;
mission of Don Juan de Acuna to, 308;
treaty of, with Bern, 309;
interview, with Damville, 488, 491.

Saxony, John William, duke of, 52.

Schomberg, German colonel in service of France, 371;
missions of, to Germany, 463, 467, 504.

Scotch Guard, history of, 7;
reduced, 208;
meeting of, 342;
supplanted by Swiss Guard, 342, n.
_See also_ Montgomery.

Scotland, French troops sent to, 199;
alliance with France, 243;
Philip II and, 245;
relations of, with England, 433, 434.
_See also_ Cardinal of Lorraine; Mary Stuart.

Sedan, duke of Bouillon at, 472.

Seine River, guard of, 138;
mouth of, 148;
line of, 181;
Coligny unable to cross, 185;
Condé unable to cross, 371.

Seize (Sixteen) nucleus of Holy League in Paris, 318.

Sens, archbishop of, 114;
Huguenots of, 127, 128;
riot at, 133;
mentioned, 209, 218, 232, 333, 339;
highroad to, held by Huguenots, 327.

Sevignac, viscount of, 394.

Sforza, Ludovico, 70.

Shakerly, Thomas, an Englishman, 126.

Sicily, troops from, 310.

Siena, Montluc at, 156.

Sigismund Augustus of Poland, death of, 464.

Silly, Jacques de, representative of noblesse in States-General, 77.

Sipierre, lieutenant in Orléannais, 63, 69.

Sluys, Spanish fleet in, dispersed, 446;
captured by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 446.

Smith, English ambassador in France, tries to dissuade Huguenots from
making peace, 198;
demands restitution of Calais, 204;
description of plague at Lyons, 236-38;
saying of, about cardinal of Lorraine, 290;
writes to Burghley, 290;
interest of, in marriage negotiations of Elizabeth and duke of
Anjou, 429.

Soissons (Soissonais), wheat dear in, 286;
captured by Huguenots, 331;
plot to seize, 350.

Somarive, cruelties of, 155.

Sorbonne, hostility of, to Huguenots, 96;
students of, 127.

Spain, 131, 158;
Catherine de Medici inclines toward, 137;
money from, 184;
urges extirpation of heresy, 210;
saying of Spain’s ambassador, 232;
commerce of, in Lombardy, 241, 242;
impatient for fulfilment of promise at Bayonne, 283;
Protestants of, 308, n.;
policy of, in Switzerland, 371;
fears French attack on Franche Comté, 418;
offers duke of Anjou command of fleet against Turks, 423;
demands that Charles IX suppress Huguenot activity in Netherlands,
426;
prospect of war with France, 443;
interest of, in Poland, 464;
alarm over possible cession of border fortress in Picardy to prince
of Condé, 512.
_See also_ Alava; Alva; Chantonnay; Philip II.

“Spanish fury”, 305.

Splügen Pass, 241.

States-General, of Orleans, called, 55, 65, 68;
relation of, to proposed National Council, 58, 68;
transferred from Meaux to Orleans, 62;
Huguenots hope to organize, 75;
opening of, 75;
debates in, 75-80;
legislation of, 81;
financial policy of, 87-89;
factional rivalry in, 91;
resolution of, governing clergy, 92;
adjourned session of, at Pontoise, 89, 106-9, 117;
demands of, 290;
demand for, 421.

Stelvio Pass, 241.

Strasburg, 308.

Strozzi, cardinal, helps in formation of Catholic league at Toulouse,
214.

Strozzi, Italian artillery colonel, 249, 271;
troops under command of, 329;
destroys bridge of boats across Seine, 332;
taken prisoner at battle of La Roche l’Abeille, 383;
massacres garrison of Marans, 455;
exchanged for La Noue, 476.
_See also_ Italians.

Stuart, Mary, 5, 21, 48, 72, 163, 199;
proposed marriage of, to Don Carlos, 94;
sought in marriage by King of Denmark, 123;
project to marry prince of Condé to, 243;
Guises want to marry, to Charles IX, 244;
duke of Anjou put forward as husband of, 423;
marries Darnley, 424.

Stuart, Robert, suspected of murder of president Minard, 41, n.;
kills constable Montmorency at battle of St. Denis, 332.

Superstition, 287.
_See also_ Nonio; Nostradamus.

Sweden, relations of, with Poland, 466.

Swiss, payment of, by Francis I, 85;
join Tavannes, 157;
sent to aid of duke of Aumale, 162;
enrolment of, to protect French frontier, 315, 318;
Huguenots try to break French alliance with, 330;
sufferings of, in the army, 342;
cannot come till September, 384;
at siege of Poitiers, 387, 453;
refuse to let France enroll mercenaries, 454;
sent into Languedoc and Dauphiné, 461;
licensed, 469.
_See also_ Froelich; Meaux.

Switzerland, French exiles from, 30, 94;
cantonal system of, 111;
mentioned, 144, 154;
Spain’s ascendency in, 240;
French interests in, 240-43;
rivalry of France and Spain in, 299;
French enrolments in, 307;
fears joint attack of Spain and Savoy, 308;
true policy of France in, 318;
policy of Spain in, 371;
debts of French crown in, 371.
_See also_ Basel; Bellièvre; Bern; Freiburg; Grisons; Valois.

Taille, 81.
_See also_ Debt; Finances.

Tarbes, Huguenots recover, 406.

Tarde, pastor of church at Ostabanès, 355.

Tavannes, marshal opposes extraordinary tribunals, 14;
sent to Dauphiné after conspiracy of Amboise, 38;
accuses Catherine de Medici of being privy to conspiracy of Amboise,
42, n.;
foils attack on Dijon, 140;
saves Châlons-sur-Saône, 149;
forces of, 154;
Swiss join, 157;
Margaret of Parma sends aid to, 212;
forms Confrérie du St. Esprit in Burgundy, 216;
sent to guard frontier against reiters, 339;
organizes Confrérie du St. Esprit in Burgundy, 352, 353;
organizes Catholic league in Berry, 354;
vigilance of, 362;
refuses to seize Condé and Coligny by treachery, 365;
at battle of Jarnac, 376;
protests against siege of St. Jean-d’Angély, 390;
bold reply of, to Spanish ambassador, 418, 419;
urges marriage of duke of Anjou with Queen Elizabeth, 426;
complicity of, in massacre of St. Bartholomew, 453.

Taxes, new, by Henry III, 509-11.

Teligny, sent to confer about peace, 344;
sent to king in overtures for peace, 392.

Templars, loans of, 83.

Tende, count of, governor of Provence, blocks viscount of Rapin, 396.

Termes, marshal, 36, 39, 69;
sent to Normandy after conspiracy of Amboise, 39;
governor of Guyenne, 63;
and Triumvirate, 99;
succeeded by marshal Bourdillon, 182;
Montluc ordered to report to, 215.

Terride, implicated with Montluc in plot to deliver Guyenne to Spain,
394;
campaign in Béarn, 398-400.

Thionville, Alva at, 311.

Three Bishoprics, 124, 302;
refuge of heretics from Lower Germany, 200;
Emperor revives claim to, 336;
promise of restoration of, to Emperor if he will stop progress of
reiters, 393;
counter-claims of France and Austria to, 424;
claims of Casimir, count palatine, to, 521.
_See also_ Metz; Toul; Verdun; Vieilleville.

Throckmorton, Sir Nicholas, English ambassador in France, 24, 126;
urges Elizabeth to give aid to Huguenots, 184;
confers with Coligny, 185;
tries to dissuade Huguenots from making peace, 198.

Thuringia, landgrave of, 122.

_Tigre, Le_, a pamphlet written by Hotman, 39.

Tithes, Huguenots refuse to pay, 118.
_See also_ Clergy; Dîme; Finances.

Tocsin, 160.

Toledo, Don Ferdinand Alvarez de, Spanish commander, 311.

Torcy, sent to interview Montgomery, 472.

Toul, riot at, 133, 301.
_See also_ Metz; Three Bishoprics; Verdun.

Toulon, 306.

Toulouse, 14, 84, 368;
riot at, 133, 142, 214;
Huguenots suffer heavily in, 150;
saved by Montluc, 157;
refuses to recognize peace of Amboise, 192;
Catholic league formed at, 214;
opposition to peace of Longjumeau at, 347;
revival of Catholic league in, 354;
environs of, devastated by viscounts, 395;
parlement of, asserts jurisdiction over Béarn, 397;
Montgomery near, 398;
invested by Coligny and Montgomery, 410, 411;
parlement of, protests against Peace of St. Germain, 417, n.;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Touraine, 45, 63, 141, 154;
Huguenots in, 95 and n.;
duke of Montpensier mobbed by Huguenots in, 120, 121.

Tournay, heresy at, 197;
revolt of, feared, 264.

Tournelles, Palais de, 3, 6.

Tournon, Cardinal, 50;
writes to Philip II, 97;
and Triumvirate, 98;
Catherine de Medici offended at, 133.

Tournon, taken by Huguenots-Politiques, 502.

Tours, 33, 35, 127;
Du Plessis, Huguenot pastor at, 64;
riots at, 133, 140;
drownings at, 154.

Trent, Council of, 114, 116, 117, 118, 124, 209, 299;
cardinal of Lorraine collects money at, 181;
findings of, 57, 209, 210, 234, 250, 273, 278, 295;
conflict of Spanish and French ambassadors at, 261, 262.

Tresques, taken by Joyeuse, 396.

Trèves, archbishop of, 303.

Triumvirate, pillars of, 97;
formation of, 98, 99;
appeals to Philip II, 99;
negotiations of, 121;
tries to influence Antoine of Bourbon, 131, 133;
intends to compel court to go to Bois de Vincennes, 137;
Antoine surrenders to, 138;
Catherine de Medici yields to, 143;
asks Margaret of Parma for aid, 145;
Huguenots demand withdrawal of, 150;
overtures of, to Spain, 211;
Spain’s slow reply to, 212, 224.

Trompette, Château, Huguenots attempt to seize, 213.
_See also_ Bordeaux.

Troyes, 84, 127, 142, 232, 339;
treaty of, 204, 209, 238, 239;
Condé moves to, 333;
Catholic league of Champagne formed at, 354;
massacre of St. Bartholomew at, 450.

Tulle, inhabitants of, refuse to pay taxes, 492.

Tunis, “kingdom of”, promised to Antoine of Bourbon, 132.

Turenne, viscount of, sent to Montgomery, 472;
sides with Montmorency, 474.

Turin, 311;
Henry III at, 488;
Damville at, 488.

Turks, 84, 89;
relations of, with Catherine de Medici, 248;
attack Malta, 248, 297, 302, 306;
league proposed against, 277;
fleet against, 423;
league against, 423, n.;
French relations with, 424;
Spain demands discontinuance of French relations with, 426;
friendliness of, to France, 453;
make truce with Emperor, 464;
Damville introduces, into Aigues Mortes, 492.
_See also_ Lepanto.

Tuscany, money from, 184;
duke of, 311;
influence of, 423.

Tyrol, 242.

Uloa, Alonzo de, Spanish commander, 310.

Universities, Huguenots excluded from, 420.

Utrecht, revolt in, 265.

Uzes, duke of, resigns, 502.

Valais, forms league with Bern and Freiburg, 308.

Valenciennes, heresy at, 197;
rebellious spirit of, 264, 266;
Louis of Nassau takes, 445, 446.

Valéry, Synod of, 319.

Valois, wheat dear in, 286.

Valteline, 241.

Vargas, member of Alva’s Council of Blood, 312.

Vassy, massacre of, 134, 135;
does not dismay Huguenots, 137;
constable advises King to repudiate guilt of, 137;
duke of Guise to blame for, 142;
Dieppe revolts after news of, 148;
convinces Philip II it is time to act, 211.

Vendôme, 127;
rising in, 150.

Venetian ambassador, quoted, 65, 70, 201, 232.

Venice, money from, 184;
in league against the Turks, 423, n.;
Henry III at, 488.

Verdun, 301;
France erects citadel at, 307, 315.

Vergt, battle of, 147, 154, 157, 215.

Vernon, 152.

Verre. _See_ Avignon.

Vesalius, physician of Philip II, attends Henry II, 3.

Vieilleville, marshal, governor of Metz, opposed to Guises, 125;
succeeds St. André, 181;
sent to Switzerland, 240, 241;
sent to Metz, 307;
confers with Condé, 328;
moderation of, 356.

Vienna, cardinal of Lorraine sent to, 196.

Vienne River, duke of Anjou withdraws army across, 387.

Villebonne, governor of Rouen, 47, 48;
guards Pont de l’Arche, 177.

Villefranche, Coligny at, 181.

Villeroy, reports on condition of king’s army before La Rochelle,
459;
sent to Languedoc, 476.

Viscounts, 375;
strength of, in the south, 391;
early history of, 394-97;
cross Loire River at Blois, 396;
cross Dordogne River to join prince of Condé, 396;
defeated in Périgord, 396;
destroy Gaillac, 396;
join Montgomery, 397;
helped by feud between Montluc and Damville, 402, 403.

Visières, lieutenant of Montgomery, pursued by Guises, 41.

Vivarais, viscount of Rapin in, 396;
Coligny in, 411.

Voulton, 334.

Wallachia, Poland hopes to recover, 455.

Walloons, at siege of Poitiers, 387.

Walsingham, urges marriage negotiations of Elizabeth to duke of
Anjou, 422.

Warwick. _See_ Havre-de-Grace.

Warwick, earl of, instructions to, 166;
seizes Havre de Grace, 167;
hopes to compel towns of Seine to capitulate, 177;
urges Elizabeth, 184;
precarious position of, 187, 201;
surrenders, 213.

Westelburg, count of, 373.

Wheat, price of, 286, 287, 343, 408.

William of Orange, sends assurance to Coligny, 379;
restoration of, demanded by Huguenots, 417;
urges alliance of France and England, 440, 441;
issues proclamation from Dillenberg, 444;
at Frankfort Fair, 446;
overtures of France to, 462;
treaty with England, 463, n.;
plots in Franche Comté, 492, 493;
possible marriage of daughter of, to duke of Alençon, 503.

Windmills, burned by Huguenots in faubourgs of Paris, 327.

Worcester, earl of, sent to France, 455.

Würtemburg, conference of duke of Guise with duke of, at Saverne, 123;
sister of duke of, proposed as wife of Henry of Navarre, 422.

Zealanders, disperse Spanish fleet at Sluys, 446.

Zurich, alarmed at approach of duke of Alva, 308;
neutrality of, 371.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _The Wars of Religion_ (“The Cambridge Modern History,” Preface).

[2] In the appendix I have published the constitution of two of these
provincial leagues hitherto unknown.

[3] _Mém. de Tavannes_, 239.

[4] The constable Montmorency, in a letter to Queen Elizabeth dated
June 30, 1559, says that the accident happened “yesterday,” i. e., June
29.—_C. S. P. Eng. For._, No. 698. Almost all the sources, however,
give June 30. Cf. Castelnau, Book I, chap. i. Throckmorton gives June
30. See p. 3, note 1.

[5] The origin of the Scotch Guard goes back to the Hundred Years’
War. In 1420, five years after the battle of Agincourt, when Henry V
was in possession of all of northern France, the dauphin, Charles VII,
sent the count of Vendôme to Scotland to ask for assistance in virtue
of the ancient league between the two nations. In 1421 a body of 1,000
Scots arrived in France under the earl of Buchan. They fought at Baugé
in Anjou in that year, but were almost all destroyed in 1424 in the
furious battle of Verneuil. The remnant, in honor of their services,
became the king’s own guard. See Skene, _The Book of Pluscarden_,
II, xix-xxi, xxvi-xxix; Houston, _L’Escosse françois_ (Discours des
alliances commencées depuis l’an sept cents septante, et continuées
jusques à present, entre les couronnes de France et d’Escosse), Paris,
1608; Forbes Leith, _The Scots Men-at-Arms and Life Guards in France,
from Their Formation until Their Final Dissolution_, 2 vols., 1882.
The Guard consisted of the principal captain, the lieutenant, and the
ensign, the maréchal-de-loges, three commis, eighty archers of the
guard, twenty-four archers of the corps; the pay of whom amounted
annually to 51,800 francs, or 6,475 pounds sterling.—_C. S. P. For._,
No. 544, December, 1559.

[6] Claude Haton, whose Catholic prejudice was strong, believed this
reluctance to be feigned (_Mémoires_, I, 107).

[7] D’Aubigné, Book II, chap, xiv, says the blow raised the King’s
visor, and that the end of the lance, which was bound with a _morne_,
or ring, to dull the point, crashed through the helmet like a bludgeon.
Tavannes, chap, xiv, says that the King had failed to take the
precaution to fasten his visor down.

[8] Throckmorton to the Lords in Council, _C. S. P. For._, June 30,
1559.

[9] D’Aubigné, _loc. cit._ La Place, 20, says that the King spoke to
the cardinal of Lorraine. De Thou, Book II, 674, on the authority of
Brantôme, doubts it.

[10] The Palais des Tournelles stood in the present Place Royale. It
was torn down in 1575.

[11] Throckmorton, _loc. cit._

[12] The constable Montmorency to Queen Elizabeth, _C. S. P. For._, No.
898, June 30, 1559. Throckmorton, _ibid._, No. 928, July 4, “doubted
the King would lose his eye.”

[13] _C. S. P. For._, No. 950, July 8, 1559. De Ruble, _Antoine de
Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, I, 432, has published Vesalius’ official
report. Henry II had a body-physician who also enjoyed a European
reputation. This was Fernal. He was the author of a Latin work upon
pathology which was translated into French in 1660 under the title: _La
pathologie de Jean Fernal, premier medicin de Henry II, roy de France,
ouvrage très-utile à tous ceux qui s’appliquent à la connoissance du
corps humain_.

[14] There is an account of the funeral in _Arch. cur._, III, 309-48.
The MS account of the funeral expenses is in the Phillipps Collection,
2,995. Compare Galembert, _Funerailles du roy Henri II, Roole des
parties et somme de deniers pour le faict des dits obsèques et pompes
funèbres_. Publié avec une introduction. Paris, Fontaine, 1869.

[15] See the description of Throckmorton, written to Queen Elizabeth,
_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,190, August 15, 1559.

[16] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,242, August 25, 1559.

[17] _Rel. vén._, I, 195. “De fort petit sens,” says La Planche, 202.

[18] Throckmorton to Cecil, June 30, 1559, _C. S. P. For._, 899.

[19] And yet the evil nature of Henry II’s reign may be exaggerated.
An extended and critical history of his reign is still to be written.
Claude Haton, no mean observer of economic conditions says: “En ce
temps et par tout le règne du dit feu roy, faisoit bon vivre en France,
et estoient toutes denrées et marchandises à bon marché, excepté
le grain et le vin, qui enchérissoient certaines années plus que
d’aultres, selon la stérilité, et toutesfois esdittes treize années
de son règne n’ont esté que trois ans de cherté de grain et de vin,
et n’a valu le blé froment, en la plus chère des dittes trois années,
que 14 et 15. s. t. le bichet (à la mesure de Provins), et les aultres
grains au prix le prix, et ne duroit telle cherté que trois moys pour
le plus.” A valuable table of prices of food stuffs follows.—Claude
Haton, I, 112, 113.

[20] See De Ruble, “Le traité de Cateau-Cambrésis,” _Revue d’hist.
diplomatique_ (1887), 385, and the more extensive work (1889) with the
same title by this author.

[21] On the general situation between the wounding and the death of
Henry II see _Nég. Tosc._, III, 400.

[22] Castelnau, Book I, chap. i. He was sixteen on January 19, 1560.
Cf. Castan, “La naissance des enfans du roi Henri de Valois,” _Revue
des savants_, 6^[me] sér., III.

[23] Throckmorton to the queen, July 18, 1559, _C. S. P. For._, No.
1,009. This information was given to the council and a deputation of
the Parlement, but no official proclamation was made.—D’Aubigné, I,
243, n. 1.

[24] Claude Haton, I, 106; Tavannes, 245. The deposed beauty
surrendered the keys of the royal cabinets and some bags of precious
jewels to the new queen, La Planche, 204; Baschet, 494, dispatch of the
Venetian ambassador, July 12, 1559. Cf. Guiffrey, _Lettres inédites de
Diane de Poitiers_, 1866; Imbart de St. Amand, _Revue des deux mondes_,
August 15, 1866, p. 984. For light upon her extravagance see Chevalier,
_Archives royales de Chenonceau: Comptes des recettes et despences
faites en la Chastellenie de Chenonceau, par Diane de Poitiers,
duchesse de Valentinois, dame de Chenonceau et autres lieux_ (Techener,
1864). Hay, _Diane de Poitiers, la grande sénéschale de Normandie,
duchesse de Valentinois_, is a sumptuously illustrated history.

[25] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,024, July 19, 1559.

[26] Castelnau, Book I, chap, ii; _C. S. P. For._, No. 972, July 11,
1559; No. 1,080, July 27, 1559.

[27] La Planche, 208; Claude Haton, I, 108; Paulin Paris,
_Négociations_, 108, note.

[28] Tavannes, 245; Paris, _Négociations relatives au règne de François
II_, 61, 76, 80, 83, 86; La Planche, 207; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,121,
August 4, 1559; _ibid._, August 1, 1559, No. 1,101, Throckmorton to the
Queen: “The French ... are in fear because of the king of Spain, who
has not as yet restored S. Quentin’s, Ham nor Chastelet, the Spanish
garrisons of which daily make courses into the country as far as Noyon,
about which the governor of Compegny has written to the King, adding
that it were as good to have war as such a peace.” _C. S. P. For._,
July 13, 1559, No. 985, Throckmorton to the Queen: “It is thought
that the treaty already made is void by the French King’s death; ...
that the king of Spain, seeing his advantage and knowing the state of
France better than he did when he made that peace, will either make new
demands, or constrain France to do as he will have them, who would be
loath to break with him again.”

[29] Tavannes, _op. cit._

[30] Jacques d’Alban de St. André, born in the Lyonnais, marshal
1547, favorite of Henry II. He was taken prisoner at the battle of
St. Quentin. After the death of Henry II, fearing prosecution for his
enormous stealings in office, he became the tool of the Guises. See
La Planche, 205, 206; _Livre des marchands_, 438, 439; and especially
Boyvin du Villars, 904 ff., on his administration in Provence.

[31] Brissac was governor of Piedmont under Henry II, where he
sustained the interests of France so energetically that Philip hated
him. The Guises made great efforts to attach him to their party, with
the hope of playing him against the Bourbons and Montmorencys (Paris,
_Négociations_, 73, note). After the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, the
fortresses of the duke of Savoy were dismantled, to the intense anger
of the latter. Cf. Fillon Collection, 2,654: Letter of July 16, 1560,
to the duchess of Mantua, complaining that the people of Caluz have
revolted against the authority of the marshal Brissac. This hard
feeling probably explains Brissac’s transfer to the government of
Picardy, in January, 1560, to the chagrin of the prince of Condé, who
asked for the place (Varillas, _Hist. de François II_, II, 35; De Thou,
Book XXV, 518) after the marriage of Emanuel Philibert to the sister of
Henry II. See Marchand, _Charles I de Cossé, comte de Brissac_, Paris,
1889, chap. xvi.

[32] La Place, 26.

[33] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,121, 1,149, August 4 and August 8, 1559.

[34] _C. S. P. For._, No. 972, July 11, 1559.

[35] Tavannes, 244. In Spain it was the prevailing belief that France
had been compelled to make the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis more through
the troubles caused by the affairs of religion than from any other
necessity; cf. _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 57, 1559. This suspicion is
confirmed by Tavannes, who says that the settlement of matters still
pending under the terms of the treaty was hastened by the Guises
through knowledge that the state of affairs in France was exceedingly
unsatisfactory to many of the nobles and fear that their power would
be openly rebelled against (Tavannes, 245; _C. S. P. For._, No. 590,
January 18, 1560, and No. 26, October 5, 1559).

[36] The pretext was Montmorency’s complaint because his son Damville
was not given the government of Provence, which St. André had held
(_Rel. vén._, I, 435; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 401).

[37] “Vieil routier.”—La Planche, 207.

[38] “Le connestable ... resigna bien d’estat de grand-maistre entre
les mains du roy, mais purement et simplement, et non en faveur
du dict de Guyse, déclarant assez qu’il ne cédoit en rien à son
adversaire.”—La Planche, 216. Cf. D’Aubigné, I, 245, Book II, chap.
xiv; _Rel. vén._, I, 393; Tavannes, 245; Castlenau, Book I, chap. ii;
Baschet, _La diplomatie venétienne_, 495. La Place, 26, is in error. An
attempt was made to soften Montmorency’s fall by making his eldest son
a marshal of France; Tavannes, 245; _C. S. P. For._, No. 376, December
5, 1559.

[39] La Planche, 203.

[40] Castelnau, Book I, chap. iii.

[41] See the interesting analysis of public opinion by La Planche,
203. On p. 208 he gives a highly drawn picture of the venality of the
parlements, whose “ancienne splendeur estoit desja esvannoye peu à
peu,” while they were frequented by “les soliciteurs des courtisans,
et les advocats favoris des grands,” in whose precincts justice was
not possible for simple, honest folk. He is as bitter in speaking of
the _conseil des affaires_ and the _conseil privé_, but it must be
remembered that the author was a Protestant and imbued with hatred
against the government because of its persecution of the Huguenots. See
Tavannes’ (p. 243) eulogy of the French bar which is nearer the truth.

[42] For Henry II’s policy toward Protestantism see De Crue, _Anne de
Montmorency_, 244-48; Weiss, _La chambre ardente_, Introd.; Hauser, “De
l’humanisme et de la réforme en France,” _Rev. hist._, LXIV (1897),
258, minimizes the intellectual causes of the French Reformation.

[43] The origin of this word has been much discussed. In the early
period of the Reformation in France, all religious schismatics save
the Vaudois, whose historical identity was different and familiar,
were called “Lutherans.” The Venetian ambassador so characterized the
French Protestants in a dispatch to the signory in 1558 (_Relazione de
Giovanni Sorano_, ed. Alberi, I, 2, 409). Boyvin du Villars (Book XII,
204) employs this same term in 1560.

The etymology of the word “Huguenot,” most commonly accepted is that
which derives it from the German word _Eidgenossen_ (confederacy) which
designated the Swiss Confederates (see _Papiers d’état du cardinal de
Granvelle_, VII, 660). The word in Geneva was naturally not German
but French or Savoyard. It is variously spelled—Eydgenots, Eygenots,
Eyguenots. But this derivation, though the best supported, is opposed
by the eminent philologist, Littré. Grandmaison, _Bulletin Soc.
hist. prot. franç._, LI (January, 1902), argues against the German
origin of the word and gives examples of its appearance as a French
surname from the fourteenth century onward. But how it came to be
applied to the French Protestants he is unable to say. Cf. Weiss: “La
dérivation du nom Huguenot,” _Bull. Soc. hist. prot. franç._, XLVIII,
12 (December, 1898). A note by A. Mazel states that in Languedoc the
word was pronounced “Duganau,” which he conjectures to be a diminutive
of “Fugou,” the great owl. If this is so, the origin of the word is
akin to that of “Chouan” in the French Revolution. The earliest use of
the word “Huguenot” in Languedoc is in Devic and Vaisette, _Histoire
du Languedoc_, XI, 342. It undoubtedly was a term of reproach,
_ibid._, XI, 374, note; cf. Claude Haton, I, 121. Without attempting
to pronounce upon the origin of the word, I subjoin some allusions
which I have come upon. Castelnau, Book II, chap, vii, says: “qui
depuis s’appelèrent huguenots en France, dont l’étymologie fut prise
à la conjuration d’Amboise, lors que ceux qui devoient présenter la
requeste, comme éperdus de crainte, fuyoient de tous costés. Quelques
femmes des villages dirent que c’estoient pauvres gens, qui ne
valloient pas des huguenots, qui estoient une forte petite monnoye,
encore pire que des mailles, du temps de Hugues Capet d’où vint en
usage que par moquerie l’on les appelloit huguenots.” Henri Estienne
and La Place, 34, say the word arose from the circumstance that the
Calvinists of Tours used to go outside of the Porte du roy Huguon to
worship. La Planche’s derivation is a study in folklore (p. 262, col.
i).

The Venetian ambassador wrote in 1563: “In quel tempo medesimo fu tra
questi principalmente, che cercorno di seminar la false dottrina un
predicator della regina di Navarra, madre del presente re di Navarra,
nominate Ugo, il quale alienò prima l’animo di quella regina dalla
religion cattolica, e poi cercò d’alienare e di corromper, come fece,
infiniti altri uomini e donne delli più grandi.”—_Rel. vén._, II,
50. A unique explanation, which I have not found noticed elsewhere is
preserved by Jean de Gaufreton, _Chronique bordelaise_ (1877), I, 92:
“En cette année les catholiques commencèrent d’appeller les Luthériens
et protestants ‘Huguenots,’ et les autres nomèrent les catholicques
papistes à cause, qu’ils tenoyent le parti du pape, et qu’ils
soustenoyent son authorité. Mais la raison pourquoy les Luthériens
furent appellées Huguenots procède de ce que les princes protestants
d’Allemagne et Luthériens ayant envoyé une solemnelle ambassade au roy,
à la requête des Luthériens et protestants de France pour demander
libre exercice du Luthéranisme en son royaume, en faveur des dits
Luthériens français, comme le chef de cette ambassade voulut en sa
première audience parler latin devant le roy, assisté des messieurs de
son conseil, il ne put jamais dire que les deux mots à sçavait ‘hue
nos’ et s’arresta tout court. Despuis les courtisans appellèrent les
Luthériens françois ‘hue nos,’ et en suite ‘Huguenots.’”

[44] Isambert, XIII, 494.

[45] Weiss, _La chambre ardente_, Paris, 1889, a study of liberty of
conscience under Henry II, based upon about five hundred _arrêts_
rendered by the Parlement of Paris between May, 1547, and March, 1550.
Before its creation heresy was dealt with by the regular courts. In
_Bulletin des comités historiques_ (1850), 173 (“Inventaire des lettres
relatives à l’histoire de France aux archives de Bâle”), there is noted
a letter of the King written in 1552 to the effect that those who have
been arrested for heresy at Lyons shall not be dealt with unjustly; but
the King reiterates his determination not to permit any new religious
doctrine to obtain. In the very month before his death, in June, 1559,
the edict of Ecouan prescribed the death penalty for all heretics,
without the least limitation or restriction, and with injunctions to
the judges not to mitigate the punishment, as they had done for some
years (Castelnau, Book I, chap. iii). The Huguenots regarded Henry
II’s death as a judgment of God.—_C. S. P. For._, No. 899, June 30,
1559: “They let not openly to say the King’s dissolute life and his
tyranny to the professors of the gospel hath procured God’s vengeance.”
A letter of Diane de Poitiers in the _Catalogue de la collection
Trémont_, No. 424, proves that some of the property confiscated from
the Huguenots was given by the King to his favorite.

[46] Vargas, _Histoire de François II_, 314.

[47] Granvella to Philip II, June 14, 1561—_Papiers d’état du cardinal
de Granvelle_, VI, 569.

[48] Armstrong, _Wars of Religion in France_, 4, 5. Cf. De Crue, _Anne
de Montmorency_, 246. The establishment of the Jesuits was not approved
in France until after the death of Henry II, owing to the resistance of
the mendicant orders and the Sorbonne.—Claude Haton, II, 636.

[49] Castelnau, Book I, chap. iii.

[50] _C. S. P. For._, No. 950, July 8, 1559.

[51] _Mém. de Condé_, I, 264.

[52] He had been converted by Hotman, the famous Huguenot
pamphleteer.—Weiss, 31.

[53] Weiss, _op. cit._; Castelnau, Book I, chap. iii. La Planche,
209-12 and 235, 236, gives an account of his sufferings and death. The
_Mém. de Condé_, I, 217 ff., contain part of the trial.

[54] Castelnau, Book I, chap. v, and especially La Planche, 220-22.

[55] La Planche, 237.

[56] _Ibid._, 226.

[57] La Place, 28.

[58] Upon the patriotism and loyalty of the French magistracy see the
notable extract from a letter of the Spanish ambassador, April 29,
1560, in _Rev. hist._, XIV, 78. Cf. the address of M. Alfred Levesque,
“Le barreau et la liberté sous les Valois: discours prononcé à la
séance d’ouverture des conférences de l’ordre des avocats,” November
28, 1846.

[59] _C. S. P. For._, No. 451, December 21, 1559. Carriages came
into use in the sixteenth century, the practice being borrowed from
Italy. Catherine de Medici was the first queen who possessed one.
For interesting information on this subject see Burgon, _Life and
Times of Sir Thomas Gresham_, I, 242, 305, 383, 486, 487; Ellis,
_Letters_, Series II, I, 253; Strutt, _Dresses_, II, 90, and a paper in
_Archeologia_, XX, 426 ff.

[60] Castelnau, Book I, chap. v; La Planche, 232-34.

[61] Robert Stuart, who claimed to be a relative of Mary Stuart, was
suspected of the murder. It was he who killed the constable Montmorency
at the battle of St. Denis in 1567.—D’Aubigné, I, 255. Another upon
whom suspicion rested was the natural son of the cardinal of Meudon,
whom Minard had persuaded to leave all his property to the poor.—_Nég.
Tosc._, III, 407.

[62] D’Aubigné, I, 255, II, chap. xvi. Two edicts were issued on
December 17 from Chambord. See Isambert, XIV, 12.

[63] La Place, 28.

[64] La Planche, 209.

[65] La Place, 41; Tavannes, 241. “There be two kinds of the people
whom the Papists term Huguenots, viz., Huguenots of religion, and
Huguenots of State. The one of these perceiving that the cardinal works
to ruin them, and their own peculiar force not sufficient to withstand
his malice, have shown appearance that they will join with the other,
who seeing themselves excluded from all government, and those of
Guise to usurp the whole authority, presently practise a firm faction
and league between themselves, either part promising to support the
other.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,235, May 31, 1568.

[66] _Rel. vén._, I, 523-25; II, 57; Davila, VI, 359. Claude Haton
emphatically asserts the feudal purposes of the Huguenot noblesse:
“Les grand seigneurs de la ligue condéienne et cause huguenoticque
s’atendoient d’estre haults eslevez, non és offices royaux, mais au
partage du royaume qu’ilz espéroient faire entre eux en le contonnant
par provinces, desquelles ilz prétendoient d’estre seigneurs
souverains, sans recognoistre roy ni aultre personne par dessus
eux.”—I, 291. Tavannes characterizes the Huguenot association in 1572
as “demi-democratique et demi-aristocratique” (_Panth. lit._, 413). The
identification of Calvinism with the political purposes of the nobles
is shown in the following letter of the cardinal de Tournon to King
Henri II, written “De Bains de Lucques, 9 juillet 1559”: “L’une des
principal ruses de ces malheureux est de commencer, s’ils peuvent, à
semer leur venin et mauvaise doctrine par les plus Grands, les attirer
et gaigner à eux, afin de pouvoir après tout plus aisément & sans
punition, infecter & gaster le reste & s’aider à un besoin de leur
force & authorité.”—Ribier, II, 807.

The cardinal Tournon and the admiral Hennebault had been trusted
with the duties of affairs of state after the fall of the constable
Montmorency in 1541. When Henry II came to the throne Montmorency
was restored to office and Tournon fell. After the death of Henry II
the queen mother proposed the return of Cardinal Tournon. The Guises
at first hesitated, but soon yielded, first because the cardinal was
the personal enemy of the constable, and second, because he was very
hostile to the reformed religion (_Rev. hist._, XIV, 72, 73).

[67] From an admirable article by E. Armstrong, “The Political
Theory of the Huguenots,” _Eng. Hist Rev._, IV, 13 ff. Cf. Weill,
_Les théories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de
religion_, Paris, 1891.

[68] See the observations of La Place, 41-45.

[69] It is true that De Thou so says: “et établir en France une
république semblable à celle des Suisses,” Book XXV, 501, but it is to
be remembered that De Thou was writing late in the reign of Henry IV,
and read back into the past the republicanism of 1572.

[70] See the eminently sane remarks of Tavannes, 260.

[71] Cf. Castelnau, Book I, chap. vi.

[72] The avarice and dishonesty of the cardinal, it is said, even went
so far as to force Catherine de Medici to divide with him the fees
arising from the confirmation of offices and the privileges accorded
towns and municipal corporations in the time of Henry II, which sums
lawfully went to her; and even then he is said to have fraudulently
estimated them in _livres_ instead of _écus d’or_.—La Planche, 208.
The _écu d’or_ was worth two _livres tournois_ in the reign of Francis
I, so that the cardinal’s little trick cut the sum in half.

[73] See the character sketch in _Rel. vén._, I, 437-39.

[74] Cf. La Place, 28.

[75] Baschet, 497, 498.

[76] See _C. S. P. For._, 1559-61, _passim_.

[77] _Ibid._, No. 405, December 12, 1559. The duchess of Lorraine
was a daughter of Christian II, the exiled ruler of Denmark. On this
question see the long note (with references appended) in Poulet, I,
126. Cf. _Arch. de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 132. There is little
doubt that Philip II and the Guises contemplated such a move (Languet,
_Epist., secr._, II, 22, 30, 34). The war going on between Denmark and
Sweden favored the project. This war lasted for seven years (_Arch. de
la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 103, 104; Raumer, II, 211).

[78] La Planche, 273.

[79] _C. S. P. For._, No. 451, December 5, 1559.

[80] Tavannes, 245; La Place, 27, 51; La Planche, 216; _C. S. P. Ven._,
No. 272, 1506.

[81] La Planche, 212. “Il Cardinale de Lorraine è quà Papa e re,” _Nég.
Tosc._, III, 404, August 27, 1559.

[82] La Planche, 212; La Place, 28; _Rev. hist._, XIV, 67, 68. On the
economic discontent due to the extravagance of Henry II, see _Rev.
hist._, XIV, 71. Claude Haton, I, 110-12 gives a favorable contemporary
judgment.

[83] The act revoking many of the alienations of the royal domain fell
hardest upon the followers of the constable and of Diane de Poitiers
(_Rev. hist._, XIV, 71, 72).

[84] _Rel. vén._, I, 431. See the character-sketch by Suriano in _Rel.
vén._, II, 47; _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 272, 1561.

[85] La Planche, 212.

[86] Throckmorton to the Queen, _C. S. P. Eng. For._, No. 1,244, August
25, 1559.

[87] La Planche, 216.

[88] _Ibid._, 212, 216.

[89] Weiss, _L’Espagne sous Philippe II_, I, 115, 16. The queen
of Spain, in company with Antoine of Navarre and Jeanne d’Albret,
arrived at Pau on December 21, having proceeded from Bordeaux.
Great preparations were made for her reception and she was nobly
entertained. The king and queen of Navarre did their part with great
magnificence. The maître des postes of Spain arrived at Pau the same
day as Her Majesty did, with instructions how she was to conduct
herself toward the Spanish nobles by whom she was to be met on her
arrival in Spain.—“Extraict,” written in a French hand, indorsed “My
Lord Ambassador,” _C. S. P. For._, II, No. 469, December 21, 1559.
The king and queen of Navarre and the cardinal Bourbon conducted her
to the frontiers and then returned; the prince of Roche-sur-Yon went
through with her to Guadalajara and carried to Philip the order of
St. Michael (_C. S. P. For._, No. 337, November 29, 1559: Killigrew
and Jones to the Queen). Philip II planned to meet his spouse at
Guadalajara and thence go to Toledo, where the marriage festivities
were to be celebrated until Shrovetide (_C. S. P. For._, No. 354:
Challoner to Cecil from Brussels). At the celebration, the duke of
Infantado, whose guest the King was at Guadalajara, had sixty shepherds
clad in cloth-of-gold (_C. S. P. For._, No. 540, January 24, 1560).
The marriage was accomplished on January 20, 1560 (_C. S. P. For._,
No. 540, January 24, 1560: statement of Granvella to Challoner). The
French were offended because, at the receiving of the Queen-Catholic at
Guadalajara, the verse of the forty-fifth Psalm was sung, “Audi, filia,
et vide, etc.,” which the French disliked much, “concluding that they
did not have altogether that which they looked for at King Philip’s
hands by means of his wife” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 591, January 18,
1560: Killigrew and Jones to Cecil).

[90] See a letter of Francis II to the bishop of Limoges, May 21,
1506, “De l’ambassadeur espagnol, Perrenot de Chantonnay, et de ses
intrigues,” in Paris, _Négociations_, 584. Thomas Perrenot, sieur
de Chantonnay, was a younger brother of the cardinal Granvella and
was a native of Besançon. He was named Spanish ambassador in France
after the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (Paris, _Nég. relatives au
règne de François II_, 56-60). His official correspondence is in
the _Archives nationales_ at Paris, K. 1,492 ff. Quite as valuable
is the private correspondence he maintained with his brother and
Margaret of Parma, transcripts of which are in the Brussels archives.
The originals are divided between Besançon and Vienna. M. Paris
pertinently says of him: “On ne sait pas assez toutes des manœuvres
de ce personnage.”—_Négociations relatives au règne de François II_,
56, note. A history of his public career would be a cross-section of
the history of the times. He spoke French and German fluently and had
a knowledge of Spanish and Italian. Catherine de Medici feared and
hated him and in August, 1560, demanded his recall in vain.—Paris,
_Négociations_, etc., 873. In 1564 he was transferred to Vienna (_R.
Q. H._, January, 1879, 19, 20) and was succeeded by Alava. All the
official correspondence of the epoch abounds with allusions to him.
See _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 393, 400, 402,
518, 592; VIII, 353, 383, 387, 457, 513, 523, 557, 568, 574, 594, 679;
IX, 1, 36, 65, 94-102, 136, 154, 166, 169, 177, 182-98, 225, 421, 264,
345-52, 358, 361, 377-81, 394, 415, 430, 434-37, 446, 452, 461, 468,
482, 489, 510, 514, 522, 538, 540-43, 549-52, 556-58, 562-64, 567, 568,
581-89, 602-9, 615, 625, 628, 654, 668, 671; Gachard, _Correspondance
de Philippe II_, II, 27, 48, 89, 108, 121, 163, 171-74; Poulet,
_Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle_, I, 565, note; _R. Q. H._,
January, 1879, 10-12. Some of his letters which were intercepted by the
Huguenots are published in the _Mémoires de Condé_. M. Paillard has
printed a portion of those relating to the conspiracy of Amboise in the
_Rev. hist._, XIV; at pp. 64, 65 is a brief sketch of the ambassador’s
life. See also Weiss’s introduction to edition of _Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, I.

[91] _C. S. P. For._, No. 543.

[92] _Ibid._, No. 508, December 27. Throckmorton wrote to the council
on February 4, 1560: “At present the French have to bestir themselves
for the good and quiet of their own country, as factions in religion
are springing up everywhere.”—_Ibid._, No. 685. Indeed, the chancellor
at this time for three days refused to sign an order necessary for
the prosecution of the war in Scotland, on the ground of the dangers
at home and the necessity of harboring the government’s resources
(_ibid._, No. 292, November 18, 1559: Killigrew and Jones to Cecil).
Among the financial expedients resorted to at this time was an order
in December, 1559, that all posts and postmasters should henceforth
be deprived of the fees which they enjoyed which amounted to 100,000
crowns yearly, and for compensation to them the price of letters was
increased a fourth part (_ibid._, No. 508, December, 1559). On May
29, 1560, a royal ordinance abolished the King’s support of the post
entirely and some new ordinances of Parlement were calculated to
increase the revenue by 2,000,000 francs (_ibid._, No. 550, January
6, 1560). In February the King raised a loan of 7,000 francs at 8
per cent. from the Parisians (_ibid._, No. 750, February 20, 1560:
Throckmorton to the Queen).

[93] “Six score commissions are sent forth for the persecution for
religion.”—_Ibid._, No. 451: Killigrew and Jones to the Queen,
December 18, 1559. This was just after the murder of the president
Minard. “The Cardinal of Lorraine lately sent a bag full of commissions
for persecution to be done about Poitiers and certain letters which he
carried apart in his bosom; the messenger was met and the letters taken
from him.”—_Ibid._, No. 590, January 18, 1560. One of these—“Lettre
de roi à tous les évêques de son royaume”—is preserved in K. 1,494,
fol. 4. It is dated January 28, 1560.

[94] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 408, January 22, 1560. On January 29 a poor
man, a binder of books, was condemned to be burned for heresy at Rouen.
While riding in a cart between two friars to be burned, a quarrel was
made with a sergeant who convoyed him and he was unhorsed, the poor
man was taken out of the cart, his hands were loosed, and a cloak was
thrown over him, and he was conveyed out of the hands of his enemies.
The justices and the governors, having knowledge of this, commanded the
gates to be shut, and, making a search that night, found him again and
burned him next day. And at his burning were three hundred men-at-arms,
for fear of the people (_C. S. P. For._, No. 708, February 8, 1560).

[95] _C. S. P. For._, No. 256, November 14, 1559; _ibid._, _Ven._, No.
132, March 6, 1560.

[96] Baschet, I, 559; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 310, January, 1560.

[97] The fear of attempts being made to assassinate them or the King
haunted the cardinal and his brother. In November the French King,
while out hunting near Blois, became so terrified, that he returned
to court, and orders were given to the Scotch Guard to wear jack and
mail and pistols (_C. S. P. For._, No. 166, November 15, 1559); in
December rumors reached the cardinal’s ears that his own death and that
of the duke of Guise was sworn (_ibid._, No. 528); in January the use
of _tabourins_ and masks in court pleasures was forbidden on account
of the fear which the cardinal of Lorraine had of being assassinated
(_ibid._, No. 658, January 28, 1559). De Thou says the cardinal was
“natura timidus.”—Book XXV. The wearing of pistols and firearms
was prohibited by two edicts, the one of July 3, 1559, the other of
December 17, 1559. The law also forbade the wearing of long sleeves
or cloaks or even top boots, in which a pistol or a poignard might
be concealed. Both measures were attributed with good reason to the
timidity of the cardinal of Lorraine.

[98] “Les protestans de France se mettans devant les yeux l’example de
leurs voisins.”—Castelnau, Book I, chap. vii.

[99] La Planche, 237.

[100] _Ibid._; Castelnau, Book I, chap. viii. The Huguenots did not
intend to take up arms against the person of the King or to force
Francis II to change the religion of the state. The assertion that
these were their purposes was an adroit stroke of the Guises (_Rev.
hist._, XIV, 85, 101).

[101] _Rel. vén._, I, 525.

[102] Volrad of Mansfeldt and Grumbach, counselor of the elector
palatine, but personal enemies of the cardinal of Lorraine, had
been drawn by sympathy into the plan, and on March 4, through their
influence, Hotman was received by the elector at Heidelberg, who gave
Hotman a letter of credit to the king of Navarre and the prince of
Condé. See Dareste, “Extraits de la correspondance inédite de François
Hotman,” _Mém. de l’Académie des sciences morales et politiques_, CIV
(1897), 649.

[103] After the failure of the conspiracy, during the course of the
investigation set on foot by the government, the constable was accused
of complicity in the affair but vigorously denied it in a remonstrance
laid before the Parlement (La Place, 37, gives a part of the text;
Castelnau, Book II, chap, xi), and while condemning the conspiracy
artfully contrived to imply that the Guises were to be blamed for much
(La Planche, 269). De Thou, II, 778, perhaps reproduces the actual
language of the constable before the Parlement, his father having been
president of the body at this time. But in the early winter Montmorency
had visited his lands in Poitou and Angoumois, and his daughter, Madame
de la Tremouille, having quitted his usual place of residence at
Chantilly, and traveled in those quarters of France which, it will be
observed, are identical with those wherein the conspiracy of Amboise
was hatched (La Place, 32). Is it reasonable to believe that a man
of his political acumen and state of feeling at the time toward the
Guises could have been unaware of at least something of what was in
preparation? The strongest evidence in favor of the innocence of the
constable is the fact that his two nephews, the cardinal de Châtillon
and the admiral Coligny were undoubtedly without knowledge of the plot.
See the proofs in Delaborde, _Vie de Coligny_, I, 391-414; D’Aubigné,
ed. De Ruble, I, 263, n. 6; Paillard, “Additions critiques à l’histoire
de la conjuration d’Amboise,” _Rev. hist._, XIV (1880), 70, 71. It is
hard, however, to believe that the constable had no information at all
of what was on foot, considering his politics and his movements during
the winter.

[104] La Place, 33; Le Laboureur, I, 386, says his first name was Jean.

[105] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 137. He had been imprisoned for devising
false evidence in a process of law (D’Aubigné, ed. De Ruble, I, 258,
n. 3). La Renaudie is said even to have gone to England to see Queen
Elizabeth (Haag, _La France protestante_, I, 259). No reference
is given, but from Hotman’s correspondence (_Acad. des sc. moral.
et polit._, CIV [1877], 645) it is evident some one was so sent.
The further fact that Mundt was approached in Strasburg and French
proclamations printed in England were circulated in Normandy (_C. S. P.
For._, 954, April 6, 1560) seems to sustain this view.

[106] La Place, 41; Castelnau, Book I, chap. viii.

[107] D’Aubigné, Book II, chap, xvii; I, 259-61 gives the names of the
provincial captains.

[108] La Planche, 239.

[109] Mundt, Elizabeth’s agent in Strasburg (he was also agent of the
landgrave Philip of Hesse), was applied to and “thought that the Queen
would not be wanting in kind offices. Already it is whispered,” he
wrote, “that there is a great agreement among the nobility and others
throughout France, who will no longer endure the haughty and adulterous
rule of the Guises, and that some of the first rank in France are
cognizant of the conspiracy who remain quiet; the rest will rise in
arms against the Guises.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 779, February 27, 1560.
Cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 409.

An added element of adventure was the participation of a certain
nobleman of wealth who seems to have financially supported the
conspiracy for self-advantage. This man imagined that the movement
might be converted into a movement for the recovery of Metz from the
French (letter of Hotman to Calvin, September 19, 1559). In Hotman’s
eyes, to restore Metz to Germany was to restore it to Protestantism,
but Calvin was cautious, for his sound policy distinguished between
rebellion and constitutional restriction of tyranny. He sent Beza to
Strasburg to attempt to prevent such an action. But the Senate of
Strasburg seized upon the project, demanded liberty for the Protestants
of Metz and Trèves, abolished the Interim, interdicted the Catholic
religion, and even expelled the Anabaptists from the city, to the
jubilation of radical Protestants, who looked upon it as just reprisal
for the repressive policy of the Guises in France.

[110] La Planche, 238.

[111] La Place, 23; La Planche, 238. Some thirty captains were party
to it who were to be put in command of some companies of German
lansquenets (La Place, 33). “Upward of sixty men, part foreigners and
part native Frenchmen” came to aid the plot (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 134,
March 15, 1560).

[112] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 125, March 16, 1560. The correspondence
of the Spanish ambassador testifies to the fact that the Protestant
soldiery was well paid, the money having been procured by spoliation
of the churches. They gave to each footman 14 francs per month and to
each horseman 16 sous per day.—_Rev. hist._, XIV, 104. The Venetian
ambassador says the horsemen got 18 soldi, the footmen 10 daily (_C. S.
P. Ven._, March 17, 1560).

[113] The Spanish Ambassador puts it upon the 6th. La Planche, Beza,
Castelnau, De Thou, D’Aubigné, La Popelinière, Le Laboureur make
March 10 the day. The discrepancy perhaps is to be accounted for by
the circumstance that Avenelles had said that March 6 was the day
designated, but the unexpected removal of the court from Blois to
Amboise (La Place, 33; La Planche, 346) postponed the date of action.
Cf. _Rev. hist._, XIV, 66, 85.

[114] Castelnau, _ibid._; La Planche, 239, 246. The statement is
confirmed by La Place, 33, 34, and La Planche, 255 who say that the
petition was written in invisible ink and intrusted to one Bigne, a
servant of La Renaudie, who having been captured after the death of his
master, in order to save his life, revealed the secret of the document.
The first article was couched in these terms: “Protestation faicte par
le chef et tous les ceux du conseil de n’attenter aucune autre chose
contre la Majestie du roy et les princes de son sang. Et estoit le but
aussi de la dicte entreprise de faire observer d’ancienne coustume
de la France par une legitime assemblée des estats.”—Tavannes,
247. Tavannes says Bigne directly said that Condé and Coligny were
implicated. Other incriminating papers were found in the boots of the
baron Castelnau (_Rev. hist._, XIV, 99, 100; La Planche, 254, 255).

[115] Castelnau, Book I, chap. xi. De Croze, _Les Guises, les Valois
et Philippe II_, I, 60-70 (2 vols., Paris, 1866), shows admirably that
there is no doubt of the formidable nature of the conspiracy of Amboise.

[116] It is said that the cardinal and his brother received intimations
of danger from Spain, Italy, Savoy, Germany, and Flanders (La Place
32; Castelnau, Book I, chap, viii) and it is certain that the cardinal
Granvella, Philip’s representative in the Netherlands, warned them. De
Thou says that warnings came from Germany, Spain, Italy, and France.
Paillard in _Rev. hist._, XIV, 81, is dubious about an Italian source,
but it is confirmed by _C. S. P. Ven._, 137, March 6, 1560. He thinks
that any Spanish source of information was impossible, for the reason
that Philip II learned everything from Chantonnay. Granvella’s warning
is acknowledged by Chantonnay in a letter of March 3, 1560, to his
brother. He was expressly told that the aim of the conspiracy was to
make away with the cardinal of Lorraine and all those of the house of
Guise (_Rev. hist._, XIV, 80, 81). This is supported by the testimony
of the constable and the Venetian ambassador (D’Aubigné, I, 263, n. 3).
It seems certain that this information was conveyed to the Guises by
February 12 (_Rev. hist._, XIV, 83; _Mém. de Condé_, I, 387; D’Aubigné,
Book II, chap. xvii). Dareste, “François Hotman et la conspiration
d’Amboise,” _Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes_, sér. III, V,
361, thinks that Hotman’s own indiscreet boasting at Strasburg was
responsible, at least in part, for the discovery of the plot.

The duke of Guise and his brother were in such fear that they wore
shirts of chain mail underneath their vestments, and at night were
guarded by pistoleers and men-at-arms. On the night of March 6, while
at Blois, the alarm was so great that the duke, the cardinal, the
grand-prior, and all the knights of the order there, watched all night
long in the courtyard (_C. S. P. For._, No. 837, March 7, 1560).

[117] Castelnau, Book I, chap, viii; La Planche, 246, 247. He received
one hundred écus and a judicial post in Lorraine (De Thou, II, 774, ed.
1740).

[118] “Among the prisoners was a Gascon gentleman, one baron de
Castelnau, who considering himself ill-used by the cardinal and the
duke of Guise, with many other captains and soldiers, dissatisfied
on account of non-payment of their arrears and because they had been
dismissed from the Court, finding themselves without salary or any
other means, and being half desperate, joined the other insurgents
about religion and conspired against the cardinal and the duke of
Guise.”—_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 135, March 16, 1560. Sancerre had known
Castelnau during the late war, and when he sought to arrest him and
his companions, they resisted. Although the city of Tours took up
arms in the king’s name against them, they made their escape into the
château de Noizay (Indre-et-Loire), between three and four leagues
from Amboise, which belonged to the wife of Renay (La Place, 33. She
had been maid of honor to Jeanne d’Albret, _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 135,
March 16, 1560). Cf. _C. S. P. For._, March 21, 1560, and note, on p.
462—the account of Throckmorton. The two versions substantially agree.

[119] _C. S. P. Ven. For._, March 16, 1560.

[120] _C. S. P. For._, No. 859, March 15, 1560; _ibid._, _Ven._, No.
135, March 16.

[121] _Rev. hist._, XIV, 102; La Planche, 247; _Arch. de la Gironde_,
XXIX, 8. Vieilleville was sent to pacify the Beauce and M. de Vassey,
another knight of the order, to Maune, near Angers, to subdue a
commotion there (_C. S. P. For._, 902, March 26, 1560).

[122] His orders at this hour are printed in the _Mém.-journ. du duc de
Guise_, 457; _Mem. de Condé_, I, 342; La Popelinière, I, 166; cf. La
Planche, 225, who gives the gist of them.

[123] Lettres-patentes du Roi Francois II au sénéschal de Lyon
“concernans la revelacion de grace que sa Ma^[te] veult faire à ceulx
qui avaient conspiré contre l’estat de la religion et son royaume,”
March 17, 1560.

[124] See the extended account in _C. S. P. Ven._, March 20, 1560;
_Nég. Tosc._, III 412-15.

[125] His corpse was hanged March 20, 1560, upon a gibbet before the
court gate, and left there for two whole days, with an inscription at
his feet running: “C’est La Renaudie dict la Forest, capitaine des
rebelles, chef et autheur de la sédition” (La Place, 35; D’Aubigné, I,
268, Book II, chap, xvii; _C. S. P. For._, 463, note, March 23, 1560).

[126] The sentencing to death of prisoners continued daily, several
being sent for execution to Blois, Tours, Orleans, and other places,
“that these acts of justice might be witnessed universally and be
better known.”

[127] The instructions of the King are a curious witness of the fury of
the Guises: “Je vous prye, y estant arrivé, faire si bonne dilligence
que vous les puissiez chastier comme ils méritent, sans avoir aucune
pitié ny compassion d’eux.... Aussy je vous envoye des lettres _dont le
nom est en blanc_ et lesquelles vous ferez remplir à votre fantaisie,
que j’escrips aux principaux seigneurs et gentilshommes dudit païs à ce
qu’ils ayent _à assembler leur voysins et vous accompaigner_ en ceste
entreprinse.”—_Négociations relatives au règne de François II_, 342,
343.

[128] Throckmorton wrote on February 27, 1560: “It is reported that
the idols have been cast out of the churches throughout Aquitaine and
that the same would speedily be done in Provence.”—_C. S. P. For._,
No. 779. Later, on April 14, the Venetian ambassador reports that the
insurgents in Provence “have stripped the churches, and mutilated the
images.”—_Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 146. In Dauphiné the achievements of
Montbrun made him famous; see De Thou, Book XXV, 548 ff.

[129] Chantonnay to the duke of Sessa, March 24, 1560, K. 1,493, No.
45. At St. Malo the insurgents killed certain public officials and
prevented an execution. On March 25 the cardinal of Bourbon went to
Rouen; and on the same day there was a sermon in a wood without the
town to above two thousand people. A priest and a clerk called them
Lutherans and cast stones at them, and a riot ensued. Two days after
the preacher was taken and burned (_C. S. P. For._, 930, March 30,
1560).

[130] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 142, March 26, 1560.

[131] _Ibid._, No. 146, April 4, 1560; _ibid._, _For._, 952, April
6. The cardinal of Lorraine justified the drastic policy of the
government, saying: “It will be more than necessary to apply violent
remedies and proceed to fire and sword, as otherwise, unless provision
be made, the alienation of this kingdom, coupled with that of Germany
and England and Scotland, would by force draw Spain and Italy and the
rest of Christendom to the same result.”—_Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 142,
March 28, 1560.

[132] The court attended the spectacle of these executions “comme s’il
eût été question de voir jouer quelque momerie.”—La Planche, 263.

[133] Monod, “La jeunesse d’Agrippa d’Aubigné,” _Mém. de l’Acad. de
Caen_, 1884.

[134] _C. S. P. For._, 1560, Introd. Hotman vented his disappointment
at the failure of the conspiracy and his wrath because of the cruel
policy of the Guises in a famous pamphlet directed against the cardinal
of Lorraine. It bore the significant title “Le Tigre.” See De Thou,
Book XXV, 512; Weill, 40, 98, Asse, “Un pamphlet en 1560,” _Revue de
France_, January 1876, and Dareste, _Mém. de l’Acad. des sc. moral.
et polit._, CIV (1877), 605. Hotman’s authorship of it remained
undiscovered for years. A counselor named Du Lyon, believed to be the
author of it, a printer named Martin, and a merchant of Rouen, who had
sponsored it, were hanged in the Place Maubert (Castelnau, Book I,
chap, xi; La Planche, 312, 313; La Place, 76, 77).

In 1875 M. Charles Read published this famous pamphlet in facsimile
from the only existing copy which was rescued from the burning of
the Hôtel-de-Ville in 1871. The text is accompanied with historical,
literary, and bibliographical notes.

[135] The baggage of the prince of Condé was opened, it being expected
to find therein letters or other writings relating to the conspiracy,
and although excuses were made after the search, attributing it to
thieves, yet as none of the contents were missing, the belief greatly
prevailed of the search having been made for that purpose (_C. S. P.
Ven._, No. 178, 1560).

On March 22 the prince of Condé was confronted with one of the
condemned conspirators, but to the discomfiture of his enemies, no
evidence against the prince could be elicited (_C. S. P. For._, No.
919, March 29 1560).

[136] La Planche, 267.

[137] Castelnau, Book I, chap. xi.

[138] La Planche, 268.

[139] May 6, 1560, Navarre to Throckmorton: “Has received a letter
enclosing a proclamation of the Queen in which he sees it intimated
that the princes and estates of France are to call her to their aid. As
first prince of the blood he repudiates this, and hopes she will not
mention him or the others in her proclamations again, as it will only
injure them with the King” (written from Pau).—_C. S. P. For._, No. 40.

[140] _Mém. de Condé_, I, 398; La Popelinière, I, 170.

[141] _C. S. P. For._, No. 992, April 12, 1560.

[142] _Ibid._, No. 954, April 6, 1560; Chantonnay wrote to the duchess
of Parma that Elizabeth was privy to the conspiracy (Ruble, _Antoine de
Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, II, 142).

[143] _C. S. P. For._, No. 992, April 12, 1560. The unfortunate baron
Castelnau, in view of the fact that he was a knight of the order, was
at first sentenced to the galleys for three years, but later, at the
instance of the Guises, was condemned to die and was beheaded on March
29, along with the captain Mazères, the duke of Nemours, the baron’s
captor, being absolved from keeping his promise to spare his life (_C.
S. P. For._, No. 952, April 6, 1560; La Planche, 264, 265; La Place,
34; D’Aubigné, 268-70, Book II, chap. xvii). One of the most prominent
of those arrested was the Scotchman, Robert Stuart, who had already
been suspected of the murder of President Minard, and who claimed to
be a relative of Mary Stuart. He was imprisoned in the Conciergerie
and put to torture, but would admit nothing. It was he who shot the
constable Montmorency on the battlefield of St. Denis. Stuart had the
reputation of being able to make bullets, called Stuardes, which would
pierce a cuirass. He himself was killed in turn at the battle of Jarnac
by the marquis of Villars, count of Tende, who stabbed him with a
dagger (_Rev. hist._, XIV, 93; Forneron, _Histoire des ducs de Guise_,
II, 92).

[144] “A conspiracy to kill them both and then to take the King and
give him masters and governors to bring him up in this wretched
doctrine,” is the way the cardinal of Lorraine and his brother
described it to the dowager queen of Scotland in a letter of March 20,
1560 (_C. S. P. For._, No. 870).

The King’s circular letter to the Parlements, bailiffs, and seneschals
of the kingdom on March 30 declared that the conspirators “s’estoyent
aidés de certains predicans venus de Genève.”—_Mem. de Condé_, I, 398.

[145] “It had been well if the Guises had not been so particularly
named as the occasion of these unquietnesses, but that it had run in
general terms,” wrote Throckmorton to Cecil (_C. S. P. For._, No. 954,
April 6, 1560). Chantonnay advised the queen mother that, in order to
avoid further difficulty, it was expedient for the Guises to retire
from court for a season (La Place, 38).

[146] La Planche, 219, 20.

[147] Tavannes actually says she was privy to the conspiracy of
Amboise, p. 247. During the reign of Henry II, Catherine de Medici
had had no political influence. She was hated as an Italian (_Rel.
vén._, I, 105). On one occasion only did she assert herself; “En 1557,
à la nouvelle du désastre de Saint-Quentin, qui ouvrait à l’Espagne
les portes de la France, il y eut un moment d’indicible panique.
Hommes d’état, hommes de guerre, tous avaient perdu la tête. Par un
hasard heureux, Catherine se trouvait à Paris; seule elle conserva son
sang-froid, et, de sa propre initiative, courant en l’hôtel-de-ville et
au parlement, et s’y montrant si éloquente et énergetique, elle arracha
aux échevins et aux membres du parlement un large subside et rendit du
cœur à la grande ville.”—La Ferrière “L’entrevue de Bayonne,” _R. Q.
H._, XXXIV, 457.

[148] “Ut exorientes tumultus reprimeret,” Raynaldus, XXXIV, 72,
col. 1; Chantonnay to Philip II, August 31, 1560, K. 1,493, No. 76;
D’Aubigné, I, 27; La Planche, 269. Shortly before the death of Henry
II, Coligny had sought to resign his government, wishing to retain
only his office of admiral but Henry refused to accept the resignation
(Delaborde, I, 362). Coligny then endeavored to have his government of
Picardy given to his nephew, the prince of Condé (_Rev. hist._, XIV,
74). Meanwhile he continued to hold the office of governor to prevent
the Guises getting control of it (La Planche, 216). Finally in January,
1560, the admiral again went to court to present his resignation, and
at the same time to urge the appointment of his nephew. This time it
was accepted, and the prince of Condé was appointed to the post (La
Planche, 217; _Rev. hist._, XIV, 74, 75).

[149] La Place, 36; _C. S. P. For._, No. 952.

[150] La Place, 38. On L’Hôpital see Dupré-Lasale, _Michel de l’Hôpital
avant son elévation au poste de chancellier de France_, 2 vols., 1875;
Amphoux, _Michel de l’Hôpital et la liberté de conscience au XVI^[e]
siècle_; Guer, _Die Kirchenpolitik d. Kanzlers Michel de l’Hôpital_,
1877; Shaw, _Michel de l’Hôpital and His Policy_.

[151] La Place, 37.

[152] Castelnau, Book I, chap, xi; _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 174, 1560;
Raynaldus, XXXIV, 66, col. 2; D’Aubigné, I, 274, n. 3; La Planche, 305;
La Place, 468, gives the text. The edict was not published, though,
until July 17 (K. 1,494, folio 6).

[153] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 193, August 30, 1560. The term “interim” was
technically applied to a resolution of the sovereign, with or without
the approbation of the diet or the estates of the country. By such an
edict religious affairs were regulated provisionally, pending a final
settlement by a general council of the church. The practice first
obtained in Germany, where Charles V issued such a decree in favor of
the Lutherans in 1548. See _Rev. hist._, XIV, 76, 77. “In modo che,
restando ciascuno d’allora in dietro assicurato dalla paura che avea
per innanzi, di poter esser inquisito, questo si può dir che fosse uno
tacito _interim_.”—_Rel. vén._, I, 414.

[154] “La reyne mère du roy, monstrant une bonne affection à l’admiral,
le pria de la conseiller et l’advertir par lettres, souvent, de tous
les moyens qu’il sçauvoit et pourroit apprendre d’appaiser les troubles
et séditions du royaume.”—Castelnau, Book I, chap. xi. Those of
the Council who were unwilling to consent to such changes absented
themselves. The marshals Brissac and St. André did so, the one alleging
ill health as his excuse, the other hatred of the king of Navarre
(_Rel. vén._, I, 549).

[155] Castelnau, Book I, chap, xi; _Rel. vén._, I, 415 and n. 2.

[156] Davila, I, 295; _Rel. vén._, I, 413. “In the rural portions
of Normandy, for unknown reasons, ‘Lutheranism’ had spread so much
that to one district of that province was given the name of ‘Little
Germany.’”—Hauser, _American Hist. Rev._, January, 1899, 225.

[157] The Tuscan ambassador, as early as April, 1560, advised his
government of the likelihood of this feud (_Nég. dip. de la France avec
la Toscane_, III, 415-17 _Rev. hist._, XIV, 74).

[158] Nanteuil, near La Fère (Aisne).

[159] La Place, 38.

[160] _C. S. P. For._, No. 232, June 24, 1560; D’Aubigné, I, 276; _Mém.
de Condé_, I, 151.

[161] La Place, 41; D’Aubigné, I, 277.

[162] La Place, 41.

[163] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 149, 1560.

[164] _Rel. vén._, II, 139; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 417. La Planche, 217,
gives a sample lampoon.

[165] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 151.

[166] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 992, April 12, 1560. On one occasion the
police of Paris, when pursuing a murderer, entered a house at a
venture, into which they thought the culprit had made his escape, where
they found and arrested the man who printed and placarded over the
walls of Paris the writings against the Guise family and against the
cardinal (_ibid._, _Ven._, No. 178, 1560; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 417, 418).
The offending printer was hanged and then quartered (_C. S. P. Ven._,
No. 186, July, 1560).

[167] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 174; _ibid._, _For._, No. 232, June, 1560;
No. 234, June 24, 1560; La Planche, 261. Francis II, during the course
of this investigation, stayed at Maillebois, a house of D’O, the
captain of the Scotch Guard, on the edge of Normandy (_C. S. P. For._,
No. 233, June 24, 1560).

[168] D’Andelot and Coligny refused to make war upon the Scotch
Calvinists (_C. S. P. For._, No. 168, June 7, 1560).

[169] “Rapport indiquant les preparatifs faits pour l’enterprise sur
l’Ecosse, à Rouen, au Hâvre et à Dieppe,” K. 1,495, No. 2, 11 juillet
1560.

“The embarkment for Scotland hastens. Soldiers arrive daily from Dieppe
and New Haven. At Caudebec, Harfleur, and New Haven there is exceeding
great store of provision and munitions, sufficient for 25,000 men for
six months.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 233, June 24, 1560.

[170] Mundt to Cecil, from Strasburg, _ibid._, No. 52, May 7, 1560.

[171] Gresham to Cecil, _ibid._, No. 617, January 22, 1560: “The French
king brings at least 20,000 footmen in Germany and he has taken up at
Lyons as much money at interest as he can get.”

The count of Mansfeldt to the Queen, _ibid._, No. 33, May 5, 1560:
“The French continue to raise troops and to buy horses and ammunition.
Possibly these preparations are being made against the insurgents of
France, but it is doubtful whether under pretense of invading Scotland.”

After the conspiracy of Amboise the duke of Ferrara sent 1,000
harquebusiers and the Pope 4,000 Italians (_ibid._, No. 952, April 6,
1560).

[172] _C. S. P. Eng._, No. 931. The clever Italian, in this case,
had more discernment than Cecil, who thought that the French would
rather “yield in some part than to lose their outward things by inward
contentions.”—Cecil to Elizabeth, June 21, 1560; _ibid._, 1560-61, No.
152, n.; Keith, 414; Wright, I, 30.

[173] See letter of the cardinal of Lorraine and duke of Guise,
Appendix I.

[174] _C. S. P. For._, No. 255, June 30, 1560. The news was concealed
from Mary Stuart for ten days.

[175] _Précis d’articles arrêtées conclus entre le commissionaire
d’Angleterre et de la France: Affaires d’Ecosse_ (summary), K. 1493,
No. 59, 6 juillet 1560.

Montluc, the bishop of Valence, the bishop of Amiens, and MM. de la
Brose, d’Oysel, and Randau were the French ambassadors who accepted the
terms offered by Cecil. Their commission was issued from Chenonceaux
May 2, 1560. Montluc and Randau signed the instrument, an abstract of
which is in _C. S. P. For._, No. 281, July 6, 1560. Castelnau, Book II,
chaps, i-vi, gives an account of the Anglo-Scotch war. See the memoir
of Montluc upon his mission, in Paulin Paris, _Négociations_, etc.,
392; and Schickler, _Hist. de France dans les archives privées de la
Grande Bretagne_, 6. The treaty may be found in Rymer, XV, 593; Keith,
I, 291; Lesley, _Hist. of Scotland_ (1828), 291.

[176] “The late peace was forced upon the French rather by necessity
occasioned by their internal discord than from their desire for
concord.”—Mundt to Cecil from Strasburg, August, 13, 1560, _C. S. P.
For._, No. 416.

[177] Chantonnay to Philip II, June 27, 1560, K. 1493, 68_c_.

[178] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 419, 420, May, 1560. Biragues, king’s
lieutenant in Saluzzo, to the duke of Anjou, March 1, 1560, Collection
Montigny, No. 298.

[179] _C. S. P. For._, No. 386, August 3, 1560. Throckmorton was told
that “all in this country (Picardy) seem marvellously bent to the new
religion.”—_Ibid._, No. 405, August 7, 1560.

[180] _Ibid._, No. 416, August 13, 1560.

[181] _Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 188, July 30, 1560.

[182] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 416, August 13, 1560.

[183] _Ibid._, No. 494, September 7, 1560.

[184] A pamphlet, issued in the nature of a petition and addressed to
the king of Navarre and the princes of the blood, abounded in invective
against them.—Castelnau, Book II, chap, vii; _C. S. P. For._, No. 168,
June 7, 1560.

[185] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 188, July 30, 1560.

[186] A vidame is a baron holding of a bishop. The vidame of Chartres
was cousin-german of Maligny, suspected in the Amboise conspiracy. The
vidame not having any children, Maligny and his brother were his sole
heirs. The comte de Bastard has written a biography of him, _Vie de
Jean de Ferrières, vidame de Chartres_, Auxerre, 1885.

[187] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 193, August 30, 1560.

The prince of Condé, during this summer, had repaired to Guyenne to
see his brother, the king of Navarre, at Bordeaux where he protested
against the Catholic policy of Antoine (La Planche, 276; La Place,
35). The brothers met on June 25 (Rochambeau, _Lettres d’Antoine de
Bourbon et de Jeanne d’Albret_, 202). In his journey he inveighed
against the usurpation of the Guises, and found a hearing from the
noblesse and gentlemen of the south, who urged him and his brother to
assume the place to which their rank entitled them. The Guises were
kept informed of this journey of the prince by the marshal St. André,
who, under pretense of visiting his brothers, kept watch of Condé
(La Planche, 314, 315; La Place, 53). The discovery of the plot was
owing to the suspicious vigilance of the duke of Guise, who marked a
Basque gentleman who appeared in Paris as a stranger bent on important
business, and surmised that he had been sent by the king of Navarre.
It was noticed that he had conferred with the vidame of Chartres, and
so, “as he was returning ... to ... Navarre, the duke of Guise had him
and his valises, with (his) letters and writings, seized at Etampes. In
the valise many letters were found, said to have been addressed both
to the king of Navarre and to his brother, the prince of Condé. Among
them were letters of the constable and his son, Montmorency, though
they were merely letters of ceremony; but those of importance were what
the vidame wrote to the prince, part in cipher and part without.”—_C.
S. P. Ven._, No. 193, Aug. 30, 1560. Cf. La Planche, 355-58; De Thou,
III, 357; _Négociations relatives au règne de François II_, 367; De
Crue, 277, 278. The vidame of Chartres was arrested on August 29, 1560,
by the provost-marshal and the lieutenant-criminal, at his lodgings in
Paris, and carried through the streets upon a mule, “with a great rout
of armed men to the Bastille.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 483, September 3,
1560. Castelnau, Book II, chap, vii, says that the letters promised
to assist the prince of Condé against all persons whatsoever except
the King and the royal family. The Venetian ambassador says that
there was enough in them “clearly to indicate that for many months
there had been an intrigue.”—_Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 193, August 30,
1560. On the other hand, Throckmorton asserts that “the substance of
the letter sent by the vidame to the king of Navarre is said to be
so wisely written that it is thought that nothing can be laid to his
charge.”—_Ibid._, _For._, No. 502, September 8, 1560. He was examined
by the archbishop of Vienne and the president De Thou. Upon his arrest
the vidame said “he was glad of it, for now the King would know of his
innocence.”—_Ibid._, No. 502; La Place, 70.

[188] The treaty of Edinburgh between Scotland and England was signed
on July 6, 1560 (_C. S. P. Scot._, IV, 42).

On July 28, 1560, Francis II, writing to the bishop of Limoges, says
it is unnecessary to do more than inform the king of Spain that he has
made peace with Scotland, which will leave him leisure to attend to the
internal affairs of the realm and to thank him for his good offices
(Teulet, I, 606); cf. _C. S. P. For._, July 28, 1560, 194, n.

[189] _C. S. P. For._, No. 345, July 19, 1560.

[190] Castelnau, Book II, chap, vii; _C. S. P. For._, No. 416, August
13, 1560, from Strasburg.

[191] _C. S. P. For._, No. 502, September 8, 1560.

[192] _Ibid._, No. 354, July 19, 1560.

[193] _Ibid._, No. 317, July 8, 1560; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 421-23, June,
1560.

[194] At the assembly at Fontainebleau the King proposed four points
for deliberation: (1) religion; (2) justice; (3) the debts of the
crown; (4) means to relieve the people (_Nég. Tosc._, III, 424, August
25, 1560). _C. S. P. For._, No. 442, August 20, 1560; La Place, 53; La
Planche, 351; Castelnau, Book II, chap, viii, give the names of those
present. The petitions are printed in _Mém. de Condé_, II, 645. Picot,
_Hist. des états généraux_, II, 14, erroneously gives the date as
August 23.

[195] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 195, August 30, 1560; Castelnau, Book II,
chap, viii, gives an abstract of the speech, in the third person. Cf.
La Place, 54, 55.

[196] Castelnau, _loc. cit._

[197] “En termes prolixes.”—De Thou, Book XXV, 525. It is printed in
_Œuvres complètes de L’Hôpital_, ed. Dufey, I, 335.

[198] “They might see all states troubled and corrupted, religion,
justice, and the nobility, every one of them ill-content, the people
impoverished and greatly waxed cold in the zeal and good will they were
wont to bear to their prince and his ministers.”—_C. S. P. For._, No.
442.

[199] La Planche, 352; Castelnau, Book II, chap. viii; the statement of
the debt given by La Planche agrees exactly with _C. S. P. For._, 442.

[200] Castelnau, _loc. cit._; La Planche, 352.

[201] See Reynaud, _Jean de Montluc, evêque de Valence_, 1893.

[202] “Les derniers et plus jeunes conseillers opinent les
premiers, afin que la liberté des advis ne soit diminuée ou
retranchée par l’authorité des princes ou premiers conseillers et
seigneurs.”—Castelnau, Book II, chap. viii. He made a typically
episcopal, not to say unctuous, address. Cf. La Place, 54; La Planche,
352; printed in _Mém. de Condé_, I, 555; La Popelinière, I, 192.

[203] La Planche, 352-61; La Place, 53-65.

[204] Reform in the collation of benefices was one of the important
deliberations of the Council of Trent (Baguenault de la Puchesse, “Le
Concile de Trente,” _R. Q. H._, October, 1869, 339).

[205] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 424, August 29, 1560.

[206] Castelnau, Book II, chap, viii; La Planche, 361.

[207] _C. S. P. For._, No. 193, August 30, 1560; Paris, _Négociations
relatives au règne de François II_, 481; _Correspondance de Catherine
de Médicis_, I, 149, n.; La Place, 68; La Planche, 363. “The government
seems determined not to await the meeting of a council general, the
decision of which will be tardy, but to convene a national one,
assembling in a synod all bishops and other leading and intelligent
churchmen of the kingdom, to consult and provide for the urgent need
of France in matters of religion which admit of no delay.”—_C. S. P.
Ven._, No. 142, 1560.

[208] La Place, 70.

[209] In Tours as early as April, 1560, a letter was published to all
the governors and ministerial officials of the cities and provinces
of the kingdom concerning the reformation of the church by means of a
congregation of the prelates of the Gallican church to be assembled for
a national council (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 151, 1560).

[210] The ultra-Catholic party at Trent accused the cardinal of wanting
to create an independent patriarchate out of the Gallican church.
Desjardins. _Nég. de la France dans le Levant_, II, 728.

As a matter of fact, at this season, the cardinal was disposed to favor
the project of a national council, as he hoped thereby to enlarge the
power and dignity of his office as primate of France. His ambition was
to become a sort of French pope, so that “he would not have thought
it wrong had all obedience to the pontiff ceased.”—_Despatches of
Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), September 23, 1560.

[211] Maynier, _Etude historique sur le concile de Trente (1545-62)_,
1874; _Journal du concile de Trente, redigé par un secrétaire vénitien
présent aux sessions de 1562 à 1563, et publié par Armand Baschet, avec
d’autres documents diplomatiques relatifs à la mission des Ambassadeurs
de France au concile_; Desjardins, _Le pouvoir civil au concile de
Trente_, Paris, 1869; Baguenault de la Puchesse, “Le concile de
Trente,” _R. Q. H._, October, 1869.

[212] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 161, 1560.

[213] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 232, June 24, 1560. When the Pope showed
anger at the determination of France, the cardinal of Lorraine actually
apologized for himself by saying that it was neither by his orders nor
with his consent, but that the printers took the liberty to give the
name of National Council to the “Congregation” which the King intended
to convoke! (_ibid._, No. 174, 1560).

[214] _Ibid._, No. 569, September 8, 1560.

[215] _Ibid._, No. 615, October 8, 1560. The demands of the Protestants
were as follows: (1) That the Council be convened in a free city of
Germany; (2) that summons be not by a papal bull, but by the Emperor,
who should provide them with safe-conducts; (3) that the Pope be
subordinated to the Council; (4) that those of the Confession of
Augsburg have a vote equally with the Catholics; (5) that the judgment
be according to the Holy Scriptures, and not according to the decrees
of the Pope; (6) that the prelates of the Council be absolved from the
oath by which they are bound to the Pope and the Church of Rome; (7)
that the acts of the Council of Trent be annulled (cf. _C. S. P. For._,
No. 782, sec. 14).

[216] “A general council is necessary for abolishing these heresies;
but ... especial care must be taken with the Emperor and the kings of
France and Spain to decide what shall be settled therein.”—_C. S. P.
For._, No. 416, August 13, 1560, from Strasburg.

[217] The Vatican understanding was that the former Council of Trent
was to be _continued_; although in the bull the word continuation was
not made use of, as in that of the jubilee, a show of deference thereby
being made to the Emperor and the French King, who had demanded a new
council. But the French government although it allowed the place, did
not allow the continuation of the former Council of Trent convened
by Paul III. For if it accepted the council as it was published by
the bull, it would have had to accept all the articles which had been
concluded in the former council. When it was argued that Philip II
was satisfied with the continuation, Francis II replied that although
continuation might suffice for the needs of his dominions, it would not
do for France, the more so because Henry II of France having caused
protest to be made in Trent of the nullity of that council, from its
not having been free, his son could not think well of the continuation.
(The reply of Francis II to Philip II, October, 1560, is in Paris,
_Négociations_, 615-22. Cf. also the luminous accounts of Elizabeth’s
agent in Venice, Guido Gianetti, _C. S. P. For._, No. 782, December 7,
1560; No. 815, December 21, 1560; and the dispatch of Throckmorton to
the queen, of December 31, 1560, giving an account of a conversation
with the king of Navarre, No. 832, §7.) In the reply made to Philip
in October, 1560, the French King declared that, by the advice of his
council, he had resolved upon an assembly of his prelates, from which
nothing was to be feared for the apostolic see, it being intended only
to provide the necessary remedies, and that it would not be a hindrance
but rather an aid to the General Council, for when it came to open,
the French prelates would be already assembled and “well informed as
well of the evil as of the remedy,” and that when the Council at Trent
should have once begun, it would put an end to the lesser assembly. As
to the place of the council, the French at first preferred to have it
meet in one of the Rhenish towns between Constance and Cologne, or at
Besançon in Burgundy, which belonged to Philip II; later, in the answer
to Don Antonio and in his letters to Rome, Francis II agreed to accept
whatever place the Emperor and the Pope decided upon.

The new session of the Council of Trent was to be preceded by a general
jubilee, giving power to confessors to absolve from all sins, _even
from that of having read prohibited books_. The bull warmly exhorted
the extirpation of heresy. This jubilee was first celebrated at Rome,
on Sunday, November 24, 1560, by a procession, with the Pope walking at
its head (_C. S. P. For._, No. 782, §§ 15, 16).

[218] La Place, 114; _C. S. P. For._, No. 630, October 12, 1560, from
Venice.

[219] Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II_, I, 191, Granvella to
Antonio Perez from Brussels, August 9, 1560.

[220] Paris, _Négociations_, etc., 615-22; _Papiers d’état du cardinal
de Granvelle_, VI, 137, 149. Don Antonio arrived at the French court on
September 23, and departed four days later (_C. S. P. For._, 619, Oct.
10, 1560). Philip II took the ground that any discussion looking toward
the reformation of religion would not only imperil the faith, but
prejudice his policy in Spain and the Netherlands; for if France should
alter anything, he feared it would cause a schism universally (_ibid._,
No. 619, Oct. 10, 1560). The growth of the reformation in Spain alone
was already quite great enough to alarm him. In the early autumn of
1559, Miranda, the archbishop of Toledo, the archbishop of Seville, and
twelve of “the most famous and best-learned religious men” in Spain
had been arrested for heresy (_ibid._, No. 133, October 25, 1559), and
at this time the inquisitors had just laid their hands on the brother
of the admiral of Spain (_ibid._, No. 619, October 10, 1560). On this
whole subject see Weiss, _The Spanish Reformers_, and Wiffen, _Life
and Writings of Juan de Valdés_, 1865. Montluc accused Jeanne d’Albret
of printing Calvinist catechisms and the New Testament in Spanish, in
Basque, and in Béarnais, and of secretly distributing them in Spain by
colporteurs (La Ferrière, _Blaise de Montluc_, 61).

[221] Paris, _Négociations_, 495; Forneron, _Histoire de Philippe II_,
I, 225. The Venetian ambassador learned the news within less than a
month (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 199, September 28, 1560).

[222] This important offer was Philip’s answer to Francis II’s letter
of August 31 and was made to L’Aubespine, the French ambassador in
Spain, on September 13, 1560, as appears from the minutes of the
Spanish chancellery in K. 1,493, No. 84. After the departure of Don
Antonio, Catherine wrote a letter to Philip II, thanking him for the
offer (_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 149).

The Venetian ambassador is particular and says he offered to put 3,500
troops in Flanders at the disposal of France, to place 2,000 infantry
near Narbonne, and another 4,000 near Bayonne, besides “a large body
of Spanish cavalry.”—_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 199, September 28, 1560.
Throckmorton’s figures are 3,000 Spaniards from the Low Countries; 500
men-at-arms and 2,000 footmen, who would enter by way of Narbonne; and
3,000 through Navarre with 500 horses of that country (_ibid._, _For._,
No. 619, § 13, October 10, 1560).

[223] _C. S. P. Eng._, No. 620, October 10, 1560.

[224] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 411, August 9, 1560.

[225] _Ibid._, No. 502, September 8, 1560; Chantonnay of Philip II,
same date, K. 1,493, No. 83.

[226] _Ibid._, No. 619, §§ 13, 15, October 10, 1560. The gendarmerie
is appointed to remain in divers countries according to an edict. Has
been informed that there is a league in hand between him (the king
of France) and the king of Spain. On the 16th there departed out of
Paris ten cartloads of munitions and artillery, but whither it is to
be conveyed and how it is to be employed he cannot learn (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 655, October 22, 1560). On the 30th Du Bois passed bringing
with him out of the places and forts in Picardy 1,000 footmen, who
marched between this town and Rouen toward Anjou; but where they shall
go is only known to himself and the duke of Guise. They keep together
strong, as if they were in an enemy’s country. After them come 500 more
(_ibid._, No. 692, Oct. 31, 1360). The Tuscan ambassador notices the
ardor of Paris to contribute blood and treasure (_Nég. Tosc._, III,
436).

[227] “From Strasburg: Frequent negotiations between the French King
and the German princes. The Rhinegrave has departed into Hesse ...
with Count John of Salm, who is also a French pensioner; where, by
the landgrave’s permission and the dissimulation of the Saxon duke
of Weimar, they have levied 2,000 cavalry to take into France, which
they have partly collected in the territories of the abbot of Fulda on
the boundaries of Hesse. The prefect of the Rhenish Circle, the count
of Salm, being informed of this preparation of cavalry, assembled
his captains at Worms, where it was decided that they would not be
permitted to transport their cavalry into France. For a warning had
been given in the Imperial Diet that no assembling or travelling
of soldiers would be allowed unless by the express permission of
the Emperor; for wherever they went they did great damage to the
inhabitants.”—_Ibid._, No. 736, November 26, 1560.

[228] For the organization of Paris at this time see _Livre des
marchands_, 423, 440-43.

[229] _C. S. P. For._, No. 665, October 22, 1560. The Venetian
ambassador says 400,000 francs—twice the amount given by Throckmorton
(_C. S. P. Ven._, 220, October 15, 1560).

[230] _Ibid._, No. 726, November 18, 1560.

[231] _Ibid._, No. 619, October 10, 1560.

[232] “The goods of divers Protestants have been seized and
divers men dispatched by night and sent by water in sacks to seek
heaven.”—_Ibid._, No. 726, November 18, 1560. Cf. La Planche, 226,
227, 233.

[233] D’Aubigné, Book II, chap, xx; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 424; for details
see La Planche, 366-73.

[234] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 200, October 15, 1560.

[235] On October 18 (La Planche, 378).

[236] “Very well armed and numbering more than 300 men in each company
and several pieces of cannon.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 665, October 25,
1560.

The people of Orleans were completely disarmed, even to knives, by an
edict which required all arms to be deposited in the Hôtel-de-Ville
(_Despatches of Suriano_ [Huguenot Society], November 1, 1560).

[237] Paris, _Négociations_, etc., 486. Castelnau, Book II, chap.
x, says the change was made because the Huguenots were numerous
around Meaux (but so were they also around Orleans), and fear lest
another conspiracy might be formed by having the place known so long
in advance. A rumor was current that the Huguenots were planning to
surprise it. I believe the real reason to be the more central location
of Orleans.

[238] “On his arrival with his brethren, the cardinal of Bourbon and
the prince of Condé, the prince was taken before the Council who
committed him prisoner to MM. de Bressey and Chauverey, two captains,
with 200 archers. The king of Navarre goes at liberty but is as it
were a prisoner.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 716, § 18, November 17, 1560;
La Place, 73; Castelnau, Book II, chap. x; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 425. La
Planche, 381, describes the method of his imprisonment.

[239] La Planche, 380; _C. S. P. For._, No. 725, November 18, 1560;
_Nég. Tosc._, III, 425, 426.

[240] “Qu’il avoit faict et faisoit plusieurs entreprises contre luy
(le roi) et l’estat de bon royaume.”—La Planche, 380; _Despatches of
Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), November 10, 1560.

[241] La Place, 38; La Planche, 378; Castelnau, Book II, chap. x; _Rel.
vén._, I, 557; Brantôme, III, 278.

[242] Yet he was so carefully watched that he was practically a
prisoner—“tanquam captivus,” says Throckmorton to Lord Robert Dudley
(_C. S. P. For._, No. 721, 1560). Damville was also regarded with
suspicion.

[243] _Ibid._, No. 716, § 18, November 17, 1560.

[244] Castelnau, Book II, chap. ix; La Planche, 318-38, gives the text
of one, which is significant because it is almost wholly a _political_
indictment of the Guises; next to nothing is said touching religion,
conclusive evidence that the Huguenot party was much more political
than religious.

[245] La Planche, 375, 376.

[246] _Ibid._, 318.

[247] “Qu’il seroit meilleur pour elle d’entretenir les choses en
l’estat qu’elles estoyent, sans rien innover.”—_Ibid._, 313.

[248] _Ibid._, 316, 317.

[249] Baschet, _La diplomatie vénitienne_, 499.

[250] _Rel. vén._, II, 65.

[251] The more one considers the arrest of the prince of Condé, the
more certain it seems that Catherine de Medici inspired it. The
Venetian ambassador believed Catherine was at the bottom of his arrest;
see Baschet, 500, 501.

[252] “The bishop of Valence says ... that the meeting of Fontainebleau
would turn into a general assembly of the three estates of
France.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 445, August 22, 1560.

[253] La Planche, 218.

[254] See the scathing comparison of the house of Guise with that of
Montmorency: “La plus ancienne yssue du premier chrestien du premier du
royaume de la chrestienté.”—_Livre des marchands_, 428-30.

[255] “Messieurs de Guyse vouloyent venir aux armes pour effacer ceste
poursuite des estats et réformation de l’église la poursuitte que nous
avions si justement commencée de leur faire rendre compte de leurs dons
excessifs, c’est-à-dire de leurs larcins, et de leur maniement des
finances, ou plustost de leurs finesses.”—_Ibid._, 456.

The petition of the estates of Touraine, assembled at Tours on October
26, 1560, to the King, is a good example of this popular demand. The
articles reflect the state of the times (_C. S. P. For._, No. 681). In
connection with this authentic petition compare the imaginary “discours
du drapier” in a fancied meeting of the estates-general, as given in
_Livre des marchands_, 427-40, the satirical forerunner of the greatest
political satire of the sixteenth century, the _Satyre Menippée_.

[256] La Planche, 260.

[257] Cf. La Place, 47-49, 110-13; La Planche, 342; and especially the
indictment in _Livre des marchands_, 436-58.

[258] To be exact, 43,700,000 livres (Isambert, XIV, 63). Part of
it was held by the Swiss cantons: “The French King is conferring
with the Swiss about paying his debts, and offers two-thirds with a
quarter for interest, and to pay the whole within three years; which
conditions they refuse, and desire him either to stand to his written
promises or that the matter shall be discussed in some place appointed
in Switzerland.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 763, December 3, 1560, from
Strasburg.

[259] “In so much as it was necessary for him to find the wherewithal
to satisfy some of these obligations, the late king had abolished
certain of them and reduced others; he had let 50,000 footmen be
billeted upon the cities of the kingdom and caused money to be raised
by the imposition of subsidies, so much so that he had found it
necessary in some places to diminish the _taille_, the people having
abandoned the county of Normandy.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 658, January
28, 1560; cf. La Place, 47; _Livre des marchands_, 447, 448; _Nég.
Tosc._, III, 405 and 455.

[260] “The soldiers through necessity have begun to rob.”—_C. S. P.
For._, _ibid._

[261] La Place, 48.

[262] La Place, 49.

[263] “Interrogatoire d’un des agens du prince de Condé,” _Arch. cur._,
sér. I, IV, 35. Madame de Roye, Coligny’s sister and mother-in-law of
Louis of Condé, was also seized in the expectation of finding papers
in her possession which would incriminate Condé, Lattoy, the advocate,
and Bouchart, the king of Navarre’s chancellor (Castelnau, Book II,
chap. ix; La Planche, 381; Frederick, count palatine of the Rhine, to
Elizabeth, from Heidelberg, _C. S. P. For._, No. 721, November 17,
1560; No. 737, §8, November 28, 1560; No. 781, December 7, 1560; De
Crue, _Anne de Montmorency_, 282 ff.).

[264] “MM. de Guise avoient asseuré le pape et le roi d’Espagne de
chasser du royaume les huguenots; desseignent (après le procès du
prince de Condé et luy executé) d’envoyer de la gendarmerie et de gens
de pied sous la charge des sieurs de Sainct André, Termes, Brissac et
Sipierre, leurs amis, pour chasser les hérétiques et faire obeyr le
roy.”—Tavannes, 257 (1560).

[265] _Mém. de Condé_, II, 379; Chantonnay to Philip II, November 28,
K. 1,493, No. 108; _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), November
22; Claude Haton, I, 130, 131.

[266] This action was a legal subterfuge, as Castelnau, Book II, chap.
xii, no friend of Condé, is honest enough to admit, citing several
precedents in favor of Condé. Cf. La Place, 73-75; La Planche, 400-2;
D’Aubigné, I, 294, 295.

[267] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), November 25, 1560.

[268] Francis II, always had been of a frail constitution, and in
his passion for hunting seems to have over-exerted himself. “The
constitution of his body is such as the physicians do say he cannot be
long lived, and thereunto he hath by this too timely and inordinate
exercise now in his youth added an evil accident.”—Throckmorton to
Elizabeth, _C. S. P. For._, No. 738, November 28, 1560; Chantonnay to
Philip II, same date, K. 1,493, No. 108. He fell ill about November
20, seemingly with a catarrh (Suriano, November 20, 25), accompanied
by headache and pain in the ear, of which he died on the night of
December 5 at the eleventh hour, although the physicians, on December
1, “mistrusted no danger of his life” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 758).
Throckmorton elsewhere calls the King’s disease “an impostume in the
head.”—_Ibid._, No. 771, December 6, 1560; cf. La Planche, 413, 418;
D’Aubigné, I, 299. Very probably the disease was _mastoiditis_—an
affection of the mastoid bone back of the ear, induced by chronic
catarrh which finally affected the brain. Suriano says: “Il corpo del
morto Re è stato aperto et hanno trovato guasto tutto il cervello, in
modo che per diligentia delli medici non si haveria potuto risanarlo”
(December 8, 1560.)

[269] D’Aubigné, I, 300, and n. 2. The vidame of Chartres, who had
been confined in the Bastille, “though allowed to take the air” (_C.
S. P. For._, No. 764, December 3, 1560), was released also, but died
almost immediately (La Place, 78-79, gives a eulogy of him). See
Lemoisne, “François de Vendôme, vidame de Chartes,” _Positions de
thèses de l’Ecole des Chartes_, 1901, 89. His death enriched the house
of Montmorency, for he left the lordship of Milly-en-Gatinois, worth
3,000 crowns yearly, to Damville, the constable’s second son (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 832, §10, December 31, 1560). The will is printed in _Bib.
de l’Ec. d. Chartes_, 1849, 342; it is dated December 23.

[270] _Rel. vén._, I, 543. On the situation after death of Francis II
see Weill, chap. ii.

[271] _C. S. P. For._, No. 764, December 3, 1560, Edwards to Cecil from
Rouen.

[272] “Lettres-patentes du roi Charles IX; pardon-général au sujet
des affaires de religion.” The Spanish ambassador had been summoned
to the court that he might write to Philip II to stand ready to
offer assistance in case of need.—_Despatches of Suriano_ [Huguenot
Society], December 3, 1560; K. 1,493, No. 113, December 3, 1560.
Chantonnay’s correspondence shows that the Spanish King was fully
informed of the progress of events in France, which is confirmed by
Throckmorton. “The King of Spain has given order to stay the five
thousand Spaniards in the Low Countries who were to go to Sicily
... the posts run apace and often between the kings of France and
Spain.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 737, November 28, 1560.

[273] La Place, 76; Claude Haton, I, 116.

[274] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), December 3, 1560.

[275] _C. S. P. For._, No. 773, December 6, 1560. “They have not only
already good forces in this town at their devotion, but have sent for
more men-at-arms to be here with all diligence ... so that if they
cannot get it by good means, they see none other surety for themselves
but to get it by such means as they can best devise ... if the Guise
forces and party be best, they will not fail to betrap them all and
to stand for it whatever it costs them.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 771,
December 6, 1560. Catherine de Medici detested Mary Stuart. She called
her “notre petite reinette écossaise.”

[276] Claude Haton, I, 118, 119. The Guises wanted, above all, to
prevent the _undivided_ regency of Catherine de Medici and even cited
the Salic law as a bar to such result (Chantonnay to Philip II,
December 28, 1560; K. 1,494, No. 12). They favored the regency of the
pliable Antoine of Bourbon, or a combination of the king of Navarre
and the queen mother. In either event a galaxy of the Guises was to
surround the throne, I. e., the cardinals of Tournon and Lorraine, the
duke of Guise, the chancellor and the two marshals Brissac and St.
André; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 434, and De Crue, _Anne de Montmorency_,
288-90, a good brief statement.

[277] Catherine sent the sieur de Lansac at once to the constable at
Etampes (cf. D’Aubigné, I, 299, and n. 2) who in turn went to consult
with his son, Damville, at Chantilly, where he was kept by his wife’s
illness, those two in turn conferring with the princess of Condé (La
Place, 76).

[278] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), December 18, 1560.

[279] How much Antoine yielded to the temptation the following report
of an interview between Throckmorton and the king of Navarre shows:
“Throckmorton said that there was a _bruit_ that the Spaniards had
passage given them by Bayonne and other forts of the French King. The
king of Navarre said that it was true, and that he was about to verify
the letters that are yet denied.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 732, December
31, 1560, § 7.

On Sardinia see _Rel. vén._, I, 555. Even the prospect of becoming
emperor was held out to him (_ibid._, I, 559; II, 76).

[280] “Although the duke of Guise is popular, above all with the
nobility, yet everybody so detests the cardinal of Lorraine that if
the matter depended upon universal suffrage, not only could he have no
part in the government, but perhaps not in the world! It is cynically
reported that his Right Reverend and Lordship took the precaution to
send his favorite and precious effects early into Lorraine.”—_C. S. P.
Ven._, No. 221, December 16, 1560.

[281] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), December 18, 1560;
_Rel. vén._, I, 433. “I found the court very much altered ... not one
of the house of Guise.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 832, December 31, 1560.

[282] Claude Haton, I, 11.

[283] The law of France, by ordinance of Charles V, had for generations
provided that the king’s majority was attained when he was fourteen
years of age; but the King’s uncles claimed that the meaning of the law
was that the King’s majority was not reached _until the end_ of his
fourteenth year, i. e., upon his _fifteenth_ birthday, which, in the
case of Charles IX, would not be until June 27, 1564. This ingenious
argument was sustained by various authors subsidized by the Guises,
who went farther and argued away the regency of the queen mother also,
in spite of the precedents of Blanche of Castille and Anne of Beaujeu,
on the ground of the Salic law (Chantonnay to Philip II, December 28,
1560; K. 1,494, No. 12).

[284] D’Aubigné, I, 302; _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I,
176; _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), March 29, 1561; _C.
S. P. For._, No. 77, § 3, March 31, 1560; La Place, 120, 121; De Crue,
_Anne de Montmorency_, 299.

[285] Cf. Viollet, _Inst. polit. de la France_, II, 95.

[286] The arrangement of executive offices at this time was very
different from that of a modern government. Instead of there being a
single secretary for foreign affairs, there were individual secretaries
_for each country_—one for Italy, one for Spain, one for Flanders,
one for Germany, etc., and each one attended to his own business. This
eliminated one more power in the government, exactly as Catherine
wanted.

[287] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), March 29, 1561.
“The King is young and the constable has now a great authority in the
realm.... But if they recover their authority, it is to be feared that
they will use more extremity than they did before, and that therefore
the queen cannot but fear his danger in this case.”—_C. S. P. For._,
No. 1,030, February 26, 1561, § 6.

[288] See the remarkable character-sketch of the Venetian ambassador in
_Rel. vén._, I, 425-27.

[289] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), December 8, 1560. On
the efforts of the Guises to control the States-General of 1560 see
Weill, 40.

[290] D’Aubigné, I, 304; Paris, _Négociations_, 789.

[291] La Place, 85, 87.

[292] Castelnau, Book III, chap. ii. In this connection the following
observation is of interest: “A disputation has lately been at Rome
among the cardinals, and the Pope has had the hearing of what is the
cause that France is thus rebelled from them. The Romans would conclude
that the dissolute living of the French cardinals, bishops and clergy,
was the cause; but the French party and the bishop, who is ambassador
there, say that nothing has wrought so much in France as of late
the practice in Rome of divers of the nobility of France where they
have seen such dissolute living of the clergymen as returning into
France they have persuaded the rest that the clergy of Rome is of no
religion.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 822, December 28, 1560.

[293] The address is printed _in extenso_ in _Œuvres complètes de
l’Hôpital_, I, 375 ff.

[294] Suriano, December 20; D’Aubigné, I, 303, 304; La Place, 88, 109.
“The estates assembled on December 13, but have done little or nothing;
divers of them will not put forth such things as they were instructed
in, now the king is dead.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 832, December 31, 1560.

[295] La Planche, 389-96; D’Aubigné, I, 305, 306.

[296] Cf. _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 237, February 17, 1561.

[297] La Place, 93.

[298] _Ibid._, 93-109.

[299] La Place, 109; La Planche, 397; D’Aubigné, I, 307.

[300] Castelnau, Book III, chap. ii.

[301] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 237, February 17, 1561. The action
practically flouted a papal bull of November 20, 1560, convening the
Council at Trent, which was intended to anticipate and _prevent_ any
such action as this at Orleans (La Planche, 403).

[302] There was also a technical argument based on the fact that in the
bull of the Council the words “_sublata suspensione_” were interpreted
to mean that the Pope intended to continue the Council already
commenced, and that the decrees already made were to be valid; which
offended France. The cardinal of Lorraine was the one who raised these
difficulties, though he tried to give the opposite impression; from him
came the opposition to the words of the bull (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 229,
January 7, 1561; _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), January
14, 1561).

[303] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 237, January 23, 1561; La Place, 124-26,
practically paraphrases the edicts.

[304] _Rel. vén._, I, 443.

[305] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), February 17, 1561.

[306] Castelnau, Book III, chap, ii, says 42,000,000; Throckmorton put
the figures at 43,000,000: _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,032, February 26,
1561; cf. No. 988, February 12, 1561; Suriano, the Venetian ambassador,
also gives the amount as eighteen million crowns (_ibid._, _Ven._, No.
237, February 17, 1561). This would approximate $75,000,000.

The debt of the King to the Genoese, Germans, Milanese, Florentines,
and Lucca amounted to 644,287 ducats (_ibid._, _For._, No. 1,432,
October 5, 1560).

[307] Dareste, _Histoire de France_, III, 456, 457.

[308] Lorenzo Contarini in 1550 speaks with satisfaction of the even
balance of the finances; Soranzo in 1556 speaks of their disorder (cf.
Ranke, _Französische Geschichte_, Book VII, chap, iv, n. 2).

[309] An ordinance of 1270 authorized a loan of 100,000 _livres
tournois_ for the crusade that culminated in disaster before Tunis.
Cf. G. Servois, “Emprunts de St. Louis en Palestine et en Afrique,”
_Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes_, sér. IV, IV, 117. Philip III
borrowed of his great vassals and from the Flemish towns (Langlois, _Le
règne de Philippe le Hardi_, chap. v).

[310] Boutaric, _La France sous Philippe le Bel_, 297.

[311] The preamble of the letters-patent of Francis I, bearing date
of September 2, 1522, makes this fact clear; for in that document
alienation is made by the government of the “aids, gabelles and
impositions” of Paris, the fees of the “grand butchery of Beauvais,”
the rates upon the sale of wine, both wholesale and retail, and of
fish, as security for the loan made. Cf. Vührer, _Histoire de la dette
publique en France_, I, 15-26; Lavisse, _Histoire de France_, V, Part
I, 241, 242.

[312] Esmein, _Histoire du droit français_, 631-34.

[313] Vührer, _Histoire de la dette publique en France_, I, 22-25.

[314] Gold was at a premium, the payments for gold crowns and pistolets
being above their valuation. All foreign coins were rated high: English
“rose” nobles = 6 francs, 12 sous; “angels” = 4 francs, 6 sous;
imperials and Phillipes were current at the same rate as “angels” (_C.
S. P. For._, No. 1,076, February 20, 1561). The gold crown was passable
at 51 francs _tournois_; the pistolet gold and weight, 49 francs
(_ibid._, No. 886, January 17, 1561). Prices of commodities were also
high. The duke of Bedford, who came over in February 1561 as a special
envoy of Elizabeth, reports, February 26: “France is the dearest
country I ever came in.”—_Ibid._, No. 1,031. Cf. the confession of
Richard Sweete, an English fugitive in France, who was forced to return
home on account of “hard times.” “Within one month they came back from
Paris, partly upon the death of the French king and partly for that
victuals were there so dear that they could not live.”—_Ibid._, II,
No. 36, October 5, 1559.

Without attempting to go at length into the intricate subject of the
various kinds of money current in France in the sixteenth century,
something yet is to be said upon the subject in order to make clear the
working of these and other economic sources. In the sixteenth century,
as during the Middle Ages, the standard of value was the _livre
tournois_, divided into _sous_ and _deniers_ (1 livre = 20 sous; 1 sou
= 12 deniers). The _livre tournois_ was really a hypothetical coin and
was merely used as a unit of calculation. The French gold coin was
the _écu d’or_ which varied in value between 1 livre, 16 sous, and 2
livres, 5 sous. In 1561 it was equivalent to 2 livres in round numbers.
The _teston_ was a silver coin of a value of 10 or 11 sous and was
sometimes called a crown or a franc by the English. The sou originally
was made of an amalgam of silver and copper and the denier or penny of
red copper.

The English during their long occupation of Normandy in the fifteenth
century, and owing to their commercial communication with Flanders,
introduced the pound sterling or “estrelin” (easterling) (Du Cange,
_Glossarium_, _s. v._ “Esterlingus;” Ruding, _Annals of the Coinage_,
I, 7; Le Blanc, _Traité historique des monnaies de France_, 82).
Though much more stable than other coinage—except the Venetian ducat
and the florin—it nevertheless slowly depreciated. Elizabeth in 1561
rechristened it the gold “sovereign.” It was worth about 8 _livres
tournois_ in 1561 (Avenel, “La fortune mobilière dans l’histoire,”
_Revue des deux mondes_, July 15, 1892, 784, 785). The French peasantry
still in certain parts of France estimate in terms of ancient coinage.
The _pistole_, by origin a Spanish coin current in Flanders and the
Milanais, was forbidden circulation as far back as Louis XIV. Yet the
peasants of Lower Normandy at the cattle fairs today will estimate the
price of their animals in ancient terms. Similarly the Breton peasantry
talk of _réaux_ (_real_), the last vestige of Brittany’s commercial
relations with Spain (Avenel, _op. cit._, 783).

The actual value of these coins in modern terms has been much debated.
M. de Wailly estimated the value of the _livre tournois_ in 1561 at
3 francs, 78 centimes. The vicomte d’Avenel thinks these figures too
high and has adopted 3 francs, 11 centimes as a mean value for the
years between 1561 and 1572. M. Lavasseur prefers the round number of 3
francs. On the basis of the last estimate one sou would be equivalent
to 15 centimes and 1 denier to 1.2 centimes in terms of modern French
money. But these figures mean nothing until the purchasing power of
money at this time is established. In this particular, estimates have
varied all the way from 3 to 12 and even to 17 and 20. M. Lemmonier
inclines to the ratio of 5 for the middle of the sixteenth century. For
an admirably clear and succinct account of the value of French money
in the sixteenth century, see Lavisse, _Histoire de France_, Vol. V,
Part I, pp. 266-69. Larger references will be found in the bibliography
appended to the chapter.

But whatever the ratio may have been, the decline in the purchasing
power of money was great. Between 1492 and 1544 Europe imported 279
millions worth (in francs) of gold and silver. In the single year 1545,
when the famous mines of Potosi were opened, 492,000,000 francs’ worth
were brought into Europe. The purchasing power of money is estimated
to have fallen one-quarter between 1520 and 1540 and one-half by the
year 1600. After the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis when peaceful relations
were renewed between France and Spain, France particularly felt the
disturbing effect of the new conditions. According to the vicomte
d’Avenel (_op. cit._), from 1541-61 the _livre tournois_ was valued
at 3 francs, 34 centimes; from 1561-72 at 3 francs, 11 centimes; from
1575-79 at 2 francs, 88 centimes. “Un capital de 1,000 livres qui
valait 22,000 francs en 1200, n’en valait plus intrinsèquement que
16,000 en 1300; 7,530 en 1400; 6,460 en 1500, et était tombé en 1600 à
2,570 francs.”—_Revue des deux mondes_, July 15, 1892, 800.

One is astonished not to find greater complaints about the “hard times”
in the chronicles and other sources of the period. To be sure, the
misery did not reach its acutest stage until the time of the League,
when the difference between the price of food stuffs and daily wages
was outrageous. For example, since 1500 the wage of the laboring
man had increased but 30 per cent., whereas the price of grain had
increased 400 per cent. At the accession of Louis XII, wheat had cost
four francs per hectolitre and the peasant earned sixteen centimes a
day; at the accession of Henry IV (in 1590), wheat sold for twenty
francs per hectolitre and the daily wage of the peasant was but
seventy-eight centimes (Avenel, “Le pouvoir de l’argent,” _Revue des
deux mondes_, April 15, 1892, 838).

[315] Castelnau, Book III, chap. ii.

[316] La Planche, 112; _C. S. P. For._, No. 990, February 12, 1561.

[317] La Planche, 113.

[318] _C. S. P. For._, No. 889, January 16, 1561; No. 890, February 12,
1561.

[319] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 237, February 17, 1561.

[320] La Place, 121.

[321] “They mean to levy the greatest subsidy that was ever granted in
France. The chief burden rests with the clergy, who give eight-tenths;
the lawyers, merchants, and common people are highly rated also. They
reckon to levy 18,000,000 francs.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 483, September
3, 1560.

[322] “The Pope has given faculty to the King to sell of the revenues
of the church by the year, and has granted the like to the French King,
_meaning to serve them to execute ... the order now to be taken at the
General Council_.”—_Ibid._, No. 777, December 7, 1560, from Toledo.
A similar arrangement was made in Spain with Philip II, in order to
restore his depleted finances.

[323] _Ibid._, No. 850, January 1, 1561.

[324] The _ordonnance_ of the King proroguing the estates did not
appear until a month later, March 25, 1561.

[325] La Place, III; _C. S. P. For._, No. 938, February 12, 1561. In
a letter dated January 22, 1561, to Peter Martyr, Hotman gives an
admirable account of the session of the States-General at Orleans. See
Dareste, “François Hotman,” _Mém. de l’Acad. des sc. moral. et polit._,
CIV, 654-56.

[326] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), March 1, 1561.

[327] _C. S. P. For._, No. 49, March 18, 1561.

[328] _Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 242, March 3, 1561.

[329] La Place, 129; La Popelinière, I, 244; De Thou, IV, 66, 67.
The king of Navarre, most of the princes of the blood, cardinals,
and nobles being present, chief among whom were the duke of Guise
and the cardinal of Lorraine. The prince was declared innocent, all
the information brought against him was pronounced false and the
letters, forgeries. This rehabilitation was also extended to the
vidame of Chartres and Madame de Roye, Coligny’s sister and mother
of the princess of Condé, and the parlementary arrêt was ordered to
be proclaimed in all the courts of parlement of the realm (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 265, § 8, June 23, 1561).

[330] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 467, and note.

[331] Ordonnance générale des états assemblés à Orléans, p. 5;
Isambert, XIV, 65. In pursuance of this legislation the cardinal of
Lorraine resigned a few of his pluralities. He gave the bishopric
of Metz to his brother, the cardinal of Guise, and retained for
himself the archbishopric of Rheims, with the Abbeys of St. Rémy
and St. Denis (Claude Haton, I, 234). On April 1, 1561, the action
of the States-General was affirmed in a royal edict which commanded
the bishops to return to their dioceses and there reside under pain
of seizure of their temporalities, and in every bailiwick in France
inventories were to be made of the whole revenues of the priest
(Isambert, XIV, 101). It was followed by an edict dealing with the
administration of the hospitals and support of the poor (_ibid._, 105),
designed to put an end to corrupt practice on the part of unprincipled
and avaricious priests who did not wish to reside at home and so sold
their cures to presbyters. Those who had numerous benefices found
means to excuse themselves from residence in their cures, in virtue
of an article of the edict, which provided that ecclesiastics who had
numerous cures, which they held _par dispense_, or other benefices
or charges requiring actual residence in some other church, and who
could not by this means reside in their parishes, by residing in one
of the parishes or other churches in which they had a benefice or
office requiring residence, were exempt from residing in their other
cures, provided that they committed them to the care of capable vicars.
In virtue of this article they were permitted the enjoyment of their
revenues after having satisfied the king’s officers in each bailiwick.
Cf. Claude Haton, I, 221, 222. The revenues of hospitals were assumed
control of by the government, and the administration thereof was
committed to the care of special administrators. Local judicial
officers instead of the clergy, as formerly, were to supervise the
distribution of money, wood, wine, and provisions, to priors, monks,
nuns, and the poor.

The hospitals of various towns of France and in particular the
hôtels-dieu at Paris and Troyes, had already, even before this, been
governed by lay commissioners. For a complaint of bad administration of
the Hôtel-Dieu at Provins by the lay officers, who enriched themselves
at the expense of the poor, and let the house run down, for which
reason the King was requested to restore the administration to the
clergy, see Claude Haton, I, 223.

[332] The letter which the bishop of Limoges, the French ambassador in
Madrid, wrote “après la mort de François II,” detailing the Spanish
monarch’s fear, is almost prophetic (Paris, _Négociations relatives au
règne de François II_, 782-85).

[333] Philip II, to Charles IX, January 4, 1561, K. 1,495, No. 13; to
Mary Stuart, January 7, K. 1,495, No. 17; _C. S. P. For._, No. 870,
January 10, 1561. He arrived on the evening of January 23. Cf. Don Juan
de Manrique and Chantonnay to Philip II, January 28, 1561, K. 1,494,
No. 55, giving an account of his reception at the French court. He left
about February 10, 1561 (_C. S. P. For._, Nos. 933, January 23, 1561,
and 984, February 11, 1561).

[334] _C. S. P. For._, No. 11, March 4, 1561; _Despatches of Suriano_
(Huguenot Society), February 19, 1651. A letter of December 26, 1560,
to the King, published in the _Revue d’hist. diplomatique_, XIII, No. 4
(1899), 604, “Dépêches de Sebastien de l’Aubespine,” states the _real_
mission of Don Juan de Manrique.

[335] The queen mother to the bishop of Rennes, April 11, 1561,
_Correspondance de. Catherine de Médicis_, I, 186. The latter’s reply
is in Paris, _Négociations_, etc., 871, May 26, 1561. Cf. Castelnau, I,
555.

[336] Lacombe, _Catherine de Médicis entre Guise et Condé_, 108. The
edict was actually a confirmation of the edict of Romorantin. See _Mém.
de Coudé_, II, 266; text of the Edict of Romorantin in Isambert, XIV,
31.

[337] Letter of Charles IX, January 23, 1561, _Opera Calvini_, XVIII,
337. The reply of the senate under date of January 28 is at 343-45.

[338] _C. S. P. Ven._, Nos. 250, 272, April, 1561. Coligny’s house was
a favorite rendezvous. He never went to mass, and when his wife gave
birth to a child in the spring of 1561 he had it baptized openly in the
popular tongue, according to the Calvinist form (_C. S. P. For._, Nos.
933, 984, 1561).

[339] For the rise of Protestantism in Normandy see Le Hardy,
_Histoire du protestantisme en Normandie depuis son origine jusqu’ à
la publication de l’Edit de Nantes_, Caen, 1869; Lessens, _Naissance
et progrès de l’hérésie de Dieppe, 1557-1609_: Publication faite pour
la I^[ére] fois d’après le MS de la biblioth. publ. av. une introd. et
des notes, Rouen, 1877; Hauser, “The French Reformation and the Popular
Classes,” _American Historical Review_, January, 1899.

[340] _Archives de la Gironde_, XIII, 132; XVII, 256.

[341] “There is not one single province uncontaminated,” wrote Suriano,
the Venetian ambassador on April 17, 1561 (_C. S. P Ven._, 272).

[342] See a. long letter of Hotman published by Dareste in _Rev.
hist._, XCVII, March-April, 1908, p. 299.

[343] _C. S. P. For._, 857, January 1, 1561.

[344] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 456.

[345] _C. S. P. For._, No. 124, April 20, 1561.

[346] _C. S. P. For._, No. 155, April 30; _C.S.P. Ven._, No. 255, May
2, and No. 258, May 14, 1561.

[347] Suriano says this hostility of Paris toward Protestantism was
greater, perhaps, because it was favored by the nobles, who were
naturally hated—“la plebe di questa Città che per professione è nemica
delle nove sette, forse perchè sono favorite dalli nobili, li quali
sono odiati per natura.”—_Op. cit._, May 2, 1561. Cf. May 16, _ab
init._ (Huguenot Society of London).

[348] “Requête de la Sorbonne au roi,” K. 1,495, No. 74, without date
but seemingly of this time.

[349] _C. S. P., Ven._ No. 259, May 16, 1561.

[350] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 158, April, 1561; cf. No. 124, April 20,
1561.

[351] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 188, and n. 1.

[352] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 259, May 16, 1561.

[353] January 4, 1561; K. 1,495, No. 15.

[354] _Ibid._, No. 16.

[355] On the whole see De Crue, _Anne de Montmorency_, 294, 295.

[356] January 31, 1561; K. 1,494 No. 21.

[357] For an example of Chantonnay’s way of working see De Crue, 296,
297, and the letters in K. 1,494, No. 54, January 15, 1561, and No. 56,
February 1, 1561.

[358] This important document which has not been published by M. Louis
Paris, or elsewhere that I can find, is in K. 1,494, No. 70 (printed in
Appendix II).

[359] La Place, 122, 123.

[360] This is the judgment of both Catholic and Huguenot historians;
e.g., Castelnau, Book III, chap. v, and Benoist, _Historie de l’édit de
Nantes_, Book I, 29, who says that the chief motive of St. André and
the constable in forming the Triumvirate was fear of being compelled to
pay back the immense sums which they had embezzled. Yet the constable
in 1561 was a poor man as the result of the heavy sums of ransom he and
his house had been obliged to pay during the late war. See De Crue,
_Anne de Montmorency_, 236.

[361] La Place, 123; Ruble, III, 71; De Crue, 303; Chantonnay to Philip
II, April 7, K. 1,494, B. 12, 73; April 9, B. 12, 75. Cf. _Mémoires
de Condé_, III, 210 ff.: “Sommaire des choses premièrement accordées
entre les ducs de Montmorency, Connestable et De Guyse, ... et le
Mareschal Sainct André, pour la Conspiration du Triumvirate, et depuis
mises en délibération à l’entrée du Sacré et Sainct Concile de Trente,
et arrestée entre les Parties en leur privé Conseil faict contre les
Héréticques et contre le Roy de Navarre en tant qu’il gouverne et
conduit mal les affaires de Charles IX.”

[362] La Planche, 454.

[363] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 448.

[364] _Rel. vén._, I, 534.

[365] The original letter is preserved in the Musée des Archives
Nationales, No. 665. See the _Mémoires de Condé_, III, 395.

[366] Philip II to the constable, the cardinal of Lorraine, and Antoine
of Navarre, April 14 and June 12, 1561, Archives nat., K. 1,495, B.
13, 33, 44. Admission of this step thus early is made in the _Mémoires
du duc de Guise_, ed. Michaud et Poujoulat, sér. I, V, 464. The
Huguenots were early apprised of it by the interception of a messenger
of the Triumvirate near Orleans. Cf. _Bref discours et véritable des
principalles conjurations de la maison de Guyse_, Paris, 1565, 5, 6.

[367] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 259, May 16, 1561.

[368] Cf. De Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, III, 251
ff.

[369] On Palm Sunday (1561) Antoine went to mass, for which Pius IV
hastened to congratulate him and the church (K. 1,494, No. 74, April
8, 1561), and for some time after Easter he continued to go to mass,
and refrained from eating flesh on the days prohibited by the church
(_C. S. P. For._, No. 248, May 18, 1561). But within a month, he
is discovered having public preaching in his house by a Protestant
minister, and “daily service in the vulgar tongue” (_ibid._, No. 265,
§13, June 23, 1561).

[370] “Como todas actiones no se goviernan siempre con la
razon.”—Granvella to Philip II, May 13, 1561, _Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VI, 541.

[371] Chantonnay’s letter of April 18, 1562, is almost entirely given
up to a report of a conversation between him and the marshal St. André
upon this question. It is very interesting (K. 1,497, No. 24).

[372] K. 1,497, No. 33.

[373] See Vargas to Philip II, from Rome, September 30, 1561, in
_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VI, 357, where he tells
the king of one of Antoine’s speeches. One of the minor duties of
Don Juan de Manrique’s mission to France in January, 1561, had been
to give Antoine hope in that quarter, in which policy Spain’s grand
master of artillery, and the papal nuncio worked together. The nuncio
was Hippolyte d’Este, the cardinal of Ferrara. His correspondence
is published in _Négociations ou lettres d’affaires ecclésiastiques
et politiques escrites au Pape Pie IV et au Cardinal Borromée, par
Hippolyte d’Est, cardinal de Ferrare, legat en France au commencement
des guerres civiles_, Paris, 1658.

[374] K. 1,497, No. 28.

[375] “Sa principal espérance de ce costé-la [Sardinia], se fonde
sur les bons et vigoureux offices qu’il se promet de nostre
Saint-Père.”—Letter II, from St. Germain, January 10, 1561.
_Négociations ... du cardinal de Ferrare_, Lettre XXXIV, June 26, 1562.

Don Juan de Manrique suggested to Antoine—“Que s’il vouloit repudir la
reine sa femme, comme hérétique qu’elle estoit, les Seigneurs de Guise
luy feroient espouser leur Nièce, veuve de Francis II.”

[376] Apparently the Sardinians were prepared to say something for
themselves in the matter. For St. Sulpice, the French ambassador in
Spain, who succeeded L’Aubespine, on October 8, 1562, writes to Antoine
to this effect: “On lui a rapporté ‘comme les galères d’Espagne, venant
d’Italie à Barcelone, et passant près de la Saidaigne, les habitans
du pays, s’étaient mis en armes avec contenance de vouloir défendre
l’abordée de leurs portes ausd. galères, de quoi s’étant depuis venus
justifier par deça; ils avaient remontré qu’ils avaient entendu que ce
roi les voulait bailler à un autre prince et qu’ils craignaient que
lesd. galères y vinssent pour les contraindre de la recevoir à sgr.,
ce qu’ils ne voulaient permettre, le suppléant de ne les aliéner de sa
courrone,’” etc.—_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 83. His correspondence
abounds with allusions to Sardinia, e. g., 17, 25, 35, 37, 79, 83, 84,
90, etc.

[377] In the presence of the king of Navarre, the constable, the dukes
of Guise, Nevers, Montpensier, and Aumale, and of spiritual lords, the
cardinal of Lorraine, who was archbishop of Rheims, and the bishops
of Laon, Langres, Châlons, Noyon, and Beauvais, the last being the
cardinal Châtillon, the only prominent Huguenot, who attended the
coronation. The prince of Condé, the admiral, the duke de Longueville,
the marshal Montmorency, and his brother Damville, were not present,
because they would not assist at mass (“M. Damville is the constable’s
best-beloved son, a Knight of the Order, one of the paragons of the
court and a favourer of the reformed faith.”—_C. S. P. For._, No.
395, §3, August 11, 1561). For a detailed account of the particulars
and party issues manifested at the ceremony see De Crue, 309, 310,
Catherine de Medici apparently took her time to advise Philip II of the
coronation, for her letter (without date) was not received by the King
until June 17, K. 1,494, No. 44.

[378] This mightily offended the Triumvirate, and the duke of Guise,
the constable, and the marshal St. André forthwith left the court in
high dudgeon.

Rochambeau, _Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jeanne d’Albret_,
Inventaire Sommaire, No. CXLIII, 27 juin 1561—“Attestation de
Catherine de Médicis et Antoine de Bourbon, pour affirmer que la
retraite du duc du Guyse, de conestable de Montmorency, et du mareschal
de St. André n’est due qu’au seul respect et affection qu’ils portent
au service du roi et au repos de ses sujets.”—Bib. Nat., F. Fr.,
3,194, fol. 5.

[379] “Procès-verbal de la reconcilation entre le prince de Condé et le
duc de Guise en presence du roi Charles IX,” in K. 1,494, No. 92; _Nég.
Tosc._, III, 460; _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 449, August 24, 1561, 461,
August 30, 1561; La Place, 139, 140.

[380] “Requeste présenté au roi par les Deputez des Eglises esparses
parmi le royaume de France.” A printed copy is to be found in K. 1,495,
No. 42. It is a really eloquent petition.

[381] Castelnau, Book III, chap, iii; _C. S. P. For._, No. 304, §3,
July 13, 1561.

[382] Suriano definitely says the edict of July was the work of the
chancellor. He gives a summary of the edict in a despatch of July 27,
1561 (Huguenot Society).

[383] Cf. _C. S. P. For._, 1561, No. 237; _Despatches of Suriano_
(Huguenot Society), June 25, 1561.

[384] Chantonnay to Philip II, July 24, 1561, K. 1,495, No. 52; _C. S.
P. For._, No. 321, §2, Paris, July 16, 1561.

[385] Isambert, _Anc. lois franç._, XIV, 109 (Edit sur la religion,
sur le moyen de tenir le peuple en paix, et sur la répression des
séditieux).

[386] Suriano, August 25; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 453-58; Castelnau, Book
III; _C. S. P. For._, No. 357; Beza, _Hist. ecclés._, I, 294 (ed.
1841); La Place, 130; D’Aubigné, I, 309.

[387] Castelnau, Book III, chap. iii; he admirably depicts the divided
state of mind of the Parlement which resulted in the edict taking
this neutral form. Suriano pithily observes: “Con questi dispareri le
cose del Regno patiscono assai, et non si può far niuna deliberatione
d’importanza che sia ferma et rissoluta, et di quà hanno havuto
origine tanti editti nel fatto di Religione che sono stati publicati
li mesi passati, li quali non solamente sono ambigui, ma diversi l’uno
dall’altro et spesse volte contrarii, donde li heretici hanno preso
tanto fomento che sono fatti più indurati et più ostinati che mai”
(June 26, 1561).

Charles IX sent the Sieur d’Ozances to Spain to soften Philip’s anger
as much as possible. In a letter of July 18, from St. Germain to his
ambassador in Spain, after stating the motives which have led him to
dispatch D’Ozances, he adds: “Au demeurant, je ne doubte point qu’on
sème de beaulx bruictz par delà, touchant le faict de la Religion, et
qu’on ne nous face beaucoup plus malades que nous ne sommes; et, pour
ceste occasion il m’a semblé qu’il serait fort à propos que le Sr.
d’Auzances feist entendre au Roy, mon bon frère, les termes en quoy
nous en sommes.” Then follow details upon the edict of pacification.
This letter was sold at auction in 1877. It is catalogued in the
_Inventaire des autographes et des documents historiques composant la
collection de M. Benjamin Fillon_, Paris, Charavay, 1877 (Series I,
34, No. 132—“Lettre de Charles IX contre-sig. Robertet, à l’évêque de
limoges, ambassadeur en espagne; St. Germain, 18 juillet, 1561”).

[388] Claude Haton, I, 122.

[389] _Ibid._, I, 129. In consequence of this state of things we find
numerous ordinances passed in the summer of 1561 in restraint of
violence; cf. “Edit sur la religion, sur le moyen de tenir le peuple
en paix et sur la répression des séditieux, July 1561,” Isambert,
XIV, 109; “Edit pour remedier aux troubles, et sur la répression des
séditieux,” October 20, 1561, _ibid._, XIV, 122; “Edit sur le port
d’armes à feu, la vente de ces armes et les formalités à suivre par les
fabricants,” October 21, 1561, _ibid._, XIV, 123.

[390] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 237, February 17, 1561, says: “_one_
representative with absolute authority to treat and conclude what might
be approved by the majority of votes.” But La Place, III, 121, says two
representatives were chosen from each bailiwick. Cf. De Crue, _Anne de
Montmorency_, 300.

[391] The estates of the Ile-de-France demanded that the council and
government of the King should be formed according to the ancient
constitution of the realm; that the accounts of the previous
administration should be examined; that the queen mother should be
removed from the government and be content with being guardian of the
King’s person; that no stranger be admitted to be of the council; that
no cardinal, bishop, or other ecclesiastical person having made suit
to the Pope, should have any place in the Privy Council, not even
the cardinal Bourbon, though he was a prince of the blood, unless he
resigned his hat; that the king of Navarre be regent of the realm
with the title of lieutenant-general, and that with him be joined a
council of the princes of the blood and others; that the admiral and
M. de Rochefoucault should have charge of the education of the King.
On these conditions the Estates offered to discharge the King’s debts
in six years; but in the event of refusal, they declared that the King
must live upon the incomes of the royal domain, much of which was
mortgaged (_C. S. P. For._, No. 77, sec. 3, March 31). Cf. _Despatches
of Michele Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), June 10, 1561; De Crue, _Anne
de Montmorency_, 300, 301; letter of Hotman to Bullinger, April 2,
1561 in _Mém. de l’Acad. des sc. moral. et polit._, CIV (1877), 656;
_Nég. Tosc._, III, 455-58. For other information, see “Remonstrances
du tiers-état du baillage de Provins,” in Claude Haton, II, 1137;
“Remonstrance ... des villes de Champagne,” _ibid._, III, 1140, which
shows the economic distress.

[392] La Place, 158 ff.; La Popelinière, I, 271 ff.; D’Aubigné, Book
II, chap, xvi; Beza, _Hist. ecclés._, ed. 1840, I, 320 ff.; L’Hôpital,
_Œuvres complètes_, I, 485 ff. De Thou, Book XXVIII, 74-77; Claude
Haton, I, 155. A test vote, however, on religion was taken, resulting
in 62 votes for liberty of worship in the case of the Huguenots, and 80
against it (letter of Hotman in _Rev. hist._, XCVII, March-April, 1908,
300).

[393] _C. S. P. For._, No. 396, August 11, 1561; La Place, 146, 147,
150.

[394] La Place, 150-52; De Thou, IV, 74, 75. The full text,
unpublished, of this discourse is in F. Fr., 3970, a volume which
contains much unused material for the history of the estates of
Pontoise. L’Hôpital’s address is one of the documents.

[395] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), August 24, 1561.

[396] _C. S. P. For._, No. 538, §5, September 26, 1561.

[397] De Crue, 312, 313; De Thou, IV, 74; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 461;
Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, III, 160; _Rel. vén._,
II, 21; K. 1,494, fol. 94. Notwithstanding this relief, the King
demanded a further subsidy amounting to three million gold crowns from
the local Estates to be paid in the following January (_C. S. P. For._,
No. 682, §10, November 26, 1561).

[398] _Ibid._; cf. No. 750, §7, December 28, 1561. Most of this debt
was held by Paris. It amounted to 7,560,056 livres.

[399] _Rel. vén._, I, 409-11. Upon the whole question, see De Crue,
_Anne de Montmorency_, chap. xiv; Esmein, _Histoire du droit français_,
632-33.

[400] De Ruble, _Le colloque de Poissy_ (1889); Klipfel, _Le colloque
de Poissy_ (1867).

[401] _C. S. P. For._, No. 265, §9, June 23, 1561; La Place, 131.

[402] Paris, _Négociations relatives au règne de François II_, 550,
615-22; _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VI, 137; Klipfel,
_Quis fuerit in Gallia factionum status_, Paris 1863, 23.

[403] Theodore Beza, “the Huguenot pope,” did not reach the court until
August 23, where he was cordially received by the prince of Condé,
before whom he preached “in open audience, whereat was a great press”
(_C. S. P. For._, No. 461, August 30, 1561). For the active agency of
Beza at court before the assembly at Poissy met, see La Place, 155-57.

[404] The Sorbonne protested against the whole proceeding, but its
request was not granted (La Place, 154; cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 458,
August 28, 1561, No. 485, September 8, 1561).

[405] _C. S. P. For._, No. 492, September 10, 1561.

[406] “Far diventar questo Regno cantoni di Svizzeri” ... (_Despatches
of Suriano_ [Huguenot Society], Aug. 15, 1561; cf. _English Hist.
Review_, VIII, 135). Elsewhere the Venetian ambassador says: “E cosi
si va alla via di redurre quella provincia a stato populare, come
Svizzeri; e distruggere la monarchia e il regno.”—_Rel. vén._, I, 538.
De Thou, Book XXV, observes: “Qui primam, quam Deo debebant, fidem
irritam fecissent; qua semel violate, minime dubitaverint regem ipsum
petere quo regnum everterent, et confusis ordinibus, in rei publicae
formam, Helvetiorum exemplo, redigerent.”

[407] _C. S. P. For._, No. 421, August 19, 1561; _ibid._, _Ven._, No.
280, September 8, 1561.

[408] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), September 18, 1561.

[409] “Demandes des ministres protestantes au roi,” K. 1,494, No. 95.

[410] Upon the personnel of the assembly, see the references in
D’Aubigné, I, 315, n. 4.

[411] _C. S. P. For._, No. 516, §7, September 20, 1561.

[412] “Paroles prononcées par Theodore de Beza touchant le
sacrement.”—K. 1,495, No. 77. 1, “Profession de foi concerté par les
prélats de France;” 2, “Première proposition des Catholiques; première
proposition des hérétiques.”—Latin, K. 1,495, No. 78; cf. _Rel. vén._,
II, 75.

[413] The cardinal’s definition of the church was, “the company of
Christians in which is comprised both reprobates and heretics, and
which has been recognized always, everywhere, and by all, and which
alone had the right of interpreting Scripture.”—_C. S. P. For._, No.
507, September 17, 1561; cf. Suriano (Huguenot Society), September 22.
His address is given at length in La Place, 179 ff. It was published at
the time. Suriano, August 23, 1561, says all the delegates “made very
long speeches.” Upon the doctrinal tactics of the cardinal of Lorraine
at the colloquy of Poissy, see the letters of Languet, _Epist. secr._,
II, 139, September 20, 1561; 159, November 26, 1561.

[414] The first president of the Parlement of Paris was committed to
keeping his house because of offensive agitation (_C. S. P. For._, No.
461, August 30, 1561).

[415] Proposition de Théodore de Bèze, K. 1,494, No. 96.

[416] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 280, September 8, 1561.

[417] _C. S. P. For._, No. 511, September 19, 1561.

[418] Not being a Frenchman, but an Italian—his name was Pietro
Martire Vermigli—he received a separate safe-conduct (Suriano
[Huguenot Society], August 23; _Rev. hist._, XCVII, March-April, 1908,
p. 302).

[419] La Place, 199.

[420] _C. S. P. For._, No. 602, October 1, 2 1561. For a description of
the last days of the Colloquy, see _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot
Society), October 16, 1561.

[421] _C. S. P. For._, No. 624, October 18, 1561. In K. 1,495, No.
66, is a résumé by the Spanish chancellery of Chantonnay’s dispatches
dealing with the colloquy.

[422] _C. S. P. For._, No. 753, from Strasburg, December 30, 1561.
Writing just a week earlier, on December 23, to his sovereign,
Chantonnay strongly condemned the course of Catherine at Poissy because
it had militated against the authority of Trent, and had given courage
to the heretics to continue their synods.—K. 1,494, No. 104. Other
references to the Colloquy of Poissy are De Thou, IV, 84 ff.; De Ruble,
_Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, 76 ff.; _Corresp. de Catherine
de Médicis_, I, Introd., ci, 239. Chantonnay’s correspondence, covering
both the colloquy and the meeting of the estates at Pontoise, is in
K. 1,494, No. 89, August 5; No. 90, August 20; No. 101, September 12
(especially valuable for the financial settlement); No. 102, September
15.

[423] _C. S. P. For._, No. 659, §10, November 14, 1561. Of these
the chancellor was the more aggressive, opposing the efforts of the
clerical party to delay and obstruct action (D’Aubigné, I, 311).

[424] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 248; _C. S. P.
For._, Nos. 225 and 245, June 6-13, 1561; No. 273, June 23, 1561. The
choice was a tactless one on the part of the Pope and one certain to
antagonize Catherine de Medici as well as the political Huguenots,
for the cardinal was a relative of the Guises by marriage. Don Luigo
d’Este, the duke of Ferrara’s brother, was the son of Alphonso d’Este
and Lucretia Borgia. He resigned his place in the church and married
the duchess of Estouteville, a marriage indicating the Guise policy of
aggrandisement (_C. S. P. For._, No. 904, March 27, 1560). The marriage
made bitter feeling between the House of Ferrara and the Guises.
“There is a breach between the Dukes of Ferrara and Guise touching the
former’s mother, who, being very rich, and lately fallen out with her
son, had secretly sent to the Duke of Guise, a gentleman with a message
that she would come to France and end her life there and be as his
mother. Word was sent her that she would be welcome; and if her son
would not permit her to come with her substance, he would take into his
hands the assignation made by the late king upon certain lands for the
payment of 100,000 crowns yearly to the Duke till such time as 600,000
crowns, borrowed from him at the Duke of Guise’s last voyage to Rome,
were paid off. The Duke keeps his mother with good watch for fear of
her escaping to France.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 446, August 22, 1561.
The cardinal traveled with great pomp, having no less than four hundred
horses in his train.

[425] _C. S. P. For._, No. 538, §1, September 26, 1561.

[426] D’Aubigné, I, 311; _Rel. vén._, II, 87; _C. S. P. For._, No. 602,
October 12, 1561.

[427] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), September 23, 1561.

[428] _Ibid._, October 22, 1561. For further details of the
negotiations, see _ibid._, November 3, 1561; _C. S. P. For._, No. 682,
§9, November 26; Baschet, _Journal du Concile de Trente_, 89.

[429] Philip II to Catherine, September 29, 1561; to Charles, _ibid._,
K. 1,495, No. 72. To Chantonnay he wrote three days later: “También
hazed entender á la Reyna como por este camino perdera su hijo, esse
reyno y la obediencia de sus vassalos.”—K. 1,495, No. 80. The words
were not merely urgent advice—they implied a threat.

[430] Weiss, _L’Espagne sous Phillippe II_, I, 114, 115; cf. Forneron,
_Histoire de Philippe II_, I, 253, n. 3. See also the remarkable
“Rapport sur une conférence entre l’ambassadeur de France et le duc
d’Albe, au sujet des affaires du roi de Navarre et des troubles pour
cause de la religion” (French transcript, apparently of a report of
the Spanish chancellery), in K. 1,496, No. 136, December 20, 1561. The
Pope indorsed the proposition of Spanish intervention in France (Vargas
to Philippe II, November 7, 1561, in _Papiers d’état du cardinal de
Granvelle_, VI, 398, 404).

[431] “Aux villes et pays où ils sont là declaires leur bailler
quelques lieux prochaine hors des dictes villes”—Résumé des points
principaux traités par l’ambassadeur de France auprès du roi Philippe
II (Communications du duc d’Alba), November 9, 1561, K. 1,495, No.
58; “Propositions faites par M. d’Ozance et l’ambassadeur ordinaire
en Espagne, l’évêque de Limoges, dans deux audiences à eux données
par le roi Philippe II” (Résumé avec annotations), Minute, Notes de
chancellerie, K. 1,495, No. 69, Madrid, September 17, 1561; “Points
principaux d’une négociation spéciale de M. d’Ozance, envoyé de
Catherine de Médici avec réponses notées à la marge, point par point:
Communications au duc d’Albe après une déliberation du Conseil d’état,
prise lui absent,” November 12, 1561, K. 1,495 No. 89; “Précis des
points traités par M. d’Ozance et de l’Aubespine, ambassadeur de
France,” K. 1,495, No. 94, December 10, 1561; “Réponses à faire par
ordre de Philippe II à M. d’Ozance, sur les nouvelles propositions
de cet ambassadeur,” K. 1,495, No. 98, December 15, 1561; “Memento
addressé par l’évêque de Limoges au duc d’Albe” (Note à communiquer
au roi Philippe II), K. 1,495 No. 100, December 20, 1561; Philip II
to Chantonnay: “Avis de ce qu’on a répondu à M. d’Ozance,” December
21, 1561, K. 1,495, No. 102; “Rapport sur une conférence entre
l’ambassadeur du France et le duc d’Albe, au sujet des affaires du
roi de Navarre et des troubles pour cause de la religion” (copié en
Français), K. 1,496, folio 136, Madrid, December 20, 1561.

[432] Summary of Philip II’s letter to Chantonnay of January 18, 1562,
in K. 1,496, No. 34.

[433] _Despatches of Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), November 4, 1561. The
_Journal du Concile de Trente_ (ed. Baschet), 89, says the intention
was to carry him into Lorraine, to prevent his becoming tainted
with heresy. Lignerolles, an intimate of the duke of Nemours, later
confessed the latter’s complicity in the plot to kidnap the young
prince and spirit him away to Savoy, but the affair was hushed up and
Lignerolles was shortly afterward released. The prince de Joinville,
Guise’s son, seems to have been more actively interested than his
father. The correspondence between Chantonnay and Philip leaves no room
for doubt of the fact that Nemours was acting as the agent of Spain
(K. 1,494, No. 106, October 31, from St. Cloud; No. 114, November 28,
1561), although Philip repudiated complicity in a letter to Catherine
(K. 1,495, No. 90, November 27, 1561), and Chantonnay declared the
whole story was a trick of the Huguenots.

[434] D’Aubigné, 321. Chantonnay seems to have been apprehensive lest
the circumstances might precipitate the civil war which every one
feared (Letter to Philip II, November 28, 1561, K. 1,494, No. 114),
and seized the opportunity afforded by it to read the queen mother
a lecture. The ambassador “used great threatenings toward the queen
mother and the king of Navarre for their proceedings in religion.”—_C.
S. P. For._, No. 659, §§1, 2.

Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, III, 245-50; De Crue,
_Anne de Montmorency_, 315, 316. The official inquiry entitled,
“Enquête sur l’enlèvement du duc d’Orleans,” is in F. Fr. 6,608.

[435] _C. S. P. For._, No. 715, §1, December 12, 1561.

[436] _Despatches of Michele Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), November 3,
1561; _C. S. P. For._, No. 659, §5, November 14, 1561.

[437] _C. S. P. For._, No. 717, §7, December 13, 1561. For some of the
famous Catholic preachers of Paris in 1561, see Claude Haton, I, 213,
214, and notes.

[438] Claude Haton, I, 177, 178.

[439] _C. S. P. For._, No. 617, October 15, 1561.

[440] _C. S. P. For._, No. 304, §4, July 23, 1561.

[441] K. 1,495, No.47, June 19, 1561. Cf. _Despatches of Suriano_
(Huguenot Society), October 1. Upon these insurrections in the south,
see D’Aubigné, I, 322-26; De Thou, II, 235 ff. (ed. 1740); _Mém.
de Condé_, III, 636; Long, _La réforme et les guerres de religion
en Dauphiné_; Pierre Gilles, _Hist. ecclés. des églises réformées
vaudoises_, chap. xxii; _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 211.

[442] “Aulx petites villes, elles se sont ralliez les unes
avec les autres en ung faict, ung monopole et une ligue
ensemble.”—_Mémoires-journaux du duc de Guise_ (M. & P., sér. I, VI,
467, col. 2); Letter of Joyeuse to the constable; duplicate to the duke
of Guise (September 16, 1561). For the work of this league see pp.
468-71. Guillaume, vicomte de Joyeuse; was lieutenant to the governor
of Languedoc and later a marshal of France.

[443] These princes were Wolfgang William, duke of Deuxponts; William,
landgrave of Hesse; Frederick the Pious, count palatine of the Rhine
(D’Aubigné, I, 333, 334; Le Laboureur, I, 673). The leading Protestant
princes of Germany were Augustus, elector of Saxony; Joachim II,
margrave of Brandenburg, John Frederick duke of Saxony; Christopher,
duke of Württemberg; Wolfgang William, duke of Deuxponts (Zweibrücken);
John Albert, duke of Mecklenberg; John the Elder, duke of Holstein;
Joachim Ernest, prince of Anhalt, and Charles, margrave of Baden. These
are enumerated in a letter of Hotman, December 31, 1560. See _Mém. de
l’Acad. des sc. moral. et polit._, CIV, 653, and _Bulletin de la soc.
prot. franç._, 1860.

[444] _Mém. de l’Acad. des sc. moral. et polit._, CIV (1877), 66; _C.
S. P. For._, No. 399, August 12, 1561.

[445] _C. S. P. For._, No. 319, July 15, 1561, from Strasburg. Hotman
visited the elector palatine at Germersheim; the landgrave of Hesse at
Cassel; the elector of Saxony at Leipsic, whence he went to Stuttgart.
He did not see the duke of Württemberg in person, and was compelled to
write to him instead. (See his letter, September 27, 1561, in _Mém.
de l’Acad des sc. moral. et polit._, CIV, 660.) Thence he went to
Heidelberg, from which point he wrote a second letter to the duke of
Württemberg, and one to the duke of Deuxponts.

[446] La Place, 121, 122; _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 249; Arch. nat., K.
1,495, folio 47, Chantonnay to Philip II, June 19, 1561.

[447] _C. S. P. For._, No. 736, November 26, 1561.

[448] Chantonnay’s correspondence shows that agents of the duke of
Guise were busy in Germany as early as October, 1561, K. 1,494, No.
105, October 28, 1561. Cf. Hubert Languet, _Epist. secr._, II, 142,
159, 202; _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 216-18, 226-52;
_Bulletin de la soc. de l’histoire du prot. français_, XXIV.

[449] _C. S. P. For._, No. 724, §2, December 14, 1561.

[450] _C. S. P. For._, No. 602, October 11, 1561, from Rome.

[451] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VI, 432-43: “Rapport
secret du secretaire Courtville,” December, 1561.

[452] Cf. Montluc, bishop of Valence, “Discours sur le bruit qui court
que nous aurons la guerre à cause de la religion,” _Mém. de Condé_, ed.
London, III, 73-82. A note adds: “Ce discours se trouve aussi au fol.
61 recto du MS R et il est à la suite d’une lettre de M. de Chantonnay,
du 24 mars 1561. Il dit à la fin de cette lettre, que l’on disoit
communement que ce Discours étoit de l’évêque de Valence (Montluc). Ce
Discours a été copié dans ce MS sur l’édition qui en fut faite dans le
tems.”

[453] On November 23, 1561, Charles IX wrote to the bishop of Limoges
in regard to Philip II: “Dites-lui que je le prie si l’on luy a donné
quelques doubtes et soupçons de mes déportements, qu’il vous en dye
quelcun et ce qu’il la mys en doubte, affin que s’il veult prendre tant
de paynes d’envoyer ung homme fidelle en lieux où il aura oppinion
qu’on fera quelques préparatifs, je luy face cognoistre que c’est
une pure menterie.”—_Catalogue ... de lettres autographes de feu M.
de Lajariette_, Charavay, Paris, 1860, No. 667. Five days later, on
November 28, 1561, Catherine de Medici wrote to the same ambassador:
“Je me défie tent de seux qui sont mal contens ... car je ne veos
ni ne suys conselliée de venir aus armes.”—_Collection de lettres
autographes ayant appartenu à M. Fossé-Darcosse_, Paris, Techener,
1861, No. 193.

[454] _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 211. Philip II was reputed to have
spent 350,000 crowns of his wife’s dowry in Germany (_C. S. P. For._,
No. 659, §18, November 14, 1561). Catherine sent a special agent,
Rambouillet, into Germany to assist Hotman in discovering information
about Spain’s intrigues there (_C. S. P. For._, No. 713, December,
1561; _Mém. de l’Acad. des sc. moral. et polit._, CIV [1877], 661).
D’Ozances in Spain received special instructions to decipher Philip
II’s conduct if possible.

[455] _C. S. P. For._, No. 265, §11, June 23, 1561. This was in
consequence of the apprehension aroused early in May by the appearance
of a large body of Spanish infantry and cavalry to survey Abbeville
whence they returned toward Guisnes (_ibid._, No. 248, from Paris, May
18, 1561).

[456] _Ibid._, No. 712, December 9, 1561, from Strasburg; No. 717,
§6, December 13, 1561, from Paris. There had been some anxiety lest
the Emperor might avail himself of the distraction in France to seize
the Three Bishoprics. But at this moment, on account of the activity
of both the Turk and the Muscovite, and because he was angry with the
Pope over the Council of Trent, Ferdinand, was friendly to France and
cordially received Marillac, the bishop of Vienne (D’Aubigné, I, 332,
333).

[457] “Le conseil du roi, voyant que les mouvements les plus
divers agitaient le royaume, décide que chaque gouverneur,
lieutenant, sénéschal et autres ministres, se rendissent à leurs
gouvernements.”—Baschet, _Journal du Concile de Trente_, 89.

[458] _C. S. P. For._, No. 595, October 9, 1561; No. 602, October 12,
1561; No. 624, October 18, 1561; No. 659, §20, November 14, 1561. The
appointments of Coligny and Condé never became operative, owing to the
outbreak of civil war early in the next year. They are important only
as they reflect Catherine’s policy of caution and craft.

[459] _Ibid._, No. 729. Thomas Shakerley was an Englishman by birth,
who had once been a page to Edward VI, while the latter was prince. He
had left England nine years before and had spent most of his time in
Rome, where, becoming an organist, he “obtained the estimation of a
cunning player for the substance and solemnity of music.” He came to
France in the suite of the cardinal of Ferrara. The Spanish ambassador
approached him with an offer to enter the secret service of Spain,
which Shakerley patriotically communicated to Throckmorton (_ibid._,
No. 730, §5, December 18; No. 750, §10, December 28, 1561).

[460] On December 27, the Protestants congregated in the Faubourg St.
Marceau, whereupon the priests and Papists assembled at St. Medard
and determined to attack them. One of the Protestant soldiers going
to remonstrate was run through. The Protestants who were appointed to
guard the assembly, seeing this, ran to his succor, but were driven
back by the numbers. Other Protestants coming up put their attackers
to rout and forced their way into the church, when the prince de la
Roche-sur-Yon, the King’s lieutenant, arrived with a strong force of
horse and foot and carried off several to the Châtelet (_ibid._, No.
783, January 4, 1561; _Mém. de Condé_, II, 541 ff.; Claude Haton, 179,
and note; _Arch. cur._, IV, 63 ff.; and an article in _Mém. de la soc.
de l’hist. de Paris_, 1886).

[461] _C. S. P. For._, No. 758, §13, December 31, 1561.

[462] _Ibid._, No. 789, §2, January 8, 1562. The prince de la
Roche-sur-Yon passed for a Calvinist, while the marshal Montmorency
was a liberal Catholic. The queen mother hoped the change would be
acceptable to both parties. Another reason for this change was that
the constable and the prince de la Roche-sur-Yon were the principals
in a law-suit involving 10,000 ducats income. It was possible for the
lieutenant of Paris to use influence with the Parlement of Paris before
which the case was to be tried, and this more obviously favored the
constable’s side of the suit. Cf. details in Chantonnay’s letter to
Philip II, January 5, 1562, K. 1,497, B. 15.

[463] _C. S. P. For._, No. 925; cf. Castelnau’s description of the
bandits in the Faubourg St. Marcel, Book III, chap. v.

[464] _C. S. P. For._, No. 789, §2, January 6, 1562.

[465] _Archives de la Gironde_, VIII, 207. The King sent a special
officer to put the offenders to death and destroy the village, but it
is significant that this commission was not intrusted to Villars, who
was sublieutenant in Languedoc and notorious for his treatment of the
Huguenots (_C. S. P. For._, No. 750, §10, December 28, 1561).

[466] Claude Haton, I, 195-98, 236, 237. His spleen is evidenced,
though, in saying that: “à cause de la grande liberté à mal faire et
dire qui leur estoit permise sans aulcune punition de justice ... si
le plus grand larron et voleur du pays eust esté prins prisonnier il
eust eschappé à tout danger voire à la mort, moyennant qu’il se feust
déclaré Huguenot et de la nouvelle prétendue religion.”—_Ibid._, I,
124. This is one of the earliest characterizations of the Huguenot
faith. It was afterward currently referred to as the “R. P. R.”

[467] _Archives de la Gironde_, XV, 57.

[468] Claude Haton, I, 194, 195, and note.

[469] Chantonnay to Philip II, January 5, 1562, K. 1,497, B. 15. The
Spanish ambassador violently expostulated with Catherine de Medici,
Antoine of Bourbon, and others after this address was over (K. 1,497,
January 11, 1562), for which Philip II commended him (K. 1,496, No. 34,
3 _verso_).

[470] Isambert, XIV, 124-29; Raynaldus, XXXIV, 292, 293. The original
document is on exhibition in the Musée des Archives at Paris. It is
catalogued K. 674, No. 4. Although authorized on January 17, the edict
was not printed until March 13, 1562 (_C. S. P. For._, No. 930, §11;
934, §1). The Edict of July had been only negative in its character,
simply forbidding judges and the magistrates from pursuing the
Huguenots, but not in any sense recognizing their religion. Castelnau,
Book I, chap. ii, makes this very clear. The Edict encountered strong
opposition in the Parlement, which twice rejected it by a plurality
vote (_C. S. P. For._, No. 849, January 28, 1562; Claude Haton, I, 185,
186). Benoist, _Histoire de l’Edit de Nantes_, I, Appendix, gives the
text together with the first and second mandamus of the King, February
14 and March 11, 1562, expressly enjoining the Parlement “to proceed to
the reading, publishing, and registering of the said ordinance, laying
aside all delays and difficulties.” The first mandamus, “Déclaration
et interprétation du roy sur certains mots et articles contenus dans
l’edict du XVII de janvier 1561,” declared that magistrates were not
officers within the meaning of the edict (Isambert, XIV, 129, n. 2).
Klipfel, _Le colloque de Poissy_, chap. iii, makes the point that the
Parlement of Paris was criminally wrong in arraigning itself upon the
side of violence and encouraging the intolerance of the populace. The
Parlement of Rouen was more complacent, and seems promptly to have
registered it (_C. S. P. For._, No. 891, §10, February 16, 1562).

The Edict of January is sometimes wrongly dated January 17, _1561_.
The error arises from the confusion of the calendar in the sixteenth
century. In 1561 the year in France legally began at Easter, which,
of course threw January 17, into the year 1561. But in 1564 a royal
_ordonnance_ abolished this usage and established January 1 as the
beginning of the year, which brought forward January 17 into its proper
year, 1562. The reform of the calendar by Gregory XIII would alter the
_date of the month_ also, according to modern reckoning. But it is
simpler to let established dates stand. Henry III authorized the use of
the Gregorian calendar in France in 1582. For a lucid account of these
changes see _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, Introd., x-xi by
the baron de Ruble.

[471] Baschet, _Journal du Concile de Trente_, 71.

[472] Claude Haton, I, 177, and n. 1. For other details see Castelnau,
Book III, chap. i; _Rel. vén._, II, 71.

[473] _Lettres de Pasquier_, II, 96. Mignet characterizes the
provisions of the Edict of January as “généréuses, simples, et sages.”
Mignet, “Les lettres de Calvin” (_Journal des savants_, 1859, p. 762),
and Haag, _La France protestante_, Introd., xix, as “le plus libéral
édit qui ait été obtenu par les réformés jusqu’à celui de Nantes.”

[474] _C. S. P. For._, No. 789, §1, January 8, 1562, and cf. No. 750,
§3, December 28, 1561. The importation of money from Germany into
Lorraine was no secret.

[475] _Ibid._, No. 729, §3, December 16, 1561. Catherine de Medici,
however, could speak the language (_ibid._, No. 2,155, December 3,
1571).

[476] _Ibid._, No. 729, §3, December 16, 1561. Chantonnay was morally
the leader of the Triumvirate, beyond a doubt, and guided its policy.
“The king of Navarre, the duke of Guise, the constable, the cardinal
of Ferrara, the marshals St. André, Brissac, and Termes, the cardinal
Tournon, have joined together to overthrow the Protestant religion and
exterminate the favorers thereof—_which enterprise is pushed forward
by the Spanish ambassador here and Spanish threatenings_.”—_C. S. P.
For._, No. 934, §1, March 14, 1562.

[477] _Ibid._, No. 758, §12, December 1; No. 531, §4, September 23,
1561.

[478] Antoine de Bourbon to Philip II December 7, 1561, K. 1,494, No.
116 (not in Rochambeau).

[479] _Despatches of Michele Suriano_ (Huguenot Society), October 18,
1561. The whole letter is exceedingly interesting.

[480] The Jesuits had long tried to get a legal status in France. Henry
II, was favorable to them, but the Parlement of Paris, the secular
clergy, and the Sorbonne were bitterly opposed. The Act of Poissy
recognized the Jesuits as a college but not as a religious order, to
the anger of the Sorbonne. See Douarche, _L’Université de Paris et les
Jesuites_, Paris, 1888, chap. iv. At the time of the expulsion of the
Jesuits from France in 1761, in reply to the question of the crown as
to their legal status, the cardinal de Choiseul made the following
answer: “Lorsqu’ils ont été reçus en France l’an 1561, par le concours
des deux puissances, ils se sont soumis et ont été astreints par la loi
publique de leur établissement à toute superintendance, jurisdiction
et correction de l’évêque diocésain et à se conformer entièrement à la
disposition du droit commun, avec la renonciation la plus formelle aux
privilèges contraires portés dans les quatre bulles par eux présentées
ou autres qu’ils pourraient obtenir à l’avenir.” ... “_Le véritable
état des Jésuites en France parâit donc être, suivant les lois
canoniques reçues dans le royaume, l’état des réguliers soumis à la
juridiction des ordinaires conformement au droit com mun._” Cf. Eugene
Sol, _Les rapports de la France avec l’Italie, d’après la série K. des
Arch. Nat._, Paris, 1905, 119, 120. The original document is in the
Archives nationales, K. 1,361, N. 1, C.

[481] _C. S. P. For._, No. 934, §2, March 14, 1562.

[482] _Ibid._, No. 931, March 9, 1562.

[483] _Ibid._, No. 924, §8, March 6, 1562; cf. _ibid._, No. 715, §4,
December 12, 1561: “The Spanish ambassador was wondrous hot with the
queen.”

[484] _Lettres du cardinal de Ferrare_, No. 14, March 3, 1562.

[485] _C. S. P. For._, No. 891, February 16, 1562.

[486] _Corresp. de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, No. 17, March 25, 1562. This
circumstance is noticed by almost all the chroniclers: D’Aubigné, Book
V, chap, iii, 1; _Mém. de Condé_, I, 76, 77; _Arch. cur._, VI, 59.

[487] Claude Haton, I, 189.

[488] Beza, _Histoire ecclés._, I, 416.

[489] Collection Godefroy (Bibliothèque de l’Institut), Vol. XCVII,
folio 19, March 6, 1562.

[490] _Inventaire des archives communales d’Agen_, BB., “Inventaire
sommaire,” XXX, 28 (April 17, 1562).

[491] D’Aubigné, II, 7, gives a long list of cities where disturbances
occurred.

[492] Vassy was a little town in the diocese of Châlons-sur-Marne, in a
dependency of Joinville belonging to the Guises.

[493] In the _Mémoires de Condé_, III, 124, there is an elaborate
Protestant version of the massacre, preceded by a letter of the duke of
Guise. The Guise account is in the _Mémoires du duc de Guise_, 471-88.
Cf. D’Aubigné, 131; _Arch. cur._, IV, 103. The Spanish ambassador’s
long letter of March 16 is in K. 1,497, No. 14. The quotation from
Ranke is in his _Civil Wars and Monarchy in France_, 211.

[494] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, March 20, 1562, K. 1,497,
No. 16. Accounts of this event abound. See La Popelinière, I, 287;
Claude Haton, I, 208; D’Aubigné, II, 10; a letter of Santa Croce in
_Arch. cur._, VI, 55; La Noue, _Mém. milit._, ed. Petitot, 128—very
interesting; and a letter of an eye-witness in _Bull. de la Soc. de
l’hist. du prot. franç._, XIII, 5.

On March 16, 1562, an ordinance of the king of Navarre enjoined the
captains and lieutenants of each quarter of Paris who were elected by
the bourgeoisie to appoint ensigns, corporals, and sergeants, and to
enlist all the men capable of bearing arms in their divisions, both
masters and servants (Capefigue, 234, 235).

[495] L’Aubespine to his brother, the bishop of Limoges, French
ambassador at Madrid (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 22; _C. S. P. Eng.
For._, No. 987, §7; manifesto of the prince of Condé to Elizabeth,
April 7, 1562).

[496] This is D’Aubigné’s comparison, II, 14, and n. 2.

[497] Delaborde, II, 48; _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I,
285, n.; _C. S. P. For._, No. 987, §12, March 31, 1562.

[498] “La mala reputacion que el chancellerio ne quanto à la
fé.”—_Correspondance de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, No. 16, March 20, 1562.

[499] Tavannes, 271; _C. S. P. For._, No. 943, March 20, 1652.

[500] Paris, _Négociations relatives au règne de François II_, 880.

[501] “Monsieur le conestable ayst d’opinion que l’on (fasse) une
lètre patente par laquelle le roy mon fils déclère qu’i ne voult poynt
ronpre l’édist dernier.... Ne distes rien deset que je vous dis de
l’ambassadeur (Chantonnay) qui ayst yci, mès au contrère distes qu’i
comense à se governer mieulx et plus dousement qu’i ne solet en mon
endroyt.”—Catherine de Medici to St. Sulpice, _circa_ April 11, 1562,
in _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 15, 16. This is a characteristic
example of the queen’s eccentric spelling.

[502] D’Aubigné, II, 15.

[503] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 22; _C. S. P. For._, No. 967,
March 31, 1562. Elizabeth wrote to Condé to “remember that in all
affairs second attempts be even more dangerous than the first.”—_C.
S. P. For._, No. 965, March 31, 1562. On the political theory of the
Huguenots that the King was a captive and that they were struggling for
his relief, see Weill, 66.

[504] _C. S. P. For._, No. 969, March 31, 1562.

[505] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, March 25, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 17.
He reports also that a boat was captured coming down the Seine loaded
with 4,000 arquebuses and other ammunition, all of which was taken to
the Hôtel-de-Ville.

[506] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, No. 17, March 25, 1562.

[507] _C. S. P. For._, No. 967, §12, March 31, 1562.

[508] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, April 2-4, K. 1,497, No. 18;
April 11, _ibid._, No. 22.

[509] La Noue, _Mémoires_, chap. ii, has described this march.

[510] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, April 8 and 11, 1562, K. 1,497,
Nos. 21, 22.

[511] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 283.

[512] According to Hotman who had left Orleans on May 29, the Huguenot
forces consisted of 15,000 foot and 5,000 horse.—Letter to the
landgrave, June 7, 1562, in _Rev. hist._, XCVII March-April, 1908, p.
304.

[513] Condé had entered Orleans on April 2. On the 7th he wrote to the
Reformed churches of France, requiring men and money in the interest of
the deliverance of the King and the queen mother and the freedom of the
Christian religion (_Mémoires de Condé_, II, 212).

[514] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, April 11 1562, K. 1,497, No. 22.

[515] _Ibid._, No. 21, April 8, 1562; De Ruble’s edition of D’Aubigné,
II, 18-20; _C. S. P. For._, No. 997, April 10, 1562; No. 1,043, §2,
April 24, 1562. Cf. Boulanger, “La réforme dans la province du Maine,”
_Revue des Soc. savant. des départ._, 2^[e] sér., VII (1862), 548.

[516] “Leurs desseins cachés ont autre racine que celle de la religion,
encores qu’ils le veuillant couvrir de ce manteau.”—Catherine de
Medici to St. Sulpice, _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 59, August 9, 1562.

[517] “Déclaration faicte par monsieur le prince de Condé, pour
monstrer les raisons qui l’ont contrainct d’entreprendre la défense
de l’authorité du roy, du gouvernement de la royne, et du repos de çe
royaume” (Orleans, 1562); cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,003, Orleans,
April 1, 1562.

The prince of Condé is said to have issued a coinage of his own at
this time with the superscription, “Louis XIII.” Chantonnay, however,
says that they were medals (K. 1,497, No. 27, May 2, 1562). See the
memoir of Secousse: “Dissertation où l’on examine s’il est vrai qu’il
ait été frappé, pendant la vie de Louis I^[er], prince de Condé, une
monnie sur laquelle on lui ait donné le titre de roi de France,” _Mém.
de l’Acad. roy. des inscrip. et bell. lettres_, XVII (1751); Poulet,
_Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle_, III, 85. Whitehead, _Gaspard
de Coligny_, 303, is convinced the story is a fabrication.

[518] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, April 11, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 22.

[519] K. 1,497, No. 21, April 8, 1562.

[520] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,013, §12, April 17, 1562.

[521] _Archives curieuses_, sér. I, IV, 175.

[522] Rouen was taken in the night of April 15. Floquet, _Histoire du
parlement de Normandie_, II, 380.

[523] Raynal, _Histoire du Berry_, IV, 35.

[524] The stopping of the couriers in the service of Spain by the
Huguenots was a source of great anxiety to Chantonnay. April 8 he wrote
to Philip advising that the couriers be sent via Perpignan and Lyons in
order to avoid being intercepted, as the Huguenots commanded the whole
line of the Loire. Cf. Letters to Philip II, April 24, 1562, K. 1,497,
No. 25; K. 1,497, No. 21; K. 1,497, No. 28.

His letter of May 5 (K. 1,497, No. 28) describes the adventure of a
courier bearing a dispatch of the bishop of Limoges. He was given
twenty blows with a knife, but managed to escape. St. Sulpice reports
a similar experience of “le chevaucher de Bayonne” in a letter to
Catherine, June 30, 1562. D’Andelot intercepted a letter from the duke
of Alva (K. 1,497, No. 26, April 28, 1562) and the prince of Condé one
from the bishop of Limoges to Catherine de Medici (K. 1,497, No. 33).
The activity of the Huguenots in Gascony gave the French and Spanish
governments special disquietude because they continually overhauled
the couriers bearing official dispatches between Paris and Madrid.
The letters of St. Sulpice contain many complaints because of the
rifling of his correspondence (see pp. 30, 35, 37, 38, 41, 59). But
the Huguenots were not the only ones who scrutinized letters unduly.
Philip II frequently asked to be shown the letters of Charles IX and
his mother to his wife, so that St. Sulpice advised Catherine always
to send two letters, one of which was to be a “dummy” to be shown to
the King (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 136). The Spanish ambassador
told Philip he would have to come out into the open and declare war
to protect his own interests (K. 1,497, No. 26, April 25, 1562). He
anticipated as early as this the probable combination of the French
Huguenots and the Dutch rebels, and warned Margaret of Parma to be on
her guard (_Correspondance de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, Nos. 30, 33, to
Philip II).

[525] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,043, §2, April 24, 1562.

[526] On April 24 the cardinal of Lorraine came to Paris with 1,000
horse (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,043, §11, April 24, 1562; _Corresp. de
Chantonnay_, April 28, K. 1,497, No. 2).

[527] This famous document, which is dated April 21, 1562, is in K.
1,496, B, 14, No. 61, and is on exhibition in the Musée des Archives.
Chantonnay’s letter to Philip II on April 24 sheds an interesting
light on the situation. In it the ambassador advises the King to write
personally to the queen mother, but not to write individually to the
others, but rather a single letter, because if Antoine of Navarre were
not addressed as _King of Navarre_ he would refuse to receive it,
whereas if the letter were written to all in common, this complication
might be avoided (K. 1,497, No. 25).

[528] The Spanish King acceded to this request on June 8, 1562 (Philip
II to Margaret of Parma; Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur
les Pays-Bas_, II, 218-23.)

He promised to send 10,000 foot and 3,000 cavalry, chiefly Italians
and Germans; cf. De Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_,
IV, 214. At about the same time the constable appealed to Rome through
Santa Croce, for a loan of 200,000 écus and a body of soldiers (_Arch.
cur._, VI, 86).

[529] The Swiss Diet, which met at Soleure on May 22, offered 6,000
infantry to be commanded by the captain Froelich (Letter of Hotman in
_Revue hist._, XCVII, March-April, 1908, 305).

[530] _C. S. P. For._, No. 6, §1, May 2, 1562. The Spanish ambassador
was deeply incensed at Catherine for making this new overture. The
intermediary was the Rhinegrave, but Chantonnay persuaded the leaders
not to recognize him (_Corresp. de Chantonnay_, April 28, 1562; K.
1,497, No. 26). The duke of Savoy offered to furnish 10,000 footmen
and 600 horse, 3,000 of the former and 200 of the latter to be at his
expense. This was the fruit of Chantonnay’s interview with Moreta,
the Savoyard ambassador, early in April, when he discussed with him a
possible restoration of the fortresses in Piedmont (K. 1,497, No. 21,
April 8, 1562).

[531] The Pope offered to give 50,000 crowns per month.

[532] “Suisses, lansquenetz et reystres, seront en ce pays devant
la fin de ce moys, sans vostre secours d’Espagne.”—_L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 24, June 12, 1562. It must be understood that in many
European states, especially those of Germany, the maintenance of
regular troops did not yet obtain as a practice. Instead, the princes
depended upon mercenary forces recruited by some distinguished captain.
These troops, which answered to the _condottieri_ of Italy were
called _Lanzknechts_ or _Reiters_. Languet stigmatizes this practice
in _Epist. ad Camerariam_, 28; cf. _Arch. d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 104.
In Protestant Germany there was a feeling that the policy of France
threatened to extinguish the gospel in other regions besides France and
therefore should be opposed by common consent. The elector palatine,
the landgrave, and Charles, margrave of Baden, planned to send an
embassy into France in the name of the Protestant princes to allay the
dissensions there, and to ask that the same liberty of religion might
be granted as was allowed by the edict of January 17. Many advocated an
open league between all the Protestant states for mutual protection, in
the hope that the mere knowledge of such a league would restrain their
adversaries (_C. S. P. For._, No. 11, May 2, 1562). Opinion was divided
in Germany as to whether Condé also should make foreign enrolments,
or whether the territories of those who had suffered these levies
to be made should be invaded by the Lutherans. Agents of the Guises
circulated a printed apology for the massacre at Vassy (D’Aubigné, II,
16, and n. 2; La Popelinière, I, 327).

Rambouillet and D’Oysel, the agents of France in these countries (St.
Sulpice, 77; _Corresp. de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 364) made much of
the King of Spain’s aid and carried credentials from Chantonnay. The
duke of Guise even sent an agent, the count of Roussy, to England, to
discover Elizabeth’s intentions, and to ascertain the military state of
her kingdom (cf. Beza, _Hist. des églises réformées_, ed. of Toulouse,
I, 373; De Ruble, IV, 103 ff.; _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 13; _C. S.
P. For._, No. 1,037, April 21, 1562).

The argument of the Catholics with the German Protestant princes and
imperial cities was that the Huguenots were political dissidents and
rebels, and that religion was a pretext with them (_L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 65). In order to counteract this teaching the Huguenots
circulated a pamphlet written by Hotman throughout the Rhine provinces
which attempted to neutralize the differences between Calvinism and
Lutheranism. (This curious pamphlet is printed in _Mém. de Condé_, II,
524; La Popelinière, I, 325. In this capacity Hotman was invaluable.
Some of his letters at this time are in _Mém. de l’Acad._, CIV, 662-65.)

The German princes as a whole tried to prevent soldiers from going
out of Germany. The landgrave Philip of Hesse arrested an officer of
cavalry who was secretly enlisting horsemen in Hesse and who said he
was doing so for Roggendorf, tore up the officer’s commission before
his face, and made him swear to leave his castle without a passport.
The duke of Württemberg also took care that no volunteers should march
through Montbéliard into France, and Strasburg forbade anyone to enlist
under severe penalties. The bishops of the Rhine kept quiet; only in
Lorraine and the Three Bishoprics was Catholic enlisting unimpeded. The
recruiting-sergeant of the Guises in Germany was the famous Roggendorf,
a Frisian by birth who had been driven out of his native land in 1548
and since then had lived the life of an adventurer, part of the time in
Turkey. (See an interesting note in Poulet, I, 542, with references.)
On April 8 the king of Navarre in the name of Charles IX, signed a
convention with him engaging the services of 1,200 German mounted
pistoleers and four cornettes of footmen of 300 men each (D’Aubigné,
II, 33, n.). These forces entered France late in July and reached the
camp at Blois on August 7 (D’Aubigné, II, 76, n. 3).

One reason why the Protestant princes of Germany were unable
immediately to make strong protest to the French crown was that the
envoys of the elector palatine, the dukes of Deuxponts and Württemberg,
the landgrave of Hesse and the margrave of Baden, were unprovided for
a month with letters of safe conduct, by the precaution of the Guises,
with the result that Roggendorf led 1,200 cavalry in the first week in
May across the Rhine and through Trèves into France for the Guises,
though the Protestant princes did all they could to hinder the passage
and expostulated with the bishops of Trèves and Cologne for allowing
them to be levied in their territories. Failing greater things, the
Protestant princes of Germany, in July, 1562, put Roggendorf under
the ban in their respective states (cf. _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 244 and
269, June 13 and July, 1562). In the end, despite the enterprise of
the Guises, the French Catholics may be said to have been unsuccessful
beyond the Rhine, that is in Germany proper, but not in Switzerland or
the episcopal states. D’Oysel, who was sent by Charles IX in July to
Heidelberg (D’Aubigné, II, 97, and n. 1; Le Laboureur, I, 430) received
a short and definite answer “which showed him how groundless were his
hopes of aid from that quarter, a document to which so much importance
was attributed that it was forthwith printed for wider circulation”
(_C. S. P. For._, No. 414, August 3, 1562, and the Introduction, xi).

The king of Spain’s captains had money and were ordered that as soon
as soldiers were taken from Germany into France they should enlist men
for the defense of his territories (_C. S. P. For._, No. 11, May 2,
1562). In the bishopric of Trèves soldiers were enrolled easily, as the
passage from thence to France was short (_ibid._, No. 74, May 19, 1562).

In Switzerland the Huguenots endeavored to prevail upon the Protestant
cantons to prevent the Catholic cantons from lending support to Guise
(_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 285, April 29, 1562). The Guises asked for a
levy of foot from the papist cantons of Switzerland in the King’s
name (_Corresp. de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 289, April 8, 1562).
The cantons promised to send 15 ensigns; but the Protestant cantons
especially Bern, told the prince of Condé that they would not suffer
any soldiers to be levied against him in their territory, on pain of
confiscation of goods. Nevertheless the Catholic Swiss managed to make
some enrolments, the men quitting home on July 8. On August 7 these
mercenaries arrived at Blois, having come by way of Franche Comté
(De Thou, Book XXX). They were commanded by Captain Froelich (see
D’Aubigné, II, 148; Zurlauben, _Hist. milit. des Suisses_, IV, 287 ff.;
Letter of Hotman in _Rev. hist._, XCVII, March-April, 1908, 307).

[533] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, No. 22.

[534] “La fleur du monde.”—_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 41. For
details see _ibid._, 24, 26-29, 36-38, 41, 50-54; _Correspondance du
cardinal de Ferrare_, Letter 40, July 3, 1562; D’Aubigné, II, 91, and
n. 2; Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, 220.

[535] St. Sulpice was dubious of Philip II’s purpose and suspected
political designs “sous le titre de notre secours” (_L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 39). Nevertheless he believed in Philip’s methods
of repression—even the Inquisition. See his letter to the French
ambassador at Trent on p. 28.

[536] _C. S. P. For._, No. 46, §3, May 11; No. 86, §1, May 23, 1562.
Cf. No. 248—Challoner to Elizabeth from Bilboa, June 24, 1562. Spain
established a naval base at La Réole to help Noailles, lieutenant of
the King in Guyenne (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 61).

[537] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, No. 21, April 8, 1562;
_C. S. P. Eng. For._, No. 1,058, April 27, 1562; _ibid._, No. 6, §2,
May 2, 1562.

[538] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, No. 33, May 2, 1562.
Philip has commented on the margin to the effect that if the Catholics
were as active as the Huguenots they would be better off.

[539] Chantonnay particularly notices this in a dispatch of April 18,
1562, K. 1,497. So also does the Tuscan ambassador (_Nég. Tosc._, III,
481, June, 1562). Traveling in France was dangerous (Windebank to
Cecil, _C. S. P. Dom._, XXII, 53, April 8, 1562).

[540] _C. S. P. Dom._, XXII, 60, April 17, 1562. Paris wore red and
yellow ribbons—the Guise colors. “Ceux de Paris disent publiquement
qu’on doit renvoyer la reine en Italie et qu’ils ne veulent plus avoir
de roi qui ne soit catholique. Ils en ont d’ailleurs un que Dieu leur
a donné, c’est le grand ‘roi de Guise.’” Letter of Hotman in _Rev.
hist._, XCVII, March-April, 1908, 305.

[541] D’Aubigné, Book II, chap. iv.

[542] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, K. 1,497, No. 36, May 28, 1562.

[543] The importance of Lyons so near the cantons of Switzerland and
Geneva is emphasized in _Nég. Tosc._, III, 488, July 6, 1562.

[544] _Correspondance de Chantonnay_, April 24, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 25.
On the situation in Rouen, see _Mém. de Condé_, III, 302 ff.; and the
diary of a citizen in _Revue retrospective_, V, 97. Montgomery who was
in western Normandy about Vire sent the King’s letter back to him after
polluting it with filth, at least so says Chantonnay, K. 1,497, No. 27,
May 2, 1562.

[545] See Carel, _Histoire de la ville de Caen sous Charles IX, Henri
III et Henri IV_, Caen, 1886.

[546] The duke of Bouillon, commandant of Caen Castle, made an attempt
to restrain the populace (_C. S. P. For._, No. 303, §7, July 12, 1562).
He posed as a neutral, but ultimately became a Huguenot.

[547] _C. S. P. For._, No. 101, May 27, 1562.

[548] _Ibid._, No. 68, May 18, 1562; cf. No. 69, §10.

[549] _C. S. P. For._, No. 69, §16, May 18, 1562.

[550] Forbes, II, 8; cf. Planche, _Histoire de Bourgogne_, IV, 556.

[551] Upon these negotiations see _Mém. de Condé_, III, 384, 388, 392,
393, 395.

[552] _C. S. P. For._, No. 106, §2, May 28, 1562. The King’s army had
but twenty-two pieces of artillery at the beginning of the first civil
war (_Rel. vén._, II, 101).

[553] _C. S. P. For._, No. 107, May 28, 1562; No. 174, June 9; _Mém.
de Condé_, III, 462. Another edict of the King put the military
government of Paris in the hands of the provost of the merchants
and the _échevins_ of the city (“Déclaration portant permission au
Prévost des Marchands et aux Echevins de la Ville de Paris, d’établir
ès Quartiers d’icelle, des Capitaines, Caporaux, Sergents des Bandes,
et autres Officiers Catholiques. A Monceaux, le 17 May 1562;” also in
_Ordonnances de Charles IX_, par Robert Estienne, fol. 187; _Mém. de
Condé_, III, 447), in compliance with a popular request made a week
earlier; “Ordonnance du Roy, donnée _en conséquence de la Requête_ des
Habitans de Paris, par laquelle il leur est permis de faire armes ceux
que dans cette Ville sont en état de porter les armes, et d’en former
des Compagnies, sous des Capitaines qui seront par eux choisesr,” May
10, 1562 (_Mém. de Condé_, III, 422, 423). The Venetian ambassador
wisely observed “Perciochè dar liberamente l’armi in mano ad un populo
cosi grande e cosi furiosi, benchè fosse cattolico, non era farse cosa
molto prudente.”—_Rel. vén._, II, 98; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 280.

[554] See Chantonnay’s letter to Philip II of May 28, inclosing the
edict and giving these and other details, K. 1,497, No. 36.

[555] “Cependant tout se ruyne et se font tous les jours infiniz
meurdres et saccagemens de part et d’autre vous verrez par les chemyn’s
une partye de la pitié qui y est, et ce royaume au plus callamiteux
estat qu’il est possible.”—L’Aubespine à l’Evêque de Limoges, June 10,
1562; _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 22.

[556] Chaumet, “Procès-verbal des titres et ornements brûlés par les
protestants,” _Les protestants et le Cathédrale d’Angoulême en 1562_,
in _Bull. de la Soc. arch., etc._ 4^[e] sér., VI, 1868-69 (Angoulême,
1870), 497.

Gellibert des Seguins, _Aubeterre en 1562_; “Enquête sur le passage des
protestants en cette ville, le pillage de l’église Saint-Jacques et
la destruction des titres et papiers du chapitre,” _Bull. de la Soc.
arch., etc._, 1862, 3^[e] sér., IV (Angoulême, 1864).

[557] The strife in Toulouse was occasioned by an edict of the
parlement of Toulouse (May 2) forbidding Calvinist worship and the
wearing of arms by the Huguenots (K. 1,495, No. 35; a printed copy
of the edict). Both parties fought for three days for possession of
the Hôtel-de-Ville where arms were stored. Nearly 5,000 Protestants,
it is said, were killed (_Corresp. de Chantonnay_, 1497, No. 36, May
28, 1562; _Commentaires de Montluc_, Book V, 234-37,) La Popelinière
(who saw it), I, 311 ff.; D’Aubigné, Book II, chap. iv; _Lettres du
cardinal de Ferrare_, No. 30, June 23, 1562; cf. _Histoire véritable
de la mutinerie, tumulte et sedition faite par les prestres de St.
Medard contre les Fideles, le Samedy XXVII juin de 1562_; Bosquet,
_Histoire sur les troubles advenus en la ville de Tolose, l’an 1562, le
dix-septiesme may_, Nouv. édition, avec notes, Paris, 1862; _Histoire
de la délivrance de la ville de Toulouse_, 1862.

[558] Stanclift, _Queen Elizabeth and the French Protestants_
(1559-60), Leipzig, 1892.

[559] _Coll. des lettres autographes_, Hotel Drouot, March 18,
1899, No. 19; Cardinal Châtillon to the queen mother, May 28, 1562,
protesting that peace is impossible without the banishment of the
Guises from court. Cf. _R. Q. H._, January 1879, 14, 15.

[560] “Tous jours sur le point que messieurs de Guise, conestable
et mareschal de St. André se retirent de la cour.”—L’Aubespine,
sécretaire d’état à son frère M. de Limoges, ambassadeur en Espagne,
June 10, 1562; _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 22; cf. the same to
the same, June 12, p 24. On these unsuccessful negotiations, see
D’Aubigné, II, 33-35; La Popelinière, I, 323; _Mém. de. Condé_, 489; La
Noue, _Mém._, Book I, chap, ii; Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne
d’Albret_, IV, chap. xix.

Condé further justified the revolt of the Huguenots on the ground
that the King and his mother were “prisoners” in the hands of the
Triumvirate, but the statement was too transparent to be believed.
Catherine herself, in order to disprove it, took the King to Monceaux
with her (_Corresp. de Chantonnay_, May 28, 1562, K. 1,497, No. 36),
whence she wrote to the Parlement of Paris explaining the reason of her
action. The Parlement promptly approved her course. _Mém.—journaux du
duc de Guise_, 495, col. 2: “Acte par lequel la Reinemère et le Roy de
Navarre declarent que la retraite voluntaire que font de la cour du duc
de Guise, le Connestable et le mareschal de St. André, ne pourra porter
préjudice à leur honneur” (May 28, 1562).

[561] “Nostre camps et à douse lyeu d’Orleans et byentot nous voyront
set que en sera.”—Catherine de Medici to Elizabeth of Spain, June 13
or 14, 1562, in _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 31.

[562] A parley was held with the usual lack of success on June 21
between the prince of Condé and his brother at Beaugency, which was
neutralized for the purpose (D’Aubigné, II, 37, and n. 4). The baron de
Ruble discovered the correspondence of the principals in the interview.
The king of Navarre exhorted his brother to accept the conditions
offered by the King, i. e., to let the Huguenots dwell peaceably
in their houses until a council settled the matters in dispute. He
promised in any event that the Protestants should have liberty of
conscience. But when the prince insisted on having the edict enforced
in Paris even, Antoine replied that the crown would never consent to
such terms (_C. S. P. For._, No. 329, §§1, 2, July 17, 1562). Even
while the truce existed straggling prisoners were taken daily by either
side. (For other military details, see _Mém. de La Noue_ [ed. Panthéon
litt.], 284; D’Aubigné, II, 39, 40; Beza, _Histoire des églises
réformées_, I, 540, 541; and the “Discours ou récit des opérations
des deux armées catholique et protestante dans les premiers jours de
juillet,” in De Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, IV,
414).

[563] Not so the royal troops, which were quartered upon the towns of
the region and nearly consumed the people by their exactions (Claude
Haton, I, 279).

[564] The Catholics, in derision, called the Huguenot gentry “millers.”
During the interview on June 9 between the prince and the queen mother,
the latter said: “Vos gens sont meusniers, mon cousin,” a fling which
the prince of Condé more than matched by the rejoinder: “C’est pour
toucher vous asnes, madame!” This anecdote is related by D’Aubigné, II,
35.

[565] Cf. Guise’s letter to the cardinal of Lorraine, Appendix III; _C.
S. P. For._, No. 238; No. 264, §3, June 29.

[566] _Ibid._, No. 425, August 5, 1562; _Archives de la Gironde_, XVII,
270. The constable seized Tours and Villars Châtellerault (D’Aubigné,
II, 41-44). For the operations of Burie in Périgord, see _Archives de
la Gironde_, XVII, 271. At Bazas a local judge, with the aid of Spanish
troops actually crucified some Calvinists (_ibid._, XV, 57).

[567] La Noue admits that the boasted discipline of the Huguenots was
disgraced by their atrocities here (_Mém. milit._, chap. xvi; cf. _C.
S. P. Ven._, No. 288, July 16, 1562).

[568] On the war in Lyonnais, Dauphiné, Provence, and Languedoc, see
D’Aubigné, Book III, chap. vii. The notes are valuable. Des Adresse
proclaimed all Catholics in Lyonnais, Burgundy, Dauphiné, and Limousin
rebels to the King (_C. S. P. For._, 340). He was not a Huguenot in
the proper sense, but rebelled against the King, and sided with the
Huguenots because he was jealous of La Mothe Gondrin, who was made
_lieutenant du roi_ instead of himself in Dauphiné (see D’Aubigné, II,
49, n. 5).

[569] D’Aubigné, II, 48. He recovered Châlons-sur-Marne in June and
Macon in August (Tavannes, 339, 343).

[570] It was at this moment that D’Andelot was sent to Germany for
succor (_C. S. P. For._, No. 374, §7, July 27, 1562).

[571] At Pont Audemer the duke caused a preacher to be hanged, and
afterward some of the best citizens and even boys (_C. S. P. Ven._,
355, July 23, 1562). There was also fear lest the English would land
troops in Guyenne (_Archives de la Gironde_, XVII, 284).

[572] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 354, July 23, 1562; Claude Haton, I, 301;
_C. S. P. For._, 185, June 13, 1562; cf. 246, §24; but see the duke
of Aumale’s disclaimer to the queen mother, of July 9, asserting that
those of Rouen, Dieppe, and Havre were plundering indiscriminately
(Appendix IV).

[573] D’Aubigné, II, 52-73. The prince of Orange found himself in a
very difficult position. His principality was continually exposed to
the attacks of the king of France and those of the Pope from Avignon.
Moreover, the conduct of the Huguenots compromised him on account of
their violence toward the priests in the sanctuaries (_Archives de la
maison d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 71, 72; Raumer, II, 2111561).

[574] Forneron, _Histoire de Philippe II_, I, 294. Montluc is unequaled
in the keenness of his political penetration. The baron de Ruble
says with truth that the old soldier rivals Hotman and Bodin in this
respect. Witness the paragraph written in December, 1563, to be found
in the memoir he sent to Damville justifying his resignation of the
lieutenancy of Guyenne (_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 297,
298 and note).

[575] There are few more interesting annals in the history of war than
the racy, egotistical, garrulous, yet sometimes pithy narrative of this
veteran leader. The fifth book of Montluc’s _Commentaires_ is wholly
taken up with the war in Guyenne in 1562-63. His correspondence during
the same period is in IV, 111-225; add Beza, _Histoire des églises
réformées_, which is remarkably accurate and impartial.

[576] Coll. Trémont, No. 51.—Antoine de Bourbon to M. de Jarnac, from
the camp at Gien, September 12, 1562, relative to sending forces into
the south to join those of Burie and Montluc.

[577] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, II, 345, and note. His
title was “conservateur de la Guyenne” (O’Reilly, _Histoire de
Bordeaux_, 221).

[578] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, II, 357.

[579] _Ibid._, 416, 421.

[580] “The French spared the women there, but the Spaniards killed
them, saying they were Lutherans disguised. These ruffians slew some
300 prisoners in cold blood—not a man escaped saving two that I
saved.”—Montluc, II, 457, 458. When these Spaniards later mutinied and
deserted in the summer of 1563, not even the Catholics regretted their
departure (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 144, 152). For the terms on
which they came, see Montluc, IV, 452, 453; D’Aubigné, II, 91, n. 2;
94, n. 4.

[581] See _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 37 ff.; De Thou,
Book XXXIII; D’Aubigné, II, 95; _Bull. de la Soc. de l’hist., du prot.
franç._, II (1854), 230; _C. S. P. For._, 837 and 415, §12 (1562). I
have purposely built this account upon Montluc’s narration in Book V of
his _Commentaires_. An additional source for Lectoure and the battle
of Vergt is his long letter to Philip II, published in _L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 84-86; add also De Ruble, _Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne
d’Albret_, 244-56.

[582] _Mém. de Condé_, III, 756: “Fragment d’une lettre de
l’ambassadeur du duc de Savoye, à la Cour de France. De Paris du
dernier de juillet, 1562;” cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 492, 493.

[583] See an article by De Crue, “Un emprunt des Huguenots français en
Allemagne et en Suisse (1562). Pleins pouvoirs données à M. d’Andelot
par le prince de Condé—Orleans, 7 juillet, 1562,” _Rev. d’hist. dip._,
1889, 195.

[584] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 77; _C. S. P. For._, 884, October
9, 1562. His instructions are in _Mém. de Condé_, III, 630. See a
letter of Hotman, July 27, 1562, to the elector palatine, _Mém. de
l’Acad. des inscrip. et belles-lettres_, CIV, 668. The original is in
the archives at Stuttgart. This letter was communicated to the duke of
Württemberg by the count palatine and was sufficient temptation to lead
the first of the famous hordes of German reiters across the border into
France.

[585] Claude Haton, 267. See in the _Mém. de Condé_, III, some letters
relating to the coming of the reiters in this year.

[586] “Ceux-ci [reiters] sont toujours prêts à se battre, mais en
tout le reste, ils n’obéissent à personne et montrent la plus grande
cruauté. Ils pillent tout, et cela ne leur suffit pas. Ils dévastent
tout et détruisent les vins et les récoltes.”—Letter of Hotman in
_Rev. hist._, XCVII, March-April, 1908, 311.

[587] Claude Haton, I, 294.

[588] _Ibid._ From an account in the Record Office, indorsed by Cecil,
we know what the wages of these hireling troops were: “The pay of every
reiter is 15 florins the month. The entertainment of the ritmeisters
is a florin for every horse, and each cornet contains 300 men. The
lieutenants have, besides the pay of one reiter, 80 florins. The
ensign, besides the pay of one reiter, has 60 florins, eight officers
having, besides a reiter’s pay, 15 florins apiece. The wage and
appointment of 4,000 reiters with their officers _per mensem_ equals
122,048 livres _tournois_, equals 81,532 florins. The colonel 3,000
florins; 15 officers equals 300 florins. To every ten reiters there
must be allowed a carriage with four horses, at 30 florins per month.
Total (not counting the money rebated) 127,448 livres _tournois_, or
84,966 florins. Total expense for four months, counting the levy,
569,792 livres _tournois_ equals 379,861 florins.

“For levying 6,000 lansknechts: for their levying, a crown per month.
The pay of every ensign of 300 men per month, 3,500 _livres tournois_.
The whole expense for four months 395,000 livres _tournois_ equals
263,337 florins. Sum total with other expenses, 1,759,792 livres
_tournois_ equals 211,174,175, 2d.”

[589] D’Andelot passed the Rhine on September 22, too late to relieve
Bourges.

[590] See Claude Haton’s vivid description of this recruiting. The new
levies did great damage to the country of Brie and Champagne, for they
were kept in villages for more than five weeks before going to camp,
and all this time the reiters were approaching closely (I, 295).

[591] Claude Haton, I, 295. He adds that Catherine de Medici sent
him secret orders to do so. But there is no evidence of this in her
correspondence, and D’Aumale’s subsequent blunder in 1569 by which
the Huguenots were able to get possession of La Charité justifies the
inference that his action was due to incapacity as a general.

[592] The long presence of the reiters in France during the civil
wars introduced many German words into the French language, for
example _bière_ (_Bier_); _blocus_ (_Blockhaus_); _boulevard_
(_Bollwerk_); _bourgmestre_ (_Burgmeister_); _canapsa_ (_Knapsack_);
_carousser_ (_Garaus machen_); _castine_ (_Kalkstein_); _halte_
(_halt_); _trinquer_ (_trinken_) and of course _reitre_ (_Reiter_)
and _lansquenet_ (_Lanzknecht_). See Nyrop, _Grammaire historique de
la langue française_, I, 51. Rabelais abounds with such words, e. g.,
“Je ne suis de cas importuns _lifrelofres_ qui, par force, poultraige
et violence, contraignent les lans et compaignons _trinquer_, voire
_carous_ et alluz qui pis est.” Rabelais, Book IV, prologue. So also in
Book IV, prol.: “Je n’y ay entendu que le _hault allemant_.”

[593] In Provins, on their own initiative, the townspeople taxed
their town, bailiwick, and _réssort_ (_sénéchausée_) to the amount of
7,000 livres _tournois_, the sum being imposed upon persons of every
class, those who had gone to the war in the King’s service alone being
exempted. This levy created great discontent, especially among the
clergy, who appealed against the bailiff and the _gens du roi_ to the
Court of Aids, alleging that the levy was made without royal commission
and without the consent of those interested. The bailiff compromised
by promising the clergy to restore the money paid by them and not to
demand more of them, and so the process was dropped (Claude Haton, I,
296, 297).

[594] On the siege of Bourges see D’Aubigné, II, 77 ff.; Raynal, _Hist.
du Berry_, IV; _Mém. des antiq. de France_, sér. III (1855), II, 191
ff.; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 494, 495; Boyer, _Doc. relat. au régime de
l’artillerie de la ville de Bourges dans le XVI^[e] siècle_, 641; in
_Bull. du Comité de la langue, de l’hist. et des arts de la France_,
III, 1855-56. The capitulation of Bourges is in _Mém. de Condé_, III,
634. See also the “Journal of Jean Glaumeau,” edited by M. Bourquelot
in _Mém. de la Soc. des antiq. de France_, XXII. Philip II expressed
his displeasure at the terms to St. Sulpice, saying, “que aulcunes des
conditions semblaient du tout assez convenables des sujetz à leur roi”
(_L’ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 70, 75. Alva’s opinion is given at p.
78).

[595] Claude Haton, I, 285. Philip II told St. Sulpice “quant un
voyage de Normandie, bien qu’il l’estimait être bien entrepris, qu’il
semblait qu’il eut été meilleur de s’adresser à Orleans, où étaient les
chefs, afin qu’ils ne se grossissent d’avantage.”—_L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 75.

[596] _C. S. P. For._, No. 374, §7, July 27, 1562; No. 510, §1, August
10, 1562. For the operations of the reiters around Paris in the summer
of 1562 see D’Aubigné, Book III, chap. xii; De Ruble’s notes are
valuable.

[597] Daval, _Histoire de la réformation à Dieppe, 1557-1657_. Publ.
pour la I^[re] fois avec introd. et notes par E. Lesens (Société
rouennaise de bibliophiles. 2 vols., 1879).

[598] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 975, 976, 1,002. This solicitation was
in the nature of an acknowledgment of an expression of interest in
them made by the English queen. For as far back as March she had sent
assurances of her interest to Condé and the admiral (_ibid._, No. 965,
March 3, 1562).

[599] _C. S. P. For._, No. 973, April 1, 1562.

[600] _Ibid._, No. 1,013, §13, April 17, 1562. Elizabeth considered
the suggestion of her ambassador so favorable that she sent Sir
Henry Sidney to France in the spring to aid Throckmorton. See the
instructions in _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,063, 1,064, April 28, 1562.

[601] “Et il assure que bien qu’elle prenne à dépit de voir que
les catholiques soient secourus de deça, elle est persuadée
que son meilleur est de se contenir et regarder de loin ce qui
adviendra.”—_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 55, July, 1562.

[602] “Réponses du duc d’Albe à St. Sulpice, October 8, 1562,”
_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 79; cf. 92, 93, 103.

[603] Throckmorton, English ambassador in France, urgently pressed such
a policy, “even though it cost a million crowns” (_C. S. P. For._,
No. 418, August 4, 1562). It was in the form of alternative offers to
the Huguenots. Upon receipt of Havre-de-Grace, England was to deliver
three hostages in guaranty of the compact, to the count palatine of the
Rhine, and to pay in Strasburg 70,000 crowns; also to deliver at Dieppe
40,000 crowns within twenty days after the receipt of Havre-de-Grace,
and 30,000 crowns within twenty days following, to be employed by Condé
upon the defenses of Rouen and Dieppe and in the rest of Normandy,
with the understanding that Havre-de-Grace was to be delivered to
France upon the restoration of Calais, and the repayment of the 140,000
crowns advanced. The second offer was to this effect: Upon receipt
of Havre-de-Grace, England was to deliver three hostages and deposit
70,000 crowns in Germany, and to send 6,000 men into Normandy to serve
at Rouen and Dieppe (_C. S. P. For._, No. 268, July, 1562; cf. Nos.
662, 663). After prolonged negotiations which were conducted by the
vidame of Chartres, the treaty of Hampton Court was framed on these
lines, on September 10, 1562 (_Mém. de Condé_, III, 689; _Mém. du duc
de Nevers_, I, 131; D’Aubigné, II, 79, 80). Elizabeth’s proclamation
and justification of her action is at p. 693 of _Mém. de Condé_.

The alliance between the prince of Condé and the English, with the
implied loss of Calais to France, more than any other fact, reconciled
Catherine de Medici to Spanish assistance. After August she personally
urged this aid (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 58, 59). Still Philip
emphatically gave her to understand that “si l’ambassadeur de Espagne
avait fait espérer que son maître déclarerait la guerre aux Anglais il
avait dépassé ses instructions, car les Espagnols étaient depuis si
longtemps liés avec ces peuples qu’il était impossible de rompre cette
alliance.”—St. Sulpice to Charles IX, November 12, 1562 (_L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 93).

The constable was at Yvetot in October, 1562, at the time of the
descent of the English upon Havre and wrote to Charles IX that he was
unable to take the field. At a later season he complains to Catherine
of the calumnies heaped upon him, and bluntly says “that he is not in
the humor to endure such things.”—_Coll. de St. Pétersbourg_, CIII,
letters pertaining to the house of Montmorency; La Ferrière, _Rapport_,
46.

[604] Archambault to St. Sulpice, _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 71;
Charles IX to St. Sulpice, September 15, _ibid._, 74. The camps on the
Loire were broken up on September 14, only sufficient forces being left
to invest Orleans. The soldiers were sent to Normandy via Montargis,
Angerville-la-Rivière, and Etampes, leaving posts at Gien, Beaugency,
and Pithiviers to keep the lines open between north and south and to
prevent D’Andelot from getting to Orleans.

On the siege of Rouen, see Claude Haton, I, 286-89. The city was taken
October 26 (Floquet, _Hist. du Parlement de Normandie_, II, 435).

On Huguenot excesses in Rouen, see an arrêt of the Parlement of Rouen,
August 26, 1562, in _Mém. de Condé_, III, 613, and another ordering
prayers for the capture of Fort St. Catherine, October 7 (_ibid._, IV,
41).

[605] See his singular letter to Cecil of July 29, 1562, in _C. S. P.
For._, No. 389.

[606] Cf. articles for the English agent Vaughan, of August 30, in
Cecil’s handwriting (_ibid._, No. 550).

[607] _Ibid._, No. 763, Vaughan to Cecil, October 4, 1562; Forbes, II,
89.

[608] _C. S. P. For._, No. 790, October 7, 1562; Forbes, II, 93.

[609] Cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 803, October 8, 1562; Forbes, II, 101;
report of a military expert to Cecil.

[610] It was taken by assault by the duke of Guise (_Corresp. de
Catherine de Médicis_, I, 414, note; Claude Haton, I, 285; _Mém. de
Condé_, IV, 41).

[611] The English aid had been divided into three bodies, that portion
which entered Rouen being only the vanguard. It was the middle portion
which followed in ships up the river and was captured by Damville. The
third body was of the rear guard and returned to Havre-de-Grace (_C.
S. P. Ven._, No. 302, October 14, 1562). In the fight off Caudebec 200
English were killed, and 80 made prisoners, all of whom were hanged
by the French—a more rigorous punishment than even sixteenth-century
war nominally allowed (_ibid._, _For._, Nos. 870, 872, October 17, 18,
1562).

[612] _Ibid._, No. 901, October 23, 1562.

[613] _C. S. P. Ven._, October 27, 1562.

[614] _Ibid._, _For._, 932, §4, October 30, 1562.

[615] For details see _Corresp. de Catherine de Méd._, I, 420, note;
Claude Haton, I, 287-91; and a relation in _Arch. cur._, IV, sér. 1,
67. Also in _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 116. The same volume has some letters
addressed to the queen of Navarre upon his death. Cf. Le Laboureur,
III, 887. Claude Haton, I, 292, 293, has an interesting eulogy of him.

[616] Charles IX and his mother were eye-witnesses of this struggle,
viewing it from a window of the convent of St. Catherine “from which
they could see all that took place within and without the city.”—_C.
S. P. Ven._, October 18, 1562.

[617] It had been the queen’s hope that Rouen might be saved from sack,
and with this object she had offered 70,000 francs to the French troops
if they would refrain from pillage. But such a hope was slight, for
Rouen was the second city of the realm and one of great wealth (_C.
S. P. Ven._, October 17, 1562). Moreover, “Guise proclaimed before
the assault that none should fall to any spoil before execution of
man, woman, and child” (_ibid._, _For._, No. 920, Vaughan to Cecil,
October 28, 1562). Catherine de Medici also throws the responsibility
upon the duke of Guise (_Corresp._, I, 430). For other details of the
sack, see Castelnau, Book III, chap. xii. “Le ravage de ceste ville fut
à la mesure de sa grandeur et à sa richesse,” is D’Aubigné’s laconic
statement (II, 88). Fortunately, for the sake of humanity, the sack was
stayed after the first day. The German troopers committed the worst
outrages. The marshal Montmorency is to be given credit for mitigating
the horrors. Montgomery, though at first reported captured, escaped to
Havre, having disguised himself by shaving off his beard (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 939, October 30, 1562), and abandoned his wife and children,
to the indignation of Vaughan, who vented his outraged sentiments to
Cecil: “A man of that courage to steal away, leaving his wife and
children behind him” (_ibid._, No. 920, October 28, 1562).

Among those in Rouen who were officially executed were a Huguenot
pastor by the name of Marlorat, with two elders of the church, a
merchant and burgess of the city, named Jean Bigot, and one Coton;
Montreville, chief president of Rouen, De Cros, some time governor of
Havre-de-Grace, eight Scotchmen who had passports of Mary Stuart to
serve under Guise, and some French priests (D’Aubigné, II, 88; _C. S.
P. For._, No. 950, §14, October 31, 1562; No. 984, §2, November 4,
1562).

[618] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 307, October 31, 1562; _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 91; “Montgoméry qui les faisait tenir s’est sauvé, laissant
le peuple livré à la boucherie.”—Letter of Catherine de Medici to St.
Sulpice.

[619] Orleans had 1,200 horsemen and 5,000 footmen in it, besides the
inhabitants, with provisions to last six months. Almost all the weak
places had been fortified with platforms, ravelins, and parapets. The
counterscarp was roughly finished. There were nine or ten cannon and
culverins with a good store of powder. The greatest menace was the
plague which daily diminished the number of the Protestants (_C. S. P.
Eng._, 596, §6, September 9, 1562—report of Throckmorton who was on
the ground).

[620] _C. S. P. Ven._, October 17, 1562. The Spanish ambassador had
foreseen the possibility of such a contingency and early in April had
cautioned Philip II not to play upon Antoine’s expectations to the
point of exasperation (K. 1,497, No. 17).

[621] _C. S. P. Eng._, 1,050, November 14, 1562.

[622] “His arm is rotten and they have mangled him in the breast and
other parts so pitifully”—in the endeavor to cut out the mortified
flesh.—_C. S. P. For._, 1,040, Smith to Cecil, November 12, 1562. Cf.
No. 932, October 30; for other details see _C. S. P. Ven._, November
8, 9, 10, 13, 1562; _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 116; D’Aubigné, II, 85. The
knowledge of his death was kept a secret for two days (_C. S. P. For._,
1,079, November 20, 1562). The Spanish court wore mourning for four
days in honor of his memory (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 103). He was
a “trimmer” to the last, on his deathbed professing the confession of
Augsburg, as a doctrine intermediate between Catholicism and Calvinism
(_Despatch of Barbaro_ [Huguenot Society], November 25, 1562).

[623] “Le roi catholique est content que la reine mère ait l’entier
gouvernement des affaires, tout en ayant près d’elle le cardinal de
Bourbon.”—_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 109, January 19, 1562 (1563).

[624] “Il y eut toujours dans la ville quatre corps de garde, Charles
IX ordonna d’établir à Etampes un magasin de vivre pour fournir son
armée.”—_Annales du Gâtinais_, XIX, 105.

[625] _C. S. P. Eng._, No. 1,070, November 20, 1562.

[626] Claude Haton, I, 305.

[627] _C. S. P. For._, 193, December 5, 1562; _ibid._, _Ven._, December
3; Forbes II, 27. La Noue gives a motive which led Condé to besiege
Paris: “Non en intention de forcer la ville, mais pour faire les
Parisiens, qu’il estimoit les soufflets de la guerre et la cuisine dont
elle se nourissoit.”—_Mém. milit. de la Noue_, chap. ix.

[628] Charles IX to St. Sulpice December 11, 1562; _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 98; _Despatch of Barbaro_ (Huguenot Society), December 7,
1562.

[629] Yet although the negotiations of the prince of Condé at this time
were tentative and the statements of the crown not intended by it to
obtain, nevertheless the claims advanced are to be observed, because
the lines along which religious toleration was to develop in France and
the outlines of subsequent edicts of toleration, like those of Amboise,
Longjumeau, and Bergerac, are foreshadowed in the articles proposed now.

Condé first proposed the following three articles: (1) liberty of
conscience with free exercise of religion where demanded; (2) security
of life and property unto all; (3) the summons of a free council within
six months, or, if that were impossible, then a general assembly of
the realm. To these proposals the government replied that Calvinist
preaching would not be permitted under any circumstances in Lyons
and other frontier towns, which were defined, nor near those with a
governor and garrison, nor in those towns which were seats of the
parlements. Condé then modified the Huguenot demands, as follows: (1)
That Calvinist preaching be permitted in the suburbs of frontier towns,
or in certain ones so appointed; (2) that it should obtain only in
those other places where it was practiced before the war began; (3)
except that it should be lawful for all gentlemen and all nobles to
have private service in their own houses; (4) all persons residing in
places where preaching was not permitted should be suffered to go to
the nearest towns or other places for the exercise of their religion,
without molestation. In reply, the government excepted Paris and the
_banlieue_ from these stipulations. All these conditions the government
and Condé accepted on December 3, 1562, Lyons being declared _not_ to
be a frontier city within the construction of the articles. Certain
minor stipulations followed as to amnesty, recovery of property, etc.
Cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,219, December 9, 1562; Beza, _Hist. des
églises réformées_, II, 121 ff., ed. 1841.

[630] “M. de Nevers has already here from 800 to 1,000 horse. They
look for 600 foot and horsemen, Spaniards and Gascons and Piedmontese,
to arrive shortly. All this while they had driven the prince off
with talk.”—_C. S. P. For._, 1,168, December 1, 1562—Smith to
Throckmorton. These reinforcements reached Paris on the night of
December 7, 1562; there were 10 ensigns of Gascons (40 or 50 in an
ensign), in all about 500 or 600 men; of the Spaniards, 14 ensigns,
“better filled,” about 2,500-3,000, all footmen, and few armed. Their
weapons were arquebuses and pikes, and some bills and halberds. “With
them a marvellous number of rascals, women and baggage” (Smith to
Cecil, _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,205, December 7, 1562; cf. Barbaro
[Huguenot Society], December 7, 1562. The Venetian ambassador went out
to view them). These reinforcements are much exaggerated in the _Mém.
de Condé_ (V, 103, 104, ed. London), which rates the Gascons as 3,000
and the Spaniards as 4,000.

[631] _C. S. P. Ven._, December 3 and 14, 1562. For an extreme example
of Chantonnay’s overbearing policy, see Barbaro’s account of a
conversation with the Spanish ambassador in the letter of January 25,
1563.

[632] _Ibid._, _For._, 1,183, December 3, 1562; No. 1,238, §7, December
13, 1562. It is fair to say, though, that Condé was almost without
artillery, having but eight guns, so that there was no possibility of
breaking the wall. The only way to take the city would have been by an
assault with scaling-ladders (letter of Hotman in _Rev. hist._, XCVII,
March-April, 1908, 311).

[633] Claude Haton, I, 307; _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 314, December 11,
1562. See Throckmorton’s earnest plea in _C. S. P. For._, 1,195,
December 6, 1562, for sending financial assistance to him. The English
intervention in Normandy was demonstrated to be a safe and profitable
venture; besides other advantages which they might draw from Rouen,
Havre, and Dieppe (which could safely be recovered) the archbishopric
of Rouen was worth 50,000 francs; the two abbeys inside the town
10,000; the abbey of Fécamp 40,000 francs; the benefices within the
town valuable; the _gabelle_ in salt and other royal rights in Rouen
and Dieppe worth 50,000 crowns, which would double when the English
merchants came, so that the military occupation of Normandy would cost
less than the profits therefrom. But arguments were in vain to persuade
Elizabeth’s double policy of caution and parsimony. Sir Nicholas drove
Smith’s warning of December 7 home by another one to Elizabeth, urging
her “to deal substantially” with Condé, “for wanting the queen’s force
of men it is not likely he will be strong enough to accomplish his
intents.”

[634] Too late the English government was alive to the danger of
its losing all, owing to the narrow policy hitherto pursued, and
Cecil hurried Richard Worseley, captain of the Isle of Wight, off to
Portsmouth on December 7 to secure 5,000 pounds, as earnest of more
money to be sent into France in aid of the Huguenots, whence he was to
hasten to Havre, warn the earl of Warwick not to give credit to any
reports of peace unless so informed by Throckmorton or Smith, and see
that the town was speedily fortified and guarded (_C. S. P. For._, No.
1,033, December 7, 1562; Forbes, II, 124, 125).

[635] Claude Haton, I, 307; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,240, December 13,
1562.

[636] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,238, December 13, 1562. On December
14, 1562, Condé wrote anxiously from his camp at St. Arneuil asking
for succor, especially that Montgomery, who had gone to England for
assistance, might be sent to him. (See Appendix V.) Montgomery was in
Portsmouth with Sir Hugh Poulet, who was commissioned to bring over the
balance of 15,000 pounds to Havre (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,270, December
16, 1562).

[637] _Ibid._, No. 1,276, December 18, 1562; No. 1,278, December 19,
1562.

[638] Guise had 22 cannon; Condé’s artillery consisted of 4
field-pieces, 2 cannon, and a culverin, which “never shot a shot”
(Throckmorton to the Queen, _C. S. P. For._, January 3, 1563. He was an
eye-witness of the battle. Forbes, II, 251).

[639] Claude Haton, I, 308, 309. Cf. note for other references.

[640] _C. S. P. Eng._, No. 228, 229, January 3, 1562; the admiral to
Montgomery (Delaborde, _Gaspard de Coligny_, II, 180), December 28,
1562, from the camp at Avarot; cf. _C. S. P. Eng._, No. 181, January 2,
1563—the admiral to Queen Elizabeth; Forbes, II, 247.

[641] De Thou, Book XXXIV, and Le Laboureur’s additions to Castelnau,
II, 81.

[642] “They did not strike a stroke” and “were defeated in running
away.”—_C. S. P. For._, January 3, 1563; Forbes, II, 251.

[643] Claude Haton, I, 311.

[644] For contemporary accounts of the battle of Dreux, see: “Discours
de la bataille,” in _Mém. du duc de Guise_, ed. Michaud, 497 ff.; Beza,
_Histoire des églises réformées_, I, 605 ff.; D’Aubigné, Book III,
chaps. xiii, xiv; Tavannes, 392 ff.; La Noue, _Mém. milit._, chap. x;
De Thou, Book XXXIV; _C. S. P. Eng._, No. 1,282, abstract of a printed
pamphlet; No. 1,316, December 21; No. 1,323, December 22, 1562—letter
of the admiral to the earl of Warwick; to Queen Elizabeth, Delaborde,
II, 178, 179. For details as to the number of prisoners, etc., see _C.
S. P. For._, Nos. 1,286-88, 1,316, 1,317, 1,335, §§4-6; 1,334, 1,353,
§6; 1,563, Nos. 12, 22, 28, narrative of Spanish troops. Excellent
accounts of the battle are to be consulted in De Ruble, _Antoine de
Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret_, II, 366 ff.; Whitehead, _Gaspard de
Coligny_, 140-45; and the duke of Aumale’s _History of the Princes of
Condé_ (Eng. trans.), I, 150-68. The standard treatment of the subject
is Coynart, _L’Année 1562 et la bataille de Dreux: étude historique et
militaire; extraits divers, correspondance officielles du temps_ (1894).

Montaigne has an interesting essay upon some peculiar incidents of the
battle. Two curious occurrences happened. The duke of Guise was the
first to alight from his horse and courteously receive the prince of
Condé (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,326, December 26, 1562); the two slept
in the same bed that night (_ibid._, _Ven._, December 21, 1562). The
duke of Aumale was unhorsed and nearly the whole army rode and trampled
over him, yet he was unhurt, owing to the heavy suit of armor he wore
(_ibid._, _For._, No. 375, §3, 1563; cf. No. 400, §2).

[645] The Parlement ordered the bishops of France to declare that in
all parishes those who knew who were Huguenots should denounce them
within nine days to their priests under pain of excommunication. This
practice led to a large exodus of the Huguenots in many of the towns
(Claude Haton, I, 312, 316, 317, and note, 318).

[646] The German form of the name was Bessenstein.

[647] _C. S. P. For._, No. 14, §2, January 3, 1563.

[648] _Ibid._, No. 16, §2, January 3, 1563, and No. 32—D’Andelot to
Elizabeth from Orleans, January 5, 1563; cf. Forbes, II, 263.

[649] Sarpi, _Histoire du Concile de Trent_, Book VII, chap. xlviii.

[650] _C. S. P. For._, No. 15, §1, January 3, 1563.

[651] _Ibid._, _Eng. For._, No. 35, January 6, 1563; Forbes, II, 270;
No. 54, §2, January 7; No. 69, §1, January 11, 1563.

[652] La Mothe Fénélon to St. Sulpice, December 17, 1562; _L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 103, 104.

[653] _C. S. P. Ven._, December 27, 1562.

[654] Randolph wrote to Cecil on January 5, 1563: “We thought ourselves
happy till we heard of the prince’s taking, but despair not as longe as
the admiral kepethe the feeldes.”—_C. S. P. Scot._, I, 1, 160.

[655] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 83, January 13, 1563; No. 84, §3, same date;
No. 109, §6, January 17; No. 137, §5, January 23, 1563.

[656] _Ibid._, No. 83, §3, January 13, 1563.

[657] “Coll. d’un ancien amateur,” Hôtel Drouot, February 10, 1877,
No. 34: Eleanor de Roye to Catherine de Medici from Orleans, December
22, 1562, asking that pity be taken upon the prince of Condé; _C. S.
P. For._, No. 35, January 6, 1563; Forbes, II, 270; No. 146, §3: “This
night (January 24) Condé was brought into this town with a strong
guard. He came on horseback, and was brought through the town in a
coach covered with black velvet, by torch-light, and the windows of the
coach open; but the torch was so carried that none could see him.” The
government had good reason to fear an attempt would be made to rescue
him while he was at Chartres.

[658] “A ce soir bien tard j’ay receu la lettre qu’il vous a pleu
m’escripre par la poste et vous puis asseurer Madame qu’il y a deux
jours que Madame la Princesse et mon nepveu Dandelot veullent vous
envoyer la response et advis de mon nepveu monsieur l’admiral et de
toute leur compaigne. Mais je les en ay engarder sur la tente qu’auyons
au retour du Plessis qui devoit estre samedy au matin pour estre rendu
certain de vostre volonté, à quoy les voys tous fort affectionnés pour
faire une bonne paix,” etc., etc.—Montmorency to Catherine de Médicis,
Orléans, 12 janvier 1563 (Fillon Collection, No. 2652).

[659] _C. S. P. For._, No. 35, §2, January 6, 1563; Forbes, II, 270.

[660] Catherine expressed this determination as far back as October 20
in a letter to St. Sulpice (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 87; _C. S. P.
For._, No. 37, January 6, 1563).

[661] _C. S. P. Ven._, February 2, 1563.

[662] Cf. _L’Ambassade St. Sulpice_, 93, 108, 114, 116, and _Corresp.
de Cath. de Méd._, I, 508, 548. This was the real mission of Don
Fernando de Toledo, a bastard son of the duke of Alva and grand
prior of the order of St. John in Castile, who was sent to France to
congratulate Charles IX on the victory of Dreux (cf. _C. S. P. For._,
No. 187, January 29, 1563, from Madrid; No. 190, January 30, from
Madrid; No. 234, February 3, from Madrid). St. Sulpice this early
surmised that Alva, at any rate, though he did not yet so suspect the
political designs of Philip II, desired the continuation of civil
war in France in order that Spain might profit by her distress, and
so wrote to Catherine de Medici.—_L’ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 93,
November 12, 1562. In consequence of this attitude, religious and
political, the arguments of France fell upon deaf ears (see _ibid._,
122, and note).

[663] Cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 35, §2, January 6, 1563; No. 109, § 4,
January 17; No. 182, §9, January 28; Forbes, II, 270, 287.

[664] _C. S. P. Ven._, February 6, 1563.

[665] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 234, February 3, 1563, from Madrid. No. 194,
January 30, 1563. The money was used to purchase the services of 3,000
reiters and some new levies of Swiss. Pending their arrival, Charles IX
called out the _arrière-ban_—cavalry of the nobility obliged to serve
upon call—to prosecute the war (_C. S. P. Ven._, February 17, 1563).
See the interesting account of the interception of 13,000 écus d’or
probably by the Huguenots, though it may have been by robbers, sent
from Flanders in February, 1563 (Paillard, “De tournement au profit des
Huguenots d’un subsidé envoyé par Philippe II à Catherine de Médicis,”
_Rev. hist._, II, 490).

[666] _C. S. P. For._, No. 145, January 24, 1563; Forbes, II, 300.

[667] _Ibid._, _Eng. For._, No. 289, February 12, 1562. “If the
admiral,” wrote the earl, “should, for want of present aid, be
discomfited and driven to make composition, they may reckon not
only upon the whole power of France being bent against this place
(Harfleur), but that the same will, with the assistance of Spain and
Scotland and their confederates, be also undoubtedly extended against
England. But if he be now aided with 10,000 men and 200,000 crowns,
further inconvenience will be stayed and may serve a better purpose
than the employment at another time of a far greater number at larger
charges. It would be better for the queen to convert a good part of
her plate into coin than slack her aid.”—_Ibid._, _Eng._, No. 290,
February 12, 1563; add Nos. 285, 287. Warwick in seconding Coligny’s
appeal (_ibid._, _For._, No. 294, February 12, 1563) urged haste in
the matter of the money, as “if it is not sent in time it will be the
ruin of the cause through mutiny of the reiters, who may even kill the
admiral;” moreover, as the admiral’s forces were all cavalry, English
infantry was wanted.

[668] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 265, 276, 280, 282, 289, February, 1563.

[669] _Ibid._, _Eng._, No. 291. Throckmorton’s report of his conference
with Admiral Coligny, February 12, 1563. It is astonishing, after
this display of selfishness and greed, that Coligny should still have
retained patience with, and faith in, Elizabeth.

[670] The duke was short of heavy guns and had to send to Paris for
them to come to Corbeil by water, from thence to Montargis, and so
after by land to the river. The defenders had improvised a mill on the
island into a fortress but after the arrival of the heavy guns, so hot
a fire was poured upon them that they were compelled to retire across
the bridge, “leaving many to the mercy of the fish” (Claude Haton, I,
319).

[671] _C. S. P. For._, No. 323, February 17, 1563. Both D’Aubigné,
Book III, chap. xvi, and La Noue, _Mém. milit._, chap. x, have vivid
accounts of this siege; cf. also De Thou, Book XXXIV.

[672] Barbaro gives details of the havoc wrought by this explosion (_C.
S. P. Ven._, January 28, 1563); cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 239, § 3, No.
323, § 18, February 17, 1563.

[673] Throckmorton wrote to Cecil on February 21: “He is to be pitied,
for every hour he is in danger of his life and of being betrayed by his
reiters.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 333, §§1, 5, 9, February 20, 1563; No.
339, February 21, 1562.

[674] _Ibid._, No. 374, March 1, 1563; Forbes, II, 332.

[675] Montgomery to the Rhinegrave, Dieppe, 8 fevrier, 1563: “Les
habitans du plat pays m’ont faict entendre qu’ils seroient prestz de
se joindre à moy si je me vouloys metre en campagne pour les deffendre
des oppressions, pilleries et sacagementz qu’ilz disent estre exercés
par ceux qui vous suivent. Monsieur l’admiral [Coligny] n’est [pas] au
pays [l’Orléannais] que me mandez ou à tout le moings qu’il a faict
une extrème diligence et est plus près de nous qu’on ne cuyde, en
delliberation de metre bientost une fin à ces troubles, pour nous faire
tous jouyr du rang que nous debrons tenir prez la personne du Roi comme
ses vrays subjets et loyaulx serviteurs.”—Fillon Collection.

[676] _C. S. P. For._, No. 352, Warwick to the council, February 25,
1563; cf. Forbes, II, 336; _C. S. P. Eng. For._, No. 327, §3, February
18, 1563; Forbes, II, 334, 380, March 1, 1563; cf. Nos. 333, 344.

[677] The money reached Havre on February 25 and was brought by
Beauvoir, Briquemault, and Throckmorton under guard of eight pieces
of artillery to Caen at once (Delaborde, II, 226, 227). The reiters
received their pay at once. For some curious information about the
avarice of the reiters and the pay given them, see _Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 129, note; VII, 407.

[678] _C. S. P. For._, 391; Forbes, II, 346.

[679] Catherine wrote with truth: “Ce royaume est réduit en telle
extrémité que la necessité veut que l’on ne perde l’occasion de faire
pacifier, principalement pour jeter hors les étrangers, mêmement les
Anglais.”—_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 101.

[680] “La guerre,” said Catherine with words of simple dignity, which
were repeated in the instructions of the special envoys sent to notify
the court of Vienna and Madrid, the Vatican and the Council of Trent,
“a tellement appauvri le royaume qu’il est réduit à un état digne de
commisération. La voie des armes était impossible; le remède propre
à un tel mal, l’expérience a démontré, c’est un libre et général
concile.”—_Corresp. de Cath. de Méd._, II, Introd., v. Philip II,
reproached the regent of Parma for not lending assistance to France.
See her letter justifying her conduct in Gachard, _Correspondance de
Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 266, August 12, 1563.

[681] The marshal Brissac succeeded to the command (_L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 120). For the influence of the death of the duke of Guise in
France, see Forneron, _Hist. des ducs de Guise_, II, 80; upon Flanders,
_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 52, 61, 65; Gachard,
_Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 245. For interesting details see
D’Aubigné, Book III, chap. xx; _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 243; _C. S. P.
For._, No. 332, February 20, 1563; No. 354, §§2-5, February 26, 1562,
both from Smith to Queen Elizabeth, written from Blois. Cf. Forbes, II,
159; 361, §§1-8, 17, February 26, 424, §10 March 8, 1563; _C. S. P.
Ven._, letters of February 23, 27, and March 2, 23, 1563. It is said
the duke received warning from Montluc and Madame de St. André, but
that the word arrived too late. The news of his death was kept from
Mary Stuart for some time. See _C. S. P. Scotland_, VI, No. 1,173,
March 10, 1563; VIII, No. 17, March 18, 1563; No. 30, April 1, 1563;
No. 31, April 10, 1563. On the political theory of assassination, see
Weill, 69.

Poltrot was put to death on March 18; for the trial, see _Mém.-journ.
de François, de Lorraine_ (Michaud Coll.), 506, 537 ff.; Paulin Paris,
_Cabinet hist._, I^[ère] part., III, 49 ff. A conspicuous instance of
the high-mindedness of Jeanne d’Albret is the letter of consolation she
wrote to the duchess of Guise after the assassination of the duke (La
Ferrière, _Rapport_, 39).

[682] _C. S. P. For._, No. 422, March 8, 1562; Forbes, II, 350, 354,
356; _C. S. P. For._, No. 437, March 12, 1563; _ibid._, No. 424,
§§25-27; No. 435, March 11, 1562, Condé to Smith.

[683] _Ibid._, No. 473; 481, March 20, the Rhinegrave to Warwick on the
basis of a letter of the queen mother (Beza, II, 17, ed. 1841).

[684] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 395, §2, March 3, 1563; 419, §5, March 7;
424, §§3, 4; Forbes, II. “La retarder d’un jour,” said De Losses in one
of the sessions of the King’s council, “c’était exposer la ville de
Paris au sac et au pillage, laisser le roi et la reine à la merci des
protestants encore aux armes.” M. Gonnor, later the marshal Matignon,
dwelt upon the miserable state of the country and concluded: “Je parle
sans passion. Je ne suis pas huguenot et je supplie la cour de ne pas
différer l’enrégistrement de l’édit.”—_Corresp. de Cath. de Méd._, II,
Introd., iii.

[685] “Traité politique par lequel en quelque sorte la gentilhommerie
provinciale s’isolait du puritanisme de Génève.”—Capefigue, 260.

[686] “C’est trop grand pitié que de limiter ainssy certains lieux pour
servir à Dieu, comme s’il ne vouloit estre en tous endroicts.”—Fillon
Collection, 2,657, the admiral to the landgrave from Caen, March 16,
1563.

[687] “Edict et déclaration faite par le roy Charles IX sur la
pacification des troubles de ce Royaume: le 19 mars 1563,” Par., _Rob.
Estienne_, 1563; Isambert, XIV, 135. The various pieces showing the
evolution of the edict are to be found in _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 305,
333, 356, 498, 504. Cf. _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 428, 430, 431 (March 10,
1563).

Biron was sent into Provence in 1563 with instructions to give an
account to the King of the manner in which justice was administered
there and how the edict was executed. He was also to find the count
of Tendes and Sommerive and express the King’s displeasure of their
conduct. The royal instructions are evidence of the sincerity with
which the government started to execute the edict (La Ferrière,
_Rapport_, 46; cf. _Collection Trémont_, sér. 3, p. 124).

[688] _C. S. P. For._, No. 424, §16; No. 590, April 8, 1563; Forbes,
II, 379.

[689] _C. S. P. Ven._, March 23, 1563. “Response faicte par le Roy
(Charles IX) et son Conseil, aux Presidens et Conseillers de sa Cour
de Parlement de Paris: Sur la remonstrance faicte à sa dicte maiesté,
concernant la déclaration de sa Maiorité, et ordonnance faicte pour le
bien, et repos publique de son Royaume” (Lyons, Rigaud, 1563).

In the first week of May the King summoned the members of the Parlement
of Paris and the authorities of the city to St. Germain, commanding
them before the week was out to obey the Edict of Toleration, to
release those imprisoned for religion, and to lay down their arms (_C.
S. P. For._, No. 703, §3, May 4, 1563). Paris finally published the
edict, but observed it slightly, the Parlement admitting the “graces”
of the edict, but saying it could not in its conscience allow two
religions (_ibid._, No. 1190, 835, June 2, 1563). For an example of the
violence of the capital see No. 895, June 15, 1562. The public criers
and the very horses which they used in the crying of the edict in the
city of Paris were in danger of being killed by the populace, which
poured out of the mouths of the streets (Claude Haton, I, 328).

[690] “Le peuple y est fort sedicieux.”—Fourquevaux to St. Sulpice,
October 13, 1563, _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 165.

[691] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., iv.

[692] _C. S. P. Ven._, March 29, April 10 and 20, 1563. On the prince
de Porcien, see Le Laboureur, I, 389; also an article by Delaborde in
_Bulletin de la Soc. prot. franç._, XVIII, 2. Claude Haton gives some
vivid details about this retirement of the reiters (Vol. I, p. 355).
Cf. _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 15, 16, 42. On the
case of the Three Bishoprics see St. Sulpice, _ibid._; _C. S. P. Ven._,
March 29, April 10, 1563; _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 323, §8, and 419, §5,
420, 455; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 403.

[693] Claude Haton, I, 279, 280.

[694] See the interesting account of an unsuccessful attempt by the
reiters to storm a château (Claude Haton, I, 347-49).

[695] Claude Haton, I, 354.

[696] Quoted by Forneron, I, 277, note 1.

[697] _C. S. P. Ven._, April 21, 1563.

[698] _Correspund de Cath. de Méd._ Introd., cxlv-vi; cf. _R. Q.
H._, October 1869, 349-51. Charles IX was firmly resolved to enforce
the national traditions of the French monarchy with reference to the
papacy. The fearless speech of Du Ferrier occasioned a sensation in
the council. France was accused of wishing, like England, to secede
from Rome and found a national church and it was even proposed to hand
the ambassador over to the Inquisition (Frémy, _Un ambassadeur libéral
sous Charles IX et Henri III_, 1880, p. 49). So energetic were the
remonstrances of Lansac that he was derisively called the “ambassador
of the Huguenots” (Frémy, 21).

On April 15, 1563, the King wrote to the cardinal of Lorraine to
inform him that, having grown impatient at the slowness of the Council
of Trent, he was sending the president Biragues to Trent and then to
the Emperor with a mission to have the council transferred to a freer
place if possible. The King declared that if the reforms demanded by
Christianity were not accorded and confirmed by the council, France
would not hesitate to convoke a national council. (See the instruction
to D’Oysel in _Corresp. de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 1-3, note.)

[699] “Articles de l’alégation de messieurs les ambassadeurs, estant de
present à la cour; envoyez, l’un par nostre saint père le Pape, l’autre
par l’Empereur, Roy des Romains, l’autre par le Roy d’Espaigne, et le
Prince de Piedmont. Au Roy de France et princes de son sang, au mois
de Fevrier, 1563,” _Mém. de Condé_, V, 406-8; cf. _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 135 and 167.

[700] Lansac and Du Ferrier were the ambassadors of France at Trent.
Lansac’s instructions, which outline the policy of France, are in
Baschet, _Journal du Concile de Trente_, etc., 251-65; add D’Aubigné,
Book III, chap. xxi; St. Sulpice, 28, 64, 102, 114, 130, 141, 160-63.
On Lansac, see _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, Index; upon
Du Ferrier, consult Frémy, _Un ambassadeur libéral sous Charles IX et
Henri III_, 1880.

The cardinal of Lorraine, while agreeing with Philip II, as to
religion and heresy, looked with resentment upon the King’s attempt
to appropriate the political destiny of Mary Stuart to his own ends
(St. Sulpice to Lansac, December 15, 1562, p. 103). The whole council
was filled with disaffection; 150 out of the 230 members present
were Italians, most of these pensioners of Rome, so that the others
resented their preponderance (Lansac to St. Sulpice, February 10, 1563,
_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 115).

There were conflicts as to precedence; some of the ambassadors
like Lansac and Du Ferrier believed in qualified toleration of
Protestants (St. Sulpice, 115); many of the members, while believing
in the enlargement of the Pope’s prerogatives in religious affairs,
were opposed to a reduction of governmental rights of control over
ecclesiastical temporalities. Philip II’s attitude in this respect was
identical with that of Charles IX—each wanted to exercise political
control over the church within his kingdom (St. Sulpice, 198). Even
the cardinal of Lorraine was an advocate of temporal independence
(St. Sulpice, 161). See Baschet, _Journal du Concile de Trente_; the
Appendix has a valuable bibliography of the history of the Council of
Trent. M. Baguenault de la Puchesse’ article in _R. Q. H._, 1869, may
be added. The cardinal of Lorraine left Trent on March 23. M. Baschet
questions (p. 214): “Que sont devenues toutes les dépêches qu’il a du
écrire à la Reine mère, tant sur sa négociation avec l’Empereur, que
sur sa visite à la Republique de Venise et son voyage en Cour de Rome,
pour l’accomplissement desquels il s’était deplacé de sa résidence au
Concile?” He was not aware of the fact, when he wrote in 1870, that
Count Hector de la Ferrière had shortly before discovered them in the
archives at St. Petersburg (La Ferrière, _Deux années de mission à
Saint Petersbourg_, 51). For the cardinal’s mission to Venice see _R.
Q. H._, October 1869, 349, 350, and 385, note.

[701] Forbes, II, 271; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,193, §5, December 5,
1562. Granvella to the King, March 10, 1563; Gachard, _Correspondance
de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 239; cf. Philip to Margaret of
Parma, May 16, _ibid._, I, 249.

[702] The fear was amply justified. Granvella wrote to his sovereign
on December 22, 1563: “Le situation actuelle de la France est plus
fâcheuse qui j’aie vue depuis la mort du roi François.”—_Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 284. Gachard, _Rapport sur les
archives de Lille_, 218, cites a remark made in 1562: “Messieurs,
acoustez bien ce qui adviendra en France entre les catholicques et les
Huguenots; cas, au son flageolet de Franche il vous faudra danser par
dechà.”

[703] On this subject see La Ferrière, _La Normandie à l’étranger_,
and his article entitled, “La paix de Troyes avec l’Angleterre,” _R.
Q. H._, XXXIII, 36 ff. Much of the article is reprinted from the
introduction to _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II.

[704] _C. S. P. For._, No. 443, March 13, 1563, Smith to D’Andelot; cf.
511, the Privy Council to Warwick, March 23, 1563; Forbes, II, 363.

[705] The prince of Eboli and the duke of Alva proposed that
Havre-de-Grace be put temporarily into the hands of Philip II, he to
mediate between England and France! (St. Sulpice to Charles IX, July
11, 1563, and to Catherine, August 27; _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_,
137, 151.)

[706] _C. S. P. For._, No. 498, March 22, 1563, Elizabeth to Smith.

[707] _Ibid._, Ven., No. 319, January 24, 1563.

[708] Charles IX to St. Sulpice, June 20, 1563; _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 122, 123.

[709] _Ibid._, 136.

[710] Neither Coligny nor D’Andelot could be prevailed upon to
serve in the war against England, although believing they had
been shabbily treated by Elizabeth. The admiral openly refused;
D’Andelot feigned illness; Condé alone, of the Huguenot leaders,
bore arms against his former ally—“l’honneur de la France couvrait
son ingratitude.”—_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II,
Introd., xii, xiii, xvii; cf. _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 498, 511, 541,
and especially 548, March, 1563. Elizabeth had replied to the envoy
sent to her by the prince of Condé to notify her of the peace made
by the prince with the King and to treat for the restitution of
Havre-de-Grace, that as the envoy had neither power nor commission
from the King, she would not negotiate with him, and that nothing must
be said about Havre-de-Grace unless the affairs of Calais were first
adjusted (_C. S. P. Ven._, May 18, 1563).

[711] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 936, April 17, 1563. Warwick in a letter to
Lord Robert Dudley and Cecil of April 23, 1563, estimates the French
force around Havre at 10,000 French and 6,000 Swiss (_ibid._, No. 659;
Forbes, II, 398).

[712] _C. S. P. For._, No. 652, Mundt to Cecil, April 20, 1563, from
Strasburg; cf. No. 659, Warwick to the Privy Council on the authority
of the Rhinegrave, April 23, 1563; Forbes, II, 398. Nevertheless, the
French continued to fortify Metz against the future (_C. S. P. For._,
No. 705, May 4, 1563).

[713] The church complied by mortgaging its possessions to this amount
(Claude Haton, I, 330). They were redeemed in the March following
(Catherine de Medici to St. Sulpice, December 22, 1563; _L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 203); _Journal de Bruslart_, 141. The transaction cost
the church 3,230,000 livres. Some of the clergy claimed that the King
had no right to do this without papal authorization (Claude Haton,
_loc. cit._).

[714] The rate was fixed at five _livres_ for each measure of wine,
and at 6 _sous_, 8 _deniers_, for each _queue_ (Claude Haton, I, 330,
331). The farm of this _gabelle_ was sold at Provins for the sum of 600
livres.

[715] “ ... Led. prince dit avoir moyen de faire sortir ... les
Allemans qu’il a en grand nombre.”—_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 101;
_C. S. P. For._, Nos. 688; 748, §§13, 20; 753, §§5, 10; No. 764 (_anno_
1563); _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 326, May 18, 1563.

[716] _C. S. P. Eng. For._, No. 750, §§6, 7, May 16, 1563; No. 753, §5,
May 17; No. 770, May 20, 1563.

[717] _C. S. P. For._, 584, April 5, 1563; Forbes, II, 573.

[718] Warwick had barely 5,000 men of all sorts to defend the town
(_C. S. P. For._, No. 680, Muster of April 29-30, 1563). There was
much sickness. Food was scarce. “The estate of victuals here,” wrote
the earl to the Privy Council on April 30, “rests now upon a scarce
proportion of one month in bread and corn (of beer we can make no
further account than as long as we are masters of water, to brew),
having neither flesh, fish, butter, nor cheese, nor any meat of the
queen’s store but bacon for two days. The clerk of the store here is
as bare in money as victuals.... The enemy’s chief hope for taking
this town rests upon famine.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 676; Forbes, II,
402. Warwick pointed out, however, that if the queen “would put forth
a power upon the sea” and keep the mouth of the Seine open, as well as
prevent relief from being brought from Flanders and Brittany, Havre
might be saved. “Their whole relief must come to them by Picardy side,
which will not suffice long; neither can they be victualled by land any
way, if the commodities of the seas be by this means taken away.”—_C.
S. P. Dom._, XXVII, 15, January 12, 1563. Cf. XXVIII, 48, May 8, 1563.

[719] _C. S. P. For._, No. 786; Forbes, II, 427.

[720] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 328, May 28, 1563.

[721] _Rel. vén._, I, 375.

[722] _Ibid._, I, 429.

[723] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 338, July 27, 1563; _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 141, 142.

[724] I have come upon an interesting item in the history of the art
of war in connection with this siege of Havre. In January, 1563, a
Corsican, resident in Spain, by the name of Pietro Paolo del Delfino
offered his services to St. Sulpice. “Il va dans l’eau,” wrote the
ambassador to Catherine, “et m’a assuré qu’avec certains engins il
empéchera que nul navire venant d’Angleterre puisse aborder aud. Havre
sans grand danger.” In June Delfino arrived at Bois de Vincennes, where
he was well received, according to his own statement (_L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 112, and n. 4). But I do not find any further mention of
him. Was this invention a sort of torpedo? We know that shells were
first used in the siege of Orleans in this year.

[725] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 341, August 6, 1563; on the progress of
the siege and the condition of Havre cf. _ibid._, _For._, 1563, Nos.
754, §6; 762, 806, §§4, 5; 828, 835, 852, §4; 853, §4; 857, §8; 871,
881, 894, 907, §2; 941, 967, 973, §2; 977, §4; 982, §9; 998, 1007,
1021, 1024, 1026, §7; 1044, §4; 1049, 1081, 1086, 1100, 1208, 1296. In
Appendix VI is a letter of Admiral Clinton to Lord Burghley, July 31,
1563, in which he says that the plague, not the arms of France, has
conquered them.

[726] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 343, August 14, 1563.

[727] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd.,
xxvi-xxviii; _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 177, 194, 195.

[728] “Adieu le droit de Calais,” wrote Robertet, Charles IX’s
secretary, on July 4, 1561, to St. Sulpice (_L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 142).

[729] _C. S. P. Ven._, 347, November 11, 1563; _ibid._, _For._, No. 6,
January 4, 1564; No. 47, January 15.

[730] _Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 348, November 18, 1563; _Archives de la
Gironde_, XVII, 293.

[731] The text of the treaty is in Rymer’s _Foedera_, XV, 640. La
Ferrière has an extended account of the negotiations in _Correspondance
de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., xxxiv-xliv. For other details
see _C. S. P. For._, 1564, Nos. 6, 47, 250-53, 297, 307-10, 314, 347,
363, 364. On the great commercial importance of the treaty of Troyes,
see De Ruble, _Le traité de Cateau-Cambrésis_, 193, 194.

[732] _C. S. P. Ven._, 1564, No. 388.

[733] “A Paris arriva toute la maison de Lorraine vestue de deuil, pour
faire une solemnelle demande de justice exemplaire sur la mort du duc
de Guise.”—D’Aubigné, II, 204; the request bearing date September 26,
1563, is in _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 667.

Coligny was so fearful of suffering violence in Paris from the bigotry
of the populace or at the instigation of the Guises, that he would not
enter the city.

[734] On these feuds see _C. S. P. For._, _anno_ 1563, No. 748, §§1-6,
15; No. 753, §1; No. 770; No. 896, §3; No. 912, §4; No. 1,003, §3; No.
1,212; No. 1,233, §4; No. 1,249; No. 1,287: No. 1,337, §3; No. 1431;
No. 1,445, §8; _Proceedings of the Huguenot Society_, letters of April
20, 30, May 1, 21, 27, 31.

[735] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,558, December 29, 1563. “Le connétable lui
même, tout en étant homme de bien catholique, était cependant carnale,
et voulait avoir appui des deux cotés.”—Baschet, _Journal du Concile
de Trente_, 240.

[736] For examples see _C. S. P. For._, No. 982, §§1, 2, an episode of
the last week of June, 1563; _ibid._, _Ven._, No. 333; _Correspondance
de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., xxix.

[737] A law was made in August forbidding the wearing of any weapon but
sword and dagger; concealment of firearms was an offense punishable by
confiscation of lands and goods (Edict of Caen, August 24, _L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 147; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,394, October 1563;
_ibid._, No. 912).

[738] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,003, July 14, 1563; _ibid._, _Ven._, No.
330, June 10.

[739] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., xxxii,
xxxiii (many examples).

[740] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 896, §§3, 17; 912 §4.

[741] _Ibid._, Nos. 1,155, 1,387, 1,394, 1,431, 1,445, _anno_ 1563.

[742] The fisheries of France, however, were profitable. “They
quietly make their herring fishery ... without impeachment.... Their
fish-markets were never better furnished.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,356,
Throckmorton to the queen November 1, 1563.

[743] Castelnau, Book V, chaps. vii-ix.

[744] “Instructions pour le Sieur de Lansac, envoyé en Espagne, janvier
1564,” _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 223.

[745] August 18, 1563. The officiai promulgation is in _Mém. de Condé_,
IV, 574. _Déclaration faicte par le Roy en sa majorité tenant son lict
de justice en sa cour de Parlement de Rouen_, Robert Estienne, Paris,
1563.

[746] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 101, 102; _R. Q. H._, XXIV, 459;
Claude Haton, I, 363, and n. 2; _Correspondance de Catherine de
Médicis_, II, Introd., xxiii; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,190, September,
1563.

The declaration, by a technicality, contravened the testament of
Charles V (1374), which for centuries had been the law regulating the
King’s majority. Charles IX was born on June 17, 1550, so that he
was _in his fourteenth year_, though not yet fourteen years old. The
Parlement of Paris for more than a month refused to register the edict,
not on political, but on religious grounds. It objected to “la mention
de l’édit de pacification d’Amboise, introduite sans motif dans la
déclaration de l’édit de la majorité, ce _que semblait reconnaître deux
religions_.”—_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd.,
xxiv. The Venetian ambassador gives an interesting character-sketch of
Charles IX at this time (_Rel. vén._, I, 419).

[747] The estates of Burgundy declared in a memorial that it was
impossible to maintain double worship in France and petitioned that
Protestant worship might be abolished in that province, May 18, 1563
(D’Aubigné, II, 205; _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 413; Castelnau, Book V, chap.
vi.)

[748] “S’étaient tous départis avec une hâte extrème causée sur la
disposition du pape.”—Testu to Catherine de Medici, _L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 207. “Les évêques français se déclarent obligés de
partir, se voyant privés de ressources.”—Baschet, _Journal du Concile
de Trente_, 239.

[749] The Pope sent the bishop of Vintimilla to Spain to persuade
Philip II to enforce the Tridentine decrees in favor of the
counter-Reformation (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 174, 200, 217, 218).
See also a letter of Luna, Philip II’s ambassador at Trent, of November
17, 1563, in _Correspondencia de los principes de Alemania con Felipe
II, y de los Embajadores de Este en la Corti di Vienna (1556-98)_ in
“Documentos inéditos,” CI, 24.

[750] _Annales Raynaldi_, 1564, No. 1; Labbé, XIV, 939; cf. _R. Q. H._,
October, (1869), 402.

[751] For the grounds of objection see _R. Q. H._ (October, 1869), 365,
366, and 401-8; Frémy, _Diplomates du temps de la Ligue_, 45. In Vol.
LXXXVI, _Coll. de St. Pétersbourg_, is a collection of letters, many of
them from Lansac and the cardinal of Lorraine while at the Council of
Trent. These are the letters whose disappearance Baschet wondered at
and deplored (La Ferrière, _Rapport_, 58).

[752] Charles IX to St. Sulpice, February 26,1564, _L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 229; D’Aubigné. II, 223; L’Estoile, I, 19; _Bulletin de
la Soc. prot. franç._, XXIV, 412. Catherine makes no allusion to this
scene in her letter to Elizabeth of Spain at this season (_L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 237). But on a subsequent occasion, when the cardinal
of Lorraine dropped the remark that the Council of Trent ought to be
called _Spanish_, the queen mother replied “qu’il avait raison, et
que aussi lui même s’était montré tel et plus de ce parti que de tout
autre.”—_Ibid._, 383.

[753] _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 462; Frémy, _Diplomates de la ligue_, chap. i.

[754] Tavannes, 291.

[755] Vargas, Spanish ambassador in Rome, to the cardinal Granvella,
February 22, 1561 (_Papiers d’état du card. de Granvelle_, VI, 512,
513; _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 460).

[756] On January 16, 1562, Granvella wrote to Perez from Brussels that
it was already impossible to prevent this (Gachard, _Correspondance de
Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 198).

[757] Philip II to Quadra, Spanish ambassador in England, August 4,
1562 (_Papiers d’etat du cardinal de Granvelle_, VI, 606).

[758] La Popelinière, Book VIII, 591, 634, gives the text of these
appeals.

[759] “Les états ne payeraient un maravédis aux bandes d’ordonnance si
on voulait envoyer celles-ci en France.”—Gachard, _Correspondance de
Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 206.

[760] “Pour coupper la racine du mal, il ny puisse avoir de plus
courte voye, ny de meilleur expédient que alluy d’armes.”—_Lettres du
cardinal de Ferrare_, Letter xxx, 1563.

[761] “Après la déclaration que seigneurs ont envoyée en Espagne
des deniers qu’ils y ont demandez, ils ne voyant pas qu’on se haste
beaucoup de leur respondre.”—_Ibid._

[762] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 492.

[763] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VI, 620, September 13,
1563. It is interesting to observe the objections of Margaret of Parma
and Granvella. According to the former, “l’impossibilité de donner
secours au roi de France était notoire, à moins qu’on ne voulût la
perte et la ruine totale des Pays-Bas.”—Gachard, _Philippe II et les
Pays-Bas_, I, 211; Margaret to Philip, August 6, from Brussels. The
latter deplores the reduction of the forces of the country because “les
ligues et confédérations (c’est ainsi qu’on les appelle) formées contre
lui, continuent.”—_Ibid._, August 6, 1562. Three future patriots of
the Netherlands were in this session of the Council of State—William
of Orange, Egmont and Hoorne. Cf. Gachard’s note.

[764] La Popelinière, Book viii, 499; _Rel. vén._ II, 99.

[765] “Cependant la ligue ne s’est pas renfermée dans l’enceinte de
Paris. Paris, qui l’avait incertaine et hesitante encore, la renvoya
aux provinces, toute brûlante et toute armée. Elle s’associa à leur
intérêts, réfléta leur passions et leur caractère, feroce en Languedoc,
durement obstinée en Bretagne, partout modifiée dans sa nature et sa
durée par la politique locale des municipalités.”—Ouvré, _Essai sur
l’histoire de la ligue à Poitiers_ (1855), 6.

[766] Ranke, _Civil Wars and Monarchy in France_, 226, notices this
contrast between the north and the south.

[767] This local organization did not seem strong enough for Montluc,
whose activity against the Protestants in 1562 was already notable
and who was suspicious lest some Huguenots might creep into the
body and betray it; so the power was taken out of the hands of the
_jurats_ of the city at his suggestion and vested in the hands of
Tilladet, governor of Bordeaux, who also had possession of the keys
of the city. This proceeding was destined to be revolutionary in the
development of the municipality. The _jurats_ pleaded their ancient
privileges, which were as old as the English domination, which Louis
XI had confirmed after the wars of the English in France were over.
But the parlement of Bordeaux approved the change and thus the form of
government of the greatest city of the Gironde was altered by stress
of circumstances (O’Reilly, _Hist. de Bordeaux_, II, 241-44; Montluc,
_Lettres et commentaires_, IV, 214, note). Cf. Gaullieur, _Histoire de
la réformation à Bordeaux et dans le ressort du parlement de Guyenne_.
Tome I, “Les origines et la première guerre de religion jusqu’à la paix
d’Amboise” (1523-63), Paris, 1848.

[768] “Tellement que les pauvres fidèles trembloyent dans Aix et
plusieurs firent constraints de s’enfuyr.”—_Mém. de. Condé_, IV, 240.
At p. 278 is an account of the formation of this league. Cf. _Discours
véritable des guerre et troubles advenus au Pays de Provence en l’an
1562._

[769] This was Henri Damville, the second son of the constable
Montmorency.

[770] This association, in the words of D’Aubigné, was the “prototype
et premier example de toutes les ligues qui ont despuis paru en
France.”—Vol. II, 137. Extended accounts of its origin may be found in
the _Annales de Toulouse_, II, 62 ff.; De Thou, IV, Book XXXIV, 496,
497; La Popelinière, Book VIII, 602, gives the text of the compact,
which shows the financial measures adopted in the support of the
league; _Lettres et commentaires de Montluc_, ed. De Ruble, II, 398;
_Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 249 ff. Protestant accounts are in Beza, Book
X; D’Aubigné, III, chap, xviii.

[771] _Commentaires_ (Eng. trans.), Book V, 232.

[772] “Ordonnance de Blaise de Montluc, chevalier de l’ordre et
lieutenant du roi en Guyenne, sur l’opinion qui devoit estres les
sujets fidèles à sa Majesté en la séné-chaussée d’Agenois, et sur
l’ordre qu’ils devoient tenir pour résister aux entreprises des sujets
rebelles.”—Ruble, _Comment. et Lettres de Montluc_, IV, 190; La
Faille, _Annales de Toulouse_, II, 62. The preamble is a recital of
Catholic grievances and Huguenot violence.

[773] D’Aubigné, II, 213, and n. 6; _Commentaires et lettres de
Montluc_, IV, 214.

[774] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,000, _anno_ 1563.

[775] Mourin, _La réforme et la ligue en Anjou_, 21, 22.

[776] It is interesting to observe how history is repeating itself in
the formation of these local associations or confraternities against
the Huguenots. In 1212 in the course of the war against the Albigenses
the “Confraternitas ad ecclesiae defensionem Massiliae instituta”
was formed at Marseilles by Arnaud, the papal legate. See Martène,
_Thesaurus anecdotorum_, _sub anno_.

[777] Martin, _Histoire de France_, IX, 201; Anquetil, I, 213.

[778] “Si la Réforme acquit une si grande importance, au point que
les esprits superficiels y virent l’origine des libertés actuelles,
c’est qu’auparavant avait éclaté une révolution sociale et économique,
dont les luttes religieuses ne furent que les arrière-maux. Tant que
les historiens, dans leurs études sur la Réforme, ne tiendront pas
compte de ce dernier point de vue, ils n’écriront à son sujet que
les romans ou des pamphlets.”—Funck-Brentano, Introd. to new ed. of
Montchrétien’s _L’Œconomie politique_, LXXI.

[779] Hauser, “The Reformation and the Popular Classes in France in the
Sixteenth Century,” _American Historical Review_, January, 1899, 220.

[780] See Hauser, _Ouvriers du temps passé_; Pariset, _Histoire de la
fabrique lyonnaise_, 1901; Roussel, “Un livre de main au XVI^[e] siècle,”
_Revue internationale de sociologie_, XIII (1905), 102, 521, 825.

[781] Eberstadt, “Der französische Gewerberecht und die Schaffung
staatlicher Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung in Frankreich vom dreizehnten
Jahrhundert bis 1581,” _Schmoller’s Forschungen_, XVII, Pt. II, 270.
This is a pioneer work in the economic subject here briefly outlined.
The reader will find Unwin’s _Industrial Development in the Sixteenth
and Seventeenth Centuries_, London, 1905, an admirable survey of the
same subject, dealing chiefly with England, but with frequent reference
to the continent, where the conditions were much the same. There is a
copious bibliography prefixed to the work. The article by M. Hauser
referred to in the _American Historical Review_, January, 1899, should
also be examined.

[782] Weiss, _La chambre ardente_, cxlv. The early identification of
the French nobility with Calvinism has been exaggerated. One must be
cautious in the use of the term “nobility,” for it is to be remembered
that the eldest son received the largest share of the inheritance and
that younger sons and small nobles, in many instances, had much in
common with the small farmers in the provinces. As Mr. Armstrong aptly
says: “All that separated them from their neighbors was ‘privilege,’
and to this they clung all the more desperately.”—Armstrong, _The
French Wars of Religion_, 4. In the decade between 1550 and 1560
there is an increase in the number of aristocratic names identified
with French Protestantism, but it was not till 1557 that the first
great noble espoused its cause and that covertly. This was Antoine of
Bourbon. In the same year Coligny and D’Andelot also inclined to it
(Whitehead, _Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France_, 63-66). On the
whole matter, see Lavisse, _Histoire de France_, V, Pt. II, 238-42.

[783] Relazione IV, 242. The great store-house of information on this
head is M. Noel Weiss, _La chambre ardente_, 1889—the trials for
heresy during the years 1547-49 of the reign of Henry II—a book which
has revolutionized the point of view of the history of the French
Reformation (see a review of this work in _English Hist. Review_, VI,
770).

In the town of Provins there were but a few Huguenots. Among them
were 1 doctor; 2 lawyers; a notary; 1 barber and surgeon; 1 dyer; 3
apothecaries; 1 draper; 1 fuller; 1 salt dealer.—Claude Haton, I, 124,
125.

[784] It would be a narrow view of the history of France at this time
to infer that religious and economic changes were the only sort. The
truth is, the reigns of Francis I and of Henry II, were an age of
transition in religion, in institutions, even in manners.

“La corruption des bonnes mœurs a continué en tous estatz, tant
ecclesiastique que aultres, depuis les cardinaux jusques aux simples
prebstres, et depuis le roy jusques aux simples villagloix. Chascun
a voulu suyvre son plaisir; on a délaissé mesme l’ancienne coustume
de s’habiller. De temps immémorial, nul homme de France n’avoit esté
tondu ni porté longue barbe avant le régne dudit feu roy; ains tous
les hommes, garçons et campagnons portoient longs cheveux et la
barbe rasée au menton.... Les prebstres et évesques se sont faict
tondre des derniers; et ont porté longue barbe, ce qui a esté trouve
fort estranger depuis le commencement du règne dudit feu roy, ont
commencé les nouvelles façons aux habillemens toutes contraires à
l’antiquité, et a semblé la France estre ung nouveau peuple ou ung
monde renouvelé.”—Claude Haton, I, 112.

[785] The _cahier_ of the estates of Orleans was published at the eve
of the French Revolution (_Recueil des cahiers généraux des trois
ordres_, chap. i).

[786] Isambert, XIV, 63 ff.

[787] I am indebted for much of this information to M. Henri Hauser,
“Les questions industrielles et commercielles aux Etats de 1560,”
_Revue des cours_, XIII, No. 6, December 15, 1904. Cf. Funck-Brentano,
Introd. to Montchrétien, _Traicté de l’œconomie politique_, LXXIV-VI.

[788] Hauser, “The Reformation and the Popular Classes in France
in the Sixteenth Century,” _American Historical Review_, January
1899, p. 223. “The trade-unions fell under the sway of the religious
brotherhoods, which excluded the non-Catholics and were soon to lead
the revolutionary movement of the League.”—_Ibid._, 227.

[789] “L’origine des ligues en ce royaume vient des
Huguenots.”—Tavannes, 222; Martin, _Histoire de France_, IX, 125.

“En face des Protestants, qui s’associaient et s’organisaient contre
les catholiques, ceux-ci avaient de bonne heure formé des unions
locales pour résister aux entreprises des hérétiques. Ces premières
ligues ont seulement un but religieux. Elles sont généralement
composées de bourgeois dévoué à la royauté et sincèrement émus des
dangers auxquels est exposé la catholicisme.”—_La grande encyc._,
XXII, 234, _s. v._ “Ligue,” article by M. de Vaissière.

“La jalousie entre les deux Religions ne se borna pas l’émulation
d’une plus grande régularité; elles cherchèrent s’appuyer l’une
contre l’autre de la force des confédérations et des serments. Depuis
longtemps la Romaine entretenoit dans son sein des associations connues
sous le nom de confréries. Elles avoient des lieux et des jours
d’assemblée fixés, une police, des repas, des exercices, des deniers
communs. Il ne fut question que d’ajouter à ce la un serment d’employer
ses biens et sa vie pour la défense de la Foi attaquée. Avec cette
formule, les confréries devinrent comme d’elles-mêmes, dans chaque
ville, des corps de troupes prêtes à agir au gré des chefs, et leur
bannières, des étendarts militaires.”—Anquetil, I, 213.

[790] Coligny expressly denied having made any promise to return
Calais to England, and as to the occupation of Havre, he said: “J’en
ignorais les termes jusqu’à la venue de Throckmorton en Normandie, et
lorsque j’en ai signé la confirmation, je n’ai jamais pu croire qu’il
y eut autre clause que l’assurance donnée à la reine du remboursement
des sommes qu’elle nous avançait.”—_Correspondance de Catherine de
Médicis_, II, Introd., xiii. See the extended discussion of this
controverted subject in Whitehead, _Gaspard de Coligny_, Appendix I,
where he shows that the admiral is to be exonerated from the odium of
having sought to betray Havre-de-Grace into the hands of the English
and puts the blame for this article of the treaty of Hampton Court upon
the vidame de Chartres.

[791] The conduct of La Rochelle in the fourth civil war is the
most pronounced instance of Huguenot willingness to subordinate
French territory to a foreign domination and this action was of the
municipality, not of a single Huguenot leader, nor did it, of course,
imply the subjection of the government of France to English rule as the
Triumvirate contemplated in the case of Spain.

[792] _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 93: “Traicté d’Association faicte par
Monseigneur le Prince de Condé avec les Princes, Chevaliers de l’Ordre,
Seigneurs, Capitaines, Gentilhommes et autres de tous estats, qui sont
entrez, ou entreront cy-apres, en la dicte association, pour maintenir
l’honneur de Dieu, le repos de ce royaume, et l’estat et liberté du Roy
sous le gouvernement de la Roy sa mere.”

The third article provides for implicit obedience to the prince of
Condé, “chef et conducteur de toute la Compagnie,” i. e., the army;
_there was no league_. Minute regulations follow for the government of
the camp, for services of prayer both morning and evening, etc. The
fourth article, which has to do with the ways and means of raising
revenue, is the nearest approach to _political_ organization: “ ...
nous jurons and promettons devant Dieu et ses Anges nous tenir prests
de tout ce qui fait en nostre pouvoir, comme d’argent; d’armes, chevaux
de service, et toutes les autres choses requises, pour nous trouver
au premier Mandement du dict Seigneur Prince.”—_Mém. de Condé_, III,
210-15. Cf. La Popelinière, Book VIII, 582 ff., upon the same subject.

[793] In 1567 when the Huguenot chiefs tried to seize Charles IX
by surprise at Meaux, thus precipitating the second civil war, the
Venetian ambassador, Correro, expressed astonishment at the perfection
of the Huguenot organization (_Rel. vén._, II, 115).

[794] Edit de confirmation de l’édit de pacification du 19 Mars
1562, sec. 6: “Nous ... prohibons et défendons, sur peine de crime
de leze-majesté à tous nos dits sujets, quels qu’ils soient, qu’ils
n’ayent à faire practique, avoir intelligence, envoyer ne recevoir
lettres ne messages, escrire en chiffre n’autre escriture feincte,
ne desguisée, à princes estrangers, ne aucuns de leur subjects et
serviteurs, pour chose concernant nostre estat sans nostre sceu et
exprès congé et permission.”—Isambert, _Recueil des lois_, XIV, 145;
the “Ordonnance explicative” of April 7 is on p. 333; cf. _Mém. de
Condé_, IV, 311; La Popelinière, Book X, 724.

[795] We find repeated orders for their dissolution, e. g., F. Fr.
15,876, fol. 201.

[796] Lettres-patentes of Charles IX extended the right of Protestant
worship to Condom, St. Sevère, and Dax, towns which did not figure in
the edict of March 19 (Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV,
257, 272, and notes). A royal ordinance was later issued giving a list
of those towns where Calvinist worship was permitted, specifying that
it must be conducted in the faubourgs, however (_Mém. de Condé_, IV,
338).

[797] Within a month the government received anonymous information
of Candalle’s activity (_Archives de la Gironde_, XXI, 14 [April 16,
1563]). Cf. “Lettre de Candalle à la reine, du mai 20, 1563” (F. Fr.
15,875, fol. 495). In the same volume, fol. 491, is a joint declaration
of the gentlemen of Guyenne upon the purposes of this association.

[798] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 214.

[799] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 552, col. 2. At
the same time Catherine wrote to certain members of the Parlement
of Bordeaux. Montluc’s reply, both the personal letter he wrote to
the queen mother (April 11), and the more official remonstrance he
forwarded to the King, is a palpable lie. He wrote to the queen
“Je vous puis asseurer ... que despuis la nouvelle de la paix, il
n’y a eu traicté d’association aucune; que, au moindre mot que
j’en ay dict, tout ne soit cessé comme s’il n’en avoit jamais
esté parle.”—_Commentaires et lettres_, IV, 206. Cf. his similar
declaration to Charles IX, on p. 214. The clergy of Bordeaux sustained
Montluc in this deception, and when the queen’s suspicion continued,
justified the association on the ground of religion. _Corresp. de
Catherine de Méd._, I, 552, note. Candalle in a letter of May 20,
1563, still evaded the truth in writing to the queen (F. Fr., 15,876,
fol. 495), and Catherine, upon more suspicious information from
d’Escars, determined to satisfy herself of certain facts, and sent two
commissioners to Guyenne to secure better information (_Commentaires et
lettres de Montluc_, IV, 270, note). Unfortunately for the government,
the Parlement of Bordeaux resented their coming as an invasion of their
jurisdiction, and the inquiry degenerated into a quarrel between the
Parlement and the commissioners (_ibid._, IV, 292, n. 1; _Corresp. de
Catherine de Médicis_, II, 114, 115).

[800] Claude Haton, I, 266.

[801] “A Lyon, les catholiques y sont pour le jour d’huy en plus
grand nombre des troiz partz pour une que les huguenotz; mais les
dits huguenotz sont les principaulx et ceulx qui ont les forces en
mains.”—Granvella to the emperor Ferdinand I, April 12, 1564, _Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 467.

[802] The coast trade with England and Holland probably explains the
prevalence of Protestantism in Lower Normandy, at least in part. But
the reasons of the prevalence of rural Huguenotism on an extensive
scale in Normandy are quite obscure. On this subject see La Ferrière,
_Normandie à l’étranger_, 2-5, 82; Hauser, “The French Reformation
and the French People in the Sixteenth Century,” _American Historical
Review_, January 1899, 225, 226.

[803] Hauser, _op. cit._, 226, 227. I find in Montluc an interesting
allusion to the prevalence of the Reformed belief among the peasantry
of Guyenne, which M. Hauser has not noticed. It occurs in a letter of
“Instruction au cappitaine Monluc [Pierre-Bertrand, called captain
Peyrot] de ce qu’il dira à la royne et au roy de Navarre, de la part du
sieur de Monluc, touchant l’état de Guyenne,” March 25, 1561, and is as
follows: “Et ce, à cause des insollences, scandalles et contemnements
que _les paisans_ dudit païs leur ont faict depuis ung an en cà,”
etc.—_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 115.

[804] Hauser, “The French Reformation and the French People in the
Sixteenth Century,” _American Hist. Review_, January 1899, 224. For
further information upon this change in the condition of the lower
and middle classes in France in the sixteenth century see Avenel, “La
fortune mobilière dans l’histoire,” _Revue des deux mondes_, August 1,
1892, pp. 605, 606; _idem_, “La propriété foncière de Philippe-Auguste
à Napoléon,” _Revue des deux mondes_, February 1, 1893, pp. 128, 129;
April 15, 1893, pp. 796, 797, 801-3, 812, 813; August 15, 1893, pp.
853-55; Lavisse, _Histoire de France_, V, Pt. I, 262-65.

[805] Remonstrance sent to the Pope out of France, _C. S. P. For._, No.
1453 (1562).

[806] _Ibid._

[807] _Rel. vén._, II, 121.

[808] Du Bois, _La ligue: documents relatifs à la Picardie d’après les
registres de l’échevinage d’Amiens_ (1859), 5.

[809] _Mém. de Condé_, II, 812.

[810] Montluc, Letter 48, March 25, 1561, _Comment. et lettres_, IV,
115. “Cette appréciation de Montluc est digne d’être signalée à cause
de sa conformité absolue avec les conclusions de l’érudition actuelle.
On admit généralement que le parti protestant, à l’époque même de sa
plus grande force, n’a jamais compté plus de dixième de la population
en France.”—Note appended by M. de Ruble.

[811] _Synodicon in Gallia_, I, lix.

[812] A Venetian syndicate interested in France in 1566 estimated the
population to be between fifteen and sixteen millions (_Rel. vén._,
III, 149). I assume this estimate to be more reliable than most.
According to Levasseur, economically France could support a population
of 20,000,000 in the sixteenth century (Foville, “La population
française,” _Revue des deux mondes_, November 15, 1891, 306).

[813] _C. S. P. For._, No. 935, §4, March 14, 1562.

[814] Upon the details of this famous tour see _Correspondance de
Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., xlv ff.; D’Aubigné, Book IV, chap
iv; Jouan, _Voyage du roi Charles IX_, new ed.; _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 243, 254, 255, 270, 272, 274-76, 287, 300, 319.

[815] _Rel. vén._, I, 108.

[816] _C. S. P. For._, No. 43, March 7, 1574.

[817] “Entrée du roy Charles IX et de la reyne-mère Catherine de
Médicis en la ville de Sens, le 15 mars 1563,” Relation extraite du MSS
d’Eracle Cartault, chanoine, et des déliberations de l’Hôtel-de-Ville.
Préface de M. H. Monceaux, 1882.

[818] Coutant, “Dépenses du roi Charles IX à Troyes le mercredi 5
avril 1564 après Pâques,” Annuaire admin., etc., pour 1860 (Troyes);
“Depenses du roi Charles IX à Troyes le samedi 8 avril 1564,” Annuaire
admin., etc., pour 1859 (Troyes).

[819] Claude Haton, I, 364.

[820] The visit of the King to Bar-le-Duc (to attend the baptism of
the child-prince Henry of Lorraine) profoundly stirred the Calvinists
of France and Switzerland. Charles IX in person, Ernest of Mansfeldt,
governor of Luxembourg, representing Philip II, and the dowager-duchess
of Lorraine, Christine of Denmark, acted as god-parents.

[821] Fourquevaux to St. Sulpice, May 19, 1564, _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 266.

[822] Armstrong, _French Wars of Religion_, 22, admirably observes:
“Geneva was practically a French republic, constantly recruited by
raw refugee material, and circulating in return trained ministers and
money, giving unity to measures which local separation was likely to
dissolve. Hence came the propagandism, the organization for victory,
the reorganization after defeat, the _esprit de corps_, the religious
zeal which whipped up flagging political or military energies.”

[823] See a letter of Alva in K. 1,502. Montluc later informed Philip
II of it (_Commentaires et lettres_, V, 25, letter of June, 1565). The
rumor seems not to have passed unheeded, for the marshal Vieilleville
cautioned the King and his mother to be moderate in their course,
saying that the Huguenots were many and the soldiers few (_Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 632). On the state of Geneva at
this time see Roget, _L’église et l’état à Genève du vivant de Calvin;
étude d’histoire politico-ecclésiastique_, 1867.

[824] The constable to St. Sulpice, June 21, 1564, in _L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 273.

[825] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 275, 276; _Nég. Tosc._, III,
515, 516; Nyd (l’abbé) “Notes écrites en 1566, à la fin d’un missel
de l’abbaye de Malgrivier (evénements rel. à Lyon, 1562-66),” _Bull.
du Com. de la langue, de l’hist. et des arts de la France_, IV, 300
(1857). The copper and lead mines of the Lyonnais had been profitable
in the Middle Ages, but the wars of the English in France and the Black
Death ruined the industry. See Jars, “Notice historique des mines du
Lyonnais, Forez et Beaujolais,” MS, Bibliothéque de Lyons, No. 1,470.

[826] _Rel. vén._, I, 35-37.

[827] A letter of his published by La Ferrière, _Deux années de mission
à St. Pétersbourg_, Paris (1867), 56, 57, casts an interesting light
upon the state of the city at this time.

[828] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 266.

[829] La Cuisine, _Histoire du parlement de Bourgogne_, I, 60;
Castelnau, Book V, chap. vi, says the petition was printed. The bishop
of Orleans, Jean de Morvilliers, in a letter dated August 21, 1563,
called the queen mother’s attention to this growing prejudice (Frémy,
_Les diplomates de la Ligue_, 30-32).

[830] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 129-31. Philip II, as has been
observed, expressed his disapproval of this practice (_ibid._, 152),
and when the French government endeavored to make it apply to the
property of the French church in the Low Countries, he set his foot
down hard (_ibid._, 188). An endeavor was made to restrain speculation
in church property by law.

[831] For details see _ibid._, 152, 156, 165, 185, 186, 226.

[832] _Castelnau_, Book V, chaps. vi and x is very clear in the
statement of various motives.

[833] Claude Haton, I, 368.

[834] See the wonderful word-picture drawn by Castelnau at the
beginning of Book V, and Montluc, Books V, VI, _passim_. For the
brigandage that prevailed see Montluc, IV, 343 (letter to the King from
Agen, March 26, 1564).

[835] Franklin, “La vie d’autrefois,” _Hygiene_, chap. ii, especially
pp. 67-75. For the plague of 1563-64 in Languedoc see _Hist. de
Languedoc_, XI, 447 (Toulouse), 464 (Montpellier, Nîmes, Castres,
etc.). It was at its height in July, 1564. It seems to have come into
Languedoc from Spain. See also _Papiers d’état du card. de Granvelle_
(March 11, 1564), VII, 387, 401; VIII, 36, 382, 470; _C. S. P. For._
(1564), Introd., xi-xii, and Nos. 544-53, §2; No. 592; Claude Haton I,
332. Those exposed to the infection were required to carry white wands
as a sign (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 824, November 20, 1580).

[836] Claude Haton, I, 332.

[837] Vingtrinier, _La peste à Lyon_, 1901.

[838] _C. S. P. For._, No. 553 (1564).

[839] On the state of medical science at this time see Franklin, “La
vie d’autrefois,” _Hygiene_, chap. ii; cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 544,
July 1, 1564 (summary of a pamphlet printed by the city authorities).

[840] Claude Haton, I, 224-28.

[841] Claude Haton, I, 332.

[842] “Non-seulement la France fut agitée en ceste année de guerres,
diminution des biens de la terre et de peste, mais aussi fut
remplie et fort tormentée des voleurs, larrons et sacrilèges, qui
de nuict et de jour tenoient les champs et forcoient les églises et
maisons, pour voller et piller les biens d’icelles pour vivre et
s’entretenir.”—_Mémoires de Claude Haton_, I, 332 (1562).

Smith declared that Lyons was the “most fearful and inhuman town he
had ever seen. Men show themselves more fearful and inhuman than
pagans.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 553, July 12, 1564.

[843] Castelnau, Book V, chap. x.

[844] Claude Haton, I, 378.

[845] _C. S. P. For._, No. 327, §11, April 14, 1564; No. 389, §12, May
12, 1564.

[846] _Ibid._, No. 755, October 21, 1565.

[847] Jeanne d’Albret had an interview with Catherine after the court
left Macon; she demanded possession of Henry of Béarn, and leave to
return to her estates. But the queen mother, feeling that to grant
either of these requests might injure her cause with Philip II, sought
to satisfy her with the gift of 150,000 livres and the assignment
of Vendôme as the place of her residence (_Corresp. de Catherine de
Médicis_, Introd., II, l).

[848] _C. S. P. For._, No. 384, §7; _Papiers d’état du cardinal de
Granvelle_, VII, 529. His opinion of the synod is expressed in Vol.
VIII, 17; _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 179, note;
Claude Haton, I, 384.

[849] _C. S. P. For._, No. 358.

[850] Castelnau, Book V, chap. x, p. 284, attests this miscarriage of
justice.

[851] _C. S. P. For._, 755, October 21, 1564.

[852] No one can read the Huguenot historian, La Popelinière, Vol. II,
Book XI, without prejudice, and not be convinced of the fact that the
French Protestants infringed both the letter and the spirit of the
Edict of Amboise. The fact that Damville, who had succeeded his father
the constable as governor of Languedoc in 1562, and who was a moderate
Catholic, was required to be so drastic in his measures of repression
that the Protestants complained of him to Charles IX, supports this
view. Cf. _Corresp. de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., l and li.

[853] Castelnau, Book V, chap. x; La Popelinière, _loc. cit._

[854] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 328; _Papiers d’état du cardinal de
Granvelle_, VIII, 398.

[855] It was rumored also that the queen mother was ready to sacrifice
the Italian protégés of France to curry favor with Spain (_Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 395-400, note; _L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 300, 335).

[856] “Traité et renouvellement d’alliance entre Charles IX, roi de
France, et Messieurs les Ligues de Suisse, faite et conclué en la ville
de Fribourg, le 7 jour de Déc., 1564” (Dumont, _Corps dip._, V, Pt. I,
129).

[857] Abridged from Rott, “Les missions diplomatiques de Pomponne
de Bellièvre en Suisse et aux Grisons (1560-74),” _Rev. d’histoire
diplomatique_, XIV, 26-41 (1900); cf. _Papiers d’état du cardinal de
Granvelle_, VIII, 630, 631; D’Aubigné, II, 210. M. Rott admirably
observes (p. 42): “Ainsi donc, cinquante ans et plus avant Richelieu,
la politique confessionnelle de la France s’inspirait déjà dans les
rapports avec l’étranger, de principes fort différents de ceux qui
dirigeaient son action à l’interieur du royaume.”

[858] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 72. The prince
of Condé had secured leave to leave the court in order to visit her
at Vitry in May, where she then lay ill. Her mother was Madeleine
de Mailly, sister of the admiral and granddaughter of Louise de
Montmorency, sister of the old constable (_ibid._, VII, 630, and note;
cf. _C. S. P. For._, 592, August 4, 1564).

[859] “All go and come by the cardinal of Lorraine, for without him
nothing is done.”—Smith to Cecil, November 13, 1564, _C. S. P. For._,
793, §2.

[860] Granvella to Mary Stuart, November, 1564, _Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 570; cf. 550, 591, 599.

Randolph to the earl of Leicester: “The prince of Condé is become a
suitor here, supported by the cardinal.”—_C. S. P. Scotland_, IX,
67, November 7, 1564. Mary Stuart expressed her repugnance at such a
prospect by saying: “Trewlye I am beholding to my uncle: so that yt
be well with hym, he careth not what becommethe of me.”—Randolph to
Cecil, _C. S. P. Scot._, II, 117, November 9, 1564. Another match,
proposed simply for the purpose of leading Condé along, was between
the young duke of Guise and the prince’s daughter, Margaret, who was
a little child.—_C. S. P. For._, No. 642, §3; Smith to Cecil from
Valence, September 1, 1564; No. 650, _ibid._, September 3, 1564; No.
784, November 7, 1564. Smith to Cecil: “News is that the prince of
Condé and the cardinal of Lorraine have intervisited each other.” Cf.
_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 127. Bolwiller who
disapproved of these plans in the interest of Philip II (_ibid._,
VIII, 381, note) evidently believed the prince won over to Catholicism
(_ibid._, VIII, 156). A propos of Condé’s relapse he sarcastically
wrote to Granvella on July 8, 1564: “Ce que l’on est en oppinion que
L’Admiral et D’Andelot se doibvent renger et hanger leur robbe, si le
font, lors me semblera-il veoir une vraye farce, et pourront les femmes
dire lors estre dadvantaige constante que les hommes, mesme madame de
Vandosme et duchesse de Ferrare demeurans en l’oppinion où l’on les
void.”—_Ibid._, VIII, 129.

[861] _Corresp. de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 106, note; _L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 164; _C. S. P. Scot._, II, 153, Randolph to Cecil,
March 1-3, 1565. Mary Stuart in 1564 was twenty-two years of age,
Charles IX barely fourteen (_Papiers d’état du card. de Granvelle_,
VIII, 347, note).

[862] Cf. the luminous letter of Philip to Granvella, August 6, 1564,
in _Papiers d’état du card. de Granvelle_, VIII, 215, 216.

[863] _C. S. P. Ven._, November 6, 1575.

[864] Fortunately for Philip, a whim of passion helped the Spanish
King’s purposes, and Catherine and the Guises failing to carry the
match between Mary Stuart and the prince were content to keep the
prince alienated from his party. The prince of Condé had become
enamored of one of the queen mother’s maids-of-honor, Isabel Limeuil,
while the court was at Roussillon, and had seduced her.

On this liaison see _Corresp. de Cath. de Méd._, II, 189, note; Louis
Paris, _Négociations_, Introd. XXVI, XXVII; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 572, and
especially La Ferrière, “Isabel de Limeuil,” _Revue des deux mondes_,
December 1, 1883, 636 and the duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de
Condé_, I, Appendix, xix. A suggestion of the manners prevailing at
court is found in the following information: “Orders are taken in the
court that no gentleman shall talk with the queen’s maids, except it
is in the queen’s presence, or in that of Madame la Princesse de la
Roche-sur-Yon, _except he be married_; and if they sit upon a form or
stool, he may sit by her, and if she sits in the form, he may kneel by
her, _but not lie long_, as the fashion was in this court.”—_C. S. P.
For._, 1091, April 11, 1565.

[865] Unknown to Charles IX, the Spanish ambassador Chantonnay, whose
recall Catherine had insisted upon for months past and who was finally
replaced late in 1564 by Alava, traversed the provinces of France in
disguise, in the interest of his master, journeying through Auvergne,
Rouergue, Toulouse, Agen and Bordeaux, before he reported at Madrid for
new duty.

St. Sulpice to Catherine de Medici, June 12, 1564; _L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 711; _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII,
592. For some correspondence between Philip II and Granvella, and
Granvella and Antonio Perez regarding Chantonnay’s recall see Gachard,
_Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 251-53. Upon
Chantonnay’s successor, Alava, see _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_,
227, 228, 236; _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 393;
_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 359, 534; Poulet, I, 570,
n. 1; Forneron, _Histoire de Philippe II_, II, 256.

On the secret service of Philip II, see Forneron, I, 218, 290, 334; II,
304, 305; _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 498, 499;
VIII, 128, 182.

Alava exceeded his instructions in threatening France with war. Philip
II, far from wishing war with France, repudiated his ambassador’s
statements (_R. Q. H._, January, 1879, p. 23).

[866] Upon one of the fits of madness of Don Carlos see letter of the
Bishop of Limoges to Catherine de Medici in La Ferrière, _Rapport_,
48, 49. The Raumer Letters from Paris, Vol. I, chap. xv, contain an
interesting account of Don Carlos, with long extracts from the sources.
The editor rightly says that Ranke in his treatise on the affair of Don
Carlos, as acute as it is circumstantial, has adopted the only right
conclusion for the solution of this mysterious episode of history. See
also _Wiener Jahrbücher_, XLVI; Forneron, _Hist. de Philippe II_, II,
103 ff.; Louis Paris, _Négociations_, etc., 888; _Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 317, note; _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_,
17, 29, 101, 597; Lea, in _Amer. Hist. Rev._, January, 1905; _English
Hist. Rev._, XIV, 335.

[867] Cf. _Papiers d’état du card. de Granvelle_, VIII, 334 and note;
cf. 215, 343, 344, 595, 596. Philip found a new prospective husband for
Mary Stuart in the person of the archduke Charles. He had abandoned the
idea of marrying Mary Stuart to his son even before the death of Don
Carlos.

[868] See _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 461.

[869] Catherine turned to her own advantage an almost forgotten wish
of Philip II that he might see her, expressed in July, 1560, when his
anxiety was great because of her lenient policy toward the French
Protestants (_R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 458).

[870] Challoner, English ambassador to Spain, to the queen: “Hardly
shall a stranger by his countenance or words gather at any great
alteration of mind, either to anger, or rejoicement, but after the
fashion of a certain still flood;” quoted by Forneron, I, 319, n. 2,
from Record Office MSS No. 466.

[871] See the extremely interesting account of the passing of the
Turkish embassy through Provins, in Claude Haton, I, 342-44.

[872] On the conspiracy of Bajazet and his flight to Persia see
D’Aubigné, Book III, chap. xxviii.

[873] _Négociations dans le Levant_, II, 729.

[874] _Ibid._, 730.

[875] Spain suspected the Sultan was desirous of securing a French
roadstead for his fleet during the siege of Malta. See _Commentaires et
lettres de Montluc_, V, 38, note; D’Aubigné, 221, and n. 1; _Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 162; _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 398; _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 473-78.

[876] _Corresp. de Cath. de Méd._, II, Introd., lxxxvi, lxxxvii; _R. Q.
H._, XXXIV, 470.

[877] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 14, Letter of March 27, 1562.

[878] Perez writes to Granvella on November 15, 1563: “La reine mère
de France tourmente sa majesté catholique pour la déterminer à une
entrevue.”—_Papiers d’état du card, de Granvelle_, VII, 256; and two
weeks later (December 4, 1563) we find Philip II writing to Alva,
saying that “L’ambassadeur de St. Sulpice lui a proposé une entrevue
avec la reine de France,” and desiring the duke’s opinion in the matter
(Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 277).
The actual text is in Philip’s correspondence, No. XXVI.

[879] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 226.

[880] “Ne se passoit jour sans nouvelle sorte de combatz, passe-temps
et plaizirs.... L’on dréçoit joustes, tournoy, commédies et
tragoedies.”—Fourquevaux to St. Sulpice, _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_,
266; cf. _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 466. For an
account of one of these entertainments, see Castelnau, Book V, chap. vi.

[881] “Le pays est tel que vous avez entendu, pleins de montagnes et
bandoliers.”—Catherine to St. Sulpice, January 9, 1564, _L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 331.

[882] Charles III had been educated in France and was a French
pensioner to the amount of 250,000 francs annually (_Rel. vén._, I,
451). On this Spanish pressure to revoke the Edict of Amboise see
_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 461, 468; Poulet, I,
576, note; Castelnau, Book V, chap. ix; _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 462, 463.
The Huguenots quickly divined it (Languet, _Epist. secr._, II, 268,
November 18, 1563; _Arch. d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 136).

The anxiety of the French Protestants over the King’s visit of Lorraine
is well expressed in the letter of Lazarus Schwendi to the Prince of
Orange, August 22, 1564, in _Arch. d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 191.

[883] Ranke, _Civil Wars and Monarchy in France_, 226.

[884] Davila, _Guerre civile di Francia_, III, 144. On September 27,
1564, the prévôt Morillon wrote to the cardinal Granvella: “L’édit de
France contre les apostatz me faict espérer que la royne mère passera
plus avant, puisque la saison est à propos; et si elle ne le faict, je
crains qu’elle et les siens le paieront.”—_Papiers d’état du card. de
Granvelle_, VIII, 361.

[885] Castelnau Book V, chap. x. Granvella expressed impatience at
Catherine’s slowness in repressing the Huguenots. See his letters to
vice-chancellor Seld and Philip II at this time in _Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 598, 599, 632, 633.

[886] Unless the order forbidding Renée of Ferrara to hold Protestant
service even in private while at the court, be taken as the first; see
_R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 467.

[887] Near Lyons, where on account of the plague the court was stopping
July 17 to August 15; it belonged to the cardinal Tournon, who held it
in apanage.

[888] Isambert, XIV, 166; Castelnau, Book V, chap. x; La Popelinière,
II, Book XI, 5, 6; Chéruel, _Histoire de l’administration monarchique
de la France_, I, 196.

[889] D’Aubigné, II, 211. On the last complaint see _Correspondance
de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 195, 203, and notes. These Catholic
associations generally at this time went by the name of “Confréries du
St. Esprit,” as D’Aubigné’s allusion shows.

[890] For an episode showing at once the manners of some in the court,
and the Catholic intensity of the people of Marseilles, see _Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 475.

[891] Lamathe, “Délibération des consuls de Nismes au sujet de l’entrée
de Charles IX dans ladite ville (1564),” _Rev. des Soc. savant des
départ._, 5^[e] série, III (1872), 781.

[892] While here, Catherine dispatched the marshal Bourdillon into
Guyenne for the purpose of dissolving the league formed at Cadillac on
March 13, 1563 (D’Aubigné, II, 213). As we shall see, the mission was
fruitless.

[893] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., lviii. The
editor adds: “De toutes les villes du Midi, c’était [Beziers] celle qui
comptait le plus de Protestants.” On account of the alarm evinced by
the Huguenots of the south—300 gentlemen of Beziers visited the King
in a body—Charles IX, when at Marseilles on November 4, “confirmed”
the Edict of Amboise. Yet so apprehensive was the court that whenever
it stopped an effort was made to disarm the local populace (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 788-1564).

[894] On the incident of Catherine reading a MS chronicle about Blanche
of Castile, see the extract of the Venetian ambassador in Baschet (_La
diplomatie vénetienne_, 521, 522).

[895] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., lix.

[896] Claude Haton, I, 378.

[897] The order of the King of December 13, 1564, prohibiting any
nobles whoever they might be, unless princes of the house of France,
from entering the government of the Ile-de-France is still unpublished.
It is preserved in a report of the Spanish ambassador, Arch. nat., K.
1,505, No. 31. It is to be distinguished from the general _ordonnance_
of the year before—“Lettres du roy contenans defenses à toutes
personnes de ne porter harquebuzes, pistoles, ni pistolets, ni autres
bastons à feu, sur peine de confiscation de leurs armes et chevaulx,”
Paris, 1564. Cf. Isambert, XIV, 142.

[898] All the historians notice this episode. See D’Aubigné, Book IV,
chap, v; _Corresp. de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., lix, lx, and
253-56 where the letters of the marshal and the queen mother on the
subject are given. The editor, in a long note, sifts the evidence.
Other accounts are in Claude Haton, I, 381-83 (other references in
note); _C. S. P. For._, No. 942, January 24, 1564; _Mém. du duc de
Nevers_, V, 12, 13; Castelnau, Book VI, chap. ii.

In _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 600-2, is an
account from the pen of Don Louis del Rio, an attaché of the Spanish
embassy at Paris; and on pp. 655, 656 is the “Harangue de l’admiral
de France à MM. de la court du parlement de Paris du 27 janvier 1565
avec la réponse.” The baron de Ruble has written the history of this
incident in _Mém. de la Soc. de l’hist. de Paris de l’Ile-de-France_,
Vol. VI.

According to a letter of Mary Stuart to Queen Elizabeth, February 12,
1565, the resentment due to the old law-suit over Dammartin flashed
out at this time. But it must have been a conjecture on her part,
for she adds: “I have heard no word of the duke of Guise or monsieur
d’Aumale.”—_C. S. P. Scot._, II, 146. The prince of Condé’s Catholic
leanings at this critical moment are manifested in a letter to his
sister, the abbess of Chelles, in which he states that he is annoyed
at the outrage committed on the cardinal of Lorraine by the marshal
Montmorency; that the union of these two houses is more than necessary;
that if he had been with the cardinal, he would have given proof of his
good-will by deeds. See Appendix VII.

[899] “Les confraires du Sainct-Esprit et autres reprenoient plus de
viguer, et les provinces ne pouvoient plus souffrir les ministres ny
les presches publics et particulièrs, et se séparoient entièrement des
huguenots; qui estoient argumens certains qu’en peu de temps il se
verroit quelque grand changement.”—Castelnau, Book VI, chap. ii.

[900] Ardent Catholics, like Cardinal Granvella, believed both the
marshal Montmorency and Damville to be Protestants at heart (_Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 278).

[901] “Des catholiques formèrent des ‘unions’ pour défendre l’honneur
de Dieu et de la Sainte Eglise, et ces unions, en se rapprochant
constituèrent la Ligue.”—Beulier, “Pourquoi la France est-elle restée
catholique au XVI^[e] siècle,” _Revue anglo-romaine_, January 11, 1896,
257. The Jesuits worked hard in France for Philip II. Forneron, II,
304, quotes an interesting letter to this effect from a Jesuit working
in France.

[902] The procès-verbal of this league is in _Mémoires de Condé_,
ed. London, VI, 290-306. For the court’s sojourn at Agen see Barrère
(l’abbé), “Entrée et séjour de Charles IX à Agen (1565),” _Bull. du
Com. de la langue, de l’hist. et des arts de la France_ I (1854), 472.

For the King’s sojourn at Condom (1565) see Barrère (l’abbé), _ibid._,
476.

[903] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 80, 81; De Thou, V,
Book XXXVII, 32; Anquetil, I, 213.

[904] Collection Godefroy, CCLVII, No. 7, July 18, 1564.

[905] De Thou, IV, Book XXXVII, 32.

[906] A printed copy of this important dispatch, entitled “Coppie d’une
lettre du sieur d’Aumale au sieur marquis d’Elbœuf son frère, sur
l’association qu’ils delibèrent faire contre la maison de Montmorency”
(February 27, 1565), is to be found in the Bib. Nat., L _b._ 33: 172.
It evidently was circulated as a political pamphlet by the Huguenots.
But where is the original? Portions of it are as follows: “Mon frère
... j’ay receu de vostre homme la lettre que m’avez escripte.... J’en
ay par plusieurs fois cy devant escript à Messieurs de Montpensier,
d’Estampes, Cehavigny: par où ils auroyent bien peu juger la volonté
que j’ay tousjours lue de nous venger, et combien je desirerois
l’association que vous dites (_verso_) prevoyant assez combien elle
estoit necessaire non seulement pour nous, mais aussi pour tous les
gens de bien à qui l’on en veult plus que jamais.

“Et pour ceste cause, mon frere, je trouverais merveilleusement bon que
les dicts Sieurs y voulsissent entendre, laissant les villes, d’autant
qu’il n’y a nulle asseurance en peuple, comme je l’ay dernièrement
encore cogneut. Mais avec la Noblesse, de ma part je suis tout resolu
et prest, et n’y veux espargner aucune chose, et le plustost sera le
meilleur. Qui me fait vous prier, de regarder et en bien adviser tous
parensemble, et mesmes avec le seigneur de Montpensier, et de m’en
mander ce que vous aurez deliberé, à fin que par là je resolue avec les
Seigneurs et Noblesse qui sont de deça et mes Gouverneurs, qui feront
tout ce que je vouldray.

“Au demeurant, vous avez bien entendu le nombre de Chevaliers de
l’Ordre qui ont esté faicts, qui sont bien pres de trente ou plus,
dont monsieur de Brion en est des premiers. Aussi des preparatifs que
lon fuit à la Court pour aller à Bayonne recevoir festoyer la Roine
d’Espaigne.”

[907] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 80-86. I have used the
seventeenth-century translation of Cotton, 274, 275, which preserves
something of the spirit of the original. De Thou, never having seen
the document in question, expresses his doubt of Montluc’s veracity in
the matter, and argues the improbability of the King’s having followed
Montluc’s advice on the ground that the crown had condemned all secret
associations as destructive of domestic tranquillity. “Why should
the King make a league with his subjects?” asks De Thou. “Far from
deriving any advantage from it, would it not diminish his authority?
Would the King not incite his subjects to do exactly what he wanted
to avoid, and by his own example accustom them to town factions; to
foment and support parties in the kingdom?”—De Thou, IV, Book XXXVII,
33. Unfortunately for the truth of De Thou’s hypothesis, the facts are
the other way, for there is documentary proof that Charles IX followed
out Montluc’s suggestion, and sent the declaration to all his officers
requesting their adherence to it. The baron de Ruble discovered the
proof in F. Fr. 20,461, fol. 58. See his edition of Montluc, III, 86,
note; cf. D’Aubigné, II, 218, and n. 6.

[908] The credit of having made this important discovery is due to the
baron de Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 317-26, 329,
330, 346, 347, 362, 363. But it was Forneron who showed the world the
magnitude of Montluc’s treason (_Hist. de Philippe II_, I, 293-330).
Suspicion of Montluc’s course, however, prevailed in his own day. He
was charged with having agreed to deliver over the province of Guyenne
to Philip II in 1570 and issued a cartel against his adversaries
denying that he had any intelligence with Spain. See Appendix VIII.

[909] D’Andelot’s appointment to this post created intense feeling
among the Catholic officers. Strozzi, Brissac, and Charry openly
refused to obey him (D’Aubigné, II, 207; Brantôme, V, 341).

[910] Forneron, I, 294, n. 3.

[911] Montluc, ed. De Ruble, IV, Introd., ix.

[912] It will be observed that Montluc independently had come to the
same conclusion as Granvella.

[913] Montluc, ed. De Ruble, IV, 317-26, February 8, 1564.

[914] Forneron, I, 330. D’Aubigné, II, 294, wrongly ascribes this plot
to the Jesuits. The traditional Protestant account, attributed to
Calignon, chancellor of Navarre, is printed in _Mém. du duc de Nevers_,
II, 579; also in _Mém. de Villeroy_. The account in _Arch. cur._, VI,
281, is much colored. Catholic historians have denied the existence
of such a plot, e. g., the abbé Garnier in _Mém. de l’Acad. des
inscrip._ (1787), Vol. L, 722. But since the publication of Montluc’s
_Correspondance_ there is no doubt of it.

[915] Forneron, I, 303-6. Cabie, _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 483,
gives the text of the ambassador’s letter to Catherine, and his note of
thanks to the queen’s embroiderer who divulged the plot.

[916] D’Aubigné, II, 204, 205; _Mém. de Condé_, IV, 669. Charles IX’s
letter of November 30, 1563, to St. Sulpice gives some details of the
process (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 186, 187).

[917] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 119, 120. Her
letter to her daughter in Spain, not in the correspondence, which
M. Cabie cites in _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 208, displays real
courage. Charles IX said he could not abandon Jeanne d’Albret “sans
être vu déserter de ses plus proches parents” (_ibid._, 247). The
instructions to Lansac, who was sent to Spain to protest in the name of
France against the papal action, show fine scorn (_ibid._, 224).

[918] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 327, note.

[919] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 228: “Réponse de Philippe II au sr.
de Lansac en sa première audience, 18 fev. 1565.”

[920] _Ibid._, 247.

[921] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 5.

[922] Letter to St. Sulpice, February 10, 1563, _ibid._, 115.

[923] _Ibid._, 135.

[924] Pius IV was so perplexed that he tried to avoid pronouncing in
the matter. “On avait décidé, à la dernière fête de St. Pierre, de
supprimer cette cérémonie, afin de n’offenser personne.”—Charles IX to
St. Sulpice, July 24, 1563, _ibid._, 141.

[925] Du Ferrier, French ambassador at Venice to St. Sulpice, April 12,
1564, _ibid._, 252.

[926] Cf. the report of the conversation between Archbishop Cispontin,
the papal secretary, and D’Oysel (_ibid._, 273, July, 1564).

[927] “Instructions données par Charles IX à L’Aubespine le jeune,
envoyé en Espagne,” _ibid._, 277, June 24, 1564.

[928] _Ibid._, 279, 281, 282, 299. “It is an error to regard, as most
historians do, the course of the relations of Philip II to the see of
Rome as a single consistent development, for the earlier part of his
reign was dominated by a principle utterly different from that which
inspired the latter. In the sixties and early seventies the Spanish
king devoted himself primarily to the maintenance of the principles
of the counter-Reformation; he abandoned political advantage in the
interest of the faith, united with the ancient foes of his house for
the suppression of heresy, dedicated himself and his people to the
cause of Catholicism.... But in the later seventies there came a
change. The spirit of the counter-Reformation was waning in France:
the old political lines of cleavage had begun to reappear; Philip
began to discover that he was draining his land to the dregs in the
interests of a foreign power who offered him no reciprocal advantages,
and reluctantly exchanged his earlier attitude of abject devotion to
the interests of the church for the more patriotic one of solicitude
for the welfare of Spain.... Viewed from the Spanish standpoint, the
story of this long development is a tragic but familiar one—reckless
national sacrifice for the sake of an antiquated ideal, exhaustion
in the interests of a foreign power, which uses and casts aside but
never reciprocates. But it adds one more to the already long list
of favorable revisions of the older and more hostile verdicts on
the Spanish monarch. Philip’s attitude toward the papacy, though
not always wise or statesmanlike, was at least far more honorable
and loyal to the church than it is usually represented (as, for
instance, by Philippson): the first part of his reign is marked by his
single-hearted devotion to the cause of Rome, and even at the last
that devotion does not falter, though the interests of his country
forced him to adopt a more national policy toward the papacy than that
with which he had begun.”—R. B. Merriman, Review of Herre, _Papsttum
und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II_ (Leipzig, 1907), in _American
Historical Review_, October, 1908, pp. 117, 118.

[929] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 177, July 30,
1564; _R. Q. H._, 1869, p. 403.

[930] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 669.

[931] Granvella said as much to Philip II, July 14, 1563. See _Papiers
d’état du card. de Granvelle_, VII, 124; cf. Gachard, _Correspondance
de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 277 (Philip II to Alva, December
14, 1563).

[932] Granvella to Perez, August 6, 1563, _Papiers d’état du cardinal
de Granvelle_, VII, 177.

[933] _Ibid._, 231.

[934] _Ibid._, 262.

[935] See Paillard, _Histoire des troubles de Valenciennes_, 1560-67.

[936] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 270.

[937] For proof see _ibid._, 55, 56, and note.

[938] “Les Huguenots de France sollicitent continuellement ceulx des
Pays-Bas pour se révolter,” writes Granvella to the Emperor on June 3,
1564 (_ibid._, 18).

[939] _Ibid._, 99; cf. 104, note.

[940] _Ibid._, 23, 393; _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 5, 275, 280, 284,
300, 305; _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 197_s_.

[941] “Si cela de la religion succède bien en France, les affaires
vauldront de mieulx.”—_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII,
152, July 15, 1564.

[942] The presence of many Belgian students at the French universities
undoubtedly contributed to this sympathy. See Gachard, _Correspondance
de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 372.

[943] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 390, 527, 550,
556, 593.

[944] _Ibid._, VII, 281.

[945] The counselor d’Assonleville wrote to Cardinal Granvella after
the peace of Troyes, “Adieu, Callais! combien qu’elle nous duiroit bien
hors de mains des François!”—Poulet, I, 570.

[946] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 191, 194, 209, 221. Each state
appointed a commission in 1563 to adjust this difficulty and other
border complications on the edge of Artois and Luxembourg (for
instances, see _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 224, 227, 228, 240, 254),
whose conferences were prolonged through the years 1564-65. See the
long note in Gachard, _Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 270.

In Collection Godefroy, XCIV, No. 16, will be found a “sommaire de la
négociation de Calais, entre le président Séguier et le conseiller
du Faur, députés de Charles IX, et les ambassadeurs de Philippe II;”
original, signed by Séguier and Du Faur. In the same collection, XCVI,
No. 6, is a delimitation treaty pertaining to the Picard frontier,
signed by Harlay and Du Drac, at Gravelines, December 29, 1565. Charles
IX refused to ratify it.

[947] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 18.

[948] “Un eslavon tan importante desta cadena.”—_Ibid._, VII, 215.

[949] For Granvella’s opinion of the demand for the Estates-General,
see his letter to Philip II, April 18, 1564 (_ibid._, 492-94).

[950] _Ibid._, 294, note, and especially 495-97; cf. _L’Ambassade de
St. Sulpice_, 188, 193.

[951] “Non admettre à couleur de la peste.”—Granvella to the duchess
of Parma, _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 411.

[952] This was a mere threat, however, as such a course would have
injured France as much as the Netherlands.

[953] See the letter of the president Viglius to Granvella, April 17,
1564, in _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 476; cf. 481.
On this whole question, so far as England is concerned see Brugmans,
_England en de Nederland in de eerste Jaren von Elizabeth’s regeering
(1558-67)_, Groningen, 1892; cf. _English Historical Review_, VIII,
358-60.

[954] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 496, 497. Cf. the
observation of Assonleville in a letter to Granvella, Poulet, I, 570.
The cardinal’s prophecy was partially fulfilled (_Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 40, 41).

[955] “Qui est autant que couper la gorge aux marchands.”—“Mémoire
envoyé pour le roi de France à St. Sulpice,” January, 1564, in
_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 210.

[956] See “Note du Ministère de France en réponse aux griefs presentés
par l’ambassadeur d’Espagne” in _Papiers d’état du cardinal de
Granvelle_, VIII, 584-86. Other references to this commercial matter
are in VII, 62, 164, 375, 411, 476, 481, 495-97, 584, 668; _L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 175, 181, 188, 191, 193, 194, 200, 206, 209, 210,
213, 217, 221, 224, 304, 350, 351; _Papiers d’état du cardinal de
Granvelle_, VIII, 6-15, 514, 515; Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe
II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 244, 246, 247; Poulet, I, 567, and n. 2. There
is a memoir on the mission of Assonleville to England, April-June 6,
1563, in the _Bulletin de la commission royale d’histoire_, sér. III,
I, 456 ff.

Undoubtedly Spain’s harsh commercial policy toward France was also
influenced in part by jealousy of the commercial relations of France
and England, for the treaty of Troyes established freedom of trade
between the two nations. For the great importance of this treaty in
the history of commerce see De Ruble, _Le traité de Cateau-Cambrésis_,
193-95.

[957] St. Sulpice sent this important information in a letter of
January 22, 1565 (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 338).

[958] _Ibid._, 366. Catherine de Medici pushed her insistence
perilously far, asserting that Alava, the Spanish ambassador in France,
had intimated that objection would not be made to the presence of the
prince of Condé, since his exclusion might endanger the peace. Philip
II promptly declared that if Alava had made Catherine believe so, he
had acted in violation of instructions. “Mémoire envoyé à Catherine sur
les réponses du roi catholique,” May 7, 1564, in _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 375.

[959] Egmont passed through Bordeaux on his way to Spain while the
court was there (_R. Q. H._, XXIV, 479).

[960] The reasons for the selection of Bayonne are set forth in _R. Q.
H._, XXXIV, 472.

[961] “Les lenteurs ... qui sont habituelles en Espagne.”—_L’Ambassade
de St. Sulpice_, 363.

[962] F. Fr. 20,647, fol. 11. For other details of the preliminaries of
Bayonne, see _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 335-38, 347, 350, 351, 353,
354, 357-60, 362, 363, 366, 374-78, 382.

[963] Cf. _Recueil des choses notables qui ont esté faites à Bayonne
Paris_, 1566; and the _Mémoires de Marguerite de Navarre_, Book I.

[964] See De Thou, Book XXVII; Mathieu, _Histoire de France_, I, 283;
La Popelinière, Book XI, 8. The prince of Orange and William of Hesse
both believed that the massacre of St. Bartholomew was concerted at
Bayonne (_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 507; IV, 108).

[965] Some of the literature upon this famous interview is as follows:
E. Marcks, _Die Zusammenkunft von Bayonne: Das französ. Staatsleben u.
Spanien in d. J. 1563-67_, Strassburg, 1889; Combes, _L’entrevue de
Bayonne de 1565_, Paris, 1882; Maury, in _Journal des savants_, 1871;
Loiseleur _La St. Barthelémy_, Paris, 1883; Lettenhove, _La conférence
de Bayonne_, 1883; La Ferrière, _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 457, and the same
in _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd.; Philippson,
_L’Athénæum belge_, July 1, 1882; De Croze, _Les Guises, les Valois
et Philippe II_; Boutaric, _La Saint Barthélemy, d’après les archives
du Vatican_ (_Bib. de l’Ecole des Chartes_, sér. V, III, 1); Raumer,
_Frankreich und die Bartholomäusnacht_, Leipzig, 1854; Wuttke, _Zur
Vorgeschichte der Bartholomäusnacht_; Soldan, _La Saint Barthélemy_
(French trans.), 1854.

[966] _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 483, and n. 2.

[967] For Alva’s judgment on the government of France see _Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 276; cf. _L’Ambassade de St.
Sulpice_, 341-43.

[968] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 523; _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 492-512, n. 4. Alva
frankly said that he wished the constable were gone with the rest—“el
condestable que valierá mas que faltára como los otros.”—_Papiers
d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 277.

[969] The duke of Montpensier was a notoriously bigoted Catholic.
The Venetian ambassador said of him: “Il quale è tenuto più atto a
governare un monasterio di frati che a comandare ad eserciti.”—_Rel.
vén._, II, 155.

[970] _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 485. Montluc put a memoir in Alva’s hands
which proposed an alliance between the crowns of France and Spain for
the purpose of crushing the Protestants in France. In event of the
French king’s refusal to become a party to this alliance, Montluc
outlined the means of defense which Philip II would have to resort
to. This memoir is published by the baron de Ruble in _Commentaires
et lettres de Montluc_, V, 23 ff. In this striking document the
veteran soldier, after setting forth his favorite thesis that French
Calvinism was antimonarchical in its nature, makes a survey of the
religious state of the provinces. He concludes that while Protestantism
was rampant everywhere in France, in five-sixths of the country the
Catholics were superior. The place of great danger is Guyenne. The
mutual safety of France and Spain requires the subjugation of this
province. France cannot or will not do this alone (cf. _Correspondance
de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 342, n. 3; 343, n. 4). It remains,
therefore, for the king of Spain to do so. This is the historical
argument for all of Montluc’s subsequent course of treason with Philip
II.

[971] This has been triumphantly proved by Count Hector de la Ferrière,
who has shown that M. Combes, _L’Entrevue de Bayonne de 1565 et la
question de St. Barthélemy d’après les archives de Simancas_, Paris,
1881, has mistranslated the very documents upon which he relied (_R. Q.
H._, _XXXIV_, 511 ff.).

[972] Pius V was elected pope January 17, 1566 (see Hilliger, _Die
Wahl Pius V zum Päpste_, 1907). He had been grand inquisitor before
his elevation, and imparted a ferocious zeal to the holy office
(see Bertelotti, _Martiri di Libero Pensero e Vittime della Sta.
Inquisizione nei Secoli, XVI, XVII, e XVIII_, Rome, 1892). The violence
of his character and his bigotry led to his committing several acts
injurious to the Catholic cause, but it was due to him that the
Spanish, Venetian, and papal fleets defeated the Turks at Lepanto.
He wrote on March 28, 1569 to Catherine de Medici: “Si Votre Majesté
continue, comme elle a fait constamment, dans la rectitude de son âme?
et dans la simplicité de son cœur, à ne chercher que l’honneur de Dieu
toutpuissent, et à combattre ouvertement et ardemment les ennemis de
la religion catholique, _jusqu’à ce qu’ils soient tous massacrés_ (ad
internecionem usque), qu’elle soit assurée que le secours divin ne lui
manquera jamais, et que Dieu lui préparera, ainsi qu’au roi, son fils,
de plus grandes victoires: ce n’est que par _l’extermination entière_
des hérétiques (deletis omnibus haeritics) que le roi pourra rendre à
ce noble royaume l’ancien culte de la religion catholique.”—Potter,
_Pie V_, 35; letter of the Pope to Catherine de Medici, March 28, 1569.
The original Latin version of this letter, the salient words of which
are in parentheses above, is in _Epistola SS. Pii V_, ed. Gouban,
III, 154, Antwerp, 1640. The editor was secretary to the marquis de
Castel-Rodrigio, ambassador of Philip IV to the Holy See. An abridged
edition was published by Potter, _Lettres de St. Pie V sur les affaires
religieuses de son temps en France_, Paris, 1826. The letter is one
of congratulation written to Catherine de Medici upon the Catholic
victory of Jarnac and the death of the prince of Condé. (Cf. the letter
of April 13, 1569, on p. 156 to the same effect.) Nevertheless, even
the Pope regarded the total destruction of the French Protestants
as a result more devoutly to be wished for than practicable. Pope
Pius V, however, was not the first advocate of destruction, for as
early as 1556 François Lepicart gave the same advice to Henry II: “Le
roy devroit pour un temps contrefaire le luthérien parmi eux [the
Protestants], afin que, prenant de là occasion de s’assembler hautement
partout, on pût faire main-basse sur eux tous, et en purger une bonne
fois le royaume.”—_Bayle’s Dictionary_, art. “Rose.”

The doctrine of assassination for heresy originally proceeded from
the mediaeval church, in which it can be traced back as far as the
beginning of the Crusades. Urban II asserted that it was not murder
to kill an excommunicated person, provided it was done from religious
zeal. (“Non enim eos homicidas arbitramur quod adversus excommunicatos
zelo catholicae matris ardentes, eorum quoslibet trucidasse
contigerit.”—Migne, _Epistolae Urbani_, CLI, No. 122; Mansi, XX, 713;
the same words are used by Ivo of Chartres, X, 331, and by Gratian
in the _Decretum_ [causa 32, quaestio 2, canon: _De neptis_].) The
passage stands in the revised edition, to which Gregory XIII prefixed
the injunction that nothing should be omitted, and the gloss gives
the following paraphrase: “Non putamus eos esse homicidas qui zelo
justitiae eos occiderunt.”

In 1208 Innocent III proscribed the count of Toulouse (Teulet, _Trésor
des Chartes_, I, 316), and in the same pontificate the Fourth Lateran
Council declared that the Pope might depose anyone who neglected
the duty of exterminating heresy and might bestow his state on
others (Harduin, _Concilia_, VII, 19). The same canon reappears in
the _Decreta_ of Gregory IX (Lib. iv, tit. 7. cap. 13). St. Thomas
Aquinas declared that the loss of political rights was incurred by
excommunication (_Summa_ [ed. 1853], III, 51). The teaching that
faith need not be kept with a heretic was well established by the
church in the thirteenth century. It was pleaded by the Emperor in
the case of Huss—“quoniam non est frangere fidem ei qui Deo fidem
frangit.”—Palacky, _Documenta Joannis Hussi_, I, 540.

The spirit of this teaching survived in the sixteenth century. In
1561 some citizens of Lucca, having embraced the Protestant belief,
were obliged to flee from the city. The government of the republic,
under suggestion from Rome, passed a law on January 9, 1562, that
whoever killed one of these refugees, though he had been outlawed,
yet would his outlawry be reversed; and that if he himself needed
not this privilege, it could be transferred to another (_Archivio
storico italiano_, X, app. 176, 177). On January 20, Pope Pius IV
wrote to congratulate the city on this pious legislation: “Legimus
pia laudabiliaque decretaque civitatis istius Generale Consilium
nuper fecit ad civitatem ipsam ab omni heresum labe integram
conservandam.... Nec vero quicquam fieri potuisse judicamus, vel ad
tuendum Dei honorem sanctius, vel ad conservandam vestre patrie salutem
prudentius.”—_Ibid._, 178, 179.

When Henry of Valois made oath to respect liberty of conscience in
Poland he was informed that it would be sin to observe the oath, but
that if he broke it, the sin of making it would be regarded as a venial
offense: “Minor fuit offensio, ubi mens ea praestandi quae pelebatur,
defuit.”—Hosii, _Opera_, II, 367.

The Ridolfi plot, it may be added, casts a very clear light upon the
teaching and conduct of Pius V.

[I owe some of the information given above to a curious accident. In
1899, among a number of books which I purchased in London, I found
a number of fragmentary notes dealing with this question. There is
nothing to indicate their authorship, but in recognition of the
assistance of some scholar to me unknown this acknowledgment is made.
It may be added that the books purchased dealt with France in the
fourteenth century].

[973] This was Montluc’s idea, which he broached both to the cardinal
of Lorraine and Philip II, in the form of an edict which he himself
improvised, and which we know that the king of Spain actually read
(_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 359-62). There are two
Spanish translations of the first document in the Archives nationales.
Philip indorsed the letter to Bardaxi in his own handwriting: “la carta
para el cardinal de Lorena.”—_Ibid._, IV, 362, note.

[974] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, IX, 306; Gachard,
_Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I, 368; letter of
Margaret of Parma to Antonio Perez, September 27, 1565.

[975] The monotony of life and the tyranny of Spanish etiquette must
have borne hard upon the little queen of Spain. But in the midst of the
miseries of this “royal slavery,” as M. le comte de la Ferrière calls
it, it was a crowning humiliation to be condemned to be the instrument
of Philip’s political intrigues. That her young spirit rebelled, though
hopelessly, against the situationis evident, from a pitiful letter
written by her to her brother’s ambassador in Spain (La Ferrière,
_Rapport_, 28).

[976] On Cardinal Pacheco see Poulet, I, 7, note and Index.

[977] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., lxxxiii,
lxxxiv.

[978] The key to it was discovered in 1885. Suriano had been Venetian
envoy at Trent. He was not the regular ambassador of the senate in
France and his dispatches seem to have been in another key from that of
Marc Antonio Barbaro the accredited ambassador.

[979] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., lxxxv.

[980] Combes, 47.

[981] “For a whole fortnight Catherine resisted the pressure of her
daughter and the Spanish envoys, who found support in the drastic
proposals of the leaders of the French Catholics. Within the last
three days of the interview, however, concessions were made which
satisfied Alva and his master, though Granvella and Alva exhibited
some skepticism. The queen was prompted, ... not by Alva’s alleged
threat that the King must lose his crown, or his brother Henry his
head, but merely by her fear that the total failure of the interview
would hinder the attainment of her ends. These concessions consisted
in the engagement to accept the decrees of the Council of Trent and in
an enigmatical promise of punishment or remedial measures. The latter,
however, probably did not refer to the judicial murder or assassination
of the Huguenot leaders—a scheme suggested by Montpensier’s confessor
and welcomed by Alva—but to the expulsion of the ministers and
subsequent enforcement of orthodoxy. The execution of these measures
was postponed until the conclusion of the journey, but it seems
probable that Catherine never seriously intended an act which would
have been the inevitable sign of civil war.”—Armstrong in _English
Historical Review_, VI, 578, 579 (review of Marcks, _Die Zusammenkunft
von Bayonne_, Strasburg, 1889).

[982] For example La Noue, chap. xii (1567).

[983] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 509, 510; _R. Q.
H._, XXXIV.

[984] “Tous les bruis que l’on fayst courer ne sont pas vray.... Et
y a tent de noblèse au demeurant que tou les souir à la sale du bal
je panserès aystre à Baionne si j’y voyais reine ma fille,” writes
Catherine to the duke of Guise (_Correspondance de Catherine de
Médicis_, II, 315).

[985] Fourquevaux, I, 6, November 3, 1565. Cf. _Correspondance de
Catherine de Médicis_, II, 326—Catherine to Fourquevaux, November 28,
1565.

[986] For the beginnings of Catherine’s negotiations in Poland see
_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., cv, 404;
Capefigue, 412 ff.

[987] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 320.

[988] “C’est la rareté et la cherté des vivres qui nous chasse,”
said Catherine to the Venetian ambassador (cited by La Ferrière,
_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., cii).

[989] See the rhyme upon it in L’Estoile, ed. Michaud, series 2, Vol.
I, p. 17.

[990] Cf. Babinet de Rencogne, “Sur un débordement de la Charente et la
cherté des vivres en 1481,” _Bull. de la Soc. art._, etc., 1860, 3^[e]
sér., II, 3 (Angoulême, 1862).

[991] Cf. Boutiot. “Notes sur les inondations de la rivière de Seine à
Troyes depuis les temps les plus reculès jusqu’ à nos jours,” _Annuaire
admin. pour 1864_ (Troyes), p. 17.

[992] Claude Haton, I, 395-98. This statement, even if there were no
other evidence, is confirmed for the south of France by the court’s
experience in the foothills of the Pyrenees in January, 1565 (cf.
_Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 465). For the west of France see _Chroniques
Fontenaisiennes_ (Paris, 1841), 84, 85, and the “Journal de Louvet,”
published in the _Revue d’Anjou_ in 1854. One quotation may suffice:
“Au mois de febvrier, il tomba sy grande quantité de neige au païs
d’Anjou et fust l’hyver si froid, que les rivières furent glacées et
qu’on marchoit et passont par-dessus, et que tous les lauriers et
romarins gelèrent, et qu’au dégel les eaux crurent et furent si grandes
qu’elles rompirent des arches, ponts et chaussées, et fust ceste année
appelée l’année du grand hyver.” I know of no article upon this subject
as a whole. M. Joubert, _Etude sur les misères de l’Anjou aux XV^[e] et
XVI^[e] siècles_, 1886, pp. 35 and 161, has a little to say. The subject
deserves treatment. The sources of course are almost wholly local.

[993] Claude Haton, I, 331.

[994] _Idem_, I, 409.

[995] Catherine’s order to the marshal Montmorency, as governor of
Paris, dated November 19, 1565, is in _Correspondance de Catherine de
Médicis_, II, 325.

[996] The authorities of Provins made requisition of the grain
possessed by private persons and appropriated all save that which
was necessary for the owners, which was sold to the townspeople
at the maximum price of 20 sous per _boisseau_. The abbot of St.
Jacques and the prior of St. Ayoul baked bread to be distributed to
the poor. One of the wealthy citizens from Easter till harvest made
daily distribution of bread to more than three hundred poor, besides
furnishing them with work (Claude Haton, I, 409).

The _boisseau_ (Med. Latin, _boissellus_ [Du Cange, _s. v._]) was an
ancient measure of capacity equivalent to 13.01 litres, approximately
12 quarts. In remote parts of France the term is still sometimes used
to indicate a décalitre. The _boisseau_ was used for both dry and
liquid measure. On the other hand the _bichet_ (Med. Latin, _bisselus_
and _busellus_, whence the English bushel) was a dry measure,
representing from one-fifth to two-fifths of a hectolitre (from 4.4
to 8.8 gallons) according to the province. The _setier_, was a larger
dry measure of 6 pecks (Paris measure). The _muid_ (Latin _modius_)
also was of variable capacity. That of Paris equaled 36 gallons. The
_queue du creu_ was a large wooden cask, about equivalent to a hogshead
and a half, and was used only for wine. The calculations of terms of
American money are on the theory that the _livre tournois_ in 1565 was
equivalent to 3.11 francs, according to the estimate of the vicomte
d’Avenel in _Revue des deux mondes_, June 15, 1892, p. 795.

[997] Claude Haton, I, 418. For information on this subject see Reuss,
_La sorcellerie au 16^[e] et au 17 siècle, particulièrement en Alsace
d’après des documents en partie inédits_; Jarrin, _La sorcellerie en
Bresse et en Bugey_ (Bourges, 1877); Pfister, “Nicolas Rémy et la
sorcellerie en Lorraine à la fin du XVI^[e] siècle,” _Revue hist._,
XCVII, 225.

[998] “Molins è città, ed à posta vicina all’ Alier, sopra il quale
ha un ponte; è la principale del ducato di Borbon. Vi è un bellissimo
palazzo, fabbricato già dai duchi di Borbon, posto in fortezza, con
bellissimi giardini e boschi e fontane, e ogni delicatezze conveniente
a principe. Tra le altre cose vi è una parte dove vi si teniano de
infinite sorte animali e ucelli, delli quali buona parte è andata de
male; pur vi restano ancora molti francollini, molte galline d’India,
molte starne, è altre simil cose; è vi son molti papagalli vi diverse
sorte.”—_Rel. vén._, I, 32, 34.

[999] When the court was at Blois so great was the number of strangers
that the Knights of the Order made a house-to-house canvass.

[1000] _C. S. P. For._, _anno_ 1565, p. 524; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III,
523. For details upon the history of the six months between July and
January, see _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, lxxxvii-cv.

[1001] _C. S. P. For._, _anno_ 1566, No. 17. Before the end of the
month the old scores were officially “shelved” by decrees of the King
in council (January 29 and 31, 1566). Many of the sources allude to
this hypocritical reconciliation: De Thou, V, Book XXIX, 184; Poulet I,
125—letter of Granvella from Rome; D’Aubigné, II, 223-25; _C. S. P.
For._, No. 57, January 29, 1566; Castelnau, Book VI, chap. ii.

[1002] _C. S. P. For._, No. 41, January 23, 1566.

[1003] _C. S. P. For._, No. 120, February 22, 1566.

[1004] _Ibid._, No. 150, March 6, 1566.

[1005] _Ibid._, No. 136, February 25, 1566. “The constable lies at
Chantilly ill at ease.”—_Ibid._, No. 406, May 21, 1566. Poulet, I,
190, Morillon to Granvella, March 5.

[1006] _C. S. P. For._, _anno_ 1566, Introd. The text of the
_ordonnance_ is in Isambert, XIV, 189; De Thou, Book XXXIX, 178-84, has
much upon it. It is he who records the speeches of the King and the
chancellor. It is interesting to observe that very similar conditions
prevailed in Germany at this time. See the account of the Diet of
Spires (1570) in Janssen, _History of the German People_, VIII, 75 ff.

[1007] Cf. Cheruel, _Histoire de l’administration monarchique de la
France_, I, 196-203; Glasson, _Histoire du droit et des institutions de
la France_, VIII, 170 ff.

[1008] The clergy of Guyenne were so incensed at this prohibition that
they threatened to leave the country (_Archives de la Gironde_, XIII,
183).

[1009] See the case of the magnificence of the house of a Parisian
shoemaker, who had purchased the estate of a king’s treasurer and
enormously enriched himself with gold and silver. Under a pretext the
queen mother secured entrance to the house. Claude Haton, I, 412, gives
a detailed description of its magnificence.

According to an estimate of January 15, 1572, the income from the
“Parties Casuelles,” that is to say, from offices vacated by the death
of particular possessors thereof, and from the “Paulette,” was two
million francs and yet the corruption in the administration was so
great that the King received but a quarter of this amount (Cheruel, I,
208).

[1010] De Thou, V, Book XXXVII, 185; D’Aubigné, II, 224; _C. S. P.
For._, Nos. 343, 344, 347, 387, April 28; May 3-4, 16, 1566; Forneron,
_Hist. des ducs de Guise_, II, 59.

[1011] “On ne sait encore quant on délogera d’icy, combien que les
laboureurs des champs ayent ja faict présenter deux requestes au Roy
pour se retirer et sa suite à Paris jusques à ce que la récolte soit
faict.”—Tronchon to M. de Cordes, July 4, 1567; quoted by the duc
d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de Condé_, I, Appendix XVI.

[1012] “Politique de bascule,” _R. Q. H._, XXVII, 274.

[1013] _C. S. P. For._, No. 275, April 12, 1566.

[1014] It was estimated that, beside footmen, captains, men-at-arms,
there were 20,000 horsemen attached to the various factions (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 470, May-June, 1566).

[1015] _C. S. P. For._, No. 667, August 21, 1566.

[1016] _Ibid._, No. 715, September 14, 1566.

[1017] Hugh Fitzwilliam to Cecil: “The constable is of great authority
with the king and the queen mother; and being mortal enemy to the house
of Guise is with his nephews and the Protestants for his life.”—_C. S.
P. For._, No. 741, October 3, 1566.

[1018] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 515. “A man might easily perceive by the sour
countenance the queen made that she liked not all that he had said.
After he had saluted divers persons the king made him somewhat too
short an answer for so long a demand.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 444, June
1, 1566.

[1019] “The king has made peace with his treasurers for a certain
sum by the constable’s means, whereof something cleaves to his
fingers.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 733, §2, September 28, 1566.

[1020] According to the estimate of this syndicate France had a
population of from fifteen to sixteen millions (_Rel. vén._, III, 149).

[1021] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,111-15, April 18-19, 1567.

[1022] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, IX, 594, 595; Poulet,
I, Introd., l-lii, n. 2; Gachard, _Don Carlos et Philippe II_, I, 303;
_C. S. P. For._, No. 641, August 13, 1566. Coussemaker, _Les troubles
religieux du XVI^[e] siècle dans la Flandre maritime 1560-70_; Van
Velthoven, _Documents pour servir à l’hist. des troubles religieux du
XVI^[e] siècle dans le Brabant_; Verly, _La furie espagnole, 1565-95_;
Kervyn de Lettenhove, _Les Huguenots et les Gueux: Etude hist. sur
vingt-cinq annels du XVI^[e] siècle (1560-1585)_, Bruges, 1883-85, 6
vols.; Poulet, _Correspondance du cardinal de Granvelle_, I, Introd.,
lvii-lxxvi; II, Introd., iv-vii; De Thou, V, 204-37; D’Aubigné, Book
IV, chap. xxi.

[1023] The most notable of these was Francis Junius, who was driven out
of Antwerp. The Spanish ambassador demanded his arrest but the prévôt
de l’hôtel refused, alleging with right that Junius was the ambassador
of the count palatine and entitled to immunity (_Correspondance de
Catherine de Médicis_, II, Introd., cviii).

[1024] On this famous siege of Malta see D’Aubigné, Book IV, chap. xix;
De Thou, Book XXXVIII. It was begun on May 17, 1565.

Mingled with this fear was apprehension lest even the Turk might
become an ally of the Flemings and the Protestant French (Poulet, I,
357, Morillon to Granvelle). That it was not an utterly fantastic
notion of him alone, see the letter of Margaret of Parma to Philip II,
in _Corresp. de Philippe II_, I, No. 411, and Gachard, _Corresp. de
Guillaume le Taciturne_, VI, 408.

[1025] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 259-89; Poulet,
I, 207; Gachard, _La Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris_, I, 88. “Avec
la liberté des consciences, que aulcungs prétendent, nous ne nous
trouverions pas mal si, suyvant l’exemple des François, nous tumbions
aux mesmes inconvenientz.”—Letter of Granvella, April 9, 1566, in
Poulet, I, 209.

[1026] Sir Francis Berty to Cecil: “The Prince of Orange since
Wednesday shows himself openly to take the Gueux part, and divers of
his men wear their badge. This town is marvellously desolated; great
riches are conveyed out, chiefly by strangers.”—_C. S. P. For._, No.
582, July 20, 1566, from Antwerp.

[1027] Poulet, I, 307.

[1028] We know of Montigny’s treason from a dispatch of Granvella to
Philip II, July 18, 1565, in which the cardinal tells the King that
Montigny is still successfully pretending to be a Calvinist and is in
correspondence with the Châtillons and Montmorency. He had already
been at least nine months in the pay of Spain. He got 20 écus per diem
for one job (_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, IX, 404, 595).
Montigny came to Paris ostensibly to attend the wedding of the duke
of Nemours’ son to the admiral’s niece at Easter time. We get a line
on Philip II’s methods at this point, for the Guises themselves were
having secret and treasonable dealings with Spain, yet did not know
of Montigny’s relation to Philip II and treated him with scorn and
contempt (_ibid._; Poulet, I, 329; cf. Finot, _L’espionnage militaire
dans les Pays-Bas entre la France et l’Espagne aux XVI^[e] et XVII^[e]
siècles_).

[1029] Poulet, I, 304; Edward Cook to Cecil: “Montgomery has told
him that the French Protestants are resolved to succour those of
Flanders.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 661, August 18, 1566. This letter
is analyzed in the _Bull. de la comm. roy. d’histoire_, 3^[e] sér., I,
129. Granvella’s confidant in Brussels, the prevost Morillon, wrote
with truth on July 7: “Je croy que si avons mal cest année ce ne sera
du costel de France.”—Poulet, I, 350. Cf. Reiffenberg, _Corresp. de
Marguerite de Parme_, 88; Gachard, _Corresp. de Philippe II_, I, 429,
431, 436; at p. 473 is a letter dated October 15 in Italian from the
duchess of Parma to Philip expressing fear of Huguenot projects.

[1030] Louis of Nassau without doubt was in close connection
with the leading French Protestants. See _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, I, 229; II, 196, 403. It was extremely difficult to
repress the ardor of the Protestants at Valenciennes, owing to its
nearness of the French border and the number of Calvinist preachers
whom the Huguenots sent into the country in June, 1566 (_ibid._, II,
135). For the influx of Calvinist preachers into the country as early
as 1561 see Languet, _Epist. secr._, II, 155. The prince of Condé was
reputed to have sold a tapestry for 9,000 florins, which he gave to the
cause there (Poulet, I, 439).

[1031] Montluc to Bardaxi, October 27, 1564: _Commentaires et lettres
de Montluc_, IV, 368.

[1032] Poulet, I, 64; Reiffenberg, 91; _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, II, 175, 178.

[1033] _Corresp. de Philippe II_, I, 433.

[1034] The government of Charles IX even winked at the secret levies
made by the prince of Condé for the benefit of Louis of Nassau, from
behind the mask of an official repudiation of the complicity of any
French in Flanders, denying that the prince of Condé was ever in
Antwerp in disguise (Poulet, I, 521, 3; Gachard, _La Bibliothèque
Nationale à Paris_, II, 206). The last assertion, of course, was
true. On July 24 a royal proclamation was issued at Alva’s instance,
forbidding French subjects to go into the Low Countries “pour
négotiation ou autrement.”—Poulet, I, 364; Gachard, _op. cit._, II, 27.

[1035] “Hinc illae lachrymae et ille metus,” wrote the provost to
Granvella (Poulet, I, 405). It was the wish of the Emperor that the
King of Spain would go in person and without an army to the Low
Countries in order to pacify it by kindness and not by force (_Archives
de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, II, 505; Raumer, I, 173, December,
1566). But Philip II could not make up his mind to come in person
to the Netherlands, although advised to do so by all. For years he
continued to entertain the thought and continually put it off. See a
letter of the Duchess of Parma to Duke Henry of Brunswick upon the
coming of the duke of Alva, January 1567, in _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 21 ff.

[1036] On April 3, 1565, St. Sulpice sent word to Charles IX that
Philip II had sent Menendez to Florida “avec une bonne flotte et
600 hommes pour combattre _les Français et les passer au fil de
l’épée_.”—_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 364. When Fourquevaux
succeeded him the French government had not yet learned of the
massacre. St. Sulpice’s fragmentary information is to be found at pp.
400, 401, 404, 414. The abortive efforts of France to secure redress
are spread at length in _Corresp. de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 209,
330, 337, 338, 341, 342, 360; and in Fourquevaux, I, Nos. 4-7, 9, 15,
21, 28, 43, 47, 55, 66. The editor’s account in the Introd., xv-xxi
is admirable. In the _Correspondencia española_, II, 126-28, is to be
found Philip II’s letter to Chantonnay, February 28, 1566, in reply to
the ambassador’s letter of advice about Coligny’s enterprise. The blood
of French colonists who had been massacred in Florida cried out for
vengeance, and from the hour of its knowledge the subject of reprisal
was a matter of common talk in the Norman ports (_C.S.P. Dom._, Add.,
XIII, 227). On September 24, 1566, Sir Amyas Paulet, the English
ambassador informed his government that he had information that a
squadron was about to sail for this purpose, although it was “late for
so long a voyage” (_ibid._, 31). On the whole history of this ill-fated
colony see Gaillard, “La reprise de la Floride faite par le capit.
Gourgues (1568),” _Notices et extr. des manuscr. de la Biblioth. Nat._,
IV, and VII (1799); Gourgues, _La reprise de la Floride_, publiée
avec les variantes, sur les MSS de la Bibl. Nat. par Ph. Tamizey de
Larroque, 1867; Gafferel, _Histoire de la Floride française_, 1875;
Parkman, _The French in North America_. The newest literature upon
the subject is Woodbury Lowery, “Jean Ribaut and Queen Elizabeth,”
_American Historical Review_, April, 1904, and the same author’s _The
Spanish Settlements within the Present Limits of the United States:
Florida, 1562-74_ (New York, 1905).

[1037] De Thou, V, 37-40.

[1038] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 381, note.
In 1558 Bolwiller made an inroad into France (_Bulletin des comités
historiques_, 1850, p. 774; a summary of a letter concerning this
episode to be found in the archives of Basel). On Bolwiller see
_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, IX, 36, note. The new plan
was occasioned by the issue of letters-patent of Charles IX on October
9, 1564, forbidding sale or alienation of any regalian rights of the
Three Bishoprics without his consent (text in _Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 394).

[1039] Bolwiller to Granvella, October 16, 1564, on the written
authority of Philip II (_ibid._, VIII, 429).

[1040] “Je tiens que les François, par voye de faict, y (Toul)
mectront la main, comme ilz ont jà commencé, et le mesmes à Metz
et Verdung.”—_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VII, 465;
Granvella to the Emperor, April 12, 1564.

[1041] _Ibid._, VIII, 504-6.

[1042] _Ibid._, IX, 44. Granvella to Perez, February 26, 1565; p. 111,
Philip II to Chantonnay, then stationed at Vienna, April 2, 1565.
Bolwiller intrusted the action to Egelolf, seigneur de Ribeauspierre
(the German form is Rapolstein), a noble of Upper Alsace. His mother
was a Fürstenburg. (See _ibid._, IX, 24, note.) Strange vicissitude,
that a descendant of that house in the next century should have been
Louis XIV’s right-hand agent in his seizures on the Rhine through the
Chambers of Réunion, playing an identically opposite part from that of
his ancestors.

[1043] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, IX, 71—Bolwiller to
the cardinal March 20, 1565.

Metz was early famous for its interest in the Reformation. The laxness
of the episcopal discipline in the first part of the sixteenth century
contributed to the growth of this spirit, and finally led to a Catholic
reaction. The city was more inclined, however, to Calvinism than to
Lutheranism. Charles V prohibited the exercise of the Lutheran faith,
but nevertheless, the Protestants of Metz made an alliance with the
Smalkald League. Under the French domination the city passed definitely
from Lutheranism to Calvinism. The French governor, Vieilleville,
was a moderate in policy and granted the Huguenots a church in the
interior of the town. During the first civil war the Protestants in
Metz remained tranquil, but soon afterward Farel visited the city
for the third time, and thereafter the city’s religious activity was
considerable. The cardinal of Lorraine suppressed Protestant preaching
in the diocese and closed the church. When Charles IX visited Metz in
1564 the edifice was destroyed and Protestant worship was forbidden.
After the death of the Marshal Vieilleville, the count de Retz was made
governor. One of the motives of the support of the Huguenot cause by
John Casimir, the prince palatine, was a promise made by the Huguenots
that he would be given the governorship of Metz. On the subject as
a whole see Thirion, _Etude sur l’histoire du protestantisme à Metz
et dans le pays Messin_, Nancy, 1885; Le Coullon, _Journal (1537-87)
d’après le manuscrit original_, publié pour la première fois et annoté
par E. de Bouteiller, Paris, Dumoulin, 1881.

[1044] _Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, IX, 462, 463.

[1045] Granvella to Perez, October 15, 1565; _ibid._, IX, 594, 595.

[1046] See Philip II’s letter to Chantonnay, October 22, 1565; _ibid._,
IX 609 ff.

[1047] He had served in Italy in 1555 and became the cardinal’s bailiff
and revenue-collector in the bishopric of Metz after the treaty of
Cateau-Cambrésis (_Commentaire et lettres de Montluc_, I, 228).

[1048] For an account of the “Cardinal’s War” see De Thou, V, Book
XXXVII, 37-40. There is another account in the _Mém. de Condé_, V, 27,
supposed to have been written by Salzedo himself. In F. Fr. 3, 197,
folio 92, there is an unpublished letter of Salzedo’s (see Appendix
IX), and another of the duke of Aumale upon this incident. Chantonnay
comforted Philip for the disappointment over Metz by telling him, that
while the restoration of the Three Bishoprics was indeed important,
because of their bearing upon the situation in Flanders, the trouble
had averted a marriage alliance between France and Austria which would
have been more calamitous (Letter to Philip II, October 30, 1565, in
_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, IX, 625).

Two years later we find the tricky cardinal of Lorraine still
protesting his innocence to Catherine and praying her not to be
suspicious of him (Letter of December 6, 1567, Fillon Collection, No.
316).

[1049] Forneron, I, 346, on the basis of Alva’s letter to Philip on May
19, 1566, and the cardinal’s own letter, written at the same time (both
preserved in K. 1,505, No. 99, and K. 1,509), assumes that the secret
intercourse between Philip II and the Guises began in the year 1566
and ascribes the immediate occasion of it to the troubles in the Low
Countries. He missed the inception of it by a year. Granvella’s letter
conclusively shows that it began in July, 1565. Every word of this
letter is of weight. It is to be found in _Papiers d’état du cardinal
de Granvelle_, IX, 399-402.

[1050] Johnson, _Europe in the Sixteenth Century_, 328. For interesting
details by an eye-witness, see Bourgon, _Life and Times of Sir Thomas
Gresham_, II, 121 ff.

[1051] Poulet, I, 509; Gachard, _Don Carlos et Philippe II_, 354; _La
Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris_, II, 213. The disastrous news reached
the King on September 5. For ten days he was ill with a high fever
in consequence. Fourquevaux, writing from Segovia on September 11,
to Charles IX, gives some details of Philip’s illness and how he was
treated by the physicians and then adds: “Les Espagnols sont bien
marriez d’entendre que les Lutheriens dud. pais (Flanders) ont commencé
s’empoigner aux eglises et reliques, et à fere marier les prebtres et
nonnains, avec infiniz autres maulx qu’ilz font, qui est le semblable
commencement des doleurs qui advindrent en votre Royaume du temps des
troubles.”—_Dépêches de M. Fourquevaux_, I, 124, 125.

[1052] The Austrian lands were invaded by the Turks in the autumn of
1566 (_Négociations dans le Levant_, II, 721; Languet, _Epist. secr._,
I, 15).

[1053] It was a pose of Philip’s that the expedition was purely
political; cf. Gachard, _Les bibliothèques de Madrid et de l’Escurial_,
94 ff., based on the correspondence of the archbishop of Rossano.

[1054] Dispatch to Charles IX, December 9, 1566 (Fourquevaux, I,
147-52). He waited in great anxiety for instructions from Paris, daily
growing more suspicious because the Spanish King said not a word to
him on the subject, although he sent for him in audience on January
14, 1567 (_ibid._, 167-72; dispatches of Jan. 5 and 18, 1567). The
tremendous financial operations of the Spanish government (consult
Gachard, _Don Carlos et Philippe II_, II, 369, 370) filled him with
alarm, and he made an unsuccessful effort to bribe the secretary of one
of Philip II’s ministers. He gathered that the Spanish forces would
likely sail for Barcelona and disembark at Nice or Genoa (_ibid._, 176,
177, February 13, 1567).

[1055] Forneron, I, 347, on authority of Alva’s dispatch in K. 1,507,
No. 2; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 527.

[1056] Gachard, _La Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris_, II, 228. The
dispatch was delayed on account of the illness of the courier and
the heavy snows he encountered in the Pyrenees, and did not reach
the ambassador until January 15, 1567 (Fourquevaux, I, 168). The
correspondence of Bernardo d’Aspremont, viscount of Orthez, governor
of Bayonne—unfortunately much scattered in the volumes of the
Bibliothèque Nationale—shows the standing danger the southern
provinces of France were in from Spanish invasion (_Commentaires et
lettres de Montluc_, III, 400, note).

[1057] Poulet, II, 183.

[1058] D’Aubigné, II, 229, note.

[1059] Poulet, II, 495.

[1060] D’Aubigné, II, 228; Zurlauben, _Hist. milit. des Suisses_, IV,
335.

[1061] We learn this from a letter of George Paulet. See Appendix X.

[1062] Poulet, II, 183; _Dépêches de M. Fourquevaux_, I, 173.

[1063] _Dépêches de M. Fourquevaux_, I, 174, February 4, 1567. Philip
II took these military preparations of the French with remarkable
equanimity—even Charles IX’s positive refusal to allow the Spanish
army to traverse France (March 24, 1567). He seemed to be sincerely
anxious to avoid friction with France (see his letter to Granvella,
February 17, 1567, in Poulet, II, 255, 256). The danger in the
Low Countries was too great to allow any outside controversy. The
clandestine operation of Protestant preachers in Spain itself and the
smuggling of heretical books into the land, concealed in casks of wine,
disquieted him more than France did at this season. (For information on
this head see Poulet, II, 126, 142, 199; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 506; Weiss,
_Spanish Protestants in the Sixteenth Century_.)

[1064] Fourquevaux (February 15, 1567), I, 180, 181. Granvella
apparently, immediately after learning of the image breaking, and
anticipating that either the King himself or the duke of Alva, would
have to go to Brussels, sent a remarkable memoir to Philip II, in which
he discusses all the various routes by which he might go, and the
advantages and disadvantages of each of them. The physical difficulties
of governing the Low Countries from Madrid are very evident (see
Poulet, I, 469-80).

[1065] The Pope’s nuncio had pointed out to Philip II what a splendid
achievement the overcoming of Geneva would be for Christendom. The
scheme was an old one. See a letter of Pius IV to Francis II, June
14, 1560, in Raynaldus, XXXIV, 64, col. 2. The King, after some weeks
of consideration, declared that he could not think of it; that even
the duke of Savoy was against the project. (See Gachard, _Corresp.
de Philippe II_, II, 552, and his _Les bibliothèques de Madrid et de
l’Escurial_, 100.) On the political ambition of the duke of Savoy see
_Rel. vén._, I, 453. He had made a treaty with Bern in 1565 (Collection
Godefroy, XCIV, fol. 21). There are three excellent German monographs
on Switzerland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Planta, _Die
Geschichte von Graubunden in ihren Hauptzügen_, Bern, 1892; _idem_,
_Chronik der Familie von Planta_, Zurich, 1892; Salis-Soglio, _Die
Familie von Salis_, Lincau-im-B., 1891. For a review of the last two
see _English Historical Review_, VIII, 588.

[1066] See _Revue d’histoire diplomatique_, XIV (1900), 45-47.

[1067] “Mais le faisant, c’estoit remectre le feu et le glaive dans
la France plus et plus cruel qu’ilz n’y ont esté.”—_Dépêches de M.
Fourquevaux_ (March 15, 1567), I, 189.

[1068] I have given the figures of Mendoza, which probably is the
strength of the forces when they arrived. The official roster is in the
_Correspondencia_, No. CXXII.

[1069] “The front of every company by a new invention was flanked with
fifteen supernumeraries, armed with musketoones, and rests wherein they
laid the barrow that could not be managed by the hands. For before his
time, such huge muskets as unmanageable were drawn upon carriages and
only used at sieges, from whence being transmitted into the field, and
those that carry them mixed with the lesser musketeers, they have been
found extraordinarily serviceable in battle.”—Stapylton’s transl. of
Strada, Book VI, 31.

Brantôme’s statement is more graphic: “Il fut luy le premier qui leur
donna en main les gros mousquetz, et que l’on veid les premiers en
guerre et parmy les compagnies; et n’en avions point veu encores parmy
leurs bandes, lors que nous allasmes pour le secours de Malte; dont
despuis nous en avons pris l’usage parmy nos bandes, mais avec de
grandes difficultéz à y accoustumer nos soldats comme j’en parle au
livre des couronnelz. Et ces mousquetz estonnzarent fort les Flamans,
quand ilz les sentirent sonner à leurs oreilles; car ilz n’en avoient
veu non plus que nous: et ceux qui les portoient les nommoit-on
Mousquetaires; très bien appoinctéz et respectéz, jusques à avoir de
grands et forts gojatz qui les leur portoient, et avoient quatre ducats
de paye; et ne leur portoient qu’en cheminant par pays: mais quand ce
venoit en une faction, ou marchans en battaille, ou entrans en garde
ou en quelque ville, les prenoient. Et eussiez dict que c’estoient des
princes, tant ils estoient rogues et marchoient arrogamment et de belle
grace: et lors de quelque combat ou escarmouche, vous eussiez ouy crier
ces mots par grand respect: _Salgan, salgan los mosqueteros! Afuera,
afuera, adelante los mosqueteros!_ Soudain on leur faisoit place; et
estoient respectéz, voire plus que capitaines pour lors, à cause de
la nouveauté, ainsy que toute nouveauté plaist.”—Brantôme, _Vies des
Grands Capitaines_: “Le Grand Duc d’Albe.”

[1070] Mendoza, _Comentarios_, II, chaps. i-iii. There is a French
translation of this work by Loumier (Soc. de l’histoire de Belge), 2
vols., 1860.

[1071] “The duke arrived in the Low Countries offending none in his
passage nor being himself offended by any one, though the French
appeared in arms upon the marches of Burgundy and Colonel Tavannes
by command from the French king with 4,000 foot and some troops were
defence of course of the borders, ‘costed’ the Spanish army. Indeed I
do not think that ever army marched so far and kept stricter rules of
discipline, so that from Italy even to the Low Countries, not only no
towns but not any cottage was forced or injured.”—Strada, VI, 31.

The only instance of plundering seems to have been in the case of
the property of the prince of Orange in Burgundy (_C. S. P. For._,
1562, August 7, 1567). This discipline is all the more remarkable,
considering the fact that there were fifteen hundred women with the
army. “Lon a sceu le passaige du duc d’Albe et de sa trouppe; quon dict
estre de six mille espaignolz et quinze cens femmes.”—Guyon to M. de
Gordes, July 11, 1567. Cited by the duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes
de Condé_, I, Appendix XVI.

[1072] Poulet, II, 183, December 25, 1566.

[1073] Morillon to Granvella, April 7, 1566: “Pas ce boult veult l’on
gaigner le magistrat des villes et le peuple: que ne sera si facille
comme l’on pense.”—Poulet, I, 203. The following is explicit: “Et
dict encores plus que, s’il se fust joinct à la première lighe des
seigneurs, la religion fust bien avant venue, car de là, dict-il,
‘tanquam ex fonte emanasse has undas,’ et que le Roy le doibt entendri
ainse et y pourveoir avant toutte euvre, puisque de celle là est née la
seconde de la religion.”—Poulet, II, 75. Cf. 118: “la première lighe
et la secunde engendrée d’icelle.”—Granvella to Viglius, November
23, 1566. As late as May 9, 1567, it is called “la gentille ligue”
(Poulet, II, 434). Granvella, in a letter to Philip in 1563, attributed
the formation of the association to Count Hoorne (_Papiers d’état du
cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 12). Noircarmes, who was better informed,
makes Brederode the moving spirit of it (Poulet, II, 613, 614).

The Gueux even had a branch organization, though one historically
different in origin, in Franche Comté, in the Confrérie de Ste. Barbe.
The seigneurs of the house of Rye enjoyed high civil and ecclesiastical
station in both Burgundies in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Marc and Claude François of Rye, father and son, were rivals and
political enemies of the Perrenots—the family of Granvella and
Chantonnay—and regarded them as upstarts. The Confrérie de Ste. Barbe
was organized by them in Franche Comté on lines similar to the Gueux
and had dealings with the latter—the members even wearing their
emblem. Cardinal Granvella accused the seigneurs of Rye of aiming to
establish Protestantism, in Franche Comté from Flanders. This probably
was true but in a less degree. Protestant agitation was a means to
an end, not an end in itself, it seems to me. If otherwise, such a
_catholic_ title for the association is very singular. On the Confrérie
de Ste. Barbe consult Poulet, I, 29; II, 44, 141. I am somewhat
inclined to think that Tavanne’s Confraternity of the Holy Spirit in
ducal Burgundy may not impossibly have been influenced by the Confrérie
de Ste. Barbe in the adjoining county of Burgundy, for Tavannes had a
long political conflict with the Parlement of Dôle in Franche-Comté
(see Collection Godefroy, CCLVII, Nos. 22, 23), and was familiar with
things there.

[1074] Poulet, I, 223.

[1075] _Ibid._, II, 269. This revised form of the Gueux in which
Calvinism is interjected is often alluded to as the “second league” in
the letters which pass between Granvella and the provost Morillon, e.
g., _ibid._, 280, 437, 600.

[1076] Poulet, II, 42.

[1077] For some examples see _ibid._, 183.

[1078] This organization seems to have been perfected by February,
1567. Poulet, II, 244, has a brief note on this matter. For an
extended article see _Bulletin historique et littéraire de la société
de l’hist. du protestantisme Français_, March, 1879. Cf. Gachard,
_Corresp. de Guill. le Taciturne_, II, cx, cxi, and notes. Marnix was
treasurer-general of the confederation (Poulet, II, 262, n. 1).

[1079] Poulet, II, 335, 336, 396. “Sine qua factum nihil,” wrote the
provost, whose conception of government was Draconian in simplicity, to
his confidential friend (_ibid._, 353).

[1080] _Ibid._, 469 and 508.

[1081] _Ibid._, 396, 438.

[1082] See Gachard, _Corresp. de Philippe II_, 461, 471, 473; Poulet,
I, 461, 521; II, 102, 106, 139, 143, 187, 394, 440, 451, 659, 675.

[1083] Morillon to Granvella, August 31, 1567, in Poulet, II, 605:
“La première chose que l’on doibt faire sera de munir et asseurer les
frontières et renvoier chascun à son gouvernement, d’aultant que les
François semblent voulloir esmouvoir, du moingz les Hugonaux.” The
cardinal had advised the duke of Alva to do this in the May preceding,
when he was at Genoa on his way northward (Poulet, II, 448, 454).

Montluc’s repeated warnings to Philip II, in the course of their
secret correspondence, of the succor French Calvinists were giving to
his Flemish rebels (K. 1,506, Nos. 46-48) led the King to enlarge the
system of espionage which he maintained in France. The movements of
the admiral, the prince of Condé, and other leaders, were carefully
reported (_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 75, note). On the
whole practice see Forneron, I, chap. xi.

[1084] Mundt to Cecil from Strasburg, July 8, 1567 (_C. S. P. For._,
No. 1,418).

[1085] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., v.

[1086] Fourquevaux (July 17, 1567), I, 237. St. Sulpice had held
similar language in 1564: “Le meilleur moyen pour le prince
d’avoir la paix est d’être toujours en état de repousser ses
voisins.”—_L’Ambassade de. St. Sulpice_, 269.

[1087] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,402, July 6, 1567. Sir Henry Norris
writes to Cecil on March 25, 1567: “A better time than this could not
be found to demand Calais, they being in such distrust of their own
force, wherefore it might be understood that some preparation of arms
was making in England.”—_Ibid._, No. 1,048. A year earlier than this
Cecil had been advised to make common cause with the Emperor, the one
to recover the Three Bishoprics, the other Calais (_ibid._, No. 326,
April 29, 1566; cf. _ibid._, _Ven._, 394, July 3, 1567). There is a
brief account of the negotiations in _Bulletins de la Comm. royale
d’histoire_, séries IV, Vol. V, 386 ff. Cf. _C. S. P. For._ (1587),
Nos. 1039, 1044, 1046, 1083.

[1088] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., iii; _C.
S. P. Ven._, Nos. 389, May 16, 1567.

[1089] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, Introd., iv.

[1090] “The prince of Condé wrote to the queen mother against the
king’s revoking the edict of pacification, who assured him on the faith
of a princess that as long as she might prevail, she should never break
it, and if he came to court, he would be as welcome as his heart could
devise, and as for the _Swiss_ they were _to defend the frontiers_ in
case the Spanish forces should attempt to surprise any peace.”—Norris
to Queen Elizabeth, August 29, 1567, _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,644.
Catherine de Medici ordered the dispersal of the Huguenot bands on the
Picard border in 1567 (_R. Q. H._, January, 1899, p. 21).

[1091] The words are from a letter of Sir Henry Norris to the earl
of Leicester in _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,537, July 21, 1567, and sound
like a paraphrase of the admiral’s language. The implication is that
Coligny’s withdrawal had some connection with the purported stealing of
Alava’s cipher in the May before. See _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,230, May
24, 1567. But according to Fourquevaux, I, 227, the Spanish ambassador
accused Catherine de Medici of the stealing, _not_ Coligny. If this
be true, then Coligny must have wanted to find a pretext for leaving
the court without arousing the suspicion or animosity of the King,
as might have been the case if he had done so openly out of sympathy
for the prince of Condé. Claude Haton, I, 406, says that Coligny
was piqued because Strozzi was given the command of the new forces
instead of himself. The prince of Condé retired to Valéry, Coligny to
Châtillon. D’Andelot soon afterward followed suit, resigning his post
as colonel-general of infantry on the ground that the marshal Cossé
refused to obey his orders, and retired to Tanlay near Tonnerre. The
fine château is still standing.

Thenceforward it was of interest to the prince to stir up doubt and
distrust among the Huguenots by misrepresenting the true reasons for
the crown’s military preparation (_Correspondance de Catherine de
Médicis_, III, Introd., vi; _C. S. P. For._, _anno_ 1567, p. 305).

[1092] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,629, August 23, 1567.

[1093] Claude Haton, I, 405.

[1094] _C. S. P. Ven._, July 12, 1567.

[1095] La Popelinière, XI, 36, 37.

[1096] See Rosseeuw-Saint-Hilaire, “Le duc d’Albe en Flandre. Procès
des comtes d’Egmont et de Hornes (1567-1568),” _Séances et travaux
de l’Acad. des sc. moral et polit._, 4^[e] sér., XVI (LXVI^[e] de la
collect.), 1863, p. 480.

[1097] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,155, May 1, 1567.

[1098] D’Aubigné, I, Book IV, chap. vii.

[1099] This château was a gift to the prince of Condé by the widow of
marshal St. André, who was infatuated with him. After the prince’s
second marriage she wedded Geoffrey de Caumont (Claude Haton, I, 363).
See also Clément-Simon, _La Maréchale de Saint-André et ses filles_,
Paris, 1896.

[1100] The rendezvous was at Rosay-en-Brie (La Popelinière, Book XII,
37; D’Aubigné, IV, chap, vii; Claude Haton, I, 424, 425).

[1101] The Venetian ambassador Correro, in his relation of the
conspiracy, expresses astonishment that the secret of the Huguenot
leaders did not leak out, and attributes the fact to the perfection of
the Protestant organization (quoted by La Ferrière in _Correspondance
de Catherine de Médicis_, III, ix). It seems to me that this feature
was less due to perfect organization than to the promptitude with which
Condé and Coligny endeavored to carry out the project. The lesson
of the conspiracy of Amboise seven years before could not have been
lost upon them. Moreover, the queen mother did have some intimation,
notwithstanding her surprise when the shock came. For on September 10,
while the court was staying at Monceaux, some armed bands of horsemen
were seen hovering around, which caused the King’s hasty removal to
Meaux (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,683, September 13, 1567, Norris to
Leicester). From that hour Catherine was on the alert, though she
refused to attach alarmist importance to the signs she had seen until
her eyes were opened.

[1102] Claude Haton, I, 434.

[1103] Zurlauben, _Hist. milit. des Suisses_, IV, 351; Laugel,
“Les régimens suisses au service de France pendant les guerres, de
religion,” _Revue des deux mondes_, November 15, 1880, pp. 332 ff.
Pfiffer had served in France during the first civil war and was made a
colonel after the battle of Dreux. There is a life of him in German by
Segesser, _Ludwig Pfyffer und seine Zeit_, Bern, 1880. Other versions
of this incident are in D’Aubigné, II, 230-32; Claude Haton, I, 428,
429; Castelnau, VI, chap. iv; De Thou, Book XLII; _Nég. Tosc._, III,
530. La Popelinière, XII, 38, 39, gives a good account of the behavior
of the Swiss. The duke of Bouillon, an eye-witness of these incidents,
has left a striking account in his _Mémoires_, ed. Petitot, 75.

[1104] For Charles IX’s own version of the affair of Meaux see a letter
of the King to the baron de Gordes, begun at Meaux and finished at
Paris, September 28, 1567, in Duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de
Condé_, I, Appendix XXII. His letter to Montluc of the same date is in
_Archives de la Gironde_, X, 437.

[1105] _Rel. vén._, II, 187.

[1106] The Guises made capital out of the event of Meaux and sedulously
exploited the King’s animosity. Martin, _Histoire de France_, IX, 216,
suggests that Charles IX’s conduct on St. Bartholomew’s Day may have
been influenced by this episode.

[1107] _Rel. vén._, II, 112, 113.

[1108] “Discipline of the Reformed Churches in France Received and
Enacted by Their First National Synod at Paris in 1559,” chap. vii,
canon 1, published in Quick, _Synodicon in Gallia_, 2 vols., London,
1692.

The first consistorial regulation which we possess has been published
by the Protestant pastor, Eugene Arnaud, from a manuscript at Grenoble.
It bears the title “Articles Polytiques par l’Eglise Réformée selon le
S. Evangile, fait à Poitiers 1557.” See _Synode général de Poitiers
1557_, _Synodes provinciaux de Lyon, Die, Peyraud, Montelimar et Nîmes
en 1561 et 1562_, _assemblée des Etats du Dauphiné en 1563_, _etc._,
par E. Arnaud. Grenoble, ed. Allier, 1872, 91 pages.

At the synod of Lyons (1563) the canons of the three preceding national
synods held at Paris, Poitiers, and Orleans, were reduced to a single
series of articles. The deliberations of most of the provincial synods
still remain in manuscript or are lost (Frossard, _Etude historique et
bibliographique sur la discipline ecclésiastique des églises réformées
de France_, 18).

[1109] Chap. vi, canon 1.

[1110] Chap. viii, canon 2. Chap. v, canon 1, provides that “a
consistory shall be made up of those who govern it (the individual
churches), to-wit, of its pastors and elders.” In some cases deacons
discharged the elder’s office (chap. v, canon 2).

[1111] Chap. viii, canon 8. Elders were elected by the joint suffrage
of pastor and people, upon oral nomination (chap. iii, canon 1).

[1112] Chap. viii, canon 9.

[1113] Chap. viii, canon 14.

[1114] Chap. viii, canon 15.

[1115] The synod of Nîmes in 1572 also divided Normandy into two
provinces (_Synodicon in Gallia_, I, 111, 112). At the same time Metz
was annexed to Champagne.

[1116] _Rel. vén._, II, 115, and n. B; _Commentaires et lettres de
Montluc_, II, Book V, 338; L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice, 107; _Mémoires
de Philippi_, 360, col. 1 (ed. Buchon); Collection Godefroy, CCLVII,
No. 46; Claude Haton, I, 425.

[1117] The democratic revolutionary character of the Huguenot movement
in Guyenne probably owes some of its intensity to the memory of the
revolt of 1548 and the merciless suppression thereof (observation of
M. Henri Hauser, _Rev. hist._, XCVII (March-April, 1908), 341, n. 6, a
review of Courteault _Blaise de Montluc_).

[1118] “Temevano prima i cattolici, non perchè fossero inferiori di
numero (che ... del popolo minuto non vi è la trigesima parte ugonotta;
la nobilita è più infetta; e s’io dicessi di un terzo, forse non
fallirei); ma perchè questi; sebben pochi, erano però uniti, concordi,
e vigilantissimi nelle loro cose.”—_Rel. vén._, II, 120.

The Huguenots fired guns instead of ringing bells as a signal of alarm
(_ibid._, 107). The _tocsin_, even before St. Bartholomew, was the
Catholic signal.

[1119] _Rel. vén._, II, 115.

[1120] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, I, 552; Ranke, _Civil
Wars and Monarchy in France_, 287; Forneron, _Les ducs de Guise_, II,
221; Anquetil, _Histoire des assemblées politiques des réformes de
France_, I, 18.

[1121] Forneron, II, 164 ff.; _Hist. de Languedoc_, V, 543, 544;
Armstrong, “The Political Theories of the Huguenots,” _English
Historical Review_, IV, 13; Merriam, _History of the Theory of
Sovereignty since Rousseau_, 13-15; Beaudrillart, _Jean Bodin et son
temps_.

[1122] “Si le roy tenoit sa loy, le royaulme en seroit mieulx régy et
gouverné, les antiens, qui ont tenu les concilles, ont bien regardé à
cella quant ilz ont uny nostre foy avec la continuation de la monarchie
des princes, car ilz ont bien poysé que le peuple, qui est gouverné
sous ung monarque, est beaucoup plus assuré et tenu en la craincté de
Dieu et à l’obéyssance qu’il doibt porter à son roy, que non celluy
qui est soubz une républicque, en laquelle sa loy admene tout le monde
et destruict les monarchies. Qui me voldra nyer que le roy prent ceste
loy qu’il ne faille que sa personne mesmes et son royaulme soit régy
et gouverné par les gens qui auront esté esleuz par les estatz, qui
sera son conseil sans lequel le roy ne pourra faire chose aucune.
Et s’il veult une chose et le conseil une aultre, le pays ne fera
sinon ce que le conseil ordonnera, parce qu’il aura esté (esleu) par
les estatz; et si le roy mesmes veult quelque chose pour luy ou pour
aultre, fauldra que, le bonnet à la main, il le viegne demander à son
conseil et les prier, là où en nostre loy il commende au conseil et à
tous, tant que nous sommes. Que l’on regarde dès ceste genre ce que
se faict en Angleterre et en Escosse, et si ce n’est plustost manière
d’aristocracie ou de démocracie que non de monarchie. Et quand le
roy sera grand, il voldra demander sa liberté, laquelle ne luy sera
concédée et s’il faict semblant de la voloir avoir par force, son
conseil mesmes luy couppera la guorge et feront un aultre roy à leur
plaisir.”—_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 297, 298 (December
1563). The baron de Ruble, in a note remarks: “Nulle part peut-être,
pas même dans les écrits de François Hotman et de Bodin, les réformes
politiques que promettait le calvinisme ne sont exposées avec autant de
clarté que dans ce mémoire de Monluc.”

[1123] Paulet to Cecil, October 13, 1567; _C. S. P. Dom._, Add.

[1124] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 549. On September 29, 1567, permission was
given the populace of Paris to arm themselves.—Lettres patentes du Roy
Charles IX pour l’establissement des capitaines de la ville de Paris
et permission aux citizens d’icelle de prendre les armes. Felibien,
_Histoire de Paris_, III, 703, 704.

[1125] La Popelinière, XII, 39; Claude Haton, I, 439; La Noue, chap.
xiv; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,427, September 30, 1567. Norris gives the
names of the towns taken by the prince of Condé’s forces.—_State
Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, Vol. XCIV No. 1,338. See Appendix XI.
According to Baschet, _La diplomatie vénitienne_, 543 and note, the
prince of Condé planned to burn Paris.

[1126] La Popelinière, Book XII, 51, 51 _bis_. The slaughter at the
bridge was terrible. The King’s captain and the color-bearer, who
managed to escape to Paris, were hanged by Charles IX.—_C. S. P.
For._, No. 1,804, November 2, 1567.

[1127] _Ibid._, No. 1,763, October 14, 1567.

[1128] Claude Haton, I, 444-46.

[1129] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 407, October 18, 1567.

[1130] Claude Haton, I, 439-45, and La Noue, chap. xvi, give some
graphic details.

[1131] Claude Haton, I, 444, 445.

[1132] “Ordonnance du Roy, portant permission à toutes personnes,
d’apporter, et faire apporter, conduire et amener à Paris, tant
par eau que par terre, toutes espèces de vivres, bleds, vins et
autres; sans payer pour iceux aucunes daces, subsides, ou imposition
quelconques.”—Paris, R. Estienne, 1567.

[1133] “Lettre addressée aux échevins de Rouen par un de leurs
délégués,” _Bulletin de la Société de l’histoire de Normandie_,
1875-80, p. 279. The whole letter is of interest.

[1134] Alva’s reply October 24, 1567, is in _Correspondance de Philippe
II_, II, 594. Cf. Gachard, _La Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris_, I, 395;
II, 459; and _Histoire des troubles des Pays-Bas_, ed. Piot, I, 293
(chap. xlvi).

[1135] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,789, October 27, 1567.

[1136] These demands were presented in writing to the queen’s
emissaries. De Thou, Book XLII; Claude Haton, I, 447; D’Aubigné, II,
232-34, have summarized them. La Popelinière, Book XII, 41-43 gives
the text. There is a monograph by Baguenault de Puchesse: _Jean de
Morvillier, évêque d’Orléans: Etude sur la politique française au XVI^[e]
siècle, d’après des documents inédits_, Didier, Paris, 1870.

[1137] La Popelinière, Book XII, 50 _bis_; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,856,
October 10, 1567.

[1138] Davila, I, 195.

[1139] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,777, October 22, 1567.

[1140] A list of officers and the number of horsemen commanded by each
who were sent to the king of France by the duke of Savoy.—_C. S. P.
For._, No. 1,735, September, 1567.

[1141] He wrote to Philip II, to Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, and the
Venetian government urging them to succor Charles IX “against the
rebels and heretics” within his kingdom, and to the duke of Lorraine
to stop the reiters.—Potter, _Lettres de St. Pie V sur les affaires
religieuses de son temps en France_, Paris, 1828. To Philip II, October
13, 1567—Potter, p. 1 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 22, p. 50); to the duke
of Savoy, October 18, 1567—Potter, p. 8 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 25,
p. 54); to Priuli, Venetian ambassador in France, October 18—Potter,
p. 6 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 24, p. 53). At the same time the Pope
wrote to the duke of Nevers in terms of rejoicing that Charles IX had
escaped at Meaux.—Potter, p. 3 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 23, p. 51),
October 16, 1567. Within a month the Pope’s word began to be made good,
for 10,000 pieces of gold were en route to France in the middle of
November.—Potter, p. 10 (ed. Gouban, Book I, No. 26, p. 56), letter
to the duke of Savoy of November 16, 1567. In it the Pope says he has
written the duke of Lorraine to stop the reiters about to enter France.

[1142] The question of payment of the Swiss still remained to be
settled and Charles IX was at his wits’ end and actually offered
a mortgage of his frontier towns, save Lyons and the frontier of
Burgundy, paying 5 per cent. interest in order to quiet the importunate
demands of the cantons.—_Revue d’histoire diplomatique_, XIV (1900),
49, 50.

[1143] Request of Charles IX to the bishop of Mainz to permit the
reiters to pass, December 9, 1567.—Coll. Godefroy, CCLVI, No. 4. John
Casimir, second son of the elector palatine, Frederick III, levied
troops for the Protestants. When protest was made against this action,
he gave an evasive reply. See Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 27; _Archives
de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, II, 163, 164; La Noue, ed. 1596, p. 897.

On the other hand the landgrave was hostile to the prince of Condé
and was fearful also of compromising himself with the Emperor and
Spain.—_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 128, 164;
Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 35.

[1144] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, December 15, 1567.

[1145] This is shown by a passage in which the elector of Saxony makes
mention of an alliance which the French nobles had offered (_Archives
de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 131, 134). Although the prince
of Condé in December declared that he had not entered into a treaty
with the Flemish Calvinists (_ibid._, 143), it is probable that these
proposals were accepted some months later. There is in existence the
minute of a treaty with Condé and Coligny dated August, 1568 (_ibid._,
III, No. 321, p. 285).

[1146] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,756, October 10, 1567.

[1147] La Popelinière, XII, 52 _bis_; D’Aubigné II, 236. La Noue
himself, with characteristic modesty, scarcely mentions this feat.

[1148] “Journal de Lépaulart relig. du monastère de
Saint-Crepin-le-Grand de Soissons, sur la prise de cette ville par les
Huguenots en 1567,” _Bull. d. Soc. arch._, XIV (Soissons, 1860).

[1149] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,804, November 2, 1567. Metz was captured
late in October by the Huguenots, but not the citadel.

[1150] _Ibid._, No. 1,822, November 16, 1567.

[1151] La Popelinière, XII, 52.

[1152] On the identity and career of Robert Stuart, see Claude Haton,
I, 458, n. 2.

[1153] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 410, November 11, 1567. Montmorency
lingered two days and died on November 12.

[1154] There are accounts of the battle of St. Denis in La Noue,
_Mémoires_, chap. xiv; _Mém. du duc de Bouillon_, 379; D’Aubigné, Book
IV, chap. ix; Claude Haton, I, 457; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 551 ff. The
editor has subjoined a note (2) giving the literature of the subject.

[1155] Claude Haton, I, 495; _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_,
III, Introd., xv.

The duke of Guise was criticized for not having pursued the Huguenots
more hotly and cut the road by Charenton, or Corbeil, or at the ford
of Lagny, which might have been done, for their army was in great
disorder and depressed on account of the losses which it had suffered.
The reason of the delay is probably to be found in the fact that the
breach between the Guises and the Montmorencys was wider than ever at
this moment. For the duke of Montpensier and the duke of Montmorency
each claimed command of the vanguard. The King finally decided in favor
of the former, whereupon Montmorency laid down his command. See Claude
Haton, I, 461, 462 and note; _Bulletin de la Societé d’histoire de
Normandie_, 1875-80, p. 279; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,833, November 24;
No. 1,837, November 29, 1567; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 557.

[1156] Claude Haton, I, 495 and note.

[1157] The admiral sent Teligny to the King on November 13 for this
purpose.—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,822, November 16, 1567; cf. No. 1,836.
We know, from a letter of Charles IX to his brother, what the King’s
terms would have been: (1) in the case of nobles, authorization of
Protestant worship to those possessed of high justice or possessors of
“pleins fiefs de haubert” i. e., fiefs that were noble, yet did not
confer title, provided it were conducted within their own dwellings
in the presence of their families and not more than fifty outside
persons, and without arms; (2) absolute limitation of other worship to
the places specifically granted in the edict of Amboise; (3) surrender
of places and property seized by the Huguenots; (4) suppression of the
Protestant cult within the walls of Lyons, but permission to worship
at two leagues’ distance from the city; (5) interdiction of levies
of money or men in the future and the discontinuance of Protestant
associations and synods.—_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II,
Introd., xiv. It is a very remarkable fact that these precise terms had
been recommended to Charles IX as a basis of settlement by Montluc in a
memoir sent to the King in February 1565. See _Commentaires et lettres
de Montluc_, V, 3-9. Montluc made the further recommendation that the
governments be divided by _sénéchaussées_ instead of by rivers, on the
ground that rivers sometimes divided towns into two jurisdictions. His
friction with Damville (cf. _ibid._, 103-6) probably accounts for the
proposed change. Montluc also advised abolition of the _vice-sénéchaux_
(_ibid._, 8).

[1158] See the proclamation of Charles IX commanding the provost Paris
to search out all gentlemen who have retired to their homes since the
battle of St. Denis; and ordering them to return to the army under
pain of forfeiture of their fiefs and property. Printed in Appendix
XII. In the second part of _Coll. de St. Pétersbourg_, Vol. XXI, is
a group of letters from Charles IX to the duke of Anjou running from
December 2, 1567. In every page the question of the military operations
of the second civil war comes up. It is evident that the gentlemen of
the _maison du roi_ complained loudly of the service required of them,
especially because they were so ill lodged.—La Ferrière, _Deux ans de
mission à St. Pétersbourg_, 24.

[1159] During the occupation of the army all Protestant children who
had been baptized in the Reformed religion by preachers were rebaptized
according to the rites of the Roman religion, and godfathers and
godmothers were given them and new names which were approved by the
church.—Claude Haton, I, 512 and note.

[1160] Claude Haton, I, 504-12.

[1161] On December 6 he published a declaration in favor of the
Huguenots.—_Bulletin de la Société du prot. franç._ XVI, 118. See also
_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,920, the elector to Charles IX, January 4, 1568.

[1162] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,911, from the camp at Dessay, January 3,
1568.

[1163] _Ibid._, No. 1,806, November 3, 1567; No. 1,864 § 2, December
15, 1567. His resolution to assist the Huguenots led to the dismissal
of his ambassador at the French court on December 17th.—_Ibid._, No.
1,889. In _ibid._, No. 1,956 there is an abstract of a long letter
of the elector palatine written to Charles IX in remonstrance of the
action of the King, and in justification of his own course.

[1164] A meeting of the electors was called for January 6, 1568, at
Fulda, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing German enrolments
for the war in France, but in reality that the Emperor might broach
the possibility of recovering the Three Bishoprics.—Mundt to Cecil,
January 6, 1568 in _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,927. I cannot understand how
Hubert Languet could have fallen into the error of thinking that the
queen mother made no opposition to the enlistment of troops in Germany
for the Huguenot cause, as he says in _Epp. Arc._, I, 43. The statement
puzzled Ranke (p. 233) who left it unsolved. The dispatch of Norris
in _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, December 15, 1567, to the effect that
Lignerolles was sent to Germany by the queen for this purpose clears
up the matter. Catherine’s correspondence fails us on this head. But
it is well known that many of her letters are scattered in private
collections and were not procurable by La Ferrière.

[1165] Alva had no flattering opinion of the cardinal of Lorraine.
In 1572 he wrote to Philip II: “Quand en faveur il est insolent et
ne se souvient de personne, tandis que, quand il est en disgrace, il
n’est bon à rien.”—Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les
Pays-Bas_, II, 267.

[1166] Gachard, _ibid._, I, 593, 594, Alva to Philip, November 1, 1567.
On the margin of this dispatch Philip wrote this piece of casuistry
with his own hand: “Me parece muy bien que hiziese lo que aqui dice, y
tanto mas que aquello no hera romper la paz, pues yo no la hizé, ni la
tengo, sino con el rey de Francia, y no con sus vasallos ereges, como
seria, si esto se hiziese no estando él libre, como aqui se dice.”

[1167] “En caso de muerte del rey y de sus hermanos, tomarse ya la voz
que el cardinal dize de rey de Francia para V. M., por el derecho de
la reyna nuestra señora; que la ley salica, que dizen, es baya, y las
armas la allanarian” (_ibid._, 594).

[1168] “Esto es el punto en que me parece que ay mas que mirar, porqué
esto se podria mal hazer sin romper; y por otra parte, parece que seria
duro dexar de abrazar á quien por tal causa se pone en mys manos; y
pues creo que por este caso avra tiempo, qu’él me avise de su parecer
sobre ello, segun allá estubienen las cosas.”—Gachard, _loc. cit._

[1169] Philip II approved this.—Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe
II_, I, 598: to Alva, November 12, 1567.

[1170] Gachard, I, 606-7, from Paris, December 4, 1567; _Correspondance
de Catherine de Médicis_, Letter CLII; _Correspondance de Philippe II_,
I, 605-7. The queen mother seems to have been frightened after the
battle of St. Denis for she disclaims blame in advance, “before God and
all the Christian princes,” if, in default of help, she be forced to
make peace with the prince of Condé. At about the same time, she also
wrote to Philip II in the same strain (quoted in part by Forneron, I,
348 from K. 1,507, No. 29). I do not find that this letter has been
printed.

[1171] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, II, 62.

[1172] Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, I,
608.

[1173] “Porqué seria mala burla yr á meter fuego en casa agena,
començandose á arder la propria.”—_Ibid._, 597: Alva to Philip II,
November 6, 1567.

[1174] It was à propos of Catherine de Medici’s weakness at this time
that the marshal Vieilleville bluntly said to Charles IX.: “Ce n’est
point Votre Majesté qui a gagné la bataille [of St. Denis]; encore
moins le prince de Condé. C’est le roi d’Espagne.”—Weiss, _L’Espagne
sous Philippe II_, I, 119.

[1175] On the military state of Sens at this time see Charles IX’s
postscript to his mother’s letter to Fourquevaux of December 7 in
_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, 89, note.

[1176] Norris, writing to Queen Elizabeth on December 15, in one place
says, “the reiters are 4,000 with 4,000 lansquenets” (§2); later
in the course of the same letter, which is a long one and probably
the information of several days running, he says, “6,800 with 6,000
lansquenets” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, December 15, 1567). This
seems to be confirmed by another report from France, December 26, which
says “the reiters who have arrived amount to 6,500 men” (_ibid._, No.
1,882).

[1177] _Ibid._, No. 1,864 §2, No. 1,882, December 15-26, 1567. The
reiters came “with certain pieces of artillery and 700 or 800 empty
wagons, trusting to be no greater losers by this dissension than by the
last” (_ibid._, No. 1,864, §3. Norris to Elizabeth).

[1178] _Ibid._, No. 1,889, December 28, 1567; No. 1,911, January 3,
1568. In _ibid._, Nos. 1,976 and 2,011, the following is given as the
strength of the two armies: “Army of the King, 20,600 horsemen and
10,000 Swiss footmen; the numbers of the other footmen are not set
down. Condé’s army, footmen 13,000; horsemen 11,900 where of reiters
6,200”—January, 1568. List of the troops of the prince of Condé with
their commanders, amounting in all to 15,000 or 16,000 foot, and 14,000
horse, exclusive of those in garrison or serving in other parts of
France—February 15, 1568. Norris wrote in February, 1568: “The prince
has crossed the Seine, and is at present nothing inferior in number
to the King’s army in infantry, but they are not esteemed so good for
battle by reason of the Switzers. He has 3,000 more cavalry than the
king has.”—_Ibid._, No. 1,981.

[1179] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,864, §4, December 15, 1567. Names of
the different noblemen commanding in the army of the King of France
(_ibid._, No. 1,918, January 4, 1568). Letters-patent of Charles IX,
dated December 16, 1567, ordered the exodus of all of the “pretended
Reformed religion” from Paris and enjoined the seizure of all their
benefices and lands, which were to be annexed to the crown property,
and the sale of all the goods of such subjects (_ibid._, Nos. 1,877,
1,878, December 21-24, 1567). In January a supplementary order
commanded the sale of all goods and movables of those with the prince
of Condé, and the annexation of all their lands and hereditaments to
the crown (_ibid._, 1,914, January 3, 1568)—decrees which “were not
left unexecuted in any point to the utmost” (Norris to Cecil, _ibid._,
No. 1,889, December 28, 1567, §1). Cf. Charles IX’s letters-patent of
February 21, 1568, bidding that the houses and real property held by
base tenure belonging to rebels shall be sold in the same manner as
personal property (_ibid._, No. 2,200, February 21, 1568). The same
sort of measures were practiced elsewhere. For instance, in Agen,
Protestant merchants suffered confiscation of grain and wine to the
amount of 1,014 livres, 7 sous (_Arch. Commun._, Agen, Reg. CC, 302).

[1180] The original letter of Charles IX, written from Paris, December
17, 1567 to the duke of Anjou, reciting the terms of peace to be
presented to the prince of Condé was sold in Paris in 1845. The duke’s
instructions were to renew hostilities if the terms were not accepted.
In Coll. Godefroy, XCVI, No. 8, is the safe-conduct given to the
cardinal Châtillon by the duke of Anjou. It is dated December 25, 1567.

[1181] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,890, January 4, 1568.

[1182] _Ibid._, No. 1,919, January 4, 1568.

[1183] Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, II,
7, to Alva, January 22, 1568.

[1184] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 430, September 11, 1568; “A Florentine
merchant greatly esteemed by these majesties and very useful to them in
money matters called upon me today and gave me information concerning
the king’s inability from want of money to continue the war.” Account
of the sums of money paid to the troops, native and foreign, in the
French king’s service during the month of January 1568, amounting to
987,052 livres, or 116,646£ 9_s._ sterling. The amounts reduced from
French to English money by Cecil (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,978, January
1568).

[1185] _Ibid._, No. 1,914, January 3, 1568. For an amusing instance see
No. 1,670.

[1186] _Ibid._, No. 2,024, February 12, 1568.

[1187] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,024, §1, February 24, 1568.

[1188] “The King’s army, finding what disorder the want of a good head
has bred hitherto, are now content to accept any, be it not a marshal
of France. It is now said that Mons. de Tavannes shall be M. d’Anjou’s
lieutenant” (_ibid._, No. 2,024, February 24, 1568).

[1189] Some of them were captured by the King’s forces in a skirmish
near Châtillon between the duke of Nevers and Montgomery, and broken
upon the wheel. The poor wretches under the torture compromised
twenty-five others of the Guard, who on March 6 were also horribly
put to death (_ibid._, No. 2,062, March 12, 1568). After the peace of
Longjumeau the Scotch captains who had joined the prince of Condé were
deprived of their commissions, although the action was contrary to the
edict. In fact a reorganization of the whole _maison du roi_ was made
(_ibid._, No. 2,135, April 18, No. 2,178, May 12, 1568). The vacancies
were filled by Swiss instead (_ibid._, Nos. 1,981, 1,987, February 1
and 6, 1568), so that the famous Scotch Guard in the end became the
King’s Swiss Guard, which lasted down to the Revolution.

[1190] _Ibid._, No. 1,981, February 1, 1568.

[1191] He was accused of having “pretermitted many fair occasions to
have fought with the prince.”

[1192] _Ibid._, No. 2,024, §2, February 24, 1568.

[1193] Claude Haton, I, 498 and note; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,833,
November 24, 1567.

[1194] Claude Haton, I, 524.

[1195] These high prices were partly owing to the fact that speculators
had bought up much of the grain, which rose in April to between 60 and
70 livres per muid. But in May, with the promise of a good harvest,
the price dropped over one-half, from 15 sous tournois per bichet to 7
sous 6 deniers, to the great regret of the merchants who had counted
upon a scarcity. On the other hand, the price of oats went higher,
being sold at from 10 to 12 sous per bichet, or boisseau, for there was
very little to be had after the passage of the troops; and because it
ripened earlier, almost all of it was taken (Claude Haton, II, 523).

[1196] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,024, February 24, 1568.

[1197] So ominous was the temper of the Parisians that even the minor
gates of the Louvre were equipped with drawbridges (_ibid._, No.
2,040, §4, March 1, 1568). Part of the indignation of Paris was due to
the outrages of some reiters in the King’s army from Luxembourg and
Lorraine, who robbed priests and despoiled churches, notwithstanding
that they were in Catholic service, so much so that “the Parisians had
rather had the prince of Condé’s people should approach Paris as they”
(_ibid._, Nos. 2,040, 2,041, March 1, 1568).

[1198] _Rel. vén._, II, 145.

[1199] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,040, §3, March 1, 1568.

[1200] _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, 136. La Rochelle
was already the Huguenots’ most important point and already large
supplies of gunpowder and ammunition, chiefly from England, were being
brought in there (cf. the captain of La Rochelle to Queen Elizabeth,
_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,057, March 10, 1568). La Popelinière, XII,
68-70, has a dissertation upon the history and institutions of La
Rochelle.

The peace of Longjumeau put an end to Montluc’s plan for the seizure of
La Rochelle, for which he had received the King’s sanction in February.
See the documents in F. Fr. 15,544, fol. 187; 15,548, foll. 163 ff.

[1201] In the controversy between the count palatine and the King the
former had asked that the word “perpetual” be inserted in the edict,
so that the edict might not be revoked at will (_C. S. P. For._, No.
1,968, 1567-68).

[1202] The balance was to be paid in two instalments at Frankfurt (_C.
S. P. For._, No. 2,135, April 18, 1568). All gifts and pensions were
revoked until the debt was paid (_ibid._, No. 2,248, June 4, 1568).
In Coll. Godefroy, CCLVII, Nos. 35, 41-43 are a number of documents
dealing with the pay of the reiters at this time. The whole sum
required for the reiters was 1,440,000 livres, and the government at
once set to work to collect it. The first collection seems to have
been a sort of _don patriotique_ made by a house-to-house visitation,
showing how pressing was the necessity. The government tried to borrow
the money which John Casimir had raised for the Protestants, but which
was not used on account of the peace, and offered to pay 16 per cent.
interest for it (_C. S. P. For._, March 28, 1568). On March 23 the King
issued letters patent forbidding all notaries and others receiving any
contract for annuities or mortgages before the sum of 1,400,000 livres
_tournois_ had been raised (_ibid._, No. 2,085). The duke of Alva was
in a state of great anxiety for fear lest the reiters would come into
the Netherlands and thought he discovered a plot to throw St. Omer into
their hands (_ibid._, No. 2,230, April 25, 1568).

All the records abound with allusions to the rapacity of the reiters:
“La nazione tedesca, nazione avara” (_Rel. vén._, II, 125 and notes).

“Les reîtres trouvaient beaucoup meilleur l’argent qu’on leur
promettait d’Angleterre que les cidres de Normandie.”—La Noue.

“L’importunità dei Tedeschi che mai cessavano de domandare donazioni o
paghe.”—Davila, I, 137.

“Ils consommeraient un gouffre d’argent—Facheux, avares,
importuns.”—Brantôme, III, 196, 310.

[1203] But restricted as they were, the terms yet mightily offended the
Guises, especially the cardinal of Lorraine who “did marvellously storm
that the king would condescend to any peace with his subjects, whereat
the king said he would agree thereto ‘maugre luy.’” (On the entire
negotiations see _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,025, Feb. 24; Nos. 2,040-41,
March 1-4; No. 2,054, March 9; Nos. 2,057, 2,058, March 10-11; No.
2,092, March 27, 1568). The final draft was completed on March 23; the
edict was signed by Charles IX on March 26. It was published at Paris
on the next day (_ibid._, Nos. 2,092-93).

[1204] _Ibid._, No. 2,058, March 11, 1568. Granvella expressed fear
of universal famine in France, followed by the plague (Gachard,
_Correspondance de Philippe II_, II, 17).

[1205] The preachers and the doctors in Paris in their sermons decried
the King and his Council (Claude Haton, II, 527 and note; cf. _ibid._,
531; _Rel. vén._, II, 121).

[1206] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,273, June 17, 1568; _Hist. du Languedoc_,
V, 482 ff.; _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 18, 88, 142, 156;
D’Aubigné, Book IV, chaps. xii-xiv.

[1207] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 2,115, 2,135, April 8-10, 1568.

[1208] _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 441.

[1209] For details see _ibid._, 443-64.

[1210] Montluc even ascribed the ravages of the plague to Damville in
order to create popular prejudice against him! (_Hist. du Languedoc_,
V, 449). His own words are: “Pour se montrer au peuple, qui avoit une
marvelleuse envie de le voir, n’y pouvant arrêter à cause de la grande
peste qui y est.” (Cf. his letters to Damville, December 31, 1567, and
August 26, 1569, in _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 103 and
159.) Montluc was doubly incensed at this moment because the peace of
Longjumeau canceled orders which he had received in February to attempt
to take La Rochelle by sea (_ibid._, VII, 148 ff.; V, 107 note, 109
note, 184 note).

[1211] _Bulletin de la Soc. acad. du Var_, 1876.

[1212] Claude Haton, II, 525. He repeats at different times the
current play upon words which designated these free-booting nobles as
“gens-pille-hommes” (gentilhommes). In general, in his estimation, the
nobility had much degenerated. See Vol. I, Introd., p. lxii.

[1213] Volunteer bands of searchers visited Huguenot houses, to inquire
into their faith (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,191, May 17, 1568). At the
court, certain of the nobles promised Charles to assure for all members
of their retinue to be good Catholics (_ibid._, Nos. 2,191, 2,235,
2,236, 2,243, 2,248, May 17 to June 4, 1568).

[1214] “D’Anjou has marvellously stomached these dealings, and has kept
his chamber, having uttered most despiteful words against them of the
religion, saying that he hoped to march upon their bellies” (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 2,177, May 12, 1568).

[1215] _Ibid._, No. 2,115, §1, April 8, 1568.

[1216] See the revelations of Norris to Cecil in _ibid._, No. 2,100,
March 30, 1568. As earnest of the royal purpose the marshal Montmorency
set at once about disarming the people of Paris.

[1217] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 22, 23.

[1218] Probably neither the cardinal nor Montluc knew that the other
had been in secret correspondence with Philip II. Knowing Philip’s
methods, it is likely that he kept them in ignorance of it. This was
his way (cf. Forneron, I, 327).

[1219] Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 328, 329,
letter of March 5, 1564.

[1220] _Ibid._, V, 76, 77 and notes.

[1221] _Ibid._, V, 145.

[1222] Cited by Forneron, _Histoire de Philippe II_, I, 327.

[1223] The ordinance of Moulins specifically alluded to the growing
popular nature of these confraternities: “Qu’on abolisse entièrement
les confréries établies sous prétexte de religion parmi le _petit_
peuple, les festins, les répas, les bâtons (bâtons de Confrérie,
qui servent à porter aux confréries l’Image de quelque saint, ou la
représentation de quelque mystère) et autres choses semblables, qui
donnent lieu à la superstition, aux troubles, à la débauche, aux
querelles, et aux monopoles” (De Thou, V, Book XXXIX, p. 183, in the
article prohibiting them). But it was as impossible then as now to
enforce a law in the face of a public opinion which did not sympathize
with the provision. Public opinion not merely favored their formation;
the very officers of the crown promoted their organization. La
Popelinière, XI, 12, makes this point.

[1224] “Discorso sopra gli umori di Francia di M^[r]. Nazaret, 1570,”
Barberini Library 3,269, fol. 63. See Appendix XIII.

[1225] D’Aubigné, III, 2.

[1226] _Mémoires de Tavannes_, ed. Michaud and Poujoulat, séries I,
VIII, 288, 289; Pasquier, Book IV, letter 23; Collection Trémont,
Nos. 1,367, 1,382; cf. La Popelinière, XI, 7-12; Pingaud, _Les
Saulx-Tavannes_, p. 61.

[1227] _State Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, XCVII, No. 1,711. A printed
pamphlet. See Appendix XIV.

[1228] Raynal, _Histoire du Berry_, IV, 79-83. The text of the act is
found in Thauvessière’s _Histoire du Berry_, 189.

[1229] The text is given in Claude Haton, II, 1152. Cf. Vicomte de
Meaux, _Luttes religieuses en France_, 177, 178; Capefigue, _La réforme
et la ligue_, 360.

[1230] Feret, _Clermont-en-Beauvaisis pendant les troubles de la
ligue_, Clermont, 1853.

[1231] _State Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, C, No. 1,863. See Appendix
XV.

[1232] _Hist. du Languedoc_, XI, 509-10 and XII; _Preuves_, No. 300, p.
cxiii; _Cabinet historique_, II, 217. This league was much more formal
in its organization than any of the others. In addition to securing the
authorization of the Parlement, the leaders had secured the sanction of
Pius V in the March _preceding_. The bull was granted March 15.

[1233] _Cabinet historique_, II, 219.

[1234] Bordenave, _Hist. de Béarn et de Navarre_, 139-45. I venture
to suggest the cardinal of Lorraine as a possible instigator, from
Bordenave’s words: “quelques autres ... sollicitez par quelques uns
des _principaux du conseil_ de France.” Philip II threw new troops
into Spanish Navarre at this time, either in consequence of Jeanne
d’Albret’s energetic action or to co-operate with the league, if it
were successful. Fourquevaux ascertained the fact, but was in the dark
as to the reason for it (_Dépêches de Fourquevaux_, II, 25, November,
1568).

[1235] A letter of Coligny, July 29, 1568, shows that the Huguenot
leader was aware of the formation of these provincial leagues. After
complaining of the assassination of one of D’Andelot’s lieutenants,
he protests against the general violence: “Ce que faict croire que ce
sont des fruictz et offices des confraires du Saint-Esprit et sainctes
ligues qu’ils appellent; mais si on voit que infiniz meurtres et
massacres qui se sont faictz avec une effrénée licence en tous les
endroictz de ce royaume depuys la paciffication il n’en ayt esté faict
aucune justice ou chastiment, quelque déclaration que Vostre Majesté
ayt faicte de sa volonté et intention, je n’en espère pas davantage
de cestuy-cy, estant bien facile à cognoistre que ce sont choses
projectées et délibérées avec les gouverneurs des provinces, et que
cela ne se faict poinct sans adveu ou pour le moins sans un tacite
consentement.”—_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, III, 163,
note.

[1236] Montmorency continually threw his influence in favor of peace
and moderation, slapping the Guises, however, in his utterances.
“The Duke Montmorency said there was nothing more necessary for the
maintenance of the king’s estate than the sincere observance of the
edict of pacification, and such as labour to the contrary are neither
friends to the king nor his crown; and for his own part if the king
did not foresee in time with due execution of justice this growing
mischief, he was resolved with his leave to depart the court with his
friends and allies, and so to withdraw himself from such as under the
pretext of maintenance of their religion, continually nourished this
division, and in the end put out the glory and renown of the French
empire.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,177, §1, May 12, 1568.

On June 17 Norris wrote to Cecil: “Montmorency has come to the court.
The process between him and the duke of Guise for the county of
Dammartin will in the end break into open enmity.”—_Ibid._, No. 2,273.

[1237] “The four marshals agree all in one against the
Cardinal.”—_Ibid._, No. 2,235, May 31, 1568.

[1238] “All things are ruled now by M. d’Anjou, who though young is a
most earnest and cruel enemy against the favourers of religion, and has
his privy counsellors, the cardinal of Lorraine being the chiefest, and
further has his chancellor, who seals all such things as the good old
chancellor of the King refuses to seal; who neither for love nor dread
would seal anything against the statutes of the realm.”—_Ibid._, No.
2,178, May 12, 1568. On the whole affair, see _ibid._, No. 2,177, §2,
May 12, 1568.

[1239] _Ibid._, No. 2,115, §2, April 8; No. 2,177, §3, May 12, 1568.

[1240] Duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de Condé_, II, App. I.

[1241] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,235, May 31, 1568.

[1242] “The garrisons in the Ile-de-France are thought to attend no
other thing but till the corn be off the ground to begin where they
left off.”—_Ibid._, No. 2,178, May 12, 1568.

[1243] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 2,235, 2,243, 2,248, May 31, June 2-4,
1568.

[1244] As to localities see Duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de
Condé_, II, 284.

[1245] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,296, June 22, 1568. They feared a plot
to capture them by trickery, as Egmont and Hoorne had been trapped
in Flanders. According to report, Lavallette was to have seized the
prince, Chavigny the admiral, and Tavannes D’Andelot. The warning
was probably given by some secretary whom Coligny had corrupted, for
shortly after this time several secretaries to the Catholic leaders
were dismissed (_ibid._, No. 2,256, June 7, 1568; cf. D’Aumale,
_Histoire des princes de Condé_, II, 12, n. 2, and p. 287). Coligny
also bribed the secretary of Don Francesco de Alava, Spanish ambassador
in France (see _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,230, May 24, 1568 and Introd., p.
xxvi).

[1246] _Ibid._, Nos. 2,256, 2,304, 2,323, June 7, 28, July 5, 1568. For
an instance of the feeling between the prince and the cardinal see Sir
Henry Norris to the queen, _ibid._, No. 2,248, June 1, 1568 and Duc
d’Aumale, _Histoire des princes de Condé_, II, 12 and n. 1.

[1247] This was the time the word first appeared (D’Aumale, II, 12,
note 3).

[1248] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,295, Norris to Cecil, June 23, 1568. On
the whole negotiation see Robinson, “Queen Elizabeth and the Valois
Princes,” _Eng. Hist. Rev._, II, 40; Hume, _Courtships of Queen
Elizabeth_, 114-49. Hume, however, is in error, p. 115, in believing
that the negotiation arose _after_ the peace of St. Germain in 1570.
The intercourse must have been kept very much in the dark, judging from
the obscure allusions in the following: Sir Henry Norris to the earl
of Leicester, _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,241, August 20, 1568—Marshal
Montmorency is very desirous to have answer to the letter which he
wrote to Leicester; the queen to the duchess of Montmorency, _ibid._,
No. 2,472, August 27, 1568—Thanks her for her courteous and honorable
entertainment in her house, and near her person of the daughter of
her chamberlain, Lord Edward Howard. Walsingham warned his government
at this time against spies of the cardinal of Lorraine in London. See
Appendix XVI.

[1249] “More have been murdered since the publishing of the peace than
were all these last troubles. Daily murders are committed without any
punishment to the offenders, others violently taken out of their houses
in the night and led to the river being without remorse drowned.”—_C.
S. P. For._, Nos. 2,383, 2,339, 2,407, July 31-August 7, 1568.

[1250] The proceedings here on both sides are measured by the success
in Flanders (_ibid._, No. 2,273, June 17, 1568; _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, II, 47; _Dépêches de Fourquevaux_, II, 24).

[1251] In February, 1568 the wholesale condemnation of the people of
the Low Countries had been pronounced by the inquisition and confirmed
by the Philip II, (_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 171).

[1252] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,432, August 17, 1568, Mundt to Cecil from
Strasburg.

[1253] Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 60; _Epist. ad Camer._, 79 and 84.

[1254] Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 64; _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 208.

[1255] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau,_ III, 207; Coll.
Godefroy, CCLVI, No. 7, Marshal Cossé to the King, June 20, 1568.

[1256] See Haag, _La France protestante_, art., “Cocqueville.” The
admiral Coligny disavowed any complicity in the enterprise. For the
fate of the other columns see _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_,
III, 212, 220, 227.

[1257] _Ibid._, 239, 255. The prince of Orange anticipated the disaster
of Jemmingen, for he disapproved of the rash policy of his brother. See
a letter on this head written by him to Louis of Nassau in July, 1568
(_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 257, and the latter’s
reply, July 17, _ibid._, III, 264, 265). Alva had been so certain of
Spanish victory that in advance of it he offered Charles IX the use of
Spanish troops (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,379, §2, July 29, 1568).

[1258] “They (Huguenots) attend the success of the war in
Flanders.”—_Ibid._

[1259] In September, 1568, a royal edict was promulgated forbidding the
_public_ profession of any but the Catholic religion, and revoking all
former edicts. Text in _Recueil de Fontanon_, IV, 294. Montluc claims
that he was the author of the idea and that he sent a rough draft of
such an edict to Charles IX (De Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de
Montluc_, V, 153, 154). In intimation of this policy, in August an oath
of allegiance and obedience had been exacted by Charles IX of all the
Huguenot leaders (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,419, August 9, 1568; cf. No.
2,407, August 7 and Duc d’Aumale, _Hist. des princes de Condé_, II, 9).

[1260] _Rel. vén._, II, 123.

[1261] Claude Haton, II, 532; _Coll. des autographes de M. de L—— de
Nancy_ (Paris, 1855), No. 477; Henry, duke of Anjou to Matignon, King’s
lieutenant in Normandy, October 8, 1568, recommending him to distribute
the gendarmerie in places most suitable to protect the country.

[1262] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 2,352, 2,379, July 14 and 29, 1569.

[1263] _Ibid._, No. 2,379, July 29, 1568; on the calculative policy
of the French crown see Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 92 and La Noue’s
comments in _Mémoires militaires_, chap. xii.

[1264] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,379, July 29, 1568.

[1265] Letter of August 23, 1568 analyzed in De Thou, Book XLIV.

[1266] See the complaints of the prince of Condé to the King, under
date of June 29 and July 22, 1568 in Duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des
princes de Condé_, II, App. I.

[1267] See the gist of the prince of Condé’s petition, summarized in
_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,451, August 23, 1568. As an instance of the
care of the government to b forehanded, agents of the crown secretly
measured even the height of the wall in the case of towns of doubtful
allegiance. Coligny complained of the attacks which his gentlemen and
those of his brother D’Andelot suffered. At Dijon the prince of Condé
prosecuted a person whom he accused of secretly having measured the
walls of Noyers (Claude Haton, II, 537, note).

[1268] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,464, August 25, 1568; cf. No. 2,484.

[1269] Claude Haton, II, 539; Le Laboureur, II, 593.

[1270] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,441, August 20, 1568; Condé was at
Noyers, Coligny at Tanlay (Yonne): D’Aubigné, Book III, 5, note; Duc
d’Aumale, _Hist. des princes de Condé_, II, 367.

[1271] Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 64, 69.

[1272] _Ibid._, I, 75; _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III,
284-86. The prince of Orange at this time was near Cleves having an
army but no money. See a letter of the prince of Orange to the duke of
Württemberg and the margrave of Baden asking for pecuniary assistance.
September 17, 1568 (_ibid._, III, 291). His plans again failed. He
tried to enter Picardy for the purpose of uniting with the Huguenots.
But the alertness of the marshal Cossé again prevented Genlis as it
had foiled Cocqueville, and the prince was compelled to abandon his
purpose. At Strasburg his army was dissolved (_ibid._, III, 295, 303,
313-16; Languet, _Epist. ad Camer._, 89; _Epist. secr._, I, 75).

[1273] Even La Noue, 804 and Beza, II, 277, assert this.

[1274] Elizabeth of Valois, queen of Spain, had died October 3, 1568.

[1275] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 2,640, 2,666, November 22, December 8,
1568.

[1276] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,441, August 20, 1568.

[1277] Tavannes, chap. xxi.

[1278] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,477, August 29, 1568. Norris states
the fact that Condé and the admiral were warned by the letters they
intercepted. The duc d’Aumale (_Hist. des princes de Condé_, II, 13)
has shown the deliberate intention of Tavannes so to do.

[1279] D’Aubigné, III, 24: “Le prince ... fit publier les loix
militaires.” Issued from La Rochelle, September 9, 1568. Summary in _C.
S. P. For._, No. 2,514. De Serres gives the text at p. 158. Delaborde
gives the admiral Coligny the credit for these regulations (III, 522).
Cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,486, discourse of the cardinal Châtillon,
who attributes the evils of France to the cardinal of Lorraine and
refutes the charge of ambition brought against the Huguenot leaders.
The cardinal fled to England at this time (see La Ferrière, _Le XVI^[e]
siècle et les Valois_, 217; D’Aubigné, III, 12, note 31). He died
in 1571. There was a rumor that Coligny, too, had gone to England
(Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 109).

[1280] Fontanon, IV, 292, 294; Claude Haton, II, 540; (September 25)
_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,561, §1, September 30, 1568; _ibid._, _Ven._,
No. 433, September 28, 1568. A supplementary edict suppressed all
offices of judicature and finance held by the Huguenots (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 2,674, December 16, 1568).

[1281] _Ibid._, No. 2,363, July 20, 1568.

[1282] _Ibid._, No. 2,467, August 27, 1568.

[1283] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 430, September 11, 1568. Other sources of
revenue were a loan upon the security of the wine duties for several
years—a heavy burden upon the people (Claude Haton, II, 547)—which
yielded about 300,000 crowns per annum. In addition, the King raised
a benevolence of 50,000 crowns from Paris, and Venice loaned 100,000
crowns (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,640, November 22, 1568) later increased
to 200,000. The Pope later authorized the sale of 50,000 crowns’ worth
of the temporalities of the church, but the sales were so managed
by certain of the clergy that the government got little from them
(_ibid._, No. 233, April, 1569, summary of an ordinance of Charles IX).

[1284] For details see Norris to Cecil, _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,550,
September 25, 1568.

[1285] Taillander, _Vie de L’Hôpital_, 200.

[1286] Even Biragues, now the chancellor, was in the secret pay of
Spain (_Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle_, VIII, 387).

[1287] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,490, September 1; No. 2,529, September
15, 1568. The two Protestant places of worship in Orleans were burned
(_ibid._, No. 2,561, §2, September 30, 1568). Things would have gone
worse with the Protestants of Orleans had it not been for the Politique
marshal Vieilleville, whose government it was, and who did all in his
power to protect the Huguenots (_ibid._, No. 190, March 24, 1569).

[1288] Jeanne d’Albret, who had been at Nérac, reached La Rochelle on
September 28, having crossed the Garonne “under the nose of Montluc”
(Olhagaray, 575), who, it is said, had orders to intercept her (Palma
Cayet, Part I, 166). Montluc glosses over his negligence in this
particular (_Commentaires_, III, 175).

[1289] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,561, September 30, 1568. D’Andelot was in
Brittany, (_ibid._, No. 2,527, September 15, 1568), but on September
16 he crossed the Loire (La Noue, chap. xix) with 1,500 horse and 20
ensigns of foot (D’Aubigné, III, 13, note 7) in spite of the strict
injunctions of the King to prevent him (D’Aubigné, III, 14, note).

[1290] _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,610, §2, October 29, 1568. Duke William
of Saxony earnestly begged Charles IX to employ his soldiery (_ibid._,
No. 2,640, §5, November 22, 1568) and the margrave of Baden accepted
a command of reiters in the King’s army (Le Laboureur, II, 724). The
duke of Deuxponts offered 8,000 reiters and 40 ensigns of lansquenets
to Condé (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,666, §1, December 8, 1568). They were
to have no pay for two months, expecting to pay themselves by seizing
the towns and castles belonging to the house of Guise in Lorraine and
Champagne. In the end England paid for their services (see the record
of the receipts in _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,011, September 10, 1571; No.
2,123, November 13, 1571). The Catholic reiters were to be paid by a
forced loan exacted of the Parisians (_ibid._, No. 2,666, December 8,
1568).

[1291] North to Cecil, _C. S. P. For._, December 30, 1568, January 11,
1569.

[1292] For description of it see _C. S. P. For._, No. 2,640, §15,
November 22, 1568. The engagement of Jazeneuil that followed, November
17, was a blow to them (see La Noue, chap. xxi; D’Aubigné, III, 37; _C.
S. P. For._, No. 2,640, §1). The minute account of the duc d’Aumale
may be found in _Hist. des princes de Condé_, II, 26-34. Whitehead,
_Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France_, 204-9, has an admirable
account.

[1293] Condé’s army before the defeat at Jazeneuil was estimated at
12,000 foot and 4,000 horse, all well mounted and armed, besides a very
large number of irregular troops.

[1294] Fourquevaux to Catherine de Medici, January 13, 1569, on the
authority of a letter of the Spanish ambassador in France, dated
January 7, 1568 (_Dépêches de Fourquevaux_, II, 47). Alava must have
regarded the news as highly important, for the courier was only six
days in making the journey to Madrid.

[1295] Fourquevaux, II, 31, 54.

[1296] Coll. Godefroy, XCVI, William of Orange to Charles IX, December
21, 1568.

[1297] Alva sent word to Charles IX at all hazards to hold the prince
of Condé back, himself promising to take care of Orange. The King sent
the Spanish duke a very large commission, not only to levy upon the
country for necessities but even to enter the French walled towns—so
far were the two crowns now in accord (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,666,
December 8, 1568).

[1298] The alarm of the government at this hour over Paris may be
measured by two police regulations of the time. One ordered search to
be made throughout the town twice a week, in all hostelries and other
places, and forbade mechanics to leave their houses on certain days.
The other allowed those of the religion who had been forbidden to leave
their houses on certain days to appoint one of their servants to go
about the town on their affairs. He was to have a certificate signed
by the captain and _commissaires_ of the quarter, and to be unarmed.
The _commissaires_ were to make a weekly search in the houses of those
of the religion, to make _procès-verbal_ of the names of all the
domestics, signed by the master of the house, and to remove all arms
found therein (_ibid._, No. 2,671, December 11; No. 2,684, December
23, 1568). Both ordinances were registered by the Parlement. During
the Christmas season no Calvinist was permitted to stir out of doors
(_ibid._, No. 2,688, §3, December 26, 1568).

[1299] “The good disposition and order that is kept in the prince’s
army is much to be commended, nothing like oppressing the country where
they pass, as that of M. d’Anjou, which was waxed hateful by their
insolent behavior, both to Protestants and Catholics. M. d’Anjou has
bestowed the greatest part of his army in the towns upon the river of
Loire.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 12, January 4, 1569.

The presence of the royal army in Anjou, under the command of the duke
of Anjou, was a heavy burden upon the people of the province, which
already had suffered heavily from the depredations of the Huguenots
in the preceding year. The municipal council of Angers, on November
4, was called upon to furnish 800 pairs of stockings, 1,500 pairs of
shoes, powder, bread, hay, straw, oats, pikes, shovels, mattocks, and
other implements. The town was filled with sick and wounded soldiers
(Joubert, _Les misères de l’Anjou, etc._, 36).

[1300] Orange was also in want of pay for his troops (Languet, _Epist.
secr._, I, 82).

[1301] _Revue d’histoire diplomatique_, XIV (1900), 51-52, 64.

[1302] _C. S. P. For._, No. 22, January 10, 1569; No. 151, March 5,
1569; La Popelinière, Book XV; De Thou and D’Aubigné add nothing new.

[1303] On the hardness of the winter of 1568-69 see La Noue, chap,
xxiv; _Hist. du Lang._, V, 514; _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_,
V, 156; Whitehead, _Coligny_, 202.

[1304] Coll. Godefroy, CCLVII, No. 57. Remonstrance of Jean de Montluc
against the continuance of the war, December 2, 1568. In the council
of the King a motion was made that the Protestants should be permitted
to enjoy the benefit of the edicts granted before; that Condé should
be given the government of Saintonge, and be given leave to aid Orange
against Spain. But neither Catherine de Medici nor the King would
listen to the proposal, and the cardinal of Lorraine argued that it
would be dangerous to further Condé in any way (_C. S. P. For._, No.
23, January 10, 1569).

[1305] Potter, _Pie V_, 19; ed. Gouban, Book III, No. 4, p. 135, letter
to the cardinal Bourbon, January, 1569; _ibid._, p. 23; ed. Gouban,
Book III, No. 5, p. 138, letter to the cardinal of Lorraine, same date.

[1306] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 439, November 9, 1568 and No. 448, January
6, 1569. The distress of commerce and the legal complications arising
from the semi-piratical acts were very great (see _C. S. P. Dom._,
1547-80, pp. 378, 386, May 29, 1570, July 29, 1570).

[1307] _Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 448, January 6, 1569. The cardinal
Châtillon was the Huguenot agent in England (see _ibid._, _For._, No.
71, January 22, 1569; No. 82, January 30, 1569). On his financial
negotiations see the detailed note of the baron de Ruble in D’Aubigné,
III, 61.

[1308] Count Mansfeldt to the duke of Aumale, January 22, 1569, Coll.
Godefroy, CCLVII, No. 58; _C. S. P. For._, No. 172, March 15, 1569.
They came, not merely with weapons and bringing horses, but with great
vans, flails, and harvest tools, with which to plunder the fields.

[1309] The forces of D’Aumale were 5,500 reiters, 26 companies of
French horsemen, and 30 ensigns of foot, besides others. The troops
that the King had were 26 companies of gendarmes, 15 companies of the
regular French army, 4,500 Swiss, 2,500 reiters, and his household
troops. Montmorency retired to Chantilly owing to the combination
against him (_C. S. P. For._, No. 75, January 25, 1569. For the details
see _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 315). There had
been a fierce strife between the factions of Guise and Montmorency
for D’Aumale’s place, the three marshals, Montmorency, Vieilleville,
and Cossé resisting his appointment. The hostility of the Parisians
to Montmorency, though certainly not the accusation of the cardinal
of Lorraine that the constable’s son had secret intelligence with the
prince of Orange, militated against him. The English ambassador even
believed that Montmorency and the duke of Bouillon might appear in arms
for Condé. Sir Henry Norris to the queen: “On the 23d ult. the duke
of Montmorency required the captains and _échevins_ of Paris to come
to the Louvre to speak with him, and declared that their disorders
and unaptness to be ruled was not unknown to the King. Lignerolles,
of the court of Parlement, and captain-general of twenty-two ensigns,
answered that Paris was like to a ship, whereof the master, neglecting
his charge, it is requisite that the pilots do put hand to the helm;
where unto Montmorency coldly replied, ‘qu’il parloyt en curtault de
butique’” _(C. S. P. For._, No. 50, January 15, 1569).

[1310] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 516.

[1311] Claude Haton, II, 516 and note; _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 42, 50,
January 11, 15, 1569.

[1312] It appears that the German princes thought of sending a
deputation into France to remonstrate with Catherine de Medici.
At least the minute of a letter to the queen has been preserved
which intimates as much. In it they deplore the sad effects of the
persecutions in France (see _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_,
II, 99-100, June, 1567). On January 24, 1569, a decree of the elector
of Saxony commanded all captains and soldiers who were his subjects and
who might be serving under the duke of Alva or the King of France, to
return home within two months after the date of the publication of the
decree; and further ordered his officers to arrest any persons whom
they might find setting forth for these services.—Dresden, January 24,
1569 (_C. S. P. For._, No. 74). In March, Augustus of Saxony, the count
palatine, and other German princes sent 50,000 silver crowns to Condé
(_ibid._, _Ven._, No. 452, March 15, 1569).

[1313] William of Orange with his two brothers went into Germany
in order to push the plan in conjunction with the duke of
Deuxponts—D’Aubigné, III, 45, 60 (_C. S. P. For._, No. 131,
February 24, 1569). For the detail of this movement see Gachard, _La
Bibliothèque Nationale à Paris_, II, 275, 278, 280. The duke of Aumale
has published some of his letters at this time (_Hist. des princes de
Condé_, II, 406 ff.).

[1314] D’Aumale at this time lay at Phalsburg and Saverne, with 4,000
reiters, 2,000 French horse, and 10,000 footmen. His penetration within
the imperial frontier offended and alarmed Strasburg where a French
faction had unsuccessfully plotted to betray the town.

[1315] See News-Letter from La Rochelle, January, 1569, in Appendix
XVII.

[1316] _C. S. P. For._, No. 105, February 10, 1569.

[1317] _Ibid._, No. 151, March 5, 1569; Claude Haton, II, 517.

[1318] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 155, March 5, 1569; on the desertions from
D’Aumale’s army see No. 172.

[1319] _Ibid._, No. 105, February 10, 1569.

[1320] For contemporary accounts of the battle of Jarnac see La
Popelinière, Book XV; Jean de Serres, 315 ff; D’Aubigné, Book V, chap.
viii; Claude Haton, II, 548 and notes. The best modern accounts are
Gigon, _La bataille de Jarnac et la campagne de 1569 en Angoumois_,
Angoulême, impr. Chasseignac (Extrait du _Bulletin de la Société
archéologique et historique de la Charente_), 1896; Patry, in _Bull.
Soc. protest. franç._, LIII, March 1902; Duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des
princes de Condé_, II, Book I, chap. i; Whitehead, _Gaspard de Coligny,
Admiral of France_, 204-9, an extremely lucid account. The evidence
upon the assassination of the prince is sifted by Denys d’Aussy,
“L’assassin du prince de Condé à Jarnac (1569),” _R. Q. H._, XLIX, 573,
and summarized (with some new additions) in Whitehead, 206, note 2.
The text of the famous dispatches, which were found in the gauntlet of
the prince of Condé are printed in full in Duc d’Aumale, _Histoire des
princes de Condé_, II, App. iii.

[1321] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 454, March 15, 1569; cf. Brantôme, III, 329.

[1322] Claude Haton, II, 549, 550.

[1323] Compare the Pope’s letter of March 6, informing Charles IX
that he has sent troops to him under Sforza and has prayed to God for
victory (Potter, _Pie V_, 28; ed. Gouban, Book III, letter 9, p. 148)
with the letter of congratulation of March 28, after he had learned of
the battle (_ibid._, p. 31; ed. Gouban, Book III, letter 10, p. 151).
The duke of Anjou sent the flags and standards captured at Jarnac to
Rome (Potter, _Pie V_, p. 54; ed. Gouban, Book III, 167, letter 17,
April 26, 1569).

[1324] “L’amiral demeurant toujours le principal gouverneur et
conseiller en toutes les affaires des huguenots.”—Castelnau, Book VII,
chap. vi.

[1325] Jean de Serres, 333.

[1326] D’Aubigné, III, 58.

[1327] Claude Haton, II, 557.

[1328] _Ibid._

[1329] D’Aubigné, III, 57; Jean de Serres, 326, gives details.

[1330] Jean de Serres, 331.

[1331] _C. S. P. For._, No. 294, June 6, 1569.

[1332] Queen Elizabeth was perfectly safe in making the loan, as the
jewels were worth three times the sum advanced (Bourgon, _Life and
Times of Sir Thomas Gresham_, II, 334-36). _C. S. P. For._, No. 258,
May 12, 1569; Duc d’Aumale, I, 70, note 2; John Casimir and the duke of
Deuxponts both promised reiters.

[1333] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 460, September 15, 1569.

[1334] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 252, May 9, 1569; the prince of Navarre
and other leaders of the Huguenot army in Saintonge to the duke of
Deuxponts and certain noblemen in his camp, and to the prince of
Orange, earnestly urging them to advance on the Loire, and declaring
that notwithstanding the death of the prince of Condé their other
losses have been small and that their forces are not diminished or
disheartened thereby. Not published in _Lettres missives de Henri IV_.

[1335] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 316; Languet,
_Epist. ad Camer._, 105; _Epist. secr._, I, 81. Copies of five letters
written by De Francourt, the agent for the Huguenot party with the
duke of Deuxponts’ and the prince of Orange, to the Huguenot leaders,
expressing regret for the death of the prince of Condé, and assuring
them of the continued adherence of the duke of Deuxponts and his
reiters to their cause are cited in _C. S. P. For._, No. 207, April,
1569. The duke of Lorraine is said to have offered Deuxponts 100,000
crowns if he would withdraw his reiters (_ibid._, No. 234, April 18,
1569).

[1336] Claude Haton, II, 517.

[1337] D’Aubigné, III, 66.

[1338] Preparations looking forward to this movement had begun as far
back as March, when the expulsion of all who would not conform to
Catholicism was ordered by the cardinal of Lorraine as bishop of Metz
and a prince of the empire (_C. S. P. For._, No. 194, March 26, 1569;
cf. Charles IX’s proclamation to the same effect on April 6; see also
Nos. 179, 197, the opposing petitions of the clergy of Metz and of the
Protestants, dated March 19 and 30 respectively).

The correspondence of the duke of Alençon pertaining to the second
civil war is in two volumes listed Nos. 36, 36 _bis_, in the St.
Petersburg collection. The duke remained in Paris, and attended to the
forwarding of powder, provisions, and money. In a letter of November
17, 1569, he writes to Charles IX that it is impossible for him to send
the sums demanded unless he sells the plate and jewels of the King.
In another he sends information of the duke of Tuscany, who was ready
to loan 100,000 écus upon the jewels of the crown. He advises that
this be done. According to his estimate they were worth 500,000 livres
(La Ferrière, _Rapport sur les recherches faites à la Bibliothèque
imperiale de St. Pétersbourg_, 27).

[1339] Proclamation by Charles IX: Commands all gentlemen and soldiers
to repair to the camp of the duke of Anjou by the 20th of June,
properly armed and equipped for service. Requires his officers to
search out the names of such as disobey this order and send them to
him, in order that they may be punished in such manner as he may
think fit (_C. S. P. For._, No. 281, May, 1569). The King is levying
a new army and is disfurnishing his garrisons in Picardy and Normandy
(_ibid._, No. 287, June 3, 1569). Alva promised 4,000 Spanish troops
(_Nég. Tosc._, III, 591).

[1340] Castelnau, Book VII, chap. v. Alva advised him to treat Coligny
_et al._ as he had treated Egmont and Hoorne.

[1341] _Ibid._, _loc. cit._; _C. S. P. For._, No. 236, April 23, 1569.

[1342] Duke of Anjou to Catherine de Medici, May 23, 1569, Coll.
Godefroy, CCLVI, No. 12; La Popelinière, Book XVI; Castelnau, Book
VII, chaps. v, vi; D’Aubigné, III, 67 and note 2; _Archives de la
maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 317; La Noue, chap. xxiv; _C. S. P.
For._, No. 286, June 3, 1569, Sir Henry Norris to the Queen: “The
duke of Deuxponts’ army being before La Charité, he caused 600 French
harquebusiers and certain companies of reiters to pass over the river,
besieging the town on both sides, and having made a breach which was
scant scalable, they made a proud assault, not without loss of some of
their soldiers, and entered the town by force, and put to the sword as
many as they found within the same. The Cardinal, to save his brother
from the stigma of the loss of La Charité, made Count Montmeyo the
scapegoat” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 293, June 7, 1569). For other details
see Hippeau, “Passage de l’armée du duc des Deux-Ponts dans la Marche
et le Limousin en 1569,” _Rev. des Soc. savant des départ._, 5^[e] série,
V (1873), p. 571; Le Bœuf (Jean), _Histoire de la prise d’Auxerre par
les Huguenots, et de la délivrance de la mesme ville, les années 1567
et 1568_, avec un recit de ce qui a précedé et de ce qui a suivi ces
deux fameux événemens et des ravages commis à la Charité, Gien, Cosne,
etc. et autres lieux du diocèse d’Auxerre, le tout précedé d’une ample
préface sur les antiquités d’Auxerre et enrichi de notes historiques
sur les villes, bourgs et villages et sur les personnes principales
qui sont nommées dans cette histoire, par un chanoine de la cathédrale
d’Auxerre, Auxerre, 1723.

[1343] Castelnau, Book VI, chap. vi; _C. S. P. For._, No. 286,
June 3. The reiters and the Swiss in the royal service were paid,
to the disadvantage of the King’s subjects, so that many captains
resigned (_ibid._, No. 351, July 27, 1569). “L’esquelz n’estoient si
sanguinaires ni saccageurs d’églises et de prebstres que ceux des
huguenots, toutesfois estoient aussi larrons les ungs que les aultres
pour serrer sur leurs harnois ce qu’ilz trouvoient à leur commodité; et
par ainsi fut la France pleine d’estrangers pour la désoler et quasi
rendre déserte” (Claude Haton, II, 547).

The temper of the Catholic army is shown in a dispatch of the duke of
Montpensier to Catherine, May 1, 1569, from the camp at Villebois,
reciting the death of young Brissac, the marshal’s son before Mussidan.
The town was taken by storm. “J’en trouve meilleu est qu’ils n’ont
laissé reschapper ung tout seul de tous ceuls qui estoyent dedans que
tout n’ayt esté passé par le fil de l’épée, ce qui semble être le vray
droict de ceste guerre.”—Collection Fillon, No. 2,656.

[1344] “The admiral minds ... to refresh his reiters, and after the
harvest to march towards Paris.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 311, June 30,
1569.

[1345] _C. S. P. For._, No. 272, May 27, 1569.

[1346] _Ibid._, No. 300, Norris to Cecil, June 14, 1569.

[1347] _Ibid._, No. 286, June 3, 1569. He required Charles IX, in the
name of the empire, to withdraw his troops from Metz (_ibid._, No. 286,
Norris to Cecil, June 3, 1569; _ibid._, No. 305, Mundt to Cecil, from
Frankfourt [?], June 23, 1569).

[1348] _C. S. P. For._, No. 286, June 3, 1569; Claude Haton, II, 692.
Marguerite herself is evidence for this: “La maison de Montmorency
aient ceux qui en avaient porté les premières paroles.”—_Mém. de
Marguerite de Navarre_ (ed. Guisson, 23), 24.

[1349] “Depuis que je y suis, jé fayst marcher vostre armaye en tele
diligense, que cet les reystres eusent vole u marcher jeudi, le jour
de la feste Dyeu, je me pouvès dyre le plus heureuse femme du monde,
et vostre frère le plus glorieux, car vous eusiés heu la fin de cete
guere, aystent réduis le duc de Dus Pons.”—Catherine de Médicis à
Charles IX de Limoges, 12 juin 1569, Fillon Collection, No. 127.

[1350] The duke of Deuxponts died on June 11, 1569, of excessive
drinking. See Janssen, VIII, 50; D’Aubigné, III, 69, note 1; Jean
de Serres, 364; _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 208.
Fortunately for the Huguenots his death made little difference in
the disposition of his army, for Wolrad of Mansfeldt, his able
lieutenant, succeeded to the command. His prudence saved the reiters
after the battle of Moncontour (see Niemarn, _Geschichte der Grafen v.
Mansfeldt_, 1834).

[1351] D’Aubigné, III, 73, 74: a graphic account; cf. _Bulletin de la
Soc. archéol. et hist. du Limousin_, IV.

“On l’appela _arquebuse à croc_ quand on l’eut munie d’un axe de
rotation reposant sur une fourchette ou _croc_ et facilitant le
pointage. L’arquebuse à croc était souvent d’un poids considérable.
Elle lançait parfois des balles de plomb de 8, 12 et 13 livres.
Jusqu’au commencement du XVI^[e] siècle, on mettait le feu à la charge au
moyen d’une mèche allumée que le coulevrinier portait enroulée autour
du bras droit. A Pavie, les Espagnols se servirent d’une arquebuse
perfectionnée par eux, dans laquelle la mèche était mise en contact
avec l’amorce pour faire partir le coup, au moyen d’un _serpentin_,
sorte de pince qu’une détente faisait agir, sans que le pointage en
fût dérangé. Disposer la mèche à la longueur voulue, en aviver le feu
avant de tirer constituait l’opération de maniement d’arme designée
sous ce nom compasser la mèche.”—_La grande encyclopédie_, III, art.
“Arquebuse.”

[1352] La Popelinière, Book XVII; D’Aubigné, III, 80, 81.

[1353] D’Aubigné, Book V, chap, xii; Jean de Serres, 355, 356.

[1354] Schomberg offered to make a levy of 4,000 Poles; 8,000 Swiss
were asked of the Catholic cantons (_C. S. P. For._, No. 351, July
27, 1569). To support them Paris was mulcted for 700,000 francs and
confiscation of Protestant lands to the crown eked out the balance
(_ibid._, No. 355, July 29, 1569).

The following summary from Sir Henry Norris’ letter to Queen Elizabeth
sets forth the government’s fiscal policy at this time: “On the 1st
instant the king went to the Palais, where in the end, the Parlement
made a general arrest of all the goods, lands, and offices of those who
bore arms against the king, and that all their lands held in fee—or
knight-service—should revert to the crown; and that for the other
lands, first there should be alienated for the sum of 50,000 crowns
by the year, and given to the clergy, in recompense of their demesne,
which the king had license to sell, and the remainder bestowed on such
as had suffered loss by the religion and done service in these wars.
It is accounted that this attainture will amount to 2,000,000 francs
a year. The same day they made sale, by sound of trumpet, of the
admiral’s goods in Paris. Some moved to have him executed in effigy,
which was thought unmeet, as serving only to irritate him to proceed
the more extremely. The king borrows 300,000 £ and offers to perpetuate
the Councillors of Parlement’s offices to their children, on their
giving a certain sum of money; besides this they tax all citizens
throughout the realm to make great contributions. The cardinals of
Bourbon and Lorraine, to show an example to the clergy, have offered to
sell 4,000 £ rent of the monasteries of St. Germain and St. Denis” (_C.
S. P. For._, No. 375, August 5, 1569).

[1355] D’Aubigné, II, 38, 39.

[1356] Louise de Bourbon, abbess de Fontevrault, daughter of François,
comte de Vendôme, and of Marie de Luxembourg, died in 1575.

[1357] For a graphic description of Poitiers in the sixteenth century
see Ouvré, _Histoire de Poitiers_, 24, 25.

[1358] _Rel. vén._, II, 271.

[1359] All the historians narrate the history of the siege of Poitiers
(see Claude Haton, II, 375 ff.; La Popelinière, Book XVII; D’Aubigné,
Book V, chap, v; Claude Haton, II, 534; De Thou, Book XLV; Liberge,
_Ample discourse de ce qui s’est fait au siège de Poitiers_, 1569, new
ed., 1846, by Beauchet-Felleau; _Mém., de Jean d’Antras_, ed. Cansalade
and Tamizey de Larroque, 1880; see also Whitehead, _Gaspard de Coligny,
Admiral of France_, 215, 216; Babinet, _Mém. de la Soc. des antiq. de
l’ouest_, séries II, Vol. XI). The story of the siege is also related
in an unpublished letter of Charles IX to the duke of Nevers, September
10, 1569, F. Fr., 3,159, No. 195.

[1360] Catherine de Medici to the duke of Anjou: approving of his false
attack upon Châtellerault (see Appendix XVIII), not published in the
_Correspondance_.

[1361] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 595.

[1362] Both La Noue, chap, xxvi, and D’Aubigné, III, 119, emphasize the
condition of the army.

[1363] The custom of kissing the ground at the moment of charging
the enemy seems to have been peculiar to the Swiss and the Germans
(D’Aubigné, Book V, chap. xvii, 120; Brantôme, VI, 221 and 522).

[1364] Claude Haton, II, 581.

[1365] Claude Haton, II, 585.

[1366] _Ibid._, 582.

[1367] La Noue, chap. xxvi. Both Henry and Louis of Nassau were in
this engagement, the latter having quitted his university studies
for war.—Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 117; _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 323.

[1368] Jean de Serres, 526, 527. See the letter of Norris, December 19,
1569, Appendix XIX.

[1369] Delaborde, III, 162.

[1370] _Mém. de Condé_, I, 207; D’Aubigné, III, 113, 114; _Arch.
cur._, séries I, VI, 875. Pius V’s letter of felicitation to the queen
mother, October 17, 1569, characterizes Coligny as “hominem unum omnium
fallacissimum, execrandaeque memoriae, Gasparem de Coligny, qui se pro
istius regni admirante gerit.”—Potter, _Pie V_, 67, ed. Gouban, Book
III, letter 43, p. 236. The admiral’s office had been declared vacant
on July 15, 1569 (Coll. Godefroy, CCLVII, No. 69).

[1371] _C.S.P. For._, Nos. 456, 459, 464, 486, October 5, 6, 10, 27,
1569. This was far from paying the reiters what the government owed
them. They had been serving for thirteen months and received pay
but for three; 2,000,000 crowns were still owing (_ibid._, No. 543,
December 19, 1569).

[1372] On the resistance of St. Jean-d’Angély see D’Aubigné, Book V,
chap. xix; La Noue, chap. xxvii; La Popelinière, Book XX.

[1373] _Ibid._, No. 511, November 21, 1569. Both the duke of Alençon
and the princess Marguerite, Henry IV’s future wife, were among the
number. The disease was smallpox (_ibid._, No. 502, November 3, No.
543, December 19, 1569).

[1374] Delaborde, III, 72; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 608.

[1375] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 514, 515, 576, November 24, 25, 1569.

[1376] _C. S. P., For._, November 24, 1569, Jeanne d’Albret to the
princes of Navarre and Condé. Not in Rochambeau, _Lettres d’Antoine de
Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret_.

[1377] An awkward delay occurred at this time owing to the fact that
Teligny’s safe-conduct provided for his coming to the King, but made
no statement as to his departure. On December 14 the queen of Navarre
and her son demanded “un passeport plus ample” from the King. When it
came with a revised form, negotiations were resumed (_Commentaires et
lettres de Montluc_, III, 263, note; _C. S. P. For._, No. 643, January,
1570. For details of these protracted negotiations see La Popelinière,
Book XXII; Delaborde, III, 176 ff.). In Appendix XX will be found a
long document consisting of a great number of articles proposed by
the queen of Navarre, the princes of Navarre and Condé, and the other
chiefs of the Huguenot party, for the pacification of France, and
divided under the heads of religion, restitution of goods and estates,
council and justice, arms, and finances, together with measures to be
taken to insure the performance of the edict (February 4, 1570).

[1378] _C. S. P. For._, No. 644, January 1570, articles sent by the
queen of Navarre to the King.

[1379] _Hist. du Lang._, V, 508, note. The parlement of Toulouse was a
special object of criticism by the Huguenots. In the act of peace they
were exempted from its jurisdiction.

[1380] _C. S. P. For._, No. 672, February 3, 1570; cf. _R. Q. H._,
XLII, 112-15, copied from Record Office; Delaborde, _Coligny_, III, 180.

[1381] _C. S. P. For._, No. 682, February 10, 1570. Not in Rochambeau.

[1382] _Ibid._, No. 674, February 5, 1570. This information had been
conveyed to Jeanne d’Albret by a packet which had been intercepted
(_ibid._, No. 689, February 17, 1570).

[1383] Waddington, “La France et les Protestants allemands sous Charles
IX et Henri III,” _Revue Hist._, XLII, 256 ff.

[1384] The queen of Navarre to Charles IX. Has received his letter
and communicated his reply to her son and nephew, and the noblemen
who are with them. Assures him that it is impossible for them to live
without the free exercise of their religion, which in the end he will
be constrained to grant, and declares that all those who advise him
otherwise are no true subjects to him (_C. S. P. Spain_, No. 683,
February 11, 1570). Not in Rochambeau.

[1385] De Thou definitely says Paris and the court were indifferent as
to the fate of the remoter provinces so long as the war did not touch
them too (Vol. VI, Book XLVII, p. 37).

[1386] “Compertum nobis est nullam esse Satanae cum filiis lucis
communionem; ita inter catholicos quidem et haereticos nullam
compositionem, nisi fictam fallaciisque plenissimam, fieri posse pro
certo habemus.”—Potter, _Pie V_, 86 (ed. Gouban), Book 4, letter I, p.
269; Pius V to Charles IX, January 29, 1570. At p. 272 is a letter in a
similar vein to the duke of Anjou, written on the same day.

[1387] De Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, VII, 184, note;
V, 135; letter of Montluc, October 31, 1568.

[1388] _Ibid._, IV, 335.

[1389] It is to be regretted that there is no monograph upon the
history of these viscounts. It would be quite worth doing. Communay,
_Les Huguenots dans le Béarn et la Navarre_, and Durier, _Les Huguenots
en Bigorre_, 1884, are valuable collections of documents. The sources
are largely in the local archives of Upper Languedoc, Guyenne, Quercy,
the Agenois, and Rouergue. My information is gathered entirely from the
two works named above and Montluc; D’Aubigné; _Hist. du Languedoc_, V;
Courteault, _Blaise de Montluc_, Paris, 1908; and Marlet, _Le comte de
Montgomery_, Paris, 1890.

[1390] _Hist. du Lang._, V, 155, 156.

[1391] De Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, IV, 354, 399,
note.

[1392] _Hist. du Lang._, V, 501; _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_,
II, 399, note; V, 268 note.

[1393] _Hist. du Lang._, V, 495.

[1394] _Hist. du Lang._, V, 495, 496; La Popelinière, Book XIII.

[1395] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 208.

In _State Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, Vol. CXV, No. 990 is a document
showing the provinces held by the Protestants. It is undated but the
mention of the viscounts in it shows that it is of this time (printed
in Appendix XXI).

[1396] _Hist. du Lang._, V, 576, note.

[1397] Bordenave, 166; _Hist. du Lang._, V, 575.

[1398] Bordenave, _Hist. de Béarn et de Navarre_, 268-77.

[1399] Olhagaray, _Histoire de Foix, de Navarre et de Béarn_ (1609),
578, however, gives the date March 4.

[1400] Bordenave, _Histoire de Béarn et de Navarre_, 216.

[1401] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 245.

[1402] In F. Fr., 15,558, fol. 293, is a memoir of Jean de Montluc to
the King, of July, 1569, enumerating the munitions and provisions of
the army before Navarrens.

[1403] _Mém. de Gaches_, 90.

[1404] I do not know that the actual text of this joint commission
is known. Montgomery, in his letter at this time styled himself as
follows: Lieutenant-général du roy en Guyenne, despuis la cousté de
la Dordoigne jusques aux Pyrénées, en l’absence et sous l’autorité
de messeigneurs les princes de Navarre et de Condé, lieutenant
et protecteur de Sa Majesté, conservateur de ses édits et aussi
lieutenant-général de la reine de Navarre en son comté de Bigorre!—De
Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 266, note.

[1405] Montgomery’s itinerary is printed in Appendix XXII.

The two parts of Montgomery’s expedition south of the Dordogne, first
the union with the viscounts, and second, the campaign against Terride
are to be distinguished, although they have been much confounded.

The sources and authorities for the history of this brief war are:
Communay, _Les Huguenots dans le Béarn et la Navarre_; Durier, _Les
Huguenots en Bigorre_; Bordenave, _Hist. de Béarn et de Navarre_, Book
VII; Montluc, _Comment. et Lettres_, III, Book VII, pp. 254-89, and his
letters for September, 1569 in Vol. V, pp. 164 ff.; D’Aubigné, Book V,
chap. xiv; La Popelinière, Book XVIII; _Hist. du Lang._, V, 578-87;
Dupleix, _Histoire de France_—his father was one of Montluc’s captains
and for some time marshal of the camp to Biron in Guyenne; Marlet,
_Le comte de Montgomery_; Courteault, _Blaise de Montluc_, chap. xi.
The baron de Ruble, ed. Montluc, V, 211, note, says: “Les documents
inédits sont presque innombrables. Outre les lettres conservées à la
Bibliothèque Nationale, principalement dans la collection Harlay, St.
Germain, vol. 323 et suivants, nous citerons, aux archives de Pau la
série B 952 à 958: les registres consulaires d’Auch, les registres
de Larcher aux archives de Tarbes, les registres consulaires de
Bagnères-de-Bigorre.” The local archives of Bigorre contain many of
Montgomery’s letters. Some of them have been published in _Arch. de la
Gascogne_, VI.

[1406] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 286.

[1407] _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 164.

[1408] Damville ignored the railings of Montluc until November, when
he wrote to the King in vindication of himself, giving a full account
of their campaign against Montgomery (De Ruble, _Commentaires et
lettres de Montluc_, V, 243-57, notes; Coll. Godefroy, CCLVII, Nos.
75 and 84. The first is printed in _Archives de la Gironde_, II, 148;
_Hist. du Lang._, V, 521, note 2; the latter is given in tome XII,
preuves, note 304). Damville seems to have anticipated an inquiry,
for he carefully laid aside all of Montluc’s letters from May 26 to
October 22, 1569. On February 27, 1570, Damville sent the King a
stinging indictment of Montluc’s course. In it he declared Montluc was
a rash impostor and accused him of forcing the people of Guyenne to
pay unjust ransoms; of violating women; of misusing public moneys; and
asserted that he courted investigation of his own conduct (De Ruble,
_Montluc_, III, 394; V, 269, and notes; _Hist. du Lang._, V, 529, note
3; the letter was first published by Le Laboureur in the _Additions
to Castelnau_, II, 130, from a copy in the Dupuy Coll., Vol. 755. M.
Tamizey de Larroque discovered the original in the Coll. Godefroy in
the Bib. de l’Institut). Most men of the time, however, deplored the
contest between these two Catholic chiefs of the south, without taking
sides (see _Archives de la Gironde_, II, 148). Montluc’s Spanish spy,
Bardaxi, naturally reproaches Damville (K. 1,574, No. 154). Probably
no judgment may fairly be pronounced until all the sources have been
carefully examined. A life of Damville is a work sorely needed; it is a
rich subject for some historical student.

The recent work of M. Courteault, _Blaise de Montluc_, 538-40, 551-53,
557-59, goes at length into this feud between Montluc and Damville. In
the main the author sides with the marshal—“Damville acceptait les
faits accomplis et ne jugeait pas utile de combattre Mongonmery” (p.
551). He declares that “prudemmement, il [Montluc] a passé dans son
livre ce grave incident sous silence” (p. 551). He admits, however,
that if the King had ordered an investigation Damville would have had
something to answer for (p. 559).

There are numerous letters of Charles IX to Montluc in the St.
Petersburg archives. In them Charles harps upon the disagreeable
conduct of Montluc toward Jeanne d’Albret, and tries at one and the
same time to repress the queen’s indefatigable propaganda lest it anger
Spain, and to restrain Montluc because of his outrageous conduct and
the illustrious blood of the queen of Navarre (La Ferrière, _Rapport_,
22.) Letters of the marshal Montmorency and of marshal Damville are
also in this volume. Those of the latter cover the history of all the
campaigns of Montgomery in Béarn. He condemns Montluc for the death
of Terride. The marshal’s laconic language is strikingly in contrast
with Montluc’s rhetorical complaint (La Ferrière, _Rapport_, 44). If we
may believe Brantôme, “dans toutes les guerres Montluc gagna la pièce
d’argent; auparavant il n’avoit pas grandes finances, et se trouva
avoir dans ses coffres cent mille escus.” Charles IX once sharply
reminded Montluc in a letter of November, 1562, that he was getting
500 livres per month for his table. (La Ferrière, _Blaise de Montluc
d’après sa correspondance inédite_, Mém. lus à la Sorbonne, 1864.)

[1409] Coligny was quick to seize the opportunity afforded in the
south to continue the war there until the crown came to terms with
the Huguenots. After the King’s capture of St. Jean-d’Angély, Coligny
crossed the Loire to join Montgomery (cf. Delaborde. III, 157, 161,
169, 170; _Montluc_, III, 347, October; _C. S. P. For._, No. 577,
December, 1569; Letters from La Rochelle to the cardinal of Châtillon).
The cardinal has received letters from his brother the admiral, dated
from Montauban November 22, informing him that the princes are well,
that their army is increasing, that the reiters are content and
have received pay, and that there is no difficulty in joining with
Montgomery and the viscounts. Their army will consist of 6,500 horse
and 12,000 arquebusiers. For the proclamation issued from Montauban
see Appendix XXIII. In _C. S. P. For._, No. 667, January, 1570, is an
extract of a letter from La Rochelle, describing the position of the
armies of the admiral and the count of Montgomery, who are on either
bank of the Garonne, and in good spirits and health.

[1410] De Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 263, 264.
Letter of Montluc to Charles IX, January 9, 1570. He writes almost
broken hearted.

[1411] So great was the desolation inflicted that the King was obliged
to remit the _taille_ in Agenois (_Arch. municip. d’Agen reg. consul._,
fol. 262). The Protestants were so encouraged that even those living
in Agen, Montluc’s own town, dared to revolt (_Bull. du Com. de la
langue et de l’hist. de France_, I, 478; _Reg. munic. d’Agen_, fol.
254). An interesting comparison might be made between the rules for the
government of the camp issued by Coligny at this time—they are in K.
1,575, No. 7—and those issued by the prince of Condé at Orleans, in
April, 1562. For an example of the severe discipline in the Protestant
army see Claude Haton, II, 568; cf. De Thou, Book XXX.

[1412] De Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 74.

[1413] _Ibid._, 314.

[1414] De Ruble, _op. cit._, III, 315-29; Montluc’s sang-froid is
amazing as he writes.

[1415] Delaborde, III. 157, 161, 169, 170. Early in 1569 Montluc sent a
complaint to Charles IX protesting against this export of grain. This
trade redounded to the advantage of the commander of the Gascon coast,
who was a brother of the bishop of Agen, and Montluc’s complaint gave
rise to an acrimonious correspondence preserved in Coll. Harley St.
Germain, No. 323, which throws some light on the interesting question
of trade in the sixteenth century (see _Commentaires et lettres de
Montluc_, III, 395, note).

[1416] See Montluc’s observations in III, 368, 369. He gives a spirited
account on p. 367 of an attack of the reiters on Monbrun, describing
the way they fought in the close quarters of a town.

[1417] _C. S. P. For._, No. 543, December 19, 1569.

[1418] Ruble, _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 262.

[1419] He took it long before historians attributed the honor to him
(_ibid._, 382).

[1420] _Ibid._, 366.

[1421] “Il devoit considérer l’importance de la place qui estoit sur
deux rivières.”—_Ibid._

[1422] _Ibid._, V, 266.

[1423] All this happened on the night of December 15 and 16
(_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 384, 385). De Thou, V, Book
XLV, 666-68, and Popelinière, Book XXII, both tell the tale. A learned
dissertation in _Hist. du Lang._, XII, note 5, clears up a number of
obscure points in these accounts.

[1424] The last of them got across by January 3, 1570 (_Montluc_, III,
384-91, and his letter of January 9, in V, 261-64).

[1425] For a description of Blaye see _Rel. vén._, I, 22, 23.

[1426] For a description of Brouage see _Rel. vén._, I, 27.

[1427] The sources are unanimous on this point, both Protestant
and Catholic (La Noue, _Disc. polit. et milit._, chap. xxix; La
Popelinière, Book XXII; Montluc, _Comment._, III, 395; Brantôme, ed.
Lalanne, IV, 322; _Hist. du Lang._, V, 527-29, note; Delaborde, III,
189). The outrages of the reiters were so great that a special order of
the day was required to govern their conduct (see K. 1,575, No. 17).

[1428] During the nine months which elapsed between the battle of
Moncontour and the peace of St. Germain, the Huguenot army marched over
300 leagues.

[1429] La Popelinière, Book XXII; La Noue, chap. xxix; _Revue hist._,
II, 542, 543.

[1430] La Noue’s observation on this point is curious; cf. Delaborde,
III, 205.

[1431] Cf. Elizabeth’s declarations of neutrality to Norris, (_C.
S. P., For._, No. 704, February 23, 1570). Across the Channel the
cardinal of Châtillon did all he could to secure the support of the
English queen for the Huguenots (_ibid._, No. 742, the cardinal
to Cecil, March 9, 1570; cf. Delaborde, _Coligny_, III, 185); La
Ferrière, _Le XVI^[e] siècle et les Valois_, 254-56; and a letter of the
cardinal to the prince of Orange, April 23, 1570, (_Arch. de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 373-77). But it was not from England direct, but
from Germany, under the stimulus of English gold, that France looked
for assistance to come to the Huguenots (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 476,
February 26, 1570).

[1432] See Appendix XXIV.

[1433] _State Papers, Foreign_, Elizabeth, Vol. CXII, No. 693 J, the
cardinal of Lorraine to——. May 4, 1570, see Appendix XXV.

[1434] _Coll. des autographes de M. Picton_, No. 67. Order signed by
the cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon, and Pellevé, June 24, 1570, for the
alienation of 50,000 _écus de rente_ of the property of the church.

[1435] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 332.

[1436] The actual document is still preserved in the Archives
nationales, K. 1,725, No. 41. It is dated June 16, 1570, and
countersigned by L’Aubespine.

[1437] He borrowed 4,000 livres, chiefly in Bordeaux; the munitions
came from Toulouse and Bayonne. The provinces were required to furnish
the supplies (_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 400). The
consular registers of Agen and Auch still preserve the records of his
requisitions. According to the report of a Spanish spy, in K. 1,576,
No. 5, the forces consisted of 10,000 footmen, 1,500 horse, and 18
pieces of artillery. This is surely exaggerated. His _Commentaires_
imply that his men were few in number and he expressly says that he was
short of munitions and artillery.

[1438] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 401.

[1439] _Commentaries of Blaise de Montluc_, translated by Cotton,
368, 369. This occurred on July 23, 1570. To consummate Montluc’s
humiliation, Charles IX filled his place, without giving him
opportunity to resign, by appointing the marquis de Villars to be his
successor. He did not reach Guyenne until October 22. In the meantime
his brother, Jean de Montluc, bishop of Valence, and _commissaire des
finances_ in Guyenne, and as much a Politique as the other was a bigot,
exercised authority for him. Gascony was governed by the seigneur de
Vigues (_Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, III, 434).

[1440] _C. S. P. Spain_, No. 687, February 15, 1570.

[1441] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 1,023, June 20, 1570, La Noue to the
cardinal of Châtillon; _ibid._, No. 1,107, July 22, 1570; Hauser, _La
Noue_, 20-22. He received the name “Iron Arm” (Bras-de-fer) from the
circumstance that he afterward wore a mechanism made of iron, with
which, at least, he was able to guide his horse.

[1442] On Coligny’s campaign in Rouergue and the Cévennes in the spring
of 1570, see _Revue hist._, II, 537-39, letters of the cardinal of
Armagnac of April 1, April 11, and May 10.

[1443] Delaborde, III, 209-15.

[1444] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 618.

[1445] The parlement of Toulouse strongly protested against the edict
(_Hist. du Lang._, V, 538, note 5). The Peace of St. Germain was
registered by the Parlement on August 11, 1570 (_C. S. P. For._, August
11, 1570; cf. Delaborde, III, 230, 231). The Pope wrote with mingled
alarm and regret over the Peace of St. Germain to the cardinals of
Bourbon and Lorraine, on September 23, 1570 (Potter, _Pie V_, 103, 107,
ed. Gouban, Book IV, letter 7, pp. 282, 285).

[1446] For an excellent discussion of the feudal interests and policy
of the Huguenots in the civil wars, see Weill, _Les théories sur le
pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de religion_, 73-80.

[1447] See the letter of the papal nuncio to Philip II, June 26, 1570,
in Appendix XXVI. The Pope had protested even earlier than this (brief
of Pius V to the cardinal of Lorraine, March 2, 1570, disapproving
of the conditions of peace). The King, even if vanquished, ought not
to have consented to such detestable terms. The Pope’s sorrow is
the greater because of the cardinal’s assent to them (La Ferrière
_Rapport_, 55).

[1448] In 1562 on account of fear lest the Moriscos might enter into
relation with the Moors of Africa, the government of Spain forbade the
use of arms among them. In 1567 an attempt was made to suppress their
language and abolish their national customs. A terrible war ensued. Don
John of Austria finally suppressed the revolt after it had lasted for
ten years. But in 1570, in anticipation of a Turkish attack from the
west the Moors again rebelled and Spain had to compromise (_Archives de
la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 361; cf. Lea, _The Moriscos of Spain_).

[1449] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 485, July 20, 1570.

[1450] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 439.

[1451] “Montmorency bears the vogue in court.”—_C. S. P. For._, No.
1,216, Norris to the Queen, August 31, 1570. To enhance his prestige at
this time, Montmorency’s claim of right of precedence at court which
the duke of Mayenne contested was decided by the Privy Council in his
favor (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,083, July 9, 1570).

[1452] Christopher de Thou to the King, December 2, 1570 defending the
Parlement against the accusation that it is unjust to the Calvinists:
“Mais un tel crime et si execrable ne se scauroit asses punir, et
seroit plus tost à craindre que nous fussions reprehensibles de trop
grande rémission que de grand severité, qu’ils appelent cruauté.”
He and his colleagues wish that the duke of Anjou might enter into
possession of his appanage in order that the duchy of Alençon may be in
the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris and not in that of Normandy
(Collection la Jarriette, No. 2,796).

[1453] Sir Henry Norris under date of September 23, testifies that “the
state here is very quiet, where all strife and old grudges seem utterly
buried, and men live in good hope of the continuance thereof, since
the occasioner of all the troubles [the cardinal of Lorraine] in this
realm is out of credit” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,285, Norris to Cecil).
The reiters in the course of their return home, pillaged the fair of
Champagne (Claude Haton, II, 592 and note).

[1454] Thirty articles complaining of infractions of the Edict of
Pacification, and desiring that they may be redressed, with the King’s
answers in the margin (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,323, October, 1570).

[1455] _Ibid._, No. 1,359. Pierre Ramus was excluded from the College
of Presles by this decree.

[1456] Ordonnance du Roy sur les defences de tenir Escolles,
Principaultez, Colleges; ny lire en quelque art; ou science que ce
soit, en public, privé ou en chambre, s’ilz ne sont congenuz et
approuvez esté de la Religion catholique et romaine. Avec l’Arrest de
la court du Parlement. Poictiers, B. Noscereau, 1570.

[1457] Claude Haton, II, 610 and 617.

[1458] _Ibid._, 629.

[1459] _Ibid._, 740.

[1460] The vidame of Chartres to the Marshal Montmorency, October 3,
1570. See Appendix XXVII. The scheme originated with the vidame de
Chartres and the cardinal Châtillon (see La Ferrière, “Les projets de
marriage d’une reine d’Angleterre,” _Revue des deux mondes_, September
15, 1881, p. 310); cf. Hume, _Courtships of Queen Elizabeth_, 115. In
1563 the prince of Condé had actually proposed the marriage of Charles
IX and Elizabeth (_Revue des deux mondes_). August 15, 1881, p. 861.

[1461] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,521, January 27, 1571. Walsingham to
Cecil.

[1462] Such an offer, in the nature of things, could not have been
accepted. Aside from the fact that France at this juncture was
unwilling to further any cause advocated by Spain, there was too much
practical advantage to France in maintaining the _entente cordiale_
with the Turks. Turkish influence might be brought to bear upon the
Emperor to neutralize his opposition to French enterprise in Poland;
moreover, France had but recently concluded an advantageous commercial
treaty with the Sultan. For accounts of the relations of France and
Turkey at this time see Du Ferrier, _Un ambassadeur liberal sous
Charles IX et Henri III_, 44-102; Flament, “La France et la Ligue
contre le Turc (1571-73),” _Rev. d’hist. dip._, XVI, 1902, p. 619;
Janssen, _History of the German People_, VIII, chap. v, “Turkish
wars up to 1572.” The league of the Christian powers, whose efforts
culminated in the famous engagement of Lepanto was formed in May, 1571.
The king of Spain, the Pope and Venice were the principals thereof.
Spain was to provide one-half of the forces, the Venetians one-third,
and the Pope the remainder. The capture of Cyprus by the Turks in the
spring of 1570 was the immediate cause of its formation (cf. _La vraye
et très fidelle narration des succès, des assaults, defences et prinse
du royaume de Cypre_, faicte par F. Ange de Lusignan, Paris 1580;
_Commentari della guerra di Cipro e della lega dei principi cristiani
contro il Turco_, di Bartolomeo Sereno, 1845; Herre, _Europäische
Politik in cyprischen Krieg_, 1570-73, Leipzig, 1902—there is a
review of this in _English Hist. Review_, XIX, 357; Miller, “Greece
under the Turks 1571-1684,” _English Hist. Review_, XIX, 646). Europe
expected a double attack on the part of Mohammedanism, both in the
Mediterranean and by land against Hungary and Transylvania, as in 1530.
Venice trembled for Zara in Dalmatia. These fears were not misplaced.
The warlike preparations of the Sultan went so far as to offer pardon
to all malefactors, except rebels and counterfeiters, who would serve
in the galleys. The allied fleet lay at Candia during the winter of
1570-71 awaiting reinforcements. But there was a vast amount of anxiety
and discontent among the allies, for nothing but the sense of a common
peril could have united Venice and Spain, or Venice and the Pope. In
the politics of Europe Venice was a neutral power, and neutrality in
the religious politics of the time, in Philip II’s eyes, was almost
tantamount to heresy. Moreover, as was inevitable, the tediousness
of the preparations and the corruption of officials of the fleet was
so great that men even died of hunger inflicted through fraud. Only
Venice’s administration seems to have been efficient.

[1463] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 150.

[1464] _Négociations dans le Levant_, III, 13.

[1465] _L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 261, 267.

[1466] _Dépêches de M. Fourquevaux_, II, 28; III, 41.

[1467] Sir Thomas Smith, the English ambassador in France, described
her in January, 1571 as “a pretty little lady, but fair and
well-favored.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 8.

[1468] Even at the official ceremony (Godefroi, _Ceremonial français_,
II, 20) of betrothal in the cathedral at Speyer the latent hostility
of France and Spain was manifested. The Spanish ambassador refused
to give precedence to the ambassador of Charles IX, and so absented
himself, the Venetian envoy being compelled to do the same, because
of the alliance between these two powers (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,355,
Cobham to Cecil, October 22, 1570). For other details cf. Nos. 1,267,
1,275, 1,377, 1,430. On the negotiations see _Mém. de Castelnau_ (ed.
Le Laboureur), II, Book VI, 467.

[1469] _Rel. vén._, II, 255. Killigrew in a letter to Lord Burghley,
December 29, 1571, shrewdly observed, à propos of the change, that
“divers of the followers of Guise have not letted to say that the duke
of Alva knew the way to Paris’ gates.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,196.
For an example of Biragues’ intriguing, and this of the most shameful
sort, in connection with the proposed marriage of Henry of Navarre and
Marguerite of Valois see La Ferrière, _Rapport_, 43. The Huguenots had
hoped for L’Hôpital’s recall.—_Nég. Tosc._, III, 641.

[1470] Janssen, _History of the German People_, VIII, 117 ff.

[1471] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,590, March 5, 1571.

[1472] This is the keen observation of the Venetian ambassador (cf. _C.
S. P. Ven._, 515, August 1, 1571).

[1473] The duke of Montmorency to Lord Burghley, May 20, 1571, see
Appendix XXVIII. On the whole negotiation see La Ferrière, “Elisabeth
et le duc d’Anjou,” _Revue des deux mondes_, August 15, 1881, p. 857;
September 15, 1881, p. 307.

[1474] The words were used to De Foix (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,632,
April 1, 1571, Walsingham to Burghley).

[1475] _Ibid._, No. 1,739, May 25, 1571; No. 1,813, Francis Walsingham
to Lord Burghley: He told her that he had delivered a form of the
English prayers to Monsieur de Foix, which form the Pope would have
by council confirmed as Catholic if the Queen would have acknowledged
the same as received from him (Note in margin, “an offer made by the
Cardinal of Lorraine as Sir N. Throgmorton showed me”). That the Queen
was bound to prefer the tranquillity of her realm before all other
respects. There was never before offered to France like occasion of
benefit and reputation.

[1476] Report of conference between Walsingham and De Foix, _C. S. P.
For._, No. 1,732, May 25, 1571.

[1477] Anecdote reported by Walsingham to Burghley, _C. S. P., For._,
No. 1,813, June 21, 1571.

[1478] _Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 576, August 16, 1571; _ibid._, _For._, No.
1,928, August 17, 1571.

[1479] _Ibid._, No. 1,883, July 27, 1571. De Foix and Montgomery were
deeply discouraged, the former protesting to Walsingham that he had
“never travailled more earnestly in any matter in his life” (_ibid._,
No. 1,732). “The queen mother never wept so much since the death of her
husband” (_ibid._, No. 1,886, July 30, 1571). “The queen mother was in
tears.... M. de Limoges said that ... he never saw the King in greater
chafe, and the Queen Mother wept hot tears” (_ibid._, January 8, 1572).

[1480] _Ibid._, No. 1,886, July 30, 1571.

[1481] _C. S. P. For._, No. 20, January 7, 1572.

[1482] _C. S. P. For._, No. 23, January 9, 1572, Smith to Burghley.

[1483] The Queen to Walsingham: Directs him to express her great regret
to the French king and the queen mother that she cannot assent to their
proposal brought by M. de Montmorency for her marriage with the duke of
Alençon, and to assure them that the only impediments arise from the
great disparity in their age, and from the bad opinion that the world
might conceive of her thereby (_C. S. P. For._, No. 496, July 20, 1572;
cf. No. 375, May 25, instructions to the earl of Lincoln).

[1484] This objection was one so difficult to make without giving
offense that it required all the delicacy of the English envoys to say
anything at all. In _C. S. P. For._, No. 494 under date of July 20,
1572, will be found a draft of instructions to Walsingham in Burghley’s
handwriting on this matter, and by him endorsed: “Not sent.” Burghley
evidently preferred to leave this delicate subject to his sovereign.
See the queen to Walsingham, _ibid._, No. 502, July 23, 1572, printed
in full by Digges, p. 226.

[1485] Smith’s comments to Burghley are candor itself. “These two
brethren be almost become ‘Capi de Guelphi et Gibellini.’ The one has
his suite all Papists, the other is the refuge and succour of all the
Huguenots, a good fellow and lusty prince.”—_Ibid._, No. 23, January
9, 1572. He glosses over Alençon’s imperfections by the remark that “he
is not so tall or fair as his brother, but that is as is fantasied,”
and adds: “Then he is not so obstinate, papistical, and restive like a
mule as his brother is.”—_Ibid._, No. 28, January 10, 1572.

[1486] See below for details of this treaty. Coligny’s letter is
analyzed in _C. S. P. For._, No. 500, July 22, 1572 (not in Delaborde).

[1487] La Ferté to——; draft, endd. by Burghley: Windsor, 6th
September, 1572.—_C. S. P. For._, No. 555.

[1488] _C. S. P. For._, No. 502, July 23, 1572, the Queen to Walsingham.

[1489] Walsingham to Lord Burghley: “ ... and if he sees no hope then
to further what he may the league.”—_C. S. P. For._, January 17, 1572;
_Hatfield Papers_, II, 46.

[1490] Charles IX to M. de la Mothe-Fenelon: Directs him to inform the
queen of England that the duke of Alva does all he can to encourage the
500 or 600 English refugees in Flanders in their enterprise against
England, in which they will be assisted by Lord Seton with 2,000 Scots,
who have determined to seize on the prince of Scotland, and send him
into Spain. Directs him and M. de Croc to watch and do all in their
power to frustrate this design (_C. S. P. For._, No. 330, May 2, 1572;
cf. Introd., xii, xiii and No. 257).

[1491] On the efforts of Alva to revive the commerce of Flanders see
D’Aubigné, Book V, chap. xxxii, p. 265; _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 94, 95,
January 28 and 31, 1572; Motley, _Rise of the Dutch Republic_, chap.
v; Altmeyer, _Histoire des relations commerciales des Pays-Bas avec
le Nord pendant le XVI siècle_; Bruxelles, 1840; Reiffenberg, _De
l’etat de la population, des fabriques et des manufactures des Pays-Bas
pendant le XV^[e] et le XVI^[e] siècle_, Bruxelles, 1822.

[1492] “The answer of the Merchant Adventurers to the French king’s
offer to establish a staple in France” in _C. S. P. For._, No. 515,
July, 1572: It would be no commodity for them to have a privilege in
France, as those things in which they are principally occupied, viz.,
white cloths, are chiefly uttered in Upper and Lower Germany. Besides,
if they alter their old settled trade, they would also have to seek
for dressers and dyers in a place unacquainted with the trade. It is
dangerous to have the vent of all the commodity of the realm in one
country, especially seeing the French have small trade to England.
There is besides such evil observance of treaties and so evil justice
in France. The drapers of France so much mislike the bringing of cloth
into France that they will not endure it, insomuch as January last, by
proclamation, all foreign cloth was banished. The converting of the
whole trade of England into France would be hurtful to the navy, for
that the ports there are so small that no great ship may enter.

For the Merchant Adventurers in the sixteenth century see Burgon, _Life
and Times of Sir Thomas Gresham_, I, 185-89.

[1493] _C. S. P. For._, No. 278, April 20, 1572, Queen Elizabeth to
Charles IX.

[1494] Walsingham, _ibid._, No. 135.

[1495] _Ibid._, No 143, September 26, 1571.

[1496] _Ibid._, No. 247.

[1497] Walsingham to Lord Burghley: Has been asked whether that
enterprise having good success, and the French king lending all his
forces to the conquest of Flanders, the queen of England would be
content to enter foot in Zealand, Middleburgh being delivered into
her hands. They fear that the French king will not be content with
Flanders, whatsoever is promised (_C. S. P. For._, No. 2,202, December
31, 1571).

[1498] _Rel. vén._, I, 543; _C. S. P. For._, No. 687, February 15,
1570. Sir Henry Norris to Cecil. The King keeps his chamber, which they
marvel not at who know his diet.

[1499] For a character-sketch of Charles IX see Baschet, _La diplomatie
vénitienne_, 539-41; cf. _Rel. vén._, II, 43 and 161. Lord Buckhurst,
in a letter to Queen Elizabeth of March 4, 1571, gives an account
of one of Charles’ hunting parties in the Bois de Vincennes, which
illustrates his temperament. “After dinner,” he relates, “the King
rode to a warren of hares thereby, and after he had coursed with much
pastime, he flew to the partridge with a cast of very good falcons; and
that done, entered the park of Bois de Vincennes, replenished with some
store of fallow deer. Understanding that Lord Buckhurst had a leash of
greyhounds, he sent to him that he might put on his dogs to the deer,
which he did, but found that the deer ran better for their lives than
the dogs did for his pastime. After this the King and all the gentlemen
with him fell to a new manner of hunting, chasing the whole herd with
their drawn swords, on horseback, so far forth as they being embosked
were easily stricken and slain; they spared no male deer, but killed of
all sorts without respect, like hunters who sought not to requite any
part of their travail with delight to eat of the slain venison.”—_C.
S. P. For._, No. 1,589, March 4, 1571. In the spring of 1573 the
French consul in Alexandria sent Charles three trained leopards for
deer-hunting (Coll. Godefroy, CCLVI, No. 51). In June, 1571, the
King was somewhat seriously injured while hunting, by striking his
head against the branch of a tree (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,777, June
8, 1571). In March, 1572, he again was injured (letter of the King
to the duke of Anjou, March 21, 1572, in Coll. Pichon, No. 28). His
passion for the chase often led him to neglect the business of state,
conduct which Coligny once sharply reproved (_C. S. P. For._, No.
2,156, November 29, 1571), and he was frequently ill from fatigue or
exposure (_L’Ambassade de St. Sulpice_, 301). The King himself inspired
the French translation of a Latin treatise of the sixteenth century
on hunting, by Louis Leroy de Coutances, _Libre du roy Charles_.
His patronage also inspired another work on the same subject: “Du
Fouilloux, La Vénerie de lacques du Fouilloux, Gentilhomme, Seigneur
dudit lieu, pays de Gastine, en Poitou. Dédise au Roy Très-Chrestien
Charles, neufiesme de ce nom. Avec plusieurs Receptes et Remèdes pour
guérir les Chiens de diverses maladies. Avec Privilege du Roy. A
Poitiers, Par les de Marnefz, et Bouchetz, frères, circa 1565.” Charles
IX was also given to low practical jokes. For example this is reported
of him from Paris, September 18, 1573: The King, in an old cloak and
evil-favoured hat, withdrew himself “to a little house upon the bridge
from all the ladies, and there cast out money upon the people to get
them together, and made pastime to cast out buckets of water upon them
while they were scrambling for the money.”—_C. S. P. For._, Paris,
September 18, 1573.

[1500] Walsingham reported to Burghley in August 12, 1571: “This prince
is of far greater judgment than outwardly appears. There is none of any
account within his realm whose imperfections and virtues he knows not,”
although, he adds, “those who love him lament he is so overmuch given
to pleasure.”—_Ibid._, No. 1,921.

[1501] In May 1571 the Guises were in discredit. The duke went to
Joinville, the cardinal of Lorraine to Rheims, the duke of Mayenne
started for Turkey. Guise did not come back to Paris till January 1572
(Bouillé, _Histoire des ducs de Guises_, II, Book IV, chap. iv).

[1502] “He appeared at all hours near his majesty’s chair upon the same
terms as the lords who had never left the court” (_C. S. P. Ven._, No.
576, September 15, 1570). Coligny first became a member of the _conseil
du roi_ at this time (Soldan, _Vor d. St. Barthloomäusnacht_, 39).
Blois was practically the capital of France at this time. Paris was
avoided both to save creating suspicion among the Huguenots and because
of its Guisard sympathies. “He would change from white to black the
moment he was in Paris” said Walsingham of the King. Capefigue, _Hist.
de la réforme_, III, 92, points out Blois was “le siège naturel d’un
gouvernement qui voulait s’éloigner du catholocisme fervent. Placé à
quelques lieues d’Orleans, donnant la main à la Rochelle, et par la
Rochelle, se liant au Poitou, à la Saintonge, au Béarn.”

[1503] The King conceives of no other subject better than of the
admiral, and there is great hope that he will use him in matters of the
greatest trust, for he begins to see the insufficiency of others, some
being more addicted to others than to him, others more Spanish than
French, or given more to private pleasures than public affairs (_C. S.
P. For._, No. 1,921, August 12, 1571).

[1504] Alva to Philip II, April 5, May 22, 1572, in Gachard,
_Correspondance de Philippe II_, II, 239. In December, 1570, the
marshal Cossé was sent to La Rochelle. In March, 1571, Cossé and Biron
were sent a second time.

[1505] See Walsingham, Letter of August 12, 1571, to Leicester. He
gained a great ascendency over Charles IX (Languet, _Epist. ad Camer._,
132-36, 140. “Count Ludovic is the King’s avowed pensioner.”)—_C. S.
P. For._, No. 2,156, November 29, 1571. Some of his correspondence is
in _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III.

[1506] On the secret interview of Charles IX, Louis of Nassau, and La
Noue at Blois, see D’Aubigné, Book VI, chap. i, 282; _Mémoires de la
Huguerye_, I, 25. The Dutch cause suffered fearfully in this autumn.
On November 1 and 2 a frightful storm made terrible inundations on the
coast; hundreds of vessels were wrecked; in West Frisia alone nearly
20,000 persons were drowned (_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_,
III, 385).

[1507] For details, see Capefigue, III, 44. Charles IX gave evasive
replies to all the remonstrances of the Spanish ambassador (Languet,
_Epist. secr._, I, 177, August 15, 1571).

[1508] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,578, Walsingham to Cecil; _Nég. Tosc._,
III, 694.

[1509] Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, II,
239—Alva to Philip II, April 5, 1572; cf. p. 250; _Archives de la
maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 441. The Prince of Orange in 1569 began
the practice of issuing letters of marque and reprisal in virtue of his
position as sovereign prince of Orange. As a result in the next year
the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay were crowded with vessels
hostile to Spain. The most famous of these marauders soon destined to
become known as the “Beggars of the Sea” was Adrian de Bergues. On
one occasion within the space of two days, he overhauled and captured
two merchant fleets, the one of 40, the other of 60 sail (_Arch. de
la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 351). Upon the importance of La
Rochelle as a seaport, see La Noue, chap. xxviii. Some of Strozzi’s
correspondence when in command of the fleet before La Rochelle in 1572
is in F. Fr., XV, 555; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, 760-63.

[1510] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,921, August 12, 1571. Languet makes
Charles IX’s reply less emphatic than this. Languet, _Epist. secr._,
I, 177, August 15, 1571. I am inclined to believe that Walsingham
colored the anecdote. Languet shows the hesitations and vacillations of
Charles IX, pp. 132, 136, 140. The Spanish ambassador’s grounds of fear
for Flanders were the more substantial because the garrisons that had
occupied St. Jean-d’Angély, Niort, Saintes, and Angoulême during the
late war were newly stationed in the border fortresses of Picardy. To
Alava’s alarmed inquiry Charles IX blandly replied that “the reason why
these troops were sent to the frontiers was to give them employment,
because if the King had disbanded them all at once the soldiery might
have mutinied for lack of pay” (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 499, February 19,
1571; No. 575, August 1, 1571).

[1511] “The only impediment to the marriage between the prince of
Navarre and the lady Margaret is religion.”—_C. S. P. For._, No.
2,038, Walsingham to Cecil, September 16, 1571. The whole matter was
referred to eight counselors to settle: those of the Huguenots were
Jeanne d’Albret, La Noue, Louis of Nassau, and Francourt (_C. S. P.
For._, March 29, 1572; _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III,
417). The Pope made objection that, aside from the difference of
religion, the parents of Henry of Navarre and Marguerite of Valois
were relatives within the third degree, and refused to grant the
dispensation for the marriage (_Nég. Tosc._, III, 712-14). To this
demur the Huguenots triumphantly argued that it was not necessary for
the Pope or any other priest to give dispensation, since it was a
_royal_ marriage and it was not fitting for the King’s authority to
be demeaned by that of the church (Claude Haton, II, 661). There was
violent opposition by radical Huguenots, especially the pastors, to
the marriage, and fear lest the Pope’s refusal to grant a dispensation
might lead to a rupture between France and Rome like that of England
under Henry VIII (_Nég. Tosc._, III, 733 and 740). Finally it was
arranged that the marriage should be celebrated by a priest of the
church of Rome, and that Henry would accompany his wife to mass in the
church where the ceremony was to be held, but that he was to retire
before the service so that he was neither to be present at the mass
nor hear it said (_ibid._, 662 and note, 663, note). The cardinal
of Lorraine, with his usual “trimming” wrote to the queen mother:
“Madame, je vous baise très humblement les mains de ce qu’il vous
plaît me mander la conclusion du marriage de madame vostre fille,
puisqu’il est au contentement de vos majestés et selon les désirs des
catholiques.”—_Collection des autographes_, No. 278, April 17, 1572.

For the preliminaries of the marriage of Marguerite of Valois and Henry
of Navarre see _Revue des deux mondes_, October 1, 1884, pp. 560-64.

[1512] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 516; August 15, 1571. Spain and France
clashed in Switzerland, too, at this time. For Switzerland refused
to permit forces to fight the Turk on the ground that the Swiss were
unused to maritime warfare, yet the Grisons and the Tyrol raised two
regiments for the French King (_ibid._, _For._, No. 189, March 25,
1572, from Heidelberg or Strasburg).

[1513] “There have been no other speeches but war with
Spain.”—Killegrew to Lord Burghley, December 8, 1571; _C. S. P. For._,
No. 2,163; cf. _Nég. Tosc._, III, dispatches of April 17 and 20, 1572
and _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 2,156, 2,162, November 29, December 7, 1571.
Alva fully expected war (Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur
les Pays-Bas_, II, 259, Alva to Philip II, May 24, 1572).

In the spring of 1572 Schomberg was dispatched to Germany to
contract alliances with the Lutheran princes (_Arch. de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 403; _C. S. P. For._, No. 189, March 25, 1572).
The German princes anticipated that if the Low Countries were united to
the crown of France that power would become too formidable. They wanted
France to content herself with Flanders and Artois. As for Brabant
and the other provinces that were once dependent upon the empire,
their purpose was to put them upon their old footing and to give the
government of them to some prince of Germany, who could not be other
than the prince of Orange. Holland and Zealand were to be united to
the crown of England (Walsingham, 143, French ed., letter of August
12, 1572 to Leicester). Yet momentous as the French project in the Low
Countries was, it was but part of a grander scheme, for France aimed
also to acquire a decisive influence in Germany, with the ultimate
purpose of acquiring so great ascendency over the German states as to
be able to transfer the crown of the empire, for centuries hereditary
in the house of Hapsburg, to the head of the French prince (_Rel.
vén._, I, 445). This project was part of the mission of Schomberg
in Germany (_Arch. de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, Introd., 23,
268-73). In Germany the elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse
were strong partisans of France (_ibid._, IV, Introd., 25).

The strongest advocate of France for the imperial crown was the elector
palatine, who burned with an ambition to “Calvinize the world,” and
embraced with ardor a project which could not fail to redound to the
honor of the Huguenots. The elector of Saxony and the landgrave were
less complacent. The first was a friend of the emperor Maximilian and
expressed his indignation at the imperial pretensions of Charles IX.
Even William of Hesse, in spite of his hereditary attachment to the
crown of France, returned a guarded reply (_ibid._, IV, Introd., 28 and
123).

[1514] The revolt took place on Easter Sunday, April 6, 1572. On
the whole subject of the revolt of the Netherlands at this time see
Janssen, _History of the German People_, VIII, chap. ii; La Gravière,
“Les Gueux de Mer,” _Revue des deux mondes_, September 15, 1891, p.
347; November, 1891, p. 98; January 15, 1892, p. 389.

[1515] See the letter of President Viglius to Hopper in _Arch. de la
maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 415, and _C. S. P. For._, No. 260, April
19, 1572.

[1516] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 418-19. On the
alliance concluded at the Frankfurt Fair see _ibid._, III, 448. For
the whole subject consult Waddington, “La France et les protestants
allemands sous les règnes de Charles IX et Henri III,” _Revue
historique_, XLII, 266 ff.

[1517] The treaty of Blois provided for a defensive league between
Queen Elizabeth and Charles IX and stipulated the amount of succor
by sea or land to be rendered by either party in case of need; if
either party were assailed for the cause of religion or under any
other privileges and advantages for the pretext, the other was bound
to render assistance; a schedule of the number and description of the
forces to be mutually furnished, together with their rates of pay, was
annexed. De Frixa and Montmorency were sent to England to ratify the
treaty. A full account of the gorgeous reception of Montmorency will be
found in Holinshed and the Account Book of the Master of the Revels.
The earl of Lincoln left for France, May 26, 1572. He was instructed to
say, if any mention was made of the Alençon marriage, that Elizabeth
felt offended by the way she had been treated in the Anjou negotiations
and that in any case “the difference in age should make a full stay.”

Text of the treaty of Blois in Dumont, _Corps diplomatique_, V, Part
I, 211. The letter of the King to Elizabeth after the signature is in
_Bulletin de la société du prot. français_, XI, 72.

[1518] _Mémoires et correspondance de Du Plessis-Mornay_, I, 36-38
(Paris, 1824).

[1519] _Ibid._, II, 20-39; cf. Whitehead, _Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral
of France_, 248. On the authorship of the memoir consult same volume
Appendix II.

[1520] _C. S. P. For._, No. 419, Captain Thomas Morgan to Lord Burghley
from Flushing, June 16, 1572; Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II_,
II, 268, Alva to Philip II, July 18, 1572.

[1521] La Popelinière, XXVII, 108; Fillon Collection, No. 133, Charles
IX to the Duke of Longueville, governor of Picardy from Blois, May 3,
1572. Enjoins him to repair the fortifications of Picardy, and to be
on guard against the duke of Alva, who was arming under the pretext of
repressing the Gueux.

[1522] Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II_, II, 356 and note 3;
_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 425-26; _Mém. de la
Huguerye_, 105; see La Popelinière’s account (XXVII, 107), of the
situation of the city. It was the capital of Hainault.

[1523] _C. S. P. For._, No. 406, June 10, 1572, to Torcy.

[1524] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 437.

[1525] Coll. Godefroy, CCLVIII, No. 8. French dispute with Spain over
navigation of the Sluys.

[1526] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 441-42.

[1527] In _ibid._, 463-64, 467-68, will be found a list of the
principal officers of the prince of Orange and of the towns at his
devotion (cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 374, July, 1572).

[1528] _Ibid._, Nos. 478, 511, July, 1572.

[1529] The estates met at Dordrecht on July 15 (_Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 447).

[1530] He had received his recall and the duke of Medina-Coeli had been
sent to succeed him, and at this hour was on the ground urging a policy
of moderation (Raumer, I, 202). Yet Alva refused to give up (_Archives
de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 437).

[1531] The march of the Spanish army that intercepted Genlis was
so accurate as to give rise to the belief that Alva had prior
information. It is uncertain. Mendoza, who was with the Spanish army
(_Commentaires_, Book VI, chap. vii) seems to confirm the suspicion.
His account (chaps. vii-xiii) is very vivid. Only thirty of Genlis’
men escaped; the rest were either killed or drowned. On the warnings
given to Genlis, see a relation in _Archives curieuses_, VII. There is
an unpublished account of Genlis’ defeat in F. Fr., 18,587, fol. 541.
According to La Huguerye, 125, he was strangled in prison.

[1532] It did so on September 19. See a letter of William of Orange
to his brother John, September 24, 1572, in _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 511. La Noue prophesied the fall of the city
when he saw the heights of Jemappes occupied by the troops of Spain
(Hauser, _La Noue_, 33).

[1533] As late as August 11, 1572, the Prince of Orange was still
looking for the coming of the admiral Coligny into the Low Countries
(see a letter of his to his brother John, of this date in _Archives de
la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, III, 490).

[1534] Albornoz to secretary of state Cayas, from Brussels, July 19,
1572 (see Gachard, _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_,
II, 269). A note of M. Gachard adds: “Cette lettre, datée de St.
Leger, le 27 avril 1572, était écrite par Charles IX au comte Louis de
Nassau. Il y disait qu’il était déterminé, autant que les occasions et
la disposition de ses affaires le permettraient à employer les forces
que Dieu avait mises en sa main à tirer les Pays-Bas de l’oppression
sous laquelle ils gémissaient. Une traduction espagnole de cette lettre
existe aux Archives de Simancas, _papeles de Estado_, liasse 551.”
Charles IX. repudiated its authenticity (see a letter to Mondoucet,
French agent in Flanders, dated August 12, 1572, in _Bulletin de la
Commission d’hist. de Belgique_, séries II, IV, 342). The admiral
Coligny, without knowing of the incriminating evidence in Alva’s hands
after the failure before Mons, urged Charles IX to declare war upon
Spain at once as the shortest and safest way out of the difficulty
(Brantôme, _Vie des grandes capitaines françois_—M’l’admiral de
Châtillon).

[1535] As late as August 21, France had the hardihood to protest her
innocence of any enterprise in Flanders (Gachard, _Correspondance de
Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, II, 271, Philip to Alva, August 2, 1572;
_ibid._, II, 273, Alva to Philip, August 21, 1572).

[1536] There is in existence the record of an extremely curious
conversation of the admiral Coligny upon this subject with Henry
Middelmore, one of the English agents in France, in which the latter
frankly said: “Of all other thinges we colde least lyke that France
shulde commaunde Flawnders, or bryng it under theyr obedience, for
therein we dyd see so apparawntlye the greatnes of our dainger, and
therefore in no wyse colde suffer it.”—Ellis, _Original Letters_, 2d
series, III, 6. I find the same thought expressed in a letter of Thomas
Parker to one Hogyns, written from Bruges, June 17, 1572. See Appendix
XXIX.

[1537] On this last phase see _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_,
IV, Introd., xlix ff., and Froude, _Hist. of England_, X, 312.

[1538] For a particular account see Whitehead, _Gaspard de Coligny,
Admiral of France_, 257-64. Two of Lord Burghley’s correspondents give
accounts (_C. S. P. For._, Nos. 537, 538, August 22, 1572). See also an
interesting extract from the registers of the Bureau of the Ville of
Paris in _Archives curieuses_, VII, 211.

[1539] For the order of Marcel, provost of the merchants, immediately
before the massacre, see _Arch. cur._, VII, 212. On the council
of August 24, see Cavalli, 85. Charles IX at first denied any
responsibility and blamed the Guises. When this proved a dangerous
explanation, he asserted the massacre was made to foil a similar plot
on the part of the Huguenots.

[1540] At Blois not only the Huguenots were not mistreated but the city
became a city of refuge (D’Aubigné, III, 344, note 6). The Mayor of
Nantes refused to carry out the orders for massacre (_Bulletin de la
Soc. du prot. franç._, I, 59). Hotman was saved from the massacre at
Bourges by his students; on the massacre at Troyes see the relation in
_Arch. cur._, VII, 287; and for that at Lyons an article by Puyroche
in _Bulletin de la Soc. du prot. franç._, XVIII, 305, 353, 401; for
Normandy, _ibid._, VI, 461; _Revue retrospective_, XII, 142 (Lisieux);
on the massacre at Rouen, Floquet, _Hist. du parlement de Normandie_,
III, 126 ff.; on the massacre at Bordeaux see _Arch. de la Gironde_,
VIII, 337. De Thou, Book LIII, says there were 264 victims. On the
massacre at Toulouse see _Bull. de la Soc. du prot. franç._, August
15, 1886; _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 639. On the non-execution of the
massacre in Burgundy see _Bull. de la Soc. du prot. franç._, IV, 164,
and XIV, 340 (documents). The reason for this leniency was the nearness
of Burgundy to the frontier.

[1541] The contemporary literature on the massacre is given by M.
Felix Bourquelot, editor of the _Mém. de Claude Haton_ in a long note
in II, 673-76. Summarized, these opinions are the following: 1. The
massacre was done in order to avert a massacre by the Huguenots, after
the wounding of Coligny. This was the belief of Marguerite of Navarre
(_Mémoires_, ed. Guessard, 264).

2. The massacre was premeditated by Charles IX and his mother from the
time of the Bayonne conference.

3. The massacre was intended to be a military stroke, the government
preferring to attempt their overthrow in this way rather than by battle
on the open field.

Salviati, the papal nuncio, who ought to have known, explicitly denies
the rumor that a conspiracy was on foot by the Huguenots. In a dispatch
of September 2 (I quote the French translation of Chateaubriand who
copied them for the Paris archives) he says: “Cela n’en demeurera pas
moins faux en tous points, et ce sera une honte pour qui est à même de
connaître quelques choses aux affaires de ce monde de le croire.” In
reply to the Pope’s urgency to extirpate the Protestants, he wrote on
September 22: “Je lui fis part de la très grand consolation qu’avaient
procuré au Saint Père les succès obtenus dans ce royaume par une
grace singulière de Dieu, accordée à toute la Chrétienté sous son
pontificat. Je fis connaître le désir qu’avait sa Sainteté, de voir
pour la plus grande gloire de Dieu, et le plus grand bien de France,
tous les hérétiques extirpés du royaume, et j’ajoutai que dans cette
vue le Saint Père estimait que très à propos que l’on revoqua l’édit
de pacification.” On October 11th, he writes: “Le Saint Père, ai je
dit en éprouve une joie infinie, et a ressenti une grande consolation
d’apprendre que sa Majesté avait commandé d’écrire qu’elle espérait
qu’avant peu la France n’aurait plus d’Huguenots.” Cardinal Orsini, who
was dispatched as legate from Rome to congratulate Charles IX and to
support the exhortations of Salviati, describes his audience with the
King on December 19. Orsini assured the King that he had eclipsed the
glory of all his house, but urged him to fulfil his promise that not
a single Huguenot should be left alive in France: “Se si rigardavva
all’objetto della gloria, non potendo niun fatto de suoi antecessori,
se rettamente si giudicava, agguagliarsi al glorioso ac veramente
incomparabili di sua Maesta, in liberar con tanta prudentia et pietà
in un giorno solo il suo regno da cotanta diabolica peste.... Esortai
... che con essendo servitio ni di Dio, ni di sua Maesta, lasciar
fargli nuovo piede a questa maladetta setta, volesse applicare tutto
il suo pensiero e tutte le forze sue per istirparla affatto, recandosi
a memoria quelle che ella haveva fatto scrivere a sua Santità da
Monsignor il Nuntio, che infra pochi giorni non sarebbe pi un ugonotto
in tutto il suo regno.”—Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS Ital., 1,272. The
Pope proclaimed a jubilee in honor of the massacre.

Subjoined is a list of the leading authors and articles upon this
subject. The most recent consideration which sifts all preceding
investigation is that by Whitehead, _Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of
France_, London, 1904, chaps. xv, xvi; Phillipson, “Die römische Curie
und die Bartholomaüsnact,” _West Europa_, II, 255 ff.; Baguenault de
Puchesse, “La St. Barthélemy: ses origines, son vrai caractère, ses
suites,” _R. Q. H._, July-October, 1866; “La premeditation de St.
Barthélemy,” _R. Q. H._, XXVII, 272 ff.; Boutaric, “La St. Barthélemy
d’après les Archives du Vatican,” _Bib. de l’école des Chartes_, sér.
III, 3; Theiner, Continuation of Baronius, I (Salviati’s letters);
Gandy, “Le massacre de St. Barthélemy,” _Revue hist._, July, 1879;
cf. review in _Bull. de la Soc. prot. français_; Rajna, in _Archivio
storico ital._, sér. V, No. XXIII, January 15, 1899; Michiel et
Cavalli, “La Saint-Barthélemy devant le sénat de Venise. Relation
des ambassadeurs ... traduite et ann. par W. Martin,” Paris, 1872;
Soldan, _Hist. Taschenbuch_, 1854; G. P. Fisher, “The Massacre of St.
Bartholomew,” _New Englander_, January, 1880; Loiseleur, “Les nouvelles
controverses sur la St. Barthélemy,” _Rev. hist._, XV, 1883, p. 83;
“Nouveaux documents sur la St. Barthélemy,” _Rev. hist._, IV, 1877, p.
345; Tamizey de Larroque, “Deux lettres de Charles IX,” _R. Q. H._,
III, 1867, p. 567; “La St. Barthélemy, lettres de MM. Baguenault de
Puchesse et G. Gandy,” _R. Q. H._, XXVIII, 1880, p. 268; Dareste, “Un
incident de l’histoire diplomatique de Charles IX,” _Acad. des sc.
moral. etc._, LXXI-II, 1863, p. 183; Laugel, “Coligny,” _Revue des deux
mondes_, September, 1883, pp. 162-85.

[1542] The duke of Guise is not so bloody, neither did he kill any man
himself but saved divers; he spake openly that for the admiral’s death
he was glad, for he knew him to be his enemy. But for the rest, the
King had put to death such as might have done him very good service
(_C. S. P. For._, No. 584, September, 1572).

[1543] Montluc clearly appreciated that this was the case and developed
the idea in his _Commentaires_, VI, 231-33. Quite as remarkable are
the observations of the Venetian ambassador: _Rel. vén._, II, 171.
Spain anticipated the possibility of a French attempt to recover the
Milanais: “The King of Spain being suspicious of the said league has
given commission that Italy and Milan be in readiness.”—_C. S. P.
For._, No. 120, February 7, 1572, from Venice.

[1544] _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 528, note, 544, note 2. On the siege of
Montauban, see La Bret, _Histoire de Montauban_, 2 vols., 1841. There
is a letter of the marshal Brissac on the resistance in F. Fr., No. 15,
555, fol. 104.

[1545] See abstract of Biron’s commission in _C. S. P. For._, November
6, 1572; cf. _Correspondance inédite d’Armand de Gontaut Biron,
maréchal de France_, par E. de Barthélemy, Paris, 1874, from the
originals at St. Petersburg.

[1546] _Coll. des autographes_, 1844, No. 104, Charles IX to the duke
of Longueville, November 4, 1572.

[1547] _C. S. P. For._, No. 640, November 13, 1572; cf. No. 637;
_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 38-39, letter of Brunynck,
secretary to the prince of Orange, to John of Nassau, December, 1572.

[1548] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 667, 673, §§17-20 (1572).

[1549] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 683 and 755, Worcester to the Queen,
February 5, 1573.

[1550] This petition is a remarkable compound of current politics and
biblical history. In it the inhabitants of La Rochelle, her “tres
obeissains fidelles subjects,” beg that she will consider and follow
the example of Constantine, who broke off all alliance with his friend
Licinius to whom he had given his sister in marriage, on account of
his tyranny practiced on the Christians of the East. They remind her
also of the evil done by Herod in keeping his rash oath. She ought not
therefore to keep the league with those who wish to exterminate her
people in Guyenne, which belongs to her, and whose arms she bears. If
she will succour them they will willingly expose their lives and goods
in order to acknowledge her as their sovereign and natural princess
(_ibid._, No. 682, 1572).

[1551] _Ibid._, No. 800, February 28, 1573; No. 948, May 3, 1573;
_Chroniques Fontenaisiennes_, 166, 167.

[1552] See Claude Haton, II, 710, 711, 717, 718, 722-25, 726, 729, 731.
The government sent out inspectors to make an inventory of the grain
still available. Much of it was confiscated for the use of the army at
an established price, and a maximum price fixed for the sale of the
remainder.

[1553] _Ibid._, 715, 716 (see a discourse upon the extreme dearth in
France and upon the means to remedy it, in _Arch. cur._, VI, 423). The
dearness of all things, according to the writer, probably Bodin, is the
result of the excessive luxury which prevails among the higher classes
and the combination made by the merchants to raise prices. He proposes
the establishment of public granaries and that the government price be
made obligatory for all dealers.

[1554] _C. S. P. For._, No. 800, February 28, 1573.

[1555] _Ibid._, No. 1,000, May 31, No. 1,027, June 9, 1573.

[1556] The Politiques hoped to persuade Charles IX to stop the war
at home and exact redress from Spain for the massacre in Florida by
attacking the Spanish West Indies. Even the duke of Anjou favored this.
See Appendix XXX.

[1557] La Popelinière, XXI, 214 and 232 _bis_; _C. S. P. For._, No.
1,042, Dr. Dale to Lord Burghley, June 16, 1573: “The hearts of all men
were being discouraged with the long siege” and the King’s heart bled
“to see the misery of his people that die for famine by the ways where
he rode.”

[1558] La Rochelle at first refused to let La Noue enter. On the whole
matter see Hauser, _La Noue_, chap. ii.

[1559] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,547, March 21, 1573; Raumer, II, 265;
the marshals Biron and Strozzi, with Pinart, were commissioned for the
purpose (_Arch. hist. du Poitou_, XII, 233). The negotiations may be
seen in detail in Loutzchiski, _Doc. inédits_, 62 ff.

[1560] _Vie de La Noue_, 95; Letter of Charles IX to the duke of
Anjou, February 7, 1573, Coll. Lajariette, Paris, 1860, No. 669; Coll.
Godefroy, CCLVI, No. 57. At the same time Charles IX wrote in person to
Montgomery, trying to lure him from the enterprise he was engaged in.
See Appendix XXXI.

[1561] _C. S. P. Ven._, Nos. 540, 541, April 6 and 20, 1573.

[1562] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 1,050, June 22, 1573; _Chroniques
fontenaisiennes_, 169.

[1563] See the series of documents on this head in Coll. Godefroy,
CCLVI, Nos. 25, 29, 30, 38, 41-43. 46, 73, 77.

[1564] When the army disbanded, it was a frequent sight in the villages
to see the wounded or sick being transported in baggage wagons (Claude
Haton, II, 737). The villages near La Rochelle where the camp had been
established were burned upon the evacuation of the troops “to prevent
the plague which began to be hot.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,107, Wilkes
to Walsingham, July 31, 1573; cf. No. 1,052, June 25, to the same
effect.

[1565] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,072, Dr. Dale to the Queen, late in June,
1573.

[1566] The articles were sent to the Catholic camp on July, 6.

[1567] _Hist. du Languedoc_, V, 543, note; _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,090,
July 11, 1573.

[1568] Lery, _Histoire mémorable de la ville de Sancerre_, contenant
les entreprises, buteries, assaux et autres efforts des assiégeans:
les résistances, faits magnanimes, la famine extrème et délivrance des
assiegez, 1574; Discours de l’extrème famine etc. dont les assiegez de
la ville de Sancerre ont été affligez et ont usé environ trois mois,
_Arch. cur._, VIII, 21.

[1569] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,101, July 23, No. 1,107, July 31, 1573.
In Languedoc and Dauphiné the Huguenots were strong, and possessed of
many towns (see a letter of Louis of Nassau in _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 75 and the “Names of all the towns in the south
of France of which the Huguenot party could be sure of, together with a
list of the noblemen attached to the party” in Appendix XXXII).

[1570] _Vie de La Noue_, 99; _C. S. P. For._, No. 965, May 16, No.
1,095, July 23, 1573. A deputation of Huguenots of Languedoc came to
Fontainebleau in September, 1573 (cf. Letter of Schomberg to Louis of
Nassau, September 29, 1573, _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_,
IV, 211 and Appendix 117).

[1571] Long, 115, 116. The instrument of government contained 89
articles.

[1572] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 972, 986, March 20 and 30, 1573. The
collection of these forced loans was expedited by the presence of
Strozzi’s men-at-arms and the Scotch Guard in the Louvre; and two bands
of Swiss at St. Cloud. In this way, Charles IX was able to collect
the money “without danger of commotion,” and avoided that worst of
expedients to the crown, the States-General (see particulars in Dr.
Dale’s letter to Burghley of January 11, 1573, _ibid._, No. 1,291).
In June the assembly of the clergy agreed to furnish the queen mother
200,000 livres and within three years to redeem 1,800,000 livres’
worth of the King’s debts. The clergy made a great stroke by obtaining
the creation of four receivers-general for the collection of these
subsidies, the appointments to which they sold for between 600,000
and 700,000 livres, thus saving themselves that amount in the final
(_ibid._, No. 1,027, June 9, 1573). But this relief came too late
for the government to continue the prosecution of the war before La
Rochelle. The capitulation with the Rochellois was too far advanced to
be withdrawn. Moreover, the crown itself was anxious to close the war.

[1573] Catherine de Medici to Schomberg, September 13, 1572, _Arch. de
la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, Appendix, No. 13; Weill, 86; _Revue
retrospective_, V, 363.

[1574] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 876. On July 7 the Tuscan ambassador wrote:
“E, se questo regno si liberassi delle guerre civili, saria facil cosa
la rompessi con Spagna; chè questo, credo, sia il fine di tutti li
trattamenti che fa Orange in questo regno.”—_Ibid._, 883.

[1575] _Ibid._, IV, 108, 109.

[1576] In the same month William of Orange dispatched to France the
Seigneur de Lumbres, whose popularity with the King was so great that
he even offered to take him into his service (_Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, Introd., p. 21, and p. 165), and another agent with
instructions to treat with the King and the queen mother (_ibid._,
IV, 119-24, May, 1573). William stipulated for the preservation of
the rights and privileges of whatever provinces and towns might be
conquered by France, and that in case of open war by France upon Spain,
in lieu of an annual subsidy of 400,000 florins, France should give
assistance with men and ships of war, besides the sum mentioned, to
be paid within two years after the conclusion of peace (_ibid._, IV,
116-19; cf. the prince of Orange to Louis of Nassau upon the proposed
French alliance, June 17, 1573).

[1577] _Ibid._, IV, 33. On May 15, 1573, the prince of Orange concluded
a treaty with England, permitting the English to enter the Scheldt
in return for which the prince was to be permitted to purchase
arms and ammunition and powder in England (_Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 94). For William of Orange’s connection with La
Rochelle see _ibid._, 43 and 56. Compare letter of Charles IX to the
duke of Anjou, March 18, 1573, complaining of the depredations of the
“Wartegeux” on the Norman coast (Coll. Godefroy, CCLVIII, No. 49).

[1578] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 273, 274;
_Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_, IV, 270, 271, note.

[1579] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 270 and Appendix
43. Schomberg and Louis of Nassau drew up the articles of the proposed
treaty. In Appendix 44 will be found the articles as originally drawn
up, and on p. 116 the modified form of them as they were changed by
the prince of Orange. The most important change is that whereby the
prince altered the word “subjection” as applied to the Netherlands to
“protectorate.” The further idea is expressed that these negotiations
would be fruitless unless the Edict of Pacification were established
with full force in France (_ibid._, IV, 270, 271). On the whole subject
of French negotiations in Germany after St. Bartholomew see Waddington,
_Rev. hist._, XLII, 269 ff.

[1580] De Thou, VII, 37 (cf. Louis of Nassau’s letter to his brother
on the subject in _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 278
ff.). Charles IX was ill at the time and the queen mother went alone
to Blamont (_ibid._, IV, 276, 277; _Mém. du duc de Bouillon_). The
Spanish ambassador in France was not unobservant of the favorable
policy of Charles toward the Netherlands and so informed the duke of
Alva (_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 132). The peace
of La Rochelle was a hard blow to Spain (Languet, _Epist. secr._, I,
201; St. Goard to Charles IX, July 17, 1573 in _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 164-69). These negotiations of the prince of
Orange and his brother with England and France, however, came too late
to save Haarlem. On July 12 the unhappy city succumbed. On the 14th the
Spaniards entered and began a regular massacre, in which nearly 1,800
persons were either slain with the sword, hanged, or drowned (_ibid._,
IV, 173; cf. a letter of the prince of Orange to Louis of Nassau,
giving details of the surrender on July 22, 1573, _ibid._, 175).

[1581] _C. S. P. For._, No. 686 (1572).

[1582] _Ibid._, No. 673, December 20, 1572.

[1583] These were Montluc, bishop of Valence, and M. de Rambouillet.
The former’s speeches (April 10 and 22), are printed in _Mém. de
l’estat de France_, II, 147, 224, in a French translation. The original
discourses were in Latin. In _Arch. cur._, IX, 137, is a letter of one
of Rambouillet’s suite.

[1584] See the account of the election in _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,082,
June 5, 1573; cf. Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 189; Castelnau, ed.
Le Laboureur, III, 298. The news of the duke of Anjou’s success was
naturally received with greater pleasure in Paris than anywhere else in
Europe. Bonfires were lighted and the _Te Deum_ sung in honor of his
election (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,027, June 9, 1573). The clergy, in the
assembly of the clergy which took place soon after the news arrived,
voted the duke a subsidy of 300,000 crowns (_ibid._, No. 992).

[1585] Claude Haton, II, 734; _Nég. Tosc._, III, 886, 887.

[1586] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 886, 887.

[1587] Claude Haton, II, p. 735.

[1588] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,100, July 23, 1573.

[1589] The existence of a plot to kidnap the duke of Anjou in Germany
in order to force France to return the Three Bishoprics was suspected
by Schomberg (_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, Appendix,
Nos. 112, 113). The duke was also afraid to go to Poland by way of
Germany, fearing to get into difficulties on account of the massacre
of St. Bartholomew, which still vividly angered the Protestant
princes (_ibid._, IV, Introd., p. xxvi, and pp. 15, 19, 26, 32). His
first thought was to go by way of Venice and Ragusa, through Servia,
Bulgaria, and Moldavia (Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, 197; _Archives
de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 168, note). The advantage of the
ancient alliance between France and Venice at this time would have
been great. There was also some thought of his going entirely by sea,
and the good offices of England were invoked to protect his journey
(Castelnau, ed. Le Laboureur, III, 345). The young prince of Condé had
been invited to go along, but excused himself on the ground that he was
afraid of being arrested for his father’s debts, “being a marvellously
great sum.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,245, December 12, 1573.

[1590] _Ibid._, No. 1,097, July 18, 1573, from Frankfurt.

[1591] _Ibid._, No. 1,177, September 20, 1573; _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 295.

[1592] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,168, September 18, 1573.

[1593] For Catherine’s intense interest in the Polish question, see
Vol. IV of her _Correspondance_, _passim_, and _Arch. de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 267.

[1594] _Commentaires et lettres de Montluc_, V, 299-306, 309-18,
322-24—a series of remarkable political judgments.

[1595] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 31; Appendix, No.
69 and p. 96.

[1596] _Ibid._, IV, Appendix, Letters 1-8 refer to Schomberg’s mission
to Germany in the spring and summer of 1572.

[1597] The history of Henry of Anjou’s career in Poland has been
written at length by the marquis de Noailles, _Henri de Valois et la
Pologne_, Paris, 1867 (see also L’Epinois, “La Pologne en 1572,” _R. Q.
H._, IV, 1868, p. 266; Bain, “The Polish Interregnum,” _English Hist.
Review_, IV, 645). In Coll. Godefroy, CCLVI, Nos. 54, 62, 64, 66, 70,
72, is a series of letters dealing with French interest in Poland at
this time.

[1598] _Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, Appendix, Nos. 69
and 71.

[1599] _Ibid._, IV, Appendix, No. 17, Schomberg to Catherine de Medici,
October 9, 1572. The landgrave bluntly said that twice before such
overtures had been made to German princes—in 1567 and 1571—and that
civil war and the massacre had followed (_ibid._, No. 72).

[1600] St. Goard to Charles IX, July 9, 1573, _ibid._, IV, Appendix,
No. 66; Schomberg to the duke of Anjou, February 10, 1573, _ibid._,
Appendix, No. 34. The intense Catholic prejudices of the duke of Anjou,
now king of Poland, were a serious bar to the progress of Schomberg’s
negotiations in Germany. He warned the duke not to give the impression
of Spanish leanings (Schomberg to the duke of Anjou, October 9, 1572,
_ibid._, IV, Appendix, No. 18), and seems almost to have persuaded him
to abandon his intense Catholic-Spanish predilection (_ibid._, pp. 15,
268). The duke of Anjou is even said to have given Schomberg 100,000
francs. The letter is said to have been burned at the time of the
Coconnas conspiracy in order to shield the duke of Alva’s son (_ibid._,
IV, 384).

[1601] Charles IX to St. Goard, May 10, 1573, regarding a dispatch of
the Spanish ambassador to Philip II telling of the negotiations of the
King with Louis of Nassau (_ibid._, IV, Appendix, No. 55).

[1602] _Ibid._, IV, Appendix, No. 51.

[1603] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,202, 1,286, November 11, 1573, January
2, 1574.

[1604] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 894, December 23, 1573.

[1605] _Ibid._, 891-93, November 5, 1573.

[1606] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,132, 1,138, August 18-22, 1573.

[1607] The attack was aggravated by a heavy cold taken while hunting
so that Charles IX was compelled for a season to quarter himself in a
small inn at Vitry. He was not scarred by the pox but he lost flesh
alarmingly by reason of the illness and never recovered his health, and
passed into quick consumption (cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,229, November
18, 1573, Dr. Dale to Burghley).

[1608] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 891; _R. Q. H._, XXXIV, 485.

[1609] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,235, November, 1573.

[1610] The écu which formerly had circulated as 57 sous _tournois_ went
up to 58; Spanish pistols, which were at 55 rose to 56; testons de
France valued at 12 sous by the edict rose to 12 sous 6 d. _tournois_.
Bad coin was driven out of the realm. Claude Haton, II, 749, 750.

[1611] _Ibid._, 752, 753.

[1612] Claude Haton, II, 760 (1574).

[1613] See details in _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 567, December 30, 1573. The
queen mother was accused of planning to take La Rochelle by surprise
(_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 309-11; _Nég. Tosc._,
III, 896).

[1614] _C. S. P. Ven._, Nos. 568, 569, January 22, February 1, 1574.

[1615] For details of this war see _Chronique des guerres en Poitou,
Aunis, Xaintonge et Angoumois de 1574 à 1576_, ed. by Fontenelle de
Vaudoré, Paris, 1841.

[1616] _C. S. P. For._, No. 570, February 6, No. 572, February 28;
_ibid._, _Eng._, No. 1,336, March 8, No. 1,338, March 8, No. 1,357,
March 23, No. 1,342, March 15 (1574).

[1617] On March 9, 1573, Sir Thomas Smith wrote to Walsingham: “Pirates
of all nations infest our seas and under the flag of the prince of
Orange or the count of Montgomery, pillage the English and foreigners
impartially.” (Cf. Walsingham, 392. _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 575, March 24,
1574.)

[1618] Montgomery to Burghley, from Carentan, March 23, 1574 (C. S. P.
For., 1351; cf. _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 576, March 26; Delisle, _Les deux
sièges de Valognes en 1562 et 1574_, St. Lô, 1890).

[1619] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,352. Commission from the King to the
sieur de Torcy, etc., dated Bois de Vincennes, March 11, 1574.
Montgomery’s reply is subjoined, dated March 22; _ibid._, _Ven._, No.
577, April 2, 1574. Montgomery must have been in error as to the date
of his arrival at Coutances, which he puts on March 11. It must have
been earlier. Torcy’s commission bears this date. On May 29 the chief
of the Huguenots, or rather, Montgomery, wrote to Lord Burghley from
Carentan, justifying the taking up arms, and stating what need there is
of the favor and protection of the Queen (_ibid._, _For._, No. 1,429,
May 24, 1574).

[1620] Weill, 128, 129.

[1621] _Mém. du duc de Bouillon_, 89. The scheme was to deprive the
duke of Anjou of the command before La Rochelle and put the duke of
Alençon and Henry of Navarre in command both by land and by sea. It
failed, though Charles IX seems to have been willing, because Anjou
flatly refused to resign (see letter in Appendix XXXIII).

[1622] Forneron, _Histoire des ducs de Guise_, II, 276. On the whole
question see De Crue, _Le parti des Politiques au lendemain de la St.
Barthélemy_, Paris, 1892; Weill, 133 ff.

[1623] Weill, 88, 89. The actual author was Beza.

[1624] Weill, 132; citing La Huguerye, II, 84.

[1625] Weill, 95-97.

[1626] _Ibid._, 133.

[1627] See Corvière, _L’organisation politique du parti protestant tenu
à Millau_ (1886).

[1628] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,349, 1,356, March 17 and 30, 1574. There
were ten ensigns in every regiment, each of 300 men.

[1629] _Ibid._, No. 1,388, April, 1574. The prince was reputed to have
about 6,000 or 7,000 reiters, “French, German, or Swiss.”—_Ibid._, No.
1,433, Wilkes to Walsingham, May 31, 1574.

[1630] See details in _ibid._, No. 1,322, February 16, 1574.

[1631] Hume supposes (_Courtships of Queen Elizabeth_, 177) that
Elizabeth, knowing that this plot was in progress, again withdrew her
permission for an interview with the duke of Alençon. She feared the
result if the interview were unsuccessful; she would not allow a public
visit under any circumstances, and did not wish a private. The recent
expedition against La Rochelle had also angered her subjects, so that
now the negotiations were once more apparently at a standstill. But we
must not forget her private scheme. Nothing could be more in line with
Elizabeth’s policy than to promote a family quarrel in the French royal
house. That she was well informed of the plot can scarcely be doubted,
for March 16, 1574, we find a safe-conduct for Alençon in the foreign
papers; and the permission given for him to come to the Queen as soon
as he has notified her of his arrival in England. April 1, moreover,
Dale wrote to Walsingham, “The Duke has hope in the Queen and feareth
much”—there is nothing more to explain the reference. Hume does not
explicitly state Elizabeth’s connivance and the editor of Hall, Vol.
II, does not mention the plot at all (p. xxi); neither does Burlingham
in his résumé. It can scarcely be doubted, however, that Elizabeth was
actively interested or, at least, informed of its progress.

[1632] _Mém. de madame Mornay_, 74, 75.

[1633] De Thou, Book LVII; _Arch. cur._, VII, 105.

[1634] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 572, February 28, and _ibid._, _For._, Nos.
1,331, 1,336, 1,350, March 2, 8, 22, 1573.

[1635] The duke of Alençon and the king of Navarre issued a declaration
denying all knowledge of Guitery’s enterprise against the King at St.
Germain. Tractprinted at Paris by Frederic Morel, 1574, p. 8; cf.
_Lettres de Henri IV_, I, 60; _Mém. de la Huguerye_, I, 182, note 2.

[1636] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 573, March 10, 1574.

[1637] _Ibid._, No. 574, March 17, 1574.

[1638] _Ibid._

[1639] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,377, 1,378, April 10-12, 1574; _ibid._,
_Ven._, Nos. 580, 581, April 9-10.

[1640] But it is not to be doubted that back of the affair was a secret
movement of the liberal Huguenots and the Politiques to put Alençon
upon the throne in event of the death of Charles IX and so foil the
succession of the bigoted Henry of Anjou. _Vie de Mornay_, 23: Jalluard
à Taffin, ministre du St. Evangile, May 8, 1574: “L’emprisonnement du
duc d’Alençon, roy de Navarre, mareschal de Montmorenci, et autres, ont
apporté non seulement un grand estonnement, mais aussi rompu des grands
desseins.”—_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, V, 2; cf. IV, 375.
Moderate men perceived the value of Alençon as a counterpoise to Henry
of Poland (cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,431, May 25, 1574). On the entire
matter see De Crue, “La Molle et Coconat et les négociations du parti
des Politiques,” _Rev. d’hist. dip._, VI, 1892, p. 375.

[1641] _Arch. cur._, VIII, 127 ff. Among other charges, La Mole
was accused of practicing sorcery—“that there should be an image
of wax and a strange medal in the chamber of La Mole for some
enchantment.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,398, Dr. Dale to Burghley, April
27, 1574.

[1642] _Ibid._, April 22, 1574; No. 1,398, April 27, 1574.

[1643] _Ibid._, _Ven._, No. 586, May 2, 1574.

[1644] _Ibid._, and _ibid._, _For._, No. 1,401, Dale to Burghley, April
30, 1574. The whole process was a mockery of justice. According to
another report the King promised “that he would write to the Parlement
to delay the proceedings. But the bearer of the letters, on arriving
at Paris found the Porte St. Antoine closed. The execution was so much
hurried that in a moment they were both executed. It is said this was
done by reason of a perfumer relating to the first President what
had passed in Court, and that the Queen Mother had obtained their
pardon. For which cause they were made to come more quickly from the
Conciergerie, the carriage made to journey hastily, and directly they
arrived at the place of execution they were executed without the usual
proclamations.”—_C. S. P. For._, No 1,403, May 2, 1574.

[1645] Claude Haton, II, 765.

[1646] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 584, April 19, 1574. Both Henry of Navarre
and his fellow-prisoner seemed to have believed in these days that if
Charles IX should die their own expectation of living would be slender,
and their only hope be in corrupting the guard. But they were without
money. This is the purport of a cipher dispatch, dated May 22, from
Paris and sent to Burghley to be deciphered by him personally. This he
actually did, for the draft is in his handwriting (_ibid._, _For._,
No. 1,422, 1574; cf. No. 1,431). His reply—to Walsingham—was sent
three days later (by a slip of the pen he has, however, written “March”
instead of May).

[1647] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,408, Dr. Dale to Burghley, May 5, 1574.
See a letter of Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, to Charles IX protesting
against the arrest of Montmorency, May 19, 1574, in Coll. Godefroy,
CCLVI, No. 92. Elizabeth seems to have interested herself very much
in their fate and sent Thomas Leighton to France in their behalf.
The face of affairs thus was changed, for to give some credibility
to her stories of a happy family, Catherine had to allow the princes
more liberty. Besides, Leighton was captain of Guernsey, and could be
of great assistance to Montgomery so that he had to be well treated
and his desires gratified. The Guises, however, were gaining great
influence in court again and in event of the King’s death, Alençon
expected the Bastille. To escape this he desired money from Elizabeth
to bribe his guards and Burghley actually recommended that this course
be followed. De Thoré, the youngest of the constable’s sons, fled
to Cassel for safety (Claude Haton, II, 763 and note). The fury of
the Guises pursued him even in Germany (see a letter of one Davis
to count John of Nassau, June 7, 1574, in _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, 19, giving some particulars on this head, and one
of Schomberg to the same, August 28, at p. 49).

[1648] See _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,417, May 17, 1574; _Hist. du Lang._,
V, 520, note 1.

[1649] Yesterday he was more ill-at-ease than ordinarily, and no one
entered his room, but at sunrise several gentlemen and priests came
in. The priests performed the service, at which the queen mother
was present. He has been of better countenance since hearing of the
execution of De la Mole and Coconnas, and said he hoped to live to see
the end of all his conspirators (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,403, May 2,
1574). Early in April, two couriers were dispatched to Poland to warn
Henry of Anjou to be ready for any emergency (_ibid._, _Ven._, No. 590,
May 2, 1574). Dr. Dale, the English ambassador, reports, under date of
May 22: “On the 22d the King fell suddenly sick. The audience appointed
with the ambassador of the duke of Florence was countermanded, the
best physicians sent for, and the opinion is that the King is in great
danger. The falling down of blood into his lungs is come to him again,
and the physicians gave their opinion that if it should happen again
they could not assure him of any hope. Paris, 22 May, 1574.”—_C. S. P.
For._, No. 1,422.

[1650] Frémy, _Un ambassadeur liberal sous Charles IX et Henri III_,
226. The King actually said “Tirez moy ma _custode_,” from the
Latin word _custodire_, to protect. Claude Haton, II, 767, gives an
impressive account of the deathbed scene.

[1651] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 591, May 30, 1574. For other accounts see
_Arch. cur._, VIII, 253, 271. There is a remarkable tract in the State
Paper office “giving particulars of the ancestors and birth of Charles
IX, the civil wars of his reign, his victories, the massacre of St.
Bartholomew, his famous sayings, his wife and daughter, his decrees,
his motto, his favorite servant, his master and nurse, his liberality,
his sports, his study of music and singing, the fiery spectre seen by
him, his breaking the law, his speech in the senate, his amours, his
affliction of the ecclesiastics, his study of liberal sciences, his
food, drink, and sleep, a prodigy preceding his death, his sickness,
his discourse before his death, his death and testament, description of
his body and stature.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,628 (1574). The queen of
France returned to Vienna and died in a convent in 1592.

[1652] Isambert, XIV, 262.

[1653] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,448, June 10, 1574.

[1654] Henry III, to Elizabeth (see Appendix XXXV).

[1655] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 1,449 and 1,464, _anno_ 1574.

[1656] Catherine risked a Protestant uprising in order to sate her
vengeance upon the man who had slain Henry II. The Venetian ambassador,
however, conjectured that there was more of policy than of revenge
in the act. “It was certainly more to please the Parisians from whom
she hoped to have efficient aid than for any other reason that she
had Montgomery put to death.”—_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 588, May 20,
No. 597, June, 1574. Matignon was made a marshal of France as his
reward (_ibid._, _For._, No. 176, June 13, 1575). For particulars
of Montgomery’s execution see _Arch. cur._, VIII, 223 ff.; and the
_Discours de la mort et execution de Gabriel comte de Montgommery, par
arrest de la court, pour les conspirations par luy commises contre le
roy_, Lyon: Benoist Rigaud, 1574.

[1657] _Nég. Tosc._, III, 926-27, April 5 and May 11, 1574.

[1658] “Tenuti per forastieri e Alemanni.”—_Rel. vén._, II, 228.

[1659] Claude Haton, II, 778. These bandits were sometimes called
“Foruscits” or “Fuorisciti,” from the Italian _uscir fuora_ (see a
letter of the cardinal of Armagnac in _Rev. hist._, II, 529).

“En 1576 les paysans du Dauphiné s’étant soulevés, entreprirent
vainement ce qu’ils ont exécuté plus de deux siècles après cette
époque. Ils se rassemblèrent en un corps considérable pour piller et
brûler les châteaux, et exterminer les gentilshommes. Mandalot, à la
tête d’une troupe déterminée, dissipa avec promptitude ce rassemblement
qu’on appela la ‘Ligue des Vilains.’”—_Histoire ou mémoire de ce qui
se passa à Lyons pendant la ligue, appelée la Sainte-Union, jusqu’à la
reddition de la ville sous l’obeissance du roi Henri IV_, Bibliothèque
de Lyon, No. 1,361.

[1660] “On taschast de réconcilier par tous moyens les malcontens et
principalement ceux qui, par le passé, ont eu crédit et autorité en
France, qui pourront augmenter les troubles et soustenir la mauvaise
et pernicieuse volonté de ceux qui voudroient invertir l’ancienne
et naturelle succession de la couronne de France.”—Du Ferrier to
Catherine de Medici, June, 1574, in Frémy, _Un ambassadeur liberal sous
Charles IX et Henri III_, 235.

[1661] Articles proposed by the count palatine’s ambassador for a
pacification (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,556, _anno_ 1574). The post
was subsidized by the French King by way of Reinhausen, Neustadt,
Kaiserslautern, Limbach (near Hamburg), Saarbrück, St. Avold, and Metz
(_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, V, 49).

[1662] _Vie de La Noue_, 87.

[1663] The Poles made a hard attempt to prevent Henry from leaving
the kingdom. They were dissatisfied that he assumed the title of King
of France without consulting them, and wanted him to govern his new
kingdom through ministers chosen from among them, and to employ himself
in military exploits against the Tartars and Turks (Languet, _Epist.
secr._, I, 121).

[1664] Frémy, _Un ambassadeur liberal sous Charles IX et Henri III_,
232.

[1665] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,543, September 10, 1574.

[1666] The duke and his fellow-captives made several efforts to escape,
in one of which Alençon narrowly missed doing so (see the account
in _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 600, July 26, 1574). In consequence, when
Catherine started to meet her son at Lyons, leaving the government of
Paris in care of the Parlement (_ibid._, No. 1,509, July 10, 1574), the
young princes traveled in the coach with her. “Her chickens go in coach
under her wing, and so she minds to bring them to the King.”—_Ibid._,
_For._, No. 1,511, Dale to Walsingham, August 9, 1574.

[1667] _Ibid._, No. 1,537, Dale to Sir Thomas Smith and Francis
Walsingham, September 2, 1574, from Lyons.

[1668] See the striking comments of the Venetian ambassador, _Rel.
vén._, II, 245, 246.

[1669] _Rel. vén._, II, 245, 246.

[1670] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,543, September 10, 1574, No. 1,555,
September 11, 1574; Thomas Wilkes to Walsingham and Dr. Dale to
Sir Thomas Smith and Walsingham. There were 6,500 Swiss at Châlons
(_ibid._, No. 1, 537, September 2, 1574). Henry III had sent orders in
advance of his coming, commanding that on the 30th of August all the
companies of ordinance should retire in garrison and await the orders
of the provincial governors. Troops were levied in Picardy, Champagne,
Brie, Burgundy, and Lorraine, to prevent the Protestant reiters from
gaining entrance into the country and were put under the command of the
duke of Guise, Vaudemont, and the marshal Strozzi (Claude Haton, II,
779).

[1671] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,590, November 4, 1574. The headquarters
of the Catholic forces were between Dijon and Langres, but troops
patrolled the whole course of the Marne and extended westward to Sens.
Artillery was sent up the Seine from Paris. The camp of the horse was
fixed near Troyes (Claude Haton, III, 779).

[1672] De Thou, Book L, chap. xii; _Vie de Mornay_, 23; Coll. Godefroy,
CCLIX, No. 2, “Les habitants du diocèse de Montpellier au roi, 4 juin,
1574.”

[1673] For other interesting details see _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,568,
September 29, 1574.

[1674] Le Laboureur, II, 135.

[1675] _C. S. P. For._, No. 1,584, October 23, 1574.

[1676] Schomberg’s comment is amusing: “Monsieur le mareschal Damphille
se contint sagement, dont les ennemis de ceste maison s’arrachent la
barbe.”—August 28, 1574, in _Arch. de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, 49.

[1677] _Chroniques fontenaisiennes_, 228-32; L’Estoile, I, 37; Weill,
137, note 3.

[1678] “A little piece of money might win the reiters to join with them
of the religion.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,623, December 23, 1574.

[1679] Aigues-Mortes was a strong port and the staple of salt for
Languedoc, Dauphiné, the Lyonnais, and Burgundy (_ibid._, No. 17,
January 25, 1575). Dr. Dale thought that the project was to connive
at a Turkish attack in Germany for the purpose of embarrassing the
Catholic princes there (_ibid._, No. 1,620, December 23, 1574).

[1680] The plot was an old one and long in preparation. See a letter
of St. Goard to the King, May 20, 1573 (_Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, IV, Appendix, No. 59). The Spanish had been advised
by word from Besançon, on April 3, that those of Geneva and Bern had
confederated with the Lutheran cantons and secured the favor of the
duke John Casimir, whose purpose was to overcome Besançon and the free
county of Burgundy (cf. letter of De Grantyre, the French agent in the
Grisons, to Bellièvre, April 8, 1573, Coll. Godefroy, CCLVIII, No.
52, and the letter of Charles IX to Bellièvre, May 9, 1573, _ibid._,
No. 55). The author of the plan was a Dr. Butterich, councilor of the
elector (_Archives de la maison d’Orange-Nassau_, V, 89, 99, 101, 107,
120-3). The Swiss cantons were also appealed to, but Beza hesitated
(_ibid._, 111). Spain had secret information of the plot (_ibid._, 89).
It finally failed (see a letter of Butterich to John of Nassau, June 6,
1575, _ibid._, 214; cf. Languet, _Epist. secr._, I, Part II, 106, July
11, 1575).

[1681] An example of eccentric partisanship is afforded by the duke
d’Uzes, who was a Huguenot, but who for enmity toward Damville joined
the King. Henry III made him a marshal and left him in chief command
when he went to Rheims (_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,617, December 23, 1574;
No. 13, January 16, 1575). Bellegarde was also made marshal in this
year (_ibid._, No. 1,570, September 29, 1574).

[1682] “Seminario della guerra.”—_Rel. vén._, II, 230.

[1683] Claude Haton, I, 782, 783.

[1684] See the luminous _Relazione del Giovanni Michel_, the Venetian
ambassador in France in 1575, ed. Tommaseo, II, 229-33.

[1685] _Correspondance de Philippe II sur les Pays-Bas_, III, 105,
note, June 15, 1574.

[1686] _Ibid._, 165-66, Requesens to Philip II, September 24, 1574:
“Il y a en France beaucoup d’Espagnols qui ont déserté des Pays-Bas;
il sont recueillis par M. de Guise et d’autres qui leur font un
bon traitement et leur donnent de grosses payes.” M. Gachard has
paraphrased the letter.

[1687] “La longa continuazione della guerra, che tutti li paesani
che prima erano disarmati e vilissimi, tutti dati all’arte del campo
e all’agricoltura, ovvero ad alcuna delle arti mecaniche, adesso
sono tutti armati, e talmente essercitati e agguerriti che non si
distinguono dalli più veterani soldati; tutti fatti archibugieri
eccellentissimi.”—“Relazione del Giovanni Michel,” _Rel. vén._,
II, 232; cf. Long, 167: “Des violences et des outrages exercés par
quelques petits gentilhommes sur des paysans excitèrent la vengeance
des villageois voisins, qui, furieux, accoururent en grand nombre. Les
provocateurs imprudents se sauvèrent, mais leur maisons furent pillées
et saccagées. On voit déjà _la haine du peuple_, poussé au desespoir
par les impôts et par les exacteurs, contre les privilegiés. Le peuple,
si mal disposé, ne devait pas être provoqué dans son ressentiment. Les
defenseurs de la cause commune vont se lever.”

[1688] The English ambassador gives particulars of the cardinal’s
death. “The King would needs go in procession with the Battus, who
are men that whip themselves as they go as a sort of penance. The
cardinal went in this solemn procession well-nigh all the night, and
the next day he said mass for a solemnity, wherewith he took a great
cold and a continual fever which brought him into a frenzy, wherein he
continued divers days. A Jew took upon him to work wonders and gave
him a medicine whereby he came to his remembrance for a time. Upon the
medicine there did break out certain pustules or spots in his body like
the pourpres, whereby some would say he was poisoned. Shortly after he
fell into his old frenzy and so died, the 18th day after he first fell
sick.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 1,624, December, 1574.

[1689] _Ibid._, No. 58, March 23, 1575. This letter is not printed in
the _Correspondance de Catherine de Médicis_. The Venetian ambassador
has a long and interesting character-sketch of the queen in _Rel.
vén._, II, 243. There are several monographs upon this “pure, douce et
mélancolique figure” [Galitizin, _Louise de Lorraine reine de France
(1553-1601)_; Meaume, _Etude historique sur Louise de Lorraine reine
de France (1553-1601)_, Paris, 1882; Baillon, _Histoire de Louise de
Lorraine, reine de France, 1553-1601_, Paris, 1884].

[1690] _C. S. P. For._, No. 33, March 3, 1575.

[1691] The Pope finally advanced a sum upon the security of the crown
jewels (_C. S. P. For._, No. 168, June 6, 1575).

[1692] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 55, 57, 67, March, 1575. The clergy in
Dauphiné protested against the burden laid upon the church there by the
King’s measure, complaining that its support was not costing the crown
a sou there; one of them even had the face to declare that they had
more to hope from Damville than from the King (_ibid._, No. 67, March,
1575).

[1693] Declaration et protestation de Henry de Montmorency, seigneur
Damville, mareschal de France, gouverneur et lieutenant général pour
le Roy en Languedoc. Issued from Nîmes, April 25, 1575. There is an
abstract of it in _C. S. P. For._, No. 106, 1575.

[1694] “L’organisation politique de cette Union (Union protestante)”fut
élaborée dans les assemblées tenues à Milhau, en décembre, 1573, et
en juillet, 1574. La base fut l’autonomie des villes, que usurpèrent
peu à peu l’administration. La Rochelle et Montauban confièrent
l’autorité à des chefs électifs, pris dans la bourgeoisie. En suite ces
républiques urbaines se fedérèrent. Il fut décidé que chaque généralité
aurait son assemblée et que délégués des généralités formeraient les
états généraux de l’Union. Ainsi se constitua au sein du royaume une
république fédérative, où l’élément aristocratique ne tarda pas à
dominer (Lavisse et Rambaud, “_Histoire générale_, V, 147;” cf. Cougny,
“Le parti républicain sous Henri III,” _Mémoires de la Sorbonne_, 1867;
Hippeau, “Les idées républicaines sous le règne de Henri III,” _Revue
des Soc. savant. des départ._, IV^[e] sér., III).

[1695] L’Estoile, I, 3, 38.

[1696] I have availed myself of the synopsis in _C. S. P. For._, No.
112, May, 1575.

[1697] Dr. Junius to the prince of Condé, _Archives de la maison
d’Orange-Nassau_, V, 237.

[1698] See Dr. Dale’s observations in letter to Burghley, May 21, 1575;
_C. S. P. For._, No. 138.

[1699] _Ibid._, No. 121, May 4, 1575. Through the duke of Savoy Henry
III seems to have offered to set Montmorency free, provided Damville
would deliver up Aigues-Mortes (_ibid._, No. 168, June 6, 1575).

[1700] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 114 and 287, _anno_ 1575.

[1701] Letter of the duke of Guise to M. de Luxembourg from Châlons,
September 3, 1575, _Coll. des autographes_, 1846, No. 213. The duke of
Guise was anxious for the safety of Langres.

[1702] _C. S. P. For._, No. 235, July 15, 1575, from Cracow.

[1703] _C. S. P. For._, No. 345, September 13, 1575. In Appendix XXXIV
will be found a long account in Latin from the pen of Dr. Dale upon the
condition of France at this time.

[1704] _C. S. P. For._, No. 120, _anno_ 1575. Even before leaving
Poland Henry III had anxiously written to Elizabeth urging the good
offices of his ambassador in England, De la Mothe-Fenelon (see the
letter in Appendix XXXV). The articles of peace agreed to during the
life of King Charles provided that in the event of the death of one
of the contracting parties, that party’s successor should be allowed
the space of one year to accept or refuse the conditions of peace,
the other party being bound by the articles to continue in friendship
in the event of the former accepting these articles; the Queen now
insisted that, when these articles were first agreed to, the French
King was at peace with all his vassals and had by the Edict of January
conceded to the Huguenots the free exercise of their religion, and
therefore at the present time he was bound to observe all that had been
promised (_C. S. P. Ven._, No. 624, April 24, 1575).

[1705] _Correspondance de Philippe II_, III, 209 and note.

[1706] _Ibid._, 271.

[1707] _Ibid._, 333.

[1708] _Ibid._, 348.

[1709] _Correspondance de Philippe II_, III, 319, 320.

[1710] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 622, March 22, 1575. In Arch. nat., K.
1537, No. 22, is the report of a Spanish spy, written from Calais on
March 18, 1575, which confirms the suspicion of English tampering in
France. Printed in Appendix XXXVI.

[1711] Schomberg’s observations were absolutely just, for on July 23,
1575, at Heidelberg, an instrument was signed by Charles Frederick, the
elector palatine, Henry, prince of Condé, and Charles de Montmorency,
in which the count palatine acknowledged the receipt from the English
Queen of 50,000 “crowns of the sun, each crown being of the value
of six English shillings sterling,” which amount was transferred to
“Henri de Bourbon, prince de Condé, chief of those of the religion in
France, as well as of those Catholics with them associated” (i. e.,
the Politiques). Elizabeth’s name was to be shielded throughout, the
elector assuming entire liability for repayment which was to be made
“before the army now levied in Germany for service in France shall
depart to France” (see _C. S. P. For._, No. 254, “The obligation
and quittance of the prince of Condé,” July 23, 1575, Heidelberg;
cf. _ibid._, _Ven._, 627; July 12, 1575, the guess of the Venetian
ambassador in France). Cf. _ibid._, No. 633, September 7, 1575. The
Venetian ambassador seems to have thought that trouble in Ireland would
prevent England from advancing any more to the Huguenots (_ibid._, No.
631, August 9, 1575). The harvest of 1575 was generally good. But no
invading army would enter France before the grain was cut and stacked
(cf. _ibid._).

[1712] _C. S. P. Ven._, No. 634, September 11, 1575.

[1713] _Ibid._, _For._, No. 388, October 3, 1575; L’Estoile, _anno_
1575; see the interesting details of Henry III’s curious fits of
contrition in Frémy, “Henri III, pénitent; étude sur les rapports de ce
prince avec diverses confréries et communautés parisiennes,” _Bull. du
Com. d’hist. et d’archéol. du diocèse de Paris_, 1885.

[1714] Claude Haton, II, 780; Walsingham to Burghley, _State Papers,
Foreign,_ Elizabeth, CV, No. 51, printed in Appendix XXXVII. From Dreux
the duke issued a manifesto, September 17, 1575, in which he explained
his conduct and complained of the undue taxation and the imposition
which the people were suffering in the King’s name, declaring
that he would take under his protection all the French of the two
religions, and demanding the call of the Estates-General for redress
of grievances (Claude Haton, II, 781 and note). Alençon styled himself
“Gouverneur-général pour le roy et protecteur de la liberté et bien
publique de France” (_C. S. P. For._, No. 365, September, 1575).

[1715] Claude Haton, II, 784, 785.

[1716] Paris furnished the King 4,000 soldiers at its own expense. The
new troops were lodged in the faubourgs of St. Germain, St. Marceau,
and Notre-Dame des Champs (_ibid._, 787).

[1717] Claude Haton, II, 788-89; D’Aubigné, Book VII, chap. xix. From
this circumstance the duke was often called Le Balafré. (_C. S. P.
For._, No. 450, November 10, 1575.)

[1718] Claude Haton, II, 797.

[1719] _C. S. P. For._, No. 422, October 29, 1575. The King called
these pilgrimages “nouaines” (cf. _ibid._, No. 506, Dr. Dale to Lord
Burghley, December 20, 1575).

[1720] Protestant worship was provisionally authorized in the towns
held by the confederates. Angoulême and Bourges refused to open their
gates to Alençon and so he was offered Cognac and St. Jean-d’Angély
instead. The prince of Condé was refused admittance to Mezières (Claude
Haton, II, 805, note).

[1721] For details as to this levy, see Claude Haton, II, 804. This
tax was laid upon the clergy, as well as others, and called forth a
protest from the former, who pleaded an edict issued by Henry III at
Avignon shortly after his return from Poland, forbidding the governors
to enforce the payment of tailles, munitions, etc., upon the clergy.

[1722] Fontanon, IV, 840.

[1723] Claude Haton, II, 820.

[1724] Paris remonstrated against this (_ibid._, 828 and note 1).

[1725] _Ibid._, 817; L’Estoile, I, 46.

[1726] Claude Haton, II, 806-8.

[1727] _C. S. P. For._, No. 535.

[1728] Dr. Dale writes on February 28: “The Guises are nothing privy to
the queen mother’s doings and she likes as evil of them.”—_C. S. P.
For._, No. 634, February 28, 1576.

[1729] _C. S. P. For._, No. 592, January 1576: “The King of Spain makes
the King very great offers to break the peace.”

[1730] Dr. Dale to Sir Thomas Smith and Walsingham. All the fair
promises of the delivery of Bourges and La Charité are like to come to
nothing, as may appear by the enclosed letter of Monsieur to the Court
of Parliament. There is a secret League between Guise, Nemours, Nevers,
Maine, and others of that house, together with the Chancellor, against
all that would have any peace, and if it should be made, to begin a
sharp war afresh (_C. S. P. For._, No. 583, _anno_ 1576). From the
first Languet was skeptical. He anticipated reaction (_Epist. secr._,
I, Part II, 181, 205).

[1731] M. Frémy has published a work in which he makes the bizarre
claim that the origin of the Académie française is to be at least
remotely ascribed to Henry III (_Les origines de l’Académie française._
_L’Académie des derniers Valois, 1570-1585_, d’après des documents
nouveaux et inédits, 1888. There is a review of it in the _English
Hist. Review_, III, 576). Some one has said that “all the Valois
kings were either bad or mad.” The aphorism would seem to apply to
the character of Henry III, in both capacities. He was a mountebank,
a roisterer, a dabbler in philosophy, a religious maniac, and a moral
pervert. L’Estoile and Lippomano especially abound in allusions or
accounts of him (e. g., _Rel. vén._, II, 237-39). Compare this account
with the earlier observations of Suriano, _ibid._, I, 409, and Davila,
VII, 442. On the “mignons,” Henry III’s favorites, see L’Estoile, I,
142, 143. Henry III’s very handwriting manifests his character: “Son
écriture semble tout d’abord régulière, mais elle n’est pas formée,
les lettres s’alignent sans s’unir, sans se rejoindre, certainement
c’est une des écritures les plus difficiles à déchiffrer.... C’est
l’homme qui s’y révèle l’indolent, l’efféminé monarque qui de son lit
écrivait ces lignes à Villeroy: ‘J’ay eu le plaisir d’avoir veu vostre
mémoire très bien faict comme tout ce qui sort de vostre boutique, mais
il fault bien penser, car nous avons besoin de regarder de près à nos
affaires. Je seray sitost là que ce seroit peine perdue d’y répondre.
Aussi bien suis-je au lit _non malade, non pour poltronner, mais pour
me retrouver frais comme la rose_.’”—La Ferrière, _Rapport de St.
Pétersbourg_, 27.

[1732] See the remonstrance in _C. S. P. For._, No. 505, December 19,
1575.

[1733] _Ibid._, No. 584, January 9, 1576.

[1734] For particulars see Dale’s letter to Smith and Walsingham,
_ibid._, No. 605, February 6, 1576; Claude Haton, II, 829.

[1735] _C. S. P. For._, Nos. 614, 625, 662, February 14-22, March 8,
1576. Mayenne, whose marquisate was erected into a duchy on January 1,
1576, had succeeded his brother, the duke of Guise, as chief commander
of the royal forces, and advanced toward Lorraine in order to prevent
the reiters from joining the enemy. Henry III had sent Biron (he had
been made a marshal in the June preceding—_ibid._, No. 178, June 13,
1575) to them to persuade them not to enter France, representing that a
truce had been concluded between the King and the duke of Alençon. But
the prince of Condé replied that if the duke had made his peace with
the King, he, the prince, had not. Biron failed and La Noue was sent,
who likewise was unsuccessful (Claude Haton, II, 824, 825).

[1736] _C. S. P. For._, No. 662, Dale to Smith and Walsingham, March 8,
1576; Claude Haton, II, 832.

[1737] _C. S. P. For._, No. 740, April 17, 1576.

[1738] Dr. Dale wrote truly to Lord Burghley saying that the
Protestants had “gotten more without any stroke stricken than ever
could be had before this time by all the wars, as appears by the note
of the provinces that are to be under the government of them and their
friends.”—_C. S. P. For._, No. 777, May 11, 1576.

[1739] La Popelinière, III, 361.

[1740] This claim ran back to the reign of Charles VII; the original
amount was 25,000 livres. Louis XI altered it to 6,000 livres, plus the
county of Gaure and the town of Fleurance, and this revised form was
approved by Charles VIII in 1496 (cf. _C. S. P. For._, No. 672, §5; May
16, 1576).

[1741] Henry of Navarre’s memoir is given _in extenso_ in _ibid._, No.
671, May 15, 1576.

[1742] La Popelinière, III, 365.

[1743] Maffert, _Les apanages en France du XVI^[e] au XIX^[e] siècle_
(1900).

[1744] Articles du maréchal de Dampville, gouverneur de Languedoc et
des Etats du pays, présentés au Roi pour la décharge de la province,
May 2, 1576.—Coll. Godefroy, XCIV, No. 21.

[1745] Nusse, “La donation du duché de Château-Thierry par le duc
d’Alençon à Jean Casimir, comte palatin du Rhin,” _Annales de la
Société hist. et archéol. de Château-Thierry_, Vol. XI (1875), p. 61.

[1746] The text of the Paix de Monsieur is in Isambert, XIV, 280. The
sources for the history are many. The correspondence of Dale, the
English ambassador in France, and the other English agents, Wilkes and
Randolph, in _C. S. P. For._, 1876, for March, April, and May, is full
and detailed (cf. D’Aubigné, Book VIII, chap. xxvii; De Thou, Book
LXXII). La Popelinière, III, 360 ff., gives the text of the treaty and
the letters-patent of the King. The act was registered in Parlement on
May 14, 1576, though signed by the King on May 2.

[1747] Two days before this scene took place, the newly elected king of
Poland Stephen Bathori, prince of Transylvania, had written informing
the deposed Valois that he had assumed the Polish crown and desiring to
know what Henry would have done with the household stuff he had left
behind in Poland (_C. S. P. For._, No. 789, May 29, 1576). The Emperor
had had numerous partisans, but refused to accept the condition that he
fix his residence in Poland (_Epist. secr._, I, Part II, 143).

[1748] See the vivid details in Claude Haton, II, 834-40, 847, 851, 858.

[1749] _Ibid._, 855-60.

[1750] The words in brackets are faded and are supplied from No. 460.

[1751] Ellipses indicate places where the MS is faded or creased so as
to be illegible.

[1752] The words in brackets are faded and are supplied from No. 455.

[1753] The date is in Burghley’s hand.

[1754] The MS is torn here.

[1755] The reference to the original cipher is “State Papers, Scotland,
Elizabeth, Vol. III, No. 82.” (This is not signed addressed or
endorsed. Pencil note by editor: “See April 29.”)

[1756] The Editor’s pencil note to the cipher (Scotland ii. 82) is
“March 12,” but the letter is calendared under [March 20].

[1757] Cayas, secretary to Philip II.

[1758] On the margin, in the writing of Philip II: “Es menester tener
prevenido lo que se les ha de dar para este tiempo.”

[1759] This heading is in another hand.

[1760] This copy is on the other side of the same sheet of paper.

[1761] For _est_.

[1762] The original probably has _amener_.

[1763] _Il_ is missing.

[1764] M. d’Auzances (or Ausances) was lieutenant of the king in the
district of Messin.

[1765] Places in Lorraine.

[1766] Laon.

[1767] Soissons.

[1768] Boulogne.

[1769] This letter is printed V. and is altered in ink to B.

[1770] From Communay, _Les huguenots dans le Béarn et la Navarre_,
p. 175. The italicized portions are further details which I have
added.—J. W. T.

[1771] Cf. Courteault, p. 553 n. 2.

[1772] Cf. _Les huguenots en Béarn_, p. 64.

[1773] _Ibid._, pp. 65, 68.

[1774] _Ibid._, p. 68.

[1775] The above document was sent by Biron to M. de Fourquevaux,
French ambassador in Spain. There is an extract from the letter of
Biron to Forquevaux translated into Spanish, same carton (K. 1,515),
pièce No. 69. Biron’s letter is dated March 17, 1570, from Narbonne.

[1776] A space is left blank to the MS.

[1777] This letter of Sir Henry Norris is a draft originally
intended to be sent to the Queen, with the terms of address altered
throughout—_your highness_ altered to _your honour_, etc.

[1778] The MS is torn here.

[1779] The postscript is in the same hand as the king’s signature.

[1780] A space is left blank in the MS.

[1781] See the subscription and the notice of receipt at the end of the
despatch.

[1782] Although the Catalogue has the date February 18 it is a mistake;
the document has very clearly 17th.

[1783] The postscript is found thus, between the date and the signature.

[1784] Altered in Burghley’s hand from _Iº Julii._

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