By Author [ A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z |  Other Symbols ]
  By Title [ A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z |  Other Symbols ]
  By Language
all Classics books content using ISYS

Download this book: [ ASCII | HTML | PDF ]

Look for this book on Amazon

We have new books nearly every day.
If you would like a news letter once a week or once a month
fill out this form and we will give you a summary of the books for that week or month by email.

Title: Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches from the Dardanelles, etc
Author: Hamilton, Ian
Language: English
As this book started as an ASCII text book there are no pictures available.
Copyright Status: Not copyrighted in the United States. If you live elsewhere check the laws of your country before downloading this ebook. See comments about copyright issues at end of book.

*** Start of this Doctrine Publishing Corporation Digital Book "Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches from the Dardanelles, etc" ***

This book is indexed by ISYS Web Indexing system to allow the reader find any word or number within the document.

produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries)



  =2/== net

  A Book Full of Interest to Everyone

  This unique book describes briefly, but clearly, the History, Uniform,
  Battle Honours, Traditions, Nicknames, and Crest of every Regiment
  in the British Army, and is profusely Illustrated with 32 COLOURED
  PLATES. The many peculiarities of dress and custom in the Army are
  touched on, and the whole forms a reliable book of reference.

  NOW READY. On Sale at all Booksellers or direct from GALE & POLDEN,
  Ltd., 2 AMEN CORNER, EC.




    V.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., &c.



  THE FIRST DESPATCH                            1

  THE SECOND DESPATCH                          43

  PRESS BUREAU STATEMENTS                      84



  General Sir Ian Hamilton        _Frontispiece_

  Map 1                           _facing_  p. 16

  Map 2                              "         32

  Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood,
   K.C.S.I.                          "         40

  Map 3                              "         64

  Brigadier-General R. W. M.
   Jackson, C.B.                     "         78

  Lieut.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston,
   C.B.                              "         82

  Map 4                              "         96

  Map 5                              "        116


  "What's brave, what's noble, let's do it."

I was serving in the Royal Navy when Lieutenant Lucas, H.M.S. _Hecla_,
earned the first Victoria Cross that was gazetted, for having thrown
overboard a live shell. I was in the 21-gun battery before Sevastopol
sixty-one years ago when Captain Sir William Peel, R.N., picked up from
amongst a number of powder cases, and carried resting on his chest,
a 42-pounder live Russian shell, which burst as he threw it over the
parapet; and having seen many extraordinarily gallant deeds performed
by men of all ranks in both Services, I think that I am a fair judge of
fighting values.

Just sixty-one years ago an Ordinary Seaman, H.M.S. _Queen_, was
one of a detachment of a Petty Officer and six Bluejackets who had
left our advanced trenches carrying a heavy scaling ladder, 18 feet
long, to enable the soldiers to cross the ditch of the Great Redan
at Sevastopol. When the only surviving ladder-party was close up to
the abatis, three of the men under the Rear part of the ladder were
shot down, and a young midshipman then put his shoulder under it. The
boy was young, had already been wounded, and was moreover weak, being
officially on the sick list, so doubtless was an inefficient carrier.
The Bluejacket in front was unaffected by the storm of missiles of all
sorts through which he had passed in crossing the 500 yards between our
trenches and the Redan, although in his company of sixty men, nineteen
sailors had been killed and twenty-nine wounded within twenty minutes.

The fire was vividly described by Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, who was
looking on. He, with the experience of the Peninsular War, and having
witnessed the assaults of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, thus portrayed
it: "I never before witnessed such a continuous and heavy fire of
grape and musketry"; and again: "I had no conception of such a shower
of grape." The Bluejacket had remained apparently unconcerned by the
carnage, but he realised that the now one-surviving carrier at the Rear
end of the ladder was not doing much to help, and thinking that he was
addressing a messmate, exclaimed encouragingly, as he half turned his
head: "Come on, Bill, let's get our ladder up first," being shot dead
as he finished the sentence.

I was often asked in the early days of the War whether I thought that
the men in the ranks were of the same fighting value as those of two
generations ago, and invariably answered confidently as follows: "Yes,
just the same at heart, but with better furnished heads." The contents
of this Booklet clearly attest the accuracy of that opinion.

Education has done much to improve the "Fighting Services," but the
most potent magnet for bringing out the best of the Anglo-Saxon Nation
is the fuller appreciation of Democracy. The officers, not content with
leading their men gallantly, which they have always done, now feel
for them and with them as staunch comrades. All ranks are now nearer,
geographically, mentally and morally, than they have ever been before
to the heart of England.

Sixty years ago a brave officer could think of no better prize for
the reward of gallantry than money, and a General about to assault
Sevastopol on September 8, 1855, offered £5 for the first man inside
the Great Redan.

When, in the winter 1854-5, the institution of the Victoria Cross was
suggested, the Royal Warrant for which was not issued until 1856,
nearly all the senior officers disliked the innovation, and our
Government, realising this feeling, hesitated to entrust them with
the selection of the recipients of the distinction. In one battalion
the men were instructed to nominate a private soldier. They, as in
all good regiments, reflected the views of their officers, as regards
the innovation, and unanimously elected a comrade who, being trusted
for his sobriety and honesty, used to carry down the grog-can at
dinner-time to the trenches, and so, not only enjoyed a "soft billet,"
but was never under fire except for one hour in twenty-four.

A perusal of the despatches and of the _London Gazette_ announcing the
bestowal of decorations is like reading of the mortal combats described
in Virgil's Twelfth Book of the "Æneid," and fills the mind with

It is perhaps only soldiers who can fully appreciate the enduring
courage of the Munster Fusiliers, who, after losing half their
numbers by drowning, and by fire of shrapnel and bullets, with their
Brigadier-General, his Brigade-Major, and most of their Regimental
officers down, could reform into remnants of Companies, and after a
night without food, follow a Staff Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty
Wylie, from the beach up to the Old Castle, and assault successfully
Hill No. 141. These men are, indeed, worthy descendants of their
predecessors who carried the walls of Delhi in 1857.

No soldiers can read the story of the heroism shown by the 1st
Lancashire Fusiliers commanded by Major Bishop; how they jumped ashore
under a hurricane of lead which was rained on Beach W, and how they
broke through the wire, and had by 10 a.m. carried three lines of
hostile trenches, without feeling proud of the people of the "Clothing
Towns." The men are worthy of their forefathers, who at Minden in 1759
advanced in line with "Colours flying and Drums beating" against a mass
of hostile cavalry, which they defeated.

I hope that the young soldiers of the King's Own Scottish Borderers may
be taught to recall, not only the deeds of their predecessors at Namur,
1695, and the glorious victory of the infantry over a mass of hostile
cavalry, which they shared with the Lancashire Fusiliers; but also what
their battalion did on Y Beach of the Dardanelles on April 26 last,
when after many hours of fighting, causing the battalion a loss of 50
per centum, the survivors held with determination a trench which had
been constructed for four times their number of effectives; and then,
when orders were given to abandon the position, how the courage of a
small Rear-guard enabled all the wounded, ammunition, and stores to be
safely re-embarked.

The burning courage of the Australian and New Zealand Division
must make any soldier proud of his Colonial brothers. They were
disembarked at night, and the units became unavoidably mixed up, for
some of them had in their ardour followed up the Turks, whom they had
repulsed, further than had been intended. It seems from a perusal of
the despatch, that in spite of their short military training, the
self-reliance naturally acquired by men who lead a less artificial
life than those brought up in cities and towns in England, enabled our
Colonials, inspired by their personal courage, to resist successfully
for hours the attacks of a vastly superior number of Turks.

In a number of glorious deeds recorded in the _London Gazette_ it is
somewhat difficult to select any deed standing out beyond the rest,
but it seems probable that the personal prowess of Lance-Corporal
Albert Jacka, 14th Battalion Australian Imperial Forces, can scarcely
ever be surpassed. During the night of May 19-20 he, with four other
Australians, was holding a trench which was heavily attacked. The five
men accounted for many Turks, but when Jacka's four comrades had
been killed or wounded, the trench was rushed, and occupied by seven
Moslems. Lance-Corporal Jacka attacked and killed all seven, five by
successive shots from his rifle, and two with his bayonet.

Commander Unwin's exploits were remarkable. He had fitted admirably for
the work in view the _River Clyde_ steamship, and successfully beached
her; and although hit by three bullets, he worked for hours in the
water to save wounded men, and continued his self-sacrificing efforts
until he became inanimate from cold and exhaustion.

One of Commander Unwin's subordinates, George Samson, who vied with him
in tasks of enduring gallantry, belongs to the Royal Naval Reserve, and
is mentioned for having worked on a lighter all day attending to the
stricken until he was dangerously wounded. Yet at the annual dinner
last week of the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union, when Samson,
apparently now a Petty Officer, as modest as he is brave, was presented
with a gold watch and chain, in returning thanks, said: "I would sooner
land again in the Dardanelles than have to make a speech."

Commander Robinson is a remarkable instance not only of calculating
courage, but also of the thorough training which Naval officers
receive. "He refused to allow anyone to accompany him on his dangerous
mission, as his men's white clothing made them very conspicuous.
After having penetrated alone into a two-gun battery of the enemy, on
the 26th February, he destroyed a gun and then returning for another
demolition charge, wrecked the remaining piece."

The Commander-in-Chief at Gallipoli, affectionately termed by his
friends in the Service "Johnnie," being a very brave man, appreciates
the courage of those under his command. He showed great determination
in the unhappy war in South Africa in 1881, when he was severely
wounded, and in the battle of Eland's Laaghte in October, 1899, led
so determinedly in front that he would have been recommended for the
Victoria Cross but for his senior rank.

The Services in the Dardanelles are fortunate in having a scholarly
General to narrate their stirring deeds, for many of our commanders,
from Marlborough to Clyde, have felt more difficulty in writing a
description of a victory than they had experienced in winning it.

In the last half century the power of appreciating noble deeds and the
merits of capable officers has increased. The days are fortunately
passed since our senior generals said: "We find all our officers are
much of a muchness."

There is now a more generous acknowledgment of the fact that the
life of a labouring man is as much to him as is that of a peer to a
duke's son; there has grown up amongst our soldiers a deeper sense of
appreciating valour apart from natural or acquired advantages.

As Admiral Holmes and his Squadron in the St. Laurence enabled General
Wolfe to capture Quebec in 1759, so Admiral John de Robeck has enabled
General Sir Ian Hamilton to land his troops and hold the western
coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Hamilton, happier than Wolfe,
lives to acknowledge his debt to the Senior Service, describing it
affectionately as "The father and mother of the Army."

[Illustration: October 1. 1915 Evelyn Wood]


  _From the General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to
  the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W._

               General Headquarters,
          Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
                           _May_ 20, 1915.


I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the
Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including May 5.

In accordance with your Lordship's instructions I left London on March
13 with my General Staff by special train to Marseilles, and thence in
H.M.S. _Phæton_ to the scene of the naval operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean, reaching Tenedos on March 17 shortly after noon.

Immediately on arrival I conferred with Vice-Admiral de Robeck,
Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet; Général d'Amade, Commanding
the French Corps Expéditionnaire; and Contre-Amiral Guepratte, in
command of the French Squadron. At this conference past difficulties
were explained to me, and the intention to make a fresh attack on the
morrow was announced. The amphibious battle between warships and land
fortresses took place next day, March 18. I witnessed these stupendous
events, and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant deduction that
the co-operation of the whole of the force under my command would be
required to enable the Fleet effectively to force the Dardanelles.

By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of
the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus,
where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles,
at its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a
south-westerly direction for 52 miles, attaining near its centre a
breadth of 12 miles. The northern coast of the northern half of the
promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain
of hills, which extend as far as Cape Sulva. The precipitous fall of
these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too
restricted for any serious military movements. The southern half of
the peninsula is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between
Gaba Tepe and Kalkmaz Dagh; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts
at Kilid Bahr; whilst the toe is that promontory, five miles in width,
stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.


The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to

  (1) Sari Bair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost
  perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be
  a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.

  (2) Kilid Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification
  artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of
  the Narrows from an attack from the Aegean.

  (3) Achi Babi, a hill 600 feet in height, dominating at long field-gun
  range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.

A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that
from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon,
presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside
of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full
of spurs, nullahs, and confused under-features.

Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places
are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W), and half
a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two
miles farther up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same
cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully
looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to
heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham by Quebec (Y).
Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300 yards across,
facing a semicircle of steeply-rising ground, as the flat bottom of
a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old
castle, on the other by a modern fort. By Eski Hissarlik, on the
east of Morto Bay (S), was another small beach, which was, however,
dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there
are two good landing-places on either side of Gaba Tepe. Farther to
the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous
and difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines
of wire entanglements were plainly visible from on board ship. What
seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made
out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and
of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging
except by practical test.

Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to
convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for
flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore
could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a
tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The
landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described--a
theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such
attempt--involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming
in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes.
The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else
so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or
three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough
to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration
and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt.
It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as
many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as
well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if
awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the

The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it
been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly
to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then
to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks
of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an
eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must
always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the
end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.


Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the
transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. The bulk of the
forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having
been possible to pay due attention to the operation upon which I now
proposed that they should be launched.

Owing to lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in that harbour
was out of the question. With your Lordship's approval, therefore, I
ordered all the transports, except those of the Australian Infantry
Brigade and the details encamped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian
ports. On March 24 I myself, together with the General Staff, proceeded
to Alexandria, where I remained until April 7, working out the
allocation of troops to transports in minutest detail as a prelude to
the forthcoming disembarkation. General d'Amade did likewise.

On April 1 the remainder of the General Headquarters, which had not
been mobilized when I left England, arrived at Alexandria.

Apart from the rearrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not
without profit, since it afforded me opportunities of conferring with
the G.O.C. Egypt and of making myself acquainted with the troops, drawn
from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire, which
it was to be my privilege to command.

By April 7 my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me to
return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing
touches to my plan in close co-ordination with the Vice-Admiral
Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet.

The covering force of the 29th Division left Mudros Harbour on the
evening of April 23 for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y. Of
these, V, W, and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and
Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces
of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The
landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned
that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should reach the shore
simultaneously at 5.30 a.m. after half an hour's bombardment from the


The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on
the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were
transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to
approach the shore. About midnight these ships, each towing a number
of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables and,
escorted by the 3rd Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards
their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just
before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was
no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over
the promontory; the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The
four battleships and four cruisers which formed the 3rd Squadron at
once took up the positions that had been allotted to them, and at 5
a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of the
enemy's defences was begun. Meanwhile the troops were being rapidly
transferred to the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore.
Not a move on the part of the enemy; except for shells thrown from the
Asiatic side of the Straits the guns of the Fleet remained unanswered.


The detachment detailed for S beach (Eski Hissarlik Point) consisted of
the 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) under Lieut.-Colonel
Casson. Their landing was delayed by the current, but by 7.30 a.m. it
had been successfully effected at the cost of some fifty casualties,
and Lieut.-Colonel Casson was able to establish his small force on the
high ground near De Totts Battery. Here he maintained himself until the
general advance on the 27th brought him into touch with the main body.

The landing on Y beach was entrusted to the King's Own Scottish
Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval Division,
specially attached to the 29th Division for this task, the whole
under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Koe. The beach at this point
consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling
scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of

A number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff
facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these
precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend
them. Very different would it have been had we, as was at one time
intended, taken Y 2 for this landing. There a large force of infantry,
entrenched up to their necks, and supported by machine and Hotchkiss
guns, were awaiting an attempt which could hardly have made good its
footing. But at Y both battalions were able in the first instance to
establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water, and
ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and, in accordance
with the plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain
touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately, the enemy's
strong detachment from Y 2 interposed, our troops landing at X were
fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and
the attempt to join hands was not persevered with.

Later in the day a large force of Turks were seen to be advancing upon
the cliffs above Y beach from the direction of Krithia, and Colonel
Koe was obliged to entrench. From this time onward his small force was
subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery,
and owing to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland
from the edge of the cliff, the guns of the supporting ships could
render him little assistance. Throughout the afternoon and all through
the night the Turks made assault after assault upon the British
line. They threw bombs into the trenches, and, favoured by darkness,
actually led a pony with a machine gun on its back over the defences,
and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position
when they were bayoneted.

The British repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet, and always
drove off the enemy for the moment, but the Turks were in a vast
superiority and fresh troops took the place of those who temporarily
fell back. Colonel Koe (since died of wounds) had become a casualty
early in the day, and the number of officers and men killed and wounded
during the incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 a.m. on the 26th
only about half of the King's Own Scottish Borderers remained to man
the entrenchment made for four times their number. These brave fellows
were absolutely worn out with continuous fighting; it was doubtful
if reinforcements could reach them in time, and orders were issued
for them to be re-embarked. Thanks to H.M.S. _Goliath_, _Dublin_,
_Amethyst_, and _Sapphire_, thanks also to the devotion of a small
rearguard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the
enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of the whole of the
troops, together with the wounded, stores, and ammunition, was safely
accomplished, and both battalions were brought round the southern
end of the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses had been, and
unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much ground
at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it stood, there can be no
doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of the main attack,
seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy columns
of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during
what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle.


The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some
200 yards long by 8 yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops
to be landed here were the 1st Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed
ashore from H.M.S. _Implacable_ in two parties, half a battalion
at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson
Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. H.M.S. _Implacable_,
with a boldness much admired by the Army, stood quite close in to the
beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear.
Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but
little loss. The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches
on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily
counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of
the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had
established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a
mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they
were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach.
Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had been
wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the


The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the following lines:

As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the
Fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed
ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier _River Clyde_
(Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the
Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the
Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.

The _River Clyde_ had been specially prepared for the rapid
disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of
the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gangplank by
which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow.
As soon as the first tows had reached land the _River Clyde_ was to
be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to
form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was
hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity.
Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns,
protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.

The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to
follow in tows from the attendant battleships.

V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. Between
the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village and that which is
crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of
three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are
slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits
of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a
height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a
defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some 10 yards wide and 350
yards long, backed along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy
escarpment about 4 feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down
to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no
small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.


At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the
village, stands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, a battered ruin with wide
breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen masonry within and around
it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a
ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort, had
been long bombarded by the Fleet, and the guns of the forts had been
put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts
of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced
slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open
beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On
the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made
of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere,
ran right across from the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of the
north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and
even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front
of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third
transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the
eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the
upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in
one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms
to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either
flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine guns,
which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle
fire from the ridge.

Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance
had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard
either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.

As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite
correspond with the intentions of the Commander. The _River Clyde_ came
into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance of the tows, and, just as the
latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst
the boats and the collier were approaching the landing-place the Turks
made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing
was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the
storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming
boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews
suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who
succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain
some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side.
None of the boats, however, was able to get off again, and they and
their crews were destroyed upon the beach.

Now came the moment for the _River Clyde_ to pour forth her living
freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of
placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore.
A strong current hindered the work and the enemy's fire was so
intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot.
Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working
party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the
disembarkation began.

A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way; but, short as was the
distance, few of the men ever reached the farther side of the beach
through the hail of bullets which poured down upon them from both
flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporized
pier of lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the shore
drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were
drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the
lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the
lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the
Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from
shrapnel as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.


[Illustration: MAP 1. (_To face page 16._)]

For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed
the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General
Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade-Major, and a number of men of the
Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie
down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain
Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 a.m., about one
thousand men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been
killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by
the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Further attempts to
disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been in open boats but
few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately,
the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection
to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no
attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.

Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change
in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the
machine-guns on the _River Clyde_, which did valuable service in
keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempt on their
part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin
Fusiliers, which had been landed at a camber just east of Sedd-el-Bahr
village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by midday
had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y beach
that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach;
but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance,
and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire
Fusiliers had already effected a landing.

Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the
Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and
seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V
beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the
numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this
advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their
ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way
along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had
fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A
good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a
cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still
so accurate in the bright moonlight, that all attempts to clear the
fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after
the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned
to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at
daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day,
except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.

Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore
on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and
of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The Brigadier and
his Brigade-Major had been killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington
Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed and the
Adjutant had been wounded. The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was
wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either
wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing-party still crouched
on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had
saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General
Staff--Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel
Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the _River Clyde_,
had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all
their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless
imminent peril.


Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie
and Williams set to work to organize an attack on the hill above the
beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units together
after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by close and
continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties.
Fortunately General Hunter-Weston had arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss
about this same time for a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships
upon the Old Fort, Sedd-el-Bahr Village, the Old Castle north of the
village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of
this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie, and
Captain Walford, Brigade-Major R.A., the troops gained a footing in
the village by 10 a.m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition and
suffered heavy losses from the fire of well concealed riflemen and
machine guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval
gunfire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they penetrated
to the northern edge of the village, whence they were in a position
to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain
Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly
led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of
the village, under a galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely
to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had
almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But
the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their
way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and
occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.


W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards
long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of
Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a
break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises
precipitously, but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes afford a
more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and
ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing-place
into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement
extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed
network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows.
Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking
the beach was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully
afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine guns also
were cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune
from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the
wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in
its turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east,
and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both
these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about 20 feet
broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope
leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles
lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from
these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making
intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these
redoubts had been captured.

So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may
well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction
that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British
soldier--or any other soldier--than the storming of these trenches from
open boats on the morning of April 25.


The landing at W had been entrusted to the 1st Battalion Lancashire
Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete lack of the
sense of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed
our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the
disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the
whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket
boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters.
As soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the
boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the
beach and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of
rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General
Hare, commanding the 88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which
escaped the cross fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also
in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire

While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from
the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground
a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their
officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore, and, fired
at from right, left, and centre, commenced hacking their way through
the wire. A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe,
but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the
warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the
flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through
the entanglements and collected under the cliffs on either side of
the beach. Here the companies were rapidly re-formed, and set forth to
storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them.

In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill
114 whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape
Helles side of the landing-place.

Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but
the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 a.m.
three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the
beach was assured.

About 9.30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours
later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the troops which had
landed on X beach.

On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little
progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which
had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the
wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it
was here that Major Frankland, Brigade-Major of the 86th Infantry
Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was
unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been wounded earlier
in the day, and Colonel Wolley-Dod, General Staff 29th Division, was
now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organize a further

At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy
bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several
men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages
through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4
p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured.

An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who
could make no headway at all against the dominating defences of the
enemy. To help them out the 86th Brigade pushed forward in an easterly
direction along the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming
of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again
the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen
quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a
vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 fort
grew hotter and hotter, until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a
sleepless night and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to
rest on their laurels for a while.

When night fell, the British position in front of W beach extended from
just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114.
Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this
line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were
the 2nd London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion,
which had been landed as a beach working party.

During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were
made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile the
disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and
X beaches.


The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay
on the afternoon of April 24, escorted by the 2nd Squadron of the
Fleet under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just
after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500
men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros
were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with
remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the
remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their
transports to six destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with
the tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the
coast, H.M.S. _Queen_ (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing
on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3.30 a.m. orders to go
ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4.10 a.m. the destroyers
were ordered to follow.

All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in
complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface
of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the moon,
which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its
orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.

A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the
landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not
at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows
having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of
disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had
selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although
this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off
the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing
in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation has
been much better defiladed from shell fire.


The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow
strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and
the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep
ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a
north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small
but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore.
Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by
the seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the
ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer except
near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access
to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled
knot the under-features of Sari Bair, separated by deep ravines, which
take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered
with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy
cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which
they run north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.

The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and
they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about
one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept
the lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all
ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken--every one remained
perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure
enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched
land the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore,
and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So
vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand
it and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.


This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade, under Major
(temporary Colonel) Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd Brigades
followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time
12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been
landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to
the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced
the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling from
his field guns, to stand farther out to sea.

The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any
formed detachments post-haste as they landed to the critical point of
the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had
pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended--all
these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the
mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others
falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a
semicircular position with its right about a mile north of Gaba Tepe
and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this
period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of
action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the
disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of
the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of
20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong
effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This
counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the
guns of H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6.30 p.m. a third most determined
counter-attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground
with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the
Turks made constant attacks, and the 8th Battalion repelled a bayonet
charge; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had
practically no rest on the night of the 24th to 25th; they had been
fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and they had been
subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had
been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in spite of their
fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as
full of fight as ever.


It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more
seriously. Several times our machine guns got on to them in close
formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their

The reorganization of units and formations was impossible during the
26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible
until a reorganization could be effected, and it only remained to
entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for
bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges--in itself a
most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division
were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on April 28 and 29.


On the night of May 2 a bold effort was made to seize a commanding
knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading
machine guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost
without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the
enemy. On May 4 an attempt to seize Kaba Tepe was also unsuccessful,
the barbed wire here being something beyond belief. But a number
of minor operations have been carried out, such as the taking of a
Turkish observing station; the strengthening of entrenchments; the
reorganization of units, and the perfecting of communication with the
landing-place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of the
best troops of the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, are constantly
kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish
sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own game.

The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been
invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral
Thursby's hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty
and powerful friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps.


Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of the French Corps
was successfully disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French
Fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when they
re-embarked. Five hundred prisoners were captured by the French on this

This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V
beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the success of the
British landings.

On the evening of the 26th the main disembarkation of the French Corps
was begun, V beach being allotted to our Allies for this purpose, and
it was arranged that the French should hold the portion of the front
between the telegraph wire and the sea.

The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching from
Hill 236 near Eski Hissarlik Point to the mouth of the stream two miles
north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at midday, was
completed without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated their
new line. The forward movement relieved the growing congestion of the
beaches, and by giving us possession of several new wells afforded
a temporary solution to the water problem, which had hitherto been
causing me much anxiety.

By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established themselves
on a line some three miles long, which stretched from the mouth of the
nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlik Point,
the three brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions on the
left and in the centre, with four French battalions on the right, and
beyond them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right.


Owing to casualties this line was somewhat thinly held. Still, it was
so vital to make what headway we could before the enemy recovered
himself and received fresh reinforcements that it was decided to push
on as quickly as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general
advance to commence at 8 a.m. next day.

The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their left brigade
leading, the French were directed to extend their left in conformity
with the British movements and to retain their right on the coast-line
south of the Kereves Dere.

The advance commenced at 8 a.m. on the 28th, and was carried out with
commendable vigour, despite the fact that from the moment of landing
the troops had been unable to obtain any proper rest.

[Illustration: MAP 2. (_To face page 32._)]

The 87th Brigade, with which had been incorporated the Drake Battalion,
Royal Naval Division, in the place of the King's Own Scottish Borderers
and South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 a.m. had
advanced some two miles. Here the further progress of the Border
Regiment was barred by a strong work on the left flank. They halted to
concentrate and make dispositions to attack it, and at that moment
had to withstand a determined counter-attack by the Turks. Aided by
heavy gun-fire from H.M.S. _Queen Elizabeth_, they succeeded in beating
off the attack, but they made no further progress that day, and when
night fell entrenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the

The Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the
Krithia ravine, reached a point about three-quarters of a mile
south-west of Krithia. This was, however, the farthest limit attained,
and later on in the day they fell back into line with other corps.

The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed steadily until
about 11.30 a.m., when the stubbornness of the opposition, coupled
with a dearth of ammunition, brought their advance to a standstill.
The 86th Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, which had been held
in reserve, were thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th
Brigade in the direction of Krithia.

The movement commenced at about 1 p.m., but though small reconnoitring
parties got to within a few hundred yards of Krithia, the main body
of the brigade did not get beyond the line held by the 88th Brigade.
Meanwhile, the French had also pushed on in the face of strong
opposition along the spurs on the western bank of the Kereves Dere, and
had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown back and
their left in touch with the 88th Brigade. Here they were unable to
make further progress; gradually the strength of the resistance made
itself felt, and our Allies were forced during the afternoon to give


By 2 p.m. the whole of the troops with the exception of the Drake
Battalion had been absorbed into the firing line. The men were
exhausted, and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford
them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transport
available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and
cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from
the landing-places.

Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Babi had now perforce to be
abandoned--at least for this occasion. The best that could be expected
was that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at
3 p.m. the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet
against the centre and right of our line, even this seemed exceedingly
doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did take place. The French were
also forced back, and at 6 p.m. orders were issued for our troops to
entrench themselves as best they could in the positions they then held,
with their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connection with
our Allies. In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was
temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered severely.

Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men, artillery,
and munitions during the day, Krithia should have fallen, and much
subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.

Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with
the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have received
proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of
evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no
reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered
my purpose.


For, after all, we had pushed forward quite appreciably on the whole.
The line eventually held by our troops on the night of the 28th ran
from a point on the coast three miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a
point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the
French south-east to the coast.

Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and 88th Brigades had
occurred during the day's fighting, and there was a dangerous
re-entrant in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th Brigades
near the Krithia nullah. The French had lost heavily, especially in
officers, and required time to reorganize.

April 29 was consequently spent in straightening the line, and in
consolidating and strengthening the positions gained. There was a
certain amount of artillery and musketry fire, but nothing serious.

Similarly, on the 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack
delivered by the enemy. The landing of the bulk of the artillery was
completed, and a readjustment of the line took place, the portion held
by the French being somewhat increased.

Two more battalions of the Royal Naval Division had been disembarked,
and these, together with three battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn
from the line, were formed into a reserve.


This reserve was increased on May 1 by the addition of the 29th Indian
Infantry Brigade, which released the three battalions of the 88th
Brigade to return to the trenches. The Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient
had disembarked the whole of their infantry, and all but two of their
batteries by the same evening.

At 10 p.m. the Turks opened a hot shell fire upon our position, and
half an hour later, just before the rise of the moon, they delivered
a series of desperate attacks. Their formation was in three solid
lines, the men in the front rank being deprived of ammunition to make
them rely only upon the bayonet. The officers were served out with
coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to
the Turkish guns that they were to lengthen their range; white that
our front trenches had been stormed; green that our main position had
been carried. The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and knees until
the time came for the final rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was
signed Von Zowenstern and addressed to the Turkish rank and file who
were called upon, by one mighty effort, to fling us all back into the

"Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him!

"We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our religion, our
country, and our nation will perish!

"Soldiers! The world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is
to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up
your life in the attempt!"


The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of
the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts
had already been killed or wounded. So when the Turks came right on
without firing and charged into the trenches with the bayonet they made
an ugly gap in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal
Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and executed a brilliant
bayonet charge against the enemy, and by the Essex Regiment detached
for the purpose by the Officer Commanding 88th Brigade. The rest of
the British line held its own with comparative ease, and it was not
found necessary to employ any portion of the reserve. The storm next
broke in fullest violence against the French left, which was held by
the Senegalese. Behind them were two British Field Artillery Brigades
and a Howitzer Battery. After several charges and counter-charges
the Senegalese began to give ground, and a company of the Worcester
Regiment and some gunners were sent forward to hold the gap. Later,
a second company of the Worcester Regiment was also sent up, and the
position was then maintained for the remainder of the night, although
about 2 a.m. it was found necessary to dispatch one battalion Royal
Naval Division to strengthen the extreme right of the French.


About 5 a.m. a counter-offensive was ordered, and the whole line began
to advance. By 7.30 a.m. the British left had gained some 500 yards,
and the centre had pushed the enemy back and inflicted heavy losses.
The right also had gained some ground in conjunction with the French
left, but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress. As
the British centre and left were now subjected to heavy cross fire from
concealed machine guns, it was found impossible to maintain the ground
gained, and therefore, about 11 a.m., the whole line withdrew to its
former trenches.

The net result of the operations was the repulse of the Turks and
the infliction upon them of very heavy losses. At first we had them
fairly on the run, and had it not been for those inventions of the
devil--machine guns and barbed wire--which suit the Turkish character
and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the
crest of Achi Babi. As it was, all brigades reported great numbers of
dead Turks in front of their lines, and 350 prisoners were left in our

On the 2nd, during the day, the enemy remained quiet, burying his dead
under a red crescent flag, a work with which we did not interfere.
Shortly after 9 p.m., however, they made another attack against the
whole Allied line, their chief effort being made against the French
front, where the ground favoured their approach. The attack was
repulsed with loss.

During the night 3rd/4th the French front was again subjected to a
heavy attack, which they were able to repulse without assistance from
my general reserve.

The day of the 4th was spent in reorganization, and a portion of the
line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the previous
night's fighting, was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade. The night
passed quietly.

During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire
Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.

Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next day, and these
and the three days' battle which ensued will be dealt with in my next


The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this
despatch, were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering:

  177 Officers and 1,990 other ranks killed.
  412 Officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded.
  13 Officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.

From a technical point of view it is interesting to note that my
Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the time when the
landings were finally arranged. All the highly elaborate work involved
by these landings was put through by my General Staff working in
collaboration with Commodore Roger Kayes, C.B., M.V.O., and the Naval
Transport Officers allotted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeck.
Navy and Army carried out these combined duties with that perfect
harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to success.

[Illustration: LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, K.C.S.I. (_To face
page 40._)]


Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father
and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realises how much he owes
to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the
destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless
crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give
their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.

Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le Général
d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and
has afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The
landing of Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the
attention of the enemy was transformed by the Commander of the Corps
Expéditionnaire de l'Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured
some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the
landing of the French Division at Sedd-el-Bahr no troops could have
acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances,
and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of
Monsieur le Général d'Amade.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps above Kapa Tepe, as well as during the subsequent
fighting. The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of
these difficult and hazardous operations--operations which were crowned
with a very remarkable success--speaks, I think, for itself.

Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was tried very highly,
not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and
night attacks and counter-attacks which ensued. Untiring, resourceful,
and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he
possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a Commander of
troops in the field.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief of the General
Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile
epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can
certainly say no less.

I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review,
and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

    I have the honour to be,
  Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
   IAN HAMILTON, General,
           Commanding Mediterranean
             Expeditionary Force.


         General Headquarters,
    Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
                        _August_ 26, 1915.


At the close of the ten days and ten nights described in my first
despatch our troops had forced their way forward for some 5,000 yards
from the landing-places at the point of the peninsula. Opposite them
lay the Turks, who since their last repulse had fallen back about
half a mile upon previously prepared redoubts and entrenchments. Both
sides had drawn heavily upon their stock of energy and munitions, but
it seemed clear that whichever could first summon up spirit to make
another push must secure at least several hundreds of yards of the
debatable ground between the two fronts. And several hundred yards,
whatever it might mean to the enemy, was a matter of life or death to
a force crowded together under gun fire on so narrow a tongue of land.
Such was the situation on May 5, the date last mentioned in my despatch
of the 20th of that month.

On that day I determined to continue my advance, feeling certain that
even if my tired troops could not carry the formidable opposing lines
they would at least secure the use of the intervening ground. Orders
were forthwith issued for an attack.


The many urgent calls for reinforcements made during the previous
critical fighting had forced me to disorganize and mix together
several of the formations in the southern group, to the extent even
of the French on our right having a British battalion holding their
own extremest right. For the purposes of the impending fight it became
therefore necessary to create temporarily a Composite Division,
consisting of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry Brigades
(withdrawn for the purpose from the northern section), together with
a Naval Brigade formed of the Plymouth and Drake Battalions. The 29th
Division was reconstituted into four brigades, _i.e._ the 88th and 87th
Brigades, the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade (T.F.), and the 29th Indian
Infantry Brigade. The French Corps Expéditionnaire was reinforced by
the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new Composite Division formed my General

The 29th Division, whose left rested on the coast about three miles
north-east of Cape Tekke, was ordered to direct, its right moving on
the south-east edge of Krithia, while the Corps Expéditionnaire with
the 2nd Naval Brigade had assigned to them for their first point of
attack the commanding ridge running from north to south above the
Kereves Dere. A foothold upon this ridge was essential, as its capture
would ensure a safe pivot on which the 29th Division could swing in
making any further advance. Communication between these two sections
of the attack was to be maintained by the Plymouth and Drake Battalions.


During the three days (May 6-8) our troops were destined to be very
severely tried. They were about to attack a series of positions
scientifically selected in advance which, although not yet joined up
into one line of entrenchment, were already strengthened by works on
their more important tactical features.

The 29th Division led off at 11 a.m., the French corps followed suit
at 11.30 a.m.; every yard was stubbornly contested; some Brigades were
able to advance, others could do no more than maintain themselves.
Positions were carried and held, other positions were carried and lost;
but, broadly, our gunners kept lengthening the fuses of their shrapnel,
and by 1.30 p.m. the line had been pushed forward two to three hundred
yards. Here and there this advance included a Turkish trench, but
generally speaking the main enemy position still lay some distance
ahead of our leading companies.

By 4.30 p.m. it became clear that we should make no more progress that
day. The French Corps were held up by a strong field work. They had
made good a point upon the crest line of the lower slope of the Kereves
Dere ridge, but there they had come under a fire so galling that they
were unable, as it turned out, to entrench until nightfall. The 88th
Brigade could not carry a clump of fir trees to their front; company
after company made the perilous essay, but the wood, swept by hidden
machine-guns, proved a veritable deathtrap. The Lancashire Fusiliers
Brigade also were only just barely holding on and were suffering heavy
losses from these same concealed machine-guns. The troops were ordered
to entrench themselves in line and link up their flanks on either side.

At night, save for rifle fire, there was quiet along the whole British
line. On the right a determined bayonet charge was made upon the
French, who gave ground for the moment, but recovered it again at dawn.


Next morning (May 7) we opened with shrapnel upon the enemy's trenches
opposite our extreme left, and at 10 a.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers
Brigade began the attack. But our artillery had not been able to locate
the cleverly sited German machine-gun batteries, whose fire rendered
it physically impossible to cross that smooth glacis. Next to the
right the 88th Brigade swept forward, and the 1/5th Royal Scots, well
supported by artillery fire, carried the fir trees with a rush. This
time it was discovered that not only the enfilading machine-guns had
made the wood so difficult to hold. Amongst the branches of the trees
Turkish snipers were perched, sometimes upon small wooden platforms.
When these were brought down the surroundings became much healthier.
The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, of the 87th Brigade, were pushed up
to support the left of the 88th, and all seemed well, when, at 1.20
p.m., a strong Turkish counter-attack drove us back out of the fir
clump. As an off-set to this check the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
captured three Turkish trenches, and a second battalion of the 87th
Brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, was sent forward on the
left to make these good.

At 3 p.m. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade again reported they
were definitely held up by the accurate cross-fire of batteries of
machine-guns concealed in the scrub on the ridge between the ravine
and the sea, batteries which also enfiladed the left flank of the 88th
Brigade as it endeavoured to advance in the centre. Unless we were to
acquiesce in a stalemate the moment for our effort had arrived, and a
general attack was ordered for 4.45 p.m., the whole of the 87th Brigade
to reinforce the 88th Brigade, and the New Zealand Brigade to support


Despite their exhaustion and their losses the men responded with a
will. The whole force, French and British, rose simultaneously and
made a rush forward. All along the front we made good a certain amount
of ground, excepting only on our extreme left. For the third time
British bayonets carried the fir clump in our centre, and when darkness
fell the whole line (excepting always the left) had gained from 200 to
300 yards, and had occupied or passed over the first line of Turkish

The troops were now worn out; the new lines needed consolidating, and
it was certain that fresh reinforcements were reaching the Turks.
Balancing the actual state of my own troops against the probable
condition of the Turks I decided to call upon the men to make one
more push before the new enemy forces could get into touch with their

Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the line gained;
to maintain that line against counter-attack, and to prepare to advance
again next morning. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade was withdrawn into
reserve, and its place on the left was taken by the Brigade of New

General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment on a hill in rear
of the left of our line. Under my plan for the fresh attack the New
Zealand Brigade was to advance through the line held during the night
by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia. Simultaneously, the
87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the west of the ravine,
whilst endeavouring, by means of parties of scouts and volunteers,
to steal patches of ground from the areas dominated by the German

At 10.15 a.m. heavy fire from ships and batteries was opened on the
whole front, and at 10.30 a.m. the New Zealand Brigade began to move,
meeting with strenuous opposition from the enemy, who had received
his reinforcements. Supported by the fire of the batteries and the
machine-guns of the 88th Brigade, they pushed forward on the right
and advanced their centre beyond the fir trees, but could make little
further progress. By 1.30 p.m. about 200 yards had been gained beyond
the previously most advanced trenches of the 88th Brigade.

At this hour the French Corps reported they could not advance up the
crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till further progress was made
by the British.

At 4 p.m. I gave orders that the whole line, reinforced by the 2nd
Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope arms, and move on Krithia
precisely at 5.30 p.m.

At 5.15 p.m. the ships' guns and our heavy artillery bombarded the
enemy's position for a quarter of an hour, and at 5.30 p.m. the field
guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover the infantry advance.


The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack was perfect,
the timing of the movement being carried out with great precision. Some
of the companies of the New Zealand regiments did not get their orders
in time, but acting on their own initiative they pushed on as soon
as the heavy howitzers ceased firing, thus making the whole advance

The steady advance of the British could be followed by the sparkle
of their bayonets until the long lines entered the smoke clouds. The
French at first made no move, then, their drums beating and bugles
sounding the charge, they suddenly darted forward in a swarm of
skirmishers which seemed in one moment to cover the whole southern face
of the ridge of the Kereves Dere. Against these the Turkish gunners now
turned their heaviest pieces, and as the leading groups stormed the
first Turkish redoubt the ink-black bursts of high-explosive shells
blotted out both assailants and assailed. The trial was too severe for
the Senegalese tirailleurs. They recoiled. They were rallied. Another
rush forward, another repulse, and then a small supporting column of
French soldiers was seen silhouetted against the sky as they charged
upwards along the crest of the ridge of the Kereves Dere, whilst
elsewhere it grew so dark that the whole of the battlefield became a

Not until next morning did any reliable detail come to hand of what
had happened. The New Zealanders' firing line had marched over the
cunningly concealed enemy's machine-guns without seeing them, and
these, reopening on our supports as they came up, caused them heavy
losses. But the first line pressed on and arrived within a few yards
of the Turkish trenches which had been holding up our advance beyond
the fir wood. There they dug themselves in.


The Australian Brigade had advanced through the Composite Brigade, and,
in spite of heavy losses from shrapnel, machine-gun, and rifle fire,
had progressed from 300 to 400 yards.

The determined valour shown by these two brigades, the New Zealand
Brigade, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, and the 2nd Australian
Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General the Hon. J. W. McCay, are
worthy of particular praise. Their losses were correspondingly heavy,
but in spite of fierce counter-attacks by numerous fresh troops they
stuck to what they had won with admirable tenacity.

On the extreme left the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R.
Marshall, made a final and especially gallant effort to advance across
the smooth, bullet-swept area between the ravine and the sea, but once
more the enemy machine-guns thinned the ranks of the leading companies
of the South Wales Borderers, and again there was nothing for it but to
give ground. But when night closed in the men of the 87th Brigade of
their own accord asked to be led forward, and achieved progress to the
extent of just about 200 yards. During the darkness the British troops
everywhere entrenched themselves on the line gained.

On the right the French column, last seen as it grew dark, had stormed
and still held the redoubt round which the fighting had centred until
then. Both General d'Amade and General Simonin had been present
in person with this detachment and had rallied the Senegalese and
encouraged the white troops in their exploit. With their bayonets these
brave fellows of the 8th Colonials had inflicted exceedingly heavy
losses upon the enemy.


The French troops whose actions have hitherto been followed belonged,
all of them, to the 2nd Division. But beyond the crest of the ridge
the valley of the Kereves Dere lies dead to anyone occupying my post
of command. And in this area the newly-arrived Brigade of the French
1st Division had been also fighting hard. Here they had advanced
simultaneously with the 2nd Division and achieved a fine success in
their first rush, which was jeopardized when a battalion of Zouaves was
forced to give way under a heavy bombardment. But, as in the case of
the 2nd Division, the other battalions of the 1st Régiment de Marche
d'Afrique, under Lieutenant-Colonel Nieger, restored the situation, and
in the end the Division carried and held two complete lines of Turkish
redoubts and trenches.

The net result of the three days' fighting had been a gain of 600 yards
on the right of the British line and 400 yards on the left and centre.
The French had captured all the ground in front of the Farm Zjimmerman,
as well as a redoubt, for the possession of which there had been
obstinate fighting during the whole of the past three days.

This may not seem very much, but actually more had been won than at
first meets the eye. The German leaders of the Turks were quick to
realize the fact. From nightfall till dawn on the 9th-10th efforts were
made everywhere to push us back. A specially heavy attack was made upon
the French, supported by a hot cannonade and culminating in a violent
hand-to-hand conflict in front of the Brigade Simonin. Everywhere the
assailants were repulsed, and now for the first time I felt that we
had planted a fairly firm foothold upon the point of the Gallipoli

Meanwhile in the northern zone also, the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps had strengthened their grip on Turkish soil. Whilst in the
south we had been attacking and advancing they had been defending and
digging themselves more and more firmly into those cliffs on which it
had seemed at first that their foothold was so precarious.


On May 11, the first time for eighteen days and nights, it was found
possible to withdraw the 29th Division from the actual firing line and
to replace it by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and by the 42nd
Division, which had completed its disembarkation two days previously.
The withdrawal gave no respite from shells, but at least the men were,
most nights, enabled to sleep.

The moment lent itself to reflection, and during this breathing space I
was able to realize we had now nearly reached the limit of what could
be attained by mingling initiative with surprise. The enemy was as much
in possession of my numbers and dispositions as I was in possession of
their first line of defence; the opposing fortified fronts stretched
parallel from sea to straits; there was little scope left now, either
at Achi Baba or at Kaba Tepe, for tactics which would fling flesh
and blood battalions against lines of unbroken barbed wire. Advances
must more and more tend to take the shape of concentrated attacks on
small sections of the enemy's line after full artillery preparation.
Siege warfare was soon bound to supersede manœuvre battles in the
open. Consolidation and fortification of our front, improvement of
approaches, selection of machine-gun emplacements and scientific
grouping of our artillery under a centralized control must ere long
form the tactical basis of our plans.

So soon, then, as the troops had enjoyed a day or two of comparative
rest I divided my front into four sections. On the left was the 29th
Division, to which the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was attached. In
the left centre came the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, on the right
centre stood the Royal Naval Division, and at my right was the Corps
Expéditionnaire. Thus I secured organization in depth as well as front,
enabling each division to arrange for its own reliefs, supports, and
reserves, and giving strength for defence as well as attack. Hitherto
the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements had forced a hand-to-mouth
procedure upon head-quarters; now the control became more decentralized.

Already, before the new system of local efforts had come into working
order, the 29th Indian Brigade had led the way towards it by a
brilliant little affair on the night of May 10-11. The Turkish right
rested upon the steep cliff north-east of Y beach, where the King's Own
Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, Royal Naval Division,
had made their first landing. Since those days the enemy had converted
the bluff into a powerful bastion, from which the fire of machine-guns
had held up the left of our attacks. Two gallant attempts by the Royal
Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing
on this cliff on May 8 and 9 had both of them failed.


During the night of May 10-11 the 6th Gurkhas started off to seize
this bluff. Their scouts descended to the sea, worked their way for
some distance through the broken ground along the shore, and crawled
hands and knees up the precipitous face of the cliff. On reaching
the top they were heavily fired on. As a surprise the enterprise
had failed, but as a reconnaissance it proved very useful. On the
following day Major-General H. B. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry
Brigade, submitted proposals for a concerted attack on this bluff
(now called Gurkha Bluff), and arrangements were made with the Navy
for co-operation. These arrangements were completed on May 12; they
included a demonstration by the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division
and by our artillery and the support of the attack from the sea by the
guns of H.M.S. _Dublin_ and H.M.S. _Talbot_. At 6.30 a.m. on May 12 the
Manchester Brigade and the 29th Divisional artillery opened fire on
the Turkish trenches, and under cover of this fire a double company of
the 1/6th Gurkhas once more crept along the shore and assembled below
the bluff. Then, the attention of the Turks being taken up with the
bombardment, they swiftly scaled the cliffs and carried the work with a
rush. The machine-gun section of the Gurkhas was hurried forward, and
at 4.30 p.m. a second double company was pushed up to join the first.

An hour later these two double companies extended and began to entrench
to join up their new advanced left diagonally with the right of the
trenches previously held by their battalion.

At 6 p.m. a third double company advanced across the open from their
former front line of trenches under a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire,
and established themselves on this diagonal line between the main
ravine on their right and the newly captured redoubt. The 4th double
company moved up as a support, and held the former firing line.

Our left flank, which had been firmly held up against all attempts
on the 6th-8th, was now, by stratagem, advanced nearly 500 yards.
Purchased as it was with comparatively slight losses (21 killed, 92
wounded) this success was due to careful preparation and organization
by Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade,
Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, commanding 1/6 Gurkhas, and
Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) F. A. Wynter, R.G.A., commanding
the Artillery Group supporting the attack. The co-operation of the two
cruisers was excellent, and affords another instance of the admirable
support by the Navy to our troops.


On May 14 General Gouraud arrived and took over from General d'Amade
the command of the Corps Expéditionnaire. As General d'Amade quitted
the shores of the peninsula he received a spontaneous ovation from the
British soldiers at work upon the beaches.

The second division of the Corps Expéditionnaire, commanded by General
Bailloud, had now completed disembarkation.

From the time of the small local push forward made by the 6th Gurkhas
on the night of May 10-11 until June 4 the troops under my command
pressed against the enemy continuously by sapping, reconnaissance,
and local advances, whilst, to do them justice they (the enemy) did
what they could to repay us in like coin. I have given the escalade of
Gurkha Bluff as a sample; no forty-eight hours passed without something
of the sort being attempted or achieved either by the French or


Turning now to where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were
perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair, I must begin by explaining that
their _rôle_ at this stage of the operations was--first, to keep open
a door leading to the vitals of the Turkish position; secondly, to
hold up as large a body as possible of the enemy in front of them,
so as to lessen the strain at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast
to play second fiddle to Cape Helles, a part out of harmony with the
dare-devil spirit animating those warriors from the South, and so it
has come about that, as your Lordship will now see, the defensive of
the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to take on the
character of an attack.

The line held during the period under review by the Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps formed a rough semi-circle inland from the beach
of Anzac Cove, with a diameter of about 1,100 yards. The firing line
is everywhere close to the enemy's trenches, and in all sections of
the position sapping, counter-sapping, and bomb attacks have been
incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches has been
impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have fallen on Anzac
within the hour, and these of all calibres, from 11 inches to field
shrapnel. Around Quinn's Post, both above and below ground, the contest
has been particularly severe. This section of the line is situated on
the circumference of the Anzac semicircle at the furthest point from
its diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere ledges on the brink of
a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below. The enemy's
trenches are only a few feet distant.


On May 9 a night assault, supported by enfilade fire, was delivered
on the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's Post. The trenches were
carried at the point of the bayonet, troops established in them, and
reinforcements sent up.

At dawn on May 10 a strong counter-attack forced our troops to
evacuate the trenches and fall back on Quinn's Post. In opposing this
counter-attack our guns did great execution, as we discovered later
from a Turkish officer's diary that two Turkish regiments on this date
lost 600 killed and 2,000 wounded.

On the night of May 14-15 a sortie was made from Quinn's Post with the
object of filling in Turkish trenches in which bomb-throwers were
active. The sortie, which cost us some seventy casualties, was not

On May 14 Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood was slightly wounded,
but, I am glad to say, he was not obliged to relinquish the command of
his Corps.


On May 15 I deeply regret to say Major-General W. T. Bridges,
commanding the Australian Division, received a severe wound, which
proved fatal a few days later. Sincere and single-minded in his
devotion to Australia and to duty, his loss still stands out even
amidst the hundreds of other brave officers who have gone.

On May 18 Anzac was subjected to a heavy bombardment from large-calibre
guns and howitzers. At midnight of the 18th-19th the most violent
rifle and machine-gun fire yet experienced broke out along the front.
Slackening from 3 a.m. to 4 a.m. it then broke out again, and a heavy
Turkish column assaulted the left of No. 2 section. This assault was
beaten off with loss. Another attack was delivered before daylight on
the centre of this section; it was repeated four times and repulsed
each time with very serious losses to the enemy. Simultaneously a heavy
attack was delivered on the north-east salient of No. 4 section, which
was repulsed and followed up, but the pressing of the counter-attack
was prevented by shrapnel. Attacks were also delivered on Quinn's
Post, Courtney's Post, and along the front of our right section. At
about 5 a.m. the battle was fairly joined, and a furious cannonade was
begun by a large number of enemy guns, including 12-in. and 9·2-in.,
and other artillery that had not till then opened. By 9.30 a.m. the
Turks were pressing hard against the left of Courtney's and the right
of Quinn's Post. At 10 a.m. this attack, unable to face fire from the
right, swung round to the left, where it was severely handled by our
guns and the machine-guns of our left section. By 11 a.m. the enemy,
who were crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn's Post, were
giving way under their heavy losses.


According to prisoners' reports 30,000 troops, including five fresh
regiments, were used against us. General Liman von Sanders was himself
in command.

The enemy's casualties were heavy, as may be judged from the fact that
over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our trenches. A
large proportion of these losses were due to our artillery fire. Our
casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded, including nine
officers wounded.


The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carrying through of
the negotiations for the suspension of arms, which actually took place
on May 24. About 5 p.m. on May 20 white flags and Red Crescents began
to appear all along the line. In No. 2 section a Turkish staff officer,
two medical officers, and a company commander came out and were met
by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding the Australian Division,
halfway between the trenches. The staff officer explained that he was
instructed to arrange a suspension of arms, for the removal of dead
and wounded. He had no written credentials, and he was informed that
neither he nor the General Officer Commanding Australian Division had
the power to arrange such a suspension of arms, but that at 8 p.m. an
opportunity would be given of exchanging letters on the subject, and
that meanwhile hostilities would recommence after ten minutes' grace.
At this time some stretcher parties on both sides were collecting
wounded, and the Turkish trenches opposite ours were packed with men
standing shoulder to shoulder two deep. Matters were less regular in
front of other sections, where men with white flags came out to collect
wounded. Meanwhile it was observed that columns were on the march
in the valley up which the Turks were accustomed to bring up their

On hearing the report of these movements, General Sir W. R. Birdwood,
commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, ordered his trenches
to be manned against a possible attack. As the evening drew in the
enemy's concentration continued, and everything pointed to their
intention of making use of the last of the daylight to get their
troops into position without being shelled by our artillery. A message
was therefore sent across to say that no clearing of dead or wounded
could be allowed during the night, and that any negotiations for such
a purpose should be opened through the proper channel and initiated
before noon on the following day.

Stretcher and other parties fell back, and immediately firing broke
out. In front of our right section masses of men advanced behind lines
of unarmed men holding up their hands. Firing became general all along
the line accompanied by a heavy bombardment of the whole position, so
that evidently this attack must have been pre-arranged. Musketry and
machine-gun fire continued without interruption till after dark, and
from then up to about 4 a.m. next day.

Except for a half-hearted attack in front of Courtney's Post, no
assault was made till 1.20 a.m., when the enemy left their trenches
and advanced on Quinn's Post. Our guns drove the Turks back to their
trenches, and beat back all other attempts to assault. By 4.30 on May
21 musketry fire had died down to normal dimensions.


As the Turks seemed anxious to bury their dead, and as human sentiment
and medical science were both of one accord in favour of such a course,
I sent Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief of the General Staff,
on May 22, to assist Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding
the Army Corps, in coming to some suitable arrangements with the
representative sent by Essad Pasha. The negotiations resulted in a
suspension of arms from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. on May 24. The procedure
laid down for this suspension of arms was, I am glad to inform your
Lordships, correctly observed on both sides.

The burial of the dead was finished about 3 p.m. Some 3,000 Turkish
dead were removed or buried in the area between the opposing lines.
The whole of these were killed on or since May 18. Many bodies of men
killed earlier were also buried.

On May 25, with the assistance of two destroyers of the Royal Navy, a
raid was carried out on Nibrunesi Point. A fresh telephone line was
destroyed and an observing station demolished.


On May 28, at 9 p.m., a raid was made on a Turkish post overlooking
the beach 1,200 yards north of Kaba Tepe, H.M.S. _Rattlesnake_
co-operating. A party of fifty rifles rushed the post, killing or
capturing the occupants. A similar raid was made against an enemy
trench to the left of our line which cost the Turks 200 casualties, as
was afterwards ascertained.

[Illustration: MAP 3. (_To face page 64._)]

From May 28 till June 5 the fighting seemed to concentrate itself
around Quinn's Post. Three enemy galleries had been detected there,
and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed twenty Turks
and injured thirty. One gallery had, however, been overlooked, and at
3.30 a.m. on May 29, a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's
Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb attack, before
which our left centre sub-section fell back, letting in a storming
party of Turks. This isolated one sub-section on the left from the two
other sub-sections on the right.

At 5.30 a.m. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 a.m. the
position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian
Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed.
All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured, and the work of
restoration was begun.

At 6.30 a.m. the Turks again attacked, supported by artillery, rifle,
and machine-gun fire and by showers of bombs from the trenches. The
fine shooting of our guns and the steadiness of the infantry enabled
us to inflict upon the enemy a bloody repulse, demoralizing them to
such an extent that the bomb throwers of their second line flung the
missiles into the middle of their own first line.


At 8.15 a.m. the attack slackened, and by 8.45 a.m. the enemy's attacks
had practically ceased.

Our casualties in this affair amounted to 2 officers, 31 other ranks
killed, 12 officers and 176 other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses
must have been serious, and were probably equal to those sustained on
May 9-10. Except for the first withdrawal in the confusion of the mine
explosion, all ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage.

On May 30 preparations were made in Quinn's Post to attack and destroy
two enemy saps, the heads of which had reached within 5 yards of our
fire trench. Two storming parties of thirty-five men went forward at 1
p.m., cleared the sap heads and penetrated into the trenches beyond,
but they were gradually driven back by Turkish counter-attacks, in
spite of our heavy supporting fire, our casualties being chiefly caused
by bombs, of which the enemy seem to have an unlimited supply.

During May 31 close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post.

On June 1, an hour after dark, two sappers of the New Zealand Engineers
courageously crept out and laid a charge of guncotton against a timber
and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely demolished.


After sunset on June 4 three separate enterprises were carried out by
the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These were undertaken in
compliance with an order which I had issued that the enemy's attention
should be distracted during an attack I was about to deliver in the
southern zone.

(1) A demonstration in the direction of Kaba Tepe, the Navy
co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches.

(2) A sortie at 11 p.m. towards a trench 200 yards from Quinn's Post.
This failed, but a second sortie by 100 men took place at 2.55 a.m. on
June 5 and penetrated to the Turkish trench; demolished a machine-gun
emplacement which enfiladed Quinn's Post, and withdrew in good order.

(3) At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at 11 p.m. A party of
sixty men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank,
stormed the enemy's trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted
and twenty-eight captured. A working party followed up the attack and
at once set to work. Meanwhile the Turkish trenches on the left of the
post were heavily assailed with machine-gun fire and grenades, which
drew from them a very heavy fire. After daybreak a strong bomb attack
developed on the captured trench, the enemy using a heavier type of
bomb than hitherto.

At 6.30 a.m. the trench had to be abandoned, and it was found necessary
to retire to the original fire trench of the post and the bomb-proof
in front of its left. Our casualties were eighty; those of the enemy
considerably greater.


On June 5 a sortie was made from Quinn's Post by 2 officers and 100 men
of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of
a machine-gun in a trench known as German Officer's Trench. A special
party of ten men with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant
E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales) Australian Imperial
Force) made a dash for the machine-gun; one of the ten men managed to
fire three rounds into the gun at a range of 5 feet and another three
at the same range through a loophole. The darkness of the trench and
its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage
was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as
possible was dismantled. The party suffered some casualties from bombs,
and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The
aim of this gallant assault being attained the party withdrew in good
order with their wounded. Casualties in all were thirty-six.


I now return to the southern zone and to the battle of June 4.

From May 25 onwards the troops had been trying to work up within
rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On May 25 the Royal
Naval and 42nd Divisions crept 100 yards nearer to the Turks, and on
the night of May 28-29 the whole of the British line made a further
small advance. On that same night the French Corps Expéditionnaire was
successful in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left
west of the Kereves Dere.

All Turkish counter-attacks during May 29 were repulsed. On the night
of May 30 two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment. But
on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet.

On every subsequent night up to that of June 3-4 assaults were made
upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our
position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the
enemy's front line of trenches which ran from the west of the Kereves
Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.

Taking our line of battle from right to left the troops were deployed
in the following order:--The Corps Expéditionnaire, the Royal Naval
Division, the 42nd (East Lancs) Division and the 29th Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned,
was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted
to 24,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding 8th Army
Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.

My General Head-quarters for the day were at the command post on the

At 8 a.m. on June 4 our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate
bombardment, which continued till 10.30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment
recommenced, and continued till 11.20 a.m., when a feint attack was
made which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and
rifles. At 11.30 a.m. all our guns opened fire and continued with
increasing intensity till noon.

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range, and along
the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced.

The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French
1st Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French 2nd Division,
with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called
the "Haricot," for which they had already had three desperate contests.
Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a
feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.


The 2nd Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed forward with
great dash; the "Anson" Battalion captured the southern face of a
Turkish redoubt which formed a salient in the enemy's line, the "Howe"
and "Hood" Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12.15
p.m. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in their
hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12.25 p.m.

The Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division advanced magnificently. In
five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by
12.30 p.m. the Brigade had carried with a rush the line forming their
second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The
working parties got to work without incident, and the position here
could not possibly have been better.

On the left the 29th Division met with more difficulty. All along the
section of the 88th Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at
noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most
places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men and inflicted severe
loss upon us. But the 88th Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester
Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the
88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting
fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole
of the Turkish first line.


Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish
front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery
bombardment, and the barbed wire obstacle was intact. The result was
that, though the 14th Sikhs on the right flank pushed on despite
losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of
the Brigade could make no headway. A company of the 6th Gurkhas on the
left, skilfully led along the cliffs by its commander, actually forced
its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the Brigade
threatened isolation, and it was as skilfully withdrawn under fire.
Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left so that, if possible, a
fresh attack might be organized.

Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were
being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against
the "Haricot." The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared
communication trenches, and, under cover of accurate shell fire, were
able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back,
uncovered in doing so the right flank of the Royal Naval Division.
Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire
with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing
in their turn the "Howe" and "Hood" Battalions to enfilade, so that
they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under
exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.

By 1.30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had
been lost again, and the Brigade was back in its original position, the
"Collingwood" Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been
practically destroyed.


The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly captured line
from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wiped
out. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks
began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which
was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had
so brilliantly won. After 1.30 p.m. it became increasingly difficult
for this gallant Brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred;
the Brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed; yet it
continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort
was made to sustain the Brigade in its position. Its right flank was
thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire and reinforcements
were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal
Naval Division. But ere long it became clear that unless the right of
our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters
to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should
co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements
were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice
postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported
that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect
of success. By 6.30 p.m., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be
extricated with loss from the second line Turkish trenches, and had to
content themselves with consolidating on the first line, which they had
captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the
spirit displayed by this Brigade that there was great difficulty in
persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered nothing
would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of the 88th
Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve
battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in
both cases heavy fire drove them back.

At 4 p.m. under support of our artillery the Royal Fusiliers were able
to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact
that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated
position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserves had been largely depleted by the despatch of
reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to
hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the
enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained
in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was
considerable--namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of
our centre, a front of nearly 3 miles. That the enemy suffered severely
was indicated, not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of
his attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon the
trench captured by the French 1st Division on the extreme right. Here
two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amounted to 400, including 11
officers: amongst these were 5 Germans, the remains of a volunteer
machine-gun detachment from the _Goeben_. Their commanding officer was
killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures
were made by the 42nd Division under Major-General W. Douglas.


From the date of this battle to the end of the month of June the
incessant attacks and counter-attacks which have so grievously swelled
our lists of casualties have been caused by the determination of the
Turks to regain ground they had lost, a determination clashing against
our firm resolve to continue to increase our holding. Several of these
daily encounters would have been the subject of a separate despatch
in the campaigns of my youth and middle age, but, with due regard to
proportion, they cannot even be so much as mentioned here. Only one
example each from the French, British, and Australian and New Zealand
spheres of action will be most briefly set down so that Your Lordship
may understand the nature of the demands made upon the energies and
fortitude of the troops.

(1) At 4.30 a.m. on June 21 the French Corps Expéditionnaire attacked
the formidable works that flank the Kereves Dere. By noon their 2nd
Division had stormed all the Turkish first and second line trenches to
their front and had captured the Haricot redoubt. On their right the
1st Division took the first line of trenches, but were counter-attacked
and driven out. Fresh troops were brought up and launched upon another
assault, but the Turks were just as obstinate and drove out the second
party before they had time to consolidate. At 2.45 p.m. General Gouraud
issued an order that full use might be made of the remaining five hours
of daylight, and that, before dark, these trenches must be taken and
held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division would be sacrificed. At
6. p.m. the third assault succeeded; 600 yards of trenches remained in
our hands, despite all the heavy counter-attacks made through the night
by the enemy. In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest
French drafts specially distinguished themselves by their forwardness
and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken, and the enemy's
casualties (mostly incurred during counter-attacks) were estimated at
7,000. The losses of the Corps Expéditionnaire were 2,500.


(2) The Turkish right had hitherto rooted itself with special tenacity
into the coast. In the scheme of attack submitted by Lieutenant-General
A. G. Hunter-Weston, commanding 8th Army Corps, our left, pivoting
upon a point in our line about one mile from the sea, was to push
forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards. If the
operation was successful then, at its close, we should have driven
the enemy back for a thousand yards along the coast, and the trenches
of this left section of our line would be facing east instead of, as
previously, north-east. Obviously the ground to be gained lessened as
our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivoted right.
Five Turkish trenches must be carried in the section nearest the sea:
only two Turkish trenches in the section furthest from the sea. At
10.20 a.m. on June 28 our bombardment began. At 10.45 a.m. a small
redoubt known as the Boomerang was rushed by the Border Regiment. At
11 a.m. the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured
three lines of Turkish trenches. On their right the 4th and 7th Royal
Scots captured the two Turkish trenches allotted to them, but further
to the east; near the pivotal point the remainder of the 156th Brigade
were unable to get on. Precisely at 11.30 a.m. the second attack took
place. The 86th Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed over
the trenches already captured by their comrades of the 87th Brigade,
and, pushing on with great steadiness, took two more lines of trenches,
thus achieving the five successive lines along the coast. This success
was further improved upon by the Indian Brigade, who managed to secure,
and to place into a state of defence, a spur running from the west of
the furthest captured Turkish trench to the sea. Our casualties were
small; 1,750 in all. The enemy suffered heavily, especially in the
repeated counter-attacks, which for many days and nights afterwards
they launched against the trenches they had lost.


(3) On the night of June 29 and 30 the Turks, acting, as we afterwards
ascertained, under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha, to drive
us all into the sea, made a big attack on the Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps, principally on that portion of the line which was
under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From midnight
till 1.30 a.m. a fire of musketry and guns of greatest intensity was
poured upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced to the assault,
and was completely crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the
7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour later another grand attack took place
against our left and left centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our
artillery and rifle fire. The enemy's casualties may be judged by the
fact that in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were
actually seen to fall.

On the evening of this day, June 30, the Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force suffered grievous loss owing to the wounding of General Gouraud
by a shell. This calamity, for I count it nothing less, brings us down
to the beginning of the month of July.

The command of the Corps Expéditionnaire français d'Orient was then
taken over by General Bailloud, at which point I shall close my

(_To face page 78._)]


During the whole period under review the efforts and expedients whereby
a great army has had its wants supplied upon a wilderness have, I
believe, been breaking world records.

The country is broken, mountainous, arid, and void of supplies; the
water found in the areas occupied by our forces is quite inadequate for
their needs; the only practicable beaches are small, cramped breaks in
impracticable lines of cliffs; with the wind in certain quarters no
sort of landing is possible; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage,
of lighters and small craft has led to crisis after crisis in our
carrying capacity, whilst over every single beach plays fitfully
throughout each day a devastating shell fire at medium ranges.

Upon such a situation appeared quite suddenly the enemy submarines.
On May 22 all transports had to be dispatched to Mudros for safety.
Thenceforth men, stores, guns, horses, etc., had to be brought from
Mudros--a distance of 40 miles--in fleet sweepers and other small and
shallow craft less vulnerable to submarine attack. Every danger and
every difficulty was doubled.

But the Navy and the Royal Engineers were not to be thwarted in their
landing operations either by nature or by the enemy, whilst the Army
Service Corps, under Brigadier-General F. W. B. Koe, and the Army
Ordnance Corps, under Brigadier-General R. W. M. Jackson, have made
it a point of honour to feed men, animals, guns, and rifles in the
fighting line as regularly as if they were only out for manœuvres on
Salisbury Plain.

I desire, therefore, to record my admiration for the cool courage and
unfailing efficiency with which the Royal Navy, the beach personnel,
the engineers, and the administrative services have carried out these
arduous duties.


In addition to its normal duties the Signal Service, under the
direction of Lieutenant-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, Director
of Army Signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal
Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and has rapidly
readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made on it by
sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movements of General
Head-quarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the
telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines, often under heavy fire,
has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the
best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole
of their work. As an instance, the central telegraph office at Cape
Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high explosive shell. The
officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed or wounded and the
office entirely demolished. But No. 72003 Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal
Engineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men,
and within 39 minutes reopened communication by apologizing for the
incident and by saying he required no assistance.


The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying
conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk
must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their
attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches,
on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their
way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it is not
as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep
all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own
opinion that efficiency, method, and even a certain quiet heroism have
characterized the evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.


In my three Commanders of Corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.

General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the
battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its
lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calm in crisis,
full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his
British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not
for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of
human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring
the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every
soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he
is known to his Chief.

Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter-Weston possesses a genius for war. I
know no more resolute Commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals
based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attacks are powerless
to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be
responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that
wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long
experience in the field.

In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to
Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however
inadequately, place on record the untiring, loyal assistance he has
continued to render me ever since.

The thanks of every one serving in the Peninsula are due to
Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all
of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly
placed at our disposal.

[Illustration: LIEUT.-GENERAL A. G. HUNTER-WESTON, C.B. (_To face page

Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of
the force, I must refer to the shadow cast over the whole of our
adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted
comrades. Some of them we shall never see again; some have had the mark
of the Dardanelles set upon them for life, but others, and, thank God,
by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.

    I have the honour to be,
  Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,
       IAN HAMILTON, General,
             Commanding Mediterranean
               Expeditionary Force.


_August 10_

Sir Ian Hamilton reports that fighting at several points on the
Gallipoli peninsula has taken place during the last few days.
Substantial progress has been made.

In the southern zone 200 yards on a front of 300 yards has been gained
east of the Krithia road, and has been held in spite of determined
counter-attacks, which have been repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

Repeated attacks by the Turks elsewhere in this zone have been beaten

Several attacks by the French Corps have been made and their
whole-hearted co-operation has proved of the greatest assistance.

In the Anzac zone a footing on the Chunuk Bair portion of Sari Bair has
also been gained and a crest occupied after fierce fighting and the
successful storming of strongly held positions.

Here, too, the enemy's losses have been considerable. The advance was
commenced at night under cover of a searchlight from a destroyer.

Elsewhere a fresh landing was successfully effected and considerable
progress made.

Six hundred and thirty prisoners have been taken together with one
Nordenfelt gun, two bomb mortars, nine machine-guns, and a large
number of bombs. Scattered about are quantities of the enemy's rifles,
ammunition, and equipment.

_August 11_

The latest report from Sir Ian Hamilton states that severe fighting
continued yesterday in the Gallipoli Peninsula, mainly in the Anzac
zone and in that to the north.

The positions occupied were slightly varied in places, but the general
result is that the area held at Anzac has been nearly trebled owing
chiefly to the gallantry and dash of the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps, while to the north no further progress has yet been made.

The troops have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and the French
battleship _St. Louis_ is reported to have put out of action five out
of six guns in Asiatic batteries.


               Admiralty, _August 16, 1915_.

    The following despatch has been received
    from Vice-Admiral John M. de Robeck, reporting
    the landing of the Army on the Gallipoli Peninsula,
    April 25-26, 1915:

                      Triad, _July 1, 1915_.


I have the honour to forward herewith an account of the operations
carried out on April 25 and 26, 1915, during which period the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was landed and firmly established in
the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The landing commenced at 4.20 a.m. on 25th. The general scheme was as

Two main landings were to take place, the first at a point just north
of Gaba Tepe, the second on the southern end of the peninsula. In
addition a landing was to be made at Kum Kale, and a demonstration in
force to be carried out in the Gulf of Xeros near Bulair.

The night of the 24th-25th was calm and very clear, with a brilliant
moon, which set at 3 a.m.

The first landing, north of Gaba Tepe, was carried out under the orders
of Rear-Admiral C. F. Thursby, C.M.G. His squadron consisted of the
following ships:

     Battleships.  Cruiser.   Destroyers.   Seaplane   Trawlers. Balloon
                                             Carrier.             Ship.

      _Queen_    _Bacchante_   _Beagle_   _Ark Royal_     15    _Manica_
      _London_                 _Bulldog_
      _Prince of               _Foxhound_
      _Wales_                  _Scourge_
      _Triumph_                _Colne_
      _Majestic_               _Usk_

To _Queen_, _London_, and _Prince of Wales_ was delegated the duty of
actually landing the troops. To _Triumph_, _Majestic_, and _Bacchante_
the duty of covering the landing by gunfire.

In this landing a surprise was attempted. The first troops to be landed
were embarked in the battleships _Queen_, _London_, and _Prince of

The squadron then approached the land at 2.58 a.m. at a speed of 5
knots. When within a short distance of the beach selected for landing
the boats were sent ahead. At 4.20 a.m. the boats reached the beach and
a landing was effected.

The remainder of the infantry of the covering force were embarked at 10
p.m., 24th.


The troops were landed in two trips, the operation occupying about half
an hour, this in spite of the fact that the landing was vigorously
opposed, the surprise being only partially effected.

The disembarkation of the main body was at once proceeded with. The
operations were somewhat delayed owing to the transports having to
remain a considerable distance from the shore in order to avoid the
howitzer and field-guns' fire brought to bear on them and also the fire
from warships stationed in the Narrows, Chanak.


The beach here was very narrow and continuously under shell fire.
The difficulties of disembarkation were accentuated by the necessity
of evacuating the wounded; both operations proceeded simultaneously.
The service was one which called for great determination and coolness
under fire, and the success achieved indicates the spirit animating all
concerned. In this respect I would specially mention the extraordinary
gallantry and dash shown by the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade
(Colonel E. G. Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O.), who formed the covering
force. Many individual acts of devotion to duty were performed by the
personnel of the Navy; these are dealt with below. Here I should like
to place on record the good service performed by the vessels employed
in landing the second part of the covering force; the seamanship
displayed and the rapidity with which so large a force was thrown on
the beach is deserving of the highest praise.

On the 26th the landing of troops, guns and stores continued throughout
the day; this was a most trying service, as the enemy kept up an
incessant shrapnel fire, and it was extremely difficult to locate the
well-concealed guns of the enemy. Occasional bursts of fire from the
ships in the Narrows delayed operations somewhat, but these bursts of
fire did not last long, and the fire from our ships always drove the
enemy's ships away.

The enemy heavily counter-attacked, and though supported by a very
heavy shrapnel fire he could make no impression on our line which was
every minute becoming stronger. By nightfall on April 26 our position
north of Gaba Tepe was secure.

The landing at the southern extremity of the Gallipoli peninsula was
carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss, C.M.G.,
M.V.O., his squadron consisting of the following ships:

    Battleships.         Cruisers.     Fleet     Trawlers.

   _Swiftsure_           _Euryalus_      6          14
   _Implacable_          _Talbot_
   _Cornwallis_          _Minerva_
   _Albion_              _Dublin_
   _Lord Nelson_
   _Prince George_

Landings in this area were to be attempted at five different places;
the conditions at each landing varied considerably. The position of
beaches is given below.

_Position of Beach._--Y beach, a point about 7,000 yards north-east of
Cape Tekeh. X beach, 1.000 yards north-east of Cape Tekeh. W beach,
Cape Tekeh--Cape Helles. V beach, Cape Helles--Seddul Bahr. Camber,
Seddul Bahr. S beach, Eski-Hissarlik Point.

Taking these landings in the above order: _Landing at Y Beach._--The
troops to be first landed, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, embarked
on the 24th in the _Amethyst_ and _Sapphire_, and proceeded with
the transports _Southland_ and _Braemar Castle_ to a position off
Cape Tekeh. At 4.0 a.m. the boats proceeded to Y beach, timing their
arrival there at 5 a.m., and pulled ashore covered by fire from H.M.S.
_Goliath_. The landing was most successfully and expeditiously carried
out, the troops gaining the top of the high cliffs overlooking this
beach without being opposed; this result I consider due to the rapidity
with which the disembarkation was carried out and the well-placed
covering fire from ships.


The Scottish Borderers were landed in two trips, followed at once by
the Plymouth Battalion Royal Marines. These troops met with severe
opposition on the top of the cliffs, where fire from covering ships
was of little assistance, and, after heavy fighting, were forced
to re-embark on the 26th. The re-embarkation was carried out by the
following ships: _Goliath_, _Talbot_, _Dublin_, _Sapphire_, and
_Amethyst_. It was most ably conducted by the beach personnel and
covered by the fire of the warships, who prevented the enemy reaching
the edge of the cliff, except for a few snipers.

_Landing at X Beach._--The 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers (two companies
and M.G. section) embarked in _Implacable_ on 24th, which ship
proceeded to a position off the landing-place, where the disembarkation
of the troops commenced at 4.30 a.m., and was completed at 5.15 a.m.

A heavy fire was opened on the cliffs on both sides. The _Implacable_
approached the beach, and the troops were ordered to land, fire
being continued until the boats were close into the beach. The
troops on board the _Implacable_ were all landed by 7 a.m. without
any casualties. The nature of the beach was very favourable for the
covering fire from ships, but the manner in which this landing was
carried out might well serve as a model.


_Landing at W Beach._--The 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers embarked
in _Euryalus_ and _Implacable_ on the 24th, who proceeded to positions
off the landing-place, where the troops embarked in the boats at
about 4 a.m. Shortly after 5 a.m. _Euryalus_ approached W beach and
_Implacable_ X beach. At 5 a.m. the covering ships opened a heavy fire
on the beach, which was continued up to the last moment before landing.
Unfortunately this fire did not have the effect on the extensive wire
entanglements and trenches that had been hoped for, and the troops,
on landing at 6 a.m., were met with a very heavy fire from rifles,
machine-guns, and pom-poms, and found the obstructions on the beach
undamaged. The formation of this beach lends itself admirably to the
defence, the landing-place being commanded by sloping cliffs offering
ideal positions for trenches and giving a perfect field of fire. The
only weakness in the enemy's position was on the flanks, where it was
just possible to land on the rocks and thus enfilade the more important
defences. This landing on the rocks was effected with great skill, and
some maxims, cleverly concealed in the cliffs, and which completely
enfiladed the main beach, were rushed with the bayonet. This assisted
to a great extent in the success of the landing, the troops, though
losing very heavily, were not to be denied and the beach and the
approaches to it were soon in our possession.

The importance of this success cannot be overestimated; W and V beaches
were the only two of any size in this area on which troops, other than
infantry, could be disembarked, and failure to capture this one might
have had serious consequences, as the landing at V was held up. The
beach was being continuously sniped, and a fierce infantry battle was
carried on round it throughout the entire day and the following nights.
It is impossible to exalt too highly the service rendered by the 1st
Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in the storming of the beach; the dash
and gallantry displayed were superb. Not one whit behind in devotion
to duty was the work of the beach personnel, who worked untiringly
throughout the day and night, landing troops and stores under continual
sniping. The losses due to rifle and machine-gun fire sustained by the
boats' crews, to which they had not the satisfaction of being able to
reply, bear testimony to the arduous nature of the service.

During the night of the 25th-26th enemy attacked continuously, and it
was not till 1 p.m. on the 26th, when V beach was captured, that our
position might be said to be secure.

The work of landing troops, guns, and stores continued throughout this
period, and the conduct of all concerned left nothing to be desired.

[Illustration: MAP 4. (_To face page_ 96.)]


_Landing at V Beach._--This beach, it was anticipated, would be the
most difficult to capture; it possessed all the advantages for defence
which W beach had, and in addition the flanks were strongly guarded by
the old castle and village of Seddul Bahr on the east and perpendicular
cliffs on the west; the whole foreshore was covered with barbed wire
entanglements which extended in places under the sea. The position
formed a natural amphitheatre with the beach as stage.

The first landing here, as at all other places, was made in boats,
but the experiment was tried of landing the remainder of the covering
force by means of a collier, the _River Clyde_. This steamer had been
specially prepared for the occasion under the directions of Commander
Edward Unwin; large ports had been cut in her sides and gangways built
whereby the troops could reach the lighters which were to form a bridge
on to the beach.

V beach was subjected to a heavy bombardment similarly to W beach, with
the same result, _i.e._, when the first trip attempted to land they
were met with a murderous fire from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun,
which was not opened till the boats had cast off from the steamboats.

A landing on the flanks here was impossible, and practically all the
first trip were either killed or wounded, a few managing to find some
slight shelter under a bank on the beach; in several boats all were
either killed or wounded; one boat entirely disappeared, and in another
there were only two survivors. Immediately after the boats had reached
the beach the _River Clyde_ was run ashore under a heavy fire rather
towards the eastern end of the beach, where she could form a convenient
breakwater during future landing of stores, etc.

As the _River Clyde_ grounded, the lighters which were to form
the bridge to the shore were run out ahead of the collier, but
unfortunately they failed to reach their proper stations and a gap
was left between two lighters over which it was impossible for men to
cross; some attempted to land by jumping from the lighter which was in
position into the sea and wading ashore; this method proved too costly,
the lighter being soon heaped with dead and the disembarkation was
ordered to cease.

The troops in the _River Clyde_ were protected from rifle and
machine-gun fire and were in comparative safety.


Commander Unwin, seeing how things were going, left the _River Clyde_
and, standing up to his waist in water under a very heavy fire, got the
lighters into position; he was assisted in this work by Midshipman G.
L. Drewry, R.N.R., of H.M.S. _Hussar_; Midshipman W. St. A. Malleson,
R.N., of H.M.S. _Cornwallis_; Able Seaman W. C. Williams, O.N. 186774
(R.F.R. B. 3766), and Seaman R.N.R. George McKenzie Samson, O.N. 2408A,
both of H.M.S. _Hussar_.

The bridge to the shore, though now passable, could not be used by the
troops, anyone appearing on it being instantly shot down, and the men
in _River Clyde_ remained in her till nightfall.

At 9.50 a.m. _Albion_ sent in launch and pinnace manned by volunteer
crews to assist in completing bridge, which did not quite reach beach;
these boats, however, could not be got into position until dark owing
to heavy fire.

It had already been decided not to continue to disembark on V beach,
and all other troops intended for this beach were diverted to W.

The position remained unchanged on V beach throughout the day, men of
war and the maxims mounted in _River Clyde_ doing their utmost to keep
down the fire directed on the men under partial shelter on the beach.

During this period many heroic deeds were performed in rescuing wounded
men in the water.

During the night of the 25-26 the troops in _River Clyde_ were able
to disembark under cover of darkness and obtain some shelter on the
beach and in the village of Seddul Bahr, for possession of which now
commenced a most stubborn fight.


The fight continued, supported ably by gunfire from H.M.S. _Albion_,
until 1.24 p.m., when our troops had gained a position from which they
assaulted Hill 141, which dominated the situation. _Albion_ then ceased
fire, and the hill, with old fort on top, was most gallantly stormed by
the troops, led by Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie, General
Staff, who fell as the position was won. The taking of this hill
effectively cleared the enemy from the neighbourhood of the V beach,
which could now be used for the disembarkation of the allied armies.
The capture of this beach called for a display of the utmost gallantry
and perseverance from the officers and men of both services--that they
successfully accomplished their task bordered on the miraculous.


_Landing on the "Camber," Seddul Bahr._--One half company Royal Dublin
Fusiliers landed here, without opposition, the _Camber_ being "dead
ground." The advance from the _Camber_, however, was only possible on a
narrow front, and after several attempts to enter the village of Seddul
Bahr this half company had to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.

_Landing at "De Totts" S Beach._--The 2nd South Wales Borderers (less
one company) and a detachment 2nd London Field Company R.E. were landed
in boats, convoyed by _Cornwallis_, and covered by that ship and _Lord

Little opposition was encountered, and the hill was soon in the
possession of the South Wales Borderers. The enemy attacked this
position on the evening of the 25th and during the 26th, but our troops
were firmly established and with the assistance of the covering ships
all attacks were easily beaten off.

_Landing at Kum Kale._--The landing here was undertaken by the French.

It was most important to prevent the enemy occupying positions in this
neighbourhood, whence he could bring gun fire to bear on the transports
off Cape Helles. It was also hoped that by holding this position it
would be possible to deal effectively with the enemy's guns on the
Asiatic shore immediately east of Kum Kale, which could fire into
Seddul Bahr and De Totts.

The French, after a heavy preliminary bombardment, commenced to land at
about 10 a.m., and by the afternoon the whole of their force had been
landed at Kum Kale. When they attempted to advance to Yeni Shehr, their
immediate objective, they were met by heavy fire from well-concealed
trenches, and were held up just south of Kum Kale village.

During the night of the 25th and 26th the enemy made several
counter-attacks, all of which were easily driven off; during one of
these 400 Turks were captured, their retreat being cut-off by the fire
from the battleships.

On the 26th, when it became apparent that no advance was possible
without entailing severe losses and the landing of large
reinforcements, the order was given for the French to withdraw and
re-embark, which operation was carried out without serious opposition.


I now propose to make the following more general remarks on the conduct
of the operations:

From the very first the co-operation between Army and Navy was most
happy; difficulties which arose were quickly surmounted, and nothing
could have exceeded the tactfulness and forethought of Sir Ian Hamilton
and his staff.

The loyal support which I received from Contre-Amiral E. P.
A. Guepratte simplified the task of landing the Allied armies


The Russian fleet was represented by H.I.R.M.S. _Askold_, which ship
was attached to the French squadron. Contre-Amiral Guepratte bears
testimony to the value of the support he received from Captain Ivanoff,
especially during the landing and re-embarkation of the French troops
at Kum Kale.

The detailed organization of the landing could not be commenced until
the Army Head-quarters returned from Egypt on April 10. The work to be
done was very great, and the naval personnel and material available

Immediately on the arrival of the Army Staff at Mudros, committees,
composed of officers of both services, commenced to work out the
details of the landing operations, and it was due to these officers'
indefatigable efforts that the expedition was ready to land on April
22. The keenness displayed by the officers and men resulted in a good
standard of efficiency, especially in the case of the Australian and
New Zealand Corps, who appear to be natural boatmen.


Such actions as the storming of the Seddul Bahr position by the 29th
Division must live in history for ever; innumerable deeds of heroism
and daring were performed; the gallantry and absolute contempt for
death displayed alone made the operations possible.

At Gaba Tepe the landing and the dash of the Australian Brigade for the
cliffs was magnificent--nothing could stop such men. The Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps in this, their first battle, set a standard as
high as that of any army in history, and one of which their countrymen
have every reason to be proud.

In closing this despatch I beg to bring to their Lordships' notice
the names of certain officers and men who have performed meritorious
service. The great traditions of His Majesty's Navy were well
maintained, and the list of names submitted of necessity lacks those
of many officers and men who performed gallant deeds unobserved and
therefore unnoted. This standard was high, and if I specially mention
one particular action it is that of Commander Unwin and the two young
officers and two seamen who assisted him in the work of establishing
communication between _River Clyde_ and the beach. Rear-Admirals R. E.
Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O., C. F. Thursby, C.M.G., and Stuart Nicholson,
M.V.O., have rendered invaluable service. Throughout they have
been indefatigable in their efforts to further the success of the
operations, and their loyal support has much lightened my duties and

I have at all times received the most loyal support from the Commanding
Officers of His Majesty's ships during an operation which called for
the display of great initiative and seamanship.

Captain R. F. Phillimore, C.B., M.V.O., A.D.C., as principal Beach
Master, and Captain D. L. Dent, as principal Naval Transport Officer,
performed most valuable service.



  Commander EDWARD UNWIN, R.N.

  While in _River Clyde_, observing that the lighters which were to form
  the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the
  ship and under a murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into
  position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and
  immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped
  up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his
  work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again
  attended by the doctor, for three abrasions caused by bullets, after
  which he once more left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, to save
  some wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He
  continued at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to
  stop through pure physical exhaustion.

  Midshipman GEORGE L. DREWRY, R.N.R.

  Assisted Commander Unwin at the work of securing the lighters under
  heavy rifle and maxim fire. He was wounded in the head, but continued
  his work and twice subsequently attempted to swim from lighter to
  lighter with a line.

  Midshipman WILFRED ST. A. MALLESON, R.N.

  Also assisted Commander Unwin, and after Midshipman Drewry had failed
  from exhaustion to get a line from lighter to lighter, he swam with it
  himself and succeeded. The line subsequently broke, and he afterwards
  made two further but unsuccessful attempts at his self-imposed task.

  Able Seaman WILLIAM CHAS. WILLIAMS, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B.3766).

  Held on to a line in the water for over an hour under heavy fire,
  until killed.


  Worked on a lighter all day under fire, attending wounded and getting
  out lines; he was eventually dangerously wounded by maxim fire.

  Lieut.-Commander RALPH B. JANVRIN, R.N.

  Conducted the trawlers into Morto Bay, for the landing at "De Totts,"
  with much skill.

  This officer showed great judgment and coolness under fire, and
  carried out a difficult task with great success.

  Lieut. JOHN A. V. MORSE, R.N.

  Assisted to secure the lighters at the bows of the _River Clyde_ under
  a heavy fire, and was very active throughout the 25th and 26th at V

  Surgeon P. B. KELLY, R.N., Attached To R.N.A.S.

  Was wounded in the foot on the morning of the 25th in _River Clyde_.
  He remained in _River Clyde_ until morning of 27th, during which time
  he attended 750 wounded men, although in great pain and unable to walk
  during the last twenty-four hours.

  Lieut.-Commander ADRIAN ST. V. KEYES, R.N.

  General Sir Ian Hamilton reports as follows: "Lieut.-Commander
  Keyes showed great coolness, gallantry, and ability. The success of
  the landing on Y beach was largely due to his good services. When
  circumstances compelled the force landed there to re-embark, this
  officer showed exceptional resource and leadership, successfully
  conducting that difficult operation."

  I entirely concur in General Hamilton's opinion of this officer's
  services on April 25 and 26.


  This officer has organized the entire system of land communication;
  has laid and repaired cables several times under fire; and on all
  occasions shown zeal, tact, and coolness beyond praise.

  Mr. JOHN MURPHY, Boatswain, _Cornwallis_.

  Midshipman JOHN SAVILLE METCALF, R.N.R., _Triumph_.

  Midshipman RUPERT E. M. BETHUNE, _Inflexible_.

  Midshipman ERIC OLOFF DE WET, _London_.

  Midshipman CHARLES W. CROXFORD, R.N.R., _Queen_.

  Midshipman C. A. L. MANSERGH, _Queen_.

  Midshipman ALFRED M. WILLIAMS, _Euryalus_.

  Midshipman HUBERT M. WILSON, _Euryalus_.

  Midshipman G. F. D. FREER, _Lord Nelson_.

  Midshipman R. V. SYMONDS-TAYLOR, _Agamemnon_.

  Midshipman C. H. C. MATTHEY, _Queen Elizabeth_.

  Lieut. MASSY GOOLDEN, _Prince of Wales_.

  Recommended for accelerated promotion:

  Mr. CHARLES EDWARD BOUNTON, Gunner, R.N., _Queen Elizabeth_.

  The following officers are "Commended for service in action":

  Capt. H. A. S. FYLER, _Agamemnon_, Senior Officer inside the Straits.

  Capt. A. W. HENEAGE, M.V.O., who organized and trained the

  Capt. E. K. LORING, Naval Transport Officer, Gabe Tepe.

  Capt. H. C. LOCKYER, _Implacable_.

  Capt. C. MAXWELL-LEFROY, _Swiftsure_.

  Capt. the HON. A. D. E. H. BOYLE, M.V.O., _Bacchante_.

  Capt. A. V. VYVYAN, Beach Master, Z beach.

  Capt. C. S. TOWNSEND, Beach Master, W beach.

  Capt. R. C. K. LAMBERT, Beach Master, V beach.

  Commander the HON. L. J. O. LAMBART, _Queen_.

  Commander (now Captain) B. ST. G. COLLARD, Assistant Beach Master, W

  Commander C. C. DIX, Assistant Beach Master, Z beach.

  Commander N. W. DIGGLE, Assistant Beach Master, V beach.

  Commander H. L. WATTS-JONES, _Albion_ (acting Captain).

  Commander I. W. GIBSON, M.V.O., _Albion_.

  Lieut,-Commander (now Commander) J. B. WATERLOW, _Blenheim_.

  Lieut.-Commander H. V. COATES, _Implacable_.

  Lieut.-Commander E. H. CATER, _Queen Elizabeth_.

  Lieut.-Commander G. H. POWNALL, _Adamant_ (killed in action).

  Lieut. A. W. BROMLEY, R.N.R., _Euryalus_.

  Lieut. H. R. W. TURNOR, _Implacable_.

  Lieut. H. F. MINCHIN, _Cornwallis_.

  Lieut. OSCAR HENDERSON, _Ribble_.

  Lieut. KENNETH EDWARDS, _Lord Nelson_.

  Major W. T. C. JONES, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., Beach Master, X beach.

  Major W. W. FRANKIS, R.M.L.I., _Cornwallis_.

  Tempy. Surgeon W. D. GALLOWAY, _Cornwallis_.

  Mr. ALFRED M. MALLETT, Gunner T., _Ribble_.

  Mr. JOHN PIPPARD, Boatswain, _Sapphire_.

  Midshipman ERIC WHELER BUSH, _Bacchante_.

  Midshipman CHARLES D. H. H. DIXON, _Bacchante_.

  Midshipman DONALD H. BARTON, _London_.

  Midshipman A. W. CLARKE, _Implacable_.

  Proby. Midshipman WILLIAMS D. R. HARGREAVES, R.N.R., _Sapphire_.

  Midshipman F. E. GARNER, R.N.R., _Triumph_.

  Midshipman GEORGE H. MORRIS, R.N.R., _Lord Nelson_.

  Midshipman the HON. G. H. E. RUSSELL, _Implacable_.

  Midshipman D. S. E. THOMPSON, _Implacable_.

  Midshipman W. D. BROWN, _Implacable_.


The work accomplished by the destroyer flotillas fully maintained the
high standard they have established in these waters.

On the 25th and 26th _Wolverine_ (Commander O. J. Pretis) (killed
in action), _Scorpion_ (Lieut.-Commander (now Commander), A. B.
Cunningham), _Renard_ (Lieut.-Commander L. G. B. A. Campbell),
_Grampus_ (Lieut.-Commander R. Bacchus), _Pincher_ (Lieut.-Commander
H. W. Wyld), and _Rattlesnake_ (Lieut.-Commander P. G. Wodehouse),
carried out mine-sweeping operations under Captain Heneage inside the
Dardanelles in a most satisfactory manner, being frequently under
heavy fire. On the 26th the French sweepers _Henriette_ (Lieut. de
Vaisseau Auverny), _Marius Chambon_ (Lieut. de Vaisseau Blanc), and
_Camargue_ (Lieut. de Vaisseau Bergeon) assisted them, _Henriette_
doing particularly well.

_Beagle_ (Commander (now Captain) H. R. Godfrey), _Bulldog_
(Lieut.-Commander W. B. Mackenzie), _Scourge_ (Lieut.-Commander H. de
B. Tupper), _Foxhound_ (Commander W. G. Howard), _Colne_ (Commander
C. Seymour), _Chelmer_ (Lieut.-Commander (now Commander) H. T.
England), _Usk_ (Lieut.-Commander W. G. C. Maxwell), and _Ribble_
(Lieut.-Commander R. W. Wilkinson) assisted in the disembarkation at
Gaba Tepe.

Rear-Admiral Thursby reports as follows on the work accomplished by
these boats:

"The destroyers under Captain C. P. R. Coode (Captain 'D') landed the
second part of the covering force with great gallantry and expedition,
and it is in my opinion entirely due to the rapidity with which so
large a force was thrown on the beach that we were able to establish
ourselves there."

I entirely concur in Admiral Thursby's remarks on the good work
performed by this division.



  P.O. JOHN HEPBURN RUSSELL, O.N. F.839, of the Royal Naval Air Service,
  was wounded in gallantly going to Commander Unwin's assistance.

  Air Service, assisted Commander Unwin in rescuing wounded men.

  P.O. SEC. CL. FREDERICK GIBSON, O.N. 191025, R.F.R. B.3829, _Albion_,
  jumped overboard with a line and got his boat beached to complete
  bridge from _River Clyde_ to shore. He then took wounded to _River
  Clyde_ under heavy fire.

  Ord. Seaman JESSE LOVELOCK, _Albion_, J.28798, assisted in getting
  pontoon in position; also helped wounded on beach and in boats to
  reach _River Clyde_, displaying great gallantry and coolness under

  A.B. LEWIS JACOBS, O.N. J.4081, _Lord Nelson_. Took his boat into V
  beach unaided, after all the remainder of the crew and the troops
  were killed or wounded. When last seen Jacobs was standing up and
  endeavouring to pole the cutter to the shore. While thus employed he
  was killed.

  HERBERT J. G. MORRIN, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 236225, _Bacchante_.

  ALFRED J. CHATWEN, Ch. Yeo. Signals, O.N. 156109, _Cornwallis_.

  ALBERT PLAYFORD, P.O., O.N. 202189, _Cornwallis_.

  ARTHUR ROAKE, A.B., O.N. S.S. 1940 (R.F.R. B.88431), _Cornwallis_.

  HENRY THOMAS MORRISON, Seaman, R.N.R., O.N. 1495D, _Albion_.

  DANIEL ROACH, Seaman, R.N.R., 1685D, _Albion_.

  DAVID S. KERR, A.B., O.N. 239816, _Ribble_.

  ALBERT BALSON, P.O., O.N. 211943, _Prince of Wales_.

  WILLIAM MORGAN, P.O., O.N. 193834, _Prince of Wales_.

  JAMES GETSON, Stoker, P.O., O.N. 295438, _London_.

  EDWARD L. BARONS, A.B., O.N. J.7775, _London_.

  WILLIAM PUTMAN, P.O., O.N. 236783, _Queen_.

  ROBERT FLETCHER, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 213297, _Queen_.

  SAMUEL FORSEY, A.B., S.S. 2359 (R.F.R. B.4597), _Albion_.

  HENRY J. ANSTEAD, Acting C.P.O. 179989, _Implacable_.

  KENNETH MUSKETT, Ldg. Seaman, J.1325, _Implacable_.

  THOMAS P. ROCHE, Ch. P.O. (Pensioner), O.N. 165533, _Prince George_.

  JOHN MAPLE, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 171890 (R.F.R. Chat. B.2658),

  HENRY WILLIAMS, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 176765 (R.F.R., Chat., B.1326),

  WILLIAM F. HOFFMAN, A.B., O.N. 195940 (R.F.R., Chat., B.2650),

  HENRY G. LAW, A.B., O.N. 195366 (R.F.R., Chat., B.8261), _Euryalus_.

  HENRY RIDSDALE, Stoker, R.N.R., O.N. 1136U, _Euryalus_.

  COLIN MCKECHNIE, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 157509, _Lord Nelson_ (killed).

  STANLEY E. CULLUM, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 225791, _Lord Nelson_ (killed).

  FREDERICK T. M. HYDE, A.B., O.N. J.21153, _Lord Nelson_ (killed).

  WILLIAM E. ROWLAND, A.B., O.N. J.17029, _Lord Nelson_ (wounded).

  ALBERT E. BEX, A.B., O.N. J. 17223, _Lord Nelson_ (wounded).

The above men from _Lord Nelson_ were part of boats' crews landing
troops on V beach, a service from which few returned.

Commended for service in action:

  HARRY E. PALLANT, P.O., O.N. 186521, _Implacable_.

  JESSE BONTOFT, P.O., O.N. 193398, _Implacable_.

  THOMAS J. TWELLS, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 232269, _Implacable_.

  RICHARD MULLIS, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 220072, _Implacable_.

  MATTHEW B. KNIGHT, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 230546, _Implacable_.

  JOHN E. MAYES, Ldg. Seaman, O.N. 196849 (R.F.R. B.8581), _Implacable_.

  WILLIAM J. WHITE, P.O.I., O.N. 142848, _Albion_.

  FREDERICK G. BARNES, P.O., O.N. 209085, _Swiftsure_.

  HENRY MINTER, P.O., O.N. 163128, _Queen Elizabeth_.

  HARRY R. JEFFCOATE, Sgt. R.M.L.I., Ch. 10526, _Cornwallis_.

  FRANK E. TROLLOPE, Pte. R.M.L.I., Ch. 19239, _Cornwallis_.

  GEORGE BROWN, Ch. P.O., 276085, _Sapphire_.

  BERTIE SOLE, Ldg. Seaman, 208019 (R.F.R., B. 10738), _Sapphire_.

  CHARLES H. SOPER, Signalman, J.9709, _Sapphire_.

  FRANK DAWE, A.B., 231502, _Albion_.

  SAMUEL QUICK, Seaman, R.N.R., 3109 B., _Albion_.

  JAMES RICE, Seaman, R.N.R., 519 D., _Albion_.

  WILLIAM THOMAS, Seaman, R.N.R., 2208 B., _Albion_.

  WILLIAM H. KITCHEN, Seaman, R.N.R., 4330 A., _Albion_.

  FRANCIS A. SANDERS, A.B., 221315 (R.F.R., Chat., B.8199), _Euryalus_.

  WILLIAM F. HICKS, A.B., S.S. 4795, _Euryalus_.

  WILLIAM F. HAYWARD, A.B., 235109, _London_.

  GEORGE GILBERTSON, A.B., 207941 (R.F.R., B.4910), _London_.

  ANDREW HOPE, A.B., S.S. 2837 (R.F.R., B.5847), _London_.

  CHARLES A. SMITH, A.B., J.27753, _Lord Nelson_ (wounded).

  BASIL BRAZIER, A.B., J.6116, _Lord Nelson_ (wounded).

  CHARLES H. SMITH, A.B., J.28377, _Lord Nelson_.

  HENRY A. B. GREEN, A.B. 238024, _Lord Nelson_ (wounded).

No officer could have been better served by his staff than I have been
during these operations. The energy and resource of my Chief of Staff,
Commodore R. J. B. Keyes, was invaluable, and, in combination with
Major-General Braithwaite--Chief of the General Staff--he established a
most excellent working agreement between the two services.

Captain George P. W. Hope, of _Queen Elizabeth_, acted as my flag
captain. His gift of organization was of the greatest assistance in
dealing with the mass of details inseparable from an operation of such

Commander the Hon. A. R. M. Ramsay has used his sound practical
knowledge of gunnery to great advantage in working out, in connection
with the military, the details of gunfire from the covering ships.

Captain William W. Godfrey, R.M., a staff officer of great ability, has
given me invaluable assistance throughout the operations.

I would also mention my secretary, Mr. Basil F. Hood, Acting Paymaster,
and secretarial staff, whose good services under the direction and
example of Mr. Edward W. Whittington-Ince, Assistant Paymaster, will
form the subject of a later separate report. Also Lieutenant-Commander
James F. Sommerville (Fleet Wireless Telegraph Officer), and Flag
Lieutenants L. S. Ormsby-Johnson, Hugh S. Bowlby, and Richard H. L.
Bevan, who have performed good service in organizing with the military
the intercommunication between the Allied Fleets and Armies.

                    J. M. DE ROBECK,
  To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

   _Wyman & Sons Ltd., Printers, London and Reading_


(_By courtesy of the "Morning Post."_)


                 The Allies' Advance
                       on the
                   _Turkish Capital_


               Coloured Detail Map of the



                       etc., etc.

              Well produced in Four Colours
              and showing all the towns in
              and around the War area.

              6d. net. On Sale Everywhere.

                     Post Free 7d.

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton St., Strand, W.C.

  "Vivid, tense, and full of matter and facts, these despatches deserve
  to be preserved by anyone who wishes to keep an intelligent eye on the
  War."--_Daily Graphic._

                    _3rd Edition Now Ready._





  _Standard_:--"So well has Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett marshalled his facts,
          the whole campaign may be followed without effort."

         _One Shilling net.           Of all Booksellers
             and Bookstalls, or post free 1/2 from_

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton Street, Strand, W.C.

      _Compact and Complete! Thrilling and Authentic!_

                  THE STANDARD HISTORY

     1/-                OF THE             1/-

  NET PER VOL.           WAR            NET PER VOL.

       Including complete text of Gen. French's
     despatches and full descriptive narrative by

                     EDGAR WALLACE

     Vol. 1. Liége--Mons--Cambrai and Le Cateau
             --Paris--The Marne--The Aisne

     Vol. 2. Ypres--Armentières--Battle for the Coast

     Vol. 3. St. Eloi--Givenchy--Ypres
             --Neuve Chapelle--Hill 60

     Vol. 4. Dardanelles and Naval Despatches

          The volumes are strongly bound in
          cloth, printed in a clear type on good
          paper, and bring up to date the
          complete history of the War on land
          and on sea.

   _Of all Booksellers and Bookstalls, or 1/2 post free
             direct from the Publishers_

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton St., Strand, W.C.

                 Authentic Biographies
                 of Eminent Statesmen

            Crown 8vo., Cloth, with Portrait,
                  =2s. 6d.= net each.

                 SIR EDWARD GREY, K.G.
           By the Author of "King Edward VII."

                  DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
                  By HUBERT DU PARCQ.

                 HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH
                  By HAROLD SPENDER.

               _Uniform with the above._

                  THE REAL CROWN PRINCE
           By the Author of "Sir Edward Grey."

      _Of all Booksellers, or post free, 2/8, direct
                 from the Publishers_,

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton Street, Strand, W.C.

                     TALES OF THE
                    FLYING SERVICES

                    By C. G. GREY,
               Editor of "The Aeroplane."

                  OF AERIAL WARFARE

                     PRICE 1/= NET.

                Buy a Copy to-day of your
              Bookseller or Newsagent. Post
             free, 1/2, from the Publishers,

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton St., Strand, W.C.

              _What Will happen if the
               Allies make a premature
               or unsatisfactory Peace?_




                   EDGAR WALLACE

              The most astounding book
             of prophecies ever written.

                 ON SALE EVERYWHERE

         One Shilling net, of all Booksellers,
             or post free 1/2 direct from

     GEORGE NEWNES LTD., 8-11 Southampton St., W.C.

             Every reader of "The Bowmen"
             will be deeply interested in

                  PHYLLIS CAMPBELL'S

                    Book entitled

                  BACK OF THE FRONT

              The subject of the Angelic
              Vision at Mons has aroused
            the keenest interest, and this
             book will form an important
            contribution to the controversy.

          Introduction by W. L. COURTNEY, M.A.

                      1/- NET

                 ON SALE EVERYWHERE.

              Post free 1/2 direct from

  GEORGE NEWNES LTD., 8-11 Southampton St., Strand, W.C.


            Smith's Week By R. S. WARREN BELL
   The finest school story of the year. Full of humorous
    Incidents. It is safe to prophesy that "Smith" will
  win the affection of boys of all ages. He is true grit. 3/6

            Boys' Illustrated Book of the War
  New edition of this splendid book, with over 50 illustrations
        and coloured plates. Entertaining chapters
  concerning the brilliant deeds of the Army and the Navy. 3/6

              Our Boys' Book of the Navy
       Authentic descriptions of the life and duties of our
  gallant sailors, written by an expert. Well illustrated. 3/6

           Heroes All--Gallant Deeds of the War
                   By EDGAR WALLACE,
    A stirring collection of stories of heroic and thrilling
   deeds on land, sea, and in the air. 256 pages. Splendidly
             illustrated. Cloth. Large crown. 3/6


                The Captain Vol. 33
    A perfect gift book containing innumerable articles on a
   host of subjects of vital interest to all Boys & Sportsmen. 6/-

            The Strand Magazine Vol. 50
    Universally recognised as the first and foremost in fiction
          and articles of wide interest. 6/6

           The Wide World Magazine Vol. 35
  True stories of thrilling experiences and risky exploits
       vividly related by the actual adventurer. 6/6

              The Woman at Home Vol. 12
    Half-yearly volumes of the best Magazine for every
            woman and every home. 5/- NET.

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton Street, Strand, W.C.

                       _THE DAILY GRAPHIC--
              "This volume should appeal strongly to all
               who have friends or relatives either in the
               Territorials or the new formations."_

                        KITCHENER'S ARMY
                      the TERRITORIAL FORCES

              Every British Subject will treasure this
              volume, which provides a complete story
              of Britain's great achievement in training
              to perfection the greatest Volunteer
              Army ever raised. It forms a Standard
                    Work for you and posterity

    "The copiously illustrated story of what is rightly called 'the
     great achievement.'"

    "Impressive pages of letterpress and excellent photographs which
     everyone will study with greatest pride and satisfaction."

    "Very attractively got up."

    "This handsomely printed and illustrated work ought to be
     in every British home."

                         KITCHENER'S ARMY
                    and the TERRITORIAL FORCES

  Size 11 ins. by 8-1/4 ins, by 2 ins. 192 pages. Over 250 Photographs.
  Cloth, bevelled boards, gilt extra, emblematical design in bas-relief,
  6/-. Library Edition, bound in Half Morocco, 7/6. Post Free 4d. extra


                     THE INTERNATIONAL
                    REFERENCE ATLAS OF
                  THE WORLD     10/6 net

                  OFFICER AT THE FRONT

         It is thoroughly reliable and singularly
            complete, and has been produced
         J. G. BARTHOLOMEW, LL.D., F.R.G.S., etc.

        of the WORLD is entirely new, and contains
        120 Modern and Authentic Maps, beautifully
    printed in colours, with geographical pronunciation
         and a general Index of nearly 25,000
      Names of Places with latitude and longitude.

     _10/6 net of all Booksellers, or 10/10 post free
               from the Publishers_,

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton St., Strand, W.C.

                    NEWNES' POPULAR
                    SHILLING SERIES

             Artistic Cloth Cover--Coloured
             Picture Wrapper--Good Paper--
                       Clear Type.

      W. W. Jacobs         Salthaven
                           Master of Craft
                           Sea Urchins
                           At Sunwich Port

      H. De Vere Stacpoole The Street of the Flute Player
                           Drums of War
                           Ships of Coral

      R. W. Chambers       The Common Law
                           The Danger Mark
                           Ailsa Paige

      Temple Thurston      Apple of Eden
                           Evolution of Katherine

      Humphry Ward         Canadian Born
                           Diana Mallory

      Mrs. Belloc Lowndes  Price of Admiralty
                           When no Man Pursueth
                           Studies in Wives

      BEATRICE HARRADEN    Hilda Strafford

      EDEN PHILLPOTTS      Forest on the Hill

      JOHN OXENHAM         Maid of the Silver Sea

      STANLEY WEYMAN       Count Hannibal

      Mrs. E. NESBIT       The House with No Address

      FRANK DANBY          Heart of a Child

      RENE BAZIN           The Nun

      MAY EDGINTON         Oh! James!

      J. C. SNAITH         The Principal Girl

  1/- net. Of all Booksellers, Newsagents, and Bookstalls,
        or from the Publishers (postage 2d. extra)

  GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton Street, Strand, W.C.

             There is a Splendid Selection
         of over 100 Favourite Songs, complete
               with Words and Music, in

                   'Kitchener Army'
                     _SONG BOOK_

            --Songs with a swing that will
              cheer those at home and the
            "boys" on the march or in camp.

                 Price - - Sixpence Net

    Can easily be carried in the pocket. Send 7d. in stamps
      and we will send a copy off for you to any address.

    GEORGE NEWNES, Ltd., 8-11, Southampton St., Strand, W.C.


                 _MUSIC LOVERS' LIBRARY_

             This splendid Library covers the
             whole range of Musical production.

            VOCAL                     OPERATIC

          PIANOFORTE                  ORATORIO

             Over 120 Selections, containing
             some 1,500 different pieces of
                  Music to choose from.

                  YOUR FAVOURITE PIECES
                      ARE INCLUDED.

      Send two stamps for complete List of Music which
         the Publishers will forward together with

                TWO FREE PIECES OF MUSIC
                   (PIANO AND VOICE).

  GEORGE NEWNES LTD., 8-11 Southampton St., Strand, W.C.

[Illustration: "Ask for the tin with the Red and Yellow label."]

       *       *       *       *       *

Transcribers note: The author freely used hyphenated and un-hyphenated
versions of the same word. I have retained this 'feature'. Italic text
is denoted by _underscores_ and bold text by =equal signs=.

       *       *       *       *       *

*** End of this Doctrine Publishing Corporation Digital Book "Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches from the Dardanelles, etc" ***

Doctrine Publishing Corporation provides digitized public domain materials.
Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians.
This effort is time consuming and expensive, so in order to keep providing
this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties,
including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ Make non-commercial use of the files We designed Doctrine Publishing
Corporation's ISYS search for use by individuals, and we request that you
use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ Refrain from automated querying Do not send automated queries of any sort
to Doctrine Publishing's system: If you are conducting research on machine
translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a
large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of
public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ Keep it legal -  Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for
ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because
we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States,
that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries.
Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we
can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is
allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Doctrine Publishing
ISYS search  means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world.
Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About ISYS® Search Software
Established in 1988, ISYS Search Software is a global supplier of enterprise
search solutions for business and government.  The company's award-winning
software suite offers a broad range of search, navigation and discovery
solutions for desktop search, intranet search, SharePoint search and embedded
search applications.  ISYS has been deployed by thousands of organizations
operating in a variety of industries, including government, legal, law
enforcement, financial services, healthcare and recruitment.