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Title: Narrative and Critical History of America, Vol. VI (of 8) - The United States of North America, Part I
Author: Various
Language: English
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NARRATIVE AND CRITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICA

The United States of North America
Part I


[Illustration]


NARRATIVE AND CRITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICA

Edited by

JUSTIN WINSOR

Librarian of Harvard University
Corresponding Secretary Massachusetts Historical Society

VOL. VI



Boston and New York
Houghton, Mifflin and Company
The Riverside Press, Cambridge

Copyright, 1887,
By Houghton, Mifflin & Co.
All rights reserved.

The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A.
Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Company.



CONTENTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

[_The cut on the title shows the obverse of the Washington medal,
struck to commemorate the siege of Boston._]


  CHAPTER I.

  THE REVOLUTION IMPENDING. _Mellen Chamberlain_                       1

  ILLUSTRATIONS: George III., 20; Lord North, with Autograph,
  21; Rockingham, 31; Fac-simile of _Glorious News_, May 16,
  1766, 33; John Adams, 36; Fac-simile of Adams's Writing, 37;
  Samuel Adams, with Autograph, 40; Samuel Adams, 41; Revere's
  Plan of State Street at the time of the Boston Massacre, 48;
  Autographs of the Court for the Trial following the Boston
  Massacre,—Benjamin Lynde, John Cushing, Peter Oliver, Edmund
  Trowbridge, Jonathan Sewall, Samuel Winthrop, 50; of the
  Counsel,—Robert Treat Paine, Samuel Quincy, John Adams, Josiah
  Quincy, Jr., and Sampson S. Blowers, 51; Joseph Warren, 54;
  Fac-simile of Broadside, June 22, 1773, 55; A Contemporary
  Print, 59; Broadside, June 17, 1774, 61.

  CRITICAL ESSAY                                                      62

  EDITORIAL NOTES                                                     68

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Statue of James Otis, 69; Jonathan Mayhew, 71;
  Autograph of Charles Chauncey, 71; George III., 76; Fac-simile
  of Handbill, Faneuil Hall Meeting, Oct. 28, 1767, 77; of
  Broadside, _The True Sons of Liberty_, 78; List of Merchants
  importing contrary to agreement, 79; Broadside proscribing
  William Jackson, 80; Revere's Cut of the Landing of Troops in
  Boston, 1768, 81; John Dickinson, with Autograph, 82; Autograph
  of James Bowdoin, 83; William Livingston, 84; Liberty Song,
  86; Massachusetts Liberty Song, 87; Fac-simile of Instructions
  to Representatives, signed by Richard Dana and William Cooper,
  87; Handbill on the Anniversary of the Boston Massacre, 89;
  Handbill of Warning, Dec. 2, 1773, 92; Philadelphia Poster
  about the Tea-Ships, 93; Josiah Quincy's Manuscript Dedication
  of his Port-Bill Tract, 94; Quincy Mansion, 96; Handbill
  announcing the Port Bill and Regulating Bill, 97; Handbill
  of General Brattle's Letter, 1774, 98; Autograph of Thomas
  Cushing, 99; Signers of the Congress of 1774, 102; Satirical
  Print, _Virtual Representation_, 103; Josiah Quincy's Diary,
  105; Lord North, 107; Chatham, 109; Richard Price, Portrait and
  Autograph, 111; Autograph of Lord Dartmouth, 111.


  CHAPTER II.

  THE CONFLICT PRECIPITATED. _The Editor_                            113

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Autograph of Admiral Graves, 114; Notice of
  Committee of Correspondence, signed by William Cooper, 115;
  Autograph of Jedediah Preble, 116; of Joseph Hawley, 118;
  Roads of Roxbury and beyond, 120; Roads between Boston and
  Marlborough, 121; Heath's Account of the Fight at Menotomy,
  126; General Heath, with Autograph, 127; Autograph of Ethan
  Allen, 128; Ruins of Ticonderoga, 129; Pen-and-Ink Sketch of
  the Roxbury Lines, 130; Warren's Last Note, 132; Notice to the
  Militia, 133; Order of the Committee of Safety, 135; Autograph
  of Colonel William Prescott, 135; of John Brooks, 136; of
  General Howe, 136; of John  Stark, 137; of Richard Pigot, 137;
  of Governor Tryon, with seal, 140; of Joseph Reed, 141;
  Washington's Heads of Letter, July 10, 1775, 141; Letter of John
  Hancock, June 22, 1775, 143; Autograph of General Gage, 145;
  Handbill thrown within the British Lines, 147; Views of Country
  around Boston from Beacon Hill, 148, 149, 150, 151; A Vaudevil
  on _The Boston Blockade_, 154; Playbill of Zara, 155; Autograph
  of General Knox, 156; Views of Boston and of the Castle, 157;
  Proclamation of Washington, 159; Guy Carleton, with Autograph,
  164; Seal of Lord Dunmore, 167; Plan of Attack on Fort Moultrie,
  169; Plan of Attack on Charlestown, S. C., 170; William
  Moultrie, 171.

  CRITICAL ESSAY                                                     172

  NOTES                                                              174

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Colonel Parker's Lexington Deposition, 176;
  Colonel Barrett's Concord Deposition, 177; Plan of Lexington,
  179; of Concord, 180; Emerson's Diary, 181; Earl Percy, 182,
  183; Lexington Green, 185; Richard Frothingham, 186; Ezra
  Stiles, with Autograph, 188; Autograph of Samuel Swett, 191;
  General Putnam, with Autograph, 192; Autograph of General
  Ward, 192; Joseph Warren, 193; Handbill (Tory Account) of the
  Battle of Bunker Hill, 196; View of the Battle of Bunker Hill,
  197; Plans of Charlestown Peninsula and the Battle, 198, 199;
  Plan of the Battle, 201; Autograph of General Heath, 203;
  Plan of the Siege of Boston, 206; Boston and Vicinity, June,
  1775, 208; Boston and Charlestown, 1775, 210; British Lines on
  Boston Neck, 211; Map of the St. Lawrence and Sorel Rivers,
  215; General Montgomery on the Capitulation of St. John, 217;
  Attestation of Montgomery's Will, 218; Richard Montgomery, 220,
  221; Benedict Arnold, with Autograph, 223; Montresor's Map of
  the Kennebec Region, 224; David Wooster, with Autograph, 225;
  Plan of Siege of Quebec, 226; Autograph of Charles Carroll
  of Carrollton, 227; View of Sullivan's Island, 228; View of
  Charlestown, S. C., and the British Fleet (1776), 229.


  CHAPTER III.

  THE SENTIMENT OF INDEPENDENCE, ITS GROWTH AND CONSUMMATION.
  _George E. Ellis_                                                  231

  CRITICAL ESSAY                                                     252

  EDITORIAL NOTES                                                    255

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Autographs of the Mecklenburg Committee, 256;
  Thomas Jefferson, 258; State House, Philadelphia, 259; Original
  Draft of the Declaration of Independence, 260; Autograph
  of Thomas Jefferson, 261; Portrait and Autograph of Roger
  Sherman, 262; Autographs of the Signers of the Declaration of
  Independence, 263-266; Fac-simile of a Contemporary Broadside
  of the Declaration, 267; John Dickinson, 268; John Hancock (the
  Scott picture), 270; (a German picture), 271; Charles Thomson,
  272; Fac-simile of a Page of Christopher Marshall's Diary, 273.


  CHAPTER IV.

  THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HUDSON. _George W. Cullum_                    275

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Mortier House, on Richmond Hill, Washington's
  Headquarters, 276; Lord Howe, 277; General Sir William Howe,
  278; Lord Stirling, 280; Roger Morris House, Washington's
  Harlem Headquarters, 284; Autograph of Knyphausen, 289;
  Portrait and Autograph of Burgoyne, 292; another Portrait,
  293; Lord George Germain, 295; General Arthur St. Clair,
  297; Autograph of General Schuyler, 297; General John Stark,
  301; General Horatio Gates, 302; General Horatio Gates, with
  Autograph, 303; Sir Henry Clinton, Portraits and Autograph,
  306, 307; General George Clinton, 308; Fac-simile of Burgoyne's
  Letter to Gates, 310; Rude contemporary Cuts of Washington and
  Gates, 311.

  CRITICAL ESSAY                                                     315

  DISPOSAL OF THE CONVENTION TROOPS                                  317

  EDITORIAL NOTES                                                    323

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Plan of Fort Montgomery, 324; Chain at Fort
  Montgomery, 324; Plan of Constitution Island, 325; Plans of
  the Battle of Long Island, 327, 328; Ratzer's smaller Map of
  New York City, 332; Johnston's Map of New York Island (1776),
  335; the Sauthier-Faden Plan of Campaign round New York (1776),
  336; Fort Washington and Dependencies, 339; the Sauthier-Tryon
  Map of New York Province (1774), 340; the Present Seat of
  War, from Low's _Almanac_, 342; New York and Vicinity, from
  the _Political Magazine_, 343; Campaign of 1776, from Hall's
  _History_, 344; Hessian Map of the Campaign above New York
  (1776), 345; Map of Arnold's Fight near Valcour Island, 347;
  Trumbull's Plan of Ticonderoga and its Dependencies (1776),
  352; Map of Ticonderoga (1777) used at St. Clair's Trial, 353;
  Fleury's Map of Fort Stanwix, 355; Plan of the Conflict at
  Saratoga, 362; Attack on Forts Clinton and Montgomery as mapped
  by John Hills, 363; another Plan, from Leake's _Life of Lamb_,
  365.


  CHAPTER V.

  THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DELAWARE.—PHILADELPHIA UNDER HOWE AND
  UNDER ARNOLD. _Frederick D. Stone_                                 367

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Charles Lee, 369; his Autograph, 370; Fac-simile
  of an Appeal of the Council of Safety, Dec. 8, 1776, 371;
  Broadside of the Council of Safety, 372; Lord Howe, 380;
  General Grey, 383; General Sir William Howe, 383; Alexander
  Hamilton, 384; Anthony Wayne, 385; the Destruction of the
  "Augusta", 388; Fac-simile of Proclamation of Washington, Dec.
  20, 1777, 390; Playbill of Theatre in Southwark, February,
  1778, 394.

  EDITORIAL NOTES                                                    403

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Autograph of General Richard Prescott, 403;
  Map, from the _Gentleman's Magazine_, of the Neighborhood of
  New York, 404; Joseph Reed, 405; Charles Lee, 406; Marshall's
  Map of Trenton, Princeton, and Monmouth, 408; Hessian Map
  of Trenton and Princeton, 409; Faden's Map of Trenton and
  Princeton, 410; Wiederhold's Map of Trenton, 411; Wilkinson's
  Map of Trenton, 412; of Princeton, 413; Hall's Map of the
  Campaign of 1777, 414; Galloway's Map, 415; General Sir William
  Howe, 417, 418; Washington's Map of Brandywine, 420; Hessian
  Map of Brandywine, 422; Hessian Map of Paoli, 423; Faden's Map
  of Trudruffrin, or Paoli, 424; Approaches to Germantown, 425;
  Montresor's Map of Germantown Battle, 426-427; Hessian Map of
  Germantown, 428; View of Stenton, Logan's House, 429; Faden's
  Map of Operations on the Delaware, 429; Lafayette's Map of the
  Attack at Gloucester, N. J., 430; Map of Fort Mifflin on Mud
  Island, 431; Fleury's Plan of Fort Mifflin, 432-433; Attack on
  Fort Mifflin, 434-435; Plan of Mud Island Fort, 437; Attack on
  Mud Island, 438; Map of Valley Forge Encampment, 439; Defences
  of Philadelphia, 440, 441; Vicinity of Philadelphia, 442;
  Barren Hill, 443; Plan of the Battle of Monmouth, 444; Monmouth
  and Vicinity, 445.

  THE TREASON OF ARNOLD. _The Editor_                                447

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Portraits of Benedict Arnold, 447, 448, 449;
  Arnold's Commission as Major-General, signed by John Hancock,
  450; Plans of West Point, 451, 459, 462; Portraits of Major
  John André, 452, 453, 454; Autographs of André, 452, 453; Plans
  of the Hudson River, 455, 456, 465; Portrait and Autograph of
  Benjamin Tallmadge, 457.


  CHAPTER VI.

  THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT. _Edward Channing_              469

  ILLUSTRATIONS: View of Charlestown, S. C., 471; Fac-simile
  of General Moultrie's Order, 471; Fac-simile of Commodore
  Whipple's Letter, 472; General Benjamin Lincoln, Portrait and
  Autograph, 473; Portraits of Cornwallis, 474, 475; Portrait of
  General Gates, 476; Lord Rawdon, 489; Kosciusko, 492; Steuben,
  497; Portrait and Autograph of Rochambeau, 498; Autographs of
  French Officers, 500; Portraits of Comte de Grasse, 502, 503;
  his Autograph, 502; Fac-simile of Articles of Capitulation at
  Yorktown, 505; Nelson House, 506.

  CRITICAL ESSAY                                                     507

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Portraits of General Nathanael Greene, 508, 509,
  512, 513; his Autograph, 514.

  NOTES                                                              519

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Map of Siege of Savannah (1779), 521; Plan of
  Charleston (1780), 526; Siege of Charleston, 528; Battle of
  Camden, 531; Gates's Defeat, 533; Battle of Guildford, 540; Map
  of Cape Fear River, 542; Action at Hobkirk's Hill, 543; Diagram
  of the Naval Action of De Grasse, 548; Plans of the Yorktown
  Campaign, 550, 551, 552.

  EDITORIAL NOTES ON EVENTS IN THE NORTH                             555

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Hessian Map of the Hudson Highlands, 556; Stoney
  Point, 557; Verplanck's Point, 557; Faden's Plan of Stony
  Point, 558; Paulus Hook, 559.


  CHAPTER VII.

  THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. _Edward E. Hale_     563

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Fac-simile of Commodore Tucker's Orders to
  command the "Boston", 566; Esek Hopkins, 569; Autograph of
  Joshua Barney, 575; of Captain John Barry, 581; Fac-simile of
  Captain Tucker's Parole at Charleston, 583.

  GENERAL EDITORIAL NOTES                                            589

  SPECIAL EDITORIAL NOTES                                            589

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Paul Jones, 592; Richard Pearson, 593; Count
  D'Estaing, 594, 595; his Autograph, 595; Plan of the Siege of
  Newport, 596; Blaskowitz's Plan of Newport, 597; Sullivan's
  Campaign Map, 598; View of the Fight on Rhode Island, 599;
  Lafayette's Map of Narragansett Bay, 600; his Plan of the
  Campaign on Rhode Island, 602; Autograph of General Solomon
  Lovell, 603; Map of the Attack on Penobscot (Castine), 604.


  CHAPTER VIII.

  THE INDIANS AND THE BORDER WARFARE OF THE REVOLUTION. _Andrew
  McFarland Davis_                                                   605

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Guy Johnson's Map of the Country of the Six
  Nations, 609; Joseph Thayendaneken (Brant), 623; Brant, by
  Romney, 625; his Autograph, 625; St. Leger's Order of March,
  628; Peter Gansevoort, 629; the Butler badge, 631; General
  Sullivan, 637.

  CRITICAL ESSAY                                                     647

  NOTES                                                              673

  ILLUSTRATION: Map of Colonel Williamson's Marches, 675.


  CHAPTER IX.

  THE WEST, FROM THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH FRANCE, 1763, TO THE
  TREATY OF PEACE WITH ENGLAND, 1783. _William Frederick Poole_      685

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Henry Bouquet, 692; Plan of Bushy Run Battle,
  693; Bouquet's Council with the Indians, 695; Bouquet's
  Campaign Map, 696; Map of the Illinois Country, 700; Ruins of
  Magazine at Fort Chartres, 703; Daniel Boone, 707; Plan of
  Kaskaskia, 717; Lieutenant Ross's Map of the Mississippi, 721;
  Fac-simile of Colonel Clark's Summons to Governor Hamilton, 727.

  THE CLOSING SCENES OF THE WAR. _The Editor_                        744

  ILLUSTRATIONS: Captain Asgill, 745; Fraunce's Tavern in New
  York, 747.


  INDEX                                                              749



              NARRATIVE AND CRITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICA.



CHAPTER I.

THE REVOLUTION IMPENDING.

BY MELLEN CHAMBERLAIN,

_Librarian Boston Public Library._


THE American Revolution was no unrelated event, but formed a part
of the history of the British race on both continents, and was not
without influence on the history of mankind. As an event in British
history, it wrought with other forces in effecting that change in the
Constitution of the mother country which transferred the prerogatives
of the crown to the Parliament, and led to the more beneficent
interpretation of its provisions in the light of natural rights. As an
event in American history, it marks the period, recognized by the great
powers of Europe, when a people, essentially free by birth and by the
circumstances of their situation, became entitled, because justified
by valor and endurance, to take their place among independent nations.
Finally, as an event common to the history of both nations, it stands
midway between the Great Rebellion and the Revolution of 1688, on the
one hand, and the Reform Bill of 1832 and the extension of suffrage
in 1884, on the other, and belongs to a race which had adopted the
principles of the Reformation and of the Petition of Right.

The American Revolution was not a quarrel between two peoples,—the
British people and the American people,—but, like all those events
which mark the progress of the British race, it was a strife between
two parties, the conservatives in both countries as one party, and
the liberals in both countries as the other party; and some of its
fiercest battles were fought in the British Parliament. Nor did it
proceed in one country alone, but in both countries at the same time,
with nearly equal step, and was essentially the same in each, so that
at the close of the French War, if all the people of Great Britain had
been transported to America and put in control of American affairs,
and all the people of America had been transported to Great Britain
and put in control of British affairs, the American Revolution and the
contemporaneous British Revolution—for there was a contemporaneous
British Revolution—might have gone on just the same, and with the
same final results. But the British Revolution was to regain liberty;
the American Revolution was to preserve liberty. Both peoples had a
common history in the events which led to the Great Rebellion; but in
the reaction which followed the Restoration, that part of the British
race which awaited the conflict in the old home passed again under the
power of the prerogative, and, after the accession of William III.,
came under the domination of the great Whig families. The British
Revolution, therefore, was to recover what had been lost. But those
who emigrated to the colonies left behind them institutions which were
monarchical, in church and state, and set up institutions which were
democratic. And it was to preserve, not to acquire, these democratic
institutions that the liberal party carried the country through a long
and costly war.[1]

The American Revolution, in its earlier stages at least, was not a
contest between opposing governments or nationalities, but between two
different political and economic systems, to each of which able and
honest men then adhered, and now adhere. The motives and conduct of
each party, therefore, ought to be stated with exact impartiality. It
was not only inevitable, but wise, and on the whole wisely conducted in
accordance with the traditions and methods of political action to which
our British race had been accustomed. It was also honestly and fairly
opposed by those who neither accepted revolutionary principles, nor
recognized the validity of the reasons assigned for their application
to the existing state of affairs.

Readers of American history from the Restoration of Charles II.,
in 1660, to the Revolution find frequent reference to the King's
Prerogatives, Navigation Laws, Acts of Trade, and in later years to
Writs of Assistance, as subjects of complaint between Great Britain
and her colonies; and as these were among the immediate causes of the
war, they require explanation. When the Earl of Hillsborough (April 22,
1768) required the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, through
Governor Bernard (June 21st), in his majesty's name, to rescind the
resolution which had given birth to their Circular Letter of February
11, 1768, the order was a claim of right by the king to control the
legislative action of that province; and the refusal of the House was
regarded by the prerogative party both in Great Britain and in the
colonies as in derogation of the king's constitutional power.

What was the foundation of this alleged authority of the king over the
colonies? By the public law of all civilized nations in the fifteenth
century, the property in unoccupied lands belonged to the crown of the
country by which they were discovered;[2] and if, as was generally the
case, these lands were inhabited by savages, still the fee was in the
crown, subject only to such use as might be made of them by wandering
tribes. Such is the law to-day. This title to the English colonies was
not in the people of England nor in the state, but in the crown, and
descended with it. The crown alone could sell or give away these lands.
The crown could make laws for the inhabitants, and repeal them; could
appoint their rulers, and remove them. Parliament could do neither.
The political relations of the colonists were to the crown, not to
the government of England; nor were they in any respect subject to
parliamentary legislation.[3] They were not citizens within the realm,
nor, except in a qualified sense, of the empire, but subjects of the
crown, having only such rights as it granted to them in their charters;
and even these charters the crown claimed, and exercised the right to
amend or revoke. James I. amended that of Virginia in 1624, and Charles
II. revoked that of Massachusetts in 1684. They were regarded merely
as charters of incorporated land companies, and, as such, subject to
revocation by the king who granted them; and when these companies had
developed into municipal governments, they were considered as still
subject to alteration or repeal by the sovereign power,[4] although in
both cases rights of property were saved to the owners. Strange as this
doctrine may seem, it is now substantial law in England and in America.

To all these rights, privileges, and disabilities the emigrants agreed
when they purchased lands from the crown; and the rights and duties,
whether of the crown or of its subjects, descended to their respective
successors. With such rights, though not in all cases with such views
in respect to them, the colonists came to America; and such rights, and
no more, their children possessed, under the British Constitution, at
the time of the American Revolution, in the days of George III.

These claims of the crown every colony resisted as incompatible with
its essential rights, and yet they were legal and constitutional
prerogatives, admitted by the greatest judges of England, and most
necessarily have been admitted in the colonies not only by Hutchinson
and Oliver, but by James Otis and John Adams, had they sat as judges.
It was on this legal and constitutional ground that the prerogative
party stood both in England and in America.

But in England from the time of James I., and in America from the
coming of Winthrop, there had been an anti-prerogative party; and as
the prerogative party in England and the prerogative party in America
were one and the same, so the anti-prerogative party in England and the
anti-prerogative party in the colonies were one and the same, having
similar views, and, though separated by a thousand leagues, working to
the same end. On this question came the first political contest of the
Revolution; that of parliamentary supremacy came later. The strength of
one side was in legal and constitutional principles, as they were then
interpreted by judicial tribunals; that of the other lay in the changes
which were taking place in the British Constitution,—in short, in
revolution. The revolutionary party succeeded in both countries: in
America, by war; in England, by more silent influences which have
greatly modified, if not destroyed, the prerogative.

Although the prerogative was a cardinal right in the British
Constitution, and freely exercised by popular sovereigns like
Elizabeth, it began to be questioned under James I., and resisted
under Charles I., who lost his life in its defence, as James II. lost
his crown.[5] But the progress of this revolution was not steady,
nor did it always hold what it had gained. There came periods of
reaction, one of which was in the early days of George III. He was
strenuous in maintaining his prerogative, and, by the support of the
"King's Friends", probably held it with a firmer hand than any of
his predecessors since Elizabeth. The contest about the prerogatives
encountered this difficulty: that successful resistance in a particular
instance settled no principle, but left all other cases untouched.[6]
The extension of the navigation acts to the colonies by Parliament,
though assented to by King Charles II., was in derogation of his
prerogatives; and so in the time of William III. (1696) was the
attempt to transfer certain colonial affairs from the Privy Council,
which represented the king, to a proposed Council of Commerce, which
would have been the creature of Parliament. In consistency with
these proceedings, the king's power over the colonies ought to have
been transferred to Parliament; and instead of remaining the king's
colonies, they ought to have become a part of the empire, and his
authority over them no greater than that over the territory within the
four seas. But it was otherwise. The colonists remained the king's
subjects. He appointed their governors; he frequently set aside their
laws, and over them he exercised his royal prerogatives. One capital
point, however, had been gained by the revolutionary party on both
sides of the water. Successful invasions of the prerogative had at
length created what was called the "spirit of the constitution."[7]
The loyalists, however, seemed to be firmly entrenched in their
constitutional position, nor did the anti-prerogative party avoid a
dilemma: how to escape out of the hands of the king without falling
into the hands of Parliament. If, as some claimed when they resisted
the royal prerogative, they were British subjects, entitled to the same
rights and privileges as native-born subjects within the realm, why
then should they, more than other subjects, be free from the burdens
imposed by the imperial policy? But when, in pursuance of that policy,
Parliament undertook to tax the colonies, then they were forced by the
logic of the situation to claim that, though subjects of "the best of
kings", they owed no more allegiance to Parliament than the Scotch did
before the union.[8]

Probably no one more heartily detested the claims of the prerogative
than Franklin; and yet the phase which the controversy had assumed
compelled him to take high prerogative ground. Such was his position
with regard to the Stamp Act, as is seen in the note below.[9] Andros
himself could have asked for nothing better, in 1686; and when Franklin
was asked what the king could do, should the colonies refuse just
requisitions, he had no other answer than this,—that they would not
refuse!

Such is the doctrine of the prerogative which gave rise to constant
conflicts between the king and the colonists, from 1660 to 1774,
and in every colony was among the political causes which led to the
Revolution. But it was an English question as well as an American
question,—a party question in both countries, and it was finally
settled with the same result in each, though by different means. We
must look further for the real controversy between the English people
and the American people.

Another cause of the Revolution, but one which, in no strict sense,
concerned the political relations between the people of Great Britain
and the American colonists, was the attempt of the British merchants
to monopolize the trade of the colonies, not for the benefit of the
British people, but for their own. This also was a party question,
on one side of which were arrayed the adherents of the Mercantile or
Protective System, and on the other those of the Economic or Free
Trade System. The mercantile class endeavored to subordinate colonial
interests to the protective system by navigation laws and acts of
trade; and the resistance of the colonists to these acts was a claim
for free trade which finally involved them in a war with the mother
country.

What were those navigation laws and acts of trade which called forth
the invective of James Otis when he argued the Writs of Assistance, and
revived in the bosom of the octogenarian John Adams the hearty curse
he bestowed upon them in his youth; and on what foundation did they
rest?[10]

Nations acquire new territories, and maintain and defend them, to
promote their own interests, and not the interests of those who inhabit
them; still less the interests of other nationalities. This has been
the case in all ages and under all forms of government, to which
our own age and nation form no exception. By the right of discovery
the British crown became possessed of the territory included in the
thirteen American colonies, settled mainly by British subjects. Lands
were granted to individuals, or companies, with the expectation that
they would build up prosperous communities, to contribute by their
products and trade to the wealth of the mother country. On these
purely selfish considerations she protected them; and when their trade
was grown to be considerable and their markets valuable, the British
merchants took measures to secure both, instead of sharing them
with other nations, or allowing them to follow the interests of the
colonists. Such was the policy of Great Britain at the dictation of the
mercantile class; and in the maintenance of that policy, in sixty years
between 1714 and 1774, she paid out of her Exchequer the enormous sum
of £34,697,142 sterling, a sum greater than the estimated value of the
whole real and personal property in the colonies.[11]

Between 1660 and 1770 Parliament enacted various laws whose enforcement
produced irritation from the beginning, and had no inconsiderable
influence in promoting the final rupture. These acts may be classed
as,—First, navigation laws, designed to secure the naval and maritime
supremacy of Great Britain throughout the world; these were aimed at
the Dutch. Second, acts of trade, procured by the mercantile class, to
monopolize the trade of the British colonies. Like the corn-laws of a
later generation, these formed part of the protective system, and were
dictated by class interest. Third, acts for the protection of British
manufactures by preventing their growth in the colonies, where their
best market was found. Fourth, acts designed to secure the strict
execution of the preceding acts by establishing colonial admiralty
courts, custom-houses, and boards of customs. Fifth, acts which
imposed and regulated duties and port charges in commercial towns.
In no sense were these acts for revenue, British or colonial. They
brought nothing into the British Exchequer, but drew large sums from
it.[12] They were passed solely in the interest of the mercantile and
manufacturing classes, whose protection had much to do with bringing on
the Revolution, but whose clamors happily prevented efficient measures
for its suppression. These demonstrations, which gained them great
credit in the colonies, grew out of their fear of losing not only the
£4,000,000 due by their colonial debtors, but also their future trade.

Before the Grenville Act of 1764 no measures had been taken to relieve
the Exchequer from demands on account of the colonies. The people and
the government had suffered the mercantile and manufacturing classes
to dictate their colonial policy. Not that the prosperity of these
classes did not contribute to the general prosperity of the realm;
for, on the contrary, it had made Great Britain the most affluent and
powerful country on the globe. But this system did not promote the
welfare of all classes alike; and when the time came, as it did after
the frightful expenditure in the French War, that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer was compelled to ask for ready money to pay the interest on
the debt and to meet current expenses, neither the merchants nor the
manufacturers, who had grown rich by the war, offered on that account
to pay larger taxes, but they were quite willing that the British
farmer should do so, or that a revenue should be sought from the
American colonies.

Some account of these famous laws is essential at this point. There
were three statutes embraced under the general term Navigation Laws
and Acts of Trade, in which are to be found the principles of the
Mercantile System. They were passed in 1660, 1663, and 1672, during the
reign of Charles II., and may be found in the _Statutes at Large_,[13]
with the following titles respectively: "An Act for the Encouraging and
Increasing of Shipping and Navigation", "An Act for the Encouragement
of Trade", and "An Act for the Encouragement of the Greenland and
Eastland Trades, and for the Better Securing the Plantation Trade."[14]

The navigation laws will be more readily understood if we attend solely
to their effect on the American colonies, and disregard unimportant
exceptions and limitations. By the act of 1660, none but English or
colonial ships could carry goods to or bring them from the colonies.
This excluded all foreigners, and especially the Dutch, who at that
time were the principal carriers for Europe. The result was that the
colonists lost the advantage of their competition. Far more serious
was the provision which restricted them from carrying sugar, tobacco,
cotton, wool, indigo, ginger, fustic and all other dyeing wood, the
product of any English colony, to any part of the world, except Great
Britain, or some other English colony. This affected the English sugar
islands of the West Indies and the Southern colonies, which were
obliged to send their products to the overstocked English or colonial
markets, more than it affected New England, whose great staples,
lumber, fish, oil, ashes, and furs, were free to find their best
market, provided only they were sent in English or colonial vessels.

British merchants not satisfied with this monopoly procured a more
stringent act in 1663, which provided that no commodity, the growth,
product, or manufacture of Europe, should be imported into the
colonies, except in English-built ships, sailing from English ports. By
this act England became the sole market in which the colonists could
purchase the products or manufactures of Europe, nor could they send
their own ships for them, unless English-built or bought before October
1, 1662. They were obliged to buy in English markets and import in
English vessels.[15] This discouraged ship-building for the European
trade in a country full of timber, and compelled the payment of charges
and profits to English factors dealing in Continental goods for the
American market.

By these two acts British merchants had undertaken to monopolize,
with certain exceptions, the carrying trade of the colonies and their
markets for the sale and the purchase of goods. But avarice was not
satisfied. There had grown up a trade, especially profitable to New
England, with the Southern colonies which were without shipping. By the
act of 1660, foreign and intercolonial trade in certain articles was
permitted, with the expectation that it would be limited to necessary
local supply. But Boston merchants, shipping to that port tobacco and
some other colonial products in excess of the local demand, sent the
surplus to Continental Europe, without payment of British or colonial
duties, and thus undersold the British trader, who had paid heavy
import duties. To suppress this profitable irregularity, it was enacted
in 1672 that the enumerated products shipped to other colonies should
be first transported to England, and thence to the purchasing colony.
The colonial merchants had the option, however, of bringing tobacco,
for instance, from Virginia direct to Massachusetts, first paying an
export duty equivalent to the English import duty.[16]

These enactments subjected colonial interests to those of British
ship-owners and merchants; and as they had been thus duly protected,
the manufacturers in turn claimed similar protection by statutes
which should prevent the colonists from setting up competing
manufactories.[17] How could there have been any difference of opinion
among the colonists respecting such statutes? A general answer is,
that the colonial system, which regarded the colonies as feeders for
the navigation, trade, and manufactures of the parent state, was the
accepted doctrine of European statesmen. Pitt was its stanchest
advocate, and Burke its rational friend. Adam Smith, who assaulted
it in 1776,[18] did not succeed in overthrowing it. Twenty-five
years later, Henry Brougham controverted Smith's views.[19] It is
not strange, therefore, that it found advocates among the colonists
themselves. It was also far from being a one-sided question.

James Otis's arguments on the Writs of Assistance and John Adams's
letters to William Tudor, by dwelling on the injurious features of
these acts, and passing over all compensating considerations, give an
erroneous notion of them. The idea that they originated in a hostile
disposition of the British people or merchants towards the colonists
is not entitled to a moment's consideration. They formed a commercial
policy, not a political policy. The more numerous, wealthy, and
prosperous the colonists became, the more useful they were to the
British merchants, so long as they could monopolize the trade. That
was their object; and where the freedom of colonial trade would not
interfere with British trade, it was left free. For example, the most
profitable trade of New England was with the French and Spanish West
India Islands and the Spanish Main. The short distance favored small
vessels and small capitals. The exchange of lumber, grain, cattle, and
fish for sugar and molasses, with an occasional voyage to the coast
of Africa for slaves, during that traffic,[20] yielded rich returns.
This trade was free; and so was that of Asia and Africa, and some
ports of Europe, except for certain enumerated articles. It was not
only permitted, but with respect to some commodities was encouraged by
bounties. Between 1714 and 1774, the colonists, chiefly those of New
England, received £1,609,345 sterling on their commodities exported
to Great Britain;[21] and through a system of drawbacks, by which the
duties on goods imported into England were repaid on their exportation
to America, the colonists often bought Continental goods cheaper than
could the subjects within the realm. These favors no more indicated
good will than the restrictions indicated hostility. Both rested on
purely commercial considerations. There were other compensations. The
naval supremacy of Great Britain, due chiefly to the navigation laws,
protected colonial commerce in whatever seas it was pushed; and the
stimulus of monopoly withdrew British capital from other less lucrative
enterprises, and directed it to the colonies, where it was freely
used by planters in developing lands which otherwise would have been
uncultivated for lack of capital.[22] And although certain colonial
produce was obliged to find its only European market in England, it had
the monopoly of that market.

If it was a hardship to the tobacco growers of Maryland and Virginia to
be compelled to send that product to England, they had this advantage,
that no Englishman could use any other. He was forbidden by penal
statutes to grow his own supply even in his own garden. As to those
laws which restrained manufactures in the colonies, it was the opinion
of Henry Brougham,[23] who cites Franklin as an authority, that they
merely prohibited the colonist from making articles which could have
been more cheaply purchased.[24] He could import a hat from England
for less than it cost to make one, and he did so. But the best ground
for nominal submission to the navigation laws and acts of trade was
found in their easy evasion, and the fact that they never were, and
never could have been, rigidly enforced. From the first, all attempts
to enforce them led to dissatisfaction. Randolph's revenue seizures
in the time of Charles II. and James II. had no small influence in
overthrowing Andros's government in the revolution of 1689, and so had
Charles Paxton's in bringing on the American Revolution.

Before the new policy of enforcing these laws was entered upon, the
colonies enjoyed British naval protection; they possessed the monopoly
of the British market; they drew bounties from the British Exchequer;
they purchased European goods more cheaply than the British people
could do; and, stating the facts somewhat broadly, they manufactured
whatever they found to be for their advantage, and sent their ships
wherever they pleased, notwithstanding the navigation laws and acts of
trade. The result was that the colonies, especially barren and frozen
New England, engrossed most profitable commerce which England had
attempted to monopolize, and increased in wealth beyond all colonial
precedent.[25] But these halcyon days were destined to pass under
clouds. British merchants had seen from the beginning the amassing of
fortunes in the colonies by illicit trade, and the falling off of their
own. They had striven to enforce the laws, and Parliament had lent its
assistance,—but in vain. Under the first charter of Massachusetts, the
collector of customs was the governor, whose annual election depended
upon the good will of those who were evading the navigation laws; under
the second charter, the governor was appointed by the king, and sworn
to enforce those laws. But colonial juries generally checkmated the
king's representative. Then followed admiralty courts without juries,
which produced indignant protests. The new system was irritating rather
than efficient on a long line of coast filled with bays, creeks,
and ports not patrolled by revenue cutters. The British merchant
was foiled, and anger was the result. The attempt to monopolize the
commerce of the colonies was a failure; and so long as the navigation
laws were a dead letter the advantages of the situation were with the
colonists. They were content.

But the time came at the close of the French War when the mercantile
system was subordinated to a revenue system, and the enforcement of
the navigation laws and acts of trade, made more stringent by some
new ones, became the policy of the government. Its instruments were
admiralty courts with enlarged jurisdiction, commissioners of customs,
writs of assistance, and an adequate naval force. When that time came,
the Revolution was not far off![26]

In 1755, Shirley, then governor of Massachusetts, had persuaded the
General Court to attempt by a stamp act to meet the expenses of the
French War. This produced an irritation like that which followed in
1765 the act of the British ministry;[27] and to Shirley, as much as to
any other man, perhaps, was due the suggestion of those parliamentary
measures which led to the Revolution. Long residence in Boston and
his profession as a lawyer had made him familiar with the evasions of
the navigation laws; and his larger duties as commander-in-chief, in
which he found much difficulty in bringing the colonial assemblies into
concerted and efficient action, doubtless suggested measures which
were adopted by the British ministry. However this may have been, the
enforcement of the navigation laws was taken in hand for the first time
by the government, and no longer left to depend upon private interests.
This unwonted activity was shown as early as 1754. Its most formidable
weapon was the Writ of Assistance.

More than four years before the passage of the Stamp Act, James Otis
had resisted the granting of these writs before the Superior Court
of Massachusetts. John Adams, then a student of law, took notes of
Otis's argument, and fifty-six years later wrote: "Then and there
was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary
claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born."[28] This was no mere rhetorical phrase.[29] The influence of
this controversy in producing the Revolution is not wholly due to the
fiery eloquence of Otis, whose words, said John Adams, "breathed into
the nation the breath of life", nor to the range of his argument,
which called in question the mercantile and political systems of
Great Britain, but to their effect upon the commercial interest—then
the leading one—of New England; for if the latent powers of these
writs were set free, and used by the revenue officers, the commerce
of Boston, Salem, and Newport would have been effectually crippled.
Authorized in England, they were extended to the colonies by an act of
William III.[30] The officers of customs, however, instead of applying
to the courts for them, relied upon the implied powers of their
commissions, and forcibly entered warehouses for contraband goods.
The people grew uneasy, and some stood upon their rights against the
officers, whose activity was stimulated by documents like that given in
the note below.[31]

Governor Shirley issued these writs, though the power to do so was
solely in the court.[32] But they would have held a less important
place in the history of the Revolution had it not been for the
concurrence of several circumstances. All writs become invalid on the
demise of the crown and six months thereafter. George II. died October
25, 1760, and the news reached Boston December 27th. The government
had already resolved upon a more vigorous enforcement of the revenue
laws. The king had instructed Bernard, the newly appointed governor
of Massachusetts, to "be aiding and assisting to the collectors and
other officers of our admiralty and customs in putting in execution"
the acts of trade. Pitt also directed the colonial governors to prevent
trade with the enemy and a commerce which was "in open contempt of
the authority of the mother country, as well as to the most manifest
prejudice of the manufactures and trade of Great Britain."[33] Seizures
of uncustomed goods were frequent. The third part of the forfeiture of
molasses which belonged to the province amounted before 1761 to nearly
five hundred pounds in money. Bernard arrived in August, 1760. Chief
Justice Sewall, who had expressed doubts as to the legality of writs
of assistance, died September 11th; and Hutchinson, his successor,
took his seat January 27, 1761. As the outstanding writs had become
invalid, their renewal became necessary. But when Charles Paxton, the
surveyor at Boston, appeared for that purpose in the Superior Court,
February term, 1761, he was confronted by a petition signed by sixty
inhabitants of the province, chiefly merchants of Boston, who desired
to be heard in opposition, in person and by their counsel, James Otis
and Oxenbridge Thacher. Otis, Advocate-General for the crown, had
resigned his office to avoid supporting the writ.[34] Gridley, the
Attorney-General, appeared in his stead. No complete report of the
arguments has been preserved.[35] Gridley, who treated the question as
purely one of law, to be determined by statutes and precedents, said of
Otis's argument, that "quoting history is not speaking like a lawyer;"
and as to the arbitrary nature of the writ which allowed the entry of
private houses in search of uncustomed goods, he reminded him that by
a province law a collector of taxes, without execution, judgment, or
trial, could arrest and throw a delinquent taxpayer into prison. "What!
shall my property be wrested from me? Shall my liberty be destroyed by
a collector for a debt unadjudged, without the common indulgence and
lenity of the law? So it is established; and the necessity of having
public taxes effectually and speedily collected is of infinitely
greater moment to the whole than the liberty of any individual."

Otis's argument is well known. Carried to its logical results, it was a
plea for commercial and political independence of the colonies, and was
fully vindicated by the result of the conflict it precipitated. But as
a legal argument it is less conclusive.[36]

The majority of the court, however, were with Otis; and had judgment
been given at the time, the decision would have been in his favor.
But Hutchinson counselled delay until the practice in England could
be learned; and as it appeared that such writs were issued, of
course, from the Exchequer, on the 18th of November, the court, after
re-argument, pronounced them to be legal. Thenceforth they were freely
used. Otis's argument, without doubt, secured his election to the
General Court in May, in which his influence was second to that of no
other in bringing on the struggle which ended in independence. Nor was
its effect limited to Massachusetts. It reached the remotest colonies,
and, as John Adams said, led to "the revolution in the principles,
views, opinions, and feelings of the American people."[37]

Revolution, however, had been long impending. The treaty of
Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 1748, which put an end to the long war
between England and France, opened with the declaration that "Europe
sees the day which the Divine Providence had pointed out for the
reëstablishment of its repose. A general peace succeeds to a long and
bloody war." But neither the peace, nor the treaty by which it was
secured, was satisfactory to one of the belligerents; for England had
failed to secure the commercial advantages for which the war had been
undertaken, and the terms of the treaty, requiring her to give hostages
for the restoration of Cape Breton to France, excited the indignation
of the British people. Nor were other causes for the renewal of
the war wanting. The aggressive policy of France in respect to the
English possessions in Acadia and along the Ohio and the Mississippi,
notwithstanding the treaty, soon produced its legitimate results. The
Seven Years' War followed. In Asia and in the West Indies, the maritime
powers measured their strength by sea. At the same time in North
America, England and her colonies on the one side, and France on the
other, contended for the empire of the continent. Led by Clive, Wolfe,
Amherst, and Rodney, and inspired by the genius of Pitt, the forces of
England everywhere prevailed, and she took the first place among the
nations.

On the 10th of February, 1763, at Paris, was signed the treaty that
recognized the extinction of the French empire in North America. This
treaty marks an epoch in the history of America, as well as in that of
England and of France. To the latter it was a period of humiliation,
not only in the loss of colonies upon which, for nearly a century, she
had expended vast sums without any adequate return, but also in the
frustration of her purpose of gaining sole possession of the continent.

By England it was regarded as the close of a contest to maintain
her power on the same continent, and make it subservient to her
commercial and manufacturing interests, which had lasted for nearly a
hundred years. Yet there was a well-founded apprehension, expressed
at the time, that her colonies, relieved from the fear of French
aggressions, would throw off the authority of the mother country.[38]
What was the fear of the mother country, on the other hand, was the
hope and expectation, more or less remote, of the colonies. For the
experience gained in the French wars was of great value to them in the
revolutionary struggle. Officers had become familiar with the direction
of large bodies of troops, and with the means of their transport
and supply; and soldiers had learned that efficiency depended upon
discipline. Provincial assemblies also had been taught to look for
safety in strategic operations remote from their own territory. But at
no time before the assembling of the congress of 1754 had the colonies
been called to consider such a union of all as would give unity to
military operations, and secure the semblance, at least, of a general
government. The union proposed at that time would have involved some
loss of independence, without securing any efficient means of enforcing
the recommendations of the congress, and so the colonies hesitated, and
finally laid it aside. But there can be no doubt that the consideration
given to it by the several colonies led them more readily to come
together for concerted action in the congress of 1765.

       *       *       *       *       *

The year 1763 is usually regarded as the beginning of the American
Revolution, because in that year the English ministry determined to
raise a revenue from the colonies. This led to a contest, which, like
most civil wars, was long and embittered. It engendered feelings
which have not yet passed away,—feelings which interfere with a calm
and dispassionate review of the motives of the parties concerned,
and of the circumstances which attended their controversy. It was
a war between Britons and the descendants of Britons, who, with a
common ancestry, laws, and manners, retained their essential race
characteristics in spite of the lapse of time or the change of place:
everywhere and always lovers of liberty, but in power haughty,
insolent, and aggressive on the weak, and in subjection turbulent and
impatient of restraint; proud of ancestry, partial to old customs
and precedents, but quick to resist laws which impede the course of
equity, and never permitting forms to prevent the accomplishment of
substantial justice. Such was the parent and such was the child: and in
the light of these facts we are to read the history of the Revolution.
It exhibited the race in no new light, nor did the contest involve
any new principle. Its sentiments were expressed in the old idiomatic
language,—petition, remonstrance, riot, war.

For more than a hundred years the colonies had been regarded as
appendages to the crown rather than as an integral part of the
empire; and when Parliament, at the instigation of the mercantile
classes and in derogation of royal prerogative, began at the close
of the seventeenth century to assume control over them, and, a few
years later, to vote large sums from the imperial treasury for their
protection, and, in some cases, for the support of their civil
governments, that body looked for reimbursement to the profits which
would inure to British merchants from the monopoly of colonial trade
and navigation, and flow indirectly into the national Exchequer.
But with the close of the French War a new policy seemed to become
necessary. The debt had swelled to frightful proportions. The British
people were groaning under the weight of the annual interest and their
current expenses. Every source of revenue seemed to be drained, and the
ministry turned their eyes for relief to the colonies; not, indeed,
for relief from the present debt, but from the necessity of adding to
it the whole expense of defending the colonies. This was the fatal
mistake which precipitated the Revolution. On this subject, however,
there seems to be some misapprehension. The popular idea was, and still
is, that the colonists were to be taxed to pay the interest on the
national debt and the current expenses of the government, and that all
moneys raised in the colonies were to pass into the British Exchequer
(thus draining them of their specie), there to remain subject to the
king's warrant. Such, however, was not the scheme of the ministry.
Not a farthing was to leave America. All sums collected were to be
deposited in the colonial treasuries, and only certificates thereof
were to be sent to the Exchequer. These were to be kept apart from the
general funds, and, after defraying the charges of the administration
of justice and the support of the civil government within all or any of
the colonies, they were to be subject to parliamentary appropriation
for their defence, protection, and security, and for no other
purpose.[39]

The alleged necessity was this: The government had broken the French
power in Canada, and shaken its hold upon the lakes and great rivers of
the West. This achievement, so glorious to the empire, and therefore to
the colonies as parts of it, and more immediately for their benefit,
had added one hundred and forty millions to the national debt, under
which the subjects within the realm were staggering. While some
colonies had been tardy or negligent in furnishing their quotas of men
and money for the war, yet it was acknowledged that as a whole they had
borne their fair proportion of the expense, and that some had exceeded
their share. So far all was clear. Although Canada had been conquered
mainly for the colonies, still the conquest added to the security
and glory of the empire, and the accounts for past expenditures
were squared. But what of the future? As these possessions had been
acquired, a stable government was needed for them, both for the
safety of the colonies and for the honor of England. They were still
inhabited by Indians under French influence, and they might become
dangerous unless controlled by military power. Choiseul, the great
French minister, informed by the reports of his secret agent, foresaw
the complications likely to arise in the government of the colonies,
and was not without hope of retrieving by diplomacy the losses which
had occurred from war. Forts and garrisons were necessary. Although
the Northern colonies were comparatively secure, the Carolinas and
Georgia were menaced by powerful and hostile tribes. The government
must regard the colonies as a unit, of which all parts were entitled
to imperial protection. To this view of the case there could be no
sound objection. Twenty thousand troops,—Pitt thought more would be
needed,—besides civil officers to regulate such affairs as did not
fall within colonial jurisdictions, were to be sent to the colonies. At
whose expense ought these military and civil forces to be maintained?
The British farmer objected to pay for the protection of his untaxed
colonial competitor in the British market. If the colonies were to
continue to be governed in the interest of the mercantile classes,
upon them might reasonably fall the expense of their protection. But
the acquisition of vast territories required a new policy, and it was
deemed equitable that they should be defended at the expense of the
empire of which the colonies were a part. They had claimed and received
imperial protection, and they ought to bear a proportional part of the
cost, which might be collected under the imperial authority with the
same certainty and promptness as were taxes on other subjects of the
king. This was the ministerial view of the matter as I gather it from
the debates in Parliament.

This claim of the ministry was met by the liberal party on both sides
of the water in two ways. It was asserted that the late war, and in
fact all the wars which affected the colonies, had been waged in the
interest of commerce and for the aggrandizement of the realm of which
they were no part, and that the newly acquired territories were of
doubtful advantage to colonies as yet sparsely populated. But if these
considerations were not conclusive, still the colonists ought not to
be taxed, because the imperial government by monopolizing their trade
received far more than the colonial share of the expense attending
their defence. The liberals also asserted that there was no disposition
on the part of the colonists to seek exemption from a reasonable share
of these imperial expenses; but as in the past they had voluntarily
contributed their part, and in some cases even more, so they would in
the future; and that in the future, as in the past, these contributions
ought to be voluntary, and the frequency and amount to be determined by
the provincial assemblies. Moreover, as the colonists neither had, nor
could have, any equitable or efficient representation in the imperial
Parliament, they could not consent to have their property taken from
them by representatives not chosen by themselves.

The ministry and their adherents replied that the foregoing arguments,
even if sound, were such as no party charged with the administration of
affairs, and obliged to raise a certain amount of money from a people
clamorous for relief from present taxes, could accept; that no reliance
could be placed on voluntary contributions; that the necessities of
government required that money should be raised by some system which
would act with regularity and certainty, and reach the unwilling as
well as the willing; that even in the last war, when the existence of
the English colonies was threatened by a foe moving with celerity by
reason of its unity, the movements of English troops had been delayed
by the backwardness of the colonies in furnishing their quotas; and now
that the pressure of the French power was removed from New England,
that section would leave the Middle and Southern colonies to their own
resources, especially when it was remembered how remiss those colonies
had been in assisting the north and east when attacked.[40] It was also
answered that so far from the monopoly of the colonial trade being a
set-off to the expenses incurred by the mother country in defending the
colonies, the fact was notorious that by the evasion of the navigation
laws and acts of trade the colonists had escaped the restrictions
intended by those laws, and at the same time had received bounties and
drawbacks from the British Exchequer which enabled them to undersell
the British merchants in the markets of Europe.

Here was a deadlock. The arguments on both sides seemed conclusive.
No practical solution of the difficulty was proposed at the time, nor
has been since. Both parties were firm in their convictions. Neither
could yield without the surrender of essential rights. A conflict
was unavoidable unless one party would relinquish the authority
claimed by the imperial government; unavoidable unless the colonies,
essentially free by growth, development, and distance, would yield to
pretensions incompatible with their rights as British subjects. The
new policy contemplated after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748
was carried into effect after the treaty of Paris in 1763. But nothing
could have been more unfortunate than the time at which Great Britain
inaugurated this policy, and no ministers than those by whom it was
to be carried out. On essential political questions which divided the
colonists and the mother country Great Britain herself was in the midst
of a revolution. The new policy which was inaugurated fell into the
hands of those opposed to it. Whig ministers were charged with the
execution of an illiberal and reactionary scheme. Consequently, the
administration of American affairs was weak and vacillating. The result
was inevitable. Had Pitt, with his large views and great administrative
abilities, been at the head of affairs for ten years after the peace,
the Revolution might have been postponed. On the other hand, had the
mercantile system during the same period been administered with the
unity of purpose and thoroughness of measures which characterized
Carleton's administration in Canada, and had it been enforced by the
military genius of Clive, the rebellion might have been temporarily
suppressed.

In the journals and statutes of the provincial assemblies we find
from the beginning a similarity of causes leading to the final
rupture. There are the same quarrels about the royal prerogative; the
same repugnance to the navigation laws and acts of trade; the same
unwillingness to make permanent provision for the support of the royal
governors and judges, and the same restiveness under interference
with their internal affairs; but owing either to differences in their
original constitutions or of interests, commercial and agricultural,
or because of varied nationality and religion, or by reason of all
these causes combined, discontent was less general in the Southern than
in the Northern colonies. Of the Northern colonies, in Massachusetts
we find the causes which brought on the war operative and continuous
from the beginning. Party strife between friends and opponents of
prerogative existed in other colonies, but in Massachusetts the
conflict broke out with special virulence between the adherents of
Otis and those of Hutchinson. It was also intensified by the pecuniary
interests of a large part of the inhabitants of Boston, which were
affected by the enforcement of the navigation laws through the aid of
writs of assistance. It was for this enforcement that Hutchinson was
held responsible when the mob sacked his house, and were ready to do
violence to his person.

The province had received from the British Exchequer more than £60,000
sterling for the war expenses of 1759, and nearly £43,000 for those of
1761. Money was plentiful, and more was expected from the same source.
There was a lull in the angry storm of local politics when news of the
preliminaries of peace reached Boston in January, 1763. With this came
assurances that Parliament would reimburse the colonies for expenses
incurred, beyond their proportion, in the last year of the war; and
the two Houses of the General Court agreed upon an address expressing
gratitude to the king for protection against the French power, and
full of loyalty and duty. But quiet was not of long continuance.
The close of the war dried up several sources of profitable trade
or adventure,[41]—some legal, such as furnishing supplies to the
king's forces, and some illicit. Then came orders from the Board of
Trade to enforce the navigation laws, heretofore chiefly evaded, but
now to be enforced with the aid of writs of assistance. At the same
time plans were entertained by the cabinet for making changes in the
constitutions of the colonies; and what was hardly less opportune, the
English bishops incessantly pressed upon the ministry the adoption of
archbishop Secker's scheme of introducing an episcopal hierarchy into
America, which would have carried with it some of the worst features
of the prerogative.[42] The history of the period from the treaty of
1763 to the meeting of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia in
1774 is a narrative of an attempt by the British ministry to enforce
certain measures upon unwilling colonists, and of the resistance of the
colonists to those measures. Who were the ministers, what were their
measures, and how did the colonists resist them?

Pitt had carried the country through a long and glorious war; but
he was not satisfied with the results. The cost had been heavy, and
as a guaranty against future expense he meditated the substantial
annihilation of the French power. He knew that France and Spain had
entered into the Family Compact with a view to a war with England. War
with Spain was only a question of time, and he would have anticipated
its declaration by seizing the immense treasure belonging to that
power, then on the sea. This would have replenished the British
Exchequer, and perhaps have deferred a resort to American taxation.
Pitt urged this measure at a cabinet meeting, September 18, 1761.
His advice was not followed, and he resigned October 5. But war was
declared against Spain, January 1, 1762, and carried on with brilliant
results, though the golden opportunity of securing the Spanish treasure
was lost. The preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau,
November 3, 1763.

[Illustration: GEORGE III.

(From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. i. It follows a
painting by Reynolds. Cf. cut in Murray's _History_, vol. i.—ED.)]

This virtually ended Pitt's connection with the ministry and with the
conduct of American affairs as a leader; for although he was again at
the head of the ministry from August 2, 1766, to October, 1768, his
direction was merely nominal. It was during his administration that
the Townshend Acts were passed, and the Mutiny Act extended to the
colonies,—facts which show divided counsels and the lack of uniform
purpose. Pitt seldom appeared in the ministry except to oppose his own
government. Whenever his great powers were most needed by sore-pressed
colleagues to devise some practicable policy for replenishing the
Exchequer, or for governing the colonies, he was in the country
wrestling with the gout. This was a serious loss to the mother country,
but it hastened the independence of America.

[Illustration: LORD NORTH.

From Doyle's _Official Baronage_, ii. 89. It follows Dance's picture.
Cf. J. C. Smith's _Brit. Mez. Portraits_, i. p. 135; Gay's _Pop. Hist.
U. S._, iii. 365; Walpole's _Last Journals_.—ED.]

The terms of peace with France were settled by Bute and Bedford,
against the views of Pitt; but on April 16, 1763, Bute retired from
the ministry, before the new policy for the government of the colonies
had been fully developed. He was succeeded by George Grenville, who
continued at the head of the government until July, 1765. Grenville was
able, well informed, and thoroughly honest. His knowledge of financial
matters was extensive and accurate, and, as Chancellor of the Exchequer
during the preceding administration, he had become familiar with the
difficulties of providing for the expenses of government. No question
could have been more perplexing at this time. A certain amount of
revenue was required to meet the interest on the public debt, and to
defray current expenses. Economic theories of commercial policy would
not serve as an item in the budget. The minister needed the money,
and the Stamp Act was framed and passed. He also encountered other
difficulties when public sentiment had become inflamed by the question
of General Warrants. His relations to the king were unfriendly. Pitt
threw his influence into the scale of the opposition, and Grenville's
administration was a failure.

[Illustration]

The Rockingham ministry began July 13, 1765, and ended August 2,
1766. The colonists themselves could hardly have chosen one more to
their mind. It was weak and vacillating. It repealed the Stamp Act,
and passed the Declaratory Bill. To Dowdswell, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, the Massachusetts House voted their thanks. Then came
the Chatham-Grafton ministry, which was in power until December 31,
1769. This was nominally Pitt's ministry; but his elevation to the
peerage impaired his influence with the people, and after nine months
he retired from public affairs by reason of ill health. Men of such
opposite views and character as Shelburne, Hillsborough, Charles
Townshend, and Lord North were of this ministry.

Lord North was premier from February 10, 1770, to September 6, 1780.
Long after he wished to retire he continued to hold power at the
personal solicitation, and even by the command, of the king. He was
able, faithful, and patriotic; but his heart was not in the work of
subduing the colonies, nor could he pilot the ship of state through
dangerous seas.

Such were the ministers at one of the most critical periods in English
history. No first-class man is to be found among them save Pitt, and
his real attitude was that of opposition. He raised the storm, but when
his hand ought to have been on the helm he was prostrate in the cabin.

Nor were the governors of Massachusetts, during a period when affairs
needed a firm hand, although worthy gentlemen, altogether such as a
far-seeing ministry would have chosen to carry out the new policy.
Shirley was the only governor of Massachusetts who possessed the
favor of the people; and yet he believed in the king's prerogative,
and valued himself highly as its representative. He endeavored to
suppress illicit trade and to enforce the navigation laws; and from
his conferences with Franklin, it is certain that he contemplated some
radical changes in the constitutions of the colonies.[43] But he got
more money from the people for public uses than any previous governor,
and even persuaded them to pass a provincial stamp act.[44] The secret
of Shirley's influence may have been that he was less eager to secure
his own salary than some of his predecessors had shown themselves to
be, and that he had displayed unequalled activity in conducting the
French war, which engaged the attention of the people. Pownall, who
succeeded Shirley, belonged to the popular party. He gave no particular
attention to the navigation laws, and was on the opposite side from
Hutchinson, who was lieutenant-governor during the latter part of his
term, which closed in 1760.

After Pownall came Bernard, and with him the beginning of the
Revolution. Bernard was not without ability, accomplishments, and
good intentions; but he was a Tory. More firmly even than Shirley,
he believed in the royal prerogatives, and in some modification of
the provincial charters to bring their action into harmony with the
imperial system. During his administration, and in some cases at his
suggestion, the ministry entered upon that series of measures which
lost the colonies to Great Britain: the enforcement of the navigation
laws; the use of writs of assistance; Grenville's revenue acts in 1764;
the Stamp Act of 1765; the Townshend duties of 1767; and the arrival of
military forces in 1768.

The purposes contemplated by these successive administrations were not
unreasonable, nor were the measures by which they sought to accomplish
them unwise in themselves. The general policy was the same as that
afterwards pursued by the colonies when they had become a great
empire,—homogeneity, equal contributions to expenses, a preference for
their own shipping, and protection to their own industries.

The difficulty arose from a misconception of the relations of the
colonies to the mother country. They were not a part of the realm, and
could neither equally share its privileges nor justly bear its burdens.
The attempt to bring them within imperial legislation failed, and
could only fail. They were colonies; and the chief benefit the parent
state could legitimately derive from them was the trade which would
flow naturally to Great Britain by reason of the political connection,
and would increase with the prosperity of the colonies.

Early in 1763 the Bute ministry, of which George Grenville and Charles
Townshend were members, entered upon the new policy. To enforce the
navigation laws, armed cutters cruised about the British coast and
along the American shores; their officers, for the first time, and
much to their disgust, being required to act as revenue officers.
To give unity to their efforts, an admiral was stationed on the
coast. To adjudicate upon seizures of contraband goods, and other
offences against the revenue, a vice-admiralty court, with enlarged
jurisdiction, and sitting without juries, was set up.[45] Royal
governors, hitherto chiefly occupied with domestic administration,
were now obliged to watch the commerce of an empire. It was seen long
before this time that the successful administration of the new system
would require some modification of the provincial charters; but the
difficulties were so serious that the matter was deferred.

Such was the new order of things. The student who reflects upon the
complete and radical change effected or threatened by these new
measures, so much at variance with the habits and customary rights
of the colonists, breaking up without notice not only illicit but
legitimate trade, and sweeping away their commercial prosperity, is no
longer at loss to account for the outburst of wrath which followed the
Stamp Act, a year later.[46] To avert these hostile proceedings, the
colonists memorialized the king and Parliament. They employed resident
agents to act in their behalf. They availed themselves of party
divisions and animosities in England. They alarmed British merchants
by non-importation and self-denying agreements. When these measures
seemed likely to prove ineffectual, they aroused public sentiment
through the press, by public gatherings and legislative resolutions, by
committees of correspondence between towns and colonies, and finally
by continental congresses. They did not scruple to avail themselves of
popular violence, nor, in the last extremity, of armed resistance to
British authority.

So far as trade and commerce were concerned, it was a struggle between
British and colonial merchants. The colonial merchants desired freedom
of commerce; the British merchant desired its monopoly. But this does
not state the case precisely; for the colonial merchants were desirous
of retaining what they possessed rather than of acquiring something
new. By the navigation laws the British merchant had a legal monopoly
of certain specified trades; but by evading these laws, the colonial
merchants had gained a large part of this trade for themselves.
One party, standing on legal rights, wished to recover this lost
trade; the other party, basing their claim on natural equity and long
enjoyment, wished to retain it. This was an old question, a hundred
years old; but it had acquired new interest since the government,
with the aid of writs of assistance, had undertaken to enforce the
navigation laws and acts of trade. Such was the first issue between the
parties. The second was this, and it was new: As has been said, Great
Britain had never undertaken to raise a revenue from the colonies,
though she had often contemplated doing so, and especially during
the French war just closed. At the close of the war it was estimated
that £300,000 would be required to man the forts about to be vacated
by the French, and to maintain twenty regiments to hold the Indians
in check, who were still under French influence and might become
dangerous, as happened in Pontiac's time; and to give efficiency to
civil administration by granting to governors, judges, and some other
officers fixed and regular salaries, instead of having them depend on
irregular and fluctuating grants of colonial assemblies. One third of
these expenses—£100,000—the ministry proposed to raise by laying
duties on importations, reserving a direct tax by stamps for fuller
consideration.

The colonists met this proposition by denying both the necessity and
the right of raising a revenue,—at first distinguishing between
external and internal taxes, and finally objecting to all taxes raised
by a Parliament in which they neither were nor practically could be
represented. These issues were complicated with several others of long
standing, but which may be left out of the account here.

The popular idea has been that the Revolution began with the Stamp
Act. But it seems strange that prosperous colonists, in whose behalf
the British people had expended £60,000,000 sterling, should refuse to
pay £100,000, one third of the sum deemed necessary for their future
defence, and that months before they were called upon to raise the
first penny they should fall into a paroxysm of rage, from one end of
the continent to the other, and commit disgraceful acts of violence
upon property and against persons of the most estimable character.

This view, however, overlooks several facts. If we disregard the
chronic quarrels in all the colonies, growing out of the exercise of
the royal prerogatives, Virginia and Massachusetts especially had been
aroused on the abstract questions concerning the relations of the
colonies to Great Britain, and in them the earliest demonstrations of
hostility to the Stamp Act were manifested. In the famous "Parsons
Case" argued by Patrick Henry in December, 1763, in words which rang
through Virginia because they affected every man in that colony,
he drew the prerogative into question, not only in regard to the
ecclesiastical supremacy of the Anglican hierarchy, but also on the
right of the king to negative the "Two-penny Act" of the colonial
assembly. In Massachusetts, James Otis, in 1761, arguing the writs of
assistance, assumed the natural rights of the colonists to absolute
independence. But the promulgation of none of these theories of
abstract rights accounts for the general outbreak in 1765. Its
most potent influence was the enforcement of the navigation acts in
the great commercial centres, and the ruin threatening New England
through the breaking up of her trade with the French West Indies and
the Spanish Main[47] by the modification of the Sugar Act in 1764.
The staples of New England were fish, cattle, and lumber. The better
quality of fish found a market in Europe, but this trade was subject
to competition. For the poorer quality the chief market was in the
French West Indies, where by the French law it could be exchanged only
for molasses. This was shipped to New England, and used not only in
its raw state, but distilled into rum, which, besides supplying home
consumption, was to some extent exported to Africa in exchange for
slaves. This trade and commerce with the Spanish Main was the chief
source of the wealth of New England. But in 1733, to protect the
sugar industry of the English West India islands, a duty amounting
to prohibition was laid on all sugar and molasses imported into the
American colonies from the French islands. So long as this act was not
enforced, it did little harm; but if enforced, it would not only ruin
the trade in rum and lumber, but injure the fisheries also, for the
English islands were limited in population and had no liking for poor
fish. The French, besides being more numerous, were less particular
as to their diet; but if they could not sell molasses, they would not
buy fish. It was proposed to modify and enforce this act. Minot[48]
says: "The business of the fishery, which, it was alleged, would be
broken up by the act, was at this time estimated in Massachusetts at
£164,000 sterling per annum; the vessels employed in it, which would be
nearly useless, at £100,000; the provisions used in it, the casks for
packing fish, and other articles, at £22,700 and upwards; to all which
there was to be added the loss of the advantage of sending lumber,
horses, provisions, and other commodities to the foreign plantations
as cargoes, the vessels employed to carry fish to Spain and Portugal,
the dismissing of 5000 seamen from their employment, the effects of the
annihilation of the fishery upon the trade of the province and of the
mother country in general, and its accumulative evils by increasing the
rival fisheries of France. This was forcibly urged as it respected the
means of remittances to England for goods imported into the province,
which had been made in specie to the amount of £150,000 sterling,
beside £90,000 in the treasurer's bills for the reimbursement money,
within the last eighteen months. The sources for obtaining this money
were through foreign countries by the means of the fishery, and would
be cut off with the trade to their plantations." This was what the
enforcement of the molasses act meant. Neither the duties laid in 1764
nor the collection of the taxes anticipated from the Stamp Act of 1765
would have produced a tithe of the evil that would have followed. John
Adams,[49] confirming the statement of Minot, says: "The strongest
apprehensions arose from the publication of the orders for the strict
execution of the molasses act, which is said to have caused a greater
alarm in the country than the taking of Fort William Henry did in
the year 1757."[50] Rumors of the intention of the ministry had been
rife for some time, and in January, 1764, the Massachusetts Assembly
wrote to their agent in London that the officers of the customs, in
pursuance of orders from the Lords of the Treasury, had lately given
public notice that the act, in all its parts, would be carried into
execution, and that the consequences would be ruinous to the trade of
the province, hurtful to all the colonies, and greatly prejudicial to
the mother country.[51]

Besides the rumors of the modification of the Sugar Act came others
respecting new duties, and a Stamp Act. In its alarm, the General
Court determined to send Hutchinson to London as special agent, to
prevent, if possible, the intended legislation. He was in favor of
allowing the colonies the freest trade, but acknowledged the supremacy
of Parliament.[52] No man knew the colonies better, or was better able
to present their just claims, than Hutchinson. He had much at stake
in the colony in which he was born, and to which he had rendered many
and honorable services. No man loved her better, or was more worthy
of honor from her. He was chosen by both Houses; but Governor Bernard
suggested doubts as to the expediency of his going to England without
the special leave of the king; and subsequently the project was laid
aside in consequence of some rising suspicions as to his political
sentiments.[53]

Ruin threatened New England. A Stamp Act was not needed to set her
aflame; and the other colonies soon had reasons of their own for
joining her in the general opposition. All parties were agreed as to
the danger, but they differed as to the remedy.

The reports which reached America in the winter of 1764, respecting
the intentions of the ministry to raise a revenue from the colonies,
were verified in the following spring. The substance of Grenville's
resolutions (with the exception of that respecting stamps, which was
laid aside for the present) became a law April 6, 1764. Bancroft has
summarized this act as "a bill modifying and perpetuating the act
of 1733, with some changes to the disadvantage of the colonies; an
extension of the navigation acts, making England the storehouse of
Asiatic as well as of European supplies; a diminution of drawbacks on
foreign articles exported to America; imposts in America, especially
on wines; a revenue duty instead of a prohibitory duty on foreign
molasses; an increased duty on sugar; various regulations to restrain
English manufactures, as well as to enforce more diligently acts of
trade; a prohibition of all trade between America and St. Pierre and
Miquelon."[54]

Organized opposition to the ministerial measures began in Boston, and
perhaps, at that time, could have begun nowhere else. For not only were
the interests of that town, in the fisheries, trade, and navigation,
the most considerable in the colonies, but there, as nowhere else in
the same degree, for more than a century, had been operative causes of
dissatisfaction connected with the navigation acts, the exercise of the
royal prerogatives, and ecclesiastical affairs; and in no other section
had Otis's declaration of the general principles of liberty found such
ready acceptance.

The Grenville Act of April, 1764, was to take effect September 30. News
of its passage had scarcely arrived in Boston before the citizens in
town meeting, May 24, voted instructions[55] to their representatives
in the General Court, which had been presented by Samuel Adams. They
were directed to endeavor to prevent proceedings designed to curtail
their trade, and to impose new taxes,—"for if their trade might be
taxed, why not their lands?"—and to obtain from the General Assembly
all needed advice and instruction, so that their agent in London might
effectually "demonstrate for them all those rights and privileges which
justly belonged to them either by charter or birth." Since the other
colonies were equally interested, their representatives were also to
endeavor to obtain coöperation in that direction.

Thus at the very outset the patriots sought counsel and union with
the sister colonies. These instructions were scattered far and wide.
The General Court came in on the 30th. June 1, letters from the
London agent were referred to a committee of which Otis was one. On
the 8th, _The Rights of the British Colonies_ was read,[56] and
again on the 12th, when it was referred to the committee of which
Otis was a member.[57] On the 13th a letter to Mauduit, their agent,
was reported, which must have made his ears tingle,[58] for it was
a scathing rebuke for neglect and inefficiency in not preventing
the injurious legislation, and for making unwarranted concessions
in behalf of the colony.[59] Otis went over the whole question of
colonial rights and grievances, but by implication he admitted that
representation in Parliament would prove satisfactory.[60] The same
committee was directed to correspond with the other governments,
requesting coöperation in their endeavors to effect the repeal of the
Sugar Act and to prevent the Stamp Act. The letter of the committee,
drawn by Otis, together with his _Rights of the Colonies_, was sent
to the agent in London, to make the best use of them in his power. As
this action taken by the House of Representatives, which did not seek
the concurrence of the Council as usual, was not regarded as judicious
by the moderate party, the governor was induced to call the General
Court together on the 12th of October. In the mean time the temper of
the merchants had become soured by revenue seizures to the amount of
£3,000.[61]

The General Court (November 3), in answer to the governor's speech,
elaborately discussed the act of Parliament, and the same day agreed
upon a petition to the House of Commons, setting forth the injurious
nature of the new measures and of the navigation laws, as well as
deprecating their enforcement. This was accompanied by a letter to
their agent, showing historically the services and expenses of the
colony in various wars, and their willingness to share in the defence
of the empire.[62] These papers—the petition and the letter—were
drawn up by Hutchinson; but though able, candid, and convincing,
their tone did not satisfy the more ardent patriots, especially when
they were contrasted with Otis's fiery letter to the agent in June,
or when compared with similar documents emanating from some other
colonies,—that of New York in particular: for the discontent of the
colonies, to which the Boston instructions doubtless contributed,
was general, and manifested itself in petitions, remonstrances, and
correspondence.[63]

The events of 1764 left no doubt as to the manner in which the people
would receive the Stamp Act of 1765; nor, although with grievances
of their own, were they unobservant of what was going on in England.
"Wilkes and Liberty" was a familiar cry in Boston as well as in London,
and the names Whig and Tory became terms of reproach.[64]

Notwithstanding the memorials and petitions of the colonial assemblies,
and the remonstrances of their agents in London, George Grenville
persevered in his determination to bring in a stamp bill. Since its
first suggestion, he had listened patiently to the colony agents and
other friends of America; but they proposed nothing better, or so
good, if the colonies were to be taxed at all. They admitted that the
stamp tax would be inexpensive in its collection, and general in its
effect upon different classes of people. Indeed, so little did the
agents understand the real feeling in America that they—and Franklin
was among them—were quite ready, when the time came, to solicit
positions as stamp-distributors for their friends, and Richard Henry
Lee even asked a place for himself.[65] February 6, 1765, Grenville
introduced his resolutions for a Stamp Act, and put forward his plan in
a carefully prepared speech. Colonel Barré's opposition called forth
the well-known question of Charles Townshend, and the still more famous
rejoinder of the former. Pitt was away and ill. The debate occupied
but one session of the Commons, and the ministers were directed to
bring in a bill, which was done on the 13th. Numerous petitions
against it, presented by colonial agents, were rejected under the rule
which allowed no petition against a money bill. The bill passed both
Houses, and on March 22 received the royal assent. But in America
there was no apathy. If there had been a calm, it presaged the coming
storm. The passage of the bill was known in America before the end
of May, and from Virginia came the first legislative response. She
spoke through the voice of her great orator. Of Patrick Henry's six
resolutions, though supported by a powerful speech, only four, however,
were carried, May 30, by a small majority, in a House in which the
Established Church and the old aristocracy were very powerful.[66]

The General Court of Massachusetts did not meet until May 27, but
set to work so promptly that the House, June 6, under the lead of
James Otis, who had recovered from a fit of vacillation, voted that
it was highly expedient that there should be a meeting, as soon as
might be, of committees from the several colonial assemblies, "to
consult together on the present circumstances of the colonies, and
the difficulties to which they are and must be reduced by operation
of the late acts of Parliament for levying duties and taxes on the
colonies." It was agreed to send them a circular letter to that effect,
recommending a congress, in the city of New York, the first Tuesday
of October. This measure, which led to the Stamp Act Congress, was
pushed through with an unanimous vote of the House (June 6), though
probably not with the equally concordant opinion of the members; and
the circular, which was dated June 8, was immediately dispatched.[67]
James Otis, Oliver Partridge, and Timothy Ruggles—the last two having
little heart in the matter—were chosen delegates. The response to
the Massachusetts circular was neither unanimous, nor, from some of
the assemblies, enthusiastic.[68] At this stage of the Revolution,
in high offices and in provincial assemblies were friends of the
royal government able to make their influence felt in opposition to
popular measures. Nine of the colonies, however, were represented in
the congress, and from others came expressions of good-will. In the
mean time public sentiment was rapidly shaping itself into violent
opposition to the act. In Boston the Sons of Liberty were on the alert.
When the name of Andrew Oliver appeared among the stamp-distributors
he was hanged in effigy from the Liberty Tree on the night of the 13th
of August; and the next night the frame of a building going up on his
land, and supposed to be intended as a stamp-office, was broken in
pieces and used to consume the effigy before his own door.[69] On the
26th of the same month the records of the hated Vice-Admiralty Court
were burned by the mob, the house of the comptroller of the customs
sacked, and that of Chief Justice Hutchinson forcibly entered and
left in ruins. His plate and money were carried off, and his books
and valuable manuscripts were thrown into the streets. Nor did he or
his family escape without difficulty. The militia were not called
out to maintain order, for many of the privates were in the mob. Men
of standing secretly connived at proceedings which they afterwards
insincerely condemned. Though these violent outbreaks came earlier
and were carried to greater excess in Massachusetts than in any other
province, similar demonstrations followed in Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New York, and Pennsylvania.[70]

When the Stamp Act Congress met in New York, October 7, 1765, that
city was the headquarters of the British forces in America, under the
command of General Gage. Lieutenant-Governor Colden, then filling the
executive chair, was in favor of the act, and resolved to execute it;
but the Sons of Liberty expressed different sentiments. The Congress
contained men some of whom became celebrated. Timothy Ruggles was
chosen speaker, but Otis was the leading spirit. In full accord with
him were the Livingstons of New York, Dickinson of Pennsylvania,
McKean and Rodney of Delaware, Tilghman of Maryland, and Rutledge and
the elder Lynch of South Carolina. New Hampshire, Virginia, North
Carolina, and Georgia failed to send delegates, but not for lack of
interest in the cause. The Congress prepared a Declaration of Rights
and Grievances, An Address to the King, a Memorial to the House of
Lords, and a Petition to the House of Commons, and adjourned on October
25th. For a clear, accurate, and calm statement of the position of the
colonies these papers were never surpassed; nor, until the appearance
of the Declaration of Independence, was any advance made from the
ground taken in them.[71]

It is not to be inferred from the results of their proceedings that
there were no differences of opinion among the delegates. Several of
them afterwards took sides with the king; and there was doubtless
diversity of sentiment on the Stamp Act, as well as in Parliament,
which reassembled January 14, 1766, under a different ministry from
that which had carried the measure less than a year before. For in
a few months after the passage of the act, George III., chiefly on
personal grounds, had changed his legal advisers. After negotiations
with Pitt had failed, a new ministry, with the Marquis of Rockingham
as chief, and the Duke of Grafton and General Conway as Secretaries
of State, was installed, July 13, 1765. It was a Whig ministry. With
it, though not of it, was associated Edmund Burke, private secretary
of Rockingham, and not long after, through his influence, a member of
the House of Commons. This change of the ministry was regarded with
favor by the colonists, and doubtless encouraged their resistance to
the Stamp Act. The action of the colonists produced a great effect
on the new ministry, and alarmed the British merchants trading with
America. Their trade had been threatened by non-importation agreements
made to take effect January 1, 1766, and their debts were imperilled by
the determination of the colonists to withhold the amount of them as
pledges for good conduct. The general confusion likely to arise in the
administration of justice, and the transactions of the custom-house,
from want of stamps, brought the ministry to their wits' end.
Parliament assembled December 17th. But notwithstanding an effort by
Grenville to bring on a general consideration of American affairs, the
subject was postponed until after the holidays.

[Illustration: ROCKINGHAM.

From Doyle's _Official Baronage_, iii. 170.—ED.]

In the mean time some embarrassment was anticipated from the want of
stamps, November 1,[72] when the act was to go into operation. Governor
Bernard (September 25) had called the attention of the House of
Representatives to the courts, which guarded the property and persons
of the inhabitants, and to the custom-houses, upon which depended legal
trade and navigation. The House, in its answer, October 23, had not
shared his excellency's apprehensions, but was not then quite ready to
say, as it said three months later (January 17, 1766), "The courts of
justice must be open,—open immediately,—and the law, the great rule
of right in every county of the province, executed."[73] But this
attitude had not been taken without intermediate steps. In December the
town of Boston presented a petition to the governor and council for
the reopening of the courts, which was supported by John Adams, who
then first publicly identified himself with the patriot cause, of which
he became one of the most efficient advocates. After some delay and
inconvenience, the courts and custom-houses throughout the colonies,
early in the spring, took the risk of proceeding without stamped
papers, trusting to find their justification in necessity.

Parliament reassembled January 14, 1766. The king's speech opened with
a reference to "affairs in America, and Mr. Secretary Conway laid
before the House of Commons important letters and papers on the same
subject." On the 17th a petition of the merchants of London trading
with North America against the Stamp Act was presented. Then (January
28) followed the examination of Franklin, in relation to the Stamp
Act, before the House, in committee.[74] With this mass of information
before them, American affairs received an exhaustive discussion. The
Stamp Act was repealed, and the royal assent was given March 18th. The
debates on the Declaratory Act were no less full. It was a memorable
session,—memorable for the first speech of Burke; for those great
speeches of Pitt which placed him at the head of modern orators, for
Grenville's masterly defence of his colonial policy, and for Franklin's
examination. It was also memorable for the constitutional discussions
of Mansfield and Camden in the House of Lords. If the reader finds
it difficult to resist Mansfield's judicial interpretation of the
British Constitution adverse to the American claim, he recognizes in
the great principles then enunciated the force which popularized that
Constitution and marked a forward movement of the British race.

The Declaratory Act—that the king, with the advice of Parliament, had
full power to make laws binding America in all cases whatsoever—was
passed. This gave Pitt some trouble, considering his emphatic
declaration in that regard; but the liberal party in the colonies
soon met it with the counter-affirmation that Parliament possessed
no authority whatever in America except by consent of the provincial
assemblies. If the colonists had not forced the British government from
its position, they had advanced from their own. The repeal, however,
caused great rejoicing on both sides of the Atlantic. British merchants
expected no further trouble from non-importation agreements, and hoped
that the colonists would now pay their debts,—amounting to £4,000,000.
But there were misgivings on both sides. The ardent patriots were
outspoken in condemning the Declaratory Act, which Franklin had thought
would give no trouble. But the act of 1764, laying duties, remained;
and the enforcement of the navigation laws—their real grievance—lost
none of its vigor. Governor Bernard was under instructions to enforce
the laws against illicit trade; and in addition to these official
obligations, his share in the forfeitures of condemned goods laid his
motives open to suspicion. Nothing could have been more unfortunate for
his administration. It was also alleged that merchants were encouraged
in schemes to defraud the revenue; and that when their ships and
cargoes were compromised, they were seized and condemned. At a time
when conciliatory measures were needed to reassure the colonists,
the harshest were followed. Nevertheless, the repeal weakened the
prerogative party on both sides of the water, and encouraged the
liberal party by a knowledge of its power.

[Illustration: GLORIOUS NEWS

Fac-simile of an original in the library of the Mass. Hist.
Society.—ED.]

Governor Bernard opened the General Court, May 29, 1766, with
congratulations on the repeal of the Stamp Act. If he had stopped
there he would have acted wisely; but he alluded to the "fury of
the people" in their treatment of Hutchinson, and to some personal
matters, which called forth a reply from the House couched in terms
showing no abatement of animosity. This was increased on the receipt
of another message from the governor (June 3), enclosing the Act of
Repeal and the Declaratory Act, and at the same time informing them
that he had been directed by Secretary Conway to recommend "that full
and ample compensation be made to the late sufferers by the madness
of the people", agreeably to the votes of the House of Commons. He
also complained of their exclusion of the principal crown officers
from the Council by non-election.[75] The General Court promptly
availed themselves of this last topic for reply, instead of committing
themselves on the matter of compensation. They did not fail, however,
to vote a politic address of thanks to the king for assenting to the
repeal of the Stamp Act, and to offer their grateful acknowledgments
to Pitt and those members of the two Houses who had advocated it.[76]
But the subject of compensation could not be passed by. The governor
urged prompt compliance with the recommendation of Conway. The House,
however, professing the greatest abhorrence of the madness and
barbarity of the rioters, and promising their endeavors "to bring the
perpetrators of so horrid a fact to exemplary justice, and, if it be
in their power, to a pecuniary restitution of all damages", regarded
compensation by the province as not an act of justice, but rather of
generosity, and wished to consult their constituents. Therefore they
referred the matter to the next session.[77]

In December the two Houses passed a bill granting compensation to those
who had suffered losses in the Stamp Act riots, but, on the suggestion
of Joseph Hawley, accompanied it with a general pardon, indemnity and
oblivion to the offenders. Why they should have been so solicitous for
the safety of those who had committed crimes, condemned in June in
the severest terms, does not appear; and this invasion of the royal
prerogative of pardon did not fail to attract the attention of the
Parliament.[78]

In the late contest with Parliament the colonists had gained a victory,
but it was neither final nor precisely on the right ground. As a matter
of practical politics, they were ready to accept Pitt's distinction
between commercial regulations and internal taxes. They took the repeal
of the Stamp Act with thanks, but not as a finality. They participated
in the lively demonstrations of joy which followed that event on both
sides of the Atlantic; but thoughtful observers on both sides perceived
that one of the most powerful agencies in effecting the repeal was
the mercantile class, which had no intention of relinquishing its
grasp upon colonial commerce. Nor was the popular feeling without
guidance. It was the good fortune of the colonists, all through the
long contest, to have statesmen like John Adams, Jay, and Dickinson,
who could supplement the passionate appeals of Otis and some of his
associates with the calm reasons of political philosophy. None rendered
more valuable services in this respect than John Adams. In a series
of papers which appeared in the _Boston Gazette_ in the summer and
fall of 1765,—when the minds of the people were inflamed by the Stamp
Act,—and were afterwards republished in London as _A Dissertation on
the Canon and Feudal Law_, he combated the ecclesiastical and feudal
principles which lay at the bottom of the monarchical and Anglican
system.

The substantial grievance of the commercial colonies was not the Stamp
Act, which had not taken a farthing from their pockets. It was the
enforcement of trade regulations, which impaired the value of the
fisheries and dried up a principal source of revenue. A renewal of
the contest, and for the first time on its true grounds, was not long
postponed. The Rockingham ministry gave way, and Pitt, gazetted Earl
of Chatham July 30, 1766, took the helm of state August 2d, and was
the nominal head of the government until October, 1768. Among those
associated with him were the Duke of Grafton, Charles Townshend,
Conway, and the Earl of Shelburne. It was Pitt's misfortune—and his
country's—during these stormy times, that when he was most needed he
was disabled by sickness. Historians have speculated as to the probable
pacification of America had Pitt—not Chatham—guided affairs.[79]
Pitt's was a great name in America as well as in Europe. By his genius
the French power in America had been destroyed. This the colonists
knew. He had been generous in reimbursing their expenses in the late
war. This, and his efforts in effecting the repeal of the Stamp Act,
they remembered with gratitude. Whatever man could do in restoring
things to their old order Pitt could have done. He might even have
relinquished something of his claims for parliamentary supremacy in
respect to trade and general legislation; but it is doubtful whether,
even at that early period, he could have eradicated the ideas of
independence which had taken possession of the colonists, or have
arrested the movement which resulted in the independence of America and
the overthrow of the royal prerogative in England.

[Illustration: JOHN ADAMS. (_Amsterdam print._)

The Amsterdam edition, 1782, of _Geschiedenis van het Geschil tusschen
Groot-Britannie en Amerika ... door zijne Excellentie, den Heere John
Adams_.

There is a likeness of John Adams as a young man engraved in his _Life
and Works_, vol. ii. He says of himself at the time of the famous scene
when Otis was making his plea against the Writs of Assistance, and he
was taking notes of it, that the artist depicting it would have to
represent the young reporter as "looking like a short, thick Archbishop
of Canterbury" (_Works_, x. 245). There was a print published in London
in 1783 showing a head in a circle, which is reproduced in the _Mag.
of Amer. Hist._, xi. 93. Copley painted him once, in 1783, in court
dress, and the painting now hangs in Memorial Hall, Cambridge. The
head of this full-length picture was engraved for Stockdale's edition
of Adams's _Defence of the Constitutions_, published in 1794; and the
painting was never engraved to show the entire figure till it appeared
in vol. v. of the _Works_ (A. T. Perkins's _Copley_, p. 27). Cf. the
head in Bartlett Woodward's _United States_.

Stuart first painted him in 1812, and this picture belongs to his
descendants, and is engraved in the _Works_, vol. i. There are copies
of this picture by Gilbert Stuart Newton and B. Otis, both of which
have been engraved. The Newton copy is in the Mass. Hist. Society
(_Catal. of Cabinet_, no. 47; _Proc._, 1862, p. 3). The Otis copy
has been engraved by J. B. Longacre (Sanderson's _Signers_, vol.
viii.). Stuart again painted Adams in 1825, the year before he died,
representing him as sitting at one end of a sofa. It is engraved on
steel in the _Works_, vol. x., and on wood in the _Mem. Hist. Boston_,
iii. 192. (Cf. Mason's _Stuart_, p. 125.) Another Stuart is owned by
Mr. T. Jefferson Coolidge, of Boston.

A portrait by Col. John Trumbull also hangs in Memorial Hall,
Cambridge; and Adams's likeness is also in Independence Hall. (Cf.
Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. v.) A cabinet full-length by
Winstanley, painted while Adams was at the Hague (1782), is in the
Boston Museum (Johnston's _Orig. Portraits of Washington_, p. 93).

Among the contemporary popular engravings, mention may be made of that
by Norman in the _Boston Magazine_, Feb., 1784; one in the _European
Magazine_ (vol. iv. 83).

Stuart also painted a portrait of the wife of John Adams, which is
engraved in the _Works_, vol. ix. A picture of her by Blythe, at the
age of twenty-one, accompanies the _Familiar Letters_.

Views of the Adams homestead in Quincy, Mass., are given in the _Works_
(vol. i. p. 598); in _Appleton's Journal_ (xii. 385); in Mrs. Lamb's
_Homes of America_. An india-ink sketch, showing a distant view of
Boston beyond the house, is in the halls of the Bostonian Society.—ED.]

The Massachusetts Assembly was in no amiable frame of mind. When there
was no cause for quarrel, they made one. Bernard had probably been
advised to preserve a prudent silence respecting political affairs.
At the opening of the session, January 28, 1767, in a message of less
than ten printed lines, he recommended "the support of the authority
of the government, the maintenance of the honor of the province, and
the promotion of the welfare of the people", as the chief objects for
their consultation. This called forth a captious reply, and a complaint
because Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson, who had not been reëlected to
the Council, appeared in the council-chamber at the opening of the
session, at the request of the governor and as matter of courtesy.
The House found in his presence, if voluntary, "a new and additional
instance of ambition and lust of power."

[Illustration: AUTOGRAPH OF JOHN ADAMS, 1815.

Part of a letter in Smith and Watson's _Hist. and Lit. Curios_., 1st
ser., pl. vii.—ED.]

In the spring of 1767, Parliament had occasion to inquire into some
colonial legislation. In April, 1765, the Mutiny Act had been extended
to the colonies. This was intended in part to provide for military
offences not within the jurisdiction of civil courts, and in part
to require the colonies in America, as in England in like cases,
to provide for quartering the king's troops. The New York Assembly
made only partial provision. When Sir Henry Moore, the governor,
communicated to them the letter of Earl Shelburne, to the effect that
the king expected obedience to the act, the Assembly resolved not to
comply, and called in question the authority of Parliament. Parliament
then took the matter in hand, and suspended their legislative authority
until compliance.[80] This action brought them to terms. It made
considerable stir throughout the colonies, and was regarded as a
serious invasion of their rights.

The arrival of several companies of royal artillery at Boston, in
the fall of 1766, and the quartering of them at the expense of the
province, by order of the governor and council, gave the General Court
occasion, at their session in January, 1767, to express their opinion
about unauthorized expenditures of the public money, and to enquire if
more troops were expected.[81] The governor explained the quartering
of the troops, and said he had no expectation, except from common
rumor, of the arrival of additional forces. But his statement failed to
allay apprehensions of a design on the part of the ministry to support
their measures by military power. Added to other causes of alarm in
1767 was a report that Anglican bishops were about to be supported in
the colonies, at the expense and under the patronage of the British
government.

In 1767 strife was renewed on what are known as the Townshend
Acts. Charles Townshend was Chancellor of the Exchequer in the
Chatham-Grafton ministry. He had reluctantly voted for the repeal of
the Stamp Act, and still held to his opinions that the colonists should
pay some share of the civil and military expenses arising from their
defence and government; and if, to secure promptness and uniformity of
action, some modification of their charters should be found necessary,
then that ought to follow. In conformity with these views, he had
given some pledges in respect to deriving a revenue from America,
and, during Chatham's retirement, had brought forward his scheme of
taxation in certain resolutions of the Committee of Ways and Means,
April 16, 1767,[82] the substance of which was enacted June 29th, to go
into effect November 20th. There were two acts known as the Townshend
Acts: the first[83] providing for the more effectual execution of
the laws of trade, and for the appointment of commissioners for that
purpose; and the second[84] granting duties on glass, paper, colors,
and tea, and legalizing writs of assistance. The revenue thus raised
was to be applied to "defraying the charge of the administration of
justice, and the support of the civil government in such provinces
where it should be found necessary; and towards further defraying the
expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the said dominions."
Before the act went into operation Charles Townshend died (September
4, 1767), and Chatham's powers continued to be enfeebled by disease.
It was the misfortune of Great Britain that both these able men should
have been withdrawn from the public service during this critical
period, and that the policy of each had to be represented by inferior
men. Chatham's conciliatory methods had no fair trial; and Townshend's
coercive measures were pressed neither with unity of purpose nor vigor
of execution.

Between the passage of Townshend's Acts in the summer of 1767 and their
taking effect in November, the colonists had ample time to study and
organize opposition, stimulated by the arrival (November 5, 1767) of
Burch and Hulton, two of the five commissioners of customs who had
been sent over to enforce them. At first the people expressed their
resentment, in which, as usual, those of Boston took the lead, by
renewing their non-importation agreements. In the mean time efforts
had been made to introduce domestic manufactures.[85] These practical
measures in Massachusetts were supplemented by one of the ablest
discussions of colonial rights which had yet appeared. In the early
winter of 1767-8 John Dickinson published in a Philadelphia newspaper a
series of essays entitled _The Farmer's Letters_, which soon attracted
notice both in America and England.

[Illustration:

From _An impartial History of the War in America_ (Boston, 1781), vol.
i. p. 325, engraved by J. Norman, a Boston engraver.

In 1772, when Adams was forty-nine, John Hancock commissioned Copley
to paint pictures of Adams and himself, to commemorate their political
union, and the two portraits hung for many years in the Hancock mansion
on Beacon Street in Boston, before they were given to the town. That of
Adams is a three-quarters length, and shows him standing at a table,
holding a paper, in the attitude of speaking (Perkins's _Copley_, p.
28). As engraved by H. B. Hall, it is given in Wells's _Life of Samuel
Adams_, vol. i.; and it is also engraved in Delaplaine's _Repository_
(1815); in Bancroft, vol. vii. (orig. ed.), and in other places, as
well as, on wood, in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_ (iii. 35). After having
hung for some years in Faneuil Hall, it has now been transferred to the
Art Museum. It was engraved—the bust only—by Paul Revere, for the
_Royal American Mag._, April, 1774, and a reproduction of this is given
by Wells (vol. ii.). A copy of the original was made by J. Mitchell,
and from this a mezzotint by Samuel Okey was issued at Newport in 1775.

Another and smaller picture, also by Copley (Perkins, p. 29), and
said to have been painted in 1770, hangs in Memorial Hall, Cambridge,
and has been engraved in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, ii. 438. Cf.
Sanderson's _Signers_, vol. ix.

The Copley type of head characterizes the engraving by J. Norman, given
above from the Boston edition of a current history. The London edition
(1780) of the same book has a picture which has little resemblance to
the Copley type, as will be seen by the fac-simile likewise herewith
given, and marked "London, 1780."

There was a picture made late in life by John Johnson, which has been
destroyed; but from a mezzotint of it, made in 1797 by Graham, H. B.
Hall reëngraved it for Wells's third volume, and on wood in Higginson's
_Larger History_, p. 255.

The statue by Miss Whitney follows the Copley head. One copy of this
is in the Capitol at Washington, and another in Dock Square, in
Boston.—ED.]

Their influence among all classes was widespread and profound.

[Illustration: SAMUEL ADAMS, LONDON, 1780.]

The year 1768 was one of the most momentous of the Revolutionary
period. Hitherto the colonists, in defence of their property, had
denied the supremacy of Parliament as based on usurpation; but now,
in defence of their privileges, they denied the prerogative of the
king, the source of their political existence. This grew out of the
Massachusetts Circular Letter. The General Court came together December
30, 1767. John Hancock, James Otis, and Joseph Hawley were prominent
members, but though James Otis was still active, Samuel Adams was
the master spirit. Never was his practical sagacity more serviceable
to the cause; never did his genius for politics shine brighter. His
fruitful pen is apparent in the remarkable series of state papers
called forth by the Townshend Acts, comprising the letter of the
House to their London agent (January 12, 1768), the Petition to the
king (January 20), and the Circular Letter to the assemblies of the
several colonies (February 11).[86] If the Townshend Acts were to be
successfully resisted, union of sentiment and action among all the
colonies was essential. This was the object of the circular letter.
It was an arraignment of Parliament and the ministry in respect to
the revenue acts, and the system by which the British government
proposed to make civil officers, including the judges, the instruments
for its enforcement; and it solicited an interchange of opinions on
these subjects.[87] Governor Bernard watched the proceedings of the
House with the deepest interest, nor was he long in doubt as to the
nature of the circular letter, for two days after its adoption a
copy of it was proffered, in case he desired it.[88] This letter was
preceded (besides the documents already mentioned) by letters to the
Marquis of Rockingham, General Conway, Lord Camden, and to the Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury. The details of these papers cannot
be given here. They present the whole case of the colonies, their
rights, their grievances, their remonstrances, and their petitions.
They proceeded mainly from the pen of Samuel Adams, who, when he
had shaken himself clear from profuse professions of loyalty and
disclaimers of "the most distant thoughts of independence", rose to
the annunciation of the loftiest principles of statesmanship, in
the declaration that "the supreme legislative, in any free country,
derives its power from the constitution, by the fundamental rules of
which it is bounded and circumscribed;"—"that it is the glory of the
British Constitution that it hath its foundation in the law of God
and nature;"—"that the necessity of rights and property is the great
end of government;"—"that the colonists are natural-born subjects by
the spirit of the law of nature and nations;" and "that the laws of
God and nature were not made for politicians to alter." Nor does he
confine himself to the enunciation of abstract principles, but states
the rights of the colonists of Massachusetts on historical grounds,
and shows the oppressive and impolitic nature of the acts complained
of.[89] Changes were taking place in the Grafton ministry which boded
evil to the colonies. Shelburne, the most liberal friend of the
Americans, was succeeded by Hillsborough in December, 1767, and Conway
by Weymouth, January 20, 1768. While the circular letter was on its
way to the colonies and to Westminster (for it was intended also for
England), events were occurring at Boston which showed the temper of
the people, and had no inconsiderable influence upon the action of the
British government. The anniversary of the repeal of the Stamp Act,
March 18, 1768, did not pass without popular demonstrations of ill-will
to the customs officials, nor did the governor escape abusive language
from the mob.[90] For some years these officers had been resisted in
making seizures of uncustomed goods, which were frequently rescued
from their possession by interested parties, and the determination of
the commissioners of customs to break up this practice frequently led
to collisions; but no flagrant outbreak occurred until the seizure of
John Hancock's sloop "Liberty" (June 10, 1768), laden with a cargo of
Madeira wine. The officer in charge, refusing a bribe, was forcibly
locked up in the cabin, the greater part of the cargo was removed,
and the remainder entered at the custom-house as the whole cargo.
This led to seizure of the vessel, said to have been the first made
by the commissioners, and for security she was placed under the guns
of the "Romney", a man-of-war in the harbor. For this the revenue
officers were roughly handled by the mob. Their boat was burned, their
houses threatened, and they, with their alarmed families, took refuge
on board the "Romney", and finally in the Castle. These proceedings
undoubtedly led to the sending additional military forces to Boston in
September.[91]

The General Court was in session at the time, but no effectual
proceedings were taken against the rioters. Public sympathy was with
them in their purposes, if not in their measures. But the inhabitants
of Boston, in town meeting on the 14th, in an address to Governor
Bernard, probably drawn by Otis,[92] among other matters complained
of being invaded by an armed force. With grim humor, the address
represents the commissioners, who had fled for safety to the Castle,
as having "of their own notion" relinquished the exercise of their
commission, and expressed the hope that they would never resume it, and
demanded of the governor to give immediate order for the removal of
the "Romney" from the harbor. Some weeks later (June 30) the Council
passed the customary resolution, setting forth "their utter abhorrence
and detestation" of the riotous proceedings, and desiring that the
governor, through the attorney-general, would prosecute all guilty
persons, that they and "their abettors might be brought to condign
punishment."[93]

When the circular letter was laid before the ministry, April 15,
1768, it caused great excitement in parliamentary circles, and led
to the gravest mistake which was made by the government during
the entire Revolutionary period. Other measures, perhaps without
exception, had a show of necessity; nor, as the British Constitution
was then interpreted by the highest authority, were they clearly
unconstitutional. But when the Earl of Hillsborough, speaking
for the king, June 21, 1768, required the Massachusetts House of
Representatives to rescind their circular letter on pain of immediate
dissolution, there was a violation of the constitutional right of
the House to express their opposition to measures deemed injurious
to their constituents, and to communicate their sentiments to other
colonies whose interests were similarly affected. Equally unwise was
Hillsborough's letter to the colonial assemblies, requiring them to
disregard the Massachusetts circular. Responses to the circular letter,
when they expressed the sentiments of the assemblies rather than those
of the royal governors, were in full sympathy with Massachusetts.[94]
The representatives, says Bernard, "have been much elated, within
these three or four days, by some letters they have received in
answer to the circular letter",[95] and Hutchinson thought that "the
strength which would be derived from this union confirmed many who
would otherwise have been wavering."[96] But when Governor Bernard
(June 21, 1768) communicated to the House instructions from the king
to rescind the circular letter, and recommended immediate action as
of important consequence to the province, no doubt it caused anxiety.
Under a similar pressure New York had receded. The House apprehended
the gravity of the situation, and took seven or eight days for
consideration, and even then desired to consult their constituents. But
when Bernard informed them that further delay would be considered as
a refusal, they voted, 92 to 17, not to rescind, and "the number 92",
Hutchinson says, "was auspicious, and 17 of ill omen, for many months
after, not only in Massachusetts Bay, but in most of the colonies on
the continent."[97] They doubtless were influenced by Otis, who spoke
with great power, and, according to Bernard, unsparingly denounced the
ministry and "passed an encomium on Oliver Cromwell."[98] Massachusetts
deliberately disobeyed the king's command, and defied his power. Before
dissolution, the House agreed (June 30, 1768) upon a message to the
governor, arguing the question very fully, and declaring their refusal
to rescind; a letter to the Earl of Hillsborough; and a Report and
Resolves, in which they repeat the story of their grievances, doings,
and rights with great fullness and ability.[99]

The effect of this action, so honorable to the House, was unfavorable
upon the ministry. De Berdt, the London agent, in a letter to the
House, August 12, 1768, giving the substance of a conversation with
the Earl of Hillsborough, says that his lordship informed him that he
would have used his influence for the repeal of the Townshend Acts, and
believed he could have obtained it; but since the news respecting the
non-rescinding of the circular letter, the matter was in doubt. "The
crown must be supported, or we sink into a state of anarchy."

In July, 1768, General Gage, then at New York, had been directed by the
ministry to remove one or two regiments to Boston; and when the news
of the riots of March 18 reached England, on August 14, two additional
regiments were ordered from Ireland. When rumors of these orders became
rife in Boston, there were indications that the country would be raised
to prevent the landing of the troops; but different counsels prevailed.
A town meeting was held in Faneuil Hall on the 12th and 13th of
September, which agreed to call a meeting of the towns.[100] Ninety-six
towns and eight districts were finally represented in the convention
which assembled at the time appointed (September 22). Their first
act was a petition to the governor setting forth their apprehensions
in respect to a standing army. This the governor refused to receive,
but he expressed his opinion of the unauthorized meeting they were
holding, directed them to separate instantly, and threatened to assert
the prerogatives of the crown. After a recital of grievances, with
declarations of loyalty and promises of assistance to civil magistrates
in suppressing disorders, they adjourned on the 29th. Their proceedings
were moderate,—a moderation induced, as some supposed, by the arrival
at Nantasket, September 28, from Halifax of a fleet of seven armed
vessels, with nearly a thousand troops.[101] If contempt of the royal
prerogative, after the refusal to rescind the circular letter, could
have been more pointedly expressed, it was by holding a provincial
convention without sanction of law. Between these measures and April
19, 1775, no step involving a new principle was taken. The burning of
the "Gaspee" in 1772 and the destruction of the tea in 1773 were merely
the filling in of a picture firmly sketched in outline.

The refusal of the provincial council and of the town to provide
for quartering the royal troops on their arrival was a practical
nullification of the Mutiny Act, which served still further to
strain the relations between Massachusetts and the British ministry.
Parliament came together November 8, 1768. Both Houses were swift to
condemn the late proceedings of the General Court of Massachusetts
and of the town of Boston. On December 15 these acts were made the
basis of eight resolutions, introduced by the Earl of Hillsborough,
and an address to the king, moved by the Duke of Bedford, to obtain
information respecting the actors in the riotous proceedings since
December 10, 1767, with a view, if deemed advisable, of ordering
their transportation to England for trial. These were passed by the
House of Commons (January 26, 1769), after a debate in which the
whole subject of American affairs was discussed.[102] The news of
these proceedings at first created some uneasiness in Boston among
those implicated; but apprehension subsided when it was learned from
their friends in England that the voting of Bedford's Address by the
two Houses was merely political;[103] that lenient, not rigorous,
measures were intended by the ministry; and that the late act laying
duties would be repealed. This intelligence reassured the patriotic
party, but correspondingly depressed the tories, who saw no hope in
the vacillating policy of the ministry.[104] A policy was much needed.
Chatham had resigned in October, 1768, and the Duke of Grafton became
the nominal, as he had long been the real, head of the ministry. Lord
North, Chancellor of the Exchequer, had charge of the revenue. The
Duke of Grafton favored the total repeal of the Townshend duties,
but Lord North favored the retention of that on tea, as a matter of
principle; and so it was decided by a majority of one in the Cabinet
Council. Parliament rose May 9, and four days later the Earl of
Hillsborough reported to the several colonies the resolutions of the
government on the circular letter. Lord Hillsborough's letter gave
little comfort to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, whose
firmness was commended by Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the threat
of transportation of the Bostonians to England for trial under a
statute of Henry VIII. called forth from the latter colony vigorous
resolutions and an address to the king, May 16, 1769.[105] Jefferson
has given the history of these resolutions.[106] This action did not
meet the approval of Lord Botetourt, the governor of Virginia, and he
dissolved the House of Burgesses. This, however, did not prevent the
delegates from meeting at the Apollo, in the Raleigh tavern, and, as
citizens, entering into a non-importation agreement which bore the
names of Henry, Randolph, Jefferson, and Washington, and became an
example to all the colonies.[107] During the remainder of the year 1769
the progress of the Revolution was confined chiefly to Massachusetts,
and there it assumed the form of an altercation between the House of
Representatives and the governor in respect to the presence of the
king's forces.[108] Coming in for their annual session near the end
of May, the House, unwilling even to organize in the presence of the
military, sent a message to the governor, remonstrating against so
gross a breach of its privileges, and requesting him to give orders to
remove the standing army, the main guard of which was kept with cannon
pointed at the very door of the State House.[109] There was no design
in this arrangement, but it was very menacing, nevertheless. For nearly
two weeks messages kept passing back and forth, to the purport, on the
governor's side, that he had no authority to remove the troops, they
being under the commander-in-chief; and on the part of the House, that
they would do no business while the troops remained. It occurred to the
governor that, if he could not remove the troops, he could remove the
General Court; and this he did by directing the secretary to adjourn it
to Cambridge. The Court did not appreciate this stroke of humor, and
proceeded to business only after a protest of necessity. But Bernard's
career was drawing to a close. June 28th he informed the House that the
king desired him to repair to Great Britain. July 8th the House passed
nineteen resolutions,[110] covering the whole ground of dispute with
the home government, and arraigning the governor for various political
misdemeanors. They petitioned for his recall; and Governor Bernard
left the province, accompanied by the reproaches of the House and
manifestations of joy by the people. He did not succeed in a position
in which all who had preceded him and all who followed him failed. He
could not serve well two masters.

[Illustration: PLAN OF KING STREET AND VICINITY.

NOTE.—The plan on the following page is a reduction from that used in
the trial following the massacre, and was made by Paul Revere. It now
belongs to the MS. collections of the writer of this chapter. The key
to the letters in the street, a part of the original drawing, is lost.
Those attached to the buildings, etc., are substituted for the legends
which are in the original, and which would be illegible in the reduced
scale of the present reproduction. They signify as follows:—

A, Doct^r Jones; B, Doct^r Roberts; C, Brigdens, goldsmith; D, John
Nazro, store; E, Main Street; F, Town house; G, Brazen Head; H, Benj.
Kent, Esq., house; I, Mrs. Clapham; J, Exchange Tavern; K, Exchange
Lane; L, Custom House; M, Col. Marshall's house; N, "N.B. The pricked
line is the Gutter;" O, Mr. Paine's house; P, Mr. Davis's house; Q,
Mr. Amory's house; R, Quaker Lane; S, Warden and Vernon's shop; T,
Levi Jening, shop; U, Mr. Peck, wa[t]ch maker, shop; V, Court Square;
W, whipping-post; X, J. & D. Waldo, shop; Y, Pudin Lane; Z, G. C.
Phillips, house; 1, Ezk. Prince, Esq., office; 2, Guard House; 3, Mr.
Bowse, shop.

Revere engraved a large folding picture of the massacre, which appeared
in the official _Short Narrative_, which has been reproduced in the
_Old State House Memorial_ (Boston, 1882, p. 82) and in the _Mag. of
Amer. Hist._ (Jan., 1886, p. 9), in an article on Revere by E. H. Goss.
A reëngraving of Revere's plate is in the London (Bingley) edition of
the same, and on a smaller scale in the other London (Dilby) edition,
and this last is reproduced in the _Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 40.
Thomas's _Mass. Kalendar_ (1772) has a woodcut representation, after
Revere's drawing. Cf. nos. 579 to 583 of the _Catal. of the Cab. of the
Mass. Hist. Soc._—ED.]

When Sir Francis Bernard[111] sailed for England on board the
"Rippon", in August, 1769, he left the administration in the hands
of Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson. For several months nothing of
importance took place, except misunderstandings growing out of the
non-observance of the non-importation agreements (which were renewed
March, 1770), and quarrels between the troops and the populace which
resulted in the deplorable scenes of March 5, 1770. The circumstances
which led to this affair are too well known to need recital in
detail. While the town was occupied by British regiments, collisions
were constantly occurring. None knew better than the populace the
helplessness of the soldiers to resent insult or injury by arms.
Even in case of riots, the reading of the Act and the intervention
of the civil power were necessary preliminaries to firing upon the
crowd. Nothing but confinement of the soldiers to their barracks could
have prevented collisions with the populace. The patriot leaders had
determined to get rid of the regiments at all cost. The affair at
Gray's wharf on Saturday, March 2, led to the more serious affray on
Monday, the 5th. On the evening of that day, between seven and eight
o'clock, the cry of fire and ringing of bells drew together a large
crowd, which was followed by a collision with the troops, and resulted
in the death of three persons and wounding of several others, two
mortally. The Boston Massacre soon became known throughout the country,
and aroused a spirit of resistance hitherto unfelt. Its immediate
effect was the withdrawal of the troops from the town to the Castle,
on account of the resolute attitude assumed by Samuel Adams. The men
who lost their lives in this affray were buried in one grave, to which
they were followed by an immense procession, and for some years the
anniversary of their death was observed by commemorative ceremonies.
All classes in the community joined in execrating the soldiers, and
gave no ear to justifying or mitigating circumstances. Inflamed and
grossly inaccurate accounts of the transactions were drawn up and
scattered through the colonies and sent to Great Britain. But time
somewhat allayed the first feeling of animosity; and when the facts
became better known, it clearly appeared that the soldiers had fired,
without orders, upon the crowd only when it had become necessary in
defence of their lives. Captain Preston (October 24) and the soldiers
(November 27) engaged in the affray were brought to trial on a charge
of murder, and were all acquitted, except two soldiers who were
convicted of manslaughter. These were slightly branded, and all of them
were liberated. John Adams and Josiah Quincy, Jr., appeared in their
defence, and with equal honor the jurors did their duty in accordance
with the law and the evidence. The news of the events of March 5
became known in London April 21, through Mr. Robertson. one of the
commissioners of the customs.[112]

[Illustration: THE COURT AT THE TRIAL

A fac-simile of a group of original autographs belonging to the
writer of this chapter. Winthrop was the clerk of the court. The
Attorney-General Sewall drew the indictment, but did not appear for the
king.—ED.]

The Townshend act, though drawn conformably to the colonial
distinctions between internal and external taxes, produced the
same dissatisfaction as the Stamp Act had done. There was no real
difference. If Parliament could lay external taxes, it could lay
internal taxes. Non-importation agreements in the several colonies
followed in 1769, and so long as they were observed, even without
great strictness, were disastrous to British merchants, the value of
whose exports to the American colonies between Christmas in 1767 and
Christmas in 1769 fell off nearly £700,000 sterling; or, if we take
the figures for those colonies where the agreement was most effective,
in New England from £419,000 to £207,000, in New York from £482,000 to
£74,000.[113] Though the agreement was not observed equally in all the
colonies, nor in entire good faith in any,—Massachusetts and Rhode
Island, particularly, suffered some discredit in this respect, as
compared with New York and Philadelphia,—the general result seriously
alarmed British merchants, who petitioned Parliament for the repeal of
the Townshend act.[114] These petitions were considered in the House
of Commons March 5, 1770, and Lord North, in accordance with Earl
Hillsborough's circular letter, proposed to take off all the duties
laid by the Townshend act of 1767, except that on tea, which he would
preserve as a sort of declaratory act, especially since the conduct of
the Americans had been such as to prevent an entire compliance with
their wishes.[115] Governor Pownall offered as an amendment the entire
repeal of the act, and supported his motion in an extremely able and
interesting speech.[116]

[Illustration: THE COUNSEL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OF THE ACCUSED

A fac-simile of a group of signatures belonging to the writer of this
chapter.—ED.]

Pownall's amendment was lost by a vote of 204 to 142. The merchants
failed to procure a repeal of the duties, although Alderman Trecothic
made one more effort in their behalf, on the 9th of April, "in a very
sensible speech."[117]

When the news of the Boston Massacre reached England late in April,
1770, it recalled attention to American affairs, which, after the
defeat of Trecothic's motion, seemed to have been laid aside for the
remainder of the session. Trecothic called for the papers.[118] While
waiting for them, Governor Pownall made a speech on the "powers of
government [which] the crown can and ought to grant to the dependencies
of the realm; what form and power of government the British subject
in those parts ought to be governed by; what powers are granted,
both civil and military; and what arrangements, and means taken, for
administering and executing these powers."[119] Burke, in the second of
eight resolutions, affirmed "that a principal cause of the disorders
which have prevailed in North America hath arisen from the ill-judged
and inconsistent instructions given, from time to time, by persons in
administration, to the governors of some of the provinces of North
America."[120] Later, the same resolutions were brought forward in
the House of Lords by the Duke of Richmond. But Burke was not acting
in good faith. A close observer wrote at the time: "It is plain
enough that these motions were not made for the sake of the colonies,
but merely to serve the purposes of the opposition, to render the
ministry, if possible, more odious, so that they may themselves come
into the conduct of affairs, while it remains very doubtful whether
they would do much better, if at all, than their predecessors."[121]
This resulted well for the colonies, and, in the long run, for the
progress of liberal ideas in both countries. But to those who wished
for the continuance of the British connection, and believed in its
practicability, it must have been a matter for profound regret that
the liberal leaders, from Chatham to Fox, simply found fault with the
acts of the ministry, and proposed nothing instead. The ministry,
conciliatory to-day and severe to-morrow, had no fixed policy. American
affairs gave way to the exigencies of a general election, just as
we have lately seen in this country, great interests jeopardized by
the unwillingness of both political parties to treat them on the
eve of a presidential election. If, instead of this vacillating
and inconsistent policy, both parties had given their attention to
devising some rational system of colonial administration, as proposed
by Pownall,[122] leaving local affairs to the colonists, but placing
imperial affairs under a permanent board, not changeable with every
ministry, the colonies and the mother-country might have remained
united, perhaps for a generation, longer.

The Townshend duties, except those on tea, were repealed in April; but
this did not satisfy the colonists, and dissensions arose among the
merchants of the several colonies in regard to the non-importation
agreement. Those of New York became dissatisfied with Boston and
Newport merchants, who had agreed to import non-dutiable articles,
even before the news of the repealing act; and in October, 1770, all
sections fell into the same plan, but no teas were to be imported. The
Sons of Liberty in New York in vain resisted this arrangement.

In Massachusetts the patriots were seldom without causes of just
complaint. Governor Hutchinson, in obedience to instructions of General
Gage, had delivered (September 10) the keys of Castle William, in
Boston harbor, which belonged to the province, to Colonel Dalrymple,
who was the servant of the king; and following royal instructions, had
refused to convene the General Court at Boston, instead of Cambridge,
or to assent to any bill by which the assessors (in 1771) could tax the
officers of the crown.[123] These exercises of the royal prerogative,
and the payment of the governor's salary by the crown, involved
constitutional questions of higher import, as the British Constitution
then stood, than the question of parliamentary supremacy, and were
matters of unceasing contention. In 1770, Franklin was chosen London
agent of the colony, although not without some objection, in the place
of De Berdt, recently deceased (May), and Hutchinson was appointed
governor in March, 1771.

In 1772, although it was a year of general quiet, two events happened,
which, in different ways, promoted the purposes of the more ardent
patriots,—the burning of the "Gaspee" at Providence in June, and the
formation of committees of correspondence in November. On the 9th of
June, Lieutenant Dudingston, commander of the "Gaspee", who had shown
great activity in the revenue service at Rhode Island, in undertaking
to intercept the "Providence Packet", Captain Lindsay, ran aground on
Namquit Point. While in this position, the "Gaspee" was boarded on the
following night by a party of citizens led by John Brown, a respectable
merchant. In the _mêlée_ the lieutenant was wounded and the vessel was
burned. The affair created a great sensation in England, and it was
ordered that those engaged in it should be sent to England for trial.
For this purpose the home government appointed colonial commissioners,
who sat at Newport from the 4th to the 22 January, 1773, to inquire
into the matter.[124] At the end of their deliberations they required
Wanton, the governor of Rhode Island, to arrest the offenders, for
trial in England. He appealed for directions to the Assembly, as did
Stephen Hopkins, the chief-justice of the highest court. That body
referred the matter to the discretion of the chief-justice, and he
accordingly refused to arrest, or to allow the arrest of, any person
for transportation.[125] Nothing came of the order except ill-humor in
England and indignation in the colonies, where it was regarded as an
invasion of their constitutional right of trial by their peers.

Samuel Adams was always busy on political subjects; nor were subjects
wanting. The Earl of Hillsborough had been succeeded in the American
department (August 4, 1772) by Lord Dartmouth; but the change in
administration made no change in the policy of paying the salaries
of the provincial judges by the king, and thus rendering them less
dependent on the popular will. This was thought to be in derogation of
colonial rights, especially so long as the judges held their seats only
during the king's pleasure.

[Illustration: JOSEPH WARREN.

From a pastel owned by the heirs of the late Hon. C. F. Adams. It is
unfinished below the chest.—ED.]

Accordingly, a town meeting assembled in Faneuil Hall, October 28,
and adjourned November 2d. Samuel Adams moved "that a committee of
correspondence be appointed, to consist of twenty-one persons, to state
the rights of the colonies, and of this province in particular, as
men, as Christians, and as subjects; to communicate and publish the
same to the several towns in this province and to the world, as the
sense of this town, with the infringements and violations thereof that
have been, or from time to time may be, made; also requesting of each
town a free communication of their sentiments on this subject."[126]
This was the beginning of an organization (November 22), entered into
with hesitation by some of the leading patriots of Boston, which
finally secured the public confidence, and became a great power for the
concentration of popular sentiment.

[Illustration: PRINTED PAGE.

Slightly reduced from an original in the Boston Public Library.—ED.]

It undoubtedly led to the larger measure of intercolonial
correspondence instituted by Virginia during the next spring; and not
the least of its claims to consideration is the fact that it engaged
the attention and secured the services of Joseph Warren as the trusted
lieutenant of Samuel Adams.[127]

The American Revolution rests upon grounds so high and clear, and was
carried forward by measures so honorably conceived and so persistently
adhered to, that all who adopt its principles must regret any
circumstance in its history by which the opinion of candid people is
divided. Such a division is found in connection with the Hutchinson
letters. The story is briefly this:—In the years 1768 and 1769
Thomas Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver, then officers in Massachusetts,
appointed by the crown, and sworn to a faithful discharge of their
duties, with several other persons, in a private correspondence with
Thomas Whately, an English gentleman, formerly, but not then, connected
with the government, communicated facts about colonial affairs the
truth of which has never been impugned, and expressed opinions which
Tories might honestly entertain. These letters in some unexplained
manner found their way—either from the cabinet of the person to whom
they were addressed, after his death, or, as is more likely, from the
papers of George Grenville, to whom Whately had probably entrusted
them for perusal—into the hands of Franklin, the colony agent in
London, by whom they were sent in 1773, with an unsigned letter, to
the speaker of the Massachusetts House. The injunctions in respect to
them were loosely regarded, and they were published by a breach of
faith which implicated a large body of men. They were made the basis of
a petition by the General Court to the king for the removal of their
writers from the offices which they held; but after a hearing before
the Privy Council, January 29, 1774, the petition, which the province
did not attempt to support by evidence, was dismissed as "groundless,
vexatious, and scandalous." Two days later, Dr. Franklin was removed
from the office of deputy postmaster-general for the colonies,—a
circumstance of great consequence to the American cause, since it
irrevocably committed to it one who had been thought its lukewarm
promoter.

Massachusetts, which had led in most of the Revolutionary movements,
did not take the lead in establishing committees of correspondence
between the colonies. That honor belongs to Virginia; and its
chief cause was the action of the commissioners in the "Gaspee"
case. March 12, 1773, Dabney Carr, who had been put forward at the
suggestion of Jefferson, moved certain resolutions in the Virginia
House of Burgesses, which, supported by Richard Henry Lee and Patrick
Henry, were unanimously adopted. Rhode Island followed in adopting
similar measures. On May 28th the Massachusetts House responded to
Virginia.[128] Hutchinson justly considers this as one of the most
important and daring movements of the patriotic Party during the
Revolution.[129] It paved the way for the union of the colonies and
for the General Congress which was convened at Philadelphia the next
year.

To the patriots of Philadelphia belongs the credit of making the first
public demonstration against the project of the East India Company for
transporting their accumulated stock of tea to America, in a series
of resolutions passed October 18, at a meeting held in the State
House.[130] News of the intention of the company to do this had reached
America in August. Samuel Adams was ready. The towns in the province
of Massachusetts were aroused by Joseph Warren's circular letter in
behalf of the Committee of Correspondence, September 21, 1773, and
the Philadelphia resolutions were adopted in Faneuil Hall. Constant
communications were kept up between the importing colonies. Ships
loaded with tea were dispatched about the month of August to Boston,
New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, but the tone of the public
press in those towns indicated a determination not to allow the sale of
the cargoes. The Charleston consignees, on the request of the people,
resigned; those at Boston refused. November 28, one of the tea ships
arrived in Boston, followed not long after by two more. These were
placed under guard by the patriots. The consignees would neither resign
nor return the tea, and the time was near at hand when they would
be seized for non-payment of duties. Thursday, December 16, a large
meeting of the citizens was held at the Old South Church, at which
Josiah Quincy, Jr., spoke in words that have become historical. After
all efforts to induce Hutchinson to grant a pass for the return of the
tea (which he thought would be illegal) had proved futile, a war-whoop
was sounded at the door of the Old South, and a large company of men
disguised as Indians rushed to Griffin's wharf. Teas to the value
of £18,000 were thrown from the vessels into the sea, and the same
treatment was bestowed upon another cargo which came some weeks later.
This act, although applauded throughout the colonies, was not imitated
by them; other means were found to prevent the sale of the teas.[131]

While the news of these events was on its way to England, John Adams
signalized his zeal in the patriotic cause and evinced his faith in the
provincial constitution by leading in the impeachment of Chief-Justice
Oliver for having accepted his salary from the crown instead of the
people, in derogation of their fundamental rights.[132]

Governor Hutchinson, finding himself powerless to quell the storm,
determined to put himself in closer communication with the ministry by
going to England, but was delayed by the death of Lieutenant-Governor
Oliver, until he was finally superseded by General Gage, who arrived in
Boston May 13, 1774. As he was about to leave, he received an address,
dated May 30, approving his conduct, and signed by many respectable
Tories; but some of them were afterwards obliged by threats of popular
violence to make their recantations in the newspapers. June 1, he
sailed from Boston, and never saw his native shore again.[133] In
the mean time an account of the destruction of the teas had reached
England, and produced great indignation, which was shared to some
extent by the most ardent friends of the colonists, whose efforts to
mitigate and delay the punishment visited upon the offending people of
Boston were unavailing. On the 7th of March, the king sent a message
communicating the despatches from America; and on the 14th Lord North
brought in the Boston Port Bill, which transferred the commerce of
Boston, after the 1st of June, to Salem, but gave power to the king, in
council, to restore it, upon the return of order and full compensation
to the owners for the teas destroyed. Having passed both Houses, this
received the king's assent March 31, and took effect June 1. While
the measure was pending in the House of Lords, Lord North introduced
another bill, which provided for the appointment of councillors by the
crown, the appointment and removal by the governor of judges of the
superior courts, justices of the peace, and other minor officers, and,
with the consent of the council, of sheriffs. The governor's permission
was made necessary for the holding of town meetings, except for the
choice of officers. It was also provided by another act that offenders
and witnesses might be transported for trial to the other colonies, or
to England.[134]

These severe measures did not pass without resistance or protest by the
liberal party in Parliament. They reached Boston June 2, 1774, were
printed in the newspapers on the 3d, and soon found their way into all
the colonies, where they excited indignation against the ministry and
sympathy for the people of Boston, which was manifested by liberal
contributions for relief when afterwards the loss of business had
brought distress. If anything more was needed to arouse the anger of
New England, it was supplied by the Quebec Bill, less objectionable
to that section because it extended the bounds of Canada over regions
for which the colonies had contended, than because it perpetuated
civil and ecclesiastical institutions hateful to the descendants of
Puritans. Hutchinson thought that these severe measures would bring
the recalcitrant Bostonians to reason. But he was mistaken. The matter
had already passed from the forum of reason, and was reserved for the
arbitrament of impending war. Instead of being subdued, the spirit of
the people became more resolute.

The Boston Port Bill, designed as a punishment for the destruction of
the tea, brought ruin to the commerce of Boston, and distress to all
whose subsistence depended upon it; but its political effect was to
draw the colonies together, and that was so effectually promoted by the
vigorous action of the committee of correspondence that the idea of a
continental congress soon became general.

[Illustration: A CONTEMPORARY PRINT.

Sketched from a finely executed mezzotint, published in London in 1774.
The man thrown from his horse seems to be Gage. The original belongs to
the Boston Public Library.—ED.]

On May 26, 1774, Governor Gage informed the General Court that by
the king's command its sessions would be held at Salem from June 1st
until further orders. The court was convened at that place, and the
patriots, guided by Samuel Adams, were making arrangements for a
general congress at Philadelphia, when the governor, getting a hint of
their action, sent Flucker, the provincial secretary, with a message to
dissolve them. The secretary, however, found the door of the chamber
of the Representatives locked; and before it was opened, that body had
determined that "a committee should be appointed to meet, as soon as
may be, the committees that are or shall be appointed by the several
colonies on this continent, to consult together upon the present state
of the colonies", and had chosen James Bowdoin, Samuel Adams, John
Adams, Thomas Cushing, and Robert Treat Paine delegates thereto. Such
was the origin in Massachusetts of the first Continental Congress which
met at Philadelphia September 5, 1774.[135]

The 17th of June, the day on which delegates to the Continental
Congress were chosen, is also notable for "the Port Act" meeting in
Faneuil Hall. From the general distress among the laboring classes in
Boston the Tories had expected a reaction in favor of the ministry;
consequently a counter demonstration by the patriots was deemed
advisable. In the absence of Samuel Adams, then at Salem, John Adams
was chosen moderator, and from this time he was one of the most
conspicuous actors in the American Revolution. Joseph Warren was also
present, and active in the cause which, a year later, he consecrated
with his blood. The action of the town became widely known from a
broadside, which is here reproduced.

After the repeal of the Stamp Act and the modifying of the Townshend
act, there remained nothing to threaten seriously the pockets of
the colonists. The tea duty had been retained to save the claim
of parliamentary supremacy, which was not likely to be asserted
in any offensive way. The navigation acts must soon have given
way to a more liberal and equitable policy, and everything out of
Massachusetts—certainly out of New England—indicated that the people
were becoming tired of strife, and were ready for a return to more
cordial relations with the mother country. This was what Samuel Adams
feared, and determined to prevent. To this end nothing could have been
more efficient than his policy in respect to the teas, and nothing
more to his mind than the consequent action of Parliament. After this
a contention which had been mainly local became general. The essential
modification of the Massachusetts charter was a blow which imperilled
every colonial government, and made the cause of Massachusetts that of
every other colony,—a cause for which other colonies manifested their
sympathy not only in relieving the distress occasioned by the closing
of the port of Boston, but by uniting in declarations of their common
right to maintain the integrity of a system of government which had
been forming through many generations.

The Congress of 1774 was the inevitable result of the conduct of the
British ministry subsequent to the peace of 1763. This served only to
engender discontent in the colonies, and to strengthen the purpose
of the patriotic party to hasten a revolution which many regarded as
inevitable in time. The parliamentary government of the colonies fell
into confusion for want of a well-defined policy and a consistent
administration. But instead of such a policy, colonial affairs were
regulated by ministers as wide apart in their views as Grenville,
Rockingham, Townshend, Grafton, Shelburne, Hillsborough, Lord North,
and Earl Dartmouth. Nothing could have kept the colonies as an integral
part of the empire except some plan such as Franklin or Pownall might
have devised and Shelburne might have administered. But the colonies
were remote and but little known, and in the complication of European
affairs, and amid the contentions of parties, they received only slight
and intermittent attention from the ministry or the Parliament. No
statesman save Choiseul seems to have understood the completeness of
the change in interests which had been brought about by the extinction
of the French power in America, or the necessary advance of the
colonies under a new régime to a place among the great powers of the
world. The colonists themselves felt, rather than understood, their
relations to nationality and to the commerce of the world. This was the
time chosen by the British ministry to impose upon them the restrictive
mercantile system of Charles II.

[Illustration: BROADSIDE, JUNE 17, 1774.

The original is in the Boston Public Library. There are other
significant broadsides of about this time. On June 8th, the citizens of
Boston issued an address to their countrymen relative to the blockade
of their port, and on July 26th they adopted a letter on the blockade,
which was sent to the several towns,—both in broadside.—ED.]

It is doubtful, however, whether any policy could have rendered
permanent the subjection of the colonies, even such a nominal
subjection as that in which they had always been held. In looking
for the causes of the Revolution, it is well to discriminate between
those which were general in their effects and those which were local.
The latter had been more actively operative and of longer existence
in Massachusetts, where the Revolution began, than in any other
colony. These were interwoven with the civil and ecclesiastical
history of her people, which made them peculiarly apprehensive in
respect to threatened invasion of rights which they had secured only
by expatriation. Although the peculiar experience of Massachusetts
did not cause the Revolution, it is doubtful whether, except for that
experience, the Revolution would have occurred for some years. Nor was
resistance to the Anglican ecclesiastical pretensions, connected as
they were with the most odious features of the prerogative, confined
to New England, but made itself felt in New York and in Virginia.[136]
The general causes were the ever present and ever active strife between
parties,—the liberals and the conservatives,—arising from a diversity
of political ideas, and intensified by ambition, interest, and personal
animosities. But the proximate causes of the Revolution will be found
in that change of policy which led the ministry, at the close of a war
that had strained the colonies to the utmost, to enforce the navigation
laws, to lay taxes, to invoke the prerogative, and finally to overthrow
the government of Massachusetts, and thus to threaten the autonomy of
the people under the provincial constitutions.


CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

THE change in British colonial policy contemplated by the ministry
during the progress of the French War, and entered upon between 1763
and 1774, developed those causes of dissatisfaction which had been
intermittently operative for more than a century, and finally led to
war in 1775. In the preceding chapter I have omitted, or passed lightly
over, many incidents of the period which had no particular political
significance, and dwelt more at length on the principles and causes
which led to the Revolution. I shall pursue the same course in this
essay.

The growth and development of the colonies brought forward, in
succession, two practical questions. The first was, how far the
interests of the colonies, as appendages to the crown, but subject,
nevertheless, to an undefined parliamentary authority, could be
subordinated to the interests of the trading and manufacturing classes
in England. This was purely an economic question, and the answer to
it in England assumed the subjection of the colonies and the validity
of the mercantile system, neither of which was vigorously contested
by the colonists so long as neither was rigidly enforced. But the
question changed during the progress, and more especially at the close,
of the French War, and then became this: How far could the interests
of the colonies be subordinated to the necessities of an imperial
revenue and the political policy of an empire? Hence arose the second
question: What degree of autonomy could be allowed to the colonies, as
integral parts of the empire, entitled to its privileges and subject
to its burdens, when both were to be determined consistently with the
constitutional prerogatives of the king and the supremacy of Parliament
on the one side, and on the other with the natural and acquired rights
of the colonies?

Regarded purely as an economic question, it was a matter of
indifference to the colonists whether their pockets were depleted
by the enforcement of an old policy or by the adoption of a new
policy. The Sugar Act of 1733, if enforced, would have produced a
parliamentary tax. The Grenville Act of 1764 did no more. But the
former was intended as a regulation of trade; the latter to produce a
revenue. This difference of intent raised a constitutional question,
and it was on this constitutional question, behind which lay the real
economic question, that the patriotic party chose to fight the battle.
Grenville's Act, as an external tax, produced but little; and the Stamp
Act, as an internal tax, not a farthing.

It was, therefore, mainly on the constitutional question—of the right
to tax, rather than to throw off intolerable burdens—that people
divided into parties. As Webster said, "They went to war against a
preamble. They fought seven years against a declaration."[137] To
understand the attitude of the tories on the economic question as
well as on the constitutional question, we must consider the state of
colonial affairs which led to the Congress of 1754, and the tentative
efforts of that body to find consistent and reciprocal relations of the
colonies to the imperial government, for union, defence, and revenue.
To understand the attitude of the patriots, we must consider the
reasons of the ministry for rejecting such a union, and their efforts
to force each colony into relations to the crown and Parliament deemed
by them consistent and reciprocal, but regarded by the colonists as
subversive of their rights as Englishmen, and of their rights acquired
by charters, growth, development, and usage, which, as they justly
claimed, had become constitutional.

Though the enforcement of the navigation laws and acts of trade, at
the close of the French War, is regarded by historians as one of the
principal causes of the Revolution, I fail to find a satisfactory
or entirely accurate account of them, either as the basis of the
mercantile system, or, later, of a revenue system. Such a treatment
would hardly be practicable in the limits of a general history. These
laws have been elaborately discussed by Thomas Mun, Sir Josiah Child,
Sir William Patty, Charles Davenant, Joshua Gee, John Ashley, and, not
to mention others, Adam Smith and Henry Brougham. But these authors
wrote with reference to their influence, as part of the mercantile
system, on British interests. How they affected colonial interests is
the question which chiefly concerns us.

To answer this question we must know not merely what those laws
enacted, but to what state of colonial trade they originally and
successively applied. For instance, what, from time to time, by
development of agricultural or other industries, between 1640 and 1774,
had the colonists to sell, and what, as they increased in wealth, did
they wish to purchase; and where, left to the unrestricted course of
trade, would they have carried their products, and where purchased
their merchandise? In other words, what would they have done and become
under free trade?

Then we must know what changes in this normal condition of trade were
intended by the navigation laws, and to what extent and with what
effect their partial enforcement operated before 1763. With these facts
before us, we could estimate with some exactness the valid objections
to the new system on the part of the colonists, when enforced by the
British navy, commissioners of customs, admiralty courts, and writs of
assistance, and what was their influence in bringing on the Revolution.

Having made up the debit account, we should be able to set against
it the compensations in naval protection, bounties,[138] drawbacks,
British capital, and long credits, in developing colonial agriculture
and commerce.[139]

Unfortunately there does not exist any history of the commerce of
the American colonies, from the Commonwealth to 1774, as affected
by navigation laws, acts of trade, and revenue measures. No one who
has read the twenty-nine acts which comprise this legislation will
recommend their perusal to another; for, apart from their volume, the
construction of these acts is difficult,—difficult even to trained
lawyers like John Adams, whose business it was to advise clients
in respect to them.[140] Nor have special students, like Bancroft,
stated their effect with exact precision, as in respect to the Act of
1663;[141] and notably in respect to the Townshend Act of 1767,[142]
where his error amounts to a perversion of its meaning. Palfrey has
been more successful, though not entirely free from error.[143] The
author of the _Development of Constitutional Liberty_,[144] a work
of uncommon research and ability, reads the act of 1672 as though it
prohibited the carrying of fish from Massachusetts to Rhode Island
except by the way of England, failing to notice that it was not one
of the "enumerated articles", or that even those could pass directly
from colony to colony upon payment, at the place of export, of duties
equivalent to those laid upon their importation to England. To give a
monographic treatment to the subject would require familiarity with
the construction of statutes, and exact information not only of the
shifting conditions of colonial trade, but of the evasions which called
forth supplemental acts, or constructions of existing acts by the Board
of Trade.[145]

In Burke's _Account of the European Settlements in America_[146] much
may be found respecting colonial products and commerce, and especially
those of New England (in ch. vii.), which leaves little to be desired
concerning the sources of her wealth, and the complaints of British
merchants of the methods by which it had been acquired. But I have
found nowhere else so full and clear an account of the course of trade
of Boston at the time of the Revolution, and the effect upon it of the
enforcement of the navigation laws and acts of trade in 1770, as in an
anonymous pamphlet entitled _Observations of the Merchants at Boston in
N. E. upon Several Acts of Parliament, 1770_.[147]

An essential part of this history is that which relates to the medium
of exchange, and to the attempts of Parliament to regulate the
issue of paper money as a legal tender in the interests of British
merchants.[148]

The history of the navigation laws suggests the similarity of the
causes which led to the successive revolutions of 1689 and 1775 in
Massachusetts. The violation of these laws was a principal reason for
the abrogation of the first charter, in 1684, graphically described
by Palfrey,[149] and their enforcement by courts of admiralty, under
Dudley, Andros, and Randolph, was one cause of the overthrow of
the Andros government in 1689.[150] The resistance to the same and
additional enactments, when enforced as revenue measures, led to
the alteration of the second charter in 1774, and this again led to
revolution by the united colonies.

One of the most efficient instruments in the execution of the
navigation laws was the writs of assistance granted by the court in
Massachusetts in 1761.[151]

If the student of American history finds difficulty in accepting the
common accounts of the constitutional opinions and motives of two
fifths of the colonists, among whom were many who must be regarded as
intelligent and respectable, his doubts as to the accuracy of these
narratives receive some confirmation when he becomes familiar with the
history of the Congress of 1754, the circumstances which led to it, and
the opinions of some of its representative men. A comparison of their
views will show how far they were willing to go in the "abridgment of
English liberties", for the sake of union, defence, and government.
Franklin, Hutchinson, and Pownall formed plans for union, and all were
at Albany in 1754, and participated in the discussions, though Pownall,
not being a member, explained his views outside the congress.[152]

The difference between Pownall, Hutchinson, and Franklin was this:
that while all contemplated the union of the empire under one general
government as something dictated by the interest of all the parts,
Hutchinson limited the power of the President more than Franklin,
and Pownall was unwilling to contemplate the transfer of its seat
to America; the prospect of which gave Franklin no concern. "The
government cannot be long retained without union. Which is best, to
have a total separation, or a change of the seat of government?"[153]
Speculations as to the results of such a union are now idle, unless
for the interest drawn towards them by Professor Seeley's _Expansion
of England_, and Franklin's belief, expressed in 1789, "that if the
foregoing plan [that of 1754], or something like it, had been adopted
and carried into execution, the subsequent separation of the colonies
from the mother country might not so soon have happened, nor the
mischiefs suffered on both sides have occurred, perhaps, during another
century."[154]

A comparison of the views of such men as Franklin, Hutchinson, and
Pownall, expressed before they were forced into partisan relations to
the impending conflict, help us in forming opinions respecting their
conduct when affairs, no longer within the control of individuals, were
swept onward by an uncontrollable impulse. Neither the colonies[155]
nor the ministry approved of the proposed union; and when the new
policy of raising a revenue was inaugurated the colonies were without
defined integral relations to the mother country, and the government
without administrative machinery for their regulation. The result was
confusion. The press became heated, and an angry war of pamphlets
ensued. At first the controversy was confined to the distinction
between internal taxes and commercial regulations, but soon it involved
the whole question of parliamentary power. This was elaborately and
temperately discussed in the _Farmer's Letters_, by John Dickinson,
but nowhere in America with more fulness (within the period covered by
this chapter) than by Governor Hutchinson and the two Houses of the
Massachusetts General Court, in messages and answers respectively, in
January and February, 1773.[156]

So far as the Revolution grew out of the Massachusetts controversy
between the king's representatives and the General Court, its progress
may be traced in the _Speeches of the Governors of Massachusetts,
1765 to 1775, and the Answers of the House of Representatives to the
same_.[157] These authentic documents, with the _Journals of the House_
and the _Records of the Town of Boston_, may be referred to as showing
the temper with which the parties treated each other, and the questions
that were of paramount interest. The student will not find it easy
to ascertain the facts which should make the history of the period.
Contemporaneous accounts were generally drawn up with a partisan
disregard of truth, and too much has been written subsequently in the
same spirit. For the critical period of 1768, when the troops were sent
over on account of the revenue riots, we have Bernard's _Letters_,
which, though representing only one side, were written under a sense of
official responsibility to the government. Though much complained of
at the time as wanting in candor, their statements were evaded rather
than controverted by the _Answer of the Major Part of the Council_, in
a letter to the Earl of Hillsborough (April 15, 1769), as well as in
_The Vindication of the Town of Boston_ (Oct. 18, 1769), drafted by
Samuel Adams. For the entire period covered by this chapter, I find no
narrative apparently more just, or opinions more candidly expressed,
than in Ramsay's _History of the American Revolution_. Remote from the
scene of the conflict, Ramsay shared the passions of neither party.

The most important events of this period were the passage of the Boston
Port Bill, and other related measures. The reasons which led to these
acts are set forth at length in _The Report from the Committee on the
Disturbances in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay_, April 20, 1774.[158]
In this report may be seen the strength of the British case. Franklin's
view of the matters referred to in the Report of the Lords may be found
in a paper entitled _Proceedings in Massachusetts_,[159] and the bill
itself was discussed in an interesting pamphlet by Josiah Quincy, Jr.,
_Observations on the Act of Parliament_.[160]

Franklin's paper was a clever argument in which he treated facts so as
to serve his purpose rather than that of historic truth. His use of
Oliver's phrase, "to take off the original incendiaries", which was a
pleasant _ad hominem_ hit, has been adopted seriously by Bancroft,[161]
in a chapter entitled "A Way to Take off the Incendiaries." The
concessions which Franklin was willing to make for a settlement of
the difficulties, as late as December 4, 1774, may be seen in "Some
Special Transactions of Dr. Franklin in London, in Behalf of America",
in Ramsay.[162]

[Illustration]


EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE argument of Otis on the Writs of Assistance is the first
well-arranged expression of the gathering opposition,[163] and what
John Adams called "the heaves and throes of the burning mountain",
forerunning the eruption, were shown in James Otis's _A vindication
of the conduct of the House of Representatives of the province of
the Massachusetts-Bay; more particularly, in the last session of the
general assembly_ (Boston, 1762).[164]

John Dickinson and Joseph Galloway were already pitted against each
other on the question of maintaining the proprietary government of
Pennsylvania, or of seeking a royal one.[165]

Frothingham[166] says the earliest organized action against taxation
was when the town of Boston passed instructions to its representatives,
May 24, 1764, the original writing of which is among the Samuel Adams
MSS. The paper was printed in the newspapers of the day, and shortly
afterwards in the famous tract of Otis, _The Rights of the British
Colonies asserted and proved_,[167] in which, however, he failed, with
all his fervid and cogent reasoning, to stand in every respect by the
advanced position which he had taken in his plea against the Writs of
Assistance.[168]

[Illustration: JAMES OTIS.

After a statue of James Otis, by Crawford, in the chapel at Mount
Auburn. The usual portrait of Otis is by Blackburn, painted in 1755,
and now owned by Mrs. H. B. Rogers. The earliest engraving of it which
I have noticed is by A. B. Durand in Tudor, and again in the _Worcester
Magazine_ (1826), vol. i. It has been engraved by W. O. Jackman, J.
R. Smith, O. Pelton, and best of all by C. Schlecht, in Gay's _Pop.
Hist. U. S._, iii. 332. Cf. Loring's _Hundred Boston Orators_, and
the woodcut in the _Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 6. The earliest engraved
likeness is probably a rude cut on the title of Bickerstaff's _Almanac_
(1770), which is reproduced in Lossing's _Field-Book of the Rev._, i.
486.

There is a photograph of the house where Otis was killed by lightning
(May 28, 1783) in Bailey's _Andover_, p. 86. Cf. _Appleton's Journal_,
xi. 784. The principal detailed authority on the career of Otis (born,
1724; died, 1783) is William Tudor's _Life of James Otis_, which
Lecky, in his _England in the Eighteenth Century_ (iii. 304), calls "a
remarkable book from which I have derived much assistance." Francis
Bowen wrote the life in Sparks's _Amer. Biog._, vol. xii. John Adams
had an exalted opinion of Otis, and Otis's character receives various
touches in Adams's _Works_ (x. 264, 271, 275, 279, 280, 284, 289-295,
299, 300). Bancroft depicts him in 1768 (vol. vi. 120, orig. ed.),
but he failed rapidly later by reason of the blows he received in an
assault in Sept., 1769, provoked by him. Cf. Greene's _Hist. View_ (p.
322); D. A. Goddard in _Mem. Hist. Boston_ (iii. 140); Barry's _Mass._
(ii. 259).]

One of the ablest as well as one of the most temperate expressions of
the stand taken by the colonies was in Stephen Hopkins's _Rights of the
Colonies examined; published by Authority_ (Providence, 1765).[169]

Similar arguments were set forth in behalf of Connecticut by its
governor.[170]

Already, in 1764, when Oxenbridge Thacher printed his _Sentiments
of a British American_, he had formulated the arguments against the
navigation acts and British taxation, which ten years later, in
the Congress of 1774, Jay embodied in his Address to the British
People.[171]

John Adams, in later years, when distance clarified the atmosphere,
looked upon the conflict which Jonathan Mayhew waged with Apthorpe, and
with the abettors of all schemes for imposing episcopacy on the people
by act of Parliament, as the repelling of an attack upon the people's
right to decide such questions for themselves, and as but a forerunner
of the great subsequent question.[172]

[Illustration: JONATHAN MAYHEW.

Copied from a mezzotint engraving in the American Antiquarian Society's
possession, marked "Richard Jennys, jun., pinxt et fecit."

A portrait by Smibert, and engraved by J. B. Cipriani, is in Hollis's
_Memoirs_ (1780), p. 371; and a reëngraving has been made by H. W.
Smith. Cf. Bradford's _Life of Mayhew_; Thornton's _Pulpit of the
Rev._; _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, ii. 245, with note on his portraits.

The principal source of detailed information about Mayhew is Alden
Bradford's _Memoir of the life and writings of Jonathan Mayhew_
(Boston, 1838). Cf. Tudor's _Otis_ (ch. 10); Thomas Hollis's _Memoirs_;
Tyler's _Amer. Lit._ (ii. p. 199); touches in _John Adams's Works_ (iv.
29; x. 207, 301); and on his death, Dr. Benjamin Church's _Elegy_, Dr.
Chauncy's discourse, both in 1766, and the _Life of Josiah Quincy,
Jr._, p. 384.]

The issue on the question of taxation without representation was
forced, after many indications of its coming,[173] when the British
Parliament passed the Grenville Act in 1764, and in the next year what
is known as the Stamp Act, a tax on business papers, increasing their
cost at different rates, but sometimes manyfold.[174] The question
of the authorship of the bill is one about which there has been some
controversy,[175] and, contrary to the general impression, the truth
seems to be that the consideration of the bill caused little attention
in and out of Parliament, and the debates on it were languid.[176]

In May a knowledge of the passage of the Stamp Act reached Boston,[177]
and it was to go into effect Nov. 1st. In June the Massachusetts
legislature determined to invite a congress of all the colonies in
October. In August it was known that Jared Ingersoll for Connecticut
and Andrew Oliver for Boston had agreed to become distributors of the
stamps. The mob hanged an effigy of Oliver on the tree afterwards
known as Liberty Tree,[178] and other outrages followed. The governor
did not dare to leave the castle. Dr. Mayhew delivered a sermon,
vigorous and perhaps incendiary, as Hutchinson averred when he traced
to it the passions of the mob which destroyed his own house in North
Square on the evening of August 26th.[179] The town contented itself
with passing a unanimous vote of condemnation the next day.[180] On
Sept. 25th Bernard addressed the legislature in a tone that induced
them to reply (Oct. 25th), and to fortify their position by resolves
(Oct. 29th).[181] Finally, in December, Andrew Oliver,[182] the stamp
distributor, was forced to resign, and on the 17th to sign an oath that
he would in no way lend countenance to the tax.[183]

The spirit in Boston was but an index of the feelings throughout all
the colonies.[184] The histories of the several States and the lives of
their revolutionary actors make this clear.[185]

In October, 1765, what is known as the Stamp Act Congress assembled
in New York, in the old City Hall.[186] Its proceedings are in print,
and its deliberations are followed in the general histories and in the
lives of its members.[187]

Franklin had, with considerable opposition, been appointed the London
agent of Pennsylvania in 1764, and, being in that city, was accused by
James Biddle of promoting the passage of the Stamp Act, but his letters
show how he seems only to have yielded when he could not prevail in
opposing.[188]

In July, 1765, the Rockingham administration came in, followed by
the parliamentary sparring of Grenville and Pitt. In February, 1766,
Dr. Franklin was examined before the House of Commons as to the
temper of the colonies respecting the Stamp Act. He gave them some
good advice,[189] and a full report of the questions and answers is
preserved.[190] Parliament having passed the so-called Declaratory
Act (March 7th) in vindication of its prerogatives, Pitt and Conway
effected the repeal of the Stamp Act (March 18th), and vessels
immediately sailed to carry the news to the colonies.[191] The whole
question of taxation, thus brought squarely to an issue by the
controversy over the Stamp Act, induced frequent rehearsals of argument
in debates and pamphlet, and the later historians have summarized the
opposing views.[192]

Josiah Tucker, the Dean of Gloucester, began in 1766 a series of
tracts, which he continued for ten years, in which he advanced
sentiments respecting the colonies, not very flattering, while at the
same time he held to arguments which few at the time admitted the force
of, when he advocated the peaceful separation of America from the
crown.[193]

The most important presentation of the Tory insistence in defence
of the Stamp Act policy came directly—or, at least, through his
secretary, Charles Lloyd—from Grenville himself, in his attack on the
Rockingham party, in the _Conduct of the late Administration examined,
with Documents_.[194]

[Illustration: GEORGE THE THIRD.

Reproduction of a print in Entick's _General Hist. of the Late War_
(3d ed., 1770), iv. frontispiece. A profile likeness, showing the king
in armor, is in Murray's _Impartial History of the present War in
America_, (London, 1778).]

The movements for organization to suppress importation, which had
begun in 1765, taking shape particularly in Philadelphia in Oct.
and Nov.,[195] were brought into definite prominence by the votes
of Boston, Oct. 28, 1767,[196] copies of which were circulated in
broadside, as shown in the annexed fac-simile.[197] The influence of
these had more marked effect in England than had followed any previous
manifestations of that kind.[198]

[Illustration: PRINTED PAGE]

[Illustration: HANDBILL

Copy of a broadside in the library of the Mass. Hist. Society.]

Some other fac-similes are also given indicative of the prevailing
coercive measures, which soon became popular. The next year (1768)
committees were appointed in New York to consider the expediency of
entering into measures to encourage industry and frugality and to
employ the poor, and by 1769 the movement looking to independence of
the British manufacturers became general through the colonies.[199]

[Illustration: FROM EDES AND GILL'S NORTH AMERICAN ALMANACK, 1770.]

In February, 1768, the Massachusetts House of Representatives, by
a circular letter addressed to the other colonies, invited them to
consultation.[200] It drew from Hillsborough a circular letter of
warning to the continent,[201] and in May Virginia issued a letter
inviting a conference.[202] On June 10, 1768, the seizure of the sloop
"Liberty" brought further riotous proceedings in its train.[203]

[Illustration: PROSCRIBING AN IMPORTER.

After an original handbill in the Mass. Hist. Soc. library.]

What is known as the "War of the Regulators", or "Regulation", a series
of riotous disturbances in North Carolina, 1768-1771, has usually been
held to be one of the preliminary uprisings against British oppression.
A. W. Waddell, in a paper in the _N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._ (1871,
p. 81), contends that it was nothing but a lawless outburst, and
advances evidence to prove that the participants were but a small
majority of the people, with no great principle in view; that they were
ignorant, never republicans, became Tories, and were opposed by the
prominent Whig leaders. He considers that Caruthers and other local
historians[204] are responsible for the common misconception arising
from their attempt to reflect credit on North Carolina for what is
claimed to be an early patriotic fervor.

[Illustration: LANDING OF THE TROOPS IN BOSTON, 1768.

Fac-simile of an engraving by Paul Revere, which appeared in _Edes and
Gill's North American Almanack_, Boston, 1770. It is reëngraved in S.
G. Drake's _Boston_, p. 747, and in S. A. Drake's _Old Landmarks of
Boston_, p. 119. KEY: 1, The "Beaver", 14 guns; 2, "Senegal", 14; 3,
"Martin", 10; 4, "Glasgow", 20; 5, "Mermaid", 28; 6, "Romney", 50; 7,
"Launaston", 40; 8, "Bonetta", 10.

Revere also engraved a large copperplate of the same event, which is
given in heliotype fac-simile, on different scales, in the _Boston
Evacuation Memorial_ (p. 18) and _Mem. Hist. of Boston_ (ii. 532). Cf.
also Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 356; Dearborn's _Boston Notions_,
126, etc. The same view of the town was again used by Revere, but
extended farther south, in a cut in the _Royal American Mag._ (1774),
which is given in fac-simile in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, ii. 441.
There is also a water-color mentioned in _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, 2d
ser., ii. 156. On Revere as an engraver, see W. S. Baker's _American
Engravers_, Philad., 1875, and the list in _N. E. Hist. and Gen. Reg._,
1886, p. 204.

In Sept. (dated 14th) the selectmen of Boston sent a circular to the
other towns, calling a convention (_Boston Rec. Com. Rept._, xvi. 263)
to consider the declaration of Bernard "that one or more regiments
may soon be expected in this province" (original broadside in Mass.
Hist. Soc., _Misc. MSS._, 1632-1795). It is printed and explained in
that society's _Proceedings_, iv. 387. The convention sat from Sept.
22d to 29th. On the 30th, in the early morning, the British fleet
took soundings along the water-front, and in the afternoon a number
of war-ships came up from the lower harbor and anchored with springs
on their cables. On Oct. 1st the landing took place. The news spread
through the land, and the irritation was increased. (Cf. _Mass. Hist.
Soc. Proc._, xx. 9; Barry, _Mass._, ii. 370; Loring, _Boston Orators_,
75; _Franklin's Works_, vii. 418.)

The question of the expense of quartering troops had been raised by
Massachusetts and New York in 1767 (Hutchinson, iii. 168), and a letter
of Gage on the subject is in the Shelburne Papers, vol. li. (_Hist.
MSS. Com. Rept._, v. 219). Cf. Hillsborough to Governor Franklin in _N.
J. Archives_, x. p. 12. The message of the Assembly to Bernard, praying
for their removal (May 31, 1769), is in Hutchinson (iii. App. 497).]

A contemporary vindication of the movement, and of Herman Husband,
the leader, bringing the history of the commotions down to 1769 only,
evidently based on material furnished by Husband, was printed in Boston
in 1771.[205] Husband himself seems, during the preceding year, to
have printed anonymously, giving no place of publication, a narrative
of his own, fortified by the letters of Tryon and others, with the
remonstrances and counter-statements.[206]

[Illustration:

This cut from Nathaniel Ames's _Astronomical diary or Almanack_, 1772,
Boston, is inscribed "The Patriotic American Farmer, J-N D-K-NS-N,
Esq., Barrister-at-Law, who with Attic Eloquence and Roman spirit hath
asserted the liberties of the British Colonies in America." Cf. Scharf
and Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 276.

C. W. Peale's portrait of Dickinson (1770) was engraved by I. B.
Forrest. Cf. _Catal. of Gallery of Penna. Hist. Soc._ (1872), no. 161;
Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 476.

On Dickinson's influence, see "The great American essayist" in the
_Mag. of Amer. Hist._, Feb., 1882, p. 117; Sept., 1883, p. 223; Read's
_Life of George Read_, 49, 79; Wells's _Adams_, ii. 38; Quincy's
_Josiah Quincy, Jr._, 104; Green's _Hist. View_, 370; Lossing's
_Field-Book_, i. 476. Cf. letters of Dickinson in _Mem. Hist. Boston_,
iii. 22; Lee's _Life of A. Lee_, ii. 293, 296, etc.]

The most conspicuous presentation of the American side in 1768 were
the famous _Farmer's Letters_, as they were usually called, of John
Dickinson.[207]

Some of the most important of the documents of the Boston patriots
were printed in London under the supervision of Thomas Hollis, long a
devoted friend of the colonists.[208]

During 1768 and 1769 we find record of the workings of political
sentiments in the colonies in abundant publications.[209]

The most important development in 1769 came from some letters which had
been addressed by Governor Bernard and General Gage to the ministry,
and to which, in the exercise of his rights as a member of Parliament,
Alderman Beckford had obtained access and taken copies, subsequently
delivered by him to Bollan, who transmitted them to Boston, where they
were at once printed. From these letters the public learned of the
urgency which the governor had used with the government to induce it to
institute more stringent measures of repression.[210]

The publication of these letters led to the printing of _An appeal to
the world; or a vindication of the town of Boston, from many false
and malicious aspersions contain'd in certain letters and memorials,
written by Governor Bernard, General Gage [etc.]. Published by order of
the town_ (Boston, 1769),[211] and induced also a letter to the Earl of
Hillsborough.[212]

[Illustration: WILLIAM LIVINGSTON.

Fac-simile of the engraving in Sedgwick's _Life of William Livingston_.
Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 330.]

There are in the _Sparks MSS._ (no. xx.) copies of annotations which
Franklin, then in London, made on the margins and fly-leaves of sundry
pamphlets, which just at this time were engaging attention in London,
and these comments show how the struggle was regarded by a mind of
Franklin's astuteness, amid the influences of the British capital.
Sparks printed parts of these annotations in his _Familiar letters and
miscellaneous pieces by Dr. Franklin_, and again in his edition of
_Franklin_, vol. iv.[213] Some letters which passed between Franklin
and William Strahan in 1769 are also of great interest.[214]

The Boston Massacre of March, 1770, was the violent culmination of
prevailing passions, and was in a measure induced by the sacrifice of
life which resulted from the boarding by a press-gang from the "Rose"
frigate of a ship belonging to Hooper, of Marblehead,[215] and by the
riotous proceedings which, in Jan., 1770, brought about the death
of the boy Snider.[216] Soon after the affray of March, the town of
Boston published a _Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre in Boston_
(Boston, Edes and Gill, 1770),[217] which depicted the condition
of the people at the time, and gave an appendix of depositions,
including one of Jeremy Belknap.[218] Copies were sent to England at
once,[219] but the rest of the edition was kept back till after the
trial, when "Additional Observations" were appended.[220] The volume,
thus completed, was reprinted in New York in 1849, with notes and
illustrations by John Daggett, Jr.; and again in Frederick Kidder's
_History of the Boston Massacre_ (Albany, 1870), which is the most
considerable monograph on the subject.[221]

[Illustration: FROM BICKERSTAFF'S BOSTON ALMANAC, 1769.

This song was written by John Dickinson, with some assistance from Dr.
Arthur Lee, and was sent (printed in the _Penna. Chronicle_, July 4,
1768) by Dickinson from Philadelphia to Otis, accompanied by a letter
dated July 4, 1768. It was sung to the tune "Hearts of Oak", and was
made conspicuous in Boston by being sung at Liberty Hall and the
Greyhound Tavern in Aug., 1768. It had been reprinted in the _Boston
Gazette_, July 18th. An amended copy, "the first being rather too
bold", was given in the _Penna. Chronicle_ July 11th. In September it
appeared as a broadside, with the music. Edes and Gill's _Almanac_, in
reprinting it in 1770, says it is "now much in vogue in North America."
(Cf. Tudor's _Life of Otis_, pp. 322, 501; Moore's _Songs and Ballads
of the Rev._, p. 37; Drake's _Town of Roxbury_, p. 166; _Mem. Hist. of
Boston_, iii. p. 131.)

A parody appeared in the _Boston Gazette_, Sept. 26, 1768 (Moore, p.
41). This parody gave rise to the "Massachusetts Song of Liberty",
which is given in Edes and Gill's _Almanac_ (1770), as well as in
Bickerstaff, under the full title of _The Parody parodized, or the
Massachusetts Liberty Song_. It has been ascribed to Mrs. Mercy Warren.
(Cf. Moore, p. 44; Lossing, _Field-Book of the Rev._, i. 487.) The
_Almanac_ (Edes and Gill) of 1770 also contains "A new Song composed by
a Son of Liberty and sung by Mr. Flagg at Concert Hall, Boston, Feb.
13, 1770."]

A stenographic report was made of the trial of Preston, and sent to
England, but it has never been published.[222]

The trial of eight of the soldiers took place Nov. 27, 1770, and John
Hodgson,[223] the stenographer of the earlier trial, made a Report,
_The trial of William Wemms, ... published by permission of the Court_
(Boston, 1770),[224] which gives the evidence and pleas of counsel,
and a report of the trial of Edward Manwaring and others, accused of
firing on the crowd from the windows of the custom-house. They were
acquitted.[225] [Illustration: FROM BICKERSTAFF'S BOSTON ALMANAC,
1770.]

[Illustration: PART OF INSTRUCTIONS TO BOSTON REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 15,
1770.

The original draft of these instructions, in the handwriting of Josiah
Quincy, Jr., is among the Quincy MSS. in the cabinet of the Mass.
Hist. Society. This is a reproduction of the last page, showing the
signatures of Richard Dana and of Cooper, the town clerk.]

The principal statement on the government side was _A Fair Account of
the late unhappy disturbance at Boston, extracted from the depositions
that have been made concerning it by persons of all parties, with an
appendix containing affidavits and evidences not mentioned in the
narrative that has been published at Boston_ (London, 1770).[226]
This _Fair Account_ contained a deposition of Secretary Andrew
Oliver, tending to show that the soldiers were justifiably defending
themselves; and making public the doings of the governor's council
thereupon. This "breach of a most essential privilege" excited
animadversion, and the council censured Oliver.[227] The purport of the
English presentations is to show that the soldiers did not fire till
duly provoked by assaults, and the more candid American writers, like
Ramsay, Abiel Holmes, Hildreth, and others, seem to allow this.[228]

Bancroft (orig. ed., vi. 347) has a long note on the evidence about
the provocation and first assault. He gives ten reasons for thinking
Preston gave orders to fire, and six reasons for thinking the
provocation was not sufficient to justify the firing. The evidence in
this form is omitted in the final revision of Bancroft.

The anniversary of the Massacre was observed in Boston till the
struggle for Independence was passed, and a series of annual orations
commemorates the continued and aroused feelings of the people.[229]

The appendix to the third volume of Hutchinson's _History_ records
the sparring of Hutchinson and the legislature during the next six
months.[230]

The list of Haven in Thomas (ii. 606) gives the American tracts
published in 1770; but the more significant ones of the year appeared
in London.[231]

The year 1771 was less eventful. In England, it seemed for a while as
if the worst had passed. W. S. Johnson had written at the close of
the preceding year (Dec. 29, 1770), "The general American controversy
is at present looked upon here as very much at an end."[232]
Franklin had been made the agent for Massachusetts;[233] he was
still putting tersely to his correspondents the American view of the
controversy,[234] and he had a conference with Hillsborough.[235]

Hutchinson in March had succeeded to the governor's chair, with
reluctance, as he professed.[236] The American tracts may be gleaned in
Haven's list.[237]

The events of 1772 are of more interest. The Boston patriots emphasized
their arguments in their instructions to their representatives in
May.[238] Later (July 14th) they passed a remonstrance against taxation
and sent it to the king.[239]

[Illustration:

NOTE.—The annexed cut is part of a handbill in the library of the
Mass. Hist. Society.]

There are diverse views as to the originator of the committees of
correspondence. Gordon's opinion (i. 312) that James Warren was the
instigator was adopted by Marshall, but is held by Bancroft (vi.
428) to be erroneous. John Adams gave the first movement to Samuel
Adams.[240] One of the first-fruits of the committee, as a provincial
measure, was the report drafted by Samuel Adams (Nov. 2, 1772), which
was printed as the _Rights of the Colonies_.[241] The vote passed by
Virginia, March 12, 1773, was the immediate cause of intercolonial
activity.[242]

The seizure and destruction of the revenue vessel Gaspee in
Narragansett Bay, June 10, 1772, is considered by Rhode Island writers
as the earliest aggressive conduct of the patriots. John Russell
Bartlett,[243] in the _R. I. Colonial Records_ (vol. vii. pp. 57-192),
gathers all the documentary evidence, and this was in 1861 published
separately as _A History of the Destruction of his Britannic Majesty's
Schooner Gaspee ... accompanied by the Correspondence connected
therewith; the action of the General Assembly of Rhode Island thereon,
and the official journal of the ... Commission of Inquiry appointed by
King George III._[244]

Early in 1773 the patriots of Boston produced what is called "the most
elaborate state paper of the Revolutionary contest in Massachusetts."
This is the reply of the House of Representatives to the governor in
the contest then waging with him.[245]

The act which included the duty on tea had passed Parliament June 29,
1767, and in March, 1770, it had been repealed, except, in order to
maintain the theoretical right of Parliament to tax, the tax on tea had
been retained in force. Pownall[246] had exerted his utmost to make the
repeal include tea. The test was deferred till it was announced[247]
that the East India Company was assisted by government in sending over
a surplus of tea which they had. A series of impassioned gatherings in
Boston, and demonstrations not so boisterous in the other colonies, led
to the destruction of the tea in Boston harbor, and elsewhere resulted
in the transshipment of the tea whence it came.[248]

[Illustration: A BOSTON WARNING.

After an original in the Mass. Hist. Society.]

[Illustration: A PHILADELPHIA POSTER.

After an original in the library of the Pennsylvania Hist. Society.]

Another significant event of 1773 was the episode of the Hutchinson
letters. They had been written (1767-1769), from Boston, to Thomas
Whately, and came, after the latter's death (June, 1772), by some
unknown means, into Franklin's hands. When Cushing[249] and the
patriots printed them,—for the rumor of their existence led the
"people abroad" to compel their publication,[250]—Franklin made no
complaint, and bore with reserve the defamation which was visited
upon him in England, and which is still repeated by later English
writers,[251] Franklin finally prepared a statement in vindication,
but it was not published till Temple Franklin printed his edition
of _Franklin's Works_.[252] The letters were printed without any
indication of Franklin's connection with them; but when a duel grew
out of the publication, in which a brother of Whately was wounded
by Mr. Temple,[253] who had been accused of purloining the letters,
Dr. Franklin, to prevent a further meeting, published a note in the
_Public Advertiser_, acknowledging his agency.[254] Sparks appends a
note in his edition,[255] in which he refutes the claim of Dr. Hosack
(_Biographical Memoir of Dr. Hugh Williamson_, 1820) that Williamson
had been the medium of transmitting the letters.[256]

Mr. R. C. Winthrop, in discussing the question,[257] introduces a
paper of George Bancroft, "Whence came the papers sent by Franklin to
Cushing in his letter of Dec. 2, 1772?" Bancroft's conclusion is that
Whately sent the letters to Grenville (who died Nov. 13, 1770), and
they were found among his papers, and through some agency or consent of
Temple passed into Franklin's hand.[258]

[Illustration: QUINCY'S DEDICATION.

This is the original draft of the dedication to Quincy's tract on the
Port Bill, the MS. of which is among the Quincy MSS. in the cabinet of
the Mass. Hist. Society. Its full title is _Observations on the act of
parliament commonly called the Boston port-bill; with thoughts on civil
society and standing armies_ (Boston, 1774; Philad., 1774; London,
1774. It is reprinted in the _Life of Josiah Quincy, Jr._ Cf. Sabin,
xvi. 67,192, etc.)]

The letters, when laid before the Massachusetts Legislature, produced
some resolutions (June 25, 1773),[259] followed by a petition to the
king,[260] asking that Hutchinson and Oliver might be removed from
office. This led to the presence of Franklin before the Privy Council,
and the attack on Franklin's character by Wedderburn.[261]

[Illustration: THE QUINCY MANSION.

After a water-color painted by Miss Eliza Susan Quincy in 1822. The
house was built in 1770, by the father of the patriot, Josiah Quincy,
Jr. The original sketch is among the Quincy MSS. in the Mass. Hist.
Soc. cabinet. Cf. cut in _Appleton's Journal_, xiv. 161. Of Josiah
Quincy, Jr., there was an engraving made in his lifetime, which was
held to be a good likeness, and from this, and with the family's
assistance, Stuart, fifty years after Quincy's death, painted the
picture which is engraved in the _Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 37.]

[Illustration: HEADING OF A HANDBILL.

Fac-simile of the top portion of an original broadside in Mass. Hist.
Society's library. The bills were that for the impartial administration
of justice, and that for better regulating the government of the
province of Massachusetts Bay.]

The earliest significant movement in 1774 was the impeachment
of Peter Oliver, chief justice, and younger brother of the late
lieutenant-governor, for receiving his salary from the crown,—the
controversy respecting the governor and other officers being thus made
independent of the people, having been one which had been active for
two years past.[262]

Gen. Gage had landed in Boston May 17th, to put in force, June 1st,
what is known as the Boston Port Bill (approved March 31, 1774), or _An
Act to discontinue, in such manner, and for such time as are therein
mentioned, the landing and discharging, lading or shipping, of goods,
wares, and merchandise, at the town, and within the harbour of Boston,
in the province of Massachuset's Bay, in North America_.[263]

While Salem and Marblehead were thus made chief ports of entry, the
commerce of Boston was suddenly checked, and the town was forced to a
dependence for succor upon other towns and other colonies.[264]

The effect of the measures on the other colonies was instant and
widespread.[265]

One of the immediate results in Massachusetts because of these
oppressive acts was a retaliatory "Solemn League and Covenant" agreed
upon in the provincial assembly,—a combination made more or less
effectual by the active agency of Boston and Worcester in issuing
broadsides against the use of imported British goods.[266]


In July, 1774, close upon his arrival in London, Hutchinson held an
interview with the king, and set forth his opinions of the condition of
affairs in the colonies.[267]

In August, 1774, Gage received the two acts mentioned in the annexed
fac-simile of a handbill.[268]

It is claimed by Dawson[269] that the movements of 1774 in New York
Were precipitated by the merchants and their adherents, "aristocratic
smugglers", who formally organized themselves in May, 1774; and it was
on the 6th of July that Alexander Hamilton made his stirring appeal at
"the great meeting in the fields."[270] Further south a similar spirit
prevailed.[271]

[Illustration: HANDBILL.

Fac-simile of an original in the library of the Mass. Hist. Society,
where is another, dated Sept. 2, 1774, quoting this, and including an
address by Gen. Brattle to the public, deprecating the current belief
that his action in writing that letter was inimical to the cause. Cf.
H. Stevens's _Catal._ (1870), no. 261. See on this mater John Andrews's
diary in _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, viii. 351, 354.]


The question of originating the Congress of 1774 is one upon which
there has been some controversy. It seems evident that the first
proposal for a congress for general purposes was in a vote of
Providence, R. I., May 17, 1774.[272] Cushing of Massachusetts and Dr.
Franklin appear to have exchanged views on the subject in 1773.[273]
Hancock seems to have suggested a congress in March, 1774.[274] In May
the Sons of Liberty in New York formally proposed a Congress.[275] A
resolution of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, June 17th,
looked towards one, and similar action took place in the House of
Burgesses in Virginia.[276]

[Illustration]

The Congress opened with a concession of the New England members, when
Samuel Adams proposed the Episcopalian Duché for chaplain.[277] John
Adams tells how the scheme of the Congress struck him,[278] and we
learn from him something of the appearance and bearing of an assembly,
where the "Tories were neither few nor feeble", and the political
feelings were far from being in unison. "One third Whigs, another
Tories, the rest mongrel", he says.[279] Franklin thought that only
unanimity and firmness could conduce to any good effect from it.[280]

For the local feeling in Philadelphia and among the members assembled
there at the time, see John Adams's diary, Ward's diary,[281] and
Christopher Marshall's diary.

The original edition of the _Journal of the Proceedings of the Congress
held in Philadelphia, Sept. 5, 1774_ (Philad., 1774), bore the earliest
device of the colonies, twelve hands grasping a column based on Magna
Charta, surmounted by a liberty cap with the motto _Hanc tuemur_.[282]

What we know of the debates, apart from the proceedings, is chiefly
derived from some brief notes by John Adams.[283]

The Congress put forth a Declaration of Rights, and a draft of it
is preserved in a hand thought to be that of Major Sullivan, of New
Hampshire. Wells (_Sam. Adams_, ii. 234) thinks that Samuel Adams had a
hand in it, as it resembles the pamphlet issued by the Boston Committee
of Correspondence in 1772. The original draft of it, with the final
form, is given in the _Works of John Adams_,[284] who claimed the
authorship of article iv.

The petition of Congress to the king was drafted by John
Dickinson.[285] It was signed in duplicate, and both copies were
successively sent to Franklin, one of which is in the Public Record
Office, and the other, retained by Franklin, is among the Franklin MSS.
in the library of the Department of State at Washington.[286]

The petition to the king was first printed in London by Becket in
_Authentic Papers from America, submitted to the dispassionate
consideration of the public_ (London, 1775). This produced a card
(Jan. 17, 1775) from Bollan, Franklin, and Arthur Lee, calling the
copy of the petition "surreptitious as well as materially and grossly
erroneous" (_Sparks Catal._, p. 84).

It is sometimes said that R. H. Lee, and sometimes that John Jay,
wrote the "Address to the People of Great Britain" which the Congress
adopted.[287] They also passed a "Memorial to the inhabitants of the
colonies."[288]

On the 9th of September the people of Boston and the neighborhood met
outside the limits of the town, and passed a paper, drawn up by Joseph
Warren, more extreme and less dignified than was demanded, known as
the "Suffolk Resolves",[289] and this was transmitted to the Congress,
where, when the Resolves were read, as John Adams says, there were
tears in the Quaker eyes. Jones[290] says that the loyalists had joined
the Congress to help in claiming redress for grievances, but that the
approval of these Resolves rendered their continuance with the Congress
in its measures impossible. Hutchinson[291] says that when the Resolves
were known in England, they were more alarming than anything which had
yet been done.[292]

On Sept. 28th Joseph Galloway introduced his plan of adjustment,
calling for a grand council to act in conjunction with Parliament in
regulating the affairs of the colonies. The scheme was finally rejected
by a vote of six colonies to five, after having allured many of the
leading men to its support.[293]

The Congress, Oct. 20th, adopted the Articles of Association, pledging
in due time the country to non-importation, non-exportation, and
non-consumption, so as to sever completely all commercial relations
with England.[294]

In the summer of 1774 the British Parliament had, after some
opposition, passed what is known as the "Quebec Bill", restoring the
old French law in the civil courts of Quebec, securing rights to the
Catholic inhabitants, and extending the limits of that province south
of Lake Erie as far as the Ohio.[295]

[Illustration: CONGRESS OF 1774.]

The debates[296] in Parliament caused much diversity of opinion, and
gave rise to a number of pamphlets.[297] The Congress of 1774 sought
to counteract this action by an address to the inhabitants of Quebec,
which was distributed both in English and French.[298]

[Illustration]

Pownall in London told Hutchinson that every step of the Congress was
known to the ministry.[299] We know that Dartmouth, probably through
Galloway, received accounts of the temper of the delegates,[300] and
that Joseph Reed was in communication with Dartmouth at the time.[301]

The revolutionary measures advocated by the Congress were far from
receiving general acceptance,[302] and in New York they elicited some
sharp and vigorous controversial pamphlets.[303] It was the general
opinion at the time that Samuel Seabury was the author of two of the
ablest of these tracts, though the claims for their authorship are now
divided between Seabury and Isaac Wilkins, while each may have assisted
the other in a joint production[304] which rendered at this time the
name of a "Westchester Farmer" famous.[305]

[Illustration: JOSIAH QUINCY'S DIARY.

This is reproduced from a page of the diary of Josiah Quincy, Jr.,
which was kept while he was in London in 1774. It is the beginning of
his description of an interview with Lord North. The original diary is
among the Quincy MSS. in the cabinet of the Mass. Hist. Society. Quincy
had sailed from Salem Sept. 28, 1774, and was not averse to having the
Tories think that he was going for his health; but Gage seemed to have
had a suspicion that about this time somebody was going over with bad
designs (P. O. Hutchinson, 296). We learn from the same source (p.
301) that North thought his interviewer was "a bad, insidious man,
designing to be artful without abilities to conceal his design",—a
view that Hutchinson no doubt had helped the minister to form. With
Quincy's spirit, we can imagine how North's warning that there must
be submission before reconciliation would be taken. There was some
suspicion also that Quincy was making observations upon Franklin to
discern how far that busy genius could be trusted. Franklin seems to
have satisfied him, and on his homeward voyage Quincy dictated to a
sailor the report to the patriots that he had every reason to fear
he would not live to deliver in person, as indeed he did not. It is
preserved, and printed in his _Life_, where will be found his journal
kept in London. Joseph Reed's letters to him, while in London, are in
_The Life of Joseph Reed_, i. 85, etc. Quincy made out lists in London
of the friends and foes of America among the merchants. Cf. letter of
William Lee, April 6, 1775, in _Sparks MSS._, xlix. vol. ii.]

Another leading Tory writer at this time was Dr. Myles Cooper, the
president of King's College, who was as sharply assailed for his
_Friendly Address_[306] as the "Westchester Farmer" was.

Something of an official character belongs to _A true state of
the proceedings in the Parliament of Great Britain, and in ...
Massachusetts Bay, relative to the giving and granting the money of the
people of that province, and of all America, in the House of Commons,
in which they are not represented_ (London, 1774), for Franklin is said
to have furnished the material for it, and Arthur Lee to have drafted
it.[307]

One of the most significant of the American tracts of 1774 was John
Dickinson's _Essay on the constitutional power of Great Britain over
the colonies in America_.[308]

The journals of the provincial congress of Massachusetts (1774-1775)
are in the _Mass. Archives_ (vol. cxl.), and have been printed as
_Journal of each Provincial Congress of Mass. 1774-75, and of the Com.
of Safety, with an Appendix_ (Boston, 1838). The proceedings of the
session of Nov. 10, 1774, were circulated in a broadside.

In England we have the debates of Parliament, such correspondence as is
preserved, and the records of passing feeling, to help us understand
the condition of public opinion.[309]

The Assembly of New York met in January, 1775. Dawson contends that
the usual view of the loyal element controlling its action is not
sustained by the facts, and that in reality neither patriot nor Tory
was satisfied with its action.[310]

The feeling in Virginia is depicted in Giradin's continuation
of Burk's _Virginia_ (which was written under the cognizance of
Jefferson), in Rives's _Madison_, and in Wirt's _Patrick Henry_.[311]

[Illustration: LORD NORTH.

From Murray's _Impartial History of the Present War_, i. 96. Cf.
_London Mag._ (1779, p. 435) for another contemporary engraving.]

The Congress of 1775 met in Philadelphia, May 10th. Quebec had been
invited to send delegates.[312] Lieut.-Gov. Colden kept the majority
of the New York Assembly from sending delegates.[313] John Hancock was
chosen president, May 24th.[314]

The proceedings are given in the _Journals of Congress_.[315]

Perhaps the best expression of argumentative force on both sides was
reached in the controversy waged by John Adams against Jonathan Sewall,
as he always supposed, but in reality against Daniel Leonard, of
Taunton, as it has since been made evident.[316]

[Illustration: CHATHAM.

From the title of _Bickerstaff's Boston Almanac_ for 1772,—the common
popular picture of him. Cf. the head in _Gentleman's Mag._, March, 1770.

In 1768, Edmund Jennings of Virginia, being in London, and seeking,
probably unsuccessfully, to get a portrait of Camden for some
"gentlemen of Westmoreland County" who had subscribed for that purpose,
contented himself with commissioning young "Peele, of Maryland", then
in London, to make a picture of Chatham, following "an admirable bust
by Wilton, much like him, though different from the common prints."
Jennings presented it to R. H. Lee in a letter dated Nov. 15, 1768, and
the _Virginia Gazette_ of April 20, 1769, says it had just arrived. The
picture was placed in Stratford Hall, Lee's house, but was transferred
to the Court-House of Westmoreland in 1825, or thereabouts. In 1847 it
was transferred to the State of Virginia, and placed in the chamber
of the House of Delegates in Richmond, where it now is. It represents
Chatham "in consular habit, speaking in defence of American liberty."
Cf. _Va. Hist. Reg._, i. p. 68; _Richmond Despatch_, Sept. 26, 1886.
There is an engraving of Hoare's portrait of Chatham, representing him
sitting and holding a paper, given in fac-simile in _Mag. of Amer.
Hist._, Feb., 1887. On the statue of Pitt at Charleston, S. C., see
_Mag. of Amer. History_, viii. 214. For medals, see account by W. S.
Appleton in _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, xi. 299. D'Auberteuil, in his
_Essais_, ii. 93, gives a curious picture of Pitt in Parliament on
crutches, with more gout in his features than in his legs. Cf. Doyle's
_Official Baronage_, i. 359.]

One of the most powerful pleas for conciliation was made in Richard
Price's _Observations on the nature of civil liberty ... and the
justice and policy of the war with America_ (London, 1776, in six
editions, at least; Boston, 1776, etc.).[317]

[Illustration: DR. PRICE.

From the _London Magazine_, May, 1776 (p. 227). "Published by R.
Baldwin, June 1, 1776."]

For the mutations and progress of opinion in England at this time we
may follow Bancroft (orig. ed., vol. viii.) and Smyth (_Lectures_, nos.
31-33), and the latter compares the expressions of this progress as
recorded in Ramsay and the _Annual Register_.[318]

[Illustration]

For the aspects of political leadership in Parliament during 1775-76,
and the struggles in debates, see the _Parliamentary History_ and the
_Amer. Archives_,[319] and we may offset among the general histories
the Tory sympathies of Adolphus (_England_, ii. ch. 24) with the
liberal tendencies of Massey (_Hist. of England_), but the lives of
the principal leaders bring us a little nearer to the spirits of the
hour.[320]

During 1775 Franklin in London was maintaining his correspondence with
his American friends,[321] and conferring with Chatham upon plans of
conciliation,[322] and discussing the ways of compromise with Lord and
Lady Howe.[323]



CHAPTER II.

THE CONFLICT PRECIPITATED.

BY JUSTIN WINSOR,

_The Editor_.


"YOU must be firm, resolute, and cautious; but discover no marks
of timidity", wrote one from London to James Bowdoin, February 20,
1774.[324] Firm, resolute, cautious, but bold! This was the impelling
spirit of the hour. Hutchinson was at the same time writing to
Dartmouth that anarchy was likely to increase, till point after
point was carried, and every tie of allegiance was severed.[325]
Indications were increasing that the conflict of argument and the
burst of political passion were before long to give way to the trial
of force, and to the inevitable severing of friends which a resort to
arms would entail. All this was prefigured on the first of June, 1774,
when Hutchinson, bearing with him the addresses of his admirers,[326]
left his house on Milton Hill forever, and walked along the road,
bidding his neighbors good-bye at their gates; when, as he approached
Dorchester Neck, he got into his carriage, which had followed him, and
was driven to the point, where he took boat, was conveyed to a frigate,
and in a short time was passing out by Boston light, leaving behind the
line of ships at their moorings, which, with shotted guns, marked the
beginning of the Boston blockade. That severing of friends and that
threat of war was at that moment, away off in Virginia, accompanied
by the tolling of bells out of sympathy for Boston. The Massachusetts
yeomanry had not yet openly seized the musket, but their tribune, Sam.
Adams, a few days later, turned the key upon the governor's secretary
in Salem, when that officer was sent to dissolve the assembly. It was
then that Adams and his associates proceeded to pass votes, with no
intention of submitting them to the executive approval,—the beginning
of the end, which we have seen Hutchinson but a few months before had
anticipated. Between the upper and the nether mill-stone, between the
patriots of Massachusetts and the Tories of Parliament, the charter
of William and Mary was rapidly crushed. Parliament determined that
all power should come from them, and the province leaders determined
otherwise. So the distribution of authority provided under the charter
ceased. The rival powers in and around Boston could not long abstain
from force. Each watched the other, in the hopes of a pretext to be
beforehand, without being the aggressor.

[Illustration]

On the first of July, 1774, when Hutchinson, in London, was convincing
the king that the ministry's aggressive measure was going to bring the
recalcitrant Bostonians to terms, Admiral Graves, in his flag-ship,
was entering Boston harbor, and new regiments soon followed in their
transports. Presently one could count thirty ships of war at their
moorings before the town, and the morning drum-beats summoned to the
roll-call strong garrisons at Castle William, in Boston itself, and
at Salem, now the capital. It was known that arms were stopped, if
any one tried to carry them from Boston; and it soon became evident
to Gage that it was best to concentrate his force, for he removed his
headquarters from Danvers[327] to Boston, and thither his two regiments
followed him. Perhaps he had heard of the enthusiasm of a certain young
officer, whom he had seen twenty years before, saving all that was
saved, on Braddock's bloody day; and how, surviving for the present
crisis, he had just declared, in distant Virginia, that he was ready
to raise, subsist, and march a thousand men to Boston. Gage must have
known George Washington quite as well as the Bostonians did, who were,
it is to be feared, better prepared on their part to look upon Israel
Putnam, as he marched into town from Connecticut with a drove of sheep
for the hungered populace, as a greater hero than the Virginian colonel.

September came in, and it did not look as if the conflict could be put
off longer.[328] On the first of that month Gage sent a detachment to
the Powder House beyond Quarry Hill, in the present Somerville, and it
brought away ammunition and cannon and took them to the castle.

[Illustration: NOTICE OF THE COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE.

From an original in the volume of _Proclamations_, etc., in the library
of the Mass. Hist. Society.]

News of the inroad spread, and on the next day crowds gathered
in Cambridge with arms in their hands. They assembled before
Lieutenant-Governor Oliver's house[329] and forced him to resign.
Joseph Warren, in Boston, heard of the tumult and hastened to the spot.
His influence prevailed, and the sun went down without the shedding of
blood. It was ominous, however, to Gage, and he set to work rebuilding
the old lines across Boston Neck, and constructing barracks. He soon
encountered difficulties. Somehow laborers could not be hired, nor
provisions be bought. Somehow his freight-barges sunk, his carts of
straw got on fire, his wagons were sloughed; and somehow, with all his
vigilance, a few young men made up for the loss of the powder-house
pieces by stealthily carrying off by night some cannon from
Boston,[330] besides some others from an old battery in Charlestown.
It was soon found that the men on the Neck lines needed protection,
and Admiral Graves tried to send up a sloop of war into the South bay
to enfilade the road from Roxbury, if occasion came; but her draught
was too much, and so he employed an armed schooner. By November the
works were finished. Warren thought them as formidable as Gage could
make them, but the old Louisbourg soldiers laughed at them and called
them mud walls.

Meanwhile, in October, the military spirit was taking shape throughout
the province. On the 5th the legislative assembly, which had met at
Salem on Gage's call, though he sought to outlaw them by rescinding
(September 28) his precept, had declared his attempted revocation
without warrant in law, and had resolved itself into a provincial
congress. The body then adjourned to meet in Concord, where, under
John Hancock's presidency, they appointed a Committee of Safety
to act as the executive of the province, and chose three general
officers,—Preble,[331] Ward, and Pomeroy. The militia was organized,
and minute-men were everywhere forming into companies. Gordon tells how
the country was astir with preparations. Connecticut was not far behind
in ordering her militia to be officered, and in directing her towns to
double their stock of ammunition, while she voted to issue £15,000 in
paper money,—the first of the war.

"An armed truce", wrote Benjamin Church, "is the sole tenure by which
the inhabitants of Boston possess life, liberty, and property." Away
from Boston, the towns made common cause. "Liberty and Union" was to
be read on a flag flying in Taunton. When news of these and similar
events reached England, Lord North told Hutchinson that, for aught he
could see, it must come to violence, with consequent subjection for the
province.[332] When such tidings reached Virginia it found her officers
just sheathing their swords after their conflict with the Indians in
the mountains, and resolving next to turn their weapons against the
oppressors of America. Gage, in Boston, whom Warren really felt to
be honest and desirous of an accommodation, was awaking to a juster
measure of the task of the ministry, which might, he said, require
20,000 troops to begin with. As he pondered on such views, he might
have heard, on the evening of the 9th of November, 1774, the ringing
of the bells which greeted the return of Sam. Adams and his colleagues
from the Philadelphia congress. Shortly after the middle of the month
the British in Boston went into winter quarters.[333] So November
passed;—the Committee of Safety had arranged to raise and support
an army, and the recommendation of the Continental Congress had been
approved.

December came. Boston was not yet burned, as some in London believed it
was when Quincy heard them laying wagers in the coffee-houses,[334] and
if Sam. Adams was not the first politician in the world, as others told
the same ardent young Bostonian, he was sharing conspicuous honors at
home, with his distant kinsman, John Adams. The latter, as Novanglus,
in his public controversy with the unknown Massachusettensis, was just
attracting renewed attention. But that sturdy patriot, while he was
arguing in public, was comforting himself in private by reckoning that
Massachusetts could put 25,000 men in the field in a week; and New
England, he counted, had 200,000 fighting men, "not exact soldiers",
he confessed, "but all used to arms."[335] Tidings were coming in
which told how this warlike spirit might be tested. Governor Wanton,
of Rhode Island, had spirited away from the reach of the British naval
officers forty-four cannon, which were at Newport. Paul Revere had
gone down to Portsmouth and harangued the Sons of Liberty, till they
invaded Fort William and Mary and (December 14, 1774) carried off the
powder and cannon.[336] From Maryland, where they had lately been
burning a tea-ship,[337] the word was that its convention had ordered
the militia to be enrolled. From Pennsylvania it appeared that Thomas
Mifflin was conspicuous among the Quakers in advocating the measure
of non-intercourse. From South Carolina the news was halting. Could
her rice-planters succeed in getting their product excepted from such
a plan? They did. Gage had some time before[338] written to Dartmouth
that they were as mad in the southern Charlestown as in northern
Boston; and when one of their Tory parsons had intimated that clowns
should not meddle with politics, they had been as fiery as they could
have been in Massachusetts.[339] Gordon, of Jamaica Plain, in appending
notes to a sermon which he had just preached on the Provincial
Thanksgiving of December 15, 1774, refers to the brave lead of Virginia
in the present time, as nine years before she had been foremost in
the stamp-act time.[340] Governor Dunmore was reporting to Dartmouth
(December, 1774) that every county in Virginia was arming a company of
men, to be ready as occasion required.

John Adams, at Philadelphia, read to Patrick Henry from a paper of
Joseph Hawley, that the result of the action of the ministry rendered
it necessary to fight. "I am of that man's opinion", replied the
ardent Virginian.[341] With the new year (1775) that opinion was
becoming widespread. _Ames' Almanac_ (1775), published in Boston, was
printing, for almost every family in New England to read, "a method for
making gunpowder", so that every person "may easily supply himself with
a sufficiency of that commodity." Day by day news came to Boston from
every direction of the indorsement of Congress, and of the wild-fire
speed of the dispersion of the military spirit. Those who remembered
the 40,000 men who marched towards Boston at the time of the D'Anville
scare, thirty years before, said the enthusiasm then was nothing like
the present. Somehow Gage began to feel more confident. He had in
January 3,500 men in his Boston garrison, and almost as many more were
expected, and he did not hesitate to send (January 23) Captain Balfour
and a hundred men, with two cannon, to Marshfield, to protect the two
hundred loyalists there, who had signed the articles by which Timothy
Ruggles was hoping to band the friends of government together, and the
reports which Balfour sent back seemed to satisfy the governor that the
measure was effective.[342]

On the first of February, 1775, the second provincial congress
assembled at Cambridge, and they soon issued a solemn address to
the people, deprecating a rupture, but counselling preparations for
it.[343] It was not then known that Gage had won over Dr. Church, and
that through this professing patriot the British headquarters in Boston
were informed of the doings of congress. Church's defection encouraged
the tories, and on the 6th, handbills appeared in Boston, reminding the
patriots of the fate of Wat Tyler.[344] A few days later Cambridge was
alarmed by the report that troops were coming out of Boston to disperse
them; but the day passed without the proof of it. The Committee of
Safety were anxious, for they knew that the other colonies and their
friends in England were fearful that the conflict would be precipitated
without the consent of congress; and the authority of congress was
now so dominant that its cognizance of such measures was essential to
the continuance of the sympathy with Massachusetts which now existed.
No one at this time was more solicitous for this prudent measure than
Joseph Hawley, and no one in Massachusetts had a steadier head. On the
18th Peter Oliver wrote from Boston to London: "Great preparations on
both sides for an engagement, and the sooner it comes the better."[345]
"Every day, every hour widens the breach!" wrote Warren to Arthur Lee,
two days later.[346] Already the provincial congress had conferred
on the Committee of Safety (February 9) the power to assemble the
militia, and John Thomas and William Heath had been added to the
general officers. The committee, on the 21st, had voted to buy supplies
for 15,000 men, including twenty hogsheads of rum. On the same day Sam.
Adams and Warren signed a letter to the friends of liberty in Canada,
and secret messengers were already passing that way. Presently, on the
26th, the impending conflict was once more averted.

Colonel David Mason, of Salem, had been commissioned by the Committee
of Safety as an engineer, and was now at work in that town mounting
some old cannon which had been taken from the French. Gage heard of it,
and by his orders a transport appeared at Marblehead, with about 300
men under Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie, who rapidly landed and marched
his men to Salem. Their purpose was seasonably divined; the town was
aroused, and, in the presence of a mob, the commander thought it safer
to turn upon his steps.[347] A British officer, Colonel Smith, with
one John Howe, was at about the same time sent out in disguise to
scour the country towards Worcester, and pick up news for Gage;[348]
and two others, Brown and Bernière, were a few weeks later prowling
about Concord.[349] The patriots did not scour for news. It came in
like the wind,—now of county meetings, now of drills, now of Colonel
Washington's ardor in Virginia, and now of Judge Drayton's charge to
the grand jury in Carolina.

[Illustration: ROADS OF ROXBURY AND BEYOND.

Sketched from a MS. map in the library of Congress, which is apparently
one of the maps made by Gage's secret parties of observation.]

Early in March came the anniversary of the Boston massacre. Two days
before, Judge Auchmuty, in Boston, wrote to Hutchinson: "I don't see
any reason to expect peace and order until the fatal experiment of arms
is tried.... Bloodshed and desolation seem inevitable."[350] While this
tory was writing thus, the patriots, in a spirit that somewhat belied
their professed wish to avoid a conflict, were arranging for a public
commemoration of the massacre. It could have been omitted without any
detriment to the cause, and to observe it could easily have begotten
trouble amid the inflamed passions of both sides. "We may possibly be
attacked in our trenches", said Sam. Adams. It little conduced to peace
that Joseph Warren was selected to deliver the address, which, as the
fifth came on Sunday, was delivered on Monday, the sixth. The concourse
of people suggested to Warren to enter the Old South meeting-house,
where the crowd was assembled, by a ladder put against a window in
the rear of the pulpit. Forty British officers were present, and the
moderator offered them front seats, and some of the officers placed
themselves on the pulpit stairs. A contemporary story says that it was
a set purpose of the officers to break up the meeting,[351] and that
one of them took an egg in his pocket, to be thrown at the speaker for
a signal. This man tripped as he entered the building, and the egg
was broken before its time. Another officer, below the desk, held up
some bullets in his open palm as Warren warmed in his eloquence. The
speaker quietly dropped his handkerchief on the leaden menace, and went
on. So the meeting came to an end, with no outbreak; though there was
some hissing and pounding of canes when the vote of thanks was put.
As the crowd came out of the meeting-house there was an apprehensive
moment,[352] for the Forty-third Regiment chanced to be passing, with
beating drums, and for an instant the outcome was uncertain.[353]
Gage had suffered the commemoration to pass without recognition, but
ten days later his officers made the event the subject of a provoking
burlesque, when Dr. Thomas Bolton delivered from the balcony of the
British Coffee House in King Street a mock oration in ridicule of
Warren, Hancock, and Adams.[354] There was no knowing what purpose this
ridicule might mask; and a committee of the patriots, mostly mechanics,
were constantly following the progress of events, meeting secretly
at the Green Dragon[355] for consultation, and setting watches at
Charlestown, Cambridge, and Roxbury, to give warning if there were any
signs that the royal troops were preparing to move from the town.

On the 22d March, 1775, the provincial congress assembled again at
Concord, and set to work in organizing their army, and in devising
an address to the Mohawks, with the purpose of securing them to the
patriot side. They also prepared to use the Stockbridge Indians as
mediators with their neighbors, who were already tampered with, as was
believed or alleged, by emissaries from Canada. It was already known
that the people of the New Hampshire Grants were preparing to seize
Ticonderoga as soon as the war-cloud should burst.

[Illustration: BETWEEN BOSTON AND MARLBOROUGH.

Sketched from a MS. map in the library of Congress, which is seemingly
the original or copy of the map made by one of Gage's secret parties
sent to observe the country.]

News sped rapidly by relays of riders. It was not long after Patrick
Henry had said in Virginia, "We must fight; an appeal to arms and
to the God of hosts is all that is left for us",[356] before the
words were familiar in Massachusetts, and John Adams, who knew, said
that Virginia was planting wheat instead of tobacco. At Providence
they were burning tea in the streets, and men went about erasing the
advertisements of the obnoxious herb from the shop-windows. Everywhere
they were quoting the incendiary speech of John Wilkes, the lord mayor
of London, whose retorts upon the ministry were relished as they were
read in the public prints. As if to test whether March should pass
without bloodshed,[357] Gage on the 30th sent Earl Percy out of town
with a brigade, in light marching order, and he went four miles, to
Jamaica Plain, and returned. The minute-men gathered in the neighboring
towns, but no encounter took place.[358]

So April came, with the rattle of the musket still unheard. On the
second day two vessels arrived at Marblehead, bringing tidings that
Parliament had pledged its support to the king and his ministers, and
that more troops were coming. On the 8th a committee reported to the
provincial congress on an armed alliance of the New England colonies,
and messengers were sent to the adjacent governments.[359] Connecticut
responded with equipping six regiments; New Hampshire organized her
forces as a part "of the New England army", and Rhode Island voted to
equip fifteen hundred men. In Virginia it looked for a while as if
the appeal to arms would not be long delayed, for Dunmore fulminated
against their convention; and he even threatened to turn the slaves
against their masters, and he did seize the powder at Williamsburg, of
which the province had small store at best. Calmer counsels prevailed,
and the armed men who had gathered at Fredericksburg dispersed to
reassemble at call.

       *       *       *       *       *

The contest meanwhile had been precipitated in Massachusetts. The rumor
had already gone to England that it was close at hand. Hutchinson,
in London, on the 10th, when writing to his son in Boston, had said:
"Before this reaches you it will be determined;" and while tidings
of the actual conflict was on the way, Hutchinson learned in London
that Pownall had been prepared by letters from Boston for something
startling.[360] The circle of sympathizers with America were in this
suspense while Franklin was on the ocean, hither bound, and, if we may
believe Strahan, he had left England in a rancorous state of mind,
causing men to wonder what he intended on arriving, whether to turn
general and fight, or to bolster in other ways the spirits of the
rebels.[361] When he arrived the fight had begun.

On the 15th of April the provincial congress had adjourned. On the
16th, Isaiah Thomas spirited his press out of Boston and took it to
Worcester, where, in a little more than a fortnight, the _Massachusetts
Spy_ reappeared.[362] Families, impressed with the forebodings of
the sky, were moving out of town. Samuel Adams and Hancock had been
persuaded to retire to Lexington,[363] to be beyond the grasp of Gage,
who was shortly expected to order the arrest of the patriots, for which
he had had instructions since March 18th.[364] The Boston committee
of observation was watchful. It had noticed that on the 14th the
"Somerset" frigate had changed her moorings to a position intermediate
between Boston and Charlestown, and on the 15th the transports were
hauled near the men-of-war. Notice of these signs was sent to Hancock
and Adams, and preparations were begun for removing a part of the
stores at Concord. When, during the afternoon of the 18th, some of the
precious cannon were trundled into Groton, her minute-men gathered
for a night march to Concord. During that same day Gage sent out from
Boston some officers to patrol the roads towards Concord, and intercept
the patriot messengers, and to discover, if possible, the lurking-place
of Adams and Hancock. In the evening it was observed in Boston that
troops were marching across the Common to the inner bay. William Dawes
was at once dispatched to Concord by way of Roxbury, for the patriot
watch had not been without information before the troops actually
moved. Gordon tells us that they got a warning from a "daughter of
liberty unequally yoked in point of politics", and as Gage's wife was
a daughter of Peter Kemble, of New Jersey, it has been surmised that
the informer may have been one very near to headquarters.[365] Paul
Revere immediately caused the preconcerted signal-light to be set in
a church-tower at the north end of Boston, and crossing the river in
a boat, he mounted a horse on the Charlestown side and started on his
famous midnight ride. It was none too soon. At eleven o'clock eight
hundred men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, were passing over the
back bay in boats to Lechmere Point. Here they landed at half past two
in the morning, and the moon at this hour was well up. They marched
quietly and rapidly, but not unobserved, and when they approached
Lexington Green they found drawn up there a company of minute-men.
Smith had become alarmed when, as he was advancing, he found the
country aroused in every direction, and sent back for reinforcements.
Earl Percy, with the succor, was by some stupidity[366] delayed, and
did not get off from Boston till between nine and ten the next morning,
and he then took the circuitous route by Roxbury and Cambridge.

The critical moment on Lexington Green had then long passed. Major
Pitcairn, who commanded Smith's advance-guard, would not or could
not prevent that fatal volley in the early morning light, by which
several of the small body of provincials were killed before they broke,
while, by a scattering return fire, one or two of the British were
wounded.[367] Smith, without being aware that Hancock and Adams were at
the moment within sound of his musketry, and just then being conducted
farther from his reach, waited while his troops gave three cheers, and
then resumed his march, passing on towards Concord. The provincials
gathered their dead and wounded, and managed as the British passed on
to pick up a few stragglers, the first prisoners of the war.[368]

On the redcoats went as the day broadened.[369] They followed the road
much as it runs to-day, though in places steeps and impediments are
now avoided by a better grade. Their march went by the spots which the
genius of Hawthorne and Emerson have converted into shrines. In the
centre of Concord they halted, while the gathering provincials, who
had retired before them, watched the smoke of devastation. Smith had
detailed two detachments to find and destroy stores. One of these,
sent to Colonel Barrett's, beyond the North Bridge, had some success,
and while it was absent the provincials, now increased in numbers from
the neighboring towns, approached a guard which had been left at the
bridge. Here the British fired at the Americans across the stream, and
the volley being returned, a few were killed on both sides, before the
British guard retreated upon the main body, whither they were soon
followed by the other detachment which was out. Smith took two hours to
gather wagons for his wounded and make preparations for his retreat,
which had now become imperative, for the militia were seen swarming on
the hills.[370] When Smith started he threw out a flanking party on his
left, which followed a ridge running parallel to his march; but when
the sloping of the land compelled the flankers to descend to the level
of the road, the British lost the advantage which the ridge gave them,
and the minute-men, who now began to strike the British line of march
at every angle, waylaid them at cross-roads, and dropped an incessant
fire upon them from copse, hill, and stone wall, until the retreating
troops, impeded with their wounded, and leaving many of their dying
and dead, huddled along the road like sheep beset by dogs. Just on the
easterly outskirts of Lexington they met Percy, whose ranks opened
and received the fugitives; and Stedman, the British historian who
was with Percy, tells us how the weary men hung out their tongues as
they cumbered the ground during their halt. It was near two o'clock,
and Percy planted his cannon to keep his assailants at bay, while his
troops, now about eighteen hundred in number, rested and refreshed
themselves. Before this, his baggage train, which had been delayed in
crossing the bridge from Brighton to Cambridge so as to fall far behind
his hastening column, had been captured, with its guard, by a crowd
of old men some distance below, at Menotomy.[371] When Percy limbered
his pieces and his troops fell again into column, the hovering militia
renewed the assault. As pursuer and pursued crossed West Cambridge
plain the action was sharp. Percy did not dare attempt to turn towards
the boats which Smith had left at Lechmere Point, and any intention he
may have had of halting at Cambridge and fortifying was long vanished.
So he pursued the road which led towards Charlestown Neck. Several
hundred militiamen, who had come up from Essex County,[372] were nearly
in time at Winter Hill to cut the British off in their precipitate
retreat, and "God knows", said Washington, when he learned the facts,
"it could not have been more so." Percy, however, slipped by, and as
darkness was coming on, the fire of the pursuers began to slacken
as they approached Bunker Hill. Here, with the royal ships covering
their flanks, the British halted, and, facing about, formed a line and
prepared to make a stand. General Heath, who during the latter part
of the day had been on the ground, drew off his militia, and at the
foot of Prospect Hill held the first council of war of the now actual
hostilities. Warren, early in the day hastening from Boston across the
river, had galloped towards the scene of conflict. When he encountered
Percy's column on its way out, he seems to have evaded it and joined
General Heath, then taking cross-roads to intercept the pursuing
militia. Heath took the command of the provincials soon after Percy
resumed his march. From this time Warren, as chairman of the committee
in Boston, kept near Heath, for counsel if need be, and Heath says that
on the West Cambridge plain a musket-ball struck a pin from Warren's
earlock.

No one could tell what would happen next, after this suddenly
improvised army had begun to rendezvous that night in Cambridge. As the
straggling parties, in bivouac and in what shelter they could find,
compared experiences and counted the missing, messengers were hurrying
in every direction with the tidings of the war at last begun![373]

On the 20th of April there was much to do beside picking up the dead
that may have been left over night along the road from Concord. The
Committee of Safety[374] were summoning all the towns to send their
armed men to Cambridge.[375] Warren was writing to Gage to beg better
facilities for getting the women and children, with family effects,
out of Boston.[376] These were busy days for that ardent patriot. The
militia were beginning to pour in, and Warren must do the chief work in
reducing the mob to order. Congress comes to Watertown, and Warren, in
the absence of Hancock, must preside. He bids God-speed to Samuel Adams
and John Hancock[377] as they start for the Continental Congress. He
hears with a sinking heart of the vessel which arrived at Gloucester
on the 26th, bringing the body of Josiah Quincy, so lately warm that,
when the tidings reached Cambridge of his death, Warren supposed he had
lived to get ashore.[378]

[Illustration: HEATH'S ACCOUNT OF THE FIGHT AT MENOTOMY.

From a slip of paper in the _Heath Papers_, vol. i. no. 71.]

[Illustration

After a copperplate in _An Impartial Hist. of the War in America_,
Boston, 1784, vol. iii. The background is much the same as that of
a portrait of Washington in the same work, and the print, issued in
Boston, where Heath was well known, shows what kind of effigies then
passed current. A portrait of Heath by H. Williams has been engraved by
J. R. Smith. (_Catal. Cab. Mass. Hist. Soc._, p. 46.) There is extant
a likeness owned by Mrs. Gardner Brewer, of Boston. Cf. _Mem. Hist.
of Boston_, iii. 183. Heath was born in Roxbury, March 2, 1737, and
died Jan. 24, 1814. His service was constant during the war, though
his deeds were not brilliant. He seems conspicuously to have acquired
the regard of Washington; though Bancroft calls him vain, honest, and
incompetent. His papers are in the Mass. Hist. Soc. Cabinet.]

Another day Warren is busy carrying out the behests of the Committee
of Safety respecting their scant artillery. At another time he is
encouraging wagoners to go into Boston to bring out the friends of
the cause and their property; but it was not so easy to get Gage's
permission, and as the tories made a plea that these Boston patriots
were necessary hostages, obstacles were thrown in the way.[379] There
were rumors, too, of an intention of the royal troops once more to
raid upon the country. Only two days after the 19th of April, Ipswich
was wild with such rumors, and the alarm spread to the New Hampshire
line[380] and beyond.[381]

The patriots at Cambridge were not pleased when they found that the
Connecticut assembly had sent a committee to bear a letter from
Governor Trumbull (April 28) and to confer with Gage.[382] There was a
feeling that the time had passed for such things, and Warren wrote (May
2) a letter beseeching the sister colony to stand by Massachusetts,
which elicited from Trumbull a response sufficiently assuring.[383]

[Illustration: Ethan Allen]

Already there was a proposition warlike enough from a Connecticut
captain who had just led his company to Cambridge, and was now urging
the seizure of Ticonderoga and its stores. The proposition was timely.
During the previous winter the patriots had learned that the British
government was intending to separate the colonies by securing the line
of the Hudson.[384] Accordingly the instigator of this counter-movement
was ordered, May 3d, to carry it out, and Benedict Arnold makes his
first appearance in American history. Meanwhile, however, acting upon
hints which Arnold had already dropped before leaving Connecticut, or
perhaps anticipating such hints, some gentlemen in that colony, joining
with others of Pittsfield, in Massachusetts, had gone to Bennington,
where, on the day before Arnold was commissioned, they had been joined
by Col. Ethan Allen. Thus the plan which Arnold had at heart was likely
to be carried out before he could arrive from Cambridge. A few days
later the command of the force which had gathered naturally fell to
Allen as having the largest personal following, and this following was
loyal enough to their leader to threaten to abandon the enterprise if
Arnold, who arrived very soon, should press his rights to the command.
By a sort of compromise, Allen and Arnold now shared amicably the
leadership. Less than a hundred men had reached the neighborhood of
the fort on the morning of May 10, when, in the early dawn, the two
leaders, overpowering the sentinels at the sally-port, reached the
parade-ground with their men, and forced an immediate surrender from
the commandant, still in his night-clothes. Fifty men and nearly two
hundred cannon, and many military stores, were thus promptly and easily
secured. More than a hundred other pieces were added, when, on the
12th, Colonel Seth Warner,[385] with a coöperating detachment, seized
the post at Crown Point, and shortly afterwards Bernard Romans took
possession of Fort George.[386]

[Illustration: RUINS OF TICONDEROGA, 1818.

From a plate in the _Analectic Magazine_ (Philadelphia, 1818). Cf.
views in Lossing's _Field-Book_, and _Harper's Monthly_ (vii. p. 170);
Von Hellwald's _America_, pp. 134, 135.]

On the 14th some of Arnold's belated men reached him with a captured
schooner, which Arnold immediately put to use in conveying a force
by which he surprised the fort at St. John's, on the Sorel, and then
returned to Ticonderoga.[387]

       *       *       *       *       *

Meanwhile the provincials had begun to use the spade in Cambridge,
and here and there a breastwork appeared.[388] On the 5th of May the
provincial congress pronounced Gage "an unnatural and inveterate
enemy",[389] and issued a precept for a new congress to convene.

[Illustration: ROXBURY LINES.

Follows a contemporary pen-and-ink sketch, showing the American lines
as seen from the British lines on Boston Neck. The original is in the
library of Congress.]

The military anxiety was increasing. Thomas had but 700 men at Roxbury,
which he tried to magnify in the British eyes by marching them in and
out of sight, so as to make the same men serve the appearance of many
more. On the 8th of May there was an alarm that the royal troops were
coming out, and the militia of the near towns were summoned.[390] To
put on an air of confidence, a few days later (May 13), Putnam, from
Cambridge, marched with 2,200 men into Charlestown and out again,
without being molested, though part of the time within range of the
enemy's guns. It was the military assertion of the idea, which the day
before the Watertown congress had expressed, of governing themselves.
"It is astonishing how they have duped the whole continent", wrote
Gage to Dartmouth,[391] and perhaps he had not heard even then of the
last victory of opinion down in Georgia, where parishes of New England
descent were forcing issues with their neighbors.

The Committee of Safety now resolved to remove the live-stock from
the islands in Boston Harbor; and Gage, on his part, determined on
securing some hay on Grape Island, near Weymouth. These counter-forays
led to fighting, and for some weeks the harbor was alive with
skirmishing.[392] Meanwhile the Massachusetts congress had urged
Connecticut to let Arnold bring some of the cannon captured on
Lake Champlain to Cambridge,[393] and the day before the brush
occurred at Grape Island they had delivered (May 20) a commission
as commander-in-chief of the Massachusetts troops to Artemas Ward.
In Boston the remaining loyalists were soon cheered by advices
promising large reinforcements, which they now confidently began to
expect,[394] and the feeling grew apace among the beleaguerers that
a better organization and a closer dependence of the colonies among
themselves were necessary to meet the impending dangers. Dr. Langdon,
the president of Harvard College, in the election sermon[395] on the
day when the new provincial congress met (May 31), had recognized
the general obedience which was already paid to the advice of the
Continental Congress. There were not a few who remembered how, twenty
years before, the young Virginian, Colonel George Washington, had come
to Boston, and who recalled the good impression he had made. They had
heard lately of the active interest and sympathy with the patriots'
cause which he was manifesting among his neighbors in that colony. On
the 4th of May, Elbridge Gerry, with the approval of Warren, wrote to
the Massachusetts delegates at Philadelphia, that they would "rejoice
to see this way the beloved Colonel Washington" as generalissimo.[396]
This was the feeling, while the army which lay about Boston was a mere
inchoate mass, far from equal to the task which they had undertaken;
but brave words did much; brave spirits did more; and John Adams
was writing from Philadelphia that one "would burst to see whole
companies of armed Quakers in that city, in uniforms, going through
the manual."[397] The tories in Boston looked on with mingled fear and
confidence. "We are daily threatened", wrote Chief-justice Oliver from
Boston (June 10), "with an attack by fire-rafts, whale-boats, and what
not."[398]

[Illustration: WARREN'S LAST NOTE.

The original is among the Heath Papers (Mass. Hist. Soc.), and is given
in fac-simile in Frothingham's _Warren_, p. 506; and reduced (as above)
in G. A. Coolidge's _Brochure of Bunker Hill_, p. 34.]

One of the new British generals now lent his literary skill to his
commanding general, for Burgoyne was a playwright and had an easy way
of vaporing, which was quite apparent in Gage's proclamation of June
12,[399] to warn the rebellious and infatuated multitudes, and to hold
out forgiveness to all but Samuel Adams and John Hancock.[400] The
provincial congress, through Warren, prepared a counter-manifesto, but
events were rushing too speedily to leave time for its publication. On
the very day of issuing his proclamation Gage wrote to Dartmouth that
he was intending to attack the rebels, "which every day becomes more
necessary."[401]

[Illustration: NOTICE TO THE MILITIA.

After an original in the volume of _Proclamations_ in the library of
the Mass. Hist. Society.]

On the 14th Warren was made the second major-general of the
Massachusetts forces, and his active spirit gave encouragement, since
the inalertness of Ward was creating much concern. Early in the
morning of the 17th Warren left Watertown, and the provincial congress
convened without him, but they knew the emergency. A broadside exists
of this day, in which they call upon the neighboring militia to hold
themselves in readiness. In the anxious hours of this, St. Botolph's
day,[402] with all eyes on Boston, the Continental Congress had chosen
Washington to be their military chief,[403] and had adopted the forces
which were about to show that Boston was not besieged idly. It took
time then for Cambridge to know what was happening in Philadelphia;
but the assembled legislators at Watertown might well hope for what had
really happened, when, as the fateful day wore on, messengers arrived,
declaring that the Continental funds were to be used to help supply
this beggared army, and that all the aspirations of its provincial
congress to set up a civil government of their own had met the approval
of the continent.[404]

Now to look at the military situation. Already John Thomas, a physician
of Kingston, had been made second in command under Ward; and Richard
Gridley, an old Louisbourg artilleryman, had been made chief engineer.
As yet the New England colonies were the only ones which had sent
their armed men to the scene. The Massachusetts men had taken post
mostly at Cambridge, near the college; and here, as the days went on,
came also a Connecticut regiment under Israel Putnam, who had left
his plough in its furrow. So, as June began, there had assembled on
this side of Boston between seven and eight thousand men, eager, but
poorly equipped, and with a small supply of powder. On the Roxbury
side, fronting the British lines on Boston Neck, there were about four
thousand Massachusetts men, under John Thomas, supported by a camp
a little farther out, at Jamaica Plain, to which Joseph Spencer had
come with another Connecticut regiment, and Nathanael Greene, with a
body of Rhode Islanders. Thomas had some field-pieces and a few heavy
cannon, and his force constituted the army's right wing. Its left wing
was upon the Mystick at Medford, and near Charlestown Neck, and here
were the New Hampshire men, and among their officers the old Indian
fighter, John Stark, was conspicuous. Three companies of Massachusetts
men constituted the extreme left at Chelsea. So, as the summer came
on, perhaps about 16,000 men in all were encamped as a fragile army
besieging Boston. General Ward exercised by sufferance a superior
authority over all, though as yet no colony but New Hampshire had
instructed its troops to yield him obedience. As Massachusetts claimed
three quarters of the entire force thus drawn together, the assumption
of chief command by her first officer was natural enough in a common
cause.

The force which this sixteen thousand loosely organized men dared to
hold imprisoned in Boston was a well-compacted army of somewhere from
five to ten thousand men, for it is difficult amid conflicting reports
to determine confidently a fixed number. On the 25th of May Gage had
been joined by a reinforcement, accompanied by three other general
officers,—Burgoyne, Clinton, and Howe.

The council of war at Cambridge was meanwhile directing new works
to be constructed, strengthening and stretching their lines of
circumvallation. Its opinions were divided on the question of
occupying so exposed a position as the most prominent eminence on
the peninsula of Charlestown, the defence of which might bring on a
general engagement, which their stock of powder could not support. On
the 13th of June the American commanders had secretly learned that
Gage intended on the 18th to take possession of Dorchester Heights, the
present South Boston. There was but one counter-move to make, and that
was to seize in anticipation the summit of the ridgy height which began
at Charlestown Neck and extended, in varying outline, to the seaward
end of the peninsula,—an eminence known as Bunker Hill. On the 16th of
June, a council of war, held in the house near Cambridge common, known
then as the Hastings and later as the Holmes House,[405] decided, upon
the recommendation of the Committee of Safety, to occupy Bunker Hill at
once.

[Illustration: ORDER OF THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

This has before appeared in G. A. Coolidge's _Brochure of Bunker Hill_,
1875.]

That evening about 1,200 men, of whom 200 were from Connecticut under
Thomas Knowlton, the whole being under the command of Colonel William
Prescott, first listened to a prayer of the president of the college,
and then marched, with their intrenching tools, in the darkness, to
Charlestown Neck.

[Illustration]

Here the purpose was for the first time disclosed to the men. They
resumed their march, going up the slope of the hill before them, while
Nutting's company and a few Connecticut men were sent along the shore
opposite Boston, to patrol it. The highest summit of the hill was the
one first reached; but, after a consultation, it was decided to proceed
to a lower one, more nearly before Boston. Here Richard Gridley marked
out a redoubt, and at midnight the men took their spades and began
to throw up the breastworks. Putnam, who seems to have accompanied
Prescott, now returned to Cambridge, and while the men worked busily,
Prescott sent an additional patrol to the river, and twice went down
himself, to be satisfied, as he heard the "All's well" of the watch on
the men-of-war moored opposite, that no noise of the intrenching tools
had reached the enemy. Soon after the first glimmer of dawn on the
17th, the sailors on the ships discovered the embankments, now about
six feet high, when one of the vessels, the "Lively", at once opened
fire upon them. This lasted only till Admiral Graves could send orders
to cease, but was shortly renewed from the ships and from the batteries
on Copp's Hill, in Boston, as soon as the British generals comprehended
the situation. Prescott's men meanwhile kept at their work. One man
was soon killed by a cannon-ball. The commander and others walked the
parapet, encouraging their men, and Willard, one of the councillors
who stood by Gage as they surveyed the hill through their glasses,
recognized the Pepperell colonel, and told the British general what
sort of man he had got to encounter. A promise had been given to
Prescott that in the morning a relief and refreshments would be sent
from Cambridge; but nothing came to the hungry men, as they still
worked. Ward, who heard the firing, yielded to Putnam's persuasion
to send reinforcement, only so far as to despatch a part of Stark's
regiment, for he feared that Gage would seem to prepare to assault
in Charlestown, while his intention might be to attack in Cambridge.
Finally, about ten o'clock, Major John Brooks[406] reached headquarters
with a request from Prescott for help and food. Richard Devens pressed
Ward to comply, and at eleven the rest of the New Hampshire men were
ordered to march.

[Illustration]

Meanwhile, as the tide rose, some floating batteries were sent up the
stream to take the works in flank, and later, to rake the Neck. A few
stray shots were returned from a single field-piece in the redoubt,
one of whose balls passed over Burgoyne's head, as he tells us, while
he was watching at Copp's Hill. Putnam came again from Cambridge,
and induced Prescott to send off a large number of his men with the
intrenching tools, and under Putnam's direction this detail soon began
to use them in throwing up earthworks on the higher summit in the
rear,—labor wasted, as it turned out.

[Illustration]

As the day wore on, Gage held a council of war, and it was determined
not to land troops at the Neck and attack in rear, as Clinton urged,
but to assault in front. This decision was long the ground of severe
criticism upon Gage, and ruined his military reputation. The ships
were put into better positions, and redoubled their fire. By noon
the British troops in Boston were marching to the wharves, where
they embarked in boats, and, under the command of General Howe, they
rowed to Moulton's or Morton's Point, where the landing was quickly
made.[407] Howe drew up his men on the rising ground which makes the
least of the three heights of the peninsula, and anticipating sharp
work, sent back the boats for more men.

Prescott observed all this from the hill, but looked longingly up the
peninsula for his own reinforcements. A few wagons came, not with men,
but with beer, though nothing adequate even of this. The feeling began
to spread among the men on the hill that they had been treacherously
left to their fate; but they got encouragement from a few brave souls
who came straggling in from Cambridge. Pomeroy, the French war veteran,
was one. James Otis, wreck as he was, came.[408] So did Warren, whose
presence the men recognized by a cheer, and, major-general as he
was, he came to fight under Colonel Prescott. Putnam, too, had again
returned, and was seen riding about the field in a restless way, with
a word of encouragement here and there, and pointing out to a few
reinforcements now arriving where best to go.

[Illustration]

Prescott's eye, observing Howe's dispositions, saw he was aiming to
advance along the Mystick and take the redoubt in reverse. So Knowlton,
with two field-pieces and the Connecticut troops, were sent down the
hill towards the Mystick, where they began to make a line of defence of
a low stone wall, which was topped by a two-rail fence. Stark and Reed,
with the New Hampshire regiments, diminished somewhat by details which
Putnam had taken from them to help the work in the trenches on the
higher hill, soon came up and ranged their men in a line with Knowlton.
There was, however, an interval between this part of the field and
the breastwork and redoubt, which offered a chance for the enemy to
intervene and break the line. An attempt was made to prepare for such a
contingency by grouping the few guns which they had at this point. New
troops, in small numbers, continued to come up, and they were placed in
position as best they could be to keep the line strong in all parts as
it sloped away from the crowning redoubt towards either river.

[Illustration]

It was nearing three o'clock when the British boats returned from
Boston; and when their troops landed Howe had about 3,000 men in array.
He pushed his guns forward and got them in position to play upon the
American field-pieces, and soon drove them away, while at the same
time some skirmishing took place on the British flanks, whose main
body was now advancing in a measured step in two columns: one led by
Howe against the rail-fence, the other by Pigot against the redoubt.
The assault was become one of infantry only, for the British guns
were soon mired in some soft ground, and the balls in reserve had
proved of an over-calibre.[409] Pigot's front got near the redoubt
before the Americans poured in their fire, which was deadly enough to
send the staggered column wildly back. At the same time, along the
Mystick Howe's advance was met by the American field-pieces, some
of which had been drawn to the rail-fence. Their musketry fire was
reserved, as at the redoubt, and when it belched upon the deployed
enemy it produced the same effect. So there was a recoil all along the
British line. In the respite before they advanced again, Putnam tried
to rally some troops in the rear, and to get others across the Neck,
which the raking fire of the British vessels was now keeping pretty
clear of passers.[410] But there was not time to do much, for Howe
was soon again advancing, his artillery helping him more this time;
and to add to the terror of the scene, he had sent word to Boston
to set Charlestown on fire by shells, and the conflagration had now
begun.[411] The smoke did not conceal the British advance,[412] and
Prescott and Stark kept their men quiet till the enemy were near enough
to make every shot tell. The result was as during the first attack. The
royal troops struggled bravely; but all along the line they wavered,
and then retreated more precipitately than before.

There was a longer interval before Howe again advanced, and Prescott
used it in making such a disposition of his men as would be best in a
hand-to-hand fight, for neither adequate reinforcements nor supplies
had reached him, and his powder was nearly gone. There was a good
deal of confusion and uncertainty in the rear, all along the road to
Cambridge. Ward had ordered a plenty of troops forward, but few reached
the peninsula at all, or in any shape for service. Putnam did what he
could to bring order out of confusion; but his restless and brandishing
method, and his eagerness to finish the works on Bunker Hill, were not
conducive to such results as a quiet energy best produces. The brave
men at the front must still do the work left for them, with such chance
assistance as came.

Howe was rallying his men for a third assault. Major Small had landed
400 marines, to make up in part for the losses. Clinton had seen how
confused the troops were as he looked across the river with his glass,
and had hurried over from Boston to render Howe help as a volunteer
aid. The British general determined now to concentrate his attack
upon the works on the crown of the hill, making only a demonstration
against the rail-fence. He brought his artillery to bear in a way that
scoured the breastwork which flanked the redoubt, and then he attacked.
His column reserved their fire and relied on the bayonet. They met
the American fire bravely, but soon perceived that it slackened; and
surmising that the American powder was failing, they took new courage.
Those of the defenders who had ammunition mowed down the assailants
as they mounted the breastworks, Major Pitcairn among them;[413]
but as soon as Prescott saw the defence was hopeless, he ordered a
retreat, and friend and foe mingled together as they surged out of the
sally-port amid the clouds of dust which the trampling raised, for a
scorching sun had baked the new-turned soil. It was now, while the
confused mass of beings rocked along down the rear slope of the hill,
that Warren fell, shot through the head. No one among the Americans
knew certainly that he was dead, as they left him. The British stopped
to form and deliver fire, and there was thus time for a gap to open
between the pursuers and the pursued. The New Hampshire men and others
at the rail-fence, seeing that the redoubt was lost, tenaciously faced
the enemy long enough to prevent Prescott's men from being cut off,
and then stubbornly fell back. Some fresh troops which had come up
endeavored to check the British as they reached the slope which led
to the intrenchments that Putnam had been so solicitous about; but
the British wave had now acquired an impulse which carried it bravely
up the hill; and Putnam, skirring about, was not able to make anybody
stand to defend the unfinished works. So down the westerly slope of
the higher summit to the Neck the provincials fled, and the British
followed. The vessels poured in their fire anew as the huddled runaways
crossed the low land, and not till they got beyond the Neck was there
any effectual movement by fresh troops to cover the retreat. General
Howe fired a few cannon shot after them, as he mustered his forces on
the hill. It was now about five o'clock. There was time in the long
summer's day to advance upon Cambridge, but Howe rejected Clinton's
advice to that end, and began, with other troops which had been sent to
him from Boston, to throw up breastworks on the inland crown of Bunker
Hill. Thus spading for their defence, the British passed the night,
while the Americans lay on their arms on Winter and Prospect hills, or
straggled back to Cambridge. There was no disposition on either side to
renew the fight.

Prescott did not conceal his indignation at not having been better
supported, when he made his report at Ward's headquarters. He knew
he had fought well; but neither he nor his contemporaries understood
at the time how a physical defeat might be a moral victory. Not
knowing this, there was little else than mortification over the
result,—indeed, on both sides. A wild daring had brought the battle
on, and something like bravado had led the British general into a
foolhardy direct assault, while more skilful plans, availing of their
ships, might have accomplished more without the heavy loss which they
had endured.[414] The British folly was increased by the way in which
they allowed the provincials to make the first great fight of the war a
political force throughout the continent.

[Illustration: TRYON'S SEAL AND AUTOGRAPH.

From a plate in Valentine's _N. Y. City Manual_, 1851, p. 420.]

The general opinion seems to be that the Americans had about 1,500 men
engaged at one time, and that from three to four thousand at different
times took some part in it.[415] The British had probably about the
same numbers in all, but were in excess of the Americans at all times
while engaged.[416] The conflict with small arms lasted about ninety
minutes.

On the morning of the 18th of June (Sunday) the British renewed the
cannonading along their lines, as if to cover some movement, but
nothing came of it, and each side used the shovel busily on the
intrenchments. A shower in the afternoon stopped the firing.

       *       *       *       *       *

[Illustration]

There was a dilemma in New York a few days later. Governor Tryon, who
had been in England, was already in the harbor ready to land on his
return, and Washington was approaching through Jersey on his way to
Boston. It was determined by the city authorities to address and extend
courtesies to both. The American general chanced to be ahead, and got
the parade and fair words first. Tryon disembarked a few hours later,
and received the same tributes.[417]

It was Sunday, June 25, when Washington reached New York. He found the
town excited over the recent battle, the news of which he had met a few
hours out of Philadelphia.[418]

[Illustration: WASHINGTON'S HEADS OF LETTER, JULY 10, 1775.

This is about half of the whole as given in fac-simile in Wilkinson's
_Memoirs_, i. p. 855. The original is now among the Reed-Washington
letters in the Carter-Brown library. It was the basis of Washington's
first formal official letter to the president of Congress, which, as
written out by Joseph Reed, is given in Sparks' _Washington_, iii. p.
17. It shows the degree of attention which the general bestowed on his
minutes for his secretary's use.

Washington, on his first arrival, had taken temporary quarters in the
house of the president of the college, known now as the Wadsworth house
(_Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 107; Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 408),
till the finest house in the town, one of a succession of mansions on
the road to Watertown, was made ready for his use. These houses, which
had all been deserted by their Tory owners, gave the name of Tory Row
to this part of Cambridge. The one assigned to Washington's use was
a Vassall house, later, however, known as the Craigie house, when it
became the property of Andrew Craigie, from whose family it passed to
the ownership of Longfellow, who died in it. Sparks lived in it when
he edited _Washington's Writings_. It is familiar in engravings. Cf.
_Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. p. 113, with a note on various views of
it; and for its associations, see Samuel Longfellow's _Life of H. W.
Longfellow_; Irving's _Washington_, ii. p. 11; Greene's _Hist. View
of the Amer. Rev._, p. 220; _Manhattan Mag._, i. 119; Mrs. Lamb's
_Homes of America_; Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 415. Among the other
buildings of Revolutionary associations still standing in Cambridge
are the Brattle house, the headquarters of Mifflin; the Vassall house,
where Dr. Church was confined; the house where Jonathan Sewall lived,
later occupied by General Riedesel; the Oliver house, now owned by
James Russell Lowell; the "Bishop's Palace", where Burgoyne was
quartered; and Christ Church, where Washington attended service (view
in _Mass. Mag._, 1792, and compare Nicholas Hoppin's discourses, Nov.
22, 1857, and Oct. 15, 1861). For more of the historical associations
of these Cambridge sites, see the _Harvard Book_; Drake's _Landmarks
of Middlesex_; the Cambridge _Centennial Memorial_ (1875); William
J. Stillman's _Poetic Localities of Cambridge_ (Boston, 1876); T.C.
Amory's _Old and New Cambridge_; an illustrated paper in _Harper's
Monthly_, Jan., 1876, another by Alexander Mackenzie, in the _Atlantic
Monthly_, July, 1875; _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, June, 1858, and Sept.,
1872; and the book edited by Arthur Gilman, _Theatrum Majorum, The
Cambridge of 1776_, which has an eclectic diary (by Mary W. Greely) of
the siege, purporting to be that of one Dorothy Dudley.]

[Illustration]

Among the letters now passing through New York was one upon that
battle, addressed to the President of Congress, which Washington
took the liberty of opening for his own guidance. After instructing
Schuyler, who was to be left in charge of the forces in New York, to
keep watch upon Tryon[419] and Guy Johnson,[420] Washington the next
day (26th) started for Cambridge. On the 2d of July Washington reached
Watertown, and on the 3d, under a tree still standing,[421] he took
command of the army, which thus passed, in effect, under Continental
control, numbering at the time nearly 15,000 men fit for duty.[422]
To brigade this army, rectify the circumvallating lines, watch the
constant skirmishes, and assign the new bodies of troops arriving to
places in the works, was the labor to which Washington devoted himself
at once. On the 9th of July he held his first council of war,[423] and
on the 10th he addressed his first letter to Congress, describing the
condition of the siege as he had found it.

[Illustration]

To guard against surprise, and replenish the magazines, required
constant diligence, and the supply of powder never ceased to be a cause
of anxiety in the one camp, while the diminishing stock of provisions
produced almost as much concern in Boston. The beleaguered British,
however, got some relief from the exodus of the Boston people, which
the stress of want forced the royal commander to permit.[424] So the
summer was made up of anxious moments. The independent husbandmen
of New England made but intractable raw recruits, and Washington,
who had expected to find discipline equal to that which the social
distinctions of the South gave to the masses there, was disappointed,
and did not wholly conceal his disgust.[425] He grew, however, to
discern that campaigns could produce that discipline as well, if not
better, than a life of civil subservience. Recruits came in from the
South, and when some of the Northern officers saw the kind of men that
Morgan and others brought as riflemen from Virginia, their comment was
scarcely less austere. "The army would be as well off without them",
said Thomas, who, next to Washington, was the best disciplinarian
in the camp. Of the generals, Lee was, however, by much the most
conspicuous. There was a glamour about the current rumors of his
soldierly experience that obscured what might have been told of his
questionable character.[426] His eccentricities were the camp talk,
and rather served to magnify his presence, while it proved dangerous
to perambulate the lines with him and his crowd of dogs, since the
exhibition tempted the enemy to drop their shells in that spot.[427]
Early in July a trumpeter approached the American lines bringing a
letter from General Burgoyne to General Lee, and the camp straightway
proceeded to invest the strange general with political importance.
Burgoyne and Lee were old campaigners together, and Lee, before he
left Philadelphia, had written a stirring letter to the British
general on the bad prospects of the ministerial policy. The letter
which now came was a reply, and proposed a conference on Boston Neck,
to which Congress advised Lee not to accede, and the momentary ripple
subsided.[428]

In August there was some correspondence with Gage respecting the
treatment of prisoners, in which Washington appears to the better
advantage.[429] The correspondence of the American general during
the summer constantly dwells upon the scarcity of powder, though for
prudence' sake he veils his expressions as much as he can. His own
troops and even Congress had no conception of his want, and while
Washington hardly dared fire a salute because of the powder it would
take, Richard Henry Lee, from Philadelphia, was urging him to plant
batteries at the mouth of Boston harbor, and keep the enemy's vessels
from coming in and going out.[430] Governor Cooke, of Rhode Island,
who was doing his best to get powder from Bermuda, was compelled to
keep the secret too. Apparently Washington did not let his brigade
commanders know the whole truth.[431] Under these circumstances
Washington had no courage to attack, and Gage, on his part, was content
to keep his men from deserting as best he could.

During September the threatening manœuvres of the British cruisers
along the Connecticut coast[432] kept Governor Trumbull from sending
what powder he had, and there was little hope, when Washington called a
council of war on the 11th, that anything would come of it. There had
been just then some internal manifestations not very reassuring.[433]
A letter which Dr. Benjamin Church had tried to get to the British
in Newport harbor had been intercepted, and its cypher interpreted.
There was no expressed defection made clear by it, but suspicions were
aroused, and Church, being arrested, was summoned before the congress
at Watertown, where he made a speech protesting his innocence, but
scarcely quieting the suspicions. He was put under control, and removed
from the neighborhood of the army.[434]

There was scarce less gratification in the camp at Cambridge in getting
rid of their doubtful associate than was experienced in Boston in
getting a release from their sluggish general. The ministry had saved
that soldier's pride as much as they could in desiring to have him
nearer at hand for counsel;[435] and the sympathetic loyalists whom he
had befriended paid him their compliments in an address. Gage finally,
on October 10, issued his last order, turning over the command to
Howe.[436]

In the middle of October, the burning of Falmouth, the modern Portland,
in Maine, seemed to make it clear that the war was to be conducted
ruthlessly on the British part. Captain Mowatt, with a small fleet,
had entered the harbor and set the town on fire, and to those who
communicated with him it was said that he announced his doings to
be but the beginning of a course of such outrages. When the news
reached Washington, he dispatched Sullivan to Portsmouth, with orders
to resist as far as he could any similar demonstration there.[437]
What a modern British historian[438] has called a "wanton and cruel
deed" seems to have been but the hasty misjudgment of an inferior
officer, without orders to warrant the act, and the ministry promptly
disowned the responsibility.[439] During October, also, a committee of
Congress,[440] visiting Washington's camp, could see for themselves
the troubles of their heroic commander. They had not yet heard in
Philadelphia the roar of hostile guns,—a sensation they might now
experience. They could share Washington's perplexities as the new
enlistments halted upon the expiration of the old,[441] and perhaps
join in some of his kindly merriment when Phillis Wheatley, the
negress, addressed his Excellency in no very bad verses.[442]

[Illustration: HANDBILL.] [443]

[Illustration: FROM BEACON HILL, 1775, No. 1. (_Looking towards
Dorchester Heights._)]

[NOTE.—This and the three companion sketches are drawn from a
panoramic view in colors, now in the Cabinet of the Mass. Hist. Soc.,
of which a much reduced heliotype is given in the _Mem. Hist. Boston_,
iii. 80. This view is a copy by Lieutenant Woodd of the Royal Welsh
Fusiliers, from the original by Lieutenant Williams, of the same
regiment, which is preserved in the King's Library (Brit. Museum). Cf.
_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, iv. 397, 424; _Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 80.

The foreground on the left is the summit of Beacon Hill, not far
from the spot where the State House now stands, though at a level
considerably higher than the present one. Two of the guns now standing
on Cambridge Common were taken from the dock in Boston after the
British evacuated it, and they resemble the cannon here sketched, and
one of them may possibly be that identical gun. The spire at the left
would seem to be that of the First Church, which stood on the present
Washington Street nearly opposite the head of State Street. (Cf. view
of it in _Memorial History of Boston_, ii. 219.) The spire next to the
right must have been that of the Old South Church. That on the extreme
right would seem to be the steeple of the New South (Church Green) in
Summer Street, now disappeared.]

[Illustration: FROM BEACON HILL, 1775, No. 2. (_Looking towards
Roxbury._)

In No. 2 the Hancock House is in the foreground. The earliest sketch
of this house is a very small one, making part of the Price-Faneuil
View of Boston (1743), and its presence in which and other data led
to the suspicion that this 1743 view was from an old plate, which had
been originally cut twenty years earlier, and this was subsequently
proven. Cf. _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, xviii. 68; xxi. 249. The earliest
enlarged view of the house is in the _Mass. Mag._, 1789. Cf. _Mem.
Hist. Bost._, iii. 202. An oil painting, belonging to Mrs. F. E. Bacon,
is on deposit in the halls of the Bostonian Society, where, also, are
some interior views of the house.

The British encampments on Boston Common are indicated in the
foreground at the left. The parallel lines (8) show the neck connecting
Boston with Roxbury. The meeting-house (10) on the distant land is that
of the First Religious Parish in Roxbury, on the site now occupied by
the church near the Norfolk Home. The American fort just beyond (at 11)
was on a rocky summit, where now the stand-pipe of the Cochituate Water
Works is placed.]

[Illustration: FROM BEACON HILL, 1775, No. 3. (_Looking towards
Brookline and the outlet of Charles River._)

No. 3 shows in the foreground the most westerly of the three summits of
Beacon Hill (Louisbourg Square—though much lower, the hill having been
cut down—represents its present site), and the rope walks. There is a
similar water-color drawing among the Peter Force maps and views in the
library of Congress.

The inward curve of the nearer shore on the right of the picture
represents the area now including Cambridge Street and the territory
north of it, below Blossom Street, covering the approaches to the
bridge now leading to Cambridge, the oldest parts of which near the
College are shown at 16; while at 17 we have the American encampments
at Prospect Hill, the modern Somerville. The American works between the
College and Charles River seem to be intended by 15. The mouth of the
river is seemingly indicated by the point of land just below the number
14, which apparently stands for the Brookline fort and its connections,
in the modern Longwood. Between the man in the foreground and the
somewhat abrupt eminence beyond him, was a depression in the outline of
the ridge, not far from the head of the present Anderson Street.]

[Illustration: FROM BEACON HILL, 1775, No. 4. (_Looking towards
Charlestown._)

No. 4 has the Old West Church in the foreground, where Jonathan Mayhew
preached. Its spire was subsequently taken down by the British to
prevent its use as a signal station for the friends of the provincials.
It stood till 1806, when the present edifice was built. (Drake's
_Landmarks_, 374.)

This picture is substantially duplicated on another page, in the Rawdon
view, sketched during the continuance of the battle of Bunker Hill. The
Mount Pisca (Pisgah) at 19 the present Prospect Hill in Somerville.
The lines of Winter Hill and Ploughed Hill would be in the direction
of 20. At 27 is a glimpse of the Mystick River seen beyond Charlestown
Neck, the armed British transport at 16 commanding the road over that
neck. At 22 are the new works of the British, begun after the battle
of Bunker Hill, and shown in the contemporary plan of the Charlestown
peninsula, given on another page, while the British encampment is on
the inner slope of the hill, at 23. Below, and along the shore (24,
24), are indicated the ruins of Charlestown, while the figures 25 mark
the position of the redoubt which was defended by Colonel Prescott and
his men. The house on the hither shore, below the transport, marks
nearly the spot where the present bridge to East Cambridge begins. In
the foreground on the extreme right are somewhat vague indications of
the dam inclosing the mill-pond, in which the present Haymarket Square
occupies a central position.]

Perhaps they may have had the grim satisfaction of riding to distant
parts of the lines in Thomas Hutchinson's coach, kept now for the
general's use, if we may believe the refugee himself.[444]

A little later, Josiah Quincy, who from his house at Braintree could
look out upon the harbor, had been urging Washington to block the
channel, and thus imprison the British ships there at anchor, and
prevent the coming of others. Washington appreciated the motives of
that ardent patriot, but he would have liked better the cannon and
powder that would have rendered the plan feasible.[445] At all events,
the possible chances of the plan made not a very pleasant prospect
for Howe, who had already set his mind—as, indeed, the ministry had
already advised[446]—upon evacuating the town; but his ships were as
yet not sufficient for the task, and hardly sufficient to protect his
supply-boats from the improvised navy which Washington had been for
some time commissioning.[447]

John Adams, in Philadelphia, was getting uneasy over the apparent
inaction of Washington, and wrote in November (1775) to Mercy Warren
that Mrs. Washington was going to Cambridge,[448] and he hoped she
might prove to have ambition enough for her husband's glory to
give occasion to the Lord to have mercy on the souls of Howe and
Burgoyne![449]

The left wing of the beleaguering army was now pushed forward and
occupied Cobble Hill, the site of the present McLean Asylum, and the
two armies watched each other at closer quarters than before, the
almost foolhardy Americans feeling increased confidence when the
fortunate captain of an ordnance brig gave them a supply of munitions.
In December, Massachusetts and New Hampshire[450] promptly supplied the
loss of Connecticut and Rhode Island troops, who were not to be induced
to prolong their enlistments. Washington was cheered with this alacrity
of a portion, at least, of the New England yeomen, and he suffered as
many as he could of those who had come hastily to the camp in the
spring to go home on brief furloughs to make winter provision for their
families. Before the year was out, Congress had authorized Washington
to destroy Boston if he found it necessary. The British general was,
on his part, organizing in that town a Royal Regiment of Highland
Emigrants,[451] and other loyalist battalions, putting Ruggles,
Forrest, and Gorham in command of them.[452]

On the first of January, 1776, the federal flag, with its thirteen
stripes and British Union,[453] was first raised over the American
camp, and their council of war was inspirited to determine upon an
attack, as soon as the chances of success seemed favorable; but the
prudent ones trusted rather to Howe's evacuating through his straits
for provisions, and held back from the final decision. It was not
forgotten that 2,000 men were still without firelocks, and there was
not much powder in the magazines. The total environing army scarce
numbered ten thousand men fit for duty, and they were stretched out in
a long circumvallation, while the enemy could mass at least half that
number on any one point, and had a fleet to sustain them. Howe had not
shown a much more active spirit than Gage had displayed, and there was
a feeling in the British camp that he was too timid for the task,[454]
and there could not have been much hopefulness in seeing so much better
a general as Clinton sent off in January with several regiments, to
join other forces and a fleet on the coast of North Carolina.[455]
Washington meanwhile kept up a show of activity, and when, on the
evening of January 8, he sent Knowlton on a marauding scout into
Charlestown, there was a little flutter of excitement in Boston for
fear it foreboded more serious work, and the British officers were
hastily summoned to their posts from the play-house, where they were
diverting themselves,[456]—the play on this particular occasion being
something they had planned, and called _The Boston Blockade_.

       *       *       *       *       *

As early as the middle of June, 1775, General Wooster, with some
Connecticut troops, had by invitation of Congress marched to the
neighborhood of New York, to be prepared for any demonstration from
British ships which might attempt to land troops, for the British naval
power was and continued to be supreme in the harbor till Washington
occupied the city.

[Illustration: NOTE.—This broadside, and the opposite one, are given
in fac-similes from copies in the Massachusetts Historical Society's
library, and they pertain to theatrical performances given by the
British officers in Boston during the siege.]

[Illustration]

Before Clinton had left Boston, Washington, under Lee's urgency, had
decided to possess New York, and the plan, which was submitted to
John Adams, as representing the Congress, met with that gentleman's
approval.[457] Lee was accordingly sent into Connecticut to organize
such a force as he could for advancing on that city.[458] He kept
Washington informed of his success in these preliminaries, and finally
reached New York himself on February 4,[459] and here he remained till
it was ascertained that Clinton was proceeding to the South, where
he was instructed to follow that general and confront him as best he
could, as we shall presently see.[460]

The chief event of February, 1776, was the arrival of the cannon
captured at Ticonderoga, and the placing them in the siege batteries
along the American lines, for Washington had dispatched Knox to bring
these much needed cannon to him. John Adams records meeting them on
their way at Framingham, January 25;[461] and when the train of fifty
pieces and other munitions reached the lines, there was something less
of anxiety than there had been before.[462] The army, however, was
still deficient in small arms, and Washington wrote urgently to the New
York authorities for assistance of that kind.[463]

By the first of March powder had been obtained in considerable
quantities, and Washington opened a bombardment from all parts of his
lines, which was deemed necessary to conceal a projected movement.
During the night of March 4-5, General Thomas, from the Roxbury
lines,[464] with 2,500 men, took possession of Dorchester Heights.[465]
It was moonlight, but the men worked on without discovery, and by
morning had thrown up a cover. Both armies now laid plans for battle.

[Illustration: BOSTON.

After a photograph of a view in the British Museum. Cf. similar views
in _Moore's Diary of the Amer. Rev._, i. 97; _Mem. Hist. Boston_,
iii. p. 156; Lossing's _Field-Book_; Grant's _British Battles_, ii.
138. The house in the left foreground is the house built by Governor
Shirley. It is still standing, but much changed. See a view of it in
the frontispiece of _Mem. Hist. Boston_, vol. ii.

There is a view of the town and harbor in the _Pennsylvania Mag._,
June, 1773; and others of a later date are in the _Columbian Mag._,
Dec., 1787; _Mass. Mag._, June, 1791. Cf. Winsor's _Readers' Handbook
of the Amer. Rev._, p. 66, for other views and descriptions.]

[Illustration: BOSTON CASTLE.

After a photograph of a view in the British Museum.]

Howe determined to attack the Heights by a front and flank assault.
Washington reinforced Thomas, and planned at the same time to move
on Boston by boats across the back bay. The British dropped down on
transports to the Castle, but a long storm delayed the projected
movement. This so effectually gave the Americans time to increase
their defences that the British general saw that to evacuate the town
was the least of all likely evils. As he began to show signs of such
a movement, the Americans began to speculate upon their significance.
Heath, at least, was fearful that the appearances were only a cloak
to cover an intention to land suddenly somewhere between Cambridge
and Squantum.[466] But the genuineness of Howe's intention gradually
became apparent, as, indeed, evacuation with him was a necessity,
while Admiral Shuldam also saw that his fleet, too, was immediately
imperilled from the newly raised works on Dorchester Heights. So Howe
had scarce an alternative but to give a tacit consent to a plan of the
selectmen of Boston for him to leave the town uninjured, if his troops
were suffered to embark undisturbed. Washington entered upon no formal
agreement to that end, but acquiesced silently as Howe had done.[467]
There was still some cannonading as Washington pushed his batteries
nearer Boston on the Dorchester side, at Nook's Hill, teaching Howe
the necessity of increased expedition. By early light on the 17th of
March it was discovered that Howe had begun to embark his troops,
and by nine o'clock the last boat had pushed off, completing a roll,
including seamen, fit for duty, of about 11,000 men, with about a
thousand refugees.[468] The Continentals were alert, and their advanced
guards promptly entered the British works on the several sides. The
enemy's ships fell down the harbor unmolested; but that night they
blew up Castle William, and the vessels gathered together in Nantasket
Roads. Here they remained for ten days, causing Washington not a little
anxiety; and he wrote to Quincy, at Braintree, to have all the roads
from the landings patrolled, lest the British should send spies into
the country.[469] On the 27th, all but a few armed vessels, intended
to warn off belated succor,[470] had disappeared in the direction of
Halifax.[471]

Ward was left with five regiments to hold the town and its
neighborhood,[472] while Colonel Gridley, "whom I have been taught to
view", said Washington, "as one of the greatest engineers of the age",
was directed to fortify the sea approaches.[473]

[Illustration: OCCUPATION OF BOSTON.

After an original in the collection of _Proclamations_ in the library
of the Mass. Hist. Society. Cf. _Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. p. 181;
Sparks's _Washington_, iii. 322; Niles's _Principles and Acts_ (1876),
p. 127. Curwen records, when the proclamation reached London, that its
prohibition of plunder "was a source of comfort."]

Washington gradually moved his remaining army to New York, not without
apprehension at one time that he would have to direct them to Rhode
Island, for a fog had befooled some people in Newport into sending
him a message that the British fleet was in the offing there. He left
Cambridge himself April 4th, not for Virginia, as some good people
imagined he would do, out of loyalty to his province,[474] but to
defend as he could the line of the Hudson, of which signs were already
accumulating that it was the game for each side to secure. A few of
the enemy's ships still hung about Nantasket Roads, and some desultory
fighting occurred in the harbor.[475] The British, however, failed to
prevent some important captures of munition vessels being made. It was
not till June that General Lincoln, with a militia force, brought guns
to bear upon the still lingering enemy, when they sailed away, and
Boston was at last free of a hostile force.

It is now necessary to follow two other movements, which had been begun
while the siege of Boston was in progress, the one to the north, and
the other to the south.

The exploits of Allen and Arnold at Ticonderoga, already related, had
invited further conquests; but the Continental Congress hesitated to
take any steps which might seem to carry war across the line till
the Canadians had the opportunity of casting in their lot with their
neighbors. On the 1st of June, 1775, Congress had distinctly avowed
this purpose of restraint; and they well needed to be cautious, for
the Canadian French had not forgotten the bitter aspersions on their
religion which Congress had, with little compunction, launched upon its
professors, under the irritation of the Quebec Act. Still their rulers
were aliens, and the traditional hatred of centuries between races
is not easily kept in abeyance. Ethan Allen was more eager to avail
himself of this than Congress was to have him; but the march of events
converted the legislators, and the opportunity which Allen grieved to
see lost was not so easily regained when Congress at last authorized
the northern invasion. Arnold and Allen had each aimed to secure the
command of such an expedition, the one by appealing to the Continental
Congress, the other by representations to that of New York. Allen had
also gone in person to Philadelphia, and he and his Green Mountain
Boys were not without influence upon Congress, in their quaint and
somewhat rough ways, as their exuberant patriotism later made the New
York authorities forget their riotous opposition to the policy which
that province had been endeavoring to enforce in the New Hampshire
Grants. Connecticut had already sent forward troops to Ticonderoga to
hold that post till Congress should decide upon some definite action;
and at the end of June, 1775, orders reached Schuyler which he might
readily interpret as authorizing him, if the Canadians did not object,
to advance upon Canada.[476] He soon started to assume command, but
speedily found matters unpromising. The Johnsons were arming the
Indians up the Mohawk and beyond in a way that boded no good, and they
had entered into compacts with the British commanders in Canada. Arnold
had been at Ticonderoga, and had quarrelled with Hinman, the commander
of the Connecticut troops. Schuyler heard much of the Green Mountain
Boys, but he only knew them as the lawless people of the Grants, and
soon learned that Allen and Warner had themselves set to quarrelling.
Presently, however, Allen reported at Ticonderoga for special service,
as he had been cast off by his own people. Another volunteer, Major
John Brown, was sent by Schuyler into Canada for information.
Schuyler's position was a trying one. He had few troops of his own
province. The Connecticut troops were too lax in discipline to suit his
ideas of military propriety, and his temperament had little to induce
him to make concessions to the exigencies of the conditions.[477] With
the best heart he could, he tried to organize his force for an advance,
and assisted, in Indian conferences at Albany, to disarm, as far as he
might, the Mohawks of their hostility.

In August the news from Canada began to be alarming. Richard
Montgomery, an Irish officer who had some years before left the army
to settle on the Hudson and marry, was now one of the new brigadiers.
He urged Schuyler to advance and anticipate the movement now said to
be intended by Carleton, the English general commanding in Canada. At
this juncture Schuyler got word from Washington that a coöperating
expedition would be dispatched by way of the Kennebec, which, if
everything went well, might unite with Schuyler's before Quebec.

Montgomery had already started from Ticonderoga, and it was not till
the foot of Lake Champlain had been reached that Schuyler overtook
him, and, with an effective force of about 1,000 men, he now prepared,
on the 6th of September, to advance upon St. Johns. The demonstration
caused a little bloodshed, but, getting information which deceived
him, he fell back to the Isle-aux-Noix, and prepared to hold it
against a counter attack, and to prevent any vessel of the enemy
penetrating to the lake. The outlook for a while was not auspicious.
Malaria made sad inroads among the men, and of those who were left on
duty, insubordination and lack of discipline, and perhaps a shade of
treachery, impaired their efficiency. Schuyler was prostrate on his
bed, and Montgomery was forced to unmilitary expedients because of the
temper of his troops. Schuyler's disorder seeming to have permanently
mastered him, he resigned the command to Montgomery and returned up
the lake. He had, at least, the satisfaction of meeting reinforcements
pushing down to the main body. Before these arrived Montgomery had
begun the siege of St. Johns, and he was pressing it, when Ethan Allen,
whom Montgomery was expecting to join him, met with Brown, and these
two planned an attack on Montreal. It was attempted, but Brown and
his men failed to coöperate, and Allen and those he had with him were
finally captured.[478] When the Canadians heard that the redoubtable
Green Mountain leader was in irons on board an English vessel bound for
Halifax,[479] a great deal was done towards awakening them from that
spell of neutrality upon which the American campaign so much depended
for success.

So Montgomery continued to keep his lines about St. Johns with great
discouragement. He met every embarrassment which a hastily improvised
and undisciplined mass of men could impose upon a man who was of high
spirit and knew what soldierly discipline ought to be. A gleam of hope
at last came. He detached a party to attack Fort Chamblée, further
down the Sorel, and it succeeded (October 18), and he was thus enabled
to replenish his store of ammunition, which was by this time running
low.[480] So Montgomery was enabled to press the siege of St. Johns
with renewed vigor. When Wooster, the veteran Connecticut general,
joined him with the troops of that colony, there was some apprehension
that the younger Montgomery might find it difficult to maintain his
higher rank against the rather too independent spirit of the old
fighter.[481] No disturbance, however, occurred, and both worked
seemingly in union of spirit. Every effort of Carleton to relieve the
British commander at St. Johns failing, that officer surrendered the
post, and, on November 3d, Montgomery took possession.

       *       *       *       *       *

We may turn now to the expedition that Washington had promised to
dispatch from Cambridge, and which had been thought of as early as May.
Benedict Arnold had hurried from Crown Point to lay his grievances
before the commander-in-chief. It seemed to Washington worth while
to assuage his passions and to profit by his dashing valor, for he
had by this time become convinced that Howe had no intention of
venturing beyond his lines. So Arnold was commissioned Colonel, and
given command of the new expedition, and the satisfied leader saw
gathering about him various quick spirits, better recognized later.
Such was Morgan, who led some Virginia riflemen, and Aaron Burr, who
sprang to the occasion as a volunteer.[482] Washington provided
Arnold with explicit instructions, and with an address to circulate
among the Canadians.[483] About eleven hundred men proceeded from
Cambridge to Newburyport, whence, by vessel and bateaux, they reached
Fort Western (Augusta, Maine), towards the end of September. Here the
expeditionary force plunged into the wilderness, up the Kennebec,
environed with perils and the burdens of labor. Suffering and nerving
against vexations and weariness that grew worse as they went on, they
saw the sick and disheartened fall out, and found their rear companies
deserting for want of food.[484] Those that were steadfast were forced
to eat moccasins and anything. On they struggled to the ridge of land
which marked the summit of the water-shed between the Atlantic and the
St. Lawrence. Then began the descent of the Chaudière, perilous amid
the rush of its waters, which overturned their boats, and sent much
of what stores they had left on a headlong drive down the stream. At
last the open country was reached, and Arnold stopped to refresh the
survivors. He dispatched Burr to see if he could find Montgomery,[485]
and, making the most of the friendly assistance of the neighboring
inhabitants, Arnold advanced to Point Levi, and began to make
preparations for crossing the St. Lawrence. The city of Quebec looked
across the basin in amazement on a stout little army, of whose coming,
however, they had had an intimation; while Arnold's men were hard at
work making or finding canoes and scaling-ladders.

Meanwhile where was Montgomery, whom Burr, disguised as a priest, and
speaking French or Latin as required, was seeking up the river? He had
got possession of Montreal without a blow, and sending Colonel Easton
down to the mouth of the Sorel, that officer intercepted the little
flotilla with which Carleton was trying to reach Quebec, and captured
all of the fugitives except Carleton himself, who escaped in a disguise
by night. The news of Arnold, which Burr at last brought to Montgomery,
made that general more anxious than ever to push on to Quebec, but the
expiration of the enlistments of some of his men much perplexed him,
and he was obliged to make many promises to hold his army together.
Before Montgomery could reach him, Arnold had in the night taken about
550 men across the river, and ascending at Wolfe's Cove, he had paraded
them before the walls and demanded a surrender. The garrison was small,
and in part doubtful, and the inhabitants were more than doubtful, but
the lieutenant-governor, Cramahé, with his stanchest troops, the Royal
Scotch, overawed the rest, and kept the gates closed. The vaporing
Arnold had been known in the past within the town as a horse-jockey,
and his promise as a general, with his shivering crowd, did not greatly
impress those whom he had somewhat farcically beleaguered. In a day or
two Arnold became frightened and drew off his men, strengthened now a
little by others who had crossed the river. Unmolested he went up the
river, to keep within reach of Montgomery, perceiving as he went up
the banks the succor for Quebec which Carleton, having picked up men
here and there, was bringing down by water.

[Illustration: Guy Carleton

From the _Political Mag._, iii. 351. Cf. Jones's _Campaign for the
Conquest of Canada_, p. 112; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, June, 1883, p.
409; Moore's _Diary of the Revolution_, p. 454; B. Sulte's _Hist. des
Canadiens français_ (as Lord Dorchester, to which rank Carleton was
subsequently raised).]

By the 1st of December, Montgomery, with three armed schooners and only
300 men, reached Arnold at Point-aux-Trembles. The united forces now
turned their faces towards Quebec, less than a thousand in all, with a
body of two hundred Canadians, under Colonel James Livingston, acting
in conjunction; and on the 5th were before the town. Carleton haughtily
scorned all advances of Montgomery to communicate with him, and devoted
himself to overawing the town, quite content that the rigors of winter
should alone attack the invaders. While the Americans were making some
show of planting siege-batteries, plans for assault were in reality
maturing, and a stormy night was awaited to carry them out. It came on
the night before the last day of the year. While two feints were to be
made on the upper plain, the main assaults were to be along the banks
of the St. Charles and the St. Lawrence, from opposite sides, with a
view to joining and gaining the upper town from the lower. Montgomery
led the attack beneath Cape Diamond on the St. Lawrence side, and while
in advance with a small vanguard, and unsuspecting that his approach
was discovered, he was opened upon with grape, and fell, with others
about him.[486] His death was the end of the assault on that side.
Arnold was at first successful in carrying the barriers opposed to
him, but was soon severely wounded and taken to the rear. Morgan, who
succeeded to the command, was pressing their advantage, when Carleton,
relieved by Montgomery's failure, and by the discovery that the other
attacks meant nothing, sent out a force, which so hemmed Morgan in,
that, having already learned of Montgomery's failure, he found it
prudent to surrender with the few hundred men still clinging to him.
The Americans elsewhere in the field hastily withdrew to their camp,
and Carleton was too suspicious of the townspeople to dare to take any
further advantage of his success.

The command of the Americans now devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Donald
Campbell, who sent an express to Wooster at Montreal, urging him to
come and take the control. That general thought it more prudent to
hold Montreal as a base,[487] and remained where he was, while he
forwarded the dismal news to his superior, Schuyler, at Albany, who had
quite enough on his hands to overawe Sir John Johnson and the Tories
up the Mohawk. The succession of Wooster to the command in Canada
boded no good to the New York general, and led to such crimination and
recrimination between the two that Congress, towards spring (1776),
took steps to relieve Schuyler of the general charge of the campaign.
Thomas, who had rendered himself conspicuous in driving the British
from Boston, was made a major-general (March 6), and was ordered to
take the active command in Canada. A New England general for troops in
the main from those colonies seemed desirable, and Thomas was certainly
the best of those furnished by Massachusetts during the early days of
the war.

Meanwhile Arnold, amid the snows, was audaciously seeming to keep up
the siege of Quebec in his little camp, three miles from the town.
Small-pox was beginning to make inroads on his little army, scarce at
some periods exceeding five hundred effective men. Wooster finally
came from Montreal on the first of April, and assumed command. For the
influence intended to soothe and gain the Canadians to pass from the
courtly Montgomery to the rigid and puritanical Wooster was a great
loss, and it soon became manifest in the growing hostility of the
people of the neighboring country. It was by such a pitiful force that
Carleton allowed himself to be shut up in Quebec for five months.

This was the condition of affairs when a commission, consisting of
Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll, was sent by
Congress, with delegated powers, to act with prompter decision on
the spot.[488] They reached Albany early in April, and found Thomas,
from Boston, already there. So the two generals, Schuyler and Thomas,
pushed on ahead of the commissioners, and, with the reinforcements now
setting towards Canada, before and behind them, it seemed as if a new
vigor might be exerted upon the so far disastrous Northern campaign.
Thomas directed his course to Quebec, while the commissioners went to
Montreal, where they found the most gloomy apprehensions existing, and
were soon convinced that, without hard money and troops, Canada must be
relinquished. Franklin returned to Philadelphia to impress this upon
Congress, while Schuyler was at his wits' ends to find men, provisions,
and money to send forward, till Congress should act.

Washington, by this time in New York with the troops which had
forced the evacuation of Boston, yielded to the orders of Congress,
and sent Sullivan of New Hampshire with a brigade, carrying money
and provisions, to reinforce the wretched army in Canada, thereby
diminishing, with great risk, his own force to less than 5,000 men.
Thomas had at this time reached Quebec (May 1), where he found, out
of the 1,900 men constituting the beleaguering army, only about a
thousand not in hospital, and scarcely five hundred of these were
effective troops. It was necessary to do something at once, for the
breaking ice told the American general that a passage was preparing
for a British fleet, which was known to be below. Plans for an assault
on the town miscarried, and while Thomas was beginning to remove his
sick preparatory to a retreat, three British men-of-war appeared in the
basin. They landed troops, and gave Carleton an opportunity to hang
upon the rear of the retreating invaders, and pick up prisoners and
cannon. He did not pursue them far.[489]

Near the same time a force of British and Tories, coming down the river
from Ontario, had fallen upon Arnold's outpost at Cedar Rapids, above
Montreal, and had captured its garrison. Thus disaster struck both
ends of the American line of occupation. The force under Thomas was
withdrawing to the Sorel, when Burgoyne, with large reinforcements,
landed at Quebec. Up the Sorel the Americans retreated, joined now
by the troops under Thompson, which Washington had earlier sent from
New York. Thomas[490] soon died (June 2) of small-pox at Chamblée;
and Wooster being recalled, Sullivan, who now met the army, took the
command, and pushing forward to the mouth of the Sorel, prepared to
make a stand. He soon sent a force under Thompson towards Three Rivers,
to oppose the approaching British, now reaching 13,000 in number,
either at Quebec or advancing from it,—a number to confront, of which
apparently Sullivan had no conception. This general himself possessed
hardly more than 2,500 men, for Arnold, instead of reinforcing him,
as directed, had left Montreal for Chamblée. The action at Three
Rivers, of which the cannonading had been heard at the Sorel, proved
a disastrous defeat. It was followed by the British vessels pushing
up the river, and as soon as they came in sight Sullivan broke camp
and also retreated to Chamblée, followed languidly by Burgoyne. Here
Sullivan joined Arnold, and the united fugitives, of whom a large
part were weakened by inoculation, continued the retreat to the
Isle-aux-Noix, thence on to Crown Point, where early in July the poor
fragmentary army found a little rest,—five thousand in all, and of
these at least one half were in hospital.[491]

[Illustration: DUNMORE'S SEAL.

From a plate in Valentine's _N. Y. City Manual_, 1851.]

       *       *       *       *       *

We may glance now at the progress of events to the southward. In
Virginia, Dunmore, the royal governor, hearing of Gage's proclamation
proscribing Hancock and Adams, feared that he might be seized as a
hostage, and took safety on board a man-of-war in Yorktown harbor.
Events soon moved rapidly in that quarter.[492] Patrick Henry, perhaps
a little unadvisedly, was made commander of their militia.[493] In
due time, from his floating capitol, Dunmore issued his proclamation
granting freedom to slaves of rebels,[494] and had directed a motley
crew of his adherents to destroy the colonial stores at Suffolk,
and this led to a brisk engagement at the Great Bridge (December 9,
1775), not far from Norfolk, in which the royalists were totally
defeated.[495] The destruction of that town, now under the guns of the
royal vessels, soon followed, on the first of January, 1776.[496]

On the 27th of February, 1776, the Scotch settlers of North Carolina,
instigated by Martin, the royal governor, and under the lead of their
chief, Macdonald,[497] endeavored to scatter a force of militia at
Moore's Creek Bridge, but were brought to bay, and compelled to
surrender about half of a force which had numbered fifteen or sixteen
hundred.[498]

Early in 1776 the task was assigned to Clinton, who had in January
departed from Boston, as we have seen, to force and hold the Southern
colonies to their allegiance, and Cornwallis, with troops, was sent
over under convoy of Sir Peter Parker's fleet, to give Clinton the
army he needed. The fleet did not reach North Carolina till May. In
March, Lee, while in New York, had wished to be ordered to the command
in Canada, as "he was the only general officer on the continent who
could speak and think in French." He was disappointed, and ordered
farther south.[499] By May he was in Virginia, ridding the country of
Tories, and trying to find out where Parker intended to land.[500] It
was expected that Clinton would return north to New York in season
to operate with Howe, when he opened the campaign there in the
early summer, as that general expected to do, and the interval for
a diversion farther south was not long. Lee had now gone as far as
Charleston (S. C.), and taken command in that neighborhood, while in
charge of the little fort at the entrance of the harbor was William
Moultrie, upon whom Lee was inculcating the necessity of a slow and
sure fire,[501] in case it should prove that Parker's destination, as
it might well be, was to get a foothold in the Southern provinces, and
break up the commerce which fed the rebellion through that harbor.

[Illustration: FORT MOULTRIE, 1776.

Reduced from the plan in Johnson's _Traditions and Reminiscences of the
Amer. Revolution in the South_ (Charleston, S. C., 1851). It shows that
the rear portion of the fort had not been finished when the attack took
place. The same plate has an enlarged plan of the fort only. See the
maps in Drayton's _Memoirs of the Amer. Rev. in the South_ (Charleston,
1821, two vols.), ii. 290, which is similar to Johnson's Ramsay's _Rev.
in S. Carolina_, i. 144, which is of less area; and that in Gordon's
_Amer. Revolution_, iii. 358. These are the maps of American origin.
Lossing (ii. 754) follows Johnson.]

The people of Charleston had been for some time engaged on their
defences, and "seem to wish a trial of their mettle", wrote a
looker-on.[502] The fort in question was built of palmetto logs, and
was unfinished on the land side. Its defenders had four days' warning,
and the neighboring militia were summoned. On the 4th of June the
hostile fleet appeared,[503] and having landed troops on an adjacent
island, it was not till the 27th that their dispositions were made for
an attack.

[Illustration: ATTACK ON CHARLESTON, 1776.

From _Political Mag._ (London, 1780), vol. i. p. 171,—somewhat
reduced. Carrington notes (p. 176), as dated Aug. 31, 1776, and
belonging to the _North Amer. Pilot_: "An exact plan of Charleston and
harbor, from an actual survey, with the attack of Fort Sullivan on the
26th June, 1776, by his Majesty's squadron, commanded by Sir Peter
Parker." Cf. no. 37 of the _American Atlas_ (Faden's), and the _Amer.
Military Pocket Atlas_, 1776, no. 5. Mr. Courtenay, in the _Charleston
Year Book_, 1883 (p. 414), gives a folded fac-simile of a broadside
map, _A plan of the Attack on Fort Sullivan ... with the disposition of
the King's land forces, and the encampments and entrenchments of the
rebels, from the drawings made on the spot. Engraved by Wm. Faden_, by
whom it was published Aug. 10, 1776. The dedication to Com. Parker is
signed by Lieut.-Col. Thomas James, royal regiment of artillery, June
30, 1776. It has a corner plan of the "Platform in Sullivan's Fort",
by James, on a larger scale. Appended to the map are a list of the
attacking ships, and extracts from Parker's and Clinton's despatches.
The channel between Long and Sullivan's islands is given as seven feet
in the deepest part. The original MS. of this Faden map is in the Faden
Collection in the library of Congress (no. 41), where is also a MS.
map of Charleston and its harbor, a topographical drawing, finished
in colors (no. 40). Cf. _Plan de la Barre et du hâvre de Charlestown
d'après un plan anglois levé en_ 1776. _Rédigé au dépôt général de la
marine_ [Paris], 1778. (_Brit. Mus. Maps_, 1885, col. 764.)

These are the different English maps. In the same _Charleston Year
Book_, p. 478, is an account of the successive forts on the same spot.
A view of Charleston is in the _London Mag._ (1762, p. 296), and one by
Thomas Leitch, engraved by S. Smith, 1776, is noted in the _Brit. Mus.
Map Catal._, 1885, col. 764.]

Their ships threw shot at the fort all day, which did very little
damage, while the return fire was rendered with a precision surprising
in untried artillerists, and seriously damaged the fleet,[504] of which
one ship was grounded and abandoned.

[Illustration: WILLIAM MOULTRIE.

From the copperplate in his _Memoirs of American Revolution, on far as
it related to States of N. and S. Carolina and Georgia. Compiled from
most authentic materials, the author's personal knowledge of various
events, and including an Epistolary Correspondence on Public Affairs,
with Civil and Military Officers, at that period_. (New York, 1802, two
volumes.) The likeness in the _National Portrait Gallery_ (New York,
1834) is Scriven's engraving of Trumbull's picture.

There is a portrait in the cabinet of the Penna. Hist. Soc., no. 58.
See the paper on General Moultrie in South Carolina in _Appleton's
Journal_, xix. 503, and Wilmot G. Desaussure's _Address on Maj.-Gen.
William Moultrie_, before the Cincinnati Society of South Carolina,
1885.]

The expected land attack from Clinton's troops, already ashore on
Long Island, was not made. A strong wind had raised the waters of the
channel between that island and Sullivan's Island so high that it
could not be forded, and suitable boats for the passage were not at
hand.[505] A few days later the shattered vessels and the troops left
the neighborhood, and Colonel Moultrie had leisure to count the costs
of his victory, which was twelve killed and twice as many wounded. The
courage of Sergeant Jasper, in replacing on the bastion a flag which
had been shot away, became at once a household anecdote.[506]


CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

THE earliest attempt with any precision to enumerate the various
sources of information upon the whole series of military events about
Boston during 1775 and 1776 was by Richard Frothingham, in the notes of
his _Siege of Boston_ (1849), where, in an appendix, he groups together
the principal authorities. Later than this, Barry (_Massachusetts_,
iii. ch. 1), Dawson (_Battles_, vol. i.), and others had been full in
footnotes; but the next systematized list of sources was printed by
Justin Winsor in 1875, in the _Bulletin_ of the Boston Public Library.
This last enumeration was somewhat extended in the _Bunker Hill
Memorial_, published by the city of Boston,[507] and still more so by
the same writer in his _Handbook of the American Revolution_, Boston,
1879. It is condensed in the _Memorial Hist. of Boston_, iii. 117.

       *       *       *       *       *

Salem, because of a little alleged pricking of bayonets when Leslie's
expedition was harassed there in February, 1775, has sometimes claimed
to have witnessed the first shedding of blood in the war. The principal
monograph on the subject is C. M. Endicott's _Account of Leslie's
retreat at the North Bridge in Salem, on Sunday, Feb. 26, 1775_ (Salem,
1856).[508] Early resistance to British arms, and even bloodshed in
the act, had undoubtedly occurred before the affair at Lexington, and
writers have cited the mob at Golden Hill,[509] in New York, and the
massacre at Westminster, in the New Hampshire Grants, when an armed
body of settlers arose against the authority of the king, as asserted
in favor of the jurisdiction of New York in March, 1775.[510]

The precipitation of warfare, however, can only be connected with the
expedition to Lexington and Concord. Every stage of the affair has been
invested with interest by discussion and illustration. The ride of Paul
Revere to give warning has grown to be a household tale in the spirited
verse of Longfellow; but, as is the case with almost all of that poet's
treatments of historical episodes, he has paid little attention to
exactness of fact, and has wildly, and often without poetic necessity,
turned the channels of events. In literary treatment, the events of
Lexington and Concord form so distinct a group of references that they
can be best considered in a later note (A), as can also the sources of
information respecting the fight at Bunker Hill (B).

Of the siege of Boston, the chief monograph is Frothingham's, already
referred to. Other contributions of a monographic nature are the
address and chronicle of the siege by Dr. George E. Ellis in the
_Evacuation Memorial of the City of Boston_ (1876); W. W. Wheildon's
_Siege and Evacuation of Boston and Charlestown_ (Boston, 1876,
pp. 64); and the chapters on the siege in Dawson's _Battles of the
United States_, vol. i., and Carrington's _Battles of the Revolution_
(1876).[511]

Among the general historians, Bancroft has made an elaborate study
of the siege, devoting to it a large part of his vol. viii. (orig.
edition), and all the histories of the United States, Massachusetts,
and Boston necessarily cover it.[512]

The principal of the later British historians is Mahon, in his _Hist.
of England_, vol. vi. Lecky (_England in the Eighteenth Century_, ii.
ch. 12), while he goes little into details, gives an admirable account
of the two respective camps. _The Life of Burgoyne_, by Fonblanque, is
the fullest of the biographies of the actors on the British side.

On the American side, the lives of leading officers all necessarily
yield to those of Washington,[513] whose letters, as contained in
vol. iii. of Sparks's ed. of his _Writings_, can well be supplemented
by those of Reed, then his secretary.[514] Of the contemporary
general historians, Gordon and Mercy Warren were familiar with the
actors of the time. The _Journals_ of the Continental Congress and
of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts follow the development
of events, and show how in some ways the legislation shaped
them.[515] Contemporary records and comments are garnered in Almon's
_Remembrancer_, Force's _Archives_, Niles's _Principles and Acts of the
Revolution_, and Moore's _Diary of the Amer. Revolution_. The life and
daily routine of both camps are to be traced in abundant orderly books,
diaries, and correspondence, of which the register is given in the
notes (C and D) following this essay.

Of the Canada expedition, in its combined movements by the Kennebec
and Lake Champlain, the authorities for detail may well be reserved
for later notes (G and H), but for comprehensive treatment references
may be made to the general historians and a few special monographs. As
respects the campaign in general, the only considerable special study
is Charles Henry Jones's _History of the Campaign for the Conquest of
Canada in_ 1776 (Philad., 1882). The book does not profess, however,
to follow the movements before the death of Montgomery, nor to touch
at all the coöperating column of Arnold before it had united with the
other. A principal interest of its writer is, furthermore, to chronicle
the share of Pennsylvanians in the campaign. The study is therefore
but an imperfect one, and the author gives the student no assistance
in indicating his sources. The reader most necessarily have recourse,
then, for a survey of the whole campaign, to such general works as
Bancroft's _United States_ (vol. viii.), Carrington's _Battles_ (p.
122), and other comprehensive and biographical works.[516]

The political aspects of the movement on Canada arise in the main from
the mission of the Commissioners of Congress to the army, and their
efforts to affect the sympathies of the Canadians. The sources of this
matter are also traced in a subsequent note.[517]

[Illustration]


NOTES.

=A.= LEXINGTON AND CONCORD.—The details of Revere's connection with
the events of the 18th and 19th April are not altogether without
dispute. Revere's own narrative was not written till 1798,[518] and
was printed in the _Mass. Hist. Soc. Collections_, vol. v., but not
so accurately as to preclude the advisability of reprinting it in the
same society's _Proceedings_, Nov., 1878. Richard Devens's nearly
contemporary account of the signal lanterns is printed in Frothingham's
_Siege of Boston_, p. 57.[519] The traditional story of the other
messenger of that eventful night is told in H. W. Holland's _William
Dawes and his ride with Paul Revere_.[520]

In a book which was published at Boston in 1873 as _Historic Fields and
Mansions of Middlesex_, but whose title in a second edition, in 1876,
reads _Old Landmarks and Historic Fields of Middlesex_, Mr. Samuel
Adams Drake follows (ch. xvi.-xviii.) the route of the British troops
from Lechmere Point to Concord and back to Charlestown, pointing out
the localities of signal events in the day's course.

The provincial congress ordered depositions[521] to be taken of those
who had participated in the events of the day, with a main purpose of
establishing that the British fired first at Lexington. These were
signed in several copies. One set of them, accompanied by a request
from Warren to Franklin to have them printed and dispersed in England,
was entrusted to Capt. John Derby, of Salem, who took also a copy of
the _Essex Gazette_, in which an account of the fighting was printed,
and sailed in a swift packet for England four days after Lieutenant
Nunn, bearing Gage's despatches, had sailed from Boston (April 24).
Derby reached Southampton on the 27th of May, and was in London the
next day.[522] London had been stirred three weeks before with rumors
of a bloody day with Gage's troops,[523] and now two days later the
government felt called upon to announce they had no tidings; whereupon
Arthur Lee, who, since Franklin had sailed for America, had succeeded
to his place as agent of Massachusetts, and had received the papers,
made a counter-announcement that the public could see the affidavits at
the Mansion House.[524] The tidings spread. Hutchinson communicated the
news to Gibbon, and he recorded it in a letter, May 31.[525] On the 5th
of June Horace Walpole wrote it to Horace Mann. On the 7th, Dartmouth
spoke of the "vague and uncertain accounts of a skirmish, made up for
the purpose of conveying misrepresentation."[526]

[Illustration: LEXINGTON DEPOSITION.

Fac-simile of the original in the Arthur Lee Papers in Harvard College
library. The fac-simile on the opposite page, relating to the action
at Concord, is reproduced from an original in the same collection of
papers.]

[Illustration]

On the same day the friends of America, forming the Constitutional
Society, met at the King's Arms in Cornhill, and raised a subscription
of £100, to be paid to the widows and families of the provincials who
had been killed.[527] On the 8th another vessel reached Liverpool,
confirming the news, but giving no particulars. Finally, on the 10th,
the official report of Gage, with the statements of Percy and Smith,
reached the government.[528]

Meanwhile, both sides at home had been busy with circulating their
pleas of vindications. The provincial congress at once despatched
messengers south,[529] and the Rev. William Gordon, an Englishman
settled in Jamaica Plain, drew up (May 17, 1775) for the patriots their
authoritative _Account of the Commencement of hostilities_;[530] and
various other contemporary accounts on the provincial side have come
down to us,[531] and of importance among them are the narratives of
the ministers of Lexington and Concord, the Reverends Jonas Clark and
William Emerson.[532]

[Illustration: LEXINGTON, 1775.

After a plan in Hudson's _Lexington_, p. 173. The British approached
from Boston up the road, past the Munroe Tavern, still standing (C),
past Loring's house and barn (I J); and opposite Emerson's house (H)
they sighted, looking beyond the meeting-house (L), the Lexington
militia, under Capt. John Parker, drawn up along the farther side of
the triangular green, in front of the houses of Daniel Harrington
(E) and Jonathan Harrington (D, still standing) (who was one of the
killed), which were separated from each other by a blacksmith's shop
(G). The house on the opposite side of the common (F) was Nathan
Munroe's (still standing), and on the third side was Bucknam's Tavern
(B, still standing), where Parker's company was mostly assembled
when the order was given to form on the common. When the minute-men
scattered, most of them ran across the swamp; but some fled up the
Bedford road, in the direction of the Clarke House (A), still standing,
where Adams and Hancock had spent the night, but from which they were
now hurrying towards Burlington for better protection.

On the return of the British from Concord, they met Percy's column
on the road between Munroe's Tavern and Loring's. Percy now kept the
provincials at bay by planting his field-pieces at M and N, while some
of the wounded were carried into the tavern, which is still standing.
The buildings (I J) were set on fire and burned down. Balls from
Percy's cannon have been dug up since in the town. One went through the
meeting-house (L). Several of these balls are preserved. While Percy
was halting, General Heath arrived among the provincials and assumed
the command. Cf. the plans in Josiah Adams's _Address at Acton_;
Moore's _Ballad History of the Revolution_.

There are views of the Clarke House in Hudson's _Lexington_, 430;
Drake's _Landmarks of Middlesex_, 364-368; Lossing's _Field-Book_, i.
523; and of the Munroe Tavern in Hudson, part ii. p. 161.]

The _Memoirs_ of General Heath are, of course, of first importance; for
he was on the ground soon after Percy took the command on the British
side.[533]

[Illustration: CONCORD, 1775.

This follows a plan in Hudson's _Lexington_, p. 191. The British
approached from Lexington by the road (1), and halted in the middle of
the town (3). The provincials, who were assembled by the liberty-pole
(2), retired along the road (5) by the Rev. William Emerson's house
[Hawthorne's "Old Manse"], and across the North Bridge (between 5 and
8) to the high land (6), where they halted, and where reinforcements
from the neighboring towns reached them. Colonel Smith, the British
commander, now sent out two parties to seek for stores. One, which went
by the road (4) to the South Bridge, found little. The other followed
the road (5) by the North Bridge, and passing beneath the provincials
at 6, turned to their right, and took the road (5) to Colonel Barrett's
house, where they destroyed some cannon and other stores. This second
party had left a detail at the North Bridge to secure their retreat by
that way, for the road (10) did not then exist. The provincials, after
the party bound to Colonel Barrett's passed on, descended from 6 to the
North Bridge, when the detail defending it, who were near 8, recrossed
the bridge. Here the first firing took place, and some were killed
on both sides, the river being between the combatants. The British
detail now retired towards the centre of the town, the Americans
following them across the bridge, but immediately dispersing without
military order. While thus scattered, the British party, returning from
Barrett's house, recrossed the North Bridge without molestation, and
rejoined the main body at the centre of the town. Here the British,
after destroying other stores and delaying for about two hours, formed
for the return march towards Lexington, the main body following the
road (2), while a flanking party took the ridge of high land (2).

Cf. also the plans in Frothingham's _Siege of Boston_, 70.]

A few days after the 19th, John Adams tells us[534] he rode along "the
scene of action toward Lexington for many miles, and inquired of the
inhabitants the circumstances." He gives us no particulars, but what he
learned was not calculated to diminish his ardor in the cause.[535]

The accounts on the British side are almost equally numerous, including
the official reports of Gage, Percy, and Smith, already referred to.
General Gage sent (April 29)[536] to Gov. Trumbull, of Connecticut,
a statement, which was printed at the time in a handbill as a
_Circumstantial Account_, and he refers to it "as taken from gentlemen
of indisputable honor and veracity, who were eye-witnesses of all the
transactions of that day."[537]

In 1779 there was printed at Boston a pamphlet containing General
Gage's instructions to Brown and De Bernière,[538] from a MS. left in
Boston by a British officer, to which is appended an account of the
"transactions" of April 19, with a list of the killed, wounded, and
missing,[539] and in 1775 there was printed at London a contemporary
summary in _The Rise, Progress, and Present State of the Dispute_.[540]

The question of firing the first shot at Lexington was studiously
examined at the time, each side claiming exemption from the charge
of being the aggressor, and Frothingham[541] and Hudson[542] collate
the evidence. It seems probable that the British fired first, though
by design or accident a musket on the provincial side flashed in the
pan before the regulars fired.[543] That some irregular return of the
British fire was made seems undeniable, though at the time of the
semi-centennial celebration certain writers, anxious to establish
for Concord the credit of first forcibly resisting the British arms,
denied that claim on the part of the neighboring town. The controversy
resulted in Elias Phinney's _Battle of Lexington_, published in
1825,[544] with depositions of survivors, taken in 1822; and Ezra
Ripley's _Fight at Concord_, published in 1827.[545] The parts borne by
the men of other towns have had their special commemorations.[546]

[Illustration: PART OF EMERSON'S RECORD IN HIS DIARY, APRIL 19, 1775
(from Whitney's _Literature of the Nineteenth of April_).]

[Illustration: PERCY.

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, Lond., 1785, vol. ii. A portrait
engraved by V. Green is noted in J. C. Smith's _Brit. Mezzotint
Portraits_, ii. 576. Cf. also _Evelyns in America_, 304; _Memorial
Hist. of Boston_, iii. 57, 58; "Percy family and Alnwick Castle" in
Jewitt's _Stately Homes of England_. In the _Third Report_ of the Hist.
MSS. Commission there are (1872) various papers of the Percy family
touching the American war. Some of these papers have been procured
from England by the Rev. E. G. Porter, of Lexington. Several letters
of Percy, addressed to Bishop Percy, sold not long since at a sale of
the Bishop's MSS., were bought by a London dealer, and are now in the
Boston Public Library. They are quoted from in this and other chapters.
On July 30, 1776, a picture of Percy was placed in Guildhall, London,
by the magistrates of the city and liberties of Westminster, in token
of his services in America. Cf. also Doyle's _Official Baronage_, ii.
670.]

[Illustration: PERCY.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, i. 382.]


=B.= BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL, _June 17, 1775_.—There are four sufficient
authorities for tracing all that is known respecting the battle of
Bunker Hill, even to minute particulars, especially with respect
to the testimony of those who, from nearness to the event, or from
opportunity, are best entitled to be considered in the matter. The
earliest master of the literature and records of the fight was Richard
Frothingham, who through life was identified with the story of Bunker
Hill, and who has on the whole, in his _Siege of Boston_ and in his
_Life of Joseph Warren_, given us the amplest details.[547] His latest
gleanings were included in _The Battlefield of Bunker hill: with a
relation of the action by William Prescott, and illustrative documents.
A paper communicated to the Massachusetts Historical Society, June
10, 1875, with additions._ (Boston: printed for the author. 1876. 46
pp.)[548]

In June, 1868, Henry B. Dawson, in a special number of the _Historical
Magazine_, entered into an elaborate collation of nearly all that had
been published up to that time, making his references in footnotes,
which serve as a bibliography of the subject.[549]

[Illustration: LEXINGTON GREEN.

From the _Massachusetts Magazine_ (Boston, 1794). Four views (12 X 18
inches, on copper) of different aspects of the day's fight were drawn
by Earl, a portrait painter, and engraved by Amos Doolittle shortly
afterward. They are reproduced in the centennial edition of Jonas
Clark's _Narrative_; in Frank Moore's _Ballad History_; in _Potter's
American Monthly_, April, 1875; in _Antique views of y^e Town of
Boston_; and separately, with an explanatory text, by E. G. Porter, as
_Four Drawings of the Engagement at Lexington and Concord_ (Boston,
1883). The view of the attack on Lexington Green was drawn from Daniel
Harrington's house (see plan), and was reduced by Doolittle himself
for Barber's _History of New Haven_. (W. S. Baker's _Amer. Engravers_,
Philad., 1875, p. 45.) It has also been redrawn several times by
others. See Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 421, 524; Hudson's _Lexington_,
p. 183; the Centennial edition of Phinney, etc.

Earl and Doolittle were soldiers of a New Haven company, which reached
Cambridge a few days after the fight.

There is a view of Concord taken in 1776 in the _Massachusetts Mag._,
July, 1794, which is reproduced in Whitney's _Literature of the
Nineteenth of April_.

There is an early but fanciful picture of the "Journée de Lexington"
in François Godefroy's _Recueil d'Estampes representant les different
événemens de la guerre qui a procuré l'indépendence aux États Unis de
l'Amérique_.

An account of Jonathan Harrington, the last survivor of the fight, is
in _Potter's Amer. Monthly_, April, 1875, and in Jones's _New York
during the Revolution_, i. 552.

In fiction, mention need only be made of Cooper's _Lionel Lincoln_, and
Hawthorne's _Septimus Felton_.

In 1875 there was an exhibition of relics of the fight at Lexington,
and some of them are still retained in the library hall. A printed list
of them was issued in 1875. A musket taken from a British soldier was
bequeathed by Theodore Parker to the State of Massachusetts, and now
hangs in the Senate Chamber. Cf. _Hist. Mag._, iv. 202 (July, 1880).]

In 1875 Justin Winsor published first in the _Bulletin_ of the Boston
Public Library a bibliographical commentary on all printed matter
respecting the battle, grouping his notes by their affinities; and this
was enlarged in the _Celebration of the Centennial Anniversary of the
Battle_, published by the city of Boston in 1875; and still further
augmented in a section of his _Handbook of the American Revolution_
(Boston, 1879).

In 1880 James F. Hunnewell, in his _Bibliography of Charlestown and
Bunker Hill_ (Boston), grouped everything alphabetically under such
main headings as monographs, maps and plans, contemporary newspapers,
American statements, British accounts, French accounts, anniversaries.
His enumeration is more nearly exhaustive than Mr. Winsor's, though
this may still supplement it in some particulars.

       *       *       *       *       *

The earliest printed accounts which we have of the battle are in
the newspapers, and of these a full enumeration is given by Mr.
Hunnewell.[550]

What may be called the official statements on the American side were
speedily placed before the public, but, strange to say, neither of the
two officers who have been held to have directed the conduct of the
Americans vouched for any of the early accounts. From Putnam we have
nothing. Prescott made no statement, which has come down to us, earlier
than in a letter addressed to John Adams, Aug. 25, 1775,[551] though he
is said to have assisted the Rev.

[Illustration: RICHARD FROTHINGHAM.

After a steel plate kindly furnished by Mr. Frothingham's son, Mr.
Thomas Goddard Frothingham. There is a memoir of Mr. Frothingham, by
Charles Deane, in the _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, Feb., 1885, and
separately. Mr. Frothingham was born Jan. 31, 1812, and died Jan. 29,
1880. Remarks made to the society at the time of his death are in the
_Proc._ (Feb., 1880), xvii. 329. Cf. R. C. Winthrop's _Speeches_ (1878,
etc.), p. 125.]

Peter Thacher in a narrative which was prepared within a fortnight,
Thacher himself having observed the fight from the Malden side of
Mystick River.[552] This Thacher MS. was made the basis of the account
which the Committee of Safety, by order of the provincial congress,
prepared for sending to England.[553] There have been preserved a
large number of letters and statements written by eye-witnesses or by
those near at hand, some of them conveying particulars essential to
the understanding of the day's events, but most adding little beyond
increasing our perceptions of the feelings of the hour.[554]

[Illustration:

After the painting belonging to Yale College. Cf. photograph in
Kingsley's _Yale College_, i. 102; engravings in Hollister's
_Connecticut_, i. 234, and _Amer. Quart. Reg._, viii. 31, 193; and
memoir in Sparks's _Amer. Biog._, xvi. 3, by J. L. Kingsley.]

To these may be added various diaries and orderly-books, which are of
little distinctive value.[555] There are other accounts, written at a
later period, in which personal recollections are assisted by study
of the recitals of others, and chief among them are the narrative in
Thacher's _Military Journal_ (Boston, 1823), where the account is
entered as of July, 1775, and chapter xix. of General James Wilkinson's
_Memoirs_ (1816), embodying what he learned in going over the field
in March, 1776, with Stark and Reed. Col. John Trumbull saw the smoke
of the fight from the Roxbury lines, and gave an outline narrative
in his _Autobiography_ (1841).[556] The account in General Heath's
_Memoirs_ (Boston, 1798) is short.[557] A few of the earlier general
histories of the war were written by those on the American side who
had some advantages by reason of friendly or other relations with the
actors.[558] Of the still later accounts, Frothingham and Dawson have
already been referred to for their bibliographical accompaniments.
The diversity of evidence[559] respecting almost all cardinal points
of the battle's history has necessarily entailed more or less of
the controversial spirit in all who have written upon it, but for
thoroughness of research and a fair discrimination combined, the
labors of Frothingham must be conceded to be foremost. Dawson is
elaborate, and he reveals more than Frothingham the processes of his
collations, but his spirit is not so tempered by discretion, and an
air of flippant controversy often pervades his narrative. Of the more
recent general historians it is only necessary to mention Bancroft[560]
and Carrington. The former gave to it three chapters in his original
edition, in 1858, which, by a little condensation, make a single
one in his final revision, but without material change.[561] The
account in Carrington[562] is intended to be distinctively a military
criticism.[563]

The troops of Connecticut[564] and New Hampshire[565] were the only
ones engaged beside those of Massachusetts.

The question of who commanded during the day has been the subject of
continued controversy, arising from the too large claims of partisans.
Though there is much conflict of contemporary evidence, it seems well
established that Col. William Prescott commanded at the redoubt, and
no one questioned his right. He also sent out the party which in the
beginning protected his flank towards the Mystick; but when Stark,
with his New Hampshire men, came up to strengthen that party, his
authority seems to have been generally recognized, and he held the rail
fence there as long as he could to cover the retreat of Prescott's men
from the redoubt. Putnam, the ranking officer on the field, Warren
disclaiming all right to command, withdrew men with entrenching tools
from Prescott, and planned to throw up earthworks on the higher
eminence, now known as Bunker Hill proper, and near the end of the
retreat he assumed a general command, and directed the fortifying of
Prospect Hill. It is not apparent, then, that any officer, previous to
this last stage of the fight, can be said to have had general command
in all parts of the field. The discussion of the claims of Putnam and
Prescott has resulted in a large number of monographs, and has formed a
particular feature in many of the general accounts of the battle, the
mention of some of which has for this reason been deferred till they
could be placed in the appended note.[566]

A list of officers in the battle, not named in Frothingham's _Siege_,
is given in the _N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, April, 1873; and an
English list of the Yankee officers in the force about Boston in
June, 1775, is in _Ibid._, July, 1874. The Lives of participants and
observers add occasionally some items to the story.[567]

[Illustration:

This follows the reproduction of an engraving in J. C. Smith's _Brit.
Mezzotint Portraits_, p. 1716, which is inscribed: ISRAEL PUTNAM, Esq.,
_Major-General of the Connecticut forces, and Commander-in-chief at the
engagement on Buncker's-Hill, near Boston, 17 June, 1775. Published
by C. Shepherd, 9 Sep^r 1775. J. Wilkinson pinxt._ (Cf. _Mass. Hist.
Soc. Proc._, xix. 102.) There is a French engraving, representing him
in cocked hat, looking down and aside, and subscribed "Israel Putnam,
Eq^{re}., major général des Troupes de Connecticut. Il commandait en
chef à l'affaire de Bunckes hill près Boston, le 17 Juin, 1775." Col.
J. Trumbull made a sketch of Putnam, which has been engraved by W.
Humphreys (_National Portrait Gallery_, N. Y., 1834) and by Thomas
Gimbrede.

Cf. portraits in Murray's _Impartial Hist._ (1778), i. 334; Hollister's
_Connecticut_; Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed., i. 413; and
_Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa_ (Nürnberg, 1778).

For lives of Putnam, see Sabin, xvi. no. 66,804, etc. For his
birthplace, see _Appleton's Journal_, xi. 321; Miss Larned's _Windham
County, Conn._ Cf. B. J. Lossing in _Harper's Monthly_, xii. 577;
_Evelyns in America_, 273; R. H. Stoddard in _Nat. Mag._, xii. 97.]

[Illustration: JOSEPH WARREN.

After a copperplate by J. Norman in _An Impartial Hist. of the War
in America_ (Boston, 1781), vol. ii. p. 210. The best known picture
of Warren is a small canvas by Copley, belonging to Dr. John Collins
Warren, of Boston, which has been often engraved, and is given in
mezzotint by H. W. Smith in Frothingham's _Life of Warren_. The picture
in Faneuil Hall is painted after this, and Thomas Illman has engraved
that copy. A larger canvas by Copley, painted not long before that
artist left Boston for England, is owned by Dr. Buckminster Brown,
of Boston, and was engraved for the first time in the _Mem. Hist. of
Boston_, iii. 60, where will be found accounts of various contemporary
prints and memorials of Warren (pp. 59, 61, 142, 143), including his
house at Roxbury, the manuscript of his Massacre Oration, etc. Cf.
Frothingham's _Warren_, p. 546; _Hist. Mag._, Dec., 1857; Loring's
_Hundred Boston Orators_, p. 67; Mrs. J. B. Brown's _Stories of
General Warren_; _Life of Dr. John Warren_; the _Warren Genealogy_;
_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, Sept., 1866. The earliest eulogy was that
by Perez Morton in 1776 (Loring's _Hundred Boston Orators_, 327;
Niles's _Principles and Acts_, 1876, p. 30), and the earliest memoir
of any extent was that by A. H. Everett, in Sparks's _Amer. Biography_
(vol. x.). There are reminiscences in the _N. E. Hist. and Geneal.
Reg._, xii. 113, 234, which were based by Gen. William H. Sumner on
some letters published by him in 1825 in the _Boston Patriot_, when,
as adjutant-general of the State, he arranged for the appearance of
the Bunker Hill veterans in the celebration of that year, and derived
some reminiscences from them respecting Warren's appearance and
action during the fight. All other accounts of Warren, however, have
been eclipsed by Frothingham's _Life of Warren_ (Boston, 1865). In
the _Boston Medical and Surgical Journal_ (June 17, 1875), Dr. John
Jeffries (son of the surgeon of the British army who saw Warren's body
on the field) published a paper on his death. Cf. also R. J. Speirr in
Potter's _Amer. Monthly_, v. 571; Frothingham's _Warren_, pp. 519, 523;
Barry's _Massachusetts_, i. 37, and references.

The grateful intentions expressed by the Massachusetts House of
Representatives (April 4, 1776), by the Continental Congress (April
8, 1777; Sept. 6, 1778; July 1, 1780,—see _Journals of Congress_),
and by the Congress of the United States (Jan. 30, 1846,—_Mass.
Hist. Soc. Proc._, ii. 337), have never been carried out. Benedict
Arnold manifested a special interest in the welfare of Warren's
children (_N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, April, 1857, p. 122). The
Freemasons erected a pillar to his memory on the battlefield in 1794,
which disappeared when the present obelisk was begun in 1825. There
is a view of the pillar in the _Analectic Mag._, March, 1818, and
in Snow's _Boston_, 309. Cf. _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, xiv. 65. A
statue of Warren, by Henry Dexter, was placed in a pavilion near the
obelisk in 1857. Cf. G. W. Warren's _Hist. of the Bunker Hill Monument
Association_; Frothingham's _Warren_, p. 547.]

Among the anniversary discourses upon the battle, a few will bear
reading. The earliest was by Josiah Bartlett in 1794, published by B.
Edes, in Boston, the next year. Daniel Webster made a famous address
at the laying of the corner-stone of the monument in 1825, which can
be found in his _Works_, i. 59. (Cf. _Analectic Mag._, vol. xi.; A.
Levasseur's _Lafayette en Amérique_, Paris, 1829.) The same orator, at
the completion of the monument in 1843, embodied little of historical
interest in his Address. (_Works_, i. 89.[568]) Alexander H. Everett's
_Address_ in 1836 was subsequently inwoven in his _Life of Warren_. The
Rev. George E. Ellis began his conspicuous labors in this field in his
discourse in 1841. Edward Everett spoke in 1850 (_Orations_, etc., iii.
p. 3), and Gen. Charles Devens, at the Centennial in 1875, delivered an
oration, which was published by the city of Boston. The most noteworthy
address since that time was that of Robert C. Winthrop at the unveiling
of the statue of Colonel William Prescott, June 17, 1881.[569] This
statue, of which an engraving will be found in the _Mem. Hist. of
Boston_ (iv. 410), stands near the base of the monument.[570]

       *       *       *       *       *

We turn now to the accounts on the British side. The orderly-books
of General Howe are preserved among Lord Dorchester's (Carleton's)
Papers in the Royal Institution, London. Sparks made extracts from
them, now in no. xlv. of the _Sparks MSS._ in Harvard College library.
Extracts relating to the dispositions for the day of the battle, and
for subsequent days, are given by Ellis (1843) p. 88.[571] Cf. _Mag.
of Amer. Hist._, 1885, p. 214. The more immediate English notes and
comments on the battle can be best grouped in a note.[572]

During 1775 there were two English accounts, aiming at something like
historical perspective. One of these was, very likely, by Edmund Burke,
and was in the _Annual Register_ (p. 133, etc.). The other was _An
Impartial and Authentic Narrative of the Battle fought on the 17th of
June, 1775, between his Britannic Majesty's Troops and the American
Provincial Army on Bunker's Hill near Charles Town in New England_.
The author was John Clark, a first lieutenant of marines. He gives a
speech of Howe to his men, representing that it was delivered just
as he advanced to the attack, but this and much else in the book are
considered of doubtful authenticity.[573]

In 1780 there appeared in the _London Chronicle_ some letters by Israel
Mauduit, which were republished the same year as _Three letters to
Lord Viscount Howe: added, Remarks on the battle of Bunker's Hill_
(London, 1780), which in a second edition (1781) reads additionally
in the title, _To which is added a comparative view of the Conduct of
Lord Cornwallis and General Howe_. There was among the Chalmers' MSS.
(Thorpe's _Supplemental Catal._, 1843, no. 660) a writing entitled
_Some particulars of the battle of Bunker's Hill, the situation of the
ground_, etc. (8 pp., 1784), which Chalmers calls a "most curious paper
in the handwriting of Israel Mauduit, found among his pamphlets, Jan.
23, 1789."

In 1784 William Carter's _Genuine Detail of the Royal and American
Armies_ appeared in London. Carter was a lieutenant in the Fortieth
Foot, and his book was seemingly reissued in 1785, with a new
title-page. (Brinley, no. 1,789; Stevens, _Bibl. Amer._, 1885, nos. 80,
81; Harvard Coll. lib., 6351.16.)

[Illustration:

NOTE.—The fac-simile on this page is of a handbill, printed in Boston,
giving the tory side of the fight at Bunker Hill,—after an original in
the library of the Mass. Hist. Society.]

[Illustration: NOTE.—This sketch of Bunker Hill Battle, made for Lord
Rawdon, follows a tracing of the original belonging to Dr. Emmet of
New York, furnished to me by Mr. Benson J. Lossing. A finished drawing
from this sketch is given in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, vol. iii. Cf.
_Harper's Mag._ xlvii., p. 18. The spire in the foreground is that of
the West Church, which stood where Dr. Bartol's church, in Cambridge
Street, Boston, now stands, showing that the sketcher was on Beacon
hill, 138 feet above the water. The smoke from the frigate to the right
of the spire rises against the higher hill where Putnam endeavored
to rally the retreating provincials. This hill is 110 feet above the
water, and about one mile and a half distant from the spectator. One
hundred and thirty rods to the right of this summit is the crown of the
lower or Breed's Hill, where the redoubt was, which is 62 feet above
the sea. Dr. Emmet secured this picture and another of the slope of
the hill, taken after the battle, and showing the broken fences (_Mem.
Hist. of Boston_, iii. 88), at the sale of the effects of the Marquis
of Hastings, who was a descendant of Lord Rawdon, then on Gage's staff
(_Harper's Monthly Mag._, 1875). The earliest engraved picture of the
battle is one cut by Roman, which was published the same year, and
appeared also in Sept., 1775, on a reduced scale, in the _Pennsylvania
Magazine_. It has been reproduced in Frothingham's _Centennial: Battle
of Bunker Hill_ (1875), in Moore's _Ballad History_, and in other of
the Centennial memorials. In 1781 a poem by George Cockings, _The
American War_ (London), had a somewhat extraordinary picture, which
has been reproduced in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 401, by S. A.
Drake, and others. In 1786 Col. John Trumbull painted his well-known
picture of the battle, which has been often engraved. (Cf. Trumbull's
_Autobiography_; _N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, xv.; Tuckerman's _Book
of the Artists_; _Harper's Magazine_, Nov., 1879.) Trumbull claimed
that the following figures in his picture were portraits: Warren,
Putnam, Howe, Clinton, Small, and the two Pitcairns.

In the _Mass. Magazine_, Sept., 1789, there is a view of Charlestown,
showing Bunker's and Breed's hills, with their original contours. It
is reproduced in _Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 554, with a note upon other
early views. Frothingham (_Siege_, p. 121) gives one from an early
manuscript which closely resembles the topography of the Rawdon sketch;
and again (_Centennial_, etc.) another which is in fact the perspective
sketch of the town at the edge of Price's view of Boston (1743),
converted into a panoramic picture (_Mem. Hist. of Boston_, ii. 329).

The _Gentleman's Mag._, Feb., 1790, has a view of Charlestown, with the
tents of the British army on the hill, taken after the battle, and from
Copp's Hill. It shows the wharves and ruins of the town. (Cf. note in
_Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 88.)]

The account of the loyalist Jones (_N. Y. during the Rev._, i. 52) has
his usual twist of vision, though he is severe on Gage for "taking the
bull by the horns" in making an attack in front.

[Illustration: CHARLESTOWN PENINSULA, 1775.

Sketched from a plan by Montresor, showing the redoubt erected by the
British, after June 17, on the higher eminence of Bunker Hill. The
original is in the library of Congress, where is a plan on a large
scale of this principal redoubt.]

The long list of general histories on the British side, detailing the
events of the battle, begins with Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the War_
(London, 1778; Newcastle, 1782), and is made up during the rest of that
century by the _Hist. of the War_ published at Dublin (1779-85); Hall's
_Civil War in America_ (1780); _The Detail and Conduct of the Amer.
War_ (1780); Andrews's _Hist. of the War_ (1785, vol. i. 301,—quoted
at length by Ryerson, _Loyalists_, i. 461); Stedman, _Hist. Amer. War_
(London, 1794, vol. i. 125). The best of the later historians is Mahon
(_Hist. of England_, vi.), who was forced to admit, when pressed upon
the question, that the American claims of victory, which he says they
have always held, appear only in the reports of later British tourists
(vol. vi., App. xxix.). Lecky, in his brief account (_England in the
Eighteenth Century_, iii. 463), makes an intention of Gage to fortify
the Charlestown and not the Dorchester heights the incentive to the
American occupation of the former. Edw. Bernard's _History of England_
(London) has a curious "View of the Attack on Bunker's Hill, with the
burning of Charlestown."

Something confirmatory, rather than of original value, can be gained
from the histories of various regiments which took part in the
battle, as detailed in the series of _Historical Records_ of such
regiments.[574]

       *       *       *       *       *

The battle almost immediately found commemoration in British ballads
(_Hist. Mag._, ii. 58; v. 251; Hale's _Hundred Years Ago_, p. 7), and
the slain were commemorated in elegiac verses, as in M. M. Robinson's
_To a young lady, on the death of her brother, slain in the late
engagement at Boston_ (London, 1776). The same year there appeared at
Philadelphia _The Battle of Bunker's Hill, a dramatic piece in five
acts, in heroic measure, by a gentleman of Maryland_.

[Illustration: PLAN OF BUNKER HILL.

NOTE.—The references in the corner of this cut, too fine to be easily
read in this reduced fac-simile, are as follows:—

"_A A._ First position, where the troops remained until reinforcements
arrived.

_B B._ Second position.

_C C C._ Ground on which the different regiments marched to form the
line.

_D D._ Direction in which the attack was made upon the redoubt and
breastwork.

_E E._ Position of a part of the 47th and marines, to silence the fire
of a barn at E.

_F._ First position of the cannon.

_G._ Second position of the cannon in advancing with the grenadiers,
but stopped by the marsh.

_H._ Breastwork formed of pickets, hay, stones, etc., with the pieces
of cannon.

_I I._ Light infantry advancing along the shore to force the right of
the breastwork _H_.

_L L._ The "Lively" and "Falcon" hauled close to shore, to rake the low
grounds before the troops advanced.

_M M._ Gondolas that fired on the rebels in their retreat.

_N._ Battery of cannon, howitzers, and mortars on Copp's Hill, that
battered the redoubt and set fire to Charlestown.

_O O O._ The rebels behind all the stone walls, trees, and brush-wood,
and their numbers uncertain, having constantly large columns to
reinforce them during the action.

_P._ Place from whence the grenadiers received a very heavy fire.

_Q._ Place of the fifty-second regiment on the night of the 17th.

_R._ Forty-seventh regiment, in Charlestown, on the night of the 17th.

_S._ Detachments in the mill and two storehouses.

_T._ Breastwork thrown up by the remainder of the troops on the night
of the 17th.

_Note._ The distance from Boston to Charlestown is about 550 yards."]

Its author is said to be Hugh Henry Brackenridge, and the frontispiece,
"The Death of Warren", by Norman, is held to be the earliest engraving
in British America by a native artist (Hunnewell, p. 13; Brinley, no.
1,787; Sabin, ii. 7,184; xiv. 58,640). In 1779 there was printed at
Danvers, _America Invincible, an heroic poem, in two books: a Battle at
Bunker Hill, by an officer of rank in the Continental army_ (Hunnewell,
p. 13). In 1781 an anonymous poem was published in London, known later
to be the production of George Cockings, and called _The American War,
in which the names of the officers who have distinguished themselves
during the war are introduced_ (Brinley, no. 1,788; Hunnewell, p. 14).
Of later use of the battle in fiction, it is only necessary to name
Cooper's novel of _Lionel Lincoln_ and O. W. Holmes's _Grandmother's
Story of Bunker Hill Battle_ (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, 1875, p. 33).

       *       *       *       *       *

The chief enumerations which have been heretofore made of the plans
of the battle of Bunker Hill are by Frothingham, in _Mass. Hist. Soc.
Proc._, xiv. 53; by Hunnewell in his _Bibliog. of Charlestown_, p. 17;
and by Winsor in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, iii. (introduction). The
earliest rude sketches are by Stiles in his diary (Dawson, p. 393),
and one formed by printer's rules in _Rivington's Gazetteer_, Aug. 3,
1775 (Frothingham's _Siege_, p. 397, and Dawson, p. 390). Montresor, of
the British engineers, very soon made a survey of the field, and this
was used by Lieutenant Page in drawing a plan of the action, which he
carried to England with him when, on account of wounds received while
acting as an aid to Howe, he was given leave of absence (_Mass. Hist.
Soc. Proc._, June, 1875, p. 56). In the Faden collection (nos. 25-30)
of maps in the library of Congress there are Page's rough and finished
plans, drawn before the British works on the hill were begun, and also
plans by Montresor and R. W., of the Welsh Fusiliers. Page's plan,
as engraved, was issued in London in 1776, and called _A Plan of the
Action at Bunker's Hill_.[575]

Page's, however, was not the first engraved. One "by an officer on
the spot" was published in London, Nov. 27, 1775, called _Plan of
the battle on Bunker's Hill. Fought on the 17th of June_, which was
issued as a broadside, with Burgoyne's letter to Lord Stanley on the
same sheet. The central position of the Americans is called "Warren's
redoubt." This is reproduced in F. Moore's _Ballad History of the
Revolution_.

Another contemporary British plan—discovered probably "in the baggage
of a British officer", after the royal troops left Boston in March,
1776, but not brought to light till forty years later, when it was
mentioned in a newspaper in Wilkesbarre, Penn., as having been found in
an old drawer—was one made by Henry de Bernière, of the Tenth Royal
Infantry, on nearly the same scale as Page's, but less accurately.

[Illustration: BOSTON AND BUNKER HILL.

(_Impartial History_, _etc._, 1781.) ]

It was engraved in 1818 in the _Analectic Magazine_ (Philad., p. 150),
and a fac-simile of that engraving is annexed. The text accompanying
it states that its general accuracy had been vouched for by Governor
Brooks, General Dearborn, Dr. A. Dexter, Deacon Thos. Miller, John
Kettell, Dr. Bartlett, the Hon. James Winthrop, and Mr. [Judge]
Prescott. General Dearborn and Deacon Miller thought the rail fence
too far in the rear of the redoubt, having been really nearly in the
line of it. Judge Winthrop and Dr. Bartlett thought the map in this
particular correct. There was the same division of belief regarding
the cannon behind the fence, Dearborn and Miller believing there were
none there, Brooks and Winthrop holding the contrary. Other witnesses
represented to the editor of the _Magazine_ that there was no interval
between the breastwork and the fence, but that an imperfect line of
defence connected the redoubt with the Mystick shore, as represented in
Stedman's (Page's) map.[576]

In the _Portfolio_ (March, 1818) General Dearborn criticised the plan
(Dawson, p. 406), and, using the same plate in his separate issue of
his comments, he imposed in red his ideas of the position of the works,
and this was in turn criticised by Governor Brooks.[577] Mr. G. G.
Smith made a (plan) _Sketch of the Battle of Bunker Hill by a British
Officer_ (Boston, 1843), which grew out of the plan and the comments on
it. Bernière's plan was also used by Colonel Swett as the basis of the
one which he published in his _History of the Battle of Bunker Hill_
(1828, 1826, 1827), which has been frequently copied (Ellis, Lossing,
etc.). The latest attempt to map the phases of the action critically is
by Carrington in his _Battles of the Revolution_ (p. 112), who gives
an eclectic plan. Plans adopting the features of earlier ones are in
the English translation of Botta's _War of Independence_, Grant's
_British Battles_ (ii. 144). A plan of the present condition of the
ground, by Thomas W. Davis, superposing the line of the American works,
is given in the Bunker Hill Monument Association's _Proceedings_
(1876). A map of Charlestown in 1775 with a plan of the battle was
prepared and published in 1875 by James E. Stone. A plan of the works
as reconstructed by the British, and deserted by them in March, 1776,
is given in Carter's _Genuine detail_, etc. (London, 1784), which is
reproduced in Frothingham's _Siege_, p. 330. Other MS. plans of their
works on both hills are in the Faden maps in the library of Congress.

Before the war closed a plan was engraved by Norman, a Boston engraver,
which is the earliest to appear near the scene itself. This was a
_Plan of the town of Boston with the attack on Bunker's Hill, in the
peninsula of Charlestown, on June 17, 1775_ (measuring 11-1/2 × 7
inches), which is, however, of no topographical value as respects the
action. It appeared in Murray's _Impartial History_ (1778), i. p. 430,
and in An Impartial History of the War in America (Boston, 1781, vol.
i.), and a reduced fac-simile of it is annexed.[578]


=C.= THE AMERICAN CAMP.—A variety of journals and diaries have been
preserved, the best known of which is that of Dr. Thacher, a surgeon on
Prospect Hill.[579]

The daily life of the Cambridge camp is best seen in the letters
sent from it, and foremost in interest among such are those of
Washington.[580] From the Roxbury camp there are letters of General
Thomas in the _Thomas Papers_, where is one of Dr. John Morgan, the
medical director. Several from Jedediah Huntington are preserved in
the Trumbull Papers, and are printed in the _Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll._,
xlix.[581] The principal letters from the Winter Hill camp are those
of General Sullivan,[582] and a few have been printed written at the
Prospect Hill camp.[583]

Something of the spirit prevailing in Watertown, where the Provincial
Congress was sitting, can be seen in the letters of James Warren and
Samuel Cooper.[584]

There are in the library of the Amer. Antiq. Soc. at Worcester
several orderly-books of the siege,[585] and others are preserved
elsewhere.[586]

       *       *       *       *       *

=D.= THE BRITISH CAMP.—The condition of Boston during the siege
must be learned from various sources. The _Boston News-Letter_ was
still published, but numbers of it are very scarce for this period,
and no other of the Boston newspapers continued to be published in
the town.[587] It was a convenient vehicle for the British generals,
and any morsel of news likely to be distasteful to the patriots,
like the intercepted correspondence of Washington and John Adams,
was pretty sure to reach the American lines through its columns. The
correspondence of the generals is preserved in the British Archives
and in the papers at the Royal Institution (London), and occasionally
some few letters, like those of Percy in the Boston Public Library,
have been found elsewhere. It is charged that Gage's papers were stolen
in Boston.[588] Some new glimpses were got when Fonblanque published
his _Life of Burgoyne_.[589] The best accounts of the succession
of events in the town and the daily life are found in Dr. Ellis's
"Chronicles of the Siege",[590] and in Mr. Horace E. Scudder's "Life
in Boston during the Siege", a chapter in the _Memorial Hist. of
Boston_, vol. iii.,[591] which may be consulted (p. 154) for various
sources respecting the details of the privations and amusements of the
people and the garrison, and of the vicissitudes of its buildings and
landmarks.[592] An account of the British works in Boston is given in
Frothingham's _Siege of Boston_, and the _Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 79.
The current record of the outposts, etc., is noted in Moore's _Diary
of the Rev._, 109, etc. Carrington (_Battles_, 154) refers to a MS.
narrative of experiences in the town by one Edw. Stow. Some of the
correspondence of the Boston selectmen with Thomas, at Roxbury, is
in the _Thomas Papers_. It is, however, to the diaries, letters, and
orderly-books which have been preserved that we must go for the details
of life in the beleaguered town.[593]


=E.= BOSTON EVACUATED.—The letters of Washington[594] best enable
us to follow the movements, but they may be supplemented by other
contemporary accounts.[595]

Howe's despatch to Dartmouth, dated Nantasket Roads, is in Dawson,
i. 94.[596] His conduct of the siege is criticised in _A view
of the evidence relative to the Conduct of the American War_
(1779). Contemporary dissatisfaction was expressed in an ironical
congratulatory poem published in London (Sabin, iv., 15,476).

One Crean Brush,[597] acting under orders of Howe, endeavored to carry
off the merchandise from the stores of the town, so far as he could,
on a vessel put at his disposal. Howe's proclamation in his favor is
in fac-simile in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, iii. 97. Brush's vessel
was later captured by Manly (_Evacuation Memorial_, 166). Similar
experience in trying to escape with his merchandise was suffered by
Jolley Allen, as portrayed in his _Account of a part of his sufferings
and losses_, ed. by C. C. Smith, given in _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._,
Feb., 1878, and separately. Allen's narrative was reprinted in the
spelling of the original MS. in _An Account of a part of the sufferings
and losses of Jolley Allen, a native of London, with a preface and
Notes by Mrs. Frances Mary Stoddard_ (Boston, 1883). An inventory
of the stores left by the British is in the _Siege of Boston_,
406.[598] In the cabinet of this society is a handbill adopted by
the freeholders of Boston, Nov. 18 [1776?], calling upon all who had
suffered in property in Boston since March, 1775, to report the same to
a committee.[599]

Washington's instructions (April 4, 1776) to Ward are in the printed
_Heath Papers_, P. 4. The Mass. legislature, April 30, 1776, ordered
beacons to be set at Cape Ann, Marblehead, and Blue Hill, ready to be
fired in case of the enemy's reappearing, which was for a long time
dreaded. Ward writes to Washington of his measures in progress.[600]

The correspondence of John Adams and John Winthrop (_Mass. Hist.
Coll._, xlv.) shows constant anxiety lest the defences should not be
prepared in case of need.[601]

[Illustration: SIEGE OF BOSTON, 1776.

The westerly half of the map in the octavo atlas of Marshall's
_Washington_, which is a reduction of the map in the earlier quarto
atlas (1804). It is reproduced in the French translations of Marshall
and of Botta.]

The cut on the title of the present volume represents one side of the
medal given by Congress to Washington, to commemorate his raising the
siege of Boston.[602]


=F.= MAPS OF THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.—Plans of Boston and its
neighborhood, including its harbor, for the illustration of the siege
of Boston, are numerous, and the account of them given in the _Mem.
Hist. of Boston_ (iii., introd.) is in the main followed in the present
enumeration, which divides them into those of American, English,
French, and German origin, and adheres as far as possible to the order
of publication in each group.

The earliest American is the 1769 (or last) edition of what is known
as Price's edition of Bonner's map of Boston, which had done service
since 1722 by successive changes in the plate, this last issue showing
Hancock's Wharf, and "Esqr. Hancock's seat" on Beacon Street.[603] This
map sufficed for local use till the events of 1775 induced new interest
in the topography, when the earliest response came from Philadelphia,
where C. Lownes engraved _A new plan of Boston Harbour from an actual
survey_, for the _Pennsylvania Magazine_. It presented a reminder of
the great event of the year in its "N. B. Charlestown burnt, June 17,
1775, by the Regulars." There is another _Draught of the Harbour of
Boston and the adjacent towns and roads_, a manuscript, dated 1775,
among the _Belknap Papers_, i. 84, in the cabinet of the Mass. Hist.
Society. The same _Pennsylvania Magazine_, the next month (July, 1775),
gave as engraved by Aitkins _A new and correct plan of the town of
Boston and Provincial Camp_. The town seems to be taken from a plan
which had appeared in the _Gentleman's Magazine_ (London) the previous
January; but in one corner was added a plan of the circumvallating
lines of the besieging army.[604] Later in the season two other plans
were made, showing the American lines, which were not published,
however, till long after. One is given in Force's _American Archives_,
4th series, vol. iii.,[605] and the other was made by Col. John
Trumbull, in Sept., 1775, which was published in his _Autobiography_ in
1841.[606] Of about the same time is another very small _Plan of Boston
and its environs_, showing the circumvallating lines, which is in one
corner of a large _Map of the Seat of Civil War in America_, engraved
by B. Romans, and dedicated to Hancock. There is also, in the library
of the Mass. Hist. Society, a rude plan of the harbor and vicinity,
showing the positions of the provincials, which are reckoned at 20,000,
while the royal forces are put at 8,000. I find no other American plan
till Norman's, in 1781, reproduced on another page; and not another
till _The Seat of the late War at Boston_ appeared in the _Universal
Asylum and Columbian Magazine_, July, 1789, p. 444, but this is a
rather scant map of the country as far inland as Worcester. Gordon had
the year before this given a map in his _American Revolution_ (London,
1788) based on English sources; but it has been the foundation of most
of the eclectic maps since published in this country.[607]

In 1822 a Mr. Finch printed in _Silliman's Journal_ an account of the
traces then remaining of the earthworks of the siege, both American and
British.[608] There is an enumeration of the different sections of the
lines, within and without Boston, in the _Mem. Hist. Boston_ (vol. iii.
104).[609]

[Illustration: BOSTON AND VICINITY, JUNE, 1775.]

The earliest English plan of this period is one called _A plan of
Boston and Charlestown from a drawing made in 1771_, which occupies the
margin of a larger map, engraved for _The Town and Country Magazine_
in 1776, later to be mentioned. The _Catalogue of the King's Maps_
(British Museum) shows a colored plan of Boston and vicinity (1773)
in the centre of a large sheet, with marginal views (later to be
described).

In 1774 a _Plan of the town of Boston_ made part of a _Chart of the
Coast of New England_, which appeared in the _London Magazine_, April,
1774, and in _The American Atlas_, issued by Thomas Jefferys in London,
in 1776. This map seems to be the model of a _New and accurate Plan of
the town of Boston_, which is engraved in the corner of _A Map of the
most inhabited part of New England, by Thomas Jefferys, Nov. 29, 1774_,
usually also found in _The American Atlas_ (1776, nos. 15 and 16). This
map is found with the date 1755, even after changes of a later date had
been made in the plate.[610] The original map has also a marginal plan
of Boston harbor (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, September, 1864).

The earliest English map of 1775 is one which appeared in the
_Gentleman's Magazine_ (January, 1775), though it is dated Feb. 1,
1775. It shows the town and harbor.[611]

In the June number of the _Gentleman's Magazine_ is a "map of the
country one hundred miles round Boston, in order to show the situation
and march of the troops, as well provincial as regulars, which are now
within sight of each other, and are hourly expected to engage."

In June, 1775, was also made a not very accurate map of the town and
its environs, which was published in London, Aug. 28, to satisfy the
eagerness for a map of the region to which the news of the battle of
Bunker Hill had turned all eyes. It is to be found in the first volume
of _Almon's Remembrancer_, and is reproduced herewith. A few weeks
after the fight at Charlestown there was probably made in Boston the
MS. plan of _Boston and circumjacent Country_, showing the present
situation of the king's troops and the rebel intrenchments. It is dated
July 25, 1775, and is owned by Dr. Charles Deane.[612]

The largest chart which we have of Boston harbor of this period
is dated August 5, 1775, and was the work of Samuel Holland, the
surveyor-general of the Northern colonies, who was for some years
employed on a coast survey.[613] It takes in Nahant, Nantasket, and
Cambridge, and was based principally on the surveys of George Callendar
(1769).[614] When Des Barres included it in his _Atlantic Neptune_
(part iii., no. 6, 1780-1783), he marked in the besieging lines, and
dated it Dec. 1, 1781, and in this state Des Barres also used it in his
_Coast and Harbors of New England_.[615]

A map showing thirty miles round Boston, and bearing date Aug. 14,
1775, is in the king's library (British Museum), and is signed by
M. Armstrong. It has marginal statistical tables, and in the upper
right-hand corner is a plan of the "action near Charlestown, 17
June, 1775."[616] There is among the Force maps in the library of
Congress the MS. original of the map (sketched herewith as _Boston and
Charlestown_, 1775), which is called _A Draught of the Towns of Boston
and Charlestown and the circumjacent country, shewing the works thrown
up by his Majesty's Troops, and also those by the Rebels during the
campaign of 1775. N. B. The rebel entrenchments are expressed as they
appear from Beacon Hill._

On August 28th the British town-major in Boston, James Urquhart,
licensed Henry Pelham to make a _Plan of Boston with its environs_. It
was engraved in aquatints in London, on two sheets, and not published
till June 2, 1777. Dr. Belknap, who was much troubled to find a correct
plan of the town for this period, thought Pelham's was the best.[617]

[Illustration: BOSTON AND CHARLESTOWN, 1775.]

There are among the Faden MSS. in the library of Congress two MS.
maps. One is probably the best plan of Boston itself of this period,
and the other the best of those of the vicinity.[618] They represent
the conditions of 1775, though they were not engraved and published
by William Faden in London till Oct. 1, 1777, and Oct. 1, 1778,
respectively. They are both, in the main, after a survey by William
Page, of the British engineers. The first is called _A Plan of the
Town of Boston, with the Intrenchments, etc., of his Majesty's forces
in 1775, from the observations of Lieut. Page and from the plans of
other gentlemen_. It gives the peninsula only, with a small portion
of Charlestown, and was again issued in Oct., 1778.[619] The second
is _Boston, its environs and harbour, with the Rebels' works raised
against that town in 1775, from the observations of Lieut. Page,
and from the plans of Capt. Montresor_. It includes Point Alderton,
Chelsea, Cambridge, and Dorchester, and there is a copy in the library
of the Mass. Hist. Society.

[Illustration: BRITISH LINES ON BOSTON NECK, 1775-76.

This is from Page's _Plan of the Town of Boston_, published in London
in 1777, and is accompanied by the following Key:—_a_, redoubt;
_b_, block-house for cannon; _c_, six 24-pounders, 2 royals; _d_,
four 9-pounders; _e_, six 24-pounders; _f_, left bastion; _g_, right
bastion; _h_, _h_, guard-houses; _i_, _i_, traverses; _k_, _k_,
magazines; _l_, _l_, abattis; _m_, _m_, _m_, routes-du-pols; _n_,
block-house for musketry; _o_, floating battery, 2 guns; _p_, _p_,
fleches, 1 sub. and 20 men. The building beyond the outer lines and
near the edge of the upland is Brown's house, the scene of skirmishes
during the siege (_Mem. Hist. of Boston_, iii. 80; Heath's _Memoirs_).
The narrowest part of the neck was at the present Dover Street where
it intersects Washington Street. The foundations of the main works
at this point were laid bare in digging a drain in March, 1860. The
outer works were just within Blackstone and Franklin squares. There
are views of these lines in the Faden Collection in the library of
Congress, dated August, 1775, probably the original of the engraved
views which accompany Des Barres' coast survey, and of which there
are reproductions in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, iii. 80. Cf.
also Frothingham's _Siege_, p. 315. The same Faden Collection has
a pen-and-ink plan of the lines, dated Aug., 1775 (no. 37 of the
_Catal._).

During the summer of 1775, John Trumbull, then an aid to General
Spencer, crawled up, under cover of the tall grass, near enough to
the British lines to sketch them; but a continuance of the hazardous
exploit was soon rendered unnecessary by the desertion of a British
artilleryman, who brought with him a rude plan of the entire work. So
Trumbull says in his _Autobiography_, p. 22. Washington, on comparing
this surreptitious sketch with the deserter's plan, found them so
nearly to correspond that Trumbull thinks his own future promotion
probably arose from it. Trumbull's sketch and the memorandum of the
deserter "from the Welsh fusileers" seem to have been the basis
of a careful drawing of the British lines, prepared apparently at
headquarters in Cambridge, as it bears the handwriting of Washington's
aid, Thomas Mifflin, an explanatory table of the armament in the works.
This found its way into that portion of the Papers of Arthur Lee which
went to the Amer. Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, and from it a
reduced heliotype is given in the _Mem. Hist. of Boston_, iii. p. 80.
Washington sent a copy of the plan, nearly duplicate, to Congress, and
this is given in Force's _Amer. Archives_, 4th ser., i. p. 29, and is
reproduced on a smaller scale in Wheildon's _Siege and Evacuation of
Boston_, p. 34. (Cf. _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, April, 1879, p. 62.)
There are two other American drawings of the lines, of less importance.
One is in the _Pennsylvania Magazine_ for Aug., 1775, and is called _An
exact plan of Gen. Gage's lines on Boston Neck in America, July 31,
1775_. The other is a small marginal view of _The Lines thrown up on
Boston neck by the ministerial army_, making part of the _Seat of the
Civil War_, by Romans. A rude powder-horn plan is noted in the _Mass.
Hist. Soc. Proc._ (Nov., 1881), xix. 103. One of the Faden MS. plans
shows a proposed star redoubt at a point outside the lines.]

In October, 1775, an "Engineer at Boston", Lieut. Richard Williams,
made and sent over to England a plan showing the "redoubt taken from
the rebels by General Howe", the British camp on the higher summit of
Bunker Hill, together with the American lines at Cambridge and Roxbury.
In London it was compared with "several other curious drawings", from
which additions were made, when it was published by Andrew Dury, March
12, 1776, as engraved by Jno. Lodge for the late Mr. Jefferys, and
called _Plan of Boston and its environs, showing the true situation of
his Majesty's Army, and also those of the rebels_.[620] In the same
month (Oct., 1775) a _Plan of Boston_, with Charlestown marked as in
ruins, appeared in the _Gentleman's Magazine_ (p. 464). Another _Map of
Boston and Charlestown, by an English officer present at Bunker Hill_,
was published in London, Nov. 25, 1775. The last map made during the
British occupation of Boston was _An accurate map of the Country round
Boston in New England, published by A. Hamilton, Jr., near St. John's
Gate, Jan. 16, 1776_, appearing in the _Town and Country Magazine_. It
measures 11-1/2 × 12-1/2 inches, and extends from Plymouth to Ipswich,
and inland to Groton and Providence.

The evacuation of Boston in March, 1776, removed the centre of interest
elsewhere, but there was for some time an apprehension of the return of
the British for a naval attack; and while the Americans were fortifying
the harbor, the English were publishing in London several maps of
its configuration. The earliest was a _Chart of Massachusetts Bay
and Boston Harbour_, published April 29, 1776. With the date changed
to Dec. 1, 1781, it was subsequently included by Des Barres in the
_Atlantic Neptune_, and in the _Charts of the Coast and Harbors of
New England_, 1781.[621] Another _Chart of Boston Bay_, whose limits
include Salem, Watertown, and Scituate, following Holland's surveys,
was published Nov. 13, 1776, and later appeared, dated Dec. 1, 1781, in
the _Atlantic Neptune_, and in the _Coast and Harbors of New England_.
A chart of the harbor, with soundings, was also included in the _North
American Pilot for New England_ (London, 1776), showing a solitary tree
on the peninsula marked "Ruins of Charlestown." There was a second
edition of the _Pilot_ in 1800. A small plan of the harbor is also
in the margin of Carrington Bowles's _Map of the seat of war in New
England_ (London, 1776).

The first eclectic map was that published by Gordon in his _Amer.
Revolution_ (London, 1788), which he based on Pelham's map for the
country, and Page's for the harbor.[622]

       *       *       *       *       *

The French maps published in Paris were almost always based on English
sources. Such were the _Carte de la baye de Baston_ (no. 30), and
_Plan de la ville de Baston_ (no. 31), in _Le Petit Atlas maritime,
vol. i., Amérique Septentrionale, par le S. Bellin, 1764_. There
are several other French maps without date, but probably a little
antedating the outbreak of hostilities. Such are a _Plan de la ville
et du port de Boston_, published by Lattré in Paris;[623] and a small
map, _Plan de la ville de Boston et ses environs_, engraved by B. D.
Bakker. An engraved map, without date, is in the British Museum, called
_Carte des environs de Boston, capitale de la N^{lle} Angleterre en
Amérique_.[624] It carries the coast from below Plymouth to above the
Merrimac. There is in the Poore collection of maps in the Mass. State
Archives a _Carte de la baye de Baston_ (marked Tome i. no. 30).

The only dated map of this period is a _Carte du porte et havre de
Boston, par le Chevalier de Beaurain_ (Paris, 1776). The corner
vignette shows a soldier bearing a banner with a pine-tree.
Frothingham, who reëngraved this picture, could find no earlier
representation of the pine-tree flag.

The English (1774) map of the "most inhabited part of New England" was
reproduced "after the original by M. Le Rouge, 1777", under the title
of _La Nouvelle Angleterre en 4 feuilles_; and it was again used in
the _Atlas Ameriquain Septentrional, à Paris, chez Le Rouge_ (1778),
repeating the map of Boston, with names in English and descriptions in
French. Another reproduction from the English appeared in the _Carte
particulière du Havre de Boston, reduite de la carte anglaise de Des
Barres par ordre de M. de Sartine_ (1780). It belongs to the _Neptune
Americo-Septentrional, publié par ordre du Roi_.

There is among the Rochambeau maps (no. 14), in the library of
Congress, a _Plan d'une partie de la rade de Boston_, done in color,
about eight inches wide by sixteen high, showing the forts and giving
an elaborate key.

       *       *       *       *       *

There is a curious map of Boston and its harbor, with names in Latin,
but apparently of German make, _Ichnographia urbis Boston_ and
_Ichnographia portus Bostoniensis_, which make part of a larger map,
perhaps the _Nova Anglia_ of Homann of Nuremberg. The _Geschichte
der Kriege in und ausser Europa_, published also at Nuremberg in
1776 (erste theil) has a map of Boston. Of the same date (1776), and
belonging to the _Geographische Belustigungen für Erläuterung der
neuesten Weltgeschichte_ (Zweytes Stück), published at Leipsic, is a
_Carte von dem Hafen und der Stadt Boston_, following the French map of
Beaurain even to reproducing the group with the pine-tree banner. It
embraces a circuit about Boston of which the outer limits are Chelsea,
Cambridge, Dorchester, Long Island, Deer Island, and Pulling Point.

       *       *       *       *       *

=G.= THE CAPTURE OF TICONDEROGA, 1775.—It is in dispute who planned
and who conducted the capture of Ticonderoga. On Feb. 21, 1775, Col.
John Brown had suggested it to Warren (_Force's Archives_). Arnold made
a statement of the post's defenceless condition to the Committee of
Safety in Cambridge, April 30, 1775 (_Mass. Archives_, cxlvi. p. 30;
_Amer. Bibliopolist_, 1873, p. 79). On the 2d of May he was given a
money credit and munitions, and on the 3d he was definitely instructed
to organize his party (_Mass. Archives_, cxlvi. p. 39). It is claimed
that some purpose of acting on the suggestion of Brown prompted in
part, at least, the Massachusetts provincial congress to appoint
early in April a committee to proceed to Connecticut and the other
New England colonies. Whether it was by their instigation, by certain
movements in Connecticut, or by the direct agency of Arnold that the
plan was formed, it is difficult to say. It is also claimed that the
plan grew out of a conference with the Massachusetts delegates to the
Philadelphia Congress, when, on their way, they stopped at Hartford
and held a session with Governor Trumbull and his council (_Force's
Archives_, ii. 507; Wells's _Sam. Adams_, ii. 298). Bancroft and the
Connecticut antiquaries find the beginning rather in the impulses of
one Parsons, who had just returned from Massachusetts, and had got from
Benedict Arnold, whom he met on the way, a statement of the plunder to
be obtained there, and, without any formal consent of the governor and
council, proceeded in the organization of a committee in Connecticut
(Bancroft, orig. ed., vii. 338; final revision, iv. 182). Official
sanction was first evoked when Massachusetts, a few days later,
commissioned Arnold (_Mass. Archives_, cxlvi. 130, 139; _American
Bibliopolist_, 1873, p. 79; _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Proc._, 1844, p. 14).
The Connecticut antiquaries have mainly set forth the claims of their
colony for leadership of the affair in the papers which constitute vol.
i. (pp. 163-185) of the _Conn. Hist. Soc. Collections_, in which is the
journal of Edward Mott,[625] the chairman of the Connecticut committee,
edited by J. H. Trumbull.[626]

The part taken in the movement in Western Massachusetts arose
from confidence reposed in Brown and others of Pittsfield, by the
Connecticut men who passed through that town on their way to the
New Hampshire Grants.[627] Brown had, during the previous winter,
notified the Massachusetts committee that Ticonderoga would receive
the attention of Ethan Allen and Green Mountain boys as soon as
the outbreak came. The credit which attaches to this commander is
complicated by the relations which Arnold bore to the final capture,
and has in turn given rise to controversy. The most comprehensive
examination of the question on the Vermont side is L. E. Chittenden's
Addresses before the Vermont Historical Society, Oct., 1872 (published
at Rutland by the society), and at the unveiling of Allen's statue
at Burlington, July 4, 1873. We have Allen's own statements in his
_Narrative of his captivity, etc._[628]

Dawson thinks that the merit of originating the active measures cannot
be taken from Benedict Arnold, and in his chapter (_Battles of the
United States_, i. ch. 2) on the subject traces minutely the sources
of each step in the progress of events, and in his Appendix (p. 38)
prints the protest (May 10th, p. 38) of the Connecticut committee
against Arnold's interference and Arnold's report (May 11th, p. 38)
to the Massachusetts Congress.[629] There are some of the current
reports preserved in Moore's _Diary of the Amer. Revolution_ (i. pp.
78-80), and the account, which ignores Arnold, of the _Worcester Spy_
(May 16th) is given in the _Amer. Bibliopolist_ (1871, p. 491). There
are other contemporary accounts in the _American Archives_ (vols.
ii. and iii.); a journal by Elmer is in the _New Jersey Hist. Soc.
Proc._, vols. ii. and iii.; a Tory account in Jones's _New York during
the Revolutionary War_ (vol. i. pp. 47, 546), with a letter of May
14th.[630] Narratives by Caldwell and Beaman are in the _Historical
Magazine_, August, 1867, and May, 1868, respectively.[631]


=H.= THE CANADA CAMPAIGN, 1775-1776.—Washington in New York, June
25th, entrusted to Schuyler the command in the North (Lossing's
_Schuyler_, i. 330; Jones's _N. Y. during the Rev. War_, 58), and
Congress issued (May 29, 1775) an address to the Canadians (_Journal
of Congress_; Pitkin's _United States_, i. App. 19). In August it was
reported that this address was left at the door of every house in
Canada. Schuyler reached Ticonderoga July 18th (Lossing's _Schuyler_,
i. ch. 21; Palmer's _Lake Champlain_, ch. 6; Irving's _Washington_,
ii.), and pushed on to the foot of Lake Champlain in September
(Lossing, i. ch. 23).

Among the early reports, inducing the project of invading Canada, were
the letters of Maj. John Brown (Aug. 14, 1775) and Ethan Allen (Sept.
14th) respecting the condition of the Canadians (Sparks's _Corresp. of
the Rev._, i. 461, 464). There are other letters on the state of Canada
at this time in the _N. H. Prov. Papers_, vii. 515, 547, 561-62, 569.
The Schuyler Papers, with the letters which they contain of Montgomery,
Arnold, Wooster, and Sullivan, are a main source of information
respecting the whole campaign.[632]

[Illustration: FROM THE ATLAS OF WILKINSON'S MEMOIRS.

A modern eclectic map is given in Carrington's _Battles_, 171. The most
considerable contemporary map for the illustration of the movements
during the Revolution in Canada is one published by Jefferys, in 1776,
of the _Province of Quebec, from the French Surveys and those made by
Capt. Carver and others after the War, with much detail of names, plan
of Quebec and heights of Abraham, Montreal and isles of Montreal_ (27 x
19 inches). On Feb. 16, 1776, Sayer and Bennett published in London _A
new map of the Province of Quebec according to the royal proclamation
of 7 Oct., 1763, from the French surveys, corrected with those made
after the war by Captain Carver and other officers in his majesty's
service_. There was a French reproduction of it in Paris in 1777,
included in the _Atlas Ameriquain_ (1778), called _Nouvelle Carte de la
Province de Quebec selon l'édit du Roi d'Angleterre du 7 8{bre}, 1763,
par le Capitaine Carver, traduites de l'Anglois, à Paris chez le Rouge,
1777_.

Jefferys also issued in 1775 _An exact Chart of the River St. Lawrence
from Fort Frontenac to Anticosti_ (37 X 24 inches), which is usually
accompanied by a _Chart of the Golf of St. Lawrence, 1775_(24 X 20
inches). _North Amer. Pilot_, nos. 11, 20, 21, 22. There is in the
_Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa_ [Nuremberg], 1776, a
"Karte von der Insel Montreal und den Gegenden umher", following a plan
by Bellin.

A map of Canada in 1774 is embraced in Mitchell's _Map of the British
Colonies_, and in Wright's ed. of _Cavendish's Debates in the Commons
(1774) on the Canada bill_, London, 1839. There are other maps in the
_American Atlas_ and Hilliard d'Auberteuil's _Essais_.]

Schuyler's health preventing his taking the field in person, the
interest in the campaign centres in Montgomery up to the time of his
death.[633] We have despatches of his (Nov. 3, 1775) on the capture of
St. Johns,[634] on the taking of Chamblée,[635] and on the capitulation
of Montreal,[636] with his letters from before Quebec (Sparks,
_Corresp._, i. 492, etc.). A letter from one of his aids at this time
(Dec. 16, 1775) is in _Life of George Read_, p. 115.

The principal Life of Montgomery is that by J. Armstrong, in Sparks's
_Amer. Biography_ (i. p. 181), which may be supplemented by other minor
accounts.[637]

The connection of Benedict Arnold with the Campaign is illustrated in
his letters, beginning with those before he left the column advancing
by Lake Champlain, and then following his progress on the expedition
to coöperate by the Kennebec route, which Washington proposed to
Schuyler in a letter of Aug. 20, 1775 (Sparks's _Washington_, iii. 63).
On Sept. 14th Washington sealed his instructions to Arnold (Sparks,
iii. 86; Dawson, 113; Henry's _Journal_, ed. 1877, p. 2). It is said
that the route to be taken was suggested to Arnold by the journal of an
exploration in that direction by Montresor in 1760.[638] That engineer
had, by order of General Murray, made a survey of this route in
1761.[639] There are maps to illustrate Arnold's route in the _Atlantic
Neptune, London Mag._, 1776, Marshall's Atlas to his _Washington_,
and in the 1877 edition of Henry's _Journal_.[640] All the general
histories and a few biographies and local records necessarily cover the
story.[641] Arnold himself is the best contemporary authority.

[Illustration: CAPITULATION OF ST. JOHNS.

Fac-simile, slightly reduced, of the reproduction in Smith's _Amer.
Hist. and Lit. Curios._, 2d series, p. xl., from the original in the
collection of Ferdinand J. Dreer, of Philadelphia.]

A number of his letters respecting the expedition are in Bowdoin
College library,[642] and they and others will be found in print in
the _Maine Hist. Soc. Collections_ (1831), vol. i. 357, etc., and in
Sparks's _Corresp. of the Revolution_, i. 46, 60, 88, 475, etc.[643]
His journal of his progress is unfortunately rather meagre, and covers
but a few weeks, Sept. 27 to Oct. 30, 1775. The original manuscript was
left by Arnold at West Point when he fled, and extracts from it are
printed in S. L. Knapp's _Life of Aaron Burr_, 1835; it is now owned by
Mr. S. L. M. Barlow, of New York, and a copy, made from it when owned
by Judge Edwards, of New York, is in the _Sparks MSS._ (lii. vol. ii.).

[Illustration: CONCLUSION AND ATTESTATION OF MONTGOMERY'S WILL.

Cf. _Harper's Mag._, vol. lxx. p. 356.]

Various other journals of the actors in the expedition have been
preserved.[644]

Arnold's letters at the Point-aux-Trembles and before Quebec are
in Sparks's _Corresp. of the Rev._ (i. App.), together with those
addressed to Wooster,[645] Schuyler, and Washington after the failure
of the assault on Quebec, Dec. 31, 1775.[646]

[Illustration: MONTGOMERY.

After the only original portrait preserved at Montgomery Place, and
representing him at about twenty-five. Cf. _Harper's Mag._, lxx. p.
350; Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed., vol. ii.

The study of Trumbull's well-known picture of "The Death of Montgomery"
is on a card less than four inches square, now owned by Major Lewis, of
Virginia, and is marked "J. Trumbull to Nelly Custis, 1790" (Johnston's
_Orig. Portraits of Washington_, p. 72).]

[Illustration: RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

From _An Impartial History of the War in America_, vol. i. p. 392
(Boston), engraved by J. Norman. Cf. the engraving in Murray's
_Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, ii. 193. Neither of these
copper-plates are probably of any value as likenesses. They show the
kind of effigy doing service at the time.]

The great resource for original material on the siege of Quebec, beside
the letters given by Sparks and Lossing, are in the gatherings of _4
Force's Archives_, vols. iv., v., and vi.; Almon's _Remembrancer_,
vol. ii.; _N. Y. Col. Docs._, viii. 663, etc.; and in a large number
of diaries and other contemporary records, which may readily be
classed as American or British, with a few emanating from the French
Canadians.[647]

On Jan. 19, 1776, a report was made in Congress that the army in Canada
be reinforced (_Secret Journals_, i. 241).

[Illustration

From an engraving of full length in _An Impartial Hist. of the War in
America_, Lond. 1780, p. 249. A mezzotint similar to this was published
in London, 1776, as "Col. Arnold, who commanded the provincial troops
sent against Quebec" (J. C. Smith, _Brit. Mez. Portraits_, iv.
1714-1717). The portrait in profile, by W. Tate,—a handsome face,—was
engraved in line by H. B. Hall in 1865, and etched by him in 1879 for
Isaac N. Arnold's _Life of B. Arnold_. Cf. Jones's _Campaign for the
Conquest of Canada_, p. 168. Other portraits of Arnold are given later
in the present volume.]

[Illustration: MONTRESOR'S MAP.

Sketched from the original (1760) among the Peter Force maps in the
Library of Congress. There is a copy in the library of the N. E. Hist.
and Geneal. Society.]

In April Arnold returned to Montreal, and Wooster took command
before Quebec,[648] to be superseded by General Thomas, who reached
the camp May 1st. Upon Carleton's being reinforced, Thomas began
to retreat.[649] Burgoyne arrived with additional troops in June
(Fonblanque's _Burgoyne_, 211). The affair at the Cedars took place
May 19, 1776.[650] The movement against Three Rivers had been begun by
orders of Thompson, who was in command upon the death of Thomas (June
2d), and remained so for a few days till Sullivan arrived.

[Illustration:

From _An Impartial History of the War in America_, Lond., 1780, p.
400, where the cut represents his full length. Cf. prints published in
London in 1776 (_Brit. Mez. Portrait_, by J. C. Smith); Hollister's
_Connecticut_, i. 390; Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest of Canada_,
28; _Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa_ (Nürnberg, 1778).]

Smith, in the _St. Clair Papers_, i. 17, collates the authorities
on this movement,[651] calling in question the statements given by
Bancroft.

Sullivan's Irish precipitancy and over-confidence did not mend matters
as the retreat went on, and raised delusive hopes which were more
welcome than Arnold's gloomy views.[652]

[Illustration: SIEGE OF QUEBEC, 1775-76.

Sketched from a manuscript plan noted in the _Sparks Catalogue_ (p.
208), which belongs to Cornell University, and was kindly communicated
to the editor. The original (18½ × 15 inches) is marked as "on a
scale of 30 chaines to an Inch", and is signed "E. Antill ft." in
the corner. Mr. Sparks has marked it "Siege of Quebec, 1776." It is
endorsed on the outside, "Gen^l Arnold's plan of Quebec, with y^e
Americans besieging it, y^e winter of 1776." It bears the following
Key: "H, Headquarters. A, A, A, advanced guards. B, B, B, main guards.
C, C, C, quarter guards. D, Capt. Smith's riflemen. E, cul-de-sac,
where the men-of-war lay, F, governor's house. G, where all materials
are carried to build our batteries, out of view of the town. I, lower
town. K, the barrier, near which General Montgomery fell. K L, the
dotted line shews the route the troops took under the general, thro'
deep snow without any path." The dotted line in the river marks the
extent of ice from the shore, and in the open stream are the words:
"(Unfrose) Ice driving with y^e Tide." The roads are marked by broken
lines – – – – – – –. The position of patrols are marked by the
letter P.

The principal engraved map is a _Plan of the city and environs of
Quebec with its siege and blockage by the Americans from the 8th of
December, 1775, to the 13th of May, 1776_. _Engraved by Wm. Faden,
London; published 12 Sept., 1776._ The original MS. draft is among
the Faden maps (no. 20) in the library of Congress. There are other
plans as follows: _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, April, 1884, p. 282; Leake's
_Life of Lamb_, p. 130; Atlas to Marshall's _Washington_; Carrington's
_Battles_, p. 138; Stone's _Invasion of Canada_, p. xvii.; a marginal
plan in Sayer and Bennett's _New Map of the Province of Quebec_,
published Feb. 16, 1776; and a German "Plan von Quebec" in the
_Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa_, Nuremberg, 1777, Dritter
Theil. There is a marginal map of Quebec in an edition of Carver's map
of the Province of Quebec, published by Le Rouge in Paris in 1777, and
included in the _Atlas Ameriquain_ (1778).

For views of Quebec and the points of attack, see Moore's _Diary of
the Rev._, i. 185; Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 198; and _Mag. of Amer.
Hist._, April, 1884, p. 274. A view of the plains of Abraham is in
_Ibid._, p. 296.]

The retreat continued to Crown Point, and in July Sullivan was relieved
by Gates; and the campaign was over,—nothing accomplished. On July
26th Governor Trumbull reviews the condition of the army in a letter
in Hinman's _Conn. during the Rev._ (p. 560).[653] The letters of
Ira Allen and John Hurd express the uneasy state of mind along the
frontier, which now took possession of the exposed settlers (_N. H.
Prov. Papers_, viii. pp. 301, 306, 311, 315-317, 405). Insecurity was
felt at Ticonderoga (_N. H. State Papers_, viii. 576, 581).

Congress twice appointed commissioners to proceed towards Canada.
In Nov., 1775, Robert R. Livingston, John Langdon, and Robert Treat
Paine were sent, with instructions dated Nov. 8th,[654] to examine
the fortifications of Ticonderoga and the highlands, and "to use
their endeavors to procure an accession of the Canadians to a union
with these colonies;" and their report (Nov. 17th), with a letter to
Montgomery (Nov. 30th), is in the _Sparks MSS._ (lii. vol. ii.). In
March, 1776, Benj. Franklin, Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll were
instructed (_Journals of Congress_, i. 289; Force, v. 411) to proceed
to Canada to influence, if possible, the sympathies of the Canadians.
Carroll was a Roman Catholic, and he was accompanied by his brother,
John Carroll, a priest.[655] Much was expected of the mission on
this account (Adams's _Familiar Letters_, 135). Franklin, delayed at
Saratoga (April), began to feel that the exposures of the expedition
were too much for one of his years, and sat down to write "to a few
friends by way of farewell."[656] Carroll kept a diary, which has been
since printed.[657] There are papers appertaining to the mission in
Force's _Archives_, 4th, iv., v.; Sparks's _Washington_ (iii. 390), and
his _Corresp. of the Rev._ (i. 572), and Lossing's _Schuyler_ (vol.
ii.).[658] On Jan. 31, 1850, Mr. William Duane delivered an address on
_Canada and the Continental Congress_ before the Penna. Hist. Soc.,
which is printed among their occasional publications.

[Illustration: SULLIVAN'S ISLAND.

A part of a view published in London, August 10, 1776, and made by
Lieut.-Col. Thomas James, of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. June 30,
1776. It represents the position of the fleet during "the attack on the
28th of June, which lasted nine hours and forty minutes." The position
of the ships is designated by A, "Active", 28 guns; B, "Bristol",
flag-ship, 50 guns; C, "Experiment", 50 guns; D, "Solebay", 28 guns.
The "Syren", 28 guns, and "Acteon", 28 guns, and the "Thunder",
bomb-ketch, were nearer the spectator as was the "Friendship", of 28
guns. L is Sullivan's Island; M, a narrow isthmus, defended by an armed
hulk, N; the mainland is O; myrtle-grove, P.

Faden also issued at the same time, as made by Col. James, a long
panoramic view of Sullivan's and Long islands, showing the American and
British camps on the opposite sides of the dividing inlet.]

Mr. Brantz Mayer's introduction to the Centennial ed. of Carroll's
journal is largely concerned with the question of the Catholic
pacification of Canada. Cf. Brent's _Life of Archbishop Carroll_; and
B. W. Campbell's "Life and Times of Archbishop Carroll" in _U. S. Cath.
Mag._, iii. The unfortunate comments (Oct. 21, 1774) of the Continental
Congress on the Quebec Act was much against the persuasions of the
commissioners, and it was soon evident that all their efforts, on this
side at least, were futile. (Cf. Force's _Am. Archives_, ii. 231.)

After Franklin and John Carroll had left Montreal, Charles Carroll and
Chase remained, endeavoring to support the military councils.[659]


=I.= THE ATTACK ON SULLIVAN'S ISLAND, JUNE, 1776.—Clinton's
proclamation to the magistrates of South Carolina, June 6, 1776, is
in Ramsay's _Revolution in South Carolina_, i. 330. Lee's report
to Washington (July 1, 1776) is in Sparks's _Correspondence of the
Revolution_, i. 243; to Congress (July 2d), in _Ibid._, ii. 502; in
Lee's _Memoirs_, p. 386; in Force's _American Archives_, 5th ser., i.
p. 435; _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._, 1872, pp. 100, 107; and in Dawson (p.
139). John Adams (_Familiar Letters_, 203) notes the exhilaration which
the news caused in Philadelphia.

There are other contemporary accounts in Gen. Morris's letter in the
_N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._, 1875, p. 438; in R. W. Gibbes's _Doc. Hist.
of the Amer. Rev._, 1776-1782, pp. 2-19; in Force's _Archives_; in
Frank Moore's _Diary of the Rev._, i. p. 257; in Moore's _Laurens
Correspondence_, p. 24. A "new war song" of the day, referring to
the battle, is given in Moore's _Songs and Ballads of the Rev._, p.
135. A broadside account was printed in Philadelphia, June 20, 1776
(Hildeburn's _Bibliog._, no. 3342). A plan of the attack after a London
original was published in Philadelphia in 1777, with a "Description of
the attack in a letter from Sir Peter Parker to Mr. Stephens, and an
extract from a letter of Lieut. Gen. Clinton to Lord Geo. Germaine"
(Hildeburn, no. 3539).

[Illustration: CHARLESTOWN, S. C., AND THE BRITISH FLEET, JUNE 29, 1776.

After a print published in London by Faden, August 10, 1776, taken by
Lieut.-Col. James, the day after the fight.

KEY.—A, Charlestown; B, Ashley River; C, Fort Johnston; D, Cummins
Point; E, part of Five-Fathom Hole, where all the fleet rode before and
after the attack; F, station of the headmost frigate, the "Solebay",
two miles and three quarters from Fort Sullivan, situated to the
northward of G; H, part of Mt. Pleasant; I, part of Hog Island;
K, Wando River; L, Cooper River; M, James Island; N, breakers on
Charlestown Bar; O, rebel schooner of 12 guns.

There is "An exact prospect of Charlestown, the metropolis of South
Carolina", in the _London Mag._, 1762, a folding panoramic view, which
shows the water-front with ships in the harbor.]

The earliest general account is by Moultrie himself in his _Memoirs of
the American Revolution_. Cf. Gordon's _Amer. Rev._; and John Drayton's
_Memoirs of the American Revolution_ [through 1776] _as relating to the
State of South Carolina_ (Charleston, 1821, two vols.). Of the later
general historians, reference may be made to Bancroft (orig. ed.),
vol. viii. ch. 66, and final revision, iv. ch. xxv., a full account;
to Dawson, i. ch. 10, to Carrington, ch. 27, 28; to Gay, iii. 467;
Irving's _Washington_, ii. ch. 29; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. p. 754.
Something can be gleaned from Garden's _Anecdotes of the Revolution_;
_Memoirs of Elkanah Watson_; the life of Rutledge in Flanders's _Chief
Justices_; and from such occasional productions as William Crafts's
address (1825), included in his _Miscellanies_; Porcher's address in
the _South Carolina Hist. Coll._, vol. i.; C. C. Jones, Jr.'s address
on Sergeant Jasper in 1876, and the _Centennial Memorial_ of that year
and the paper in _Harper's Monthly_, xxi. 70, by T. D. English.

On the British side we have Parker's despatch (July 9th) in Dawson, p.
140; a letter of Clinton (July 8th) in the _Sparks MSS._, no. lviii.;
Clinton's _Observations on Stedman's History_; the reports in the
_Gent. Mag. and Annual Register_; the early historical estimate in
Adolphus's _England_, ii. 346. Jones, _New York in the Revolutionary
War_, i. 98, gives the Tory view. There is a contemporary letter by a
British officer given in Lady Cavendish's _Admiral Gambier_, copied in
_Hist. Mag._, v. 68. Hutchinson (_Life and Diary_, ii. 92) records the
effects of the fight in England.[660]



CHAPTER III.

THE SENTIMENT OF INDEPENDENCE, ITS GROWTH AND CONSUMMATION.

BY GEORGE E. ELLIS, D. D., LL. D.,

_President Mass. Hist. Society._


THE assertion needs no qualification that the thirteen colonies would
not in the beginning have furnished delegates to a congress with the
avowed purpose of seeking a separation from the mother country; and
we may also affirm, that, with a possible forecast in the minds of
some two or three members, such a result was not apprehended. If any
deceptive methods—as was charged at the time—were engaged in turning
a congress avowedly called to secure a redress of grievances into
an agency for securing independence, they will appear in the sharp
scrutiny with which we may now study the inner history of the subject.
And if an explanation of the course of the Congress can be found,
consistent with its perfect sincerity, we must then seek to trace the
influences alike of the new light which came in upon the delegates,
and of successive aggravating measures of the British government, in
substituting independence as its object. Though it is certain that
Samuel Adams, fretting under the hesitations of Congress, had proposed
to an ardent sympathizer that the four New England colonies should act
in that direction by themselves, his own clear judgment would have
satisfied him that that step would have been futile unless the other
colonies followed it. If there were but a single colony from which no
response could be drawn, the consequences would have been obstructive.
That different sections of the country should have furnished leaders
so in accord as Samuel Adams, Richard H. Lee, and Gadsden was a most
felicitous condition. A congress, then, composed of delegates from all
the colonies was the indispensable and the only practicable method
for working out the scheme of independence, and even such a congress
must avoid basing its action on local grievances. The reserve which
the delegates from Massachusetts found it politic to practise, in not
obtruding their special grievances, was well decided upon from the
first, and proved to be effective. That the circumstances required
patience in such men as the Adamses is abundantly evident from the
frankness with which they wrote outside of Congress of the temporizing
and dilatoriness of what went on in it.

There is no general assertion which comes nearer to the truth on
this subject than that, from the first colonization of America by
the English, the spirit of independence was latent here, and was in
a steady process of natural development. George Chalmers, with the
opportunities of a clerk of the Board of Trade, made an inquisitive
private study of State Papers, and reached the full conviction that
the colonists from the start, not only quietly assumed, but really
aimed at an independence. He quotes abundant warnings, and charges the
successive crown officials here and at home with culpable negligence
in not acting on these warnings when they might have done so.[661] The
pages of Chalmers confirm and illustrate the fact that the colonists
lived in the enjoyment of a more real autonomy, and a do-as-you-please
enfranchisement, than was shared by home subjects. There went with this
a sort of assumption, a bold conceit, a sturdy truculency, which could
be easily trained into defiance.[662]

Large allowance also must be made on account of the fact that the
colonies had mastered their most critical perils wholly from their own
resources. English benevolence in private individuals had generously
fostered some enterprises of learning and charity here. But government
had left the exiles to fight their own battles against the savages
and the earliest French enemies. Far back in colonial times Governor
Winthrop records that, in some emergent strait of the exiles, a
suggestion was made of turning to England for help. The suggestion
was shrewdly put aside, lest, having asked such aid, they might incur
obligations.

It was of course admitted that the colonists had come under some
form of obligation to the home government during the exhausting
campaigns of the French and Indian wars. A question, however, soon
came under debate, as to what that obligation involved. Great Britain
assumed that it justified a demand upon the colonists for revenue.
The colonists roused themselves to repudiate any obligation to be
enforced by the payment of a tax imposed by a Parliament in which
they had no representation. It was just here that the latent spirit
of independence led the colonists to examine to the root their
relations of allegiance, and, on the other hand, their natural rights.
The General Court of Massachusetts, in 1768, had admitted "that his
Majesty's high court of Parliament is the supreme legislative power
over the whole empire." It took less than ten years to bring it about
that Massachusetts either had not understood what it said,—at least,
had not meant to say exactly that,—or had come to think differently
about it.

In the Bill of Rights coming from the first Congress the committee
say: "In the course of their inquiry they find many infringements and
violations of rights, which they pass over for the present." These
previous impositions and disabilities came in, however, afterwards for
their full share of rhetoric and argument. As we trace the method in
which the controversy with government matured, we mark these stages
of it. Objection and forcible resistance found their first occasion
when, at the close of the French war, government devised the policy
of the Stamp Act. The colonists came to distinguish this as creating
an _internal_ tax, in contrast to the previous _external_ taxes,
through the laws regulating commerce, to which heretofore they had
not objected. Vindicating their resistance to the new internal tax,
they came to find similar grievances in the former external taxes.
So they were teaching themselves first to define and then to assert
independence.

We have become accustomed to associate with the term Congress the
idea of a legally constituted organic body, with defined powers
authoritatively assigned to it, the exercise of which is binding on
its constituents. Our Continental congresses were of quite another
sort, and had no authority save what might be granted to the wisdom and
practicability of the measures they advised. Most certain it is that
only a very small minority of the people of the colonies were concerned
in calling the early congresses. As certain, also, is it that a very
large preponderance of the people of all classes were then strongly
opposed to any violent measures, to sundering ties of allegiance, or to
seeking anything beyond a peaceful redress of grievances. On the whole,
while it must be admitted that Congress was generally in advance of its
constituency, it knew how to temporize and to give intervals of pause
in steadily working on to its ultimate declaration. "Natural leaders"
always start forth in such a cause, and they learn their skill by
practice.

When it became evident that, instead of any healing of the breach,
the whole activity of the Congress tended to widen it, a regret was
expressed in some quarters that, by the connivance and consent of
the royal governors, and through the regular legislative processes,
a more legal and conservative character had not been secured to this
meeting of delegates,—as if dangerous plotting might thereby have
been averted. But the patriot leaders of the movement were too well
advised to look for any such official coöperation. The very life of
their scheme depended upon its wholly popular conception. Nor could the
consent of governors and formal assemblies have been won to it. The
whole method of the steady strengthening of the spirit of alienation
from Great Britain was a working of popular feeling in channels
different from those of ordinary official direction and oversight.

It was but fair to assume that the objects of the first Congress
would be defined by the instructions furnished by those who sent
or commissioned its members. The delegates from New Hampshire were
bid "to consult and adopt such measures as may have the most likely
tendency to extricate the colonies from their present difficulties,
to secure and perpetuate their rights, liberties, and privileges,
and to restore that peace, harmony, and mutual confidence which once
happily subsisted between the parent country and her colonies."
Massachusetts bade her delegates "deliberate and determine upon wise
and proper measures, to be by them recommended to all the colonies,
for the recovery and establishment of their just rights and liberties,
civil and religious,[663] and the restoration of union and harmony
between Great Britain and the colonies, most ardently desired by all
good men." Rhode Island's charter governor empowered the delegates
"to join in consulting upon proper measures to obtain a repeal of the
several acts of the British Parliament, &c., and upon proper measures
to establish the rights and liberties of the colonies upon a just and
solid foundation." Connecticut authorized its delegates "to consult and
advise on proper measures for advancing the best good of the colonies."
The delegates from New York were trusted without any particular
instructions, having merely a general commission "to attend the
Congress at Philadelphia." So, also, New Jersey appointed its delegates
"to represent the colony of New Jersey in the said General Congress."
Pennsylvania sent a committee from its own Assembly in behalf of the
province "to consult upon the present unhappy state of the colonies,
and to form and adopt a plan for the purposes of obtaining redress of
American grievances, ascertaining American rights upon the most solid
and constitutional principles, and for establishing that union and
harmony between Great Britain and the colonies which is indispensably
necessary to the welfare and happiness of both." The deputies from
the three Lower Counties were "to consult and determine upon all such
prudent and lawful measures as may be judged most expedient for the
colonies immediately and unitedly to adopt, in order to obtain relief
for an oppressed people, and the redress of our general grievances."

It will be observed that the instructions from these eight colonies
are moderate and pacific in terms, without menace, or a looking to any
other results than harmony. Something a little more emphatic appears
in what follows. The Maryland delegates were to use all efforts in
their power in the Congress "to effect one general plan of conduct
operating on the commercial relations of the colonies with the mother
country." Virginia bade her delegates "consider of the most proper
and effectual manner of so operating on the commercial connection of
the colonies with the mother country as to procure redress for the
much-injured province of the Massachusetts Bay; to secure British
America from the ravage and ruin of arbitrary taxes; and speedily to
procure the return of that harmony and union so beneficial to the
whole nation, and no ardently desired by all British America." The
delegates of South Carolina are instructed "to concert, agree to, and
effectually prosecute such legal measures as shall be most likely to
obtain a repeal of the said acts and a redress of those grievances."
The deputies of North Carolina were authorized "to deliberate upon the
present state of British America, and to take such measures as they may
deem prudent to effect the purpose of describing with certainty the
rights of Americans, repairing the breach made in those rights, and for
guarding them for the future from any such violations done under the
sanction of public authority."

Now it is true that one may read as between the lines of these
instructions intimations of reserved purposes, and possibly menaces
that something more will be required if what is suggested in them fail
of effect; but as they stand, their tone is not hostile or menacing.
They limit the terms and measure of what they exact. Several very
pregnant suggestions present themselves. Men of a large variety of
opinions and purposes might take part in a congress so constituted.
If the measures proposed had been restricted, so to speak, to the
programme, there might have been substantial accord among the
delegates, and no one could have been startled and offended with what
they soon regarded as rebellious manifestations in the Congress.

The case of Joseph Galloway, at first esteemed a most resolute
patriot, and then committing himself to extreme loyalty, presents
us an example. He was a lawyer of great abilities, a gentleman of
wealth and of high social position. He had made many strong protests
against the oppressive measures of government. He was a member of the
Pennsylvania Assembly eighteen years, and twelve years its speaker. He
says[664] that when he was chosen as a delegate to the first Congress
he positively refused to serve unless he was allowed to draw his own
"instructions." He was permitted to do so, and he himself signed
them as speaker. They contain this injunction: "You are strictly
charged to avoid everything indecent and disrespectful to the mother
state." Chosen a delegate to the second Congress, he positively
declined to serve, though importuned to do so by Dr. Franklin. The
instructions given to the eight associates named with him for this
second Congress contained the stringent words, "We strictly enjoin
you that you, in behalf of this colony, dissent from and utterly
reject any propositions, should such be made, that may cause or lead
to a separation from the mother country, or a change of the form of
government." The removal of this restriction on June 14, 1776, enabled
a majority of the delegates to give the vote of the province for
independence.

No man in this first Congress marked a stronger contrast to Galloway
than Samuel Adams, the "man of the people." Compared with what Joseph
Reed called "the fine fellows from Virginia", Adams was not what is
conventionally called a gentleman; but while John Hancock brought from
Massachusetts money and ambition, his colleague carried the hardier
brains of the two. The odious epithet of "demagogue" attached to Adams,
not because of any beguiling arts, but from his plain simplicity of
garb, preferred associates, manners, and mode of life. In his cheap and
homely attire, dispensing with any other mode of influence than that of
an honest heart and a vigorous mind, he had made himself the familiar
companion of the mechanics, artificers, and craftsmen of North Boston,
the shipbuilders, joiners, and calkers,—the rough, honest, and thrifty
democracy,—with whom, sitting on a spar or loitering in a workshop, he
would spend long and instructive hours. He was puritanically religious
and rigidly observant of solemnities, prayed in his family, and asked
a blessing at each meal of his simple fare. He neglected his own
business to devote himself to public interests. Of his own poverty he
was neither ashamed nor proud. It would not have been seemly for him
to have presented himself to the courtly gentry of the Congress as he
appeared in the streets of Boston. It would doubtless have confirmed
the prejudice which many entertained of him as an ill-bred mass-leader.
For deep and wide learning in legal, political, and economical science,
added to his college culture, and for debating powers, he was the
peer of any of his associates. If he had been left to himself in his
straits he would have gone on his high errand clad as he was; but
before he was to go his friends had done the best they could for him.
The tailor, the hatter, bootmaker, and haberdasher, appearing at his
house from anonymous friends, had furnished him a complete outfit,
not, however, of the full sumptuousness of Hancock's. As for the rest,
Adams was well prepared in bodily presence to meet for the first
time his warm friend in correspondence, Richard Henry Lee. No truly
lineal citizen of the old Puritan colony will ever be ashamed of this
characteristic representative of its traditions and its people at the
first Congress,—this prophet of independence.

The fact, without any fulness of detail, is assured to us that there
was much of discordance and dissension in this Congress of 1774.
Probably there was scarcely a single proposition or speaker that did
not find an antagonist. Certainly it appeared that Congress was not
ready to break from the mother realm. Results, however, were reached
of a sort to prompt just such further measures from the British
government as to insure some livelier work in its next session. The
most decisively contumacious act of the Congress was the adoption
and approval of the resolves passed by the daring Suffolk County
(Massachusetts) meeting, which most clearly endorsed rebellion, and
took steps in initiating it.[665] It is to be remembered, moreover,
that in this first Congress, Washington, whose frank sincerity stands
unimpeached, denied that the colonies wished for, or could safely,
separately or together, set up for independence. Before Congress again
met in May, the first blood had been shed at Lexington and Concord;
and Massachusetts, as the first colony to set up as a consequence its
own autonomy, sought and received the ratification of its conduct by
Congress, after it had assembled.

The instructions to the delegates still held them to seeking a redress
of grievances and the restoration of harmony, as "desired by all good
men", and in pursuit of this object a second letter or petition to
the king, which John Adams calls "Dickinson's letter", was prepared
and adopted by Congress. It was respectful, earnest, tender in its
professions and appeals. It besought the king himself to interpose
between his much-abused and long-enduring subjects and the oppressive
measures of his ministers, as if he himself was misled and imposed
upon by them. The bearing which this most remarkable letter has upon
the charge of insincerity and hypocrisy in the action of Congress is
apparent. It is enough to say here that Richard Penn, the messenger
who bore the letter, was not permitted to see the king, whose only
recognition of it was a violently toned proclamation for suppressing
rebellion and sedition among his American subjects. Startling was the
effect on the Congress of this royal declaration of an unrelenting
purpose, which arrived on November 1st, coupled with the intelligence
of a large reinforcement of the British army and navy, and with the
purposed employment of seventeen thousand German mercenaries. The same
day brought an account of the burning of Falmouth, now Portland, by
Captain Mowat, reasonably exciting an alarm in all the settlements on
the seaboard. What might be lacking in the final resolution of some of
the leading members of Congress to come to the issue was well supplied
by these last measures of government, which could work only in the
direction of an implacable rupture. Still it is a matter of fact,
now attested by full evidence, that the majority of Congress, either
held by their lingering hope of some scheme of conciliation, or even
doubtful if their constituents would reinforce their own resolution
now, would not entertain a motion for independence.[666] A recess of
the Congress from August 5th to September 5th gave to some of the
members an opportunity to try the pulse of their constituents. The
king in his speech, October 26, 1775, reiterated his stern purposes.
It is noticeable that in the comments made upon it by speakers in the
opposition, the avowals of members in the Congress were confidently
quoted as repelling the charge that they were aiming for independence;
but General Conway said significantly, "They will undoubtedly prefer
independence to slavery."

The delegates of the thirteen colonies—Georgia being now
represented—met in Philadelphia, May 12, 1776, having now the whole
bearings of the struggle fully before them. The members had found their
way to the assurance that their professed loyalty to the constitution
of the realm consisted with, and might even require, a defiance of
its monarch. There were those who still held back. We note that
personal alienations declared themselves between members, starting
from differences of opinion or strength of resolve, as they faced the
final question. Perhaps it is well that oblivion has been allowed to
settle over the attitudes and words of some of the actors of the time,
whether in or out of Congress. Gadsden, Lee, the Adamses, and Patrick
Henry were ready and eager for the boldest venture, supported by Chase
of Maryland, Ward of Rhode Island, Wolcott and Sherman of Connecticut,
and at last by Wyeth of Virginia. Wilson of Pennsylvania held back. So
did the strongly patriotic Dickinson, restrained by Quaker influence.
He was yet to be reassured, and his ballot was to be the decisive one.
Massachusetts should have been a unit; but Samuel Adams and Hancock
were alienated, and Paine and Cushing were not yet full-strung, but the
last-named was soon superseded by Gerry, who was in entire sympathy
with the Adamses. Congress recommended the colonies whose governors had
deserted their posts to set up governments of their own, if only for a
temporary purpose, till constitutional rule should be reëstablished.
Then, after an emphatic but calm restatement of grievances, and the
failure of all efforts to secure a redress, Congress engaged with the
question whether all the colonies might not be forced to set up such
a government of their own. The dastardly conduct of Lord Dunmore,
governor of Virginia, in following his own flight for refuge on board a
frigate with a proclamation to stir an insurrection among the slaves,
might well have left it to R. H. Lee, by direct instruction from his
constituents, early in May, to announce that on an appointed day he
should move for a declaration of independence. He did so on Thursday,
the 7th of June. His motions were for such a declaration, with a
complete dissolution of all political connection between the colonies
and Great Britain; for the forming of foreign alliances, and a plan of
confederation. John Adams seconded the motions. They were discussed on
Saturday in a committee of the whole. On Monday, after a long debate,
Rutledge moved a postponement of the question for three weeks. Up to
this point Jefferson says that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and South Carolina were not ready for the decision, and
thought it prudent to wait, though fast stiffening for the issue.

On June 10th Congress resolved that the consideration of Mr. Lee's
first proposed resolution—that declaring independence—be postponed
to the 1st of July; but that no time should be lost in the interval,
it appointed, on June 11th, a committee to prepare such a declaration.
This committee was Jefferson, John Adams, Franklin, Sherman, and
Robert R. Livingston.[667] This postponement was in deference to the
unreadiness of the delegates of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina to take the decisive step. Some
unnamed member had procured the passage of a vote that on whichever
side the majority should turn, the decision should be pronounced
unanimous, for or against the resolutions. The vote of each colony was
to count for one, whatever the number of its delegates, the majority
in each delegation pronouncing for its colony. The debate was sharp
and intensely earnest. The vote of Pennsylvania was divided. Those
of the six colonies just named being in opposition, there was no
decision. Two of the halting Pennsylvania delegates being induced to
absent themselves on the next day, fifty delegates being present, the
resolutions prevailed by a majority of one province.[668] They had been
bitterly opposed by Livingston of New York, Dickinson and Wilson of
Pennsylvania, and Rutledge of South Carolina. Argument, persuasion, and
appeal were diligently pressed to draw the hesitating to acquiescence.
Meanwhile several of the colonies were anticipating the action of
Congress in taking their stand for independence: North Carolina, in
April, 1776, and also Massachusetts, at the same date; Virginia, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New Jersey followed; and New
York, as we shall see, soon came into line.

The proposed measures of Congress, associated with the leading one of
independence, were most sagaciously devised for dignifying the primary
resolve and elevating the action which should sustain it above the
character of a mere rebellion. Those measures assumed the rights and
responsibilities of nationality. The issuing of letters of marque and
reprisal, the making free of all the ports for commerce with all the
world except Great Britain, and the inviting of foreign alliances, were
exercises of the prerogatives of sovereignty, and were the reasons
assigned by France for regarding the United States as a nation at
war with another nation. On July 12th Congress appointed a committee
of one delegate from each colony charged with reporting a plan of
confederation, and another committee of five to propose a plan for
foreign alliances.

The Declaration marked a crisis alike in the forum and for the people.
It was read to Washington's army, and drew wild plaudits from officers
and from the ranks. As rapidly as panting couriers could disperse it
over the country it was formally received with parade and observance,
and read in town and village. It gave life and inspiration for every
successive measure to turn a purpose into an accomplished fact.[669]

Many of our writers, in tracing the working of the various opinions
which aided in fostering the spirit of independence, have found reason
to ascribe much influence to strong religious animosities, especially
to hostility to the state religion of England. It might perhaps be
difficult to trace sharply and directly through all the colonies any
lines of division of this character attributable to such an agency, as
distinct and positive as those which manifested themselves in secular
affairs, but there can be no question that sectarian influences had an
important part in the animosities of the time. It would have been but
natural that in this matter the line between the loyal and the disloyal
should have been drawn between the English Church and the dissenters,
who were the vast majority of the colonists; but this rule was by no
means without many marked exceptions. All the Episcopal ministers
officiating in the colonies had received ordination in England.
Their oath bound them to loyalty. Most of them, too, in the northern
provinces, were pensioners of an English missionary society. The test
applied to them when the spirit of rebellion was strengthening was
whether they would read or omit in their services the prayers for the
king. It stood little for them to plead in their defence their oath
and their dependence on a foreign fund. Such a plea was a poor one,
as being strictly personal and selfish, born of a love of ease and of
a cringing spirit. Some of them left their pulpits, and maintained a
discreet silence. Those who insisted upon fulfilling all the pledges
and duties of their office were in many cases roughly handled. It is
to be considered, however, that so far as sectarianism in religion
would alienate the colonies from Great Britain, it could not have
been a prime agent in the case, for then it would have alienated them
from each other, to which result it did not avail. The Tory refugee
Judge Jones uses the terms Presbyterians and Episcopalians as almost
synonymous with the terms rebels and loyalists. But this was by no
means true.[670] The leading patriot John Jay, with many others from
his province, was an Episcopalian. The Episcopalians of Virginia,
of Maryland, and of the Carolinas were as stiffly opposed to the
importation here of English prelates as were the Congregationalists of
New England. The Tory Galloway[671] traced our rebellious spirit to
the same source as that of the English civil war, viz., to Puritanism.
He wrote: "The disaffection is confined to two sets of dissenters,
while the people of the Established Church, the Methodists, Lutherans,
German Calvinists, Quakers, Moravians, etc., are warmly attached to
the British government." Galloway exceeded the strict truth in that
statement.

The numbers, position, and experiences of Episcopal ministers in the
provinces at the period of the war have been recently presented in an
elaborate and well-authenticated monograph on the subject.[672] From
this it appears that there were at the time not far from two hundred
and fifty clergymen, all of foreign ordination. The lack of Episcopal
supervision brought with it laxity of discipline. At the southward the
church gathered into it the wealthy, the officials of the government
and of the army and navy, professional men, and merchants. But their
clergy, instead of being, like their few brethren at the North,
stipendiaries of a foreign society, largely derived their support
from those to whom they ministered, and so, though being under the
oath of allegiance, were more free to share the patriotic sentiments
of the laity, and they did so. Clergy and laity in the Southern
provinces seem, many of them, to have been as strongly opposed, for
temporary or other reasons, to the introduction of a foreign prelacy
as were those at the North. Several of the Episcopal clergy in the
Middle and Southern provinces proved themselves most ardent patriots,
not only in discourse but by taking chaplaincies in the Continental
armies, and even serving in the ranks and as officers in command. The
trial test for deciding their position was in the religious services
required of them on the days appointed by Congress for thanksgiving or
fasting. Their choice was not a free one between a full or a mutilated
service of prayer. The severest sufferers of this class were among the
Episcopal ministers of New York and Connecticut, who resolved to stand
for loyalty. Some, however, trimmed to time and necessity; others were
patriots. Provoost, afterwards the first Bishop of New York, espoused
the side of the people.[673]

It was in New England that the "Puritanism" of which Galloway wrote had
the prevailing influence; and a very energetic and effective influence
it was, working with other agencies in making the English civil
government all the more odious because of the lordly prelates, who
ruled not only in church, but in state. The inherited and traditionary
spirit of New England had kept alive the memory of the ecclesiastical
tyranny which had developed Puritanism in Old England, and of the
trials and sacrifices by which deliverance had been secured. Those
very New England colonies in which the rebellious spirit was most
vigorous had been in but recent years, by help alike of sympathizers
and opponents, conservatives of the old ways and reformers with the
new, working their own way of relief from their theocratic basis of
government, and securing freedom for themselves in belief and worship,
with progress in the severance of church and state. They could not
patiently contemplate the establishment of prelacy among them. Two
occasions, operating as warnings, had freshened the old Puritan spirit
of New England just previous to the opening of civil contention.
One was the project, which had been zealously pressed, of sending
English bishops into the colonies, whose functions the popular mind
refused to distinguish between those which they exercised as lords,
both spiritual and temporal, in England and those of ordination
and confirmation, etc., which was all that was required of them as
"superior clergy" here. An animated pamphlet controversy had been
waging on this subject a decade before the outbreak of hostilities, in
which appeared as a champion on one side the bold and able minister
Jonathan Mayhew of Boston, and on the other, Secker, Archbishop of
Canterbury.[674] No English prelate ever had functions or presence
on our territory. The other reason, for a revival of the hostility
here against the Established Church, was found in the coming hither
into the old Congregational parishes, and the maintenance here by an
English missionary society, of a number of Episcopal ministers. It
was charged—not, however, justly—that the benevolent founders of
that society had endowed it solely for the support of missionaries
to neglected and forlorn persons,—fishermen and others in the
colonies,—whereas it was used to promote division and disaffection in
places well provided with a ministry. This charge was overstrained, for
no missionary was sent to any place where there were not those, few
or many, who were actual members of the English Church, or who stood
out against the doctrine and discipline of Congregationalism. None the
less did hostility to the English Church help largely to stimulate the
spirit of rebellion.[675]

The first provincial congress of Massachusetts, assembled in 1774, knew
very well the grounds of their reliance when by resolution they sent
an address to each and all of the ministers in the province, reminding
them of the valued aid and sympathy which their common ancestors in
the years of former trials had found in their religious guides, and
earnestly appealing for their help and strong efforts among their
people in resistance of the tyranny of the mother country. The New
England ministers were not slow in responding to—indeed, they had in
many cases anticipated—this appeal of their civil leaders. They had a
marvellous skill for discerning the vital relations between politics
and religion, while they had a strong repugnance to what was conveyed
by the terms "church and state." With very few exceptions,—such,
however, there were, in rare cases, of pastors in years and of timid
spirits,—the ministers were foremost in inspiriting patriotism and in
meeting all the emergencies of the times.[676]

The only organized and official measures taken by any one of the
religious denominations in sympathy with the American Revolution was
that of the Presbyterians, who had freed themselves from dependence on
a civil establishment. The Scotch-Irish Presbyterians on the frontiers
of Virginia and North Carolina had stoutly vindicated their religious
rights against the Established Church in Virginia, and were among
the foremost in asserting their independence of the mother country.
With the sturdiest resolution they had successfully triumphed over
the Episcopal party in New York and thwarted government influence in
its behalf. John Witherspoon, the only clergyman in the Congress of
1776, gave by delegated authority the vote of the Presbyterians for
independence.[677]

And now the question may well be asked, Where rests the chief
responsibility for bringing to this result the protracted controversy
between the mother realm and her colonies? The Declaration of
Independence was yet to be made good by a severe struggle on the part
of the colonies, and to be accepted by the other party in the issue.
It is rarely, if indeed the case has any historical parallel, when
so large a measure of the responsibility for bringing about a signal
revolution in the great affairs of a nation can, as in this instance,
be directly charged upon an individual, and that was his majesty
George III.[678] The facts of the case with their full evidence stand
now clearly certified. That Declaration, with the event which it
signified, might have come in other ways. Agencies and events were
working to it. But that it came when it did, and as it did, he at
whose heavy cost it came was largely the conspicuous agent and cause
of it. That this is so, let the following tracing of the stages of the
developments attest. And by the charge here alleged is meant that the
king was mainly instrumental in bringing about the result, not merely
by an official or representative responsibility, nor by prerogative,
but by the prompting of personal feeling and private decision. It is
also to be admitted that the king may have been guided by the purest
motives and the loftiest sense of duty to preserve in any way the
jewels of his crown and the integrity of his empire. But none the less
it was his will and resolve that decided the issue.

As we have seen, the effect of every measure of the British government
brought to bear upon the colonies was directly the opposite of what
had been intended. Threats and penalties exasperated, but did not
intimidate. Seeming concessions and retractions did not conciliate.
Contempt and defiance called out corresponding and reciprocal feelings.
There was a strict parallelism between the ministerial inventions for
securing the mastery and the patriot ingenuity and earnestness for
nullifying them. The few incidental accompaniments of popular violence
and mobs were so familiar to the people of England at home as to count
for little. They were to be regretted and condemned, but they were
fully offset by the indiscriminate and vengeful punishments which
government visited upon them.

We are to remember that the king, if not the originator and adviser
of all these measures, gave them his cordial approval. More and
more, as the quarrel ripened, his personal will and resolve asserted
themselves, even autocratically. When the catastrophe finally came,
his prime minister frankly confessed, that by the king's urgency, and
in compliance with his own view of the claims of loyalty, he had been
acting against his own clear judgment of what was wise and right,
if not against his conscience.[679] Who, then, so much as the king,
as sole arbiter, by his own personal decision, substituted arms for
debate? The colonies, no longer the aggressive party, were put on
the defensive. Still, even after this dropping of the royal gage of
battle, the Assembly of Pennsylvania, with its residuum of Quakerism,
required of its members the old oath of allegiance to George III., and
Dickinson reported to it strongly loyal instructions for its delegates.
Is it strange that Franklin refused to take his seat in that body?
Two years later,—March 17, 1778,—the king writes to Lord North: "No
consideration in life shall make me stoop to opposition. Whilst any ten
men in the kingdom will stand by me, I will not give myself up into
bondage. I will rather risk my crown than do what I think personally
disgraceful. It is impossible that the nation should not stand by
me. If they will not, they shall have another king, for I will never
put my hand to what will make me miserable to the last hour of my
life."[680] And again, when the end was at hand, the king, writing to
Lord North, March 7, 1780, says: "I can never suppose this country so
lost to all ideas of self-importance as to be willing to grant American
independence. If that word be ever universally adopted, I shall despair
of this country being preserved from a state of inferiority. I hope
never to see that day, for, however I am treated, I must love this
country."[681]

Recalling the fact that in all previous remonstrances[682] and
petitions, without a single exception, whether coming from a
convention, an assembly, or a congress, the ministry and Parliament
were made to bear the burden of all complaints and reproaches, we note
with emphasis that in the Declaration of Independence, for the first
time, "the present king of Great Britain" is charged as the offender.
Its scathing invectives in its short sentences begin with "He." His
tools and supporters are all lost sight of, passed unmentioned. This
substitution of the monarch himself as chargeable, through his own
persistency, with the whole burden heretofore laid at the door of his
advisers indicates the necessity which Congress felt of seeming to
sever their plain constitutional allegiance to the monarch, and of
ignoring all dependence on his ministers or Parliament, whose supremacy
over the colonies they had always denied. Hence the tone and wording of
all the previous utterances of Congress, deferential and even fulsome
as they now seem, in sparing the king, for the first time, in the
Declaration, are changed to give the necessary legal emphasis of the
capital letter in _He_. Indeed, the law and the man were essentially
as one, for the candid monarch told John Adams, on his subsequent
appearance as the minister of the United States, that he was the last
person in his realm to consent to the independence of the colonies. The
utter hopelessness of the measures of government was obvious to the
wiser statesmen of Britain and to those whose observation was guided by
simple common sense.[683]

A matter of sharp and reproachful criticism—which has not wholly
disappeared from more recent pages of history and comment—was found
in what certainly had the seeming of insincerity and duplicity in the
earnest professions of loyalty made by leading patriots while the
spirit of absolute independence, latent and but thinly veiled, was
instigating measures of defiance, and even of open hostility. The
patriots, it was boldly charged, had practised a mean hypocrisy. The
shock of the disclosure was at the time sudden and severe. Joseph
Galloway, though perhaps the most hostile and vengeful, was by no means
the least able or the most estranged and disappointed of a class of
very prominent men, who avowed that they had been alienated from the
patriot cause by the exposed duplicity of its wiliest leaders. They had
joined heart and hand in council and measures with those who professed
to be seeking only a redress of grievances, with an unqualified
loyalty as British subjects to the king and the constitution, and in a
disavowal of any idea of independence.

On the other side of the water, the Declaration, as "throwing off the
mask of hypocrisy" by the patriots, was a very painful shock to many
who had been most friendly and earnest champions of the cause of the
colonists. The members of the opposition in Parliament and in high
places were taunted by the supporters of government for all their
pleading in behalf of rebels. And when, besides the bold avowal of
independence, the added measures of a suspension of all commerce with
Great Britain, and of an alliance of the patriots with the hereditary
enemy of their mother country, came to the knowledge of those who
had been our friends, the consternation which it caused them was but
natural. Manufacturers and merchants, against whose interests so heavy
a blow had been dealt, and all Englishmen who scorned the French, our
new ally, might with reason rank themselves as now our enemies. Of
course, the ministry and the abetters of the most offensive measures of
government availed themselves of the evidence now offered of what they
had maintained was the ultimate purpose of the disaffected colonists,
hypocritically concealed, and they confidently looked for a well-nigh
unanimous approval and support of the vengeful hostilities at once
entered upon. It was affirmed that the British officers and soldiers
here, who had before been but half-hearted and lukewarm in fulfilling
their errand, now became as earnest and impassioned in war measures
as if they were fighting Indians, Frenchmen, or Spaniards. Such were
really the effects wrought on both sides of the water, not merely by
the bold avowal of independence, but by what was viewed as the exposure
of a subtle and hypocritical concealment of the purpose of it under
beguiling professions of loyalty.

What is there to be said, either by way of explanation or of
justification, of the course ascribed to the patriots? It is well
to admit freely that there was much said, if not done, that had the
seeming of duplicity and insincerity, of secrecy of design and of
sinuous dealing. And after yielding all that can be charged of this,
we may insist that, in reality, it was nothing beyond the seeming.
Neither disguise, nor duplicity, nor hypocrisy, nor artful or cunning
intrigue, in any shape or degree, was availed of by the patriots.
The result to which they were led was from the first natural and
inevitable, and it was reached by bold and honest stages, in thinking
out and making sure of their way. The facts are all clearly revealed
to us in their course of development. The maturing of opinion, till
what had been repelled as a calamity was accepted as a necessity,
is traceable through the changing events of a few heavily burdened
years, if not even of months and days, to say nothing of the symptoms
of it which a keen perception may discover during the career of four
generations of Englishmen on this continent. Its own natural stages
of growth were reached just at the time that it was attempted to
bring it under check by artificial restraint of the home government.
That government compelled the colonists to ask themselves the two
questions: first, if they were anything less than Englishmen; and
further, if their natural rights were any less than those of men. There
has been much discussion as to when and by whom the idea of American
independence was first entertained. It would be very difficult to
assign that conception to a date or to an individual. All that was
natural and spontaneous in the situation of the colonists would be
suggestive of it; all that was artificial, like the tokens of a foreign
oversight in matters of government, would be exceptional or strange
to it. Husbandmen, mechanics, and fishermen would not be likely to
trouble themselves with the ways in which their relations as British
subjects interfered with their free range in life. Larger and deeper
thinkers, like Samuel Adams, would feel their way down to comprehensive
root questions, sure at last to reach the fundamentals of the whole
matter,—as, What has the British ministry and Parliament to do with
us? It required nine years to mature the puzzling of a peasant over the
question of a trifling tax into the conclusion of a republican patriot
statesman. Every stage of this process is traceable in abounding
public and private papers, with its advances and arrests, its pauses
and its quickenings, its misgivings and assurances, in all classes of
persons, and in its dimmest and its fullest phases. We have seen how
it was working its way in the honest secrecy of a few breasts in the
first Congress, even when repelled as a dreaded fatality. Samuel Adams
is generally, and with sufficient evidence, credited as having been
the first of the leading spirits of the revolt to have reached—at
first in private confidence, steadily strengthening into the frankest
and boldest avowal—the conviction that the issue opened between the
colonies and the mother country logically, necessarily, and inevitably
must result in a complete severance of the tie between them. Even at
that stage of his earliest insight into the superficial aspect of
the controversy, when he is quoted as if hypocritically saying one
thing while he intended another, it will be observed that his strong
professions of loyalty are qualified by parenthetical suggestions of
a possible alternative. Thus, in the Address which he wrote for the
Massachusetts Assembly, in 1768, to the Lords of the Treasury, his
explicit professions of loyalty for his constituents close with the
caveat that this loyalty will conform itself to acquiescence so far
as "consists with the fundamental rules of the Constitution."[684]
Of course, as the oppressive measures of government exasperated the
patriots, they were not only led on to discern the full alternative
before them, but were unreserved in their expressions of a willingness
to meet it, at whatever cost. Still, however, what seemed like
hesitation in the boldest was simply a waiting for the slow and timid
to summon resolution for decisive action. Of the single measures in
Congress preceding the Declaration of Independence, the most farcical
and the most likely to be regarded as hypocritical was the second
petition to the king, which his majesty spurned. His ministers had to
compare with its adulatory insincerities some intercepted letters of
John Adams, written nearly at the same time, stinging with defiance
and treason. But John Adams well described this petition to the king
as "Dickinson's Letter." Dickinson himself is the most conspicuous
and true-hearted of the class of men who to the last shrunk from
the severance of the tie to the mother country. Yet he was to be
the one whose casting vote, by a substitute, was to ratify the
great Declaration. There may have been weakness in his urgency that
that petition should proffer a final hope of amity, but it was the
prompting of thorough manliness and honesty. As we have seen, it was
the royal scorn of that petition, backed by a wilful personal espousal
of responsibility, which made the king the real prompter of the
Declaration of Independence.[685]

Leaving out of view all obligations of the colonies to the mother
country, there was still quite another class of very reasonable
apprehensions which had a vast influence over the halting minds. What
would be the relations of the severed and possibly contentious colonies
to each other, with all their separate interests, rivalries, and
jealousies? Might not anarchy and civil war make them rue the day when,
in rejecting the tempered severity of the rule of a lawful monarch,
they had forfeited the privilege of having an arbiter and a common
friend?

Nor was this the only dread. The Indians were still a formidable foe
on the frontiers. So far as they were held in check, it was largely
by English arms and influence. Without anticipating the cruel and
disgraceful complication of the trouble which was to come, and the
aggravations of civil war, by the enlistment of these savages by
England as her allies against her former subjects, it was enough
for timid colonists looking into the future to realize the power of
mischief which lurked with these wild men in the woods. Every further
advance of the colonists beyond the boundaries already secured would
provoke new hostilities, and remind the pioneers of the value to them
of English armaments and reinforcements. And yet once more, those were
by no means bugbear alarms which foreboded for the colonists, left
to themselves, outrages from French and Spanish intrigue, ambition,
and greed of territory. France and Spain had losses and insults to
avenge against England, and might seek for reprisals on the undefended
colonists. It needs only an intimation, without detail, of the
apprehensions which either reason or imagination might conjure from
this foreboding, to show how powerfully it might operate with prudent
men in suspending their decision between rebellion and loyalty. All
these considerations, taken separately and together, whether as
resulting in slow and timid maturing of sentiment and of profession
in Congress, or as influencing the judgment of patriot leaders, or as
guiding the vacillating course of individuals and multitudes, may have
given a seeming show of insincerity and duplicity to words contrasted
with subsequent deeds. But a clear apprehension of all the alternatives
which were then to be balanced will satisfy us that there was little
room for hypocrisy to fill.

Some show of reason for charging upon the patriots duplicity and lack
of downright frankness was found in their professions of a steadfast,
but still a qualified, loyalty. If there was not at first some
confusion or vagueness in their own ideas on this point, they certainly
set themselves open to such a misunderstanding by the ministry as
to leave it in doubt whether they knew their own minds or candidly
declared them. The controversy, from its beginning till its close,
was constantly alleged to start from this discriminating standard of
loyalty: the colonists repudiated the exercise of authority over them
by Parliament and the ministry, and yet avowed themselves faithful and
loyal subjects of the king. The king could govern and act only through
Parliament. How could they repudiate the authority of Parliament and
respect that of the king? What was to be the basis, scope, and mode
of exercise of his authority? They certainly could not have in view
the exercise of an autocracy over them, the restoration of the old
royal prerogative which a previous glorious revolution had shattered.
The king could exercise his authority in the colonial assemblies only
through governors, and those governors had been rendered powerless
here. Even the sage and philosophic Franklin found himself perplexed
on this point. Writing from London to his son in New Jersey, March 13,
1768, he says: "I know not what the Boston people mean; what is the
subordination they acknowledge in their Assembly to Parliament, while
they deny its power to make laws for them?"[686] Galloway pertinently
asked of the first Congress, "if they had any other union of the two
countries more constitutional in view, why did they not petition
for it?" "The Congress, while they professed themselves subjects,
spoke in the language of allies, and were openly acting the part of
enemies."[687] How are we to reconcile two statements made by Pitt
in the same speech, in January, 1776: "This kingdom has no right to
lay a tax on the colonies." "At the same time, on every real point of
legislation, I believe the authority of Parliament to be fixed as the
Polar Star." Without any attempt to conceive or fashion a definition of
their ideal, the good common sense of the patriots at last worked out
the conclusion that their emancipation from the Parliament involved a
dispensing with the king.[688]

There was no disguising the fact, however, that, with independence
declared, there was no such unanimity of purpose among all the members
of Congress, still less among their many-minded and vaguely-defined
constituency. It was inevitable, therefore, that both a degree of
arbitrariness towards halting and censorious objectors, and of harsh
severity towards open resistants, should henceforward characterize
the measures approved by the patriot leaders. There was a sagacious
moderation and prudence in the measures taken by Congress to conciliate
and reassure the half-hearted and the hesitating. For the final stand
had been taken that nothing short of an achieved independence should be
accepted as the issue.

The prime movers in the patriot cause continued to be the main workers
for it, and gradually reinforced themselves by new and effective
aiders. Astute and able men, well read in history and by no means
without knowledge of international law and the methods of diplomacy,
surveyed the field before them, provided for contingencies, and found
full scope for their wits and wisdom. When we consider the distractions
of the times, the overthrow of all previous authority, the presence
and threats of anarchy, the lack of unanimity, and the number and
virulence of discordant interests, and, above all, that Congress had
only advisory, hardly instructive, powers, even with the most willing
portion of its constituents, we can easily pardon excesses and errors,
and heartily yield our admiration to the noble qualities and virtues
of those who proved their claim to leadership. When we read the
original papers and the full biographies of these men, we are impressed
by the balance and force of their judgment, their power of expressing
reasons and convictions, their calm self-mastery, and the fervor of
their purposes.


CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.


THE source to which naturally we should first apply ourselves for the
fullest information on the development of the purpose of independence
would be the _Journals of Congress_. But our disappointment would
be complete. The same reasons which enjoined on the members secrecy
as to the proceedings seem to have deprived the record even of some
things that were done and of almost every utterance in debate. We
have to look to other sources, the most scattered and fragmentary,
to learn the names even of the principal leaders in the debates, and
from beginning to end we have not the report, scarcely a summary, of a
single speech. Our reasonable inference from such hints is that some
ten, or at most fifteen, members were the master-spirits in securing
the adoption of measures, while they were opposed by some as earnest as
themselves, but not as numerous. But whatever may have been written in
the original _Journals_ was subjected to a cautious selection when they
were printed by a committee. It is only from Jefferson himself, for
instance, that we learn (Randall's _Jefferson_, i. 15) how, somewhat to
his chagrin, "the rhetoric" of his draft of the Declaration was toned
down. Especially do the _Journals_, as printed, suppress all evidences
of strong dissension, of which we have abundant hints in fragments from
John and Sam. Adams, Franklin, Dickinson, Galloway, Jefferson, Jay, and
Livingston. But the _Journals_ do spread before us at length sundry
admirable papers, drawn by able and judicious committees.[689]

The reader must turn to the notes appended to chapter i. of the present
volume for an examination of some of the leading pamphlets occasioned
by the Congresses of 1774 and 1775, and for an examination of their
opposing views, with more or less warning of the inevitable issue of
independence.

One may easily trace in the writings of Franklin, extending through
the years preceding the Revolution, and through all the phases of the
struggle, seeming inconsistencies in the expression of his opinions
and judgment. But these are readily explicable by changes in time and
circumstance. We must pause, however, upon the strong statement made
by Lecky in the following sentence: "It may be safely asserted that if
Franklin had been able to guide American opinion, it would never have
ended in revolution."[690]

Opportune in the date of its publication, as well as of mighty cogency
in its tone and substance, was that vigorous work by Thomas Paine,
a pamphlet bearing the title "Common Sense." If we take merely the
average between the superlatively exalted tributes paid to his work as
the one supremely effective agency for bringing vast numbers of the
people of the colonies to front the issue of independence, and the
most moderate judgments which have estimated its real merit, we should
leave to be assigned to it the credit of being the most inspiriting of
all the utterances and publications of the time for popular effect.
The opportuneness of the appearance of this remarkable essay consisted
in the fact that it came into the hands of multitudes, greedy to read
it, a few months before the burning question of independency was to
be settled. The papers issued by Congress might well answer the needs
of the most intelligent classes of the people, in reconciling them to
the new phase of the struggle. But there were large numbers of persons
who needed the help of some short and easy argument, homely in style
and quotable between plain neighbors. And this eighteen-penny pamphlet
met that necessity. It appeared anonymously. John Adams says it was
ascribed to his pen. Paine had been in confidential intercourse with
Franklin, and the sagacious judgment of that philosopher doubtless
suggested the form and substance of some of its contents, and may have
kept out of it some things less apt or wise. Washington, Franklin,
and John Adams welcomed it as a vigorous agency for persuading masses
of simple and honest men that their rights must now be taken into
their own hands for vindication. The character of the writer alienated
from him the regard of those who could and who would willingly have
advanced his interests, and made him to multitudes an object of horror
and contempt. Though his pamphlet bore the title of "Common Sense",
Gouverneur Morris says that that was a quality which Paine himself
wholly lacked. Posterity, however, may well accord to him as a writer
the high consideration given to him by his contemporaries, of having
happily met by his pen a crisis and a pause in the state of the popular
mind. Franklin wrote that "the pamphlet had prodigious effects."[691]

Adam Smith's _Wealth of Nations_ was published in the same year. Wise
men have often affirmed that if it had appeared a generation earlier,
and if the doctrines and principles which it advocated had passed into
the minds of statesmen and economists, peaceful rather than warlike
measures would have disposed of the controversy. It required the
lapse of twoscore years to convince English statesmen and economists
of the practical wisdom of the leading principles advanced by this
college professor. He maintained the general viciousness and folly of
the English colonial administration; that while even the restricted
commercial monopoly was more generous than the colonial rule of any
other governments, the prohibition of manufactures was mischievous and
oppressive. He agreed with Dean Tucker, that a peaceful separation of
the colonies would benefit rather than harm the mother country. Yet,
under existing circumstances, such a separation was impracticable,
because neither the government nor the people of the realm would
seriously entertain the proposition.[692]

One of the best expositions of the views held by some of the Tory
writers, that the seeds of independency were sown with the early
settlements and nurtured through their history, is given in a tract by
Galloway,[693] which was published in London in 1780, as _Historical
and Political Reflections on the Rise and Progress of the American
Rebellion. In which the Causes of that Rebellion are pointed out, and
the Policy and Necessity of offering to the Americans a System of
Government founded in the Principles of the British Constitution, are
clearly demonstrated. By the Author of Letters to a Nobleman on the
Conduct of the American War_. He pleads that the rebellion has been
encouraged by the assertion "of the injustice and oppression of the
present reign by a plan formed by the administration for enslaving
the colonies", and asserts that the mother country had fostered the
infancy and weakness of the colonies, had espoused their quarrels,
and, at an enormous cost of debt, had defended them. "The colonies are
very rich and prosperous, with more than a quarter of the population
of Great Britain, and should share its burdens. The rebellion did not
spring from a dread of being enslaved." The writer then ably and justly
traces its origin to the principles of the Puritan exiles, from whose
passion for religious freedom has grown that for civil independence.
He attributes much influence helpful to rebellion to the organization
among the Presbyterians at Philadelphia, in 1764, which united by
correspondence with the Congregationalists of New England. The other
sects were generally averse to measures of violent opposition to
authority. The measures of government are vindicated, and all trouble
is traced to a faction in New England, sympathized with and led on by a
similar faction at home. The "Circular Letter", bringing the colonies
into accord, wrought the mischief. Two sharply divided parties at once
were formed, or proved to exist: the one defining and standing for the
right of the colonies with a redress of grievances, on the basis of
a solid constitutional union with the mother country, and opposed to
sedition and all acts of violence; the other resolved by all means,
even though covert and fraudulent, to throw off allegiance, appeal
to arms, run the venture of anarchy, and assert, and if possible
attain, independence. The latter party, acting with some temporary
reserve and caution, opposed all peaceable propositions, and covertly
worked for their own ends. They used most effectively a system of
expresses between Philadelphia and the other towns, Sam. Adams being
the artful and diligent fomenter of all this mischief. By his guile,
Congress was brought to approve the Resolves of the Mass. Suffolk
Conference, which declared "that no obedience is due to acts of
Parliament affecting Boston", and provided for an organization of the
provincial militia against government. He proceeded to argue that "the
American faction", as in the fourth resolve of their Bill of Rights,
explicitly declare their colonial independence. This was followed by
an address to his majesty,—not calling it a petition,—and which
the writer proceeded to analyze with much acuteness, as being vague
and evasive in its professions, and suggestive of conditions which
would prove satisfactory. Finally, "the mask was thrown off", and the
casting vote of the "timid and variable Mr. Dickinson" carried the
Declaration of Independence. "Samuel Adams, the great director of their
councils, and the most cautious, artful, and reserved man among them,
did not hesitate, as soon as the vote of independence had passed, to
declare in all companies that he had labored upwards of twenty years
to accomplish the measure." Mr. Galloway closes with sharp strictures
upon the bewildered and vacillating policy which the government has
heretofore pursued, and pleads for a firm and generous "constitutional
union" between the realm and the colonies. The growth of the spirit of
independence necessarily makes a part of all general histories of the
war, which are characterized in another place.

  [Illustration]


EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE claim of Chalmers that the passion for independence had latently
existed from the very foundation of the New England colonies[694] had
been early denied by Dummer in his _Defence of the N. E. Charters_.
John Adams[695] had been outspoken in his advocacy of independence
for more than a year before R. H. Lee introduced his resolution into
Congress. He had avowed it in letters, which the British intercepted in
July, 1775, and printed in a Boston newspaper. If Josiah Quincy, Jr.
(_Memoirs_, 250, 341), can be believed, he found Franklin in London in
1774 holding ideas "extended on the broad scale of total emancipation"
(Sparks's _Franklin_, i. 379). The resolves of Mecklenburg County in
North Carolina, in May, 1775, were strongly indicative. John Jay traced
the beginning of an outspoken desire to the rejection by the king of
the petition of the Congress of 1775 (_N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._,
July, 1776). In the autumn of that year it is certain that the passion
for independence animated the army round Boston (Frothingham's _Siege
of Boston_, 263), and in December James Bowdoin was confident that
the dispute must end in independence (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, xii.
228). There was very far from any general adhesion to the belief in its
inevitableness at all times during 1775. Washington was not conscious
of the wish (Sparks, i. 131, ii. 401; Smyth, ii. 457). Gov. Franklin
was expressing to Dartmouth the prevalence of a detestation of such
views (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, xiv 342). The English historians have
dwelt on this (Mahon, vi. 92, 94; Lecky, iii. 414, 447, iv. 41).[696]

[Illustration: AUTOGRAPHS OF THE MECKLENBURG COMMITTEE, MAY 31, 1775.

From the plate in W. D. Cooke's _Rev. Hist. of No. Carolina_, p.
64. Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 619, for another fac-simile and
accounts of the signers; also see C. L. Hunter, _Sketches of Western
North Carolina_ (Raleigh, 1877, p. 39). It has been strenuously claimed
and denied that, at a meeting of the people of Mecklenburg County, in
North Carolina, on May 20, 1775, resolutions were passed declaring
their independence of Great Britain. The facts in the case appear to be
these:—On the 31st of May, 1775, the people of this county did pass
resolutions quite abreast of the public sentiment of that time, but not
venturing on the field of independency further than to say that these
resolutions were to remain in force till Great Britain resigned its
pretensions. These resolutions were well written, attracted notice,
and were copied into the leading newspapers of the colonies, North and
South, and can be found in various later works (Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 619, etc.). A copy of the _S. Carolina Gazette_ containing them
was sent by Governor Wright, of Georgia, to Lord Dartmouth, and was
found by Bancroft in the State Paper Office, while in the _Sparks
MSS._ (no. lvi.) is the record of a copy sent to the home government
by Governor Martin of North Carolina, with a letter dated June 30,
1775. Of these resolutions there is no doubt (Frothingham's _Rise of
the Republic_, p. 422). In 1793, or earlier, some of the actors in the
proceeding, apparently ignorant that the record of these resolutions
had been preserved in the newspapers, endeavored to supply them from
memory, unconsciously intermingling some of the phraseology of the
Declaration of July 4th in Congress, which gave them the tone of a
pronounced independency. Probably through another dimness of memory
they affixed the date of May 20, 1775, to them. These were first
printed in the _Raleigh Register_, April 30, 1819. They are found to
resemble in some respects the now known resolves of May 31st, as well
as the national Declaration in a few phrases. In 1829 Martin printed
them, much altered, in his _North Carolina_ (ii. 272), but it is not
known where this copy came from. In 1831 the State printed the text of
the 1819 copy, and fortified it with recollections and certificates
of persons affirming that they were present when the resolutions were
passed on the 20th: _The Declaration of Independence by the Citizens
of Mecklenburg County, N. C., on the twentieth day of May, 1775, with
documents, and proceedings of the Cumberland Association_ (Raleigh,
1831). This report of the State Committee is printed also in 4 Force,
ii. 855. The resolves are reprinted in _Niles's Reg._ (1876, p. 313);
in Caldwell's _Greene_; in Lossing (ii. 622), and in other places.
Frothingham says he has failed to find any contemporary reference in
manuscript or print to these May 20th resolutions. Jefferson (_Memoir
and Corresp._, iv. 322; Randall's _Jefferson_, 1858, vol. iii. App. 2)
denied their authenticity, and J. S. Jones supported their genuineness
in his _Defence of the Revolutionary History of North Carolina_
(Boston, 1834). In 1847 Rev. Thomas Smith, in his _True Origin and
Source of the Mecklenburgh and National Declaration of Independence_,
agreed to the priority of the May 20th resolutions, but thought that
both those and the national Declaration were drawn in part from the
ordinary covenants of the Scottish Presbyterians,—hence agreeing
naturally in some of their phraseology.

The principal attempts to sustain the authenticity of the resolutions
of May 20th are F. L. Hawks's lecture in W. D. Cooke's _Revolutionary
Hist. of North Carolina_, and W. A. Grahame's _Hist. Address on the
Mecklenburg Centennial at Charlotte, N. C._ (N. Y. 1875). The adverse
view, held generally by students, is best expressed in J. C. Welling's
paper in the _No. Amer. Rev._, April, 1874, and in H. B. Grigsby's
_Discourse on the Virginia Convention of 1776_ (p. 21). John Adams
was surprised on their production in 1819 (_Works_, x. 380-83). Cf.
further in Moore's _North Carolina_, i. 187; _No. Carolina Univ.
Mag._, May, 1853; Bancroft's _United States_, orig. ed., vii. 370,
and final revision, iv. 196, and also in _Hist. Mag._, xii. 378;
Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 474; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 619;
Johnson's _Traditions and Reminiscences of the Amer. Rev. in the South_
(Charleston, 1851, p. 76); _Amer. Hist. Rec._, iii. 200; _Mag. of Amer.
Hist._, July, 1882, p. 507; _Southern Lit. Messenger_, v. 417, 748.

The antedating of the Congressional Declaration of July 4, 1776,
by local bodies, stirred beyond a wise prudence, might well have
happened in days when the air was full of such feelings; but they
were of little effect, except the Suffolk Resolves of Sept. 6, 1774,
which were adopted by the Congress of 1774. Perhaps the earliest of
these ebullitions were some votes passed by the town of Mendon, in
Massachusetts, in 1773 (_Amer. Antiq. Soc. Proc._, April, 1870). A
fac-simile of the record is given in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii.
472.]

Early in 1776 the passion for independence gathered head. In March,
Edmund Quincy thought the feeling was universal in the Northern
colonies (_N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, 1859, p. 232). Francis
Dana, just home from England, was saying that he was satisfied no
reconciliation was possible (Sparks, _Corresp. of the Rev._, i. 177).
The probability of independence was recognized in the instructions
which Congress gave to Silas Deane in March, on his sailing for Europe.
In April came the violent measure in Congress of abolishing the British
custom laws. The press was beginning to give the warning note,[697]
but not without an occasional counter statement, as when the _N. Y.
Gazette_ (April 8, 1776) asserted that Congress had never lisped a
desire for republicanism or independence. Sam Adams was urgent (Wells,
ii. 397). John Adams was writing to Winthrop, of Cambridge, to restrain
him from urging Massachusetts to break precipitately the union of the
colonies (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll._, xliv. 298), and he was counselling
Joseph Ward to be patient, for it "required time to bring the colonies
all of one mind; but", he adds, "time will do it" (_Scribner's Mag._,
xi. 572).

May was the decisive month, and events marched rapidly. On the 1st,
Massachusetts set up a committee to conduct the government of the
province in the name of the people.[698] On the 4th the last Colonial
Assembly of Rhode Island renounced its allegiance (_Newport Hist.
Mag._, Jan., 1884, p. 131). A letter of Gen. Lee to Patrick Henry, on
May 7th, has raised a doubt of Henry's steadfastness (Force, 5th ser.,
i. 95), but Henry assisted in that vote of the Virginia Convention,
on the 15th, which instructed its representatives in Congress to
move a vote of independence.[699] R. H. Lee wrote to Charles Lee
that "the proprietary colonies do certainly obstruct and perplex the
American machine."[700] Dickinson, as representing these proprietary
governments, saw something different from independency in John Adams's
motion of May 15th, that "the several colonies do establish governments
of their own;" but when that vote had passed, Adams and everybody else,
as he says, considered it was a practical throwing off of allegiance,
and rendered the formal declaration of July 4th simply necessary.[701]
Hawley and Warren now wrote to Sam Adams, inquiring why this hesitancy
in declaring what even now exists? (Wells, ii. 393); and Winthrop urges
the same question upon John Adams (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll._, xliv. 306).

[Illustration: THOMAS JEFFERSON. (_After picture owned by T. J.
Coolidge, of Boston._)

After a painting in monochrome by Stuart, which was formerly at
Monticello, and is now owned by Jefferson's great-grandson, T.
Jefferson Coolidge, of Boston. It was painted during Jefferson's
presidency. An engraving from a copy owned by Mrs. John W. Burke, of
Alexandria, Va., is given in John C. Fremont's _Memoirs of my Life_,
vol. i. p. 12 (N. Y., 1887). A portrait of Jefferson, three quarters
length, sitting, with papers in his lap, was painted for John Adams by
M. Brown, and is engraved in Bancroft's _United States_, orig. ed.,
vol. viii. A picture by Neagle is engraved in Delaplaine's _Repository_
(1835). The profile by Memin is in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 484.
There are various likenesses by Stuart: a full-face and a profile,
owned by T. Jefferson Coolidge, of Boston,—the profile is mentioned
above, and the full-face is one of a series of the Five Presidents, and
it has been engraved in Higginson's _Larger History_; a full-length,
belonging to the heirs of Col. T. J. Randolph, of Edgehill, Va.
(engraved in stipple by D. Edwin); and other pictures in the Capitol,
in the White House, at Bowdoin College, and in the possession of
Edw. Coles, of Philadelphia (engraved by J. B. Forrest). The picture
engraved in Sanderson's _Signers_, vii., is a Stuart. A photogravure,
made of the one at Bowdoin College, is given in an account of the art
collections there, issued by the college.

Lossing, in a paper on "Monticello", Jefferson's home, in _Harper's
Mag._, vol. vii., pictures some of the memorials of Jefferson (cf.
also _Scribner's Monthly_, v. 148), and adds views of the houses of
other signers of the Declaration. This is done also by Brotherhead
in his _Book of the Signers_, together with rendering in fac-simile
autograph papers of each of them. Cf. J. E. Cooke on Jefferson in
_Harper's Mag._, liii. p. 211; and also "The Virginia Declaration of
Independence, or a group of Virginia Statesmen", with various cuts,
in the _Mag. of Amer. History_, May, 1884, p. 369, giving portraits
of Archibald Cary, Edmund Pendleton, Patrick Henry, R. H. Lee, Geo.
Mason, Thomas Nelson, Jr., Benj. Harrison, Edmund Randolph, James
Madison, with views also of Gunston Hall (Mason's home), Henry's
house, Harrison's mansion of Berkeley, and of the old Raleigh tavern,
associated with the patriots' meetings.]

As the debates went on, reassuring notes came from New England in
respect to the Virginia resolutions. Connecticut took action on June
14th (Hinman's _Connecticut during the Rev._, 94). Langdon wrote
from New Hampshire, June 26th, that he knew of none who would oppose
it (_Hist. Mag._, vi. 240). The vote of July 2d finished the issue.
Honest belief, intimidation, a run for luck, and more or less of
self-interest[702] had made the colonies free on paper, and compelled
anew the conflict which was to make their pretensions good.

[Illustration: STATE HOUSE, PHILADELPHIA, 1778.

This view of the building in which Congress sat is from the _Columbian
Magazine_, July, 1787. Cf. Scharf and Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i.
322, and Egle's _Pennsylvania_, p. 186; _Harper's Mag._, iii. 151. An
architect's drawing of the front is on a folding sheet in _A new and
complete Hist. of the Brit. Empire in America_ (London, 1757?). Cf.
other views in Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 272, 288. A water-color view
by R. Peale is now preserved in the building. Cf. Belisle's _Hist. of
Independence Hall_; Col. F. M. Etting's _Memorials of 1776_, his _Hist.
of the Old State House_ (1876), and his paper in the _Penn Monthly_,
iii. 577; Lossing and others in _Potter's Amer. Monthly_, vi. 379,
455, vii. 1, 67, 477; John Savage's illustrated article in _Harper's
Monthly_, xxxv. p. 217. Between 1873 and 1875 the hall was restored
nearly to its ancient appearance, and now has some of the furniture
in it used at the time of the Declaration. Cf. view in Gay, iii.
481, and Higginson's _Larger Hist._, 278. It has become a museum to
commemorate the Revolutionary characters. The reports of the committee
of restoration were printed. Cf. Scharf and Westcott, i. 318, and
Col. Etting's _History;_ also B. P. Poore's _Descriptive Catal. of
Government Publications_, p. 945.

For the conditions of living in Philadelphia, and the appearance of the
town at this time and during the war, see _Watson's Annals_; Scharf
and Westcott's _Philadelphia_ (ch. xvi., 1765-1776, xvii., 1776-1778,
xviii., 1778-1783); Henry C. Watson's _Old Bell of Independence_
(Philad., 1852,—later known as _Noble Deeds of our Forefathers_);
R. H. Davis in _Lippincott's Mag._ (July, 1876), xviii. 27, and in
_Harper's Monthly_, lii. pp. 705, 868; and F. D. Stone on "Philadelphia
Society a hundred years ago, or the reign of Continental money." in
_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, iii. 361. The diaries of Christopher Marshall
(Albany, 1877) and of James Allen (_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, July, 1885,
pp. 176, 278, 424) are of importance in this study.]

[Illustration: ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

This reproduces only the sentences near the beginning in the
handwriting of Thomas Jefferson, showing his corrections. Later in
the manuscript there are corrections, of no great extent, in the
handwriting of John Adams and Benj. Franklin. The original paper is
in the Patent Office at Washington, and is printed in Jefferson's
_Writings_, i. 26; in Randall's _Jefferson_; in the _Declaration of
Independence_ (Boston, 1876, published by the city), where is also a
reduced fac-simile of the engraved document as signed. Cf. Guizot's
_Washington_, Atlas. Lossing (_Field-Book_, ii. 281) gives a fac-simile
of a paragraph nearly all of which was omitted in the final draft,
as was the paragraph respecting slavery (Jefferson's _Memoir and
Corresp._, i. p. 16). A letter of Jefferson to R. H. Lee, July 8, 1776,
accompanying the original draft, showing the changes made by Congress,
is in Lee's _Life of R. H. Lee_, i. 275. For accounts of various
early drafts, and for John Adams's instrumentality in correcting it,
see C. F. Adams's _John Adams_, i. 233, ii. 515. Cf. also Parton's
_Jefferson_, ch. 21; and his _Franklin_, ii. 126. John Adams contended
that the essence of it was in earlier tracts of Otis and Sam. Adams
(_Works_, ii. 514).

On the literary character of the document, see Greene's _Historical
View_, p. 382; the lives of Jefferson by Tucker, Parton, Randall,
John T. Morse, Jr. The similarity of the preamble of the Constitution
of Virginia and certain parts of the Declaration have been taken to
show that Jefferson plagiarized (_New York Review_, no. 1), but the
testimony of a letter of George Wythe to Jefferson, July 27, 1776,
seems to make it clear that Jefferson was the writer of that part of
the Constitution, though Geo. Mason formed the body of it. Cf. also
Wirt's _Patrick Henry_ and Tucker's _Jefferson_.

The text of the Declaration as Jefferson originally wrote it will be
found in Randall's _Jefferson_, p. 172; Niles's _Weekly Register_, July
3, 1813; Timothy Pickering's _Review of the Cunningham Correspondence_
(1824), the _Madison Papers_. These copies do not always agree, since
different drafts were followed. It is given, with changes indicated as
made by Congress, in Jefferson's _Works_, i.; Russell's _Life and Times
of Fox_; Lee's _R. H. Lee_. John Adams (_Works_, ii. 511) gives the
reasons why Jefferson was put at the head of the committee for drafting
the Declaration (_Potter's American Monthly_, vii. 191).

[Illustration]

Trumbull's well-known picture of the committee presenting the
Declaration in Congress was made known through A. B. Durand's engraving
in 1820. The medals commemorating the event are described in Baker's
_Medallic Portraits of Washington_, p. 32. The house in Philadelphia
in which Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence is shown
in Scharf and Westcott's _Philadelphia_ (i. 320); Watson's _Annals
of Philadelphia_ (iii.); Brotherhead's _Signers_ (1861, p. 110);
_Potter's American Monthly_, vi. 341; Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii.
483; Higginson's _Larger Hist. U. S._, 274. The desk on which he wrote
it was for a long time in the possession of Mr. Joseph Coolidge of
Boston, and at his death passed by his will to the custody of Congress.
Randall's _Jefferson_, i. 177; _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, iii. 151.]

The resolutions of independency of June 7th, introduced by R. H.
Lee, in accordance with instructions from Virginia,[703] are not
preserved either in the MS. or printed journals, and John Adams tells
us (_Works_, iii. 45) much was purposely kept out of the records;
but they have been found in the secretary's files, and are given in
fac-simile in Force (4th ser., vi. p. 1700). Of the proceedings and
debates which followed we have, beside the printed journals (i. 365,
392), three manuscript journals.[704] For details we must go to the
memoranda made by Jefferson from notes taken near the time.[705]
There seems no doubt that John Adams was the leading advocate of the
Declaration[706] and such traces as are found of other speakers are
noted in Bancroft, orig. ed., viii. 349; Wells's _Sam. Adams_, ii.
413, 433; Randall's _Jefferson_, i. 182. Bancroft draws John Adams's
character with some vigor (viii. 309). Dickinson made the main speech
against Adams. Bancroft abridges it from Dickinson's own report (viii.
452); Ramsay (i. 339) sketched it. (Cf. Niles's _Principles_, 1876,
p. 400, and _John Adams's Works_, iii. 54.) Adams thought Dickinson's
printed speech very different from the one delivered. Galloway, in his
_Examination_ before Parliament, gave only the flying rumors of what
passed. The later writers summarize the debates and proceedings.[707]

There is some confusion in later days in the memory of participants,
by which the decision for independence on July 2d is not kept quite
distinct from the formal expression of it on July 4th. (Cf. McKean in
_John Adams_, x. 88.)

It was the New York, and not the New Jersey, delegates who were not
instructed to vote for the Declaration (Wells, i. 226). The position of
New York is explained by W. L. Stone in _Harper's Mag._, July, 1883.
The instructions from Pennsylvania and Delaware came late.[708]

[Illustration: ROGER SHERMAN

After a painting owned by a descendant in New Haven. Cf. portrait by
Earle in Sanderson's _Signers_ in Brotherhead's _Book of Signers_
(1861), p. 75, will be found a view of his house. He was of the
Committee to draft the Declaration of Independence.]

Notwithstanding that the statements of both Jefferson (_Writings_,
Boston, 1830, vol. i. 20, etc.) and Adams, made at a later day
(_Autobiography_), and the printed _Journals of Congress_, seem to the
effect that the Declaration was signed by the members present on July
4, 1776, it is almost certain that such was not the case.

[Illustration]

[Illustration]

NOTE.—These four plates show the signatures of the signers (now very
much faded in the original document), arranged not as they signed,
but in the order of States, beginning with Massachusetts and ending
with Georgia. The signatures were really attached in six columns,
containing respectively 3, 7, 12 (John Hancock heading this one), 12,
9, 13,—as is shown in a reduced fac-simile of the entire document as
signed, given in _The Declaration of Independence_ (Boston, 1876).
The signatures are also given in Sanderson's _Signers_, vol. i.;
in _Harper's Mag._, iii. 158, etc. The formation of a set of the
autographs of the "Signers" is, or rather has been, called the test
of successful collecting. The signatures of Thomas Lynch, Jr., Button
Gwinnett, and Lyman Hall are said to be the rarest. The Rev. Dr. Wm. B.
Sprague is said to have formed three sets; but these collections, as
well as those of Raffles, of Liverpool, and Tefft, of Savannah, have
changed hands.

[Illustration]

The finest is thought to belong to Dr. Thomas Addis Emmet, of New York.
The set of Col. T. B. Myers is described in the _Hist. Mag._, 1868.
One was sold in the Lewis J. Cist collection in N. Y., Oct., 1886 (p.
47). It has been said that "of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration
of Independence, nine were born in Massachusetts, eight in Virginia,
five in Maryland, four in Connecticut, four in New Jersey, four in
Pennsylvania, four in South Carolina, three in New York, three in
Delaware, two in Rhode Island, one in Maine, three in Ireland, two in
England, two in Scotland, and one in Wales. Twenty-one were attorneys,
ten Merchants, four physicians, three farmers, one clergyman, one
printer; sixteen were men of fortune. Eight were graduates of Harvard
College, four of Yale, three of New Jersey, two of Philadelphia, two of
William and Mary, three of Cambridge, England, two of Edinburgh, and
one of St. Omers.

[Illustration]

At the time of their deaths, five were over ninety years of age, seven
between eighty and ninety, eleven between seventy and eighty, twelve
between sixty and seventy, eleven between fifty and sixty, seven
between forty and fifty; one died at the age of twenty-seven, and the
age of two is uncertain. At the time of signing the Declaration, the
average of the members was forty-four years. They lived to the average
age of more than sixty-five years and ten months. The youngest member
was Edward Rutledge, of South Carolina, who was in his twenty-seventh
year. He lived to the age of fifty-one. The next youngest member was
Thomas Lynch, of the same State, who was also in his twenty-seventh
year. He was cast away at sea in the fall of 1776. Benjamin Franklin
was the oldest member. He was in his seventy-first year when he signed
the Declaration. He died in 1790, and survived sixteen of his younger
brethren. Stephen Hopkins, of Rhode Island, the next oldest member, was
born in 1707, and died in 1785. Charles Carroll attained the greatest
age, dying in his ninety-sixth year. William Ellery, of Rhode Island,
died in his ninety-first year." The standard collected edition of their
lives is a work usually called Sanderson's _Biography of the signers of
the declaration of independence_ (Philadelphia, 1820-27, in 9 vols.)

_Contents._—1. View of the British colonies from their origin to their
independence; John Hancock, by John Adams. 2. Benjamin Franklin, by J.
Sanderson; George Wythe, by Thomas Jefferson; Francis Hopkinson, by R.
Penn Smith; Robert Treat Paine, by Alden Bradford. 3. Edward Rutledge,
by Arthur Middleton; Lyman Hall, by Hugh McCall; Oliver Wolcott,
by Oliver Wolcott, Jr.; Richard Stockton, by H. Stockton; Button
Gwinnett, by Hugh McCall; Josiah Bartlett, by Robert Waln, Jr.; Philip
Livingston, by De Witt Clinton; Roger Sherman, by Jeremiah Evarts. 4.
Thomas Heyward, by James Hamilton; George Read, by —— Read; William
Williams, by Robert Waln, Jr.; Samuel Huntington, by Robert Waln, Jr.;
William Floyd, by Augustus Floyd; George Walton, by Hugh McCall; George
Clymer, by Robert Waln, Jr.; Benjamin Rush, by John Sanderson. 5.
Thomas Lynch, Jr., by James Hamilton; Matthew Thornton, by Robert Waln,
Jr.; William Whipple, by Robert Waln, Jr.; John Witherspoon, by Ashbel
Green; Robert Morris, by Robert Waln, Jr. 6. Arthur Middleton, by H. M.
Rutledge; Abraham Clark, by Robert Waln, Jr.; Francis Lewis, by Morgan
Lewis; John Penn, by John Taylor; James Wilson, by Robert Waln, Jr.;
Carter Braxton, by Judge Brackenborough; John Morton, by Robert Waln,
Jr.; Stephen Hopkins, by Robert Waln, Jr.; Thomas M'Kean, by Robert
Waln, Jr. 7. Thomas Jefferson, by H. D. Gilpin; William Hooper, by J.
C. Hooper; James Smith, by Edward Ingersoll; Charles Carroll, by H. B.
Latrobe; Thomas Nelson, Jr., by H. D. Gilpin; Joseph Hewes, by Edward
Ingersoll. 8. Elbridge Gerry, by H. D. Gilpin; Cæsar Rodney, by H. D.
Gilpin; Benjamin Harrison, by H. D. Gilpin; William Paca, by Edward
Ingersoll; George Ross, by H. D. Gilpin; John Adams, by E. Ingersoll.
9. Richard Henry Lee, by R. H. Lee; George Taylor, by H. D. Gilpin;
John Hart, by Robert Waln, Jr.; Lewis Morris, by E. Ingersoll; Thomas
Stone, by E. Ingersoll; Francis L. Lee, by Robert Waln, Jr.; Samuel
Chase, by E. Ingersoll; William Ellery, by H. D. Gilpin; Samuel Adams,
by H. D. Gilpin.

Vols. 1, 2 were edited by John Sanderson; the remainder by Robert Waln,
Jr. A list of the authors of the different biographies is given in the
_Massachusetts Historical Society's Proceedings_, xv. 393. There was a
second edition, revised, improved, and enlarged (Philadelphia, 1828,
in 5 vols.). An edition revised by Robert T. Conrad was published in
Philadelphia in 1865.

An enumeration of books which grew out of Sanderson's _Signers_ is
given in Foster's _Stephen Hopkins_, ii. 183. Much smaller books are
Charles A. Goodrich's _Lives of the Signers_ (New York, 1829), and
there are other collections of brief memoirs by L. C. Judson (1829) and
Benson J. Lossing. Cf. also papers by Lossing in _Harper's Mag._, iii.,
vii., and xlviii., and his _Field-Book_, ii. 868.

A fac-simile of the engrossed document as signed is given in _The
Declaration of Independence_ (Boston, 1876), and others are in Force's
_Amer. Archives_, 5th ser., i. 1595; and one was published in N. Y.
in 1865. The earliest fac-simile is one engraved on copper by Peter
Maverick, of which there are copies on vellum, as well as on paper. It
is called _Declaration of Independence, copied from the Original in the
Department of State and published, by Benjamin Owen Tyler, Professor
of Penmanship. The publisher designed and executed the ornamental
writing and has been particular to copy the Facsimilies exact, and has
also observed the same punctuation, and copied every Capital as in the
original_ (Washington, 1818).

[Illustration

NOTE.—The cut on this page is a reduction of a broadside issued in
Boston, of which there is a copy in the library of the Mass. Hist.
Society, where there are copies of similar broadsides issued in
Philadelphia and Salem. The fac-simile given in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U.
S._ (iii. 483) is of the Boston broadside without the imprint at the
bottom of the sheet. The first impression made for Congress was printed
at Philadelphia by John Dunlap, and the copy sent to Washington is
in the library of the State Department. It was also later printed in
broadside at "Baltimore in Maryland, by Mary Katharine Goddard", and
those of the copies which I have seen, as attested by Hancock and
Thomson in their own hands, in addition to the printed signatures, and
sent to the several States by order of Congress, Jan. 18, 1777, are
of this Baltimore imprint. Such a copy is in the _Mass. Archives_,
cxlii. 23, together with the letter of Hancock transmitting it to
that State. There is another copy, similarly attested, in the Boston
Public Library; and a reduced fac-simile of such a copy, with its
attestations, is given in the _Orderly-book of Sir John Johnson_ (p.
220). It was generally, I think, inscribed on the records of the
several States, and I have seen it in the records of the towns in
New England. (Cf. _N. H. State Papers_, viii. 200.) It is copied as
it appeared in the _Penna. Journal_, July 10th, in Moore's _Diary
of the Rev._, i. 262; and in England it was reprinted in _Almon's
Remembrancer_, iii. 258; _Annual Register_, 1776, p. 261; and in the
_Gentleman's Mag._, Aug., 1776.

The earliest authorized reprint in any collection appeared at
Philadelphia in 1781, in _The Constitutions of the several States
of America; The Declaration of Independence; The Articles of
Confederation; The Treaties between his most Christian Majesty and
the United States of America. Published by order of Congress_ (Sabin,
iv. 16,086, who says 200 copies were printed, and who gives various
other early editions). The Rev. William Jackson edited at London, in
1783, _The constitutions of the independent states of America; the
declaration of independence; and the articles of confederation. Added,
the declaration of rights, non-importation agreement, and petition of
Congress to the King. With appendix, containing treaties._ It can be
found in Bancroft, viii. 467; H. W. Preston's _Documents illustrating
American History_; Sherman's _Governmental Hist. U. S._, p. 615;
Frothingham's _Rise of the Republic_, p. 539; and in very many other
collections and places.]

[Illustration: JOHN DICKINSON.

From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_ (London, 1783). Cf. _Heads of
illustrious Americans_ (London, 1783). The usual portrait is given in
Higginson's _Larger History_, p. 270.]

McKean, in 1814, said it was not so,[709] and the best investigators of
our day are agreed that the president and secretary alone signed it on
that day, though Lossing, following Jefferson, has held that, though
signed on that day on paper by the members, it was in the nature of a
temporary authentication, and it did not preclude the more formal act
of signing it on parchment, which all are agreed was done on August
2d following. Thornton, of New Hampshire, signed as late as Nov. 4th;
and McKean, who was absent with the army, seems to have temporarily
returned so as to sign later in the year. Thornton's name appears in
the printed _Journal_ as attached to the Declaration on July 4th, and
McKean's is not, though McKean was present and Thornton was not. The
fact is, the printed _Journal_ is not a copy of the record of that day,
and was made up without due regard to the sequence of proceedings,
when prepared by a committee for the press in the early part of 1777.
There is in Force's _American Archives_ (4th ser., vol. vi. p. 1729)
a journal constructed by combining the original record (of which we
have no printed copy) and the minutes and documents of the official
files. From a collation of all these early records it appears that the
vote of January 18, 1777, ordering the Declaration to be printed with
the names attached,—then for the first time done,—made it convenient
to use this printed record in making the published _Journal_ entry
under July 4th. In this way the name of Thornton, who signed it even
subsequent to Aug. 2d, appears in that printed record as having been
put to the Declaration on July 4th. That any paper copy was signed
on July 4th is not believed, from the fact that no such copy exists;
and if it be claimed that it has been lost, there is still ground for
holding rather that it never existed, inasmuch as no vote is found for
any authentication except in the usual way, by Hancock and Thomson,
the president and secretary. McKean's criticism was the first to
confront the usual public belief of its being signed July 4th, as many
respectable writers have maintained since who preferred the authority
of the printed _Journal_ and of Jefferson and Adams. Such was Mahon's
preference, and Peter Force rather curtly criticised him for it, in
the _National Intelligencer_.[710] Force did not explain at length
the grounds of his assertions, and Mahon did not alter his statement
in a later edition; but a full explanation has been made by Mellen
Chamberlain in his _Authentication of the Declaration of Independence_
(Cambridge, 1885), which originally made part of the _Mass. Hist. Soc.
Proc._, Nov., 1884, p. 273. He gives full references.

The immediate effects of the Declaration in America are traced in
Frothingham's _Rise of the Republic_, p. 548. "No one can read", says
Wm. B. Reed in his _Life of Joseph Reed_ (i. p. 195), "the private
correspondence of the times without being struck with the slight
impression made on either the army or the mass of the people by the
Declaration of Independence."

The Declaration was, of course, at once commented on in the
_Gentleman's Magazine_, in Almon's _Remembrancer_, and in the
other periodical publications. Hutchinson's _Strictures_ have been
mentioned. The ministry seem to have been behind the _Answer to the
Declaration of the American Congress_, referred to in a preceding
page, which was ostensibly written by John Lind and privately printed
in London in 1776, but was soon published without his name, appearing
in five different editions during the year, and was the next year
(1777) printed in French both in London and La Haye. In the earlier
edition the outline of a counter declaration was included (Sabin, x.
41,281-82). Lord Geo. Germaine is also said to have had a hand in
_The Rights of Great Britain asserted against the claims of America_,
which passed through three editions at least, the last with additions,
during 1776, beside being reprinted in Philadelphia (Hildeburn, no.
3,352). Sir John Dalrymple and James Macpherson are also thought to
have some share in it.[711] Lord Camden's views are given in Campbell's
_Lives of the Chancellors_ (v. 301). It soon became apparent that
the liberal party in England felt that the Declaration showed the
Americans determined to act without their continued assistance (Smyth's
_Lectures_, ii. 439). Bancroft (ix. ch. 3) traces the general effects
in Europe.[712]

The appearance, Jan. 8, 1776, of the _Common Sense_, written by
Thomas Paine, a stay-maker and sailor whom Franklin had accredited
when he came over in the summer of 1774, had produced a sudden effect
throughout the continent.[713]

[Illustration: JOHN HANCOCK. (_The Scott picture._)

Perkins (_Life and Works of Copley_, p. 70) notes three different
likenesses of Hancock, painted by that artist. The first represents him
sitting at a table, which bears an open book, upon which his left hand
lies, while the right holds a pen. This picture, formerly in Faneuil
Hall, is now in the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. The Copley head
has been engraved by I. B. Forrest and J. B. Longacre (_Sanderson's
Signers_), and there is a woodcut in the _Memorial Hist. of Boston_,
iv. p. 5, and another engraving of it in W. H. Bartlett's _United
States_, p. 343. Cf. Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 358. The German
picture from the _Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa_ (Neunter
Theil, Nürnberg, 1777), of which a fac-simile is given herewith, is
evidently based on this picture, omitting the accessories. A similar
picture, with supports of cannon at the lower angles, is in Hilliard
d'Auberteuil's _Essais_, i. p. 152. It seems to have been the likeness
known on the continent of Europe, and is perhaps the one referred to
by John Adams, in writing to Spener, a Berlin bookseller, when he
says, "The portrait of Mr. Hancock has some resemblance in the dress
and figure, but none at all in the countenance" (_Works_, ix. 524).
The immediate prototype of the German picture may have been a London
engraving, described in Smith's _British Mezzotint Portraits_ as being
in an oval, with a short wig and tie at back, and professing to be
painted by Littleford, and published Oct. 25, 1775, by C. Shepherd,
which was one of a series of American portraits published in London
from 1775 to 1778, of which some, says that authority, were reëngraved
in Germany. The two other Copley pictures are described by Perkins as
being owned by Hancock's descendants: one an oval, showing him dressed
in blue coat laced with gold; the other a miniature on copper. There
is in the Bostonian Society a photograph of a picture owned by C. L.
Hancock. It will be remembered that Hancock's widow married Capt.
James Scott; and it is perhaps one of these Copley pictures that is
reproduced from an English print in J. C. Smith's _British Mezzotint
Portraits_, p. 1321, and shown in the present engraving (the Scott
picture), of which the original, an oval, bears this inscription:
"The Hon^{ble} John Hancock, Esq^r, late Governor of Boston in North
America, done from an original picture in the possession of Capt.
James Scott. Published by John Scott, No. 4, Middle Row, Holborn.
Copley pinx^t. W. Smith, sculp." Smith also gives another print, which
represents Hancock as standing, with the left hand in his pocket, the
other holding a letter addressed to "Mons. Monsieur Israel Putnam,
major general à Long Island." The face is much like the other.

The Copley head seems also to have been used in the sitting figure,
which appeared in the _Impartial History of the War in America_
(London, 1780, p. 207), of which a fac-simile is elsewhere given. The
same picture was reëngraved in even poorer manner in the Boston edition
of the book with the same title (1781, p. 346). Other contemporary
engravings are found in the _European Magazine_ (iv. p. 105); in the
_Royal American Magazine_ (March, 1774, reproduced in fac-simile in the
_Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 46); and in Murray's _Impartial History of
the present War_ (1778, vol. i. p. 144). Cf. Drake's _Tea Leaves_, p.
286.

The character of Hancock had pettinesses that have served to lower his
popular reputation, and this last is well reflected in the drawing
of his traits in Wells's _Sam. Adams_ (ii. 381). John Adams, whose
robustness of character was quite at variance with that of his friend,
was not blinded to sterling qualities in the rich man, who gave an
adherence to a cause that few of his position in Massachusetts did
(_John Adams's Works_, x. 259, 284). Adams's grandson speaks of the
biography of Hancock in Sanderson's _Signers_ as a curious specimen of
unfavorable judgment in the guise of eulogy, and a sketch by this same
grandson, C. F. Adams, is in the _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, p. 73, and a
memoir by G. Mountfort in Hunt's _American Merchants_, vol. ii. The
accounts in Loring's _Hundred Boston Orators_, p. 72, and by Gen. W. H.
Sumner in the _N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, April, 1854 (viii. 187),
are rambling antiquarian tales.]

[Illustration: JOHN HANCOCK. (_From the "Geschichte der Kriege."_)]

John Adams (_Works_, ii. 507; ix. 617) said of _Common Sense_ that it
embodied a "tolerable summary of the arguments for independence which
he had been speaking in Congress for nine months", and which Mahon
(vi. 96) has called "cogent arguments" "in clear, bold language;" but
Adams deemed unwise some of its suggestions for the governments of the
States, and to counteract their influence he published anonymously
his _Thoughts on Government_ (Philadelphia, 1776; Boston, 1776; often
since, and also in _Works_, iv. 193; ix. 387, 398), which he says met
the approval of no one of any consideration except Benjamin Rush. He
added his name to the second edition, and records that it soon had
due influence upon the Assemblies of the several States, when about
this time they adopted their constitutions. Adams's views were first
embodied in a letter to R. H. Lee, Nov. 15, 1775 (_Works_, iv. 185;
Sparks's _Washington_, ii., App.). What seems an anonymous reply
from a native of Virginia—that colony being then engaged in framing
a constitution—was _An address to the Convention of the Colony and
Ancient Dominion of Virginia_, which was an attempt to counteract the
tendency to popular features in government, which Adams had inculcated.
It is in Force, 4th ser., vi. 748, and was written by Carter Braxton
(Hildeburn's _Issues of the press in Pennsylvania_, Philad., 1886, no.
3,340).

[Illustration: CHARLES THOMSON.

From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_ (London, 1783). Cf. also
_Heads of illustrious Americans_ (London, 1783). There is a portrait
in the gallery of the Penna. Hist. Society. Scharf and Westcott's
_Philadelphia_ (i. 274, 275) gives his likeness and a view of his
house, and another picture of the house is in Brotherhead's _Signers_
(1861, p. 113). Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 267, and Potter's
_Amer. Monthly_, vi. 172, 264, vii. 161.]

Adams also wrote an amplified statement of some of his views to John
Penn, of North Carolina, which is given in John Taylor's _Inquiry into
the principles and policy of the Government of the United States_
(1814), and in Adams's _Works_, iv. 203.

The vote of Congress of May 15, 1776, had called upon the several
colonies to provide for independent governments, and Jameson
(_Constitutional Conventions_, N. Y., 1867, p. 112, etc.) summarizes
the actions of the several States.[714] New Hampshire was the first
to act, and Belknap in his _New Hampshire_, and the histories of the
other States, tell the story of their procedures. South Carolina was
the next, but Virginia was the earliest to form such a constitution
that it could last for many years. On June 12, 1776, she adopted her
famous Declaration of Rights, drawn by Geo. Mason,[715] and June 29th
perfected her constitution.[716] For New Jersey, see L. Q. C. Elmer's
_Hist. of the Constitution adopted in 1776 and of the government under
it_ (Newark, 1870, and in _N. J. Hist. Soc. Proc._, 2d ser., ii.
132), and the _Journal and votes and Proceedings of the Convention of
New Jersey_ (Burlington, 1776). For the movements in Pennsylvania,
see Reed's _Jos. Reed_, i. ch. 7; the _Proceedings relative to the
calling of the Conventions of 1776 and 1790_ (Harrisburg, 1825); Anna
H. Wharton's "Thomas Wharton, first governor of Pennsylvania", in the
_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, v. 426, vi. 91; and the biographies of the
members of the convention in the _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, iii. and iv.
The statements of the loyalist Jones in his _New York during the Rev._
(p. 321) are controverted by Johnston in his _Observations_ (p. 41).

[Illustration: CHRISTOPHER MARSHALL'S DIARY.

A page from Christopher Marshall's diary, preserved in the Penna. Hist.
Soc., giving his description of the public reading of the Declaration
of Independence, in Philadelphia, on July 8th. Cf. _Extracts from the
diary of Christopher Marshall kept in Philadelphia and Lancaster during
the American Revolution, 1774-1781, edited by Wm. Duane_ (Albany,
1877). On this reading, see _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, viii. 352, and W.
Sargent's _Loyal Verses of Stansbury and Odell_, p. 116.

The English notion of the way in which the proclamation was made may
be learned from Edward Bernard's contemporary folio _Hist. of England_
(p. 689), where a large print represents an uncovered man on horseback
reading a scroll to a crowd in the street, called "The manner in which
the American Colonies declared themselves independent of the King
of England throughout the different provinces on July 4, 1776." The
reading took place in New York July 9th (Bancroft, ix. 36), and in
Boston July 18th (_Mem. Hist. Boston_, iii. 183). Moore's _Diary of the
Rev._, i. (1776), records from contemporary journals the way in which
it was received in various places. A letter of Major F. Barber in the
_New Jersey Hist. Soc. Proc._, v., shows how the reception of the news
was observed at Fort Stanwix.]

For the convention in New York, see _Debates of the N. Y. Conventions_
(1821), App., p. 691; Flanders's _Life of Jay_, ch. 8; and Sparks's
_Gouverneur Morris_.[717] For Georgia, see C. C. Jones's _Georgia_,
ii. ch. 13. Jameson (p. 138) outlines the peculiar circumstances
of the early constitutional history of Vermont. Massachusetts was
the last (1780) of the original States to frame a constitution.
(See _John Adams's Works_, iv. 213; ix. 618.) Adams drafted the
constitution presented by the committee, which was printed as _Report
of a Constitution or form of government_,[718] and is printed without
embodying the Errata in _John Adams's Works_ (iv. 219), which copies it
from the Appendix of the _Journal of the Convention_ (Boston, 1832),
where it was also printed in that defective manner.[719]

John Adams, in his _Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the
United States of America_ (1787,—in _Works_, iv. 271), set forth the
views which influenced largely the framers of many of the constitutions
of the States. Connecticut and Rhode Island retained their original
charters through the war.

This action of the States rendered easier a plan of confederation,
which seems to have been proposed by Franklin as early as Aug. 21,
1775. On July 12, 1776, a plan in Dickinson's handwriting, based on
Franklin's, was reported, and was finally adopted by Congress, Nov. 15,
1777 (_Journals_, ii. 330), which was ratified by all the States in
1778 except Delaware (1779) and Maryland (1781), at which last date it
became obligatory on all.[720]

The reader needs to be cautioned against a publication which assumes
to be an _Oration delivered at the State House in Philadelphia Aug. 1,
1776_, by Samuel Adams (Philadelphia, reprinted at London, 1776), and
which was translated into French and German. It is reprinted in Wells,
iii., App. There is no copy of the pretended Philadelphia original
known, and the publication is a London forgery (Wells, ii. 439),
discoverable, if for no other reason, from the fact that its writer was
unaware that the Declaration of Independence had passed.



CHAPTER IV.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HUDSON.

BY GEORGE W. CULLUM,

_Major-General United States Army._


WHEN, in March, 1776, the British evacuated Boston, Washington felt
assured that New York, already threatened, would be their objective
point, not only on account of its commercial and strategical
importance, but because it was the great arsenal of America. He
therefore, as soon as practicable, concentrated in and about it his
whole disposable force, and pushed forward the defences of the city
and of its vicinity, already planned and partly executed by General
Lee. Until the arrival of Washington, April 13, 1776, General Putnam
commanded at New York, and General Greene, with a considerable body
of troops, took charge of the incomplete intrenchments of Brooklyn,
extending from the Wallabout (the present Navy Yard) to Gowanus Cove
on New York Bay. These were now strengthened by four redoubts armed
with twenty pieces of artillery, and by a strong interior keep mounting
seven guns. These Brooklyn Heights, from their proximity and command of
New York, were considered the key of the defence of this valuable city.

Fort George, with several redoubts and batteries, guarded the southern
end of Manhattan Island, while the fortified hills overlooking
Kingsbridge protected its northern extremity. On Red and Paulus
Hooks, and at various points along the shores of the East and Hudson
rivers, were erected earthworks, and a strong redoubt was built upon
Governor's Island. Between the latter and the "Battery", hulks were
sunk to obstruct the main channel. Notwithstanding all these defences,
Manhattan Island, as events proved, was assailable at many points.

To defend these works, scattered over more than twenty miles,
Washington had an army of only 17,225 men, of whom 6,711 were sick,
on furlough, or detached, leaving but 10,514 present for duty. Most
of these were militia, badly clothed, imperfectly armed, without
discipline or military experience, and their artillery was old and of
various patterns and calibres.

There had been dispatched from England a powerful fleet under Lord
Howe, convoying a large body of troops to reinforce those already in
America. The army of General William Howe (brother of the Admiral)
on Staten Island in August (including some 8,600 German hirelings)
numbered, as stated by General Clinton, 31,625 rank and file, of whom
24,464 were well-appointed, disciplined soldiers, fit for duty and
equal to any in Europe.

The struggle for the Hudson, by the coöperation of the army of Canada
with Howe, was now about to begin; but Washington was at his wits' end
to foresee the particular point upon which the blow would fall. Hence
he was obliged to retain the greater part of his troops in New York to
defend the city, holding them ready, however, to support any point in
the vicinity whether assailed by the enemy's large fleet or by their
powerful army.

[Illustration: THE MORTIER HOUSE, RICHMOND HILL. (_Washington's
Headquarters._)

From a plate in the _New York Magazine_, June, 1790, when the
house, then owned by Mrs. Jephson, was occupied by John Adams, as
Vice-President of the United States. It was at one time the home of
Aaron Burr. See Parton's _Burr_, i. 81.

Washington's first headquarters in New York were probably at a house,
180 Pearl St., opposite Cedar St., sometimes called the house of Gov.
Geo. Clinton, of which a view is given in Valentine's _Manual_, 1854,
p. 446, and in Lossing's _Mary and Martha Washington_ (N. Y., 1886), p.
153. He is also supposed by some to have occupied for a short interval
the Kennedy mansion, No. 1 Broadway, known to have been used certainly
by Col. Knox as artillery headquarters, of which a view is given in
Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed. ii. 211, and in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U.
S._, iii. 495. (Cf. Drake's _Knox_; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 594;
Johnston's _Campaign of 1776_, p. 86.) In June, if not earlier, he
removed to the Mortier House on Richmond Hill, and remained there till
September, when he transferred his headquarters first to the Apthorp
House (view in _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, 1885, p. 227), still standing at
the corner of Ninth Avenue and Ninety-first Street, and next to the
Morris House at Harlem.—ED.]

On the morning of August 22, 1776, General Howe, under cover of the
guns of the British ships, without mishap, delay, or opposition,
debarked, as stated by Admiral Howe, about 15,000 men, with artillery,
baggage, and stores, on Long Island, in the vicinity of the Narrows;
and on the 25th, General de Heister's German division was landed at
Gravesend Cove. This invading force of "upwards of 20,000 rank and
file", well armed and with forty cannon, promptly occupied a line
extending from the Narrows, through Gravesend, to Flatlands, and made
ready for an immediate advance through the passes of the long range of
densely wooded hills running eastwardly from the Narrows to Jamaica,
about two and a half miles in front of Brooklyn. To oppose this large
force of regular troops, the Americans had not quite 8,000 men, most of
whom were raw militia, and of these about one half were outside of the
defences of Brooklyn, ready to participate in the impending battle.

[Illustration: LORD HOWE.

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, Lond., 1785, vol. ii.—ED.]

The most direct route from the British landing-place to the Brooklyn
intrenchments was by the road running nearly parallel to the bay,
and passing through a gorge just back of the Red Lion Tavern, where
Martense Lane joins the usual thoroughfare at the edge of Greenwood
Cemetery. A second road led from Flatbush directly through the pass
defended by General Sullivan's intrenchments. The third was by the road
from Flatbush to Bedford. Finally, the fourth, extending to Flushing,
intersected the Bedford and Jamaica road at the pass between the
present Evergreen and Cypress Cemeteries, about three miles east of
Bedford, or about ten miles from the Narrows.

[Illustration: GEN. SIR WM. HOWE.

From the upper part of an engraving of full length in _An Impartial
Hist. of the War in America_, Lond., 1780, p. 204. Smith in his _Brit.
Mez. Portraits_ records a print, standing posture, sash and star, right
elbow on block, left hand on hip, marked "Corbutt delin't et fecit.
Lond. 10 Nov. 1777."—ED.]

When the British landed on the 22d, Colonel Hand's regiment was
deployed to oppose them, but the enemy proving to be in too great
force, Hand fell back to Prospect Hill and thence to Flatbush, burning
property which would be of immediate use to the foe; but he did not
at once apprise the commanding general of the real character of the
British movement. So soon, however, as Washington heard of the landing,
he dispatched six regiments to reinforce the garrison of Brooklyn
Heights, and ordered additional forces to be in readiness to cross the
East River from Manhattan Island, if Howe's movement did not prove
to be a feint to cover a real attack upon New York. General Greene,
unfortunately, was too sick to retain the active command on Long
Island, every point of which, between Hell Gate and the Narrows, he had
carefully studied. He was succeeded, August 20th, by General Sullivan,
a far inferior officer. As Washington said of him, he was "active,
spirited, and zealously attached to the cause", but was tinctured with
"vanity, which now and then led him into embarrassments;" besides which
he lacked "experience to move on a large scale", as he had just shown
in Canada. On the 24th of August, Washington placed Putnam in command
over Sullivan. Putnam was a brave soldier, but wholly ignorant of
the science of war, besides being advanced in years. He was entirely
unacquainted with the arrangements which had been made for the defence
of his position, and he never went beyond the Brooklyn Heights
intrenchments on the day of the battle. The truth is, no one exercised
a general command in that conflict.

De Heister's division, constituting the enemy's centre, occupied
Flatbush August 26th, threatening the pass in front, which Sullivan
held with a large force under cover of intrenchments. During the
evening, Cornwallis withdrew from Flatbush to Flatlands, there becoming
the reserve of the British right, which was composed of choice
regiments under General Clinton, aided by Lord Percy and accompanied by
the commander-in-chief.

The British plan of attack would have been very hazardous in the
presence of an enterprising enemy; but against undisciplined troops,
small in numbers and without skilful leadership, it proved a brilliant
success. The right, under Clinton, by a night march was to seize the
Cypress Hill pass, and then move down the Jamaica road towards Bedford
to get in the rear of Sullivan's left. To divert the attention of the
Americans from this stealthy march, General Grant was to menace their
right, towards Gravesend, before daybreak, and De Heister at the same
time was to cannonade the American centre under Colonel Hand. These
attacks were not, however, to be pressed till General Clinton's guns
were heard in the rear of Sullivan, when the Americans were to be
assailed with the utmost vigor from all quarters. Besides these land
operations a squadron of five ships, under Sir Peter Parker, was to
menace New York and keep up a cannonade against Governor's Island and
the right flank of the American defences.

Sir Henry Clinton, the principal actor in this contest, with his heavy
column and its artillery, guided by a Tory farmer, at nine in the
evening of the 26th, moved silently forward from Flatlands through
New Lots (now East New York), having successfully crossed Shoemaker's
narrow causeway over a long marsh. At three on the morning of the
27th, Clinton arrived within half a mile of the pass he was to force,
being followed and joined before daybreak by the main body under Lord
Percy. Soon after daylight a small American patrol was captured and the
unguarded pass occupied. Thus the whole right wing of the enemy, after
partaking of refreshments, was marching unopposed directly to Brooklyn
Heights. The battle, by this bold and lucky manœuvre, was in this way
virtually gained before any real struggle had begun.

General Grant, on the enemy's left, with two brigades and a regiment,
two companies of Tories and ten pieces of artillery, in the mean
time advanced along the bay road against the flying Americans, and,
at daybreak of the 27th, got through the pass in the hills and was
marching on the Brooklyn lines. General Parsons, in command of the
American outpost on the right, succeeded in rallying some of the
fugitives and posting them advantageously on a hill until the arrival
of Lord Stirling, who, with 1,500 choice Continental troops, had been
sent by Putnam on learning the condition of affairs. For some hours
Grant amused Stirling by slight skirmishes about Battle Hill (now
in Greenwood Cemetery), till Clinton had reached his destined goal,
when Grant, with quadruple forces, pushed forward to grapple in a
death-struggle with his gallant foe. At the same time De Heister, who
had slept upon his arms during the night at Flatbush, as soon as he
heard Clinton's signal guns, sent Count Donop to storm the redoubt
which protected Sullivan and defended the pass through the hills,
while he himself pressed forward with the main body of the Hessians.
Sullivan, hemmed in on all sides, ordered a retreat to the Brooklyn
lines, but it was too late, as he was already ensnared in the prepared
net, and before long all was a scene of confusion, consternation, and
slaughter. Some of the Americans, after fighting desperately, broke
through the enemy's line, but a large number were killed, wounded,
or taken prisoners. Washington, from Brooklyn, witnessed this sad
catastrophe, but was powerless to prevent it.

Stirling in like manner, met by the force under Cornwallis, which had
been detached from Clinton's column, was nearly surrounded, having no
chance for escape except across Gowanus Creek, in which the tide was
fast rising. After a terrible conflict of twenty minutes, the mass
of Stirling's command succeeded in passing the muddy stream, but the
general and some of his bravest companions were compelled to surrender
to superior numbers. Washington wrung his hands in agony at the sight
of such disaster. "Good God", he cried, "what brave fellows I must this
day lose!"

[Illustration: STIRLING.

After a photograph of a portrait in a family brooch, attested by H. S.
Watts, Oct. 8, 1879 (in Harvard College library, given by Professor
C. E. Norton). There is a picture, taken at a later day, engraved in
Duer's _Life of Stirling._—ED.]

By two o'clock in the afternoon, this battle, or rather this series
of skirmishes between forces very unequal in numbers, quality, and
skill, was terminated by the retreat of the remnant of Americans which
had escaped capture. Howe stated his loss at 367 killed, wounded,
and missing; and he estimated that of the Americans at 3,300, though
probably it did not exceed one half of that number, of whom 1,076,
including Generals Stirling, Sullivan, and Woodhull (captured at
Jamaica on the next day), were made prisoners.

Fortunately the victor, instead of pressing his advantage and at once
assaulting the Brooklyn intrenchments, which covered the demoralized
troops, waited till the next day, when he broke ground as for a regular
siege, and began cannonading the American works. "By such ill-timed
caution", says Lord Mahon, "arising probably from an overestimate of
the insurgents' force, the English general flung away the fairest
opportunity of utterly destroying or capturing the flower of the
American army;" yet such was the joy of the British government over
this cheap success that General Howe was knighted for a victory over
inexperienced troops one fifth his own numbers.

Washington, promptly profiting by the over-caution of his antagonist,
strengthened his position, and conceived the masterly measures for
his retreat from Long Island. Without the knowledge of Howe, availing
himself of a dense fog and rain, and favored by a fair wind, he safely
crossed the East River with all his troops, stores, and artillery,
except a few heavy pieces which the mud prevented him from moving. The
army reached New York on the morning of the 30th, Washington leaving in
the last boat after having been forty-eight hours almost continuously
in the saddle without once closing his eyes. "Whoever", says Botta,
"will attend to all the details of this retreat will easily believe
that no military operation was ever conducted by great captains with
more ability and prudence, or under more unfavorable auspices."

Though the British general had gained a decided success, he was as far
as ever from the object of his campaign—the capture of New York. The
victors and the vanquished now confronted each other from opposite
sides of a stream half a mile broad, each making ready for a decisive
effort. Howe possessed a large, veteran, and disciplined European
army, while Washington's troops, for the most part, were a demoralized
assemblage of heterogeneous organizations, not much superior to an
armed mob.

"Our situation", writes Washington to the President of Congress, "is
truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th
ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled
their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of
calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in
order to repair our losses, are discouraged, intractable, and impatient
to return. Great numbers of them have gone off: in some instances
almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time.
This circumstance of itself, independently of others, when fronted by a
well-appointed enemy superior in numbers to our whole collected force,
would be sufficiently disagreeable; but when their example has infected
another part of the army, when their want of discipline and refusal
of almost every kind of restraint and government have produced a like
conduct but too common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that
order and subordination necessary to the well-doing of an army, and
which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military
establishment would admit of, our condition becomes more alarming; and,
with the deepest concern, I am obliged to confess my want of confidence
in the generality of the troops.

"All these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertained,
and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning
to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia, or other
troops, than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our
regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully
convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties
must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their
defence is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean, one to
exist during the war. Nor would the expense incident to the support of
such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every emergency
far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new
enlistments, which, when effected, are not attended with any good
consequences. Men who have been free and subject to no control cannot
be reduced to order in an instant; and the privileges and exemptions,
which they claim and will have, influence the conduct of others; and
the aid derived from them is nearly counterbalanced by the disorder,
irregularity, and confusion they occasion."

Three weeks later, he again writes: "It becomes evident to me, then,
that, as this contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the
war must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have
good officers, there are no other possible means to obtain them but
by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your
officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen and men of character to
engage; and till the bulk of your officers is composed of such persons
as are actuated by principles of honor and a spirit of enterprise, you
have little to expect from them.... But while the only merit an officer
possesses is his ability to raise men, while these men consider and
treat him as an equal, and in the character of an officer regard him
no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no
order nor discipline can prevail; nor will the officer ever meet with
that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination. To
place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken
staff.... To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the
work of a day, a month, or even a year; and unhappily for us and the
cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been laboring
to establish in the army under my immediate command is in a manner
done away with by having such a mixture of troops as have been called
together within these few months....

"The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended
from one are remote, and in my judgment, situated and circumstanced
as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting
one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is
certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare upon
oath whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful, upon
the whole, I should subscribe to the latter."

The defeat of the American army on Long Island, a heavy blow to
the patriot cause, suggested a desperate remedy to the mind of
Washington,—no less a measure than the deliberate destruction of the
great commercial city of New York. "Till of late", he writes to the
President of Congress, "I had no doubt in my own mind of defending
this place; nor should I have yet if the men would do their duty, but
this I despair of.... If we should be obliged to abandon the town,
ought it to stand as winter-quarters for the enemy? They would derive
great conveniences from it on the one hand, and much property would
be destroyed on the other.... At present I dare say the enemy mean to
preserve it if they can. If Congress, therefore, should resolve upon
the destruction of it, the resolution should be a profound secret, as
the knowledge of it will make a capital change in their plans." General
Greene, John Jay, and many others of note were of the same opinion.
Congress decided otherwise, and Howe forbore to bombard it from
Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island, both belligerents deeming its
possession of far greater service to either than its destruction.

As New York was not to be destroyed, it became a serious question
how a city swarming with Tories was to be defended with less than
twenty thousand militia against a powerful army. Washington, Greene,
Putnam, and others were opposed to the attempt, but were overruled by
a council of war. The question was finally left by Congress to the
commander-in-chief, who, deeming the city untenable, made preparations,
September 10th, for its speedy evacuation, which was concurred in, two
days later, by a new council of war. This determination was timely, as
the Americans were about to be driven out.

Howe, anticipating Washington's design, determined to prevent the
execution of it by the same manœuvre he had tried so successfully on
Long Island,—that was to threaten the city's front and right flank by
the fleet, while his army, assembled about the present site of Astoria,
should cross the East River, turn Washington's left flank, cut off his
communications with the mainland, oblige him to fight on the enemy's
terms, and force him to surrender at discretion, or by a brilliant
stroke break the American army in pieces, and secure their arms and
stores.

On the evening of September 14th Howe began his crossing of the East
River by taking possession of Montressor (Randall's) Island, and the
next morning he sent three ships up the Hudson as high as Bloomingdale,
which stopped any further evacuation of the city by water. Soon after,
under the fire of ten vessels-of-war, the main British force, under
Sir Henry Clinton, embarked upon flatboats, barges, and galleys, at
the mouth of Newtown Creek, and by the favoring tide was carried to
Kip's Bay (34th Street), where they disembarked and quickly put to
rout the panic-stricken American militia, and pursued the fugitives in
disorderly flight over the fields to Murray Hill.

So soon as Washington heard the enemy's cannonade he rode with all
speed to the front, and used every exertion to rally the runaways; but
his efforts, though seconded by the officers in immediate command,
were utterly futile. Mortified and in despair at such poltroonery, the
commander-in-chief almost lost control of himself, and, says General
Greene, "sought death rather than life" at the hands of the enemy.

Unopposed, the British marched to the Incleberg on Murray Hill and
encamped, while the Americans retreated to Harlem Heights. Putnam,
at the sacrifice of baggage and stores, and of most of his heavy
artillery, by taking the river road, barely escaped with the troops
remaining in the city. Howe was in close pursuit of this rear-guard of
about four thousand men, but unexpectedly stopped for nearly two hours
at the residence of Mrs. Murray[721] to enjoy her old Madeira, so that,
in the language of the times, "Mrs. Murray saved the American army."

[Illustration: WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS AT HARLEM (Sept., 1776)

This was the house of Col. Roger Morris, and at a later day the
residence of Madam Jumel. It follows a drawing in Valentine's _N. Y.
City Manual_, 1854, p. 362. Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 816; Gay's
_Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 505; and for a view of the hall, _Harper's
Magazine_, lii. 640. Its position was east of Tenth Avenue, near One
Hundred and Sixtieth Street.—ED.]

The British, on September 15, 1776, took possession of New York with a
large detachment under General Robertson; while Howe with the main body
of the army encamped on the outskirts of the city. The northern line of
their camp extended from Horen's Hook on the East River to Bloomingdale
on the Hudson, which line was fortified with field-works and protected
on the flanks by vessels-of-war. Behind this line lay their disciplined
army of twenty-five thousand British and Germans.

Washington took position in their front, and for the protection of
his army of about fourteen thousand fit for duty he fortified Harlem
Heights with a triple line of intrenchments extending across Manhattan
Island. Immediately after securing his position, Washington, to arouse
some military ardor in his discomfited militia, formed the design of
cutting off some of the enemy's light troops, who, encouraged by their
recent successes, had advanced to the extremity of the high ground
opposite to the American camp. To effect this object, Colonel Knowlton,
of Bunker Hill fame, and Major Leitch were detached with parties of
rangers and riflemen to get in their rear, while Washington diverted
their attention by a feigned direct attack. By some mistake, the fire
was begun on the front instead of upon their flank and rear, by which
the enemy, though defeated, secured their escape to their main body.
This successful skirmish, called the battle of Harlem Plains, was
purchased by the loss of the brave Knowlton and Leitch, both of whom
were mortally wounded.

The British rejoicings upon the occupation of their snug
winter-quarters in New York were suddenly interrupted, early on the
morning of September 21st, by the breaking out of flames from a low
groggery near Whitehall Slip, which, for want of proper fire apparatus
to check them, spread rapidly over one fourth of the city, consuming
five hundred buildings, including the Lutheran and Trinity churches.
Whether this was the work of incendiaries is not positively known.
Congress and the city's inhabitants had strenuously opposed such an
act, though it was strongly recommended as a military necessity by
Washington and by others of high rank and position.

While Howe "continued at gaze" awaiting coming events, Washington
continued to strengthen his position on Harlem Heights, and established
alarm posts on the east side of Harlem River as far as Throg's Neck on
the Sound, to insure surveillance of the whole field of operations.

The Harlem lines being too strong for a front attack, Howe, after
leaving a sufficient force under Lord Percy to watch them and guard the
city, embarked, October 12th, his main army on ninety flatboats, to
execute by his favorite manœuvre the turning of these obstacles and of
Washington's left flank. His object was to cut off Washington's retreat
and shut him up on Manhattan Island, the only exit from which was by
Kingsbridge. Adverse winds so delayed the British general that he only
passed Hell Gate on the afternoon of the 14th, and the fleet did not
reach Throg's Neck till nightfall. Here Howe had previously landed his
advance-guard, but Washington had anticipated him by occupying, on the
12th, the passes leading to the mainland.

The enemy's design being now fully developed, it was decided in a
council of war, held in the American camp on the 16th, to leave Harlem
Heights, no longer tenable, and to evacuate the whole of Manhattan
Island except Fort Washington, which General Greene deemed impregnable
and of great value for future operations. Accordingly, the American
army formed a series of intrenched camps on the hills skirting the
right bank of the swollen Bronx, and extending thirteen miles, from
Fordham Heights to White Plains, and protected from the enemy by the
river in front.

After waiting five days for supplies, Howe, on the 18th, left Throg's
Neck, debarked again on Pell's Point, and on the march northward
encountered Glover's brigade well posted behind stone fences. After
a hot skirmish Glover slowly fell back, while the enemy advanced to
the heights of New Rochelle. Here the British encamped till the 22d,
when they were joined by the second division of Hessians under General
Knyphausen. This delay gave Washington ample time to strengthen himself
at White Plains, where he held a strong and important strategic
position commanding the roads leading up the Hudson and to New England.

On the morning of the 28th of October the opposing armies, each
about thirteen thousand strong, confronted each other. Washington's
intrenchments, partly a double line, occupied the hilly ground within
the village of White Plains, the left resting upon a mill-pond and
the right on a bend of the Bronx, which protected its flank and rear.
Across the Bronx rose Chatterton's Hill, presenting a steep rocky front
to the enemy, but it was not fortified.

Howe, believing he was now to fight the decisive battle of the war,
moved up in two heavy columns, Clinton commanding the one on the right
and De Heister that on the left. They seemed at first as if intending
to attack in front; but they soon filed off to the left, extending
their line to the front of Chatterton's Hill. Here the main body
halted, while a column four thousand strong proceeded to cross the
Bronx and storm the hill under cover of the fire of twenty pieces of
artillery. General McDougall with fifteen hundred Continentals and
militia, and Captain Alexander Hamilton with two pieces of artillery,
immediately arrayed themselves on the rocky brow of the hill for its
defence. As the main British body, under General Leslie, clambered up
the steep acclivity it was met by a withering fire from the infantry
and artillery, from which it recoiled and sought shelter. A second
assault up the slope met with an equally determined resistance, and
for some time the enemy was held in check. Rahl, with two regiments
that had forded the Bronx a quarter of a mile below, now appeared on
the American right, and drove the militia from their post. This break
compelled McDougall, exposed to a heavy fire in front and flank, to
retreat across the Bronx to White Plains, though with his six hundred
Continentals he maintained an obstinate conflict for an hour, and
carried off all his wounded and artillery. The American loss in the
engagement was 30 prisoners and 130 killed and wounded, while their
opponents' losses were 231.

Howe contemplated an assault, the next morning, upon the American camp,
but was deterred by the apparent strength of the lines. These had
been built hastily, as General Heath says, of _corn-stalks_, the tops
being turned inwards, and the roots with the adhering earth outwards.
The British army, strongly reinforced by the arrival of Lord Percy
on the 30th, designed attacking the American works on the following
day, but a storm delayed their operations, and gave Washington time
to withdraw his forces to the heights of New Castle, where he erected
strong defences. In the meanwhile Knyphausen had been ordered to move
from New Rochelle to Kingsbridge, where he encamped on November 2d, the
Americans retiring to Fort Washington on his approach. Howe in person
suddenly left White Plains on the night of the 5th for Dobbs's Ferry,
to which his army was already moving. "The design of this manœuvre",
wrote Washington on the 6th to the President of Congress, "is a matter
of much conjecture and speculation, and cannot be accounted for with
any degree of certainty." A council of war which met that day evidently
inferred that it threatened a movement across or up the Hudson, for it
was unanimously agreed immediately to throw a body of troops into New
Jersey, and station three thousand at Peekskill to guard the Highlands.
Howe really contemplated a far different move—the capture of Fort
Washington.

Why Sir William did not again attack Washington, and why he changed
his whole plan, is now well understood to be due to the treason of
William Demont, the adjutant of Colonel Magaw, in command of Fort
Washington. This man, on the 2d of November, undiscovered, passed into
the British camp, and placed in the hands of Lord Percy complete plans
of the defences of Mount Washington and a statement of their armament
and garrisons. This detailed information was immediately sent, with
its author, to Howe, and must have reached him a day or two before
his sudden departure from White Plains. The conclusive evidence of
this treason is furnished by the culprit himself in his letter,[722]
dated London, January 16, 1792, to the Rev. Dr. Peters, of the Church
of England, which was first published by Mr. E. F. DeLancey, in the
_Magazine of American History_ (Feb., 1877).

Fort Washington, built by Colonel Rufus Putnam soon after the
evacuation of Boston, occupied the highest ground at the northern
end of Manhattan Island. It was a pentagonal bastioned earthwork
without a keep, having a feeble profile and scarcely any ditch. In its
vicinity were batteries, redoubts, and intrenched lines. These various
field fortifications, of which Fort Washington may be considered the
citadel, extended north and south over two and a half miles, and had
a circuit of six miles. The three intrenched lines of Harlem Heights,
crossing the island, were to the south; Laurel Hill, with Fort George
at its northern extremity, lay to the east; upon the River Ridge, near
Tubby Hook, was Fort Tryon, and close to Spuyten Duyvel Creek were
some slight works known as "Cork Hill Fort;" and across the creek,
on Tetard's Hill, was Fort Independence. The main communication with
these various works was the old Albany road, crossing Harlem River
at Kingsbridge. This road was obstructed by three lines of abatis,
extending from Laurel Hill to the River Ridge.

Fort Washington mounted not more than eighteen guns _en barbette_, of
various calibres, from nines to thirty-twos. The garrison of all the
various works was less than 3,000 men, mostly Pennsylvanians, who
were commanded by Colonel Magaw, an officer of but little military
experience. The ground about the fort was well suited for defence, and
the works not only protected the upper part of Manhattan Island, but
in conjunction with Fort Lee, on the palisades opposite, commanded
the Hudson. However, from their too elevated positions and distance
from each other, these two works, on the opposite sides of the river,
with their feeble armament, proved insufficient, even with a partially
constructed barrier of sunken hulks, to prevent the passage of the
British vessels-of-war.

As these forts did not close the river, Washington did not deem it
expedient to weaken his force, which was necessary to him for field
operations, by leaving a large garrison on an island essentially in
the hands of the enemy. To the opinion of General Greene, in general
command of these works, and in deference to the expressed wishes of
Congress to hold them at any cost, Washington yielded his better
judgment. His modesty and sense of imperfect knowledge of the science
and practice of war led him, as it did on several occasions, to defer
too much to others, and though he did not think it "prudent to hazard
the men and stores at Mount Washington", he left it discretionary with
Greene to give the necessary orders for its evacuation.

Howe, November 15th, demanded the surrender of Fort Washington, stating
that, if he were compelled to take it by assault, the garrison would be
put to the sword. Magaw replied that to propose such an alternative was
unworthy of a British officer, and that, for himself, he should defend
the fort to the last extremity.

On the 15th Washington started across the river from Fort Lee, to
which he had come, to determine the condition of the garrison at Fort
Washington. He says, "I had partly crossed the North River when I met
General Putnam and General Greene, who were just returning from thence,
and they informed me that the troops were in high spirits and would
make a good defence, and, it being late at night, I returned."

Magaw, awaiting the enemy's attack, made a judicious disposition of
his forces to defend Fort Washington and the various intrenchments
in its vicinity. Colonel Rawlings took command of Fort Tryon and the
northern end of the River Ridge, with an outpost at Cork Hill Fort;
Colonel Baxter held Fort George and the summit of Laurel Hill; Colonel
Cadwallader occupied the Harlem Lines; while Magaw, at his central
position of Fort Washington, directed the whole.

Howe's attack upon Fort Washington was skilfully planned and admirably
executed. A vessel-of-war, the "Pearl", took up a position in the
Hudson to protect the contemplated movement of the Hessian troops
and enfilade the northern outworks of Fort Washington; while thirty
flatboats were in the Harlem River for ferrying troops,—these boats
having eluded the vigilance of the American sentries on the night of
the 14th, when passing up the Hudson and through Spuyten Duyvel Creek.

On the morning of the 16th, under a furious cannonade from the heights
on the east bank of the Harlem, three distinct assaults were ordered
to be made upon the American defences, besides a fourth movement,
which, though designed as a feint, became a real attack at the critical
moment. The _first_ British column, under General Knyphausen, moved
down from Kingsbridge, and with him were Rahl's Germans marching close
to the Hudson; the _second_, under General Matthews, supported by Lord
Cornwallis, crossed the Harlem and moved upon Fort George and the
northern end of Laurel Hill; the _third_, or feint, under Lieut.-Col.
Stirling, floated down the Harlem to threaten the southerly part of
Laurel Hill; while the _fourth_, of British and Hessians, led by Earl
Percy and accompanied by Howe, moved from Harlem Plain upon the triple
lines of Harlem Heights.

[Illustration]

The latter column, advancing from the south, began the attack upon
the outer or southernmost American line, where Cadwallader, unable to
check Lord Percy's superior forces, fell back to his stronger middle
line. Howe then ordered Stirling to land from the Harlem and clamber
up the steep slope of Laurel Hill to threaten the rear of Cadwallader.
The latter sent a detachment, as did also Colonel Magaw, to oppose
Stirling's landing, without avail. Matthews at the same time debarked
his column and attacked the Americans on Laurel Hill, where Baxter
was killed. The united forces of Matthews and Stirling overcame all
opposition and took 170 prisoners. Baxter's force was compelled, as
was also Cadwallader, when pressed by Percy, to seek refuge in Fort
Washington. About noon the Hessian column from the north was in motion.
Rahl soon scattered the small guard in Cork Hill Fort and advanced upon
Fort Tryon, crowding Rawlings by superior force nearly back to Fort
Washington, when, being joined by Knyphausen, who had made his way over
wooded and difficult ground and across abatis, the reunited German
columns bore down all opposition. The Americans at this point also,
after a spirited resistance, were compelled to take refuge in Fort
Washington, which, now overcrowded and exposed to the deadly concentric
fire of the enemy, left Magaw no alternative but surrender. He asked
for a parley of four hours, but he was allowed only half an hour. In
the end he capitulated, upon honorable terms, to General Knyphausen,
to whom the glory of the day belonged. Magaw had received a promise
from Washington to attempt to bring off the troops if he would hold
out till night, which Magaw deemed impossible, with troops huddled
together and exposed to destruction from the enemy's near circle of
fire. This capture cost the enemy nearly 500 men in killed and wounded.
The American loss was 150 killed and wounded, 2,634 taken prisoners
(including many of their best troops), 43 pieces of artillery of from
three to thirty-two pounds calibre, a large number of small arms, and
much ammunition and stores. The whole of Manhattan Island thus passed
into British hands.

Immediately after the capture of Fort Washington, Sir William Howe
crossed with his army into New Jersey, it being too late for any
coöperation with the Northern army under General Carleton, who had
already retreated from Crown Point into Canada.[723]

       *       *       *       *       *

This New York campaign had been most disastrous to the American cause;
yet it was far from a brilliant success for the Anglo-Hessian arms.
Washington, with troops inferior in numbers, arms, organization,
discipline, and experience, had outgeneralled Howe, with a superior
veteran army, whenever he acted upon his own good judgment and did not
yield his convictions to his subordinates, to whom most of the errors
of the campaign were due.

It is doubtful whether there was any necessity whatever for the British
to fight the battle of Long Island, as their fleet might have occupied
the East River, as it subsequently did, and thus have caged the part
of Washington's army which was on Long Island. It is true that the
American batteries on Brooklyn Heights and Governor's Island might have
done the fleet much damage; but if it was too dangerous to run the
gauntlet of the Buttermilk Channel, four fathoms deep, it would have
been an easy matter to sail around the eastern end of Long Island, and
safely enter the East River from that direction.

Had the East River been occupied by the British fleet, it could, while
cutting off half of our army from the defence of New York, at the same
time have threatened the city front pending the transportation of the
British army by water to points above the city from whence to turn
either or both flanks of Manhattan Island. Washington, thus shut up,
would have been compelled to fight at great disadvantage, and possibly
surrender at discretion.

Even admitting that the battle of Long Island was necessary, Howe, in
dividing his army into three masses, stretching over a line of more
than ten miles, ran great risk of being beaten in detail had all of the
American forces on the island been concentrated at a central position,
ready to be thrown successively upon his isolated columns. It is true
the undisciplined American forces might not have been able to cope in
the open field with British and German regulars; but Howe had no right
to presume their inferiority after his own experience of their good
conduct at Bunker Hill and Clinton's trial at Sullivan's Island.

The American general also committed a great military blunder in leaving
with raw troops the shelter of the Brooklyn intrenchments for the
precarious protection of the Long Island Ridge, several important
passes in which were left entirely unguarded, though Washington had
ordered their careful observation.

After the retreat of the American army to New York, Howe wasted two
precious weeks, during which Washington had time to organize his
defence; and when the British general crossed the East River, he
committed a great mistake in debarking at Kip's Bay,—a halfway measure
which involved a long land march to his objective, White Plains.
Washington, with great vigor, seized his advantage, and, by availing
himself of his shorter interior line, arrived first at the coveted
position and fortified it. Had Howe moved to this point by water
immediately after the battle of Long Island, he undoubtedly would have
succeeded in turning Washington's left flank, and would thus have cut
off his retreat. The British general's delay of _two months_ after the
battle of Long Island in moving less than thirty miles to reach White
Plains was inexcusable. In a shorter period Moltke began and ended the
campaign of 1866, which so humbled the great power of the Austrian
empire.

When Howe decided to attack the American army at White Plains he should
have thrown his entire force upon Washington's centre, and thus have
won a decisive victory with his superior troops; whereas he used less
than one third of his army in driving Washington's right wing from
Chatterton's Hill upon his main body, which then successfully retreated
before the tardy and inert British general.

Howe's good fortune in capturing Fort Washington was due more to the
treason of Magaw's adjutant and to Washington's yielding to bad advice,
than to any skill of the British commander.[724]

       *       *       *       *       *

With the invasion of New Jersey by the Anglo-Hessian army all military
operations at the mouth of the Hudson were terminated. The struggle
for the control of this great river was to be transferred to its upper
waters, and it was expected that the coming campaign would be so
conducted as soon to force the whole power of the colonies into silence
and submission.

General Gates, who was appointed the successor of Sullivan in the
command of the army of Canada, was, says Horace Walpole, "the son of
a housekeeper of the second Duke of Leeds." He had neither brilliant
qualities nor military genius, but possessed the vanity and ambition to
covet the highest position, for the attainment of which he resorted to
disgraceful intrigue. When assigned to this command, in June, 1776, the
army of Canada was flying to Crown Point; so, like Sancho Panza, Gates
found himself a governor without a government; but, nothing abashed,
he at once claimed the command of the Northern department, then under
Schuyler. Congress sustained the latter, whereupon Gates took post at
Ticonderoga, where the remnant of the American army had retired upon
the abandonment of Crown Point, and promptly adopted vigorous measures
to put the work in good condition for defence and to reinforce its
garrison against any forward movement of General Carleton.

To secure control of Lake Champlain, a squadron of small vessels was
ordered to be constructed at its head (Skenesborough), which, to the
number of nine, mounting in all fifty-five guns, were completed by
the middle of August. Arnold, in command of these and some additional
galleys from Ticonderoga, moved down to the foot of the lake, and
anchored his vessels across it to bar the passage of the enemy.

[Illustration:

From _Political Magazine_ (1780), i. 743, with a memoir of Burgoyne.
There are modern engravings of this likeness in Moore's _Diary of the
Amer. Rev._, i. p. 513; and in Lossing's _Field Book_, i. 37.—ED.]

Carleton, as active as his adversary, had built at St. Johns a flotilla
of "thirty fighting vessels." When Arnold discovered the superiority of
the enemy's fleet in vessels and guns to be more than double his own,
and that they were manned by picked British sailors, he fell back and
formed line of battle between Valcour's Island and the western shore
of the lake. In this disadvantageous position he was attacked, October
11th, by Captain Pringle, of the British navy, with thirty-eight
vessels and boats, mounting 123 guns. Though the crews of Arnold's
flotilla were landsmen, he maintained a desperate fight from eleven in
the forenoon until dark, when, availing himself of the obscurity of a
thick fog, he escaped with part of his vessels, unobserved, through the
enemy's fleet; but, owing to adverse winds and his crippled condition,
he was overtaken on the 13th off Split Rock, where he was again
attacked. Some of his flotilla escaped and some were captured, but he
himself, after fighting four hours, ran his remaining vessels ashore,
set them on fire with their flags flying, and escaped with their crews
through the forests to Ticonderoga. General Carleton now advanced to
Crown Point, of which he took possession October 14th, and pushed a
reconnoissance to within sight of Ticonderoga. When Carleton's boats
appeared, Gates made an effective display of his garrison, whereupon
the British general fell back to Crown Point, which he evacuated, and,
it being too late for further active operations, he retired to Canada.

[Illustration: BURGOYNE.

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. iii. Fonblanque
gives a likeness painted by Ramsay at Rome in 1750, and this is
repeated in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 567. Reynolds painted him in
1766 (Fonblanque, p. 86). J. C. Smith (_Brit. Mez. Portraits_, ii. 710)
records a picture by Pine. Cf. Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest of
Canada_, p. 194, and the illus. ed. of Irving's _Washington_, iii.—ED.]

The enemy had scarcely departed when Schuyler applied himself with
tireless assiduity to prepare against a new invasion during that
winter or in the coming year. He continually pressed upon Congress and
Washington the wants of his department in men and munitions of war.
In every way he tried to conciliate the Indian tribes; and he lost no
opportunity of gaining information of the enemy's designs and movements.

Burgoyne, after the battle of Bunker Hill, had suggested to Lord
Rochefort, Secretary of State for the colonies, that, as there was
"no probable prospect of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion with
any force that Great Britain and Ireland could supply", there should
be employed "a large army of such foreign troops as might be hired,
to begin their operations up the Hudson River; another army, composed
partly of old disciplined troops and partly of Canadians, to act from
Canada; a large levy of Indians and a supply of arms for the blacks,
to awe the Southern provinces, conjointly with detachments of regulars;
and a numerous fleet to sweep the whole coast,—might possibly do the
business in one campaign."

The importance of securing the control of the Hudson, thereby to
separate the New England from the Middle and Southern States, was
eminently correct; but the proposed mode of accomplishing it was, as
the sequel proved, entirely wrong.

Burgoyne, like many other Englishmen, had held American prowess in
contempt, and ridiculed the enrolment of provincials as "a preposterous
parade of military arrangement." His later experience probably changed
his views, for when he had supplanted that noble soldier Sir Guy
Carleton in the command of the British army in Canada, through "family
support" more than from "military merit", he took good care to secure a
strong and veteran force, commanded by officers of noted skill and long
experience.

Burgoyne's army, which took the field in July, 1777, had a total,
rank and file, of 7,902, of which 4,135 were British, 3,116 Germans,
148 Canadian militia, and 503 Indians. The artillery corps and train
were of the most serviceable character, "probably the finest and most
excellently supplied as to officers and private men that had ever been
allotted to second the operations of any army."

The commander-in-chief was a polished gentleman, a popular dramatist,
an effective speaker, a useful member of Parliament, and a gallant
officer who had won laurels in Portugal; Major-General Phillips, the
second in command, was a distinguished artillerist who had earned a
high reputation in Germany; Major-General Riedesel had been selected
because of his long experience, especially in the Seven Years' War;
Brigadier-General Fraser, who commanded the light brigade, was a
knightly soldier, ambitious of glory, who had seen much service in
America; Hamilton and Powel, who commanded brigades, had been twenty
years on active duty; Lord Balcarras and Major Acland, commanding
respectively the light infantry and grenadiers, were soldiers of high
professional attainments; La Corne St. Luc, the commander of the
Indians, had been an active partisan of the French in Canada wars,
and "was notorious for brutal inhumanity;" and the many staff and
regimental officers were already men of mark, or subsequently rose to
high positions.

With such a thoroughly disciplined and well-appointed army, Burgoyne
fondly anticipated making a triumphal march of two hundred miles
to Albany, there to meet St. Leger descending the Mohawk, and Howe
ascending the Hudson, and thus by combined movements to dismember the
thirteen United States. This march of the Northern army seemed not
arduous, as most of Burgoyne's way was by water through the Sorel, Lake
Champlain, and the upper Hudson; but he had taken little account of the
extraordinary physical difficulties he was doomed to encounter, and the
hostility of the inhabitants along much of his route.

[Illustration: LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, i. 190.—ED.]

Another embarrassment greatly marred the British plans. Lord
George Germain, the Secretary of State for the colonies, had given
Burgoyne positive orders for his march to Albany, from which he was
not to deviate; while Howe was left, through a piece of criminal
negligence,[725] without any imperative instructions to coöperate with
the army in Canada; besides which, it was almost impossible to arrange
any concerted action between forces separated by four hundred miles of
hostile country.

Burgoyne, however, like a true soldier, determined to obey orders,
though it might break empires. Consequently, on June 13th, at St.
Johns, the standard of England was hoisted on board the "Radeau", and
saluted by all the rest of the shipping and forts, thus announcing the
beginning of this eventful and important campaign.

On the 20th, Burgoyne issued, with seeming royal prerogative, a
bombastic proclamation, commending the justice and clemency of the
king, who had directed "that Indians be employed;" denouncing the
obstinacy of Americans as "wilful outcasts;" threatening the terrors
of savage warfare of the "thousands of Indians" under his command, "to
overtake the hardened enemies of Great Britain;" and, "in consciousness
of Christianity and the honor of soldiership", warned all of his
opposers that "the messengers of justice and wrath await them on
the field, and devastation, famine, and every concomitant horror
that a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military duty must
occasion."[726]

Burgoyne, after delivering himself of this pronunciamiento of
loving-kindness towards his American erring brothers, and setting
forth the sweet humanity of his dusky allies, who "had sharpened their
affections upon their hatchets", proceeded up Lake Champlain, pioneered
by these children of the forest in their birch canoes, the fleet and
army following, with music and banners, as if engaged in a splendid
regatta.

While Burgoyne with the main army was moving south, Lieutenant-Colonel
St. Leger, in conformity with instructions from the British cabinet,
with a detachment of about 1,000 men (English regulars, provincials,
and Indians), was rapidly advancing west to Fort Stanwix, by the St.
Lawrence and Lakes Ontario and Oneida. After reducing this post and
subjugating the patriots of the Mohawk valley, he was ordered to join
his chief at or near Albany.

Burgoyne's formidable invading force of 7,863 men, with 42 pieces of
artillery, which reached Crown Point June 27th, advanced thence, July
1st, in battle array: the right wing of British troops under General
Phillips, upon Fort Ticonderoga on the west bank of the lake; the left
wing of Germans under General Riedesel, upon Fort Independence on the
east bank; and the floating batteries in line across the lake. Burgoyne
had announced in orders: "This army must not retreat."

General Schuyler had recently visited Forts Ticonderoga and
Independence, where, instead of a garrison of 5,000 men, he found only
2,546 half-armed and poorly provided Continental troops and 900 raw
militia, "many of them mere boys, and one third of the whole force
unfit for duty." He noted, with serious forebodings, the unfitness of
the works to resist attack, a state to which lack of workmen and the
neglect of Gates had brought them. The reduction of this stronghold
was indispensable to Burgoyne's progress, not only as insuring his
communications with Canada, but because of the danger of leaving such a
force in his rear.

In an endeavor to strengthen these fortifications, of which General
St. Clair had recently taken command, the works had been too much
extended, and the key-points—Mount Hope, commanding Fort Ticonderoga,
and Mount Defiance, a supposed inaccessible eminence at the confluence
of the waters of Lakes George and Champlain—had not been occupied;
consequently, they were seized by the British and artillery was planted
upon them.

St. Clair, no favorite of fortune, finding himself nearly invested
on the 5th, and exposed to a plunging fire from these heights, which
he could not return, wisely determined to evacuate all his works
that night, under pretence of making a sortie. As soon as it was
dark enough, the women and wounded, together with some ammunition
and stores, were placed upon 200 bateaux, which were to be escorted
to Skenesborough by five armed galleys and a guard of 600 men, all
under the command of Colonel Long. In thus abandoning Ticonderoga, St.
Clair justified himself, saying that "we had lost a post, but saved a
province."

St. Clair, leaving his heavy artillery and many supplies behind, with
the garrison of Fort Ticonderoga passed undisturbed, at midnight, over
the floating bridge across the lake. On the southern side the troops
from Fort Independence joined him, and all were safely escaping, when,
without orders, General De Fermois's headquarters were fired, the
blaze of which disclosed the retreat to the enemy. The alarm was at
once given, and the deserted forts were seized by the British. General
Fraser was in pursuit at daylight of the 6th, followed soon after by
General Riedesel with the German grenadiers.

[Illustration: ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.

From a photograph of a miniature furnished by Mr. F. D. Stone. It was
painted near the close of the war. Daniel Goodwin, Jr., _Provincial
Pictures_, p. 72, says there is another miniature on ivory, owned by
Miss Mary R. Sheets, of Indianapolis.

[Illustration]

A likeness by C. W. Peale hangs in Independence Hall in Philadelphia.
It was drawn by J. B. Longacre, and engraved by E. Wellmore. It
represents him at the time he was governor of the Northwest Territory.
Cf. _St. Clair Papers_; Goodwin's _Provincial Pictures_, p.72. There is
also a pencil sketch by John Trumbull given in the _St. Clair Papers_,
and in the illustrated edition of Irving's _Washington_. Cf. 2 _Penna.
Archives_, vol. x.; Lossing's _Field-Book_, i. 132. A view of his home
is given in Egle's _Pennsylvania_, p. 1156.—ED.]

Meanwhile, Burgoyne and Phillips, in the fleet, broke through the boom
and bridge across the lake, in chase of Colonel Long and the American
flotilla, which, on the afternoon of the 7th, was overtaken and
attacked at the wharves of Skenesborough. Two of the covering galleys
struck their colors, and the others were blown up by their crews. The
bateaux, mills, and stockade there were promptly burned, and then
the detachment fled to Fort Anne, eleven miles below. Early the next
morning Long sallied out and had a sharp encounter with his pursuers
under Colonel Hill; but when victory was almost within his grasp, the
enemy was reinforced by a number of savages sent forward by Burgoyne,
who had remained at Skenesborough. Colonel Long, after burning Fort
Anne, retreated sixteen miles to Fort Edward, where he met Schuyler on
his way to Ticonderoga with a small reinforcement.

St. Clair, with the main body, was even less fortunate. He retreated
through the wilderness to Castleton, his rear-guard of 1,200 men,
under Colonel Warner, stopping over night at Hubbardton, where on
the morning of the 8th it was attacked by Fraser with an inferior
force. After a spirited engagement Hale's militia regiment abandoned
the field, and the enemy was reinforced by the arrival of Riedesel's
Brunswickers, which latter turned the American right flank and
compelled their retreat to Rutland, the rendezvous appointed by St.
Clair in the event of disaster. From here the remnant of St. Clair's
forces, by a circuitous march of more than a hundred miles, on the
12th reached Fort Edward, where Schuyler, on the 20th, could muster
only 4,467 men fit for duty. This little army was deficient in almost
every requisite for battle, while Burgoyne, flushed with victory, lay
within a day's forced march with his veteran army of nearly double the
American force.

Schuyler was charged by Congress with "neglect of duty" in not ordering
a timely retreat of the garrison from Ticonderoga, if untenable; and,
if to be defended, not to have been present at the attack upon it.
The court-martial, of thirteen distinguished officers, unanimously
acquitted him "with the highest honor."[727]

These reverses, which closed the first act of the drama of varied
events in this checkered campaign, seemed to open the way to Burgoyne's
triumph, and they spread universal alarm among the patriots, who had
considered Ticonderoga the closed gate to northern invasion. These
disasters, however, were blessings in disguise, despite the desertion
of the militia. Washington predicted ultimate success, and Schuyler was
roused to great efforts to oppose the enemy's advance. Wood Creek was
at once obstructed with logs and huge stones; all roads were broken up
and their bridges destroyed; dry land was converted into morass, trees
were felled in every direction, and the whole of this wild and savage
country was stripped of cattle and supplies, for which the enemy had
consequently to depend upon Canada and remoter England.

Having provided this barrier against the enemy, Schuyler, who had
been joined by Arnold, fell back to Fort Miller with his artillery
(brought from Fort George), where he tarried till he had ruined the
road over which he passed, and thence proceeded to Stillwater to await
reinforcements, making that his fortified headquarters, while his
little army occupied a camp, which was intrenched on Van Schaick's
Island, near the mouth of the Mohawk.

Burgoyne was so elated by his successes that he dispatched his
aide-de-camp Captain Gardner to England, "with news so important to
the king's service, and so honorable to the troops under his command."
But while the British colors were flying over Ticonderoga, he little
dreamed of the difficulties and reverses which were awaiting him. To
provide garrisons for these works in his rear, to which he had sent
all his surplus artillery and baggage, he was compelled "to drain the
life-blood of his army", since Carleton had declined to supply the
necessary troops for their defence, on the ground that his jurisdiction
as governor did not extend beyond the bounds of Canada.

Burgoyne availed himself of the water transportation of Lake George for
most of his artillery and stores; but, for the march of his army from
Skenesborough, a trackless wilderness confronted him, through which he
had to remove countless obstacles, cut a new pathway, and build no less
than forty bridges, one of which, over a swamp, was two miles long.
Wood Creek had also to be opened for his bateaux. In these laborious
undertakings his army was exhausted with overwork, and suffered
terribly with midsummer heat and innumerable insects. Consequently,
with his utmost efforts, he did not reach Fort Edward till July 30th,
or twenty-four days after leaving Lake Champlain, a distance of only
twenty-six miles. Burgoyne remained at Fort Edward till August 15th,
awaiting the transportation across the portage from Lake George of
the necessary artillery, ammunition, provisions, and bateaux for his
descent of the Hudson.

During this enforced delay important events were occurring elsewhere,
on the Mohawk and near Bennington. General Lincoln at the same time was
recruiting troops in New England, with which to attempt the recapture
of Ticonderoga and cut off the British retreat to Canada.

Fort Stanwix, or Fort Schuyler as it was subsequently called, on the
head-waters of the Mohawk, near the present Rome, N. Y., was built in
1758, and in April, 1777, was put under command of Colonel Gansevoort,
who, with Colonel Marinus Willet, placed it in a better condition of
defence. The garrison of the work was 750 Continental troops, before
which St. Leger, accompanied by the loyalist Sir John Johnson, and
Joseph Brant the great Mohawk chief, appeared, August 2, and the
next day summoned it to surrender. Gansevoort paying no attention to
this, the British colonel prepared for a regular siege, and sent out
detachments to cut off all succor.

The inhabitants of Tryon County were panic-stricken, but the aged
General Herkimer by great efforts collected 800 militia and marched
to Oriskany, within eight miles of the fort, to which he sent a
messenger with a request that upon the messenger's arrival three guns
should be fired and a sortie made to facilitate the advance of the
succoring party through the besiegers. The signal was delayed, and,
unfortunately, Herkimer's better judgment was overruled by his younger
officers, who were impatient of delay. This led to his moving forward
and to his being ambushed in a valley, the head of which was held by
loyalists, while Indian allies under Brant occupied the sides. Here a
desperate hand-to-hand fight of five hours ensued, early in which the
brave Herkimer was mortally wounded; but seated upon his saddle, and
propped against a tree, he calmly continued to give his orders and
animate his men with his own heroism till the end of the battle.

At length the long-expected signal guns were heard, when Colonel Willet
with 250 men made a sudden dash upon a weak part of the besiegers'
camp. Though he failed to reach Herkimer, he destroyed two sections of
the enemy's intrenchments, and captured the British camp equipage, Sir
John Johnson's papers, five flags, and some prisoners.

The Indians, who had lost many of their braves at Oriskany, hearing
the sound of Willet's musketry in their rear, quickly retreated, and
were soon followed by the loyalists, leaving Herkimer in possession of
the field. St. Leger still continued the siege of the fort, where now
floated for the first time the American flag, just adopted by Congress,
made of alternate stripes of a soldier's white shirt and a camp-woman's
red petticoat, the field being cut out of an old blue overcoat. Beneath
this were hung the five captured British standards.

St. Leger on the 7th again demanded the surrender of the fort,
threatening Indian vengeance, and falsely stating that Burgoyne was in
possession of Albany. Gansevoort returned an indignant refusal to this
disgraceful threat. Soon came rumors of the approach of the intrepid
Arnold to raise the siege. Statements sent forward of his numbers,
purposely exaggerated, caused the flight of the panic-stricken Indians,
and St. Leger, August 22, abandoned his trenches, some artillery and
camp equipage, and fled to Canada. The right wing of the invaders being
thus paralyzed, Arnold returned in triumph to join Schuyler.

Burgoyne's difficulties increased. His Indian allies were
insubordinate, and the patriots swelled the American ranks. Finding
that his scanty supplies had to be replenished from his distant base
in Canada, or rather from England, he decided to make a raid upon
Bennington, to secure horses, cattle, and provisions from the depot
there. He hoped also that this move would strike terror among the
unfriendly inhabitants of the New Hampshire Grants, who hung "like a
gathering storm upon his left", and also would elevate the flagging
spirits of his army, by a victory which he supposed would be easy.
Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Baum was dispatched with a select corps
of 550 British, German, and loyalist troops and 150 Indians. Colonel
Breyman, with 642 heavy dismounted Brunswick chasseurs, was sent on
the 15th as a support. To oppose this expedition, General John Stark
hastily collected 1,400 trained militia.

[Illustration: JOHN STARK.

After a silhouette given in Rev. Albert Tyler's _Bennington, the
battle, 1777; Centennial Celebration, 1877_ (Worcester, 1878). This
book is of some interest for its account of the ground and its
landmarks, and relics of the battle. A view of Stark's monument is
given in Potter's _Manchester_, N. H., p. 584; and an account of his
homestead is in the _Granite Monthly_, v. 84. The usual portrait of
Stark is that given in Caleb Stark's _Memoir of Gen. John Stark_
(Concord, 1860), and in the illustrated ed. of Irving's _Washington_,
ii. 437. Cf. _N. E. Hist. Geneal. Reg._, July, 1853, and the original
ed. of the Stark _Memoirs_, for another likeness.—ED.]

Though constant skirmishing took place on the 15th, a pouring rain
prevented a general engagement till the next day, when the determined
Yankee leader declared he would beat the invader or "before night
Molly Stark would be a widow." To fulfil his pledge he seized the
initiative, attacked the enemy on three sides, stormed their
intrenchments on the Walloomscoick River and captured their guns,
dispersed the Indians and loyalists, and went in hot pursuit of
the Germans and British, when his exhausted forces were checked by
Breyman's supporting detachment. Colonel Warner's excellent regiment,
at once fresh and eager, arrived that afternoon and renewed the action,
which was continued till dark, when Breyman, under the cover of night,
made good his retreat. Baum was mortally wounded, 207 men were killed,
700 were captured, including the wounded; and 1,000 stand of small
arms, all the enemy's artillery and most of their baggage fell into the
hands of the Americans. Had there been another hour of daylight, none
would have escaped. Stark's losses were 40 killed and 42 wounded.

This victory and the success in the Mohawk valley were as inspiriting
to the American as depressing to the Anglo-German army. Burgoyne was
now beset with danger on every side. Formidable obstacles accumulated
in his path, famine stared him in the face; all his English flour and
beef had been consumed, and the whole surrounding country was sending
enthusiastic volunteers to bar his progress.

Nearly a month before, Washington had predicted that Burgoyne's
successes "would precipitate his ruin", and that his "acting in
detachments was the course of all others most favorable to the American
cause", as cutting off any of them "would inspirit the people and do
away with much of their present anxiety." The beginning of the end had
already come.

The first stage in this eventful campaign was for Burgoyne a great
success; the second was an equally great failure; and now the last was
coming, in which the most decisive results and the highest plaudits
were to be won or lost. Schuyler unquestionably would have been the
hero of this final development had he not most inopportunely been
replaced by Gates, a mediocre soldier. Fortunately, the latter's
deficiencies were compensated by officers inferior in rank but superior
in ability,—the dashing Arnold, the daring Morgan, not to name others.

[Illustration: HORATIO GATES.

From _An Impartial Hist. of the War in Amer._, London, 1780, p. 494.
The engraving in the Boston edition, 1781, vol. ii., is by J. Norman.
Smith (_Brit. Mez. Portraits_) records an engraving published in
London, Jan. 2, 1778, which represents him holding a similar scroll,
but "with right hand on hip."—ED.]

Congress, in the exercise of its prerogative, made and displaced
generals at its will, and too often was influenced by sectional
interests and rivalries. The command of the Northern Department was
especially the prize of party favorites. Wooster, Thomas, Sullivan,
Schuyler, and Gates had in rapid succession followed each other, and
now Schuyler, after all he had done to baffle the enemy and organize
victory, was to be the victim of prejudice—of New England against
New York—which dated back to colonial days. Schuyler placed little
reliance upon New England troops, and their representatives in Congress
had as little confidence in Schuyler's generalship.

[Illustration: Horatio Gates

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, vol. ii. There is a
portrait by Stuart, published in 1798 as engraved by Tiebout, given in
steel (bust only) by H. B. Hall in Jones's _Campaign for the Conquest
of Canada_ (p. 140), and in photogravure (whole picture) in Mason's
Stuart (p. 183). The expression in this last is wholly different
from the steel engraving. There is also a picture in the _Heads of
Illustrious Americans_, London, 1783. There are other likenesses,—cf.
Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 586; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 669.

Gates after the war lived for a while on his estate in the Shenandoah
valley (view of his house in _Appleton's Journal_, July 19, 1873, p.
69, and Mrs. Lamb's _Homes of America_), but finally removed to New
York, and lived near what is now Second Avenue and Twenty-third Street.
A view of the house occupied by him as headquarters at Saratoga is in
Lossing's _Hudson River_, p. 94.—ED.]

Each misjudged the other; but the outcome of this feeling between Dutch
and Puritan blood was unfortunate in superseding the soldierly Schuyler
by the intriguing Gates. And it was a cruel reverse to the former, just
as his skilful plans were culminating in the utter discomfiture of
the enemy, and his successes at Stanwix and Bennington were bringing
reinforcements from every quarter to his standard with which to take
the offensive, that he should be shorn of the laurels which were about
to crown him as the brilliant leader in this most important campaign of
the Revolution. If Schuyler had been left in command, probably all the
after-complications connected with Burgoyne's surrender would have been
avoided.

The resolution of Congress superseding Schuyler reached him on the 10th
of August. The noble patriot responded to this ungenerous censure by
renewed efforts for his army till Gates's arrival on the 19th, and then
he extended to his unworthy successor the courtesy of a true gentleman,
for with him the country's welfare was paramount to all personal wrongs.

Gates, clothed with plenary powers and granted by Congress almost
everything denied to Schuyler, moved, after a delay of three weeks,
with his army, 6,000 strong, from the mouth of the Mohawk to Bemis's
Heights, a commanding position on the west bank of the Hudson, which
was selected by Arnold and fortified by the engineer Kosciusko. The
principal hill was occupied on three sides by extensive intrenchments
and redoubts with an abatis. A line of breastworks on the east extended
from the hill to the Hudson, to guard a floating bridge across the
river and to sweep the plain in front; and on the west was a lower hill
which was only partially fortified. The whole position was covered by a
ravine in front, through which flowed a branch of Mill Creek.

Gates took personal command of the right wing of the army, occupying
the intrenchments between the Hudson and the heights to the west;
Learned held the centre; while Arnold had charge of the left wing,
comprising Morgan's riflemen, some Continental troops, and a body of
militia.

To coöperate in checking the advance of the enemy, General Lincoln with
2,000 militia was sent to threaten Burgoyne's communications. Colonel
Brown with 500 of Lincoln's force, on September 18th, surprised the
outposts and key-points of Ticonderoga, destroyed over two hundred
bateaux and gunboats, captured 293 prisoners and 5 cannon, released 100
Americans, and brought away the Continental standard left flying over
the fort when abandoned by St. Clair.

Burgoyne was greatly perplexed. To retreat was to acknowledge his
weakness, and to advance was possibly to sacrifice his army and
lose his coveted peerage. Under these circumstances he stood still,
hoping his recent defeats would soon be forgotten, and he should be
strengthened for the future.

Having finally received from Lake George his artillery, military
stores, and thirty days' provisions, Burgoyne crossed to the west bank
of the Hudson; September 13th-14th, he moved with his army to Saratoga;
on the 15th-16th he tarried at Dovegot (near Coveville) to reconnoitre,
repair bridges, and open roads over this rugged country; on the 17th
he marched to Sword's Farm; on the 18th he advanced to Wilbur's Basin,
within two miles of the American position, having constantly to
skirmish with Arnold; and on the morning of the 19th he was engaged
in reconnoitring and making preparations to attack Gates, if deemed
expedient.

A table-land, intersected with ravines through which flowed Mill Creek
and its branches, separated the two armies. Except a narrow cultivated
strip, adjoining the Hudson, the ground was covered in great part by a
dense forest. The river formed its eastern boundary, and on the north,
west, and south sides were wooded heights, separated from each other by
valleys.

While the Americans occupied the south heights, the Anglo-German army
made ready to take possession of those on the north, and then to turn
the western hills, thus to get in rear of the American left by a flank
movement of their right, while their centre attacked in front and was
supported by their left.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Burgoyne's army
advanced in three columns. He, in person, in command of the centre
column, moved towards Freeman's Farm, opposite to the American left;
Riedesel and Phillips with a large train of artillery, forming the
left column, followed the river road, and, after the attack had begun,
turned westward to support and prolong the line of battle of the
deployed centre; while, by a circuitous march, Fraser, with Breyman's
German riflemen, having his flanks covered by Canadians, loyalists,
and Indians, moved with the right column, taking post westward of
the centre, thus greatly overlapping the American left, which it was
designed to turn and rout.

Gates, called by Burgoyne "an old midwife", impassively looked on,
giving no orders and evincing no desire to fight, while the impatient
Arnold, foreseeing the enemy's movement to turn his left, sent Morgan's
riflemen and some of Dearborn's light infantry to check it. They rushed
upon the enemy, and dispersed the Canadians and Indians; but following
up their success too eagerly, they soon encountered the British line of
battle, and were overpowered by superior numbers. This being reported
to Gates, the Continental troops were sent to support Morgan, but the
entire force proved insufficient to cope with and counteract Fraser's
movement. Arnold, undismayed, then changed his direction, and fell
suddenly upon the enemy's centre with a view of separating Burgoyne
from Fraser. The battle was waged with great fury by both antagonists,
and as each received reinforcements the conflict deepened, and, with
varying success, became more and more stubborn. Burgoyne finally
escaped defeat by the timely coming up of Riedesel with Pausch's
artillery. After this death-struggle of four hours' duration, darkness
terminated the contest. The Americans fell back in good order to their
intrenchments, while the Anglo-German army, lying on their arms,
retained the barren field of their foiled efforts to advance. Though
both sides claimed the victory, neither had triumphed at "Freeman's
Farm." It was in reality a drawn battle. The forces engaged in the
conflict were nearly equal, the Americans having about 3,000 and the
enemy nearly 3,500 of their best troops. The loss of the former was
65 killed, 218 wounded, and 38 missing; while that of the latter,
according to their own authorities, was about 600 killed and wounded.
British bayonets and abundant artillery were fully matched by American
rifles, without a single piece of ordnance. Had Arnold been properly
reinforced by Gates, he might have broken the enemy's line and have
gained a complete victory.

Gates's army was confident and jubilant as to the issue of the
campaign, Burgoyne's anxious and despondent; while both generals
strengthened their positions, and their camps resounded with "dreadful
note of preparation" for a coming conflict.

[Illustration:

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. iii. There is
also a likeness in Murray's _Impartial Hist._ Cf. _Mag. of Amer. Hist._
October, 1883, p. 326.—ED.]

The quarrel which had been brewing between Gates and Arnold, growing
out of former jealousy and the supersedure of Schuyler, ripened into
open hostility. The crisis of the feud came when Gates failed in his
official report to make any mention of Arnold's personal participation
in the battle of Freeman's Farm. Thereupon a violent altercation
ensued, resulting in Arnold being relieved of his command and excluded
from headquarters.

Though unemployed, he continued with the army, the officers of his
division begging him not to leave them, as another battle was impending.

The two armies confronted each other within cannon-shot, and scarcely a
night passed without some contest between pickets or foraging parties.
Burgoyne, anxiously awaiting news of Sir Henry Clinton's coöperation
from New York, tenaciously held his ground, though living upon half
rations. Gates in the mean time supinely rested in his camp, awaiting
the day when the ripened fruit of Schuyler's skill, in retarding the
enemy's march and cutting off his detachments, should fall at his feet,
and Burgoyne be compelled to starve or pass under the Caudine Forks.

       *       *       *       *       *

Sir Henry Clinton, having been reinforced from England, left New
York, October 3, with a large fleet and 3,000 troops, to effect the
long-expected junction with Burgoyne. On the 5th he reached Verplanck's
Point, on the Hudson River, from which he made a feint upon Peekskill.
Having by this ruse deceived the aged Putnam, in command of the Hudson
Highlands, Clinton crossed with his main body on the 6th to King's
Ferry, and, by following a circuitous route around the Dunderberg
Mountain, the British general in the afternoon carried by assault the
feebly garrisoned but bravely defended Forts Montgomery and Clinton.
The enemy's fleet then destroyed the boom and chain across the river,
forced the Americans to burn two frigates, which could not escape,
and ended their excursion up the Hudson at Esopus (now Kingston) by
laying it in ashes and returning to New York, it being too late to save
Burgoyne.

       *       *       *       *       *

[Illustration: SIR HENRY CLINTON.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, i. p. 526.—ED.]

The American army, after the battle of Freeman's Farm, was daily
growing stronger in men and fortifications, while the Anglo-German
force was constantly becoming weaker and worn out by watching and
incessant alarms. Burgoyne's situation was critical, for he could
neither advance nor retreat with safety, and to stand still was to
starve. Already the loyalists and Canadians were deserting in numbers,
and his Indians, having little opportunity for plundering and scalping,
were abandoning him altogether.

Receiving no tidings from Sir Henry Clinton, Burgoyne determined
to make an armed reconnoissance of the American left on the 7th of
October, and attack the next day, should there be a reasonable prospect
of success; if not, to fall back on the 11th behind the Batten-Kill.

Accordingly, leaving proper guards for his camp, Burgoyne in person,
at ten A. M. of the 7th, with 1,500 choice troops and ten pieces of
artillery, moved out for the contemplated reconnoissance, which was
at the same time to cover a foraging party to gather wheat for the
pressing necessities of his army. His troops were formed in three
columns, and when within three quarters of a mile of the American left
were deployed in line of battle upon open ground behind a screen of
dense forest. Fraser, with 500 picked men, formed the right, ready
to fall upon Gates's left; Riedesel, with his Brunswickers, held the
centre; Phillips was in charge of the British left; while the Indians,
rangers, and provincials were to work their way through the woods to
gain the left and rear of the American camp, in which Lincoln then
commanded the right, and Gates had taken Arnold's place on the left.

So soon as the enemy moved and the foragers were at work, Gates ordered
out Morgan. Divining Burgoyne's intention, Morgan was to seize the
high ground on the enemy's right by making a wide sweep; Learned was
to hold the German centre in check; and Poor, with his brigade of
Continentals and some militia, concealed by the woods, was to assail
the British left. Poor, supported by Learned, opened the battle at
half past two with great fury against Major Acland's grenadiers, and
extended his blows to Riedesel's centre; Morgan and Dearborn almost
simultaneously fell like a thunderbolt upon the enemy's right.

[Illustration: GEORGE CLINTON.

Reproduced from Delaplaine's _Repository of the lives and portraits
of Distinguished Americans_ (Philad.). It was painted by Ames. It is
engraved on steel in Allen C. Beach's _Centennial Celebrations of the
State of New York_ (Albany, 1879), and by J. B. Forrest in Irving's
_Washington_, ii. 209. A profile likeness by St. Memin is engraved in
the _Doc. Hist. N. Y._, vol. iv. A portrait in uniform at an earlier
age was etched by H. B. Hall, in 1866, and appears in the _Mag. of
American History_, December, 1881. An engraving of a bust by Ceracchi
(owned by the N. Y. Hist. Soc.) accompanies a memoir of Clinton by W.
L. Stone in _Ibid._, iii. 336.—ED.]

Burgoyne, seeing the danger of Fraser's right being turned, ordered
him to fall back to a new position, in doing which Fraser was mortally
wounded by one of Morgan's sharpshooters. In the mean time, Poor was
playing wild havoc with Acland's grenadiers, captured Phillips's
artillery after killing nearly all of its gunners, and then turned
their own pieces upon the British, putting the entire left of their
army to flight.

The Germans still firmly held their ground in the centre, when Arnold,
maddened by his wrongs, dashed wildly into the thickest of the
fight, without authority assumed command of his old division, with
audacity and judgment led regiment after regiment to the attack at
different points, roused his troops to the highest enthusiasm, and
forced back by his impetuous assaults the already shattered British
line, which Burgoyne then courageously led in person. But all of the
British commander's determination was of little avail, his entire
forces being driven back into their intrenched camp. Here the wreck
of the Anglo-German army made a firm stand; but Arnold still sought
new dangers. With desperation he and his fearless followers mounted
embankments and abatis to assail Balcarras, then dashed upon the strong
works of the German camp, and ceased not his furious onsets till the
whole of the enemy's fortified position lay open, when night closed the
scene.

The American army in this decisive battle lost 50 killed and 150
wounded, including among the latter the dauntless Arnold. The enemy,
besides nine guns, a large supply of ammunition, and much baggage, lost
176 killed, about 250 wounded, and some 200 prisoners. Among those who
lost their lives were the gallant Fraser and the sturdy Breyman, and
included in the wounded were several British officers of high rank.

Burgoyne, signally defeated and exposed to a new attack by double his
fighting force, prudently retreated, on the stormy night of the 8th,
to Saratoga, leaving behind his sick, wounded, and everything he could
possibly spare. General Fraser was buried, as he had requested, in a
large redoubt near the Hudson, the guns fired over his grave being the
American artillery aimed at the group of distinguished mourners before
knowing the occasion of their assembling.

Gates, who had not been personally engaged in either battle of his
army, remained two days with his main body in the abandoned camp of the
enemy at Wilbur's Basin, he judiciously having sent detachments to take
advantageous positions to hem in Burgoyne. On the 11th, Gates ordered
his main body to cross the Fishkill, supposing Burgoyne had further
retreated; but his advanced guard of 1,500 men under Nixon quickly
withdrew, having discovered the enemy intrenched and in battle array on
the other side of the stream.

Burgoyne, now finding himself exposed to the concentric fire of the
Americans, who nearly surrounded him, and having no opening through
which to retreat to Lake George or to Lake Champlain, called a council
of war to deliberate upon his desperate situation. "By their unanimous
concurrence and advice", says he, "I was induced to open a treaty with
Major-General Gates." At ten A. M. of the 14th, a flag of truce was
sent by Burgoyne, asking for a parley, during which Gates demanded an
unconditional surrender of the enemy's troops as prisoners of war. This
proposition Burgoyne peremptorily refused to entertain. Hostilities in
the mean time were suspended, and modified proposals were made. After
two days' delay, Gates, hearing of Sir Henry Clinton's advance up the
Hudson, and fearing that he might reach Albany, agreed upon the terms,
dictated by Burgoyne, as follows:—

The Anglo-German troops to march out of their camp with all the honors
of war, and their artillery to be moved to the bank of the Hudson
River, and there left, together with the soldiers' arms, which were
to be piled at the word of command from their own officers. It was
further agreed that a free passage to Great Britain should be granted
to the troops on condition of their not serving again in the present
contest; that all officers should retain their baggage and side-arms,
and not be separated from their men; and that all, of whatever country
they might be, following the camp, should be included in the terms of
capitulation. Before signing the treaty, Burgoyne demurred to designate
it as a _capitulation_, whereupon Gates readily consented to its being
called a TREATY OF CONVENTION, and as such it was signed October 16,
1777.

[Illustration: BURGOYNE TO GATES.

Somewhat reduced, after the fac-simile in Wilkinson's _Memoirs_, i.
282.—ED.]

Burgoyne in a rich uniform, accompanied by his brilliant staff and
general officers, rode, on October 17, to the headquarters of General
Gates, who was simply attired in a plain blue coat. Reining up their
horses, Burgoyne gracefully raising his cocked hat, said, "The fortune
of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner;" to which the victor,
gracefully returning the salute, replied, "I shall always be ready
to bear testimony that it has not been through any fault of your
excellency."

[Illustration: WASHINGTON AND GATES.

From _Bickerstaff's Boston Almanac_. This is from the title of the
number for 1778, and shows the kind of effigies popularly current in
such publications.—ED.]

On the site of old Fort Hardy the Anglo-German army, October 17,
grounded their arms at the command of their own officers, none of the
American troops being present to witness this humiliation of the enemy.
In the afternoon the captured troops crossed the Hudson, and, escorted
by a company of light dragoons, were marched between the parallel
lines of American soldiers, preceded by two officers, unfurling "the
stars and stripes" just adopted by Congress. While this ceremony took
place in the presence of Burgoyne and Gates, the former drew his sword
and presented it to the latter, which being received was courteously
returned, when both generals retired into Gates's tent.[728]

While the prisoners, under guard of General Heath, were marching to
Boston, Gates hurried to Albany to oppose any movement of Sir Henry
Clinton; and Major Wilkinson was sent to Congress to communicate
the joyful tidings of Burgoyne's surrender. Rejoicings were heard
throughout the United States, and the successful general was so elated
and his vanity so stimulated that he aspired to supplant Washington, as
he had Schuyler.

       *       *       *       *       *

A few criticisms upon the plan of the campaign of 1777, and the mode
of conducting it, may be permitted. The British cabinet wisely decided
upon the seizure of the Hudson as the most efficient way of breaking
the power of the revolted colonies; but, in carrying out its design, it
violated a fundamental maxim of war. No principle of strategy is better
established than the superiority of _interior_ as against _exterior_
lines of operation of armies, as was so admirably illustrated in the
"Seven Years' War." Frederic the Great, without any frontier barriers
and open to attack on all sides, from his central position kept at bay
France, Austria, Russia, Saxony, Sweden, and the Germanic body, whose
united population was over twenty times as great as that of Prussia,
including Silesia, a recently conquered province. In like manner, the
Americans, in July, 1777, were within a great circle,—Schuyler on the
upper Hudson, Putnam at the Highlands, and Washington in New Jersey,
within supporting distance of each other; while the British armies were
widely separated upon its vast circumference,—St. Leger moving to
the upper Mohawk, Burgoyne from Canada, Clinton at New York, and Howe
sailing to the Chesapeake.

In the struggle for the Hudson, the two independent British armies—one
in Canada and the other in New York—were expected to coöperate in
order to attain a common object, while Burgoyne with the one was tied
down by fixed orders, and Clinton with the other had no instructions
as to the part he was expected to perform. Besides, their bases were
separated by about four hundred miles of wild, hostile, and thinly
populated country, rendering intercommunication so difficult that, of
ten messengers sent out by different routes to Howe, not one returned
to Burgoyne.

No precaution was taken to provide for the losses of Burgoyne's
army, nor to supply the necessary drafts upon it to garrison the
posts in his rear, guarding his communications with Canada. When he
gained possession of Ticonderoga, he called upon Sir Guy Carleton to
furnish the necessary force to hold the place; but Carleton did not
feel justified, under his precise orders, to send troops beyond his
jurisdiction. Consequently, Burgoyne "drained the life-blood of his
force" in the field to provide for the defence of this and other works
left behind.

Burgoyne's _logistics_, or means of supplying and moving his army, were
very defective. Not till June 7, 1777, a month after his arrival in
Canada, did he make provision for the transportation of either stores
or artillery, and then his arrangements were so entirely inadequate
that they seemed based upon the assumption that his adversary was his
inferior in all military qualities. Hence, he decided "to trust to the
resources of the expedition for the rest", while for his own personal
baggage he used no less than "_thirty carts_." Most of his provisions
had to be brought from England, a distance of 3,600 miles; some from
Canada; and for the rest he relied upon the meagre resources of the
hostile country he was to traverse. Consequently his army was often on
reduced rations, sometimes nearly starving, and finally, to secure its
existence, he undertook his disastrous raid upon Bennington.

After the pursuit of St. Clair, Burgoyne should have returned with his
army to Ticonderoga, and taken the water route by Lake George, instead
of forcing his way through an obstructed wilderness to Fort Edward,
which he did not reach till July 30th, nor leave till August 14th.
Had Schuyler directed Burgoyne's operations he could not have planned
measures more conducive to his own advantage. On the Lake George route
were only two small armed schooners to oppose any resistance, and
from the head of the lake was a direct road to Albany, which had been
followed by Abercrombie and Amherst. As it was, Burgoyne was compelled
to send his supplies and artillery by the lake, and then carry them
over the portage to Fort Edward, which consumed more time than would
have been necessary to move in light marching order direct to Albany.
General De Peyster, a careful student of this campaign, says: "Burgoyne
could have been reassembled at 'Old Ty' by the 10th July; could have
been transported to Fort George by the 12th; and, having left his heavy
guns and all but his light artillery and indispensable materials there
or at Ty, in depot, with a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort
Edward on the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is
about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations and an extra supply of
ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have
swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's delay
for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July." But the
British commander had proclaimed, "This army must not retreat." Though
he subsequently tried to palliate his mistake, all his correspondence
shows that pride in carrying out his declaration, not military
principles, made him persevere in the false movement which lost him the
campaign, and secured in the end American independence.

Burgoyne, after his brilliant success at the opening of the campaign,
suddenly relapsed into the sluggishness of his German allies. Instead
of rapidly pursuing his demoralized foe, he tarried at Skenesborough
till his pathway was thoroughly obstructed and the fugitives had
recovered from their panic. After he had lost his prestige and the
Americans had gained confidence by success at Stanwix and Bennington,
he attempted with diminished forces to cope with the growing strength
of his opponent. Thus, by delay, he lost in September what he might
have achieved in July. From his arrival at Skenesborough till he had
reached his southernmost point at Freeman's Farm, he moved only _fifty
miles in seventy-four days_.

Slow in all his movements, Burgoyne's tardiness was increased by his
large and superfluous train of artillery which accompanied all his
toilsome marches. Even when he required the greatest celerity, he chose
for his raid upon Bennington, not the nimble-footed light infantry
under the dashing Fraser, but cumbrous dismounted German dragoons
moving only a mile and a third an hour.

Burgoyne was not only slow, but he was irresolute. After his disastrous
defeat at Bemis's Heights he lost five precious days in fatal
indecision while retreat was possible. On October 12th his last chance
had passed, he then being completely invested by the Americans, and
nothing was left to him but surrender. According to Madame Riedesel,
he had given in this crisis of his fate more attention to his mistress
than to his army. Aspasia had triumphed over Mars.

While Burgoyne committed many blunders, his opponents had their
shortcomings also. The fortifications of Ticonderoga, after falling
into the hands of the Americans, were too much extended for their
defence by a moderate garrison; but the most fatal error was the
failure to occupy Mount Defiance, which completely commanded all the
American works, and, when seized by the British, left St. Clair no
alternative but hasty retreat and the abandonment of much artillery and
considerable supplies. The fugitives then counted largely on the delay
of their pursuers, who followed them with celerity, severely punishing
them at Skenesborough and Hubbardton.

Congress committed the most criminal error, outweighing all others, in
substituting, at the most critical moment of the campaign, a military
charlatan for an accomplished soldier,—in supplanting Schuyler, who
was the organizer of the victories, by Gates, who "had no fitness for
command and wanted personal courage." To say nothing of the difference
in merit of the two commanders, the time for making the change was most
inopportune.

Putnam, a brave officer but no general, managed things so badly in the
Highlands that Forts Montgomery and Clinton were lost, and the Hudson
was opened to the enemy whenever he chose to advance.[729]


CRITICAL ESSAY ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

THE titles alone of the numerous works which have been consulted in the
preparation of the foregoing narratives would fill many of these pages.
Therefore, to avoid repetition, as most of them are common to all the
chapters of this History of the American Revolution, reference will
be made only to those authorities which have a bearing upon disputed
points, or to newly discovered facts respecting the "Struggle for the
Hudson."

Of the many authors who have written of the New York campaign of 1776,
nearly all have followed the narrations given in Sparks's _Washington_
and in the official despatches of the various officers engaged. For
topographical details we have relied upon Des Barres' _Atlantic
Neptune_ (1780-81), with its plans of battles, sieges, etc., and maps
of the seat of war, and upon the recent Coast Survey charts. Local
historians have supplied many minor particulars, which need not be
enumerated, except, perhaps, the one relating to the treason of William
Demont, already referred to in the text. Much new light has been thrown
upon the Burgoyne campaign by works published within the last few
years.[730]

One of the most earnestly disputed points of Burgoyne's campaign is
whether Arnold was personally engaged with the enemy at the battle of
Freeman's Farm, on Sept. 19, 1777. Some authorities, notably Bancroft,
while admitting that Arnold's troops were in the thickest of the fray,
deny that the general himself was on the battlefield; while Stedman,
Irving, Stone, and many others, equally competent to weigh the facts,
maintain that Arnold was the conquering hero of the fight, and that,
but for him, Burgoyne would have marched straight on to Albany.

Just after Gates had superseded Schuyler in the command of the
Northern army, Arnold had returned from the Mohawk valley flushed
with success and impatient to win new laurels. He was incessantly
engaged in skirmishing with the enemy and adding to his reputation as a
brilliant, dashing officer. Gates was envious of Arnold's growing fame,
and resentful of his partiality for Schuyler. Hence arose a coolness
towards Arnold, which rapidly ripened into bitter hostility. That
the action of Freeman's Farm, a five hours' battle, full of skilful
movements, was purely a series of chance operations without a guiding
spirit, is utterly preposterous. As Gates was not engaged, whose was
the directing mind but Arnold's, the second in command?

It seems impossible that one devoid of fear, brave even to rashness,
who even courted danger at the risk of death, and one too who was
filled with ambition and love of military glory, could possibly have
allowed his command to go into action without leading its movements
and sharing its perils. His subsequent heroism amid the carnage of
battle at Bemis's Heights would seem a sufficient refutation of the
charge that he who was always in the thickest of the fight was only
a looker-on while the conflict of September 19th was raging around
Freeman's Farm.

Gates, in his official report of the battle of Freeman's Farm, makes no
mention of Arnold being engaged; and his adjutant-general, Wilkinson,
in his _Memoirs_, written long after Arnold's good name had been
blasted by his treason, says: "Not a single general officer was on the
field of battle on the 19th of September, until evening, when General
Learned was ordered out."

Under ordinary circumstances, the testimony of the commander-in-chief
and his adjutant-general would be considered conclusive; but it must
be borne in mind that both of these officers were inimical to Arnold,
that neither was personally engaged in the battle, and that the wooded
character of the ground precluded either from following any one's
movements through the conflict.

On the other side, we have the contemporary testimony of officers
present on the battlefield, newspaper accounts of the time, and
Arnold's own division order of the day after the battle, in which he
speaks of the zeal and spirit of the company officers engaged, in
a manner which none but a close observer could notice. Besides, we
have the direct evidence of two of Arnold's staff officers—Colonels
Livingston and Varick—that their chief was the hero of the battle of
Freeman's Farm; the former warmly lauding "his conduct during the late
action", and declaring that "to him alone is due the honor of our late
victory." Even the enemy's chief, Burgoyne, said in the British House
of Commons: "Mr. Gates had determined to receive the attack in his
lines. Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, foreseeing the danger of
being turned, advanced without consultation with his general, and gave
instead of receiving battle."

Another much-disputed point is whether to Schuyler or Gates is chiefly
due the triumph of our arms in the Burgoyne campaign. Bancroft, in his
_History of the United States_ (vol. ix. ch. 21, orig. ed.), states
that Schuyler lacked military talents, failed to harry the advance
of Burgoyne, wanted personal courage, and had no influence with the
people. All these charges have been triumphantly refuted by his
grandson and by his biographer.[731]

General Schuyler's zeal, energy, ability, and sterling virtues have
been so fully set forth in the preceding narrative of the Burgoyne
campaign that any amplification here is needless; but it may be proper
to add the testimony of some of our most distinguished countrymen as
to the merits of this true gentleman, noble soldier, and patriotic
Fabian hero. Chief Justice Marshall says: "In this gloomy state
of things no officer could have exerted more diligence and skill
than Schuyler." Chancellor Kent writes: "In acuteness of intellect,
profound thought, indefatigable activity, exhaustless energy, pure
patriotism, and persevering and intrepid public efforts, Schuyler had
no superior." Daniel Webster said: "I consider Schuyler as second only
to Washington in the services he rendered to the country in the war of
the Revolution. His zeal and devotion to the cause under difficulties
which would have paralyzed the efforts of most men, and his fortitude
and courage when assailed by malicious attacks upon his public and
private character, _every one of which was proved to be false_, have
impressed me with a strong desire to express publicly my sense of his
great qualities."

Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Jefferson, and most of the great men of the
Revolution had unbounded confidence in Schuyler; and modern historians,
such as Irving, Sparks, Lossing, and others, bear like testimony to
his virtues and services. Even Congress, which had so unjustly removed
Schuyler from his command, when convinced of its error, would not
consent to his resignation from the army till he persistently demanded
it. Though Schuyler's military career did not sparkle with "feats of
broil and battle", he exhibited those great qualities which are as
conducive to the success of war as "the magnificently stern array"
of arms in the heady fight. He was ready in expedients to foil the
enemy, skilful and persevering in executing them, and resolute and
untiring till his end was obtained. Never discouraged by disaster,
and stimulated to higher effort as fortune frowned, he continued
sanguine of success in the darkest hour of adversity. Every assault
upon his reputation fell harmless before his invulnerable patriotism;
no injustice could swerve him from the path of honor; and to him, as to
all true men, the meaning of life was concentrated in the single word
DUTY.

[Illustration]


NOTE BY GENERAL CULLUM.

DISPOSAL OF THE CONVENTION TROOPS.[732]—In accordance with Article
IV. of the convention, the captured army was marched, under guard of
General Glover, to the neighborhood of Boston, where it arrived about
Nov. 6th. The British troops were barracked on Prospect Hill and the
German troops on Winter Hill, the officers being quartered in Cambridge
and the neighboring towns. Much complaint was made of the character
and insufficiency of their accommodations, but considering the limited
supply of houses at the disposal of General Heath, commanding the
Eastern department, he did the best in his power, without the aid of
the State of Massachusetts, to whose Council he appealed for the use
of "at least one of the colleges" for their comfort. At the worst,
however, these captives fared far better than our own troops at Valley
Forge during that winter.[733]

Under Article V. supplies were to be furnished to Burgoyne's army
"at the same rates." This was interpreted by Congress, Dec. 19th, to
mean "that the accounts of all provisions and other necessaries which
already have been or which hereafter may be supplied by the public to
prisoners in the power of these States shall be discharged by either
receiving from the British Commissary of Prisoners, or any of his
agents, provisions or other necessaries, equal in quality and kind to
what had been supplied, or the amount thereof in gold or silver."

Exacting provisions _in kind_, though inconvenient to the British
commissary, was not unreasonable, considering their scarcity; but the
condition that expenditures made in depreciated Continental money
should be liquidated, dollar for dollar, in gold and silver, was a hard
one. As a justification for this latter requirement, it was stated by
Congress "that General Howe had required that provisions should be sent
in for the subsistence of the American prisoners in his possession,
and that for the purchase of such necessaries he had forbidden the
circulation of the currency of the States within such parts as are
subject to his power."

By Article II. General Howe was authorized to send transports to Boston
to receive the troops for their conveyance to England. For its failure
to carry out the obligation imposed upon it by its own general, the
American government, through Congress, justified itself by claiming
that Burgoyne had already evaded the provisions of Article I. of the
convention. Bancroft, in his _History of the United States_, contends
that it had been broken by Burgoyne at the time of the surrender,
by the concealment of the military chest and other public property,
of which the United States were thus defrauded.[734] He therefore
sustains Congress in its subsequent demand for the descriptive lists
"of all persons comprehended in the surrender", and the postponing of
the embarkation of Burgoyne's army "until his capitulation should be
expressly confirmed by Great Britain."

On the other side are many high authorities, among whom is Dr. Charles
Deane, who, Oct. 22, 1877, made an exhaustive report upon the subject
of the Convention of Saratoga to the American Antiquarian Society. He
contends that the acts of Congress "were not marked by the highest
exhibition of good policy or of good faith."[735]

Fair inferences, from the facts in evidence, lead to the belief
that neither party was scrupulous in carrying out its obligations.
Burgoyne, after a preliminary agreement to the terms of the convention,
_was in favor of breaking the treaty_, because, before affixing his
signature to it, he had heard of the success of Sir Henry Clinton
in the Hudson Highlands. He was willing, therefore, to barter his
plighted promise to further his own interest, and actually submitted
to a council of his officers "whether it was consistent with public
faith, and if so, expedient, to suspend the execution of the treaty,
and trust to events." To the honor of the officers of the Anglo-German
army, a decided majority of the council overruled the wishes of the
general-in-chief, whereupon Burgoyne, Oct. 17, signed the convention.

Its second article stipulated that "a free passage be granted to the
army, under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, to Great Britain, on condition
of not serving again in North America during the present contest."
It seems almost incredible that even Gates could have been guilty of
such fatuity in sacrificing by this article all the fruits of the past
campaign, and jeoparding American independence. It would have been
better to have disarmed and disbanded these demoralized troops on the
spot. He could thus have saved the country much anxiety, inconvenience,
and expense, in guarding, housing, and caring for them till rested from
their fatigues and embarked for England, where they could be exchanged
for an army of fresh troops, which might cross the ocean in the spring
to plague the inventors of such a stupid compact, or convention.

Burgoyne was not slow to avail himself of a _literal_ interpretation
of words he had designedly used in drawing up the convention, for we
find him, only three days after the surrender, writing to his friend,
Colonel Phillopson: "I dictated terms of convention which save the army
to the State for the next campaign."

Was it in the same spirit that Burgoyne carried out the first article
of the convention, by which his "arms and artillery" were to be left
piled on the banks of the Hudson? By a _literal_ interpretation this
might mean only muskets and cannon, but certainly such would not be
the accepted military meaning of that article, especially as it had
to be construed in connection with the sixth article, permitting all
officers "to retain their carriages, bat-horses, and other cattle, and
no baggage to be molested or searched; Lieutenant-General Burgoyne
giving his honor that there are no public stores secreted therein."
But, notwithstanding all this, Madame Riedesel, the wife of General
Riedesel, says in her journal: "Now I was forced to consider how I
should safely carry the colors of our German regiments still further,
as we had made the Americans at Saratoga believe that they were burnt
up—a circumstance which they at first took in bad part, though
afterwards they tacitly overlooked it. But it was only the staves that
had been burned, the colors having been thus far concealed. Now my
husband confided to me his secret, and entrusted me with their still
further concealment. I therefore shut myself in with a right honorable
tailor, who helped me make a mattress in which we sewed every one of
them. Captain O'Connell, under pretence of some errand, was dispatched
to New York and passed the mattress off as his bed. He sent it to
Halifax, where we again found it on our passage from New York to
Canada, and where—in order to ward off all suspicion in case our ship
should be taken—I transferred it into my cabin, and slept during the
whole of the remaining voyage to Canada upon those honorable badges."
She truly called them "honorable badges", for to an army they are the
insignia of nationality and emblems of power, under which the soldier
ventures his life and reputation.

How was it with the British flags? Burgoyne stated that they were
all left in Canada. But it happens that one of them was displayed at
Ticonderoga upon the evacuation of that place by St. Clair; and five
of them were captured at Fort Stanwix from St. Leger, whose detachment
accompanied Burgoyne till just before leaving Canada upon his great
campaign. Further, it is written in the _Historical Record of the
Ninth Regiment_ that Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, of that regiment, "being
anxious to preserve the colors, took them off the staves and concealed
them in his baggage, which he was permitted to retain." Subsequently
these colors, hidden among his baggage, in which Burgoyne had given his
honor that no public property was secreted, Colonel Hill presented "to
George III., who rewarded his faithful services with the appointment of
aide-de-camp to his Majesty, and the rank of Colonel in the army."

As Burgoyne was by Article I. allowed to march to the ground of
surrender "with the honors of war", General Horatio Rogers, with the
sentiment of a true soldier, says in one of his admirable annotations
of _Hadden's Journal_: "Had Burgoyne's officers believed that their
colors were not embraced in the terms of the convention, they would
have flung them to the breeze and proudly marched out under them, as an
indication of how much of their honor they had preserved, especially
when they supposed they were about to embark for England; for soldiers
lay down their lives for their flags, the loss, surrender, or
concealment of which, save in rare instances, is synonymous with defeat
and humiliation."[736]

Though it appears that all of the accoutrements and other public
property of the Anglo-German army were not surrendered and a
considerable part was found unserviceable, it is unnecessary to make
a special point of this minor matter, after presenting the graver
delinquencies on Burgoyne's part.

General Halleck, one of the best authorities on the Laws of War, in
his work on _International Law_, says: "The general phrase, 'with all
the honors of war,' is usually construed to include the right to march
with colors displayed, drums beating, etc.... A capitulation includes
all property in the place not expressly excepted, and a commander who
destroys military stores or other property after entering into such
agreement not only forfeits all its benefits, but he subjects himself
to severe punishment for his perfidy. So, after a capitulation for the
surrender of an army in the field, any officer who destroys his side
arms or his insignia of rank deprives himself of all the privileges of
that rank, and may be treated as a private soldier. The reason of the
rule is manifest. The victor is entitled to all the honors and benefits
of his agreement the moment it is entered into, and to destroy colors,
arms, etc. thereafter is to deprive him of his just rights. Such
conduct is both dishonorable and criminal."

Whether the shortcomings of the British general-in-chief were known
to Washington cannot be determined, but the latter's correspondence
clearly indicates what he believed would be the action of George III.
upon the arrival of the convention troops in Great Britain. Hence
he writes, November 13, to General Heath: "Policy and a regard to
our own interest are strongly opposed to our adopting or pursuing
any measures to facilitate their embarkation and passage home, which
are not required of us by the capitulation."[737] Congress, December
17, concurred in these views, and consequently refused Burgoyne's
application for his army to embark from Newport or some port on Long
Island Sound, to avoid the long and dangerous winter passage around
Cape Cod of the British transports which were to receive the troops.

In this, as in all matters involving the success of the Revolution,
Washington was not only patriotic, but morally right. We had committed
a blunder at Saratoga, but there was no reason why we should increase
the mischievous effect of it by expediting the enemy's movements from
Boston, and thus add to the danger of our destruction by enabling him
to replace Burgoyne's troops in America by others they might relieve
elsewhere, in time for the next year's campaign.

Congress had, November 8th, instructed General Heath to require
descriptive lists of all the convention troops, to secure us against
their reappearing in arms against us during the war. This Burgoyne
resented as impeaching the honor of his nation, but he subsequently
complied with a measure so essential to our protection.

In Burgoyne's complaint of November 14th regarding the quarters for his
officers and men, he inadvertently said, "The public faith is broke",
which unguarded expression was at once seized upon by Congress; when a
committee, of which Francis Lightfoot Lee was chairman, submitted its
report, upon which Congress, then composed "of but a few members, and
all of them not the most suitable for the station", adopted, January 8,
1778, the following resolutions:—

"_Resolved_, that as many of the cartouch-boxes and several other
articles of military accoutrements annexed to the persons of the
non-commissioned officers and soldiers included in the Convention of
Saratoga have not been delivered up, the Convention, on the part of the
British army, has not been strictly complied with.

"_Resolved_, that the refusal of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to give
descriptive lists of the non-commissioned officers and privates
belonging to his army, subsequent to his declaration that the public
faith was broke, is considered by Congress in an alarming point of
view; since a compliance with the resolution of Congress could only
have been prejudicial to that army in case of an infraction of the
convention on their part.

"_Resolved_, that the charge made by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, in
his letter to Major-General Gates of the 14th of November, of a breach
of the public faith on the part of these States, is not warranted by
the just construction of any article of the Convention of Saratoga;
that it is a strong indication of his intention, and affords just
ground of fear that he will avail himself of such pretended breach of
the convention, in order to disengage himself and the army under him
of the obligation they are under to these United States; and that the
security which these States have had in his personal honor is thereby
destroyed.

"_Resolved, therefore_, that the embarkation of Lieutenant-General
Burgoyne and the troops under his command be suspended till a distinct
and explicit ratification of the Convention of Saratoga shall be
properly notified by the court of Great Britain to Congress."[738]

Delays followed these resolutions, and finally, February 3, 1778,
General Heath was instructed that the embarkation of the troops was
to be indefinitely postponed, the transports upon their arrival to be
ordered away from the port of Boston, and the guard over the prisoners
to be strengthened. General Burgoyne, of course, was indignant, and
offered that, "should any doubt still subsist that the idea of being
released from the engagement of the convention has been adopted by any
part of the troops", he would give a further pledge of the faith of
every officer in his command, "provided the suspension is immediately
broken off." This frank offer was referred to a committee, which
reported that in their opinion it contained nothing "sufficient to
induce Congress to recede from their resolution of the 8th of January;"
and the report was agreed to March 2, 1778.

This disingenuous resolution of Congress, "that the embarkation be
suspended" until the happening of some further contingent event, was
returning the poisoned chalice to Burgoyne's lips, being exactly in
keeping with his proposition submitted, October 15, 1777, to a council
of his officers, "whether it was consistent with public faith, and if
so, expedient, to suspend the execution of the treaty and trust to
events."

Notwithstanding many members had no confidence in the political
integrity of Great Britain,[739] such holding of the convention troops
as prisoners of war, contrary to the principles of international
law, certainly placed Congress in a most unfavorable light. Even so
distinguished a member as Richard Henry Lee, writing to Washington,
says: "It is unfortunately too true that our enemies pay little regard
to good faith, or any obligations of justice and humanity which render
the Convention of Saratoga a matter of great moment; and it is also,
as you justly observe, an affair of infinite delicacy. The undoubted
advantage they will take even of the appearance of infraction on our
part, and the American character, which is concerned in preserving its
faith inviolate, cover this affair with difficulties, and prove the
disadvantage we are under in conducting war against an old, corrupt,
and powerful people, who, having much credit and influence in the
world, will venture on things that would totally ruin the reputation
of young and rising communities like ours." We would further remark
that the moral standard of even the most civilized nations was not then
as high as in this more advanced age, and that upon the construction
of this convention hung the independence of the United States. Napier
said of the Convention of Cintra in 1808: "A convention implies some
weakness, and must be weighed in _the scales of prudence, not those of
justice_."

General Burgoyne and his staff were allowed by Congress to return to
England on parole. Soon after their departure the British troops were
removed to Rutland, Mass., because of fears of their being rescued by
the British forces then at Newport, R. I. Congress finally directed
that the Convention troops, in order to be more easily subsisted,
should be removed to Charlottesville, Virginia,[740] where they arrived
in January, 1779, and they were detained in the United States till the
conclusion of peace with Great Britain. Most of the officers had in the
mean time been exchanged.

Dr. Deane, in concluding his investigation of this subject, says:
"There can be no doubt that the supreme authority in the State would
always have the right, as it has the power, to revise a treaty made
by its agents, as in the case we have been considering. This follows
from the nature of sovereignty itself. An Arnold might be bribed to
to capitulate to the enemy. But where such treaties are entered into
in good faith, and the obvious powers of the commanders have not been
exceeded, the agreements between the victor and the vanquished are
regarded by the highest authorities as to be sacredly kept. Humanity
demands it; otherwise there would be no cessation of hostilities till
the annihilation of both belligerents."[741]

While Great Britain had just cause to complain of the violation of the
Convention of Saratoga by the American Congress, she might ask herself,
did she always observe strict faith with her revolted colonies.

According to the Articles of Capitulation of Charleston, S. C., May 12,
1780, the garrison were allowed some of the honors of war. They were
to march out and deposit their arms between the canal and the works
of the place, but the drums were not to beat a British march, nor the
colors to be uncased; the Continental troops and seamen, keeping their
baggage, were to remain prisoners of war until exchanged; the militia
were to be permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners
on parole, and while they kept their parole were not to be molested in
their property by the British troops; the citizens of all descriptions
were to be considered as prisoners on parole, and to hold their
property in the town on the same terms as the militia.

After the capitulation, Sir Henry Clinton sent out three expeditions
and issued three proclamations, all having in view the subjugation of
South Carolina. The butchery which Tarleton inflicted is well known;
and even the British historian, Stedman, who was then an officer under
General Clinton, says of it: "The virtue of humanity was totally
forgot." The enemy's detachments, sent to various parts of the State,
paid little regard to the rights and property of its inhabitants. Sir
Henry, assuming that the province was already conquered, issued, before
his departure to New York, a proclamation discharging all the military
prisoners, except those captured in Fort Moultrie and Charleston, from
their parole after June 20, 1780. Thus, without their own consent, by
Clinton's arbitrary fiat, these paroled persons were converted from
their neutrality into British subjects, and compelled to take up arms
against their neighbors, or, failing to comply with this enforced
allegiance, were treated as rebels. The Whig inhabitants were worried,
plundered, and murdered by Tories, in open violation of all British
pledges; leading men were confined in prison-ships; and patriotic
citizens, who had resumed their swords upon finding all guaranties
violated, had their property sequestrated, and themselves were severely
punished, sometimes with death. The British rule was truly a reign of
terror.

Lord Mahon stigmatizes in the severest language American faith as
utterly derelict in carrying out the Convention of Saratoga,[742] while
of the sequel of the capitulation of Charleston he has no holy horror.
His only remark is: "_Perhaps_ these measures exceeded the bounds of
justice; certainly they did the bounds of policy." This same English
historian, in his account of Arnold's treason, speaks of the death of
André as the "greatest blot" upon the career of Washington. He contends
that it was unjust to arrest André, because he had a safeguard from
Arnold; and sneers at the twelve distinguished American generals upon
the Board which condemned the spy, as incompetent plebeians, drawn
from "the plough-handle and from the shop-board." According to Mahon's
fallacious mode of reasoning, Washington should not only have let André
go free, because protected by the traitor's pass, but should have
given up West Point, its garrison and arms, to Sir Henry Clinton, as
fully agreed upon by Arnold, the duly constituted American commander.
According to such reasoning, Judas Iscariot was justified in betraying
the Saviour, because he had been one of the trusted twelve who sat down
to the Last Supper. The just fate of the spy and betrayer was the same,
except that Judas was his own executioner.

Of the various military conventions, that of Kloster-Zeven, of
September 8, 1757, between the Duke of Cumberland and Marshal
Richelieu, most resembles that of Saratoga. In both the victors had
the vanquished at their mercy; in both the terms of surrender, under
the circumstances, were moderate beyond all necessity; in both the
capitulations were unsatisfactory to the governments concerned; and in
both the treaties were broken from motives of expediency, frivolous
pretexts being used to cover the odium of bad faith.

George II., as Elector of Hanover, "to clear himself", says Sir
Edward Cust, "from the dishonor of the convention, disavowed his son's
authority to sign it", recalled him from his command, and declared
that the hero of Culloden had ruined his father and disgraced himself.
We cannot enter into the reasons assigned by the British ministry for
abrogating this compact, but they were at the least as invalid as those
used by our Congress in suspending the execution of the Convention
of Saratoga. When the Hanoverian army, under Prince Ferdinand of
Brunswick, took the field in contravention of agreement, Marshal
Richelieu declared his own fidelity in keeping the treaty, and that,
should the enemy "commit any act of hostility", he, as authorized
by the laws of war, "would push matters to the last extremity." The
declaration of the French marshal "was seconded", says Smollett, the
British historian, "by the Count de Lynar, the Danish ambassador, who
had meditated the Convention of Kloster-Zeven under direction of his
master to save Hanover from the horrors of war."


EDITORIAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORITIES.

=I.= THE CAMPAIGN AROUND NEW YORK CITY IN 1776.—The Americans had been
early warned of the British plans to secure the line of the Hudson
(_Journal of the Provincial Congress of New York_, 172; Lossing's
_Schuyler_, ii. 16), and on the American side plans of obstructing
and defending the river had been made as early as Sept., 1775, and
they ever after constituted a chief anxiety of the continental and
provincial authorities.[743] Several early maps making record of these
efforts have been preserved.[744]

[Illustration: FORT MONTGOMERY, MAY 31, 1776.]

[Illustration: CHAIN AT FORT MONTGOMERY.

Reduced from the cut in Ruttenber's _Obstructions to the Navigation of
Hudson's River_, p. 64.

KEY. A, Fort Montgomery. B, Fort Clinton. C, Poplopen's Kill. D,
Anthony's Nose. _a_, floats to chain. _b b b_, boom in front of chain.
_c c c_, chain. _d_, rock at which the chain was secured and large
iron roller. _e e_, cribs and anchors. _f_, blocks and purchase for
tightening chain. _g h_, ground batteries for defence of chain. [S,
section showing floats and chain; _c c c_, chain; _f f f_, floats.]

The cut follows the original drawing found in the papers of the secret
committee. There is a plate showing the boom and chain at West Point in
Boynton's _West Point_, p. 70.]

The anomalous condition of New York during the later part of 1775 is
shown from the Tory point of view in Jones's _New York during the
Revolution_. Rivington's press was destroyed in Nov., 1775 (_N. Y. City
Manual_, 1868, p. 813). There was an irruption from New Jersey into
Long Island in Jan., 1776 (Jones, i. 68). In Feb. the military control
appears in Col. David Waterbury's orderly-book (_Mag. of American
Hist._, Dec., 1884, p. 555). Moore gives current published reports,
including Gov. Tryon's proclamation in March (_Diary of the Rev._, i.
216). During the same month Lee made a report on the fortifications of
the city (_N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._, 1871, p. 354), and Field, in his
_Battle of Long Island_, traces the measures of Lee to convert New York
into a camp and to root out the Tories on Long Island.

[Illustration: CONSTITUTION ISLAND, 1776.

From the _Sparks Maps_. KEY: "A, Gravel Hill battery, 11 guns. B, Hill
clift battery, 3 in front, not finished. C, Marine battery, 8 guns. D,
Romain's battery, 14 guns. E, Round Tower, 8 guns." These works were
later commanded by those erected at West Point.]

Stirling had also been exercising command in New York (Duer's
_Stirling_, 139), and had seized Gov. Franklin of New Jersey (_N. J.
Archives_, x. 702). In April, 1776, Putnam arrived with instructions
from Washington (Sparks's _Washington_, iii. 337), finding Heath fresh
from a review of the troops (Moore, i. 228).[745]

With the arrival of Washington in the middle of April, 1776, the
campaign may be said to have begun. His batteries soon sent the
few British ships in the harbor down to Sandy Hook, and Benjamin
Tupper, commanding the little American flotilla, tried to destroy the
lighthouse at that point, June 21.[746] Beside the official letters of
this time there are numerous private ones.[747]

Late in June and early in July Lord Howe's fleet arrived in the lower
harbor, and the troops were landed on Staten Island.[748]

The harbor of New York necessarily had more or less hydrographical
treatment in all the early plans. Before the outbreak of hostilities,
this may be seen, not only in the Des Barres series of maps, but in
the chart of 1764,[749] reproduced in Valentine's _Manual_ (1861, p.
597).[750] After the war began, we find several harbor maps worthy of
note.[751]

During June came the plot for assassinating Washington in New
York.[752] Washington was discouraged with the progress of the
recruiting. "Washington and Mercer's camps recruit with amazing
slowness", wrote Jefferson from Philadelphia, July 20th.[753] Mercer
commanded the Flying Camp of militia from Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
Maryland, which were hovering between the British and Philadelphia.[754]

Clinton's expeditionary force returned from Sullivan's Island Aug. 1st,
and the active campaign began when, three weeks later, Howe moved a
large part of his force across from Staten Island[755] to Gravesend,
on Long Island, Aug. 22d, Sir George Collier commanding the fleet
which covered the landing,[756] and the advance then began towards
the lines near Brooklyn which General Greene had had the charge of
constructing.[757]

Respecting the orders antecedent to and during the battle, those
of Washington are in Force; but Johnston adds to them from the
orderly-books.[758] Washington's own account can be found in his
letters to Congress, to Gov. Trumbull, to the Mass. Assembly,[759] and
he probably dictated the letter of Col. Harrison, his secretary, to
Congress.[760]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND, 1776.

Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress,
called _Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les
Rebelles_, etc.

KEY: "A, Le camp du Général Howe sur Staten Island à l'arrivée du
général de Heister avec la 1re division des troupes Hessoises le 22
d'Aoust, 1776. B, Le camp qu'on occupa sur Staten Island cette division
après du debarqué. C, L'endroit où les troupes debarquerent sur Long
Island. D, Camp du général Howe près de Gravesend. E, Camp du général
de Heister après la descente sur Long Island le 27 d'Aoust, 1776. F,
Marche de la colonne droite commandée par le général Clinton vers
Bedford dans la nuit du 26 au 27 Aoust. G, Marche de la colonne gauche,
commandée par le général Grant. H, Attaque de l'avant garde du général
Clinton du 27me Aoust. J, Où le général Clinton forma sa colonne pour
continuer l'attaque. K, Attaque du général Grant. L, Attaque du général
de Heister. M, Les lignes des enemis à Brooklin. N, Corps détachés de
l'enemis hors de ses lignes. O, Les redoutes de l'enemis à Readhook. Q,
Les redoutes à Gouverneur island."

The lines (·—·—) represent roads. The blocks, half-black and
half-white, are the Americans; those divided diagonally are the
Hessians; the solid black are the British.

A Hessian officer's map, obtained from Brunswick, and showing Ratzer's
topography, is given in fac-simile in Field's monograph (p. 310), and a
German map of Long Island is given in the _Geographische Belustigungen_
(Leipzig, 1776). There is a somewhat coarse-colored map among the
Rochambeau maps (no. 25), measuring fifteen inches wide by eighteen
high, called _Attaque de l'armée des Provinciaux dans Long Island du 27
Août, 1776_. _Publié, 1776._ A MS. "Plan of the Attack of the Rebels
on Long Island by an officer of the army" is among the Faden maps (no.
56) in the library of Congress. The map used in Stedman is re-engraved,
with additions, in Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed., ii. 309.]

[Illustration: LONG ISLAND, AUGUST, 27, 1776.

Sketched from a large _Plan of the Battle of Long Island and of the
Brooklyn defences, Aug. 27, 1776, compiled by Henry P. Johnston_,
which accompanies his _Campaign of 1776_, and is based, as he says, on
Ratzer's map of Brooklyn (1767-68) and the United States coast survey.
Before daylight on the morning of the 27th, the British advance under
General Grant disturbed the American pickets at the Red Lion, which
is near the westerly angle of the present Greenwood Cemetery area,
marked on the plan with a dotted line. As the day wore on, the conflict
pressed between the British at P and Q and the Americans under Stirling
and Parsons at O and N,—Smallwood's Marylanders holding the extreme
right on the water, and Huntington's Connecticut regiment on the
extreme left. Johnston (p. 165) says Stirling's position was between
18th and 20th streets of the modern Brooklyn, and not as Sparks's map
places him, near the Narrows. Meanwhile, a British column at 9 o'clock
the previous evening had begun to move from Flatlands, and at 3 the
next morning captured an American patrol at B, and at 6 the British
column (marching in this order,—Clinton, Cornwallis, Percy, Howe)
neared the American advance under Miles at C, who retired; and at 9
A. M. the British column was at Bedford and threw out a force to M,
which began to attack the American outposts of D (Miles), E (Wyley),
and F (Chester), forcing them to retire upon Sullivan, who commanded
the forces of Johnston (H), Hitchcock (J), and Little (G), with pickets
at K,—all within or near the present limits of Prospect Park, shown
by the dotted line. Threatened by the British flanking column as well
as by the Hessians in front, approaching from Flatbush under Heister
with the commands of Von Stirn (S), Von Mirbach (T), and Donop (U),
the Americans, after the capture of Sullivan himself, retreated as
best they could across the creek and got within the lines. The column
of the British advancing from Bedford threw out a force under Vaughan
towards L to menace Fort Putnam and that part of the American works,
while Cornwallis advancing towards R had a conflict there round the
Cortelyou house at 11.30 A. M. with Stirling, who was trying to check
this rear attack of the British, while such of his troops as could be
controlled retreated from N and O, and, passing the marsh, crossed
the creek (half a dozen or so being drowned), and reached dry land
near some redoubts within the American line of defence. The point A
represents the position of the present City Hall of Brooklyn. Stirling,
meanwhile, with Smallwood's Marylanders in danger of being crushed
between Cornwallis and Grant, and foiled in the attempt to reach Fort
Box, retreated towards Flatbush, but encountered in that direction Gen.
Heister's Hessians, and gave himself up to that officer.

T. W. Field in his monograph, the _Battle of Long Island_, gives a
large plan showing the relations of the modern streets to the old
landmarks, and marking "the natural defensible line, as nearly as it
could be authenticated by documentary and traditionary evidence."
Field adds that "the routes of the British were generally over country
roads long since abandoned, and now covered with buildings; but their
localities were accurately surveyed by the author before their traces
were lost." Field also says (p. 145) that the American works were at
once levelled by the British, and new ones were erected on interior
lines. (Cf. G. W. Greene's _General Greene_, i. 159.) These latter
lines are shown, as well as the earlier American works, in a _Map of
Brooklyn at the time of the Revolution_, drawn by Gen. Jeremiah Johnson
(Valentine's _Manual_, 1858). A rude map by J. Ewing, made Sept., 1776,
is given in fac-simile in Johnston's _Campaign of 1776_ (Documents, p.
50) and in 2d ser. _Penna. Archives_, x. 194. Dr. Stiles made a rough
plan in his diary, which he based upon a map of the ground and upon the
information given him by one who was at Red Hook at the time. It is
given in fac-simile by Johnston (p. 70).

The plan in Carrington's _Battles_ (p. 214) is extended enough to
illustrate the movements after the British occupation of New York;
that in H. R. Stiles's _Brooklyn_ (vol. i. 250) is an eclectic one,
made with care, and his text attempts to identify the position of the
lines and forts in relation to present landmarks. Gordon acknowledges
receiving from Greene a map improved by that general (_Hist. Mag._,
xiii. 25).

There are other plans in Marshall's _Washington_ (large and small
atlas); Sparks's _Washington_, iv. 68, repeated in Duer's _Stirling_
(p. 162); Guizot's _Washington_; Samuel Ward's lecture on the battle,
1839; J. T. Bailey's _Hist. Sketch of Brooklyn_ (Brooklyn, 1840); W.
L. Stone's _New York City_, p. 246; Henry Onderdonk, Jr.'s _Queens
County_, and _Suffolk and Kings Counties_; Ridpath's _United States_;
Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 806, 809, 810; Lowell's _Hessians_;
_Harper's Monthly_, Aug., 1876. Ratzer's map of Brooklyn is reproduced
in Stiles's _Brooklyn_ (i. 63), with a view of the same date (p. 217).
Cf. map in Valentine's _N. Y. Manual_ (1856). Cf. the bibliography
of Long Island in _Amer. Bibliopolist_, Oct., 1872, and in Furman's
_Antiquities of Long Island_, App.]

Sullivan's letter is in effect a defence of himself,[761] and other
letters from participants and observers are preserved,[762] as well as
journals of actors on the field,[763] and other personal recitals,[764]
and narratives in the public press.[765] On the British side we have
Howe's despatch[766] of Sept. 3, with the comments and inquiry which
it elicited,[767] and the report and journals of Sir George Collier,
in command of the fleet.[768] In addition we have a number of personal
experiences and accounts of eye-witnesses,[769] as well as statements
from the German participants.[770]

The circumstances of the battle and retreat have occasioned some
controversy, in which Bancroft has been criticised by the grandsons of
Gen. Greene[771] and Joseph Reed.[772]

Respecting the armies on both sides and their losses, there is ground
for dispute. It is claimed that the British had about double the
numbers of the Americans, and the losses of killed and wounded were
about equal on both sides, though the Americans also lost heavily in
prisoners.[773] But on this point see the preceding chapter.

Without enumerating at length the treatment of the general
histories,[774] and the biographies of participants,[775] the battle
of Long Island has had much special local[776] and monographic
treatment, particularly at the hands of Field, Johnston, Dawson, and
Carrington.[777] On the English side we have contemporary and later
examples of historical treatment.[778] It was the first substantial
victory for the royal arms, and had little of the disheartening
influence which the forcing of the redoubt at Bunker Hill had brought
with it. The effect was correspondingly inspiriting to the Tories in
America and to the government party in England.[779]

       *       *       *       *       *

In transferring the scene across the river to New York, it is best
in the first place to trace the topography of the town and island by
the maps of the period, and to follow the cartographical records of
the military movements during the campaign, before classifying the
authorities.

John Hill's large plan of New York, extending as far north as
Thirty-fourth Street, surveyed in 1782, and dedicated to Gov. George
Clinton, was drawn in 1785.[780] He marks all the works of the
Revolution,—coloring yellow those thrown up by the Americans in
1776; orange, those of the Americans which the British repaired; and
green, those later erected by the royal forces. Johnston's map[781]
adopts these yellow lines. Loosing (_Field-Book_, ii. 593, 799), in
describing the New York lines, differs somewhat from Hill's map.
Johnston controverts Jones and De Lancey (Jones's _New York during the
Revolutionary War_), who claim that the American lines were levelled by
the British; he also cites Smythe, who described them in March, 1777,
as was also done by Thomas Eddis in Aug., 1777,[782] and by Anburey
in 1781, and he depends on Hill's draft of them in 1782. Johnston (p.
36) also describes the appearance of the town at the opening of the
war.[783] Johnston (p. 194) claims that his eclectic map is the first
to give the entire island as it was in 1776. He followed the surveys
of Ratzer and Montresor as far north as Fiftieth Street, and from that
point to Kingsbridge he used the map of 1814, made by Randall for the
commissioners to lay out streets. The annexed sketch of Johnston's map
shows the fortifications surrounding the town of New York.

[Illustration: PART OF RATZER'S SMALLER MAP OF NEW YORK CITY.

The following key explains the figures: 1, Fort George; 2, Trinity
Church; 5, Old Dutch Church; 6, New Eng. Dutch Church; 8, Presbyterian
meeting; 10, French Church; 11, Lutheran Church; 13, Calvinist Church;
16, New Scots' meeting; 17, Quakers' meeting; 18, Jews' synagogue;
20, Free English School; 21, Secretary's office; 22, City Hall; 25,
Exchange; 26, Barracks; 27, Fish Market; 28, Old slip; 31, Oswego
Market.

This is the best contemporary map on a large scale of the city of New
York. It is dedicated to Gov. Moore, and made after surveys by Lieut.
B. Ratzer in 1767. The whole map is given in Valentine's _Manual_,
1854; Dawson's _New York City during the Amer. Rev._ (1861); Jones's
_N. Y. during the Rev. War_, i. 388. There is an original in Harvard
College library. Cf. _Map Catal. Brit. Mus._, 1885, col. 2972. It was
reissued in 1776 and 1777. Cf. Lamb's _New York_, i. 757, 760. This
map of the town is a different one from Ratzer's map of the city and
vicinity, which has at the bottom a southwest view of the town.

Thomas Kitchen, the English cartographer, published a map, after
Ratzer's surveys, of New York city and vicinity in the _London Mag._,
1778. It has been reproduced in Shannon's _N. Y. City Manual_, 1869,
and in the _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, 1885, p. 549.

_A Plan of the City of New York and its Environs_, "surveyed in the
winter of 1766", and dedicated to Gen. Gage by John Montresor, is given
in Jefferys' _General Topog. of North America and the West Indies_
(London, 1768). Another form of it, purporting to be a later work, is
the large folding _Plan of the City of New York and its environs, ...
surveyed in the winter, 1775_, also dedicated to Gen. Gage by John
Montresor, and published in London. It has been reproduced in D. T.
Valentine's _N. Y. City Manual_, 1855, p. 482. It has a corner chart of
the bay from Hoboken to Sandy Hook. Cf. the _American Atlas_, nos. 20
and 25. Montresor's plan was reproduced in Paris by Le Rouge in 1777.

Major Holland, the British surveyor-general, made a plan of the city
of New York, which appeared separately and as a part of his _Map of
New York and New Jersey_ (1776). Cf. Valentine's _Manual_, 1863, p.
533, and the small plan of New York and vicinity, eight miles to an
inch, which is given in _New York City in the Revolution_ (1861). A
plan of part of the city made in 1771 is given in Valentine's _Manual_,
1856, p. 426. There are among the Rochambeau maps several plans of New
York and its environs, rather coarse and faded (nos. 26, 27, 28, 31).
Contemporary printed maps are in Gaine's _Universal Register_ (N. Y.,
1776) and in the _Universal Mag._, 1776.

A survey of the region of Turtle Bay in 1771 is given in Valentine's
_Manual_, 1860, p. 572, and a view at a later day in _Ibid._, 1858,
p. 600. A MS. plan of Fort George (New York) by Sauthier is among the
Faden maps (no. 95) in the library of Congress.]

Howe was much criticised for his dilatoriness and his failure promptly
to use his fleet to get in the rear of Washington's army.[784] There
was a division of counsels among Washington's officers as to the
advisability of attempting to hold the city; but a decision to evacuate
finally prevailed.[785] Washington's army was gradually dwindling,
for Congress and the country had hardly reached a conception of the
necessity of long enlistments.[786] Finally on Sept. 15th the British
passed over from Long Island to Kip's Bay, and the Americans fled in
a panic;[787] and, with loss of many stores, Washington gathered his
forces within the Harlem lines. Johnston's draft of the works on Harlem
Heights follows Sauthier's plan. The site of the fight thereabouts is
west of Eighth Avenue and north of One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Street
of the modern city. Johnston (p. 258) identifies the localities by the
present landmarks, and says (p.264) that "some of the works are well
preserved to-day" (1878). He also says that Randall, when he surveyed
the island in 1812, found the remains of the works agreeing with
Sauthier's drafts.[788]

Sauthier's draft of the conflict at Harlem Plains is reproduced in
the _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, May, 1880. Later plans of the locality,
drawn with reference to the landmarks of the battle, or interesting
for comparison, are the map of 1814 in Valentine's _Manual_ (1856) and
the large folding plan of the upper part of New York, with the modern
streets, upon which, in colors, is superposed a draft of this action.
This last is given, with an account of the fight, in Shannon's _N. Y.
City Manual_, 1868, p. 812.[789] We may note some of the principal
contemporary and later authorities on this action of Harlem Plains.[790]

The origin of the fire of Sept. 21st, by which a considerable part of
New York was burned, has been a subject of dispute, the Tories charging
it upon the Americans;[791] but later authorities, English as well as
American, agree in not believing it the work of incendiaries. It is
known that Washington advocated the burning of the city if evacuation
became necessary, and Jones (i. p. 84) says committees of Congress had
agreed upon it, but that body certainly in the end directed Washington
to spare it (_Journals_, Sept. 3, 1776).[792]

[Illustration: JOHNSTON'S NEW YORK ISLAND, 1776.

A marks the position of Trinity Church; B, the City Hall Park; C,
the Mortier house, the American headquarters; D, Badlam's fort; E,
Spencer's fort; F, the redoubt on Jones's hill; G, Bayard Hill fort; H,
Hospital. Fort Stirling, in Brooklyn, is at K. The figures represent
the batteries and redoubts: 1, Grand battery; 2, Whitehall battery;
3, Waterbury's battery; 4, redoubts; 5, Grenadier battery; 6, Jersey
battery; 7, McDougal's battery; 8, Oyster (?) battery. The other marks
indicate the positions of barricades.

When the British, leaving Newtown Creek, on Long Island, landed at
Kip's Bay, the shore batteries thereabouts were abandoned by the
Americans. Scott, at L, retreated by the broken line (— — —), and
crossed along Bowery Lane, the ground now covered by Union and Madison
squares (shown by the dotted oblongs). Wadsworth and Douglas retreated
from M and N respectively, back upon Parsons at P and Fellows at Q,
and all pursued the Bloomingdale road, just skirting the southwesterly
corner of the area now known as Central Park (the large dotted oblong
E E). Meanwhile, the garrison of the town lines, under Putnam and
Silliman, retreated by the road leading from Fort G towards Greenwich;
and near Bloomingdale the several columns joined and pursued their
march to the lines on the heights above Harlem. Parton (_Life of Burr_,
86) describes how Burr at this time led Knox's brigade successfully
away from Bunker Hill. Howe, who had advanced from Kip's Bay, dallied
at the Murray house at O, and so failed to intercept the fugitives.
Chester (R) and Sargeant (S) also deserted the works at Horn's Hook,
and, striking the Kingsbridge or post read, retreated through McGowan's
Pass at T. Thus all, by one road or another, got within the lines on
Harlem Heights. Farther on in the text this map will be again referred
to, for later movements. Cf. map in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii.
491.]

[Illustration: THE SAUTHIER-FADEN PLAN, 1776.]

The movement of Howe, which now forced Washington off New York Island
and to a position at White Plains, is illustrated by a sketch of the
"Sauthier-Faden plan", herewith given, and which may be explained
by the annexed note[793] in connection with the special original
sources,[794] and later historians.[795]

The reader may now revert to two outline maps already given, namely
_Johnston's New York Island_ and the _Sauthier-Faden plan_, in order to
follow the movements which led to the fall of Fort Washington, using
the annexed descriptive key;[796] but the outline of the original
sources of the fall of Fort Washington, as well as the later accounts,
are much the same as for the earlier events of the campaign.[797]

[Illustration: FORT WASHINGTON AND DEPENDENCIES.]

[Illustration:

A part of the map made by Claude Joseph Sauthier in 1774, by order of
Gov. Tryon, and published by William Faden in London, Jan. 1, 1779, as
a _Chorographical Map of the Province of New York in North America,
Compiled from actual surveys deposited in the Patent Office at New
York_. This section is reproduced from a reduction made in 1849 by
David Vaughan, and published in the _Doc. Hist. N. Y._, vol. i., where
Tryon's report on the province in 1774 is printed. There is a copy of
the original in Harvard College library (portfolio 3520). It was the
basis of the map _Carte des troubles de l'Amérique, par ordre du Chev.
Tryon, par Sauthier et Ratzer, traduite de l'Anglais, à Paris, chez
Le Rouge_, 1778, which is included in the _Atlas Amériquain_, no. 15.
It was also followed in maps published at Augsburg in 1777, and at
Nuremberg, 1778. There is another _Special Karte von den Brittischen
Colonien in Nord America_, showing the New England and Middle colonies,
published in Christian Leiste's _Beschreibung des Brittischen Amerika
zur Ersparung der Englischen Karten_, Wolfenbüttel, 1778. An English
map with a Swedish title, _Krigs Theatre in America_, is found in the
_Beskrifning öfver de Engelska Colonierne i Nord America, 1776-1777_
(Stockholm, 1777). Sauthier's surveys also appear in _A map of the
province of New York by Sauthier, to which is added New Jersey from
the topographical observations of Sauthier and Ratzer_, 1776. Cf.
also _A map of the provinces of New York and New Jersey ... from the
topographical observations of Sauthier_, Lotter, 1777 (_Brit. Mus.
Maps_, 1885, col. 3,666).

Sauthier's drafts may be compared with _A map of the province of New
York with part of Pensilvania and New England from an actual survey by
Captain Montresor, engineer, 1775_, which was published in London, June
10, 1775, by A. Dury, making four sheets, and was republished "with
great improvements", April 1, 1777 (_Brit. Mus. Map Catal._, 1885, col.
2,969). It was reëngraved in Paris and published in 1777 by Le Rouge,
separately, and as nos. 13 and 14 of the _Atlas Amériquain_ in 1778.
Ithiel Town, in the preface of his _Particular services_, etc.,—now
a scarce book, as only seventy copies escaped a fire,—speaks of his
having obtained from a family near London maps of the American war,
mostly about Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, made by Montresor,
which were submitted to Marshall. There is a portrait and account of
Montresor in Scull's _Evelyns in America_, 251.

Another important map is _The Provinces of New York and New Jersey with
part of Pensilvania and the province of Quebec, drawn by Major Holland,
Surveyor-General of the northern district in America, corrected and
improved from the original materials by Govern^r, Pownall, Member of
Parliament_. It was first published in London, June 15, 1775, and in a
second edition, in 1776, there were added to it marginal maps of Amboy
and the city and bay of New York. The _Brit. Mus. Map_, 1885, col.
2,969, shows the plates with different titles, dated 1775, 1776; also
Frankfort, 1777, and London, 1777. Cf. the map in Mills's _Boundaries
of Ontario_; the Evans map as reproduced by Jefferys, 1775 (see Vol.
V. p. 85); the map in the _American Atlas_, and that of the country
from the Chesapeake to the Connecticut, in the _Gent. Mag._, September,
1776.]

The letters of Washington and Greene are still the main source
of information for the evacuation of Fort Lee, which at once
followed.[798]

It may be well now to note some of the contemporary maps of the whole
campaign, as indicating the extent and character of the geographical
knowledge then current. The earliest of these is one which appeared
in the supplement (p. 607) of the _Gentleman's Magazine_, 1776, and
is called a _Map of the Progress of his Majesty's Armies_. Two of the
American household manuals, _Low's Almanac_ (1776) and _Isaac Warren's
Almanac_ (1777), had the same rude cut, a fac-simile of which, with the
key, is shown below.

[Illustration: LOW'S ALMANAC, 1777.

KEY: A, Gen. Washington's lines on New York Island; B, fort at Powles
Hook; C, Bunker Hill, near New York; D, the Sound; E, Kingsbridge; F,
Hell Gate; G, Fort Constitution [Washington]; H, Mount Washington; I,
Governor's Island.]

A popular map (price one shilling) of _The Country twenty-five miles
round New York, drawn by a gentleman from that City_, was also
published in London, Jan. 1, 1777, by W. Hawkes, with a chronological
table of events from Dec. 16, 1773, to Oct. 18, 1776.

Des Barres issued in London, Jan. 17, 1777, a large map, _Plan of the
operations of the army and fleet of Admiral and Lord Howe near New
York, 1776_,[799] and a more popular presentation of the same field was
made in the _Political Mag._, vol. ii. p. 657. The earliest attempt
at historical rendering, Capt. Hall's _History of the Civil War in
America_ (London, 1780), was accompanied by a map, a portion of which
is here given in fac-simile; and Gordon (ii. 310), a few years later,
gave an eclectic map, made in the main from American data.[800]

[Illustration: NEW YORK AND VICINITY.

(_Political Mag._)]

[Illustration: CAMPAIGN OF 1776. (_Hall._)

A, the landing of the British near Utrecht on Long Island, under cover
of the "Phœnix", "Rose", and "Greyhound", with the "Thunder" and
"Carcass" bombs, Aug. 22, 1776; B, pass at Flatbush and field of action
where the rebels were defeated, Aug. 27th; C, British and Hessian
encampment, Aug. 28th; D, encampments of the British army, Sept. 1st;
E, embarkation of the British troops at Newtown Inlet, and then landing
at New York Island, Sept. 15th; F, skirmish on Vanderwater's Height,
the rebels retiring, Sept. 16th; G, route of British in boats to Frog's
Neck, Oct. 12th; H, several corps of British troops in boats go to
Pell's Point, Oct. 18th; I, skirmish, rebels routed, Oct. 18th. Then
followed fighting at Mararo Neck (shown on the full map), the rebels
retreating, Oct. 21st; on the road to Kingsbridge, Oct. 23d; again
approaching White Plains, Oct. 28th; at Brunx's River, Oct. 28th;
followed Nov. 1st by the rebel evacuation of their intrenchments near
White Plains, and by Cornwallis's landing on the Jersey shore, Nov.
18th. Q, attack on Fort Washington, Nov. 16th; R, Fort Lee surprised,
Nov. 20th.]

In giving detailed references for the several stages of the campaign,
the letters from and to Washington have been a source of the first
importance; and beside those given by Sparks in his printed works,
there are others registered in the _Sparks MSS._ (no. xxix.), the
_Heath Papers_ (_Mass. Hist. Coll._, xliv.), not to name less important
gatherings,[801] all of which form a general running commentary on
events of the summer's and autumn's campaign, which could be further
elucidated by the memoirs of Heath and Graydon, the lives of Reed and
Greene, and by various diaries on both sides.[802]

[Illustration: CAMPAIGN ABOVE NEW YORK, 1776.

A section of a large Hessian map in the library of Congress, _Plan
général des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles_,
etc. The lines (·—·—) represent roads. KEY: "3, Marche du général de
Heister et le camp qu'il occupa le 14^{me} Juin.—-S, Les batteries
faites à Remsen's Mill à Hell Gate. T, Lieu du rendezvous donné aux
troupes destinées à faire une descente sur York islande. U, Les
vaisseaux de guerre postes pour proteger cette descente. V, Descente
de l'armée sur York island. W, Position d'une partie de la première
division après la descente. Y, Redoutes de l'armée devant son camp.
Z, Où le général Howe, après avoir laissé le général Percy sur York
island, debarqua et campa avec le général de Heister le 12^{me} Oct.,
1776.—_a_, Descente du général Clinton à Pell's point le 18 Oct. _b_,
Camp de l'armée depuis New Rochelle jusqu'à Pell's Point. _c_, Camp du
général de Knyphausen après son arrivée avec la 2^{de} division des
Troupes Hessoises le 23^{me} Oct. _d_, Marche de la colonne droite
sous les ordres du général Clinton. _e_, Celle de la colonne gauche
commandée par le général de Heister. _f_, Engagement du général de
Heister avec l'enemis aux environs de White Plains [apparently not on
the original map]. _g_, Position de l'enemis après sa retraite. _h_,
Position de l'armée. _i_, Position des généraux Clinton et Heister
à Dobbs' Ferry. _k_, Position de général Cornwallis à Courtland
House. _m_, Campement de toute l'armée après que pleusieurs regiments
laissés dans differents endroits par le général de Knyphausen l'eurent
rejoints. _n_, La colonne droite du général de Knyphausen sous les
ordres du Colonel Rall. _o_, Où le général Cornwallis se placa pour
soutenir l'attaque du Fort Washington. _p_, Corps commandé par le
général Matheu. _q_, Descente des troupes Angloises. _r_, Attaque du
général Sterling vis-a-vis de Morris House. _s_, Batteries faites pour
soutenir l'attaque. _t_, Batteries construites de l'autre coté du creek
d'Harlem. _u_, Le fort du Washington avec ses lignes de defences. _v_,
Attaque du général Percy."

There is among the Rochambeau maps (no. 24), measuring about 16 inches
wide by 18 high, a map of the campaigns of 1776 and 1777, giving detail
with considerable precision, and accompanied by a good key.]


=II.= THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1776-1777.—Gates had taken command
in Canada early in the summer of 1776, under instructions from
Washington;[803] but as his army fell back within the department which
had been assigned to Schuyler, questions of authority arose between
them.[804]

The condition of the army during the summer is noted in Colonel
Trumbull's _Autobiography_ (p. 302), and in General Gates's returns of
September 22, 1776, in 5 _Force's American Archives_ (ii. 479).[805]

There is a list of armed vessels on Lake Champlain in 1776 in _Letters
and Papers_, 1761-1776 (MSS. in Mass. Hist. Soc.). Arnold received his
instructions from Gates.[806]

Arnold's reports on the fight near Valcour's Island, Oct., 1776, are
dated Oct. 12 (to Gates) and Oct. 15 (to Schuyler).[807]

Waterbury's account to Congress, Oct. 24, is in Dawson (i. p. 173) and
in _Hadden's Journal_ (App.). Gen. Maxwell gave no very flattering
account of Arnold's manœuvres in a letter from Ticonderoga, Oct. 20, in
Sedgwick's _Livingston_ (p. 209).[808]

On the English side, Carleton's despatch, Oct. 14, and Capt. Pringle's,
are in Dawson (pp. 174, 175). The Hanau artillerist Pausch covers the
fight in his journal.[809]

[Illustration: ARNOLD'S FIGHT. (_Sparks's copy._)

KEY: A, schooner "Carleton." B, the "Royal Savage" on shore, and burnt
on the 11th of October. C, the "Inflexible." D, schooner "Maria." E,
gondola "Royal Convert. F, radeau Thunderer." G, Point au Sable is
forty-eight miles from Crown Point. H, The French vessels sunk here in
1759.

The map of the action accompanying _Hadden's Journal_ (p. 23) is very
similar to the Sparks map; and a marginal note says that the gunboats
are from 30 to 36 feet long, and 10, 16, or 18 feet wide. Gen. Rogers
thinks Hadden's map is based on Brassier, whose amended plate is in
the _American Pocket Atlas_ (1776). Rogers objects to the view that
Arnold's retreat was round the north end of Valcour's Island (instead
of the route marked on the map), as has been maintained by Palmer in
his _Lake Champlain_, and by W. C. Watson in the _Amer. Hist. Record_
(iii. 438, 501) and _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ (June, 1881, vol. vi. p.
414).]

The earliest plan of this naval action seems to have been added to the
then recently published plate of Lake Champlain, engraved after surveys
by William Brassier, by order of Amherst, in 1762,[810] which, with
Jackson's survey of Lake George, was published by Sayer and Bennett,
in London, Aug. 5, 1776. Some copies of the map with the same date
show the position of Arnold's fight of Oct. 11. The plate has been
altered at that point, and it is this section of the map which Lossing
copies in his _Field-Book_[811] (i. 163) and in his paper in _Harper's
Monthly_ (vol. xxiii. p. 726). The annexed sketch is based upon a plan
in the Sparks maps (Cornell University), kindly transmitted to the
editor by the librarian.[812]

       *       *       *       *       *

In the winter of 1776-77, Burgoyne had submitted to the government
some "Thoughts for conducting the war from the side of Canada",—a
paper which, barring some important changes, became the scheme of the
summer's plans.[813]

The stages of the preparation in Canada can be followed in _Force's
American Archives_; and references will be found in the _Index to MSS.
in the British Museum_ (particularly under "Canada" and "Burgoyne", in
those acquired 1854-1875).[814]

The records of the Germans are mentioned in Lowell's _Hessians_ (p.
117), and in the sources indicated by Mr. Lowell in another chapter of
the present volume[815]

In the spring of 1777 St. Clair was designated for the command at
Ticonderoga, the advanced post against the invasion of Burgoyne (_St.
Clair Papers_). The light-headed Sullivan thought it unfair that he
was not selected for the post (_Correspondence of the Rev._, i. 352).
The British onset was appalling. James Lovell, in March, wrote, "It
is plain that we must look forward for another summer's bloody work"
(_Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._, April, 1860, p. 9). Congress was emphasizing
the stories of British brutality (_Journals of Congress_, ii. 97).

On May 22d Schuyler had been confirmed in his command of the Northern
department, and Gates had gone to Philadelphia to lay his grievances
before Congress (Lossing's _Schuyler_, ii.; Irving's _Washington_,
iii.). Burgoyne (Fonblanque, App. E) was talking to his Indians in
June, and two days later he made his famous proclamation to frighten or
allure the country people. Fonblanque (p. 23) is not unmindful of its
unworthy bombast, and Lecky (vi. 64) says it was "greatly and justly
blamed."[816]

There will be occasion later to enumerate the maps illustrating the
successive stages and conflicts of the campaign; but it may be well
at this point to append in a note the principal maps of the entire
movement of the British army, which cover also the field of its actions
on both flanks.[817]

The most important source respecting the siege and evacuation of
Ticonderoga is the _Proceedings of a General Court Martial, held at
Whiteplains, N. Y., for the trial of Maj.-Gen. St. Clair, Aug. 25,
1778_ (Philad., 1778).[818] It was reprinted in the _Collections_ of
the N. Y. Hist. Soc. in 1880. It includes various letters of Schuyler
and St. Clair in June (pp. 14, 101, 121, etc.), the doings of the
council of war, July 5th, which decided upon a retreat (p. 33), and the
letters of St. Clair at Ticonderoga, and one to Hancock, July 14th,
from Fort Edward (p. 69, etc.). Three days later, July 17th, St. Clair
sent an account from Fort Edward to Washington, which, with the letter
of Schuyler, likewise to Washington, is in Sparks's _Corresp. of the
Rev._, i. 393, 400.[819] Much of this material is also included in the
published _St. Clair Papers_.[820] Sparks had earlier added copies of
some of the St. Clair papers to his Collection of Manuscripts.[821]

On the English side, Burgoyne's letters are in Fonblanque's _Burgoyne_
(p. 248), _Gent. Mag._, Aug., 1777, and Dawson's _Battles_. Anburey's
_Travels_ (letter xxx.) throws some light.

For the effect of the evacuation on the country, see _Journals of
Congress_, iv. 719; Wells's _Sam. Adams_, ii. 485, 488; _Diplomatic
Correspondence of the Amer. Rev._, i. 315. The apprehension felt in the
adjacent country is shown in letters of Ira Allen and others in the _N.
H. State Papers_, viii. 632, 633, 643, 644, 648, 651.

We have some contemporary maps of Ticonderoga previous to and during
the siege. In August, 1776, Colonel John Trumbull made a plan which
is engraved in his _Autobiography_ (N. Y., 1841, p. 32),[822] and is
reproduced herewith.[823] The map used at the trial of St. Clair is
engraved in the _Proceedings_; and from a MS. copy made for Sparks, and
now at Cornell University, the annexed sketch (p. 353) is drawn.

On the affair at Hubbardton, July 7th, the official accounts of St.
Clair (July 14th) and Burgoyne (July 11th) are given in Dawson's
_Battles_ (i. 224, 229, 231), and other contemporary accounts in the
_Vermont Hist. Soc. Coll._, i. p. 168, etc.[824]

In Burgoyne's _State of the Expedition_ is a "plan of the action at
Huberton under Brig.-Gen. Fraser, supported by Maj.-Gen. Riedesel, on
the 7th July, 1777, drawn by P. Gerlach, engraved by Wm. Faden", and
published at London, Feb. 1, 1780.[825] Three days later, Burgoyne
(July 10) issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Vermont, and
Schuyler (July 13) made a counter proclamation.[826]

       *       *       *       *       *

The chief sources of documentary evidence regarding the movements in
1777 around Fort Stanwix are _5 Force's Archives_ (vols. i., ii.,
and iii.) and the Gansevoort Papers (copies in _Sparks MSS._, lx.),
including a letter of Arnold, August 22, 1777, dated at German Flats,
which Sparks has indorsed "evidently intended to be intercepted." On
the American side, we have further Colonel Willet's letter[827] to
Trumbull, Aug. 11th, in Dawson (i. 248); the account in the _Penna.
Evening Post_, given in Moore's _Diary_ (i. 477); Wilkinson's _Memoirs_
(pp. 204, 212); the _Journals of the New York Provincial Congress_
(vol. i.); and Sparks's _Corresp. of the Rev._ (ii. 578). Gordon gives
some details from eye-witnesses, mainly through reports made to him
by the Rev. Samuel Kirkland. Dwight picked up anecdotes about the
battlefield in 1799, which he prints in his _Travels_ (vol. iii.).
The best eclectic accounts are those by William L. Stone, father and
son,—the elder giving us his _Life of Brant_ (i. ch. 10 and 11), and
the younger, his _Orderly-book of Sir John Johnson during the Oriskany
campaign, 1776-1777, annotated by William L. Stone. With an historical
introduction illustrating the life of Sir John Johnson, by J. Watts
De Peyster. And some tracings from the footprints of the tories or
loyalists in America contributed by Theodorus Bailey Myers_ (Albany,
1882), being no. 11 of Munsell's historical series.[828] The younger
Stone's labors took a wider range in that portion of his _Campaign of
Lieutenant-Gen. John Burgoyne_ which is given to the expedition of St.
Leger, though he followed in the main his father's _Life of Brant_. In
the _Orderly-book_, just mentioned, however he modified some of his
views.

There is rather too much of patriotic fervor for a discriminating
analysis in a monograph, _The Battle of Oriskany, its place in History,
an address at the Centennial Celebration, Aug. 6, 1877, by Ellis H.
Roberts_ (Utica, 1877), but it is in most respects valuable and a
convenient gathering of information, not otherwise found without much
trouble, and is well fortified with notes.[829]

The principal English source is the account by St. Leger.[830]

To illustrate the movements near Fort Schuyler or Stanwix, we have
the plan made by Fleury in Sept., 1777, which is engraved in Stone's
_Life of Brant_, i. p. 230,—the essential portion of which is given
herewith.[831]

[Illustration: TICONDEROGA AND ITS DEPENDENCIES. AUGUST, 1776. J. T.
(_Trumbull's Plan._)]

[Illustration: TICONDEROGA, 1777. (_Sketched from the St. Clair trial
map._)

KEY: A, old fort in very bad condition, wanting repair; could not
be defended with less than 500 men. B, stone redoubt; about 200 men
would defend it; overlooketh the line Y, opposite the Lake, in Fort
Independence. C, block-house for 100 men. D, French redoubt upon the
low ground for about 200 men, commanded by the opposite side. E, new
breastwork for 200 men. F, new fleche for 100 men. G, new redoubt for
150 men. H, new redoubt for 100 men. I, redoubt upon the low ground
for 250 men, commanded by the opposite side. K, Jersey redoubt upon
the low ground for 300 men, commanded by the opposite side. L, redoubt
upon the low ground for 100 men. M, redoubt upon the low ground for
100 men. N, French lines upon the high ground; overlooks all the works
on Ticonderoga side; for 2,000 men and not less, considering the
great length and importance of the place. O, P, Q, R, new works in
addition to the French lines. S, high ground occupied by the enemy,
and overlooks the French lines. T, Mount Hope; overlooks ground, S,
occupied by the enemy. U, block-house burnt by the enemy. VV, high
hill; overlooks Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. X, the bridge [and
boom]. Y, line upon the low ground, commanded by the opposite side (B),
for 800 men. Z, barbet battery.

1, sloops. 2, line only marked upon the ground. 3, picket-fort for
600 men. 4, block-house for 100 men. 5, 6, line with three new-made
batteries for 1,500 men and not less. 7, block-house for 100 men. 8,
battery made by the enemy. 9, road made by the enemy to cut off the
communication from Mount Independence to Skenesborough.

The drawn plan in _Hadden's Journal_ (p. 83) speaks of the lines
protecting Fort Independence on the land side as being made "of logs
thrown up but not completed", from which a "path for cattle" led to
Hubbardton. Mount Defiance is called "Sugar Loaf Hill." The English
are represented as landing at the point marked "Camp", and the Germans
on the opposite shore. Gen. Phillips took the position on Mount Hope.
Lossing (_Field-Book_, i. 131) gives a view from the top of Mount
Defiance. A description of the fortifications about Ticonderoga, from
Riedesel's _Memoirs_, is in Stone's _Campaign of Burgoyne_ (p. 434).]

The position of the ground as shown by Fleury can be compared with
that of a _Topographical map of the country between the Mohawk River
and Wood Creek, from an actual survey taken in Nov., 1758_, which is
engraved from the original MS. (in the N. Y. State library) in the
_Doc. Hist. N. Y._ (quarto ed. iv. p. 324), where will also be found
(p. 327) a detailed plan of Fort Stanwix, as erected in 1758 (see Vol.
V., p. 528).[832]

       *       *       *       *       *

Respecting the action (Aug. 16th) at Bennington, General Lincoln sent
the first accounts to Schuyler, who transmitted them to Washington
(Sparks's _Corresp. of the Rev._, i. 425). Stark's letter to Gates, of
Aug. 22d, is in Wilkinson's _Memoirs_ (p. 209); _Vermont Hist. Coll._
(i. 206); Dawson's _Battles_ (i. 260). His letter of the same day to
the Council of New Hampshire is in the _N. H. State Papers_, viii. 670.
The papers of Stark were used by Sparks in copies in the _Sparks MSS._
(no. xxxix.).[833]

There is in the Gates Papers (copies in _Sparks MSS._, xx.) an "account
of the enemy's loss in the late action of the 16th Aug., 1777, near
Bennington",—amounting to 991 killed, wounded, and prisoners;
Hessians, Canadians, and Tories. American loss, killed, between twenty
and thirty; wounded, not known.[834]

Burgoyne's original instructions to Baum are in the cabinet of the
Mass. Hist. Soc.,[835] and are printed in their _Collections_ (vol.
ii.).[836]

Letters of Baum and Burgoyne, Riedesel's report to the Duke of
Brunswick, Breymann's report[837] to Burgoyne, and Burgoyne's reports
to Germain, are in the _Documents in relation to the part taken by
Vermont in resisting the invasion of Burgoyne_ (_Vt. Hist. Soc. Coll._,
vol. i. pp. 198, 223, 225); Dawson's _Battles_ (i. 261-264); Eelking's
_Riedesel_ (iii. 184, 210, 261). A long account by Glick, a German
officer, is also in the _Vt. Hist. Coll._ (i. 211). On the jealousy of
the British and Hessians, see a letter by Hagan in the _N. E. Hist.
and Geneal. Reg._ (1864, p. 33).[838] An account "by a gentleman who
was present" is copied from the _Penna. Evening Post_, Sept. 4th, in
Moore's _Diary of the Rev._ (p. 479). A narrative by the Rev. Mr.
Allen in the _Connecticut Courant_, Aug. 25th, is copied in Smith's
_Pittsfield, Mass._[839]

[Illustration: FORT STANWIX OR SCHUYLER.

KEY: A, Fort Schuyler. B, Flagstaff, 3 guns. C, Northwest, 4 guns.
D, Northeast, 3 guns. E, Southeast, 4 guns. F, Powder magazine. G,
Laboratory. H, Barracks. I, Hornwork begun. J, Drawbridge. K, Covered
way. L, Glacis. M, Sally-port. N, Commandant's quarters. O, Willett's
attack. The following are British batteries, etc. 1, three guns. 2,
four mortars. 3, three guns. 4, redoubts to cover the batteries. 5,
lines of approaches. 6, British encampment. 7, Loyalists. 8, Indians.
9, ruins of Fort Newport. There is a copy of the map made for Mr.
Sparks among the Sparks Maps at Cornell University.]

The local aspects of the fight are touched upon in Hall's and other
histories of Vermont,[840] and the general authorities necessarily
enlarge more or less upon it, as an episode.[841] At the first
anniversary of the Bennington fight, in 1778, a speech was made by Noah
Smith, which was printed at Hartford in 1779, and is reprinted in the
_Vermont Hist. Coll._ (i. p. 251). On Oct. 20, 1848, James D. Butler
gave an address before the Legislature of Vermont, which "contained
original testimonies of witnesses now long dead, and notes from papers
since burned in the Vermont State House." When printed at Burlington,
in 1849, it was accompanied by an address by George Frederick Houghton
on the life and services of Col. Seth Warner.[842] The centennial
observances of 1877 produced several memorials.[843]

Gen. Carrington (_Battles_, p. 334) gives one of the best plans of
the Bennington fight. There is among the _Sparks MSS._ (no. xxviii.)
a sketch map, with this indorsement by Mr. Sparks: "Drawn by Mr.
Hiland Hall, Bennington, Oct. 13, 1826. Very accurate. Ground examined
by myself at the time." It shows the Walloomsack River (a branch of
the Hoosick River) with the skirting road to Bennington, three times
crossing the river. On this road, going up stream, are marked (in
order) the beginning of the second action, the hill where the stand was
attempted, the places where Breyman was met by Warner, where the cannon
were posted in the first battle, and the line of Stark's advance.

In Burgoyne's _State of the Expedition_ is a plan called "Position of
the Detachment under Lieut.-Col. Baum, at Walmscook, near Bennington,
shewing the attacks of the enemy on the 16th of August, 1777, drawn by
Lieut. Durnford, engineer; engraved by Wm. Faden", and published at
London, Feb. 1, 1780.[844]

       *       *       *       *       *

Meanwhile Schuyler was gathering an army as best he could. In July
he wrote to Heath that its spirits were recovering (_Heath Papers_,
i. 300). The militia were called out early in August to assist him
(_Journals of Congress_, ii. 214). W. L. Stone tells the story of Moses
Harris, his faithful spy, in the _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ (ii. 414). The
discontent with Schuyler on the part of the politicians was beginning
to be shaped to party measures, and led to his being superseded in
August by Gates, while a battle was imminent, as Schuyler thought.[845]

Bancroft (vol. ix.) does not hold Schuyler free from the responsibility
of the ill success of the campaign up to this time; but he is
controverted by G. W. Schuyler in his _Correspondence and Remarks
upon Bancroft's History of the Northern Campaign_; by Lossing in his
_Schuyler_; and by J. W. De Peyster in the _Mag. of Amer. Hist._
(February, 1877, vol. i. 134).[846]

Burgoyne meanwhile (August 26) was writing to Germain that the campaign
was looking badly, and the loyalists not as helpful as he hoped. The
conflict which Schuyler thought impending took place September 19, and
is variously known as the battle of Freeman's Farm, or Stillwater, or
the first battle of Bemis's Heights. Gates had already appealed to
the Green Mountain boys for assistance, as the records of the Vermont
Council of Safety show (Stevens, _Bibl. Geog._, 1870, no. 693). Gen.
Glover's letters to James Warren during Aug. and Sept. are in the
_Sparks MSS._ (no. xlvii.) and in Upham's _Glover_, and his account
of the battle of the 19th is in _Essex Institute Hist. Coll._ (v. no.
3). Col. Varick's letter to Schuyler is in the _Sparks MSS._, lxvi.
Wilkinson gives the best account of any participant (i. ch. 6), and his
letter of Sept. 20 is in Dawson (i. 301). Gates's letter to Congress,
Sept. 22, is also in Dawson (i. 301). Gordon gives the American
loss.[847]

The question of Arnold's participancy in the battle of the 19th, while
the left wing—his own command—was engaged, has been the subject of
controversy.[848]

The attempt of an American force to cut Burgoyne's line of
communications by the lakes is described in the "Fight at Diamond
Island", Sept. 24, by De Costa, who gives the official report of Col.
Brown (_N. E. Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, 1872, p. 147). These evidences
come mainly from the Gates Papers, and are recapitulated in Stone's
_Campaign of Burgoyne_ (App. 10).

Respecting the action of Oct. 7, the earliest official accounts are
in Glover's letter of Oct. 9, and in Gates's to Congress, of Oct.
18,—both of which are reprinted by Dawson (i. 302, 303). James
Wilkinson's letter of Oct. 9 is in the New York Archives, with various
other letters of the campaign (_Sparks MSS._, no. xxix.). A letter of
Oliver Wolcott from Bemis's Heights is in the _Trumbull MSS._ (vol.
vii.). The lives of Arnold (by I. N. Arnold, ch. 10, etc.) indicate his
important influence on the field, where he was wounded.[849]

On the action of Col. Brooks in the field see _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proc._
(vii. 478). There is an account by Samuel Woodruff, an eye-witness, in
the appendix of _An account of Burgoyne's Campaign and the memorable
battles of Bemis's Heights, Sept. 19th, and October 7th, 1777, from
the most authentic resources of information, including many incidents
connected with the same_, by Charles Neilson (Albany, 1844).[850]

The story of Major Acland and Lady Acland has long been one of the
romantic episodes of the campaign. The family account is given by W. L.
Stone in the _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ 1877 (iv. 50), and Jan., 1880, and
in _Lippincott's Mag._, Oct., 1879.[851]

The various stages of the negotiations which resulted in what is
known as the "Convention" can be followed in the documents given in
Fonblanque (p. 306); Wilkinson's _Memoirs_ (pp. 304, 306, 317); Dawson
(i. 303); Stedman's _Amer. War_; Stone's _Campaign of Burgoyne_ (p.
102); and O'Callaghan's _Orderly-Book of Burgoyne_. The original
definitive articles are in the N. Y. Hist. Soc., and fac-similes of the
signatures are in Lossing's _Field-Book_ (i. 79).[852]

Wilkinson carried the news of the surrender to Congress (Wilkinson's
_Memoirs_; Wells's _Sam. Adams_, ii. 494). Gates describes his own
success to his wife (Moore's _Diary_, 511). Chaplain Smith gives some
details of the meeting of Gates and Burgoyne (_Chaplain Smith and the
Baptists_, p. 222). There are reminiscences in Surgeon Meyrick's letter
in Trumbull's _Autobiography_ (p. 301), and papers in _Pennsylvania
Archives_ (vol. v.). Recollections of Gen. Ebenezer Mattoon, an actor
in the scene as written out in 1835, are in the Appendix (no. 13) of
Stone's _Campaign of Burgoyne_. The comment of Wm. Whipple is in _N. H.
State Papers_, viii. 707. Burgoyne's letter from Albany, Oct. 20, to
Germain is in his _State of the Expedition_.[853]

De Lancey (App. p. 674, to Jones's _New York during the Rev._) collates
the authorities on the strength of the respective armies. Gates's
returns of his army (11,098) are in the Gates MSS. Burgoyne, in his
_State of the Expedition_, gives Gates's returns as 18,624,—the
difference may be the number of sick and furloughed men. Burgoyne
praised Gates's men after he had seen them (Fonblanque, 316). The
numbers of Burgoyne's army are given in Appendix D in Fonblanque.
The question is also examined in the App. of Stone's _Campaign of
Burgoyne_. Gordon (_Amer. Rev._, ii. 578) gives the number surrendered
at 5,791; but there is a great difference in the estimates. Alexander
Scammell makes it 10,611 in _Letters and Papers, 1777-80_ (Mass. Hist.
Soc. Cabinet). In the Stark MSS. is a table of Burgoyne's losses
(14,000), covering the whole campaign, and put into verse (_Sparks
MSS._, xxxix.).[854]

Respecting the campaign as a whole, the best contemporary accounts on
the American side are found in the official correspondence as embraced
in Sparks's _Washington_ (iv. 486, etc.) and _Correspondence of the
Revolution_ (vol. ii., App.), and in the letters of the commanding
generals.[855]

Various important letters are put in evidence in the _Proceedings of
the general court martial for the trial of Maj.-Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 1,
1778_ (Philad., 1778).[856]

An account of Alexander Bryan, Gates's chief scout, is in the App. of
Stone's _Campaign of Burgoyne_.

There are among the copies of the Lincoln Papers in the _Sparks MSS._
(xii.) various letters, etc., respecting the campaign against Burgoyne.
The earliest is one from Gen. Schuyler to Lincoln, dated at Saratoga,
July 31, 1777, and the last is one from Lincoln to Gov. Clinton,
Oct. 5, 1777, expressing anxiety lest Putnam should not be able to
resist Gen. Clinton, to whom Burgoyne in his straits was looking for
relief.[857] At a later day Lincoln wrote a long letter from Boston,
Feb. 5, 1781, to John Laurens, recounting his part in this campaign
from the time of Gates's taking command to the date of Lincoln's being
wounded, Oct. 8th (Sparks's _Corresp. of the Rev._, ii. 533).

Various letters of Henry Brockholst Livingston during the Northern
campaign of 1777 (June-Aug.), only parts of which are printed in
Sedgwick's _Livingston_, are among the papers of Gov. William
Livingston, which, when Sparks made his copies in 1832 (_Sparks MSS._,
lii., vol. iii.) were in the possession of Theodore Sedgwick, Jr. Other
letters will be found in the _Trumbull MSS._ (Mass. Hist. Soc.)[858]

The campaign of Burgoyne has necessarily made part of the labors of the
general historians. Gordon and Ramsay were among the earliest, on the
American, and Stedman (i. ch. 16) on the English side. Of the later
writers, Bancroft gives it three chapters (21, 22, 24) in his original
edition, and four in his final revision[859] (10, 11, 12, 13). Lowell
finds it an important section of his history of the German auxiliaries
(_Hessians_, p. 221, etc.). The lives of principal participants, like
Arnold, Lincoln, Gates, and Schuyler on the American side, cover it.

A recent life of Morgan, _The Hero of Cowpens_, by Rebecca McConkey
(N. Y., 1881), would claim for the Virginian the praise which is
usually given to Arnold. The general surveys of Marshall (iii. ch. 5)
and Irving (iii. ch. 9-22) brought it within the scope of their lives
of Washington; and J. C. Hamilton's _Republic of the United States_
includes it. Local aspects are treated in Dunlap's _New York_; Holden's
_Queensbury_ (p. 433); Hollister's _Connecticut_; Hinman's _Connecticut
during the Revolution_ (p. 112); and Mrs. Bonney's _Historical
Gleanings_ (i. 58). Robin's _New Travels_ (letter 12) gives the current
accounts prevailing a little later.

The earliest considerable monographic narrative was Charles Neilson's
_Original, Compiled and Corrected Account of Burgoyne's Campaign, and
the Memorable Battle of Bemis's Heights, September 19, and October 7,
1777, from the most Authentic Sources of Information_, etc. (Albany,
1844).

The most devoted chronicler of the campaign, however, is the younger
William L. Stone (b. 1835), who published _Reminiscences of Saratoga
and Ballston_ in 1875, an article on "Burgoyne in a new light" in _The
Galaxy_ (v. 78), and one on the campaign in _Harper's Monthly_ in 1877
(vol. lv. p. 673), and in the same year the most important work on the
subject yet produced, _The Campaign of Lieutenant-General John Burgoyne
and the Expedition of Lieutenant-Colonel Barry St. Leger_, which draws
from every important help to the study of the military movements which
had been so far brought to light. In the next year (1878), Mr. Stone
prepared the _Memoir of the Centennial Celebration of Burgoyne's
Surrender, Schuylerville, Oct. 17, 1875_. It included an historical
address by Mr. Stone himself, others by Horatio Seymour and George
William Curtis.[860]

The English later writers have been in the main fair in their
statements. Mahon (vi. 191), while praising the army of Gates, denies
him the merit of its successful conduct, giving it essentially to
Stark and Arnold. The American student finds little to question in
the unusually impartial narrative embodied in Edward Barrington De
Fonblanque's _Political and Military episodes in the latter half of the
Eighteenth Century, derived from the life and Correspondence of John
Burgoyne_ (London, 1776).[861]

On the German side the main sources are Max von Eelking's _Die
Deutschen Hülfstruppen im nord-amerikanischen Befreiungskriege,
1776-1783_ (Hannover, 1863,—2 vols.), who gives chapters 7 and
8 to this campaign; the same writer's _Leben und Wirken des
Herzoglich-Braunschweig'schen_ _General-lieutenants Friedrich Adolph
von Riedesel_ (Leipzig, 1856,—3 vols.) and _Generalin von Riedesel's
Berufs-Reise nach Amerika_ (Berlin, 1801), both of which Riedesel
memoirs have been translated by W. L. Stone.[862]

The succession of battles and movements preceding the final surrender
of Burgoyne have been well mapped.[863]

       *       *       *       *       *

[Illustration]

[Illustration

NOTE.—The main British map of the attack of Clinton and Montgomery
(Oct. 6, 1777) is one made by John Hills, and published in London by
Faden, Jan., 1784, a portion of which, showing the detail, is annexed.
The same map is used by Stedman (i. 362), and there is a reduction in
the _Catal. of Hist. MSS. rel. to the War of the Rev._ (Albany, 1868,
ii. 298), and in the illus. ed. of Irving's _Washington_, iii. 244.
Cf. also the maps in Sparks's _Washington_ (v. 92); _Harper's Mag._,
lii. 648; and in Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 166. Original MS. drafts,
showing the attack on the forts, made by Holland, by the Hessian
Wangenheim, and by others, are among the Faden maps (nos. 70-73) in
the library of Congress. Holland's surveys were followed in the plans
of Montgomery and Clinton (1777) by Lieut. John Knight, of the Royal
Navy.]

Respecting the diversion of Clinton in Burgoyne's favor, the letters of
Putnam, whose business it was to hold the passes of the Hudson against
the British, are in Sparks's _Washington_ (v. App. p. 471), and in his
_Correspondence of the Revolution_ (i. 438; ii. App. 536, etc.), and in
the _Western Reserve Hist. Soc. Tracts_, no. 46.[864] Dawson, beside
the despatch of Putnam to Washington on the capture, gives also George
Clinton's to Washington (i. 341, 342).[865] Contemporary American
accounts of the capture and of the burning of Kingston are in Moore's
_Diary_ (p. 506, 510); and a narrative, by G. W. Pratt, of the Kingston
episode is in the _Ulster Hist. Soc. Coll._ (i. 107).

[Illustration]

On the British side, Sir Henry Clinton's despatches are in _Almon's
Remembrancer_ (vol. v.), and that to Howe of Oct. 9th is in Dawson (i.
344), with one from Commodore Hotham to Howe (p. 346).[866]

The maps of the Hudson already enumerated are of use in the study of
this movement.[867] Plans of intended works (1776) and obstructions in
the river near Fort Montgomery are given in the _Calendar of Historical
MSS. relating to the War of the Rev._ (Albany, 1868, vol. i. 474,
616),[868] and a MS. plan of William A. Patterson, first lieutenant,
15th reg., April 22, 1776, is in the _Heath MSS._, i. 246 (Mass. Hist.
Soc.).

The correspondence of the committee of Congress with the commissioners
in France, regarding the effect of the surrender of Burgoyne, is in
_Diplomatic Correspondence_ (i. 338, 355). Cf. Stuart's _Jonathan
Trumbull_. Jonathan Loring Austin, dispatched by the Massachusetts
authorities, carried the first intelligence to France.[869] Schulenberg
wrote to the commissioners from Berlin (_Diplom. Corresp._, ii. 120),
and Izard replied (_Ibid._, ii. 370).[870]

Burgoyne sailed from Rhode Island for England in April, 1778.[871] On
arriving, he had an early interview with Lord George Germain, but the
king refused to see him. He appeared in Parliament,[872] where he had
earlier been a firm but not bellicose upholder of the government,[873]
on May 21st, and on the 26th and 28th made speeches in his own defence,
which were published in London, June 16, 1778, as _The substance of
General Burgoyne's speeches, ... with an appendix containing Gen.
Washington's letter to Gen. Burgoyne_.[874]

The king, piqued at finding Burgoyne on the side of the opposition in
Parliament, ordered him to return to his imprisoned troops, and, rather
than go, the general resigned his civil and military offices, and
printed an explanation in _A letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to
his constituents, with the correspondence between the secretaries of
war and him, relative to his return to America_ (London, 1779).[875]

[Illustration: ATTACK ON CLINTON AND MONTGOMERY.

After the plan in Leake's _Life of Lamb_, p. 176. The legend in
northwest corner of the map reads by error "Halt of the _right_
[should be _left_] column." Other eclectic maps are given in Sparks's
_Washington_, v. 92; in Boynton's _West Point_; and in Carrington's
_Battles_, p. 362.]

Lord George Germain, or, as some have thought, Sir John Dalrymple,
published a _Reply to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's letter to his
constituents_[876] (London, 1779), pronouncing it a libel upon the
king's government, and this was seconded by an anonymous _Letter to
Lieutenant-General Burgoyne on his letter to his constituents_ (London,
1779).[877]

The further controversy over Burgoyne's failure includes the following
publications:—

_A brief examination of the plan and conduct of the Northern expedition
in America in 1777, and of the surrender of the army under the command
of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne_ (London, 1779),—a severe attack.[878]

_An Enquiry into and remarks upon the Conduct of Lieutenant-General
Burgoyne; the plan of operations for the campaign of 1777; the
instructions from the Secretary of State, and the circumstances that
led to the loss of the northern army_ (London, 1780).[879]

_Essay on modern martyrs, with a letter to General Burgoyne_ (London,
1780),[880]—charging him with being the personal cause of his own
misfortunes.

In addition, there were some publications reviewing the conduct of
Howe's as well as Burgoyne's campaigns in 1777, which will be noticed
in another place.

Burgoyne's main defence against all these charges appeared in his
_A State of the Expedition from Canada as laid before the House of
Commons, with a collection of Authentic Documents, and an addition
of many circumstances which were prevented from appearing before
the House by the Prorogation of Parliament, written and collated by
himself, with plans_ (London, 1780).[881] In his introduction Burgoyne
says, that, being denied a professional examination of his conduct,
and disappointed in a parliamentary one, he was induced to make this
publication.[882]

This publication was followed by _A Supplement to the State of the
Expedition from Canada, containing Gen. Burgoyne's Orders respecting
the Principal Movements and Operations of the Army to the Raising of
the Siege of Ticonderoga_ (London, 1780).[883]

Burgoyne was attacked in return in the following: _Remarks on General
Burgoyne's State of the Expedition from Canada_ (London, 1780),[884]
being a defence of the ministry, and holding that Burgoyne had
forfeited all claims to pity. _A letter to Lieutenant-General Burgoyne
occasioned by a second edition of his State of the Expedition, etc._
(London, 1780).[885] Fonblanque (ch. viii.) portrays the effect in
England of the parliamentary inquiry. Cf. Macknight's _Burke_ (ch. 30).
The Rev. Samuel Peters' reply to Burgoyne in the Appendix of Jones's
_New York during the Revolutionary War_ (vol. i. p. 683).

The _Centennial Celebrations of the State of New York_ (Albany, 1879)
gives the addresses of that period, by M. I. Townshend and John A.
Stevens.[886]



CHAPTER V.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DELAWARE.—PHILADELPHIA UNDER HOWE AND UNDER
ARNOLD.

BY FREDERICK D. STONE,

_Librarian of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania._


"THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the
sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of his
country, but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man
and woman."

So wrote Thomas Paine, December 19, 1776. The preceding month had been
fraught with adversity. The loss of Fort Washington on the 16th of
November had rendered Fort Lee useless, as with it alone the passage
of the river could not be obstructed. Its evacuation was immediately
ordered, and the ammunition and some of the guns were removed. Before
all could be taken away, however, the fort became the object of
the enemy's attention. On the night of the 19th, two columns under
Cornwallis, composed of British and Germans, with a detachment from
the fleet, in all about six thousand men, crossed the river and landed
at Closter dock, seven miles above Fort Lee, then commanded by General
Greene. The night was stormy, and the movement escaped the notice of
Greene's sentries. By morning the sailors had dragged the artillery
to the top of the Palisades, and everything was ready for an advance
upon the fort. Greene was informed of the landing of Cornwallis, and
immediately took steps to secure a retreat for his command, then
numbering about three thousand men. Word was sent to Washington, who
was at the village of Hackensack with the troops which he had brought
with him from White Plains. In three quarters of an hour the commanding
general was at Greene's side. Seeing that the fort was not tenable,
he ordered a retreat. No time was to be lost; and leaving the tents
standing, the kettles over the fires, and such stores as could not be
removed, the troops were hurried towards the advancing enemy with such
speed that they gained the road leading to the only bridge over the
Hackensack before Cornwallis could intercept them.

The situation of the Americans was now more precarious than it had
been at Fort Lee. They were in danger of being shut in between the
Hackensack and Passaic rivers; they were in a perfectly flat country,
without intrenching tools or camp equipage; their right flank could be
turned and their line of retreat threatened if the British should land
a force at the head of Newark Bay or at Amboy. Washington's forces were
greatly reduced by reverses and by desertions. Nearly all that were
left were militia of the flying camp, called out for an emergency, and
impatient to return home, as their time of service had nearly expired.
Small as his numbers were, Washington was obliged to post some at Amboy
and others at Brunswick, to protect his flanks. As those remaining
were insufficient to hinder the advance of the enemy in his front, he
ordered Lee, whom he had left in command on the east of the Hudson, to
cross that river and join him, and, with hardly three thousand men,
Washington began his retreat through the Jerseys.

On the 21st he was at Aquacknoc Bridge on the Passaic, and by the
23d at Newark. On the 28th he left Newark, the advance-guard of the
British entering the town as his rear-guard quitted it, and the next
day he arrived at Brunswick. Here an attempt would have been made to
prevent the enemy crossing the Raritan, but the stream was fordable in
a number of places. As the British approached, the Jersey and Maryland
brigades, whose terms of service expired that day, refused to stay an
hour longer, and as the British crossed the river the line of march
was again taken up for Trenton. This point was reached on the 2d of
December, two brigades having been left at Princeton, under Stirling,
to watch the enemy.

Having seen his stores and baggage safely over the Delaware, and being
reinforced by about twelve hundred militia from the neighborhood of
Philadelphia, Washington faced about on the 6th, with such men as were
fit for service, and set out to join Stirling at Princeton.

It had not been the intention of Howe, when he ordered Cornwallis over
the Hudson, to do more than take possession of and hold East Jersey,
and Cornwallis's orders did not permit him to go beyond Brunswick. But
the slight opposition which Washington was able to offer to the British
advance excited in Howe the hopes of capturing Philadelphia, and he
joined Cornwallis in person at Brunswick. After a short halt, he pushed
on towards Stirling at Princeton, and before Washington could reach
that general Stirling was in full retreat, to avoid being intercepted.
A retrograde movement was ordered, and by the 8th the American army was
on the west bank of the Delaware. The advance of Cornwallis's column
reached the river before the rear-guard of the Americans had landed
on the Pennsylvania side; but as Washington had secured all the boats
for a considerable distance above and below Trenton, his position
was comparatively a safe one. Here for a time he rested his men, and
urged upon Congress the necessity of raising additional troops, and
the importance of preparing for the defence of Philadelphia, as the
military stores were in that city.

In his retreat through the Jerseys, Washington was greatly embarrassed
by the conduct of General Charles Lee. The instructions he had given
Lee on the 17th of November to join him may have been discretionary,
but the language and frequency of his orders left no doubt of the
expectations of the commander-in-chief. But Lee chose to read the
orders in the light of his wishes. On the east of the Hudson he
had an independent command, which he purposed to retain as long as
he could. Schemes and suggestions that should have had no weight
were allowed to delay his passage over the river until December
2d, and then his advance was slow and hesitating. The prospect of
receiving reinforcements from the Northern army, which would make his
command equal to that of Washington, strengthened his wish to act
independently. He proposed, as soon as the troops from the north should
join him, to attack the rear of the enemy. While this plan may not
have been devoid of military judgment, it is doubtful if it would have
had more than a temporary effect on Howe's movements, while it would
have deprived Washington of the reinforcements he so greatly needed.
Notwithstanding Washington's explicit directions to avoid the enemy
in joining him, Lee hung so close to the enemy's flank as to leave a
doubt of his real intentions, and on the morning of the 13th, just
after having put on record that he believed Washington to be "damnably
deficient", he was surprised and taken prisoner by Lieutenant-Colonel
Harcourt, at White's tavern, near Baskingridge, three miles from his
camp.

[Illustration: CHARLES LEE

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the Present War_, i. p. 478.]

The estimation in which Lee was held gave an undue importance to
his capture. The British thought that in it they had deprived their
opponents of nearly all the military science they possessed, and they
styled him the American Palladium. With the Americans he had many
friends, who were flattered that a soldier of European distinction
should have espoused their cause, and, dazzled with his success at
Charleston, they rated him higher than Washington, and, unintentionally
perhaps, weakened the confidence that should have been reposed in the
commander-in-chief by his subordinates.

Having failed to overtake Washington in New Jersey, Howe turned
northward to Coryell's Ferry, fifteen miles above Trenton, in hopes of
finding boats to enable him to cross the Delaware; but in this he was
disappointed. He then took post at Pennington with a portion of his
force, while with the remainder he returned to Trenton, repaired the
bridges below the town which the Americans had destroyed, and extended
his line as far as Burlington.

So great was the terror spread through New Jersey as the British
advanced, that many of her citizens took advantage of the amnesty which
was offered by the Howes to all who would put themselves under their
protection within sixty days from the 30th of November. Chief among
these was Samuel Tucker, president of the Committee of Safety, who had
held many positions of honor and trust. Nor was this defection confined
to the east side of the Delaware. It was now that Joseph Galloway, and
citizens of Philadelphia, like the Allens, who had supported the cause
of the colonies until independence became the avowed object of the war,
sought safety within the British lines. But the influence which their
conduct might have exercised upon the people was neutralized by what
was soon endured at the hands of the British and Hessian troops. Never
before had any of the colonies been exposed to the unbridled impulses
of a mercenary and licentious soldiery. Houses were plundered and their
contents destroyed in mere wantonness, women were forced to submit to
indignities, and all the horrors which usually attended the invasion
of a European country by a foreign army in the eighteenth century were
transferred to the soil of New Jersey.[887]

[Illustration]

In Philadelphia the excitement was intense. On the 28th of November a
meeting was held in the State House yard to consider the condition of
affairs. It was addressed by Mifflin, who had been sent to the city to
warn Congress of the danger which threatened the army. He spoke with
animation, and endeavored to rouse the people to action. His efforts
met with some success, and in a few days the troops that reinforced
Washington prior to his retreat into Pennsylvania were in motion. On
the 30th the Council of Safety advised the citizens to prepare, upon
short notice, to remove their wives and children to places of safety.
On December 2d, when it was known in the city that Howe's army was at
Brunswick, crowds gathered at the Coffee House to learn the news. The
stores and schools were closed, and all business was suspended. No one
was allowed to cross the Delaware without a pass, while recruiting
parties with drums beating paraded in the streets. The roads leading
from the city were crowded with vehicles of every description, bearing
the families of citizens and their effects to places of refuge.

[Illustration: AN APPEAL.

Reduced from an original in the library of the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.]

When these means of transportation failed, the water craft on the
Delaware was pressed into service. Women with children in their arms
were crowded in smoky cabins so low that they could not sit upright,
while the younger girls were quartered on the decks, from whence
they were driven by the snow and rain. But sadder sights presented
themselves in the streets of the city. The sick of the army arrived
daily. Many of the men had gone to the field clad only for a summer
campaign. They had succumbed to exposure, and had reached Philadelphia
in an almost naked condition. Measures were at once set on foot for
their relief. Vacant houses were taken for their accommodation. The
most seriously afflicted were sent to the hospitals, while committees
of citizens went from door to door begging clothing for their use.

[Illustration: BROADSIDE.

Reduced from an original in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.]

Handbills were issued giving information of the advance of the enemy,
and to awaken the indignation of the people printed sheets were
circulated describing the insults to which the women of New Jersey had
been subjected. Some of the citizens refused to take the Continental
money, as it was rumored that Congress would soon disperse. On the 11th
of December Congress requested Washington to contradict this rumor in
general orders, and to assure the army that the delegates would remain
in Philadelphia until it was certain the enemy would capture the city.
It was well that Washington exercised his discretion in this matter,
for the next day the crushing news was known throughout the city that
he had been obliged to cross the Delaware. Congress at once adjourned
to Baltimore, having first conferred on Washington "full power to order
and direct all things relative to the department and to the operations
of the war."

The state of political affairs in Pennsylvania was the chief cause of
the inefficiency which exposed Philadelphia to the danger of capture
and of the panic with which her citizens were seized. The old colonial
charter had been abrogated, but the new constitution had not been put
into effect, and the condition of society bordered upon anarchy.

For two weeks after Washington had retreated across the Delaware there
seemed little chance of impeding the British advance. "Day by day the
little handful was decreasing, from sickness and other causes." The
services of all the regular troops in it, with the exception of those
from Virginia and Maryland, expired on the first of the year, and the
militia could not be depended upon. "They come", wrote Washington,
"you cannot tell how, go you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell
where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at
last at a critical moment." "These", he said again to Congress, on the
20th of December, "are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence." On
Congress he urged the importance of raising at once an army upon a more
substantial basis, and impressed upon those around him the necessity of
the utmost vigilance. But in the anguish of the moment he wrote to his
brother: "If every nerve is not strained to recruit the new army with
all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up.... I
cannot entertain the idea that [our cause] will finally sink, though it
may remain for some time under a cloud."

Each day brought new difficulties to be overcome. When it was learned
that the fleet that had sailed from New York had appeared off New
London, the march of a portion of Heath's troops, which had been
ordered from Peekskill, was countermanded, and three regiments from
Ticonderoga were directed to halt at Morristown, where about eight
hundred militia had been collected, and General Maxwell was sent
to command them. On the 20th, the troops under Gates and Sullivan
joined Washington. The former had been sent by Schuyler. Sullivan's
division was that which had been commanded by Lee up to the time of his
capture. Washington had been led to believe that a portion of these
troops had reënlisted, and he had been waiting until they should join
him to strike a blow at Howe's forces. Only a small number of the men
had done so, however, and he found that on the first of the year he
would have but fifteen hundred men independent of the militia. It was
evident, therefore, that the blow must be struck at once.

On the 14th of December the British troops went into winter-quarters.
They were stationed at Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, and Bordentown.
Howe returned to his easy quarters in New York. Cornwallis obtained
permission to visit England, and left Grant at Brunswick in command of
New Jersey. The troops at Trenton were under the Hessian, Lieut.-Col.
Rahl; those at Bordentown were commanded by his superior, Count Donop,
who had some outposts as far south as Burlington and Mount Holly. Howe
knew his line was too far extended, but he wished to cover the county
of Monmouth, where there were indications of an outbreak on the part
of some loyalists. The American army reached from Coryell's Ferry to
Bristol. The crossings above Trenton were guarded by Stirling, Mercer,
Stephen, and Fermoy. Ewing lay opposite Trenton. Dickinson with a few
New Jersey troops was opposite Bordentown, and Cadwalader with the
Pennsylvania militia was at Bristol.

Washington decided to attack the troops at Trenton. His men fit for
duty did not exceed five thousand, and of these nearly two thousand
were militia. The troops under Rahl consisted of three battalions of
Hessians, having with them six field-pieces, fifty chasseurs, and
twenty dragoons,—twelve hundred in all. Circumstances favored the plan
which Washington now adopted. Colonel Griffin, with two companies of
Virginians and some militia, had driven a party of Hessians, who had
penetrated as far south as Moorestown and Haddonfield, back to Mount
Holly, where they had been reinforced by Donop, who was thus too far
removed from Trenton to support Rahl in case of an emergency. The
success of Griffin made the militia at Bristol anxious for service, and
it was decided by Cadwalader and Reed, who was with him, to gratify
them by supporting Griffin. To this Washington assented, and at the
same time confided to Reed and Cadwalader his contemplated movement
against Trenton. On the morning of the 23d he wrote to them asking if
the plan had been carried out, and informed them that one hour before
day on the morning of the 26th was the time he had fixed upon for
attacking Rahl. "For heaven's sake", he wrote, "keep this to yourselves
as the discovery of it may prove fatal to us. Our numbers, sorry I
am to say, being less than I had any conception of; but necessity,
dire necessity, will, nay must justify an attack. Prepare and concert
with Griffin; attack as many of their posts as you possibly can with
a prospect of success; the more we can attack at the same instant the
more confusion we shall spread, and the greater good will result from
it."

Washington was informed that it was impracticable to act with Griffin;
and Reed repaired to Philadelphia to urge Putnam to create a diversion
by crossing the river at Cooper's Ferry. He found, however, that little
could be expected from Putnam, and returned to Bristol on the 25th,
where Cadwalader was preparing to carry out the part which Washington
had assigned to him. It was the intention of Washington to cross the
Delaware above Trenton with about one half of his command, and attack
the enemy, while Ewing and Cadwalader should cross opposite Trenton and
Bristol, and not only cut Rahl's line of retreat but prevent Donop from
reinforcing him.

Notwithstanding the fact that no aid could be expected from Putnam,
Washington determined to proceed, and urged Cadwalader to do all in his
power to support him. The boats had been gathered at McKonkey's Ferry,
nine miles above Trenton, and as the men marched to them the footprints
they left in the snow were here and there tinged with blood from the
feet of those who wore broken shoes. The boats were promptly manned
by Glover's regiment from Marblehead, and at dark the crossing began.
It was three o'clock before the artillery was landed, and four before
the troops took up the line of march. The attack was to have been made
about five, and against a more vigilant enemy this delay would have
proved fatal. But Rahl was not vigilant. He despised his opponents, and
refused to protect his position with redoubts as instructed by Donop.
He had been informed of Washington's intended movement, but paid no
attention to the report. It so happened that on the morning of the
attack his outposts had been fired upon by a body of strolling militia,
and this he supposed was the attack he was to look for. Washington
had with him two thousand four hundred men. These he divided into two
columns. One was commanded by Sullivan, and marched by the river road
which entered the town on the northwest. The other, under Greene,
took the Pennington road which approached the town from the north.
The Americans advanced in a violent storm of snow and hail. Greene's
command arrived at the outskirts of the town three minutes before
Sullivan's. The attacks of both parties were almost simultaneously.
Many of the guns were rendered useless by the storm, and the men were
ordered to charge. Those who had bayonets fixed them and rushed upon
the pickets, who retired. The Hessians were taken entirely by surprise.
For a while Rahl was allowed to remain undisturbed in bed, but when
matters grew serious he was aroused and hurriedly assumed command.
Some of his half-formed regiments were advanced towards the Americans,
but were driven back, throwing those in their rear into inextricable
confusion. Two lines of retreat were open to Rahl. One lay over the
bridge which crossed the Assanpink, south of the town; the other was
the road to Brunswick. But Sullivan's attack was so spirited that the
Hessians were driven past the road which led to the bridge, and as they
attempted to escape towards Brunswick, Washington intercepted them
with Hand's riflemen and held them in check. A battery under Captain
Thomas Forrest created great havoc in their ranks, and two of their
guns were turned against it. These were immediately charged by the
Americans, who were led by Captain William Washington and Lieutenant
James Monroe. Both were wounded, but the guns were captured. Rahl was
mortally wounded in trying to rally his men, and shortly after he fell
his command surrendered. All was over in three quarters of an hour.
With the exception of the horse and a small number of the infantry
which escaped over the Assanpink or to Brunswick, Rahl's entire force
was either killed or captured. The prisoners numbered nine hundred and
eighteen. The killed, Washington thought, did not exceed twenty or
thirty. The Americans had two privates killed, one frozen to death,
and two officers and four men wounded. As the enemy were supposed to
be in force at Princeton and Bordentown, and the Americans were in no
condition to withstand an attack, it was thought best not to risk the
advantage which had been gained, and as soon as the men were rested the
army, with its prisoners, returned to Pennsylvania.

Ewing and Cadwalader had been unable to carry out the parts assigned
them, on account of the ice. The latter sent a portion of his infantry
over the river, but recalled it when he found he could not land his
artillery. With no definite news of Washington's success, Cadwalader
recrossed on the morning of the 27th, supposing Washington to be at
Trenton. He soon learned his mistake, but discovered that Donop had
retreated towards Brunswick when he heard of the action at Trenton.
Cadwalader then moved on to Burlington, and on the 29th marched to
Crosswicks. The desperate condition of affairs previous to the battle
had stimulated the people to extraordinary efforts, and the news of the
victory raised their spirits in proportion to the depression they had
so lately suffered. Ignorant of the victory Washington had achieved,
Congress on the 27th vested him with powers that virtually constituted
him a military dictator for the period of six months. To convince the
people of the reality of the victory, the Hessians were marched through
the streets of Philadelphia, and one of their standards was hung up in
the chamber of Congress at Baltimore. Public rejoicings broke forth on
every side. "The Lord of Hosts has heard the cry of the distressed, and
sent an angel to their assistance", exclaimed Muhlenberg, the patriarch
of the Lutherans. On the 27th and 28th of December, fifteen hundred
militia under Mifflin followed Cadwalader into New Jersey, while the
Jerseymen gathered at Morristown and other points. In the face of this
feeling it was necessary that the offensive should be resumed, and on
the 30th Washington occupied Trenton. The service of the New England
troops expired on the first of the year; but through the efforts of
Robert Morris money was raised to offer bounties, which, with appeals
to their patriotism, induced them to remain six weeks longer with the
army.

As soon as Cornwallis heard of the surprise at Trenton, he gave up his
visit to England and hastily joined Grant at Brunswick. On the 30th,
with 8,000 men, he marched towards Trenton, with the determination of
driving Washington over the Delaware or capturing his entire force.
Washington immediately ordered Cadwalader and Mifflin to Trenton, and
sent forward a detachment under General Fermoy to retard the advance
of Cornwallis. On the night of January the 1st this detachment was at
Five Mile Run, between Trenton and Princeton. Early on the morning of
the 2d Cornwallis set out from Princeton, where he had halted the night
previous. The Americans retired before him, disputing every foot of
ground. Hand's riflemen, Scott's Virginians, and Forrest's battery bore
the brunt of the fighting. It was nearly noon by the time Shabbakong
Creek was reached, and two hours passed before the British succeeded in
crossing it. The main portion of the American army was strongly posted
on the south side of the Assanpink, the banks being sufficiently high
to enable the men in the rear to fire over the heads of those in front
of them. As the British approached Trenton, troops were sent forward by
Washington to support the Americans. A battery placed on a hill beyond
Trenton held the British in check for a short time, but the Americans
were soon driven into the town and across the bridge. The cannonading
on both sides was heavy, but the British were unable to force their
way across the stream, and as night approached Cornwallis, against the
advice of his officers, withdrew his troops, determined to renew the
conflict in the morning. "If ever there was a crisis in the affairs of
the Revolution", wrote Wilkinson, "this was the moment. Thirty minutes
would have sufficed to have brought the two armies into contact, and
thirty minutes more would have decided the combat." Washington's
position was indeed critical. It was hardly possible that with his
raw levies he could continue to hold in check the well-disciplined
troops of Cornwallis, which in the morning would be reinforced with
troops he had left at Maidenhead and Princeton. The Delaware behind
Washington was full of floating ice, and to cross it in that condition
was impossible. If Cornwallis should force the Americans' position,
the victory of the British would be decisive. Immediately after dark a
council of war was held. It was then decided to turn the left flank of
the enemy, strike a blow at Princeton, where the garrison was small,
and march on Brunswick, the depository of the British stores. The
sentries of both armies were posted along the banks of the Assanpink,
and at some points were within one hundred and fifty yards of each
other. Working parties were sent within hearing distance of the enemy
to throw up intrenchments, the guards were doubled, and everything was
done to indicate that Washington intended to defend his position to
the last. But at midnight the fires were replenished and the troops
silently withdrawn. Marching by the Quaker road, Washington turned the
left flank of Cornwallis, and by daybreak reached a point directly
south of Princeton. With the main body he moved directly on the town,
and ordered a detachment under Mercer to march to the left and demolish
the bridge over Stony Brook, thus destroying direct communication with
Cornwallis. The garrison at Princeton consisted of the 17th, 40th,
and 55th regiments and three companies of light horse. The 17th and
55th, with a few dragoons, started at sunrise on the morning of the
3d to join Cornwallis. The 17th, under Colonel Mawhood, had crossed
the bridge over Stony Brook, that Mercer was to destroy, and was some
distance beyond it, when Mawhood discovered Mercer on his flank and
rear, moving north on the east side of the stream. He at once recrossed
the bridge, and both parties endeavored to gain the high ground east of
the stream. As the Americans had the shortest distance to march, they
were successful, and with their rifles they poured a deadly fire into
the 17th and 55th, as they advanced to drive them from their position.
They had no bayonets, however, and were unable to stand the charge of
the British. They fled through an orchard in their rear, leaving their
commander mortally wounded on the ground. It was not until Mawhood
emerged from the orchard that he was aware that the whole American army
was within supporting distance of the troops he had just engaged. On
hearing the firing on his left, Washington halted his column, and with
the Pennsylvania militia moved to the support of Mercer. Encouraged
by the irresolution of the militia, Mawhood charged them, but other
regiments coming up and the militia gaining confidence, the British
halted, and then fled, as the Americans in turn advanced against them.
The 55th retreated to Princeton and joined the 40th. They made a mere
show of defending the town, took refuge in the college building,
deserted it, and were soon seen in full retreat across the Millstone
towards Brunswick. Washington's troops had been under arms for over
eighteen hours, and were too much fatigued to follow them. Having
dispersed the 17th regiment, he destroyed the bridge over Stony Brook
and Millstone as the head of Cornwallis's rear-guard came in sight. It
was commanded by Leslie, who had marched from Maidenhead as soon as he
heard the firing in his rear. Washington turned north at Kingston, and
proceeded to Somerset Court-House, where he rested his men. Cornwallis
was not aware that the Americans had been withdrawn from his front
until he heard the sound of the guns at Princeton. Realizing at once
that he had been outgeneralled, and that his stores were in danger, he
ordered a retreat. Failing to reach Princeton in time to be of service,
he continued his march to Brunswick, and made no attempt to follow
Washington. The losses of the British in these engagements were severe;
those on the 2d of January were never known. At Princeton, Washington
estimated that one hundred men were left dead upon the field, and that
the killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to five hundred. Ensign
Inman, of the 17th, wrote that of the two hundred and twenty-four rank
and file of his regiment, which set out on the morning of the 3d, one
hundred and one were either killed or wounded, and that he was the only
officer of the right wing not injured. The Americans lost only twenty
or thirty privates, but many officers. Bravely had they urged their
men on in the thickest of the fight. That Washington escaped seemed
a miracle to those who saw him lead the troops which drove Mawhood
back. Hazlet, Morris, Neal, and Shippin fell upon the field. Mercer,
mortally wounded, died upon the 12th, lamented by the whole country.
From Somerset Court-House Washington marched to Morristown, where he
went into winter-quarters. The British troops were soon all withdrawn
to Amboy and Brunswick. In less than three weeks Washington had turned
back the tide of adversity, and had compelled his opponents to evacuate
West Jersey.

Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January until the
28th of May, during which time no military movement of importance took
place. His men left for their homes as soon as their terms of service
expired, and as few militia entered the camp to take their places, at
times it seemed as if the army would be so reduced as to be unworthy
of the name. It was not until late in the spring that the new levies
reached headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to
Middlebrook, and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th of
June Howe marched from Brunswick and extended his line to Somerset
Court-House, and Arnold was sent to Trenton to take measures to prevent
his crossing the Delaware. The militia turned out in a spirited manner,
and Howe did not care to advance in the face of the opposition they
could offer, with Washington on his flank. He endeavored to bring on a
general engagement with the latter, but Washington refused to leave the
strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy.

Early in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its object
the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark his troops
and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or Chesapeake, and
march directly on the city. With the object of reaching the fleet he
started to cross to Staten Island; but learning that Washington was at
Quibbletown, he recalled his men and proceeded to Westfield, hoping to
outflank him. But, as Washington retired, Howe was unsuccessful, and
finally passed over to Staten Island, totally evacuating New Jersey.

For over six weeks Washington was ignorant of Howe's intentions.
Supposing that he would endeavor to coöperate with Burgoyne, and
would sail up the Hudson, Washington moved his army to Ramapo, in New
York. On the 23d of July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks
on the vessels, the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly.
Its departure was promptly reported to Congress. Signal fires were
lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from time to time by
those who were watching for it, and messengers carried inland the news
of its progress. At last, on the 30th, it was spoken off the capes of
Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed it too hazardous to sail up that river,
and after consulting with his brother, the general, continued on his
course southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay, and
on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry.

On the 24th of July Washington heard that the fleet had sailed
southward, and in consequence marched his army from Ramapo to Coryell's
Ferry. He continued his march to Philadelphia, when he learned that
the fleet was off the capes of Delaware; but as it was soon lost sight
of, he retraced his steps, and halted in Bucks County, Pennsylvania,
twenty miles from Philadelphia. While there, Lafayette, De Kalb, and
Pulaski joined the army.

[Illustration: LORD HOWE.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, ii. p. 96. Cf. cut
in _European Mag._, ii. 432. There is a colossal statue of Howe, by
Flaxman, in St. Paul's, London.]

For a while everything was in suspense. Concluding at last that Howe
had sailed for Charleston, Washington consulted with his officers, and
decided to return to the Hudson, so that Burgoyne could be opposed or
New York attacked, as circumstances should direct. He was just about
to do this when word was brought that the fleet had entered Chesapeake
Bay, and was at least two hundred miles from the capes. This news
created great consternation in Philadelphia, but the excitement was not
as great as it had been the previous winter, when Howe was at Trenton.
Repeated alarms had made the people callous, and internal political
differences continued to divide them. Besides this, the pacific
influence which the presence of a large Quaker population exercised
seemed to bear down all military efforts. Stirring appeals were made
by the authorities, new bodies of militia were ordered to be raised,
handbills calculated to arouse the people were issued, but all with
unsatisfactory results. To impress the lukewarm with the strength of
his forces, and to inspire hopes in the breasts of the patriotic, on
the 24th of August Washington marched his army through the streets of
Philadelphia. The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them
some uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats.

The Americans halted south of Wilmington, and a picked corps under
Maxwell was thrown to the front. The country below was patrolled by
parties of Delaware militia under Rodney, and Washington reconnoitred
it in person. The disembarkation of Howe's army on the 25th was
watched by a few militia, who fled when a landing was effected. Howe's
men were in good health, but hundreds of his horses had died on the
voyage, and those that survived were little better than carrion. His
advance, therefore, was slow. He moved in two columns, one on each
side of Elk River. Several days were spent in collecting horses, and
on the 3d of September the columns joined at Aitken's tavern. Here a
severe skirmish took place with Maxwell's corps, which was driven back.
Washington's force then lay behind Red Clay Creek, his left resting
on Christiana Creek, and extending in the direction of Newport. On the
8th the British advanced as if to attack the American left, but by
night Washington learned that the greater part of Howe's army was at
Milltown, on his right. Fearing that Howe would push past him in that
direction, cross the Brandywine, and gain the road to Philadelphia,
Washington, on the evening of the 8th, quietly withdrew his troops from
Red Clay Creek, and threw them in front of Howe, at Chad's Ford, on the
Brandywine. A redoubt, commanded by Proctor, was thrown up on the east
bank to protect the crossing. Wayne's division, formerly Lincoln's, was
within supporting distance, and Greene's, still further to the rear,
was to act as a reserve. The Pennsylvania militia, under Armstrong,
formed the left wing. They were posted at the fords below Chad's, which
were easily protected. The right wing was commanded by Sullivan. It was
composed of his own division and those of Stirling and Stephen. Both
Washington and Sullivan were unacquainted with the country to their
right, and supposed that, when they guarded the fords three miles above
where Sullivan was stationed, the enemy could not approach from that
direction without their receiving timely notice.

The British marched from Milltown to Kennett Square. On the morning
of the 11th, Knyphausen with 7,000 men took the direct road to Chad's
Ford. He skirmished with Maxwell, who had crossed the stream to meet
him, and drove him back over the Brandywine. At daybreak on the same
day, another column, 7,000 strong, set out from Kennett Square. It was
commanded by Cornwallis, and Howe accompanied it in person. It took
a road leading north to a point above the forks of the Brandywine,
turned to the east, crossed the west branch at Trimble's Ford and the
east at Jeffrey's, and then moved south. The plan was that Knyphausen
should engage the attention of the Americans in front until Cornwallis
had gained a position to attack their right. In this Knyphausen was
successful, his attempts to cross the Brandywine at Chad's Ford being
only feints.

About noon Washington heard of Cornwallis's march. He promptly
determined to cross the stream and engage Knyphausen, while Cornwallis
was too far distant to reinforce him or threaten the American right.
Wayne, Greene, and Sullivan's divisions were ordered to advance. Greene
had gained the west bank when word was received from Sullivan that a
Major Spear had assured him that there must be some mistake. He had
that morning passed over the road Cornwallis was said to be on, and
had seen nothing of him. Fearing that Cornwallis's march was only a
feint, and that he had returned and rejoined Knyphausen, Washington
ordered Greene back and sent scouts out for additional information.
By two o'clock it was obtained. Cornwallis was discovered on the
road to Dilworth, and would soon be in the rear of the Americans.
Stirling and Stephen were deployed on the hill southwest of Birmingham
Meeting-House, and Sullivan's division was ordered to join them.
Before it could reach its position Cornwallis began the attack. As he
attempted to turn the American right, Sullivan endeavored to move his
three divisions to the east. His own division had been formed in line
half a mile from those of Stirling and Stephen, and in closing the gap
it fell into confusion and was routed. With the divisions of Stirling
and Stephen, Sullivan made every effort to hold the position; but he
was outnumbered, his left flank was uncovered, and his entire command
was finally driven in confusion from the field. Sullivan, Stirling,
and Conway had encouraged their men with exhibitions of personal
bravery, and Lafayette, who acted as a volunteer, was wounded while
endeavoring to rally some fugitives. When Washington heard the firing
in the direction of Birmingham he rode thither with the utmost speed.
Meeting the fugitives, he ordered Greene to support the right wing. The
order was executed with wonderful promptness. Greene, throwing Weedon's
brigade on the flank of the enemy and Muhlenberg's in their front,
checked the pursuit. But the Americans were obliged to fall back until
they came to a narrow defile, flanked on both sides by woods, from
which the British could not drive them, and night ended the conflict.
When Knyphausen learned that Cornwallis was engaged he pushed across
the stream at Chad's Ford, but Wayne, Maxwell, and Proctor held him
in check until they found that the right wing had been defeated, when
they retired in good order, fighting as they fell back towards Chester.
There at night the defeated army gathered, and Washington reported to
Congress that, notwithstanding the misfortunes of the day, his troops
were in good spirits.

The American loss was about one thousand, killed, wounded, and
prisoners; that of the British, five hundred and seventy-nine. That
the conduct of the Americans inspired their opponents with respect is
shown by the language of Sir William Howe in summarizing the opposition
he had met with up to this time. "They fought the king's army", he
wrote, "on Long Island; they sustained the attack at Fort Washington;
they stood the battle at Brandywine: and our loss upon those occasions,
though by no means equal to theirs, was not inconsiderable."

The day after the battle Washington marched from Chester to
Philadelphia. He rested his army two days at Germantown, and then
recrossed the Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle
should be risked before the city should be given up. On the 16th the
two armies met on the high ground south of Chester Valley and prepared
for action. The skirmishing had actually begun, when a violent storm
stopped the engagement by ruining the ammunition of both armies.
Washington withdrew to the hills north of the valley, and finding it
impossible to repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again
over the Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and
attack their rear should they attempt to follow. Wayne was to have
been reinforced by detachments under Smallwood and Gist, which did not
reach him. When the British moved nearer to the Lancaster road, Wayne
took position in their rear. He supposed that they were ignorant of his
presence, and wrote to Washington to that effect. But on the night of
the 20th he was attacked by a strong detachment under Major-General
Grey, and although he had taken measures to guard against a surprise,
the onslaught was so sudden that his men, who were sleeping on their
arms, were unable to make an effective resistance, and about one
hundred and fifty were either killed or wounded by the bayonet.

[Illustration: GENERAL GREY.

From Doyle's _Official Baronage_, ii. 76. There is a print in the
_European Mag._, Oct., 1797, and in Murray's _Impartial Hist._, vol.
ii. p. 433.]

Howe on the 21st resumed his march towards Philadelphia. Finding that
the Americans had thrown up intrenchments at Swedes Ford, he turned
up the river as if to cross above. Washington feared that it was his
intention to strike at Reading, where his stores were deposited, and to
protect them marched in the same direction on the opposite side of the
river. When he reached Potts Grove, now Pottstown, he discovered that
Howe, by a retrograde movement on the night of the 22d, had crossed at
Fatland and Gordon's fords, and was in full march for Philadelphia.

On the day of the battle of Brandywine the citizens of Philadelphia
heard the sound of cannon in the west, and gathered in the streets
to discuss and wonder what the future would bring forth. At night
a messenger arrived with news of the disaster. Everything was in
confusion, and when, on the morning of the 19th, about one o'clock, a
letter was received from Colonel Hamilton stating that the British were
marching on the city, the members of Congress were aroused from their
beds, and departed in haste for Lancaster, where they had agreed to
meet should their removal from Philadelphia become necessary.

[Illustration: GENERAL HOWE.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, i. 280.]

"It was a beautiful still moonlight night, and the streets as full of
men, women, and children as on a market day." The alarm was premature,
but on the 25th Howe's army encamped at Germantown. Through Thomas
Willing, a leading citizen of Philadelphia, the inhabitants were
promised by Sir William Howe that if they should remain peaceably
in their dwellings they would not be molested. The next morning,
Cornwallis, with three thousand men, took possession of the city.
The troops marched down Second Street to the music of "God save the
King", and were greeted by some of the inhabitants with "acclamations
of joy", but the people generally "appeared sad and serious." Howe
immediately began to throw up a line of intrenchments north of the
city, extending from the Delaware to the Schuylkill, and informed his
brother, the admiral, who was in Delaware Bay, that the army was in
possession of the city. The defences of the river prevented the fleet
from approaching, and the day after the occupation an attempt was made
by the American flotilla to cannonade the city. The smaller vessels
were driven off before they had done serious damage, but the frigate
"Delaware" ran aground and was captured.

[Illustration: ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

After a crayon in the Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania. There is a picture in
Independence Hall. Ceracchi's bust is given in stipple in Delaplaine's
_Repository_ (1815).

For view of "The Grange", Hamilton's home, see Valentine's _N. Y.
Manual_, 1858, p. 468; Mrs. Lamb's _Homes of America_; Lossing's
_Hudson_, 275.—ED.]

The main portion of Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of
a single street, two miles in length, and five from the city. In the
centre stood the market-house, and along the road which there crosses
the main street Howe's army was encamped. The left under Knyphausen
reached to the Schuylkill, the right under Grant and Mathews to the
York road. At the upper end of the town stood the large stone mansion
of Benjamin Chew, late chief justice of the province, and in a field
opposite the 40th Regiment under Colonel Musgrave was encamped. The
advance was a mile beyond at Mount Pleasant, where the second battalion
of light infantry was stationed, with their pickets thrown out at Mount
Airy still further on. After Howe crossed the Schuylkill, Washington
marched to Pennybacker's Mills, and thence to Metutchen Hills, fifteen
miles from Philadelphia. He had been reinforced by McDougall's brigade
and other troops; and learning that Howe had detached a portion of his
command to reduce the forts on the Delaware, he determined to attack
him at Germantown. His plan was to engage the troops at Mount Pleasant
with a portion of his army, while a large force under Greene should
move down the Lime Kiln road, which enters the town from the east at
the market-house, and attack Grant and Mathews. At the same time the
Pennsylvania and Jersey militia were to make demonstrations on the
enemy's left and right flanks respectively.

[Illustration: ANTHONY WAYNE.

From the _New York Magazine_, March, 1797, following a picture by
Trumbull, now at New Haven. Other engravings are in the _National
Portrait Gallery_ (N. Y., 1834); Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed.,
vol. iii.; in Jones's _Georgia_, vol. ii., engraved by H. B. Hall;
Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 177. It has been engraved by I. B. Forrest,
J. F. E. Prud'homme, and others. A portrait by Henry Elonis is engraved
by Geo. Grahame. A likeness, front face, without hat, is in the _Mag.
of Amer. History_, Feb., 1886, and _History of Chester County_ by Futhy
and Cope. Cf. _Penna. Archives_, vol. x., and the sketch by J. W. De
Peyster, and a new portrait in _United Service_, March, 1886, p. 304.

A view of Wayne's house is given in Egle's _Pennsylvania_, p. 540;
Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 373; _Harper's Mag._, April, 1880.—ED.]

Washington moved from his quarters on the evening of October 3d.
Sullivan commanded the troops that were to attack the enemy in front,
and was followed by the reserve under Stirling, which Washington
accompanied. Sullivan arrived at Chestnut Hill on the morning of the
4th at sunrise, and halted two hours to allow Greene to gain his
ground, that the attacks might be made at the same time. Captain Allen
McLane's company and a portion of Conway's brigade were then ordered
to advance. They drove the guard at Mount Airy back on the light
infantry, and held them in check while Sullivan formed his line.
Wayne's division was on the east of the road, Sullivan's on the west.
The whole under Sullivan then moved forward, driving the light infantry
before them. A thick fog enveloped everything, and the men could not
see forty yards in front of them. But Wayne's men dashed on, calling
to each other to remember Paoli and crying for vengeance. The light
infantry were reinforced by the 40th Regiment under Musgrave. Just
then Howe rode up, calling out: "For shame, light infantry! I never
saw you retreat before." But he found the attack was general, and rode
back to the main line. Down the main street and past Chew's house
Sullivan and Wayne pursued the flying troops. But here the rout of
the British was checked by Agnew, who hastened forward with a portion
of the left wing. As the reserve passed Chew's house they were fired
upon by six companies of the 40th that had taken refuge there with
their commander Musgrave. Stirling endeavored to dislodge them, but
the effort was futile. Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens and Major Louis
Fleury daringly attempted to fire the house, but were unsuccessful.
While this was going on, Greene made his attack on the right wing. His
march had taken half an hour longer than anticipated, while he still
met the enemy sooner than planned, as their first battalion of light
infantry had been moved forward the night before on the Lime Kiln
road. Greene attempted to advance in line of battle, but his line was
thrown into confusion. He drove a portion of the troops back to the
market-house, but when he encountered Grant he was obliged to retire,
and a part of his command was captured. Woodford's brigade wandered so
far from Greene's right as to reach the rear of Chew's house. It was
then directly behind Wayne's division, and when the brigade fired on
the house Wayne's men retired, as they supposed the enemy were in their
rear. This uncovered Sullivan's flank, and he too was obliged to fall
back. The British pursued until Whitemarsh was reached, where Wayne
checked them with a battery posted on the hill, near the church. The
Americans lost nearly eleven hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners;
the British, five hundred and twenty-one. The American General Nash, of
North Carolina, and the British General Agnew were mortally wounded.
While the Americans were defeated in their object, the moral results of
the battle were in their favor. It inspired them with confidence, and
showed the world that though driven from the field of Brandywine they
were still aggressive.

It was now evident to Howe that he must open communication with New
York by water, or his army would be in a state of siege. His attention
was therefore turned to the defences of the Delaware which were held by
the Americans. The most formidable of these was Fort Mifflin, situated
on an island in the river a short distance below the mouth of the
Schuylkill. Opposite this, at Red Bank, on the Jersey shore, was Fort
Mercer, while four or five miles below, at Billingsport, was another
fortification. Opposite these points _chevaux-de-frise_ were sunk in
the channel, which were protected by the batteries and by a fleet of
small vessels, known as the Pennsylvania navy, commanded by Commodore
John Hazelwood. Besides these, there were several larger vessels which
had been built by order of Congress.

On the 19th of October Howe withdrew his troops from Germantown and
encamped them behind his lines of intrenchments on the north side of
the city. Before this he had erected batteries to attack Fort Mifflin.
He now sent a body of men, under Colonel Stirling, over the river from
Chester to capture the fort at Billingsport. The garrison there was not
sufficient for the defence of the fort, and as the British approached
they evacuated the post. By the 21st Admiral Howe succeeded in passing
the lower _chevaux-de-frise_, and his vessels sailed up the river to a
point nearly opposite Fort Mifflin. On the same day three battalions
of Hessians, with artillery, crossed into Jersey from Philadelphia
to attack Fort Mercer. They arrived before the fort on the afternoon
of the 22d. It was commanded by Colonel Christopher Greene, of Rhode
Island, who had with him but six hundred men. The fortifications were
unfinished, but a strong redoubt, with an abatis, had been constructed.
Donop summoned the garrison to surrender, and upon receiving a refusal
formed his regiments for the attack. They rushed upon the embankments
and passed the abandoned lines with little opposition. But when they
charged the redoubt, they were met with a fire that nearly filled the
ditches with killed and wounded. Most of the men retired in confusion,
and those who attempted to scale the works were beaten back in a
hand-to-hand conflict. It was intended that the fleet should coöperate
with Donop; that the "Vigilant", with sixteen 24-pounders, should
pass to the west of Fort Mifflin, while other vessels should engage
Hazelwood and prevent his offering assistance to Greene. The plan
failed, however, at all points. The "Vigilant" could not sail up the
west channel, and Hazelwood was more than a match for the vessels sent
against him. He drove them back, while some of his boats sailed close
to the shore and poured an effective fire into the flank of Donop's
column. It was in vain that Donop and his officers re-formed the men
and led them back to the attack. They were shot down in scores as
they attempted to remove the abatis, and in three quarters of an hour
from the time the engagement opened the men withdrew for the last
time, leaving Donop behind them, mortally wounded. He died three days
afterwards, "finishing", to use his own words, "a noble career early."
His command had numbered about twenty-five hundred men, one sixth of
whom were either killed or wounded. The Americans had but fourteen
killed and twenty-three wounded. Two of the vessels which had been
sent against Hazelwood, the "Augusta" and the "Merlin", ran aground,
and were discovered in that position by the Americans on the 22d. They
were at once attacked, and the magazine of the "Augusta" exploded
with terrific force. She had been set on fire either by accident or
by a shot from the American batteries, and blew up before all of her
crew could be removed. It was found impossible to save the "Merlin",
and she was fired by her officers and destroyed.

[Illustration: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AUGUSTA.

After a painting in gallery of the Hist. Soc. of Pennsylvania, said
to have been painted by a French officer. Cf. Wallace's _Col. Wm.
Bradford_.]

Taught caution by these reverses, Howe made no further effort to
capture the forts until he had succeeded in erecting a number of
batteries on the Pennsylvania shore within range of Fort Mifflin. On
the 10th of November these were opened with serious result to the
Americans. The reply from the fort was spirited, and the damage done to
it in daytime was repaired during the night. On the first day, Colonel
Samuel Smith, of Maryland, who commanded the garrison, was wounded,
and was taken to Red Bank. The second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel
Russell, was relieved, on account of ill-health, by Major Simeon
Thayer, of Rhode Island, and the defence of the fort was continued.
On the 15th the "Vigilant", carrying sixteen 24-pounders, and a hulk
with three guns of the same capacity, succeeded in passing up the
west channel and taking the fort in the rear, while other vessels
engaged the fleet. The fort by this time was little more than a mass
of ruins. The ammunition was nearly exhausted. Major Fleury, the
engineer of the fort, and Major Talbot were wounded; nearly all the
guns were dismounted, and whenever the men appeared on the platforms
they were picked off by sharpshooters in the shrouds of the vessels.
During the night of the 15th the garrison was removed to Red Bank, as
preparations were being made to storm the place the next day, and on
the morning of the 16th the British took possession of the place. The
gallant defence of this fort by about three hundred men called forth
commendations from all sides. Swords were voted to Hazelwood and Smith
by Congress, while Fleury and Thayer were promoted. Fort Mercer was
now the only water-defence held by the Americans. With the object of
capturing it, on the 18th Cornwallis marched to Chester and crossed to
Billingsport. Greene was sent to oppose him, and crossed the Delaware
at Bristol; but before he could render any assistance to Varnum, who
commanded the troops on the Jersey side of the river, that officer was
obliged to retire before Cornwallis and abandon Fort Mercer, which the
British now destroyed. Lafayette, who was with Greene, made a spirited
attack on a body of Hessians encamped near Gloucester, for which he
gained considerable credit. The majority of the small vessels of the
Pennsylvania navy succeeded in passing up the river by the batteries
that Howe had erected at Philadelphia, but the larger ones, together
with nearly all those built by Congress, were destroyed.

A few days after the fall of Fort Mifflin the British transports made
their way up to Philadelphia, and to some extent relieved the distress
that the scarcity of provisions occasioned. About the end of October
Washington removed his headquarters to Whitemarsh, and on November 24th
reconnoitred the enemy's lines with a view to attack them. A majority
of his officers, however, opposed the plan. It was soon evident that
Sir William Howe was about to resume the offensive, and Greene was
recalled from Jersey. On the evening of December 4th, Howe, with nearly
all his army, marched out of Philadelphia with the avowed intention of
driving Washington over the mountains. His advance-guard arrived at
Chestnut Hill about daylight the next morning. General James Irvine
with the Pennsylvania militia met them at the foot of the hill, and,
after a sharp skirmish, the militia fled, leaving Irvine wounded in the
hands of the British. When Howe arrived in front of Washington's lines
he found them so strong that he did not dare to attack them, and after
spending four days in endeavoring to gain a position that would compel
Washington to attack him, he suddenly gave up the design and returned
to the city.

[Illustration]

As the season was advancing, and the Americans were in no condition to
keep the field, it was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley
Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek
empties into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods
and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was severely
criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness. But the position
was central and easily defended. The army arrived there about the
middle of December, and the erection of huts began. They were built
of logs, and were fourteen by fifteen feet each. The windows were
covered with oiled paper, and the openings between the logs were
closed with clay. The huts were arranged in streets, giving the place
the appearance of a city. It was the first of the year, however,
before they were occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the
army had become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the
men were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support
life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes at the
open fires. "My brigade's out of provisions, nor can the commissary
obtain any meat", wrote Huntington on the 22d of December. "Three
days successively we have been destitute of bread", said Varnum the
same day, "and two days we have been entirely without meat." Soap,
vinegar, and other articles necessary for the health of the men were
never furnished, and so imperfectly did the clothier-general perform
his duties that many of the men were without shirts, and hundreds were
confined to the hospitals and farm-houses for want of shoes. Blankets
and proper coverings were so scarce that numbers, after toiling
during the day, were obliged to sit by the fires all night to keep
from freezing. By the 23d of December two thousand eight hundred and
ninety-eight men were unfit for duty, because they were barefoot and
otherwise naked. The horses died of starvation by hundreds, and the
men were obliged to haul their own provisions and firewood. As straw
could not be found to protect the men from the cold ground, sickness
spread through their quarters with fearful rapidity. "The unfortunate
soldiers", wrote Lafayette, in after-years, "were in want of
everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet
and their legs froze till they became black, and it was often necessary
to amputate them.... The army frequently remained whole days without
provisions, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and officers
was a miracle which each moment served to renew." At times, however,
it seemed as if the forbearance of the men was exhausted, and that the
war would end in mutiny. But the officers succeeded in allaying the
feelings of discontent, and under the management of Greene, who assumed
the duties of quarter-master-general on the 23d of March, a change for
the better took place.

While the country around Valley Forge was so impoverished by the
military operations of the previous summer as to make it impossible
for it to support the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly
owing to the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster
after leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its
sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the congresses which
had preceded it. "The Continental Congress and the currency", wrote
Gouverneur Morris in 1778, "have greatly depreciated." Many of the
members entertained the widespread fear of a standing army, and refused
to follow the advice given by Washington for the relief of the men
who defended them. Some of the delegates, indeed, did not hesitate to
criticise the judgment of Washington, and question his abilities. The
capture of Burgoyne gave them an opportunity of comparing the results
of the Northern and Southern campaigns. In writing of Washington's
army a member of Congress said to Gates: "We have had a noble army
melted down by ill-judged marches, which disgrace their authors and
directors, and which have occasioned the severest and most just sarcasm
and contempt of our enemies. How much you are to be envied, my dear
general! How different your conduct and your fortune! In short, this
army will be totally lost unless you come down and collect the virtuous
band, who wish to fight under your banner, and with their aid save
the southern hemisphere. Congress must send for you." "I am weary",
exclaimed John Adams, "with so much insipidity." "I am sick of Fabian
systems in all quarters." It was a matter for thanksgiving, he thought,
that the credit of defending the Delaware was "not immediately due to
the commander-in-chief nor to Southern troops. If it had been, idolatry
and adulation would have been unbounded." The prevalence of these
sentiments made it easy for disappointed soldiers like Mifflin and
Conway to spread dissensions which, if they had been allowed to grow,
would have brought about the removal of Washington. Mifflin's eloquence
and abilities as a politician far exceeded his merits in the field; and
he was jealous of the preference shown by Washington for Greene and
Knox. Conway aspired to a major-generalship, and was chagrined that
Washington opposed him. If Washington had been removed and Lee or Gates
appointed in his place, Mifflin and Conway would have been benefited
by the change. The schemes of the last two were warmly supported by
James Lovell and Dr. Benjamin Rush, and the most insidious measures
were entered upon to undermine the reputation of Washington. Anonymous
letters were circulated for this purpose, and the country was made to
ring with the cry that, under a Gates, a Lee, or a Conway, the Southern
army would be victorious. Through the influence of this faction, Gates
was made president of the Board of War, of which Mifflin was a member,
and authority which belonged to the commander-in-chief was vested in
it. To separate Lafayette from Washington, and gain for themselves the
influence of his name, the "Cabal", as it has been called, proposed
an impracticable winter campaign against Canada, which Lafayette was
to command, with Conway to assist him. But here the faction spent
its strength. The friends of Washington had been put on their guard
by the disclosure of a correspondence which showed the malignity of
his enemies. Wilkinson, who was on Gates's staff, repeated, while his
tongue was loosened with wine, an opinion expressed in a letter that
Conway had written to Gates. Gates read it to his military family.
"Heaven has been determined to save your country", it said, "or a weak
general and bad counsellors would have ruined it." The words reached
Washington, who enclosed them to Conway, simply informing him that he
understood they formed a portion of a letter of his to Gates. It was
in vain that the members of the Cabal attempted at first to carry the
matter through with a high hand, then to deny that such a letter had
ever been written, and finally to excuse themselves. Their ends were
discovered and their power was gone. Lafayette would have nothing to
do with the Canadian expedition unless De Kalb was made his second
in command. He repaired to Albany only to find that no measures had
been taken to carry out the promises made him, and as the friends of
Washington were soon in the ascendency in Congress, Lafayette was
recalled to Valley Forge.

Through the advice of a committee which Congress had sent to camp to
inquire into the condition of the army, many defects and abuses were
corrected, and its organization was improved. The new troops that had
been called for came in slowly, but their effectiveness was increased
through the exertion of Baron Steuben, who joined the army about the
close of February. A pupil of Frederick the Great, and a distinguished
officer in the Prussian service, he won the esteem of Congress by
offering to serve as a volunteer. His experience and industry soon
instilled a discipline into the army which it had never known, and
in May he was made inspector-general, with the rank and pay of a
major-general.

       *       *       *       *       *

While the American army was suffering at Valley Forge the British were
comfortably quartered in Philadelphia. When they first entered the
city it presented a sorry appearance: 590 dwellings and 240 stores
were unoccupied; the leaden spouts of many houses had been taken
down to mould into bullets, and the bells of the churches and public
buildings had been removed to places of safety. The male population
between the ages of eighteen and sixty numbered but 5,335, and of
these one fifth were Quakers. The feelings of the Quaker citizens had
been greatly outraged by the arrest and banishment to the western
part of Virginia of a number of their people. Sullivan had discovered
on his march through New Jersey what he believed to be a treasonable
correspondence on their part with the enemy, and he had forwarded the
papers to Congress. The matter had been referred to the authorities
of Pennsylvania, who found in the correspondence, and in an address
issued by the Quaker meeting in December, the grounds for sending
the Quaker leaders into exile. It was but natural that the families
of these men should have looked upon the British as their deliverers
from an outrageous tyranny. But they soon found to their sorrow that
their opposition to war afforded them as little protection from one
side as from the other. The property destroyed by the British was
enormous, and a revulsion of feeling was the consequence. At one time
seventeen handsome houses beyond the lines were set on fire to prevent
their being occupied by the American pickets. Persons living in the
neighborhood of the city were robbed by both parties, and their crops
carried off or destroyed. The temptation to sell their produce for
hard money induced some of the neighboring farmers to supply the enemy
with luxuries, though they found access to the city hazardous. The
Americans under Smallwood guarded the roads leading to Wilmington,
while Generals Potter and Lacy scoured the country west and north of
the city. Captains Allen McLane, Clark, and Lee watched the movements
of the enemy and reported them to Washington, but they could not oppose
the large forces that Howe frequently sent out to protect those who
were willing to risk furnishing him with provisions.

[Illustration:

NOTE.—The play-bill on the opposite page is after a fac-simile given
in Smith's _Amer. Hist. and Lit. Curios._, 2d series. A list of such
bills printed in Philadelphia at this time is given in Hildeburn's
_Issues of the Press in Penna._, ii. pp. 315, 316.]

The desolation which surrounded the town was soon in striking contrast
with the scenes within. The empty stores were occupied by itinerant
traders from New York, who offered for sale articles of luxury that
the war had driven from the American market. The officers of the army
were quartered on the citizens, and after the campaign closed they gave
themselves up to social enjoyments. Clubs met at the public-houses, and
weekly balls were given at the City Tavern. As many of the officers
were men of education and refinement, they were warmly welcomed in
the families of leading citizens; but there was another class who did
much to change the moral aspect of the city, when, by following the
loose example of their commander, Sir William Howe, they shocked the
staid citizens with their immorality. Cock-fighting and gambling were
favorite amusements, and a faro-table kept by a foreigner proved the
ruin of many young officers. The theatre on South Street was fitted up
under directions of Captains André and De Lancey. Some of the scenes
were painted by André. The profits of the performances were divided
among the widows and orphans of the soldiers. As spring approached,
horse-racing was added to the list of amusements. While citizens of
wealth could take part in the gaieties which surrounded them, those
in moderate circumstances suffered privations. Firewood was extremely
scarce and provisions high. "Nothing but hard money will pass", wrote a
resident to a relative outside of the lines. "There is plenty of goods,
but little money among the tradespeople. The market is poor. I received
the butter by J——; we are no longer accustomed to eat butter on our
bread. I keep it to make water soup, which we have nearly every day."
The army of occupation, on the other hand, was plentifully supplied
with military stores after the defences on the Delaware were captured.

Martial law ruled supreme. The appointment of Joseph Galloway to be
superintendent of police and the designation of magistrates under him
were the only steps taken towards the revival of civil authority, and
Galloway received his orders from headquarters.

The supineness of Howe robbed the British of all the benefits that
might have resulted from the capture of Philadelphia. Attempts were
made to raise regiments of loyalists, but so little support did the
scheme receive that it was only partially successful. The "Pennsylvania
Loyalists", of which William Allen, Jr., was colonel, and the "Queen's
Rangers", commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Simcoe, were the most
efficient of these corps. No attempt was made to drive Washington's
half-starved forces from their camp, although their condition was
perfectly well known to Howe through the deserters that flocked to
the city. The military movements of Howe while in Philadelphia were
confined to foraging expeditions and attacks on isolated posts that
could be surprised and broken up with little danger of loss. While
these were successful, they gave to the war a predatory character that
reflected little credit on British arms, and intensified the bitterness
entertained for all representatives of royal authority.

The British government, dissatisfied with the results of Howe's
campaigns, decided early in 1778 upon his recall. Sir Henry Clinton,
his successor, arrived in Philadelphia the 8th of May, and on the 18th
an entertainment was given by the officers of the army in honor of the
retiring commander. The fête was styled the "Mischianza", and consisted
of a regatta, a mock tournament, and a ball. But "Knights of the
Burning Mountain" and of the "Blended Rose", with squires and ladies
decked with spangles and ribbons, could not disguise the fact that the
royal army had failed in accomplishing the task assigned to it, and
the chagrin of its veterans was deepened by the frivolous scenes which
marked the retirement of Sir William Howe.

The alliance with France made it necessary for the British to contract
their operations, and Sir Henry Clinton brought with him orders to
evacuate Philadelphia. His intention of doing so became known to
Washington, and that his information might be more certain he ordered
Lafayette, with a body of two thousand four hundred men, the flower of
the army, to cross the Schuylkill and take a position near the city.
This movement was made on the very day of the Mischianza, and on the
morning of the 19th Howe learned that Lafayette was at Barren Hill,
twelve miles distant. Clinton had not yet assumed command, and in the
hope of closing his career in America by a brilliant stroke, Howe
determined to make an effort to capture the young Frenchman and his
detachment. So confident was he of doing this, that, before leaving the
city, he invited his friends to meet Lafayette, whom he promised to
bring with him on his return, while his brother, the admiral, prepared
a vessel in which to take the distinguished captive to England. On
the night of the 19th Grant, with five thousand men, marched by way
of Frankford and Oxford, and by morning he had gained a point on
the Swedes Ford road two miles in the rear of Lafayette. Another
detachment, under Grey, was sent by way of Chestnut Hill to attack
Lafayette's flank; while the main portion of the army, under Howe,
took the Ridge road, to attack him in front. Lafayette's position was
on high ground, and was naturally strong. Neither Grey nor Howe could
approach him without his being aware of their advance. In his rear were
two roads. One led along the riverside to Matson's Ford, three miles
distant; the other along a ridge, a short distance from the river, to
Swedes Ford, still higher up. The ground between the roads was heavily
wooded. Had Grant, who held the Swedes Ford road, sent a portion of
his force to Matson's Ford (which he could have done by a cross-road),
Lafayette's only line of retreat would have been destroyed. But in
place of doing this he marched down the Swedes Ford road to attack the
American rear. Through the carelessness of his scouts, Lafayette was
ignorant of Grant's position. He was preparing his force to receive
Howe, when he heard of the column advancing from Chestnut Hill. He had
just faced a portion of his troops in that direction when he learned
that Grant was in his rear. Lafayette's danger was now apparent, but
he was equal to the occasion. Without losing a moment, he sent troops
through the woods, with orders to allow themselves to be seen at times
by Grant, and lead him to suppose that they were the advance-guards of
larger numbers. He also left a small body to engage the attention of
Howe and Grey, and then silently marched his detachment along the river
road, below Grant, to Matson's Ford. Grant was entirely deceived. He
halted his men, reconnoitred the troops seen in the woods, and then
pushed on to Barren Hill, where he met the other columns and discovered
that Lafayette had escaped. The British pursued him to the ford, but by
the time they reached it Lafayette had drawn up his force on the other
side, and his rear-guard could be seen following him, dotting the river
like the corks of a seine. Fearing that Lafayette had been reinforced
by the entire American army, Howe made no attempt to follow him, but
returned to the city, and on the 24th sailed for England.

The evacuation of Philadelphia was now only a question of time, and the
news that it had been decided upon was appalling to the Tory citizens
who had openly committed themselves to the royal side. In their despair
they offered to raise three thousand men, if two thousand of the royal
army could be left in addition, to protect the city. Howe had advised
some of them to make terms with Congress, but those who had been most
active in serving him decided to leave with the army. One hundred and
eighty transports arrived in the Delaware, and such diligence was
used in loading them that for days light carts drawn by soldiers, and
every kind of carriage, from wagons to wheelbarrows, were constantly
rolling between the houses and the river. As fast as the transports
received their cargoes they dropped down the river. The defences were
dismantled. On the 30th of May bodies of troops were thrown across
the Delaware to protect the passage of the army. Everything was now
ready for the departure of the British, but the final movement was
delayed for a few days on account of the arrival of the commissioners
appointed under the conciliatory bills of Parliament. At last, on the
morning of June 18th, the men were withdrawn from the lines and marched
below the city, where they were embarked upon boats and taken over to
Gloucester. This was done so quietly that many of the citizens were not
aware of the departure of the army until they noticed the absence of
the redcoats in the streets. "They did not go away", wrote a resident,
"they vanished."

By narrowly watching the movements of the enemy Washington was
convinced that it was Clinton's intention to march the greater part of
his army across Jersey. In this opinion he was opposed by the erratic
Charles Lee, who had been exchanged, and had reached the camp. Lee
could not believe that the British would give up Pennsylvania, and
argued that it was more probable that they would strike at Lancaster,
or possibly cross the lower Susquehanna and take up a position on its
west bank. Before this, however, Washington had sent all of the Jersey
troops into that State. He had put them under the command of Maxwell,
with directions to coöperate with Dickinson, who commanded the militia,
in opposing any attempt Clinton should make to cross the State. On
the 18th of June George Roberts rode at full speed into camp at Valley
Forge. He had been at the ferry over the Schuylkill at Market Street,
and citizens on the Philadelphia side had shouted over the water that
the British had gone. They had destroyed the bridge, so that he was
unable to cross, but the intelligence could be relied upon. Shortly
afterwards a letter was received from Captain Allen McLane confirming
the news. He had ridden into the city from the north, and had picked up
some stragglers.

Washington had everything in readiness to move the army at a moment's
notice. Six brigades were immediately put in motion, and the remainder
of the army followed the next day. Crossing the Schuylkill at Valley
Forge, Washington marched directly for Coryell's Ferry on the Delaware,
which he crossed on the 22d. He now sent a picked corps under Morgan
to assist Maxwell. At Hopewell a council of war was held. Lee opposed
any attack, and argued that, on military grounds, rather than delay
the British, he would build a bridge of gold to facilitate their
march. He so successfully urged his views that it was decided to
move on a line parallel with the enemy, and send only a detachment
of fifteen hundred men under Scott to aid Maxwell in annoying their
flanks. Greene, Lafayette, and Wayne protested against the decision
of the Council, and as their views agreed with Washington's, and
were supported by Steuben and Du Portail, Washington determined to
attack Clinton if an opportunity offered. For this purpose he moved
his army to Kingston, whence he could strike at Clinton's line if he
attempted to cross the Raritan. He also sent Wayne with a thousand men
and Poor's detachment to join Scott and Maxwell. The command of this
body belonged to Lee, but as he did not approve of the change in the
plans, he declined it in favor of Lafayette. Subsequently, however, Lee
claimed it, and to relieve Washington from an embarrassing position,
and save Lee's feelings, Lafayette magnanimously yielded. The Jersey
militia had turned out in a spirited manner, and under Dickinson and
Forman were doing all in their power to retard Clinton's advance. They
destroyed the bridges as they retired from Haddonfield to Mount Holly,
and filled up the wells so that the enemy could not obtain water. The
heat was intense and the British suffered severely. Clinton arrived at
Crosswicks on the 23d, just in time to save a bridge over the creek at
that place. There he learned that Washington was in Jersey, and would
soon be on his flank if he continued to march in his present direction.
Encumbered as he was with a baggage train twelve miles long, Clinton
knew it would be impossible to protect it in crossing the Raritan. He
determined, therefore, to march by the way of Freehold to the Neversink
Hills, from which place he could embark his army for New York. Morgan
and Maxwell hung on his rear from the time he left Crosswicks, and to
protect his baggage Clinton sent it to the head of the column. As he
approached Freehold, he knew from the frequency with which troops were
seen on his left that he was in close proximity to the American army.
He arrived at Freehold, where the court-house of Monmouth County is
situated, on the morning of the 26th, and there encamped. The head of
his column extended a mile and a half beyond the court-house on the
road to Middletown. His left was on the road just marched over from
Crosswicks to Freehold. The village was entered on the west by a road
leading to Cranberry. It passed over low ground that was intersected
by several swamps and ravines, which, with woods, completely covered
the left of Clinton's line. The American army reached Cranberry,
eight miles from Freehold, on the morning of the 26th. On account of
a violent storm it was obliged to halt there, but the advance under
Lee was within five miles of the enemy. When Washington heard of
Clinton's position he ordered Lee to prepare a plan to attack him as
soon as he resumed his march, unless it should prove that there were
strong reasons for his not doing so. On the evening of the 27th Lee
called his officers together only to tell them that no plan could be
decided upon until the field was reached. At sunrise on the morning
of the 28th, Knyphausen, with the baggage, began his march towards
Middletown. At eight o'clock he was followed by the rest of the army.
Scarcely had the rear-guard moved from its ground when it was fired
upon by the militia under Dickinson. The militia were forced to retire,
and as they did so were met by Lee's detachment as it advanced from
Englishtown. On account of conflicting information the Americans halted
for a short time, and then engaged the enemy and drove them towards
their retreating columns. As matters were growing serious, Clinton
reinforced his rear-guard, and the fighting promised to become general.
But Lee had no faith in the ability of the Americans to cope with the
British, and as the latter occupied strong ground he withdrew his men.
From the time Clinton began his march across Jersey, Lee had contended
that all the Americans could hope to do was to fall upon some isolated
party of the enemy and either rout or capture it. To effect this he
endeavored to draw the rear-guard of the British across the ravines
intersecting the low ground west of Freehold, and while they were thus
separated from the main body to defeat them. But his men could not
understand his strategy. As they were withdrawn from one position after
another they lost heart. It seemed to them that they were flying from
a shadow, and so frequently were they ordered back that the retreat
became rapid and confused. When Washington heard that Dickinson had
engaged the enemy he again sent word to Lee to attack them also, unless
there were powerful reasons for the contrary, and he would support him
with the entire army. The day was excessively hot, and the men threw
off their knapsacks that they might march more quickly. As they came to
the church which stands between Englishtown and Freehold, stragglers
were met who told them that Lee was retreating. Unwilling to believe
the story, Washington spurred to the front to learn the truth. After
passing the ravine which borders the low ground we have spoken of,
on the west, he met Lee and his men in full retreat. A stormy scene
ensued. Overwhelmed by the indignation which Washington manifested,
Lee vainly endeavored to excuse his conduct. Little time, however, was
lost in wasting words. Calling upon Colonels Stewart and Ramsey, who
were near him with their regiments, to check the enemy, then but two
hundred yards distant, Washington crossed the ravine in his rear, and
formed his men as they came up on its western bank. Greene was placed
on the right and Stirling on the left, while Wayne remained east of
the ravine in front of Greene. In this position a severe engagement
took place. Encouraged by the retreat of Lee, Clinton sent additional
reinforcements to his rear, and vainly strove to drive Washington from
his chosen ground. A battery under the Chevalier de Mauduit Duplessis,
planted on an elevation on Greene's right, kept up an effective fire
on the enemy's left, while Wayne repelled a desperate charge led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Monckton, in which that officer fell at the head of
his men. Night ended the conflict, and both parties slept on the ground
which they had occupied. At midnight Clinton withdrew his troops, and,
leaving his dead unburied, resumed his march to Middletown. He retired
so silently that Poor, who lay close to his right, was not aware of the
movement, and on the morning of the 29th the Americans found themselves
alone on the field. By daybreak Clinton was on too strong ground to be
attacked, and after resting his men a few days Washington marched to
the North River, and Clinton embarked for New York.

The battle of Monmouth, as the conflict at Freehold was called, was the
last general engagement fought on Northern soil. The Americans had 229
killed and wounded, the British over 400. Besides this, the latter lost
many by desertion on their march, and numbers fell from the effects of
the heat, which registered ninety-six degrees on the day of the battle.

Lee's conduct would probably have passed unnoticed had he not, in a
letter to Washington, endeavored to defend himself, while he demanded
the grounds which called forth the remarks addressed to him on the
battlefield. The letter was written in a highly improper spirit, and
the result was a court-martial, that found Lee guilty of disobedience
of orders, misbehavior before the enemy, and disrespect of the
commander-in-chief. For these reasons he was suspended from command
for twelve months, and before he was again ordered to service he was
dismissed from the army for having written an impertinent letter to
Congress.

Before leaving Valley Forge, Washington directed General Arnold, who
had not fully recovered from the wounds received at Saratoga, to
proceed to Philadelphia and take military command of the city. The
duties assigned him were of a delicate nature. Congress had ordered
that when the Americans took possession of the city no goods should
be sold or removed until their ownership had been decided upon by a
properly constituted commission. The object of this was to secure for
the army such goods as the British and Tories might have abandoned or
parted with at nominal prices to their friends. In his instructions to
Arnold, Washington had referred him to the resolutions of Congress for
his guidance, and had urged him to take every step in his power to
preserve tranquillity and give security to individuals of every class
until the restoration of civil power. Arnold arrived on the morning of
the 19th of June, and with the approbation of several of the principal
citizens issued a proclamation that closed the stores and suspended
business. It also commanded the citizens to make returns to the town
major of goods in their possession, beyond those needed for family
use, that the purchasing agents of the army might contract for those
they required. The temptation to benefit himself by the power he now
exercised was greater than Arnold could withstand, and three days after
he issued his first proclamation he entered into an agreement with the
clothier-general of the army and another individual, that all goods
purchased for the public and found to be superfluous should be charged
to them and sold for their joint account. It soon became noised about
that Arnold was personally interested in the purchases ostensibly
made for the government, and although the secret of the agreement was
preserved until after his treason, the knowledge of his speculations
in Montreal gave such a color of truth to the rumor that the community
were greatly dissatisfied: besides, he took up his abode in a spacious
mansion on Market Street, formerly the residence of Governor Penn,
which Howe had just vacated, and entered upon a style of living far
beyond his means.

When the exiled Whigs returned to their homes they found the city in
a filthy condition, and its surroundings a scene of desolation. The
houses in the built-up portions of the city were not much injured,
but many of them had been stripped of their furniture, and the papers
were filled with advertisements of missing articles which the owners
hoped to recover. The Supreme Executive Council resumed its sessions
in Philadelphia on the 26th of June. Its patriotic president, Thomas
Wharton, Jr., had died at Lancaster the month previous, and it was
presided over by the vice-president, George Bryan. The Congress
assembled more slowly. On the 2d of July a few delegates gathered in
the State House, and two days afterwards celebrated the anniversary
of Independence at the City Tavern; but it was not until the 7th that
a sufficient number were present to conduct business. On the 12th,
Gérard, the French ambassador, arrived. Until a suitable residence
could be found for him he was the guest of Arnold. Congress received
and entertained him on the 6th of August. No opportunity was lost of
honoring the new ally. On the birthday of Louis XVI. the president
and members of Congress called upon his ambassador and offered their
congratulations, and on the 25th were in turn entertained by Gérard.

In the midst of their rejoicings the Whigs did not forget the Tories,
whom they looked upon as promoters of their sufferings. Many of them
had been attainted of treason while the government was at Lancaster,
but the most obnoxious had gone off with the British. Such as remained
were summoned before the authorities, and so great was the clamor
against them that several were executed for aiding the enemy. The
new Constitution had been put into effect, but it was opposed by a
number of conscientious Whigs, and its administration was largely
in the hands of new men, who did not command universal respect.
The depreciation of the currency had also a demoralizing effect.
Speculation ran wild, and the greatest extravagance prevailed. The
prices of all kinds of commodities rose to enormous figures, and the
attempts of Congress to regulate them by law and fix the value of the
currency only served to increase the evil. The community was soon
divided into two classes. The Anti-Constitutionalists and the Tories
formed one party; the supporters of the new government the other.
The latter zealously advocated all the measures of Congress, and,
classing their opponents under the one head of "Tories", accused them
of being the authors of all the difficulties that embarrassed the
government; it was through their efforts that traitors were allowed to
go unpunished, and the necessaries of life locked up so that higher
prices could be wrung from the people. "Party disputes and personal
quarrels", wrote Washington from Philadelphia, in December, "are the
great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire,
a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and
want of credit ... are but secondary considerations." "Our money", he
continued, "is now sinking fifty per cent. a day in this city; and yet
an assembly, a concert, a dinner, or a supper, that will cost three or
four hundred pounds, will not only take men off from acting in this
business, but even from thinking of it."

It was in a community thus rent by faction and passion that Arnold
commanded. The early restoration of civil power limited his authority,
but his arrogance soon brought him in conflict with the new government.
Unable to brook the restraint it put upon him, he joined its opponents,
and was soon the centre of a gay and fashionable circle that gladly
added so distinguished a soldier to their number. Arnold at that time
was a widower, in his thirty-eighth year. He was of a susceptible
nature, and before long fell in love with Miss Peggy Shippen, the
daughter of Edward Shippen, a leading lawyer of character and
position, whose political opinions caused him to be numbered among
the disaffected. In this company the temptations to spend money were
not easily resisted, and Arnold soon yielded to them. He gave elegant
entertainments, and lived ostentatiously, if not extravagantly. He was
soon involved in debt, and in the hopes of extracting himself entered
into questionable speculations. His quarrel with the state authorities
became more bitter, and in February, 1779, the Council published a
series of charges which were referred to Congress. The committee who
considered them failed to find Arnold guilty of any intentional wrong,
and on the 19th of March he resigned the command of Philadelphia, and
on the 8th of April was married to Miss Shippen. The Pennsylvania
authorities were dissatisfied with the action of the committee of
Congress, and succeeded in having the case reconsidered. After
considerable delay, it was determined that the whole matter should be
referred to a court-martial, to be appointed by the commander-in-chief.
The court met in December, and the following month found Arnold guilty
of two of the charges that had been preferred against him. The most
serious one, that of speculating in goods bought for the public while
the stores were closed, was not sustained for want of evidence, which
was not discovered until after his treason. The acts he was found
guilty of were indiscretions rather than crimes; and for these he was
sentenced to be reprimanded by the commander-in-chief.


EDITORIAL NOTES ON THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

DURING the movements of Washington to check the British in their
attempts to secure New York, what Congress called a flying camp was
formed of some militia in Jersey, under Mercer, to impede the enemy's
advance in case he turned towards Philadelphia.[888]

In Nov., 1776, Washington, crossing into New Jersey,[889] left Lee in
command on the New York side, but Washington, at first requesting,
afterwards instructed Lee to follow him (Sparks's _Washington_, iv.
168, 186-7, 193; 5 Force, iii. 779; _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._, 1872, p.
267). Lee's secret purpose was to find some excuse for delaying, and so
to prolong his independent command, with a chance of making a brilliant
stroke. He endeavored at first to quiet Washington's importunities by
detaching a part of Heath's force at Peekskill, but Heath would take
orders only from Washington (_Memoirs_).[890] Finally Lee was moved to
follow (Dec. 2d and 3d), and while crossing Jersey "to reconquer it" he
was surprised at his transient quarters, Dec. 13, 1776, and captured.
Captain Bradford, Lee's aid, gave Stiles the account which is entered
in his diary (Johnston's _Campaign of 1776, Docs._, p. 146, and _N. E.
Hist. and Geneal. Reg._, 1860, p. 33).[891]

[Illustration: (From the _Gentleman's Magazine_.)]

We have abundant evidence of the consternation which ensued in
Philadelphia upon the advance of the British to Trenton.[892] The
political condition of the government of the colony was very unstable.
The colonial charter, under the instigation of Congress (May 10, 1776),
had been overthrown by a convention called in the interests of the
patriot party, which in July had met to frame a new constitution.[893]
This, however, upon its adoption, failed of being effective, by its
opponents' obstructive movements to prevent the organization of an
executive council, so that in the interim the supreme power, such as it
was, resided in a Council of Safety, which was hampered in its control
of the militia. Such was the conjunction when fear of an invasion
came, and the Quaker element was passive under the alarm, and, indeed,
antagonistic to measures of resistance.[894]

[Illustration: JOS. REED.

From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_ (Lond., 1783). Cf. also _Heads
of illustrious Americans_ (London, 1783). A likeness by C. W. Peale,
engraved by Sartain, is in W. B. Reed's _Life of Jos. Reed_, vol. i. A
copy of the original painting is in the Hist. Society of Penna. There
is also the profile likeness in _2 Penna. Archives_, xi.; Scharf and
Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 279. There is a painting in Independence
Hall by C. W. Peale, which differs from that engraved by Sartain.]

The Jersey campaign in general can be followed in original authorities
in Sparks's _Washington_, vol. iv.; Force's _5 Amer. Archives_, iii.;
in Joseph Reed's "Narrative of the movements of the American army in
the neighborhood of Trenton in the winter of 1776-1777", which, having
been used in Reed's _Reed_, i. ch. 14, is printed in the _Penna. Mag.
of Hist._, Dec., 1884, p. 391; the account by Congress,—not very
correct,—dated Baltimore, Jan. 9, 1777, and sent to France (Lee's _R.
H. Lee_, and E. E. Hale's _Franklin in France_, 97); and the current
reports sent from Boston, Feb. 27, by Bowdoin to Franklin (Hale, p.
110.)[895]

The principal British contemporary accounts are in Stedman, _Annual
Register_, Howe's _Narrative_, the evidence of Cornwallis in the
_Detail and Conduct of the War_, and _Letter to a Nobleman_, 1779.

[Illustration: CHARLES LEE.

From _An Impartial Hist. of the War in America_, Lond., 1780, p. 319,
where the print represents his full length. Compare with this a print
by Thomlinson, published in London, Oct. 31, 1755, with cannon and
a flag bearing the motto "Appeal to Heaven", which is reproduced in
Smith's _British Mezzotint Portraits_, and the engraving by G. R. Hall
in Moore's _Treason of Charles Lee_, and in the quarto edition of
Irving's _Washington_. There is a German print in the _Geschichte der
Kriege in und ausser Europa_ (Nürnberg, 1778).

Dr. Moore considers the only picture of Lee which "bears any
evidence of authenticity, or answers to the descriptions given by
his contemporary friends and biographers", to be one drawn by Barham
Rushbrooke at the time of Lee's return from Poland, and showing him
dressed in the uniform of an aid of King Stanislaus. It was first
engraved in 1813 in Dr. Thomas Gridlestone's treatise to prove that
Lee was Junius, and that writer said of it that, "though designed as a
caricature, it was allowed, by all who knew General Lee, to be the only
successful delineation of his countenance or person." It is familiar in
prints, representing his extremely attenuated figure in profile, with
a small dog in front of him. It is given in Moore's _Treason of Lee_;
Gay's _Pop. Hist. U. S._, iii. 460; in Scull's _Evelyns in America_ (p.
295,—also see p. 196); and in K. M. Rowland's "Virginia Cavaliers" in
the _Southern Bivouac_, April, 1886.

There are views of Lee's house in Virginia in J. E. Cooke's "Historic
houses in the Shenandoah", in _Appleton's Journal_, p. 69, July 19,
1873, and in Mrs. Lamb's _Homes of America_.

The principal sources of Lee's history are: Edward Langworthy's
_Memoirs of the Life of the late Charles Lee, to which are added his
Political and Military Essays_ (London, 1792; Dublin, 1792; New York,
1792, 1793). It was reproduced as _Life and Memoirs of Maj.-Gen.
Charles Lee_ (N. Y., 1795, 1813), as _Political and Military Essays,
with Memoirs_, etc., 2d ed., with App. (London, 1797), and with new
title as _Anecdotes of the late Charles Lee, Esq._ (London, 1797). Cf.
Sparks's _Life of Charles Lee_ (1846); Moore's _Treason of Lee_; the
_Papers of Charles Lee_, published by the N. Y. Hist. Soc. in their
collections; Irving's _Washington_, i. 377; Fonblanque's _Burgoyne_,
160; Jones's _N. Y. during the Rev._, ii. ch. 23; John Bernard's
_Retrospections of America_ (1887), p. 96.]

The story is also told in local monographs,[896] and by the general
historians.[897]

On the temporary clothing of Washington with dictatorial powers, see
the Circular of Congress (Dec. 28th), explaining why it was done
(_Journals_, i. 585). Cf. also Sparks's _Washington_, iv. 550; Greene's
_Greene_, i. 292; Thacher's _Military Journal_, 74; Wells's _Sam.
Adams_, ii. 458, and the adverse views of Abraham Clark in _N. Jersey
Rev. Corresp._, p. 68.

The purpose of some sudden stroke on Washington's part is well
indicated.[898] The advance of Griffin with militia was opportune in
drawing Donop forward to Mount Holly, so that he was too distant to
support Rahl at Trenton.

On the attack on Trenton there is special record from the Washington
papers in Sparks (iv. 242, 246, 541), Dawson, i. 20 (to Congress),
_Mass. Soc. Hist. Col._, xliv. 32 (to Heath, and Heath's letter in
_N. H. State Papers_, viii. 445). Others are in 5 Force, iii., a full
record of the battle. Congress wrote to the agents in France (_Diplom.
Corresp._, i. 246.)[899]

What is known as the Reed-Cadwalader controversy, hinging upon the
alleged weakness or defection of Joseph Reed at this time, is more
particularly examined in another place.

On the English side we have Howe's despatch in Dawson (i. 202) Tryon to
Germain in _N. Y. Col. Doc._ (viii. 694). The effect of the battle in
England to discourage the expatriated loyalists is told in Hutchinson's
_Diary_, ii. 139. Stedman accuses Howe of bad judgment in placing
so unfit a man in command as Rahl. Adolphus (ii. 385), On "private
information" supposed to have been Arnold's, says that Arnold suggested
to Washington the movement, and Mahon (vi. 130) has followed Adolphus.

[Illustration: TRENTON, PRINCETON, MONMOUTH.

From the map in Marshall's _Atlas_ to his _Washington_ (1804). Cf. also
Sparks's _Washington_, iv. 258; Guizot's _Atlas_ to his _Washington_.
The plans of Trenton and Princeton in Carrington (pp. 270, 302) vary
somewhat from the contemporary ones as to roads. The chief contemporary
English map of New Jersey is one based on the surveys of Bernard Ratzer
in 1769, which was published in London, Dec. 1, 1777, by William
Faden, and called _The Province of New Jersey, divided into East and
West, commonly called the Jerseys_ (32 × 23 inches). It was improved
from surveys by Gerard Banker. It was reissued in fac-simile by the
Geological Survey of New Jersey in 1877, and this fac-simile is in W.
S. Sharp's reprint of Smith's _New Jersey_, 1877. Another fac-simile
was published in 1884. A second edition of the original was published
in 1778, corrected by the British and Hessian engineers.

An American map of the campaign, by Erskine, is given in the
illustrated ed. of Irving's _Washington_, ii. 430. There are English
maps in the _Gent. Mag._, Sept., 1776, and in Stedman's _American War_.
Gordon gives a map (vol. ii. 525). Cf. Lossing's _Field-Book_, vol. ii.

We have Hessian maps of some of the movements preceding Howe's
evacuation of New Jersey in 1777, which are among the Faden MS.
maps in the library of Congress, and bear the name of Wangenheim, a
"lieutenant dans les chasseurs Hessois, 1777", namely: No. 75, "Plan
de l'affaire de Westfield et du camp de Raway, 1777, Jan. 26, 27." No.
76, "Plan de notre camp à New Brunswick, le 12^e Juin; notre marche le
14 à Middlebush; la situation du camp le 15^e Juin, et celle de Gen.
Washington à Boundbrook." No. 77, "Position de notre camp le 24 Juin,
1777, à Perth Amboy."]

[Illustration: TRENTON AND PRINCETON.

A section of a large map in the library of Congress, apparently of
Hessian origin, _Plan général des opérations de l'armée Britannique
contre les Rebelles_, etc. The broken lines represent roads. The
Americans are represented by blocks, half white and half black. The
British are solid black. KEY: "76, Marche du Général Cornwallis.
77, Marche du Général Knyphausen le 23 Juin, et son camp près de
Richardstown."]

[Illustration: FADEN'S MAP OF TRENTON AND PRINCETON.

Sketched from a _Plan of the Operations of General Washington against
the king's troops in New Jersey, from the 26th of December, 1776, to
the 3d January, 1777, by William Faden_. London, 15th April, 1777.
This map also makes part of the _American Atlas_, and the original
MS. draft is among the Faden maps in the library of Congress. The map
(the roads being represented by broken lines) bears legends to the
following purport: Washington from his headquarters at Newtown moved
his men on the evening of December 25th to 1, and by 4 o'clock on the
morning of the 26th he had crossed to 2, where he divided his army into
two divisions. The left, composed of 1,200 men with ten field-pieces
under Greene, but accompanied by Washington himself, proceeded through
3 towards Trenton; the right, under Sullivan, consisting of 1,500
men with ten field-pieces, went through 4. Meanwhile "Erwin's" and
Cadwallader's forces came to 5, hoping to cross the ferry, but the ice
in the river prevented. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, Rahl
at Trenton was surprised, and the entire force of Hessians with him
were captured except 200 men, who, with some chasseurs and dragoons,
escaped to "Burdenton", where they net Count Donop, who now, joined
by these fugitives, proceeded with his command to Crosswicks, thence
to Allenstown and Princeton. Washington, after his victory, encamped
at 6, where he was reinforced by troops from Virginia, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania. On January 2d the position was this: Washington had been
confronted at 7 by the advance of Cornwallis at 8. The second brigade
of the British under Leslie was at Maidenhead, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Mawhood, with the 17th, 40th, and 55th British regiments, was on the
road at 10,—all these troops having moved forward from Princeton
after Washington's attack at Trenton. During the night of January 2d,
Washington having withdrawn his detachments over the bridge, left fires
along the southern bank of the Assumpink Creek to deceive the British,
and marched from his camp at 6 to Allenstown, then turned towards
Princeton, but his force in part left the road, and by the dotted line
proceeded to 9, and on the morning of Jan. 3d attacked Mawhood at 10.
Of the three British regiments here, the 17th was driven upon Leslie
at Maidenhead, while the 40th and 55th retreated through Princeton and
Kingstown towards Brunswick, beyond 12. Washington followed them to
Kingstown and encamped there on Jan. 3, after having broken down the
bridge over the Millstone to interfere with Cornwallis's overtaking
him. On Jan. 4 Washington took the road through 11 to the passes in the
hills, while Cornwallis, reaching Kingstown the same day, proceeded
through 12 towards Brunswick.]

[Illustration: TRENTON.

Wiederhold's plan from the archives at Marburg, sketched from a
fac-simile furnished by Mr. E. J. Lowell. (Cf. his _Hessians_, 92.)
_A_ marks the centre of the village. The Hessian outposts were at
_B_, one officer and 24 men; _C_, Captain Altenbocum's company of the
Lossberg regiment, quartered in the neighborhood, which formed in
front of the captain's quarters, while the picket at _B_ occupied the
enemy; _D_, one captain, one officer, and 75 men; _E_, one officer and
50 Jägers, who retreated over the bridge on Sullivan's approach; _F_,
one officer and 30 men, who joined Donop over the Bordentown road. The
two columns of Washington and Sullivan emerged from the woods at _G
G_. The broken lines (— — — —) indicate their line of march and
successive positions, till they surrounded the Hessians. The beginning
of the dotted lines (. . . . .) in the village shows where the Hessians
attempted to form; but Rahl and Lossberg were driven back to _H_,
and Knyphausen to _J_, and surrounded they surrendered. Knyphausen
endeavored to reach the bridge, having with him the Lossberg cannon,
which got stuck in the marsh at _K_, and the delay in extricating
them was sufficient for Sullivan to occupy the bridge and cut off
Knyphausen's retreat. His own cannon were at _M_, and were not used.
Rahl's cannon were at _N_, and early dismounted. The Americans used
cannon at _s s s_, etc. There is also among the Rochambeau maps (no.
18) a map done in faint colors, with an elaborate key, which is marked
_Engagement de Trenton_, by Wiederhold, measuring about eight inches
wide by ten high. A French plan is given in _Mag. of Amer. Hist._,
1880, p. 369. Cf. map in Raum's _Trenton_; Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 228 (with Rahl's headquarters, p. 228, and a view, p. 222).
Carrington's special map of Trenton (p. 278) gives more detail than the
contemporary plans.]

Bancroft (ix. 217; cf. Irving, ii. 466) notes the Hessian journals
which he had used.[900]

The affair at Princeton has special treatment in the Washington papers
(Sparks, iv. 259; Dawson, i. 204), and is necessarily covered by the
general historians.[901] On the English side Howe's letter (Jan. 5,
1777) to Germain is the principal source, and it will be found in
_Gent. Mag._, Feb., 1777; C. C. Haven's _Thirty days_, 60; Dawson, i.
210. Cf. Mahon, vi. 132.[902]

[Illustration: FROM WILKINSON'S ATLAS.

Sullivan delayed at F to give Washington a chance to make his longer
detour by A before he (Sullivan) advanced by D. Washington attacked
at B, and threw out riflemen at G and H. Rahl, deserted by a part of
his force, who fled to Donop at Bordentown, surrendered at I, when he
became aware of Sullivan's approach behind him.

Wilkinson also gives a map showing the movements between Dec. 25, 1776,
and Jan. 3, 1777, and this is the basis of the map in C. C. Haven's
_New Historic Manual concerning the battles of Trenton and Princeton_
(Trenton, 1871).]

[Illustration: FROM WILKINSON'S ATLAS.

The advance, with which Wilkinson was, came by G to the vicinity of
the wood A and Quaker meeting-house B. The main column turned off and
followed the line _b_. Gen. Mercer proceeded to _f_. A detachment of
the British at _d_, with officers reconnoitring at _a a_, discovered
the American line on the route _h_; but coming to _g_, they also
discovered Mercer at _f_, who wheeled by the line _c_, and gaining
the orchard of Wm. Clark's house (5) confronted at 1—2 the British
detachment now formed at 3—4. The Americans retreated when the British
advanced to the slope (_o o o_), where they saw Moulder's battery,
X, near Thomas Clark's house (7), which Washington had sent from his
main line at _h_, together with other troops by the line _r r_, which
induced the British to retreat on the line _e e_, while Mawhood,
their commander, fled with a few infantry by the line, _s s_. At this
juncture another British regiment, which had advanced from Princeton to
C, fell back, and joining other troops took post at K and C, where they
confronted Washington's main body, which now deployed at _i i_; and as
the Americans attacked, the British fled to the college building (P),
and then beyond by the route _t t_. Cf. plan in Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 235. Carrington's plan of Princeton (p. 278) gives further details
from later study.]

[Illustration: CAMPAIGN OF 1777.

A map in Captain Hall's _Hist. of the Civil War in America_ (London,
1780), vol. i.]

Howe's campaign of 1777 was the ruin of his military reputation.[903]
Jones, in his severe criticism upon Howe, unjustly charges Galloway
with making the suggestion of the expedition to the Head of Elk.[904]
It is certain that Galloway threw himself upon Howe's protection not
far from the time when Howe committed himself to a plan of capturing
Philadelphia. About the same time it has been charged that General Lee,
by a treasonable project, aided Howe's purposes in the same direction.

[Illustration: CAMPAIGN OF 1777.

From Galloway's _Letters to a Nobleman_, London, 1779. KEY: _A_, the
British army before the battle of Brandywine. _B_, Gen. Knyphausen's
advance to the attack. _C_, Lord Cornwallis having turned the right
wing of the rebel army. _D_, Sullivan advanced to oppose him. _E_,
position of the rebel army. _F_, General Howe's quarters, in which
he remained five days after the rebel defeat. _a a a_, Washington's
retreat to Chester and Philadelphia. _G_, his camp at Chester, where
he remained fourteen hours after the battle. The roads with the zigzag
mark show those by which the rebels might have been intercepted after
the battle. _H_, Washington's flight after the skirmish at Goshen.
_I_, Washington's retreat when Sir Wm. Howe crossed the Schuylkill.
_K_, Washington's camp, whence he marched to surprise the British
army at Germantown, and to which he retreated after the battle. _L_,
Washington's camp at Whitemarsh. (For his headquarters see Lossing's
_Field-Book_, ii. 321, and his _Mary and Martha Washington_, p. 162.)
_M_, the first position of the British. _N_, the second. _O, O, O_,
where Washington's camp might have been attacked with advantage. _P_,
British camp at Germantown. The line ——— denotes marches of the
British army; the line of dots . . . . . . . . the marches of the rebel
army. _Q_, Washington's lines at Valley Forge in the winter 1777.
_R, R, R, R, R_, positions which might have been taken to besiege
or assault the rebel quarters. _S_, the bridge. This map is also
reproduced in _The Evelyns in America_, p. 252.

The principal contemporary engraved maps of this part of the country
were the 1770 edition of Scull's _Map of Pennsylvania_ (see Vol. V. p.
240), which was at this time included in the _American Atlas_ (London,
1776), and the _Atlas Amériquain_ (Paris, 1777), and Pownall's edition,
1776, of Evans's _Map of the Middle Colonies_ (see Vol. V. p. 85), as
well as Jefferys' edition, 1775, of the same, not so accurate. To these
might be added Montresor's _Province of New York and Pennsylvania,
1777_; Mellish and Tanner's _Seat of War in America_; Faden's map of
July 1, 1778, given in fac-simile in the _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i.
285; the maps in the _Gentleman's Mag._, 1776 and 1777; Almon's _Seat
of War in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 1777_. A modern
map, covering the same field to illustrate the campaign, is given in
Theodore W. Bean's _Washington at Valley Forge one hundred years ago_,
and is repeated, with a few changes, in _Proceedings at the Dedication
of the Paoli Monument_ (Westchester, 1877). The contemporary French
maps are Du Chesnoy's _Théâtre de la Guerre_, 1775-1778, Beaurain's
_Carte pour servir à l'intelligence de la guerre_ (Paris, 1777), Brion
de la Tour's _Théâtre de la Guerre_ (Paris, 1777), with another by
Phelippeaux "pour servir de suite", and Bourgoin's _Théâtre de la
Guerre_ (Paris). There is a German map in the _Geschichte der Kriege in
und ausser Europa_. There is in the Maryland Hist. Soc. library a map
of stage routes between Baltimore and New York, showing the operations
of the British from Elk River (1777) to Neversink (1778). (Lewis
Mayer's _Catal. of MSS. etc., in Maryland Hist. Soc._, 1854.)

Cf. also the maps in Sparks's _Washington_, v. 66; Moore's _Diary of
the Revolution_, orig. ed., 495; _Penna. Archives_, 2d ser. vol. iii.;
Moorsom's _Fifty-second Regiment_; Hamilton's _Coldstream Guards_;
Carrington's _Battles_, p. 398.]

George H. Moore laid before the N. Y. Hist. Soc., in June, 1859, the
document in Lee's handwriting, dated March 29, 1777, while he was a
prisoner in New York, in which he sketches a plan for Howe's guidance
in the coming campaign. The "plan" in fac-simile, together with an
elucidation of it, was printed in Moore's _Treason of Charles Lee_,
New York, 1860. The "plan" is also in _N. Y. Hist. Soc. Coll._,
1872, p. 361. Lee was at that time trying to induce Congress to send
commissioners to New York to confer with him (Bancroft, ix. ch. 19),
but Congress was not ensnared. Moore contends (p. 84) that the "plan"
is responsible for Howe turning towards Philadelphia, instead of going
north to help Burgoyne. Bancroft (ix. 333; also see p. 211) asserts
that it could have had no influence on Howe's movements.[905]

Lecky quotes Galloway's testimony, that of the 66,000 men voted by
Congress for this campaign, hardly 16,000 were in the field. Bancroft
admits that no one better than Marshall (iii. ch. 3) has described the
part of Washington in this campaign.[906]

At the opening of the campaign Washington was kept long in suspense
as to the purpose of Howe. The eastern people feared his object
was Boston.[907] Alexander Hamilton early in the season had become
Washington's aide, and his letters at once begin to contain
speculations on Howe's purpose (_Works_, Lodge's ed., vii. 481,
496, 500). On May 28th, Washington moved his headquarters from
Morristown[908] to Middlebrook, and it was thought Howe would attempt
to march direct for Philadelphia. On June 12th, Sullivan writes to
Weare that Howe was to be confronted the next day (_N. H. State
Papers_, viii. 584); and when it was known that Howe was retiring
towards New York, Washington, June 23d, little credited a report, then
prevalent, that the British army was panic-struck (_Mass. Hist. Soc.
Coll._, vii. 138).[909] Cf., for all these movements, Montresor's
_Journal_.

[Illustration: GENERAL HOWE.

From _The Impartial Hist. of the War in America_.]

In July, when news came of the fall of Ticonderoga, there were no
signs that Howe was preparing to coöperate with Burgoyne, and Hamilton
wondered (_Works_, vii. 507, 515). When Howe sailed from New York,
Washington was in suspense.[910] On July 31st, it was learned that
Howe's fleet was at the capes of Delaware, and the next day the
vessels had disappeared.[911] It was now supposed that Howe had gone
to Charleston, S. C., and that Washington might safely reinforce the
Northern army (_Hamilton's Works_, vii. 517). Lafayette first took
his seat at a council of war called to consider the propriety of this
(Sparks's _Washington_, v. 445).

In August, 1777, Gen. Sullivan conducted a raid into Staten Island to
seize Tories. He captured some papers which implicated the Philadelphia
Quakers in inimical movements. (Cf. _Journals of Congress_, ii.
246, 253.) In other respects the incursion was unfortunate, and
his movements were examined by a court of inquiry, which acquitted
him.[912]

Howe had been six weeks at sea, with three weeks' provisions, when he
landed at the Head of Elk.[913]

Upon Washington's march to confront Howe, see, for the preliminary
movements, William J. Buck's paper on "Washington's Head Quarters on
the Neshaminy", in the _Penna. Mag. Hist._, i. 275.[914]

[Illustration: GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE.

From Andrews's _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. i. It is
reëngraved in Gay's _Pop. Hist. U.S._, iii. 412. Cf. engraving in
Irving's _Washington_, illus. ed., New York, 1857, ii. Sargent gives a
clever presentation of the character of Howe in his _André_, p. 136.]

Upon the battle on the Brandywine the main American source is the
letters of Washington. With Washington's aid, R. H. Harrison wrote
to Congress from Chad's Ford, Sept. 11th, at 5 P. M., a letter which
was at once circulated in broadside (Sabin, iii. p. 463; Hildeburn,
no. 3,533). Pickering drafted for the commander-in-chief the report
(_Life of T. Pickering_, i. 157) written at Chester, at midnight,
September 11th (Sparks, i. 251; v. 58; Dawson, i. 278). Hamilton was
on Washington's staff (J. C. Hamilton's _Life of Hamilton_). C. C.
Pinckney, also on the staff, wrote a letter in 1820 (_Hist. Mag._,
July, 1866, x. 202). Marshall, as a participant, drew somewhat upon
personal experience in his account in the _Life of Washington_.
Lafayette's narrative, as given to Sparks, is in the _Sparks MSS._ (no.
xxxii. Cf. also Lafayette's _Mémoires_). There is a journal of Capt.
William Beatty, of the Maryland line, in the _Hist. Mag._, 2d. ser., i.
79. Sparks examines some of the disputed points of the battle.[915]

There are contemporary records and opinions in the _Penna. Archives_,
2d ser., x. 316; the letter of the N. H. delegates in Congress in _N.
H. State Papers_, viii. 678; current reports in Moore's _Diary_, 495;
gossip in Adams's _Familiar Letters_, 296, etc.; Knox's account (Sept.
13th) in Drake's _Knox_, 48.[916]

On the British side, we find Howe's report, Oct. 10th, to Germain in
Almon, v. 409; Dawson, i. 281. Cf. the evidence before Parliament in
the _Conduct of the War_ and the narrative in Stedman.[917]

The Hessian participancy is examined in Lowell's _Hessians_, 197.
Bancroft quotes Ewald's _Beyspiele grosser Helden_ as the testimony of
an eye-witness of Washington's well-conducted retreat.[918]

A portion of the British troops used breech-loaders.[919]

The movements of the opposing armies toward Philadelphia can be
followed in the main in the authorities cited for the battle. Some
local details are in Pennypacker's _Phœnixville_, and an account of the
damage done by the British on the march is in Smith's _Delaware County_
(p. 544).

For the Paoli attack, we have Wayne's defence at the court-martial in
Dawson, i. 315, and in the _One hundredth anniversary of the Paoli
massacre_, p. 52, which last contains also, beside sundry contemporary
records, the addresses of J. S. Futhey (also in _Penna. Mag. Hist._, i.
285) and Wayne McVeagh. The report of Howe to Germain is in Dawson, i.
317.[920]

On Sept. 26th, Washington described the state of the army, then at
Potsgrove (_Mag. Amer. Hist._, Nov., 1884, p. 461). He was foiled by
a rain in an effort to hold the British once more at bay, and Howe
entered Philadelphia.[921]

[Illustration:

NOTE TO THE OPPOSITE MAP.—Washington's map of the Brandywine campaign,
on the opposite page, is reduced from a tracing of the original in the
possession of the Pennsylvania Historical Society. The legends upon it
in Washington's handwriting are noted in the following key by letters,
while those of the surveyor are given by figures. At one end of the
map is the following inscription: "Laid down at 200 p^s in an Inch,
the 27^{th} day of August, An. Dom^i 1777. P^r Jais. Broom, Surv^r. N.
Castle Co^y." At the other end is the following table:—

                                        "_m._  _q._  _p^s._
  From Chester County to Brandywine       7     0     21
  From Brandywine to New Castle           6     1     19
  From New Castle to Red Lyon             7     1      0
  From Red Lyon to St. George             3     2     46
  From St. George to Cantwell's Bridge    7     0     60
  From Cantwell's to Blackbird            5     2     70
                                         ——     —     ——
                                         37     0     56

  From Chester County to Brandywine       7     0     21
  From Brandywine to Newport              4     0     79
  From Newport to Bridgetown              5     0     12
  From Bridgetown to Red Lyon             4     0     19
  From Red Lyon to Harris Inn             5     2     51
  From Harris Inn to Witherspoon's        6     1     44
  From Witherspoon's to Blackbird         6     1     42
                                         ——     —     ——
                                         38     3     28

  From New Castle to Christiana Bridge    4   3    45"

KEY: A, Chandler Ford, very good, but very broken ground and narrow
defiles on the Et. side. B, Fording place by Thomas Gibson's. C, To
Gibson's Ford. D, Road leading to Kennet's Square. E, Road leading
towards Red Clay Creek. F, Hendrickson's Tavern. G, Richland fording
place. H, Tavern. I, Smith's Store. J, James Walker. K, Mill Town. L,
Rising Sun Tavern.

1, The Bottom Road, passing Brandywine at Chad's Ford (18). 2,
Newlin's. 3, The line dividing the counties of Chester and Newcastle.
[This is the curved northern boundary of Delaware.] 4, Gibson's Mill.
5, Gibson's Ford. The Center Road [runs to F]. 6, Kennet Meeting-house.
7, Clark's Inn. 8 [to 7 and beyond], The Road leading from Wilmington
to Kennet's. 9, Naaman's Creek. 10, Grubb's Inn. Grubb's Road [leads
from 10 to 5]. 11, The Road leading from Wilmington to Chester. 12,
Shelpot Creek. 13, Foulk's Road. 14, The Concord Road. 15, Brandywine
Creek. This creek, except the fording place, impassable. 16, Bridge.
17, M'Kim's [?] Mill. 18, Chad's Ford. 19, 20, Delaware River. 21,
Wm. Miller's Mill. 22, Red Clay Creek. 23, Christiana River. 24, The
Borough of Wilmington. 25, The Road leading from Wilmington towards
Lancaster. 26, Mill Creek. 27, Bridge. 28, The Road leading from
Wilmington to Newcastle. 29, Ferry. 30, Newport. 31, The Road leading
from Newport towards Lancaster with bridge at 32. 33, The Lancaster
Road. 34, Mill creek. 35, Bridge. 36 [to 46], White Clay Creek. 37, New
Castle. 38, The Road leading from N. Castle to Christiana Bridge. 39,
Bridge [Christiana]. 40, Hamburgh. 41, [The Road] to the Red Lyon. 42,
The Road leading from New Castle to the Elk River. 43, The Road leading
from Christiana Bridge to Elk River. 44, Ogle Town. 45, The Road
leading from Ogletown to the Head of Elk. 46, Mill of Capt. Black's.
47, 48, [Shaded space showing where the original is worn through].
49, Newark. 50, The Road to Johnson Ferry on Susquehanna. 51, [Road
to Nottingham]. 52, Iron Hill. 53, The Road leading from Red Lyon to
Black Bird Creek. 54, St. George's Creek. 55, Mill Pond. 56, Trap [?]
57, Drawyer's Creek. 58, Appoquinimink Creek. 59, Cantwell's Bridge.
60, Witherspoon's. 61, Part of Bohemia. 62, The upper Road leading from
Red Lyon to Blackbird Creek. 63, Clemon Mill. 64, Elk. 65, Part of
Elk River. 66, Joseph Gilpin's. 67, Harris Inn. 68, The Road leading
towards Bohemia.]

Sullivan, with the charge of inefficiency for Brandywine still hanging
over him, was the first to encounter the outposts of the British at
Chestnut Hill, when he opened the day of Germantown. His letter (Oct.
25th) addressed to the president of New Hampshire was first printed by
Sparks.[922]

Washington's letters to Congress and others are of the first
importance.[923]

In Timothy Pickering's _Life_ (i. 166) there is an account of the
battle from his journal, which sustains the positions taken by
Pickering in 1826,—though he does not refer to it at that time,—in
the controversy which was waged by him and Sparks with Johnson, the
author of the _Life of Greene_.[924]

[Illustration: BRANDYWINE.

Sketched from a large MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress, _Plan
générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les Rebelles_,
etc. KEY: "19, Marche de l'armée pour New Gardens. 22, Marche du
général Knyphausen pour Kennet Square, 9 Sept. 24, Camp que l'armée
occupa aux environs de Kennet Square. 26, Marche du général Cornwallis
vers le Brandywine. 30, Première position du Gen. Cornwallis. 31,
2me position de ce général. 32, Attaque de ce général. 33, Position
des enemis. 34, Retraite des enemis. 38, Marche du corps detaché à
Wilmington. 57, Marche du corps detaché à Wilmington pour Philadelphia
le 16 Oct." The lines (·–·–) represent roads.

The published plans of Brandywine are the following: In the
_Examination of Joseph Galloway and letters on the Conduct of the war_.
In Sparks's _Washington_, v. 58. Cf. also Duer's _Stirling_, ii.;
Irving's _Washington_, iii. 190. In Marshall's _Washington_, vol. v.
Sketch by J. S. Bowen and J. S. Futhey in _Penna. Hist. Soc. Bull._,
i. no. 7 (1846). In _Penna. Archives_, 2d ser., x. 316; Carrington's
_Battles_, p. 382; Hamilton's _Grenadier Guards_, ii.; Lowell's
_Hessians_, 198; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 377 (with views of the
ground, 378, 379).

There are among the Faden maps (nos. 78, 79) in the library of Congress
a careful topographical drawing of the battle of Brandywine, and a
corrected proof of the map as published by Faden in 1778. There are
among the Faden maps (nos. 80, 80½) plans, by the Hessian Wangenheim,
of the camp at Wilmington to cover the British hospitals after the
fight at Brandywine, and a map of the positions of the army in the
action of Sept. 19th, as well as Cornwallis's march in November to
Philadelphia.]

Of the writers near the event, Gordon drew from original sources;
Marshall was an actor in the scenes; and there are accounts in
Wilkinson, i. 353, 359, 361. G. W. P. Custis's _Recollections_, ch. 4,
and the later writers need to be consulted.[925]

On the English side, Howe's despatch to Germain is in Dawson (i. 330).
The letter of a British officer, dated Philadelphia, Oct. 19, 1777
(London Chronicle, Jan. 3-6, 1778), is reprinted in _Penna. Mag. of
Hist._, April, 1887, p. 112.[926]

[Illustration: TRUDRUFFRIN, OR PAOLI.

Sketched from a portion of a MS. Hessian map in the library of
Congress, called _Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique
contre les Rebelles_, etc. The lines ·–·– represent roads.

KEY: "41, marche du général Knyphausen et son camp le 18^{me}; 42,
marche du général Cornwallis le même jour; 43, camp du corps près de
Valley Forge; 44, corps des Rebelles surpris par le général Grey le
21^{me}; 45, camp et marche du général Knyphausen le 21^{me}; 46,
marche de l'armée par le Schuylkill près de Valley Forge, et le camp
qu'elle occupa le 23^{me} près de Norris Town House." The British are
shown in solid black blocks, the Americans in black and white.]

[Illustration:

NOTE.—This map is a fac-simile from one of Faden's maps. There is
among the copies of the Lafayette maps in the Sparks collection at
Cornell University one of the _British Camp at Trudruffrin, from the
13th to the 21st of September, with the attack made by Major-General
Grey against the Rebels near White Horse tavern on the 20th of
September_. This is merely a transcript of the Faden map, of which
there is a fac-simile in _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i. 285. Cf. _Penna.
Archives_, 2d ser., x. 316. The MS. of Faden's maps is among the Faden
maps in the library of Congress (no. 81). There is a view of the Paoli
monument in Scharf and Westcott's _Philad._, i. 349, and in Lossing's
_Field-Book_, ii. 372.]

[Illustration: From _Pennsylvania Archives_ (2d ser., vol. xi. p. 191).

Cf. the maps in Scharf and Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 353, and in
_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i. 375.]

The seaward defence of Philadelphia depended on the forts Mercer
and Mifflin, on the _chevaux-de-frise_ in the river, and on the
Pennsylvania navy. Howe's first attempt, in October, to get his
shipping up to support his army failed.[927]

[Illustration: MONTRESOR'S PLAN OF GERMANTOWN.

NOTE.—This map is sketched after an original in Harvard College
library. There is a duplicate, evidently made by the same hand, among
the Peter Force maps, in the library of Congress. The map was engraved
and published in London. There is a map published by Faden in London,
March 12, 1784, which is not trustworthy, however, as to roads, which
was called _Sketch of the Surprise of Germantown by the American forces
commanded by General Washington, Oct. 4, 1777, by J_[ohn] _Hills, Lt.
23d Reg._

Other published maps are the following: in Johnson's _Greene_, i. 80
(showing three stages); Sparks's _Washington_, v. 86 (also in Duer's
_Stirling_, ii. 177; Irving's illustrated _Washington_, iii. 286;
Guizot's _Atlas_); Carrington's _Battles_, 392; Lossing's _Field-Book_,
ii. 314; Scharf and Westcott's _Philad._, i. 354; _Penna. Archives_, 2d
ser., xi. 188; _Penna. Mag. of Hist._, i. 368.

For views of the Chew House, see Day's _Hist. Coll. of Penna._,
492; Scharf and Westcott's _Philad._, i. 356; Egle's _Penna._, 178;
Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 514; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._ (March, 1880),
iv. 192.

The following are the main portions of Howe's despatch to Lord George
Germain, dated at Germantown, Oct. 10, 1777: "The enemy marched at
six o'clock in the evening of the third from their camp near Skippach
Creek, about sixteen miles from Germantown. This village forms one
continued street for two miles, which the line of the encampment, in
the position the army then occupied, crossed at right angles, near a
mile from the head of it, where the second battalion of light infantry
and the fortieth regiment were posted. At three o'clock in the morning
of the fourth, the patrols discovered the enemy's approach, and the
army was immediately ordered under arms. Soon after the break of day
the enemy began their attack upon the second light infantry, which
they sustained for a considerable time, supported by the fortieth
regiment; but at length being overpowered by increasing numbers, the
light infantry and a part of the fortieth retired into the village,
when Lieutenant-Colonel Mulgrave with six companies of the latter corps
threw themselves into a large stone house [Chew's], which, though
surrounded by a brigade, and attacked by four pieces of cannon, he most
gallantly defended, until Major-General Grey, at the head of three
battalions of the third brigade, turning his front to the village, and
Brigadier-General Agnew, who covered Major-General Grey's left with
the fourth brigade, by a vigorous attack repulsed the enemy with great
slaughter. The fifth and fifty-fifth regiments from the right, engaging
them at the same on the other side of the village, completed the defeat
of the enemy in this quarter. The regiments of Du Corps and Donop being
formed to support the left of the fourth brigade and one battalion of
the Hessian grenadiers in the rear of the Chasseurs, were not engaged.
The precipitate flight of the enemy preventing the two first corps from
entering into action, and the success of the Chasseurs in repelling all
efforts against them on that side, did not call for the support of the
latter. The first light infantry and the pickets of the line in front
of the right wing were engaged soon after the attack began upon the
head of the village. The pickets were obliged to fall back, but the
light infantry, being well supported by the fourth regiment, sustained
the enemy's attack with such determined bravery that they could not
make the least impression on them.

"Two columns of the enemy were opposite to the guards, twenty-seventh
and twenty-eighth regiments, who formed the right of the line.
Major-General Grant, who was upon the right, moved up the forty-ninth
regiment about the time that Major-General Grey had forced the enemy in
the village, and then advancing with the right wing, the enemy's left
gave way, and was pursued through a strong country between four and
five miles.

"Lord Cornwallis, being early apprised, at Philadelphia, of the enemy's
approach, put in motion the two battalions of the British and one of
the Hessian grenadiers, with a squadron of dragoons, and his lordship
getting to Germantown just as the enemy had been forced out of the
village, he joined Major-General Grey, when, placing himself at the
head of the troops, he followed the enemy eight miles on the Skippach
road; but such was the expedition with which they fled, he was not able
to overtake them. The grenadiers from Philadelphia, who, full of ardor,
had run most of the way to Germantown, could not arrive in time to join
in the action."]

[Illustration: GERMANTOWN AND VICINITY.

Sketched from a part of a large map in the library of Congress,
evidently of Hessian origin,—_Plan générale des opérations de l'armée
Britannique contre les Rebelles_, etc. (August, 1776 to 1779). From
the Renvoy the interpretation of the following numbers is taken: "40,
marche du général Cornwallis le 16^{me}; 47, marche du général de
Knyphausen vers Germantown et le camp qu'il occupa le 23^{me} près
de ce village; 48, marche du général Cornwallis vers Germantown et
son camp près de village; 50, campment de l'armée aux environs de
Germantown; 51, emplacement des enemies et leur attaque; 52, la maison
deffendue par le Colonel Musgrave avec un partie du 40^{me} regiment;
54, retraite de l'enemie." The lines (·–·–) mark the roads.]

The _chevaux-de-frise_ at Billingsport was laid by Robert Whyte, who
went subsequently over the enemy, and he is charged with placing it
purposely in a defective manner. Wallace (p. 228, with plans, p.
134), who examines the evidence, seems to think the charge is proved.
Respecting the share of the navy in the defence of the river, the
principal sources are the minutes of the naval board, etc., in _2
Penna. Archives_, vol. i., and other papers in iv. 748. An examination
of this defence is made in Wallace, p. 130, etc.[928]

[Illustration: STENTON (JAMES LOGAN'S HOUSE).

This view of the house occupied by Howe and Washington as headquarters
is taken from a painting in the Penna. Hist. Society. It is a rear view
of the building. There is in the same collection a pen-and-ink sketch
by Joseph Pennell. The position of the house can be seen in the map on
another page, called "Approaches to Germantown." Howe occupied it at
the time of the battle of Germantown. Cf. Scharf and Westcott, p. 871.]

[Illustration: FADEN'S MAP OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE DELAWARE.

Sketched from an adaptation of Faden's _Course of the Delaware river
from Philadelphia to Chester, exhibiting the several works erected by
the rebels to defend its passage, with the attacks made upon them by
his majesty's land and sea forces, engraved by Wm. Faden, 1778_, which
is given in Wallace's _Col. Wm. Bradford_, p. 228.

KEY: 1, Lord Howe in the "Eagle", with the "Apollo" and transports; 2,
the "Camille" and "Zebra;" 3, the "Vigilant" and "Fury", which moved
up by the dotted line to a position in the channel between Mud Island
and Carpenter's Island, to attack Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island; 4, the
"Experiment" and transports, below the "lower stackadoes" (shown by the
zigzag line) through which there was a passage of seventeen feet near
the fort at "Billingport", which was abandoned to Lt.-Col. Stirling,
Oct. 1st; 5, camp on Nov. 18th; 6, wreck of "Merlin;" 7, the "Augusta"
blown up; at these points (6 and 7) were the other British vessels,
"Somerset", "Isis", "Roebuck", "Pearl", "Liverpool", "Cornwallis's
galley",—some attacking Fort Mifflin, others engaging the American
fleet at 8, others the battery of two 18-pounders and two 9-pounders
at 10; the house of Tench Frances is between this battery and Manto
Creek; 8, between the American fleet at this point and Mud Island is
the "upper stackadoes" (shown by the zigzags); 9, the nearer of the
two islands off Fort Mercer is Woodberry Island, and the other is Red
Bank Island. These two islands have since disappeared. The rest of
the American fleet was at this point. Beside the shore batteries on
Carpenter's Island, there was a redoubt further inland, and another
redoubt protected Webb's Ferry and the road to Philadelphia.]

Upon the attack of Donop on Fort Mercer, at Red Bank (Oct. 22), the
letter received by Washington from Major Ward, written at the desire of
the commander of the fort, Col. Christopher Greene (cf. Greene's _Nath.
Greene_, i. 489), is in Sparks's _Washington_, v. 112, and Dawson, i.
355, as is also Commodore Hazlewood's description of the naval part of
the attack.[929]

[Illustration: LAFAYETTE'S VICTORY NEAR GLOUCESTER, N.J.

This sketch follows a colored map among the Lafayette maps in the
Sparks collection at Cornell University, entitled _Carte de l'action de
Gloucester entre un parti Américain, sous le G^l. Lafayette et un parti
des Troupes de Lord Cornwallis, commandé par ce G^l. après son fourage
dans le Jersey, le 25 9^{bre}, 1777_. While Lafayette's forces were at
Haddonfield, the enemy at Gloucester were reconnoitred from Sand Point
(1), and when the troops moved along the Haddonfield road the American
riflemen (6), supported by the militia, attacked the Hessian outposts
(9), when detachments were stationed on the cross-roads (7, 7) to
protect the American right flank, while some chasseurs (8) threatened
the Hessians' right flank. The enemy were driven back (10) till
Cornwallis supported them with some English. They were still further
pushed back till within a mile of Gloucester (11), when night closed
the conflict. The legend on the map puts the English and Hessians (2,
3, 9) at 5,000 men, the boats (4) representing the withdrawal of part
of them with their baggage across the river.

Lafayette's narrative, as given by him to Sparks, is in the _Sparks
MSS._, no. xxxii.]

Lafayette talked with Sparks of Donop (_Sparks MSS._, xxxii.).
Knyphausen's report is in the archives at Marburg, and is used by
Lowell (_Hessians_, 206). The despatches of the Howes are in Almon (v.
499), and Dawson (i. 356, 357).

[Illustration: (From a large map in the library of Congress.)]

Of the attack (Nov. 10-16) on Fort Mifflin (Mud Island) and its
evacuation, with the opening of the river to the British fleet, the
best garner of contemporary accounts with comment, is in Wallace's
_Bradford_ (p. 194, etc.), but some of this material is found also
elsewhere.[930]

There has been some dispute over the respective claims of Col. Samuel
Smith[931] and Commodore Hazlewood for the defence of the fort
(Wallace, App. 10).

[Illustration: FLEURY'S PLAN OF FORT MIFFLIN.

NOTE.—The annexed plan is a fac-simile, somewhat reduced, of a
pen-and-ink sketch among the Sparks maps in the library of Cornell
University. It is endorsed "Maj. Fleury's Plan of Fort Mifflin", and it
bears also on the back in the author's hand these words:

"The engineer author of this imperfect draugh begg endulgence for it;
considering that he has not paper, pen, rule, neither circel, and being
disturbed by good many shells or cannon balls flying in the fort. LEWIS
FLEUR."

The reverse also bears an "Explanation" in French in Fleury's hand, and
beneath an English translation in another hand, seemingly made at the
time. This last is as follows:—

"Explanation—All marked A are new works. A 1, 2, 3. Traverses to
defend the battery from ricochet shot. A 4, 5. Ditches to close the
left of the battery, which was open. A 6. A double iron chain which
encloses the right of the battery. A 7. Pits with sharp upright stakes
to defend the approaches to our enclosure. A 8. Banquet raised round
the wall. A 9. Ditches and parapet of reunion between our barracks,
which will make a second inclosure and be furnished with loop-holes. A
10. Last retreat in the middle of the Fort, made when we had only 120
men in garrison. A 11. Demilunes to flank the front, substituted to
[_sic_] the block house, which was blown up. A 12, 13, 14. Fraisework.

"15. Enemy's battery of 2 mortars. 16. [Ditto] 5 pieces large cannon, 1
mortar. 17. [Ditto] 2 pieces cannon, 1 mortar. 18. Unfinished Redoubt
at a mile and a third from the fort, near the road. 19. A pretty
extensive work at about the same distance. 20. Epaulements for the
guards."]

[Illustration: ATTACK ON FORT MIFFLIN.

NOTE.—This map is reduced in fac-simile from one of Fleury's
pen-and-ink sketches among the Sparks maps at Cornell University.
It is endorsed "Mudd Island", but not by Washington, as the _Sparks
Catalogue_ (p. 207) says. There are noted in the same catalogue (p.
207) two other pen-and-ink drafts of the fort and its vicinity, both
apparently the work of Fleury, also. One is smaller, covering much the
same ground as the present fac-simile except that it does not show
the ships and Hog Island. It is entitled: "Figuré aproximatif de fort
island et des ouvrages des assiégeans. 16 octobre, 1777." It has an
"Explanation" in French on the reverse, accompanied by a statement
that it had been scrawled on a gun-carriage, without compasses, rule,
or scale, and under difficulties arising from the bursting of one bomb
which carried away his inkstand, and of another which ploughed the
ground where he sat.

The other plan is larger, and has been folded like a letter, and
is addressed on the outside, "His Excellency General Washington,
Headquarters." It shows only the west edge of Mud Island, but marks
particularly the distance, range, and armament of the attacking
batteries, and is called, "Figuré aproximatif des ouvrages des
assiégeans 14 9^{bre,} 1777." It marks the distance from the redoubt
on the highland to Fort Mifflin as "1 mile 1-4 5 p." The wharf on the
island is described as "où l'enemie déscendra, quoi que nous l'ayons
detruite."

Other published maps of Mud Island (Fort Mifflin) are in Scharf and
Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 363; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 296;
Wallace's _William Bradford_, p. 229.

Scharf and Westcott (p. 361) also give a plan made before the attack,
by Col. Downman, of the British army.

Red Bank is particularly delineated in Smith's _Delaware Co._, 321;
_Penna. Archives_, 2d ser., vol. v.; and Lossing, ii. 290, with views,
etc.]

On the British side we have the despatches of the Howes (Dawson, i.
364, 366), the journal of Montresor (_Penna. Mag. of Hist._, 1882, v.
393; vi. 34); the letters in Scull's _Evelyns in America_, 246, 253;
and the account in Rivington's _Gazette_, cited by Wallace.

In addition to the references already made for the two attacks, the
entire movements on the river are illustrated more generally in the
letters of Washington, copied from the Penna. Archives, as well as in
the diary of the Council of War in the _Sparks MSS._, no. 2. There are
other contemporary accounts.[932]

Lafayette's attack on Gloucester soon followed. See plan on page 430.

The contrasts between the hilarities of the British in Philadelphia
and the trials of the Americans at Valley Forge during the winter are
abundantly illustrated.

The publication of the _Penna. Evening Post_ was resumed in
Philadelphia, Oct. 11, 1777, and continued during the British
occupation of Philadelphia.[933]

Various diaries kept in and near Philadelphia have been preserved,[934]
and the details of the life in the town have been worked up by modern
writers.[935]

The complimentary festival given to General Howe on his departure,
known as the Mischianza, took place May 18th, at the Wharton house.[936]

On the condition of Washington's camp at Valley Forge we have first the
testimony of his own letters and those of his corespondents,[937] as
well as that of sundry diaries and journals.[938]

The question of supplies as affecting the camp is considered in
Stuart's _Trumbull_ and Greene's _Greene_ (ii. 48), this general being
made quartermaster-general in March.

[Illustration: ATTACK ON MUD ISLAND.

From Galloway's _Letters to a Nobleman_, London, 1779. The leading
published map of Delaware Bay and River at this time was one surveyed
by Joshua Fisher, and published in London by Sayer and Bennett, 1775
and 1776. It was reproduced in _Penna. Archives_, 2d ser., vol. iii.;
and maps based on them are in the _Gent. Mag._, July, 1779. There was
a French edition issued in Paris by Le Rouge in 1777, which also made
part of the _Atlas Amériquain_. Other charts are in the _No. Amer.
Pilot_, 1776, and in the _Neptune Américo-Septentrional_, 1778.

There are plans for obstructing the river, in _Penna. Archives_,
2d ser., i. 749. Other maps of the river defences will be found in
Sparks's _Washington_, v. 156; Irving's _Washington_ (quarto), iii.
278; Smith's _Delaware County_, p. 321; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii.
298; Carrington's _Battles_, p. 396.]

There are preserved various orderly-books of the camp.[939]

There were efforts to reorganize the army during the winter. Congress
had created a board of war in November, 1777 (Pickering, i. 187;
Lossing, ii. 867). On Jan. 10, 1778, a committee of Congress was
appointed to visit the camp and concert plans for the reorganization
(_Journals_, ii. 401). A plan was drawn up by conference, and later
adopted by Congress (Sparks, v. 525). Francis Dana wrote from the
camp, Feb. 12th, to Congress, and the draft, found among the papers of
Laurens, was printed in the _Polit. Mag._ (vol. i.,—1780), by which it
was thought to appear that Howe could have destroyed the American army
if he had had enterprise.[940]

A few days after the taking of Philadelphia, the Rev. Jacob Duché,
of that city, who had been an approved supporter of the Americans,
transmitted a letter to Washington, tempting him to desert the cause.
Washington sent the letter to Congress; but Sparks could not find
it in the Archives at Washington, and prints it from _Rivington's
Gazette_ (_Corresp. of the Rev._, i. 448). The letters which grew out
of this act, including one of expostulation from Francis Hopkinson, the
brother-in-law of Duché, and that of repentance sent to Washington by
Duché in 1783, can be found in Sparks, v. 94, 476.[941]

[Illustration: MUD ISLAND, 1777-1778.

Sketched from a corner map of the large MS. map, called on another
page, "The Defences of Philadelphia, 1777-1778."]

The military movements during the autumn of 1777 were mainly to try the
temper of the opposing forces and to secure forage, and the incessant
watching of each other's motions made Pickering write to Elbridge
Gerry (Nov. 2d,—_Mag. Amer. Hist._, Nov., 1884, p. 461) that "since
Brandywine we have been in a constant state of hurry."[942]

[Illustration: ENCAMPMENT AT VALLEY FORGE, 1777-1778.

A sketch made by combining two in the Sparks collection at Cornell
University. One is a French plan, from the Lafayette maps, which
gives the main features of the topography to the present sketch. The
other is one transmitted by General Armstrong to Mr. Sparks in 1833,
embodying the recollections of a Mr. William Davis, "a remarkably
active and intelligent man, who resided within the limits of the camp
during its continuance there." General Armstrong cites the testimony
of a son of General Wayne, that the recollections of Davis "of the
most minute occurrences of the period were entirety unaffected by
age." Upon this dependence has been put for the positions of the
troops and the quarters of the general officers. The plan given by
Sparks (_Washington_, v. 196) seems to have been made by a similar
combination, though he omits the locations of the general's quarters.
The plan of Sparks is essentially followed in Guizot's _Washington_,
in Lossing's _Field-Book_ (vol. ii. 334,—also see _Harper's Monthly_,
xii. 307), and in Carrington's _Battles_, p. 402 (and in _Mag. of Amer.
Hist._, Feb., 1882).

There is a view of Washington's headquarters in Scharf and Westcott's
_Philadelphia_, i. 369; Egle's _Pennsylvania_, p. 182; Lossing's
_Field-Book_, ii. 332, and in his _Mary and Martha Washington_, p. 168;
and _Mag. Amer. Hist._, Feb., 1882.

The French alliance was celebrated in camp May 6, 1778 (Sparks, v. 355;
Moore's _Diary_, ii.).

For landmarks, etc., of Valley Forge, see Lossing's _Field-Book_;
Read's _Geo. Read_ (p. 326), from the _Ohio State Journal_; _Harper's
Mag._, lx., 660, April, 1880.

At the centennial celebration, June, 1878, there were addresses by
Henry Armitt Brown (in his _Memoir and Orations_, edited by J. M.
Hoppin), and one by Theodore W. Bean, printed in the _Daily Local
News_, Westchester, Pa., June 20, 1878.]

During this time, Oct.-Dec., Washington was kept informed of the
British movements through the letters of Maj. Clark (_Penna. Hist. Soc.
Bull._, vol. i.). There was in November a project discussed of taking
Philadelphia by storm (Drake's _Knox_, 136). Congress was urging the
States to renewed efforts (_N. H. State Papers_, viii. 728). Early in
December Howe had tried to allure Washington to a battle near Chestnut
Hill or Whitemarsh (Sparks, v. 180; Dawson, i. ch. 31). By the middle
of December the American army had gone into winter-quarters at Valley
Forge (Reed's _Reed_, i. 345), but not without having thought at the
same time of an attack on New York (_Ibid._, 344).

[Illustration

NOTE.—This plan of the British works between the Delaware and the
Schuylkill is sketched from the main portion of a drawing preserved in
the Penna. Hist. Society, which bears the following indorsement: "The
redoubts in the English lines are ten, beside two advanced ones. No.
1, which I took a plan of in the month of July, was then compleat, but
the excessive heat of the weather and many avocations prevented our
prosecuting the survey till October, by which time the wooden work of
the other redoubts, as well as the abaties, were carried away, which
rendered it uncertain how many platforms there were in each, but from
what traces remained [I] believe I am right in nos. 2 & ten: the other
seven [eight] varied so little from no. 2, that the plan of that may
serve for the rest: I am equally uncertain whether the abatis ran
in direct lines from redoubt to redoubt or formed angles, but know
that each part terminated at about 20 feet from the counter-scarps of
contiguous redoubts, these intervals being occasionally stopped up by
chevaux-de-frize. All the 10 redoubts were well faced both within and
without with strong planks, but the advanced redoubts and other small
pieces were only faced with fascines. On the right of the line where
small streams run through swampy ground an inundation was formed by
sloping the arches of the bridges, and making dams were necessary, each
furnished with a tumbling dam, well planked on the top and slopes of
the main dam, to carry off superfluous water.

  LEWIS NICOLA."

Enlarged plans and cross-sections of redoubts nos. 1, 2, and 10 are
given in the margin, as well as of the western advanced redoubt, and
other small works, including the "Barriers across Kensington and
Germantown roads with a cremaillered work between them cut out of the
bank between the roads." The stars near the lines denote the places of
"houses destroyed by the English." Cf. description in _Penna. Mag. of
Hist._, iv. 181.]

[Illustration: DEFENCES OF PHILADELPHIA, 1777-1778.

Sketched from a large MS. map by John Montresor in the library of
Congress, dedicated to Sir William Howe, and called _Plan of the City
of Philadelphia and its environs, shewing the defences during the years
1777-1778, together with the Siege of Mud Island_. A similar map by
Montresor is among the King's maps in the British Museum (_Catal._, ii.
176).]

[Illustration: VICINITY OF PHILADELPHIA.

Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress,
called _Plan générale des opérations de l'Armée Britannique contre
les Rebelles, etc._ The lines (·—·—) are roads. KEY: "59, Attaque
de mudden island le 15 Novembre. 60, Position du général Howe le 4
Dec. pour forcer le général Washington à quitter sa position sur les
hauteurs de White Marsh. 61, Marche du général Howe pour fourages
entre Derby et Chester. 62, Camp de l'armée près de Philadelphia. 63,
Camp de l'armée après avoir evacué Philadelphia le 26^{me} Juin, 1778.
64, Corps detaché à Gloucester. 65, Marche du général Knyphausen le
18^{me} Juin et son camp à Haddenfield. 66, Marche et camp du général
Cornwallis le 18^{me} Juin. 67, Marche du général Knyphausen le 20^{me}
Juin et son camp à Moorfield."

The published maps of Philadelphia and its vicinity at this time are
the following: N. Scull and G. Heap's, originally in 1750 (cf. Vol. V.
240), and reproduced by Faden in 1777, and reduced in the _Gent. Mag._,
Dec., 1777. Kitchin's _Philadelphia and Environs_, in _London Mag._,
Dec., 1777, and reproduced in the _Penna. Archives_, 2d series, vol.
iii. A map surveyed by Eastburn in 1776, Philad., 1777; one surveyed
by Hill, Philadelphia, 1777. Plan of Philadelphia in the _Atlantic
Neptune_ (1777), vol. i. Plan in the _American Atlas_ (1777). _Gegend
und Stadt von Philadelphia_, in _Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser
Europa_, Nürnberg, 1778, Zehnter Theil. There was published by John
Reed, in 1774, _An Explanation of the Map of the City and Liberties
of Philadelphia_. A folding plan showing the British works is in
Scharf and Westcott's _Philadelphia_, i. 360. Various MS. plans of
Philadelphia and its neighborhood, with the river defences, are among
the Faden maps (nos. 82-86) in the library of Congress. Among the Penn
papers in the Hist. Soc. of Penna. is a MS. map showing the positions
of the British at Germantown before the battle.]

In January an attempt by the Americans to destroy the shipping at
Philadelphia, by floating combustibles down the river from above,
failed; but it gave rise to Hopkinson's humorous verses on the "Battle
of the Kegs."[943]

In March Congress was urging young men of spirit and property to raise
light cavalry troops (_Journals_, ii. 463), for Simcoe's British
horsemen were raiding about the country for forage, meeting, however,
now and then with resistance, as at Quintin's Bridge (March 18th) and
Hancock's Bridge (March 21st).[944] At the beginning of May there was
another conflict at Crooked Billet.[945] Three weeks later (May 20th)
Lafayette skilfully extricated himself from an advanced position at
Barren Hill, whither Washington had sent him towards the enemy, and
Where the British commander sought to cut him off.[946]

[Illustration: BARREN HILL.

This map is sketched and reduced from a MS. map preserved in the
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, signed "Major Capitaine, A. D. C.
du Gen^l. Lafayette", and called _Plan de la retraite de Barrenhill
en Pensilvanie, où un detachement de 2,200 hommes sous le Général
la Fayette, etoit entourré par l'armée Anglaise sous les G^x. Howe,
Clinton, et Grant, le 28 May, 1778_. It bears the following KEY:
(_translation_) _a._ Position of the American detachment on Barren
Hill, eleven miles from Philadelphia and twelve miles from Valley
Forge, on the right bank of the Schuylkill. _b._ Pickets of the
Americans, which retired on the approach of the enemy. _c._ A French
company under Captain M'Clean, with fifty Indians. _e._ Place where
the militia were ordered to gather, but they failed to do so. _f._
March of Maj.-Gen. Grant at the head of grenadiers and chasseurs, and
two brigades, making in all 8,000 men, with 15 pieces of cannon. _g._
Where the enemy were first discovered. _h._ Americans occupying the
meeting-house and burial-ground, deploying to defend their left flank.
_i._ March of the detachment on the second warning to reach Matson's
Ford. _k._ Chasseurs detached to confront Gen. Grant. _l._ Body of
English cavalry, followed by a body of grenadiers and chasseurs. _m._
March of Gen. Grant, always following the Americans. _n._ Matson's
Ford, which the Americans gained and passed, when they occupied the
highlands, _o_, while a small force was sent to Swede's Ford. _p._ Rich
road by which Howe and Clinton advanced with the rest of the British
army. _q._ Point where Howe and Grant formed, whence, seeing that their
attempt had failed, they returned to Philadelphia. _r._ Road from
Swede's Ford, by which the American detachment returned the next day to
occupy Barren Hill.

There is among the Sparks maps at Cornell University a duplicate copy
of this map, made from Lafayette's original. Cf. maps in Sparks, v.
378; Carrington's _Battles_, p. 408; Lossing, ii. 329; and the view of
the church (p. 322).]

Clinton, on relieving Howe from the command in Philadelphia, was
instructed to evacuate the city (Sparks, v. 548). This materially
changed the plans for the campaign, which had been determined upon
prior to the announcement of the French alliance (_Sparks MSS._, xlv.
and lviii.). Washington meanwhile was considering an alternative of
plans, and getting the opinions of his general officers;[947] but
the movements of the British to evacuate Philadelphia soon changed
all.[948]

[Illustration: PLAN OF MONMOUTH BATTLE.

From a plan in Hilliard d'Auberteuil's _Essais_, i. p. 270. KEY: The
English had passed the night at _a_. Lee's advance showed itself at 3,
when the British debouched from their position at 1, while their guns
at 2 fired on the Americans. The Americans at 3 retired into the wood,
and joined Lee's main body, which debouched from the wood at 4, their
guns taking position at 6 and 7, while the British guns were at 5. The
Americans (4, 8, and 10) retired and took position at 11; and while
still further retreating, the British attacked at 12, and the Americans
made a stand at 13, and before all could retire still farther the
British again attacked at 14. The Americans again formed at 15, when
Washington, coming up by way of the new Baptist meeting-house with the
main body, formed at 16, Stirling and Greene in front, and Lafayette in
the rear, while Lee's men at 15 passed to Washington's rear, a British
reconnoitring force appearing meanwhile at 17, and Plessis-Mauduit's
battery, supported by 500 men, taking position at 18. The British at 14
and 17, being repulsed, united at 19, whence they were further repulsed
and took position at 20. They formed again at 21 after Washington's
attack. They passed the night at 22.

This map was apparently engraved from an original, followed in two
plans, differently drawn, but in effect the same, which are among the
maps in the Sparks collection at Cornell University, and which were
copied from Lafayette's own plan at Lagrange. It is called _Carte de
l'affaire de Montmouth, où le général Washington commandait l'armée
Américaine et le général Clinton commandait l'armée Anglaise, le 28
Juin, 1778_. The "legende" shows references from 1 to 22, with extra
ones _a_ and _b_, the latter (_b_) being at the junction of the two
dotted lines in the rear of 16, and is explained as the "movement of
the second line, commanded by General Lafayette, which, as soon as the
column at 17 was perceived, was detached to occupy the wood west of
the meeting-house, which the column 17 was approaching; but when this
column 17 was repulsed the line was restored."

There is also among the Sparks maps (Lafayette copies) a pen-and-ink
sketch-plan,—differing somewhat, giving more detail,—made on the
American side, and this more nearly resembles the plan given by Sparks
in his _Washington_ (v. p. 430,—repeated in Duer's _Stirling_, ii.
196; and in Guizot's _Washington_. Cf. Irving's _Washington_, quarto
ed.). The plan in Lossing's _Field-Book_ (ii. 356) is based on the one
here engraved, and he also gives a view of the Freehold meeting-house
(p. 359) and of the field (p. 362). Carrington (ch. 56) gives an
eclectic plan with more detail than any other.

A view of the monument commemorating the battle is in the _U. S. Art
Directory_ (1884).]

[Illustration: MONMOUTH AND VICINITY.

Sketched from a part of a MS. Hessian map in the library of Congress,
called _Plan générale des opérations de l'armée Britannique contre les
Rebelles_, etc. The lines (·—·—) represent roads. KEY: "79, Marche du
général de Knyphausen de son camp devant Englishtown le 24 Juin. 80,
Marche du général Cornwallis. 83, Retraite des enemis."

There is a copy of the map of the region of the march by Clinton's
engineer in the library of the N. Y. Hist. Soc. (_Mag. of Amer. Hist._,
Sept., 1878, p. 759).]

The battle of Monmouth, though in the end a victory for Washington,
secured for the British what they fought for, a further unimpeded march
toward New York. Washington's letters are of the first importance.[949]
We have also accounts by Hamilton;[950] by Lafayette,[951] as given to
Sparks; and statements by several other witnesses.[952]

The trial of Lee, and the papers produced by it, furnish abundant
contemporary evidence. The trial was published at Philadelphia, 1778,
as _Proceedings of Court-Martial held at Brunswick in New Jersey, July
4, 1778_.[953]

On the British side, Clinton's despatch is in _Lee Papers_, (1872), p.
461; Dawson, i. 415. A British journal kept during the march is in the
_N. J. Hist. Soc. Proc._, i. 15; an orderly-book picked up on the field
is in a transcript in the Penna. Hist. Society.[954]

The British retreat is commended in Baron von Ochs's _Betrachtungen
über die neuere Kriegskunst_ (Cassel, 1817). Cf. Lowell's _Hessians_,
p. 209.

Respecting the Conway Cabal, the best gathering of the documentary
evidence is in an appendix to Sparks's _Washington_.[955] Sparks's
conclusion is that the plot never developed into "a clear and fixed
purpose", and that no one section of the country more than another
specially promoted it. Mahon (vi. 243) thinks that Sparks glides over
too gently the participation of the New Englanders, who have been
defended from the charge of participation by Austin in his _Life of
Elbridge Gerry_ (ch. 16). Gordon implicates Samuel Adams, and J. C.
Hamilton is severe on the Adamses (_Repub. U. S._, i. ch. 13, 14).
Mrs. Warren found no cause to connect Sam. Adams with the plot, and
Wells (_Sam. Adams_, ii. ch. 46) naturally dismisses the charge. It
is not to be denied that among the New England members of Congress
there were strong partisans of Gates, and the action of Congress for
good in military matters was impaired by an unsettled estimate of the
wisdom of keeping Washington at the head of the army, though it did
not always manifest itself in assertion (Greene's _Greene_, i. 287,
403, 411). Nothing could be worse than John Adams's proposition to have
Congress annually elect the generals (_Works_, i. 263); and he was not
chary of his disgust with what was called Washington's Fabian policy.
Sullivan, in one of his oily, fussy letters to Washington (_Corresp.
of the Rev._, ii. 366) finds expression of a purpose to revive the
plot in William Tudor's massacre oration in Boston in March, 1779. The
expressions of Charles Lee, that "a certain great man is most damnably
deficient" (Moore's _Treason of Lee_, p. 68), like utterances of
others, are rather indicative of ordinary revulsions of feeling under
misfortunes than of a purpose of combination among the disaffected.
Gates's refusal to reinforce Washington, and Hamilton's vain efforts to
persuade him, naturally fall among the indicative signs;[956] and this
apathy of Gates very likely conduced immediately to the loss of Fort
Mifflin at the time it was abandoned (Wallace's _Bradford_, App. 12).
The attempt to gain over Lafayette by the attractions of a command in
invading Canada, can be followed in Sparks's _Washington_.[957]


THE TREASON OF ARNOLD.

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE AUTHORITIES BY THE EDITOR.

JUST when and by what act Arnold was put in treasonable correspondence
with the British is not clearly established. Bancroft[958] says it was
towards the end of February, 1779,[959] but he gives no authority.

[Illustration: ARNOLD.

After the medallion, engraved by Adam, of a picture by Du Simitière,
painted in Philadelphia from life. The original is in Marbois'
_Complot d'Arnold et de Sir Henry Clinton_ (Paris, 1816), where it is
inscribed "Le Général Arnold, déserté de l'armée des Etats Unis, le 25
Sept^{bre}, 1780." The copy of Marbois in the Brinley sale (no. 3,961)
had also the sepia drawing from which the engraver worked. The Du
Simitière head had already appeared in the _European Magazine_ (1783),
vol. iii. 83, and in his _Thirteen Heads_, etc.

A familiar profile likeness, looking to the right, was engraved by H.
B. Hall for the illustrated edition of Irving's _Washington_, and is
also to be found in H. W. Smith's _Andreana_. Another profile, similar,
but facing to the left, is in Arnold's _Arnold_, and was etched by H.
B. Hall in 1879. Cf. Harris and Allyn's _Battle of Groton Heights_.

Lossing has given us views of Arnold's birthplace in Norwich (_Harper's
Mag._, xxiii. 722; _Field-Book_, ii. 36), and of his house in New
Haven (_Harper_, xvii. 13; _Field-Book_, i. 421), and of his Willow
(_Harper_, xxiv. 735).]

[Illustration: BENEDICT ARNOLD.

From the _Geschichte der Kriege in und ausser Europa, Eilfter Theil_,
Nürnberg, 1778.]

Clinton, in Oct., 1780,[960] says it was eighteen months before, which
would place it about April, 1779, and this is the period adopted
by Sparks[961] and Sargent.[962] The latter writer thinks Arnold
made the advances; the former believes them to have come from the
British.[963] It has also been believed that the mutual recognition
was effected in some way through a Lieutenant Hele, a British spy, who
was in Philadelphia after Arnold took command. There might arise a
suspicion that the understanding was induced through the Tory family
of Miss Peggy Shippen, whom Arnold had married in April, 1779. There
are stories of her maintaining correspondence with her British friends
in New York, but we do not know of any letters remaining as proof of
it, except one from André to that lady after her marriage to Arnold,
and after the British correspondence with him under feigned names had
begun, in which letter the gambolling Major André commiserated his fair
friend of the previous winter on the difficulty she might experience in
buying gewgaws in Philadelphia, and offering to find them for her in
New York. Whether this language, like the commercial phrases in which
Arnold was at this time conducting his correspondence under the name
of "Gustavus" with one "John Anderson", a British merchant in that
city, was likewise a blind is not probably to be discovered, and it
might or might not involve a doubt as to the privity of Peggy Arnold
in the rather lagging negotiations;[964] but the probability is that
André wrote the letter in his own name in order that Arnold might, by
the similarity of the handwriting, identify his _pseudo_ Anderson; for
by this time the nature of information which inured to the advantage
of the British, and which Gustavus communicated to Anderson from time
to time, had pretty well convinced Clinton that the person with whom
he was dealing was high in rank, and probably near headquarters in
Philadelphia.

[Illustration: ARNOLD.

From Murray's _Impartial Hist. of the present War_, ii. p. 48.]

Arnold had warm admirers; and those who trusted him for certain
brilliant merits in the field included, among others, Washington
himself; but Congress did not confide in him with so unquestioning a
spirit. That body had raised over him in rank several of his juniors,
much to Arnold's chagrin[965] and Washington's annoyance; and it was
only after a renewed exhibition of his intrepidity at Danbury that it
had tardily raised him to a major-generalship. Though his commission
of May, 1777, gave him equal rank, it made him still, by its later
date, the junior of those who had been his inferiors.[966] The Burgoyne
campaign had been fought by him under a consequent vexation of mind,
and his spirits chafed, not unreasonably, at the slight. The wound he
then received incapacitating him for the field, had induced Washington,
as has been shown, to put him in command of Philadelphia after the
British evacuated it. It was now observed that he more willingly
consorted with the Tory friends of his wife than with the tried
adherents of the cause. His arrogance and impetuosity of manner always
made him enemies. The Council of Pennsylvania by a resolution (_Hist.
Mag._, Dec., 1870), as we have seen, brought Congress to the point of
ordering a court-martial to decide upon the charges preferred against
the general, and to Arnold's revulsion of feelings at this time has
been traced, by some, the beginning of his defection.[967] Certain it
is that he was kept in suspense too long to render him better proof
against insidious thought, for it was not till December, 1779, that
the trial came on. Meanwhile his debts pressed, his scrutinizers were
vigilant, and there seems some reason to believe that he sought to get
relief by selling himself to the French minister,—a project which, if
we may believe the account, was repelled by that ambassador. To add
to his irritation, Congress did not find the accounts which he had
rendered of his expenditures in the Canada expedition well vouched, and
Arnold resented their inquiries as an imputation upon his honesty.[968]

[Illustration: ARNOLD'S COMMISSION AS MAJOR-GENERAL.

Reduced from the fac-simile given in Smith and Watson's _Hist. and Lit.
Curios._, 1st series, plate xlii.]

[Illustration: WEST POINT.

Sketched from a colored drawing in the _Moses Greenleaf Papers_ (Mass.
Hist. Soc.).]

The trial at last resulted in his acquittal on two of the more serious
charges; but being judged censurable on two others, he was sentenced to
a public reprimand from the commander-in-chief.[969]

[Illustration

A profile cut by himself for Miss Rebecca Redman, in 1778, and given in
Smith and Watson's _Hist. and Lit. Curiosities_, 1st series, pl. xxv.]

The burden of a public reproof, no matter how delicately imposed, was
not calculated to arrest the defection of man already too far committed
to retreat. If we may believe Marbois, not the best of guides, there
was found among Arnold's papers, after his flight, a letter, undated
and unsigned, in which he was urged to emulate the example of Gen.
Monk, and save his country by an opportune desertion of what was no
longer a prospering cause.[970] It soon became evident to Arnold that
of himself, destitute of representative value, he was not a commodity
that Clinton was eager to buy. Accordingly the recusant soldier
sought to offer a better bargain to the purchaser by the makeweight
of something that Clinton particularly longed for, and this was the
possession of the Hudson Valley through its chief military posts.[971]
To get a hold upon this, the time was opportune, for there was a
change to be made in its commander. Arnold, however, did not get the
coveted prize without some intrigue, for Washington, when he found
that the wounded soldier professed eagerness for hotter work, proposed
his taking the command of one of the wings of the main army. Arnold
met the compliment by referring to his wounds as precluding work in
the saddle, and induced Schuyler and R. R. Livingston to importune
Washington to assign him to West Point.[972] The device succeeded,
and Arnold reached West Point, as its commander, in the first week of
August, and established his headquarters in the confiscated house which
had belonged to Beverley Robinson, and which was situated on the east
bank of the river, a little below West Point.[973] Clinton could have
no longer any doubt of the identity of his correspondent, now that
"Gustavus" wrote from the Robinson house.

The conspirators' first effort was to establish communications through
Robinson, on business ostensibly having relations to this confiscated
property; but Washington, to whom, for appearances, Arnold showed
Robinson's application for an interview, told him that the civil, and
not the military, powers should meet such proposals. Arnold could find
at this time little difficulty in transmitting his clandestine letters,
for there was constant occasion for the passage of flags from his
own headquarters. To cover his proceedings from the officers of the
American outposts, he only had to pretend that the expected messages or
messengers were from his own spies in New York.[974]

[Illustration

From the _Political Magazine_, March, 1781, ii. 171. There is a modern
reproduction of this engraving in the _Minutes of a Court of Inquiry_,
etc., Albany, 1865. and in H. W. Smith's _Andreana_, Phila., 1865, who
gives a full-length, of the origin of which we are left uninformed.]

Clinton was apparently not willing to commit himself to any bargain,
unless Arnold would give a personal interview as an evidence of his
sincerity; while Arnold, in according, on his part insisted that
his interviewer should be the convenient Anderson. André, since he
had become the adjutant-general of the British army, was now fully
understood to represent that fictitious New York merchant. Arnold
named Robinson's house for the meeting, and would make arrangements by
which any flag should pass the outposts. This was objected to, and the
neutral ground near Dobbs Ferry was settled upon. Here Arnold went in
his barge; but the officers of the British guard-boats were not in
the secret, and the meeting failed by reason of their chasing Arnold's
barge up the river. Another attempt was planned, but this failed
in the beginning, apparently by André's going up to the "Vulture",
sloop-of-war, which was lying in the river, instead of landing lower
down, as was expected. André was provided with full instructions, which
if obeyed would have saved him the ignominy of a felon's death. He was
not to put off his uniform, was not to go within the American lines,
and was not to receive any papers. His bargain with Arnold was to have
no written expression, and it involved on Sir Henry's part the dispatch
of an ample force in a flotilla from Sir George Rodney's fleet, then
in New York, where the men were already embarked, ostensibly for the
Chesapeake, and the attack was to be made on the 25th of September,
when it was supposed that Washington would have left the Hudson to go
to Connecticut for an interview with Rochambeau. There was further to
be made by André a promise that Arnold should have a commission in the
British army and a sum of money. The American general, on his part, was
so to dispose the forces in the works about West Point that the attack
would, beyond doubt, end in a surprise and a mastery that would give
color to the necessity of a surrender, which he was promptly to make.

[Illustration: ANDRE.

This picture of André, by himself, was originally engraved in 1784
by J. K. Sherwin, and was reëngraved by Hopwood for J. H. Smith's
_Authentic Narrative_, London, 1808, and from this second engraving
the present cut is taken. It has of late years been engraved by H. B.
Hall in Sparks's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iv.; H. W. Smith's
_Andreana_; Sargent's _André_; _Mag. of Amer. Hist._, 1879, p. 745
(etched by H. B. Hall). What seems to be the same, but extended to
include the thighs, is given in Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 197; _Two
Spies_, 36. A picture by Reynolds (given in Harper's, lii. 822, and
_Cyclop. U. S. Hist._, i. 46) is said to be preserved at Tunbridge
Wells. A pen-and-ink sketch by himself, made during his confinement,
is now preserved in the Trumbull gallery at New Haven. Sparks first
engraved it, and it has since been reproduced by Lossing, in _Harper's
Mag._, xxi. 4, in Smith's _Andreana_, and elsewhere.]

It now became necessary that some device should be practised to let
Arnold know that André had reached the "Vulture." There had just
happened some firing upon a boat of the "Vulture", in going to meet
what the British captain supposed or pretended to suppose a white flag
displayed on the shore. This gave the opportunity of dispatching a flag
to the commander in the Highlands, to remonstrate against such perfidy.
The British captain accordingly sent such a message, and André wrote
the letter in a hand which he knew Arnold would recognize, and moreover
countersigned it with "John Anderson, Secretary."

Arnold at once bent to the occasion. He engaged one Joshua Hett Smith,
who lived in the neighborhood, to go by night to the "Vulture" in a
boat, and bring to the adjacent shore a gentleman whom he would find
on board, from whom Arnold expected to get information. How far Smith
was a dupe or a knave has never been satisfactorily determined. The
business would seem to have had a plain significance to a quick-witted
man; but a court was not able later to convict Smith of knowing
precisely what it all meant. Smith had also with him two oarsmen, and
it was not apparently believed that they were in a position to know
enough to render their patriotism doubtful. It was then by night, in
a boat steered by Smith, that André, dressed in his uniform, but with
an overcoat wrapped about him, was rowed ashore. According to Smith,
the darkness and the outer garment so concealed Andre's dress that
his steersman never suspected him to be an officer. Arnold was found
waiting in the bushes, a little remote from the landing. Here Smith
left the two conspirators alone and returned to his boat; but when the
signs of dawn began to appear he returned to warn them. Arnold, who had
brought along with him an extra horse, mounted André on it, and the two
started to go to Smith's house,[975] which was two or three miles away
on the hill, and within the American lines.

[Illustration: HUDSON RIVER.

Reduced from a rough pen-and-ink sketch, three feet and eight inches
long, preserved among the Sparks MS. maps in Cornell University
library, and inscribed "To his Excellency George Clinton, Esq^r,
Governor of the State of New York, this map of Hudson's River through
the Highlands is humbly dedicated by his Excellency's most humble
servant THOMAS MACHIN, iv. January, MDCCLXXVIII."]

If André is to be believed, he was not told that he was to go within
the American outposts, and indeed there is no conclusive evidence
to show why they went to Smith's house at all. Perhaps Smith or the
boatmen refused, in the growing light, to take the risk of the return
to the vessel. The general opinion has been that the conspirators had
not concluded their negotiations, and needed more time. That Arnold had
had a predetermined purpose to go to the house, if necessary, seems
to be made clear from the fact that he had induced Smith to move his
family away from their home temporarily, and on some pretext which
Smith did not object to. André says that he first discovered Arnold's
plan to get him within the American lines when, as they rode on their
way, Arnold gave the countersign at the outposts. This was the first
departure from Clinton's instructions. After they had reached the house
the day broadened, and, the sound of cannon being heard, André went to
a window, whence he could see the "Vulture" in the distance,[976] and
saw that the Americans had dragged some cannon to a neighboring point,
whence their fire became so annoying that the vessel raised her anchor
and fell down the river. André became anxious lest this incident should
preclude his return by water. The day had not far advanced when the
bargain was completed, and Arnold prepared to leave for West Point to
perfect the dispositions expected of him. He left behind sundry papers,
mostly in his own handwriting, which André was to take to Clinton. Why
another injunction of his superior was evaded by André in accepting the
papers is not clear. They conveyed no information about the condition
of the post which Clinton did not already possess or André could repeat
to him. Possibly it was thought that, being in Arnold's autograph, the
documents might serve as a pledge for what André was verbally to report
to him.

Arnold seems to have made no certain provision for his
fellow-conspirator's return to the "Vulture", but he left passes, which
could be used either on the water or land passage, as circumstance
might determine. André spent an anxious day after Arnold left. He was
finally cheered by observing that the "Vulture", as if mindful of him,
had returned to her previous moorings; but his hopes were futile. As
night came on Smith showed no signs of arranging for a water passage to
the ship, and made excuses.

[Illustration: HUDSON RIVER.

After the original draft by Major Villefranche (1780) as reproduced in
Boynton's _West Point_, p. 45. Sargent, in his _André_, gives a map
"engraved from a number of original drawings by Villefranche and other
engineers, and preserved by Major Sargent, of the American army, who
was stationed at West Point as aide to General [Robert] Howe until that
officer was relieved by Arnold."]

The fact probably was, that, after the cannonading of the morning,
Smith had no desire to risk himself on the river in a boat. It was
accordingly agreed that André should undertake to return to New York by
land, and that Smith should accompany him beyond the American outposts,
under the protection of Arnold's pass and of his own acquaintance with
the officers of the lower posts. It now became necessary for André to
disregard another of Clinton's directions, and exchange his uniform
for common clothes.[977] This done, he put the papers which Arnold
had given him under his soles and within his stockings. Thus arrayed,
about dusk the two started, accompanied by Smith's negro servant. They
crossed King's Ferry, and proceeding on their way were stopped once,
but suffered to advance on showing Arnold's pass. After spending the
night at a house, they had gone on some distance the next morning when
Smith parted with André, and, going to Robinson's house, reported to
Arnold that André had been conducted beyond the lines. André went on in
better spirits than before, feeling sure now that he could encounter
nothing more serious than some wandering cowboys, as the British
marauders who infested the Neutral Ground between the two armies were
called, and with whom he could easily parley to their satisfaction.
The natural foes of the "Cowboys" were the "Skinners", who harried the
unfortunate adherents of the British along the same roads, and wrestled
with the Cowboys as opportunity offered.[978] As it happened, a party
of the American prowlers were out to intercept some British marauders,
and three of the number were ensconced close by a stream not far from
Tarrytown, on the upper side. They were by name John Paulding, David
Williams, and Isaac Van Wart. Paulding was by force of character the
leader, and was dressed in a refugee's suit, which not many days before
had been put upon him in exchange for his own better garments, when
he had come out from confinement within the British lines. This suit,
as well as Paulding's profession that he was "of the lower party",
given to André's inquiry when, as he came along, he was stopped by the
men, led to André's revealing himself as a British officer. When the
traveller found he had made a mistake, he showed Arnold's pass, and
tried to enforce it by threats of the American commander's displeasure
if the captors dared to disregard it. This failing, he tried bribes,
and it was André's opinion that if he could have made the payment sure
he might have got off, as money seemed to be their object. The men,
on the other hand, said that they could have resisted any offer of
money when, on searching their prisoner, they found the papers in his
boots.[979] Paulding, who alone could read, saw the purport of the
documents, and pronounced André a spy.

[Illustration: COLONEL BENJAMIN TALLMADGE.

After a sketch taken by Colonel Trumbull, at the close of the war, and
engraved in the _Memoir of Col. Benjamin Tallmadge, prepared by himself
at the request of his children_, New York, 1858. A portrait in his
later years, painted by E. Ames and engraved by G. Parker, is in the
_National Portrait Gallery_, Philadelphia, 1836, vol. iii.]

André was remounted and led under their combined guidance to the
quarters[980] of Colonel Jameson, who commanded some dragoons at
Northcastle. That officer recognized Arnold's handwriting in the
papers found on the prisoner, but he seems to have been bewildered
by the discovery, though it was afterwards urged that he thought
the transaction was a plot of "John Anderson", whoever he might be,
to implicate Arnold in some mischief. How far the prisoner himself
may have prompted Jameson is not known, for it was clear enough to
André that Arnold only could now extricate him from the gathering
toils. Accordingly, events took a promising turn for him when Jameson
dispatched the prisoner, under escort, to Arnold's headquarters, with
a letter which informed his superior of what was apparent enough, that
some dangerous papers had been found on Anderson, and that he had sent
them to Washington. Major Benjamin Tallmadge, one of his officers, who
was absent on a scout, returned before André had long been gone, and
learning the particulars from Jameson saw at once the blunder, and
persuaded Jameson to send a messenger to recall André and his escort.
Jameson did so, but insisted that the letter to Arnold should go on, as
it did.

The messenger with the papers sought to intercept Washington on the
lower road from Hartford, which the commander-in-chief was supposed
at that time to be traversing on his return from the interview with
Rochambeau.

The next morning André was sent, for better security, in the charge of
Tallmadge to Colonel Sheldon's quarters at New Salem. Here, getting
permission to walk in the door-yard in the custody of an officer named
King, André revealed his name and station, and being allowed pen and
paper, he made the same avowal in a letter to Washington, which, when
written, he handed to Tallmadge. Its contents confirmed that officer's
suspicion that the prisoner was a military man, for he had shown a
soldier's habit of turning on his heel as he paced his room.

Washington, returning by the upper road, had missed Jameson's
messenger, who, retracing his steps, passed through New Salem, where
he was entrusted also with the letter which André had just written,
and then went on towards the Robinson house, where Washington was then
supposed to be.

It was now the 25th, the very day when Rodney was to come up the river
with his flotilla, and Arnold sat at breakfast at this same Robinson
house,[981] not knowing what the day would develop. There were with him
Mrs. Arnold, who had not long before (Sept. 15) come from Philadelphia,
and two of Washington's aides, who had arrived a little in advance of
their chief.

It was two days earlier than Washington had been expected back, and
this was a serious perplexity in the mind of the conspirator. The
suspense was soon ended, for Jameson's messenger to him shortly
arrived, and the letter was put in Arnold's hands before the company.
He read it, showed, as was remembered afterwards, a little agitation,
but only a little, and in a few minutes left the table, saying that it
was necessary for him to go to West Point. It seemed natural enough
to his guests; but Mrs. Arnold observed his agitation more keenly,
and followed him to their chamber, where all was revealed to her. She
swooned; he kissed the infant lying there; descended the stairs;[982]
stopped an instant to say to the breakfast party that Mrs. Arnold
was not feeling well and would not come down again; mounted a horse
which he had already ordered; hurried down the steep road to the
river; entered his barge and seated himself in its prow; directed
his men to row to mid-stream; and then priming his pistols, which he
had taken from his holster, he ordered them to hurry down the river,
as he had to go with a flag to the "Vulture", and must hasten back
to meet Washington, who was shortly to reach his quarters. He tied a
white handkerchief to a cane, and waved it as he passed Livingston's
batteries at Verplanck's Point, and that officer recognizing the
barge allowed it to pass on. In a few minutes more he was under the
"Vulture's" guns, and then under her flag. His boatmen resisted his
offers of recompense for desertion, and were not allowed to return to
shore to spread the intelligence, which they now comprehended.[983]

[Illustration: WEST POINT.

Reproduced from the plan in Marbois' _Complot d'Arnold et de Sir Henry
Clinton_, Paris, 1816. A plate in the _Mag. of Amer. Hist_., 1879,
p. 756, showing the route of André, is a portion of a map among the
Simeon de Witt's maps (i. no. 66) in the library of the New York Hist.
Society, and was made by Robert Erskine, the topographical engineer
of the army, 1778-1780, and was for the whole length of it, from
Staten Island to Newburgh, engraved for the first time in Irving's
_Washington_, quarto ed., ii. 276.

There are other maps of the scene of the conspiracy and its attendant
events in Sparks's _Washington_, vii. 216; Guizot's Atlas to his
_Washington_; Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iv.; Carrington's
_Battles_, 512; Lossing's _Field-Book_, ii. 148; and Boynton's _West
Point_, 104.]

Not long after Arnold left the Robinson house, Washington arrived,
and, learning that Arnold had gone to West Point, he passed over
unsuspicious to that post, where he was surprised not to find
Arnold.[984] While Washington was gone, Jameson's messenger with the
captured papers and André's letter arrived, and Hamilton, left behind
by Washington, opened them as his confidential aide.[985] As soon as
Washington's boat approached on his return from West Point, Hamilton
went towards the dock to meet his chief, whispered a word, and both
later entered the house and were closeted. The plot was revealed.
Hamilton was dispatched to Livingston to head off Arnold in his escape
if possible, but on reaching that officer's post it was found that
Arnold's boat had already passed. Before Hamilton was ready to set out
on his return, a flag from the "Vulture" brought ashore a letter from
Arnold, addressed to Washington, framed in lofty expressions of his own
rectitude, and avowing the innocence of Smith, of his own wife, and his
aides.[986] Before Hamilton's return, Washington had dined with his
officers without revealing the secret, but he shortly took Knox and
Lafayette into his confidence. There was naturally great uncertainty
as respects the extent of the conspiracy, and of what preparations
the enemy had made for an immediate onset. The anxiety of the moment
was soon evinced by the great activity of aides and orderlies. Word
was sent in every direction for arrangements to be made for any
emergency.[987]

André was brought to West Point, and Smith was arrested and held for
examination. Special precautions were taken to keep them apart and to
prevent escape. André was then conveyed down the river, still under
Tallmadge's care, to headquarters at Tappan, where he was closely
guarded in an old stone house, still standing.[988]

A board of general officers was at once summoned to consider the case
and recommend what action should be taken. The papers taken from André
were laid before them.[989] André himself was brought into their
presence, when he made a written statement, and answered questions.
He acknowledged everything, but said nothing to implicate others. He
affirmed that he did not consider himself under the protection of a
flag when he landed from the "Vulture." The report of the board was
that André was a spy, and merited the death of a spy. Washington
ordered the execution, and sent a record of the proceedings to Congress
and recommended its publication. Congress printed the record.[990]

Clinton was meanwhile informed of what had happened by the return of
the "Vulture" to New York, and wrote to Washington that Arnold's
flag and pass should save André from the character of a spy. Beverley
Robinson wrote to a similar purport, and so did Arnold; but the latter
added a threat of retaliation in case André was executed, which was not
calculated to further the purpose of André's friends, and it is rather
surprising they allowed the letter to proceed. Washington replied
in effect that a flag must be used in good faith to preserve its
character, and that the concealment of dress and papers was the action
of a spy.

Gen. Robertson was sent by Clinton to make further representations, and
Washington put off the execution till Greene could confer with that
general at an outpost. A repetition of the arguments on the British
side made no change in the aspects of the case; and when Robertson
quoted Arnold as saying André was under a flag, Greene told him they
believed André rather than Arnold. Robertson wrote again to Washington,
who had now definitely fixed mid-day of Oct. 2d for the execution.
Washington thought it also best to leave unanswered a note of André
requesting to be shot rather than hanged. Further letters, amplifying
the British arguments, were prepared,[991] but before they could be
sent to Washington word came that the execution had taken place.

During his confinement in Tappan, and after he became aware of his
fate, André conducted himself with a cheerful dignity that much
endeared him to the gentlemen who came in contact with him. His
servant had brought from New York fresh linen and his uniform, which
André put on with evident satisfaction. He practised his ready skill
in pen-and-ink drawing, and made several sketches, which he gave
to his attendants as souvenirs.[992] As his hour approached, he
said graciously to his escort, "I am ready", and went to the place
appointed, surrounded by guards and through a large concourse of
people. Of the general officers of the army at the post only the
commander-in-chief and staff were absent; and as the sad procession
passed headquarters the blinds were drawn, and no one was seen.
When the gibbet came in sight, André shrank a moment, but instantly
recovered, for he had nourished hopes that his request as to the manner
of his death would not be denied. He bandaged his eyes himself; lifted
the cloth a moment to say that he wished all to bear witness to the
firmness with which he met his death; and when the cart was withdrawn
died instantly.[993] When his uniform was removed and placed in his
servant's hands, the coffin which contained the body was buried near
the spot.

His remains were disinterred in 1821 and taken to England,[994] where
they were deposited in Westminster Abbey, beside the monument which
had been erected there to his memory shortly after his death.[995]
Many years after the removal, a rude boulder,[996] on which a simple
record was chiselled, was placed on the spot of his burial; but this
had disappeared when a few years since a plain monument, with an
inscription by Dean Stanley of the Abbey, was made to perpetuate the
record of his grave.[997]

[Illustration:

NOTE.—A reduced sketch is placed opposite from a plan by Villefranche,
made in 1780, and given in fac-simile in Boynton's _West Point_, p.
86. He also (p. 79) gives Villefranche's plan (1780) of Fort Arnold,
built 1778 on the eastern limits of West Point. On Villefranche see
_Ibid._, p. 160. Boynton also gives a long folding panoramic view of
West Point in 1780 from the eastern bank of the river, which shows the
batteries and camps on both banks. Cf. illustrated paper, by Lossing,
in _Scribner's Mag._, v. 4.]

Arnold received the price of his desertion,[998] was made a general
in the British service, and turned his sword, both in Connecticut
and Virginia, against his countrymen. Afterwards he went to England,
was treated with an enforced respect in some places, and scorned in
others.[999] He lived for a while in New Brunswick, but he never
escaped the torments which the presence of honorable men inflicted upon
him. His descendants live to-day in England and in Canada, and some of
them have attained high rank in the British army; and no one of them,
as far as known, has disgraced the good name of the old Rhode Island
family, whence Benedict Arnold descended.[1000]

The report of the court respecting André, with its appendix (already
referred to), and the trial of Smith were the first public sifting of
the evidence about the conspiracy. Smith was acquitted by the military
tribunal,[1001] and was then turned over to the civil authorities for
a further trial; but, succeeding in escaping in women's clothes, he
reached New York, and England, where several years later he published a
narrative, which it is not easy to reconcile with all his evidence in
his trial,—the supposition[1002] being that he was addressing injured
Americans in the one case and disappointed Britons in the other.[1003]
Marbois, the secretary of the French legation at Philadelphia at the
time, wrote a _Complot d'Arnold et Clinton_, which was not published
till 1816 at Paris. Sparks says, that what came under Marbois' personal
observation is valuable; but otherwise the book, as most students
think, should be used with caution.[1004]

The earliest comprehensive treatment of the subject—and it has hardly
been surpassed since—was in Sparks's _Life and Treason of Arnold_
(Boston), and he gives the principal documentary evidence in his
_Washington_, vol. vii. App.[1005]

The next special examination of the conspiracy was made in Winthrop
Sargent's[1006] _Life and Career of Major John André_ (Boston,
1861),—an excellent book.[1007]

In 1864 the story necessarily made a part of Edward C. Boynton's
_History of West Point_, who pointed out the military advantage of the
Highlands of the Hudson.[1008] Not long after this, Henry B. Dawson,
then editing the _Yonkers Gazette_, printed in its columns sixty-eight
contemporary documents or narratives, and these, subsequently printed
from the same type in book-form, constitute no. 1 of Dawson's
_Gazette Series_, under the title of _Papers concerning the capture
and detention of Major John André_ (1866). It is the most complete
gathering of authentic material which has been made.

The volume (x.) of Bancroft which contains his account of the
conspiracy appeared in 1875, and was constructed "by following
only contemporary documents, which are abundant and of the surest
character, and which, taken collectively, solve every question....
The reminiscences of men who wrote in later days are so mixed up with
errors of memory and fable that they offer no sure foothold."[1009]

The _Life of Arnold_, by Isaac N. Arnold, of Chicago, and the _Two
Spies_ of Benson J. Lossing, are the last considerable examinations of
the subject.[1010]

[Illustration]

The story of the culmination and collapse of the conspiracy is easily
told with the abundant testimony of those who were observers and
actors,—much of the record being made at the time, though some of it,
put upon paper at varying intervals later, may need to be scrutinized
closely, particularly as regards André's demeanor from the moment of
his arrest to his execution.[1011]

For the English side we must mainly depend on the letters and
statements of Clinton, which are elaborate, and may well be
supplemented by contemporary and later English historians.[1012]

As respects the justice of André's execution, the military authorities
were disagreed on the two sides at the time, and for a while the
alleged offence of Washington was considered in England a conspicuous
blot upon his character; but Lord Mahon has been the only prominent
instance of continued belief in this view among English writers, who
have generally conceded the right of the Americans to count André a
spy, however they might wish that Washington had been more clement.
The attractive manners and brilliant mental habit of André have
blinded even American writers to the atrocious nature of his mission,
and to the sinister purpose which a man of sensibility and elevated
character should never have grasped, even amid the license which a
state of war gives. The power to face death with a calm and graceful
courage may indeed be mated with the moral lightness that belongs to an
intellectual popinjay and a debased intriguer.[1013]



CHAPTER VI.

THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT.

BY EDWARD CHANNING,

_Instructor in History in Harvard College_.


IN the autumn of 1778 the British commander-in-chief, Sir Henry
Clinton, determined to attempt for the second time the subjugation of
the Southern colonies, and Savannah was selected as the first point of
attack. On November 27, 1778, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell,
with thirty-five hundred men of all arms, sailed from Sandy Hook, and
anchored off Tybee Entrance December 23d. Meantime a deserter from an
advance transport had given the Americans warning. Their commander was
General Robert Howe, a good but unsuccessful officer, who had not been
fortunate in securing the confidence of the authorities of Georgia.
Ascertaining these facts, Campbell pressed on without awaiting the
arrival of Brigadier-General Augustine Prevost with a reinforcement
from Florida. On the 28th, late in the afternoon, the British fleet
assembled in the Savannah River, off Giradeau's house on Brewton Hill,
which is about two miles from Savannah in a straight line, though
double that distance by road. A causeway, nearly half a mile in length,
ran from the river to the bluff through a rice-field which in ordinary
times could have been flooded, but over which the bluff was now
accessible from all points.

On the morning of the 29th the Highlanders carried the position with
trifling loss, when Campbell, advancing toward Savannah, found the
Americans most advantageously posted across the highroad. Through no
fault of Howe, his rear was attained, while he awaited an attack in
front. The Americans suffered a severe loss, and only a small part of
them succeeded in joining Lincoln beyond the Savannah River. Campbell
pushed up the Savannah, and in ten days the frontier of Georgia was
secured, and this was the condition when Prevost arrived and took
command.

Although Lincoln had arrived at Charleston on December 6th, he was not
able to reach Purisburgh before the 5th of January, 1779. His army,
composed almost entirely of militia, refused under him, as it had under
Howe, to be governed by the Continental rules of war.[1014]

At first it seemed to the enemy that the occupation of Georgia could be
easily maintained, but the neighboring militia rallied under Pickens,
and drove the British back. The American success, however, was brief,
for Colonel Prevost, a brother of the general, turned upon General
Ashe, who with a detachment from Lincoln's army was following the
British retreat. The Americans were surprised and suffered a defeat,
which cost Lincoln one third of his army and restored to Prevost his
superiority in Georgia.[1015]

The scale again turned. Lincoln, reinforced, once more severed the
British communications with the up-country Tories, when Prevost, to
disconcert his adversary, at first sought to get between him and
Charleston, and then suddenly advanced on the city itself. Here
Moultrie, who had been watching the British advance, threw up some
defences. Negotiations for a surrender followed, and Governor Rutledge,
who was in the town, even proposed a scheme of neutrality for the State
during the war, to which Prevost would not listen. The British now
intercepted a messenger from Lincoln, and finding that general closing
in upon him, Prevost suddenly decamped and marched toward Savannah.

The summer was uneventful; but in the early autumn D'Estaing, who
after leaving Newport had been cruising with some success in the West
Indies, now turned northerly, and on September 3 (1779) his advance
ships arrived off the mouth of the Savannah River. A landing, however,
was not effected until the 12th, when the troops landed at Beaulieu, on
Ossabaw Sound, fourteen to sixteen miles from Savannah. They did not
reach that town until the 16th, so that Prevost had time to call in
his scattered detachments, and all but those from Beaufort had arrived
when, on the evening of that day, D'Estaing, in the name of the king of
France, summoned him to surrender. A correspondence followed, which was
prolonged till the defences were strengthened and Maitland got up from
Beaufort with eight hundred men, when Prevost refused to surrender.

D'Estaing had been all the more willing to grant the truce as Lincoln,
who was looked for from Charleston, had not arrived on the 16th. By
the 23d a considerable part of the Americans had joined the French,
and siege operations were begun. Guns were brought up from the French
ships and trenches pushed to within three hundred yards of the besieged
lines. On September 24th a sortie was made by the garrison for the
purpose of developing the strength of the besiegers. The sortie was
repulsed with ease, but the French, following the assailants back to
their lines, were exposed to a murderous fire, and incurred a heavy
loss in killed and wounded. The bombardment was then begun with vigor,
but with little effect. At last, on October 8th, D'Estaing declared
that he could not keep his vessels longer exposed to the Atlantic
gales. An assault was determined on. In the night the sergeant-major of
one of the Charleston militia regiments deserted to the enemy and gave
full information of the intended movement, and further declared that
the attack on the British left would be only a feint, the real attack
being directed against the Spring Hill redoubt, on the right.[1016]

The assault took place, and failed as much by a lack of coöperation
between the columns as by the treachery. This disaster so dispirited
the allies that Lincoln crossed the river on the 19th, and when he was
safe on the other side the French withdrew to their ships and sailed
away,—their last frigate leaving the river on the 2d of November.

[Illustration: VIEW OF CHARLESTOWN, S. C.

Sketched from a marginal view on a chart of _The Harbour of
Charlestown, from the surveys of Sir Jas. Wallace, Captain in his
Majesty's navy and others_, published in London by Des Barres, Nov. 1,
1777, and making part of the _Atlantic Neptune_. Cf. _Mag. of Amer.
Hist._ (1883), p. 830. _The Catal. of the king's maps_ (Brit. Mus.)
shows an engraved view of 1739, and other early views are noted in
Vol. V., p. 331. There is a view by Leitch, in 1776. In a paper, "Up
the Ashley and Cooper", by C. F. Woolson, in _Harper's Magazine_, lii.
p. 1, there is a view of Drayton house, occupied by Cornwallis as
headquarters.—ED.]

[Illustration: GENERAL MOULTRIE'S ORDER, MARCH 25, 1780.

From the Commodore Tucker Papers in Harvard College library.—ED.]

The sailing of the French left the coast again exposed, and Clinton,
coming from New York, now prepared to attack Charleston. On the 11th
of February, 1780, a landing was made on Simmons' Island, just to the
north of the North Edisto River. Thence by John's Island, Stono Ferry,
Wappoo Cut and River, the Ashley was reached, and a lodgment was
effected on the neck of land at the seaward end of which Charleston
stands. Clinton advanced with caution. On the 1st of April the first
parallel was opened about eight hundred yards from the American works.

[Illustration: From the Tucker Papers in Harvard College library.]

On the 21st of March the British fleet, commanded by Admiral Mariot
Arbuthnot in person, had crossed the bar unopposed. Some time was spent
in taking on board their provisions and guns. Then on the afternoon of
the 7th, 8th, or 9th of April—for there is a hopeless confusion as
to the exact date—in the midst of a furious thunder-shower the fleet
ran by Fort Moultrie without material damage, except to the store-ship
"Eolus", which was abandoned. The greater portion of the garrison of
Moultrie, commanded by Colonel C. C. Pinckney, was then withdrawn,—the
feeble remnant surrendering on the 6th of May, with scarcely a show of
resistance.

On the 8th of April guns were mounted in battery in the first British
parallel. On the 11th, Lincoln having refused to surrender, fire was
opened. The second parallel was completed on the 19th, bringing the
British to within four hundred and fifty yards of the opposing line.

[Illustration:

After a picture by Col. Sargent, owned by the Mass. Hist. Society
(_Proc._, Jan., 1807, vol. i. p. 192; _Catal. Cabinet_, no. 13). A copy
by Herring was engraved by T. Illman. Cf. Jones's _Georgia_, vol. ii.
(bust only); Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., vol. iii.; _Harper's
Mag._, lxiii. 341. A rude contemporary copperplate print, by Norman,
appeared in the Boston ed. of _An Impartial Hist. of the War_ (1784),
vol. iii. 64.—ED.]

On the morning of the 13th Tarleton and Ferguson, by a sudden push,
dispersed the force at Monk's Corner, which had guarded Lincoln's
supplies. On the 18th a reinforcement of three thousand men arrived
from New York, and enabled Clinton to complete the investment of
the town, the command on the eastern side of the Cooper being
given to Cornwallis. There was during the next few days a sortie,
some desultory fighting, and an unsuccessful correspondence for a
surrender. On May 8th the third parallel was completed, bringing the
besiegers to within forty yards of the works, while the canal in
front of the lines was partly drained and the batteries were ready
to open fire. Clinton again summoned the garrison, but again Lincoln
declined to surrender,—this time because Clinton refused to regard the
citizens as anything but prisoners on parole. On the 11th the British
reached the ditch and advanced to within twenty-five yards of the
works. Resistance was no longer to be thought of, especially as the
citizens themselves now petitioned to have the terms offered by Clinton
accepted. The articles were accordingly drawn up and signed on the
12th, and the English took possession.

[Illustration: CORNWALLIS.

From Andrews' _Hist. of the War_, London, 1785, vol. ii. There is an
engraving after an original drawing by T. Prattent in the _European
Mag._, Aug., 1786. There are engravings of him later in life in Lee's
_Memoir of the War in the Southern Department_ (Philadelphia, 1872),
vol. ii., and in the _Cornwallis Correspondence_. Cf. _Harper's Mag._,
lxiii. p. 325; Irving's _Washington_, ii. 282; Boyle's _Official
Baronage_, i. 459. Reynolds painted him in 1780, having already painted
him in 1761. The former picture was engraved by Chas. Knight in 1780.
Cf. Hamilton's _Engraved Works of Reynolds_, pp. 19, 169. There is a
mezzotint by D. Gardiner. Cf. John C. Smith's _Brit. Mez. Port._, ii.
745; and in _Ibid._, iv. 1,444, an engraving by Ward after a picture by
Buckley is noted. There is a contemporary account of Cornwallis in the
_Polit. Mag._, ii. 450.—ED.]

On that day the Continentals to the number of perhaps fifteen
hundred—there were about five hundred in the hospital at the
time—marched out, with colors cased and drums beating the "Turk's
March", and laid down their arms. By regarding every adult capable of
bearing arms as a militiaman, Clinton reckoned his prisoners at five
thousand. Lincoln has been severely censured for this defence, but
if the Carolinians had rallied as expected, he might have held out
until the heats of the summer and the arrival of De Ternay would have
compelled Clinton's retirement.

Clinton now sent out three expeditions to the up-country, the most
important of which was destined to secure the region north of the
Santee and Wateree.[1017] Cornwallis, commanding this expedition,
detached Tarleton against Buford, who had with him the remnants of the
American cavalry and some Continentals from Virginia. Tarleton overtook
him at Waxhaw Creek on the 29th of May. Of the five hundred Americans
who entered the fight, one hundred and thirteen were killed, while
one hundred and fifty were wounded. The slaughter was vindictive, and
"Tarleton's Quarters" will never be forgotten in the upper regions of
South Carolina.

Clinton and Arbuthnot, judging their conquest of the province
permanent, now proclaimed as rebels all who refused the oath of
allegiance, and then sailed for New York, leaving Cornwallis in
command.

[Illustration: CORNWALLIS.

From the _London Mag._, June, 1781 (p. 251).—ED.]

The new commander's proclamations, following upon those of Clinton and
Arbuthnot, were enough at variance with them to create discontent among
those inclined toward the British side. The spirits of the patriots
began to revive, especially in the back regions, where Colonels Locke
and Williams and Generals Rutherford and Sumter gathered strong bands
around their standards. The fights at Ramsour Mills, Rocky Mount,
Hanging Rock, and Musgrove Mills, which these partisans conducted,
were in the main successful, but all were lost to sight in the great
disaster which soon overtook the American arms near Camden.

Early in the spring of 1780, it had been decided to send a
reinforcement under De Kalb to Lincoln, at Charleston. With about
fourteen hundred men of the Maryland and Delaware lines, that general
left Morristown on the 16th of April, 1780, and on the 1st of June, in
Petersburg, he learned of the fall of Charleston. He decided to push on
with the utmost speed, in the hope that his coming might still save the
interior of the State. But delay after delay occurred, and De Kalb did
not reach the Deep River before the 6th of July, when he found nothing
prepared for his reception; and what was still more inexcusable, the
North Carolina militia, under Caswell, were holding aloof. On the 25th
a new commander of the Southern armies arrived in Horatio Gates, the
popular hero of Saratoga. His appointment had been made by Congress
against the wishes of Washington, but in obedience to a general popular
consent. De Kalb received Gates with genuine pleasure, and took his
place at the head of the regulars, then forming the whole army.

Against the advice of his ablest officer, Otho H. Williams, Gates
determined to join the North Carolinians in their camp near Lynch's
Creek, since they would not join him, and with them he hoped to seize
Camden. Two days after his arrival, on July 27th, the march began, and
after the most acute suffering from hunger the regulars joined the
militia. So lax was the discipline among Caswell's men, that Williams
and a party of officers rode through their lines and camp without being
once challenged. Approaching the general's tent, they were informed
that it was an unseasonable hour for gentlemen to call. Yet Caswell
was within striking distance of a disciplined army, commanded by an
enterprising general, Lord Rawdon. Marching a little farther, the
British were found in a strong position on the southern bank of Little
Lynch's Creek.

[Illustration: HORATIO GATES.

From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_ (London, 1783).—ED.]

By a march up the creek, Gates might have placed his superior force on
Rawdon's flank and rear. This was what Rawdon feared, and what De Kalb
is said to have advised. Instead he passed two days in idleness, and
then, inclining to the right, marched to Clermont or Rugeley's Mill,
on the road from Charlotte to Camden, and not more than thirteen miles
from the latter. There, seven hundred militia from Virginia joined
him. From that place, too, he sent four hundred men, including some
regulars, to assist Sumter in a contemplated attack on the enemy's
communications. It was now determined to seek a more defensible
position on the banks of a creek seven miles nearer Camden. This
position could be turned only by marching a considerable distance
either up or down the creek. Exactly what Gates had in view by this
movement can not now be ascertained.[1018]

Cornwallis arrived at the front on the morning of August 14th, and
decided to surprise Gates; but the two armies started on respective
marches at precisely the same hour, ten o'clock of the evening of
August 15, 1780. Their advanced guards met at about half past two the
next morning. Armand, a French adventurer, with his "legion" forming
the American van, retired panic-stricken, and the two armies deployed
across the road. The position in which the opposing generals now found
themselves was singularly favorable to the smaller numbers of the
British, as the front was necessarily very short, owing to a marsh
which protected while limiting either flank. This advantage Cornwallis
was not slow to perceive. A hurried council was held on the American
side, and it was decided that there was no alternative but to fight. At
dawn the enemy was observed getting into position on the extreme left.
Stevens, with the Virginia militia, already in line, was ordered to
charge before the enemy's formation was complete. It so happened that
Cornwallis, thinking the Virginians were making some change in their
dispositions, ordered his right forward. Led by the gallant Webster,
the British came on with such a rush that the men of Virginia threw
down their loaded guns with bayonets set, broke and dispersed to the
rear. Nor did the North Carolinians do better. Seeing the Virginians
break, they did not await the onset, but threw away their arms and
fled. One regiment indeed, inspired by the example of the regulars,
fired several rounds before it broke. Deserted by those whom they had
marched so many weary miles to succor, the men of Maryland and Delaware
fought till to fight longer was criminal. Then the under-officers,
on their own responsibility, brought off all they could, for their
commander, De Kalb, overwhelmed by eleven wounds, had fallen into
the hands of the enemy,—"a fate", says Williams, "which probably
was avoided by other generals only by an opportune retreat." That
night Gates found himself at Charlotte, sixty miles from the scene of
conflict. Caswell was with him, and they were soon joined by Smallwood
and Gist. In fact, excepting the one order issued to the Virginians at
the outset, the leaders seem to have left the conduct of the fight to
De Kalb and the subordinate officers. From Charlotte Gates retired to
Hillsborough, where the legislature was then sitting.

Cornwallis seems to have been satisfied with the havoc wrought on
the field of battle, for he pursued without vigor, and soon returned
to Camden and gave his attention to Sumter. That enterprising but
negligent chieftain had captured the redoubt at the ferry over the
Wateree, and had ensnared a convoy destined for Cornwallis. On the
night of the 17th, hearing of Gates's overthrow, Sumter left his camp,
and moved with such celerity that a corps which Cornwallis sent
against him failed to strike him. Shortly after, Tarleton found him
less vigilant, and came upon him so unexpectedly that resistance was
hardly attempted, and Sumter escaped with scarcely half his force.

Gates has been severely blamed for this defeat; too severely, it seems
to me. The march of the regulars from Buffalo Ford to Lynch's Creek was
undoubtedly full of hardship, but it was well planned and executed. Nor
do the troops who made it seem to have been demoralized by it. On the
contrary, seldom have men fought more gallantly than De Kalb's division
fought on the morning of August 16, 1780. The Virginians, whose flight
made defeat probable, followed the Continentals in the march across the
"desert", and did not suffer nearly as much as the leading division.
The North Carolina militia, whose panic turned a probable defeat into
a rout, had no part whatever in that painful march. The disaster was
due to the over-confidence which Gates felt in his men. Had the militia
stood firm, the event of the campaign might have been different.
There was no defect in Gates as a strategist or tactician. He had a
larger number of men in line than his opponent. His dispositions were
as perfect as the time and place permitted. The defeat Was "brought
on", to use the emphatic words of Stevens, the gallant leader of the
Virginians, "by the damned cowardly behavior of the militia."

From Camden Cornwallis advanced to Charlotte, overcoming all obstacles
which the militia under Davie interposed. Other militia, meanwhile,
under Clarke, advanced on Augusta, but British reinforcements from
Ninety-Six, under Cruger, forced Clarke to abandon the attack, and,
burdened with the families of some leading Whigs, he retired towards
the mountains. Cornwallis, hearing of this, ordered Ferguson, who
had been beating up recruits in the upper country, to endeavor to
cut Clarke off. Now it happened that at this very time the sturdy
frontiersmen, under the leadership of Colonel William Campbell, Colonel
Isaac Shelby, Lieutenant-Colonel John Sevier, and Colonel Charles
McDowell, had assembled at Watauga, bent on the destruction of Ferguson
and his little army.[1019] To the number of one thousand and forty
they left their place of meeting on September 26th and marched for
Gilberton, where Ferguson was supposed to be. On the 30th they were
joined by Colonel Cleveland, with three hundred and fifty men from
North Carolina. The senior officer was McDowell, but from his slowness
he was not deemed the best man to conduct such an arduous enterprise,
and while he was sent to Gates to name a leader they chose Campbell
for their chief. Pressing on, they reached the Cowpens, where they
were joined by Williams and Lacy, with about four hundred men from the
Carolinas.

Meantime Ferguson, not ignorant of the approach of this formidable
force, which appeared to have sprung from the earth, had begun his
retreat towards Charlotte. Anxious to intercept Clarke, he had delayed
his march longer than was prudent, and had taken post on the top of
a spur of King's Mountain, where he probably hoped to be reinforced
before the enemy should come up with him. While at the Cowpens, on
October 6th, the Americans received certain information of Ferguson's
position. They resolved to select the best mounted of their little
army, and, leaving the poorly mounted and the footmen to follow, to go
in pursuit of Ferguson and fight him wherever found. In the evening,
therefore, they broke up from the Cowpens, and, marching all night,
reached, without being discovered, the foot of King's Mountain on
the afternoon of the next day. The spot on which the British were
found was singularly well suited to the mode of fighting in which the
backwoodsmen were adepts. King's Mountain proper is sixteen miles long,
and in some places is high and steep. The southern end, however, where
Ferguson was encamped, rises only about sixty feet. It was wooded,
except on the summit, which partook of the nature of a plateau. The
Americans, under their respective leaders, so timed their movements
that Ferguson was surrounded almost before he knew it. The band led
by Campbell seems to have made the first attack from the south. It
was speedily driven back at the point of the bayonet, but re-formed
at the foot of the hill and returned to the charge. Meantime Shelby
was pressing on from the north. He, too, was driven back, when,
re-forming his men, he also returned to the fight. These charges and
countercharges were three times repeated. Cleveland, Sevier, and the
rest did their work splendidly in their respective positions. The
British, inspired by the example of their heroic leader, fought bravely
and well; but their position was so perilous that their loss was double
that of the assailants. Ferguson, while leading a charge, or perhaps
while endeavoring to cut his way out, was killed. De Peyster, the
second in command, showed the white flag, as was his duty, resistance
being useless, but the firing did not cease for some time, even though
the beaten Tories were suing for quarter. At that moment an attack
was made from the rear by another band of British, who were probably
returning from a foraging expedition. This new and sudden attack led to
a renewal of the slaughter of the unresisting foe on the hill.

The neighborhood was bare of provisions, and the next morning the
now half famished victors, with their no less hungry prisoners, made
a hurried retreat towards the mountains. On the 13th the Americans
arrived at a place then called Bickerstaff's Old Fields, about nine
miles from the present hamlet of Rutherfordton. There they improvised a
court, and sentenced thirty to forty of their prisoners to death. But
after nine had been hanged, the remainder were reprieved or pardoned.

Such was the famous battle of King's Mountain in South Carolina. It
changed to a great extent the whole course of the war in the Southern
department, as it deprived Cornwallis of the only corps that he could
afford to hazard for a long time out of supporting distance. As for
Cornwallis, as soon as he heard of the disaster, instead of sending
Tarleton in pursuit, he broke up from Charlotte, and retired as fast
as he could to Wynnesborough, in South Carolina, midway between Camden
and Ninety-Six, where he would be within supporting distance of either
in case they were attacked. He was followed by Gates, who encamped at
Charlotte, his light parties advancing even to Rugeley's.

Not long after his arrival at Wynnesborough, Cornwallis detached
Tarleton, with a portion of the Legion, to disperse the band with
which Marion awed the country between the Santee and Pedee rivers.
Tarleton had now to deal with a soldier both bold and discreet. All his
artifices were unavailing to entrap Marion, and he was recalled to go
in pursuit of Sumter, who had encamped at Fishdam Ford, not far from
the British headquarters. Meanwhile, Major Wemyss had attacked Sumter
just before daybreak on the morning of November 11th. He approached
the camp unchallenged at first, but he soon encountered a picket,
which fired five shots before retiring. Two shots disabled Wemyss. His
second in command, continuing the attack without a proper knowledge of
the ground, was repulsed. Sumter, hearing of the approach of Tarleton,
prudently withdrew from such a dangerous neighborhood, and had reached
the ford of the Tyger, near Blackstocks, when Tarleton appeared. Unable
to cross, he drew up his men on the side of a hill. Tarleton, rashly
attacking with his advance, was beaten off with great loss. The British
leader withdrew to his main body, and prepared to storm the hill the
following morning; but in the night Sumter crossed the river, and once
over his men dispersed in every direction. The American loss at these
two actions was small, though a wound received at the Blackstocks kept
Sumter from the field for several months.

From this time on the war in the Southern department assumed a new and
brighter aspect, for on December 2, 1780, less than a month after the
affair at the Blackstocks, Nathanael Greene arrived at Charlotte, and
took command of the remnants of the gallant Continentals who had fought
so splendidly at Camden. He was respectfully received by Gates, who
retired to his Virginia farm.[1020]

The task that Greene had before him might well have appalled the
boldest. Without food, without money or credit, almost without an army,
he was expected to face the most enterprising commanders—Cornwallis,
Rawdon, and Tarleton—that the British had on this continent, while
they were at the head of a large and well-appointed army. But Greene
was not the man to be easily disheartened. With the possible exception
of Washington, the best soldier of high rank in the American army, he
resembled his chief in being a careful observer of men. His judgment,
too, with regard to all matters connected with war was excellent, and
has seldom been surpassed. As a strategist he had no equal in the
opposing army, while he possessed the rare power of being able to
adapt his tactics to the army and to the country, although it has been
claimed that credit has been given him for what really was the product
of another mind.

Gates handed over to his successor an army which numbered on paper
twenty-three hundred and seven men, including nine hundred and
forty-nine Continentals. But so many were insufficiently clad and
equipped that, to use the new commander's own words, "not more than
eight hundred were present and fit for duty." Food was scarce, and the
_morale_ of the army was low. Greene sought a new camp on the eastern
bank of the Pedee, opposite Cheraw Hill, where food was more abundant.
There he subjected his men to a discipline to which they had long
been strangers, while Morgan, with a strong detachment, threatened
Cornwallis's other flank.

Morgan took with him four hundred of the Maryland line, under
Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Howard, two companies of Virginia militia, and
about one hundred dragoons led by William Washington. To these were
afterwards added more than five hundred militia from the Carolinas.
Morgan advanced to Grindall's Ford on the Pacolet, near its confluence
with Broad River. In this position he seriously menaced Ninety-Six and
even Augusta itself. Cornwallis needed to dislodge him before he could
advance far in his projected invasion of North Carolina. He therefore
detached Tarleton, with his Legion and a strong infantry support,
against Morgan, while he himself advanced with the main body along the
upper road to North Carolina, thus placing himself on Morgan's line
of retreat whenever that commander should be driven back. Learning of
these movements, Morgan retired from Grindall's Ford, and moving with
commendable speed on the night of January 16, 1781, encamped at the
Cowpens. Tarleton was now close upon him, and, marching the greater
part of the night, he discovered the Americans drawn up in line of
battle on the morning of the 17th. The position which Morgan had chosen
was in many respects a weak one. The country was well fitted for the
use of cavalry, in which the British excelled, while the Broad River,
flowing parallel to his rear, made retreat difficult if not impossible.
Nor were the flanks protected in any manner.[1021] Hardly waiting
for his line to be formed, and with his reserve too far in the rear,
Tarleton dashed forward.[1022] A militia skirmish line was easily
brushed aside, and the main body of militia, after firing a few rounds
with terrible precision, also retreated. The Continentals, however,
under their gallant leader, stood firm. But Howard's flank soon became
enveloped. He ordered his flank company to change its front. Mistaking
the order, the company fell back, and the whole line was ordered to
retire upon the cavalry. The British, who had been joined by the
reserve, thinking that the Americans were retreating, came on like a
mob. Seeing this, Howard ordered the 1st Maryland to face about. They
obeyed, and poured such an unexpected and murderous fire into the
advancing foe that the British line paused, became panic-stricken,
turned, and fled. In vain did Tarleton call upon his dragoons for
a charge. His order was either not delivered or was misunderstood.
Colonel Washington, on the other hand, advanced with a rush, and the
day was won. Almost to a man the British infantry was either killed
or captured. But they had fought well, and their loss, especially in
officers, bears testimony to their splendid conduct on the field.[1023]

King's Mountain lost to Cornwallis his best corps of scouts. This
disaster deprived him of his light infantry, whose presence during the
forced marches now to come would have been of incalculable service. For
this reason the affair at the Cowpens, while in reality only a fight
between two small bodies of troops, in importance of results deserves
to be ranked among the most important conflicts of the war. It was
indeed, as has so often been said, "the Bennington of the South."

Cornwallis, when he had detached Tarleton to the defence of Ninety-Six,
and later, when he had ordered him to push Morgan to the utmost, had
expected to be able to get on Morgan's line of retreat, and thus drive
him into the mountains, or at least prevent his rejoining Greene. But
with Greene on his flank at the Cheraws, he had been afraid to move
far from Camden before Leslie with the reinforcements could get out
of Greene's reach. He was, therefore, no further advanced than Turkey
Creek, twenty-five miles away, when the news of the disaster at the
Cowpens reached him. On the 18th, Leslie, with two battalions of the
Guards under O'Hara and the Hessian regiment of Bose, arrived. On the
19th the pursuit was begun, and on the 24th Cornwallis reached the
crossing of the Little Catawba at Ramsour's Mill, only to learn that
Morgan had crossed at the same place two days before. In fact, that
enterprising leader, instead of being dazzled by the victory at the
Cowpens, passed the Broad River on the evening of the day of action,
and, pursuing his route toward the mountains, passed Ramsour's Mill on
the 21st. With the bulk of his detachment he then sought a junction
with the main body under Greene. Turning to the east, he crossed the
Catawba at Sherrald's Ford on the 23d, and took post on the eastern
bank. At this place he finally rid himself of his prisoners, sending
them to Virginia under an escort of militia.

There can be little doubt of the chagrin Cornwallis experienced at
the escape of Morgan. It prompted him to destroy what he thought
was useless baggage, and to make another attempt to overtake the
Americans. This burning of his train occupied two days, and, necessary
as it may have seemed, the consequent lack of supplies led to the
fearful suffering of his army after Guilford, and made his retreat to
Wilmington a necessity. It was his first grave error in his struggle
with Greene. On the 27th he put his troops in motion for the Catawba,
but before he reached the fords a sudden rise of the river made the
crossing an impossibility, and gave Morgan two days' respite. The delay
was still more important in giving Greene time to reach the post of
danger and take command of the detachment. The news of the victory
at Cowpens had not reached the camp at the Cheraws until the 25th.
Instantly divining the course that Cornwallis would pursue, Greene sent
an express to Lee, who, as soon as he had joined, had been dispatched
to coöperate with Marion in an attack on Georgetown, next to Charleston
then the most important seaport in South Carolina. The attack failed
for some reason that is not quite apparent; but Lee brought off
his troops in safety, and rejoined Greene in time to render most
important service. On the 29th, the main army, under command of General
Huger, left the camp for Salisbury, where Greene hoped to be able to
concentrate his entire force. On the 31st the Catawba began to subside.
Putting their troops in motion, Greene and Morgan directed their steps
toward Salisbury, where they arrived on February 2d. The Yadkin was
crossed in safety the next day, though rising rapidly all the time;
then sending orders to Huger to join him at Guilford Court-House, and
not at Salisbury as formerly ordered, Greene once more breathed freely.

On the afternoon of the 1st, Cornwallis had also put his troops in
motion. His design was to make a feint of crossing at Beattie's Ford
while with the Guards he should pass the river at the less known
Cowan's Ford. By some means, Davidson, who commanded the militia in
that region, became cognizant of the design, and stationed himself
at Cowan's with about four hundred men, where he expected to hold
Cornwallis in check long enough to be of real service to the retiring
Americans.

Shortly before daybreak Cornwallis reached the river, and saw the
watch-fires on the opposite bank. Without a moment's hesitation the
Guards rushed into the rapid stream. When about halfway across they
were discovered, and a fire was opened upon them by the militia. But
now occurred one of those accidents that so often in war defeat the
best-laid plans. The ford, turning in mid-stream at an angle with
the direct line, ran under a bank where the militia were waiting for
the British; but when they arrived at the turning-point, instead of
inclining to the right, the Guards—their guide having deserted through
fear—kept straight on, and gained the bank with a loss of only sixty
in killed, wounded, and missing. The militia retired, and although
Tarleton was sent after them, they made good their retreat with a loss
which would have been trifling but for a mortal wound under which the
gallant Davidson fell. There were many hair-breadth escapes during this
splendid charge. Cornwallis's horse was shot under him, but reached the
bank before he fell. Leslie was carried down stream, and O'Hara's horse
rolled over with his rider while in the water.

Pushing on with all speed possible in the wretched condition of the
roads, Cornwallis's van, under O'Hara, reached the Yadkin at the
Trading Ford a few hours after the Americans had crossed; but O'Hara,
though he missed the soldiers, captured a train of wagons belonging to
the country people who were flying with the army. Here again the forces
of nature came to the assistance of the Americans, for the Yadkin
rose so rapidly that it could not be forded, and Greene had carefully
secured all the boats on the eastern bank.

Cornwallis now gave up all idea of preventing the union of the two
wings of the opposing army, which, indeed, was effected soon after at
Martinsville, near Guilford. The British commander decided to place
himself between his opponents and the fords of the Dan, hoping thereby
to prevent the Americans taking refuge in Virginia. Accordingly, on the
7th he crossed the Yadkin at the Shallow Ford. It was now a serious
question with Greene to escape the new danger. The militia failing to
come to his aid, he was obliged to protect his Continentals by a flight
into Virginia. He determined to cross the Dan at Irwin's Ferry, and
sent orders to have boats ready at that point. On the 10th the march
was renewed. The light troops, united in one division, were placed
under the command of O. H. Williams, with orders to delay the enemy as
much as possible. By rapid marching the main army reached Irwin's Ferry
and crossed on the 13th and 14th, before Williams and the rear-guard
came in sight. The experience of this light division has been well
told by Lee, whose Legion first measured sabres with Tarleton's men on
the 12th. From that time the rear of the Americans and the advance of
O'Hara were almost constantly in sight of each other. At every crossing
or other suitable place Williams would draw his men out and thus compel
the British to deploy; then, his object being accomplished, and the
British delayed for a few minutes, the march would be resumed, and the
two armies would soon be marching as one again. Cornwallis, conscious
finally that his prey had escaped, turned back to Hillsborough, and,
erecting the Royal Standard, called upon all loyal North Carolinians to
rally to the aid of their royal master.

On the 18th, only four days after his escape, recruits had come in so
rapidly that Greene detached Lee across the Dan to seek information,
and to show the Tories that the Americans were by no means beaten. Lee
had, in addition to his legion, two companies of the Maryland line.
He was joined on the southern side of the river by Pickens with a
considerable body of Carolina militia.

On the 23d Greene himself crossed the Dan with the main army, and
sought the difficult country on the head-waters of the Haw, as the
Cape Fear River is called in its upper course. Here again, as during
the retreat, the light troops were put into the hands of Williams. The
two divisions manœuvred with such precision that Cornwallis was held
at arm's length, while militia and Continentals came into the American
camp from all directions. The American commander saw that the time had
now come to give way no more. He stationed himself on a hillside near
Guilford, and awaited the approach of the British. The position which
had attracted his attention during the retreat possessed a combination
of rising ground, cleared spaces, and woods which could hardly be
surpassed for the irregular formation that Greene, following the
example set by Morgan at the Cowpens, deemed best suited to his troops.

To Cornwallis, the presence of Greene had been most disastrous.
Strategy had failed to annihilate his opponent, and the offered battle,
even on ground of the American general's own selection, was welcome to
the British commander; and on the morning of the 15th of March, 1781,
the trial came.

In his front line Greene put the North Carolina militia, their flanks
resting in the woods, the centre being protected in some measure by
a rail fence. Three hundred yards behind were posted the Virginia
militia under Stevens and Lawson. Though militia in name, some of those
under Stevens were veterans in reality. But, taught by his bitter
experience at Camden, Stevens posted riflemen behind his line, with
orders to shoot any who should run. The Virginians were entirely in
the woods. Three to four hundred yards behind them, on the brow of a
declivity, with open fields in their front, were the regulars. On the
right was the Virginia brigade under Huger. Then, after an interval for
the artillery under Singleton, came the Maryland brigade, commanded
by Williams. The first regiment was led by Gunby, with Howard as
lieutenant-colonel. This was the regiment which had aroused universal
admiration by its splendid conduct at Camden and its wonderful
subordination at the Cowpens, when a gallant charge converted a bloody
check into a crushing disaster. The second Maryland regiment, commanded
by Ford, was new to the service. It held the extreme left of the line.
The regulars presented a convex front. Lee with the "Legion" and
Campbell's riflemen from the backwoods acted as a corps of observation
on the left, while Washington, with the regular cavalry and the
remnant of the Delaware regiment under the heroic Kirkwood and Lynch's
riflemen, protected the right flank.

As soon as Cornwallis found himself in the presence of his enemy, he
deployed without reserves, except the British dragoons under Tarleton.
The "Hessian" regiment of Bose and the 71st under Leslie, with the
1st battalion of the Guards in support, held the right; next came the
23d and 33d regiments under Webster, with the Grenadiers and the 2d
battalion of the Guards under O'Hara in support; while the extreme
left was occupied by the light infantry of the Guards and the Jägers.
The artillery was on the road with Tarleton. As the line moved forward
it first encountered the North Carolinians, who fired a volley, and
perhaps more, before they broke. On the extreme right, however, Lee
with his light troops held the regiment of Bose and the 1st battalion
of the Guards in check. But the defection of the North Carolinians
separated him from the rest of the army. The first line being broken,
Webster rushed upon the Virginians. But the woods were so thick, and
the defence of the Virginians so stout, that his loss at this point was
very considerable. At length, Stevens having been wounded in the thigh,
the Virginians retired and Webster advanced upon the Continentals. On
his right was Leslie with the 71st. When the advancing line reached the
front of the 1st Maryland, it was received with such a murderous fire
that it stopped. The Marylanders then advanced with the bayonet, and
the British gave way and retreated. It has been said by writers on both
sides, that had Greene thrown forward another regiment at this moment
the day would have been won. But this is by no means certain, as the
events of the next few minutes were to show. For Leslie with the 71st
and O'Hara with the Guards now came up and assailed the 2d Maryland
with such fierceness that it broke and fled. But the 1st Maryland was
not far off. Wheeling into line, it opposed the Guards until Washington
charged and broke the British line. J. E. Howard—now in command, Gunby
having been dismounted—then followed with the bayonet, and pressed
the enemy so hard that re-formation was for the moment impossible.
Cornwallis, seeing that the flight must be stopped at all hazards,
ordered his artillery—posted on an eminence in the centre of the
field—to open on the Marylanders through the ranks of his own men.
In this way the pursuit was checked, though at terrible loss to the
British.

Greene's hopes were soon dashed. The shattered lines of the enemy
re-formed and returned to the conflict. Pressing heavily on the
Virginia regulars, and reinforced by the 1st battalion of the Guards,
which had disengaged itself from Lee, the whole American line was
endangered. Greene, who wished to run no chances, and who probably
did not know that Lee had once more connected himself with the main
line, ordered a retreat. The artillery, the horses having been killed,
was left on the ground, but otherwise the withdrawal was easily and
skilfully effected.

Such was the battle of Guilford. Numerically, Greene was superior;
but of good troops he had only a handful. When the two leaders summed
up their losses, it became evident that a decisive blow had been
struck at Cornwallis. The Americans lost seventy-nine killed and
one hundred and eighty-four wounded, together with one thousand and
forty-six missing. Of these last some may have been wounded, but by
far the greater part were militiamen, who had returned to their homes.
Cornwallis reported his own loss at ninety-three killed, and four
hundred and thirteen wounded, and twenty-six missing—a most serious
diminution of his force.

Cornwallis in his proclamation and letters maintained, however, that
he had achieved a great triumph. It was his despatch to Germain which
occasioned the well-known assertion of Charles James Fox that "another
such victory would destroy the British army." Even before the fight it
had been almost a necessity to open communications with the sea, as
the army was suffering for want of the stores that had been destroyed
at Ramsour's Mill. Believing the Cape Fear River navigable as far as
Cross Creek, Cornwallis had sent Major Craig to seize Wilmington and to
open navigation as far as possible, which he succeeded in doing to a
point at a short distance above Wilmington. Leaving his wounded at the
New Garden Quaker Meeting-house, near the battlefield, Cornwallis set
out on the morning of the 18th for Wilmington, arriving there on April
7, 1781. Greene had pursued as soon as possible. But his ammunition,
never very abundant, was now almost exhausted. Besides, food was very
scarce in the district to be traversed, and Greene arrived at Ramsey's
Mill only to find that Cornwallis had built a bridge over Deep River
at that point and escaped, although Lee had pressed so hard on his
rear that the bridge could not be destroyed. Here the pursuit ended;
for the Virginia militia, now that their time was up, refused to serve
longer. Though Cornwallis escaped, and though Greene had lost one of
the best contested battles of the war, he had won the campaign. He was
free once more to turn his attention toward relieving South Carolina of
her military rulers. On April 6th, one day before Cornwallis arrived at
Wilmington, the southward march began, Lee being detached to operate on
the line of Rawdon's communications with Charleston.

Lee soon joined Marion, who was skulking in swamps between the Pedee
and Santee, and, uniting forces, the two captured a fortified depot of
Watson, the British officer scouring this region, and then endeavored
to prevent his rejoining Rawdon.

On the 7th of April Greene had broken up from Ramsey's, and, taking the
direct road, had encamped on Hobkirk's Hill, to the north of Camden,
and about a mile and a half from the British works at that place. As
Rawdon did not come out from his intrenchments, Greene on the 23d moved
nearer. Anxious for Marion and Lee, and desirous of supporting some
artillery which he detached to them, Greene moved to a position south
of Camden. It appears, however, that on the 23d or 24th he decided to
fall back. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 24th he reëncamped
on Hobkirk's Hill. During that night a renegade drummer-boy informed
Rawdon of the position and number of the American force. He also said
that Greene had neither artillery nor trains near at hand, although
both were on the march to join him. It was a most propitious time to
strike, and Rawdon determined to attempt a surprise the next morning.

Making a considerable detour to the right, he struck the American left
almost unperceived. Greene had thrown out a strong picket in that
direction, but the superiority of the British was so great that they
drove in the guards and were upon the Americans before the formation
was complete. That the attack was not a disaster was due to the
prudence of Greene, who had encamped in order of battle. Perceiving
that Rawdon's line was very short, Greene ordered Ford with the 2d
Maryland to flank it on the right, and Campbell was told to do the
same on the left. Gunby with the 1st Maryland, and Hawes with the
Virginia regulars, were ordered to attack with the bayonet in front,
while Washington with the cavalry was to get into the rear and take
advantage of any opening that might offer. Unfortunately, neither Ford
nor Campbell were able to put in their men before Rawdon, seeing his
danger, brought up his reserves and extended his flank. This was owing
partly to Ford being struck down in the beginning of the movement.

The defeat of Greene, however, was due to one of those accidents
against which no foresight can provide. It seems that as the 1st
Maryland was getting into position to charge, or perhaps as it was
moving forward, Beattie, the captain of one of the leading companies,
was shot. His men began firing, and fell into confusion. Then Gunby,
instead of pushing his rear companies forward, as Greene always
declared he should have done, ordered the regiment to form on the rear
companies. The men retiring were seized with a panic, and the heroes of
three battles broke. They were rallied soon after, but it was then too
late. The whole line was compromised, and Greene ordered a retreat.

Though Greene was not surprised, the attack was most unexpected.
This was owing in a great measure to the woods in his front, which
permitted Rawdon to reach the picket line without discovery. Even
then Greene fully expected victory, and had his men done their duty,
as he had a perfect right to expect, this adventurous attempt of the
young British commander would have resulted in his complete overthrow.
Such was Greene's opinion, and such is the opinion of most American
writers.[1024] Retiring first to Sanders Creek or Gum Swamp, the very
spot Gates was trying to reach when he met Cornwallis, and later to
Rugeley's Mill, Greene brought up his provisions and recruited the
strength of his men. Though not beaten at Hobkirk's Hill, Greene was
greatly discouraged. Especially distressing was the non-arrival of
expected reinforcements. The terms of service of his best men were
expiring, and he could see no source from which to draw recruits. His
losses in the recent engagement had not been so great as those of
his opponent; but Marion and Lee had been unable to prevent Watson
from rejoining his chief. Still Greene did not lose heart. As soon as
his men had recovered from fatigue he crossed the Wateree and posted
himself at Twenty-five-Mile Creek, on the road from Camden to Fishing
Creek and the Catawba settlements.

Watson reached Camden on May 7th. On the evening of the same day Rawdon
moved out from his fortifications, and, crossing the Wateree, turned
on Greene, intending to pass his flank and attack him from the rear.
But Greene was too vigilant, for, learning of Rawdon's departure from
Camden, he retired still higher up the river, first to Sandy's Creek
and later to Colonel's Creek, the latter being nine miles from his
former position. The position on the further bank of Colonel's Creek
was very favorable to the party attacked. The light troops had been
left in the front, as at Hobkirk's Hill. Coming upon them at Sandy's
Creek, Rawdon mistook them for the main body, and their position
seemed so strong that he did not feel willing to risk an attack. It
was impossible for him to remain longer in Camden with Greene in such
threatening attitude, especially as his line of communication with
Charleston was in the hands of Lee and Marion. On the 10th, leaving his
wounded who were unable to be moved at Camden, Rawdon evacuated that
place, and marching to the east of the Santee, he crossed at Nelson's
Ferry and took post at Monk's Corner, not more than thirty miles from
Charleston.

[Illustration: RAWDON.

From Doyle's _Official Baronage_, ii. 151. The likeness by Reynolds
was painted in 1789, and is at Windsor Castle, and is engraved in the
_European Mag._, June, 1791; it was also engraved in mezzotint by
John Jones. Cf. Hamilton's _Engraved Works of Reynolds_, pp. 56, 183,
and J. C. Smith's _Brit. Mezzotint Portraits_, ii. 767. Cf. Irving's
_Washington_, 4^o ed., iv. 331.—ED.] There is an account of Rawdon's
career to date in _Pol. Mag._, ii. 339, and Lossing has given a sketch
of his life in _Harper's Monthly_, xlvii. 15. He is better known by his
later title of Marquis of Hastings, which he bore as governor-general
of India. Cf. note to p. 49 of _Cornwallis Corresp._ It is to be noted
that both he and his chief, Cornwallis, showed a humanity in after life
which did not grace their careers in America.]

One of the motives which had induced Rawdon to make this precipitate
retreat was the hope of saving the garrison of Fort Motte, an important
post on the Congaree, near its confluence with the Wateree. Lee and
Marion had appeared before the place on the 8th. They had pushed the
siege with vigor, but were so destitute of artillery and siege tools
that it seemed the siege might be prolonged until the coming of Rawdon
should enforce its abandonment. Happily it occurred to some one that
the roof of Mrs. Motte's house, which stood in the middle of the
inclosure, could be set on fire. It is related that Mrs. Motte herself
furnished the bow and arrows with which this was accomplished. At any
rate, soon after Rawdon's watch-fires were seen in the distance the
house was on fire, the stockade untenable, and the garrison prisoners
of war. Marion then separated from Lee, and, turning toward Charleston,
compelled the enemy to look well to his communications.

When Rawdon evacuated Camden he sent orders to the commander at Fort
Granby to retire to Charleston, and directed Cruger, at Ninety-Six, to
join Brown at Augusta. Neither of these orders reached its destination.
As soon as the post at Motte's had surrendered, Lee was ordered to
Fort Granby. Proceeding with his usual celerity, he arrived before the
place in the night of the 14th. His single piece of artillery opened
on the fort as soon as the morning fog had dispersed. The garrison was
completely taken by surprise. Time being of the utmost importance to
Lee, the besieged were promised their baggage—in reality the property
of plundered patriots—if they would immediately surrender. The terms
were accepted, and Lee joined Pickens at Augusta.[1025]

Lee reached this place on the evening of the 21st of May. On his way
he had captured a small stockade, containing, under a strong guard,
valuable stores for the Indians. Augusta is, or rather was, situated
on the southern bank of the Savannah River. Its defences consisted
of a strong work, Fort Cornwallis, in the centre of the town. It was
garrisoned by a force of regulars under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, who
had already once successfully defended the place. Not far from Fort
Cornwallis was a smaller work, named after its defender Fort Grierson.
While Lee watched the garrison of the larger fort, Pickens and Clarke
advanced to the attack of Fort Grierson. Its defenders soon were
compelled to leave their stronghold for the main fort. Their attempt
to reach it was a vain one, as most of the garrison were captured or
killed.[1026]

The attack on Fort Cornwallis was now pressed with vigor. As at Fort
Watson, use was here made of an expedient, already tried in the
campaign, of advancing a log pen or Mahem tower, on the top of which
was mounted the besiegers' only piece of artillery, whence it was
used with great effect. The defence was most gallant, the garrison
often sallying, and even attempting to blow up a house in which a
covering party of riflemen were to have been placed; but the explosion
was premature. Everything being ready for an assault, the garrison
capitulated after one of the most splendid defences of the war. Lee
then went to the assistance of Greene, who was now conducting the siege
of Ninety-Six.

The village of Ninety-Six was then situated near the Saluda River,
about twenty-five miles from Augusta. For many years a post had been
established there as a protection against the Indians. When the British
overran the State, it was selected as a proper position for one of the
exterior line of posts of which Camden was the most important, though
the possession of Augusta gave to the British the command of upper
Georgia. When Camden was evacuated, Ninety-Six became useless and
should have been abandoned; but the messengers bearing Rawdon's orders
to that effect were stopped by the Americans. When, therefore, Greene
arrived before the place, on the 22d of May, he found it defended
by Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, with about 500 men, mainly New York
loyalists. A stockade protected the rivulet which supplied the garrison
with water, and their main fort, the "Star", had sixteen salient and
reëntering angles. Greene was not strong enough completely to invest
this fort, and he contented himself with an attempt to carry it by
regular approaches.

This was Greene's first siege, and, unfortunately, he had no engineer
of the requisite ability. Acting on the advice of Kosciusko, ground was
broken at a distance of seventy paces from the "Star." The besieged
soon sallied, destroyed the uncompleted works, and retired with
trifling loss, taking with them the intrenching tools. The British were
surprised at the temerity of the Americans in opening their trenches so
near. The sally taught Greene a lesson, for he next opened a trench at
a distance of four hundred paces, under the protection of a ravine. The
work was now pushed with vigor, and, notwithstanding numerous sallies
on the part of the garrison, by the morning of June 18th the third
parallel was completed. The assailants were now within six feet of the
ditch, while riflemen in a Mahem tower kept the besieged from their
guns during the day.

[Illustration: KOSCIUSZKO.

NOTE ON PORTRAIT OF KOSCIUSZKO.—After an engraving by Anton
Oleszeynski. Cf. Dr. Theodor Flathe's _Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_
(Berlin, 1887), i. p. 205. Cf. A. W. W. Evans's _Memoir of Kosciusko_,
privately printed for the Cincinnati Society, 1883. There was a model
made in wax from life by C. Andras, from which an engraving was made by
W. Sharp (W. S. Baker's _William Sharp, Engraver_, Philad., 1875, p.
66).

There are some notes on Kosciusko by Gen. Armstrong in the _Sparks
MSS._ Cf. Greene's _Hist. View_, 297, and B. P. Poore's _Index_, for
his claims on the United States (p. 131).—ED.]

Lee with the "Legion" had arrived from Augusta on the 3d, and had
conducted operations against the stockade covering the watering-place
with such vigor that it had been evacuated on the 17th. Four days more
would have placed the garrison in the power of the besiegers. But it
was not so to be. Rawdon, in Charleston, had received considerable
reinforcements direct from Ireland, and early in June he pushed forward
through the heat, and eluded Sumter.[1027] With Rawdon within a day's
march, Greene must either take the fort by storm or abandon the siege.
He decided on an assault,—probably more to satisfy the desires of his
men than because he thought it was the best thing to be done. On the
18th, at noon, the attack was made in two columns, Greene not being
willing to hazard his whole force in a general storm. On the extreme
right, Lee, with "Legion" infantry and the remains of the gallant
Delaware regiment, directed his efforts against the stockaded fort,
which had already been abandoned, according to the British account of
the siege. At all events, Lee had no trouble in carrying out his part
of the work. But on the other flank the assault was not so successful.
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, with his Virginia regiment and with the
1st Maryland, formed the storming column. They advanced with great
gallantry, but, though they gained the ditch, they could not effect a
lodgment on the parapet. They were driven back with considerable loss
by two parties of the besieged, which attacked them in the ditch on
both flanks in such a way that the artillery and riflemen in the tower
could not fire without injuring friend and foe alike. Greene called off
his men, and Rawdon being within a few miles, he retired on the next
morning to a safe place of retreat. In the end he retreated as far as
Timm's Ordinary, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. Rawdon, his men
worn down with their long march, could not overtake him, and finally
halting on the banks of the Enroree, he turned back to Ninety-Six. That
place being untenable with the means at his disposal, he divided his
men into two parties. With one he regained the low country, resigning
the command to Stuart on account of ill-health.[1028] Gathering the
Tories of the neighborhood, Cruger escorted them to Charleston, while
Greene led his army to the High Hills of the Santee, where he passed
the heats of the summer.

At length, toward the end of August, Greene learned that Stuart was
proposing to establish a fortified post at a strong and healthful
position called Eutaw Springs. Greene determined to prevent this,
and descending from his camp he made a wide detour to get across the
river which separated the two armies; for although he was distant from
Stuart only sixteen miles as a bird flies, the most practicable route
was nearly seventy miles long. He crossed the Wateree at Camden, and,
marching parallel to the river, crossed its affluent, the Congaree,
at Howell's Ferry on the 28th and 29th. Proceeding by slow and easy
marches, he reached Burden's plantation on the 7th of September.
At that place Marion joined him, and preparations were made for an
advance on the enemy the next day. Stuart at Eutaw seems to have been
singularly negligent. He sent out but one patrol, which was captured
by Lee. He would have been surprised had not two men deserted from the
North Carolina regiment and given him warning. As it was, he had barely
time to call in his foraging parties before Greene was upon him.

Stuart had with him about 2,300 men of all arms, Greene rather less.
The British commander ranged his men in one line, the right being
protected by Eutaw Creek, while the left was in the air, as the
military term is. Greene advanced in two lines, the militia, under
Marion, Pickens, and Malmady, being in the front. The right of the
second line was held by Sumner with the North Carolina regulars. In the
centre were the Virginia Continentals under Campbell, while on the left
J. E. Howard and Hardman led the two Maryland regiments. To Lee, who
had the advance during the march, was assigned the protection of the
right flank, Henderson with a South Carolina brigade covering the left.
The cavalry under Washington and the brave remnant of the Delaware
regiment brought up the rear, and acted as a reserve.

Here at last there was no wavering among the militia, excepting those
from North Carolina, who nevertheless fired several rounds before
breaking. Under Marion and Pickens the rest fought splendidly. It is
said that some of them fired no less than seventeen rounds before
giving way; then Sumner advanced with the North Carolina regulars. At
length they, too, were forced back; but the British following them
with too great impetuosity, their own line became deranged. This was
the opportunity for the men of Maryland and Virginia to retrieve
the reputation lost at Guilford and Hobkirk's Hill, and splendidly
they responded to the call. Rushing forward,—the Virginians alone
disobeying orders so far as to fire,—the whole burst upon the enemy
in front and swept him from the field. Unfortunately, their course led
through the British camp, and they dispersed to plunder the abandoned
tents. Now it happened that when the British fell back a party threw
themselves into a strong brick house and an adjoining picketed garden;
thence they delivered a withering fire upon the victors of a moment
before. And more unfortunate still, when the "Legion" was ordered to
charge the retiring foe, Lee could not be found, and the charge, being
made without vigor, was a failure. On the right, too, the British had
not retreated: they still occupied a flanking position, from which
they could not be dislodged, even though Washington and all but two of
his officers were killed or wounded in the attempt. All these things,
coupled with the heat, compelled Greene to sound the retreat. Leaving
such of the wounded as were within range of the brick house on the
field, he retired to his camp at Burdell's, seven miles distant, that
being the nearest point where a supply of good water could be obtained.
Both commanders claimed the victory. It would be not unfair, perhaps,
to call it a drawn battle. Neither party can be said to have retained
possession of the field, as Stuart retreated with great precipitation
from the vicinity on the night of the next day. Greene acknowledged a
loss in Continentals alone of 408 in killed and wounded. The loss in
militia has never been stated. It must have been considerable, as a
portion of the militia fought with great obstinacy. According to the
American accounts, the enemy lost in prisoners 500 men, including 70
wounded. But Stuart reported only 257 missing; his killed and wounded
he gives at 433.

As soon as Greene ascertained the retreat of the enemy he followed
with all speed; but Marion and Lee were too weak to prevent Stuart's
receiving a reinforcement. Stuart finally halted at Monk's Corner,
while Greene passed the Santee at Nelson's Ferry and retired to the
High Hills.

       *       *       *       *       *

Cornwallis at Wilmington had a difficult problem to solve. Should he
go south to the relief of Rawdon, or north to the conquest of Virginia?
Another campaign in North Carolina was plainly out of the question.
The distances were so great and the country was so sparsely settled
that it was a matter of great difficulty to move any considerable force
there, even when unopposed. The recent campaign had fully demonstrated
that a bold and enterprising leader with a handful of trained troops
could seriously impair the usefulness of a royal army, even though he
could not destroy it. The best base of operations for another campaign
in South Carolina was Charleston, and the best way to get there was
by water; but any such movement looked too much like a retreat to be
seriously considered. Besides, Cornwallis did not believe that he
could get to Camden in time to relieve Rawdon, as the place was not
provisioned for a siege. On the other hand, a movement into Virginia
offered many advantages. There the army would always be within easy
march of the sea, and reinforcements could be brought from New York or
sent thither with great ease. Then, too, it seemed to Cornwallis—and
his supposition was probably correct—that with Virginia, the great
storehouse of the Southern armies, once in his hands, the complete
conquest of the Carolinas would be easy and certain. So impressed
was he with this idea that he endeavored to induce Clinton to shift
the headquarters of the army from the Hudson to the Chesapeake; but
Clinton had other views, and New York remained the base of operations.
Clinton even went further, and avowed his dislike of the whole plan
of operations; but Cornwallis had the approval of Germain, and the
northern movement was undertaken.

Clinton, however, had always looked with favor on desultory expeditions
to Virginia, as they drew the attention of that State to her own
defence, and therefore away from the defence of the Carolinas. As
early as the spring of 1779, he had sent Matthews and Collier to the
Chesapeake, with instructions to do as much damage to the Americans as
possible; but beyond plundering Portsmouth and burning Suffolk they
accomplished little, and returned to New York. The next year Leslie
was detached in the same direction to effect a diversion in favor of
Cornwallis's invasion of North Carolina. King's Mountain not only put
an end to that invasion, but compelled Cornwallis to call Leslie to
his aid. Leaving Portsmouth, which he had fortified, Leslie sailed
for Charleston, and reached the front in season to take part in the
campaign against Greene. On Leslie's withdrawal Clinton sent another
expedition to Virginia to destroy military stores which had been
collected for the supply of Greene. The command this time was given to
Arnold, though, to guard against a new treason, dormant commissions
were given to his chief officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Dundas and
Simcoe. Arnold penetrated to Richmond without encountering much
opposition. He destroyed nearly everything of value at that place, and
then endeavored to seize some arms which had at one time been deposited
at Westham. Failing in this, he descended the river to Portsmouth. The
militia had now collected in considerable numbers. For this or for
some other reason, Arnold kept within the fortifications of that place.

About this time Rochambeau had sent a few vessels to annoy the British
in the Chesapeake; but, besides capturing the "Romulus",—a 44-gun
ship,—they did little, and returned to Newport. Washington now
proposed that the two armies should unite in an attempt to capture the
traitor. To this end he detached Lafayette with the light infantry,—a
picked corps of about twelve hundred men from the New England and New
Jersey lines,—to act in unison with a force of the same size which
Rochambeau detached from his army. Lafayette, for a time concealing his
destination by a feigned attack on Staten Island, reached Annapolis
in safety. Leaving his troops there, to be brought the rest of the
way by the French fleet when it should arrive, Lafayette proceeded to
Suffolk. He found Muhlenberg, with the militia, at that place, guarding
the approaches to Portsmouth. But the French were not fortunate, since
their departure from Newport was so long delayed that the fleet arrived
off the Capes of the Chesapeake only to find Arbuthnot guarding the
entrance. In the fight which followed, both sides claimed the victory.
But all the advantages of victory were on the side of the British, as
Destouches' ships were so badly cut up that he was obliged to return
to Newport. Success now being improbable, Lafayette returned to his
troops, and the march to the North was begun. At the Head of Elk new
orders were found, directing him to return to the South and place
himself under the orders of Greene. The cause of this radical change
in plan was the reinforcement of two thousand men under Phillips which
Clinton had sent to Virginia.

Phillips arrived on March 25, and took command. Towards the end of
April, the British to the number of twenty-five hundred landed at City
Point on the James River. Steuben, who was then at Petersburg, took
up a strong position at Blandford, where the enemy found him on the
morning of April 25. He was soon obliged to retreat. The enemy then
marched to Petersburg, and destroyed a large amount of tobacco and
other valuable property. The 27th saw them at Osborn's, where they
captured, after some show of resistance, a fleet of merchant vessels.

When Phillips and Arnold arrived at Richmond they found that Lafayette
was before them. The young Frenchman had reached Baltimore on the
17th of April. Purchasing on his own credit shoes and clothes suited
to a Virginia summer, he made a forced march, and threw himself into
Richmond twenty-four hours in advance of the British. Not wishing to
attack him in such a strong position, Phillips retired down the river,
followed by the Americans. On the 7th of the next month (May, 1781),
the British commander received word from Cornwallis that he would join
him at Petersburg. Suddenly ascending the river, he reoccupied that
town on the night of the 9th. On the 13th Phillips died, and a week
later Cornwallis arrived and assumed command, Arnold returning to New
York.

Then followed a series of marches, the design of the British commander
being to cut Lafayette off from Wayne, who was marching to his support.
But Lafayette moved with too great celerity. Early in June the desired
junction of the Americans was made near Raccoon Ford, on the Rapidan.
Meantime, while Lafayette was out of reach, Cornwallis sent out two
expeditions. The first, under Simcoe, operated against Steuben, at that
time guarding the stores at the Point of Fork. The Prussian veteran,
mistaking Simcoe's detachment for the main army, abandoned the stores
and retired with great precipitation. The second expedition, led by
Tarleton, was designed for the capture of the civil rulers of Virginia,
but a Virginia Paul Revere warned them of their danger in time, and
they made good their escape,—though it is said that Jefferson, then
resting from the fatigues of the session at Monticello, had but five
minutes to spare. But the raid, successful, or not, had no importance,
although popular writers are wont to dwell upon it.

[Illustration: STEUBEN.

From Du Simitière's _Thirteen Portraits_, London, 1783. Cf. _Harper's
Mag._, lxiii p. 336, and the lives of Steuben.—ED.]

With Wayne and his Pennsylvanians, in addition to his own Light
Infantry, Lafayette felt strong enough again to oppose the enemy
in the field. By a well-executed movement through an unknown and
long-disused road, the young marquis placed himself between Cornwallis
and Albemarle Old Court House, whither the stores had been removed
from Richmond. Cornwallis, instead of attacking him, retired down the
James, Lafayette following at a distance of about twenty miles. On the
25th of June the British were at Williamsburg, the Americans being
not far off, at Bottom's Bridge. While at Williamsburg, Cornwallis
sent Simcoe to destroy some boats and stores which had been collected
on the Chickahominy. Lafayette, on his part, detached Butler of
the Pennsylvania line, with orders to attack Simcoe on his return.
A partial engagement ensued at Spencer's Ordinary, which ended in
Simcoe's being able to continue his retreat.

It can hardly be said that this retrograde movement on the part of the
British was due to the presence of Lafayette, although his presence
undoubtedly contributed toward making Cornwallis desirous of getting
into communication with Clinton. It is probable, too, that Cornwallis
hoped to be so strongly reinforced that the conquest of the State
during the coming autumn would be assured. But Clinton, believing, from
intercepted despatches, and from the movements of the Americans, that
Washington was meditating an attack on New York, instead of complying
with Cornwallis's desires, ordered him to send a portion of his own
troops to New York.

[Illustration]

[Illustration:

After a sketch supposed to be by Fersen, aide of Rochambeau, and
following a reproduction given in Balch's _Les Français en Amérique_,
p. 174. Cf. Irving's _Washington_, quarto ed., and E. M. Stone's _Our
French Allies_, p. 281; _Harper's Mag._, lxiii. 329.—ED.]

The latter, therefore, retired to Portsmouth, where the embarkation
could be easily effected. To Lafayette, the crossing of the James
seemed to offer the chance of at least picking off a rear guard; but
Cornwallis was attacked too soon, owing in part to the impetuosity of
Wayne, and the onset came near being a disaster. In the end, however,
Wayne succeeded in bringing off his men, though he lost two pieces of
artillery. Cornwallis, fearing an ambuscade, did not push the pursuit.
He then made his way to Portsmouth unmolested, while the Americans
sought a healthy summer camp on Malvern Hill. Just at this moment,
owing to the arrival of reinforcements in New York, Clinton decided
to leave Cornwallis's force intact. Furthermore, he determined to
establish a permanent base in the Chesapeake, and ordered Cornwallis
to fortify a place, mentioning Old Point Comfort, where the navy could
be sheltered. He also authorized him to take possession of some other
post, as Yorktown, if he thought it necessary. Now Cornwallis seems to
have regarded the fortifying of Yorktown as the only alternative, and
the engineers and naval officers declaring Old Point Comfort unsuitable
for a naval station, he seized York and Gloucester, and began the
erection of the proper works. Clinton always asserted that he had no
intention of ordering anything of the kind. But the weight of evidence
seems to be in favor of Cornwallis. At all events, he took possession
of Yorktown. As soon as his movements were discovered, Lafayette left
his summer camp, and, taking a strong position in the fork of the
Pamunkey and Mattapony rivers, sent out parties to watch the further
movements of the enemy, Wayne being ordered toward the south, as if
to the assistance of Greene. Such was the situation in Virginia when
the French came to the aid of the Americans, and began the operations
leading to the siege of Yorktown.

On the 1st and 2d of May, 1780, the Marquis of Rochambeau, with about
five thousand men, left the roadstead of Brest. The transports were
convoyed by a small fleet of seven ships of the line, under the command
of the Chevalier de Ternay. Their progress was slow, and it was not
until July 12th that the fleet anchored in Newport harbor.[1029]
Batteries were immediately erected on shore to protect the shipping
from the English fleet, which was under Arbuthnot. This admiral,
hastening from Charleston, in company with Clinton, now bent his whole
energy toward the destruction of the French fleet. But the British
commanders, always on bad terms, quarrelled, and Washington threatening
New York, while the New England militia rallied to the defence of their
newly arrived allies, the attempt on Newport was abandoned. A naval
blockade was kept up, however, and the French army was neutralized by a
few ships of war. Thus they passed the remainder of 1780 and the first
part of 1781.

On the 8th of May (1781) M. de Barras, successor to De Ternay, who
had died in the preceding year,[1030] arrived at Boston. He brought
news of the departure from Brest of a powerful fleet commanded by M.
de Grasse. This French admiral had with him a small convoy with six
hundred recruits for Rochambeau; but the bulk of his fleet was destined
primarily for the West Indies. De Grasse had been directed, however,
to come on the American coast in July or August, relieve the fleet at
Newport, and for a limited period act in conjunction with the American
and French armies. On May 21st a conference between Washington and
the French commanders was held at Weathersfield, in Connecticut. It
was there determined to make a united attack upon New York, provided
De Grasse could coöperate. This was Washington's plan, though an
expedition against the British in Virginia seems even then to have been
proposed. Later a note from De Grasse arrived, asking where he should
strike the American coast. Rochambeau replied that it would be best
for him to look into the Chesapeake, and then, should no employment
be found there, to proceed to New York. Rochambeau also inclosed the
articles of the Weathersfield conference, hinting at the same time that
De Grasse must be his own judge as to the practicability of crossing
the New York bar with his ships. Finally he asked him to borrow for
three months the brigade under St. Simon, which was destined to act in
conjunction with the Spaniards.

On the 18th the advance of the French left Providence for the Hudson.
Washington at this time was encamped at Peekskill. Ten days later,
on June 28th, he determined to seize by surprise, if possible, the
forts on the northern end of New York Island. The night of July 2d was
selected for the enterprise, and the command of the advance was given
to Lincoln; Lauzun, with the French Legion, making a forced march to
his aid. But the scheme failed. The enemy attacked Lincoln, and Lauzun
reached the scene of conflict too late to be of assistance. The troops
were drawn off in safety, however, and retired to Dobbs Ferry, where
they were joined by the French infantry on July 6th. While awaiting the
arrival of the fleet, nothing was attempted beyond a reconnoissance
in force of the northern defences of the island. It was this movement
which induced Clinton to send for the Virginia troops.

On August 14th a letter from De Grasse arrived which put a new face on
the whole war; for the French admiral announced that he should sail for
the Chesapeake, with a view to carry out the scheme of Rochambeau for
a united movement against Cornwallis. He added that his stay on the
American coast would be short, and that he hoped the land forces would
be ready to act with him.

[Illustration: FRENCH OFFICERS.]

There was now nothing to be done but to abandon the cherished project
against New York, and to move all of the allied armies that could
be spared from the vicinity of New York to the Chesapeake. Leaving
Heath with four thousand men to garrison the forts on the Hudson, and
suitable parties to guard against an irruption from Canada, Washington
set out with the rest of the land forces for Williamsburg, by the
way of Philadelphia, Head of Elk, and the Chesapeake. On the 19th
the army crossed the Hudson at King's Ferry, and moved as though to
attack Staten Island. This feint was so well managed that Clinton was
completely deceived. On September 2d the Americans marched through
Philadelphia, the French following on the 3d, 4th, and 5th. By the
8th the allied army was again united at the Head of Elk. The news of
the arrival of De Grasse at the Capes of the Chesapeake had reached
Washington on the 5th, and had been communicated to the troops on the
following morning.[1031]

De Grasse, on his arrival at Lynnhaven Bay, just inside Cape Henry, had
found an aide of Lafayette's, and soon the marquis arrived in person.
As soon as possible the troops under St. Simon were landed at Jamestown
Island, and Wayne was recalled from his southward march. These corps,
with the light infantry and the Virginia militia, took up a strong
position at Williamsburg, not more than twelve miles from Yorktown.
Cornwallis reconnoitred the lines; but they were too strong to be
attacked except at great risk. Confident in being relieved by Clinton
and Graves, he retired to his fortifications.

Had Rodney done his full duty he would have followed De Grasse in his
northward cruise. But pleading illness, he sent fourteen ships of the
line, under Hood, to the assistance of Graves, and sailed himself for
Europe.[1032] The event was most fo