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Title: The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign
Author: Clifford, Hugh Charles, Sir
Language: English
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Transcriber’s Note
This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.
Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_.
Errors, when reasonably attributable to the printer, have been
corrected. Please see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for
details. Corrections made to the text are summarized there.
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this, their placeholders ([Illustration: ]) been moved to the
closest sensible paragraph break.
[Illustration:
H. Walker Barnett & Co.
LIEUT.-COL. R. A. DE B. ROSE, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Commanding the Gold Coast Regiment.
Frontispiece. ]
THE
GOLD COAST REGIMENT
IN THE EAST AFRICAN
CAMPAIGN
BY SIR HUGH CLIFFORD, K.C.M.G.
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1920
_All rights reserved_
TO
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL R. A. DE B. ROSE,
C.M.G., D.S.O.,
AND TO THE
OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
AND MEN
OF THE
GOLD COAST REGIMENT OF THE WEST
AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
IN ADMIRATION OF THEIR COURAGE, THEIR STEADFASTNESS AND THEIR
ACHIEVEMENTS, IN SYMPATHY WITH THEIR HEAVY LOSSES, AND IN
GRATITUDE FOR THE LUSTRE WHICH THEY SHED UPON THE
COLONY WHOSE NAME THEY BEAR
BY
THEIR SOMETIME GOVERNOR AND TITULAR
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
=HUGH CLIFFORD.=
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE VOYAGE TO AND ARRIVAL IN EAST AFRICA 1
II. THE ADVANCE ON THE DAR-ES-SALAAM—LAKE TANGANYIKA 10
RAILWAY
III. THE PASSAGE INTO THE ULUGURU MOUNTAINS—THE BATTLES AT 25
KIKIRUNGA HILL AND AT NKESSA
IV. IN THE KILWA AREA—GOLD COAST HILL 43
V. IN THE KILWA AREA—IN THE SOUTHERN VALLEY OF THE LOWER 61
RUFIJI
VI. IN THE KILWA AREA—MNASI AND RUMBO 78
VII. IN THE KILWA AREA—NARUNGOMBE 93
VIII. THE HALT AT NARUNGOMBE 107
IX. THE ADVANCES TO MBOMBOMYA AND BEKA 119
X. NAHUNGU AND MITONENO 134
XI. RUANGWA CHINI TO MNERO MISSION STATION 148
XII. LUKULEDI 161
XIII. EXPULSION OF VON LETTOW-VORBECK FROM GERMAN EAST 180
AFRICA
XIV. TRANSFER OF THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT TO PORTUGUESE EAST 197
AFRICA
XV. THE ADVANCE FROM PORT AMELIA TO MEZA 211
XVI. THE ENGAGEMENT AT MEDO 232
XVII. THE ADVANCE FROM MEDO TO KORONJE AND MSALU 250
XVIII. THE EXPULSION OF VON LETTOW-VORBECK FROM THE NYASSA 268
COMPANY’S TERRITORY AND THE RETURN OF THE GOLD COAST
REGIMENT TO WEST AFRICA
APPENDICES
I. THE MOUNTED INFANTRY OF THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT 279
II. HONOURS AND DECORATIONS EARNED IN EAST AFRICA 286
III. STRENGTH OF THE REGIMENT AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AT 290
VARIOUS PERIODS, AND DRAFTS DISPATCHED TO IT FROM
THE GOLD COAST
IV. LETTERS OF APPRECIATION FROM THE GENERAL OFFICER 292
COMMANDING PAMFORCE, AND FROM THE GOLD COAST
GOVERNMENT. RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL
INDEX 295
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FACING PAGE
LIEUT.-COL. R. A. DE B. ROSE, C.M.G., D.S.O. _Frontispiece_
CAPT. J. F. P. BUTLER, V.C., D.S.O. 28
MAJOR G. SHAW, M.C., CAPT. E. G. WHEELER, M.C., MAJOR 92
H. READ
GROUP OF OFFICERS 140
MEN IN MARCHING ORDER 160
THREE NATIVE N.C.O.’S 230
2·95 BATTERY 196
SERGT. SANDOGO MOSHI, D.C.M. 288
MAPS
KIKIRUNGA HILL 27
GOLD COAST HILL 52
KIBATA AND NGARAMBI AREA 62
OPERATIONS AGAINST MEDO _facing_ 238
GENERAL MAP OF THE EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN _end of volume_
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT
IN THE
EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I
THE VOYAGE TO AND ARRIVAL IN EAST AFRICA
When during the latter days of July, 1914, the prospect of war with the
German Empire became imminent, the Gold Coast Regiment was rapidly
mobilized, and detachments took up pre-arranged strategical positions on
the borders of Togoland. On the declaration of war on the 4th August,
the invasion of this German colony was promptly undertaken; and the
Regiment, which had been joined at Lome, the capital of Togoland, by a
small party of Tirailleurs from Dahomey, pursued the retreating enemy up
the main line of railway to Kamina—the site of a very large and
important German wireless installation—where, on the 28th August, he was
forced to an unconditional surrender.
On the 18th September Major-General Dobell, who had been appointed to
command the British and French troops which were about to undertake the
invasion of the German Kameruns, arrived off Lome; and the bulk of the
Gold Coast Regiment, leaving two companies to occupy the conquered
territory in Togoland, and a small garrison in the Gold Coast and
Ashanti, joined this Expeditionary Force.
In the Kameruns stiff fighting was experienced, and it was not until the
11th April, 1916, that the Gold Coast Regiment returned to its
cantonments at Kumasi, after having been continuously upon active
service for a period of twenty months.
In Togoland and in the Kameruns alike the Regiment had won for itself a
high reputation for courage and endurance; and the fine spirit animating
all ranks was strikingly displayed by the enthusiasm with which the news
that the force was again required for active service overseas was
received, though at that time the men had enjoyed only a very few weeks’
rest in their cantonments at Kumasi. Nor was this due to the courage
born of ignorance, for the Regiment had learned from bitter experience
the dangers and difficulties of the type of fighting in which it was
about once more to take a part. The pursuit through bush and scrub, or
through wide expanses of high grass, of a stubborn and crafty enemy is a
task which, as many British regiments have learned in places spattered
all up and down the tropics, imposes a peculiar strain upon the nerves
and upon the endurance of the forces which engage in it. The enemy, who
alone knows his plans and his objectives, and whose movements are
designed to avoid rather than to seek contact with his pursuers, unless
he can attack or sustain attack in circumstances specially favourable to
himself, possesses throughout the immense advantage of the initiative.
If he elect to retreat, the pursuer must plod after him, whither he
knows not, through country which is not of his choice, and with the
character of which he has had no opportunity of rendering himself
familiar. If the enemy resolves to make a stand, it is almost invariably
in a position which he has selected on account of the advantages which
it affords to him; and when in due course he has been ejected from it,
the pursuit through the Unknown of an elusive and usually invisible
enemy begins _ab novo_, in circumstances which the apparent success has
done nothing material to improve. These facts combine to render a
campaign in the bush a heart-breaking and nerve-racking experience, even
when the enemy is an undisciplined native levy armed with more or less
primitive weapons. In the Kameruns, however, and to a much greater
degree in East Africa, the enemy was composed of well-trained native
soldiers, with a good stiffening of Europeans; he was armed with
machine-guns and magazine-rifles; he was supplied with native guides
intimately acquainted with every yard of the country; and he was led
with extraordinary skill and energy by German officers. It was
bush-fighting on a scale never hitherto experienced, with all the
advantages which such fighting confers upon the pursued, and the
corresponding disadvantages inherent to the pursuit, exaggerated to an
unprecedented degree. Yet the men of the Gold Coast Regiment, who in the
Kameruns had already had more than a taste of its quality, celebrated
the fact that they were once more to engage in such a campaign with war
dances and clamorous rejoicings.
By the evening of the 5th July, 1916, the Gold Coast Expeditionary Force
had assembled at the port of Sekondi. It consisted of four Double
Companies—A, B, G, and I—with a Pioneer Company, and a Battery of two
2·95 guns, and 12 machine guns, and a number of carriers. Its strength
was 36 British officers, 15 British non-commissioned officers, 11 native
clerks, 980 native rank and file, 177 specially trained carriers
attached to the battery and to the machine guns, 1 store-man, 204 other
carriers, and 4 officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps—in all 1428
men—under the Commanding Officer of the Gold Coast Regiment,
Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. de B. Rose, D.S.O.
The present writer, who at that time was Governor of the Gold Coast
Colony and its Dependencies—Ashanti and the Northern Territories—had
come round by sea from Accra to wish the Regiment God-speed. On the
evening of 5th July, Colonel Rose and all the officers who could be
spared from duty, were entertained by me at a banquet, given in the
Court House, at which all the leading officials and the most prominent
members of the European and African unofficial community of Sekondi were
present.
Officers and men, who at that time had been fighting almost continuously
since the 4th August, 1914, save for the brief rest which they had
recently enjoyed at Kumasi, presented on this occasion a very smart and
workmanlike appearance. They were thoroughly well-equipped and
thoroughly seasoned troops, with achievements already to their credit of
a kind that had filled the Colony to which they belonged with pride.
By midday on the 6th July the embarkation of this force with all its
stores and equipment, on board the transport _Æneas_, was completed. The
men were transported in lighters to the ship’s side, and thence were
slung inboard in batches of half-a-dozen or more in the sag of a canvas
sail—a rough and ready, but very effective, expedient, which delighted
the struggling groups of men as the sling bore them aloft and deposited
them, screaming with laughter, in inextricable knots upon the deck. At
about 2 p.m. the transport got under way, taking a southerly course at
right angles to the coast, which here runs east and west. The phenomenon
was witnessed by excited groups of natives from the beach at Sekondi,
for never within living memory had any ship bearing their countrymen
steered a course that was not parallel to the shore; and when the vessel
at last disappeared below the skyline something like consternation
prevailed. It was as though she, and all aboard her, had dropped
suddenly into the depths of some unknown abyss. Superstitious fears were
further stimulated by the fact that an eclipse of the sun occurred on
that day, and much discussion arose among the men as to whether the omen
should be regarded as of favourable or of evil portent.
The voyage round the southern extremity of the African continent, and up
the east coast to the neighbourhood of Mombassa, was uneventful. The
_Æneas_ called at the Cape and at Durban. At the latter place the whole
of the Regiment was allowed ashore, and was taken _en masse_ to see the
“movies,” a new experience which astonished and delighted them. They
were also paraded, inspected, and addressed by the Mayor—a stimulating
ordeal which, however, in the popular estimation took a second place
when compared with the miracles beheld at the cinematograph. Cold
weather was met with when rounding the Cape, but the men appeared to
feel it very little; and the force was in fine fettle when, on the 26th
July, the _Æneas_ arrived at Kilindini, the port of Mombassa, after a
journey that had occupied exactly three weeks.
Kilindini is a land-locked harbour, and the town, which is a somewhat
incongruous modern adjunct to ancient and picturesque Mombassa, consists
mainly of sheds, warehouses, and wharfs.
Disembarkation was effected by lighters, which were towed alongside a
jetty, and here a stroke of ill-luck greeted the Regiment at the outset
of its career in East Africa. For weeks not a drop of rain had fallen at
Kilindini, but now, when the disembarkation was in full swing, a sudden
tornado blew up from the sea, bringing a downpour by which officers and
men were speedily soaked to the skin. There was no alternative, however,
but to carry on, and drenched and rather woe-begone, the force was
presently landed. Two trains were awaiting the Regiment at a point
distant about a couple of hundred yards from the jetty; but the day
being a Sunday, the Sabbatarian principles of the local porters, which
may have owed their inspiration either to indolence or to piety, forbade
the natives of Kilindini to engage in servile work. In pouring rain,
therefore, the men set to, and in a creditably short time all the
baggage, stores, and equipment had been transferred from the lighters to
the railway waggons; and at 4 p.m. the first train started upon its
journey up-country. This train consisted of passenger carriages, but
that which followed it some six hours later was mainly made up of
covered trucks. The men, with the steam rising in clouds from their
brown knitted jerseys, were packed in batches of ten into the carriages
and trucks; and in this fashion the journey up the main line toward
Nairobi was begun.
While daylight lasted the way led mostly through open grass country
apparently very sparsely inhabited, which was succeeded later by what
looked like dense thorn-jungle, and the junction at Voi was reached by
the first train at about midnight. From this point the military
authorities had constructed a loop-line, which runs in a south-westerly
direction through the mountain range, of which on the north-west
Kilima-Njaro is the stupendous culmination, until it effects a junction
with the German railway from Tanga to Moschi at a point some twenty
miles south of the last-named place. At dawn, therefore, the men of the
Regiment, shivering for their skins, looked out upon wide expanses of
mountain scenery—a vast sweep of hillsides, rounded summits and
undulations, covered with short grass, and strewn with gigantic boulders
of rock. In the distance Kilima-Njaro was frequently visible, with its
crest covered by perpetual snow. The line ran from Voi to the junction
with the Tanga-Moschi railway at heights varying from 6000 to 9000 feet;
and the men of the Gold Coast Regiment, who are accustomed to regard 60°
F. as registering a temperature which is almost unbearably cold, and who
were still damp from the drenching they had received at Kilindini,
suffered seriously from the low temperature. The fact that nearly half
of them were accommodated in trucks, which though roofed had only half
walls, rendered the exposure all the more severe. A few halts were
allowed in order to enable the men to stretch their legs; but time did
not admit of much cooking being done, and for the most part the, to
them, unnatural foods of bully beef and biscuit, and draughts of
ice-cold water, were all that they had to restore the natural heat of
their bodies. It was an extremely trying experience for troops recruited
in the Tropics, and many cases of pneumonia subsequently resulted, not a
few of which proved fatal.
From the junction the trains bearing the Regiment proceeded eastward
down the captured German railway, in the direction of the sea and Tanga,
to Ngombezi, which is distant some forty miles from that terminus. Here
they arrived on the 29th July, having been joined on the preceding day
by Captain H. C. C. de la Poer, as special service officer. Captain de
la Poer had long been resident in East Africa, possessed much local
knowledge, and spoke Swahili fluently. Ngombezi is situated at a height
of some 2000 feet above sea-level; and on detraining, the Regiment went
into temporary camp, the officers and men bivouacking under shelters
fashioned from blankets and water-proof sheets.
On the 30th July the Regiment was inspected by General Edwards, the
Inspector-General of Communications. The service kit of the Force
consists of a green knitted forage cap, a khaki blouse, shorts and
putties of the same material, with the leather sandals which are known
in West Africa as _chuplies_. The men of the Regiment, all of whom at
this period were recruited from the people of the far interior which
lies to the northward of Ashanti, are for the most part sturdy,
thick-set fellows, with rather blunt but not pronouncedly negroid
features, which show traces in some instances of a slight admixture of
Arab blood. They are at once strong and active. They possess great pluck
and endurance and are very amenable to discipline; and their fidelity
to, and confidence in, their officers have become a by-word. For the
rest they are as tough and business-like looking a body of men as any
judge of good fighting material need desire to see.
General Edwards, at the end of his inspection, expressed himself very
much struck by the physique of the men, and by their smart and
soldierlike appearance. He emphasized the fact that no other unit which
he had inspected had arrived in the country so well and efficiently
equipped—a fact which caused great satisfaction on the “Home Front” in
the Gold Coast when his opinion was duly repeated to the Colonial
Government; and he forthwith wired to the Commander-in-Chief reporting
that the Regiment was fit to take the field immediately.
This was the first sprig of laurel won by the Corps after its arrival in
East Africa. It was destined in the course of the long campaign upon
which it was about to embark to garner others wherefrom to fashion the
substantial crown which it eventually brought back in triumph to the
Gold Coast.
CHAPTER II
THE ADVANCE ON THE DAR-ES-SALAAM—LAKE
TANGANYIKA RAILWAY
The military situation, at the moment when the Gold Coast Regiment
received its orders to take the field, was approximately as follows.
Tanga, the coast terminus of the more northerly of the two German
railways, had fallen some time before, and the whole line from Moschi to
the sea was now in the hands of the British. A column of Indian troops
was moving down the coast with Sandani at the mouth of the Wami river,
Bagamoyo at the mouth of the Kingani, and Dar-es-Salaam, the terminus of
the principal railway, as its successive objectives. The enemy had been
driven, not only away from the Tanga-Moschi railway, but to the south of
the Pangani-Handeni-Kondoa-Irangi road; and General Smuts had
established General Headquarters on the left bank of the Lukigura River,
which falls into the Wami on its left bank at a point distant some sixty
miles from its mouth.
The Commander-in-Chief had with him here the First Division under
Major-General Hoskyns, consisting of the 1st and 2nd East African
Brigades under the command respectively of Brigadier-General Sheppard
and Brigadier-General Hannyngton. With the exception of a machine-gun
detachment of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, which was attached to
the 2nd East African Infantry Brigade, both these brigades were composed
of Indian troops. The Gold Coast Regiment was about to join up with the
25th Royal Fusiliers, and with it to form the Divisional Reserve.
On the right, the Second Division, which was composed of South African
Infantry and mounted troops, under Major-General Van der Venter, had its
advanced base at Kondoa-Irangi and for its objective Dadoma, on the main
railway which runs from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigome, near Ujiji, on Lake
Tanganyika.
Between the Second Division and General Smuts’ troops, a force composed
of South African mounted men, under the command of Brigadier-General
Brits, was operating independently, with Kilossa on the railway as its
objective. It was General Smuts’ intention to attack the railway with
the First Division at Morogoro, a mission station, which lies not quite
fifty miles due east of Kilossa.
It had not yet been found possible to establish a main base at Tanga;
and at the moment all supplies were being landed at Kilindini, and were
conveyed thence, by the railway route which the Regiment had followed,
to Korogwe on the Tanga-Moschi line. An advanced base had been formed at
Handeni, five-and-thirty miles to the south-east of Korogwe; and for six
weeks General Smuts had been compelled to remain inactive in his camp on
the Lukigura River, while sufficient stores, etc., were being
accumulated to render a further and continuous advance possible.
His plan, as will be seen by the disposition of his forces, was to
attack the main German railway line, as nearly as possible
simultaneously, at Dar-es-Salaam on the coast, at Morogoro, at Kilossa
and at Dadoma. This would have the effect of depriving the enemy of the
use of the line and of driving him to the south of it; after which an
attempt would be made to expel him from the country north of the Rufiji
River.
* * * * *
The Regiment had been inspected by General Edwards on the 30th July, and
on the 4th August, leaving the Depôt Company to establish itself at
Korogwe, they left their temporary camp at Ngombezi and began their
march to Msiha, the headquarters of the First Division on the banks of
the Lukigura. It was now that their troubles began, and the nine days of
that march live in the memory of officers and men as perhaps the most
trying period of the whole campaign.
Though the altitude was not great, the climate was cool even at midday;
but while the Europeans belonging to the force found it wonderfully
bracing, the men missed the genial warmth of their native land, and at
night suffered greatly from the cold.
The line of march led along an unmetalled track, over which
motor-lorries had been ploughing their way for weeks, and the surface
had been reduced to a fine powder some six to eight inches in depth. The
constant passage of lorries, and now the first-line transport of the
Regiment—which consisted of mule-carts and of the carriers who had
accompanied the force from the Gold Coast—and the plodding feet of the
men on the march stirred up this loose deposit into a dense fog of a
dull-red hue. As the day advanced, each man became plastered with
particles of this fine red dust, which seemed to possess peculiarly
penetrating properties, till one and all resembled so many figures
fashioned from _terra cotta_. Eyes, nostrils and mouths became filled
with this stuff, occasioning acute thirst; but the way was waterless,
save for a few foul holes half filled with brackish water.
The lot of the rear-guard was the hardest, for the second-line
transport, locally supplied to the Regiment, consisted of South African
ox-wagons, each of which was drawn by a team of sixteen oxen driven by
Cape boys. The imported cattle had many of them become infected by
_trypanosomæ_, and not a few were literally on their last legs. The
exigencies of the situation, however, rendered it necessary for these
luckless brutes to be driven as long as they could stand; but progress
was incredibly slow, and frequent halts were occasioned to unyoke some
miserable ox, which had fallen never to rise again, and thereafter to
rearrange his yoke-fellows. At the best, as they crept forward, the
floundering wagons with their straining teams churned the dust into
impenetrable, ruddy clouds, which, mingling with the fog already caused
by the passage of the infantry, well-nigh smothered the men who formed
the rear-guard. Though the actual length of each day’s march was fairly
short, the last man rarely reached the camping-place until long after
dark.
The physical trials to which the rank and file were exposed—the choking
dust, the raging thirst which it occasioned, the inadequate supply of
brackish water, met with at long intervals, which seemed powerless to
appease even when it did not aggravate their sufferings, the nauseating
stench arising from the putrifying carcases of dead horses, mules and
oxen, with which the line of march was thickly strewn, the bitterly cold
nights, and the ominous way in which man after man succumbed to
pneumonia—were rendered almost unbearable by reason of the superstitious
fears by which the men were haunted. The memory of that long railway
journey, which half of them had made in open trucks, through the
freezing cold of the nights and early mornings high up in the mountains,
was still fresh in their minds. They had seen many of their comrades
suddenly stricken by pneumonia—to them a by no means familiar
disease—and killed thereby after a few days or hours of painful struggle
for life. Now they found themselves in an unknown land, separated from
their homes by immeasurable distances, with wide expanses of sour scrub
spreading around them, and holding for them no promise of finality;
while day after day, they plodded, parched and choking, along that
interminable road, saw their fellows succumb at every halting-place, and
learned presently to believe that the water with its salt-taste, which
was alone available to allay their thirst, and of which they could never
obtain enough, was a poisoned draught that was killing them. This was a
devil’s country to which their officers had brought them—a land of evil
spirits out of which they could never hope again to win their way. The
Europeans—officers and non-commissioned officers alike—sought
ceaselessly to cheer and hearten-up their men; but for the first time in
the memory of any of them, their efforts met with no response. The men
had become unrecognizable. Usually the most cheerful and light-hearted
of mankind, they wore now a sullen, hang-dog air. They were sulky,
suspicious and resentful. For the first time in the history of the
Regiment their confidence in their officers—which to these men has
become a religion—had been strained almost to the breaking-point. And
their officers knew it. “You could not get a grin out of them at any
price,” said one who had seen his men in many a tight place, and had
never known them to show even a passing sign of discouragement or
depression; and when you cannot conjure a grin out of the gnarled
features of a man of the Gold Coast Regiment, something very like the
Trump of Doom has sounded for him.
The Regiment, after resting on the 8th August at Handeni, and drawing a
fresh supply of rations, pushed on for another four days to Mahazi,
where it duly reported its arrival to the headquarters of the First
Division.
The front had now been reached, the enemy was close at hand, and there
was a river of running water to delight the hearts of the parched and
dust-coated men. The reaction was immediate. There was no lack of grins
now; and these found their reflections in the faces of a band of anxious
officers, as they listened to the cheerful babble resounding from their
new encampment. It is a music that is discordant enough at times, but
now it was more than welcome after the sullen silence of suspicion and
distrust that had brooded over the camp and the line of march for more
than a week.
On the 13th August the Regiment moved forward on the road to Turiani.
The country in which they found themselves was no longer grey or
powdered red with dust, but actually green, though it was still, for the
most part, covered by waist-high scrub and grass, and the folds of the
undulating plain rendered any extended view impossible. The proximity of
the enemy, as is usual in warfare of this type, was more certain than
his whereabouts, and all military precautions were henceforth taken
during the day’s march to Turiani, and during the subsequent advance.
On the 15th August the Regiment moved to Chasi, and on the 16th August,
after working all day at the construction of two bridges, the camp was
advanced to Kwevi Lombo, near the Makindu River, and established at
about 11 p.m.
On the 17th August the Regiment received orders to move forward in the
early afternoon to Dakawa, where fighting had been in progress all day.
The men, resting in camp after their hard day and late night, had
listened all the morning, like a pack of terriers quivering with
excitement, to the familiar sounds of machine-gun and rifle-fire; and
after a march of four and a half hours they reached Dakawa at 7 p.m.
Here General Smuts had established his headquarters, and Colonel Rose
personally reported to him the arrival of the Regiment. General Smuts
ordered the Regiment to sit down and rest until the rising of the moon,
and then to proceed to a ford two and a half miles west of the main
road. At dawn, if the enemy was still in position, they were to cross
the river and join General Enslin’s Brigade, which belonged to the force
operating independently under Major-General Brits.
These orders were duly carried out, the Regiment being guided to the
ford by the celebrated scout, Lieutenant Pretorius, a way for the
infantry having been beaten down through the tough high grass by a body
of South African mounted men. This movement was carried out by the
Regiment with the least avoidable noise. The enemy, however, becoming
aware that the ford was occupied, drew off during the night; and next
morning, therefore, the Regiment returned to its own division, and
camped near a broken bridge over the Mkundi River, a left affluent of
the Wami. Here it remained until the 23rd August, when it moved forward
eight and a half miles to Kimamba, and thence, on the 24th August, to a
camp on the banks of the Ngere-Ngere, a small stream which falls into
the Ruwu on its left bank a few miles above Mafisa.
This latter day’s march calls for a word of description. The Regiment,
which was now acting as part of the reserve to the 2nd East African
Brigade, marched last of the fighting troops, with the heavy transport
and the actual rear-guard still further behind it. The country traversed
was a flat plain broken by frequent undulations, and grown upon by
shortish grass, brittle and wilted by the sun. Mean-looking trees were
spattered all over the plain, but were usually wide enough apart to
permit of the easy passage of armoured motor-cars. Of these a number,
under the charge of naval officers, accompanied the marching men,
scudding up and down the column and searching the country in the
immediate neighbourhood of the line of march, much as a dog hunts on all
sides of a path along which its owner is walking. Occasionally, a deep
donga would be met with, which could not be negotiated by a motor-car;
and then the marching men would turn to with their picks and shovels,
fill in a section of the dried-up watercourse, and so fashion a
temporary road across it which enabled the cars to pass. This was
accomplished over and over again with great ease and rapidity; and for
the rest, the country presented no serious obstacle to the use of these
armoured vehicles.
August, in East Africa, is of course the height of the dry season, and
in all tropical regions of this continent the dry season means a fierce
heat, beating down during all the hours of daylight upon a parched and
thirsty earth, and refracted from the wilted vegetation with an almost
equal intensity. It means that every stream has run dry, and that even
many of the larger rivers have shrunken into mere runnels. It means that
sun-dried grass and scrub and the very leaves upon the trees have become
brittle and inflammable as tinder; and that the bush fires, for the most
part self-generated,—such as those which of old so greatly affrighted
Hanno and his Carthaginian mariners on the West Coast of Africa—are
ubiquitous,—are columns of smoke by day and pillars of fire by night.
Any sudden change of wind at this season of the year may cause the
traveller to be unexpectedly confronted by a wall of flame, raging
almost colourless in the fierce sunlight, advancing on a wide front with
innumerable explosions like the rattle of musketry, and with a rapidity
which is apt to prove highly embarrassing.
During this day’s march the natural heat was intensified by these
constant conflagrations, above which the agitated air danced in a
visible haze, and from which there came a breath like that from a
furnace, bearing in all directions innumerable charred and blackened
fragments of vegetation. Through this heated atmosphere the marching
troops plodded doggedly onward, parched with thirst, and playing an
eternal game of hide and seek with the attacking bush-fires. Many narrow
escapes occurred, and the first-line transport of the Gold Coast
Regiment was once fairly caught, the casualties including 6 oxen, an
army transport cart, 2 wagons, 10,800 rounds of small arm ammunition, 20
picks, 42 shovels, one rifle, some private kit, and a quantity of
rations, all of which were burned to a cinder. Eighteen other oxen were
so badly burned that they had to be slaughtered, their meat being issued
as rations to the Divisional Reserve.
Another element besides fire, however, seemed to conspire this day
against the advancing force; for the exact position of the Ngere-Ngere
could not be located, and when the Regiment arrived at the place where
it was to bivouac for the night, there was no water to be found in its
vicinity. Water had, however, been discovered some miles further on, and
carts were dispatched to fetch it. Darkness had already fallen, and the
outlook was sufficiently depressing; but an officer of the Gold Coast
Regiment, who happened to push his way into a patch of thick bush
adjoining the camping-place, quite accidentally discovered the river by
the simple process of pitching headlong into it. The Ngere-Ngere is a
very winding stream, and though its neighbourhood was indicated by a
belt of thick bush, the greenness of which could only be due to the
proximity of water, the leading troops had missed this point on the
road, to which the river happened to approach to within a distance of a
few yards, and owing to an abrupt bend, which the bed of the stream
takes at this place, the nearest point at which its banks were again
struck was about a mile distant.
At once the glad tidings were given, and the men speedily obtained all
the water they required. The Gold Coast Regiment had bivouacked for the
night near the scene of its discovery; but though a start had been made
that morning at 5.30 a.m., it was a late hour before the last troops
struggled into camp.
Shortly after the Dar-es-Salaam railway had been crossed at Massambassi
by the main force, B Company was placed at the disposal of Colonel
O’Grady—an officer of the Indian Army, who had won for himself in the
Himalayas a great reputation as an Alpine climber—and proceeded with him
and a remnant of the East African Mounted Rifles into a clump of
fertile, well-watered and hilly country, which was comparatively thickly
populated, and where a number of German foraging-parties were believed
to be at work. The tracks leading through these hills were wide enough
for two to march abreast, but after the manner of native paths all the
tropics over, they took no account of gradients, but led straight up
each precipitous ascent till the summit was reached, and thence plunged
down the opposite slope to encounter a fresh rise when the valley level
was reached. It is inevitable that all paths in hilly country, which are
made by folk who habitually go bare-footed, should deal with ascents and
declivities in this switchback fashion; for roads scarped out of the
hill’s face, unless they are constructed on scientific engineering
principles, are speedily worn away by the annual torrential rains. This
renders them agonising to men who do not use boots, for though the act
of walking on the side of the foot is uncomfortable enough even for men
who are well shod, it is excruciating to those who go bare-footed; and
in their estimation any strain on the lungs and on the back-sinews,
which the constant climbing and descent of hills entail, is preferable
to this much more painful means of progression.
Through these hills went Colonel O’Grady, the handful of white men
composing the detachment of the East African Mounted Rifles—some dozen
survivors of that gallant corps which had seen such hard times and had
done such splendid work during the earlier phases of the campaign—and B
Company of the Gold Coast Regiment. The valleys were thickly planted
with native food-stuffs of all descriptions, including such luxuries as
sugar-cane bananas, etc.; and eggs and fowls were also obtainable in
moderate quantities. Patrols were sent out in all directions at once, to
forage for the little force and thoroughly to search the surrounding
country for German forage-parties. One of these—a body of eleven
Germans, genially intoxicated to a man on native beer, and quite
incapable of resistance—was brought in by the East African Mounted
Rifles, and a few Askari,[1] who were also engaged in foraging, were
captured by B Company. When this group of hills had been thoroughly
searched, Colonel O’Grady released B Company, which at once rejoined the
Regiment. The latter, meanwhile, had been following in the track of B
Company, and at daybreak on the 3rd September, the whole corps entered
the mission station at Matombo.
Footnote 1:
Askari = Native soldier.
These mission stations are a feature of erstwhile German East Africa.
They are, for the most part, charmingly situated, generally upon the
crest of a hill, whence a magnificent view of the surrounding country
can be obtained. They consist, as a rule, of one or more substantially
built two-storeyed buildings constructed of mud, or of locally made
bricks, lime-washed, and roofed with red tiles, which are also
manufactured on the spot. The church, which usually flanks them, is
built of rough blocks of stone, as is that at Matombo, or of bricks or
mud, as the case may be; and it is often surmounted by a tapering,
red-tiled spire. The eminences upon which these stations have been
established, and the land around their feet, are set with gardens,
groves of fruit trees, and patches of cultivation, all of which
obviously owe their existence to European initiative and supervision.
The native congregations ordinarily occupy a number of scattered
hovels—built much further apart from one another than is the native
habit in West Africa—thatched with grass, and placed at a respectful
distance from the buildings occupied by the missionaries. The latter in
German East Africa, unlike their prototypes on the West Coast,
apparently did not welcome the too close proximity of their proselytes.
The mission buildings at Matombo were found to contain a number of
Germans, who were supposed to be too old for active service, and a good
many of their women and children. The church, which had been converted
into a hospital, was full of German sick and wounded, who had been left
in charge of a medical man of their own nationality. This interesting
individual was allowed to continue his ministrations, and it was always
believed—whether rightly or wrongly it is impossible to say—that he
subsequently made use of the liberty thus accorded to him to signal the
movements of the Regiment to his compatriots posted in the Uluguru
mountains, the entrances to which the British were now engaged in
forcing.
The whole of this hilly area was thickly populated by people clothed
only in a kind of kilt made of grass, who, though many of them had been
impressed by the Germans to serve as carriers, appeared to take no very
close interest in the movements of either of the opposed forces. The
Uluguru mountains were their home—the only world they knew; and these
hapless folk had no alternative, therefore, but to remain where they
were, watching with the philosophical resignation so characteristic of a
tropical population this strife of gods or devils which had temporarily
transformed the quiet countryside into an inferno. It was only
occasionally that their equanimity was ruffled for a space by the chance
explosion of a shell in close proximity to their dwellings.
General Smuts’ drive had so far proved successful, and the Germans,
fighting a more or less continuous rear-guard action, but offering no
very stubborn or prolonged resistance at any given point, had been
forced back, first on to the line of the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika
railway, and then across it into the mountainous country which lies
between the railway and the low-lying valley of the Rufiji River.
The Gold Coast Regiment had itself crossed the railway line at a point
some miles to the east of Morogoro, and had thence penetrated into the
hilly country to the south for a distance of some fifteen miles, camping
on Sunday, the 3rd September, in the neighbourhood of the mission
station at Matomba. This place is situated on the northern edge of the
Uluguru Mountains—highlands which occupy an area measuring approximately
a hundred miles square—out of which it was now the task of the First
Division to endeavour to drive the enemy, who had sought refuge in them.
It was on the 4th September, 1916—the day on which the mission station
at Matomba was quitted—that the Gold Coast Regiment was fated, for the
first time, to take a more active part in the East African campaign.
CHAPTER III
THE PASSAGE INTO THE ULUGURU MOUNTAINS—THE
BATTLES AT KIKIRUNGA HILL AND AT
NKESSA
The task which the First Division had before it was to force a passage
into the Uluguru Mountains, the main entrances to which the enemy was
preparing stoutly to defend. The principal highway lay some distance to
the east of the Matomba mission-station, and here the main battle was in
progress; but commanding the road, along which the Gold Coast Regiment
marched when it moved out of its camp at Matomba, the enemy had occupied
a very strong position, and was using Kikirunga Hill—a sugar-loaf-shaped
mountain crowned with a clump of trees and underwood, rising clear above
its fellows to a height of perhaps 3000 feet—as an observation point.
The Regiment was ordered to expel him, if possible, from this hill.
At 7 a.m. on the 4th September the Regiment moved out of camp, and about
two hours later the enemy opened fire with a couple of howitzers, upon
the road a little ahead of the marching troops. No casualties were
inflicted, but the Regiment was halted, moved off the road, and took up
a sheltered position on the right side of it, in a gut between two
hills.
Captain Jack Butler, V.C., D.S.O.—who had won both these distinctions
while serving with the Gold Coast Regiment in the Kameruns—was then sent
forward with the Pioneer Company to reconnoitre the enemy’s position.
Captain Butler and his men advanced up the road, which climbed steeply,
with many windings and sinuosities, towards the head of the pass—leading
into the Uluguru Mountains—which was situated near the foot of the hills
of which, on the left side of the road, Kikirunga is the culminating
point. This road ran, from the spot where the Regiment was halted, up a
sharp ascent and along a narrow valley, on either side of which kopjes
of gradually increasing height rose at frequent intervals. The first of
these, situated about a mile and a half from his starting-point, and
lying to the left of the road, was occupied by Captain Butler and the
Pioneer Company, and a picket was sent out to take up a position at a
spot where, a little further on, the road took a deep U-shaped bend
toward the left.
[Illustration: KIKIRUNGA HILL]
From the kopje occupied by the Pioneers a general view of the enemy’s
position could be obtained. On the left front, about a mile away as the
crow flies, Kikirunga arose skyward from the huddle of lower hills in
which it has its base, and from one of the slopes of these, somewhat to
the right of the peak, an enemy machine-gun opened fire upon the
position which Butler had occupied. The beginning of the U-shaped bend
which the road took to the left lay beneath and slightly to the right of
Butler’s kopje; and on the far side of this loop, where the road, which
throughout ran between an avenue of mango trees, wound back towards the
right, another kopje, about a hundred feet higher than that upon which
the Pioneers were posted, ran steeply upward to a crest which was held
by the enemy, and from which presently another machine-gun also opened
fire.
[Illustration:
Bassano, Ld.
CAPT. J. F. P. BUTLER, V.C., D.S.O.
60th Rifles.
To face p. 28. ]
The road, still climbing steeply, wound round the foot of this kopje,
and between a succession of similar hills; and from the right of it a
big clump of mountains, some 2500 feet above valley-level, rose in a
great mass of grassy and boulder-strewn slopes. All these hillsides were
covered with shaggy, sun-dried grass about two feet in height, broken by
many outcrops of rock, a few trees and patches of scrub, with little
copses and spinneys in the valley-hollows between hill and hill. In the
middle distance a great dome-shaped peak, some miles further away than
Kikirunga, rose majestically, dominating the landscape and presenting a
wide facet of precipitous grey cliff to the eye of the observer. The
view obtained from the kopje which Butler had occupied was a splendid
example of tropical mountain scenery; but from the standpoint of the
leader of an attacking force its strength was even more impressive than
its beauty. The enemy had had ample time in which to choose his ground,
and he had availed himself to the full of his opportunity.
It was not till nearly five o’clock in the afternoon, however, that the
Pioneer Company became heavily engaged; and Captain Butler presently
went forward to the picket which he had placed near the bend of the road
to see how things fared with them. It was while he was lying here on the
road beside his men that he and several of the picket were wounded by a
sudden burst of machine-gun fire from the kopje immediately in front of
him. In all, twelve men of the Pioneers were wounded during the
afternoon, but the Company held firm, and maintained its hold upon the
kopje which Butler had occupied. Late in the afternoon B Company, under
the command of Captain Shaw, was sent forward to reinforce the Pioneers,
and to make good the ground which had been won. This was successfully
accomplished, the wounded were evacuated to the rear, and the men dug
themselves in, and dossed down for the night in the excavations they had
made.
Captain Butler died that evening of the wounds which he had sustained
during the afternoon. A young officer possessed of at once a charming
and forceful personality, of an absolutely fearless disposition and of
more than ordinary ability, Captain Butler, V.C., D.S.O., had won for
himself a conspicuous place in the Gold Coast Regiment, and had earned
the devotion and affection of the men in a very special degree. His
death, in this the first action in which the Regiment had been engaged
since its arrival in East Africa, was felt to be a specially malignant
stroke of ill-fortune, and was mourned as a personal loss by his
comrades of all ranks.
During the night, orders were sent to Captain Shaw, who was now
commanding the advanced companies, to push forward at the earliest
opportunity. This he did at dawn, creeping in the darkness to the point
of the road where Captain Butler had been wounded, and thence up the
grassy hill to the road above it. Here the charge was sounded, and the
men with fixed bayonets rushed up the kopje, which was captured after a
few shots had been fired. In this charge Acting-Sergeant Bukari of B
Company displayed conspicuous bravery, which was subsequently rewarded
by a second Distinguished Conduct Medal. This fine soldier was promoted
to non-commissioned rank on the field, and awarded a D.C.M. for
conspicuous gallantry when fighting in the Kameruns. Now, in this his
first fight in East Africa, he again won that coveted distinction; but
his subsequent history was a sad one. Evacuated to the rear suffering
from only a slight wound which, during the long journey to the base at
Korogwe, on the Tanga-Moschi railway, was allowed to become septic, he
died in hospital before ever he had learned of the second reward which
his dash and courage had earned for him.
During the rest of the day the force under Captain Shaw’s command
continued to fight its way from kopje to kopje up the road, the Pioneers
under Lieutenant Bray and B Company under Captain Shaw alternately
advancing under the protection of the other’s fire. In this manner, by
evening, a point distant about 400 yards from the head of the pass was
reached and secured.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African
Rifles was advancing up the northern slope of the big clump of
mountains, which have been described as rising on the right side of the
pass. As soon as this was observed, a gun of the Gold Coast Regiment was
brought into action to assist the advance of the newcomers. The enemy
was heavily shelled, but owing to the commanding positions which he
occupied, it was not found possible to push home the infantry attack,
the King’s African Rifles not having yet won possession of the crest of
the mountains. None the less, considerable progress was made during the
day, and B Company succeeded in capturing the highest point of the spur
round which the road ran.
At dusk on the 5th September Captain Wheeler with A Company relieved B
Company, and took over from it the ground which it had won, B Company
forthwith going into reserve. During the day, moreover, Major Goodwin
made a reconnaissance with half of I and half of G Company for the
purpose of finding out whether a flanking party could be sent over the
hills to join up with the King’s African Rifles. He was able to report
that this could be accomplished.
During the night of the 5th-6th September, the enemy received
reinforcements, and shortly after dawn he opened a violent machine-gun
fire upon the advanced positions occupied by the Gold Coast Regiment.
Two guns of the Battery were brought up, and all the commanding heights
held by the enemy were heavily shelled by them, assisted by two guns
belonging to the 5th South African Battery. By noon the enemy’s fire
slackened, and the King’s African Rifles began to make their presence
felt on the summit of the mountains to the right of the pass, which they
had now succeeded in occupying. G Company, under the command of Captain
Poyntz, had been sent early in the morning to join up with the King’s
African Rifles by the path discovered the day before by Major Goodwin,
and this junction was effected by about 2 p.m. An hour later the enemy’s
fire ceased, and by 4 p.m. Kikirunga Hill, the capture of which was the
task that had been set to the Gold Coast Regiment, was duly occupied.
The casualties during this two and a half days of fighting numbered 42
in all, including Captain Butler and 6 rank and file killed, 3 men
dangerously, 13 severely, and 19 slightly wounded. Among the latter was
Colour-Sergeant Beattie. The doctors and their staff of stretcher
bearers, etc., had a heavy time during these few days, as they not only
attended to the wounded and evacuated them to the rear under fire, but
also conveyed all the more serious cases back to the mission station at
Matombo.
On the side of the enemy the casualties suffered were difficult to
ascertain, but he lost three Germans and three native soldiers killed,
and there were numerous signs of considerable damage having been
inflicted upon him, while a number of rifles and some ammunition were
picked up in the positions from which he had retired. In the type of
warfare in which the Regiment was now engaged, however, it almost
invariably happens that the fugitive force is able to inflict more
casualties upon its pursuers than it is likely itself to sustain. As has
already been observed, it enjoys the advantage which the selection of
the ground confers, and can always occupy positions from which it can do
the greatest damage to an advancing enemy with a _minimum_ of risk to
itself. It is also able to break off an engagement at the precise moment
that best suits its convenience and advantage; and the possession of
machine-guns further enables it to fight a delaying rear-guard action,
and to mask the fact of its retirement, to the very last moment. It
rarely happens in fighting of this class that the holding of a given
position is a matter of any special importance to a fugitive force. The
latter therefore hold it as long as it pays to do so, and thereafter can
abandon it without danger or embarrassment, as soon as its defence
threatens to become inconvenient. The pursuing force, on the other hand,
has only one course open to it—to attack the enemy whenever and wherever
he can be found, to inflict upon him as much injury as circumstances
permit, but above all, to keep him on the move and to allow him as
little rest and peace as possible. It is an expensive business, and it
becomes increasingly difficult as lines of supply and communication
progressively extend. It is, however, the only method whereby
bush-fighting can be efficiently prosecuted; and expense and difficulty
are qualities inseparable from this kind of warfare.
The following telegram was received by Colonel Rose from
Brigadier-General Hannyngton, commanding the 2nd East African Brigade,
on the evening of the 6th September:—
“Please tell your Regiment that I think they all worked splendidly
to-day, and I wish to thank them for their good work.”
On the 7th September, while the King’s African Rifles advanced, the Gold
Coast Regiment rested and reorganized. On the 8th September, however, it
pushed forward along the road which it had opened for itself under the
lee of Kikirunga Hill, and made its way _viâ_ Kassanga into the heart of
the Uluguru mountains. These are a clump of high hills, covered with
grass and patches of scrub, and strewn with boulders, and the road was
scarped out of the hillsides, with a steep slope running skyward on the
one hand, and a _khudd_—over the edge of which, from time to time, a
transport mule toppled—falling away no less steeply on the other. The
view of the marching men was for the most part confined to the grassy
slope on one side of them, to the valley tilted steeply downward on the
other, and across it to the rolling, boulder-strewn hills, smothered in
long shaggy grass, green or sun-dried, with the blue of a tropical sky
arching over-head. No signs of life were visible, save an occasional
deserted village, composed of scattered mud huts, with grass roofs in
the last stages of decay and dilapidation; but from the vantage ground
all about them the marching men could, of course, be seen from many
miles away.
On the 8th September the Regiment caught up with the King’s African
Rifles, which had dispersed a small party of the enemy. On the 9th
September the former, which was still leading the advance, surprised and
scattered the 22nd German Company at a place called Donho; and that
night, after a very hard day’s marching the Gold Coast Regiment camped
at Kiringezi at about 4.45 p.m. On the 10th September the Regiment came
out upon the main road which connects Tulo and Kissaki, and a stray
German Askari was killed by the men of G Company, who also captured a
few rifles. The 2nd East African Brigade was found to be some five miles
ahead, and in the afternoon the Regiment overtook it, and once more
joined the reserve.
The advance troops had succeeded in keeping more or less constant touch
with the enemy, and as he now showed a disposition to make yet another
stand, A and B companies, under Major Goodwin, were sent off at 4 p.m.
on the 11th September to reinforce and prolong the extreme right of the
British line, which was being held by the King’s African Rifles.
Meanwhile half of I Company had been sent to the eastern or extreme left
of the line in order to form an escort to the Machine Gun Company of the
Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. Just before dark half of G Company
received orders to advance and take up a position on the left of half I
Company. At 8 a.m. on the 12th September further orders were received,
and the rest of the Regiment—viz., the Pioneer Company, half of I
Company and the Battery—moved up the road toward Nkessa and held itself
in readiness to reinforce the left. This the Pioneer Company and half I
Company did at 11 a.m., the former taking up a position on the extreme
left of the line; and shortly afterwards the Battery advanced to a point
immediately in the rear of these companies.
At 2.30 p.m, an advance from the left in a generally
south-south-westerly direction was ordered, and the Pioneer Company and
half I Company pushed forward to a distance of from 500 to 600 yards,
when they were held up by the enemy who were strongly posted in a
village ahead of them. Here the men dug themselves in. Captain Poyntz,
who was in command, held on to this position for some time, but he was
eventually compelled to retire, as he found that all touch with the
company on his right had been lost, and as he heard heavy firing from
his right rear, he feared that his detachment might be surrounded and
cut off.
Meanwhile, G Company, under Captain Macpherson, had barely advanced a
hundred yards before it was forced to halt, a very heavy fire being
opened upon it from a salient in the enemy’s line on the right flank.
The fire was so close and continuous that one gun of the Battery had to
be retired; and when, subsequent to the action, the grass was burned off
and the true position revealed, it was found that the contending forces
had here been within fifty or sixty yards of one another.
The enemy’s position was astride of the Tulo road, to which his trenches
and rifle-pits ran at right angles for a distance of about four and a
half to five miles, his extreme right being thrown slightly forward in
the neighbourhood of the village against which the Pioneer Company and
half I Company, under Captain Poyntz, had advanced. The country was for
the most part grass and thick scrub, with trees interspersed among them;
but in the centre of his position on the side of the road opposite the
British left, where a patch of young cotton trees afforded him excellent
cover, he had pushed forward the salient of which mention has been made
above.
Orders were sent to Captain Poyntz to fall back; but his own
appreciation of the situation had already shown him that retirement was
necessary, and he presently lined up alongside G Company, which
maintained its position.
Reinforcements were asked for by telephone, and a reply was received
from Brigade Headquarters that the 29th Punjabis were being sent up by a
road which had recently been constructed to a neighbouring water-supply.
A later telephone message stated that the 29th would advance to the
relief of the Gold Coast Regiment _viâ_ the main road.
Meanwhile, on the right flank, A and B Companies had been sent by Major
Goodwin to occupy a position on the extreme right of the British line,
with the King’s African Rifles on their left. At 8.45 a.m. a brisk
action began, but the advance achieved was slow. By 1.30 p.m., however,
two hills overlooking Nkessa had been occupied. The edge of this village
opposite to A and B Companies was strongly held by the enemy, and though
the fight continued while daylight lasted, no further advance was made.
At 6 p.m., therefore, outpost positions were taken up for the night, and
the men slept in the rifle-pits which they had dug. Intermittent firing
continued during the night.
On Wednesday, 13th September, patrols were sent out at dawn, and it was
eventually established that the enemy had retired from the positions
which he had held overnight. A company, under Captain Wheeler, was sent
from Major Goodwin’s force on the right to rejoin the Regiment on the
left of the line; and early in the morning the half of I Company, which
had been with the guns of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, was
relieved by the 29th Punjabis, and rejoined the other half of the
Company, which was posted between the Pioneer Company on the extreme
left and G Company.
The Regiment then advanced, the Pioneers entering the village which they
had attacked the day before, without opposition, where they were later
joined by I Company. G Company, which had to advance through very dense
elephant grass, lost touch with the rest of the force, as can so easily
happen in country of this description, and communication with it was not
re-established until the afternoon.
From the village which the Pioneers had occupied, patrols were sent out
to locate the river, and this accomplished, the Pioneers, leaving I
Company in occupation of the village, crossed the stream, which was only
a few feet in width, and advanced in the direction of Nkessa, holding
both banks. At first only a few snipers were encountered, but eventually
the enemy was found to be in occupation of a position, with his left
resting on a village on the river’s bank, and his right thrown slightly
forward. The enemy promptly attacked, and Captain Poyntz retired the
Pioneers about 200 yards, and having dug himself in, held on to his
rifle-pits for the rest of the day. At about 1.30 p.m. one section of A
Company, which had been sent to reinforce the Pioneers, came up on their
left on the southern side of the stream; and an hour and a half later I
Company with two machine-guns and the Battery came into action and
bombarded the villages held by the enemy on the left and right fronts.
At 4 p.m. an advance was ordered, and after an hour’s fighting, B
Company and three sections of A Company reinforced the left of the
Regiment, and, night coming on, were halted and dug themselves in. The
thick elephant grass in which these operations were conducted rendered
the exact location of the enemy’s position a matter of great difficulty
during the whole of this day.
On the morning of the 14th September, the enemy was found to have once
more evacuated his positions, and the Gold Coast Regiment, having been
relieved by the King’s African Rifles, marched into Nkessa, where the
brigade camp had already been formed.
The casualties sustained by the Regiment between the 11th and the 13th
September numbered four killed and thirty-three wounded, including
Captain Greene, Lieutenant Bray, Colour-Sergeant May, and Lieutenant
Arnold. The last named died in Tulo hospital on the 16th September of
the wounds which he had received on the 12th September. Lieutenant
Isaacs, who had been sent forward to reconnoitre, stumbled into an enemy
patrol, and was captured.
On the 19th September the Battalion moved to a spot on the banks of the
Mgeta River, where a camp was formed. The Mgeta is a branch of the Ruwu,
which falls into the sea at Bagamoyo, opposite to the southern extremity
of the island of Zanzibar. Here the patrols and outposts of the Regiment
were in frequent touch with the enemy, and a good many casualties were
sustained; and on the 22nd September the Battalion returned to the
brigade camp at Nkessa. On the 30th the Regiment moved to a new outpost
camp, between the Mgeta and Nkessa; and while here a section of I
Company, under Lieutenant Berry, was sent out to demolish a wooden
bridge over the Mgeta. Just as the work was nearing completion, this
small force was suddenly fired upon by an enemy patrol posted in thick
bush, while many of the men were standing waist-deep in the stream, five
soldiers being killed and four wounded.
The following day the Battalion, having been relieved by the 130th
Baluchis, was moved to Tulo, whence a couple of days later it was sent
back to Nkessa, an attack upon that place being anticipated. Here the
outposts had frequent casual encounters with the enemy, and on the 16th
October two different patrols found mines on the Kissaki road, which had
been laid as a trap for troops advancing by that route. These were
constructed by embedding a four-inch shell in the earth at the depth of
a few feet, with a friction-tube attached to one end of a plank, the
other end of which slanted upward to just below the surface of the road.
This plank, at a spot about one-third of its total length, measuring
from the shell, was supported upon a fulcrum in such a manner that, when
any weight was imposed upon the portion near the surface, the lower end
jacked up and caused the shell to explode.
On the 17th October the Battalion was once more moved to Tulo, where it
remained until the 7th November, upon which date the Second Brigade
broke camp and began a march to the coast at Dar-es-Salaam. The way led
to the banks of the Ruwu River, of which the Mgeta is a right affluent.
and from Magogoni, the point at which the stream was struck, down its
valley to Mafisa. The country traversed—a green and fertile valley,
dipping gently toward the coast—was perhaps the most attractive area
seen by the Regiment in the lowlands of East Africa during the course of
the whole campaign. The rivers, of course, were shrunken to their lowest
levels, and many of the tributary streams were dried up; but water was
obtainable along the whole line of march, and in spite of the tropical
heat, which increased in intensity as the coast was approached, the nine
days occupied by the journey to Dar-es-Salaam were less trying than were
most of the marches undertaken by the Regiment during this campaign.
At Mafisa the main road, which runs from Kidugato on the railway to
Dar-es-Salaam, was struck; and here the valley of the Ruwu was quitted,
the Brigade marching in an easterly direction, almost parallel to the
railway, which was struck in its turn at Kisserawe on the 15th November.
Although this line had now been for some time in the hands of the
British, so much damage had been wrought to it that it was not yet open
to traffic; and the Brigade, to which the Regiment was still attached,
accordingly continued its march to Dar-es-Salaam by road. The last-named
place was reached on the 17th November, and the Regiment forthwith
embarked on the steam transport _Ingoma_, the men, with their baggage,
stores, etc., and a number of carriers being conveyed from the landing
stage to the ship’s side in lighters. All were got on board by 6.30
p.m., and a rather comfortless night was spent, the _Ingoma_ being
crowded to the gunwales with the men of the Regiment, their carriers and
details belonging to other units. Very early in the morning of the 18th
November the ship got under way, and set off on her two-hundred-mile
journey down the coast to Kilwa Kisiwani.
CHAPTER IV
IN THE KILWA AREA—GOLD COAST HILL
The reason for the transfer of the Gold Coast Regiment, from the region
lying to the north of the Rufiji to a scene of operations situated to
the southward of that river, can be explained in a few words.
The enemy having been driven, in the course of the 1916 campaign, first
across the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika railway, and thereafter through
the hilly country to the south of that line to the southernmost fringe
of the Uluguru Mountains, it was the object of the British command to
confine him, if possible, to the lowlying valley of the Rufiji during
the coming wet season. He, on the other hand, it was thought, would try
to establish his winter quarters in some convenient spot on the southern
side of the valley, and it was believed that two of the places which he
had selected for this purpose were the mission stations of Kibata and
Mtumbei Juu, which are charmingly situated among the group of mountains
that rises from the plain within a mile or two of the sea-shore between
the Rufiji and Matandu rivers. In order to frustrate any such intention,
Brigadier-General Hannyngton had been dispatched some weeks earlier to
conduct the operations in the area above described, and it was for the
purpose of acting as a reserve to General Hannyngton’s Force that the
Gold Coast Regiment was now being dispatched to Kilwa Kisiwani. Another
factor in the situation was the great difficulty which the supply of the
troops operating to the north of the Rufiji would present during the
rainy season. It had become evident that their number must be reduced,
and that even when this had been effected so far as safety allowed, the
maintenance of the remainder, in a country which ere long would become
water-logged, would be no easily solved problem.
* * * * *
The Regiment arrived at Kilwa Kisiwani on the 19th November, and
disembarking during the afternoon, marched to Mpara, where it encamped.
Here on the following day the Battalion was joined by the Depôt Company,
which had hitherto remained at Korogwe, on the Tanga-Moschi Railway
under Major Read; but owing to the difficulties of transport, its stores
did not arrive with it. On the 24th November the Regiment marched up the
coast, along a sandy track within sight of the sea, to a camp situated
four miles to the west of Bliss Hill near Kilwa. Arrangements were made
for forming a Depôt Company and store accommodation at Mpara as a
regimental base, and G Company was broken up, the men composing it being
posted to other companies.
On the 25th November the Regiment began its march along the road which
leads in a westerly direction from Kilwa to Chemera, but owing to the
late arrival of the transport-carriers and water-carts a start was not
made until the afternoon. The Regiment halted for the night in the bush,
six miles from their starting-point and a like distance from
Nigeri-geri, about six miles down the road; and on the following day it
moved on to a camp about two and a half miles to the east of Mitole.
The line of march this day led across a villainous arid flat, covered
with mean and dusty scrub and coarse rank grass, wilted and sun-dried.
There was not an atom of shade to be found during the whole day’s march;
the heat from on high was great, and was vied with in intensity by the
heat refracted from the ground; and across this weary expanse officers
and men plodded painfully, ankle-deep in the sandy surface of the road,
and racked with unappeasable thirst. In spite of the assurance given to
the Regiment that water would be procurable along the route, not a drop
was to be obtained until the camp was reached late in the afternoon. The
Gold Coast soldier is a toughish fellow, and as a rule is not greatly
affected by extremes of heat. Like all Africans, however, he is blessed
with very open pores, and an insufficient supply of drinking-water hits
him peculiarly hard. On this day no less than forty men fell out, and
sank exhausted on the line of march, and it would have gone hard with
them had not some motor-drivers hurried to the rear and returned, after
an absence of some hours, with a supply of water. Many of these
exhausted men did not get into camp until the following day, and all of
them, together with eight officers—for they, too, were “foot-slogging
it” with their men—had forthwith to be sent to hospital as the result of
this one day’s march.
None the less, on the 27th November, the Regiment shifted camp to a spot
lying three miles to the west of Mitole; and on the following day it
moved on to Chemera, where it relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Regiment of the King’s African Rifles. As soon as this had been
effected, I Company with 2 officers, 1 British non-commissioned officer
and 182 rank and file, marched off to Namaranje to occupy an outpost
position at that place.
The strength of the Regiment at this time was already very considerably
reduced, as the breaking up of G Company and the distribution of its
_personnel_ among the remaining Companies indicated. The field-state on
November 28th—the day upon which the Regiment went into camp at
Chemera—showed that only 19 British officers were present, as against
the 36 who had started from Sekondi at the beginning of the preceding
July, and that during the intervening period, the number of British
non-commissioned officers had been reduced from 15 to 10, and that of
the rank and file from 980 to 715. The principal battle casualties have
been noted in the course of this narrative, but much greater havoc had
been wrought to the _personnel_ of the force by ill-health occasioned by
exposure, over-exertion, bad food, and water insufficient in quantity
and often vile in quality.
It was hoped that on its arrival at Chemera a period of rest would be
enjoyed by the Regiment, but before it had been in camp a week word was
received that a force composed of a battalion of the King’s African
Rifles and the 129th Baluchis, which was in occupation of the mission
station at Kibata, was being very hard pressed by the enemy, and ran
some risk of being surrounded.
On the 9th December, therefore, the Regiment left Chemera and marched in
a northerly direction to Mtumbei Chini, and thence on the 10th December
to Kitambi at the foot of the mountains, in the heart of which the
mission stations of Mtumbei Juu and Kibata are situated. It should be
noted that the words “chini” and “juu,” which will be found so
frequently to occur in place-names in East Africa, signify respectively
“low” and “high.” Thus “Mtumbei Chini” means “Mtumbei on the Plain,” and
“Mtumbei Juu” means “Mtumbei on the Hill.”
A mile from Kitambi a river was met, through which the advanced guard,
under the command of Captain Harman, had to wade with the water up to
their necks. The officer commanding the rear-guard reported that when he
crossed it, the river was only knee-deep; while Captain A. J. R.
O’Brien, R.A.M.C., who passed the same place next morning, found no
river at all, but only a partially dried-up river-bed—rather an
interesting instance of the eccentricities of tropical watercourses.
They, indeed, can rarely be relied upon for very long together, either
to furnish drinking-water or to refrain from impeding transport.
From Kitambi onward only mule-transport and head-carriers could be used,
the path up which the Regiment was climbing being at once too narrow and
too steep for the passage of motors. The precipitous track was difficult
for the men, and still more difficult for the pack-animals; and though
the distance from Kitambi to Mtumbei Juu mission station was only eight
miles, the mule transport took three-and-twenty hours to make the
journey, and in the course of the day three mules were lost by falling
over precipices.
The position at Kibata mission station—which lies a few miles to the
east and slightly to the north of Mtumbei Juu, and is separated from it
by a fairly deep valley—was approximately as follows at the time when
the Gold Coast Regiment arrived at the latter station. One battalion of
the King’s African Rifles and the 129th Baluchis had occupied Kibata,
which is situated upon a prominent hill surrounded by an amphitheatre of
commanding mountains, and this force had forthwith become the object of
very severe bombardment. The Germans had brought up one of the 4·1 naval
guns, rescued by them from the _Koenigsberg_, and having placed it in a
position on the other side of the mountains at some spot slightly to the
north-west of Kibata, were shelling the mission station heavily. They
evidently had an excellent observation point concealed somewhere on the
surrounding mountains, for they were making very good practice; and the
enemy had also established himself upon the slopes overlooking Kibata in
a roughly semicircular position, with his left to the east and his right
to the west of the mission station. A ridge, which runs parallel upon
the east to the hill upon which the mission station stands had been
occupied by the garrison; and it was from this point alone that they
were able in any degree to retaliate upon the attacking force. For the
rest, the King’s African Rifles and the Baluchis, who had no means of
locating the position of the 4·1 gun, and who, even if they had done so,
possessed no artillery with which to make an adequate reply to its fire,
could only endure the punishment they were receiving with such patience
as they might command. The position, in fact, was rapidly becoming
untenable; and on the afternoon of the 13th December General Hannyngton
made a careful examination of the ground from a height in the
neighbourhood of Mtumbei Juu, and decided to attempt to turn the enemy’s
right flank.
Between Mtumbei Juu and Kibata, at a point near the base of the valley
which divides the hill upon which the mission station stands from that
occupied by the Kibata mission buildings, a hill slopes upward in a long
spur, trending in a northerly direction. Its surface, covered with grass
and strewn with outcrops of rock, is broken by many minor crests, till
the summit is reached at its most northerly extremity. Near the top a
spur juts out to the east and south, shaped somewhat like the flapper of
a seal, its slopes separated from the main hill by a semicircular
valley. The crest, on which there are a few trees but no cover of any
kind, to-day bears the name of Gold Coast Hill. The outlying spur is
called Banda Hill. From a point near Mtumbei Juu mission station and
almost directly to the north of it, a ridge of mountains runs first
north and later with a curve to the east overlooking and commanding Gold
Coast Hill. It was General Hannyngton’s hope that if the latter could be
captured while this ridge still remained unoccupied, it would be
possible thence to get round behind the enemy and so to outflank his
right. The task of capturing this hill was assigned by him to the Gold
Coast Regiment.
Accordingly, at 6 a.m. on the 14th December, B Company, under Captain
Shaw, was sent forward along the mountain track which connects Mtumbei
Juu with Kibata, to get into touch with the force at Kibata, which a day
or two earlier had been reinforced by another battalion of the King’s
African Rifles, and which was now under the command of General O’Grady.
He reported that the road between the two missions was open, and at dusk
the rest of the Battalion moved along the road for a distance of two to
two and a half miles, and there camped for the night.
At dawn on the 15th December, the disposition of the Regiment was as
follows:—
The main body lay encamped about two miles along the Mtumbei Juu-Kibata
road, with an outpost line, consisting of 50 rifles and one machine-gun,
of B Company, under Captain Kelton, thrown out about a mile to the east.
Captain Wheeler, with half A Company and one machine-gun, was posted on
a line immediately in front of the main body, with a picket on the main
road, and another on Harman’s Kopje—a small hill to the north-west of
the camp. The other half of A Company, under Captain Harman, with one
machine-gun, was in occupation of a hill about 1000 yards north of
Harman’s Kopje, with an outpost on a small hill to the left of a path
which led to Kibata, and another picket some 600 yards along this path
at its point of junction with a track leading west.
At 5 a.m. the Pioneer Company, under the command of Captain Poyntz,
moved forward out of camp, and three-quarters of an hour later, Captain
Biddulph, at the head of the advanced guard, passed the post which was
being held by half A Company, under Captain Harman, and came under fire
from the outlying spur on the right which bears the name of Banda Hill.
Captain Biddulph was dangerously wounded, and Lieutenant Duncan was
killed; and the vanguard then withdrew to the main body, while the
Battery came into action from a hill to the north of Harman’s Kopje,
loosing off a dozen rounds across the valley at Banda Hill, whence the
enemy’s fire had come.
At about 8 a.m. Captain Poyntz continued his advance, and working round
the small hills on the left of the main road, reached Gold Coast Hill,
the summit of which was the main objective of the Force, at about 11
a.m. During this advance he encountered no further opposition, though he
occupied Banda Hill and another eminence situated somewhat to the
north-west of it, and left small detachments to hold each of these
points.
[Illustration: Gold Coast Hill]
While this advance was in progress, the enemy brought his big naval gun
into action, shelling very heavily the main road, behind the hill whence
the Battery had opened fire. During this bombardment, one of his shells
pitched almost at the feet of Colonel Rose, who was sitting under the
lee of the hill with the Adjutant, Captain Pye, by his side, and with an
orderly standing near. Both Captain Pye and the orderly were killed
instantly, and Colonel Rose was flung backward from this seat to a
considerable distance, but was otherwise unharmed.
At one o’clock a heavy counter-attack began on Gold Coast Hill, and upon
a small ridge in advance of that position, which was held by Lieutenant
Shields with 30 rifles and one machine-gun; and the violent shell,
howitzer, rifle and machine-gun fire concentrated upon these points
quickly caused many casualties.
By this time the remaining companies of the Regiment, under the command
of Major Goodwin, were in reserve upon Banda Hill, and upon the hill to
the north-west of it, which had originally been occupied by Captain
Poyntz in the course of his advance; and half of A Company, led by
Captain Wheeler, was sent forward in support of the Pioneers. They were
shortly followed by Lieutenant Piggott with one of B Company’s
machine-guns, who took up a position on the right flank of the crest of
Gold Coast Hill. Lieutenant Piggott was almost immediately wounded, but
he contrived none the less to continue in the firing-line.
At 2.30 p.m. Captain Poyntz was dangerously, and Captain Wheeler
severely wounded, leaving Captain Harman—who had himself been slightly
wounded—alone to command the main position, with Lieutenant Shields and
Lieutenant Piggott, the one on the ridge in advance, the other on the
right flank of the crest of the hill.
Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Kinley with one machine-gun and Lieutenant
Taylor with the rest of A Company came up in support; but Lieutenant
Taylor was severely wounded almost at the moment of his arrival on the
crest of the hill.
About 3 p.m. the enemy again opened heavy shell fire upon Gold Coast
Hill, once more causing many casualties; and Major Goodwin went forward
with the remainder of the reserves—about 50 rifles of B Company, under
Captain Shaw—who took up a position to the right of Lieutenant Piggott’s
machine-gun post.
For two and a half more hours the Gold Coast Regiment clung to the
position which it had occupied, and in which it had sustained such heavy
and continuous losses since 11 o’clock in the morning; but at 5.30 p.m.
the 40th Pathans began to relieve it. The relief was effected without
serious loss just before darkness fell, and the Gold Coast Regiment took
up outpost positions for the night between the hill, which ever since
has been known by its name, and the main road from Mtumbei Juu to
Kibata.
It was estimated that the enemy fired 180 high explosive shells from his
naval gun from the time the hill was occupied until dark; and the men
were throughout terribly exposed, as the concentration of his rifle and
machine-gun and occasional howitzer fire was such that they were unable
to dig themselves in. Effective retaliation was impossible, yet the
behaviour of the men throughout the day was magnificent. Those who were
in occupation of the hill clung to it during more than six hours with
dogged resolution. Those who successively advanced to their support,
moved forward with alacrity, and never showed a trace of wavering or
hesitation. It was about as severe a test as any to which a body of
native troops could be subjected, but the Regiment passed splendidly
through the ordeal, the severity of which may be judged from the
following casualty list.
During this day—December 15th, 1916—the Regiment sustained no less than
140 casualties. It lost 2 officers killed and 7 wounded; 1 British
non-commissioned officer wounded; 26 soldiers killed and 87 wounded; and
5 gun and ammunition carriers killed and 12 wounded,—approximately 15
per cent. of the men engaged, and nearly 50 per cent. of the officers.
On the 16th December the Regiment remained in camp reorganizing its
shattered forces; on the 17th and 18th December it was held in reserve;
and though during the 17th detachments were moved forward in support of
the 40th Pathans, who had been retired from Gold Coast Hill to the
kopjes near its foot, they did not come into action. On that day, too,
Captain Kelton, with 75 rank and file of B Company, were sent back to
Kitambi. On the 19th December the Regiment was withdrawn, and went into
camp at the foot of Mtumbei Juu Mission Hill. On the 21st of December
the Regiment took up positions upon a roughly semicircular ridge on the
left of the road to Kibata and lying to the north-east of the mission,
and here it remained for some days, occasionally using the Battery to
support the 40th Pathans on Harman’s Kopje, and sending out patrols,
some of which had slight brushes with the enemy. On the 24th Captain
Kelton, Captain D’Amico, R.A.M.C., Lieutenant Percy, Colour-Sergeant
Beattie, and 78 rank and file, with other details, rejoined the Regiment
from Kitambi; and on this day intelligence was received that Military
Crosses had been awarded to Captain Shaw and to Captain A. J. R. O’Brien
of the West African Medical Staff, which they had earned at Kikirunga
Hill.
On the 27th December Captain Kelton, with 80 rank and file, took over
Harman’s Kopje from the 40th Pathans, and on the 29th December, a German
camp having been located on the northern slope of Gold Coast Hill, the
Battery opened fire upon it at 11 a.m., but found the target beyond its
range. The enemy replied, and quickly found the position of the Battery,
which Captain Foley at once removed to another prepared position. This
movement had hardly been completed ere a shell burst within seven feet
from the spot which had been vacated only a few moments earlier—a
striking illustration of the excellence of the enemy’s observation and
of the accuracy of his fire.
At 9 a.m. on this day Captain Wray arrived in camp with welcome
reinforcements from Kumasi and a party of Volunteers from Accra in the
Gold Coast. These reinforcements consisted of 160 men of D Company, who
were all Fulanis, and 90 Jaundis, who had originally been recruited in
the Kameruns, under Captain Wray and Lieutenant Downer, 150 men of the
Gold Coast Volunteers under Captain Hellis, and 200 Sierra Leone
carriers.
At 1.35 p.m. Captain Biddulph died from the wounds which he had
received, when in command of the advanced guard, early in the morning of
the 15th December.
On the 29th the reinforcements were paraded and allocated to the various
companies; and on the following day General Hannyngton held a parade of
details from all companies that could be spared from the firing-line,
and decorated 3926 Regimental Sergeant-Major Manasara Kanjaga, 4388
Battery Sergeant-Major Bukari Moshi, and Sergeant Palpukah Grumah with
Distinguished Conduct Medals which had been awarded to them for services
rendered in the Kamerun Campaign.
The strength of the Regiment on the 31st December, 1916, after the
reinforcements above mentioned had been received, amounted to 19
officers, 14 British non-commissioned officers, 10 clerks and dressers,
860 rank and file, 444 gun, ammunition, and transport carriers, 34
servants, and 48 stretcher-bearers, making a total of 1429 officers and
men of all ranks.
During the first week of January, 1917, the Regiment continued to occupy
the ridge to the north-west of the Mtumbei Juu mission station, and on
the left of the road leading to Kibata, sending out frequent patrols,
which collected some useful information, and came on more than one
occasion into touch with the enemy. The latter, meanwhile, had sustained
a fairly severe check at the hands of General O’Grady’s force, which,
from the ridge occupied by it to the eastward of the Kibata mission
station, had delivered a very successful night attack upon the extreme
left of the enemy’s position.
On the 8th January, information having been received that large bodies
of the enemy had left and were leaving the area by the road to Mwengei—a
village over the hills directly to the north of Kibata—Colonel Rose
decided to make a reconnaissance in force in order to try to reach this
road, and to retake Gold Coast Hill. At an early hour of the day,
therefore, he proceeded with 250 rifles from A and B Company, with the
Battery and with the 24th Mountain Battery, along the high ridge
overlooking Gold Coast Hill, of which mention has already been made,
starting from the north-westerly extremity of the ridge which the
Regiment had been holding. Owing, however, to the extremely difficult
character of the country through which his way led, he was not able to
reach a suitable place from which to begin operations until late in the
afternoon.
At 6.30 on the following morning Major Goodwin began to push forward
along the ridge which commanded Gold Coast Hill from the north-west. No
opposition was met with, and a patrol which was sent out to reconnoitre
Gold Coast Hill reported that it had been evacuated by the enemy. This
was later confirmed by Lieutenant Downer, who had reached Gold Coast
Hill by the old route from Harman’s Kopje, which the Regiment had
followed on the 15th December.
Other patrols were sent forward and reached the Mwengei road, effecting
a junction with the 2nd King’s African Rifles and the 129th Baluchis,
who had been operating from Kibata. The fact of the enemy’s retreat was
now established, the whole area being clear of hostile forces; but the
day being far advanced, Colonel Rose camped for the night at One-Stick
Hill, so named from a conspicuous white palm-tree on its crest, in a
position of extraordinary strength which had been established by the
Germans, and from which it was obvious most of the heavy howitzer,
rifle, and machine-gun fire poured upon Gold Coast Hill on the 15th
December had come.
On the 10th January the reconnoitring party returned to Regimental
Headquarters _viâ_ Gold Coast Hill and the main road from Kibata to
Mtumbei Juu Mission, while active patrolling of the Kibata-Mwengei road
began.
On this day word was received that Captain Poyntz had been awarded the
Military Cross, Colour-Sergeant Campbell the Distinguished Conduct
Medal, and Lance-Corporal Sully Ibadan the Military Medal for their
meritorious services in the engagement on the 15th December.
During the next few days points of strategic importance were occupied,
and patrols were sent out in various directions. By one of these, which
was furnished by the 40th Pathans, two white German prisoners were
brought in, one of whom was a certain Major von Bompkin, and the other a
gunner from the _Koenigsberg_, decorated with the Iron Cross. Major von
Bompkin had been second-in-command to von Lettow-Vorbeck, but after the
British had forced their way into the Uluguru Mountains at the beginning
of the preceding September, he had headed a deputation to the German
Commander-in-Chief, representing to him that enough had been done for
honour, and that further resistance was useless and a mere waste of
human lives. Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s reply was forthwith to degrade him to
the rank of a mere patrol commander; and at the time of his capture von
Bompkin was in charge of a party of only six men. He had apparently
taken the harsh treatment meted out to him in a fine soldierly spirit,
and as a patrol leader had shown great daring and enterprise. For
instance, on one occasion he had passed the greater part of the night in
the middle of the camp occupied by the 40th Pathans, sheltering himself
from the rain in the officers’ latrine. At dawn he had run into a very
sleepy officer of the regiment, who failed to recognize him as an enemy
in the uncertain light, and he had thereafter made good his retreat,
carrying with him the detailed information of which he had come in
search.
On the 20th January the Regiment moved down the mountain by the main
road to Kitambi, Colonel Rose returning to Mtumbei Juu mission station
in the afternoon. He came back to Kitambi on the following day with the
staff of the 3rd East African Brigade, to the command of which he had
been temporarily appointed; and on the 22nd January he left for Ngarambi
Chini, a place situated some twenty miles due west of Kibata. Major
Goodwin took over the command of the Gold Coast Regiment with effect
from the 21st January.
CHAPTER V
IN THE KILWA AREA—IN THE SOUTHERN VALLEY
OF THE LOWER RUFIJI
On the 26th January, 1917, the Regiment, under the command of Major
Goodwin, left Kitambi for Ngarambi Chini, and reached its destination
next day, after camping for the night on the road at Namatwe, a spot
distant fourteen and a half miles from the former place. From this point
the roads in the neighbourhood were regularly patrolled; and on the 31st
January the Regiment moved to Kiyombo—a place some six miles north of
Ngarambi Chini—where the brigade camp was established. From the 29th
January to the 6th February A and B Companies were detached from the
Regiment, and were stationed first at Namburage and later at a place on
the banks of the Lugomya River, to which the name of Greene’s Post was
given. From all these points, the work of patrolling the roads in the
vicinity was regularly carried out; and on the 3rd February Lieutenant
Shields, with Colour-Sergeant Nelson, 50 rank and file and 1
machine-gun, were sent out on this duty from Njimbwe, where the Pioneer
Company was then on a detached post, along the road leading to Utete. It
should be noted that the Utete here mentioned is not the largish town on
the right bank of the Rufiji River which bears that name, but a much
smaller place situated about eleven miles north of Kiyombo.
[Illustration: KIBATA AND NGARAMBI AREA]
The patrol under Lieutenant Shields had orders to meet a patrol of the
King’s African Rifles from Kiwambi at a point some nine miles from
Njimbwe, but he had proceeded along the road leading to Utete for a
distance of only about a mile and a half when the advance point sent
back to report that they had seen a group of about ten German _Askari_
on the eastern or right side of the track. It was a favourite trick of
the Germans at this time to dress themselves and their native soldiers
in kit belonging to the British which had fallen into their hands, and
thus to occasion confusion as to who was friend and who was foe. The
country through which Lieutenant Shields was patrolling was for the most
part of a fairly open character, though it was covered with rank grass,
set pretty thickly with trees, and studded here and there with patches
of underwood. The party of the enemy had only been glimpsed for a
moment, but as Lieutenant Shields went forward at once, followed or
accompanied by Colour-Sergeant Nelson, a white man, dressed like an
officer of the King’s African Rifles, appeared at a little distance
ahead of the advance point, crying out in English, “Don’t fire! we are
K.A.R.’s.” Lieutenant Shields, who was very short-sighted, taken in by
this treacherous ruse, bade his men not fire, and the enemy, who appear
to have been about 200 strong with many Europeans among them, thereupon
poured a volley into the patrol from the bush at very short range. This
was followed by the blowing of bugles and an assault. Lieutenant Shields
and Colour-Sergeant Nelson were both shot, as also was the corporal in
charge of the machine-gun while trying to bring his piece into action. A
German who attempted to approach Shields as he lay on the ground was
shot by a man of the Gold Coast Regiment, and the rest of the
machine-gun team managed to get their gun away safely. The patrol,
however, had to retire in disorder, and in addition to the casualties
already enumerated 8 rank and file were missing and were afterwards
ascertained to have been killed, while 2 stretcher-bearers were wounded,
and 1 machine-gun carrier, 1 transport-carrier and 2 stretcher-bearers
were also missing. The patrol further lost 3 boxes of small-arm
ammunition, 6 machine-gun belts, 2 stretchers and a medical haversack.
It was Lieutenant Shields, it will be remembered, who held the advanced
post on the ridge beyond the summit of Gold Coast Hill during those
soul-searching hours between 11 a.m. and dusk on the 15th December. It
seemed a tragedy that this gallant young officer, who had come unscathed
through the ordeal of that day, and who had earned for himself a high
reputation for coolness and courage, should lose his life in the paltry
wayside ambush above described.
George Hilliard Shields was at the outbreak of war a member of the
Education Department of the Gold Coast, and held the post of headmaster
of the Government Boys’ School at Accra. He had earlier filled a
scholastic post in Raffles’ Institute at Singapore: and in the Gold
Coast he distinguished himself by passing the very difficult
interpreter’s examination in the Ga language. Like so many Gold Coast
civilians, Mr. Shields early volunteered for active service, but it was
not found possible to release him from civil employment until the
Regiment was ordered to East Africa in the middle of 1916. He will long
be remembered in Accra for the excellent and manly influence which he
exerted over the boys who were under his tutelage.
At 1.30 p.m. a standing patrol was sent forward to the Kibega River on
the Unguara road, where it entrenched itself. Shortly afterwards a small
enemy patrol appeared on the road to the south of this post and was
fired upon. The men composing it bolted into the bush, their porters
dropping their loads, which turned out to be part of the small-arms
ammunition lost by Lieutenant Shields earlier in the day. Later in the
afternoon the enemy returned and, supported by three maxims, attacked
the post. The patrol of the Regiment held on for a while, but finding
itself outnumbered, retired through the bush to the camp at Njimbwe,
losing one man.
On the 4th February, the Regiment left the camp at Kiyombo and moved
forward to Njimbwe, which lies about five miles to the north, where the
40th Pathans presently joined them; and from here, as usual, small
patrols were daily sent out along the roads in the neighbourhood.
On the 5th February the Pioneer Company and the Battery left Njimbwe at
5.30 a.m., in the midst of a terrific thunderstorm, for the purpose of
supporting the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African
Rifles, who were about to deliver an attack upon two German camps, both
of which overlooked the Ngarambi-Utete road. They came in contact with
an enemy post, which was quickly dislodged, and they subsequently joined
up with the King’s African Rifles, only to learn that the elusive enemy
had abandoned his camps.
The detachment camped for the night with the King’s African Rifles at
the junction of the road to Utete with another track; and as a token
that the dry season was now fairly over, heavy rain fell with melancholy
persistency during all the hours of darkness. The men, of course, had no
shelter save such as they had been able to improvise for themselves on
the preceding evening; and there are, perhaps, few more dreary or
depressing experiences than that of lying out all night under the
relentless beat of a steady tropical downpour. The cold felt has little
in common with the brisk, keen cold of a frosty day or that met with at
a high altitude; but it has certain raw and penetrating properties, and
the discomfort becomes hourly more acute, while at every moment the
puddles suck and squelch beneath you, and fresh streams of colder water
flow in from unexpected directions to chill you to the bone.
At 8 a.m. on the following morning—February 6th—the detachment left its
comfortless bivouac, and marched and waded back to Njimbwe over a
shockingly bad track, which the heavy rain of the night before had
reduced to a quagmire and in places had flooded to a depth of two feet.
The detachment had hardly got into camp when some carriers, who had been
out searching for fuel, ran in with the news that the enemy was
approaching. An attack quickly followed, the enemy taking up a line from
south-east to west, and approaching in places to within 200 yards of the
camp. The surprise was complete, and some of the men of the 40th
Pathans, who were outside the perimeter when the attack began, were
unfortunately injured by their own machine-gun fire. The enemy, however,
was not in any great strength, and he had evidently not realized that he
was attacking so large a force. When he discovered the situation he drew
off somewhat hastily, and was hotly pursued for over a mile. Only a few
of the attacking force were seen, but among them an European was
observed wearing a King’s African Rifles hat and flash, and two
_Askari_, one with a turban and one with the green knitted cap which is
part of the service kit of the men of the Gold Coast Regiment. The
casualties sustained by the latter were 1 man killed, 3 wounded, 1
gun-carrier and 5 transport-carriers wounded, and 1 Gold Coast Volunteer
missing, of whom nothing was ever subsequently heard. The 40th Pathans
lost 6 men killed and 18 wounded, while the known enemy losses were 10
men wounded, including 1 European. Immediately after this incident,
Captain Harman took out a patrol to repair the telephone-line, which had
been cut, while for some time previously it had been frequently tapped
by the enemy.
The next few days were occupied in patrolling the roads in the
neighbourhood of the camp; and on the 9th February the bodies of
Lieutenant Shields, Colour-Sergeant Nelson, and of eight soldiers, who
had been killed on the Utete road on the 3rd February, were discovered.
A burial party was sent out, and the bodies of Lieutenant Shields and
Colour-Sergeant Nelson were brought back to the camp, where the burial
service was read by the Rev. Captain Nicholl, and Holy Communion was
celebrated.
For some weeks past the men of the Regiment had been suffering very
acutely from lack of sufficient food. Not only was the supply
inadequate, but much of the stuff sent up had to be condemned as quite
unfit for human consumption. Many of the men were terribly emaciated,
and some eighty of them were subsequently sent to hospital suffering
from starvation. Had the Regiment not had the good fortune to find a few
food plots planted with cassava, things would have been even worse than
they were. The officers would have fared no better had not some of them
chanced to possess a slender stock of European provisions, which they
shared in common; but the officers of a neighbouring mess had to live
for weeks upon nothing but mealie porridge, which they consumed at
frequent intervals throughout the day, as they found it impossible to
eat at a sitting enough of this filling but unsatisfying stuff to allay
their hunger for more than a few hours.
The discipline of the men of the Gold Coast Regiment under this
prolonged and trying ordeal was beyond all praise. They had followed
their white officers across the sea to this unknown land, where they had
endured cold such as they had never dreamed of, where they had been
grilled by the sun and parched by unappeasable thirst. They had plodded
manfully up hill and down dale, across barren, arid flats, and had waded
through a water-logged country. Whenever and wherever they had met the
enemy they had fought him like the fine soldiers they are, until the
saying, “The green caps never go back,” had passed into a proverb in the
German camp. Now in the heart of a dismal swamp, they were slowly but
surely starving. Yet never once did they murmur or blame their officers.
During the next fortnight the Regiment remained in the camp at Njimbwe,
sending out patrols, some of which had difficulty in preventing
themselves from being cut off by the suddenly deepening swamps, when a
more than usually heavy downpour flooded the low-lying land; squabbling
with enemy forage-parties for possession of the rare patches of cassava;
taking an occasional prisoner; and sustaining a few attacks upon its
outposts. During one of the latter incidents, on Valentine’s Day,
Machine-gun Corporal Tinbela Busanga behaved with great gallantry,
working his gun, after he had been badly wounded in the arm, until he
was too faint with loss of blood to carry on. On this day, though the
enemy was driven off without difficulty, two men of B Company were
wounded. On another occasion, a patrol of six men, under Corporal Amandu
Fulani 4, was ambushed and killed to a man, though not until they had
made a hard fight of it. Amandu Fulani, who was a very smart and gallant
young soldier, had been orderly to the Governor at Accra, but when D
Company was ordered to East Africa, he insisted upon accompanying “his
brothers.” When his body was found, it had been stripped of his uniform,
but a gunshot wound in the abdomen had been bound up with his
_kamar-band_. Though the enemy had removed his casualties, there were
abundant signs that the little patrol had sold their lives dearly.
And during all this time the entry in the War Diary of the Regiment,
“Half Rations,” sounds its reiterated and despairing note.
On the 23rd February the Gold Coast Regiment moved out of Njimbwe camp
at daybreak, marched to Ngarambi Chini, which was reached at 2 p.m., and
where an hour’s halt was called. The march was continued till 6 p.m., at
which time Namatewa was reached. The distance traversed was a good
twenty miles, which at any time is a tough bit of work for a body of
marching men, but though a few swamps were met with the road was drier
than might have been expected. None the less, the men, in their then
half-famished condition, arrived very tired, and were glad to find that
the Pioneer Company, which had gone on in advance, had got a comfortable
camp ready for their reception, and had succeeded in finding excellent
water. This latter feat had been performed, not for the first time, by
Corporal Musa Fra-Fra, a native of the North-Eastern Province of the
Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. This man seemed to possess some
strange instinct which enabled him unerringly to discover water if such
were to be obtained anywhere by digging or otherwise; and though he
obstinately refused to reveal his secret or to show any one how to
perform similar miracles, frequent use was made of his strange faculty
by the officers of the Pioneer Company during the campaign in East
Africa.
From this point the Regiment marched by fairly easy stages to Kitambi,
at the foot of the hills, to Mtumbei Chini, Chemera, and Mitole, where
it arrived on the 27th February, and went into camp to reorganize and
recuperate. The men had richly earned a period of rest, for they had
been continuously on the march or on active service ever since their
arrival at Kilindini, in British East Africa, exactly seven months
earlier.
Colonel R. A. de B. Rose, D.S.O., who had actively commanded the
Regiment ever since the end of August, 1914, who had served with it
throughout the Kameruns campaign before bringing it to East Africa, and
who since January 20th had been in command of a column, was made a
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel with effect from the 1st January, 1917, to the
great satisfaction of the officers and men.
* * * * *
This pause in the Regiment’s activities, though it was not destined to
prove of any long duration, may be taken as providing a convenient
opportunity briefly to review the general military situation as it stood
at the end of the wet season of 1917. The rains in the lower valley of
the Rufiji River began this year early in February, and in the ordinary
course they might be expected to last until late in May, the
commencement of the dry season in tropical East Africa usually
synchronizing more or less accurately with the breaking of the
south-west monsoon upon the shores of Ceylon on the other side of the
Indian Ocean.
As we have seen, the drive from north to south, which had been begun in
earnest in the preceding August, and for participation in which the Gold
Coast Regiment had arrived just in time, had had the effect of expelling
the enemy first from the country between the Tanga-Moschi and the
Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika railways, and later from the country
between the last-named line and the Rufiji. Once across this river, a
further retreat to the south became for the enemy almost a necessity;
and when he found that he could not establish his winter headquarters in
the highlands about Kibata mission station, he seems to have broken his
forces up into comparatively small parties, and while keeping in touch
with the troops on the southern side of the Rufiji, who were under
General Hannyngton’s command, to have worked steadily south, living on
the country as far as possible, and gradually making his way out of the
water-logged areas amid which he had been overtaken by the break-up of
the dry weather early in February.
Von Lettow-Vorbeck, the German Commander-in-Chief, who throughout was
the living soul of the resistance offered to the British, was not a man
who believed in doing things by halves, and when he found that the
valley of the Rufiji was untenable, he established his main headquarters
nearly two hundred miles further to the south of that river, at a place
lying within thirty-five miles of the Rovuma, which is the boundary
between erstwhile German and Portuguese East Africa. The spot chosen was
the mission station at Massassi, which is pleasantly situated at a
height of 1500 feet above sea-level, and is a point at which the
principal roads running through the south-eastern portion of the
territory cross one another. The main road from the port of Lindi, which
runs in a south-westerly direction to Makotschera on the Rovuna, and
there effects a junction with the main road which skirts the northern
bank of that river from Sassaware to its mouth, crosses at Massassi the
main road from Newala on the south-east, which runs in a north-westerly
direction to Liwale, and thence almost due north to the Rufiji River at
Mikesse. From Liwale, moreover, another main road runs in a
north-easterly direction to the sea at Kilwa Kivinje, and west by south
to Songea—itself a point of junction of an elaborate road-system—and
thence due west to Wiedhafen on the shores of Lake Tanganyika.
Even in this campaign, it should be noted, the influence of British
sea-power made itself felt, for though some supplies are known to have
reached the enemy in spite of the naval blockade, the command of the sea
had enabled General Hannyngton’s force to be slipped in behind the
retreating Germans _viâ_ Kilwa, and had shown to von Lettow-Vorbeck the
danger he ran of being cut off or surrounded by troops rapidly
transported by sea to some spot south of the scene of his land
operations. Apart from the commanding position which Massassi occupied
as the key-point of the main lines of communication by land in this part
of the country, and from its convenient proximity to the
German-Portuguese boundary, its selection as von Lettow-Vorbeck’s main
headquarters during the 1917 campaign was probably due to the fact that
it could not easily be outflanked by troops conveyed further to the
south by sea. With his main headquarters established at this point,
moreover, and with all the principal highways in this part of the
country at his immediate disposal, he could freely raid the districts to
the north in which the scattered British forces were strongly
established, and could occupy and hold, as long as it paid him to occupy
and hold them, points of vantage such as Liwale, which could
conveniently be used as his advance bases.
The German troops must have suffered considerably during the months
immediately following their expulsion from the country north of the
Rufiji, though it is doubtful whether they were called upon to endure a
greater measure of physical discomfort or more acute starvation than
that which fell to the lot of the Gold Coast Regiment and the 40th
Pathans in their water-logged camp at Njimbwe, or to that of the
Nigerian Brigade—which had now arrived in East Africa—and which, while
holding with other troops the northern bank of the Rufiji during all
that dismal rainy season, went lamentably short of everything save
water, of which there was always an odious superfluity.
The fidelity of the German native soldiers at this period, and the fact
that so few of them voluntarily surrendered to the British, have been
quoted in certain ill-informed quarters as providing a striking
testimony to the affection which the Germans are alleged to have
inspired in the native population of East Africa. Subscription to any
such opinion argues a complete misunderstanding of the military system
which the Germans erected in their African colonies. It had for its
basic principle the establishment among the native population of an
isolated caste, whose members were not only allowed, but were actively
encouraged, to assert their superiority over the rest of the inhabitants
of the country, who, where a soldier was concerned, ceased to have any
rights of person or of property, and could look for no redress when it
was an _Askari_ who had maltreated them. It will be remembered that in
the German mind, as it was revealed to a disgusted world in August and
September, 1914, there existed a strange confusion of thought, which
drew no distinction between fear of physical violence and the respect
inspired by noble qualities. Thus it was openly declared by the German
High Command that the organized bestialities practised in Belgium would
cause the whole world “to respect the German soldier.” It was this
characteristic confusion of ideas which led the Germans in their African
colonies to seek to inspire the native population with a proper spirit
of “respect” for their white rulers, by placing every ruffian who wore
the Kaiser’s uniform above the law, and by bestowing upon him a free
hand in so far as the treatment of the rest of the native population was
concerned. An example may be cited, which is drawn from the personal
knowledge of the present writer. In September, 1913, a German native
soldier in the employment of the Togoland Government shot an old woman—a
British subject—for an unwitting breach of quarantine regulations, and
having shot her, proceeded to club her to death with the butt-end of his
rifle Protests were duly made to the then Governor of Togoland, Duke
Adolf Freidrich of Mecklenburg, and assurances were given that suitable
notice had been taken of the incident. Yet when the British occupied
Lome, the capital of Togoland, less than a year later, the culprit was
found not even to have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
During the earlier part of the campaign, and as far as possible up to
the very end, everything was done to mark the superiority of the
_Askari_ over the rest of African mankind. They were provided with
carriers who were, to all intents and purposes, their bondsmen and
body-servants, their very rifles being carried for the soldiers when on
the line of march and at a secure distance from the enemy. For their use
a commando of women, under military escort, was marched about the
country—a luxury with which the German officers also were for the most
part plentifully provided; and, in fact, no stone was left unturned to
impress upon the men themselves and upon the rest of the native
population that the _Askari_ were a Chosen People in whose presence no
dog must presume to bark.
The inevitable effect of this system was that the hand of every civilian
native throughout the German colonies in Africa was against the
_Askari_, and when war broke out these native soldiers were unable, even
if they had been willing to risk so hazardous an experiment, to melt
back into the native population from whom they had been completely
differentiated and isolated, and whose undying hatred they had earned in
good measure, shaken together, pressed down, and running over. Their
only safety lay in holding together, and in maintaining as long as
possible the tottering military system to which they owed alike their
past privileges and their present imminent danger of death at the hands
of an enemy, or of still worse things if they fell into the clutches of
their outraged countrymen. Toward the end of 1916 a number of captured
_Askari_ were sent back to British East Africa, and were there
incorporated in a battalion of the King’s African Rifles. The reputation
which they there won for themselves is instructive—excellent on parade,
but a most violent and undisciplined crew when off duty, who in their
relations with the native population respected the laws neither of God
nor of man.
It was due to the German system, it is true, that the _Askari_ remained
faithful to their white masters, but the reasons which inspired this
fidelity are to the last degree discreditable to Germany and to her
conception of the manner in which an European nation should “co-operate
in the work of civilization”[2] among a primitive people in a distant
land.
Footnote 2:
It was a British Prime Minister who declared, speaking during the
early eighties of the nineteenth century, that if Germany desired
colonies, “Great Britain would welcome her co-operation in the work of
civilization.”
CHAPTER VI
IN THE KILWA AREA—MNASI AND RUMBO
During the month of March, 1917, the main body of the Regiment lay in
camp at Mitole, undergoing company training, and sending out frequent
small patrols along the roads in the neighbourhood. The Depôt Company
still remained at Mpara, between Kilwa Kivinje and Kilwa Kisiwani, the
latter being the port at which the Regiment had landed when it was
transported south by sea from Dar-es-Salaam in the preceding November. B
Company was dispatched to hold a post at a place variously called
Kirongo and Nivanga, which lies almost due west from Mnasi a few miles
up a track that leads from the main Kilwa Kivinje-Liwale road, to Njijo,
whence the main road from Kilwa Kivinje runs northward to Kitambi. A
post consisting of one officer and twenty men of the Pioneer Company was
also established at Nigeri-geri, near the junction of the main roads
from Kitambi and Liwale, and on March 26th the whole company was sent
there. On the 25th March the post at Nivanga, which was protecting a
party working on the Chemera road, was attacked by an enemy patrol,
which was driven off without difficulty, but two men of A Company were
wounded.
On the 3rd April, the Regiment left Mitole, and marching across country
along a vile track till the main highway leading from Kilwa Kivinje to
Liwale was encountered, reached Mnasi on the following day, and
proceeded to establish a camp there. Mnasi lies on the main road above
mentioned and is distant about three-and-twenty miles from Kilwa
Kivinje. Here two wells, dug by the Germans and cased with brick, were
found, but they contained no water. B Company was separated from the
rest of the Regiment at this time, being still stationed at Kirongo.
Very early in the morning of April 11th, a bush native came into camp
and reported that another native, who had come into Makangaga from the
south on the preceding evening, had brought word that the enemy was at
Likawage, rather more than thirty miles to the south of Mnasi, and that
two companies, over two hundred strong, were marching down the road to
that place. Makangaga lies south-east of Mnasi and is distant barely
four miles from that place. Accordingly Lieutenant Kinley, with
seventy-five rank and file and one machine-gun, was at once dispatched
to make an attempt to ambush the advancing enemy.
This little band proceeded up the road to Makangaga, and passing through
that village, sought some point of vantage from whence to attack the
enemy as he marched down the road. For once men of the Gold Coast
Regiment, whose patrols had so often been harassed by an elusive and
invisible enemy, were to have a chance of subjecting a German force to a
similarly unpalatable experience.
The country, however, was for the most part a dead flat, broken only by
gentle undulations, and now, toward the end of the rains, it was covered
with a new growth of tall grass, very thick and lush. In these
circumstances, it was not possible to find any spot which actually
overlooked the road and was at the same time securely concealed from the
observation of the enemy’s advanced points. Lieutenant Kinley, however,
took careful note of the lie of the land, and led his little force into
the high grass, where he drew it up in as compact a line as possible in
a position parallel to the highway, and distant some sixty or seventy
yards from it. Here the machine-gun was set up, and the men, breathless
with expectation and excitement, lay down and waited.
Presently the sound of a large body of men marching down the road became
audible; and Lieutenant Kinley, reserving his fire until he judged that
the main body of the enemy was in his immediate front, let the Germans
have it with rifle and machine-gun for all his little force was worth.
An indescribable uproar ensued, while enemy bullets whistled in every
direction above the heads of Kinley’s men; and presently it became
obvious that the Germans were rushing into the long grass upon a wide
front to counter-attack their assailants.
Fearing to be enveloped by the greatly superior force which he had had
the hardihood to ambush, Lieutenant Kinley ceased fire, rapidly moved
his men to the rear and toward one of the enemy’s flanks, and from
thence repeated his former tactics. Another wild hooroosh was the
result, and for perhaps a quarter of an hour, the Germans and the little
band of Gold Coasters played an exciting game of hide and seek, each
being completely hidden from the other by the ten-foot screen of grass,
and being compelled to trust purely to the sounds that reached them to
determine the direction of their fire. At the end of that time a
luckless band of Germans, composed of Europeans and natives, wandered
into view, walking along a path within a few yards of a spot in which
Lieutenant Kinley and his breathless men were lying. Very few of the
enemy survived this encounter; and Lieutenant Kinley considering that he
had now done as much damage as he would be able to effect without
running too great a risk of himself being enveloped and cut off,
extricated his small force with considerable skill, and led it back to
the camp at Mnasi.
In this brilliant little encounter six men of the Gold Coast Regiment
were killed, six were wounded, and one fell into the hands of the enemy.
The latter lost three white men and fifteen _Askari_ killed, and over
thirty wounded; and the Gold Coast Regiment, remembering the fate of
Lieutenant Shields and Colour-Sergeant Nelson and their men, had the
satisfaction of feeling that, to use the phrase of the officers’ mess,
“they had got back some of their own.”
On the 13th April the enemy sent in a flag of truce, and restored to the
Gold Coast Regiment four of the men who had been wounded during
Lieutenant Kinley’s action on the 11th April. The bearer of the flag of
truce admitted the heavy losses which the enemy had sustained on that
occasion. For his daring little exploit, Lieutenant Kinley was
recommended by Colonel Rose, who was still commanding the 3rd East
African Brigade, for a Distinguished Service Order.
On the 15th April, the Regiment made a nine hours’ march over a
villainous track to Migeri-geri, which is situated on the main road
thirteen and a half miles from Kilwa, where a new camp was established;
and on the 17th of April Lieutenant Beech with a patrol of fifty rank
and file and one machine-gun marched along the Mnasi road to investigate
the cutting of the telegraph wire. He met a patrol of B Company, with
whom was the agent of the Intelligence Department, and they shortly
afterwards had a brush with an enemy patrol, B Company losing one man
killed and one wounded; but the enemy was driven off and the telegraph
line repaired.
On the same day, Captain Foley with the Battery and an escort of thirty
rank and file of A Company, joined a force, commanded by the Colonel of
the 40th Pathans, which was operating in the direction of Mnasi; the
Gold Coast Regiment took over the outposts hitherto held by the Pathans;
Captain Greene and the Pioneer Company joined the Regiment in camp; and
at 7 p.m. a cable party was sent out to restore communication with the
Officer Commanding the Pathans at Rumbo, a place about five miles south
by east of Migeri-geri.
On the following day the Battery and its escort, under the command of
Captain Foley, came in for a pretty hot engagement at Rumbo, where they
were in action with the 40th Pathans and 150 men of the 2nd Battalion of
the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles. It was the 40th Pathans,
it will be remembered, who took over Gold Coast Hill from the Regiment
at dusk on the 15th December, and throughout the campaign they had
fought with steadfastness and courage. Their casualties, both in the
field and from sickness, had been very severe, however, and their
numerical strength had recently been made up by large drafts of raw
recruits from India, the bulk of whom were not drawn from the strata of
the population which, in the past, have always supplied men for the 40th
Pathans. Precisely what happened on this day does not concern us here.
That the veterans of the 40th Pathans fought gallantly is attested by
the fact that of one of their machine-gun teams every man was killed at
his post, but the rest of the story can best be confined to the
experiences of the Battery of the Gold Coast Regiment and of its
commander.
On the 18th April Captain Foley got his guns into position, in order to
cover and support the infantry advance, at a point across the Ngaura
River in the neighbourhood of Rumbo. The stream, in which the water was
on that day nearly chin-deep, was behind him, and the camp of the force
which Colonel Tyndall of the 40th Pathans was commanding lay in the bush
on the further bank. The country was covered by pretty dense trees and
scrub, and all that the guns could do was to shell the area in which the
enemy was believed to be concealed. After this had been going on for
some time, the Battery trumpeter, Nuaga Kusasi, approached Captain Foley
and reported that there were no British soldiers in front or on the
flanks of the Battery, and that the men moving in the bush, barely
thirty yards ahead, were the enemy. Captain Foley was incredulous, but
Nuaga Kusasi insisted, and stating that he could see a German officer,
put up his rifle and fired at him. Immediately the bush ahead of the
guns was seen to be alive with enemy _Askari_.
The men of the Battery, and the thirty men of A Company which formed its
escort, behaved admirably, and Bogoberi, one of the gun-carriers, drew
his matchet and declared that he and his fellows would charge the enemy
with those weapons before the guns should be touched. His example was
followed by all the other gun-carriers, who were enlisted men drawn from
the same tribes as the soldiers.
These things happened in the space of a few seconds, and already Captain
Foley had taken complete charge of the situation, his fluency in Hausa
making it easy for him to give his orders clearly and rapidly. He bade
the Battery Sergeant-Major retire the two guns and all the ammunition
across the river, and then dividing his small force, which was composed
of the thirty men of A Company and about a dozen men of the Battery, he
placed half under the Sergeant-Major of A Company and the rest under
Sergeant Mahmadu Moshi of the Battery. These non-commissioned officers
successively led charges into the bush, whence, barely twenty yards
away, the enemy were firing upon Foley’s men. This had its immediate
effect, and Foley next retired half his little party a few yards to the
rear, while the rest emptied their magazine rifles into the bush
occupied by the enemy. The party in advance then retired at the double
through the men behind them, and in their turn took up a position from
which to cover the retreat of their fellows. In this manner the enemy,
who were in greatly superior force, were successfully kept at bay, while
Sergeant-Major Bukare Moshi retired the two guns to the further bank of
the river, an operation which was so successfully conducted that, in
spite of the deep water, it was performed with the loss of only one box
of ammunition. One gunner and three men of A Company were killed, and
three gun-carriers were wounded; but the guns were saved, and the great
coolness and skill with which Captain Foley handled his men, and the
pluck, steadfastness, and resource which the latter showed, won the
special praise of Colonel Tyndall of the 40th Pathans. The action of the
Battery on this occasion did much to avert what at one time threatened
to be a serious disaster. Later in the day Captain Shaw, with two
hundred men of A and B Companies, marched to Rumbo to reinforce the 40th
Pathans.
The feat thus accomplished was one of quite extraordinary difficulty.
The river-crossing at this point, even in the dry season, is by no means
easy, for the banks, which are some ten feet in height, rise sheer from
the bed and had been worn smooth by the passage of much running water.
On this particular day, however, the stream was a raging torrent and the
steep banks were as slippery as ice. That, in these circumstances, the
passage of the guns and ammunition should have been effected with such
expedition and success shows what human effort is capable of achieving
in moments of intense excitement.
During the action just described, Lieutenant Murray, R.N., who was in
command of a naval Lewis gun section, had all the men of his team either
killed or wounded. He then attached himself to Captain Foley, rendering
him valuable assistance, and refusing himself to cross the stream until
the last of the Battery had passed over in safety.
Captain Macpherson, in command of I Company, was also in action during
this day at a place called Beaumont’s Post, which was situated near the
banks of the Magaura river, on a track that runs parallel to the coast,
but well out of sight of the sea, to the east and a little to the south
of Rumbo. This post, though of great strength, was very close to the
enemy, and it and the patrols sent out from it were frequent objects of
his attack. On this occasion Captain Macpherson lost two men killed, two
wounded, and two local porters killed.
On the 19th April the rest of the Regiment marched to Rumbo, and there
relieved the 40th Pathans; and during the afternoon the enemy, under a
flag of truce, sent in five men who had been wounded during the action
of the preceding day, and who had fallen into his hands. The bearer of
the flag of truce admitted that the enemy had himself lost thirty men in
that action, so the veterans of the 40th Pathans and the Battery of the
Gold Coast Regiment and its escort had not put up their rather desperate
little fight in vain.
During the next two days the surrounding country was patrolled, and the
defences of the camp at Rumbo were improved; and on the 22nd April the
Brigade Headquarters were established there, and the 2nd Battalion of
the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles arrived in camp.
Patrolling continued, and on the 25th April Captain Macpherson reported
from Beaumont’s Post that he had been engaged with the enemy on the 18th
April and again on the 20th April; that he had lost in all four men
killed, four wounded, and one missing; and that among the killed was
Company Sergeant-Major Hassan Bazaberimi.
It was while the Regiment was in camp at Rumbo that von Lettow-Vorbeck
planned and carried out one of those daring little ventures which, even
though they might have no special military value, helped no doubt to
keep up the spirits of his people, and certainly appealed very strongly
to his opponents’ instinctive love of a good sportsman. He sent a small
raiding party through the bush to a point overlooking the harbour of
Kilwa Kisiwani, and having got a gun on to a hill in the vicinity,
opened fire upon a British transport which was lying at anchor. He
actually scored three hits, and, the surprise being complete, this
unexpected attack upon the British sea-base caused for the moment a
certain amount of apprehension. Even the Depôt Company of the Gold Coast
Regiment at Mpara was mobilized under Major Read, and was posted along
the northern shore of the harbour; but the Germans were not in a
position to deliver any serious attack, and when a British cruiser
appeared on the scene they prudently withdrew.
For the rest of the month the Regiment remained at Rumbo, daily
patrolling the country, improving the defences and the water-supply of
the camp, and having frequent slight brushes with the enemy, in the
course of which a few casualties were sustained.
The strength of the Regiment on the 1st May 1917, was only 9 officers, 6
British non-commissioned officers, 7 clerks, 2 dressers, 786 rank and
file, 381 carriers, 18 servants, and 41 stretcher-bearers, or 1250 men
of all ranks. As compared with the _personnel_ of the force which had
left Sekondi for East Africa on the 6th July, 1916, only one-fourth of
the _cadre_ of officers was now available; the British non-commissioned
officers were reduced by 9; the rank and file by 194; and this in spite
of the reinforcements from the Gold Coast which had reached the Regiment
on the 27th December. Notwithstanding the prolonged and trying
experiences to which the men had been subjected, they were as keen and
as staunch as ever; but the strength of a native force must ever depend
in a great degree upon European leadership, and now there were only 7
company officers and 2 British non-commissioned officers all told, to be
distributed between the Battery and the four Companies of the Regiment,
two of the other British non-commissioned officers being members of the
Royal Army Medical Corps, and one being in charge of the transport. It
may be accounted no less than marvellous that, in these circumstances,
the corps continued to exhibit so great a measure of energy and
vitality.
During the whole of May, however, the Gold Coast Regiment remained in
camp at Rumbo, making the usual daily patrols, and on one occasion
taking part in a reconnaissance in force, in conjunction with the
garrison at Mnasi and I Company at Beaumont’s Post, on a thirty-two-mile
front, during which, however, the enemy was not brought to action. A few
casualties continued to occur during the month to men belonging to the
detachment at Beaumont’s Post; but by the end of May there were eleven
combatant and two medical officers with the Regiment,—a material
improvement, but still little more than one-third of the proper
establishment. The combatant British non-commissioned officers still
numbered only four. During the month news was received that Lieutenant
Kinley had been awarded the Military Cross for his action on 11th April,
and that a similar distinction had been conferred upon Captain Foley,
commanding the Battery, for services rendered in the engagement at
Rumbo, when supporting the 40th Pathans, on the 18th April. A
Distinguished Conduct Medal, and four Military Medals were also awarded
to the Battery and to the sections of A Company which supplied its
escort for the fight they had put up on that day.
On the 29th May, half the Pioneer Company, under Lieutenant Bray, went
to Migeri-geri to form part of the garrison at that place.
On the 1st June, 1917, Major Goodwin was appointed an Acting
Lieutenant-Colonel, and was also awarded the French _Croix de Guerre_.
Intelligence was also received that Lieutenant Piggott had been awarded
the silver medal of the Italian Order of San Maurico.
During the first nine days of the month nothing occurred beyond the
usual patrols, and an occasional interchange of shots with the enemy;
but on the 10th June, the Pioneer Company reliefs, returning from a post
two and a half miles west of the camp, were ambushed at about 7.30 a.m.
by a party of the enemy of great numerical superiority. The returning
patrol extended in the bush, opened fire on the enemy, and compelled him
to retire. The body of one German _Askari_ was left on the ground, and
some blood spoor was seen in the bush. The Pioneers lost one man killed
and one wounded.
On the 11th June information was received that, on the occasion of His
Majesty’s birthday, the Distinguished Service Order had been conferred
upon Lieutenant-Colonel Goodwin and upon Captain Harman, the Military
Cross upon Lieutenant Piggott, and the Distinguished Conduct Medal upon
Sergeant-Major Medlock.
On the following day, Captain Macpherson with three of the sections of I
Company which, with a company of the 33rd Punjabis, had been occupying
Beaumont’s Post, where they had had so many brushes with the enemy and
had sustained such frequent casualties, rejoined the Regiment at Rumbo.
Lieutenant Biltcliffe, with another detachment of I Company, remained at
Beaumont’s Post, and on the same day he reported that a mixed patrol,
composed of his men and of the 33rd Punjabis, had been ambushed by the
enemy, and that one man of the Regiment had been killed and seven others
wounded. The Punjabis lost one European officer and six Indian soldiers
killed. On the 13th June Lieutenant Biltcliffe returned to Rumbo from
Beaumont’s Post with the rest of I Company, after patrolling the Magaura
River, a small stream that empties itself into the inlet of the sea
which forms a deep and narrow bay slightly to the north and west of
Kilwa Kisiwani.
On the 15th June 987 men of the Sierra Leone Carrier Corps came into
camp and were attached to the Gold Coast Regiment, whose officers, with
a sigh of relief, saw these sturdy West Africans replace the much less
efficient and reliable local porters.
Captain Shaw was appointed Acting Major, and second in Command of the
Gold Coast Regiment on the 16th June, and on the 28th June he was
appointed Acting Lieutenant-Colonel, and took over the command, Major
Goodwin having been invalided to the base. Shortly before Colonel Rose
had been struck down with dysentery and had also been invalided to
Dar-es-Salaam, the command of the 3rd East African Brigade being taken
over from him by Colonel Orr. General Beves had succeeded General
Hannyngton in the command of the Division.
A camp on Lingaula Ridge, a few miles to the south of Rumbo, which had
been evacuated by the enemy, was occupied by Lieutenant Bray with I
Company on the 28th June; and the same day the Regiment received orders
to move on the morrow to Ukuli, a place to the south and only slightly
to the east of Rumbo, whence it returned on the 30th June, without
having succeeded in bringing the enemy to action. On this latter date
the detachment at Lingaula Ridge was attacked by an enemy patrol, which
was driven off with the loss of one European killed, I Company having
two men wounded.
[Illustration:
MAJOR G. SHAW, M.C. CAPT. E. G. WHEELER, M.C. MAJOR H. READ.
To face p. 92.
]
Thus ended the month of June, 1917. The dry season might now be regarded
as fairly established, and the country, covered by a luxuriant growth of
elephant grass and of fresh green bush into which the recent rains had
infused a new life, was already beginning to dry up. The _cadre_ of
officers was still far below strength, but it now numbered thirteen
combatants, with two medical officers and three officers attached to the
Sierra Leone Carrier Corps. The rank and file only totalled 771 men; but
the little force now possessed 1264 sturdy West African carriers, 42
stretcher-bearers, and five interpreters, and was perhaps more really
mobile than it had yet been since its arrival in East Africa. In all
Colonel Shaw had under his command 2156 men; and after the comparative
stagnation and the constant harassing patrol work of the past six
months, the Regiment looked forward with eager anticipation to the
resumption of more active campaigning.
CHAPTER VII
IN THE KILWA AREA—NARUNGOMBE
General Beves was now preparing to take the offensive, his plan being to
divide his force into three columns which, working southward, but
describing segments of a circle on the west and on the east, might
perhaps get in behind the enemy and contrive to envelope him. As usual
the difficulties of maintaining sufficient supplies of provisions,
ammunition and water obtruded themselves from the outset; but the force
was well equipped with motor transport, and it was hoped that, by
cutting tracks eight feet wide through the bush, a passage might be made
for these vehicles in the rear of the advancing columns.
In order to deceive the enemy as to the main line of his advance,
Colonel Orr decided to make a feint along the road past Lingaula Ridge
due south of the camp at Rumbo, and this duty he assigned to a company
of the Gold Coast Regiment. Colonel Shaw selected B Company for the
purpose; and when at 10 p.m. on the 4th July the Regiment left Rumbo
with the No. 1 Column, B Company, under the command of Lieutenant Eglon,
remained behind at Linguala Ridge.
There was an eclipse of the moon on the night selected for the start,
and the darkness was intense, and it was not till noon on the 5th July
that Beaumont’s Post was reached. No. 1 Column, which was commanded by
Colonel Orr, consisted of the Gold Coast Regiment, the 33rd Punjabis,
the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, the
famous Indian Mountain Battery from Derajat, which goes by the name of
the “D. M. B.,” and the 8th South African Infantry, which joined the
Gold Coast Regiment at Beaumont’s Post. No. 1 Column was to make the
sweep southward on the left of the advance. No. 2 Column was composed of
the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African
Rifles, the 7th South African Infantry, and the 27th Mountain Battery,
under the command of Colonel Grant. Its sweep was to be made on the
right of the advance. A third column was operating still further to the
left of No. 1 Column. This column consisted of the 3rd Battalion of the
3rd King’s African Rifles, and the 40th Pathans. On the day before the
engagement at Narungombe it was reinforced by one and a half companies
of the 8th South African Infantry from No. 1 Column. No. 3 Column was
under the command of Colonel Taylor. The 129th Baluchis were in reserve
at Makangaga.
No. 1 Column left Beaumont’s Post at 7 p.m. on the 5th July for Ukuli,
and at midnight the men bivouacked in column of route. At dawn the march
was resumed, and at 4 p.m. the Gold Coast Regiment took over the
advanced guard from the King’s African Rifles, who had been heavily
engaged all day, and had succeeded in dislodging the enemy from a
prepared position.
As soon as this relief had been affected, the Pioneer Company advanced
and engaged the enemy’s rear-guard, which it found some 300 yards up the
road, and which it drove back to a distance of about a mile. Here the
Pioneer Company bivouacked, remaining all night in its advanced position
as outpost company, the rest of the Regiment rejoining No. 1 Column in
camp. One man was killed and one wounded in the advance by the Pioneer
Company.
On the 7th July, the Gold Coast Regiment marched as advanced guard to
the column which was now heading in the direction of Ngomania. This
place was occupied by the Regiment, after encountering slight
resistance, and the rear-guard of the column came into camp there at
about 3 p.m.
On this day, however, No. 2 Column had a serious engagement with the
enemy in which many casualties were sustained on both sides.
On the 8th July, the Gold Coast Regiment, which had received orders to
march to Mnindi, there to join up with No. 2 Column, left Ngomania at
4.30 a.m. It was accompanied by a section of the D.M.B., and the little
force marched to Makangaga—the scene of Lieutenant Kinley’s
exploit—where at 9 p.m. it bivouacked for the night.
Meanwhile B Company, which had been left behind at Lingaula Ridge under
the command of Lieutenant Eglon, had carried out the duty entrusted to
it with great dash and brilliancy. On the 7th July Lieutenant Eglon,
pushing southward down the road from his camp at Lingaula Ridge, found
no less than three companies of Germans in front of him, and promptly
attacked. Though the enemy hopelessly outnumbered the men under his
command, Lieutenant Eglon managed to drive them from three successive
positions, making as great a display of B Company as possible, and
evidently impressing the Germans with the idea that they were about to
be attacked in force. During these operations Lieutenant Scott was
seriously wounded, Sergeant Awudu Arigungu, who had had long service
both with the Northern Nigeria Regiment and with the Gold Coast
Regiment, was killed, and eight other men of B Company were wounded.
Having effected his purpose, Lieutenant Eglon, in accordance with his
instructions, fell back to Lingaula Ridge, and on the 9th July rejoined
the Regiment at Makangaga.
From this place No. 2 Column cut across country, almost due west, to
Kirongo, on the main Liwale-Kilwa road, leaving Makangaga at 6.30 a.m.
on the 10th July, Colonel Shaw commanding the column on the march.
Kirongo was reached at 1.30 p.m.; and on the following morning at 6 a.m.
the column pushed on five miles to some water-holes in the dried-up bed
of a stream called Kirongo-Ware, where it camped at 1.30 p.m. On this
day Colonel Ridgeway assumed the command of No. 2 Column.
At 6 a.m. on the 12th July No. 2 Column resumed its march down the track
leading in a south-easterly direction to Kilageli, and at 10 a.m. its
patrols came into touch with enemy scouts, with whom a few shots were
exchanged. An enemy camp at Kilageli, ahead of the column, was located
and bombarded by the D.M.B., and the column deployed and occupied this
camp without resistance at about 4 p.m. Here the column rested for the
night, and on the 13th July at 1.30 p.m. it continued its advance, and
at sundown reached Minokwe, which lies four miles further along the road
south by west of Kilageli. At 4 a.m. on the 14th July, the column again
moved forward in the direction of an enemy position some six miles to
the west of Mtanduala, from the advanced trenches of which a hot fire
was opened upon it. The D.M.B. came into action and shelled the enemy
position, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the King’s African Rifles
and the 7th South African Infantry joined in the fight, in which the
Gold Coast Regiment also engaged at about 11 a.m. The enemy, fighting a
rear-guard action, retired, and two hours later the engagement came to
an end. The casualties were few, and the column bivouacked for the night
in the prepared position from which the Germans had been ejected.
On the 15th July, the column marched in a south-westerly direction to
Kihendye and thence to Rungo, a few shots being exchanged during the day
between the King’s African Rifles and enemy scouts. The former lost one
man killed and three wounded.
During this day the work of cutting a path, designed for the use of
motor-lorries, across country and through the thick, tall grass began,
two companies of the Gold Coast Regiment being sent forward for this
purpose; and during the whole of the next two days this work was
continued. It was a very toilsome job, hacking an eight-foot track
through elephant-grass and occasional patches of thorn-thicket, with a
merciless sun smiting down from above, with nought to breathe save the
stuffy overheated and used-up air peculiar to big grass patches in the
tropics, with only a few dry biscuits for food, and a constant,
agonising insufficiency of water. The men stuck to it manfully, but one
poor fellow died during the day of exhaustion and heat-apoplexy; and in
the end this vast expenditure of labour was all in vain. The track had
been cut on a compass-bearing, but the only surveys in existence were
very roughly approximate, and the path through the grass was eventually
brought to a standstill by encountering a steep cliff up which no
motor-lorry could conceivably find a way. A little further on, a large
main road which runs north and south was struck, and No. 2 Column
presently found itself in junction with No. 1 Column, which had advanced
down this road to Kipondira. Here the Gold Coast Regiment was
retransferred to No. 1 Column.
On the 18th July No. 1 Column left Kipondira at 10 a.m., the Gold Coast
Regiment being stationed towards the rear of the force, which was in
action with the enemy until about 2.30 p.m., when the Germans retired,
and the column camped for the night at Kihumburu. Two miles further down
the road from this place the main body of the enemy operating in this
part of the country had taken up a strongly entrenched position at
Narungombe. The plan for his envelopment had miscarried, as was almost
certain to befall in a country such as that through which the columns
were operating, where movements of troops were inevitably slow, where
difficulties hampered supply, where scarcity of water presented a
constant menace to the very existence of the forces in the field, and
where a few scouts, used with even a modicum of skill, could easily keep
the enemy informed of the direction which any hostile unit was taking.
No. 3 Column had carried out the task entrusted to it very successfully,
for the wide sweeping movement which it had made had enabled it to cut
in behind the enemy, who was in occupation of a scarp at Mikikama, where
he would have presented a formidable barrier to the advance of No. 1
Column. This was a service of considerable importance; but now all three
columns, though their convergence in front of Narungombe had not been
intended, were assembled in the vicinity of the main road a few miles to
the north of that place. This well illustrates the extreme difficulty of
concerted operations when carried out in thick bush or high grass, as
soon as ever the roads or paths running through it are quitted.
The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, who
had borne the brunt of this day’s fighting, had rendered a tremendous
service to the columns by expelling the Germans from a water-hole at
Kihumburu, and thus making it available for the troops. It was evident,
however, that the supply so obtained was quite insufficient for the
needs of the force for more than a very limited space of time; and it
thus became a matter of vital importance that the enemy should be
dislodged from the very strong position which he had taken up at
Narungombe, where a much larger set of water-holes was known to exist.
Orders were accordingly given for an attack to be delivered upon
Narungombe early on the following morning.
The position which the enemy had prepared and occupied consisted of a
series of breastworks some two and a half feet in height, built of earth
stoutly faced with sticks driven deep into the ground and bound together
with lianas, with a number of small redoubts and strongly constructed
machine-gun emplacements, and a specially strong defensive post for the
accommodation of the high command. These works, drawn along the upper
slopes of two hills, between which the high-road passes, extended in an
irregular but continuous line, with many slight protrusions and
salients, for a distance of two and a half miles. The defensive position
was particularly strong at the left extremity of the enemy’s line. From
the British camp at Kihumburu the main road runs due south and almost
straight to the centre of the German position, dipping into a valley a
few hundred yards in advance of the British camp, and thereafter rising
gradually in a long glacis to the hills upon which the enemy was
entrenched. The country hereabouts is undulating, and covered throughout
with high grass, and patches of thorn-scrub set fairly thickly with
rather mean-looking trees; but immediately in advance of the enemy’s
position, the grass had been cut, leaving stalks about two feet six in
height, for a distance of some three hundred yards, and thus depriving
the attacking force of any cover. The enemy had four companies in the
firing-line, with four more companies in reserve, which, however,
arrived too late to take part in the battle. He had two guns of about
2·95 calibre and at least six machine-guns; but above all, he had, as
usual, been able to select his own defensive position, and could rely
upon making the task of his ejectment an extremely expensive
undertaking.
On Thursday, the 19th July, the British advance began at 6 a.m., No. 1
Column leading with the Gold Coast Regiment in the centre. It had been
reported that no enemy post existed at a point nearer than 1000 yards
along the road from the British camp; but before the Regiment had
traversed 300 yards, and while they were still in column of route, fire
was opened upon them, and two men were killed and three wounded ere ever
they had time to deploy. An advance in extended order through high grass
is necessarily a rather slow operation, and while the Gold Coast
Regiment was working forward, one company of the 2nd Battalion of the
King’s African Rifles was sent forward out of reserve, and in order to
protect the Regiment’s advance, occupied a ridge on their right flank
which lay to the south-west of the British camp,
At 8.15 a.m. the advance-guard of the Regiment became heavily engaged,
Lieutenant Eglon having led B Company to within a short distance of the
enemy’s well-entrenched and strongly held position. Here this gallant
young officer, who had done so well a few days earlier when attacking
from Lingaula Ridge, was killed, and B Company suffered many casualties.
Colonel Shaw had taken up an advanced position along the road behind a
mound, from which he was able throughout the day closely to observe the
operations he was conducting; and he now sent I Company to prolong the
line on the right of the attack. A few minutes later the Pioneer Company
was also sent forward to prolong the right; and at 9.30 a.m. the 33rd
Punjabis, who had been held in reserve, were also sent yet further to
prolong the right, while the 7th South African Infantry deployed on the
left of the Gold Coast Regiment.
At this juncture orders were given for No. 3 Column to attempt a wide
turning movement on the right of the enemy’s position, the 3rd Battalion
of the 3rd King’s African Rifles and the 40th Pathans leading the
advance, with certain water-holes as their objective. No. 2 Column was
ordered at the same time to carry out a similar turning movement on the
left. At 10.30 a.m. these troops began to get into position, and at noon
No. 3 Column became heavily engaged. The 3rd Battalion of the 3rd King’s
African Rifles and the 40th Pathans had been pushed forward, without any
preliminary scouting, into a valley on the British left, where they
presently came under a devastating rifle and machine-gun fire from both
forces. By this time the enemy’s fire had grown intense along the whole
line; and the 8th South African Infantry, the bulk of whom still formed
part of No. 1 Column and occupied ground on the left of the Gold Coast
Regiment, attempted to advance, but were enfiladed by machine-gun and
rifle fire from salients in the enemy’s line. They maintained their
position for a while, but the troops upon their left failed to make
good, and the grass all round them was set on fire by the British
shells.
This failure on the left placed the Gold Coast Regiment in a highly
perilous position, as its flank was now completely in the air. Moreover,
by this time, the grass was well alight along the whole of the front.
The men, however, were steady as a rock, and showed no signs of giving
way as had the South African and Indian troops on their immediate left.
As for the blazing grass, that was a phenomenon to which they had all
their lives been accustomed, and they manfully stamped the flames out,
in spite of the heavy fire to which they were exposed, and stolidly
resumed the fight. On the left of the line, where the danger was most
imminent, Colour-Sergeant Campbell very specially distinguished himself,
and did much to encourage and confirm the spirit of the men, only too
many of whose officers were already _hors-de-combat_. He fought his
machine-gun until practically all its team had fallen, and in the end
brought it safely out of action.
Meantime the right flank had advanced 800 yards, but at 3.30 p.m. they
were strongly counterattacked by the enemy, and two platoons of the 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles were sent to
prolong the right and to get into touch with No. 2 Column, which so far
had failed to make its appearance. And all this time the enemy
maintained from his defences an intense and relentless fire.
A general advance had been arranged to take place at 2.30 p.m., but the
position on the left had by that time become so critical that the
movement could not be carried out at the hour fixed; and at 4 p.m.
orders were sent to the Gold Coast Regiment not to attempt any further
advance. These orders arrived too late, and the Gold Coast Companies on
the right, with the 33rd Punjabis and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, charged and took certain of the
enemy’s trenches, but were unable to hold on owing to their left being
unsupported and to their ammunition running short. They were accordingly
retired, but only to a distance of 100 yards from the enemy’s trenches,
where they dug themselves in and held on. The 2nd Battalion of the
King’s African Rifles remained on the enemy’s flank in a patch of thick
bush, and succeeded thence in getting into touch with No. 2 Column.
Darkness was now falling, and the Gold Coast Regiment and the troops on
its right bivouacked for the night in the rifle-pits which they had dug
for themselves.
Meanwhile, the troops on the left had again been led forward into action
by Major Hill of the South African Infantry and by the Commander of the
Stokes Battery, thus reconsolidating the line on the left of the Gold
Coast Regiment.
At dawn on the following day it was found that the enemy had evacuated
his position. He had effected his object, and had made the attacking
force pay a heavy price for the possession of the water-holes of
Narungombe. Now, before he could be enveloped or cut off, he beat a
hasty retreat toward the south. The position from which he had inflicted
so much damage upon his pursuers had served its purpose, and he had
nothing more to gain by attempting longer to hold it.
The casualties suffered by the Gold Coast Regiment, having regard to its
strength at this time, were very heavy. Of the greatly reduced _cadre_
of officers and of British non-commissioned officers, Lieutenant Eglon
was killed, Captain A. J. R. O’Brien, M.C., of the West African Medical
Staff, was severely wounded, as also were Captain Leslie-Smith,
Colour-Sergeant Baverstock and another colour-sergeant. Lieutenant Bray
was slightly wounded. B Company lost its sergeant-major—Awudu Bakano—a
very fine soldier, and of the rank and file, 37 were killed and 114 were
wounded. The total casualties were thus 158 out of about 790 men
engaged, or 20 per cent. of the whole combatant strength of the corps.
Never had the men of the Gold Coast Regiment shown more grit than on
this day at Narungombe. They went into action early in the morning of
the 19th July after having been marching and fighting, or painfully
cutting paths through the bush and high grass—labouring practically
without cessation—since the evening of the 4th of that month. They were
hotly engaged with the enemy during the whole day, exposed to a fierce
sun, with very poor cover, with little to eat and with less to drink,
and were exposed throughout to gun, rifle and machine-gun fire, mostly
at fairly short range, from 8 a.m. to nightfall. In addition to the
enemy, they had constantly to fight the blazing grass, which rendered
their position more and more exposed; yet these Africans never wavered,
but continued stubbornly to hold their positions, though more than one
company had been robbed of all its European leaders and was being
commanded solely by its native non-commissioned officers. When towards
the end of the day, they had occupied the enemy’s trenches on the right,
and running short of ammunition and being unsupported on their left,
were unable to hold on, they retired only a hundred yards in obedience
to orders and with perfect steadiness, and from their new position
forthwith resumed the fight. It would be difficult to devise a test more
searching that could be applied to native troops, and the triumphant
manner in which on this occasion the “green caps” maintained their
reputation as men who “never go back” is a striking proof of the
Regiment’s high quality as a fighting unit.
For the services rendered by him while in command of the Regiment on
this day, Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw was subsequently awarded a bar to the
Military Cross which he had already earned.
CHAPTER VIII
THE HALT AT NARUNGOMBE
Although the Germans had abandoned their position at Narungombe, the
severe losses which they had inflicted upon the British were out of all
proportion to any advantages which the latter could claim to have
secured. The check, too, impressed the British command with the
difficulty of dealing with the enemy unless the pursuit could be
rendered not only rapid but continuous, and above all with the fact that
an adequate supply of water was the hinge upon which all future
operations must turn. At Narungombe the very machine-guns of the Gold
Coast Regiment had for a time been put out of action through lack of
water wherewith to cool the jackets, and the men in the firing-line had
been cruelly tortured by thirst during the greater part of that day.
After the fight at Narungombe, therefore, the column under General
Beves’ command remained in camp at that place to refit. There
reinforcements speedily arrived, and General Hannyngton, returning from
sick-leave, presently resumed command of the force. A large fortified
camp was established; a space to the north of it was cleared and made
into an aerodrome; supplies of every description were accumulated; and
all things were made as ready as circumstances permitted for a renewed
advance. Meanwhile no forward movement was attempted from July 20th to
September 17th, a delay during two precious months of the dry season
which unfortunately gave the enemy also time to rest and reorganize, to
complete his preparations for further resistance to the advance, and to
accumulate supplies at his advanced bases and depôts. It was desired,
however, that General Hannyngton’s new advance should form part of a
much larger scheme; and its timing, so as to ensure co-operation with
another column whose movements will be described in the following
paragraph, imposed perhaps a longer period of inactivity than was
necessary merely for the purpose of refitting.
The Nigerian Brigade, which had arrived in East Africa some months after
the Gold Coast Regiment, had endured unspeakable things during the wet
season of 1916-17 in its camp on the northern bank of the Rufiji. Here
the Brigade had suffered from an insufficiency of supplies and the
difficulties occasioned by a water-logged countryside. Now three
battalions, under General Cunliffe, had been brought round by sea to
Kilwa Kisiwani, and were about to operate as a separate column on the
right of General Hannyngton’s force, at present encamped at Narungombe.
The task of these columns would be to endeavour to drive the enemy
southward into the Lindi area; and meanwhile a large force, of which the
remaining battalion of the Nigerians formed a part, had been landed at
Lindi, and was trying to slip in behind the enemy for the purpose of
helping to encircle him.
Meanwhile, Belgian troops from the Congo were advancing in a
south-easterly direction, with Mahenge as their immediate
objective,—Mahenge being an important place, two hundred miles due west
of Kilwa, on the main road which runs north and south from Songia to
Kilossa on the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika railway. Simultaneously,
General Northey’s force, which had worked through from Northern Rhodesia
and had had a certain amount of fighting in the neighbourhood of Lake
Tanganyika, was advancing, in a north-easterly direction, upon Mpepo, a
place that lies fifty miles south-west of Mahenge. The object of both
these forces, and of a third which was advancing southward with its base
at Dadome on the Dar-es-Salaam railway, was the envelopment or
dislodgment of the German European and native troops which, under the
command of Major von Tafel, were operating in the western part of the
territory, mostly to the south of the Ulanga, which is an upper branch
of the Rufiji River.
The position at Narungombe, which as we have seen is situated on a main
road that runs north and south some thirty miles to the east of the
highway that leads from Kilwa Kivinje to Liwale, was as follows. The
enemy had retired down the former of these roads to Mihambia, which is
distant only twelve miles from Narungombe, and where there are another
set of water-holes; and he had established here his main advanced
position. From the high-road at Mihambia, a footpath leads west to a
place called Kitiia, three miles away, where four tracks meet. One of
these runs for five miles in a westerly direction till a ravine, which
bears the name of Liwinda, is struck; one runs south-east to rejoin the
high-road at Mpingo five miles south of Mihambia, and northward to
Mikikole, which is some five and a half miles off. At Mikikole the Gold
Coast Regiment had an outpost; and from this place footpaths lead, one
north-west to Narungombe; one east to a point on the main road four and
a half miles south of Narungombe, occupied by the company of the 2nd
Battalion of the King’s African Rifles, to which the name of Gregg’s
Post was given; and a third in a south-westerly direction, crossing
Liwinda Ravine, and running on to some water-holes nine miles further
off near the native village of Mbombomya, and thence to Ndessa. This
latter place and Mnitshi on the high-road, some ten miles south of
Mihambia, were at this time the principal advanced bases and supply
depôts of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces in this portion of the territory,
though at neither of them had any fortification been attempted. On a
hill near Mpingo, however, the enemy had established a signal-station.
The country hereabouts is for the most part a wide expanse of undulating
flat, studded with frequent trees, smothered in thick, and often tall
grass, and broken here and there by patches of dense bush. At this
season of the year it was waterless, save for a few ponds spattered very
sparsely over the face of the land. Bush-fires had been raging
intermittently for weeks, and in many places the country was bare and
blackened. Though now and again glades occur among the trees, it is
rarely possible to obtain an extended view in any direction; and though
the vegetation did not impede the movements of troops so completely as
it does in real tropical forest country, the character of the locality
gave great advantages to a force whose main object was to fight a
delaying campaign, and presented proportionate disadvantages to the
force that aimed at enveloping its enemy. The British were further
hampered by their ignorance of the district, and above all by the
scarcity of water. Aeroplanes were being used, and by them bombs were
frequently dropped upon the German camp at Ndessa; but for the most part
the efforts of the airmen illustrated the eternal triumph of hope over
experience. Even when to the landsman’s eye the country appeared to be
fairly open, the whole area, seen from above, was revealed as one
continuous expanse of grass and tree-tops, devoid of all distinguishing
landmarks. It was difficult, in such circumstances, to pick out even
well-known localities, while the detection of small posts established by
the enemy in the bush, and carefully screened from observation, was for
the most part impossible. The infantry patrols had generally to smell
out such danger-points for themselves.
A peculiar feature of this district is the Liwinda Ravine, of which
mention has already been made. It consists of a natural hollow, some two
hundred feet in depth and from four hundred to eight hundred yards in
breadth, which traverses the country for many miles from the north-west
to the south-east. The ground along its edges differs in no way from the
rest of the surrounding areas of bush and orchard-country, except that
it is somewhat more elevated than most of them.
Throughout this district ant-bears abound, and their holes, which are
ubiquitous, are often large enough to admit of the entrance of a man.
* * * * *
On the 21st July, two days after the engagement at Narungombe,
Lieutenant-Colonel Rose rejoined the Regiment and took over the command.
He was accompanied by Captain Hornby, who until he had fallen ill had
long filled the post of Adjutant, and by four new officers—Captains
McElligott and Methven, M.C., and Lieutenants Lamont and S. B. Smith—all
of whom were joining the Gold Coast Regiment for the first time. Captain
Hornby resumed his work as Adjutant which, during his absence on sick
leave, had been successively performed by Lieutenant Downer and by
Colour-Sergeant Avenell, both of whom had discharged the difficult
duties assigned to them with marked success.
On the 22nd July the Regiment was for the first time supplied with Lewis
guns, and the work of training teams for them was forthwith put in hand.
On the 28th July, Captains Briscoe, Hartland and Brady, and Lieutenants
Baillie, Willoughby and Maxwell joined the Regiment with reinforcements
consisting of 354 rank and file and 7 machine-gun-carriers from the Gold
Coast. On the 29th July 50 rifles of B Company, under Lieutenant
Baillie, with Colour-Sergeant Campbell, joined the detachment of the 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles at Gregg’s Post; and a
detachment composed of men of B Company, under Captain Methven, was sent
out to occupy an outpost at Mikikole.
During the whole of August the Regiment lay in camp at Narungombe, its
duties being confined to vigorous training, more especially of the new
drafts, and daily patrolling of the roads from the camp and from the
outposts at Mikikole and Gregg’s Post. A few more men rejoined from sick
leave during the month, and on the 31st August the Regiment was more
nearly up to strength than it had been at any time since the very early
days of the campaign. There were present 29 officers, including 2
doctors, and 2 officers attached to the transport; 17 British
non-commissioned officers, including 1 non-commissioned officer of the
Royal Army Medical Corps and 4 belonging to the Transport; 7 clerks, 957
rank and file, 133 enlisted gun and ammunition-carriers, 34 servants,
and 1 European and 4 native interpreters—a total of 2130 of all ranks.
* * * * *
On the 7th September orders were sent to Captain Methven to move to
Liwinda Ravine with 70 rifles of B Company, leaving a picket of 1
European and 20 rifles at Kitiia _en route_. His instructions were to
dig for water on his arrival at the Ravine; to take every precaution to
prevent the existence of his camp becoming known to the enemy, and to
make systematic reconnaissances throughout the neighbourhood, including
the roads leading to the fortified enemy post at Mihambia and to
Mnitshi.
Liwinda Ravine was reached without incident, but though pits were sunk
to a depth of 20 feet not a drop of water could be found. The
establishment of a water depôt at this place formed, however, an
essential feature of General Hannyngton’s plan for the advance which he
was about to undertake; and on the 10th September big water-troughs
fashioned of rubber, measuring some 20 feet in length, 3 feet in width,
15 inches in depth, were sent to the Ravine on the heads of carriers.
Water was also conveyed thither in the long tins to which in India the
name of _pakhal_ is given, each of which is a load for two men. Only two
of the troughs reached their destination in a water-tight condition; and
this attempt to establish a water depôt proved a laborious job which
only met with a qualified measure of success.
Meanwhile Captain Methven, with a patrol of twenty men, had gone on a
scouting expedition to the south-east, in order to try to ascertain the
exact position of the enemy’s camp and supply depôt at Mnitshi. This,
and two subsequent patrols in the direction of the main road, undertaken
by Lieutenant Woods, were perilous little reconnaissances penetrating
deep into the country occupied by the enemy, and they were very far from
commending themselves to the native headman, who was impressed to act as
guide. He was an ancient African, very wizened and emaciated, who in
camp sported a soiled Mohammedan robe, to which as a Pagan he had no
right, with an European waistcoat worn buttoned-up outside it. In the
bush he reverted to a dingy loin-cloth wound sparsely about his middle.
His anxiety to preserve his skin intact, amid admittedly adverse
circumstances, altogether outstripped his regard for truth; and when he
had guided Captain Methven to an eminence overlooking Mpingo, he
unhesitatingly declared that place to be Mnitshi, which, as a matter of
fact, lies five miles further to the south along the main road which
leads from Mihambia to Mpingo. This had for him the satisfactory effect
of shortening the distance to be covered by the patrol, and of
proportionately diminishing its dangers; but Captain Methven reported to
Headquarters that he was uncertain how far his guide was to be relied
upon, and expressed doubt as to whether the place identified as Mnitshi
was indeed that enemy supply depot.
On the 13th September Lieutenant Woods took a small patrol through the
bush to a point on the main road south of Mihambia, and on his way back
he came across water-holes near Mbombomya. As Captain Methven considered
it important that a more detailed examination should be made, Lieutenant
Woods returned to these water-holes next day. As he approached them,
however, and when he and his patrol and the ancient guide were in a
patch of grass that was not more than waist-high, the enemy suddenly
appeared from a camp which he had in the interval constructed in a
cup-like hollow on the top of a piece of rising ground overlooking the
water-holes. Shots were forthwith exchanged, and Woods, seeing that his
small party was in a fair way to be surrounded by the enemy, who were at
least one company strong, shouted to his men to disperse and to get back
to their camp as best they might. Meanwhile, he himself very pluckily
ran at top speed and in full view of the enemy, as straight as he could
go for the water-holes and the German camp, secured a good view of both,
and then plunged into a patch of thick bush, in which he succeeded in
eluding his pursuers. He and all his patrol eventually made their way
back to the Ravine, one man and one stretcher-bearer only being missing.
Of the soldier nothing more was heard, but the stretcher-bearer was
picked up many days later, very emaciated and with a bullet-wound in his
leg, having crawled through the bush nearly as far to the south and west
as Ndessa. The ancient African, who had vanished the moment the enemy
appeared, had slipped into an ant-bear’s hole, and had there passed the
night. He returned to the camp in the Ravine on the following morning.
On the 14th September a patrol from Kitiia, which had crept to within
hearing distance of the enemy camp at Mihambia, had a brush with a
hostile patrol as it was returning to its post.
Some native porters, who had deserted from the German Force at the
water-holes, also came into camp, and from them a good deal of more or
less reliable information was obtained by Captain Methven on the subject
of the enemy’s numbers and disposition. From this source it was learned
that Hauptmann Kerr, with 9 Europeans, 200 _Askari_, and 4 machine-guns
had passed through the camp at the water-holes near Mbombomya on the
14th September, from Ndessa, on his way to Mnitshi; that the force at
the water-holes consisted of 5 Europeans and 150 _Askari_ with 2
machine-guns; that there were at that time only 5 enemy companies
encamped at Ndessa; and that the main road and the track to Ndessa had
both been mined. It was also stated by the porters that the enemy were
short of food and that the Europeans were living on rations of rice and
millet.
* * * * *
On the 18th September the main body of the Gold Coast Regiment moved out
of camp at Narungombe, where they had been now for almost exactly two
months, and marched along the footpath to Mikikole, and thence to the
water depôt which Captain Methven had established at Liwinda Ravine. The
men started with full water-bottles, and each carried a little canvas
bag of water of the kind known in India as a _chaqual_, with which,
moreover, every spare carrier was also loaded. The camp at Liwinda
Ravine was reached without incident.
The orders issued to No. 1 Column, to which the Regiment was attached,
were that Mihambia should be attacked on the morning of September 19th
by the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles,
with one and a half companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, the 27th
Mountain Battery and the Stokes Battery. In order to prevent
reinforcements reaching the enemy at Mihambia, a force under Colonel
Rose, consisting of the Headquarters, the Battery, and two companies of
the Gold Coast Regiment, was to proceed on the morning of the attack to
the junction of the track from Ndessa and the water-holes, near
Mbombomya, with that from Mnitshi, at a spot situated about two and a
half miles to the south of the camp at Liwinda Ravine. It was also
intended that while, on the 19th September, No. 1 Column was attacking
the enemy on the Mihambia-Mbombomya-Mnitshi area, No. 2 Column should
take up a position on the right from whence to deliver an attack upon
Ndessa on the morning of September 20th, for the purpose of cutting off
his retreat toward the south, and this operation would be supported by
the reserve of “Hanforce,” as the force under the command of General
Hannyngton was always called.
The Nigerian Brigade, operating further on the right, was to move to
Ruale, a few miles south-west of Ndessa, on the 19th September.
These concerted movements were designed to drive the enemy from his
fortified position at Mihambia, from Mnitshi and from Ndessa, and if
possible across the Mbemkuru River into the arms of the forces thrusting
west, from their base on the sea at Lindi, along the road which leads
thence to Liwale.
CHAPTER IX
THE ADVANCE TO MBOMBOMYA AND BEKA
On the morning of Wednesday, the 19th September, the Gold Coast Regiment
quitted its camp at Liwinda Ravine. At 6 a.m. A Company and half the
Pioneer Company, with which was the 27th Mountain Battery, set out for
Kitiia, under the command of Major Shaw. Kitiia, as has been mentioned,
lies five miles to the east of the camp at Liwinda Ravine, and three
miles to the west of Mihambia, and is connected with both by a footpath
leading through the grass, tree-set scrub, and occasional bush. It was
the function of this little force, as soon as it had obtained touch with
the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles,
which was advancing upon Mihambia along the main road from Gregg’s Post,
to move off the footpath into the high grass and bush, and to endeavour
to fall upon the left flank and rear of the enemy’s position. Major Shaw
also had instructions to send sixty rifles from Kitiia to act
independently, with the German porters’ camp, which was situated to the
south of their fortified position at Mihambia, as its objective.
Major Shaw’s force reached Kitiia without incident, and shortly
afterwards got into touch with the right of the King’s African Rifles.
It then quitted the track, and working its way through the grass and
scrub and between the trees on a compass bearing, advanced toward
Mihambia. In traversing country of this description, where no extended
view in any direction is obtainable, it is always a matter of great
difficulty to strike the exact objective aimed at; and on this occasion,
when Major Shaw arrived in the vicinity of Mihambia, it was to find
himself in front of the enemy’s left, instead of on his flank or to his
rear. A Company and half the Pioneers, however, forthwith attacked, and
the 27th Mountain Battery came into action. Simultaneously, the King’s
African Rifles joined in the attack.
The enemy’s position at Mihambia very generally resembled that which he
had taken up two months earlier at Narungombe. Here, however, the
water-holes were in the valley, and the enemy’s fortifications were
drawn along the crest of the hill which sloped up from them, and lay
astride the main road leading from Narungombe. On his left there rose an
isolated hill which did not appear at this time to be occupied.
The attack was delivered with vigour, and the water-holes passed at once
into the hands of the British. The enemy, moreover, did not make a very
stout resistance; and as he began to fall back, Major Shaw sought
permission to occupy the isolated hill on the right of the attack, of
which mention has already been paid, which commanded the main road. Some
delay occurred before leave to execute this movement could be obtained,
and when at last the occupation of this eminence was attempted, the
enemy was found to be holding it in great strength, and the whole of the
rest of the day was spent in vain attempts to dislodge him. So stout a
resistance did he offer, indeed, that the British advance was definitely
arrested, the troops being forced to dig themselves in, and it was not
until an hour or two before dawn on the 20th September that the enemy
eventually retreated down the main road in a southerly direction.
Meanwhile Colonel Rose, with the remainder of the Gold Coast Regiment,
had marched from the camp in the Liwinda Ravine in a southerly
direction, and had occupied Nambunjo Hill, overlooking the main road
between Mpingo and Mnitshi, and situated some two and a half miles to
the west of it. An hour after the Regiment left Liwinda Ravine
telegraphic communication with Gregg’s Post, and consequently with
Colonel Orr, who was commanding No. 1 Column, was interrupted.
At 8.30 a.m. B Company, which was acting as advance guard, reached a
path leading to Mbombomya, and an officer’s patrol, under Lieutenant
Woods, was sent down this track with orders to lay an ambush, and to
protect the flank and right rear of the Regiment. A second officer’s
patrol, under Lieutenant S. B. Smith, was sent forward with orders to
attempt to surprise the enemy’s signal-station on the hill near Mpingo,
and then to push on south to Mnitshi, five miles further down the main
road. Lieutenant Woods’ patrol came into touch with the enemy within
three-quarters of an hour from the time when he left the main body of
the Regiment. He shortly afterwards reported that the enemy in front of
him were few in numbers, but that they were resisting his advance and
were fighting a series of small rear-guard actions. He was instructed
that his chief duty was to guard the track from Mbombomya, and that he
should dig himself in and endeavour to protect the flank and right rear
of the Regiment.
Meanwhile, at 11 a.m. Major Shaw reported by telegraph that he had got
into touch with the King’s African Rifles at 9.45 a.m., but shortly
afterwards telegraphic communication ceased, and it was subsequently
discovered that the line had been cut and that about a mile of wire had
been removed. The Regiment was now cut off from all communication with
the forces with which it was co-operating. This, however, did not long
continue, and by midday the telegraphic connection with No. 1 Column was
restored.
Nambunjo Hill was reached at 2.45 p.m., and a perimeter camp was
established there.
At 5.15 p.m. word was received from Lieutenant Smith that his attempt to
surprise the signal-station at Mpingo Hill had failed, and that as the
position was too strongly held for his small force to attempt an attack
upon it, he had withdrawn, and was lying up in the bush at a spot
overlooking the main road in the neighbourhood of Mpingo. Already at
2.30 p.m. ninety rifles of B Company, under Captain Methven, had been
sent forward to pick up Lieutenant Smith’s patrol, and to try to get
astride the main road; and at 5 p.m. his party became heavily engaged
with the enemy. Instructions were sent to him to attempt to advance
toward Mihambia, as No. 1 Column reported that they had been held up by
the enemy, posted on the hill already mentioned, and had been compelled
to dig themselves in. Meanwhile, however, Lieutenant Smith’s patrol had
been having a very hot time of it. His position was located by the
enemy, his patrol was almost completely surrounded, and he only
succeeded in extricating it with great difficulty, and joined Captain
Methven, who was then at a spot about a mile and a half south of
Mihambia, at about 5.30 p.m. Any further advance in the direction of
Mihambia was rendered impossible owing to the thickness of the bush and
the rapid approach of darkness. Moreover, like the whole of Colonel
Rose’s command, this detachment had long ago exhausted its supply of
water, and the men were suffering acutely from thirst.
At 6.15 p.m. Lieutenant Woods’ patrol on the Mbombomya road was strongly
attacked by one full company of the enemy with two machine-guns, and was
compelled to fall back, his men, who had been fighting all day, being
also much exhausted for want of water. Captain McElligott, with a
section of I Company, was sent out at once with orders to entrench
themselves astride the track from Mbombomya, and to hold on at all
costs, so as to protect the flank and right rear of the Regiment on
Nambunjo Hill.
The whole of Colonel Rose’s command was now very hard up for rations,
but above all for water, and though supplies of both had been wired for
to No. 1 Column, nothing reached them that night.
At 3 a.m., on the 20th September, Lieutenant Parker left for the camp at
Liwinda Ravine with all the available carriers to fetch rations and
water, which No. 1 Column reported it was dispatching from Mihambia at 5
o’clock that morning. At dawn, too, Captain McElligott sent forward a
patrol from his entrenched position on the track leading to Mbombomya;
an officer’s patrol under Lieutenant Baillie was dispatched to the main
road, with orders to remain under cover, and to watch the movements of
the enemy; and a third patrol was sent out towards Kitiia to try and
establish touch with Major Shaw’s detachment.
Soon after 8 a.m. it was learned that the enemy had evacuated his
trenches at Mihambia, and Colonel Rose was instructed to occupy
Mbombomya as soon as water and rations had reached him, and his force
was once more in a position to advance.
At 8 a.m. also Captain Wray, with a second section of I Company, was
sent to reinforce Captain McElligott and to take over the command of the
post, and at about 9.30 a.m. he became engaged with the enemy. Shortly
before, word was received that No. 1 Column would advance down the main
road from Mihambia at noon for the purpose of occupying Mnitshi; and
Lieutenant Baillie, who had crept to the edge of the road at a point
distant some two miles east of that place, reported that the enemy and
his porters in large numbers were streaming past him from the direction
of Mihambia towards Mpingo. The enemy south of Mihambia, however, was
covering his retreat by fighting a rear-guard action with his
machine-guns.
At 11.20 a.m. rations and water at last reached the Gold Coast Regiment,
but the 350 _chaquals_ sent were only half-full, and this was all the
water available for a force of 1400 men, who had not had a drop beyond
the issue made to them on the night of September 18th before they left
the camp at Liwinda Ravine. The rations supplied contained provisions
for the fighting men only, and left out of the count gun-carriers,
stretcher-bearers and the ammunition column. However, rations were
pooled, a portion of the emergency rations of the Regiment was thrown
into the common stock, and all the men had something to eat and a few
gulps of water to drink, though the ration served out was only half a
pint per man. The thirst from which one and all were suffering was very
acute, and though the men were chewing bits of bark and roots to try to
relieve the dryness that was parching mouths and throats and swollen
tongues, numbers of them fell exhausted on the ground during the
skirmishes fought on this day, and had to be carried in a
semi-unconscious condition out of the firing-line.
As soon as the troops in the camp on Nambunjo Hill had been watered and
fed, three sections of B Company, under Captain Methven, were sent to
reinforce Captain Wray, who was being heavily attacked. His men had been
without water for more than twenty-four hours and were terribly
exhausted, but they none the less put up a stout fight, in the course of
which Captain Wray was severely wounded, and Corporal Issaka Kipalsi
showed great pluck and coolness while in command of a party of bombers.
On the arrival of Captain Methven’s reinforcements the enemy withdrew.
Meanwhile, the advance of No. 1 Column, with which was Major Shaw and
his detachment, had met with considerable resistance, and the position
was reported to be “very serious all round.” A telegram was also
received from the column stating that though rations were being sent
out, it was not possible to dispatch any more water to the camp at
Liwinda Ravine. Later in the day it was learned that No. 1 Column had
succeeded in advancing as far along the road as Mpingo, but that there
was no chance of the water-holes at Mnitshi being captured that day; and
Captain Methven also found it impossible to seize the water-holes near
Mbombomya before dark. No. 1 Column could supply itself with water from
the captured holes at Mihambia, but the position of the Gold Coast
Regiment was rapidly becoming desperate. Officers and men alike were
agonized by thirst, which was intensified by the heat in this dried-up,
arid waste of dust-smothered vegetation, and those of them who had been
fighting and patrolling all day were reduced to a state of pitiable
exhaustion. If a supply of water could not be obtained early on the
morrow a considerable portion of the force would almost inevitably
perish of drought in that weary wilderness.
At 6 a.m. on the 21st September, the Pioneer Company with a supply of
rations and of water left Mpingo and reached the camp at Nambunjo Hill
at 11 a.m., the Battery having simultaneously been sent back to join up
with No. 1 Column. Of the 15 _pakhals_ which the Pioneers had brought
with them six were one-third full only and eight were only half full.
The ration did not amount to half the supply of one hundred and sixty
gallons which had been promised, and though it relieved the immediate
distress in some slight extent, the whole force was still in a pitiable
state of thirst.
As soon as the men had been watered, the Gold Coast Regiment quitted its
camp, and moved out to join Captain Methven’s force on some high ground
north of Mbombomya village; and Captain Methven with B Company then
moved south, cleared the village, and reached the water-holes which lay
one and a half miles to the west of it, occupying both places. The
water-holes at the village itself were all dry, and those beyond were
found, to the intense disappointment of the men, only to contain
sufficient water to supply the needs of one company. Fresh holes were
dug, but the evening of the 21st September found the Regiment almost as
severely racked by thirst as ever, and during the day numbers of the men
had completely collapsed. During the night the Mbombomya water-holes
only yielded a pitiful supply of ten gallons.
The Regiment on the 22nd September had no alternative but to remain
inactive at Mbombomya awaiting water which No. 1 Column reported it had
forwarded to it; but B Company sent out patrols towards Kihindo Juu and
Ndessa, and to the main road between Mnitshi and Marenjende, some ten
miles south of Mihambia. Information was also sent to Colonel Rose that
the Nigerian Brigade had been at a point four and a half miles
west-south-west of Mawerenye—a place some seven miles down the road from
Marenjende—at 9.30 that morning; and that No. 2 Column was at Kitandi to
the east of them, based upon Ndessa Juu for its water supply, The Gold
Coast Regiment was ordered to move upon Ndessa Chini as soon as possible
after it had received the supply of water which had been dispatched to
it, and to reach that place by travelling _viâ_ Marenjende on the main
road.
During the afternoon two officers’ patrols from No. 2 Column came into
the camp of the Gold Coast Regiment at Mbombomya.
Before nightfall some 800 to 1000 gallons of water reached the Gold
Coast Regiment from Mihambia, and the long agony which the men had so
patiently endured was at last sensibly relieved. There is no physical
privation which human beings in the tropics can experience that is in
any way comparable in the intensity of suffering which it occasions to
lack of water. Such a shortage can only occur in the hot weather, at a
season when the atmosphere is so abnormally dry that a man may feel his
very eyebrows lift and stiffen as the last, least drop of moisture is
sucked from out of them. All about lies a parched and arid wilderness,
here and there blackened by bush-fires, where the leafless trees provide
no shade, an environment the very dustiness of which alone occasions an
abnormal sensation of thirst; and the air is charged with ashes and with
minute particles of dust, that seem to penetrate and dry up every pore
of the skin. Perspiration evaporates almost before it has time to form
upon your rough and cracking skin; and your whole body is subjected to a
desiccative process that sets nature clamouring for constant artificial
irrigation. If water be available men swill it in unimaginable
quantities, and repeat the operation at frequent intervals; but if there
be no water, the thought of it—the dream and vision of it—presently
absorb the whole of your mental faculties. You may nail your attention
to other things, may be deeply occupied by work that ordinarily would
engross your whole mind, but throughout, at the back of it all, you are
conscious of an insistent need that dwarfs all other things, and for the
moment is the one agonizing reality. For you now thirst no longer only
with parched mouth, swollen tongue, cracking lips and throat that is dry
as a lime-kiln, for each individual pore is gaping and aching with
drought which every passing minute renders more acute and unendurable.
Such trifles as the discomfort of accumulating dirt which cannot be
washed away hardly affect you; the craving to drink has blotted out all
other physical sensations. You realize that you are treading a road
along which, perilously close ahead, madness lies in ambush.
It says much for the discipline of the men, and for the trust which they
repose in their officers that, during those appalling days between the
morning of the 19th and the afternoon of the 22nd September, none
deserted, straying away from the force on an insane quest for water.
On the 23rd September the Regiment left Mbombomya, and on its arrival at
Ndessa Juu, which place was reached without incident, it learned that
the Nigerian Brigade, which was working its way southward cutting a path
through the bush by means of which its mechanical transport could follow
it, had on the preceding day been very heavily engaged with the enemy at
a place called Bweho Chini, which lies ten miles away from Riale and to
the west of the main road. The Nigerians, it was subsequently
ascertained, had here come into collision with the main German forces,
under von Lettow-Vorbeck, which had attacked their camp in great
strength at about 4.30 p.m., and had continued the assault upon it at
intervals until midnight. The enemy suffered very heavy losses and drew
off just as the Nigerians’ supply of ammunition threatened to give out.
His defeat did much to shatter his _morale_, and though he subsequently
put up some good fights before he crossed the Rovuma River into
Portuguese territory, the severe handling which he received at Bweho
Chini may be said to have definitely started him “on the run.”
At Ndessa Juu large water-holes were found, and the men of the Regiment
were able properly to satisfy their thirst at last. Here also some
Indian troops belonging to “Hanforce” were met, and touch was resumed
with the mechanical transport, which meant that the men and the
carriers, who had been on very short commons ever since the 19th
September, once more received full rations.
On the 24th September, the Regiment left Ndessa at 2 p.m. and reached
Kitandi, where it camped for the night after a three hours’ march. No
trace of the enemy was seen during the day.
On the morrow the Regiment marched to Bweho Chini—the scene of the big
fight which the Nigerians had had with von Lettow-Vorbeck’s main force
on the 22nd September—where junction was effected with No. 1 Column. The
rest of the Regiment, under Major Shaw, however, was not in camp, as it
was holding an outpost some five miles away from Bweho on a track
leading to Beka.
During these two days Lieutenants Bussell and Shaw, Sergeants Campbell
and Payne and 71 rank and file joined the Regiment from the Depôt
Company at Mpara, and Captain Benham, 14 rank and file, and 5 carriers
were evacuated sick.
On the 26th September No. 1 Column marched at dawn, the Gold Coast
Regiment acting as the advanced guard, with Major Shaw’s detachment,
which consisted of A Company, working independently in advance of the
column. The immediate objective was Nahungu, a place which lies on the
main road and on the left bank of the Mbemkuru River, ten miles
south-south-west of Bweho Chini. The enemy were known to have a prepared
position of great strength at this place, which is a point where several
tracks meet and where the main road on both sides is overlooked by
hills.
Major Shaw gained touch with the enemy at 7.30 a.m., and from that time
onward the Germans fought a series of rear-guard actions, their whole
object on this day and during the operations which immediately followed
being, as was afterwards made clear, to cover the retreat of their main
body with their baggage, train of porters, and the numerous wounded whom
they had borne away from the hard-fought field of Bweho Chini.
At 10.30 a.m., B Company, under Captain Methven, was sent to join up
with A Company under Major Shaw, and the latter was instructed to try to
push the enemy rear-guard back upon Nahungu. It was expected that the
Nigerian Brigade would be at Naiku River, some six or seven miles north
of Nahungu.
It presently became evident, however, that Nahungu was too far off for
the column to be able to deliver an attack upon it that day; and the
advance guard received instructions to select a site for a camp early in
the afternoon. Accordingly, No. 1 Column camped at Beka, and the night
passed without incident.
Since the 19th September the Gold Coast Regiment had sustained the
following casualties: Captain Wray severely wounded, Lieutenant Percy
wounded, 8 soldiers killed, 22 wounded, and 1 carrier killed and 3
wounded.
With the arrival at Beka the first phase of the push south which had
been begun on the 19th September may be said to have come to an end, a
new one opening on the 27th September with the projected attack upon the
enemy stronghold at Nahungu. So far, the enemy’s right, against which
No. 1 Column had been operating, had been driven from Mihambia, some
thirteen miles south to the banks of the Mbemkuru River, a few miles
north-west of which his main body had come into such disastrous
collision with the Nigerian Brigade. He had now fallen back up the
valley of the Mbemkuru for a further distance of fourteen miles to
Nahungu, the general line of his retreat being in a south-westerly
direction. Sixty miles to the east of Nahungu was the port of Lindi,
whence a large force under General Beves was fighting its way, through
very hilly and difficult country, along the road leading to von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s headquarters at Massassi, the general line of this
advance being parallel to the enemy’s line of retreat up the valley of
the Mbemkuru River. Massassi itself lay only some five and sixty miles
south of Nahungu, and if it could be captured before the end of the dry
season, the expulsion of the Germans from their East African possessions
would have been practically effected.
CHAPTER X
NAHUNGU AND MITONENO
On the 27th September No. 1 Column broke camp at 5.30 a.m. and continued
its march to Nahungu from the east, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Regiment of the King’s African Rifles forming the advanced guard, with
the Gold Coast Regiment in support. Simultaneously the Nigerians were
advancing upon Nahungu in two columns from the north. Very shortly after
leaving camp, the King’s African Rifles came into contact with the enemy
outposts. The latter fell back, and a ridge situated to the east of
Nahungu was occupied without any serious opposition, by the King’s
African Rifles, by the 27th Mountain Battery, and by the Headquarters
and two companies of the Gold Coast Regiment with the Battery. The main
road here runs east and west through fairly thick trees and underwood,
with the river flowing parallel to it a few hundred yards to the south.
The road ascends from a boulder-strewn hollow until the crest of the
ridge above mentioned, which is in the nature of a long hogsback along
the spine of which the road runs, is reached. It is overlooked on the
north-west by Nahungu Hill, a bush and tree-covered eminence which the
enemy had strongly fortified, and where a gun was now in position; and
it is also commanded from the south-west by Pori Hill, a similar
isolated eminence on the other side of the Mbemkuru to the left front of
the British, upon which another gun was in position. This piece was of
Portuguese manufacture—how obtained no man could say—and its fire proved
completely ineffective. The shrapnel burst in the right spot with
exemplary regularity, but thereafter pattered down through the trees
with less violence than hail, exciting much derision from the men
subjected to this innocuous bombardment. The gun at Nahungu Hill was
more formidable, but it was put out of action by the 27th Mountain
Battery at about 5 p.m.
The King’s African Rifles deployed along the crest of the hill, as soon
as its summit was nearly reached. The position which they took up was
roughly the segment of a circle, with its convex side toward the enemy,
and the road bisecting it at right angles. The Pioneers and I Company of
the Gold Coast Regiment reinforced the firing-line of the King’s African
Rifles, which was extended on both sides of the road; and Colonel Rose,
realizing that his left flank was exposed, posted a section of I Company
with one machine-gun under Captain McElligott, halfway down the hill to
the left rear of the firing-line, and there made them dig themselves in.
He also sent an officer’s patrol furnished by the Pioneer Company, under
Captain Buckby, down to the river to watch the movements of the enemy
from that direction. Meanwhile A Company under Major Shaw, and B Company
under Captain Methven, were held in reserve behind the shelter of the
rising ground, and a few hundred yards to the rear.
The moment the presence of the British was discovered, the enemy guns on
Nahungu and on Pori Hill both opened fire, and though the gun on the
latter did no damage, it was recognized that this hill commanded the
left of the Regiment’s position, and an officer’s patrol under Captain
Buckby, as has been mentioned, was sent to the river at 4 p.m. to watch
any movement that might be made from that direction. At 5 p.m. the
troops on the right got into touch with the Nigerians, but shortly
afterwards touch with them was again lost; and half an hour later the
Pioneer Company joined up with the firing-line of the King’s African
Rifles on the left. About the same time B Company, under Captain
Methven, was brought forward from the reserve and was halted in the
hollow at the base of the rising ground, on the crest of which the
fighting was going on.
Though it was hardly anticipated that B Company would be called upon to
take part in the action, Captain Methven sent out one native
non-commissioned officer’s patrol to supplement Captain Buckby’s patrol
which, earlier in the day, had been dispatched to the river on the south
of the position, and he also established a picket of ten men, under
Colour-Sergeant Naylor, to guard B Company’s left flank. At dusk he went
forward to this picket with ten more men to see how the former was
faring, and to tell them that they would have to remain for the night in
the shallow excavations which they had made. Just as he reached them one
of the men of the picket drew attention to a considerable commotion in
the bush in the direction of the river, and presently an irregular line
of men was seen to be scuttling through the trees and underwood. In the
uncertain light the impression at first formed was that they belonged to
the King’s African Rifles. One of them was carrying a machine-gun on his
shoulder, which he set up with extraordinary quickness, and forthwith
opened fire at Captain Methven, at a range of not more than thirty
yards. He missed him, however, and the men of B Company, who were
squatting down barely a hundred yards away, and who, clumped together as
they were, presented at that moment an absolutely fool-proof target,
were able to fling themselves flat upon the ground and to crawl into a
line, whence they opened a hot fire upon the advancing enemy over the
head of Captain Methven and his picket of twenty men.
Darkness was now falling, and the movement of the enemy presently
developed into a strong attack, the object of which was to outflank the
British left, and to work in to the rear of the positions on the ridge.
In this attempt he very nearly succeeded, and might well have done so
had it not been for the prompt action taken by Major Shaw, who, with A
Company, was a hundred yards or more further down the road than the spot
occupied by B Company. He rapidly deployed the men under his command,
having in the darkness practically to assign his place to each
individual, and he in an incredibly short time joined his line up with
that formed by B Company, thus presenting a united and continuous front
on the British left to the enemy’s determined and well-timed
counter-attack, upon which A and B Companies now poured a heavy and
sustained fire. The section of I Company which, with one machine-gun
under the command of Captain McElligott, had dug themselves in earlier
in the day on what was now the left of the enemy’s line of attack, also
came into action with great effect.
Meanwhile Captain Methven’s picket had been joined by both the patrols
that had been posted near the river, they having contrived to evade the
advancing enemy. The little party, however, had a very hot time of it.
From their rear, B Company was firing over their heads with machine-gun
and rifle. Ahead of them, less than fifty yards away, the enemy was in
considerable force and was busy with rifles and machine-gun; while the
men of the picket, exposed to this double fusillade, and being compelled
to lie as flat as they could to avoid British, no less than German
missiles, threw the bombs, with which some of them were provided, with a
wonderful recklessness that caused many to explode in a manner more
dangerous to their friends than to their opponents. The fire, too, was
very rapid, and its maintenance was essential if the picket were to
avoid being rushed and overwhelmed by the enemy; yet it presently became
evident that the supply of small-arms ammunition in the men’s possession
would speedily become exhausted. No one with the picket, except Captain
Methven, knew precisely where the Headquarters of the Regiment had been
fixed, or could undertake to strike it in the dark; so Captain Methven
decided to attempt to find it himself. It was a really desperate venture
to try to make one’s way through the scrub, with the enemy firing from
in front and B Company blazing away from the rear, but Captain Methven
crawled and crouched and ran, now on his feet, now on all-fours, tearing
his way through the underwood and scratching and bruising himself from
head to foot until, luck befriending him, he contrived to reach
headquarters. Here he procured some boxes of ammunition, and managed to
impress a couple of Mendi carriers, with whom, dragging a box of
ammunition in each hand, he returned to the picket by the perilous route
whereby he had left it. It was a gallant deed dashingly done, and it
saved the picket; and the prompt action taken by Major Shaw, combined
with the pluck and steadiness of the men of B Company, prevented what
might well have been an enemy success of some magnitude. On this
occasion Corporal Bila Busanga especially distinguished himself by his
steadiness and courage, and by the admirable manner in which he kept the
men together. As it was, the attack was beaten off at the end of an
hour; a perimeter camp was formed; and the night passed without further
incident.
Considering the character of the fighting, and the confusion caused at
dusk and in the darkness by the enemy’s attack upon the left flank, the
casualties sustained by the Regiment on this day were light. They
amounted to 1 soldier and 2 carriers killed, 21 men wounded, of whom 1
shortly afterwards died, and 13 carriers wounded.
Patrols sent out at dawn on the 28th September reported that, as usual,
the enemy had retired during the night; and Pori Hill was forthwith
occupied by a patrol of the Gold Coast Regiment under Captain
McElligott, and Nahungu Hill by the 2nd Battalion of the King’s African
Rifles. The rest of No. 1 Column moved forward and occupied the ground
between Nahungu Hill and the river.
Two officers’ patrols of the Gold Coast Regiment were sent out, one
along the road to the west, and one along the north, or left, bank of
the river. The former reported that a gun had been retired by that
route.
[Illustration:
CAPT. G. M. DOWNER. CAPT. S. T. LAMONT, M.C. LIEUT. D. BISSHOPP.
LT.-COL. R. A. DE B. ROSE, C.M.G., D.S.O. \CAPT. E. B. METHVEN,
M.C.
To face p. 140.
]
During the afternoon some officers belonging to the Nigerian Brigade,
with about fifty men of that corps, came across from their camp to the
north to call on the Gold Coast Regiment, they having now joined up with
General Hannyngton’s force. In the mess great cordiality prevailed, and
the incidents of the Nigerians’ big fight at Bweho Chini were discussed
with eager interest; but among the rank and file of the Gold Coast
Regiment this encounter created the greatest excitement and delight.
They had long known by report that a host of “their brothers” from West
Africa were co-operating with them in the fight against the common
enemy; but this was the first time that they had actually seen any of
them in the flesh. Many of the men composing both forces belonged to the
same tribes, spoke the same language, and had innumerable memories and
associations in common. Some may even have been personally known to one
another; and this unexpected meeting in the dreary waste places of
German East Africa with their kinsmen—men of the familiar types of whom
they had seen no representatives for more than fourteen toil-laden
months—held for the homesick men of the Gold Coast Regiment something of
the reassurance and comfort which is felt at the sight of the welcome
face of an old friend and by his warm hand-grip. Moreover, the rank and
file of both corps were comfortably convinced that but for the West
Africans the enemy would have had a comparatively easy time of it.
* * * * *
On the 29th September, A, B, and I Companies, under the command of Major
Goodwin, left camp at 8 a.m., the rest of the Regiment remaining at
Nahungu. This force had instructions to push forward to Mihomo, _viâ_
Kihindi; along the north bank of the Mbemkuru. This river is at Nahungu
about forty yards in width, but now, at the height of the dry season,
the actual stream was greatly shrunken and ran for the most part little
more than two feet deep, though here and there big still pools were
occasionally met with. The banks of the river are covered with fairly
high trees and bush. After the experiences in the waterless waste to the
west of Mihambia, the men of the Regiment had greeted the sight of
running water with enthusiasm, and during the preceding day had revelled
in a bathe, by means of which the accumulated dust and dirt of ten
laborious, parching days were at length scrubbed away.
The function assigned to Major Goodwin’s force was that of backing up
the South African Cavalry, which had last been heard of at Mihomo Chini;
and simultaneously an officer’s patrol of 20 men was sent out along the
southern, or right, bank of the river with instructions to keep in touch
with Major Goodwin if possible.
After advancing about seven and a half miles along the northern bank of
the river, Major Goodwin was held up by an enemy party of about 70
rifles and a machine-gun; and on this being telephoned through by him to
Headquarters, he was instructed to find a suitable position in which to
camp for the night. This he did about half a mile further on. Later in
the afternoon the enemy attacked this camp with about 80 rifles and 2
machine-guns. They were driven off without difficulty, but one man of
the Gold Coast Regiment was killed and two were wounded.
On the morning of the 30th September the remainder of No. 1 Column
marched from Nahungu along the north bank of the river to Major
Goodwin’s camp; and from the latter place, before the arrival of the
column, two officers’ patrols were sent out, one to Kihindi Hill and one
to reconnoitre the crossings over the river in the direction of Mitoneno
on the south bank. These two places are situated nearly opposite one
another, with the river separating them, at a distance of about nine
miles upstream from Nahungu.
When No. 1 Column arrived in camp, the enemy was found to be still in
position on the hills in front of the camp, and the 1st Battalion of the
3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles were sent to attack him. By
nightfall, however, the enemy had not been dislodged.
On the following morning the 1st Battalion of the King’s African Rifles,
supported by the 27th Mountain Battery, renewed its attack on the
enemy’s position in front of the camp, while the rest of No. 1 Column,
which had now been reinforced by the 129th Baluchis and one section of
the 22nd Mountain Battery, attempted a turning movement _viâ_ Kihindi
and Mitoneno. The patrol sent to Kihindi Hill on the preceding day had
left there a small picket of one officer and twelve men.
No. 1 Column marched at 6 a.m., the advance guard being formed of the
Pioneers and I Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, with the Regimental
Headquarters and the Stokes Battery. On reaching the main road, which
here runs to the north of the river and parallel to its course, the
picket at Kihindi Hill, which reported that the night had passed without
incident, was relieved, the relieving party being instructed to remain
on the hill till 5 p.m., at which hour it was to rejoin the column.
On reaching the river, patrols were sent out to scout the high ground on
the southern bank, and when this was reported clear of the enemy, it was
in due course occupied by the Gold Coast Regiment. These movements had
resulted in No. 1 Column having slipped in behind the enemy’s rear,
while his front was still being engaged by the 1st Battalion of the 3rd
King’s African Rifles and No. 27 Mountain Battery. He was not, however,
completely encircled, as a gap still existed toward the south, by means
of which he was able later to extricate himself from the dangers that
threatened him.
At 2.30 p.m. orders were received to push on towards Mitoneno by the
main path running from the east along the south bank of the river, and
the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles were
at the same time ordered to advance by a track leading along the right
bank. As Mitoneno was approached the King’s African Rifles became
engaged with the enemy, and the Pioneer Company of the Gold Coast
Regiment was pushed forward to get into touch with the right of their
line, to achieve which the Pioneers had to cross to the north bank of
the Mbemkuru.
At 4 p.m. it was ascertained that the enemy was in position on the south
bank also, and two sections of I Company, under Captain McElligott, were
sent forward to get abreast of the Pioneer Company and to attempt to
envelope the enemy’s left. At the same time the rest of I Company and A
and B Companies were brought up to be in a position to launch an attack
when the exact disposition of the enemy’s forces were more clearly
known, as, owing to the thick bush, the precise situation remained very
obscure. Half an hour later the rest of I Company, under Captain Dawes,
was sent forward to join up with the detachment under Captain
McElligott, on the right. The 129th Baluchis had in the meantime dug
themselves in to the right rear of the Gold Coast Regiment, and as a
consequence a large gap was left between I Company’s right and the left
flank of the Baluchis.
At 4.40 p.m. Captain Dawes reported that he was heavily engaged; that
the enemy were working round his right flank; and that he required
support. A Company was accordingly sent forward to his assistance, Major
Goodwin assuming the command of the firing-line.
The firing all along the front was now fast and furious, and the reserve
of small-arms ammunition with the Gold Coast first line was accordingly
sent forward, and an urgent message for more was dispatched to the
ammunition-column. It was then ascertained that the latter was a long
way to the rear of the column and that no further supply of ammunition
could be expected for some time to come. This rendered the position one
of considerable anxiety, for the firing continued to be very heavy.
Two sections of B Company, under Lieutenant Woods, were now sent forward
to reinforce and prolong Captain Shaw’s right. A little later a
detachment of the 129th Baluchis, a corps which at that time had been
almost depleted of its officers, were also sent to prolong the right;
but pushing too far forward, and losing their sense of direction after
they had come into contact with the enemy, they passed across the front
of the right extremity of the firing-line, and as a consequence they
suffered a number of unnecessary casualties. About 80 of them, however,
eventually joined B Company on the extreme right, and were later joined
by 40 more men of their regiment. The two remaining sections of B
Company, under Captain Methven, had a little earlier been sent to
reinforce the right, but very soon two sections, under Lieutenant Woods,
had to be sent back to fill a gap between I and A Companies.
The position with regard to small-arms ammunition was now very serious.
The transport-carriers had vanished to a man, and no word could be
gained of the ammunition column. However, 20 boxes of cartridges were
borrowed from the Baluchis by the Gold Coast Regiment and were taken to
the firing-line by the battery carriers—trained men who had stuck to
their duty—under the leadership of Captain Foley. Later, when at last a
supply was received from the long-lost ammunition column, Lieutenant
Baldwin, in charge of the carriers attached to that body, rendered great
service in bringing ammunition up and taking it forward to the
firing-line.
By 5.30 p.m. the Gold Coast Regiment had thrown the whole of its
reserves into the firing-line, and the Pioneer Company, which had been
sent to the left, was urgently recalled, but considerable delay
inevitably occurred before it was able to rejoin the rest of the
Regiment. On the arrival of the Pioneers, just as darkness was falling,
one section was at once sent to reinforce Captain Shaw, the remainder
being held in reserve.
At 6.15 word reached Colonel Rose that the King’s African Rifles on his
left had been withdrawn, and Major Goodwin was accordingly instructed to
draw in his left. The firing had now died down, only occasional shots
being heard. The firing-line was therefore drawn in; a perimeter camp
was formed; and the night passed without incident.
On the 2nd October, scouts sent out reported that the enemy had
retreated; and patrols from the Baluchis and the 2nd Battalion of the
2nd King’s African Rifles were dispatched to the west and the south-west
to try to pick up his spoor. The rest of No. 1 Column closed upon the
camp formed overnight by the Gold Coast Regiment, where it duly dug
itself in.
The casualties sustained by the Gold Coast Regiment in the fighting on
the 1st October amounted to 5 men killed, and 3 Europeans, 50 rank and
file and 10 carriers wounded.
On the 3rd October, the men of the Gold Coast Regiment enjoyed that, to
them, unusual experience—a day of rest. Ever since leaving the camp at
Narungombe, now more than a fortnight earlier, they had been incessantly
on the march or in action, and during that time they had had scant
leisure to devote to matters of even an essential character which merely
concerned their personal comfort. Now at last, during all the hours of
daylight, they were free to do as they chose, and to complete their
well-being the shrunken stream of the Mbemkuru exhibited in the midst of
this thirsty land the rare phenomenon of running water. The day of rest,
therefore was converted into a monster washing-day, the men revelling in
a succession of baths such as had not been enjoyed by any of them for
months, and thereafter, subjecting their clothes and other belongings to
an energetic washing and scrubbing and sun-drying till the whole camp
was one large _dhobi_-green. It was real refreshment after all their
labours and privations, and by evening the men, new-washed, cool and
comfortable once more, were in high spirits and were thoroughly ready to
resume their duties on the morrow.
CHAPTER XI
RUANGWA CHINI TO MNERO MISSION STATION
The operations which have formed the subject of the three preceding
chapters were designed to drive von Lettow-Vorbeck’s main force in a
south-easterly direction, until its progress should be stayed by
“Linforce.” This latter column, in the face of stubborn resistance, and
hampered, too, by the inadequate harbour facilities available at Lindi,
was fighting its way mile by mile down the road which leads from that
place to Massassi, where, as we have seen, von Lettow-Vorbeck had
established his General Headquarters. As must inevitably happen in
fighting of this character, all the British columns engaged occupied the
anomalous, one might almost say the paradoxical, position of attacking
forces which were incessantly and perpetually on the defensive. For them
were combined all the risks of the attack upon prepared and
unreconnoitred positions with all the moral and actual disadvantages
which ordinarily attach to the defence. They were, indeed, only properly
to be described as attacking forces because it was they that were
advancing, the enemy which was retreating before them; but in the daily
conflicts with the enemy, in which they were so constantly entangled,
the actual attack was usually delivered by the latter. It was he, not
the British, who selected the spot where fighting should take place; to
him, not to them, were secured, in practical perpetuity, the advantages
of surprise and of being the first to open fire; and while he could
concentrate all his attention upon the task of hampering, embarrassing
and resisting the advance of his opponents, the commanders of British
columns and units alike were for ever distracted from the actual
fighting by a knowledge of the extreme vulnerability of the formation in
which they were compelled to move, and by the precautions necessary to
protect it, as far as possible, from assaults upon its flanks. In this
rough country, where an advance was only possible along the main roads
or along well-worn paths, each column, with its inevitable train of
pack-animals and loaded carriers, sprawled down the tracks for miles in
the rear of the advancing force, men and beasts alike being often
compelled to go in single file. The pace of such a column is that of the
slowest man in it, for it is essential that straggling should, as far as
possible, be prevented. It is fortunate if the progress made averages a
modest two miles an hour—it will much more often approximate to half
that rate of advance; yet the actual fighting force, which can be spared
from the work of mere protection, cannot abandon the transport and press
on ahead for any great distance without the risk of becoming paralyzed
for lack of supplies and ammunition, or without exposing the long,
snake-like column of unarmed men and terrified animals to an attack that
may work in a few moments its complete disintegration.
The circumvention or outflanking of an enemy in these circumstances and
in such country, and still more the envelopment of him, are for the most
part impossible military feats. Such movements are generally dependent
upon the rapid man[oe]uvring of troops, and upon the enemy being kept in
complete ignorance of the strategy which his opponent is adopting; but
rapidity of movement was the one thing which could not be insured in the
East African bush, save only where a very small body of men was
concerned; and the forces at von Lettow-Vorbeck’s command were
sufficiently numerous to expose any weak unit, temporarily detached from
the main body, to imminent danger of being cut off or overwhelmed. As
for secrecy, that was unattainable in country where the enemy’s scouts
could creep up to within a few yards of a British column without running
any save the most slender risk of being observed, and where, when once
the main roads were quitted, the passage of any large body of men
through the bush inevitably caused an amount of noise and commotion that
was nicely calculated to advertise its presence to even the least
watchful and suspicious of enemies. When to these things are added the
fact that the British attack was always delivered upon an opponent who
was perfectly familiar with the geography of the country in which the
operations were being conducted, and to whom it was a matter of complete
indifference which point of the compass he should select as the
direction of his temporary retreat, the handicaps under which the
British commanders laboured can be to some extent appreciated.
Where possible mechanical transport was used, and this fact alone served
in a great measure to anchor the British columns to the main roads.
Sooner or later, however, there came a time or a place at which it was
no longer possible to depend even mainly upon motor transport, and
thereupon hosts of pack-animals and of head-carriers became the machine
of military supply, and the clamorous, snake-like column thus evolved
wriggled, with incredible slowness and clamour, into the wilderness of
grass and bush. Of the transport mule much has been written, and much
more has been said—most of it being unprintable. As for the East African
carrier, the late Sir Gerald Portal said the last word about him a full
quarter of a century ago. “As an animal of burden,” he wrote, “man is
out and out the worst. He eats more, carries less, is more liable to
sickness, gets over less ground, is more expensive, more troublesome,
and in every way less satisfactory than the meanest four-footed creature
that can be trained, induced, or forced to carry a load.”
The men who took part in the East African campaign are louder than any
in the expression of their admiration for von Lettow-Vorbeck, for the
pluck and grit and resource which he displayed, for his dogged
resolution, and for the fine resistance which he put up, and which may
justly be attributed to his individual energy and force of character.
Members of the British public, who happily for themselves have no
personal experience of bush-fighting, would do well to realize, however,
how heavy was the balance of the military advantages which he throughout
enjoyed, how completely these discounted any that could be derived by
his opponents from mere numerical superiority, and how practically
impossible is the task of rounding up in the bush a well-armed and
elusive enemy, which had been entrusted to the British commanders. It
may even be said that von Lettow-Vorbeck did not really make the most of
his opportunities, and that, given the superiority of his armament, he
played this game of bush-fighting less skilfully and successfully than
it had been played in their time by the Burman and by the Malay. Had he
realized, as the Burmese and the Malays both realized, how small a force
is needed to check and delay the advance of an enemy column through the
bush, and had he thereafter devoted most of his attention to constant
harassing attacks upon the terribly vulnerable transport trains, it
would have been altogether impossible for the British to drive him, in
the course of two dry-weather campaigns, steadily southward from the
country north of the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika Railway to beyond the
Rovuma River into Portuguese territory.
When all the facts above noted are borne in mind, therefore, it ceases
to be in any degree wonderful that von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces—which
from first to last never numbered more than five or six thousand
_Askari_ and perhaps a thousand to fifteen hundred white men—were able
to keep their British pursuers chasing them to and fro and up and down
the jungles of East Africa for nearly four years, with all the grotesque
lack of success with which a dignified middle-aged person runs after his
hat upon a windy day.
On the 4th October the Gold Coast Regiment, rested and refreshed, and
above all clean once more, took the field again.
As far as could be ascertained, the enemy appeared to be holding
positions on the right bank of the Mbemkuru River on the road to Namehi,
approximately four and a half miles to the west of Mitoneno. Patrols
sent out on the preceding day had drawn fire from him from the hills to
the south of the river, and it was General Hannyngton’s intention to
attempt to hold the enemy by a frontal attack delivered by one battalion
drawn from No. 1 Column, while the remainder of that force worked round
his right and sought to possess itself of the hilly country to the
south. The reserve of “Hanforce” was simultaneously to detail a weak
battalion to hold the enemy’s left flank, the rest being held ready in
support. Meanwhile, across the river on the British right, the 25th
Indian Cavalry were to remain at Kihindi, holding themselves in
readiness to move, at fifteen minutes’ notice, in any direction in which
their services might be required.
At dawn on the 4th October No. 1 Column moved out of its camp at
Mitoneno, and speedily found itself in action with the enemy. The Gold
Coast Regiment, however, was in reserve on this day, and so did not take
part in the action. The column fought its way forward for a distance of
four miles, and when, fairly late in the afternoon, the Regiment arrived
at the place where it was proposed that a perimeter camp should be
formed for the night, B Company, under Captain Methven, was sent to hold
a flat-crested hill upon the south, from which the camp was commanded.
At dusk the enemy fired a few shells over the camp, but the night passed
otherwise without incident.
At Ruangwa Chini, which is the name of the place in the neighbourhood of
which No. 1 Column had been held up all day, the road at the spot near
which the camp was being established runs east and west and roughly
parallel to the river, which is distant from it a few hundred yards on
the north—the right of the British advance. On the left the country was
very difficult, the road being overlooked by a succession of red,
laterite hills, for the most part bare of vegetation, though long rank
grass sprouted wherever there was a foothold for its roots. The slopes
of these hills were covered and strewn with outcrops and boulders of the
same red rock, the colour of which is the deep, rich hue that in England
is associated with the coombs and lanes of Devon. The principal feature
was the high hill which, late in the afternoon, B Company of the Gold
Coast Regiment was detailed to occupy in conjunction with the 129th
Baluchis. This hill, of naked red rock, rose in an almost precipitous
slope, from near the southern edge of the road, to a flat summit, barely
fifty yards in breadth, but extending in a position parallel to the
track for perhaps ten times that distance. Its southern and western
slopes, which were both accessible to the enemy, were much less abruptly
graded; but the approach from the east was again very steep. Near the
western extremity of this hill the road curved about its foot in a
south-westerly direction; and in the thickish bush, which lay between
the road and the river on the right front of the British advance, the
enemy had got a gun into position, whence it shelled the head of the
column from a safe distance. Early in the day the Germans had contrived
to shoot down a British aeroplane into the tree-tops in that locality;
but the pilot and the observer both escaped without any serious injury,
and were able to make their way back to No. 1 Column.
When that morning the British were advancing along the road from their
camp at Mitoneno, the 129th Baluchis had scaled the eastern face of the
flat-topped hill above described, and had worked along its summit to a
point near to its western extremity. Here, however, they had come into
contact with an enemy post, which had opened fire upon them with a
machine-gun. The Baluchis had twice retired, but later in the day they
had dug their way from the road to the base of the northern face of the
hill, and thence had climbed the steep ascent to its summit, where they
had dug themselves in in a line of rifle-pits drawn across the flat top
at a point about halfway along its length.
Meanwhile Lieutenant Foster of the 27th Mountain Battery had climbed
with his orderly up the eastern face of the hill, and from there was
engaged in observing for his unit the German fire from the gun posted in
the bush on the right front of the British advance. He presently became
aware that a party of the enemy was working its way up the gentle slope
on the southern side of the hill at a spot to the rear of the place
where the Baluchis were dug in; and Lieutenant Foster and his orderly,
taking cover behind a boulder, opened fire upon the enemy with revolver
and rifle, and for a time actually succeeded in staying or delaying his
advance.
This was the position of affairs when B Company, under Captain Methven,
who had been ordered to dig himself in at a spot near the foot of the
eastern extremity of the hill, in order to guard the left and left rear
of the column, was instructed to quit his entrenchments and go to the
assistance of the Baluchis on the summit. He and his men scaled the
steep eastern face of the hill, which the Baluchis had climbed in the
course of their first advance that morning, and were in time to relieve
Lieutenant Foster and his orderly, who were still maintaining their
plucky lone-hand fight. B Company then worked along the southern edge of
the crest until it had lined up abreast of the Baluchis in their shallow
rifle-pits, and thence pushed forward to the western extremity of the
hill, from whence the enemy was already retiring down the slope leading
to his main position. Here B Company dug itself in for the night, having
effectually relieved the camp from the menace to which the occupation of
this summit by the enemy had exposed it.
In the course of this operation B Company lost 1 private killed, 5
wounded, and 1 machine-gun carrier wounded.
On the 5th October, patrols sent out at dawn came almost immediately
into touch with the enemy, who was estimated to have some five companies
in position at Ruangwa Chini, about two miles to the west—namely, in the
direction of the column’s advance. The 129th Baluchis, the 1st Battalion
of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, and the 2nd Battalion
of the 2nd Regiment of that corps were dispatched to attack the
position, supported by the 27th Mountain Battery and the Kilwa Battery.
This hilly and rocky laterite country was very difficult, however, and
by 3.30 p.m. so little progress had been made that Colonel Orr decided
to break off the attack, and to withdraw the units that had been engaged
in it to the camp which the column had occupied on the preceding
afternoon.
The Gold Coast Regiment was not engaged during the day, but one of its
carriers was wounded by a stray bullet.
On the 6th October, No. 1 Column marched at dawn, working through the
bush in a southerly direction for the purpose of outflanking the right
of the enemy’s position, and of cutting off his retreat, should he
attempt to make use of any of the paths leading toward the south. The
troops in reserve remained in camp to hold the enemy in front, and to be
ready to thrust forward if the flanking movement proved successful. The
27th Cavalry, meanwhile, had instructions to co-operate from the left
bank of the Mbemkuru.
No. 1 Column was able to get into a position well to the rear of that
which the enemy had occupied on the preceding day, but the Germans had
retired from it during the night, leaving only a party of some forty men
to watch and delay the movements of the British troops. On the approach
of the latter this small band dispersed, and a part of it, which had
apparently got “bushed,” consisting of one German and ten _Askari_, was
captured.
No. 1 Column, suffering somewhat from the disillusionment and
disappointment which are the prevailing sentiments that bush-fighting
commonly inspires in a pursuing force, accordingly worked its way
laboriously back to the main road, where it learned that the rest of the
column, which had encountered no resistance, was encamped about two and
a half miles ahead of it.
The check at Ruangwa Chini is, in a measure, typical of military
operations in the bush. By it the enemy had been able to reduce the
advance achieved in the space of three days by a force, greatly its
numerical superior, to a matter of seven or eight miles; and in
accomplishing this he had exposed himself to no inconvenience and to
negligible danger.
On the 7th October No. 1 Column resumed its interrupted march down the
main road, which here runs west, with the river parallel to it upon the
right. The Gold Coast Regiment, less two companies and the battery,
furnished the advance guard. A distance of between eight and nine miles
was traversed during the day, and a camp was taken up for the night near
Kiperele Chini.
The 25th Cavalry were encamped, with one company of the Gold Coast
Regiment, at a spot about a mile and a quarter further down the road.
On the 8th October No. 1 Column marched down the main road, and camped
for the night at Mbemba, which is distant some ten miles from Kiperele
Chini.
From this point the road which No. 1 Column had been following more or
less continuously ever since it started pushing south from Narungombe,
runs on, in a south-westerly direction, still adhering closely to one or
another bank of the river. About ten miles from Mbemba it strikes the
main Liwale-Massassi road, at a place named Mangano, and here the 25th
Cavalry captured large quantities of stores belonging to the Germans.
These stores, however, consisted exclusively of native food-stuffs such
as mealies, the kind of millet locally called _mantana_, cassava and a
little rice—bulky stuff which, since it could not be carried off, was
burned to prevent it again falling into the enemy’s hands.
On the 9th October No. 1 Column left the main road and the banks of the
Mbemkuru River, and turning off to the left along a narrow track, pushed
forward in a south-south-easterly direction to Lihonja, distant from
Mbemba a matter of some seven miles. Here the main Liwale-Massassi road
was struck by the Column for the first time—a really first-class
laterite highway, some twenty to twenty-five feet in width, running
through grass country and open bush, with a surface consolidated by
constant traffic. This road was now followed for a distance of about
nine miles, and the Column camped for the night at a mission station
named Mnero. This is a pretty little station, with mission buildings and
church perched upon a low hill, and with at least a mile square of
well-cultivated land lying around it. The church was subsequently used
by the British as an advance hospital for their sick and wounded.
[Illustration:
GOLD COAST REGIMENT.
Men in marching order.
To face p. 160.
]
During October 9th, as on the two preceding days, the advance of No. 1
Column had been accomplished without incident.
Eight miles down the road from Mnero Mission Station, to the east and
slightly to the south of that place, lies Ruponda, where yet another
large food depôt was known to have been established by the enemy, and
this was now the Column’s immediate objective.
Having quitted the banks of the Mbemkuru, the British troops were once
again dependent upon water-holes, but the country was here less arid
than it had been further north between Narungombe and Nahunga; and at
Mnero itself, and thence all along the line of march eastward and
southward, a sufficient, and at times even an abundant, supply of water
was available either in existing water-holes or to be obtained by
digging.
With the quitting of Mbemkuru Valley and the push to the south upon
which No. 1 Column was now embarked, the second phase of the advance may
be said to have ended and the third phase to have begun.
CHAPTER XII
LUKULEDI
The position at this moment was approximately as follows. After the
taking of Nahungu on the 28th September it had become evident to the
British Command that it was not possible to feed and supply all the
troops assembled in that area, and the Nigerian Brigade was accordingly
given a week’s rations, and with Major Pretorius acting as its guide,
was bidden to march across country, by such tracks as it could find, to
join up with “Linforce” on the Lindi-Massassi road. This was a somewhat
perilous adventure, for, though the Nigerian Brigade carried with them
only a week’s rations, it was anticipated that this cross-country march
would probably occupy a period of at least ten days. The area about to
be traversed, moreover, was very little known, and no exact information
was forthcoming concerning the numbers or the disposition of the enemy’s
troops between the Mbemkuru River and the Lindi-Massassi road. In Major
Pretorius, however, the Nigerians possessed a tower of strength. This
remarkable man, who in peace-time had been a professional
elephant-hunter, not only knew the highways and byways of British and
German East Africa more intimately than any other living soul, but had
established over the native population a species of hypnotic influence.
Though von Lettow-Vorbeck had placed a price upon his head, and though
from time to time some unusually daring person had the hardihood and the
imprudence to attempt to earn it, the gang of native toughs and
scalawags whom he gathered around him and who aided him in his scouting,
regarded him with an almost superstitious reverence and served him with
unshakable fidelity. On this occasion he piloted the Nigerians across
country, by footpaths and through the bush, for a distance of more than
fifty miles as the crow flies, and brought them safely to their
destination, though in the course of their march they had one very
severe encounter with the enemy in which one of their battalions
sustained heavy casualties.
Ever since they began their march inland from Lindi, the troops
composing “Linforce,” with which the Nigerian Brigade had now joined up,
had experienced persistent and very effective resistance from the enemy
in the difficult, hilly country through which the Lindi-Massassi road
runs; and at the time of the arrival of the Nigerians they had only
succeeded in progressing along this highway for a distance of about
thirty miles from their base. The enemy troops opposing them, like those
which were resisting the advance of “Hanforce,” were based upon von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s General Headquarters, which, as we have seen, were
established at Massassi; and to the security of this place the advance
of the converging British columns was now presenting a constantly
increasing menace.
Von Lettow-Vorbeck, at the time of the arrival of No. 1 Column at the
mission station at Mnero, was reported to be at Ruwanga, a spot in the
centre of the base of a roughly isosceles triangle whereof the sides are
formed respectively by the Mbemkuru River and the road from Mbemba to
Ruponda. He was said to be occupying a strongly fortified position, and
to have with him not less than ten companies of troops. The nearest
British force was No. 2 Column of “Hanforce,” which was operating to the
left and east of No. 1 Column; and it was confidently anticipated that
von Lettow-Vorbeck would reinforce Ruponda now that that important food
depôt was threatened by the occupation of Mnero.
On the arrival of No. 1 Column at the last-named place, on the 9th
October, the 25th Cavalry pushed on towards Ruponda, and at 8 p.m. the
Gold Coast Regiment followed in their wake, with orders to support them
and to get as near to Ruponda as might prove to be possible. The rest of
the Column was to march at 2 a.m.
At 1 a.m. on the 10th October the native guides with the Gold Coast
Regiment reported that Ruponda village, which was said to be occupied by
the 8th Schutzen Company, was only a short distance ahead. No trace of
the 25th Cavalry was found, however, and it was supposed that they must
have left the main road and that they must be camping somewhere in the
bush.
At 5 a.m. orders were received by the Gold Coast Regiment to march upon
Ruponda at 5.30 a.m., acting as the advanced guard of the column, and
about the same time touch was at last obtained with the 25th Cavalry,
who reported that Ruponda was occupied by the enemy and was being held
against the column’s advance. This was confirmed shortly afterwards when
the advanced guard of the Regiment was fired upon as it drew near to the
village; and I Company and the Pioneer Company thereupon moved forward
to the attack, the remainder of the Regiment simultaneously making a
flanking movement in order to occupy some high ground on the north-east
of Ruponda.
As the attack developed, however, the Germans were found to be few in
numbers, and while I Company continued to engage them, the rest of the
Regiment pushed round the right flank of the enemy’s position to seize
some high ground and to prevent any possible reinforcements from Ruwanga
joining up with the little force in occupation of Ruponda. This movement
was carried out, no opposition being met with, and as the position was
found to be a good one for defensive purposes, No. 1 Column advanced and
formed a camp upon the high ground which the Gold Coast Regiment had
occupied.
I Company was still engaging a small party of the enemy, and the 129th
Baluchis were sent to the village to clear up the situation. The Germans
then withdrew, and the large stocks of native foodstuffs which had been
accumulated at Ruponda fell, practically undefended, into the hands of
the British. The casualties amounted to one man of I Company killed.
From the 10th to the 16th October inclusive, No. 1 Column remained
encamped at Ruponda, sending out patrols in all directions to
reconnoitre the surrounding country, digging water-holes, and performing
other similar duties. At noon on the 10th October a small party of the
enemy, consisting of about forty men with a machine-gun, sniped the camp
for about half an hour, inflicting a few casualties; and once or twice
the patrols from Ruponda came into touch with enemy scouting parties.
The German correspondence captured at this place showed that the state
of things in the enemy camp was very far from happy. Von
Lettow-Vorbeck appears to have inspired all his subordinates with
fear, but the admiring affection with which he is believed to have
been regarded by his _Askari_ does not seem to have been shared by
many of even the more senior of his European subordinates. As was to
be expected in the circumstances in which the Germans had now so long
been living, food bulked big in their thoughts and in their
imaginations; and as a topic it filled a wholly disproportionate space
in much of the correspondence captured. As the large stocks of native
food-stuffs seized by the British at Nangano and again at Ruponda
clearly showed, the _Askari_ were for the most part well fed and well
cared for; but cassava and maize and millet, which will perfectly
content an African, form a sadly monotonous and unsatisfying diet for
white men who have to make of them their staple for many months on
end. The Germans waxed almost lyrical in their correspondence when at
long intervals fortune sent a pig or some such infrequent luxury their
way; but they devoured them in haste, like the Israelites of old, and
wrote in terms of the most explicit dispraise of the disgusting
greediness, the gross selfishness, and the predatory character of
their Chief. No food was apparently secure when that energetic person
had got wind of its existence. For the rest, the correspondence showed
that all the European rank and file in the German camp were sick unto
death of this protracted and, in their opinion, futile resistance;
that their dread of von Lettow-Vorbeck and of the prompt and exemplary
punishments to which he on occasion resorted, alone chained them to
their duty; and that in spite of their Commander-in-Chief’s great
influence over the _Askari_, the native soldiers, too, were heartily
weary of the war, and had of late been deserting in large numbers.
Every one concerned, except von Lettow-Vorbeck himself, appeared,
indeed, to be ripe for surrender; and it is a wonderful tribute to the
energy, to the force of character, and to the resolution of this man
that, with such sentiments prevailing all around him and growing daily
more and more intense, the campaign was maintained up to the date upon
which, a year later, the Armistice was signed, purely and solely
_because he so willed it_.
* * * * *
On the 16th October the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s
African Rifles, with a detachment of the Pioneers of the Gold Coast
Regiment, left Ruponda and marched down the Massassi road, about
thirteen miles to Chingwea, there to prepare a camp and develop the
water supply in anticipation of the advance of No. 1 Column. No. 2
Column was at this time operating on the left of No. 1 Column, and was
reported to be at a place some ten miles north of Ruwanga; and word was
also received that “Linforce” had advanced down the Lindi-Massassi road
as far as Mtama, which is nearly thirty-three miles from Lindi, and had
expelled the enemy from the former place.
On the 17th October, No. 1 Column, to which a company of the Gold Coast
Regiment, under Major Shaw, acted as advanced guard, left Ruponda and
marched to Chingwea, without incident. On the following morning a start
was made at 5.30 a.m., the mission station at Lukuledi, about twelve
miles further down the road, being the objective on that day.
The Gold Coast Regiment formed the advance-guard on this occasion, B
Company, under Captain Methven, preceding the main body, from which at
the outset it was separated by a distance of about 400 yards. B Company
at this time was not quite 160 strong, including 4 officers—Captain
Methven, and Lieutenants Woods, Baillie and S. B. Smith—and 1 British
non-commissioned officer, Colour-Sergeant Cuneen. It was accomplished by
Captain Gush, a member of the West African Medical Staff. With B Company
there also went the 7th Light Armoured Car Battery, which consisted of
two Rolls-Royce cars, each of which was armed with a machine-gun and was
manned by an officer and two men, all of whom were Europeans. These cars
were surmounted by armour-plated turrets, in which the machine-guns were
placed; and the driver was similarly protected, the only vulnerable spot
being the narrow window through which he looked when driving the car.
The bonnet was also protected by armour, but the wheels, which were
furnished with pneumatic tyres, were exposed to any fire that might be
brought to bear upon the vehicle. At a later date cars of this
description were provided with patent tyres of a special character,
which were not capable of being punctured.
At a point about three miles from the camp the 1st Battalion of the 3rd
Regiment of the King’s African Rifles had overnight established a post,
and from here that Regiment now entered the bush on the right side of
the road. Its instructions were to make a wide sweeping movement to the
west and south in such a manner as to enable it to deliver an attack
upon the mission station at Lukuledi from the rear and right flank of
that position, which should be timed so as to synchronize with the
arrival of the Gold Coast Regiment in front of it.
As soon as the 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles had taken
to the bush, the Gold Coast Regiment continued its march down the road,
B Company being still a few hundred yards ahead. As Captain Methven
advanced, he sent out patrols to the right and left to explore the
numerous paths which here ran criss-cross on both sides of the main
road; and after he had advanced some miles upon his way, he deployed his
company, the two armoured cars keeping, however, to the main road. The
country through which he was passing is for the most part open bush with
low scrub, scattered trees and much grass. All the vegetation was
parched and sun-dried, and there were frequent blackened patches where
the grass had been burned to stubble and where the trees were charred
and leafless.
B Company’s advance proceeded without incident until about eight miles
had been covered and only four more separated the little force from the
mission station on the other side of the dried-up bed of the Lukuledi
River. At this point a small black boy, wearing a blue waist-skirt, was
met sauntering quite unconcernedly down the centre of the road. Though
he was only about twelve years of age, and quite alone, he manifested
neither fear nor excitement at finding himself thus suddenly confronted
by a body of armed men, and he answered the questions addressed to him
with the grave maturity of demeanour that is so often to be observed in
native children, and which sits so quaintly upon them. Captain Methven,
and many of the men of the Company, had picked up a working knowledge of
Swahili during their campaigning in East Africa, so communication with
the child was easy enough, and from him it was learned that there were a
good many Germans and _Askari_ at the mission-station, but that they had
packed up their gear and apparently meditated an early departure. He
added that there was a small enemy post just across the dried-up bed of
the Lukuledi River on the left of the advance. The small boy was passed
back under escort to the Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment, and B
Company resumed its march.
About two miles before the mission station at Lukuledi is reached, the
road breasts a fairly steep ascent, the crest of which is perhaps a mile
and a half from the mission buildings. From the summit of this rise the
road dips in a long slope to the Lukuledi River—a stream some twenty or
thirty feet in width, with low water-worn banks, and at this season of
the year without a drop of moisture anywhere visible in the cracked,
sun-baked mud which composes its bed. At the foot of the hill the road
crosses this river-bed, and bending slightly to the right climbs the
hill on the summit of which the mission station is situated. The surface
of this hill is pitted near its base by a few shallow folds and hollows,
and toward the left of the advance there were patches of shortish grass.
For the rest, however, the vegetation had been burned off and the grass
reduced to blackened stubble not more than an inch or two in length.
On the top of the hill some of the mission buildings were enclosed in a
_boma_—a zariba or stockade constructed of impenetrable thorn
bushes—which blocked the road. To the left rear of this stockade, as
viewed from the front, the road once more emerged from it, and passing a
substantial, two-storeyed dwelling-house built of red locally-burned
bricks, that occupied a position on its left, it ran on two to three
hundred yards to the church, which was built of the same material and
was surmounted by a high spire. Behind the station, the country was
covered by the same open bush, scattered trees, grass and occasional
scrub already described. From the valley of the Lukuledi, which
separated the Mission Hill from the hill whence the road led down to the
river crossing, some fairly high trees rose to a sufficient height for
their tops partially to obscure the depth of the depression in which
they were rooted.
The summit of the hill leading down to the river crossing was very bare,
the grass on each side having been completely burned away, and on
arrival here Captain Methven felt convinced that his little force, which
was now nearly two miles in advance of the rest of the Regiment, must be
clearly visible from the mission station. Owing to the mass of the
tree-tops rising from the river valley, it is doubtful, however, whether
he was right in this conjecture; but as he advanced a solitary shot was
twice fired from the bush upon his left. Believing himself to be under
observation from the mission station, Captain Methven deployed his men
on either side of the road in the sparse bush and grass, in order to
provide them with such cover as was available, and he then began to
descend the hill, the armoured cars moving forward with him, but of
course remaining on the highway. Halfway down the hill the rearmost car
suddenly developed engine trouble, and had to be left behind.
The section of B Company which was under Lieutenant Woods’ command led
the advance, and on reaching the river crossing it found that, though an
enemy post had been established on the far side of it and to his left,
as had been accurately reported by the small boy, it had now been
withdrawn. Woods therefore crossed the river, and proceeded up the road
until the _boma_ was reached. There was no sign of the enemy, and he
accordingly went back down the road and reported to Captain Methven that
he believed the station to be unoccupied, and that he had sent a small
party forward to confirm this fact.
B Company was then deployed along the base of the Mission Hill, the
section on the left wing being under the command of Lieutenant S. B.
Smith, that next to it being under Lieutenant Baillie, while the centre,
with which was the machine-gun, was astride the road, under Captain
Methven and Colour-Sergeant Cuneen, with Lieutenant Woods’ section upon
its right. The formation of the company was thus an irregular
semicircular line, the men being in extended order; and it was thus
that, at about 2.30 p.m., the advance up the hill was begun.
The few shallow folds and hollows in the surface of the hill near its
base had been left behind, and B Company had advanced about a hundred
yards into the wide belt of bare and fire-blackened earth which extended
thence to the edge of the _boma_, when fire was suddenly opened upon it
from machine-guns placed in the bush to the right and left of the
mission station, while from behind the _boma_ there came a tremendous
burst of rifle-fire. The enemy had watched the approach of B Company,
and had held his fire awaiting the psychological moment to attack. Now,
when Captain Methven’s little force had reached a position where no
cover was to be found for a hundred yards or more in any direction, the
Germans suddenly subjected their opponents to a withering
cross-fusillade. Shortly afterwards a party of the enemy, about 150
strong, was seen to emerge from behind the mission house to the right
rear of their position, and to run at a double into some long grass with
the evident intention of outflanking the left of the line formed by B
Company.
The position in which Captain Methven’s little force found itself was
desperate, no less; but, as usual, the courage, the discipline and the
steadfastness of the men were beyond praise. Hugging the bare ground as
closely as they might they returned the enemy’s fire; but save the
_boma_, they had no target at which to aim, while the Germans were
firing upon them, as the accuracy of their marksmanship proved, at
ranges which had been carefully ascertained in advance.
Captain Methven brought his machine-gun into action, and Colour-Sergeant
Cuneen, who was working it, was immediately killed. Sergeant-Major Mama
Juma, who took his place, was instantly hit, and though it was now
evident that the enemy had the position of this gun “taped,” as it is
called, and that it was practically certain death for any one to touch
it, the gun-team continued to try to serve it until every man among them
had been killed or wounded. From end to end of the line the casualties
were now very heavy, but retreat was even more dangerous than the
continued occupation of this mercilessly exposed position; and B Company
maintained its ground, and manfully tried to return the enemy’s fire. On
the right, Lieutenant Woods was killed early in the action, but Sergeant
Yessufu Mamprusi at once assumed command of the section, and continued
to direct and steady his men. In the centre, where the casualties were
very heavy, Colour-Sergeant Cuneen had been killed and the whole of the
machine-gun team had been put out of action, while Captain Methven had
been thrice wounded in the same leg—a leg which already bore the scar of
a wound received some months earlier on the western front in France.
The foremost armoured car, contrary to orders, had come right up into
the firing-line, thus presenting a target to the enemy which caused the
men lying to the right and left of it to be subjected to a specially
devastating fire. Both this car and its fellow, which had overcome its
engine troubles, and had crept up the hill, had had their tyres shot to
ribbons; the driver of the leading car had been wounded in the eye,
through the window of his vehicle, and the machine-guns with which they
were armed were quite unable effectively to retaliate upon the enemy.
On the left of Captain Methven, Lieutenant Baillie had been shot through
both feet, and had contrived to drag himself back into an isolated patch
of grass and scrub, in which he was now lying. Further to the left
again, Lieutenant S. B. Smith alone survived unharmed, but though the
grass here afforded a certain amount of cover for his section, his
position was being outflanked and enfiladed by the enemy.
Meanwhile the rest of the Regiment had arrived at the summit of the hill
leading down to the river crossing, and the Pioneer Company was sent
forward to the relief of B Company, with Major Goodwin in command. The
slope was descended, the river-bed was crossed, and the Pioneers took
cover in such hollows in the surface of the hill near its base and right
flank as they could find. It was in one of these hollows that Captain
Methven presently met Major Goodwin, with whom the position was
discussed; but it was evident that B Company, more than a third of whom
were now casualties, could not be withdrawn, and that any attempt to
reinforce their firing-line would only result in a useless sacrifice of
life. All that could be done was for B Company to remain where it was,
and to endure the terrible punishment to which it had been exposed for
more than an hour. The fire continued to be so hot that many of the dead
and wounded in the firing-line were being hit over and over again.
Lieutenant Saunderson was sent forward from the Pioneer Company to take
over the section, at that time being commanded by Sergeant Yessufu
Mamprusi, on the extreme left of the line; and very shortly after his
arrival he attempted and led a desperate charge against the _boma_. His
men loyally followed him, but the feat attempted was impossible of
achievement, and their gallant young leader fell riddled with bullets
within a yard of that impenetrable stockade of thorns. Here his body was
recovered next day, having during the night been partially buried by the
Germans, and several of his section lay dead around him. Sergeant
Yessufu Mamprusi, however, who had himself taken part in the charge, led
the survivors back to their former position, where they remained during
the remainder of the afternoon. This non-commissioned officer, who
throughout showed great coolness and courage, and who continued to
command his men to the very end of the day, was himself wounded in three
places.
Robert de Bedick Saunderson, who here lost his life, was just
six-and-twenty years of age. He had been appointed an Assistant District
Commissioner in the Gold Coast in January, 1915, served in Ashanti for a
few months, and then was attached to the Gold Coast Regiment at Kumasi,
being accounted “one of the lucky ones” by his brother officers, in that
his application to be seconded for military service had been approved.
In April of the following year he returned from leave, and was for a
time employed in the Secretariat at Accra; but when in April, 1917, the
second draft was dispatched from the Gold Coast to reinforce the troops
in East Africa, Mr. Saunderson accompanied it, and was with the
Regiment, except when incapacitated by sickness, until he fell at
Lukuledi in the manner just described.
Meanwhile Lieutenant Foster, of whose lone-hand fight mention has been
made in connection with the action at Ruwanga Chini, had crossed the
river and made his way up the hill to the hollow on the northern slope
of it where Major Goodwin was halted. His business, as usual, was to try
to observe for the 27th Mountain Battery, to which he was attached, and
which had now opened fire from the opposite hill upon the buildings in
the _boma_, and upon the area between the big dwelling-house and the
church. Here he learned from Captain Methven of the position in which
Lieutenant Baillie was lying in a little patch of bush to the right rear
of his section, most of whom were now casualties. To reach this spot
about one hundred yards of burned stubble, in which not a square inch of
cover was anywhere obtainable, had to be crossed. This area, throughout
the afternoon, had been swept by the enemy’s rifles and machine-guns,
which had the range to a nicety. Lieutenant Foster was warned by Captain
Methven that it was almost certain death to attempt to reach Lieutenant
Baillie, but this information had no deterrent effect, and Lieutenant
Foster not only went out, but actually succeeded in bringing Lieutenant
Baillie safely back to the dressing-station without either of them being
hit. In any other war this gallant exploit would have won, as it surely
merited, the Victoria Cross. As it was, the Military Cross was awarded
to Lieutenant Foster for this signal act of heroism. Captain Gush, while
dressing Lieutenant Baillie’s wounds, was himself shot through the arm.
The remainder of the Gold Coast Regiment had now moved down the hill,
and had dug itself in at a spot on the slope above the river crossing;
while the rest of No. 1 Column had halted on the crest whence, as has
been noted, the 27th Mountain Battery had come into action. How far
their fire was effective could not be ascertained, but it afforded the
only relief that was to come to B Company during this trying afternoon,
and about this time the enemy’s fire showed signs of slackening.
From the position which the Regiment had taken up Major Shaw was sent
with three sections of I Company to occupy some high ground on the east
and south-east, and to gain touch with Major Goodwin and the Pioneers. I
Company was at that time the only company in reserve, and the left and
right flanks of the Regiment were therefore very much exposed. No
information could be gathered as to the whereabouts of the 1st Battalion
of the 3rd King’s African Rifles, and the orders issued to Major Shaw
were therefore cancelled, the left flank of the Regiment being made
secure by posting A Company and three sections of I Company there to
guard it.
This movement had hardly been completed before the enemy delivered a
vigorous counter-attack upon the left of the Regiment’s position. It was
carried out with great determination, but it was beaten off without
difficulty by Major Shaw, and as the _Askari_ exposed themselves much
more recklessly than usual, it was thought that considerable losses were
inflicted upon the enemy. Such beliefs were, however, throughout this
campaign, for the most part mere matters of speculation and conjecture,
for the enemy attached great importance to the removal of his dead and
wounded, and generally left as little trace as possible of any
misfortune that might have befallen him.
Toward dusk the enemy fire died down, and as soon as darkness had fallen
the Pioneers, the two armoured cars, and all that was left of B Company
were withdrawn from the position on the hill, which the latter had
occupied for nearly four hours, and fell back to the slope across the
river upon which the rest of the Gold Coast Regiment lay entrenched. The
remainder of No. 1 Column lay encamped on the road about a mile further
to the rear.
The casualties sustained on that afternoon were Lieutenants Woods and
Saunderson and Colour-Sergeant Cuneen killed, and Captains Methven and
Gush and Lieutenant Baillie wounded, while 10 of the rank and file were
killed and 25 were wounded, and of the gun-carriers 2 were killed and 7
wounded—in all 15 killed and 35 wounded, many of the latter being hit
more than once. The total casualties thus numbered 50 out of a total of
about 160 men actually engaged. The enemy had set their trap with
cunning and dexterity. It was one in which, given the circumstances of
the advance, it was not possible for B Company to avoid being caught. A
detachment of the King’s African Rifles succeeded in reaching the
neighbourhood of the church during the afternoon, but the place was at
that time being shelled by the 27th Battery so heavily that a withdrawal
was considered necessary.
Captain Methven, who had already earned a Military Cross on the Western
Front, was awarded a bar to that decoration for the gallant service he
had rendered from the time he occupied Liwinda Ravine on the 9th August
to the 18th October, when he was repeatedly but happily not fatally
wounded, in that death-trap on the Mission Hill at Lukuledi.
CHAPTER XIII
EXPULSION OF VON LETTOW-VORBECK FROM
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
On the 19th October patrols sent out at dawn reported that the enemy had
retired. The 1st Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African
Rifles accordingly occupied the mission _boma_ and the church, while the
remainder of No. 1 Column camped on the crest of the hill to the north,
overlooking the valley of the Lukuledi, from which on the preceding day
Captain Methven had caught his first view of the mission buildings.
Before this move was made, I Company of the Gold Coast Regiment was
dispatched to occupy a ridge to the north-east of the camp in which the
Regiment had passed the night; and from here a strong officer’s patrol
was sent out along the road which runs in an easterly direction from
Lukuledi to Chikukwe. At 3 p.m. a detachment of the 1st Battalion of the
3rd King’s African Rifles took over this post from I Company; and at 6
p.m. the patrol along the Chikukwe road returned and reported that it
had obtained touch with the enemy at a point about four miles down the
road.
During the day the Battery rejoined the Gold Coast Regiment, and the
129th Baluchis rejoined No. 1 Column.
On the 20th October the enemy delivered an attack in force upon the 1st
Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, who were in
occupation of the Mission Hill. This attack was the result of certain
rapid movements that von Lettow-Vorbeck had made during the past few
days, which are of sufficient importance to warrant some detailed
description.
As we have seen, he had last been heard of at Ruwanga, a point some
sixteen miles north-east of Ruponda; and on the arrival of No. 1 Column
at the Mission Station of Mnero, it had been confidently anticipated
that he would take energetic steps to defend his food depôts at Ruponda.
Instead, leaving perhaps three companies with six machine-guns to resist
the British advance at Lukuledi, he marched rapidly eastward, and joined
forces with the troops which were opposing “Linforce” near Mtama, on the
Lindi-Massassi road. He here fought two severely contested actions with
“Linforce,” at Njengao and at Mahiwa, which places are only two or three
miles apart, the former being about four miles further down the Linda
road than Mtama. The brunt in both these engagements was borne by the
Nigerians and by General O’Grady’s Brigade, which was mainly composed of
battalions of the King’s African Rifles, who succeeded in inflicting
unusually heavy losses on von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces, but themselves
suffered even more serious casualties. It was estimated at the time,
that the enemy lost 800 men killed and wounded, and that the British
loss was approximately 2000.
Satisfied that he had now done enough temporarily to paralyse the
advance of “Linforce,” von Lettow-Vorbeck forthwith set off post-haste
down the main road in the direction of Massassi, taking with him four of
the companies which had been in action with the Nigerians both at
Njengao and at Mahiwa. Pushing on very rapidly to Chigugu, he left two
companies there, and picked up three fresh ones which had been in action
at Lukuledi on the 18th October.
His plan was to approach the last-named place from the south with the
men under his command, advancing from the direction of Massassi, while
the two companies which he had left at Chigugu simultaneously attacked
the left flank of the British from the east. These concerted movements
were timed to be executed on the morning of the 20th October.
On that day the 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles,
supported by the 25th Cavalry, had orders to advance toward Massassi,
and it had actually set forth upon its march when it suddenly found
itself confronted by von Lettow-Vorbeck’s five companies, with which
were two guns. The King’s African Rifles took up a position south of the
church, which completely dominated the German attack, and though the
bulk of the 25th Cavalry failed to support them, they, in the fight
which ensued, not only inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy but caused
him to abandon two of his machine-guns, and took from him also a number
of prisoners.
It is worth noting that during the British attack upon the Mission Hill
at Lukuledi, on the 18th October, care had been exercised to avoid
shelling the church. Von Lettow-Vorbeck’s gunners were hampered by no
corresponding scruples, and one of their first acts was to bring the
tall spire down with a crash.
Meanwhile the two German companies left by von Lettow-Vorbeck at Chigugu
had made their way across to a spot north of the main camp and a mile or
so up the road, where the 25th Cavalry had their encampment. They found
it practically undefended, and they in a few moments reduced it to a
woeful state of chaos. The horses left in it were slaughtered, stores
and equipment were destroyed, and everything which was spoilable was
completely ruined.
The 129th Baluchis had been sent forward to support the 1st Battalion of
the 3rd King’s African Rifles on the Mission Hill, and the camp was
taken over by the Gold Coast Regiment with the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
King’s African Rifles in reserve. The enemy force which had demolished
the camp of the 25th Cavalry, twice attempted to attack during the day,
but on both occasions were beaten off without difficulty. That was all
that these two companies were able to achieve, and von Lettow-Vorbeck’s
main attack having met with no success, the Germans drew off, probably
in the direction of Massassi. The enemy’s troops had been worked with
merciless severity during the past few days. They had fought two severe
actions on the Lindi road, and thereafter had covered by dint of forced
marches a distance of not less than fifty miles. Without rest or
refreshment they had then been launched upon an attack against Lukuledi,
where they had encountered very effective resistance from the 1st
Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles. The prisoners captured were
pitifully exhausted; and there can be little doubt that von
Lettow-Vorbeck on this occasion subjected his willing troops to a strain
beyond their strength.
In these circumstances it is all the more regrettable that at this
moment orders were received by No. 1 Column to fall back on Ruponda.
This order was dictated not by choice but by necessity. “Hanforce” was
still based for its supplies upon Kilwa Kisiwani, which was distant from
Ruponda by road very nearly one hundred and fifty miles. It had been
hoped that by this time the provisioning of the columns might be
supplemented by supplies landed at Lindi, which is only seventy odd
miles from Lukuledi; but the very stout resistance which “Linforce” had
encountered had prevented it from advancing westward from its base for
much more than half that distance. Already, after the fight at Nahungu,
difficulties of supply and transport had compelled the British Command
to detach the Nigerian Brigade from the troops thrusting south from the
Kilwa area, and had caused it to transfer itself to “Linforce.” Now,
once again, the ever-lengthening lines of communication behind
“Hanforce” had imposed upon the machinery of transport a strain which
threatened it with a serious break-down. There was no alternative,
therefore, but temporarily to shorten those lines, and though it was
realized that the moral effect which a retirement would produce at this
juncture could not but be deplorable, orders were issued for the column
to fall back.
Accordingly, at 8.30 p.m. on the 22nd October, No. 1 Column began its
march back to Ruponda. To the Gold Coast Regiment which, during the
advance, had so often acted as advanced guard, the position of
rear-guard was now assigned, and it was not till 3 a.m., after the last
of the long train of laden men and animals had finally crawled out of
camp, that the Regiment, too, set forth upon the road. All fires were
left burning, and everything was done to prevent the enemy from
detecting the movement which was in progress. Chingwea, twelve miles up
the road, was reached without incident, and at 3.30 p.m. the retirement
to Ruponda was continued. Ruponda was reached by the Gold Coast Regiment
and the perimeter of the camp was taken over by it at 9.40 a.m. on the
23rd October.
From this date until the 7th November the Gold Coast Regiment remained
in the standing camp which had now been formed at Ruponda, furnishing
patrols which kept in touch with No. 2 Column to the east, drilling the
men for three hours daily, and training gun-teams for the Stokes Battery
with which it had now been provided.
On the 7th November No. 1 Column resumed operations in the
Chigugu-Lukuledi area, and marched without incident to Chingwea. Here it
learned that “Linforce,” which was still fighting its way down the
Lindi-Massassi road, had the day before been in action against eight of
von Lettow-Vorbeck’s companies, and that after the engagement the enemy
had retired in the direction of Nangus, which is on the main road at a
spot about twenty miles east by north of Lukuledi, and about the same
distance north-east of Massassi.
On the 8th November No. 1 Column marched to Igumi on the left bank of
the Lukuledi River, seven miles below the mission station; and on the
following day, it pushed on to Chigugu, on the main Lindi-Massassi road.
This place is distant only about ten miles south-west of Nangus, where
von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were reported to be encamped.
Meanwhile No. 2 Column had crossed the rear of No. 1 Column and had
occupied Lukuledi, whence it made a strong reconnaissance to Ndomondo on
the Lukuledi River, two and a half miles up-stream from Igumi. None of
these movements met with any opposition from the enemy.
On the 10th November, No. 1 Column pushed on east by south to the
mission station at Ndanda, and a high ridge on the south of this place
was occupied by the 129th Baluchis and the 55th Rifles, which had now
joined the Column. Only slight opposition was met with and four
Europeans were captured, and an enemy hospital was found containing 54
sick and wounded German combatants, and 120 _Askari_. There were also at
this place a number of civilians and several European women and
children.
The 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles occupied the village,
and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles took up a
position on the road leading from Ndanda to Nangus. The rest of No. 1
Column encamped at the mission station. Word was here received that
“Linforce” was only three miles to the east of Nangus, and that No. 2
Column had occupied Chigugu, where No. 1 Column had spent the preceding
night. Thence they had advanced toward the mission station at Jumbe
Nwinama, which lies about two and a half miles to the east, where they
had come into collision with the enemy.
It looked at the moment as though von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were at
last in a fair way to be surrounded, and it was anticipated that his
main body would try to escape _viâ_ Chiwata, leaving strong rear-guards
to keep both “Linforce” and “Hanforce” in play, and to delay their
advance.
On the 11th November No. 1 Column remained encamped at Ndanda Mission
Station, two strong patrols being sent out; the one toward Nangus and
the other toward Chiwata. The latter was undertaken by B Company of the
Gold Coast Regiment, which went some miles down the track without seeing
any traces of the enemy.
On the 12th November No. 1 Column marched back to Chigugu, its objective
being Mwiti, which is situated on the right bank of the river of that
name—a tributary of the Rovuma—and lies fourteen miles due east of
Massassi and about half that distance almost due south of Chiwata.
Moving from Chigugu to Chikukwe on the 13th November, No. 1 Column
attacked and occupied Mwiti on the 14th November. The Gold Coast
Regiment, however, was in reserve upon this day and took no part in the
action beyond sending a patrol, furnished by I Company, to occupy a
ridge on the right of the advance of the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd
Regiment of the King’s African Rifles. This was achieved without
opposition from the enemy.
The country in which “Hanforce” was now operating consisted of a
succession of hills which rise from the plain to the height of anything
from 1000 to 2000 feet, and are grouped about the western and southern
flanks of the great Makonde plateau. The latter, which towers above the
highest of its foothills by a good 1000 feet or more, is an elevated
piece of flat land, roughly circular in shape, situated between the
Lukuledi and Rovuma rivers to the north-east of Newala, and measuring
approximately forty miles from north to south and again from east to
west. The slopes of all these hills and those which lead up to the
plateau are covered by grass and trees; and though the latter are
sparsely scattered over the hillsides, they grow more thickly in the
valleys, which seen from above seem to be choked with vegetation. The
foothills are intersected by deep ravines and gorges, and it was through
these that von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were now making their way in the
direction of Newala, the last German base in this part of the country.
Word had been received from the War Office on the 9th November that a
German airship was _en route_ for East Africa, and later it was reported
that it had started, that it intended to effect a landing on the summit
of the Makonde Plateau, and that it might be expected to arrive on the
14th November. This was precisely the sort of spectacular performance,
dear to the German heart, in which the enemy so frequently indulged
during the war, and which usually involved him in expense and risk
altogether disproportionate to the military value that could thereby
conceivably be secured. It was doubtless thought by simple folk in
Berlin that the dramatic arrival of a Zeppelin on the battlefields of
East Africa would fill the native troops fighting against von
Lettow-Vorbeck with awe, terror and despair, and would produce upon them
the demoralizing effect which a belief that the Germans stood possessed
of supernatural powers might be expected to inspire. But the Oriental
and African native of to-day is a thoroughly _blasé_ person who has long
ago outgrown such childish weaknesses. To put the matter colloquially,
he is “fed up” with European inventions, which have almost ceased to
amuse or interest him, and have long ago ceased to excite his wonder,
much less his fear. The arrival of a German Zeppelin at this juncture
would have been welcomed by the men of the Gold Coast Regiment, for
instance, as a bright spot breaking the drab monotony of their days;
while the British airmen, who by now were heartily sick of the practical
inutility of most of the work that they were doing in East Africa, would
have hailed its coming with even greater joy. The Zeppelin is believed
to have actually made a start from Aleppo, or from some other place in
Asia Minor, but if so it was recalled before it had proceeded far upon
its journey. Perhaps von Lettow-Vorbeck, who throughout received
frequent messages from his Government by wireless, and who may
occasionally have been able to communicate with it in his turn, warned
the Great General Staff that an airship could produce no effect,
military or moral, that it was pretty certain to be wrecked, and that,
in a word, the game was not worth the candle.
The mission station at Mwiti, unlike most of its counterparts in East
Africa, has been built upon flat land, shut in toward the north and east
by a semicircular range of hills; and from this place the Pioneer
Company of the Gold Coast Regiment was sent on the 15th November to
patrol to Manyambas, six and a half miles to the south-east, which is
connected with Mwiti by a track skirting the base of the hills. The
Pioneers left half a company at Maruchiras, a place on this track beyond
the Miwale River, a left affluent of the Mwiti, which in its turn is a
left tributary of the Rovuma; for the enemy had now been driven south of
the Mambir, the last river of note in erstwhile German East Africa, and
had been definitely pushed into the valley of the Rovuma, which is the
northern boundary of the Portuguese possessions.
Meanwhile, at 2 p.m., the rest of the Gold Coast Regiment marched out of
camp at Mwiti, and breasting a long slope in an easterly direction,
ascended to the summit of a hill lying immediately under the lee of the
escarpment which, across a deep valley, leads up to the Makonde Plateau.
The latter rising directly to the north of Miwale Hill, the eminence
occupied by the Gold Coast Regiment, soared above it to a height of
perhaps 2000 feet.
The object of this movement was, if possible, to locate a German camp
which was believed to exist at Luchemi, in the ravine between Miwale
Hill and the slope leading up to the plateau; but looking down from this
height, the valley was revealed as a sea of tree-tops and vegetation to
the depths of which the eye could not penetrate. At 6.15 p.m. a camp was
selected on a spur jutting out into the valley. To the east, however,
there rose yet another and a higher spur, connected with that upon which
the camp was pitched by a saddle, the whole covered by grass and trees.
This spur was reported by a patrol from a picket of the 55th Rifles,
which had taken up a position on the northern flank of Miwale Hill prior
to the arrival of the Gold Coast Regiment on its eastern summit, to be
held by the enemy. This rendered the position of the camp somewhat
precarious, and that night no lights or fires were permitted.
Word was received that evening that the Nigerians had occupied Chiwata,
five miles to the north, at one o’clock that afternoon, and that on the
morrow they would operate from that place against the enemy camp at
Luchemi.
At dawn on the 16th November, Captain Briscoe with twenty rifles drawn
from A Company set out from the camp to patrol down into the valley in a
northerly direction; and Captain McElligott started at the same time, in
command of a similar patrol, to reconnoitre the high spur across the
saddle to the east of the camp. Captain Briscoe’s patrol was fired upon
very shortly after he left camp; and a little later a party of the enemy
were seen moving about down in the valley. It was one of the many trials
of the campaign in East Africa that even a glimpse of the folk against
whom they were fighting was very rarely vouchsafed to the attacking
forces. It was the rôle of the former to keep well under cover at all
times, to let their pursuers discover their whereabouts if they could,
and to make them pay as heavy a price as possible for the knowledge so
obtained. The spectacle of a number of German soldiers, visible to the
naked eye, and scuttling about in the valley, accordingly created
considerable excitement, and fire was at once opened upon them with the
Gold Coast Regiment’s machine-guns. There are few feats more difficult,
however, than accurately to find the range of an object situated far
below and aimed at from a considerable height above it. Almost
invariably the fire is not sufficiently depressed, and the bullets fly
well over the target. It may be doubted, therefore, whether on this
occasion much execution was done. The enemy, however, quickly took
cover, and was presently seen to be in action with the 55th Rifles, who
were working up the valley from west to east.
Between eight and nine o’clock in the morning the rest of No. 1 Column
joined the Gold Coast Regiment on Miwale Hill; and the 1st Battalion of
the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles was sent south to work
round the high spur on the east, which was being patrolled by Captain
McElligott and his party.
The latter had reached the spur without encountering any opposition, but
he reported that the northern slopes were occupied by the enemy, and
that patrols sent out by him in that direction had been fired upon. At
1.45 p.m. Captain McElligott, signalling by flag-wagging from the
western slope of the spur, confirmed this report; and in the meantime B
Company had been dispatched to reinforce his patrol. With B Company also
flag-communication was established, and the 55th Rifles and the 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles were sent forward to occupy
the spur.
No sooner had Captain McElligott’s signaller set to work on the western
slope of the spur than the enemy from the bottom of the valley began
shelling the British position with quite extraordinary accuracy. The
first shot was aimed at Captain McElligott’s signaller and scored a
direct hit, blowing the poor fellow to pieces. The shelling which
followed was no less accurate, and the target this time was the crowded
perimeter camp in which No. 1 Column had that morning joined up with the
Gold Coast Regiment. As all the carriers and troops were inside the
perimeter, the position was rendered peculiarly vulnerable, and great
commotion and consternation were caused among the non-combatants by the
extreme precision of the enemy’s aim. As soon, therefore, as the 55th
Rifles and the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles had
established themselves upon the spur to the east, the whole of the
remainder of No. 1 Column moved across to that less dangerous spot,
where another perimeter camp, sheltered this time from the guns in the
valley, was formed. During the night the enemy retired from his
positions on the northern flank of this spur.
It is not thought that any large body of the enemy was present on this
day, but a strong rear-guard—for such it probably was—had been able to
check the British advance, and had succeeded in giving von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s main body the time it needed to escape from a desperate
situation, and to slip away in the direction of Newala.
The casualties sustained by the Gold Coast Regiment on the 16th November
were 1 colour-sergeant, who had been attached to the Gold Coast Regiment
from the South African Infantry, killed, and Captain Dawes and 1
colour-sergeant wounded, 3 soldiers and 1 carrier killed, and 9 soldiers
and 8 carriers wounded.
On the 17th November No. 1 Column moved forward in an easterly direction
to a camp which had been occupied on the preceding night by the 1st
Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles; and the
latter marched east and occupied a big water-hole near Luchemi. On the
following day Luchemi was occupied by No. 1 Column, no resistance being
offered by the enemy; and on the 19th November the column pushed on to
Mkundi, which lies almost due west of the hills upon which Massassi is
situated, and at a distance of perhaps two and a half miles from that
station. It will be remembered that Massassi had been chosen by von
Lettow-Vorbeck, after he had been driven across the Rufiji, as his
General Headquarters. He had now, however, abandoned it and was basing
his present operations upon Newala, which is distant only a dozen miles
from the Portuguese frontier on the Rovuma River. It was for Newala that
the enemy’s forces were now believed to be heading; and it was
understood that the troops under von Tafel’s command, who had been
driven in a south-easterly direction by the advance of the Belgians and
of General Northey’s column, had been ordered to join forces with von
Lettow-Vorbeck at this place.
At Mkundi information was received that the Nigerians had captured a
German hospital on the previous day, containing 25 British, 2 Belgian
and 5 Portuguese officers prisoners, and 250 German and 700 natives,
most of whom, however, were believed to be carriers, though there were
100 or more _Askari_ among them. Twenty German officers and 242
_Askari_, and 4 European and 10 native non-combatants had also
surrendered on this day. Von Lettow-Vorbeck, with the Governor of German
East Africa—Herr Schnee—were believed to have with them some 800 to 1200
men, and to be about to quit the erstwhile German colony and to cross
over into Portuguese territory.
On the evening of the 19th November the disposition of the British
forces operating in this area was approximately as follows. No. 2 Column
had reached Nairombo on the left bank of the Mwiti River, twelve miles
south of Chiwata. One battalion of the Nigerians was at Mpoto, on the
main road from Massassi to Newala, and distant about fourteen miles to
the north-west of the latter place. Two Nigerian battalions were at
Manyambas, the village to which the Pioneer Company of the Gold Coast
Regiment had marched from the mission station at Mwiti on the 15th
November; No. 3 Column was halting further north with orders not to
advance for the present; and the 25th Cavalry were near Lulindi,
fourteen miles east of Mpoto.
On the 20th November No. 1 Column marched from Mkundi, in a
south-easterly direction, to Lulindi, a distance of fourteen miles; and
here information was received that Lieutenant Isaacs, who, it will be
remembered, had been captured by the Germans during the fight at Nkessa
in the Uluguru Mountains on the 12th September, 1916, was among the
British officers who had been released by the Nigerians on the 18th
November. During his fourteen months’ captivity Lieutenant Isaacs had
lost about two stone in weight, and had suffered severely from the
shortage of all supplies, by which the Germans themselves had for many
months been acutely pinched. Apart from these inevitable hardships,
however, he and his fellow-European captives appear to have been well
treated. The absence of any British native soldiers among the men
released was, however, of sinister significance.
On the 21st November No. 1 Column advanced with the intention of making
a reconnaissance in force towards Newala for the purpose of attacking
and capturing this the last of the enemy’s strongholds in his African
colonies. The advance was led by the 55th Rifles and the 1st Battalion
of the 3rd King’s African Rifles, the Gold Coast Regiment following in
support. The 55th Rifles, however, occupied Newala without resistance,
and it was there ascertained that von Lettow-Vorbeck, with the remainder
of his war-worn forces and carrying the unhappy Herr Schnee with him,
had early that morning marched south to Nakalala on the northern bank of
the Rovuma, where a number of canoes had been assembled, and intended
thence to cross over into Portuguese territory.
At Newala 126 Germans surrendered to No. 1 Column.
[Illustration:
GOLD COAST REGIMENT.
2·95 Battery.
To face p. 196.
]
CHAPTER XIV
TRANSFER OF THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT
TO PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA
The actual movements and whereabouts of von Lettow-Vorbeck and his
troops were, as usual, still largely a matter of conjecture, but every
base which he had possessed in German East Africa was now in the hands
of the British. He was known to be short of supplies, of food, of
equipment, and of ammunition; the end of the dry season was drawing
near, and the Portuguese were aware that he was approaching the
frontier, and were strongly encamped at Ngomano, on the right bank of
the Rovuma, about fifty miles upstream from the point at which the
German force had crossed the river. The Rovuma is here a fine river,
with a bed of sand and shingle, about half a mile wide from bank to
bank. At this season, however, it was shrunken to such an extent that
the running water measured only a hundred yards or so across, and was
easily fordable at many points. The banks of the Rovuma were low and
water-worn; the country in the vicinity was flat and covered with
vegetation, which owed such fertility as it possessed to annual
extensive inundations. In the rainy season the valley of the Rovuma
would clearly be even more uninhabitable than the basin of the Rufiji
had proved to be in 1916-17.
There were many sanguine people in the British camp who held that with
the expulsion of von Lettow-Vorbeck from the territory that had once
belonged to Germany the campaign in East Africa—which had already,
nearly a year before, been publicly declared to have been practically at
an end—was now at last definitely concluded. Since the first
pronouncement to that effect was made, the enemy, quite unperturbed by
this pious expression of opinion, had kept the field continuously, had
fought a series of vigorous rear-guard actions, among which those at
Njengao and Mahiwa on the Lindi road were of considerable magnitude, and
had incidentally cost the British taxpayer an average of over twelve
millions sterling _per mensem_. Now, even if fighting did not cease, the
campaign, it was thought, could henceforth be conducted upon a much more
modest scale; but most of the men who had fought against von
Lettow-Vorbeck, and who had had opportunities of gauging the resolution,
the determination, the resourcefulness, and, if you will, the dogged
obstinacy of the man, were convinced that he would carry on the fight so
long as he had an _Askari_ to fire a rifle, and a cartridge to be
discharged. It was also regarded as probable that he and von Tafel might
still be able to join forces.
On the night of the 21st November the Gold Coast Regiment, which had not
entered Newala, camped on the road halfway between that place and
Lulindi, and on the following day retraced its steps to the latter. On
the 23rd November, No. 1 Column marched from Lulindi to Luatalla, where
it was joined by the 55th Rifles and the 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s
African Rifles from Newala. Word was here received that von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s column was moving down the right, or Portuguese, bank
of the Rovuma, and it was reported by natives that von Tafel had
recrossed the river to the left bank, and was moving slowly and with
great difficulty through the bush in the neighbourhood of Miesi, which
lies halfway between the Mwiti and Bangalla rivers, both of which are
left tributaries of the Rovuma. No. 1 Column was ordered to proceed to
the mouth of the Bangalla River, by forced marches, for the purpose of
trying to cut off von Tafel, and of preventing him from effecting a
junction with von Lettow-Vorbeck. The Cavalry was to move in advance of
No. 1 Column, and No. 2 Column was simultaneously to march down the
Bangalla River from the north.
At 4 p.m. on the 24th November, therefore, No. 1 Column, with the Gold
Coast Regiment leading the advance, set out for the mouth of the
Bangalla, and at midnight bivouacked in column of route along the
roadside. At 5.30 a.m. on the 25th November, the march was resumed, and
the junction of the Bangalla with the Rovuma was reached at 10.30 a.m.
During the march a solitary bull buffalo, outraged by this intrusion
upon his privacy, savagely charged the column, went through it like a
clown through a paper hoop, knocking over two carriers, and so vanished
into the bush.
During the march a distance of 24 miles was covered, and it was
calculated that since leaving Ruponda, nine days earlier, the main body
of No. 1 Column had marched no less than 174 miles—an average of over 19
miles _per diem_—while many of the units composing it, of which the Gold
Coast Regiment was one, had materially exceeded that average. This would
have been a sufficiently fine performance anywhere and in any
circumstances for a body of infantry impeded at every step by a large
number of carriers; but in the East African bush, at the fag-end of the
dry season, when everything is at its dryest and hottest, it represented
a really considerable feat.
On the 26th November, word having been received that an enemy force,
composed of thirty white men and an unknown number of _Askari_, had cut
the Column’s line of communication to the north-east, the 129th Baluchis
were dispatched toward Luatalla for the purpose of dislodging it; and at
9 a.m. the remainder of the column marched from Bangalla to Miesi by the
road which it had followed on the preceding day. On arrival here it was
learned that the 129th Baluchis, who at this time consisted of only
about 130 rifles, had had a sharp engagement with the enemy on the banks
of the Mwiti River, that they had had the worst of the encounter, and
that they had been compelled to retire, leaving a considerable amount of
small-arms ammunition in the hands of the Germans. This, however, was
subsequently recovered, the enemy having had no means of carrying it
away.
The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles were sent to a place
called Jumbe Nambude, with half of A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment,
to form a flank guard to the Column; but at 6 p.m. this half-company
returned to Miesi, having seen nothing of the enemy.
During the night the enemy with whom the 129th Baluchis had come into
collision retired, and communication with Lustalla was restored. Half of
B Company, under Captain McElligott, was sent to patrol the Mbalawala
hills, to the north of Miesi, and thence to send out parties to
reconnoitre to the north and north-west. It was thought that von Tafel’s
camp was near Nambingo, to the west of Miesi, between the Bangalla and
Mwiti rivers.
On the 28th November No. 1 Column marched back to Bangalla, at the
junction of the river of that name with the Rovuma, where the perimeter
camp formed on the 25th November was reoccupied. Here Captain McElligott
with his patrol rejoined the Gold Coast Regiment. Very shortly after the
arrival of the column in camp, a British aviator effected a landing on
the sand and shingle of the Rovuma’s dried-up bed, and when he came up
to the camp it was found that he was Lieutenant Nash, who, in 1913-14,
had been engaged in surveying the line of the projected railway
extension in the Gold Coast from Koforidua to Kumasi. After he had
partaken of such frugal fare as the mess of the Regiment afforded—for at
this time the whole force had for some days been on greatly reduced
rations—Lieutenant Nash resumed his journey, a squad of Gold Coast men
being sent out to give his machine a “push off,” as the sand and shingle
of the river-bed proved to be rather heavy going. Nash flew down the
river for a few miles, and then finding that his stock of petrol was
running short and that his machine must be lightened, he dropped all the
bombs he had with him into the Rovuma. Thus in a double degree the Gold
Coast may claim to have had a special share in the surrender of von
Tafel and his forces; for the explosion of Nash’s bombs led the German
Commander to believe that von Lettow-Vorbeck’s troops were heavily
engaged with the British between him and Newala. He had already learned
that the latter place had been evacuated; his whole force had consumed
practically all its supplies; ammunition was running very short; and now
it seemed that he was separated from von Lettow-Vorbeck on the left bank
of the Rovuma by a British column. This decided him to surrender, and
that afternoon he sent in his Chief Staff Officer and another member of
his staff with a white flag. They were received by a detachment of the
Pioneer Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, and were forthwith conducted
to Colonel Orr, the Column Commander.
The German officers, one of whom spoke English perfectly, stated that
von Tafel had destroyed his last ammunition and buried or burned all his
arms of precision. He asked to be allowed to surrender unconditionally,
and suggested that his force should be marched into the British camp,
and should occupy near it any area that might be chosen for the purpose.
These conditions were approved, and late that afternoon the German
force, consisting of 190 Europeans and about 1,200 _Askari_, with their
carriers and camp-followers, waded across the Rovuma which they had
crossed the preceding evening and came into camp.
The whole movement was carried out with machine-like precision. The
little column marched, as though on parade, to the area which had been
allotted to it for its encampment, in which each company at once took up
the position habitually assigned to it. Baggage having been deposited in
a most orderly fashion, the men of each company instantly set to work to
construct bush-huts for their European officers, while the carriers
cleared the grass and underwood with their matchets, and prepared less
elaborate huts for the _Askari_. The work was done with great rapidity,
and on a system which had evidently become so instinctive that each cog
knew to a nicety the precise place which it occupied in the elaborate
mechanism. But what chiefly impressed the British spectators was not
only the discipline and the order, but the almost unbroken silence which
prevailed throughout. Silence in the ranks is easy enough to secure
among men subject to strict military discipline, but no Englishman has
yet learned the secret of imposing a like silence upon a mob of male and
female African carriers. The result was impressive, but it may perhaps
be hoped that the British never will achieve this particular miracle.
Those who know the natives of Africa will agree that it is only to be
wrought by means of methods that have always found greater favour in
Prussia than they are ever likely to secure in Great Britain. The cowed
and silent carrier was the inevitable adjunct to the German _Askari_, an
analysis of whose privileged position has been attempted in an earlier
chapter of this book.
Though von Tafel’s men did not appear to be at all near starvation,
they, and especially the Europeans, had not been full-fed for many days.
In illustration of this it may be mentioned that a Tabora sovereign—the
handsome gold coin, bearing the Prussian arms on the obverse and an
African elephant on the reverse, and with no bevelling to its edge, of
which von Lettow-Vorbeck had caused a few thousand to be coined at
Tabora during the early days of the campaign—was freely offered that
afternoon for a tin of honest bully-beef. No. 1 Column, however, was
itself very hard-up for rations; and on the morrow von Tafel’s men,
under the escort of the 55th Rifles, were sent up the bed of the
Bangalla River to join the Lindi road at a point to the south-west of
Massassi, and thence to march along it to the sea. They were fed by
means of the consignments of rations which were being dispatched from
Lindi for the use of the British columns in the field; and the latter
accordingly, for a space, went shorter of supplies than ever.
* * * * *
On the 29th November, orders were received to break up No. 1 Column. All
the Indian units were directed to proceed to Massassi, and all the
African units—the Gold Coast Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd and
the 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles—to Naurus, where they
were to join up with No. 2 Column. The Indian and African troops were
designated A Column and B Column respectively; and the command of the
latter was entrusted to Colonel Rose, Lieutenant S. B. Smith acting as
his Staff Officer.
B Column started upon its march on the 30th November, and moving _viâ_
Nambere and Maparawe, reached Naurus, without incident, on the 2nd
December.
The strength of the Gold Coast Regiment at this time was as follows.
There were actually present in the field 19 British officers, including
2 doctors and 2 officers attached to the transport; 8 British
non-commissioned officers, of whom 3 belonged to the transport; 850 rank
and file, including 18 signallers and 84 Gold Coast Volunteers, the
majority of the latter being employed as orderlies; 106 gun and
ammunition-carriers; 35 stretcher-bearers, 21 servants, 5 clerks, and
1305 carriers. The potential strength of the Regiment, however, largely
exceeded these figures, for 11 British and 2 British non-commissioned
officers were now available at Mpara, Mingonyo or Lindi, some of whom
had returned from leave, while others were newly posted for service with
the corps; and new drafts having arrived from the Gold Coast, 510 rank
and file and 106 gun and ammunition-carriers were in readiness to join
the Regiment. The total available force, therefore, at this time,
numbered 1360 rank and file and 212 gun and ammunition-carriers, and it
was once again very fairly well officered. The Regiment also possessed,
in addition to its machine-guns, 2 Lewis and 4 Stokes guns.
On the other hand, the quality of the rank and file was not quite up to
the standard of the original force which the Gold Coast had put into the
field in July, 1916. The men at that time composing the Regiment were
seasoned soldiers, all, or nearly all, of whom had recently seen active
service. They were “made” soldiers to a man, and had every one of them
been subjected to a long process of training and discipline. Gaps in
their ranks, after the arrival of the first fully-trained draft which
had joined the Regiment in December, 1916, had been filled, in the first
instance, by hastily collected levies of greatly inferior quality, and
as early as the fight at Nahungu, at the end of September, 1917, it had
not been thought expedient to make use of all of them in the
firing-line. Subsequent drafts were far superior to these, and had also
undergone a more prolonged training, but they, of course, lacked the
experience of the men belonging to the original Expeditionary Force and
of those who formed the first draft of reinforcements. On the whole they
acquitted themselves very well; but the Gold Coast Regiment at the end
of December, 1917, though numerically stronger than it had been at any
period during the whole campaign, was not, perhaps, such a homogeneous
and thoroughly efficient force as it had been on its first arrival in
East Africa.
* * * * *
On the 3rd December, the Pioneer Company of the Gold Coast Regiment,
under Captain Arnold, was sent to Wangoni, on the banks of the Rovuma,
to relieve the 1st Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles, and the
rest of the Regiment was employed during the next few days in
road-making, in cleaning up old camping grounds, and on other fatigues.
On the 5th December a draft consisting of 5 British officers, 2 British
non-commissioned officers, and 401 men, nearly all of whom were new
drafts from the Gold Coast, reached the Regiment from Mpara.
On the 9th December, Colonel Rose, who had been summoned by General Van
der Venter to General Headquarters, which were established at that time
at the mission station at Ndanda, handed over the command to Major
Goodwin, and set off for his destination by motor-car; and it was
announced that the Gold Coast Regiment was about to be sent by sea from
Lindi to Port Amelia in Portuguese East Africa. It also leaked out that
von Lettow-Vorbeck, having reached a point on the left bank of the
Rovuma near Ngomano, had waded across the river, his men having at that
time barely fifty rounds of small-arms ammunition per head, and being to
all intents and purposes at the end of their resources. He had then
surprised the Portuguese camp at Ngomano so effectively that he
succeeded in capturing _inter alia_ a million rounds of small-arms
ammunition, several guns, and a supply of canned European provisions
sufficient to meet the requirements of his force for at least three
months. Having thus secured to himself a new lease of life, he was now
proceeding to make things as unpleasant as possible for the Government
of Portuguese East Africa.
* * * * *
On the 9th December the Gold Coast Regiment marched to Bangalla—not the
place where the river of that name debouches into the Rovuma, but the
spot where that stream is bridged by the road which leads through
Massassi from Makochera, on the Rovuma, to Lindi on the sea. From this
point the Regiment marched up the main road, reached Massassi Mission
Station on the 12th December, picking up at that place a signal section
of Royal Engineers, and pushing on to Chigugu the same day. Marching
distances which varied from nine to sixteen miles daily, the Regiment,
on the 15th December, reached Mahiwa, where General O’Grady’s Column
from Lindi had fought one of its big battles. On the morrow at Mtama,
nine miles further up the road, it was learned that Major Shaw, with
Captains Harris and Watts, and Lieutenants Pike, Smith and Biltcliffe
and 250 men of the Gold Coast Regiment, had already sailed from Lindi
for Port Amelia. On the 17th December Mtua was reached, and Lieutenant
Withers, Colour-Sergeant Thornton, and A Company, with two machine-guns
and their teams, were then dispatched to Lindi by motor-car to embark
for Port Amelia. The authorities were evidently in a hurry, and von
Lettow-Vorbeck was reported already to have two companies of his
_Askari_ within ten hours’ march of Port Amelia.
Next day, the Regiment moved on two miles to Mingoya, where it held
itself in readiness to embark at Arab House, the landing-stage at Lindi,
which lay some six miles further up the road.
Meanwhile Colonel Rose had reported himself to General Van der Venter,
the Commander-in-Chief, and to General Sheppard, the Chief of Staff, at
Ndanda Mission on the Lindi main road. He was here informed that it had
been decided to send a column forthwith to assist the Portuguese at Port
Amelia, where much consternation had been caused by the approach of von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces: that the column would be composed mainly of the
Gold Coast Regiment; and that the command would be entrusted to Colonel
Rose.
The Gold Coast Regiment had now been serving continuously in East Africa
since its arrival at Kilindini on the 26th July, 1916. During the
seventeen months that had thereafter elapsed the Regiment had been
constantly on the march or in action, save when it had been camped, as
for instance at Njimbwe, at Mnasi, at Rumbo or again at Narungombe, in
close proximity to the enemy, with whom its patrols and outposts had
been in almost daily collision. Thanks to the efforts of the Government
of the Gold Coast, and to the highly efficient work performed by
Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, D.S.O., who had assumed command of the
training depôts in that colony, the Regiment had been constantly and
regularly reinforced: but after the remainder of the regular force,
originally left behind in the Gold Coast, had been sent to East Africa,
the quality of some of the drafts had by no means equalled the high
standard at which the Regiment had always hitherto aimed. The Nigerian
Brigade, which had reached East Africa some months after the arrival of
the Gold Coast Regiment, was about to be sent back to Lagos: but the
Gold Coast Regiment, which had enjoyed less than three months’ rest at
Kumasi after the conclusion of the campaign in the Kameruns, was still
to be kept in the field.
It was realized by all, however, that a great compliment to the
Regiment, and a tacit recognition of the fashion in which it had borne
itself, were implied in this selection of it, out of all the available
troops, to undertake yet one more campaign; and if there were some who
thought that the men were being tried almost too severely, the rank and
file accepted the new duties which were about to be imposed upon them
with their usual philosophy and good temper.
CHAPTER XV
THE ADVANCE FROM PORT AMELIA TO MEZA
With the transfer of military operations from German to Portuguese
territory the campaign against von Lettow-Vorbeck assumed a somewhat new
aspect. Until now the German Commander-in-Chief had been operating in
country that had long been subject to German rule, throughout which
German mission stations and German administrative posts had been
established, and where every corner and cranny of each district was
familiarly known to Europeans or natives resident in the German camps.
The enemy troops, moreover, had possessed bases both for military
purposes and for the accumulation of supplies; and so long as this
continued to be the case points existed here and there which it was
important should be maintained as long as possible, and which the
movements of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces were to some extent designed to
defend. With the abandonment of Newala, the last of these permanent
posts had been evacuated, and with it any prisoners of war he had taken
and the German sick and wounded, who had hitherto been under the
treatment of their own doctors, had been suffered to fall into the hands
of the British. Thereafter von Lettow-Vorbeck occupied a position of
complete independence and irresponsibility. He was situated very much as
de Wet and his commando were situated during the concluding months of
the South African War; and his troops had similarly been transformed
from an army in the field into a mobile band of fugitive marauders,
whose only objects were to avoid capture, to cause to their pursuers and
to all connected with them the _maximum_ amount of loss and trouble, and
simultaneously to maintain themselves by seizing any supplies upon
which, from time to time, they could contrive to lay their hands. The
business of the British, on the other hand, was rendered more difficult
than ever. The object to be aimed at was to wear down the enemy’s
forces, to reduce them by gradual attrition, and for this purpose to
bring them to action whenever and wherever this could be achieved. There
were now, however, no important places, such as Newala, to be threatened
by the British advance, and von Lettow-Vorbeck having got rid of all
_impedimenta_, and having no preoccupation save that of maintaining
himself in the field as long as possible, was able to place his
opponents in a very embarrassing position. This he was now about to do,
compelling “Pamforce,” as the Expeditionary Force dispatched to Port
Amelia was officially designated, to extend its lines of communications
from the coast into the interior for any distance that he might elect to
fall back before it; diminishing by this means the strength of the
striking force which it could actually bring against him, since lines of
communications have to be garrisoned and guarded; multiplying with every
additional mile the difficulties surrounding transport and supply; while
he carefully husbanded his own forces, and contented himself with
delaying and harassing the advance by means of small patrols whose
occasional losses could not seriously diminish his military strength.
The estimate formed of the strength of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s troops at
the moment when he evacuated Newala—viz. that they only amounted to
about 800 to 1200 men—was certainly incorrect, and subsequent operations
clearly showed that he had at his disposal not less than 2000 soldiers,
10 per cent. of whom perhaps were white men. These were now nearly as
well armed and equipped as they had ever been; and in von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s able hands they were capable of leading their opponents
as tantalizing a dance through the jungle-covered plains and hills of
tropical East Africa as de Wet had led the British troops across the
veldt to the south some seventeen years earlier.
He in the first instance established his Headquarters at Nanguari, a
place on the right bank of the Lujendi River, which is one of the
principal right affluents of the Rovuma. The Portuguese camp, which von
Lettow-Vorbeck had so successfully surprised, had been pitched at
Ngomano, at the junction of the Lujendi with the Rovuma; and Nanguari,
nearly a hundred miles up the former river, had for von Lettow-Vorbeck
the advantage of being one of the most inaccessible places in the
northern part of Portuguese East Africa. From Nanguari, he dispatched
raiding parties, some of which threatened Port Amelia, while others
penetrated down the coast as far as Nkufi and Lurio, at the mouth of the
Luri River, where they gutted the shops and stores of their stocks of
European provisions. It is possible that the report which was current
with regard to von Lettow-Vorbeck’s intention to attack and sack Port
Amelia may have been true, but if so, this project was abandoned when
word reached him that British forces had landed at that port. He,
however, placed some of his forces astride the road which runs westward
inland from the shores of Pomba Bay, so as to frustrate any attempt that
the British might make to convey troops to the south of him by sea, and
so to slip them in behind him, as they had earlier attempted to do by
landing a force at Lindi while he was still operating actively in the
Kilwa area.
Major Shaw’s detachment of 250 men which, as we have seen, had been
dispatched from Lindi to Port Amelia in the middle of December, had
reached the latter place in time to save it from attack, if an attack
upon it indeed formed part of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s plans. Major Shaw,
however, was not provided with carriers, and none were forthcoming at
Port Amelia. His force, therefore, was reduced to a condition of
complete immobility, and he was forced to content himself with putting
Port Amelia in a state of defence by forming an entrenched camp in its
vicinity.
* * * * *
After the arrival of the Gold Coast Regiment at Mingoya, it was joined
on the 18th December by Captain Harman, D.S.O., who had been absent for
several months on sick leave, with whom were Captain Duck, D.S.O., and
150 details. On the following day, at 3 a.m., A Company marched to Arab
House, and thence was ferried across the bay to Lindi. On the 23rd
December Colonel Goodwin with the Regimental Headquarters and 620 men,
including the Battery, with 4 Stokes guns and 100 _personnel_, marched
to Arab House, where they were embarked in lighters. Captain Harman
remained behind at Mingoya in charge of details. At 2 p.m. the Gold
Coast Regiment was transhipped from the lighters on to H.M. transport
_Salamis_, and immediately set off down the coast on their journey to
Port Amelia, which is distant from Lindi a matter of 180 miles. They had
been joined on board the _Salamis_ by A Company, and by Colonel Rose and
the Headquarters of “Pamforce.”
Shortly after midnight a slight shock was felt, and the _Salamis_ came
to a standstill with that peculiar sensation of finality which always
conveys the impression to those on board a stranded ship that the vessel
has of a sudden been welded indissolubly into a neighbouring continent.
The _Salamis_ thereafter behaved precisely as though this had actually
occurred, and every effort to move her proved to be unavailing. There
was nothing to be done, therefore, but to await the next high tide,
which was due at about 9 a.m.; and at this hour, two whalers having
arrived in the interval, fresh attempts to get her afloat were made. The
_Salamis_ obstinately declined, however, to budge an inch; and late in
the afternoon H.M.S. _Lunkwa_, an armed merchantman commanded by Captain
Murray, R.N., having meanwhile come upon the scene, it was decided to
transfer the Gold Coast Regiment to her. This was accomplished by
midnight, and the members of the little force spent a dismal Christmas
Day steaming back up the coast to Lindi, mourning their separation from
many of their stores and much of their private gear—a great deal of
which, as it subsequently turned out, they were destined never to see
again; and on their arrival they took up their quarters in the crowded
detail camp.
On the 27th December 250 men of the Gold Coast Regiment, with 2 Stokes
guns and the 50 rank and file and the carriers attached to them, under
the command of Captain Duck, returned on board the _Lunkwa_, and once
more set for Port Amelia. For lack of transport the remainder of the
Regiment had perforce to be left behind at Lindi, but Colonel Rose and
the Headquarters of “Pamforce” accompanied Captain Duck’s detachment.
Colonel Goodwin and the Headquarters of the Regiment, with 500 rifles
and 300 carriers of the Sierra Leone Carrier Corps, embarked on H.M.
transport _Hongbee_ on the 5th January, 1918, and followed the two
detachments, under Captain Shaw and Captain Duck, which had preceded
them.
* * * * *
The Portuguese Estado d’Africa Oriental, like Gaul in the time of Julius
Cæsar, is divided into three parts—Lorenço Marquez, Mozambique, and the
territory of the Nyassa Company. The last-named, which is really the
northern portion of Mozambique, comprises all the country situated
between the Rovuma and the Lurio, or Luli, rivers, and between the
eastern borders of British Nyassaland and the sea. It is leased to a
chartered company, which appoints its own Governor, subject to the
approval of some Portuguese authority, and depends for its revenues upon
a poll-tax and a hut-tax. Both of these impositions are for the most
part paid in kind, and they are collected by agents or revenue-farmers,
who occupy the entrenched forts, locally called _bomas_, which are
dotted about the country at fairly frequent intervals. The smaller
fortified posts, similarly occupied by the native agents of the
revenue-farmers, are called _mborio_. The population is comparatively
speaking dense, but there is little trade and even less prosperity. It
is of the territory exploited by this chartered company that Port Amelia
is the capital.
At Port Amelia there is an inlet of the sea, roughly circular in shape,
which measures about six miles across at its widest part, and bears the
name of Pomba Bay. The entrance to this bay is about a mile broad and on
the southern side a cliff, two hundred feet or more in height, juts out,
narrowing the mouth of the inlet. It is at the foot of this cliff that
the commercial portion of Port Amelia and the native town are situated;
and on its summit is the house of the Governor, flanked by the building
in which the officers of the Portuguese Government at once live and
work, with a rather ramshackle set of police barracks facing it. The
landing-place at Port Amelia consists of a short, snub-nosed stone pier,
which leads to a sandy beach, beyond which there is a single line of
rather mean-looking shops and commercial buildings. These are for the
most part constructed of mud, lime-washed or colour-washed, red or blue,
fitted with green shutters and roofed with corrugated iron. Near their
centre, however, there are two fairly substantial houses built of wood,
one of which was subsequently used as a rest-house for British officers
passing through Port Amelia. To the left, as you face the town, the
native quarter adjoins the commercial buildings—a cluster of squalid mud
huts roofed with grass. The total population of the place does not
exceed fifteen hundred souls.
From the lower town a steep motor-road climbs the hill till the summit
of the cliff is reached, where it passes between the Governor’s house
and the police barracks. The former is a two-storeyed building, raised
on piles, with stone or concrete verandah pillars, but for the rest
constructed entirely of wood. The block of Government offices in which
the officials live and work is built of similar materials; but the
police barracks are a mud structure colour-washed a dull red. All these
buildings, like those in the commercial town at the foot of the cliff,
are roofed with corrugated iron.
Judged from the æsthetic standpoint, these tin roofs are always an
abomination; but in the tropics they are peculiarly hateful. They are
most efficient conductors of heat, and with a vertical sun beating down
upon them, they produce in the buildings which they cover an atmosphere
resembling that of an oven. Moreover, exposure to the sea air causes
rapid corrosion, and they speedily cease to be even water-tight. For the
rest, the extensive use of corrugated iron roofing in the tropics always
marks, in a European settlement, a very primitive stage of development.
It proclaims the phase of makeshifts and of temporary expedients—the
period of comfortless picnicking—which must always precede, though it is
not always followed by, an era of advancement and prosperity. Where
corrugated iron roofing is found predominating in any tropical
settlement which has been in European occupation for more than a very
few years, the fact may be accepted as a sure indication that local
enterprise has so far produced very indifferent results.
From the flat ground on the top of the cliff a grassy slope runs down in
a long slope to the waters of the Indian Ocean. Turning one’s back on
this and looking out across the bay, a rather pretty view is obtained of
hills rising inland behind the little fishing village of Bandari, six
miles away. The shores of the bay are stretches of sand varied by
patches of black-green mangroves; and seen from the sea, Port Amelia—a
line of mean white and colour-washed buildings, surmounted by glaring
tin roofs, and flanked by a cluster of native hovels—devoid of
vegetation, and sweltering beneath a tropical sun, appears as
undesirable a specimen of a European outpost as it would be possible
anywhere to light upon.
Major Shaw’s detachment, which had been the first to arrive, had
established a camp on the top of the high ridge, which has the sea on
one side of it and the waters of the bay upon the other, at a spot
distant about a mile from the residence of the Governor.
The motor-road, which ascends to the top of the cliff, runs on, dropping
down again to the level of the bay, through masses of very thick, fine
grass; and by this route Mtuge, which lies about two miles inland from
Bandari, is distant eight and twenty miles from Port Amelia. A quicker
means of reaching this place, however, is to sail across the bay to
Bandari; but here there is a sloping beach and shoal water which prevent
even a rowing-boat being brought close to the shore. The journey to
Bandari was usually accomplished by sailing across the bay in _dhows_,
such as have plied in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and upon the waters
of the Indian Ocean ever since the days of Hippalus and before. When the
wind was favourable this was easy enough, but often, in the sheltered
area of the bay, these sailing-boats would be becalmed for days at a
time, and they still more often had to be warped out from the shore for
several hundreds of yards to a point from whence they could catch enough
breeze to set them moving. This operation was affected by shipping the
anchor and placing it on board a gig, which then rowed ahead of the
_dhow_ and dropped the anchor overboard. Next all hands and the cook
tugged on the anchor-chain, till the _dhow_ had been brought short up to
her moorings, when the anchor was once more shipped, retransferred to
the gig, and the tedious process was repeated. By this means a couple of
hours were sometimes occupied in covering a distance of as many hundred
yards.
When the _dhow_ had at last been got under way, and the six miles of sea
separating Port Amelia from Bandari had been crossed, all her contents
had to be man-handled to the shore for a distance of about two hundred
yards. Between Bandari and Mtuge, whence the main road runs inland in a
westerly direction, there lies a swamp which rendered the two-mile
journey a matter of still further difficulty; and at a later period this
slough became spattered with derelict motor-lorries which had become
engulfed in it past all possibility of salvage. These facts are worth
noting as illustrating some of the initial difficulties which impeded
the transport and supply of “Pamforce”; for Mtuge was destined to be the
base of its operations during its thrust into the interior of the Nyassa
Company’s territory. Mtuge, as we have seen, could also be reached from
Port Amelia by the road which ran round the bay.
Though Port Amelia had been reported to be threatened by von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s marauders, the arrival of the British troops caused no
apparent excitement; but Signor Abilio de Lobao Soeiro, the Governor of
the Nyassa Company’s territory, was very civil and obliging, and on the
day following Colonel Rose’s arrival he placed the Portuguese gunboat
_Chaimite_ at his disposal to transport him and Major Shaw and to tow
three or four _dhows_ containing 250 men of the Gold Coast Regiment
across the bay to Bandari.
Colonel Rose, however, found himself almost as completely paralyzed as
Major Shaw had done, for still no carriers were forthcoming; and though
alarming rumours were current concerning the doings of von
Lettow-Vorbeck’s raiding parties at Mkufi and Lurio, it was only
possible to send an Intelligence Department agent with forty scouts down
the coast to report what was going on. This agent kept in touch with
Colonel Rose by telephone, and the reports which he sent back were very
far from being reassuring; but as a matter of fact the German patrols
sent to loot the coast stores to the south of Port Amelia were never
more than thirty or forty men strong, though they brought with them or
impressed sufficient porters to carry away everything likely to be of
service to them upon which they could lay their hands. This was the
report returned from Mkufi by Captain Harris, who, with a party of
thirty rifles, was sent to that place from Port Amelia to ascertain the
real state of affairs.
The main body of the Gold Coast Regiment reached Port Amelia without
further mishap on the 7th January. It was forthwith disembarked and
marched up the hill to the camp which had been established by Major
Shaw. On the following day A Company, under Captain Wheeler, marched
down the coast road from Port Amelia to Mkufi. Captain Wheeler was
instructed to patrol the country in the neighbourhood of the Magaruna
River and of Chiure, which lies about forty miles inland from Mkufi. He
was also to send patrols south along the coast as far as Lurio and Lurio
Bay. A post consisting of thirty rifles, under Captain Harris, had
already been established at Mkufi before the arrival of the main body of
the Regiment, and it was instructed to remain there with Captain Wheeler
and A Company.
On the 9th January two Stokes guns and the Battery, under Captain
Parker, were sent across the bay to Bandari by _dhows_, and from that
place they joined Major Shaw’s detachment at Mtuge. On the following day
the Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment with I Company and details
left the camp at Port Amelia at 6.30 a.m. _en route_ for Mtuge. They
marched along the motor-road already described, descending to the level
of the bay and thereafter skirting its shores. The grass on either side
of the road was impenetrable, the black loam underfoot made heavy going,
and the heat and the exhausted atmosphere, which in the tropics is
peculiar to a narrow path through grass, rendered the march more than
ordinarily trying. The road itself was much overgrown—symptomatic of the
decay by which Port Amelia appeared to be stricken; but it was later
cleared and repaired, and throughout the expedition to this part of
Portuguese East Africa, it was the only route available for the passage
of motor-vehicles from Port Amelia to the troops at the front. The
Regiment camped for the night at a point fourteen miles along the road,
and reached Mtuge next day. The Pioneer Company and two Stokes guns
remained at Port Amelia, and the other details left there were formed
into a sub-depôt under the command of Captain Watt.
The force at Mtuge, after the arrival of Colonel Goodwin on the 11th
January, consisted of the Headquarters of the Regiment, I Company, B
Company, and two Stokes guns.
From Mtuge two roads run inland in a westerly direction. Of these one is
the main road from Mtuge to Medo, which place is distant about
eighty-four miles from Mtuge. The other is a telegraph road, originally
designed for motor traffic, but at this time much overgrown, which also
runs in a westerly direction, rejoining the main road at Nanunya, a
place distant some seven and twenty miles from Mtuge. From Nanunya the
telegraph line follows the main road as far as Meza, which is about
thirty-four miles further on.
Major Shaw’s detachment had been patrolling the country in the
neighbourhood of Mtuge since its establishment at that place, but on one
occasion only had the enemy been met, a patrol under Lieutenant
Robertson having come into contact with a small party of _Askari_ on the
telegraph road above mentioned.
On the 12th January a party consisting of 145 rifles, 1 Lewis gun and 1
machine-gun, under Captain Dawes, left Mtuge to patrol by native paths
to Pumone, a place which is situated about ten miles to the south of the
main road and some forty-five miles south-west by west of Mtuge. Here it
was known that the enemy had a post, and Captain Dawes was ordered to
eject him from it if possible.
On the 13th January Captain Foley reached the camp at Mtuge with two
Stokes guns from Port Amelia, and assumed command of the Battery.
On the 14th January a party of fifty men belonging to I Company was
sent, under Lieutenant Clarke, to patrol toward Sanananga, which lies on
the telegraph road about ten miles to the south of the main road and is
distant about sixteen miles from Mtuge. At Sanananga Lieutenant Clarke
came into contact with an enemy patrol, and a fight took place in which
one carrier was killed and two soldiers wounded. The enemy was believed
to have lost five killed, the number of his wounded being unknown; and
he retired, Lieutenant Clarke remaining at Sanananga and consolidating
his position.
On the 15th January, A Company, under Captain Wheeler, arrived at Mtuge
from Mkufi, having left Colour-Sergeant Hart and thirty rifles at the
latter place. No traces of the enemy had been seen in the neighbourhood
of Mkufi.
On the same day, I Company, under Captain Harman, was sent up the main
road to establish a camp at Mahiba, a place about twelve miles from
Mtuge. Here some high ground suitable for the purpose was found, in the
neighbourhood of which a sufficient water supply could be obtained by
digging in a sort of rocky grotto. The country all around was an
undulating expanse of grassy land, set fairly thickly with small trees,
and studded with patches of scrub and frequent clumps of bamboos—in a
word, the usual featureless, uninteresting bush country so common in
Africa beyond the limits of the belts of forest.
The country up the road as far as the Sovar River, about six miles
further on, was reported by Captain Harman to be clear of the enemy.
On the 16th January I Company established a post at Sovar River; and
Lieutenant Clarke reported from Sanananga that the country was occupied
by the enemy as far as Bulu, a village five miles up the telegraph road
from the former place.
On the 17th January the Regimental Headquarters were removed from Mtuge
to Mahiba, the Pioneer Company and two Stokes guns accompanying it; and
on the same day Captain Dawes reported that he had moved toward Pumone
at dawn on the 15th January with the intention of attacking it. While
still three miles distant from his objective, however, he had
encountered an enemy patrol, and though it was driven in, it had
succeeded in delaying his progress for a considerable time. Accordingly,
Captain Dawes did not come within sight of Pumone till near midday, and
he then found that it was a strong post, prepared for defence and with
well-constructed entrenchments occupied by the enemy. Having regard to
the scanty supply of small-arms ammunition in his possession, and to his
distance from reinforcements, Captain Dawes did not consider it
advisable to attempt an attack. He consequently withdrew to Koloi, the
place from which he had started that morning, and was thence actively
patrolling the country in the neighbourhood.
On the 20th January motor transport between Mtuge and Mahiba was
established, for all this time every effort was being made to improve
the road between Port Amelia and the front; and Lieutenant Barrett who,
with twenty rifles, had been sent up the main road on the preceding day
to examine Nanunya as a suitable site for a camp, reported that he had
found a party of the enemy at that place, and that in the encounter
which followed one of the Intelligence Department scouts attached to his
patrol had been killed. Lieutenant Barrett had later fallen back to the
post at Sovar River.
On the 21st January Lieutenant Bisshopp, with fifteen men of I Company,
one Intelligence Department agent and ten scouts, left for Sovar River
to reinforce Lieutenant Barrett; and on the same day two officers, a
hundred rifles of A Company, one machine-gun and one Stokes gun were
dispatched from Mtuge to reinforce Captain Dawes at Koloi. News was also
received that the Depôt Company of the Gold Coast Regiment had at last
arrived at Port Amelia.
On the 22nd January Lieutenant Bisshopp reached Nanunya without
encountering opposition, and he there learned from the local natives
that the enemy post at that place had only consisted of one German and
five _Askari_. On his way back Lieutenant Bisshopp, in accordance with
instructions, left a post consisting of Lieutenant Barrett, twenty
rifles and one Stokes gun at Namarala, and brought in the men who had
hitherto been stationed at Sovar River.
On the 25th January Captain Dawes, who had advanced to within six miles
of Pumone on the previous day, attacked and occupied that place at noon,
expelling the enemy without difficulty and capturing and destroying five
tons of native foodstuffs which had been accumulated there by him. In
the course of this operation one soldier and one carrier were wounded.
On this day the post at Namarala, which had been established by
Lieutenant Bisshopp, was strengthened; and a detachment of the
newly-formed King’s African rifles Mounted Infantry arrived at Mahiba
_en route_ for Nanunya. Instructions were then sent to Captain Dawes at
Pumone to get into touch with the Mounted Infantry, and to patrol toward
Ankuabe, which lies twelve miles up the main road beyond Nanunya, for
the purpose of finding a suitable position for a camp within striking
distance of the former place.
On the 28th January the post at Namarala was moved forward to Nanunya,
the former being occupied by twenty rifles of the Pioneer Company under
Lieutenant Wilson. On the following day the King’s African Rifles
Mounted Infantry occupied Ankuabe without opposition, and Captain Dawes
next day moved to that place, leaving thirty rifles under Lieutenant
Norris to garrison Pumone. On the 30th January the Regimental
Headquarters, with the Pioneer Company and I Company, marched up the
road to Namarala, and on the following day established their camp at
Nanunya. On the 3rd February the Headquarters of the Regiment, with
which also was Colonel Rose and the Headquarters of “Pamforce,” A and B
Companies and two guns of the Battery, moved forward to Ankuabe, leaving
the rest of the Battery, the Pioneer Company, I Company and two Stokes
guns to garrison Nanunya. The site chosen for the camp at Ankuabe was
overlooked by a big bluff of rock, but its sides were so precipitous as
to be unscaleable, and it therefore presented no menace to the security
of the camp.
On the 4th February the Post at Pumone was withdrawn to the Maguida
River, five miles south of Ankuabe; and though reports were received
that the enemy were advancing, he failed to put in an appearance, the
natives subsequently stating that he had been checked by an unfordable
river, and that two of his white men had been badly mauled by lions.
On the 8th February an enemy patrol, consisting of two Europeans and
forty _Askari_, came out of the bush on to the main road between Nanunya
and Ankuabe at a point where a post manned by six men of the Gold Coast
Regiment, under Lance-Corporal Etonga Etun, had been established. The
men of this post opened fire upon the enemy, and led by Etonga Etun,
charged him so hotly that the Germans and their _Askari_ and carriers
did not stop to find out the small numbers by which they were opposed,
but dropping some of their loads, took refuge in precipitate flight.
Among the articles picked up by Etonga Etun’s party were some belts of
machine-gun ammunition and a couple of European loads containing among
other things a number of official papers. Etonga Etun, who showed such
dash on this occasion, was a native of Jaunde, and was originally
enlisted during the 1914-16 campaign in the German Kameruns. In East
Africa he won both the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Military
Medal.
An attempt was made from Ankuabe to cut off the retreat of this enemy
patrol, but the latter made good its escape, dispersing into the bush in
great haste when overtaken by the Mounted Infantry. The captured
documents showed that the object of this party had been to harass the
British lines of communication and especially to capture mails and
ammunition.
During the next few days nothing of any interest occurred, but on the
17th February the 22nd D.M.B. arrived in camp, and on the 25th February
the Gold Coast Regiment, less one hundred rifles of I Company and two
Stokes guns, marched out of Ankuabe with half a section of the 22nd
D.M.B., and camping for the night at Muapa, fourteen miles up the road,
next day advanced on Meza.
The start was made at 6 a.m., fifty men under Lieutenant Bisshopp being
left in charge of all the supply carriers in the camp at Muapa. Just
before 7 a.m. an enemy patrol was met, which retired hurriedly, and
nothing more happened until one o’clock, when the enemy, posted in some
thick bush about three-quarters of a mile east of Meza, opened fire with
a machine-gun upon the advancing troops. He retired after an engagement
which lasted about half an hour, during which only one man of the Gold
Coast Regiment was wounded; and at 2.30 p.m. Meza was occupied. Two
camps which the Germans had established a little beyond Meza village
were found to be deserted. The supply convoy came into camp at 5 p.m.
On the 27th February a post was established on the main road eight miles
beyond Meza, and about 1200 carriers were sent back to Muapa to bring up
supplies.
[Illustration:
SERGT. GRANDA DIKALE, D.C.M., M.M. CORPL. SHUMBO LAMBE,
D.C.M. CORPL. ETONGA ETUN, M.M.
To face p. 230.
]
During the first ten days of March nothing occurred, the troops being
employed in patrolling the country around Meza, where on one or two
occasions they came into contact with small parties of the enemy. The
task of accumulating supplies was now chiefly engrossing the attention
of the Headquarters staff of “Pamforce,” which, on the 11th March,
established itself at Meza. Indeed, the question of transport was the
hinge upon which at this junction everything turned. The advance was
favoured by the fact that no definite break had yet occurred in the
weather, though a good deal of rain had fallen since the camp was
advanced to Ankuabe. Moreover, no difficulty with regard to water had as
yet been encountered, though the quality of the supply obtained was not
always very satisfactory. For the rest, however, the advancing force was
tethered to its base at Mtuge by the sixty odd miles of road along which
it had advanced; and though the highway had been improved and motor
traffic established, the indifferent landing facilities at Port Amelia,
the uncertain sea communication between that place and Bandari, and the
fact that everything taken to the latter had to be man-handled from the
_dhows_ to the shore, caused endless vexatious delays. The deep, black
“cotton” soil, moreover, was quickly reduced to a quagmire by even a
moderate amount of rain; and eventually it had to be “corduroyed” with
small tree-trunks along its entire length. Every advance, of course,
added to the distances over which supplies had to be conveyed, and more
than two months had been occupied in pushing some sixty-four miles up
the main road to Meza, without it having once been found possible to
bring the enemy to action.
The German Commander-in-Chief, who was now engaged in playing out time,
had so far completely succeeded in attaining the objects he had in view.
CHAPTER XVI
THE ENGAGEMENT AT MEDO
Although the Great War had now been in progress for more than three
years and a half, the time-honoured British practice of attempting to
effect a military purpose while employing therefor a wholly inadequate
force had once more been resorted to. The difficulties which had been
experienced in feeding and supplying the columns of “Linforce” and
“Hanforce” during the operations which led to von Lettow-Vorbeck’s
retreat across the Rovuma, probably convinced the British Command that
any direct pursuit of the enemy into the country beyond that river, at a
time when the beginning of the rainy season was almost due, would be
attended by too great risks. The Germans, as they retired, always swept
the country clear of supplies of every description and of practically
all its able-bodied inhabitants, so an advancing British force would
depend entirely upon the provisions that could be conveyed to it from
Lindi along many miles of unmetalled motor-road, and thereafter by
head-carriage over tracks, most of which would be submerged as soon as
the waters of the Rovuma had been sufficiently swelled by the first
freshet to cause them to overflow their banks.
Direct pursuit being therefore out of the question, an advance westward
from Port Amelia had been determined upon, but unfortunate delays had
occurred, as we have seen, and by the time “Pamforce” had begun its
march inland, the enemy had been able to complete his arrangements for
its embarrassment and for his own security.
Towards the end of February, therefore, it was decided that “Pamforce”
must be strengthened if anything practical were to be achieved, and a
second column was dispatched to Port Amelia, the whole force being
placed under the command of General Edwards. It was General Edwards, it
will be remembered, who, while commanding the lines of communication
when the extended attack upon the Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika Railway
was in progress in 1916, had inspected the Gold Coast Regiment
immediately after its arrival in East Africa.
“Pamforce” was now divided into two columns, one, under the command of
Colonel Rose, being composed of the Gold Coast Regiment, the 4th
Battalion of the 4th Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, the 22nd
D.M.B., and a body of the King’s African Rifles Mounted Infantry, and
the other, under the command of Colonel Giffard, comprising the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles. The
first was designated “Rosecol” and the second “Kartucol.”
* * * * *
A good deal of rain fell during March, deepening the swamp between
Bandari and Mtuge, which had already caused so much trouble, filling the
nullahs all along the road, and reducing the surface to a quagmire
which, in many places, made traffic very difficult, even though the
track had now been “corduroyed” from end to end. The journey up the road
from Mtuge to Meza, though the distance was only some four-and-sixty
miles, often took more than a week, and after the striking force had
been strengthened by the addition of “Kartucol” the work of moving the
new troops up to the front and of accumulating sufficient supplies to
render an advance in any degree continuous, when it could at last be
undertaken, proved to be at once slow and difficult.
Until the 27th March, therefore, the Gold Coast Regiment remained in
camp at Meza, sending out patrols in all directions, doing its best to
familiarize itself with the topographical features of the country in its
neighbourhood, and having occasional brushes with small parties of the
enemy, which more than once attempted to cut its lines of communication.
On the 27th March half the Gold Coast Regiment with the Stokes Battery
and half the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African
Rifles, marched up the road, and camped for the night at Natovi—eleven
miles distant—pushing on the next day to Namarika, some seven miles
further on. Heavy rain fell on both days very soon after the camp was
formed, and the bush-huts, called _banda_ in East Africa, constructed of
sticks and grass, afforded indifferent protection from the tropical
downpour, which turned the trodden mud of the camp into deep slush.
From Natovi Lieutenant Clarke, with a patrol of thirty rifles, had been
sent out to try to intercept an enemy foraging party, and on the
following day Captain Leslie-Smith and fifty men had been left at
Namarika, when the rest of the Regiment advanced eight miles along the
road to Manambiri. On the 29th March patrols under Lieutenant Chaundler
and Lieutenant Beech were sent out, the first along the main road as far
as Kitambo, distant four miles from Manambiri, and the other along the
Nicoque-Medo road, which branches off to the north-west from the latter
place. Neither of these parties found any traces of the enemy, and
Lieutenant Clarke’s report, when he reached Manambiri the same
afternoon, was similarly negative. During the night, however, shots were
exchanged between an enemy patrol and an outpost furnished by the 4th
Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles.
On the 30th March Lieutenant Chaundler again patrolled to Kitambo, but
found that an enemy camp, which had been established just beyond that
village, was deserted. During the day Manambiri camp, which by now had
become a mere mud-hole, was rearranged, an endeavour being made to pitch
it upon higher ground.
On the 2nd April, an enemy patrol having fired upon a party of sappers
and miners near Namarika at about 7 a.m., Lieutenant Bisshopp with fifty
rifles was sent out to try to intercept him, marching through the bush
on a compass-bearing for a distance of eight miles. It was a toilsome
and comfortless task, cutting and forcing a way through dripping-wet
bush, but it led to no result.
On the 5th April Captain Harman patrolled along the main road to Medo
with half of I Company, and reached Namaaka, which is distant about four
miles from Manambiri. From Namaaka he sent out a small party which
engaged an enemy patrol, composed of about thirty men and two
machine-guns, which retired before it, though two men of I Company were
wounded.
On the 7th April the Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment, with A and
I Companies, advanced to Namaaka. This place was reached without
incident, but two miles further on the advanced guard came up against a
party of the enemy, about fifty strong with two machine-guns. A fight
ensued which lasted for about two hours, in the course of which one man
of the advanced guard was killed, and five men, two machine-gun carriers
and four carriers belonging to the Sierra Leone Carrier Corps were
wounded. The enemy was driven back to a position behind a large swamp,
from which it would have been very difficult to eject him unless he
could be outflanked. The advanced guard was not strong enough to attempt
this, and it accordingly fell back upon the main body. A patrol was then
sent round the north side of the swamp, only to find that the enemy had
retired.
On the 8th April, half of I Company, under Captain Webber, was sent
forward in the direction of Medo, and came into touch with the enemy at
a place about half a mile beyond the position behind the swamp which the
latter had evacuated on the preceding evening. As usual, the first
intimation received on this occasion of the proximity of the enemy was a
volley fired from cover, the men forming the advanced point being shot
down. This accomplished, the enemy blew his bugles and sounded the
charge. It had been previously arranged that, in the event of a fight
developing, the supporting section, under Lieutenant Bisshopp, should
move to the side of the road upon which the enemy appeared to be the
more numerous, in order to support the leading section, which was under
the command of Lieutenant Clarke. As the enemy came on, the shouting and
cheering which accompanied his charge indicated that he was strongest on
the left of the road, so Lieutenant Bisshopp with his party pushed
forward in that direction at the double, receiving a volley in partial
enfilade from the _Askari_ who were engaging Lieutenant Clarke’s
section, and whose onset had already been almost stopped by the latter.
As Lieutenant Bisshopp’s section continued at the double, they presently
met the enemy, who were also delivering an attack upon Lieutenant
Clarke’s flank; whereupon the _Askari_ faced about and bolted. Many of
them were wearing the green caps which are part of the service kit of
the men of the Gold Coast Regiment, and so confused at all times is
fighting in the bush, that one of Lieutenant Bisshopp’s party, seeing
his officers aiming at a retreating _Askari_, pulled his rifle down,
crying out that the fugitive was one of their own corps. The next
moment, this soldier fell, shot through the ankle, ejaculating many and
bitter things about the manners and morals of the “Germani.” I Company
then attacked and drove the enemy down the road for several miles, and
the other half of I Company having been sent forward to reinforce, a
strong post was established about two miles west of Namaaka, with a
picket thrown out a mile ahead of it. On this day I Company lost three
men killed and five men wounded.
In the afternoon the rest of the column arrived at Namaaka, and on the
9th April it went forward through I Company’s post, the 4th King’s
African Rifles being the advanced guard. The enemy were driven back
about four miles further down the road, and the column camped for the
night at a point to which the name of Rock Camp was given, on account of
a large isolated bluff which was situated near to it on the northern
side of the road.
From Rock Camp Lieutenant Reid was sent out to try to locate the road to
Kimone toward the south, and Lieutenant Cumming took out a patrol in a
north-easterly direction to the Montepuez River, which falls into the
sea about forty-five miles north of Port Amelia, and on the right bank
of which Medo is situated.
This place was now the immediate objective of “Pamforce,” the enemy
being believed to have occupied it in some strength, and to have
accumulated there a considerable quantity of supplies.
General Edwards and his Staff reached Rock Camp at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th
April, and at 1.30 p.m. the Gold Coast Regiment moved out towards Medo,
which was distant about seven miles.
[Illustration:
SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE
OPERATIONS AGAINST MEDO.
]
The _boma_, or entrenched camp, at Medo—originally a stronghold of a
Portuguese revenue-farmer—occupied a situation on a piece of rising
ground some six or seven miles up the main road from Rock Camp. To the
south of the _boma_, and about three-quarters of a mile from it, lay the
village of Medo; and the country, which is here both rocky and hilly,
was for the most part parkland, studded with frequent trees and covered
with grass and patches of bush. Though some of it had the appearance of
being fairly open, it proved to be what is called “very blind,” no
extended view being obtainable in any direction.
The main road runs east and west from Rock Camp to Medo, passing through
broken country, and flanked on the left or southern side by Chirimba
Hill. This is an eminence several hundred feet in height and about two
miles in length—a mass of slate-grey rock rising out of a tangle of bush
and low forest, which clothes its lower slopes and overflows to the very
edge of the road. The summit of this hill is razor-edged and deeply
serrated throughout its length, rising into three principal peaks
divided by ravines; and its nature was such that no attempt could be
made to advance along it. Running parallel to the main road at a
distance of only a few hundred yards from it, Chirimba Hill commanded it
for a matter of about two miles, and completely dominated the position.
As usual, the enemy had selected a very awkward place in which to offer
this, his first serious resistance to the British advance in Portuguese
East Africa. He was six companies strong—say about eight hundred
men—with twelve machine-guns and one field gun which he had captured
from the Portuguese at Ngomano. The whole force was under the command of
Major Kohl, the ablest of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s lieutenants, to whom
throughout the campaign the task of harassing and delaying the British
advance, and of fighting rear-guard actions, was most frequently
confided by his chief. He had posted men in the thick bush along the
base of Chirimba Hill, and had occupied a strong position on high ground
astride the road on a very extended front, and most effectually
concealed in the bush.
When the Regiment moved forward on the afternoon of the 10th April,
Captain Harris with fifty rifles was sent out on the left to try to
establish himself on the eastern extremity of Chirimba Hill. This patrol
ran into an ambush before it had proceeded far upon its way, Sergeant
Flatman and one soldier being killed and several of the party wounded.
Though, after this, Captain Harris was at first forced to retire, he
succeeded in collecting his rather scattered men, and, advancing again,
made good a post on the slopes of the hill which had been his objective.
Meanwhile the advance-guard had come into action about three miles down
the road from Rock Camp, and it speedily became evident that the enemy
could not be ejected from the position he had taken up until Chirimba
Hill had been occupied. The Gold Coast Regiment accordingly camped at a
place two miles from Rock Camp, with an advanced post thrown out a mile
further down the road. Its further losses during the afternoon were 1
man killed, 10 wounded, and 1 carrier missing, who was believed to have
been killed.
On the 11th April the rest of “Rosecol” moved forward to the camp which
the Gold Coast Regiment had established over night, and at dawn the
advanced guard, consisting of I Company and two Stokes guns, advanced to
the forward post a mile further down the road. From this point an
officer’s patrol consisting of one section of I Company under Captain
Webber was sent out on the left to occupy the peak at the eastern
extremity of Chirimba Hill, at the foot of which a post had been
established by Captain Harris on the preceding evening. His right rested
on the road, the section being thence strung out through the bush to the
foot of the hill.
Simultaneously another section of I Company, under Lieutenant Barrett,
was pushed out on the right of the road, its left keeping touch with
Captain Webber’s right. Yet a third section of I Company, under
Lieutenant Bisshopp, was deployed on Lieutenant Barrett’s right.
Lieutenant Barrett’s section was the first to come into action, a small
party of the enemy opening fire upon it and then retiring. It was also
seen by one of the enemy’s observation-points posted on Chirimba Hill,
for it was shelled by the Portuguese field-gun, which was posted in the
bush somewhere in the neighbourhood of Medo _boma_ to the right front of
the advance. A section of A Company was sent out still more to the right
to move along a track to the north which ran parallel to the main road,
and was often described as “the telegraph road,” as there were vestiges
on it of a line which had been constructed by the Portuguese and
utilized by the enemy.
Major Shaw, who was in command of the advance, decided that it was not
possible to push on further until Chirimba Hill had been cleared of the
enemy, and a section of A Company was sent out to the left to reinforce
Captain Webber’s party. This part of the line came into action early in
the afternoon, and was engaged with the enemy, posted in the thick bush
and low forest on the lower slopes of Chirimba Hill, until about 4.30
p.m. By the end of the day all that had been achieved was the
establishment of a post, occupied by half of I Company under Captain
Webber, on the slopes of Chirimba Hill, the eastern extremity of which
had been cleared of the enemy; while on the right of the road a small
post had been established under a native non-commissioned officer, about
four hundred yards in advance of the point reached by Captain Webber on
the left of the line.
At 4 p.m. “Kartucol” advanced from Rock Camp through the bush to the
south of Chirimba Hill, for the purpose of taking up a position from
which to join on the morrow in a general attack upon Medo; and an hour
later “Rosecol” received orders to advance at 6 a.m. on the following
morning, the attack to be delivered by the Gold Coast Regiment, the 4th
Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles forming the force and column
reserve.
On the 12th April the advanced guard, consisting of B Company with two
Stokes guns, under Major Shaw, moved forward at 6 a.m., the 22nd D.M.B.
covering its advance by shelling the bush in which the enemy was
believed to have established himself. The broken, bush-covered country
lent itself to defence, and the enemy’s machine-gun and rifle fire from
the lower slopes of Chirimba Hill was persistent and galling, nor could
even his main position be accurately located. Early in the day, however,
three or four men of I Company scaled the higher peak of Chirimba Hill,
which overlooked that cleared of the enemy the night before, and
succeeded in ejecting therefrom a solitary _Askari_, who had evidently
been engaged in observing for the enemy’s gun.
At this time the advance of “Rosecol” was being opposed by about two
companies of the enemy, the remainder being held in reserve, though the
movement of “Kartucol” round the southern side of Chirimba Hill had not
yet been discovered by Kohl. The resistance offered was, as usual, of a
very determined character, and the progress made by the attacking force
was proportionately slow.
During the whole of the advance the Stokes guns belonging to the Gold
Coast Regiment were of the greatest assistance. Under the command of
Captain Foley and Lieutenant Lamont, these guns had been almost
continuously employed in all recent actions, and while the companies of
the Regiment had taken it in turn to bear the brunt of the work, the
Stokes gun team and their officers had a record of almost continuous
activity. On this occasion they had opened fire as soon as ever the
machine-guns came into action, throwing their shells about one hundred
and fifty to three hundred yards to the right and left of the advance on
both sides of the road. When the line halted to fire, fifteen minutes
were allowed the Stokes guns to take up fresh positions, generally about
fifty yards in the rear of the firing-line. This worked very well, and
the advance, though slow, was practically continuous until about 12.30
p.m., when the enemy developed a very stout resistance, and held the
Gold Coast Regiment up for nearly three hours.
At 2 p.m. two sections of A Company, under Captain Wheeler, were sent
forward to reinforce Major Shaw, and to extend the line on the right of
the advance; and an hour later the Headquarters of the Regiment, with
two sections of I Company, advanced, and Colonel Goodwin took over the
command from Major Shaw. The latter then went forward and assumed the
command of the firing-line, which at this time had worked its way along
the northern face of Chirimba Hill, and was getting clear of its western
extremity. Simultaneously fifty rifles of I Company, with one
machine-gun and one Lewis gun, under the command of Captain Harman, were
sent out to the right of the two sections of A Company, under Captain
Wheeler, with orders to extend the line to the right and to be prepared
to swing the right flank round so as to enfilade the enemy when the
advance was continued.
At about 3 p.m. “Kartucol,” on the southern side of Chirimba Hill, was
heard to be heavily engaged with the enemy, and the resistance offered
to the advance of the Gold Coast Regiment perceptibly slackened. Major
Shaw therefore worked round the western end of the hill and succeeded in
getting into touch with the King’s African Rifles, who had dug
themselves in in a hastily made perimeter camp. At the moment of Major
Shaw’s arrival the enemy was delivering a strong counter-attack upon the
leading troops of “Kartucol,” which were very hard pressed. Major Shaw
at once attacked vigorously, and a very sharp engagement ensued, which
resulted in the Gold Coast Regiment and the King’s African Rifles
driving the enemy back with considerable losses.
Meanwhile half of I Company, under Captain Harman, which, as we have
seen, had been sent out on the extreme right of the advance, had met a
large open swamp, the negotiation of which caused some delay; and as the
firing-line, commanded by Major Shaw, was wheeling steadily to the left,
following the configuration of the ground at the western extremity of
Chirimba Hill, touch with A Company was presently lost. Captain Harman
crossed from the right to the left of the main road, still without
regaining touch with A Company; and soon after firing broke out in front
of him. Advancing in the direction from which the sound came, touch with
the right of A Company was at last regained; but as the whole line
pushed forward the wheel to the left became more and more pronounced,
Major Shaw being engaged at this time in moving round the western
extremity of Chirimba Hill to go to the assistance of “Kartucol.” Just
as this movement began, fire was opened upon Captain Harman’s
half-company from the right flank and right rear, the enemy company,
which had hitherto been held in reserve, having been sent, it is
probable, to join up with the other companies which were delivering a
heavy attack upon the roughly made perimeter camp in which “Kartucol”
was defending itself. The half-section of I Company on the extreme right
of Captain Harman’s little party was hastily faced about to resist the
attack from the right rear, and the section bombers on its left drove
the enemy off from its right front. The attacking party to the right
rear, however, was more persistent, and Colour-Sergeant Thornett, with
three of his machine-gun team and three carriers, who at the moment when
fire was opened upon them had just loaded up in order to move forward,
were all hit, Colour-Sergeant Thornett being killed on the spot. These
losses were caused by a machine-gun which the enemy had captured from
the Portuguese. The reserve gun-team and carriers, however, behaved with
their usual coolness, and they succeeded in getting their gun away, only
leaving one box of ammunition behind them, which was recovered next day.
Sergeant Mudge was wounded badly in the groin and died in the course of
a few minutes, while Lieutenant Barrett was slightly wounded in the
thigh.
Meanwhile the half-section of I Company on the immediate left of the
party which had been thus roughly handled, had gone on with the main
advance, leaving only about twenty-five men to deal with the surprise
attack which had been delivered upon them. They succeeded, none the
less, in driving the enemy off; but recognizing the necessity of
guarding the right flank of the main advance against a possible renewed
attack, and hampered in his movements by the number of his casualties,
Captain Harman decided to remain where he was, and not to attempt for
the moment to regain touch with the troops on his left.
The wounded men were carried back to the place where Colonel Goodwin had
established his Headquarters, the work being done in difficult
circumstances, no stretchers or stretcher-bearers being available.
Darkness fell, and Captain Harman’s little party, having found no
further trace of the enemy, gathered together and began to work over to
the left with the intention of regaining touch with the men under Major
Shaw’s command. These had now joined up with “Kartucol,” as already
mentioned, and had thereafter established themselves in the perimeter
camp which had been hastily dug earlier in the day by the King’s African
Rifles. Here, guided by the bugle-call of I Company, Captain Harman’s
party presently joined them; and the weary men of both columns dossed
down for the night on the bare ground to sleep as best they might,
without food or cover of any description.
While the engagement was in progress Colonel Rose and several members of
his staff had a very narrow escape. They had been walking up and down
the road at some distance to the rear when a loud explosion occurred
within a few feet of them, and a man of the 22nd D.M.B., who a few
moments before had been coming down the road toward them, was blown into
the air, receiving terrible injuries from which he shortly afterwards
died. It was a road-mine which he had touched off—a road-mine
constructed, as usual, of one of the 4·1 shells from the
_Koenigsberg_—and Colonel Rose and his companions, who as it was were
only spattered from head to foot with mud, had during the last quarter
of an hour repeatedly passed within a few inches of the spot where the
slightest pressure upon the surface of the road would have ignited the
charge. These road-mines were found with considerable frequency, and the
men of the Gold Coast Regiment had a rather embarrassing habit of
digging them up, and carrying them to their officers for inspection,
live-fuse and all, handling the lethal things with a reckless
familiarity which it was hair-erecting to witness. On the whole,
however, extraordinarily little damage was done by these man-traps.
Mention has been made of the good work done by the Stokes guns under
Captain Foley and Lieutenant Lamont. These guns, one of the notable
inventions of the Great War, proved to be the ideal artillery for
bush-warfare. Their discharge causes so slight a report that, when
rifle-fire is going on, it is practically inaudible, and it was
therefore very difficult for the enemy to locate the positions from
which the guns were shelling them. On the other hand, the Stokes guns
were very handy and could be got into action with great rapidity, while
the shells thrown by them burst with a particularly loud report that was
not without its moral effect, and threw a very effective charge.
The losses sustained by the Regiment from the 10th to the 12th of April
amounted to 4 Europeans—Colour-Sergeant Thornett, Sergeant Mudge, and
Sergeant Flatman—killed, and Lieutenant Barrett wounded; 10 men killed
and 40 wounded; and 1 carrier killed and 14 wounded—in all 69
casualties. Unfortunately the losses among the rank and file included a
number of old soldiers and section commanders, all of whom were at this
time doubly valuable owing to the experience which they had gained
during nearly four years of almost continuous warfare.
During these three days a great strain was imposed upon Captain J. M.
O’Brien, of the West African Medical Staff, and upon his assistants; and
Captain O’Brien, by no means for the first time, displayed almost
reckless courage while attending to the wounded under fire.
On the 13th April scouting parties sent out from the camp found that, as
usual, the enemy had retired. His primary object had been to delay and
embarrass the British advance, and to make it pay as heavily as might be
for its passage over a few miles of road lying through particularly
difficult country. This he had achieved; and if indeed the _boma_ at
Medo had contained any accumulation of supplies, he had also succeeded
in removing them before he was compelled to evacuate that place, for
none were found when the troops occupied Medo on the 13th April.
Meanwhile “Pamforce,” which throughout the three days’ fighting had been
engaged in attacking and being attacked by an enemy who, from beginning
to end, remained practically invisible, was no nearer the fulfilment of
its purpose—the wearing down or rounding up of von Lettow-Vorbeck’s
forces—than it had been when, more than three months earlier, it had
first landed at Port Amelia.
CHAPTER XVII
THE ADVANCES FROM MEDO TO KORONJE AND
MSALU
All that remained of the Portuguese _boma_ at Medo was the deep ditch by
which it had been surrounded, and the mound or earthwork fashioned from
the earth that had been excavated from it. Any buildings that these
fortifications may have been designed to protect had long ago been
burned to the ground, and save for a big red-brick store, with an iron
roof, situated outside the ditch, there was no habitable place in the
immediate vicinity. It can never have been of much military value,
except against attacks delivered by natives armed with primitive
weapons, and its capture and occupation by the British conferred upon
the latter no material advantage. Medo, however, or rather the place a
few miles east of it where Rock Camp had been formed, marks the
beginning of a stretch of very blind and difficult country, where big
clumps of bamboos are numerous, where bamboo-brakes of considerable
extent are not infrequently encountered, and where elephant grass nine
feet high is a common feature. Further on along the road, as the columns
advanced, more broken ground was met with, and numbers of isolated rocky
hills, often fantastically shaped—the solitary curved horn of the
rhinoceros being one of the forms most commonly represented—provided the
enemy with excellent observation-posts from which every movement of the
British troops could be watched and provided against.
On the 13th April the two columns camped at Medo, and on the following
day a strong officer’s patrol of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles went down the road toward Mwalia, and speedily found
itself engaged with the enemy. Von Lettow-Vorbeck and Kohl had allowed
the British, very slowly and painfully, to work their way inland from
the coast from a distance of eighty-four miles to Medo; and having now
drawn them on into a very difficult belt of country, they were preparing
to ambush the advance once or twice daily, to make the troops fight as
often as possible and in disadvantageous circumstances, for the
camping-ground and for their supply of water, and to withhold from them
any chance of dealing a very effective blow at their ubiquitous and
elusive enemy.
The campaign was at once more harassing and less hopeful than had been
the advance from Narungombe to Lukuledi in the preceding year, for then
“Linforce” had been working its way inland from Lindi, and there had
always been a chance of the enemy being enveloped by the converging
columns; and the country, though thick and difficult, had not been so
blind and so impenetrable as that through which “Pamforce” was at
present engaged in making its way. Now, too, there was no British force
closely co-operating with “Rosecol” and “Kartucol” to threaten the
enemy’s flank and rear, though some of General Northey’s troops had made
their way in a south-easterly direction from Mahenge, and were known to
have crossed the Rovuma, and Colonel Rose, while still in command in
Portuguese East Africa, had succeeded in getting the 3rd Battalion of
the 2nd King’s African Rifles dispatched to Mozambique, where, under
Colonel Phillips, they were brigaded with a Portuguese force under Major
Leal. There was, however, no immediate prospect of bringing von
Lettow-Vorbeck to a definite action, for there no longer existed German
posts, such as Ruponda, Massassi and Newala, the defence of which was
important to him because their capture would work him a measure of moral
and even of material injury. Instead von Lettow-Vorbeck, at this time,
seemed to have the whole of the vast continent of Africa into which to
retreat, and the prospect of surrounding or cutting off any large body
of his forces was felt by all to be more remote than ever.
None the less, “Pamforce” continued to move forward down the road from
Medo to Mwalia and from Mwalia to Koronje, with ever-lengthening lines
of communication stringing out behind it, and with daily ambushes
delaying its progress. These, often enough, were laid for it by small
enemy posts consisting of one native non-commissioned officer and half a
dozen _Askari_, but in such blind country it was on each occasion
necessary to clear up the situation before the advance could be
continued, lest the column should find themselves caught in some more
elaborate trap with results that might well prove to be disastrous.
Moreover, the character of the country, which greatly favoured the
tactics that the enemy was now adopting, practically confined the
British to a series of frontal attacks, as it did not admit of flanking
movements being successfully carried out.
* * * * *
On the 15th April “Rosecol” left the camp at Medo, and began to advance
down the road in the direction of Mwalia. The 4th Battalion of the 4th
King’s African rifles formed the advanced guard, the Gold Coast Regiment
being in reserve. The former’s advanced points were attacked, as usual,
and the Battalion engaged a small enemy rear-guard, the progress made
during the day amounting to only four and a half miles. From this time
onward, the Gold Coast Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles took it in turns to lead the advance, and each was
preceded at a short distance by an advanced detachment consisting of 300
rifles with the usual complement of machine and Lewis guns, and two
Stokes guns of the Gold Coast Regiment. This leading detachment had
points thrown out ahead on each side of the road and a line of
skirmishers deployed behind them, the remainder of the detachment
advancing in open order on both sides of the road, with connecting files
between them and the main body in their rear.
On the 16th April the advanced detachment was supplied by A Company and
two sections of I Company, under the command of Major Shaw. During the
day small engagements were fought with an enemy rear-guard, consisting
of one company, but the Stokes guns proved very useful and effective,
the enemy being shelled out of successive positions from which, but for
these guns, it would have cost much delay and probably many casualties
to eject him. As it was, only two men of the Regiment and one Sierra
Leone carrier were wounded. The column camped at 2 p.m., Major Shaw’s
detachment digging itself in about a mile further down the road.
On the 17th April the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles
furnished the advanced detachment, that regiment being at the head of
the column, with the Gold Coast Regiment following in reserve. During
the afternoon the King’s African Rifles became heavily engaged with the
enemy, who had been reinforced and was now opposing the advance with
three companies and six machine-guns. The road here ran through elephant
grass nine feet in height, and it was found impossible to locate the
enemy’s positions. On the other hand, the King’s African Rifles had dug
themselves in across the road, the lie of which was accurately known to
the Germans, and the former consequently sustained many casualties. The
4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles was a newly raised force,
largely composed of recruits, and the ordeal of being fired upon by an
invisible enemy, against whom no effective retaliation was possible, was
very severe. However, they held on, and in the afternoon A Company was
sent forward to reinforce them. This company and the two Stokes
gun-teams, which had been with the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles all day, sustained 28 casualties before dark, losing 3
men and 1 battery gun-carrier killed, and 13 men, 6 battery gun-carriers
and 5 Sierra Leone carriers wounded.
Next morning the Gold Coast Regiment took over from the King’s African
Rifles the position which the latter had occupied during the night, and
was directed to hold the enemy in front while a strong detachment from
“Kartucol” attempted a wide flanking movement on the right. Captain Duck
with thirty rifles was sent forward from the position held by the
Regiment to get in touch with the enemy in order to give the flanking
detachment an objective. He speedily found and engaged the enemy,
whereupon the rest of “Kartucol” advanced through the Gold Coast
Regiment and joined in the fight. The enemy, however, had once again
reduced his rear-guard to a single company, and on the 19th April
“Kartucol” continued the advance, “Rosecol” following in the rear. On
the following day the two columns were to have exchanged places, but the
rations expected from the rear arrived so late on the night of the 19th
April that this arrangement could not be carried out. The delay had been
caused by the convoy being attacked by the enemy near Rock Camp. The
officer commanding this convoy was killed, and much confusion was
wrought by the ambush, though the carriers and their escort contrived to
get through with the loss of a few bags of mails. There were many
Europeans in camp who would far more willingly have foregone their
dinners. In a captured diary Kohl was subsequently found complaining
with disgust that the mails taken on this occasion contained no
information concerning the progress of the war in Europe, and mainly
consisted of “love to dear Jack.”
"Kartucol," therefore, continued the advance and occupied Mwalia, while
“Rosecol” camped for the night at Kalima, about four miles short of that
place. The distance from Medo to Mwalia is not quite five-and-twenty
miles. The column had left Medo on the 15th April and “Kartucol” had
reached Mwalia on the 20th April, the average daily progress being
therefore little more than four miles.
On the 21st April “Rosecol” remained in camp at Kalima, where it was
joined by General Edwards and his staff. “Kartucol” during the day was
shelled by the enemy, and on the 22nd April it moved forward and
occupied an enemy position two miles in front of the camp at Mwalia.
Both columns remained in these positions until the 26th April, when
“Rosecol” moved forward and occupied Makuku, about twelve miles down the
road, “Kartucol,” which had preceded it, having advanced three miles
further to a place called Mbalama. At Makuku the main road, hitherto
followed, which leads from Mtuge to Lusinje, is crossed by another which
runs south-west to Koronje; and Mbalama is situated some three miles
down this latter track.
On the 27th April “Rosecol” advanced through “Kartucol,” and marched
down the road towards Koronje, with Nanungu, some forty miles further to
the west and slightly south of the former place, as its ultimate
objective. The advanced detachment, under Major Shaw, consisted of the
Pioneer Company and A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment with two Stokes
guns. A small party of the enemy was engaged and driven back; “Rosecol”
camped for the night about four miles west of Mbalama.
Next day, 28th April, the advance was continued, being led this time by
the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles, two Stokes guns of
the Gold Coast Regiment, as usual, accompanying the advanced detachment.
About six miles were covered during the day, and as “Rosecol” was
forming camp at about 3.30 p.m., patrols from the advanced detachment
came into touch with the enemy, and Lieutenant McEvoy was wounded in the
hand by a stray bullet, and a trumpeter belonging to the Stokes Gun
Battery was killed.
On the 29th April the enemy was found to have abandoned the positions
which he had occupied the night before; and at 7 a.m. the advanced
detachment, consisting of half I and B Companies with two of the Gold
Coast Stokes guns, advanced, the rest of “Rosecol” following half an
hour later. Major Shaw, who was, as usual, in command of the advanced
detachment, came into contact with the enemy at about 10.30 a.m., and
thereafter the latter fought an intermittent rear-guard action—a series
of harassing ambushes—until 4.30 p.m., when camps were formed for the
night, Major Shaw’s men occupying a position about a mile in advance of
the rest of the column. In the course of the day only two men of the
Gold Coast Regiment were wounded, the Stokes guns once more proving very
useful in dislodging the enemy from successive positions.
On the 30th April, “Kartucol” passed through “Rosecol” with the
intention of attacking an enemy position, which was known to be held by
four companies and one gun. The Headquarters of the Gold Coast Regiment,
with half the Stokes Battery, the Pioneers and I Company, marched in the
rear of “Kartucol” as reserve troops. Touch was not gained with the
enemy until the afternoon, but owing to the country traversed being very
difficult and blind, the progress made was so slow that no attack could
be delivered upon the German position owing to the lateness of the hour.
The two columns, therefore, formed a perimeter camp at about 4.30 p.m.
at a place on the Koronje road about four hundred yards west of the
Montepuez River. One Battalion from “Kartucol” occupied an advanced camp
about one thousand yards further down the road leading to Koronje.
On the 1st May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
advanced along the road toward Koronje, while the 2nd Battalion of the
same Regiment went out on the right to attempt to outflank the enemy’s
left. The country was still very difficult and extremely blind, and
progress was again very slow. It was subsequently discovered, moreover,
that from an observation post on the summit of Koronje Hill, to the left
of the road, the enemy could follow every movement of the British
troops. While, therefore, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s African
Rifles was laboriously working its way round to the right, its attempt
to surprise and outflank the enemy was foredoomed to failure from the
outset. Meanwhile, of course, this movement greatly delayed the advance
of the rest of the force.
The detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment which, under the command of
Major Shaw, was with “Kartucol,” was employed to escort the 22nd D.M.B.
and the ammunition column of that force.
At about 5 p.m. the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
became heavily engaged, and simultaneously an enemy party of about forty
rifles, which had worked its way through the bush to the rear, attacked
the D.M.B. which was being escorted by fifty rifles of I Company. The
latter, under Lieutenant Kay, acted with great steadiness and
promptitude. At the moment when the attack was delivered, the Mountain
Battery, which had just come out of action, was limbered up. For a
moment the guns were in peril, but Lieutenant Kay held the enemy and
beat off the attack while the mules and their loads were got away in
safety.
The sound of the firing misled the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd King’s
African Rifles, which was out on the right, with the result that it
rejoined the column in the rear of the enemy.
A perimeter camp was formed for the night, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd
King’s African Rifles digging themselves in at a point about eight
hundred yards in advance of the main body.
On the 2nd May, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
pushed out patrols which quickly came into touch with the enemy, who was
soon after engaged by “Kartucol,” which drove him back. No progress,
however, was made during the day, and on the morrow it was found that,
while the enemy’s rear-guard was fighting “Kartucol,” the position at
Koronje had been evacuated. “Kartucol” then advanced and camped near
Koronje, the detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment under Major Shaw
rejoining “Rosecol” in the afternoon.
On the 4th May “Kartucol” again advanced and located a strong enemy
position near the Milinch hills, about six and a half miles west of
Koronje, through which the road passes. On this day three officers and
ten British non-commissioned officers belonging to the Gold Coast
Regiment arrived from Port Amelia.
On the 5th May, “Rosecol” advanced and took over from “Kartucol,” which
then fell back to the camp which the former had hitherto occupied. The
4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles encamped at a point down
the road about a mile in advance of the main body of “Rosecol”; and
patrols were sent out to the right and left to try to find a way round
the enemy’s position on the Milinch Hills. Both these patrols were
furnished by A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, that on the right
being commanded by Captain Harris and that on the left by Lieutenant
Withers.
On the 6th May Captain Harris returned and reported that the country to
the north was much more open than that through which the columns had
recently been advancing, and that it would be almost impossible to make
a flanking movement from the right side of the road. On the 7th May
Lieutenant Withers came in from the south bringing a similar report; and
meanwhile patrols sent out by the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s
African Rifles had on both days come into touch with the enemy just east
of the Milinch Hills, and reported that the position which he was
occupying was a very strong one. This was indeed the case, for the enemy
was posted on the crests and slopes of two hills, both of which
commanded the gut between them through which the road runs; yet on the
8th May it was discovered that the Germans had retired, and two
companies of the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles went
forward and occupied the position which he had evacuated.
Meanwhile the lines of communication were lengthening behind the
columns, and now measured approximately one hundred and forty miles from
Mtuge, which in its turn is twenty-eight miles by road from Port Amelia.
Also the heavy and increasing traffic over the road had not tended to
improve it; and though road corps, recruited from South Africa and East
Africa, toiled ceaselessly at its repair, the difficulties of transport
and supply were becoming daily more and more acute. At this time, the
columns at the front had been on very short commons for a considerable
period, and the company officers of the Gold Coast Regiment reported
that their men were not getting enough food to keep them fit to take
part in active operations of so trying and arduous a character as those
at present in progress.
On the 9th May the Gold Coast Regiment took over the Milinch Hills from
the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles; and on this day
local natives reported to Colonel Rose that von Lettow-Vorbeck, with a
large enemy force, was moving in a north-easterly direction toward
Lusinje. This place lies about thirty-seven miles almost due north of
Nanungu, on the main road from which the columns had branched off in a
south-westerly direction at Makuku, as already noted. Accordingly the
4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles was dispatched across
country to Msalu Boma, which is situated on that road at a point, as the
crow flies, about twenty-three miles north-west of Koronje, and
twenty-seven miles east by south of Lusinje. The orders issued to this
battalion of the King’s African Rifles were that they should deal with
any enemy parties weak enough to enable action to be taken with effect,
but to avoid any serious engagement with his numerically superior
forces.
It was believed that a fairly strong party of the enemy were occupying a
hill on the right side of the road at a place called Jirimita, about
five or six miles down the road from the pass through the Milinch Hills,
and at dawn on this day two patrols were sent out, one under the command
of Captain Leslie-Smith and the other under Lieutenant Bisshopp. Each
patrol consisted of seventy-five rifles, drawn respectively from A and I
Companies; and Captain Leslie-Smith, who went out on the right of the
road, had orders to make a flanking movement and to come back to the
highway at a point about four miles beyond Jirimita. Lieutenant
Bisshopp, on the left, was instructed to make a wider and longer sweep,
and to strike the road about three miles further on. It was hoped thus
to outflank the enemy and to cut off his retreat. It was a difficult
task in the broken country through which these two patrols had to work,
at once to maintain a correct sense of direction, and accurately to
estimate the distance traversed. However, both these small parties
started off, expecting to be a night or two in the bush, and each in the
end succeeded in exactly carrying out the orders issued to it.
Meanwhile, during the morning of the same day Lieutenant Wilson, with a
patrol of twenty rifles drawn from the Pioneer Company, got touch with
an enemy outpost of about the same strength at a point some two miles
west of the Milinch Hills; and at 4.45 p.m. a second officer’s patrol,
under Lieutenant Beech, was sent out down the road in the same direction
for a distance of two and a half miles without coming into contact with
the enemy, whose outpost had retired since the morning.
At 6 a.m. on the 10th May, Lieutenant Withers, with fifty rifles and one
Lewis gun of A Company, was sent down the road with orders to brush
aside any small party of the enemy that he might encounter, and
thereafter to try and ascertain the real strength of the force which was
opposing the advance of the column.
Three and a half miles from the Milinch Hill Lieutenant Withers met a
small party of the enemy, which he drove back; and about five miles out
he found an enemy camp, strongly entrenched, which had evidently been
designed to accommodate some four companies, but which had been recently
burned. As far as it was possible to judge, this camp had been destroyed
and abandoned two days earlier; and though the tracks leading from it
were at once confused and confusing, conveying at first the impression
that the enemy had retired in a northerly direction, it was subsequently
ascertained that he had retreated down the main road. Just beyond the
burned camp this road was found to bifurcate, one fork leading
west-north-west and the other west-south-west. It was the latter route
which the enemy had taken.
The main patrol camped at a point where the road bifurcated, and sent
out small parties to reconnoitre along each of the forks, but neither of
them came into touch with the enemy.
On the 11th May the patrols under Captain Leslie-Smith and Lieutenant
Bisshopp, which had been sent out on the 9th May, rejoined the Regiment.
As has already been noted, they had achieved the difficult feat of
striking the road at the points aimed at, but for the rest, though
Lieutenant Bisshopp’s patrol had surprised and killed one enemy
_Askari_, who had probably been left behind to watch the movements of
the British, nothing more had been seen of the enemy, who must have
passed down the road while these patrols were still making their way
through the bush.
On the 12th May one of the battalions of the 2nd King’s African Rifles
from “Kartucol” took over from the Gold Coast Regiment, which returned
to the main camp occupied by “Rosecol.” On the following day the latter
marched across country, in the wake of the 4th Battalion of the 4th
King’s African Rifles, which had preceded them on the 9th May, in the
direction of Msalu Boma. The way led along a native footpath which only
admitted of men marching in single file, but in order to beat out a
track for the transport through the high grass and standing crops of
maize and millet, the column advanced four abreast—a hard task for
troops who had been insufficiently fed for many days, and who were now
required to cover between daybreak and dusk a distance of eighteen
miles. The column camped in the bush, and on the following day it joined
up with the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African Rifles at the _boma_
at Msalu. This place, too, had once been a stronghold of a Portuguese
revenue-farmer, and had been fortified against attack by the natives,
but it had now been completely destroyed by fire.
At Msalu news was received that von Lettow-Vorbeck and the whole of his
main force were at Nanungu, and that so far they had given no signs of
any intention to move to the north toward the Rovuma River, or south to
the Lurio, which divides the territory of the Nyassa Company from the
Province of Mozambique. It was also learned that the King’s African
Rifles Mounted Infantry were at Lusinje, some six-and-twenty miles along
the main road west by north of Msalu, and about thirty-two miles almost
due north of Nanungu.
“Rosecol” remained at Msalu on the 14th and 15th May, the neighbourhood
being clear of the enemy, but much infested by lions. The proximity of
these brutes got upon the nerves of some of the inmates of the camp, and
on the night of the 13th—14th May a carrier, who had had a nightmare in
which they played a prominent part, awoke in a panic, shattering the
silence with his yells and outcry. Instantly an indescribable scene
resulted. Tumbling over one another to get at the camp-fires, the
porters fought and scrambled for firebrands which they waved wildly, and
impeded by which they made desperate efforts to climb into neighbouring
trees. The country here is orchard-bush, and the only trees available
are small and stunted—altogether inadequate as places of refuge from the
onslaught of a lion. The terrified carriers, however, were long past
reason, and appeared to consider that their one chance of salvation lay
in getting even a foot or two above the ground. The lions on this
occasion existed only in their imagination, and order and confidence
were presently restored. During the same night, however, the 4th King’s
African Rifles lost two sentries, one killed and one badly mauled by
these brutes, so the terror of the carriers had at any rate some measure
of justification.
With the arrival of “Rosecol” at Msalu the second phase of the advance,
which had its beginning with the fight at Medo, may be regarded as
concluded. The enemy had offered a persistent and fairly effective
resistance to the progress of the columns along the main road through
the difficult country which lies between Medo and the Milinch Hills. His
main force, which was believed to be at Nanungu, was really encamped at
Wanakoti, about three and a half miles to the north of that place; and
against him were advancing “Kartucol” from the east, “Rosecol” from the
north-east, and a weak column of perhaps 800 rifles, which General
Northey had dispatched across the Rovuma in a south-easterly direction,
under the command of Colonel Griffiths. Von Lettow-Vorbeck still had the
choice of several lines of retreat, for at Wanakoti many tracks cross
one another, and though the road to Koronje on the east and to Chisona
on the north-west were closed to him by the British advance, the track
leading south-west to Mahu was still open, and while retreating along it
he would have opportunities of breaking off, should it suit his
convenience to do so, in almost any direction.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE EXPULSION OF VON LETTOW-VORBECK FROM
THE NYASSA COMPANY’S TERRITORY AND THE
RETURN OF THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT
On the 16th May “Rosecol” left Msalu, and marching along bush paths in a
westerly direction, leaving the road to Lusinje on the north and having
the Msalu River on its right, began a movement which was designed to cut
the main road between Lusinje and Nanungu. Camping for two nights in the
bush—orchard country which, though the soil was of a rocky character,
was broken by frequent patches of cultivated land—the column crossed
this road on the 18th May, and pushed on toward Chisona. On reaching the
Lusinje–Nanungu road, a patrol was dispatched to examine the ford across
the Msalu River, and on approaching it was fired upon by a party which
proved to be composed of scouts belonging to the Rhodesian Native
Regiment—part of the weak column which General Northey had sent out
across the Rovuma River. Connection was thus established for the first
time with this force.
On the 19th May “Rosecol” continued its march to Chisona, where it
camped on the banks of the Msalu River at a place about two miles from
the column from “Norforce” above mentioned, which was under the command
of Colonel Griffiths. The river was unfordable at this season of the
year, but the battery-carriers quickly constructed a bridge under the
personal supervision of Colonel Goodwin, who, as a former commander of
the Pioneer Company, had proved himself, both in the Kameruns and in
East Africa, to possess a special gift for such improvizations.
On the 20th May the column crossed the Msalu, and marched due south to
within five miles of Chilonga, I Company leading the advance and doing
what it could to widen and improve the existing paths so as to
facilitate the passage of the column. On the 21st May the latter pushed
on twelve miles in a westerly direction and camped at a spot some three
miles to the north of the road to Mahua. Five companies of the enemy,
under Kohl, were reported to be on this road; and it was here learned
that “Kartucol” had entered and occupied Nanungu without opposition, and
was advancing along the Mahua road. This advance had been opposed by
Kohl during the day, one company of the enemy with one gun having been
in action, while the rest of his force was held in reserve. Meanwhile
Colonel Griffiths’ column was marching parallel to “Rosecol,” on a line
a few miles to the north of it.
At this juncture General Edwards hoped to surround Kohl from the west,
east, and north; and with this object in view “Kartucol” was ordered to
advance along the Mahua road, Colonel Griffiths’ column to march in a
south-westerly direction, so as to get astride that road in the rear of
the enemy, while “Rosecol” was instructed to march on a line about three
miles to the north of the Mahua road and roughly parallel to it with the
object of turning the enemy’s left.
During the afternoon of the 22nd May Colonel Griffiths’ force was heard
to be heavily engaged, and “Rosecol” continued its march until 10 p.m.,
when it camped, Major Shaw in command of the Pioneers and B Company of
the Gold Coast Regiment, and two Gold Coast Stokes guns, forming an
advanced detachment encamped on high ground a few miles forward,
overlooking the place where Colonel Griffiths was entrenched. During all
these operations “Rosecol” was separated from “Kartucol” by the Mwambia
Ridge—a high barrier of grey, granite hills, with unscalable, cliff-like
sides, rising abruptly from the grass and bush and orchard forest at
their base—which flanks the main road on the north for a matter of more
than a dozen miles.
Colonel Griffiths’ column, it appeared, had struck the Mahua road, and
had entered and occupied Kohl’s camp at Mwariba, meeting with very
little resistance. Here he had possessed himself of practically all
Kohl’s heavy baggage—a really severe loss to the enemy at this juncture;
but almost immediately afterwards he had been vigorously attacked, his
small column being completely surrounded and suffering many casualties.
Failing to push home his attack, however, the enemy had drawn off during
the night and had then retired in a southerly direction.
Yet another attempt to envelop him had definitely failed.
The Gold Coast Regiment this day came into contact with the enemy for
the first time since it had quitted the main road near Koronje on the
13th April. Its only casualty, however, was one man wounded.
On the 23rd May “Rosecol” advanced through Colonel Griffiths’ camp, with
Major Shaw’s detachment about one mile ahead of it; and very shortly
afterwards the latter became engaged with the enemy, who, with one
company and two machine-guns, was covering the retirement of Kohl’s main
force. Major Shaw drove this enemy party back a matter of two miles,
when he was relieved by the 4th Battalion of the 4th King’s African
Rifles, who now formed the advanced detachment of “Rosecol,” supported
as usual, however, by two guns of the Gold Coast Regiment’s Stokes
Battery.
On this morning the Regiment lost one British non-commissioned officer,
Sergeant Kent, and one soldier killed, and three men wounded.
On the 24th May the 4th King’s African Rifles advanced at 6 a.m., and
forthwith became engaged with the enemy, whose strength had now been
increased to at least two companies with four machine-guns. All day long
the Germans fought a series of very stubborn rear-guard actions, and the
progress made by dusk was only two miles. In the course of the day
Lieutenant Percy and two battery gun-carriers, attached to the Gold
Coast Stokes guns, were wounded.
On the 25th May “Rosecol” advanced along the Mahua road in the direction
of Korewa, with “Kartucol” following in its rear; Colonel Griffiths’
column having marched west on the preceding day with the object of once
again getting astride the road behind the enemy, this time on the other
side of Korewa. The enemy was not met with, however, Major Shaw
occupying Korewa in the afternoon without opposition, and during the
night news was received that Colonel Griffiths had struck the road at
the point aimed at, and that he, too, had seen nothing of the enemy.
From Korewa patrols were sent out in several directions, and by the 27th
May, it having by then become pretty evident that von Lettow-Vorbeck
with the main body, followed at a short distance by Major Kohl and his
redoubtable rear-guard, had crossed the Lurio River into the province of
Mozambique, Colonel Griffiths’ column marched that evening in pursuit.
On the 28th May B Company, less one machine-gun and one Lewis gun, left
the camp at 6 a.m. for Wanakoti, thirty miles to the east, acting as
escort to the 22nd D.M.B. The rest of the Regiment remained in camp at
Korewa, where it was rejoined by B Company in due course.
* * * * *
With the retreat of von Lettow-Vorbeck southward across the Lurio River,
the expedition into the Nyassa Company’s territory, which had been begun
five months earlier by the landing of Major Shaw’s advanced detachment
at Port Amelia, reached its natural termination. Yet another campaign,
based so far as the British were concerned upon the port of Mozambique,
was about to begin, though as yet no very extensive preparations had
been made for its effectual initiation.
The Gold Coast Regiment, as it has been seen, had been transferred
straight from the pursuit of von Lettow-Vorbeck through the Kilwa and
Lindi areas and on to the banks of the Rovuma, to the very trying inland
march from Port Amelia. Other units subsequently engaged in that
enterprise had in the interval been afforded a period of rest, the 2nd
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of the King’s African Rifles, for example,
having been allowed to return for a space to their cantonments and to
their womenkind at Nairobi. The men of this corps and those of the Gold
Coast Regiment, who had done so much hard fighting in company, had
learned greatly to trust and value one another, and though they were
drawn from such widely different parts of the African continent and
though the Gold Coast soldiers’ knowledge of Swahili was still rather
elementary, a species of blood-brotherhood had come to be recognized as
existing between them. When the “Second Second,” as this battalion of
the King’s African Rifles was familiarly called, had made its appearance
in Portuguese East Africa, it had been warmly welcomed by the men of the
Gold Coast Regiment, and the latter, it may be surmised, had listened
not without envy to the accounts which their friends had to give them of
the good time the former had enjoyed during their stay at Nairobi. Were
the war-worn veterans of the Gold Coast Regiment never to enjoy a
similar respite from patrols, attacks, counter-attacks and endless toils
and fatigues? The men put the question to their officers. They would
fight on if they must, embarking forthwith upon this new campaign which
was clearly about to begin; but they would fight better, they felt, if
in the interval they might have a taste of the delights of rest and home
in their cantonments at Kumasi. Colonel Goodwin, who was now commanding
the Regiment, and Colonel Rose, who was commanding the column to which
the battalion was attached, shared the men’s opinion, and General
Edwards agreed that the Regiment had fairly earned a rest.
Accordingly, at 7 a.m. on the 1st June, the Gold Coast Regiment left the
camp at Korewa, and began its march back to Port Amelia. From Medo to
Ankuabe—a distance of five-and-twenty miles—it was conveyed by
motor-cars, but the rest of that weary journey was accomplished on foot
over a road which had been knocked to pieces by the traffic passing over
it. A standing camp was established at Gara, between Mtuge and Bandari,
which was reached on the 13th June, Colonel Rose having, on the
preceding day, relinquished the command of “Rosecol” and resumed that of
the Regiment.
The rest of June, July and the first twelve days of August were spent in
refitting, and men of the Regiment who were doing duty at various points
along the lines of communication were gradually recalled and collected.
On the 29th July Colonel Rose and Major Read sailed for South Africa
from Port Amelia on board H.M. Transport _Hymettus_; and on the 13th
August Major Hornby with 37 officers, 17 British non-commissioned
officers, 862 rank and file, and 135 stretcher-bearers, gun-carriers,
etc., embarked on board H.M.T. _Magdalena_ and on the 14th August set
sail for West Africa.
At Durban, reached on the 18th August, Colonel Rose and Major Read
rejoined the Regiment, and both here and at Capetown, where the
transport arrived on the 27th August, several officers were landed who
were taking leave in South Africa, Australia or Tasmania.
Accra, the capital of the Gold Coast, was reached without incident late
on the 5th September, and on the following day the Governor, who had
seen the Regiment off from Sekondi exactly two years and two months
earlier, came on board the _Magdalena_ to welcome and inspect the
troops, and to thank them on behalf of the Colony whose name they bear,
for the splendid fashion in which, through all the trials and dangers of
the East African campaign, they had upheld its reputation.
Colonel Rose and Major Read disembarked at Accra, but the Regiment
sailed on the evening of the 6th September for Sekondi, where it arrived
early next morning.
From this port to Kumasi, whither the Regiment at once proceeded in
special trains, its journey was a triumphal progress. At Sekondi itself
a feast of native foods, such as these soldier-exiles had not tasted for
two years, had been prepared for their consumption; and at every
halting-place crowds had assembled to greet and acclaim the Regiment and
to load the men with gifts. All along the line little knots of natives
shouted and danced their welcome, and even after darkness had fallen
every station at which the trains stopped was crammed by eager crowds of
Europeans and natives alike, bent upon showing the men what pride the
colony felt at the reputation which they had won for themselves, and how
deep was the popular sympathy for all they had suffered and endured.
It was a royal home-coming, and when at dawn the men, worn out with
excitement and fatigue at last arrived at Kumasi, their women met them
at the station in a clamorous mob, and accompanied them in triumph to
their cantonments, with the songs and dances wherewith the warriors of
West Africa have always been greeted on their return from a victorious
campaign.
But, alas! there were wailings and keenings too, mingling with the
joyful tumult, for many a woman there was lamenting some poor fellow who
lies buried far away on the other side of Africa, and would not be
comforted because he was not.
* * * * *
The casualties sustained by the Gold Coast Regiment during the campaign
in East Africa were as follows:—
─────────────────────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────┬─────────
│Killed in│ │ │ Died of│
│ action.│ Wounded.│ Missing.│diseases.│Invalided.
─────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────
British officers │ 9│ 21│ —│ │
British non-commissioned │ │ │ │ │
officers │ 6│ 9│ —│ 4│ 15
Rank and file │ 181│ 603│ 13│ 206│ 469
Gun-carriers │ 9│ 56│ —│ 16│ 28
Stretcher-bearers │ —│ │ —│ —│ —
Clerks │ —│ —│ —│ 1│ 1
Carriers │ 10│ 33│ —│ 40│ 24
─────────────────────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────┼─────────
Total │ 215│ 725│ 13│ 270│ 567
─────────────────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────┴─────────
The strength of the Gold Coast Regiment actually in the field never much
exceeded 900 rifles. The total of effectives belonging to the Regiment
at any one time in East Africa never numbered much more than 3000, and
from first to last the total number of officers and men of all ranks
dispatched did not amount to much more than 3800. When these facts are
remembered, the above table will be found strikingly to illustrate the
severity of the fighting in which the Regiment took so active a part,
and to indicate the ravages caused by disease to which prolonged strain
and hardship exposed it.
* * * * *
Meanwhile the recruiting efforts made by the Government of the Gold
Coast, to which during 1917-18 Captain Armitage, C.M.G., D.S.O., the
Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, had devoted special
energy and enthusiasm, had resulted in the collection of a very large
number of recruits at the various training-depôts throughout the Colony,
Ashanti, and the Northern Territories; and the Regiment had proved
itself to possess such fine qualities that, as the early end of the war
was not at that time anticipated, the War Office decided to convert it
from a battalion to a brigade. This consisted of four full battalions
with a battery of four 2·75 guns, and a battery of eight Stokes guns,
and it was constituted a brigade as from the 1st November, 1918, under
the command of Brigadier-General Rose. It was an open secret that, as
soon as its organization was complete, the Second West African Brigade,
as it was now called, was to be dispatched on active service to
Palestine.
Then, during the closing days of October and the first half of November,
came the dramatic collapse of the Central Powers and of their Allies—the
_débacle_ in the Balkans, the surrender of Turkey, the rout of the
Austro-Hungarian armies on the Italian front, the succession of
hammer-blows delivered on the western front from the Swiss frontier to
the sea, and finally the Armstice granted to a defeated, crime-stained
enemy, the terms of which exactly reflected the magnitude of the Allies’
victory, and the extent to which Germany and Germans had forfeited the
trust and the respect of all mankind.
The reading of those terms from the balcony of the Public Offices at
Accra to a large concourse of people, almost beside themselves with
enthusiasm and delight, was recognized as closing the short career of
the Gold Coast Service Brigade; and by the end of the following December
its disbandment was completed. It had existed long enough, however, to
enable the Gold Coast to boast that it, no less than its neighbour the
huge territory of Nigeria, had been able to raise by voluntary
enlistment a full brigade of soldiers for the service of the Empire in
the Great War.
APPENDIX I
THE MOUNTED INFANTRY OF THE GOLD COAST| REGIMENT
There is another Gold Coast unit, which never served with the rest of
the Regiment, and which remained behind in Portuguese East Africa when
the remainder of the battalion returned to the West Coast, and of its
short but adventuresome career some brief account must here be given.
At the end of February, 1918, nearly two months after the arrival of
Colonel Goodwin with the main body of the Gold Coast Regiment at Port
Amelia, Lieutenant G. H. Parker, who has been mentioned in an earlier
chapter as having been in temporary command of the Battery, was chosen
by Colonel Rose to raise and train a small body of Mounted Infantry. He
was told to pick out for this purpose, from a newly arrived draft of
recruits from the Gold Coast, 170 men; and to him were attached
Lieutenants Drummond and Saunders, and five British non-commissioned
officers.
The men chosen were natives of the Hinterland of the Gold Coast, to
whom, since they for the most part live beyond the range of the tsetse
fly and the _Trypanosoma_, horses are more or less familiar animals.
About 10 per cent. of them could ride in the hunched-up, Tod Sloan-like
fashion peculiar to folk to whom saddles are unusual luxuries; but not a
man among them had the vaguest ideas concerning horse-mastership and
management.
Four riding-schools were constructed near the camp, upon the top of the
hill which slopes on the one side to the waters of the Indian Ocean, and
on the other falls in a sheer cliff to the beach at Port Amelia; and
daily for hours at a time the European officers and non-commissioned
officers shouted themselves hoarse, while the men bumped round the
_manèges_. A certain number were incurably horse-shy, and had to be
“returned to store,” but the majority were quite fearless and enjoyed
their daily ride, and though horses had not been received at Port Amelia
until the end of March, by the 30th May No. 1 Troop of the Mounted
Infantry of the Gold Coast Regiment was declared to be fit to take the
field.
This troop, under the command of Lieutenant Drummond, consisting of 1
British non-commissioned officer, 41 rank and file, 51 horses, 2 mules,
and 2 camp-followers, left Port Amelia on the above-mentioned date, and
rode up the well-worn track from Mtuge to Medo, and thence to Wanakoti,
General Edwards’ Headquarters. The troop arrived at this place just as
the Gold Coast Regiment was about to begin its march back to the coast
from Korewa.
It is not possible to follow the history of this troop in detail without
embarking upon a full account of the campaign in the Province of
Mozambique, to which the British were committed after the Germans had
retreated across the Lurio River, and this forms no part of the plan of
the present work. It must, therefore, suffice to note that “Kartucol”
from this time onward followed hard upon the heels of the enemy forces,
pursuing them without intermission nearly as far south as Kilimane. A
little north of this place one and a half companies of the 2nd Battalion
of the 3rd King’s African Rifles, with a much larger force of Portuguese
encamped at Nhamaccura, were attacked by the enemy, who, having
possessed himself of the guns belonging to the Portuguese, nearly
annihilated the small British detachment, Colonel Gore Brown, who was in
command, being himself killed with a large number of his men.
After this the enemy went north once more, still pursued by “Kartucol,”
which had now cut loose from its transport and was living on the
country; and the Germans shortly afterwards attacked and invested
Namirrue, a place near the centre of the province, which was being held
by a company of the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd King’s African Rifles,
under Captain Bustard.
Drummond’s Troop of Gold Coast Mounted Infantry had worked its way down
in a southerly direction from Wanakoti to Namirrue, scouting for the
columns, and doing some excellent work; and it had joined up with
Captain Bustard’s little force just before the latter was surrounded.
Finding that the position which he occupied at the moment of the enemy
attack was commanded by the German guns, Captain Bustard occupied a
higher hill near at hand; and, though hopelessly outnumbered, cut off
from water, and bombarded by a Stokes gun which had been captured by the
Germans, he made a gallant fight of it, and held out for three days.
Meanwhile the three remaining troops of the Gold Coast Mounted Infantry,
under Captain Parker, had sailed from Port Amelia on the 1st July,
arriving on the following day at Mussuril Bay, in the entrance to which
lies the island of Mozambique. The force consisted of 8 British
officers, 10 British non-commissioned officers, 137 rank and file, 84
East Africans, 2 Indians, 11 other details, with 133 horses, 50 mules,
and 141 donkeys.
The Mounted Infantry were disembarked at Lumbo, on the northern shores
of the bay, and on the 5th July marched twenty miles to Monapo, where
their depôt was established. On the 8th July the Squadron began its
march to Nampula, eighty miles further inland, where at this time
General Edwards had his Headquarters; and travelling an average of about
twenty miles a day, it reached its destination on the afternoon of the
11th July. Here Captain Parker learned that No. 1 Troop was with Captain
Bustard at Namirrue, and that it was thought that the small post
established there would embarrass the retreat of the enemy, who was
known to be advancing from the south.
On the following days the Squadron pushed on in the direction of Chinga,
which lies five-and-forty miles to the west of Nampula, walking and
leading most of the time, for sore backs among the horses were already
giving occasion for anxiety. From Chinga on the 15th July the Squadron
marched sixteen miles to Marrupula; and here on the following day
Captain Parker received orders to press forward as rapidly as possible
to Metil, and thence to take up certain positions on the Ligonha River.
Three days’ rations were drawn, and though the nights were very cold,
the capes and spare clothing were all left behind, the men being cut
down to their body-clothes and one blanket each, in order to ease the
horses of as much weight as possible.
On the 17th July the Squadron covered a distance of thirty-three miles
to Calipo, and on the morrow reached Pequerra, and pushed on thence to
the banks of the Ligonha River, travelling on that day thirty-six miles
between dawn and dusk.
The geography of the country was very imperfectly known, and the only
available maps were grossly inaccurate. Moreover, whereas it had been
anticipated that the Ligonha River would only be fordable in a few
places, which the Squadron had been ordered to hold, it was found that
the stream was quite shallow for a distance of at least twenty miles.
This was discovered on the 19th July, on which day Metil was reached,
the Squadron having marched one hundred and two miles to that place from
Murrupula in fifty-seven hours—a very good performance for a newly
raised body of Mounted Infantry.
From Metil one troop, under Lieutenant Poole, was sent eastward to
Napue; a second, under Lieutenant Viney, went toward Muligudge, five
miles south-east of Metil; and a third, under Lieutenant Saunders, back
along the track towards Pequerra, twenty men and Lieutenant Broomfield
remaining at Metil with Captain Parker. All these mounted patrols had
orders to try to locate the enemy and to keep touch as far as possible
with one another and with Captain Parker.
On the 23rd July news was received that Namirrue was invested by the
enemy, and that though it was still holding out, Colonel Fitzgerald’s
column, consisting of the 4th Battalion of the 4th and the 3rd Battalion
of the 3rd King’s African Rifles, had had to retire when attempting to
move to Captain Bustard’s relief. As Captain Parker was instructed to
get as many of his men together as possible in order to scout in the
direction of Namirrue, the troops under Lieutenants Poole and Viney were
recalled, and on the 24th July, Captain Parker moved back to Pequerra,
and thence proceeded through dense bush to the banks of the Ligonha.
From here Lieutenant Viney with twelve troopers crossed the stream and
went scouting in what was believed to be the direction of Namirrue. On
the 26th July Lieutenant Broomfield with twenty men were sent to Lulete,
Captain Parker and Lieutenant Saunders with twenty-eight men—all that
remained at their disposal—moving up the left bank of the Ligonha. At 4
p.m. they came upon a track, surprised an enemy baggage-train, and
captured nine porters, the baggage-guard making off. Lieutenant Saunders
with a few rifles was left to watch the trail, and late that afternoon
he had a brush with the enemy, and captured a German, an _Askari_, and
about a dozen more porters, also killing one or two enemy soldiers.
On the 27th July Captain Parker set off for Pequerra with the prisoners,
leaving Lieutenant Saunders with a few men to watch the track and to
snipe and harass the enemy. Captain Parker fell in with a superior force
of the enemy, lost all his prisoners and a good many of his men and
horses, and was himself reported missing for three days. At the end of
that time, however, he and the surviving remnant of his troop contrived
to rejoin. Meanwhile Lieutenant Saunders also came into touch with the
enemy, was wounded and had several of his men and nearly all his horses
shot; while Lieutenant Viney, who was surprised and attacked just as he
had off-saddled, was killed, his men, acting on his orders, dispersing
into the bush. Immediately afterwards word was received that Captain
Bustard at Namirrue had been compelled to surrender, and with him
Lieutenant Drummond and what was left of No. 1 Troop of the Gold Coast
Mounted Infantry.
This meant that the Gold Coast Mounted Infantry, which on the 5th July
had numbered, including Lieutenant Drummond’s troop, about one hundred
and sixty-five rank and file, was now reduced to sixty-five men; and
Captain Parker returned to the depôt at Mnapo to train and equip further
drafts, while Lieutenant Broomfield remained in the field in command of
the handful of mounted men still effective as a fighting force.
Though the enemy had won successes at Nhamaccura and at Namirrue, in
both of which places he had succeeded in cutting off small British
forces, he was now being hunted by “Kartucol” from the south into the
grip of six converging columns; and for the first time in the history of
the whole campaign he was so completely cornered that in the
neighbourhood of Chalana—a place some five-and-forty miles inland from
the coast of Antonio Annes—he was compelled to concentrate all his
troops, combining them into a single force.
It was while the meshes of the net appeared at last to be securely drawn
around von Lettow-Vorbeck, that Lieutenant Broomfield and his little
body of sixty men of the Gold Coast Mounted Infantry specially
distinguished themselves. It was of great moment to General Edwards that
he should be kept fully and frequently informed of the exact position
and movements of the enemy, and this service was rendered to him by
Lieutenant Broomfield. For a week the Gold Coast Mounted Infantry
maintained close touch with the enemy’s main body. The country is here
very thickly populated. The Germans, who were paying for all their
supplies with cloth which they had looted from the Portuguese stores,
had made themselves very popular with the local natives, who witnessed
the wholesale destruction of the Portuguese _bomas_ with ecstatic
delight. The British, who they were assured were hired bravos engaged by
the Portuguese to capture their deliverers, were proportionately
unpopular, and the movements of Broomfield’s two troops were again and
again betrayed by the natives to the enemy. Often he had to change his
resting-place three and four times a day; he was engaged with the enemy
almost as frequently; yet his active patrolling continued without
interruption, and General Edwards was kept regularly informed as to
every move which the enemy was making. It was, in its way, an
outstanding little bit of work, carried out with great coolness,
persistency and skill, and it by itself would abundantly have justified
all the labour which had been expended in raising and training the Gold
Coast Mounted Infantry.
At Numarroe—which lies much further to the west and must not be confused
with Namirrue—von Lettow-Vorbeck surprised and captured at the end of
August a small British detachment from what had formerly been one of
General Northey’s columns; but at Liome on the 31st August and on the
1st September he came in for the worst hammering he had experienced in
the whole course of the campaign, losing some fifty of his Europeans and
several hundreds of his _Askari_ killed, wounded and captured. On this
occasion Lieutenant Drummond and a number of other captives were able to
make their escape.
Thereafter, as is now well known, von Lettow-Vorbeck broke away north,
succeeded in crossing the Lurio River, and thence treked through the
Nyassa Company’s territory to Ngomano on the Rovuma, where at the end of
November in the preceding year he had re-equipped and refitted at the
expense of the Portuguese garrison. Crossing the Rovuma, he once more
entered German East Africa, still hotly pursued by battalions of the
indefatigable King’s African Rifles; but when after the signing of the
Armistice he finally surrendered, he made his submission to a small
police post in Northern Rhodesia.
The Gold Coast Mounted Infantry, once more reinforced and under the
command of Major Parker, joined in the pursuit as far north as Ngomano,
but on this occasion saw no fighting. On the 3rd October, however,
orders were received for them to return to the Gold Coast in order to
rejoin the 2nd West African Brigade; and as soon as the necessary
arrangements could be completed, the men of the Gold Coast Mounted
Infantry were embarked at Port Amelia, and on their arrival at Accra
were disbanded, and reabsorbed into the Gold Coast Regiment.
APPENDIX II
LIST OF HONOURS AND DECORATIONS AWARDED TO EUROPEAN STAFF AND NATIVE
RANK AND FILE OF THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT DURING THE EAST AFRICAN
CAMPAIGN.
(1) EUROPEAN OFFICERS.
Date.
Brevet Temporary Lieut.-Colonel 7/2/17
Lieut.-Colonel R. A. de B. Rose,
D.S.O.
Major G. Shaw, M.C. 5/8/18
Brevet Major on Lieut. (Temporary Captain) 5/8/18
promotion to T. B. C. Piggott,
Captain M.C.
D.S.O. Major H. Goodwin 10/6/17
Captain H. A. Harman 10/6/17
Bar to D.S.O. Lieut.-Colonel R. A. de B. 5/8/18
Rose, D.S.O
M.C. Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) 24/11/16
G. Shaw
Captain A. J. R. O’Brien 24/11/16
Captain R. H. Poyntz 24/1/17
Captain J. Leslie-Smith 13/8/17
Captain J. G. Foley 29/10/17
Captain H. B. Dawes 5/8/18
Lieutenant T. B. C. Piggott 10/6/17
Lieutenant G. H. Parker 11/3/18
Lieutenant R. F. Beech 11/3/18
Lieutenant G. B. Kinley 30/4/18
Lieutenant L. B. Cumming 27/7/18
Bar to M.C. Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) 13/8/17
G. Shaw, M.C.
Bar to M.C. Captain A. J. R. O’Brien, M.C. 13/8/17
Captain E. B. Methven, M.C. 5/11/17
Captain J. G. Foley 17/10/18
Legion d’Honneur Lieut.-Colonel R. A. de B. 22/10/17
Croix d’Officier Rose, D.S.O.
Croix de Guerre Major H. Goodwin, D.S.O. 4/1/17
Italian Silver Medal Lieutenant. T. B. C. Piggott, 4/1/17
M.C.
O.B.E. Major H. Read 9/9/18
(2) BRITISH NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.
D.C.M. 7024 Corpl. J. Campbell 24/1/17
9532 R.S.M. F. C. Medlock 10/6/17
28399 Sergt. E. Thornton 19/7/17
69845 Pte. S. G. Radford 19/7/17
(R.A.M.C.)
1847 Sergt. C. A. Thornett 17/6/18
Bar to D.C.M. 7024 Corpl. J. Campbell 19/7/17
(Russian) Cross St. 69845 Pte. S. G. Radford 12/11/16
George (3rd
Class)
(3) NATIVE RANK AND FILE.
D.C.M 3948 Corpl. Akanno Ibadan 19/7/17
113 M.G.C. John Lagos 19/7/17
3844 C.S.M. Mumuni Moshi 19/7/17
6727 Corpl. Yessufu Kotokoli 19/7/17
5827 Sergt. Moriambah 19/7/17
Moshi
5737 Corpl. Musa Fulani 6/7/17
and 19/7/17
6557 Temporary Corpl. Seti 24/11/16
Frafra
8427 Pte. Yaw Kuma 19/7/17
5493 Corpl. and Tem. Sergt. No date
Chililah Grunshi
8581 L/Corpl. Granda Dikale 19/7/17
7339 Trptr. Nuaga Kusase 18/4/17
5048 Corpl. Sandogo Moshi No date
5397 Dr. Musa Karaki No date
5655 Sergt. Alhaji Grunshi 19/7/17
7817 Pte. Seidu Chokosi 20/9/17
5860 L/Corpl. (Acting-Corpl.) 18/10/17
Issaka Dagarti
4188 Sergt. Yessufu Mamprusi 18/10/17
7426 Bugler Nufu Moshi 1/10/17
4157 C.S.M. Musa Wongara 11/4/17
5225 Sergt. Mamadu Moshi 25/5/17
Bar to D.C.M. 4961 Sergt. Bukara Kukawa 24/11/16
6557 Temporary Corpl. Seti 15/8/17
Frafra
Military Medal 4188 Sergt. Yessufu Mamprusi 19/7/17
6689 Pt. Akuluga Moshi 19/7/17
6414 Sergt. Palpuku Grumah 19/7/17
182 M.G.C. Kwenjeh Moshi 19/7/17
109 M.G.C. Dogali 19/7/17
7842 Pte. Adama Bazaberimi 19/9/17
7248 Pte. Allassan Grumah 15/12/16
4765 Sergt. Braima Dagarti 15/12/16
6690 L/Corpl. Kuka Moshi 15/12/16
6756 Corpl. Timbala Busanga 15/12/16
6675 Corpl. Yero Fulani 15/12/16
13 H.G.C. Imoru Dodo 6/2/17
5593 Corpl. Nuaga Moshi 11/4/17
6688 Pte. Nubela Busanga 11/4/17
6833 Pte. Sebidu Moshi 11/4/17
4388 B.S.M. Bukare Moshi 23/5/17
137 Hdm. G. C. Kwesi John 23/5/17
94 G. C. Lawani Ibadan 23/5/17
959 Sergt. Member 23/5/17
8481 L/Corpl. Ntonge Etun 24/11/16
3851 Sergt. Ali Wongara 24/11/16
170 S. B. Bawa Hausa 24/11/16
200 S. B. Musa Kano 24/11/16
5658 L/Corpl. Sulley Ibadan 24/1/17
Meritorious Service V. 103 Corpl. J. W. H. 17/6/18
Medal Amartey
O.R.S. G. M. Fraser 17/6/18
31 Qr.Mr.-Sergt. S. Amonoo 17/6/18
Aidoo
[Illustration:
SERGT. SANDOGO MOSHI, D.C.M.
.rj 1
To face p. 288 ]
APPENDIX III
STRENGTH OF THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT
ON JULY 31ST, 1916.
Officers 55
British non-commissioned officers 13
Rank and file 1702
STRENGTH OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ON
JULY 6TH, 1916.
Officers 36
British non-commissioned officers 15
Clerks 11
Rank and File 980
Carriers (battery) 177
Carriers (other) 204
Storemen 1
Officers (R.A.M.C.) 4
STRENGTH OF THE DRAFTS SENT FROM THE GOLD
COAST TO REINFORCE THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
First draft—25th November, 1916:—
Officers 4
Clerks 1
Rank and file 402
Second draft—21st April, 1917:—
Officers 2
British non-commissioned officers 1
Rank and file 500
Third draft—5th July, 1917:—
Officers 3
British non-commissioned officers 2
Rank and file 799
Fourth draft—6th October, 1917:—
Rank and file 401
Fifth draft—10th December, 1917:—
Rank and file 500
N.B.—Date shown in each case is that of departure from
the Gold Coast.
APPENDIX IV
_Letter from the General Officer Commanding “Pamforce” to
the Officer Commanding the Gold Coast Regiment._
FAREWELL MESSAGE TO THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT BY THE
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING PAMFORCE.
The departure of the Gold Coast Regiment from my Command furnishes me
with a fitting opportunity to place on record my high appreciation of
the distinguished and gallant services which the Gold Coast Regiment has
never failed to render me within the period that I have had the honour
to command Pamforce.
The greatest testimony to the excellence of the services rendered by the
Gold Coast Regiment is to be found in the fact that during the period
which the Regiment has formed an integral part of Pamforce, it has
assisted in reducing the enemy forces by at least one-half of his former
strength, and the measure of the achievement of the Regiment is the
contrast between the strength of the enemy force when Pamforce was
formed and his strength to-day.
I would desire at this juncture to pay a high tribute of my regard to
the Officer Commanding, Officers, British Non-Commissioned Officers, and
the Native Ranks, for the initiative, resource, and daring which has
characterized the service of all during this particularly difficult
phase of the campaign, while I would wish expressly to place on record
my high appreciation and gratitude for the able and efficient support
that has been so loyally extended to me by Colonel R. A. De B. Rose,
D.S.O., to whose soldierly qualities I feel I owe much.
I bid good-bye to the Regiment with deep regret, but nevertheless with
confidence that, no matter in what other theatre of war the Regiment may
be called on to serve, the Gold Coast Regiment will ever prove itself
worthy both of the confidence of King and Country by upholding the
highest traditions of British arms, and the sacred heritage of the Flag
of Saint George.
I wish you all God-speed, good luck, and a safe return, and so farewell.
(Sgd.) W. F. S. EDWARDS,
Brigadier-General,
General Officer Commanding Pamforce.
Wanakote,
3rd June, 1918.
_Letter addressed to the Officer Commanding the Gold Coast
Regiment by the Acting Colonial Secretary._
No. 5276/M.P.11393/18.
Colonial Secretary’s Office, Accra, Gold Coast,
6th September, 1918.
SIR,
On the occasion of your return to the Colony with the first
portion of the Gold Coast Regiment which is now on its way back from
active service in East Africa, I am directed by the Governor to convey
to you and to ask you to transmit to the Officers, European and Native
Non-commissioned Officers and the men of the Gold Coast Expeditionary
Force under your command, the thanks of the Government of the Gold Coast
for the brilliant and gallant services which they have rendered, and His
Excellency’s warm congratulations to them on their safe return.
2. The fine reputation which the Regiment won for itself in Togoland and
subsequently in the Kameruns has, I am to add, been confirmed and
enhanced by its behaviour during the campaign in East Africa; and the
whole Colony is proud of the record of the Regiment which bears its name
and is recruited from its inhabitants.
3. The heavy losses in Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men
which the Regiment has sustained since it left the Colony on the 6th
July, 1916, though they are the inevitable result of its prowess, are
deeply mourned in the Gold Coast and its Dependencies, and I am to take
this opportunity of expressing His Excellency’s heartfelt sympathy with
you and with the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men of the
Expeditionary Force, which you have commanded with such conspicuous
success.
4. His Excellency hopes that the Regiment will now, for a period, be
able to enjoy the rest which it has so nobly earned, but that, if the
war continues, a further opportunity may be afforded to it, at no very
distant date, once more to render active and valuable assistance to the
Empire,
I have, etc.,
(Sgd.) C. H. HARPER,
Acting Colonial Secretary.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. De B. Rose, D.S.O.,
Officer Commanding Gold Coast Regiment,
Coomassie.
_Resolution passed by the Legislative Council on the 28th
October, 1918._
That this Council do record its proud appreciation of the
reputation as a fighting force won by the Gold Coast Regiment in
East Africa; and that this Council do request His Excellency
to convey to Lieutenant-Colonel Rose, D.S.O., and to the
Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men of the Regiment its
congratulations on the distinguished record of service in the
field, which the Regiment has maintained throughout the
Great War, and its deep sympathy with all ranks in the heavy
casualties which the Regiment has sustained.
INDEX
A Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, 4, 31, 35, 37, 38, 50,
53, 61, 82, 84, 119, 131, 135, 215, 222, 236, 244, 253, 260
Accra, 4, 275, 278;
volunteers from, 56;
school at, 64
_Æneas_, the transport, 5
Aeroplane, British, shot down, 155
Aeroplanes, use of, 111
Africa, East, climate in August, 18;
bush fires, 18;
commencement of the dry season, 71;
the carrier, 151
African, an ancient, acts as guide, 114
Aidoo, Quarter-Master Sergt. S. Amonoo, awarded the Meritorious
Service Medal, 289
Airship, German, 188
Aleppo, 189
Amartey, Corpl. J. W. H., awarded the Meritorious Service
Medal, 289
Ankuabe, 227;
capture of, 228
Ant-bears, 111;
size of holes, 112
Antonio Annes, 284
Arab house, 208, 215
Armistice, terms, 277
Armitage, Capt., Chief Commissioner of the Northern
Territories, 277
Armoured Car Battery, the 7th Light, 167, 174
Arnold, Captain, 206
——, Lieut., death, 39
Ashanti, 4
_Askari_, the German native soldier, 22;
reasons for the fidelity, 74, 77;
result of the military system, 75-77, 203;
reputation, 77;
desertion, 166
Austro-Hungarian armies, rout, 277
Avenell, Colour-Sergt., 112
Awudu Arigungu, Sergt., killed, 96
—— Bakano, Sergt.-Major, killed, 105
B Column, march to Naurus, 204
B Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, 4, 20, 29, 35, 37, 50,
54, 61, 78, 79, 82, 93, 95, 101, 121, 131, 138, 153, 156,
167-169, 172, 175, 201, 228, 242, 270, 272
Bagamoyo, 10, 39
Baillie, Lieut., 112, 124, 167, 172;
wounded, 174, 178;
brought to safety, 177
Baldwin, Lieut., 146
Baluchis, the 129th, 47, 58, 142, 144, 154, 155, 156, 164;
at Makangaga, 94;
casualties, 145;
engagement at Mwiti, 200
Baluchis, the 130th, 40
_Banda_, or bush-huts, 234
Banda Hill, 49, 51, 53
Bandari, 219
Bangalla, 207;
river, 199
Barrett, Lieut., 226;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 241;
wounded, 246, 248
Baverstock, Colour-Sergt., wounded, 105
Bazaberimi, Pte. Adama, awarded the Military Medal, 288
Beattie, Colour-Sergt., 56;
wounded, 32
Beaumont’s Post, 86, 87, 89, 90, 94
Beech, Lieut. R. F., 82, 235, 263;
awarded the Military Cross, 286
Beka, 131, 132
Belgian troops, advance on Mahenge, 108
Benham, Captain, illness, 131
Berry, Lieut., 40
Beves, General, in command of the Division, 91;
plan of attack, 93;
at Narungombe, 107;
at Lindi, 133
Biddulph, Capt., 51;
wounded, 51;
death, 56
Biltcliffe, Lieut., 90;
at Port Amelia, 208
Bisshopp, Lieut., 226, 235, 237;
at Muapa, 230;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 241;
patrol-work, 262-264
Bliss Hill, 44
Bogoberi, gun-carrier, 84
_Bomas_, or entrenched forts, 217
Bompkin, Major von, taken prisoner, 59
Brady, Capt., 112
Bray, Lieut., 30;
killed at the battle of Nkessa, 39
——, Lieut., 89; at Lingaula Ridge, 91;
wounded, 105
Briscoe, Capt., 112, 191
British columns in East Africa, disadvantages in fighting,
148-152;
transport, attack on, 87
Brits, Brig.-General, in command of South African mounted
troops, 11
Broomfield, Lieut., 282, 283, 284
Brown, Colonel Gore, killed, 280
Buckby, Capt., 135, 136
Buffalo, charges through No. 1 Column, 199
Bukari, Acting-Sergeant, awarded the D.C.M., 30;
death, 30
Bulu, 225
Busanga, Corpl. Bila, 139
——, Pte. Nubela, awarded the Military Medal, 288
——, Corpl. Timballa, wounded, 69;
awarded the Military Medal, 288
Bush fighting, 3, 151, 158;
fires, 18, 110;
huts, 234
Bussell, Lieut., 131
Bustard, Capt., 280, 281;
surrender, 283
Butler, Capt. Jack, at the battle of Kikirunga, 26-29;
killed, 29, 32;
characteristics, 29
Bweho Chini, engagement at, 130
Calipo, 282
Campbell, Corpl. J., 112, 131;
awarded the D.C.M. and Bar, 59, 287;
bravery, 103
Capetown, 274
Cavalry, the 25th, destruction of the camp, 183;
at Lulindi, 195
_Chaimite_, the, 221
Chalana, 284
_Chaqual_, canvas bag of water, 117
Chasi, 16
Chaundler, Lieut., 235
Chemera, 44, 46, 71
Chigugu, 182, 186, 208
Chikukwe, 180
Chilonga, 269
Chinga, 281
Chingwea, 166, 185
“Chini,” meaning of the word, 47
Chirimba Hill, 239;
advance on, 240-244;
action at, 244-247
Chisona, 266, 268
Chiure, 222
Chiwata, 191, 195
Chokosi, Pte. Seidu, awarded the D.C.M., 288
_Chuplies_, meaning of the word, 9
Clarke, Lieut., 224, 234, 237
Clifford, Sir Hugh, Governor of the Gold Coast Colony, 4;
banquet to the officers, 4
Column, No. 1: 98, 101, 117, 126, 132, 134, 142, 143, 153, 157,
159, 163, 164, 166;
at Ukuli, 94;
march to Ruponda, 184;
at Ndanda, 187;
occupy Mwiti, 187;
Luchemi, 194;
at Luatalla, 198;
charged by a bull buffalo, 199;
at Bangalla, 201;
broken up, 204
——, No. 2: 94, 96-98, 102, 103, 104, 118, 127, 166, 195
——, No. 3: 94, 99, 102, 195
Cumming, Lieut. L. B., 238;
awarded the Military Cross, 286
Cuneen, Colour-Sergt., 167, 172;
killed, 173, 178
Cunliffe, General, 108
D Company, 56
“D. M. B.,” the Indian Mountain Battery, 94, 96, 233, 242, 247,
259, 272
Dadoma, 11, 12, 109
Dagarti, Sergt. Braima, awarded the Military Medal, 288
——, Corpl. Issaka, awarded the D.C.M., 288
Dakawa, 16
D’Amico, Capt., 55
Dar-es-Salaam, 10, 12, 20, 40, 41
Dar-es-Salaam-Lake Tanganyika Railway, 72, 109
Dawes, Capt. H. B., 144, 224, 225;
wounded, 194;
captures Pumone, 227;
at Ankuabe, 228;
awarded the Military Cross, 286
Depôt Company, 78;
mobilized, 87;
at Port Amelia, 227
Derajat, 94
_Dhow_, or sailing-boats, 220
Dikale, Corpl. Granda, awarded the D.C.M., 288
Dobell, Major-General, in command of the British and French
troops, 1;
at Liome, 1
Dodo, Imoru, awarded the Military Medal, 288
Dogali, M. G. C., awarded the Military Medal, 288
Donho, 34
Downer, Lieut., 56, 112;
at Gold Coast Hill, 58
Drummond, Lieut., 279, 280, 285
Duck, Capt., 214, 216, 255
Duncan, Lieut., killed, 51
Durban, 5, 274
East African Brigades: the 1st, 10;
the 2nd, 10, 35;
the 3rd, 60;
Mounted Rifles, 21;
capture Germans, 22
Edwards, Brig.-General W. F. S., Inspector-General of
Communications, 8;
inspects the Gold Coast Regiment, 8, 12;
at Port Amelia, 233;
Rock Camp, 238;
Kalima, 256;
plans to surround Kohl, 269;
at Nampula, 281;
farewell message, 292
Eglon, Lieut., 93;
at Lingaula Ridge, 95;
killed, 101, 105
Enslin, General, 17
Etun, Corpl. Ntonge, 229;
awarded the Military Medal, 289
Fitzgerald, Colonel, 282
Flatman, Capt., killed, 240, 248
Foley, Capt. J. G., 56, 82, 224,243, 248;
at the battle of Rumbo, 83-86;
awarded the Military Cross and Bar, 89, 286, 287;
at the battle of Mitoneno, 145
Foster, Lieut., exploit at Ruangwa Chini, 155;
act of heroism, 176;
awarded the Military Cross, 177;
the D.C.M. and Bar, 287
Fra Fra, Temp. Corpl. Seti, awarded the D.C.M. and Bar 287, 288
Fraser, G. M., awarded the Meritorious Service Medal, 289
Fulani, Corpl. Amandu, killed, 69
——, Corpl. Musa, awarded the D.C.M., 287
——, Corpl. Yero, awarded the Military Medal, 288
Fulanis, 56
G Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, 4, 31, 35, 36, 38;
broken up, 44, 46
Gara, 274
German East Africa, mission stations, 22
Germans, surrender at Kamina, 1;
retreat, 24, 121, 124, 139, 146;
casualties, 32, 81;
evacuate Nkessa, 39;
bombard Kibata, 48;
attack on Gold Coast Hill, 53;
accuracy of firing, 56;
evacuate it, 58;
treachery, 63;
attack on Njimbwe, 67;
headquarters at Massassi, 72, 162, 194;
expelled from the Rufiji, 72, 74;
reasons for the fidelity of the native soldiers, 74, 77;
result of the military system, 75-77, 203;
ambush against, 79-81;
flag of truce, 81, 86;
fire on a British transport, 87;
attack on Narungombe, 98-104;
retire to Mihambia, 109, 120, 124;
at Ndessa, 116;
defeated at Bweho Chini, 130;
rear-guard actions, 131, 271;
engagements at Nahungen, 134-139;
Mitoneno, 144-146;
advantages of their position, 148-152;
at Ruangwa Chini, 156;
stores captured, 159, 164;
defeated at Ruponda, 164;
capture of their correspondence, 165;
fear of their Commander-in-Chief, 165, 166;
attacked at Lukuledi, 172-178;
at Nangus, 185;
taken prisoners, 195;
surrender, 196, 202;
evacuate Medo, 249;
campaign in Mozambique, 280-285
Germany, declaration of war, 1;
armistice terms, 278
Gifford, Colonel, in command of Pamforce column, 233
Gold Coast Colony, 4;
recruiting campaign, 277
Gold Coast Hill, 49;
attack on, 53-55;
evacuated, 58
Gold Coast Mounted Infantry, campaign in Mozambique, 279-285;
at Accra, 285
Gold Coast Regiment, mobilized, 1;
invasion of Togoland, 1;
the Kameruns, 2;
courage and endurance, 2, 105;
at Sekondi, 4, 275;
appearance, 4, 9;
on board the _Æneas_, 5;
inspection at Durban, 5;
at Kilindini, 6;
journey to Ngombezi, 6-8;
service kit, 8;
characteristics, 9, 15;
join up with the Royal Fusiliers, 11;
march to Msiha, 12-15;
at Dakawa, 16;
march to the Ngere-Ngere, 17-20;
transport burnt, 19;
at Metomba, 22-24;
the battle of Kikirunga, 25-32;
casualties, 32, 39, 55, 67, 104, 132, 139, 146, 178, 181,
194, 248, 276;
at Kiringezi, 34;
occupy Nkessa, 39;
march to Dar-es-Salaam, 40;
on board the _Ingoma_, 41;
at Kilwa Kisiwana, 44;
march to Chemera, 44-46;
reduction in the _personnel_, 46;
march to Mtumbei Chini, 47;
attack on Gold Coast Hill, 50-55;
reinforcements, 56, 112;
total strength, 57, 88, 89, 92, 113, 205, 276, 290;
at Ngarambi Chini, 61;
Njimbwe, 65, 69;
shortage of food, 68, 261;
discipline, 68, 129;
march to Mitole, 70, 78;
at Mnasi, 79;
Migeri-geri, 82;
Rumbo, 86, 88;
Ngomania, 95;
Makangaga, 95;
join up with No. 2 Column, 95;
retransferred to No. 1 Column, 98;
attack on Narungombe, 101-104;
at Mikikole, 110;
Liwinda Ravine, 117;
sufferings from thirst, 125-129;
at Mbombomya, 127;
Ndessa Juu, 129;
Kitandi, 130;
march on Nahungen, 131;
attack on, 134-139;
meeting with the Nigerian Brigade, 140;
attack on Mitoneno, 144-146;
bathing and washing, 147;
in reserve, 153;
advance on Ruponda, 163, 185;
march to Lukuledi, 167, 168;
at Lulindi, 198;
Bangalla River, 199, 207;
selected for service in Portuguese East Africa, 209;
at Mingoya, 214;
transferred from H.M. _Salamis_ to H.M.S. _Lunkwa_, 215;
at Port Amelia, 222, 274, 279;
Meza, 230, 234;
at the battle of Chirimba Hill, 244-247;
advance on Mwalia, 253;
at Milinch Hills, 261;
respite from fighting, 273;
reception at Kumasi, 276;
list of honours and decorations awarded to, 286-289;
farewell message from Brig.-Gen. Edwards, 292.
Gold Coast Service Brigade, 277;
disbanded, 278
Goodwin. Lieut-Colonel H., 31, 35, 37, 58, 207;
wounded, 53;
in command of the Gold Coast Regiment, 60;
appointed Acting Lieut.-Colonel, 89;
awarded the _Croix de Guerre_, 89, 287;
the D.S.O., 90, 286;
invalided to the base, 91;
in command of Companies, 141;
advance on Mihomo, 141;
at the battle of Mitoneno, 144, 146;
attack on Lukuledi, 174;
voyage to Port Amelia, 215, 279;
on board H.M. _Hongbee_, 216;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 244
Grant, Colonel, 94
Greene, Capt., 82
Greene, Capt., killed at the battle of Nkessa, 39
Green’s Post, 61
Gregg’s Post, 110, 113, 119
Griffiths, Colonel, 266;
in command of “Norforce,” 268;
captures Mwariba, 270
Grumah, Pte. Allassan, awarded the Military Medal, 288
Grumah, Sergt. Palpuku, awarded the D.C.M., 57:
the Military Medal, 288
Grunshi, Sergt. Alhaji, awarded the D.C.M., 288
Grunshi, Corpl. Chililah, awarded the D.C.M., 287
Gush, Capt., 167;
wounded, 177, 178
Handeni, base at, 11, 15
“Hanforce,” 118, 153
Hannyngton, Brig.-General, in command of the 2nd East African
Brigade, 10;
telegram of congratulation, 33;
military operations at Kilwa, 43;
plan of attack, 49, 113, 153;
awards decorations, 57;
resumes command, 107
Harman, Capt. H. A., 47, 50;
wounded, 53;
awarded the D.S.O., 90, 286;
at Minoya, 214, 215;
Mahiba, 225;
Namaaka, 235;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 244, 245
Harman’s Kopje, 50, 51, 55
Harper, C. H., letter from, 294
Harris, Capt., 260;
at Port Amelia, 208;
Mkufi, 222;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 240
Hart, Colour-Sergt., at Mkufi, 225
Hartland, Capt., 112
Hassan Bazaberimi, Company Sergeant-Major, killed, 87
Hausa, S. B. Bawa, awarded the Military Medal, 289
Hellis, Capt., 56
Hill, Major, 104
_Hongbee_, H.M., 216
Hornby, Major, 112, 274
Hoskyns, Major-General, in command of the First Division, 10
_Hymettus_, H.M., 274
I Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, 4, 31, 35, 36, 38, 40,
46, 89, 90, 135, 144, 164, 177, 222, 225, 228, 236, 242-247,
253, 269
Ibadan. Corpl. Akanno, awarded the D.C.M., 287
Ibadan, G. C. Lawani, awarded the Military Medal, 288
Ibadan, Corpl. Sulley, awarded the Military Medal, 59, 289
Igumi, 186
Indian Cavalry, the 25th, 153
Indian Mountain Battery, or the “D.M.B.,” 94, 96, 233, 242,
247, 259, 272
Indian Ocean, 219, 279
_Ingoma_, the transport, 41
Isaacs, Lieut., taken prisoner, 39;
released, 196
Issaka, Kipalsi, Corpl., bravery, 125
Jaundis, 56
Jerimita, 262
John, Hdm. G. C. Kwesi, awarded the Military Medal, 288
Jumbe Nambude, 200
Jumbe Nwinama, mission station, 187
“Juu,” meaning of the word, 47
Kalima, 256
Kameruns, 1;
fighting in, 2
Kamina, wireless installation at, 1
Kano, S. B. Musa, awarded the Military Medal, 289
Karaki, Dr., Musa, awarded the D.C.M., 288
“Kartucol,” 233;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 242, 244;
Mwalia, 255;
Koronje, 258-260;
pursuit of the Germans, 280
Kassanga, 34
Kay, Lieut., 259
Kelton, Capt., 50, 55
Kent, Sergt., killed, 271
Kerr, Hauptmann, 116
Kibata, mission station, 43, 47, 57;
shelled by the Germans, 48
Kibega river, 65
Kidugato, 41
Kigome, 11
Kihendye, 97
Kihindi Hill, 142, 143
Kihindo Juu, 127
Kihumburu, 98, 99, 100
Kikirunga Hill, 25, 26;
battle of, 28-32
Kilageli, 96
Kilimane, 280
Kilima-njaro, 7
Kilindini, 6, 11, 209
Kilney, Lieut., 53
Kilossa, 11, 12, 109
Kilwa Kisiwani, 42, 44, 78, 87
Kilwa Kivinje, 73, 78, 79
Kimamba, 17
Kingani River, 10
King’s African Rifles, 48, 50, 58, 65, 94, 97, 142, 143, 157,
166, 168, 177;
at the battle of Kikirunga, 30;
advance, 33;
at the battle of Nkessa, 37;
Rumbo, 87;
Narungombe, 101-104;
Mihambia, 117, 119;
Nahungen, 134;
occupy Lukuledi, 180;
advance on Massassi, 182;
at Ndanda, 186;
Mahiba, 227;
dispatched to Mozambique, 252;
advance on Mwalia, 254;
Koronje, 258;
Jerimita, 262;
Nairobi, 273
Kinley, Lieut. G. B., 95;
encounter with Germans, 79-81;
awarded the D.S.O., 82;
the Military Cross, 89, 286
Kiperele Chini, 158
Kipondira, 98
Kiringezi, 34
Kirongo, 78, 79, 96
Kirongo-Ware, 96
Kissalu, 34;
mines on the road, 40
Kisserawe, 41
Kitambi, 47, 55, 71, 78, 235
Kitandi, 128, 130
Kitiia, 109, 113, 116, 119
Kiwambi, 63
Kiyombo, 61, 65
_Koenigsberg_, 48
Kohl, Major, at Chirimba Hill, 239;
plans to surround, 269;
loss of his baggage, 270;
retreat to Mozambique, 272
Koloi, 226
Kondoa-Irangi, 11
Korewa, 271, 272
Korogwe, 11, 44
Koronje, 252, 256;
advance on, 258;
evacuated, 259
Kotokoli, Corpl. Yessufu, awarded the D.C.M., 287
Kukawa, Sergt. Bukara, Bar to D.C.M., 288
Kuma, Yaw, awarded the D.C.M., 287
Kumasi, 2, 4, 276
Kusase, Nuaga, awarded the D.C.M., 288
Kwevi Lombo, 16
Lagos, John, awarded the D.C.M., 287
Lamont, Lieut., 112, 243, 248
Leal, Major, 252
Legislative Council, resolution, 294
Leslie-Smith, Capt. J., wounded, 105;
at Namarika, 235;
patrol work, 262-264;
awarded the Military Cross, 286
Lettow-Vorbeck, von, Commander-in-Chief, 59;
at Massassi, 72, 133, 148, 162;
attack on a British transport, 87;
defeat at Bweho Chini, 130;
pluck and resource, 151, 166, 198;
forces, 152;
at Ruwanga, 163;
refuses to surrender, 166;
actions, 181;
concerted movements, 182;
at Newala, 194;
expelled from German East Africa, 196, 198;
captures ammunition at Ngomano, 207;
march on Port Amelia, 208;
character of his military operations, 212, 251;
at Nanguari, 213;
raiding parties, 213, 221;
at Nanungu, 265;
Wanakoti, 266;
retreat to Mozambique, 272;
surrender, 285
Ligonha River, 282
Lihonja, 159
Likawage, 79
Lindi, 73, 108, 118, 133, 148, 207
“Linforce” Column, 148, 161, 251;
joined by the Nigerian Brigade, 162;
advance to Mtama, 167;
actions, 181, 185
Lingaula Ridge, 91, 93, 95
Liome, 285
Lions, at Msalu, 265
Liwale, 73, 78, 118
Liwinda Ravine, 109, 110, 111;
water depôt at, 113, 117
Lome, 1, 76
Lorenço Marquez, 216
Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, 10, 35, 37
Luatalla, 198
Luchemi, 190, 194
Lugomya River, 61
Lujendi River, 213
Lukigura River, 10
Lukuledi, mission station at, 167, 169-171;
attack on, 168-178;
destruction of the church, 183
—— River, 169, 186
Lulete, 283
Lulindi, 195, 198
Lumbo, 281
_Lunkwa_, H.M.S., 215
Lurio, 213, 222, 265;
River, 214, 272, 285
Lusinje, 256, 261
Lustalla, 201
Macpherson, Capt., 86, 87;
at the battle of Nkessa, 36;
Rumbo, 90
Mafisa, 17, 41
Magaruna River, 222
Magaura River, 86, 91
_Magdalene_, H.M.T., 274
Magogoni, 41
Maguida River, 228
Mahazi, 15
Mahenge, 109
Mahiba, 225
Mahiwa, 208;
action at, 181, 198
Mahu, 267
Makangaga, 79, 94, 95
Makindu River, 16
Makochera, 207
Makonde Plateau, 188, 190
Makotschera, 73
Makuku, 256, 262
Mama Juma, Sergt.-Major, 173
Mambir River, 190
Mamprusi, Sergt. Yessufu, 173;
wounded, 175;
awarded the D.C.M. and the Military Medal, 288
Manambiri, 235
Manasara Kanjaga, Sergt.-Major, awarded the D.C.M., 57
Mangano, 159
Manyambas, 190, 195
Marenjende, 127
Marrupula, 281
Maruchiras, 190
Massambassi, 20
Massassi, mission station at, 72, 133, 148, 182, 208;
headquarters of the Germans, 72, 162, 194
Matandu River, 43
Matombo Mission Station, 22, 24, 25
Mawerenye, 127
Maxwell, Lieut., 112
May, Colour-Sergt., killed at the battle of Nkessa, 39
Mbalama, 256
Mbalawala hills, 201
Mbemba, 158
Mbemkuru River, 118, 131, 132, 133, 135, 141, 144, 147, 153,
157, 159, 160;
valley of, 132
Mbombomya, 110;
water-holes at, 115, 117, 127
_Mborio_, or fortified posts, 217
McElligott, Capt., 112, 123, 124, 135, 138, 144;
patrol work, 191-193, 201
McEvoy, Lieut., wounded, 257
Mecklenburg, Duke Adolf Freidrich of, Governor of Togoland, 76
Medlock, Sergt.-Major F. C., awarded the D.C.M., 90, 287
Medo, 223, 235, 238, 250;
engagement at, 236;
evacuated, 249
Member, Sergt., awarded the Military Medal, 288
Methven, Capt. E. B., 112;
at Liwinda Ravine, 113;
scouting expedition, 114;
advance on Mihambia, 122, 123;
attack on, Nahungu, 136;
gallant deed, 139;
at the battle of Mitoneno, 145;
attack on Ruangwa Chini, 156;
march to Lukuledi, 167;
attack on, 171-173;
wounded, 173, 178;
awarded a bar to the Military Cross, 179, 287
Metil, 281, 282
Meza, 224, 230
Mgeta River, 39, 40
Miesi River, 199, 201
Migeri-geri, 82
Mihambia, 109, 115, 119;
attack on, 117, 120;
evacuated, 124
Mihomo, 141
Mikesse, 73
Mikikama, 99
Mikikole, 110, 113, 117
Milinch Hills, 260
Mingoya, 208, 214
Minokwe, 97
Mission stations in German East Africa, 22
Mitole, 45, 46, 71, 78
Mitoneno, 142;
advance on, 143;
engagement at, 144-146
Miwale Hill, 190;
River, 190
Mkufi, 222
Mkundi, 194, 195;
River, 17
Mnapo, 281, 283
Mnasi, 78, 79, 89
Mnero, mission station at, 159
Mnindi, 95
Mnitshi, 110, 114, 115, 117, 127
Mombassa, 6
Montepuez River, 238, 258
Moon, eclipse, 93
Morogoro Mission Station, 11, 12, 24
Moschi, 10
Moshi, Pte. Akuluga, awarded the Military Medal, 288
——, Sergt.-Major Bukare, 85;
awarded the D.C.M., 57;
the Military Medal, 288
——, Corpl. Kuka, awarded the Military Medal, 288
——, Kwenjeh, awarded the Military Medal, 288
——, Sergt. Mamadu, 84;
awarded the D.C.M., 288
——, Sergt. Moriambah, awarded the D.C.M., 287
——, Mumuni, awarded the D.C.M., 287
——, Corpl. Nuaga, awarded the Military Medal, 288
——, Bugler Nufu, awarded the D.C.M., 288
——, Corpl. Sandogo, awarded the D.C.M., 288
——, Pte. Sebidu, awarded the Military Medal, 288
Mountain Battery, the 24th, 58
Mountain Battery, the 27th, 94, 117, 119, 134, 142, 157, 177
Mozambique, 216, 272;
campaign in, 280
Mpara, 44, 78
Mpepo, 109
Mpingo, 110, 114, 121, 122, 126
Mpoto, 195
Msalu Boma, 262, 264;
River, 268;
bridge across, 269
Msiha, 12
Mtama, 167, 181, 208
Mtandula, 97
Mtua, 208
Mtuge, 219, 221, 223, 225
Mtumbei Chini, 47, 71
—— Juu, Mission Station, 43, 47, 48, 55
Muapa, 229
Mudge, Sergt., killed, 246, 248
Mule, the transport, character, 151
Muligudge, 282
Murray, Capt., in command of H.M.S. _Lunkwa_, 215
Murray, Lieut., 86
Murrupula, 282
Musa Fra-Fra, Corpl., instinct for discovering water, 70
Mussuril Bay, 281
Mwalia, 251;
advance on, 253-256
Mwambia Ridge, 270
Mwariba, 270
Mwengei, 57, 58
Mwiti Mission Station, 187, 190, 200;
River, 195
Nahungu, 131;
attack on, 134-139, 206
Naiku River, 132
Nairobi, 7, 273
Nairombo, 195
Nakalala, 196
Namaaka, 235;
fight at, 236-238
Namarala, 227, 228
Namaranje, 46
Namarika, 234
Namatwe, 61, 70
Nambingo, 201
Nambunjo Hill, 121, 126;
perimeter camp at, 122
Namburage, 61
Namehi, 153
Nampula, 281
Namirrue, 280, 281, 282, 284
Nanguari, 213
Nangus, 185
Nanungu, 256, 265, 269
Nanunya, 223, 226, 228
Napue, 282
Narungombe, 98, 107, 109;
attack on, 99-104
Nash, Lieut., 201
Natovi, 234
Naurus, 205
Naylor, Colour-Sergt., 136
Ndanda, mission station, 186, 207
Ndessa, 110, 116;
attack on, 118
Ndessa Juu, 129;
water-holes at, 130
Ndomondo, 186
Nelson, Colour-Sergt., 61, 63;
shot, 64;
discovery of his body, 67;
burial, 68
Nerungombe, engagement at, 94
Newala, 73, 188, 194;
Germans surrender, 196;
abandoned, 211
Ngarambi Chini, 60, 61, 70
Ngaura River, 83, 86
Ngere-Ngere, the, 17, 20
Ngomania, 95
Ngomano, 197, 207, 285
Ngombezi, 8, 12
Nhamaccura, 280, 284
Nicholl, Rev. Captain, 68
Nigerian Brigade, 74, 127;
at Rufiji, 108;
advance on Ruale, 118;
engagement at Bweho Chini, 130;
meeting with the Gold Coast Regiment, 140;
march to join up with “Linforce,” 161;
actions, 181;
occupy Chiwata, 191;
capture a German hospital, 195
Nigeri-geri, 78
Nivanga, 78
Njengao, action at, 181, 198
Njijo, 78
Njimbwe, 61, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 74
Nkessa, battle of, 35-39, 196
Nkufi, 218
“Norforce,” 268
Norris, Lieut., at Pumone, 228
Northey, General, 252;
advance on Mpepo, 109
Nuaga Kusasi, battery trumpeter, 83
Numarroe, 284
Nyassa Company territory, 216
O’Brien, Capt. A. J. R., 47;
awarded the Military Cross and Bar, 56, 286, 287;
wounded, 105
O’Brien, Capt. J. M., 249
O’Grady, General, 20, 50, 57, 181
One-Stick Hill, 58
Orr, Colonel, 202;
in command of the 3rd East African Brigade, 91, 93;
in command of No. 1 Column, 94;
attack on Ruangwa Chini, 157
_Pakhals_, or long tins, 114, 126
Palestine, 277
“Pamforce,” 212, 221;
at Meza, 280;
division of, 233;
advance to Koronje, 252
Parker, Capt. G. H., 123, 222;
trains the Mounted Infantry, 279;
at Mussuril Bay, 281;
awarded the Military Cross, 286
Path, cutting a, 97
Pathans, the 40th, 54, 55, 56, 59, 65, 74, 82, 94, 102;
casualties, 67;
at the battle of Rumbo, 83-86
Payne, Sergt., 131
Pequerra, 282, 283
Percy, Lieut., 56;
wounded, 132, 271
Phillips, Colonel, 252
Piggott, Capt. T. B. C., wounded, 53;
awarded the Italian Silver Medal, 89, 287;
the Military Cross, 90, 286
Pike, Lieut., at Port Amelia, 208
Pioneer Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, 4, 35, 36, 38, 51,
65, 70, 78, 94, 101, 119, 126, 135, 136, 164, 174, 190;
at the battle of Kikirunga, 26-32;
Migeri-geri, 89;
ambush against, 90;
at the battle of Mitoneno, 146;
Wangoni, 206;
Port Amelia, 223
Poer, Capt. H. C. C. de la, Special Service Officer to the Gold
Coast Regiment, 8
Pomba Bay, 214, 217
Poole, Lieut., 282
Pori Hill, 135, 136, 139
Port Amelia, 207, 208, 217, 279;
defence of, 214
Portal, Sir Gerald, on the East African carrier, 151
Portuguese East Africa, 72;
ammunition at Ngomano captured, 207;
division of, 216
Potter, Lieut.-Col., in command of the training depôts, 209
Poyntz, Capt. R. H., 31;
at the battle of Nkessa, 36-38;
advance on Gold Coast Hill, 51;
wounded, 53;
awarded the Military Cross, 59, 286
Pretorius, Major, 17;
acts as guide to the Nigerian Brigade, 161
Pumone, 224, 225, 227
Punjabis, the 29th, 37
Punjabis, the 33rd, 90, 94, 102
Pye, Capt., 51;
killed, 53
Radford, Pte. S. G., awarded the D.C.M. and Cross of St.
George, 287
Read, Major H., 44, 87;
voyage to Accra, 274;
awarded the O.B.E., 287
Reid, Lieut., 238
Ridgeway, Colonel, in command of No. 2 Column, 96
Rifles, the 55th, occupy Newala, 196
Road-mine, explosion, 247
Robertson, Lieut., 224
Rock Camp, 238;
convoy attacked, 255
Roofs, corrugated iron, result, 218
Rose, Lieut.-Col. R. A. De B., in command of the Gold Coast
Expeditionary Force, 4, 274;
telegram of congratulation, 33;
knocked over by a shell, 53;
reconnaissance, 58;
in temporary command of the 3rd East African Brigade, 60;
Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, 71;
attack of dysentery, 91;
rejoins the Regiment, 112;
attack on Mihambia, 117;
occupies Nambunjo Hill, 121;
in command of B Column, 204, 207;
on board H.M. _Salamis_, 215;
at Port Amelia, 221;
at Ankuabe, 228;
in command of “Pamforce” division, 233;
escape from an explosion, 247;
at Accra, 275;
in command of the Second West African Brigade, 277;
awarded the Bar to D.S.O., 286;
Legion d’Honneur Croix d’Officier, 287;
letter from C. H. Harper, 294
“Rosecol,” 233;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 240, 242;
Mwalia, 253-256;
at Kalima, 256;
advance on Milinch Hills, 260;
at Msalu, 265, 266, 269;
advance on Korewa, 271
Rovuma River, 72, 73, 130, 187, 188, 197, 199, 207, 265, 285
Royal Fusiliers, join up with the Gold Coast Regiment, 11
Ruale, 118
Ruangwa Chini, 154;
attack on, 156-158
Rufiji River, 12, 24, 43, 61, 71, 72, 108, 109, 197
Rumbo, engagement at, 82-86
Rungo, 97
Ruponda, 160, 163, 164, 185;
food depôts at, 181
Ruwanga, 163, 181
Ruwu, the, 17, 39, 40
_Salamis_, H.M., stranded, 215
Sanananga, 224
Sandani, 10
Sassaware, 73
Saunders, Lieut., 279, 282;
wounded, 283
Saunderson, Lieut. R. de Bedick, killed, 175, 178;
career, 175
Schnee, Herr, Governor of German East Africa, 195, 196
Schutzen Company, the 8th, 163
Scott, Lieut., wounded, 96
Sekondi, Port of, 4, 275
Shaw, Colonel G., 50, 54;
at the battle of Kikirunga, 29, 30;
awarded the Military Cross and Bar, 56, 106, 286;
at Rumbo, 85;
appointed Acting Major and Second in Command of the Gold
Coast Regiment, 91;
in command of No. 2 Column, 96;
attack on Narumgombe, 101
Shaw, Lieut., 131
Shaw, Major, advance on Mihambia, 119;
at Kitiia, 119;
march on Nahungu, 131;
attack on, 137;
march to Chingwea, 167;
attack on Lukuledi, 177;
at Port Amelia, 208, 214, 219;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 241, 242, 244;
occupies Korewa, 272
Shepperd, Brig.-General, in command of the 1st East African
Brigade, 10;
Chief of Staff, 208
Shields, Lieut. George Hilliard, 61;
attack on Gold Coast Hill, 53;
treachery of the Germans, 63;
killed, 64;
head-master of the Government Boy’s School at Accra, 64;
discovery of his body, 67;
burial, 68
Sierra Leone Carrier Corps, 91, 236
Smith, Lieut. S. B., 112, 167, 172, 174;
attempt to surprise the signal-station at Mpingo, 121;
failure, 122;
surrounded, 123;
Staff-Officer, 204;
at Port Amelia, 208
Smuts, General, Commander-in-Chief, Headquarters at Lukigura,
10;
plan of attack, 11;
at Dakawa, 16
Soeiro, Signor Abilio de Lobao, Governor of the Nyassa Company,
221
Songea, 73, 109
South African Infantry, the 7th, 94, 97, 102;
the 8th, 94, 102
Sovar River, 225, 226
Stokes Battery, 104, 117, 185, 243, 248, 254
Tabora, gold coin, 204
Tafel, Major von, 109, 194, 198;
surrender, 202
Tanga, fall of, 10
Tanga-Moschi Railway, 7, 10, 11, 44, 72
Tanganyika, Lake, 11, 73
Taylor, Colonel, in command of No. 3 Column, 94
Taylor, Lieut., 58;
wounded, 54
Thornett, Colour-Sergt. C. A., killed, 246, 248;
awarded the D.C.M., 287
Thornton, Colour-Sergt. E., at Port Amelia, 208;
awarded the D.C.M., 287
Thirst, sufferings from, 13, 45, 107, 125-129
Togoland, invasion of, 1
Transport of the army, need for protection, 149
Tulo, 34, 36, 40
Turiani, 16
Turkey, surrender of, 277
Tyndall, Colonel, 83, 85
Ujiji, 11
Ukuli, 91, 94
Ulanga, 109
Uluguru Mountains, 23, 24, 25, 26, 34, 43, 196
Unguara, 65
Utete, 61, 63, 66
Venter, Major-General Van der, in command of the Second
Division, 11;
Commander-in-Chief, 207, 208
Viney, Lieut., 282;
killed, 283
Voi, 7
Wami River, 10
Wanakoti, 266, 272, 280
Wangoni, 206
Watercourses, tropical, eccentricities, 47
Water depôt, attempt to establish at Liwinda Ravine, 114;
shortage of, 13, 45, 107, 123, 125-129
Watt, Capt., 223
Watts, Capt., at Port Amelia, 208
Webber, Capt., advance on Medo, 236;
Chirimba Hill, 241, 242
Wet, General de, 212
Wheeler, Capt., 31, 37, 50;
wounded, 53;
at Mkufi, 222;
Mtuge, 225;
advance on Chirimba Hill, 244
Wiedhafen, 73
Willoughby, Lieut., 112
Wilson, Lieut., 263;
at Namarala, 228
Withers, Lieut., 260, 263;
at Port Amelia, 208
Wongara, Sergt. Ali, awarded the Military Medal, 289
Wongara, Musa, awarded the D.C.M., 288
Woods, Lieut., reconnaissances, 114, 115;
patrol on the Mbombomya road, 121;
attack on, 123;
at the battle of Mitoneno, 145;
advance on Lukuledi, 167, 171;
killed, 173, 178
Wray, Captain, 56, 124;
attack on, 125;
wounded, 125, 132
Zanzibar, island of, 39
Zeppelin, recalled, 189
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES,
ENGLAND
[Illustration:
_Stanford’s Geographical Establishment, London_
[Large
Version]
]
Transcriber’s Note.
This table summarizes those aspects of the text which were
deemed to be attributable to the printer, and which have
therefore been corrected.
Place-names can be very similar, and care was taken to keep the
spelling as printed, except where a single variant was obvious.
For example, the reference on p. 91 to the ‘Mgaura’ River would
seem to identical to the ‘Magaura’ River referred to on p. 86.
The index entry for the latter mentions both pages. Lingaula
Ridge is referred to once each as ‘Linguala’ (p. 91) and
‘Langaula’ (p. 93). Both are corrected in the text. With respect
to the index, it should be observed that spelling there
sometimes contradicts the text; thus ‘Jirimita’ Hills is
referred to in the Index as ‘Jerimita’, etc. The index entries
have not been corrected.
7.19 the stu[d/p]endous culmination Replaced.
25.17 from this hill[,/.] Replaced.
40.34 of which the Mget[e/a] is a right affluent Replaced.
45.5 distance from N[i]geri-geri Added.
65.31 terrif[f]ic thunderstorm Removed.
91.2 patrolling the M[a]gaura River Added.
91.33 the detachment at Ling[ua/au]la Ridge Transposed.
93.25 remained behind at L[a/i]ngaula Ridge. Replaced.
95.25 overlooking the water-holes[.] Added.
97.22 King’s African [K/R]ifles Replaced.
98.18 retransferred to No. 1 Column[,/.] Replaced.
128.10 Gold Coast Regiment at Mbombo[n/m]ya. Replaced.
206.14 Exe[d/p]itionary Force Replaced.
220.18 [affected] by shipping the anchor _sic_
248.33 almost contin[u]ous warfare. Added.
254.8 Shaw’s deta[t]chment digging itself Removed.
301.2.30 Mecklenburg, Duke Adolf Fr[i]edrich of, Added.
Governor of Togoland, 76
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